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SSymantec Intelligenceymantec Intelligence
Quarterly Report: October -Quarterly Report: October -
December, 2010December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical
Infras tructures
White P aper: S ymantec Intelligence Q4 2010 Report
SSymantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October -ymantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October -
December, 2010December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructures
Contents
Introduction to T argeted A ttacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Trojan Hydraq – One Y ear Later . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Stuxnet W orm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Vulnerabilities in SCAD A Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Real-W orld Implications of T argeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Mitigation & Pro tection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Credits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Introduction to T argeted A ttacks
Targeted attacks occur when malicious code and threats are developed f or and directed at specific individuals,
organizations, corporations, or sectors. A ttack ers gather inf ormation on the tar get in order to f ocus attacks to their
specifications prior to sending out the malicious code. The cus tomization of tar geted attacks can mak e them more
dangerous than non-tar geted attacks because they are tailored explicitly to aff ect a tar get group. F or ex ample, attack ers
could tar get senior employees at a financial ins titution who ha ve access to confidential inf ormation. In the case of a data
breach, attack ers could tak e adv antage of the leak ed sensitive inf ormation to craf t an attack that would lure victims to
unwittingly download malicious code or to divulge even more inf ormation.
Commonly known as adv anced persis tent threats (AP Ts), tar geted attacks can be as easy as using a spoof ed email address
to send email messages to addressees with the domain name of a compan y or cus tomers of a specific ins titution. The
email messages would ha ve been written using social engineering techniques and, as such, t ypically ha ve a sense of
urgenc y or importance associated with them to coerce the recipient to open the malicious attachments. The email
messages of ten contain le gitimate details, such as ref erences to real or ganizations or news events, to give them the
appearance of authenticit y. For ex ample, attack ers could use a spoof ed email address of an IT securit y manager to send
out email to employees about a po tential securit y issue, or else masquerade as an HR manager reques ting that employees
verif y payroll credentials included in an attachment. As with man y tar geted attacks, the attack er sends out only a limited
number of emails in order to a void attracting too much attention and theref ore alerting securit y personnel to the po tential
threat.
Targeted attacks are also known to use phishing campaigns that direct the recipient to a malicious web site, at which point
the victim is expo sed to malicious code, either from code embedded in the site itself or via a program or file they are
encouraged to download. 1An ex ample of this t ype of attack is f ound with the c ybercriminals peddling rogue securit y
software, who rely on these phishing campaigns a great deal. Ironically, they exploit users’ f ear of being expo sed to
malicious code threats to expo se them to malicious code, since the rogue antivirus programs that users are off ered f or
free from these sites of ten contain malicious pa yloads.
Motivations f or such cus tomiz ed attacks can range from s tealing confidential inf ormation such as account credentials f or
profit, to interf ering with da y-to-da y operations, to mischief. In man y ins tances, attack ers only need to compromise one
vulnerable computer to gain access to an or ganization’s net work. They can then use the compromised sys tem as a
launching point f or sub sequent attacks.
Targeted attacks agains t critical infras tructure sectors are especially dangerous because the attacks are tailored to disrup t
specific or ganizations that ma y be essential to the functioning of a countr y's societ y. Ex amples of critical infras tructure
sectors include transportation, communication, and utilities. This section will discuss t wo prominent recent attacks: The
Hydraq T rojan and the Stuxnet worm.
1-Also known as spear phishing or tar geted phishingSymantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October - December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructures
1Trojan Hydraq – One Y ear Later
Trojan Hydraq, 2also known as Aurora, was firs t discovered on Januar y 11, 2010, when it was used as part of a tar geted
attack, lik ely in an attemp t to gain access to a corporate net work and s teal confidential inf ormation. 3Hydraq entered
computers via email attachments or was downloaded by o ther threats, such as via malicious web sites. It allowed attack ers
to compromise sys tems by exploiting a z ero-da y vulnerabilit y in client-side sof tware. 4Once ex ecuted, the T rojan ins talled a
back door that allowed an attack er to control the computer and perf orm a v ariet y of compromising actions. These included
modif ying, ex ecuting, and deleting files; ex ecuting malicious files; and, mo st importantly, gaining access to the
compromised corporation’s net work—which then opened up the tar get to additional attacks. As with o ther common
Trojans, Hydraq would attemp t to remo tely contact its command and control (C&C) ser ver via a number of URLs in order to
receive updates and further ins tructions. 5
The number of inf ections from Hydraq was limited due to the nature of the tar geted attacks—only a small number of
corporations were tar geted (figure 1). Ano ther factor limiting the number of inf ections is that attack ers of ten pref er to
avoid attracting attention by limiting their attacks and, thus, remain concealed on a small volume of computers as long as
possible, rather than risk expo sing themselves by compromising too man y at once. 6Finally, T rojan Hydraq thwarted
antivirus sensors because it contained an obfuscation technique called “spaghetti code” in which blocks of code of the
Trojan are rearranged to a void detection. 7
Once a tar geted attack is discovered, it becomes less eff ective due to increased awareness and the adop tion of increased
securit y measures, such as updating patches and sanitizing inf ected machines. As such, the longevit y of Hydraq was
short-lived, peaking in Januar y 2010 and sub sequently tapering off af ter F ebruar y 2010.
2-Please see http://w ww.symantec.com/securit y_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-011114-1830-99 and http://w ww.symantec.com/outbreak/index.jsp?id=trojan-h ydraq
3-http://w ww.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojanh ydraq-incident
4-http://w ww.securit yfocus.com/bid/35759
5-http://w ww.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojanh ydraq-incident
6-http://w ww.symantec.com/connect/blogs/h ydraq-attack -mythical-proportions
7-http://w ww.symantec.com/connect/blogs/seeing -pas t-trojanh ydraq-s-obfuscationSymantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October - December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructures
2Figure 1: A ttemp ted T rojan Hydraq inf ections by month. (Source: S ymantec Corporation)
The Stuxnet W orm
The Stuxnet worm firs t garnered international attention in July 2010 when it was link ed with attacks that tar geted
indus trial control sys tems such as power plants and gas pipelines (figure 2). 8The worm inf ected at leas t 15 control
systems in factories around the world, including in German y and in a number of personal computers within Iran’s Bushehr
nuclear power plant. 9It was also announced that the worm had aff ected the sof tware used in centrifuges in volved in Iran’s
uranium enrichment program. 10
Stuxnet was designed to tar get its attack on particular indus try control sys tems—specifically, programmable logic
controllers (PL Cs)—and to change the code to modif y the frequenc y con verter drives of the controller. 11The worm was the
first to simultaneously exploit f our z ero-da y vulnerabilities in its attacks. 12It also used s tolen digital certificates to sign and
legitimiz e the malicious files. 13This t ype of attack demons trated that the authors of Stuxnet had deep knowledge of their
targets, and the control sys tems and processes of tho se tar gets.
8-http://w ww.symantec.com/securit y_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-071400-3123-99
9-Please see http://w ww.bbc.co.uk/news/technolog y-11388018, http://w ww.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/technolog y/27virus.html?_r=1, and http://w ww.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/11/s tuxnet-sabo tage-centrifuges/
10-http://af.reuters.com/article/ener gyOilNews/idAFLDE6A S1L120101129
11-http://w ww.symantec.com/connect/blogs/s tuxnet-breakthrough
12-http://w ww.symantec.com/connect/blogs/s tuxnet-using -three-additional-z ero-da y-vulnerabilities
13-http://w ww.symantec.com/connect/blogs/hack ers-behind-s tuxnetSymantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October - December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructures
3Stuxnet was especially dangerous because it was able to inf ect sys tems via remov able flash drives—in o ther words,
systems that were no t normally connected to the Internet—and it was able to hide injected code located on a PL C.
Elevating the threat was the fact it was able to update itself using a P2P component in its code. Using a P2P net work
mak es it ver y difficult to tak e the threat offline, because there are no central control ser vers. Auto-propagation methods
allowed the Stuxnet worm to thrive and operate f or a longer period of time compared to, sa y, Trojan Hydraq. One method
of propagation Stuxnet used was to copy itself onto net work -shared drives that were pro tected by weak passwords. 14
Since the worm did no t collect personal inf ormation, such as financial inf ormation or account logins, nor did it herd
infected sys tems into a bo tnet, po ssible mo tivations f or Stuxnet ma y have been either sabo tage or the extortion of a
specific tar get. F or more detailed inf ormation on Stuxnet, please see the lates t version of S ymantec’s do ssier on the
subject. 15
14-http://w ww.symantec.com/securit y_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-071400-3123-99
15-http://w ww.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/securit y_response/whitepapers/w32_s tuxnet_do ssier.pdfSymantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October - December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructures
4Figure 2: A ttemp ted Stuxnet worm inf ections by month. (Source: S ymantec)
Vulnerabilities in SCAD A Systems
SCAD A (Super visor y Control and Data Acquisition) represents a wide range of pro tocols and technologies f or monitoring
and managing equipment and machiner y in v arious sectors of critical infras tructure and indus try, such as tho se used f or
power generation and dis tribution. Theref ore, the securit y of SCAD A technologies and pro tocols is a particular concern of
governments because the disrup tion of related ser vices can result in the failure of infras tructure and the po tential lo ss of
life, among o ther consequences.
This discussion is based on data surrounding publicly known vulnerabilities aff ecting SCAD A technologies. The purpo se of
this section is to provide insight into the s tate of securit y research in relation to SCAD A sys tems. T o a lesser de gree, this
may also provide insight into the overall s tate of SCAD A securit y. Vulnerabilities aff ecting SCAD A sys tems ma y present a
threat to critical infras tructure that relies on these sys tems. Due to the po tential f or disrup tion of critical ser vices, theseSymantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October - December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructures
5vulnerabilities ma y be associated with politically mo tivated or s tate-sponsored attacks. This is a concern f or governments
and enterprises that are in volved in the critical infras tructure sector. While this discussion provides insight into public
SCAD A vulnerabilit y disclo sures, due to the sensitive nature of vulnerabilities aff ecting critical infras tructure, there is
likely priv ate securit y research conducted by SCAD A technolog y and securit y vendors. S ymantec does no t have insight into
any priv ate research because the results of such research are no t publicly disclo sed.
In the f ourth quarter of 2010, S ymantec documented 10 public SCAD A vulnerabilities; a to tal of 15 SCAD A vulnerabilities
were documented f or all of 2010. The number of vulnerabilities reported in SCAD A technologies is t ypically ver y small
because SCAD A is currently a ver y niche area of securit y research. Only a small proportion of the securit y communit y is
involved in researching SCAD A securit y vulnerabilities; the resources and access to technologies remain a challenge f or
lab tes ting by securit y researchers. However, attack ers with malicious intent are able to tar get live sys tems and apply their
existing knowledge of securit y vulnerabilities and exploits to these sys tems. Ex amples of such vulnerabilities include:
•A total of three W eb application vulnerabilities were discovered in the Intellicom Netbiter webSCAD A WS100
and WS200 products. 16The vulnerabilities can allow attack ers to upload and ex ecute arbitrar y scrip t code and
may also allow access to po tentially sensitive inf ormation.
•An SQL -injection vulnerabilit y aff ecting the login page of the Indus trial T echnolog y System (IT S) SCAD A sys tem
was discovered and ma y allow attack ers to compromise the application by making unauthoriz ed changes to the
underlying database. 17
•There were three remo te buff er-overflow vulnerabilities discovered in the D ATAC RealWin SCAD A
server.18Attack ers can exploit these vulnerabilities to ex ecute code on the ser vers.
•Three vulnerabilities were discovered in E cava Inte graX or, including t wo remo te code-ex ecution vulnerabilities
and a director y-tra versal vulnerabilit y.19These issues can be exploited by attack ers to ex ecute arbitrar y code or
to access po tentially sensitive inf ormation that ma y aid in further attacks.
Web application vulnerabilities (such as the firs t four vulnerabilities above) are of ten easy f or attack ers to discover and
exploit. Additionally, man y SCAD A implementations, such as the D ATAC RealWin SCAD A ser ver, run on Micro soft Windows
or other widely deployed operating sys tems and employ W eb applications and browser plug -ins f or their functionalit y. This
can mak e it is easier f or attack ers to generaliz e their exis ting skills to tar get these technologies.
While securit y researchers ha ve pinpointed vulnerabilities specific to SCAD A technologies, there is also a po tential threat
from vulnerabilities in components connected to SCAD A sys tems. This can include operating sys tems ho sting the SCAD A
technologies or o ther components such as database sof tware. Net work -accessible devices ma y use either common or
specializ ed net working pro tocols that are prone to attacks, which ma y compromise the a vailabilit y and inte grity of
affected devices. Theref ore, malicious or o therwise malf ormed net work traffic ma y aff ect these devices in a manner
similar to o ther net work -accessible ser vices within the enterprise. Additionally, man y SCAD A en vironments employ le gacy
technologies that are no t equipped with mechanisms f or authentication or measures to ensure the a vailabilit y, inte grity,
and confidentialit y of data. These sys tems ma y be particularly at risk, especially if they are no t fault-tolerant or designed
to handle ex ceptional conditions such as malf ormed input.
16-http://w ww.securit yfocus.com/bid/43636
17-http://w ww.securit yfocus.com/bid/43680
18-http://w ww.securit yfocus.com/bid/44150
19-Please see http://w ww.securit yfocus.com/bid/45487, http://w ww.securit yfocus.com/bid/45535, and http://w ww.securit yfocus.com/bid/45549Symantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October - December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructures
6Testing these technologies in a lab en vironment is a challenge f or securit y researchers due to limited resources and access
to the necessar y equipment. As a result, this can hinder the preemp tive discover y of po tential vulnerabilities. However,
attack ers with malicious intent can tar get live sys tems in the wild and apply their exis ting securit y knowledge to the
systems with little re gard f or an y unintended repercussions.
Real-W orld Implications of T argeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructure
Indus trial control sys tems (ICS), such as SCAD A, are used by the critical infras tructure sector to control the processes f or
daily operations. They are essential f or gathering and processing inf ormation sent by sensors and sending out the
appropriate commands that control local operations. In addition, ICS are crucial f or monitoring plant and s tation
environments to ensure they are working under saf e conditions. If required, the control sys tems send out commands to
protect the local en vironment and prevent an y emer genc y situations, such as the overheating of machiner y, increased
levels of to xic gases, fire, or po tential power grid overloads. The commands can be sent to shut down sys tems, isolate
zones, open pressure v alves, or tak e other saf ety measures. When ICS fails to function as intended, these problems can go
unno ticed.
In July 2010, f or ex ample, a SCAD A sys tem used to monitor water pump s failed to report that water s torage levels f or a
residential water supply were extremely low. 20This resulted in cit y residents being unable to access water from their
faucets. Although the problem was identified quickly and the supply was replenished af ter jus t a few hours, this illus trates
how an attack er could hamper basic essential ser vices by attacking these sys tems.
There are man y diff erent causes of ICS-related incidents, such as inadvertent adminis trative mis takes or errors during
system updates, insider attacks, and mischief. The risks of indus trial sabo tage or s tate-sponsored attacks aimed at
disrup ting critical infras tructure are the mo st concerning. These t ypes of threats could ha ve po tentially dev astating
outcomes if successfully ex ecuted.
Disabling sys tem saf eguards and trig gering actions outside of intended operation can result in permanent ph ysical
damage to machiner y and o ther equipment as well as the facilities that house them. Should extensive damage aff ect a
system such as the water s torage supply discussed above, residents of a cit y could be f orced to go without accessible
potable water f or extended periods of time. Despite being an electronic attack, this would put a burden on emer genc y
services and o ther aid or ganizations. This would also cause significant financial setbacks while equipment is repaired or
replaced. Other scenario s could result in black outs of power grids and communication net works. In more extreme
examples, machiner y failure could cause fire, explo sions, or release harmful to xins that could damage the en vironment or
cause the lo ss of lif e. The implication of these attacks is ver y important because they eff ectively represent a much lar ger
target than the vulnerable sys tem itself.
Although the ICS securit y communit y has been actively growing, there ma y be a significant amount of catching up to do
acro ss the numerous indus tries that use the technolog y. Awareness and proactive research and development by securit y
communities can only culminate in real success through the adop tion of eff ective mitigation and prevention measures in
environments outside the lab.
Past tar geted attacks, such as T rojan Hydraq and the Stuxnet worm, are important because they demons trate that there
are vulnerabilities in critical infras tructure sectors—specifically, in the power and ener gy sectors. The Stuxnet attacks
20-http://w ww.isssource.com/incident-report-scada-water-sys tem-fails/Symantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October - December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructures
7were the firs t ones that specifically tar geted ICS. 21This is significant because it is an actual event of what was f ormerly jus t
a plausible scenario.
Despite being isolated from external net works, the aff ected sys tems became inf ected with malicious code, which caused
damage to the sys tems. 22To repair the damage, sys tems were tak en off -line and shut down, resulting in production and
revenue lo ss, and increased manpower to fix the issues. 23In addition, the malicious code could be indiscriminate in its
attacks, causing widespread collateral damage to o ther non-tar geted sys tems. In the case of Stuxnet, the worm inf ected
over six million computers in China. 24
An important implication of tar geted attacks on ICS, specifically Stuxnet, is that the attack ers who craf ted the malicious
code were able to exploit and tak e adv antage of a wide v ariet y of vulnerabilities aff ecting these sys tems. The Stuxnet
worm developers ma y have helped to pa ve the wa y for others to cultiv ate more sophis ticated attacks or inspire copycat
targeted attacks. Other attack ers could reverse engineer the Stuxnet worm and use it as a template f or future attacks. Or,
they could use v ariations of the worm to launch attacks that disrup t other critical infras tructures, such as utilities, power
grids, or oil and gas refineries. T argeting the latter could lea ve cities and communities in emer genc y situations.
21-http://w ww.symantec.com/connect/blogs/s tuxnet-breakthrough
22-http://w ww.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9JLF8F03.htm
23-http://w ww.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/world/middleeas t/30tehran.html?_r=2&hp
24-http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-10/01/c_13538835.htmSymantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October - December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructures
8Mitigation & Pro tection
To limit expo sure to attacks, net works running SCAD A pro tocols and devices should be isolated from o ther net works.
These assets should no t be connected to the Internet or o ther net works unless s trictly required. If this is no t possible, to
completely limit access by external net works, net work access should be s trictly re gulated by limiting incoming/outgoing
traffic to required pro tocols only. IPSec and VPNs can also be deployed to limit access to authoriz ed net works and
individuals. A def ense-in-dep th strate gy should be deployed so that securit y risks elsewhere in the or ganization canno t
affect the control net work. Additional la yers of def ense should be deployed to pro tect k ey assets. Endpoint securit y
products ma y provide an additional level of pro tection f or ho sts within the SCAD A en vironment that run commonly
available commercial operating sys tems.
Securing a SCAD A en vironment ma y present diff erent challenges than tho se faced when securing an enterprise. In man y
cases, it ma y not be po ssible to create a tes t environment f or auditing purpo ses. F urthermore, an y disrup tion of ser vices
may be co stly or damaging. Theref ore, bo th passive asset discover y as well as vulnerabilit y scanning technologies are bes t
applied to limit the po tential f or side eff ects. Antivirus and patch management measures should be undertak en with care
and or ganizations should consult securit y and control sys tem vendors f or support in applying these solutions in a manner
that minimiz es risk and downtime. P olicy compliance and auditing should ensure that configuration benchmarks and
securit y baselines are enf orced through the or ganization and especially on critical control sys tems. Intrusion detection
and prevention sys tems should be deployed to monitor and prevent attacks on critical sys tems and net works.Symantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October - December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructures
9Credits
Marc F ossi
Executive E ditor
Manager, Development
Securit y Technolog y and Response
Gerr y Egan
Director, Product Management
Securit y Technolog y and Response
Eric Johnson
Editor
Securit y Technolog y and Response
Trevor Mack
Associate E ditor
Securit y Technolog y and Response
Téo Adams
Threat Analys t
Securit y Technolog y and Response
Joseph Blackbird
Threat Analys t
Securit y Technolog y and Response
Mo King L ow
Threat Analys t
Securit y Technolog y and ResponseSymantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October - December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructures
10
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SSymantec Intelligenceymantec Intelligence
Quarterly Report: October -Quarterly Report: October -
December, 2010December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical
Infras tructures
White P aper: S ymantec Intelligence Q4 2010 Report
SSymantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October -ymantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October -
December, 2010December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructures
Contents
Introduction to T argeted A ttacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Trojan Hydraq – One Y ear Later . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The Stuxnet W orm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Vulnerabilities in SCAD A Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Real-W orld Implications of T argeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Mitigation & Pro tection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Credits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Introduction to T argeted A ttacks
Targeted attacks occur when malicious code and threats are developed f or and directed at specific individuals,
organizations, corporations, or sectors. A ttack ers gather inf ormation on the tar get in order to f ocus attacks to their
specifications prior to sending out the malicious code. The cus tomization of tar geted attacks can mak e them more
dangerous than non-tar geted attacks because they are tailored explicitly to aff ect a tar get group. F or ex ample, attack ers
could tar get senior employees at a financial ins titution who ha ve access to confidential inf ormation. In the case of a data
breach, attack ers could tak e adv antage of the leak ed sensitive inf ormation to craf t an attack that would lure victims to
unwittingly download malicious code or to divulge even more inf ormation.
Commonly known as adv anced persis tent threats (AP Ts), tar geted attacks can be as easy as using a spoof ed email address
to send email messages to addressees with the domain name of a compan y or cus tomers of a specific ins titution. The
email messages would ha ve been written using social engineering techniques and, as such, t ypically ha ve a sense of
urgenc y or importance associated with them to coerce the recipient to open the malicious attachments. The email
messages of ten contain le gitimate details, such as ref erences to real or ganizations or news events, to give them the
appearance of authenticit y. For ex ample, attack ers could use a spoof ed email address of an IT securit y manager to send
out email to employees about a po tential securit y issue, or else masquerade as an HR manager reques ting that employees
verif y payroll credentials included in an attachment. As with man y tar geted attacks, the attack er sends out only a limited
number of emails in order to a void attracting too much attention and theref ore alerting securit y personnel to the po tential
threat.
Targeted attacks are also known to use phishing campaigns that direct the recipient to a malicious web site, at which point
the victim is expo sed to malicious code, either from code embedded in the site itself or via a program or file they are
encouraged to download. 1An ex ample of this t ype of attack is f ound with the c ybercriminals peddling rogue securit y
software, who rely on these phishing campaigns a great deal. Ironically, they exploit users’ f ear of being expo sed to
malicious code threats to expo se them to malicious code, since the rogue antivirus programs that users are off ered f or
free from these sites of ten contain malicious pa yloads.
Motivations f or such cus tomiz ed attacks can range from s tealing confidential inf ormation such as account credentials f or
profit, to interf ering with da y-to-da y operations, to mischief. In man y ins tances, attack ers only need to compromise one
vulnerable computer to gain access to an or ganization’s net work. They can then use the compromised sys tem as a
launching point f or sub sequent attacks.
Targeted attacks agains t critical infras tructure sectors are especially dangerous because the attacks are tailored to disrup t
specific or ganizations that ma y be essential to the functioning of a countr y's societ y. Ex amples of critical infras tructure
sectors include transportation, communication, and utilities. This section will discuss t wo prominent recent attacks: The
Hydraq T rojan and the Stuxnet worm.
1-Also known as spear phishing or tar geted phishingSymantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October - December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructures
1Trojan Hydraq – One Y ear Later
Trojan Hydraq, 2also known as Aurora, was firs t discovered on Januar y 11, 2010, when it was used as part of a tar geted
attack, lik ely in an attemp t to gain access to a corporate net work and s teal confidential inf ormation. 3Hydraq entered
computers via email attachments or was downloaded by o ther threats, such as via malicious web sites. It allowed attack ers
to compromise sys tems by exploiting a z ero-da y vulnerabilit y in client-side sof tware. 4Once ex ecuted, the T rojan ins talled a
back door that allowed an attack er to control the computer and perf orm a v ariet y of compromising actions. These included
modif ying, ex ecuting, and deleting files; ex ecuting malicious files; and, mo st importantly, gaining access to the
compromised corporation’s net work—which then opened up the tar get to additional attacks. As with o ther common
Trojans, Hydraq would attemp t to remo tely contact its command and control (C&C) ser ver via a number of URLs in order to
receive updates and further ins tructions. 5
The number of inf ections from Hydraq was limited due to the nature of the tar geted attacks—only a small number of
corporations were tar geted (figure 1). Ano ther factor limiting the number of inf ections is that attack ers of ten pref er to
avoid attracting attention by limiting their attacks and, thus, remain concealed on a small volume of computers as long as
possible, rather than risk expo sing themselves by compromising too man y at once. 6Finally, T rojan Hydraq thwarted
antivirus sensors because it contained an obfuscation technique called “spaghetti code” in which blocks of code of the
Trojan are rearranged to a void detection. 7
Once a tar geted attack is discovered, it becomes less eff ective due to increased awareness and the adop tion of increased
securit y measures, such as updating patches and sanitizing inf ected machines. As such, the longevit y of Hydraq was
short-lived, peaking in Januar y 2010 and sub sequently tapering off af ter F ebruar y 2010.
2-Please see http://w ww.symantec.com/securit y_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-011114-1830-99 and http://w ww.symantec.com/outbreak/index.jsp?id=trojan-h ydraq
3-http://w ww.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojanh ydraq-incident
4-http://w ww.securit yfocus.com/bid/35759
5-http://w ww.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojanh ydraq-incident
6-http://w ww.symantec.com/connect/blogs/h ydraq-attack -mythical-proportions
7-http://w ww.symantec.com/connect/blogs/seeing -pas t-trojanh ydraq-s-obfuscationSymantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October - December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructures
2Figure 1: A ttemp ted T rojan Hydraq inf ections by month. (Source: S ymantec Corporation)
The Stuxnet W orm
The Stuxnet worm firs t garnered international attention in July 2010 when it was link ed with attacks that tar geted
indus trial control sys tems such as power plants and gas pipelines (figure 2). 8The worm inf ected at leas t 15 control
systems in factories around the world, including in German y and in a number of personal computers within Iran’s Bushehr
nuclear power plant. 9It was also announced that the worm had aff ected the sof tware used in centrifuges in volved in Iran’s
uranium enrichment program. 10
Stuxnet was designed to tar get its attack on particular indus try control sys tems—specifically, programmable logic
controllers (PL Cs)—and to change the code to modif y the frequenc y con verter drives of the controller. 11The worm was the
first to simultaneously exploit f our z ero-da y vulnerabilities in its attacks. 12It also used s tolen digital certificates to sign and
legitimiz e the malicious files. 13This t ype of attack demons trated that the authors of Stuxnet had deep knowledge of their
targets, and the control sys tems and processes of tho se tar gets.
8-http://w ww.symantec.com/securit y_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-071400-3123-99
9-Please see http://w ww.bbc.co.uk/news/technolog y-11388018, http://w ww.nytimes.com/2010/09/27/technolog y/27virus.html?_r=1, and http://w ww.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/11/s tuxnet-sabo tage-centrifuges/
10-http://af.reuters.com/article/ener gyOilNews/idAFLDE6A S1L120101129
11-http://w ww.symantec.com/connect/blogs/s tuxnet-breakthrough
12-http://w ww.symantec.com/connect/blogs/s tuxnet-using -three-additional-z ero-da y-vulnerabilities
13-http://w ww.symantec.com/connect/blogs/hack ers-behind-s tuxnetSymantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October - December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructures
3Stuxnet was especially dangerous because it was able to inf ect sys tems via remov able flash drives—in o ther words,
systems that were no t normally connected to the Internet—and it was able to hide injected code located on a PL C.
Elevating the threat was the fact it was able to update itself using a P2P component in its code. Using a P2P net work
mak es it ver y difficult to tak e the threat offline, because there are no central control ser vers. Auto-propagation methods
allowed the Stuxnet worm to thrive and operate f or a longer period of time compared to, sa y, Trojan Hydraq. One method
of propagation Stuxnet used was to copy itself onto net work -shared drives that were pro tected by weak passwords. 14
Since the worm did no t collect personal inf ormation, such as financial inf ormation or account logins, nor did it herd
infected sys tems into a bo tnet, po ssible mo tivations f or Stuxnet ma y have been either sabo tage or the extortion of a
specific tar get. F or more detailed inf ormation on Stuxnet, please see the lates t version of S ymantec’s do ssier on the
subject. 15
14-http://w ww.symantec.com/securit y_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-071400-3123-99
15-http://w ww.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/securit y_response/whitepapers/w32_s tuxnet_do ssier.pdfSymantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October - December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructures
4Figure 2: A ttemp ted Stuxnet worm inf ections by month. (Source: S ymantec)
Vulnerabilities in SCAD A Systems
SCAD A (Super visor y Control and Data Acquisition) represents a wide range of pro tocols and technologies f or monitoring
and managing equipment and machiner y in v arious sectors of critical infras tructure and indus try, such as tho se used f or
power generation and dis tribution. Theref ore, the securit y of SCAD A technologies and pro tocols is a particular concern of
governments because the disrup tion of related ser vices can result in the failure of infras tructure and the po tential lo ss of
life, among o ther consequences.
This discussion is based on data surrounding publicly known vulnerabilities aff ecting SCAD A technologies. The purpo se of
this section is to provide insight into the s tate of securit y research in relation to SCAD A sys tems. T o a lesser de gree, this
may also provide insight into the overall s tate of SCAD A securit y. Vulnerabilities aff ecting SCAD A sys tems ma y present a
threat to critical infras tructure that relies on these sys tems. Due to the po tential f or disrup tion of critical ser vices, theseSymantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October - December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructures
5vulnerabilities ma y be associated with politically mo tivated or s tate-sponsored attacks. This is a concern f or governments
and enterprises that are in volved in the critical infras tructure sector. While this discussion provides insight into public
SCAD A vulnerabilit y disclo sures, due to the sensitive nature of vulnerabilities aff ecting critical infras tructure, there is
likely priv ate securit y research conducted by SCAD A technolog y and securit y vendors. S ymantec does no t have insight into
any priv ate research because the results of such research are no t publicly disclo sed.
In the f ourth quarter of 2010, S ymantec documented 10 public SCAD A vulnerabilities; a to tal of 15 SCAD A vulnerabilities
were documented f or all of 2010. The number of vulnerabilities reported in SCAD A technologies is t ypically ver y small
because SCAD A is currently a ver y niche area of securit y research. Only a small proportion of the securit y communit y is
involved in researching SCAD A securit y vulnerabilities; the resources and access to technologies remain a challenge f or
lab tes ting by securit y researchers. However, attack ers with malicious intent are able to tar get live sys tems and apply their
existing knowledge of securit y vulnerabilities and exploits to these sys tems. Ex amples of such vulnerabilities include:
•A total of three W eb application vulnerabilities were discovered in the Intellicom Netbiter webSCAD A WS100
and WS200 products. 16The vulnerabilities can allow attack ers to upload and ex ecute arbitrar y scrip t code and
may also allow access to po tentially sensitive inf ormation.
•An SQL -injection vulnerabilit y aff ecting the login page of the Indus trial T echnolog y System (IT S) SCAD A sys tem
was discovered and ma y allow attack ers to compromise the application by making unauthoriz ed changes to the
underlying database. 17
•There were three remo te buff er-overflow vulnerabilities discovered in the D ATAC RealWin SCAD A
server.18Attack ers can exploit these vulnerabilities to ex ecute code on the ser vers.
•Three vulnerabilities were discovered in E cava Inte graX or, including t wo remo te code-ex ecution vulnerabilities
and a director y-tra versal vulnerabilit y.19These issues can be exploited by attack ers to ex ecute arbitrar y code or
to access po tentially sensitive inf ormation that ma y aid in further attacks.
Web application vulnerabilities (such as the firs t four vulnerabilities above) are of ten easy f or attack ers to discover and
exploit. Additionally, man y SCAD A implementations, such as the D ATAC RealWin SCAD A ser ver, run on Micro soft Windows
or other widely deployed operating sys tems and employ W eb applications and browser plug -ins f or their functionalit y. This
can mak e it is easier f or attack ers to generaliz e their exis ting skills to tar get these technologies.
While securit y researchers ha ve pinpointed vulnerabilities specific to SCAD A technologies, there is also a po tential threat
from vulnerabilities in components connected to SCAD A sys tems. This can include operating sys tems ho sting the SCAD A
technologies or o ther components such as database sof tware. Net work -accessible devices ma y use either common or
specializ ed net working pro tocols that are prone to attacks, which ma y compromise the a vailabilit y and inte grity of
affected devices. Theref ore, malicious or o therwise malf ormed net work traffic ma y aff ect these devices in a manner
similar to o ther net work -accessible ser vices within the enterprise. Additionally, man y SCAD A en vironments employ le gacy
technologies that are no t equipped with mechanisms f or authentication or measures to ensure the a vailabilit y, inte grity,
and confidentialit y of data. These sys tems ma y be particularly at risk, especially if they are no t fault-tolerant or designed
to handle ex ceptional conditions such as malf ormed input.
16-http://w ww.securit yfocus.com/bid/43636
17-http://w ww.securit yfocus.com/bid/43680
18-http://w ww.securit yfocus.com/bid/44150
19-Please see http://w ww.securit yfocus.com/bid/45487, http://w ww.securit yfocus.com/bid/45535, and http://w ww.securit yfocus.com/bid/45549Symantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October - December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructures
6Testing these technologies in a lab en vironment is a challenge f or securit y researchers due to limited resources and access
to the necessar y equipment. As a result, this can hinder the preemp tive discover y of po tential vulnerabilities. However,
attack ers with malicious intent can tar get live sys tems in the wild and apply their exis ting securit y knowledge to the
systems with little re gard f or an y unintended repercussions.
Real-W orld Implications of T argeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructure
Indus trial control sys tems (ICS), such as SCAD A, are used by the critical infras tructure sector to control the processes f or
daily operations. They are essential f or gathering and processing inf ormation sent by sensors and sending out the
appropriate commands that control local operations. In addition, ICS are crucial f or monitoring plant and s tation
environments to ensure they are working under saf e conditions. If required, the control sys tems send out commands to
protect the local en vironment and prevent an y emer genc y situations, such as the overheating of machiner y, increased
levels of to xic gases, fire, or po tential power grid overloads. The commands can be sent to shut down sys tems, isolate
zones, open pressure v alves, or tak e other saf ety measures. When ICS fails to function as intended, these problems can go
unno ticed.
In July 2010, f or ex ample, a SCAD A sys tem used to monitor water pump s failed to report that water s torage levels f or a
residential water supply were extremely low. 20This resulted in cit y residents being unable to access water from their
faucets. Although the problem was identified quickly and the supply was replenished af ter jus t a few hours, this illus trates
how an attack er could hamper basic essential ser vices by attacking these sys tems.
There are man y diff erent causes of ICS-related incidents, such as inadvertent adminis trative mis takes or errors during
system updates, insider attacks, and mischief. The risks of indus trial sabo tage or s tate-sponsored attacks aimed at
disrup ting critical infras tructure are the mo st concerning. These t ypes of threats could ha ve po tentially dev astating
outcomes if successfully ex ecuted.
Disabling sys tem saf eguards and trig gering actions outside of intended operation can result in permanent ph ysical
damage to machiner y and o ther equipment as well as the facilities that house them. Should extensive damage aff ect a
system such as the water s torage supply discussed above, residents of a cit y could be f orced to go without accessible
potable water f or extended periods of time. Despite being an electronic attack, this would put a burden on emer genc y
services and o ther aid or ganizations. This would also cause significant financial setbacks while equipment is repaired or
replaced. Other scenario s could result in black outs of power grids and communication net works. In more extreme
examples, machiner y failure could cause fire, explo sions, or release harmful to xins that could damage the en vironment or
cause the lo ss of lif e. The implication of these attacks is ver y important because they eff ectively represent a much lar ger
target than the vulnerable sys tem itself.
Although the ICS securit y communit y has been actively growing, there ma y be a significant amount of catching up to do
acro ss the numerous indus tries that use the technolog y. Awareness and proactive research and development by securit y
communities can only culminate in real success through the adop tion of eff ective mitigation and prevention measures in
environments outside the lab.
Past tar geted attacks, such as T rojan Hydraq and the Stuxnet worm, are important because they demons trate that there
are vulnerabilities in critical infras tructure sectors—specifically, in the power and ener gy sectors. The Stuxnet attacks
20-http://w ww.isssource.com/incident-report-scada-water-sys tem-fails/Symantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October - December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructures
7were the firs t ones that specifically tar geted ICS. 21This is significant because it is an actual event of what was f ormerly jus t
a plausible scenario.
Despite being isolated from external net works, the aff ected sys tems became inf ected with malicious code, which caused
damage to the sys tems. 22To repair the damage, sys tems were tak en off -line and shut down, resulting in production and
revenue lo ss, and increased manpower to fix the issues. 23In addition, the malicious code could be indiscriminate in its
attacks, causing widespread collateral damage to o ther non-tar geted sys tems. In the case of Stuxnet, the worm inf ected
over six million computers in China. 24
An important implication of tar geted attacks on ICS, specifically Stuxnet, is that the attack ers who craf ted the malicious
code were able to exploit and tak e adv antage of a wide v ariet y of vulnerabilities aff ecting these sys tems. The Stuxnet
worm developers ma y have helped to pa ve the wa y for others to cultiv ate more sophis ticated attacks or inspire copycat
targeted attacks. Other attack ers could reverse engineer the Stuxnet worm and use it as a template f or future attacks. Or,
they could use v ariations of the worm to launch attacks that disrup t other critical infras tructures, such as utilities, power
grids, or oil and gas refineries. T argeting the latter could lea ve cities and communities in emer genc y situations.
21-http://w ww.symantec.com/connect/blogs/s tuxnet-breakthrough
22-http://w ww.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9JLF8F03.htm
23-http://w ww.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/world/middleeas t/30tehran.html?_r=2&hp
24-http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2010-10/01/c_13538835.htmSymantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October - December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructures
8Mitigation & Pro tection
To limit expo sure to attacks, net works running SCAD A pro tocols and devices should be isolated from o ther net works.
These assets should no t be connected to the Internet or o ther net works unless s trictly required. If this is no t possible, to
completely limit access by external net works, net work access should be s trictly re gulated by limiting incoming/outgoing
traffic to required pro tocols only. IPSec and VPNs can also be deployed to limit access to authoriz ed net works and
individuals. A def ense-in-dep th strate gy should be deployed so that securit y risks elsewhere in the or ganization canno t
affect the control net work. Additional la yers of def ense should be deployed to pro tect k ey assets. Endpoint securit y
products ma y provide an additional level of pro tection f or ho sts within the SCAD A en vironment that run commonly
available commercial operating sys tems.
Securing a SCAD A en vironment ma y present diff erent challenges than tho se faced when securing an enterprise. In man y
cases, it ma y not be po ssible to create a tes t environment f or auditing purpo ses. F urthermore, an y disrup tion of ser vices
may be co stly or damaging. Theref ore, bo th passive asset discover y as well as vulnerabilit y scanning technologies are bes t
applied to limit the po tential f or side eff ects. Antivirus and patch management measures should be undertak en with care
and or ganizations should consult securit y and control sys tem vendors f or support in applying these solutions in a manner
that minimiz es risk and downtime. P olicy compliance and auditing should ensure that configuration benchmarks and
securit y baselines are enf orced through the or ganization and especially on critical control sys tems. Intrusion detection
and prevention sys tems should be deployed to monitor and prevent attacks on critical sys tems and net works.Symantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October - December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructures
9Credits
Marc F ossi
Executive E ditor
Manager, Development
Securit y Technolog y and Response
Gerr y Egan
Director, Product Management
Securit y Technolog y and Response
Eric Johnson
Editor
Securit y Technolog y and Response
Trevor Mack
Associate E ditor
Securit y Technolog y and Response
Téo Adams
Threat Analys t
Securit y Technolog y and Response
Joseph Blackbird
Threat Analys t
Securit y Technolog y and Response
Mo King L ow
Threat Analys t
Securit y Technolog y and ResponseSymantec Intelligence Quarterly Report: October - December, 2010
Targeted A ttacks on Critical Infras tructures
10
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
NOVEMBER 20152 | November 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
3 Summary
4 From the Security Response Blog
4 Terror-Alert Spam Targets the Middle
East, Canada to Spread Malware
5 November in Numbers
6 Targeted Attacks & Phishing
6 Top 10 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
6 Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
7 Phishing Rate
7 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as
Phishing by Industry Sector
8 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as
Phishing by Organization Size
9 Vulnerabilities
9 Total Number of Vulnerabilities
10 Malware
10 New Malware Variants
10 Top 10 Malware
11 Top 10 Mac OSX Malware Blocked on OSX Endpoints
12 Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Malware Was Detected
12 Percent of Email Malware as URL vs. Attachment by Month
13 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as
Malicious by Industry Sector
13 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as
Malicious by Industry Sector
13 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as
Malicious by Organization Size
14 Mobile & Social Media
14 Android Mobile Malware Families by Month
14 New Android Variants per Family by Month
15 Social Media
16 Spam
16 Overall Email Spam Rate
16 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Industry Sector
17 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Organization Size
18 About Symantec
18 More Information
Welcome to the November edition of the Symantec
Intelligence report. Symantec Intelligence aims
to provide the latest analysis of cyber security
threats, trends, and insights concerning malware, spam, and other potentially harmful business
risks.
Symantec has established the most comprehensive
source of Internet threat data in the world through
the Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network,
which is made up of more than 57.6 million attack sensors and records thousands of events per
second. This network monitors threat activity
in over 157 countries and territories through a combination of Symantec products and services
such as Symantec DeepSight™ Intelligence,
Symantec™ Managed Security Services, Norton™ consumer products, and other third-party data
sources.3 | November 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Summary
The proportion of email traffic containing malware was up in November, where one in 140 emails
contained malware. Public Administration was the most targeted sector in November, with one in every 85.6 emails containing malware. Organizations with 251-500 employees were most likely to be targeted by malicious email in the month of November, where one in 93.7 emails was malicious.
In one email campaign in particular, attackers attempted to prey upon user’s fears of terror
attacks in light of recent international news. While the attachments were presented as security tips to help the recipients protect themselves, one of the files contained a malicious payload that included a remote access Trojan. (See this month’s Security Response blog for more details.)
Interestingly, there were 19.4 million new pieces of malware created in November. This rate has
steadily declined in the second half of 2015, from a high of 57.6 million seen in June. While such a decline could point to a reduction in malicious activity, it could also mean that attackers are having a higher success rate in compromising computers, thus not needing to produce as much malware to achieve their goals.
The overall email spam rate in November was also up at 54.1 percent, an increase of 0.6 percent-
age points from October. At 57 percent, the Mining sector again had the highest spam rate during November.
In terms of targeted attacks in general, the Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate sector was the most
targeted sector during November, comprising 41 percent of all targeted attacks. Large enterpris-es were the target of 49.9 percent of these spear-phishing attacks.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat [email protected]
Methodology
The Symantec Intelligence Report comprises monthly analysis based on the latest data available
from the Symantec Global Intelligence Network. As new information is continually being discovered,
some metrics published in the report may be subject to change. Subsequent reports will be updated to
reflect the latest information in order to ensure the most accurate reporting and analysis of the threat landscape.4 | November 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Terror-Alert Spam Targets the Middle East, Canada to Spread Malware
Cybercriminals spoof law enforcement officials in Dubai, Bahrain, Turkey,
and Canada to send terror-alert spear-phishing emails containing Backdoor.Sockrat.
By Symantec Security Response
Last month, Symantec observed malicious emails spoofing
the email address of one United Arab Emirates (UAE) law
enforcement agency, particularly the Dubai Police Force.
These spear-phishing emails, which read like a warning from the Dubai Police, bank on users’ fear of terror attacks
to trick them into executing the malicious attachments. The
attachments are disguised as valuable security tips that could help recipients to protect themselves, as well as their
companies and their families, from potential terror attacks
that may occur in their business location.
To add more credibility to the emails, the crooks imperson-
ate the incumbent Dubai Police lieutenant general, who is
also the head of general security for the emirate of Dubai, by signing the email with his name.
The emails come with two attachments, one of which
is a PDF file that is not actually malicious but acts as a decoy file. The malware resides in the other attachment,
an archive, as a .jar file. Further analysis of the malware
confirms that the cybercriminals behind this campaign are using a multiplatform remote access Trojan (RAT) called Jsocket (detected as Backdoor.Sockrat ). This RAT is a new
product from the creators of the AlienSpy RAT, which has been discontinued earlier this year.
Targets beyond the UAE
While the group behind this campaign mainly targeted UAE-based companies and employees, we have also
seen similar spear-phishing runs targeting three other
countries: Bahrain, Turkey and, more recently, Canada. Like in the Dubai campaign, the cybercriminals are also using incumbent law enforcement officials’ names in these
countries to lend credibility to their fake terror alerts, which
also purport to provide protective measures supposedly outlined in attached files. The group is expanding their
reach and we may see new email models targeting addition-
al countries.
Interestingly enough, despite not being entirely written
in the countries’ respective official languages, the emails
are pretty crafty. All officials used in the cybercriminals’ scheme are currently in office. The subject in most cases
reflects the name of an employee who works for the
targeted company. All these details show that the crooks did some research before sending these phishing emails. If they
do not have any employee information, then they would
email other targets in the company that could provide them an entry point, such as customer service representatives or
IT department personnel.
At the time of writing, we can confirm that this campaign
is aimed at various big companies in the Middle East and Canada. While the campaign does not target a specific
type of industry, we have observed such emails sent to
the following sectors: energy, defense contractor, finance,
government, marketing, and IT.
With recent events such as those witnessed in Paris and
Beirut, terrorist attacks have become a threat across the
world, and terror groups have been known to make their
presence felt online too. We may yet see more of these kinds of social engineering tactics preying on real-world fears.From the Security Response Blog
About the Security Response blog
In the Symantec Intelligence Report we republish a blog that highlights key data or an event that stood out during the month. Our security researchers around the world frequently publish new blogs during the month on topics
such as malware, security risks, vulnerabilities, and spam. For the latest security news and information, visit:
http://www.symantec.com/connect/symantec-blogs/security-response5 | November 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
NOVEMBER IN NUMBERS6 | November 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Large enterprises were the target
of 49.9 percent of spear-phishing
attacks in November. Similarly, 24.9 percent of attacks were directed at small businesses with less than 250 employees.Company Size November October
1-250 24.9% 19.7%
251-500 4.1% 5.2%
501-1000 12.9% 2.6%
1001-1500 4.5% 3.7%
1501-2500 3.8% 0.9%
2501+ 49.9% 67.9%
Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
Source: Symantec
Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted OrganizationTargeted Attacks & Phishing
The Finance, Insurance, & Real
Estate sector was the most targeted sector during November, comprising 41 percent of all targeted attacks.
Top 10 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
Source: Symantec
010 20 30 40 50 60 70 80Nonclassifiable EstablishmentsMiningRetailManufacturingEnergy/UtilitiesWholesaleServices - ProfessionalServices - Non TraditionalTransportation, Communications,
Electric, Gas & Sanitary ServicesFinance, Insurance & Real Estate 41%
12%
11%
4%
4%
4%
3%
2%
1%18%
4%
10%
3%
4%
NA
5%
1%
1%
2% 69%November October
Top 10 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks7 | November 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Phishing Rate Inverse Graph: Smaller Number = Greater Risk
Source: Symantec400
800
1200
1600
2000
2400
2800N O S A J J M A M F J
2015D1 IN
1,9051,172
2,1741,5171,004
1,465
2,6662,0571,865
2,4481,628
2,278
Phishing Rate The overall phishing rate has
decreased slightly this month,
where one in 2,278 emails was a phishing attempt.
Industry November October
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 1 in 1,224.4 1 in 1,082.9
Nonclassifiable Establishments 1 in 1,464.9 1 in 1,036.9
Public Administration 1 in 1,575.0 1 in 1,397.0
Services - Professional 1 in 1,787.8 1 in 2,011.3
Mining 1 in 2,104.3 1 in 1,957.6
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 1 in 2,377.8 1 in 2,262.6
Services - Non Traditional 1 in 2,539.8 1 in 2,466.1
Wholesale 1 in 2,603.3 1 in 2,431.5
Construction 1 in 2,983.3 1 in 2,486.5
Transportation, Communications,
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services1 in 3,717.1 1 in 3,016.4
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing
by Industry Sector
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing by Industry Sector Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing
topped the list of industries
with the highest proportion of phishing attempts during the month of November.8 | November 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Company Size November October
1–250 1 in 2,131.3 1 in 2,015.2
251–500 1 in 1,765.7 1 in 1,856.5
501–1000 1 in 2,131.2 1 in 2,028.0
1001–1500 1 in 2,863.9 1 in 2,609.2
1501–2500 1 in 1,619.1 1 in 1,654.4
2501+ 1 in 2,569.4 1 in 2,421.4
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing
by Organization Size
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing by Organization Size Companies with 1501-2500
employees were the most
targeted organization size in November for phishing attempts.9 | November 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
The number of vulnerabilities
disclosed decreased in
November, from 441 in October to 346 reported during this month.
Total Number of Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
0100200300400500600700
N O S A J J M A M F J
2015D349441 428562
471 469540579
526579
348 346
Total Number of VulnerabilitiesVulnerabilities10 | November 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
W32.Ramnit!html and W32.
Almanahe.B!inf continue to
be the most commonly seen malware detections in November.Rank Malware NameNovember
PercentageMalware NameOctober
Percentage
1 W32.Ramnit!html 7.6% W32.Ramnit!html 7.0%
2 W32.Almanahe.B!inf 6.0% W32.Almanahe.B!inf 5.8%
3 W32.Sality.AE 5.5% W32.Sality.AE 5.7%
4 W32.Ramnit.B 4.0% W32.Downadup.B 4.0%
5 W32.Downadup.B 3.6% W32.Ramnit.B 4.0%
6 W97M.Downloader 3.1% W32.Ramnit.B!inf 2.8%
7 W32.Ramnit.B!inf 3.0% W32.Virut.CF 1.7%
8 W32.Virut.CF 1.7% W97M.Downloader 1.6%
9 W32.Chir.B@mm(html) 1.7% W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 1.4%
10 Trojan.Swifi 1.3% W32.Chir.B@mm(html) 1.4%
Top 10 Malware
Source: Symantec
Top 10 MalwareMalware
New Malware Variants
Source: Symantec
01020304050607080
N O S A J J M A M F J
2015D57.6
53.7
46.6
38.5
21.744.7
33.7
26.535.8
29.244.5
19.4MILLIONS
New Malware Variants There were 19.4 million new
pieces of malware created in
November. This rate has steadily declined in the second half of 2015, from a high of 57.6 million seen in June.11 | November 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
OSX.CnetDownloader was the
most commonly seen OS X threat
on OS X endpoints in November.Rank Malware NameNovember
PercentageMalware NameOctober
Percentage
1 OSX.CnetDownloader 82.6% OSX.Sudoprint 42.0%
2 OSX.Sudoprint 4.5% OSX.RSPlug.A 9.9%
3 OSX.RSPlug.A 1.9% OSX.Klog.A 6.1%
4 OSX.Klog.A 1.7% OSX.CnetDownloader 5.8%
5 OSX.Sabpab 1.4% OSX.Wirelurker 5.5%
6 OSX.Keylogger 1.4% OSX.Flashback.K 5.4%
7 OSX.Okaz 0.9% OSX.Luaddit 3.9%
8 OSX.Wirelurker 0.9% OSX.Keylogger 3.6%
9 OSX.Luaddit 0.8% OSX.Exploit.Launchd 3.0%
10 OSX.Remoteaccess 0.7% OSX.Okaz 2.4%
Top 10 Mac OS X Malware Blocked on OS X Endpoints
Source: Symantec
Top 10 Mac OSX Malware Blocked on OSX Endpoints 12 | November 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Malware Was Detected
The proportion of email traffic
containing malware increased
this month, where one in 140 emails contained malware.100
150200
250
300
350
400N O S A J J M A M F J
2015D
1 IN
Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Malware Was Detected
Source: SymantecInverse Graph: Smaller Number = Greater Risk319
337252
302208195207
237
274246207140
Percent of Email Malware as URL vs. Attachment by Month
The percentage of email malware
that contains a URL remained
low this month, hovering around two percent.
Percent of Email Malware as URL vs. Attachment by Month
Source: Symantec
0510152025%
N O S A J J M A M F J
2015D3 32 214
5
38
3 3 3 313 | November 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Industry November October
Public Administration 1 in 85.6 1 in 148.0
Services - Professional 1 in 103.2 1 in 188.5
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 1 in 104.2 1 in 172.3
Wholesale 1 in 145.2 1 in 195.5
Construction 1 in 145.6 1 in 220.2
Services - Non Traditional 1 in 154.5 1 in 209.6
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 1 in 163.1 1 in 288.3
Mining 1 in 195.0 1 in 296.7
Transportation, Communications,
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services1 in 204.1 1 in 345.7
Nonclassifiable Establishments 1 in 206.9 1 in 340.3
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious
by Industry Sector
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious by Industry Sector Public Administration was
the most targeted sector in
November for email malware, where one in every 85.6 emails
contained malware.
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious by Industry Sector
Company Size November October
1-250 1 in 109.3 1 in 144.3
251-500 1 in 93.7 1 in 158.9
501-1000 1 in 122.5 1 in 200.5
1001-1500 1 in 143.8 1 in 228.4
1501-2500 1 in 139.8 1 in 236.8
2501+ 1 in 190.4 1 in 307.1
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious
by Organization Size
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious by Organization Size Organizations with 251-500
employees were most likely to be
targeted by malicious email in the month of November, where one in 93.7 emails was malicious.14 | November 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Mobile & Social Media
0
123456789
N O S A J J M A M F J
2015D
Android Mobile Malware Families by Month
Source: Symantec4
1
0 01 16
3
03
12 In November there was one
new mobile malware family
discovered.
Android Mobile Malware Families by Month
There was an average of 46
Android malware variants per family in the month of in November.
0
1020304050
N O S A J J M A M F J
2015D
New Android Variants per Family by Month
Source: Symantec40424445 4546
3638 38 3839 39
New Android Variants per Family by Month15 | November 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Last 12 Months
Social Media
Source: Symantec
0102030405060708090100%
Comment
JackingFake
AppsLikejacking Fake
OfferingManual
Sharing577
16
.022
Manual Sharing – These rely on victims to actually do the work of sharing
the scam by presenting them with intriguing videos, fake offers or messages that they share with their friends.
Fake Offering – These scams invite social network users to join a fake event or group
with incentives such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to sharecredentials with the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
Likejacking – Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website
buttons that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
Fake Apps – Users are invited to subscribe to an application that appears to be
integrated for use with a social network, but is not as described and may be used to steal credentials or harvest other personal data.
Comment Jacking – This attack is similar to the "Like" jacking where the attacker tricks the
user into submitting a comment about a link or site, which will then be posted to his/her wall.
Social Media In the last twelve months, 77
percent of social media threats
required end users to propagate them.
Fake offerings comprised 16
percent of social media threats.16 | November 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
545452
54.1%
+.6% pts53.5%
+1.3% pts52.2%
-.5% pts
November October September
Overall Email Spam Rate
Source: Symantec
Overall Email Spam Rate The overall email spam rate in
November was 54.1 percent,
up 0.6 percentage points from October.Spam
Industry November October
Mining 57.0% 57.8%
Manufacturing 55.5% 55.4%
Services - Non Traditional 55.2% 52.7%
Construction 55.0% 54.0%
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 54.7% 53.9%
Public Administration 54.7% 52.7%
Services - Professional 54.2% 53.9%
Retail 54.1% 54.2%
Nonclassifiable Establishments 53.6% 53.6%
Wholesale 53.4% 53.2%
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Industry Sector
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Industry Sector At 57 percent, the Mining sector
again had the highest spam rate during November. The Manufacturing sector came in
second with 55.5 percent.17 | November 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Company Size November October
1–250 54.8% 53.4%
251–500 54.9% 54.4%
501–1000 54.0% 53.8%
1001–1500 54.2% 53.2%
1501–2500 54.0% 53.7%
2501+ 53.5% 53.3%
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Organization Size
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Organization Size While most organization sizes
had around a 54 percent spam
rate, organizations with 251-500 employees had the highest rate at 54.9 percent.18 | November 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
About Symantec
More Information
Symantec Worldwide: http://www.symantec.com/
ISTR and Symantec Intelligence Resources: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/
Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer/Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC) is the global leader in cybersecurity. Operating one of the
world’s largest cyber intelligence networks, we see more threats, and protect more customers from the next generation of attacks. We help companies, governments and individuals secure their most important data wherever it lives.
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
OCTOBER 20152 | October 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
3 Summary
4 From the Security Response Blog
4 Dridex Takedown Sinks Botnet Infections
5 October in Numbers
6 Targeted Attacks & Phishing
6 Top 10 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
6 Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
7 Phishing Rate
7 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as
Phishing by Industry Sector
8 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as
Phishing by Organization Size
9 Vulnerabilities
9 Total Number of Vulnerabilities
10 Malware
10 New Malware Variants
10 Top 10 Malware
11 Top 10 Mac OSX Malware Blocked on OSX Endpoints
11 Crypto-Ransomware Over Time
12 Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Malware Was Detected
12 Percent of Email Malware as URL vs. Attachment by Month
13 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as
Malicious by Industry Sector
13 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as
Malicious by Organization Size
14 Mobile & Social Media
14 Android Mobile Malware Families by Month
14 New Android Variants per Family by Month
15 Social Media
16 Spam
16 Overall Email Spam Rate
16 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Industry Sector
17 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Organization Size
18 About Symantec
18 More Information
Welcome to the October edition of the Symantec
Intelligence report. Symantec Intelligence aims
to provide the latest analysis of cyber security
threats, trends, and insights concerning malware, spam, and other potentially harmful business
risks.
Symantec has established the most comprehensive
source of Internet threat data in the world through
the Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network,
which is made up of more than 57.6 million attack sensors and records thousands of events per
second. This network monitors threat activity
in over 157 countries and territories through a combination of Symantec products and services
such as Symantec DeepSight™ Intelligence,
Symantec™ Managed Security Services, Norton™ consumer products, and other third-party data
sources.3 | October 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Summary
The number of vulnerabilities disclosed increased in October, from 349 in September to 441
reported during this month. However, vulnerability disclosures have trended lower over the last three months when comparing the last year’s worth of monthly disclosures.
The number of new malware variants also appears to be lower than what has been seen over the
last 12 month period. There were 21.7 million new pieces of malware created in October, which is down from the high for 2015 of 57.6 million seen back in June.
However, not everything is trending downward. Crypto-ransomware was up once again during
October, setting another high for 2015, with 44 thousand instances seen during the month.
Spam also appears to have been increasing slightly over the last few months, reaching a
six-month high of 53.5 percent. Spam rates appeared to have bottomed out during June, which saw the lowest spam levels seen in over a decade, but have increased slightly since.
In terms of targeted attacks, the Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate sector was the most targeted
sector during October, comprising 69 percent of all targeted attacks. Large enterprises were the target of 67.9 percent of spear-phishing attacks as well, up from 45.7 percent in September.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to contact us with any comments or
feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat [email protected]
Methodology
The Symantec Intelligence Report comprises monthly analysis based on the latest data available
from the Symantec Global Intelligence Network. As new information is continually being discovered,
some metrics published in the report may be subject to change. Subsequent reports will be updated to
reflect the latest information in order to ensure the most accurate reporting and analysis of the threat landscape.4 | October 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Dridex Takedown Sinks Botnet Infections
International police action hits gang that specialized in stealing banking credentials.
By Symantec Security Response
An international law enforcement crackdown against the
Dridex botnet has seen one man charged and a coordinated effort to sinkhole thousands of compromised computers,
cutting them off from the botnet’s control. The operation,
which involved the FBI in the US , the UK National Crime
Agency , and a number of other international agencies, may
seriously disrupt a cybercrime enterprise which has stolen tens of millions of dollars from victims worldwide.
Potent financial threat
Dridex, which is detected by Symantec as W32.Cridex and also known as Bugat, is a financial threat that adds
the infected computer to a botnet and injects itself into
the victim’s web browser in order to steal information, including banking credentials.
The malware is usually spread through phishing emails
designed to appear to come from legitimate sources in order to lure the victim into opening a malicious attachment. It is
also capable of self-replication by copying itself to mapped
network drives and attached local storage such as USB keys. As is common with most financial attackers, the Dridex
group regularly changed its tactics and most recently has
been observed using malicious macros in Microsoft Office documents attached to emails to infect computers.
As reported in Symantec’s State of financial Trojans 2014
whitepaper, Dridex was the third largest financial threat last year, accounting for some 29,000 detections. Never -
theless, this represented a decrease, with the number of infections down 88 percent since 2012.Recent telemetry suggests that the threat has enjoyed something of a resurgence in activity, with detections
beginning to increase again in the past few months.
The attackers behind Dridex have targeted a broad range
of countries. The largest number of detections in 2015
was in the US. This was followed by Japan and Germany,
with significant numbers of infections also seen in the UK, Canada, Australia, and a number of other European
countries.
Law enforcement swoop
Yesterday’s operation saw a 30-year-old Moldovan man
charged by prosecutors in the US for offenses including
criminal conspiracy, unauthorized computer access with
intent to defraud, damaging a computer, wire fraud, and bank fraud. His extradition to the US is currently being
sought following his arrest in Cyprus in August.
The FBI also obtained an injunction permitting it to start
sinkholing Dridex infections by redirecting traffic from
infected computers away from command-and-control
(C&C) servers to benign substitute servers. This sinkholing operation is also being supported by the UK National Crime
Agency.
This is the latest in a series of recent takedowns against
major financial fraud cybercrime groups, following earlier
operations against Gameover Zeus, Shylock , and Ramnit .From the Security Response Blog
About the Security Response blog
In the Symantec Intelligence Report we republish a blog that highlights key data or an event that
stood out during the month. Our security researchers around the world frequently publish new
blogs during the month on topics such as malware, security risks, vulnerabilities, and spam.
For the latest security news and information, visit:
http://www.symantec.com/connect/symantec-blogs/security-response5 | October 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
OCTOBER IN NUMBERS6 | October 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Large enterprises were the target
of 67.9 percent of spear-phishing
attacks in October, up from 45.7 percent in September. Similarly, 19.7 percent of attacks were directed at small businesses with less than 250 employees.Company Size October September
1-250 19.7% 34.5%
251-500 5.2% 6.6%
501-1000 2.6% 7.2%
1001-1500 3.7% 3.8%
1501-2500 0.9% 2.1%
2501+ 67.9% 45.7%
Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
Source: Symantec
Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted OrganizationTargeted Attacks & Phishing
The Finance, Insurance, & Real
Estate sector was the most targeted sector during October, comprising 69 percent of all targeted attacks.
Top 10 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
Source: Symantec
010 20 30 40 50 60 70 80ConstructionMiningRetailNonclassifiable EstablishmentsServices - ProfessionalWholesaleTransportation, Communications,
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary ServicesManufacturingServices - Non TraditionalFinance, Insurance, & Real Estate 69%
27
20 10
5
4 17
4 14
3 7
2 5
3
1
.3 NA
1 1 3October September
Top 10 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks7 | October 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Phishing Rate Inverse Graph: Smaller Number = Greater Risk
Source: Symantec400
800
1200
1600
2000
2400
2800O S A J J M A M F J
2015D N1 IN
1,9051,172
2,1741,5171,004
1,465
2,6662,0571,865
2,4481,628647
Phishing Rate The overall phishing rate has
decreased slightly this month,
where one in 2,174 emails was a phishing attempt.
Industry October September
Nonclassifiable Establishments 1 in 1,036.9 1 in 1,006.4
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 1 in 1,082.9 1 in 988.0
Public Administration 1 in 1,397.0 1 in 1,353.2
Mining 1 in 1,957.6 1 in 2,062.9
Services - Professional 1 in 2,011.3 1 in 1,194.4
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 1 in 2,262.6 1 in 1,888.1
Wholesale 1 in 2,431.5 1 in 2,303.3
Services - Non Traditional 1 in 2,466.1 1 in 2,210.3
Construction 1 in 2,486.5 1 in 2,324.9
Transportation, Communications,
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services1 in 3,016.4 1 in 2,828.2
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing
by Industry Sector
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing by Industry Sector Nonclassifiable Establishments
topped the list of industries
with the highest proportion of phishing attempts during the month of October.8 | October 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Company Size October September
1–250 1 in 2,015.2 1 in 723.4
251–500 1 in 1,856.5 1 in 1,703.2
501–1000 1 in 2,028.0 1 in 1,874.8
1001–1500 1 in 2,609.2 1 in 2,169.5
1501–2500 1 in 1,654.4 1 in 1,998.8
2501+ 1 in 2,421.4 1 in 1,715.3
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing
by Organization Size
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing by Organization Size Companies with 1501-2500
employees were the most
targeted organization size in October for phishing attempts.9 | October 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
The number of vulnerabilities
disclosed increased in October,
from 349 in September to 441 reported during this month.
Total Number of Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
0100200300400500600700
O S A J J M A M F J
2015D N349441 428562
471 469540579
526579
348457
Total Number of VulnerabilitiesVulnerabilities10 | October 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
W32.Ramnit!html and W32.
Almanahe.B!inf continue to
be the most commonly seen malware detections in October.Rank Malware NameOctober
PercentageMalware NameSeptember
Percentage
1 W32.Ramnit!html 7.0% W32.Ramnit!html 7.8%
2 W32.Almanahe.B!inf 5.8% W32.Almanahe.B!inf 6.3%
3 W32.Sality.AE 5.7% W32.Sality.AE 5.6%
4 W32.Downadup.B 4.0% W32.Downadup.B 4.1%
5 W32.Ramnit.B 4.0% W32.Ramnit.B 3.9%
6 W32.Ramnit.B!inf 2.8% W32.Ramnit.B!inf 3.5%
7 W32.Virut.CF 1.7% W32.Virut.CF 1.8%
8 W97M.Downloader 1.6% W32.Chir.B@mm(html) 1.6%
9 W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 1.4% Trojan.Swifi 1.4%
10 W32.Chir.B@mm(html) 1.4% W97M.Downloader 1.3%
Top 10 Malware
Source: Symantec
Top 10 MalwareMalware
New Malware Variants
Source: Symantec
01020304050607080
O S A J J M A M F J
2015D N57.6
53.7
46.6
38.5
21.744.7
33.7
26.535.8
29.244.563.6MILLIONS
New Malware Variants There were 21.7 million new
pieces of malware created in
October, down from the high for 2015 of 57.6 million seen in June.11 | October 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
OSX.Sudoprint was again the
most commonly seen OS X threat
on OS X endpoints in October. This threat takes advantage of a vulnerability targeting the OS X operating system that was patched in August.Rank Malware NameOctober
PercentageMalware NameSeptember
Percentage
1 OSX.Sudoprint 42.0% OSX.Sudoprint 81.6%
2 OSX.RSPlug.A 9.9% OSX.RSPlug.A 3.1%
3 OSX.Klog.A 6.1% OSX.Klog.A 2.5%
4 OSX.CnetDownloader 5.8% OSX.Wirelurker 1.9%
5 OSX.Wirelurker 5.5% OSX.Keylogger 1.7%
6 OSX.Flashback.K 5.4% OSX.Flashback.K 1.4%
7 OSX.Luaddit 3.9% OSX.Luaddit 1.4%
8 OSX.Keylogger 3.6% OSX.Remoteaccess 1.1%
9 OSX.Exploit.Launchd 3.0% OSX.Netweird 0.7%
10 OSX.Okaz 2.4% OSX.Okaz 0.6%
Top 10 Mac OS X Malware Blocked on OS X Endpoints
Source: Symantec
Top 10 Mac OSX Malware Blocked on OSX Endpoints
Crypto-ransomware was up
during October, setting another high for 2015.
Crypto-Ransomware Over Time
Source: Symantec
01020304050607080
O S A J J M A M F J
2015D N3134 353944
36
2028
2123
1648THOUSANDS
Crypto-Ransomware Over Time12 | October 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Malware Was Detected
The proportion of email traffic
containing malware increased
this month, where one in 208 emails contained malware.100
150200
250
300
350
400O S A J J M A M F J
2015D N
1 IN
Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Malware Was Detected
Source: SymantecInverse Graph: Smaller Number = Greater Risk319
337252
302208195207
237
274246207
246
Percent of Email Malware as URL vs. Attachment by Month
The percentage of email malware
that contains a URL remained
low this month, hovering around two percent.
Percent of Email Malware as URL vs. Attachment by Month
Source: Symantec
01020304050%
O S A J J M A M F J
2015D N3 3214
538
3 3 3 34113 | October 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Industry October September
Public Administration 1 in 148.0 1 in 422.3
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 1 in 172.3 1 in 307.9
Services - Professional 1 in 188.5 1 in 400.7
Wholesale 1 in 195.5 1 in 455.5
Services - Non Traditional 1 in 209.6 1 in 603.0
Construction 1 in 220.2 1 in 441.1
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 1 in 288.3 1 in 394.1
Mining 1 in 296.7 1 in 471.5
Nonclassifiable Establishments 1 in 340.3 1 in 586.2
Transportation, Communications,
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services1 in 345.7 1 in 606.1
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious
by Industry Sector
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious by Industry Sector Public Administration was the
most targeted sector in October
for email malware, where one in every 148 emails contained
malware.
Company Size October September
1-250 1 in 144.3 1 in 165.0
251-500 1 in 158.9 1 in 374.4
501-1000 1 in 200.5 1 in 460.6
1001-1500 1 in 228.4 1 in 489.2
1501-2500 1 in 236.8 1 in 542.2
2501+ 1 in 307.1 1 in 596.6
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious
by Organization Size
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious by Organization Size Organizations with less than 250
employees were most likely to be
targeted by malicious email in the month of October, where one in 144.3 emails was malicious.14 | October 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Mobile & Social Media
0
123456789
O S A J J M A M F J
2015D N
Android Mobile Malware Families by Month
Source: Symantec4
1
0 016
3
03
128 In October there was one
new mobile malware family
discovered.
Android Mobile Malware Families by Month
There was an average of 45
Android malware variants per family in the month of in October.
0
1020304050
O S A J J M A M F J
2015D N
New Android Variants per Family by Month
Source: Symantec40424445 45
3638 38 3839 39
36
New Android Variants per Family by Month15 | October 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Last 12 Months
Social Media
Source: Symantec
0102030405060708090100%
Comment
JackingFake
AppsLikejacking Fake
OfferingManual
Sharing579
14
.1 2
Manual Sharing – These rely on victims to actually do the work of sharing
the scam by presenting them with intriguing videos, fake offers or messages that they share with their friends.
Fake Offering – These scams invite social network users to join a fake event or group
with incentives such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to sharecredentials with the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
Likejacking – Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website
buttons that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
Fake Apps – Users are invited to subscribe to an application that appears to be
integrated for use with a social network, but is not as described and may be used to steal credentials or harvest other personal data.
Comment Jacking – This attack is similar to the "Like" jacking where the attacker tricks the
user into submitting a comment about a link or site, which will then be posted to his/her wall.
Social Media In the last twelve months, 79
percent of social media threats
required end users to propagate them.
Fake offerings comprised 14
percent of social media threats.16 | October 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
545253
53.5%
+1.3% pts52.2%
-.5% pts52.7%
+2.4% pts
October September August
Overall Email Spam Rate
Source: Symantec
Overall Email Spam Rate The overall email spam rate
in October was 53.5 percent,
up 1.3 percentage points from September.Spam
Industry October September
Mining 57.8% 55.7%
Manufacturing 55.4% 53.7%
Retail 54.2% 52.6%
Construction 54.0% 52.7%
Services - Professional 53.9% 52.7%
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 53.9% 52.1%
Nonclassifiable Establishments 53.6% 51.7%
Wholesale 53.2% 52.1%
Services - Non Traditional 52.7% 51.8%
Public Administration 52.7% –
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Industry Sector
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Industry Sector At 57.8 percent, the Mining
sector again had the highest spam rate during October. The Manufacturing sector came in
second with 55.4 percent.17 | October 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Company Size October September
1–250 53.4% 52.3%
251–500 54.4% 52.5%
501–1000 53.8% 52.4%
1001–1500 53.2% 51.9%
1501–2500 53.7% 52.1%
2501+ 53.3% 52.2%
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Organization Size
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Organization Size While most organization sizes
had around a 53 percent spam
rate, organizations with 251-500 employees had the highest rate at 54.4 percent.18 | October 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
About Symantec
More Information
Symantec Worldwide: http://www.symantec.com/
ISTR and Symantec Intelligence Resources: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/
Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer/Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC) is the global leader in cybersecurity. Operating one of the
world’s largest cyber intelligence networks, we see more threats, and protect more customers from the next generation of attacks. We help companies, governments and individuals secure their most important data wherever it lives.
|
Page 1 of 25
Symantec Intelligence
Symantec Intelligence Report : August 2011
Turbulent financial m arkets trigger a r eturn to s tock pump-and-dump spam; Master Boot Record (MBR) malware may
be making a comeback
Welcome to the August edition of the Symantec Intelligence report which , combining the best research and analysis
from the Symantec.cloud MessageLabs Intelligence Report and the Symantec State of Spam & Phishing Report ,
provid es the latest an alysis of cyber security threats, trends and insights from the Symantec Intelligence team
concerning malware, spam, and other potentially harmful business risks. The data used to compile the analysis for
this combined report includes data from July and August 2011 .
Report highlights
• Spam – 75.9 percent in August (a decrease of 1.9 percentage points since July 2011): page 13
• Phishing – One in 207.7 emails identified as phishing (a n increase of 0. 48 percentage points since July 2011) : page 16
• Malware – One in 2 03.3 emails in August contained malware (an increase of 0. 14 percentage points since July 2011): page 17
• Malicious Web sites – 3,441 Web sites blocked per day (a decrease of 49. 4 percent since July 2011) : page 19
• 34.1 percent of all malicious domains blocked were new in August (a decrease of 1 .32 percentage points since July 2011) :
page 19
• 17.3 percent of all Web- based malware blocked was new in August (a decrease of 3 .82 percentage points since July 2011) :
page 19
• Global Debt Crises News Drives Pump- and-Dump Stock Scams : page 2
• Are MBR Infections Back in Fashion?: page 3
• Phishing Apple’s iDisk: page 5
• Phishing Brazilian Brands: page 6
• The Truth Behind the Shady RAT: page 6
• Spammers take advantage of Unicode normalisation to hide URLs: page 11
• Best Practices for Enterprises and Users: page 22
Introduction
Overall spam levels were lower in August than last month . However , with the stock markets in turmoil once more,
spammers are seeking to benefit from fluctuations in a turbulent market, most notably by sending large volumes of
spam relating to certain “ pink sheets ” stocks that the scammers are trying to manipulate. Unlike companies on a stock
exchange, companies quoted on the pink sheets system do not need to meet minimum requirements or file with the
US Securities and Exchange Commission.
Phishing activity increased in August, with many increases coming from attacks related to major brand names such as
those related to Appl e’s iDisk service , and a variety of Brazilian companies and services, including social networking
and financial brand names.
An increase in malware activity also follows from an increase in boot-time malware or Master Boot Record (MBR)
infections and finally, Symantec Intelligence takes a closer look at some of the techniques behind the Shady RAT
operation recently in the news. Whilst the malware may not have been technically sophisticated or advanced in
nature, it was nevertheless successful in penetr ating some organizations that it was targeted towards – highlighting
that targeted attacks do not always need to be advanced in order to be persistent. Page 2 of 25
Interestingly, i n its MessageLabs Intelligence Annual Security Report for 20101
I hope you enjoy reading thi s month’s edition of the report, and please feel free to contact me directly with any
comments or feedback. , Symantec Intelligence p redicted that
in 2011, botnet controllers would begin to employ techniques such as steganography to conceal command and control
instructions, and just such a system was employed in the Shady RAT analysis in this month’s report.
Paul Wood, Senior Intelligence Analyst
[email protected]
@paulowoody
Report analysis
Global Debt Crises News Drives Pump -and- Dump Stock Scams
Just as they sound, “ pump -and-dump stocks” are promoted ( “pumped ”) by their owners in order to inflate the price of
the stocks as much as possible so that they may then be sold ( “dumped ”) before their valuation crashes back to
reality. The spam for these scams tries to convince the prospective mark that the penny stock is actually worth more
than its valuation, or that it will soon skyrocket. Most of these claims are either misleading or false.
In a successful campaign, the deluge of spam will help artificially drive up the price of the stock to a point where the scammers decide to sell their shares. This usual ly coincides with them ending the spam campaign, which in turn
reduces the interest in the stock, helping to drive its valuation back to its original low price (which can also be exploited in the market). A well -executed pump- and-dump spam campaign can produce substantial profits for the
scammers in a matter of days.
In the current turbulent environment, many people may be convinced to invest in stocks that the scammers claim will
benefit from the market turbulence.
For example, we have recently observed a spate of penny stock spam promoting Resource Exchange of America
Corp. (RXAC.PK) stocks. The message is obfuscated with extraneous line breaks and spaces between the words.
Similarly, the email headers contain broken words such as “ Stoc ks” and “ m oney”. Poorly translated non sequiturs
occur throughout the messages (e.g., “ United States still an AAA country, Obama says?!”).
Most of the spam originates from the United States and China, while a percentage is being generated from other
countries in Asia. The majority of the attacks target North American users.
Examples of the subject lines of these messages include the following and can be seen in figure 1, below :
• Stoc ks Ready to Bounce?
• There is a MASSIVE PROMOTION underway NOW!
• Been right on the m oney
1 http://www.symanteccloud.com/mlireport/MessageLabsIntelligence_2010_Annual_Report_FINAL.pdf Page 3 of 25
Figure 1: Examples of recent stock -spam email
This analysis was also published in a blog2
post by Samir Patil on 10 August 2011.
Are MBR Infections Back in Fashion?
A Master Boot Record (MBR) is an area of the hard disk (usually the first sector) used by a computer to perform start
up operations. It is one of the first things to be read and executed by the computer hardware when a computer is
powered on, even before t he operating system itself.
MBR infections offer great scope for deep infection and control of computers, which makes the idea attractive to
malware creators. Contemporary MBR infection methods are a fairly complex affair usually executed by highly skille d
individuals. This is probably one reason why after the creators of Trojan.Mebroot rediscovered the lost art of MBR
infection, back in 2007 (based on work done b y Soeder and Permeh of eEye Digital Security3
Mebroot was a significant piece of malwa re. It not only infected the MBR of the computer but also implemented direct
disk access to write its own code into unused sectors of the hard disk and therefore place itself into an area that the host operating system wa sn’t even aware of. This type of lo w-level infection, coupled with a sophisticated root kit,
makes it difficult to detect and get rid of Mebroot from an infected computer. in 2005 on BootRoot),
not too many other malware creators have followed in their wake.
While MBR infection has been a mainstay of Mebroot, another gang developed the highly sophisticated threat
Backdoor.Tidserv (originally infected system driver files) back in the summer of 2010 . Aside from Mebroot and
Tidserv, there have been few other threats between 2008 and 2010 using the MBR infection technique,
Trojan.Mebratix and Trojan.Bootl ock being the only examples; it looked like MBR infections were going nowhere fast.
If we f ast forward to August 2011, the picture for MBR malware has changed considerably. So far in 2011, we have
seen Backdoor.Tidserv.M , Trojan.Smitnyl , Trojan.Fispboot , Trojan.Alworo, and Trojan.Cidox . This represents as
many new MBR or boot time malware threats as there had been in the previous three years. This increase potentially
2 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/global -debt-crises- news -drives -pump- and-dump- stock- scams
3 http://www.blackhat.com/presentations/bh- usa-05/bh- us-05-soeder.pdf
Page 4 of 25
indicates a comeback of boot time malware. What makes this exploit attractive in 2011 is that most of the “R esearch
and Development” around this type of malware has been completed. With the release of the details for BootRoot and
VBootkit, malware authors are able to take the research and proof of concept code and simply adapt them for their
own needs.
Figure 2: Infographic summary of MBR malware
According to analysis by the Symantec Intelligence team, it is evident that a number of MBR infecting malware
families currently in circulation borrowed heavily from the BootRoot PoC. The arrival of short -lived ransom ware type
threats lends weight to the idea, because this type of malware can be considered as throw away code. Ransomware
is made for a single purpose and are not expected to provide a long length of service so malware authors don’t spend
too much time and effort in creating and hiding them.
This is in sharp contrast to the more advanced examples of back door Trojans for whom the creators are trying to
build a lasting and useful network of computers for profit. These are signs that the barrier to entry for this type of
malware has been lowered. At this time, all the recent boot time malwares target the MBR with the exception of Trojan.Cidox which takes a slightly different approach. Instead of targeting the MBR, it infects the Initial Program Loader to achi eve a similar overall effect; this is an innovation on the current MBR infection techniques.
Infecting the MBR is not a new technique per se ; many of the old boot sector viruses from over a decade ago did
something similar. The difference is modern MBR malware do so much more than just infecting the MBR. It certainly looks as if MBR malware is making a comeback in 2011 .
This analysis was also published in a blog
4 post by Hon Lau on 8 August 2011. Additionally, Symantec has created a
more detailed infographic5
that summarizes these threats and what they do; an excerpt is shown in figure 2, above.
4 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/are- mbr-infections -back -fashion- infographic
5 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/mbr_malware_back.pdf
SMITNYL
FEBRUARY
TIDSERV.M
JANUARY
FISPBOOT
APRIL
CIDOX*
JULY
BOOTLOCK
NOVEMBER
MEBATRIX
MARCH
TIDSERV.L
AUGUST
2010
2009
2011
ALWORO
JUNE
RETURN OFTHEBOOTUPMALWARE
MEBROOT
JANUARY
STONED
BOOTKIT
JULY
2008
*CidoxisnotstrictlyanMBRthreat
buttargetsbootmecomponents.
WHATTHEYDO
Infostealing:CollectsinformaonanduploadsittoaremotelocaonMBR
ModifiestheMBRand
usesrawdiskaccess
techniquestomodify
disksectors
IPLoader:
ModifiestheInal
ProgramLoader
Payment:
Usestechniquesto
misleadorextortusers
intomakingapayment
Adverts:
Displays
adversements
Rootkit:Usestechniquestohideitspresence
DownloadFiles:Downloadfilesfromaremotelocaon
MBR
IPLoader
Payment
DownloadFiles
Backdoor&InfostealingRootkit
Adverts
Bootlock
Cidox
Fispboot
Alworo
Tidserv.M
Smitnyl
Tidserv.L
Mebatrix
Mebroot
Backdoor:OpensabackdoorallowingremotecommunicaonsTherehavebeenasmanynewMBR threatsfound
inthefirstsevenmonthsof2011astherewerein
thepreviousthreeyears.Page 5 of 25
Phishing Apple’s iDisk
Apple's MobileMe is a collection of online services and software. Among its various services is a file- hosting service
called iDisk. Recently, Symantec has recorded phishing sites that spoofed iDisk’s Web page. The phishing sites were
hosted on a free Web -hosting site.
So, what’s in this service that interests phishers? The service is based on a paid subscription, with which files of up to
20 GB can be uploaded and shared. Phishers are looking to gain access to this service for free. This is an example of
a phishing attack targeti ng user information for reasons other than financial gain.
Figure 3: Login prompt for MobileMe phishing Web site
The phishing site prompts the user to enter their password for logging in , as can be seen in figure 3. (In this case, the
user ID was already populated on the phishing page.) After the password is entered, the page redirects to the
legitimate Web page of Apple MobileMe with an error message for an invalid password, which creates the illusion that a common error had occurred.
The phishing URLs c ontained a query string in which a particular value represented a user’s ID. Changing the value of
this ID within the query string would accordingly be reflected on the phishing page. Below is a sample phishing URL:
http://******.com/test?authenticate_user name=******
[Domain name and User name removed]
Typically, phishing sites are sent to customers through spam mails in which the message does not specify the
customer’s name. For example, spam email messages are addressed as “ Dear Valued Customer” or “Dear
Member.” By specifying the user ID, phishers are attempting to gain the user’s confidence. This brings us to another question: from where do the phishers get these user IDs?
The user IDs are taken from email addresses. For example, in [email protected], phishers are considering
“user001” as the user ID. The email addresses, on the other hand, are those that have been previously harvested by
spammers. Although the user IDs retrieved in this manner may not necessarily represent an actual MobileMe user ID,
phishers are simply trying their luck by targeting a large number of users.
This analysi s was also published in a blog
6
post by Mathew Maniyara on 14 July 2011.
6 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/phishing -apple- s-idisk
Page 6 of 25
Phishing Brazilian Brands
Symantec keeps track of the brands targeted by phishing and monitors trends in the countries in which the brand’s
parent company is based. Over the past couple of months, phishing sites have been increasingly targeting Brazilian
brands. The number of phishing sites on Brazilian brands made up about 5 percent of all phishing sites. This is an
increase of nearly three times that of the previous month. The phishing Web pages were in Brazilian Portuguese. The
most targeted brand in these phishing sites was a social networking site.
Below are some noteworthy statistics on the trend observed to date, as highlighted in figure 4 , below :
Figure 4: Types of domain names used in phishing Web sites for Brazilian brands
• The majority of the phishing on Brazilian brand s, approximately 58 percent, used IP domains (e.g.,
domains such as h ttp://255.255.255.255).
• Twelve Web -hosting sites were used to host 4 percent of the phishing sites on Brazilian brands.
• There were several banks attacked in phishing and the banking sect or made up about 39 percent of the
brands targeted. Phishing of the social networking sector primarily targeted one single brand and
comprised 61 percent of the total. The remaining phishing sites (approximately 0.5 percent) spoofed an
airlines brand.
• Appr oximately 64 percent of the phishing sites were created using automated phishing toolkits. The
remaining 36 percent were unique URLs.
As the majority of the phishing attack s came from automated toolkits, we understand that phishers are trying to target
more Internet users from Brazil. With the possession of these toolkits, phishers are able to create phishing sites in
large numbers by randomizing URLs. Below are two randomizi ng URLs used in the toolkits:
http://***.***.***.***/~namo/login011/?accounts/ServiceLogin?
http://***.***.***.***/~namo/login008/?accounts/ServiceLogin?
[IP addresses removed]
The Truth Behind the Shady RAT
McAfee recently published a report about what they called Operation Shady RAT7
7 http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/features/2011/09/operation- shady -rat-201109? , focusing on a series of what some
may call “advanced persistent threat” attacks. The attacks were dubbed in some quarters as “one of the largest series
of cyber attacks ever.” While quite a bit of data was presented regarding the potential scale of these attacks, details on the threats and how the attacks were staged were somewhat limited.
Page 7 of 25
The Sym antec Intelligence team analyzed this threat and identified the initial attack vectors, the threats used and how
the attack was staged. In addition, we have also uncovered what appears to be the same information source about the
victims of the attacks that was used as the basis of the original report. This information is freely available on the
attackers’ command and control s ite, which is a strange oversight considering this type of attack is often described as
“advanced” or “sophisticated.”
The attack mainly comprises of three stages, which are detailed below.
STAGE 1:
Target organizations are selected and then emails are cr eated and sent to individuals within those organizations. The
emails follow the typical targeted attack modus operandi — that is they contain some subject or topic that may be of
interest to the recipient, such as rosters, contact lists, budgets, and so forth. The attached file contains the details
promised in the email text, as part of a social engineering ploy. In our investigations we’ve uncovered many such
emails covering a whole gamut of topics.
Some recent examples of emails used in these attacks can be seen in figure 5 , below. These emails contain various
attachments, typically Microsoft Office files such as Word documents, Excel spreadsheets, PowerPoint presentations, and PDF documents. These files are loaded with exploit code, so that when the user opens the file the exploit code is executed, resulting in the computer becoming compromised.
Figure 5: Examples of emails related to the attacks
Page 8 of 25
Example attachment names included:
• Participant_Contacts.xls
• 2011 project budget.xls
• Contact List -Update.xls
• The budget justification.xls
In the Excel files, we have seen the old, but clearly still effective Microsoft Excel 'FEATHEADER' Record Remote
Code Execution Vulnerability8 (detected by Bloodhound.Exploit.3069
) being exploited. Once the file is opened on an
unpatched computer, a clean copy of an Excel file is dropped and opened so that th e user is not suspicious. A Trojan
is also dropped and executed. One possible tell -tale sign of this exploit is that Excel appears to hang for a short time
before it resumes, and the application may even crash and restart.
STAGE 2:
Once the Trojan is installed, it will attempt to contact a remote site that is hardcoded into the Trojan itself. Some recently used examples include:
• www.comto[REMOVED].com/wak/mansher0.gif
• www.kay[REMOVED].net/images/btn_topsec.jpg
• www.swim[REMOVED[.net/images/sleepyboo.jpg
• www.comto[REMOVED].com/Tech/Lesson15.htm
The first thing you will notice is that the URLs are pointing at image and HTML files. At first glance, they don’t seem all
that suspicious. This is an interesting ploy used by the attackers to hide the comma nds. Many firewalls are configured
to allow image and HTML files to pass through HTTP traffic.
Without close inspection, based on the context provided by the Trojan sample, these images and HTML files look
totally legitimate. Some examples are highlighted in figure 6 , below.
Figure 6: Examples of images containing hidden commands found on the command and control server
8 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/36945
9 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2009- 111306 -5541 -99
Page 9 of 25
Upon closer inspection of the file and the Trojan code, we can see that there are commands hidden in the image using
steganography . These commands are totally invisible to the human eye, since the bits representing the commands
are mathematically built into the data representing the image.
In the versions of the Tro jans that are downloading HTML files, the commands are hidden in HTML comments that
look like gibberish, but are actually encrypted commands that are further converted into base- 64 encoding , as can be
seen in the examples shown in figure 7 , below .
Figure 7: Examples of encoded commands hidden within HTML and image files
While these commands are clearly visible to a user if they view the HTML code in a text editor, they look completely
harmless, and indeed are harmless unless the file is parsed by the Trojan on a compromised computer. The
commands may be one of the following:
run: {URL/FILENAME} — Downloads an executable to the %Temp% folder and then executes the new
program.
sleep:{NUMBER} — Sleeps for a specified amount of ti me, in minutes.
{IP ADDRESS}:{PORT NUMBER} — Causes the Trojan to connect to a remote IP on the specified port.
This command is really useful from the attacker’s point of view, since it opens a direct connection to the
specified IP address through the specified port number. Once the Trojan has opened the remote connection,
after receiving the {IP ADDRESS}:{PORT} command, we are set for the next stage of the attack.
STAGE 3:
When the Trojan connects to a remote computer using the {IP ADDRESS}:{PORT} com mand, it establishes a remote
shell with the computer. This enables the attacker at the remote site to directly issue shell commands to be run on the
compromised computer. Of course all of this activity is invisible to the end user, since the shell is hidd en and is a low -
tech and lightweight way of accessing the computer.
When the Trojan connects to the remote IP on the specified port number, it waits to receive an "active" command.
Once received, the back door sends the following string, which is a form of a handshake between the Trojan and the
controller:
"/*\n
@***@*@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@
@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@>>>> \*\n\r"
The Trojan then copies the file %System% \cmd.exe (a DOS shell) to %Temp% \svchost.exe and then uses the copied
file to open a remote shell on the compromised computer.
Page 10 of 25
Next, the Trojan periodically checks with the remote server for one of the following commands:
gf:{FILENAME} — Retrieves a file from the remote server.
pf:{FILENAME} — Uploads a file to the remote server.
http:{URL}.exe — Retrieves a file from a remote URL, beginning with http and ending in .exe. The remote
file is downloaded and executed.
taxi: {COMMAND} — Sends a command from the remote server.
slp:{RESULT} — Sends the results of the command executed above to the remote server to report the
status.
This small collection of commands is enough for an attacker to stage a comprehensive breach into the affected
organization. Any functions not available to the att acker in the Trojan itself can be easily downloaded onto the
compromised computer and executed at will. Collected data is then simply uploaded back to the remote attacker using
the pf command.
Victims of the attacks
A significant number of organizations worldwide were seemingly affected by this particular series of attacks. T he
attackers not only failed to secure their server properly, but also installed various Web traffic analysis tools to monitor
their progress. Thi s however makes it much easier to investigate such attacks. For example, on one of the sites we
were able to see the statistics about computers contacting the command and control server to download command
files; an example of this is shown in figure 8 . Based on this information, we were also able to determine the
organizations affected by this threat.
Figure 8: Example of Web traffic analysis tools installed on C&C Web server
Page 11 of 25
As already discussed in the public domain, the victims ranged from government agencies to private companies.
What‘s still unclear is the type of information the attackers were targeting. Due to the variety of organizations and
individuals impacted, there is no clear motive. Not only are the victims loc ated in various places around the globe, so
too are the servers involved in these attacks.
Conclusions
While this attack is indeed significant, it is one of many similar attacks taking place daily. Continually, there are other
malware groups targeting org anizations in a similar manner in order to gain entry and pilfer secrets. While there is a
need for information, there will always be those ready to supply it. We may not always know the true motivations and
identities of those behind these attacks, but we can work to exploit mistakes they make in order to get a better view of
what they are doing and bring us one step closer to tracking them down.
Going back to the earlier question, is the attack described in Operation Shady RAT a truly advanced persistent threat? We would contend that it isn’t, but perhaps it didn’t need to be advanced in order to succeed. However, c onsider ing
the errors made in configuring the servers behind the command and control channels, and the relatively non -
sophisticated malware and techniques used in this case , the people behind it are persistent , but no more so than the
myriad of other malware groups out there such as those behind Zeus and Tidserv.
This analysis was also published in a blog
10
post by Hon Lau on 4 August 2011.
Spammers take advantage of Unicode normalisation to hide URLs
Spammers are never idle when it comes to finding new ways to bypass mail filters - after all, this is crucial to a
spammer's success. Recently we've seen a low, but steady, number of spam messag es where spammers are
replacing characters in URLs (which point to spam sites) with Unicode characters which look similar or identical. This
is yet another way of obfuscating URLs in an attempt to make it more difficult to analyse URLs. To understand how this technique works, a bit of knowledge of the Unicode standard is helpful. As well as specifying a large repertoire of
characters, Unicode also provides normalisation rules for converting similar and/or equivalent characters to a single form.
For exampl e, under various Unicode normalisation forms, an encircled number is considered equivalent to the
corresponding ordinary number. This latest spammer obfuscation technique relies on the HTML rendering engine in mail clients (or Web browser for Web-based email) applying the appropriate Unicode normalisation to URLs.
For example, a spam message contains the following URL:
http://example ․ⅼy/xyz
At first glance, the period or dot might look like a normal dot character, but it has actually been replaced with U nicode
character U+2024 ("ONE DOT LEADER"). The " ⅼ" in the top -level domain also appears like a normal Latin letter " l",
but is actually Unicode character U+217C ("SMALL ROMAN NUMERAL FIFTY"). When a Web browser or mail client
HTML rendering engine processes this URL, it typically applies Unicode normalization to it, replacing the "ONE DOT LEADER" character with a normal dot, and replacing the "SMALL ROMAN NUMERAL FIFTY" with a normal "l "
character, allowing the user to visit the spam site.
A schem atic for t he process can be seen in figure 9, below.
10 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/truth- behind -shady -rat Page 12 of 25
Figure 9: Infographic describing the Unicode normalization process
In a sense, this is similar to IDN (Internationalized Domain Name) homograph attacks11
where similar -looking Unicode
characters are used to lead users to fake sites, often for phishing. However, this technique differs as it involves using
similar Unicode characters to obfuscate a site rather than fake or spoof a site.
Symantec.cloud and Sy mantec Brightmail customers are protected from these attacks by our URL filtering
technologies which support handling these characters.
This analysis was also published in a blog12
post by Nicholas Johnston and Francisco Pardo on 4 August 2011.
11 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/spammers -taking -advantage- idn-url-shortening -services
12 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/spammers -take-advantage -unicode -normalisation- hide- urls
Page 13 of 25
Global Tr ends & Content Analysis
Spam, phishing and malware data is captured through a variety of sources, including the Symantec Global Intelligence
Network , the Symantec Probe Network (a system of more than 5 million decoy accounts ), Symantec.cloud and a
number of other Symantec security technologies. Skeptic™, the Symantec.cloud proprietary heuristic technology is
also able to detect new and sophisticated targeted threats.
Data is collected from over 8 billion email messages and over 1 billion Web requests which are processed per day
across 1 5 data centers , including malicious code data which is collected from over 130 million systems in 86 countries
worldwide . Symantec intelligence also gathers phishing information through an extensive antifraud community of
enterprises, security vendors, and more than 50 million consumers.
These resources give the Symantec Intelligence analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze,
and provide informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and spam . If there
is a malicious attack about to hit, we know about it first. We bloc k it; we keep it from affecting our customers.
Spam Analysis
In August 2011, the global ratio of spam in email traffic declined to 75.9 percent (1 in 1. 32 emails); a decrease of 1 .9
percent age points when compared with July 2011.
As the global spam level diminished in August 2011, Saudi Arabia remained the most spammed geography, with a
spam rate of 8 4.8 percent , and China overtook Russia to become the second most -spammed . The largest increase in
spam in China was attributed to the IT Services sector (89.3 percent of email blocked as spam). Moreover, 90 percent
of global spam is in English, but Russian is the most common non -English spam language and accounts for
approximat ely 1.7 percent of spam; Chinese13
13 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/rise- chinese- spam spam now accounts for approximately 0.6 percent of global spam. 13
4
22005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010Saudi Arabia
China
Italy
Russian Federation
Sweden84.8%
81.6%
81.3%
81.1%
78.8%Automotive
Education
Marketing/Media
Manufacturing
Non-Profit79.0%
78.9%
77.4%
77.1%
76.9%1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+75.7%
75.7%
76.2%
76.8%
76.4%
75.8%Spam Rate
August 201175.9%
77.8%
75.8%LastMonth:
SixMonthAvg.: Top5Geographies Top5Verticals ByHorizontal
201175.9%
India 16.6%
Brazil 10.3%
RussianFederaon 6.5%
VietNam 5.7%
Ukraine 2.6%
Indonesia 2.5%
Pakistan 2.4%
UnitedStates 2.2%
SaudiArabia 2.1%
China 2.0%5Page 14 of 25
In the US, 7 5.8 percent of email was spam and 75.0 percent in Canada. The spam level in the UK was 76.5 percent .
In The Netherlands, spam accounted for 77.4 percent of email traffic, 75.8 percent in Germany, 76.1 percent in
Denmark and 73.7 percent in Australia. In Hong Kong, 75.2 percent of email was blocked as spam and 73.4 percent in
Singapore, compared with 72.8 percent in Japan. Spam accounted for 74.0 percent of email traffic in South Africa and
77.0 percent in Brazil.
In August , the Automotive industry sector continued to be the most spammed industry sector, with a spam rate of 79.0
percent . Spam levels for the Education sector reached 78.9 percent and 75.5 percent for the Chemical &
Pharmaceutical sector; 75.7 percent for IT Services, 75.7 percent for Retail, 75.4 percent for Public Sector and 75.3
percent for Finance.
Global Spam Categories
The most common category of spam in August was pharmaceutical related, but the second most common was related
to adult/dating spam. Examples of many of these subjects can be found in the subject line analysis, below.
Category Name August 2011 July 2011
Pharmaceutical 40.0% 47.0%
Adult/Sex/Dating 19.0% 14.5%
Watches/Jewelry 17.5% 7.5%
Unsolicited Newsletters 11.5% 7.5%
Casino/Gambling 7.0% 3.5%
Unknown/Other 2.5% 2.0%
Degrees/Diplomas 1.5% 2.5%
Jobs/Recruitments 1.0% 10.5%
Discount Products/Software 0.5% <0.5%
Scams/Fraud/419 0.5% <0.5%
Spam Subject Line Analysis
In the latest analysis, adult -related dating spam accounted for fewer of the most common spam subject lines in
August , with blank subject lines being the most common, closely followed by pharmaceutical related subjects .
Rank August 2011
Total Spam: Top Subject Lines No. of
Days July 2011
Total Spam: Top Subject Lines No. of
Days
1 (blank subject line) 31 drop me a line 30
2 ED-Meds -Antidepressants -And- Pain Relief -
Meds -8O% -OFF 31 r u online now? 30
3 Buy Advanced Penis Enlargement Pill now,
it is selling fast. 31 hi darling.. 30
4 Made of the most potent clinically proven
natural herbs. 31 new email 30
5 Permanently increases length and width of your erection. Advanced Penis Enlargement Pill. 31 found you :) 30
6 Advanced Penis Enlargement Pill.
Permanently increases length and width of
your erection. 31 im online now 30
7 my hot pics :) 23 my new pics :) 30
8 found you :) 23 my new email 30
9 new pics for you.. 24 my hot pics :) 30
10 im online now 23 I'm online now… 30
Page 15 of 25
Spam URL TLD Distribution
The proportion of spam exploiting URLs in the .RU top- level domain fell by 3 .5 percentage points in August , with the
largest increase relating to spam URLs in the . com TLD.
TLD August July Change
(% points)
.com 57.6% 54.9% +2.7
.ru 7.1% 10.6% -3.5
.info 18.4% 18.3% +0.1
.net 5.8% 6.2% -0.4
Average Spam Message Size
In August , almost half of all spam was 5Kb in size or less, compared with approximately two -thirds in July . Spam with
attachments (including malware such as generic polymorphic malware hidden in ZIP file attachments), including
image attachments often used in pharmaceutical spam, accounted for the increase in spam between 5Kb and 10Kb in
size.
Message Size August July Change
(% points)
0Kb – 5Kb 49.7% 65.1% -15.4
5Kb – 10Kb 35.2% 21.2% +14.0
>10Kb 15.0% 13.7% +1.3
Spam Attack Vectors
It can be seen in the chart below that a major spike in attachment spam occurred on 29 July, but unlike a similar event
on 29 June, th is did not result in a surge in NDR spam (spam related non- delivery reports) , which would be expected
following a widespread dictionary attack . The growth in attachments also related to a large volume of pharmaceutical
spam that contained ima ge file attachments .
0%3%6%9%12%15%
10Jul 13Jul 16Jul 19Jul 22Jul 25Jul 28Jul 31Jul 03Aug 06Aug 09AugAtachment
NDRPage 16 of 25
Phishing Analysis
In August , phishing email activity increased by 0.01 percentage points since July 2011; one in 319.3 emails (0.3 13
percent ) comprised some form of phishing attack.
Phishing attacks in Sweden increased to overt ake the UK and become the most targeted geography for phishing in
August , with one in 45.3 emails identified as phishing. Phishing in the UK also increased, making it the second most
targeted country, with one in 79.5 emails identified as phishing attacks. In Sweden, 51.6 percent of phishing attacks
related to one well -known financial services brand, popular for servicing international money transfer s and money
orders .
Phishing levels for the US were one in 999.3 and one in 229.9 for Canada. In Germany phi shing levels were one in
928.6 , one in 508.2 in Denmark and one in 295.9 in The Netherlands. In Australia, phishing activity accounted for one
in 914.5 emails and one in 2,178 in Hong Kong; for Japan it was one in 8,115 and one in 2,474 for Singapore. In
Brazil, one in 445.7 emails was blocked as phishing and in South Africa the rate fell to 1 in 256.9 .
The Public Sector remained the most targeted by phishing activity in August , with one in 24.8 emails comprising a
phishing attack. Phis hing levels for the Chemical & Pharmaceutical sector reached one in 720.3 and one in 446.0 for
the IT Services sector; one in 410.5 for Retail, one in 94.4 for Education and one in 220.7 for Finance.
Analysis of Phishing Web sites
The number of phishing Web sites decreased by 6.7 5 percent in August . The number of phishing Web sites created
by automated toolkits decreased by about 18.3 percent. The number of unique phishing URLs also decreased by 1 .67
percent and phishing Web sites using IP addresses in place of domain names ( for example, http://255.255.255.255) ,
increased by 18. 34 percent. The use of legitimate Web services for hosting phishing Web sites accounted for
approximately 9 percent of all phishing Web sites , a decrease of 16.81 percent from the previous month. The number
of non -English phishing sites saw an increase of 9. 07 percent.
The most common non -English languages identified in phishing Web sites during August included Portuguese,
French, Italian and Spanish. 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010Sweden
United Kingdom
Malta
Norway
Belgium1in45.3
1in79.5
1in180.6
1in199.1
1in205.5Public Sector
Education
Non-Profit
Finance
Accom/Cateri ng1in24.8
1in94.4
1in215.8
1in220.7
1in281.11-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+1in205.5
1in315.2
1in418.9
1in414.1
1in443.5
1in165.1Phish ingRate
August 20111in207.7
1in319.3
1in273.2LastMonth:
SixMonthAvg.: Top5Geographies Top5Verticals ByHorizontal
2011
1
354
21in
207.7
UnitedStates 46.3%
UnitedKingdom 31.0%
Australia 5.1%
Germany 2.1%
Canada 1.6%
Netherlands 1.4%
HongKong 1.3%
SouthAfrica 0.8%
Singapore 0.8%
India 0.7%Page 17 of 25
Geographic Location of Phishing Web Sites
Tactics of Phishing Distribution
Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks, by Industry Sector
August 2011Phishing WebSites Locations
154 32Country July June
UnitedStates 49.8% 49.5%
Germany 6.5% 6.5%
UnitedKingdom 3.8% 3.7%
Canada 3.7% 3.3%
Russia 3.0% 2.7%
France 2.7% 3.1%
Brazil 2.6% 2.2%
Netherlands 2.3% 2.1%
Poland 1.6% 1.7%
China 2.5% 2.8%
1.6%8.7%6.1%56.9%26.8%
TyposquatngFreeWebHostngSitesIPAddressDomainsOtherUniqueDomainsAutomatedToolkits
88.8%
10.2%
0.2%
0.9%Financial
InformaonServices
Government
Others 0.5%
0.4%
<.0.1%
<.0.1%Retail
Communicaons
RetailTrade
ISPPage 18 of 25
Malware Analysis
Email -borne Threats
The global ratio of email -borne viruses in email traffic was one in 2 03.3 emails (0. 49 percent ) in August , an increase of
0.14 percentage points since July 2011.
In August , 37.1 percent of email -borne malware contained links to malicious Web sites, a decrease of 7 .6 percentage
points since July 2011. Continuing the widespread attacks that were identified in July, a large proportion of emails
contained generic polymorphic malware variants and accounted for 18.5 percent of all email -borne malware in August ,
compared with 23.7 percent in July; m any included attached ZIP files that contained the generic malware.
Email -borne malware attacks increased to one in 53.2 emails in Sweden, propelling the country to the top of the list
with the highest ratio of malicious emails in August . Luxembourg was the second most geography under fire in
August, with one in 85.1 emails was identified as malicious in August . In Sweden, 44.6 percent of email -borne
malware was identified as generic polymorphic malware, characteristic of that described i n the Symantec Intelligence
report14
In the UK one in 86.5 emails was blocked as malicious , and virus levels for email -borne malware reached one in 611.1
in the US and one in 219.6 in Canada. In Germany virus activity reached one in 369.2 , one in 444.4 in Denmark and
in The Netherlands one in 147.6. In Australia, one in 797.0 emails were malicious and one in 744.2 in Hong Kong; for
Japan it was one in 1,912, compared with one in 918.0 in Singapore. In Brazil, one in 392.3 emails in contained
malicious content and in South Africa the rate dropped to 1 in 160.7 . for July 2011.
With one in 24.0 emails being blocked as malicious, the Public Sector remained the most targeted industry in August .
Virus levels for the Chemical & Pharmaceutical sector were one in 334.6 and one in 345.3 for the IT Services sector;
one in 374.6 for Retail, one in 94.0 for Education and one in 383.0 for Finance.
14 http://www.symanteccloud.com/mlireport/SYMCINT_2011_07_July_FINAL- EN.pdf 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010Swede n
Luxem bourg
Unite dKingdom
Netherla nds
South Africa1in53.2
1in85.1
1in86.5
1in147.6
1in160.7Publi cSecto r
Educa tion
Non-Prof it
Marke ting/Media
Accom /Cate ring1in24.0
1in94.0
1in192.5
1in250.3
1in258.61-250
251-5 00
501-1 000
1001 -1500
1501- 2500
2501+1in222.5
1in288.7
1in300.8
1in344.1
1in304.0
1in166.4Virus Rate
August 20111in203.3
1in280.7
1in230.8LastMonth:
SixMonthAvg.: Top5Geographies Top5Verticals ByHorizontal
20111in
203.3
1
34
2UnitedStates 40.9%
UnitedKingdom 23.9%
Australia 6.3%
Germany 3.0%
Netherlands 2.8%
HongKong 2.4%
Japan 1.5%
Denmark 1.5%
India 1.2%
Canada 1.2%5Page 19 of 25
The table below shows the most frequently blocked email -borne malware for August , many of which take advantage of
malicious h yperlinks. Overall, 18.5 percent of email -borne malware was associated with variants of generic
polymorphic malware, including Bredolab, Sasfis, SpyEye and Zeus variants.
Malware Name % Malware
Exploit/SuspLink -e958 7.20%
W32/Bredolab.gen!eml 4.90%
Exploit/SuspLink.dam 4.34%
W32/Generic.dam 2.09%
W32/Generic -6ac4 2.06%
Exploit/MimeBoundary003 1.69%
W32/Netsky.c -mm 1.56%
Exploit/Link -e88c 1.47%
VBS/Generic 1.36%
W32/Netsky.P -mm 1.34%
Web -based Malware Threats
In August , Symantec Intelligence identified an average of 3 ,441 Web sites each day harboring malware and other
potentially unwanted programs including spyware and adware; a decrease of 49.4 percent since July 2011. T his
reflects the rate at which W eb sites are being compromised or created for the purpose of spreading malicious content.
Often this number is higher when W eb-based malware is in circulation for a longer period of time to widen its potential
spread and increase its longevity.
As detection for W eb-based malwar e increases, the number of new W eb sites blocked decreases and the proportion
of new malware begins to rise, but initially on fewer Web sites. Further analysis reveals that 3 4.6 percent of all
malicious domains blocked were new in August ; a de crease of 1 .3 percentage points compared with July 2011.
Additionally, 17.3 percent of all W eb-based malware blocked was new in August ; a decrease of 3 .8 percentage points
since the previous month.
The chart above shows the increase in the nu mber of new spyware and adware W eb sites blocked each day on
average during August compared with the equivalent number of Web -based malware W eb sites blocked each day.
Web Policy Risks from Inappropriate Use
The most common trigger for policy -based filtering applied by Symantec Web Security.cloud for its business clients
was for the “Advertisements & Popups” category, which accounted for 4 2.4 percent of blocked W eb activity in August .
Web-based advertisements pose a potential risk though the use of “malvertisements,” or malicious advertisements.
These may occur as the result of a legitimate online ad -provider being compromised and a banner ad being used to
serve malware on an otherwise harmless Web site.
The se cond most frequently blocked traffic was categorized as Social Networking, account ing for 17.6 percent of URL -
based filtering activity blocked, equivalent to approximately one in every six Web sites blocked. Many organizations
allow access to social networ king W eb sites, but facilitate access logging so that usage patterns can be tracked and in
some cases implement policies to only permit access at certain times of the day and block access at all other times. New Malware Sites perDay
New sites withspyware
New sites withweb viruses
Total94/day
3,347/day
3,441/day
2008 2009 2010 2011WebSecurity Services Activity:Page 20 of 25
This information is often used to address perfor mance management issues, perhaps in the event of lost productivity
due to social networking abuse.
Activity related to Streaming Media policies resulted in 8.2 percent of URL -based filtering blocks in August . Streaming
media is increasingly popular when t here are major sporting events or high profile international news stories, such as
the riots that affected the UK in August. This activity often result s in an increased number of blocks, as businesses
seek to preserve valuable bandwidth for other purposes. This rate is equivalent to one in every 12 Web sites blocked.
Endpoint Security Threats
The endpoint is often the last line of defense and analysis; however, the endpoint can often be the first -line of defense
against attacks that spread using USB storage devices and insecure network connections . The threats found here can
shed light on the wider nature of threats confronting businesses, especially from blended attacks and threats facing
mobile workers . Attacks reaching the endpoint are likely to ha ve already circumvented other layers of protection that
may already be deployed, such as gateway filtering.
The table below shows the malware most frequently blocked targeting endpoint devices for the last month. This
includes data from endpoint devices pr otected by Symantec technology around the world, including data from clients
which may not be using other layers of protection, such as Symantec Web Security.cloud or Symantec Email AntiVirus.cloud.
Malware Name15% Malware
W32.Ramnit!html 8.68%
W32.Sality.AE 8.44%
Trojan.Bamital 8.10%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 6.84%
W32.Downadup.B 3.63%
W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 2.59%
W32.Virut.CF 2.58%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 2.38%
W32.SillyFDC 1.75%
Trojan.ADH.2 1.74%
The most frequently blocked malware for the last month was W32.Ramnit!html. This is a generic detection for .HTML files infected by W32.Ramnit
16
15For further information on these threats, please visit: http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/landing/threats.jsp , a worm that spreads through removable drives and by infecting executable files. The
worm spreads by encrypting and then appending itself to files with .DLL, .EX E and .HTM extensions. Variants of the
Ramnit worm accounted for 1 5.8 percent of all malicious software blocked by endpoint protection technology in
August .
16 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010- 011922 -2056- 99&tabid=2 WebSecurity Services Activity:
Policy-Based Filtering
Advertisement andPopups
Social Networking
Streaming Media
Computing andInternet
Chat
Peer-T o-Peer
Search
Hosting Sites
GamesNewsWebViruses andTrojans
Trojan.Gen
Dropped:Rootki t.49324
Gen:V ariant.Dropper .26
VBS/Generic
Infostealer .Gampass
Trojan:GIF/GIFra me.gen!A
Dropped:T rojan.PWS.OnlineGames.KDVN
VBS.LoveLetter .CI
W32.Almanahe.B
Trojan.Script.474851Potentially Unwanted Prog
rams
PUP:Generic.1689 11
PUP:Generic.182547
PUP:Clkpotato!gen 4
PUP:Generic.178280
PUP:Agent.NGZ
PUP:Generic.183433
Application.Generi c.190952
PUP:SW .9231
PUP:Agent.NFU
PUP:Generic.173909
August 201142.4%
17.6%
8.2%4.4%
4.3%
2.1%
1.9%1.9%
1.7%
1.6%28.9%19.5%
7.3%6.6%
4.7%
4.2%
2.0%1.7%
1.1%
0.9%25.4%
6.5%5.8%
5.5%
4.4%
3.7%
3.7%
3.1%
2.7%
2.7%Page 21 of 25
For much of 2010, W32.Sality.AE17
Many new viruses and Trojans are based on earlier versions, where code has been copied or altered to create a new
strain, or variant. Often these variants are created using toolkits and hundreds of thousands of variants can be created
from the same piece of malware. This has become a popular tactic to evade signature- based detection, as each
variant would traditionally need its own signature to be correctly identified and blocked. had been the most prevalent malicious threat blocked at the endpoint.
By deploying techniques, such as heuristic analysis and generic detection, it ’s possible to correctly identify and block
several variants of the same malware families, as well as identify new forms of malicious code that seek to exploit certain vulnerabilities that can be identified generically. Approximat ely 17.4 percent of the most frequently blocked
malware last month was identified and blocked using generic detection.
17 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sality -whitepaper Page 22 of 25
Best Practice Guidelines for Enterprises
1. Employ defense- in-depth strategies : Emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive
systems to guard against single- point failures in any specific technology or protection method. This should
include the deployment of regularly updated firewalls, as well as gateway antivirus, intrusion detection,
intrusion protection systems, and Web security gateway solutions throughout the network.
2. Monitor for network threat, vulnerabilities and brand abuse. Monitor for network intrusions, propagation
attempts and other suspicious traffic patterns, identify attempted connections to known malici ous or
suspicious hosts. Receive alerts for new vulnerabilities and threats across vendor platforms for proactive remediation. Track brand abuse via domain alerting and fictitious site reporting.
3. Antivirus on endpoints is not enough: On endpoints, signatur e-based antivirus alone is not enough to
protect against today’s threats and Web -based attack toolkits. Deploy and use a comprehensive endpoint
security product that includes additional layers of protection including:
o Endpoint intrusion prevention that pr otects against un -patched vulnerabilities from being exploited,
protects against social engineering attacks and stops malware from reaching endpoints;
o Browser protection for protection against obfuscated Web -based attacks;
o Consider cloud -based malware prev ention to provide proactive protection against unknown threats;
o File and Web -based reputation solutions that provide a risk -and-reputation rating of any application
and Web site to prevent rapidly mutating and polymorphic malware;
o Behavioral prevention capabilities that look at the behavior of applications and malware and prevent malware;
o Application control settings that can prevent applications and browser plug -ins from downloading
unauthorized malicious content;
o Device control s ettings that prevent and limit the types of USB devices to be used.
4. Use encryption to protect sensitive data: Implement and enforce a security policy whereby sensitive data is
encrypted. Access to sensitive information should be restricted. This should inc lude a Data Loss Protection
(DLP) solution, which is a system to identify, monitor, and protect data. This not only serves to prevent data
breaches, but can also help mitigate the damage of potential data leaks from within an organization.
5. Use Data Loss Pr evention to help prevent data breaches: Implement a DLP solution that can discover
where sensitive data resides, monitor its use and protect it from loss. Data loss prevention should be
implemented to monitor the flow of data as it leaves the organization over the network and monitor copying
sensitive data to external devices or Web sites. DLP should be configured to identify and block suspicious
copying or downloading of sensitive data. DLP should also be used to identify confidential or sensitive data assets on network file systems and PCs so that appropriate data protection measures like encryption can be
used to reduce the risk of loss.
6. Implement a removable media policy. Where practical, restrict unauthorized devices such as external
portable hard -drives and other removable media. Such devices can both introduce malware as well as
facilitate intellectual property breaches —intentional or unintentional. If external media devices are permitted,
automatically scan them for viruses upon connection to the n etwork and use a DLP solution to monitor and
restrict copying confidential data to unencrypted external storage devices.
7. Update your security countermeasures frequently and rapidly: With more than 286M variants of malware
detected by Symantec in 2010, ent erprises should be updating security virus and intrusion prevention
definitions at least daily, if not multiple times a day.
8. Be aggressive on your updating and patching: Update, patch and migrate from outdated and insecure
browsers, applications and brows er plug- ins to the latest available versions using the vendors’ automatic
update mechanisms. Most software vendors work diligently to patch exploited software vulnerabilities;
however, such patches can only be effective if adopted in the field. Be wary of deploying standard corporate images containing older versions of browsers, applications, and browser plug -ins that are outdated and
insecure. Wherever possible, automate patch deployments to maintain protection against vulnerabilities
across the organizati on.
9. Enforce an effective password policy . Ensure passwords are strong; at least 8 -10 characters long and
include a mixture of letters and numbers. Encourage users to avoid re- using the same passwords on multiple
Web sites and sharing of passwords with othe rs should be forbidden. Passwords should be changed
regularly, at least every 90 days. Avoid writing down passwords. Page 23 of 25
10. Restrict email attachments: Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments
that are commonly used to spread viruses, such as .VBS, .BAT, .EXE, .PIF, and .SCR files. Enterprises
should investigate policies for .PDFs that are allowed to be included as email attachments.
11. Ensure that you have infection and incident response procedures in place :
o Ensure that you have your security vendors contact information, know who you will call, and what
steps you will take if you have one or more infected systems;
o Ensure that a backup -and-restore solution is in place in order to restore lost or compromised data in
the event of successful attack or catastrophic data loss;
o Make use of post -infection detection capabilities from Web gateway, endpoint security solutions and
firewalls to identify infected systems;
o Isolate infected computers to prevent the risk of further infection w ithin the organization;
o If network services are exploited by malicious code or some other threat, disable or block access to those services until a patch is applied;
o Perform a forensic analysis on any infected computers and restore those using trusted medi a.
12. Educate users on the changed threat landscape:
o Do not open attachments unless they are expected and come from a known and trusted source, and do not execute software that is downloaded from the Internet (if such actions are permitted) unless the downlo ad has been scanned for viruses;
o Be cautious when clicking on URLs in emails or social media programs, even when coming from trusted sources and friends;
o Do not click on shortened URLs without previewing or expanding them first using available tools and plug-ins;
o Recommend that users be cautious of information they provide on social networking solutions that
could be used to target them in an attack or trick them to open malicious URLs or attachments;
o Be suspicious of search engine results and only click t hrough to trusted sources when conducting
searches —especially on topics that are hot in the media;
o Deploy Web browser URL reputation plug- in solutions that display the reputation of Web sites from
searches;
o Only download software (if allowed) from corporate shares or directly from the vendors Web site;
o If users see a warning indicating that they are “infected” after clicking on a URL or using a s earch
engine (fake antivirus infections), have users close or quit the browser using Alt -F4, CTRL+W or the
task manager.
Page 24 of 25
Best Practice Guidelines for Users and Consumers
1. Protect yourself : Use a modern Internet security solution that includes the following capabilities for maximum
protection against malicious code and other threats:
o Antivirus (file and heuristic ba sed) and malware behavioral prevention can prevents unknown
malicious threats from executing;
o Bidirectional firewalls will block malware from exploiting potentially vulnerable applications and
services running on your computer;
o Intrusion prevention to prot ection against Web -attack toolkits, unpatched vulnerabilities, and social
engineering attacks;
o Browser protection to protect against obfuscated Web -based attacks;
o Reputation -based tools that check the reputation and trust of a file and Web site before dow nloading;
URL reputation and safety ratings for Web sites found through search engines.
2. Keep up to date : Keep virus definitions and security content updated at least daily if not hourly. By deploying
the latest virus definitions, you can protect your compu ter against the latest viruses and malware known to be
spreading in the wild. Update your operating system, Web browser, browser plug- ins, and applications to the
latest updated versions using the automatic updating capability of your programs, if availabl e. Running out -of-
date versions can put you at risk from being exploited by Web -based attacks.
3. Know what you are doing: Be aware that malware or applications that try to trick you into thinking your
computer is infected can be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file- sharing programs,
free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software.
o Downloading “free” “cracked” or “pirated” versions of software can also contain malware or include
social engineering attacks that in clude programs that try to trick you into thinking your computer is
infected and getting you to pay money to have it removed.
o Be careful which Web sites you visit on the Web. While malware can still come from mainstream Web
sites, it can easily come from l ess reputable sites sharing pornography, gambling and stolen software.
o Read end -user license agreements (EULAs) carefully and understand all terms before agreeing to
them as some security risks can be installed after an end user has accepted the EULA or because of
that acceptance.
4. Use an effective password policy: Ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers, and change
them often. Passwords should not consist of words from the dictionary. Do not use the same password for multiple applications or Web sites. Use complex passwords (upper/lowercase and punctuation) or
passphrases.
5. Think before you click: Never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless you expect it and trust
the sender. Even from trusted users, be suspicious.
o Be cautious w hen clicking on URLs in emails, social media programs even when coming from trusted
sources and friends. Do not blindly click on shortened URLs without expanding them first using
previews or plug- ins.
o Do not click on links in social media applications wit h catchy titles or phrases even from friends. If you
do click on the URL, you may end up “liking it” and sending it to all of your friends even by clicking anywhere on the page. Close or quit your browser instead.
o Use a Web browser URL reputation solution that shows the reputation and safety rating of Web sites
from searches. Be suspicious of search engine results; only click through to trusted sources when
conducting searches, especially on topics that are hot in the media.
o Be suspicious of warnings that pop -up asking you to install media players, document viewers and
security updates; only download software directly from the vendor’s Web site.
6. Guard your personal data : Limit the amount of personal information you make publicly available on the
Internet (in cluding and especially social networks) as it may be harvested and used in malicious activities
such as targeted attacks, phishing scams.
o Never disclose any confidential personal or financial information unless and until you can confirm that
any request for such information is legitimate.
|
Page 1 of 17
Symantec Intelligence
Symantec Intelligence Report : August 2012
Data breaches; Fake antivirus warning appears to come from Symantec; New attacks from old groups
Welcome to the August edition of the Symantec Intelligence report , which provides the latest analysis of cyber security
threats, trends , and insights from the Symantec Intelligence team concerning malware, spam, and other potentially
harmful business risks. The data used to c ompile the analysis for this report includes data from May 2011 through
August 2012.
Report highlights
• Spam – 72.3 percent (an increase of 4.7 percentage points since July): page 9
• Phishing – One in 312.9 emails identified as phishing (a n increase of 0.109 percentage points since July ): page 12
• Malware – One in 233.1 emails contained malware ( a decrease of 0.14 percentage points since July ): page 13
• Malicious Web site s – 1,099 websites blocked per day ( a decrease of 49.8 percent since July): page 15
• The state of data breaches to date in 2012: page 2
• A look at a malicious email scam that pretends to come from Symantec : page 6
• A new Java zero-day vulnerability appears in the wild: page 7
• An overview of the Elderwood Project: page 8
Introduction
In this month’s report we focus on data breaches —security incidents where user information becomes publically
exposed or stolen. We compare what has happened in 2012 to a similar period in 2011, going back to the beginning of
the Operation AntiSec campaign last year.
We also highlight an interesting attempt to install malicious software through an email spam campaign, appearing to come from Symantec. The spam emails attempt to trick ing users into believing they have a worm on their computer
and then download ing a tool that will remove it. If the file is downloaded and executed, an information- stealing Trojan
is installed.
Finally, we discuss two new attacks coming from well -known attacker groups. First up is a new zero- day vulnerability
in Java that is currently being used in the wild by the same folks that were behind last year’s Nitro attacks. Then we
provide an overview of the Eldderwood Project —a series of attacks carried out by the same folks that were behind the
“Aurora” or Hydraq attacks .
I hope you enjoy reading this month’s edition of the report, and please feel free to contact me directly with any
comments or feedback.
Paul Wood, Cyber Security Intelligence Manager
[email protected]
@paulowoody
Page 2 of 17
Report analysis
Data Breaches in 2012
In the spring of 2011, a hacking campaign began, dubbed Operation AntiSec1. Launched by the hacker collectives
Anonymous and LULZSEC , the operation has carried out a long string of data breaches from a number of very
prominent organizations , and continues to release data to this day .2 While the existence of hacks exposing the private
information of users stored by various organizations was not new, we had not previously seen the volume and fanfare
around data breaches . It seemed that with each new day, a new breach made headlines —often times with the number
of identities exposed in the hundreds of thousands, if not millions.
Data breaches are a serious issue for an organization. The exposure of customer data can lead to a loss of
confidence in the organization by its users . Even worse, the organization could find themselves in violation of data
privacy laws or on the receiving end of a lawsuit created by its users.
So while AntiSec data breaches are still making the news a year later, has the data breach climate improved overall ?
Are there more or less data breaches occurring? Are the numbers of data breaches rising or falling? We’ll take a look
at all of these points, and more.
In order to carry out our analysis of data breaches we took a look at the data collected by Symantec’s Norton
Cybercrime Index3 (CCI). The Nort on CCI is a statistical model which measures the levels of threats including
malicious software, fraud, identity theft, spam, phishing and social engineering daily. The data breach section of the Norton CCI is derived from data breaches that have been reported by legitimate media sources and have exposed
personal information, including name, address, Social Security numbers, credit card numbers, or medical history.
Using publicly available data the Norton CCI determines the sectors that were most often affected by data breaches, as well as the most common causes of data loss.
In order to make an accurate comparison, we examined data starting in late spring 2011 through the end of the year.
We compared this data against a similar eight -month period from January through August of 2012. Comparing these
2011 and 2012 data sets helped identify data breach trends in 2012 to date.
Overall, the number of breaches during the same two periods is fairly consistent. The average number of breaches per month is down slight ly, but not by statistically wide margin. The average number of breaches per month was 16.5
in our 2011 data set, while in 2012 this number dropped to 14.
The average number of identities stolen is down during the same period. In the last eight months of 2011 the average
number of identities stolen was 1,311,629 per data breach. So far in 2012, this number is down to 640,169 identities
per breach —that’s a drop of more than half.
The reasons for this drastic drop in average number identities stolen point to the fact that, while the overall number of attacks where about the same, there number of records stolen in the biggest attacks in 2011 was much larger. The top
five breaches in our 2011 data set all registered in the tens of millions of identities. In 2012, only one breach registered above 10 million.
It’s tough to say exactly why there were fewer breaches of this size. It could indicate that after a few high- profile hacks
in 2011, many large companies took steps to shelter their customer record databases from internet attacks. It could also be that hackers aren’t going after the largest data breaches they can pull off, but rather smaller breaches that
contain more sensitive information.
We may not see the sheer numbers of attacks per month like we did in our 2011 data set, but that doesn’t mean that
the threat has passed. Rather, it’s possible data breaches today have simply become more targeted. While the
numbers in 2012 are down compared to 2011—even hitting a low in February of this year —they do appear to be on
an upward trajectory.
1 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_AntiSec
2 http://news.cnet.com/8301- 1009_3- 57505925- 83/fbi -finds -no-evidence- that-antisec -hacked- its-laptop
3 http://us.norton.com/protect -yourself/promo Page 3 of 17
Figure 1 – Number of data breaches per m onth in 2012 to date
The biggest issue we encounter when looking at data breach numbers is the wild variance in the number of records
from one breach to the next. In one instance there can be over a million identities stolen; in another there could be
less than 10 identities stolen. This sort of variance makes the overall number of stolen i dentities harder to qualify and
determine overall trends.
A few high- volume breaches in the 2011 data brought the average up overall. With this in mind, another way to look at
this information would be by the median number of identities per breach. The median of identities stolen in 2012 is 6,800 per breach. That’s 41% higher than the previous eight months , at 4,000 per breach. Looking at the numbers this
way, it appears that the number of identities stolen in each breach is up.
This shows that while the overall average number of identities stolen is down, the core number of identities stolen, when accounti ng for variance, is increasing over time. This could indicate that the attackers are going after more
select, targeted batches of data, as opposed to making off with big- number caches of data. The information that they
are stealing could very well be small er in size, but more useful for criminal activities.
Figure 2 – Number of identities breached per month in 2012 to date 05101520
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug
30.7m
1.1m 144,318 2.8m 921,486 8.2m 13.4m
3.6m
0m5m10m15m20m25m30m35m
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul AugPage 4 of 17
We know that not all data breaches are the result of cybercrime. Sometimes a laptop containing sensitive data is
stolen simply to resell the hardware. Other times hardware is simply lost, never making its way back to the owner. I n
some cases website coding mistakes accidentally expose private data to the public.
Are private identities exposed during data breaches generally the result of hackers deliberately stealing data? As it
turns out, the answer is overwhelmingly ” yes.” A whopping 88% of all identities stolen in data breaches during 2012
have been the result of hackers. The same was true for our 2011 data set, though the number for has grown —up 14%
from 74% in May through December of 2011.
Figure 3 – Top causes for data breach by number of identities exposed in 2012 to date
However, while this shows who is responsible for the most identities exposed overall from data breaches, it can be
skewed by individual breaches that are larger in size. Let’s look at the same data, but based on the number of
breaches instead.
Hackers are still responsible for the highest number of data breaches at 40%, but other methods resulted in a majority of breaches overall. In fact, roughly 1 out of every 5 breaches was caused by the accidental exposure of data. The
same can be said for theft or loss of hardware. So, while hackers are responsible for the largest number of data
breaches and identities stolen, there are other factors that result in a large number of data breaches overall.
Figure 4 – Top causes for data breach by number of breaches in 2012 to date
We also examined which industries had the most data breaches. We divided the overall number of identities breached
within an industry by the total number of breaches in that industry.
So which industries are responsible for the most data breaches? In our 2011 data set, information technology and computer software were top of the list, making up about 80% of total breaches. It seems these industries have done
much to improve their standing, having been surpassed by the retail trade and telecoms in numbers of identities
stolen. Hackers88.4%Theft Or Loss8.9%Unknown 1.9%Insider The ft0.39%Accidentally Made Public 0.37%
Hackers40.6%Accidentally
Made Public
21.4%Thef t Or Loss18.8%Insider The ft8.0%Unknown 7.1%Page 5 of 17
Figure 5 – Top sectors by number of identities exposed in 2012 to date
However, while this shows the number of identities exposed overall, it can also be influenced by particularly large
breaches with high numbers of identities exposed. To compare, let’s take a look at how the sectors break down by
numbers of breaches.
In this c ase, the healthcare industry tops the list for number of overall breaches, with 34.1 % of the overall number of
breaches. Contrast this with the fact that this industry is only responsible for 2.7% of the overall number of identities
exposed. Given the sens itive nature of medical records, this is a perfect example of a high number of attacks that
result in small numbers of highly sensitive records being exposed.
Figure 6 – Top sectors by number of data breaches in 2012 to date
So how does the state of the data breach landscape look now when compared to our 2011 data set? Overall it’s a
mixed bag. There’s little doubt that hackers are responsible for the majority of data breaches occurring today, though the number of overall breaches remains about the same. Some industries have made strides to reduce their exposure,
while new ones have found themselves the victim. And while the size of the average attack has dropped, it could be
that attackers are simply targeting smaller caches of more valuable information. It appears that there is still much work
to be done in order to bring down the overall numbers of data breaches.
Retail 40%Telecom 15%Computer So ftware 13%Accounting 11%Government 8%Financial 4.5%Healthcare 2.7%Information Technolo gy2.6%Social Ne tworking 2.6%Computer Hardware 0.7%
Healthcare 34.1%Computer So ftware 14.3%Education 11.0%Accounting 8.8%Information Technolo gy6.6%Government 6.6%Telecom 5.5%Retail 4.4%Computer Hardware 4.4%Financial 4.4%Page 6 of 17
Fake virus notification using Symantec logo
By Nicholas Johnston
We recently saw some malicious fake antivirus software. Such software often goes by generic names like “Windows
Defender” or similar, but this particular software claims to be a Symantec product. An email claims that not only is the
recipient infected— all users on the same network are as well. The email uses out -of-date Symantec branding, and
links to a malicious application called RemovalTool.exe. Symantec does not produce a tool like this, nor does it email
users in this way.
Figure 7 – Fake email pretending to come from Symantec
If a user downloads and executes the tool, a di alog box posing as a Java update, appears :
Figure 8 – Fake Java installation dialog box
One clue that this is a fake update is that it refers to Sun Microsystems , which developed Java, but was acquired by
Oracle several years ago. In addition, the instal ler isn’t digitally signed. Compare this with a screenshot of the
legitimate Java updater:
Page 7 of 17
Figure 9 – Real Java installation dialog box
While the email may give the impression of being fake antivirus software , once installed the threat does not claim t hat
the computer is infected. There are no visual indications that anything has been installed, though this might meet user
expectations as the installer claims to be a simple removal tool, rather than a complete antivirus product. The malware
downloads an information- stealing Trojan, which is detected as Infostealer .4
Special thanks to Sian John for reporting the scam.
Java Zero -Day Used in Targeted Attack Campaign
The following is an abridged version of two blog entries from the Security Response blog, published on 28 August &
30 August .
FireEy e recently documented5 a Java zero- day vulnerability ( CVE-2012- 46816) in the wild that is thought to have been
used initially in targeted attacks. Symantec is aware that attackers have been using this zero- day vulnerability since
22 August. We have located two compromised websites serving up the malware:
• ok.[REMOVED].net/meeting/applet.jar
• 62.152.104.[REMOVED]/public/meeting/applet.jar
One sample of malware downloaded by the exploit has been identified as Trojan.Dropper7 (MD5
4a55bf1448262bf71707eef7fc168f7d). This particular sample connects to hello.icon.pk, which resolves to
223.25.233.244.
The Java exploit is be ing detected by Symantec as Java.Awetook .8 The vulnerability consists of a privilege escalation
due to a class that allows access to protected members of system classes, which should not be accessible. Because
of this, malicious code can bypass the restrictions imposed by the sandbox and use the " getRuntime().exec() " function
in order to execute a malicious payload. In our tests, we have confirmed that the zero- day vulnerability works on the
4 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2000- 122016- 0558 -99
5 http://blog.fireeye.com/research/2012/08/zero- day-season- is-not-over-yet.html
6 http://cve.mitre.org/cgi -bin/cvename.cgi?name=2012- 4681
7 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2002- 082718- 3007 -99
8 http://www.symantec.com/security_res ponse/writeup.jsp?docid=2012- 082715- 0841 -99
Page 8 of 17
latest version of Java (JRE 1.7), but it does not work on the older version JRE 1.6. A proof of concept for the exploit
has been published and the vulnerability has already been added in Metasploit.
Not only that, but this Jav a zero- day vulnerability has also been used in a targeted attack campaign. In October 2011,
we documented a particular campaign – The Nitro Attacks .9 In that instance, the attackers were primarily targeting
chemical companies. Despite our work in uncovering and publishing the details behind these attacks, the attackers
continued undeterred and even used our own report in their social en gineering campaign !
The attackers have escalated their efforts, using this new Java zero- day vulnerability. We can confirm that some of the
attackers behind this round of attacks are actually the Nitro gang.
The traditional modus operandi of the Nitro attackers is to send an email to victims. That email contains an
attachment, which is a password- protected self -extracting zip file. The email claims to be an update for some piece of
commonly installed software. The targeted user extracts it, runs it, and is infected with a copy of Backdoor.Darkmoon
10 (also known as Poison Ivy).
In these latest attacks, the attackers have developed a somewhat more sophisticated technique. They are using a
Java zero- day, hosted as a .jar file on websites, to infect victims. As in the previous documented attacks, the attackers
are using Backdoor.Darkmoon, re- using command- and-control infrastructure, and even re- using file names such as
“Flash_update.exe”. It is likely that the attackers are sending targeted users emails containing a link to the malicious
jar file. The Nitro attackers appear to be continuing with their previous campaign.
As of 30 August, Oracle released an out-of-band patch11 for CVE- 2012- 4681 . Java users are advised to download the
patch immediately.
The Elderwood Project
Symantec Security Response has recently published new research12 about the activities of a group that has carried
out targeted attacks over the last three years. The group first rose to prominence in 2009 with the “Aurora” or Hydraq
attacks .13 Security Response has dubbed this campaign the “Elderwood Project”, based on a variable used in the
source code by the attackers.
What sets the Elderwood Project aside from most targeted attacks is its heavy reliance on zero- day vulnerabilities.
While most targeted attacks rely on malicious email attachments or known vulnerabilities (as we recently discussed in
the June Intelligence Report14), Elderwood has used eight zero- day vulnerabilities over the last three years.
The attackers also make use of an exploitation technique call ed a “watering hole attack”. In this scenario, the
attackers compromise a website that caters to the interests of people working within the targeted organization. The attackers then wait for the target to come to them, rather than explicitly going after the target, in much the same way a predator in the savanna lies in wait for its prey near a source of water.
For more information on the Elderwood Project, such as who may be behind it, what their motivations are, and who are the main targets, download The Elderwood Project
15 whitepaper.
9 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the_nitro_attacks.pdf
10 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005- 081910- 3934 -99
11 http://www.java.com /en/download/index.jsp
12 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/elderwood- project
13 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010- 011114- 1830 -99
14 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/b- intelligence_report_06_2012.en- us.pdf
15 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the- elderwood- project.pdf Page 9 of 17
Global Trends & Content Analysis
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the world through the
Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network, which is made up of more than 64.6 million attack sensors and records
thousands of events per second. This network monitors attack activity in more than 200 countries and territories
through a combination of Symantec products and services such as Symantec DeepSight™ Threat Management
System, Symantec™ Managed Security Services and Norton™ consumer products, and other third- party data
sources.
In addition, Symantec maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting
of more than 47,662 recorded vulnerabilities (spanning more than two decades) from over 15,967 vendors
representing over 40,006 products.
Spam, phishing and malware data is captured through a variety of sources, including the Symantec Probe Network, a
system of more than 5 million decoy accounts; Symantec.cloud and a number of other Symantec security
technologies. Skeptic™, the Symantec.cloud proprietary heuristic tec hnology is able to detect new and sophisticated
targeted threats before reaching customers’ networks. Over 8 billion email messages and more than 1.4 billion Web
requests are processed each day across 15 data centers. Symantec also gathers phishing information through an
extensive antifraud community of enterprises, security vendors, and more than 50 million consumers.
These resources give Symantec’s analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze, and provide
informed commentary on e merging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and spam. The result is the
annual Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, which gives enterprises and consumers the essential information to
secure their systems effectively now and into the future.
Spam Analysis
In August , the global ratio of spam in email traffic rose by 4.7 percentage point since July , to 72.3 percent ( 1 in 1.38
emails ).
Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Saudi Arabia
Norway
China
Oman
Brazil 83.3%
78.1%
77.6%
77.3%
76.7% Education
Non-Profit
Marketing/Media
Engineering
Gov/Public Sector 75.6%
74.3%
74.3%
74.3%
73.7% 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 73.3%
72.9%
72.6%
73.1%
72.5%
72.8% Spam Rate
August 2012 72.3%
72.3% 67.6%
67.2% Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012
25.7%
15.2%
5.3%
4.9%
4.6%
4.2%
2.0%
1.4%
1.4%
1.3% Saudi Arabia
India
Turkey
Canada
United States
Brazil
Viet Nam
Russian Federation
Korea (South)
ArgentinaPage 10 of 17
Global Spam Categories
The most common category of spam in August is related to the Sex/Dating category , with 42.51 percent.
Category Name August
2012 July
2012
Sex/Dating 42.51% 23.46%
Pharma 32.61% 12.87%
Watches 8.55% 2.40%
Jobs 6.85% 1.52%
Software 5.86% 1.54%
Casino 1.60% 0.50%
419/scam/lotto 0.76% 0.08%
Degrees 0.60% 0.18%
Mobile 0.48% 0.07%
Weight Loss 0.11% 0.14%
Newsletters 0.07% 57.22%
Spam URL Distribution based on Top Level Domain Name
The proportion of spam exploiting URLs in the .com top- level domain increased in August , as highlighted in the table
below. The .info top- level domain also made the list this month, pushing.br out of the top four .
TLD August
2012 July
2012
.com 64.6% 63.9%
.net 8.3% 6.9%
.ru 7.0% 8.3%
.info 3.1% N/A
Average Spam Message Size
In August , the proportion of spam emails that were 5KB in size or less decreased by 3.4 percentage points.
Furthermore, the proportion of spam messages that were greater than 10K B in size decrease d by 1.1 percent , as can
be seen in the following table.
Message Size August
2012 July
2012
0Kb – 5Kb 44.3% 47.7%
5Kb – 10Kb 30.2% 25.8%
>10Kb 25.5% 26.6%
Spam Attack Vectors
August highlights the decrease in spam emails resulting in NDRs (spam related non- delivery reports) . In these cases,
the recipient email addresses are invalid or bounced by their service provider. Page 11 of 17
NDR spam, as shown in the chart above, is often as a result of widespread dictionary attacks during spam campaigns ,
where spammers make use of databases containing first and last names and combine them to generate random email
addresses . A higher -level of activity is indicative of spammers that are seeking to build their distribution lists by
ignoring the invalid recipient emails in the bounce- backs . The list can then be used for more targeted s pam attacks
containing malicious attachment s or link s. This might indicate a pattern followed by spammers in harvesting the email
addresses for some months and using those addresses for targeted attacks in other months. 0.0%4.5%9.0%
NDR MalwarePage 12 of 17
Phishing Analysis
In August , the global phishing rate inc reased by 0.109 percentage points, taking the global average rate to one in
312.9 emails ( 0.32 percent) that comprised some form of phishing attack.
Analysis of Phishing Web sites
Overall phishing in creased by about 9.44 percent this month. Unique domains increased by about 38 percent as
compared to the previous month. Phishing websites that used automated toolkits decreased by 7 percent.
Phishing websites with IP domains (for e.g. domains like http://255.255.255.255) increased by about 24 percent.
Webhosting services comprised of 3 percent of all phishing, a decrease of 13 percent from the previous month. The
number of non- English phishing sites decreased by 51 percent. Among non- English phishing sites, Portuguese,
French, Italian , and Chinese were highest in August .
Geographic Location of Phishing Web Sites
Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Netherlands
South Africa
United Kingdom
Canada
Denmark 1 in 122.6
1 in 140.3
1 in 140.8
1 in 343.6
1 in 464.0 Public Sector
Finance
Education
Accom/Catering
Building/Cons 1 in 83.1
1 in 110.9
1 in 232.5
1 in 304.6
1 in 368.4 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 1 in 295.8
1 in 571.0
1 in 704.0
1 in 629.0
1 in 1,109.9
1 in 232.5 Phishing Rate
August 2012 1 in 312.9
1 in 312.9 1 in 475.3
1 in 466.5 Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012
37.3%
28.9%
15.9%
4.8%
3.9%
3.5%
1.7%
1.0%
0.7%
0.3% United States
United Kingdom
New Zealand
Australia
Canada
India
Korea, Republic of
Sweden
South Africa
Hong Kong
August 2012 Phishing Web Sites Locations
*Note: Data lags one monthCountry July* June
UnitedStates 52.0%
Germany 6.0%
UnitedKingdom 4.1%
Brazil 3.2%
France 2.9%Canada 3.4%
Russia 2.5%
Spain 1.2%Netherlands 2.3%
Poland 1.4%50.0%
6.4%
4.4%
3.7%
2.9%2.9%
2.9%
0.9%2.3%
1.4%Page 13 of 17
Tactics of Phishing Distribution
Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks, by Industry
TyposquattingFree Web Hosting SitesIP Address DomainsOther Unique DomainsAutomated Toolkits
0.001% 0.003% 0.008% 0.009% 0.17% 0.27% 0.40% 0.52% 27.01% 32.31% 39.31%
SecurityRetail TradeISPInsuranceGovernmentCommunicationsRetailTelecommunicationsBankingInformation ServicesE-CommercePage 14 of 17
Malware Analysis
Email -borne Threats
The global ratio of email -borne viruses in email traffic was one in 233.1 emails ( 0.4 percent ) in August , a decrease of
0.14 percentage points since July .
In August , 19.6 percent of email -borne malware contained links to malicious website s, 6.9 percentage points lower
than July.
Frequently Blocked E mail-borne Malware
The table below shows the most frequently blocked email -borne malware for August , many of which relate to generic
variants of malicious attachments and malicious hy perlinks distributed in emails. Approximately 37.6 percent of all
email -borne malware was identified and blocked using generic detection.
Malware identified generically as aggressive strains of polymorphic malware accounted for 18.2 percent of all email -
borne malware blocked in August .
Malware Name % Malware
W32/Bredolab.gen!eml.j 16.05%
Exploit/Link -generic -ee68 7.44%
W32/NewMalware -Generic 7.40%
W32/Bredolab.gen!eml.k 6.88%
W32/Bredolab.gen!eml.l 5.43%
HTML/JS -Encrypted.gen 4.50%
W32/ BouncedNastyMail.gen.dam 2.56%
W32/NewMalware -ee73 2.09%
Exploit/BouncedGeneric 1.64%
Exploit.DarkPath.loc 1.53%
The top- ten list of most frequently blocked malware accounted for approximately 55.5 percent of all email -borne
malware blocked in August . Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Netherlands
United Kingdom
Austria
Hungary
Canada 1 in 107.7
1 in 115.1
1 in 178.3
1 in 212.0
1 in 276.3 Public Sector
Education
Accom/Catering
Finance
Marketing/Media 1 in 54.0
1 in 111.0
1 in 157.7
1 in 161.0
1 in 200.9 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 1 in 251.0
1 in 283.8
1 in 339.1
1 in 262.6
1 in 474.1
1 in 188.9Virus Rate
August 2012 1 in 233.1
1 in 233.1 1 in 340.9
1 in 324.6 Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012
53.2%
23.3%
5.1%
3.1%
2.4%
1.7%
1.6%
1.4%
1.4%
1.3% United Kingdom
United States
Brazil
Australia
Sweden
South Africa
Japan
India
Netherlands
Hong KongPage 15 of 17
Web -based Malware Threats
In August , Symantec Intelligence identified an average of 1,099 website s each day harboring malware and other
potentially unwanted programs including spyware and adware; a decrease of 49.8 percent since July. This reflects the
rate at which website s are being compromised or created for the purpose of spreading malicious content. Of ten this
number is higher when Web-based malware is in circulation for a longer period of time to widen its potential spread
and incr ease its longevity.
As detection for Web- based malwar e increases, the number of new websites blocked decreases and the proportion of
new malware begins to rise, but initially on fewer websites . Further analysis reveals that 41.8 percent of all malicious
domains blocked were new in August ; a decrease of 11.7 percentage points compared with July . Additionally, 10.3
percent of all Web- based malware blocked was new in August ; a decrease of 1.8 percentage points since July .
The chart above shows the decrease in the number of new spyware and adware websites blocked each day on
average during August compared with the equivalent number of Web- based malware websites blocked each day.
Web Policy Risks from Inappropriate Use
Some of t he most common trigger s for poli cy-based filtering applied by Symantec Web Security.cloud for its business
clients are s ocial networking, advertisements and popus, and streaming media category . Many organizations allow
access to social networking websites , but facilitate access logging s o that usage patterns can be tracked and in some
cases implement policies to only permit access at certain times of the day and block access at all other times. Web -
based advertisements pose a potential risk though the use of “malvertisements,” or malicious advertisements. These
may occur as the result of a legitimate online ad- provider being compromised and a banner ad being used to serve
malware on an otherwise harmless webs ite. Streaming media is increasingly popular when there are major sporting
events or high profile international news stories . This activity often result s in an increased number of blocks, as
businesses seek to preserve valuable bandwidth for other purposes.
Endpoint Security Threats
The endpoint is often the last line of defense and analysis; however, the endpoint can often be the first -line of defense
against attacks that spread using USB storage devices and insecure network connections . The threats found here can
shed light on the wider nature of threats confronting businesses, especially from blended attacks and threats facing New Malware Sites per Day
New sites with spyware
New sites with web viruses
Total11/day
1,088/day
1,099/dayWeb Security Services Activity:
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
August 2012
Web Security Services Activity:
Policy-Based Filtering
Social Networking
Advertisement and Popups
Streaming Media
Computing and Internet
Chat
Peer- To-Peer
Hosting Sites
Search
News
GamesWebViruses and Trojans
Trojan.JS.Iframe.BPN
Suspicious.Pythia
Trojan.Generic.4315639
JS:Trojan.Crypt.FC
Trojan.JS.Iframe.B RV
Gen: Trojan.Heu r.PT.Ci4abmtlSyo
Trojan.Maljava!gen23
Trojan.JS.Agent.GHF
Trojan.JS.Agent.GLM
Trojan. Webkit!html Potentially Unwanted Programs
PUP:Generic.183433
PUP:Clkpotato!gen3
Gen:Application.Heur
PUP:Mediafinder
PUP:Agent.NLK
PUP:9231
PUP:Crossid
PUP:Android/DroidRoote r.G
PUP:Relevant.BH
PUP:Generic.183457
August 2012 30.2%
30.0%
8.4%
4.1%
4.0%
2.9%
2.7%
1.9%
1.6%
1.5%11.8%
9.7%
6.8%
5.5%
5.1%
4.8%
3.8%
2.6%
2.4%
2.3% 9.3%
7.4%
6.0%
4.3%
4.1%
3.8%
3.6%
3.6%
3.6%
3.1%Page 16 of 17
mobile workers . Attacks reaching the endpoint are likely to have already circumvented other layers of protection that
may already be deployed, such as gateway filtering.
The table below shows the malware most frequently blocked targeting endpoint devices for the last month. This
includes data from endpoint devices protected by Symantec technology around the world, including data from clients
which may not be using other layers of protection, such as Symantec Web Security.cloud or Symantec Email
AntiVirus.cloud.
Malware Name16 % Malware
W32.Sality.AE 6.78%
W32.Ramnit!html 5.99%
W32.Ramnit.B 4.78%
W32.Downadup.B 4.54%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 3.44%
W32.Virut.CF 2.15%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 2.05%
W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 1.40%
W32.Mabezat.B 1.06%
W32.Virut!html 1.05%
For much of 2012 , variants of W32.Sality.AE
17 and W32.Ramnit18 had been the most prevalent malicious threat s
blocked at the endpoint. Variants of W32.Ramnit accounted for approximately 14.4 percent of all malware blocked at
the endpoint in August , compared with 7.4 percent for all variants of W32.Sality.
Approximately 43.9 percent of the most frequently blocked malware last month was identified and blocked using
generic detection. Many new viruses and Trojans are based on earlier versions, where code has been copied or altered to create a new strain, or variant. Often these variants are created using toolkits and hundreds of thousands of
variants can be created from the same piece of malware. This has become a popular tactic to evade signature- based
detection, as each variant would traditionally need its own signature to be correctly identified and blocked.
By deploying techniques, such as heuristic analysis and generic detection, it ’s possible to correctly identify and block
several variants of the same malware families, as well as identify new forms of malicious code that seek to exploit certain vulnerabilities that can be identified generically.
16For further information on these threats, please visit: http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/landing/threats.jsp
17 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006- 011714- 3948 -99
18 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010- 011922- 2056 -99
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
AUGUST 2014p. 2
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2014
CONTENTS
3 Summary
4 TARGETED ATTACKS + DATA BREACHES
5 Targeted Attacks
5 Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing
Emails
5 Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of
Targeted Organization
5 Average Number of Spear-Phishing
Attacks Per Day
6 Top-Ten Industries Targeted
in Spear-Phishing Attacks
7 Data Breaches
7 Timeline of Data Breaches
8 Total Identities Exposed
8 Top Causes of Data Breaches
8 Total Data Breaches
9 Top-Ten Types of Information Breached
10 MALWARE TACTICS
11 Malware Tactics
11 Top-Ten Malware
11 Top-Ten Mac OSX Malware Blocked on OSX Endpoints
12 Ransomware Over Time
12 Malicious Activity by Source: Bots
13 Vulnerabilities
13 Number of Vulnerabilities
13 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
14 Browser Vulnerabilities
14 Plug-in Vulnerabilities15 SOCIAL MEDIA
+ MOBILE THREATS
16 Mobile
16 Mobile Malware Families by Month,
Android
17 Mobile Threat Classifications
18 Social Media
18 Social Media
19 PHISHING, SPAM + EMAIL THREATS
20 Phishing and Spam
20 Phishing Rate
20 Global Spam Rate
21 Email Threats
21 Proportion of Email Traffic
Containing URL Malware
21 Proportion of Email Traffic
in Which Virus Was Detected
22 About Symantec
22 More Informationp. 3
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2014
Summary
Welcome to the August edition of the
Symantec Intelligence report. Symantec
Intelligence aims to provide the latest
analysis of cyber security threats, trends,
and insights concerning malware, spam, and
other potentially harmful business risks.
Symantec has established the most
comprehensive source of Internet threat
data in the world through the Symantec™
Global Intelligence Network, which is made
up of more than 41.5 million attack sensors
and records thousands of events per second.
This network monitors threat activity in
over 157 countries and territories through
a combination of Symantec products and
services such as Symantec DeepSight™
Threat Management System, Symantec™
Managed Security Services, Norton™
consumer products, and other third-party
data sources. As reported in the ISTR Volume 19 , 2013 saw a 500 percent
increase in ransomware in the latter part of the year. Overall
ransomware levels remained high through March 2014, and
then slowly started to decline, in part due to the disruption of
the GameOver Zeus botnet back in late May.
In contrast, crypto-style ransomware has seen a 700 percent-
plus increase. These file-encrypting versions of ransomware
began the year comprising 1.2 percent of all ransomware detec -
tions, but now make up 31 percent at the end of August. One
variant known as Trojan.Cryptodefense began to appear in large
numbers in early June. By the end of July, it made up 77 percent
of all crypto-style ransomware for the year to date. This follows
predictions in the ISTR saying this type of malware would
become more common in 2014.
Over 31.5 million identities were reported exposed in August,
from 12 incidents. The jump in exposed identities is due to a
large breach in South Korea, comprising 27 million identities. In
the last 12 months 53 percent of data breaches were caused by
hacking and 21 percent were accidentally made public.
The average number of spear-phishing emails blocked each day
for August was 20, compared with 54 in July and 88 in June. This
is below the year-to-date average of 86, which is slightly higher
than the daily average of 84 for all if 2013.
The most frequently used malicious file types in these email-
based targeted attacks were .exe and .doc file types, with .exe
attachments coming out on top this month at 31.8 percent. 29
percent of spear phishing emails were sent to Manufacturing,
returning it to the top of the industries targeted.
One in 1,587 emails was identified as a phishing attempt,
compared with one in 1,298 for July and one in 496 in June.
While at first glance this looks like a big drop, it is not indica -
tive of a wider trend just yet, resulting in only a 0.01 percentage
point decrease in the overall phishing rate.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to
contact us with any comments or feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat Analyst
[email protected]. 4
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2014
TARGETED ATTACKS
+ DATA BREACHESp. 5
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2014
At a Glance
• The average number of
spear-phishing attacks
dropped to 20 per day in
August, the lowest seen in
the last twelve months.
• The .exe file type was the
most common attachment
type used in spear-phishing
attacks, followed by .doc
files.
• Organizations with 2500+
employees were the most
likely to be targeted in
August.
• Manufacturing lead the
Top-Ten Industries targeted,
followed by Professional
Services.Targeted Attacks
Average Number of Spear-Phishing
Attacks Per Day
Source: Symantec :: SEPTEMBER 2013 — AUGUST 2014
A J J M A M F J
2014D N O S54
21 20116
54141
84 84
5488103165
Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing
Emails
Source: Symantec :: AUGUST 2014
Executable type August July
.exe 31.8% 15.10%
.doc 22.8% 19.90%
.txt 9.6% --
.rtf 7.7% --
.scr 4.4% 5.60%
.class 4.2% 2.40%
.pdf 2.8% 2.00%
.tjv 1.1% --
.com 0.8% --
.fas 0.7% --Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size
of Targeted Organization
Source: Symantec :: AUGUST 2014
Organization Size August July
1-250 28.8% 35.7%
251-500 7.8% 8.5%
501-1000 4.6% 9.0%
1001-1500 6.3% 3.1%
1501-2500 4.6% 4.1%
2500+ 47.8% 39.6%p. 6
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2014
Top-Ten Industries Targeted in
Spear-Phishing Attacks
Source: Symantec :: AUGUST 2014
LogisticsMiningRetailPublic AdministrationTransportation, Gas,
Communications, ElectricServices - Non TraditionalWholesaleFinance, Insurance
& Real EstateServices - ProfessionalManufacturing 29%
16
15
12
9
7
6
1
1
1p. 7
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2014
Data Breaches
At a Glance
• The largest data breach reported in August resulted in the
exposure of 27 million identities. For the month, 31 million
identities were exposed.
• Hackers have been responsible for 53 percent of data breach -
es in the last 12 months.
• Real names, government ID numbers, such as Social Security
numbers, and home addresses were the top three types of
data exposed in data breaches.
20406080100120140160
A J J M A M F J D N O S
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
IDENTITIES EXPOSED (MILLIONS)
INCIDENTS IDENTITIES EXPOSED (Millions)Timeline of Data Breaches
Source: Symantec :: SEPTEMBER 2013 — AUGUST 2014
147
2.8 .9 1.131
1.7 2.68.1130
113159
.827
22222927
25
2124
15141221
510152025303540
p. 8
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2014
Top Causes of Data Breaches
Source: Symantec :: SEPTEMBER 2013 — AUGUST 2014
Insider TheftTheft or Loss
of Computeror DriveAccidentally
Made PublicHackers
53%
20% 21%
6%Number
of Incidents
137
55
5116
259 TOTAL
Total Data
Breaches
SEPTEMBER 2013 — AUGUST 2014
259
Total IdentitiesExposed
SEPTEMBER 2013 — AUGUST 2014
598 Millionp. 9
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2014
Top-Ten Types of Information Breached
Source: Symantec :: SEPTEMBER 2013 — AUGUST 2014
Real Names
Gov ID numbers (Soc Sec)Home AddressBirth DatesFinancial InformationMedical RecordsPhone NumbersEmail AddressesUsernames & PasswordsInsurance01
02030405060708091068
%
44%
40%
40%
32%
30%
19%
18%
14%
8%
Methodology
This data is procured from the Norton Cybercrime Index (CCI). The Norton CCI is a statistical model
that measures the levels of threats, including malicious software, fraud, identity theft, spam,
phishing, and social engineering daily. The data breach section of the Norton CCI is derived from
data breaches that have been reported by legitimate media sources and have exposed personal
information.
In some cases a data breach is not publicly reported during the same month the incident occurred,
or an adjustment is made in the number of identities reportedly exposed. In these cases, the data in
the Norton CCI is updated. This causes fluctuations in the numbers reported for previous months
when a new report is released.
Norton Cybercrime Index
http://us.norton.com/protect-yourselfp. 10
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2014
MALWARE TACTICSp. 11
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2014
Malware Tactics
At a Glance
• W32.Sality and W32.
Ramnit variants continue
to dominate the top-ten
malware list.
• The most common
OSX threat seen on OSX
was OSX.RSPlug.A,
making up 51 percent of
all OSX malware found on
OSX Endpoints.
• Overall ransomware
activity has remained low
since March of this year.
However, crypto-style
ransomware has seen
a 700 percent increase
since January.
• The US and China where
first and second, respec -
tively, in August in terms
of overall botnet source
activity.Top-Ten Malware
Source: Symantec :: AUGUST 2014
Rank Name August July
1 W32.Sality.AE 4.3% 4.8%
2 W32.Ramnit!html 4.3% 4.3%
3 W32.Almanahe.B!inf 3.6% 3.9%
4 W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 3.0% 2.1%
5 W32.Ramnit.B 2.7% 2.9%
6 W32.Downadup.B 2.3% 2.8%
7 W32.Ramnit.B!inf 1.9% 2.0%
8 W32.Virut.CF 1.2% 1.4%
9 Trojan.Zbot 1.1% 1.4%
10 W32.SillyFDC 0.9% --
Top-Ten Mac OSX Malware Blocked
on OSX Endpoints
Source: Symantec :: AUGUST 2014
Rank Malware Name August July
1 OSX.RSPlug.A 51.2% 38.20%
2 OSX.Flashback.K 8.5% 8.80%
3 OSX.Stealbit.B 8.1% 12.50%
4 OSX.Klog.A 7.2% --
5 OSX.Sabpab 4.2% 5.80%
6 OSX.Netweird 2.7% 2.00%
7 OSX.Flashback 2.6% 2.50%
8 OSX.Crisis 2.2% 5.70%
9 OSX.FakeCodec 1.9% 1.70%
10 OSX.Keylogger 1.6% 2.60%p. 12
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2014
Malicious Activity by Source: Bots
Source: Symantec :: JULY 2014
Rank Country/Region Percent
1 United States 25.2%
2 China 11.7%
3 Taiwan 7.7%
4 Hungary 5.1%
5 Italy 4.2%
6 Brazil 3.1%
7 Canada 3.1%
8 Japan 3.0%
9 France 2.8%
10 Germany 2.5%
Ransomware Over Time
Source: Symantec :: SEPTEMBER 2013 — AUGUST 2014 THOUSANDS
2004006008001,000
A J J M A M F J
2014D N O S625
419861
660
465
342425
156 143230 183149p. 13
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2014
Number of Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: SEPTEMBER 2013 — AUGUST 2014
A J J M A M F J
2014D N O S438575
399549
438471542562579
473663
555
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: SEPTEMBER 2013 — AUGUST 2014
A J J M A M F J
2014D N O S0 0 0 0 02 2
05
014Vulnerabilities
At a Glance
• There were 399 vulner -
abilities disclosed during
the month of August.
• There were no zero-day
vulnerabilities discovered
in August.
• Internet Explorer has
reported the most brows -
er vulnerabilities in the
last 12 months.
• Oracle’s Java reported
the most plug-in vulner -
abilities over the same
time period.p. 14
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2014
Browser Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: SEPTEMBER 2013 — AUGUST 2014
20406080100
A J J M A M F J
2014D N O S
Opera
Mozilla FirefoxMicrosoft Internet Explorer
Google Chrome
Apple Safari
Plug-in Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: SEPTEMBER 2013 — AUGUST 2014
1020304050607080
Java
Apple
Adobe
ActiveX
A J J M A M F J
2014D N O S
p. 15
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2014
SOCIAL MEDIA
+ MOBILE THREATSp. 16
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2014
Mobile
Mobile Malware Families by Month,
Android
Source: Symantec :: SEPTEMBER 2013 — AUGUST 2014
7
24
24
2 234 4 4
3
A J J M A M F J
2014D N O S
At a Glance
• There were two Android
malware families discov -
ered in July.
• Of the threats discovered
in the last 12 months, 24
percent steal information
from the device and 23
percent track the device’s
user.
• In terms of social
networking scams, 52
percent were fake offer -
ings and 37 percent were
manually shared scams.p. 17
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2014
Mobile Threat Classifications
Source: Symantec :: SEPTEMBER 2013 — AUGUST 2014
Track User Risks that spy on the individual using the device, collecting SMS
messages or phone call logs, tracking GPS coordinates, recording phone calls,
or gathering pictures and video taken with the device.
Steal Information This includes the collection of both device- and user-specific
data, such as device information, configuration data, or banking details.
Traditional T hreats Threats that carry out traditional malware functions,
such as back doors and downloaders.
Recon/f_igure D evice These t ypes of risks attempt to elevate privileges
or simply modify various settings within the operating system.
Adware/Anno yance Mobile risks that display advertising or generally perform
actions to disrupt the user.
Send Conte nt These risks will send text messages to premium SMS numbers,
ultimately appearing on the bill of the device’s owner. Other risks can be used to send spam messages.
Adware
AnnoyanceSend
ContentReconfigure
DeviceTraditional
ThreatsTrack
UserSteal
Information8%11%21%23%
13%24%p. 18
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2014
Social Media
Social Media
Source: Symantec :: SEPTEMBER 2013 — AUGUST 2014
52%
Fake Offers These scams invite social network users to join a fake event or group
with incentives such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to share
credentials with the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
Manual Sharing Scams These rely on victims to actually do the work of sharing
the scam by presenting them with intriguing videos, fake offers or messages that they share with their friends.
Likejacking Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website
buttons that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
Comment Jacking Similar to likejacking, this type of scam relies on users clicking
links that are added to comments by attackers. The links may lead to malware or survey scams.
Fake App Users are invited to subscribe to an application that appears to be
integrated for use with a social network, but is not as described and may be used to steal credentials or harvest other personal data.
Comment
JackingFake
AppsLikejacking Manual
SharingFake
Offering37%
8.5%
1.7% .6%p. 19
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2014
PHISHING , SPAM + EMAIL THREATSp. 20
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2014
Phishing and Spam
Phishing Rate
Source: Symantec :: SEPTEMBER 2013 — AUGUST 2014
1 in 200
1 in 400
1 in 600
1 in 800
1 in 1000
1 in 1200
1 in 1400
1 in 1600
A J J M A M F J
2014D N O S359311236
306
401
478370
731395
469
1290
1587
At a Glance
• The phishing rate was
down again in August,
at one in 1,587 emails,
down from one in 1,290
emails in July.
• The global spam rate
was 62.6 percent for the
month of August.
• One out of every 270
emails contained a virus.
• Of the email traffic in
the month of August, 3.2
percent contained a mali -
cious URL.
Global Spam Rate
Source: Symantec :: SEPTEMBER 2013 — AUGUST 2014
1020304050607080
A J J M A M F J
2014D N O S75
64.868.870.6
62.2 62.166.2
58.560.6
59.963.7
62.6p. 21
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2014
Email Threats
Proportion of Email Traffic
Containing URL Malware
Source: Symantec :: SEPTEMBER 2013 — AUGUST 2014
51015202530354045
A J J M A M F J
2014D N O S14.7
10.5 9.513.615.614.2
5.7
2.613.7
7.47.9
3.2
1 in 50
1 in 100
1 in 150
1 in 200
1 in 250
1 in 300
1 in 350
1 in 400
1 in 450
1 in 500
A J J M A M F J
2014D N O SProportion of Email Traffic
in Which Virus Was Detected
Source: Symantec :: SEPTEMBER 2013 — AUGUST 2014
206191129112
207188141
234183
232
351270p. 22
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2014
About Symantec
More Information
• Symantec Worldwide: http://www.symantec.com/
• ISTR and Symantec Intelligence Resources: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
• Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/
• Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer/
• Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex/Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC) is an information protection expert that helps
people, businesses and governments seeking the freedom to unlock the opportunities
technology brings – anytime, anywhere. Founded in April 1982, Symantec, a Fortune
500 company, operating one of the largest global data-intelligence networks, has
provided leading security, backup and availability solutions for where vital information
is stored, accessed and shared. The company’s more than 20,000 employees reside in
more than 50 countries. Ninety-nine percent of Fortune 500 companies are Symantec
customers. In fiscal 2013, it recorded revenues of $6.9 billion. To learn more go to
www.symantec.com or connect with Symantec at: go.symantec.com/socialmedia .
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
AUGUST 20152 | August 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
3 Summary
4 From the Security Response Blog
5 August in Numbers
6 Targeted Attacks & Phishing
6 Top 10 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
6 Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
7 Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing Attacks
7 Phishing Rate
8 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing by Industry Sector
8 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing by Organization Size
9 Vulnerabilities
9 Total Number of Vulnerabilities
9 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
10 Vulnerabilities Disclosed in Industrial Control Systems
11 Malware
11 New Malware Variants
11 Top 10 Malware
12 New Malware Variants
12 Top 10 Mac OSX Malware Blocked on OSX Endpoints
13 Ransomware Over Time
13 Crypto-Ransomware Over Time
14 Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Malware Was Detected
14 Percent of Email Malware as URL vs. Attachment by Month
15 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious by Industry Sector
15 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as
Malicious by Organization Size
16 Mobile & Social Media
16 Android Mobile Malware Families by Month
16 New Android Variants per Family by Month
17 Social Media
18 Spam
18 Overall Email Spam Rate
18 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Industry Sector
19 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Organization Size
20 About Symantec
20 More Information
Welcome to the August edition of the Symantec
Intelligence report. Symantec Intelligence aims
to provide the latest analysis of cyber security
threats, trends, and insights concerning malware, spam, and other potentially harmful business
risks.
Symantec has established the most comprehensive
source of Internet threat data in the world through
the Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network,
which is made up of more than 57.6 million attack sensors and records thousands of events per
second. This network monitors threat activity
in over 157 countries and territories through a combination of Symantec products and services
such as Symantec DeepSight™ Intelligence,
Symantec™ Managed Security Services, Norton™ consumer products, and other third-party data
sources.3 | August 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Summary
August was a big month for zero-day vulnerabilities, in which a total of 11 were reported.
This is by far the largest number disclosed in a given month to-date.
Six of these zero-day vulnerabilities impact industrial control systems, devices used in indus-
trial sectors and critical infrastructures, across five vendors. The vulnerabilities cover a wide range of possible attacks, including remote code execution and denial of service attacks.
Two further zero-day vulnerabilities were discovered in the Apple OS X operating system.
When used in tandem, these two vulnerabilities can cause memory corruption in the OS X kernel and gain the attacker escalated privileges on the compromised computer. For more information see the Security Response blog republished in this report.
These vulnerabilities come on the heels of a new OS X threat called OSX.Sudoprint. This
threat exploits a local privilege escalation vulnerability in the OS X operating system, which was patched by Apple at the beginning of August. This threat comprised over 77 percent of the OS X threats we saw on OS X endpoints this month.
Ransomware attacks were down in August, where over 155 thousand attacks were detected.
While ransomware attacks appear to be down to their lowest levels in the last 12 months, we have reason to believe that attackers have shifted tactics and are currently pushing fake security software, such as FakeAV threats, instead. However, crypto-ransomware continues to grow, setting another monthly high for the year.
In other news, the Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services sector
was by far the most targeted sector during August, comprising 52 percent of all targeted attacks. Small businesses with less than 250 employees also made up the majority of organi-zation sizes, where 78.4 percent of spear-phishing attacks were reported.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to contact us with any comments or
feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat [email protected] | August 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
New Mac Os X Vulnerability Could Provide Attackers With Root Access
Symantec confirms existence of flaw, which requires victim to voluntarily run an application for exploit.
By Symantec Security Response
Symantec has confirmed the existence of two new vulner -
abilities in the Mac OS X operating system which, if
exploited, could allow an attacker to escalate privileges on
an affected computer in order to gain root access. While
the vulnerabilities require the victim to voluntarily run an application in order for an attack to be successful, they
represent a threat until a patch is published by Apple.
The vulnerabilities were discovered by Italian researcher
Luca Todesco , who posted a proof-of-concept exploit to
Github on August 16. Todesco said that he reported the issue to Apple a few hours before making it public. Apple has yet to publicly comment on the vulnerabilities.
Analysis by Symantec has confirmed that the proof-of-
concept exploit works as described. The vulnerabilities are reported to affect OS X version 10.9.5 to 10.10.5. The beta
for OS X 10.11 is understood to be not affected.
The exploit uses two different vulnerabilities to create a
memory corruption in the OS X kernel. This is then used
to bypass security features that block exploit code from
running, providing the attacker with root access.News of the new vulnerabilities comes days after another privilege escalation vulnerability was patched by Apple. The Apple Mac OS X Prior to 10.10.5 Multiple Security Vulner -
abilities (CVE-2015-3760) enabled a malicious installer to gain root access to an affected computer, allowing it to install other unauthorized software.
There have been no reports of these latest vulnerabilities
being exploited in the wild; however, the likelihood of attacks will increase as news spreads.
Mitigation
Until a patch for the vulnerability is issued, affected Mac OS X users are advised to exercise caution and only download
and install new software from trusted sources.
Mac OS X users are advised to apply any security updates to
the OS as soon as they become available.
Analysis of this vulnerability is ongoing and further
updates may be published if new information is uncovered.From the Security Response Blog
About the Security Response blog
In the Symantec Intelligence Report we republish a blog that highlights key data or an event that stood out during the month. Our security researchers around the world frequently publish new
blogs during the month on topics such as malware, security risks, vulnerabilities, and spam. For the
latest security news and information, visit:
http://www.symantec.com/connect/symantec-blogs/security-response5 | August 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
AUGUST IN NUMBERS6 | August 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
The Transportation,
Communications, Electric, Gas,
& Sanitary Services sector was by far the most targeted sector during August, comprising 52 percent of all targeted attacks.
Top 10 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
Source: SymantecPublic AdministrationConstructionRetailNonclassifiable EstablishmentsWholesaleServices - ProfessionalServices - Non TraditionalManufacturingFinance, Insurance, & Real EstateTransportation, Communications,
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services 52%
6
12 13
12
7 30
5 11
5 13
2 17
5
1
1 3
2 2 2August July
Top 10 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
Small businesses with less than
250 employees were the target
of 78.4 percent of spear-phishing attacks in August, up from 33.2 percent in July. In contrast, 11.7 percent of attacks were directed at large enterprises.Company Size August July
1-250 78.4% 33.2%
251-500 2.8% 12.6%
501-1000 3.3% 7.7%
1001-1500 2.3% 3.0%
1501-2500 1.4% 9.3%
2501+ 11.7% 34.1%
Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
Source: Symantec
Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted OrganizationTargeted Attacks & Phishing 7 | August 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Phishing Rate Inverse Graph: Smaller Number = Greater Risk
Source: Symantec400
800
12001600200024002800A J J M A M F J
2015D N O S1 IN
1905
2041161015171004
1465
266620571865
24481628647
Phishing Rate The overall phishing rate has
decreased slightly this month,
where one in 1,905 emails was a phishing attempt. The most commonly seen
attachment type used in targeted attacks were .txt files, followed by .doc files, at 32.2 percent and 29.7 percent respectively. Executable files with the .exe extension came in third with 17.3 percent. RankAttachment
TypeAugust Overall
Percentage
1 .txt 32.2%
2 .doc 29.7%
3 .exe 17.3%
4 .ace 10.2%
5 .pdf 5.0%
6 .xls 1.9%
7 .pps 1.2%
8 .fas 1.2%
9 .scr 0.6%
10 .class 0.3%
Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing Attacks
Source: Symantec
Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing Attacks8 | August 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Company Size August July
1–250 1 in 1,573.9 1 in 1,288.9
251–500 1 in 1,367.0 1 in 1,613.7
501–1000 1 in 1,736.5 1 in 1,899.6
1001–1500 1 in 2,195.5 1 in 2,209.9
1501–2500 1 in 1,862.6 1 in 2,045.5
2501+ 1 in 2,351.2 1 in 1,872.3
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing
by Organization Size
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing by Organization Size Companies with 251-500
employees were the most
targeted organization size in August.Industry August July
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 1 in 943.7 1 in 837.1
Public Administration 1 in 1,177.7 1 in 1,359.2
Nonclassifiable Establishments 1 in 1,414.3 1 in 1,564.4
Services - Professional 1 in 1,474.3 1 in 1,566.8
Services - Non Traditional 1 in 1,917.3 1 in 1,320.5
Wholesale 1 in 2,241.0 1 in 2,343.8
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 1 in 2,320.3 1 in 1,357.6
Construction 1 in 2,361.4 1 in 2,241.5
Mining 1 in 2,907.0 1 in 2,017.1
Transportation, Communications,
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services1 in 3,246.0 1 in 3,114.3
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing
by Industry Sector
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing by Industry Sector The Agriculture, Forestry, &
Fishing sector was again the
most targeted Industry overall for phishing attempts in August, where phishing comprised one in every 943.7 emails. This rate has been higher in this sector than in
any other industry since April.9 | August 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
The number of vulnerabilities
disclosed declined in August,
from 579 in July to 348 reported during this month.
Total Number of Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec100200300400500600700
A J J M A M F J
2015D N O S600 596
428562
471 469540579
526579
348457
Total Number of VulnerabilitiesVulnerabilities
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
There were 11 zero-day
vulnerabilities disclosed in
August. This includes six targeting industrial control systems and two targeting the OS X operating system.
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec24681012
A J J M A M F J
2015D N O S6
02
012
1 1 1
011
310 | August 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Vulnerabilities Disclosed in Industrial Control Systems
Source: Symantec1234567
A J J M A M F J
2015D N O S1234567
12
12
1356
11 1 1Vulnerabilities
Unique Vendors Six zero-day vulnerabilities in
industrial control systems were
reported by in August, impacting five ICS vendors.
Vulnerabilities Disclosed in Industrial Control Systems
Methodology
In some cases the details of a vulnerability are not publicly disclosed during the same month that
it was initially discovered. In these cases, our vulnerability metrics are updated to reflect the time
that the vulnerability was discovered, as opposed to the month it was disclosed. This can cause
fluctuations in the numbers reported for previous months when a new report is released.11 | August 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
New Malware Variants
W32.Ramnit!html and W32.
Almanahe.B!inf continue to
be the most commonly seen malware detections in August.Rank Malware NameAugust
PercentageMalware NameJuly
Percentage
1 W32.Ramnit!html 6.3% W32.Almanahe.B!inf 6.6%
2 W32.Almanahe.B!inf 5.5% W32.Ramnit!html 5.8%
3 W32.Sality.AE 5.2% W32.Sality.AE 5.7%
4 W32.Downadup.B 3.7% W32.Downadup.B 4.1%
5 W32.Ramnit.B 3.6% W32.Ramnit.B 3.4%
6 W32.Ramnit.B!inf 2.6% Trojan.Swifi 3.2%
7 W97M.Downloader 1.9% W32.Ramnit.B!inf 2.5%
8 Trojan.Swifi 1.8% W97M.Downloader 2.0%
9 W32.Virut.CF 1.6% W32.Virut.CF 1.7%
10 W32.Chir.B@mm(html) 1.3% W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 1.7%
Top 10 Malware
Source: Symantec
Top 10 MalwareMalware
New Malware Variants
Source: Symantec1020304050607080
A J J M A M F J
2015D N O S57.6
53.7
46.6
26.635.944.7
33.7
26.535.8
29.244.563.6MILLIONS There were more than 46.6
million new pieces of malware
created in August. While down from July, this is still well above the 41.5 million monthly average seen over the last twelve months.12 | August 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
New Malware Variants
OSX.Sudoprint was the most
commonly seen OS X threat
on OS X endpoints in August. This threat takes advantage of a vulnerability targeting the OS X operating system that was discovered in July and patched earlier this month.Rank Malware NameAugust
PercentageMalware NameJuly
Percentage
1 OSX.Sudoprint 77.3% OSX.RSPlug.A 61.9%
2 OSX.RSPlug.A 7.5% OSX.Wirelurker 10.0%
3 OSX.Klog.A 4.4% OSX.Crisis 8.4%
4 OSX.Wirelurker 1.9% OSX.Keylogger 4.8%
5 OSX.Crisis 1.5% OSX.Klog.A 3.5%
6 OSX.Flashback.K 1.0% OSX.Luaddit 1.8%
7 OSX.Keylogger 1.0% OSX.Stealbit.B 1.3%
8 OSX.Luaddit 0.8% OSX.Flashback.K 1.3%
9 OSX.Sabpab 0.7% OSX.Freezer 1.1%
10 OSX.Remoteaccess 0.5% OSX.Netweird 0.8%
Top 10 Mac OS X Malware Blocked on OS X Endpoints
Source: Symantec
Top 10 Mac OSX Malware Blocked on OSX Endpoints 13 | August 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Ransomware Over Time
Ransomware attacks were
down in August, where over 155
thousand attacks were detected.
While ransomware attacks
appear to be down to their lowest levels in the last 12 months, we have reason to believe that attackers have shifted tactics and are currently pushing FakeAV threats instead.
Ransomware Over Time
Source: Symantec100200300400500600700800
A J J M A M F J
2015D N O S477
413
155734
693756
399544
354
248297738THOUSANDS
Crypto-Ransomware Over Time
Crypto-ransomware was up
during August, setting another high for 2015.
Crypto-Ransomware Over Time
Source: Symantec1020304050607080
A J J M A M F J
2015D N O S3134 356272
36
2028
2123
1648THOUSANDS14 | August 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Malware Was Detected
The proportion of email traffic
containing malware increased
this month, where one in 252 emails contained malware.100
150200
250
300
350
400A J J M A M F J
2015D N O S1 IN
Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Malware Was Detected
Source: SymantecInverse Graph: Smaller Number = Greater Risk319
337252
351329195207
237
274246207
246
Percent of Email Malware as URL vs. Attachment by Month
The percentage of email malware
that contains a URL remained
low this month, hovering around three percent.
Percent of Email Malware as URL vs. Attachment by Month
Source: Symantec1020304050%
A J J M A M F J
2015D N O S36
714
538
3 3 3 34115 | August 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Industry August July
Public Administration 1 in 154.4 1 in 288.9
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 1 in 227.6 1 in 252.7
Services - Professional 1 in 249.1 1 in 338.0
Wholesale 1 in 274.6 1 in 333.3
Construction 1 in 288.0 1 in 376.3
Services - Non Traditional 1 in 311.0 1 in 280.1
Finance, Insurance. & Real Estate 1 in 351.4 1 in 416.4
Nonclassifiable Establishments 1 in 385.9 1 in 519.5
Transportation, Communications,
Electric, Gas. & Sanitary Services1 in 392.6 1 in 392.4
Mining 1 in 484.9 1 in 438.3
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious
by Industry Sector
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious by Industry Sector Public Administration was the
most targeted sector in August,
where one in every 252.7 emails
contained malware.
Company Size August July
1-250 1 in 162.1 1 in 275.8
251-500 1 in 206.0 1 in 259.5
501-1000 1 in 249.1 1 in 351.1
1001-1500 1 in 291.3 1 in 389.5
1501-2500 1 in 299.8 1 in 373.2
2501+ 1 in 409.7 1 in 401.7
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious
by Organization Size
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious by Organization Size Organizations with less than 250
employees were most likely to be
targeted by malicious email in the month of August, where one in 162.1 emails was malicious.16 | August 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Mobile & Social Media
123456789
A J J M A M F J
2015D N O S
Android Mobile Malware Families by Month
Source: Symantec4
1
0356
3
03
128 In August there were no new
mobile malware families
discovered.
Android Mobile Malware Families by Month
There was an average of 44
Android malware variants per family in the month of in August.
1020304050
A J J M A M F J
2015D N O S
New Android Variants per Family by Month
Source: Symantec404244
33373638 38 3839 39
36
New Android Variants per Family by Month17 | August 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Last 12 Months
Social Media
Source: Symantec102030405060708090100%
Comment
JackingFake
AppsLikejacking Fake
OfferingManual
Sharing579
14
.1 2
Manual Sharing – These rely on victims to actually do the work of sharing
the scam by presenting them with intriguing videos, fake offers or messages that they share with their friends.
Fake Offering – These scams invite social network users to join a fake event or group
with incentives such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to sharecredentials with the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
Likejacking – Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website
buttons that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
Fake Apps – Users are invited to subscribe to an application that appears to be
integrated for use with a social network, but is not as described and may be used to steal credentials or harvest other personal data.
Comment Jacking – This attack is similar to the "Like" jacking where the attacker tricks the
user into submitting a comment about a link or site, which will then be posted to his/her wall.
Social Media In the last twelve months, 79
percent of social media threats
required end users to propagate them.
Fake offerings comprised 14
percent of social media threats.18 | August 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
535050
52.5%
+2.4% pts50.1%
+.4% pts49.7%
-1.8% pts
August July June
Overall Email Spam Rate
Source: Symantec
Overall Email Spam Rate The overall email spam rate in
August was 52.5 percent, up 2.4
percentage points from July.Spam
Industry August July
Mining 54.8% 55.7%
Manufacturing 53.9% 53.8%
Construction 53.4% 53.0%
Services - Professional 53.1% 52.5%
Retail 52.7% 53.0%
Services - Non Traditional 52.6% 51.9%
Nonclassifiable Establishments 52.6% 52.0%
Public Administration 52.5% –
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 52.4% 52.2%
Wholesale 52.4% 52.1%
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Industry Sector
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Industry Sector At 54.8 percent, the Mining
sector again had the highest spam rate during August. The Manufacturing sector came in
second with 53.9 percent.19 | August 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Company Size August July
1–250 52.7% 52.3%
251–500 53.0% 52.6%
501–1000 52.9% 52.3%
1001–1500 52.3% 51.9%
1501–2500 52.6% 52.2%
2501+ 52.6% 52.4%
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Organization Size
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Organization Size While most organization sizes
had around a 52 percent spam
rate, organizations with 251-500 employees had the highest rate at 53 percent.20 | August 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
About Symantec
More Information
Symantec Worldwide: http://www.symantec.com/
ISTR and Symantec Intelligence Resources: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/
Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer/Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC) is an information protection expert that helps people,
businesses and governments seeking the freedom to unlock the opportunities technology brings – anytime, anywhere. Founded in April 1982, Symantec, a Fortune 500 company, operating one of the largest global data-intelligence networks, has provided leading security, backup and availability solutions for where vital information is stored, accessed and shared. The company’s more than 20,000 employees reside in more than 50 countries. Ninety-nine percent of Fortune 500 companies are Symantec customers. In fiscal 2014, it recorded revenues of $6.7 billion. To learn more go to
www.symantec.com or connect with Symantec at: go.symantec.com/socialmedia.
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
AUGUST 2013p. 2
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
3 Executive Summary
4 BIG NUMBERS
7 TIMELINE
8 August Security Timeline
10 Social Media
11 Social Media
11 Top 5 Social Media Attacks, 2013
12 DATA BREACHES
13 Data Breaches
13 Top 5 Data Breaches by Type of Information Exposed
13 Timeline of Data Breaches, 2013
14 MOBILE
15 Mobile
15 Mobile Malware by Type
16 Cumulative Mobile Android Malware
17 VULNERABILITIES
18 Vulnerabilities
18 Total Vulnerabilities Disclosed by Month
18 Browser Vulnerabilities
18 Plug-in Vulnerabilities19 SPAM, PHISHING, & MALWARE
20 Spam
20 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Geography
20 Global Spam Volume Per Day
20 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Industry
21 Top 10 Sources of Spam
21 Average Spam Message Size
21 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Company Size
21 Spam by Category
21 Spam URL Distribution Based on Top Level Domain Name
22 Phishing
22 Top 10 Sources of Phishing
22 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Company Size
22 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Industry
22 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Geography
23 Phishing Distribution in August
23 Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks
24 Malware
24 Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected
24 Top 10 Email Virus Sources
25 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Industry
25 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Geographic Location
25 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Company Size
26 Endpoint Security
26 Top 10 Most Frequently Blocked Malware
27 Policy Based Filtering
27 Policy Based Filtering
28 About Symantec
28 More Informationp. 3
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
Executive Summary
Welcome to the August edition of the Symantec Intelligence report.
Symantec Intelligence aims to provide the latest analysis of cyber
security threats, trends, and insights concerning malware, spam,
and other potentially harmful business risks.
In this month’s report we take a look at social media scams so far in 2013. What we have noticed is
that fake offerings, such as bogus opportunities for discount purchases, has dominated the social
landscape this year, making up 82 percent of all social media attacks.
In the realm of data breaches, August saw a decrease in the number of breaches, with seven
reported during the month. However, there were a further nine breaches reported in August that
had occurred earlier in the year, bringing the total to 125 breaches resulting in a total of 91 million
identities being exposed in 2013 so far.
In other news, 213 new mobile malware variants were discovered this month, a modest increase
since July, but nowhere near the numbers we saw in June. There were 469 new vulnerabilities
discovered in August, a 13 percent increase compared to the total in August of 2012.
The global spam rate fell 2.4 percentage points from July to 65.2 percent. The top-level domain
for Poland (i.e. .pl) comprised almost 48% of spam-related domains in August, topping the list two
months in a row.
Finally, financial-themed phishing emails top the list of topics, comprising 66.8 percent of all
phishing attempts blocked. Many of these phishing attempts appear to have come from Japan,
which is responsible for 55 percent of phishing emails.
We’ve also provided a run-down of the biggest security stories for the month of August, recapping
what happened and what that means to you.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to contact us with any comments or
feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat Analyst
[email protected]. 4
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
BIG NUMBERSp. 5
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
Overall Email Phishing Rate:
Overall Email Phishing Rate:
1 in 736
1 in 6261 in 464
JulJun
AugHIGHER NUMBER = LOWER RISK
Overall Email Virus Rate:
Overall Email Virus Rate:
MayApril
1 in 326
1 in 465
1 in 340Jun
Jul
AugHIGHER NUMBER = LOWER RISK
Estimated Global
Email Spam Rate Per DayEstimated Global
Email Spam Rate Per Day
SPAM AS PERCENT OF ALL EMAIL
Jun Jul Aug0102030405060708090100
65% 64% 68%
New Vulnerabilities
New Vulnerabilities
561
561
July
510
June
469
469
Aug
July3June4
Aug2
Mobile
VulnerabilitiesMobile
Vulnerabilities
p. 6
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
Data Breaches
Data Breaches
125Number of Breaches
(Year-to-Date)
91,068,940Number of IdentitiesExposed (Year-to-Date)
Mobile Malware VariantsMobile Malware VariantsVARIANTS (CUMULATIVE)504
161213
Aug Jul Jun10002000300040005000600070008000900010000
A J J M A M F JAN
2013D N O S A
6,8526,852p. 7
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
TIMELINEp. 8
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
August Security Timeline
August06
Attackers continued to target the ‘Master Key’ Android
vulnerability , which allows them to inject malicious code into
apps without invalidating the digital signatures. Security
researchers have found that the flaw has been used to target the
app of a South Korean bank . The attackers offered a malicious
update for the banking app, as well as a Trojanized version
of the full app, on a third-party app store. These malicious
offerings take advantage of the vulnerability, allowing the
infected app to keep the same cryptographic signature as the
legitimate release. When the user opens the infected app, they
are prompted to input their account information. If they do so,
their data is sent to a remote server under the attacker’s control.
August 11
Another critical vulnerability was found in Android, which could
allow attackers to steal from the wallets of a well-known digital
currency. Developers of the digital currency stated that any
wallet that was generated by an Android app is vulnerable to
theft due to a flaw within the mobile OS itself. The vulnerability
involves a component which generates secure random numbers.
The developers recommended that users update their wallet
app as soon as possible. They also told users to generate a new
address with a repaired random number generator and send the
money in the wallet back to themselves.
August16
A computer glitch may have caused the opening of the doors
in a maximum security wing at a Florida prison . The possible
glitch set prisoners free, with gang members able to pursue an
attack on a fellow inmate. However, a surveillance video released
suggests that the doors may have been opened intentionally,
possibly by a prison staff member, or remotely by someone
else, by triggering a “group release” button in the computerized
system.
The video raises the possibility that some prisoners knew in
advance that the doors were going to open. It’s the second time
in two months that all of the doors in the maximum security
wing opened at once. Part of the investigation into this latest
incident will establish what vulnerabilities may exist within the
software and whether it constituted a remote hack or not. August21
The company behind a popular video game suffered a data
breach affecting a portion of its North American players of one
of its most popular online games. The company has revealed
that the breach was the result of nefarious work by hackers, and
that passwords and credit card numbers stored in encrypted
form were breached. In addition, user names, email addresses,
and some real names were accessed.
The company has said they will contact affected users about the
breach and will force players to change their passwords. It will
also develop new security features for user accounts.
August22
It has emerged that attackers compromised the wire payment
switch at a number of US banks to steal millions of dollars over
the past several months . The attackers conducted distributed
denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against at least three unnamed
banks. While this was happening, the attackers hijacked the wire
payment switch to make fraudulent wire transfers from multiple
accounts.
Attackers often target a customer’s bank account through
malware that steals banking credentials. However, in this
campaign, attackers could get access to numerous accounts at
once by simply targeting the wire payment switch while the
banks’ resources were diverted elsewhere. p. 9
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
August26
New European data regulations have come into effect , requiring
telecom operators and Internet service providers (ISPs) to notify
authorities of data breaches within 24 hours of detection. These
organizations must tell authorities which pieces of information
were compromised within one day of discovering the breach and
what measures will be put in place to mitigate the damage. If full
disclosure isn’t possible during this time limit, the companies
must provide an initial set of information and give further
details within three days. If their customers’ personal data is
“adequately encrypted ,” the companies would not have to notify
their customers as, according to the European Commission,
a breach would “not actually reveal the subscriber’s personal
data.”
While the laws aim to improve data protection in the EU, some
have criticized the stricter time limit . The European Parliament
is reportedly set to vote on whether the law will remain as it is in
October, and if they vote to change it, the amended regulations
will be put in place in May 2014.
August27
The websites of several high-profile news and social media
organizations were affected by a cyber attack undertaken by the
Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) against the companies’ domain
name system (DNS) provider. According to the providers , the
hacking group managed to access the login credentials of a
reseller and used their account to modify the DNS records of
several domain names . As a result, the SEA could redirect traffic
from these websites to their own address. The provider said it
has since changed the DNS records back, modified the affected
reseller’s login credentials, and has strengthened its own
security.August28
New malware targeting users of a popular social network has
been found. The malware not only steals everything stored in
the victim’s browser, but also blocks the victim’s access to the
browser settings to prevent them from removing the malware.
An independent researcher has said that the malware appears
as a link in an email or on the social network and tells users that
they have been tagged in a post. When the user clicks on the
link, they are directed to a Web page that asks them to download
a plug-in in order to watch a video. However, this was found
to be a malicious plug-in that allows an attacker to get access
to everything stored on the victim’s browser, such as online
accounts with saved passwords. The malware can also block the
user from accessing their browser settings to remove the threat
and can block access to websites that offer antivirus software.
According to the researcher, the malware has been spreading
at a rate of 40,000 attacks an hour and has already potentially
affected more than 800,000 people using a well-known browser.
The malware is spreading by hijacking victims’ accounts and
reaching out to people on their friends’ lists. The social network
said it was working to clear the malicious links from its website
while the browser extensions involved have been disabled. p. 10
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
SOCIAL MEDIAp. 11
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
Social Media
At a Glance
• 82 percent of all social
media attacks so far in
2013 have been fake
offerings. This is up from
56 percent in 2012.
• Fake Plug-ins are the
second-most common
type of social media
attacks at 8.2 percent, up
from fifth place in 2012,
at 5 percent.
• Fake Apps have risen
overall in 2013, now
making up 2.1 percent of
social media attacks. In
2012, this category was
ranked sixth.Top 5 Social Media Attacks, 2013
Source: Symantec
Methodology
Fake Offering. These scams invite social network users to join a fake event or group with
incentives such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to share credentials with
the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
Fake Plug-in Scams. Users are tricked into downloading fake browser extensions on their
machines. Rogue browser extensions can pose like legitimate extensions but when installed
can steal sensitive information from the infected machine.
Likejacking. Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website buttons
that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
Fake Apps. Applications provided by attackers that appear to be legitimate apps; however,
they contain a malicious payload. The attackers often take legitimate apps, bundle malware
with them, and then re-release it as a free version of the app.
Manual Sharing Scams. These rely on victims to actually do the hard work of sharing the
scam by presenting them with intriguing videos, fake offers or messages that they share
with their friends.
8.2%
5.2%
2.1%
1.7%Fake
Offering
Manual SharingLikejackingFake Plug-in
Fake Apps82%p. 12
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
DATA BREACHESp. 13
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
Data Breaches
At a Glance
• August appears to contain
the least data breach
activity this year, both in
terms of the number of
breaches and identities
exposed. However, this
number may change as
further breaches are
disclosed
• There were a number of
breaches reported during
August that occurred
earlier in the year. This
brings the total number of
breaches to 125 for so far
in 2013.
• Of the reported breaches
so far in this year, the top
three types of information
exposed are a person’s
real name, birth date, and
government ID number
(e.g. Social Security).Timeline of Data Breaches, 2013
Source: SymantecNUMBER OF INCIDENTSIDENTITIES BREACHED (MILLIONS)
INCIDENTS IDENTITIES BREACHED
051015202530354045505560
AJ J MA MF JAN
2013D N OS AJ J MA MF JAN
2012051015202530
Top 5 Data Breaches by Type of Information Exposed
Source: Symantec
33%38%
27%
25%53%Real Names
Gov ID numbers (Soc Sec)Birth Dates
Medical Records
Home Address
Information Exposed in BreachesInformation Exposed in Breaches
% OF ALL BREACHESMethodology
This data is procured from the Norton Cybercrime Index (CCI).
The Norton CCI is a statistical model that measures the levels
of threats, including malicious software, fraud, identity theft,
spam, phishing, and social engineering daily. The data breach
section of the Norton CCI is derived from data breaches that
have been reported by legitimate media sources and have
exposed personal information.
In some cases a data breach is not publicly reported during the
same month the incident occurred, or an adjustment is made in
the number of identities reportedly exposed. In these cases, the
data in the Norton CCI is updated. This causes fluctuations in
the numbers reported for previous months when a new report is
released.
Norton Cybercrime Index
http://us.norton.com/protect-yourselfp. 14
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
MOBILEp. 15
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
Mobile
At a Glance
• So far in 2013, 40 percent
of mobile malware tracks
users, up from 15 percent
in 2012.
• Traditional threats,
such as back doors and
downloaders are present
in almost a quarter of all
mobile malware threats.
• Risks that collect data,
the most common risk
in 2012, is down 15
percentage points to 17
percent of risks.
• Two new mobile malware
families were discovered
in August, along with 213
new variants.
24%
40%
7%
11%
23%
17%
Track User
Risks that spy on the individual using the
device, collecting SMS messages or phone call logs, tracking GPS coordinates, recording phone calls, or gathering pictures and video taken with the device.
Traditional Threats
Threats that carry out traditional malware functions, such as back doors and downloaders.
Adware/Annoyance
Mobile risks that display advertising or generally perform actions to disrupt the user.Send Content
These risks will send text messages to premium SMS numbers, ultimately appearing on the bill of the device’s owner. Other risks can be used to send spam messages.Change Settings
These types of risks attempt to elevate privileges or simply modify various settings within the operating system. Collect Data
This includes the collection of both device- and user-specific data, such as device information, configuration data, or banking details. Mobile Malware by Type
Source: Symantecp. 16
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
Cumulative Mobile Android Malware
Source: Symantec
VARIANTS FAMILIES
4080120160200240280320360400
A J J M A M F JAN
2013D N O S A J J M A M F JAN
201210002000300040005000600070008000900010000FAMILIES (CUMULATIVE) VARIANTS (CUMULATIVE)
p. 17
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
VULNERABILITIESp. 18
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
Vulnerabilities
At a Glance
• There were 469 new
vulnerabilities discovered
in August, bringing the
total for the year up
to 4315, a 13 percent
increase compared to the
same period in 2012.
• Two vulnerabilities were
discovered in mobile
operating systems during
the month of August.
• Google’s Chrome
browser continues to
lead in reporting browser
vulnerabilities, while
Oracle’s Java leads
in reported plug-in
vulnerabilities.
• No zero-day
vulnerabilities were
disclosed during the
month of August.Total Vulnerabilities Disclosed by Month
Source: Symantec
100200300400500600700800
A J J M A MF JAN
2013D N O S A J J M A MF JAN
2012
Plug-in Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
0102030405060708090100%
Adobe Acrobat Reader
Adobe Flash PlayerApple QuickTimeOracle Sun Java
Browser Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
102030405060708090100%
Apple Safari
Google ChromeMicrosoft Internet ExplorerMozilla FirefoxOpera
p. 19
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
SPAM, PHISHING, & MALWAREp. 20
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
At a Glance
• The global spam rate
dropped 2.4 percentage
points in August to 65.2
percent, down from 67.6
percent in July.
• Education continues to
be the most commonly
targeted industry, as was
the case in June and July.
• The top-level domain (TLD)
for Poland, .pl, has topped
the list of malicious TLDs
for the second month in
a row, comprising almost
48% of all spam-related
domains in August.
• Sex/Dating spam continues
to be the most common
category, at 70.4 percent.
Weight loss spam comes in
second at 12.3 percent.Spam
Global Spam Volume Per Day
Source: Symantec
0102030405060
A J J M A M F JAN
2013 D N O S A J J M A M F JAN
2012BILLIONS
Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Geography
Source: Symantec
Geography Percent
Saudi Arabia 78.6%
Sri Lanka 76.1%
China 73.2%
Hungary 72.3%
Qatar 70.0%Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Percent
Education 68.9%
Chem/Pharm 67.4%
Manufacturing 66.1%
Non-Profit 66.0%
Accom/Catering 65.6%p. 21
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
Top 10 Sources of Spam
Source: Symantec
Source Percent of All Spam
India 6.98%
United States 6.66%
Spain 5.72%
Argentina 5.56%
Finland 5.44%
Italy 4.75%
Peru 4.46%
Brazil 4.25%
Iran 4.25%
Germany 3.48%
Spam URL Distribution Based on Top Level Domain Name*
Source: Symantec
*Month .pl .com .ru .net
Jul 47.8% 15.9% 14.3% 6.1%
Jun 58.9% 18.4% n/a 8.7%
*Data lags one monthAverage Spam Message Size*
Source: Symantec
*Month 0Kb – 5Kb 5Kb – 10Kb >10Kb
Jul 21.1% 28.2% 50.7%
Jun 22.2% 47.5% 30.3%
*Data lags one monthSpam by Category
Source: Symantec
Category August
Sex/Dating 70.4%
Weight Loss 12.3%
Pharma 9.4%
Jobs 5.4%
Watches 1.7%Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Percent
1-250 64.6%
251-500 65.1%
501-1000 64.6%
1001-1500 65.7%
1501-2500 65.1%
2501+ 65.5%p. 22
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
At a Glance
• The global phishing rate is up in August, comprising one in every
625.6 email messages. In July this rate was one in 736.5.
• Financial themes continue to be the most frequent subject matter,
with 66.8 percent of phishing scams containing this theme.
• Japan has seen an increase in phishing during the month of
August, where one in 443 emails is a phishing scam.
• Not only that, but Japan tops the list of sources of phishing
emails, responsible for distributing 55 percent of phishing scams.
• The Public Sector was the most targeted industry in August, with
one in every 76.7 emails received in this industry being a phishing
scam.Phishing
Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Geography
Source: Symantec
Geography Rate
United Kingdom 1 in 246.1
South Africa 1 in 339.3
Japan 1 in 443.2
Australia 1 in 584.6
Italy 1 in 1,217.3Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Rate
Public Sector 1 in 76.7
Education 1 in 384.0
Finance 1 in 467.5
Accom/Catering 1 in 508.8
Non-Profit 1 in 614.7Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Rate
1-250 1 in 609.1
251-500 1 in 799.8
501-1000 1 in 1,501.5
1001-1500 1 in 1,110.3
1501-2500 1 in 536.4
2501+ 1 in 553.1
Top 10 Sources of Phishing
Source: Symantec
Source August
Japan 54.74%
Hong Kong 16.94%
United States 10.16%
United Kingdom 8.54%
South Africa 2.29%
Ireland 2.29%
Australia 1.84%
Sweden 0.63%
Denmark 0.51%
Singapore 0.40%p. 23
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
41.2%
4.0%
4.0%
1.1%49.8%Automated Toolkits
Other Unique DomainsIP Address DomainsFree Web Hosting SitesTyposquatting
Phishing Distribution:Phishing Distribution:Phishing Distribution in August
Source: Symantec
27.0%
4.2%
1.8%
0.6%66.8%FinancialInformation ServicesRetailComputer SoftwareCommunications
Organizations Spoofed
in Phishing Attacks:Organizations Spoofed
in Phishing Attacks:Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks
Source: Symantecp. 24
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
Malware
1 in 50
1 in 100
1 in 150
1 in 200
1 in 250
1 in 300
1 in 350
1 in 400
1 in 450
1 in 500
A J J M A M F JAN
2013D N O S A J J M A M F JAN
2012Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected
Source: SymantecTop 10 Email Virus Sources
Source: Symantec
Geography Percent
United States 43.14%
United Kingdom 21.99%
Italy 5.44%
India 5.42%
Australia 5.27%
South Africa 3.38%
Ireland 2.72%
Hong Kong 1.67%
Netherlands 1.62%
Canada 1.11%At a Glance
• The global average virus rate in August was one in 340.1 emails,
compared to one in 465.1 in July.
• The United Kingdom topped the list of geographies, with one in
174.9 emails containing a virus, up from one in 258.4 during July.
• The United States was the largest source of virus-laden emails,
making up 43.1 percent of all email-based viruses.
• Small-to-medium size businesses with 1-250 employees were
the most targeted company size, where one and 311.6 emails
contained a virus.p. 25
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Rate
Public Sector 1 in 53.2
Education 1 in 258.9
Accom/Catering 1 in 265.7
Non-Profit 1 in 320.9
Marketing/Media 1 in 347.7
Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Rate
1-250 1 in 311.6
251-500 1 in 387.4
501-1000 1 in 511.3
1001-1500 1 in 408.2
1501-2500 1 in 327.9
2501+ 1 in 323.8Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Geographic Location
Source: Symantec
Geography Rate
United Kingdom 1 in 174.9
United Arab Emirates 1 in 254.0
Australia 1 in 292.2
South Africa 1 in 314.5
Hungary 1 in 319.6p. 26
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
At a Glance
• Variants of W32.Ramnit accounted for 16.4 percent of all malware
blocked at the endpoint.
• In comparison, 7.9 percent of all malware were variants of W32.
Sality.
• Approximately 39.4 percent of the most frequently blocked
malware last month was identified and blocked using generic
detection.Endpoint Security
Top 10 Most Frequently Blocked Malware
Source: Symantec
Malware August
W32.Sality.AE 7.13%
W32.Ramnit!html 6.40%
W32.Ramnit.B 5.72%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 3.93%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 3.63%
W32.Downadup.B 3.50%
W32.Virut.CF 2.54%
W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 1.59%
Trojan.Maljava 1.56%
W32.SillyFDC 1.34%p. 27
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
Policy Based Filtering
Source: Symantec
Category Percent
Social Networking 47.43%
Advertisement & Popups 22.43%
Computing & Internet 2.72%
Streaming Media 2.59%
Peer-To-Peer 2.06%
Chat 1.98%
Hosting Sites 1.97%
News 0.79%
Games 0.75%
Entertainment 0.71%Policy Based Filtering
At a Glance
• The most common trigger for policy-based filtering applied by
Symantec Web Security .cloud for its business clients was for the
“Social Networking” category, which accounted for 47.4 percent
of blocked Web activity in August.
• “Advertisement & Popups” was the second-most common trigger,
comprising 22.4 percent of blocked Web activity.p. 28
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: AUGUST 2013
About Symantec
More Information
• Security Response Publications: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/publications /
• Internet Security Threat Report Resource Page: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport /
• Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response /
• Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer /
• Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex /Symantec protects the world’s information and is a global leader in security, backup, and
availability solutions. Our innovative products and services protect people and information
in any environment—from the smallest mobile device to the enterprise data center to cloud-
based systems. Our world-renowned expertise in protecting data, identities, and interactions
gives our customers confidence in a connected world. More information is available at
www.symantec.com or by connecting with Symantec at go.symantec.com/socialmedia .
|
Symantec Intelligence
Symantec Intelligence Report : December 2012
Welcome to the December edition of the Symantec Intelligence report , which provides the latest analysis of cyber
security threats, trends , and insights from the Symantec Intelligence team concerning malware, spam, and other
potentially harmful business risks . The data used to compile the analysis for this report includes data from November
through December 2012.
Report highlights
• Spam – 70.6 percent (an increase of 1.8 percentage points since November ): page 2
• Phishing – One in 377.4 emails identified as phishing (a n increase of 0.225 percentage points since November ): page 5
• Malware – One in 277.8 emails contained malware ( a decrease of 0.03 percentage points since November ): page 6
• Malicious website s – 762 website s blocked per day ( a decrease of 58.7 percent since November ): page 8
Introduction
I hope you enjoy reading this month’s edition of the report, and please feel free to contact me directly with any
comments or feedback.
Ben Nahorney , Cyber Security Threat Analyst
[email protected]
@symantec, @symanteccloud, @norton, @threatintel
Page 1 of 10
Global Trends & Content Analysis
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the world through the
Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network, which is made up of more than 64.6 million attack sensors and records
thousands of events per second. This network monitors attack activity in more than 200 countries and territories
through a combination of Symantec products a nd services such as Symantec DeepSight™ Threat Management
System, Symantec™ Managed Security Services and Norton™ consumer products, and other third- party data
sources.
In addition, Symantec maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive vulnerability da tabases, currently consisting
of more than 47,662 recorded vulnerabilities (spanning more than two decades) from over 15,967 vendors
representing over 40,006 products.
Spam, phishing and malware data is captured through a variety of sources, including the Symantec Probe Network, a
system of more than 5 million decoy accounts; Symantec.cloud and a number of other Symantec security
technologies. Skeptic™, the Symantec.cloud proprietary heuristic technology is able to detect new and sophisticated
targeted threats before reaching customers’ networks. Over 8 billion email messages and more than 1.4 billion Web
requests are processed each day across 15 data centers. Symantec also gathers phishing information through an
extensive antifraud community of enterprises, security vendors, and more than 50 million consumers.
These resources give Symantec’s analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze, and provide
informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and spam. The result is the
annual Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, which gives enterprises and consumers the essential information to
secure their systems effectively now and into the future.
Spam Analysis
In December , the global ratio of spam i n email traffic rose by 1.8 percentage point since November , to 70.6 percent ( 1
in 1.42 emails ). This follows the continuing trend of global spam levels diminishing gradually since the latter part of
2011 .
Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Saudi Arabia
Hungary
Sri Lanka
Qatar
China 85.9%
81.9%
77.2%
75.5%
75.4% IT Services
Education
Recreation
Non-Profit
Accommodation/Catering 72.2%
71.8%
71.6%
71.5%
71.3% 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 71.4%
70.2%
70.6%
70.7%
70.7%
70.3% Spam Rate
December 2012 70.6%
68.8%
70.6% 69.9% Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012
12.7%
6.9%
6.3%
4.8%
4.3%
3.7%
3.09%
3.08%
3.07%
3.06% United States
India
Canada
Russian Federation
Brazil
Finland
Peru
Germany
Korea (South)
France
Page 2 of 10
Global Spam Categories
The most common category of spam in December is related to the Sex/Dating category , with 82.62 percent.
Category Name December
2012 November
2012
Sex/Dating 82.62% 57.72%
Pharma 9.04% 14.71%
Watches 4.49% 12.69%
Jobs 1.45% 5.46%
Software 1.22% 3.38%
Newsletters 0.75% 0.08%
Mobile 0.14% 3.77%
419/S cam/ Lotto 0.06% 0.20%
Casino 0.04% 1.23%
Degrees 0.02% 0.01%
Spam URL Distribution based on Top Level Domain Name
The proportion of spam exploiting URLs in the .com top- level domain decreased in December , as highlighted in the
table below. This is in line with a slight increase in other top- level domains this month.
TLD December
2012 November
2012
.com 60.0% 64.1%
.ru 11.0% 6.2%
.net 6.6% 6.5%
.info 6.1% n/a
Average Spam Message Size
In December , the proportion of spam emails that were 5Kb in size or less increase d by 14.8 percentage points.
Furthermore, the proportion of spam messages that were greater than 10Kb in size decrease d by 14.2 percent , as can
be seen in the following table.
Message Size December
2012 November
2012
0Kb – 5Kb 51.6% 36.8%
5Kb – 10Kb 24.3% 24.9%
>10Kb 24.1% 38.3%
Spam Attack Vectors
December highlights the decrease in spam emails resulting in NDRs (spam related non- delivery reports) . In these
cases, the recipient email addresses are invalid or bounced by their service provider. The proportion of spam that
contained a malicious attachment or link in crease , with periodic spike s of spam activity during the period, as shown in
the chart below.
Page 3 of 10
NDR spam, as shown in the chart above, is often as a result of widespread dictionary attacks during spam campaigns ,
where spammers make use of databases containing first and last names and combine them to generate random email
addresses . A higher -level of act ivity is indicative of spammers that are seeking to build their distribution lists by
ignoring the invalid recipient emails in the bounce- backs . The list can then be used for more targeted spam attacks
containing malicious attachment s or link s. This might indicate a pattern followed by spammers in harvesting the email
addresses for some months and using those addresses for targeted attacks in other months. 0.0%2.0%4.0%6.0%8.0%10.0%12.0%14.0%16.0%18.0%20.0%
11-Nov
12-Nov13-Nov14-Nov
15-Nov
16-Nov17-Nov
18-Nov
19-Nov
20-Nov
21-Nov22-Nov23-Nov
24-Nov
25-Nov26-Nov
27-Nov28-Nov
29-Nov
30-Nov
1-Dec
2-Dec
3-Dec4-Dec
5-Dec
6-Dec7-Dec
8-Dec
9-Dec
10-DecMalware NDR
Page 4 of 10
Phishing Analysis
In December , the global phishing rate increase d by 0.225 percentage points, taking the global average rate to one in
377.4 emails ( 0.27 percent) that comprised some form of phishing attack.
Analysis of Phishing W ebsites
The overall phishing de creased by about 34 percent this month. Unique domains decreased by about 14 percent as
compared to the previous month. Phishing websites that used automated toolkits decreased by 50 percent. Phishing
websites with IP domains (for e.g. domains like http://255.255.255.255) decreased by about 14 percent. Webhosting
services comprised of 4 percent of all phishing, a de crease of 25 percent from the previous month. The number of
non-English phishing sites in creased by 7 percent. Among non- English phishing sites, French, Italian , Portuguese,
and Chinese were highest in December.
Geographic Location of Phishing Web sites
Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Norway
South Africa
Spain
United Kingdom
Singapore 1 in 81.4
1 in 84.2
1 in 90.0
1 in 229.3
1 in 253.8 Public Sector
Marketing/Media
Agriculture
Education
Estate Agents 1 in 134.7
1 in 2 11.1
1 in 223.0
1 in 230.9
1 in 258.0 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 1 in 221.7
1 in 544.9
1 in 589.8
1 in 574.6
1 in 479.8
1 in 418.6 Phishing Rate
December 2012 1 in 377.4
1 in 445.1
1 in 377.4 1 in 357.2 Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012
24.2%
20.2%
17.8%
16.3%
9.1%
3.8%
1.9%
1.5%
0.9%
0.9% United States
Norway
Spain
United Kingdom
Hong Kong
Korea, Republic of
Canada
Germany
France
Australia
December 2012 Phishing Websites Locations
*Note: Data lags one monthCountry November*
UnitedStates
Germany
UnitedKingdom
BrazilFranceCanada
RussiaChina
Netherlands
Australia51.7%
5.6%
4.2%
3.0%
2.7%3.9%
2.8%
1.9%2.9%
1.3%54.7%
4.8%
3.6%
3.4%
2.9%3.1%
2.5%
2.0%2.1%
n/aOctober
Page 5 of 10
Tactics of Phishing Distribution
Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks, by Industry
1.3% 3.7% 4.0% 42.1% 49.0%
TyposquattingIP Address DomainsFree Web Hosting SitesAutomated ToolkitsOther Unique Domains
0.008% 0.030% 0.033% 0.19% 1.24% 1.25% 1.35% 3.8% 5.0% 22.0% 65.2%
InsuranceISPRetail TradeGovernmentEntertainmentRetailTelecommunicationsComputer SoftwareCommunicationsInformation ServicesBanking
Page 6 of 10
Malware Analysis
Email -borne Threats
The global ratio of email -borne viruses in email traffic was one in 277.8 emails ( 0.36 percent ) in December , a decrease
of 0.03 percentage points since November .
In December , 27.2 percent of email -borne malware contained links to malicious websites, 13.0 percentage points
higher than November .
Frequently Blocked E mail-borne Malware
The table below shows the most frequently blocked email -borne malware for December , many of which relate to
generic variants of malicious attachments and malicious hy perlinks distributed in emails. Approximately 46.9 percent
of all email -borne malware was identified and blocked using generic detection.
Malware identified generically as aggressive strains of polymorphic malware accounted for 0.9 percent of all email -
borne malware blocked in December .
Malware Name % Malware
Suspicious.JIT.a -SH 28.83%
Exploit/Link -generic -ee68 15.74%
W32/Exploit -Archive.Gen -SH 13.15%
Trojan.Gen -SH 5.21%
Suspicious.JIT.a -SH.dam 2.78%
W32/Exploit -Archive.Gen -SH.dam 2.57%
Exploit/ SpoofBBB 2.40%
Exploit/Link -FakeACHUpdate 1.24%
Suspicious.JIT.a.dam 1.19%
ZIP/Generic.dam 1.17%
The top- ten list of most frequently blocked malware accounted for approximately 74.3 percent of all email -borne
malware blocked in December . Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 South Africa
Australia
United Kingdom
Italy
Canada 1 in 77.5
1 in 94.0
1 in 177.3
1 in 266.4
1 in 290.1 Public Sector
Transport/Utilities
Recreation
Education
Marketing/Media 1 in 69.4
1 in 125.5
1 in 179.9
1 in 207.3
1 in 233.0 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 1 in 291.4
1 in 355.2
1 in 423.8
1 in 129.9
1 in 305.9
1 in 278.1Virus Rate
December 2012 1 in 277.8
1 in 255.8
1 in 277.8 1 in 258.0 Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012
40.9%
24.9%
9.1%
4.3%
2.9%
2.5%
2.1%
1.7%
1.7%
1.6% United States
United Kingdom
Australia
India
Sweden
Canada
Brazil
Netherlands
Hong Kong
France
Page 7 of 10
Web -based Malware Threats
In December , Symantec Intelligence identified an average of 762 websites each day harboring malware and other
potentially unwanted programs including spyware and adware; a decrease of 58.7 percent since November . This
reflects the rate at which websites are being compromised or created for the purpose of spreading malicious content.
Often this number is higher when Web- based malware is in circulation for a longer period of time to widen its potential
spread and incr ease its longevity.
As detection for Web- based malwar e increases, the number of new websites blocked decreases and the proportion of
new malware begins to rise, but initially on fewer websites. Further analysis reveals that 39.6 percent of all malicious
domains blocked were new in December ; an increase of 7.1 percentage points compared with November . Additionally,
11.9 percent of all Web- based malware blocked was new in December ; an increase of 0.3 percentage points since
November .
The chart above shows the XXcreaseXX in the number of new spyware and adware websites blocked each day on
average during December compared with the equivalent number of Web- based malware website s blocked each day.
Web Policy Risks from Inappropriate Use
Some of t he most common trigger s for policy -based filtering applied by Symantec Web Security.cloud for its business
clients are s ocial networking, advertisements and pop- ups, and streaming media category . Many organizations allow
access to social networking websites , but facilitate access logging so that usage patterns can be tracked and in some
cases implement policies to only permit access at certain times of the day and block access at all other times. Web -
based advertisements pose a potential risk though the use of “malvertisements,” or malicious advertisements. These
may occur as the result of a legitimate online ad- provider being compromised and a banner ad being used to serve
malware on an otherwise harmless website . Streaming media is increasingly popular when there are major sporting
events or high profile international news stories. This activity often results in an increased number of blocks, as
businesses seek to preserve valuable bandwidth for other purposes.
Endpoint Security Threats
The endpoint is often the last line of defense and analysis; however, the endpoint can often be the first -line of defense
against attacks that spread using USB storage devices and insecure network connections . The threats found here can
shed light on the wider nature of threats confronting businesses, especially from blended attacks and threats facing New Malware Sites per Day
New sites with spyware
New sites with web viruses
Total15/day
762/day
777/dayWeb Security Services Activity:
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Web Security Services Activity:
Policy-Based Filtering
Advertisement and Popups
Social Networking
Streaming Media
Computing and Internet
Peer- To-Peer
Chat
Hosting Sites
Games
News
EntertainmentWebViruses and Trojans
Trojan.JS.Agent.GHF
JS:Trojan.Script.AA L
Trojan.Swifi
JS:Trojan.Crypt.KK
JS:Trojan.Crypt.K A
Trojan.Malscript!html
JS:Trojan.JS.Iframe.AM
Trojan.Maljava
Trojan.Malscript
JS:Trojan.Crypt.JF Potentially Unwanted Programs
Dropped:Adware.Generic.299792
Application.DirectDownloade r.A
Dropped:Adware.Generic.262597
Application:Android/Counterclank. A
Adware:Android/AirPush. A
Adware:W32/Baidu.gen!B
Adware.GoonSquad
Adware:Android/Ropin. A
Adware.Adpopup
Spyware.Ardakey
December 2012 30.5%
28.6%
7.2%
4.0%
3.5%
3.1%
2.8%
2.0%
1.7%
1.5% 17.8%
7.0%
6.4%
4.0%
2.9%
2.4%
2.4%
2.3%
2.2%
1.5% 80.6%
18.9%
0.3%
0.03%
0.018%
0.016%
0.014%
0.013%
0.012%
0.010%
Page 8 of 10
mobile workers . Attacks reaching the endpoint are likely to have already circumvented other layers of protection that
may already be deployed, such as gateway filtering.
The table below shows the malware most frequently blocked targeting endpoint devices for the last month. This
includes data from endpoint devices protected by Symantec technology around the world, including data from clients
which may not be using other layers of protection, such as Symantec Web Security.cloud or Symantec Email
AntiVirus.cloud.
Malware Name1 % Malware
W32.Sality.AE 6.5%
W32.Ramnit!html 6.0%
W32.Downadup.B 4.9%
W32.Ramnit.B 4.9%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 3.9%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 2.4%
W32.Virut.CF 2.1%
W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 1.9%
W32.Xpaj.B 1.1%
W32.Virut!html 1.0%
For much of 2012 , variants of W32.Sality.AE
2 and W32.Ramnit3 had been the most prevalent malicious threat s
blocked at the endpoint. Variants of W32.Ramnit accounted for approximately 11.7% of all malware blocked at the
endpoint in December , compared with 5.6 percent for all variants of W32.Sality.
Approximately 34.8 percent of the most frequently blocked malware last month was identified and blocked using
generic detection. Many new viruses and Trojans are based on earlier versions, where code has been copied or altered to create a new strain, or variant. Often these variants are created using toolkits and hundreds of thousands of
variants can be created from the same piece of malware. This has become a popular tactic to evade signature- based
detection, as each variant would traditionally need its own signature to be correctly identified and blocked.
By deploying techniques, such as heuristic analysis and generic detection, it ’s possible to correctly identify and block
several variants of the same malware families, as well as identify new forms of malicious code that s eek to exploit
certain vulnerabilities that can be identified generically.
1For further information on these threats, please visit: http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/landing/threats.js p
2 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006- 011714- 3948 -99
3 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010- 011922- 2056 -99
Page 9 of 10
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
DECEMBER 2013p. 2
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
3 Executive Summary
4 BIG NUMBERS
7 TARGETED ATTACKS
8 Targeted Attacks in 2013
8 Targeted Attacks per Day
8 First Attacks Logged by Month
9 Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
9 Top 10 Industries Attacked
9 First Attacks Logged by Size
9 File Extensions of Attachments
10 Social Media
11 Social Media
11 Top 5 Social Media Attacks, 2013
12 DATA BREACHES
13 Data Breaches
13 Top 5 Types of Information Exposed
13 Timeline of Data Breaches, 2013
14 MOBILE
15 Mobile
15 Mobile Malware by Type
16 Cumulative Mobile Android Malware
17 VULNERABILITIES
18 Vulnerabilities
18 Total Vulnerabilities Disclosed by Month
18 Browser Vulnerabilities
18 Plug-in Vulnerabilities19 SPAM, PHISHING, & MALWARE
20 Spam
20 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Geography
20 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Industry
21 Top 10 Sources of Spam
21 Average Spam Message Size
21 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Company Size
21 Spam by Category
21 Spam URL Distribution Based on Top Level Domain Name
22 Phishing
22 Top 10 Sources of Phishing
22 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Company Size
22 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Industry
22 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Geography
23 Phishing Distribution
23 Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks
24 Malware
24 Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected
24 Top 10 Email Virus Sources
25 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Industry
25 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Geographic Location
25 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Company Size
26 Endpoint Security
26 Top 10 Most Frequently Blocked Malware
27 Policy Based Filtering
27 Policy Based Filtering
28 About Symantec
28 More Informationp. 3
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
Executive Summary
Welcome to the December edition of the Symantec Intelligence
report. Symantec Intelligence aims to provide the latest analysis of
cyber security threats, trends, and insights concerning malware,
spam, and other potentially harmful business risks.
This month, we see the email virus rate increase for the second month in a row, reaching an annual
high of one in 164 emails.
Targeted attacks continue to focus on the Service-related industries, both in the professional and
non-traditional realms. Two out of every five targeted attacks appear to be focused on these Service
categories.
We also saw an increase in the overall number of data breaches reported in December, many of
which occurred in previous months. Many of these disclosures from earlier in the year could be due
to various regulations and/or laws requiring the disclosure of a breach during the year it occurred.
In other news, the number of mobile malware variants has declined for the third month in a row,
and global spam rate has increased this month, after a two month decline.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to contact us with any comments or
feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat Analyst
[email protected]. 4
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
BIG NUMBERSp. 5
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
Overall Email Phishing Rate:
Overall Email Phishing Rate:
1 in 1,134
1 in 1,0531 in 1,311 NovOct
DecHIGHER NUMBER = LOWER RISK
Overall Email Virus Rate:
Overall Email Virus Rate:
Oct
NovDecHIGHER NUMBER = LOWER RISK
1 in 437
1 in 253
1 in 164
Estimated Global
Email Spam Rate Per DayEstimated Global
Email Spam Rate Per Day
SPAM AS PERCENT OF ALL EMAIL
Oct Nov Dec0102030405060708090100
68% 62% 64%
New Vulnerabilities
New Vulnerabilities
Nov
Oct
Dec
663
663
438 438
471 471
Nov6Oct5
Dec1
Mobile
VulnerabilitiesMobile
Vulnerabilities
p. 6
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
Data Breaches
Data Breaches
215Number of Breaches
(Year-to-Date)
342,794,556 Number of IdentitiesExposed (Year-to-Date)
Mobile Malware VariantsMobile Malware VariantsVARIANTS (CUMULATIVE) 161132
Dec Nov Oct193 186
10002000300040005000600070008000900010000
D N O S A J J M A M F JAN
2013D
7,6127,612p. 7
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
TARGETED ATTACKSp. 8
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
Targeted Attacks in 2013
Targeted Attacks per Day
Source: Symantec
2013 2013 TREND (Projected) 2011 2012
TARGETED ATTACKS
255075100125150175200225250
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANAt a Glance
• Targeted attacks were
down in December, after
above-average numbers
in October and November.
• Large organizations of
2500+ are targeted in
39% of attacks, though
organizations with fewer
than 250 employees are
targeted more often,
based on first attacks.
• The .exe file type was
the most common
attachment, making up
31.3% of email-based
targeted attacks that
included file attachments.
First Attacks Logged by Month
Source: Symantec
100200300400500600700800900100011001200
D N O S A J J M A M F JAN
2013p. 9
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
Source: Symantec
Company Size Percent
1-250 29.8%
251-500 10.7%
501-1000 9.5%
1001-1500 3.3%
1501-2500 7.6%
2500+ 39.0%First Attacks Logged by Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Percent
1-250 52.5%
251-500 10.9%
501-1000 9.2%
1001-1500 5.1%
1501-2500 4.9%
2500+ 17.4%
File Extensions of Attachments
Source: Symantec
File Extension Percent
.exe 31.3%
.scr 18.4%
.doc 7.9%
.pdf 5.3%
.class 4.7%
.jpg 3.8%
.dmp 2.7%
.dll 1.8%
.au3 1.7%
.xls 1.2%Top 10 Industries Attacked
Source: Symantec
Industry Percent
Services - Professional 20.1%
Services - Non Traditional 18.5%
Public Administration 14.8%
Finance, insurance & Real Estate 13.4%
Manufacturing 11.1%
Transportation, communications, electric, gas &
Sanitary Services8.0%
Wholesale 5.2%
Retail 2.2%
Nonclassifiable Establishments 2.0%
Logistics 1.8%
The “Professional” services category includes services such as Legal, Accounting,
Health, and Education. “Non-Traditional” services include Hospitality, Recreational, and
Repair services.p. 10
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
SOCIAL MEDIAp. 11
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
Social Media
At a Glance
• 81 percent of all social
media attacks in 2013
where fake offerings. This
is up from 56 percent in
2012.
• Likejacking is the second-
most common type of
social media attack at 7
percent, though it is down
from 2012, when it made
up 10 percent.
• Fake Apps have risen
overall in 2013, making
up 2 percent of social
media attacks. In 2012,
this category was ranked
sixth.
Methodology
Fake Offering. These scams invite social network users to join a fake event or group with
incentives such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to share credentials with
the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
Fake Plug-in Scams. Users are tricked into downloading fake browser extensions on their
machines. Rogue browser extensions can pose like legitimate extensions but when installed
can steal sensitive information from the infected machine.
Likejacking. Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website buttons
that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
Fake Apps. Applications provided by attackers that appear to be legitimate apps; however,
they contain a malicious payload. The attackers often take legitimate apps, bundle malware
with them, and then re-release it as a free version of the app.
Manual Sharing Scams. These rely on victims to actually do the hard work of sharing the
scam by presenting them with intriguing videos, fake offers or messages that they share
with their friends.Top 5 Social Media Attacks, 2013
Source: Symantec
Top Social Media Attacks
7%
6%Fake
Offering
Fake PluginLikejacking
2%Fake Apps
2%Manual Sharing81%p. 12
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
DATA BREACHESp. 13
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
Data Breaches
At a Glance
• The largest breach that
was reported in December
actually occurred during
November, where 40
million identities were
exposed.
• There were a number of
breaches reported during
December that occurred
earlier in the year. This
brings the total number of
reported breaches to 215
so far for 2013.
• Of the reported breaches
so far, the top three types
of information exposed
are a person’s real name,
government ID number
(e.g. Social Security), and
birth date.Timeline of Data Breaches, 2013
Source: SymantecNUMBER OF INCIDENTSIDENTITIES BREACHED (MILLIONS)
INCIDENTS IDENTITIES BREACHED
153045607590105120135150
D N O S A J J M A M F JAN
2013D81624324048
Top 5 Types of Information Exposed
Source: Symantec
40%40%
36%
31%70%Real Names
Gov ID numbers (Soc Sec)
Birth Dates
Home Address
Medical Records
Information Exposed in BreachesInformation Exposed in Breaches
% OF ALL BREACHESMethodology
This data is procured from the Norton Cybercrime Index (CCI).
The Norton CCI is a statistical model that measures the levels
of threats, including malicious software, fraud, identity theft,
spam, phishing, and social engineering daily. The data breach
section of the Norton CCI is derived from data breaches that
have been reported by legitimate media sources and have
exposed personal information.
In some cases a data breach is not publicly reported during the
same month the incident occurred, or an adjustment is made in
the number of identities reportedly exposed. In these cases, the
data in the Norton CCI is updated. This causes fluctuations in
the numbers reported for previous months when a new report is
released.
Norton Cybercrime Index
http://us.norton.com/protect-yourselfp. 14
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
MOBILEp. 15
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
Mobile
At a Glance
• 33 percent of mobile
malware tracks users in
2013, up from 15 percent
in 2012.
• Traditional threats,
such as back doors and
downloaders are present
in 20 percent of all mobile
malware threats.
• Risks that collect data,
the most common risk
in 2012, is down 12
percentage points to 20
percent of risks.
• Four new mobile malware
families were discovered
in December, along with
132 new variants.
20%33%
8%Track User
Risks that spy on the individual using the
device, collecting SMS messages or phone call logs, tracking GPS coordinates, recording phone calls, or gathering pictures and video taken with the device.
Traditional Threats
Threats that carry out traditional malware functions, such as back doors and downloaders. 21%
Adware/Annoyance
Mobile risks that display advertising or generally perform actions to disrupt the user.
Send Content
These risks will send text messages to premium SMS numbers, ultimately appearing on the bill of the device’s owner. Other risks can be used to send spam messages.10%
Change Settings
These types of risks attempt to elevate privileges or simply modify various settings within the operating system. 20%
Collect Data
This includes the collection of both device- and user-specific data, such as device information, configuration data, or banking details. Mobile Malware by Type
Source: Symantecp. 16
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
Cumulative Mobile Android Malware
Source: Symantec
VARIANTS FAMILIES
4080120160200240280320360400
D N O S A J J M A M F JAN
2013D10002000300040005000600070008000900010000FAMILIES (CUMULATIVE) VARIANTS (CUMULATIVE)
p. 17
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
VULNERABILITIESp. 18
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
Vulnerabilities
At a Glance
• There were 471 new
vulnerabilities discovered
in December, bringing
the total for the year up
to 6436, a 18 percent
increase compared to
2012.
• There was one
vulnerability in mobile
operating systems
disclosed during the
month of December.
• Google’s Chrome
browser continues to
lead in reporting browser
vulnerabilities, while
Oracle’s Java leads
in reported plug-in
vulnerabilities.
• Two zero-day
vulnerabilities were
disclosed during the
month of December.Total Vulnerabilities Disclosed by Month
Source: Symantec
100200300400500600700800
D N O S A J J M A M F JAN
2013D
Plug-in Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
10%20%30%40%50%60%
Adobe Acrobat Reader
Adobe Flash PlayerApple QuickTimeOracle Sun Java
Browser Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
10%20%30%40%50%60%
Apple Safari
Google ChromeMicrosoft Internet ExplorerMozilla FirefoxOpera
p. 19
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
SPAM, PHISHING, & MALWAREp. 20
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
At a Glance
• The global spam rate increase 1.8 percentage points in December
to 64 percent, up from 62.2 percent in November.
• Education was the most commonly targeted industry, taking the
top spot for the second month in a row.
• The .com top-level domain (TLD) was again the most frequently
used malicious TLD in December.
• Sex Dating spam is the most common category, at 76.3 percent.
Pharmaceutical and Job-related spam tied for second at 9.2
percent each.Spam
Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Geography
Source: Symantec
Geography Percent
Sri Lanka 75.2%
Israel 71.6%
France 71.5%
Saudi Arabia 69.2%
China 69.1%
Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Percent
Education 65.9%
Gov/Public Sector 65.6%
Non-Profit 65.4%
Chem/Pharm 65.1%
IT Services 64.9%p. 21
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
Top 10 Sources of Spam
Source: Symantec
Source Percent of All Spam
Spain 7.6%
United States 7.6%
Finland 6.4%
Argentina 5.1%
Italy 4.9%
India 4.1%
Canada 4.0%
Brazil 3.7%
Peru 3.5%
Romania 3.1%
Spam URL Distribution Based on Top Level Domain Name
Source: Symantec
Month* .com .info .us .biz
Nov 36.7% 26.1% 10.1% 9.6%
Oct 26.1% n/a 11.8% 17.7%
*Data lags one monthAverage Spam Message Size
Source: Symantec
Month* 0Kb – 5Kb 5Kb – 10Kb >10Kb
Nov 37.0% 24.7% 38.4%
Oct 40.2% 26.0% 33.8%
*Data lags one monthSpam by Category
Source: Symantec
Category Percent
Sex/Dating 76.3%
Pharma 9.2%
Jobs 9.2%
Watches 1.8%
Software 1.3%Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Percent
1-250 63.7%
251-500 64.0%
501-1000 63.7%
1001-1500 64.1%
1501-2500 63.8%
2501+ 64.2%p. 22
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
At a Glance
• The global phishing rate is up in December, comprising one in 1
in 1,053 email messages. In November this rate was one in 1 in
1,311.
• Financial themes continue to be the most frequent subject matter,
with 61.6 percent of phishing scams containing this theme.
• The United Kingdom had the highest rate in December, where one
in 530 emails was a phishing scam.
• Australia tops the list of sources of phishing emails, responsible
for distributing 35.9 percent of phishing scams.
• The Public Sector was the most targeted industry in December,
with one in every 173 emails received in this industry being a
phishing scam.Phishing
Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Geography
Source: Symantec
Geography Rate
United Kingdom 1 in 530
Australia 1 in 734
Mexico 1 in 1,062
New Zealand 1 in 1,073
Italy 1 in 1,096Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Rate
Public Sector 1 in 173
Finance 1 in 652
Education 1 in 803
Accom/Catering 1 in 834
Marketing/Media 1 in 1,016Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Rate
1-250 1 in 862
251-500 1 in 944
501-1000 1 in 1,489
1001-1500 1 in 1,811
1501-2500 1 in 1,963
2501+ 1 in 2,905
Top 10 Sources of Phishing
Source: Symantec
Source Percent
Australia 35.9%
New Zealand 29.3%
United States 18.8%
United Kingdom 6.0%
South Africa 3.5%
Sweden 2.1%
Chile 1.3%
Netherlands 0.5%
Canada 0.3%
Malaysia 0.3%p. 23
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
43.0%
4.3%
3.3%
0.8%48.6%Automated Toolkits
Other Unique DomainsIP Address DomainsFree Web Hosting SitesTyposquatting
Phishing Distribution:Phishing Distribution:Phishing Distribution
Source: Symantec
33.8%
5.2%
0.9%
0.5%61.6%FinancialInformation ServicesRetailComputer SoftwareCommunications
Organizations Spoofed
in Phishing Attacks:Organizations Spoofed
in Phishing Attacks:Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks
Source: Symantecp. 24
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
Malware
1 in 50
1 in 100
1 in 150
1 in 200
1 in 250
1 in 3001 in 350
1 in 400
1 in 450
1 in 500
D N O S A J J M A M F JAN
2013DProportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected
Source: SymantecTop 10 Email Virus Sources
Source: Symantec
Geography Percent
United Kingdom 60.7%
Sri Lanka 14.0%
United States 13.9%
Australia 2.7%
France 0.9%
South Africa 0.9%
Japan 0.8%
Netherlands 0.7%
Singapore 0.5%
Hong Kong 0.5%At a Glance
• The global average virus rate in December was one in 164
emails, compared to one in 253 in November.
• The United Kingdom topped the list of geographies, with one
in 65 emails containing a virus.
• The United Kingdom was also the largest source of virus-laden
emails, making up 60.7 percent of all email-based viruses.
• Small-to-medium size businesses with 1-250 employees were
the most targeted company size, where one and 147 emails
contained a virus.p. 25
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Rate
Public Sector 1 in 33
Education 1 in 76
Accom/Catering 1 in 122
Recreation 1 in 150
Prof Services 1 in 151
Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Rate
1-250 1 in 147
251-500 1 in 150
501-1000 1 in 167
1001-1500 1 in 183
1501-2500 1 in 213
2501+ 1 in 324Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Geographic Location
Source: Symantec
Geography Rate
United Kingdom 1 in 65
Switzerland 1 in 128
Austria 1 in 200
Ireland 1 in 201
Hungary 1 in 256p. 26
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
At a Glance
• Variants of W32.Ramnit accounted for 8.1 percent of all malware
blocked at the endpoint.
• In comparison, 4.3 percent of all malware were variants of
W32.Sality.
• Approximately 30.1 percent of the most frequently blocked
malware last month was identified and blocked using generic
detection.Endpoint Security
Top 10 Most Frequently Blocked Malware
Source: Symantec
Malware Percent
W32.Sality.AE 5.7%
W32.Ramnit!html 4.8%
W32.Ramnit.B 4.1%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 3.6%
W32.Downadup.B 3.5%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 2.9%
Trojan.Zbot 2.5%
W32.Virut.CF 1.9%
W32.SillyFDC 1.5%
W32.Mabezat.B!inf 1.0%p. 27
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
Policy Based Filtering
Source: Symantec
Category Percent
Social Networking 50.8%
Advertisement & Popups 21.1%
Streaming Media 4.9%
Hosting Sites 3.6%
Computing & Internet 3.4%
Search 1.8%
Chat 1.6%
Gambling 1.3%
News 1.1%
Entertainment 1.0%Policy Based Filtering
At a Glance
• The most common trigger for policy-based filtering applied by
Symantec Web Security .cloud for its business clients was for the
“Social Networking” category, which accounted for 50.8 percent
of blocked Web activity in December.
• “Advertisement & Popups” was the second-most common trigger,
comprising 21.1 percent of blocked Web activity.p. 28
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2013
About Symantec
More Information
• Security Response Publications: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/publications /
• Internet Security Threat Report Resource Page: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport /
• Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response /
• Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer /
• Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex /Symantec protects the world’s information and is a global leader in security, backup, and
availability solutions. Our innovative products and services protect people and information
in any environment—from the smallest mobile device to the enterprise data center to cloud-
based systems. Our world-renowned expertise in protecting data, identities, and interactions
gives our customers confidence in a connected world. More information is available at
www.symantec.com or by connecting with Symantec at go.symantec.com/socialmedia .
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
DECEMBER 2014p. 2
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2014
CONTENTS
3 Summary
4 TARGETED ATTACKS + DATA BREACHES
5 Targeted Attacks
5 Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing
Emails
5 Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
5 Average Number of Spear-Phishing Attacks Per Day
6 Top-Ten Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
7 Data Breaches
7 Timeline of Data Breaches
8 Top-Ten Types of Information Breached
9 MALWARE TACTICS
10 Malware Tactics
10 Top-Ten Malware
10 Top-Ten Mac OSX Malware Blocked on OSX Endpoints
11 Ransomware Over Time
12 Vulnerabilities
12 Number of Vulnerabilities
12 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
13 Browser Vulnerabilities
13 Plug-in Vulnerabilities14 MOBILE THREATS
15 Mobile
15 Mobile Malware Families by Month, Android
16 PHISHING, SPAM + EMAIL THREATS
17 Phishing and Spam
17 Phishing Rate
17 Global Spam Rate
18 Email Threats
18 Proportion of Email Traffic Containing URL Malware
18 Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected
19 About Symantec
19 More Informationp. 3
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2014
Summary
Welcome to the December edition of the
Symantec Intelligence report. Symantec
Intelligence aims to provide the latest
analysis of cyber security threats, trends,
and insights concerning malware, spam, and
other potentially harmful business risks.
Symantec has established the most
comprehensive source of Internet threat data in the world through the Symantec™
Global Intelligence Network, which is made
up of more than 41.5 million attack sensors
and records thousands of events per second.
This network monitors threat activity in
over 157 countries and territories through
a combination of Symantec products and services such as Symantec DeepSight™
Threat Management System, Symantec™
Managed Security Services, Norton™
consumer products, and other third-party
data sources. This month’s report takes us through December with a number
of rolling 12-month metrics that we’ve tracked over the last year.
However, it’s important to point out that this is a snapshot of
monthly data for December, as opposed to a year-end summary of activity in 2014. We will be exploring 2014 as a whole in the
upcoming Internet Security Threat Report XX, scheduled for
publication in the coming months.
In December there were eight data breaches reported that took
place within the month of December. This number is likely to
rise as more data breaches that occurred during the month are reported in the future. For instance, there were 14 new data
breaches reported during December that took place between
January and November.
The most commonly encountered malware in December was
Trojan.Swifi. This threat is a Trojan horse that may be down-
loaded from a Web site and exploits a vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player.
A new zero-day vulnerability was also disclosed during the
month of December. The Adobe Flash Player CVE-2014-9163 Stack Based Buffer Overflow Vulnerability may allow attackers
to execute arbitrary code within the context of the affected
application or result in denial-of-service conditions if the exploit fails.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to
contact us with any comments or feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat Analyst
[email protected]. 4
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2014
TARGETED ATTACKS
+ DATA BREACHESp. 5
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2014
At a Glance
• The average number of
spear-phishing attacks dropped to 33 per day in December, down from 43 in November.
• The .doc file type was the
most common attachment
type used in spear-phishing attacks. The .exe file type came in second.
• Organizations with 2500+ employees were the most likely to be targeted in December.
• Manufacturing lead the Top-Ten Industries targeted, followed by Finance, Insur-
ance, & Real Estate. Targeted Attacks
Average Number of Spear-Phishing
Attacks Per Day
Source: Symantec :: JANUARY 2014 — DECEMBER 2014
255075100125150175200225250
D N O S A J J M A M F J
201454 5345 43
2033141
84 84
5488165
Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing
Emails
Source: Symantec :: DECEMBER 2014
Executable type December November
.doc 26.7% 25.9%
.exe 15.7% 16.4%
.au3 8.2% 8.6%
.scr 5.0% 5.3%
.jpg 4.6% 4.8%
.class 3.4% 2.2%
.pdf 1.6% 1.6%
.bin 1.5% 1.6%
.txt 1.4% 1.3%
.dmp 1.0% 1.0%Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
Source: Symantec :: DECEMBER 2014
Organization Size December November
1-250 31.5% 34.4%
251-500 11.5% 8.4%
501-1000 6.6% 8.8%
1001-1500 3.5% 3.2%
1501-2500 9.3% 4.5%
2500+ 37.6% 40.7%p. 6
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2014
Top-Ten Industries Targeted in
Spear-Phishing Attacks
Source: Symantec :: DECEMBER 2014
ConsultingConstructionPublic AdministrationRetailTransportation,
Communications, & ElectricServices - Non TraditionalServices - ProfessionalWholesaleFinance, Insurance,
& Real EstateManufacturing 27%
24
13
12
11
4
2
1
1
1p. 7
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2014
Data Breaches
At a Glance
• There were eight data breaches reported this month that took
place during the month of December. This number is likely to rise as more data breaches that occurred during the month are reported.
• In comparison, there were 14 new data breaches reported during December that took place between January and
November.
• Real names, government ID numbers, such as Social Security
numbers, and home addresses are currently the top three types of data exposed in data breaches.
20406080100120140160
D N O S A J J M A M F J
2014
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
IDENTITIES EXPOSED (MILLIONS)
INCIDENTS IDENTITIES EXPOSED (Millions)Timeline of Data Breaches
Source: Symantec :: JANUARY 2014 — DECEMBER 2014
147
59
178
31.5
10
16.4.05 1.7 2.68.124
510152025303540
30
27
2527
22
2019 1920
18
821p. 8
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2014
Top-Ten Types of Information Breached
Source: Symantec :: JANUARY 2014 — DECEMBER 2014
Real Names
Gov ID numbers (Soc Sec)Home AddressBirth DatesFinancial InformationMedical RecordsEmail AddressesPhone NumbersUsernames & PasswordsInsurance01
02030405060708091066
%
45%
43%
36%
36%
24%
21%
20%
16%
10%
Methodology
This data is procured from the Norton Cybercrime Index (CCI). The Norton CCI is a statistical model
that measures the levels of threats, including malicious software, fraud, identity theft, spam,
phishing, and social engineering daily. The data breach section of the Norton CCI is derived from
data breaches that have been reported by legitimate media sources and have exposed personal information.
In some cases a data breach is not publicly reported during the same month the incident occurred,
or an adjustment is made in the number of identities reportedly exposed. In these cases, the data in the Norton CCI is updated. This causes fluctuations in the numbers reported for previous months
when a new report is released.p. 9
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2014
MALWARE TACTICSp. 10
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2014
Malware Tactics
At a Glance
• Trojan.Swifi was the
most common malware blocked in December, up from tenth place in November.
• W32.Ramnit variants
continue to dominate the
top-ten malware list.
• The most common OSX threat seen on OSX was OSX.Keylogger, making up 16.3 percent of all OSX malware found on OSX Endpoints.
• The amount of ransom-ware seen during December increased
when compared to previ-
ous months. Overall ransomware activity has remained low since March of this year. Top-Ten Malware
Source: Symantec :: DECEMBER 2014
Rank Name December November
1 Trojan.Swifi 7.0% 1.4%
2 W32.Almanahe.B!inf 5.2% 4.5%
3 W32.Ramnit!html 5.1% 4.4%
4 W32.Sality.AE 5.0% 4.8%
5 W32.Ramnit.B 3.7% 2.7%
6 W32.Downadup.B 2.4% 3.0%
7 W32.Ramnit.B!inf 2.3% 2.3%
8 W32.Virut.CF 1.7% 1.5%
9 W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 1.6% 1.6%
10 W32.SillyFDC 1.1% 1.4%
Top-Ten Mac OSX Malware Blocked
on OSX Endpoints
Source: Symantec :: DECEMBER 2014
Rank Malware Name December November
1 OSX.Keylogger 16.3% 11.8%
2 OSX.Wirelurker 13.6% –
3 OSX.Okaz 11.2% 13.4%
4 OSX.RSPlug.A 10.1% 11.0%
5 OSX.Luaddit 9.3% –
6 OSX.Klog.A 7.6% 8.4%
7 OSX.Flashback.K 6.3% 15.7%
8 OSX.Stealbit.B 4.1% 7.6%
9 OSX.Freezer 2.7% –
10 OSX.Netweird 2.2% 3.7%p. 11
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2014
Ransomware Over Time
Source: Symantec :: JANURARY 2014 — DECEMBER 2014 THOUSANDS
100200300400500600
D N O S A J J M A M F J
2014468
365518
349
236 230
183
149
9578 77116p. 12
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2014
Number of Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: JANUARY 2014 — DECEMBER 2014
100200300400500600700800
D N O S A J J M A M F J
2014438575600 596
457428399542562579
473555
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: JANUARY 2014 — NOVEMBER 2014
12345678
D N O S A J J M A M F J
20140 0 0 0 012
05
014Vulnerabilities
At a Glance
• There were 428 vulner-
abilities disclosed during the month of December.
• There was one zero-day vulnerability disclosed during December
(CVE-2014-9163).
• Internet Explorer has
reported the most brows-er vulnerabilities during the month of December.
• Adobe, reporting on Acro-bat and Flash programs, disclosed the most plug-in vulnerabilities over the same time period.p. 13
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2014
Browser Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: JANUARY 2014 — DECEMBER 2014
20406080100
D N O S A J J M A M F J
2014
Opera
Mozilla FirefoxMicrosoft Internet Explorer
Google Chrome
Apple Safari
Plug-in Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: JANUARY 2014 — DECEMBER 2014
1020304050607080
Java
Apple
Adobe
ActiveX
D N O S A J J M A M F J
2014
p. 14
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2014
MOBILE THREATSp. 15
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2014
Mobile
Mobile Malware Families by Month,
Android
Source: Symantec :: JANUARY 2014 — DECEMBER 2014
8
6
24
2 235
34 4
3
12345678910
D N O S A J J M A M F J
2014
At a Glance
• There were six Android
malware families discov-ered in December.p. 16
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2014
PHISHING , SPAM + EMAIL THREATSp. 17
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2014
Phishing and Spam
Phishing Rate
Source: Symantec :: JANUARY 2014 — DECEMBER 2014
1 in 0
1 in 500
1 in 1000
1 in 1500
1 in 2000
1 in 2500
D N O S A J J M A M F J
201420411610647
1517401478370
731395496
1290
1587
At a Glance
• The phishing rate
dropped in December, at one in 1,517 emails, down from one in 647 emails in December.
• The global spam rate
was 55.3 percent for the
month of December.
• One out of every 195 emails contained a virus.
• Of the email traffic in the month of December, 14 percent contained a mali-cious URL.
Global Spam Rate
Source: Symantec :: JANUARY 2014 — DECEMBER 2014
102030405060708090100%
D N O S A J J M A M F J
201455 5562 6266
5961 6064 63
5855p. 18
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2014
Email Threats
Proportion of Email Traffic
Containing URL Malware
Source: Symantec :: JANUARY 2014 — DECEMBER 2014
102030405060708090100%
D N O S A J J M A M F J
20146741
1416 14
6314
7 83
1 in 50
1 in 100
1 in 150
1 in 200
1 in 250
1 in 300
1 in 350
1 in 400
1 in 450
1 in 500
D N O S A J J M A M F J
2014Proportion of Email Traffic
in Which Virus Was Detected
Source: Symantec :: JANUARY 2014 — DECEMBER 2014
351329246195
207188141
234183
232
351270p. 19
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: DECEMBER 2014
About Symantec
More Information
• Symantec Worldwide: http://www.symantec.com/
• ISTR and Symantec Intelligence Resources: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
• Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/
• Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer/
• Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex/Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC) is an information protection expert that helps
people, businesses and governments seeking the freedom to unlock the opportunities
technology brings – anytime, anywhere. Founded in April 1982, Symantec, a Fortune
500 company, operating one of the largest global data-intelligence networks, has
provided leading security, backup and availability solutions for where vital information
is stored, accessed and shared. The company’s more than 20,000 employees reside in more than 50 countries. Ninety-nine percent of Fortune 500 companies are Symantec
customers. In fiscal 2013, it recorded revenues of $6.9 billion. To learn more go to
www.symantec.com or connect with Symantec at: go.symantec.com/socialmedia.
|
Page 1 of 19
Symantec Intelligence
Symantec Intelligence Report : February 2012
Socially engineered polymorphic malware spoofing a well -known North American business mediation and
arbitration service
Welcome to the February edition of the Symantec Intelligence report which , provid es the latest analysis of cyber
security threats, trends and insights from the Symantec Intelligence team concerning malware, spam, and other
potentially harmful business risks . The data used to compile the analysis for this report includes data from January
and February 2012.
Report highlights
• Spam – 68.0 percent (a decrease of 1.0 percentage points since January ): page 7
• Phishing – One in 358.1 emails identified as phishing (a n increase of 0. 01 percentage points since January ): page 10
• Malware – One in 274.0 emails contained malware (a n increase of 0.03 percentage points since January ): page 12
• Malicious Web site s – 2,305 Web sites blocked per day (an increase of 9.7 percent since January ): page 13
• New wave of cyber -attacks designed to impersonate the Better Business Bureau : page 2
• Blogs review: page 6
• Best Practices for Enterprises and Users: page 16
Introduction
In February, global spam levels continued to fall, accounting for 68.0 percent of global email traffic, whilst malicious
email activity increased, with 1 in 274 emails being bl ocked as malicious . Contributing to this increase in malware
activity were attacks r eminiscent of similar incidents that were first reported back in 2007. In 2007, and again in 2012,
business es were seemingly being targeted with emails purporting to originate from the US Better Business Bureau,
socially engineered to suggest that a complaint had been filed against the organization and the details of the
complaint could be found in the file attachment , which would lead to a PDF files that contained an embedded
executabl e. Although the attacks recorded in 2007 and 2012 bear similar social engineering techniques, the recent
waves have used considerably more advanced techniques, including such as server -side polymorphism , making them
especially protean in nature .
The tragic death of pop star Whitney Houston earlier this month precipitated a predictable wave of malicious attacks ,
as is so often associated with celebrity news and current events. This was just the latest example of spammers and
cyber cri minals using news events to try to make their emails more tempting. In this case, the attackers quickly
responded in order to take advantage of people’s curiosity to find out more about the circumstances of her death,
including links to fake videos circulating on at least one popular social network . Rather than a video being presented
to them , the user would be asked to upgrade some software in order to view the video, but the software being installed
could potentially lead to a malware infection.
Cyber criminals t apping into the zeitgeist was particularly noticeable i n the week running- up to St. Valentine’s Day , as
the volume of spam messages referencing the event rose by as much as three and a half times the daily average for
that week , before fall ing off again after February 14, with a late spike occurring on February 16, when almost 6 times
the daily average volume of emails referencing the special day were recorded .
As the London 2012 Olympics draws closer, spam messages relating to the Olympic Games has gradually been
increasing, but is not yet a major feature in spam email subjects. Based on our experience with the FIFA World Cup in
2010, the volume of spam relating to the event increased more dramatically in the few weeks and months prior to t he
start of the event , around the April and May timeframe. Page 2 of 19
I hope you enjoy reading this month’s edition of the report, and please feel free to contact me directly with any
comments or feedback.
Paul Wood, Cyber Security Intelligence Manager
[email protected]
@paulowoody
Report analysis
New wave of cyber -attacks designed to impersonate the Better Business Bureau
A recent increase in malware w here attacks are r eminiscent of similar incidents that were first reported back in 2007,
when C -level business executives were being targeted with emails that purported to originate from the US Better
Business Bureau (BBB). A recent surge of similarly designed attacks in 2012 suggest this tactic has made a
renaissance. Like the attacks in 2007, the recent spates were also socially engineered to suggest that a complaint had been filed against the targeted organization and the details of the complaint could be found in the file attachment. The
attachments were frequently PDFs files that contained an embedded executable, or HTML file attachments that redirected the user to the malicious files, often hosted on a compromised Web site. Although the attacks recorded in 2007 and 2012 bear similar social engineering techniques, the recent waves are using considerably more advanced techniques, including server -side polymorphism.
The first large waves of attacks came in January 2012, when they accounted for approximately 7.3% of all email
malware, and one in 295 emails were malicious. These attacks have a similar appearance to phishing emails, but with
links to compromised Web sites hosting malware and t he BBB website carried a warning
to its members of these
attacks, and encourages its members to forward examples of suspicious emails to [email protected] .
Server -side polymorphism enables the attacker to generate a unique strain of malware for each use, in order to evade
detection by traditional anti -virus security software. Scripts such as PHP are commonly used on the attacker’s Web
site to generate the malicious code on- the-fly. Like the Greek sea- god, Proteus , the continually transforming nature of
these attacks makes them very difficult to recognize and detect using more traditional signature- based defens es.
However, because of their ability to respond quickly to new and previously unknown threats, cloud -based heuristics,
as noted later in this report, are very effective at detecting these aggressive strains of polymorphic malware, which in
February accoun ted for 41.1 percent of all email -borne malware blocked in February
Server -side polymorphic malware in itself has been in use for some time. In fact , the technique is being used very
aggressively and is being filtered on an almost daily basis by the company’s .cloud email services. H owever, the
attackers frequently change their tactics and social engineering techniques in order to deceive the recipients into
falling victim to the attacks . Typical examples recently have included emails spoofing well-known businesses,
including FedEx, UPS, DHL, and American Airlines. The latest twist marks a return to a tactic first seen in 2007, where
the emails purport to be sent by the Better Business Bureau, a well -known business -to-business mediation and
arbitration service.
In the latest wave of attacks, t here appear to be two methods used: either the email contains the malicious attachment
in a file, or the attachment contains a URL that leads to the malware . Let’s take a look at how this works in more
detail.
In the first example, the malicious em ail contains a malicious URL, which is in the HTML attachment. This is similar to
some of the tactic s employed with phishing emails, but instead of including a URL to a phishing Web site, the URL in
the HTML file actually points to an encrypted JavaS cript, which then downloads and executes the malicious code onto
the user’s computer, without them realizing what has happened, and without their consent or knowledge.
At the time of writing this report , more than 700 examples were stopped in one wave of attacks , each email was
destined for a different client, and the attack was over in less than 30 minutes. An example of this can be seen in
figure 1, below. Page 3 of 19
Figure 1: Example of BBB spoofed email containing malware
The HTML file attachment contains highly obfuscated JavaScript, designed to evade anti-virus detection. An example
of this is shown in figure 2 , below.
Figure 2: Snippet of HTML file containing obfuscated JavaScript code
When decrypted, this code creates a hidden HTML IFRAME1 tag, which is used to connect to a remote server hosted
in Russia, as shown in figure 3 , below.
1 http://www.w3.org/TR/html4/present/frames.html#h- 16.5
Page 4 of 19
Figure 3: Snippet of decrypted JavaScript code that contains hidden IFRAME
Interestingly, the Web site also includes a robots.txt file, which is used to prevent the attackers’ code from being
indexed when visited by a Web crawler, such as a search engine.
The URL contained in the hidden IFRAME tag points to a PHP script that deploys another encrypted JavaScript file,
which in turn downloads the final malicious PDF file as the payload , using the Phoenix exploit toolkit .
Analysis of the PDF payload
Further analysis shows that the PDF file contains yet more highly obfuscated JavaScript inside a XFA object2 (part of
the internal structure of a PDF file). The JavaScript , as shown in figure 4 , contains two stages of encryption.
Figure 4: Extract of JavaScript contained within the PDF
2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XFA
Page 5 of 19
Figure 5, below shows an example of the first stage, which in turn extracts the second stage. The second stage
contains the executable shell code, as shown in figure 6 .
The extracted shell code, i n figure 5 , is used to perform a heap overflow exploit against a known vulnerability , CVE-
2010- 0188: Remote Code Execution Vulnerability . Here, an invalid value in the TIFF image is used to corrupt the TIFF
parser (LibTIFF) in certain unpatched versions of a well-known PDF viewer application.
Figure 5: First level of decrypted JavaScript
Figure 6: Second level - executable shell code
A successful exploitation will connect to a remote server hosted in Russia , which will attempt to download and execute
a fake anti -virus product without the user’s permission.
Typically, t hese URLs are only available only for a short period of time. Moreover, a s mentioned earlier, similar waves
of attacks have also been blocked where the PDF malware is attached directly to the original email, such as in the
attacks described in this blog post3.
3 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/pdf -malware- writers -keep- targeting- vulnerability
Page 6 of 19
Blogs Review
During February a number of security related topics were covered on the Symantec Connect Security blog:
http://www.symantec.com/connect/security/blogs
Some of the highlights include the following examples :
Feb 14 Is Here Again!
Spam levels always rise when a holiday or special event
approaches. Symantec researchers are observing a surge of
spam as Valentine’s Day gets closer and closer. Unbelievable discounts on jewelry, dinners, and expensive gift articles are the key themes for the Valentine’s Day
related spam. Further popular fake promotions include:
online pharmaceuticals, fake e -cards, gift cards, chocolates,
and flowers. The purpose of these fake promotions is to
capture a user’s personal and financial details …
For further details, please visit:
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/feb- 14-here- again
Malware to Mourn Whitney Houston
The world is mourning the loss of another legendary pop
singer also k nown as the queen of pop - Whitney Houston.
Spammers are paying homage to the icon with malware. The
malicious email shows a video of the last appearance of the
star in a Los Angeles night club and also downloads an
executable binary. This file is detected by Symantec
Antivirus as WS.Reputation.1
. The email originated from
Ireland and targets Portuguese readers. The malicious file is
hosted on a hijacked Japanese website…
For further details, please visit:
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malware- mourn- whitney -
houston
Zeusbot/Spyeye P2P Updated, Fortifying the Botnet
We blogged
about a parallel Zeusbot/Spyeye build near the
end of last year that introduced some improvements in the
botnet, moving the network architecture away from a simple
bot-to-C&C system and introducing the beginnings of a peer -
to-peer model. This new variant new uses P2P
communication exclusively in order to keep the botnet alive
and gathering information. With the latest update, it seems
that the C&C server has disappeared entirely for this
functionality. Where they were previously sending and
receiving control messages to and from the C&C, these
control messages are now handled by the P2P network …
For further details, please visit:
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/zeusbotspyeye- p2p-
updated- fortifying- botnet Is Waledac Spam Dirtying the Russian 2012 Elections?
Recently there have been several reports about the re-
emergence of a botnet variant (Kelihos), which Symantec detects as
W32.Waledac.C . The Waledac family is a threat
that has been monitored by Symantec for many years and was featured in numerous
blogs as well as a white paper . In
the past, Waledac gained its infamy as a spamming botnet that utilized compromised systems to send out spam. The
purpose of these spamming campaigns had usually been for self-propagation of the threat through spam emails
containing a link, often (but not always) pointing to a
Waledac binary file hosted on a mali cious website. The
variant W32.Waledac.C is also sending out spam emails, but
with a twist…
For further details, please visit:
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/waledac -spam -dirtying-
russian- 2012- elections
Server -side Polymorphic Android Applications
For quite some time, we have observed the technique of
server -side polymorphism being used to infect Windows
computers around the world. What this means is that every
time a file is downloaded, a unique version of the file is
created in order to evade traditional signature-based
detection. We are now seeing this same technique being used for malicious Android applications hosted on Russian
websites. We detect all of these variants as Android.Opfake
.
The sites hosting Opfake include either links or buttons that
can be used to download the malicious packages that are
purporting to be free versions of popular Android software.
The applications morph themselves automatically in a few ways every time the threat is downloaded…
For further details, please visit:
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/server -side- polymorphic -
android- applications
Page 7 of 19
Global Trends & Content Analysis
Spam, phishing and malware data is captured through a variety of sources, including the Symantec Global Intelligence
Network , the Symantec Probe Network (a system of more than 5 million decoy accounts ), Symantec.cloud and a
number of other Symantec security technologies. Skeptic™, the Symantec.cloud proprietary heuristic technology is
also able to detect new and sophisticated targeted threats.
Data is collected from over 8 billion email messages and over 1 billion Web requests , which are processed per day
across 15 data centers , including malicious code data, which is collected from over 130 million systems in 86
countries worldwide. Symantec Intelligence also gathers phishing information through an extensive antifraud
community of enterprises, security vendors, and more than 50 million consumers.
These resources give the Symantec Intelligence analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze
and provide informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and s pam. If there
is a malicious attack about to hit, we know about it first. We block it; we keep it from affecting our customers.
Spam Analysis
In February , the global ratio of spam in email traffic fell by 1.0 percentage points since January , to 68.0 percent (1 in
1.47 emails) . This follows the continuing trend of global spam levels diminishing gradually since the latter part of 2011 .
As the global spam rate increased, Saudi Arabia remained the most spammed geography in February ; with a spam
rate of 76.2 percent .
In the US, 68.9 percent of email was spam and 68.5 percent in Canada. The spam level in the UK was 68.6 percent .
In The Netherlands, spam accounted for 70.0 percent of email traffic, 67.9 percent in Germany, 68.8 percent in
Denmark and 68.3 percent in Australia. In Hong Kong, 67.9 percent of email was blocked as spam and 6 7.0 percent in
Singapore, compared with 65.1 percent in Japan. Spam accounted for 6 8.8 percent of email traffic in South Africa and
72.4 percent in Bra zil.
Moreover, t he Automotive sector overtook Education to become the most spammed industry sector in February , with a
spam rate of 70.9 percent ; the spam rate for the Education sector was 70.6 percent. The spam rate for the Chemical &
Page 8 of 19
Pharmaceutical sector was 6 8.9 percent , compared with 68.4 percent for IT Services, 68.6 percent for Retail, 68.5
percent for Public Sector and 68.0 percent for Finance.
The spam rate for small to medium -sized businesses (1 -250) was 68.3 percent , compared with 68.9 perce nt for large
enterprises (2500+) .
Global Spam Categories
The most common category of spam in February related to the Adult/Sex/Dating category, overtaking pharmaceutical
related spam for the first time.
Category Name February
2012 January
2012
Adult/Sex/Dating 43.0% 22.5%
Pharmaceutical 30.5% 38.0%
Watches/Jewelry 9.0% 27.5%
Weight Loss 4.5% 3.5%
Unknown/Other 2.5% 1.5%
Software 2.0% 0.5%
Jobs/Recruitments 1.5% 0.5%
Malware 1.5% <0.5%
Scams/Fraud/419 1.5% 0.5%
Unsolicited Newsletters 1.0% 2.5%
Casino/Gambling 1.0% 2.0%
Phishing 1.0% <0.5%
Degrees/Diplomas 0.5% 0.5%
Spam URL Distribution based on Top Level Domain Name
The proportion of spam exploiting URLs in the . com and . info top-level domains increased in February , as highlighted
in the table below .
TLD February
2012 January
2012
.com 58.9% 57.8%
.ru 8.0% 9.4%
.info 8.0% 6.9%
.net 7.1% N/A
Average Spam Message Size
In February , the proportion of spam emails that was 5Kb in size or less increased by almost 3 percentage points.
Furthermore, the proportion of s pam messages that were greater than 10Kb in size also increased, but by half as
much, as can be seen in the following table. The larger spam file sizes often relate to malware with malicious
attachments, an increase that is also shown in spam categories above.
Message Size February
2012 January
2012
0Kb – 5Kb 58.6% 55.7%
5Kb – 10Kb 26.1% 30.5%
>10Kb 15.2% 13.8%
Page 9 of 19
Spam Attack Vectors
The proportion of spam that contained a malicious attachment or link increased toward the end of the previous month,
with two major spikes of spam activity during the first half of the period, as shown in the chart below . The frequency of
smaller -volume attacks has also increase d. Many of t hese larger attachments were related to generic polymorphic
malware variants , as discussed in previous4 Symantec Intelligence report s.
In February , the number of spam emails resulting in NDRs (spam related non- delivery reports) , has increased slightly ,
and follows the profile of attachment spam relating to malware attacks. In these cases, the recipient email addresses
are invalid or are bounced by their service provider; however, the majority of spam uses more targeted approaches , to
minimize the number of NDRs .
NDR spam , as shown in the chart above, is often as a result of widespread dictionary attacks during spam campaigns ,
where spammers make use of databases of first and last names and combine them to generate random email
addresses . A lower-level of activity is indicative of spammers that are seeking to maintain their distribution lists in
order to minimize bounce- backs; IP addresses are more l ikely to appear on anti -spam block -lists if they become
associated with a high vo lume of invalid recipient emails.
4 http://www.symanteccloud.com/intelligence 0%5%10%15%20%25%NDR AttachmentPage 10 of 19
Phishing Analysis
In February , the global phishing rate increased by 0. 01 percentage points , taking the global average rate to one in
358.1 emails (0. 28 percent ) that comprised some form of phishing attack.
The Netherlands remained the country most targeted for phishing attacks in February , with one in 152.8 emails
identified as phishing.
Phishing levels for the US reached one in 753.5 and one in 427.9 for Canada. In Germany phishing levels were one
in 700.9, one in 461.9 in Denmark. In Australia, phishing activity accounted for one in 499.9 emails and one in 1,045
in Hong Kong; for Japan it was one in 4,762 and one in 689.9 for Singapore. In Brazil one in 863.9 emails was blocked
as phishing .
The Public Sector remained the most targeted by phishing activity in February , with one in 84.1 emails comprising a
phishing attack. Phishing levels for the Chemical & Pharmaceutical sector reached one in 726.2 and one in 670.6 for
the IT Services sector , one in 523.7 for Retail, one in 150.0 for Education and one in 328.6 for Finance.
Phishing attacks targeting small to medium -sized businesses (1-250) accounted for one in 2 65.7 emails, compared
with one in 361.9 for large enterprises (2500+) .
Analysis of Phishing Web sites
Overall, t he number of phishing Web sites decreased by 0.9 percent in February compared with the previous month.
The number of phishing Web sites created by autom ated toolkits decreased by approximately 0.7 percent , accounting
for approximately 42.8 percent of phishing Web sites , including attacks against well -known social networking Web
sites and social networking apps .
The number of unique phishing domains decreased by 1.2 percent and phishing Web site s using IP addresses in
place of domain names ( for example, http://255.255.255.255) , increased by 21.0 percent. The use of legitimate Web
services for hosting phishing Web sites accounted for approximately 5. 8 percent of all phishing Web sites , a decrease
of 2.0 percent compared with the previous month. The number of non- English phishing Web sites decreased by 6.3
percent.
Of the non- English phishing Web sites Portuguese, French, Italian and Spanish were among the highest in February .
Page 11 of 19
Geographic Location of Phi shing Web Sites
Tactics of Phishing Distribution
Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks, by Industry
February 2012 Phishing Web Sites Locations
Country February January
UnitedStates 51.6% 25.9%
Germany 6.2% 3.4%
UnitedKingdom 3.5% 1.8%
Brazil 3.3% 1.7%
Canada 2.9% 1.4%
France 2.8% 1.2%
Netherlands 2.6% 1.2%
Russia 2.6% 1.4%
China 2.6% 1.3%
Australia 1.2% 0.6%
1.1% 5.8% 4.0% 57.2% 42.8%
TyposquattingFree Web Hosting SitesIP Address DomainsOther Unique DomainsAutomated Toolkits
0.006% 0.006% 0.013% 0.029% 0.051% 0.100% 0.456% 0.572% 2.0% 13.2% 37.4%
InsuranceAviationRetail TradeISPSecurityGovernmentRetailCommunicationsTelecommunicationsInformation ServicesE-CommercePage 12 of 19
Malware Analysis
Email -borne Threats
The global ratio of email -borne viruses in email traffic was one in 274.0 emails (0. 37 percent ) in February , an increase
of 0.03 percentage points since January .
In February , 27.4 percent of email -borne malware contained links to malicious Web site s, 1.6 percentage points lower
than January .
Luxembourg became the geography with the h ighest ratio of malicious email activity in February , with one in 63.9
emails identified as malicious .
In the UK , one in 154.5 emails was identified as malicious , compared with South Africa, where one in 184.9 emails
was blocked as malicious . The v irus rate for email -borne malware in the US was one in 436.5 and one in 294.0 in
Canada. In Germany virus activity reached one in 369.2 and one in 611.7 in Denmark. In Australia, one in 387.6
emails was malicious. For Japan the rate was one in 1,167, compared with one in 452.8 in Singapore. In Brazil, one in
534.7 emails in contained malicious content.
With one in 71.2 emails being blocked as malicious, the Public Sector remained the most targeted industry in
February . The v irus rate for the Chemical & Pharmac eutical sector reached one in 328.5and one in 405.4 for the IT
Services sector; one in 364.7 for Retail, one in 124.1 for Education and one in 297.8 for Finance.
Malicious email -borne attacks destined for small to medium -sized businesses (1 -250) accounted for one in 262.5
emails, compared with one in 261.7 for large enterprises (2500+) .
Page 13 of 19
Frequently Blocked E mail-borne Malware
The table below shows the most frequently blocked email -borne malware for February , many of which relate to
generic varian ts of malicious attachments and malicious hy perlinks distributed in emails. Approximately 28 .7 percent
of all email -borne malware was identified and blocked using generic detection.
Malware identified generically as aggressive strains of polymorphic malware, including the attacks discussed earlier in
this report, accounted for 41. 1 percent of all email -borne malware blocked in February .
Malware Name % Malware
Exploit/SpoofBBB 5.22%
W32/Bredolab.gen!eml.j 4.62%
Exploit/Link -generic -ee68 4.21%
Trojan.Bredolab 3.37%
Exploit/LinkAliasPostcard -4733 3.05%
VBS/Generic 2.25%
Exploit/FakeAttach 2.10%
Exploit/Link -5434 1.84%
Packed.Generic.349 1.68%
Trojan.Bredolab!eml -30e2 1.62%
The top- ten list of most frequently blocked malware accounted for approximately 29.9% of all email -borne malware
blocked in February .
Web -based Malware Threats
In February , Symantec Intelligence identified an average of 2 ,305 Web sites each day harboring malware and other
potentially unwanted programs including spyware and adware; an increase of 9 .7 percent since January . This reflects
the rate at which Web sites are being compromised or created for the purpose of spreading malici ous content. Of ten
this number is higher when Web-based malware is in circulation for a longer period of time to widen its potential
spread and increase its longevity.
As detection for Web- based malwar e increases, the number of new Web sites blocked decreases and the proportion
of new malware begins to rise, but initially on fewer Web site s. Further analysis reveals that 31.5 percent of all
malicious domains blocked were new in February ; a decrease of 8 .4 percentage points compared with January .
Additionally, 13 .0 percent of all Web- based malware blocked was new in February ; a decrease of 2 .2 percentage
points since January .
The chart above shows the increase in the number of new spyware and adware Web site s blocked each day on
average during February compared with the equivalent number of Web- based malware Web sites blocked each day.
Web Policy Risks from Inappropriate Use
The most common trigger for policy -based filtering applied by Symantec Web Security.c loud for its business clients
was for the “Advertisements & Popups” category, which accounted for 3 4.2 percent of blocked Web activity in
February . Web- based advertisements pose a potential risk though the use of “malvertisements,” or malicious
advertisements. These may occur as the result of a legitimate online ad- provider being compromised and a banner ad
being used to serve malware on an otherwise harmless Web site.
Page 14 of 19
The second most frequently blocked traffic was categorized as Social Networking, account ing for 19.6 percent of URL -
based filtering activity blocked, equivalent to approximately one in every 5 Web sites blocked. Many organizations
allow access to social networking Web sites, but facilitate access logging so that usage patterns can be tracked and in
some cases implement policies to only permit access at certain times of the day and block access at all other times.
This information is often used to address performance management issues, perhaps in the event of lost productivity due to social net working abuse.
Activity related to streaming m edia policies resulted in 1 0.7 percent of URL -based filtering blocks in February .
Streaming media is increasingly popular when there are major sporting events or high profile international news stories . This a ctivity often result s in an increased number of blocks, as businesses seek to preserve valuable
bandwidth for other purposes. This rate is e quivalent to one in every 9 Web sites blocked.
Endpoint Security Threats
The endpoint is often the last line of defense and analysis; however, the endpoint can often be the first -line of defense
against attacks that spread using USB storage devices and insecure network connections . The threats found here can
shed light on the w ider nature of threats confronting businesses, especially from blended attacks and threats facing
mobile workers . Attacks reaching the endpoint are likely to have already circumvented other layers of protection that
may already be deployed, such as gateway filtering.
The table below shows the malware most frequently blocked targeting endpoint devices for the last month. This includes data from endpoint devices protected by Symantec technology around the world, including data from clients which may not be us ing other layers of protection, such as Symantec Web Security.cloud or Symantec Email
AntiVirus.cloud.
Malware Name5 % Malware
WS.Trojan.H 28.05%
W32.Sality.AE 4.38%
W32.Downadup.B 3.53%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 3.43%
W32.Ramnit!html 3.18%
Trojan.Maljava 2.92%
W32.Ramnit.B 2.80%
Trojan.ADH.2 2.39%
Trojan.Malscript!html 1.89%
Trojan.ADH 1.49%
The most frequently blocked malware for the last month was WS.Trojan.H
6. WS.Trojan.H is generic cloud- based
heuristic detection for files that possess characteristics of an as yet unclassified threat. Files detected by this heuristic
are deemed by Symantec to pose a risk to users and are therefore blocked from accessing the computer.
5For further information on these threats, please visit: http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/landing/threats.j sp
Page 15 of 19
For much of 2011 , variants of W32.Sality.AE7 and W32.Ramnit8 had been the most prevalent malicious threat blocked
at the endpoint. Variants of W32.Ramnit accounted for approximately 9 .6% of all malware blocked at the endpoint in
February , compared with 5 .0% for all variants of W32.Sality.
Ramnit has also recently been implicated in the theft of identities from major social networking Web sites. It was
reported that many of t hese stolen credentials used to distribute malicious links via the profile pages of the affected
users, heightening the risk for those users who shared the same password for several online accounts, potentially
providing the attackers with a springboard into corporate networks .
Approximately 17 .1 percent of the most frequently blocked malware last month was identified and block ed using
generic detection. Many new viruses and Trojans are based on earlier versions, where code has been copied or
altered to create a new strain, or variant. Often these variants are created using toolkits and hundreds of thousands of
variants can be c reated from the same piece of malware. This has become a popular tactic to evade signature- based
detection, as each variant would traditionally need its own signature to be correctly identified and blocked.
By deploying techniques, such as heuristic analys is and generic detection, it ’s possible to correctly identify and block
several variants of the same malware families, as well as identify new forms of malicious code that seek to exploit
certain vulnerabilities that can be identified generically.
6 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011- 102713- 4647 -99
7 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006- 011714- 3948 -99
8 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010- 011922- 2056 -99 Page 16 of 19
Best P ractice Guidelines for Enterprises
1. Employ defense- in-depth strategies : Emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive
systems to guard against single- point failures in any specific technology or protection method. This should
include the deployment of regularly updated firewalls, as well as gateway anti virus, intrusion detection,
intrusion protection systems, and Web security gateway solutions throughout the network.
2. Monitor for network threat, vulnerabilities and brand abuse. Monitor for network intrusions, propagation
attempts and other suspicious traf fic patterns, identify attempted connections to known malicious or
suspicious hosts. Receive alerts for new vulnerabilities and threats across vendor platforms for proactive
remediation. Track brand abuse via domain alerting and fictitious Web site reporti ng.
3. Antivirus on endpoints is not enough: On endpoints, signature- based antivirus alone is not enough to
protect against today’s threats and Web- based attack toolkits. Deploy and use a comprehensive endpoint
security product that includes additional layers of protection including:
o Endpoint intrusion prevention that protects against un- patched vulnerabilities from being exploited,
protects against social engineering attacks and stops malware from reaching endpoints;
o Browser protection for protection against obfuscated Web-based attacks;
o Consider cloud- based malware prevention to provide proactive protection against unknown threats;
o File and Web- based reputation solutions that provide a risk -and-reputation rating of any application
and Web site to prevent rapidly mutating and polymorphic malware;
o Behavioral prevention capabilities that look at the behavior of applications and malware and prevent
malware;
o Application control settings that can prevent applications and browser plug- ins from downloading
unauthorized malicious content;
o Device control settings that prevent and limit the types of USB devices to be used.
4. Use encryption to protect sensitive data: Implement and enforce a security policy whereby sensitive data is
encrypted. Access to sensitive informat ion should be restricted. This should include a Data Loss Protection
(DLP) solution, which is a system to identify, monitor, and protect data. This not only serves to prevent data breaches, but can also help mitigate the damage of potential data leaks from within an organization.
5. Use Data Loss Prevention to help prevent data breaches: Implement a DLP solution that can discover
where sensitive data resides, monitor its use and protect it from loss. Data loss prevention should be
implemented to monitor the flow of data as it leaves the organization over the network and monitor copying
sensitive data to external devices or Web sites. DLP should be configured to identify and block suspicious
copying or downloading of sensitive data. DLP should also be used to identify confidential or sensitive data
assets on network file systems and PCs so that appropriate data protection measures like encryption can be
used to reduce the risk of loss.
6. Implement a removable media policy. Where practical, restrict unauthorized devices such as external
portable hard- drives and other removable media. Such devices can both introduce malware as well as
facilitate intellectual property breaches —intentional or unintentional. If external media devices are permitted,
automatically scan them for viruses upon connection to the network and use a DLP solution to monitor and
restrict copying confidential data to unencrypted external storage devices.
7. Update your security countermeasures frequently and rapidly: With more than 286M variants of malware
detected by Symantec in 2010, enterprises should be updating security virus and intrusion prevention definitions at least daily, if not multiple times a day.
8. Be aggressive on your updating and patching: Update, patch and migrate from outdated and insecure
browsers, applications and browser plug- ins to the latest available versions using the vendors’ automatic
update mechanisms. Most software vendors work diligently to patch exploited software vulnerabilities;
however, such patches can only be effec tive if adopted in the field. Be wary of deploying standard corporate
images containing older versions of browsers, applications, and browser plug- ins that are outdated and
insecure. Wherever possible, automate patch deployments to maintain protection agai nst vulnerabilities
across the organization.
9. Enforce an effective password policy . Ensure passwords are strong; at least 8 -10 characters long and
include a mixture of letters and numbers. Encourage users to avoid re- using the same passwords on multiple
Web sites and sharing of passwords with others should be forbidden. Passwords should be changed
regularly, at least every 90 days. Avoid writing down passwords. Page 17 of 19
10. Restrict email attachments: Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file att achments
that are commonly used to spread viruses, such as .VBS, .BAT, .EXE, .PIF, and .SCR files. Enterprises
should investigate policies for .PDFs that are allowed to be included as email attachments.
11. Ensure that you have infection and incident response procedures in place :
o Ensure that you have your security vendors contact information, know who you will call, and what steps you will take if you have one or more infected systems;
o Ensure that a backup- and-restore solution is in place in order to restore lost or compromised data in
the event of successful attack or catastrophic data loss;
o Make use of post -infection detection capabilities from Web gateway, endpoint security solutions and
firewalls to identify infected systems;
o Isolate infected computers to prevent the risk of further infection within the organization;
o If network services are exploited by malicious code or some other threat, disable or block access to
those services until a patch is applied;
o Perform a forensic analysis on any infected computers and restore those using trusted media.
12. Educate users on the changed threat landscape:
o Do not open attachments unless they are expected and come from a known and trusted source, and do not execute software that is downloaded from the Internet (if such actions are permitted) unless
the download has been scanned for viruses;
o Be cautious when clicking on URLs in emails or social media programs, even when coming from
trusted sources and friends;
o Do not click on shortened URLs without previewing or expanding them first using available tools and
plug-ins;
o Recommend that users be cautious of information they provide on social networking solutions that
could be used to target them in an attack or trick them to open malicious URLs or attachments;
o Be suspicious of search engine results and only click through to trusted sources when conducting
searches —especially on topics that are hot in the media;
o Deploy Web browser URL reputation plug- in solutions that display the reputation of Web sites from
searches;
o Only download software (if allowed) from corporate shares or directly from the vendors Web site;
o If users see a warning indicating that they are “infected” after clicking on a URL or using a s earch
engine (fake antivirus infections), have users close or quit the browser using Alt -F4, CTRL+W or the
task manager.
Page 18 of 19
Best Practice Guidelines for Consumers
1. Protect yourself: Use a modern Internet security solution that includes the following capabilities for maximum
protection against malicious code and other threats:
o Antivirus (file and heuristic based) and malware behavioral prevention can prevents unknown
malicious threats from executing;
o Bidirectional firewalls will block malware from exploiting potentially vulnerable applications and
services running on your comput er;
o Intrusion prevention to protection against Web- attack toolkits, unpatched vulnerabilities, and social
engineering attacks;
o Browser protection to protect against obfuscated Web- based attacks;
o Reputation- based tools that check the reputation and trust of a file and Web site before downloading;
URL reputation and safety ratings for Web sites found through search engines.
2. Keep up to date : Keep virus definitions and security content updated at leas t daily if not hourly. By deploying
the latest virus definitions, you can protect your computer against the latest viruses and malware known to be
spreading in the wild. Update your operating system, Web browser, browser plug -ins, and applications to the
latest updated versions using the automatic updating capability of your programs, if available. Running out -of-
date versions can put you at risk from being exploited by Web- based attacks.
3. Know what you are doing : Be aware that malware or applications that t ry to trick you into thinking your
computer is infected can be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file- sharing programs,
free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software.
o Downloading “free, ” “cracked” or “pirated” versions of software can also contain malware or include
social engineering attacks that include programs that try to trick you into thinking your computer is
infected and getting you to pay money to have it removed.
o Be careful which Web sites you visit on the Web. While malware can still come from mainstream Web
sites, it can easily come from less reputable Web sites sharing pornography, gambling and stolen
software.
o Read end- user license agreements (EULAs) carefully and understand all terms before agree ing to
them as some security risks can be installed after an end user has accepted the EULA or because of
that acceptance.
4. Use an effective password policy: Ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers, and change
them often. Passwords should not consist of words from the dictionary. Do not use the same password for multiple applications or Web site s. Use complex passwords (upper/lowercase and punctuation) or
passphrases.
5. Think before you click : Never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless you expect it and trust
the sender. Even from trusted users, be suspicious.
o Be cautious when clicking on URLs in emails, social media programs even when coming from trusted sources and friends. Do not blindly click on shortened URLs without expandi ng them first using
previews or plug- ins.
o Do not click on links in social media applications with catchy titles or phrases even from friends. If you
do click on the URL, you may end up “liking it” and sending it to all of your friends even by clicking
anywhere on the page. Close or quit your browser instead.
o Use a Web browser URL reputation solution that shows the reputation and safety rating of Web sites
from searches. Be suspicious of search engine results; only click through to trusted sources when
conducting searches, especially on topics that are hot in the media.
o Be suspicious of warnings that pop- up asking you to install media players, document viewers and
security updates; only download software directly from the vendor’s Web site.
6. Guard your person al data : Limit the amount of personal information you make publicly available on the
Internet (including and especially via social networks) as it may be harvested and used in malicious activities
such as targeted attacks and phishing scams.
o Never disclose any confidential personal or financial information unless and until you can confirm that
any request for such information is legitimate.
|
Symantec Intelligence
Symantec Intelligence Report : February 2013
Welcome to the February edition of the Symantec Intelligence report , which provid es the latest analysis of cyber
security threats, trends , and insights from the Symantec Intelligence team concerning malware, spam, and other
potentially harmful business risks . The data used to compile the analysis for this report includes data from J anuary
through February 2013.
Report highlights
• Spam – 65.9 percent (an increase of 1.8 percentage points since January ): page 2
• Phishing – One in 466.3 emails identified as phishing ( an increase of 0.018 percentage points since January ): page 4
• Malware – One in 408.2 emails contained malware ( a decrease of 0.11 percentage points since January ): page 5
• Malicious website s – 1,530 websites blocked per day ( a decrease of 32.2 percent since January ): page 6
Introduction
In the past month we‘ ve discover ed of the earliest known variant of the Stuxnet worm , as well as combat the Bamital
botnet , which was successfully shut down through a joint Symantec/Microsoft collaboration.
Up until last month the earliest known variant of Stuxnet was 1.001, created in 2009. Last month, we discover ed the
earliest known version of the Stuxnet worm, Stuxnet 0.5, which stems from 2007. Stuxnet 0.5 allows us further insight
into the history and evolution of Stuxnet.
Stuxnet 0.5 differs in form from other known variants as it is based on a different programming platform. Stuxnet 0.5 is
partly based the same platform as W32.F lamer
, whe reas 1.x versions were based on the Tilded platform. It is also
different in that Stuxnet 0.5 ’s only method of replication is through infection of Siemens Step 7 project files. When a
removable drive is inserted in an infected drive, Stuxne t 0.5 will infect any Step 7 project archives with .s7p or .zip file
name extensions on the drive.
Stuxnet 0.5 takes control of valves attached to centri fuges , opening and closing the valves at intervals, compromising
the integrity of the system as a whole. Version 0.5 works by fingerprinting target computers to determine if it is in the
right location befor e activating the payload. Stuxnet 0.5 also collects instrument readings when the centrifuges are
running as normal and, when it is making its attack, displays those readings to the controllers in order to mask its
activities. Stuxnet 0.5 differs in that it was designed to attack the centrifuges’ valve system as opposed to 1.x variants
which sought to disrupt the operation of frequency converters used to control the speed of the centrifuges.
In other news, Symantec, in partnership with Microsoft
, shut down a botnet controlling hundreds of thousands of
computers. Bamital , a botnet which in the last two years has compromised more than eight million computers,
operated by hijacking search engine results and redirecting to servers controlled by attackers. Analysis of a single
Bamital command and control (C&C) sever over a six week period in 2011 revealed over 1.8 million unique IP
addresses communicating with the server. The botnet servers have now been shut down, and users of infected
computers will be informed of their infection w hen attempti ng to search the Internet .
Bamital is an example of click fraud, a highly lucrative endeavor where by att ackers aim to distort the numbers of
clicks on an advertisement or visits to a specific website. Redirecting internet users to corrupt third party vendors or
selling internet traffic through fictitious users, attackers seek to make financial gain from advertising expenditure.
I hope you enjoy reading this month’s edition of the report, and please feel free to contact me directly with any
comments or feedback.
Darragh Cotter , Associate Information Developer
[email protected]
@symantec, @symanteccloud, @nortononline , @threatintel
Page 1 of 8
Global Trends & Content Analysis
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the world through the
Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network, which is made up of more than 64.6 million attack sensors and records
thousands of events per second. This network monitors attack activity in more than 200 countries and territories
through a combination of Symantec products and services such as Symantec DeepSight™ Threat Management
System, Symantec™ Managed Security Services and Norton™ consumer products, and other third- party data
sources.
In addition, Symantec maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting
of more than 47,662 recorded vulnerabilities (spanning more than two decades) from over 15,967 vendors
representing over 40,006 products.
Spam, phishing and malware data is captured through a variety of sources, including the Symantec Probe Network, a
system of more than 5 million decoy accounts; Symantec.cloud and a number of other Symantec security
technologies. Skeptic™, the Symantec.cloud proprietary heuristic technology is able to detect new and sophisticated
targeted threats before reaching customers’ networks. Over 8 billion email messages and more than 1.4 billion Web
requests are processed each day across 15 data centers. Symantec also gathers phishing information through an
extensive antifraud community of enterprises, security vendors, and more than 50 million consumers.
These resources give Symantec’s analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze, and provide
informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and spam. The result is the
annual Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, which gives enterprises and consumers the essential information to
secure their systems effectively now and into the future.
Spam Analysis
In February , the global ratio of spam in email traffic rose by 1.8 percentage point since January , to 65.9 percent ( 1 in
1.52 emails ). This follows the continuing trend of global spam levels diminishing gradually since the latter part of 2011 .
Global Spam Categories
The most common category of spam in February is related to the Sex/Dating category , with 78.13 percent.
Category Name February
2013 January
2013
Sex/Dating 78.13% 71.65%
Pharma 14.20% 14.87%
Jobs 3.75% 0.55%
Watches 1.06% 7.29%
Software 1.04% 1.52%
Casino 0.79% 3.50%
Malware 0.47% 0.12%
419/scam/lotto 0.06% 0.05%
Newsletters 0.04% 0.04%
Degrees 0.01% 0.01%
Spam URL Distribution based on Top Level Domain Name
The proportion of spam exploiting URLs in the .com top- level domain decreased in February , as highlighted in the table
below. This is in line with a slight increase in all other top- level domains this month.
TLD February
2013 January
2013
com 51.33% 54.36%
ru 13.14% 12.34%
info 9.34% 8.92%
net 6.88% 5.85%
Page 2 of 8
Average Spam Message Size
In February , the proportion of spam emails that were 5Kb in size or less increase d by 10.92 percentage points.
Furthermore, the proportion of spam messages that were greater than 10Kb in size in creased by 1.03 percent , as can
be seen in the following table.
Message Size February
2013 January
2013
0Kb – 5Kb 57.73% 46.81%
5Kb – 10Kb 27.03% 38.98%
>10Kb 15.24% 14.21%
Spam Attack Vectors
February highlights the decrease in spam emails resulting in NDRs (spam related non- delivery reports) . In these cases,
the recipient email addresses are invalid or bounced by their service provider. The proportion of spam that contained a
malicious attachment or link decreased , with periodic spike s of spam activity during the period, as shown in the chart
below.
NDR spam, as shown in the chart above, is often as a result of widespread dictionary attacks during spam campaigns ,
where spammers make use of databases containing first and last names and combine them to generate random email
addresses . A higher -level of act ivity is indicative of spammers that are seeking to build their distribution lists by
ignoring the invalid recipient emails in the bounce- backs . The list can then be used for more targeted spam attacks
containing malicious attachment s or link s. This might indicate a pattern followed by spammers in harvesting the email
addresses for some months and using those addresses for targeted attacks in other months. 0.00%0.05%0.10%0.15%0.20%0.25%0.30%0.35%0.40%0.45%0.50%
Malware
NDR
Page 3 of 8
Phishing Analysis
In February , the global phishing rate increased by 0.018 percentage points, taking the global average rate to one in
466.3 emails ( 0.214 percent) that comprised some form of phishing attack.
Analysis of Phishing W ebsites
The overall phishing increased by about 19 percent this month. Unique domains in creased by about 8 percent as
compared to the previous month. Phishing websites that used automated toolkits in creased by 33 percent. Phishing
websites with IP domains (for e.g. domains like http://255.255.255.255) increased by about 28 percent. Webhosting
services comprised of 5 percent of all phishing, an increase of 5 5 percent from the previous month. The number of
non-English phishing sites decreased by 56 percent. Among non- English phishing sites, Portuguese, French and
German were highest in January .
Geographic Location of Phishing Web sites
February 2012 Phishing Websites Locations
*Note: Data lags one monthCountry January*
UnitedStates
Germany
China
BrazilRussiaCanada
FranceUnited Kingdom
Netherlands
Spain52.7%
5.5%
4.4%
2.8%
2.4%4.2%
2.6%
2.0%2.8%
1.4%51.8%
5.9%
4.0%
2.7%
2.9%4.4%
2.7%
2.2%2.5%
1.2%December
Page 4 of 8
Tactics of Phishing Distribution
Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks, by Industry
1.2% 4.0% 5.2% 42.3% 47.3%
TyposquattingIP Address DomainsFree Web Hosting SitesOther Unique DomainsAutomated Toolkits
0.02% 0.05% 0.2% 0.6% 0.7% 0.7% 0.9% 4.0% 22.0% 70.8%
ISPInsuranceGovernmentTelecommunicationsEntertainmentCommunicationsRetailComputer SoftwareInformation ServicesFinancial
Page 5 of 8
Malware Analysis
Email -borne Threats
The global ratio of email -borne viruses in email traffic was one in 4 08.2 emails ( 0.25 percent ) in February , a decrease
of 0.11 percentage points since January .
In February , 23.0 percent of email -borne malware contained links to malicious website s, 10.5 percentage points lower
than January .
Frequently Blocked E mail-borne Malware
The table below shows the most frequently blocked email -borne malware for February , many of which relate to
generic variants of malicious attachments and malicious hy perlinks distributed in emails. Approximately 1 8.7 percent
of all email -borne malware was identified and blocked using generic detection.
Malware identified generically as aggressive strains of polymorphic malware accounted for 1 .1 percent of all email -
borne malware blocked in February .
Malware Name % Malware
Suspicious.JIT.a -SH 38.14%
Exploit/Link -Inducement -18d5 -SH 4.14%
Trojan.Gen -SH 4.01%
Exploit/Link -82c6 3.75%
HTML/JS -Encrypted.gen 2.09%
Trojan.Gen 1.80%
Exploit/Link -d6b1 1.66%
Trojan.Malscript 1.54%
W32/Exploit -Archive.Gen -SH 1.50%
Exploit/SpoofBBB 1.48%
The top- ten list of most frequently blocked malware accounted for approximately 60.1 percent of all email -borne
malware blocked in February .
Web -based Malware Threats
In February , Symantec Intelligence identified an average of 1 ,530 websites each day harboring malware and other
potentially unwanted programs including spyware and adware; a decrease of 32.2 percent since January . This reflects
the rate at which website s are being compromised or created for the purpose of spreading malicious content. Of ten
this number is higher when Web-based malware is in circulation for a longer period of time to widen its potential
spread and increase its longevity.
As detection for Web- based malwar e increases, the number of new websites blocked decreases and the proportion of
new malware begins to rise, but initially on fewer websites. Further analysis reveals that 3 7.2 percent of all malicious
domains blocked were new in February ; a decrease of 2.3 percentage points compared with January . Additionally, 11.5
percent of all Web- based malware blocked was new in February ; a decrease of 0.5 percentage points since January .
Web Policy Risks from Inappropriate Use
Some of t he most common trigger s for policy -based filtering applied by Symantec Web Security.cloud for its business
clients are s ocial networking, advertisements and pop- ups, and streaming media category . Many organizations allow
access to social networking websites , but facilitate access logging so that usage patterns can be tracked and in some
cases implement policies to only permit access at certain times of the day and block access at all other times. W eb-
based advertisements pose a potential risk though the use of “malvertisements,” or malicious advertisements. These may occur as the result of a legitimate online ad- provider being compromised and a banner ad being used to serve
malware on an otherwise h armless website . Streaming media is increasingly popular when there are major sporting
events or high profile international news stories. This activity often results in an increased number of blocks, as
businesses seek to preserve valuable bandwidth for ot her purposes.
Page 6 of 8
Endpoint Security Threats
The endpoint is often the last line of defense and analysis; however, the endpoint can often be the first -line of defense
against attacks that spread using USB storage devices and insecure network connections . The threats found here can
shed light on the wider nature of threats confronting businesses, especially from blended attacks and threats facing
mobile workers . Attacks reaching the endpoint are likely to have already circumvented other layers of protecti on that
may already be deployed, such as gateway filtering.
The table below shows the malware most frequently blocked targeting endpoint devices for the last month. This
includes data from endpoint devices protected by Symantec technology around the world, including data from clients
which may not be using other layers of protection, such as Symantec Web Security.cloud or Symantec Email
AntiVirus.cloud.
Malware Name1 % Malware
W32.Sality.AE 7.35%
W32.Ramnit!html 6.87%
W32.Ramnit.B 5.86%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 4.29%
W32.Downadup.B 4.00%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 2.27%
W32.Virut.CF 2.19%
W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 1.44%
Trojan.ADH 1.17%
W32.Chir.B@mm(html) 1.16%
For much of 2012 and 2013, variants of W32.Sality.AE
2 and W32.Ramnit3 had been the most prevalent malicious
threat s blocked at the endpoint. Variants of W32.Ramnit accounted for approximately 17.4 percent of all malware
blocked at the endpoint in February , compared with 8 .2 percent for all variants of W32.Sality.
Approximately 40.7 percent of the most frequently blocked malware last month was identified and blocked using
generic detection. Many new viruses and Trojans are bas ed on earlier versions, where code has been copied or
altered to create a new strain, or variant. Often these variants are created using toolkits and hundreds of thousands of variants can be created from the same piece of malware. This has become a popular tactic to evade signature- based
detection, as each variant would traditionally need its own signature to be correctly identified and blocked.
By deploying techniques, such as heuristic analysis and generic detection, it ’s possible to correctly identify an d block
several variants of the same malware families, as well as identify new forms of malicious code that seek to exploit
certain vulnerabilities that can be identified generically.
1For further information on these threats, please visit: http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/landing/threats.jsp
2 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006- 011714- 3948 -99
3 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010- 011922- 2056 -99
Page 7 of 8
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
FEBRUARY 2014p. 2
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
3 Executive Summary
4 BIG NUMBERS
7 TARGETED ATTACKS
8 Targeted Attacks
8 Targeted Attacks per Day
8 First Attacks Logged by Month
9 Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
9 Top 10 Industries Attacked
9 First Attacks Logged by Size
9 File Extensions of Attachments
10 Social Media
11 Social Media
11 Top 5 Social Media Attacks
12 DATA BREACHES
13 Data Breaches
13 Top 5 Types of Information Exposed
13 Twelve-Month Timeline of Data Breaches
14 MOBILE
15 Mobile
15 Mobile Malware by Type
16 Cumulative Mobile Android Malware
17 VULNERABILITIES
18 Vulnerabilities
18 Total Vulnerabilities Disclosed by Month
18 Browser Vulnerabilities, Last Twelve Months
18 Plug-in Vulnerabilities, Last Twelve Months19 SPAM, PHISHING, & MALWARE
20 Spam
20 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Geography
20 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Industry
21 Top 10 Sources of Spam
21 Average Spam Message Size
21 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Company Size
21 Spam by Category
21 Spam URL Distribution Based on Top Level Domain Name
22 Phishing
22 Top 10 Sources of Phishing
22 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Company Size
22 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Geography
22 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Industry
23 Phishing Distribution
23 Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks
24 Malware
24 Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected
24 Top 10 Email Virus Sources
25 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Industry
25 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Geographic Location
25 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Company Size
26 Endpoint Security
26 Top 10 Most Frequently Blocked Malware
27 Policy Based Filtering
27 Policy Based Filtering
28 About Symantec
28 More Informationp. 3
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
Executive Summary
Welcome to the February edition of the Symantec Intelligence report.
Symantec Intelligence aims to provide the latest analysis of cyber
security threats, trends, and insights concerning malware, spam,
and other potentially harmful business risks.
For the most part, February was a quiet month for data beaches, after a series of months where
massive breaches were reported. One large breach, originally disclosed in January, has since been
reported as taking place in December of 2013. We have updated our charts to reflected this new
information. In the last twelve months, running from March 2013 through February 2014, more
than 500 million identities have been exposed. Of the breaches reported in the last twelve months,
70 percent of the identities contained real names, and 42 percent include birth dates.
Targeted attacks dropped slightly February, though remained at higher numbers than in the last
four months of 2013. Non-Traditional Services, which includes Hospitality, Recreational, and
Repair services, was the most targeted industry, making up 25 percent of attacks.
There were 542 new vulnerabilities reported in February. In the realm of browser vulnerabilities,
Microsoft’s Internet Explorer currently leads in vulnerabilities reported, nudging past Google
Chrome, which has held the top spot for most of the last year.
In other news, the global spam rate increased 2.2 percentage points in February, the phishing rate
has declined further this month, and the email virus rate is up slightly from January to one in 351
emails.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to contact us with any comments or
feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat Analyst
[email protected]. 4
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
BIG NUMBERSp. 5
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
Overall Email Phishing Rate:
Overall Email Phishing Rate:
1 in 1,444
1 in 1,8581 in 1,053
JanDec
FebHIGHER NUMBER = LOWER RISK
Overall Email Virus Rate:
Overall Email Virus Rate:
Dec
JanFebHIGHER NUMBER = LOWER RISK
1 in 3511 in 164
1 in 431
Estimated Global
Email Spam Rate Per DayEstimated Global
Email Spam Rate Per Day
SPAM AS PERCENT OF ALL EMAIL
Dec Jan Feb0102030405060708090100
64% 64% 62%
New Vulnerabilities
New Vulnerabilities
Jan
Dec
Feb
471
471
555 555
542 542
Jan2Dec1
Feb6
Mobile
VulnerabilitiesMobile
Vulnerabilities
p. 6
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
Data Breaches
Data Breaches
232Number of Breaches
(12 month period)
503,565,704Number of IdentitiesExposed (12 month period)
Mobile Malware VariantsMobile Malware VariantsVARIANTS (CUMULATIVE)139119
Feb Jan Dec132
010002000300040005000600070008000900010000
F J D N O S A J J M A M F
7,8707,870p. 7
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
TARGETED ATTACKSp. 8
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
Targeted Attacks
Targeted Attacks per Day
Source: Symantec
2014 2012 2013
TARGETED ATTACKS
0255075100125150175200225250
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANAt a Glance
• Targeted attacks dropped
slightly February, though
remained at higher
numbers than the last
four months of 2013.
• Small companies of 250
employees or less were
targeted in 42 percent
of attacks, though
organizations with 2500+
employees were targeted
more often, based on first
attacks.
• The .exe file type was
the most common
attachment, making up
19.3% of email-based
targeted attacks that
included file attachments.
First Attacks Logged by Month
Source: Symantec
0100200300400500600700800900100011001200
F J
2014D N O S A J J M A Mp. 9
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
Source: Symantec
Company Size Percent
1-250 42.2%
251-500 8.4%
501-1000 6.9%
1001-1500 3.2%
1501-2500 4.1%
2500+ 35.3%First Attacks Logged by Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Percent
1-250 30.0%
251-500 9.1%
501-1000 9.7%
1001-1500 6.3%
1501-2500 7.5%
2500+ 37.5%
File Extensions of Attachments
Source: Symantec
File Extension Percent
.exe 19.3%
.jpg 10.5%
.doc 10.2%
.au3 10.1%
.scr 6.8%
.class 2.3%
.bin 1.9%
.pdf 1.2%
.com 0.9%
.dat 0.8%Top 10 Industries Attacked
Source: Symantec
Industry Percent
Services - Non Traditional 25.0%
Manufacturing 18.7%
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate 14.9%
Services - Professional 10.2%
Wholesale 10.1%
Public Administration 5.7%
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas &
Sanitary Services5.6%
Retail 3.0%
Construction 1.6%
Mining 1.1%
The “Professional” services category includes services such as Legal, Accounting,
Health, and Education. “Non-Traditional” services include Hospitality, Recreational, and
Repair services.p. 10
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
SOCIAL MEDIAp. 11
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
Social Media
At a Glance
• 82 percent of all social
media attacks in February
where fake offerings.
• Likejacking is the second-
most common type of
social media attack at 8
percent.
Methodology
Fake Offering. These scams invite social network users to join a fake event or group with
incentives such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to share credentials with
the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
Fake Plug-in Scams. Users are tricked into downloading fake browser extensions on their
machines. Rogue browser extensions can pose like legitimate extensions but when installed
can steal sensitive information from the infected machine.
Likejacking. Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website buttons
that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
Fake Apps. Applications provided by attackers that appear to be legitimate apps; however,
they contain a malicious payload. The attackers often take legitimate apps, bundle malware
with them, and then re-release it as a free version of the app.
Manual Sharing Scams. These rely on victims to actually do the hard work of sharing the
scam by presenting them with intriguing videos, fake offers or messages that they share
with their friends.Top 5 Social Media Attacks
Source: Symantec
Top 5 Social Media Attacks
8%
5%Fake
Offering
Manual SharingLikejacking
3%Fake Apps
2%Comment Jacking82%p. 12
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
DATA BREACHESp. 13
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
Data Breaches
At a Glance
• The largest data breach
that was disclosed in
January has since been
reported as taking place
in December of 2013,
as now reflected in our
chart.
• In the last twelve months,
running from March 2013
through February 2014,
more than 500 million
identities have been
exposed.
• Of the breaches reported
in the last twelve months,
70 percent of the
identities contained real
names, and 42 percent
include birth dates.Twelve-Month Timeline of Data Breaches
Source: SymantecNUMBER OF INCIDENTSIDENTITIES BREACHED (MILLIONS)
INCIDENTS IDENTITIES BREACHED
020406080100120140160180
F J
2014D N O S A J J M A M051015202530354045
Top 5 Types of Information Exposed
Source: Symantec
40%42%
39%
32%70%Real Names
Gov ID numbers (Soc Sec)Birth Dates
Home Address
Medical Records
Information Exposed in BreachesInformation Exposed in Breaches
% OF ALL BREACHESMethodology
This data is procured from the Norton Cybercrime Index (CCI).
The Norton CCI is a statistical model that measures the levels
of threats, including malicious software, fraud, identity theft,
spam, phishing, and social engineering daily. The data breach
section of the Norton CCI is derived from data breaches that
have been reported by legitimate media sources and have
exposed personal information.
In some cases a data breach is not publicly reported during the
same month the incident occurred, or an adjustment is made in
the number of identities reportedly exposed. In these cases, the
data in the Norton CCI is updated. This causes fluctuations in
the numbers reported for previous months when a new report is
released.
Norton Cybercrime Index
http://us.norton.com/protect-yourselfp. 14
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
MOBILEp. 15
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
Mobile
At a Glance
• 30 percent of mobile
malware discovered over
the last twelve months
tracks users.
• Risks that collect data,
such as device info and
banking details, make up
17 percent of all risks.
• Traditional threats,
such as back doors and
downloaders are present
in 13 percent of all mobile
malware threats.
• Two new mobile malware
families were discovered
in February, along with
119 new variants.30%
Track User
Risks that spy on the individual using the
device, collecting SMS messages or phone call logs, tracking GPS coordinates, recording phone calls, or gathering pictures and video taken with the device.
13%
Traditional Threats
Threats that carry out traditional malware functions, such as back doors and downloaders.
11%
Adware/Annoyance
Mobile risks that display advertising or generally perform actions to disrupt the user.13%
Send Content
These risks will send text messages to premium SMS numbers, ultimately appearing on the bill of the device’s owner. Other risks can be used to send spam messages.
16%
Change Settings
These types of risks attempt to elevate privileges or simply modify various settings within the operating system. 17%
Collect Data
This includes the collection of both device- and user-specific data, such as device information, configuration data, or banking details. Mobile Malware by Type
Source: Symantecp. 16
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
Cumulative Mobile Android Malware
Source: Symantec
VARIANTS FAMILIES
04080120160200240280320360400
F J
2014D N O S A J J M A M010002000300040005000600070008000900010000FAMILIES (CUMULATIVE) VARIANTS (CUMULATIVE)p. 17
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
VULNERABILITIESp. 18
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
Vulnerabilities
At a Glance
• There were 542 new
vulnerabilities discovered
in February, bringing the
total for the last twelve
months to 6403. This is a
14 percent increase over
the prior twelve-month
period.
• There were six
vulnerabilities in mobile
operating systems
disclosed during the
month of February.
• Microsoft’s Internet
Explorer currently leads
in reporting browser
vulnerabilities, while
Oracle’s Java leads
in reported plug-in
vulnerabilities.Total Vulnerabilities Disclosed by Month
Source: Symantec
0100200300400500600700800
F J
2014D N O S A J J M A M
Plug-in Vulnerabilities, Last Twelve Months
Source: Symantec
10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%
Adobe Acrobat Reader
Adobe Flash PlayerApple QuickTimeOracle Sun Java
Browser Vulnerabilities, Last Twelve Months
Source: Symantec
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%
Apple Safari
Google ChromeMicrosoft Internet ExplorerMozilla FirefoxOpera
p. 19
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
SPAM, PHISHING, & MALWAREp. 20
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
At a Glance
• The global spam rate increased 2.2 percentage points in February
to 64.3 percent, up from 62.1 percent in January.
• Mining was the most commonly targeted industry at 64.1 percent,
followed by Manufacturing at 63.4 percent.
• The .com top-level domain (TLD) was again the most frequently
used malicious TLD in February.
• Sex Dating spam is the most common category, at 54.9 percent.
Pharmaceutical spam came in second at 39.7 percent.Spam
Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Geography
Source: Symantec
Geography Percent
Sri Lanka 74.1%
Hungary 70.0%
Brazil 69.0%
Israel 67.0%
Saudi Arabia 66.2%
Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Percent
Mining 64.1%
Manufacturing 63.4%
Agriculture, Forestry &
Fishing62.7%
Retail 62.2%
Services - Professional 62.1%
The “Professional” services category includes services such as Legal, Accounting,
Health, and Education. p. 21
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
Top 10 Sources of Spam
Source: Symantec
Source Percent of All Spam
Spain 9.8%
United States 8.2%
Germany 5.4%
Italy 5.3%
Finland 5.3%
Argentina 5.3%
Canada 3.6%
Brazil 3.3%
India 3.3%
Romania 3.2%
Spam URL Distribution Based on Top Level Domain Name
Source: Symantec
Month* .com .ru .info .biz
Dec 34.6% 22.0% 12.9% 7.1%
Jan 33.1% 13.2% 13.7% 10.3%
*Data lags one monthAverage Spam Message Size
Source: Symantec
Month* 0Kb – 5Kb 5Kb – 10Kb >10Kb
Dec 18.7% 32.7% 48.6%
Jan 28.4% 19.2% 52.3%
*Data lags one monthSpam by Category
Source: Symantec
Category Percent
Sex/Dating 54.9%
Pharma 39.7%
Jobs 2.2%
Software 1.5%
Watches 0.5%Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Percent
1-250 61.9%
251-500 61.9%
501-1000 62.5%
1001-1500 62.1%
1501-2500 61.8%
2501+ 62.3%p. 22
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
At a Glance
• The global phishing rate is down in February, comprising one in
1 in 1,858 email messages. In January this rate was one in 1 in
1,444.
• Financial themes continue to be the most frequent subject matter,
with 62.4 percent of phishing scams containing this theme.
• South Africa had the highest rate in February, where one in 668
emails was a phishing scam.
• The United States tops the list of sources of phishing emails,
responsible for distributing 49.7 percent of phishing scams.
• Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing was the most targeted industry in
February, with one in every 887 emails received in this industry
being a phishing scam.Phishing
Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Geography
Source: Symantec
Geography Rate
South Africa 1 in 668
New Zealand 1 in 713
United Kingdom 1 in 934
Australia 1 in 1,205
Canada 1 in 1,698Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Rate
1-250 1 in 1,448
251-500 1 in 1,449
501-1000 1 in 1,773
1001-1500 1 in 1,875
1501-2500 1 in 2,018
2501+ 1 in 2,433
Top 10 Sources of Phishing
Source: Symantec
Source Percent
United States 49.7%
United Kingdom 10.9%
Australia 8.9%
Germany 7.0%
India 6.2%
New Zealand 6.0%
South Africa 5.8%
Sweden 2.3%
Denmark 1.3%
Canada 0.3%Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Rate
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 1 in 887
Public Administration 1 in 915
Services - Professional 1 in 1,444
Services - Non Traditional 1 in 1,936
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate 1 in 2,124
The “Professional” services category includes services such as Legal, Accounting,
Health, and Education. “Non-Traditional” services include Hospitality, Recreational, and
Repair services.p. 23
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
35.0%
2.9%
2.3%
0.9%58.9%Other Unique Domains
Automated ToolkitsFree Web Hosting SitesIP Address DomainsTyposquatting
Phishing Distribution:Phishing Distribution:Phishing Distribution
Source: Symantec
29.8%
9.2%
2.0%
0.5%62.4%FinancialInformation ServicesRetailComputer SoftwareCommunications
Organizations Spoofed
in Phishing Attacks:Organizations Spoofed
in Phishing Attacks:Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks
Source: Symantecp. 24
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
Malware
1 in 0
1 in 50
1 in 100
1 in 150
1 in 200
1 in 250
1 in 3001 in 350
1 in 400
1 in 450
1 in 500
F J
2014D N O S A J J M A MProportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected
Source: SymantecTop 10 Email Virus Sources
Source: Symantec
Geography Percent
United States 49.1%
United Kingdom 36.7%
Australia 4.6%
South Africa 1.3%
Germany 1.2%
India 0.9%
Japan 0.7%
Netherlands 0.6%
Sweden 0.6%
France 0.6%At a Glance
• The global average virus rate in February was one in 351
emails, compared to one in 431 in January.
• The United Kingdom topped the list of geographies, with one
in 162 emails containing a virus.
• The United States was the largest source of virus-laden
emails, making up 49.1 percent of all email-based viruses.
• Organizations with 250-500 employees were the most
targeted company size, where one and 304 emails contained
a virus.p. 25
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Rate
1-250 1 in 304
251-500 1 in 307
501-1000 1 in 418
1001-1500 1 in 321
1501-2500 1 in 459
2501+ 1 in 384Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Geographic Location
Source: Symantec
Geography Rate
United Kingdom 1 in 162
Saudi Arabia 1 in 195
Hungary 1 in 290
Kenya 1 in 187
Ghana 1 in 143Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Rate
Public Administration 1 in 149
Services - Professional 1 in 255
Agriculture, Forestry &
Fishing1 in 307
Services - Non Traditional 1 in 346
Wholesale 1 in 422
The “Professional” services category includes services such as Legal, Accounting,
Health, and Education. “Non-Traditional” services include Hospitality, Recreational, and
Repair services.p. 26
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
At a Glance
• Variants of W32.Ramnit accounted for 7.2 percent of all malware
blocked at the endpoint.
• In comparison, 5.4 percent of all malware were variants of
W32.Sality.
• Approximately 49.8 percent of the most frequently blocked
malware last month was identified and blocked using generic
detection.Endpoint Security
Top 10 Most Frequently Blocked Malware
Source: Symantec
Malware Percent
Trojan.Zbot 5.5%
W32.Sality.AE 4.8%
Trojan.Malscript 3.5%
W32.Downadup.B 3.2%
W32.Ramnit!html 2.8%
W32.Ramnit.B 2.5%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 2.3%
W32.SillyFDC 1.7%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 1.6%
Trojan.Maljava 1.5%p. 27
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
Policy Based Filtering
Source: Symantec
Category Percent
Social Networking 46.5%
Advertisement & Popups 19.1%
Streaming Media 3.8%
Hosting Sites 2.8%
Computing & Internet 2.6%
Chat 1.4%
Gambling 1.2%
Search 1.1%
News 0.8%
Entertainment 0.8%Policy Based Filtering
At a Glance
• The most common trigger for policy-based filtering applied by
Symantec Web Security .cloud for its business clients was for the
“Social Networking” category, which accounted for 46.5 percent
of blocked Web activity in February.
• “Advertisement & Popups” was the second-most common trigger,
comprising 19.1 percent of blocked Web activity.p. 28
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2014
About Symantec
More Information
• Security Response Publications: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/publications /
• Internet Security Threat Report Resource Page: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport /
• Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response /
• Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer /
• Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex /Symantec protects the world’s information and is a global leader in security, backup, and
availability solutions. Our innovative products and services protect people and information
in any environment—from the smallest mobile device to the enterprise data center to cloud-
based systems. Our world-renowned expertise in protecting data, identities, and interactions
gives our customers confidence in a connected world. More information is available at
www.symantec.com or by connecting with Symantec at go.symantec.com/socialmedia .
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
FEBRUARY 2015p. 2
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2015
CONTENTS
3 Summary
4 TARGETED ATTACKS + DATA BREACHES
5 Targeted Attacks
5 Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing
Emails
5 Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of
Targeted Organization
5 Average Number of Spear-Phishing
Attacks Per Day
6 Top-Ten Industries Targeted
in Spear-Phishing Attacks
7 Data Breaches
7 Timeline of Data Breaches
8 Top-Ten Types of Information Breached
9 MALWARE TACTICS
10 Malware Tactics
10 Top-Ten Malware
10 Top-Ten Mac OSX Malware Blocked on OSX Endpoints
11 Vulnerabilities
11 Number of Vulnerabilities
11 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
12 Browser Vulnerabilities
12 Plug-in Vulnerabilities
13 MOBILE THREATS
14 Mobile
14 Mobile Malware Families by Month,
Android15 PHISHING, SPAM + EMAIL THREATS
16 Phishing and Spam
16 Phishing Rate
16 Global Spam Rate
17 Email Threats
17 Proportion of Email Traffic
Containing URL Malware
17 Proportion of Email Traffic
in Which Virus Was Detected
18 About Symantec
18 More Informationp. 3
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2015
Summary
Welcome to the February edition of the
Symantec Intelligence report. Symantec
Intelligence aims to provide the latest
analysis of cyber security threats, trends,
and insights concerning malware, spam, and
other potentially harmful business risks.
Symantec has established the most
comprehensive source of Internet threat
data in the world through the Symantec™
Global Intelligence Network, which is made
up of more than 41.5 million attack sensors
and records thousands of events per second.
This network monitors threat activity in
over 157 countries and territories through
a combination of Symantec products and
services such as Symantec DeepSight™
Threat Management System, Symantec™
Managed Security Services, Norton™
consumer products, and other third-party
data sources. W32.Ramnit!html was the most common malware blocked in
February. W32.Ramnit variants have dominated the top-ten
malware list for quite some time. However, near the end of the
month, a law enforcement operation led by Europol and assisted
by Symantec, Microsoft, and a number of other industry
partners, seized infrastructure owned by the cybercrime group
behind Ramnit . It is likely that Ramnit’s placement within the
top ten list will be impacted by these actions in the coming
months.
The largest data breach reported during February took place
in January, and resulted in the exposure of 80 million identi -
ties. There were six data breaches reported in February that
took place during the same month. This number is likely to
rise as more data breaches that occurred during the month are
reported.
In other news, the average number of spear-phishing attacks
rose to 65 per day in February, up from 42 in January. There were
400 vulnerabilities and one zero-day vulnerability disclosed
during February.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to
contact us with any comments or feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat Analyst
[email protected]. 4
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2015
TARGETED ATTACKS
+ DATA BREACHESp. 5
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2015
At a Glance
• The average number of
spear-phishing attacks rose
to 65 per day in February,
up from 42 in January.
• The .doc file type was the
most common attachment
type used in spear-phishing
attacks. The .txt file type
came in second.
• Organizations with 2500+
employees were the most
likely to be targeted in
February.
• Finance, Insurance, &
Real Estate lead the Top-
Ten Industries targeted,
followed by Manufacturing.Targeted Attacks
Average Number of Spear-Phishing
Attacks Per Day
Source: Symantec :: MARCH 2014 — FEBRUARY 2015
102030405060708090100
F J
2015D N O S A J J M A M54 53
4543
203384 84
5488
4265
Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing
Emails
Source: Symantec :: FEBRUARY 2015
Executable type February January
.doc 27.6% 46.1%
.txt 21.0% 8.3%
.xls 16.2% 7.8%
.scr 12.6% –
.rar 7.6% –
.rtf 4.9% 1.3%
.zip 2.3% –
.exe 2.3% 2.0%
.bin 0.9% 8.0%
.ppsx 0.4% –Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size
of Targeted Organization
Source: Symantec :: FEBRUARY 2015
Organization Size February January
1-250 29.1% 35.2%
251-500 9.0% 7.8%
501-1000 8.0% 14.7%
1001-1500 3.8% 4.3%
1501-2500 6.2% 5.3%
2500+ 43.8% 32.7%p. 6
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2015
Top-Ten Industries Targeted in
Spear-Phishing Attacks
Source: Symantec :: FEBRUARY 2015
Information TechnologyMiningConstructionTransportation,
communications, electric,
gas & Sanitary ServicesServices - ProfessionalServices - Non TraditionalWholesaleManufacturingFinance, insurance
& Real Estate 31%
19
13
13
10
5
1
0
0p. 7
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2015
Data Breaches
At a Glance
• There were six data breaches reported in February that took
place during the same month. This number is likely to rise
as more data breaches that occurred during the month are
reported.
• The largest data breach reported during February took
place in January, and resulted in the exposure of 80 million
identities.
• Real names, home addresses, and government ID numbers,
such as Social Security numbers, are currently the top three
types of data exposed in data breaches.
20406080100120140160
F J
2015D N O S A J J M A M
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
IDENTITIES EXPOSED (MILLIONS)
INCIDENTS IDENTITIES EXPOSED (Millions)Timeline of Data Breaches
Source: Symantec :: MARCH 2014 — FEBRUARY 2015
147
59
178
31.5
10
16.5.45 1.783
.01510152025303540
6252428
22
2119202322
12
10p. 8
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2015
Top-Ten Types of Information Breached
Source: Symantec :: MARCH 2014 — FEBRUARY 2015
Real Names
Home AddressGov ID numbers (Soc Sec)Financial InformationBirth DatesEmail AddressesMedical RecordsPhone NumbersUsernames & PasswordsInsurance01
02030405060708091067
%
46%
44%
35%
33%
24%
24%
22%
17%
9%
Methodology
This data is procured from the Norton Cybercrime Index (CCI). The Norton CCI is a statistical model
that measures the levels of threats, including malicious software, fraud, identity theft, spam,
phishing, and social engineering daily. The data breach section of the Norton CCI is derived from
data breaches that have been reported by legitimate media sources and have exposed personal
information.
In some cases a data breach is not publicly reported during the same month the incident occurred,
or an adjustment is made in the number of identities reportedly exposed. In these cases, the data in
the Norton CCI is updated. This causes fluctuations in the numbers reported for previous months
when a new report is released.p. 9
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2015
MALWARE TACTICSp. 10
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2015
Malware Tactics
At a Glance
• W32.Ramnit!html was the
most common malware
blocked in February.
• W32.Ramnit variants
continue to dominate the
top-ten malware list.
• The most common
OSX threat seen on OSX
was OSX.RSPlug.A,
making up 15.7 percent
of all OSX malware found
on OSX Endpoints.Top-Ten Malware
Source: Symantec :: FEBRUARY 2015
Rank Name February January
1 W32.Ramnit!html 6.3% 6.5%
2 W32.Sality.AE 5.7% 5.5%
3 W32.Almanahe.B!inf 4.7% 5.8%
4 W32.Ramnit.B 4.5% 4.4%
5 W32.Downadup.B 2.9% 2.7%
6 W32.Ramnit.B!inf 2.7% 2.7%
7 W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 2.0% 2.1%
8 W32.Virut.CF 1.9% 1.7%
9 Infostealer 1.7% –
10 W32.Chir.B@mm(html) 1.3% –
Top-Ten Mac OSX Malware Blocked
on OSX Endpoints
Source: Symantec :: FEBRUARY 2015
Rank Malware Name January January
1 OSX.RSPlug.A 15.7% 19.2%
2 OSX.Keylogger 14.6% 18.9%
3 OSX.Klog.A 12.3% 9.3%
4 OSX.Flashback.K 9.2% 3.2%
5 OSX.Wirelurker 6.0% 10.5%
6 OSX.Flashback 5.4% 3.2%
7 OSX.Luaddit 5.1% 8.0%
8 OSX.Stealbit.B 3.6% 6.1%
9 OSX.Crisis 2.8% –
10 OSX.Freezer 2.6% 2.6%p. 11
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2015
Number of Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: MARCH 2014 — FEBRUARY 2015
100200300400500600700800
F J
2015D N O S A J J M A M438575600 596
457428399 400562579
473494
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: MARCH 2014 — FEBRUARY 2015
12345678
F J
2015D N O S A J J M A M0 0 0 0 012 2
1
014Vulnerabilities
At a Glance
• There were 400 vulner -
abilities disclosed during
the month of February.
• There was one zero-day
vulnerability disclosed
during February.
• Microsoft Internet
Explorer reported the
most browser vulnerabili -
ties during the month of
February.
• Adobe, reporting on
the Acrobat and Flash
programs, disclosed the
most plug-in vulnerabili -
ties over the same time
period.p. 12
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2015
Browser Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: MARCH 2014 — FEBRUARY 2015
102030405060708090100
F J
2015D N O S A J J M A M
Opera
Mozilla FirefoxMicrosoft Internet Explorer
Google Chrome
Apple Safari
Plug-in Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: MARCH 2014 — FEBRUARY 2015
51015202530354045505560
Java
Apple
Adobe
ActiveX
F J
2014D N O S A J J M A M
p. 13
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2015
MOBILE THREATSp. 14
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2015
Mobile
Mobile Malware Families by Month,
Android
Source: Symantec :: MARCH 2014 — FEBRUARY 2015
8
6
04
2 235
34 4
3
12345678910
F J
2014D N O S A J J M A M
At a Glance
• There were no new
Android malware families
discovered in February.p. 15
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2015
PHISHING , SPAM + EMAIL THREATSp. 16
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2015
Phishing and Spam
Phishing Rate
Source: Symantec :: MARCH 2014 — FEBRUARY 2015
1 in 500
1 in 1000
1 in 1500
1 in 2000
1 in 2500
F J
2015D N O S A J J M A M20411610647
15171004
1466370
731395496
1290
1587
At a Glance
• The phishing rate
declined in February,
at one in 1,466 emails,
down from one in 1,004
emails in January.
• The global spam rate was
54 percent for the month
of February.
• One out of every 237
emails contained a virus.
• Of the email traffic in
the month of February, 3
percent contained a mali -
cious URL.
Global Spam Rate
Source: Symantec :: MARCH 2014 — FEBRUARY 2015
102030405060708090100%
F J
2014D N O S A J J M A M55 55 54 5466
5961 6064 63
5855p. 17
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2015
Email Threats
Proportion of Email Traffic
Containing URL Malware
Source: Symantec :: MARCH 2014 — FEBRUARY 2015
102030405060708090100%
F J
2015D N O S A J J M A M6741
14
536314
7 83
F J
2015D N O S A J J M A MProportion of Email Traffic
in Which Virus Was Detected
Source: Symantec :: MARCH 2014 — FEBRUARY 2015
351329246195
207
237141
234183
232
351270p. 18
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: FEBRUARY 2015
About Symantec
More Information
• Symantec Worldwide: http://www.symantec.com/
• ISTR and Symantec Intelligence Resources: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
• Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/
• Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer/
• Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex/Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC) is an information protection expert that helps
people, businesses and governments seeking the freedom to unlock the opportunities
technology brings – anytime, anywhere. Founded in April 1982, Symantec, a Fortune
500 company, operating one of the largest global data-intelligence networks, has
provided leading security, backup and availability solutions for where vital information
is stored, accessed and shared. The company’s more than 20,000 employees reside in
more than 50 countries. Ninety-nine percent of Fortune 500 companies are Symantec
customers. In fiscal 2013, it recorded revenues of $6.9 billion. To learn more go to
www.symantec.com or connect with Symantec at: go.symantec.com/socialmedia .
|
Page 1 of 17
Symantec Intelligence
Symantec Intelligence Report: January 2012
Spammers seek to take advantage of New Year holidays and events .
Welcome to the January edition of the Symantec Intelligen ce report which, provides the latest analysis of cyber
security threats, trends and insights from the Symantec Intelligence team concerning malware, spam, and other
potentially harmful business risks. The data used to compile t he analysis for this report in cludes data from December
2011 and January 2012.
Report highlights
Spam – 69.0 percent (an increase of 1.3 pe rcentage points since December 2011): page 5
Phishing – One in 370.0 emails identified as phishing (an in crease of 0.06 percentage points since December 2011): page 7
Malware – One in 295.0 emails contained malware (a decre ase of 0.02 percentage points since December 2011): page 9
Malicious Web sites – 2,102 Web sites blocked per day (a decrease of 77.4 percent since December 2011): page 11
Spammers continue to take advantage of holidays and events: page 2
Best Practices for Enterprises and Users: page 14
Introduction
As this is the first edition of the Symant ec Intelligence report for 2012, I would lik e to take this opportunity to wish you
a very happy and malware-free New Year. As you will see from the main topic of this report, The New Year is an
opportune time for spammers to take advantage of one of the major notable dates in the calendar.
In the most recent examples, cited in this report, spamme rs have taken advantage of compromised Web sites in order
to redirect people to their own spam Web sites. The comp romised Web sites are used to host a PHP redirect script,
frequently containing a reference to New Year in the name of the file, as an element of the social engineering used to
lure the recipient into clicking on the link. Other notable ev ents coming-up in 2012 are likely to become more exploited
in spam, phishing and malware as the year draws on, including the Chinese New Year, St. Valentine’s Day in
February and the London Olympics in June.
In December, global spam levels reached 67.7 percent, 2.8 percentage points lower than the November figure of 70.5
percent. However, spam activity increas ed by 1.3 percentage points in January, grad ually returning to similar levels as
November 2011, which was lower than the average in 2011. There have been a number of pressures on spammers
throughout 2011 and as a result they are now using more ta rgeted approaches and continue to exploit social media as
alternatives to email.
I hope you enjoy reading this month’s edition of the report, and please feel free to contact me directly with any
comments or feedback.
Paul Wood, Senior Intelligence Analyst
[email protected]
@paulowoody
Page 2 of 17
Report analysis
Spammers continue to take advantage of holidays and events
Beginning on New Year's Eve, January 1, 2012 and continuing earlier into the days following, Symantec Intelligence
identified spammers taking advantage of the New Year anniversar y, seemingly to entice users into clicking on spam
links contained in the email messages.
Further investigation revealed that spammers were compromi sing legitimate Web servers, leaving the main Web site
content intact (to avoid or delay detection) and si mply adding a simple PHP script, typically named
"HappyNewYear.php", "new-year-link.php" or "new-year. link.php". These scripts simply redirect to a spam
pharmaceutical Web site.
Analysis of one of the messages we saw using these links makes the spammers' motives clearer, as can be seen in figure 1, below.
Figure 1: Example spam email containing New Year reference in spam URL
The message uses social engineering techniques to try to entice the recipient to open the link. The " friend_id "
parameter in the URL could perhaps su ggest that the destination is some kind of social networking Web site.
In addition, around New Year, many Web sites and blogs p ublish various "top ten" lists of the past year, their
predictions for the coming year, so a URL containing the phr ase "new year" may seem more relevant and topical, and
may increase the likelihood of it being opened.
However, this is just the social engineering element, and the URL redirects (through a compromised machine) to a
familiar spammer "My Canadian Pharmacy" Web site, as can be seen in figure 2, below.
Page 3 of 17
Figure 2: Example spam Web site redirected from New Year spam URL
Symantec Intelligence has seen over 10,000 unique domain na mes compromised with this "new year link" redirect
script. It is likely that files called "new-year-link.php" or similar are likely to indicate that the Web server has been
compromised; perhaps serving as a timely reminder to ensure all servers are properly patched and updated.
This is just the latest example of spammers using holi days and current events to try to make their mails more
appealing. In the run-up to Christmas in 2011, spammers spoo fed a number of legitimate retailers, offering Christmas
special offers and deals on a variety of products (typically counterfeit watches and drugs). As we've separately
covered in the Symantec Intelligence Report and in some of our blogs, 419 or advance fee fraud scammers are also
skilled at using notable holidays, anniversaries and current events to their advantage, for example, there was an
increase in the number of scams relating to the devasta ting earthquake in Japan last year, and the "Arab spring"
movement, as well as many others.
January 23 also sees the start of Chinese New Year (als o referred to as “Spring Festival”) celebrations. With
celebrations continuing for several days, it is the most im portant traditional Chinese holiday, and is also celebrated in
many countries and territories with significant Chinese popul ations. The huge interest in this event (to celebrate the
“Year of the Dragon”) means that spammers and malware authors are likely to try to exploit this annual festivity.
Symantec Intelligence also expects to see spammers taki ng advantage of the fast-approaching Valentine's Day. It is
likely that pharmaceutical spammers will take advantage of t he day's romantic connotations, typically to promote their
erectile dysfunction drugs, while malware authors are likely to use the popular idea of having a secret admirer to lure
victims into unwittingly installing malware.
Following Valentine's Day, we also expect to see plent y of spam and malware taking advantage of the upcoming
UEFA Euro 2012 football tournament, jointly hosted by Ukra ine and Poland. Once UEFA Euro 2012 is over, it's not
long until the Summer Olympics in London. Indeed we have al ready seen many references to the games in 419 or
advance fee fraud messages. These messages have in cluded attachments such as "London 2012 Olympic
Games.doc", "LONDON 2012 OLYMPIC GAMES RAFFL E PROGRAM.doc", "LONDO N OLYMPICS LOTTERY
WINNER!.doc," to name but a few examples, su ch as the one shown in figure 3, below.
Page 4 of 17
Figure 3: Example 419 spam referencing a major sporting event
By relating their mails to widely-celebrated holidays and cu rrent events with global interest, spammers and malware
authors can (at first glance at least) make their messages more interesting, and increa se the chance of recipients
visiting spam Web sites or becoming infected.
Therefore, as major events draw closer, such as notab ly St. Valentine’s Day and the London Olympic Games, the
social engineering employed by spammers will almost cert ainly be adapted to take advantage of people’s interest in
these events. We expect there to be an in crease not only in spam activity rela ting to these events, but also in scams
and 419 frauds as well. With legitimate Web servers being exploi ted in many of these latest attacks, it is especially
important to remain vigilant and ensure that businesses adhere to a best practice for patching and maintaining Web
and other potentially vulnerable servers.
Page 5 of 17
Global Trends & Content Analysis
Spam, phishing and malware data is captured through a variety of sources, including the Symantec Global Intelligence
Network, the Symantec Probe Network (a system of more than 5 million decoy accounts), Symantec.cloud and a
number of other Symantec security te chnologies. Skeptic™, the Symantec.clo ud proprietary heuristic technology is
also able to detect new and sophisticated targeted threats.
Data is collected from over 8 billion email messages and over 1 billion Web requests, which are processed per day
across 15 data centers, including malicious code data, wh ich is collected from over 130 million systems in 86
countries worldwide. Symantec Inte lligence also gathers phishing inform ation through an ex tensive antifraud
community of enterprises, security vendor s, and more than 50 million consumers.
These resources give the Symantec Intelligence analysts unp aralleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze
and provide informed commentary on emerging trends in atta cks, malicious code activity , phishing, and spam. If there
is a malicious attack about to hit, we know about it firs t. We block it; we keep it from affecting our customers.
Spam Analysis
In January 2012, the global ratio of spam in email traffic rose by 1.3 percentage points since December 2011, to 69.0
percent (1 in 1.45 emails). This follows a more noticeabl e drop in December when spam fell by 2.8 percentage points
to 67.7 percent. Consequently, this recent increase means that spam has almost returned to the same level as in
November 2011.
As the global spam rate increased, Saudi Arabia became t he most spammed geography in January; with a spam rate
of 75.5 percent and China was the seco nd most-spammed with 75.0 percent of email traffic blocked as spam.
In the US, 69.0 percent of email was s pam and 68.7 percent in Canada. The spam level in the UK was 69.3 percent.
In The Netherlands, spam accounted for 70.7 percent of email traffic, 68.2 percent in Germany, 69.1 percent in
Denmark and 68.6 percent in Australia. In Hong Kong, 67.5 percent of email wa s blocked as spam and 66.7 percent in
Singapore, compared with 65.6 percent in Japan. Spam accounted for 69.5 percent of email traffic in South Africa and
73.1 percent in Brazil. 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Saudi Arabia
China
Brazil
Kuwait
Luxembourg 75.5%
75.0%
73.1%
71.9%
71.4% Education
Non-Profit
Automotive
Engineering Marketing/Media 71.0%
70.8%
70.3%
70.2% 70.2% 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 68.9%
69.0%
68.8%
69.2%
69.1%
69.1% Spam Rate
Sources
January 2012 69.0%
67.7%
72.0% Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012
25.0%
10.2%
5.8% 5.6% 4.4%
3.7%
3.3% 2.3%
2.3%
1.8% United States
India
Brazil Russian Federation United Kingdom
China
Vietnam
Pakistan
Germany
France 69.0%Page 6 of 17
Moreover, the Education sector became the most spammed industry sector in January, with a spam rate of 71.0
percent. The spam rate for the Chemic al & Pharmaceutical sector was 69.0 percent, compared with 68.7 percent for
IT Services, 68.4 percent for Retail, 68.9 percent for Public Sector and 68.2 percent for Finance.
The spam rate for small to medium-sized businesses (1-250) was 68.9%, compared with 69.1% for large enterprises
(2500+).
Global Spam Categories
The most common category of spam in January was phar maceutical related, but the second most common was
related to watches/jewelry spam. Examples of many of thes e subjects can be found in the subject line analysis, below.
Category Name January
2012 November
2011
Pharmaceutical 38.0% 32.5%
Watches/Jewelry 27.5% 19.5%
Adult/Sex/Dating 22.5% 12.5%
Weight Loss 3.5% 8.0%
Unsolicited Newsletters 2.5% 17.5%
Casino/Gambling 2.0% 2.0%
Unknown/Other 1.5% 4.0%
Software 0.5% 2.0%
Scams/Fraud/419 0.5% 1.5%
Degrees/Diplomas 0.5% <0.5%
Jobs/Recruitments 0.5% <0.5%
Malware <0.5% <0.5%
Phishing <0.5% <0.5%
Spam URL Distribution based on Top Level Domain Name
The proportion of spam exploiting URLs in the .com and .inf o top-level domains increased in January, as highlighted in
the table below.
TLD January
2012 November
2011
.com 57.8% 55.1%
.ru 9.4% 9.4%
.info 6.9% N/A
.org 6.6% 7.4%
Average Spam Message Size
In January, the proportion of spam emails that was 5Kb in size or less decreased; however, the proportion of spam
messages that were greater than 10Kb in size increased, as can be seen in the following table.
Message Size January
2012 November
2011
0Kb – 5Kb 55.7% 57.8%
5Kb – 10Kb 30.5% 31.2%
>10Kb 13.8% 11.0%
Page 7 of 17
Spam Attack Vectors
The proportion of spam that contained a malicious attach ment or link was much less than was observed during the
previous month, with only two major spikes of spam activity during the first half of the period. The frequency of attacks
has diminished significantly since the end of December 201 1. Many of these larger attachments were related to
generic polymorphic malware variants, as discussed in many previous1 Symantec Intelligence reports.
In January, the number of spam emails resulting in NDRs (spam related non-delivery reports), has been consistently
stable and low, suggesting the attackers may be using valid email distribution lists to c onduct these attacks, and using
more targeted approaches. NDR spam is often as a result of widespread dictionary attacks during spam campaigns,
where spammers make use of databases of first and la st names and combine them to generate random email
addresses. This low-level of activity is indicative of spammers that are seeking to maintain their distribution lists in
order to minimize bounce-backs; IP addresses are more likely to appear on anti-spam block-lists if they become
associated with a high volume of invalid recipient emails.
1 http://www.symanteccloud.com/intelligence 0%5%10%15%20%25%
11‐Dec 18 ‐Dec 25 ‐Dec 1 ‐Jan 8 ‐JanAttachment NDR MalwarePage 8 of 17
Phishing Analysis
In January, the global phishing rate increased by 0.06 per centage points, taking the average to one in 370.0 emails
(0.27 percent) that comprised some form of phishing attack.
The Netherlands became the country most targeted for phishin g attacks in January, with one in 62.6 emails identified
as phishing. The UK was the second most targeted country, with one in 179.4 emails identified as phishing attacks.
Phishing levels for the US were one in 1,145 and one in 379. 9 for Canada. In Germany phishing levels were one in
797.6, one in 330.9 in Denmark. In Australia, phishing acti vity accounted for one in 542.2 emails and one in 942.9 in
Hong Kong; for Japan it was one in 5,692 and one in 1,156 for Singapore. In Brazil one in 1,007 emails was blocked
as phishing.
The Public Sector remained the most targeted by phishing ac tivity in January, with one in 99.1 emails comprising a
phishing attack. Phishing levels for the Chemical & Phar maceutical sector reached one in 838.0 and one in 647.8 for
the IT Services sector, one in 529.4 for Retail, one in 169.4 for Education and one in 253.7 for Finance.
Phishing attacks targeting small to medium-sized busi nesses (1-250) accounted for one in 225.2 emails, compared
with one in 410.9 for large enterprises (2500+).
Analysis of Phishing Web sites
The number of phishing Web sites decr eased by 18.2 percent in January. The number of phishing Web sites created
by automated toolkits decreased by approximately 41.4 percent, accounti ng for approximately 42.6 percent of
phishing Web sites, including attacks against well-known social networking Web sites and social networking apps.
The number of unique phishing domains increased by 15.9 percent and phishing Web sites using IP addresses in
place of domain names (for example, http://255.255.255.255), increased by 78.0 percent. The use of legitimate Web
services for hosting phishing Web sites accounted for approximately 5.9 percent of all phishing Web sites, an increase
of 21.2 percent from the previous mont h. The number of non-English phishing Web sites increased by 41.5 percent.
Of the non-English phishing Web sites Portuguese, Italian, French and Spanish were among the highest in January. Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Netherlands
United Kingdom
Denmark
Canada
India 1 in 62.6
1 in 179.4
1 in 330.9
1 in 379.9
1 in 456.9 General Services
Public Sector
Education
Accom/Catering
Non-Profit 1 in 99.1
1 in 141.7
1 in 169.4
1 in 236.5 1 in 241.7 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 1 in 225.2
1 in 395.5
1 in 529.4
1 in 498.7
1 in 597.1
1 in 410.9 Phishing Rate
January 2012 1 in 370.0
1 in 479.0
1 in 358.3 Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012
65.2%
13.0%
7.1%
6.1%
4.8% 0.9%
0.7%
0.6% 0.3%
0.2% United Kingdom
United States Hong Kong
Australia
Ireland Denmark
Spain
Sweden India
Netherlands 1 in
370.0Page 9 of 17
Geographic Location of Phishing Web Sites
Tactics of Phishing Distribution
Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks, by Industry
1.0%5.9%2.4%48.1%42.6%
TyposquattingFree Web Hosting SitesIP Address DomainsOther Unique DomainsAutomated Toolkits
45.5%
44.0%
7.6%
2.1%
0.4%
0.3%
0.1%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%
0.0%Banking
E‐Commerce
Information Services
Telecommunications
Retail
Communications
Government
Retail Trade
Security
ISP
InsurancePage 10 of 17
Malware Analysis
Email-borne Threats
The global ratio of email-borne viruses in email traffic wa s one in 295.0 emails (0.33 percent) in January, a decrease
of 0.02 percentage points since December 2011.
In January, 29.0 percent of email-borne malware contained links to malicious Web sites, unchanged since December
2011.
The Netherlands was besieged with the highest ratio of malicio us emails in January, with one in 61.4 emails identified
as malicious. The UK had the second highest rate, with one in 169.1 emails identified as malicious.
In South Africa, one in 305.9 emails was blocked as malicio us. The virus rate for email-borne malware in the US was
one in 592.5 and one in 285.4 in Canada. In Germany virus activity reached one in 471.7 and one in 318.1 in
Denmark. In Australia, one in 327.9 emails was malicious. For Japan the rate was one in 1,573, compared with one in
482.9 in Singapore. In Brazil, one in 681.7 emails in contained malicious content.
With one in 90.2 emails being blocked as malicious, the Public Sector remained the most targeted industry in January.
The virus rate for the Chemical & Pharmaceutical sector reached one in 381.3 and one in 399.4 for the IT Services
sector; one in 407.1 for Retail, one in 138.3for Education and one in 236.7 for Finance.
Malicious email-borne attacks destined for small to medium-sized businesses (1-250) accounted for one in 277.3
emails, compared with one in 281.5 for large enterprises (2500+).
Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Netherlands
United Kingdom
Luxembourg
India Canada 1 in 61.4
1 in 169.1
1 in 205.4
1 in 278.0 1 in 285.4 Public Sector
Education
Non-Profit
Marketing/Media
Finance 1 in 90.2
1 in 138.3
1 in 203.8
1 in 229.9
1 in 236.7 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 1 in 277.3
1 in 294.8
1 in 349.1
1 in 325.6
1 in 393.8
1 in 281.5Virus Rate
January 2012 1 in 295.0
1 in 278.6
1 in 242.9 Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012
47.1%
36.1%
3.0% 2.3% 1.8%
1.8%
1.5% 0.9%
0.9%
0.6% United States
United Kingdom
India
Australia
Netherlands
Ireland
Sweden Hong Kong
France
Canada 1 in 295.0Page 11 of 17
Frequently Blocked Email-borne Malware
The table below shows the most frequently blocked email-bo rne malware for January, many of which relate to generic
variants of malicious attachments and malicious hyperlinks distributed in emails. Approx imately 28.7 percent of all
email-borne malware was identified and blocked using generic detection.
Malware identified generically as aggressive strains of pol ymorphic malware, such as Bredolab, Zeus and SpyEye,
accounted for 22.0 percent of all ema il-borne malware blocked in January; equi valent to 76.8 percent of all generic
malware blocked.
Malware Name % Malware
Exploit/SpoofBBB 7.31%
Exploit/Link-generic-ee68 6.71%
Suspicious.JIT.a 4.36%
VBS/Generic 4.20%
Exploit/LinkAliasPostcard-4733 2.79%
Trojan.Bredolab 2.10%
Trojan.Bredolab!eml-3a2a 1.58%
HeurAuto-14d6 1.55%
W32/Zbot-gen-c30b-54b2 1.47%
Link-Trojan.IFrame.QZ-544e 1.42%
The top ten list of most frequently bl ocked malware accounted fo r approximately 33.5% of all email-borne malware
blocked in January.
Web-based Malware Threats
In January, Symantec Intelligence identified an average of 2,102 Web sites each day harboring malware and other
potentially unwanted programs including spyware and adware; a decrease of 77.4 percent since December 2011. This
reflects the rate at which Web sites are being compromis ed or created for the purpose of spreading malicious content.
Often this number is higher when Web-based malware is in circulation for a longer period of time to widen its potential
spread and increase its longevity.
As detection for Web-based malware increases, the number of new Web sites blocked decreases and the proportion
of new malware begins to rise, but initially on fewer Web si tes. Further analysis reveals that 39.9 percent of all
malicious domains blocked were new in January; a dec rease of 4.8 percentage points compared with December
2011. Additionally, 15.2 percent of all Web-based malw are blocked was new in January; an increase of 0.7
percentage points since December 2011.
The chart above shows the increase in the number of new spyware and adware Web sites blocked each day on
average during January compared with the equivalent numbe r of Web-based malware Web sites blocked each day.
Web Policy Risks from Inappropriate Use
The most common trigger for policy-based filtering applied by Symantec Web Security.cloud for its business clients
was for the “Advertisements & Popups” category, which ac counted for 32.4 percent of blocked Web activity in
January. Web-based advertisements pose a potential ri sk though the use of “malvertisements,” or malicious New Malware Sites per Day
New sites with spyware
New sites with web virusesTotal 26/day
2,076/day
2,102/dayWeb Security Services Activity:
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
January 2012Page 12 of 17
advertisements. These may occur as the result of a l egitimate online ad-provider being compromised and a banner ad
being used to serve malware on an otherwise harmless Web site.
The second most frequently blocked traffic was categorized as Social Networking, account ing for 19.4 percent of URL-
based filtering activity blocked, equivalent to approximat ely one in every 5 Web sites blocked. Many organizations
allow access to social networking Web si tes, but facilitate access logging so that usage patte rns can be tracked and in
some cases implement policies to only permit access at cert ain times of the day and block access at all other times.
This information is often used to address performance managem ent issues, perhaps in the event of lost productivity
due to social networking abuse.
Activity related to streaming media policies resulted in 11.0 percent of URL-based filt ering blocks in January.
Streaming media is increasingly popular when there are major sporting events or high profile international news
stories. This activity often results in an increased number of blocks, as businesses seek to preserve valuable
bandwidth for other purposes. This rate is equivalent to one in every 9 Web sites blocked.
Endpoint Security Threats
The endpoint is often the last line of defense and analysis ; however, the endpoint can often be the first-line of defense
against attacks that spread using USB storage devices and insecure network connections. The threats found here can
shed light on the wider nature of threats confronting busi nesses, especially from blended attacks and threats facing
mobile workers. Attacks reaching the endpoint are likely to have already circumvented other layers of protection that
may already be deployed, such as gateway filtering.
The table below shows the malware most frequently blocke d targeting endpoint devices for the last month. This
includes data from endpoint devices protected by Symantec technology around the world, including data from clients
which may not be using other layers of protection, such as Symantec Web Security.cloud or Symantec Email
AntiVirus.cloud.
Malware Name2 % Malware
WS.Trojan.H 26.52%
W32.Sality.AE 6.09%
W32.Ramnit!html 5.88%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 5.75%
W32.Ramnit.B 5.18%
W32.Downadup.B 2.63%
W32.Virut.CF 1.65%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 1.63%
Trojan.ADH.2 1.50%
W32.SillyFDC 1.40%
2For further information on these threats, please visit: http ://www.symantec.com/business/securi ty_response/landing/threats.jsp
Web Security Services Activity:
Policy-Based Filtering
Advertisement and Popups
Social Networking Streaming Media
Computing and Internet
Search
Chat
Hosting Sites Games
Peer-To-Peer
NewsWeb Viruses and Trojans
JS:Trojan.Script.DR
Trojan.JS.WPress.A
Gen:Variant.Graftor.8369
Trojan.Maljava
Trojan.Script.475646
Trojan.ADH.2
Trojan.Gen.2
JS.AddedIframe
Trojan.Malscript!html
Trojan.Script.12023 Potentially Unwanted Programs
PUP:JS.Script.C
PUP:MyWebSearch.EC PUP:9231
PUP:Clkpotato!gen3
PUP:Generic.183433
PUP:Generic.62006
PUP:Relevant.BH PUP:Generic.183457
PUP:Generic.391406
PUP:Generic.376539
January 2012 32.4%
19.4%
11.0%
4.5%
4.0%
3.1%
2.9% 2.7%
2.3%
2.0% 25.3%
18.2%
5.2%
3.5%
3.1%
2.4%
2.0% 1.9%
1.8%
1.7% 21.4%
14.1%
11.9%
10.6%
9.3%
5.3%
3.4% 2.3%
1.9%
1.5%Page 13 of 17
The most frequently blocked malware for the last month was WS.Trojan.H3. WS.Trojan.H is generic cloud-based
heuristic detection for files that posses c haracteristics of an as yet unclassified threat. Files detected by this heuristic
are deemed by Symantec to pose a risk to users and are therefore blocked from accessing the computer.
For much of 2011, variants of W32.Sality.AE4 and W32.Ramnit5 had been the most prevalent malicious threat blocked
at the endpoint. Variants of W32.Ramnit accounted for approxi mately 17.0% of all malware blocked at the endpoint in
January, compared with 6.8% for all variants of W32.Sality.
Ramnit has also recently been implicated in the theft of identities from major social networking Web sites. It was
reported that many of these stolen credentials used to distribute malicio us links via the profile pages of the affected
users, heightening the risk for those users who shared the same password for several online accounts, potentially
providing the attackers with a spri ngboard into corporate networks.
Approximately 13.5 percent of the mo st frequently blocked malware last month was identified and blocked using
generic detection. Many new viruses and Trojans are based on earlier versions, where code has been copied or
altered to create a new strain, or va riant. Often these variants are created usin g toolkits and hundreds of thousands of
variants can be created from the same pi ece of malware. This has become a po pular tactic to evade signature-based
detection, as each variant would traditionally need its own signature to be correct ly identified and blocked.
By deploying techniques, such as heuristic analysis and gener ic detection, it’s possible to correctly identify and block
several variants of the same malware fa milies, as well as identify new forms of malicious code that seek to exploit
certain vulnerabilities that can be identified generically.
3 http://www.symantec.com/security_res ponse/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-102713-4647-99
4 http://www.symantec.com/security_res ponse/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-011714-3948-99
5 http://www.symantec.com/security_res ponse/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-011922-2056-99 Page 14 of 17
Best Practice Guidelines for Enterprises
1. Employ defense-in-depth strategies : Emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive
systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protection method. This should
include the deployment of regularly updated firewalls, as well as gateway antivirus, intrusion detection,
intrusion protection systems, and Web security gateway solutions throughout the network.
2. Monitor for network threat, vu lnerabilities and brand abuse. Monitor for network intrusions, propagation
attempts and other suspicious traffic patterns, iden tify attempted connections to known malicious or
suspicious hosts. Receive alerts for new vulnerabilit ies and threats across vendor platforms for proactive
remediation. Track brand abuse via domain alerting and fictitious Web site reporting.
3. Antivirus on endpoints is not enough: On endpoints, signature-based antivirus alone is not enough to
protect against today’s threats and Web-based attack toolkits. Deploy and use a comprehensive endpoint
security product that includes additi onal layers of protection including:
o Endpoint intrusion prevention that protects agai nst un-patched vulnerabilities from being exploited,
protects against social engineering attacks and stops malware from reaching endpoints;
o Browser protection for protection a gainst obfuscated Web-based attacks;
o Consider cloud-based malware prevention to prov ide proactive protection a gainst unknown threats;
o File and Web-based reputation solutions that prov ide a risk-and-reputation rating of any application
and Web site to prevent rapidly mutating and polymorphic malware;
o Behavioral prevention capabilities that look at t he behavior of applications and malware and prevent
malware;
o Application control settings that can prevent app lications and browser plug-ins from downloading
unauthorized malicious content;
o Device control settings that prevent and li mit the types of USB devices to be used.
4. Use encryption to protect sensitive data: Implement and enforce a security policy whereby sensitive data is
encrypted. Access to sensitive information should be re stricted. This should include a Data Loss Protection
(DLP) solution, which is a system to identify, monitor, and protect data. This not only serves to prevent data
breaches, but can also help mitigate the damage of potential data leaks from within an organization.
5. Use Data Loss Prevention to help prevent data breaches: Implement a DLP solution that can discover
where sensitive data resides, monitor its use and prot ect it from loss. Data loss prevention should be
implemented to monitor the flow of data as it leaves the organization over the network and monitor copying
sensitive data to external devices or Web sites. DLP should be configured to identify and block suspicious
copying or downloading of sensitive data. DLP should al so be used to identify conf idential or sensitive data
assets on network file systems and PCs so that appro priate data protection measures like encryption can be
used to reduce the risk of loss.
6. Implement a removable media policy . Where practical, restrict unautho rized devices such as external
portable hard-drives and other removable media. Su ch devices can both introduce malware as well as
facilitate intellectual property breaches—intentional or unintentional. If external media devices are permitted,
automatically scan them for viruses upon connection to the network and use a DLP solution to monitor and
restrict copying confidential data to une ncrypted external storage devices.
7. Update your security countermeasures frequently and rapidly: With more than 286M variants of malware
detected by Symantec in 2010, ent erprises should be updating security virus and intrusion prevention
definitions at least daily, if not multiple times a day.
8. Be aggressive on your updating and patching: Update, patch and migrate from outdated and insecure
browsers, applications and browser plug-ins to the la test available versions using the vendors’ automatic
update mechanisms. Most software vendors work diligent ly to patch exploited software vulnerabilities;
however, such patches can only be effective if adopted in the field. Be wary of deploying standard corporate
images containing older versions of browsers, applicat ions, and browser plug-ins that are outdated and
insecure. Wherever possible, automate patch deploy ments to maintain protection against vulnerabilities
across the organization.
9. Enforce an effective password policy . Ensure passwords are strong; at least 8-10 characters long and
include a mixture of letters and numbers. Encourage user s to avoid re-using the same passwords on multiple
Web sites and sharing of passwords with others should be forbidden. Passwords should be changed regularly, at least every 90 days. Avoid writing down passwords. Page 15 of 17
10. Restrict email attachments: Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments
that are commonly used to spread vi ruses, such as .VBS, .BAT, .EXE, .PIF, and .SCR files. Enterprises
should investigate policies for .PDFs that are allowed to be included as email attachments.
11. Ensure that you have infection and incident response procedures in place:
o Ensure that you have y our security vendors cont act information, know w ho you will call, and what
steps you will take if you have one or more infected systems;
o Ensure that a backup-and-restore solution is in plac e in order to restore lost or compromised data in
the event of successful attack or catastrophic data loss;
o Make use of post-infection detection capabilities fr om Web gateway, endpoint security solutions and
firewalls to identify infected systems;
o Isolate infected computers to prevent the risk of further infection within the organization;
o If network services are exploited by malicious code or some other threat, disable or block access to
those services until a patch is applied;
o Perform a forensic analysis on any infected com puters and restore those using trusted media.
12. Educate users on the changed threat landscape:
o Do not open attachments unless they are expect ed and come from a known and trusted source, and
do not execute software that is downloaded from the Internet (if such actions are permitted) unless
the download has been scanned for viruses;
o Be cautious when clicking on URLs in emails or social media program s, even when coming from
trusted sources and friends;
o Do not click on shortened URLs without previewi ng or expanding them first using available tools and
plug-ins;
o Recommend that users be cautious of information they provide on social networking solutions that
could be used to target them in an attack or tr ick them to open malicious URLs or attachments;
o Be suspicious of search engine results and only click through to trusted sources when conducting
searches—especially on topics that are hot in the media;
o Deploy Web browser URL reputation plug-in solution s that display the reputation of Web sites from
searches;
o Only download software (if allowed) from corporat e shares or directly from the vendors Web site;
o If users see a warning indicating that they are “i nfected” after clicking on a URL or using a search
engine (fake antivirus infections), have users close or quit the browser using Alt-F4, CTRL+W or the
task manager.
Page 16 of 17
Best Practice Guidelines for Consumers
1. Protect yourself : Use a modern Internet security solution that includes the following capabilities for maximum
protection against malicious code and other threats:
o Antivirus (file and heuristic based) and malware behavioral prevention can prevents unknown
malicious threats from executing;
o Bidirectional firewalls will block malware from exploiting potentially vulnerable applications and
services running on your computer;
o Intrusion prevention to protection against Web-a ttack toolkits, unpatched vulnerabilities, and social
engineering attacks;
o Browser protection to protect agains t obfuscated Web-based attacks;
o Reputation-based tools that che ck the reputation and trust of a f ile and Web site before downloading;
URL reputation and safety ratings for Web sites found through search engines.
2. Keep up to date : Keep virus definitions and security content updat ed at least daily if not hourly. By deploying
the latest virus definitions, you can protect your comp uter against the latest viruses and malware known to be
spreading in the wild. Update your operating system, W eb browser, browser plug-ins, and applications to the
latest updated versions using the aut omatic updating capability of your pr ograms, if available. Running out-of-
date versions can put you at risk from being exploited by Web-based attacks.
3. Know what you are doing : Be aware that malware or applications t hat try to trick you into thinking your
computer is infected can be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file-sharing programs,
free downloads, and freeware and shar eware versions of software.
o Downloading “free,” “cracked” or “pirated” versions of software can also contain malware or include
social engineering attacks that include programs that try to trick you into th inking your computer is
infected and getting you to pay money to have it removed.
o Be careful which Web sites you visit on the Web. While malware ca n still come from mainstream Web
sites, it can easily come from less reputabl e Web sites sharing pornography, gambling and stolen
software.
o Read end-user license agreements (EULAs) carefully and understand all terms before agreeing to
them as some security risks can be installed afte r an end user has accepted the EULA or because of
that acceptance.
4. Use an effective password policy: Ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers, and change
them often. Passwords should not consist of words fr om the dictionary. Do not use the same password for
multiple applications or Web sites. Use complex passwords (upper/lowercase and punctuation) or
passphrases.
5. Think before you click : Never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless you expect it and trust
the sender. Even from trusted users, be suspicious.
o Be cautious when clicking on URLs in emails, so cial media programs even when coming from trusted
sources and friends. Do not blindly click on sh ortened URLs without expanding them first using
previews or plug-ins.
o Do not click on links in social media applications with catchy titles or phrases even from friends. If you
do click on the URL, you may end up “liking it” and se nding it to all of your friends even by clicking
anywhere on the page. Close or quit your browser instead.
o Use a Web browser URL re putation solution that shows the reput ation and safety rating of Web sites
from searches. Be suspicious of search engine resu lts; only click through to trusted sources when
conducting searches, especially on t opics that are hot in the media.
o Be suspicious of warnings that pop-up asking y ou to install media players, document viewers and
security updates; only download software di rectly from the vendor’s Web site.
6. Guard your personal data : Limit the amount of personal informat ion you make publicly available on the
Internet (including and especially via social networks) as it may be harvested and used in malicious activities
such as targeted attacks and phishing scams.
o Never disclose any confidential personal or financia l information unless and until you can confirm that
any request for such information is legitimate.
|
Symantec Intelligence
Symantec Intelligence Report : January 2013
Welcome to the January edition of the Symantec Intelligence report , which provid es the latest analysis of cyber
security threats, trends , and insights from the Symantec Intelligence team concerning malware, spam, and other
potentially harmful business risks . The data used to compile the analysis for this report includes data from December
2012 through January 2013 .
Report highlights
• Spam – 64.1 percent (a decrease of 6.5 percentage points since December ): page 2
• Phishing – One in 508.6 emails identified as phishing (a decrease of 0.068 percentage points since December ): page 3
• Malware – One in 400 emails contained malware ( a decrease of 0.11 percentage points since December ): page 3
• Malicious website s – 2,256 websites blocked per day ( an increase of 196.1 percent since December ): page 5
Introduction
In this month’s report, we find that the email malware rate has dropped significantly since December, where only one
in 400 emails containing a virus in January. This is the lowest virus rate we’ve seen since 2009. It could indicate that email virus distributors took a break after the holiday season, or that they have continued to migrate away from email
as a choice for malicious payload delivery. We’ll watch this trend carefully to see if it continues to drop off.
In other news this month, Valentine’s Day spam is in full swing. Such spam generally arrives as an ecard during this
time of year, preying upon a potential victim’s curiosity about a potential secret admirer —a situation where a legitimate
email would likely arrive unsolicite d in the first place. Unfortunately many such emails around this time of year do not
lead to unexpected romance, but rather fake bargains, phishing attempts, or malicious code. More details on these
scams can be found here
.
Finally, this month Symantec and Microsoft partnered to take down a notorious botnet: Bamital . The primary purpose
of this botnet has been to generate ad revenue by hijacking search engine results, redirecting them to a C&C server hosting ads of the attacker’s choosing. Symantec has been tracking this botnet since 2009, and has successfully shut down the all known components of used to operate the botnet. Security Response has released a whitepaper,
providing a detailed overview of the botnet, which is available for download here
.
I hope you enjoy reading this month’s edition of the report, and please feel free to contact me directly with any
comments or feedback.
Ben Nahorney , Cyber Security Threat Analyst
[email protected]
@symantec, @symanteccloud, @nortononline , @threatintel
Page 1 of 7
Global Trends & Content Analysis
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the world through the
Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network, which is made up of more than 64.6 million attack sensors and records
thousands of events per second. This network monitors attack activity in more than 200 countries and territories
through a combination of Symantec products and services such as Symantec DeepSight™ Threat Management
System, Symantec™ Managed Security Services and Norton™ consumer products, and other third- party data
sources.
In addition, Symantec maintains one of the wor ld’s most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting
of more than 47,662 recorded vulnerabilities (spanning more than two decades) from over 15,967 vendors
representing over 40,006 products.
Spam, phishing and malware data is captured through a variety of sources, including the Symantec Probe Network, a
system of more than 5 million decoy accounts; Symantec.cloud and a number of other Symantec security
technologies. Skeptic™, the Symantec.cloud proprietary heuristic technology is able to detect new and sophisticated
targeted threats before reaching customers’ networks. Over 8 billion email messages and more than 1.4 billion Web
requests are processed each day across 15 data centers. Symantec also gathers phishing information through an
extensive antifraud community of enterprises, security vendors, and more than 50 million consumers.
These resources give Symantec’s analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze, and provide
informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and spam. The result is the
annual Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, which gives enterprises and consumers the essential information to
secure their systems effectively now and into the future.
Spam Analy sis
In January , the global ratio of spam in email traffic fell by 6.5 percentage point s since December , to 64.1 percent ( 1 in
1.56 emails ). This follows the continuing trend of global spam levels diminishing gradually since the latter part of 2011 .
Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Saudi Arabia
Qatar
Hungary
Sri Lanka
Brazil 82.7%
70.8%
70.8%
70.0%
69.6% Non-Profit
Accom/Catering
Education
Chem/Pharm
Manufacturing 65.5%
65.4%
65.2%
65.1%
64.8% 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 64.2%
63.5%
63.8%
64.3%
64.4%
64.1% Spam Rate
January 2013 64.1%
70.6%
70.4% Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012 2013
11.6%
7.0%
6.2%
5.0%
4.7%
4.5%
4.1%
4.1%
3.7%
3.1% United States
India
Brazil
China
Russian Federation
Canada
Viet Nam
France
Korea (South)
Poland
Page 2 of 7
Global Spam Categories
The most common category of spam in January is related to the Sex/Dating category , with 71.65 percent.
Category Name January
2013 December
2012
Sex/Dating 71.65% 82.62%
Pharma 14.87% 9.04%
Watches 7.29% 4.49%
Casino 3.50% 0.04%
Software 1.52% 1.22%
Jobs 0.55% 1.45%
Mobile 0.24% 0.14%
419/scam/lotto 0.05% 0.06%
Newsletters 0.04% 0.75%
Degrees 0.01% 0.02%
Phishing Analysis
In January , the global phishing rate de creased by 0.068 percentage points, taking the global average rate to one in
508.6 emails ( 0.197 percent) that comprised some form of phishing attack.
Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 South Africa
United Kingdom
Norway
Italy
India 1 in 114.3
1 in 250.5
1 in 335.7
1 in 446.6
1 in 500.5Agriculture
Public Sector
Recreation
Finance
Education 1 in 106.3
1 in 146.8
1 in 305.6
1 in 329.5
1 in 338.8 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 1 in 221.7
1 in 544.9
1 in 589.8
1 in 574.6
1 in 479.8
1 in 418.6 Phishing Rate
January 2013 1 in 508.6
1 in 377.4
1 in 340.9 Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012 2013
36.9%
33.6%
10.6%
9.3%
2.4%
1.5%
1.0%
0.9%
0.7%
0.6% United States
United Kingdom
Germany
Norway
New Zealand
Australia
Brazil
Japan
South Africa
Sweden
Page 3 of 7
Malware Analysis
Email -borne Threats
The global ratio of email -borne viruses in email traffic was one in 400 emails ( 0.25 percent ) in January , a decrease of
0.11 percentage points since December .
In January , 33.5 percent of email -borne malware contained links to malicious website s, 6.3 percentage points higher
than December .
Frequently Blocked E mail-borne Malware
The table below shows the most frequently blocked email -borne malware for January , many of which relate to generic
variants of malicious attachments and malicious hy perlinks distributed in emails. Approximately 30.9 percent of all
email -borne malware was identified and blocked using generic detection.
Malware identified generically as aggressive strains of polymorphic malware accounted for 0.2 percent of all email -
borne malware blocked in January .
Malware Name % Malware
Suspicious.JIT.a -SH 32.90%
Exploit/Link -generic -ee68 8.89%
Link-Trojan.Generic.KDZ.2843 -1cc7 6.00%
W32/NewMalware -Generic 5.30%
Exploit/LinkAliasPostcard -bc46 5.11%
Exploit/OutlookDate 3.80%
Exploit/SpoofBBB 3.72%
Exploit/Link -b288 2.13%
W32/Generic.dam 1.26%
Trojan.Gen -SH 1.25%
The top- ten list of most frequently blocked malware accounted for approximately 70.4 percent of all email -borne
malware blocked in January . Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Hungary
South Africa
United Kingdom
Italy
India 1 in 104.3
1 in 110.1
1 in 236.2
1 in 249.0
1 in 302.2 Public Sector
Education
Accom/Catering
Transport/Util
Non-Profit 1 in 98.9
1 in 249.9
1 in 315.9
1 in 326.0
1 in 344.7 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 1 in 385.2
1 in 459.2
1 in 506.0
1 in 279.2
1 in 494.4
1 in 391.3Virus Rate
January 2013 1 in 400.0
1 in 277.8
1 in 247.5 Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012 2013
48.6%
38.7%
2.3%
1.7%
1.1%
1.0%
0.8%
0.8%
0.7%
0.7% United Kingdom
United States
South Africa
Australia
Sweden
Japan
Brazil
Netherlands
Germany
Hong Kong
Page 4 of 7
Web -based Malware Threats
In January , Symantec Intelligence identified an average of 2,256 website s each day harboring malware and other
potentially unwanted programs including spyware and adware; an increase of 196.1 percent since December . This
reflects the rate at which websites are being compromised or created for the purpose of spreading malicious content.
Often this number is higher when Web- based malware is in circulation for a longer period of time to widen its potential
spread and increase its longevity.
As detection for Web- based malwar e increases, the number of new websites blocked decreases and the proportion of
new malware begins to rise, but initially on fewer websites. Further analysis reveals that 39.1 percent of all malicious
domains blocked were new in January ; a decrease of 0.5 percentage points compared with December . Additionally, 11
percent of all Web- based malware blocked was new in January ; a decrease of 0.9 percentage points since December .
The chart above shows the increase in the number of new spyware and adware websites blocked each day on
average during January compared with the equivalent number of Web -based malware website s blocked each day.
Web Policy Risks from Inappropriate Use
Some of t he most common trigger s for policy -based filtering applied by Symantec Web Security.cloud for its business
clients are s ocial networking, advertisements and pop- ups, and streaming media category . Many organizations allow
access to social networking websites , but facilitate access logging so that usage patterns can be tracked and in some
cases implement policies to only permit access at certain times of the day and block access at all other times. Web -
based advertisements pose a potential risk though the use of “malvertisements,” or malicious advertisements. These
may occur as the result of a legitimate online ad- provider being compromised and a banner ad being used to serve
malware on an otherwise harmless website . Streaming media is increasingly popular when there are major sporting
events or high profile international news stories. This activity often results in an increased number of blocks, as businesses seek to preserve valuable bandwidth for other purposes.
Endpoint Security Threats
The endpoint is often the last line of defense and analysis; however, the endpoint can often be the first -line of defense
against attacks that spread using USB storage devices and insecure network connections . The threats found here can
shed light on the wider nature of threats confronting businesses, especially from blended attacks and threats facing New Malware Sites per Day
New sites with spyware
New sites with web viruses
Total 141/day
2,115/day
2,256/dayWeb Security Services Activity:
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Web Security Services Activity:
Policy-Based Filtering
Social Networking
Advertisement and Popups
Streaming Media
Computing and Internet
Chat
Peer- To-Peer
Hosting Sites
Shopping
Games
NewsWebViruses and Trojans
Gen:Heu r.ManBat.1
Trojan.HTML.Agent.II
W32.Generic-5204-0 118
JS:Trojan.JS.Iframe.AM
Trojan.Malscript
Trojan.Iframe.BM Y
JS:Trojan.Script.AKB
Trojan.JS.Agent.GHF
Trojan.Maljava
Suspicious.JI T.a Potentially Unwanted Programs
Gen:Adware.MPlug.1
Application:Android/Counterclank. A
Adware.GoonSquad
Adware:Android/AirPush. A
Adware.JS.Agent.F
Adware:Android/Ropin. A
Adware.Clkpotato!gen3
Adware:W32/Baidu.gen!B
Gen:Application.Heu r.cmKfbiBPZXoO
Gen:Application.Heu r.cmKfb WuUv3fO
January 2013 34.1%
27.6%
6.7%
3.9%
2.8%
2.7%
2.6%
2.0%
1.9%
1.7%11.4%
10.2%
5.1%
4.2%
3.9%
3.3%
3.1%
3.0%
2.6%
2.6% 63.4%
6.0%
5.7%
4.0%
3.2%
2.1%
1.9%
1.8%
1.7%
0.7%
Page 5 of 7
mobile workers . Attacks reaching the endpoint are likely to have already circumvented other layers of protection that
may already be deployed, such as gateway filtering.
The table below shows the malware most frequently blocked targeting endpoint devices for the last month. This
includes data from endpoint devices protected by Symantec technology around the world, including data from clients
which may not be using other layers of protection, such as Symantec Web Security.cloud or Symantec Email
AntiVirus.cloud.
Malware Name1 % Malware
W32.Sality.AE 7.52%
W32.Ramnit!html 7.03%
W32.Ramnit.B 5.57%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 4.97%
W32.Downadup.B 4.24%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 2.42%
W32.Virut.CF 2.31%
W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 2.05%
W32.Chir.B@mm(html) 1.24%
W32.SillyFDC 0.99%
For much of 2013 , variants of W32.Sality.AE
2 and W32.Ramnit3 had been the most prevalent malicious threat s
blocked at the endpoint. Variants of W32.Ramnit accounted for approximately 17.9% of all malware blocked at the
endpoint in January , compared with 8.3 percent for all variants of W32.Sality.
Approximately 40.8 percent of the most frequently blocked malware last month was identified and blocked using
generic detection. Many new viruses and Trojans are based on earlier versions, where code has been copied or altered to create a new strain, or variant. Often these variants are created using toolkits and hundreds of thousands of
variants can be created from the same piece of malware. This has become a popular tactic to evade signature- based
detection, as each variant would traditionally need its own signature to be correctly identified and blocked.
By deploying techniques, such as heuristic analysis and generic detection, it ’s possible to correctly identify and block
several variants of the same malware families, as well as identify new forms of malicious code that s eek to exploit
certain vulnerabilities that can be identified generically.
1For further information on these threats, please visit: http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/landing/threats.js p
2 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006- 011714- 3948 -99
3 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010- 011922- 2056 -99
Page 6 of 7
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
JANUARY 2014p. 2
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
3 Executive Summary
4 BIG NUMBERS
7 TARGETED ATTACKS
8 Targeted Attacks
8 Targeted Attacks per Day
8 First Attacks Logged by Month
9 Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
9 Top 10 Industries Attacked
9 First Attacks Logged by Size
9 File Extensions of Attachments
10 Social Media
11 Social Media
11 Top 5 Social Media Attacks
12 DATA BREACHES
13 Data Breaches
13 Top 5 Types of Information Exposed
13 Twelve-Month Timeline of Data Breaches
14 MOBILE
15 Mobile
15 Mobile Malware by Type
16 Cumulative Mobile Android Malware
17 VULNERABILITIES
18 Vulnerabilities
18 Total Vulnerabilities Disclosed by Month
18 Browser Vulnerabilities
18 Plug-in Vulnerabilities19 SPAM, PHISHING, & MALWARE
20 Spam
20 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Geography
20 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Industry
21 Top 10 Sources of Spam
21 Average Spam Message Size
21 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Company Size
21 Spam by Category
21 Spam URL Distribution Based on Top Level Domain Name
22 Phishing
22 Top 10 Sources of Phishing
22 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Company Size
22 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Industry
22 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Geography
23 Phishing Distribution
23 Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks
24 Malware
24 Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected
24 Top 10 Email Virus Sources
25 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Industry
25 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Geographic Location
25 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Company Size
26 Endpoint Security
26 Top 10 Most Frequently Blocked Malware
27 Policy Based Filtering
27 Policy Based Filtering
28 About Symantec
28 More Informationp. 3
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
Executive Summary
Welcome to the January edition of the Symantec Intelligence report.
Symantec Intelligence aims to provide the latest analysis of cyber
security threats, trends, and insights concerning malware, spam,
and other potentially harmful business risks.
A number of large data breaches were reported during the month of January. The largest new
data breach included the exposure of 105.8 million identities in South Korea. (It’s worth noting
that many individuals in the country had more than one account exposed in this breach.) Another
large data breach, previously reported as including 40 million identities, has since had its numbers
adjusted upwards and is now estimated at 110 million identities exposed. These two breaches
contribute significantly in bringing the total number of identities exposed to over 500 million for
the last twelve months.
Targeted attacks are up to their highest level since August of last year, after what appears to be
average-to-low attack numbers over the last four months. Manufacturing is the most targeted
industry, making up 21.3 percent of attacks. The non-traditional services category, which includes
hospitality, recreation, and repair, is a close second at 20.6 percent.
The number of vulnerabilities reported is also up in January after lower numbers reported in
November and December of last year. However, at 555 vulnerabilities, this number is still well
below October, which reported a high of 663 for the month.
In other news, spam and phishing rates are down slightly in January, while email virus rates are at
their lowest levels since October of last year.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to contact us with any comments or
feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat Analyst
[email protected]. 4
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
BIG NUMBERSp. 5
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
Overall Email Phishing Rate:
Overall Email Phishing Rate:
1 in 1,053
1 in 1,4441 in 1,311
DecNov
JanHIGHER NUMBER = LOWER RISK
Overall Email Virus Rate:
Overall Email Virus Rate:
Nov
DecJanHIGHER NUMBER = LOWER RISK
1 in 4311 in 253
1 in 164
Estimated Global
Email Spam Rate Per DayEstimated Global
Email Spam Rate Per Day
SPAM AS PERCENT OF ALL EMAIL
Nov Dec Jan0102030405060708090100
62% 62% 64%
New Vulnerabilities
New Vulnerabilities
Dec
Nov
Jan
438
438
471 471
555 555
Dec1Nov6
Jan2
Mobile
VulnerabilitiesMobile
Vulnerabilities
p. 6
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
Data Breaches
Data Breaches
219Number of Breaches
(12 month period)
501,516,310 Number of IdentitiesExposed (12 month period)
Mobile Malware VariantsMobile Malware VariantsVARIANTS (CUMULATIVE)132 139
Jan Dec Nov186
010002000300040005000600070008000900010000
J D N O S A J J M A M F J
7,7517,751p. 7
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
TARGETED ATTACKSp. 8
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
Targeted Attacks
Targeted Attacks per Day
Source: Symantec
2014 2012 2013
TARGETED ATTACKS
255075100125150175200225250
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANAt a Glance
• Targeted attacks were
up in January, reaching
their highest levels since
August of 2013.
• Small companies of
250 employees or less
were targeted in 39%
of attacks, though
organizations with 2500+
employees were targeted
more often, based on first
attacks.
• The .exe file type was
the most common
attachment, making up
24.7% of email-based
targeted attacks that
included file attachments.
First Attacks Logged by Month
Source: Symantec
100200300400500600700800900100011001200
J
2014D N O S A J J M A M Fp. 9
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
Source: Symantec
Company Size Percent
1-250 38.9%
251-500 9.1%
501-1000 5.8%
1001-1500 3.4%
1501-2500 4.8%
2500+ 37.9%First Attacks Logged by Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Percent
1-250 29.2%
251-500 8.5%
501-1000 9.6%
1001-1500 6.0%
1501-2500 7.5%
2500+ 39.1%
File Extensions of Attachments
Source: Symantec
File Extension Percent
.exe 24.7%
.doc 11.1%
.scr 8.4%
.au3 7.5%
.jpg 6.2%
.pdf 1.9%
.dat 1.5%
.com 0.4%
.rtf 0.4%
.zip 0.3%Top 10 Industries Attacked
Source: Symantec
Industry Percent
Manufacturing 21.3%
Services - Non Traditional 20.6%
Finance, insurance & Real Estate 13.7%
Services - Professional 11.4%
Wholesale 11.0%
Transportation, communications, electric, gas &
Sanitary Services5.9%
Public Administration 4.2%
Retail 3.2%
Construction 2.2%
Mining 1.5%
The “Professional” services category includes services such as Legal, Accounting,
Health, and Education. “Non-Traditional” services include Hospitality, Recreational, and
Repair services.p. 10
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
SOCIAL MEDIAp. 11
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
Social Media
At a Glance
• 82 percent of all social
media attacks in January
where fake offerings.
• Likejacking is the second-
most common type of
social media attack at 8
percent.
Methodology
Fake Offering. These scams invite social network users to join a fake event or group with
incentives such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to share credentials with
the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
Fake Plug-in Scams. Users are tricked into downloading fake browser extensions on their
machines. Rogue browser extensions can pose like legitimate extensions but when installed
can steal sensitive information from the infected machine.
Likejacking. Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website buttons
that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
Fake Apps. Applications provided by attackers that appear to be legitimate apps; however,
they contain a malicious payload. The attackers often take legitimate apps, bundle malware
with them, and then re-release it as a free version of the app.
Manual Sharing Scams. These rely on victims to actually do the hard work of sharing the
scam by presenting them with intriguing videos, fake offers or messages that they share
with their friends.Top 5 Social Media Attacks
Source: Symantec
Top 5 Social Media Attacks
8%
5%Fake
Offering
Manual SharingLikejacking
2%Fake Apps
2%Comment Jacking82%p. 12
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
DATA BREACHESp. 13
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
Data Breaches
At a Glance
• The largest data breach
that was reported in
January resulted in the
exposure of 105.8 million
identities.
• The reported number
of identities exposed in
a late-November data
breach has since been
adjusted upward. This
breach is now estimated
to have exposed 110
million identities.
• In the last 12 months,
more than 500 million
identities have been
exposed.Twelve-Month Timeline of Data Breaches
Source: SymantecNUMBER OF INCIDENTSIDENTITIES BREACHED (MILLIONS)
INCIDENTS IDENTITIES BREACHED
020406080100120140160180
J
2014D N O S A J J M A M F051015202530354045
Top 5 Types of Information Exposed
Source: Symantec
39%39%
37%
31%70%Real Names
Gov ID numbers (Soc Sec)
Birth Dates
Home Address
Medical Records
Information Exposed in BreachesInformation Exposed in Breaches
% OF ALL BREACHESMethodology
This data is procured from the Norton Cybercrime Index (CCI).
The Norton CCI is a statistical model that measures the levels
of threats, including malicious software, fraud, identity theft,
spam, phishing, and social engineering daily. The data breach
section of the Norton CCI is derived from data breaches that
have been reported by legitimate media sources and have
exposed personal information.
In some cases a data breach is not publicly reported during the
same month the incident occurred, or an adjustment is made in
the number of identities reportedly exposed. In these cases, the
data in the Norton CCI is updated. This causes fluctuations in
the numbers reported for previous months when a new report is
released.
Norton Cybercrime Index
http://us.norton.com/protect-yourselfp. 14
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
MOBILEp. 15
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
Mobile
At a Glance
• 32 percent of mobile
malware discovered over
the last 12 months tracks
users.
• Traditional threats,
such as back doors and
downloaders are present
in 14 percent of all mobile
malware threats.
• Risks that collect data,
such as device info and
banking details, make up
15 percent of all risks.
• Three new mobile
malware families were
discovered in January,
along with 139 new
variants.32%
Track User
Risks that spy on the individual using the
device, collecting SMS messages or phone call logs, tracking GPS coordinates, recording phone calls, or gathering pictures and video taken with the device.
14%
Traditional Threats
Threats that carry out traditional malware functions, such as back doors and downloaders.
12%
Adware/Annoyance
Mobile risks that display advertising or generally perform actions to disrupt the user.15%
Send Content
These risks will send text messages to premium SMS numbers, ultimately appearing on the bill of the device’s owner. Other risks can be used to send spam messages.
13%
Change Settings
These types of risks attempt to elevate privileges or simply modify various settings within the operating system. 15%
Collect Data
This includes the collection of both device- and user-specific data, such as device information, configuration data, or banking details. Mobile Malware by Type
Source: Symantecp. 16
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
Cumulative Mobile Android Malware
Source: Symantec
VARIANTS FAMILIES
4080120160200240280320360400
J
2014D N O S A J J M A M F10002000300040005000600070008000900010000FAMILIES (CUMULATIVE) VARIANTS (CUMULATIVE)p. 17
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
VULNERABILITIESp. 18
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
Vulnerabilities
At a Glance
• There were 555 new
vulnerabilities discovered
in January, bringing
the total for the last 12
months to 6443. This is a
17 percent increase over
the prior twelve month
period.
• There were two
vulnerabilities in mobile
operating systems
disclosed during the
month of January.
• Google’s Chrome
browser continues to
lead in reporting browser
vulnerabilities, while
Oracle’s Java leads
in reported plug-in
vulnerabilities.Total Vulnerabilities Disclosed by Month
Source: Symantec
0100200300400500600700800
J
2014D N O S A J J M A M F
Plug-in Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%
Adobe Acrobat Reader
Adobe Flash PlayerApple QuickTimeOracle Sun Java
Browser Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
10%20%30%40%50%60%
Apple Safari
Google ChromeMicrosoft Internet ExplorerMozilla FirefoxOpera
p. 19
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
SPAM, PHISHING, & MALWAREp. 20
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
At a Glance
• The global spam rate decreased 1.9 percentage points in January
to 62.1 percent, down from 64.0 percent in December.
• Mining was the most commonly targeted industry at 64.2 percent,
followed by Manufacturing at 63.2 percent.
• The .com top-level domain (TLD) was again the most frequently
used malicious TLD in January.
• Sex Dating spam is the most common category, at 75.2 percent.
Pharmaceutical spam came in second at 20.1 percent.Spam
Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Geography
Source: Symantec
Geography Percent
Sri Lanka 74.7%
Israel 68.8%
Brazil 66.9%
South Africa 65.3%
Kuwait 64.8%
Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Percent
Mining 64.2%
Manufacturing 63.2%
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 62.9%
Services - Professional 62.1%
Construction 62.1%p. 21
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
Top 10 Sources of Spam
Source: Symantec
Source Percent of All Spam
Canada 7.7%
Spain 6.8%
Russian Federation 6.4%
United States 5.9%
Finland 5.6%
Italy 5.0%
Argentina 4.2%
India 3.7%
Ukraine 3.2%
Romania 3.1%
Spam URL Distribution Based on Top Level Domain Name
Source: Symantec
Month* .com .info .ru .biz
Dec 33.1% 13.7% 13.2% 10.3%
Nov 36.7% 12.4% not listed 9.6%
*Data lags one monthAverage Spam Message Size
Source: Symantec
Month* 0Kb – 5Kb 5Kb – 10Kb >10Kb
Dec 28.4% 19.2% 52.3%
Nov 37.0% 24.7% 38.4%
*Data lags one monthSpam by Category
Source: Symantec
Category Percent
Sex/Dating 75.2%
Pharma 20.1%
Jobs 1.8%
Software 0.8%
Watches 0.8%Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Percent
1-250 62.0%
251-500 61.8%
501-1000 62.4%
1001-1500 62.2%
1501-2500 62.0%
2501+ 62.3%p. 22
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
At a Glance
• The global phishing rate is down in January, comprising one in 1
in 1,444 email messages. In December this rate was one in 1 in
1,053.
• Financial themes continue to be the most frequent subject matter,
with 67.5 percent of phishing scams containing this theme.
• The South Africa had the highest rate in January, where one in
530 emails was a phishing scam.
• The United States tops the list of sources of phishing emails,
responsible for distributing 39.9 percent of phishing scams.
• Public Administration was the most targeted industry in January,
with one in every 761 emails received in this industry being a
phishing scam.Phishing
Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Geography
Source: Symantec
Geography Rate
South Africa 1 in 540
United Kingdom 1 in 731
Australia 1 in 821
Austria 1 in 1,183
New Zealand 1 in 1,215Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Rate
Public Administration 1 in 761
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 1 in 874
Services - Professional 1 in 1,189
Transportation, communications, electric, gas &
Sanitary Services1 in 1,457.2
Construction 1 in 1,571.5Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Rate
1-250 1 in 1,122
251-500 1 in 1,130
501-1000 1 in 1,463
1001-1500 1 in 1,563
1501-2500 1 in 1,590
2501+ 1 in 1,865
Top 10 Sources of Phishing
Source: Symantec
Source Percent
United States 39.9%
Australia 27.1%
United Kingdom 24.3%
South Africa 2.4%
Netherlands 1.8%
Sweden 1.5%
Singapore 0.4%
Japan 0.3%
United Arab Emirates 0.3%
New Zealand 0.2%p. 23
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
36.3%
3.2%
1.6%
0.7%58.1%Automated Toolkits
Other Unique DomainsIP Address DomainsFree Web Hosting SitesTyposquatting
Phishing Distribution:Phishing Distribution:Phishing Distribution
Source: Symantec
29.1%
3.6%
0.9%
0.1%67.5%FinancialInformation ServicesRetailComputer SoftwareCommunications
Organizations Spoofed
in Phishing Attacks:Organizations Spoofed
in Phishing Attacks:Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks
Source: Symantecp. 24
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
Malware
1 in 0
1 in 50
1 in 100
1 in 150
1 in 200
1 in 250
1 in 3001 in 350
1 in 400
1 in 450
1 in 500
J
2014D N O S A J J M A M FProportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected
Source: SymantecTop 10 Email Virus Sources
Source: Symantec
Geography Percent
United States 66.5%
United Kingdom 15.0%
Australia 4.1%
Netherlands 2.1%
France 1.8%
Germany 1.2%
Japan 1.2%
South Africa 1.1%
Canada 0.9%
Hong Kong 0.7%At a Glance
• The global average virus rate in January was one in 431
emails, compared to one in 164 in December.
• Hungary topped the list of geographies, with one in 217
emails containing a virus.
• The United States was the largest source of virus-laden
emails, making up 66.5 percent of all email-based viruses.
• Organizations with 250-500 employees were the most
targeted company size, where one and 383 emails contained
a virus.p. 25
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Rate
Public Administration 1 in 309
Agriculture, forestry & fishing 1 in 332
Services - Professional 1 in 343
Wholesale 1 in 397
Services - Non Traditional 1 in 467
Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Rate
1-250 1 in 398
251-500 1 in 383
501-1000 1 in 459
1001-1500 1 in 396
1501-2500 1 in 475
2501+ 1 in 459Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Geographic Location
Source: Symantec
Geography Rate
Hungary 1 in 217
South Africa 1 in 221
United Kingdom 1 in 287
Hong Kong 1 in 306
Ireland 1 in 344p. 26
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
At a Glance
• Variants of W32.Ramnit accounted for 9.4 percent of all malware
blocked at the endpoint.
• In comparison, 6.1 percent of all malware were variants of
W32.Sality.
• Approximately 49.5 percent of the most frequently blocked
malware last month was identified and blocked using generic
detection.Endpoint Security
Top 10 Most Frequently Blocked Malware
Source: Symantec
Malware Percent
W32.Sality.AE 5.4%
W32.Ramnit!html 3.8%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 3.4%
W32.Downadup.B 3.4%
W32.Ramnit.B 3.1%
Trojan.Zbot 2.5%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 2.2%
W32.SillyFDC 1.7%
W32.Virut.CF 1.7%
W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 1.0%p. 27
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
Policy Based Filtering
Source: Symantec
Category Percent
Social Networking 51.7%
Advertisement & Popups 20.5%
Streaming Media 4.3%
Hosting Sites 3.2%
Computing & Internet 2.8%
Chat 1.9%
Search 1.5%
Gambling 1.0%
News 0.9%
Entertainment 0.8%Policy Based Filtering
At a Glance
• The most common trigger for policy-based filtering applied by
Symantec Web Security .cloud for its business clients was for the
“Social Networking” category, which accounted for 51.7 percent
of blocked Web activity in January.
• “Advertisement & Popups” was the second-most common trigger,
comprising 20.5 percent of blocked Web activity.p. 28
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2014
About Symantec
More Information
• Security Response Publications: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/publications /
• Internet Security Threat Report Resource Page: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport /
• Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response /
• Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer /
• Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex /Symantec protects the world’s information and is a global leader in security, backup, and
availability solutions. Our innovative products and services protect people and information
in any environment—from the smallest mobile device to the enterprise data center to cloud-
based systems. Our world-renowned expertise in protecting data, identities, and interactions
gives our customers confidence in a connected world. More information is available at
www.symantec.com or by connecting with Symantec at go.symantec.com/socialmedia .
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
JANUARY 2015p. 2
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2015
CONTENTS
3 Summary
4 TARGETED ATTACKS + DATA BREACHES
5 Targeted Attacks
5 Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing
Emails
5 Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
5 Average Number of Spear-Phishing Attacks Per Day
6 Top-Ten Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
7 Data Breaches
7 Timeline of Data Breaches
8 Top-Ten Types of Information Breached
9 MALWARE TACTICS
10 Malware Tactics
10 Top-Ten Malware
10 Top-Ten Mac OSX Malware Blocked on OSX Endpoints
11 Ransomware Over Time
12 Vulnerabilities
12 Number of Vulnerabilities
12 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
13 Browser Vulnerabilities
13 Plug-in Vulnerabilities14 MOBILE THREATS
15 Mobile
15 Mobile Malware Families by Month, Android
16 PHISHING, SPAM + EMAIL THREATS
17 Phishing and Spam
17 Phishing Rate
17 Global Spam Rate
18 Email Threats
18 Proportion of Email Traffic Containing URL Malware
18 Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected
19 About Symantec
19 More Informationp. 3
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2015
Summary
Welcome to the January edition of the
Symantec Intelligence report. Symantec
Intelligence aims to provide the latest
analysis of cyber security threats, trends,
and insights concerning malware, spam, and
other potentially harmful business risks.
Symantec has established the most
comprehensive source of Internet threat data in the world through the Symantec™
Global Intelligence Network, which is made
up of more than 41.5 million attack sensors
and records thousands of events per second.
This network monitors threat activity in
over 157 countries and territories through
a combination of Symantec products and services such as Symantec DeepSight™
Threat Management System, Symantec™
Managed Security Services, Norton™
consumer products, and other third-party
data sources. The average number of spear-phishing attacks rose to 42 per
day in January, up from 33 in December. Finance, Insurance, &
Real Estate overtook Manufacturing in the Top-Ten Industries
targeted for the month of January. The overall phishing rate also rose slightly in January, to one in 1,004 emails.
There were ten data breaches reported in January that took place
during the same month. This number is likely to rise as more data breaches that occurred during the month are reported. In
comparison, there were 14 new data breaches reported during
January that took place between February and December of 2014.
Vulnerabilities are up during the month of January, with 494
disclosed and two zero-days discovered. Google Chrome reported the most browser vulnerabilities during the month of January,
after Microsoft Internet Explorer lead for a number of months.
Oracle, reporting on the Java program, disclosed the most plug-in vulnerabilities over the same time period. In previous
month’s Adobe has held the top spot, with its Acrobat and Flash
plug-ins.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to
contact us with any comments or feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat Analyst
[email protected]. 4
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2015
TARGETED ATTACKS
+ DATA BREACHESp. 5
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2015
At a Glance
• The average number of
spear-phishing attacks rose to 42 per day in January, up from 33 in December.
• The .doc file type was the most common attachment
type used in spear-phishing
attacks. The .class file type came in second.
• Organizations with 1-250 employees were the most likely to be targeted in January.
• Finance, Insurance, &
Real Estate lead the Top-Ten Industries targeted, followed by Manufacturing.Targeted Attacks
Average Number of Spear-Phishing
Attacks Per Day
Source: Symantec :: FEBRUARY 2014 — JANUARY 2015
255075100125150175200225250
J
2015D N O S A J J M A M F54 5345 43
2033141
84 84
5488
42
Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing
Emails
Source: Symantec :: JANUARY 2015
Executable type January December
.doc 46.1% 26.7%
.class 9.9% 2.2%
.txt 8.3% 1.3%
.bin 8.0% 1.6%
.xls 7.8% –
.ace 5.0% –
.vbs 2.4% –
.exe 2.0% 15.7%
.pdf 1.9% 1.6%
.rtf 1.3% –Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
Source: Symantec :: JANUARY 2015
Organization Size January December
1-250 35.2% 31.5%
251-500 7.8% 11.5%
501-1000 14.7% 6.6%
1001-1500 4.3% 3.5%
1501-2500 5.3% 9.3%
2500+ 32.7% 37.6%p. 6
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2015
Top-Ten Industries Targeted in
Spear-Phishing Attacks
Source: Symantec :: JANUARY 2015
ConstructionEnergy/UtilitiesPublic AdministrationRetailTransportation,
communications, electric, Services - Non TraditionalServices - ProfessionalWholesaleManufacturingFinance, insurance
& Real Estate 29%
21
12
9
9
5
5
2
1
1p. 7
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2015
Data Breaches
At a Glance
• There were ten data breaches reported in January that took
place during the same month. This number is likely to rise as more data breaches that occurred during the month are reported.
• In comparison, there were 14 new data breaches reported during January that took place between February and Decem-
ber of 2014.
• Real names, home addresses, and government ID numbers,
such as Social Security numbers, are currently the top three types of data exposed in data breaches.
20406080100120140160
J
2015D N O S A J J M A M F
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
IDENTITIES EXPOSED (MILLIONS)
INCIDENTS IDENTITIES EXPOSED (Millions)Timeline of Data Breaches
Source: Symantec :: FEBRUARY 2014 — JANUARY 2015
147
59
178
31.5
10
16.5.45 1.7 2.6 3510152025303540
27
252428
22
2119202322
12
10p. 8
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2015
Top-Ten Types of Information Breached
Source: Symantec :: FEBRUARY 2014 — JANUARY 2015
Real Names
Home AddressGov ID numbers (Soc Sec)Financial InformationBirth DatesEmail AddressesMedical RecordsPhone NumbersUsernames & PasswordsInsurance01
02030405060708091067
%
43%
43%
36%
33%
23%
23%
21%
17%
9%
Methodology
This data is procured from the Norton Cybercrime Index (CCI). The Norton CCI is a statistical model
that measures the levels of threats, including malicious software, fraud, identity theft, spam,
phishing, and social engineering daily. The data breach section of the Norton CCI is derived from
data breaches that have been reported by legitimate media sources and have exposed personal information.
In some cases a data breach is not publicly reported during the same month the incident occurred,
or an adjustment is made in the number of identities reportedly exposed. In these cases, the data in the Norton CCI is updated. This causes fluctuations in the numbers reported for previous months
when a new report is released.p. 9
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2015
MALWARE TACTICSp. 10
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2015
Malware Tactics
At a Glance
• W32.Ramnit!html was the
most common malware
blocked in January.
• W32.Ramnit and W32.Sality variants continue to dominate the top-ten
malware list.
• The most common
OSX threat seen on OSX was OSX.RSPlug.A, making up 19.2 percent of all OSX malware found on OSX Endpoints.
• The amount of ransom-ware seen during January decreased slightly when compared to December. Top-Ten Malware
Source: Symantec :: JANUARY 2015
Rank Name January December
1 W32.Ramnit!html 6.5% 5.1%
2 W32.Almanahe.B!inf 5.8% 5.2%
3 W32.Sality.AE 5.5% 5.0%
4 W32.Ramnit.B 4.4% 3.7%
5 W32.Downadup.B 2.7% 2.4%
6 W32.Ramnit.B!inf 2.7% 2.3%
7 W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 2.1% 1.6%
8 W32.Virut.CF 1.7% 1.7%
9 W97M.Downloader 1.2% –
10 W32.SillyFDC 1.1% 1.1%
Top-Ten Mac OSX Malware Blocked
on OSX Endpoints
Source: Symantec :: JANUARY 2015
Rank Malware Name January December
1 OSX.RSPlug.A 19.2% 10.1%
2 OSX.Keylogger 18.9% 16.3%
3 OSX.Wirelurker 10.5% 13.6%
4 OSX.Klog.A 9.3% 7.6%
5 OSX.Okaz 8.8% 11.2%
6 OSX.Luaddit 8.0% 9.3%
7 OSX.Stealbit.B 6.1% 4.1%
8 OSX.Flashback.K 3.2% 6.3%
9 OSX.Freezer 2.6% 2.7%
10 OSX.Weapox 2.4% –p. 11
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2015
Ransomware Over Time
Source: Symantec :: FEBRUARY 2014 — JANUARY 2015 THOUSANDS
J
2015D N O S A J J M A M F108365518
349
236 230
183
149
9580 77116p. 12
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2015
Number of Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: FEBRUARY 2014 — JANUARY 2015
100200300400500600700800
J
2015D N O S A J J M A M F438575600 596
457428399542562579
473494
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: FEBRUARY 2014 — JANUARY 2015
12345678
J
2015D N O S A J J M A M F0 0 0 0 012 25
014Vulnerabilities
At a Glance
• There were 494 vulner-
abilities disclosed during the month of January.
• There were two zero-day vulnerability disclosed during January.
• Google Chrome reported the most browser vulner-abilities during the month of January.
• Oracle, reporting on the Java program, disclosed the most plug-in vulner-abilities over the same time period.p. 13
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2015
Browser Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: FEBRUARY 2014 — JANUARY 2015
20406080100
J
2015D N O S A J J M A M F
Opera
Mozilla FirefoxMicrosoft Internet Explorer
Google Chrome
Apple Safari
Plug-in Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: FEBRUARY 2014 — JANUARY 2015
1020304050607080
Java
Apple
Adobe
ActiveX
J
2014D N O S A J J M A M F
p. 14
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2015
MOBILE THREATSp. 15
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2015
Mobile
Mobile Malware Families by Month,
Android
Source: Symantec :: FEBRUARY 2014 — JANUARY 2015
8
6
24
2 235
34 4
3
12345678910
J
2014D N O S A J J M A M F
At a Glance
• There were three Android
malware families discov-ered in January.p. 16
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2015
PHISHING , SPAM + EMAIL THREATSp. 17
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2015
Phishing and Spam
Phishing Rate
Source: Symantec :: FEBRUARY 2014 — JANUARY 2015
1 in 0
1 in 500
1 in 1000
1 in 1500
1 in 2000
1 in 2500
J
2015D N O S A J J M A M F20411610647
15171004478370
731395496
1290
1587
At a Glance
• The phishing rate rose
in January, at one in 1,004 emails, up from one in 1,517 emails in December.
• The global spam rate was
54 percent for the month
of January.
• One out of every 207 emails contained a virus.
• Of the email traffic in the month of December, 5 percent contained a mali-cious URL.
Global Spam Rate
Source: Symantec :: FEBRUARY 2014 — JANUARY 2015
102030405060708090100%
J
2014D N O S A J J M A M F55 55 546266
5961 6064 63
5855p. 18
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2015
Email Threats
Proportion of Email Traffic
Containing URL Malware
Source: Symantec :: FEBRUARY 2014 — JANUARY 2015
102030405060708090100%
J
2015D N O S A J J M A M F6741
14
514
6314
7 83
1 in 50
1 in 100
1 in 150
1 in 200
1 in 250
1 in 300
1 in 350
1 in 400
1 in 450
1 in 500
J
2015D N O S A J J M A M FProportion of Email Traffic
in Which Virus Was Detected
Source: Symantec :: FEBRUARY 2014 — JANUARY 2015
351329246195
207188141
234183
232
351270p. 19
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JANUARY 2015
About Symantec
More Information
• Symantec Worldwide: http://www.symantec.com/
• ISTR and Symantec Intelligence Resources: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
• Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/
• Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer/
• Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex/Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC) is an information protection expert that helps
people, businesses and governments seeking the freedom to unlock the opportunities
technology brings – anytime, anywhere. Founded in April 1982, Symantec, a Fortune
500 company, operating one of the largest global data-intelligence networks, has
provided leading security, backup and availability solutions for where vital information
is stored, accessed and shared. The company’s more than 20,000 employees reside in more than 50 countries. Ninety-nine percent of Fortune 500 companies are Symantec
customers. In fiscal 2013, it recorded revenues of $6.9 billion. To learn more go to
www.symantec.com or connect with Symantec at: go.symantec.com/socialmedia.
|
Page 1 of 21
Symantec Intelligence
Symantec Intelligence Report : July 2011
Aggressive use of rapidly changing malware leads to a rise in sophisticated socially engineered attacks ; twist in
phishing attacks bait mobile phone users
Welcome to the July edition of the Symantec Intelligence report , now combining the best research and analysis from
the Symantec.cloud MessageLabs Intelligence Report and the Symantec State of Spam & Phishing Report , provid ing
the latest analysis of cyber security threats, trends and insights from the Symantec Intelligence team concerning
malware , spam, and other potentially harmful business risks. The data used to compile the analysis for this combined
report includes data from June and July 2011.
Repo rt highlights
• Spam – 77.8 percent in July (an increase of 4 .9 percentage points since June 2011): page 9
• Phishing – One in 319. 3 emails identified as phishing (a n increase of 0.01 percentage points since June 2011) : page 12
• Malware – One in 280 .9 emails in July contained malware (an increase of 0. 02 percentage points since June 2011) : page 13
• Malicious Web sites – 6,797 Web sites blocked per day (an increase of 25.5 percent since June 2011) : page 15
• 35.9 percent of all malicious domains blocked were new in July (an increase of 0.8 percentage points since June 2011) :
page 15
• 21.1 percent of all Web- based malware blocked was new in July (an increase of 0 .8 percentage points since June 2011) :
page 15
• Aggressively unstable malware leads to a rise in sophisticated socially engineered attacks : page 2
• Phishers’ World in Your Cell Phone: page 6
• Large scale malware attack using URL shortening services : page 7
• Best Practices for Enterprises and Users: page 18
Introduction
With one in 280.9 emails identified as malicious in July, further analysis reveals a significant increase in activity related
to what may be described as an aggressive and rapidly changing form of generic polymorphic1
In the same time frame, the number of variants, or different strains of malware involved in each attack has also grown
dramatically by a factor of 25 times the same quantity six month s previously ; an alarming proliferation in such a short
time almost certainly heightens the risk profiles of many organizations as these new strains are much harder to detect
using traditional security defenses . This new breed of malware is likely to be causing a great deal of pain for a great
number of traditional anti -virus companies that rely on signatures, heuristics and software emulation in order to detect
malicious activity . malware. This rise
accounted for 23.7 percent of all email -borne malware intercepted in July; more than double the same figure six
months ago , indicating a much more aggressive strategy on the part of the cyber criminals responsible, perhaps
greater use of automation has enabled them to increase thei r output to this extent .
The malware is frequently contained inside an executable within the attached ZIP archive file and often disguised as a
PDF file or an office document. T his new aggressive approach to distributing generic polymorphic malware on such a
scale should be concerning for many businesses , particularly for those who rely solely on more traditional security
countermeasures, which this t ype of malware is designed to evade. One example of this technique involves changing
the startup code in almost every version of the malware; subtly changing the structure of the code and making it
1 Polymorphic malware may have many variations of the same code using different encoding techniques, but the functionality of the program
remains the same in each version Page 2 of 21
harder for emulators built -in to many anti -virus products to identify the code as malicious . Technology cannot rely on
signatures and heuristics alone, and must also take into account the integrity of an executable based on knowledge of
its reputation and circulation in the real -world .
In other news, phishing a ttacks have also been seeking various means to exploit vulnerable cell phone users ; two key
areas in which we can see this trend are, firstly, the increase in phishing against wireless application protocol (WAP)
pages , which are lightweight Web pages designed for smaller mobile devices such as cell phones; and secondly, the
use of compromised domain names that have been registered for mobile devices , for example, using the .mobi top -
level domain . Symantec has identified phishing sites spoofing such Web page s and has been monitoring the trend. In
July, social networking and information services brands were frequently observed in these phishing sites. The primary
motive of these attacks continues to be identity theft. Targeting cell phone users is just part of a new strategy for
achieving the same result.
I hope you enjoy reading this month’s edition of the report, and please feel free to contact me directly with any
comments or feedback as to what you like or dislike about the new format.
Paul Wood, Senior Intelligence Analyst
[email protected]
@paulowoody
Report analysis
Aggressively unstable malware leads to a rise in sophisticated socially engineered attacks
With one in 280.9 emails identified as malicious in July, further a nalysis reveals a significant increase in activity related
to what may be described as an aggressively unstable or rapidly changing form of generic polymorphic malware. This
rise accounted for 23.7 percent of all email -borne malware intercepted in July. The malware is frequently contained
inside an executable within the attached ZIP archive file, sometimes disguised as a PDF file, for example.
In February ,2
These new strains are much harder to detect using traditional security defenses and this new breed of malware is
potentiall y causing a great deal of pain for many traditional anti -virus companies that often rely on signatures,
heuristics and software emulation in order to detect malicious activity . we first reported a rise in synchronized, integrated malicious attacks involving a number of different
strains of generic polymorphic malware, including Bredolab, Zeus, Zbot and SpyEye . Over the course of the following
months the le vel of activity related to this pattern of malicious activity has continued to increase. In February, generic
polymorphic malware accounted for approximately 10.3 percent of all email -borne malware, doubling to 23.7 percent
in July. This is an alarming pr oliferation in such a short time and almost certainly heightens the risk profile of many
organizations confronted with this threat.
Further analysis shows that the most recent samples were specifically designed to evade detection by software
emulators that often form part of the anti -virus engine installed on a target PC. Software emulation is designed to
analyze the code and follow th e flow of instructions, but only up to a point. One design element of this new breed of
malware includes a series of unnecessary “jump” instructions in the startup code, which are introduced in between the
real instructions specifically to confound the ant i-virus engine detection. An example of this can be seen in figure 1,
where every instruction has around 5 or 6 extra jumps that add nothing to the actual functionality of the code.
2 http://www.symanteccloud.com/mlireport/MLI_2011_02_February_FINAL -en.PDF Page 3 of 21
Figure 1: Fragment of startup code illustrating surplus jump (JC) instr uctions between code
Furthermore, these jump instructions often lead to other jump instructions, as shown in figure 2, hence this technique
is not only able to evade traditional anti -virus signatures, but this can even break the emulation techniques used i n
anti-virus engines by introducing more junk instructions in between the valid instructions.
Figure 2: Schematic showing how program passes control through a series of additional jumps
The largest spikes of this activity since 10 June occurred around the dates of 18 June, 2 8 June and 7 July ; as can be
seen in figure 3.
Page 4 of 21
Figure 3: Chart showing pattern of generic polymorphic malware and executable attachment malware
For the entire period between June and July highlighted in figure 3 above, approximately 11.1 percent of all email -
borne malware intercepted was identified as malicious, executable attachments , of which 46.0 percent could be
classified as aggressively unstable polymorphic malware. During this period, Symantec Intelligence identified
approximately 1,057 different strains of generic polymorphic malware being blocked, approximately 25 times more
than in February 2011 , when approximately 40 strains were identified. This indicates a much more aggressive str ategy
on the part of the cyber criminals responsible, perhaps greater use of automation has enabled them to increase their
output to this extent. Such an alarming proliferation in only six months almost certainly heightens the risk profile of
many organizations as these new strains are much harder to detect using traditional security defenses.
Many of these involved dictionary attacks, where the recipient names are often generated automatically using
dictionaries of first and last names. Dictionary attacks often result in a large number of Non -Delivery Report s (NDRs)
where emails sent to invalid addresses often result in emails being bounced as undeliverable. This pattern can be
clearly seen in the section on Spam Attack Vectors (page 11), later in this report.
Examples of these recent email -borne attacks can be seen in figure 4 , below. Although some of the more recent
attacks have spoofed credit -card providers, suggest ing the recipient is overdue in settling their balance .
0%5%10%15%20%25%30%35%
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aggressivepolymorphicmalwarePage 5 of 21
Figure 4: Examples of recent malware attacks using aggressive polymorphic techniques
As can be seen in figure 5 , the most common forms of these attacks are often disguised as correspondence from
parcel carriers and courier -based delivery services.
Subject Number Blocked in
24 Hours
Money Transfer 419
████ ██ ████ 594
████ Delivery Confirmation 1013
Figure 5: Examples of recent malware attacks using aggressive polymorphic techniques
On 18 July another wave of attacks further revealed the scale of the aggressive polymorphic nature of these attacks,
when 52 strains were identified in approximately 2,816 attacks , as highlighted in figure 6 , below .
Page 6 of 21
Figure 6: Chart showing number of copies intercepted of each new polymorphic strain on 18 July 2011
If the recipient opens the attached executable, the malware is injected into a running process before downloading
further malware from the Internet. The Web sites used to retrieve the instructions and subsequent malware appear to be hosted on fast -flux domains. Fast -flux involves the use of continually changing IP addresses associated with the
domain names involved. Often these IP addresses will belong to compromised computers perhaps hosted within the context of a wider botnet. By continually changing these IP addresses, the attackers can prevent the malware from spreading by disrupting the Web sites hosting it. In order to dismantle a fast -flux domain, the domain registrar must be
notified of the m alicious use of the service so that it may be taken offline and removed from the DNS registry.
This new aggressive approach to distributing generic polymorphic malware on such a scale is concerning for many businesses who rely solely on traditional securit y countermeasures, which this type of malware is designed to evade.
Technology cannot rely on signatures and heuristics alone, and must also take account of the integrity of an
executable based on knowledge of its reputation or circulation.
Phishers’ Worl d in Your Cell Phone
Technologies in cell phones are advancing day after day, and so phishers are also seeking various means to exploit
vulnerable cell phone users. The two key areas in which we can see this trend are, firstly, the increase in phishing
against wireless application protocol (WAP) pages, and secondly, the use of compromised domain names that have been registered for mobile devices.
Many legitimate brands have designed their websites for cell phones or WAP pages. The difference between a WAP
page and a regular Web page is that the WAP page uses reduced file sizes and minimal graphics. This is done for cell
phone compatibility and also to achieve higher browsing speeds while the user is on the move. Symantec has
identified phishing sites spoofing such Web pages and has been monitoring the trend. In July , social networking and
information services brands were frequently observed in these phishing sites.
In the example shown in figure 7 below, the phishing page consists of nothing more than a form asking for users’
credentials (This is a typical design created for cell phones) . When a victim enters the required information, the
phishing page is redirected to the WAP page of the legitimate brand. The phishing site in this case was hosted on a
free W eb hosting site. 10
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UniqueStrainIdentifierPage 7 of 21
Figure 7: Example phishing page requesting users’ credentials
The domain names used for websites accessed by mobiles devices commonly have a “.mobi” top level domain (TLD).
These domain names are compromised and utilized by phishers to h ost several phishing sites. Over the past six
months, about 65 percent of these phishing sites spoofed brands from the banking sector, whereas 19 percent were
from the e- commerce sector and the remaining were from the ISP, social networking, and information services
sectors.
The primary motive of phishers in these attacks continues to be identity theft. Targeting cell phone users is just part of a new strategy for achieving the same result.
Large scale malware attack using URL shortening services
We've seen spammers abusing URL shortening services on a huge scale for quite some time, which was also
reported in -depth as part of the May 2011 MessageLabs Intelligence Report
3
The attack abused at least five different URL shortening sites. The message claimed to be from an inter -bank funds
transfer service, claiming that a funds transfer had been cancelled. To find out why the transfer was cancelled,
recipients were encouraged to click on a link supposedly pointing to a PDF file, but actually pointing to a shortened
URL. This shortened URL then redirects to a site with several drive -by exploits . The process can be seen in figure 8 ,
below. . The explosion in popularity of micro-
blogging services and social networking stat us updates has seen a huge increase in the number of URL shortening
sites. The simple and semi -anonymous nature of these sites allows spammers to easily create thousands of links
which they then include in their spam in an attempt to evade URL -based spam b locking. In July Symantec Intelligence
identified a large malware attack using URL shortening services.
3 http://www.symanteccloud.com/mlireport/MLI_2011_05_May_FINAL -en.pdf
Page 8 of 21
Figure 8: Illustration of the process involved in URL shortening services and drive- by malware
The malware Web site was heavily obfuscated ; almost its entire content is obfuscated and contain ed inside a single
huge HTML "DIV" element, hidden with inline CSS. When a web browser renders the page, JavaScript is used to de-
obfuscate the content and run more JavaScript to carry out exploits. The page attempts several exploits including exploits tar geting PDF and Java, and also uses a Windows Help Center exploit to download more malware.
We saw hundreds of unique shortened URLs being used to link to this malware, and expect to see malware authors using this technique in future.
Page 9 of 21
Global Trends & Content Analysis
Spam, phishing and malware data is captured through a variety of sources, including the Symantec Global Intelligence
Network , the Symantec Probe Network (a system of more than 5 million decoy accounts ), Symantec.cloud and a
number of other Symantec security technologies . Skeptic™, the Symantec.cloud proprietary heuristic technology is
also able to detect new and sophisticated targeted threats.
Data is collected from over 8 billion email messages and over 1 billion Web requests which are pro cessed per day
across 16 data centers , including malicious code data which is collected from over 130 million systems in 86 countries
worldwide . Symantec intelligence also gathers phishing information through an extensive antifraud community of
enterprises , security vendors, and more than 50 million consumers.
These resources give the Symantec Intelligence analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze,
and provide informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code acti vity, phishing, and spam . If there
is a malicious attack about to hit, we know about it first. We block it; we keep it from affecting our customers.
Spam Analysis
In July 2011, the global ratio of spam in email traffic rose to 77.8 percent (1 in 1.29 emails); an increase of 4 .9 percent
when compared with June 2011.
As the global spam level declined in July 2011, Saudi Arabia remained the most spammed geography, with a spam
rate of 85. 6 percent , and Russia remained the second most -spammed .
In the US, 7 8.0 percent of email was spam and 77.7 percent in Canada. The spam level in the UK was 78.2 percent .
In The Netherlands, spam accounted for 78.8 percent of email traffic, 77.9 percent in Germany, 77.6 percent in
Denmark and 75.8 percent in Australia. In Hong Kong, 76.8 percent of email was blocked as spam and 75.7 percent in
Singapore, compared with 74.7 percent in Japan. Spam accounted for 76.9 percent of email traffic in South Africa and
78.7 percent in Brazil. Saudi Arabi a
Russ ianFederati on
China
Hungary
VietNam85.6%
83.4%
82.4%
81.9%
81.6%
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010Automotive
Education
Marketing /Media
Manufact uring
Accom/Cate ring80.7%
80.3%
79.2%
79.1%
78.8%1-250
251-5 00
501-1000
1001-150 0
1501-2500
2501+77.4%
77.5%
78.0%
78.5%
78.3%
77.9%Spam Rate
July 201177.8%
72.9%
76.7%LastMonth:
SixMonthAvg.: Top5Geographies Top5Verticals ByHorizontal
201177.8%
India 15.5%
Brazil 13.1%
RussianFederaon 6.4%
VietNam 6.4%
Indonesia 2.6%
China 2.5%
Ukraine 2.4%
Romania 2.4%
SaudiArabia 2.4%
UnitedStates 2.3%1
23
54Spam SourcesPage 10 of 21
In July, the Automotive industry sector remained the most spammed industry sector, with a spam rate of 80.7 percent .
Spam levels for the Education sector reached 80.3 percent and 77.9 percent for the Chemical & Pharmaceutical
sector; 77.8 percent for IT Services, 77.8 percent for Retail, 77.0 percent for Public Sector and 77.0 percent for
Finance.
Global Spam Categories
The most common category of spam in July was pharmaceutical related, but the second most common was related to
adult/dating spam. Examples of many of these subjects can be found in the subject line analysis, below.
Category Name June 2011 July 2011
Pharma ceutical 40.0% 47.0%
Adult/S ex/Dating 19.0% 14.5%
Jobs/Recruitments - 10.5%
Watches /Jewelry 17.5% 7.5%
Unsolicited Newsletter s 11.5% 7.5%
Casino /Gambling 7.0% 3.5%
Degrees /Diplomas 1.5% 2.5%
Unknown/Other 2.5% 2.0%
Spam Subject Line Analysis
In the latest analysis, adult -related dating spam dominates the top spam subject line list in July . .
Rank Total Spam: June 2011 Top Subject Lines No. of
Days Total Spam: July 2011 Top Subject Lines No. of
Days
1 Blank Subject line 31 drop me a line 31
2 Re: Windows 7, Office 2010, Adobe CS5 … 16 r u online now? 16
3 im online now 31 hi darling.. 31
4 my new pics :) 31 new email 31
5 drop me a line 31 found you :) 31
6 r u online now? 31 im online now 31
7 hi darling.. 31 my new pics :) 31
8 new email 31 my new email 31
9 found you :) 31 my hot pics :) 31
10 my hot pics :) 31 I'm online now… 31
Spam URL TLD Distribution
The proportion of spam exploiting URLs in the .RU top- level fell by 8.6 percentage points in July, with the largest
increase relating to spam URLs in the .info TLD.
TLD June July Change
(% points)
com 53.4% 54.9% +0.5
ru 19.2% 10.6% -8.6
info 14.9% 18.3% +3.4
net 5.5% 6.2% +0.7
Page 11 of 21
Average Spam Message Size
In July, almost two- thirds of spam was approximately 5Kb in size or less.
Message Size June July Change
(% points)
0Kb – 5Kb 62.3% 65.1% +2.8
5Kb – 10Kb 24.2% 21.2% -3.0
>10Kb 13.4% 13.7% +0.3
Spam Attack Vectors
It can be seen in the chart below that a major spike in attachment spam occurred on 29 June. This also coincided with
a surge in NDR spam (spam related non- delivery reports). Further analysis of the latter indicated that dictionary
attacks were used in order to send large volumes of spam containing attachments. The growth in attachments was
also connected to a large volume of generic polymorphic malware being spammed -out on that date, as reported
earlier in the report .
Page 12 of 21
Phishing Analysis
In July, phishing email activity increased by 0.01 percentage points since June 2011; one in 319.3 emails (0.3 13
percent ) comprised some form of phishing attack.
Phishing attacks in the UK increased to overt ake South Africa and become the most targeted geography for phishing
emails in July , with one in 127.9 emails identified as phishing attacks. Phishing in South Africa fell slightly to make it
the second most targeted country, with one in 163.1 emails identified as phishing attacks.
Phishing levels for the US were one in 1,237 and one in 192.6 for Can ada. In Germany phishing levels were one in
798.3 , one in 1,448 in Denmark and one in 526.9 in The Netherlands. In Australia, phishing activity accounted for one
in 850.8 emails and one in 2,503 in Hong Kong; for Japan it was one in 13,167 and one in 872.9 for Singapore. In
Brazil, one in 382.4 emails were blocked as phishing attacks.
The Public Sector remained the most targeted by phishing activity in July , with one in 73.2 emails comprising a
phishing attack. Phishing levels for the Chemical & Pharm aceutical sector were one in 799.0 and one in 566.2 for the
IT Services sector; one in 482.3 for Retail, one in 87.8 for Education and one in 396.7 for Finance.
Analysis of Phishing Websites
The number of phishing Web sites decreased by 6.76 percent in July. Automated toolkit and unique domains
decreased as compared to the previous month. The number of p hishing websites created by automated toolkits
decreased by about 6.50 percent. The number of u nique phishing URLs also decreased by 6.87 percent and phi shing
websites using IP addresses in place of domain names ( for example , http://255.255.255.255) , increased by 58.5
percent. The use of legitimate Web services for hosting phishing Web sites accounted for approximately 10 percent of
all phishing Web sites , a decrease of 1. 6 percent from the previous month. The number of non -English phishing sites
saw an increase of 9. 1 percent. The most common non -English languages identified in phishing Web sites during July
included Portuguese, French, Italian and Spanis h.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010UnitedKingdom
South Africa
Canada
Sweden
United Arab Emirates1in127.9
1in163.1
1in192.6
1in213.6
1in292.9Public Sector
Educa tion
Marketing/Media
Non-Profit
Accom/Catering1in73.2
1in87.8
1in212.6
1in218.4
1in236.21-250
251-500
501-1000
1001- 1500
1501-2500
2501+1in232.3
1in365.0
1in505.0
1in457.0
1in525.9
1in311.8Phishing Rate
July 20111in319.3
1in330.6
1in274.7LastMonth:
SixMonthAvg.: Top5Geographies Top5Verticals ByHorizontal
20111in
319.3
UnitedStates 29.2%
UnitedKingdom 20.3%
India 5.4%
Germany 4.1%
China 2.7%
Australia 2.4%
Canada 2.1%
Brazil 2.0%
France 2.0%
Japan 1.9%1
354
2Phishing SourcesPage 13 of 21
Tactics of Phishing Distribution
Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks, by Industry Sector
Page 14 of 21
Malware Analysis
Email -borne Threats
The global ratio of email -borne viruses in email traffic was one in 280 .9 emails (0. 333 percent ) in July, an increase of
0.01 percentage points since June 2011.
In July, 44.7 percent of email -borne malware contained links to malicious Web sites, a decrease of 2.0 percentage
points since June 2011. A large number of emails c ontained generic polymorphic malware variants and accounted for
23.7 percent of all email -borne malware in July . Many v ariants of which were commonly attached as ZIP files, rather
than hyperlinks, and as the vo lume of these attacks increased when compared with the previous month , the relative
proportion of attacks using hyperlinks diminished
Email -borne malware attacks rose in South Africa as the country became the geography with the highest ratio of
malicious emails in July, overtaking the UK as one in 125.2 emails was identified as maliciou s in July ; in the UK one in
127.0 emails was malicious. Whilst malicious activity increased in the UK and other countries, the increase was much
more pronounced in South Africa owing to a sharp rise in the number of attacks related to the latest strains of
aggressive polymorphic malware.
In the US, virus levels for email -borne malware were one in 634.8 and one in 255.9 for Canada. In Germany virus
activity reached one in 482.1, one in 1,033 in Denmark and in The Netherlands one in 451.3 . In Australia, one in 654.8
emails were malicious and one in 748.7 in Hong Kong; for Japan it was one in 2,093 , compared with one in 761.8 in
Singapore. In Brazil, one in 332.1 emails in contained malicious content.
With one in 62.1 emails being blocked as malicious, the Public Sector remained the most targeted industry in July.
Virus levels for the Chemical & Pharmaceutical sector were one in 438.9 and one in 390.0 for the IT Services sector;
one in 418.3 for Retail, one in 79.1 for Education and one in 443.5 for Finance.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010South Africa
Unite dKingd om
Luxem bourg
Swed en
Unite dArab Emira tes1in125.2
1in127.0
1in159.6
1in236.1
1in251.9Publi cSecto r
Educa tion
Marketing/Media
Non-Profit
Accom/Catering1in62.1
1in79.1
1in187.7
1in194.6
1in198.21-250
251-500
501-1000
1001- 1500
1501-2500
2501+1in255.7
1in297.0
1in373.3
1in358.5
1in270.9
1in272.3Virus Rate
July 20111in280.7
1in300.7
1in245.2LastMonth:
SixMonthAvg.: Top5Geographies Top5Verticals ByHorizontal
20111in
280.7Page 15 of 21
The table below shows the most frequently blocked email -borne malware for July , many of which take advantage of
malicious hyperlinks. Overall, 23.7. 0 percent of email -borne malware was associated with variants of generic
polymorphic malware, including Bredolab, Sasfis, SpyEye and Zeus variants.
Malware Name % Malware
W32/Bredolab.gen!eml 3.9%
Gen:Trojan.Heur.FU.bqW 5.7%
W32/NewMalware!836b 2.3%
Exploit/Link -7707 2.2%
Exploit/Link -48cc 2.1%
Exploit/LinkAliasPostcard -b11e 1.9%
W32/Netsky.c -mm 1.6%
Exploit/LinkAliasPostcard- f837 1.5%
W32/Generic -bbc5 -0e41 1.3%
Exploit/Link -ExeSpoof 1.2%
Web -based Malware Threats
In July, Symantec Intelligence identified an average of 6 ,797 Web sites each day harboring malware and other
potentially unwanted programs including spyware and adware; an increase of 25. 5 percent since June 2011. T his
reflects the rate at which W eb sites are being compromised or created for the purpose of spreading m alicious content.
Often this number is higher when W eb-based malware is in circulation for a longer period of time to widen its potential
spread and increase its longevity.
As detection for W eb-based malwar e increases, the number of new W eb sites blocked d ecreases and the proportion
of new malware begins to rise, but initially on fewer Web sites. Further analysis reveals that 35. 9 percent of all
malicious domains blocked were new in July ; an increase of 0.8 percentage points compared with June 2011.
Additio nally, 21.1 percent of all W eb-based malware blocked was new in July ; an increase of 0.8 percentage points
since the previous month.
The chart above shows the increase in the nu mber of new spyware and adware W eb sites blocked each day on
average during July compared with the equivalent number of Web -based malware W eb sites blocked each day.
Web Policy Risks from Inappropriate Use
The most common trigger for policy -based filtering applied by Symantec Web Security.cloud for its business clients
was for the “Advertisements & Popups” category, which accounted for 4 4.3 percent of blocked W eb activity in July .
Web-based advertisements pose a potential risk though the use of “malvertisements,” or malicious advertisements.
These may occur as the result of a legit imate online ad -provider being compromised and a banner ad being used to
serve malware on an otherwise harmless Web site.
The second most frequently blocked traffic was categorized as Social Networking, account ing for 16.6 percent of URL -
based filtering ac tivity blocked, equivalent to one in every six Web sites blocked.
Many organizations all ow access to social networking W eb sites, but facilitate access logging so that usage patterns
can be tracked and in some cases implement policies to only permit access at certain times of the day and block WebSecurity Services Activity:
New Malware Sites perDay
New sites withspyware
New sites withweb viruses
Total60/day
6,737/day
6,797/day
2008 2009 2010 2011Page 16 of 21
access at all other times. This information is often used to address performance management issues, perhaps in the
event of lost productivity due to social networking abuse.
Activity related to Streaming Media poli cies resulted in 7.5 percent of URL -based filtering blocks in July. Streaming
media is increasingly popular when there are major sporting events or high profile international news stories, which often result in an increased number of blocks, as businesses seek to preserve valuable bandwidth for other purposes.
This rate is equivalent to one in every 13. 4 Web sites blocked.
Endpoint Security Threats
The endpoint is often the last line of defense and analysis; however, the endpoint can often be the first -line of defense
against attacks that spread using USB storage devices and insecure network connections . The threats found here can
shed light on the wider nature of threats confronting businesses, especially from blended attacks and threats facing
mobile workers . Attacks reaching the endpoint are likely to have already circumvented other layers of protection that
may already be deployed, such as gateway filtering.
The table below shows the malware most frequently blocked targeting endpoint devices for the last month. This
includes data from endpoint devices protected by Symantec technology around the world, including data from clients
which may not be using other layers of protection , such as Symantec Web Security.cloud or Symantec Email
AntiVirus.clou d.
Malware Name4% Malware
W32.Ramnit!html 9.60%
W32.Sality.AE 8.83%
Trojan.Bamital 8.33%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 7.43%
W32.Downadup.B 3.65%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 2.68%
W32.Virut.CF 2.68%
W32.SillyFDC 2.06%
Trojan.ADH 1.80%
W32.Mabezat.B 1.78%
The most frequently blocked malware for the last month was W32.Ramnit!html. This is a generic detection for . HTML
files infected by W32.Ramnit
5
For much of 2010, W32.Sality.AE had been the most pr evalent malicious threat blocked at the endpoint; however,
since June it has remained the second most prevalent malware blocked at the endpoint . , a worm that spreads through removable drives and by infecting executable files . The
worm spreads by encrypting and then appending itself to files with .DLL, .EXE and .HTM extensions. Variants of the
Ramnit worm accounted for 1 7.3 percent of all malicious software blocked by endpoint protection technology in July .
4For further information on these threats, please visit: http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/landing/threats.js p
5 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010- 011922 -2056- 99&tabid=2 WebSecurity Services Activity:
Policy-Based Filtering
Advertisement andPopups
Social Netwo rking
Strea ming Media
Chat
Compu tingandInternet
Search
Peer-T o-Peer
Games
Hosting Sites
NewsWebViruses andTrojan s
Trojan. Gen
Dropped:T rojan.PWS. OnlineGa mes.KDVN
Trojan:HTML/ GIFrame.gen!B
Infostealer
Dropped:T rojan.Generic.6155725
VBS/G eneric
Trojan: GIF/GIFrame.gen!A
Dropped:Rootkit .49324
Infostealer .Gampass
Dropped:T rojan.Generic.6137300Potent ially Unwanted Programs
PUP:Generic.16891 1
PUP:Clkpotato!gen2
PUP:Generic.178280
PUP:Ge neric .171138
PUP:Ge neric. 167772
Applic ation. Generic.190952
PUP:Generic.173909
PUP:Zwunzi!gen3
PUP:Agent.NFM
PUP:Aurora
July 201144.3%
16.6%
7.5%
3.7%
3.4%
2.3%
2.3%
1.9%
1.7%
1.7%11.0%
9.8%
8.0%
7.6%
7.4%
7.3%
7.0%
6.8%
6.0%
4.6%24.0%
14.4%
13.9%
10.0%
5.2%
4.9%
4.8%
3.0%
2.5%
2.5%Page 17 of 21
Many new viruses and Trojans are based on earlier versions, where code has been copied or altered to create a new
strain, or variant. Often these variants are created using toolkits and hundreds of thousands of variants can be created
from the same piece of malware. This has become a popular tactic to evade signature- based detection, as each
variant would traditio nally need its own signature to be correctly identified and blocked.
By deploying techniques, such as heuristic analysis and generic detection, it ’s possible to correctly identify and block
several variants of the same malware families, as well as identify new forms of malicious code that seek to exploit
certain vulnerabilities that can be identified generically. Approximately 1 7.7 percent of the most frequently blocked
malware last month was identified and blocked using generic detection.
Page 18 of 21
Best Practice G uidelines for Enterprises
1. Employ defense- in-depth strategies : Emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive
systems to guard against single- point failures in any specific technology or protection method. This should
include the deploy ment of regularly updated firewalls, as well as gateway antivirus, intrusion detection,
intrusion protection systems, and Web security gateway solutions throughout the network.
2. Monitor for network threat, vulnerabilities and brand abuse. Monitor for networ k intrusions, propagation
attempts and other suspicious traffic patterns, identify attempted connections to known malicious or
suspicious hosts. Receive alerts for new vulnerabilities and threats across vendor platforms for proactive
remediation. Track brand abuse via domain alerting and fictitious site reporting.
3. Antivirus on endpoints is not enough : On endpoints, signature -based antivirus alone is not enough to
protect against today’s threats and Web -based attack toolkits. Deploy and use a comprehensive endpoint
security product that includes additional layers of protection including :
o Endpoint intrusion prevention that protects against un -patched vulnerabilities from being exploited,
protects against social engineering attacks and stops malware from reaching endpoints;
o Browser protection for protection against obfuscated Web -based attacks;
o Consider c loud-based malware prevention to provide proactive protection against unknown threats;
o File and Web -based reputation solutions that provide a risk -and-reputation rating of any application
and Web site to prevent rapidly mutating and polymorphic malware;
o Behavioral prevention capabilities that look at the behavior of applications and malware and prevent malware;
o Application control settings that can prevent applications and browser plug -ins from downloading
unauthorized malicious content;
o Device control s ettings that prevent and limit the types of USB devices to be used.
4. Use encryption to protect sensitive data: Implement and enforce a security policy whereby sensitive data is
encrypted. Access to sensitive information should be restricted. This should inc lude a Data Loss Protection
(DLP) solution, which is a system to identify, monitor, and protect data. This not only serves to prevent data
breaches, but can also help mitigate the damage of potential data leaks from within an organization.
5. Use Data Loss Pr evention to help prevent data breaches: Implement a DLP solution that can discover
where sensitive data resides, monitor its use and protect it from loss. Data loss prevention should be
implemented to monitor the flow of data as it leaves the organization over the network and monitor copying
sensitive data to external devices or Web sites. DLP should be configured to identify and block suspicious
copying or downloading of sensitive data. DLP should also be used to identify confidential or sensitive data assets on network file systems and PCs so that appropriate data protection measures like encryption can be
used to reduce the risk of loss.
6. Implement a removable media policy. Where practical, restrict unauthorized devices such as external
portable hard -drives and other removable media. Such devices can both introduce malware as well as
facilitate intellectual property breaches —intentional or unintentional. If external media devices are permitted,
automatically scan them for viruses upon connection to the n etwork and use a DLP solution to monitor and
restrict copying confidential data to unencrypted external storage devices.
7. Update your security countermeasures frequently and rapidly: With more than 286M variants of malware
detected by Symantec in 2010, ent erprises should be updating security virus and intrusion prevention
definitions at least daily, if not multiple times a day.
8. Be aggressive on your updating and patching: Update, patch and migrate from outdated and insecure
browsers, applications and brows er plug- ins to the latest available versions using the vendors’ automatic
update mechanisms. Most software vendors work diligently to patch exploited software vulnerabilities;
however, such patches can only be effective if adopted in the field. Be wary of deploying standard corporate images containing older versions of browsers, applications, and browser plug -ins that are outdated and
insecure. Wherever possible, automate patch deployments to maintain protection against vulnerabilities
across the organizati on.
9. Enforce an effective password policy . Ensure passwords are strong; at least 8 -10 characters long and
include a mixture of letters and numbers. Encourage users to avoid re- using the same passwords on multiple
Web sites and sharing of passwords with others should be forbidden. Passwords should be changed
regularly, at least every 90 days. Avoid writing down passwords. Page 19 of 21
10. Restrict email attachments: Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments
that are commonly used to spread viruses, such as .VBS, .BAT, .EXE, .PIF, and .SCR files. Enterprises
should investigate policies for .PDFs that are allowed to be included as email attachments.
11. Ensure that you have infection and incident response procedures in place :
o Ensure that you have your security vendors contact informati on, know who you will call, and what
steps you will take if you have one or more infected systems;
o Ensure that a backup -and-restore solution is in place in order to restore lost or compromised data in
the event of successful attack or catastrophic data los s;
o Make use of post -infection detection capabilities from Web gateway, endpoint security solutions and
firewalls to identify infected systems;
o Isolate infected computers to prevent the risk of further infection within the organization;
o If network services are exploited by malicious code or some other threat, disable or block access to
those services until a patch is applied;
o Perform a forensic analysis on any infected computers and restore those using trusted media.
12. Educate users on the changed threat landscape:
o Do not open attachments unless they are expected and come from a known and trusted source, and do not execute software that is downloaded from the Internet (if such actions are permitted) unless the download has been scanned for viruses;
o Be cautious when clicking on URLs in emails or social media programs, even when coming from
trusted sources and friends;
o Do not click on shortened URLs without previewing or expanding them first using available tools and plug- ins;
o Recommend that users be cautious of information they provide on social networking solutions that
could be used to target them in an attack or trick them to open malicious URLs or attachments;
o Be suspicious of search engine results and only click through to trusted sources when conducting searches —especially on topics that are hot in the media;
o Deploy Web browser URL reputation plug- in solutions that display the reputation of Web sites from
searches;
o Only download software (if allowed) from corporate shares or directly from the vendors W eb site;
o If users see a warning indicating that they are “infected” after clicking on a URL or using a s earch
engine (fake antivirus infections), have users close or quit the browser using Alt -F4, CTRL+W or the
task manager.
Page 20 of 21
Best Practice Guidelines for Users and Consumers
1. Protect yourself : Use a modern Internet security solution that includes the following capabilities for maximum
protection against malicious code and other threats:
o Antivirus (file and heuristic based) and malware behavioral prevention can prevents unknown
malicious threats from executing;
o Bidirectional firewalls will block malware from exploiting potentially vulnerable applications and services running on your computer ;
o Intrusion prevention to protection against Web -attack toolkits, unp atched vulnerabilities, and social
engineering attacks;
o Browser protection to protect against obfuscated Web -based attacks;
o Reputation -based tools that check the reputation and trust of a file and Web site before downloading;
URL reputation and safety rat ings for W eb sites found through search engines.
2. Keep up to date : Keep virus definitions and security content updated at least daily if not hourly. By deploying
the latest virus definitions, you can protect your computer against the latest viruses and malw are known to be
spreading in the wild. Update your operating system, Web browser, browser plug -ins, and applications to the
latest updated versions using the automatic updating capability of your programs, if available. Running out -of-
date versions can put you at risk from being exploited by Web -based attacks.
3. Know what you are doing: Be aware that malware or applications that try to trick you into thinking your
computer is infected can be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file- sharing programs,
free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software.
o Downloading “free” “cracked” or “pirated” versions of software can also contain malware or include social engineering attacks that include programs that try to trick you in to thinking your computer is
infected and getting you to pay money to have it removed.
o Be careful which Web sites you visit on the Web. While malware can still come from mainstream Web
sites, it can easily come from less reputable sites sharing pornography , gambling and stolen software.
o Read end -user license agreements (EULAs) carefully and understand all terms before agreeing to
them as some security risks can be installed after an end user has accepted the EULA or because of that acceptance.
4. Use an effective password policy: Ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers, and change
them often. Passwords should not consist of words from the dictionary. Do not use the same password for
multiple applications or Web sites. Use complex passwords (uppe r/lowercase and punctuation) or
passphrases.
5. Think before you click: Never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless you expect it and trust
the sender. Even from trusted users, be suspicious.
o Be cautious when clicking on URLs in emails, social media programs even when coming from trusted sources and friends. Do not blindly click on shortened URLs without expanding them first using
previews or plug- ins.
o Do not click on links in social media applications with catchy titles or phrases even from fr iends. If you
do click on the URL, you may end up “liking it” and sending it to all of your friends even by clicking anywhere on the page. Close or quit your browser instead.
o Use a Web browser URL reputation solution that shows the reputation and safety rating of Web sites
from searches. Be suspicious of search engine results; only click through to trusted sources when
conducting searches, especially on topics that are hot in the media.
o Be suspicious of warnings that pop- up asking you to install media players, document viewers and
security updates; only download software directly from the vendor’s Web site.
6. Guard your personal data : Limit the amount of personal information you make public ly available on the
Internet (including and especially social networks) as it may be harvested and used in malicious activities such as targeted attacks, phishing scams.
o Never disclose any confidential personal or financial information unless and until you can confirm that
any request for such information is legitimate.
|
Page 1 of 24
Symantec Intelligence
Symantec Intelligence Report: July 2012
Attacks use Olympics as bait for spam, malware and phishing attacks ; the state of Web attack toolkits in 2012
Welcome to the July edition of the Symantec Intelligence report , which provides the latest analysis of cyber security
threats, trends , and insights from the Symantec Intelligence team concerning malware, spam, and other potentially
harmful business risks . The data used to compile the analysis for this report includes data from January through June
2012.
Report highlights
• Spam – 67.6 percent (an increase of 0 .8 percentage points since June): page 14
• Phishing – One in 4 75.3 emails identified as phishing (a decrease of 0. 003 percentage points since June): page 17
• Malware – One in 340. 9 emails contained malware (a decrease of 0. 023 percentage points since June): page 19
• Malicious Web sites – 2,189 Web sites blocked per day (a n increase of 4.0 percent since June): page 21
• Olympic related scams and threats to keep an eye on: page 2
• Web attack toolkit activity in the first six months of 2012: page 7
• A roundup of the best blogs of the last month: page 11
Introduction
In this month’s report we take a look at the various attacks being perpetrated using an Olympic theme. It seems
attackers are taking to social networking to spread threats, attempting to compromise mobile devices, and trying a
number of different spam and phishing related scams surrounding the Game s. We ’ll look at each of these areas in
detail this month.
We’ll also look at Web attack toolkits and how attackers have been making use of them since we reported about their
activity in Volume 17 of the Internet Security Threat Report1. As predicted in ISTR 17 for 2011 , their use has increased
since the end of last year, but the ways in which they are being deployed is also changing.
Finally, we take a broader look at some of the more significant and interesting threats that Symantec’s Security
Response team has been tracking in recent weeks —from printing -related threats, to the latest Android malware,
including the impact of the attempted takedown of Grum, one of the largest spam -sending botnets in the threat
landscape.
I hope you enjoy reading this month’s edition of the report, and please feel free to contact me directly with any
comments or feedback.
Paul Wood, Cyber Security Inte lligence Manager
[email protected]
@paulowoody
1 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/b- istr_main_report_2011_21239364.en- us.pdf Page 2 of 24
Report analysis
Let the Games begin
As this month’s report goes to press, the 2012 London Olympics are fully underway. As with other major sporting
events, including the soccer World Cup in 2010, attackers attempt to take advantage of people’s interest in the events ,
more recently launching a variety of attacks and scams with Olympic -based themes.
Similar sporting- themed attacks took place during the 2008 Olympics in Beijing and during the 2010 World Cup2 in
South Africa, so this is not a new phenomenon, but the social engineering employed in many of these attacks may be
unfamiliar to a new audience. For the most part there may only be a few differences in the attacks; f or example ,
spammers began their Olympic campaigns quite early3, sending out the first span runs clear back in March 2011.
Attackers have also tailored their attacks towards mobile devices and social networks as well.
Let’s have a look at some of the Olympic -related threats and scams out there.
Twitter bots
Attackers have been active ly using Olympic -related trending topics on Twitter recently in order to entice people to click
on malicious links. Th e Tweets appear to be generated by bots, with poorly constructed, ambiguous sentences.
Figure 1 – Example of a Twitter bot Tweet linking to malicious content
The shorte ned URLs lead to fake pages that appear to cover a variety of topics, including business strategy tips and
health- related themes . However, the real purpose of these sites is to spread malware. An attack toolkit is set up on the
back end of the pages and will attempt to install trojan back doors or fake security software on vulnerable computers
that visit these Web sites . For instan ce, the attack might play out similar to this video .4
The accounts themselves are generally created the day the Tweets are sent, rarely have any followers, and rapidly
post a few Tweets each minute using a wide variety of hash tags linked to trending topics . Twitter has been quick to
identify these accounts and suspend them, generally within a few hours of their creation.
2 http://www.2010netthreat.com/
3 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/spammers -begin- their-games -early
4 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Upciy -g_n28
Page 3 of 24
Fake Olympic scandals
There also have been a few instances of spammers attem pting to trick users into downloading malware. For example,
one spam email we’ve recently encountered hints at a doping scandal, and includes a link to a website that mimics
YouTube.
The video in question purports to be about the supposed scandal, but ins tead of playing the video, it tell s the user to
install a new version of Flash Player . If the user clicks OK and runs the executable, they will infect the computer with a
trojan. This threat contacts a large list of malicious domains, attempting to download further malware, thus opening the
computer to a variety of threats .
Figure 2 – Fake video website attempting to trick the user into downloading a trojan
Page 4 of 24
Android.Opfake
The attackers behind Android.Opfake5, which we discussed back in the May report6, are not ones to let an opportunity
such as the Olympics go by without trying to use the topic to spread their malware. Irfan Asrar, a Security Response
Manager focused on mobile threats, has been keeping a close eye on this threat. “The authors behind Android.Opfake
are now going after apps related to the London 2012 Olympics” says Asrar. He recently noticed the attackers bundling
their threat with a copy of a legitimate Olympics application. The legitimate app, a game promoting some of the more
popular Olympic sports, was copied and repackaged with the trojan and then distributed on a Russian Android app
marketplace.
Figure 3 – Android.Opfake repackaged with Olympic -themed game
If installed, the trojan will send premium -rate SMS messages from the compromised device, leading to profits for the
attackers and an increased mobile phone bill for the user. Fortunately Symantec customers are covered. “Users of
Norton Mobile Security will be warned upon visiting the site distributing the malware,” says Asrar.
5 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012- 012709- 2732- 99
6 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/b- intelligence_report_05_2012.en -us.pdf
Page 5 of 24
Olympic -themed spam and scams
We discussed Olympic spam scams back in May7, highlighting a lottery -style scam in the report. The spammers have
continued sending out a wide variety of spam since then. We took a look at an assortment of Olympic -related subject
lines that have been in use since May , and the frequency that they appeared each day. While there was an especially
busy period for a week in mid- June, the spam rate has increased steadily for the most part, effectively doubling from
late May to late July, when the Games began.
Figure 4 – Chart showing the i ncrease in Olympic related spam and scams
The scams behind these spam runs are generally focused on gathering personal information from the user. Mathew
Maniyara, a Security Response lead in Pune, India, has been monitoring similar Olympic -related scams and has
provided the following analysis of two such scams :
Cybercriminals lean on Olympics 2012
By Mathew Maniyara
Even before the Summer Olympic Games began on 27 July 2012, online scammers had already taken the opportunity
to target users. Here at Symantec we have kept trac k of spam and phishing attacks that offered free gifts related to
the sporting event, and would like to show you a few scenarios that the attackers are playing out.
In the first example, the phishers masquerade as a MasterCard ™ promotion and created an eye-catching phishing
site. The phishing pages, hosted in Brazil, included several fake offers such as “Win Free Trips to the 2012 Summer
Olympics in London!”, “Participate and win laptops, cameras and many great prizes.”, and “MasterCard and you in the
Olymp ic Games!” The London Olympics logo was placed at the cent er of the page and below the logo were images
involved in the event. The images included the London Olympic Stadium, Wembley Stadium , the N orth Greenwich
7 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/b- intelligence_report_05_2012.en -us.pdf 020406080100120Page 6 of 24
Arena, and the London Underground promoting the London Olympics. Customers were prompted to participate in the
offers by clicking a button labeled “Participate now .”
Figure 5 – Example of an Olympic -themed phishing scam
Upon clicking the button, customers would be redirected to the next phishing page that asks for the user’s confidential
information. The information includes full name, email address and password, date of birth, credit card number, name
on card, and security code. After the required information is entered, the phishing site acknowledges the registration
with the message:
your registration was successful! good luck! num ber of the protocol 1342410522
Spammers have also been targeting customers by using fake gift cards from Visa™, reportedly worth USD $1,000. By
clicking a link provided in the spam mail, the user would be redirected to a fake survey page where the user is
required to answer questions related to the London Olympics. After the survey is complete, users are prompted to
enter their email addr ess to win the exciting gifts.
Page 7 of 24
Figure 6 – Example of s pam email offering $1,000 gift card
Internet users are advised to follow best practices to avoid spam and phishing attacks:
• Do not click on suspicious links in email messages
• Never enter personal information in a pop- up page or screen
• When entering personal or financial information, ensure the website is encrypted with an SSL certificate. Look
for a padlock, ‘https’, or a green address bar
• Frequentl y update your security software, which can protect you from online phishing
Web Attack Toolkits in 2012
In volume 17 of the Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR)8, we reported that Web attack toolkits made up almost two -
thirds of all threat activity on malicious websites in 2011. A variety of kits were available in 2011, some of which were
private and not available in the underground economy. These attack kits were frequently seeki ng to exploit third- party
browser plugins. Let’s revisit this vastly popular web threat and see what has been happening with them in the first
half of 2012.
8 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/other_resources/b- istr_main_report_2011_21239364.en- us.pdf
Page 8 of 24
As predicted in ISTR 17, the use of Web attack toolkits has been on the rise since the end of 2011. We took a look at
the average number of toolkit attacks per day picked up by Symantec sensors during the last six months of 2011, then
compared that against the daily rates during the first half of 2012.
Figure 7 – Increase in attack toolkit activity between 2011 and 2012
We discovered that, while the average number of attacks varied widely from day to day, there was an unequivocal
increase in the number of attempted attacks per day. Based on data gathered in July 2012, there are currently three
times as many Web attacks occurring now, as there where on average during the last half of 2011.
The underground marketplace for attack toolkits is also shifting rapidly. While in the past, the attack toolkits are sold
with a variety of exploits; they have slow ly migrated towards a plug -in style architecture. An attacker can purchase a
toolkit framework on an underground forum for a nominal fee, and then purchase various exploit scripts separately.
The exploit scripts in many cases can be read by different toolk its.
Figure 8 – Example of a Web attack toolkit marketplace Average attacks
per day, last 6
months of 2011Increase x2Increase x3Increase x4Increase x5Increase x6
01 Jan ‘12 21 Jan ‘12 10 Feb ‘12 01 Mar ‘12 21 Mar ‘12 10 Apr ‘12 30 Apr ‘12 20 May ‘12 09 Jun ‘12 29 Jun ‘12
Page 9 of 24
However, even this type of setup may be changing. Peter Coogan, a Security Response Manager who keeps a close
watch on these web threats, says one of the more interesting changes this year is how access to the toolkits are
controlled.
“In the past , exploit kits were sold in full to buyers to set -up and run themselves as they wished, ” says Coogan. “O nce
an exploit kit was sold, the code would eventually be leaked for free on underground forums ,” which would greatly cut
into the developer’s revenue stream ; the Blackhole exploit kit is a good example of this. In early 2011 reports surfaced
that a free version of the toolkit was making the rounds in certain underground hacker forums. There was some
speculation the developers were releasing a pared -down version in the hopes of attracting new business. However, as
further releases appeared for free on forums , it became clear that the source code was being leaked.
However, much of this has changed in the last six months, where the exploit kit is offered as a rented software -as-a-
service (SaaS) subscription , according to Coogan. “N ow it is common for the exploit kits authors to offer a drive- by
download infrastructure service using their exploit kit. This allows the exploit kit authors to keep their code base
private, ” he says.
There are a variety of attack toolkits currently active; Blackh ole, Phoenix, Nuclear Pack, Bleeding Life, and Eleonore
are some of the more popular ones. W hile there are slight differences between each toolkit, by and large the toolkits
operate in much the same way. The toolkits primarily focus on exploiting third -party browser plugins, such as Adobe
Reader, Adobe Flash Player, and Java. Frequently, patches for the vulnerabilities used in these exploit kits are
available, but haven’t been applied — in other words: the exploit kits are typically targeting out -of-date software
installations where possible, using newer exploits only when necessary.
The advantage here is that these vulnerabilities are often platform -independent and many toolkits will attempt to
exploit both Windows and Mac computers. For instance, the Blackhole exploit kit has recently been observed
exploiting CVE -2012- 17239, a Java vulnerability that was used to compromise 600,000 Macs back in April10.
The latest administration control panels for most attack toolkits even let attackers keep track of which exploits have
been the most successful, as well as which browsers and operating systems are being successfully exploited. This
gives them the option to tailor future attacks or invest in new areas to maintain or improve their numbers. An example
of this can be seen in figure 9, below.
9 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/examination- java- vulnerability -cve-2012- 1723
10 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/osxflashback -rises -java- vulnerability Page 10 of 24
Figure 9 – Example of the Blackhole toolkit administrative control panel
Attackers generally lure unsuspecting users to the Web attack toolkits by using a variety of social engineering tricks,
such as spam emails or social networking attacks. Often these contain a link to legitimate Web sites that have been
compromised and onto which the attacker has installed a Web attack tool kit. For instance, the widely popular
Blackhole attack toolkit has been behind some rather clever spam campaigns as of late. The attackers have sent
spam emails purporting to be rejected wire transfers, New York City traffic tickets, or claim that the reci pient has been
tagged in a photo on a popular social networking site. The goal in these cases is to entice the user into clicking on the
malicious link , from which the attacks can be launched.
Let’s briefly go over a scenario of how a toolkit carries out an attack. If a user clicks one of these malicious links, the
toolkit will gather any information it can about the visiting computer, such as the browser name and version, operating
system, the plug- ins installed and their versions, and the country that the visiting computer is located in. The kit then
determines which vulnerabilities may exist and attempts to exploit them. If the attack is successful, the toolkit will
download its payload — likely a backdoor trojan or a misleading application, such as fake antivirus applications.
There’s another side to the Web attack toolkit as well — the Web servers that they are often hosted on are not owned
by the attackers , but are instead personal or small business websites that haven’t kept their software up- to-date. In
many cases an attacker has previously compromised a Web server , and then install the exploit kit deep into the Web
site. In most cases the malicious pages that make up the attack toolkit are not even directly accessible from the main
website. The owner of the website or Web server may not even be aware that an attacker has installed an attack
toolkit on their system , and m ay require the services of a Web security provider to identify and remove the malicious
code and remedy the source of the compromise.
Page 11 of 24
The use of Web attack toolkits ha s grown significantly in the first half of 2012. The reason for their popularity likely has
to do with the versatility it offers attackers for compromising computer s. No manual hacking is involved as the attack
toolkit automates the exploit process. As toolkits move to an exploit plug- in framework, and even a SaaS model , it
becomes easier for an attacker to leverage the latest exploits. We expect to see continued growth in this area of the
threat landscape.
Blog Review : July 2012
A number of interesting things appeared in the threat landscape in July , which the analysts in Security Response have
blogged about as they were discovered; here are some of the recent highlights.
More threats in the Middle East
News broke in mid -July about another threat that appeared to be targeting computers in the Middle East:
Trojan.Madi11. So far there is no indication that this trojan is related to other threats found in the region, such as
Stuxnet, Duqu, and Flamer. Madi doesn’t appear to be nearly as sophisticated as these other threats; it relies on
social engineering to compromise a computer, where the others utilized things such as zero -days exploits to spread.
Further reading:
The Madi Attacks: Series of Social Engineering Campaigns12
Junk -printing threats
There have been not one, but two threats recently that seemingly print garbage to networked printers. These threats
don’t compromise printers in- and-of themselves, but rather copy themselves as print spooler .spl files to the
%System%\ Spool\PRINTERS folder on a compromised computer. In some cases, Windows interprets these threats
as print jobs, and attempts to print the binaries — resulting in what looks like garbage being printed.
Both threats contain rather unique behavior in terms of propagation as well. Trojan.Milicenso13 spreads by using
.htaccess redirection on a compromised Apache Web server . Meanwhile, W32.Printlove14 attempts to spread by
exploiting a known vulnerability in the Windows XP print spooler, patched in 2010. However, it’s only when the
compromised system is patched that it will print garbage pri nt jobs, as demonstrated in this video15.
Further reading:
• Trojan.Mili censo: A Paper Salesman’s Dream Come True16
• Trojan.Milicenso: Infection through .htaccess Redirection17
• Printer Madness: W32.Printlove Video18
Remote Access Trojan Toolkits
Two prominent remote access trojan (RAT) toolkit projects have either been shut down or saw significant contributors
leave. In the first case, the FBI carried out a sting operation that resulted in the arrests of 24 people associated with the Blackshades RAT (a.k.a. W32.Shadesrat
). In related news, the author of the DarkComet RAT decided to call it
quits, perhaps spooked by the previously mentioned Blackshades arrests. It raises the question whether this spells the
end for these toolkits? It’s tough to say for sure at the moment , as in many cases other attackers could very well step
in and pick up the projects where their authors and contributors had left them.
Further reading:
• W32.Shadesr at (Blackshades) Author Arrested?19
• DarkComet RAT - It is the END!20
11 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012- 071723- 0755- 99
12 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/madi -attacks -series -social -engineering -campaigns
13 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010- 071503- 4247- 99
14 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012- 062514- 0544- 99
15 http://www.sym antec.com/tv/allvideos/details.jsp?vid=1717218554001
16 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojanmilicenso- paper -salesman -s-dream -come -true
17 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/trojanmilicenso- infection- through -htaccess -redirection
18 http:\www.symantec.com \connect\blogs \printer -madness -w32printlove- video
19 http:\www.symantec.com \connect\blogs \w32shadesrat- blackshades -author -arrested Page 12 of 24
Android developments
Attackers continue to target the Android operating system. In particular, it appears as though the attackers continue to
look for new ways to expose their malicious app s through the Google Play marketplace; for example, some threats are
disguised in copies of legitimate, popular games, but only a small portion of the app comprises the actual game ; the
rest of the app is a trojan called Android.Fakeapp21. It is worth noting that any app that is ostensibly harmless, but
contains some hidden code that can expose the user to further risks and reveal personal information without their
knowledge, may be considered a trojan.
Figure 10 – Android.Fakeapp component makeup
Once installed, the app requests permission to perform a variety of other actions , including permission to access the
devices’ location, such as GPS information and the ability to r ead and write the user's browsing history and
bookmarks. It also downloads additional configuration files used to display advertisements to the user, encouraging
them to download further apps . Furthermore, i t also collects personal information, such as the device IMEI and phone
number, and sends it to a Web site hosted on the Internet.
It seems apparent that the developers of these apps have been trying to find what code they can slip past the Google
Play automated screening process.
Further reading:
• Android Apps Get Hit with the Evil Twin Routine Part 2: Play It Again Spam22
• Android.Dropdialer Identified on Google Play23
Data bre aches in abundance
There has been a raft of data breeches in the month of July. Some notable and large enterprises have suffered
attacks that resulted in a variety of personal information being released on the Internet. However, in one case the
attackers took a different route. Shortly before announcing a data brea ch at Maplesoft , the company quickly became
aware24 that its customers had receiv ed emails from what appeared to be a “Maples oft Security Update Team ,”
suggesting they should download a patch. The Web site link contained in the email led to an exploit kit and ultimately
attempted to install Trojan.Zbot (aka Zeus) on the compromised computer.
20 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/darkcomet- rat-it-end
21 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?doci d=2012- 022805- 4318- 99
22 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/android- apps -get-hit-evil-twin- routine -part-2-play-it-again- spam
23 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/androiddropdialer -identified- google- play
24 http://www.maplesoft.com/security
Page 13 of 24
According to Maplesoft, t he database that was breached was not the company’s customer database; ra ther it was a
partial email subscription list . The data taken included older subscription data, which meant a significant portion of the
list was outdated and many of the email addresses were no longer valid.
Further reading:
Maple soft Customers Targeted By Attackers Following Data Breach25
Grum botnet takedown
Security Researchers successfully disrupted one of the largest spam -sending botnets in the threat landscape in July .
The Grum botnet accounted for approximately one third of all spam being sent worldwide, and its disappearance in
mid-July led to a significant drop in global spam email volumes, by as much as 15 t o 20 percent .
At the time of writing it may be to early to tell what long -term impact this has had on global spam levels, or whether the
botnet controllers will be able to recover or rebuild their botnet and return to their spam -sending activities.
Figure 11 – Spam emails from Grum botnet
Further reading:
Botnet Owners Feeling “Grum” After Takedown26
25 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/maplesoft -customers -targeted- attackers -following- data-breach
26 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/botnet- owners -feeling- grum -after-takedown 01000020000300004000050000600007000080000Page 14 of 24
Global Trends & Content Analysis
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the world through the
Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network, which is made up of more than 64.6 million attack sensors and records
thousands of events per second. This network monitors attac k activity in more than 200 countries and territories
through a combination of Symantec products and services such as Symantec DeepSight™ Threat Management
System, Symantec™ Managed Security Services and Norton™ consumer products, and other third -party dat a
sources.
In addition, Symantec maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting
of more than 47,662 recorded vulnerabilities (spanning more than two decades) from over 15,967 vendors
representing over 40,006 products.
Spam, phishing and malware data is captured through a variety of sources, including the Symantec Probe Network, a
system of more than 5 million decoy accounts; Symantec.cloud and a number of other Symantec security
technologies. Skeptic™, the Sym antec.cloud proprietary heuristic technology is able to detect new and sophisticated
targeted threats before reaching customers’ networks. Over 8 billion email messages and more than 1.4 billion Web
requests are processed each day across 15 data centers. S ymantec also gathers phishing information through an
extensive antifraud community of enterprises, security vendors, and more than 50 million consumers.
These resources give Symantec’s analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze, and provide
informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and spam. The result is the
annual Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, which gives enterprises and consumers the essential information to
secure their systems effectively now and into the future.
Spam Analysis
In July, the global ratio of spam in email traffic rose by 0.8 percentage point since June , to 67.6 percent ( 1 in 1.48
emails ). It is perhaps still too early to tell what significant impact the disruption of the Grum botnet has had on the
global spam rate, which has been in decline since the end of 201 1.
Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Saudi Arabia
Hungary
Oman
China
Russian Federation 79.0%
76.2%
72.8%
72.5%
71.8% Education
Engineering
Non-Profit
Automotive
Marketing/Media 70.3%
69.5%
69.4%
69.0%
68.9% 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 67.8%
67.9%
67.7%
68.2%
68.5%
68.1% Spam Rate
July 2012 67.6%
66.8%
66.5% Last Month: Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012 67.6%
India 17.0%
SaudiArabia 13.6%
Brazil 5.2%
VietNam 5.1%
Turkey 4.6%
Canada 4.4%
Pakistan 3.4%
UnitedStates 3.3%
RussianFederaon 2.4%
Korea(South) 2.3%Page 15 of 24
Saudi Arabia overtook Hungary to become the most spammed geography in July, with a spam rate of 79.0 percent.
In the US, 67.7 percent of email was spam and 67.9 percent in Canada. The spam level in the UK was 68.5 percent.
In the Netherlands, spam accounted for 70.7 percent of email traffic, 67.8 percent in Germany, 67.7 percent in
Denmark and 66.8 percent in Australia. In Hong Kong, 67.0 percent of email was blocked as spam and 66.6 percent in
Singapore compared with 64.1 percent in Japan. Spam accounted for 67.8 percent of emai l traffic in South Africa and
71.6 percent i n Brazil.
The Education sector was the most spammed industry sector in July, with a spam rate of 70.3 percent ; the spam rate
for the Automotive sector was 69.0 percent. The spam rate for the Chemical & Pharmaceutical sector was 67.9
percent , compared with 67.7 percent for IT Services, 67.7 percent for Retail, 68.8 percent for Public Sector and 67.2
percent for Finance.
The spam rate for small to medium -sized businesses (1- 250) was 67.8 percent , compared with 68.1 percent for large
enterprises (2500+).
Global Spam Categories
The most common category of spam in July is related to the Newsletters category , with 62.20 percent. This is a
significant shift from June, when it made up only 0.08 percent of all spam , and likely the result of a campaign by the
Festi27 botnet that used the social engineering tactic of spoofing newsletters quite heavily in July .
Category Name July
2012 June
2012
Newsletters 57.22% 0.08%
Sex/Dating 23.46% 64.28%
Pharma 12.87% 18.76%
Watches 2.40% 2.94%
Software 1.54% 1.67%
Jobs 1.52% 4.72%
Casino 0.50% 5.24%
Degrees 0.18% 0.47%
Weight Loss 0.14% <0.01%
419/scam/lotto 0.08% 0.27%
Mobile 0.07% 0.09%
Spam URL Distribution based on Top Level Domain Name
The proportion of spam that contained URLs registered in the .com top- level domain decreased in July, as highlighted
in the table below. This is in line with a slight increase in all other top- level domains this month .
TLD July
2012 June
2012
.com 63.9% 74.7%
.ru 8.3% 4.1%
.net 6.9% 4.6%
.br 3.7% 2.9%
27 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012- 051407- 0645- 99 Page 16 of 24
Average Spam Message Size
In July, the proportion of spam emails that were 5Kb in size or less increased by 4.6 percentage points. Furthermore,
the proportion of spam messages that were greater than 10Kb in size increased by 3 percent , as can be seen in the
following table.
Message Size July
2012 June
2012
0Kb – 5Kb 47.7% 43.1%
5Kb – 10Kb 25.8% 33.3%
>10Kb 26.6% 23.6%
Spam Attack Vectors
July highlights the decrease in spam emails resulting in NDRs (spam related non -delivery reports) . In these cases, the
recipient email addresses are invalid or bounced by their service provider. The proportion of spam that contained a
malicious attachment or link increased , with periodic spike s of spam activity during the period, as shown in the chart
below.
NDR spam, as shown in the chart above, is often as a result of widespread dictionary attack s during spam campaigns ,
where spammers make use of databases containing first and last names and combine them to generate random email
addresses . A higher -level of activity is indicative of spammers that are seeking to build their distribution lists by
ignoring the invalid recipient emails in the bounce- backs . The list can then be used for more targeted spam attacks
containing malicious attachment s or link s. This might indicate a pattern followed by spammers in harvesting the email
addresses for some month s and using those addresses for targeted attacks in other months. 0.0%2.0%4.0%6.0%8.0%10.0%12.0%14.0%
NDR MalwarePage 17 of 24
Phishing Analysis
In July, the global phishing rate de creased by 0.003 percentage points, taking the global average rate to one in 475.3
emails (0. 21 percent) that comprised some form of phishing attack.
The Netherlands remained the country most targeted in July, with one in 94.4 emails identified as phishing attacks .
South Africa was the second- most targeted country, with one in 171 .2 emails identified as phishing attacks.
Phishing levels for the US reached one in 995.5 and one in 244.9 for Canada. In Germany phishing levels were one
in 1,091.0, one in 719.6 in Denmark. In Australia, phishing activity accounted for one in 752.1 emails and one in
2,241.4 in Hong Kong; for Japan it was one in 7,448.8 and one in 3,450.6 for Singapore. In Brazil one in 786.2 emails
was blocked as phishing.
The Public Sector remained the most targeted by phishing activity in June , with one in 113.3 emails comprising a
phishing attack. Phishing levels for the Chemical & Pharmaceutical sector reached one in 1,119.1 and one in 750.9
for the IT Services sector, one in 1,023.0 for Retail, one in 335.8 for Education, one in 285.9 for Finance, and one in
2,068.1 for the Automotive industry .
Phishing attacks targeting small to medium -sized businesses (1 -250) accounted for one in 363.8 emails, compared
with one in 418.3 for large enterprises (2500+).
Analysis of Phishing Web site s
Overall, the number of phis hing Web sites decreased by 1.8 percent in June compared with the previous month. The
number of phishing Web sites created by automated toolkits increased by approximately 12.9 percent, accounting for
approximately 63.8 percent of phishing Web sites, including attacks against well -known social networking Web sites
and social networking apps.
Overall, the number of phishing Web sites decreased by 1.8 percent in July, compared with the previous month. The
number of phishing websites created by automated toolk its increased by 12.9 percent, accounting for approximately
63.8 percent of phishing attacks . Phishing attacks related to well -known social networking Web sites and social
networking apps accounted for 15.9 percent of phishing attacks. Sources2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011Netherlands
SouthAfrica
Canad a
UnitedKingdo m
Belgium1in94.4
1in171.2
1in244.9
1in272.5
1in679.5Public Sector
Finance
Educa tion
Accom/Catering
Marketing/Media1in113.3
1in285.9
1in335.8
1in372.7
1in471.01-250
251-500
501-1000
1001 -1500
1501 -2500
2501 +1in363.8
1in719.5
1in926.0
1in782.9
1in988.4
1in418.3PhishingRate
July20121 in475.3
1 in467.6
1 in474.1LastMonth:
SixMonthAvg.: Top5 Geographies Top5Verticals ByHorizontal
20121 in
475.3
UnitedStates 47.6%
UnitedKingdom 27.0%
Australia 10.4%
Canada 9.9%
SouthAfrica 1.1%
Sweden 0.8%
Germany 0.7%
Netherlands 0.7%
Philippines 0.4%
Denmark 0.3%Page 18 of 24
The number of unique phishing domains decreased by 20.1 percent , and phishing websites with IP addresses in place
of fully -qualified domain names in the URL, increased by 49.7 percent.
The use of legitimate Web services for hosting phishing sites accounted for approximately 3.6 percent of phishing
Web sites , a decrease of 0.3 percentage points since June. The number of non- English language phishing Web sites
increased by 174 percent. The most common languages for non-English phishing sites, included: French, Italian,
Portugu ese and Spanish.
Geographic Location of Phishing Web Sites
July2011PhishingWebSitesLocations
*Note:DatalagsonemonthCountry June* May
UnitedStates 50.0% 48.8%
Germany 6.4% 6.3%
UnitedKingdom 4.4% 3.9%
Brazil 3.7% 4.7%
France 2.9% 3.0%
Canada 2.9% 2.9%
Russia 2.9% 2.4%
China 2.5% 2.6%
Netherlands 2.3% 2.2%
Poland 1.4% 1.4%Page 19 of 24
Tactics of Phishing Distribution
Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks, by Industry
Malware Analysis
Email -borne Threats
The global ratio of email -borne viruses in email traffic was one in 340.9 emails (0. 293 percent ) in July, a decrease of
0.023 percentage points since June .
In July, 26.5 percent of email -borne malware contained links to malicious Web sites, 1.5 percentage points higher than
June . 0.9% 3.6% 4.3% 27.4% 63.8%
TyposquattingFree Web Hosting SitesIP Address DomainsOther Unique DomainsAutomated Toolkits
0.002% 0.011% 0.014% 0.021% 0.37% 0.44% 0.46% 1.4% 28.0% 33.0% 36.3%
ISPSecurityRetail TradeInsuranceGovernmentRetailCommunicationsTelecommunicationsE-CommerceBankingInformation ServicesPage 20 of 24
The Netherlands remained the geography with the highest ratio of malicious email activity in July, with one in 82.2
emails identified as malicious .
In the UK , one in 216.6 emails was identified as malicious , compared with South Africa , where one in 436.6 emails
was blocked as malicious . The v irus rate for email -borne malware in the US was one in 553.3 and one in 275.0 in
Canada. In Germany virus activity reached one in 433.3 and one in 486.4 in Denmark. In Australia, one in 634.5
emails was malicious. For Japan the rate was one in 2,083.7, compared with one in 902.3 in Singapore. In Brazil, one
in 445.1 emails contained malicious content.
With one in 85.3 emails being blocked as malicious, the Public Sector remained the m ost targeted industry in July.
The v irus rate for the Chemical & Pharmaceutical sector reached one in 322.7 and one in 503.3 for the IT Services
sector; one in 596.1 for Retail, one in 210.6 for Education and one in 301.8 for Finance.
Malicious email -borne attacks destined for small to medium -sized businesses (1-250) accounted for one in 404.4
emails, compared with one in 214.4 for large enterprises (2500+) .
Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Public Sector
Education
Marketing/Media
Finance
Accom/Catering 1 in 85.3
1 in 210.6
1 in 252.5
1 in 301.8
1 in 306.6 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 1 in 214.4 1 in 365.0 1 in 367.0 1 in 404.4
1 in 470.3 1 in 472.0Virus Rate
July 2012 1 in 340.9
1 in 316.5
1 in 331.4 Last Month: Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012
UnitedKingdom 40.0%
UnitedStates 30.8%
Canada 6.5%
Brazil 3.2%
Sweden 3.0%
Australia 2.7%
Germany 2.3%
HongKong 2.0%
Netherlands 1.6%
SouthAfrica 1.3% 1 in
340.9 Netherlands
United Kingdom
Luxembourg
Canada
South Africa 1 in 82.2
1 in 216.6
1 in 260.9
1 in 275.0
1 in 436.6Page 21 of 24
Frequently Blocked E mail- borne Malware
The table below shows the most frequen tly blocked email -borne malware for July, many of which relate to generic
variants of malicious attachments and malicious hy perlinks distributed in emails. Approximately 42.7 percent of all
email -borne malware was identified and blocked using generic detec tion.
Malware identified generically as aggressive strains of polymorphic malware accounted for 21.7 percent of all email -
borne malware blocked in July.
Malware Name % Malware
W32/Bredolab.gen!eml.k 15.91%
W32/Bredolab.gen!eml.j 9.19%
Exploit/Link -generic -ee68 6.81%
Suspicious.JIT.a.dam 2.33%
Link-Gen:Variant.Barys.1516.dam 1.92%
Link-Trojan.Script.BM -2afb 1.56%
Exploit/LinkAliasPostcard -b84d 1.51%
Packed.Generic -6f41-88f2 1.47%
Packed.Modified.UPX -ff98-3ec6 1.39%
W32/Netsky.c -mm 1.24%
The top- ten list of most frequently blocked malware accounted for approximately 43.3% of all email -borne malware
blocked in June .
Web -based Malware Threats
In July, Symantec Intelligence identified an average of 2,189 Web sites each day harboring malware and other
potentially unwanted programs including spyware and adware; an increase of 4.0 percent since June. T his reflects the
rate at which Web sites are being compromised or created for the purpose of spreading malicious cont ent. Often this
number is higher when Web-based malware is in circulation for a longer period of time to widen its potential spread
and increase its longevity.
As detection for Web-based malwar e increases, the number of new Web sites blocked decreases and the proportion
of new malware begins to rise, but initially on fewer Web sites. Further analysis reveals that 53.5 percent of all
malicious domains blocked were new in July ; a decrease of 9.4 percentage points compared with June. Additionally,
12.1 percent of all Web- based malware blocked was new in July ; a decrease of 0.9 percentage points since June.
The chart above shows the increase in the number of new spyware and adware Web sites blocked each day on
average during July compared with the equi valent number of Web -based malware Web sites blocked each day.
Web Policy Risks from Inappropriate Use
The most common trigger for policy -based filtering applied by Symantec Web Security.cloud for its business clients
was for the “Advertisements & Popups” category, which accounted for 34.5 percent of blocked Web activity in July.
Web-based advertisements pose a potential risk though the use of “malvertisements ,” or malicious advertisements.
These may occur as the result of a legitimate online ad- provider being compromised and a banner ad being used to
serve malware on an otherwise harmless Web site . New Malware Sites per Day
New sites with spyware
New sites with web viruses
Total 15/day
2,174/day
2,189/dayWeb Security Services Activity:
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012Page 22 of 24
The second most frequently blocked traffic was categorized as Social Networking, account ing for 20.2 percent of URL -
based filtering activity blocked, equivalent to approximately one in every 5 Web site s blocked. Many organizations
allow access to social networking Web sites, but facilitate access logging so that usage patterns can be tracked and in
some cases implement policies to only permit access at certain times of the day and block access at all other times.
This information is often used to address performance management issues, perhaps in the event of lost productivity
due to social networking abuse.
Activity related to streaming m edia policies resulted in 9.2 percent of URL -based filtering blocks in June . Streaming
media is increasingly popular when there are major sporting events or high profile international news stories . This
activity often result s in an increased number of blocks, as businesses seek to preserve valuable bandwidth for other
purposes. This rate is equivalent to one in every 11 Web site s blocked.
Endpoint Security Threats
The endpoint is often the last line of defense and analysis; however, the endpoint can often be the first -line of defense
against attacks that spread using USB storage devices and insecure network connections . The threats found here can
shed light on the w ider nature of threats confronting businesses, especially from blended attacks and threats facing
mobile workers . Attacks reaching the endpoint are likely to have already circumvented other layers of protection that
may already be deployed, such as gateway filtering.
The table below shows the malware most frequently blocked targeting endpoint devices for the last month. This
includes data from endpoint devices protected by Symantec technology around the world, including data from clients
which may not be us ing other layers of protection, such as Symantec Web Security.cloud or Symantec Email
AntiVirus.cloud.
Malware Name28 % Malware
W32.Sality.AE 6.12%
W32.Ramnit!html 4.68%
W32.Downadup.B 4.24%
W32.Ramnit.B 4.15%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 3.06%
W32.Virut.CF 1.89%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 1.75%
W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 1.71%
Trojan.Maljava 1.33%
W32.SillyFDC 1.22%
For much of 2012 , variants of W32.Sality.AE29 and W32.Ramnit30 had been the most prevalent malicious threat s
blocked at the endpoint. Variants of W32.Ramnit accounted for approximately 12.1% of all malware blocked at the
endpoint in June, compared with 6.8% for all variants of W32.Sality.
28For further information on these threats, please visit: http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/landing/threats.js p
Web Security Services Activity:
Policy-Based Filtering
Advertisement and Popups
Social Networking
Streaming Media Chat Computing and Internet Hosting Sites
Peer- To-Peer
Search Blogs NewsWebViruses and Trojans
JS:Trojan.JS.Iframe.BO
Trojan.JS.Agent.GLM
Trojan.HTML.Redirecto r.AI
Trojan.JS.Agent.GMZ
Trojan.JS.Agent.GH P
JS.Runfore
JS:Trojan.Crypt.EM
Trojan.JS.Agent.GHF
Trojan.Script.12023
Trojan.Maljava Potentially Unwanted Programs
PUP:ActualSpy
PUP:Keylogger
PUP:Lop
PUP:9231
PUP:PigSearch
PUP:W32/SuperScan. A
PUP:Application.Heu r.cmKfbiBPZXoO
PUP:9746
PUP:Clkpotato!gen3
PUP:Ardakey
July 2012 34.5%
20.2%
9.2%
4.8% 4.1%
3.6% 3.6% 1.8% 1.7% 1.7% 17.0%
8.9% 8.3% 7.4% 6.8%
6.7%
6.4%
2.7%
2.1%
1.9% 0.2%
1.1%
0.2%
2.9%
0.4%
2.5% 1.6%
0.2%
5.6%
1.4%Page 23 of 24
Approximately 33.6 percent of the most frequently blocked malware last month was identified and blocked using
generic detection. Many new viruses and Trojans are based on earlier versions, where code has been copied or
altered to create a new strain, or variant. Often these variants are created using toolkits and hundreds of thousands of
variants can be created from the same piece of malware. This has become a popular tactic to ev ade signature -based
detection, as each variant would traditionally need its own signature to be correctly identified and blocked.
By deploying techniques, such as heuristic analysis and generic detection, it ’s possible to correctly identify and block
several variants of the same malware families, as well as identify new forms of malicious code that seek to exploit
certain vulnerabilities that can be identified generically.
29 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006- 011714- 3948- 99
30 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010- 011922- 2056- 99
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
JULY 2013p. 2
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
3 Executive Summary
4 BIG NUMBERS
7 TIMELINE
8 July Security Timeline
10 DATA BREACHES
11 Data Breaches
11 Top 5 Data Breaches by Type of Information Exposed
11 Timeline of Data Breaches, 2013
12 MOBILE
13 Mobile
13 Mobile Malware by Type
14 Cumulative Mobile Android Malware
15 VULNERABILITIES16 Vulnerabilities
16
Total Vulnerabilities Disclosed by Month
16 Browser Vulnerabilities
16 Plug-in Vulnerabilities17 SPAM, PHISHING, & MALWARE
18 Spam
18 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Geography
18 Global Spam Volume Per Day
18 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Industry
19 Top 10 Sources of Spam
19 Average Spam Message Size*
19 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Company Size
19 Spam by Category
19 Spam URL Distribution Based on Top Level Domain Name*
20 Phishing
20 Top 10 Sources of Phishing
20 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Company Size
20 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Industry
20 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Geography
21 Phishing Distribution in July
21 Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks
22 Malware
22 Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected
22 Top 10 Email Virus Sources
23 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Industry
23 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Geographic Location
23 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Company Size
24 Endpoint Security
24 Top 10 Most Frequently Blocked Malware
25 Policy Based Filtering
25 Policy Based Filtering
26 About Symantec
26 More Informationp. 3
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
Executive Summary
Welcome to the July edition of the Symantec Intelligence report.
Symantec Intelligence aims to provide the latest analysis of cyber
security threats, trends, and insights concerning malware, spam,
and other potentially harmful business risks.
In this month’s report we take a look at the latest trends in the threat landscape. In the realm of
data breaches, July sees an increase in the number of breaches, with 21 reported so far during the
month. We also note that 62 percent of all data breaches result in the exposure of real names, while
39 percent reveal either a person’s birth day or a government identification number (such as a
Social Security number).
Data breaches aren’t the only location that identities and personal data are being compromised.
Mobile malware in 2013 has also contributed significantly to data exposure, where 43 percent of
mobile threats specifically attempt to steal information from the device. This is up significantly
since 2012, where 15 percent of mobile threats behaved similarly.
In other news there were 561 new vulnerabilities discovered in July, a 17 percent increase compared
to the same period in 2012. The global spam rate rose 3.4 percentage points in July to 67.6 percent
and the top-level domain for Poland comprised almost 59% of spam-related domains in July. Finally, financial-themed phishing emails top the list of topics, comprising close to 70 percent of all
phishing attempts blocked.
We’ve also provided a run-down on the biggest security stories for the month of July, recapping
what happened and what that means to our readers.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to contact us with any comments or
feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat Analyst
[email protected]. 4
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
BIG NUMBERSp. 5
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
Overall Email Phishing Rate:
Overall Email Phishing Rate:
1 in 7361 in 4641 in 562
JunMay
JulHIGHER NUMBER = LOWER RISK
Overall Email Virus Rate:
Overall Email Virus Rate:
MayApril
1 in 326
1 in 4651 in 420 May
Jun
JulHIGHER NUMBER = LOWER RISK
Estimated Global
Email Spam Rate Per DayEstimated Global
Email Spam Rate Per Day
SPAM AS PERCENT OF ALL EMAIL
May Jun Jul0102030405060708090100
67% 64% 68%
New Vulnerabilities
New Vulnerabilities
510
510
June
518
May
561
561
July
June4May0
July3
Mobile
VulnerabilitiesMobile
Vulnerabilities
p. 6
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
Data Breaches
Data Breaches
86,901,952
109
Number of Identities
Exposed (Year-to-Date)Number of Breaches
(Year-to-Date)
Mobile Malware VariantsMobile Malware Variants
May
Jun
Jul
504
161312
p. 7
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
TIMELINEp. 8
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
July Security Timeline
July01
A new crypto-currency was hit by malware in early July.
The relatively new digital currency claims to offer quicker
transaction speeds than its competitors, as well as an ability to
mine currency on consumer-grade computers. The Trojan in question attempts to steal the victim’s digital wallet and send it
to an attacker.
July08
It emerged for the first time in July that last year’s London
Olympics could have been subjected to a cyberattack that could
have left the opening ceremony without light . According to
Olympic CyberSecurity head Oliver Hoare, extensive precautions
were put in place after attack tools and targeting information
were discovered that were thought to be related to the Olympics.
Hoare received a phone call in the early hours of the morning
before the opening ceremony and was told of the potential
attack. Although a lot of attention and planning had revolved
around the threat of a terrorist attack on the games, Hoare said that “extensive testing had still taken place for a range
of different possibilities” including cyber attacks. The
CyberSecurity team had run multiple tests dealing with an attack on the electricity infrastructure and, although time was
against them, this planning with Olympic organizers and private
sector electricity providers meant that they were well prepared.
July10
A popular messaging platform that enables users to chat to groups of up to 30 friends on their mobile device became the
target of a worm attack. The worm spread manually through the
messaging service on certain devices, changing contact group names to “Priyanka”. However, for anything malicious to occur
to the device, users needed to accept and install a contact file,
also named Priyanka. Deleting this contact and clearing the messaging service data should clean the device. July15
Attackers targeted and defaced the Pilipino website of a global technology news publication. The website displayed several
pop-ups which said that there had been a security breach. The
attackers appear to be part of Pinoy Vendetta, a hacking group based in the Philippines that undertakes acts of hacktivism, with
the aim of finding weaknesses in websites based in the country.
The page which users were redirected to claims that the group was “testing the security” of the website.
July21
A forum for an online community surrounding a popular Linux distribution suffered a data breach, affecting 1.8 million of its
members. The forum’s operators said that attackers accessed
“every user’s local username, password, and email address” from the database, but emphasized that passwords were
encrypted. Nonetheless, the operators have encouraged users
to change their passwords on the forum and any other services where they may have used the same password. The company
that backs the forum said that it is continuing to investigate how
attackers gained access to this data and is working to address the issue.
July22
A German cryptographer has released details on a way to hack SIM cards. Karsten Nohl and his team discovered an exploit that
can crack update keys using over-the-air commands. An attacker
can use the stolen key to sign and send malicious software to the device, potentially enabling the attacker “to send SMS, change
voicemail numbers, and query the phone location,” says Nohl.
With an estimated one eighth of the world’s SIMs at risk , Nohl
recommends that carriers update the SIM cards of affected
phones. p. 9
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
July24
A popular call and messaging app became the latest high-
profile hacking victim of the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA).
The service’s database was breached and its website defaced
following a successful phishing attack against one its employees. The company released a statement to say that the phishing
attack allowed access to a customer support panel and a support
administration system, but that no sensitive user data was exposed.
July25
Symantec took part in the successful takedown of a cyber-criminal gang in Tokyo. The takedown followed months of
painstaking work monitoring and investigating the activities of
a prolific Tokyo crime gang alongside Japanese law enforcement agencies. The end result was the arrest of nine of its members
including a well-known figure in poker tournament circles with
over US$1.5 million winnings to his name. This raid by the police is a major blow to the crime gang that was previously
engaged in many forms of cyber-criminal activities including
spamming, running a fake online dating site, fake antivirus, and information theft.
July26
Four Russians and a Ukrainian were charged for their role in the largest hacking and data breach scheme in U.S. history to-
date. The five conspired in a “worldwide scheme that targeted
major corporate networks, stole more than 160 million credit card numbers and resulted in hundreds of millions of dollars in
losses”, according to attorney Paul Fishman. The charges include
computer hacking conspiracy, wire fraud, conspiracy to commit wire fraud, and unauthorized computer access. The men worked
with Albert Gonzalez, a hacker serving 20 years in prison and
best known for masterminding the TJX hack in which he stole tens of millions of credit and debit card numbers.p. 10
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
DATA BREACHESp. 11
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
Data Breaches
At a Glance
• There were 21 data
breaches recorded during
the month of July, making
it the second-highest month for the year behind January. So far there have been 109 data breaches recorded through July, up 16 percent over the same period in 2012.
• However, the number of identities stolen was the third-lowest for the year, at 2.7 million. This brings the total identities exposed to 86.9 million in
2013 so far.
• Of the data breaches
reported so far in 2013, 62 percent contain a person’s real name. Birth dates and government ID numbers (e.g. Social Security) numbers appear in 39 percent of breaches.Timeline of Data Breaches, 2013
Source: SymantecNUMBER OF INCIDENTSIDENTITIES BREACHED (MILLIONS)
INCIDENTS IDENTITIES BREACHED
051015202530354045505560
JJ MAMF JAN
2013DNOSAJJ MAMF JAN
2012051015202530
Top 5 Data Breaches by Type of Information Exposed
Source: Symantec
39%
39%
32%
29%62% of breachesReal Names
Gov ID numbers (Soc Sec)Birth DatesMedical RecordsHome Address
Information Exposed in BreachesInformation Exposed in BreachesMethodology
This data is procured from the Norton Cybercrime Index (CCI).
The Norton CCI is a statistical model that measures the levels
of threats, including malicious software, fraud, identity theft,
spam, phishing, and social engineering daily. The data breach section of the Norton CCI is derived from data breaches that
have been reported by legitimate media sources and have
exposed personal information.
In some cases a data breach is not publicly reported during the
same month the incident occurred, or an adjustment is made in
the number of identities reportedly exposed. In these cases, the data in the Norton CCI is updated. This causes fluctuations in
the numbers reported for previous months when a new report is
released.
Norton Cybercrime Index
http://us.norton.com/protect-yourselfp. 12
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
MOBILEp. 13
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
Mobile
At a Glance
• So far in 2013, 43 percent
of mobile malware tracks
users, up from 15 percent
in 2012.
• Adware/Annoyance risks have also increased, from 8 percent in 2012 to 23 percent of mobile malware found so far this year.
• Risks that collect data, the most common risk in 2012, has dropped
significantly, down 15
percentage points to 17 percent of risks.
• Eight new mobile malware families were discovered in July, along with 161 new variants.
23%
43%
6%
11%
23%
17%
Track User
Risks that spy on the individual using the
device, collecting SMS messages or phone call logs, tracking GPS coordinates, recording phone calls, or gathering pictures and video taken with the device.
Traditional Threats
Threats that carry out traditional malware functions, such as back doors and downloaders.
Adware/Annoyance
Mobile risks that display advertising or generally perform actions to disrupt the user.Send Content
These risks will send text messages to premium SMS numbers, ultimately appearing on the bill of the device’s owner. Other risks can be used to send spam messages.Change Settings
These types of risks attempt to elevate privileges or simply modify various settings within the operating system. Collect Data
This includes the collection of both device- and user-specific data, such as device information, configuration data, or banking details. Mobile Malware by Type
Source: Symantecp. 14
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
Cumulative Mobile Android Malware
Source: Symantec
VARIANTS FAMILIES
4080120160200240280320360400
J J M A M F JAN
2013D N O S A J J M A M F JAN
201210002000300040005000600070008000900010000FAMILIES (CUMULATIVE) VARIANTS (CUMULATIVE)
p. 15
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
VULNERABILITIESp. 16
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
Vulnerabilities
At a Glance
• There were 561 new
vulnerabilities discovered
in July, bringing the total
for the year up to 3846, a 17 percent increase compared to the same period in 2012.
• One zero-day vulnerability was disclosed in July, a vulnerability in Internet Explorer (CVE-2013-3163).
• Three vulnerabilities were
discovered in mobile
operating system during the month of July.
• Google’s Chrome browser continues to lead in reporting browser vulnerabilities, which Oracle’s Java leads in reported plug-in vulnerabilities.Total Vulnerabilities Disclosed by Month
Source: Symantec
0100200300400500600
J J M A M F JAN
2013D N O S A J J M A M F JAN
2012
Plug-in Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
5101520253035404550%Oracle Sun Java
Adobe Flash PlayerAdobe Acrobat ReaderApple QuickTime
Browser Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
510152025303540455060%
Apple Safari
Google ChromeMozilla FirefoxMicrosoft Internet Explorer Opera
p. 17
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
SPAM, PHISHING, & MALWAREp. 18
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
At a Glance
• The global spam rate rose
3.4 percentage points in
July to 67.6 percent, up
from 64.2 percent in June.
• Education continues to be the most commonly targeted industry, as was the case in June.
• The top-level domain (TLD) for Poland, .pl, has topped the list of malicious TLDs, comprising almost 59% of spam-related domains
in July.
• Sex/Dating spam continues
to be the most common category, at 60.7 percent. Pharmaceutical spam comes in second at 27.9 percent.Spam
Global Spam Volume Per Day
Source: Symantec
0102030405060
J J M A M F JAN
2013 D N O S A J J M A M F JAN
2012BILLIONS
Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Geography
Source: Symantec
Geography Percent
Saudi Arabia 82.2%
Sri Lanka 76.8%
China 74.3%
Hungary 72.8%
Qatar 72.2%Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Percent
Education 69.2%
Chem/Pharm 68.9%
Non-Profit 68.4%
Manufacturing 68.3%
Accom/Catering 68.0%p. 19
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
Top 10 Sources of Spam
Source: Symantec
Source Percent of All Spam
United States 8.53%
Italy 7.56%
Spain 6.25%
Argentina 6.22%
India 5.07%
Brazil 4.64%
Finland 3.81%
Canada 3.60%
Germany 3.51%
Colombia 3.30%
Spam URL Distribution Based on Top Level Domain Name*
Source: Symantec
*Month .pl .com .net .biz
Jun 58.9% 18.4% 8.7% 2.9%
May 8.7% 22% N/A% N/A
*Data lags one monthAverage Spam Message Size*
Source: Symantec
*Month 0Kb – 5Kb 5Kb – 10Kb >10Kb
Jun 22.2% 47.5% 30.3%
May 33.8% 40.1% 26.1%
*Data lags one monthSpam by Category
Source: Symantec
Category June May
Sex/Dating 60.7% 78.7%
Pharma 27.9% 11.1%
Jobs 8.8% 2.5%
Watches 1.8% 4.7%
Software 0.5% 0.8%Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Percent
1-250 67.2%
251-500 67.8%
501-1000 67.6%
1001-1500 68.0%
1501-2500 67.3%
2501+ 67.8%p. 20
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
At a Glance
• The global phishing rate is down in July, comprising one in every
736.5 email messages. In June this rate was one in 463.5.
• Financial themes continue to be the most frequent subject matter, with 69.8 percent of phishing scams containing this theme.
• The United Kingdom not only tops the most targeted geography, where one in 367.0 emails are phishing scams, but is also the top source in July, responsible for 36.9 percent of all phishing scams.
• The Public Sector was the most targeted industry in July, with one in every 193.1 emails received in this industry being a phishing scam.Phishing
Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Geography
Source: Symantec
Geography Rate
United Kingdom 1 in 367.0
South Africa 1 in 401.5
Belgium 1 in 467.3
Norway 1 in 724.9
Canada 1 in 1,026.3Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Rate
Public Sector 1 in 193.1
Finance 1 in 262.1
Accom/Catering 1 in 462.1
Education 1 in 502.9
Non-Profit 1 in 714.6Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Rate
1-250 1 in 729.1
251-500 1 in 356.5
501-1000 1 in 1,595.9
1001-1500 1 in 1,413.3
1501-2500 1 in 1,981.0
2501+ 1 in 675.6
Top 10 Sources of Phishing
Source: Symantec
Source July
United Kingdom 36.90%
United States 31.89%
Hong Kong 14.41%
South Africa 4.49%
Australia 2.93%
Brazil 1.77%
Netherlands 1.50%
Germany 1.31%
France 0.63%
Sweden 0.59%p. 21
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
43.5%
5.2%
3.1%
1.3%47.0%Other Unique Domains
Automated ToolkitsFree Web Hosting SitesIP Address DomainsTyposquatting
Phishing Distribution:Phishing Distribution:Phishing Distribution in July
Source: Symantec
23.3%
3.9%
2.0%
0.9%69.8%FinancialInformation ServicesRetailComputer SoftwareCommunications
Organizations Spoofed
in Phishing Attacks:Organizations Spoofed
in Phishing Attacks:Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks
Source: Symantecp. 22
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
Malware
1 in 0
1 in 50
1 in 100
1 in 150
1 in 200
1 in 250
1 in 300
1 in 350
1 in 400
1 in 450
1 in 500
J J M A M F JAN
2013D N O S A J J M A M F JAN
2012Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected
Source: SymantecTop 10 Email Virus Sources
Source: Symantec
Geography Percent
United States 44.19%
United Kingdom 24.70%
Australia 6.37%
Canada 6.02%
India 3.93%
Netherlands 3.62%
South Africa 2.50%
Hong Kong 1.52%
Brazil 1.02%
Germany 0.69%At a Glance
• The global average virus rate in July was one in 465.1 emails,
compared to one in 325.7 in June.
• The United Kingdom topped the list of impacted geographies, with one in 258.4 emails containing a virus.
• The United States was the largest source of virus-laden emails, making up 44.2 percent of all email-based viruses.
• Businesses with 251-500 employees were the most targeted company size, where one and 325.8 emails contained a virus.p. 23
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Rate
Public Sector 1 in 93.0
Education 1 in 298.3
Accom/Catering 1 in 345.1
Finance 1 in 385.4
Marketing/Media 1 in 427.4
Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Rate
1-250 1 in 529.8
251-500 1 in 325.8
501-1000 1 in 711.8
1001-1500 1 in 490.4
1501-2500 1 in 780.7
2501+ 1 in 433.8Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Geographic Location
Source: Symantec
Geography Rate
United Kingdom 1 in 258.4
Hungary 1 in 369.2
South Africa 1 in 371.4
Belgium 1 in 386.5
Netherlands 1 in 419.8p. 24
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
At a Glance
• Variants of W32.Ramnit accounted for 17.6 percent of all malware
blocked at the endpoint.
• In comparison, 8.1 percent for all malware were variants of W32.Sality.
• Approximately 37.8 percent of the most frequently blocked malware last month was identified and blocked using generic detection.Endpoint Security
Top 10 Most Frequently Blocked Malware
Source: Symantec
Malware July
W32.Sality.AE 7.08%
W32.Ramnit!html 6.92%
W32.Ramnit.B 6.07%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 4.32%
W32.Downadup.B 3.45%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 3.29%
W32.Virut.CF 2.30%
Trojan.Zbot 2.07%
W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 1.32%
W32.SillyFDC 1.20%p. 25
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
Policy Based Filtering
Source: Symantec
Category Percent
Social Networking 32.74%
Advertisement & Popups 20.32%
Search 4.73%
Streaming Media 3.33%
Computing & Internet 3.21%
Peer-To-Peer 2.88%
Chat 2.80%
Hosting Sites 1.74%
Games 1.27%
News 1.17%Policy Based Filtering
At a Glance
• The most common trigger for policy-based filtering applied by
Symantec Web Security .cloud for its business clients was for the
“Social Networking” category, which accounted for 32.7 percent
of blocked Web activity in July.
• “Advertisement & Popups” was the second-most common trigger, comprising 20.3 percent of blocked Web activity.p. 26
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2013
About Symantec
More Information
• Symantec.cloud Global Threats: http://www.symanteccloud.com/en/gb/globalthreats/
• Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/
• Internet Security Threat Report Resource Page: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
• Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer/
• Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex/Symantec protects the world’s information and is a global leader in security, backup, and
availability solutions. Our innovative products and services protect people and information
in any environment—from the smallest mobile device to the enterprise data center to cloud-
based systems. Our world-renowned expertise in protecting data, identities, and interactions
gives our customers confidence in a connected world. More information is available at
www.symantec.com or by connecting with Symantec at go.symantec.com/socialmedia.
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
JULY 2014p. 2
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2014
CONTENTS
3 Summary
4 TARGETED ATTACKS + DATA BREACHES
5 Targeted Attacks
5 Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing
Emails
5 Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
5 Average Number of Spear-Phishing Attacks Per Day
6 Top-Ten Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
7 Data Breaches
7 Timeline of Data Breaches
8 Total Identities Exposed
8 Top Causes of Data Breaches
8 Total Data Breaches
9 Top-Ten Types of Information Breached
10 MALWARE TACTICS
11 Malware Tactics
11 Top-Ten Malware
11 Top-Ten Mac OSX Malware Blocked on OSX Endpoints
12 Vulnerabilities
12 Number of Vulnerabilities
12 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
13 Browser Vulnerabilities
13 Plug-in Vulnerabilities14 SOCIAL MEDIA
+ MOBILE THREATS
15 Mobile
15 Mobile Malware Families by Month, Android
16 Mobile Threat Classifications
17 Social Media
17 Social Media
18 PHISHING, SPAM + EMAIL THREATS
19 Phishing and Spam
19 Phishing Rate
19 Global Spam Rate
20 Email Threats
20 Proportion of Email Traffic Containing URL Malware
20 Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected
21 About Symantec
21 More Informationp. 3
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2014
Summary
Welcome to the July edition of the Symantec
Intelligence report. Symantec Intelligence
aims to provide the latest analysis of cyber
security threats, trends, and insights
concerning malware, spam, and other
potentially harmful business risks.
Symantec has established the most
comprehensive source of Internet threat data in the world through the Symantec™
Global Intelligence Network, which is made
up of more than 41.5 million attack sensors
and records thousands of events per second.
This network monitors threat activity in
over 157 countries and territories through
a combination of Symantec products and services such as Symantec DeepSight™
Threat Management System, Symantec™
Managed Security Services, Norton™
consumer products, and other third-party
data sources. The average number of spear-phishing attacks per day has
dropped back to a similar level seen in May. The .doc file type
continues to be the most common attachment type used in
spear-phishing attacks, followed by .exe files. Organizations with 2500+ employees were the most likely to be targeted, which
non-traditional services, such as Business, Amusement, and
Repair-related services, lead the Top-Ten Industries targeted, followed by Manufacturing.
The largest data breach reported in July resulted in the exposure
of 900,000 identities. Hackers continue to be responsible for 49 percent of data breaches over the last 12 months, most often
exposing real names, government ID numbers, such as Social
Security numbers, and home addresses in the data breaches.
W32.Sality and W32.Ramnit variants continue to dominate the
top-ten malware list. The most common OSX threat seen was
OSX.RSPlug.A, making up 38 percent of all OSX malware found on OSX Endpoints.
There were 575 vulnerabilities disclosed during the month of
July, though no zero-day vulnerabilities discovered. Internet Explorer has reported the most browser vulnerabilities in the
last 12 months, while Oracle’s Java reported the most plug-in
vulnerabilities over the same time period.
There were four Android malware families discovered in July. Of
the mobile threats discovered in the last 12 months, 24 percent
steal information from the device and 22 percent track the device’s user. In terms of social networking scams, 63 percent
were fake offerings and 27 percent were manually shared scams.
Finally, the phishing rate was down in July, at one in 1,299
emails, down from one in 496 emails in June. The global spam
rate was 63.7 percent for the month of July, one out of every 351
emails contained a virus, and of the email traffic in the month of July, 7.9 percent contained a malicious URL.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to
contact us with any comments or feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat Analyst
[email protected]. 4
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2014
TARGETED ATTACKS
+ DATA BREACHESp. 5
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2014
At a Glance
• The average number of
spear-phishing attacks per day has dropped back to a similar level seen in May.
• The .doc file type continues to be the most common
attachment type used in
spear-phishing attacks, followed by .exe files.
• Organizations with 2500+ employees were the most likely to be targeted in July.
• Non-traditional services, such as Business, Amuse-ment, and Repair-related services, lead the Top-Ten Industries targeted,
followed by Manufacturing.Targeted Attacks
Average Number of Spear-Phishing
Attacks Per Day
Source: Symantec :: AUGUST 2013 — JULY 2014
J J M A M F J
2014D N O S A54188
21116
54141
84 84
5488103165
Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing
Emails
Source: Symantec :: JULY 2014
Executable type July June
.doc 19.9% 19.5%
.exe 15.1% 15.4%
.au3 10.5% 11.5%
.jpg 5.9% 6.2%
.scr 5.6% 5.8%
.class 2.4% 2.1%
.pdf 2.0% 1.7%
.bin 1.0% 1.1%
.xls 0.7% —
.dmp 0.6% 0.6%Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
Source: Symantec :: JULY 2014
Organization Size July June
1-250 35.7% 36.3%
251-500 8.5% 8.4%
501-1000 9.0% 9.3%
1001-1500 3.1% 3.0%
1501-2500 4.1% 4.1%
2500+ 39.6% 38.9%p. 6
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2014
Top-Ten Industries Targeted in
Spear-Phishing Attacks
Source: Symantec :: JULY 2014
MiningConstructionRetailPublic AdministrationTransportation, Gas,
Communications, ElectricWholesaleServices – ProfessionalFinance, Insurance
& Real EstateManufacturingServices – Non-Traditional 22%
20
17
11
10
6
6
3
1
1p. 7
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2014
Data Breaches
At a Glance
• The largest data breach reported in July resulted in the expo-
sure of 900,000 identities.
• Hackers have been responsible for 49 percent of data breach-es in the last 12 months.
• Real names, government ID numbers, such as Social Security numbers, and home addresses were the top three types of data exposed in data breaches.
J J M A M F J D N O S A
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
IDENTITIES EXPOSED (MILLIONS)
INCIDENTS IDENTITIES EXPOSED (Millions)Timeline of Data Breaches
Source: Symantec :: AUGUST 2013 — JULY 2014
147
2.7 .9 1.1 1.7 2.68.1130
113159
.8 .31727
22222927
25
2023
12 1220
p. 8
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2014
Top Causes of Data Breaches
Source: Symantec :: AUGUST 2013 — JULY 2014
FraudInsider TheftTheft or Loss
of Computeror DriveAccidentally
Made PublicHackers 49%
20% 23%
7%
.4%Number
of Incidents
126
58
5318
1
256 TOTAL
Total Data
Breaches
AUGUST 2013 — JULY 2014
256
Total IdentitiesExposed
AUGUST 2013 — JULY 2014
567 Millionp. 9
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2014
Top-Ten Types of Information Breached
Source: Symantec :: AUGUST 2013 — JULY 2014
Real Names
Gov ID numbers (Soc Sec)Home AddressBirth DatesMedical RecordsFinancial InformationPhone NumbersEmail AddressesUsernames & PasswordsInsurance01
02030405060708091071
%
46%
43%
43%
32%
29%
19%
17%
13%
9%
Methodology
This data is procured from the Norton Cybercrime Index (CCI). The Norton CCI is a statistical model
that measures the levels of threats, including malicious software, fraud, identity theft, spam,
phishing, and social engineering daily. The data breach section of the Norton CCI is derived from
data breaches that have been reported by legitimate media sources and have exposed personal information.
In some cases a data breach is not publicly reported during the same month the incident occurred,
or an adjustment is made in the number of identities reportedly exposed. In these cases, the data in the Norton CCI is updated. This causes fluctuations in the numbers reported for previous months
when a new report is released.
Norton Cybercrime Index
http://us.norton.com/protect-yourselfp. 10
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2014
MALWARE TACTICSp. 11
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2014
Malware Tactics
At a Glance
• W32.Sality and W32.
Ramnit variants continue to dominate the top-ten malware list.
• The most common OSX threat seen on OSX
was OSX.RSPlug.A,
making up 38 percent of all OSX malware found on OSX Endpoints.Top-Ten Malware
Source: Symantec :: JULY 2014
Rank Name July June
1 W32.Sality.AE 4.8% 5.3%
2 W32.Ramnit!html 4.3% 5.1%
3 W32.Almanahe.B!inf 3.9% 3.7%
4 W32.Ramnit.B 2.9% 3.8%
5 W32.Downadup.B 2.8% 2.9%
6 W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 2.1% 2.1%
7 Trojan.Webkit!html 2.0% —
8 W32.Ramnit.B!inf 2.0% 2.6%
9 Trojan.Zbot 1.4% 1.4%
10 W32.Virut.CF 1.4% 1.6%
Top-Ten Mac OSX Malware Blocked
on OSX Endpoints
Source: Symantec :: JULY 2014
Rank Malware Name July June
1 OSX.RSPlug.A 38.2% 24.1%
2 OSX.Stealbit.B 12.5% 25.7%
3 OSX.Flashback.K 8.8% 14.7%
4 OSX.Sabpab 5.8% 4.9%
5 OSX.Crisis 5.7% —
6 OSX.Stealbit.A 2.7% —
7 OSX.Keylogger 2.6% 2.5%
8 OSX.Flashback 2.5% 1.6%
9 OSX.Netweird 2.0% —
10 OSX.FakeCodec 1.7% —p. 12
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2014
Number of Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: AUGUST 2013 — JULY 2014
J J M A M F J
2014D N O S A438575
469549
438471542562579
473663
555
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: AUGUST 2013 — JULY 2014
J J M A M F J
2014D N O S A0 0 0 0 02 2
05
014Vulnerabilities
At a Glance
• There were 575 vulner-
abilities disclosed during the month of July.
• There were no zero-day vulnerabilities discovered in July.
• Internet Explorer has reported the most brows-er vulnerabilities in the last 12 months.
• Oracle’s Java reported the most plug-in vulner-abilities over the same time period.p. 13
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2014
Browser Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: AUGUST 2013 — JULY 2014
20406080100
J J M A M F J
2014D N O S A
Opera
Mozilla FirefoxMicrosoft Internet Explorer
Google Chrome
Apple Safari
Plug-in Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: AUGUST 2013 — JULY 2014
1020304050607080
Java
Apple
Adobe
ActiveX
J J M A M F J
2014D N O S A
p. 14
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2014
SOCIAL MEDIA
+ MOBILE THREATSp. 15
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2014
Mobile
Mobile Malware Families by Month,
Android
Source: Symantec :: JULY 2013 — JUNE 2014
8
27
24
24
234 4
3
12345678910
J M A M F J
2014D N O S A J
At a Glance
• There were four Android
malware families discov-ered in July.
• Of the threats discovered in the last 12 months, 24 percent steal information
from the device and 22
percent track the device’s user.
• In terms of social networking scams, 63 percent were fake offer-ings and 27 percent were manually shared scams.p. 16
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2014
Mobile Threat Classifications
Source: Symantec :: AUGUST 2013 — JULY 2014
Track User Risks that spy on the individual using the device, collecting SMS
messages or phone call logs, tracking GPS coordinates, recording phone calls,
or gathering pictures and video taken with the device.
Steal Information This includes the collection of both device- and user-specific
data, such as device information, configuration data, or banking details.
Traditional T hreats Threats that carry out traditional malware functions,
such as back doors and downloaders.
Recon/f_igure D evice These t ypes of risks attempt to elevate privileges
or simply modify various settings within the operating system.
Adware/Anno yance Mobile risks that display advertising or generally perform
actions to disrupt the user.
Send Conte nt These risks will send text messages to premium SMS numbers,
ultimately appearing on the bill of the device’s owner. Other risks can be used to send spam messages.
Adware
AnnoyanceSend
ContentReconfigure
DeviceTraditional
ThreatsTrack
UserSteal
Information8%12%21%22%
14%24%p. 17
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2014
Social Media
Social Media
Source: Symantec :: AUGUST 2013 — JULY 2014
63%
Fake Offers These scams invite social network users to join a fake event or group
with incentives such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to share
credentials with the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
Manual Sharing Scams These rely on victims to actually do the work of sharing
the scam by presenting them with intriguing videos, fake offers or messages that they share with their friends.
Likejacking Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website
buttons that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
Comment Jacking Similar to likejacking, this type of scam relies on users clicking
links that are added to comments by attackers. The links may lead to malware or survey scams.
Fake App Users are invited to subscribe to an application that appears to be
integrated for use with a social network, but is not as described and may be used to steal credentials or harvest other personal data.
Comment
JackingFake
AppsLikejacking Manual
SharingFake
Offering27%
8%
1.6% .6%p. 18
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2014
PHISHING , SPAM + EMAIL THREATSp. 19
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2014
Phishing and Spam
Phishing Rate
Source: Symantec :: AUGUST 2013 — JULY 2014
1 in 200
1 in 400
1 in 600
1 in 800
1 in 1000
1 in 1200
1 in 1400
J J M A M F J
2014D N O S A
At a Glance
• The phishing rate was
down in July, at one in 1,299 emails, down from one in 496 emails in June.
• The global spam rate
was 63.7 percent for the
month of July.
• One out of every 351 emails contained a virus.
• Of the email traffic in the month of July, 7.9 percent contained a mali-cious URL.
Global Spam Rate
Source: Symantec :: AUGUST 2013 — JULY 2014
1020304050607080
J J M A M F J
2014D N O S Ap. 20
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2014
Email Threats
Proportion of Email Traffic
Containing URL Malware
Source: Symantec :: AUGUST 2013 — JULY 2014
51015202530354045
J J M A M F J
2014D N O S A
1 in 50
1 in 100
1 in 150
1 in 200
1 in 250
1 in 300
1 in 350
1 in 400
1 in 450
1 in 500
J J M A M F J
2014D N O S AProportion of Email Traffic
in Which Virus Was Detected
Source: Symantec :: AUGUST 2013 — JULY 2014p. 21
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JULY 2014
About Symantec
More Information
• Symantec Worldwide: http://www.symantec.com/
• ISTR and Symantec Intelligence Resources: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
• Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/
• Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer/
• Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex/Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC) is an information protection expert that helps
people, businesses and governments seeking the freedom to unlock the opportunities
technology brings – anytime, anywhere. Founded in April 1982, Symantec, a Fortune
500 company, operating one of the largest global data-intelligence networks, has
provided leading security, backup and availability solutions for where vital information
is stored, accessed and shared. The company’s more than 20,000 employees reside in more than 50 countries. Ninety-nine percent of Fortune 500 companies are Symantec
customers. In fiscal 2013, it recorded revenues of $6.9 billion. To learn more go to
www.symantec.com or connect with Symantec at: go.symantec.com/socialmedia.
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
JULY 20152 | July 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
3 Summary
4 July in Numbers
5 Targeted Attacks & Phishing
5 Top 10 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
5 Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
6 Phishing Rate
6 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing by Industry Sector
7 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing by Organization Size
8 Vulnerabilities
8 Total Number of Vulnerabilities
8 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
9 Vulnerabilities Disclosed in Industrial Control Systems
10 Malware
10 New Malware Variants
10 Top 10 Mac OSX Malware Blocked on OSX Endpoints
11 Ransomware Over Time
11 Crypto-Ransomware Over Time
12 Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Malware Was Detected
12 Percent of Email Malware as URL vs. Attachment by Month
13 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious by Industry Sector
13 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as
Malicious by Organization Size
14 Mobile & Social Media
14 Android Mobile Malware Families by Month
14 New Android Variants per Family by Month
15 Social Media
16 Spam
16 Overall Email Spam Rate
16 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Industry Sector
17 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Organization Size
18 About Symantec
18 More Information
Welcome to the July edition of the Symantec
Intelligence report. Symantec Intelligence aims
to provide the latest analysis of cyber security
threats, trends, and insights concerning malware, spam, and other potentially harmful business
risks.
Symantec has established the most comprehensive
source of Internet threat data in the world through
the Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network,
which is made up of more than 57.6 million attack sensors and records thousands of events per
second. This network monitors threat activity
in over 157 countries and territories through a combination of Symantec products and services
such as Symantec DeepSight™ Intelligence,
Symantec™ Managed Security Services, Norton™ consumer products, and other third-party data
sources.3 | July 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Summary
Last month we reported how the spam rate had dropped below 50 percent of email traffic.
Almost as if in response to this seemingly watershed moment, the spam rate went up slightly in July, just crossing the midpoint mark again with a percentage of 50.1. While this is the first time the spam rate have increased in more than a year, we still anticipate that the rate will continue its slow, downward trajectory in the months to come.
The Manufacturing and Wholesale industries both saw significant increases in targeted
attack activity in July, where both industries were up eight percentage points from June. Enterprises with more than 2500 employees were the most commonly targeted organization size during the month.
The number of vulnerabilities disclosed was up as well in July. There were 579 vulnerabilities
reported, in comparison to 526 in June. Of particular note were six zero-day vulnerabilities discovered during the month—the highest number seen in more than a year. Four of these zero-day vulnerabilities—three for Adobe Flash Player and one for Microsoft Windows—were discovered in the data cache of the Italian covert surveillance and espionage software company, Hacking Team, which suffered a data breach in early July.
There were 53.7 million new pieces of malware discovered in July. While down slightly from
June, this is still well above the 40.3 million average seen over the last twelve months. Ransomware has also declined slightly this month, though there have been modest increases in the amount of crypto-ransomware seen in July. There was also a slight decrease in malware detected in email traffic during the month, though the Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing industry remained on top of the list of sectors most likely to receive malicious emails.
In contrast, four mobile malware families were released onto the mobile malware landscape
in July, the highest number seen in one month during 2015. The number of mobile malware variants also continues to trend upwards, where 42 Android malware variants were seen per family during July.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to contact us with any comments or
feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat [email protected] | July 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
JULY IN NUMBERS5 | July 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
The Manufacturing and
Wholesale sectors where the
first and second most targeted industries in July. These industries each saw an eight percentage point increase in spear-phishing attacks.
Top 10 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
Source: SymantecNonclassifiable EstablishmentsPublic AdministrationConstructionRetailTransportation, Communications,
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary ServicesServices - Non TraditionalFinance, Insurance,
& Real EstateServices - ProfessionalWholesaleManufacturing 30%
22
9 17
13
12 17
11 17
6 8
5 12
7
2
2 0
2 3 2July June
Top 10 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
Large enterprises were the target
of 34.1 percent of spear-phishing
attacks in July, up from 25.1 percent in June. In contrast, 33.2 percent of attacks were directed at organizations with less than 250 employees.Company Size July June
1-250 33.2% 38.1%
251-500 12.6% 15.2%
501-1000 7.7% 9.0%
1001-1500 3.0% 9.9%
1501-2500 9.3% 2.7%
2501+ 34.1% 25.1%
Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
Source: Symantec
Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted OrganizationTargeted Attacks & Phishing 6 | July 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Phishing Rate Inverse Graph: Smaller Number = Greater Risk
Source: Symantec400
800
1200
1600
2000
2400
2800J J M A M F J
2015D N O S A1 IN1587
2041161015171004
1465
266620571865
24481628647
Phishing Rate The overall phishing rate has
increased this month, where one
in 1,628 emails was a phishing attempt.
Industry July June
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 1 in 837.1 1 in 1,469.9
Services - Non Traditional 1 in 1,320.5 1 in 3,977.5
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 1 in 1,357.6 1 in 2,901.7
Public Administration 1 in 1,359.2 1 in 2,367.3
Nonclassifiable Establishments 1 in 1,564.4 1 in 2,753.1
Services - Professional 1 in 1,566.8 1 in 2,750.3
Mining 1 in 2,017.1 1 in 3,120.1
Construction 1 in 2,241.5 1 in 3,003.1
Wholesale 1 in 2,343.8 1 in 4,142.5
Transportation, Communications,
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services1 in 3,114.3 1 in 4,495.4
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing
by Industry Sector
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing by Industry Sector The Agriculture, Forestry, &
Fishing sector was again the
most targeted Industry overall for phishing attempts in July, where phishing comprised one in every 837.1 emails. This rate has been higher than any other industry
since April.7 | July 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Company Size July June
1–250 1 in 1,288.9 1 in 1,552.5
251–500 1 in 1,613.7 1 in 2,553.7
501–1000 1 in 1,899.6 1 in 3,051.4
1001–1500 1 in 2,209.9 1 in 3,443.2
1501–2500 1 in 2,045.5 1 in 3,552.6
2501+ 1 in 1,872.3 1 in 3,624.5
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing
by Organization Size
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing by Organization Size Small companies with less than
250 employees were again the
most targeted organization size in July.8 | July 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
The number of vulnerabilities
disclosed increased in July, up
from 526 in June to 579 reported during the month.
Total Number of Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec100200300400500600
J J M A M F J
2015D N O S A399600 596
428562
471 469540579
526579
457
Total Number of VulnerabilitiesVulnerabilities
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
There were six zero-day
vulnerabilities disclosed in July,
three of which exploit the Adobe Flash Player.
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec1234567
J J M A M F J
2015D N O S A0 02
012
1 1 1
06
39 | July 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Vulnerabilities Disclosed in Industrial Control Systems
Source: Symantec1234
J J M A M F J
2015D N O S A1234
123
1 12
11 1
1Vulnerabilities
Unique Vendors Three vulnerabilities in industrial
control systems were reported by
one vendor in July.
Vulnerabilities Disclosed in Industrial Control Systems
Methodology
In some cases the details of a vulnerability are not publicly disclosed during the same month that
it was initially discovered. In these cases, our vulnerability metrics are updated to reflect the time
that the vulnerability was discovered, as opposed to the month it was disclosed. This can cause
fluctuations in the numbers reported for previous months when a new report is released.10 | July 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
New Malware Variants
OSX.RSPlug.A continues to be
the most commonly seen OS X
threat seen on OS X endpoints in July.Rank Malware NameJuly
PercentageMalware NameJune
Percentage
1 OSX.RSPlug.A 61.9% OSX.RSPlug.A 29.5%
2 OSX.Wirelurker 10.0% OSX.Keylogger 11.6%
3 OSX.Crisis 8.4% OSX.Klog.A 8.9%
4 OSX.Keylogger 4.8% OSX.Luaddit 7.8%
5 OSX.Klog.A 3.5% OSX.Wirelurker 7.1%
6 OSX.Luaddit 1.8% OSX.Flashback.K 5.4%
7 OSX.Stealbit.B 1.3% OSX.Stealbit.B 4.3%
8 OSX.Flashback.K 1.3% OSX.Freezer 3.2%
9 OSX.Freezer 1.1% OSX.Netweird 2.9%
10 OSX.Netweird 0.8% OSX.Okaz 2.5%
Top 10 Mac OS X Malware Blocked on OS X Endpoints
Source: Symantec
Top 10 Mac OSX Malware Blocked on OSX Endpoints Malware
New Malware Variants
Source: Symantec1020304050607080
J J M A M F J
2015D N O S A57.6
53.7
31.7
26.635.944.7
33.7
26.535.8
29.244.563.6MILLIONS There were more than 53.7
million new pieces of malware
created in July. While down from June, this is still well above the 40.3 million average seen over the last twelve months.11 | July 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Ransomware Over Time
Ransomware attacks were down
slightly in July, where over 413
thousand attacks were detected.
Ransomware Over Time
Source: Symantec100200300400500600700800
J J M A M F J
2015D N O S A477
413669734
693756
399544
354
248297738THOUSANDS
Crypto-Ransomware Over Time
Crypto-ransomware was up
during July, setting another high for 2015.
Crypto-Ransomware Over Time
Source: Symantec1020304050607080
J J M A M F J
2015D N O S A3134466272
36
2028
2123
1648THOUSANDS12 | July 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Malware Was Detected
The proportion of email traffic
containing malware decreased
again this month, down to the lowest levels seen since October of last year.100
150200
250
300
350
400J J M A M F J
2015D N O S A1 IN
Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Malware Was Detected
Source: SymantecInverse Graph: Smaller Number = Greater Risk319
337270
351329195207
237
274246207
246
Percent of Email Malware as URL vs. Attachment by Month
The percentage of email malware
that contains a URL remained
low this month, hovering around three percent.
Percent of Email Malware as URL vs. Attachment by Month
Source: Symantec1020304050
J J M A M F J
2015D N O S A36
714
538
3 3 3 34113 | July 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Industry July June
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 1 in 252.7 1 in 231.6
Services - Non Traditional 1 in 280.1 1 in 365.3
Public Administration 1 in 288.9 1 in 245.9
Wholesale 1 in 333.3 1 in 301.6
Services - Professional 1 in 338.0 1 in 305.8
Construction 1 in 376.3 1 in 305.8
Transportation, Communications,
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services1 in 392.4 1 in 230.2
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 1 in 416.4 1 in 481.5
Mining 1 in 438.3 1 in 371.5
Nonclassifiable Establishments 1 in 519.5 1 in 497.7
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious
by Industry Sector
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious by Industry Sector Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing
was the most targeted sector in
July, where one in every 252.7
emails contained malware.
Company Size July June
1-250 1 in 275.8 1 in 255.6
251-500 1 in 259.5 1 in 232.9
501-1000 1 in 351.1 1 in 318.1
1001-1500 1 in 389.5 1 in 292.2
1501-2500 1 in 373.2 1 in 164.0
2501+ 1 in 401.7 1 in 472.4
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious
by Organization Size
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious by Organization Size Organizations with 251-500
employees were most likely to be
targeted by malicious email in the month of July, where one in 259.5 emails was malicious.14 | July 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Mobile & Social Media
123456789
J J M A M F J
2015D N O S A
Android Mobile Malware Families by Month
Source: Symantec4
12356
3
03
128 In July there were four new
mobile malware families
discovered.
Android Mobile Malware Families by Month
There was an average of 42
Android malware variants per family in the month of in July.
1020304050
J J M A M F J
2015D N O S A
New Android Variants per Family by Month
Source: Symantec4042
3433373638 38 3839 39
36
New Android Variants per Family by Month15 | July 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Last 12 Months
Social Media
Source: Symantec20406080100
Comment
JackingFake
AppsLikejacking Fake
OfferingManual
Sharing482
12
0.11.6
Manual Sharing – These rely on victims to actually do the work of sharing
the scam by presenting them with intriguing videos, fake offers or messages that they share with their friends.
Fake Offering – These scams invite social network users to join a fake event or group
with incentives such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to sharecredentials with the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
Likejacking – Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website
buttons that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
Fake Apps – Users are invited to subscribe to an application that appears to be
integrated for use with a social network, but is not as described and may be used to steal credentials or harvest other personal data.
Comment Jacking – This attack is similar to the "Like" jacking where the attacker tricks the
user into submitting a comment about a link or site, which will then be posted to his/her wall.
Social Media In the last twelve months, 82
percent of social media threats
required end users to propagate them.
Fake offerings comprised 12
percent of social media threats.16 | July 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
505051
50.1%
+.4% pts49.7%
-1.8% pts51.5%
-0.6% pts
July June May
Overall Email Spam Rate
Source: Symantec
Overall Email Spam Rate The overall email spam rate in
July was 50.1 percent, up 0.4
percentage points from June.Spam
Industry July June
Mining 55.7% 56.1%
Manufacturing 53.8% 53.7%
Retail 53.0% 53.1%
Construction 53.0% 53.3%
Services - Professional 52.5% 52.6%
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 52.2% 52.3%
Wholesale 52.1% 52.2%
Nonclassifiable Establishments 52.0% 52.5%
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 51.9% 51.9%
Services - Non Traditional 51.9% 53.0%
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Industry Sector
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Industry Sector At 55.7 percent, the Mining
sector again had the highest spam rate during July. The Manufacturing sector came in
second with 53.8 percent.17 | July 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Company Size July June
1–250 52.3% 52.8%
251–500 52.6% 53.2%
501–1000 52.3% 52.4%
1001–1500 51.9% 51.9%
1501–2500 52.2% 52.1%
2501+ 52.4% 52.3%
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Organization Size
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Organization Size While all organization sizes had
around a 52 percent spam rate,
organizations with 251-500 employees had the highest rate at 52.6 percent.18 | July 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
About Symantec
More Information
Symantec Worldwide: http://www.symantec.com/
ISTR and Symantec Intelligence Resources: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/
Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer/Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC) is an information protection expert that helps people,
businesses and governments seeking the freedom to unlock the opportunities technology brings – anytime, anywhere. Founded in April 1982, Symantec, a Fortune 500 company, operating one of the largest global data-intelligence networks, has provided leading security, backup and availability solutions for where vital information is stored, accessed and shared. The company’s more than 20,000 employees reside in more than 50 countries. Ninety-nine percent of Fortune 500 companies are Symantec customers. In fiscal 2014, it recorded revenues of $6.7 billion. To learn more go to
www.symantec.com or connect with Symantec at: go.symantec.com/socialmedia.
|
Page 1 of 22
Symantec Intelligence
Symantec Intelligence Report: June 2011
Three-quarters of spam send from botnets in June, and th ree months on, Rustock botnet remains dormant as Cutwail
becomes most active; Pharmaceutical spam in decline as new Wiki- pharmacy brand emerges
Welcome to the June edition of the Symantec Intelligence repo rt, which for the first time combines the best research
and analysis from the Symantec.cloud MessageLabs Intelligen ce Report and the Symantec State of Spam & Phishing
Report. The new integrated report, the Symantec Intelligence Report, provides the latest analysis of cyber security
threats, trends and insights from the Symantec Intelli gence team concerning malwar e, spam, and other potentially
harmful business risks. The data used to compile the analys is for this combined report includes data from May and
June 2011.
Report highlights
Spam – 72.9% in June (a decrease of 2. 9 percentage points since May 2011): page 11
Phishing – One in 330.6 emails identified as phishing (a decrease of 0.05 percentage poi nts since May 2011): page 14
Malware – One in 300.7 emails in June contained malware (a decrease of 0.12 percentage poi nts since May 2011): page 15
Malicious Web sites – 5,415 Web sites blocked per day (an increase of 70.8% since May 2011): page 17
35.1% of all malicious domains blocked were new in June (a decrease of 1.7 percentage points since May 2011): page 17
20.3% of all Web-based malware blocked was new in June (a decrease of 4.3 percentage points since May 2011): page 17
Review of Spam-sending botnets in June 2011: page 3
Clicking to Watch Videos Leads to Pharmacy Spam: page 6
Wiki for Everything, Even for Spam: page 7
Phishers Return for Tax Returns: page 8
Fake Donations Continue to Haunt Japan: page 9
Spam Subject Line Analysis: page 12
Best Practices for Enterprises and Users: page 19
Introduction from the editor
Since the shutdown of the Rustock botnet in March1, spam volumes have never quite recovered as the volume of
spam in global circulation each day continues to fluctuate, as shown in figure 1, below.
The overall impact has been that spam now accounts for 72.9% of email in June, returning to the same level as in
April earlier this year. In June, 76.6% of this spam was being sent from botnets, compared with 83.1% in March. This
marks a return to the same level of output as at the end of 2010. On average during 2010, 88.2% of spam was sent
from botnets, falling to 77% by the end of the year. Despite these recent successes, botnets are still a dangerous
force on the Internet and can be used for a variety of other purposes, from conducting di stributed denial of service
attacks (DDoS), carrying out fraudulent click-thrus on unsus pecting Web sites for financial gain, hosting illegal Web
site content on infected computers (known as bots), har vesting personal data from infected users and installing
spyware to track the acti vities of those users.
Global spam has generally been falling since the shutdown of t he Spamit affiliate Web site in late September 2010,
and the takedown of Rustock has accelerated this decline. Spamit was one of the main affiliate Web sites through
which pharmaceutical spam was being promoted and pharmaceut ical spam levels have fallen considerably in recent
months. In the latest analysis, spam relating to pharmaceut ical products has fallen to approximately 40% of all spam
in June 2011. Pharmaceutical spam account ed for approximately 64.2% at the end of 2010.
1 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/has-rustock-botnet-ceased-spamming Page 2 of 22
Even though spam is currently at the lowest level it has been since the McColo takedown in November 2008, it is still
a huge problem In March, following the disruption of Ru stock, the largest spam-sending botnet, approximately 36.9
billion spam emails were in circulation each day during April. Th is number rose to 41.7 billion in May, before falling
back to 39.2 billion in June.
A longer-term view shows that for the same period last year, spam accounted for 121.5 billion emails in global
circulation each day, equivalent to 89.3% of email traffic in June 2010. Highlighting that over a twelve month period, a
drop of 68.7% in volume resulted in a fall of only 16. 4 percentage points in the overall global spam rate.
Figure 1 – Trend showing fluctuating global dai ly spam volume over twelve months
However, this does not mean that spammers are dead. Th is month’s report highlight s the changing nature of the
spam-sending botnet landscape and online pharmacy spam using two different angles: a spoof of an online video
sharing service and a new online pharmacy brand, perhaps se eking to exploit the popularity of the “wiki” name in a
number of high-profile Web sites. Also, May spam subject line analysis shows that adult spam continue to flourish.
This month we reviewed the state of the spam-sending botnet landscape, and concluded that despite earlier
predictions, Bagle has not taken over the role of Rustock fo llowing its shutdown; the main reason being that we could
not find any relevant connection between spam campaigns s ent by those two botnets. However, it did appear much
more likely that Grum has taken over at least in part some of the previous Rustock activity. Several spam events
occurred in which the two botnets were clearly interconnected.
I hope you enjoy reading this very first combined report, and pl ease feel free to contact me directly with any comments
or feedback as to what you like or dislike about this new format.
Paul Wood
Senior Intelligence Analyst, Symantec.cloud
[email protected]
@paulowoody ‐255075100125150175200225250
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Report analysis
Review of spam-sending botnets in June 2011
There have certainly been some major changes in the world of botnet-spam in 2011, especially since the previous
analysis from March2, in which we reported the impact of a coordina ted action led by Microsoft against the largest and
most active spam-sending botnet, Rustock, which was taken offline as a result. Three months on, this takedown
appears to have been completely effective and we have seen no spam whatsoever come from the former spamming
giant since March 16th.
In figure 2, below, it can be seen that in June, 76.6% of spam was being sent from botnet s; however, the global spam
volume is still much lower than earlier in the year, fo llowing the disruption of the Ru stock botnet. Moreover, global
spam has generally been falling since the shutdown of the Spamit affiliate Web site in September 2010, and the
takedown of Rustock has accelerated this decline. Even t hough spam is currently at the lowest level it has been since
the McColo takedown in November 2008, it is still a huge pr oblem, with an estimated 39.2 billion spam emails sent per
day globally (which equates to approximately 72.9% of global email).
Figure 2 – Proportion of spam sent from botnets since March 2011
At that time, it appeared that as Rustock’s dominance waned, Bagle was set to become its likely successor, as seen in
figure 3, below; however, the Cutwail botnet emerged to become the current dominant force in June. Cutwail is an
older, more established botnet, and has also been known for sending large volumes of email malware as well, particularly related to the Bredolab family of ma lware, which has been very active recently.
Pharmaceutical spam accounted for the vast majority of Rustock’s output, and since Spamit ceased operating,
Rustock had had periods where very little or even no spam was sent from its bots. Ho wever, these outages were
always short-lived (the longest being less than 48 hours). So the rapid decline of Bagle’s output since the end of April
is still unexplained. Almost all of its spam related to p harmaceutical products, and pot entially was one of the main
contenders to take on the business following Rustock’s demise.
The Symantec.cloud Intelligence team analyzed spam from both Rustock and Bagle since March 2011 and concluded
that Bagle has not taken over the role of Rustock following its shutdown. The main reason for this conclusion is that
we could not find any relevant connection between spam ca mpaigns sent by those two botnets. On the contrary,
looking in-depth at patterns obtained for the different spam features, their behaviors appeared to be very different;
therefore there was no evidenc e that spam campaigns previously distri buted by Rustock were being off-loaded to
Bagle.
2 http://www.symanteccloud.com/mlirep ort/MLI_2011_03_March_Final-EN.pdf 0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
Mar 2011 Apr 2011 May 2011Page 4 of 22
Figure 3 - Top ten spam-sending botnets (r elative volumes) since March 2011
However, it did appear much more likely that Grum has ta ken over at least in part some of the previous Rustock
activity. Several spam events occurred in which the two botne ts were clearly interconnected, by at least the subject
lines and the ‘ From:’ sender domains. Perhaps even more conclusively, we found that Grum had suddenly changed its
character set from ‘ISO-8859-1’ to ‘UTF-8’ (the latter mo re often used by Rustock). This change occurred between
March 10 and March 17, just a few hours after the Rustock ta kedown. Just prior to that, Rustock was also using UTF-
8 to encode its spam; such a coincidence may appear to be quite unusual. Meanwhile, analysis of the ‘ Subject:’ lines
used in spam messages, indicated that even though many botnets are involved in the distribution of pharmaceutical
spam, Rustock, and subsequently Grum, were the only ones t hat were using the registered trademark ® symbol in
their subject lines; perhaps another coincidence…
Furthermore, for each botnet, it seemed that the bot distribution of Grum was simila r to that of Rustock, but with much
fewer bots located in the ARIN region for the US, which could reflect the b107 operation undertaken by Microsoft and
others in the US against the Rust ock command and control servers.
On a Microsoft MSDN blog3, Terry Zink recently claimed that Rusto ck may be back, but under a new name and has
perhaps broken itself into smaller parts (o r smaller botnets) to be less detectable . He claims also that Darkmailer looks
a lot like Rustock, and it remains to be seen whether those claims can be veri fied independently. Certainly Darkmailer
has increased its output in recent weeks and for the first ti me appears in the top-ten list of spam sending botnets for
June.
Another long-standing botnet, Xarvester, has also increased its output since t he demise of Rustock. Xarvester has
been relatively quiet for a long time, but has recently come ba ck to the fore to become the second most active spam-
sending botnet in June, as shown in figure 4, below.
3 http://blogs.msdn.com/b/tzink/ archive/2011/05/23/has -anyone-stepped-i n-to-fill-rustock-s-gap.aspx 0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%100%
14 Mar 2011
17 Mar 201120 Mar 201123 Mar 201126 Mar 201129 Mar 2011
01 Apr 2011
04 Apr 201107 Apr 201110 Apr 201113 Apr 201116 Apr 201119 Apr 201122 Apr 2011
25 Apr 2011
28 Apr 2011
01 May 201104 May 201107 May 2011
10 May 2011
13 May 2011
16 May 2011
19 May 2011
22 May 2011
25 May 201128 May 2011
31 May 2011
03 Jun 201106 Jun 2011%ofSpam
bobaxPage 5 of 22
Botnet % of
spam spam/day spam/min Spam
/bot
/min estimated
botnet
size Country of Infection
Cutwail 16.1% 9,609,745,048 6,673,434 77 800k to
1200k India (10%), Russia (9%), Brazil
(8%)
Xarvester 6.7% 4,002,042,186 2,779,196 455 57k to 86k United Kingdom (18%), France
(13%), Italy (9%)
Maazben 3.1% 1,872,408,382 1,300,284 14 520k to
780k Republic of Korea (14%), Russia
(10%), India (10%)
Lethic 3.1% 1,824,416,511 1,266,956 45 230k to
340k Republic of Korea (25%), Russia
(15%), Ukraine (7%)
Grum 3.0% 1,801,605,428 1,251,115 140 200k to
290k Russia (14%), India (14%),
Ukraine (8%)
Bagle 2.7% 1,599,896,533 1,111,039 58 140k to
200k India (15%), Russia (1%),
Argentina (8%)
Fivetoone 2.3% 1,400,401,724 972,501 98 94k to
140k Vietnam (20%), Brazil (12%),
Indonesia (11%)
Festi 1.2% 691,992,804 480,551 166 25k to 37k India (10%), Vietnam (10%), Brazil (9%)
Bobax 0.4% 254,229,254 176,548 24 80k to
120k Ukraine (27%), India (18%),
Russia (18%)
DarkMailer 0.5% 42,575,225 29,566 351 1k to 1.5k France (27%), USA (16%), Germany (13%)
Other, smaller
Botnets 0.5% 22,277,510 15,470 321 62k to 95k
Unnamed Botnets 36.9% 21,962,912,697 15,252,023 196 660k to
990k
Total Botnet
Spam 76.6% 45,084,503,302 31,308,683 162
Non-botnet spam 23.4% 14, 510,023,657 10,076,405
Grand Total 59,594,526,959 41,385,088
Figure 4 – Most active spam-sending botnets in June 2011
As can seen from the chart in figure 5, below, with the demise of Rustock, the most common geographical sources of
spam have also changed, for example, there is less spam being sent from the US than identified previously, with less
than 2.8% of spam originating from the US, compared to 10.7% one year ago. This seems to have been largely due to
the disruption of Rustock, which had most of its bots located in the US and since those bots were no longer active, the
amount of spam from the count ry has dropped accordingly.
Country % of Spam
Korea, Republic of (South Korea) 11.2%
Russian Federation 11.1%
India 8.7%
Ukraine 6.1%
Brazil 5.3%
Vietnam 2.9%
United States 2.8%
United Kingdom 2.4%
Taiwan 2.4%
Romania 2.3%
Figure 5 – Geographical distribution of spam-sending botnets in June 2011
Conversely, the amount of spam coming from compromis ed machines in the Republic of Korea (South Korea) has
been approximately 3% for the past twelve months, but now ac counts for over 11%. This seems to be mostly due to
the increased output of the Maazben and Lethic botnets, which have a strong base in that region. Spam from Eastern
Europe has been fairly consistent, with Russia and Ukraine being the top sources. Page 6 of 22
It is also interesting to note that with the recent increase in output from the Xarvester botnet, it is fairly unique in that
the infected computers are almost exclusively based in Western European countries, including the UK and France.
Clicking to Watch Videos Leads to Pharmacy Spam
Spam messages promoting pharmaceutical products have bee n perhaps the most commonly seen spam attacks over
the past several years. Pharmaceutical products are deceptively marketed thro ugh spam emails employing a variety
of obfuscation techniques. Symantec saw an increase in pharmacy spam abusing well-known online video sharing
site.
Sample From and Subject lines observed in this spam attack are below.
From: [REMOVED] Service <service@[REMOVED].com>
Subject: [REMOVED] Administration sent you a me ssage: Your video on the TOP of [REMOVED]
Subject: [REMOVED] Service sent you a message: Best Unrated Videos To Watch
Subject: [REMOVED] Support sent you a message: Your vi deo has been removed due to terms of use violation
Figure 6 – Example of spam email purporting to contain hyperlink to video-sharing Web site
With these subject lines, the spammers have attempted to instill a sense of curiosity among the recipients. The spam
messages either state that the recipient ’s video features as a top video, such as in the example shown in figure 6
above, or that the recipient’s particular video has been removed due to a terms-of-use violation. The text,
accompanied by URL links in the message body, as in most ca ses, is the call to action in this spam campaign. The
included URLs which appear to link to the video sharing site are in fact spam URLs hosted on a hijacked domains.
When clicked, all URLs redirect to a Canadian Family P harmacy Web site as shown in figure 7 below, which was
hosted on a recently created domain owned by the spammer. Some of these domains were found to be registered in
Russia and France. The spammer, ironically, has placed a link to report spam which is just another redirect to the
same pharmacy Web page.
Page 7 of 22
Figure 7 – Example of Canadian Family Phar macy Web site linked from spam emails
The IP addresses involved in these spam attacks are par t of botnets and have been blacklisted for their past
involvement in such spam campaigns. It is likely that t hese messages were sent using multiple botnets to distribute
high-volume of spam.
Wiki for Everything, Even for Spam
Last month, Symantec Intelligence identified a new spam tact ic being used, which introduced the “Wiki” name prefix
for the promotion of fake pharmaceutical products re lating to a new pharmacy brand, WikiPharmacy. The “ Subject: ”
line in these attacks has a lot of r andomization contained in the text. The “ From: ” header is either fake or a hijacked
ISP account that gives a personalized appearance to the email.
Below are some subject lines that were observed in the spam samples:
Subject: wWIKIp
Subject: kWIKIx
Subject: yWIKIg
Subject: hWikiPharmacyl
Subject: oWikiPharmacyp Subject: uWikiPharmacym
Page 8 of 22
Figure 8 – Example of Wiki Pharmacy Web site linked from spam emails
In the example shown in figure 8 above, spammers are promoting pharmacy products at a discounted price using a
wiki-style layout. The Web page appears to belong to the Wi kiPharmacy brand. The volume of spam in this latest
attack is quite high. Needless to say is that the popularity of the wiki- name in a number of high-profile Web sites is
being exploited here, and users must be very careful not to enter personal details on these fake sites.
Here are some of the URL patterns seen in these samples:
http://sucullu.[REMOVED ].net/wiki14.html
http://cinar. [REMOVED ].org.tr/wiki14.html
http://jmleml. [REMOVED]].com/wiki14.html
http:// [REMOVED].com.br/wiki15.html http:// [REMOVED].com/wiki15.html
http://web164892.web2 3. [REMOVED].net/wiki15.html
A careful look at the “Subject” line is sufficient to identif y this type of spam. Beware of prowling predators who are
waiting to pounce on any opportunity. Please see the Best Practi ces section of the report for helpful tips in protecting
your computer.
Phishers Return for Tax Returns
The Income Tax Department of India recently announced4 that the last date for sending income tax returns for AY
2010-2011 has been extended to July 31, 2011. During 2010, phishers had plotted their phishing scams5 based on the
tax return deadline. As the deadline for tax returns of t he current financial year appr oaches, phishers have returned
with their stream of phishing sites.
This time, phishers have spoofed the Reserve Bank of India’ s Web site as a ploy for a tax refund scam. The phishing
site attempts to lure users by stating that the bank would take full responsibility for depositing the tax refund to the
user’s personal bank account. The user is prompted to select the name of the bank and enter their customer ID and
password. There is a list of eight banks to choose from . In this way, phishers intend to steal the confidential
4 https://incometaxindiaef iling.gov.in/portal/index.do
5 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/filing-deadline- extension-triggers-more-fake-offers-tax-refunds
Page 9 of 22
information of customers of several banks from a single phishing site. The following page asked for credit/debit card
number and PIN number. After these deta ils are entered, the phishing site disp lays a message acknowledging that the
request for the tax refund has been submitted successfully. The user is then redirected to the legitimate Web site of
Reserve Bank of India. If users fall victim to the phishi ng site, phishers will have stolen their information for financial
gain.
Symantec has been in contact with the Reserve Bank of I ndia. The bank has stated that emails sent in its name to
customers have been observed asking for bank account details. The Reserve Bank has clarif ied that it has not sent
any such email and that the Reserve Bank (or any bank) never issues communication asking for bank account details
for any purpose. The Reserve Bank has also appealed to me mbers of public to not respond to such email and to not
share their bank account details with anyone for any purpose.
Figure 9 – Example of fake phishing Web site used in tax refund scams
The phishing site used a numbered IP domain (for exampl e, domains like hxxp://255.255.255.255) hosted on servers
based in St Louis, USA. The same IP was used for hosti ng phishing sites of several other Indian banks. The IP
belongs to a Web site of a company that provides roof ing for houses. The IP of the company’s Web site was
compromised to host the phishing sites.
Page 10 of 22
Fake Donations Continue to Haunt Japan
A couple of months ago, Japan was hit by an earthquak e of magnitude 9.0. The earthquake and tsunamis that
followed caused severe calamity to the country. Phishers soon responded with their fake donation campaign6 in the
hopes of luring end users. Unfortunately, it seems that the phishers are continuing to use these fake donations as bait
in a recent phishing attack we observed.
In a fake donation campaign, phishers spoof the Web sites of charitable organizations and banks and use those fake
sites as bait. This time, they spoofed the German page of a popular payment gateway site with a bogus site that
asked for user login credentials. The contents of the page (in German) translated to “Japan needs your helpage
Support the relief efforts for the earthquake victims. Pl ease donate now.” The message was provided along with a
map of Japan that highlighted two cities from the affect ed region. The first city shown was the one near Japan’s
nuclear power plant, Fukushima, and the second was the capi tal city, Tokyo. The map also showed the epicenter of
the earthquake located undersea near the east coast of Japan.
Upon entering their credentials, users are redirected to t he legitimate Web site where they continue their activity,
unaware that they have provided their valuable login informat ion to phishers. Because the login credentials in question
are for a payment gateway site, the account is linked to us ers’ money by means of credit cards or bank accounts. If
the users have fell victim to the phishing site, phishers w ill have successfully stolen their personal information for
financial gain. The phishing attack was carried out using a t oolkit that utilized a single IP address, which resolved to
four domain names and was hosted on servers based in France.
6 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/phishers-have-no-mercy-japan Page 11 of 22
Global Trends & Content Analysis
Spam, phishing and malware data is captured through a variety of sources, including the Symantec Global Intelligence
Network, the Symantec Probe Network (a system of more than 5 million decoy accounts), Symantec.cloud and a
number of other Symantec security te chnologies. Skeptic™, the Symantec.clo ud proprietary heuristic technology is
also able to detect new and sophisticated targeted threats.
Data is collected in more than 86 countries from around the globe. Information is collected from over 8 billion email
messages and over 1 billion Web requests which are proc essed per day across 16 data centers, including malicious
code data which is collected from ov er 130 million systems in 86 countries worldwide. Symantec intelligence also
gathers phishing information through an extensive antifraud community of enter prises, security vendors, and more
than 50 million consumers.
These resources give the Symantec Intelligence analysts unp aralleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze,
and provide informed commentary on emerging trends in atta cks, malicious code activity , phishing, and spam. If there
is a malicious attack about to hit, we know about it firs t. We block it; we keep it from affecting our customers.
Spam Analysis
In June 2011, the global ratio of spam in email traffic de creased by 2.9 percentage point s since May 2011 to 72.9% (1
in 1.37 emails).
As the global spam level declined in June 2011, Saudi Ar abia became the most spammed geography, with a spam
rate of 82.2%, overtaking Russia, which moved into second position.
In the US, 73.7% of email was spam and 72.0% in Canada. The spam level in the UK was 72.6%. In The
Netherlands, spam accounted for 73.0% of email traffi c, 71.8% in Germany, 71.9% in Denmark and 70.4% in
Australia. In Hong Kong, 72.2% of email was blocked as spam and 71.2% in Singapore, compared with 69.2% in
Japan. Spam accounted for 72.3% of email tr affic in South Africa and 73.4% in Brazil. 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010Saudi Arabia
Russian Federation
China
Luxembourg
Hungary82.2%
79.4%
79.1%
76.8%
76.1%Automotive
Education
Manufacturing
Marketing/Media
Health Care75.0%
74.5%
74.5%
74.0%
73.8%1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+72.1%
72.0%
72.5%
73.2%
73.3%
73.2%
June 201175.8%
76.8%Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
201172.9%
Country May AprilChange
(% points)
United States 29% 31% -2
India 5% 4% +1
Russia 5% 5%
Brazil 5% 5%
Netherlands 5% 5%
Taiwan 3% 4% -1
South Korea 3% 3%
Uruguay 3% 3%
Ukraine 3% 2% +1
China 2% 3% -1Spam Sources
1
23
45Spam Rate
72.9%Page 12 of 22
In June, the Automotive industry sector became the most s pammed sector, with a spam rate of 75.0%. Spam levels
for the Education sector reached 74.5% and 73.1% for the Chemical & Pharmaceut ical sector; 72.7% for IT Services,
72.4% for Retail, 71.5% for Public Sector and 72.2% for Finance.
Global Spam Categories
Category Name June 2011
Pharmaceutical 40.0%
Adult/Sex/Dating 19.0%
Watches/Jewelry 17.5%
Newsletters 11.5%
Casino/Gambling 7.0%
Unknown 2.5%
Degrees/Diplomas 1.5%
Weight Loss 1.0%
Spam Subject Line Analysis
In the latest analysis, adult-related spam took over the t op spam subject line list. Online pharmacy spam subjects,
which dominated the list last month, slipped with first one being seen in 16th place.
Rank Total Spam: May 2011 Top Subject Lines No. of
Days Total Spam: April 2011 Top Subject Lines No. of
Days
1 Blank Subject line 31 Re: ru girl 24
2 Re: Windows 7, Office 2010, Adobe CS5 … 16 Blank Subject line 30
3 im online now 31 Re: Windows 7, Office 2010, Adobe CS5 … 12
4 my new pics :) 31 Save-80%-On-Viagra-Levitra-And-Cialis 14
5 drop me a line 31 Express Delivery system notification 7
6 r u online now? 31 Re:Hi 29
7 hi darling.. 31 Re: sale wiagrow 7
8 new email 31 Do you have problem with ErectileDysfunction?
ViagraCan help you and make sure it is a unique
drug for treatingImpotence. 16
9 found you :) 31 BuyV!AGRA (SildenafilCitrate) Generic Tablets –
Online Drugstore. ViagraCan help your ErectileDysfunction 16
10 my hot pics :) 31 Find Out How You Can Start Making $6487 a
Month At HOME 19
Spam URL TLD Distribution
TLD May April Change
(% points)
com 53.4% 55.0% -1.6
ru 19.2% 10.1% +9.1
info 14.9% 18.5% -3.6
net 5.5% 6.9% -1.4
Average Spam Message Size
Message Size May April Change
(% points)
0kb-5kb 62.33% 69.59% -7.26
5kb-10kb 24.23% 16.18% +8.05
10kb+ 13.44% 14.23% -0.79
Page 13 of 22
Spam Attack Vectors
0%4%8%12%16%
01 May
04 May
07 May
10 May
13 May
16 May
19 May
22 May
25 May
28 May
31 May
Attachment NDR MalwarePage 14 of 22
Phishing Analysis
In June, phishing activity decreased by 0.06 percent age points since May 2011; one in 286.7 emails (0.349%)
comprised some form of phishing attack.
South Africa remained the most targeted geography for phishi ng emails in June, with 1 in 111.7 emails identified as
phishing attacks. South Africa suffers from a high level of phishing activity targeting many of its four major national
banks, as well as other international financial institutions.
In the UK, phishing accounted for 1 in 130.2 emails. Phis hing levels for the US were 1 in 1,270 and 1 in 207.7 for
Canada. In Germany phishing levels were 1 in 1,375, 1 in 2,043 in Denmark and 1 in 543.7 in The Netherlands. In
Australia, phishing activity accounted for 1 in 565.2 emails and 1 in 2,404 in Hong Kong; for Japan it was 1 in 11,179
and 1 in 2,456 for Singapore. In Brazil, 1 in 409.8 emails were blocked as phishing attacks.
The Public Sector remained the most targeted by phishing ac tivity in June, with 1 in 83.7 emails comprising a phishing
attack. Phishing levels for the Chemical & Pharmaceutical sector were 1 in 897.3 and 1 in 798.3 for the IT Services
sector; 1 in 663.2 for Retail, 1 in 151.4 for Education and 1 in 160.8 for Finance.
Analysis of Phishing Websites
The number of phishing Web sites increased by 6.67 percent th is month, despite a small decline in the proportion of
phishing emails blocked. Automated toolkits and unique dom ains increased as compared to the previous month. The
number of phishing Web sites created by automated toolki ts increased by 24.82 perc ent and the number of unique
URLs increased slight ly by 0.26 percent.
Phishing Web sites using IP addresses rather than do main names (e.g. domains like http://255.255.255.255)
increased by 14.93 percent. Legitimate Web hosting services comprised 9 percent of all phishing, a decrease of 17.66
percent from the previous month. The number of non- English phishing sites saw an increase of 17.73 percent.
Among non-English phishing sites, Portuguese, Fren ch, Italian and Spanish were the highest in May.
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010South Africa
United Kingdom
Canada
United Arab EmiratesSweden1i n1 1 1 . 7
1 in 130.2
1 in 207.7
1 in 314.91 in 320.1Public Sector
Education
Finance
Non-Profit
Accom/Catering1i n8 3 . 7
1 in 151.4
1 in 160.8
1i n3 1 1 . 5
1 in 347.21-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+1i n3 2 2 . 6
1 in 490.1
1 in 689.3
1i n6 0 0 . 8
1i n7 0 9 . 1
1 in 263.2Phishing Rate
June 20111 in 330.6
1i n2 8 6 . 7
1i n2 8 9 . 7Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
20111 in 330.6
Country May April (% points)Phishing Sources
1
23 54
United States 44% 55% -11
Chile 15% unlisted N/A
Canada 5% 5%
Germany 5% 6% -1
United Kingdom 4% 6% -2
China 2% unlisted N/A
France 2% 3% -1
Netherlands 2% 2%
Russia 1% 2% -1
Aus tralia 1% 3% -2ChangePage 15 of 22
Geographic Location of Phishing Web Sites
Tactics of Phishing Distribution
Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks, by Industry Sector
June 2011Country May April (% points)Phishing Web Sites Locations
154 32
United States 51% 51%
Germany 6% 7% -1
United Kingdom 4% 5% -1
Canada 4% 3% 1
China 3% unlisted N/A
Colombia 3% 2% 1
France 2% 3% -1
Russia 2% 2%
Netherlands 2% 3% -1
Brazil 2% 2%Change
30.5%
1.4%
9.2%
4.1%
54.7%Automated Toolkits
Typosquatting
Free Web Hosting Services
IP Address Domains
Other Unique Domains
83%
16%
<1%
<1%Financial
Informations Services
Government
Others 50%
40%
4%
3%
2%
1%Retail
Communications
ISP
Retail Trade
Aviation
FoodPage 16 of 22
Malware Analysis
Email-borne Threats
The global ratio of email-borne viruses in email traffic wa s one in 300.7 emails (0.333%) in June, a decrease of 0.117
percentage points since May 2011.
In June, 46.7% of email-borne malware contained links to ma licious Web sites, an increa se of 16.6 percentage points
since May 2011. A large number of emails containing vari ants of Bredolab-related malware accounted for 12.3% of all
email-borne malware. Many variants of which were commonly a ttached as ZIP files, rather than hyperlinks, and as the
volume of these attacks diminished compared with the prev ious month, the relative proportion of attacks using
hyperlinks increased.
The UK remained the geography with the highest ratio of malicious emails in June, as one in 131.9 emails was
blocked as malicious in June.
In the US, virus levels for email-borne malware were 1 in 805.2 and 1 in 297.7 for Canada. In Germany virus activity
reached 1 in 721.0, 1 in 1,310 in Denmark and in The Nether lands 1 in 390.3. In Australia, 1 in 374.5 emails were
malicious and 1 in 666.5 in Hong Kong; for Japan it was 1 in 2,114, compared with 1 in 946.7 in Singapore. In South
Africa, 1 in 280.9 emails and 1 in 278.9 ema ils in Brazil contained malicious content.
With 1 in 73.1 emails being blocked as malicious, the Pub lic Sector remained the most targeted industry in June.
Virus levels for the Chemical & Pharmaceutical sector were 1 in 509.4 and 1 in 513.8 for the IT Services sector; 1 in
532.8 for Retail, 1 in 130.4 for Education and 1 in 182.3 for Finance.
The table below shows the most frequently blocked email-bo rne malware for June, many of which take advantage of
malicious hyperlinks. Overall, 12.3% of email-borne malware was associated with Bredolab, Sasfis, SpyEye and Zeus
variants.
Malware Name % Malware
Exploit/SuspLink-d1f2 4.85%
Link-Trojan.Generic.5483393-4cac 2.89%
W32/NewMalware!836b 2.41%
W32/NewMalware!0575 2.39%
Exploit/Link-FakeAdobeReader-8069 2.32%
Trojan.Bredolab!eml-1f08 1.97%
Exploit/LinkAliasPostcard-d361 1.52%
W32/Packed.Generic-7946 1.46%
W32/Bredolab.gen!eml 1.36%
Exploit/FakeAttach-844a 1.39% 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010United Kingdom
Luxembourg
United Arab Emirates
Brazil
South Africa1 in 131.9
1 in 188.1
1 in 275.0
1 in 278.9
1 in 280.9Public Sector
Education
Finance
Accom/Catering
Non-Profit1i n7 3 . 1
1 in 130.4
1i n1 8 2 . 3
1 in 267.4
1 in 267.51-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+1 in 342.6
1 in 380.8
1 in 478.2
1i n4 4 0 . 0
1i n4 9 5 . 2
1 in 242.8Virus Rate
June 20111 in 300.7
1i n2 2 2 . 3
1i n2 5 9 . 2Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
20111 in 300.7Page 17 of 22
Web-based Malware Threats
In June, MessageLabs Intelligence identified an average of 5,415 Web sites each day harboring malware and other
potentially unwanted programs including spyware and adware; an increase of 70.8% since May 2011. This reflects the
rate at which Web sites are being compromised or created fo r the purpose of spreading malicious content. Often this
number is higher when Web-based malware is in circulati on for a longer period of time to widen its potential spread
and increase its longevity. The 70.8% rise marks a return to the highest rate since December 2010, as can be seen in
the chart below; the rate had previously been diminishing during the first half of 2011.
As detection for Web-based malware increases, the number of new Web sites blocked decreases and the proportion
of new malware begins to rise, but initially on fewer Web site s. Further analysis reveals that 35.1% of all malicious
domains blocked were new in June; a decrease of 1. 7 percentage points compared with May 2011. Additionally,
20.3% of all Web-based malware blocked was new in June; a decrease of 4.3 percentage points since the previous
month.
The chart above shows the increase in the number of new spyware and adware Web sites blocked each day on
average during June compared with the equivalent num ber of Web-based malware Web sites blocked each day.
The most common trigger for policy-based filtering app lied by Symantec MessageLabs Web Security.cloud for its
business clients was for the “Advertisements & Popups” cate gory, which accounted for 45.0% of blocked Web activity
in June. The second most frequently blocked traffic was ca tegorized as Social Networking, and accounted for 15.8%
of URL-based filtering activity blocked, equival ent to one in every 6.3 Web sites blocked.
Web Policy Risks from Inappropriate Use
Many organizations allow access to so cial networking Web sites, but facilitat e access logging so that usage patterns
can be tracked and in some cases implement policies to only permit access at certain times of the day and block
access at all other times. This information is often us ed to address performance management issues, perhaps in the
event of lost productivity due to social networking abuse.
Activity related to Streaming Media policies resulted in 8.6% of URL-based filtering blocks in June. Streaming media is
increasingly popular when there are major sporting events or hi gh profile international news stories, which often result
in an increased number of blocks, as businesses seek to pr eserve valuable bandwidth for other purposes. This rate is
equivalent to one in every 11.6 Web sites blocked.
2008 2009 2010 2011Symantec.cloud Web Security Services Activity:
New Malware Sites per Day
New sites with spyware
New sites with web viruses
Total196/day
5,219/day
5,415/day
June 2011
Policy-Based Filtering
Advertisement and Popups
Social Networking
Streaming Media
ChatPeer-To-Peer
Computing and Internet
Search
Games
Hosting Sites
Adult/Sexually ExplicitW e bV i r u s e sa n dT r o j a n s
Trojan:GIF/GIFrame.gen!A
Trojan:HTML/GIFrame.gen!B
Packed.Generic.114
Infostealer.Gampass
Trojan.Generic.KD.232446
Exploit/Link-JavaScript-3f9f
Trojan.Gen
Trojan.Script.12023
W32.Almanahe.B
Trojan.FakeAVPotentially Unwanted Programs
PUP:Zugo.C
PUP:W32/CnsMin.S
PUP:Generic.171138
PUP:Zwunzi!gen3PUP:Generic.168911
PUP:Clkpotato!gen2
PUP:Generic.9001
PUP:Generic.167772
PUP:Generic.175061PUP:Generic.178280
June 201145.0%
15.8%
8.6%
3.8%3.0%
2.9%
2.0%
2.0%
1.7%1.6%21.1%
19.2%
17.1%
7.0%4.2%
2.9%
2.2%
2.1%
1.5%1.4%63.5%
7.3%
3.5%
3.2%2.8%
2.4%
1.9%
1.9%
1.4%1.3%Symantec.cloud Web Security Services Activity:Page 18 of 22
Endpoint Security Threats
The endpoint is often the last line of defense and analysis ; however, the endpoint can often be the first-line of defense
against attacks that spread using USB storage devices and insecure network connections. The threats found here can
shed light on the wider nature of threats confronting busi nesses, especially from blended attacks and threats facing
mobile workers. Attacks reaching the endpoint are likely to have already circumvented other layers of protection that
may already be deployed, such as gateway filtering.
The table below shows the malware most frequently blocke d targeting endpoint devices for the last month. This
includes data from endpoint devices protected by Symantec technology around the world, including data from clients
which may not be using other layers of protection, such as Symantec Web Security.cloud or Symantec Email
AntiVirus.cloud.
Malware Name7 % Malware
W32.Ramnit!html 9.47%
W32.Sality.AE 8.49%
Trojan.Bamital 8.23%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 7.59% W32.DownadupageB 3.76%
W32.Virut.CF 2.70%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 2.50% W32.SillyFDC 1.99%
Trojan.ADH.2 1.91%
Trojan.ADH 1.90%
Generic Detection* 16.9%
The most frequently blocked malware for the last month was W32.Ramnit!html. This is a generic detection for .HTML
files infected by W32.Ramnit8, a worm that spreads through removable driv es and by infecting executable files. The
worm spreads by encrypting and then appen ding itself to files with .DLL, .EXE and .HTM extensions. Variants of the
Ramnit worm accounted for 17.4% of all malicious so ftware blocked by endpoint protection technology in June.
For much of 2010, W32.Sality.AE had been t he most prevalent malicious threat blocked at the endpoint; however,
since May it has remained the second most pr evalent malware blocked at the endpoint.
* Many new viruses and Trojans are based on earlier versions, where code has been copied or altered to create a
new strain, or variant. Often these variants are created us ing toolkits and hundreds of thousands of variants can be
created from the same piece of malware. This has become a popular tactic to evade signature-based detection, as
each variant would traditionally need its own sign ature to be correctly identified and blocked.
By deploying techniques, such as heuristic analysis and generic detection, it is possible to correctly identify and block
several variants of the same malware families, as well as id entify new forms of malicious code that seek to exploit
certain vulnerabilities that can be identi fied generically. Approximately 16.9% of the most frequently blocked malware
last month was identified and blocked using generic detection.
7For further information on these threats, please visit: http ://www.symantec.com/business/securi ty_response/landing/threats.jsp
8 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/ writeup.jsp?docid=2010-011922-2056-99&tabid=2 Page 19 of 22
Best Practice Guidelines for Enterprises
1. Employ defense-in-depth strategies : Emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive
systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protection method. This should
include the deployment of regularly updated firewalls, as well as gateway antivirus, intrusion detection,
intrusion protection systems, and Web security gateway solutions throughout the network.
2. Monitor for network threat, vu lnerabilities and brand abuse. Monitor for network intrusions, propagation
attempts and other suspicious traffic patterns, iden tify attempted connections to known malicious or
suspicious hosts. Receive alerts for new vulnerabilit ies and threats across vendor platforms for proactive
remediation. Track brand abuse via domain alerting and fictitious site reporting.
3. Antivirus on endpoints is not enough: On endpoints, signature-based antivirus alone is not enough to
protect against today’s threats and Web-based attack toolkits. Deploy and use a comprehensive endpoint
security product that includes additi onal layers of protection including
o Endpoint intrusion prevention that protects agai nst un-patched vulnerabilities from being exploited,
protects against social engineering attacks and stops malware from reaching endpoints;
o Browser protection for protection a gainst obfuscated Web-based attacks;
o Consider cloud-based malware prevention to prov ide proactive protection a gainst unknown threats;
o File and Web-based reputation solutions that prov ide a risk-and-reputation rating of any application
and Web site to prevent rapidly mutating and polymorphic malware;
o Behavioral prevention capabilities that look at t he behavior of applications and malware and prevent
malware;
o Application control settings that can prevent app lications and browser plug-ins from downloading
unauthorized malicious content;
o Device control settings that prevent and li mit the types of USB devices to be used.
4. Use encryption to protect sensitive data: Implement and enforce a security policy whereby sensitive data is
encrypted. Access to sensitive information should be re stricted. This should include a Data Loss Protection
(DLP) solution, which is a system to identify, monitor, and protect data. This not only serves to prevent data
breaches, but can also help mitigate the damage of potential data leaks from within an organization.
5. Use Data Loss Prevention to help prevent data breaches: Implement a DLP solution that can discover
where sensitive data resides, monitor its use and prot ect it from loss. Data loss prevention should be
implemented to monitor the flow of data as it leaves the organization over the network and monitor copying
sensitive data to external devices or Web sites. DLP should be configured to identify and block suspicious
copying or downloading of sensitive data. DLP should al so be used to identify conf idential or sensitive data
assets on network file systems and PCs so that appro priate data protection measures like encryption can be
used to reduce the risk of loss.
6. Implement a removable media policy . Where practical, restrict unautho rized devices such as external
portable hard-drives and other removable media. Su ch devices can both introduce malware as well as
facilitate intellectual property breaches—intentional or unintentional. If external media devices are permitted,
automatically scan them for viruses upon connection to the network and use a DLP solution to monitor and
restrict copying confidential data to une ncrypted external storage devices.
7. Update your security countermeasures frequently and rapidly: With more than 286M variants of malware
detected by Symantec in 2010, ent erprises should be updating security virus and intrusion prevention
definitions at least daily, if not multiple times a day.
8. Be aggressive on your updating and patching: Update, patch and migrate from outdated and insecure
browsers, applications and browser plug-ins to the la test available versions using the vendors’ automatic
update mechanisms. Most software vendors work diligent ly to patch exploited software vulnerabilities;
however, such patches can only be effective if adopted in the field. Be wary of deploying standard corporate
images containing older versions of browsers, applicat ions, and browser plug-ins that are outdated and
insecure. Wherever possible, automate patch deploy ments to maintain protection against vulnerabilities
across the organization.
9. Enforce an effective password policy . Ensure passwords are strong; at least 8-10 characters long and
include a mixture of letters and numbers. Encourage user s to avoid re-using the same passwords on multiple
Web sites and sharing of passwords with others should be forbidden. Passwords should be changed regularly, at least every 90 days. Avoid writing down passwords. Page 20 of 22
10. Restrict email attachments: Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments
that are commonly used to spread vi ruses, such as .VBS, .BAT, .EXE, .PIF, and .SCR files. Enterprises
should investigate policies for .PDFs that are allowed to be included as email attachments.
11. Ensure that you have infection and incident response procedures in place :
o Ensure that you have y our security vendors cont act information, know w ho you will call, and what
steps you will take if you have one or more infected systems;
o Ensure that a backup-and-restore solution is in plac e in order to restore lost or compromised data in
the event of successful attack or catastrophic data loss;
o Make use of post-infection detection capabilities fr om Web gateway, endpoint security solutions and
firewalls to identify infected systems;
o Isolate infected computers to prevent the risk of further infection within the organization;
o If network services are exploited by malicious code or some other threat, disable or block access to
those services until a patch is applied;
o Perform a forensic analysis on any infected com puters and restore those using trusted media.
12. Educate users on the changed threat landscape:
o Do not open attachments unless they are expect ed and come from a known and trusted source, and
do not execute software that is downloaded from the Internet (if such actions are permitted) unless
the download has been scanned for viruses;
o Be cautious when clicking on URLs in emails or social media program s, even when coming from
trusted sources and friends;
o Do not click on shortened URLs without previewi ng or expanding them first using available tools and
plug-ins;
o Recommend that users be cautious of information they provide on social networking solutions that
could be used to target them in an attack or tr ick them to open malicious URLs or attachments;
o Be suspicious of search engine results and only click through to trusted sources when conducting
searches—especially on topics that are hot in the media;
o Deploy Web browser URL reputation plug-in solution s that display the reputation of Web sites from
searches;
o Only download software (if allowed) from corporat e shares or directly from the vendors Web site;
o If users see a warning indicating that they are “i nfected” after clicking on a URL or using a search
engine (fake antivirus infections), have users close or quit the browser using Alt-F4, CTRL+W or the
task manager.
Page 21 of 22
Best Practice Guidelines for Users and Consumers
1. Protect yourself : Use a modern Internet security solution that includes the following capabilities for maximum
protection against malicious code and other threats:
o Antivirus (file and heuristic based) and malware behavioral prevention can prevents unknown
malicious threats from executing;
o Bidirectional firewalls will block malware from exploiting potentially vulnerable applications and
services running on your computer;
o Intrusion prevention to protection against Web-a ttack toolkits, unpatched vulnerabilities, and social
engineering attacks;
o Browser protection to protect agains t obfuscated Web-based attacks;
o Reputation-based tools that che ck the reputation and trust of a f ile and Web site before downloading;
URL reputation and safety ratings for Web sites found through search engines.
2. Keep up to date : Keep virus definitions and security content updat ed at least daily if not hourly. By deploying
the latest virus definitions, you can protect your comp uter against the latest viruses and malware known to be
spreading in the wild. Update your operating system, W eb browser, browser plug-ins, and applications to the
latest updated versions using the aut omatic updating capability of your pr ograms, if available. Running out-of-
date versions can put you at risk from being exploited by Web-based attacks.
3. Know what you are doing : Be aware that malware or applications t hat try to trick you into thinking your
computer is infected can be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file-sharing programs,
free downloads, and freeware and shar eware versions of software.
o Downloading “free” “cracked” or “pirated” versions of software can also contain malware or include
social engineering attacks that include programs that try to trick you into th inking your computer is
infected and getting you to pay money to have it removed.
o Be careful which Web sites you visit on the Web. While malware ca n still come from mainstream Web
sites, it can easily come from less reputable si tes sharing pornography, gambling and stolen software.
o Read end-user license agreements (EULAs) carefully and understand all terms before agreeing to
them as some security risks can be installed afte r an end user has accepted the EULA or because of
that acceptance.
4. Use an effective password policy: Ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers, and change
them often. Passwords should not consist of words fr om the dictionary. Do not use the same password for
multiple applications or Web sites. Use complex passwords (upper/lowercase and punctuation) or
passphrases.
5. Think before you click : Never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless you expect it and trust
the sender. Even from trusted users, be suspicious.
o Be cautious when clicking on URLs in emails, so cial media programs even when coming from trusted
sources and friends. Do not blindly click on sh ortened URLs without expanding them first using
previews or plug-ins.
o Do not click on links in social media applications with catchy titles or phrases even from friends. If you
do click on the URL, you may end up “liking it” and se nding it to all of your friends even by clicking
anywhere on the page. Close or quit your browser instead.
o Use a Web browser URL re putation solution that shows the reput ation and safety rating of Web sites
from searches. Be suspicious of search engine resu lts; only click through to trusted sources when
conducting searches, especially on t opics that are hot in the media.
o Be suspicious of warnings that pop-up asking y ou to install media players, document viewers and
security updates; only download software di rectly from the vendor’s Web site.
6. Guard your personal data : Limit the amount of personal informat ion you make publicly available on the
Internet (including and especially social networks) as it may be harvested and used in malicious activities
such as targeted attacks, phishing scams.
o Never disclose any confidential personal or financia l information unless and until you can confirm that
any request for such information is legitimate.
|
Page 1 of 19
Symantec Intelligence
Symantec Intelligence Report: June 2012
A second look at Flamer, targeted attacks in the first half of 2012, and how attackers attempt targeted attacks
Welcome to the June edition of the Symantec Intelligence report , which provid es the latest analysis of cyber security
threats, trends , and insights from the Symantec Intelligence team concerning malware, spam, and other potentially
harmful business risks . The data used to compile the analysis for this report includes data from January through June
2012.
Report highlights
• Spam – 66.8 percent (a decrease of 1. 0 percentage points since May ): page 10
• Phishing – One in 467.6 emails identified as phishing (a n increase of 0. 04 percentage points since May ): page 13
• Malware – One in 316.5 emails contained malware (a n increase of 0. 04 percentage points since May ): page 15
• Malicious Web sites – 2,106 Web sites blocked per day (a n decrease of 51.7 percent since May): page 16
• What we know about W32.Flamer that we didn’t last month: page 2
• A look at targeted attacks for the first six mon ths of 2012: page 3
• In-depth look a recently attempted targeted attack : page 6
Introduction
This month we conclude our findings on the recent W32.Flamer threat . We show how there is a connection to Stuxnet
and Duqu, discuss what we know about who may have created the threat, and highlight more information about what
the threat can do.
We also take another look at targeted attacks in general to see what has changed since we last analyzed them in
detail. We show how attacks have increased in the first half of 2012, what sectors are being targeted, and how there
has been a shift in the size of companies that are being targeted.
Finally, we look in -depth at an attempted targeted attack recently carrie d out against a company in the aerospace
industr y. Breaking the attack down, we look at how the attackers attempt to entice employees in the company into
launching malicious code that would give them access to the company’s network, and what they could have done had
the attack been successful.
I hope you enjoy reading this month’s edition of the report, and please feel free to contact me directly with any
comments or feedback.
Paul Wood, Cyber Security Intelligence Manager
[email protected]
@paulowoody
Page 2 of 19
Report analysis
W32.Flamer: What we know now
When releasing our May report, the media was alight with news about the discovery of Flamer. As we went to
publication, analysis was still ongoing and it comes as no surprise that new information has come to light, which has
both expanded and changed what we know about this threat.
In the May Report we answered a series of questions about Flamer based o n what we knew at the time. Now that the
threat has been thoroughly analyzed, let’s go back and answer some of these questions in further detail .
Is Flamer related to Stuxnet and Duqu?
As it turns out, there is a connection. Early versions of Stuxnet conta ined a module called “Resource 207”, which
handled the spreading of the threat through USB and network drives. The code used for this propagation technique is
identical in both Stuxnet and Flamer.
It appears as though this code was written for Flamer, and then co -opted for use in Stuxnet. Then in 2010, Resource
207 was pulled from Stuxnet and replaced by a different module that was used to spread the threat. Where or not
Flamer and Stuxnet were developed by the same group of attackers, at the very least thi s shows that they shared
code when developing the threats.
Who made Flamer?
A lot of circumstantial information on this topic has come to light recently. While there is a high probability that a nation
state was involved in the development of this threat, no smoking gun exists that unquestionably implicates any
particular source. What we can say with a high degree of certainty is that the developers behind Flamer were likely
well-funded and well -organized. Anything beyond that is still in the realm of specu lation.
What does Flamer do?
We mentioned previously that Flamer gathers information from the computers that it compromises. However, the sheer breadth of the information it gathers is largely unparalleled in the threat landscape. Trying to catalog all the
information that Flamer scoops up has become a daunting task
1—the extent is that large. The question becomes less
about what it can gather, but if there is any inform ation on a system that it could not, once resident on the computer.
In the last month we’ve learned much more about how Flamer spreads. Interestingly, it does not spread automatically,
as the vast majority of traditional worms do. The threat must be instructed to spread by the attackers, giving the folks
behind Flamer significant control over how, when, and to what computers the threat will compromise. This level of
control helps to explain how Flamer managed to stay hidden in the threat landscape for so long.
Of particular note is the way Flamer can spread as a fake update to Windows. The threat does this by utilizing a digital
certificate supplied by Microsoft .2 This certificate, originating from a registered Terminal Services Licensing server,
chained all the way up to the Microsoft Root Authority. This certificate improperly allowed code signing, w hich Flamer
utilized to push it s executable through W indows Update to targeted computers as though they were valid Microsoft
executables. Exactly how the attackers behind Flamer managed to obtain the certificate remains somewhat of a mystery, but Microsoft has since revoked the trust of the certificates in question.
How come it hasn’t been detected before?
One of the main objectives of a targeted attack is for the threat to remain off the radar while carrying out its malicious
actions. Flamer was extremely good at this. It spread using incredibly covert methods, like Windows Update, and only
when the attackers wished it to. The threat only garnered international attention when its behavior changed —the
threat apparently went of the offensive3 and drew attention to itself.
Targeted attacks often aim to gather information about the system and network topology for use in further attacks.
Flamer seems to have done just that: it gathered reams of sensitive information that it then sent back to the attac kers.
1 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/w32flamer -enormous -data-collection
2 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/w32flamer -leveraging- microsoft- digital -certificates
3 http://www.bbc.com/news/technology -17811565 Page 3 of 19
What really makes Flamer stand out as a targeted attack is how small the infection was —almost all instances of the
threat reside in a fairly localized area in the Middle East. The attack gathered a large amount of data from a small
number of computers.
In the grander scheme of things, very few computers were impacted by Flamer. But that is not to say that the threat,
and targeted attacks like it, isn’t a concern for security professionals and users alike. As we discuss in the next
section, targeted attack s are a force to be reckoned with in today’s threat landscape.
Targeted Attack Analysis: The first six months of 2012
We last discussed targeted attack data in the Internet Security Threat Report Volum e 17,4 which showed a significant
growth in the number of targeted attacks in 2011, and also identified government and public sector organizations as
the most commonly attacked. How does the first half of 2012 compare?
Growth of targeted attacks
After reac hing a record high in December of 154 attacks per day, daily attacks dipped briefly in January before
returning to similar levels in February. For the most part, the daily attack average remained around this level for the
first half of 2012. This would hav e resulted in an average increase in targeted attacks per day of around 24% for the
first half of 2012. The notable exception to this leveling off (discounted in the above, average increase ) is the month of
April, where the targeted attacks went through the roof, at an average of 468 per day.
Figure 1 – Average targeted attacks per day during the first six months of 2012
A large amount of the increase can be attributed to one Symantec. cloud customer that came under a particularly
intense attack. This is a very rare occurrence in terms of targeted attacks, where an attacker generally attempts the
digital equivalent of putting on a disguise to sneak into a restricted area. In contrast, this particular attack would be
more akin to lowering your shoulder and running full speed into the front door.
4 http://www.symantec.com/threatreport 55 144 136 468
151 151
0100200300400500
Jan Feb Mar Apr May JunPage 4 of 19
Once this attack subsided, the numbers returned to their previous levels in May and stayed almost exactly the same in
June, further supporting the idea that this increase was an anomaly, as opposed to a trend. Given the nature and
sheer scale of this attack, along with its ability to skew other data, we have removed it from the rest of our analysis.
Most frequently targeted industries
The breakdown for overall trends for industries targeted has remained largely the same in the first half of 2012 as it
was in 2011. However, we’ve made some adjustments as to how industry data is displayed in order to give a clearer
picture of where the attacker’s efforts are being concentrated.
Figure 2 – Average number of targeted attacks blocked by Symantec.cloud per day by industry sector
Clearly the Defense industry has been the targeted industry of choice in the first half of the year, with an average of
7.3 attacks per day. In the past we’ve included this industry in the ov erall government sector, but with all other
government sectors combined receiving around 1.1 targeted attacks per day on average, breaking Defense off into its
own category helps indicate just how much attention this sector receives from attackers.
The Ch emical/Pharmaceutical and Manufacturing sector maintain the number two and three spots. These targets
have clearly received a smaller percentage of overall attention than in 2011, but the Chemical/Pharmaceutical sector are still hit by 1 in every 5 targete d attacks, while Manufacturing still accounts for almost 10% of all targeted attacks.
Targeted attacks by organization size
Larger organizations with more than 2500 employees continue to be the primary target of targeted attacks. However, there has been a shift from large companies towards small companies over the last six months . More than 3 6% of all
targeted attacks are aimed at small companies, compared to 18% at the end of 2011. In fact, when looking at the
trends month -by-month, there appears to be a direct correlation between a rise in attacks against small companies
and a drop in attacks against larger ones. Attackers could very well be diverting resources directly from one group to
the other. 1 every
3 days 1 every
5 days 2.9
per day 7.3
per day
1 every
1.5 days 1.1
per day
1 every
5 days 1.5
per day
1 every
3.5 days 1 every
2.6 days 1.1
per day
0.01.02.03.04.05.06.07.08.0Page 5 of 19
This shift could be based on a perception that smaller bus iness may be an easier point of entry. Without a full IT staff
to look after attacks, smaller businesses could be seen as a weaker link in the supply chain. For instance, an email
that appears to come from a particular individual of note (in reality a spoofed From address) could find itself
automatically forwarded on to business contacts or partners within larger organizations within the same industry.
Figure 3 – Average number of targeted attacks blocked by Symantec.cloud per day by company size
Targete d attacks by geographical distribution
Finally, looking at countries that are attacked and the possible origins of these attacks , the United States tops both
lists. In fact, many countries appear in both lists , such as Japan, China, and the United Kingdom.
It’s worth noting that source countries do not automatically equate to “attacking countries ”. The actual attackers often
use previously compromised computers as proxies . This afford s the attack er some level of anonym ity, since many
such attacks can only be traced back to these systems.
An attacker may also find it easier to gain access to a system using a proxy within the same country as the computer
they hope to compromise. In fact, in four of the top five source countries, their own country is either the first or second-
most targeted country .
57.7
4.6 4.6 4.2 17.4 68.9
0.0010.0020.0030.0040.0050.0060.0070.00
1-250 251-500 501-1000 1001-1500 1501-2500 2501+Page 6 of 19
Source Countries
Geography Percentage
of attacks Number of
attacks
United States 31.27% 9859
Japan 17.78% 5606
Malaysia 10.99% 3464
China 10.89% 3434
Taiwan 9.97% 3143
Singapore 5.01% 1581
Poland 3.26% 1029
Greece 3.25% 1025
United Kingdom 1.05% 332
Pakistan 1.02% 321
Attacked Countries
Banging on the Door: How targeted attackers breach a network
Let’s take a look at a real -world example, where a particular company has been targeted, but our Symantec .cloud
products have detected and blocked the attacks. This particular company is part of the international aerospace
industry, manufacturing and maintaining aircraft, both civil and military, in three continents.
The line of attack used in this scenario, as is the case for many targeted attacks, is to send emails that contain
malicious attachments. The attackers appear to have gathered a fairly long list of email addresses for the company.
How exactly they obtained this list remains unclear, but it could be as easy as performing an internet search for a
string with the company’s domain name and the ‘@’ symbol, then compiling a list from the results.
Next, the attackers decided to mimic the email address of a prom inent executive from another organization involved in
the aerospace filed and related sectors. The attackers could have chosen to pretend to be this individual based on
past business dealings —something that could also be gleamed from an Internet search.
The contents of the mail center around the topic of healthcare reform in the US, and what this means for US
employers.
Page 7 of 19
Now at first glance, this topic may not seem all that relevant to a company that is located outside of the US. However,
there are a few things that could make it worth a second look to someone in this company, enticing them to open the
attachment. First, a large portion of this company’s business comes from US companies. With the changes to US
healthcare law, there has been a lot of discu ssion on how this can impact a US company’s bottom line, ultimately
determining how much capital it will spend on other things. This is a topic that could very well make an aerospace company sit up and take notice, especially if it can impact overall order s from its US customers.
Still, the level of interest of an aerospace company in this topic is tenuous at best, but the importance is driven home
based on a few other items. For instance, the Subject of the email begins with “FW: [CLASSIFIED]” in big, cap ital
letters. While the sender’s company also works in the aerospace industry, they have ties to the intelligence community
as well , and could appear to have insider information on upcoming changes to the healthcare system. The forwarded
message body appears to come from a US Congressman, lending further credence to the idea that this information
may be legitimate. Finally, the attachment name seems in line with the topic, being called “Overview of Health
Reform.doc”, which sounds like a tidy summary of the situation.
Things get particularly interesting when we look at the attachment. If the curiosity of an unsuspecting user is piqued
and the attachment is opened, Word asks the user to enter a password, which can be found in the body of the email,
and lends further credibility to the idea that this information is confidential. The attackers in this case have also craftily
used Microsoft Office’s built -in encryption here, with the hopes to sneak the malicious code contained with the file past
antivirus softwar e.
After the password is entered, the document appears for a split second before Word “crashes”. In truth, the specially crafted document contains a copy of Trojan.Mdropper .
5 In this brief moment, the Trojan has exploited a vulnerability in
Word, installing its malicious payload on the computer, leading Word to close, but leaving a copy of the actual, legitimate Word document behind in the Temp folder. The Trojan then launches this temp file, and the document
5 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005- 031911- 0600- 99
Page 8 of 19
appears to open as though nothing was wrong. This all takes a matter of seconds, and could easily go unnoticed by
less observant users.
The document displayed is indeed about healthcare reform, but appears to be content that has simply been lifted from
the Internet —nothing “confidential” here. A user may simply end up scanning this document, then closing it, none the
wiser that a Trojan has been installed in the background.
The Trojan itself appears primed to slurp up all sorts of information from within the compromised computer. It collects IP addresses, user names, and system information and sends this information to a remote server. With back door
capabilities included as well, this opens the door for the attackers to perform all sorts of actions, scouring the network
for vulnerable systems, updating the malicious code, and generally gathering whatever information they are interested
in.
Fortunately the attackers were not successful, and the attacks were blocked. This attack was distributed over a 60 -
hour period, with emails going out at seemingly random intervals —sometimes three mails in one hour, other times
after a two hour break. Each of the 96 emails sent was identical ; only the addressee was changed.
The attackers seemed to set the target ed company aside at this point, but only for a few weeks. The next wave of
attempted intrusions came from a spoofed email address from the parent company of the target. The Subject and
attachment were both titled “Strategy Meeting” and the attackers didn’t even bother to hide the payload in a Word
document, simply attaching a copy of Backdoor .Darkmoon
6 as an .exe file. The emails were sent out over a 9.5 hour
period, covering an entirely new batch of email addresses within the company. 259 emails were sent in all, but this time a targeted user might see two or even three copies of the email appearing in their inbox.
Given how this attack was blocked, we do not know exactly what the attackers’ goals were. However, given the highly
sensitive nature of an aerospace company that works on both civil and military projects, it is possible that they c ould
have been attempting to steal information on aerospace design documents or manufacturing processes. Alternatively,
6 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005- 081910- 3934- 99
Page 9 of 19
given how this company works as part of a larger international aerospace network, across multiple continents, and has
close associations with other aerospace companies and organizations, the attackers may have viewed this company
as an entry point, hoping to gain access and then work their way across the network of contacts and partnerships in
the greater aerospace industry. Still, given how this attack was blocked by Symantec .cloud technology, we can only
speculate as to the true motives of the attackers.
All in all, this whole targeted attack method might seem sloppy on the part of the attackers. There are plenty of weak
points where the attack might not work, and it takes a lot of justification to rationalize why someone would fall for this
ruse hook, line, and sinker. But keep in mind that there were hundreds emails send out across the company. All the
attackers need in an attack like this is for one copy to be successfully installed. After that the doors are open.
Page 10 of 19
Global Trends & Content Analysis
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the world through the
Symantec™ Global Intelligen ce Network, which is made up of more than 64.6 million attack sensors and records
thousands of events per second. This network monitors attack activity in more than 200 countries and territories
through a combination of Symantec products and services such as Symantec DeepSight™ Threat Management
System, Symantec™ Managed Security Services and Norton™ consumer products, and other third -party data
sources.
In addition, Symantec maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currentl y consisting
of more than 47,662 recorded vulnerabilities (spanning more than two decades) from over 15,967 vendors
representing over 40,006 products.
Spam, phishing and malware data is captured through a variety of sources, including the Symantec Probe Network, a
system of more than 5 million decoy accounts; Symantec.cloud and a number of other Symantec security
technologies. Skeptic™, the Symantec.cloud proprietary heuristic technology is able to detect new and sophisticated
targeted threats before reac hing customers’ networks. Over 8 billion email messages and more than 1.4 billion Web
requests are processed each day across 15 data centers. Symantec also gathers phishing information through an
extensive antifraud community of enterprises, security vendors, and more than 50 million consumers.
These resources give Symantec’s analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze, and provide
informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and spam. The result is the
annual Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, which gives enterprises and consumers the essential information to
secure their systems effectively now and into the future.
Spam Analysis
In June, the global ratio of spam in email traffic fel l by 1.0 percentage point since May, to 66.8 percent ( 1 in 1.5
emails ). This follows the continuing trend of global spam levels diminishing gradually since the latter part of 2011 .
Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Hungary
Saudi Arabia
Russian Federation
Brazil
China 74.3%
73.9%
71.1%
71.0% 71.0%Automotive
Non-Profit
Education
Marketing/Media
Manufacturing 69.7%
68.3%
68.2%
67.9%
67.7% 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 66.4%
66.6%
66.4%
67.4% 67.4%
66.9% Spam Rate
June 2012 66.8%
67.8%
66.8% Last Month: Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012
15.1%
7.2%
6.5%
4.9%
4.8%
4.1%
4.0%
3.4%
3.0%
2.9% India
Viet Nam
Brazil
Pakistan
Canada
United States
Korea (South)
Russian Federation
Saudi Arabia
Poland 66.8%Page 11 of 19
As the global spam rate decreased, Hungary was the most spammed geography in June, with a spam rate of 74.3
percent.
In the US, 66.4 percent of email was spam and 66.5 percent in Canada. The spam level in the UK was 67.2 percent.
In the Netherlands, spam accounted for 68.9 percent of email traffic, 66.3 percent in Germany, 66.0 percent in
Denmark and 66.1 percent in Australia. In Hong Kong, 65.9 percent of email was blocked as spam and 65.8 percent in
Singapore, compared with 63.4 percent in Japan. Spam accounted for 66.8 percent of email traffic in S outh Africa and
71.0 percent in Brazil.
The Automotive sector was again the most spammed industry sector in June , with a spam rate of 69.7 percent ; the
spam rate for the Education sector was 68.2 percent. The spam rate for the Chemical & Pharmaceutical sec tor was
66.8 percent , compared with 66.4 percent for IT Services, 66.0 percent for Retail, 67.2 percent for Public Sector and
66.2 percent for Finance.
The spam rate for small to medium -sized businesses (1- 250) was 66.4 percent , compared with 66.9 percent for large
enterprises (2500+).
Global Spam Categories
The most common category of spam in June is related to the Adult/Sex/Dating category, though declining slightly
since May, comprising a smaller overall percentage for the second month in a row.
Category Name June
2012 May
2012
Adult/Sex/Dating 64.28% 70.16%
Pharma 18.76 % 19.22%
Casino 5.24% 0.88%
Jobs 4.72% 3.47%
Watches 2.94% 3.45%
Software 1.67% 1.78%
Degrees 0.47% 0.57%
419/Scam/Lotto 0.27% 0.13%
Mobile 0.09% 0.14%
Newsletters 0.08% 0.03%
Weight Loss <0.01% 0.08%
Spam URL Distribution based on Top Level Domain Name
The proportion of spam exploiting URLs in the .com top- level domain increased in June, as highlighted in the table
below. This is in line with a slight decrease in all other top- level domains this month.
TLD June
2012 May
2012
.com 74.7% 66.6%
.ru 4.1% 7.5%
.net 4.6% 5.8%
.br 2.9% 3.4%
Average Spam Message Size
In June, the proportion of spam emails that were 5Kb in size or less decreased by almost 8 percentage points.
Furthermore, the proportion of spam messages that were greater than 10Kb in size increased by 4 percent , as can be
seen in the following table.
Message Size June
2012 May
2012
0Kb – 5Kb 43.1% 51.1%
5Kb – 10Kb 33.3% 29.1%
>10Kb 23.6% 19.8% Page 12 of 19
Spam Attack Vectors
June highlights the increase in spam emails resulting in NDRs (spam related non -delivery reports) . In these cases, the
recipient email addresses are invalid or bounced by their service provider. The month appears to have been a quiet
period for spam containing malicious attachments or links. The proportion of spam that contained a malicious
attachment or link decreased, with just one spike of spam activity during the middle of the period, as shown in the
chart below.
NDR spam, as shown in the chart above, is often as a result of widespread dictionary attacks during spam campaigns ,
where spammers make use of databases containing first and last names and combine them to generate random email
addresses . A higher -level of activity is indicative of spammers that are seeking to build their distribution lists by
ignoring the invalid recipient emails in the bounce- backs . The list can then be used for more targeted spam attacks
containing malicious attachment s or link s. This might indicate a pattern followed by spammers in harvesting the email
addresses for some months and using those addresses for targeted attacks in other months. 0.0%4.5%9.0%13.5%18.0%
NDR MalwarePage 13 of 19
Phishing Analysis
In June, the global phishing rate increased by 0.04 percentage points, taking the global average rate to one in 467.6
emails (0. 21 percent) that comprised some form of phishing attack.
The Netherlands was the country most targeted in June , with one in 54.4 emails identified as phishing attacks . South
Africa was the second- most targeted country, with one in 170.9 emails identified as phishing attacks.
Phishing levels for the US reached one in 1,261.5 and one in 332 for Canada. In Germany phishing levels were one
in 1,043.7, one in 478.2 in Denmark. In Australia, phishing activity accounted for one in 708.2 emails and one in
1,182.9 in Hong Kong; for Japan it was one in 8,005.7 and one in 2,679 for Singapore. In Brazil one in 713 emails was
blocked as phishing.
The Public Sector remained the most target ed by phishing activity in June , with one in 113.9 emails comprising a
phishing attack. Phishing levels for the Chemical & Pharmaceutical sector reached one in 1,201.2 and one in 986.8
for the IT Services sector, one in 835.3 for Retail, one in 330.6 for Education, one in 247.5 for Finance, and one in
2,114.3 for the Automotive industry .
Phishing attacks targeting small to medium -sized businesses (1 -250) accounted for one in 401.6 emails, compared
with one in 402.9 for large enterprises (2500+).
Analy sis of Phishing Web site s
Overall, t he number of phishing Web sites decreased by 12.8 percent in June compared with the previous month. The
number of phishing Web sites created by automated toolkits decreased by approximately 10.4 percent, accounting for
approximately 55.5 percent of phishing Web sites , including attacks against well -known social networking Web sites
and social networking apps .
The number of unique phishing domains increased by 13.8 percent and phishing Web sites using IP addresses in
place of domain names (for example, http://255.255.255.255), increased by 0.2 percent. The use of legitimate Web
services for hosting phishing Web sites accounted for approximately 3.9 percent of all phishing Web sites, a n increase
of 0.7 percent compared with the previous month. The number of non- English phishing Web sites decreased by 2
percent. Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Netherlands
South Africa
United Kingdom
Canada
Denmark 1 in 54.4
1 in 170.9
1 in 285.5
1 in 332.0
1 in 478.2 Public Sector
Finance
Accom/Catering
Education
Marketing/Media 1 in 113.9
1 in 247.5
1 in 317.0
1 in 330.6
1 in 439.5 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 1 in 401.6
1 in 651.1
1 in 801.5
1 in 722.7
1 in 957.3
1 in 402.9 Phishing Rate
June 2012 1 in 467.6
1 in 568.3
1 in 456.5 Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012
52.1%
7.0%
3.7%
3.0%
2.9%
2.7%
2.6%
2.2%
2.0% 1.7% United States
Germany
Brazil
Russia
Canada United Kingdom
France
Netherlands
China
South Korea 1 in 467.6Page 14 of 19
Of the non- English phishing Web sites , Portuguese, French, Italian, and German were among the highest in June .
Geographic Location of Phishing Web Sites
Tactics of Phishing Distribution
Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks, by Industry
June2011PhishingWebSitesLocations
*Note:DatalagsonemonthCountry May*
UnitedStates 48.8%
Germany 6.3%
Brazil 4.7%
UnitedKingdom 3.9%
France 3.0%
Canada 2.9%
China 2.6%
Russia 2.4%
Netherlands 2.2%
Turkey 1.6%April
51.5%
6.4%
3.5%
3.6%
2.7%
3.1%
2.5%
2.5%
2.6%
0.8%
0.8% 4.0% 2.8% 36.9% 55.5%
TyposquattingFree Web Hosting SitesIP Address DomainsOther Unique DomainsAutomated Toolkits
0.011% 0.019% 0.048% 0.078% 0.439% 0.919% 1.1% 1.4% 15.0% 34.9% 46.1%
ISPInsuranceSecurityRetail TradeGovernmentTelecommunicationsCommunicationsRetailInformation ServicesE-CommerceBankingPage 15 of 19
Malware Analysis
Email -borne Threats
The global ratio of email -borne viruses in email traffic was one in 316.5 emails (0. 31 percent ) in June, a n increase of
0.04 percentage points since May.
In June, 27.4 percent of email -borne malware contained links to malicious Web sites, 1.2 percentage points lower than
May.
The Netherlands was the geography with the highest ratio of malicious email activity in June, with one in 48.6 emails
identified as malicious .
In the UK , one in 209.9 emails was identified as malicious , compared with South Africa , where one in 414.1 emails
was blocked as malicious . The v irus rate for email -borne malware in the US was one in 570.2 and one in 271.3 in
Canada. In Germany virus activity reached one in 385.4 and one in 438.4 in Denmark. In Australia, one in 598.3
emails was malicious. For Japan the rate was one in 2,372.8, compared with one in 862.7 in Singapore. In Brazil, one
in 403.8 emails contained malicious content.
With one in 89.8 emails being blocked as malicious, the Public Sector remained the most targeted industry in June .
The v irus rate for the Chemical & Pharmaceutical sector reached one in 402.1 and one in 502.1 for the IT Services
sector; one in 522.0 for Retail, one in 219.8 for Education and one in 204.2 for Finance.
Malicious email -borne attacks destined for small to medium -sized businesses (1-250) accounted for one in 306.8
emails, compared with one in 269.0 for large enterprises (2500+) .
Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Netherlands
United Kingdom
Canada
Austria 1 in 48.6
1 in 209.9 Luxembourg 1 in 160.4
1 in 271.3
1 in 308.8 Public Sector
Finance
Education
Marketing/Media
Accom/Catering 1 in 89.8
1 in 204.2
1 in 219.8
1 in 230.7
1 in 279.3 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 1 in 360.8
1 in 377.1
1 in 408.5
1 in 391.4
1 in 451.4
1 in 269.0Virus Rate
June 2012 1 in 316.5
1 in 365.1
1 in 323.8 Last Month: Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012
56.6%
15.4%
8.7%
3.1%
2.5%
2.3%
2.0%
1.4%
1.2%
1.2% United Kingdom
United States
Hong Kong
South Africa
Sweden
Canada
Australia
India
Brazil
Netherlands 1 in 316.5Page 16 of 19
Frequently Blocked E mail- borne Malware
The table below shows the most frequen tly blocked email -borne malware for June , many of which relate to generic
variants of malicious attachments and malicious hy perlinks distributed in emails. Approximately 45.4 percent of all
email -borne malware was identified and blocked using generic detection.
Malware identified generically as aggressive strains of polymorphic malware accounted for 36.2 percent of all email -
borne malware blocked in June.
Malware Name % Malware
W32/Bredolab.gen!eml.k 17.43%
W32/Bredolab.gen!eml.j 9.49%
Link-Exploit/Spam -3a71 3.82%
W32/NewMalware!16a0 3.48%
Exploit/Link -generic -ee68 3.22%
W32/NewMalware -Generic -a2a1 -3477 2.34%
HTML/JS -Encrypted.gen 1.69%
Trojan.Bredolab 1.56%
W32/Bredolab.gen!eml -01cd 1.52%
Link-Gen:Variant.Barys.1516.dam 1.43%
The top- ten list of most frequently blocked malware accounted for approximately 33.7% of all email -borne malware
blocked in June .
Web -based Malware Threats
In June, Symantec Intelligence identified an average of 2,106 Web site s each day harboring malware and other
potentially unwanted programs including spyware and adware; an decrease of 51.7 percent since May. This reflects
the rate at which Web site s are being compromised or created for the purpose of spreading malicious content. Often
this number is higher when Web-based malware is in circulation for a longer period of time to widen its potential
spread and increase its longevity.
As detection for Web-based malwar e increases, the number of new Web sites blocked decreases and the proportion
of new malware begins to rise, but initially on fewer Web site s. Further analysis reveals that 44.1 percent of all
malicious domains blocked were new in June; an increase of 3.7 percentage points compared with May. Additionally,
13.0 percent of all Web- based malware blocked was new in June; a decrease of 0.3 percentage points since May.
The chart above shows the decrease i n the number of new spyware and adware Web sites blocked each day on
average during June compared with the equivalent number of Web -based malware Web sites blocked each day.
Web Policy Risks from Inappropriate Use
The most common trigger for policy -based f iltering applied by Symantec Web Security.cloud for its business clients
was for the “Advertisements & Popups” category, which accounted for 29.9 percent of blocked Web activity in June.
Web-based advertisements pose a potential risk though the use of “mal vertisements,” or malicious advertisements.
These may occur as the result of a legitimate online ad- provider being compromised and a banner ad being used to
serve malware on an otherwise harmless Web site . New Malware Sites per Day
New sites with spyware
New sites with web viruses
Total 14/day
2,092/day
2,106/dayWeb Security Services Activity:
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012Page 17 of 19
The second most frequently blocked traffic was categorized as Social Networking, account ing for 19.6 percent of URL -
based filtering activity blocked, equivalent to approximately one in every 5 Web site s blocked. Many organizations
allow access to social networking Web sites, but facilitate access loggi ng so that usage patterns can be tracked and in
some cases implement policies to only permit access at certain times of the day and block access at all other times.
This information is often used to address performance management issues, perhaps in the event of lost productivity
due to social networking abuse.
Activity related to streaming m edia policies resulted in 8.4 percent of URL -based filtering blocks in June . Streaming
media is increasingly popular when there are major sporting events or high profil e international news stories . This
activity often result s in an increased number of blocks, as businesses seek to preserve valuable bandwidth for other
purposes. This rate is equivalent to one in every 11 Web site s blocked.
Endpoint Security Threats
The endpoint is often the last line of defense and analysis; however, the endpoint can often be the first -line of defense
against attacks that spread using USB storage devices and insecure network connections . The threats found here can
shed light on the w ider nature of threats confronting businesses, especially from blended attacks and threats facing
mobile workers . Attacks reaching the endpoint are likely to have already circumvented other layers of protection that
may already be deployed, such as gateway filtering.
The table below shows the malware most frequently blocked targeting endpoint devices for the last month. This
includes data from endpoint devices protected by Symantec technology around the world, including data from clients
which may not be us ing other layers of protection, such as Symantec Web Security.cloud or Symantec Email
AntiVirus.cloud.
Malware Name7 % Malware
WS.Trojan.H 29.06%
W32.Sality.AE 6.81%
W32.Ramnit!html 6.01%
W32.Ramnit.B 5.61%
W32.Downadup.B 3.82%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 3.53%
W32.Virut.CF 2.07%
Trojan.ADH.2 2.00%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 1.83%
Trojan.ADH 1.43%
The most frequently blocked malware for the last month was WS.Trojan.H8. WS.Trojan.H is a generic , cloud -based ,
heuristic detection for files that possess characteristics of an as -yet unclassified threat. Files detected by this heuristic
are deemed by Symantec to pose a risk to users and are therefore blocked from accessing the computer.
7For further information on these threats, please visit: http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/landing/threats.js p
Web Security Services Activity:
Policy-Based Filtering
Advertisement and Popups
Social Networking
Chat Streaming Media Computing and Internet Peer- To-Peer
Hosting Sites Search
News
BlogsWebViruses and Trojans
Trojan.JS.Agent.GH P
JS:Trojan.Crypt.DS
JS.Runfore
Trojan.Script.12023
Trojan.Iframe.ADD
Trojan.JS.Agent.GHF
Gen: Trojan.Heu r.LP.dq7@ayfQ64
Trojan.JS.Iframe.BLX
Trojan.Malscript!JS
Trojan.HTML.Redirecto r.AI Potentially Unwanted Programs
PUP:ActualSpy
PUP:Keylogger
PUP:Lop
PUP:AcePasswdSnif PUP:Aniquro. Toolba r.A
PUP:9231
PUP:Nirsoft.Sni ffPass. A
Riskware:W32/SuperScan. A
PUP:Heu r.cmKfbiBPZXoO
PUP:Heu r.cmKfbiJBX0mO
June 2012 29.9% 19.6%
15.5%
8.4% 3.4%
3.0%
2.5%
1.7%
1.5% 1.5% 13.5%
6.8%
5.2% 3.4% 3.3% 3.3% 2.7% 2.5%
2.4%
2.3% 0.7%
5.2%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
2.4%
0.2%
1.2%
2.6%
0.2%Page 18 of 19
For much of 2012 , variants of W32.Sality.AE9 and W32.Ramnit10 had been the most prevalent malicious threat s
blocked at the endpoint. Variants of W32.Ramnit accounted for approximately 15.3% of all malware blocked at the
endpoint in June, compared with 7.5% for all variants of W32.Sality.
Approximately 10.9 percent of the most frequently blocked malware last month was identified and blocked using
generic detection. Many new viruses and Trojans are based on earlier versions, where code has been copied or
altered to create a new strain, or variant. Often these variants are created using toolkits and hundreds of thousands of
variants can be created from the same piece of malware. This has become a popular tactic to evade signature -based
detection, as each variant would traditionally need its own signature to be correctly identified and blocked.
By deploying techniques, such as heuristic analysis and generic detection, it ’s possible to correctly identify and block
several variants of the same malware families, as well as identify new forms of malicious code that s eek to exploit
certain vulnerabilities that can be identified generically.
8 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011- 102713- 4647- 99
9 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006- 011714- 3948- 99
10 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010- 011922- 2056- 99
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
JUNE 2013p. 2
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2013
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
3 Executive Summary
4 BIG NUMBERS
7 TIMELINE
10 VULNERABILITIES
11 Total Vulnerabilities Disclosed by Month
11 Browser Vulnerabilities
11 Plug-in Vulnerabilities
12 SPAM, PHISHING, & MALWARE
13 Spam
13 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Geography
13 Global Spam Volume Per Day
13 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Industry
14 Top 10 Sources of Spam
14 Average Spam Message Size
14 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Company Size
14 Spam by Category
14 Spam URL Distribution Based on Top Level Domain Name
15 Phishing
15 Top 10 Sources of Phishing
15 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Company Size
15 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Industry
15 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Geography16 Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks
16 Phishing Distribution in June
17 Malware
17 Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected
17 Top 10 Email Virus Sources
18 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Industry
18 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Geographic Location
18 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Company Size
19 Endpoint Security
19 Top 10 Most Frequently Blocked Malware
19 Web-based malware
20 Policy Based Filtering
20 Policy Based Filtering
21 DATA BREACHES
22 Timeline of Data Breaches, Jan 2012 – May 2013
22 Top Industries for Data Breaches in June
23 About Symantec
23 More Informationp. 3
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2013
Executive Summary
Welcome to the June edition of the Symantec Intelligence report. The
Symantec Intelligence aims to provide the latest analysis of cyber
security threats, trends, and insights concerning malware, spam,
and other potentially harmful business risks.
In this month’s report we take a look at what has happened in a number of key sections of the
threat landscape.
We delve deeper into the trends surrounding vulnerabilities, including zero-day, browser, and plug-
in vulnerabilities. We also take a look at phishing trends over the last few months, as well as what
has been happening in both the spam and malicious code areas of the threat landscape. Finally we
include the latest high-level stats surrounding data breaches in June.
We’ve also provided a run-down on the biggest security stories for the month of June, recapping
what happened and what that means to our readers.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to contact us with any comments or
feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat Analyst
[email protected]. 4
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2013
BIG NUMBERSp. 5
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2013
Overall Email Phishing Rate:
Overall Email Phishing Rate:
MayApril
1 in 4641 in 5621 in 497
MayApr
JunHIGHER NUMBER = LOWER RISK
Overall Email Virus Rate:
Overall Email Virus Rate:
MayApril
1 in 3261 in 4201 in 269 Apr
May
JunHIGHER NUMBER = LOWER RISK
Estimated Global
Email Spam Rate Per DayEstimated Global
Email Spam Rate Per Day
SPAM AS PERCENT OF ALL EMAIL
April May June0102030405060708090100
72% 67% 64%
New Vulnerabilities
New Vulnerabilities
518
518
May
633
April
510
510
June
May0April0
June4
Mobile
VulnerabilitiesMobile
Vulnerabilities
p. 6
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2013
Data Breaches
Data Breaches
84,068,805
85
Number of Identities
Exposed (Year-to-Date)Number of Breaches
(Year-to-Date)
Mobile Malware VariantsMobile Malware Variants
Apr
May
Jun
504312219
p. 7
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2013
TIMELINEp. 8
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2013
June Security Timeline
June04
The most advanced Android Trojan seen to-date emerged in
early June. Android.Obad , or Obad for short, has capabilities
that include opening a back door, downloading files, stealing
information, sending SMS messages to premium numbers, and
spreading malware using Bluetooth. Obad’s sophistication lies
in its use of code obfuscation and string encryption, making
analysis difficult. Its discovery seems to not only suggest that
the numbers of mobile threats are increasing, but also their level
of complexity.
June05
Symantec and the Ponemon Institute released the 2013 Cost
of Data Breach Study: Global Analysis at the beginning of this
month. The study revealed that the average global cost of a data
breach in 2012 was US$136 per record. The study also found
that sectors with strong regulation, such as pharmaceutical,
financial, and healthcare industries encountered heavier costs
than other sectors.
The report analyses the data breach experiences of 277
organizations across nine countries. It shows that while the
global cost per compromised customer record had risen from
the previous year, the total cost per data breach incident in the
United States had declined. The authors credited this drop to the
introduction of incident response policies, the strengthening of
security programs, and the appointment of chief information
security officers (CISOs) in many enterprises. The fact that two-
thirds of data breaches examined in the report involved human
errors and systems problems indicates that such measures can
ultimately help companies control and reduce incidents of data
breaches and their associated costs.
June06
1,462 compromised computers used to spread the Citadel
malware, a financial Trojan , were taken offline in early June.
Citadel is a variant of the Zeus botnet ( Trojan.Zbot ) and monitors
a user’s Internet activities to gain login credentials for online
banking services. Its botnets have reportedly stolen US$500
million from bank accounts in the last 18 months. In existence
since 2011, and typically sold for around $3000 in strict and
secretive underground forums, Citadel is a full crimeware kit , providing the attackers with payload builders, a command-and-
control (C&C) server infrastructure, and configuration scripts to
target various banks.
The joint private/public take down operation was a concerted
global effort involving the digital crimes unit of a well-known
software corporation and law enforcement agencies across a
host of countries.
While the take down has not completely destroyed Citadel,
it does represent a significant disruption to the work of
underground attackers designing and using the Citadel botnet.
June06
A well-known professional networking website joined the
procession of organizations adopting two-factor authentication
(2FA). 2013 could already be described as the year of 2FA with
several high-profile social media and information technology
companies introducing the feature to help safeguard users’
data. When accessing the site from an unrecognized device, the
site’s users will now have to log in using their password and a
verification code sent to them via text message .
Companies are by and large hoping that 2FA will help to
prevent embarrassing and costly data breaches. However, the
introduction of two-factor authentication should not allow for
any security complacency. For example, two threats that can
overcome 2FA (detected by Symantec as SymbOS.Zeusmitmo
and Android.Zeusmitmo ) for mobile devices were discovered a
few years ago. These threats are used by criminals in tandem
with the desktop Zeus Trojan ( Trojan.Zbot ) to intercept incoming
SMS messages from banking websites.
June13
A new initiative that aims to curb incidents of smartphone
theft has emerged in the US. The Secure Our Smartphones
initiative endorses the introduction of a “kill switch” in each
smartphone, which would render devices unusable if stolen. The
multi-state initiative is led by state attorneys from New York and
San Francisco and has already engaged with four smartphone
manufacturers, the market leaders in production, in the hope of
pushing technological innovation towards combating ever-rising
smartphone crime . In San Francisco, 50 percent of robberies in p. 9
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2013
June Security Timeline
2012 involved a phone and in New York, 20 percent involved the
theft of a smartphone. These stats alone seem to suggest that
such an initiative and solution is widely needed.
June20
June 20 marked the latest campaign from Anonymous ,
Operation Petrol or #OpPetrol. The hacktivist collective followed
on from recent and somewhat similar operations such as
#OpUSA and #OpIsrael.
Anonymous stated that they would mainly target oil and gas
companies in the UK, US, Canada, Israel, China, Italy, France,
Russia and Germany along with government departments
involved in oil and gas in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar.
There were at least two data leaks posted online, reportedly
from large multinational oil companies, as well as a list of
websites that have been hacked where attackers replaced the
homepage with a message from Anonymous.
June22
A bug within a tool of a popular social network system has
exposed the personal data of 6 million users . The discrepancy
occurred when a user downloads a copy of his or her data .
This user may receive the phone number and email addresses
of a person who they are connected to, but do not have the
appropriate permissions to receive such information.
In related news, Symantec’s new Norton Mobile Insight
technology helped discover another privacy leak a few days later.
It flagged the social network’s Android app after discovering
the problem. When a user launched the app, before they even
logging in, their phone number was sent to the network’s
servers without their knowledge. A significant portion of the
seven million Android app users may have been affected by this.
Symantec duly informed of the social network of the leak, and a
fix for the issue is to be included in their next Android release.
June25
The Korean peninsula observed a series of cyberattacks
coinciding with the 63rd anniversary of the start of the Korean
War. While multiple attacks were conducted by multiple perpetrators, Symantec observed that one of the distributed
denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against South Korean
government websites can be directly linked to the DarkSeoul
gang and Trojan.Castov.
Symantec has found that the DarkSeoul gang is responsible
for high-profile attacks against South Korean targets over the
past four years. The group was behind the Jokra attacks seen
in March of this year, which wiped hard drives in South Korean
banks and media broadcasters and it also undertook the May
attacks on South Korean financial firms.
DarkSeoul’s campaigns follow similar methods of operation.
They focus on high-profile South Korean targets on historically
significant dates. The attacks usually involve hard disk wiping
or DDoS attacks and they often use legitimate third party
patching tools to spread across corporate networks.
As a result of Symantec’s investigations into the group, a new
threat was found which can delete files from infected computers.
Detected as Trojan.Korhigh , this disk wiper can delete images,
installers, videos, drivers, and libraries. It can gather system
information about the compromised computer and can also
overwrite the Master Boot Record (MBR) which can make the
computer unusable.p. 10
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2013
VULNERABILITIESp. 11
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2013
Vulnerabilities
At a Glance
• The total number of
vulnerabilities in 2013 is
up 16 percent so far when
compared to what we saw
in the same time period
in 2012.
• The number of zero day
vulnerabilities discovered
for first half of 2013 has
already reached a total of
12 so far. In comparison,
there were only 14 found
for the whole of 2012.
• In June 2013, there
were 510 reported
vulnerabilities and 3,285
in total for 2013 to-date,
compared with 5,291
vulnerabilities in total
reported in 2012.
• The average number of
vulnerabilities reported
each month in 2013 so
far is up, at 300 and 600
per month, compared
with 300 to 500 in 2012.
• Google’s Chrome browser
continues to lead in
terms of reporting
browser vulnerabilities,
comprising 39 percent so
far this year.
• Oracle’s Java browser
plug-in leads with the
most number of reported
plug-in vulnerabilities,
making up almost half so
far for the year-to-date.
• Four mobile
vulnerabilities were
reported in June, after
two consecutive months
with no disclosures, for a
total of 37 in 2013 so far.Total Vulnerabilities Disclosed by Month
Source: Symantec
0100200300400500600
JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
2013DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
2012
Plug-in Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
5101520253035404550%Oracle Sun Java
Adobe Flash PlayerAdobe Acrobat ReaderApple QuickTime
Browser Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
5101520253035404550%Apple Safari
Google ChromeMozilla FirefoxMicrosoft Internet Explorer Opera
p. 12
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2013
SPAM, PHISHING, & MALWAREp. 13
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2013
At a Glance
• The spam rate dropped to
64 percent in June, down
from 67 percent in May,
and 72 percent in April.
• There have been
approximately 30 billion
spam emails in circulation
worldwide each day in
2013 to-date, which is in
line with the average in
2012.
• Education was subject to
the greatest frequency
of spam in June at 68
percent,
• Saudi Arabia was the
geography with the highest
spam rate in June, at 81
percent.Spam
Global Spam Volume Per Day
Source: Symantec
0102030405060
BILLIONS
M A M F JAN
2013D N O S A J J M A M F JAN
2012J
Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Geography
Source: Symantec
Geography Percent
Saudi Arabia 81.2%
Sri Lanka 74.7%
China 71.4%
Hungary 69.3%
Peru 69.1%Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Percent
Education 68.1%
Non-Profit 65.2%
Chem/Pharm 65.0%
Manufacturing 64.8%
Accom/Catering 64.6%p. 14
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2013
Top 10 Sources of Spam
Source: Symantec
Source Percent of All Spam
United States 8.26%
Finland 6.38%
Spain 6.36%
Brazil 5.89%
India 5.51%
Argentina 5.23%
Italy 4.69%
Canada 3.95%
Mexico 2.94%
Colombia 2.93%Spam URL Distribution Based on Top Level Domain Name*
Source: Symantec
Month .ru .com .pl .pw
May 39.7% 22.0% 8.7% 5.3%
April 29.9% 30.8% N/A 11.7%
*Data lags one monthAverage Spam Message Size*
Source: Symantec
Month 0Kb – 5Kb 5Kb – 10Kb >10Kb
May 33.8% 40.1% 26.1%
April 41.8% 31.1% 27.1%
*Data lags one monthSpam by Category
Source: Symantec
Category June May
Sex/dating 60.2% 78.7%
Pharma 20.6% 11.1%
Jobs 13.9% 2.5%
Watches 2.3% 4.7%
Software 1.4% 0.8%Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Percent
1-250 63.8%
251-500 64.2%
501-1000 64.0%
1001-1500 64.1%
1501-2500 64.5%
2501+ 64.4%At a Glance
• The United States topped the list of sources of spam, followed by
Finland and Spain. Interestingly, Belarus and Kazakhstan, both of
which featured prominently in the last few months, have dropped
off the top ten list since last month.
• The .pw top-level domain (TLD) continues to feature among to the
most commonly used TLDs for spam. The TLD for Poland, .pl, has
also entered the list, coming in third for June.
• Sex/dating spam continues to dominate the list of top spam
categories, with 60 percent in June. However, this is down from
May, where it reached 79 percent.
• The percent of spam based on company size in June was
around 64 percent in all categories, with small-to-medium sized
buisnesses having the lowest percentage, and organizations with
1501-2500 people the highest.p. 15
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2013
At a Glance
• The global average phishing rate in June was 1 in 464, compared
with 1 in 562 in May, and 1 in 414 in 2012.
• The highest ratio of phishing attacks in June was identified in
emails sent to small-to-medium-sized organizations (1-250), with
1 in 325 emails blocked as a phishing scam, compared with 1 in
293 for 2012.
• The Public Sector was subject to the greatest frequency of
phishing attacks in June, with 1 in 142 emails blocked as
phishing, compared with 1 in 95 for 2012.
• Australia was the geography with the highest phishing rate in
June, with 1 in 174 emails blocked as phishing. In 2012 Australia
was the thirteenth most frequently targeted geography.
• In June, the U.S. was the largest source of phishing attacks
blocked, with approximately 48 percent of all scams blocked.Phishing
Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Geography
Source: Symantec
Geography Percent
Australia 1 in 173.7
United Kingdom 1 in 245.6
South Africa 1 in 433.4
Italy 1 in 488.7
Belgium 1 in 529.4Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Percent
Public Sector 1 in 142.8
Education 1 in 215.8
Finance 1 in 238.2
Marketing/Media 1 in 254.5
Non-Profit 1 in 274.9Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Percent
1-250 1 in 325.6
251-500 1 in 499.4
501-1000 1 in 827.5
1001-1500 1 in 354.7
1501-2500 1 in 946.4
2501+ 1 in 475.8
Top 10 Sources of Phishing
Source: Symantec
Source June May
United States 47.87% 49.63%
Germany 6.70% 6.99%
United Kingdom 5.15% 4.81%
Canada 3.26% 3.13%
Russia 3.00% 2.28%
Brazil 2.93% 3.06%
China 2.92% 1.99%
France 2.85% 2.69%
Netherlands 2.14% 2.02%
Poland 1.60% 1.61%p. 16
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2013
At a Glance
• Automated phishing toolkits accounted for approximately 47
percent of phishing attacks, compared with 54 percent in 2012.
• In June, phishing attacks classified as utilizing ‘other unique
domains’ accounted for 47 percent of phishing scams, compared
with 39 percent in 2012.
• Phishing attacks spoofing financial organizations, including
banks, accounted for 69 percent of phishing scams in June. This
includes a variety of information and personal details that can
be used for identity fraud, and theft of financial details can be
quickly turned into large amounts of money, rather than goods
which must be laundered first and require more time to process.
43.5%
5.2%
3.1%
1.3%47.0%Automated Toolkits
Other Unique Domains
IP Address Domains
Free Web Hosting Sites
Typosquatting
Phishing Distribution:Phishing Distribution:Phishing Distribution in June
Source: Symantec
23.0%
3.9%
2.0%
1.0%68.9%Financial
Information Services
Retail
Computer Software
Communications
Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks:Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks:Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks
Source: Symantecp. 17
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2013
Malware
1 in 50
1 in 100
1 in 150
1 in 200
1 in 250
1 in 300
1 in 350
1 in 400
1 in 450
1 in 500
J M A M F JAN
2013D N O S A J J M A M F JAN
2012Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected
Source: SymantecTop 10 Email Virus Sources
Source: Symantec
Geography Percent
Australia 34.45%
United States 32.29%
United Kingdom 16.93%
South Africa 2.41%
India 2.38%
Norway 1.59%
Netherlands 1.55%
Germany 1.17%
Hong Kong 0.81%
Canada 0.81%At a Glance
• The global average virus rate in June was 1 in 326, compared with
1 in 420 in May, and 1 in 269 for April.
• The highest ratio of email-based malware in June was identified
in emails sent to organizations with 1001-1500 people, with 1 in
233 emails blocked, compared with 1 in 295 for 2012.
• The Public Sector was subject to the greatest frequency of email-
based malware attacks in June, with 1 in 98 emails blocked,
compared with 1 in 72 for 2012.
• Australia was the geography with the highest virus rate in June,
with 1 in 173 emails blocked. In 2012 Australia the thirteenth
most frequently targeted geographies.
• Australia was also the largest source of virus-based malware
blocked, with approximately 34% of all malicious emails blocked.p. 18
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2013
Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Rate
Public Sector 1 in 98.1
Education 1 in 172.7
Marketing/Media 1 in 199.2
Non-Profit 1 in 226.3
Telecoms 1 in 236.9
Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Rate
1-250 1 in 306.0
251-500 1 in 318.7
501-1000 1 in 337.3
1001-1500 1 in 233.4
1501-2500 1 in 500.1
2501+ 1 in 327.8Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Geographic Location
Source: Symantec
Geography Rate
Australia 1 in 172.5
Germany 1 in 198.4
United Kingdom 1 in 214.9
Ireland 1 in 267.0
Switzerland 1 in 280.0p. 19
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2013
Web-based malware
At a Glance
• In June, Symantec Intelligence identified an average of 2,835
websites each day harboring malware and other potentially
unwanted programs including spyware and adware.
• 31 percent of all malicious domains blocked were new in June, a
decrease of 15 percentage points compared with May.
• Eleven percent of all Web-based malware blocked was new in
June, an increase of 0.5 percentage points since May.
• The number of new spyware and adware websites blocked each
day on average during June was 1,237, compared with 1,597
Web-based malware websites blocked each day.At a Glance
• Variants of W32.Ramnit accounted for approximately 18 percent
of all malware blocked at the endpoint.
• In comparison, eight percent for all malware were variants of
W32.Sality.
• Approximately 38 percent of the most frequently blocked malware
last month was identified and blocked using generic detection. Endpoint Security
Top 10 Most Frequently Blocked Malware
Source: Symantec
Malware June May
W32.Sality.AE 7.24% 6.91%
W32.Ramnit!html 6.76% 6.98%
W32.Ramnit.B 6.22% 5.86%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 4.27% 4.32%
W32.Downadup.B 3.45% 3.79%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 3.00% 2.87%
W32.Virut.CF 2.26% 2.25%
Trojan.Zbot 1.58% 1.22%
Trojan.StartPage 1.35% no data
W32.SillyFDC 1.30% no datap. 20
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2013
Policy Based Filtering
Source: Symantec
Category Percent
Advertisement & Popups 28.4%
Social Networking 21.7%
Search 12.2%
Computing & Internet 4.9%
Peer-To-Peer 4.1%
Streaming Media 4.0%
Chat 3.9%
Hosting Sites 2.3%
Games 2.1%
Entertainment 1.7%Policy Based Filtering
At a Glance
• The most common trigger for policy-based filtering applied by
Symantec Web Security .cloud for its business clients was for the
“Advertisements & Popups” category, which accounted for 28.4
percent of blocked Web activity in July.
• “Social Networking” was the second-most common trigger,
comprising 21.7 percent of blocked Web activity. p. 21
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2013
DATA BREACHESp. 22
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2013
Data Breaches
At a Glance
• The number of identities
breached is down this
month, at six million for
June, and 84 million so
far for the year.
• The number of breaches
reported so far this month
is also down slightly, with
85 incidences reported so
far this year.
• Healthcare continues
to be the industry
responsible for the most
number of reported data
breaches.
• The retail sector is
responsible for the
highest overall number of
identities exposed.Timeline of Data Breaches, Jan 2012 – May 2013
Source: SymantecNUMBER OF INCIDENTSIDENTITIES BREACHED (MILLIONS)
INCIDENTS IDENTITIES BREACHED
051015202530354045505560
J MA MF JAN
2012DNOSAJJ MA MF JAN
2012051015202530
31
1.13.9813
412
612
2 1.3351
23
6
Top Industries for Data Breaches in June
Source: Symantec
Data Breaches
Data Breaches
RetailIndustry Responsible for
Most Identities Exposed
HealthcareIndustry with Highest Number of Breachesp. 23
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2013
About Symantec
More Information
• Symantec.cloud Global Threats: http://www.symanteccloud.com/en/gb/globalthreats /
• Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response /
• Internet Security Threat Report Resource Page: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport /
• Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer /
• Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex /Symantec protects the world’s information and is a global leader in security, backup, and
availability solutions. Our innovative products and services protect people and information
in any environment—from the smallest mobile device to the enterprise data center to cloud-
based systems. Our world-renowned expertise in protecting data, identities, and interactions
gives our customers confidence in a connected world. More information is available at
www.symantec.com or by connecting with Symantec at go.symantec.com/socialmedia .
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
JUNE 2014p. 2
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2014
CONTENTS
3 Summary
4 TARGETED ATTACKS + DATA BREACHES
5 Targeted Attacks
5 Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing
Emails
5 Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of
Targeted Organization
5 Average Number of Spear-Phishing
Attacks Per Day
6 Top-Ten Industries Targeted
in Spear-Phishing Attacks
7 Data Breaches
7 Timeline of Data Breaches
8 Total Identities Exposed
8 Top Causes of Data Breaches
8 Total Data Breaches
9 Top-Ten Types of Information Breached
10 MALWARE TACTICS
11 Malware Tactics
11 Top-Ten Malware
11 Malicious Activity by Source: Bots
12 Top-Ten Mac OSX Malware
12 Ransomware Over Time
13 Vulnerabilities
13 Number of Vulnerabilities
13 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
14 Browser Vulnerabilities
14 Plug-in Vulnerabilities15 SOCIAL MEDIA
+ MOBILE THREATS
16 Mobile
16 Mobile Malware Families by Month,
Android
16 Number of Android Variants
Per Family
17 Mobile Threat Classifications
18 Social Media
18 Social Media
19 PHISHING, SPAM + EMAIL THREATS
20 Phishing and Spam
20 Phishing Rate
20 Global Spam Rate
21 Email Threats
21 Proportion of Email Traffic
Containing URL Malware
21 Proportion of Email Traffic
in Which Virus Was Detected
22 About Symantec
22 More Informationp. 3
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2014
Summary
Welcome to the June edition of the
Symantec Intelligence report. Symantec
Intelligence aims to provide the latest
analysis of cyber security threats, trends,
and insights concerning malware, spam, and
other potentially harmful business risks.
Symantec has established the most
comprehensive source of Internet threat
data in the world through the Symantec™
Global Intelligence Network, which is made
up of more than 41.5 million attack sensors
and records thousands of events per second.
This network monitors threat activity in
over 157 countries and territories through
a combination of Symantec products and
services such as Symantec DeepSight™
Threat Management System, Symantec™
Managed Security Services, Norton™
consumer products, and other third-party
data sources. The largest data breach reported in June resulted in the exposure
up 1.3 million identities. This seems like a small number when
compared to the 145 million exposed in the largest breach of
May. However, while reported in June, this breach also took
place during the month of May. This brings the total number
of identities exposed in May to over 147 million, which is the
second-worst month for data breaches in the last 12 months.
There was an average of 88 spear-phishing attacks per day in
June. This appears to be a return of spear-phishing levels seen
in the months of March and April, after the average per day
dropped in May.
A relatively new OSX threat by the name of OSX.Stealbit.B
topped our list of OSX malware, responsible for 25.7 percent of
OSX threat found on OSX systems. This threat looks for specific
bitcoin-related software on OSX computers and will attempt to
modify the programs in order to steal bitcoins.
The number of Android variants per family reached the lowest
levels seen in the last twelve months. While there was not a
significant change in the number of families discovered in
June, this may indicate that attackers have had more success
with their current set of threats, reducing their need to create
multiple variants.
June was a quiet month for vulnerabilities, where (only) 438
were reported—tying the lowest number reported in the last 12
months. There were no zero day vulnerabilities disclosed during
the month.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to
contact us with any comments or feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat Analyst
[email protected]. 4
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2014
TARGETED ATTACKS
+ DATA BREACHESp. 5
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2014
At a Glance
• The average number of
spear-phishing attacks
per day returned to similar
levels seen in March and
April, after dropping in May.
• The .doc file type continues
to be the most common
attachment type used in
spear-phishing attacks,
followed by .exe files.
• Organizations with 2500+
employees were the most
likely to be targeted in May.
• The Top-Ten Industries
targeted remains largely
unchanged from May, with
minor shifts of less than
one percent for various
industries.Targeted Attacks
Average Number of Spear-Phishing
Attacks Per Day
Source: Symantec :: JULY 2013 — JUNE 2014
255075100125150175200225250
J M A M F J
2014D N O S A J171188
21116
54141
84 84
5488103165
Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing
Emails
Source: Symantec :: JUNE 2014
Executable type June May
.doc 19.5% 17.7%
.exe 15.4% 16.1%
.au3 11.5% 11.8%
.jpg 6.2% 7.0%
.scr 5.8% 6.4%
.class 2.1% 1.6%
.pdf 1.7% 1.3%
.bin 1.1% 1.2%
.mso 0.6% —
.dmp 0.6% —Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size
of Targeted Organization
Source: Symantec :: JUNE 2014
Organization Size June May
1-250 36.3% 37.0%
251-500 8.4% 8.6%
501-1000 9.3% 9.0%
1001-1500 3.0% 3.0%
1501-2500 4.1% 4.1%
2500+ 38.9% 38.3%p. 6
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2014
Top-Ten Industries Targeted in
Spear-Phishing Attacks
Source: Symantec :: JUNE 2014
MiningConstructionRetailTransportation, Gas,
Communications, ElectricPublic AdministrationWholesaleServices – ProfessionalFinance, Insurance
& Real EstateManufacturingServices – Non-Traditional 22%
19
17
11
9
6
6
3
1
1p. 7
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2014
Data Breaches
At a Glance
• The largest data breach reported in June took place during the
month of May.
• With 1.3 million identities exposed in this breach, this brings
the total identities exposed in May to 147 million.
• Hackers have been responsible for 49 percent of data breach -
es in the last 12 months.
• Real names, government ID numbers, such as Social Security
numbers, and home addresses were the top three types of
data exposed in data breaches.
20406080100120140160
J M A M F J D N O S A J
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
IDENTITIES EXPOSED (MILLIONS)
INCIDENTS IDENTITIES EXPOSED (Millions)Timeline of Data Breaches
Source: Symantec :: JULY 2013 — JUNE 2014
147
2.7 .9 1.7 2.68130
113159
.8 .3837
1727
22222827
23
18
16
920
510152025303540
p. 8
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2014
Top Causes of Data Breaches
Source: Symantec :: JULY 2013 — JUNE 2014
UnknownFraudInsider TheftTheft or Loss
of Computeror DriveAccidentally
Made PublicHackers 49%
20% 23%
7%
.4%
.4%Number
of Incidents
131
62
5219
11
266 TOTAL
Total Data
Breaches
JULY 2013 — JUNE 2014
266
Total IdentitiesExposed
JULY 2013 — JUNE 2014
574 Millionp. 9
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2014
Top-Ten Types of Information Breached
Source: Symantec :: JULY 2013 — JUNE 2014
Real Names
Gov ID numbers (Soc Sec)Home AddressBirth DatesMedical RecordsFinancial InformationPhone NumbersEmail AddressesUsernames & PasswordsInsurance01
02030405060708091074
%
46%
44%
44%
33%
26%
20%
18%
14%
9%
Methodology
This data is procured from the Norton Cybercrime Index (CCI). The Norton CCI is a statistical model
that measures the levels of threats, including malicious software, fraud, identity theft, spam,
phishing, and social engineering daily. The data breach section of the Norton CCI is derived from
data breaches that have been reported by legitimate media sources and have exposed personal
information.
In some cases a data breach is not publicly reported during the same month the incident occurred,
or an adjustment is made in the number of identities reportedly exposed. In these cases, the data in
the Norton CCI is updated. This causes fluctuations in the numbers reported for previous months
when a new report is released.
Norton Cybercrime Index
http://us.norton.com/protect-yourselfp. 10
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2014
MALWARE TACTICSp. 11
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2014
Malware Tactics
At a Glance
• W32.Sality and
W32.Ramnit variants
continue to dominate the
top-ten malware list.
• The United States contin -
ues to be the largest
source of bot activity.
• The most common
threat on OSX was
OSX.Stealbit.B, making
up 26 percent of all OSX
malware found on OSX
Endpoints.
Malicious Activity by Source: Bots
Source: Symantec :: JUNE 2014
Rank Country/Region Percent
1 United States 21.9%
2 China 10.6%
3 Taiwan 7.1%
4 Hungary 5.0%
5 Italy 4.4%
6 Brazil 3.0%
7 Japan 2.9%
8 Canada 2.7%
9 France 2.6%
10 Germany 2.2%Top-Ten Malware
Source: Symantec :: JUNE 2014
Rank Name Percentage
1 W32.Sality.AE 5.3%
2 W32.Ramnit!html 5.1%
3 W32.Ramnit.B 3.8%
4 W32.Almanahe.B!inf 3.7%
5 W32.Downadup.B 2.9%
6 W32.Ramnit.B!inf 2.6%
7 W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 2.1%
8 W32.Virut.CF 1.6%
9 Trojan.Malscript 1.4%
10 Trojan.Zbot 1.4%p. 12
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2014
Top-Ten Mac OSX Malware Blocked
on OSX Endpoints
Source: Symantec :: JUNE 2014
Malware NamePercent of Mac Threats
Detected on Macs
OSX.Stealbit.B 25.7%
OSX.RSPlug.A 24.1%
OSX.Flashback.K 14.7%
OSX.HellRTS 6.0%
OSX.Sabpab 4.9%
OSX.SMSSend 4.5%
OSX.Keylogger 2.5%
OSX.Loosemaque 2.2%
OSX.Remoteaccess 2.0%
OSX.Flashback 1.6%p. 13
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2014
Number of Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: JULY 2013 — JUNE 2014
100200300400500600700800
J M A M F J
2014D N O S A J438561
469549
438471542562579
473663
555
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: JULY 2013 — JUNE 2014
12345678
J M A M F J
2014D N O S A J01
0 0 02 2
05
014Vulnerabilities
At a Glance
• Vulnerabilities are at
their lowest levels seen in
the last 12 months.
• There were no zero-day
vulnerabilities discovered
in June.
• Internet Explorer has
reported the most brows -
er vulnerabilities in the
last 12 months.
• Oracle’s Java reported
the most plug-in vulner -
abilities over the same
time period.p. 14
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2014
Browser Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: JULY 2013 — JUNE 2014
20406080100
J M A M F J
2014D N O S A J
Opera
Mozilla FirefoxMicrosoft Internet Explorer
Google Chrome
Apple Safari
Plug-in Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: JULY 2013 — JUNE 2014
1020304050607080
Java
Apple
Adobe
ActiveX
J M A M F J
2014D N O S A J
p. 15
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2014
SOCIAL MEDIA
+ MOBILE THREATSp. 16
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2014
Mobile
Mobile Malware Families by Month,
Android
Source: Symantec :: JULY 2013 — JUNE 2014
8
27
24
24
234 4
3
12345678910
J M A M F J
2014D N O S A J
Number of Android Variants Per Family
Source: Symantec :: JULY 2013 — JUNE 2014
20406080100120
J M A M F J
2014D N O S A J20107
3693
3360
4180
66
184846
At a Glance
• There were four Android
malware families discov -
ered in June.
• The number of variants
per family reached its
lowest levels seen in the
last 12 months.
• Of the threats discovered
in the last 12 months, 28
percent track the device’s
user and 21 percent steal
information from the
device.
• In terms of social
networking scams,
78 percent were fake
offerings.p. 17
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2014
Mobile Threat Classifications
Source: Symantec :: JULY 2013 — JUNE 2014
Track User Risks that spy on the individual using the device, collecting SMS
messages or phone call logs, tracking GPS coordinates, recording phone calls,
or gathering pictures and video taken with the device.
Steal Information This includes the collection of both device- and user-specific
data, such as device information, configuration data, or banking details.
Traditional T hreats Threats that carry out traditional malware functions,
such as back doors and downloaders.
Recon/f_igure D evice These t ypes of risks attempt to elevate privileges
or simply modify various settings within the operating system.
Adware/Anno yance Mobile risks that display advertising or generally perform
actions to disrupt the user.
Send Conte nt These risks will send text messages to premium SMS numbers,
ultimately appearing on the bill of the device’s owner. Other risks can be used to send spam messages. 51015202530
Adware
AnnoyanceSend
ContentReconfigure
DeviceTraditional
ThreatsSteal
InformationTrack
User7%12%21% 21%
13%24%p. 18
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2014
Social Media
Social Media
Source: Symantec :: JULY 2013 — JUNE 2014
70%
Fake Offers These scams invite social network users to join a fake event or group
with incentives such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to share
credentials with the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
Manual Sharing Scams These rely on victims to actually do the work of sharing
the scam by presenting them with intriguing videos, fake offers or messages that they share with their friends.
Likejacking Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website
buttons that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
Comment Jacking Similar to likejacking, this type of scam relies on users clicking
links that are added to comments by attackers. The links may lead to malware or survey scams.
Fake App Users are invited to subscribe to an application that appears to be
integrated for use with a social network, but is not as described and may be used to steal credentials or harvest other personal data.102030405060708090%
Comment
JackingFake
AppsLikejacking Manual
SharingFake
Offering20%
7%
1% .7%p. 19
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2014
PHISHING , SPAM + EMAIL THREATSp. 20
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2014
Phishing and Spam
Phishing Rate
Source: Symantec :: JULY 2013 — JUNE 2014
1 in 100
1 in 200
1 in 300
1 in 4001 in 5001 in 6001 in 7001 in 8001 in 900
J M A M F J
2014D N O S A J
At a Glance
• The phishing rate for
June was one in 496
emails, down from one in
395 emails in May.
• The global spam rate
was 59.9 percent for the
month of June.
• One out of every 232
emails contained a virus.
• Of the email traffic in
the month of June, 7.4
percent contained a mali -
cious URL.
Global Spam Rate
Source: Symantec :: JULY 2013 — JUNE 2014
1020304050607080%
J M A M F J
2014D N O S A Jp. 21
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2014
Email Threats
Proportion of Email Traffic
Containing URL Malware
Source: Symantec :: JULY 2013 — JUNE 2014
51015202530354045%
J M A M F J
2014D N O S A J
1 in 50
1 in 100
1 in 150
1 in 200
1 in 250
1 in 300
1 in 350
1 in 400
1 in 450
1 in 500
J M A M F J
2014D N O S A JProportion of Email Traffic
in Which Virus Was Detected
Source: Symantec :: JULY 2013 — JUNE 2014p. 22
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: JUNE 2014
About Symantec
More Information
• Symantec Worldwide: http://www.symantec.com/
• ISTR and Symantec Intelligence Resources: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
• Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/
• Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer/
• Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex/Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC) is an information protection expert that helps
people, businesses and governments seeking the freedom to unlock the opportunities
technology brings – anytime, anywhere. Founded in April 1982, Symantec, a Fortune
500 company, operating one of the largest global data-intelligence networks, has
provided leading security, backup and availability solutions for where vital information
is stored, accessed and shared. The company’s more than 20,000 employees reside in
more than 50 countries. Ninety-nine percent of Fortune 500 companies are Symantec
customers. In fiscal 2013, it recorded revenues of $6.9 billion. To learn more go to
www.symantec.com or connect with Symantec at: go.symantec.com/socialmedia .
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
JUNE 20152 | June 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
3 Summary
4 June in Numbers
5 Targeted Attacks & Phishing
5 Top 10 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
5 Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
6 Phishing Rate
6 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing by Industry Sector
7 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing by Organization Size
8 Vulnerabilities
8 Total Number of Vulnerabilities
8 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
9 Vulnerabilities Disclosed in Industrial Control Systems
10 Malware
10 New Malware Variants
10 Top 10 Mac OSX Malware Blocked on OSX Endpoints
11 Ransomware Over Time
11 Crypto-Ransomware Over Time
12 Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Malware Was Detected
12 Percent of Email Malware as URL vs. Attachment by Month
13 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious by Industry Sector
13 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as
Malicious by Organization Size
14 Mobile & Social Media
14 Android Mobile Malware Families by Month
14 New Android Variants per Family by Month
15 Social Media
16 Spam
16 Overall Email Spam Rate
16 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Industry Sector
17 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Organization Size
18 About Symantec
18 More Information
Welcome to the June edition of the Symantec
Intelligence report. Symantec Intelligence aims
to provide the latest analysis of cyber security
threats, trends, and insights concerning malware, spam, and other potentially harmful business
risks.
Symantec has established the most comprehensive
source of Internet threat data in the world through
the Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network,
which is made up of more than 57.6 million attack sensors and records thousands of events per
second. This network monitors threat activity
in over 157 countries and territories through a combination of Symantec products and services
such as Symantec DeepSight™ Intelligence,
Symantec™ Managed Security Services, Norton™ consumer products, and other third-party data
sources.3 | June 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Summary
There is good news this month on the email-based front of the threat landscape. According
to our metrics, the overall spam rate has dropped to 49.7 percent. This is the first time this rate has fallen below 50 percent of email for over a decade. The last time Symantec recorded a similar spam rate was clear back in September of 2003.
Phishing rates and email-based malware were also down this month. However, there were
57.6 million new malware variants created in June, up from 44.5 million pieces of malware created in May and 29.2 million in April. This increase in activity lends more evidence to the idea that, with the continued drops in email-based malicious activity, attackers are simply moving to other areas of the threat landscape.
Ransomware attacks are up in June, with over 477,000 detected during the month. While
still below the levels seen at the end of 2014, this is the second month in a row ransomware attacks have increased since they reached a 12-month low in April. Crypto-ransomware is also up in June, reaching the highest levels seen since December 2014.
In other news, after a busy month in May targeted attacks against the Manufacturing
industry leveled out in June, dropping from 41 percent to 22 percent. Manufacturing still comes out on top in terms of sectors subject to targeted attacks, but activity is now in line with what is being seen in the Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate sector and the Services – Professional sector, which come in at second and third place.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to contact us with any comments or
feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat [email protected] | June 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
JUNE IN NUMBERS5 | June 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
The Manufacturing sector
was targeted with the greatest
volume of spear-phishing attacks in June, as 22 percent were directed at manufacturing organizations.
Top 10 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
Source: SymantecMiningRetailNonclassifiable EstablishmentsConstructionWholesaleServices - Non TraditionalTransportation, Communications,
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary ServicesServices - ProfessionalFinance, Insurance, & Real EstateManufacturing 22%
41
15 17
17
12 5
9 6
8 8
7 9
2
2
2 2
<1 2 <1June May
Top 10 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
Large enterprises were the target
of 25.1 percent of spear-phishing
attacks in June, down from 39.2 percent in May. In contrast, 38.1 percent of attacks were directed at organizations with less than 250 employees.Company Size June May
1-250 38.1% 42.5%
251-500 15.2% 5.1%
501-1000 9.0% 6.6%
1001-1500 9.9% 2.7%
1501-2500 2.7% 3.9%
2501+ 25.1% 39.2%
Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
Source: Symantec
Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted OrganizationTargeted Attacks & Phishing 6 | June 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Phishing Rate Inverse Graph: Smaller Number = Greater Risk
Source: Symantec400
800
12001600200024002800J M A M F J
2015D N O S A J1 IN
24481290
1587
2041161015171004
1465
266620571865647
Phishing Rate The overall phishing rate has
decreased slightly this month,
where one in 2,448 emails was a phishing attempt.
Industry June May
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 1 in 1,469.9 1 in 856.0
Public Administration 1 in 2,367.3 1 in 1,289.3
Services - Professional 1 in 2,750.3 1 in 1,762.2
Nonclassifiable Establishments 1 in 2,753.1 1 in 1,834.9
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate 1 in 2,901.7 1 in 1,349.9
Construction 1 in 3,003.1 1 in 2,124.9
Mining 1 in 3,120.1 1 in 2,230.6
Services - Non Traditional 1 in 3,977.5 1 in 2,408.2
Wholesale 1 in 4,142.5 1 in 2,878.2
Transportation, Communications,
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services1 in 4,495.4 1 in 2,840.2
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing
by Industry Sector
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing by Industry Sector The Agriculture, Forestry, &
Fishing sector was once again the
most targeted Industry overall for phishing attempts in June, where phishing comprised one in every 1,470 emails. This rate was higher than any other industry in
either May or June.7 | June 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Company Size June May
1–250 1 in 1,552.5 1 in 1,473.9
251–500 1 in 2,553.7 1 in 1,629.5
501–1000 1 in 3,051.4 1 in 1,940.9
1001–1500 1 in 3,443.2 1 in 1,988.9
1501–2500 1 in 3,552.6 1 in 2,032.8
2501+ 1 in 3,624.5 1 in 2,280.8
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing
by Organization Size
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing by Organization Size Small companies with less than
250 employees were again the
most targeted organization size in June.8 | June 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
The number of vulnerabilities
declined in June, down from 579
in May to 526 vulnerabilities reported during the month.
Total Number of Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec100200300400500600700
J M A M F J
2015D N O S A J526575
399600 596
428562
471 469540579
457
Total Number of VulnerabilitiesVulnerabilities
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
There was a one zero-day
vulnerability discovered in May,
the Adobe Flash Player CVE-2015-3113 Unspecified Heap Buffer Overflow Vulnerability.
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec0123
J M A M F J
2015D N O S A J1
0 0 02
12
1 1
01
09 | June 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Vulnerabilities Disclosed in Industrial Control Systems
Source: Symantec024681012
J M A M F J
2015D N O S A J024681012
J M A M F J
2015D N O S A J210
2 2
1 11 11 1Vulnerabilities
Unique Vendors While two vulnerabilities in
industrial control systems were
reported by one vendor in April, none were reported in May or June.
Vulnerabilities Disclosed in Industrial Control Systems
Methodology
In some cases the details of a vulnerability are not publicly disclosed during the same month that it
was initially discovered. In these cases, our vulnerability metics are updated to reflect the time that
the vulnerability was discovered, as opposed to the month it was disclosed. This can cause fluctua-
tions in the numbers reported for previous months when a new report is released.10 | June 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
New Malware Variants
OSX.RSPlug.A continues to be
the most commonly seen OS X
threat seen on OS X endpoints in June, up 5.6 percentage points from May.Rank Malware NameJune
PercentageMalware NameMay
Percentage
1 OSX.RSPlug.A 29.5% OSX.RSPlug.A 23.9%
2 OSX.Keylogger 11.6% OSX.Keylogger 14.0%
3 OSX.Klog.A 8.9% OSX.Wirelurker 9.0%
4 OSX.Luaddit 7.8% OSX.Luaddit 8.3%
5 OSX.Wirelurker 7.1% OSX.Klog.A 8.0%
6 OSX.Flashback.K 5.4% OSX.Flashback.K 6.4%
7 OSX.Stealbit.B 4.3% OSX.Netweird 3.9%
8 OSX.Freezer 3.2% OSX.Sabpab 3.8%
9 OSX.Netweird 2.9% OSX.Stealbit.B 3.6%
10 OSX.Okaz 2.5% OSX.Flashback 3.0%
Top 10 Mac OS X Malware Blocked on OS X Endpoints
Source: Symantec
Top 10 Mac OSX Malware Blocked on OSX Endpoints Malware
New Malware Variants
Source: SymantecJ M A M F J
2015D N O S A J57.6
28.231.7
26.635.944.7
33.7
26.535.8
29.244.563.6MILLIONS There were more than 57.6
million new pieces of malware created in June, up from 44.5 million created in May.11 | June 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Crypto-Ransomware Over Time
Crypto-ransomware was also up
duing June, reaching its highest
levels since December of 2014.
Ransomware Over Time Ransomware attacks were up in
June for the second month in a row, where over 477 thousand attacks were detected.
Ransomware Over Time
Source: Symantec100200300400500600700800
J M A M F J
2015D N O S A J477673 669734
693756
399544
354
248297738THOUSANDS
Crypto-Ransomware Over Time
Source: Symantec1020304050607080
J M A M F J
2015D N O S A J3143466272
36
2028
2123
1648THOUSANDS12 | June 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Malware Was Detected
The proportion of email traffic
containing malware decreased
again this month, down from one in 207 emails in May to one in 319 emails in June.100
150200
250
300
350
400J M A M F J
2015D N O S A J1 IN
Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Malware Was Detected
Source: SymantecInverse Graph: Smaller Number = Greater Risk319
351270
351329195207
237
274246207
246
Percent of Email Malware as URL vs. Attachment by Month
The percentage of email malware
that contains a URL remained low
in June, hovering around three percent.
Percent of Email Malware as URL vs. Attachment by Month
Source: Symantec1020304050
J M A M F J
2015D N O S A J38
36
714
538
3 34113 | June 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Industry June May
Transportation, Communications,
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services1 in 230.2 1 in 305.5
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 1 in 231.6 1 in 175.3
Public Administration 1 in 245.9 1 in 150.4
Services - Professional 1 in 296.7 1 in 164.5
Wholesale 1 in 301.6 1 in 157.7
Construction 1 in 305.8 1 in 240.9
Services - Non Traditional 1 in 365.3 1 in 236.6
Mining 1 in 371.5 1 in 325.8
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 1 in 481.5 1 in 292.8
Nonclassifiable Establishments 1 in 497.7 1 in 255.9
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious
by Industry Sector
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious by Industry Sector The Transportation,
Communications, Electric, Gas,
& Sanitary Services sector was the most targeted industry in June, with one in 230 emails
containing malware.
Company Size June May
1-250 1 in 255.6 1 in 141.3
251-500 1 in 232.9 1 in 159.5
501-1000 1 in 318.1 1 in 221.3
1001-1500 1 in 292.2 1 in 205.0
1501-2500 1 in 164.0 1 in 264.6
2501+ 1 in 472.4 1 in 303.6
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious
by Organization Size
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious by Organization Size Organizations with 1501-2500
employees were most likely to be
targeted by malicious email in the month of June, where one in 164 emails contained malware.14 | June 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Mobile & Social Media
123456789
J M A M F J
2015D N O S A J
Android Mobile Malware Families by Month
Source: Symantec14
2356
3
03
128 In June there was one new
mobile malware familiy
discovered.
Android Mobile Malware Families by Month
There was an average of 40
Android malware variants per family in the month of in June.
1020304050
J M A M F J
2015D N O S A J
New Android Variants per Family by Month
Source: Symantec40
34 3433373638 38 3839 39
36
New Android Variants per Family by Month15 | June 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Last 12 Months
Social Media
Source: Symantec020406080100
Comment
JackingFake
AppsLikejacking Fake
OfferingManual
Sharing583
11
0.11.4
Manual Sharing – These rely on victims to actually do the work of sharing
the scam by presenting them with intriguing videos, fake offers or messages that they share with their friends.
Fake Offering – These scams invite social network users to join a fake event or group
with incentives such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to sharecredentials with the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
Likejacking – Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website
buttons that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
Fake Apps – Users are invited to subscribe to an application that appears to be
integrated for use with a social network, but is not as described and may be used to steal credentials or harvest other personal data.
Comment Jacking – This attack is similar to the "Like" jacking where the attacker tricks the
user into submitting a comment about a link or site, which will then be posted to his/her wall.
Social Media In the last twelve months, 83
percent of social media threats
required end users to propagate them.
Fake offerings comprised 11
percent of social media threats.16 | June 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
505152
49.7%
-1.8% pts51.5%
-0.6% pts52.1%
June May April
Overall Email Spam Rate
Source: Symantec
Overall Email Spam Rate The overall email spam rate
further declined in June,
dropping below 50 percent, to 49.7 percent.Spam
Industry May April
Mining 56.1% 55.4%
Manufacturing 53.7% 53.7%
Construction 53.3% 54.1%
Retail 53.1% 52.1%
Services - Non Traditional 53.0% 51.6%
Services - Professional 52.6% 52.5%
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 52.3% 52.3%
Public Administration 52.3% 51.4%
Wholesale 52.2% 52.1%
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 51.9% 51.7%
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Industry Sector
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Industry Sector At over 56 percent, the Mining
sector had the highest spam rate again during June. The Manufacturing sector came in
second with 54 percent.17 | June 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Company Size May April
1–250 52.8% 52.7%
251–500 53.2% 52.6%
501–1000 52.4% 52.0%
1001–1500 51.9% 52.2%
1501–2500 52.1% 52.2%
2501+ 52.3% 52.2%
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Organization Size
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Organization Size While all organization sizes had
around a 52-53 percent spam
rate, organizations with 251-500 employees had the highest rate at 53.2 percent.18 | June 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
About Symantec
More Information
Symantec Worldwide: http://www.symantec.com/
ISTR and Symantec Intelligence Resources: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/
Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer/
Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex/Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC) is an information protection expert that helps people,
businesses and governments seeking the freedom to unlock the opportunities technology brings – anytime, anywhere. Founded in April 1982, Symantec, a Fortune 500 company, operating one of the largest global data-intelligence networks, has provided leading security, backup and availability solutions for where vital information is stored, accessed and shared. The company’s more than 20,000 employees reside in more than 50 countries. Ninety-nine percent of Fortune 500 companies are Symantec customers. In fiscal 2014, it recorded revenues of $6.7 billion. To learn more go to
www.symantec.com or connect with Symantec at: go.symantec.com/socialmedia.
|
Page 1 of 20
Symantec Intelligence
Symantec Intelligence Report : May 2012
Flamer; Olympic Scams ; Macs Under Attack; Mobile Threats Continue to Rise and Android Malware Increase s
Welcome to the May edition of the Symantec Intelligence report , which provid es the latest analysis of cyber security
threats, trends , and insights from the Symantec Intelligence team concerning malware, spam, and other potentially
harmful business risks. The information used to compile the analysis for this report includes data from April and May
2012 .
Report highlights
• Spam – 67.8 percent (an increase of 3.3 percentage points since April ): page 11
• Phishing – One in 568.3 emails identified as phishing (a decrease of 0. 03 percentage points since April ): page 14
• Malware – One in 365.1 emails contained malware (a n increase of 0.03 percentage points since April): page 16
• Malicious Web site s – 4,359 Web sites blocked per day (an increase of 48.7 percent since April): page 17
• Targeted Attacks, Cyber Espionage and W32.Flamer : page 2
• London 2012 Olympic Games – Spammers Aiming for the Gold: page 3
• Flashback —The day of the Mac threat has arrived: page 5
Introduction
The threat landscape is continually shifting and changing. For years attackers focused on Windows PCs because of
the widespread prevalence of the Windows platform, the return on investment was much greater . However, in 2012
there has been a shift in the attentions of the attackers. This shift was clearly underway in 2011 as we reported in the
latest Syma ntec Internet Security Threat Report1 (ISTR) for 2011, where Android thr eats moved from something that
was more a novelty, to become a regular occurrence, such as Opfake, which covers a wide range of device OSes,
from Symbian, to Windows Mobile, to Android, and even targeting iOS devices . Not only has the growth in mobile
threats continued into 2012, but the pace has quickened significantly. By the end of May 2011, we had seen 11 new
Android threat families and twelve months on, the number will have passed 30; t hat’s almost a threefold increase, year
on year. There was also a month- by-month average increase of 42.5% in the number of new threat families.
It’s not just mobile devices that are being targeted either. While Apple’s Macintosh computers have been a ttacked in
the past , the idea that this computing platform would be targeted en mass is something Internet security experts have
warned about for years. That day has finally arrived. A t rojan by the name of Flashback, which first appeared last year,
had a breakout performance in April, successfully infecting approximately 600,000 Macs.
The recent discovery of W32/Flamer, uncovers a highly sophisticated and targeted threat primarily targeting a few
hundred organizations and individuals located in the Middle East. Based on the latest Symantec analysis, Flamer
appears to act as a general -purpose spying too. In order to shed some light, we thought we would provide a quick
round- up of what we know so far. This month we’re also highlighting the first few signs of Olympic related spam2.
Finally, for the first time this year, spam levels have begun to climb, with two- thirds of email traffic now identified as
spam , 3.3 percentage points higher than in A pril; still lower than the 75% annual average for 2011.
I hope you enjoy reading this month’s report, and feel free to contact me directly with any comments or feedback.
Paul Wood, Cyber Security Intelligence Manager
[email protected]
@paulowoody
1 http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
2 NB: The Symantec Intelligence Report is not sponsored or endorsed by the London 2012 Olympics. Page 2 of 20
Report analysis
Targeted Attacks, Cyber Espionage and W32.Flamer
By Benjamin Nahorney
The recent discovery of W32/Flamer, uncovers a highly sophisticated and targeted threat primarily targeting a few
hundred organizations and individuals located in the Middle East. Based on the latest Symantec analysis, Flamer
appears to act as a general -purpose spying too, ideally designed for cyber espionage and stealing all types of
information from compromised machines. In order to shed some light, we thought we would provide a quick round- up
of what we know so far.
W32.Flamer: The story so far
The news first broke when the Iranian Oil Ministry began disconnecting their oil facilities from the Internet last month.
The state’s oil production was reportedly under attack from a virus called ‘wiper’, according to the Iranian Students’
News Agency. A few weeks later, the Iran National CERT, Budapest University of Technology and Economics’
CrySyS lab, released details on the threat.
It seemed as though another case of digital espionage in the Middle East had been discovered. Flamer (a.k.a. Flame or Skywiper) appeared to have been in existence since 2010, maybe even earlier. The threat seemed to be the
epitome of covert malware, hiding in systems undetected for years and quietly siphoning off information, sending it to
the malware’s authors in ways not easily pic ked up by standard network analysis.
The news generated a great deal of media interest; it was almost as if a prize jewel -thief had been caught red- handed.
Comparisons to Stuxnet and Duqu were made. The finger was pointed at the political opponents of Iran . Flamer was
called the most complex piece of malware found to date. But how many of these claims are true? As with most
statements like these, there is a grain of truth in most of them. Let’s separate the wheat from the chaff.
What does Flamer do?
There has been a lot of speculation that Flamer is a type of cyber -weapon. At this point we have not seen any
evidence to support this. A more accurate description of Flamer is a cyber -espionage tool used to gather data from the
compromised computers.
Who made Flamer?
In short, we don’t know. As was the case with Stuxnet and Duqu, the finger has been pointed at nation states in
political opposition with Iran. However, there is no smoking gun that leads us to anyone in particular. All evidence that
has come to light so far is purely circumstantial, and any attempts to pin down the culprits are simply based on
conjecture.
Catching Flamer isn’t like catching a jewel thief. It’s like finding the tools left behind after the thief has already made off
with the prize diamond.
Flamer is the most complex piece of malware, ever.
Flamer is huge. Weighing in at 20 megabytes, it’s many times larger than Stuxnet or Duqu. The complexity in
analyzing Flamer lies with this fact. It’s easily on par with Stuxnet and Duqu in terms of complexity, but vastly larger.
What is interesting in terms of Flamer is that it appears to have been developed by professional software developers.
The code is very clean, and has an advanced architectural design. For instance, it makes use of a highly customizable scripting language called Lua, which allows the attackers to create custom modules for the threat. It also contains a
SQLite database which it uses to collect and store information.
Page 3 of 20
Is Flamer related to Stuxnet and Duqu?
No. However, there are certain factors that all share in common. For example, Flamer has appeared in the Middle
East, in particular in Iran, just as Stuxnet and Duqu did. It also appears to be politically motivated, as were Stuxnet
and Duqu. However, while Stuxnet and Duqu shared similar code bases, at this point we have yet to find an overlap
with Flamer. It seems as though Flamer could have been written by an entirely different team of programmers.
How come it hasn’t been detected before?
Flamer could be looked at as a textbook model for a targeted attack . Its entire purpose is to quietly compromise a
computer and remain hidden on that system. It did just that for a long period of time. It seems as though Flamer was
discovered when it stopped behaving cov ertly. Given how the Iranian Oil Ministry rapidly unplugged its computers
from the Internet, and dubbed the threat ‘wiper’, it seems that, albeit circumstantially, Flamer began behaving in a
manner that drew attention to it.
The details surrounding Flamer and its overall capabilities are still being researched and uncovered. We hope to have
more info on the larger picture in next month’s report .
For the latest information on W32.Flamer, please follow the Symantec Security Response team on Twitter:
@ThreatIntel ; here you will find links to the latest blogs and deeper analysis of this cutting- edge targeted attack.
Page 4 of 20
London 2012 Olympic Games – Spammers Aiming for the Gold
By Samir Patil
With the excitement of the 2012 Summer Olympic Games building, consumers and Internet users need to be on the
lookout for scammers trying to cash in on the event. Symantec has kept its eye on the ball and reported on malicious,
phishing and 419- spam campaigns associated with major global sporting events in the past, and this year’s Olympics
will be no different.
We have already seen lottery scams related to London Olympics. However we have uncovered a new scam where spammers are asking for participation in the event in the form of co -coordinators, welcome partners, and more. To
participate, the reader is asked to provide a large amount of personal data up front —a red flag for any sort of
promotion like this. The presence of the official logo of the event in the email is to possibly deceive users of its
legitimacy.
Figure 1 – Spam asking for Olympic participation
As the 2012 London Olympics draws nearer, we are expecting this type of threat to proliferate. Users should make it a habit to check the legitimacy of any message before downloading the attachment and avoid clicking on any links so as
not to provide any personal and sensitive information such as account numbers.
Symantec will continue to monitor these attacks and keep users informed. Users are advised not to click on URLs
from unsolicited emails. We recommend avoiding communication using phone numbers or email addresses provided
in scam emails.
To ensure that spammers don’t take away gold at the Olympics, deploy effective spam filters and make it a priority to educate emai l users against such scam emails.
Page 5 of 20
Here are a few handy tips:
• You can’t win a lottery without buying a lottery ticket
• People with millions of dollars in hand can usually spell and punctuate correctly
• THEY KNOW HOW TO TURN OFF CAPS LOCK TOO!!!
Thanks to Senthilnath Kesavelu for contribution to this story.
Flashback—The Day of the Mac T hreat has Arrived
By and large, Mac users historically have had a pretty easy time in the threat landscape. While the occasional virus or
Trojan has appeared, the platform has been largely ignored by attackers. This led many to believe the platform was
simply more secure than Windows, leading the occasional Mac user to claim “I don’t need antivirus protection, I have
a Mac.”
Whether such claims are true or not, that all changed last April. A new variant of the Flashback Trojan, called
OSX.Flashback.K , appeared and spread like wildfire. The threat ultimately infected around 600,000 Macs, leading to a
series of copycat threats, and proving to attackers that the platform was a viable alternative to Windows. So what is it
about Flashback.K that made it so much more successful than most Mac malware to- date?
Flashback was first discovered in September of 20113. At the time the threat masqueraded as an Adobe Flash Player
installation package, which is where the name originates. Since Apple does not provide Flash updates, it’s easy to see how some users may have been duped by a phony install package.
The attackers tried a few more variations of Flashback, with limited success, until they hit upon a well -known Java
vulnerability. The Oracle Java SE Remote Java Runtime Environment Denial Of Service Vulnerabilit y4 (CVE -2012-
0507) had been publically disclosed in February, and subsequently patched by Oracle. However, Apple was slower to
patch the Java versions that they look after within their OSX operating system. This left Mac users exposed and
attackers pounced.
The exploit was added to a version of the popular Blackhole exploit kit and seeded out to compromised websites
throughout the Internet. If a Mac user happened to come across one of these websites, the kit attempted to exploit the
Java platform and instal l Flashback. The result was more than half a million compromised Macs.
Once the word spread, Apple was quick to release a patch for the vulnerable version of Java and distribute it to users
of OSX version 10.6 and 10.7. The company, in an uncharacteristic move, would release a patch for the no- longer -
supported OSX 10.5 a few weeks later.
Other malware authors sat up and took notice. In the following days and weeks, other new OSX threats appeared,
such as OSX.Sabpab and OSX.Olyx.B , hoping to cash in on the newly discovered susceptibility of the Apple operating
system.
It is entirely possible that the success of this botnet even caught its authors by surprise. One of the payloads of the
threat was to generate pay -per-click revenue. When taking into account similar threats in the past, a botnet of this size
could easily ge nerate tens of thousands of dollars in revenue per day from ad clicks. However, only around 10,000 of
the 600,000 compromised computers managed to download and install the ad- clicking component. By our estimates,
this only resulted in about $14,000 (USD) total in three weeks5, and it’s unclear if they were even able to collect the
revenue earned. In all, this falls far short of the botnet’s potential.
So how did we find ourselves in this position? Why now, after all these years, are Macs suddenly being compromised
to a significant extent? It could be that, in many ways, Mac security is currently in a position that Windows was in eight
to ten years ago. There are a number of factors potentially at play here:
3 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011- 093016- 1216 -99
4 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/52161
5 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/osxflashback -how-turn-your-botnet Page 6 of 20
• It could be that many Mac users aren’t concerned about security because they haven’t encountered a serious
security issue. As a result they aren’t as vigilant in their security practices, either because they don’t think they
have to be or they just don’t know they’re vulnerable.
• It’s also possible that many Mac users have made OSX their operating system of choice based on positive
experiences with the walled garden that is iOS —the mobile version of the operating system found on the
iPhone and iPod Touch—and think that a Mac is just as secure.
• Apple’s time -to-patch track record is also a factor. There was roughly a six week gap between Oracle’s
announcement of the patch and Apple pushing it out on their platform.
• Another critical factor is the rapid growth in the adoption of OSX as an operating system of choice as a home
PC. The Macintosh now makes up over 10% of the US market share6, according to the analyst firm, Gartner
(Worldwide numbers are harder to det ermine, but may even be greater ). Perhaps the Mac has reached a
critical mass that has made it a viable target.
• There is also the factor of what attackers would consider a “quality” target. Give n how Apple computers are
generally more expensive than PCs, the owners may have more disposable income on average, perhaps
adding to the interest of attackers.
Regardless of the reasons, it looks like Mac malware is here to stay. It is a good time for Mac users to sit up, take
notice, and ensure they adhere to the standard security practices that have been used in the Windows world for years.
Delving into Android.Opfake
By Masaki Suenaga
Pre-dating many of the mobile platforms it currently targets and outl asting several of the mobile platforms where it
originated from, Android.Opfake has a tendency for survival on the mobile threat landscape not unlike roaches in the
aftermath of a nuclear holocaust. Combing business savvy through a strong black market affiliate network and quick reaction time to adapt itself to thwart efforts by security vendors, Opfake has not only managed to stay in business for several years, the Opfake family has come to define the evolution of mobile malware.
Like many traditional Trojan horses, on the surface Android.Opfake purports to be a legitimate application. In fact, we have observed several variants of the Trojan masquerading as vari ous apps and content, including an installer for the
Opera Web browser and a pornographic movie. Analysis of the code behind the malicious program, as ever, reveals a truer sense of its nature. Numerous suspicious functions exist in its functionality that would have no reasonable place
in any legitimate application. For example, encryption of its own configuration files —doubtless an attempt to prevent
its behavior from becoming too obvious. It also contains functionality to collect contact details from the device —
behavior that immediately raises concerns about information- stealing.
These suspicious activities and more are discussed in greater detail in a recent white paper, entitled
Android.Opfake
In-Depth .
Opfake - Additional Analysis
Opfake is more than just an Android threat. It had its “humble” beginning on the Symbian operating system. Before too long it appeared on the Windows Mobile platform. It seems that where there’s a mobile platform, the Opfake gang isn’t
above attempting to exploit it —they’ve even made an attempt at targeting the iPhone
7, albeit through an indirect
method. Rather than using an app, the Opfake gang laid out an elaborate online scam to trick iPhone users.
Given how applications can only be installed on an iPhone through the official App Store (unless the phone is jailbroken), an attacker cannot easily trick an ordinary user into installing malicious software. What the Opfake gang
attempted to do was trick the user into simply thinking they were installing software. After trying one of a variety of
social engineerin g tricks (e.g. telling the user their browser is out -of-date), they present the user with what looks like
an installation screen. However, the screen is fake, being nothing more than a webpage with a graphic that appears to
install something. When the “process” completes, the user is asked to input their phone number, under the guise that
6 http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=1981717
7 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/opfake- scam -targets -iphone- users Page 7 of 20
this will protect the user from unauthorized copying of the application, or some other similar reason. If the user
complies, they most likely end up being the victim of a premium SMS scam.
Figure 2 – Fake installation progress shown on mobile screen
This may not seem like much, given that no application was actually installed. It’s just an increased phone bill at worst,
right? This is true to some extent, but a charge here or there on a number of phone bill s could turn into something
quite lucrative.
To get a rough idea just how profitable Opfake could be, let’s go back to the Android side of things. It’s tough to get
the full scope, without exact numbers on a threat . We can only really count cases where our detection technology
flags a threat. This can indicate one of two things: either our software has blocked a threat from installing, or it has
picked up a threat when our software is installed on a device that has previously been compromised.
So how much money could the samples we’ve seen have garn ered for the attackers? Based on the default costs
outlined in Suenaga’s whitepaper and the number of detections we’ve seen, the potential income could have been
around 2,086, 560 Rubles, or more than $53,000 (USD) over the last 90 days. Again, this only takes into account the
devices that have Symantec technologies installed. But it’s also worth noting that this threat is largely localized to
phones that can send premium SMS messages to Russian numbers. If this is just a fraction of the overall infection, this can add up to quite a bit of money for the attackers.
Premium -rate number threats may not seem all that sophisticated, but they seem to be lucrative, if the numbers of
threats that utilize this method are any indication. It’s also recalls a time of Dialer threats of the late 90s, where attackers would compromise a computer’s modem and make it call a premium -rate number. In time attackers moved
on to other, more sophisticated threats, mainly because modems went the way of the dinosaurs. But since mobile
devices generally include phones, threats like Opfake will likely continue to include such features, so long as it remains profitable to them.
Playing Cops & Robbers with Banks & Browsers
By Nino Fred P. Gutierrez
The following is an excerpt from a blog that provides an overview of Gutierrez’s whitepaper on Trojan.Neloweg. The full paper is available on the Symantec Security Response website
8.
We are tracking a banking Trojan called Trojan.Neloweg . Looking at attempted infection s blocked in figure 3 below , a
small number of users were being targeted in the UK and the Netherlands.
8
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/Trojan_Neloweg_Bank_Robbing_Bot_in_the_B rowser.pdf
Page 8 of 20
Figure 3 – Location of attempted infections
Digging into the threat, we saw that the login credentials of these users (including banking credentials) may have been
stolen.
Trojan.Nelowe g operates similar to another banking Trojan known as Zeus9. Like Zeus, Trojan.Neloweg can detect
which site it is on and add custom JavaScript. But while Zeus uses an included configuration file, Trojan.Neloweg stores this on a malicious webserver.
Once a particular banking page has been matched, Trojan.Neloweg will cover part of the page in white, using a hidden DIV tag, and execute custom JavaScript located on the malicious server. We are currently monitoring the
threat to see what changes it is making to the banking pages that a compromised users visits.
In terms of popularity, Firefox and Internet Explorer combined make up over 50% of the usage statistics. It is no
surprise that Trojan.Neloweg would target these two giants. Interestingly, it also specifically targets a handful of browsers that utilize the Trident (Internet Explorer), Gecko (Firefox), and WebKit (Chrome/Safari) browser engines. There are a fe w reasons why a range of browsers may be targeted. The most obvious one is to ensure that
the bot infects as many targets as possible. The second reason is that some people use less well -known browsers for
online banking in order to achieve security through obscurity. Targeting those less well -known browsers may mean
that the attacker is more likely to infect a browser used for online banking.
Not only does it attempt to steal banking credentials, but also any other login credentials. To achieve this, the
malware authors give the browsers added bot functionality. The browser can function like a bot and accept
commands. It can process the content of the current page that it is on, redirect the user, halt the loading of particular pages, steal passwords, run executables, and even kill itself.
The full entry can be found on the Security Response Blog
10.
Phishers Offer Fake Storage Upgrades
By Mathew Maniyara
Customers of popular email service providers have been a common target for phishers for identity theft purposes.
Phishers are constantly devising new phishing bait strategies in the hope of stealing user email addresses and
passwords. In April 2012, Symantec observed p hishing pages that mimicked popular email services in an attempt to
dupe users with attractive storage plans.
9 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/wri teup.jsp?docid=2010- 011016- 3514 -99
10 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/playing- cops -robbers -banks -browsers
Page 9 of 20
Customers were flooded with fake offers of free additional storage space for services such as email, online photo
albums, and documents. In the first example shown in figure 4 , the phishing site was titled “Welcome to New [BRAND
NAME] Quota Verification Page”. According to the bogus offer, the additional storage plan ranged from 20 GB to 1 TB
per year, at no extra cost. The phishing page boasted t hat the free additional storage plan will help customers prevent
loss of data and the inability to send and receive emails due to exhausted storage space. It also stated that the plan
will auto -renew each year and the customer can choose to cancel at any t ime by returning to the same page:
Figure 4 – Example of fake verification page
To avoid customer suspicion when the bogus offer doesn’t materialize, phishers used a time- buying strategy. They
indicated that customers would be contacted 30 days prior to renewal and also that the upgrade process will take
effect in a 24- hour time span. After user credentials are entered, the phishing page redirected to a page which
confirmed the upgrade was initiated and complete.
The full entry can be found on the Security Response Blog11.
Phishing for Fake Discount Cards
By Mathew Maniyara
Phishers are constantly developing new strategies in an effort to trick end users. In April 2012, phishers created sites
spoofing the Apple brand with fake offers for Apple discount cards. In this phishing attack, customers were targeted by
region: namely, the UK and Australia.
11 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/phishers -offer-fake- storage -upgrades
Page 10 of 20
Figure 5 – Phishing site spoofing Apple brand name
The phishing sites mimicked the webpage of Apple and prompted customers for their Apple ID. The phishing page
stated the customer’s long- term loyalty toward the brand gave them eligibility for an Apple discount card as a reward.
Upon entering an Apple ID and clicking the “Next” button, the customer was redirected to a page that asked for more
confidential information:
Here, the phisher explained that , with a discount card worth nine Australian dollars (rewarded to the customer), they
can receive credit for $ 100 (AUD) at any Australian Apple store or on Apple’s Australian website. To accept the offer,
customers were asked to provide their personal and credit card information. Personal information included full name,
address, date of birth, and driver’s license number.
Credit card information included credit card number, expiration date, 3 digit secur ity code , and secure- code password.
After clicking the button titled “Submit and get your $100 (AUD) Apple Discount Card”, the phishing page redirected to
the legitimate Apple website.
The full entry can be found on the Security Response Blog
12.
12 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/fake- discount -cards Page 11 of 20
Global Trends & Content Analysis
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the world through the
Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network, which is made up of more than 64.6 million attack sensors and records
thousands of events per second. This network monitors attack activity in more than 200 countries and territories
through a combination of Sy mantec products and services such as Symantec DeepSight™ Threat Management
System, Symantec™ Managed Security Services and Norton™ consumer products, and other third- party data
sources.
In addition, Symantec maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting
of more than 47,662 recorded vulnerabilities (spanning more than two decades) from over 15,967 vendors
representing over 40,006 products.
Spam, phishing and malware data is captured through a variety of sources, including the Symantec Probe Network, a
system of more than 5 million decoy accounts; Symantec.cloud and a number of other Symantec security
technologies. Skeptic™, the Symantec.cloud proprietary heuristic technology is able to detect new and sophisticated
targeted threats before reaching customers’ networks. Over 8 billion email messages and more than 1.4 billion Web
requests are processed each day across 15 data centers. Symantec also gathers phishing information through an
extensive antifraud communit y of enterprises, security vendors, and more than 50 million consumers.
These resources give Symantec’s analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze, and provide
informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code ac tivity, phishing, and spam. The result is the
annual Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, which gives enterprises and consumers the essential information to
secure their systems effectively now and into the future.
Spam Analysis
In May, the global ratio of spam in email traffic rose by 3.3 percentage points since April , to 67.8 percent (1 in 1. 48
emails) . This represents the first increase in spam levels since the end of 201 1.
As the global spam rate rose, Saudi Arabia remained the most spammed geography in May; with a spam rate of 7 7.0
percent .
Page 12 of 20
In the US, 6 7.8 percent of email was spam and 6 7.6 percent in Canada. The spam level in the UK was 68. 0 percent .
In The Netherlands, spam accounted for 69.6 percent of email traffic, 67. 3 percent in Germany, 67.1 percent in
Denmark and 6 7.1 percent in Australia. In Hong Kong, 67.2 percent of email was blocked as spam and 6 6.9 percent in
Singapore, compared with 64.5 percent in Japan. Spam accounted for 6 7.7 percent of email traffic in South Africa and
72.0 percent in Brazil.
The Automotive sector was the most spammed industry sector in May, with a spam rate of 7 1.1 percent ; the spam
rate for the Education sector was 69.3 percent and 68.9 percent in the Chemical & Pharmaceutical sector . The spam
rate in the IT Services sector was 6 7.8 percent , 67.1 percent for Retail, 6 7.6 percent for Public Sector , and 67.2
percent for Finance.
The spam rate for small to medium -sized businesses (1 -250) was 67.0 percent , compared with 67.8 percent for lar ge
enterprises (2500+) .
Global Spam Categories
The most common category of spam in May related to the Adult/Sex/Dating category, down slightly from April, but still
making up the vast majority of spam for the month.
Category Name May 2012 April 2012
Adult/ Sex/Dating 70.16% 79.46%
Pharma 19.22% 13.97%
Jobs 3.47% 2.32%
Watches 3.45% 1.99%
Software 1.78% 1.07%
Casino 0.88% 0.37%
Degrees 0.57% 0.37%
Mobile 0.14% 0.20%
419/Scam/Lotto 0.13% 0.12%
Weight Loss 0.08% 0.01%
Newsletters 0.03% 0.03%
Spam URL Distribution based on Top Level Domain Name
The proportion of spam exploiting URLs in the . ru top-level domain increased by 7.5 percentage points in May, with
the .br top- level domain joining the top- four for the first time, as highlighted in the table below .
TLD May 2012 April 2012
.com 66.6% 66.2%
.ru 7.5% 7.1%
.net 5.8% 6.3%
.br 3.4% N/A
Average Spam Message Size
In May, the proportion of spam emails that were 5Kb in size or less increased by 6.6 percentage points. Furthermore,
the proportion of s pam messages that were greater than 10Kb in size decreased by 8.0 percentage points , as can be
seen in the following table. This suggests spam campaigns are moving to very short message sizes; t he larger spam
file sizes can often relate to malware with malicious file attachments.
Message Size May 2012 April 2012
0Kb – 5Kb 51.1% 44.5%
5Kb – 10Kb 29.1% 37.2%
>10Kb 19.8% 18.3% Page 13 of 20
Spam Attack Vectors
The proportion of spam that contained a malicious attachment or link increased toward the end of the previous month,
with four major spikes of spam activity during the period, as shown in the chart below. Many of these larger
attachments were related to ge neric polymorphic malware variants, such as Bredolab, as discussed in previous13
Symantec Intelligence reports.
Between April and May , the number of spam emails resulting in NDRs (spam related non- delivery reports), has
increased, and sometimes follow the profile of malware attacks. In these cases, the recipient email addresses are
often invalid or are bounced by their service provider; however, with lower volumes of spam in circulation than in
previous years, more spam is using more targeted app roaches, to minimize the number of NDRs.
NDR spam, as shown in the chart above, is often as a result of widespread dictionary attacks during spam campaigns,
where spammers make use of databases of first and last names and combine them to generate random e mail
addresses. A lower -level of activity is indicative of spammers that are seeking to maintain their distribution lists in
order to minimize bounce- backs; IP addresses are more likely to appear on anti -spam block -lists if they become
associated with a hi gh volume of invalid recipient emails.
13 http:/ /www.symanteccloud.com/intelligence 0.00%0.50%1.00%1.50%2.00%2.50%
NDR MalwarePage 14 of 20
Phishing Analysis
In May, the global phishing rate decreased by 0. 03 percentage points , taking the global average rate to one in 568.3
emails (0. 18 percent ) that comprised some form of phishing attack.
The Netherlands remained the country most targeted for phishing attacks in May, with one in 196.2 emails identified
as phishing.
Phishing levels for the US reached one in 1,702 and one in 493.1 for Canada. In Germany phishing levels were one
in 884.3, one in 930.9 in Denmark. In Australia, phishing activity accounted for one in 867.8 emails and one in 2,310
in Hong Kong; for Japan it was one in 5,525 and one in 2,072 for Singapore. In Brazil one in 1,502 emails was blocked
as phishing .
The Public Sector remained the most targeted by phishing activity in May , with one in 96.4 emails comprising a
phishing attack. Phishing levels for the Chemical & Pharmaceutical sector reached one in 1,326 and one in 1,170 for
the IT Services sector , one in 990.1 for Ret ail, one in 232.3 for Education and one in 631.8 for Finance.
Phishing attacks targeting small to medium -sized businesses (1-250) accounted for one in 450. 6 emails, compared
with one in 540.6 for large enterprises (2500+) .
Analysis of Phishing Web sites
Overall, t he number of phishing Web sites increased by 16.3 percent in May compared with the previous month. The
number of phishing Web sites created by autom ated toolkits jumped by 62.5 percent , accounting for approximately
65.9 percent of phishing Web si tes, including attacks against well -known social networking Web sites and social
networking apps .
The number of unique phishing domains decreased by 24.9 percent and phishing Web site s using IP addresses in
place of domain names ( for example, http://255.255.255.255) , increased threefold by 228.3 percent. The use of
legitimate Web services for hosting phishing Web sites accounted for approximately 3.3 percent of all phishing Web
sites, an increase of 5 .9 percent compared with the previous month. The number of non- English phishing Web sites
increased by 7 .5 percent.
Of the non- English phishing Web Portuguese, French, Italian, and German were among the highest in May .
Page 15 of 20
Geographic Location of Phishing Web Sites
Tactics of Phishing Distribution
Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks, by Industry
1.0% 3.3% 2.5% 27.4% 65.9%
TyposquattingFree Web Hosting SitesIP Address DomainsOther Unique DomainsAutomated Toolkits
0.005% 0.015% 0.045% 0.091% 0.096% 0.202% 0.751% 1.2% 1.4% 16.8% 23.9% 55.5%
AviationISPInsuranceSecurityRetail TradeGovernmentCommunicationsRetailTelecommunicationsInformation ServicesE-CommerceBankingPage 16 of 20
Malware Analysis
Email -borne Threats
The global ratio of email -borne viruses in email traffic was one in 365. 1 emails (0. 27 percent ) in May , a de crease of
0.03 percentage points since April.
In May, 26.2 percent of email -borne malware contained links to malicious Web sites, 16.9 percentage points higher
than the previous month.
Luxembourg was the geography with the highest ratio of malicious email activity in May, with one in 1 67.2 emails
identified as malicious .
In the UK , one in 205. 2 emails was identified as malicious , compared with South Africa, where one in 731.2 emails
were blocked as malicious . The v irus rate for email -borne malware in the US was one in 640.3 and one in 343.2 in
Canada. In Germany virus activity reached one in 342.2 and one in 654.2 in Denmark. In Australia, one in 335.0
emails was malicious. For Japan the rate was one in 2,036, compared with one in 709.7 in Singapore. In Brazil, one in
599.1 emails in contained malicious content.
With one in 83.5 emails being blocked as malicious, the Public Sector remained the most targeted industry in May .
The v irus rate for the Chemical & Pharmaceutical sector reached one in 427.7 and one in 521.5 for the IT Services
sector; one in 507.6 for Retail, one in 171.3 for Education and one in 457.0 for Finance.
Malicious email -borne attacks destined for small to medium -sized businesses (1 -250) accounted for one in 365.7
emails, compared with one in 352.6 for large enterprises (2500+) .
Page 17 of 20
Frequently Blocked E mail-borne Malware
The table below shows the most frequently blocked email -borne malware for May, many of which relate to generic
variants of malicious attachments and malicious hy perlinks distributed i n emails. Approximately 28.7 percent of all
email -borne malware was identified and blocked using generic detection.
Malware identified generically , including aggressive strains of polymorphic malware such as Bredolab, accounted for
18.4 percent of all email -borne malware blocked in May.
Malware Name % Malware
Suspicious.JIT.a 11.63%
Exploit/SuspLink 8.90%
W32/Bredolab.gen!eml.j 7.32%
HTML/JS -Encrypted.gen 4.35%
W32/Packed.MalProtector -5927 -205c 4.09%
W32/Bredolab.gen!eml.k 4.01%
Exploit/Link -generic -ee68 2.71%
Gen:Variant.Graftor.20106 2.18%
W32/Packed.Generic -6663 -2579 2.03%
Exploit/Link -ce71 1.69%
The top- ten list of the most frequently blocked malware accounted for approximately 48.9% of all email -borne malware
blocked in May.
Web -Based Malware Threats
In May, Symantec Intelligence identified an average of 4,359 Web sites each day harboring malware and other
potentially unwanted programs including spyware and adware —an increase of 48 .7 percent since April. T his reflects
the rate at which websites are being compromised or created for the purpose of spreading malicious content. Of ten
this number is higher when Web-based malware is in circulation for a longer period of time to widen its potential
spread and incr ease its longevity.
As detection for Web- based malwar e increases, the number of new Web sites blocked decreases and the proportion
of new malware begins to rise, but initially on fewer Web site s.
The chart above shows the increase in the number of new sp yware and adware Web site s blocked each day on
average during May , compared with the equivalent number of Web- based malware Web sites blocked each day.
Web Policy Risks from Inappropriate Use
The most common trigger for policy -based filtering applied by Sy mantec Web Security.cloud for its business clients
was the “Advertisements & Popups” category, which accounted for 3 4.7 percent of blocked Web activity in May . Web-
based advertisements pose a potential risk though the use of “malvertisements ,” or malicious advertisements. These
Page 18 of 20
may occur as the result of a legitimate online ad- provider being compromised and a banner ad being used to serve
malware on an otherwise harmless Web site .
The second- most frequently blocked traffic was categorized as Social Networking, account ing for 20.3 percent of
URL-based filtering activity blocked, equivalent to approximately one in every 5 Web sites blocked. Many
organizations all ow access to social networking Web sites, but facilitate access logging so that usage patterns can be
tracked and in some cases implement policies to only permit access at certain times of the day and block access at all
other times. This information is often used to address performance management issues, perhaps in the event of lost
productivity due to social networking abuse.
Activity related to streaming m edia policies resulted in 1 0.0 percent of the URL-based filtering blocks in May .
Streaming media is increasingly popular when there are major sporting events or high profile international news
stories . This activity often result s in an increased number of blocks, as businesses seek to preserve valuable
bandwidth for other purposes. This rate is e quivalent to one in every 10 Web sites blocked.
Endpoint Security Threats
The endpoint is often the last line of defense and analysis; however, the endpoint can often be the first -line of defense
against attacks that spread using USB storage devices and insecure network connections . The threats found here can
shed light on the w ider nature of threats confronting businesses, especially from blended attacks and threats facing
mobile workers . Attacks reaching the endpoint are likely to have already circumvented other layers of protection that
may already be deployed, such as gateway filtering.
The table below shows the malware most frequently blocked that was targeting endpoint devices for the last month.
This includes data from endpoint devices protected by Symantec technology around the world, including data from
clients which may not be using other layers of protection, such as Symantec Web Security.cloud or Symantec Email
AntiVirus.cloud.
Malware Name14 % Malware
W32.Sality.AE 5.76%
W32.Ramnit!html 4.82%
W32.Ramnit.B 4.33%
W32.Downadup.B 3.38%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 3.29%
Trojan.Maljava 2.47%
W32.Virut.CF 1.69%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 1.59%
W32.SillyFDC 1.45%
W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 1.10%
14 For further information on these threats, please visit: http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/landing/threats.js p
Page 19 of 20
While W32.Sality.AE15 holds the top spot this month, Ramnit detections came in second, third, and fifth, making it the
most prevalent family. Variants of Ramnit were recently implicated in the theft of identities from major social
networking website s, and many of t hese stolen credentials were used to distribute ma licious links via the profile pages
of the affected users, heightening the risk for those users who shared the same password for several online accounts,
potentially providing the attackers with a springboard into corporate networks .
Approximately 44.8 percent of the most frequently blocked malware last month was identified and blocked using
generic detection. Many new viruses and Trojans are based on earlier versions, where code has been copied or
altered to create a new strain, or variant. Often these var iants are created using toolkits and hundreds of thousands of
variants can be created from the same piece of malware. This has become a popular tactic to evade signature- based
detection, as each variant would traditionally need its own signature to be corr ectly identified and blocked.
By deploying techniques, such as heuristic analysis and generic detection, it ’s possible to correctly identify and block
several variants of the same malware famil y, as well as identify new forms of malicious code that seek to exploit
certain vulnerabilities that can be identified generically.
15 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid= 2006- 011714-3948- 99
|
Symantec Intell Igence Repo Rt
MAY 2013p. 2
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: may 2013
content S
content S
3 Executive Summary
4 BIG NUMBERS
7 TIMELINE
8 May Security Timeline
9 DATA BREACHES
10 Data Breaches
10 Timeline of Data Breaches, Jan 2012 – May 2013
11 Top Causes of Data Breaches in 2013
11 Top Ten Sectors by Number of Data Breaches
12 MOBILE
13 Mobile
13 Cumulative Mobile Android Malware
14 Mobile Vulnerabilities Publicly Disclosed
15 SPAM16 Spam
16
Global Spam Volume Per Day
17 Top 10 Sources of Spam
17 Average Spam Message Size*
17 Spam by Category17 Spam URL Distribution Based on Top Level Domain Name*
18 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Geography
18 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Company Size
18 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Industry
19 MALWARE20 Malware
20
Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected
20 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Geographic Location
21 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Industry
21 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Company Size
21 Top 10 Email Virus Sources
22 Top 10 Most Frequently Blocked Malware
22 Policy Based Filtering
23 Next Month
23 About Symantec
23 More Informationp. 3
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: may 2013
executive Summary
Welcome to the May Symantec Intelligence report. This report
includes many of the statistics that we have published on a monthly
basis over the last few years, along with updates to material
previously published in the annual Internet Security Threat Report.
In it we will look at the threat landscape, digging deeper into the
trends that appear over time.
In this month’s report we take a look at what has happened in a number of key sections of the
threat landscape since we published the Internet Security Threat Report XVIII. We delve deeper
into the world of data breaches, mobile threats, spam, and malware, detailing what has happened
so far in 2013 and bringing us up to speed through the month of May.
First we take a look at what is going on in the world of data breaches. Symantec and the Ponemon
Institute have just completed their eighth annual Cost of a Data Breach study, based on actual
data breach experiences of 277 companies around the globe. In it we discovered that the cost of a data breach for a compromised organization rose in 2012, to an average of $136 per identity lost.
Looking ahead to 2013, and the data we compile monthly using the Norton Cybercrime Index, we
see that the number of data breaches are up so far this year as well, and that we’ve borne witness to the largest data breach in two years—with over 50 million records stolen in one go.
The mobile threat landscape continues to show steady growth this year, with 21 new families of
malware discovered so far in 2013. The overall number of mobile vulnerabilities that have been published is down significantly when compared to the same time period in 2012. By this point last
year there had been 230 vulnerabilities published, but so far this year there have only been 33. This
could point to mobile operating system developers shoring up their OSes, though it’s still possible we’ll see more vulnerabilities later in the year.
The spam rate in May of this year has dropped slightly to 67 percent, after increasing to 71.9
percent through March and April of this year. We are also seeing an increase in the amount of spam from countries such as Belarus and Kazakhstan this year, as well as an increase in the amount
of spam coming from .pw top-level domains since they were made available for purchase by the
general public earlier this year.
Other than that, we take a look at malware, where approximately one in 420.2 emails contained
malware, and 39.3 percent of all malware on the end point was blocked using generic detections.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to contact us with any comments or
feedback.
Ben Nahorney
[email protected]. 4
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: may 2013
BIg nUmBe RSp. 5
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: may 2013
Estimated Global
Email Spam Rate Per Day
Estimated Global
Email Spam Rate Per Day
SPAM AS PERCENT OF ALL EMAIL
March April May
0102030405060708090100%
71% 72% 67%
Overall Email Virus Rate, 1 In:Overall Email Virus Rate, 1 In:
March
MayApril
420469415 Mar
Apr
MayHIGHER NUMBER = LOWER RISK
Bot Zombies
(in thousands)Bot Zombies
(in thousands)
March
April
May347
162221
Number of Identities
Exposed in 2013 To-DateNumber of Identities
Exposed in 2013 To-Date
77,996,740p. 6
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Symantec Intelligence Report :: may 2013
April0March14
May0
Mobile
VulnerabilitiesMobile
Vulnerabilities
Mobile Malware VariantsMobile Malware Variants
312219748 Mar
Apr
May
p. 7
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Symantec Intelligence Report :: may 2013
tImelI nep. 8
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: may 2013
may Security t imeline
May01
A US government website became the latest high-profile
victim of a watering hole attack . A watering hole attack can be
considered a form of targeted attack that involves compromising a legitimate website that a targeted victim might visit so as to install malware on their computer. The attack resulted in
the site hosting malware that could infect visitors with the
remote access Trojan, Poison Ivy. The malicious code redirected visitors to a site which hosted an exploit to take advantage of
vulnerability within a browser. Ultimately, this meant that a
victim’s infected computer could be remotely monitored and data could be sent to command-and-control servers.
May09
Seven men were arrested in New York in connection with their role in international cyber-attacks which resulted in the theft of
$45 million across 26 different countries. The seven are accused
of forming a New York based cell that used fake credit cards to steal $2.8 million from ATMs across the city. Withdrawal limits
on accounts from two Middle East banks were removed when
hackers gained unauthorized access, through high-end intrusion methods, to the computer networks of credit card processors.
Taking control of debit cards, hackers were effectively able to
pre-load enormous balances on to cards as well as eliminate any withdrawal limits. Global ground teams, including the New York
cell, were then able to encrypt magnetic cards with the debit
card data. This allowed the team to travel around the city and withdraw unlimited amounts of cash.
The seven accused face up to seven and a half years
imprisonment on charges of conspiracy to commit access device fraud and ten years on money laundering charges.
May12
A security warning was issued about the rise of a malicious browser extension which aims to take control of social
networking accounts. The malware was first discovered in
Brazil and targets popular browsers.
When the user installs this malicious browser extension, it
updates itself with instructions from the malware’s authors. It checks to see if the user is logged into a social network
account and attempts to obtain a configuration file with a list of commands. It can undertake numerous commands from the user’s profile, such as liking a page, sharing a link, posting,
joining a group, inviting friends to join groups, chatting to friends and making comments.
Though the malware messages are written in Portuguese, it
could be quite easily modified to target users with different languages. Ensure your devices have the latest security software
to avoid inadvertently downloading the malware.
May24
A highly respected media organization became the latest high
profile hacking victim of the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA). The
SEA has been targeting the websites and social media accounts
of well-regarded news organizations to combat what they view as inaccuracies in the media coverage of the civil war in Syria.
The activities of the pro-Assad group have contributed to the
accelerated introduction of two-factor authentication for one social media platform. Last month, the SEA caused a drop in
the Dow Jones following the release of an erroneous statement
regarding the safety of the US President on a hacked social media account of a widely respected news organization.
May28
A digital currency system based in Costa Rica was taken offline by US authorities after a multi-state investigation,
while its founder was arrested in Spain on money laundering
charges. Seen by US law enforcement agencies as a vehicle for criminals to process their ill-gotten gains, the digital currency is
estimated to have processed $6 billion among its 1 million users
worldwide. The attraction for criminals seems to have been in the relative ease and anonymity of opening and operating an
account.
It is alleged that this ease and anonymity enabled criminals to
launder profits by allowing them to add money in dollars or euro
and transfer to other accounts, subject to small administrative fees. It is thought that this digital currency may have acted as
the favored laundering method for those involved in the $45
million credit card hacking scam documented earlier. For now, underworld operators will look to use digital currencies for their
laundering means. p. 9
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: may 2013
Data BReac HeSp. 10
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: may 2013
Details
Hot off the presses, Symantec and the Ponemon Institute have released their joint 2013 Cost of
Data Breach: Global Analysis study, providing a thorough and in-depth analysis of data breach
trends for 2012. In it, we discovered that a data breach on average costs around $136 per record.
The Healthcare industry also tops the list this year in terms of industries suffering the most costs due to data breaches.
We also keep track of data breaches on a monthly basis through the Norton Cybercrime Index
1. So
far in 2013 the number of data breaches are up, with 77 documented incidents, compared to 59
by the end of May last year. The number of identities stolen per breach is also up so far this year,
with 1,164,130 identities for each breach on average. This can be partly attributed to two extremely large data breaches that took place in April and May, where hackers made off with 50 million
identities in one hack—the largest data breach we’ve seen in two years—and 22 million in another.
No doubt serious incidents, to put these hacks in perspective, there have been a total of around 78 million identities breached in total this year. This means these two hacks are responsible for 92
percent of the identities stolen in 2013.
While large hacks like this tend to skew averages, the median number of identities stolen tends
to paint a clearer picture of what’s happening in the threat landscape. In this case, the number is
down significantly for the year, with a median of 3,500 identities per breach, compared to 8,350
in 2012 overall. This indicates that, while the occasional large data breach does occur, smaller and more frequent caches of data are getting exposed when breaches do occur.
1 The Norton Cybercrime Index (CCI) is a statistical model that measures the levels of threats including malicious software, fraud,
identity theft, spam, phishing, and social engineering daily. The data breach section of the Norton CCI is derived from data
breaches that have been reported by legitimate media sources and have exposed personal information. Using publicly available data the Norton CCI determines the sectors that were most often affected by data breaches, as well as the most common causes of data loss.Data Breaches
at a glance
• The number of breaches
are up so far this year:
77 compared to 59 over
the same time period last year.
• One 50 million identity breach in late April is the largest in two years.
• Hacking is no longer responsible for the most number of data breaches. Theft or loss made up for 36 percent of all data
breaches.
timeline of Data Breaches, Jan 2012 – m ay 2013
Source: SymantecNUMBER OF INCIDENTSIDENTITIES BREACHED (MILLIONS)
INCIDENTS IDENTITIES BREACHED
MA MF JAN
2013D N O S A J J MA MF JAN
2012051015202530
31
1.13.9813
412
612
2 1 .3351
23p. 11
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: may 2013
top c auses of Data Breaches in 2013
Source: Symantec
65432136% Theft or Loss of Computer or Drive
30% Accidentally Made Public
25% Hackers
5% Unknown
3% Fraud
2% Insider TheftNaturally, since the very large data breaches were in the retail
and information technology sectors, these industries make up
the overwhelming majority of identities compromised. (It’s worth
noting that Retail lead in 2012 as well, but not by the margin it is so far in 2013 due to this 50-million-identity breach.) However,
the healthcare industry continues to lead in terms of the number of breaches suffered. What’s interesting to note so far this year is
that hacking no longer leads the pack in terms of causes of data
breaches, only making up 25 percent of all breaches. Instead,
theft or loss of data tops the list at 36 percent and accidental disclosure of information comes in second at 30 percent.
top Sectors by n umber of Data Breaches
Source: Symantec
Healthcare
43%Education
15%
6% Retail9% Government
6% Financial
5% Law Enforcement
5% Accounting
5% Information Technology
6% Otherp. 12
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: may 2013
moBIlep. 13
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: may 2013
mobile
Mobile malware continues to increase in 2013, with 21 new Android families introduced since the
beginning of 2013. The variant rates within these families also continue to grow steadily, with 1624
new variants appearing so far this year. Clearly the Android operating system is the platform of
choice for malicious developers, as threat activity on other mobile operating systems remains quiet so far, with no newly discovered threat families on other mobile operating systems.
In terms of published mobile vulnerabilities, activity has settled somewhat since the first
half of 2012. So far this year, only 33 vulnerabilities have been published. In comparison, 230 vulnerabilities had been published by this point in 2012. In contrast to mobile malware, iOS
continues to lead in this area, with 73 percent of the vulnerabilities published to Android’s 27
percent. No other mobile operating systems have published vulnerabilities so far this year. As of late, the mobile vulnerability landscape appears to have gone quiet, with no new vulnerabilities
published in April or May.
cumulative m obile a ndroid m alware
Source: Symantec
VARIANTS FAMILIES
20406080100120140160180200
M A M F JAN
2013D N O S A J J M A M F JAN
2012600120018002400300036004200480054006000FAMILIES (CUMULATIVE) VARIANTS (CUMULATIVE)
at a glance
• Mobile malware continues
to grow, with 21 new
families and 1624 new
variants so far this year.
• The slow growth of mobile vulnerabilities, which started near the end of 2012, continues into 2013, with only 33 vulnerabilities to-date this year.p. 14
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: may 2013
Why have vulnerabilities dropped off so far in 2013? It could be that mobile operating system
developers are spending more time shoring up the security on their platforms instead of
introducing new features. When looking at version releases over the last two years, fewer and fewer
updates have been released. 2012 saw the release of iOS 5.1 and then iOS 6, along with three minor releases, while 2013 has only seen iOS 6.1 and four minor releases so far. In the case of Android,
we saw eight operating system updates over three versions of the OS (Honeycomb, Ice Cream
Sandwich, and Jelly Bean). In 2013, Android development has finally been consolidated under Jelly Bean, and only one update has been released this year.
Granted these numbers could change significantly in the latter half of 2013. With the scheduled
release of iOS 7 later in the year, along with the possibility of Android’s Key Lime Pie release, we could very well see further vulnerabilities disclosed and subsequently patched.
mobile Vulnerabilities p ublicly Disclosed
Source: Symantec
102030405060708090100110120130140
M A M F JAN
2013D N O S A J J M A M F JAN
2012
946122
1836
2372
177
4 5 316
314
0 0p. 15
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: may 2013
Spamp. 16
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: may 2013
at a glance
• Spam rates have declined
to 67 percent in the month
of May, after reaching a
peak of 71.9 percent in April.
• Belarus jumped to the top of spam-sending countries. Kazakhstan also rose to fourth.
• The .pw top-level domain has gained favor with spammers since being opened to the public.Spam
Details
In the last few months, we noticed an increase in the overall spam rate. While back in February the
spam rate was 65.9 percent, it jumped 5.1 percentage points to 71.0 percent in March. This upward
trend continued in April, where the spam rate continued to increase to 71.9 percent of all email
messages. However it appears this spam run may have tapered off some, as the spam rate dropped back down to 67 percent for the month of May.
While a spam rate of almost 72 percent may seem high, this doesn’t compare to last summer, when
we saw the rate peak at 75 percent. Nor does it compare to the peaks reached in 2010 and 2011, where spam averaged out at 89 and 75 percent for the entire year, respectively.
0102030405060
BILLIONS
M A M F JAN
2013D N O S A J J M A M F JAN
2012global Spam Volume p er Day
Source: Symantecp. 17
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: may 2013
What’s interesting in this latest spam push is the location where much of the spam was coming
from. Back in March, we saw the country of Belarus jump to the top of our list of countries sending
spam. Belarus suddenly made up 13.54 percent of all spam, having barely ranked among the top 20
spam countries previously. This continued to increase in the month of April, when 18.92 percent of all spam originated from the country, before dropping somewhat in May to 12.64 percent overall.
Also notable is the increase in spam coming from Kazakhstan, which rose from a minor player to
fourth place worldwide in March and April, before dropping to seventh place in May.
Another interesting recent change we’ve observed is the sudden appearance of the .pw top-level
domain in the list of the top domains used in spam that exploits URLs. What’s curious is that the .pw didn’t appear in spam campaigns until April, and then suddenly made up 11.68 percent of all
domains. The reason for this is likely tied to the fact that the top-level domain was only opened up
to the public in March of this year, being a domain for the small Pacific Island country of Palau.
top 10 Sources of Spam
Source: Symantec
Source Percent of All Spam
Belarus 12.64%
United States 7.85%
Ukraine 5.17%
Brazil 4.53%
Finland 4.04%
India 3.93%
Kazakhstan 3.92%
Spain 3.61%
Argentina 3.31%
Vietnam 3.06%Spam UR l Distribution Based on t op l evel Domain n ame*
Source: Symantec
Month .com .ru .pw .us
April 30.8% 29.9% 11.7% 5.7%
March 41.6% 26.0% not listed not listed
*Data lags one monthaverage Spam m essage Size*
Source: Symantec
Month 0Kb – 5Kb 5Kb – 10Kb >10Kb
April 41.8% 31.1% 27.1%
March 49.6% 36.0% 14.5%
*Data lags one monthSpam by c ategory
Source: Symantec
Category May April
Sex/dating 78.7% 80.6%
Pharma 11.1% 11.9%
Watches 4.7% 4.4%
Jobs 2.5% 1.0%
Software 0.8% 0.6%p. 18
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: may 2013
top 5 a ctivity for Spam Destination by g eography
Source: Symantec
Country Percent
Saudi Arabia 82.4%
Sri Lanka 74.9%
China 73.1%
Poland 71.1%
United States 70.9%top 5 a ctivity for Spam Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Percent
Finance 83.0%
Education 67.3%
Chem/Pharm 65.8%
Non-Profit 65.4%
Accom/Catering 65.2%
top 5 a ctivity for Spam Destination by c ompany Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Percent
1-250 77.0%
251-500 64.6%
501-1000 64.4%
1001-1500 64.6%
1501-2500 65.8%
2501+ 64.7%p. 19
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: may 2013
mal WaRep. 20
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: may 2013
malware
In May, one in 420.2 emails was malicious—or 0.238 percent of all email—a drop of 0.134
percentage points since April. Of the email considered malicious, 28.8 percent contained a link to a
malicious website, a drop of 13.7 percent from the previous month.
In the UK, one in 232.9 emails was identified as malicious,
compared with South Africa, where one in 211.1 emails was blocked as malicious. With one in 99.1 emails being blocked
as malicious, the Public Sector remained the most targeted
industry in May. Malicious email-borne attacks destined for small to medium-sized businesses (1-250) accounted for one in
376.3 emails, compared with one in 397.4 for large enterprises
(2500+). In terms of the sources of malicious files in email, 49.7 percent originated in the United States, while 19.6 percent came
from computers located in the United Kingdom.1 in 50
1 in 100
1 in 150
1 in 200
1 in 250
1 in 3001 in 350
1 in 400
1 in 450
1 in 500
M A M F JAN
2013D N O S A J J M A M F JAN
2012
proportion of e mail t raffic in Which Virus Was Detected
Source: Symantec
top 5 a ctivity for m alware Destination by g eographic l ocation
Source: Symantec
Country Rate
South Africa 1 in 211.1
United Kingdom 1 in 232.9
Netherlands 1 in 246.8
Denmark 1 in 314.0
Ireland 1 in 318.4p. 21
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: may 2013
top 5 a ctivity for m alware Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Rate
Public Sector 1 in 99.1
Estate Agents 1 in 148.0
Education 1 in 264.1
Accom/Catering 1 in 288.7
Marketing/Media 1 in 321.7
top 5 a ctivity for m alware Destination by c ompany Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Rate
1-250 1 in 376.3
251-500 1 in 457.9
501-1000 1 in 560.2
1001-1500 1 in 456.4
1501-2500 1 in 563.1
2501+ 1 in 397.4top 10 e mail Virus Sources
Source: Symantec
Country Percent
United States 49.70%
United Kingdom 19.60%
Australia 6.70%
South Africa 5.42%
Hong Kong 2.65%
Canada 2.61%
Netherlands 1.57%
Brazil 1.56%
Sweden 1.39%
France 1.20%p. 22
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: may 2013
For much of 2013, variants of W32.Sality and W32.Ramnit
had been the most prevalent malicious threats blocked at the
endpoint. Variants of W32.Ramnit accounted for approximately
17.5 percent of all malware blocked at the endpoint, compared with 7.7 percent for all variants of W32.Sality.
Approximately 39.3 percent of the most frequently blocked
malware last month was identified and blocked using generic detection. Many new viruses and Trojans are based on earlier
versions, where code has been copied or altered to create a
new strain, or variant. Often these variants are created using toolkits and hundreds of thousands of variants can be created
from the same piece of malware. This has become a popular
tactic to evade signature-based detection, as each variant would traditionally need its own signature to be correctly identified
and blocked.
The most common trigger for policy-based filtering applied
by Symantec Web Security.cloud for its business clients was
for the “Advertisements & Popups” category, which accounted
for 33.0 percent of blocked Web activity in July. Web-based advertisements pose a potential risk though the use of
“malvertisements,” or malicious advertisements. These may
occur as the result of a legitimate online ad-provider being compromised and a banner ad being used to serve malware on
an otherwise harmless Web site.
policy Based Filtering
Source: Symantec
Category Percent
Advertisement & Popups 33.0%
Social Networking 26.9%
Computing & Internet 5.0%
Streaming Media 4.6%
Peer-To-Peer 3.7%
Search 3.3%
Chat 3.0%
Hosting Sites 2.3%
Unclassified 2.1%
Games 1.7%top 10 m ost Frequently Blocked m alware
Source: Symantec
Malware May April
W32.Ramnit!html 6.98% 6.96%
W32.Sality.AE 6.91% 6.87%
W32.Ramnit.B 5.86% 5.61%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 4.32% 4.34%
W32.Downadup.B 3.79% 3.54%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 2.87% 2.50%
W32.Virut.CF 2.25% 2.17%
W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 1.68% 1.42%
Trojan.Zbot 1.22% no data
W32.Virut!html 1.13% 1.09%p. 23
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: may 2013
about Symantec
more Information
• Symantec.cloud Global Threats: http://www.symanteccloud.com/en/gb/globalthreats/
• Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/
• Internet Security Threat Report Resource Page: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
• Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer/
• Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex/Symantec protects the world’s information and is a global leader in security, backup, and
availability solutions. Our innovative products and services protect people and information
in any environment—from the smallest mobile device to the enterprise data center to cloud-
based systems. Our world-renowned expertise in protecting data, identities, and interactions
gives our customers confidence in a connected world. More information is available at
www.symantec.com or by connecting with Symantec at go.symantec.com/socialmedia.next month
Vulnerabilities in 2013
Phishing trendsWeb-based malware
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
MAY 2014p. 2
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
CONTENTS
3 Summary
4 TARGETED ATTACKS + DATA BREACHES
5 Targeted Attacks
5 Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing
Emails
5 Average Number of Spear-Phishing
Attacks Per Day
5 Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of
Targeted Organization
6 Top-Ten Industries Targeted
in Spear-Phishing Attacks
7 Data Breaches
7 Timeline of Data Breaches
8 Total Identities Exposed
8 Top Causes of Data Breaches
8 Total Data Breaches
9 Top-Ten Types of Information Breached
10 MALWARE TACTICS
11 Malware Tactics
11 Top-Ten Malware
11 Malicious Activity by Source: Bots
11 Top-Ten Mac OSX Malware
12 Ransomware Over Time
13 Vulnerabilities
13 Number of Vulnerabilities
13 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
14 Browser Vulnerabilities
14 Plug-in Vulnerabilities15 SOCIAL MEDIA
+ MOBILE THREATS
16 Mobile
16 Mobile Malware Families by Month,
Android
16 Number of Android Variants
Per Family
17 Mobile Threat Classifications
18 Social Media
18 Social Media
19 PHISHING, SPAM + EMAIL THREATS
20 Phishing and Spam
20 Phishing Rate
20 Global Spam Rate
21 Email Threats
21 Proportion of Email Traffic
Containing URL Malware
21 Proportion of Email Traffic
in Which Virus Was Detected
22 About Symantec
22 More Informationp. 3
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
Summary
Welcome to the May edition of the Symantec
Intelligence report. Symantec Intelligence
aims to provide the latest analysis of cyber
security threats, trends, and insights
concerning malware, spam, and other
potentially harmful business risks.
Symantec has established the most
comprehensive source of Internet threat
data in the world through the Symantec™
Global Intelligence Network, which is made
up of more than 41.5 million attack sensors
and records thousands of events per second.
This network monitors threat activity in
over 157 countries and territories through
a combination of Symantec products and
services such as Symantec DeepSight™
Threat Management System, Symantec™
Managed Security Services, Norton™
consumer products, and other third-party
data sources. Welcome to the May Symantec Intelligence Report. After
publishing our annual Internet Security Threat Report , we’re
back to take a look at the monthly trends in the threat landscape
since the report was published.
Up until May, the year has been relatively quiet on the data
breach front. This follows three consecutive months at the end
of last year with data breaches that resulted in the exposure of
over 100 million identities each month, leading us to call 2013
the year of the “mega-breach.” May sees the return of another
large data breach, this time exposing over 145 million identities
in one breach.
In terms of targeted attacks, spear phishing attacks per day
started out fairly high, where January saw 165 attacks in an
average day. However this attack rate has slowly declined as the
year has progressed, currently sitting at 54 attacks per day for
the month of May.
Ransomware is another area of the threat landscape where we
have seen modest declines so far this year. Back in November
of 2013, Ransomware activity peaked, where Symantec was
blocking 861,000 potential Ransomware infections in the
month. These numbers remained relatively high in the first few
months of 2014, but have declined significantly in April and
May, currently sitting at only 17% of the peak activity seen last
November.
In other news, May saw the disclosure of four zero-day vulner -
abilities, there were 66 Android malware variants for every
family, and phishing, spam, and email virus rates were all up in
May after drops in April.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to
contact us with any comments or feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat Analyst
[email protected]. 4
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
TARGETED ATTACKS + DATA BREACHES
TARGETED ATTACKS
+ DATA BREACHESp. 5
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
TARGETED ATTACKS + DATA BREACHES
At a Glance
• The average number of
spear-phishing attacks
per day has dropped
again in May, down to 54
per day.
• The .doc file type
continues to be the most
common attachment type
used in spear-phishing
attacks, followed by .exe
files.
• Organizations with
2500+ employees were
the most likely to be
targeted in May.
• Non-Traditional Services,
such as Hospitality,
Recreational, and Repair
service, were the most
commonly targeted
industry, followed by
Manufacturing.Targeted Attacks
Average Number of Spear-Phishing
Attacks Per Day
Source: Symantec
0255075100125150175200225250
M A M F J
2014D N O S A J J68171188
21116
54141
84 84
54103165
Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing
Emails
May 2 014
Source: Sy mantec
Executable type May April
.doc 17.7% 17.9%
.exe 16.1% 16.5%
.au3 11.8% 11.7%
.jpg 7.0% 7.7%
.scr 6.4% 6.8%
.class 1.6% 1.8%
.pdf 1.3% 0.8%
.bin 1.2% 1.3%
.com 0.6% 0.6%
.dmp 0.6% 0.3%Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted
Organization
May 2014
Source: Symantec
Organization Size May April
1-250 37.0% 38.0%
251-500 8.6% 8.6%
501-1000 9.0% 9.0%
1001-1500 3.0% 2.8%
1501-2500 4.1% 4.1%
2500+ 38.3% 37.5%p. 6
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
TARGETED ATTACKS + DATA BREACHES
Top-Ten Industries Targeted in
Spear-Phishing Attacks
May 2014
Source: Symantec
MiningConstructionRetailTransportation, Gas,
Communications, ElectricPublic AdministrationWholesaleServices – ProfessionalFinance, Insurance
& Real EstateManufacturingServices – Non-Traditional 22%
19
17
11
9
6
6
3
1
1p. 7
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
TARGETED ATTACKS + DATA BREACHES
Data Breaches
At a Glance
• May saw the disclosure of a large data breach, resulting in as
many as 145 million identities potentially exposed from the
breach.
• The number of identities exposed each month had been rela -
tively light for the first few months of 2014, following a series
of massive data breaches in the last quarter of 2013.
• Hackers have been responsible for 48 percent of data breach -
es in the last 12 months.
• Real names, birth dates, and government ID numbers, such
as Social Security numbers, were the top three types of data
exposed in data breaches.
20406080100120140160
M A M F J D N O S A J J
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
IDENTITIES EXPOSED (MILLIONS)
INCIDENTS IDENTITIES EXPOSED (Millions)Timeline of Data Breaches
Source: Symantec
146
2.5 1.7 2.68129
113159
.8 .3861537
1727
222227 26
23
14
1019
510152025303540
p. 8
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
TARGETED ATTACKS + DATA BREACHES
Top Causes of Data Breaches
June 2013—May 2014
Source: Symantec
FraudUnknownInsider TheftTheft or Loss
of Computeror DriveAccidentally
Made PublicHackers 48%
21% 24%
7%
2%
1%Number
of Incidents
124
61
5417
21
259 TOTAL
Total Data
Breaches Total IdentitiesExposed
259
June 2013 – May 2014 577 Million
June 2013 – May 2014p. 9
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
TARGETED ATTACKS + DATA BREACHES
Top-Ten Types of Information Breached
June 2013—May 2014
Source: Symantec
01 Real Names
02 Home Address
03 Government ID Numbers (Social Security)
04 Birth Dates
05 Medical Records
06 Financial Information
07 Phone Numbers
08 Email Addresses
09 User Names & Passwords
10 Insurance75%
46%
45%
43%
32%
27%
21%
17%
14%
8%
Methodology
This data is procured from the Norton Cybercrime Index (CCI). The Norton CCI is a statistical model
that measures the levels of threats, including malicious software, fraud, identity theft, spam,
phishing, and social engineering daily. The data breach section of the Norton CCI is derived from
data breaches that have been reported by legitimate media sources and have exposed personal
information.
In some cases a data breach is not publicly reported during the same month the incident occurred,
or an adjustment is made in the number of identities reportedly exposed. In these cases, the data in
the Norton CCI is updated. This causes fluctuations in the numbers reported for previous months
when a new report is released.
Norton Cybercrime Index
http://us.norton.com/protect-yourselfp. 10
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
E-CRIME + MALWARE DELIVERY TACTICS
MALWARE TACTICSp. 11
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
E-CRIME + MALWARE DELIVERY TACTICS
Malware Tactics
At a Glance
• W32.Sality and W32.
Ramnit variants continue
to dominate the top-ten
malware list.
• The most common
threat on OSX was
OSX.SMSSend, making up
28 of all malware found
on OSX Endpoints.
• The United States contin -
ues to be the largest
source of bot activity.
• Ransomware continues to
decline in 2014, down to
17 percent of the levels
seen at the malware’s
peak in November 2013.
Malicious Activity by Source: Bots
May 2014
Source: Symantec
Rank Country/Region Percent
1 United States 22.5%
2 China 10.8%
3 Taiwan 8.1%
4 Hungary 5.8%
5 Italy 5.2%
6 Brazil 4.2%
7 Canada 3.1%
8 Japan 3.0%
9 France 2.9%
10 Germany 2.9%Top-Ten Malware
May 2014
Source: Symantec
Rank Name Percentage
1 W32.Sality.AE 5.2%
2 W32.Ramnit!html 4.9%
3 W32.Almanahe.B!inf 3.8%
4 W32.Ramnit.B 3.6%
5 W32.Downadup.B 2.9%
6 W32.Ramnit.B!inf 2.6%
7 Trojan.Zbot 2.1%
8 W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 1.9%
9 W32.Virut.CF 1.5%
10 W32.SillyFDC 1.2%
Top-Ten Mac OSX Malware Blocked
on OSX Endpoints
May 2014
Source: Symantec
Malware NamePercent of Mac Threats
Detected on Macs
OSX.SMSSend 28.0%
OSX.RSPlug.A 23.0%
OSX.Flashback.K 13.5%
OSX.HellRTS 7.4%
OSX.Sabpab 7.1%
OSX.Keylogger 5.2%
OSX.Klog.A 4.0%
OSX.Flashback 2.9%
OSX.Loosemaque 2.4%
OSX.Remoteaccess 2.4%p. 12
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
E-CRIME + MALWARE DELIVERY TACTICS
Ransomware Over Time
Source: SymantecTHOUSANDS
1002003004005006007008009001,000
M A M F J
2014D N O S A J J189286625
419861
660
421465
342425
156 143p. 13
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
E-CRIME + MALWARE DELIVERY TACTICS
Number of Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
0100200300400500600700800
M A M F J
2014D N O S A J J510561
469549
438471542562579
473663
555
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
012345678
M A M F J
2014D N O S A J J2
1 1 1 14
1
05
014Vulnerabilities
At a Glance
• Vulnerabilities are at
their lowest levels so far
in 2014.
• There were four zero-day
vulnerabilities discovered
in May.
• Google Chrome has
reported the most brows -
er vulnerabilities in the
last 12 months.
• Oracle’s Java reported
the most plug-in vulner -
abilities over the same
time period.p. 14
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
E-CRIME + MALWARE DELIVERY TACTICS
Browser Vulnerabilities
June 2013—May 2014
Source: Symantec
1020304050607080
Opera
Mozilla Firefox
Microsoft
Internet Explorer
Google Chrome
Apple Safari
M A M F J
2014D N O S A J J
Plug-in Vulnerabilities
June 2013—May 2014
Source: Symantec
1020304050607080
Java
Apple
Adobe
ActiveX
M A M F J
2014D N O S A J J
p. 15
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
SOCIAL MEDIA + MOBILE THREATS
SOCIAL MEDIA
+ MOBILE THREATSp. 16
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
SOCIAL MEDIA + MOBILE THREATS
Mobile
Mobile Malware Families by Month,
Android
Source: Symantec
246810
M A M F J
2014D N O S A J J9
8
27
24
24
234
3
Number of Android Variants Per Family
Source: Symantec
20406080100120
M A M F J
2014D N O S A J J56
20107
3693
3360
4180
66
4846
At a Glance
• There were three Android
malware families discov -
ered in the month of May.
• The number of variants
per family was down
slightly from it’s 2014
peak in April.
• Of the threats discovered
in the last 12 months, 28
percent track the device’s
user and 21 percent steal
information from the
device.
• In terms of social
networking scams,
78 percent were fake
offerings.p. 17
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
SOCIAL MEDIA + MOBILE THREATS
Mobile Threat Classifications
June 2013—May 2014
Source: Symantec
Track User Risks that spy on the individual using the device, collecting SMS
messages or phone call logs, tracking GPS coordinates, recording phone calls,
or gathering pictures and video taken with the device.
Steal Information This includes the collection of both device- and user-specific
data, such as device information, configuration data, or banking details.
Traditional T hreats Threats that carry out traditional malware functions,
such as back doors and downloaders.
Recon/f_igure D evice These t ypes of risks attempt to elevate privileges
or simply modify various settings within the operating system.
Adware/Anno yance Mobile risks that display advertising or generally perform
actions to disrupt the user.
Send Conte nt These risks will send text messages to premium SMS numbers,
ultimately appearing on the bill of the device’s owner. Other risks can be used to send spam messages. 510152025303540
Track
UserSteal
InformationTraditional
ThreatsReconfigure
DeviceSend
ContentAdware
Annoyance8%11%13%21% 21%28%p. 18
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
SOCIAL MEDIA + MOBILE THREATS
Social Media
Social Media
Jan 2014—May 2014
Source: Symantec
78%
Fake Offers These scams invite social network users to join a fake event or group
with incentives such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to share
credentials with the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
Manual Sharing Scams These rely on victims to actually do the work of sharing
the scam by presenting them with intriguing videos, fake offers or messages that they share with their friends.
Likejacking Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website
buttons that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
Comment Jacking Similar to likejacking, this type of scam relies on users clicking
links that are added to comments by attackers. The links may lead to malware or survey scams.
Fake App Users are invited to subscribe to an application that appears to be
integrated for use with a social network, but is not as described and may be used to steal credentials or harvest other personal data.102030405060708090
Comment
JackingFake Apps Manual Sharing Likejacking Fake Offering10%
6%3% 2%p. 19
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
PHISHING + SPAM
PHISHING , SPAM + EMAIL THREATSp. 20
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
PHISHING + SPAM
Phishing and Spam
Phishing Rate
Source: Symantec
1 in 100
1 in 2001 in 300
1 in 400
1 in 5001 in 6001 in 7001 in 800
M A M F J
2014D N O S A J J
At a Glance
• The phishing rate for May
was one in 395 emails, up
from one in 731 emails
in April.
• The global spam rate
was 60.6 percent for the
month of May.
• One out of every 183
emails contained a virus.
• Of the email traffic in
the month of May, 13.7
percent contain a mali -
cious URL, up from a low
of 2.6 percent in April.
Global Spam Rate
Source: Symantec
1020304050607080
M A M F J
2014D N O S A J Jp. 21
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
PHISHING + SPAM
Email Threats
Proportion of Email Traffic
Containing URL Malware
Source: Symantec
51015202530354045
M A M F J
2014D N O S A J J
1 in 50
1 in 100
1 in 150
1 in 200
1 in 250
1 in 300
1 in 350
1 in 400
1 in 450
M A M F J
2014D N O S A J JProportion of Email Traffic
in Which Virus Was Detected
Source: Symantecp. 22
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
About Symantec
More Information
• Symantec Worldwide: http://www.symantec.com/
• ISTR and Symantec Intelligence Resources: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
• Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/
• Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer/
• Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex/Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC) is an information protection expert that helps
people, businesses and governments seeking the freedom to unlock the opportunities
technology brings – anytime, anywhere. Founded in April 1982, Symantec, a Fortune
500 company, operating one of the largest global data-intelligence networks, has
provided leading security, backup and availability solutions for where vital information
is stored, accessed and shared. The company’s more than 20,000 employees reside in
more than 50 countries. Ninety-nine percent of Fortune 500 companies are Symantec
customers. In fiscal 2013, it recorded revenues of $6.9 billion. To learn more go to
www.symantec.com or connect with Symantec at: go.symantec.com/socialmedia .
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
MAY 20152 | May 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
3 Summary
4 May in Numbers
5 Targeted Attacks & Phishing
5 Average Number of Spear-Phishing Attacks per Day
5 Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing Attacks
6 Top 10 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
6 Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
7 Phishing Rate
7 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing by Industry Sector
8 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing by Organization Size
9 Vulnerabilities
9 Total Number of Vulnerabilities
9 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
10 Vulnerabilities Disclosed in Industrial Control Systems
11 Malware
11 New Malware Variants
11 Top 10 Mac OSX Malware Blocked on OSX Endpoints
12 Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Malware Was Detected
12 Percent of Email Malware as URL vs. Attachment by Month
13 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious by Industry Sector
13 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as
Malicious by Organization Size
14 Mobile & Social Media
14 Android Mobile Malware Families by Month
14 New Android Variants per Family by Month
15 Social Media
16 Spam & Botnets
16 Overall Email Spam Rate
16 Top 10 Spam-Sending Botnets
17 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Organization Size
17 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Industry Sector
18 About Symantec
18 More Information
Welcome to the May edition of the Symantec
Intelligence report. Symantec Intelligence aims
to provide the latest analysis of cyber security
threats, trends, and insights concerning malware, spam, and other potentially harmful business
risks.
Symantec has established the most comprehensive
source of Internet threat data in the world through
the Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network,
which is made up of more than 57.6 million attack sensors and records thousands of events per
second. This network monitors threat activity
in over 157 countries and territories through a combination of Symantec products and services
such as Symantec DeepSight™ Intelligence,
Symantec™ Managed Security Services, Norton™ consumer products, and other third-party data
sources.3 | May 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Summary
It appears as though attackers had small businesses clearly in their sights last month. All
of our metrics that look at the size of organizations show businesses with less than 250 employees were subjected to the largest amount of malicious activity during the month of May. For instance, 42.5 percent of spear-phishing attacks were directed at organizations of this size during May, up from 30.6 percent in April. Small organizations were the most targeted size for overall phishing too. And while all organization sizes hovered around a 52 percent spam rate, organizations with less than 250 employees had the highest rate at 52.7 percent.
Small organizations were most likely to be targeted by malicious email in the month of May
as well, where one in 141 emails contained a threat. The overall proportion of email traffic containing malware also increased this month, up from one in 246 emails in April to one in 207 emails in May. However the percentage of email malware that contained a URL remained low in May, hovering around three percent. The Public Administration sector was the most targeted industry again in May, with one in 150 emails containing malware, though this is down from one in 127 in April.
In spear-phishing attacks, Microsoft Word files—the .doc and .docx extensions—made up
over 40 percent of attachments used in spear-phishing attacks during May. Microsoft Excel files also ranked highly, comprising 13.5 percent of spear-phishing attachments. While executable files, such as .bin, .exe, and .scr files, are frequently seen in spear-phishing attacks, this category of file types was down almost 25 percentage points in May. The Manu-facturing sector was subjected to the largest volume of spear-phishing attacks, as 41 percent were directed at organizations in this sector.
In other news, there were more than 44.5 million new malware variants created in May, one
zero-day vulnerability was reported (CVE-2015-3456), and while two vulnerabilities in indus-trial control systems were reported in April, none were reported this May.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to contact us with any comments or
feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat [email protected] | May 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
MAY IN NUMBERS5 | May 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Average Number of Spear-Phishing Attacks per Day
Source: Symantec20406080100
M A M F J
2015D N O S A J J88
54
2053
45
334265
1928
1543
Average Number of Spear-Phishing Attacks per Day The average number of spear-
phishing attacks per day
continued to decline in May, down to 15 attacks per day.Targeted Attacks & Phishing
Microsoft Word files made up
over 40 percent of attachments used in spear-phishing attacks in May, up one percentage point from April.
While executable files, such
as .bin, .exe, and .scr files, are frequently seen, this category of file types is down from 32.9 percent in April to eight percent in May.RankAttachment
TypeMay Overall
PercentageAttachment
TypeApril Overall
Percentage
1 .doc 40.4% .doc 39.3%
2 .txt 24.1% .exe 20.5%
3 .xls 13.5% .au3 15.0%
4 .pdf 11.6% .scr 12.4%
5 .bin 3.9% .jpg 3.1%
6 .exe 3.7% .txt 1.2%
7 .ace 0.6% .ace 0.4%
8 .scr 0.4% .zip 0.3%
9 .rtf 0.2% .html 0.3%
10 Other 1.5% .cpl 0.3%
Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing Attacks
Source: Symantec
Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing Attacks6 | May 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
The Manufacturing sector was
targeted with the greatest volume
of spear-phishing attacks in May, as 41 percent were directed at manufacturing organizations.
Top 10 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
Source: SymantecConstructionNonclassifiable EstablishmentsRetailServices - ProfessionalTransportation, Communications,
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary ServicesServices - Non TraditionalWholesalePublic AdministrationFinance, Insurance, & Real EstateManufacturing 41%
21
19 15
11
9 6
8 7
6 19
5 7
3
2
1 4
1 2 12May April
Top 10 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
Large enterprises were the target
of 39.2 percent of spear-phishing
attacks in May, down from 42.5 percent in April. In contrast, 42.5 percent of attacks were directed at organizations with less than 250 employees during May, up from 30.6 percent in April.Company Size May April
1-250 42.5% 30.6%
251-500 5.1% 8.5%
501-1000 6.6% 12.8%
1001-1500 2.7% 2.2%
1501-2500 3.9% 3.4%
2501+ 39.2% 42.5%
Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
Source: Symantec
Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization7 | May 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Phishing Rate Inverse Graph: Smaller Number = Greater Risk
Source: Symantec400
800
1200
1600200024002800M A M F J
2015D N O S A J J1 IN496
12901587
2041161015171004
1465
266620571865647
Phishing Rate The overall phishing rate has
increased slightly for the second
month in a row, where one in 1,865 emails was a phishing attempt.
Industry May April
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 1 in 856.0 1 in 1,111.7
Public Administration 1 in 1,289.3 1 in 1,275.5
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 1 in 1,349.9 1 in 3,083.8
Services - Professional 1 in 1,762.2 1 in 1,088.3
Nonclassifiable Establishments 1 in 1,834.9 1 in 2,033.4
Construction 1 in 2,124.9 1 in 2,752.2
Mining 1 in 2,230.6 1 in 3,350.4
Services - Non Traditional 1 in 2,408.2 1 in 2,471.8
Transportation, Communications,
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services1 in 2,840.2 1 in 3,627.8
Wholesale 1 in 2,878.2 1 in 2,668.5
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing
by Industry Sector
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing by Industry Sector The Agriculture, Forestry, &
Fishing sector was the most
targeted Industry overall for phishing attempts in May, where phishing comprised one in every 856 emails. This rate was higher than any other industry in either
May or April.8 | May 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Company Size May April
1–250 1 in 1,473.9 1 in 1,706.8
251–500 1 in 1,629.5 1 in 1,975.1
501–1000 1 in 1,940.9 1 in 2,123.9
1001–1500 1 in 1,988.9 1 in 2,123.9
1501–2500 1 in 2,032.8 1 in 2,277.8
2501+ 1 in 2,280.8 1 in 2,307.1
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing
by Organization Size
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing by Organization Size Small companies with less than
250 employees was the most
targeted organization size in May.9 | May 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
The number of vulnerabilities
reported in May declined for the
second month in a row, down to 456 vulnerabilities reported during the month.
Total Number of Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec100200300400500600
M A M F J
2015D N O S A J J438575
399600 596
428494
400578
517
456 457
Total Number of VulnerabilitiesVulnerabilities
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
There was a one zero-day
vulnerability discovered in May,
the Hypervisor Floppy Emulator Vulnerability (CVE-2015-3456).
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec0123
M A M F J
2015D N O S A J J0 0 0 02
12
1 1
01
010 | May 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Vulnerabilities Disclosed in Industrial Control Systems
Source: Symantec024681012
M A M F J
2015D N O S A J J024681012
M A M F J
2015D N O S A J J210
2 2
1 11 11 1Vulnerabilities
Unique Vendors While two vulnerabilities in
industrial control systems were
reported by one vendor in April, none were reported this May.
Vulnerabilities Disclosed in Industrial Control Systems11 | May 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
New Malware Variants
OSX.RSPlug.A continues to be
the most commonly seen OS X
threat seen on OS X endpoints in May, up four percentage points from April.Rank Malware NameMay
PercentageMalware NameApril
Percentage
1 OSX.RSPlug.A 23.9% OSX.RSPlug.A 19.8%
2 OSX.Keylogger 14.0% OSX.Wirelurker 12.2%
3 OSX.Wirelurker 9.0% OSX.Keylogger 11.0%
4 OSX.Luaddit 8.3% OSX.Luaddit 9.7%
5 OSX.Klog.A 8.0% OSX.Klog.A 6.9%
6 OSX.Flashback.K 6.4% OSX.Stealbit.B 6.3%
7 OSX.Netweird 3.9% OSX.Flashback.K 5.7%
8 OSX.Sabpab 3.8% OSX.Exploit.Launchd 5.2%
9 OSX.Stealbit.B 3.6% OSX.Freezer 2.9%
10 OSX.Flashback 3.0% OSX.Sabpab 2.8%
Top 10 Mac OS X Malware Blocked on OS X Endpoints
Source: Symantec
Top 10 Mac OSX Malware Blocked on OSX Endpoints Malware
New Malware Variants
Source: Symantec1020304050607080
M A M F J
2015D N O S A J J24.728.231.7
26.635.944.7
33.7
26.535.8
29.244.563.6MILLIONS There were more than 44.5
million new pieces of malware
created in May, up from 29.2 million created in April.12 | May 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Malware Was Detected
The proportion of email traffic
containing malware increased
again this month, up from one in 246 emails in April to one in 207 emails in May.100
150200
250
300
350
400M A M F J
2015D N O S A J J1 IN
Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Malware Was Detected
Source: SymantecInverse Graph: Smaller Number = Greater Risk232
351270
351329195207
237
274246207
246
Percent of Email Malware as URL vs. Attachment by Month
The percentage of email malware
that contains a URL remained low
in May, hovering around three percent.
Percent of Email Malware as URL vs. Attachment by Month
Source: Symantec1020304050
M A M F J
2015D N O S A J J78
36
714
538
3 34113 | May 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Industry May April
Public Administration 1 in 150.4 1 in 127.0
Wholesale 1 in 157.7 1 in 236.9
Services - Professional 1 in 164.5 1 in 200.9
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 1 in 175.3 1 in 182.5
Services - Non Traditional 1 in 236.6 1 in 260.0
Construction 1 in 240.9 1 in 253.2
Nonclassifiable Establishments 1 in 255.9 1 in 261.6
Finance, insurance, & Real Estate 1 in 292.8 1 in 315.6
Transportation, Communications,
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services1 in 305.5 1 in 328.1
Mining 1 in 325.8 1 in 303.7
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious
by Industry Sector
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious by Industry Sector The Public Administration sector
was the most targeted industry
again in May, with one in 150 emails containing malware. However, this is down from one
in 127 in April.
Company Size May April
1-250 1 in 141.3 1 in 209.7
251-500 1 in 159.5 1 in 174.2
501-1000 1 in 221.3 1 in 219.8
1001-1500 1 in 205.0 1 in 210.9
1501-2500 1 in 264.6 1 in 268.4
2501+ 1 in 303.6 1 in 301.6
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious
by Organization Size
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious by Organization Size Organizations with less than 250
employees were most likely to be
targeted by malicious email in the month of May.14 | May 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Mobile & Social Media
0123456789
M A M F J
2015D N O S A J J
Android Mobile Malware Families by Month
Source: Symantec4 4
2356
3
03
128 In May there were two new
mobile malware families
discovered.
Android Mobile Malware Families by Month
There was an average of 39
Android malware variants per family in the month of in May.
01020304050
M A M F J
2015D N O S A J J
New Android Variants per Family by Month
Source: Symantec34 34 3433373638 38 3839 39
36
New Android Variants per Family by Month15 | May 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Last 12 Months
Social Media
Source: Symantec020406080100
Comment
JackingFake
AppsLikejacking Fake
OfferingManual
Sharing582
11
0.11.4
Manual Sharing – These rely on victims to actually do the work of sharing
the scam by presenting them with intriguing videos, fake offers or messages that they share with their friends.
Fake Offering – These scams invite social network users to join a fake event or group
with incentives such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to sharecredentials with the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
Likejacking – Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website
buttons that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
Fake Apps – Users are invited to subscribe to an application that appears to be
integrated for use with a social network, but is not as described and may be used to steal credentials or harvest other personal data.
Comment Jacking – This attack is similar to the "Like" jacking where the attacker tricks the
user into submitting a comment about a link or site, which will then be posted to his/her wall.
Social Media In the last twelve months, 82
percent of social media threats
required end users to propagate them.
Fake offerings comprised 11
percent of social media threats.16 | May 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
525256
51.5%
-0.6% pts52.1%
-3.7% pts55.8%
May April March
Overall Email Spam Rate
Source: Symantec
Overall Email Spam Rate The overall email spam rate
further declined in May, dropping
0.6 percentage points
to 51.5 percent.Spam & Botnets
Spam Botnet
NamePercentage
of Botnet Spam
KELIHOS 19.7%
DARKMAILER 10.5%
GAMUT 7.6%
CUTWAIL 2.0%
DYRE 0.4%
SPAMSALOT 0.1%
DARKMAILER2 0.02%
DARKMAILER3 0.02%
GRUM 0.01%
ASPROX 0.01%
Top 10 Spam-Sending Botnets
Source: Symantec
Top 10 Spam-Sending Botnets The Kelihos botnet was the most
active spamming botnet in the month of May, making of 19.7 percent of all bot-related spam traffic.17 | May 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Industry May April
Mining 55.38% 54.37%
Construction 54.07% 53.74%
Manufacturing 53.71% 53.40%
Services - Professional 52.54% 52.46%
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 52.33% 52.33%
Retail 52.08% 52.40%
Wholesale 52.06% 52.28%
Nonclassifiable Establishments 51.75% 51.76%
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 51.74% 51.71%
Services - Non Traditional 51.64% 51.61%
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Industry Sector
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Industry Sector At over 55 percent, the Mining
sector had the highest spam rate
during May. The Construction sector came in second with 54
percent.
Company Size May April
1–250 52.66% 52.04%
251–500 52.55% 52.36%
501–1000 52.00% 52.42%
1001–1500 52.20% 52.08%
1501–2500 52.16% 52.17%
2501+ 52.16% 52.11%
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Organization Size
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Organization Size While all organization sizes
hovered around a 52 percent
spam rate, organizations with less than 250 employees had the highest rate at 52.7 percent.18 | May 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
About Symantec
More Information
Symantec Worldwide: http://www.symantec.com/
ISTR and Symantec Intelligence Resources: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/
Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer/
Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex/Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC) is an information protection expert that helps people,
businesses and governments seeking the freedom to unlock the opportunities technology brings – anytime, anywhere. Founded in April 1982, Symantec, a Fortune 500 company, operating one of the largest global data-intelligence networks, has provided leading security, backup and availability solutions for where vital information is stored, accessed and shared. The company’s more than 20,000 employees reside in more than 50 countries. Ninety-nine percent of Fortune 500 companies are Symantec customers. In fiscal 2014, it recorded revenues of $6.7 billion. To learn more go to
www.symantec.com or connect with Symantec at: go.symantec.com/socialmedia.
|
Symantec Intelligence
Symantec Intelligence Report : November 2012
A look at identities lost in data breaches ; Holiday spam
Welcome to the November edition of the Symantec Intelligence report , which provides the latest analysis of cyber
security threats, trends , and insights from the Symantec Intelligence team concerning malware, spam, and other
potentially harmful business risks . The data used to compile the analysis for this report includes data from January
through November 2012.
Report highlights
• Spam – 68.8 percent (an increase of 4.0 percentage points since October ): page 6
• Phishing – One in 445.1 emails identified as phishing (a decrease of 0.124 percentage points since October ): page 9
• Malware – One in 255.8 emails contained malware ( an decrease of 0.05 percentage points since October ): page 10
• Malicious website s – 1,847 websites blocked per day ( an increase of 97.9 percent since October ): page 12
• A look at identities lost in data breaches : page 2
• Spam as a holiday tradition: page 4
Introduction
In this month’s Symantec Intelligence Report, we take a second look at data breaches this year. However, instead of
looking at the trends in terms of the nature of the breaches, we examine the types of data that is often stolen during a
data breach. It turns out the most commonly stolen information is more personal than you might first expect.
We also take a look at spam during this holiday season. We’ve not iced that spammers are using the holidays as a
means to entice users to check out the wares they’re peddling, in much the same way they have in years past. There
has also been an increase in the size of spam email messages this month—messages 10kb and larger are up 21
percent, from 17.3 percent in October to 38.3 percent of all spam email in November. We take a look at why this is,
and what we see in store for the rest of the month.
I hope you enjoy reading this month’s edition of the report, and please feel free to contact me directly with any
comments or feedback.
Ben Nahorney , Cyber Security Threat Analyst
[email protected]
@symantec, @symanteccloud, @norton, @ threatintel
Page 1 of 14
Report analysis
Information exposed: A look at identities lost in data breaches
By Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat Analyst, Symantec
Back in the August report we took a look at data breaches , where we found that the median number of identities
stolen in a data breach is up over last year. This trend has continued since then, with the median now up to 8,404
identities per breach. (Note that this is the median number rather than an average. When looking at data like this, the
average can be misleading since a few large data breaches can cause a huge increase.)
For this month, let’s take a closer look at the types of information being stolen during data breaches and what can be
done with that information. We’ve broken down the top ten information types that are reported as stolen in data
breaches by how often they appear in breaches as a whole.
To do this, we took a look at more of the data gathered through our Norton Cybercrime Index. The data breach section
of the Norton CCI is derived from data breaches that have been reported by legitimate media sources and have exposed personal information. Using publicly available data the Norton CCI determines the sectors that were most
often affected by data breaches, as well as the most common causes of data loss.
We gathered data on breaches that have occurred so far in 2012 and organized them by the typ es of information
included in the breach. We then organized each type as a percentage of overall breaches, ultimately showing how
often the information was exposed across all breaches.
Figure 1 – Percentages of data type exposed in a typical data breach
At first glance, what may seem surprising is that a person’s real name is by far the most common item to be stolen in a
data breach, where it is obtained 55% of the time. This surpasses even usernames and passwords , most commonly
used for online identities , which appears within 40% of all data breaches. This points to a trend where hackers are
targeting locations people go to complete tasks, in contrast to years past where breaches may have occurred with
Page 2 of 14
more frequency through message boards or online games . These former hot -spots would have been less likely to
include a user’s real name, often only requiring an alias for a user name.
In contrast , more than 80% of data breaches that are occurring this year are with organizations whose Internet
presence is secondary to their main business, such as the healthcare and education sectors, where online access to
services is often set up as a means of convenience instead of a business front. Viewing a website as an auxiliary
service may mean laxer security, making t hem easier targets for data breaches.
What is concerning is that government -issued ID numbers, such as Social Security numbers, are still stolen in so
many data breaches. While storing this information would make sense for some sectors such as accounting or healthcare, where knowing such numbers is a necessity, in many cases these numbers are being stolen from
organizations that really have no direct need of it. It may be time for consumers, when asked to provide a Social
Security number, to being asking th e organization just why they need it, and if an alternate identifying number can be
provided instead.
What appears to be a silver lining in this analysis is that financial information—such as banking details, credit card
details, and salary information—only appears in 13% of all data breaches. This could be due to heavier restrictions on
how financial information must be gathered, confirmed, and stored.
What’s important to note is that this data does not account for actual cases of identity theft; the data has been stolen,
but not necessarily used maliciously. Rather it opens the door for someone with mali cious intention to use the
information for illicit activities.
A hacker may use some of the information they’ve gathered in a breach to gather further information. For instance,
this information could be used to “confirm” someone’s identity over the phone, thus gaining access to further data. In
these cases, the hacker is able to work his or her way up the “data chain” in the hopes of obtaining more valuable
information.
Most cases of pure monetary theft, where an identity is falsified to purchase goods or services, are done on a much
more covert process than buying items with abandon. For example, a thief who has obtained a cache of sensitive data
might take one credit card from a list that’s been stolen and then test to see if it usable by making a very s mall
purchase— one that would draw little attention on a credit card statement. If the transaction was successful, he or she
might sell the credit card details on to another party.
Finally, an attacker could use this information to create fake accounts in someone’s name. This could mean misrepresenting someone online, such as in social networking environments . In more extreme cases, the data could
be used to blatantly impersonate the individual. While the latter is much rarer, there have been instances of people
opening credit cards in other people’s names, or impersonating another individual to receive medical treatment.
Overall, it doesn’t appear that the rise in identities exposed through data breaches is going to be slowing down any time soon. Fortunate ly, while not always required by law, it appears to becoming standard practice for organizations
that are breached to provide credit monitoring services. The best thing you can do as a consumer is to only provide personal details when absolutely necessary, and keep a close eye on your personal information as much as possible.
Page 3 of 14
Spam: A holiday tradition
with contributions by Nicholas Johnston
It’s almost becoming a holiday tradition, though not in the sense of decorating the tree or drinking eggnog. We’re all
used to being bombarded with holiday advertisements, enticing us to buy goods from various retailers, but what’s also becoming the norm is the annual run of holiday spam.
Looking at this year’s trends, naturally we see increases in Subject lines target ing certain themes during the lead- up to
various days in the holiday period. Take a look at these subject snapshots from the month of November:
Figure 2 – Spam rates for holiday subject lines
However, the spam messages appear to appeal more to the holiday season in keywords than they do in the body of the message:
Subject:
Christmas sales
Message body:
Goog morning, dear [REMOVED]!
Huge discount
Exhausted? No desire? Viagra will help! Buy here!
-> Propceia - 0.23$
-- Levtira - 1.84$
-> Cialis - 1.81$
++ Vigara - 0.79$
Take care of your body and it will take care of you. Use our autumn discounts!
Some of the websites that these spam messages lead to appear to pay a little more attention to the details of the
season however, with banners that fit the holiday spirit. Sometimes getting a full year’s jump on early shopping! (Note
the “Christmas 2013” mention.)
Figure 3 – Holiday pharmacy spam
Page 4 of 14
Now while many people are around the world are preparing for Christmas, some 419 or advance fee fraud spammers
have reminded us that there are plenty of people who don't celebrate Christmas, and plenty of cultural differences
which scammers can exploit. We recently saw a fake lottery 419 or advance fee fraud message stating:
Your Email Id has Won a whooping sum of four crores eighty lakhs,in Punjab draw please
provide Your Name,Address.
It is interesting to see scammers tailoring their mails for the Indian subcontinent by using the South Asian numbering
system. A "crore" is ten million and a "lakh" is one hundred thousand. 419 scammers never cease to amaze with their
constant tailoring and adaptation.
Finally, we have seen an increase in spam messages with f ile sizes 10kb or larger. These bigger emails are up 21
percent, from 17.3 percent in October to 38.3 percent of all spam email in November. While our first thoughts were
that this could be the result of an increase in image spam, with emails designed to appeal to holiday shoppers, we found that the increases could be attributed to a malware run during the month.
That’s not to say we won’t see an increase in image spam as Christmas approaches. In fact we expect to see the
frequency of large spam emails to stay up, if not increase in December. In much the same way that retailers s end out
larger catalogs around the holidays seasons, spammers will likely send out larger spam messages, hoping to cash in
on the holiday season.
Page 5 of 14
Global Trends & Content Analysis
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the world through the
Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network, which is made up of more than 64.6 million attack sensors and records
thousands of events per second. This network monitors attack activity in more than 200 countries and territor ies
through a combination of Symantec products and services such as Symantec DeepSight™ Threat Management
System, Symantec™ Managed Security Services and Norton™ consumer products, and other third- party data
sources.
In addition, Symantec maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting
of more than 47,662 recorded vulnerabilities (spanning more than two decades) from over 15,967 vendors
representing over 40,006 products.
Spam, phishing and malware data is captured through a variety of sources, including the Symantec Probe Network, a
system of more than 5 million decoy accounts; Symantec.cloud and a number of other Symantec security
technologies. Skeptic™, the Symantec.cloud proprietary heuristic technology is ab le to detect new and sophisticated
targeted threats before reaching customers’ networks. Over 8 billion email messages and more than 1.4 billion Web
requests are processed each day across 15 data centers. Symantec also gathers phishing information through an
extensive antifraud community of enterprises, security vendors, and more than 50 million consumers.
These resources give Symantec’s analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze, and provide
informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and spam. The result is the
annual Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, which gives enterprises and consumers the essential information to
secure their systems effectively now and into the future.
Spam Analysis
In November , the global ratio of spam in email traffic rose by 4.0 percentage point since October , to 68.8 percent ( 1 in
1.45 emails ). This follows the continuing trend of global spam levels diminishing gradually since the latter part of 2011 .
Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Saudi Arabia
Sri Lanka
Qatar
Taiwan
Oman 83.9%
76.6%
74.4%
73.1%
73.0% Education
IT Services
Non-Profit
Recreation
Gov/Public Sector 70.9%
70.1%
70.0%
69.5%
69.4% 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 69.4%
68.6%
68.5%
69.1%
68.9%
68.8% Spam Rate
November 2012 68.8%
64.8%
69.2% Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012
9.0%
7.6%
7.3%
7.1%
6.0%
4.2%
4.1%
3.2%
2.9%
2.8% India
United States
Brazil
Russian Federation
Canada
Viet Nam
South Korea
Ukraine
Romania
Peru 68.8%
Page 6 of 14
Global Spam Categories
The most common category of spam in November is related to the Sex/ Dating category , with 57.72 percent.
Category Name November
2012 October
2012
Sex/Dating 57.72% 62.73%
Pharma 14.71% 9.79%
Watches 12.69% 3.74%
Jobs 5.46% 10.45%
Mobile 3.77% 0.19%
Software 3.38% 2.49%
Casino 1.23% 0.75%
419/scam/lotto 0.20% 0.11%
Newsletters 0.08% 0.04%
Degrees 0.01% 0.35%
Spam URL Distribution based on Top Level Domain Name
The proportion of spam exploiting URLs in the .com top- level domain increased in November , as highlighted in the
table below. This is in line with a slight increase in .com top-level domains this month.
TLD November
2012 October
2012
.com 64.1 % 63.1 %
.net 6.5 % 6.8 %
.ru 6.2 % 6.2 %
.org 3.3 % n/a
Average Spam Message Size
In November , the proportion of spam emails that were 5Kb in size or less decrease d by 5.0 percentage points.
Furthermore, the proportion of spam messages that were greater than 10Kb in size in creased by 21 percent , as can be
seen in the following table.
Message Size November
2012 October
2012
0Kb – 5Kb 36.8 % 41.8 %
5Kb – 10Kb 24.9 % 40.9 %
>10Kb 38.3 % 17.3 %
Spam Attack Vectors
November highlights the decrease in spam emails resulting in NDRs (spam related non- delivery reports) . In these
cases, the recipient email addresses are invalid or bounced by their service provider. The proportion of spam that
contained a malicious attachment or link in creased , with periodic spike s of spam activity during the period, as shown in
the chart below.
Page 7 of 14
NDR spam, as shown in the chart above, is often as a result of widespread dictionary attacks during spam campaigns ,
where spammers make use of databases containing first and last names and combine them to generate random email
addresses . A higher -level of activity is indicative of spammers that are seeking to build their distribution lists by
ignoring the invalid recipient emails in the bounce- backs . The list can then be used for more targeted spam attacks
containing malicious attachment s or link s. This might indicate a pattern followed by spammers in harvesting the email
addresses for some months and using those addresses for targeted attacks in other months. 0.0%5.0%10.0%15.0%20.0%25.0%30.0%
NDR Malware
Page 8 of 14
Phishing Analysis
In November , the global phishing rate decrease d by 0.124 percentage points, taking the global average rate to one in
445.1 emails ( 0.225 percent) that comprised some form of phishing attack.
Analysis of Phishing W ebsites
The overall phishing increased by about 8.5 percent this month. Unique domains decreased by about 14 percent as
compared to the previous month. Phishing websites that used automated toolkits increased by 37 percent. Phishing
websites with IP domains (for e.g. domains like http://255.255.255.255 ) decreased by about 19 percent. Webhosting
services comprised of 2 percent of all phish ing, a de crease of 29 percent from the previous month. The number of
non-English phishing sites decreased by 8 percent. Among non- English phishing sites, French, Italian , Portuguese,
and Chinese were highest in October.
Geographic Location of Phishing Web sites
Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 South Africa
Denmark
United Kingdom
Australia
Netherlands 1 in 156.0
1 in 213.8
1 in 251.6
1 in 3 11.5
1 in 344.3 Public Sector
Education
Finance
Non-Profit
Accom/Catering 1 in 109.0
1 in 258.9
1 in 334.2
1 in 349.3
1 in 353.6 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 1 in 337.3
1 in 567.0
1 in 778.8
1 in 613.9
1 in 787.0
1 in 408.8 Phishing Rate
November 2012 1 in 445.1
1 in 286.9
1 in 372.2 Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012
25.8%
20.4%
17.5%
11.5%
5.0%
3.5%
3.1%
1.5%
1.5%
1.5% United Kingdom
United States
Australia
New Zealand
Sweden
Canada
France
Denmark
Brazil
Ireland 1 in 445.1
November 2012 Phishing Websites Locations
*Note: Data lags one monthCountry October*
UnitedStates
Germany
UnitedKingdom
Brazil
FranceCanada
RussiaChina
Netherlands
Turkey54.7%
4.8%
3.6%
3.4%
2.9%3.1%
2.5%
2.0%2.1%
1.3%September
54.2%
5.0%
3.8%
2.1%
3.0%3.4%
2.4%2.0%2.7%
1.3%
Page 9 of 14
Tactics of Phishing Distribution
Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks, by Industry
0.7% 2.4% 2.3% 38.6% 56.0%
TyposquattingFree Web Hosting SitesIP Address DomainsOther Unique DomainsAutomated Toolkits
0.004% 0.006% 0.01% 0.27% 0.50% 0.60% 0.75% 2.0% 2.2% 34.3% 59.3%
AviationISPInsuranceGovernmentEntertainmentTelecommunicationsRetailComputer SoftwareCommunicationsInformation ServicesBanking
Page 10 of 14
Malware Analysis
Email -borne Threats
The global ratio of email -borne viruses in email traffic was one in 255.8 emails ( 0.391 percent ) in November , a
decrease of 0.05 percentage points since October .
In November , 13.0 percent of email -borne malware contained links to malicious websites, 10.6 percentage points
lower than October .
Frequently Blocked E mail-borne Malware
The table below shows the most frequently blocked email -borne malware for November , many of which relate to
generic variants of malicious attachments and malicious hy perlinks distributed in emails. Approximately 35.4 percent
of all email -borne malware was identified and blocked using generic detection.
Malware identified generically as aggressive strains of polymorphic malware accounted for 15.2 percent of all email -
borne malware blocked in November .
Malware Name % Malware
Suspicious.JIT.a -SH 15.42%
Suspicious.JIT.a.dam 6.74%
W32/ Generic.dam 6.24%
W32/Bredolab.gen!eml.k -SH 5.85%
Exploit/Link -generic -ee68 5.44%
W32/Bredolab.gen!eml.j -SH 5.16%
Trojan.Sasfis.dam 3.68%
EML/Worm.XX.dam 2.99%
Link-Trojan.Blackhole.I 2.62%
W32/Bredolab.gen!eml.j 1.77%
The top- ten list of most frequently blocked malware accounted for approximately 15.8 percent of all email -borne
malware blocked in November . Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Germany
South Africa
United Kingdom
Australia
Switzerland 1 in 47.3
1 in 85.8
1 in 172.6
1 in 242.8
1 in 277.6 Public Sector
Education
IT Services
Accom/Catering
Chem/Pharm 1 in 86.6
1 in 156.6
1 in 165.8
1 in 184.9
1 in 223.2 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 1 in 279.1
1 in 327.0
1 in 155.5
1 in 288.8
1 in 399.7
1 in 248.4Virus Rate
November 2012 1 in 255.8
1 in 229.4
1 in 255.8 1 in 264.5 Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012
54.7%
16.4%
7.8%
3.1%
3.0%
2.0%
1.8%
1.7%
1.6%
1.3% United Kingdom
United States
Germany
Brazil
Australia
Sweden
South Africa
France
Japan
Hong Kong
Page 11 of 14
Web -based Malware Threats
In November , Symantec Intelligence identified an average of 1,847 websites each day harboring mal ware and other
potentially unwanted programs including spyware and adware; an increase of 97.9 percent since October . This reflects
the rate at which website s are being compromised or created for the purpose of spreading malicious content. Often
this number is higher when Web-based malware is in circulation for a longer period of time to widen its potential
spread and increase its longevity.
As detection for Web- based malwar e increases, the number of new websites blocked decreases and the proportion of
new malware begins to rise, but initially on fewer websites. Further analysis reveals that 33.3 percent of all malicious
domains blocked were new in November ; a decrease of 5.2 percentage points compared with October . Additionally,
11.0 percent of all Web- based malware blocked was new in November ; a decrease of 0.01 percentage points since
October .
The chart above shows the increase in the number of new spyware and adware websites blocked each day on
average during November compared with the equivalent number of Web- based malware website s blocked each day.
Web Policy Risks from Inappropriate Use
Some of t he most common trigger s for policy -based filtering applied by Symantec Web Security.cloud for its business
clients are s ocial networking, advertisements and pop- ups, and streaming media category . Many organizations allow
access to social networking websites , but facilitate access logging so that usage patterns can be tracked and in some
cases implement policies to only permit access at certain times of the day and block access at all other times. Web -
based advertisements pose a potential risk though the use of “malvertisements,” or malicious advertisements. These
may occur as the result of a legitimate online ad- provider being compromised and a banner ad being used to serve
malware on an otherwise harmless website . Streaming media is increasingly popular when there are major sporting
events or high profile international news stories. This activity often results in an increased number of blocks, as
businesses seek to preserve valuable bandwidth for other purposes.
Endpoint Security Threats
The endpoint is often the last line of defense and analysis; however, the endpoint can often be the first -line of defense
against attacks that spread using USB storage devices and insecure network connections . The threats found here can
shed light on the wider nature of threats confronting businesses, especially from blended attacks and threats facing New Malware Sites per Day
New sites with spyware
New sites with web viruses
Total 14/day
1,847/day
1,861/dayWeb Security Services Activity:
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Web Security Services Activity:
Policy-Based Filtering
Advertisement and Popups
Social Networking
Streaming Media
Peer- To-Peer
Computing and Internet
Chat
Gambling
Hosting Sites
Games
NewsWebViruses and Trojans
JS:Trojan.Script.E Y
Trojan.JS.Agent.HH Y
Downloader
JS:Trojan.Iframe.S
JS:Trojan.Iframe.AX P
Trojan.JS.Agent.GHF
Trojan.JS.Iframe.B RV
Trojan.Script.WO
Trojan.JS.Iframe.CFJ
Gen: Variant.Symmi.2895 Potentially Unwanted Programs
Dropped:Adware.Generic.262597
Application.DirectDownloade r.A
Spyware.PCAcme
Application:Android/Counterclank. A
Adware:Android/AirPush. A
Adware.Generic.279017
Adware:W32/Baidu.gen!B
Gen:Application.Heu r.cmKfbiBPZXoO
Spyware.Ardakey
Adware.Generic.249333
November 2012 28.9%
28.9%
7.5%
4.2%
3.9%
3.0%
2.3%
2.2%
2.0%
1.6% 35.5%
7.6%
5.6%
5.1%
2.6%
2.0%
1.4%
1.4%
1.2%
1.2% 83.5%
7.9%
3.6%
0.4%
0.4%
0.4%
0.3%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
Page 12 of 14
mobile workers . Attacks reaching the endpoint are likely to have already circumvented other layers of protection that
may already be deployed, such as gateway filtering.
The table below shows the malware most frequently blocked targeting endpoint devices for the last month. This
includes data from endpoint devices protected by Symantec technology around the world, including data from clients
which may not be using other layers of protection, such as Symantec Web Security.cloud or Symantec Email
AntiVirus.cloud.
Malware Name1 % Malware
W32.Sality.AE 6.52%
W32.Ramnit!html 6.01%
W32.Downadup.B 4.91%
W32.Ramnit.B 4.86%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 3.89%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 2.35%
W32.Virut.CF 2.09%
W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 1.85%
W32.Xpaj.B 1.06%
W32.Virut!html 1.01%
For much of 2012 , variants of W32.Sality.AE
2 and W32.Ramnit3 had been the most prevalent malicious threat s
blocked at the endpoint. Variants of W32.Ramnit accounted for approximately 15.0% of all malware blocked at the
endpoint in November , compared with 7.2 percent for all variants of W32.Sality.
Approximately 10.2 percent of the most frequently blocked malware last month was identified and blocked using
generic detection. Many new viruses and Trojans are based on earlier versions, where code has been copied or altered to create a new strain, or variant. Often these variants are created using toolkits and hundreds of thousands of
variants can be created from the same piece of malware. This has become a popular tactic to evade signature- based
detection, as each variant would traditionally need its own signature to be correctly identified and blocked.
By deploying techniques, such as heuristic analysis and generic detection, it ’s possible to correctly identify and block
several variants of the same malware families, as well as identify new forms of malicious code that s eek to exploit
certain vulnerabilities that can be identified generically.
1For further information on these threats, please visit: http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/landing/threats.js p
2 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.js p?docid=2006- 011714- 3948 -99
3 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010- 011922- 2056 -99
Page 13 of 14
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
NOVEMBER 2013p. 2
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
3 Executive Summary
4 BIG NUMBERS
7 TARGETED ATTACKS
8 Targeted Attacks in 2013
8 Targeted Attacks per Day
8 First Attacks Logged by Month
9 Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
9 Top 10 Industries Attacked
9 First Attacks Logged by Size
9 File Extensions of Attachments
10 Social Media
11 Social Media
11 Top 5 Social Media Attacks, 2013
12 DATA BREACHES
13 Data Breaches
13 Top 5 Types of Information Exposed
13 Timeline of Data Breaches, 2013
14 MOBILE
15 Mobile
15 Mobile Malware by Type
16 Cumulative Mobile Android Malware
17 VULNERABILITIES
18 Vulnerabilities
18 Total Vulnerabilities Disclosed by Month
18 Browser Vulnerabilities
18 Plug-in Vulnerabilities19 SPAM, PHISHING, & MALWARE
20 Spam
20 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Geography
20 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Industry
21 Top 10 Sources of Spam
21 Average Spam Message Size
21 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Company Size
21 Spam by Category
21 Spam URL Distribution Based on Top Level Domain Name
22 Phishing
22 Top 10 Sources of Phishing
22 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Company Size
22 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Industry
22 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Geography
23 Phishing Distribution
23 Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks
24 Malware
24 Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected
24 Top 10 Email Virus Sources
25 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Industry
25 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Geographic Location
25 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Company Size
26 Endpoint Security
26 Top 10 Most Frequently Blocked Malware
27 Policy Based Filtering
27 Policy Based Filtering
28 About Symantec
28 More Informationp. 3
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
Executive Summary
Welcome to the November edition of the Symantec Intelligence
report. Symantec Intelligence aims to provide the latest analysis of
cyber security threats, trends, and insights concerning malware,
spam, and other potentially harmful business risks.
November saw another increase in the number of targeted attacks. While these numbers are up
slightly compared to October, they’re almost double the number of targeted attacks during the
same month in 2012, though still much lower than their peaks this summer.
This month we saw another large data breach reported, where 42 million identities were exposed
as a result. However, the breach apparently took place in January, resulting in an increase in overall
numbers for the beginning of this year.
It appears that the email virus rate increased in November, where one in 235 emails contained a
malicious attachment. This is up from one in 437 emails last month, and the highest rate we’ve
seen since November 2012. In terms of industries most likely to encounter malicious emails,
the Public Sector tops the list at one in 62 emails. The United Kingdom tops both the source and
destinations locations for the month.
In other news, spam rates dropped 5.5 percentage points to 62.2 percent of email, fake offerings
still top the list of social media attacks at 82 percent, 36 percent of all malicious mobile apps track
user activity, and 438 new vulnerabilities were disclosed during the month.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to contact us with any comments or
feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat Analyst
[email protected]. 4
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
BIG NUMBERSp. 5
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
Overall Email Phishing Rate:
Overall Email Phishing Rate:
1 in 1,1341 in 1,056
1 in 1,311OctSep
NovHIGHER NUMBER = LOWER RISK
Overall Email Virus Rate:
Overall Email Virus Rate:
Sep
OctNovHIGHER NUMBER = LOWER RISK
1 in 383
1 in 437
1 in 253
Estimated Global
Email Spam Rate Per DayEstimated Global
Email Spam Rate Per Day
SPAM AS PERCENT OF ALL EMAIL
Sep Oct Nov0102030405060708090100
66% 68% 62%
New Vulnerabilities
New Vulnerabilities
Oct
Sep
Nov
549
549
663 663
438 438
Oct5Sep45
Nov6
Mobile
VulnerabilitiesMobile
Vulnerabilities
p. 6
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
Data Breaches
Data Breaches
186Number of Breaches
(Year-to-Date)
296,422,090 Number of IdentitiesExposed (Year-to-Date)
Mobile Malware VariantsMobile Malware VariantsVARIANTS (CUMULATIVE) 161213
Nov Oct Sep193249
186
10002000300040005000600070008000900010000
N O S A J J M A M F JAN
2013D N
7,4807,480p. 7
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
TARGETED ATTACKSp. 8
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
Targeted Attacks in 2013
Targeted Attacks per Day
Source: Symantec
2013 2013 TREND (Projected) 2011 2012
TARGETED ATTACKS
255075100125150175200225250
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANAt a Glance
• The number of targeted
attacks in November were
up since the previous
month, even surpassing
the number of attacks
recorded in November of
both 2011 and 2012.
• Large organizations of
2500+ continue to make
up the lion’s share of the
total number of targeted
attacks by organization
size, though organizations
with fewer than 250
employees are targeted
more often, based on first
attacks.
• The .exe file type was
the most common
attachment, making up
30.9% of email-based
targeted attacks that
included file attachments.
First Attacks Logged by Month
Source: Symantec
100200300400500600700800900100011001200
N O S A J J M A M F JAN
2013p. 9
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
Source: Symantec
Company Size Percent
1-250 29.6%
251-500 10.8%
501-1000 9.5%
1001-1500 3.2%
1501-2500 7.9%
2500+ 39.0%First Attacks Logged by Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Percent
1-250 51.5%
251-500 10.9%
501-1000 9.3%
1001-1500 5.3%
1501-2500 5.1%
2500+ 17.9%
File Extensions of Attachments
Source: Symantec
File Extension Percent
.exe 30.9%
.scr 19.0%
.doc 8.0%
.pdf 5.5%
.class 5.0%
.jpg 4.0%
.dmp 2.8%
.dll 1.8%
.au3 1.4%
.xls 1.3%Top 10 Industries Attacked
Source: Symantec
Industry Percent
Services - Professional 20.3%
Services - Non Traditional 18.8%
Public Administration 15.3%
Finance, insurance & Real Estate 13.2%
Manufacturing 10.3%
Transportation, communications, electric, gas &
Sanitary Services8.0%
Wholesale 5.0%
Retail 2.3%
Nonclassifiable Establishments 2.0%
Logistics 1.9%
The “Professional” services category includes services such as Legal, Accounting,
Health, and Education. “Non-Traditional” services include Hospitality, Recreational, and
Repair services.p. 10
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
SOCIAL MEDIAp. 11
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
Social Media
At a Glance
• 82 percent of all social
media attacks so far in
2013 have been fake
offerings. This is up from
56 percent in 2012.
• Fake Plug-ins are the
second-most common
type of social media
attacks at 7 percent, up
from fifth place in 2012,
at 5 percent.
• Fake Apps have risen
overall in 2013, now
making up 2 percent of
social media attacks. In
2012, this category was
ranked sixth.
Methodology
Fake Offering. These scams invite social network users to join a fake event or group with
incentives such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to share credentials with
the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
Fake Plug-in Scams. Users are tricked into downloading fake browser extensions on their
machines. Rogue browser extensions can pose like legitimate extensions but when installed
can steal sensitive information from the infected machine.
Likejacking. Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website buttons
that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
Fake Apps. Applications provided by attackers that appear to be legitimate apps; however,
they contain a malicious payload. The attackers often take legitimate apps, bundle malware
with them, and then re-release it as a free version of the app.
Manual Sharing Scams. These rely on victims to actually do the hard work of sharing the
scam by presenting them with intriguing videos, fake offers or messages that they share
with their friends.Top 5 Social Media Attacks, 2013
Source: Symantec
Top 5 Social Media Attacks
7%
5%
2%
2%Fake
Offering
Manual SharingLikejackingFake Plug-in
Fake Apps82%p. 12
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
DATA BREACHESp. 13
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
Data Breaches
At a Glance
• The largest breach that
was reported in November
actually occurred back in
January, where 42 million
identities were exposed.
• There were a number of
breaches reported during
November that occurred
earlier in the year. This
brings the total number of
breaches to 186 for so far
in 2013.
• Of the reported breaches
so far in this year, the top
three types of information
exposed are a person’s
real name, government
ID number (e.g. Social
Security), and birth date.Timeline of Data Breaches, 2013
Source: SymantecNUMBER OF INCIDENTSIDENTITIES BREACHED (MILLIONS)
INCIDENTS IDENTITIES BREACHED
0153045607590105120135150
N O S A J J M A M F JAN
2013D N081624324048
Top 5 Types of Information Exposed
Source: Symantec
39%40%
35%
30%71%Real Names
Gov ID numbers (Soc Sec)
Birth Dates
Home Address
Medical Records
Information Exposed in BreachesInformation Exposed in Breaches
% OF ALL BREACHESMethodology
This data is procured from the Norton Cybercrime Index (CCI).
The Norton CCI is a statistical model that measures the levels
of threats, including malicious software, fraud, identity theft,
spam, phishing, and social engineering daily. The data breach
section of the Norton CCI is derived from data breaches that
have been reported by legitimate media sources and have
exposed personal information.
In some cases a data breach is not publicly reported during the
same month the incident occurred, or an adjustment is made in
the number of identities reportedly exposed. In these cases, the
data in the Norton CCI is updated. This causes fluctuations in
the numbers reported for previous months when a new report is
released.
Norton Cybercrime Index
http://us.norton.com/protect-yourselfp. 14
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
MOBILEp. 15
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
Mobile
At a Glance
• So far in 2013, 36 percent
of mobile malware tracks
users, up from 15 percent
in 2012.
• Traditional threats,
such as back doors and
downloaders are present
in 22 percent of all mobile
malware threats.
• Risks that collect data,
the most common risk
in 2012, is down 9
percentage points to 23
percent of risks.
• Four new mobile malware
families were discovered
in November, along with
186 new variants.
22%36%
7%12%
24%23%
Track User
Risks that spy on the individual using the
device, collecting SMS messages or phone call logs, tracking GPS coordinates, recording phone calls, or gathering pictures and video taken with the device.
Traditional Threats
Threats that carry out traditional malware functions, such as back doors and downloaders.
Adware/Annoyance
Mobile risks that display advertising or generally perform actions to disrupt the user.Send Content
These risks will send text messages to premium SMS numbers, ultimately appearing on the bill of the device’s owner. Other risks can be used to send spam messages.Change Settings
These types of risks attempt to elevate privileges or simply modify various settings within the operating system. Collect Data
This includes the collection of both device- and user-specific data, such as device information, configuration data, or banking details. Mobile Malware by Type
Source: Symantecp. 16
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
Cumulative Mobile Android Malware
Source: Symantec
VARIANTS FAMILIES
4080120160200240280320360400
N O S A J J M A M F JAN
2013D N10002000300040005000600070008000900010000FAMILIES (CUMULATIVE) VARIANTS (CUMULATIVE)
p. 17
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
VULNERABILITIESp. 18
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
Vulnerabilities
At a Glance
• There were 438 new
vulnerabilities discovered
in November, bringing
the total for the year up
to 5965, a 16 percent
increase compared to the
same period in 2012.
• There were 6
vulnerabilities discovered
in mobile operating
systems during the month
of November.
• Google’s Chrome
browser continues to
lead in reporting browser
vulnerabilities, while
Oracle’s Java leads
in reported plug-in
vulnerabilities.
• Two zero-day
vulnerabilities were
disclosed during the
month of November.Total Vulnerabilities Disclosed by Month
Source: Symantec
100200300400500600700800
N O S A J J M A M F JAN
2013D N
Plug-in Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
10%20%30%40%50%60%
Adobe Acrobat Reader
Adobe Flash PlayerApple QuickTimeOracle Sun Java
Browser Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
10%20%30%40%50%60%
Apple Safari
Google ChromeMicrosoft Internet ExplorerMozilla FirefoxOpera
p. 19
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
SPAM, PHISHING, & MALWAREp. 20
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
At a Glance
• The global spam rate decrease 5.5 percentage points in November
to 62.2 percent, up from 67.7 percent in October.
• Education was the most commonly targeted industry, knocking
Pharmaceuticals from the top spot this month.
• The .com top-level domain (TLD) was the most frequently used
malicious TLD in November.
• Sex Dating spam is the most common category, at 71.2 percent.
Job-related spam comes in second at 16.5 percent.Spam
Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Geography
Source: Symantec
Geography Percent
Sri Lanka 77.5%
Israel 68.7%
Greece 67.9%
Hungary 67.7%
Brazil 67.4%
Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Percent
Education 63.6%
Non-Profit 63.5%
Recreation 62.8%
Chem/Pharm 62.7%
Gov/Public Sector 62.7%p. 21
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
Top 10 Sources of Spam
Source: Symantec
Source Percent of All Spam
United States 8.7%
Brazil 6.4%
Russian Federation 6.2%
India 5.5%
Canada 5.2%
Peru 4.8%
Argentina 3.9%
Spain 3.8%
Iran 3.3%
Italy 3.0%
Spam URL Distribution Based on Top Level Domain Name
Source: Symantec
Month* .com .biz .eu .us
Oct 26.1% 17.7% 13.6% 11.8%
Sep 30.8% 13.8% n/a n/a
*Data lags one monthAverage Spam Message Size
Source: Symantec
Month* 0Kb – 5Kb 5Kb – 10Kb >10Kb
Oct 40.2% 26.0% 33.8%
Sep 19.6% 20.4% 60.0%
*Data lags one monthSpam by Category
Source: Symantec
Category Percent
Sex/Dating 71.2%
Jobs 16.5%
Pharma 8.8%
Watches 1.4%
Software 1.2%Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Percent
1-250 62.0%
251-500 62.6%
501-1000 61.9%
1001-1500 62.3%
1501-2500 62.1%
2501+ 62.3%p. 22
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
At a Glance
• The global phishing rate is down in November, comprising one in
1 in 1,311 email messages. In October this rate was one in 1 in
1,135.
• Financial themes continue to be the most frequent subject matter,
with 74.8 percent of phishing scams containing this theme.
• South Africa had the highest rate in November, where one in 486
emails was a phishing scam.
• The United States tops the list of sources of phishing emails,
responsible for distributing 31.7 percent of phishing scams.
• The Public Sector was the most targeted industry in November,
with one in every 435 emails received in this industry being a
phishing scam.Phishing
Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Geography
Source: Symantec
Geography Rate
South Africa 1 in 486
United Kingdom 1 in 755
Austria 1 in 829
Italy 1 in 871
Netherlands 1 in 1,004Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Rate
Public Sector 1 in 435
Education 1 in 708
Accom/Catering 1 in 776
Marketing/Media 1 in 868
Non-Profit 1 in 1,007Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Rate
1-250 1 in 886
251-500 1 in 1,313
501-1000 1 in 1,886
1001-1500 1 in 1,667
1501-2500 1 in 2,266
2501+ 1 in 1,368
Top 10 Sources of Phishing
Source: Symantec
Source Percent
United States 31.7%
United Kingdom 16.2%
Sweden 9.8%
Australia 8.7%
South Africa 8.3%
Germany 7.8%
Singapore 7.5%
Hong Kong 2.6%
Austria 2.2%
Netherlands 2.2%p. 23
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
30.7%
12.7%
3.2%
1.1%52.4%Automated Toolkits
Other Unique DomainsIP Address DomainsFree Web Hosting SitesTyposquatting
Phishing Distribution:Phishing Distribution:Phishing Distribution
Source: Symantec
20.3%
4.3%
1.0%
0.6%74.8%FinancialInformation ServicesRetailComputer SoftwareCommunications
Organizations Spoofed
in Phishing Attacks:Organizations Spoofed
in Phishing Attacks:Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks
Source: Symantecp. 24
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
Malware
1 in 50
1 in 100
1 in 150
1 in 200
1 in 250
1 in 3001 in 350
1 in 400
1 in 450
1 in 500
N O S A J J M A M F JAN
2013D NProportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected
Source: SymantecTop 10 Email Virus Sources
Source: Symantec
Geography Percent
United Kingdom 54.9%
United States 15.3%
Australia 9.1%
South Africa 3.6%
Hong Kong 2.2%
France 1.8%
Netherlands 1.8%
Japan 1.7%
India 1.4%
Canada 1.0%At a Glance
• The global average virus rate in November was one in 235
emails, compared to one in 437 in October.
• The United Kingdom topped the list of geographies, with one
in 109 emails containing a virus.
• The United Kingdom was also the largest source of virus-laden
emails, making up 54.9 percent of all email-based viruses.
• Small-to-medium size businesses with 1-250 employees were
the most targeted company size, where one and 202 emails
contained a virus.p. 25
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Rate
Public Sector 1 in 62
Education 1 in 130
Accom/Catering 1 in 158
Marketing/Media 1 in 189
Recreation 1 in 191
Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Rate
1-250 1 in 202
251-500 1 in 244
501-1000 1 in 317
1001-1500 1 in 246
1501-2500 1 in 417
2501+ 1 in 254Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Geographic Location
Source: Symantec
Geography Rate
United Kingdom 1 in 109
Austria 1 in 229
United Arab Emirates 1 in 254
Hungary 1 in 258
Ireland 1 in 272p. 26
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
At a Glance
• Variants of W32.Ramnit accounted for 12.3 percent of all malware
blocked at the endpoint.
• In comparison, 6.6 percent of all malware were variants of
W32.Sality.
• Approximately 45.9 percent of the most frequently blocked
malware last month was identified and blocked using generic
detection.Endpoint Security
Top 10 Most Frequently Blocked Malware
Source: Symantec
Malware Percent
W32.Sality.AE 5.73%
W32.Ramnit!html 4.83%
W32.Ramnit.B 4.13%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 3.61%
W32.Downadup.B 3.53%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 2.88%
Trojan.Zbot 2.47%
W32.Virut.CF 1.87%
W32.SillyFDC 1.54%
W32.Mabezat.B!inf 1.01%p. 27
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
Policy Based Filtering
Source: Symantec
Category Percent
Social Networking 42.7%
Advertisement & Popups 21.4%
Streaming Media 4.5%
Hosting Sites 4.0%
Computing & Internet 3.4%
Chat 3.0%
Search 2.4%
Peer-To-Peer 1.7%
News 1.0%
Entertainment 0.9%Policy Based Filtering
At a Glance
• The most common trigger for policy-based filtering applied by
Symantec Web Security .cloud for its business clients was for the
“Social Networking” category, which accounted for 42.7 percent
of blocked Web activity in November.
• “Advertisement & Popups” was the second-most common trigger,
comprising 21.4 percent of blocked Web activity.p. 28
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2013
About Symantec
More Information
• Security Response Publications: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/publications /
• Internet Security Threat Report Resource Page: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport /
• Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response /
• Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer /
• Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex /Symantec protects the world’s information and is a global leader in security, backup, and
availability solutions. Our innovative products and services protect people and information
in any environment—from the smallest mobile device to the enterprise data center to cloud-
based systems. Our world-renowned expertise in protecting data, identities, and interactions
gives our customers confidence in a connected world. More information is available at
www.symantec.com or by connecting with Symantec at go.symantec.com/socialmedia .
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
NOVEMBER 2014p. 2
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2014
CONTENTS
3 Summary
4 TARGETED ATTACKS + DATA BREACHES
5 Targeted Attacks
5 Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing
Emails
5 Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of
Targeted Organization
5 Average Number of Spear-Phishing
Attacks Per Day
6 Top-Ten Industries Targeted
in Spear-Phishing Attacks
7 Data Breaches
7 Timeline of Data Breaches
8 Total Identities Exposed
8 Top Causes of Data Breaches
8 Total Data Breaches
9 Top-Ten Types of Information Breached
10 MALWARE TACTICS
11 Malware Tactics
11 Top-Ten Malware
11 Top-Ten Mac OSX Malware Blocked on OSX Endpoints
12 Ransomware Over Time
12 Top-Ten Botnets
13 Vulnerabilities
13 Number of Vulnerabilities
13 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
14 Browser Vulnerabilities
14 Plug-in Vulnerabilities15 SOCIAL MEDIA
+ MOBILE THREATS
16 Mobile
16 Mobile Malware Families by Month,
Android
17 Mobile Threat Classifications
18 Social Media
18 Social Media
19 PHISHING, SPAM + EMAIL THREATS
20 Phishing and Spam
20 Phishing Rate
20 Global Spam Rate
21 Email Threats
21 Proportion of Email Traffic
Containing URL Malware
21 Proportion of Email Traffic
in Which Virus Was Detected
22 About Symantec
22 More Informationp. 3
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2014
Summary
Welcome to the November edition of the
Symantec Intelligence report. Symantec
Intelligence aims to provide the latest
analysis of cyber security threats, trends,
and insights concerning malware, spam, and
other potentially harmful business risks.
Symantec has established the most
comprehensive source of Internet threat
data in the world through the Symantec™
Global Intelligence Network, which is made
up of more than 41.5 million attack sensors
and records thousands of events per second.
This network monitors threat activity in
over 157 countries and territories through
a combination of Symantec products and
services such as Symantec DeepSight™
Threat Management System, Symantec™
Managed Security Services, Norton™
consumer products, and other third-party
data sources. There was a significant jump in emails containing malicious
URLs during the month of November, where 41 percent of email-
borne malware contained a link to a malicious or compromised
website. The last time we saw this level of activity was back in
August of 2013. Since then, URL malware had been present in 3
to 16 percent of malicious emails each month, until this recent
surge.
We have reason to believe that the Cutwail botnet is responsible
for some of this increase. However, this botnet only makes up
3.7 percent of total botnet activity tracked in November. Kelihos
and Gamut appear to be in the number one and two positions,
comprising 19.2 and 18.8 percent respectively.
The topics in the campaigns we’ve seen so far include fake
telecom billing notices, as well as fax and voicemail spam, and
government levied fines. The URLs in the first two campaigns
appear to be downloaders that will install further malware on a
compromised computer, while the third campaign leads to fake
captcha sites hosting crypto-ransomware.
Ransomware as a whole continues to decline as the year
progresses. However, the amount of crypto-ransomware seen
continues to comprise a larger portion of this type of malware.
This particularly aggressive form of ransomware made up 38
percent of all ransomware in the month of November.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to
contact us with any comments or feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat Analyst
[email protected]. 4
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2014
TARGETED ATTACKS
+ DATA BREACHESp. 5
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2014
At a Glance
• The average number of
spear-phishing attacks
dropped to 43 per day in
November, down from 45 in
October.
• The .doc file type was the
most common attachment
type used in spear-phishing
attacks. The .exe file type
came in second.
• Organizations with 2500+
employees were the most
likely to be targeted in
November.
• Non-Traditional Services
narrowly lead the Top-
Ten Industries targeted,
followed by Manufacturing.
The difference between the
two industries was 0.07
percentage points.Targeted Attacks
Average Number of Spear-Phishing
Attacks Per Day
Source: Symantec :: DECEMBER 2013 — NOVEMBER 2014
255075100125150175200225250
N O S A J J M A M F J
2014D54 5345 43
2054141
84 84
5488165
Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing
Emails
Source: Symantec :: NOVEMBER 2014
Executable type November October
.doc 25.9% 62.5%
.exe 16.4% 14.4%
.au3 8.6% –
.scr 5.3% 0.1%
.jpg 4.8% 0.2%
.class 2.2% –
.pdf 1.6% 4.4%
.bin 1.6% –
.txt 1.3% 11.2%
.dmp 1.0% 0.1%Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size
of Targeted Organization
Source: Symantec :: NOVEMBER 2014
Organization Size November October
1-250 34.4% 27.1%
251-500 8.4% 6.6%
501-1000 8.8% 8.9%
1001-1500 3.2% 2.9%
1501-2500 4.5% 11.2%
2500+ 40.7% 43.3%p. 6
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2014
Top-Ten Industries Targeted in
Spear-Phishing Attacks
Source: Symantec :: NOVEMBER 2014
ConstructionMiningRetailPublic AdministrationTransportation,
communications, electricWholesaleServices - ProfessionalFinance, insurance
& Real EstateManufacturingServices - Non Traditional 20%
20
17
11
10
7
5
3
1
1p. 7
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2014
Data Breaches
At a Glance
• The two largest data breaches reported to have occurred in
November resulted in the exposure of 3.6 million and 2.7
million identities each.
• Hackers have been responsible for 57 percent of data breach -
es in the last 12 months.
• Real names, government ID numbers, such as Social Security
numbers, and home addresses were the top three types of
data exposed in data breaches.
20406080100120140160
N O S A J J M A M F J
2014D
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
IDENTITIES EXPOSED (MILLIONS)
INCIDENTS IDENTITIES EXPOSED (Millions)Timeline of Data Breaches
Source: Symantec :: DECEMBER 2013 — NOVEMBER 2014
147
59
178
31.5
10
16.41.7 2.68.1130
24
510152025303540
30
27
2527
22
2019
1516
1221p. 8
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2014
Top Causes of Data Breaches
Source: Symantec :: DECEMBER 2013 — NOVEMBER 2014
Insider TheftTheft or Loss
of Computeror DriveAccidentally
Made PublicHackers
57%
18% 18%
7%Number
of Incidents
147
46
4619
258 TOTAL
Total Data
Breaches
DECEMBER 2013 — NOVEMBER 2014
258
Total IdentitiesExposed
DECEMBER 2013 — NOVEMBER 2014
476 Millionp. 9
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2014
Top-Ten Types of Information Breached
Source: Symantec :: DECEMBER 2013 — NOVEMBER 2014
Real Names
Gov ID numbers (Soc Sec)Home AddressBirth DatesFinancial InformationMedical RecordsEmail AddressesPhone NumbersUsernames & PasswordsInsurance01
02030405060708091067
%
43%
42%
38%
35%
28%
21%
19%
16%
9%
Methodology
This data is procured from the Norton Cybercrime Index (CCI). The Norton CCI is a statistical model
that measures the levels of threats, including malicious software, fraud, identity theft, spam,
phishing, and social engineering daily. The data breach section of the Norton CCI is derived from
data breaches that have been reported by legitimate media sources and have exposed personal
information.
In some cases a data breach is not publicly reported during the same month the incident occurred,
or an adjustment is made in the number of identities reportedly exposed. In these cases, the data in
the Norton CCI is updated. This causes fluctuations in the numbers reported for previous months
when a new report is released.p. 10
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2014
MALWARE TACTICSp. 11
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2014
Malware Tactics
At a Glance
• W32.Ramnit variants
continue to dominate the
top-ten malware list.
• The most common
OSX threat seen on OSX
was OSX.Flashback.K,
making up 15.7 percent
of all OSX malware found
on OSX Endpoints.
• Overall ransomware
activity has remained low
since March of this year.
However, crypto-style
ransomware continues to
make up a larger percent -
age of ransomware,
comprising 38 percent in
November.
• Kelihos and Gamut are
the two most commonly
encountered botnets,
making up 19.2 and 18.8
percent of botnet traffic
respectively.Top-Ten Malware
Source: Symantec :: NOVEMBER 2014
Rank Name November October
1 W32.Sality.AE 4.8% 4.1%
2 W32.Almanahe.B!inf 4.5% 3.7%
3 W32.Ramnit!html 4.4% 4.0%
4 W32.Ramnit.B 2.7% 2.7%
5 W32.Downadup.B 3.0% 2.5%
6 W32.Ramnit.B!inf 2.3% 2.1%
7 W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 1.6% 1.4%
8 W32.Virut.CF 1.5% 1.3%
9 Trojan.Zbot 1.5% 1.3%
10 Trojan.Swifi 1.4% –
Top-Ten Mac OSX Malware Blocked
on OSX Endpoints
Source: Symantec :: NOVEMBER 2014
Rank Malware Name November October
1 OSX.Flashback.K 15.7% 5.4%
2 OSX.Okaz 13.4% 28.8%
3 OSX.Keylogger 11.8% 9.3%
4 OSX.RSPlug.A 11.0% 14.0%
5 OSX.Klog.A 8.4% 5.2%
6 OSX.Stealbit.B 7.6% 4.7%
7 OSX.Crisis 3.7% 4.8%
8 OSX.Netweird 3.7% 3.7%
9 OSX.Flashback 3.3% 4.0%
10 OSX.Imuler 2.5% –p. 12
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2014
Top-Ten Botnets
Source: Symantec :: NOVEMBER 2014
Rank Botnet name Percent
1 Kelihos 19.2%
2 Gamut 18.8%
3 Snowshoe 8.0%
4 Cutwail 3.7%
5 Darkmailer 1.0%
6 Asprox 0.7%
7 Grum 0.03%
8 Festi 0.0165%
9 Esxvaql 0.0162%
10 Darkmailer2 0.0151%
Ransomware Over Time
Source: Symantec :: DECEMBER 2013 — NOVEMBER 2014 THOUSANDS
100200300400500600700800
N O S A J J M A M F J
2014D660
465
342425
156 143230 183149
9580 77p. 13
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2014
Number of Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: DECEMBER 2013 — NOVEMBER 2014
100200300400500600700800
N O S A J J M A M F J
2014D438575600 596
457
399471542562579
473555
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: DECEMBER 2013 — NOVEMBER 2014
12345678
N O S A J J M A M F J
2014D0 0 0 0 02 2
05
014Vulnerabilities
At a Glance
• There were 457 vulner -
abilities disclosed during
the month of November.
• Internet Explorer has
reported the most brows -
er vulnerabilities in the
last 12 months.
• Oracle’s Java reported
the most plug-in vulner -
abilities over the same
time period.p. 14
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2014
Browser Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: DECEMBER 2013 — NOVEMBER 2014
20406080100
N O S A J J M A M F J
2014D
Opera
Mozilla FirefoxMicrosoft Internet Explorer
Google Chrome
Apple Safari
Plug-in Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: DECEMBER 2013 — NOVEMBER 2014
1020304050607080
Java
Apple
Adobe
ActiveX
N O S A J J M A M F J
2014D
p. 15
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2014
SOCIAL MEDIA
+ MOBILE THREATSp. 16
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2014
Mobile
Mobile Malware Families by Month,
Android
Source: Symantec :: DECEMBER 2013 — NOVEMBER 2014
8
4
24
2 235
34 4
3
12345678910
N O S A J J M A M F J
2014D
At a Glance
• There were eight Android
malware families discov -
ered in November.
• Of the threats discovered
in the last 12 months,
26 percent are tradi -
tional threats, such as
back door Trojans and
downloaders.
• In terms of social
networking scams, 29
percent were fake offer -
ings, while 59 percent
were manually shared
scams.p. 17
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2014
Mobile Threat Classifications
Source: Symantec :: DECEMBER 2013 — NOVEMBER 2014
Track User Risks that spy on the individual using the device, collecting SMS
messages or phone call logs, tracking GPS coordinates, recording phone calls,
or gathering pictures and video taken with the device.
Steal Information This includes the collection of both device- and user-specific
data, such as device information, configuration data, or banking details.
Traditional T hreats Threats that carry out traditional malware functions,
such as back doors and downloaders.
Recon/f_igure D evice These t ypes of risks attempt to elevate privileges
or simply modify various settings within the operating system.
Adware/Anno yance Mobile risks that display advertising or generally perform
actions to disrupt the user.
Send Conte nt These risks will send text messages to premium SMS numbers,
ultimately appearing on the bill of the device’s owner. Other risks can be used to send spam messages. 51015202530%
Adware
AnnoyanceReconfigure
DeviceSend
ContentTraditional
ThreatsTrack
UserSteal
Information7%12%26%
23%
13%19%p. 18
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2014
Social Media
Social Media
Source: Symantec :: DECEMBER 2013 — NOVEMBER 2014
Fake Offers These scams invite social network users to join a fake event or group
with incentives such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to share
credentials with the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
Manual Sharing Scams These rely on victims to actually do the work of sharing
the scam by presenting them with intriguing videos, fake offers or messages that they share with their friends.
Likejacking Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website
buttons that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
Comment Jacking Similar to likejacking, this type of scam relies on users clicking
links that are added to comments by attackers. The links may lead to malware or survey scams.
Fake App Users are invited to subscribe to an application that appears to be
integrated for use with a social network, but is not as described and may be used to steal credentials or harvest other personal data.102030405060708090100%
Comment
JackingFake
AppsLikejacking Manual
SharingFake
Offering2% .6%29%59%
9%p. 19
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2014
PHISHING , SPAM + EMAIL THREATSp. 20
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2014
Phishing and Spam
Phishing Rate
Source: Symantec :: DECEMBER 2013 — NOVEMBER 2014
1 in 0
1 in 500
1 in 1000
1 in 1500
1 in 2000
1 in 2500
N O S A J J M A M F J
2014D20411610647 306401478370
731395496
1290
1587
At a Glance
• The phishing rate rose in
November, at one in 647
emails, up from one in
1,610 emails in October.
• The global spam rate
was 54.6 percent for the
month of November.
• One out of every 246
emails contained a virus.
• Of the email traffic in the
month of November, 41.3
percent contained a mali -
cious URL.
Global Spam Rate
Source: Symantec :: DECEMBER 2013 — NOVEMBER 2014
102030405060708090100%
N O S A J J M A M F J
2014D5571
62 6266
5961 6064 63
5855p. 21
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2014
Email Threats
Proportion of Email Traffic
Containing URL Malware
Source: Symantec :: DECEMBER 2013 — NOVEMBER 2014
102030405060708090100%
N O S A J J M A M F J
2014D6741
1416 14
6314
7 83
1 in 50
1 in 100
1 in 150
1 in 200
1 in 250
1 in 300
1 in 350
1 in 400
1 in 450
1 in 500
N O S A J J M A M F J
2014DProportion of Email Traffic
in Which Virus Was Detected
Source: Symantec :: DECEMBER 2013 — NOVEMBER 2014
351329246112
207188141
234183
232
351270p. 22
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: NOVEMBER 2014
About Symantec
More Information
• Symantec Worldwide: http://www.symantec.com/
• ISTR and Symantec Intelligence Resources: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
• Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/
• Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer/
• Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex/Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC) is an information protection expert that helps
people, businesses and governments seeking the freedom to unlock the opportunities
technology brings – anytime, anywhere. Founded in April 1982, Symantec, a Fortune
500 company, operating one of the largest global data-intelligence networks, has
provided leading security, backup and availability solutions for where vital information
is stored, accessed and shared. The company’s more than 20,000 employees reside in
more than 50 countries. Ninety-nine percent of Fortune 500 companies are Symantec
customers. In fiscal 2013, it recorded revenues of $6.9 billion. To learn more go to
www.symantec.com or connect with Symantec at: go.symantec.com/socialmedia .
|
Page 1 of 25
Symantec Intelligence
Symantec Intelligence Re port: November 2011
November sees a four-fold increase in the number of daily ta rgeted attacks since January; lowest global spam rate for
three years, but Russian spammers continue to innovate in disguising their messages.
Welcome to the November edition of the Symantec Intelli gence report which, combining the best research and
analysis from the Symantec.cloud MessageLabs Intelligence Report and the Symantec State of Spam & Phishing
Report, provides the latest analysis of cyber security threat s, trends and insights from the Symantec Intelligence team
concerning malware, spam, and other potentially harmful busin ess risks. The data used to compile the analysis for
this combined report includes data from October and November 2011.
Report highlights
Spam – 70.5 percent (a decrease of 3.7 per centage points since October 2011): page 13
Phishing – One in 302.0 emails identified as phishing (an in crease of 0.04 percentage points since October 2011): page 16
Malware – One in 255.8 emails contained malware (a decre ase of 0.03 percentage points since October 2011): page 17
Malicious Web sites – 4,915 Web sites blocked per day (a n increase of 47.8 percent since October 2011): page 19
A Review of Targeted Attacks in 2011: page 2
Revolution of Russian Phone Number Spam: page 10
Best Practices for Enterprises and Users: page 22
Introduction
With targeted attacks and advanced persistent threats being very much in the news this year, we thought it would be a
good time as the end of the year draws closer to begin our re view of targeted attacks and look more closely at what
has been described as “advanced persistent threats” or APTs for short. Terms such as APT have been overused and
sometimes misused by the media, but APTs are a re al threat to some companies and industries.
In November, one in 255 emails was malicious, but approxim ately one in 8,300 of those were highly targeted. This
means that highly targeted attacks, which may be the prec ursor to an APT, account for approximately one in every
two million emails, still a rare incident rate. Targeted malware in general has grown in volume and complexity in recent
years, but as it is designed to steal comp any secrets, it can be very difficult fo r recipients to recognize, especially
when the attacker employs compelling social engineer ing techniques, as we highlight in this report.
A persistent threat residing inside your company’s network may be the by-product of a successful targeted attack,
rather than the targeted email itself containing an APT, it is likely to contain a downloader component for the actual
APT. Hence, targeted attacks of this nature can lead to an APT being deployed on your network if you don’t have the
right defenses in place.
Global spam is now at the lowest it has been since Nove mber 2008, when the rogue ISP McColo was closed-down.
The effect on spam volumes back then were very dramat ic and spam accounted for 68.0% of global emails. More
recently the decline has been much slower, but spammers have also adapted to using more targeted approaches and
exploiting social media as alternatives to email. Moreover , pharmaceutical spam is now at the lowest it has been since
we started tracking it, accounting for 35.5% of spam, compared with 64.2% at the end of 2010.
This will be the final Symantec Intelligence report in 2011; work is already underway on our annual review of the
security landscape in 2011. I hope you enjoy reading this mont h’s edition of the report, and please feel free to contact
me directly with any comments or feedback.
Paul Wood, Senior Intelligence Analyst
[email protected]
@paulowoody Page 2 of 25
Report analysis
A Review of Targeted Attacks in 2011
Targeted malware and advanced persistent threats (APTs) have been very prominent in the news during 2011,
particularly in the wake of the Stuxnet attacks that took place in 2010, and more recently with the discovery of Duqu1,
which is was created from the same source code as Stux net. Although the source code for Stuxnet is not available on
the Internet, this does not mean that the original author s were also the authors of D uqu; the source code may have
been shared or even stolen.
Defining what is meant by targeted attacks and APT is important in order to better understand the nature of this
mounting threat and to make sure that you have invested in the right kinds of defenses for your organization.
Targeted attacks have been around for a number of year s now, and when they first surfaced back in 2005,
Symantec.cloud would identify and block approximately one such attack in a week. Over the course of the following
year, this number rose to one or two per day and over the following years it rose still further to approximately 60 per
day in 2010 and 80 per day by the end of the first quarter of 2011. The types of organizations being targeted tended to
be large, well-known multi-national organizations, and were often within particular industries, including the public
sector, defense, energy and pharmaceutical. In more rece nt years the scope has widened to include almost any
organization, including smaller and medium-sized businesses. But what do we really mean by targeted attacks and
advanced persistent threats?
Defining targeted attacks
An attack can be considered as targeted if it is intended for a specific person or organization, typically created to
evade traditional security defenses and frequently makes use of advanced social engineering techniques. However,
not all targeted attacks lead to an APT; for example, the Zeus banking Trojan can be targeted and will use social
engineering in order to trick the recipient into activating the malware, but Zeus is not an APT. The attacker doesn’t
necessarily care about who the individu al recipient is; they may have been sele cted simply because the attacker is
able to exploit information gathered about that individual, typically harvested through social networking Web sites.
Social engineering has always been at the forefront of many of these more sophisticated types of attack, specially
designed to penetrate a company’s defenses and gain access to intellectual property or in the case of Stuxnet, to
interfere with the physical control syst ems of an operation. Without strong social engineering, or “head-hacking,” even
the most technically sophisticated attacks are unlikely to succeed. Many socially engineered attacks are based on
information we make available ourselves through social networking and social media sites. Once the attackers are
able to understand our interests, hobbies, with whom we so cialize, and who else may be in our networks; they are
often able to construct more believable and convincing attacks against us.
Profile of a highly targeted attack
A highly targeted attack is typically the precursor to an APT , and the typical profile of a highly targeted attack will
commonly exploit a maliciously crafted document or executabl e, which is emailed to a specific individual, or small
group of individuals. These emails will be dressed-up with a social engineering element to make it more interesting
and relevant, as highlighted in figure 1, below.
For example, a PDF attached to an email advertising half-pr ice “green-fees” may be more appealing if the recipient is
a golf fan; they may be receptive to such a bargain. Ideally, t he attacker wants to create a document that the recipient
feels more compelled to open. Sometimes the attack may be through a compromised Web site, where the recipient is
required to click on a link contained in the email, that may result in a drive-by attack, or from which they will download
the infected document.
1 http://www.symantec.com/connect/w32-duqu_sta tus-updates_installer-zero-day-exploit Page 3 of 25
Figure 1: Typical lifecycle of a targeted attack
In April 2011, MessageLabs Intelligence (now Symantec Intelligence), reported
2 attacks using the CVE-2011-0609
exploit. These attacks were blocked by Sy mantec.cloud, it was widely reported at the time that similar attacks using
the same exploit were also sent to individuals at RSA. In that case, the attack compri sed of a spreadsheet document
apparently detailing the recruitment plan for the coming financial year. It was also dressed-up to appear to have been
sent from a recruitment agency the HR team had been work ing with, a technique known as “spear phishing.” It is
human nature to be interested in gossip, so if an attacker we re to send a document called “staff_salaries.doc” then it
may have a greater chance of being opened.
Once such a malicious document is opened, the victim ’s machine becomes compromised and additional malicious
code (often referred to as the “second stage”) is subseque ntly downloaded and installed. It is this second stage that
allows remote access to the compromised machine, and facilit ates the egress of data. This becomes a stepping stone
into the rest of the company’s network, forming a kind of beac hhead. Moreover, it is really only at this stage that the
attack might be considered an APT; it hasn’t been blocked by the corporate security defenses and the computer is
now under the control of the attackers.
Evolution of APTs
Hence, the term “APT” has evolved to describe a unique catego ry of targeted attacks that are specifically designed to
target a particular individual or organization. APTs are des igned to stay below the radar, and remain undetected for as
long as possible, a characteristic that makes them especia lly effective, moving quietly and slowly in order to evade
detection. Unlike the fast-money schemes typical of more common targeted attacks, APTs may have international
espionage and/or sabotage objectives. The objective of an APT may include military, political or economic intelligence
gathering, confidential or trade secret threat, disruption of operations, or even the destruction of equipment. Stuxnet
was a good, albeit extreme example of the latter: the malwar e enabled an attacker to disrupt the industrial control
systems within the Uranium enrichment process of a particular target.
Another characteristic of an APT is that it will also be part of a longer-term campaign, and not follow the opportunistic
“smash-and-grab” approach typical of most malware in circ ulation today. Its purpose will be to remain undetected for
as long as possible, perhaps using a variety of attacks over that period; if one attack fails then a process of continual
monitoring will ensure that a follow-up attack may be more likely to succeed a few we eks later with a different
approach. If successful, an attacker can use the compromi sed systems as a beachhead for subsequent attacks.
2 http://www.symanteccloud.com/mlireport/MLI_2011_04_April_FINAL_en-us.pdf Attacker
Target
http://compromised URL/abc.html
Page 4 of 25
All of which illustrate how these attacks can be both advanc ed and persistent threats: A threat because its purpose is
to steal data or interfere with the operations of the tar geted company, and potentially exploit the compromised network
now under the attacker’s control to target users in ot her organizations. They are advanced because of the methods
employed to avoid detection, such as the use of zero-day exploits, and the means used to communicate with the
command and control network; command and control instructions o ften involve encrypted traffic, typically sent in small
bursts and disguised as normal network traffic. The key to ensuring that any stolen in formation can be exfiltrated
without detection requires the attacker to avoid using easily detectable encryption, and to use common protocol
channels that would not look out of place, but whilst making sure the data remains hidden.
Furthermore, they can be described as persistent because the aim is to main tain a foothold within the compromised
company’s infrastructure, and in order to achieve this, the attacker will use numerous methods to achieve this. The
attackers have a very clear and specific objective, they are well-funded and well-organized and without the right
protection in place, these threats have both the capa bility and the intent to achieve their desired goals.
Growth of targeted attacks
Figure 2, below shows the growth in volume of highly tar geted attacks that could lead to an APT. These attacks would
be sent to specific individuals within each of the organi zations under fire, and spread throughout the year. The attacks
would use multiple “kill-chains” (a variety of attack vectors, such as different types of malware using several exploits
over a long period of time). Sometimes these attacks woul d make use of zero-day exploits; when an attacker has
identified a means to take advantage of an unpatched vulner ability in an application for which no patch is available to
mitigate the exploit. Zero-day vulner abilities on the whole are rare and in 2010 there were only 14 recorded3 by
Symantec and 11 to date in 2011; Stuxnet made use of four zero-day vulnerabilities.
Figure 2 – Average number of targeted attacks blocked ov erall by Symantec.cloud per day worldwide in 2011
3 http://www.symantec.com/business/threatreport/topic. jsp?id=vulnerability_trends&a id=zero_day_vulnerabilities 25.630.082.193.1
78.092.9
50.177.0108.3
99.9
94.1
‐20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0 120.0
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov
2011Page 5 of 25
In November, approximately 94 such attacks were blocked by Symantec.cloud each day, four times the number
blocked in January of the same year. When this is put in perspective, one in 255 emails in November contained some
form of malware, but only one in 8,300 of these were actual highly targeted attacks that could lead to an APT. Overall,
that means that one in every two million emails cont ains a targeted attack that could lead to an APT.
With an estimated 48 billion emails in circulation each day, a highly targeted attack of this nature accounts for a very
small percentage of email traffic, but they are certainly not as rare as at the end of 2010. These attacks all have the
potential to seriously impact an organization, and in the long er-term they represent a si gnificant threat against the
economic prosperity of many companies.
Most frequently targeted industries
The chart in figure 3 below shows that the public sector has been the most frequently targeted industry during 2011,
with approximately 20.5 targeted attacks blocked each day . The chemical & pharmaceutical industry was second
highest ranked, with 18.6 blocked each day. In this latter case , many of these attacks surfaced later in the year, and fit
into the profile described in the Nitro4 attacks. Similarly, this is also the case for the manufacturing sector, which was
placed third mosttargeted with approxima tely 13.6 attacks blocked each day.
The aim of these targeted attacks each day was to establish persistent access to the targeted organization’s network,
in many cases with the aim of providi ng remote access to confidential data.
Figure 3 – Average number of targeted attacks blocked by Symantec.cloud per day by industry sector in 2011
As noted above, the objective of an APT can be to disrupt operations or even destroy equipment. While the ability for
malware to disrupt physical machinery is rare and extremely difficult to achieve, the firs t reported case since Stuxnet
4 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/m edia/security_response/whitepapers/the_nitro_attacks.pdf 1.2
4.7
1.8
1.4
4.4
18.6
3.5
4.6
1.5
11.8
2.3
20.5
1.6
5.3
13.6
4.2
6.7
8.9
3.1
1.0
4.1
9.9
6.4
5.2
1.4
‐1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0 11.0 12.0 13.0 14.0 15.0 16.0 17.0 18.0 19.0 20.0 21.0 22.0
Accom/Catering
Business Support
Agriculture
Automotive
Building/Cons
Chem/Pharm
Education
Engineering
Estate Agents
Finance
General Services
Gov/Public Sector
Health Care
IT Services
Manufacturing
Marketing/Media
Mineral/Fuel
Non‐Profit
Prof Services
Professional Services
Recreation
Retail
Telecoms
Transport/Util
WholesalePage 6 of 25
of a similar incident came to light on November 8, when it was reported that a U.S. water plant had been compromised
and the SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) system was accessed in an unauthorized fashion in order
to turn on and off a pump, causing it to eventually fail and resu lting in a partial shutdown to the plant in Illinois. It was
suspected that the initial breach occurred with the devel oper of the controller software for the industrial devices.
Perhaps the information and credentials collected in that attack were then used to commit the subsequent attacks
against the water plant. However, t he FBI and the Department of Homeland Security maintain they have not found
evidence of a cyber intrusion.
Targeted attacks by organisation size
The chart shown in figure 4, below, identifies the targeted or ganizations by their size, showing that large enterprises
consisting of more than 2,500 employees received the grea test number of attacks, with 36.7 being blocked each day.
By contrast, the small-to-medium sized business sector with less than 250 employees had 11.6 attacks blocked daily.
Figure 4 – Average number of targeted attacks blocked by Symantec.cloud per day by company size in 2011
11.6
7.3
3.83.15.936.7
0510152025303540
1‐250 251 ‐500 501 ‐1000 1001 ‐1500 1501 ‐2500 2501+Page 7 of 25
Targeted attacks by geographical distribution
In the final analysis, we looked at t he targeted attacks broken down by geographical distributio n, based on the location
of the intended recipients. This is shown in figure 5, below , and reveals that in the U.S. at least one attack is being
blocked each day, and that one in 389 users may be the recipient of such an attack. Contrast this with Japan where at
least one attack is blocked nearly every nine days, and may only be sent to one in 520 individuals.
Geography One attack per N
days
One attack per N
users
United States 1.0 389
United Kingdom 1.2 407
Hong Kong 2.9 127
Australia 3.1 1,139
France 3.2 396
Singapore 3.3 114
Switzerland 3.4 455
Middle East 4.0 539
India 4.4 82
Belgium 4.5 176
Denmark 5.1 666
Netherlands 7.0 3,307
Canada 8.8 513
Japan 8.8 520
Germany 9.4 2,790
Philippines 14.0 99
Norway 14.7 2,591
China 16.3 4
Malaysia 17.2 7,433
Hungary 18.2 196
Italy 28.1 1,310
Spain 28.1 6,522
Sweden 30.9 24,134
Taiwan 44.1 68
Israel 44.1 880
Finland 44.1 3,686
New Zealand 61.8 3,479
Ireland 61.8 5,104
Sri Lanka 77.3 2,241
Luxembourg 154.5 665
Vietnam 154.5 843
South Africa 154.5 4,878
Figure 5 – Table showing the frequency and ratio of attack s per user in the most frequently targeted regions
.
Page 8 of 25
Case-study of a targeted organization
A recent example, which we’ll use as a case-study can be seen in figure 6, and focuses on a company that produces
video games, and a series of attacks have been conducted over a period of at least two years. The purposes of these
attacks seem to be to gain access to the inte llectual property used within their products.
Figure 6 – Examples of targeted attack em ails destined for a video games company
The Japanese text shown in the second example from figure 6, translates to, "Hope to correct accidentally discovered
a design flaw in the game."
The majority of these attacks originated fr om the U.S. but this is not surprising gi ven that many of the emails were sent
from a variety of free, online Webmail services. Similar emai ls were also sent from Japan, South Korea and Taiwan,
again using free Webmail providers as the source.
Figure 7, below, show that these attac ks tend to be spaced two or three months apart and often occur in small waves,
the most recent attacks taking place in November 2011.
Page 9 of 25
Figure 7 – Pattern of targeted attacks blocked by Symantec.cloud against one company over time
The file types used in each attack have changed over time, seekin g to exploit vulnerabilities in a variety of common
office applications. As each previous attempt was blocked, the attackers were forced to find an alternative method of
intrusion.
Potential impact of targeted attacks
It can be difficult to quantify the true scale of this problem, but hopefully the data from Symantec.cloud in this report
will help to illustrate the seriousness of this issue. The challenge now lies in understanding whether your organization
is likely to be targeted in this way, and th at can be very difficult. It may be that your company is not the primary target,
but an attacker may use your organization as a stepping- stone to attack another company. You do not want your
business to be the weakest link in the supply chain. Informat ion is power, and the attackers know this, and successful
attacks can result in significant financial advantage for the cyber criminals behind them. Access to intellectual property
and strategic intelligence can give them huge advantages in a competitive market. Hopef ully, we have shown how the
means by which these attacks take place have grown more sophisticated and have advanced considerably over time.
Symantec has worked with and helped some companies w ho have been the victims of APTs and at a minimum you
should try to understand these new techniques and learn what you can do to protect yourself and your business.
Begin by reinforcing your defenses now.
For further information about targeted attacks and APTs, please download5 the latest white paper on this topic.
5 http://go.symantec.com/apt 91113
1511
2 411
153
31738
26
0102030405060
07‐Jan 12 ‐Jan 09 ‐Apr 21 ‐Apr 15 ‐Jun 07 ‐Jul 10 ‐Sep 05 ‐Oct 15 ‐Oct 09 ‐Dec 08 ‐Mar 09 ‐Mar 30 ‐Jun 04 ‐Jul 08 ‐Nov
Jan Apr Jun Jul Sep Oct Dec Mar Jun Jul Nov
2010 2011Page 10 of 25
Revolution of Russian Phone Number Spam
Most of the Russian spam emails we encounter nowa days are about online advertising, product promotion, and
training workshops. These spam emails typically are s ent out from free or hijacked personal email accounts
unsolicited, without opt-out, and has randomized subjects to avoi d being caught by the spam filters. Regardless of the
randomness, we observed that spammers like to list p hone numbers in the email content as the only contact
information instead of URL links.
Figure 8, below, shows an example of a recent Russian product promo spam.
Translation:
Figure 8: Russian-language spam promotion
Are you able to spot any abnormalities in the body content? Look closely at the phone numbers: Some digits are not
written as numbers but instead letters. Spammers have replac ed the number digits with English/Russian characters in
the phone number; a technique that we will take a closer look at in this article.
Children’s Birthday at
Laser ball
Super cool Transformers
buffet table
Highway Street
(4~9~5 )1~2~3~40~0~O(4~9~5)1~2~3~40~0~OPage 11 of 25
The following are a few examples of how spammers employed this trick in the past few years. First, a simple set of
contact information phone numbers as listed below:
(495)1234000
(495) 4321000
7(495)1234000 7-495-4321000
Then, spammers start to embellish the phone number by in serting some random symbols between the numbers:
(4~9~5)1~2~3~40~0~0
(4^95)1^2^3^40^00
495 43:21;000 (4_9_5) 4_3_21000
Later on, the spammers become more sophisticated and begi n to replace numbers with look-alike Russian or English
alphabets. Figure 9 shows a list of characters that resemble numbers in both Russian and English.
English Russian
1 I i l N/A
2 Zz N/A
3 N/A ЗзЭэ
4 N/A Чч
6 N/A ЬьБб
0 Оо Оо
Figure 9 – table of Russian and Englis h letters that resemble numbers
Using the chart in figure 9, with some creativity t he original list of phone numbers now looks like this:
(Ч^95)1^2^ З^40^Oo
(495) I 2 3 – 4O – 0 0
/495/ Ч 3=2l;0 00
(Ч~9~5) 43~2~I~0~0~O
Anti-spam technology has been more effective in identifyi ng and filtering out these spam patterns over time, which
leaves the spammers with no choice but to get even more creative and come out with new tricks. In 2010, we
observed that spammers were beginning to spell out phone nu mbers in actual Russian words, highlighted in figure 10,
below.
Figure 10 – table of Russian and English words for numbers
Russian English
1 один one
2 два two
3 три three
4 Четыре four
5 пять five
6 шесть six
7 семь seven
8 восемь eight
9 девять nine
0 ноль tenPage 12 of 25
Using this approach, and original example above, the lis t of phone numbers now looks more complicated and longer,
as follows:
(Ч^95)1 ^2^ три ^40^ OO
(495) один 2 З – 4 0 – 00
/495/ Ч;3 =2 I 00 0
(Ч~9~5) 43~2~ один ~o~o~0
Moreover, the spammers’ creativity did not end there; they t hen came up with the idea of replacing the area code with
the actual name of the city which it r epresents. Take the city Moscow, for exam ple - the area code for Moscow is 495.
Therefore, area code 495 will be replaced by the word “ Москва ”, “Moscow” or their ab breviated city name code:
(Москва ) 1 ^2^ три ^40^ OO
(Moscow) один 2 З – 4 0 – 00
(MOW) 4~3~2~1~0~ 00 (Мос) четерь 3 2;I=0O ноль
However, more recently, we observed yet another way to spoof the digits. In previous spam email shown above, the
digits were spelled out in Russian, one digit at a time. No w, the spelling has progressed into double-digits or factor-
digits, as shown in the example in figure 11, below.
English spelling Russian spelling
10 ten десять
40 forty сорок
Figure 11 – Examples of double-digit spelling used in spam
(495)12340 00 (495)123 четыре ноль 00 (495)123 сорок 00
It’s always interesting to observe the kinds of tricks spa mmers often come up with in order to evade detection by spam
filters. Fortunately, all of these tricks discussed above ar e easily caught using the latest technology. Unfortunately for
spammers, they will have to think much harder to come up with some new tricks. Symantec intelligence always keeps
a vigilant watch over the latest spam trends so that we can develop the best strategy in dealing with tricks like the
Russian phone number puzzle presented here.
Article contributed by Emily Liu, Security Response Technician, Symantec
(495)432100
The word “forty” is spelled
out in Russian to replace
digits “4” & ”0”. “4” and “0” spelled out
in Russian one digit at a
time. (495)123400
(495)432100
(495)123400Page 13 of 25
Global Trends & Content Analysis
Spam, phishing and malware data is captured through a variety of sources, including the Symantec Global Intelligence
Network, the Symantec Probe Network (a system of more than 5 million decoy accounts), Symantec.cloud and a
number of other Symantec security te chnologies. Skeptic™, the Symantec.clo ud proprietary heuristic technology is
also able to detect new and sophisticated targeted threats.
Data is collected from over 8 billion email messages and over 1 billion Web requests, which are processed per day
across 15 data centers, including malicious code data, wh ich is collected from over 130 million systems in 86
countries worldwide. Symantec Inte lligence also gathers phishing inform ation through an ex tensive antifraud
community of enterprises, security vendor s, and more than 50 million consumers.
These resources give the Symantec Intelligence analysts unp aralleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze
and provide informed commentary on emerging trends in atta cks, malicious code activity , phishing, and spam. If there
is a malicious attack about to hit, we know about it firs t. We block it; we keep it from affecting our customers.
Spam Analysis
In November 2011, the global ratio of spam in email traffi c fell by 3.7 percentage points since October to 70.5 percent
(1 in 1.42 emails).
As the global spam rate fell, Russia became the most s pammed geography in November; with a spam rate of 76.7
percent and Saudi Arabia was the second most-spammed with 76.6 percent of email traffic blocked as spam.
In the US, 69.9 percent of email was s pam and 69.5 percent in Canada. The spam level in the UK was 69.5 percent.
In The Netherlands, spam accounted for 70.5 percent of email traffic, 70.1 percent in Germany, 70.4 percent in
Denmark and 68.6 percent in Australia. In Hong Kong, 69.2 percent of email wa s blocked as spam and 68.0 percent in
Singapore, compared with 66.6 percent in Japan. Spam accounted for 70.1 percent of email traffic in South Africa and
74.3 percent in Brazil. 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Russian Fed.
Saudi Arabia
China
Brazil
Qatar 76.7%
76.6%
74.5%
74.3%
73.2%Automotive
Agriculture
Non-Profit
Education
Manufacturing 73.0%
72.6%
71.6%
71.5%
71.0% 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 69.4%
69.7%
69.6%
70.1%
69.9%
69.7% Spam Rate
November 201170.5%
74.2%
74.4% Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2011 70.5%
Spam Sources United States 28.0%
India 9.0%Russian Federa
on 5.7%
Brazil 4.3%China 4.0%United Kingdom 3.9%Vietnam 3.5%Germany 2.2%Ukraine 1.9%France 1.8%Page 14 of 25
With a drop in spam this month, the Automotive industry became the most spammed industry sector in November,
with a spam rate of 73.0 percent. The spam rate for the Education sector was 71.5 perc ent and 69.1 percent for the
Chemical & Pharmaceutical sector, compared with 69.3 per cent for IT Services, 69.0 per cent for Retail, 68.8 percent
for Public Sector and 69.2 percent for Finance.
The spam rate for small to medium-sized businesses (1-250) was 69.4%, compared with 69.7.1% for large enterprises
(2500+).
Global Spam Categories
The most common category of spam in November was ph armaceutical related, but the second most common was
related to adult/dating spam. Examples of many of these subjects can be found in the subject line analysis, below.
Category Name November 2011 October 2011
Pharmaceutical 32.5% 37.5%
Watches/Jewelry 19.5% 15.0%
Unsolicited Newsletters 17.5% 6.5%
Adult/Sex/Dating 12.5% 2.5%
Weight Loss 8.0% 4.5%
Unknown/Other 4.0% 1.5%
Casino/Gambling 2.0% 23.5%
Software 2.0% 1.5%
Scams/Fraud/419 1.5% 6.0%
Degrees/Diplomas <0.5% 0.5%
Jobs/Recruitments <0.5% 0.5%
Malware <0.5% 0.5%
Phishing <0.5% 0.5%
Spam Subject Line Analysis
In the latest analysis, spam touting discounted software and emails relating to watches & jewelry accounted for some
of the most common spam subject lines in November, perhaps a timely shift on the part of the spammers in the runup
to the holiday season and around Christmas in December. Pharmaceutical related messages still feature among the
most common spam subject lines.
Rank November 2011
Total Spam: Top Subject Lines No.
of
Days October 2011
Total Spam: Top Subject Lines No.
of
Days
1 Re: Windows 7, Office 2010, Adobe CS5
… 9 NACHA security nitification 2
2 New notification from Facebook 9 ACH Payroll Cancelled 2
3 Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Windows 7, Office
2010, Adobe CS5 ... 9 ACH Transfer Review 6
4 Penis Enlargement Pills - Enlarge you
Penis Naturally Gain Up To 4 Inches In
Length 9 Re: Back to School Software Sale 6
5 Enlarge you Penis Naturally Gain Up To 4
Inches In Length And Up To 25% Girth
Increase. 9 0 6
6 Re: software outlet online purchase 9 Facebook Administration has sent you a notification 9
7 (blank subject) 9 Fw: Fw: Fw: Fw: Windows 7, Office 2010, Adobe CS5
… 18
8 High quality Replica Watches at Watch
Replica World at $145 9 Re: Windows 7, Office 2010, Adobe CS5 … 18
9 Replica watches - THE MOST POPULAR
MODELS All our replica watches have the same look and feel of the original product 9 Fw: Fw: Fw: Windows 7, Office 2010, Adobe CS5 … 18
10 Save-8O%-0ff-Viagra©-Cia1is©-Levitra© 9 Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Windows 7, Office 2010, Adobe
CS5 … 18 Page 15 of 25
Spam URL Distribution based on Top Level Domain Name
The proportion of spam exploiting URLs in the .com and . net top-level domains fell by 2.2 and 0.5 percentage points
respectively, with the only increase by one percent age point, relating to spam URLs in the .ru TLD.
TLD November October Change
(% points)
.com 55.1% 57.3% -2.2
.ru 9.4% 8.4% +1.0
.net 6.0% 5.3% -0.5
.org 7.4% N/A N/A
Average Spam Message Size
In November, with a small decline, approximately 3 in every 5 spam emails was 5Kb in size or less; moreover, spam
between 5Kb and 10Kb in size ro se by 4.9 percentage point.
Message Size November October Change
(% points)
0Kb – 5Kb 57.8% 59.0% -1.2
5Kb – 10Kb 31.2% 26.3% +4.9
>10Kb 11.0% 14.7% -3.7
Spam Attack Vectors
It can be seen in the chart below that the number of malic ious attacks that contained a malicious attachment was
much less than during the first half of October; however , the frequency of attacks has increased since the end of
October. Many of these attachments continue to be related to generic polymorphic malware variants, as discussed in
previous6 Symantec Intelligence reports.
In November, the number of spam emails resulting in NDRs (spam related non-delivery reports), has been
consistently stable, suggesting the attackers may be using va lid email distribution lists to conduct these attacks. NDRs
6 http://www.symanteccloud.com/intelligence 0%1%2%3%4%5%6%7%8%9%10%
11‐Oct 18 ‐Oct 25 ‐Oct 1 ‐Nov 8 ‐NovAttachment NDR MalwarePage 16 of 25
often result following widespread dictionary attacks, using da tabases of first and last names. This is indicative that
spammers are maintaining their distribution lists in orde r to minimize bounce-backs, since IP addresses are more
likely to appear on anti-spam block-lists if they become asso ciated with a high volume of invalid recipient emails.
Phishing Analysis
In November, the global phishing rate increased by 0.04 per centage points, taking the average to one in 302.0 emails
(0.33 percent) that comprised some form of phishing attack.
South Africa once again became the country most targeted for phishing attacks in November, with one in 96.2 emails
identified as phishing. The UK was the second most tar geted country, with one in 167.0 emails identified as phishing
attacks.
Phishing levels for the US were one in 461.8 and one in 242.4 for Canada. In Germany phishing levels were one in
426.2, one in 781.5 in Denmark and one in 250.4 in The Netherl ands. In Australia, phishing activity accounted for one
in 361.0 emails and one in 517.0 in Hong Kong; for Japan it was one in 2,058 and one in 609.7 for Singapore. In Brazil
one in 775.3 emails was blocked as phishing.
The Public Sector remained the most targeted by phishing ac tivity in November, with one in 120.9 emails comprising a
phishing attack. Phishing levels for the Chemical & Phar maceutical sector reached one in 407.5 and one in 377.0 for
the IT Services sector, one in 397.0 for Retail, one in 130.5 for Education and one in 331.7 for Finance.
Phishing attacks targeting small to medium-sized busi nesses (1-250) accounted for one in 211.0 emails, compared
with one in 334.0 for large enterprises (2500+).
Analysis of Phishing Web sites
The number of phishing Web sites increased by 66.1 percent in November. The number of phishing Web sites created
by automated toolkits increased four -fold, by approximately 316.1 percent, ac counting for approximately 54.6 percent 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 South Africa
United Kingdom
Canada
Netherlands
Switzerland 1 in 96.2
1 in 167.0
1 in 242.4
1 in 250.4
1 in 266.1 Public Sector
Education
Government
Accom/Catering
Agriculture 1 in 120.9
1 in 130.5
1 in 140.2
1 in 204.3
1 in 217.9 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 1 in 211.0
1 in 288.3
1 in 369.5
1 in 335.4
1 in 411.0
1 in 334.0 Phishing Rate
November 2011 1 in 302.1
1 in 343.1
1 in 325.1 Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2011 1 in
302.1
United Kingdom 61.2%
United States 15.3%
Australia 6.9%
Germany 5.4%
Sweden 3.4%Denmark 2.3%
India 1.0%
France 0.9%
Hong Kong 0.8%
Singapore 0.7%Page 17 of 25
of phishing Web sites. The majority of these related to attacks against a well-known social networking Web site, and
accounted for approximately 78 percent of all toolkit-based attacks.
The number of unique phishing URLs decreased by 3.7 perc ent and phishing Web sites using IP addresses in place
of domain names (for example, http://255.255.255.255), de creased by 36.1 percent. The use of legitimate Web
services for hosting phishing Web site s accounted for approximately 7.1 percent of all phishing Web sites, a decrease
of 10.7 percent from the previous mo nth. The number of non-English phishing sites saw a fall of 4.0 percent.
Of the non-English phishing sites Portuguese, French, Italian and German were among the highest in November.
Geographic Location of Phishing Web Sites
Tactics of Phishing Distribution
Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks, by Industry Sector
November 2011 Phishing Web Sites Locations
Country October* September
United States 51.4% 52.0%
Germany 6.7% 6.6%
United Kingdom 3.7% 3.5%
Canada 2.9% 3.0%
Russia 2.7% 2.5%
France 2.7% 2.4%
Brazil 2.5% 2.5%
Netherlands 2.3% 2.2%
Australia 1.4% Not listed
Italy *Note: Data lags one month 1.4% Not listed
1.1%7.1%1.6%35.5%54.6%
TyposquattingFree Web Hosting SitesIP Address DomainsOther Unique DomainsAutomated Toolkits
88.3%
9.0%
2.6%
0.1%Financial
Information Services
Others
GovernmentPage 18 of 25
Malware Analysis
Email-borne Threats
The global ratio of email-borne viruses in email traffic was one in 255.8 emails (0.39 percent) in November, a
decrease of 0.03 percentage points since October 2011.
In November, 40.2 percent of email-borne malware contai ned links to malicious Web sites, an increase of 20.1
percentage points since October 2011.
The UK remained at the top of the table with the highest ratio of malicious emails in November, with one in 149.4
emails identified as malicious. Switzerland had the second highest rate, with one in 185.6 emails identified as
malicious.
In South Africa returned to the top-5 list this month with one in 222.5 emails blocked as malicious. Virus levels for
email-borne malware in the US reached one in 360.1 and one in 219.9 in Canada. In Germany virus activity reached
one in 275.0, one in 710.5 in Denmark and in The Nether lands one in 238.2. In Australia, one in 326.2 emails was
malicious. For Japan the rate was one in 1,147, compared with one in 450.0 in Singapore. In Brazil, one in 570.6
emails in contained malicious content.
With one in 74.3 emails being blocked as malicious, the Public Sector remained the most targeted industry in
November. Virus levels for the Chemical & Pharmaceutic al sector reached one in 275.5 and one in 276.6 for the IT
Services sector; one in 337.1 for Retail, one in 105.2 for Education and one in 386.6 for Finance.
Malicious email-borne attacks destined for small to medium-sized businesses (1-250) accounted for one in 253.7
emails, compared with one in 249.9 for large enterprises (2500+).
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 United Kingdom
Switzerland
Canada
South Africa Hungary 1 in 149.4
1 in 185.6
1 in 219.9
1 in 222.5 1 in 223.7Public Sector
Education
Marketing/Media
Estate AgentsNon-Profit 1 in 74.3
1 in 105.2
1 in 187.7
1 in 200.4 1 in 203.0 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 1 in 253.7
1 in 242.9
1 in 274.8
1 in 259.8
1 in 294.9
1 in 249.9Virus Rate
November 2011 1 in 255.8
1 in 235.8
1 in 244.2 Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2011 1 in 255.8
Virus Sources United Kingdom 61.2%
United States 16.3%Australia 5.6%India 3.0%Netherlands 2.3%Sweden 1.6%Hong Kong 1.5%
France 1.1%
Singapore 0.9%South Africa 0.8%Page 19 of 25
The table below shows the most frequently blocked email-borne malware for November, many of which relate to
generic variants of malicious attachments and malicious hype rlinks distributed in emails. Approximately 40.8 percent
of all email-borne malware was identifie d and blocked using generic detection.
Malware identified generically as aggressive strains of pol ymorphic malware, such as Bredolab, Zeus and SpyEye,
accounted for 29.6 percent of all email-borne malware in No vember; equivalent to 50.4 percent of all generic malware.
Malware Name % Malware
Exploit/Link-generic-ee68 6.53%
Exploit/Link-generic.dam 3.83%
Trojan.Bredolab!eml-6c19 3.58%
W32/Generic-fdc7-c476-c476 2.48%
Trojan.Bredolab!eml-f101 1.98%
W32/Generic-6900 1.90%
W32/Generic.dam 1.72%
W32/NewMalware!0575 1.61%
W32/Generic-8426-e566 1.54%
Trojan.Bredolab!eml-47bf 1.51%
The top ten list of most frequently bloc ked malware accounted for approximately 26.7% of all email-borne malware in
November.
Web-based Malware Threats
In November, Symantec Intelligence identified an average of 4,915 Web sites each day harboring malware and other
potentially unwanted programs including spyware and adware; an increase of 47.8 percent since October 2011. This
reflects the rate at which Web sites are being compromis ed or created for the purpose of spreading malicious content.
Often this number is higher when Web-based malware is in circulation for a longer period of time to widen its potential
spread and increase its longevity.
As detection for Web-based malware increases, the number of new Web sites blocked decreases and the proportion
of new malware begins to rise, but initially on fewer Web sites.
The chart above shows the increase in the number of new spyware and adware Web sites blocked each day on
average during November compared with the equivalent num ber of Web-based malware Web sites blocked each day.
Web Policy Risks from Inappropriate Use
The most common trigger for policy-based filtering applied by Symantec Web Security.cloud for its business clients
was for the “Advertisements & Popups” category, which ac counted for 32.4 percent of blocked Web activity in
November. Web-based advertisements pose a potential ri sk though the use of “malvertisements,” or malicious
advertisements. These may occur as the result of a l egitimate online ad-provider being compromised and a banner ad
being used to serve malware on an otherwise harmless Web site.
The second most frequently blocked traffic was categorized as Social Networking, account ing for 19.3 percent of URL-
based filtering activity blocked, equivalent to approximat ely one in every 5 Web sites blocked. Many organizations New Malware Sites per Day
New sites with spyware
New sites with web virusesTotal 277/day
9,268/day
9,545/dayWeb Security Services Activity:
2008 2009 2010 2011
November 2011Page 20 of 25
allow access to social networking Web si tes, but facilitate access logging so that usage patte rns can be tracked and in
some cases implement policies to only permit access at cert ain times of the day and block access at all other times.
This information is often used to address performance managem ent issues, perhaps in the event of lost productivity
due to social networking abuse.
Activity related to streaming media policies resulted in 11.1 percent of URL-based filtering blocks in November.
Streaming media is increasingly popular when there are major sporting events or high profile international news
stories. This activity often results in an increased number of blocks, as businesses seek to preserve valuable
bandwidth for other purposes. This rate is equivalent to one in every 9 Web sites blocked.
Endpoint Security Threats
The endpoint is often the last line of defense and analysis ; however, the endpoint can often be the first-line of defense
against attacks that spread using USB storage devices and insecure network connections. The threats found here can
shed light on the wider nature of threats confronting busi nesses, especially from blended attacks and threats facing
mobile workers. Attacks reaching the endpoint are likely to have already circumvented other layers of protection that
may already be deployed, such as gateway filtering.
The table below shows the malware most frequently blocke d targeting endpoint devices for the last month. This
includes data from endpoint devices protected by Symantec technology around the world, including data from clients
which may not be using other layers of protection, such as Symantec Web Security.cloud or Symantec Email
AntiVirus.cloud.
Malware Name7 % Malware
WS.Trojan.H 21.93%
W32.Sality.AE 6.37%
W32.Ramnit!html 6.29%
Trojan.Bamital 5.74%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 5.40%
W32.Downadup.B 3.00%
Trojan.ADH.2 2.25%
W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 1.89%
Trojan.ADH 1.78%
W32.Virut.CF 1.73%
The most frequently blocked malware for the last month was WS.Trojan.H8. WS.Trojan.H is generic cloud-based
heuristic detection for files that posses c haracteristics of an as yet unclassified threat. Files detected by this heuristic
7For further information on these threats, please visit: http ://www.symantec.com/business/securi ty_response/landing/threats.jsp
8 http://www.symantec.com/security_res ponse/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-102713-4647-99 Web Security Services Activity:
Policy-Based Filtering
Advertisement and Popups
Social Networking
Streaming Media Computing and Internet Search Chat Hosting Sites Peer-To-Peer
News
EntertainmentWeb Viruses and Trojans
Trojan.Gen.2
Suspicious.Emit
Gen:Trojan.Heur.amKfbDF29Mpi Gen:Trojan.Heur.Cu9@Y!CHhQgi Gen:Trojan.Heur.amKfbr2TVGoi
Trojan.Script.12023
Gen:Trojan.Heur.Mx9@XcmYEfei VBS/Generic
Trojan.Maljava
Trojan.JS.Redirector.MY Potentially Unwanted Programs
PUP:ZBL
PUP:MyWebSearch.EC
PUP:JS.Script.C PUP:W32/Eshoper.B PUP:FakeAntiVirus.L PUP:Generic.192950 PUP:Clkpotato!gen3 PUP:Generic.183433
PUP:9231
PUP:Agent.NGR
November 2011 32.4%
19.3%
11.1%
4.6% 4.1% 3.4% 2.6% 2.5%
2.0%
1.7% 22.1%
14.5%
12.3%
8.5% 4.1% 2.9% 2.7% 2.2%
1.7%
1.5% 25.2%
18.6%
8.8% 8.0% 6.4% 4.5% 3.3% 2.8%
2.6%
2.3%Page 21 of 25
are deemed by Symantec to pose a risk to users and are th erefore blocked from accessing the computer. For much of
2010, W32.Sality.AE9 had been the most prevalent malicious threat blocked at the endpoint.
Variants of W32.Ramnit accounted for approximately 11.9% of all malware bl ocked at the endpoint, compared with
7.2% for all variants of W32.Sality.
Approximately 15.0 percent of the mo st frequently blocked malware last month was identified and blocked using
generic detection. Many new viruses and Trojans are based on earlier versions, where code has been copied or
altered to create a new strain, or va riant. Often these variants are created usin g toolkits and hundreds of thousands of
variants can be created from the same pi ece of malware. This has become a po pular tactic to evade signature-based
detection, as each variant would traditionally need its own signature to be correct ly identified and blocked.
By deploying techniques, such as heuristic analysis and gener ic detection, it’s possible to correctly identify and block
several variants of the same malware fa milies, as well as identify new forms of malicious code that seek to exploit
certain vulnerabilities that can be identified generically.
9 http://www.symantec.com/security_res ponse/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-011714-3948-99 Page 22 of 25
Best Practice Guidelines for Enterprises
1. Employ defense-in-depth strategies : Emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive
systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protection method. This should
include the deployment of regularly updated firewalls, as well as gateway antivirus, intrusion detection,
intrusion protection systems, and Web security gateway solutions throughout the network.
2. Monitor for network threat, vu lnerabilities and brand abuse. Monitor for network intrusions, propagation
attempts and other suspicious traffic patterns, iden tify attempted connections to known malicious or
suspicious hosts. Receive alerts for new vulnerabilit ies and threats across vendor platforms for proactive
remediation. Track brand abuse via domain alerting and fictitious site reporting.
3. Antivirus on endpoints is not enough: On endpoints, signature-based antivirus alone is not enough to
protect against today’s threats and Web-based attack toolkits. Deploy and use a comprehensive endpoint
security product that includes additi onal layers of protection including:
o Endpoint intrusion prevention that protects agai nst un-patched vulnerabilities from being exploited,
protects against social engineering attacks and stops malware from reaching endpoints;
o Browser protection for protection a gainst obfuscated Web-based attacks;
o Consider cloud-based malware prevention to prov ide proactive protection a gainst unknown threats;
o File and Web-based reputation solutions that prov ide a risk-and-reputation rating of any application
and Web site to prevent rapidly mutating and polymorphic malware;
o Behavioral prevention capabilities that look at t he behavior of applications and malware and prevent
malware;
o Application control settings that can prevent app lications and browser plug-ins from downloading
unauthorized malicious content;
o Device control settings that prevent and li mit the types of USB devices to be used.
4. Use encryption to protect sensitive data: Implement and enforce a security policy whereby sensitive data is
encrypted. Access to sensitive information should be re stricted. This should include a Data Loss Protection
(DLP) solution, which is a system to identify, monitor, and protect data. This not only serves to prevent data
breaches, but can also help mitigate the damage of potential data leaks from within an organization.
5. Use Data Loss Prevention to help prevent data breaches: Implement a DLP solution that can discover
where sensitive data resides, monitor its use and prot ect it from loss. Data loss prevention should be
implemented to monitor the flow of data as it leaves the organization over the network and monitor copying
sensitive data to external devices or Web sites. DLP should be configured to identify and block suspicious
copying or downloading of sensitive data. DLP should al so be used to identify conf idential or sensitive data
assets on network file systems and PCs so that appro priate data protection measures like encryption can be
used to reduce the risk of loss.
6. Implement a removable media policy . Where practical, restrict unautho rized devices such as external
portable hard-drives and other removable media. Su ch devices can both introduce malware as well as
facilitate intellectual property breaches—intentional or unintentional. If external media devices are permitted,
automatically scan them for viruses upon connection to the network and use a DLP solution to monitor and
restrict copying confidential data to une ncrypted external storage devices.
7. Update your security countermeasures frequently and rapidly: With more than 286M variants of malware
detected by Symantec in 2010, ent erprises should be updating security virus and intrusion prevention
definitions at least daily, if not multiple times a day.
8. Be aggressive on your updating and patching: Update, patch and migrate from outdated and insecure
browsers, applications and browser plug-ins to the la test available versions using the vendors’ automatic
update mechanisms. Most software vendors work diligent ly to patch exploited software vulnerabilities;
however, such patches can only be effective if adopted in the field. Be wary of deploying standard corporate
images containing older versions of browsers, applicat ions, and browser plug-ins that are outdated and
insecure. Wherever possible, automate patch deploy ments to maintain protection against vulnerabilities
across the organization.
9. Enforce an effective password policy . Ensure passwords are strong; at least 8-10 characters long and
include a mixture of letters and numbers. Encourage user s to avoid re-using the same passwords on multiple
Web sites and sharing of passwords with others should be forbidden. Passwords should be changed regularly, at least every 90 days. Avoid writing down passwords. Page 23 of 25
10. Restrict email attachments: Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments
that are commonly used to spread vi ruses, such as .VBS, .BAT, .EXE, .PIF, and .SCR files. Enterprises
should investigate policies for .PDFs that are allowed to be included as email attachments.
11. Ensure that you have infection and incident response procedures in place:
o Ensure that you have y our security vendors cont act information, know w ho you will call, and what
steps you will take if you have one or more infected systems;
o Ensure that a backup-and-restore solution is in plac e in order to restore lost or compromised data in
the event of successful attack or catastrophic data loss;
o Make use of post-infection detection capabilities fr om Web gateway, endpoint security solutions and
firewalls to identify infected systems;
o Isolate infected computers to prevent the risk of further infection within the organization;
o If network services are exploited by malicious code or some other threat, disable or block access to
those services until a patch is applied;
o Perform a forensic analysis on any infected com puters and restore those using trusted media.
12. Educate users on the changed threat landscape:
o Do not open attachments unless they are expect ed and come from a known and trusted source, and
do not execute software that is downloaded from the Internet (if such actions are permitted) unless
the download has been scanned for viruses;
o Be cautious when clicking on URLs in emails or social media program s, even when coming from
trusted sources and friends;
o Do not click on shortened URLs without previewi ng or expanding them first using available tools and
plug-ins;
o Recommend that users be cautious of information they provide on social networking solutions that
could be used to target them in an attack or tr ick them to open malicious URLs or attachments;
o Be suspicious of search engine results and only click through to trusted sources when conducting
searches—especially on topics that are hot in the media;
o Deploy Web browser URL reputation plug-in solution s that display the reputation of Web sites from
searches;
o Only download software (if allowed) from corporat e shares or directly from the vendors Web site;
o If users see a warning indicating that they are “i nfected” after clicking on a URL or using a search
engine (fake antivirus infections), have users close or quit the browser using Alt-F4, CTRL+W or the
task manager.
Page 24 of 25
Best Practice Guidelines for Consumers
1. Protect yourself : Use a modern Internet security solution that includes the following capabilities for maximum
protection against malicious code and other threats:
o Antivirus (file and heuristic based) and malware behavioral prevention can prevents unknown
malicious threats from executing;
o Bidirectional firewalls will block malware from exploiting potentially vulnerable applications and
services running on your computer;
o Intrusion prevention to protection against Web-a ttack toolkits, unpatched vulnerabilities, and social
engineering attacks;
o Browser protection to protect agains t obfuscated Web-based attacks;
o Reputation-based tools that che ck the reputation and trust of a f ile and Web site before downloading;
URL reputation and safety ratings for Web sites found through search engines.
2. Keep up to date : Keep virus definitions and security content updat ed at least daily if not hourly. By deploying
the latest virus definitions, you can protect your comp uter against the latest viruses and malware known to be
spreading in the wild. Update your operating system, W eb browser, browser plug-ins, and applications to the
latest updated versions using the aut omatic updating capability of your pr ograms, if available. Running out-of-
date versions can put you at risk from being exploited by Web-based attacks.
3. Know what you are doing : Be aware that malware or applications t hat try to trick you into thinking your
computer is infected can be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file-sharing programs,
free downloads, and freeware and shar eware versions of software.
o Downloading “free,” “cracked” or “pirated” versions of software can also contain malware or include
social engineering attacks that include programs that try to trick you into th inking your computer is
infected and getting you to pay money to have it removed.
o Be careful which Web sites you visit on the Web. While malware ca n still come from mainstream Web
sites, it can easily come from less reputable si tes sharing pornography, gambling and stolen software.
o Read end-user license agreements (EULAs) carefully and understand all terms before agreeing to
them as some security risks can be installed afte r an end user has accepted the EULA or because of
that acceptance.
4. Use an effective password policy: Ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers, and change
them often. Passwords should not consist of words fr om the dictionary. Do not use the same password for
multiple applications or Web sites. Use complex passwords (upper/lowercase and punctuation) or
passphrases.
5. Think before you click : Never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless you expect it and trust
the sender. Even from trusted users, be suspicious.
o Be cautious when clicking on URLs in emails, so cial media programs even when coming from trusted
sources and friends. Do not blindly click on sh ortened URLs without expanding them first using
previews or plug-ins.
o Do not click on links in social media applications with catchy titles or phrases even from friends. If you
do click on the URL, you may end up “liking it” and se nding it to all of your friends even by clicking
anywhere on the page. Close or quit your browser instead.
o Use a Web browser URL re putation solution that shows the reput ation and safety rating of Web sites
from searches. Be suspicious of search engine resu lts; only click through to trusted sources when
conducting searches, especially on t opics that are hot in the media.
o Be suspicious of warnings that pop-up asking y ou to install media players, document viewers and
security updates; only download software di rectly from the vendor’s Web site.
6. Guard your personal data : Limit the amount of personal informat ion you make publicly available on the
Internet (including and especially via social networks) as it may be harvested and used in malicious activities
such as targeted attacks and phishing scams.
o Never disclose any confidential personal or financia l information unless and until you can confirm that
any request for such information is legitimate.
|
Page 1 of 19
Symantec Intelligence
Symantec Intelligence Report: October 2011
Spammers now operating spam-friendly URL-shortening services using free, open-source software; Eastern
Europeans targeted by premium-rate SMS dialer app; and Duqu, a precursor to the next Stuxnet
Welcome to the October edition of the Symantec Intelligen ce report which, combining the best research and analysis
from the Symantec.cloud MessageLabs Intelligence Report and the Symantec State of Spam & Phishing Report,
provides the latest analysis of cyber security threats, trends and insights from the Symantec Intelligence team
concerning malware, spam, and other potentially harmful busin ess risks. The data used to compile the analysis for
this combined report includes data from September and October 2011.
Report highlights
Spam – 74.2 percent in October (a decrease of 0.6 percentage points since September 2011): page 7
Phishing – One in 343.1 emails identified as phishing (an in crease of 0.07 percentage points since September 2011): page 10
Malware – One in 235.8 emails in October contained malwar e (a decrease of 0.11 percentage points since September 2011):
page 11
Malicious Web sites – 3,325 Web sites blocked per day (a decrease of 4.3 percent si nce September 2011): page 13
43.9 percent of all malicious domains blocked were new in October (a decrease of 0.7 perc entage points since September
2011): page 13
15.2 percent of all Web-based malware blocked was new in Oc tober (an increase of 0.7 perc entage points since September
2011): page 13
Spammers setting up more URL shortening services: page 2
Social engineering example from the East : page 4
New Symantec Research: W32.Duqu - Precursor to the Next Stuxnet: page 5
New Symantec Research: The Motivations of Recent Android Malware: page 6
Best Practices for Enterprises and Users: page 16
Introduction
With the advent of social networking we have all become accustomed to using URL shortening services in our online
lives, and as their use by cyber criminals has increased, Sy mantec Intelligence has also tracked how these legitimate
services have been used in different ways for malicious purpo ses in the dissemination of malware and spam over the
past few years. Following on from the preceding advance in May 2011, when spammers appeared to have established
their own shortening services, albeit a W eb site that would redirect visitors to the same spam Web site. On that
occasion there was no actual shortening service in use, it was a simple redirection t hat gave the appearance of a
shortened URL. However, for the first time, Symantec Intelligence has identifie d that spammers have now established
a genuine URL shortening service that is publically available and will generate real shortened links. These have so far
only been found in spam emails.
Furthermore, this month a premium rate SMS dialer was al so discovered targeting users in Eastern Europe. Premium
SMS dialers have always been a problem on the mobile threat landscape, especially in Eastern Europe and this
example is no exception. It attempts to pass itself off as a legitimate application by playing off the name of a popular
VoIP/messaging app. It is written in J2ME and targets Apple iPhone™ devices running a JVM.
At the time of writing, Symantec rese archers were in the midst of analyzing a newly discovered targeted threat that
shares a great deal of code in common with the infamous St uxnet malware. Of note, it is apparent that the authors of
this new threat, dubbed “Duqu,” had access to the Stuxnet source code, not just Stuxnet binar ies. Thus, it is possible
Duqu was created by the same attackers that created Stuxnet. Page 2 of 19
Duqu's purpose is to gather intelligence data and assets from ent ities, such as suppliers to industrial facilities, in order
to more easily conduct a future attack against another third party. The attackers are looking for information such as
design documents that could help them mount a future attack on an industrial facility. Thus, Duqu is essentially the
precursor to a future Stuxnet-like attack.
Finally, a new whitepaper from Symantec looks at the future of mobile malware and we have observed a marked
increase in threats targeting mobile devices in 2011; par ticularly the Android platform. This new analysis highlights
how most current efforts to monetize mobile malware have onl y a low revenue-per-infection ratio and this has severely
limited the return on investment achievable by attackers. It also offers detailed insight into the top current mobile
malware monetization schemes, including how each work s and examples of the malware presently being used to
carry them out. It is only if the curr ent monetization schemes and those likely to be seen in the near future, succeed
that will attackers continue to invest in the creation of mobile malware.
I hope you enjoy reading this month’s edition of the report, and please feel free to contact me directly with any
comments or feedback.
Paul Wood, Senior Intelligence Analyst
[email protected]
@paulowoody
Report analysis
Spammers setting up more URL shortening services
By Nick Johnston, Senior Software Engineer, Symantec
In the May 2011 Symantec Intelligence Report (then k nown as MessageLabs Intelligence), we explained how
spammers had set up their own URL shortening services to better conceal their spam sites and make them harder to
block.
In October, we recently discovered a spam gang with at least 80 URL shortening sites. These all used a similar
naming pattern, and used the .info top-level domain. However, unlike the URL shortening sites we discovered in May,
these sites are effectively public URL shortening sites. Any one can create a shortened URL on these sites; the form to
do so is also publically available, as shown in figure 1.
Spammers are using a free, open source URL shortening script s to operate these sites. At the time of writing, 87
different domains were identified as being used in this fashion.
Figure 1 – landing page of spammers’ URL shortening Web site
Page 3 of 19
After creating many shortened URLs with their own serv ice, the spammers then send spam including these URLs.
These particular spammers use a mixture of blank subjec ts and subjects designed to get recipients to open the
message, like "It's a long time since I saw you last!", "It's a good thing you came" and so on. This is a common social
engineering tactic, as seen in figure 2.
Figure 2 – Example of spam email containing spammers’ own URL shortened link
The URL in the message points to one of the spammer's URL shortening sites, and then redirects to a "Pharmacy
Express" pharmaceutical spam site. An example can be seen in figure 3, below.
Figure 3 – Spam website redirected via t he bespoke spam URL shortening service
The domains used for the URL shortening sites all have the same contact information, with all contacts based in
Moscow. The domains are all hosted by a UK subsidiary of a large hosting company. We have informed the company.
It is possible that spammers are setting up their own URL shor tening sites since legitimate URL shortening sites, who
have long suffered with abuse, have slightly improved their detection of spam an d other malicious URLs. It's not fully
clear why the sites are public. Perhaps this is simply due to laziness on the spammers' part, or perhaps an attempt to
make the site seem more legitimate.
It can be seen from the chart in figure 4 that the use of legi timate URL shortening services continues, but not at the
same rate as had been seen previously in the year. Although the number of legitimate URL shortening services is
Page 4 of 19
significant and growing all the time, many of the major, well-known ones have made it more difficult for spammers to
abuse their services and when they do, the links are often taken down very quickly.
In October approximately 0.5% of all spam contained a sh ortened URL from a legitimate service, with peaks of
between 2% and 3% on occasion.
Figure 4 – Trend showing % of spam that contains a link from a legitimate URL shortening service
However, we expect spammers to continue to abuse URL sh ortening services and continue to try to conceal their
spam sites as much as possible.
Social engineering example from the East
By Shunichi Imano, Senior Security Response Manager, Symantec
Recently, a new threat, Android.Fakeneflic1, has taken advantage of gaps in the availability2 of a legitimate video
streaming service in order to target mobile users in Nort h America. This is another example of social engineering at
work; however, this time the users that are being targeted are in Eastern Europe.
Premium SMS dialers have always been a problem on the mob ile threat landscape, espe cially in Eastern Europe,
where dialers showed up on mobiles phones not too long after the introduction of the micro edition of the Java Virtual
Machine (JVM) for mobile devices. It should therefore come as no surprise that the authors responsible for leveraging
this lucrative revenue source appear to be making a switch to newer platforms.
The latest example of a dialer that has come to our attenti on attempts to pass itself off as a legitimate application by
imitating a popular VoIP/messaging app. It is written in J2ME and targets Apple iPhone™ devices running a JVM. In
this case, the author has even gone to the extent of setti ng up a dummy website to promote the app, as shown in
figure 5, below.
1 http://www.symantec.com/business/security_res ponse/writeup.jsp?docid=2011-101105-0518-99
2 https://www-secure.symantec.com/con nect/blogs/will-your-next-tv-manual-a sk-you-run-scan-instead-adjusting-
antenna
Page 5 of 19
Figure 5 – Example of dummy Web site used to promote the rogue dialer app
Smartphones are widely used as communication tools in t he enterprise environment as they have similar functionality
to a computer, but fit in the palm of your hand. Smartphone s provide convenience to users, yet simultaneously pose a
significant danger as they are often overlooked when it comes to protecting them. Therefore, it is important that proper
privileges and policies akin to corpor ate computers should be implemented on such devices. Since originally
discovering the rogue Web site and the threat in ear ly October, it has now been taken offline.
New Symantec Research: W32.Duqu - Precursor to the Next Stuxnet
On October 14, Symantec was alerted by the Laboratory of Cryptography and System Security (CrySyS) in the
Department of Telecommunications, Budapest University of Technology and Economics – a research lab with strong
international connections – to a newly discovered targeted thr eat that shares a great deal of code in common with the
infamous Stuxnet malware. Symantec researchers have been analyzing the threat, and of greatest note is that it is
apparent that the authors of this new threat, dubbed W32.Du qu, had access to the Stuxnet source code, not just
Stuxnet binaries. Thus, it is possible Duqu was cr eated by the same attackers that created Stuxnet.
Duqu's purpose differs from Stuxnet; however, as it is de signed to gather intelligence data and assets from entities,
such as suppliers to industrial facilities, in order to more easily conduct a future attack against another third party. The
attackers are looking for information such as design do cuments that could help them mount a future attack on an
industrial facility. Thus, Duqu is essentially the precursor to a future Stuxnet-like attack.
A technical paper on this threat has al so been written by Symantec and can be found here3.
Symantec has also determined that some of the malware files associated with the W32.Duqu threat were signed with
private keys associated with a code signing certificate which has subsequently been revoked. Our investigation into
the key’s usage leads us to the conclusion that the priv ate key used for signing Duqu was stolen, and not fraudulently
generated for the purpose of this malware. At no time were Symantec’s roots and intermediate CAs at risk, nor were
there any issues with any CA, intermediate or ot her VeriSign or Thawte brands of certificates.
Highlights:
Executables using the Stuxnet source code have been discovered. They appear to have been developed
since the last Stuxnet file was recovered.
The executables are designed to capture information such as keys trokes and system information.
3http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/ enterprise/media/security_respons e/whitepapers/w32_duqu_the_precursor_t
o_the_next_stuxnet.pdf
Page 6 of 19
Current analysis shows no code directly related to indu strial control systems, expl oits or self-replication.
The executables have been found in a limited number of organizations, including those involved in the
manufacturing of supplies to industrial facilities.
The exfiltrated data may be used to enable a future Stuxnet-like attack.
New Symantec Research: The Motivations of Recent Android Malware By Eric Chien, Technical Director, Symantec
For years now, we in the cyber securi ty industry have been saying an explosion of mobile malware is just around the
corner. Beginning in earnest this year, we have indeed observed a marked increase in threats targeting mobile
devices – particularly the Android platform. However, it’s probably not accurate to say the expected explosion has in
fact occurred. The reality is that cybercriminals are still very much in t he exploratory phase of figuring out how to
monetize the exploitation of mobile devices.
Above all else, our analysis highlights how most current e fforts to monetize mobile malware have only a low revenue-
per-infection ratio. This has severely limited the return on investment achievable by attackers. It also offers detailed
insight into the top current mobile malware monetization schemes observed by Symantec, including how each works
and examples of the malware presently being us ed to carry them out. These schemes are:
Premium-rate number billing scams
Spyware
Search engine poisoning
Pay-per-click scams
Pay-per-install schemes
Adware
Stealing mobile transaction authentication numbers (mTAN)
However, the research also points out that the currently strugglin g revenue-per-infection ratio is primed to improve.
The trigger will likely be advances in mobile payment-ty pe technology and the widespread adoption of using mobile
devices for both payment and accepting payment. The key is that these applications rely on devices to transmit
financial information —such as mobile banking credentials—ba cked by real monetary funds. We’ve learned in the PC
world just how lucrative the exploitation and sale of this kind of information can be for enterprising cyber criminals.
Many vendors are now using mobile devices such as smartp hones and tablets as point-of-sa le devices. For example,
a farmer’s market vendor or a taxi dr iver may now swipe your credit card through their personal smartphone rather
than a dedicated point-of-sale device. Alter natively, a big box retailer may replac e their existing point-of-sale devices
with well known smartphones or tablets. A malicious atta cker who has infected these dev ices, which is likely easier
than infecting existing point-of-sale devices, coul d potentially skim every credit card transaction.
Additional potential revenue-generating schemes likely to be seen in the near future are discussed as well. These
include:
Selling stolen International Mobile Equipment Identit y (IMEI) numbers for use on previously blocked or
counterfeit phones.
Peddling fake mobile security products—another tactic that has been highly successful in the PC realm.
The paper surmises that only if t he current monetization schemes and those likely to be seen in the near future,
succeed will attackers continue to invest in the creation of Android malware.
Full whitepaper (PDF): Motivations of Recent Android Malware
4
4http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/ enterprise/media/security_response/ whitepapers/motivations_of_recent_and
roid_malware.pdf Page 7 of 19
Global Trends & Content Analysis
Spam, phishing and malware data is captured through a variety of sources, including the Symantec Global Intelligence
Network, the Symantec Probe Network (a system of more than 5 million decoy accounts), Symantec.cloud and a
number of other Symantec security te chnologies. Skeptic™, the Symantec.clo ud proprietary heuristic technology is
also able to detect new and sophisticated targeted threats.
Data is collected from over 8 billion email messages and over 1 billion Web requests which are processed per day
across 15 data centers, including malicious code data which is collected from over 130 million systems in 86 countries
worldwide. Symantec Intelligence also gathers phishi ng information through an extensive antifraud community of
enterprises, security vendors, and more than 50 million consumers.
These resources give the Symantec Intelligence analysts unp aralleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze
and provide informed commentary on emerging trends in atta cks, malicious code activity , phishing, and spam. If there
is a malicious attack about to hit, we know about it firs t. We block it; we keep it from affecting our customers.
Spam Analysis
In October 2011, the global ratio of spam in email traffic dec lined slightly to 74.2 percent (1 in 1.35 emails), a decrease
of 0.6 percentage points when comp ared with September 2011.
As the global spam level remained relatively unchanged in October 2011, Saudi Arabia remained the most spammed
geography; with a spam rate of 80.5 percent and Russia also remained the second most-spammed with 79.7% spam
in email traffic.
In the US, 73.8 percent of email was s pam and 73.2 percent in Canada. The spam level in the UK was 74.8 percent.
In The Netherlands, spam accounted for 75.6 percent of email traffic, 74.8 percent in Germany, 75.7 percent in
Denmark and 72.8 percent in Australia. In Hong Kong, 73.4 percent of email wa s blocked as spam and 72.2 percent in
Singapore, compared with 70.8 percent in Japan. Spam accounted for 74.8 percent of email traffic in South Africa and
77.7 percent in Brazil. 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010Saudi Arabia
Russian Federation
Luxembourg
BrazilHungary80.5%
79.7%
79.7%
77.7%77.7%Education
Automotive
Non-Profit
Marketing/Media
Manufacturing76.4%
76.2%
75.9%
75.8%
75.4%1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+73.9%
74.1%
74.4%
75.0%
74.6%
74.1%Spam Rate
October 201174.2%
74.8%
75.2%Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
201174.2%
Spam Sources United States
India
United KingdomBrazilRussian Federa
on
GermanyChinaVietnamJapanFrance34.0%
5.8%
5.1%4.7%4.1%3.9%3.8%2.7%2.4%2.0%Page 8 of 19
Despite a small drop in spam, the Educat ion sector overtook the Automotive in dustry to become the most spammed
industry sector in October, with a spam rate of 76.4 percent. The spam level fo r the Chemical & Pharmaceutical sector
was 74.0 percent, compared with 73.8 percent for IT Services , 74.0 percent for Retail, 73.8 percent for Public Sector
and 73.5 percent for Finance.
The spam rate for small to medium-sized businesses was 73.9%, compared with 74.1% for large enterprises.
Global Spam Categories
The most common category of spam in October was phar maceutical related, but the second most common was
related to adult/dating spam. Examples of many of these subjects can be found in the subject line analysis, below.
Category Name October 2011 September 2011
Pharmaceutical 37.5% 52.5%
Casino/Gambling 23.5% 16.0%
Watches/Jewelry 15.0% 7.5%
Unsolicited Newsletters 6.5% 14.5%
Scams/Fraud/419 6.0% <0.5%
Weight Loss 4.5% 1.5%
Adult/Sex/Dating 2.5% 3.5%
Unknown/Other 1.5% 4.0% Software 1.5% 0.5%
Jobs/Recruitments 0.5% 1.0%
Degrees/Diplomas 0.5% <0.5%
Malware 0.5% 0.5%
Phishing 0.5% 0.5%
Spam Subject Line Analysis
In the latest analysis, adult-related dating spam account ed for fewer of the most common spam subject lines in
October, with the most frequent being associated with a su rge in generic polymorphic malware, spoofing the identity of
an international delivery service. Pharmaceutical relat ed subjects are also becoming increasingly more common.
Rank October 2011
Total Spam: Top Subject Lines No. of
Days September 2011
Total Spam: Top Subject Lines No. of
Days
1 NACHA security nitification 2 UPS notification 6
2 ACH Payroll Cancelled 2 Uniform traffic ticket 4
3 ACH Transfer Review 6 You have notifications pending 22
4 Re: Back to School Software Sale 6 SALE OFF: Pharmacy store! 2
5 0 6 (blank subject line) 31
6 Facebook Administration has sent you a
notification 9 Re: Windows 7, Office 2010, Adobe CS5 … 12
7 Fw: Fw: Fw: Fw: Windows 7, Office
2010, Adobe CS5 … 18 Sarah Sent You A Message 11
8 Re: Windows 7, Office 2010, Adobe
CS5 … 18 Ed-Meds-Antidepressants-And-Pain Relief-Meds-
8O%-OFF 25
9 Fw: Fw: Fw: Windows 7, Office 2010,
Adobe CS5 … 18 Fw: Fw: Fw: Fw: Windows 7, Office 2010, Adobe
CS5 … 9
10 Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Windows 7, Office
2010, Adobe CS5 … 18 Fw: Windows 7, Office 2010, Adobe CS5 … 9
Page 9 of 19
Spam URL TLD Distribution
The proportion of spam exploiting URLs in the .com and .i nfo top-level domains fell by 2.2 and 2.3 percentage points
respectively, with the only increase re lating to spam URLs in the .ru TLD.
TLD October September Change
(% points)
.com 57.3% 59.5% -2.2
.info 8.2% 10.5% -2.3
.ru 8.4% 8.1% +0.3
.net 5.3% 5.8% -0.5
Average Spam Message Size
In October, approximately 3 in every 5 spam emails was 5Kb in size or less, however, spam with a larger file size,
including attachments diminished by 11.5 percentage point s compared with September, as the number of malware
attacks utilizing generic polymorphic ma lware variants decreased in October.
Message Size October September Change
(% points)
0Kb – 5Kb 59.0% 48.1% +10.9
5Kb – 10Kb 26.3% 25.6% +0.7
>10Kb 14.7% 26.2% -11.5
Spam Attack Vectors
It can be seen in the chart below that the number of malicio us attacks that contained a malicious attachment fell from
the end of September. The number of attacks was much lower in October. Many of these attachments were
connected to a rise in volume of generic polymorphic ma lware variants, as discussed in the September report.
In October, the number of spam emails resulting in NDRs (spam related non-delivery reports), has been stable during
October, suggesting the attackers may be using valid email distribution lists to conduct these attacks. NDRs often
result following widespread dictionary attacks, using dat abases of first and last names. This is indicative that
spammers are maintaining their distribution lists in orde r to minimize bounce-backs, since IP addresses are more
likely to appear on anti-spam block-lists if they become asso ciated with a high volume of invalid recipient emails.
0%5%10%15%20%25%
10‐Sep 15 ‐Sep 20 ‐Sep 25 ‐Sep 30 ‐Sep 5 ‐Oct 10 ‐OctAttachment NDR MalwarePage 10 of 19
Phishing Analysis
In October, phishing email activity diminished by 0.07 per centage points since September 2011; one in 343.1 emails
(0.29 percent) comprised some form of phishing attack.
The UK became the country most targeted geography for phishing in October, with one in 178.3 emails identified as
phishing. South Africa was the second mo st targeted country, with one in 203.8 em ails identified as phishing attacks.
Phishing levels for the US were one in 646.0 and one in 272.8 for Canada. In Germany phishing levels were one in
897.4, one in 631.8 in Denmark and one in 518.3 in The Netherl ands. In Australia, phishing activity accounted for one
in 267.0 emails and one in 359.5 in Hong Kong; for Japan it was one in 3385 and one in 500.1 for Singapore. In Brazil
one in 547.3 emails was blocked as phishing.
The Public Sector remained the most targeted by phishing ac tivity in October, with one in 86.0 emails comprising a
phishing attack. Phishing levels for the Chemical & Phar maceutical sector reached one in 543.3 and one in 500.5 for
the IT Services sector, one in 562.7 for Retail, one in 150.9 for Education and one in 304.4 for Finance.
Phishing attacks targeting small to medium-sized businesse s accounted for one in 303.5 emails, compared with one in
319.6 for large enterprises.
Analysis of Phishing Web sites
The number of phishing Web sites increased by 17.1 percent in October. The number of phishing Web sites created
by automated toolkits increased by approximately 36.1 percent. The number of unique phishing URLs increased by
12.7 percent and phishing Web sites using IP addres ses in place of domain names (for example,
http://255.255.255.255), decreased by 15.9 percent. The use of legitimate Web services for hosting phishing Web
sites accounted for approximately 13.3 percent of all phi shing Web sites, an increase of 133.6 percent from the
previous month. The number of non-English phis hing sites saw an increase of 7.4 percent.
Among non-English phishing sites Portuguese, French, Ita lian and Spanish remained the highest in September. 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010United Kingdom
South Africa
Australia
Canada
Hong Kong1i n1 7 8 . 3
1i n2 0 3 . 8
1i n2 6 7 . 0
1 in 272.8
1 in 359.5Public Sector
Education
Accom/Catering
Estate AgentsNon-Profit1i n8 6 . 0
1i n1 5 0 . 9
1 in 273.6
1i n2 8 8 . 91i n2 9 0 . 21-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+1i n3 0 3 . 5
1i n3 9 1 . 8
1i n4 5 4 . 7
1 in 440.7
1i n5 0 1 . 3
1i n3 1 9 . 6Phishing Rate
October 20111 in 343.1
1i n4 4 7 . 9
1i n3 2 2 . 6Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2011
United States 31.5%
United Kingdom 20.1%Germany 16.7%Australia 11.6%
Austria 5.9%
Canada 3.2%Belgium 2.6%
Sweden 2.4%
Singapore 1.2%India 1.2%1i n
343.1
Phishing SourcesPage 11 of 19
Geographic Location of Phishing Web Sites
Tactics of Phishing Distribution
Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks, by Industry Sector
October 2011 Phishing Web Sites Locations
Country October September
United States 52.0% 50.4%
Germany 6.6% 6.2%
United Kingdom 3.5% 3.8%
Canada 3.0% 3.1%
China 3.0% 2.7%
Brazil 2.5% 2.5%
Russia 2.5% 3.0%
France 2.4% 2.6%
Netherlands 2.2% 2.3%
Spain 1.8% 1.5%
2.0%13.3%4.1%58.7%21.8%
TyposquattingFree Web Hosting SitesIP Address DomainsOther Unique DomainsAutomated Toolkits
85.7%
11.6%
2.6%
0.2%Financial
Information Services
Others
GovernmentPage 12 of 19
Malware Analysis
Email-borne Threats
The global ratio of email-borne viruses in email traffic wa s one in 235.8 emails (0.42 percent) in October, a decrease
of 0.11 percentage points since September 2011.
In October, 20.1 percent of email-borne malware cont ained links to malicious Web sites, an increase of 3.6
percentage points since September 2011. Emails that cont ained generic polymorphic malware variants accounted for
45.1 percent of all email-borne malware in October, co mpared with 72.0 percent in September; many included
attached ZIP files that contained the generic malware.
The UK climbed to the top of the table with the highest rati o of malicious emails in October, with one in 146.4 emails
identified as malicious. Hong Kong was the geography with the second highest rate, with one in 180.3 emails
identified as malicious in October.
The previous month’s top spot belonged to South Africa, which dropped to eleventh position in October, with one in
326.0 emails blocked as malicious. Virus levels for email-borne malware in the US reached one in 330.2 and one in
211.7 in Canada. In Germany virus activity reached one in 330.9, one in 457.1 in Denmark and in The Netherlands
one in 319.4. In Australia, one in 193.4 emails was malicious. For Japan the rate was one in 1048, compared with one
in 272.4 in Singapore. In Brazil, one in 4 21.7 emails in contained malicious content.
With one in 62.0 emails being blocked as malicious, the Public Sector remained the most targeted industry in October.
Virus levels for the Chemical & Pharmaceutical sector reached one in 180.9 and one in 257.3 for the IT Services
sector; one in 355.4 for Retail, one in 99.3 fo r Education and one in 332.9 for Finance.
Malicious email-borne attacks destined for small to m edium-sized businesses accounted for one in 260.2 emails,
compared with one in 214.5 for large enterprises.
Page 13 of 19
The table below shows the most frequently blocked email-bo rne malware for October, many of which relate to generic
variants of malicious attachments and malicious hyperlinks di stributed in emails. Overall, 45.1 percent of email-borne
malware was associated with variants of generic polymorphic malware, including Bredolab, Sasfis, SpyEye and Zeus
variants.
Malware Name % Malware
Gen:Trojan.Heur.FU.bqW@a8hiAJoi 6.51%
W32/Generic-0922-13ca-13ca 5.95%
Exploit/Link-generic-ee68 5.86%
Gen:Variant.Ursnif.16 3.91%
Trojan.Bredolab!eml-866c 3.28%
Gen:Trojan.Heur.FU.bqW@aS39a0fi 2.02%
Trojan.Bredolab!eml-4e1b 1.96%
Gen:Trojan.Heur.FU.bqW@a0CDPdfi 1.74%
W32/Generic-703e-4489 1.55%
Exploit/FakeAttach 1.43%
Web-based Malware Threats
In October, Symantec Intelligence identified an average of 3,325 Web sites each day harboring malware and other
potentially unwanted programs including spyware and adware; a decrease of 4.3 percent since September 2011. This
reflects the rate at which Web sites are being compromis ed or created for the purpose of spreading malicious content.
Often this number is higher when Web-based malware is in circulation for a longer period of time to widen its potential
spread and increase its longevity.
As detection for Web-based malware increases, the number of new Web sites blocked decreases and the proportion
of new malware begins to rise, but initially on fewer Web si tes. Further analysis reveals that 43.9 percent of all
malicious domains blocked were new in October; a dec rease of 0.7 percentage points compared with September
2011. Additionally, 15.2 percent of all Web-based malwar e blocked was new in October; an increase of 0.7
percentage points since the previous month.
The chart above shows the increase in the number of new spyware and adware Web sites blocked each day on
average during October compared with the equivalent numbe r of Web-based malware Web sites blocked each day.
Web Policy Risks from Inappropriate Use
The most common trigger for policy-based filtering applied by Symantec Web Security.cloud for its business clients
was for the “Advertisements & Popups” category, which ac counted for 37.5 percent of blocked Web activity in
October. Web-based advertisements pose a potential ri sk though the use of “malvertisements,” or malicious
advertisements. These may occur as the result of a l egitimate online ad-provider being compromised and a banner ad
being used to serve malware on an otherwise harmless Web site.
The second most frequently blocked traffic was categorized as Social Networking, account ing for 18.1 percent of URL-
based filtering activity blocked, equiva lent to approximately one in every 5.5 W eb sites blocked. Many organizations New Malware Sites per Day
New sites with spyware
New sites with web virusesTotal32/day
3,293/day
3,325/dayWeb Security Services Activity:
2008 2009 2010 2011
October 2011Page 14 of 19
allow access to social networking Web si tes, but facilitate access logging so that usage patte rns can be tracked and in
some cases implement policies to only permit access at cert ain times of the day and block access at all other times.
This information is often used to address performance managem ent issues, perhaps in the event of lost productivity
due to social networking abuse.
Activity related to Streaming Media policies resulted in 8.9 percent of URL-based filtering blocks in October. Streaming
media is increasingly popular when there are major sporting events or high profile international news stories. This
activity often results in an increased number of blocks, as businesses seek to preserve valuable bandwidth for other
purposes. This rate is equivalent to one in every 11.2 Web sites blocked.
Endpoint Security Threats
The endpoint is often the last line of defense and analysis ; however, the endpoint can often be the first-line of defense
against attacks that spread using USB storage devices and insecure network connections. The threats found here can
shed light on the wider nature of threats confronting busi nesses, especially from blended attacks and threats facing
mobile workers. Attacks reaching the endpoint are likely to have already circumvented other layers of protection that
may already be deployed, such as gateway filtering.
The table below shows the malware most frequently blocke d targeting endpoint devices for the last month. This
includes data from endpoint devices protected by Symantec technology around the world, including data from clients
which may not be using other layers of protection, such as Symantec Web Security.cloud or Symantec Email
AntiVirus.cloud.
Malware Name5 % Malware
W32.Sality.AE 7.19%
W32.Ramnit!html 7.18%
Trojan.Bamital 6.03%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 5.72%
WS.Trojan.H 5.70%
W32.Downadup.B 3.19%
W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 3.05%
W32.Virut.CF 2.74%
Trojan.ADH.2 2.58%
Trojan.ADH 2.55%
The most frequently blocked malware for the last month was W32.Sality.AE6, a virus that spreads by infecting
executable files and attempts to download potentially ma licious files from the Inte rnet. For much of 2010,
W32.Sality.AE had been the most prevalent malicious threat blocked at the endpoint.
5For further information on these threats, please visit: http ://www.symantec.com/business/securi ty_response/landing/threats.jsp
6 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sality-whitepaper Web Security Services Activity:
Policy-Based Filtering
Advertisement and Popups
Social Networking
Streaming Media
Computing and Internet
UnclassifiedChat
Search
Peer-To-Peer
Hosting Sites
GamblingWeb Viruses and Trojans
VBS/Generic
Trojan.ADH.2
Trojan:GIF/GIFrame.gen!A
Gen:Trojan.Heur.gq0@vj7DnZiix
W32.Downadup.B
Trojan.Gen
Trojan.Gen.2
Infostealer.Gampass
Gen:Variant.Kazy.32829
Trojan.MaljavaPotentially Unwanted Programs
PUP:Generic.188886
PUP:9231
PUP:W32/CnsMin.S
PUP:Generic.192303
PUP:Generic.62006PUP:Generic.183433
PUP:Generic.183172
PUP:Keylogger
PUP:Agent.NGG
PUP:JS.Script.C
October 201137.5%
18.1%
8.9%
4.1%
3.8%3.4%
3.0%
2.3%
2.0%
1.6%45.3%
16.2%
7.2%
6.2%
1.8%1.6%
1.3%
1.2%
1.2%
1.0%34.7%
20.4%
7.4%
6.0%
4.5%3.4%
3.0%
2.9%
2.2%
2.0%Page 15 of 19
Variants of W32.Ramnit accounted for approximately 13.1% of all malware bl ocked at the endpoint, compared with
8.1% for variants of W32.Sality.
Many new viruses and Trojans are based on earlier versions, where code has been copied or altered to create a new
strain, or variant. Often these variants are created using toolkits and hundreds of thousands of variants can be created
from the same piece of malware. This has become a popular tactic to evade signature-based detection, as each
variant would traditionally need its own signatur e to be correctly identified and blocked.
By deploying techniques, such as heuristic analysis and gener ic detection, it’s possible to correctly identify and block
several variants of the same malware fa milies, as well as identify new forms of malicious code that seek to exploit
certain vulnerabilities that can be identified generically. A pproximately 17.6 percent of the most frequently blocked
malware last month was identified and blocked using generic detection.
Page 16 of 19
Best Practice Guidelines for Enterprises
1. Employ defense-in-depth strategies : Emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive
systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protection method. This should
include the deployment of regularly updated firewalls, as well as gateway antivirus, intrusion detection,
intrusion protection systems, and Web security gateway solutions throughout the network.
2. Monitor for network threat, vu lnerabilities and brand abuse. Monitor for network intrusions, propagation
attempts and other suspicious traffic patterns, iden tify attempted connections to known malicious or
suspicious hosts. Receive alerts for new vulnerabilit ies and threats across vendor platforms for proactive
remediation. Track brand abuse via domain alerting and fictitious site reporting.
3. Antivirus on endpoints is not enough: On endpoints, signature-based antivirus alone is not enough to
protect against today’s threats and Web-based attack toolkits. Deploy and use a comprehensive endpoint
security product that includes additi onal layers of protection including:
o Endpoint intrusion prevention that protects agai nst un-patched vulnerabilities from being exploited,
protects against social engineering attacks and stops malware from reaching endpoints;
o Browser protection for protection a gainst obfuscated Web-based attacks;
o Consider cloud-based malware prevention to prov ide proactive protection a gainst unknown threats;
o File and Web-based reputation solutions that prov ide a risk-and-reputation rating of any application
and Web site to prevent rapidly mutating and polymorphic malware;
o Behavioral prevention capabilities that look at t he behavior of applications and malware and prevent
malware;
o Application control settings that can prevent app lications and browser plug-ins from downloading
unauthorized malicious content;
o Device control settings that prevent and li mit the types of USB devices to be used.
4. Use encryption to protect sensitive data: Implement and enforce a security policy whereby sensitive data is
encrypted. Access to sensitive information should be re stricted. This should include a Data Loss Protection
(DLP) solution, which is a system to identify, monitor, and protect data. This not only serves to prevent data
breaches, but can also help mitigate the damage of potential data leaks from within an organization.
5. Use Data Loss Prevention to help prevent data breaches: Implement a DLP solution that can discover
where sensitive data resides, monitor its use and prot ect it from loss. Data loss prevention should be
implemented to monitor the flow of data as it leaves the organization over the network and monitor copying
sensitive data to external devices or Web sites. DLP should be configured to identify and block suspicious
copying or downloading of sensitive data. DLP should al so be used to identify conf idential or sensitive data
assets on network file systems and PCs so that appro priate data protection measures like encryption can be
used to reduce the risk of loss.
6. Implement a removable media policy . Where practical, restrict unautho rized devices such as external
portable hard-drives and other removable media. Su ch devices can both introduce malware as well as
facilitate intellectual property breaches—intentional or unintentional. If external media devices are permitted,
automatically scan them for viruses upon connection to the network and use a DLP solution to monitor and
restrict copying confidential data to une ncrypted external storage devices.
7. Update your security countermeasures frequently and rapidly: With more than 286M variants of malware
detected by Symantec in 2010, ent erprises should be updating security virus and intrusion prevention
definitions at least daily, if not multiple times a day.
8. Be aggressive on your updating and patching: Update, patch and migrate from outdated and insecure
browsers, applications and browser plug-ins to the la test available versions using the vendors’ automatic
update mechanisms. Most software vendors work diligent ly to patch exploited software vulnerabilities;
however, such patches can only be effective if adopted in the field. Be wary of deploying standard corporate
images containing older versions of browsers, applicat ions, and browser plug-ins that are outdated and
insecure. Wherever possible, automate patch deploy ments to maintain protection against vulnerabilities
across the organization.
9. Enforce an effective password policy . Ensure passwords are strong; at least 8-10 characters long and
include a mixture of letters and numbers. Encourage user s to avoid re-using the same passwords on multiple
Web sites and sharing of passwords with others should be forbidden. Passwords should be changed regularly, at least every 90 days. Avoid writing down passwords. Page 17 of 19
10. Restrict email attachments: Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments
that are commonly used to spread vi ruses, such as .VBS, .BAT, .EXE, .PIF, and .SCR files. Enterprises
should investigate policies for .PDFs that are allowed to be included as email attachments.
11. Ensure that you have infection and incident response procedures in place:
o Ensure that you have y our security vendors cont act information, know w ho you will call, and what
steps you will take if you have one or more infected systems;
o Ensure that a backup-and-restore solution is in plac e in order to restore lost or compromised data in
the event of successful attack or catastrophic data loss;
o Make use of post-infection detection capabilities fr om Web gateway, endpoint security solutions and
firewalls to identify infected systems;
o Isolate infected computers to prevent the risk of further infection within the organization;
o If network services are exploited by malicious code or some other threat, disable or block access to
those services until a patch is applied;
o Perform a forensic analysis on any infected com puters and restore those using trusted media.
12. Educate users on the changed threat landscape:
o Do not open attachments unless they are expect ed and come from a known and trusted source, and
do not execute software that is downloaded from the Internet (if such actions are permitted) unless
the download has been scanned for viruses;
o Be cautious when clicking on URLs in emails or social media program s, even when coming from
trusted sources and friends;
o Do not click on shortened URLs without previewi ng or expanding them first using available tools and
plug-ins;
o Recommend that users be cautious of information they provide on social networking solutions that
could be used to target them in an attack or tr ick them to open malicious URLs or attachments;
o Be suspicious of search engine results and only click through to trusted sources when conducting
searches—especially on topics that are hot in the media;
o Deploy Web browser URL reputation plug-in solution s that display the reputation of Web sites from
searches;
o Only download software (if allowed) from corporat e shares or directly from the vendors Web site;
o If users see a warning indicating that they are “i nfected” after clicking on a URL or using a search
engine (fake antivirus infections), have users close or quit the browser using Alt-F4, CTRL+W or the
task manager.
Page 18 of 19
Best Practice Guidelines for Users and Consumers
1. Protect yourself : Use a modern Internet security solution that includes the following capabilities for maximum
protection against malicious code and other threats:
o Antivirus (file and heuristic based) and malware behavioral prevention can prevents unknown
malicious threats from executing;
o Bidirectional firewalls will block malware from exploiting potentially vulnerable applications and
services running on your computer;
o Intrusion prevention to protection against Web-a ttack toolkits, unpatched vulnerabilities, and social
engineering attacks;
o Browser protection to protect agains t obfuscated Web-based attacks;
o Reputation-based tools that che ck the reputation and trust of a f ile and Web site before downloading;
URL reputation and safety ratings for Web sites found through search engines.
2. Keep up to date : Keep virus definitions and security content updat ed at least daily if not hourly. By deploying
the latest virus definitions, you can protect your comp uter against the latest viruses and malware known to be
spreading in the wild. Update your operating system, W eb browser, browser plug-ins, and applications to the
latest updated versions using the aut omatic updating capability of your pr ograms, if available. Running out-of-
date versions can put you at risk from being exploited by Web-based attacks.
3. Know what you are doing : Be aware that malware or applications t hat try to trick you into thinking your
computer is infected can be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file-sharing programs,
free downloads, and freeware and shar eware versions of software.
o Downloading “free” “cracked” or “pirated” versions of software can also contain malware or include
social engineering attacks that include programs that try to trick you into th inking your computer is
infected and getting you to pay money to have it removed.
o Be careful which Web sites you visit on the Web. While malware ca n still come from mainstream Web
sites, it can easily come from less reputable si tes sharing pornography, gambling and stolen software.
o Read end-user license agreements (EULAs) carefully and understand all terms before agreeing to
them as some security risks can be installed afte r an end user has accepted the EULA or because of
that acceptance.
4. Use an effective password policy: Ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers, and change
them often. Passwords should not consist of words fr om the dictionary. Do not use the same password for
multiple applications or Web sites. Use complex passwords (upper/lowercase and punctuation) or
passphrases.
5. Think before you click : Never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless you expect it and trust
the sender. Even from trusted users, be suspicious.
o Be cautious when clicking on URLs in emails, so cial media programs even when coming from trusted
sources and friends. Do not blindly click on sh ortened URLs without expanding them first using
previews or plug-ins.
o Do not click on links in social media applications with catchy titles or phrases even from friends. If you
do click on the URL, you may end up “liking it” and se nding it to all of your friends even by clicking
anywhere on the page. Close or quit your browser instead.
o Use a Web browser URL re putation solution that shows the reput ation and safety rating of Web sites
from searches. Be suspicious of search engine resu lts; only click through to trusted sources when
conducting searches, especially on t opics that are hot in the media.
o Be suspicious of warnings that pop-up asking y ou to install media players, document viewers and
security updates; only download software di rectly from the vendor’s Web site.
6. Guard your personal data : Limit the amount of personal informat ion you make publicly available on the
Internet (including and especially social networks) as it may be harvested and used in malicious activities
such as targeted attacks, phishing scams.
o Never disclose any confidential personal or financia l information unless and until you can confirm that
any request for such information is legitimate.
|
Page 1 of 17
Symantec Intelligence
Symantec Intelligence Report : October 2012
Scammers take to Instagram; Spam rates drop by 10 percentage points ; Ransomware evolves
Welcome to the October edition of the Symantec Intelligence report , which provid es the latest analysis of cyber
security threats, trends , and insights from the Symantec Intelligence team concerning malware, spam, and other
potentially harmful business risks . The data used to c ompile the analysis for this report includes data from January
through October 2012.
Report highlights
• Spam – 64.8 percent (a decrease of 10.2 percentage points since September ): page 9
• Phishing – One in 286.9 emails identified as phishing (a decrease of 0.059 percentage points since September ): page 12
• Malware – One in 229.4 emails contained malware ( a decrease of 0.04 percentage points since September ): page 13
• Malicious website s – 933 website s blocked per day ( an increase of 19.7 percent since September ): page 15
• Scammers attempt to leverage Instagram : page 2
• Why global spam rates are down this month: page 5
• The evolution of Ransomware: page 7
• Other stories in the threat landscape this month: page 8
Introduction
In this month’s report we investigate a new social networking avenue that scammers are attempting to leverage:
Instagram. They’re doing so in order to gather personal details and persuade users to sign up for premium -rate mobile
services, among other things. The scams take on a number of forms, from spam comments, to fake followers, to liking
photos in the hopes people will check out their profiles , which in turn often contain more spam links .
We’ve also noticed a significant drop in email spam volumes this month. The global spam rate has dropped by more
than 10%, from 75% of email traffic in September, down to 64.8% in October. We take a look at some of the likely
causes for this significant drop.
Finally, we take a look at the evolution of ‘ ransomware’ and discuss some of the most recent discoveries in the threat
landscape during October.
I hope you enjoy reading this month’s edition of the report, and please feel free to contact me directly with any
comments or feedback.
Paul Wood , Cyber Security Intelligence, Symantec
[email protected]
@symantec, @symanteccloud, @norton, @threatintel, @paulowoody
Page 2 of 17
Report analysis
Insta spam: Scammers take to Instagram
by Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat Analyst, Symantec
As an amateur photographer and fan of image effects, I’ve taken a liking to Instagram. I’m far from alone in this, given
how the photo app has recently crossed the 100 million user mark .1 Unfortunately , spammers have noticed this too
and are attempting to take advantage of those using the popular ser vice. They’re approaching it from a variety of
angles, in much the same way as they have on other social networks.
I discovered this recently with my own account. Since the photos I post lean towards an artistic bent, containing little
or no personally ide ntifiable information, I’ve opted to leave them publically viewable. Generally this isn’t an issue,
save for a sudden uptick in activity that seemingly came out of nowhere.
It all began when I received a notification on my phone about an Instagram comment. It came from an unfamiliar
account, had nothing to do with the photo, and was obviously spam:
Hi there, Get a FREE Game in my Profile, OPEN it up, Get 85.90$ :- ) xx
I went to check out the user, who appeared to be a rather attractive woman with followers in the thousands, but surprisingly for a photo- sharing service, not a single photo.
Figure 1 – Comment spam profile
Who was this mysterious lady? Her profile bio s aid largely the same thing as the comment she left me, but also
included a shortened URL. What was interesting about this spam, setting it apart from similar comment spam you might see in a blog, was that the link resided on the profile rather than in the spam message. It even included explicit
instructions about visiting the profile and opening the link. This could be due to URL monitoring carried out by
Instagram, which could automatically remove a suspicious link if it was included in a comment. Regardless, I decided to see where this led. (Note: this was done under controlled conditions, avoiding potentially malicious activity. Do not try this at home, as you could compromise your device.)
1 http://mashable.com/2012/09/11/instagram -100-million/
Page 3 of 17
The link ended up pointing to a premium mobile service that offered to send me videos of cute animals for only €4.50
per month. To avail of this service, all I had to do was give them my phone number, and I’d no longer have to watch
such videos for free on YouTube.
Figure 2 –Premium -rate service
I was happy to delete the comment and leave well enough alone, except I noticed something else: my follower
numbers had not only gone up, but doubled. This was unusual in its own right, but it happened within a two- hour
period.
Figure 3 – Sudden increase in followers
Page 4 of 17
So what led to this sudden popularity? Did I end up taking a particularly spectacular photo, garnering newfound fame,
and eventually hitting Instagram’s Popular page? Or was something else in the mix here? All of these new followers
had a few things in common:
• They were all “women” with attractive profile pictures.
• None of them had posted any photos.
• Their profile Bios included a quote, followed by a shortened URL.
While the shortened URL was different in each profile, they all lead to the same location —an adverti sement for fake
jobs working in social media. All you had to do to “Get Paid $250/Day To Mess Around on Facebook And Instagram”
was give them your name and email address.
Figure 4 – Fake follower profile leading to phishing scam
This type of spam could lead to phishing scams. What’s disconcerting is that each profile had followers in the
thousands. This is likely due to the “call and response” nature of many social networks: you follow me and I’ll follow
you. Each account was following far more profiles than were following it, further supporting this idea.
I figured that this would be it, but was surprised to be hit by a third scam wave. I noticed a significant increase in “likes ”
for my last photo. These likes came from what appear to be real profiles , with uploaded pictures . However, all the
photos, the user names used, and bio information center on advertising income referral programs. The sole purpose
of these accounts appears to be to get you to sign up for the program, resulting in the profile owner earning money for
every member referred. This is in contrast to situations where a legitimate account has been compromised and used
to send out messages . Most of the photos were meme- type pictures, advertising the referral program, pictures of
expensive items seemingly purchased with the money made, or shots of guys holding large bundles of $100 bills.
These programs could be likened to classic pyramid schemes —only those involved are now using social networking
to advertise them.
Page 5 of 17
Figure 5 – User showing money supposedly made through scheme; meme- type picture advertising referral program.
How successful are these various scam campaigns? It turns out they could be fairly lucrative. For instance, we were
able to determine that the URL on my commenter’s profile has been clicked close to 10,000 times in little more than a
month. If only a fraction of users sign up for the premium rate service, give away personal information, or join the semi -legitimate referral service, the scammers could consider their efforts successful.
It’s important to note that Instagram isn’t alone when it comes to scams like these, and most social networks have
methods to deal with them. Posting spam clearly violates Instagram’s community guidelines and accounts found guilty
of doing so are quickly disabled. In fact Instagram actively monitors for certain content and has put together a detailed
privacy and safety how -to covering how to report inappropriate comments and users .
2
In addition to this, the following best practices will help you stay safe:
• Set your account to Private. This way you have control over who follows you and who doesn’t.
• Don’t follow arbi trary followers. If you suspect an account isn’t real, ignore it.
• Don’t click shortened URLs unless you know where they lead.
• Optional: Don’t follow or accept followers without photos. The exception to this rule is if you know the person.
Some people do l ike to view photos, but don’t like to take them.
• Finally, report any suspicious accounts or comments to Instagram and follow their Privacy & Safety
guidelines .3
Why October spam fell by 10 percentage points
We noticed something interesting this month when analyzing our spam rates: there’s been a 10 percentage point drop
in the global spam rate for the month. We decided to take a closer look at what may be responsible for the drop.
We took a look at the spam rates over seven day averages . These averages peaked in mid- September, at around 43
million messages per day, and then began their decline, bottoming out around the beginning of October.
2 http://help.instagram.com/customer/portal/articles/95788
3 http://help.instagram.com/customer/portal/topics/43528- privacy -safety/articles
Page 6 of 17
Figure 6 – Seven-day averages of spam rates for September and October . (NB. Dates in MM/DD/YYYY format)
It appears that the Festi botnet has recently gone quiet and could be partly responsible for this sudden decline. This
botnet was very active in early September befor e all but disappearing in October .
Figure 7 – Festi botnet disappears in October. (NB. Dates in MM/DD/YYYY format)
This drop is most evident when looking at Saudi Arabia. Previously a hotbed for Festi -related spam in recent months ,
the botnet seems to have become largely dormant in the country —so much so that the country has gone from having
the highest spam rate worldwide to completely dropping out of the top ten in October .
Does this mean we’re winning the war against botnets and spam? We’re pleased to see that a 10 percentage point
drop in the global spam rate can result in a 50 percent drop in spam volume over a two- month period. Unfortunately,
we’ve seen drops like this before, where other botnets soon jump in to pick up the slack, or a “dead” botn et is
reincarnated in a slightly different manifestation. For example, the Kelihos botnet is now believed to be in at least its
third incarnation since Microsoft targeted the botnet in the company’s efforts to disrupt the botnet over 12 months ago.
Still it’s certainly good news, and persistent efforts to uncover and shut down such botnets should continue to pay dividends. - 10,000,000,000 20,000,000,000 30,000,000,000 40,000,000,000 50,000,000,000 60,000,000,000
9/1/12 9/15/12 9/29/12 10/13/12 10/27/12
0.00%10.00%20.00%30.00%40.00%50.00%60.00%70.00%80.00%90.00%100.00%
9/1/2012 9/15/2012 9/29/2012 10/13/2012 10/27/2012Page 7 of 17
Ransomware Evolution: The Journey Continues…
by Hon Lau, Security Response, Symantec
This year has seen a ramping up in the presence of ransomware, not just in terms of the sheer numbers seen in the
wild, but also in terms of the incorporation of new techniques.
In the early days, ransomware creators were content with simply locking the screen and displaying simple and
straight -forward m essages asking for payment of a ransom to restore access to your computer. They may even
encrypt files and request payment for a decryption key. These techniques tell of a lack of imagination, but at least the
technique was tried and tested. They represented the initial efforts of cybercriminals to extort money from innocent users. The use of embarrassing materials, such as displaying pornographic images on the screen of a locked
computer, was fairly effective and used often.
More recently, ransomware purporting to be from law enforcement, with content localized to the country of the user,
has become the norm. Typically, the lock -up screen in these examples uses social engineering to inform the user that
they have been caught engaging in illegal online activity. The threats subsequently threaten to involve law
enforcement or take legal action in order to coerce the user to comply.
As shown in a report from November 2011,
4 about 46 percent of adults in the US have acquired copyright materials
through less than legitimate means. For the 18- 29 age group, an even larger percentage of 70% have engaged in
such activity. If these statistics do indeed reflect the reality on the ground, then you can be sure that this law
enforcement -inspired social engineering trickery has a good chance of working, particularly when combined with other
techniques, such as screen and input de vice locking.
It is against this backdrop that we have recently observed a new variant ( Trojan.Ransomlock.Y )5 demonstrating further
innovation on the p art of the ransomware creators.
Figure 9 – Example Ransomware lock screen
4 http://piracy.americanassembly.org/wp- content/uploads/2011/11/AA -Research- Note -Infringement -and-Enforcement -November -2011.pdf
5 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012- 100921- 0457 -99&tabid=2
Page 8 of 17
This variant, utilizes many of the existing techniques already previously described, but it also repeatedly plays an
audio file. The audio file states:
FBI warning: Your computer is blocked for violation of federal law!
This ties in nicely with the FBI -inspired lockup screen in order to give a compelling reason to the user to act
quickly. What this recent development goes to show is that the culprits behind the ransomware are gett ing more
creative, with powerful financial motives at play. We can expect to see further innovations in the near future, as they
attempt to milk a possible cash cow further. Don’t be surprised to see crossover techniques, once used in fake antivirus, adapt ed for use the context of ransomware, and whatever else these attacker’s minds can think up.
Further reading:
The Ransomlock family has been at the forefront of the recent growth in ransomware. For an overview of the Ransomlock family of Trojans, you can r ead our recently published Trojan.Ransomlock family writeup.
6
Security Response is also publishing a new whitepaper about Ransomware. You can download a copy of this paper
entitled: Ransomware: A Growing Menace.7
Other news in the Threat Landscape
contributions by Eamonn Young and Jarrad Shearer
At the beginning of the summer, Symantec analyzed a new threat by the name of W32.Flamer .8 The level of
sophistication of this threat was only matched by that of W32.Stuxnet9 and W32.Duqu.10 It came to our attention that
this thr eat had been operating for the past two years and had been primarily targeting computers in the Middle East .11
Recently, we discovered a new module of this threat .12 This is one of those previously unknown components using
one of the supported protocols. We named this new component W32.Flamer.B ,13 which opens a back door on a
compromised computer and allows an attacker to steal information.
A new version of the Blackhole toolkit14 also appeared in October. Deemed Blackhole 2.0, the newer version of the
toolkit has removed previous patched vulnerabilities and is now providing a number of new features to make it harder
for antivirus software to detect and defend against exploit attacks. For instance, the new version includes single- use
URL generation, and can manage multiple domains from one administrative panel.
Finally, some good new broke this month as authorities in Australia, Canada, and the US joined forces to shut down
global tech support scams responsible for cold- calling users and erroneously telling them their computers are infected
with viruses .15 Canadian authorities announc ed that they had shut down two companies16 and fined them over
$500,000 in total . Meanwhile, US authorities announced that they froze the assets of six operators17 and initiated legal
action against 16 companies and 17 individuals.
While a victory for the good guys, it won’t likely stop this type of scam entirely, as others will very well take their place.
Remember to remain vigilant and know that tech companies won’t call unsolicited. If you receive a call from someone
claiming to be a technical support agent, it’s likely a scam.
6 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2009- 041513- 1400 -99
7 http://bit.ly/RCJbYy
8 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012- 052811- 0308 -99
9 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010- 071400- 3123 -99
10 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2011- 101814- 1119 -99
11 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/flamer -highly -sophisticated -and-discreet -threat -target s-middle- east
12 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/w32flamerb- additional -module- discovered
13 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012- 101611- 2743 -99
14 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blog- tags/blackhole
15 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WhV6rIgyQ -s
16 http://www.crtc.gc.ca/eng/com100/2012/r121003.htm
17 http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2012/10/pecon.shtm Page 9 of 17
Global Trends & Content Analysis
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the world through the
Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network, which is made up of more than 64.6 million attack sensors and records
thousands of events per second. This network monitors attack activity in more than 200 countries and territori es
through a combination of Symantec products and services such as Symantec DeepSight™ Threat Management
System, Symantec™ Managed Security Services and Norton™ consumer products, and other third- party data
sources.
In addition, Symantec maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting
of more than 47,662 recorded vulnerabilities (spanning more than two decades) from over 15,967 vendors
representing over 40,006 products.
Spam, phishing and malware data is captur ed through a variety of sources, including the Symantec Probe Network, a
system of more than 5 million decoy accounts; Symantec.cloud and a number of other Symantec security
technologies. Skeptic™, the Symantec.cloud proprietary heuristic technology is able to detect new and sophisticated
targeted threats before reaching customers’ networks. Over 8 billion email messages and more than 1.4 billion Web
requests are processed each day across 15 data centers. Symantec also gathers phishing information through a n
extensive antifraud community of enterprises, security vendors, and more than 50 million consumers.
These resources give Symantec’s analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze, and provide
informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and spam. The result is the
annual Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, which gives enterprises and consumers the essential information to
secure their systems effectively now and into the future.
Spam A nalysis
In October , the global ratio of spam in email traffic fell by 10.2 percentage point since September , to 64.8 percent ( 1 in
1.54 emails ). This follows the continuing trend of global spam levels diminishing gradually since the latter part of 2011 .
Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Saudi Arabia
Hungary
Sri Lanka
Qatar
China 79.4%
75.3%
74.0%
73.1%
69.9% Education
Non-Profit
Gov/Public Sector
Marketing/Media
Agriculture 66.8%
66.2%
66.2%
65.9%
65.9% 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 65.2%
65.2%
65.2%
65.5%
65.1%
64.5% Spam Rate
October 2012 64.8%
75.0%
64.8% 69.0% Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012
11.9%
7.9%
6.6%
5.0%
4.6%
4.1%
4.0%
3.3%
3.0%
2.9% India
Brazil
United States
Canada
Russian Federation
Viet Nam
Peru
Korea (South)
Romania
TurkeyPage 10 of 17
Global Spam Categories
The most common category of spam in October is related to the Sex/Dating category , with 62.73 percent.
Category Name October
2012 September
2012
Sex/Dating 62.73% 47.93%
Jobs 10.45% 7.83%
Pharma 9.79% 27.64%
Watches 3.74% 12.49%
Software 2.49% 1.20%
Casino 0.75% 2.26%
Degrees 0.35% 0.15%
Mobile 0.19% 0.17%
419/scam/lotto 0.11% 0.14%
Newsletters 0.04% 0.05%
Weight Loss 0.01% <0.01%
Spam URL Distribution based on Top Level Domain Name
The proportion of spam exploiting URLs in the .com top- level domain increased in October , as highlighted in the table
below. This is in line with a modest decrease in .ru top-level domains this month.
TLD October
2012 September
2012
.com 63.1 % 60.4 %
.net 6.8 % 6.3 %
.ru 4.3 % 12.1 %
.info 3.3 % 3.7 %
Average Spam Message Size
In October , the proportion of spam emails that were 5Kb in size or less decrease d by 20.3 percentage points.
Furthermore, the proportion of spam messages that were greater than 10Kb in size increase d by one percent , as can
be seen in the following table.
Message Size October
2012 September
2012
0Kb – 5Kb 41.8 % 62.1 %
5Kb – 10Kb 40.9 % 21.7 %
>10Kb 17.3 % 16.3 %
Spam Attack Vectors
October highlights the increase in spam emails resulting in NDRs (spam related non- delivery reports) . In these cases,
the recipient email addresses are invalid or bounced by their service provider. The proportion of spam that contained a
malicious attachment or link in crease , with periodic spikes of spam activity during the period, as shown in the chart
below. Page 11 of 17
NDR spam, as shown in the chart above, is often as a result of widespread dictionary attacks during spam campaigns ,
where spammers make use of databases containing first and last names and combine them to generate random email
addresses . A higher -level of activity is indicative of spammers that are seeking to build their distribution lists by
ignoring the invalid recipient emails in the bounce- backs . The list can then be used for more targeted spam attacks
containing malicious attachment s or link s. This might indicate a pattern followed by spammers in harvesting the email
addresses for some months and using those addresses for targeted attacks in other months. 0.0%0.5%1.0%1.5%2.0%2.5%
11-Sep
12-Sep
13-Sep14-Sep
15-Sep16-Sep17-Sep
18-Sep
19-Sep
20-Sep
21-Sep22-Sep
23-Sep
24-Sep25-Sep26-Sep
27-Sep
28-Sep
29-Sep30-Sep
1-Oct2-Oct
3-Oct
4-Oct
5-Oct
NDR MalwarePage 12 of 17
Phishing Analysis
In October , the global phishing rate de creased by 0.059 percentage points, taking the global average rate to one in
286.9 emails ( 0.35 percent) that comprised some form of phishing attack.
Analysis of Phishing W ebsites
The overall phishing de creased by about 22 percent this month. Unique domains decreased by about 13 percent as
compared to the previous month. Phishing websites that used automated toolkits increased by 5 percent. Phishing
websites with IP domains (for e.g. domains like http://255.255.255.255) decreased by about 30 percent. Webhosting
services comprised of 4 percent of all phishing, a de crease of 4 percent from the previous month. The number of non-
English phishing sites in creased by 17 percent. Among non- English phishing sites, French, Italian, Portuguese, and
Chinese were highest in September.
Geographic Location of Phishing Web sites
Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 South Africa
United Kingdom
Denmark
Netherlands
Australia 1 in 134.5
1 in 145.1
1 in 167.6
1 in 186.6
1 in 209.1 Public Sector
Education
Accom/Catering
Finance
Marketing/Media 1 in 61.4
1 in 172.4
1 in 194.5
1 in 215.4
1 in 246.4 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 1 in 186.9
1 in 286.0
1 in 292.0
1 in 402.5
1 in 486.6
1 in 563.6 Phishing Rate
October 2012 1 in 286.9
1 in 245.4
1 in 286.9 1 in 392.7 Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012
25.8%
20.4%
17.5%
11.5%
5.0%
3.5%
3.1%
1.5%
1.5%
1.5% United Kingdom
United States
Australia
New Zealand
Sweden
Canada
France
Denmark
Brazil
Ireland
October 2012 Phishing Websites Locations
*Note: Data lags one monthCountry September*
UnitedStates
Germany
UnitedKingdom
Brazil
FranceCanada
RussiaChinaNetherlands
Turkey54.2%
5.0%
3.8%
3.4%
2.7%3.0%
2.4%
2.0%2.1%
1.3%August
51.6%
5.6%
3.8%
3.7%
3.0%3.1%
2.4%2.0%2.2%
1.3%Page 13 of 17
Tactics of Phishing Distribution
Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks, by Industry
0.9% 3.0% 3.7% 44.5% 47.8%
TyposquattingIP Address DomainsFree Web Hosting SitesAutomated ToolkitsOther Unique Domains
0.010% 0.013% 0.36% 0.63% 0.81% 0.94% 1.4% 2.9% 28.9% 31.3% 32.7%
ISPInsuranceGovernmentEntertainmentRetailTelecommunicationsCommunicationsComputer SoftwareInformation ServicesE-CommerceBankingPage 14 of 17
Malware Analysis
Email -borne Threats
The global ratio of email -borne viruses in email traffic was one in 229.4 emails ( 0.44 percent ) in October , a decrease of
0.04 percentage points since September .
In October , 23.5 percent of email -borne malware contained links to malicious website s, 1.3 percentage points higher
than September .
Frequently Blocked E mail-borne Malware
The table below shows the most frequently blocked email -borne malware for October , many of which relate to generic
variants of malicious attachments and malicious hy perlinks distributed in emails. Approximately 35.4 percent of all
email -borne malware was identified and blocked using generic detection.
Malware identified generically as aggressive strains of polymorphic malware accounted for 15.2 percent of all email -
borne malware blocked in October .
Malware Name % Malware
Suspicious.JIT.a -SH 15.42%
Suspicious.JIT.a.dam 6.74%
W32/Generic.dam 6.24%
W32/Bredolab.gen!eml.k -SH 5.85%
Exploit/Link -generic -ee68 5.44%
W32/Bredolab.gen!eml.j -SH 5.16%
Trojan.Sasfis.dam 3.68%
EML/Worm.XX.dam 2.99%
Link-Trojan.Blackhole.I 2.62%
W32/Bredolab.gen!eml.j 1.77%
The top- ten list of most frequently blocked malware accounted for approximately 55.9 percent of all email -borne
malware blocked in October . Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Germany
South Africa
Austria
Luxembourg
Switzerland 1 in 71.4
1 in 135.0
1 in 197.3
1 in 208.9
1 in 209.5 Public Sector
Education
Accom/Catering
Marketing/Media
Chem/Pharm 1 in 50.4
1 in 137.4
1 in 161.5
1 in 190.0
1 in 216.7 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 1 in 225.2
1 in 250.6
1 in 168.4
1 in 245.7
1 in 366.0
1 in 224.6Virus Rate
October 2012 1 in 229.4
1 in 2 11.0
1 in 229.4 1 in 282.7 Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012
54.7%
16.4%
7.8%
3.1%
3.0%
2.0%
1.8%
1.7%
1.6%
1.3% United Kingdom
United States
Germany
Brazil
Australia
Sweden
South Africa
France
Japan
Hong KongPage 15 of 17
Web -based Malware Threats
In October , Symantec Intelligence identified an average of 933 websites each day harboring malware and other
potentially unwanted programs including spyware and adware; an increase of 19.2 percent since September . This
reflects the rate at which websites are being compromised or created for the purpose of spreading malicious content.
Often this number is higher when Web- based malware is in circulation for a longer period of time to widen its potential
spread and increase its longevity.
As detection for Web- based malwar e increases, the number of new websites blocked decreases and the proportion of
new malware begins to rise, but initially on fewer websites. Further analysis reveals that 38.5 percent of all malicious
domains blocked were new in October ; an increase of 1.63 percentage points compared with September . Additionally,
11.0 percent of all Web- based malware blocked was new in October ; a decrease of 0.4 percentage points since
September .
The chart above shows the in crease in the number of new spyware and adware websites blocked each day on
average during October compared with the equivalent number of Web -based malware website s blocked each day.
Web Policy Risks from Inappropriate Use
Some of t he most common trigger s for policy -based filtering applied by Symantec Web Security.cloud for its business
clients are s ocial networking, advertisements and pop- ups, and streaming media category . Many organizations allow
access to social networking websites , but facilitate access logging so that usage patterns can be tracked and in some
cases implement policies to only permit access at certain times of the day and block access at all other times. Web -
based advertisements pose a potential risk though the use of “malvertisements,” or malicious advertisements. These
may occur as the result of a legitimate online ad- provider being compromised and a banner ad being used to serve
malware on an otherwise harmless website . Streaming media is increasingly popular when there are major sporting
events or high profile international news stories. This activity often results in an increased number of blocks, as
businesses seek to preserve valuable bandwidth for other purposes.
Endpoint Security Threats
The endpoint is often the last line of defense and analysis; however, the endpoint can often be the first -line of defense
against attacks that spread using USB storage devices and insecure network connections . The threats found here can
shed light on the wider nature of threats confronting businesses, especially from blended attacks and threats facing New Malware Sites per Day
New sites with spyware
New sites with web viruses
Total 7/day
926/day
933/dayWeb Security Services Activity:
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Web Security Services Activity:
Policy-Based Filtering
Social Networking
Advertisement and Popups
Streaming Media
Computing and Internet
Peer- To-Peer
Chat
Gambling
Hosting Sites
Games
SearchWebViruses and Trojans
JS:Trojan.Script.E Y
Gen: Trojan.Heu r.hu9@X2ifIMki
Trojan.JS.Redirecto r.AWF
Trojan.JS.Iframe.CCW
Gen: Trojan.Heu r.hu9@Y!7zjnpi
Exploit:Java/CVE-2012-4681.H
Trojan.Script.12023
Trojan.JS.Agent.GHF
Gen: Trojan.Heu r.hu9@XQiT3mki
Trojan.Maljava!gen23 Potentially Unwanted Programs
Adware.Generic.262597
Application.DirectDownloade r.A
Spyware.PCAcme
Application.Heu r.fq1@b0InQscO
Adware.Solimba.K
Adware.Generic.251050
Adware.Generic.249333
Application.Generic.407192
Application.NSIS.Shortcut. A
Spyware.Ardakey
October 2012 30.8%
28.1%
6.9%
4.5%
3.9%
2.9%
2.8%
2.6%
1.7%
1.5% 8.1%
7.6%
7.2%
4.8%
4.7%
4.3%
4.2%
3.0%
2.8%
2.4% 83.2%
7.6%
5.2%
0.4%
0.3%
0.3%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%
0.2%Page 16 of 17
mobile workers . Attacks reaching the endpoint are likely to have already circumvented other layers of protection that
may already be deployed, such as gateway filtering.
The table below shows the malware most frequently blocked targeting endpoint devices for the last month. This
includes data fr om endpoint devices protected by Symantec technology around the world, including data from clients
which may not be using other layers of protection, such as Symantec Web Security.cloud or Symantec Email
AntiVirus.cloud.
Malware Name18 % Malware
W32.Sality .AE 6.2%
W32.Ramnit!html 5.3%
W32.Ramnit.B 4.5%
W32.Downadup.B 4.3%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 3.5%
W32.Virut.CF 1.9%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 1.8%
W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 1.7%
W32.SillyFDC 1.2%
Trojan.Maljava 1.1%
For much of 2012 , variants of W32.Sality.AE
19 and W32.Ramnit20 had been the most prevalent malicious threat s
blocked at the endpoint. Variants of W32.Ramnit accounted for approximately 13.6% of all malware blocked at the
endpoint in October , compared with 6.9 percent for all variants of W32.Sality.
Approximately 12.7 percent of the most frequently blocked malware last month was identified and blocked using
generic detection. Many new viruses and Trojans are based on earlier versions, where code has been copied or altered to create a new strain, or variant. Often these variants are created using toolkits and hundreds of thousands of
variants can be created from the same piece of malware. This has become a popular tactic to evade signature- based
detection, as each variant would traditionally need its ow n signature to be correctly identified and blocked.
By deploying techniques, such as heuristic analysis and generic detection, it ’s possible to correctly identify and block
several variants of the same malware families, as well as identify new forms of mal icious code that seek to exploit
certain vulnerabilities that can be identified generically.
18For further information on these threats, please visit: http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/landing/t hreats.jsp
19 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006- 011714- 3948 -99
20 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010- 011922- 2056 -99
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
OCTOBER 2013p. 2
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
3 Executive Summary
4 BIG NUMBERS
7 TARGETED ATTACKS
8 Targeted Attacks in 2013
8 Targeted Attacks per Day
8 First Attacks Logged by Month
9 Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
9 Top 10 Industries Attacked
9 First Attacks Logged by Size
9 File Extensions of Attachments
10 Social Media
11 Social Media
11 Top 5 Social Media Attacks, 2013
12 DATA BREACHES
13 Data Breaches
13 Top 5 Types of Information Exposed
13 Timeline of Data Breaches, 2013
14 MOBILE
15 Mobile
15 Mobile Malware by Type
16 Cumulative Mobile Android Malware
17 VULNERABILITIES
18 Vulnerabilities
18 Total Vulnerabilities Disclosed by Month
18 Browser Vulnerabilities
18 Plug-in Vulnerabilities19 SPAM, PHISHING, & MALWARE
20 Spam
20 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Geography
20 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Industry
21 Top 10 Sources of Spam
21 Average Spam Message Size*
21 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Company Size
21 Spam by Category
21 Spam URL Distribution Based on Top Level Domain Name*
22 Phishing
22 Top 10 Sources of Phishing
22 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Company Size
22 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Industry
22 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Geography
23 Phishing Distribution in September
23 Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks
24 Malware
24 Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected
24 Top 10 Email Virus Sources
25 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Industry
25 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Geographic Location
25 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Company Size
26 Endpoint Security
26 Top 10 Most Frequently Blocked Malware
27 Policy Based Filtering
27 Policy Based Filtering
28 About Symantec
28 More Informationp. 3
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
Executive Summary
Welcome to the October edition of the Symantec Intelligence report.
Symantec Intelligence aims to provide the latest analysis of cyber
security threats, trends, and insights concerning malware, spam,
and other potentially harmful business risks.
This month we saw one of the largest data breaches in a number of years, where 150 million
identities were exposed due to this one breach. This has more than doubled the number of
identities exposed so far this year, when compared to our previous numbers through September.
October also saw an increase in the number of targeted attacks. These numbers are up fivefold
compared to September, and even surpassing previous Octobers in 2011 and 2012, though still
much lower than their peaks this summer. When comparing the size of the targeted organizations,
we see that a majority of attack attempts are against large corporations with 2500-plus employees.
However, when looking at the first time an organization registers a targeted attack attempt, this
number is much higher for organizations with fewer than 250 employees. This indicates that
more new attack attempts are being made across the smaller business spectrum, though larger
organizations are more likely to be targeted continuously.
Also, the total number of mobile vulnerabilities disclosed dropped significantly in October.
September’s number was unusually high due to the release of a major update to a popular mobile
operating system, which addressed a number of vulnerabilities in the software.
In other news, fake offerings continue to dominate Social Media attacks, disclosed vulnerability
numbers are up 17 percent compared to the same period last year, and email spam rates have
increased slightly over a three-month period, while phishing attempts and viruses attachments
through email have decreased slightly.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to contact us with any comments or
feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat Analyst
[email protected]. 4
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
BIG NUMBERSp. 5
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
Overall Email Phishing Rate:
Overall Email Phishing Rate:
1 in 626
1 in 1,056
1 in 1,135SepAug
OctHIGHER NUMBER = LOWER RISK
Overall Email Virus Rate:
Overall Email Virus Rate:
Aug
SepOctHIGHER NUMBER = LOWER RISK
1 in 340
1 in 383
1 in 437
Estimated Global
Email Spam Rate Per DayEstimated Global
Email Spam Rate Per Day
SPAM AS PERCENT OF ALL EMAIL
Aug Sep Oct0102030405060708090100
65% 66% 68%
New Vulnerabilities
New Vulnerabilities
Sep
Aug
Oct
469
469
549 549
663 663
Sep45Aug2
Oct5
Mobile
VulnerabilitiesMobile
Vulnerabilities
p. 6
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
Data Breaches
Data Breaches
165Number of Breaches
(Year-to-Date)
248,282,045 Number of IdentitiesExposed (Year-to-Date)
Mobile Malware VariantsMobile Malware VariantsVARIANTS (CUMULATIVE) 161213
Oct Sep Aug193213249
10002000300040005000600070008000900010000
O S A J J M A M F JAN
2013D N O
7,2947,294p. 7
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
TARGETED ATTACKSp. 8
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
Targeted Attacks in 2013
Targeted Attacks per Day
Source: Symantec
2013 2013 TREND (Projected) 2011 2012
TARGETED ATTACKS
255075100125150175200225250
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANAt a Glance
• The number of targeted
attacks in October were
up since last month, even
surpassing the number
of attacks recorded in
October of both 2011 and
2012.
• More companies logged
their first targeted attack
in October than previous
months, making it the
second largest month for
new attacks this year.
• Large organizations of
2500+ continue to make
up the lion’s share of the
total number of targeted
attacks by organization
size, though organizations
with fewer than 250
employees are targeted
more often, based on first
attacks.
First Attacks Logged by Month
Source: Symantec
100200300400500600700800900100011001200
O S A J J M A M F JAN
2013p. 9
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
Source: Symantec
Company Size Percent
1-250 26.1%
251-500 11.3%
501-1000 10.2%
1001-1500 3.1%
1501-2500 8.6%
2500+ 40.8%First Attacks Logged by Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Percent
1-250 50.2%
251-500 11.0%
501-1000 9.4%
1001-1500 5.1%
1501-2500 5.2%
2500+ 19.0%
File Extensions of Attachments
Source: Symantec
File Extension Percent
.exe 31.17%
.scr 20.52%
.doc 8.12%
.pdf 6.07%
.class 5.41%
.dmp 3.12%
.dll 2.09%
.jpg 1.64%
.xls 1.43%
.pif 1.24%Top 10 Industries Attacked
Source: Symantec
Industry Percent
Services - Professional 22.2%
Public Administration 19.2%
Services - Non-Traditional 14.8%
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate 13.0%
Transportation, Communications, Electric, & Gas 9.1%
Manufacturing 8.7%
Wholesale 4.2%
Logistics 2.1%
Retail 1.0%
Mining 1.0%
The “Professional” services category includes services such as Legal, Accounting,
Health, and Education. “Non-Traditional” services include Hospitality, Recreational, and
Repair services.p. 10
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
SOCIAL MEDIAp. 11
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
Social Media
At a Glance
• 82 percent of all social
media attacks so far in
2013 have been fake
offerings. This is up from
56 percent in 2012.
• Fake Plug-ins are the
second-most common
type of social media
attacks at 7 percent, up
from fifth place in 2012,
at 5 percent.
• Fake Apps have risen
overall in 2013, now
making up 2 percent of
social media attacks. In
2012, this category was
ranked sixth.
Methodology
Fake Offering. These scams invite social network users to join a fake event or group with
incentives such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to share credentials with
the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
Fake Plug-in Scams. Users are tricked into downloading fake browser extensions on their
machines. Rogue browser extensions can pose like legitimate extensions but when installed
can steal sensitive information from the infected machine.
Likejacking. Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website buttons
that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
Fake Apps. Applications provided by attackers that appear to be legitimate apps; however,
they contain a malicious payload. The attackers often take legitimate apps, bundle malware
with them, and then re-release it as a free version of the app.
Manual Sharing Scams. These rely on victims to actually do the hard work of sharing the
scam by presenting them with intriguing videos, fake offers or messages that they share
with their friends.Top 5 Social Media Attacks, 2013
Source: Symantec
Top 5 Social Media Attacks
7%
5%
2%
2%Fake
Offering
Manual SharingLikejackingFake Plug-in
Fake Apps82%p. 12
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
DATA BREACHESp. 13
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
Data Breaches
At a Glance
• October saw the largest
single breach in a number
of years, with reports of
150 million identities
exposed in a single
breach.
• There were a number of
breaches reported during
October that occurred
earlier in the year. This
brings the total number of
breaches to 165 for so far
in 2013.
• Of the reported breaches
so far in this year, the top
three types of information
exposed are a person’s
real name, government
ID number (e.g. Social
Security), and birth date.Timeline of Data Breaches, 2013
Source: SymantecNUMBER OF INCIDENTSIDENTITIES BREACHED (MILLIONS)
INCIDENTS IDENTITIES BREACHED
0153045607590105120135150
O S A J J M A M F JAN
2013D N O81624324048
Top 5 Types of Information Exposed
Source: Symantec
48%49%
45%
39%89%Real Names
Gov ID numbers (Soc Sec)
Birth Dates
Home Address
Medical Records
Information Exposed in BreachesInformation Exposed in Breaches
% OF ALL BREACHESMethodology
This data is procured from the Norton Cybercrime Index (CCI).
The Norton CCI is a statistical model that measures the levels
of threats, including malicious software, fraud, identity theft,
spam, phishing, and social engineering daily. The data breach
section of the Norton CCI is derived from data breaches that
have been reported by legitimate media sources and have
exposed personal information.
In some cases a data breach is not publicly reported during the
same month the incident occurred, or an adjustment is made in
the number of identities reportedly exposed. In these cases, the
data in the Norton CCI is updated. This causes fluctuations in
the numbers reported for previous months when a new report is
released.
Norton Cybercrime Index
http://us.norton.com/protect-yourselfp. 14
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
MOBILEp. 15
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
Mobile
At a Glance
• So far in 2013, 37 percent
of mobile malware tracks
users, up from 15 percent
in 2012.
• Traditional threats,
such as back doors and
downloaders are present
in 22 percent of all mobile
malware threats.
• Risks that collect data,
the most common risk
in 2012, is down 11
percentage points to 21
percent of risks.
• Four new mobile malware
families were discovered
in October, along with
193 new variants.
22%
37%
7%
13%
24%
21%
Track User
Risks that spy on the individual using the
device, collecting SMS messages or phone call logs, tracking GPS coordinates, recording phone calls, or gathering pictures and video taken with the device.
Traditional Threats
Threats that carry out traditional malware functions, such as back doors and downloaders.
Adware/Annoyance
Mobile risks that display advertising or generally perform actions to disrupt the user.Send Content
These risks will send text messages to premium SMS numbers, ultimately appearing on the bill of the device’s owner. Other risks can be used to send spam messages.Change Settings
These types of risks attempt to elevate privileges or simply modify various settings within the operating system. Collect Data
This includes the collection of both device- and user-specific data, such as device information, configuration data, or banking details. Mobile Malware by Type
Source: Symantecp. 16
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
Cumulative Mobile Android Malware
Source: Symantec
VARIANTS FAMILIES
4080120160200240280320360400
O S A J J M A M F JAN
2013D N O10002000300040005000600070008000900010000FAMILIES (CUMULATIVE) VARIANTS (CUMULATIVE)
p. 17
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
VULNERABILITIESp. 18
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
Vulnerabilities
At a Glance
• There were 663 new
vulnerabilities discovered
in October, bringing
the total for the year up
to 5527, a 17 percent
increase compared to the
same period in 2012.
• There were 5
vulnerabilities discovered
in mobile operating
systems during the month
of October.
• Google’s Chrome
browser continues to
lead in reporting browser
vulnerabilities, while
Oracle’s Java leads
in reported plug-in
vulnerabilities.Total Vulnerabilities Disclosed by Month
Source: Symantec
100200300400500600700800
O S A J J M A M F JAN
2013D N O
Plug-in Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
10%20%30%40%50%60%
Adobe Acrobat Reader
Adobe Flash PlayerApple QuickTimeOracle Sun Java
Browser Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
10%20%30%40%50%60%
Apple Safari
Google ChromeMicrosoft Internet ExplorerMozilla FirefoxOpera
p. 19
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
SPAM, PHISHING, & MALWAREp. 20
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
At a Glance
• The global spam rate increased 1.3 percentage points in October
to 67.7 percent, up from 66.4 percent in September.
• Education was the most commonly targeted industry, knocking
Pharmaceuticals from the top spot this month.
• The top-level domain (TLD) for Russia, .ru, continues to top the
list of malicious TLDs in October.
• Pharmaceutical spam is the most common category, at 69.4
percent. Sex/Dating spam comes in second at 23.6 percent.Spam
Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Geography
Source: Symantec
Geography Percent
Sri Lanka 81.2%
Saudi Arabia 77.0%
Hungary 76.9%
China 72.5%
Egypt 72.4%
Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Percent
Education 68.8%
Chem/Pharm 68.6%
Non-Profit 68.3%
Marketing/Media 68.2%
Manufacturing 68.2%p. 21
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
Top 10 Sources of Spam
Source: Symantec
Source Percent of All Spam
United States 6.90%
Finland 6.87%
India 5.96%
Peru 5.47%
Italy 5.39%
Spain 5.04%
Canada 4.95%
Brazil 4.88%
Argentina 4.25%
Iran 3.45%
Spam URL Distribution Based on Top Level Domain Name*
Source: Symantec
*Month .ru .com .biz .info
Sep 37.92% 30.82% 13.83% 4.2%
*Data lags one monthAverage Spam Message Size*
Source: Symantec
*Month 0Kb – 5Kb 5Kb – 10Kb >10Kb
Sep 19.6% 20.4% 60.0%
Aug 33.1% 34.1% 32.9%
*Data lags one monthSpam by Category
Source: Symantec
Category Percent
Pharma 69.4%
Sex/Dating 23.6%
Jobs 3.9%
Watches 1.2%
Software 0.8%Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Percent
1-250 67.4%
251-500 67.9%
501-1000 67.6%
1001-1500 67.9%
1501-2500 67.6%
2501+ 67.8%p. 22
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
At a Glance
• The global phishing rate is down in October, comprising one in 1
in 1,134.9 email messages. In September this rate was one in 1 in
1,055.7.
• Financial themes continue to be the most frequent subject matter,
with 78.9 percent of phishing scams containing this theme.
• Australia has the highest rate in October, where one in 370.9
emails was a phishing scam.
• The United States tops the list of sources of phishing emails,
responsible for distributing 32.8 percent of phishing scams.
• The Public Sector was the most targeted industry in October,
with one in every 460.2 emails received in this industry being a
phishing scam.Phishing
Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Geography
Source: Symantec
Geography Rate
Australia 1 in 370.9
Monaco 1 in 486.3
South Africa 1 in 534.2
United Kingdom 1 in 726.7
Denmark 1 in 809.9Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Rate
Public Sector 1 in 460.2
Finance 1 in 631.5
Education 1 in 651.7
Marketing/Media 1 in 739.5
Accom/Catering 1 in 825.5Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Rate
1-250 1 in 763.6
251-500 1 in 1,383.8
501-1000 1 in 1,941.8
1001-1500 1 in 1,478.4
1501-2500 1 in 2,370.0
2501+ 1 in 1,114.2
Top 10 Sources of Phishing
Source: Symantec
Source Percent
United States 31.84%
Germany 18.70%
United Kingdom 16.22%
South Africa 15.23%
Australia 6.26%
Sweden 3.80%
Brazil 2.11%
Hong Kong 0.88%
Netherlands 0.77%
Canada 0.63%p. 23
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
34.8%
8.4%
2.8%
1.1%52.9%Automated Toolkits
Other Unique DomainsIP Address DomainsFree Web Hosting SitesTyposquatting
Phishing Distribution:Phishing Distribution:Phishing Distribution
Source: Symantec
15.3%
4.3%
1.2%
0.6%78.9%FinancialInformation ServicesRetailComputer SoftwareCommunications
Organizations Spoofed
in Phishing Attacks:Organizations Spoofed
in Phishing Attacks:Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks
Source: Symantecp. 24
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
Malware
1 in 50
1 in 100
1 in 150
1 in 200
1 in 250
1 in 300
1 in 350
1 in 400
1 in 450
1 in 500
O S A J J M A M F JAN
2013D N OProportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected
Source: SymantecTop 10 Email Virus Sources
Source: Symantec
Geography Percent
United Kingdom 38.18%
United States 33.31%
Australia 6.17%
India 2.39%
Netherlands 2.33%
South Africa 2.30%
Japan 1.78%
Hong Kong 1.78%
Canada 1.70%
France 1.68%At a Glance
• The global average virus rate in October was one in 436.7
emails, compared to one in 383.1 in September.
• The United Kingdom topped the list of geographies, with one
in 240.7 emails containing a virus.
• The United Kingdom was also the largest source of virus-laden
emails, making up 38.2 percent of all email-based viruses.
• Small-to-medium size businesses with 1-250 employees were
the most targeted company size, where one and 369.6 emails
contained a virus.p. 25
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Rate
Public Sector 1 in 179.4
Telecoms 1 in 186.2
Other 1 in 231.6
Transport/Util 1 in 303.9
Accom/Catering 1 in 317.9
Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Rate
1-250 1 in 369.6
251-500 1 in 447.4
501-1000 1 in 601.9
1001-1500 1 in 469.5
1501-2500 1 in 718.6
2501+ 1 in 413.8Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Geographic Location
Source: Symantec
Geography Rate
United Kingdom 1 in 240.7
United Arab Emirates 1 in 278.1
Australia 1 in 297.5
Austria 1 in 325.7
Hungary 1 in 342.8p. 26
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
At a Glance
• Variants of W32.Ramnit accounted for 13.7 percent of all malware
blocked at the endpoint.
• In comparison, 6.7 percent of all malware were variants of
W32.Sality.
• Approximately 40.5 percent of the most frequently blocked
malware last month was identified and blocked using generic
detection.Endpoint Security
Top 10 Most Frequently Blocked Malware
Source: Symantec
Malware Percent
W32.Sality.AE 5.96%
W32.Ramnit!html 5.34%
W32.Ramnit.B 4.62%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 3.80%
W32.Downadup.B 3.60%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 3.22%
Trojan.Malscript 2.22%
W32.Virut.CF 2.04%
Trojan.Zbot 1.55%
W32.SillyFDC 1.49%p. 27
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
Policy Based Filtering
Source: Symantec
Category Percent
Social Networking 51.63%
Advertisement & Popups 19.67%
Streaming Media 3.86%
Hosting Sites 3.70%
Computing & Internet 3.21%
Chat 2.67%
Peer-To-Peer 2.49%
Search 2.13%
Gambling 0.94%
News 0.87%Policy Based Filtering
At a Glance
• The most common trigger for policy-based filtering applied by
Symantec Web Security .cloud for its business clients was for the
“Social Networking” category, which accounted for 51.6 percent
of blocked Web activity in October.
• “Advertisement & Popups” was the second-most common trigger,
comprising 19.7 percent of blocked Web activity.p. 28
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2013
About Symantec
More Information
• Security Response Publications: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/publications /
• Internet Security Threat Report Resource Page: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport /
• Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response /
• Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer /
• Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex /Symantec protects the world’s information and is a global leader in security, backup, and
availability solutions. Our innovative products and services protect people and information
in any environment—from the smallest mobile device to the enterprise data center to cloud-
based systems. Our world-renowned expertise in protecting data, identities, and interactions
gives our customers confidence in a connected world. More information is available at
www.symantec.com or by connecting with Symantec at go.symantec.com/socialmedia .
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
OCTOBER 2014p. 2
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2014
CONTENTS
3 Summary
4 TARGETED ATTACKS + DATA BREACHES
5 Targeted Attacks
5 Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing
Emails
5 Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
5 Average Number of Spear-Phishing Attacks Per Day
6 Top-Ten Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
7 Data Breaches
7 Timeline of Data Breaches
8 Total Identities Exposed
8 Top Causes of Data Breaches
8 Total Data Breaches
9 Top-Ten Types of Information Breached
10 MALWARE TACTICS
11 Malware Tactics
11 Top-Ten Malware
11 Top-Ten Mac OSX Malware Blocked on OSX Endpoints
12 Ransomware Over Time
12 Malicious Activity by Source: Bots
13 Vulnerabilities
13 Number of Vulnerabilities
13 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
14 Browser Vulnerabilities
14 Plug-in Vulnerabilities15 SOCIAL MEDIA
+ MOBILE THREATS
16 Mobile
16 Mobile Malware Families by Month, Android
17 Mobile Threat Classifications
18 Social Media
18 Social Media
19 PHISHING, SPAM + EMAIL THREATS
20 Phishing and Spam
20 Phishing Rate
20 Global Spam Rate
21 Email Threats
21 Proportion of Email Traffic Containing URL Malware
21 Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected
22 About Symantec
22 More Informationp. 3
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2014
Summary
Welcome to the October edition of the
Symantec Intelligence report. Symantec
Intelligence aims to provide the latest
analysis of cyber security threats, trends,
and insights concerning malware, spam, and
other potentially harmful business risks.
Symantec has established the most
comprehensive source of Internet threat data in the world through the Symantec™
Global Intelligence Network, which is made
up of more than 41.5 million attack sensors
and records thousands of events per second.
This network monitors threat activity in
over 157 countries and territories through
a combination of Symantec products and services such as Symantec DeepSight™
Threat Management System, Symantec™
Managed Security Services, Norton™
consumer products, and other third-party
data sources. The number of spear phishing attacks per day continues to
trend downward over the last twelve months, coming in at 45
per day in October. Of the attachments used in such email-
based attacks, the .doc attachment type comprised 62.5 percent and .exe attachments made up 14.4 percent. Of the industries
attacked, the category of Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
received 28 percent of all spear phishing attempts in the month of October, followed by Manufacturing at 17 percent.
The largest data breach that was disclosed in October took place
back in July. This breach had previously been reported; however, we learned this month that the breach resulted in the exposure
of identities within 76 million households, plus information on
an additional seven million small businesses.
In the Mac threat landscape, OSX.Okaz was the most frequently
encountered OSX risk seen on OSX endpoints, making up 28.8
percent of OSX risks. OSX.Okaz is an adware program that may modify browser homepage and search settings.
Finally, Ransomware as a whole continues to decline as the year
progresses. However, the amount of crypto-style ransomware seen continues to increase. This particularly aggressive form of
ransomware made up 55 percent of all ransomware in the month
of October.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to
contact us with any comments or feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat Analyst
[email protected]. 4
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2014
TARGETED ATTACKS
+ DATA BREACHESp. 5
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2014
At a Glance
• The average number of
spear-phishing attacks dropped to 45 per day in October, down from 53 in September.
• The .doc file type was the
most common attachment
type used in spear-phishing attacks. The .exe file type came in second.
• Organizations with 2500+ employees were the most likely to be targeted in October.
• Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate lead the Top-Ten Industries targeted,
followed by Manufacturing.Targeted Attacks
Average Number of Spear-Phishing
Attacks Per Day
Source: Symantec :: NOVEMBER 2013 — OCTOBER 2014
255075100125150175200225250
O S A J J M A M F J
2014D N54 5345
20116
54141
84 84
5488165
Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing
Emails
Source: Symantec :: OCTOBER 2014
Executable type October September
.doc 62.5% 52.9%
.exe 14.4% 4.8%
.txt 11.2% 9.1%
.pdf 4.4% 1.0%
.ace 0.7% –
.jpeg 0.2% –
.htm 0.1% –
.dmp 0.1% 9.1%
.scr 0.1% 15.4%
.rtf 0.1% –Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
Source: Symantec :: OCTOBER 2014
Organization Size October September
1-250 27.1% 32.5%
251-500 6.6% 8.7%
501-1000 8.9% 8.6%
1001-1500 2.9% 3.7%
1501-2500 11.2% 3.9%
2500+ 43.3% 42.6%p. 6
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2014
Top-Ten Industries Targeted in
Spear-Phishing Attacks
Source: Symantec :: OCTOBER 2014
MiningPublic AdministrationEnergy/UtilitiesRetailWholesaleTransportation,
Communications,
Electric, Gas Services - ProfessionalServices - Non TraditionalManufacturingFinance, Insurance
& Real Estate 28%
17
14
10
9
9
4
3
2
1p. 7
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2014
Data Breaches
At a Glance
• The largest data breach disclosed in October actually took
place in July, and resulted in the exposure of at least 76 million identities.
• Hackers have been responsible for 57 percent of data breach-es in the last 12 months.
• Real names, government ID numbers, such as Social Security numbers, and home addresses were the top three types of data exposed in data breaches.
20406080100120140160
O S A J J M A M F J
2014D N
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
IDENTITIES EXPOSED (MILLIONS)
INCIDENTS IDENTITIES EXPOSED (Millions)Timeline of Data Breaches
Source: Symantec :: NOVEMBER 2013 — OCTOBER 2014
147
59
178
31.5
10
1 1.7 2.68.1130
113
23
510152025303540
222927
2527
212019
11 1121p. 8
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2014
Top Causes of Data Breaches
Source: Symantec :: NOVEMBER 2013 — OCTOBER 2014
Insider TheftTheft or Loss
of Computeror DriveAccidentally
Made PublicHackers
57%
18% 18%
7%Number
of Incidents
147
46
4618
257 TOTAL
Total Data
Breaches
NOVEMBER 2013 — OCTOBER 2014
257
Total IdentitiesExposed
NOVEMBER 2013 — OCTOBER 2014
583 Millionp. 9
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2014
Top-Ten Types of Information Breached
Source: Symantec :: NOVEMBER 2013 — OCTOBER 2014
Real Names
Gov ID numbers (Soc Sec)Home AddressBirth DatesFinancial InformationMedical RecordsPhone NumbersEmail AddressesUsernames & PasswordsInsurance01
02030405060708091069
%
44%
43%
40%
33%
28%
20%
21%
16%
8%
Methodology
This data is procured from the Norton Cybercrime Index (CCI). The Norton CCI is a statistical model
that measures the levels of threats, including malicious software, fraud, identity theft, spam,
phishing, and social engineering daily. The data breach section of the Norton CCI is derived from
data breaches that have been reported by legitimate media sources and have exposed personal information.
In some cases a data breach is not publicly reported during the same month the incident occurred,
or an adjustment is made in the number of identities reportedly exposed. In these cases, the data in the Norton CCI is updated. This causes fluctuations in the numbers reported for previous months
when a new report is released.p. 10
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2014
MALWARE TACTICSp. 11
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2014
Malware Tactics
At a Glance
• W32.Sality and W32.
Ramnit variants continue to dominate the top-ten malware list.
• The most common OSX threat seen on OSX
was OSX.Okaz, making up
28.8 percent of all OSX malware found on OSX Endpoints.
• Overall ransomware activity has remained low since March of this year. However, crypto-style ransomware continues to increase, making up 55 percent of ransomware in October.
• China and the US where first and second, respec -
tively, in October in terms of overall botnet source activity.Top-Ten Malware
Source: Symantec :: OCTOBER 2014
Rank Name October September
1 W32.Sality.AE 4.1% 4.4%
2 W32.Ramnit!html 4.0% 4.3%
3 W32.Almanahe.B!inf 3.7% 3.7%
4 W32.Ramnit.B 2.7% 2.7%
5 W32.Downadup.B 2.5% 2.3%
6 W32.Ramnit.B!inf 2.1% 2.0%
7 W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 1.4% 2.2%
8 Trojan.Zbot 1.3% 1.2%
9 W32.Virut.CF 1.3% 1.4%
10 W32.Chir.B@mm(html) 1.2% 1.4%
Top-Ten Mac OSX Malware Blocked
on OSX Endpoints
Source: Symantec :: OCTOBER 2014
Rank Malware Name October September
1 OSX.Okaz 28.8% 7.6%
2 OSX.RSPlug.A 14.0% 26.3%
3 OSX.Keylogger 9.3% 3.6%
4 OSX.Flashback.K 5.4% 8.7%
5 OSX.Klog.A 5.2% 2.9%
6 OSX.Crisis 4.8% 8.7%
7 OSX.Stealbit.B 4.7% 5.3%
8 OSX.Flashback 3.9% 4.0%
9 OSX.Netweird 3.7% 5.2%
10 OSX.Sabpab 2.3% 2.7%p. 12
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2014
Malicious Activity by Source: Bots
Source: Symantec :: SEPTEMBER 2014
Rank Country/Region Percent
1 United States 26.4%
2 China 11.9%
3 Taiwan 8.2%
4 Hungary 4.8%
5 Italy 4.2%
6 Canada 3.4%
7 Japan 3.0%
8 Brazil 2.8%
9 Poland 2.3%
10 Germany 2.2%
Ransomware Over Time
Source: Symantec :: NOVEMBER 2013 — OCTOBER 2014 THOUSANDS
2004006008001000
O S A J J M A M F J
2014D N861
660
465
342425
156 143230 183149
95 80p. 13
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2014
Number of Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: NOVEMBER 2013 — OCTOBER 2014
100200300400500600700800
O S A J J M A M F J
2014D N438575600 596
399438471542562579
473555
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: NOVEMBER 2013 — OCTOBER 2014
12345678
O S A J J M A M F J
2014D N0 0 0 02 2 2
05
014Vulnerabilities
At a Glance
• There were 596 vulner-
abilities disclosed during the month of October.
• There were two zero-day vulnerabilities discovered in October.
• Internet Explorer has reported the most brows-er vulnerabilities in the last 12 months.
• Oracle’s Java reported the most plug-in vulner-abilities over the same time period.p. 14
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2014
Browser Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: NOVEMBER 2013 — OCTOBER 2014
20406080100
O S A J J M A M F J
2014D N
Opera
Mozilla FirefoxMicrosoft Internet Explorer
Google Chrome
Apple Safari
Plug-in Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: NOVEMBER 2013 — OCTOBER 2014
1020304050607080
Java
Apple
Adobe
ActiveX
O S A J J M A M F J
2014D N
p. 15
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2014
SOCIAL MEDIA
+ MOBILE THREATSp. 16
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2014
Mobile
Mobile Malware Families by Month,
Android
Source: Symantec :: NOVEMBER 2013 — OCTOBER 2014
24
24
2 235
34 4
3
12345678910
O S A J J M A M F J
2014D N
At a Glance
• There were five Android
malware families discov-ered in July.
• Of the threats discovered in the last 12 months, 26 percent are tradi-
tional threats, such as
back door Trojans and downloaders.
• In terms of social networking scams, 38 percent were fake offer-ings, while 49 percent were manually shared scams.p. 17
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2014
Mobile Threat Classifications
Source: Symantec :: NOVEMBER 2013 — OCTOBER 2014
Track User Risks that spy on the individual using the device, collecting SMS
messages or phone call logs, tracking GPS coordinates, recording phone calls,
or gathering pictures and video taken with the device.
Steal Information This includes the collection of both device- and user-specific
data, such as device information, configuration data, or banking details.
Traditional T hreats Threats that carry out traditional malware functions,
such as back doors and downloaders.
Recon/f_igure D evice These t ypes of risks attempt to elevate privileges
or simply modify various settings within the operating system.
Adware/Anno yance Mobile risks that display advertising or generally perform
actions to disrupt the user.
Send Conte nt These risks will send text messages to premium SMS numbers,
ultimately appearing on the bill of the device’s owner. Other risks can be used to send spam messages. 51015202530%
Adware
AnnoyanceReconfigure
DeviceSend
ContentTraditional
ThreatsTrack
UserSteal
Information6%13%26%
22%
13%19%p. 18
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2014
Social Media
Social Media
Source: Symantec :: NOVEMBER 2013 — OCTOBER 2014
Fake Offers These scams invite social network users to join a fake event or group
with incentives such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to share
credentials with the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
Manual Sharing Scams These rely on victims to actually do the work of sharing
the scam by presenting them with intriguing videos, fake offers or messages that they share with their friends.
Likejacking Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website
buttons that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
Comment Jacking Similar to likejacking, this type of scam relies on users clicking
links that are added to comments by attackers. The links may lead to malware or survey scams.
Fake App Users are invited to subscribe to an application that appears to be
integrated for use with a social network, but is not as described and may be used to steal credentials or harvest other personal data.102030405060708090100%
Comment
JackingFake
AppsLikejacking Manual
SharingFake
Offering2% .6%38%49%
10%p. 19
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2014
PHISHING , SPAM + EMAIL THREATSp. 20
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2014
Phishing and Spam
Phishing Rate
Source: Symantec :: NOVEMBER 2013 — OCTOBER 2014
1 in 500
1 in 1000
1 in 1500
1 in 2000
1 in 2500
O S A J J M A M F J
2014D N20411610236
306401478370
731395496
1290
1587
At a Glance
• The phishing rate rose
in October, at one in 1,610 emails, up from one in 2,041 emails in September.
• The global spam rate
was 55.3 percent for the
month of October.
• One out of every 329 emails contained a virus.
• Of the email traffic in the month of October, 6.9 percent contained a mali-cious URL.
Global Spam Rate
Source: Symantec :: NOVEMBER 2013 — OCTOBER 2014
102030405060708090100%
O S A J J M A M F J
2014D N6971
62 6266
5961 6064 63
5855p. 21
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2014
Email Threats
Proportion of Email Traffic
Containing URL Malware
Source: Symantec :: NOVEMBER 2013 — OCTOBER 2014
102030405060708090100%
O S A J J M A M F J
2014D N67101416 14
6314
7 83
1 in 50
1 in 100
1 in 150
1 in 200
1 in 250
1 in 300
1 in 350
1 in 400
1 in 450
1 in 500
O S A J J M A M F J
2014D NProportion of Email Traffic
in Which Virus Was Detected
Source: Symantec :: NOVEMBER 2013 — OCTOBER 2014
351329129112
207188141
234183
232
351270p. 22
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: OCTOBER 2014
About Symantec
More Information
• Symantec Worldwide: http://www.symantec.com/
• ISTR and Symantec Intelligence Resources: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
• Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/
• Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer/
• Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex/Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC) is an information protection expert that helps
people, businesses and governments seeking the freedom to unlock the opportunities
technology brings – anytime, anywhere. Founded in April 1982, Symantec, a Fortune
500 company, operating one of the largest global data-intelligence networks, has
provided leading security, backup and availability solutions for where vital information
is stored, accessed and shared. The company’s more than 20,000 employees reside in more than 50 countries. Ninety-nine percent of Fortune 500 companies are Symantec
customers. In fiscal 2013, it recorded revenues of $6.9 billion. To learn more go to
www.symantec.com or connect with Symantec at: go.symantec.com/socialmedia.
|
Page 1 of 23
Symantec Intelligence
Symantec Intelligence Report: September 2011
Social Engineering Attacks Soar as Polymorphic Malware Rate Peaks at 72% of Email Malware in September; Cyber
Criminals Ambush Popular Blogging Platform to Push Pills
Welcome to the September edition of the Symantec Inte lligence report which, combining the best research and
analysis from the Symantec.cloud MessageLabs Intelligence Report and the Symantec State of Spam & Phishing
Report, provides the latest analysis of cyber security threat s, trends and insights from the Symantec Intelligence team
concerning malware, spam, and other potentially harmful busin ess risks. The data used to compile the analysis for
this combined report includes data from August and September 2011.
Report highlights
Spam – 74.8 percent in September (a decrease of 1.1 percentage points since August 2011): page 11
Phishing – One in 447.9 emails identified as phishing (a decrease of 0.26 percentage points since August 2011): page 14
Malware – One in 188.7 emails in September contained malwar e (an increase of 0.04 percentage points since August 2011):
page 16
Malicious Web sites – 3,474 Web sites blocked per day (an increase of 1.0 percent since August 2011): page 17
44.6 percent of all malicious domains blocked were new in September (an increase of 10.0 percentage points since August
2011): page 17
14.5 percent of all Web-based malware blocked was new in S eptember (a decrease of 2.9 per centage points since August
2011): page 17
Malicious emails masquerade as office printer messages: page 2
Spammers exploit WordPress vulnerability to promote pharmaceutical spam Web sites: page 2
Fake Offers with Fake Trust Seals: page 8
Spammers and malware authors making increasing use of obfuscated JavaScript: page 8
Best Practices for Enterprises and Users: page 20
Introduction
A deluge of malicious email-borne malware has left a clear mark on the threat landscape for September.
Approximately 72% of all email-borne malware in September could be characterized as aggressive strains of generic
polymorphic malware, first identified in the July1 Symantec Intelligence Report. In July, this rate was 23.7%, falling
slightly to 18.5% in August before soaring to 72% in Sept ember. This unprecedented high-water mark underlines the
nature by which cyber criminals have es calated their assault on businesses in 2 011, fully exploiting the weaknesses of
more traditional security countermeasures.
The social engineering behind many of these attacks has al so accelerated, with the adoption of a variety of new
techniques such as pretending to be an email from a smart printer/scanner being forwarded by a colleague in the
same organization. Many of these attacks continue to im personate a variety of well-known, international parcel
delivery services. The idea of an office printer sending ma lware is perhaps an unlikely one, as printers and scanners
were not actually used in these attacks, but perhaps this sense of security is a ll that is required for such a socially
engineered attack to succeed in the future.
Moreover, although spam levels remained fairly stable durin g September, spammers have identified vulnerabilities in
certain older versions of the popular WordPress blogging software used on a large number of Web sites across the
Internet. The exploitation of these vulnerabilities to serve t he spammers’ interests functions as a stark reminder for the
1 http://www.symanteccloud.com/mlirepor t/symcint_2011_07_july_final-en.pdf Page 2 of 23
need to ensure software is up-to-date with latest patches an d releases. It is important to note that blogs hosted by
WordPress.com seem to be unaffected by these compromises.
Finally, we also take an in-depth look at why JavaScript has become an enduring favorite in the arsenal of cyber
criminals and spammers alike, and how it is being used on the front lines in the continuing war between the good and
the bad guys.
I hope you enjoy reading this month’s edition of the report, and please feel free to contact me directly with any
comments or feedback.
Paul Wood, Senior Intelligence Analyst
[email protected]
@paulowoody
Report analysis
Malicious emails masquerade as office printer messages
Some of the newest printers have scan-to-email ability, a f eature that allows users to email scanned documents to a
specified email address on demand. Symantec Intelligence has identified malware authors using social engineering
tactics that take advantage of this, sending executables in a compressed “.zip” archive via email. The attachment
contains an executable disguised as a scanned document from a printer, as shown in the example in figure 1, below.
Figure 1: Example of malicious email masquerading as a scanned document sent from an office printer
In each case the sender domain was spoofed to matc h the recipient domain, sometimes appearing as though
forwarded to the recipient by a colleague at the same orga nization, implying that this email originated internally.
To be clear, office printers and scanners will not send ma lware-laden files, and many are unlikely to be able to send
scanned documents as “.zip” file attachments. No printe r or scanner hardware was involved in the distribution
process, and in general, users should always be care ful when opening email attachments, especially from an
unknown sender.
Some examples are shown in figure 2, below.
Page 3 of 23
Figure 2: Examples of malicious emails spoofing smart office printer/scanners
In figure 3, Symantec Intelligence gathered some interestin g statistics from observing these emails during a 24-hour
period beginning 13 September 2011.
Subjects FrequencyUnique
Attachments
Scan from a [printer name A] #{6-8 random digits} 742 1,393
Scan from a [printer name B] #{6-8 random digits} 41 779
Figure 3: Table showing the frequency and number of different attachments spoofing a printer
In these examples, the attacker has also changed the file ex tension of the archived file in such a way as to display a
“.doc” extension when viewed using certain archiv ing tools, as shown in figure 4, below.
Page 4 of 23
Figure 4: Example of “.zip” archive incorrectly displaying contents with “.doc” extension
The actual file name stored in the “.zip” archive is compris ed of a “cod.exe” extension, but this is incorrectly displayed
by some archiving tools because of a special hidden charac ter (hex code 0xAB, highlighted below), which precedes
the “cod.exe” part of the file name. This will result in the file being incorrectly displayed with “exe.doc” appended in the
archive viewer.
In addition to the above examples, we have also seen the fo llowing example, which was the same strain of malware
distributed using a number of different subjects and two different filenames; in one case a supposed document and
another as a photograph, shown in figure 5, below.
File Name Frequency
Document_NR727875272_Coll=d4=c7=abcod.exe 410
photo_W71765413082011_Coll=d4=c7=abgpj.exe 149
Figure 5: Table showing the frequency of another example
As before, the file name ending with “cod. exe” will be incorrectly displayed using some “.zip” archive viewing tools as
“exe.doc” and similarly, “gpj.e xe” will display as “exe.jpg.”
In figure 6, below are some examples of other interesting subj ect lines that were also used to distribute this particular
malware run during the same 24-hou r period, beginning 13 September.
Page 5 of 23
Figure 6: Examples of other social engineerin g subjects used to spread the same malware
Some Other Interesting Subjects Frequency
Pornographic mail 85
Company Contract doc 40
Tax debt notification 34
Revenue ( IRS ) Department 25
Printer Scanned doc 21
domain suspension mail 9
pornographic picture 3
Figure 7: 24-hour snapshot showing variety of s ubject frequencies in use to distribute malware
It is evident from the variety shown in these examples that the attackers are trying a wide number of different possible
social engineering strategies in order to trick t he recipient into opening the malicious attachment.
This article was contributed by Bhaska r Krishnappa, Malware Analyst, Symantec
Page 6 of 23
Spammers exploit WordPress vulnerability to promote pharmaceutical spam Web sites
In the Symantec Intelligence blog we've covered how spam mers like to conceal their actual spam sites through
elaborate chains of redirects, often involving hacked or compromised sites, URL shortening sites, obfuscation
techniques, or combinations of all of these.
We've recently seen spammers exploiting a vulnerability in WordPress, the popular open-source blogging software
running on thousands of servers worldwide. Spammers are using the WordPress platform to compromise a Web
server, placing a file deep within the WordPress directory st ructure, presumably in an attempt to avoid (or at least
delay) detection. The buried file is a simple HTML page, usually containing text like "Page loading" which is briefly
shown before a HTTP “meta refresh” is used to redirect users to the spammer's "Canadian Health&Care Mall" Web
site, as shown in figure 8:
<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0; url=http://[new address to redirect]" />
Note that blogs hosted by Word Press.com seem to be unaffected by these vuln erabilities, it is only older versions of
the software downloaded from WordPress.org that appear vuln erable. Symantec Intelligence has not yet been able to
identify the specific versions affected , but will continue to update this inform ation via the Symantec Intelligence blog2.
Spam emails containing links to these compromised Web sites are also being spammed out.
Figure 8: Pharmacy Web site linked from spam email via a compromised blog
In some cases, the file placed on comp romised servers is named as the firs t few characters of the compromised
domain name, with a ".html" extension. In the above exampl e, the compromised domain name started with "mattjo",
and the file placed on the server is called "mattj.html".
2 http://www.symantec.com/connect/sym antec-blogs/symantec-intelligence
Page 7 of 23
Later compromises used a randomly generated file name inst ead. Over a 48-hour period, we saw several thousand
unique domains being compromised in this way. It is likely t hat the only common factor is that these domains were all
using a vulnerable version of the blogging platform. A carefu lly crafted search engine query is perhaps all that is
needed by the attackers as a prelude to compromising these Web sites.
This serves as a good reminder of the need to keep all softw are up-to-date with latest patches and releases. Recent
versions of WordPress (2.7 and higher) can be updated semi -automatically as described in this WordPress support
article3.
This article was contributed by Nicholas Johnston, Senior Engineer, Symantec
Fake Offers with Fake Trust Seals
Phishers are constantly looking for new ideas in their effo rts of tricking end users. Symantec Intelligence identified a
phishing site that utilized a number of new tricks. The phish ing site masqueraded as a well-known software company
and claimed to offer associated software products at discounted rates. The phishing page highlighted these fake offers
as “summer offerings” and stated that customers could save 80% on their purchases. Us ers were prompted to enter
their billing information, personal information, and cred it card details to complete their purchases.
The personal information that was requested consisted of the user’s email address and phone number, as shown in
figure 9. The credit card details that were asked for were the card number, CVV code, and card expiration date. If any
users had fallen victim to the phishing site, the phishers w ould have successfully stolen their confidential information
for financial gain.
3 http://codex.wordpress.org/Updati ng_WordPress#Au tomatic_Update
Page 8 of 23
Figure 9: Phishing Web site
Although these fake offers were used as the bait, it wasn’t the only trick being offered up by the phishing site. There
were further tactics employed in the hope of luring a great er number of end users. The phishing site was hosted on a
newly registered domain name, and this new domain name wa s indexed in several popular search engines and had a
very high page ranking. Phishers achieved the boosted page ranking by using common search keywords for the
products within the domain name. For example, the domain would look like “common-sear ch-keywords.com”. Thus, if
a user searched with these keywords in a search engine, they could end up with the phishing site as a high-ranked
result.
The phishers’ ploys didn’t end there. The phishing page al so contained fake trust seals at the bottom of the page. A
legitimate trust seal is a seal provided to Web pages by a third party, typically a software security company, to certify
that the Web site in question is genuine. Clicking on a trust seal will pop up a window provided by the third party,
which contains details of the site name and the encryption data used to secure the site.
How did phishers overcome this security measure? They used fake trust seals that spoofed two major companies,
which when clicked, popped up a window that referenced a fake site. The URL of the fake site utilized sub-domain
randomization. Below is the format of the URL:
http://www.[ software security company ].com.[ fake domain ].com
With a quick glance at the URL, it would seem that the trus t seal is linked to an appropriate third party, but it’s not. If
we read the complete URL for the pop-up window, we can see t hat it’s a fake site. The best practice for identifying a
legitimate trust seal is to click on the seal and read the complete URL of the pop-up window. The pop-up window
should have a padlock icon, ‘https’, or a green address bar.
This article originally appeared as a blog4 post by Mathew Maniyara, on 5 September 2011
Spammers and malware authors making increasing use of obfuscated JavaScript
JavaScript is a rich and dynamic programming language, becoming increasingly popular for developing richer, more
interactive web applications, which more closely mirror thei r desktop counterparts in func tionality and responsiveness.
However, it's not just Web developer s who are increasingly using JavaScript. Spammers and malware authors are
increasingly using obfuscated JavaScript to conceal where t hey are redirecting users, and in some cases, also to
conceal entire Web pages.
For spammers, hosting simple JavaScript obfuscation pages on free hosting sites can increase the lifetime of that site
before the site operator realizes the page is being used as pa rt of malicious activity. JavaScript is popularly used for
redirecting visitors of a compromised Web site to the spammers landing page.
4 http://www.symantec.com/connect/bl ogs/fake-offers-fake-trust-seals
Page 9 of 23
While some of these techniques have been common in malware distribution for some time, spammers are also
increasingly using them.
Simple redirecting
JavaScript, through the Web browser and document interfac e DOM (Document Object Model) makes it possible to
redirect a user from one site to another. This has lo ng been a favored technique of spam and malware authors,
creating ever longer and more complex "chains" of redirects (i.e . one redirect redirecting to another redirect and so on,
before ultimately leading to the destination site).
Obfuscating techniques allow the destination URL or Web si te address to be concealed to such an extent that when
the Web page's HTML source is viewed, the URL is not visible.
A very simple technique is to replace some characters of the destination address with escaped characters. This
notation is usually used for representing special characters , or including quotation marks inside a quoted string. For
example:
location.href=unescape('%68%74%74%70%3a%2f')+'\u002f\u0077\u0077'+'w.smswi'+'fe.c'+'\u006f\u006d'+''
This snippet of code combines URI-style escaping, where each character is represented as a percent symbol (%)
followed by its hex representation, and JavaScript string escaping ( \u followed by the Unicode codepoint value of a
character). When executed, this code will redirect the browser to http://www.smswife.com .
This is a simple technique, but probably enough to bypas s many naïve checks in some more basic security
countermeasures.
Another similar technique doesn't direct ly redirect the user; instead, Java Script code updates the document, adding
text to it, for example:
document.write(unescape("%3c%68%74%6d%6c%3e%3c%...."))
This particular code promotes a get-rich-quick site, which it then loads within a HTML frame:
<html><head><title>CityVille Secrets - Get Your Exclusive Secrets Guide Today!</title></head><frameset
border="0" framespacing="0" frameborder="0" rows="100%,*"><frame name="mainone" marginwidth="0"
marginheight="0" src="http://ca748bqp27uuhz67qf1tpaz19f.hop.clickbank.net/"></frameset></html>
Making use of the Eval function call
JavaScript is a dynamic language and contains an "eval()" f unction. This allows JavaScript code to be evaluated (i.e.
executed or run) during runtime. This is a powerful f eature but can also be abused. Spammers and malware authors
often build up huge strings of JavaScript code, usually by it erating through vast strings or arrays containing characters
encoded in a primitive way. These huge strings are th en evaluated, making it harder to analyze the code.
Here's an example of this technique:
sblrvyn="" + "h" + "t" + "t" + "p" + ":" + "/" + "/" + "v" + "i" + "p" + "-" + "m" + "e" + "d" + "s" + "2" +
"4" + "." + "c" + "o" + "m" + "/";
document.write('<script>xlkfgizslh="p" + "a" + "r" + "e" + "n" + "t" + "." + "l" + "o" + "c" + "a" + "t" +
"i" + "o" + "n" + "." + "href=" + "sblrvyn"; eval(xlkfgizslh);<\/scr');
document.write('ipt>');
The "sblrvyn" variable gets the text string of "http://vip- meds24.com/" assigned to it. The code then writes more
JavaScript to the page. This JavaScript assigns " parent.location.href=sblrvyn " to a variable called "xlkfgizslh". Note
that "sblrvyn" contains the URL to redirect to. Page 10 of 23
Finally, the JavaScript evaluates the co ntents of the "xlkfgizslh" variable, causing the Web browser's JavaScript
engine to run the code and redirect the user to the desired Web site.
Advanced obfuscation
In some cases, JavaScript is used to obfuscate an entire web page, rather than just conceal or hide a redirect. This is
more common for malware, where malware authors want to conceal the many exploits hosted on such obfuscated
pages.
A common technique is to store the entire page's obfuscated content in a single HTML "div" element. This "div"
element is often hidden using CSS (Cascading Style Sheets), so a user viewing the web page won't see a long list of
seemingly random characters. For example, a Web page might contain this HTML:
<div id="ReferenceError"><div style="display:none;">504c364c602c413
... ]</div></div>
Note: We haven't included all the obfuscated data here, as it's around 89,000 bytes long.
The obfuscation works by representing each character in the actual page as a number. These numbers are separated
or delimited by the letter "c" - so 504, 364, 602 and 413 repres ents the first few characters in this example. Note that
the "div" element finishes with a “]”.
The code to de-obfuscate this replaces all occurrences of the letter "c" inside the "div" with a comma, and add a “[” to
the beginning. The string now resembles “[504, 364, 602, 413]”, which is evalua ted as a JavaScript array using the
“eval()” function as described earlier. Each element of the array (i.e. each number in the list) is then being divided by
the number “7” and the result used as an index into a look- up table. This look-up table returns the actual desired
character, which is then appended to a string, building up yet more JavaScript code to evaluate.
In this case, the code writes more JavaScript to the page, which attempts many exploits including exploits for Java,
PDFs (with different exploits tailored to different versions of PDF viewi ng software), Flash and other software.
JavaScript's rich and dynamic nature combined with the DO M interface to Web browsers (and Web pages) allows
spammers and malware authors lots of potential for obfuscat ion and thus concealing the r eal nature of the Web page.
This article was contributed by Nicholas Johnston, Senior Engineer, Symantec
Page 11 of 23
Global Trends & Content Analysis
Spam, phishing and malware data is captured through a variety of sources, including the Symantec Global Intelligence
Network, the Symantec Probe Network (a system of more than 5 million decoy accounts), Symantec.cloud and a
number of other Symantec security te chnologies. Skeptic™, the Symantec.clo ud proprietary heuristic technology is
also able to detect new and sophisticated targeted threats.
Data is collected from over 8 billion email messages and over 1 billion Web requests which are processed per day
across 15 data centers, including malicious code data which is collected from over 130 million systems in 86 countries
worldwide. Symantec Intelligence also gathers phishi ng information through an extensive antifraud community of
enterprises, security vendors, and more than 50 million consumers.
These resources give the Symantec Intelligence analysts unp aralleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze
and provide informed commentary on emerging trends in atta cks, malicious code activity , phishing, and spam. If there
is a malicious attack about to hit, we know about it firs t. We block it; we keep it from affecting our customers.
Spam Analysis
In September 2011, the global ratio of spam in email traffi c declined to 74.8 percent (1 in 1.34 emails), a decrease of
1.1 percentage points when compared with August 2011.
As the global spam level remained relatively unchang ed in September 2011, Saudi Arabia remained the most
spammed geography; with a spam rate of 84.0 percent and Russia became the second most-spammed. The largest
increase in spam in China was attribut ed to the IT Services sector (89.3 percent of email blocked as spam).
In the US, 74.5 percent of email was s pam and 74.1 percent in Canada. The spam level in the UK was 75.5 percent.
In The Netherlands, spam accounted for 76.4 percent of email traffic, 75.5 percent in Germany, 75.2 percent in
Denmark and 73.3 percent in Australia. In Hong Kong, 73.9 percent of email wa s blocked as spam and 72.6 percent in
Singapore, compared with 71.6 percent in Japan. Spam accounted for 74.3 percent of email traffic in South Africa and
77.1 percent in Brazil. 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010Saudi Arabia
Russian FederationMalaysia
Luxembourg
Italy84.0%
79.9%79.8%
79.1%
78.6%Automotive
Education
Marketing/Media
Non-Profit
Manufacturing77.8%
77.2%
76.4%
76.4%
76.2%1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+74.5%
74.8%
74.9%
75.8%
75.3%
74.8%Spam Rate
September 201174.8%
75.9%
75.0%Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2011
United States 47.5%
India 9.6%
United Kingdom 8.1%
Brazil 7.6%Russian Federa
on 6.7%
China 5.4%
Germany 4.3%Viet Nam 3.8%
Japan 3.8%
Canada 3.0%Spam Sources
1
25
43Page 12 of 23
In September, the Automotive industry se ctor remained as the most spammed industry sector, with a spam rate of
77.8 percent. The spam level for the Education sector was 77.2 percent and 74.6 per cent for the Chemical &
Pharmaceutical sector, 74.4 percent for IT Services, 74.3 percent for Retail, 74. 5 percent for Public Sector and 74.3
percent for Finance.
Global Spam Categories
The most common category of spam in September was ph armaceutical related, but the second most common was
related to adult/dating spam. Examples of many of these subjects can be found in the subject line analysis, below.
Category Name September
2011 August
2011
Pharmaceutical 52.5% 40.0%
Casino/Gambling 16.0% 7.0%
Unsolicited Newsletters 14.5% 11.5%
Watches/Jewelry 7.5% 17.5%
Unknown/Other 4.0% 2.5%
Adult/Sex/Dating 3.5% 19.0%
Weight Loss 1.5% <0.5%
Jobs/Recruitments 1.0% 1.0%
Software 0.5% 0.5%
Scams/Fraud/419 <0.5% 0.5%
Degrees/Diplomas <0.5% 1.5%
Spam Subject Line Analysis
In the latest analysis, adult-related dating spam account ed for fewer of the most common spam subject lines in
September, with the most frequent being associated with a surge in generic polymorphic malware, spoofing the
identity of an international delivery serv ice. Pharmaceutical related subjects are also becoming increasingly more
common.
Rank September 2011
Total Spam: Top Subject Lines No. of
Days August 2011
Total Spam: Top Subject Lines No. of
Days
1 UPS notification 6 (blank subject line) 31
2 Uniform traffic ticket 4 ED-Meds-Antidepressants-And-Pain Relief-Meds-
8O%-OFF 31
3 You have notifications pending 22 Buy Advanced Penis Enlargement Pill now, it is
selling fast. 31
4 SALE OFF: Pharmacy store! 2 Made of the most potent cl inically proven natural
herbs. 31
5 (blank subject line) 31 Permanently increases length and width of your
erection. Advanced Penis Enlargement Pill. 31
6 Re: Windows 7, Office 2010, Adobe CS5 … 12 Advanced Penis Enlargement Pill. Permanently
increases length and width of your erection. 31
7 Sarah Sent You A Message 11 my hot pics :) 23
8 Ed-Meds-Antidepressants-And-Pain Relief-
Meds-8O%-OFF 25 found you :) 23
9 Fw: Fw: Fw: Fw: Windows 7, Office 2010,
Adobe CS5 … 9 new pics for you.. 24
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Page 13 of 23
Spam URL TLD Distribution
The proportion of spam exploiting URLs in the .info top-le vel domain fell by 7.9 percentage points in September, with
the largest increase relating to spam URLs in the .com TLD.
TLD September August Change
(% points)
.com 59.5% 57.6% +1.9
.info 10.5% 18.4% -7.9
.ru 8.1% 7.1% +1.0
.net 5.8% 5.8% 0
Average Spam Message Size
In September, almost half of all spam was 5Kb in size or less, however, spam with a larger file size, including
attachments increased by 11.2 percentage points compared with August. This was a result of a rise in the number of
generic polymorphic malware variants in circulation during September.
Message Size September August Change
(% points)
0Kb – 5Kb 48.1% 49.7% -1.6
5Kb – 10Kb 25.6% 35.2% -9.6
>10Kb 26.2% 15.0% +11.2
Spam Attack Vectors
It can be seen in the chart below that from the end of August, a series of major spikes in attachment spam occurred
approximately every two days. These attachments were c onnected to a rise in volume of generic polymorphic
malware variants, as discussed at the beginning of this repo rt. Furthermore, these attacks did not result in a surge in
NDR spam (spam related non-delivery reports), which would be expected follo wing a widespread dictionary attack,
suggesting the attackers may be using valid email distribution lists to conduct these attacks. It may also be that they
are perhaps doing a better job of maintaining their distribut ion lists in order to minimize bounce-backs, since IP
addresses are more likely to appear on block-lists if t hey generate a high volume of invalid recipient emails.
0%7%14%21%28%35%
10 Aug 13 Aug 16 Aug 19 Aug 22 Aug 25 Aug 28 Aug 31 Aug 3 Sep 6 Sep 9 SepAt achment
NDRPage 14 of 23
Phishing Analysis
In September, phishing email activity diminished by 0. 26 percentage points since August 2011; one in 447.9 emails
(0.223 percent) comprised some form of phishing attack.
Phishing attacks in South Africa increased once more position the country as the most targeted geography for
phishing in September, with one in 133.1 emails identified as phishing. The UK remained the second most targeted
country, with one in 221.1 emails identified as phishing attacks.
Phishing levels for the US were one in 985.9 and one in 317.6 for Canada. In Germany phishing levels were one in
1,125, one in 1,071 in Denmark and one in 377.2 in The Netherl ands. In Australia, phishing activity accounted for one
in 740.0 emails and one in 1,882 in Hong Kong; for Japan it was one in 12,812 and one in 1,958 for Singapore. In
Brazil one in 439.0 emails was blocked as phishing.
The Public Sector remained the most targeted by phishing ac tivity in September, with one in 125.8 emails comprising
a phishing attack. Phishing levels for the Chemical & Pharmaceutical sector reached one in 797.3 and one in 754.6
for the IT Services sector, one in 664.5 for Retail, one in 156.9 for Education and one in 388.6 for Finance.
Analysis of Phishing Web sites
The number of phishing Web sites decr eased by 12.2 percent in September. The number of phishing Web sites
created by automated toolkits decreas ed by approximately 38.6 percent. The number of unique phishing URLs also
decreased by 2.6 percent and phishing Web sites using IP addresses in place of domain names (for example,
http://255.255.255.255), decreased by 16.9 percent. The use of legitimate Web services for hosting phishing Web
sites accounted for approximately 6 percent of all phishing Web sites, a decrease of 32.7 percent from the previous
month. The number of non-English phishing sites saw a decrease of 14.1 percent.
The most common non-English languages identified in phi shing Web sites during September included Portuguese,
French, Italian and Spanish. 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010South Africa
United Kingdom
Canada
Norway
Netherlands1i n1 3 3 . 1
1i n2 2 1 . 1
1 in 317.6
1i n3 4 3 . 1
1 in 377.2Public Sector
Education
Non-Profit
Accom/Catering
Marketing/Media1i n1 2 5 . 8
1i n1 5 6 . 9
1i n3 0 5 . 0
1i n3 2 7 . 3
1 in 388.41-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+1 in 341.1
1i n4 8 0 . 9
1 in 509.6
1i n5 6 9 . 1
1i n6 9 2 . 7
1i n4 5 7 . 0Phishing Rate
September 20111i n4 4 7 . 9
1 in 207.7
1 in 305.7Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
20111i n4 4 7 . 9
Phish Sources
35
42 1United States 27.7%
Austria 26.4%
United Kingdom 18.4%
India 6.8%Sweden 3.8%Netherlands 3.4%New Zealand 3.1%Australia 2.5%
Hong Kong 1.8%
Germany 1.1%Page 15 of 23
Geographic Location of Phishing Web Sites
Tactics of Phishing Distribution
Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks, by Industry Sector
September 2011 Phishing Web Sites Locations
154 32Country September August
United States 50.4% 49.8%
Germany 6.2% 6.5%
United Kingdom 3.8% 3.8%
Canada 3.1% 3.7%
Russia 3.0% 3.0%
China 2.7% 2.5%
France 2.6% 2.7%
Brazil 2.5% 2.6%
Netherlands 2.3% 2.3%
Spain 1.5% <0.5%Page 16 of 23
Malware Analysis
Email-borne Threats
The global ratio of email-borne viruses in email traffic was one in 188.7 emails (0.53 percent) in September, an
increase of 0.04 percentag e points since August 2011.
In September, 16.5 percent of email-bo rne malware contained links to malicious Web sites, a decrease of 20.5
percentage points since August 2011. Em ails that contained generic polymorp hic malware variants accounted for 72.0
percent of all email-borne malware in September, compared with 18.5 percent in August; many included attached ZIP
files that contained the generic malware.
Email-borne malware attacks in Hungary climbed to one in 111. 2 emails, positioning the country at the top of the table
with the highest ratio of malicious emails in September. Switzerland was the second most geography under fire in
September, with one in 128.2 emails was identified as malicious in September.
In the UK one in 129.9 emails was blocked as malicious, and virus levels for email-borne malware reached one in
224.8 in the US and one in 164.8 in Canada. In Germany virus activity reached one in 197.9, one in 488.8 in
Denmark and in The Netherlands one in 174.9. In Austra lia, one in 341.5 emails were malicious and one in 215.6 in
Hong Kong; for Japan it was one in 658.3, compared with one in 307.2 in Singapore. In Brazil, one in 363.5 emails in
contained malicious content.
With one in 61.5 emails being blocked as malicious, the Public Sector remained the most targeted industry in
September. Virus levels for the Chemical & Pharmaceutic al sector were one in 104.5 and one in 192.2 for the IT
Services sector; one in 276.1 for Retail, one in 80.1 for Education and one in 240.9 for Finance.
14
5322005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010Hungary
Switzerland
United Kingdom
Luxembourg
South Africa1i n1 1 1 . 2
1i n1 2 8 . 2
1i n1 2 9 . 9
1i n1 4 0 . 8
1 in 153.7Public Sector
Education
Chem/Pharm
Estate Agents
Accom/Catering1i n6 1 . 5
1i n8 0 . 1
1 in 104.5
1i n1 3 8 . 5
1 in 155.51-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+1i n2 0 8 . 2
1i n1 9 5 . 1
1 in 197.2
1 in 203.8
1i n1 9 8 . 2
1 in 177.2Virus Rate
September 20111i n1 8 8 . 7
1 in 203.3
1 in 227.4Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
20111i n1 8 8 . 7
United Kingdom 42.1%
United States 17.8%Netherlands 16.3%Sweden 4.7%France 4.2%Hong Kong 4.2%Australia 2.3%India 2.3%Japan 0.8%Germany 0.8%Virus SourcesPage 17 of 23
The table below shows the most frequently blocked ema il-borne malware for September, many of which take
advantage of malicious attachments. Overall, 72.0 percent of email-borne malware was associated with variants of
generic polymorphic malware, including Br edolab, Sasfis, SpyEye and Zeus variants.
Malware Name % Malware
Gen:Trojan.Heur.FU.bqW@amtJU@oi 5.1%
Gen:Trojan.Heur.BDT.bqW@b8J!Mvci 4.2%
Gen:Trojan.Heur.BDT.bqW@bS6mfcai 4.1%
Exploit/Link-generic-ee68 3.8%
Gen:Trojan.Heur.FU.bqW@a8Y5GDei 3.6%
Gen:Trojan.Heur.BDT.bqW@bC6h06ii 3.4%
Trojan.Zbot 3.1%
Gen:Trojan.Heur.FU.bqW@aiZha1gi 3.0%
Gen:Trojan.Heur.FU.bqW@a4wN11gi 2.9%
Gen:Trojan.Heur.FU.bqW@a0jG0qpi 2.8%
Web-based Malware Threats
In September, Symantec Intelligence identified an average of 3,473 Web sites each day harboring malware and other
potentially unwanted programs including spyware and adware; an increase of 1.0 percent since August 2011. This
reflects the rate at which Web sites are being compromis ed or created for the purpose of spreading malicious content.
Often this number is higher when Web-based malware is in circulation for a longer period of time to widen its potential
spread and increase its longevity.
As detection for Web-based malware increases, the number of new Web sites blocked decreases and the proportion
of new malware begins to rise, but initially on fewer Web si tes. Further analysis reveals that 44.6 percent of all
malicious domains blocked were new in September; an increase of 10.0 percentage points compared with August
2011. Additionally, 14.5 percent of all Web-based malwar e blocked was new in September; a decrease of 2.9
percentage points since the previous month.
The chart above shows the increase in the number of new spyware and adware Web sites blocked each day on
average during September compared with the equivalent number of Web-based malware Web sites blocked each
day.
Web Policy Risks from Inappropriate Use
The most common trigger for policy-based filtering applied by Symantec Web Security.cloud for its business clients
was for the “Advertisements & Popups” category, which ac counted for 41.0 percent of blocked Web activity in
September. Web-based advertisements pose a potential ri sk though the use of “malve rtisements,” or malicious
advertisements. These may occur as the result of a l egitimate online ad-provider being compromised and a banner ad
being used to serve malware on an otherwise harmless Web site.
The second most frequently blocked traffic was categorized as Social Networking, account ing for 17.7 percent of URL-
based filtering activity blocked, equiva lent to approximately one in every six We b sites blocked. Many organizations
allow access to social networking Web si tes, but facilitate access logging so that usage patte rns can be tracked and in New Malware Sites per Day
New sites with spyware
New sites with web virusesTotal 70/day
3,404/day
3,474/dayWeb Security Services Activity:
2008 2009 2010 2011Page 18 of 23
some cases implement policies to only permit access at cert ain times of the day and block access at all other times.
This information is often used to address performance managem ent issues, perhaps in the event of lost productivity
due to social networking abuse.
Activity related to Streaming Media policies resulted in 8.8 percent of URL-based filter ing blocks in September.
Streaming media is increasingly popular when there are major sporting events or high profile international news
stories. This activity often results in an increased number of blocks, as businesses seek to preserve valuable
bandwidth for other purposes. This rate is equivalent to one in every 11 Web sites blocked.
Endpoint Security Threats
The endpoint is often the last line of defense and analysis ; however, the endpoint can often be the first-line of defense
against attacks that spread using USB storage devices and insecure network connections. The threats found here can
shed light on the wider nature of threats confronting busi nesses, especially from blended attacks and threats facing
mobile workers. Attacks reaching the endpoint are likely to have already circumvented other layers of protection that
may already be deployed, such as gateway filtering.
The table below shows the malware most frequently blocke d targeting endpoint devices for the last month. This
includes data from endpoint devices protected by Symantec technology around the world, including data from clients
which may not be using other layers of protection, such as Symantec Web Security.cloud or Symantec Email
AntiVirus.cloud.
Malware Name5 % Malware
W32.Sality.AE 7.8%
W32.Ramnit!html 7.1%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 6.2%
Trojan.Bamital 6.1%
W32.Downadup.B 3.9%
W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 3.1%
Trojan.ADH.2 2.8%
Trojan.ADH 2.5%
W32.Virut.CF 2.4%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 2.2%
The most frequently blocked malware for the last month was W32.Sality.AE6, a virus that spreads by infecting
executable files and attempts to download potentially malicious files from the Internet. For the first time since the end
of 2010, Sality overtook Ramnit to become the most prev alent malware blocked at the endpoint. For much of 2010,
W32.Sality.AE had been the most prevalent malicious threat blocked at the endpoint.
5For further information on these threats, please visit: http ://www.symantec.com/business/securi ty_response/landing/threats.jsp
6 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/sality-whitepaper Web Security Services Activity:
Policy-Based Filtering Web Viruses and Trojans
VBS/Generic
Trojan:GIF/GIFrame.gen!A
Trojan.Gen
W32.DownadupW32.Downadup.B
Gen:Variant.Kazy.34674
Trojan.Gen.2
Bloodhound.Flash.7New Unclassified Trojan
Gen:Variant.Kazy.32829Potentially Unwanted Programs
PUP:9231PUP:W32/CnsMin.S
PUP:Generic.62006
PUP:Generic.188886PUP:Generic.183433
PUP:WinPump.A
PUP:Generic.188088PUP:KeyloggerPUP:Heur.xq1@RihoWSii
PUP:Generic.183172
September 201142.3%
24.4%
2.8%
2.6%2.4%
2.2%
1.9%1.7%1.2%
1.0%37.9%
19.6%
8.6%
5.3%3.4%
2.8%
2.7%1.9%1.9%
1.8%Advertisement & Popups 41.0%
Social Networking 17.7%
Streaming Media 8.8%
Chat 4.7%
Computing & Internet 3.9%
Peer-To-Peer 2.4%
Gambling 1.9%
Games 1.8%Hosting Sites 1.7%
Search 1.6%
News 1.6%Page 19 of 23
W32.Ramnit!html is a generic detection for .HTML files infected by W32.Ramnit7, a worm that spreads through
removable drives and by infecting executable files. Variant s of the Ramnit worm accounted for 13.5 percent of all
malicious software blocked by endpoint protection technology in September.
Many new viruses and Trojans are based on earlier versions, where code has been copied or altered to create a new
strain, or variant. Often these variants are created using toolkits and hundreds of thousands of variants can be created
from the same piece of malware. This has become a popular tactic to evade signature-based detection, as each
variant would traditionally need its own signatur e to be correctly identified and blocked.
By deploying techniques, such as heuristic analysis and gener ic detection, it’s possible to correctly identify and block
several variants of the same malware fa milies, as well as identify new forms of malicious code that seek to exploit
certain vulnerabilities that can be identified generically. A pproximately 20.8 percent of the most frequently blocked
malware last month was identified and blocked using generic detection.
7 http://www.symantec.com/security_respons e/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-011922-2056-99&tabid=2 Page 20 of 23
Best Practice Guidelines for Enterprises
1. Employ defense-in-depth strategies : Emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive
systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protection method. This should
include the deployment of regularly updated firewalls, as well as gateway antivirus, intrusion detection,
intrusion protection systems, and Web security gateway solutions throughout the network.
2. Monitor for network threat, vu lnerabilities and brand abuse. Monitor for network intrusions, propagation
attempts and other suspicious traffic patterns, iden tify attempted connections to known malicious or
suspicious hosts. Receive alerts for new vulnerabilit ies and threats across vendor platforms for proactive
remediation. Track brand abuse via domain alerting and fictitious site reporting.
3. Antivirus on endpoints is not enough: On endpoints, signature-based antivirus alone is not enough to
protect against today’s threats and Web-based attack toolkits. Deploy and use a comprehensive endpoint
security product that includes additi onal layers of protection including:
o Endpoint intrusion prevention that protects agai nst un-patched vulnerabilities from being exploited,
protects against social engineering attacks and stops malware from reaching endpoints;
o Browser protection for protection a gainst obfuscated Web-based attacks;
o Consider cloud-based malware prevention to prov ide proactive protection a gainst unknown threats;
o File and Web-based reputation solutions that prov ide a risk-and-reputation rating of any application
and Web site to prevent rapidly mutating and polymorphic malware;
o Behavioral prevention capabilities that look at t he behavior of applications and malware and prevent
malware;
o Application control settings that can prevent app lications and browser plug-ins from downloading
unauthorized malicious content;
o Device control settings that prevent and li mit the types of USB devices to be used.
4. Use encryption to protect sensitive data: Implement and enforce a security policy whereby sensitive data is
encrypted. Access to sensitive information should be re stricted. This should include a Data Loss Protection
(DLP) solution, which is a system to identify, monitor, and protect data. This not only serves to prevent data
breaches, but can also help mitigate the damage of potential data leaks from within an organization.
5. Use Data Loss Prevention to help prevent data breaches: Implement a DLP solution that can discover
where sensitive data resides, monitor its use and prot ect it from loss. Data loss prevention should be
implemented to monitor the flow of data as it leaves the organization over the network and monitor copying
sensitive data to external devices or Web sites. DLP should be configured to identify and block suspicious
copying or downloading of sensitive data. DLP should al so be used to identify conf idential or sensitive data
assets on network file systems and PCs so that appro priate data protection measures like encryption can be
used to reduce the risk of loss.
6. Implement a removable media policy . Where practical, restrict unautho rized devices such as external
portable hard-drives and other removable media. Su ch devices can both introduce malware as well as
facilitate intellectual property breaches—intentional or unintentional. If external media devices are permitted,
automatically scan them for viruses upon connection to the network and use a DLP solution to monitor and
restrict copying confidential data to une ncrypted external storage devices.
7. Update your security countermeasures frequently and rapidly: With more than 286M variants of malware
detected by Symantec in 2010, ent erprises should be updating security virus and intrusion prevention
definitions at least daily, if not multiple times a day.
8. Be aggressive on your updating and patching: Update, patch and migrate from outdated and insecure
browsers, applications and browser plug-ins to the la test available versions using the vendors’ automatic
update mechanisms. Most software vendors work diligent ly to patch exploited software vulnerabilities;
however, such patches can only be effective if adopted in the field. Be wary of deploying standard corporate
images containing older versions of browsers, applicat ions, and browser plug-ins that are outdated and
insecure. Wherever possible, automate patch deploy ments to maintain protection against vulnerabilities
across the organization.
9. Enforce an effective password policy . Ensure passwords are strong; at least 8-10 characters long and
include a mixture of letters and numbers. Encourage user s to avoid re-using the same passwords on multiple
Web sites and sharing of passwords with others should be forbidden. Passwords should be changed regularly, at least every 90 days. Avoid writing down passwords. Page 21 of 23
10. Restrict email attachments: Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments
that are commonly used to spread vi ruses, such as .VBS, .BAT, .EXE, .PIF, and .SCR files. Enterprises
should investigate policies for .PDFs that are allowed to be included as email attachments.
11. Ensure that you have infection and incident response procedures in place:
o Ensure that you have y our security vendors cont act information, know w ho you will call, and what
steps you will take if you have one or more infected systems;
o Ensure that a backup-and-restore solution is in plac e in order to restore lost or compromised data in
the event of successful attack or catastrophic data loss;
o Make use of post-infection detection capabilities fr om Web gateway, endpoint security solutions and
firewalls to identify infected systems;
o Isolate infected computers to prevent the risk of further infection within the organization;
o If network services are exploited by malicious code or some other threat, disable or block access to
those services until a patch is applied;
o Perform a forensic analysis on any infected com puters and restore those using trusted media.
12. Educate users on the changed threat landscape:
o Do not open attachments unless they are expect ed and come from a known and trusted source, and
do not execute software that is downloaded from the Internet (if such actions are permitted) unless
the download has been scanned for viruses;
o Be cautious when clicking on URLs in emails or social media program s, even when coming from
trusted sources and friends;
o Do not click on shortened URLs without previewi ng or expanding them first using available tools and
plug-ins;
o Recommend that users be cautious of information they provide on social networking solutions that
could be used to target them in an attack or tr ick them to open malicious URLs or attachments;
o Be suspicious of search engine results and only click through to trusted sources when conducting
searches—especially on topics that are hot in the media;
o Deploy Web browser URL reputation plug-in solution s that display the reputation of Web sites from
searches;
o Only download software (if allowed) from corporat e shares or directly from the vendors Web site;
o If users see a warning indicating that they are “i nfected” after clicking on a URL or using a search
engine (fake antivirus infections), have users close or quit the browser using Alt-F4, CTRL+W or the
task manager.
Page 22 of 23
Best Practice Guidelines for Users and Consumers
1. Protect yourself : Use a modern Internet security solution that includes the following capabilities for maximum
protection against malicious code and other threats:
o Antivirus (file and heuristic based) and malware behavioral prevention can prevents unknown
malicious threats from executing;
o Bidirectional firewalls will block malware from exploiting potentially vulnerable applications and
services running on your computer;
o Intrusion prevention to protection against Web-a ttack toolkits, unpatched vulnerabilities, and social
engineering attacks;
o Browser protection to protect agains t obfuscated Web-based attacks;
o Reputation-based tools that che ck the reputation and trust of a f ile and Web site before downloading;
URL reputation and safety ratings for Web sites found through search engines.
2. Keep up to date : Keep virus definitions and security content updat ed at least daily if not hourly. By deploying
the latest virus definitions, you can protect your comp uter against the latest viruses and malware known to be
spreading in the wild. Update your operating system, W eb browser, browser plug-ins, and applications to the
latest updated versions using the aut omatic updating capability of your pr ograms, if available. Running out-of-
date versions can put you at risk from being exploited by Web-based attacks.
3. Know what you are doing : Be aware that malware or applications t hat try to trick you into thinking your
computer is infected can be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file-sharing programs,
free downloads, and freeware and shar eware versions of software.
o Downloading “free” “cracked” or “pirated” versions of software can also contain malware or include
social engineering attacks that include programs that try to trick you into th inking your computer is
infected and getting you to pay money to have it removed.
o Be careful which Web sites you visit on the Web. While malware ca n still come from mainstream Web
sites, it can easily come from less reputable si tes sharing pornography, gambling and stolen software.
o Read end-user license agreements (EULAs) carefully and understand all terms before agreeing to
them as some security risks can be installed afte r an end user has accepted the EULA or because of
that acceptance.
4. Use an effective password policy: Ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers, and change
them often. Passwords should not consist of words fr om the dictionary. Do not use the same password for
multiple applications or Web sites. Use complex passwords (upper/lowercase and punctuation) or
passphrases.
5. Think before you click : Never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless you expect it and trust
the sender. Even from trusted users, be suspicious.
o Be cautious when clicking on URLs in emails, so cial media programs even when coming from trusted
sources and friends. Do not blindly click on sh ortened URLs without expanding them first using
previews or plug-ins.
o Do not click on links in social media applications with catchy titles or phrases even from friends. If you
do click on the URL, you may end up “liking it” and se nding it to all of your friends even by clicking
anywhere on the page. Close or quit your browser instead.
o Use a Web browser URL re putation solution that shows the reput ation and safety rating of Web sites
from searches. Be suspicious of search engine resu lts; only click through to trusted sources when
conducting searches, especially on t opics that are hot in the media.
o Be suspicious of warnings that pop-up asking y ou to install media players, document viewers and
security updates; only download software di rectly from the vendor’s Web site.
6. Guard your personal data : Limit the amount of personal informat ion you make publicly available on the
Internet (including and especially social networks) as it may be harvested and used in malicious activities
such as targeted attacks, phishing scams.
o Never disclose any confidential personal or financia l information unless and until you can confirm that
any request for such information is legitimate.
|
Page 1 of 14
Symantec Intelligence
Symantec Intelligence Report : September 2012
How attackers administer malicious Web servers; An android threat that claims to charge your device
Welcome to the September edition of the Symantec Intelligence report , which provides the latest analysis of cyber
security threats, trends , and insights from the Symantec Intelligence team concerning malware, spam, and other
potentially harmful business risks . The data used to compile the analysis for this report includes data from August
through September 2012.
Report highlights
• Spam – 75.0 percent (an increase of 2.7 percentage points since August ): page 6
• Phishing – One in 245.4 emails identified as phishing (a n increase of 0.088 percentage points since August ): page 9
• Malware – One in 211.0 emails contained malware ( an increase of 0.04 percentage points since August ): page 11
• Malicious website s – 780 website s blocked per day ( a decrease of 29.1 percent since August ): page 12
• A look at how attackers administer malicious Web servers : page 2
• An innovative Android app that’s too good to be true: page 4
Introduction
In this month’s report, we take a look at an often- overlooked side of malicious code: how attackers ad minister the Web
servers that the y use to spread spam and malicious code. We highlight a PHP -based tool in particular that is often
used to control and manipulate the configuration of these Web servers.
The tool can r un arbitrary PHP code, bruteforce file transfer and database accounts, and even allows quick access to
Web server configuration files so that the attacker can edit them in order to suit their malicious needs. The attacker
can easily obfuscate his or her code, making its function less apparent if viewed by the legitimate server admins.
We’ve witnessed this tool being used to create spam -related websites and hosting exploit pages to compromise
further computers.
We also take a look at a rather interesting Android application that attempts to trick the user into thinking that the y can
charge their device with nothing but the rays of the sun. The only problem is, Android devices do not contain solar
panels —a critical component needed to turn light into electricity. Naturally the application can do nothing of the sort.
Instead, it s teals sensitive information from the user .
Besides that we’ve seen slight increases in spam emails, phishing attempts, and email -borne threats this month. The
file size of spam emails has shown a decrease this month, where 62 percent are smaller than 5Kb. This may indicate
that attackers are currently including URLs that lead to spam or malicious websites, like the sites discussed in our lead story, instead of graphically focused emails.
I hope you enjoy reading this month’s edition of the report, and please feel free to contact me directly with any comments or feedback.
Paul Wood, Cyber Security Intelligence Manager
[email protected]
@paulowoody
Page 2 of 14
Report analysis
A Glimpse Inside the Spam and Malware Underworld
by Nicholas Johnston
Compromised Web servers are a common occurrence in the treat landscape. They’re often the heart behind spam
deliver y and can play host to the exploit kits that facilitate the spread of malicious code. While we often talk about how
these compromised servers administer malicious code, there’s an aspect to the attacks we don’t often talk about: how
the attackers administr ate these servers.
As a brief reminder, compromised servers are popular with spammers and malware authors as they reduce costs and
complexity of hosting their own servers, and make it more difficult for security companies to deal with abuse: instead
of the reputation of a Web server being simply 'good' or 'bad', this mixed reputation has to be handled carefully.
A Symantec.cloud system recently identified an interesting compromised Web server in Kazakhstan. The server is a
shared hosting server, hosting man y legitimate web sites. However, spammers had uploaded a PHP -based shell
application, giving them almost full control of the server through a convenient Web interface.
Figure 1 – PHP- based application for administering a compromised Web server
The application is quite full -featured. At the top of the screen, information about the system is shown: free disk space,
version of the Linux kernel, and so on. By default, the application ("BOFF") opens in file manager view, allowing files to be created, vie wed, downloaded, renamed, etc. However, the application offers plenty of other functionality. There's
a console, effectively providing basic shell access to the server. If this level of access isn't sufficient, there's an option
to set up a server on an ar bitrary port, with 31337 —representing "elite" in so- called "leet -speak" —being the default.
Any doubt that this shell is a malicious tool is removed when some of its other features are uncovered, giving an
attacker the ability to do the following:
• Run arbitrary PHP code, bypassing PHP's safe mode if it’s enabled.
• Bruteforce FTP, Mysql and Postgres accounts.
• Use shortcuts to find Web server configuration files.
Page 3 of 14
Another part of the interface lists "userful" [sic] tools installed on the server like compi lers and downloading tools (like
cURL or wget).
All of this functionality allows an attacker to use the system, sending spam or setting up malicious Web pages, as they
see fit. Although this shell is interesting in itself, what the shell allows us to discover is even more interesting.
Several highly obfuscated PHP files have been placed on this particular server, for example:
Figure 2 –Obfuscated PHP
One of these files acts a simple but effective back door, allowing arbitrary files to be downloaded to the server. These
files can contain extra PHP code to run. To function, the back -door requires certain obscurely -named HTTP request
parameters to be set. The MD5 sum of one of the parameters must match a particular MD5 specified in the PHP
source code, acting as a crude type of authentication. When the back -door script receives a valid request and tries to
download files from a location specified, it includes lots of details about the server such as the host name and PHP configuration.
Spammers have also place d several other static HTML files on the server. The URLs that point to these files are
included in spam messages. One file redirects to a pharmaceutical spam site:
Figure 3 – Pharmaceutical spam website
Another redirects to a pornographic site:
Figure 4 – Pornographic spam website
Page 4 of 14
But perhaps most interesting is that the site also includes a page containing obfuscated JavaScript:
Figure 5 – Obfuscated JavaScript
When run, this JavaScript redirects to a page containing a variety of exploits. Any computers guided to these pages
could find themselves falling victim to the attackers.
This tool makes it quite easy for the attackers to configure a compromised Web server to perform a variety of tasks.
It's very interesting to see the gang controlling this Web server is promoting both spam and malicious links. Perhaps
compromising machines is more profitable than spam, or perhaps it allows spammers to infect more machines with spam -sending botnet software.
Android Application Makes “Incredible ” Technological Breakthrough
by Hon Lau
The world of Android application s is truly a buzzing hive of activity these days. As a result, more and more scamm ers
jump on this highly productive bandwagon, and the types of attacks and scams get more creative—some are so
incred ible they defy belief .
As any smartphone user knows, battery life is a perennial problem. The high processing power of embedded CPUs
and large, bright LCD screens , coupled with frequent usage, means a lot of juice is required to keep the show going
throughout the day. Device u sers can sometimes be caught short for power , finding themselves with a dead device
when they need it.
This has spawned a whole genre of applications aimed at addressing this problem. There are some applications that
will offer status updates on battery life and notify you when your battery is getting low. Still others help make your
battery last longer by turning off features that are not necessary .
Page 5 of 14
The effectiveness of these types of applications varies from the useful t o the negligible, so a little research is required
to determine this . Unfortunately there are also malicious application s, such as “ Battery Long” (Android.Ackposts1), that
appear to help with the battery life, but simply steal information from the compromised device.
Breaking through the boundaries of credibility are a bunch of application s that will supposedly turn your phone screen
into a solar charger. Even th ough this is completely false, there are a number of “legitimate” application s out there
making this claim . Many operate by using the cameras to measure the ambient light levels to move an onscreen dial,
indicating the “charge rate” for increased accuracy. These are joke application s at best , in some cases even including
small print on the application description page denying it has the ability to actually charge the phone.
Beyond the fun that can be had playing practical jokes, there is good reason to avoid such applications altogether.
Take the following iteration of Android.Sumzand2 for example.
Figure 6 – Fake solar charger in Android.Sumzand
The application claims to be able to convert the screen on your device into a solar panel and use it to charge the
battery , if exposed to sunlight. However, there are some unstated capabilities within this application that you need to
watch out for —Android.Sumzand also happens to steal contact data from your phone.
Until real solar panels are actually installed on phones, it’s best to just continue charging your phone the old- fashioned
way: plugging it in to a wall socked or USB port. Besides that, be careful what you download and install from
application marketplaces . If an application requests permissions that seem out of the ordinary for what it is supposed
to do, then don’t install it.
1 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012- 072302- 3943 -99
2 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012- 080308- 2851 -99
Page 6 of 14
Global Trends & Content Analysis
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the world through the
Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network, which is made up of more than 64.6 million attack sensors and records
thousands of events per s econd. This network monitors attack activity in more than 200 countries and territories
through a combination of Symantec products and services such as Symantec DeepSight™ Threat Management
System, Symantec™ Managed Security Services and Norton™ consumer products, and other third- party data
sources.
In addition, Symantec maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting
of more than 47,662 recorded vulnerabilities (spanning more than two decades) from over 15,967 vendors
representing over 40,006 products.
Spam, phishing and malware data is captured through a variety of sources, including the Symantec Probe Network, a
system of more than 5 million decoy accounts; Symantec.cloud and a number of other Symantec securi ty
technologies. Skeptic™, the Symantec.cloud proprietary heuristic technology is able to detect new and sophisticated
targeted threats before reaching customers’ networks. Over 8 billion email messages and more than 1.4 billion Web
requests are processed each day across 15 data centers. Symantec also gathers phishing information through an
extensive antifraud community of enterprises, security vendors, and more than 50 million consumers.
These resources give Symantec’s analysts unparalleled sources of dat a with which to identify, analyze, and provide
informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and spam. The result is the
annual Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, which gives enterprises and consumers the essential information to
secure their systems effectively now and into the future.
Spam Analysis
In September , the global ratio of spam in email traffic rose by 2.7 percentage point since August , to 75.0 percent ( 1 in
1.33 emails ). This follows the continuing trend of global spam levels diminishing gradually since the latter part of 2011 .
Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Saudi Arabia
Sri Lanka
Sweden
China
Qatar 84.9%
81.7%
79.7%
79.2%
79.1% Education
Recreation
Non-Profit
Gov/Public Sector
Engineering 77.9%
77.6%
76.5%
76.2%
75.9% 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 75.6%
74.9%
75.0%
75.4%
74.8%
75.2% Spam Rate
September 2012 75.0%
72.3%
69.0% Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012
17.4%
11.7%
6.1%
5.1%
4.9%
4.2%
3.9%
2.9%
2.2%
2.0% India
Saudi Arabia
United States
Turkey
Canada
Brazil
Peru
Viet Nam
Colombia
Romania 75.0%Page 7 of 14
Global Spam Categories
The most common category of spam in September is related to the Sex/Dating category , with 47.93 percent.
Category Name September
2012 August
2012
Sex/Dating 47.93% 42.51%
Pharma 27.64% 32.61%
Watches 12.49% 8.55%
Jobs 7.83% 6.85%
Casino 2.26% 1.60%
Software 1.20% 5.86%
Mobile 0.17% 0.48%
Degrees 0.15% 0.60%
419/scam/lotto 0.14% 0.76%
Newsletters 0.05% 0.07%
Weight Loss <0.01% 0.11%
Spam URL Distribution based on Top Level Domain Name
The proportion of spam exploiting URLs in the .com top- level domain decreased in September , as highlighted in the
table below.
TLD September
2012 August
2012
.com 60.4% 64.6 %
.ru 12.1 % 7.0 %
.net 6.3 % 8.3 %
.info 3.7 % 3.1 %
Average Spam Message Size
In September , the proportion of spam emails that were 5Kb in size or less increase d by 17.8 percentage points.
Furthermore, the proportion of spam messages that were greater than 10Kb in size decrease d by 9.2 percent , as can
be seen in the following table.
Message Size September
2012 August
2012
0Kb – 5Kb 62.1 % 44.3 %
5Kb – 10Kb 21.7 % 30.2 %
>10Kb 16.3 % 25.5 %
Spam Attack Vectors
September highlights the increase in spam emails resulting in NDRs (spam related non- delivery reports) . In these
cases, the recipient email addresses are invalid or bounced by their service provider. The proportion of spam that
contained a malicious attachment or link de creased , with periodic spike s of spam activity during the period, as shown
in the chart below. Page 8 of 14
NDR spam, as shown in the chart above, is often as a result of widespread dictionary attacks during spam campaigns ,
where spammers make use of databases containing first and last names and com bine them to generate random email
addresses . A higher -level of activity is indicative of spammers that are seeking to build their distribution lists by
ignoring the invalid recipient emails in the bounce- backs . The list can then be used for more targeted spam attacks
containing malicious attachment s or link s. This might indicate a pattern followed by spammers in harvesting the email
addresses for some months and using those addresses for targeted attacks in other months. 0.0%0.5%1.0%1.5%2.0%2.5%
NDR MalwarePage 9 of 14
Phishing Analysis
In September , the global phishing rate increased by 0.088 percentage points, taking the global average rate to one in
245.4 emails ( 0.41 percent) that comprised some form of phishing attack.
Analysis of Phishing Websites
The overall phishing increased by about 4.46 percent this month. Unique domains in creased by about 13 percent as
compared to the previous month. Phishing websites that used automated toolkits decreased by 3 percent. Phishing
websites with IP domains (for e.g. domains like http://255.255.255.255) decreased by about 29 percent. Webhosting
services comprised of 3 percent of all phishing, an increase of 9 percent from the previous month. The number of
non-English phishing sites in creased by 103 percent. Among non- English phishing sites, French, Italian , Portuguese,
and Spanish were highest in August.
Geographic Location of Phishing Web sites
Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 United Kingdom
South Africa
Netherlands
Australia
Denmark 1 in 103.8
1 in 145.2
1 in 168.3
1 in 2 11.4
1 in 233.1 Public Sector
Finance
Education
Accom/Catering
Retail 1 in 68.5
1 in 72.7
1 in 199.3
1 in 244.4
1 in 359.3 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 1 in 257.7
1 in 540.2
1 in 672.6
1 in 595.0
1 in 827.5
1 in 173.6 Phishing Rate
September 2012 1 in 245.4
1 in 312.9
1 in 424.1 Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012
37.3%
28.9%
15.9%
4.8%
3.9%
3.5%
1.7%
1.0%
0.7%
0.3% United States
United Kingdom
New Zealand
Australia
Canada
India
Korea, Republic of
Sweden
South Africa
Hong Kong 1 in 312.9
September 2012 Phishing Websites Locations
*Note: Data lags one monthCountry July August*
UnitedStates 52.0%
Germany 6.0%
UnitedKingdom 4.1%
Brazil 3.2%
France 2.9%Canada 3.4%
Russia 2.5%
China 2.1%Netherlands 2.3%
Poland 1.4%51.6%
5.6%
3.8%
3.7%
3.0%3.1%
2.4%
2.0%2.2%
1.8%Page 10 of 14
Tactics of Phishing Distribution
Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks, by Industry
1% 3% 3% 42% 51%
TyposquattingFree Web Hosting
SitesIP Address DomainsOther Unique
DomainsAutomated Toolkits
0.009% 0.026% 0.027% 0.20% 0.24% 0.49% 0.51% 0.60% 2.4% 24.6% 32.1% 38.8%
ISPRetail TradeInsuranceGovernmentCommunicationsRetailTelecommunicationsEntertainmentComputer SoftwareBankingE-CommerceInformation ServicesPage 11 of 14
Malware Analysis
Email -borne Threats
The global ratio of email -borne viruses in email traffic was one in 211.0 emails (0. 47 percent ) in September , an
increase of 0.04 percentage points since August .
In September , 22.2 percent of email -borne malware contained links to malicious websites, 2.6 percentage points
higher than August .
Frequently Blocked E mail-borne Malware
The table below shows the most frequently blocked email -borne malware for September , many of which relate to
generic variants of malicious attachments and malicious hy perlink s distributed in emails. Approximately 30.5 percent
of all email -borne malware was identified and blocked using generic detection.
Malware identified generically as aggressive strains of polymorphic malware accounted for 10.9 percent of all email -
borne malware blocked in September .
Malware Name % Malware
W32/Bredolab.gen!eml.j 12.51%
Exploit/Link -generic -ee68 6.24%
W32.Virut!html 5.50%
HTML/JS -Encrypted.gen 4.84%
Suspicious.JIT.a -1cd6 3.80%
W32/Warezov -Heur 3.74%
Suspicious.JIT.a -2f53 3.55%
W32/NewMalware!16a0 2.28%
NewMalware.Generic -db21 -42bb 2.24%
VBS/Generic 1.63%
The top- ten list of most frequently blocked malware accounted for approximately 46.3 percent of all email -borne
malware blocked in September . Sources 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 United Kingdom
Netherlands
Australia
Italy
Spain 1 in 103.0
1 in 121.2
1 in 149.9
1 in 268.2
1 in 286.4 Public Sector
Finance
Education
Non-Profit
Marketing/Media 1 in 58.1
1 in 74.7
1 in 165.8
1 in 280.1
1 in 289.3 1-250
251-500
501-1000
1001-1500
1501-2500
2501+ 1 in 288.4
1 in 344.6
1 in 414.1
1 in 341.0
1 in 471.0
1 in 150.7Virus Rate
September 2012 1 in 2 11.0
1 in 233.1
1 in 299.5 Last Month:
Six Month Avg.: Top 5 Geographies Top 5 Verticals By Horizontal
2012
53.2%
23.3%
5.1%
3.1%
2.4%
1.7%
1.6%
1.4%
1.4%
1.3% United Kingdom
United States
Brazil
Australia
Sweden
South Africa
Japan
India
Netherlands
Hong Kong 1 in 2 11.0Page 12 of 14
Web -based Malware Threats
In September , Symantec Intelligence identified an average of 780 websites each day harboring malware and other
potentially unwanted programs including spyware and adware; a decrease of 29.1 percent since August . This reflects
the rate at which website s are being compromised or created for the purpose of spreading malicious content. Of ten
this number is higher when Web-based malware is in circulation for a longer period of time to widen its potential
spread and increase its longevity.
As detection for Web-based malwar e increases, the number of new websites blocked decreases and the proportion of
new malware begins to rise, but initially on fewer websites. Further analysis reveals that 36.9 percent of all malicious
domains blocked were new in September ; a decrease of 4.9 percentage points compared with August . Additionally,
11.4 percent of all Web- based malware blocked was new in September ; an increase of 1.1 percentage points since
August .
The chart above shows the decrease in the number of new spyware and adware websites blocked each day on
average during September compared with the equivalent number of Web- based malware website s blocked each day.
Web Policy Risks from Inappropriate Use
Some of t he most common trigger s for policy -based filtering applied by Symantec Web Security.cloud for its business
clients are s ocial networking, advertisements and pop- up, and streaming media category . Many organizations allow
access to social networking websites , but facilitate access logging so that usage patterns can be tracked and in some
cases implement policies to only permit access at certain times of the day and block access at all other times. Web -
based advertisements pose a potential risk though the use of “malvertisements,” or malicious advertisements. These
may occur as the result of a legitimate online ad- provider being compromised and a banner ad being used to serve
malware on an otherwise harmless website . Streaming media is increasingly popular when there are major sporti ng
events or high profile international news stories. This activity often results in an increased number of blocks, as
businesses seek to preserve valuable bandwidth for other purposes.
Endpoint Security Threats
The endpoint is often the last line of defense and analysis; however, the endpoint can often be the first -line of defense
against attacks that spread using USB storage devices and insecure network connections . The threats found here can
shed light on the wider nature of threats confronting businesses, especially from blended attacks and threats facing New Malware Sites per Day
New sites with spyware
New sites with web viruses
Total 7/day
772/day
779/dayWeb Security Services Activity:
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
September 2012
Web Security Services Activity:
Policy-Based Filtering
Social Networking
Advertisement and Popups
Streaming Media
Computing and Internet
Chat
Peer- To-Peer
Hosting Sites
Search
News
GamesWebViruses and Trojans
Trojan.JS.Iframe.BPN
Suspicious.Pythia
Trojan.Generic.4315639
JS:Trojan.Crypt.FC
Trojan.JS.Iframe.B RV
Gen: Trojan.Heu r.PT.Ci4abmtlSyo
Trojan.Maljava!gen23
Trojan.JS.Agent.GHF
Trojan.JS.Agent.GLM
Trojan. Webkit!html Potentially Unwanted Programs
PUP:Generic.183433
PUP:Clkpotato!gen3
Gen:Application.Heur
PUP:Mediafinder
PUP:Agent.NLK
PUP:9231
PUP:Crossid
PUP:Android/DroidRoote r.G
PUP:Relevant.BH
PUP:Generic.183457
September 2012 30.2%
30.0%
8.4%
4.1%
4.0%
2.9%
2.7%
1.9%
1.6%
1.5%11.8%
9.7%
6.8%
5.5%
5.1%
4.8%
3.8%
2.6%
2.4%
2.3% 9.3%
7.4%
6.0%
4.3%
4.1%
3.8%
3.6%
3.6%
3.6%
3.1%Page 13 of 14
mobile workers . Attacks reaching the endpoint are likely to have already circumvented other layers of protection that
may already be deployed, such as gateway filtering.
The table below shows the malware most frequently blocked targeting endpoint devices for the last month. This
includes data from endpoint devices protected by Symantec technology around the world, including data from clients which may not be using other la yers of protection, such as Symantec Web Security.cloud or Symantec Email
AntiVirus.cloud.
Malware Name3 % Malware
Trojan.Gen.2 6.24%
W32.Sality.AE 6.18%
W32.Ramnit!html 5.30%
W32.Downadup.B 4.34%
Trojan.ADH.2 3.92%
Trojan Horse 3.04%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 1.77%
W32.SillyFDC 1.17%
Trojan.ADH 1.15%
Downloader 1.10%
For much of 2012 , variants of W32.Sality.AE
4 and W32.Ramnit5 had been the most prevalent malicious threat s
blocked at the endpoint. Variants of W32.Ramnit accounted for approximately 13.6% of all malware blocked at the
endpoint in September , compared with 6.9 percent for all variants of W32.Sality.
Approximately 46.0 percent of the most frequently blocked malware last month was identified and blocked using
generic detection. Many new viruses and Trojans are based on earlier versions, where code has been copied or altered to create a new strain, or variant. Often these variants are created using toolkits and hundreds of thousands of
variants can be created from the same piece of malware. This has become a popular tactic to evade signature- based
detection, as each variant would traditionally need its own signature to be correctly identified and blocked.
By deploying techniques, such as heuristic analysis and generic detection, it ’s possible to correctly identify and block
several variants of the same malware families, as well as identify new forms of malicious code that s eek to exploit
certain vulnerabilities that can be identified generically.
3For further information on these threats, please visit: http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/landing/threats.jsp
4 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006- 011714- 3948 -99
5 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010- 011922- 2056 -99
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
SEPTEMBER 2013p. 2
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
3 Executive Summary
4 BIG NUMBERS
7 TIMELINE
10 TARGETED ATTACKS
11 Targeted Attacks in 2013
11 Targeted Attacks per Day
11 Anatomy of Latest Watering Holes
12 First Attacks Logged by Month
12 Top 10 Industries Attacked
13 Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
13 File Extensions of Attachments
13 First Attacks Logged by Size
14 Q&A on Hidden Lynx
16 Social Media
17 Top 5 Social Media Attacks, 2013
18 DATA BREACHES
19 Top 5 Data Breaches by Type of Information Exposed
19 Timeline of Data Breaches, 2013
20 MOBILE
21 Mobile Malware by Type
22 Cumulative Mobile Android Malware
23 VULNERABILITIES
24 Total Vulnerabilities Disclosed by Month
24 Browser Vulnerabilities
24 Plug-in Vulnerabilities25 SPAM, PHISHING, & MALWARE
26 Spam
26 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Geography
26 Global Spam Volume Per Day
26 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Industry
27 Top 10 Sources of Spam
27 Average Spam Message Size*
27 Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Company Size
27 Spam by Category
27 Spam URL Distribution Based on Top Level Domain Name*
28 Phishing
28 Top 10 Sources of Phishing
28 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Company Size
28 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Industry
28 Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Geography
29 Phishing Distribution in September
29 Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks
30 Malware
30 Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected
30 Top 10 Email Virus Sources
31 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Industry
31 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Geographic Location
31 Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Company Size
32 Endpoint Security
32 Top 10 Most Frequently Blocked Malware
33 Policy Based Filtering
33 Policy Based Filtering
34 Contributors
34 About Symantec
34 More Informationp. 3
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
Executive Summary
Welcome to the September edition of the Symantec Intelligence
report. Symantec Intelligence aims to provide the latest analysis of
cyber security threats, trends, and insights concerning malware,
spam, and other potentially harmful business risks.
In this month’s report we take a detailed look at targeted attacks in 2013 so far. What we’ve found
is that attackers have continued to refine their techniques, adding new tricks to attack methods
such as watering holes and spear phishing in order to increase the likelihood of snaring their
intended targets.
We also take a look at targeted attack trends over the last three years to get a better feel for how
attackers are operating. While we’ve noticed is that attacks per day are lower compared to last
year, attacks are up 13 percent over a three year period. We also take a look at the times of the year
attackers are more likely to kick off targeted attack campaigns, who they’re targeting, and the type
of malicious payloads they’re using.
While looking at targeted attacks, I sat down with one of our leading threat researchers to talk
about a targeted attack group recently discussed in a new Symantec whitepaper . We talk about
who the Hidden Lynx group is, how they operate, and what they’re after, as well as what the future
might hold for these attackers.
Also, this month’s timeline focuses on stories surrounding targeted attacks during the month of
September, recapping what happened and what that means to you.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to contact us with any comments or
feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat Analyst
[email protected]. 4
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
BIG NUMBERSp. 5
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
Overall Email Phishing Rate:
Overall Email Phishing Rate:
1 in 736
1 in 626
1 in 1,056AugJul
SepHIGHER NUMBER = LOWER RISK
Overall Email Virus Rate:
Overall Email Virus Rate:
1 in 465 Jul
AugSepHIGHER NUMBER = LOWER RISK
1 in 340
1 in 383
Estimated Global
Email Spam Rate Per DayEstimated Global
Email Spam Rate Per Day
SPAM AS PERCENT OF ALL EMAIL
Jul Aug Sep0102030405060708090100
65% 66% 68%
New Vulnerabilities
New Vulnerabilities
469
469
Aug
561
July
549
549
Sep
Aug2July3
Sep7
Mobile
VulnerabilitiesMobile
Vulnerabilities
p. 6
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
Data Breaches
Data Breaches
144Number of Breaches
(Year-to-Date)
91,247,719Number of IdentitiesExposed (Year-to-Date)
Mobile Malware VariantsMobile Malware VariantsVARIANTS (CUMULATIVE) 161213
Sep Aug Jul161213249
10002000300040005000600070008000900010000
S A J J M A M F JAN
2013D N O S
7,1017,101p. 7
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
TIMELINEp. 8
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
September Targeted Attacks Timeline
September04
Attackers took advantage of this month’s G20 summit in St.
Petersburg in Russia to target multiple groups . This campaign
targeted financial institutions, financial services companies,
government organizations, and a number of other organizations
involved in economic development.
The attackers sent emails that claimed to come from a G20
representative. The email thanked the targets for circulating
“updated building blocks,” referring to the theme of multiple
documents discussing the UK government’s feedback on how
to address development, anti-corruption and employment. The
message continued, saying that the UK government has made
comments on these documents and the sender claims that they
are attached in the email.
Symantec detects the executable as Backdoor.Darkmoon , a
remote access Trojan that has previously been used in a number
of targeted attack campaigns including the Nitro Attacks .
September 06
A new banking Trojan has been found targeting online banking
users in a variety of countries. The Trojan was part of a
campaign where the attackers posed as a legitimate organization
and sent emails with disguised malicious attachments to
victims. These emails either claimed that postal tracking
information or an invoice was attached.
The attackers were aiming to obtain login credentials to gain
access to victims’ online bank accounts using the Trojan’s
keystroke logging capabilities. The malware could inject
malicious code into targeted banks’ Web pages. Security
researchers also said that the Trojan attempted to trick victims
into installing a mobile app in order to bypass two-factor
authentication to log into bank accounts. After a victim’s
computer was infected, a malicious Web page appeared and
asked them to input their mobile device model and number. The
attackers then sent a text message linking to the malicious app.
September09
Malicious actors are always quick to exploit our desire to be
informed of the latest news, often using current affairs as email
subject lines or topics in order to target victims with malware.
As expected, the current situation in Syria is being used in this
way. Symantec Security Response has published a blog detailing
a targeted attack campaign that used the recent chemical attack
in Syria as a lure . The email referred to a recently published
article by the Washington Post , taking the text directly from
the original news item and placing it in a malicious Word
document. The malicious document contained Backdoor.Korplug
and exploited the Microsoft Internet Explorer Use-After-Free
Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-2013-2551).
September12
An ongoing cyber espionage campaign was found targeting
South Korean entities, such as government and military think-
tanks, supporters of Korean unification and a variety of shipping
companies. The campaign used malware that allowed attackers
to spy on victims and steal data.
While the researchers haven’t confirmed how victims’
computers were infected, they suspect that the attackers
used spear-phishing emails that contained a Trojan dropper
to download additional malware. The operation used a lot of
different malicious programs and each one implemented a
single spying function. Symantec detects the malware cited in
this report as Trojan.Kisuky .p. 9
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
September18
Microsoft reported a critical vulnerability in Internet Explorer
which could enable remote code execution on an affected
computer if the user visits a website containing malicious
content directed towards the browser. This typically happens
when an attacker compromises the security of trusted websites
that Internet Explorer users visit frequently, or convinces
someone to click on a link in an email, or via a social networking
site, or in an instant message.
While the vulnerability has since been patched, Microsoft
stated that all supported versions of Internet Explorer were
affected;moreover, there were also reports of a limited number
of targeted attacks specifically directed at versions 8 and 9. For
more details about preventing this threat see the blog entry,
“New Internet Explorer Zero-day Found in Targeted Attacks .”
September26
Security researchers reported on a small group of hackers for
hire called Icefog that have potentially performed surgical
“hit and run” operations against several organizations across
the globe. The attacks used custom cyberespionage tools to
compromise Windows and Mac OS X computers, which were
used to locate and steal specific information before abandoning
the infected computer. The attackers sent spear-phishing emails
and used exploits for known vulnerabilities in their campaigns.
Once the targeted computers were compromised, the attackers
placed back-doors and other data-stealing tools on them. They
could then gather sensitive documents, email credentials and
other passwords that could be used to gain access to even more
data.
Unlike many other advanced persistent threats (APTs), which
compromise computers for months in order to continuously
steal data, the Icefog attackers seemed more interested
in carrying out quick, surgical strikes to gather specific
information. Symantec detects the threats used in this campaign
as Backdoor.Hormesu . p. 10
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
TARGETED ATTACKSp. 11
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
Targeted Attacks in 2013
So far in 2013 few new attack techniques have been seen in the
realm of targeted attacks. Instead we’ve seen a shoring up of
attack methods. Since the techniques used in the last couple of
years still continue to reap rewards, attackers probably see little
reason to change them. Rather we’ve seen efforts to refine their
strategies.
For instance, in past watering hole attacks an attacker
would compromise a legitimate website that the
target is known to use and then lie in wait for them to
visit it. Attackers continue to use such techniques this
year, but are lying in wait on multiple sites in order to
compromise more diverse set of targets. While each
of these sites may be used to snare a different target
profile, they all redirect to the same exploit. This allows the
attackers to leverage one vulnerability in multiple campaigns, or
easily swap out exploits, cutting down on overall administration
for the attackers.
We’ve also seen an increase in more aggressive spear-phishing
attacks. In these cases the attacker sends an email and then
follows up with a phone call directly to the target, such as the
“Francophoned” attack from this summer. The attacker may
impersonate a high ranking employee, and request that the target
open an attachment immediately. This assertive method of attack
Targeted Attacks per Day
Source: Symantec
2013 2013 TREND (Projected) 2011 2012
TARGETED ATTACKS
0255075100125150175200225250
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANAnatomy of Latest Watering Holes
Source: Symantec
Exploit
LocationTarget
Visits Website
Compromised
Websitesp. 12
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
has been reported more often
in 2013 than in previous
years.
With these refined
techniques, attackers may be
taking more time to ensure
an attack is successful. Our
overall attack numbers
appear to support this.
For instance, the average
number of attacks per day is
down 41 percent in the first
nine months of 2013 when
compared to the same period
last year. Our projections
for the rest of the year show
attacks per day dropping in
the last quarter of 2013 if
this trend were to continue.
However, this is still a 13
percent increase over the averages during the same period in
2011, showing targeted attacks are still trending upwards over a
longer period of time.
While these numbers show the sheer volume of targeted attacks,
it doesn’t tell us much about when new attack campaigns are
kicked off. To look at this, we filtered out multiple attacks
against the same company to see when organizations first
logged an attack during 2013. These first attacks appear to be
trending up month on month in 2013. Of particular note is that
the month of May saw a significant increase in the number
of new attacks. Using this as a marker for kicking off targeted
attack campaigns, and looking back at our attacks per day
numbers, this increase is followed with an uptick in volume of
daily targeted attacks during the summer months of this year.
In terms of targets, it appears that manufacturing is no longer
the leading industry on the receiving end of targeted attacks,
having dropped from 24 percent of attacks in 2012 to 8.7
percent so far in 2013. Taking its place near the top of our
charts are service-related industries, both professional (22%)
and non-traditional (15%).1
Why have service-related industries risen this year? Much of
this could be related to supply chain attacks, where attackers
look for the easiest point of entry and work their way up the First Attacks Logged by Month
Source: Symantec
0100200300400500600700800900100011001200
S A J J M A M F JAN
2013
Top 10 Industries Attacked
Source: Symantec
Industry Percent
Services - Professional 22.2%
Public Administration 19.2%
Services - Non-Traditional 14.8%
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate 13.0%
Transportation, Communications, Electric, & Gas 9.1%
Manufacturing 8.7%
Wholesale 4.2%
Logistics 2.1%
Retail 1.0%
Mining 1.0% 1 The “Professional” category includes services such as Legal, Accounting, Health, and
Education. “Non-Traditional” includes Hospitality, Recreational, and Repair services.p. 13
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
Source: Symantec
Company Size Percent
1-250 24.1%
251-500 11.8%
501-1000 10.8%
1001-1500 2.9%
1501-2500 9.5%
2500+ 40.8%First Attacks Logged by Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Percent
1-250 48.3%
251-500 11.4%
501-1000 9.4%
1001-1500 5.1%
1501-2500 5.6%
2500+ 20.3%
File Extensions of Attachments
Source: Symantec
File Extension Percent
.exe 35.7%
.scr 24.2%
.doc 9.6%
.pdf 7.0%
.class 5.1%
.dmp 3.6%
.dll 2.4%
.xls 1.7%
.pif 1.4%
.jar 0.8%chain. Attackers will often direct their efforts to the areas
that they see as having the laxest security. The shift from
manufacturing to service as an attack target could be due to
these industries being seen as an easier avenue into a supply
chain.
Moreover, most of the manufacturing companies being targeted
in 2012 were in the Defense or Engineering industries. Increased awareness and tighter security countermeasures mean the
criminals have to adapt, and this is perhaps what we have seen
in 2013 so far.
In terms of the size of organizations, it appears as though the
swing from targeting large enterprises to smaller organizations
has continued this year. So organizations with over 2500+
employees is down approximately 9 percentage points, from 50
percent in 2012, to 41 percent so far this year. SMBs continue
to make up the largest percent of smaller organizations,
though there appears to be a shift into the 251-500 and 501-
1000 ranges, which have increase 7 and 8 percentage points
respectively.
If we look at the first attacks over the year, similar to how we did
attacks per day, we see a definite shift towards targeting smaller
businesses. In fact the 1-250 employee range comprises over 48
percent of all unique attacks so far this year.
In terms of email-based targeted attacks, executables still top
the list of attachment types. While it seems at face value that
document formats, like .pdf and .doc files, would have a larger
measure of success from a social engineering standpoint. It
turns out that that isn’t necessarily the case, since roughly
64 percent of attachments are executables. In fact, we’ve seen
specific cases where attackers have sent .pdf files that go
unopened within the target organization. However, in a follow-
up targeted email that included a run-of-the-mill .exe file, the
file was opened and the payload executed.
These attachment types continue to roll in with the same, time-
tested subject matter as well: invoices, calls for research papers,
resumes, etc. It appears that so long as these methods continue
to trick the targets, attackers see no reason to change their
techniques. p. 14
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
Q&A on Hidden Lynx
Earlier this year, details of a hack against security vendor Bit9
emerged . Hackers had gained access to the company’s digital code-
signing certificates, and succeeded in signing their malware with
it. This signed malware was then distributed in targeted attack
campaigns.
The roots of this attack, and the group behind it, go back much
further. Symantec Security Response looked closely at the attack
and those behind it, and recently published a whitepaper detailing
the activities of a hacking group , dubbed Hidden Lynx.
Stephen Doherty, a Senior Threat Intelligence Analyst and one of
the primary investigators, lead the investigation into Hidden Lynx.
I sat down and talked with him about who this hacking group is,
how they’re structured, and just how brazen they’ve become.
Who are the Hidden Lynx group?
Hidden Lynx is a group we’ve been tracking for the last
number of years. The group itself is a targeted attack group
who is based in China. They have been involved in attacks
since at least 2009, including the high-profile attacks involving
Bit9. We think it’s a professional organization, with lots of
experience, using cutting edge techniques. They do a pay-per-
order service, where a client will contact the group and ask
them to pursue some specific information that is of use to
them.
How do they compare to your typical hacking group?
They are more capable than the typical groups you might
see in many targeted attacks. They managed to get onto
[Bit9’s] machines and sign their malicious Trojans with Bit9
certificates. This happened around the same time as a number
of zero days were distributing these Trojans, so we thought it
was a worthwhile exercise to go and have a look at exactly what
these guys were doing, who they target, and why they target
certain industries, in order to build up an overall picture of their
capabilities.
Who are the primary targets that they appear to be going after?
They tend to go after both private industry and governmental
organizations in the wealthiest and most technologically
advanced countries. Their range of targets is wide, which
suggests that there are lots of requests for different types of
information.
In terms of industries, they tend to go after quite specific
organizations within the financial industry. They’ll target asset
management agencies or companies that would be involved in
investment banking, like mergers and acquisitions. What is the goal of the attacks carried out by the Hidden Lynx
group?
The overall goals are quite varied. At the moment they’re
focusing on Japan and South Korea . The large campaign
mentioned in the paper was VOHO, which was focused in the US,
so their targets shift quite regularly. This could be a case of not
bringing too much focus to the group: if they continue to attack
in certain locations, it can bring a lot of heat on them. They
might move around for that reason, or it could be just a case
where that campaign was run. They got the required information
and now they’ve moved to another country to get information
there. So their overall goals are probably financially motivated,
but the goals of an attack will change based on what information
they’re after.
What are their primary attack methods?
They’re cutting edge in what they do. They have access to the
latest exploits. We’ve seen them using spear phishing attacks,
and VOHO was a large watering hole campaign. To get into quite
hard to reach places they have used supply chain attacks.
They’ve also been observed attacking vulnerable applications
on public-facing servers that a company might have. That’s how
they got into Bit9: they located a public-facing server and used
SQL-injection attacks to install a Trojan. From there they were
able to obtain passwords and move through the network, where
they eventually gained access to their code-signing certificate
and signed some of their malware. This is quite a large win on
their behalf. Just having the audacity to go in and gain access like
this, most attackers wouldn’t even consider it. “We think [Hidden Lynx]
is a professional
organization, with lots of
experience, using cutting
edge techniques.”p. 15
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
In your paper you mention that the Hidden Lynx group has
carried out “one of the largest and most successful watering-
hole attacks to date.” What makes these watering hole attacks
different than those we’ve seen in the past?
The VOHO attacks are the most significant in terms of size. RSA
had examined the access logs from the webserver and saw that
the payload was delivered to 4,000 machines, which is typically
much higher than a normal watering hole attack.
They compromised ten legitimate websites to redirect to this
exploit that they were hosting. Each of these watering holes had
slightly different expected visitors to each site. They rerouted
all these watering hole websites to one exploit. In many cases
watering holes typically just infect one legitimate website and
wait for the unsuspecting user to visit, where as this one was
much larger in scale.
Y ou mention two distinct threats, Trojan.Naid and Backdoor.
Moudoor , used and maintained by what appear to be two
separate attack teams within the Hidden Lynx group. What are
the differences between these two teams and why do you think
the group would be organized in such a way?
To begin with Naid has been around since 2009. That dates all
the way back to when we saw the attacks involving Aurora, and
that’s been used right up to today. Then you have Moudoor,
which is a more recent Trojan, which first surfaced in 2011.
We see Moudoor in larger-scale infections. We believe this is
operated by a team who is larger in size. They’ll infect a lot
more varied targets and have a much higher distribution rate.
Naid is seen in much more limited use, and we think that this is their Trojan that they reserve for special operations—if they’re
finding a specific target difficult to penetrate, they typically send
in Trojan.Naid. This is why we think there is a more elite team
within the Hidden Lynx group that operates this Trojan.
There appear to be ties between the Hidden Lynx group and
Operation Aurora. What are these connections, and is the
Hidden Lynx group the latest iteration of a long running
hacking campaign?
Hidden Lynx is definitely a long-running hacking campaign.
The more familiar Trojan with Aurora was Trojan.Hydraq , but
we believe Naid was also participating in this attack. When the
command and control domains and the organizations targeted
were examined, it’s very likely that both these Trojans were used
in this attack. So we think Hydraq would have been the initial
backdoor that was downloaded onto the machine via the exploit,
and then Trojan.Naid was then subsequently installed on the
infected machines.
Does this mean Naid is unique to this attack group?
Yes, we don’t believe Naid is available to any other attack groups.
It’s a very specific Trojan. We don’t see widespread distribution,
so this is another reason we believe that it was this group that
participated in the Aurora attacks.
Now that the Hidden Lynx group’s tactics are out in the open,
what do you think the next steps will be for these attackers?
The obvious thing would be similar to what happened with
Aurora: Hydraq disappeared within a matter of months and they
just persisted with different Trojans. We expect the same thing
to happen. They’ll swap the Trojans that they use, but they’ll
continue to attack in the same manner.
We’re already looking into Trojans that look like they’re being
used by this group at this time. We certainly know of one:
Backdoor.Fexel . It shares some infrastructure that was used
during the Hidden Lynx campaign and is using the most recent
zero-day , obviously post-publication of the paper.
In your experience, do you think we’ll be seeing more or less of
this group as time goes on?
I think we’ll see at least as much, considering their experience
and their capabilities. There are lots and lots of attack groups
that come from China, but this would be one of the stand-out
groups. I think for that fact they’re not going to go away any time
soon. Even with some of the major focus on the group, they’re
still attacking to this day. “They’re not going to go
away any time soon.
Even with some of the
major focus on the
group, they’re still
attacking to this day.”p. 16
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
SOCIAL MEDIAp. 17
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
Social Media
At a Glance
• 82 percent of all social
media attacks so far in
2013 have been fake
offerings. This is up from
56 percent in 2012.
• Fake Plug-ins are the
second-most common
type of social media
attacks at 7.3 percent, up
from fifth place in 2012,
at 5 percent.
• Fake Apps have risen
overall in 2013, now
making up 1.9 percent of
social media attacks. In
2012, this category was
ranked sixth.
Methodology
Fake Offering. These scams invite social network users to join a fake event or group with
incentives such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to share credentials with
the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
Fake Plug-in Scams. Users are tricked into downloading fake browser extensions on their
machines. Rogue browser extensions can pose like legitimate extensions but when installed
can steal sensitive information from the infected machine.
Likejacking. Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website buttons
that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
Fake Apps. Applications provided by attackers that appear to be legitimate apps; however,
they contain a malicious payload. The attackers often take legitimate apps, bundle malware
with them, and then re-release it as a free version of the app.
Manual Sharing Scams. These rely on victims to actually do the hard work of sharing the
scam by presenting them with intriguing videos, fake offers or messages that they share
with their friends.Top 5 Social Media Attacks, 2013
Source: Symantec
Top 5 Social Media Attacks
Top 5 Social Media Attacks
7.3%
4.9%
1.9%
1.7%Fake
Offering
Manual SharingLikejackingFake Plug-in
Fake Apps82%p. 18
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
DATA BREACHESp. 19
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
Data Breaches
At a Glance
• September appears to
contain the least data
breach activity this year
in terms of identities
exposed. However, this
number may change as
further breaches are
disclosed.
• There were a number of
breaches reported during
September that occurred
earlier in the year. This
brings the total number of
breaches to 144 for so far
in 2013.
• Of the reported breaches
so far in this year, the top
three types of information
exposed are a person’s
real name, birth date, and
government ID number
(e.g. Social Security).Timeline of Data Breaches, 2013
Source: SymantecNUMBER OF INCIDENTSIDENTITIES BREACHED (MILLIONS)
INCIDENTS IDENTITIES BREACHED
051015202530354045505560
S A J J M A M F JAN
2013D N O S081624324048
Top 5 Data Breaches by Type of Information Exposed
Source: Symantec
41%42%
34%
31%66%Real Names
Gov ID numbers (Soc Sec)Birth Dates
Home Address
Medical Records
Information Exposed in BreachesInformation Exposed in Breaches
% OF ALL BREACHESMethodology
This data is procured from the Norton Cybercrime Index (CCI).
The Norton CCI is a statistical model that measures the levels
of threats, including malicious software, fraud, identity theft,
spam, phishing, and social engineering daily. The data breach
section of the Norton CCI is derived from data breaches that
have been reported by legitimate media sources and have
exposed personal information.
In some cases a data breach is not publicly reported during the
same month the incident occurred, or an adjustment is made in
the number of identities reportedly exposed. In these cases, the
data in the Norton CCI is updated. This causes fluctuations in
the numbers reported for previous months when a new report is
released.
Norton Cybercrime Index
http://us.norton.com/protect-yourselfp. 20
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
MOBILEp. 21
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
Mobile
At a Glance
• So far in 2013, 37 percent
of mobile malware tracks
users, up from 15 percent
in 2012.
• Traditional threats,
such as back doors and
downloaders are present
in a fifth of all mobile
malware threats.
• Risks that collect data,
the most common risk
in 2012, is down 12
percentage points to 20
percent of risks.
• Seven new mobile
malware families were
discovered in September,
along with 249 new
variants.
20%
37%
7%
14%
26%
20%
Track User
Risks that spy on the individual using the
device, collecting SMS messages or phone call logs, tracking GPS coordinates, recording phone calls, or gathering pictures and video taken with the device.
Traditional Threats
Threats that carry out traditional malware functions, such as back doors and downloaders.
Adware/Annoyance
Mobile risks that display advertising or generally perform actions to disrupt the user.Send Content
These risks will send text messages to premium SMS numbers, ultimately appearing on the bill of the device’s owner. Other risks can be used to send spam messages.Change Settings
These types of risks attempt to elevate privileges or simply modify various settings within the operating system. Collect Data
This includes the collection of both device- and user-specific data, such as device information, configuration data, or banking details. Mobile Malware by Type
Source: Symantecp. 22
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
Cumulative Mobile Android Malware
Source: Symantec
VARIANTS FAMILIES
4080120160200240280320360400
S A J J M A M F JAN
2013D N O S10002000300040005000600070008000900010000FAMILIES (CUMULATIVE) VARIANTS (CUMULATIVE)
p. 23
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
VULNERABILITIESp. 24
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
Vulnerabilities
At a Glance
• There were 549 new
vulnerabilities discovered
in September, bringing
the total for the year up
to 4864, a 16 percent
increase compared to the
same period in 2012.
• There were 45
vulnerabilities discovered
in mobile operating
systems during the month
of September.
• Google’s Chrome
browser continues to
lead in reporting browser
vulnerabilities, while
Oracle’s Java leads
in reported plug-in
vulnerabilities.
• Two zero-day
vulnerabilities were
disclosed during the
month of September.Total Vulnerabilities Disclosed by Month
Source: Symantec
100200300400500600700800
S A J J M A M F JAN
2013D N O S
Plug-in Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%
Adobe Acrobat Reader
Adobe Flash PlayerApple QuickTimeOracle Sun Java
Browser Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
0%5%10%15%20%25%30%35%40%
Apple Safari
Google ChromeMicrosoft Internet ExplorerMozilla FirefoxOpera
p. 25
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
SPAM, PHISHING, & MALWAREp. 26
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
At a Glance
• The global spam rate
increased 1.2 percentage
points in September to
66.4 percent, up from 65.2
percent in August.
• Pharmaceuticals were
the most commonly
targeted industry, knocking
Education from the top
spot this month.
• The top-level domain (TLD)
for Russia, .ru, has topped
the list of malicious TLDs
in September. The TLD for
Poland, which previously
held the top spot, has
dropped from the charts.
• Sex/Dating spam continues
to be the most common
category, at 88.5 percent.
Job-related spam comes in
second at 6.5 percent.Spam
Global Spam Volume Per Day
Source: Symantec
1020304050
S A J J M A M F JAN
2013 D N O S BILLIONS
Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Geography
Source: Symantec
Geography Percent
Sri Lanka 79.7%
China 72.6%
Saudi Arabia 71.9%
Hungary 71.6%
Greece 70.5%Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Percent
Chem/Pharm 68.5%
Education 68.4%
Manufacturing 67.3%
Marketing/Media 67.1%
Non-Profit 66.9%p. 27
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
Top 10 Sources of Spam
Source: Symantec
Source Percent of All Spam
United States 7.75%
Spain 6.75%
Italy 5.92%
Finland 5.69%
India 5.67%
Argentina 5.27%
Brazil 4.72%
Canada 4.15%
Iran 3.60%
Peru 3.17%
Spam URL Distribution Based on Top Level Domain Name*
Source: Symantec
*Month .ru .com .biz .net
Aug 44.2% 30.9% 7.4% 5.5%
*Data lags one monthAverage Spam Message Size*
Source: Symantec
*Month 0Kb – 5Kb 5Kb – 10Kb >10Kb
Aug 33.1% 34.1% 32.9%
Jul 21.1% 28.2% 50.7%
*Data lags one monthSpam by Category
Source: Symantec
Category Percent
Sex/Dating 85.5%
Jobs 6.5%
Pharma 3.9%
Watches 2.3%
Software 1.0%Top 5 Activity for Spam Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Percent
1-250 65.9%
251-500 66.3%
501-1000 66.2%
1001-1500 66.5%
1501-2500 66.3%
2501+ 66.7%p. 28
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
At a Glance
• The global phishing rate is down in September, comprising one in
1055.7 email messages. In August this rate was one in 625.6.
• Financial themes continue to be the most frequent subject matter,
with 76.8 percent of phishing scams containing this theme.
• South Africa has the highest rate in September, where one in 471
emails was a phishing scam.
• The United States tops the list of sources of phishing emails,
responsible for distributing 42 percent of phishing scams.
• The Public Sector was the most targeted industry in September,
with one in every 189.5 emails received in this industry being a
phishing scam.Phishing
Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Geography
Source: Symantec
Geography Rate
South Africa 1 in 470.7
United Kingdom 1 in 517.3
Netherlands 1 in 672.6
Australia 1 in 725.4
Canada 1 in 914.6Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Rate
Public Sector 1 in 189.5
Education 1 in 656.0
Finance 1 in 701.8
Accom/Catering 1 in 737.1
Non-Profit 1 in 877.4Top 5 Activity for Phishing Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Rate
1-250 1 in 753.0
251-500 1 in 1,325.8
501-1000 1 in 1,886.2
1001-1500 1 in 1,100.6
1501-2500 1 in 2,168.6
2501+ 1 in 1,011.4
Top 10 Sources of Phishing
Source: Symantec
Source Percent
United States 41.96%
United Kingdom 17.38%
Australia 8.93%
South Africa 8.28%
Ireland 7.02%
Japan 5.00%
Germany 2.77%
Sweden 1.30%
Canada 1.09%
Hong Kong 0.83%p. 29
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
43.1%
5.2%
3.6%
1.0%47.1%Automated Toolkits
Other Unique DomainsIP Address DomainsFree Web Hosting SitesTyposquatting
Phishing Distribution:Phishing Distribution:Phishing Distribution in September
Source: Symantec
16.0%
5.2%
1.9%
0.8%76.8%FinancialInformation ServicesRetailComputer SoftwareCommunications
Organizations Spoofed
in Phishing Attacks:Organizations Spoofed
in Phishing Attacks:Organizations Spoofed in Phishing Attacks
Source: Symantecp. 30
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
Malware
1 in 50
1 in 100
1 in 150
1 in 200
1 in 250
1 in 300
1 in 350
1 in 400
1 in 450
1 in 500
S A J J M A M F JAN
2013D N O SProportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected
Source: SymantecTop 10 Email Virus Sources
Source: Symantec
Geography Percent
United Kingdom 41.19%
Ireland 21.48%
United States 18.49%
Australia 3.11%
Netherlands 2.32%
South Africa 1.63%
France 1.46%
India 1.39%
Brazil 1.12%
Canada 1.08%At a Glance
• The global average virus rate in September was one in 383.1
emails, compared to one in 340.1 in August.
• The United Arab Emirates topped the list of geographies, with one
in 159.2 emails containing a virus.
• The United Kingdom was the largest source of virus-laden emails,
making up 41.2 percent of all email-based viruses.
• Small-to-medium size businesses with 1-250 employees were
the most targeted company size, where one and 340.8 emails
contained a virus.p. 31
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Industry
Source: Symantec
Industry Rate
Public Sector 1 in 106.4
Recreation 1 in 116.8
Transport/Util 1 in 191.7
Accom/Catering 1 in 262.4
Education 1 in 305.5
Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Company Size
Source: Symantec
Company Size Rate
1-250 1 in 340.8
251-500 1 in 372.1
501-1000 1 in 547.8
1001-1500 1 in 416.1
1501-2500 1 in 691.4
2501+ 1 in 352.8Top 5 Activity for Malware Destination by Geographic Location
Source: Symantec
Geography Rate
United Arab Emirates 1 in 159.2
United Kingdom 1 in 192.6
Austria 1 in 299.2
Netherlands 1 in 312.2
Italy 1 in 409.9p. 32
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
At a Glance
• Variants of W32.Ramnit accounted for 17.6 percent of all malware
blocked at the endpoint.
• In comparison, 7.3 percent of all malware were variants of
W32.Sality.
• Approximately 39.0 percent of the most frequently blocked
malware last month was identified and blocked using generic
detection.Endpoint Security
Top 10 Most Frequently Blocked Malware
Source: Symantec
Malware Percent
W32.Ramnit!html 6.98%
W32.Sality.AE 6.62%
W32.Ramnit.B 5.90%
W32.Ramnit.B!inf 4.05%
W32.Almanahe.B!inf 3.67%
W32.Downadup.B 3.28%
W32.Virut.CF 2.29%
Trojan.Zbot 1.75%
Trojan.Maljava 1.39%
W32.SillyFDC 1.29%p. 33
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
Policy Based Filtering
Source: Symantec
Category Percent
Social Networking 48.07%
Advertisement & Popups 20.35%
Hosting Sites 4.15%
Streaming Media 3.46%
Computing & Internet 3.29%
Peer-To-Peer 2.66%
Chat 2.58%
Search 2.40%
Gambling 1.70%
Portal 1.20%Policy Based Filtering
At a Glance
• The most common trigger for policy-based filtering applied by
Symantec Web Security .cloud for its business clients was for the
“Social Networking” category, which accounted for 48.1 percent
of blocked Web activity in September.
• “Advertisement & Popups” was the second-most common trigger,
comprising 20.4 percent of blocked Web activity.p. 34
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2013
About SymantecContributors
More Information
• Security Response Publications: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/publications /
• Internet Security Threat Report Resource Page: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport /
• Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response /
• Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer /
• Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex /Special thanks to Stephen Doherty and Gavin O’Gorman for their contributions this month.
Symantec protects the world’s information and is a global leader in security, backup, and
availability solutions. Our innovative products and services protect people and information
in any environment—from the smallest mobile device to the enterprise data center to cloud-
based systems. Our world-renowned expertise in protecting data, identities, and interactions
gives our customers confidence in a connected world. More information is available at
www.symantec.com or by connecting with Symantec at go.symantec.com/socialmedia .
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
SEPTEMBER 2014p. 2
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2014
CONTENTS
3 Summary
4 TARGETED ATTACKS + DATA BREACHES
5 Targeted Attacks
5 Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing
Emails
5 Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of
Targeted Organization
5 Average Number of Spear-Phishing
Attacks Per Day
6 Top-Ten Industries Targeted
in Spear-Phishing Attacks
7 Data Breaches
7 Timeline of Data Breaches
8 Total Identities Exposed
8 Top Causes of Data Breaches
8 Total Data Breaches
9 Top-Ten Types of Information Breached
10 MALWARE TACTICS
11 Malware Tactics
11 Top-Ten Malware
11 Top-Ten Mac OSX Malware Blocked on OSX Endpoints
12 Ransomware Over Time
12 Malicious Activity by Source: Bots
13 Vulnerabilities
13 Number of Vulnerabilities
13 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
14 Browser Vulnerabilities
14 Plug-in Vulnerabilities15 SOCIAL MEDIA
+ MOBILE THREATS
16 Mobile
16 Mobile Malware Families by Month,
Android
17 Mobile Threat Classifications
18 Social Media
18 Social Media
19 PHISHING, SPAM + EMAIL THREATS
20 Phishing and Spam
20 Phishing Rate
20 Global Spam Rate
21 Email Threats
21 Proportion of Email Traffic
Containing URL Malware
21 Proportion of Email Traffic
in Which Virus Was Detected
22 About Symantec
22 More Informationp. 3
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2014
Summary
Welcome to the September edition of the
Symantec Intelligence report. Symantec
Intelligence aims to provide the latest
analysis of cyber security threats, trends,
and insights concerning malware, spam, and
other potentially harmful business risks.
Symantec has established the most
comprehensive source of Internet threat
data in the world through the Symantec™
Global Intelligence Network, which is made
up of more than 41.5 million attack sensors
and records thousands of events per second.
This network monitors threat activity in
over 157 countries and territories through
a combination of Symantec products and
services such as Symantec DeepSight™
Threat Management System, Symantec™
Managed Security Services, Norton™
consumer products, and other third-party
data sources. The average number of spear-phishing attacks rose to 53 per day
in September, after a 12-month low in August. Spear phishing
activity has returned to levels seen earlier in the summer, but is
still down from the 12-month average of 85 attacks per day.
The .doc file type was the most common attachment type used
in spear-phishing attacks, making up more than 52.9 percent of
all attachments in September. At 4.8 percent, last month’s top
attachment, .exe file types, dropped to fourth.
There were only four publically disclosed data breaches that
took place within the month September, resulting in the
exposure of 2.5 million identities. However, there were 14
additional data breaches reported in September that took
place earlier in the year. The largest data breach reported in
September actually took place in April, and resulted in the
exposure of 56 million identities.
Ransomware continues to decline as 2014 progresses. However,
crypto-style ransomware remains high, making up 38 percent of
all ransomware detected in September.
There were 600 vulnerabilities disclosed in the month of
September, the highest number so far in 2014 and second-high -
est in the last 12 months.
One in 2,041 emails was identified as a phishing attempt,
compared with one in 1,587 for August. While at first glance this
looks like a big drop, it results in only a 0.01 percentage point
decrease in the overall phishing rate.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to
contact us with any comments or feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat Analyst
[email protected]. 4
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2014
TARGETED ATTACKS
+ DATA BREACHESp. 5
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2014
At a Glance
• The average number of
spear-phishing attacks rose
to 53 per day in September,
after a 12-month low in
August.
• The .doc file type was the
most common attachment
type used in spear-phishing
attacks. The .exe file type
dropped to fourth.
• Organizations with 2500+
employees were the most
likely to be targeted in
September.
• Manufacturing lead the
Top-Ten Industries targeted,
followed by Non-Traditional
Services.Targeted Attacks
Average Number of Spear-Phishing
Attacks Per Day
Source: Symantec :: OCTOBER 2013 — SEPTEMBER 2014
255075100125150175200225250
S A J J M A M F J
2014D N O54 53
20116
54141
84 84
5488103165
Attachments Used in Spear-Phishing
Emails
Source: Symantec :: SEPTEMBER 2014
Executable type September August
.doc 52.9% 22.8%
.scr 15.4% 4.4%
.dmp 9.1% –
.exe 4.8% 31.8%
.bin 2.6% –
.class 2.5% 4.2%
.au3 1.3% –
.7z 1.0% –
.pdf 1.0% 2.8%
.xls 0.3% –Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size
of Targeted Organization
Source: Symantec :: SEPTEMBER 2014
Organization Size September August
1-250 32.5% 28.8%
251-500 8.7% 7.8%
501-1000 8.6% 4.6%
1001-1500 3.7% 6.3%
1501-2500 3.9% 4.6%
2500+ 42.6% 47.8%p. 6
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2014
Top-Ten Industries Targeted in
Spear-Phishing Attacks
Source: Symantec :: SEPTEMBER 2014
ConstructionRetailPublic AdministrationMiningWholesaleServices - ProfessionalTransportation,
communications, electricFinance, insurance
& Real EstateServices - Non TraditionalManufacturing 25%
17
15
13
10
8
3
2
2 2p. 7
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2014
Data Breaches
At a Glance
• The largest data breach reported in September actually took
place in April, and resulted in the exposure of 56 million
identities.
• Hackers have been responsible for 56 percent of data breach -
es in the last 12 months.
• Real names, government ID numbers, such as Social Security
numbers, and home addresses were the top three types of
data exposed in data breaches.
20406080100120140160
S A J J M A M F J
2014D N O
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
IDENTITIES EXPOSED (MILLIONS)
INCIDENTS IDENTITIES EXPOSED (Millions)Timeline of Data Breaches
Source: Symantec :: OCTOBER 2013 — SEPTEMBER 2014
147
59
1 131.5
2.5 1.7 2.68.1130
113159
27
222927
25
2225
1918
17
421
510152025303540
p. 8
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2014
Top Causes of Data Breaches
Source: Symantec :: OCTOBER 2013 — SEPTEMBER 2014
Insider TheftTheft or Loss
of Computeror DriveAccidentally
Made PublicHackers
56%
19% 19%
6%Number
of Incidents
142
49
4816
255 TOTAL
Total Data
Breaches
OCTOBER 2013 — SEPTEMBER 2014
255
Total IdentitiesExposed
OCTOBER 2013 — SEPTEMBER 2014
656 Millionp. 9
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2014
Top-Ten Types of Information Breached
Source: Symantec :: OCTOBER 2013 — SEPTEMBER 2014
Real Names
Gov ID numbers (Soc Sec)Home AddressBirth DatesFinancial InformationMedical RecordsPhone NumbersEmail AddressesUsernames & PasswordsInsurance01
02030405060708091069
%
43%
41%
41%
33%
29%
19%
19%
15%
8%
Methodology
This data is procured from the Norton Cybercrime Index (CCI). The Norton CCI is a statistical model
that measures the levels of threats, including malicious software, fraud, identity theft, spam,
phishing, and social engineering daily. The data breach section of the Norton CCI is derived from
data breaches that have been reported by legitimate media sources and have exposed personal
information.
In some cases a data breach is not publicly reported during the same month the incident occurred,
or an adjustment is made in the number of identities reportedly exposed. In these cases, the data in
the Norton CCI is updated. This causes fluctuations in the numbers reported for previous months
when a new report is released.
Norton Cybercrime Index
http://us.norton.com/protect-yourselfp. 10
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2014
MALWARE TACTICSp. 11
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2014
Malware Tactics
At a Glance
• W32.Sality and W32.
Ramnit variants continue
to dominate the top-ten
malware list.
• The most common
OSX threat seen on OSX
was OSX.RSPlug.A,
making up 26 percent of
all OSX malware found on
OSX Endpoints.
• Overall ransomware
activity has remained low
since March of this year.
However, crypto-style
ransomware has been on
the rise this year, making
up 38 percent of ransom -
ware in September.
• China and the US where
first and second, respec -
tively, in September in
terms of overall botnet
source activity.Top-Ten Malware
Source: Symantec :: SEPTEMBER 2014
Rank Name September August
1 W32.Sality.AE 4.4% 4.3%
2 W32.Ramnit!html 4.3% 4.3%
3 W32.Almanahe.B!inf 3.7% 3.6%
4 W32.Ramnit.B 2.7% 3.0%
5 W32.Downadup.B 2.3% 2.7%
6 W32.SillyFDC.BDP!lnk 2.2% 2.3%
7 W32.Ramnit.B!inf 2.0% 1.9%
8 W32.Virut.CF 1.4% 1.2%
9 W32.Chir.B@mm(html) 1.4% 1.1%
10 Trojan.Zbot 1.2% 0.9%
Top-Ten Mac OSX Malware Blocked
on OSX Endpoints
Source: Symantec :: SEPTEMBER 2014
Rank Malware Name September August
1 OSX.RSPlug.A 26.3% 51.2%
2 OSX.Crisis 8.7% 2.2%
3 OSX.Flashback.K 8.7% 8.5%
4 OSX.Okaz 7.6% –
5 OSX.Stealbit.B 5.3% 8.1%
6 OSX.Netweird 5.2% 2.7%
7 OSX.Flashback 4.0% 2.6%
8 OSX.Keylogger 3.6% 1.6%
9 OSX.Klog.A 2.9% 7.2%
10 OSX.Sabpab 2.7% 4.2%p. 12
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2014
Malicious Activity by Source: Bots
Source: Symantec :: AUGUST 2014
Rank Country/Region Percent
1 China 28.5%
2 United States 18.2%
3 Taiwan 5.4%
4 Hungary 3.7%
5 Italy 2.8%
6 Canada 2.6%
7 Brazil 2.6%
8 Germany 2.1%
9 United Kingdom 2.1%
10 Turkey 2.1%
Ransomware Over Time
Source: Symantec :: OCTOBER 2013 — SEPTEMBER 2014 THOUSANDS
2004006008001000
S A J J M A M F J
2014D N O419861
660
465
342425
156 143230 183149
95p. 13
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2014
Number of Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: OCTOBER 2013 — SEPTEMBER 2014
100200300400500600700800
S A J J M A M F J
2014D N O438575600
399438471542562579
473663
555
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: OCTOBER 2013 — SEPTEMBER 2014
12345678
S A J J M A M F J
2014D N O0 0 0 0 02 2
05
014Vulnerabilities
At a Glance
• There were 600 vulner -
abilities disclosed during
the month of August.
• There were no zero-day
vulnerabilities discovered
in September.
• Internet Explorer has
reported the most brows -
er vulnerabilities in the
last 12 months.
• Oracle’s Java reported
the most plug-in vulner -
abilities over the same
time period.p. 14
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2014
Browser Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: OCTOBER 2013 — SEPTEMBER 2014
20406080100
S A J J M A M F J
2014D N O
Opera
Mozilla FirefoxMicrosoft Internet Explorer
Google Chrome
Apple Safari
Plug-in Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec :: OCTOBER 2013 — SEPTEMBER 2014
1020304050607080
Java
Apple
Adobe
ActiveX
S A J J M A M F J
2014D N O
p. 15
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2014
SOCIAL MEDIA
+ MOBILE THREATSp. 16
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2014
Mobile
Mobile Malware Families by Month,
Android
Source: Symantec :: OCTOBER 2013 — SEPTEMBER 2014
24
24
2 23 34 4 4
3
12345678910
S A J J M A M F J
2014D N O
At a Glance
• There were three Android
malware families discov -
ered in July.
• Of the threats discovered
in the last 12 months, 24
percent steal information
from the device.
• In terms of social
networking scams, 41
percent were fake offer -
ings, while 46 percent
were manually shared
scams.p. 17
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2014
Mobile Threat Classifications
Source: Symantec :: OCTOBER 2013 — SEPTEMBER 2014
Track User Risks that spy on the individual using the device, collecting SMS
messages or phone call logs, tracking GPS coordinates, recording phone calls,
or gathering pictures and video taken with the device.
Steal Information This includes the collection of both device- and user-specific
data, such as device information, configuration data, or banking details.
Traditional T hreats Threats that carry out traditional malware functions,
such as back doors and downloaders.
Recon/f_igure D evice These t ypes of risks attempt to elevate privileges
or simply modify various settings within the operating system.
Adware/Anno yance Mobile risks that display advertising or generally perform
actions to disrupt the user.
Send Conte nt These risks will send text messages to premium SMS numbers,
ultimately appearing on the bill of the device’s owner. Other risks can be used to send spam messages. 51015202530%
Adware
AnnoyanceReconfigure
DeviceSend
ContentTraditional
ThreatsTrack
UserSteal
Information5%11%24% 24%
13%24%p. 18
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2014
Social Media
Social Media
Source: Symantec :: OCTOBER 2013 — SEPTEMBER 2014
Fake Offers These scams invite social network users to join a fake event or group
with incentives such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to share
credentials with the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
Manual Sharing Scams These rely on victims to actually do the work of sharing
the scam by presenting them with intriguing videos, fake offers or messages that they share with their friends.
Likejacking Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website
buttons that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
Comment Jacking Similar to likejacking, this type of scam relies on users clicking
links that are added to comments by attackers. The links may lead to malware or survey scams.
Fake App Users are invited to subscribe to an application that appears to be
integrated for use with a social network, but is not as described and may be used to steal credentials or harvest other personal data.102030405060708090100%
Comment
JackingFake
AppsLikejacking Manual
SharingFake
Offering2% .6%41%46%
9%p. 19
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2014
PHISHING , SPAM + EMAIL THREATSp. 20
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2014
Phishing and Spam
Phishing Rate
Source: Symantec :: OCTOBER 2013 — SEPTEMBER 2014
1 in 500
1 in 1000
1 in 1500
1 in 2000
1 in 2500
S A J J M A M F J
2014D N O2041311236
306401478370
731395496
1290
1587
At a Glance
• The phishing rate was
down again in September,
at one in 2,041 emails,
down from one in 1,587
emails in August.
• The global spam rate
was 57.9 percent for the
month of September.
• One out of every 351
emails contained a virus.
• Of the email traffic in
the month of August, 5.8
percent contained a mali -
cious URL.
Global Spam Rate
Source: Symantec :: OCTOBER 2013 — SEPTEMBER 2014
102030405060708090100%
S A J J M A M F J
2014D N O656971
62 6266
5961 6064 63
58p. 21
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2014
Email Threats
Proportion of Email Traffic
Containing URL Malware
Source: Symantec :: OCTOBER 2013 — SEPTEMBER 2014
102030405060708090100%
S A J J M A M F J
2014D N O611 101416 14
6314
7 83
1 in 50
1 in 100
1 in 150
1 in 200
1 in 250
1 in 3001 in 350
1 in 400
1 in 450
1 in 500
S A J J M A M F J
2014D N OProportion of Email Traffic
in Which Virus Was Detected
Source: Symantec :: OCTOBER 2013 — SEPTEMBER 2014
351191129112
207188141
234183
232
351270p. 22
Symantec Corporation
Symantec Intelligence Report :: SEPTEMBER 2014
About Symantec
More Information
• Symantec Worldwide: http://www.symantec.com/
• ISTR and Symantec Intelligence Resources: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
• Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/
• Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer/
• Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex/Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC) is an information protection expert that helps
people, businesses and governments seeking the freedom to unlock the opportunities
technology brings – anytime, anywhere. Founded in April 1982, Symantec, a Fortune
500 company, operating one of the largest global data-intelligence networks, has
provided leading security, backup and availability solutions for where vital information
is stored, accessed and shared. The company’s more than 20,000 employees reside in
more than 50 countries. Ninety-nine percent of Fortune 500 companies are Symantec
customers. In fiscal 2013, it recorded revenues of $6.9 billion. To learn more go to
www.symantec.com or connect with Symantec at: go.symantec.com/socialmedia .
|
SYMANTEC INTELLIGENCE REPORT
SEPTEMBER 20152 | September 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
3 Summary
4 From the Security Response Blog
4 Android Marshmallow Will Not Go
Soft on Mobile Ransomware
6 September in Numbers
7 Targeted Attacks & Phishing
7 Top 10 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
7 Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
8 Phishing Rate
8 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as
Phishing by Industry Sector
9 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as
Phishing by Organization Size
10 Vulnerabilities
10 Total Number of Vulnerabilities
10 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
11 Malware
11 New Malware Variants
11 Top 10 Malware
12 Top 10 Mac OSX Malware Blocked on OSX Endpoints
12 Crypto-Ransomware Over Time
13 Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Malware Was Detected
13 Percent of Email Malware as URL vs. Attachment by Month
14 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as
Malicious by Industry Sector
14 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as
Malicious by Organization Size
15 Mobile & Social Media
15 Android Mobile Malware Families by Month
15 New Android Variants per Family by Month
16 Social Media
17 Spam
17 Overall Email Spam Rate
17 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Industry Sector
18 Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Organization Size
19 About Symantec
19 More Information
Welcome to the September edition of the
Symantec Intelligence report. Symantec
Intelligence aims to provide the latest analysis
of cyber security threats, trends, and insights concerning malware, spam, and other potentially
harmful business risks.
Symantec has established the most comprehensive
source of Internet threat data in the world through
the Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network,
which is made up of more than 57.6 million attack sensors and records thousands of events per
second. This network monitors threat activity
in over 157 countries and territories through a combination of Symantec products and services
such as Symantec DeepSight™ Intelligence,
Symantec™ Managed Security Services, Norton™ consumer products, and other third-party data
sources.3 | September 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Summary
The Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate sector was the most targeted sector during September,
comprising 27 percent of all targeted attacks. Large enterprises were the target of 45.7 percent of spear-phishing attacks in September, up from 11.7 percent in August.
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing was the most targeted sector in September for both phishing
attempts and emails containing malware. One in every 307.9 emails contained malware and one in every 988 emails was a phishing attempt. The mining sector, which includes oil and gas extraction, had the highest spam rate at 55.8 percent.
There were ten zero-day vulnerabilities disclosed in September, down slightly from August. This
includes three targeting Microsoft software and two vulnerabilities targeting security software from two vendors.
Crypto-ransomware was up during September, setting another high for 2015. However, this
device-locking type of ransomware is still down from the peak we saw last year in October.
There were 38.5 million new pieces of malware created in September, down from the high for
2015 of 57.6 million seen in June, but still higher than the numbers seen in the first few months of 2015.
OSX.Sudoprint was again the most commonly seen OS X threat on OS X endpoints in September.
This threat continues to take advantage of a vulnerability targeting the OS X operating system, discovered in July and patched in August.
We hope that you enjoy this month’s report and feel free to contact us with any comments or
feedback.
Ben Nahorney, Cyber Security Threat [email protected]
Methodology
The Symantec Intelligence Report comprises monthly analysis based on the latest data available
from the Symantec Global Intelligence Network. As new information is continually being discovered,
some metrics published in the report may be subject to change. Subsequent reports will be updated to
reflect the latest information in order to ensure the most accurate reporting and analysis of the threat landscape.4 | September 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Android Marshmallow Will Not Go Soft on Mobile Ransomware
Recent updates in the upcoming Android 6.0 will challenge mobile ransomware’s ability to lock screens.
By Dinesh Venkatesan
Last month, we blogged about some of the detec-
tion-evasion and anti-analysis tactics employed by Android ransomware and the continuous
cat-and-mouse game between the security
community and ransomware creators.
In this blog, we will look at how the Android
platform continues to evolve, and in particular
how recent changes in Android 6.0 Marshmal-low could have a potential impact in the mobile
malware ecosystem. Google is due to release the
final version of Android 6.0 before the end of September, so these changes may arrive on users’
phones sooner rather than later, depending on
their device manufacturer or carrier.
Let’s discuss some of the concepts that will help
us understand how the upcoming OS update may
affect mobile ransomware.
How does ransomware work in Android?
While there can be more than one answer to this question, the most common trick seen in almost
all of Android ransomware variants is to leverage the
“SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW” permission in order to lock infected devices’ screens. The threats largely depend on this
permission, as it allows an application to open system-type
windows and display them on top of every other application or window.
As the Figure 1 shows, a device infected with Android.
Lockdroid.E displays a WebView—a view that displays web pages—in a linear layout, with the layout type set to “TYPE_
SYSTEM_ALERT” to create a system-alert type of window.
Figure 1. Layout properties (left) set to “TYPE_SYSTEM_
ALERT” would create a system-alert type of window (right),
locking the device
Alternatively, certain Russian-language ransomware variants
tend to use “system error” or “system overlay” type of windows, which can also superimpose themselves over all other windows displayed on the device, as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Russian-language ransomware usually locks a
device’s screen using a system-error type of window
In general, ransomware variants use system-type windows—
system alert, system error, or system overlay—to create
locked screens that can appear on top of all other windows.
In Android, if any app is trying to create a system window, it
must get “android.permission.SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW”
from the user of the device.
Change is afoot
Now, ransomware creators who decide to create malware with Android Marshmallow as their target will have their
work cut out for them. Given the new changes in the latest From the Security Response Blog
Figure 1. Layout properties (left) set to “TYPE_SYSTEM_ALERT” would create a system-
alert type of window (right), locking the device5 | September 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
version of the OS, which is due to be released sometime this
month after the third and final preview was released on
August 17, ransomware creators are bound to run into some
difficulty. These changes are poised to challenge ransom-ware that relies on obtaining the permissions outlined
previously, thereby limiting its ability to lock screens.
Starting with this new version of Android, a new permis-sions model will be in force, where apps will be required to
request permissions on an as-needed basis. Device owners
will now be prompted whether to approve, on demand, when
an app tries to use a feature that needs permission from the “dangerous” category (as set by Android developers).
Besides that hurdle for creators of malicious apps, they face
an even bigger obstacle, as the final Mashmallow software development kit (SDK) has already placed the permission
“SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW” in the “above dangerous”
category.
This means that if a ransomware app has set its target SDK
as Marshmallow, it will need explicit permission from the
user to lock their device. For a user to give this permission, they need to manually navigate through not-so-straightfor -
ward steps from the Settings app before they can allow the app to lock the screen.
Backward compatibility
Does this development mean Android ransomware is on the brink of extinction? No, certainly not. While the changes are
a really good move on Android’s part, ransomware creators
could, and likely will, update their code to directly take the victims to this Settings screen and use social-engineering
tricks to convince them into turning on this permission.
More importantly, Android 6.0’s backward compatibility
feature could provide another lifeline for ransomware to
continue to infect devices running Marshmallow. The new
permission model will only be applicable if the malicious app is specifically targeting the Marshmallow SDK. If the
attacker targets a previous Android SDK (Lollipop, for
example) their ransomware could still work on a Marshmal-low device by following the older permission model.
Nevertheless, the new model is one more hurdle for ransom-
ware creators to cross when Marshmallow is fully released.
About the Security Response blog
In the Symantec Intelligence Report we republish a blog that highlights key data or an event that stood out during the month. Our security researchers around the world frequently publish new
blogs during the month on topics such as malware, security risks, vulnerabilities, and spam.
For the latest security news and information, visit:
http://www.symantec.com/connect/symantec-blogs/security-response
Figure 2. – Russian-language ransomware usually locks a device’s
screen using a system-error type of window 6 | September 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
SEPTEMBER IN NUMBERS7 | September 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Large enterprises were the target
of 45.7 percent of spear-phishing
attacks in September, up from 11.7 percent in August. Similarly, 34.5 percent of attacks were directed at small businesses with less than 250 employees.Company Size September August
1-250 34.5% 78.4%
251-500 6.6% 2.8%
501-1000 7.2% 3.3%
1001-1500 3.8% 2.3%
1501-2500 2.1% 1.4%
2501+ 45.7% 11.7%
Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
Source: Symantec
Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted OrganizationTargeted Attacks & Phishing
The Finance, Insurance, &
Real Estate sector was the most targeted sector during September, comprising 27 percent of all targeted attacks.
Top 10 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
Source: SymantecConstructionRetailNonclassifiable EstablishmentsPublic AdministrationTransportation, Communications,
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary ServicesWholesaleServices - Non TraditionalManufacturingServices - ProfessionalFinance, Insurance,
& Real Estate 27%
13
520
17
14 12
7 7
5 5
352
2
3
1 2
1 3 1September August
Top 10 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks8 | September 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Phishing Rate Inverse Graph: Smaller Number = Greater Risk
Source: Symantec400
800
1200
1600
2000
2400
2800S A J J M A M F J
2015D N O1 IN
19051172
161015171004
1465
266620571865
24481628647
Phishing Rate The overall phishing rate has
increased slightly this month,
where one in 1,172 emails was a phishing attempt.
Industry September August
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 1 in 988.0 1 in 943.7
Nonclassifiable Establishments 1 in 1,006.4 1 in 1,414.3
Services - Professional 1 in 1,194.4 1 in 1,474.3
Public Administration 1 in 1,353.2 1 in 1,177.7
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 1 in 1,888.1 1 in 2,320.3
Mining 1 in 2,062.9 1 in 2,907.0
Services - Non Traditional 1 in 2,210.3 1 in 1,917.3
Wholesale 1 in 2,303.3 1 in 2,241.0
Construction 1 in 2,324.9 1 in 2,361.4
Transportation, Communications,
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services1 in 2,828.2 1 in 3,246.0
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing
by Industry Sector
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing by Industry Sector The Agriculture, Forestry, &
Fishing sector was again the
most targeted Industry overall for phishing attempts in September, where phishing comprised one in every 988.0 emails. This rate has been higher in this sector than in
any other industry since April.9 | September 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Company Size September August
1–250 1 in 723.4 1 in 1,573.9
251–500 1 in 1,703.2 1 in 1,367.0
501–1000 1 in 1,874.8 1 in 1,736.5
1001–1500 1 in 2,169.5 1 in 2,195.5
1501–2500 1 in 1,998.8 1 in 1,862.6
2501+ 1 in 1,715.3 1 in 2,351.2
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing
by Organization Size
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Phishing by Organization Size Companies with 1-250
employees were the most
targeted organization size in September.10 | September 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
The number of vulnerabilities
disclosed increased slightly in
September, from 348 in August to 349 reported during this month.
Total Number of Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec100200300400500600700
S A J J M A M F J
2015D N O349596
428562
471 469540579
526579
348457
Total Number of VulnerabilitiesVulnerabilities
There were 10 zero-day
vulnerabilities disclosed in
September, down slightly from August. This includes three targeting Microsoft software and two targeting security software from two vendors.
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec024681012
S A J J M A M F J
2015D N O6
2
012
1 1 1
01011
3
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities11 | September 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
W32.Ramnit!html and W32.
Almanahe.B!inf continue
to be the most commonly seen malware detections in September.Rank Malware NameSeptember
PercentageMalware NameAugust
Percentage
1 W32.Ramnit!html 7.8% W32.Ramnit!html 6.3%
2 W32.Almanahe.B!inf 6.3% W32.Almanahe.B!inf 5.5%
3 W32.Sality.AE 5.6% W32.Sality.AE 5.2%
4 W32.Downadup.B 4.1% W32.Downadup.B 3.7%
5 W32.Ramnit.B 3.9% W32.Ramnit.B 3.6%
6 W32.Ramnit.B!inf 3.5% W32.Ramnit.B!inf 2.6%
7 W32.Virut.CF 1.8% W97M.Downloader 1.9%
8 W32.Chir.B@mm(html) 1.6% Trojan.Swifi 1.8%
9 Trojan.Swifi 1.4% W32.Virut.CF 1.6%
10 W97M.Downloader 1.3% W32.Chir.B@mm(html) 1.3%
Top 10 Malware
Source: Symantec
Top 10 MalwareMalware
New Malware Variants
Source: Symantec
01020304050607080
S A J J M A M F J
2015D N O57.6
53.7
46.6
38.535.944.7
33.7
26.535.8
29.244.563.6MILLIONS
New Malware Variants There were 38.5 million new
pieces of malware created in
September, down from the high for 2015 of 57.6 million seen in June, but still higher than the numbers seen in the first few months of 2015.12 | September 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
OSX.Sudoprint was again the
most commonly seen OS X threat
on OS X endpoints in September. This threat takes advantage of a vulnerability targeting the OS X operating system that was patched in August.Rank Malware NameSeptember
PercentageMalware NameAugust
Percentage
1 OSX.Sudoprint 81.6% OSX.Sudoprint 77.3%
2 OSX.RSPlug.A 3.1% OSX.RSPlug.A 7.5%
3 OSX.Klog.A 2.5% OSX.Klog.A 4.4%
4 OSX.Wirelurker 1.9% OSX.Wirelurker 1.9%
5 OSX.Keylogger 1.7% OSX.Crisis 1.5%
6 OSX.Flashback.K 1.4% OSX.Flashback.K 1.0%
7 OSX.Luaddit 1.4% OSX.Keylogger 1.0%
8 OSX.Remoteaccess 1.1% OSX.Luaddit 0.8%
9 OSX.Netweird 0.7% OSX.Sabpab 0.7%
10 OSX.Okaz 0.6% OSX.Remoteaccess 0.5%
Top 10 Mac OS X Malware Blocked on OS X Endpoints
Source: Symantec
Top 10 Mac OSX Malware Blocked on OSX Endpoints
Crypto-ransomware was up
during September, setting
another high for 2015.
Crypto-Ransomware Over Time
Source: Symantec
01020304050607080
S A J J M A M F J
2015D N O3134 353972
36
2028
2123
1648THOUSANDS
Crypto-Ransomware Over Time13 | September 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Malware Was Detected
The proportion of email traffic
containing malware decreased
this month, where one in 302 emails contained malware.100
150200
250
300
350
400S A J J M A M F J
2015D N O
1 IN
Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Malware Was Detected
Source: SymantecInverse Graph: Smaller Number = Greater Risk319
337252
302
329195207
237
274246207
246
Percent of Email Malware as URL vs. Attachment by Month
The percentage of email malware
that contains a URL remained
low this month, hovering around three percent.
Percent of Email Malware as URL vs. Attachment by Month
Source: Symantec
01020304050%
S A J J M A M F J
2015D N O3 3714
538
3 3 3 34114 | September 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Industry September August
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 1 in 307.9 1 in 227.6
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 1 in 394.1 1 in 351.4
Services - Professional 1 in 400.7 1 in 249.1
Public Administration 1 in 422.3 1 in 154.4
Construction 1 in 441.1 1 in 288.0
Wholesale 1 in 455.5 1 in 274.6
Mining 1 in 471.5 1 in 484.9
Nonclassifiable Establishments 1 in 586.2 1 in 385.9
Services - Non Traditional 1 in 603.0 1 in 311.0
Transportation, Communications,
Electric, Gas, & Sanitary Services1 in 606.1 1 in 392.6
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious
by Industry Sector
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious by Industry Sector Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing
was the most targeted sector in
September, where one in every
307.9 emails contained malware.
Company Size September August
1-250 1 in 165.0 1 in 162.1
251-500 1 in 374.4 1 in 206.0
501-1000 1 in 460.6 1 in 249.1
1001-1500 1 in 489.2 1 in 291.3
1501-2500 1 in 542.2 1 in 299.8
2501+ 1 in 596.6 1 in 409.7
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious
by Organization Size
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Malicious by Organization Size Organizations with less than 250
employees were most likely to
be targeted by malicious email in the month of September, where one in 165.0 emails was malicious.15 | September 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Mobile & Social Media
123456789
S A J J M A M F J
2015D N O
Android Mobile Malware Families by Month
Source: Symantec4
1
0 056
3
03
128 In September there were no
new mobile malware families
discovered.
Android Mobile Malware Families by Month
There was an average of 45
Android malware variants per family in the month of in August.
1020304050
S A J J M A M F J
2015D N O
New Android Variants per Family by Month
Source: Symantec40424445
373638 38 3839 39
36
New Android Variants per Family by Month16 | September 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Last 12 Months
Social Media
Source: SymantecComment
JackingFake
AppsLikejacking Fake
OfferingManual
Sharing579
14
.1 2
Manual Sharing – These rely on victims to actually do the work of sharing
the scam by presenting them with intriguing videos, fake offers or messages that they share with their friends.
Fake Offering – These scams invite social network users to join a fake event or group
with incentives such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to sharecredentials with the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
Likejacking – Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website
buttons that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
Fake Apps – Users are invited to subscribe to an application that appears to be
integrated for use with a social network, but is not as described and may be used to steal credentials or harvest other personal data.
Comment Jacking – This attack is similar to the "Like" jacking where the attacker tricks the
user into submitting a comment about a link or site, which will then be posted to his/her wall.
Social Media In the last twelve months, 79
percent of social media threats
required end users to propagate them.
Fake offerings comprised 14
percent of social media threats.17 | September 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
525350
52.2%
-.5% pts52.7%
+2.4% pts50.1%
+.4% pts
September August July
Overall Email Spam Rate
Source: Symantec
Overall Email Spam Rate The overall email spam rate in
September was 52.2 percent,
down 0.5 percentage points from August.Spam
Industry September August
Mining 55.7% 54.8%
Manufacturing 53.7% 53.9%
Construction 52.7% 53.4%
Services - Professional 52.7% 53.1%
Retail 52.6% 52.7%
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 52.1% 52.4%
Wholesale 52.1% 52.4%
Services - Non Traditional 51.8% 52.6%
Nonclassifiable Establishments 51.7% 52.6%
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 51.6% 52.0%
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Industry Sector
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Industry Sector At 55.7 percent, the Mining
sector again had the highest spam rate during September. The Manufacturing sector came in
second with 53.7 percent.18 | September 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
Company Size September August
1–250 52.3% 52.7%
251–500 52.5% 53.0%
501–1000 52.4% 52.9%
1001–1500 51.9% 52.3%
1501–2500 52.1% 52.6%
2501+ 52.2% 52.6%
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Organization Size
Source: Symantec.cloud
Proportion of Email Traffic Identified as Spam by Organization Size While most organization sizes
had around a 52 percent spam
rate, organizations with 251-500 employees had the highest rate at 52.5 percent.19 | September 2015
Symantec Intelligence Report
About Symantec
More Information
Symantec Worldwide: http://www.symantec.com/
ISTR and Symantec Intelligence Resources: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/
Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer/Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC) is an information protection expert that helps people,
businesses and governments seeking the freedom to unlock the opportunities technology brings – anytime, anywhere. Founded in April 1982, Symantec, a Fortune 500 company, operating one of the largest global data-intelligence networks, has provided leading security, backup and availability solutions for where vital information is stored, accessed and shared. The company’s more than 20,000 employees reside in more than 50 countries. Ninety-nine percent of Fortune 500 companies are Symantec customers. In fiscal 2014, it recorded revenues of $6.7 billion. To learn more go to
www.symantec.com or connect with Symantec at: go.symantec.com/socialmedia.
|
Cloud Security Threat Report (CSTR)
Volume 1 | June 2019
Adapting to the New
Reality of Evolving
Cloud Threats
Executive Summary Introduction
While Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) application usage is proliferating, and workloads are
increasingly migrating to IaaS platforms like AWS and Azure, on-premises applications,
storage, and private clouds persist. The resulting hybrid IT environment is challenging existing
security paradigms, creating complexity, and leaving organizations scrambling to keep up.
Symantec surveyed 1,250 security decision makers worldwide in Spring 2019 to understand
the shifting cloud security landscape, the scope of Shadow IT and Shadow Data usage, and to
gauge the maturity of security practices as enterprises transition to the cloud. Compared to
aggregated and anonymized telemetry data from Symantec data sources, what we found was
eye opening and often quite alarming.
Cloud Security Threat ReportOne of the biggest takeaways from our external survey is that firms
are storing data in more than one environment. Section
The Tipping Point Is Here.
Few Are Ready.
18 %
18 %
18%
17%
16%
13%Private Cloud – IaaS
Public Cloud – IaaS
On-premises
Public Cloud – SaaS
Private Cloud – SaaS
Hybrid Cloud01
53%
ARE FORGING
AHEAD
WITH CLOUD
DEPLOYMENT
0369%
ARE STILL
STORING
SOME DATA
ON PREMISESCloud Security Threat Report
Most IT and SecOps organizations don’t know how fast their
cloud portfolio is growing or what’s being used.
The majority of workloads have also shifted to the cloud.
On average, organizations report that over half (53%) of their
workload has been migrated to the cloud. However, only a
small minority (3%), have transferred all of their workloads to
a cloud platform.
Visibility into these cloud workloads is a problem. An
overwhelming majority of survey respondents (93 percent)
report issues keeping tabs on all cloud workloads.
Forty-nine (49) percent of respondents confirmed their
cloud-security manpower is inadequate to deal with all
incoming alerts.
A skills and security personnel shortage is the primary culprit:
most respondents said they need to enhance Cloud security
skills (93%) while 84 percent confirmed they needed to add
staff to close the gap. PERCEPTION
REALITY452 Visibility is Cloudy
Capacity is Maxed
041807CLOUD
APPS
FELT THEY NEEDED
TO ENHANCE CLOUD
SECURITY SKILLS 93%According to survey respondents,
the average organization believes its
employees are using 452 cloud apps.
However, according to Symantec’s own
data, the actual number of Shadow IT
apps in use per organization is nearly
four times higher, at 1,807.Cloud Security Threat Report
Companies underestimate the security impact of employee
misuse of cloud apps. The external survey estimates that
28 percent of employees engage in some kind of high-risk
behavior. Symantec’s own research again illustrates how
reality outpaces survey perceptions: 85 percent of the larger
organizations (more than 1,000 employees) reported some
high-risk users, and 30 percent of those had 100 or more
high-risk users. Most organizations’ cloud maturity is not advancing as rapidly
as the expansion of new cloud apps being deployed—a hurdle
confirmed by over half (54 percent) of respondents in the
external survey. Seventy-three (73) percent blame immature
security practices, including use of personal accounts,
and lack of multi-factor authentication (MFA) or data loss
prevention (DLP) services, for at least one cloud incident.
Only 1 in 10 survey respondents say they are able to
adequately analyze cloud traffic.73%
28%BLAME IMMATURE SECURITY
PRACTICES FOR AT LEAST
ONE CLOUD INCIDENT
OF EMPLOYEES ENGAGE
IN SOME KIND OF
HIGH-RISK BEHAVIOREmployee Behavior
is Risky BusinessImmature Practices
Prevail
05The Top Threats Section02
06The three highest threat categories, according to the external survey
respondents, are:
MANAGING
IDENTITY AND
AUTHENTICATIONACCIDENTAL
INSIDE
THREATSPHISHING
45% 43% 42%
According to Symantec internal data, of nearly 33,000 apps
evaluated for their Business Readiness Rating (BRR), which
is based on 80+ security attributes, less than 1 percent
have the requisite built-in security for regular business use
while 39 percent are not suitable at all for business use.
The majority exhibit only some necessary security controls.
Shadow Data is proliferating within both sanctioned and
unsanctioned SaaS services. More than half of external
survey respondents (52 percent) said that increased use
of cloud apps to store and share sensitive corporate data was a problem. The vast majority (93 percent) said that
they grapple with users oversharing cloud files containing
sensitive and compliance-related data, while on average 35
percent of cloud files are overshared.
More worrying are the fall-out effects that can happen
from this lax approach to security controls. The external
survey reports that 68 percent of respondents have either
seen direct or likely evidence that their data had been for
sale on the Dark Web.Cloud Security Threat Report
7Risks from
Misconfigured
Servers, Malware,
and Unauthorized
Access
Survey respondents say that nearly two-thirds of security
incidents under investigation in the last twelve months
have occurred at the cloud level, and nearly one-third of
all incidents has been classified as cloud-only.
Bad Guys
Symantec research shows that 16 percent of outbound web
traffic may come from compromised servers, directed to known
command-and-control domains that control bots or other
malware attacks. The external survey findings bear this out,
with responding organizations rating an average of 11 website
visits per week as risky, and 11 as malicious. While the numbers
don’t jump out on paper, if you do the math, the results add up
to approximately 572 risky or malicious website visits a year,
which significantly increases corporate exposure.
Internet of Things (IoT) devices are fast becoming another
important attack vector. According to external survey
respondents, the number of IoT devices causing IaaS incidents
rose for seven in ten organizations over the last year. The Threat
from Inside
Cloud incidents that result from insider threats—either
purposeful, inadvertent, or through compromised
credentials, are a major concern for 48 percent of respondents.
In addition, 21 percent of respondents said the problem
was increasing in intensity.
Immature security practices are creating serious gaps and
driving higher incidents of insider threats. Symantec research
found that 65 percent of organizations neglect to implement
multi-factor authentication (MFA) as part of the configuration of
IaaS and 80 percent don’t use encryption.
NEGLECT TO IMPLEMENT
MULTI-FACTOR
AUNTHENTICATION (MFA)
RISKY OR MALICIOUS
WEBSITE VISITS PER YEAR65%
572More than half of respondents in the external survey
confirmed their cloud security practices were not mature
enough to meet the demands of the growing use of cloud
apps, and nearly three-quarters said they experienced a
security incident in cloud-based infrastructure due to this
immaturity. Symantec’s own data confirms that 85 percent
of customers are not using Center for Internet Security
(CIS) best practices.Companies that continue to engage or accelerate cloud
services without a plan to mature their security practices
do so at their own peril. Organizations should consider
these key steps to shore up their cloud security posture:Best Practices
for Building an Effective
Cloud Security StrategySection
03
8Develop a governance
strategy supported
by a Cloud Center of
Excellence (CCoE) Embrace a
Zero-Trust
Model Promote shared
responsibilityUse automation
and artificial intelligence
wherever possible The heterogeneity of the modern enterprise environment
has added a broader set of vulnerabilities and strike
vectors. Huge visibility gaps leave organizations in the
dark about how much and where data and workloads
reside, making it harder to identify and mitigate
mounting security risks. Too many companies are not acknowledging the
perception gap in cloud security and are vastly
underestimating today’s threats. Investment in cloud
cyber security platforms that leverage automation and
AI to supplement limited human resources is a clear
way to automate defenses and enforce data governance
principles. Beyond technology, it’s time to recalibrate
culture and adopt security best practices at a human
level. It’s a combination of both that will ensure the
enterprise is sufficiently safeguarded today and more
importantly, for tomorrow when it’s anyone’s guess
what the future may bring. Conclusion
Organizations Underestimate
Cloud Risks at Their Peril Section
04
9
|
Real-Time Information 2800 Eisenhower Avenue 703-373-5100 1-877-INFOSEC
ProtectionSM Alexandria, VA 22314 703-329-3100 Fax www.riptech.com
©2002 by Riptech, Inc. All Rights Reserved
January 28, 2002
An Important Message from the President:
Over the past four years, Riptech has developed and refined an advanced infrastructure to deliver managed
security services. Leveraging this infrastructure, Riptech continually conducts sophisticated data mining
and expert analysis of security data to detect and respond to cyber attacks in real time on behalf of its clients. As a by-product of this service, Riptech maintains a vast repository of analyzed attack data. This
repository of attack data was recently analyzed to identify cyber attack trends over time.
Prior to the production of this report, attempts to summarize network attack trends were based mainly on
the statistical analysis of raw firewall log and intrusion detection alert data, which for a variety of reasons
tend to overestimate the true intensity of attacks and provide misleading conclusions regarding the true nature of Internet-based threats. Other techniques rely strictly on survey results, which suffer from
inconsistent attack detection capabilities, as well as inherent inaccuracies associated with self-reporting of
security incidents. In sum, while both of these methods provide a baseline understanding of cyber attack activity, each lacks a systematic process for detecting, analyzing, and validating security attacks that are
used in the trending analysis.
As the observations discussed in the Internet Security Threat Report demonstrate, Riptech is uniquely
positioned to provide a more refined picture of cyber attack trends over time. In many cases, the findings
simply confirm observations set forth by others, while in other cases, the findings directly conflict with conventional wisdom. Findings presented in this report are enlightening and, in several instances, uncover
previously unknown observations about the nature of cyber attack activity and intensity.
In summary, we believe that a wide variety of audiences stand to benefit from this report. Security
administrators at individual companies will use this information to gain a more precise understanding of
their unique risk profile and thereby create more informed mitigation decisions. Members of the media will use the report as a source of information concerning the nature of the cyber threat. Finally, members of the
information security community will use this information to obtain more clarity on the nature of cyber
security threats and thereby provide a higher level of security to their clients.
We hope that you find the observations in this report to be useful, and we look forward to sharing
additional insights in future issues of the report.
Sincerely,
Amit Yoran President and Chief Executive Officer
now from
©2002 by Riptech, Inc. All Rights Reserved
Riptech Internet Security Threat Report
Attack Trends for Q3 and Q4 2001
Introduction
Riptech’s Internet Security Threat Report offers a broad quantitative analysis of Internet-
based attacks targeted at hundreds of organizations during the last half of 2001. Because
of the large sample size of the organizations studied (selected from Riptech’s client base), the trends presented in this report provide an overall indicator of threats faced by the
entire Internet community.
Trends presented in this report are made possible by Riptech’s managed security service.
Enabled by the Caltarian
SM technology platform, Riptech analyzes data produced by
numerous brands of firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDSs) used by hundreds of
clients throughout the world. Using a sophisticated combination of technology and
human expertise to analyze this data, Riptech identifies and investigates cyber attacks that
occur on client networks in real-time. A by-product of this daily investigation of Internet attacks is a vast amount of data on cyber threats that can be analyzed to reveal interesting
and actionable trends. Due to the nature of the data that is collected, it is important to
note that the majority of detected attacks are from external threats. While internal attacks (i.e., those launched by company insiders) are also detected, the trends in this report focus
on the threat of attacks launched from the outside.
We believe this study provides a uniquely accurate view of the state of Internet threats.
Over the past six months alone, Riptech investigated 128,678 cyber attacks on behalf of
its clients. These attacks were detected by analyzing more than 5.5 billion firewall logs and IDS alerts. Trends discussed in this report are based on the historical analysis of
these attacks. Because the analysis is based on consistent, comparable data reviewed by
expert analysts, the findings offer a more reliable view of the state of Internet security as compared to studies that rely on less controlled methodologies.
1 For example, survey-
based studies suffer from the widely disparate ways in which organizations detect, track, calculate, and report security incidents. Open source data collection services, which are based on the automated analysis of firewall and IDS logs submitted voluntarily by
companies, suffer from the inclusion of large numbers of false-positive security events.
In sum, the Riptech Internet Security Threat Report is the first large-scale study to analyze Internet attacks based on actual empirical attack data that have been consistently
collected and analyzed over an extended period of time.
1 See Appendix A for a detailed discussion of different types of methodologies that organizations use to investigate Internet-based attack trend s.
January 2002 Riptech, Inc.
2800 Eisenhower Avenue Alexandria, VA 22314
703-373-5100
Primary Authors
Tim Belcher Chief Technology Officer
Elad Yoran
Founder & Executive Vice
Presiden t
Contributing Authors
Mark Higgins Brian Dunphy
Jeff Odom
Media Contact
Michael Adler
Dir., Corp. Communications
703-373-5163
[email protected]
In order to ensure that the Internet community is informed of future attack trends that emerge on the Internet,
Riptech will continue to publish the Internet Security Threat Report on a semi-annual basis. In addition to
revisiting trends addressed in this report (e.g., attack intensity by industry), future reports will investigate
entirely new trends and hypotheses in order to provide even deeper insights into the nature of the Internet
security threat and how it is evolving over time. TIMELINE FOR FUTURE REPORTSnow from
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 3
DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE SAMPLE SET 5
/xrhombus INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION 5
/xrhombus COMPANY SIZE 6
/xrhombus OWNERSHIP TYPE 6
METHODOLOGY 7
/xrhombus ATTACK IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION 7
/xrhombus CLIENT CLASSIFICATIONS 8
/xrhombus ATTACK METRICS 9
GENERAL ATTACK TRENDS 12
/xrhombus ATTACKER INTENT 12
/xrhombus ATTACK INTENSITY 13
/xrhombus ATTACK SCOPE AND SEVERITY 14
/xrhombus ATTACK SOURCE 15
COMMON ATTACK ACTIVITY 17
/xrhombus OVERVIEW 17
/xrhombus TOP TEN ATTACKS 17
THREAT VARIANCE BY TYPE OF COMPANY 19
/xrhombus ATTACKS BY INDUSTRY 19
/xrhombus ATTACKS BY COMPANY SIZE AND OWNERSHIP TYPE 21
CONCLUSIONS 23
APPENDIX A—VALUE OF ANALYZED ATTACK DATA A-1
/xrhombus OVERVIEW A-1
/xrhombus ANALYSIS OF UNANALYZED VERSUS VALIDATED ATTACKS A-2
/xrhombus CONCLUSIONS A-3
APPENDIX B—ANALYSIS OF CODE RED AND NIMDA B-1
/xrhombus BACKGROUND B-1
/xrhombus CODE RED B-2
/xrhombus CODE RED II B-3
/xrhombus NIMDA B-4
/xrhombus DISCUSSION B-5
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Riptech’s analysis of attack data revealed a wealth of interesting observations, many of
which represent original findings. Overall, it appears that the external threat is increasing steadily, and may, in fact, be increasing more rapidly than is commonly reported by other
Internet security studies. In addition, while the Internet community as a whole appears to
suffer from an increased threat from outside attacks, the relative threat to individual organizations appears to vary significantly depending on factors such as company size,
company ownership, and industry affiliation. Major findings discussed in this report are
summarized below.
Major Findings
/circle4 The growing threat of worm-related activity
- Not surprisingly, the Nimda and Code Red worms generated the majority
of attack activity, accounting for 63% of all attack activity detected by Riptech.
- The enormous impact of these two worms, which only targeted a handful
of web server vulnerabilities, demonstrates the persistent, broad-scale prevalence of vulnerabilities to major attacks.
- New worms and variants of existing worms will certainly appear in the
future, as hackers discover new vulnerabilities and innovative ways to exploit existing vulnerabilities.
- As a final note on worm activity, because the data set was so heavily
affected by these two events, subsequent analysis removes these two incidents from consideration (unless otherwise noted) in order to reveal
other underlying trends and issues.
2
/circle4 The rate of attack activity increased substantially over the past six months
- Average attacks per company increased by 79% between July and
December 2001.
- While less than 1% of all attacks detected by Riptech posed a severe and
immediate threat to clients, the raw number of severe attacks (i.e., nearly
1,000 critical and emergency attacks), was still substantial due to the sheer volume of total attacks.
- Furthermore, over the past six months more than 43% of companies
suffered at least one attack that would have resulted in a successful breach had intervention not occurred on the client’s behalf.
/circle4 A substantial percentage of attacks appeared to be deliberately targeted at a
specific organization
- 39% of attacks appeared to be a deliberate attempt to compromise a
specific target system or company; 61% of attacks appeared to be opportunistic in nature (i.e., the attacker was broadly searching for any
vulnerable system on the Internet).
- The rate of targeted attacks was 42% for companies with greater than 1,000
employees, directionally suggesting that larger, higher profile companies
may be the victims of deliberate attacks more frequently than lower profile
companies.
2 See Appendix B for a detailed discussion of the Code Red and Nimda worms.
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/circle4 The vast majority of attacks against the sample were launched from a small
number of countries
- Ten countries were the source of approximately 70% of all attacks against
the sample.
- The United States (30%), South Korea (9%), and China (8%) were the
most frequent sources of attack, accounting for approximately 47% of all
attacks.
- In terms of the number of attacks launched per Internet user, Israel was by
a wide margin the largest source of attack activity; in addition, five of the
top ten attacking countries per Internet user are located in the Pacific Rim,
including Hong Kong, Thailand, South Korea, Malaysia, and Taiwan.
- South Korea, France, and Taiwan were top ten attack sources BOTH in
terms of total attacks and attacks per Internet capita.
/circle4 Different industries suffer significantly different rates of attack intensity and
severity
- High Tech, Financial Services, Media/Entertainment, and Power and
Energy companies showed the highest intensity of attacks per company;
each averaged more than 700 attacks per company over the past six
months.
- Power and Energy companies suffered severe attacks at a rate that was
more than twice the mean of all companies in the sample set.
- Power and Energy companies suffered attacks from the Middle East at a
rate that was more than 3 times greater than the mean for all companies in
the sample set.
- High Tech and Financial Services companies suffered attacks from Asia at
a rate that was 55-70% greater than the mean for all companies in the
sample set.
/circle4 Attack intensity and intent varied moderately depending on company size and
significantly based on ownership type
- Companies with greater than 500 employees suffered at least 50% more
attacks per company than companies with fewer than 500 employees.
- Attackers are slightly more likely to launch targeted attacks against
companies with more than 1,000 employees than companies with less than 1,000 employees.
- Public companies suffered approximately twice the number of attacks per
company as private and nonprofit companies.
It is important to note that the majority of the analysis presented in this report excludes attacks associated
with the Code Red and Nimda worms. This decision was made because while these two incidents only represent two distinct events that occurred over the past six months, they accounted for approximately 63%
of the malicious activity detected by Riptech. When evaluating overall attack trends, Nimda and Code Red
are discussed as two distinct security-related events during the study period. If Riptech were to include Code Red and Nimda in the overall analysis of attack activity, all major trends in the report would primarily
reflect activity associated with these two single events. Therefore, unless otherwise indicated, trends in this
report do not include attack activity associated with these worms. AN IMPORTANT NOTE ABOUT CODE RED AND NIMDA
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DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE SAMPLE SET
The sample set from which the attack trends in this report were derived consists of more
than 300 companies, located in more than 25 countries throughout the world. Combined, the security devices at these companies protect more than 1 million Internet-connected
hosts. In terms of diversity, the sample set includes a broad array of organizations as
measured by criteria such as industry, size, and ownership type. Key characteristics of the sample set are outlined in greater detail throughout the remainder of this section.
/xrhombus Industry Classification
Industry segments with the strongest representation include Business Services, High
Tech, and Financial Services. Figure 1 presents the industry break down of the sample
set in percentage terms.
Business Services
25%
High Tech
14%
Financial Services
11%E-Commerce
9%Other
8%Manufacturing
8%Healthcare
6%Media/Entertainment
6%Power & Energy
5%Nonprofit
4%ASP
4%FIGURE 1—I NDUSTRY BREAK DOWN OF SAMPLE
* ”Other” includes industries that each represents less than 2% of the sample size. Industries that are accounted for in this
category include retail, telecommunications, transportation, education, legal, government, and real estate.
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/xrhombus Company Size
The total number of employees was used as a proxy to measure company size.
Figure 2 indicates the break down by company size for the sample set.
/xrhombus Ownership Type
Privately owned companies constitute the majority of the sample set. Nonprofit and
government entities combined represent approximately 11% of the sample. Figure 3
indicates the break down by ownership type for the sample set.
1,000 - 4,999
12%5,000+
11%
500 - 999
8%
Fewer than 500
69%FIGURE 2—C OMPANY SIZE BY NUMBER OF
EMPLOYEES FOR THE SAMPLE
Private
72 %Public
17%Nonprofit
7%Go vernment
4%FIGURE 3—C OMPANY OWNERSHIP TYPE
FOR THE SAMPLE
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METHODOLOGY
Trends discussed in this report are based solely on the analysis of cyber attacks that were
directed at a sample of organizations selected from among Riptech’s client base. The
subset consisted of well over 300 companies that subscribed to Riptech’s real-time
security monitoring service over the past six months. Each attack that was analyzed for this report was identified, investigated, and commented on by Riptech’s Security
Operations Center (SOC) analysts. False positive signs of malicious activity (which
often constitute up to 99% of raw IDS alerts) are excluded from this analysis, as these alerts provide a misleading perception of the true nature of the Internet security threat.
Over the past six months, Riptech analyzed, confirmed, and categorized 128,678 attacks,
which were generated from the analysis of more than 5.5 billion firewall logs and IDS alerts. It is these 128,678 attacks that were analyzed for this report.
In order to provide a detailed understanding of how attack trends were determined, this section outlines the following three critical components of Riptech’s methodology:
/circle4 Attack Identification and Classification —This is the process that Riptech uses to
identify, investigate, and classify attacks that are directed toward clients. The attack
identification and classification process enables Riptech to focus the analysis in this
report exclusively on actual confirmed attacks.
/circle4 Client Classification —Riptech categorizes each of its clients according to a wide
range of criteria, such as industry, company size, and company ownership type. Categorizing clients by different criteria enables Riptech to observe how attack
trends vary for different types of organizations.
/circle4 Attack Metrics —Riptech used five attack metrics to determine the nature of attack
activity against Riptech’s clients over time. Metrics used in this report include attack
intensity, attack severity, attack type, attack source, and attacker intent.
Each of the three core components of Riptech’s methodology is summarized in greater
detail throughout the remainder of this section.
/xrhombus Attack Identification and Classification
Identification and classification of attacks is the end result of a sophisticated process that
involves the use of complex technology and analysis by Riptech security experts.
Through this process Riptech is able to analyze every firewall log and IDS alert generated by client devices and isolate and investigate entire attack sequences in real time. The
combination of sophisticated technology and expert human analysis ensures that the
attack identification process is comprehensive and consistent over time. Figure 4
outlines the key steps of the attack identification and classification process.
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FIGURE 4—A TTACK IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION PROCESS
Stage of Analysis Description Data Generated during
the Six-Month Period
Stage #1—Collection and
Normalization of Security Data
from Clients’ Firewalls and IDSs Security data is imported from firewalls and/or IDSs,
normalized into a standard format, and stored in a dedicated client database. 5.5 billion firewall logs and
IDS alerts
Stage #2—Data Mining of Normalized Security Data Security data is continuously mined by Caltarian to isolate
occurrences and/or patterns of potentially malicious activity. Once identified, such patterns or occurrences of malicious activity are stored as sub-events in a separate table within the database. 3.2 million sub-events
Stage #3—Security Event
Correlation and Presentation Security sub-events generated during the data mining stage are
linked by logical criteria, such as attack type, attack direction, and source IP. For example, a correlated security event may present all signs of attacks detected from a single IP address in China. Security events are then posted to a graphical user interface (GUI) in the Riptech SOC, and security analysts review and investigate each event to determine the type and severity of the event. 652,605 possible attacks
Stage #4—Attack Classification After completing an investigation of the possible attack,
attacks that are determined to be “false positive” are eliminated from consideration.
* Confirmed attacks are assigned a
signature that indicates the type of attack that has occurred. Based upon the apparent intent and sophistication of the activity, attacks are also assigned a severity level. Only attacks that are assigned a signature number and severity level are analyzed in this report. 128,678 validated attacks
* False positive attacks represent attacks that were initially flagged as potentially malicious, but later determined to be benig n after evaluation by a Riptech
security analyst. Over the past six months 523,927 possible attacks were determined by analysts to be “false positives.”
/xrhombus Client Classifications
The sample set was classified according to a wide variety of criteria. Classifications were
based on information obtained from the client and from public sources. Organizations
were categorized according to 9 different classifications:
/circle4 Industry
/circle4 Company size (by number of employees)
/circle4 Company location
/circle4 Ownership type (public, private, etc.)
/circle4 Membership in Fortune 500
/circle4 Multinational presence
/circle4 Parent company
/circle4 Security device type (e.g., firewall or IDS)
/circle4 Security device brand and version
For this report, Riptech focused on trends related to industry, company size, and ownership type, as these classifications demonstrated the most significant variance in
threat exposure. For future reports, other classifications, such as geographic location,
may also be highlighted. In addition, several new classifications will be added in future reports and will be used to determine additional risk factors that affect the nature of the
cyber security threats for different types of companies.
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/xrhombus Attack Metrics
Riptech uses five basic metrics to determine trends in attack activity over time. These
metrics are then applied to different classifications of clients to determine how the cyber-
security threat differs for companies that share common characteristics. For example, attack intensity is evaluated for companies that reside in different industries to see if
certain industries are more prone to attack than others. Each metric used to measure the
relative cyber security threat is summarized throughout the remainder of this section.
Attack Intensity
Overall, attack intensity was determined by looking at the total number of attacks per
company that were detected against the sample over a set time (i.e., day, week, month,
etc.). By calculating the average attacks per company each day, and then averaging the sum of these averages over six months, Riptech was able to accurately account for clients
that were added to the sample set throughout the past six months. In sum, these formulas
ensured that changes to the Riptech client base over time did not affect measures of attack intensity.
Attack Severity
Every attack that is identified and investigated by Riptech security analysts is assigned a
severity rating. The primary purpose of this rating system is to enable Riptech’s clients to prioritize their review of security events based upon the relative level of danger that
the event presents to their organization. A determination of severity is made by
considering characteristics of an attack, defense mechanisms used by the client, and the value of the assets that are at risk.
For the purposes of this report, the severity rating enabled Riptech to determine differences in the danger faced by various types of organizations over time. Figure 5
outlines the four severity ratings that Riptech assigns to attacks and explains the types of
attacks that are included in each category.
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FIGURE 5—E VENT SEVERITY SCALE
Severity Level Description
Informational These events consist of scans for malicious services and IDS events that do not have a significant impact on the
client’s network. Example:
/circle4 Scans for vulnerable services where all connection attempts are dropped by the firewall.
Warning These events represent malicious attacks that were successful in bypassing the firewall, but did not compromise
the intended target systems. Example:
/circle4 Scans/horizontal sweeps where some connections were allowed, but a compromise has not occurred.
Critical These events are malicious in nature and require action on the part of Riptech or the client to remedy a weakness
or actual exploit of the client network or devices. By definition, if a critical event is not addressed with countermeasures, the attack may result in a successful compromise of a system. Examples:
/circle4 Continuous attacks by a single IP address against the client network.
/circle4 A significant vulnerability on the customer's network that was identified by either an attacker or the
Security Operations Center (SOC). For example, a web exploit is observed and appears to be successful, but there is no observed follow-up activity to take advantage of the vulnerability.
/circle4 Unknown suspicious traffic that warrants an investigation by the client to track or eliminate the traffic flow.
Emergency These events indicate that a security breach has occurred on the client’s protected network. An emergency event
requires the client to initiate some form of recovery procedure. Examples:
/circle4 Successful exploit of a vulnerable web server.
/circle4 Successful compromise of a system by a worm (e.g., Nimda).
Attack type
In order to gain a better understanding of attack trends over time, Riptech analysts
categorize attack activity of a similar nature using a numbering system.3 In effect, each
type of attack activity that is identified by Riptech is assigned a signature number that
indicates the specific actions taken by an attacker. For example, an attempt by an
attacker to exploit the Microsoft IIS Unicode vulnerability is assigned a unique signature number each time it is detected by Riptech analysts. Currently, Riptech tracks thousands
of different forms of attack activity, and analysts are adding new signatures daily as new
vulnerabilities and attack methods emerge. In order to measure the frequency of different types of attack activity, Riptech measured the percentage of validated attacks that
contained specific forms of attack activity.
3 Due to the large number of attack signatures (and the fact that these signatures are considered valuable intellectual property ), a comprehensive listing of
specific signatures tracked by Riptech is not included in this report.
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Attack Source
Riptech identified the national and regional source of attacks by cross-referencing source
IP addresses of every attack with several third party databases that are able to link the
geographic location of hosts to the source IP address. While these databases are reliable at a high level, there is some margin of error. Currently, Riptech cross references source
IPs of attacks against every country in the world and also analyzes attack trends
according to the following regions as defined by the 2001 CIA World Fact Book :
/circle4 Africa
/circle4 Asia
/circle4 Caribbean
/circle4 Eastern Europe
/circle4 Latin America /circle4 Middle East
/circle4 North America
/circle4 Oceania
/circle4 South America
/circle4 Western Europe
Attacker Intent
In order to determine general attacker objectives, Riptech looked at a sample of more
than 100 clients who share a common network block. Riptech then examined all attacks launched against these clients, and determined the percentage of clients that suffered
targeted versus opportunistic attacks. Figure 6 outlines how each type of attack was
categorized as targeted versus opportunistic.
FIGURE 6—D EFINITIONS OF ATTACKER INTENT
Objective Description
Opportunistic Opportunistic attacks appear to be intent on locating any vulnerable system that exists on the
Internet regardless of who owns the system or the specific function of the system. In this situation the victim of the attack was not identified in advance, but rather was selected after being identified as a vulnerable system. Typically, these attacks are preceded by a scan of many systems on the Internet until the attacker pinpoints a system that has vulnerabilities that he/she knows how to compromise.
Targeted Targeted attacks appear to be directed at a specific organization. In theory, attackers who
launch these types of attacks have identified the target company in advance and have made a conscious and deliberate attempt to gain access to their network. In this situation, the attacker is not looking for a specific vulnerability to gain access to ANY organization, but rather is looking for ANY vulnerability that will enable them to gain access to a specific system. For this report, these include all attacks in which the attacker did not perform any scan on any other networks within the network block of the sample set. In this situation, the attacker has only shown signs of malicious activity against one client.*
* It is important to note that it is possible that some attacks that appear targeted are actually opportunistic in nature. This is due to the fact that some attackers may use tools that randomly select a target without systematically scanning an entire network block for vulnerable systems. While it is expected that the number of these occurrences is small, this does introduce some margin of error in this calculation.
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GENERAL ATTACK TRENDS
An analysis of attacks against the sample set revealed several interesting findings.
Overall, these findings strongly suggest that attack activity is severe, diverse, and steadily increasing. In order to provide a broad sense of the attack trends observed against the
entire sample set, findings related to each of Riptech’s five attack metrics are discussed
throughout this section.
/xrhombus Attacker Intent
One of the most intriguing and challenging questions about Internet attacks is that of
intent—was the attacker targeting a specific organization, or simply trolling the Internet
and searching for an opportunity to exploit any vulnerable systems. The electronic data trail leaves few clues around this issue, since the same exploits and methodologies are
frequently used for both types of attacks. That said, Riptech has created a methodology
to separate two general classes of attack: those that are opportunistic (i.e., the attack is intended to exploit any vulnerable organization discovered on the Internet), and those that
are targeted specifically at a given organization.
The results of Riptech’s analysis of targeted versus opportunistic attacks suggest that
39% of attacks were targeted toward a specific organization, while 61% were
opportunistic in nature. While some number of the attacks classified as targeted may simply result from hackers that randomly selected targets (without scanning a network
block to systematically identify vulnerable systems), it appears that the percentage of
total attacks that are targeted in nature is significantly larger than is typically reported.
Opportuni sti c Attacks
61 %Targeted Attacks
39%FIGURE 7—A TTACKS BY ATTACKER INTENT
Note: The methodology to determine the frequency of each type of attack is described in further detail in
the Methodology section of this report under Figure 6 .
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/xrhombus Attack Intensity
An analysis of overall attack activity over the past six months indicates that the intensity
of cyber attacks is severe and increasing steadily. The average Riptech client suffered
approximately 25 attacks per week over the six-month period. Figure 8 shows total
attack activity by week over the past six months.
Based on Figure 8 , several observations are worthy of note.
/circle4 Steady Rise in Attack Intensity —The intensity of attacks against the sample set
rose nearly 79% in the past six months. This rise began in the third week of
September, peaked during the middle of November, and has shown a slight decline
since the first week in December. While this rise in intensity may be magnified to some extent by the fact that Riptech is constantly adding new attack signatures to its
database, overall, there is little doubt that the rate of attacks increased measurably
over the past six months.
/circle4 Impact of September 11th Terrorist Attacks —Excluding Nimda, there was no
noticeable impact on attack activity during the week following September 11th. However, attack intensity rose precipitously within two weeks of the terrorist attacks.
It is not clear whether there is a causal relationship, but the change in attack rates
soon after September 11th is substantial.
/circle4 Code Red and Nimda Effect —While activity associated with these two worms is
not included in Figure 8 , these events were responsible for approximately 63% of
the overall malicious activity detected by Riptech over the past six months. As such,
these two worms presented two of the most significant challenges to the Internet
community during this time period.
051015202530354045
8-Jul
15-Jul
22-Jul
29-Jul
5-Aug
12-Aug
19-Aug
26-Aug
2-Sep
9-Sep
16-Sep
23-Sep
30-Sep
7-Oct
14-Oct
21-Oct
28-Oct
4-Nov
11-Nov
18-Nov
25-Nov
2-Dec
9-Dec
16-Dec
23-Dec
30-Dec
WeekAverage Attacks Per CompanyFIGURE 8—A TTACKS PER COMPANY PER WEEK
Note: Date labels indicate the last day of the week for each data point. It is important to note that in order to provide a full w eek
worth of data, attacks detected on December 31, 2001 were excluded from this analysis.
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/xrhombus Attack Scope and Severity
The scope of attack activity over the past six months was extremely broad. In fact, 100%
of the sample experienced some form of attack activity. This discovery strongly indicates
that the extent of the threat on the Internet may be even greater than indicated by several recent reports. In fact, our findings strongly suggest that once companies connect their
systems to the Internet, they are virtually guaranteed to suffer some form of attack
activity. Figure 9 illustrates this point by highlighting the percentage of companies that
suffered at least one attack in different severity levels.
Despite the high percentage of clients that suffered attacks over the past six months, it is important to note that, on a percentage basis, the vast majority of attacks were relatively
benign in nature. In fact, approximately 99% of the attacks detected against Riptech’s
clients were informational in nature and presented no immediate threat. That said, critical and emergency-level events have been detected on the networks of 43% of
Riptech’s clients, indicating that, without real-time intervention, actual security breaches
were imminent at some point in the past six months for nearly half of Riptech’s clients.
4
4 Clients that suffered emergency events are not necessarily a subset of clients that suffered critical events; therefore, the n umber of clients that suffered
either a critical or emergency event is slightly higher than the number of clients that suffered a critical event only. 1 00.0%
93.0%
41 .0%
12 . 7 %
0%20%40%60%80%100%120%
Informational Warning Critical Emergency
Severity Lev elPercent of Companies
Suffering at least One EventFIGURE 9—P ERCENTAGE OF COMPANIES
SUFFERING ATTACKS BY SEVERITY
Note: Refer to Figure 5 for a full description of the type of activity associated with each severity level.
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/xrhombus Attack Source
The breadth of attack activity against the sample set was equally diverse in terms of
attack source. Over the past six months alone, Riptech detected attacks originating from
140 countries; however, it is important to add that 70% of these attacks originated from only 10 countries. The United States was the source of the largest number of attacks,
which is most likely because the U.S. maintains the largest Internet user base (148
million according to 2001 CIA estimates), as well as the fact that many global ISPs register all IP space in the U.S.
5 South Korea and China, also with large Internet user
bases, were the second and third largest sources of attack. Figure 10 shows the top ten
attacking countries against the sample set.
Riptech also analyzed the relative intensity of attacks originating in different countries, as
measured by the number of attacks generated by that country in relation to the number of
Internet users. Figure 11 shows the top ten attacking countries as a function of attacks
per 10,000 Internet users within the country.
5 Central Intelligence Agency. 2001 World Fact Book. http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook 2.0%2.5% 2.5% 2.6%3.9%4.5%5.9%7.8%8.8%29.6%
0%5%10%15%20%25%30%35%
Japan
Great Britain
Italy
Taiwan
Canada
France
Germany
China
South Korea
United States
Origin of AttackPercentage of Total AttacksFIGURE 10—T OP TEN ATTACK SOURCES BY COUNTRY
Note: Figure 10 shows the percentage of attacks that came from the ten most frequent sources of attack. Overall, these 10 countries were the source of
70% of the attacks against the sample set.
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Adjusting for the number of Internet users in each country revealed several interesting findings:
/circle4 Despite showing only a modest overall number of attacks, the intensity of attacks
from Israel is nearly double the attack intensity rate of any other individual country.
/circle4 Five of the top ten attacking countries are located in the Pacific Rim; these include
Hong Kong, South Korea, Thailand, Taiwan, and Malaysia.
/circle4 South Korea, France, and Taiwan rated high on BOTH the total attack and attack
intensity scale.
/circle4 Despite the overwhelming number of attacks originating from the United States, the
U.S. has a relatively low rate of attack intensity (averaging only 3.5 attacks per
10,000 Internet users).
Possible contributing factors to these differences among country attack rates include:
varying legislation around computer crime; varying levels of security awareness leaving
countries more vulnerable to being used as a launching point for attacks; presence of state-sponsored cyber espionage; and other social, political, and cultural issues.
7.07 7.1 0 7.52 7.74 7.858.6010 .0 311.5 714 .5 026.1 6
051015202530
Denmark
Taiwan
Poland
Malaysia
Turkey
France
South Korea
Thailand
Hong Kong
Israel
Origin of AttacksAttacks per 10,000 Internet UsersFIGURE 11—T OP TEN ATTACK
SOURCES PER INTERNET CAPITA
Note: Figure 11 shows the top ten attack sources in terms of the number of attacks per 10,000 Internet users in the country. In order to
ensure that this measure is statistically significant, this metric was only applied to countries with more than 1,000,000 Inter net users.
The number of Internet users in each country was derived from the CIA’s 2001 World Fact Book.
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COMMON ATTACK ACTIVITY
/xrhombus Overview
The diversity of attacks detected over the past six months against the sample is significant. In fact, Riptech detected the use of several thousand different types of attack
activity. Despite this diversity, it is important to note that approximately 63% of all
malicious activity detected over the past six months was related to the outbreak of the Code Red and Nimda worms. Overall, Microsoft's Internet Information Services IIS
vulnerabilities, which only affect Windows-based systems, were the target of the majority
of attacks. While there are several other high impact vulnerabilities that affect Windows systems, many of these were successfully mitigated by the use of firewalls.
/xrhombus Top Ten Attacks
When analyzing the most common ten attacks detected against the sample, a majority of
the attacks targeted either public services (e.g., Web) or remote access services (e.g., FTP, SSH). Riptech expects that this trend will continue in the future, mainly due to the
fact that firewalls, which most companies have in place at their Internet gateways, offer
adequate protection against many other common vulnerabilities. As such, in many cases, public and remote access services are the only services that are accessible (and thus
exploitable) from the Internet. Figure 12 lists the top ten attacks that Riptech detected
over the past six months. It is important to note that these observations include activity associated with Code Red and Nimda.
FIGURE 12—T OP TEN ATTACKS
Activity Type Percentage
of Attacks
Containing
Activity∗∗∗∗ Description
Microsoft Index Services
ISAPI Overflow Attack 47.8% Microsoft's Internet Information Services (IIS) server contains an idq.dll file, which attackers can
access via the web. The idq.dll is a dynamic link library (DLL) that supports Microsoft's Index Server. This DLL is installed by default with IIS and is exposed to compromise on servers that run IIS (regardless of whether or not the index server is actually enabled). A buffer overflow vulnerability in the idq.dll in IIS 4.0/5.0 allows a remote attacker to execute commands on the server with system-level permissions. This vulnerability was originally published in June 2001 and was widely exploited by Code Red. The high frequency of this exploit is attributable mainly to activity associated with the Code Red Worm.
Generic "root.exe" Request
Attack 25.1% When attacking a Windows system, an intruder often renames 'cmd.exe' to 'root.exe' and moves
the file to a more accessible directory on the web server. This allows the intruder to execute commands on the web server even if it is subsequently patched for the published IIS vulnerabilities. Code Red II left a copy of root.exe in the /scripts directory, which was later exploited by the Nimda worm (and variants). Therefore, the high frequency of this exploit is attributable mainly to activity associated with the Nimda worm.
Microsoft IIS Directory
Traversal (Unicode) Attack 23.5% Microsoft's IIS 4.0/5.0 and Windows 98 hosts running Microsoft Personal Web Server are
vulnerable to this directory traversal vulnerability if extended UNICODE character representations are used in substitution for '/' and '\,' e.g. http://target/scripts/.%c1%1c../ path/file.ext. This vulnerability was published by Microsoft in October 2000 and, since then, continues to be one of the most widely exploited IIS vulnerabilities. This was one of the exploits used by Nimda. Although this exploit is frequent regardless of worm activity, the particularly high frequency of this exploit over the past six months is mostly attributable to the spread of the Nimda worm.
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FIGURE 12 ( CONTINUED )
Name Percentage
of Attacks∗∗∗∗ Description
Microsoft IIS Superfluous
Decode Attack 17% A vulnerability in Microsoft's IIS servers allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary commands
on the system by simply encoding the URL twice. The second decode is the actual vulnerability as most web servers will decode the URL once correctly. This vulnerability was published in May 2001, and has been widely exploited since. While Nimda certainly increased the frequency of this attack, it is likely that many of these attacks were not associated with the worm.
Generic "cmd.exe" Request
Attack 16.5% While not considered a vulnerability in and of itself, many different IIS web attacks access
cmd.exe if the exploit is successful. Many attackers then either use cmd.exe directly to execute commands on the remote web servers such as "copy", "dir", "tftp", etc., or make a copy of the file and rename it root.exe for future access (example: Code Red II). Because cmd.exe requests are a common secondary sign of attack, this type of activity was observed frequently against the sample set.
Scan for 27374/tcp
(SubSeven) 5% Probes against port 27374/tcp, which are consistently one of the most common scans detected
against the sample, increased 170% over the past 6 months. In the past, hackers have used Port 27374 for a variety of backdoor and trojan horse programs. The most common of these is known as “SubSeven.” SubSeven is a trojan horse program that runs on Windows systems and allows an attacker to remotely control the system. There was even a worm, W32/Leaves in July that targeted the SubSeven Trojan in order to obtain access to systems. While the sample was a target of many of these scans, very few were followed up with attempted exploits. This is probably due to the fact that the primary targets of these scans are home systems that are not protected by firewalls and/or Antivirus software.
Scan for vulnerable and/or
misconfigured FTP servers 3.8% Throughout the past 6 months, probes for FTP services were consistently high. In many cases,
attackers are probing for either vulnerable versions of FTP servers or misconfigured FTP servers with a writeable directory. When attackers identify a writeable directory, they can then use the server to distribute illegal material, such as pornography, pirated mp3s, and pirated software.
Scans for systems with RPC
(tcp) enabled 2.8% Scans for RPC services, while also very high, actually decreased by 29% over the past 6 months.
RPC is used primarily by a variety of UNIX system services, each of which are vulnerable to a number of exploits. Services exploited via RPC include CDE Tooltalk, snmpXdmid, and rpc.statd. Almost all of the attacks observed against the sample set were dropped by the perimeter firewall, so Riptech was unable to identify the specific vulnerabilities that were targeted. RPC vulnerabilities remain very popular due to the large number of potentially vulnerable UNIX systems on the Internet.
Scans for SSH service 1.3% SSH is used as a secure alternative to Telnet. Due to the strong encryption capabilities of this service, as well as a variety of strong authentication options, SSH provides remote users with a secure mechanism to access systems remotely. Unfortunately, many older distributions/versions of SSH are plagued with several vulnerabilities. As a result, SSH scans not only rank in the top 5 services scanned for, but also increased by 341% over the past six months. Many sites utilize SSH to remotely access and manage critical servers, so the recent vulnerabilities provide attackers with the capability to compromise high profile systems,. The attractiveness of these targets is probably related to the high level of interest in this service.
Scans for LPD service 1.2% LPD probes decreased by 29% over the past 6 months. LPD or Line Printer Daemon provides printing service for a variety of operating systems, but primarily UNIX systems. Most implementations of LPD are exposed to a variety of these vulnerabilities, several of which allow a remote attacker to gain system access.
∗ This figure represents the total number of attacks that included the specified type of activity. It is important to note tha t the sum of these percentages is
greater than 100% because many attacks include several of these activities.
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THREAT VARIANCE BY TYPE OF COMPANY
/xrhombus Attacks by Industry
Despite the steady increase in overall attacks against organizations in the sample set, the
nature and severity of the cyber threat appears to differ significantly by industry segment.
Most notable is the observation that high tech, power and energy, and financial services companies appear to suffer the greatest level of attack intensity and severity. Figure 13
and Figure 14 illustrate these trends.
0.1 6 0.331.0 6 1.191 .42 1 .452.052.626.629.2312 .5 0
0.002.004.006.008.0010.0012.0014.00
ASP
E-Commerce
Nonprofit
Media/Entertainment
Other
Healthcare
Manufacturing
Business Services
High Tech
Financial Services
Power & Energy
IndustrySevere Attacks Per CompanyFIGURE 14—S EVERE ATTACKS PER COMPANY BY INDUSTRY
Figure 14 shows the average number of severe attacks over the past six months for different industries. Severe attacks include those
that are categorized as either emergency or critical. 422 439477520561592 600706 725895961
02004006008001,0001,200
Other
HealthcareE-Commerce ASP
Manufacturing
Nonprofit
Business Services
Media/Entertainment
Power & Energy
Financial ServicesHigh Tech
IndustryAttacks Per CompanyFIGURE 13—A TTACKS PER COMPANY BY INDUSTRY
Figure 13 indicates the average number of attacks per company in each industry over the past six months.
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In addition to the overall threat against different industries, Riptech also evaluated the
nature of the threat from different regions throughout the world. Two particularly interesting trends that emerged were the difference in attack intensity from Asia and the
Middle East. Figure 15 and Figure 16 illustrate these trends.
13 .1 13 . 915 .118 .1 18 . 524.8 24.928.231 .137.366.5
01020304050607080
ASP
HealthcareOther
Manufacturing
E-Commerce
Business Services
Nonprofit
Financial Services
Media/Entertainment
High Tech
Power & Energy
IndustryAttacks Per CompanyFIGURE 15—A TTACKS FROM THE MIDDLE EAST PER
COMPANY BY INDUSTRY
Figure 15 was intended to show the difference in threat from a region that is well known to house numerous groups that are hostile to
the United States and its allies. The CIA 2001 World Fact Book was used as a reference to categorize Middle Eastern countries.
10 612 8 13 316 2 16 3 16 317 019 521 031 4339
050100150200250300350400
Other
Healthcare
E-CommerceASP
Manufacturing
Business Services
Nonprofit
Media/Entertainment
Power & Energy
High Tech
Financial Services
IndustryAttacks Per CompanyFIGURE 16—A TTACKS FROM ASIA
PER COMPANY BY INDUSTRY
Figure 16 was intended to show the difference in threat from a region that includes several countries that rated high in attack intensity
per Internet capita; the goal was to determine if there were specific industries that this region were singling out as targets.
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The previous figures clearly demonstrate that the cyber security threat is particularly
intense in three or four key industries. These findings provide an opportunity for organizations to assess their security postures with respect to the relative threat rates
present in each industry. Major observations include:
/circle4 The four most frequently targeted industries are High Tech, Financial Services,
Media/Entertainment, and Power and Energy.
/circle4 Power and Energy companies suffer a significantly higher rate of severe attacks than
other industries. The rate of severe attacks per company for the Power and Energy
industry is more than twice the mean of the entire sample set.
/circle4 Power and Energy companies suffered a substantially higher rate of attacks per
company from the Middle East. The rate of attack for Power and Energy companies is more than twice the average rate for the entire sample set.
/circle4 High Tech and Financial Services companies suffer a higher rater of attacks from
Asia. The rate of attacks for companies in these industries is 55-70% higher than the
mean rate of the entire sample set.
/circle4 E-Commerce companies show low rates of attack intensity and severity. Despite the
fact that these companies receive prominent attention when security breaches occur,
the threat exposure for this industry appears to be substantially below the average.
/xrhombus Attacks by Company Size and Ownership Type
Company size in terms of number of employees appeared to have a moderate impact on
the intensity of cyber attacks; however it appears that size is only significant at the 500-
employee mark. The intensity of attacks by company size is presented in Figure 17 .
560905 901
845
01002003004005006007008009001,000
1-499 500-999 1000-4999 5000+
Number of E mployeesAttacks Per CompanyFIGURE 17—A TTACKS PER COMPANY BY COMPANY SIZE
Figure 17 indicates the average number of attacks per company by company size over the past six months.
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Similar to industry classification, the ownership type of a company appears to have a
significant impact on the relative frequency of attacks. Private and nonprofit companies,
which constitute 79% of Riptech’s clients, exhibited a virtually identical level of attack intensity, averaging 544 and 581 attacks per company, respectively. Public companies,
however, appear to be significantly more prone to attacks, suffering nearly 1,100 attacks
per company. The intensity of attacks by ownership type is illustrated in Figure 18 .
Possible reasons for the greater threat rate experienced by public and large companies include:
/circle4 Greater Number of Targets at Large Companies —The correlation may simply
reflect the fact that larger companies have larger networks, and, as a result, offer
more targets to hackers. Since public companies also tend to be large, it is
conceivable that this correlation simply reflects the fact that large companies have more systems that can be targeted by hackers.
/circle4 Company Name Recognition —Organizations with greater public visibility may be
more likely to suffer cyber attacks. Both public companies and large companies are
more likely to be in the public eye, increasing the likelihood that they will draw the
attention of an attacker.
5565691,094
02004006008001,0001,200
Nonprofit Private Public
Ownership StatusAverage Attacks Per CompanyFIGURE 18—A TTACKS PER COMPANY BY
COMPANY OWNERSHIP
Figure 18 indicates the average number of attacks by company by ownership type over the past six months. Government
organizations are not presented in the figure due to the relatively small sample size.
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CONCLUSIONS
The findings presented in Riptech’s Internet Security Threat Report reveal that the
external threat is diverse, growing, and significant. The findings also suggest that the external threat is perhaps even more severe than is indicated by several recent studies on
Internet security. More than 40% of the sample experienced an attack that required
immediate intervention to prevent a security breach. Furthermore, the fact that the Internet security threat rate appears to be substantially higher for the financial services,
high tech, and power and energy industries provides an opportunity for IT and risk
management executives in these industries to review their security postures in light of these findings. And above all, this report should clearly illustrate that the Internet
security threat is real, pervasive, and perhaps more severe than previously anticipated.
Stakeholders of Internet-connected organizations should ensure that appropriate measures have been taken to address this increasing threat rate.
Riptech, Inc., the premier provider of scalable, real-time managed security services, protects clients through advanced outsourced security monitoring and professional services. Riptech's unique Caltarian
SM technology
platform provides Real-Time Information ProtectionSM through around-the-clock monitoring, analysis, and
response. The Caltarian technology is capable of processing large volumes of network security data to
separate security threats from false positives in real-time, with carrier-class scalability. Additionally, Riptech's Security Professional Services group provides security policy development, assessment and
auditing, penetration testing, incident forensics, and response. Riptech security specialists have secured
hundreds of organizations including Fortune 500 companies and federal agencies. Founded in 1998 by former Department of Defense security professionals and market experts, Riptech is headquartered in
Alexandria, Virginia with offices in San Jose, California, and New York City. ABOUT RIPTECH
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APPENDIX A—V ALUE OF ANALYZED ATTACK DATA
/xrhombus Overview
In order to understand why the Riptech Internet Security Threat Report offers a uniquely
accurate view of attack trends, it is important to compare Riptech’s methodology to those
used by other organizations that report on attack trends. The three types of methodologies that are generally used to determine Internet-based attack trends are listed
below in Figure A-1 .
FIGURE A-1—A TTACK TRENDING METHODOLOGIES
Methodology Description
Methodology #1—Analysis of Survey
Data Several attack reports draw from periodic surveys that solicit feedback regarding security
incidents that companies detected over a specified period of time. While these types of surveys
are excellent sources for more subjective types of information, such as the financial impact of security breaches, surveys only provide a rudimentary view of attack trends by criteria such as
intensity, severity, and origin.
Analogy: This type of analysis would be similar to a crime survey that polled households to
estimate the number and cost of specific crimes that occurred over the past year.
Methodology #2—Automated Analysis
of Raw Security Device Data Companies that subscribe to this methodology rely entirely on the automated or statistical
analysis of firewall and IDS data that are submitted voluntarily by organizations throughout the
world. Companies that use this methodology conduct a high-level analysis of these data to
detect trends in network usage and attack patterns. Because this approach does not involve the validation of each attack by security experts, it is probable that false positive signs of attack
activity significantly affect the accuracy of the results.
Analogy: This type of analysis would be similar to a crime report that was based on every
security alarm that was set off at companies throughout the world (regardless of whether the
alarm was actually triggered by malicious activity).
Methodology #3—Examination of
Validated Cyber Attacks Riptech’s methodology determines attack trends by reconstructing entire attack sequences and
then ensuring validation of each attack by security experts. Prior to validation, security experts
initially detect these attacks by using powerful software tools that isolate attack sequences from
billions of firewall logs and IDS alerts. For a full description of Riptech’s Methodology, see page 7 of the report.
Analogy: This type of analysis would be similar to a crime report that was based on the
historical analysis of every successful or attempted crime that was detected, investigated, and
validated by a security company over the past year. Alarms that turned out to be false positives
would be eliminated from consideration.
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/xrhombus Analysis of Unanalyzed Versus Validated Attacks
The analysis of raw security data and the analysis of validated attacks are the only two
methodologies that are based entirely on empirical data. While the analysis of survey
data is valuable in some situations (particularly when attempting to assess the financial impact of security breaches), it is based entirely on human perception rather than actual
empirical evidence of attacks. This being the case, survey results may provide a false
impression of the true state of cyber attack trends. For example, due to the fact that many organizations choose not to report security breaches, surveys may substantially
underestimate the true threat of cyber attacks.
In contrast, the analysis of raw security data and the analysis of validated attacks are
based entirely on empirical data. However, although these two approaches are similar in
several ways, there are also significant differences. In sum, the two major advantages of Riptech’s methodology, which is based entirely on the analysis of validated cyber attacks,
are as follows:
/circle4 Use of Powerful Attack Reconstruction Tools— In order to identify attacks among
billions of lines of log data, Riptech uses powerful software tools to detect and
isolate entire attack sequences. This process ensures that the attack identification process is comprehensive (i.e., all attacks evident in the log data are identified) and
mutually exclusive (i.e., all signs of malicious activity associated with a single attack
are only counted once during the trend analysis process).
/circle4 Validation of Attacks by Security Experts— Real-time investigations of attack
sequences by security experts eliminate false positive signs of attacks from the data set. This process ensures that actual, validated attacks are the only data source.
False positive signs of attack activity, which can produce misleading observations
about the volume and nature of cyber attacks, are eliminated from the data set.
The automated analysis of raw log data, while still based on empirical data, suffers from
several flaws, each of which has the potential to distort attack trends. The two most significant flaws of this approach are listed below.
/circle4 Precision of Attack Identification —This type of analysis does not examine entire
attack sequences, which often include a number of individual signs of malicious
activity. Therefore, a single attack may be treated for analysis purposes as several
different attacks. For example, a sequence of seven different forms of attack activity from a single source IP may be treated as seven distinct attacks rather than a single
event. Because of this flaw, observations may overestimate the overall intensity of
attack activity, as well as distort the apparent nature of cyber attacks (e.g., relative frequency of different types of exploits).
/circle4 Influence of False Signs of Attacks —This type of analysis does not filter out false
signs of malicious activity. As a result, attack intensity is significantly
overestimated. Figure A-2 illustrates this point by showing Riptech’s calculation of
total attack activity (i.e., individual signs of potential malicious activity) detected over the six-month period versus total validated attacks. As the figure illustrates the
average rate of attack activity based solely on the analysis of potential malicious
activity is approximately 20 times the average rate of attacks based on validated data.
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/xrhombus Conclusions
Organizations use three basic methodologies to summarize cyber attack trends. For a
variety of reasons, the analysis of validated attacks provides a more precise and
comprehensive picture of attack activity over time. Survey results, while valuable in several ways, tend to unde r-report attack intensity and fail to capture trends based on
empirical data. The analysis of raw security data, while based on empirical evidence,
suffers from a significant distortion of results due to a failure to isolate entire attack sequences and eliminate false positive signs of attack activity. In sum, Riptech’s Internet
Security Threat Report, which is the only report based on validated, empirical attack data,
represents a uniquely accurate study of Internet-based attack activity.
Total signs of potential attack activity per company
Total validated attacks per company Week 02004006008001,0001,2001,4001,6001,8002,000
7/8/2001
7/22/2001
8/5/20018/19/2001
9/2/20019/16/2001
9/30/2001
10/14/2001
10/28/2001
11/11/2001
11/25/2001
12/9/2001
12/23/2001
051015202530354045
7/8/2001
7/22/2001
8/5/20018/19/2001
9/2/20019/16/2001
9/30/2001
10/14/2001
10/28/2001
11/11/2001
11/25/2001
12/9/2001
12/23/2001Attacks Per Company FIGURE A-2—U NANALYZED ATTACK ACTIVITY
VERSUS VALIDATED ATTACKS
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APPENDIX B—A NALYSIS OF CODE RED AND NIMDA
/xrhombus Background
A comprehensive analysis of Internet attack trends for Q3 and Q4 of 2001 clearly must
address the Code Red and Nimda worms. However, because of their widespread impact,
it is important to note that many information security professionals have already
conducted a substantial amount of research regarding these worms. As such, this section is only intended to provide a high-level synopsis of these events, rather than a detailed
technical analysis.
In sum, the widespread outbreak of the Code Red and Nimda worms arguably established
2001 as ‘The Year of the Worm.’
6 While Code Red, Code Red II, and Nimda were not
the only worms launched during this time period, these worms were by far the most severe. Due to the high profile nature of these events, each is discussed in greater detail
throughout the remainder of this appendix. In addition, a timeline of major worm-related
activity and basic description of each worm is presented in Figure B-1 and Figure B-2 .
FIGURE B-1–T IMELINE OF SIGNIFICANT WORM ACTIVITY
Date Activity
July 13, 2001 First version of Code Red is reported
July 19, 2001 Code Red (CRv2) rapidly spreads across the Internet
July 20, 2001 Code Red (CRv2) unsuccessfully launches a DDoS attack against www.whitehouse.gov
Aug. 1, 2001 Code Red (CRv2) is reactivated and spreads rapidly across the Internet again.
Aug. 4, 2001 Code Red II (CRII) outbreak begins
Sept. 18, 2001 Nimda outbreak begins
6 As was previously explained in the introduction, Riptech made a conscious decision to separate Code Red and Nimda related acti vity from the majority
of the trend analysis due to the fact that all other observations of attack activity would otherwise be overshadowed due to the sheer magnitude of these
three events.
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FIGURE B-2–W ORM DETAILS
Worm Target Vulnerabilities Impact
Code Red /circle4 Microsoft IIS Index Service ISAPI Overflow /circle4 Vandalized English web pages
/circle4 Unsuccessfully launched DDoS attack on the 20th-27th of
every month
/circle4 Had potential to overload and crash systems as a result of
scans for new victims
Code Red II /circle4 Microsoft IIS Index Service ISAPI Overflow /circle4 Created two backdoors on infected systems by renaming
‘cmd.exe’ to ‘root.exe’ and then placing the renamed file in a directory that is accessible via the web server, as well as placing a Trojan horse named ‘explorer.exe’ on systems so the C: and D: drives are shared out
/circle4 Had potential to overload and crash systems as a result of
scans for new victims
Nimda /circle4 Backdoor left by Code Red II and sadmind/IIS
worms∗
/circle4 Microsoft IIS Directory Traversal vulnerabilities
(UNICODE)
/circle4 Automatic execution of embedded MIME types
(used to facilitate propagation via e-mail and files on network shares) /circle4 Had potential to overload and crash systems as a result of
scans for new victims
/circle4 Shares the c: drive as C$
/circle4 Creates a Guest account and adds the account to the
Administrator group
∗ sadmind/IIS worm spread across the Internet compromising Solaris systems and vandalizing Microsoft IIS servers in May 2001.
/xrhombus Code Red
Information security professionals first reported the existence of the Code Red worm on
Friday, July 13, 2001. However, early versions of Code Red suffered from a flaw that
severely hampered its propagation potential. As a result, the scope of the outbreak was limited to a small portion of the Internet. Riptech first observed an early version of Code
Red on July 14, and due to the limited outbreak, Riptech only logged a few additional
reports of activity until July 19.
Primary Attack Activity
On the morning of July 19, a new version of the Code Red worm, which some referred to
as Code-Redv2
7 first appeared on the Internet in mass. This particular version had
resolved the propagation flaw and thus began to infect hosts at an exponential rate. Within 14 hours of Code Red’s re-release, over 300,000 hosts were infected and actively
attacking other hosts on the Internet. On July 20, 2001 (00:00 GMT), Code Red entered
the final stage of the attack sequence. At this point, the propagation scans ceased and the compromised systems launched a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack against
www.whitehouse.gov. This attack was largely unsuccessful due to the successful
execution of countermeasures by White House domain administrators and cooperating Internet service providers (ISPs).
7 CRv2 is an alternative name for the Code Red worm and should not be confused with the Code Red II worm.
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Follow-up Activity
Following a series of warnings from CERT/CC, the FBI’s National Infrastructure
Protection Center (NIPC), and various security experts around the world, Code Red
became reactivated on August 1, 2001. During the first few days of reactivation, the worm compromised more than 400,000 hosts. Finally, five months after its original
debut, the Riptech SOC was still detecting roughly 30,000 infected hosts per day during
its peak in December 2001. Code Red activity detected during Q3 and Q4 is presented in Figure B-3 .
/xrhombus Code Red II
Code Red II, a major variant of Code Red, was first reported on August 4, 2001. Both
Code Red and Code Red II exploit the same Microsoft Internet Information Services (IIS)
vulnerability and propagate in similar ways; however, Code Red II’s payload differs
significantly. Code Red II installs two backdoor programs that allow an attacker to access compromised machines. In addition, the scanning rate of Code Red II depends on
the default language of the infected machine. For example, the worm scans systems
configured for the Chinese (PRC or Taiwanese) language two times faster and two times longer than it scans systems configured in other languages. This suggests that this variant
may be a form of nationalistic retaliation for the first Code Red worm, which vandalized
web servers on English systems with the message “Hacked by Chinese!!”
050,000100,000150,000200,000250,000300,000350,000400,000450,000
7/1/01
7/8/01
7/15/01
7/22/01
7/29/018/5/01
8/12/01
8/19/01
8/26/019/2/01
9/9/01
9/16/01
9/23/01
9/30/01
10/7/01
10/14/01
10/21/01
10/28/01
11/4/01
11/11/01
11/18/01
11/25/01
12/2/0112/9/01
12/16/01
12/23/01
12/30/01
DateTotal Unique Sources Launching
Code Red Attack ActivityFIGURE B-3—C ODE RED ACTIVITY DETECTED AGAINST SAMPLE SET
Note: In order to better reflect the counting methods used by others when describing Code Red, Riptech counted and aggregated data differently for this
graph. The number of detections in Figure B-3 therefore does not correlate with other metrics used throughout this report. In addition, this graph does
not differentiate between Code Red v2 and Code Red II as well as any other minor variants.
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From a network perspective, the differences between Code Red and Code Red II are
subtle, and it is not possible to differentiate between the two worms based solely on the
analysis of firewall logs (a substantial source of data for this report). However, based on Riptech’s observations, a bulk of the exploits detected during Q4 follow the timing
window of the first Code Red worm, suggesting that Code Red II activity is now
significantly less common than Code Red.
/xrhombus Nimda
Upon its September 18, 2001 release, the Nimda worm infected a large portion of the
Internet with victims ranging from end users who accidentally visited infected websites to
administrators who failed to eliminate the backdoors left by Code Red a month earlier. The widespread impact of Nimda was mostly attributable to the range of propagation
methods, which allowed the worm to spread rapidly once it gained a foothold on a
network. The Nimda worm has few similarities with Code Red and Code Red II. Nimda targeted different vulnerabilities, used different mechanisms to propagate and used
different types of backdoors. Overall, Nimda’s most unique characteristic—one that will
likely appear in future worms—was its wide variety of propagation capabilities, which included:
/circle4 Reading infected e-mail
/circle4 Executing and/or browsing infected files on network shares
/circle4 Visiting infected web sites
/circle4 Scanning for IIS servers vulnerable to the Microsoft Directory Traversal
(UNICODE) vulnerability
/circle4 Scanning for IIS servers in which Code Red II previously installed the backdoor
executable “root.exe.”
Figure B-4 illustrates the impact of Nimda on the sample set during Q3 and Q4
Note: In order to better reflect the counting methods used by others when describing Nimda, Riptech counted and aggregated data dif ferently for this
graph. The number of detections in Figure B-4 therefore does not correlate with other metrics used throughout this report. 050,000100,000150,000200,000250,000300,000350,000
7/1/2001
7/8/2001
7/15/2001
7/22/2001
7/29/2001
8/5/2001
8/12/2001
8/19/2001
8/26/2001
9/2/2001
9/9/2001
9/16/2001
9/23/2001
9/30/200110/7/200110/14/200110/21/200110/28/200111/4/200111/11/2001
11/18/2001
11/25/2001
12/2/2001
12/9/2001
12/16/2001
12/23/2001
12/30/2001
DateTotal Unique Sources Launching
Nimda Attack ActivityFIGURE B-4—N IMDA ACTIVITY DETECTED AGAINST SAMPLE SET
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/xrhombus Discussion
As of the publication of this report, Code Red, Nimda, and variants of both worms are
still active on the Internet on a daily basis. These and future worms are best viewed as a
virtual plague that spreads as a result of insecure software and inattentive network administration practices. Historically, malicious code, which includes exploits, viruses,
and worms, tend to evolve over time as new programmers use previous code as a
foundation on which to base new forms of malicious code. Thus, companies throughout the world should not only expect future worms, but should also actively prepare for such
events. With such a wide variety of vulnerabilities that currently remain unexploited,
additional worms are certain to surface in the future. While it is difficult to predict the precise characteristics of future worms, several high-risk services, such as the following,
will likely impact the form of these worms.
High-Risk Services
A public service/application that must be accessible to the Internet is much more likely to be targeted by future worms than other services. Therefore, any new vulnerabilities that
affect these services may be the target of the next worm. Three probable targets of future
worm activity include:
/circle4 Domain Name Service (DNS) —DNS translates host and domain names to IP
addresses and vice-versa. All networks not only must have DNS servers, but also
must publish their exact locations (IP addresses) in order to function effectively.
High-profile vulnerabilities have plagued DNS since its inception, and a few worms have even been written specifically to exploit these vulnerabilities. Given the
widespread deployment of DNS servers, coupled with the presence of well-known
vulnerabilities, there is a high probability that future worms will target this service. Unfortunately, if a worm successfully targets this service, not only could the worm
propagate very rapidly, there is also a high probability that Internet availability
would severely deteriorate due to the critical role that DNS plays in Internet communications.
/circle4 E-mail —Several past forms of malicious code, such as LoveLetter, Melissa, and
Nimda, propagated successfully via e-mail. E-mail is an effective method of
transport mainly because it allows text and data to move from untrusted networks
(such as the Internet) to trusted networks (such as a protected internal network) countless times each day with limited security checks. In order to counteract this
type of activity many companies have deployed anti-virus filters to protect against
known malicious code. But if these software programs are not updated immediately upon the discovery of new malware, they are rendered useless. In addition, as e-mail
clients, such as Microsoft Outlook, become more feature-rich, the ability of attackers
to create new, and possibly more destructive, worms increases.
|
©2002 by Riptech, Inc. All Rights Reserved
Riptech Internet Security Threat Report
Attack Trends for Q1 and Q2 2002
Executive Summary
The Riptech Internet Security Threat Report provides a broad quantitative analysis of
Internet-based attacks targeted at hundreds of organizations during the preceding six-
month period. Because of the large sample of organizations studied (selected from Riptech’s client base), the trends presented in this report provide an overall indicator of
threats faced by the entire Internet community. This edition of the Riptech Internet
Security Threat Report covers the six-month period starting on January 1, 2002 and ending on June 30, 2002.
In sum, attack activity for the past six-month period was 28% higher than activity recorded during the prior six-month period, a projected annual growth rate of 64%. This
increase is mainly due to the maintenance of relatively high rates of attacks that were
attained in December 2001. Fortunately, the first half of 2002 lacked a widespread, devastating event, such as the Nimda and Code Red outbreaks in the summer and fall of
2001. While SQL Spida presented a strong reminder of the ever-present threat of worms,
most companies in the sample set viewed it as a nuisance rather than a major threat.
It is important to note that virtually all statistics indicate that Internet attack activity
remains intense, pervasive, and potentially severe. In addition, because the threat continues to vary for companies by factors such as industry affiliation and ownership
structure, it is probable that many types of organizations actually experienced a
significant escalation in threat over the past six months. As an example, Power and Energy companies were more likely to suffer a severe attack in the last six months than
they were during the prior six-month period.
On the positive side, Riptech discovered what appears to be the first quantifiable evidence
that companies may be achieving some level of success in defending against Internet
attacks. For example, the percentage of companies that suffered at least one severe attack during the past six months declined by nearly half, a trend that is partly attributable to a
gradual strengthening of the security postures of companies represented in the sample set.
Companies that did not strengthen their security posture likely suffered higher rates of severe attack activity.
Finally, this edition of the Threat Report includes an analysis of the modus operandi of various types of attackers. For example, Riptech examined the frequency with which
attackers use various operating systems as platforms, as well as the most common
systems and services that attackers seek for exploitation. In addition, Riptech initiated an ongoing commitment to track activity from possible sources of cyber terrorism. It is our
goal that this information may help companies develop a greater awareness of their
relative risk to different types of cyber attack activity.
Volume II
July 2002
Riptech, Inc.
2800 Eisenhower Avenue Alexandria, VA 22314
(703) 373-5100
Editor
Mark Higgins
Authors
Tim Belcher
Chief Technology Officer and
Co-Founder
Elad Yoran Executive Vice President and
Co-Founder
Research & Analysis Team
Brian Dunphy
Director, Analysis Operations
Cori Lynn Arnold
Research Associate
Media Inquiries:
[email protected]
(703) 373-5350
While Riptech believes that the Threat Report offers a unique perspective on Internet attack activity, observations are inherently biased to some degree. Because Riptech’s sample set only consists of organizations that have
implemented at least some security best practices, such as the deployment of well-configured firewalls and intrusion
detection systems, they may be significantly less likely to suffer attempted or actual compromises. This being the case, the results of this study should be viewed as a best-case scenario. AN IMPORTANT NOTE ABOUT THE SAMPLE SET
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF CONTENTS ................................................................................................. 2
ABOUT THE INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT ...................................... 3
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS............................................................................................ 4
DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE SAMPLE SET................................................................. 7
/xrhombus INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION ......................................................................................... 7
/xrhombus COMPANY SIZE............................................................................................................ 7
/xrhombus COMPANY OWNERSHIP ................................................................................................ 8
/xrhombus CLIENT TENURE ........................................................................................................... 8
METHODOLOGY ........................................................................................................... 9
/xrhombus ATTACK IDENTIFICATION AND CLASSIFICATION ........................................................ 10
/xrhombus CLIENT CLASSIFICATIONS .......................................................................................... 10
/xrhombus ATTACK METRICS ..................................................................................................... 11
GENERAL ATTACK TRENDS ................................................................................... 16
/xrhombus OVERALL ATTACK ACTIVITY .................................................................................... 16
/xrhombus ATTACK SEVERITY .................................................................................................... 17
/xrhombus ATTACK AGGRESSION ............................................................................................... 18
/xrhombus ATTACKS BY DAY OF WEEK...................................................................................... 19
ATTACK VARIANCE BY COMPANY TYPE........................................................... 21
/xrhombus CLIENT TENURE ......................................................................................................... 21
/xrhombus INDUSTRY .................................................................................................................. 23
/xrhombus OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE ............................................................................................ 25
/xrhombus COMPANY SIZE.......................................................................................................... 27
ATTACKER PROFILES............................................................................................... 29
/xrhombus ATTACK SOURCE ....................................................................................................... 29
/xrhombus ATTACKER INTENT .................................................................................................... 31
/xrhombus ATTACKER PLATFORM ............................................................................................... 32
/xrhombus TOP 20 S CANS ........................................................................................................... 33
/xrhombus TOP ATTACKING NETWORK BLOCKS ......................................................................... 35
APPENDIX A—CYBER-TERRORISM WATCH LIST.......................................... A-1
APPENDIX B—WORM ACTIVITY ANALYSIS .................................................... B-1
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ABOUT THE INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT
Riptech’s Internet Security Threat Report provides a broad quantitative analysis of
Internet-based attacks targeted at hundreds of organizations. Trends presented in this
report are made possible by Riptech’s managed security service. Enabled by the Caltarian
SM technology platform, Riptech analyzes data produced by numerous brands of
firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDSs) used by hundreds of clients throughout
the world. Using a sophisticated combination of technology and human expertise to analyze this data, Riptech identifies and investigates cyber attacks that occur on corporate
networks in real time.
As part of this daily investigation of Internet attacks, Riptech has developed and
maintained the world’s largest repository of data on validated cyber attacks, which can be
analyzed to reveal important and actionable trends. Due to the nature of the data that is used in this analysis, it is important to note that the majority of detected attacks are from
external threats. While internal attacks (i.e., those launched by company insiders) are
also detected, the trends discussed in the report focus on the threat of attacks launched from the outside.
We believe the Internet Security Threat Report series provides a unique view of the state of Internet attack activity. Over the past six months alone, Riptech investigated more
than one million potential cyber attacks on behalf of its clients. These attacks were
detected by analyzing individual data points consisting of more than 11 billion firewall logs and IDS alerts. From these data points, Riptech isolated more than 1 million
possible attacks and more than 180,000 confirmed attacks, which were analyzed for this
report. Because the analysis is based on consistent, comparable data reviewed by expert analysts, the findings offer a more reliable view of the state of Internet security as
compared to studies that rely on less controlled methodologies. For example, survey-
based studies suffer from the widely disparate ways in which organizations detect, track, calculate, and report incidents. Open source data collection services, which are based on
the automated analysis of firewall and IDS logs submitted voluntarily by companies,
suffer from the inclusion of large numbers of false positive security events. In sum, the Riptech Internet Security Threat Report is the most reliable study to analyze Internet
attacks based on actual empirical attack data that have been consistently collected and
analyzed over an extended period of time.
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SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
An analysis of attack activity over the past six months reveals that Internet attacks remain
a significant threat to organizations of all types. Specific findings that support this
observation are highlighted throughout this section under the following subtitles: General Attack Trends, Trends by Company Type, and Attacker Profiles and Appendices.
General Attack Trends
/circle4 Attack activity for the entire six-month period was 28% higher than activity
recorded during the prior six-month period, a projected annual growth rate of
64%
- On average, companies experienced 32 attacks per company per week
during the past six months, as opposed to 25 attacks per company per week
during the prior six-month period.
- While daily attack volume varied significantly, Riptech observed a
consistent, gradual increase in cyber attack activity.
/circle4 Highly aggressive attacks were 26 times more likely to result in a severe attack
than moderately aggressive attacks
- 3.57% of highly aggressive attacks warranted a severe classification, as
compared to only 0.14% of moderately aggressive attacks. This suggests
that highly aggressive attacks, while relatively uncommon, provide a
significantly greater threat to organizations.
- 99.99% of low aggression attacks were non-severe, reflecting the fact that
these typically involved attacks that were quickly abandoned by the
attacker or simply resulted from automated reconnaissance.
/circle4 Companies in the sample set were less likely to suffer a severe attack during the
past six months, providing preliminary evidence that these companies are achieving success in defending their networks
- 23% of companies suffered at least one severe attack during the past six
months, as compared to 43% during the prior six-month period.
- The lower likelihood of suffering severe attacks is in part attributable to a
gradual strengthening of the security posture for companies represented in
the sample set.
/circle4 Attack activity continues to be a 24x7 phenomenon; however, during the past
six months, companies experienced a greater threat during weekdays
- The number of unique attackers per day was 36% higher on weekdays than
on weekends; the overall rate of attack activity was 19% higher on
weekdays.
- The rate of severe attacks was more than twice as high on weekdays and
the rate of highly aggressive attacks was more than three times as high on
weekdays, suggesting that companies face a relatively higher level of risk from Monday through Friday.
Unless otherwise indicated, attacks associated with worms, such as Code Red and SQL Spida, are not included in
the data analysis. This decision was made because while worm activity represents a handful of distinct types of
attacks, these attacks account for a disproportionately large share of activity. Had we included this activity in the
analysis, many important trends in the report would be hidden in the background. AN IMPORTANT NOTE ABOUT WORM ACTIVITY
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/circle4 Attacks from countries on the Cyber-Terrorism Watch List were moderate in
volume, but showed several distinct attributes
- Countries on the Watch List generated less than 1% of all attacks detected
over the past six months; 84% of this activity originated in Kuwait,
Pakistan, Egypt, Indonesia, and Iran.
- Attacks were detected from only three of the seven countries designated by
the U.S. State Department as “State Sponsors of Terrorism.” Iraq, Syria,
North Korea, and Libya did not show any attacks over the past six months; however, this is likely attributable to Internet connectivity and mapping
restraints.
- Scanning patterns from countries on the Watch List differed from patterns
observed from all other countries, suggesting that the modus operandi of
attackers operating from countries on the Watch List may differ from those
of attackers elsewhere in the world.
Trends by Company Type
/circle4 Long-term security monitoring clients experienced a relatively lower level of
risk exposure than newer security monitoring clients
- Approximately 30% of companies with less than 12 months of tenure as
security monitoring clients experienced at least one severe attack during the past six months, as compared to only 17% of companies with greater
than 12 months of tenure.
- Approximately 3% of companies with less than 12 months of tenure
experienced at least one highly aggressive attack, as compared to 19% of
companies with more than 12 months of tenure, suggesting that long-term
monitoring clients drive attackers to resort to more highly aggressive tactics.
- In sum, as both volume and aggressiveness of attacks increase over time,
security monitoring provides a quantifiable reduction in the likelihood of successful compromise.
/circle4 Industry risk exposure was relatively consistent over the past two six-month
periods
- High Tech, Financial Services, and Power and Energy companies continue
to show the highest rates of attack activity per company.
- 70% of Power and Energy companies suffered a severe attack during the
past six months, as opposed to 57% during the prior six-month period.
/circle4 Public companies continue to experience higher risk exposure than Private,
Nonprofit, and Government entities
- Public companies experienced an overall attack rate that is more than 50%
higher than the mean for the sample set.
- Public companies were also nearly twice as likely to experience at least one
severe attack and nearly twice as likely to suffer a highly aggressive attack as Private, Nonprofit, and Government entities.
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Attacker Profiles and Appendices
/circle4 Analysis of attacks by country of origin over the past six months shows many
consistencies with the prior six-month period; however, a few compelling
changes were also observed
- The majority of Internet attacks (approximately 80%) were launched from
the top ten attacking countries ; up from the 70% rate recorded during the
prior six-month period. This increase was mostly attributable to the rise in
attacks originating in the United States.
- The average attacks per Internet capita for countries with between 100,000
and 1 million Internet users is approximately 50% higher than the average
rate for countries with more than 1 million Internet users.
- Among countries with less than 1 million Internet users, Iran and Kuwait
show the highest rate of attacks per 10,000 Internet users.
/circle4 An analysis of attacker profiles and modus operandi revealed several entirely
new insights, while also confirming past observations
- The percentage of attacks that appeared targeted at a specific company
remained relatively unchanged—37% of attacks appeared targeted during
the past six months versus 39% during the prior six-month period.
- 93% of attackers detected over the past six months were only active for a
single day. This likely reflects a large volume of home users, who
constantly change their source IP address. If conventional wisdom were to
hold true—that most attackers repeatedly use the same previously compromised systems to launch their attacks—one would expect this
number to be much lower. This finding suggests that the majority of
attackers that Riptech detected came from the actual systems or general location used by the attackers.
- 99.9% of all scans detected over the past six months were focused on only
20 services.
- The 47 network blocks flagged for high rates of attack activity were
located in only 7 different countries; 72% of these network blocks were
located in China and the United States.
/circle4 While worms are still appropriately considered a potential major threat,
activity from new and existing worms over the past six months was relatively high in volume, but presented only a moderate threat to companies in the
sample set
- 44% of overall attack activity over the past six months resulted from
worms, as opposed to 63% during the previous six-month period.
- Three major worms (Code Red, Nimda, and SQL Spida) continue to
produce a large volume of scanning activity; however, over the past six months, less than 1% of companies in the sample set experienced a severe
attack as a result of this activity.
- Because of the low severity rate, the majority of companies in the sample
set viewed Code Red, Nimda, and SQL Spida as a nuisance rather than a
significant threat.
- Interestingly, Riptech observed that a small percentage of apparent Code
Red-related scans came from Unix systems. Since Unix systems are not
susceptible to Code Red infection, Riptech believes that these attackers
were using Code Red to disguise their activity and avoid detection by security administrators.
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DEMOGRAPHICS OF THE SAMPLE SET
The sample set from which the attack trends in this report was derived consists of a subset
of more than 400 companies, located in more than 30 countries throughout the world.
Combined, the security infrastructure at these companies protects millions of Internet-connected hosts. In terms of diversity, the sample set includes a broad array of
organizations as measured by criteria such as industry, size, ownership type, and length of
time as a security monitoring client. Key characteristics of the sample set are outlined in greater detail below.
/xrhombus Industry Classification
Figure 1 presents the industry break down of the sample set in percentage terms.
Industry groups were determined by reviewing a variety of public and private standards for industry classification, as well as engaging in direct client interactions. For the
current edition of the Threat Report, ASP and E-Commerce were consolidated under one
“E-Commerce” classification.
/xrhombus Company Size
The total number of employees was used as a proxy to measure company size. Employee
number was selected as the best proxy for company size because the number of
employees typically correlates best to the relative size of a company’s network. Employee counts were gathered from public sources, as well as engaging in direct, client
interactions. Figure 2 indicates the break down by company size for the sample set.
* “Other” includes industries that each represents less than 2% of the sample size.
Industries that are accounted for in this category include retail, telecommunications,
transportation, education, legal, government, and real estate.
Figure 1: Industry Breakdown
for Sample Set
Business Services
25%
High Tech
16%
Financial Services
12%E-Commerce
10%Healthcare
7%Manufacturing
6%Nonprofit
6%Power & Energy
5%Media/Entertainment
4%
Other*
9%
Figure 2: Company Size by Number of
Employees for Sample Set
Fewer than 500
67%5000+
14%1000-4999
12%500-999
7%
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/xrhombus Company Ownership
Figure 3 indicates the break down by ownership type for the sample set. Data indicating
the ownership structure of clients was gathered from public sources, as well as engaging
in direct client interactions.
/xrhombus Client Tenure
This metric indicates the length of time in which organizations in the sample set have
subscribed to Riptech’s security monitoring service. The companies in the sample set are
distributed between short, medium, and long-term time periods in which they subscribed to Riptech’s security monitoring service.
Figure 3: Company Ownership Type
for Sample Set
Government
4% Nonprofit
7%
Private
68%Public
21%
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METHODOLOGY
Trends discussed in the Internet Security Threat Report are based on the analysis of cyber
attacks that were directed at a sample of organizations selected from among Riptech’s
client base. The subset for this issue of the report consisted of over 400 companies that subscribed to Riptech’s real-time security monitoring service over the past six months.
Each attack analyzed for this report was identified, investigated, annotated and classified
appropriately by Riptech’s Security Operations Center (SOC) analysts. False positive signs of malicious activity (which can constitute up to 99% of raw IDS alerts and other
security product output) are excluded from this analysis, as these alerts provide a
misleading perception of the true nature of the Internet security threat. In addition, unless otherwise indicated, attacks associated with worms, such as Code Red and SQL Spida,
are not included in the data analysis. This decision was made because while worm
activity represents a handful of distinct types of attacks, these attacks account for a disproportionately large share of activity. Had we included this activity in the analysis,
many trends in the report would likely be hidden in the background.
Over the past six months, Riptech analyzed, validated, and categorized more than one
million potential attacks, which were generated from the analysis of approximately 11 billion individual data points in the form of firewall logs and IDS alerts. From these data
points, Riptech isolated more than 1 million potential attacks and 180,000 confirmed
attacks, which were analyzed for this report.
In order to provide a detailed understanding of how attack trends were determined, this
section outlines the following three critical components of Riptech’s methodology:
/circle4 Attack Identification and Classification —Riptech uses a combination of
technology and human expertise to review security-relevant data, weed out false positive signs of attack activity, and document valid instances of attempted attacks.
The process of identifying and classifying attacks is critical to Riptech’s ability to
gain insight into actual attack activity occurring on the Internet.
/circle4 Client Classification —Riptech categorizes each of its clients according to a wide
range of criteria, such as industry, company size, and company ownership type. Classifications are based on industry standards, and are determined from reviewing
several public sources of information, as well as consulting directly with clients.
/circle4 Attack Metrics —Riptech used a wide variety of attack metrics to determine the
nature of attack activity over time, including:
1. Overall Attack Activity 5. Attack Aggression
2. Attack Severity 6. Attacker Profiles
3. Attack Type 7. Cyber-Terrorism Watch List
4. Attack Source
5. Attacker Intent
Each of the three core components of the methodology is summarized in greater detail throughout the remainder of this section.
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/xrhombus Attack Identification and Classification
Identification and classification of attacks is the end result of a sophisticated process that
involves the use of complex technology and analysis by Riptech security experts. During
this process Riptech analyzes every firewall log and IDS alert generated by client devices and isolates and investigates entire attack sequences in real time. The combination of
sophisticated technology and expert human analysis ensures that the attack identification
process is comprehensive and consistent over time. Figure 4 outlines the key steps of the
attack identification and classification process.
Figure 4: Attack Identification and Classification Process for Clients in the Sample Set
Stage of Analysis Description Data Generated during
the Six-Month Period
Stage #1—Collection and
Normalization of Security Data
from Clients’ Firewalls and IDSs Security data is imported from firewalls and/or IDSs,
normalized into a standard format, and stored in a dedicated client database. 11 billion firewall logs and
IDS alerts
Stage #2—Data Mining of Normalized Security Data Security data is continuously mined by Caltarian to isolate
occurrences and/or patterns of potentially malicious activity. Once identified, such patterns or occurrences of malicious activity are stored as sub-events in a separate table within the database. 5.1 million sub-events
Stage #3—Security Event
Correlation and Presentation Security sub-events generated during the data mining stage are
linked by logical criteria, such as attack type, attack direction, and source IP. For example, a correlated security event may present all signs of attacks detected from a single IP address in China. Security events are then posted to a graphical user interface (GUI) in the Riptech SOC, and security analysts review and investigate each event to determine the type and severity of the event. 1 million possible attacks
Stage #4—Attack Classification After completing an investigation of the possible attack,
attacks that are determined to be “false positive” are eliminated from consideration.
* Confirmed attacks are assigned a
signature that indicates the type of attack that has occurred. Based upon the apparent intent and sophistication of the activity, attacks are also assigned a severity level. Only attacks that are assigned a signature number and severity level are analyzed in this report. 180,000+ validated attacks
* False positive attacks represent attacks that were initially flagged as potentially malicious, but later determined to be benig n after evaluation by a Riptech
security analyst. Over the past six months more than 800,000 possible attacks against clients in the sample set were determine d by analysts to be “false
positives.”
/xrhombus Client Classifications
The sample set was classified according to a wide variety of criteria. Classifications were based on information obtained directly from clients, as well as public sources.
Organizations were categorized according to the 11 different classifications, each of
which is listed below.
/circle4 Industry /circle4 Client tenure
*
/circle4 Company size /circle4 Company location
/circle4 Company ownership /circle4 Network function* (e.g., internal,
/circle4 Membership in Fortune 500 E-commerce, or Internet gateway)
/circle4 Multinational presence /circle4 Parent company
/circle4 Security device brand and version /circle4 Security device type (e.g., firewall)
* Indicates a new classification
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©2002 by Riptech, Inc. All Rights Reserved
In this edition of the Threat Report, Riptech focused on trends related to industry,
company size, company ownership, and client tenure, as these classifications
demonstrated the most notable variance in threat exposure. In future reports, other classifications, such as geographic location, may also be highlighted. In addition, several
new classifications will be added in future reports to determine additional risk factors that
affect the nature of cyber security threats.
/xrhombus Attack Metrics
Riptech uses a wide variety of metrics to discover trends in attack activity. These metrics
are then applied to different classifications of clients to determine whether a statistically
significant relationship exists. For example, the average number of attacks per company is evaluated for companies that reside in different industries to test if certain industries
are more prone to attacks than others. Each metric used to measure the nature of the
cyber security threat is summarized below.
Overall Attack Activity
Riptech uses two basic metrics to quantify overall attack activity, Attacks Per Company
and Unique Attackers. As a general rule, the Attacks Per Company metric serves as the
most reliable indicator of attack volume over a specified time period, while the Unique
Attackers metric serves as the most reliable indicator of the total number of attackers that
were active over a specified time period. This is an important distinction considering the
fact that a single attacker may be responsible for dozens (if not hundreds) of attacks. Each metric is explained in more detail below.
/circle4 Attacks Per Company — Measures the total number of attacks per company that
were detected against the sample over a set time (i.e., day, week, month, etc.). The
Attacks per Company metric is the most reliable indicator of attack volume detected
over a specified time period. For the six-month period of the report, this metric is calculated by taking the average attacks per company each day, and then averaging
the sum of these averages over six months. The attacks per company metric was
specifically designed to account for clients that were added to the sample set throughout the past six months. The formula ensures that changes to the client base
over time do not affect measures of overall attack activity.
/circle4 Unique Attackers —Measures the total number of unique source IP addresses that
launched attacks over a set time (i.e., day, week, month, etc.). The Unique Attackers
metric is the most reliable indicator of the actual number of attackers that launched attacks over a specified time period.
As final note, it is important to explain that several types of Denial of Service attacks, which are misleading indicators of the overall number of unique attackers and the number
of attacks during the past six months, were not included in the data set used for this study.
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Attack Severity
Every attack validated by a Riptech security analyst is assigned one of four severity
classifications: informational, warning, critical, and emergency. The primary purpose of
this rating system is to prioritize responses to attacks based on the relative level of danger that the event presents. A determination of severity is based on characteristics of an
attack, defensive posture of the client, value of the assets at risk, and the relative success
of the attack.
For the current edition of the Threat Report, these four severity levels are further grouped
into two classifications: severe and non-severe attacks. Severe attacks include attacks classified as either “emergency” or “critical”, while non-severe attacks include attacks
classified as either “informational” or “warning.” The severity classification system is
explained in greater detail in Figure 5 .
Figure 5: Attack Severity Metrics
Severity
Classification Severity
Level Description
Informational These attacks consist of scans for malicious services and IDS attacks that do not have a significant
impact on the client’s network. Example:
/circle4 Scans for vulnerable services where all connection attempts are dropped by the firewall.
Non-Severe
Warning These attacks represent malicious attacks that were successful in bypassing the firewall, but did not
compromise the intended target systems. Example:
/circle4 Scans/horizontal sweeps where some connections were allowed, but a compromise has not
occurred.
Critical These attacks are malicious in nature and require action on the part of Riptech or the client to remedy a
weakness or actual exploit of the client network or devices. By definition, if a critical attack is not addressed with countermeasures, the attack may result in a successful compromise of a system. Examples:
/circle4 Continuous attacks by a single IP address against the client network.
/circle4 A significant vulnerability on the client's network that was identified by either an attacker or the
Security Operations Center (SOC). For example, a web exploit is observed and appears to be successful, but there is no observed follow-up activity to take advantage of the vulnerability.
/circle4 Unknown suspicious traffic that warrants an investigation by the client to track or eliminate the
traffic flow.
Severe
Emergency These attacks indicate that a security breach has occurred on the client’s protected network. An
emergency attack requires the client to initiate some form of recovery procedure. Examples:
/circle4 Successful exploit of a vulnerable web server.
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Attack Type
For this edition of the Threat Report, Riptech replaced the list of the top 10 exploits with a list of the top 20 network scans . The change is designed to provide information that is
more actionable for members of the Internet community. Because attackers can literally
use dozens of different vulnerabilities to exploit any single service, it is more valuable for security administrators to know which services attackers are most likely to target, rather
than the specific exploits that are most commonly used. Riptech discovered in the past
that many of the top exploits were targeted at a single service. Therefore, information on top exploits only offers a partial view of the overall risk that organizations face.
Attack Source
Riptech identified the national and regional source of attacks by cross-referencing source
IP addresses of every attack with a third-party, subscription-based database that links the geographic location of hosts to source IP addresses. While these databases are generally
reliable, there is a small margin of error. Currently, Riptech cross references source IPs
of attacks against every country in the world and also analyzes attack trends according to the following regions as defined by the 2001 CIA World Fact Book :
/circle4 Africa
/circle4 Asia
/circle4 Caribbean
/circle4 Eastern Europe
/circle4 Latin America /circle4 Middle East
/circle4 North America
/circle4 Oceania
/circle4 South America
/circle4 Western Europe
It is important to note that while Riptech has a reliable process for identifying the source
IP of the host and/or network block that is directly responsible for launching an attack, it
is impossible to verify whether the attacker is actually physically present at this location.
It is probable that many apparent sources of attacks are, in fact, systems that were compromised and then used by attackers as a platform to disguise his/her identity and
true location.
Attacker Intent
In order to determine general attacker objectives, Riptech looked at a sample of more than 100 clients who share a common network block. Riptech then examined all attacks
launched against these companies, and determined the percentage that suffered targeted
and opportunistic attacks. Figure 6 outlines how each type of attack was categorized.
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Figure 6: Definitions of Attacker Intent
Objective Description
Opportunistic Opportunistic attacks appear to be intent on locating any vulnerable system that exists on the
Internet regardless of who owns the system or the specific function of the system. In this situation the victim of the attack was not identified in advance, but rather was selected after being identified as a vulnerable system. Typically, these attacks are preceded by a scan of many systems on the Internet until the attacker pinpoints a system that has vulnerabilities that he/she knows how to compromise.
Targeted Targeted attacks appear to be directed at a specific organization. In theory, attackers who
launch these types of attacks have identified the target company in advance and have made a conscious and deliberate attempt to gain access to their network. In this situation, the attacker is not looking for a specific vulnerab ility to gain access to ANY organization, but rather is
looking for ANY vulnerab ility that will enable them to gain access to a specific system. For
this report, these include all attacks in which the attacker did not perform any scan on any other networks within the network block of the sample set. In this situation, the attacker has only shown signs of malicious activity against one client.*
* It is important to note that it is possible that some attacks that appear targeted are actually opportunistic in nature. This is due to the fact that some attackers may use tools that randomly select a target without systematically scanning an entire network block for vulnerable systems. While it is expected that the number of these occurrences is small, this does introduce some margin of error in this calculation.
Attack Aggression
Riptech created a measure of Attack Aggression to quantify the level of effort associated
with each attack detected during the study period. Creating a precise method to measure
relative levels of Attack Aggression, however, is a considerable challenge due to the fact that the same technical attack characteristics that indicate high aggression in one case
may indicate low aggression in another. For example, in many cases, attacks that involve
a large number of exploits indicate a high level of aggression, while in other cases it indicates that an attacker is using a sophisticated (but easy to operate) hacking tool.
To correct for this complication, Riptech's Attack Aggression Scale is based on multiple factors, including the number of signatures triggered, number of companies affected, and
the duration of the attack. The specific technical indicators that were taken into account
in the aggression scale are described in Figure 7 . Once all attacks were ranked in terms
of aggression, Riptech created a distribution curve to separate attacks into three levels of
aggression: high, moderate, and low.
Figure 7: Attack Aggression Indicators
Technical Indicator Description
Number of Signatures
Triggered Measures the number of attack signatures triggered by the attacker
during the course of the attack. The number of attack signatures has a direct correlation to the Attack Aggression score.
Number of Companies
Affected Measures the number of companies targeted by the attacker. The
number of companies attacked has an inverse correlation to the Attack Aggression score.
Attack Duration Measures the time duration of the attack. The length of time spent
by the attacker has a direct correlation to the Attack Aggression
score.
Note: Measuring aggression is inevitably subjected to viewer perception. For example, while Code Red could be
considered a highly aggressive attack if one considers the magnitude of its impact to the Internet community, from a single client’s perspective, Code Red represents a low aggression attack because it only involve a small amount of time and effort directed specifically at a single company’s network. For this study, Attack Aggression is measured from the perspective of a single target company, rather than the entire Internet community.
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It is important to clarify the difference between Attack Severity and Attack Aggression.
Attack Aggression is based on an algorithm that approximates the level of effort
associated with an attack from a single company’s perspective, while Attack Severity is based on human analysis of the actual level of threat that an attack represents to the target
organization. Just as a severe attack can result from a relatively non-aggressive attack, a
highly aggressive attack may be non-severe in nature because it fails to uncover an exploitable vulnerability. In sum, severity is a proxy for threat and risk, while aggression
is a proxy for effort and sophistication.
Attacker Profiles
For this edition of the Threat Report, Riptech designed an automated system that profiles a subset of attackers immediately after they attack one or more companies. The profiler
gathers public data, such as the attacker’s operating system and services available on the
attacker’s system. Combined with other metrics of attack activity, the profiler provides deeper insight into attackers’ modus operandi. It is important to note, however, that
many of the systems identified as “attackers,” may actually be systems that were
themselves compromised and then used as a launching point by attackers located elsewhere.
Cyber-Terrorism Watch List
In response to warnings issued by the United States Department of Homeland Security
indicating that terrorists may be exploring the use of cyber-terrorism, Riptech created the Cyber-Terrorism Watch List. The Watch List tracks cyber attack activity from two types
of countries: those designated by the U.S. State Department as State Sponsors of
Terrorism and those from which terrorists have reportedly operated and recruited in the past. Countries selected for the latter category were based on a review of a variety of
public sources that indicate possible “hot spots” of terrorist activity.
It is important to note that, while Riptech does not claim to have specific expertise in
terrorism, we believe this list presents an adequate starting point for tracking potential
cases of cyber terrorism by monitoring some of the more likely sources. Countries included on the Cyber-Terrorism Watch List are listed in Figure 8 .
FIGURE 8: C OUNTRIES CURRENTLY ON THE
CYBER -TERRORIST WATCH LIST
(January 1, 2002 – June 30, 2002)
U.S. State Department
Designated State
Sponsors of Terrorism Countries with Reported
Terrorist Activity
/circle4 Cuba
/circle4 Iran
/circle4 Iraq
/circle4 Libya
/circle4 North Korea
/circle4 Sudan
/circle4 Syria /circle4 Afghanistan
/circle4 Egypt
/circle4 Indonesia
/circle4 Jordan
/circle4 Kuwait
/circle4 Lebanon
/circle4 Morocco
/circle4 Pakistan
/circle4 Saudi Arabia
/circle4 United Arab Emirates
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GENERAL ATTACK TRENDS
/xrhombus Overall Attack Activity
The overall rate of attack activity for the past six months was 64% higher on an annualized basis. While fluctuations occurred during the past six months, on average,
companies suffered approximately 32 attacks per company per week, as compared to 25
attacks per company per week during the prior six-month period. Specific observations relating to the overall rate of attack activity are summarized below.
/circle4 Attack activity for the entire six-month period was 28% higher than activity recorded
during the prior six-month period, a projected annual growth rate of 64%.
/circle4 While daily attack volume varied significantly, Riptech observed a consistent
gradual increase in cyber attack activity over the past six months.
Figure 9 shows the average attacks per company per week over the past year.
Figure 9: Attacks Per Company Per Week
(January 1, 2002 - June 30, 2002)
05101520253035404550
7/8/2001
7/22/2001
8/5/2001
8/19/2001
9/2/2001
9/16/2001
9/30/2001
10/14/2001
10/28/2001
11/11/200111/25/2001
12/9/2001
12/23/2001
1/6/2002
1/20/2002
2/3/2002
2/17/2002
3/3/2002
3/17/20023/31/2002
4/14/2002
4/28/2002
5/12/2002
5/26/2002
6/9/2002
6/23/2002
WeekAverage Attacks
Per Company Per WeekJanuary 1, 2002
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/xrhombus Attack Severity
Similar to the prior six-month period, all of the companies in the sample set experienced
some form of attack activity over the past six months; however, the majority of these
attacks were relatively non-severe in nature. Additional positive news is that the percentage of companies experiencing severe attacks was nearly half the percentage
recorded during the prior six-month period. Specific observations relating to trends in
Attack Severity are outlined below.
/circle4 Similar to the prior six-month period, more than 99% of all attacks detected by
Riptech were non-severe in nature and did not present an immediate threat to companies.
/circle4 23% of companies suffered at least one severe attack during the past six months, as
compared to 43% during the prior six-month period. While the percentage of
companies suffering at least one severe attack has declined overall, the fact that
nearly one quarter of companies faced an imminent security breach is still concerning.
/circle4 While several factors may have contributed to this decline, this trend is partly a
function of gradual improvements made to the security posture of companies
represented in the sample set. Companies that did not strengthen their security
posture likely suffered higher rates of severe attacks. This observation is discussed in more depth on page 21 .
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/xrhombus Attack Aggression
Background
Riptech introduces a new attack metric, called Attack Aggression, in this edition of the Threat Report. This metric quantifies the level of effort that various attackers exert in
order to penetrate target systems. Due to the complex nature of Attack Aggression,
Riptech created a scale based on multiple factors, including the number of signatures triggered, number of companies affected, and the duration of the attack. Once all attacks
were ranked in terms of aggression, Riptech created a distribution curve to separate
attacks into three levels: high, moderate, and low. For a full description of the methodology used to calculate Attack Aggression, see page 14
.
Findings
Significant observations with regard to Attack Aggression are summarized below.
/circle4 Approximately 3.57% of highly aggressive attacks were also severe, while
approximately 0.14% of moderately aggressive attacks and 0.01% of low aggressive
attacks were also severe. While highly aggressive attacks were relatively uncommon (less than 1% of all attacks were categorized as highly aggressive), this data indicates
that when these attacks occur, they are more than 26 times more likely to be severe
than moderately aggressive attacks.
/circle4 Only 0.01% of severe attacks were categorized as low aggression. This ratio most
likely reflects the fact that a low aggression attack typically involved one of the following scenarios:
1. The attacker commenced an attack, but quickly gave up after determining
that the network was not a viable target.
2. An attacker was simply trolling the Internet looking for vulnerable
systems and decided not to follow up with exploit attempts against a potential target.
Figure 10 illustrates the break down of attacks according to various levels of aggression
and severity.
Figure 10: Breakdown of Aggression
Levels by Severity
(January 1, 2002 – June 30, 2002)
Aggression Level
High Moderate Low
Severe 3.57% 0.14% 0.01%
Non-Severe 96.43% 99.86% 99.99%
Total 100% 100% 100%
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/xrhombus Attacks by Day of Week
Several metrics suggest that companies were exposed to higher risk of potential attack
and compromise on weekdays as compared to weekends.
1 Specifically, companies
suffered higher overall rates of attack activity during weekdays and were also more likely to suffer severe and highly aggressive attacks on these days. Observations relating to the
rate of attack activity by day of week are outlined below.
/circle4 Over the past six months, the average rate of overall attack activity on weekdays was
approximately 19% higher than the rate of activity on weekends.
/circle4 The average number of unique attackers per day during weekdays was 36% higher
than the number of unique attackers per day during the weekend, suggesting that
many attackers may have decreased their level of activity on weekends.
/circle4 The rate of severe attacks on weekdays is more than double the rate on weekends,
and the rate of highly aggressive attacks on weekdays is more than triple the rate on weekends.
Figure 11 illustrates the percent of attacks of various types that occur on each day of the
week; Figure 12 illustrates the percent of all unique attackers detected by day of week;
and Figure 13 visually depicts the predictable dips in attack activity on weekends.
1 Riptech used Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) to determine boundaries for each day of the week. Saturday and Sunday are considered
“weekends” and Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday are considered “weekdays.” Figure 11: Percent of Attacks by Day of Week
(January 1, 2002 - June 30, 2002)
13.9%14.9%16.1%
15.0%
12.8%12.4%18.0%
16.4%19.7%
4.9%6.6%11.6%15.5%21.9%
15.5%
9.7%
5.8%15.0%
14.8%19.7%20.0%
0%5%10%15%20%25%
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
Day of WeekPercent of All Attacks
in Each Category
Total Attacks Highly Aggressive Attacks Severe Attacks
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Figure 12: Unique Attackers by Day of Week
(January 1, 2002 - June 30, 2002)
14.6%15.9%16.4%
15.5%
14.9%
11.5%11.3%
0%2%4%6%8%10%12%14%16%18%
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday Sunday
Day of WeekPercent of All Unique Attackers
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ATTACK VARIANCE BY COMPANY TYPE
/xrhombus Client Tenure
In the current edition of the Threat Report, Riptech introduces a new client classification, Client Tenure, which tracks the amount of time that each company has accrued as a
security monitoring client. The purpose of this metric is to assess the effect that security
monitoring has on a company’s attack profile. In the past, Riptech analysts provided anecdotal evidence that a relationship existed between client tenure and the nature of
attack activity. For example, analysts observed that as tenure increased, clients became
less likely to suffer severe attacks. For this study, Riptech sought to quantify this observation. To accomplish this, Riptech categorized companies according to the
number of months of service that they accumulated as monitoring clients and measured
the variability in attack activity.
Overall, this analysis substantiates past observations, strongly suggesting that as clients
accumulate tenure, the likelihood of suffering a severe attack decreases, while the likelihood of suffering a highly aggressive attack increases. Specific observations related
to attack activity by client tenure are summarized below.
/circle4 Approximately 30% of companies with less than 12 months of tenure experienced at
least one severe attack during the past six months, as compared to 17% of companies
with greater than 12 months of tenure.
/circle4 Approximately 3% of companies with less than 12 months of tenure experienced at
least one highly aggressive attack, as compared to 19% of companies with more than 12 months of tenure.
/circle4 While companies with more than 12 months of tenure were more likely to experience
a highly aggressive attack, these companies were still less likely to experience a
severe attack overall because they generally maintain a stronger defensive posture.
Evidence of this comes from an analysis of moderately aggressive attacks, which were the source of approximately 96% of all severe attacks. During the past six
months, 14% of companies with greater than 12 months of tenure suffered a severe
attack that was moderately aggressive, as compared to 21% of companies with less than 12 months of tenure.
Figure 13 shows the percentage of clients suffering one or more severe attacks by client
tenure; Figure 14 shows the percentage of clients experiencing one or more highly
aggressive attacks by client tenure.
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Figure 14: Incidence of Highly Aggressive
Attacks by Client Tenure
(January 1, 2002 - June 30, 2002)
2.0%1.5%4.5%4.9%15.2%25.0%
0.0%5.0%10.0%15.0%20.0%25.0%30.0%
1-3 Months 4-6 Months 7-9 Months 10-12
Months13-15
Months16-18
Months
Months as ClientPercent Suffering One or More Highly
Aggressive AttacksFigure 13: Incidence of Severe Attacks by Client Tenure
(January 1, 2002 - June 30, 2002)
40.7%
30.3%
22.4%27.2%
17.0% 16.7%
0%5%10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%
1-3 Months 4-6 Months 7-9 Months 10-12
Months13-15
Months16-18
Months
Months as ClientPercent Suffering
One or More Severe Attacks
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/xrhombus Industry
Overall, attack rates by industry were similar to those recorded during the prior six-month
period. The Power and Energy, Financial Services, and High Tech sectors suffered
relatively high rates of attack activity, while industries, such as E-Commerce and Manufacturing suffered relatively moderate to low rates of attack activity. Specific
highlights from this analysis are presented below.
/circle4 Power and Energy, Financial Services, and High Tech companies continued to
experience the highest rate of overall attack activity, and also suffered relatively
higher rates of severe and highly aggressive attacks during the past six months.
/circle4 70% of Power and Energy companies suffered at least one severe attack during the
first six months of 2002, as opposed to 57% during the last six months of 2001.
Figure 15 shows the number of attacks per company by industry; Figure 16 and
Figure 17 show the percentage of companies suffering severe and highly aggressive
attacks by industry.
Figure 15: Attacks Per Company by Industry
(January 1, 2002 - June 30, 2002)
438617 623659 6677008999771,0181,280
02004006008001,0001,2001,400
Other
Manufacturing
Media/Entertainment
E-Commerce
Healthcare
Business Services
Nonprofit
High Tech
Financial Services
Power & Energy
IndustryAverage Attacks Per Company
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Figure 17: Incidence of Highly Aggressive
Attacks by Industry
(January 1, 2002 - June 30, 2002)
3%5%9% 9%10%11%13%18%19%20%
0%5%10%15%20%25%
E-Commerce
Business Services
Other
Healthcare
Manufacturing
Nonprofit
Financial Services
Media/Entertainment
High Tech
Power & Energy
IndustryPercent Suffering One or More Highly
Aggressive AttacksFigure 16: Incidence of Severe Attacks by Industry
(January 1, 2002 - June 30, 2002)
9%12% 13%18%19%21%27%32%46%70%
0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%
Healthcare
Other
E-Commerce
Media/Entertainment
Manufacturing
Business Services
High Tech
Nonprofit
Financial Services
Power & Energy
IndustryPercent of Companies Suffering
One or More Severe Attacks
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/xrhombus Ownership Structure
An analysis of attack activity by company ownership structure yielded mixed results with
regard to Government, Nonprofit, and Private companies, while Public companies experienced a higher level of attack activity along all attack metrics. These results are
similar to those recorded in the prior six-month period, which also indicated that Public
companies suffered higher rates of overall attack activity. Specific highlights of this analysis are presented below.
/circle4 Public companies experienced overall attacks per company at a rate that was
approximately 50% higher than the mean for all companies, and were nearly twice as
likely to experience severe and highly aggressive attacks.
/circle4 Private, Nonprofit, and Government entities varied with regard to risk; however, in
comparison to public companies, these types of companies consistently suffered
lower rates of attack activity.
Figure 18, Figure 19, and Figure 20 show the rate of various forms of attack activity by
company ownership.
Note: It is important to note that Government clients principally include small state and local organizations. Figure 19: Attacks Per Company by Ownership
(January 1, 2002 - June 30, 2002)
4756938041274
02004006008001,0001,2001,400
Government Private Nonprofit Public
Ownership StructureAverage Attacks Per Company
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Figure 21: Incidence of Highly Aggressive Attacks
by Company Ownership
(January 1, 2002 - June 30, 2002)
8.0%8.5%13.2%
0.0%2.0%4.0%6.0%8.0%10.0%12.0%14.0%
Nonprofit Private Public
Ownership StructurePercent Suffering At Least One Highly
Aggressive Attack Figure 20: Incidence of Severe Attacks by
Company Ownership
(January 1, 2002 - June 30, 2002)
16%27%28%34%
0%5%10%15%20%25%30%35%40%
Private Government Nonprofit Public
Ownership StructurePercent of Companies Suffering At
Least One Severe Attack
Note: Government organizations did not suffer any highly aggressive attacks over the past six months.
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/xrhombus Company Size
Riptech used the number of company employees as a proxy to measure the relative size
of companies. While it appears that larger companies are exposed to a relatively higher
threat, the results of this analysis are less conclusive than the analysis of companies along other classifications. Specific highlights of this analysis are presented below.
/circle4 Companies with more than 1,000 employees experienced nearly 40% more attacks
per company than companies with less than 1,000 employees.
/circle4 Companies with more than 5,000 employees were the most likely to suffer both
highly aggressive and severe attacks.
Figure 22, Figure 23, and Figure 24 show the rate of various forms of attack activity by
company size.
Figure 22: Attacks Per Company by Company Size
(January 1, 2002 - June 30, 2002)
6817411,110
1,007
02004006008001,0001,200
1-499 Employees 500-999 Employees 1000-4999 Employees 5000+ EmployeesNumber of EmployeesAttacks Per Company
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Figure 24: Incidence of Highly Aggressive
Attacks by Company Size
(January 1, 2002 - June 30, 2002)
9%10%
5%16%
0%2%4%6%8%10%12%14%16%18%
1-499 Employees 500-999 Employees 1000-4999
Employees5000+ Employees
Number of EmployeesPercent Suffering One or More Highly
Aggressive Attacks
Figure 23: Incidence of Severe Attacks by Company Size
(January 1, 2002 - June 30, 2002)
16%33%
26%36%
0%5%10%15%20%25%30%35%40%
1-499 Employees 500-999
Employees1000-4999
Employees5000+ Empl oyees
Number of EmployeesPercent of Companies Suffering
One or More Severe Attacks
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ATTACKER PROFILES
Riptech has built a wide variety of tools to identify attacker attributes, such as their
apparent country of origin, the systems they are running, and their scans and exploits of
choice. This section outlines several of these trends.
/xrhombus Attack Source
An analysis of attacks over the past six months by country of origin revealed many
similarities to the prior six-month period. It is important to note that for the current
edition of the Threat Report, Riptech analyzed two separate categories of attacking countries per Internet capita. The first summarizes attacks per Internet capita for
countries with more than 1 million Internet users; this group represents countries with a
relatively large, developed Internet infrastructure. The second summarizes attacks per Internet capita for countries with between 100,000 and 1,000,000 Internet users; this
group represents countries with relatively smaller and less-developed Internet
infrastructures. Countries with fewer than 100,000 Internet users were excluded from this analysis. Highlights with regard to attack activity by source are summarized below.
/circle4 The list of top ten attacking countries remained relatively consistent over the past
two six-month periods. While the order varied slightly, the top ten countries on both
lists were identical.
/circle4 Approximately 80% of Internet attacks were launched from the top ten attacking
countries, up from 70% recorded during the last study period. This increase appears
mostly attributable to the rise in attacks originating from the United States.
/circle4 The average attacks per Internet capita for countries with between 100,000 and 1
million Internet users is approximately 50% higher than the average rate for countries with more than 1 million Internet users.
/circle4 Iran and Kuwait top the list of attacking countries per Internet capita for countries
with less than one million Internet users. The rate of attack activity from Kuwait far
exceeds the rest of the top ten countries and is more than twice the mean of all of the
top ten attacking countries in this category.
Figure 25 shows the breakdown of all attacks by country of origin.
Figure 25: Breakdown of Attacks by Country of Origin
Country Percent of Total Attacks
January – June 2002 Percent of Total Attacks
July – December 2001
United States 40.0% 29.6%
Germany 7.6% 5.9%
South Korea 7.4% 8.8%
China 6.9% 7.8%
France 5.2% 4.5%
Canada 3.0% 3.9%
Italy 2.7% 2.5%
Taiwan 2.4% 2.6%
Great Britain 2.1% 2.5%
Japan 2.1% 2.0%
Total 79.6% 70.1%
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Figure 26 and Figure 27 show the rate of attacks per 10,000 Internet users for countries
with two different ranges of Internet populations.2
Figure 26: Attacks Per Internet Capita
(More than 1 M Internet Users)
Country Attacks Per
10,000 Internet Users
(January 1, 2002 – June 30, 2002)
Israel 33.1
Hong Kong 22.1
France 19.9
Belgium 17.6
Thailand 15.9
Poland 15.7
South Korea 15.5
Taiwan 13.8
Germany 13.1
China 10.4
Top Ten Average 14.4
Figure 27: Attacks Per Internet Capita
(Less than 1 M & Greater than 100,000 Internet Users)
Country Attacks Per
10,000 Internet Users
(January 1, 2002 – June 30, 2002)
Kuwait 50.8
Iran 30.8
Peru 24.5
Chile 24.4
Nigeria 23.4
Morocco 22.3
Puerto Rico 20.8
Argentina 19.3
Estonia 17.3
Romania 16.5
Top Ten Average 21.7
2 It is important to note that per capita rates are based on the 2001 CIA World Fact Book , which was not updated during the past six
months. As a result, apparent changes in per capita rates over the past six-month period, as compared to the prior six-month p eriod do
not account for rates of growth in each country’s Internet population.
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/xrhombus Attacker Intent
One of the most intriguing and challenging questions about Internet attacks is that of
intent—was the attacker targeting a specific organization, or simply trolling the Internet
and searching for an opportunity to exploit any vulnerable systems. Riptech’s methodology separates attacks into two general categories: those that were opportunistic
(i.e., the attack was intended to exploit any vulnerable organization discovered on the
Internet), and those that were targeted specifically at a given organization. For a description of the methodology, see page 13 .
During the prior six-month period, Riptech discovered that 39% of attacks appeared to be targeted. Analysis over the past six months revealed similar breakdowns—37% of all
attacks appeared targeted in nature, while 63% appeared opportunistic. Figure 28 shows
the breakdown of opportunistic versus targeted attacks for the past six months.
Figure 28: Attacks by Attacker Intent
(January 1, 2002 - June 30, 2002)
Targeted
37%
Opportunistic
63%
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/xrhombus Attacker Platform
Riptech developed and maintains a proprietary, automated system to continuously
identify the platforms used by a random sample of attackers immediately after they are
detected launching an attack against companies. The intent of this system is to profile typical attackers both in terms of the systems that they most commonly use and the
services that they most commonly run. In addition, Riptech also tracks the number of
days that attackers were active. Major insights from this investigation are listed below.
/circle4 The Microsoft Windows suite of operating systems were used by more than 63% of
attackers, which is not surprising considering the dominant market penetration of Windows and the fact that most home users use Windows systems. Generic Unix
and various versions of Linux accounted for approximately 20% of activity.
/circle4 Unreachable systems, a large percentage of which are likely to represent the actual
systems used by attackers, accounted for only 10% of the attack sample.
3 This
finding suggests that at least 10% of attackers detected during the past six months launched attacks directly against their intended target.
/circle4 Perhaps most interesting is that 93% of all attackers detected were only active for a
single day. This likely reflects a large volume of home users, who constantly change
their source IP address. If conventional wisdom were to hold true—that most
attackers repeatedly use the same previously compromised systems to launch their attacks—one would expect this number to be much lower. This finding suggests that
the majority of attackers that Riptech detected came from the actual systems or
general location used by the attackers.
Figure 29 shows the breakdown of attackers by the systems used to launch the attack.
3 “Unreachable Systems” could not be profiled by Riptech either because the attacker quickly disconnected from the Internet or t he
attacker was protected by a highly restrictive firewall.
Figure 29: Breakdown of Attackers
by Operating Systems Used
(January 1, 2002 - June 30, 2002)
Windows (other)
21.2%Windows 2000/XP
42.2%Linux (generic)
1.0%Unknown
4.2%
Linux (RedHat)
8.6%
Unreachable
10.3%
Unix (generic)
12.1%Solaris
0.5%
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/xrhombus Top 20 Scans
For this edition of the Threat Report, Riptech provides a list of the twenty most frequent
scans detected against companies in the sample set. The frequency of different types of
scans serves as a high level indicator of the types of services for which hackers are most often searching.
Overall Trends
During the past six months, 99.9% of scanning activity was concentrated on only 20
services. Each of these services is listed in Figure 30 . While it may be comforting to
know that the majority of scanning is focused on a relatively small subset of services, it is
also important to note how quickly a low frequency scan can transform into a high
frequency scan. As an example, after the emergence of the SQL Spida worm on May 20, 2002, Riptech saw the average number of scans for Microsoft SQL increase from five to
several thousand per day. Even six weeks after SQL Spida, Microsoft SQL still accounts
for 15% of all scanning activity. The case of SQL Spida illustrates why a truly effective security posture must adequately address both high-risk services, as well as relatively
low-risk services, which always have the potential to transform rapidly into a high-impact
threat.
Figure 30: Top Twenty Network Scans
(January 1, 2002 – June 30, 2002)
Scan Type Operating
Systems AffectedPercent of Total
Scans
FTP All 31.7%
MSSQL Windows 15.0%
SSH Primarily Unix 12.4%
RPC (tcp) Primarily Unix 10.4%
HTTP* All 9.5%
SubSeven Windows/Mac 4.8%
LPD Unix 3.2%
CDE Subprocess Control Unix 2.1%
DNS (tcp) Primarily Unix 2.1%
Netbios (137/ udp) Windows 1.7%
Telnet Primarily Unix 1.6%
Wingate Proxy/SOCKS (1080/tcp) Primarily Windows 1.2%
Netbios (139/tcp) Windows 1.0%
Squid Proxy Primarily Unix 0.8%
SMTP All 0.7%
SNMP All 0.5%
Netbus (12345/tcp) Mostly Windows 0.5%
SMB/File Sharing (445/tcp) Windows 0.4%
HTTPS All 0.2%
Kazaa Windows 0.1%
* It is important to note that many sources have suggested that the majority of Internet attacks target the
HTTP service. Unfortunately, these observations are typically based only on the analysis of data from IDSs. Since a disproportionate share of IDS alerts are focused on HTTP attacks, coupled with the fact that many IDSs cannot detect scanning activity, analysis of IDS alerts alone yields distorted findings. Riptech avoids this distortion by looking solely at attack scanning activity, rather than restricting analysis only to exploits triggered by IDS alarms. In the end, this methodology provides more precise data concerning the types of services that attackers are most frequently seeking for exploitation.
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Noteworthy Shifts in Activity
Over the past six months, Riptech noted several interesting shifts in scanning activity,
each of which is discussed below.
/circle4 FTP —Scans for FTP increased by 86% during the first three months of 2002, and
then declined slightly through June. Close to 36% of FTP scans originated in
Germany and France. Currently, the rate of FTP scans is 50% higher than levels recorded in January 2002. Riptech has observed that the majority of attackers that
scan for FTP have one of two objectives: (1) fully compromise a system by
leveraging well-known vulnerabilities, or (2) leverage misconfigurations to “borrow” an FTP server for use in uploading and storing pirated software, music, or movies.
/circle4 Microsoft SQL —Scans for Microsoft SQL increased dramatically over the past 6
months as a result of the SQL Spida worm. While Riptech first began detecting low
levels of scanning for Microsoft SQL in the Fall 2001, the release of the SQL Spida
worm on May 20, 2002 immediately caused more than a 500-fold increase in the rate of these scans. Since the release of SQL Spida, the SOC has identified more than
20,000 hosts infected by the SQL Spida worm.
/circle4 SSH —Once considered a secure alternative to Telnet, SSH is widely used by system
administrators to access Unix (and some Windows) systems remotely.
Unfortunately, over the past year, a variety of remotely exploitable vulnerabilities emerged, rendering this service highly exposed to attack. While SSH remains the
third highest target of scans, over the past six months this rate declined by 50%.
However, considering the fact that several new SSH vulnerabilities were disclosed over the past few weeks (see http://www.cert.org/ advisories/CA-2002-18.html
),
SSH scans may soon rise again.
/circle4 RPC —RPC has been one of the most frequently targeted Unix services over the past
five years. A variety of Unix applications utilize the RPC daemon, and
vulnerabilities in any one of these services can be targeted by attacking port 111 (tcp & udp). In the past six months, the number of scans for RPC increased by 20%.
/circle4 HTTP —Web servers continue to be a popular target for attackers. Over the past six
months, scans for web servers increased by 123%, with the majority of this increase
occurring in May and June. Due to a variety of new Microsoft IIS and Apache
vulnerabilities, Riptech expects scans for HTTP to continue increasing at a rapid rate. It is distinctly possible that the increase in scans for HTTP signifies that
attackers are creating an inventory of the different versions of web servers operating
on the Internet. These attackers may then use this inventory to create new worms that target web servers more efficiently than in the past.
/circle4 CDE Subprocess Control —Most likely as a result of the release of a new
vulnerability in January 2002 (see http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-01.html
),
the rate of CDE scans in June 2002 were more than four times the rate recorded in
January 2002.
/circle4 SNMP —Several new SNMP vulnerabilities that affect countless systems were
disclosed in February 2002. While these vulnerabilities led to an initial increase in scans for SNMP in February, no significant increases have been detected since.
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/xrhombus Top Attacking Network Blocks
When evaluating repeat sources of attacks, tracking network blocks, rather than
individual source IPs, yields the most actionable information. While attackers frequently
change their apparent source IP address—more than 93% of unique source IPs that attacked companies in the sample set were only active for a single day over the past six
months—they are less likely to change the network block from which they operate.
Therefore, network blocks that contain one or more highly active attackers will often show a high volume of attacks from many unique source IPs over an extended period of
time. By identifying network blocks that match this profile, one can develop a better
sense of where future attacks may originate.
Over the past six months, Riptech isolated 47 highly active Class C network blocks, each
of which was active for more than 10 days and was the source of more than 15 unique attacking source IPs. It is important to note that ISPs and companies associated with
these network blocks are most likely not the true source of attacks. In fact, many are
systems that were previously compromised, and others are network blocks allocated to home users. Keeping this caveat in mind, the top attacking network blocks are listed in
Figures 31 – 33, and high-level observations regarding this list are provided below.
Network blocks from the same ISP location are grouped together.
/circle4 Only 7 countries in the world (United States, China, South Korea, France, Germany,
Turkey, and the Philippines) contributed to the list of top attacking network blocks. 72% of these were located in only 2 countries: China and the United States.
/circle4 The majority of network blocks represent space allocated to dial-up users and/or
individual home users, suggesting that corporate networks are rarely used in mass as
a frequent attack launch point. It is important to note that a highly active dial-up
network range may be the result of only a few (or even a single) attackers over time.
Figure 31: Top Attacking Network Blocks from North America
(January 1, 2002– June 30, 2002)
Network BlockUnique
Sources Total Days
Active Location
208.191.23.0/24
64.24.150.0/24
66.19.72.0/24 66.19.76.0/24
64.24.149.0/24
66.19.176.0/24 64.24.148.0/24 210 107 United States
65.139.127.0/24
65.139.126.0/24
65.141.51.0/24 172 62 United States
199.232.245.0/24
199.232.242.0/24
199.232.255.0/24 66 28 United States
216.53.218.0/24 59 28 United States
209.128.161.0/24 33 24 United States
205.208.148.0/24 28 21 United States
63.199.200.0/24 19 23 United States
63.11.67.0/24 18 14 United States
64.2.142.0/24 16 16 United States
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Figure 32: Top Attacking Network Blocks from Asia
(January 1, 2002– June 30, 2002)
Network BlockUnique
Sources Total Days
Active Location
218.24.129.0/24 29 26 China
61.132.208.0/24 24 48 China
61.182.255.0/24 23 29 China
61.185.221.0/24 21 18 China
61.177.118.0/24 20 26 China
61.157.80.0/24 19 24 China
61.157.84.0/24 19 27 China
61.144.140.0/24 18 21 China
202.101.10.0/24 17 65 China
61.145.232.0/24 17 18 China
218.11.140.0/24 17 28 China
218.20.225.0/24 16 18 China
211.98.136.0/24 16 28 China
61.182.248.0/24 16 29 China
211.153.0.0/24 16 20 China
202.164.166.0/24 16 13 Philippines
218.233.206.0/24 25 21 South Korea
61.254.88.0/24 19 22 South Korea
211.183.5.0/24 18 14 South Korea
211.252.216.0/24 16 13 South Korea
Figure 33: Top Attacking Network Blocks from All Other Regions
(January 1, 2002– June 30, 2002)
Network BlockUnique
Sources Total Days
Active Location
62.212.118.0/24 16 18 France
217.3.5.0/24 24 27 Germany
217.1.1.0/24 24 25 Germany
213.20.128.0/24 23 22 Germany
212.185.239.0/24 23 25 Germany
213.20.64.0/24 20 20 Germany
213.20.224.0/24 17 16 Germany
212.175.38.0/24 23 57 Turkey
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Riptech, Inc., the premier provider of scalable, real-time managed security services, protects clients through advanced outsourced security monitoring and professional services. Riptech's unique Caltarian
SM technology
platform provides Real-Time Information ProtectionSM through around-the-clock monitoring, analysis, and
response. The Caltarian technology is capable of processing large volumes of network security data to
separate security threats from false positives in real-time, with carrier-class scalability. Additionally, Riptech's Security Professional Services group provides security policy development, assessment and
auditing, penetration testing, incident forensics, and response. Riptech security specialists have secured
hundreds of organizations including Fortune 500 companies and federal agencies. Founded in 1998 by former Department of Defense security professionals and market experts, Riptech is headquartered in
Alexandria, Virginia with offices in San Jose, California, and New York City. ABOUT RIPTECH
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APPENDIX A—C YBER -TERRORISM WATCH LIST
Background
In response to a recent warnings issued by the United States Department of Homeland Security indicating that terrorists may be exploring the use of cyber-terrorism, Riptech
added the Cyber-Terrorism Watch List to current and future editions of the Threat
Report. The Watch List tracks cyber attack activity from two types of countries: those designated by the U.S. State Department as State Sponsors of Terrorism and those from
which terrorists have reportedly operated and recruited in the past. For a full description
of the methodology used to select countries on the Watch List, see page 15 .
Findings
An analysis of attack activity from countries on the Cyber-Terrorism Watch List is
presented below.
/circle4 Attacks were detected from only three of the seven countries designated by the U.S.
State Department as “State Sponsors of Terrorism.” 90% of this activity emanated
from Iran, while the remaining 10% was split evenly between Cuba and Sudan. It is important to note that because Iraq, North Korea, Syria, and Libya, have little, if any,
IP space assigned to them, it is difficult to detect attacks coming directly from these
nations. Therefore, it is certainly possible that these countries are launching attacks, but they are being funneled through ISPs located in neighboring countries.
/circle4 Countries on the Watch List generated less than 1% of all attacks detected during the
past six-month period; 84% of this activity originated in Kuwait, Pakistan, Egypt,
Indonesia, and Iran. Figure 34 shows the breakdown of attack activity from
countries on the Watch List.
/circle4 The monthly rate of attack activity from countries on the Watch List remained
relatively constant over the past six months. At a high level, the variations in attack activity roughly match the patterns observed from all countries throughout the world.
Figure 35 shows the rate of attack activity from countries on the Watch List over the
past six months.
/circle4 Only one severe attack over the past six months came from a country on the Watch
List. This attack originated in Iran and was targeted at an E-commerce company with less than 500 employees located in the United States. Riptech has no evidence
suggesting that this attack was in any way related to cyber terrorism.
/circle4 RPC was the target of approximately 25% of all scans from countries on the Watch
List, versus only 10.4% from all countries throughout the world. Other significant
differences in scanning activity, such as the rate of scanning for FTP, LPD, and SubSeven, suggests that the modus operandi of attackers from countries on the
Watch List may differ from the modus operandi of attackers located in other
countries throughout the world. Figure 36 shows the top ten scans from countries on
the Watch List.
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Figure 34: Breakdown of Attacks from Countries on
the Cyber-Terrorism Watch List
(January 1, 2002 - June 30, 2002)
Asia
22.7%Europe
28.3%North America
43.7%Cyber-Terrorism
Watch List
0.7%Other
4.5%
Jordan
0.3%Sudan
0.6%Cuba
0.7%Morocco
8.3%
United Arab Emirates
3.5%
Pakistan
19.0%Indonesia
14.8%
Egypt
19.0%Kuwait
19.4%Lebanon
1.0%Saudi Arabia
1.7%Iran
11.7%
Figure 35: Attacks Per Company Per Month from
Countries on the Cyber-Terrorism Watch List
(January 1, 2002 - June 30, 2002)
01234567
January February March April May JuneMonthAttacks per Company
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Figure 36: Top Ten Scans from Countries on the Cyber-
Terrorism Watch List
(January 1, 2002– June 30, 2002)
Scan Type Scan Breakdown for
Cyber-Terrorism
Watch List Countries Scan Breakdown for
All Countries
RPC 25.5% 10.4%
FTP 22.6% 31.7%
LPD 10.3% 3.2%
SubSeven 9.8% 4.8%
SSH 6.6% 12.4%
HTTP 5.3% 9.5%
CDE Subprocess
Control 5.0% 2.1%
DNS 4.2% 2.1%
Telnet 3.2% 1.6%
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APPENDIX B—W ORM ACTIVITY ANALYSIS
The outbreak of Code Red and Nimda during the last half of 2001 illustrated the growing
sophistication and danger of Internet worms. According to estimates set forth by
Carlsbad, Florida-based Computer Economics, variants of Code Red alone infected several million hosts worldwide within a matter of hours, and cost organizations more
than $2 billion in clean up expenses and lost productivity.
4 In light of continued activity
by Code Red and Nimda, coupled with the recent emergence of the SQL Spida worm, Riptech investigated the relative threat that these worms presented to the Internet
community over the past six months. Highlights are presented below.
/circle4 Code Red, Nimda, and SQL Spida showed a high level of activity over the past six
months, as indicated by the observations below.
- Worms accounted for approximately 44% of all attack activity over the
past six months, as compared to 63% during the prior six-month period.
- The rate of Code Red scans rose by nearly 50% from January 2002 to
February 2002, and then remained level through June 2002.
- Nimda appeared as an ever-present source of scanning activity, but
average daily scans in June were approximately 50% lower than the average daily scans in January.
- SQL Spida, which first emerged on May 20, 2002, created a significant
amount of scanning activity in a short burst of time. While these scans decreased after a few days, as of June 30, 2002, Riptech was still detecting more than 500 unique hosts scanning for Microsoft SQL per day as a result of this worm.
/circle4 Despite the relative frequency of Code Red, Nimda, and SQL Spida scans, these
worms only presented a moderate threat to the Internet community, and only a slight
threat to the companies represented in the sample set. This is mainly due to the fact
that most companies have taken the necessary steps to implement the required patches to protect their systems. As a result, less than 1% of companies in the
sample set suffered a severe attack as a result of these worms.
/circle4 Using our attacker profiling system, Riptech determined that a small percentage of
apparent Code Red-related scans over the past six months came from Unix systems.
Since Unix systems are not susceptible to Code Red, Riptech believes that these attackers were attempting to disguise their activity as Code Red in order to avoid the
attention of security administrators.
/circle4 As a final note, it is important to consider the fact that Code Red, Nimda, and SQL
Spida still represent a major “potential” threat to organizations—even those that have
properly safeguarded their systems from infection. As an example, there is always the possibility for an attacker to introduce a new variant of a worm, such as Code
Red, that uses the thousands of systems that remain vulnerable as a launching point
for a distributed denial of service attack.
Figures 37 -- 39 show the rate of scans per day resulting from Code Red, Nimda, and
SQL Spida. Figure 40 illustrates the relative scale of activity among the three major
worms.
4 Jesdenun, A. “Despite More Security Spending, Internet a More Dangerous Pl ace.” Associated Press. (January 16, 2002).
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Figure 38: Unique Source IPs Per Day from Nimda
(January 1, 2002 - June 30, 2002)
05,00010,00015,00020,00025,000
1/1/2002
1/8/2002
1/15/2002
1/22/2002
1/29/2002
2/5/2002
2/12/2002
2/19/2002
2/26/2002
3/5/2002
3/12/20023/19/2002
3/26/2002
4/2/20024/9/2002
4/16/2002
4/23/2002
4/30/2002
5/7/2002
5/14/2002
5/21/2002
5/28/2002
6/4/2002
6/11/2002
6/18/2002
6/25/2002
DateUnique Source IPs
Figure 37: Unique Source IPs Per Day
From Code Red and Variants
(January 1, 2002 - June 30, 2002)
050001000015000200002500030000350004000045000
1/1/2002
1/8/2002
1/15/2002
1/22/2002
1/29/2002
2/5/2002
2/12/20022/19/20022/26/2002
3/5/2002
3/12/20023/19/20023/26/2002
4/2/20024/9/2002
4/16/2002
4/23/20024/30/2002
5/7/2002
5/14/2002
5/21/2002
5/28/2002
6/4/2002
6/11/20026/18/20026/25/2002DateUnique Source IPs
Note: Due to Code Red’s attack algorithm, which initiates propagation on the first day of each month and ceases on the
20th of each month, activity appeared in predictable peaks and valleys.
|
√3REPORT
VOLUME III FEB 2003Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
1The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
provides the Internet community with a deeperunderstanding of how Internet threats are evolvingover time. The Report derives insights on cyberattack trends from the world’s most extensive networkof intrusion detection systems (IDSs) and firewalls
deployed throughout the world. In addition to morethorough analysis of network-based attacks, thisissue is expanded in scope, incorporating analysisof vulnerability and malicious code data as well. By combining these resources, the Internet SecurityThreat Report becomes the only report to providea comprehensive view of the security landscape.
This view is based on Symantec r esources, which
include one of the world’s largest repository ofsecurity attack data, the world’s most comprehensivevulnerability database, and millions of code submissions from antivirus customers. These findings can help IT managers understand theevolving nature of security threats, and how a varietyof factors ultimately affect the risks experienced bytheir organizations.
As discussed throughout this report, Internet
threats have intensified and evolved in many ways,while remaining relatively stable along other criteria.
Excluding worm and blended threat activity, measured
cyber attack volume declined slightly for the firsttime, dropping 6% since the prior six-month period.Despite the decline, many organizations, such asthose in the financial services sector, experienced a sharp rise in attack volume and relative attackseverity, while other companies, such as tenuredsecurity monitoring clients, substantially reducedtheir risk profile. Attack volume by country of originwas mostly consistent with past studies. 80% of attacks were launched from or through systems
located in only 10 countries, and the United Stateswas by far the largest source of attacks.
Adding to risks associated with cyber attacks, the
discovery rate for new IT product vulnerabilitiesaccelerated substantially over the past year. Thetotal number of new, documented vulnerabilities in2002 was 81.5% higher than in 2001. This risewas driven almost exclusively by vulnerabilitiesrated as relatively severe. Furthermore, approximately60% of the documented vulnerabilities were easilyexploitable either because sophisticated tools werewidely available or because exploit tools were notrequired at all. Finally, by leveraging the vast supplyof vulnerabilities, malicious code writers introducedseveral successful blended threats over the past six months. Within hours of release many of thesethreats spread rapidly among Internet-connectedorganizations, and several continue to infect thou-sands of systems throughout the world today.
In conclusion, the evidence clearly shows that the
risk of cyber attacks and malicious code infectionsremains high for all Internet-connected organiza-tions. In addition, the potential introduction ofentirely new, and potentially more destructive,forms of malicious code and cyber attack toolsrepresents a substantial future risk. The remainderof this report provides greater detail on majorthreat trends, as well as highlighting future concerns.The findings provide IT professionals with a greaterunderstanding of the ever-evolving Internet threatenvironment, which they can then use to createmore effective security postures.EDITOR
Mark Higgins
Manager, Trending and Analysis
Symantec Managed
Security Services
RESEARCH & ANALYSIS TEAM
David Ahmad
Manager, Development
Symantec Security Response
Cori Lynn Arnold
Security Analyst
Symantec Managed
Security Services
Brian Dunphy
Director, Analysis Operations
Symantec Managed
Security Services
Michael Prosser
Principal Trend Analyst
Symantec Security Services
Vincent Weafer
Senior Director, Development
Symantec Security Response
MEDIA INQUIRES
Candice Garmoe
310-449-4324
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Threat Report
Attack Trends for Q3 and Q4 2002
Executive Summary3Report Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
2About the Symantec Internet Security
Threat Report
The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
provides the most accurate and comprehensive com-
pendium of current trends in cyber security threats.Trends derive from the analysis of a broad range ofthreat data. The first section of the report providesinsights into major trends in actual cyber attackactivity. These insights are based on the statisticalanalysis of real-time cyber attacks detected by asample set of more than 400 companies, whichdeploy over 1,000 intrusion detections systems andfirewalls in more than 30 countries. The secondsection of the report provides insights into majortrends in threat exposure by analyzing documented
vulnerabilities and outbreaks of malicious code.
Insights in these sections draw from the statisticalanalysis of malicious code submissions from millionsof corporate and home users throughout the worldand a vulnerability database consisting of more than6,000 distinct entries.The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report is
firmly grounded on analysis of empirical data.Leveraging the full breadth of Symantec’s technologyand service offerings, these data and analysis nowcover the full spectrum of information security,including vulnerability analysis, malicious codeanalysis, and network-based cyber attacks. Bysharing this information, we provide members ofthe information security community with bench-marks and guidance to evaluate the effectivenessof their current and future security strategies within their own company, industry, and throughoutthe global Internet community.Contents
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1
About the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3
Report Highlights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
Cyber Attack Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
Network-based Cyber Attack Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
General Attack Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
Attack Activity by Company Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .14
Attacker Profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
Cyber-Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .24
Internal Misuse and Abuse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26
Vulnerability and Malicious Code Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
Emergence of New Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
General Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27
Future Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .31
Emergence of Malicious Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34
Current Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .34
Future Concerns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .37
Appendix A—Network-Based Cyber Attack Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39Company Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39Attack Metrics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .40Individual Research Inquiries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .43
Appendix B—Malicious Code Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46
Infection Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46Malicious Code Database . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .46
Appendix C—Vulnerability Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47
Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47Vulnerability Classifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .47Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
3Report Highlights
Overall threats in terms of cyber attacks, IT prod-
uct vulnerabilities, and overall susceptibility to newforms of malicious code remained substantial andconstantly evolving over the past six months. Forcompanies who are not making use of appropriatecountermeasures, these threats have increasedtheir risk of compromise. Specific findings thatsupport this observation are highlighted throughoutthis section under the following subtitles: CyberAttack Trends, Vulnerability Trends, and MaliciousCode Trends.
CYBER ATTACK TRENDS
Excluding worm and blended threat activity, the
rate of network-based attacks over the past six
months was 6% lower than the rate recordedduring the prior six-month period.
• On average, companies experienced 30 attacks
per company per week during the past sixmonths, as compared with 32 attacks per com-pany per week during the prior six-month period.
• Approximately 85% of this activity was classified
as pre-attack reconnaissance, and the remaining15% was classified as various forms of attempted(or successful) exploitation.
• Despite the decline in attack volume over the
prior six-month period, average attacks percompany during the past six months remained20% higher than the rate recorded during thesame six-month period in 2001.The severe event incidence rate during the
past six months was slightly lower than the raterecorded during the prior six-month period.
• 21% of companies in the sample set suffered
at least one severe event over the past sixmonths, as compared to 23% during the priorsix-month period.
• The current severe event incidence rate remains
far below the rate of 43%, which was recordedduring the same six-month period in 2001.
Several notable patterns of attacker activity
were observed during specific windows of time.
• Attack volume and severity were considerably
lower on Saturdays and Sundays than on any otherday of the week, which confirms observations fromthe prior six-month period.
• Fluctuations in attacker activity appeared to be a
function of the approximate local times in whichthe attacking systems were located, rather thanthe local times in which the victims were located.
• Internet-connected organizations experienced
a notable spike in attacker activity between thehours of 12:00 and 21:00 Greenwich MeanTime (GMT) independent of each network’slocation or time zone. This appears to be theresult of several high-volume regional sources ofattacks achieving peak activity at approximatelythe same time.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
4The volume and relative severity of attacks
experienced by companies continued to varybased on characteristics, such as industry, size,and client tenure.
• Power and Energy companies continued to
show the highest rate of attacks and severeevent incidence.
• Both the nonprofit and financial services sectors
experienced higher rates of overall attack volumeand severe event incidence, respectively.
• Larger companies, measured in terms of
employee count, consistently experienced ahigher volume and greater severity of attacks.
• Companies continued to show risk reduction as
security monitoring client tenure increased. Thesevere event incidence rate for companies withless than 12 months tenure was 29%, while theincidence rate for companies with more than 12 months tenure was 17%.
Overall attack activity by apparent country of
origin remained relatively consistent over thepast 18 months; however, a few notable fluctua-tions in activity were also detected.
1
• The top ten attacking countries accounted for
80% of all attacks detected during the prior sixmonths; the United States continued to showthe highest attack volume, accounting for 35.4%of all attacks.• Attacks from South Korea increased by 62%
over the past six months, establishing this countryas the second largest overall source of attacksand the highest source of attacks per 10,000Internet users among Tier One countries.
2One
factor driving this trend may be South Korea’srapidly growing consumer broadband infrastruc-ture. As broadband becomes more accessible inother nations, their exposure to and participation inmalicious activity may also rise unless protectiontechnologies are widely deployed.
• Several Eastern European countries showed
high rates of attacks per 10,000 Internet users.Poland and the Czech Republic were numbertwo and three, respectively, on the list of TierOne countries, while Romania, Latvia, Lithuania,and Slovakia were all represented on the list ofTier Two countries.
Symantec detected no verifiable cases of Cyber
Terrorism during the past six months.
• Attacks from countries included on the Cyber
Terrorist Watch List accounted for less than 1%of all activity.
Cases of internal misuse and abuse accounted for
more than 50% of incident response engagements.
• In addition to exceeding external attacks in overall
volume, the customer self-assessments of damagewere particularly high for internal cases of abuseand misuse.
• High self-reported damage estimates, coupled
with the relative simplicity with which the perpe-trators acted, should be considered a warningsign that protecting against the internal threat isextremely important.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
51Tracking the “true” source of attacks is extremely difficult. Attackers can jump through multiple systems and countries before hitting their intended tar-
get. Therefore, the data referenced in these findings only represents the last hop that the attacker took before hitting his/he r intended target.
2When evaluating attacks per 10,000 Internet users, countries were separated into two tiers. Tier One countries include those wi th more than 1 million
Internet users; Tier Two countries include those with between 100,000 and 1 million Internet users. These categorizations separ ate countries with rela-
tively well-developed infrastructures from those with emerging Internet infrastructures.VULNERABILITY TRENDS
Symantec documented 2,524 new vulnerabilities
over the past year, which amounted to an 81.5%increase over 2001.
• On average, Symantec analysts documented 7
new vulnerabilities per day over the past year.
• Potential drivers of the increase include the
establishment of the responsible disclosuremovement, the use of several new methodologiesto exploit software bugs, and increased mediaexposure for vulnerability researchers.
The increase in new vulnerabilities was driven
by the sharp rise in moderately or highly severevulnerabilities.
• The total number of moderate and high severity
vulnerabilities documented in 2002 was 84.7%higher than the total documented in 2001. Incomparison, the total number of low severity vulnerabilities was only 24.0% higher than thetotal documented in 2001.
• The rapid development and deployment of
remotely exploitable web applications appears tobe the most substantial driver of this trend.
The relative ease with which attackers could
exploit new vulnerabilities remained unchangedover the past year.
• Approximately 60% of all new vulnerabilities
could be easily exploited either because the vulnerability did not require the use of exploitcode or because the required exploit code waswidely available.
• However, of the subset of vulnerabilities that
required the use of exploit code, only 23.7%actually had exploit code available in 2002, ascompared with 30.0% in 2001.Based on vulnerabilities that surfaced in 2002,
a number of high-risk future threats haveemerged, which attackers and malicious codewriters are only beginning to leverage.
• Known blended threats are exploiting only a
fraction of the vulnerabilities that are currentlydocumented. Because past blended threatswere able to successfully exploit vulnerabilitiesthat were known for several months, it appearsthat many recently discovered vulnerabilitiesremain highly viable targets for future threats.
• A number of widely used open source applica-
tions were trojanized with backdoors over thepast year. The attacks targeted high profile distri-bution sites that had taken significant efforts toprotect themselves. This may serve as a warningnot only to other open source projects, but alsoto commercial software vendors. Rather than targeting individual systems, attackers are clearlyexploring alternative ways of impacting a largenumber of systems in a short period of time.
• Web client vulnerabilities, specifically those that
affect Microsoft’s Internet Explorer, should beclosely watched over the next year. The volumeand severity of these vulnerabilities increasedsubstantially over the past year. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
6MALICIOUS CODE TRENDS
Blended threats continue to present the greatest
risk to the Internet community.3
• Three blended threats (namely Klez, Bugbear,
and Opaserv) were the source of nearly 80% of malicious code submissions to SymantecSecurity Response over the previous six months.
• In addition, a large percentage of cyber attacks
detected by Symantec Managed Security Servicesclients were caused by only a handful of both old and new blended threats, such as Bugbear,Nimda, and Code Red.
• Because recent forms of malicious code, such
as Bugbear, continued to successfully exploitvulnerabilities that were at least one month old,the Internet community as a whole still appearsto be highly vulnerable to new blended threatsthat exploit known vulnerabilities as a method of propagation.
Infection vectors (method of exploitation) and
payload preferences have changed over the pastsix months.
• Self-replicating mass mailers experienced a
sharp increase in volume. Eight of the top 50reported threats over the past six months wereclassified as self-replicating mass mailers, asopposed to only 1 out of the top 50 during thesame six-month period in 2001.• Malicious code that steals confidential informa-
tion from users has increased substantially overthe past year. The potential for exposing tradesecrets, sensitive financial information, and otherforms of proprietary data could easily increasethe damage potential by orders of magnitude.
Technologies that are just now entering the mass
market present highly attractive opportunities formalicious code writers.
• High market penetration and increasing
unauthorized usage of instant messaging andpeer-to-peer (P2P) applications make these programs an attractive infection vector for futureblended threats.
• Mobile devices are expected to achieve stronger
market penetration in 2003 and 2004. Oftendeployed with relatively weak security protection,these devices represent a highly attractive infectionvector for future malicious code.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
73Blended threats combine the characteristics of viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and malicious code with server and Internet vulne rabilities to initiate, transmit,
and spread an attack. By utilizing multiple methods and techniques, blended threats often spread rapidly and cause widespread d amage.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
8Cyber Attack Activity
NETWORK-BASED CYBER ATTACK ACTIVITY
OVERVIEW
Symantec houses one of the world’s largest and most
detailed repositories of cyber attack data. Theserepositories consist of data collected from thousands
of firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDSs)throughout the world. The sample set studied inthis report includes more than 400 companies,located in more than 30 countries. Complimentingthis data set, Symantec analysts at four SecurityOperations Centers (SOCs) deployed throughoutthe world constantly review attack data and trendsin order to identify and monitor the latest threats.The statistics and expert commentary in this sectiondraw from these resources.
Overall, an analysis of attacks detected during the
past six months reveals that network-based cyberattacks remain a substantial threat to organizationsof all types. While the overall volume of activitydeclined by 6% during the past six months,Symantec noted several interesting developmentsrelated to topics, such as event severity, threatvariance by company type, and patterns of activityby attack source. Findings are provided under thefollowing sub-sections:
• General Attack Trends
• Attack Activity by Company Type• Attacker Profiles• Cyber Terrorism• Internal Abuse and Misuse
As a reminder, unless otherwise stated, the statis-
tics presented in this section exclude activity frommajor worms and blended threats, such as SQLSpida and Code Red. Only a handful of worms andblended threats accounted for 78% of all attackactivity detected by Symantec over the past sixmonths. While this is an important observation inand of itself, the topic of worms and blendedthreats is addressed adequately in the MaliciousCode Section of the report. Eliminating this type ofactivity in this section enabled Symantec to identifyunderlying cyber attack trends of importance thatwould otherwise be obscured or completely hiddenby the sheer volume of activity from major wormsand blended threats.GENERAL ATTACK TRENDS
Overall Attack Activity
The overall rate of cyber attack activity during the
past six months was 6% lower than the raterecorded during the prior six-month period. Whilefluctuations occurred each week, on average,companies suffered approximately 30 attacks percompany per week during the last six-month period,as compared to 32 attacks per company per weekduring the prior six-month period. Despite thisdecline, the rate of attack activity over the past six months remained 20% higher than the raterecorded during the same six-month period in2001. Figure 1 shows the average attacks per
company per week over the past 12 months.
In terms of attack type, 85% of attacks were
classified as pre-attack reconnaissance, which, inisolation, did not necessarily present an immediatethreat to organizations. The remaining 15% ofattacks consisted of attempted (or in some cases)successful exploitation attempts.
4Figure 2 shows a
breakdown of all cyber attack activity detected bythe sample set over the prior six-month period.
5
Event Severity
All of the companies in the sample set experienced
at least some form of attack activity on a dailybasis over the past six months; however, the majorityof this activity was determined to be relatively non-threatening in nature. When classifying maliciousactivity, severe events involve sequences of attackactivity that have either caused a security breachon a company’s network or present an immediatedanger of a security breach if intervention is nottaken. For example, if Symantec detects a successfulscan for FTP followed by several exploit attempts,and the targeted network has multiple FTP serverswith well-known, high-risk vulnerabilities, the
activity is classified as a “severe” event. For a
full description of this classification system, seepage 39 ofAppendix A . Specific observations relating
to trends in event severity are outlined below.
• More than 99% of all events detected by
Symantec were classified as non-severe and didnot represent an immediate threat to the compa-nies in the sample set. These types of eventstypically consisted of reconnaissance activity that
4An example of reconnaissance activity is a scan launched by an attacker to detect a particular service, such as FTP. On the oth er hand, an exploit attempt is an action taken
by an attacker to use a known vulnerability to gain unauthorized access to systems or create a denial of service.
5Figure 2 includes worm and blended threat activity in the analysis simply to illustrate graphically the magnitude of this activity.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
9was not followed up with exploitation attempts, or
probes for specific vulnerabilities that wereknown to be unavailable on the target systems.
• Companies were slightly less likely to experience
a severe event during the past six months thanthey were during the prior six-month period.Specifically, 21% of companies suffered at leastone severe event, as compared to 23% duringthe prior six-month period.• Severe event incidence rates remained consid-
erably lower than those observed during thesame six-month period in 2001, in which theincidence rate was 43%. While several factorsmay have influenced this trend, observationsfrom the past two studies strongly indicate that it is at least partially attributable to gradualstrengthening of the security postures of compa-nies represented in the sample set. Therefore,the apparent decline in risk for this sample setmay not hold true for the Internet community asa whole. This observation is discussed in moredepth on page 14 .
05101520253035404550
7-Jan-02
14-Jan-0221-Jan-0228-Jan-02
4-Feb-02
11-Feb-0218-Feb-0225-Feb-02
4-Mar-02
11-Mar-0218-Mar-0225-Mar-02
1-Apr-028-Apr-02
15-Apr-0222-Apr-0229-Apr-02
6-May-02
13-May-0220-May-0227-May-02
3-Jun-02
10-Jun-0217-Jun-0224-Jun-02
1-Jul-028-Jul-02
15-Jul-0222-Jul-0229-Jul-02
5-Aug-02
12-Aug-0219-Aug-0226-Aug-02
2-Sep-029-Sep-02
16-Sep-0223-Sep-0230-Sep-02
7-Oct-02
14-Oct-0221-Oct-0228-Oct-02
4-Nov-02
11-Nov-0218-Nov-0225-Nov-02
2-Dec-029-Dec-02
16-Dec-0223-Dec-0230-Dec-02WeekAttacks per CompanyFigure 1.
Attacks per Company per Week(Jan 1, 2002 – Dec 30, 2002)
Exploit Attempts
15%Pre-Attack Reconnaissance
85%
Worms and Blended Threats
78%Other
22%Figure 2.
Attack Activity by Type(July 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002)Figure 3 shows the severe event incidence rate at
companies in the sample set over the past threesix-month periods.
Attacker Aggression
In the July 2002 issue of the Internet Security
Threat Report, a metric called attacker aggression,was used to reveal differences in the level of effortthat attackers were willing to exert to penetrate network defenses and the extent to which those
attackers were focused on a particular target.Analysis indicated a sharp drop in the occurrence ofhighly aggressive attacks. As a result, this analysisfailed to yield a critical mass of highly aggressiveevents. Specifically, less than 2% of all companies inthe sample set experienced a highly aggressive event,as compared to 10% during the prior six-month period. Lacking a sufficient sample of companiesaffected by highly aggressive events, comparisonsacross industry and by company size were not done.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
100123
WeekAttacks per Unique Attacker
7/7/20027/14/2002 7/21/2002 7/28/20028/7/2002
8/11/2002
8/18/2002 8/25/20029/1/2002
9/8/2002
9/15/2002 9/22/2002
9/29/2002
10/6/2002
10/13/200210/20/2002
10/27/2002 11/3/2002
11/10/2002
11/17/2002
11/24/200212/1/2002 12/8/2002
12/15/2002
12/22/2002
12/29/2002Figure 4.
Average Attacks per Unique Attacker(July 1, 2002 – Dec 29, 2002)23%
Study PeriodSevere Event Incidence
0%5%10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%50%
Period II
(Jan 1, 2002 – June 30, 2002)43%
Period I
(July 1, 2001 – Dec 31, 2001)Period III
(July 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002)21%Figure 3.
Severe Event Incidence by Study Period(July 1, 2001 – Dec 31, 2002)Analysis using a second metric also suggested
that there was a decline in aggression over thepast six months. This metric measured the averagenumber of attacks per unique attacking IP address.The more attacks per attacker, the higher the overallaggression of attackers. Results of this analysis
revealed that in the fourth quarter attackers onaverage performed 15% less actions against companies in the sample set than they did in thethird quarter. Figure 4 tracks the average number of
attacks per unique attacker over the past six months.
Based on the results of these two inquiries, it
appears that attacker aggression declined duringthe past six months. This observation, coupledwith observations by Symantec analysts, supportsthe conventional wisdom that most attackerssearch for a few vulnerabilities to exploit, and will abandon their efforts if these vulnerabilities are unavailable. However, even if this is true, companies should not find false comfort in theknowledge that, at any given moment, most attack-ers are probably only targeting a small subset ofvulnerabilities. This is because the specific contentsof an attacker ’s toolkit can change overnight. For
example, the release of a new hacking tool or theemergence of a new blended threat can quicklytransform unpopular vulnerabilities into top targets.Threat Variance by Time
Maintaining adequate defenses against cyber
attack activity is inevitably a 24x7x365 obligation.Attackers and malicious code can strike organiza-tions from anywhere in the world, on any day ofthe week, and at any time of day. While it is indis-putable that the overall threat of attacks nevercompletely subsides during any specific time period, Symantec has isolated certain days of theweek and certain hours of the day in which attackersshow an unusually high or unusually low level ofactivity. These observations are explained in greaterdetail in the remainder of this section.
ATTACKER ACTIVITY BY DAY OF WEEK
Over the past six months, organizations experiencedsubstantially lower levels of attack volume andattack severity during the weekends. These obser-vations are consistent with those recorded duringthe prior six-month period. Statistics showing threatvariance by day of week include:
•Total attacks on Saturdays and Sundays were 50%
lower than total attacks on any other day of theweek. This observation is illustrated in Figure 5.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
110%2%4%6%8%10%12%14%16%
DaySevere Event Incidence
Monday17.0% 17.1%
Tuesday16.4%
Wednesday16.2%
Thursday15.8%
Friday8.9%
Saturday8.6%
Sunday18%Figure 5.
Attacks by Day of Week(July 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002
)•The total number of unique attackers on
Saturdays and Sundays was approximately 50%lower than the total on any other day of the week.This observation is illustrated in Figure 6 .
•The total number of severe events on Saturdays
and Sundays was at least 25% less than the totalon any other day of the week. This observation isillustrated in Figure 7 .ATTACKER ACTIVITY BY TIME OF DAY6
Measurements of attacks by time of day are skewed
by the fact that both victims and attackers may belocated in multiple time zones. For the purpose ofthis report, we treated time of day as two distinctmetrics: time of day from a victim ’s perspective and
time of day from an attacker ’s perspective. The
results strongly suggest that fluctuations in the rate ofattack activity experienced by all Internet-connectedorganizations are largely a function of the localtimes in which the attacking systems are located,not the local time in which victims are located. Thisobservation is explained in greater detail.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
120%2%4%6%8%10%12%14%16%
DayPercentage of Attackers18%20%
17.0%17.5%16.8% 16.7%
16.1%
8.3%
7.6%
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday SundayFigure 6.
Unique Attackers by Day of Week(July 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002)
DayPercentage of All Severe Events
0%5%10%20%25% 12.7%15.2%21.5%
13.9%22.8%
9.5%
4.4%
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday SundayFigure 7.
Severe Events by Day of Week(July 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002)
6Tracking the “true” source of attacks is extremely difficult. Attackers can jump through multiple systems and countries before hitting their inten ded target. Therefore, the data
in this section only summarizes the last hop that the attacker took before hitting his/her intended target.•Attacking systems are generally more active
between the hours of 7:00 and 20:00 in their
respective local time zones. Figure 8 shows the
percentage of total unique attackers detectedper hour from 7 major regions throughout theworld normalized to local time.
7
•Due to the lack of geographic boundaries
governing access to Internet-connected organiza-tions, attackers often target victims on a globalbasis. As a result, variance in attack volume fromthe victim ’s perspective is a function of when
attackers located in different regions throughoutthe world generally achieve peak activity.•Several regions with relatively high attack volumes
reach their peak levels of activity within thesame general window of time each day. As aresult, regardless of where a victim is located,attacker activity consistently peaks between thehours of 12:00 and 21:00 GMT. Individualorganizations throughout the world must put thisobservation into the context of their local timesto determine when they should expect to seepeaks in attacker activity. For example, the peakhours of activity in New York City, USA are 7:00AM to 4:00 PM (GMT –5 hours), while the peak Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
130:00:00 1:00:00 2:00:00 3:00:00 4:00:00 5:00:00 6:00:00 7:00:00 8:00:00 9:00:00
10:00:00 11:00:00 12:00:00 13:00:00 14:00:00
15:00:0016:00:0017:00:00 18:00:00
19:00:00 20:00:00 21:00:00 22:00:00 23:00:00Percentage of All Attacks8%
7%6%5%4%3%2%1%0%
Hour of Day within Each Region ’s Local Time
North America
Asia
Africa
Western Europe
Eastern Europe
South America
Middle East
ExpectedFigure 8.
Attacker Activity by Hour Normalized to Local Time(July 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002)
7Oceania was not included in this analysis because this region contributed less than 1% of overall attack activity and was the o nly region that did not show
a recognizable pattern of peak activity by hour of day.hours of activity in Beijing, China are 8:00 PM to
5:00 AM (GMT +8 hours). Figure 9 shows the
percentage of unique attackers detected againstthe sample set by hour of day, and Figure 10
shows when peak activity occurs in the corre-sponding local times for each major region usedin this analysis.ATTACK ACTIVITY BY COMPANY TYPE
Client Tenure
Symantec uses a metric, called client tenure,
to assess how the effectiveness of a company ’s
attack defenses evolves as they improve theirsecurity posture over time. Symantec analystshave historically provided anecdotal evidence thata relationship existed between client tenure and Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
14Percent of All Attackers
Expected Percent0%1%2%3%4%5%6%7%Percentage of All Attackers
0:00:00 1:00:00 2:00:00 3:00:00 4:00:005:00:00 6:00:00 7:00:00 8:00:00 9:00:00
10:00:00
11:00:00 12:00:00 13:00:0014:00:0015:00:00
16:00:00
17:00:0018:00:00 19:00:00 20:00:00
21:00:00
22:00:00
23:00:00
Hour of Day (GMT)Figure 9.
Attackers by Hour of Day(July 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002)
Region Peak Activity
North America 12:00 to 21:00
Asia 2:00 to 13:00
Western Europe 11:00 to 21:00
Eastern Europe 8:00 to 21:00
South America 12:00 to 21:00
Middle East 8:00 to 19:00
Africa 8:00 to 16:00Figure 10.
Peak Activity the relative severity of attack activity. For example,
analysts observed that as tenure increased, clientsbecame much less likely to suffer security breaches.In order to quantify this observation, Symanteccontinually assesses the effect of client tenure ona company ’s likelihood of suffering one or more
severe events.
Confirming observations from the previous study,
as client tenure of companies in the sample setincreased, the likelihood of suffering a severe eventdecreased. This is presumably due to the fact thatclients strengthen their security posture as theyimprove their defenses against the types of attacksthat they witness on a daily basis. Observationssupporting this theory are outlined below.
•Approximately 29% of clients with less than 12
months of tenure experienced at least one severeevent over the past six months, as compared to17% with greater than 12 months tenure. Theseincidence rates are almost identical to those observed during the prior six month period,
which recorded rates of 30% for clients with lessthan 12 months of tenure and 17% for clientswith greater than 12 months of tenure. The resultsof this inquiry are presented in Figure 11.
• In addition to tracking differences in severe
event incidence among clients with different levelsof tenure, Symantec also tracked a controlgroup over the past year to assess differences insevere event incidence as this group gainedtenure. Symantec performed this analysis bycalculating the severe event incidence rate for acontrol group that had 1-18 months of tenureduring the study period ending on July 31, 2002,and 7-24 months of tenure during the last six-month period. The results revealed that thecontrol group suffered an incidence rate of 28%in the period ending on July 31, 2002 and arate of 20% during the last six months. Thesefindings once again support the observation thatthe likelihood of suffering a severe event decreasesas client ’s improve their security posture.
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
150%5%10%15%20%25%30%35%40%
1-3 MonthsClient TenureSevere Event Incidence Rate30%33%
21%30%
20%
17%15%
4-6 Months 7-9 Months 10-12 Months 13-15 Months 16-18 Months 19+ MonthsFigure 11.
Severe Event Incidence by Client Tenure(July 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002)Industry
Attack activity by industry was relatively similar to
that reported during the prior two six-month periods.However, there were several interesting trends thatwere revealed by comparing historical rates of attackactivity with current rates. Specific observations arepresented below.
8
•The Power and Energy industry continued to
show the highest rate of both attack volume andsevere event incidence. Attack volume for theentire six-month period was 987 attacks percompany, and approximately 60% of power and energy companies experienced at least onesevere event.
9
•The financial services industry, which the Internet
community often assumes to be an attractive target for attackers, showed a substantialincrease in severe event incidence. Specifically,the severe event incidence rate for the six-monthperiod ending December 31, 2001 was 28%,
while the rate for the past six months was 48%.•The nonprofit sample set, which included several
high-profile activist groups, showed substantialincreases in attack volume and a moderateincrease in severe event incidence over the pastthree study periods. Specifically, attack volumeover the past six months was 43% higher thanvolume during the six-month period endingDecember 31, 2001, while severe event incidenceincreased by only five percentage points overthe same period of time. This trend is particularlynoteworthy because many people do not instinctively believe that the nonprofit sector is a popular target for attackers. While it is inher-ently difficult to identify causality behind thistrend, it is possible that the rise is related tocyber hacktivism.
10Because the nonprofit sector
in the sample set included several groups thatare self-reported targets of cyber hactivist activity,it is possible that this rise is indicative of a morewidespread increase in this type of activity.
• Telecommunications companies, which were not
previously tracked as a distinct category of com-panies, showed high rates of both attack volumeand severe event incidence. Telecommunicationscompanies recorded attack volume of 845 attacksper company and 25% suffered at least onesevere event.
11
Figure 12 and Figure 13 show attack volume and
severe event incidence by industry over the pastsix months. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
168Industries discussed in this section account for the following percentages of companies in the overall sample set: Financial S ervices (14%), Nonprofit (6%), Power and
Energy (4%), and Telecommunications (3%).
9Symantec only monitors the corporate networks of power and energy companies; attacks contributing to these statistics did not n ecessarily endanger critical
systems, such as SCADA systems.
10Hactivisim is defined as the misuse of computers in carrying out various objectives related to activist causes.
11Symantec only monitors the corporate networks of telecommunications companies; therefore, these statistics do not reflect attac k activity against the infrastructure main-
tained by telecommunications companies.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
17Attacks per Company
(entire six-month period)
0200400600800
50410001200
556584602 616681 689 753845 869987
IndustryManufacturingOther
Small Business
Media/EntertainmentHigh Tech
TelecommunicationsHealthcare
E-Commerce
Financial ServicesNonprofit
Power & EnergyFigure 12.
Attacks per Company by Industry(July 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002)Severe Event Incidence
0%10%20%30%40%
9%50%60%70%
11% 12%16%19% 19%22%25%30%48%60%
IndustrySmall BusinessOther
Manufacturing
High Tech
Nonprofit
Media/EntertainmentHealthcareE-Commerce
Telecommunications
Pinancial Services Power & EnergyFigure 13.
Severe Event Incidence by Industry(July 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002)Company Size
In order to evaluate attack activity by company
size, Symantec continues to use employee countas a proxy. The results of the current study mostlyconfirm past observations, which indicated thatboth attack volume and severe event incidenceincreased with company size.
This observation is logical for several reasons. First,
larger companies by their very nature typically havebigger networks, which often attract more attackssimply due to their size. The more IP space andsystems maintained by a company, the moreattacks they will likely attract. Second, larger com-panies often have networks that are substantiallymore complex than those at smaller companies, and therefore may be more prone to security lapses
that enable attackers to launch successful attacks.As a result, one would expect severe event incidencerates to rise with company size. Finally, largercompanies have more public exposure than smallercompanies, and therefore they may be more likelyto attract attacks that are specifically targeted atthem. If this is true, it would influence both attackvolume and severe event incidence.
Figure 14 and Figure 15 show attack volume and
severe event incidence by company size over thepast six months.
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
181,092
0200400600
1-499 500-999 1000-4999 5000+Employee CountAttacks per Company
(entire six-month period)8001,0001,200
637715794Figure 14.
Attacks per Company by Size(July 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002)ATTACKER PROFILES
Attacks by Source12
An analysis of attacks by country of origin revealed
many similarities with the prior six-month period.Once again, the vast majority of attacks werelaunched from only a few countries. For example,the top ten countries alone accounted for 80% of all of the attacks detected against the sampleset. In addition to this broad observation, therewere a few countries that showed substantial shiftsin attack activity. Several of the most notable obser-vations include:
•South Korea had a substantial increase in attack
volume over the past year (particularly in recentmonths). Total attacks launched from SouthKorea during the past six months were 62%higher than the total during the prior six-monthperiod. Further, South Korea was the number one country in terms of attacks per 10,000
Internet users among Tier One countries,
13
as opposed to number six during the prior six-month period.
• There are several possible factors influencing
this trend, many of which are difficult to meas-ure. However, one such factor is the high rate ofgrowth in the use of broadband connectivity.According to a recent survey by the International
Telecommunications Union , South Korea is the
leader in broadband usage, with 58% of homeusers currently connected.
14This makes South
Korean systems attractive launch points forattackers both within the country and through-out the world. The rise in attacks from SouthKorea may be an indicator of what networkattack patterns will look like in other countries Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
1912Tracking the “true” source of attacks is extremely difficult. Attackers can jump through multiple systems before hitting their intended
target. The data in this section only summarizes the last hop that the attacker took before hitting his/her intended target. It is possible that many attacks
contributing to these statistics do not represent the true source of origin.
13When evaluating attacks per 10,000 Internet users, countries were separated into two tiers. Tier One countries include those wi th more than 1 million
Internet users; Tier Two countries include those with between 100,000 and 1 million Internet users. These categorizations separ ate countries with rela-
tively well-developed infrastructures from those with emerging Internet infrastructures.
14“Asia-Pacific Telecommunications Indicators 2002. ” International Telecommunications Union. (December 2, 2002).14%40%
33%41%
0%5%10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%
1-499 500-999 1000-4999 5000+Employee CountSevere Event IncidenceFigure 15.
Severe Event Incidence by Company Size(July 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002)as broadband becomes more widely deployed.
It also speaks to the importance of protectinghome computers, especially when they haveaccess to corporate resources through Internet-based VPNs.
•Israel, which was number one on the list of top
ten attacking countries per 10,000 Internetusers among Tier One countries during the firsttwo study periods, dropped to number 10 duringthe last six months. Total attack volume fromIsrael dropped by approximately 50% during thistime period.
• Several Eastern European countries have shown
increases in both attack volume and attacks per Internet capita. For example, Poland moved
from number eight in terms of attacks per 10,000Internet users during the six-month period endingDecember 31, 2001 to number two in the pastsix months. In addition, four Eastern Europeancountries (Latvia, Romania, Lithuania, andSlovakia) were listed on the top ten countries per10,000 Internet users among Tier Two countries.
• Iran and Kuwait continue to top the list of the top
ten attacking countries per 10,000 Internet usersamong Tier Two countries.
Tables 16 , 17, and 18show the top ten attacking
countries in terms of overall volume and perInternet capita for the past three study periods.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
20Figure 16.
Top Ten Attacking Countries in Terms of Overall Volume (July 1, 2001 – Dec 31, 2002)
Ranking Country Attacks per 10,000 Internet users Ranking in Period II Ranking in Period I
(July 1, 2001 – Dec 31, 2001 ) (Jan 1, 2002 –Jun 30, 2002 ) (July 1, 2001 – Dec 31, 2001 )
1 South Korea 23.7 6 4
2 Poland 18.4 58
3 Czech Republic** 14.2 11 NA
4 France 14.2 35
5 Taiwan 14.0 79
6 Hong Kong 13.9 22
7 Belgium 13.3 4 17
8 Mexico 11.8 13 14
9 China 10.8 10 11
10 Israel 10.1 11Figure 17.
Top Ten Attacking Countries per Internet Capita (Tier-One Countries*)(July 1, 2001 – Dec 31, 2002
)
* The values for the top ten countries differ considerably from values reported in the prior report. This is due to the fact tha t the CIA World Fact Book reported new Internet user figures
in August 2002. Since many countries have substantially more Internet users, the corresponding per capita attack rate is typically much lower than was previous recorded.
** Czech Republic was #11 on the Tier Two list in July 2002 and was not ranked in January 2002 because the reported number of I nternet users during these time periods was
less than one million.Country Percent of Total Percent of Total Percent of Total
(July 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002 ) (Jan 1, 2002 – June 30, 2002 ) (July 1, 2001 – Dec 31, 2001 )
United States 35.4% 40.0% 29.6%
South Korea 12.8% 7.4% 8.8%
China 6.9% 6.9% 7.8%
Germany 6.7% 7.6% 5.9%
France 4.0% 5.2% 4.5%
Taiwan 3.9% 2.4% 2.6%
Canada 3.2% 3.0% 3.9%
Italy 3.0% 2.7% 2.5%
Great Britain 2.2% 2.1% 2.5%
Japan 1.8% 2.1% 2.0%
TOTAL 80.0% 79.6% 70.1%Attacker Intent
One of the most intriguing and challenging questions
about cyber attacks is that of intent —was the
attacker targeting a specific organization, or simplyscanning the Internet in search of an opportunityto exploit vulnerable systems. Symantec ’s method-
ology to gauge intent separates attacks into twogeneral categories: those that were opportunistic(i.e., the attack was intended to exploit any vulner-able organization discovered on the Internet), and those that were targeted specifically at a given
organization. For a full description of the method-ology, see page 44 of Appendix A .
Analysis over the past six months revealed that
only 24% of attacks appeared to be targeted innature, as compared with 37% during the priorsix-month period. Figure 19 shows the breakdown
of opportunistic versus targeted attacks for thepast six months.
While the percentage of targeted attacks has
declined, the number still remains surprisingly high.Explaining the cause of the drop, however, is perhapsas difficult as explaining the specific motives
of each attacker. The drop could be attributable tothe fact that the companies in the sample set are not being specifically singled out by attackers as
frequently as they were in the past. It could signal a
general shift in mentality among attackers toward amore opportunistic approach. Unfortunately, due tothe nature of this subject, causality is hard to deter-mine with precision at this point.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
21Ranking Country Attacks per 10,000 Internet users Ranking in Period II
(July 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002 ) (Jan 1, 2002 –June 30,2002 )
1 Iran 29.3 2
2 Kuwait 23.3 1
3 Puerto Rico 22.0 7
4 Romania 21.1 10
5 Latvia 18.7 17
6 Tanzania** 16.9 N/A
7 Peru 16.2 3
8 Lithuania 13.0 13
9 Ecuador** 10.9 N/A
10 Slovakia 10.7 23Figure 18.
Top Ten Attacking Countries per Internet Capita (Tier-Two Countries*) (July 1, 2001 – Dec 31, 2002)
* During the first study period, attacks per Internet capita were not calculated for Tier Two countries.
**Tanzania and Ecuador were not ranked in the July 2002 report because the reported number of Internet users
in each of these countries at the time was less than 100,000.
Figure 19.
Attackers by Attacker Intent (July 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002)
Opportunistic
76%Targeted
24%Attacker Platform
Symantec maintains a system to identify and
profile the platforms used by a random sample ofattackers immediately after they are detectedlaunching an attack. The intent of this system is toprofile typical attackers both in terms of the systemsthat they most commonly use and the servicesthat they most commonly run. The main insightfrom this analysis confirms previous findings —the
Microsoft Windows suite of operating systems wasused by a majority of attackers. Considering thedominant market penetration of Windows and thefact that most home users use Windows systems,this was lower than expectations. The breakdown ofactivity by attacker operating systems is presentedin Figure 20 .
Top 20 Scans
This section lists the 20 most frequent scans
detected against companies in the sample set. Thefrequency of different types of scans provides ahigh-level snapshot of the types of reconnaissanceactivity in which attackers engaged over the pastsix months. It is important to note that worm and blended threat activity (most notably that
associated with SQL Spida, Opaserv, and Bugbear)were included in this analysis.
Similar to previous reports, 99.9% of scanning
activity was concentrated on only 20 services, eachof which is listed in Figure 21 . The substantial
impact of both old and relatively new worms andblended threats on the scanning environment isalso clearly illustrated in this table. For example,SQL Spida, which first emerged in May 2002,remained the single largest source of scanningactivity during the past six months. Finally, it isimportant to note that services that are not includedon this list can still become very popular targetswith the discovery of a new vulnerability and development of exploit tools. For example, prior to the release of the SQL Spida worm in May 2002,Microsoft SQL was not included on the list of top 20 scans.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
22Scan Type Percent of Total Scans
Microsoft SQLServer 29.5%
HTTP 16.5%
FTP 13.3%
Netbios Name Service 13.0%
HTTPS 4.0%
SSH 3.2%
SMTP 3.1%
RPC(tcp) 2.5%
SubSeven 2.0%
Netbios ( 139/tcp) 1.8%
Netbios ( 445/tcp) 1.7%
SOCKS (1080/tcp) 1.3%
CDESubprocess Control 1.1%
57/tcp 1.0%
Telnet 0.9%
Squid Proxy 0.9%
LPD 0.8%
135/tcp 0.6%
DNS 0.6%
1524/tcp (Ingreslock) 0.4%Figure 21.
Top 20 Scans(July 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002)Figure 20.
Breakdown of Attackers by Operating Systems Used (July 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002)
Microsoft Windows
32%Linux (RedHat)
8%
Solaris
1%Linux (generic)
1%
Unix (generic)
12%
Windows 2000/XP
46%Additional noteworthy shifts in attacker reconnais-
sance activity that are not immediately evident inFigure 21 are explained below.
• HTTPS —Attackers scanned for HTTPS-enabled
web servers at a higher rate over the past sixmonths. This can be primarily attributed to anumber of recently released Denial-of-Service(DoS) and Remote Access Buffer Overflow vulnerabilities affecting OpenSSL, an Apacheweb server extension that supports the HTTPSfunctionality. The most damaging of these vul-nerabilities was the OpenSSL SSLv2 MalformedClient Key Remote Buffer Overflow Vulnerability(BID 5363), which the Linux.Slapper worm used to compromise vulnerable Apache servers.Therefore, a large portion of HTTPS scans isattributable to this worm.
• SMB File Shares (445/tcp) —Scans for SMB File
Shares increased substantially over the past sixmonths, which mostly reflects the widespreadoutbreaks of Opaserv variants. This protocol wasintroduced in Windows 2000 as an alternative tothe use of Netbios for file sharing. As use of thisprotocol becomes more pervasive, it is becoming
an increasingly popular infection vector for worms
and blended threats. As systems continue tomigrate to versions of Microsoft operating systemsthat use SMB file shares, attackers and malicious
code writers will continue to tar get it on a more
frequent basis.• SOCKS & Squid Proxies —In order to disguise
their true source of origin, attackers often routetheir connections through proxy services, such asSOCKS and Squid. This tactic allows them tolaunch attacks on third parties or view restrictedwebsites with relative anonymity. In fact, auto-mated tools on the Internet maintain databases
of open proxies just to make it easier for such people to locate them. A large increase in scansfor these proxies over the past six months sug-gests that attackers are increasingly searching forthese services in order to disguise their identities.
• 57/tcp —A popular methodology that attackers
use to fingerprint a target ’s operating system
requires the use of a closed TCP port. Over thepast six months, at least one popular hackingtool emerged that uses port 57/tcp for this purpose.
15Increases in scans for 57/tcp may
indicate increasing usage of this reconnaissancetool. Prior to this six-month period, attackersrarely scanned for this port.
• 135/tcp —The rise in port 135/tcp scans is
primarily due to the increasing use of a newpopular technique to deliver popup adds via the built in Windows System Alert. Spammersoften use a built in Windows Remote ProcedureCall (RPC) vulnerability on exposed Windowssystems to deliver advertising messages. The rise in scans is most likely attributable tospammers who are searching for an audience.
16Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
2315Details on this tool are available at http://www.fx-tools.net/index.php.
16See http://online.securityfocus.com/news/1231 for more details on this vulnerability.CYBER-TERRORISM
Overview
The question of whether cyber terrorism currently
presents a real threat to companies and govern-ment organizations is the subject of much debate.Some individuals insist that not only is cyber terror-ism a threat, it is actually happening today; othersinsist that this type of threat will probably not materialize in any meaningful form for several years.
Isolating and providing analysis of cyber terrorism
cases has proven an extremely difficult task. The firstchallenge is that in order to truly isolate cyber terroristactivity, the intended results of individual attacksmust be understood. Because Symantec typicallyidentifies attacks in the early stages, it is often impos-sible to assess the intended results of attackers.
As an alternative, we have tracked activity from
countries throughout the world that may be morelikely than others to harbor cyber terrorists.Unfortunately, this technique introduces severalsources of error. First, cyber terrorists (unlike conventional military attacks) can strike from anycountry in the world. Nobody knows if they willstrike from the Middle East, the United States,Europe, or even from within one ’s own network.
Further, even if we can reliably isolate likely sourcecountries, cyber terrorists can disguise their identi-ties by launching attacks from a compromised system in another, less suspicious country or byobfuscating the attack through open proxies.
Despite the potential flaws of tracking attacks from
likely sources of cyber terrorism, we have decidedthat withholding this type of analysis was not a better alternative. This is mainly because under-standing the overall volume and type of attackactivity from countries that may be more likelythan others to harbor cyber terrorists providesorganizations with a general understanding of thelevel of technical sophistication of the populationwithin these countries. For example, a review ofscanning activity from countries on the CyberTerrorist Watch List suggests that attackers fromthese countries rely on relatively antiquated hackingtechniques. Whether or not this type of insight is trulyrelevant to investigations of cyber terrorism is hard to determine, but we believe that it is noteworthy.With this in mind, the remainder of the section
presents data measuring the volume and type ofactivity detected from systems located in countrieson the Cyber Terrorist Watch List. For a fulldescription of the methodology used to selectcountries on the list, see Page 44 .
Summary of Findings
•Countries on the Cyber Terrorist Watch List
produced no severe events against companiesin the sample set, as opposed to one severeevent that was produced by a system in Iranduring the prior six-month period. Furthermore,Symantec detected no verifiable cases of cyberterrorist attacks during the past six months.
•Countries on the Cyber Terrorist Watch List
generated less than 1% of all attacks detectedduring the past six months.
•Indonesia and Iran were the top two attacking
countries on the Watch List, replacing Kuwaitand Egypt, which topped the list during the priorsix-month period. These four countries aloneaccounted for nearly 70% of all attack activityamong Watch List countries.
Figures 22, 23, 24 show the volume and type
of attacks launched from countries on the CyberTerrorist Watch List.
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
24Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
25Country Change
United Arab Emirates 334%
Jordan 250%
Cuba 118%
Indonesia 35%
Saudi Arabia 26%
Lebanon 0%
Iran -32%
Morocco -48%
Kuwait -61%
Egypt -63%
Pakistan -84%
Libya -100%
Sudan* N/AFigure 23.
Percent Rise in Attacks from Countries on Cyber
Terrorism Watch List between 3rd and 4th Quarters(July 1, 2002 – Dec 31,2002)
Scan Type Percent of Total Scans
FTP 32.2%
CDE Subprocess Control 13.6%
LPD 9.4%
SSH 8.6%
DNS 7.6%
HTTPS 5.2%
Hack Attack Trojan 5.0%
RPC (tcp) 4.1%
SubSeven 3.5%
57/tcp 2.9%
Telnet 2.4%
Netbios ( 445/tcp) 1.5%
SNMP 1.2%
Napster Proxy ( 8888/tcp) 0.9%
Netbios ( 139/tcp) 0.7%
AnalogX Proxy ( 6588/tcp) 0.4%
Squid Proxy 0.2%
SMTP 0.1%
SOCKS ( 1080/tcp) 0.1%
12345 /tcp 0.1%Figure 24.
Top 20 Scans from Countries on Cyber Terrorist Watch List**(July 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002)Figure 22.
Attack Activity from Countries on Cyber Terrorist Watch List(July 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002)
Asia
29.1%Cuba
2.5%
Indonesia
23.6%Egypt
7.8%Saudi Arabia
6.1%
Morocco
5.4%
United Arab Emirates
4.7%
Lebanon
1.4%
Jordan
1.0%
Libya
0.9%
Sudan
0.4%
North America
38.9%Europe
25.6%
Iran
20.3%Kuwait
10.7%
Pakistan
15.3%All Other Regions
5.5%
Cyber Terrorist
Watch List
0.9%
* Sudan did not show any attacks during the third quarter; therefore,
a growth rate could not be calculated.
** Worm and Blended Threat-related attacks were not included in the analysis in order
to reveal underlying attack trends.INTERNAL MISUSE AND ABUSE
The vast majority of attacks detected by Symantec
over the past six months were determined to beprimarily external in nature. Although this reportclearly demonstrates that external attacks are asubstantial threat, organizations must also considerthe threat of insiders.
Over the past few years, Symantec ’s Services
Division has conducted numerous investigations ofsecurity incidents. A review of these cases suggeststhat the insider threat is just as severe as externalthreats. In fact, greater than 50% of all incidents to which Symantec responded involved abuse or misuse of company resources by employees. In addition, the amount of self-reported financial damage in these cases was significantly greaterthan that caused by external breaches. Over thecourse of the past two years, Symantec ’s team
witnessed costly thefts of confidential information,cases of highly organized corporate espionage,cases of email harassment that led to multiple terminations (not to mention potential lawsuits),and even one case of email misuse that promptedcriminal charges.Perhaps the most frightening aspect of these
incidents was the relative ease with which thoseresponsible acted. Most perpetrators were notrequired to “hack” into any systems —system
authorization was already granted to them asemployees. In fact, system administrators, theemployees typically responsible for granting levelsof access, were often the guilty party.
Given the demonstrated danger of the internal
threat, organizations must not ignore the need tomaintain a high level of vigilance within theirorganization, as well as on the perimeter. Securityadministrators must not forget that issues, such asemployee screening, segregation of IT responsibili-ties, and internal auditing are key aspects of aneffective security posture. While internal breachesare often ignored and inherently difficult to detect,these types of incidents can be the most costly toan organization.
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
26Vulnerability and Malicious Code Trends
EMERGENCE OF NEW VULNERABILITIES
OVERVIEW
The constant discovery of new IT product vulnera-
bilities continually adds to the complexity faced by the Internet community. The emergence of asingle vulnerability can leave systems that are perceived to be secure at one moment renderedcompletely exposed to attack during the next. Withmultiple vulnerabilities emerging daily, the relativeeffectiveness of an organization ’s security posture
is in a constant state of flux.
In addition to maintaining one of the largest repository
of attack data, Symantec also maintains the mostcomprehensive vulnerability database and discussionforum. As this is the first time we have includedsuch information in our Internet Security ThreatReport, we are providing a high-level overview of thevulnerability environment during 2001 and 2002.The intent is to (1) outline several facts about ITproduct vulnerabilities, (2) highlight ways in whichthe discovery of new vulnerabilities is changing overtime, and (3) discuss recent vulnerabilities thatpresent the greatest risk to organizations.GENERAL TRENDS
Overall Volume
In 2002, Symantec documented 2,524 vulnerabilities
affecting more than 2,000 distinct products. Thistotal was 81.5% higher than the total documentedin 2001. Figure 25 tracks this increase by
showing the total number of new vulnerabilities documented monthly between January 1, 2001 andDecember 31, 2002.
The sharp rise in new vulnerability discoveries is
probably attributable to a variety of factors, suchas those listed below.
1. Responsible Disclosure Movement —In recent
years, technology companies have increasinglyadopted a policy of responsible disclosure. Forexample, many security research organizationsand product vendors, including Symantec, haverecently initiated a greater commitment toacknowledge and rectify emerging vulnerabilitieswith the formation of the Organization forInternet Safety. It is possible, therefore, thatsome of the rise may simply reflect the fact thatvendors are now more likely to publicly acknowl-edge (and offer fixes for) new vulnerabilities thataffect their products.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
27223
107 106
81131
113128157
136
94106101131219
192
166229235
208221
210237
192 192
050100150200250
MonthDocumented Vulnerabilities
Feb-01 Jan-01 Mar-01 Apr-01 May-01 Jun-01 Jul-01 Aug-01 Sept-01 Oct-01 Nov-01 Dec-01 Jan-02 Feb-02 Mar-02 Apr-02 May-02 Jun-02 Jul-02Aug-02 Sep-02 Oct-02 Nov-02 Dec-02Figure 25.
Total New Vulnerabilities by Month(January 1, 2001 - December 31, 2002)2. Lack of Vendor Prioritization of Security During
Product Development Phase —While open
disclosure of vulnerabilities appears to beimproving after products are available on themarket, there still appears to be a persistent failure on the part of vendors to prioritize securityconcerns BEFORE new products and productversions are released. It is also possible that thedeclining economic conditions in the technologysector are exacerbating this issue.
3. New Methods of Exploiting Software Bugs —
During the course of the past two years, vulner-ability researchers have developed several newmethods of exploiting programming errors, thusenabling them to identify a variety of vulnerabili-ties that were previously unknown. As a result,new threats, such as those involving advancedbuffer overflows, heap overflows, and formatstrings, are now emerging more frequently.
4. Increased Effort Among Vulnerability
Researchers —A portion of the rise may simply
be a result of increased effort among individualsand organizations that dedicate their time to discovering new vulnerabilities. As more timeand effort are invested, more vulnerabilities are discovered.5. Media Coverage —Recent outbreaks of high-profile
blended threats, which propagate by exploitingvulnerabilities, have increased the newsworthinessof vulnerability discoveries. The opportunity forpublicity is frequently a motive of malicious codewriters and hackers. Therefore, the promise ofmedia coverage may be encouraging more intensesearches for vulnerabilities, as well as more frequent public disclosures.
Regardless of cause, the number of vulnerabilities
that attackers have at their disposal has increasedsubstantially over the past two years. As a result,the potential exposure of corporate networks andsystems to compromise by individual attackersand malicious code is also increasing.
Severity
Perhaps even more concerning than the overall
increase of new vulnerabilities is the fact that thisrise was driven almost exclusively by vulnerabilitiesrated as either moderately or highly severe.
17In
2002, moderate and high severity vulnerabilitiesincreased by 84.7%, while low severity vulnerabili-tiesonly rose by 24.0%. This trend is graphically
illustrated in Figure 26 . Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
28020406080100Documented Vulnerabilities
Jan-01 Feb-01 Mar-01 Apr-01 May-01 Jun-01 Jul-01 Aug-01 Sep-01 Oct-01 Nov-01 Dec-01 Jan-02 Feb-02 Mar-02 Apr-02 May-02 Jun-02Jul-02Aug-02 Sep-02 Oct-02 Nov-02 Dec-02
Month High Severity
Moderate Severity
Low SeverityFigure 26.
Vulnerability Volume by Severity(Jan 1, 2001 – Dec 31, 2002)
17See Page 47 of the Appendix C for a full description of how vulnerabilities are categorized by severity.While it is difficult to isolate all of the factors driving
this trend, Symantec believes that the following arethe most critical:
1. Focused Research —People dedicated to
vulnerability research seem to spend more oftheir time looking for vulnerabilities with greaterseverity. This tendency is especially evident invulnerability discussion forum conversations. Inaddition, the recent increase in searches for vulnerabilities affecting Internet Explorer is anexcellent example of this tendency.
2. Public Visibility —Individuals and organizations
that discover new vulnerabilities are much morelikely to announce their discovery publicly if the vulnerability is relatively severe in nature. It is quite possible that the discovery of new,low-severity vulnerabilities is increasing at acomparable rate, but that these discoveries arenot disclosed due to the lack of perceived impact.
3. Proliferation of Web Applications —Over the past
few years, hundreds of new web applicationshave entered the market.
18The nature of many
of these applications renders them much morelikely to have remotely accessible vulnerabilities that are relatively easy to exploit. Therefore, Web
application vulnerabilities are almost universallyclassified as moderately to highly severe.Symantec observed a sharp rise in web applica-tion vulnerabilities over the past two years whichaccounted for many of the new moderate/highseverity vulnerabilities. Figure 27 illustrates this
trend. Overall, the total number of web applica-tion vulnerabilities discovered in 2002 was178% higher than the total discovered in 2001.Furthermore, 95% of these vulnerabilities wereremotely exploitable and 99% were rated ashighly or moderately severe.
Ease of Exploitation
The relative ease with which attackers can exploit
a new vulnerability is a critical determinant of risk.In order to rank relative ease of exploitation,Symantec classifies all vulnerabilities according tothe three categories, listed below.
1. Exploit Available —Indicates that sophisticated
exploit code that enables the exploitation of thevulnerability is publicly available to all would-beattackers.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
29Figure 27.
Web Application Vulnerabilities by Month(Jan 1, 2001 – Dec 31, 2002)
051015202530354045
MonthDocumented Vulnerabilities50
234
210
61824
1416
112733
313247
2943
30 30
253029
22
Jan-01 Feb-01 Mar-01 Apr-01 May-01 Jun-01 Jul-01 Aug-01 Sep-01 Oct-01 Nov-01 Dec-01 Jan-02 Feb-02 Mar-02 Apr-02 May-02 Jun-02 Jul-02Aug-02 Sep-02 Oct-02 Nov-02 Dec-02
18Web applications are defined as any application that uses HTTP as the primary channel of input and/or output. This may include web-based email systems,
web-based forums, website management tools, CGI scripts of any kind, web servers, web clients, application servers, etc.2. No Exploit Required —Indicates that would-be
attackers can exploit the vulnerability withouthaving to use any form of sophisticated exploitcode. In other words, the attacker does notneed to create or use complex scripts or tools to exploit the vulnerability.
19
3. No Exploit Available —Indicates that would-be
attackers must use exploit code to make use ofthe vulnerability; however, no such exploit codeis publicly available.
The first two types of vulnerabilities are generally
considered “easily exploitable ” because the attacker
requires only limited sophistication to make use ofthem. The last type of vulnerability is considered“difficult to exploit ” because the attacker must
develop his/her own exploit code to make use of it.
Over the past two years the percentage of vulnera-
bilities classified as “easily exploitable ” consistently
hovered around 60%. Essentially, this statisticmeans that relatively unsophisticated attackers couldexploit more than half of all of the vulnerabilities that
emerged over the past two years either because exploit code was widely available, or because the
vulnerability did not require the use of exploit code.Figure 28 illustrates this trend.
20
While the percentage of easily exploitable vulnera-
bilities on the whole was relatively consistent overthe past two years, the two types of easilyexploitable vulnerabilities experienced differentrates of change. Specifically, the total number ofvulnerabilities with no exploit available or no exploitrequired increased substantially. However, at thesame time, the total vulnerabilities with exploitsavailable remained relatively steady. This trend isillustrated in Figure 29 .
As evidenced in Figure 29 , of those vulnerabilities
that required an exploit, a smaller percentageactually had an exploit available in 2002.Specifically, the percentage of new vulnerabilitieswith exploits declined from 30.0% in 2001 to23.7% in 2002. This trend may be a function ofseveral factors. First, it may reflect the recentmovement by members of the information security Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
300%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%
MonthPercentage of Documented Vulnerabilities
Mar-01 Apr-01 May-01 Apr-01 May-01 Jun-01 Jul-01Aug-01 Sep-01 Oct-01 Nov-01 Dec-01 Jan-02 Feb-02 Mar-02 Jun-02 Jul-02 Aug-02 Sep-02 Oct-02 Nov-02 Dec-0258.4%62.6%66.7%
58.6%
52.9%62.5%70.2%
56.6%64.4%
61.8%73.1%
64.1%
56.6%58.1%60.4%
51% 52% 51.6%61.9% 59.1%
54.7%53.1%Figure 28.
Percent of Vulnerabilties Classified as Easily Exploitable by Month(Mar 1, 2001 – Dec 31, 2002)
19For example, the Microsoft Extended Unicode Directory Traversal Vulnerability (BID #1806) is easily exploited by hand with the simple substitution of a few characters.
20Figure 28 does not include data from January and February 2001 because Symantec did not begin tracking “ease of exploitation ” consistently until March 2001.community to withhold exploit code from the public.
In the past, many individuals willingly postedexploit code to public forums (often just to achieveproof of concept). Recently, however, many ofthese same individuals have encouraged oneanother to embrace a greater sense of collectiveresponsibility and to avoid publicizing exploit code.It is possible that the drop in the percentage ofvulnerabilities with exploit code is evidence that thismovement is truly gaining momentum.
This trend can be viewed as both a positive and
negative development. From a positive perspective,the decreasing availability of exploit code makes itmore difficult for relatively unsophisticated attackers,such as script kiddies, to exploit new vulnerabilities.From this perspective, the overall threat to anorganization declines. On the other hand, becausemany new exploits are not being released publicly, itis possible that some highly sophisticated attackersare developing and using exploit code withoutpublic knowledge. By keeping exploit code secret,these attackers are better able to avoid detection.From this perspective, the threat to individualorganizations may actually increase.A second factor driving this trend may simply be
that sophisticated organizations and individuals (i.e.,those that create exploit code for new vulnerabilities)are not keeping pace with the sheer volume of newvulnerability discoveries. As a result, the percentageof vulnerabilities with exploits is declining.
21
FUTURE CONCERNS
In 2002, Symantec documented nearly 50 new vulnerabilities each week, a rate that was more than80% higher than the rate recorded during the prioryear. Fortunately, despite the overall rise in new vulnerability discoveries, many present a relativelylow level of risk to corporations. This may be dueto the fact that the vulnerability itself is not particularly severe in nature or, more likely, becausethe
vulnerability affects a product that is rarely
deployed in a corporate environment. Rather thanoverwhelming
the reader with descriptions of the
2,000+ vulnerabilities that emerged in 2002,Symantec has isolated three types of vulnerabilitiesthat we believe warrant more detailed discussion.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
31020406080100120Documented Vulnerabilities
Mar-01 Apr-01 May-01 Jun--01 Jul-01 Aug-01 Sep-01 Oct-01 Nov-01 Dec-01 Jan-02 Feb-02 Mar-02 Apr-02 May-02 Jun-02 Jul-02 Aug-02 Sep-02 Oct-02 Nov-02 Dec-02
Month Exploit Available
No Exploit Available
No Exploit RequiredFigure 29.
Overall Volume of Vulnerability by Ease Breakout(Mar 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002)
140
21This trend may also be partially a function of time required to produce an exploit. Therefore, the percentage of vulnerabilitie s discovered in 2002 that have
exploit code publicly available may rise with time.Bugtraq ID
2524
1754
42313597
53622880
230227081806
866
1387
14801780
5033Vulnerability Name
Microsoft IE MIME Header Attachment Execution Vulnerability
Microsoft Virtual Machine com.ms ActiveX Component Arbitrary
Program Execution VulnerabilityMicrosoft SQL Server Multiple Extended Stored Procedure BufferOverflow VulnerabilitiesMicrosoft Internet Explorer Spoofable File Extensions VulnerabilityOpenSSL SSLv3 Session ID Buffer Overflow VulnerabilityMS Index Server and Indexing Service ISAPI Extension Buffer OverflowVulnerabilityISC Bind 8 Transaction Signatures Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
MS IIS/PWS Escaped Characters Decoding Command Execution
VulnerabilityMicrosoft IIS and PWS Extended Unicode Directory TraversalVulnerabilitySolaris Sadmind Buffer Overflow VulnerabilityWu-Ftpd Remote Format String Stack Overwrite Vulnerability
Multiple Linux Vendor rpc.statd Remote Format String VulnerabilityMicrosoft Windows 9x / Me Share Level Password Bypass Vulnerability
Apache Chunked-Encoding Memory Corruption VulnerabilityCVE Reference
Number
CVE-2001-0154
CVE-2000-1061
CVE2002-0154
CAN-2001-0875
CAN-2002-0656
CVE-2001-0500
CVE-2001-0010CVE-2001-0333CVE-2000-0884CVE-1999-0977
CVE-2000-0573
CVE-2000-0666CVE-2000-0979
CVE-2002-0392Relevant Blended Threats
W32.HLLW.Winevar
Digispid Worm
W32.Appix
Linux Slapper
Code Red
1. Linux Lion Worm
2. Linux.Adore Worm
Nimda
1. Nimda
2. Sadmind/IIS Worm
Sadmind/IIS Worm
1. Linux Ramen Worm2. Linux.Adore Worm1. Linux Ramen Worm2. Linux.Adore Worm
W32.Opaserv
FreeBSD.Scalper WormDate of
Vulnerability
Discovery
03/29/2001
09/05/2000
03/05/200212/13/2001
07/30/200206/18/2001
01/29/200105/15/200110/17/200012/14/1999
06/22/2000
07/16/200010/10/2000
07/30/2002Date of First
Blended Threat
Outbreak
05/22/2001
11/23/2002
05/21/200209/17/2002
09/13/200207/16/2001
03/23/200109/18/200109/18/200105/11/2001
01/17/2001
01/17/200109/20/2002
09/13/2002Time Delay from
Discovery to First
Outbreak (days)
54
809
77
278
4528
53
126336514
209
185710
45Figure 30.
Blended Threat Vulnerabilities and Time Delays Before First Use
1. W32.Brid
2. W32.Bugbear3. W32.Klez4. W32.Aliz5.W32.Nimda6. W32.Badtrans7. W32.Frethem8. W32Yaha9. W32.Manymize10. W32.Chir11. W32.Holar12. W32.Appix13. W32.HLLW.WinevarBlended Threat Targets
Evidence gathered from monitoring malicious code
outbreaks and cyber attack activity clearly indicatesthat blended threats present one of the most substantial (and potentially costly) threats to theInternet community.
22During the past two years,
blended threats, such as Code Red and Nimda,infected millions of hosts and caused estimated billions of dollars in damages.
23
The most damaging threats exploited vulnerabilitiesfor which vendors had created patches long beforethe threat emerged. Table 30 illustrates this point,
by listing the vulnerabilities targeted by several major blended threats that spread over thepast three years, as well as the time delay thateach experienced before it was first targeted by ablended threat.In essence, the time delay between a vulnerability
discovery and its first use in a blended threat, coupled with the rising number of highly severevulnerabilities, reinforces the need for companiesto improve their security configuration and patchmanagement practices. Known blended threats areexploiting only a fraction of the vulnerabilities thatare currently documented. Symantec remains highly concerned that vulnerabilities enablingfuture blended threats are widely available and justwaiting to be exploited. As a result, we expect thatat least a few vulnerabilities that emerged over thepast year will become targets of future blendedthreats. Also, despite the current lack of precedence,it is quite possible to consider a scenario in thenear future where blended threats exploit vulnera-bilities that have not been published and are completely unknown to vendors.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
3222Blended threats combine the characteristics of viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and malicious code with server and Internet vulne rabilities to initiate, transmit, and spread
an attack. By utilizing multiple methods and techniques, blended threats often spread rapidly and can cause widespread damage.
23According to estimates from Carlsbad, Florida-based Computer Economics, variants of Code Red alone infected several million hos ts worldwide within a matter of hours,
and cost organizations more than $2 billion in clean up expenses and lost productivity. Jesdenun, A. “Despite More Security Spending, Internet a More Dangerous Place. ”
Associated Press. (January 16, 2002).Backdoors Affecting Open Source Applications24
Over the past year, a single group of attackers
compromised web sites hosting a wide variety ofopen source software packages. In many cases,the attackers proceeded to make subtle maliciouschanges to the posted source code of the hostedapplications with the hope that they would bedownloaded and used by unsuspecting users.These modifications typically opened a “back
door” and communication channel to a remote
host on the affected systems, which presumablyenabled the attacker to gain remote control of thesystem via the Internet. Several popular opensource software packages, including Mail TransferAgents (MTAs), security tools, peer-to-peer applications, and IRC clients announced thatbackdoors were planted in their 2002 product distributions as a result of these incidents. Table 31
lists some of the more notable applications affectedby these incidents.
The most concerning fact about these incidents is
not necessarily the applications affected —many
are not used at the enterprise level —but rather
the rapidity of the attacks and the fact that thesites affected were known to be highly consciousof security issues. These incidents should be considered a warning not only to other opensource projects, but also to commercial softwarevendors. Rather than targeting individual systems,attackers are clearly exploring alternative ways ofimpacting a large number of systems in a shortperiod of time.Web Client Vulnerabilities
Over the past year, Symantec noticed increased
effort among vulnerability researchers to identifyweb client vulnerabilities. As a result, Symantechas recorded a sharp increase of new web clientvulnerabilities. Further, Symantec has observedthat individuals are developing exploit code forweb client vulnerabilities more frequently than forother applications.
Of particular concern among web client vulnerabil-
ities were those that affected Microsoft InternetExplorer —largely because of its widespread use.
Over the past year, Symantec documented 59 newInternet Explorer vulnerabilities, 31 of which areconsidered highly severe and at least six of whichwould qualify as attractive targets for future blendedthreats. The most concerning aspect about theExplorer vulnerabilities is that several enableattackers to completely bypass “security zones, ”
which are a critical element protecting client systems when users browse the Internet. In effect,vulnerabilities such as the Microsoft InternetExplorer IFRAME dialogArguments Cross-ZoneAccess Vulnerability (BID #6205), enable attackersto run code of their choice on a user ’s system
through acts as simple as redirecting the user to amalicious web page.
25Attackers can leverage these
vulnerabilities for a range of malicious acts, such asdata theft, installation of trojans, and modificationof files. Furthermore, malicious code writers canpotentially use these vulnerabilities as a propagationmechanism for high impact malicious code, suchas blended threats.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
33Application Type Links to Relevant Information and Recommendations
IRSSI Unix-based http://online.securityfocus.com/bid/4831
IRC Client
Fragroute Network Intrusion http://online.securityfocus.com/archive/1/274892
Detection Evasion
Toolkit
OpenSSH Free version of http://online.securityfocus.com/bid/5374
the SSH Protocol
Fragrouter Network Intrusion http://online.securityfocus.com/bid/6022
Detection Evasion http://online.securityfocus.com/archive/1/296407
Toolkit
Sendmail email http://online.securityfocus.com/bid/5921
LibPCap and Packet Sniffing http://online.securityfocus.com/bid/6171
TCPDumpFigure 31.
Open Source Applications Affected by Hosting Site Attacks
24A backdoor is a small program that is intentionally hidden inside a program/application that appears to have a legitimate funct ion. The backdoor program per-
mits unauthorized access to the system by a knowledgeable user.
25Details on Microsoft Internet Explorer IFRAME dialogArguments Cross-Zone Access Vulnerability (BID 6205) can be accessed at the following link:
http://online.securityfocus.com/bid/6205 In conclusion, the rapid discovery of new web
client vulnerabilities is a trend that Symantec willcontinue to monitor over the next year. In the mean-time, the potential exposure to web client attacksand outbreaks of destructive forms of maliciouscode appears to have increased substantially inrecent months. This is particularly concerning atthe enterprise level, as companies deploy web
clients on virtually all client systems and rarelyencourage or require frequent updates by employees.
SQL Database Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities that affect relational databases are
another class of threats that experienced substantialgrowth over the past year. Many of these vulnera-bilities were highly severe in nature because theyenable attackers to gain complete control of adatabase. This year, Symantec documented over65 vulnerabilities affecting database products fromMicrosoft, Oracle and IBM. Microsoft issued 11security bulletins for SQL Server 2000 and 7.0 in2002, while Oracle published 20 security alerts.
Compounding this threat is the growing insecurity
of web-based applications, which often utilizedatabases as their back-end. For example, numer-ous well-known e-commerce applications and websites employ this type of architecture. In sum, thecombined increase of database and web applica-tion vulnerabilities has made mission-critical databases more vulnerable than ever to remoteattackers. This greatly increases risk for the manycompanies that maintain remote access to sensitiveclient and corporate data. EMERGENCE OF MALICIOUS CODE
OVERVIEW
Methodologically, there are few credible analyticaltechniques that researchers can use to predictfuture malicious code activity. It is well known(particularly among members of the anti-viruscommunity) that entirely new types of threats oftenemerge without any warning signs. Often these arethe types of threats that spread the most rapidlybecause many (if not all) targeted systems lack therequired defenses. Recognizing the inherent limi-tations of relying solely on past activity, this section
of the Internet Security Threat Report points out keyareas of concern in which we reasonably expect
future malicious code and activity. These observa-
tions draw heavily from the analysis of:
• Existing systems and applications
•Emerging systems and applications
under development
• Intelligence gathering and adversary profiling
• Behavioral analysis
Reliance on this type of analysis yields a more
comprehensive picture of the current and futurethreat environment. With this understood, theremainder of this section outlines several currenttrends that are affecting organizations, as well asthree future concerns.
26
CURRENT TRENDS
Several of the following trends and analysis arebased on malicious code submissions to Symantec
AntiVirus Research Automation (SARA) system.For a more detailed description of this system, see page 46 in Appendix B .
Blended Threats
Blended threats combine the characteristics of
viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and malicious codewith host and Internet vulnerabilities to initiate,transmit, and spread. By utilizing multiple methodsand techniques for propagation, blended threatsoften spread rapidly and cause widespread damage.Examples of blended threats include, but are notlimited to: Code Red, Nimda, and Bugbear.
In terms of damage potential, the multiple propa-
gation mechanisms of blended threats enablethem to compromise a company ’s security posture,
and also frequently eat up system resources andnetwork bandwidth. Unfortunately, following good Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
34 26Additional details on all worms cited in this section can be obtained at http://securityresponse.symantec.com. security practices such as requiring strong,
non-default passwords, is often not enough to prevent this type of attack. Blended threats exploitIT product vulnerabilities, and so long as systemsmaintain a vulnerability targeted by a specificblended threat, infection is possible. While notguaranteed effective, maintaining good securityand patch management practices seems to beamong the best defense mechanisms against thistype of threat.
During the past six months, three blended threats —
Klez, Opaserv, and Bugbear —accounted for nearly
80% of all malicious code submissions. Additionallyblended thr eat submissions were approximately
twice as high as in the same six-month period of2001. Finally, the Internet community also wit-nessed the emergence of two new blended threatsof note, Bugbear and Opaserv. Although neithercaused a volume of damage that was comparablewith that caused by the 2001 outbreaks of CodeRed and Nimda, widespread propagation of these threats (as evidenced by their inclusion inthe list of Top Five Submissions), is a soberingreminder that blended threats continue to presenta substantial risk.
Finally, a review of the major blended threats that
emerged over the past several years revealed thatall of these threats targeted known vulnerabilities,some of which were well documented for morethan six months before the blended threat wascreated. If future blended threats reasonably followa similar pattern, there already are numerous knownvulnerabilities that are perfectly viable candidates forthe next major blended threat.
In conclusion, despite the fact that the damage
potential of the most recent blended threats wasconsiderably less that that of past threats such as Nimda, Symantec still expects that the relative risk
presented by these threats will rise over the nextyear. Of particular concern is the seemingly endlesssupply of known vulnerabilities that malicious codewriters can readily exploit. On a positive note,organizations can take several steps to improvetheir defenses against future blended threats.
27
Windows 32 Viruses/Worms
Over the past year, 1,200 new 32-bit Windows
viruses and worms were released, a substantialrise from the prior year. Maintaining this trend,malicious code submissions during the fourthquarter of 2002 consisted predominantly ofWindows 32 threats, as opposed to script- ormacro-based threats. Furthermore, three of theTop Five virus/worm threats reported by SymantecSecurity Response during the fourth quarter wereclassified as Win32. Table 32 shows the top five
malicious code submissions during the fourth quarter.
Fortunately, even with the complexity of Win32
threats, and the volume of data they tend to gener-ate, most market-leading anti-virus products haverobust Win32 detection. Provided that anti-virusproducts are implemented correctly and wellmaintained on all platforms and across all tiers ofa corporate network, proactive companies shouldbe well protected from the majority of Win32s.
Linux Threats
One trend that remains somewhat subtle is the
recent increase in malicious code targeting Linuxsystems. In 1998 we saw the first widespreadexample of a successful Linux threat, theLinux.ADM.Worm. In addition to its worm-likecharacteristics, it also exploited a widely knownvulnerability, causing the compromise of a largenumber of systems. Until recently, however, therewere relatively few successful malicious code outbreaks on Linux.
In September 2002 this trend shifted when the
Linux.Slapper worm emerged and caused signifi-cant outbreaks on Linux systems. The infectionvector of the worm and its variants is based on a Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
35Rank Occurrence Threat
1 47.6% W32.Klez.h@mm
2 21.8% W32.Bugbear@mm
3 7.5% W32.Opaserv.Worm
4 7.2% JS.Exception.Exploit
53 % W95.Hybris.WormFigure 32.
Top Five Malicious Code Submissions by Percentage of Overall Submissions (October 1, 2001 – Dec 31, 2002)
27To assist, Symantec has outlined a comprehensive set of tactical recommendations, which can be obtained by downloading the whit e paper at the following link.
http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/blended.pdf. remote buffer overflow vulnerability in the OpenSSL
implementation of the SSL protocol targetingApache web servers on various versions of the Linuxoperating environment. In addition to Slapper, anumber of highly sophisticated zoo-based Linuxviruses and worms emerged in recent months.
28
Many of these threats were concerning becausethey demonstrated that malicious code writers aredeveloping a higher level of sophistication in programming and increased familiarity with theLinux operating system and its applications. Theevolution of the Linux threat landscape will beobserved with great interest during the next twelvemonths. This threat is especially concerning asLinux-based solutions are brought to the consumermarket.
29As opposed to individuals already familiar
with various flavors of the Unix operating systems,home users are likely unaware of appropriatesecurity practices.
Self-Replicating Mass Mailers
Another trend that has escalated over the past six
months is the increase in mass-mailing worms thatpropagate by using their own SMTP engine.
30Most
old forms of email threats used email clients suchas Microsoft Outlook to propagate. However, manyof the more recent mass-mailer worms follow thefollowing sequence. First, they exploit known vulnerabilities to infect a system. Next, they harvestemail addresses from the infected system. Finally,they propagate by using an email engine that isindependent of the client email. In effect, thismethodology enables the code to propagate without
requiring user interaction.As a result, users are often unaware of the e-mails
generated from their infected systems. Furthermore,
because these threats spoof the “From ” address
on e-mails, victims of the infection are oftenunable to determine the true origin of the threat.This makes tracking down sources of infectionextremely difficult.
During the past six months, eight of the top 50
malicious code submissions carried their ownSMTP engines. This is a stark contrast to the sametime period in 2001, when only 1 of the top 50malicious code submissions had its own SMTPengine. In response to the increasing presence ofmass mailers with SMTP engines, several market-leading anti-virus products have created new typesof technology that detect and eliminate this type ofthreat more effectively.
Use of Network Shares as Infection Vector
Over the past six months, Symantec noted a rise
in malicious code that spread via network shares.The W32.Opaserv worm variants, which spreadrapidly in the wild during the last few weeks ofSeptember 2002, were excellent examples of thistype of worm. Unlike Klez and Bugbear, Opaservinfected vulnerable Windows 9x systems overWindows shares even if the password was set forthe share. Previously, the W32.Funlove virus useda similar infection vector; however, Funlove did notuse a vulnerability exploit, and thus the attack ofthe worm could be stopped with passwords alone.
Carrier Viruses and Worms
Over the past year, Symantec noted an increase of
carrier viruses and worms, which are forms ofmalicious code that enable other forms of maliciouscode to propagate in addition to itself. An example Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
3628Zoo-based threats are those that exist only in virus and anti-virus labs, not in the wild. Most zoo threats never get released into the wild, and as a result, rarely threaten users.
29In 2001, according to IDC, the Linux Client Operating Environment (COE) grew at a 49% rate, especially in the emerging Asia/Pac ific market. Latin America has also
shown strong growth. As Linux becomes more of a “packaged ” offering with equivalent component offerings to Windows and major Unix variants, this trend is forecast-
ed to continue. “Worldwide Linux Operating Environments Forecast and Analysis, 2002-2006: A Market in Transition. ” IDC. July 2002. <http://www.idc.com>.
30Malicious code that has its own SMTP engine is able to spread without using an existing email application. For example, after i nfecting a personal computer with Microsoft
Outlook, this type of malicious code can propagate via email without using the Outlook application.is the Opaserv worm, which replicates by creating
e-mails from bits of files/e-mails from the infectedsystem. If one or more of the files selected byOpaserv happens to be infected with other viruses,these viruses are also transmitted with the Opaservinfected file. As a result of the rise of new carrierviruses and worms, Symantec has seen relativelyold viruses re-emerge in the wild. In the case ofOpaserv, for example, Symantec saw a re-emergenceof infections by older viruses, such as W95.Spacesand W32.Funlove.
The recent increase of carrier viruses and worms
is concerning because they can cause old threatsto re-emerge with much higher impact. Many pastforms of malicious code that had the potential forhigh impact failed to spread widely. However,when they are "carried" by malicious code that iscapable of wide scale propagation, suddenly theycan spread much more effectively and cause aconsiderable amount of damage. Fortunately, while the use of carrier viruses occasionallybreathes new life into old threats, users can usuallydefend adequately against these threats simply bykeeping anti-virus products up to date with the latest signatures.
Theft of Confidential Data
Over the past year, Symantec noted a rise in mali-
cious code that steals confidential data from users.For example, there was a sharp increase in maliciouscode that extracts “To” and “From ” names from a
user’s address book, thereby enabling misuse and
further theft of data by the creator. While older viruses, such as W32/Sircam.@mm, compromisedconfidentiality by exporting random documents, morerecent viruses and blended threats not only exportconfidential documents, but also export system data that can be used to inflict further damage. Forexample, blended threats, such as Bugbear exportconfidential data including lists of file names, lists ofprocesses, user names, processor type, OS version,memory information, local drives, and networkresource and type. Additionally, Bugbear can deliver logged keystrokes to a third party, whichmay yield important information such as passwordsand other details.The implications of this trend are inherently diffi-
cult to quantify. In order to better understand theimpact within their organization, companies shouldpay closer attention to whether or not confidentialdata has been compromised when investigatingmajor malicious code incidents. In addition, usersneed to be aware of their browser privacy policiesand protection mechanisms to minimize the abilityof malicious code to export confidential data.
FUTURE CONCERNS
The variety of threat types that facilitate compro-mises of data/system availability, confidentiality,and integrity is clearly increasing. While historicaldata analysis indicates that Windows 32 threats,blended threats, and self-replicating mass-mailersare all on the rise, there are several risks based onmarket analysis that also warrant close attention.The remainder of this section outlines several threatsthat Symantec views as high risks in the future.
Instant Messaging
According to Gartner Research, by the fourth
Quarter of 2002 approximately 70% of enterprisesused unmanaged consumer instant messaging ontheir networks to conduct business.
31In addition,
Symantec Managed Security Services noted a similarrise in usage of instant messaging applicationsamong clients, many of whom maintain strict policiesforbidding such action.
As both legitimate and unauthorized usage rises,
the threat of malicious code that uses instant messaging clients for propagation is becomingmore significant. While this threat is not entirelynew—a few viruses that use AIM, ICQ, Yahoo and
MSN exist today —the market penetration of
instant messaging usage is now sufficient to makeviable the use of Instant Messenger as a primaryand efficient infection vector for malicious codethat has a much more devastating impact.
32Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
3731Grey, M. “Instant Messaging in the Enterprise Will Remain a Puzzle. ” COM-18-7979. 22 Nov. 2002. Gartner Research. <http://www.garner.com>.
32Fortunately, there are many steps that organizations can take to better protect against this threat. For a more complete descri ption of the security risks of
using instant messaging and guidelines for securing this application a white paper is available at:http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/secure.instant.messaging.pdfPeer-to-Peer Applications
In 1999, Napster emerged as the first widely used
peer-to-peer (P2P) application designed to allowwidespread sharing of files over the Internet. Sincethe creation of Napster, the use of new P2P appli-cations, such as LimeWire, Morpheus, and variousversions of KaZaA, has increased dramatically.Symantec analysts have also noted a disturbing rise in unauthorized usage of P2P applications among company employees despitesecurity polices that strictly forbid this practice.Finally, compounding this trend, several recentworms began using P2P file-sharing networks as a primary infection vector in 2002.
The combination of wide deployment and increasing
usage, coupled with the fact that most of the currentP2P networking applications actually circumvententerprise security policy by bypassing controlssuch as firewalls, makes these applications a highlyattractive target for future cyber attackers andmalicious code writers. Symantec strongly encour-ages organizations to prohibit P2P use amongemployees or establish clear and enforceable usagerestrictions if business need dictates that P2P usageis required.
Mobile Devices
Another area that should be watched with care is
the mobile device arena. Gartner Research predictsthat 2004 will be the major breakthrough year forthe mobile email/personal information manager(PIM) market globally.
32The “always on ” nature of
the connectivity, remote access to critical sensitivedata, and the increasingly computational nature ofthese devices, sets the stage for a potential virusor worm of significance. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
38 32Dulaney, K. Clark, B.. “E-Mail/PIM Is Still No. 1. ” SPA-18-5839. 20 Nov. 2002.Gartner Research. <http://www.gartner.com>.Appendix A —Network-Based Cyber
Attack Methodology
OVERVIEW
Appendix A outlines key components of the
methodology that Symantec used to measure andreport trends in cyber attack activity. The data andinsights are derived from a subset of companiesthat subscribe to Symantec Managed SecurityServices (MSS) and, in some cases, the SymantecDeepSight Threat Management System (TMS). Thesubset studied for this report includes a majority of Symantec Managed Security Service customerswith the exception of statistical outliers, which wereremoved from this analysis. The appendix is dividedinto the following sections:
•Company Demographics
•Attack Metrics
•Individual Research Inquiries
COMPANY DEMOGRAPHICS
The sample set from which the cyber attack trends in
this report were derived consists of a subset of morethan 400 companies, located in more than 30countries thr oughout the world. Combined, the
security infrastructure at these companies protectsmillions of Internet-connected hosts. In terms of diversity, the sample set includes a broad array of
organizations as measured by criteria such as indus-try, ownership type, company size, and length of timeas security monitoring clients. A subset of companycharacteristics is outlined in greater detail below.
IndustryFigure 33 presents the industry break down of the
sample set in percentage terms. Industry gr oups
are based on the review of a variety of public andprivate references, as well as direct client interac-tions. It is important to note that several classifica-tions were altered since the July 2002 issue of theReport. These changes were necessary to create anew, standardized classification methodology thatis now employed by both the Symantec ManagedSecurity Services and Threat ManagementServices.
Company Size
Employee count was used as a proxy to measure
company size. This metric was selected as thebest proxy for company size because the numberof employees typically correlates best to the relativesize of a company ’s network. Employee counts
were gathered from public sources, as well asengaging in direct, client interactions. Figure 34
indicates the break down by company size for thesample set.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
39Figure 34.
Breakdown of Companies by Employee Count(July 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002)
1-499
64%500-999
7%1,000-4,999
11%5,000+
18%Telecommunications
3%
Power & Energy
4%
Media/Entertainment
4%
Manufacturing
5%
E-Commerce
8%
Healthcare
8%
High Tech
12%Financial Services
14%Other
18%Small Business
18%
Nonprofit
6%Figure 33.
Breakdown of Companies by Industry(July 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002)Company Ownership Status
Company ownership status was gathered mainly from
public sources, as well as engaging in direct, clientinteractions. Figure 35 indicates the breakdown by
company ownership status for the sample set.
ATTACK METRICS
Overview
Several reports analyzing cyber attack activity are
currently circulating the information security community, and each report claims to offer themost accurate depiction of key trends. Unfortunately,benchmarking findings among studies is difficult(if not impossible) because each report attempts to capture “attack activity ” in a different way. For
example, the CERT Annual Report relies on “security
breaches ’ that were detected and voluntarily
reported to CERT by corporations and individuals.The annual CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security
Survey also captures trends in attack activity by
measuring “security breaches ” that were detected
and reported by survey respondents. In order toavoid ambiguity with our findings, Symantec ’s
methodology for identifying various forms of“attack activity ” is outlined clearly on the following
pages and applied consistently throughout ourmonitoring and analysis.Attack Definitions
The first step in analyzing cyber attack activity is
to define precisely what is an “attack. ” Rather
than limiting our analysis to only one metric ofattack activity, Symantec uses several differentmetrics, each of which is uniquely appropriateunder a certain set of circumstances. Presentedbelow is a high-level summary of the four metricsthat are commonly used in the Report.
•Attacks —Attacks are individual signs of malicious
activity that are isolated by the Symantec SecureOperations Center technology platform and validated by Symantec analysts. Attacks canconsist of one or more IDS alerts and/or firewalllogs that are indicative of a single type of attackeraction. For example, multiple firewall logs oftenindicate the occurrence of a single network scan.Attacks do not include false positive indicatorsof attack activity, as technology and experthuman analysts exclude this type of activity fromthe data set.
•Events —Security events are logical groupings of
multiple attacks. A security event may include agroup of similar, but non-threatening, signs ofattack activity experienced by companies duringthe course of a day (e.g., all non-threateningHTTP scans experienced during a single day are grouped into an event); or a security eventmay include multiple attacks against a singlecompany by a single attacker during a specifiedperiod of time.
•Unique Attackers —The Unique Attacker metric
is the most reliable indicator of the actual numberof attackers detected by the sample set. Themetric captures the total number of uniquesource IP addresses that launched attacksagainst companies over a set time (e.g., day,week, month, etc.).Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
40Government
3%Nonprofit
10%
Public
25%
Private
62%Figure 35.
Breakdown of Companies by Ownership Status(July 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002)•Attacks per Company —The attacks per company
metric captures the average volume of attacksthat companies experience over time. Symantecgenerates these statistics by taking the averageattacks per company each day, and then averagingthe sum of these averages over specified periodsof time. By calculating the average number ofattacks per company in the sample sets eachday, Symantec accounts for clients that wereadded to the sample set throughout the studyperiod, thereby ensuring that these additions donot falsely inflate the apparent volume of activity.
Because “attacks ” and “events ” involve the use of
complex technology and extensive validation, thesetwo metrics are outlined in greater detail throughoutthe remainder of this appendix.Attack and Event Data
Identification and Classification Process
One of the most valuable attributes of the findings
in this report is the fact that each possible sign ofattack activity is evaluated by Symantec analysts tovalidate whether it truly represents malicious activity.Identification and classification of attacks andevents is the end result of a sophisticated processthat involves the use of complex technology andexpert human analysis. During this processSymantec analyzes every firewall log and IDS alert generated by client devices and isolates andinvestigates entire attack sequences in real time.The combination of sophisticated technology andexpert human analysis ensures that the identifica-tion and classification process is comprehensiveand consistent over time. Figure 36 outlines the key
steps of the attack and event identification andclassification process.
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
41Stage of Analysis DescriptionFigure 36.
Attack Identification and Classification Process for Companies in the Sample Set
Stage #1 —Collection and
Normalization of Security Data from
Clients ’ Firewalls and IDSs
Stage #2 —Data Mining of
Normalized Security Data
Stage #3 —Security Event
Correlation and Presentation
Stage #4 —Event ClassificationSecurity data is imported from firewalls and/or IDSs, normalized into a
standard format, and stored in a dedicated database.
Security data is continuously mined by the Secure Operations Center
Technology Platform to isolate occurrences and/or patterns of potentially mali-cious activity. Once identified, such patterns or occurrences of malicious activityare stored as attacks in a separate table within the database.Attacks generated during the data mining stage are linked by logical criteria,such as attack type, attack direction, and source IP. For example, a correlatedsecurity event may present all signs of attacks detected from a single IP addressin China. Security events are then posted to a graphical user interface (GUI) inthe Symantec Secure Operations Center, and security analysts review and inves-tigate each event to determine the type and severity of the event.After completing an investigation of the possible event, those that are determined to be “false positive ” are eliminated from consideration.* Based
upon the apparent intent and sophistication of the activity, attacks are validatedand assigned a severity level. Only events that are judged to be valid occur-rences of malicious activity are analyzed in this report. Each action contributingto an event is considered an “attack, ” while the sequence of attacks in its
entirety is considered an “event. ”
* False positive attacks represent attacks that were initially flagged as potentially malicious, but later determined to be beni gn after evaluation by a
Symantec security analyst.DISTINCTION BETWEEN ATTACKS AND EVENTS
The best way to view the attack and event metrics
used in this report is as follows: Attacks represent
each individual action taken by attackers; andEvents represent logical groupings of attack activity
that are either similar in nature or are taken by asingle attacker within a continuous time sequence.To provide greater clarity, each metric is summa-rized graphically in Figure 37 .
Symantec uses both “attacks ” and “events ” to
evaluate malicious activity because reliance on asingle metric in all situations inevitably generatesinaccuracies. For example, suppose Symantec onlyused the “attack ” metric to measure the frequency
of “severe ” activity. This approach would lead to
inaccuracies because severe activity is really afunction of attack sequences (or events), not individual signs of attack activity. In fact, analystshave analyzed several severe events that consist ofhundreds of individual attacks, each of which inisolation may not indicate a severe threat. It wouldbe misleading, therefore, to count this series ofrelated activity as hundreds of individual severeattacks. Therefore, in this case, evaluating “events ”
rather than “attacks ” yields a more accurate measure
of severe activity.On the other hand, when looking at total attack
activity over time, the amount of distinct attackeractions would be grossly underestimated if wewere to base the analysis solely on events. This isbecause “events ” may consist of hundreds (or
even thousands) of individual attacker actions. Forexample, clients often experience hundreds ofnon-threatening scans caused by blended threatson a daily basis; however, rather than overwhelm-ing clients by reporting each individual scan,Symantec aggregates this activity into a singleevent that is reported to clients once per day.While this is the most practical reporting strategyfor clients, it inherently underestimates the amountof attack activity that companies are experiencing.If Symantec were to use the number of “events ”
reported to clients over time, scanning activity(which is a valid indicator of malicious activity)would be grossly underestimated.
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
42Figure 37.
Symantec Security Events versus Attacks
Event A (Correlated by IP Address)
Attacks from 10.24.52.38
• Attack A —Scan for FTP Service
• Attack B —Anonymous Login Attempt
• Attack C —Attempt to Create a Directory
• Attack D —Directory Created with ‘Warez ’
Terminology Use
* To avoid double counting, the scan from 10.24.52.38 is not counted as an attack because it is already counted as an attack wit hin Event A.Attack Count —Event A consists of
4 attacks: A, B, C, and D.
Event Count —Event A consists of 1
event, which in this case is ‘severe. ’
Attack Count —Event B consists of
3 attacks: E,F, and G*.
Event Count —Event B consists of
1 event, which in this case is ‘non-severe. ’Event B (Correlated by Signature)
FTP Scanning Attacks on November, 1, 2002
• Attack A —FTP Scan from 10.24.52.38
• Attack E —FTP Scan from 69.45.23.10
• Attack F —FTP Scan from 45.34.29.76
• Attack G —FTP Scan from 123.34.20.1INDIVIDUAL RESEARCH INQUIRIES
The following section outlines several specific
inquiries discussed in the cyber attack activity sectionof the report.
Event Severity
Every event validated by a Symantec security
analyst is assigned to one of four severity classifi-cations: informational, warning, critical, and emergency. The primary purpose of this rating system is to prioritize client responses to maliciousactivity based on the relative level of danger thatthe event presents to their environment. A deter-mination of severity is based on characteristics ofan attack, defensive posture of the client, value of the assets at risk, and the relative success of the attack.
For the Internet Security Threat Report, these four
severity levels are further grouped into two classifi-cations: severe and non-severe events. Severe eventsinclude activity classified as either “emergency ”or
“critical ”, while non-severe events include activity
classified as either “informational ” or “warning. ” In simple terms, a severe event demands IMMEDIATE
countermeasures from an organization, while anon-severe event is mainly informative. The severityclassification system is explained in greater detailin Figure 38 .
Attacks by Time of Day
Each attack detected by Symantec has a correspon-
ding time stamp (expressed in Greenwich Mean
Time), which describes the precise time that theattack was detected. This time is extracted fromthe log data (i.e., firewall or IDS) produced by thedevice that Symantec is monitoring. However, inorder to evaluate when attackers are most activewithin specific locations throughout the world,Symantec normalized these time stamps to thelocal time in which the attacking system was located.For example, suppose Symantec detects anattacker at 12:00 GMT, and the attacking systemwas located in New York City; the local time of theattacker in this example is 7:00 (GMT –5). Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
43Severity Severity Level Description
ClassificationFigure 38.
Event Severity Metrics
Non-Severe
SevereInformational
Warning
Critical
EmergencyThese events consist of scans for malicious services and IDS events that do not have a significant impact on the
client ’s network.
Example:•Scans for vulnerable services where all connection attempts are dropped by the firewall.
These events consist of malicious attacks that were successful in bypassing the firewall, but did not compromisethe intended target systems.
Example:•Scans/horizontal sweeps where some connections were allowed, but a compromise has not occurred.
These events are malicious in nature and require action on the part of Symantec or the client to remedy a weak-ness or actual exploit of the client network or devices. By definition, if a critical event is not addressed withcountermeasures, it may result in a successful compromise of a system.
Examples:•Continuous attacks by a single IP address against the client network.
•A significant vulnerability on the client's network that was identified by either an attacker or the Security
Operations Center (SOC). For example, a web exploit is observed and appears to be successful, but there isno observed follow-up activity to take advantage of the vulnerability.
•Unknown suspicious traffic that warrants an investigation by the client to track or eliminate the traffic flow.
These events indicate that a security breach has occurred on the client ’s protected network. An emergency
event requires the client to initiate some form of recovery procedure.
Examples:•Successful exploit of a vulnerable web server.In order to produce Figure 38 on page 43 , which
illustrates the rate of all attackers normalized tothe local time within 7 regions, Symantec used thefollowing local times.
These local times were selected because they
represented a logical average point for regions that
extend across several time zones. However, it isimportant to understand that this limitation makes
these statistics a rough visualization of attackactivity by region.
Attack Source
Symantec identified the national and regional source
of attacks by automatically cross-referencing sourceIP addresses of every attack with several third-party,
subscription-based databases that link the geographic
location of hosts to source IP addresses. While thesedatabases are generally reliable, there is a smallmargin of error. Currently, Symantec cross referencessource IP addresses of attacks against every country
in the world and also analyzes attack trends according
to the following regions:
•Africa
•Asia
•Caribbean
•Eastern Europe
•Latin America
It is important to note that while Symantec has a
reliable process for identifying the source IP of thehost and/or network block that is directly responsiblefor launching an attack, it is impossible to verifywhether the attacker is actually physically present at this location. It is probable that many apparentsources of attacks are, in fact, systems that wereused by attackers as a platform to disguise his/heridentity and true location.Attacker Intent
In order to determine a general sense of attacker
objectives, Symantec looked at a sample of morethan 100 Managed Security Services clients whoshare a common Class B network block. Symantecthen examined all attacks launched against thesecompanies, and determined the percentage thatsuffered targeted and opportunistic attacks. Figure 39
outlines how each type of attack was categorized.
Top Network Scans
When evaluating attacks, Secure Operations
Center analysts separate activity into several differentcategories. At the highest level, attacks are separatedinto “reconnaissance ” and “exploits. ” As the terms
suggest, reconnaissance is an indicator of thetypes of systems and/or services that attackersseek for attempted compromise, while exploitsindicate the actual actions that attackers undertaketo compromise a system that they identify aspotentially vulnerable. The listing of the top networkscans is an indicator of reconnaissance activity.The metric reveals the types of services for whichattackers most frequently search for exploitation.
Attacker Platform
Symantec employs an automated system that
profiles a subset of attackers immediately after theyattack one or more clients. The profiler gathers public data, such as the attacker ’s operating system
and services available on the attacker ’s system.
Combined with other metrics of attack activity, theprofiler provides deeper insight into attackers ’
modus operandi. It is important to note, however,that many of the systems identified as “attackers, ”
may actually be systems that were themselvescompromised and then used as a launching pointby attackers located elsewhere.
Cyber Terrorism Watch List
In response to warnings issued by the United
States Department of Homeland Security indicatingthat terrorists may be exploring the use of cyber-Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
44Region Local Time
Africa GMT +2
Asia GMT +7
Eastern Europe GMT +2
Middle East GMT +3
North America GMT -6
Oceania34GMT +11
South America GMT -3
Western Europe GMT +1
•Middle East
•North America
•Oceania
•South America
•Western Europe
34Oceania was not included in the figures summarizing this analysis because this region contributed less than 1% of overall attac k activity and was the only region that did
not show a recognizable pattern of peak activity by hour of day.terrorism, a Cyber Terrorism Watch List was included
in this Report. The Watch List tracks cyber attackactivity from two types of countries: those designatedby the U.S. State Department as State Sponsors ofTerrorism and those from which terrorists havereportedly operated and recruited in the past.Countries listed under the latter category includethose identified by either public or private sourcesas potential "hot spots" of terrorist activity. It is important to note that, while Symantec does
not claim to have specific expertise in terrorism, we believe this list presents an adequate startingpoint for tracking potential cases of cyber terrorismby monitoring some of the more likely sources.Countries included on the Cyber-Terrorism WatchList are listed in Figure 40 .
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
45Objective DescriptionFigure 39.
Definitions of Attacker Intent
Opportunistic
TargetedOpportunistic attacks appear to be intent on locating any vulnerable system
that exists on the Internet regardless of who owns the system or the specificfunction of the system. In this situation the victim of the attack was notidentified in advance, but rather was selected after being identified as a vulnerable system. Typically, these attacks are preceded by a scan of manysystems on the Internet until the attacker pinpoints a system that has vulnerabilities that he/she knows how to compromise.Targeted attacks appear to be directed at a specific organization. In theory,attackers who launch these types of attacks have identified the target company in advance and have made a conscious and deliberate attempt togain access to their network. In this situation, the attacker is not looking fora specific vulnerability to gain access to ANY organization, but rather islooking for ANY vulnerability that will enable them to gain access to a spe-cific system. For this report, these include all attacks in which the attackerdid not perform any scan on any other networks within the network block of the sample set. In this situation, the attacker has only shown signs ofmalicious activity against one client.*
* It is possible that some attacks that appear targeted are actually opportunistic in nature. This is due to the fact that some attackers may use tools that
randomly select a target without systematically scanning an entire network block for vulnerable systems.
Figure 40.
Countries Currently on the Cyber-Terrorist Watch List(July 1, 2002 - December 31, 2002)
U.S. State Department
Designated State Sponsors
of Terrorism
Cuba
IranIraq
Libya
North Korea
Sudan
SyriaCountries with
Reported Terrorist
Activity
Afghanistan
Egypt
Indonesia
Jordan
Kuwait
Lebanon
Morocco
Pakistan
Saudi Arabia
United Arab EmiratesAppendix B —Malicious Code Methodology
Observations in this section were based, in part,
on empirical data and expert analysis. The dataand analysis draw primarily from two databases,described below.
INFECTION DATABASE
As part of its continuing effort to detect and
eradicate computer viruses, Symantec developedthe Symantec AntiVirus Research Automation(SARA) technology. Symantec uses this technologyto analyze, replicate, and define a large subset ofthe most common computer viruses that are quarantined by Symantec AntiVirus customers. Inan average month SARA receives hundreds of thou-sands of suspect files daily from both enterprise andindividual consumers located throughout the world.These suspect files are then analyzed by Symantecand matched with virus definitions. An analysis ofthis aggregate data set provides Symantec with statistics on infection rates for different types ofmalicious code.
MALICIOUS CODE DATABASE
In addition to infection data, Symantec Security
Response analyzes and documents attributes foreach new form of malicious code that emergesboth in the wild and in a zoo environment.Descriptive records of new forms of malicious codeare then entered into a database for future reference.For this report, historical trend analysis was performed on this database to reveal trends, suchas the use of different infection vectors and the frequency of various types of payloads.Appendix C —Vulnerability Methodology
OVERVIEW
Symantec Threat Analysts search hundreds of
security vendor, industry, and underground websites and mailing lists, looking for informationabout possible new security vulnerabilities.Following the discovery of a new vulnerability,threat analysts gather all information related to thenew vulnerability and create an alert. Within thealert are numerous fields that describe character-istics of the vulnerability, such as severity, ease ofexploitation, and products affected. To date,Symantec ’s Security Response Service maintains a
database that contains detailed reports describingmore than 6,000 distinct vulnerabilities, and isgenerally considered to be the largest and mostaccurate such database.
VULNERABILITY CLASSIFICATIONS
The remainder of this appendix outlines several ofthe classifications that Symantec uses when documenting new vulnerability discoveries. Themajority of these classifications are used eitherdirectly or indirectly for various research inquiriesin the current issue of the Report.
Vulnerability Type
After discovering a new vulnerability, Threat
Analysts classify the vulnerability into one of 12possible categories. The classification system isbased on Taimur Aslam ’s white paper, entitled
“A Taxonomy of Security Faults in the Unix
Operating System, ” which defines the taxonomy
used to classify vulnerabilities.
35Possible values
are indicated below, and the previously mentioned
white paper provides a full description of the meaning
behind each classification.
•Boundary Condition Error
•Access Validation Error
•Origin Validation Error
•Input Validation Error
•Failure to Handle Exceptional Conditions
•Race Condition Error
•Serialization Error
•Atomicity Error
•Environment Error
•Configuration Error
•Design ErrorSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
46 35Aslam, T. “A Taxonomy of Security Faults in the Unix Operating System. ”Purdue University. (1995).Severity
Symantec analysts calculate a severity score on a
scale of 1 to 10 for each new vulnerability discovery.The severity score is based on the following factors:
•Impact —This measures the relative impact on
the affected systems if the vulnerability is exploit-ed. For example, if the vulnerability enables theattacker to gain full, root access to the system,the vulnerability is classified as “high impact. ”
Vulnerabilities with a higher impact rating con-tribute to a higher severity score.
•Remote Exploitability —This measure indicates
whether or not the vulnerability can be exploitedremotely. Remotely exploitable vulnerabilitiesoccur when it is possible using at least onemethod to exploit the vulnerability from a host,distinct from the vulnerable system, via sometype of communication protocol, such as TCP/IP,IPX, or dial-up. Vulnerabilities that are remotelyexploitable contribute to a higher severity score.
•Ease of Exploitation —This measures the relative
ease with which vulnerabilities can be exploited.Vulnerabilities for which an exploit is widely available or for which an exploit is not required,contribute to a higher severity score. This metricis described in greater detail later in this section.
•Authentication Requirements —This metric indi-
cates whether the vulnerability can be exploitedonly after providing some sort of credentials tothe vulnerable system, or whether it is possible to exploit it without supplying any authenticationcredentials. Vulnerabilities that require noauthentication on the part of the attacker con-tribute to a higher severity score. After gathering information on these four attributes,
analysts use a pre-established algorithm to generatea severity score that ranges from 1 to 10. For thepurposes of this report, vulnerabilities are rated as high, moderate, or low severity based on the following scores.
Ease of Exploitation
The ease of exploitation metric indicates how easily
vulnerabilities can be exploited. The vulnerabilityanalyst assigns the ease rating after thoroughlyresearching the need for and availability of exploitsfor the vulnerability. All vulnerabilities are classifiedinto one of three possible categories, listed below.
•Exploit Available —Indicates that sophisticated
exploit code that enables the exploitation of thevulnerability is publicly available to all would-beattackers.
•No Exploit Required —Indicates that would-be
attackers can exploit the vulnerability without having to use any form of sophisticated exploitcode. In other words, the attacker does not needto create or use complex scripts or tools to exploitthe vulnerability.
•No Exploit Available —Indicates that would-be
attackers must use exploit code to make use ofthe vulnerability; however, no such exploit code ispublicly available.
In this report, the first two types of vulnerabilities are
considered “easily exploitable ” because the attacker
requires only limited sophistication to make use of it.The last type of vulnerability is considered “difficult
to exploit ” because the attacker must develop his/her
own exploit code to make use of the vulnerability.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
47Severity Level Severity Score Range
High X ≥7
Moderate 4 ≤X < 7
Low X < 4
|
1Symantec Internet Security
Threat Report
September 2003
EXECUTIVE EDITOR
Linda McCarthy
Symantec Office of the CTO
MANAGER, DEVELOPMENT
David AhmadSymantec Security Response
SENIOR THREAT ANALYST
Cori Lynn ArnoldSymantec Managed Security
Services
SENIOR MANAGER, ANALYSIS
OPERATIONS
Brian Dunphy
Symantec Managed Security
Services
SENIOR MANAGER, DEVELOPMENT
Oliver Friedrichs
Symantec Security Response
RESEARCH FELLOW
Sarah GordonSymantec Security Response
SECURITY ARCHITECT
Peter SzorSymantec Security Response
PRINCIPAL TREND ANALYST
Mike Prosser
Symantec Security Services
SENIOR DIRECTOR, DEVELOPMENT
Vincent Weafer
Symantec Security ResponseATTACK HIGHLIGHTS:
• Systems in the United States are still the
primary source of attacks
• Increased scanning of non-public services,
such as Microsoft SQL Server
• Severe events for managed security service
customers decreased 52%
• Remote execution of commands
MALICIOUS CODE HIGHLIGHTS:
• Blended threats have increased 20%• Increased threat to confidential data• Speed of propagation has increased• Linux systems may be targeted for future
attacks
• Windows 32—increased sophistication of
malicious code
• New infection vectors:
– Instant messaging – Peer-to-peer serviceVULNERABILITY HIGHLIGHTS:
• 80% of all vulnerabilities discovered are
remotely exploitable
• Web application vulnerabilities up 12%• Attacks are being released faster• Areas to watch for new vulnerabilities:
– Integer error– Timing analysis– Microsoft Internet Explorer – Microsoft IIS
CURRENT ISSUES:
• In August 2003, Blaster worm exploits
a vulnerability 26 days after it was discovered
• The cost of eight days of massive
worm attacks in August may be up toUSD$2 billion
• Corporate systems and PC home users
remain at risk
1All data analyzed in this report reflect data captured between January 1, 2003, and June 30, 2003, and are compared to data cap tured
between January 1, 2002, and June 30, 2002, unless noted otherwise.
2Computer Economics estimates the economic impact of the recent wave of outbreaks: http://www.computereconomics.com/article.cfm ?id=867Executive Summary
The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report provides a six-month update about Internet threat
activity1. It includes analysis of network-based attacks, a review of known vulnerabilities, and
highlights of malicious code. This summary of that report can alert executives to impending threats
and current trends.
With over 20,000 sensors monitoring network activity in over 180 countries, Symantec has
established one of the most comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the world, giving
Symantec's analysts a superior source of attack data from which to spot important trends. These trends educate executives about potential threats and exposures, and using the data can help them identify weaknesses in their own security architecture or policies.
In August 2003, the Win32.Blaster blended threat rapidly spread worldwide, and several other
highly severe worms followed. In only eight days the pace and frequency of these threats createdhavoc for systems administrators as well as for PC home users, with an estimated cost of damagesrunning up to $2 billion
2. This report clearly shows why some corporations were prepared and
not affected by these threats while others were unprepared. Threat Report highlights:Symantec Internet
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY2Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
0%5%10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%Figure 1
Vulnerabilities Targeted for New Attacks by Vulnerabilty Age(January 1, 2003–June 30, 2003)
Vulnerabilty Age Range0 to 6
Months6 to12
Months12 to 18
Months18 to 24
Months24 to 30
Months30 to 36
Months36 to 42
Months42 to 48
Months39%
25%
14%
10%
4% 5%
1% 1%Percentage of New Attack Targets
Source: Symantec CorporationThe Window of Time to Patch Systems is Closing
ATTACKS ARE BEING RELEASED QUICKER
Blaster used a well-known Microsoft security flaw that had been announced only 26 days before
Blaster was released. This fact supports our analysis that the time from discovery to outbreak
has shortened greatly. During the first half of 2003, our analysis shows that attackers focused on
the newer vulnerabilities; of all new attacks observed, 64% targeted vulnerabilities less than oneyear old. Furthermore, attackers focused on highly severe vulnerabilities that could cause seriousharm to corporations; we found that 66% targeted highly severe vulnerabilities. That attackersare quickly focusing on the attacks that will cause the most harm or give them the most visibility
should be a warning to executives. Corporations must enforce patch-management policies to ensure
that systems are protected from newly found flaws and must deploy adequate defenses inadvance to protect their data against new threats on the horizon.
Blended Threats
BLENDED THREATS INCREASING IN SPEED AND FREQUENCY
Blended threats, which use combinations of malicious code to begin, transmit, and spreadattacks, are increasing and are among the most important trends to watch and guard against this
year. By using multiple t echniques, blended threats can spread to large numbers of hosts, causing
rapid and widespread damage. During the first half of 2003, blended threats increased nearly20% over the last half of 2002. One blended threat alone, Slammer, disrupted systems worldwide
in less than a few hours. Slammer’s speed of propagation, combined with poor configurationmanagement on many corporate sites, enabled it to spread rapidly across the Internet and causeoutages for many corporations. Companies hit by Slammer were not harmed as badly as theymight have been, because it was designed to propagate quickly, de grade networks, and to
compromise vulnerable systems rather than cause destruction or steal confidential data.Corporations that had updated firewalls, updated patches, and virus pro tection throughout
the enterprise were prepared for this attack. Blended-Threat Targets
MICROSOFT IIS VULNERABILITIES
Microsoft IIS is one of the most widely deployed Web servers throughout the world. Symantec
has documented several high-severity vulnerabilities affecting it. Their characteristics renderthese vulnerabilities attractive targets for future blended threats. Given Microsoft IIS’s susceptibilityto past blended threats such as Code Red and Nimda, Symantec believes that it may again be hitby highly destructive malicious-code attacks.
MICROSOFT INTERNET EXPLORER VULNERABILITIES
Several vulnerabilities allow attackers to compromise client systems through Web pages containingembedded malicious code. Others can enable the easy and almost undetectable installation ofspyware, which allows attackers to extract confidential data.
THEFT OF CONFIDENTIAL DATA
The release of Bugbear and its variant Bugbear.B (discovered in early June 2003) were good
examples of theft of confidential data. Once systems were infected, confidential data was extractedsuch as file names, processes, usernames, keystrokes, and other critical system information,
and delivered to a third party, potentially compromising passwords and decryption keys.Furthermore, it appears that the creator of Bugbear specifically targeted banks.
During the first half of 2003, Symantec saw a 50% increase in confidential data attacks using
backdoors. By granting access to compromised systems, backdoors allow data to be exported to
unauthorized individuals. For example, entire sessions can be logged, and passwords for systemsand applications can be taken. Compan ies need to implement controls that make it difficult for
malicious code to steal confidential data, such as updated firewalls, patch management policies,intrusion detection, virus protection, and so on.
ATTACKERS EXECUTING COMMANDS FROM THOUSANDS OF INFECTED SYSTEMS
Once a system is compromised, an attacker can install malicious code known as a “bot” thatallows the attacker to use the system for future scanning or as a launching point for futureattacks (such as planned, dis tributed denial-of-service attacks). Once a system has become
infected, the attacker can maintain a running list of the entire botnet (network of infected
systems) by simply issuing commands through Internet Relay Channel (IRC is a common communication channel used by bots). Afterw ards, all listening bo ts (somet imes numbering
in the thousands) will execute any command issued by the attacker. Symantec examined an automated tool like this, which accounted for supposable Nimda (blended threat) traffic,
after it was captured in a Honeypot network
3.
CONCLUSION
The evidence in this report clearly shows that the risk of blended threats and attacks is rising.Understanding how to budget for security and what products and services are needed will involve
some of the most important decisions that every corporation faces in the 21st century. The
trends that we discuss in this report help ex ecutives understand some of the threats faced by
their systems administrators every day.
Symantec carefully monitors other potential threats such as the rise in peer-to-peer attacks
(including instant messaging), mass mailers (like SoBig), the general trend toward theft of
confidential information, and the rapid in crease in the number of Windows 32 (Win32) threats.
These issues and others are discussed further in each section of Symantec’s Internet Security
Threat Report , available for download at www.ses.symantec.com/ITR .
3Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
3 For details about this tool see, https://tms.symantec.com/members/AnalystReports/030627-IllpatientAnalysis.pdf4WORLD HEADQUARTERS
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Symantec, the Symantec logo, and DeepSight are U.S. registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation. Symantec AntiVirus, Symantec AntiVirus Research Automation (SARA), Symantec
Managed Security Services, and Symantec Security Response are trademarks of Symantec Corporation. Microsoft and Windows are re gistered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation.
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Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec Corporation. NO WARRANTY. The tec hnical information is being delivered to you
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Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice. 10187537SYMANTEC, THE WORLD LEADER IN INTERNET SECURITY TECHNOLOGY, PROVIDES A BROAD RANGE OF CONTENT AND NETWORK SECURITY
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FOR MORE INFORMATION, PLEASE VISIT WWW.SYMANTEC.COMSymantec Internet
Symantec Internet Security
Threat Report
Trends for January 1, 2003 – June 30, 2003ATTACK TRENDSSymantec Internet Security Threat Report ATTACK TRENDS
2EXECUTIVE EDITOR
Linda McCarthy
Symantec Office of the CTO
SENIOR THREAT ANALYST
Cori Lynn Arnold
Symantec Managed Security
Serv ices
SENIOR MANAGER, ANALYSIS
OPERATIONS
Brian Dunphy
Symantec Managed SecurityServ ices
SENIOR MANAGER,
DEVELOPMENT
Oliver Friedrichs
Symantec Security Response
PRINCIPAL TREND ANALYST
Mike Prosser
Symantec Security ServicesContents
Report Highlights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Types of Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Positive Results with Symantec Managed Security System Client Tenure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Top Ten Attacks and Network Scans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Blended Threat Targets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Increased Threat to Non-Public Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Misconfigured Proxies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Attacks Disguised as Worm Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
FTP Scans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Symantec Internet Security Threat Report ATTACK TRENDS
3Report Highlights
Overall threats remained significant during the
first half of 2003. Companies without adequatecontrols risk having their networks and applicationscompromised. This report discusses in depth somespecific findings that support this observation.
1
HIGHLIGHTS: ATTACK TRENDS
•The top ten attack sources account for nearly
80% of all attack activity
•Systems in the United States are still a primary
source of attacks
•Increased scanning of non-public services, such
as Microsoft SQL Server
•Network-based attacks were 19% higher
•The severe event incidence rate declined by 52%
among managed security service customers
•11% of companies suffered from at least one
severe event, down from 23% in 2002
•M ost attacks occurred between 1 p.m. and
10 p.m. GMT (from 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. EST)
•Remote execution of commandsTypes of Attacks
OVERVIEW
Attack trends noted here are based on data
from two sources: Symantec DeepSight ThreatManagement System and Symantec ManagedSecurity Services. This first section of the report provides insights into major trends in actual attackactivity based on statistical analysis of real-timeattacks. With the ability to select data from 20,000sensors in over 180 countries around the world, the sample size has doubled over the previous six-month period. (See The Threat Report Methodology
document for the methodology used.)
The statistics presented in this section, with the
exception of the top ten attacks and scans, excludeactivity associated with major worms and blendedthreats, such as SQL Slammer, Code Red, andNimda.
2This was done because a small number of
worms and blended threats accounted for the vastmajority of attack activity (78% during this timeperiod). Filtering out this type of activity enablesSymantec to identify underlying, important attacktrends that would otherwise be obscured or com-pletely hidden by the sheer volume of activity frommajor worms and blended threats.
This section highlights:•Attack sources by location
•Attacks by day of the week
•Attacks by time of day
•Severity of attacks
•Top ten attack typesSymantec Internet Security Threat Report ATTACK TRENDS
41All data analyzed in this report were captured between January 1, 2003, and June 30, 2003, and are compared with data captured between January 1, 2002, and
June 30, 2002, unless noted otherwise.
2The top ten attacks and scans include worm and blended threat activity in order to show what systems administrators are seeing every day. Unless otherwise
stated, all other statistics presented in the attack section exclude worms and blended threats. Worms and blended threats are c overed in detail under the
Malicious Code section of this report.ATTACK SOURCES
Top Ten Attack Sources
Symantec’s analysis of the origins of attacks showed
that 80% of all attacks were launched from systemslocated in just 10 countries. As noted in pastreports, systems in the United States were the mainsource of attack, and in the first half of 2003, 51%of all attacks were launched from systems locatedwithin the United States. The top ten countriesidentified as attack sources were virtually the sameas those reported in the same six-month period of2002. The only exception was the Netherlands,which replaced Taiwan (even though the data setnow includes the Symantec DeepSight ThreatManagement System data). See Figure 1 .
It is simple to trace an attack back to the last IP
address from which the attack was launched, butthis location is seldom the attacker’s own system.Attackers normally hop through multiple unsecuredsystems or use previously compromised systems to hide their location prior to launching the actualattack. For example, an attacker in China couldlaunch an attack from a compromised system located in South Korea against a corporate Webserver in New York.Top Ten Attack Sources per Internet Capita
In addition to identifying the top ten attack sources
in terms of overall volume, Symantec analyzedattacks by country in relation to the number ofInternet users within each country. This metric is intended to identify geographic locations with relatively high concentrations of attacking systems.For example, a country such as Israel does not
show a high overall volume of attack activity mainlybecause the country has a small Internet user base.But when attacks from Israel are expressed on a per–Internet user basis, it becomes clear that thiscountry consistently shows a high “concentration”of attacking systems relative to the size of itsInternet user base.
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report ATTACK TRENDS
5United States
ChinaGermanySouth KoreaCanadaFranceGreat BritainNetherlandsJapanItalyCountry
1
23456789
10Rank
51%
5%5%4%4%3%2%2%2%2%Percent of TotalFigure 1:
Top Ten Attack Sources
Six Months Ending June 2003
Source: Symantec CorporationFigures 2 and 3show the top attack sources per
10,000 Internet users in two different classes. Thefirst includes countries with more than 1 millionInternet users; this group represents countries with a relatively large, developed Internet infra-structure. The second includes countries with
between 100,000 and 1 million Internet users; this group represents countries with smaller andless-developed Internet infrastructures. Countrieswith fewer than 100,000 Internet users wereexcluded from this analysis.
ATTACKS BY DAY OF WEEK
Symantec has noted in past reports that certain
hours of the day and days of the week are more or less prone to attack activity. During the first half of 2003, Symantec noted decreased attack activityon weekends, echoing the trends of past reports.Although only 20% of attackers were active overthe weekend, possibly taking advantage of reduced support staff and the less likelihood of detection,this reinforces the need for continuous securitymonitoring.Symantec also compared attack activity related to
worm propagation versus all other attack activity.While worms don’t care what day of the week it is,there are many other factors that affect their propa-gation rate, for example, the number of computersturned on. As a result, attacks associated withworm propagation are not perfectly distributedacross the week, and there is a minor dip in activityover the weekend (though much less of a dip com-pared with non-worm attack activity). Figure 4
shows the percentage of worm and non-wormattackers detected by day of week during the firsthalf of 2003.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report ATTACK TRENDS
6Israel
United StatesBelgiumNew ZealandCanadaChileFranceNetherlandsNorwayMexicoCountry
1
23456789
10RankFigure 2: Top Ten Attack Sources per Internet Capita
Countries with Greater than 1 Million UsersSix Months Ending June 2003
Source: Symantec CorporationPeru
IranKuwaitUnited Arab EmiratesNigeriaSaudi ArabiaCroatiaVietnamEgyptRomaniaCountry
1
23456789
10RankFigure 3: Top Ten Attack Countries per Internet Capita
Countries with between 100,000 and 1 Million Internet UsersSix Months Ending June 2003
Source: Symantec CorporationATTACKS BY TIME OF DAY
Attack activity for the entire Internet community
consistently peaks at predictable times during the day. For all Internet-connected organizations(regardless of geographic location), attack activityagainst a target peaks between 1:00 p.m. GMT and10:00 p.m. GMT.
3
Since attacks originate globally, an individual organization’s normal work hours will not correlatedirectly with the peak attack activity. However,depending on the location of the organization, the local time for this peak attack activity will vary.For example, a corporate network in Washington,
D.C., will see peak activity between the hours of
8:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. EST. However, an organiza-tion in Tokyo, Japan, will see peak activity betweenthe hours of 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. the next day. Without effective detection and monitoring in con-
junction with strong security awareness programsand policies, such attacks would be a challenge tonotice at any hour of the day or night.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report ATTACK TRENDS
73The Greenwich Meridian (Prime Meridian or Longitude Zero degrees) marks the starting point of every time zone in the world. GMT is the average (mean)
time it takes the earth to make a complete rotation. GMT has been measured from Greenwich, England, since 1884 (http://greenwic h2000.com/). 0%4%6%
2%8%10%12%14%16%18%
Day of WeekMonday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday SundayPercent of All Attackers
Non-Worm Activity
Worm Activity
Source: Symantec CorporationFigure 4: Attacker Activity by Day of Week
(January 1, 2003 – June 30, 2003)Symantec Internet Security Threat Report ATTACK TRENDS
8INTERNET ATTACKS PER COMPANY
The overall rate of attack activity during the past six
months was 19% higher than the rate for the samesix-month period in 2002. On average, companiesexperienced approximately 38 attacks per companyper week, as compared with 32 attacks per compa-ny per week during the same six-month period in
2002.
4Figure 5 illustrates this trend.
Despite the rise in attack volume, Symantec saw a
decline in the number of severe debilitating attacks. SEVERITY OF ATTACKS
Sharp Decline in Severe-Event Incidence
On average, companies were substantially less
likely to experience a severe event during the pastsix months, as compared with the prior six-monthperiod.
5Only 11% of companies suffered from one
or more severe events during the first six months of 2003, versus 23% during the same period in2002. Figure 6 shows the reduction of severe event
incidence rates in the last year. While it is difficultto isolate the cause of this trend, Symantec believesit reflects the overall strengthening of the securitypolicies among customers.
2930313233343536373839
6 Months Ending June 200232
6 Months Ending June 200338
Six-Month PeriodAttacks per Company
Source: Symantec CorporationFigure 5 : Attacks per Company per Week
(First Six Months of 2002 vs. First Six Months of 2003)
0%10%20%30%
Six-Month Period23%
11%Severe Event Incidence
Source: Symantec CorporationJan – June 2002 Jan – June 2003Figure 6 : Severe Event Incidence by Six-Month Period
4Total number of attacks came from Managed Security Service data.
5Only companies that subscribe to the Symantec Managed Security Service were evaluated in terms of event severity. This is becau se attacks detected by the DeepSight
Threat Management systems are not currently classified according to severity. For more details on event severity, see Appendix A. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report ATTACK TRENDS
9Prevalence of Non-Severe Events
More than 99% of all events detected by Symantec
during the first six months of 2003 were classifiedas non-severe and did not represent an immediatethreat to the companies in the sample set. It isprobable that this type of “noise” constitutes thevast majority of attacks detected by companies
throughout the Internet, which explains why com-panies often experience such difficulty isolating“real threats” from the vast amounts of attack data.
Positive Results with Symantec Managed
Security Service Client Tenure
Symantec uses a metric, called client tenure, to
assess how the effectiveness of a company’s attackdefenses evolve as Symantec drives improvementsto their security posture over time. In the past, thismetric revealed that companies with greater tenureas security monitoring clients were less likely to suffer severe events. The hypothesis was thattenured clients tended to have stronger securitypostures, which made severe events less likely. For this issue of the Threat Report, Symantec retested
this hypothesis, and the results suggest that thetrend has continued. The one difference, however, isthe level of tenure at which severe event incidencedrops. During the first half of 2003, companies withless than six months of tenure were nearly twice aslikely to suffer a severe event as companies withgreater than six months of tenure. In the previousreport, the likelihood of suffering a severe eventdropped sharply at the 12-month point. Figure 7
shows the severe event incidence rates by clienttenure.0%5%10%15%20%25%
Months of Tenure1–3
Months4–6
Months7–9
Months10–12
Months13–15
Months16–18
Months19+
Months20%
19 %
10%
9%12 % 12 %
11 %Severe Event Incidence
Source: Symantec CorporationFigure 7: Severe Event Incidence by Client Tenure
(January 1, 2003 – June 30, 2003)Top Ten Attacks and Network Scans
In past reports, Symantec analyzed the top 10
network scans launched against companies in orderto provide a better understanding of the types ofservices attackers most often seek to exploit. Forthe current issue of the Threat Report, Symantec
repeated this investigation and added our analysisof the top 10 attacks. This new measurementreveals the specific attacks that were most com-monly detected against companies. In sum, the top10 scans can be thought of as a measurement ofreconnaissance activity, while the top 10 attacksmeasure the specific attacks that are actually
launched. Figures 8 and 9list the top 10 attacks
and the top 10 scans (worm and blended threatattacks were included in this analysis).
While the top ten scans measure reconnaissance
activity, they do not correlate to the top ten attacks.Most of the attacks detected for the first half of2003 were associated with worm activity ( Figure 8 ).Symantec Internet Security Threat Report ATTACK TRENDS
10 Microsoft SQL Server 2000 Resolution Service Stack Overflow Attack
Microsoft Indexing Server/Indexing Services ISAPI Buffer Overflow Attack Muhammad A. Muquit Count.cgi Attack Generic HTTP Directory Traversal Attack Generic WebDAV/Source disclosure “Translate: f” HTTP Header Request Attack Microsoft IIS Escaped Character Parsing Attack SMB-NETBIOS Default Administrative Share Attack Microsoft IIS/PWS Escaped Characters Decoding Command Execution Attack Microsoft FrontPage Sensitive Page Attack Microsoft IIS 4.0/5.0 Extended UNICODE Directory Traversal AttackSignature
1
23456789
10Rank
27%
17%
6% 3% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 1%Percent of All
AttacksFigure 8: Top Ten Attack Types
(January 1, 2003 – June 30, 2003)
Source: Symantec Corporation
Common Internet File System (CIFS)
NetBIOS Name ServiceMicrosoft SQL Monitor HTTP FTP Microsoft SQL Server17300/tcpHTTPS NetBIOS Session Service NetBIOS RPC 445/tcp
137/udp
1434/udp
80/tcp21/tcp
1433/tcp
17300/tcp
443/tcp139/tcp135/tcp24%
16%11%10%
6%6%4%4%4%2%Scan Type Port
1
23456789
10Rank Percent of All AttacksFigure 9: Top Ten Network Scans
(January 1, 2003 – June 30, 2003)
Source: Symantec CorporationBlended Threat Targets
A total of 51% of all network scans targeted the top
three services. When compared to the same timeperiod last year, these same three services accountedfor only 2% of network scans. For example, prior to
Slammer, scanning activity related to Microsoft SQLMonitor (1434/udp) was almost non-existent. Thisshows that a worm can easily turn an obscure vulner-ability into the number one attack within minutes.
Systems administrators must be aware of a sudden
shift or increase in activity over ports. Knowing thata possible attack is on the horizon can make the dif-ference between being attacked or being prepared
to adequately defend against an attack. To guardagainst attacks, systems administrators can benefitfrom early warning and intrusion detection for bothknown and unknown attacks.
7
Increased Threat to Non-Public Services
Out of the top scanned ports, only three servicesare commonly made available as public services:FTP, HTTP, and HTTPS. Of these three services,
only HTTPS was scanned at a much higher rate than during the same time period last year. Most of the top ten scans targeted non-public servicessuch as Microsoft SQL Server and file sharing (services that are commonly available on both home computers and internal corporate networks).When non-public services are exploited, the numberof potential victims is substantially higher than insystems that only host public services. Althoughcompanies do not typically allow these non-publicservices to enter their networks directly from theInternet, internal systems are still at risk because of unsecured and unpatched laptops and homecomputers connecting via VPNs. This trend rein-forces the importance of extending security policies
and controls beyond public-facing systems.
Misconfigured Proxies
During this time period, three common proxy services were routinely targeted: SOCKS, Alt SOCKS,and Squid. A proxy server acts as an intermediary between
a private network and the Internet. To increase performance, many proxy servers cache Web con-tent. Misconfigured proxy servers are frequentlyused by spammers to relay anonymous unsolicitedemail and may also allow an attacker to gain unauthorized access to networks. Many unsophisti-cated home computer users are setting up proxyservers to share a single cable modem or DSL linewith multiple home computers. This increases therisk of unauthorized use and access.
Attacks Disguised as Worm Activity
Most of the top-ranking attacks were attributed
to blended threats (such as Nimda and Code Red).Once released these worms continue to thrive onvulnerable networks long after their first appear-ance. Attackers often use the same vulnerabilitiesas worms to build large networks of compromisedsystems. By blending in with worm activity, attackerscan go unnoticed by systems administrators.
An area of concern is that once a system is compro-
mised, an attacker can install malicious code knownas a bot that allows the attacker to use the systemfor future scanning or as a launching point for
future attacks (such as planned distributed denial-of-service attacks). A bot (short for robot) is a smallapplication that serves as an agent for another pro-gram or user. There are good (legal) bots such asWeb crawlers or bad bots that are installed without
the user’s knowledge. These bad bots, or “zombies”as they are sometimes called, will listen on a desig-nated port for commands from their master.
One common communication channel often used
by bots is Internet Relay Chat (IRC). By having eachindividual bot connected to an IRC server once asystem has become infected, the attacker can main-tain a running list of the entire botnet by simplyissuing commands through IRC. Then all listeningbots (sometimes numbering in the thousands) will execute any command issued by the attacker.Symantec examined an automated tool like this,which accounted for supposable Nimda (blendedthreat) traffic after it was captured in a Honeypotnetwork.
8 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report ATTACK TRENDS
117Unknown attacks are often referred to as zero-day attacks. Threats at this point in their life cycles are also called zero-day attacks. Because they are
not publicly known, they are not yet reflected in detection signatures and can sidestep existing defenses.
8For details about this tool see, https://tms.symantec.com/members/AnalystReports/030627-IllpatientAnalysis.pdfFTP Scans
Although FTP scans decreased from the same time
period last year, systems administrators should notlet down their guard. While FTP servers were notaffected by blended threat activity (the only servicein the top ten list not affected), unauthorized individuals continue to exploit misconfigured FTPservers with writable directories to share a varietyof copyrighted content (such as movies, music, soft-ware, and pornography). Systems administratorsshould test their FTP servers to ensure that they are configured correctly. Routine testing for mis-configured systems can help ensure that systemsare secure and have not been compromised.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report ATTACK TRENDS
12Glossary
Blended Threat
Blended threats combine the characteristics of
viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and malicious codewith server and Internet vulnerabilities to initiate,transmit, and spread an attack. By using multiplemethods and techniques, blended threats can rapidly spread and cause widespread damage.
Buffer Overflow
A “buffer overflow” is a type of programmatic
flaw that is due to a programmer allowing for anunbounded operation on data. Buffer overflow conditions commonly occur during memory copyoperations. In these cases, a lack of bounds check-ing can allow for memory to be written beyond thebuffer, corrupting potentially sensitive values inadjacent memory. Buffer overflow conditions havetypically been exploited to hijack program execution
flow (i.e., execute arbitrary instructions) by over-writing activation records in stack memory. Bufferoverflows in the heap have also proven exploitable,allowing for attackers to have their own instructionsexecuted in the process space of the affected program.
Class A Network
A Class A network is the largest IP address class
of the three public use “classes” (Class A, Class B,and Class C) in the IP address space. There are 127Class A networks with each supporting around 16million hosts or individual IP addresses. ClasslessInter-Domain Routing (CIDR) is an updated address-ing scheme that provides more effective use of IPaddresses than the old Class A, B, and C scheme.You will now see Class A networks called a /8 (slash
eight) network, so called for the 8-bit network prefixassigned under CIDR.Exploit
A program or technique that takes advantage of a
vulnerability in software and that can be used forbreaking security or otherwise attacking a host.
Infection Vector
The method in which malicious code gains access
to a computer system. The most common infectionvector today is email. Other vectors of infectioninclude floppy disks, vulnerabilities in software,peer-to-peer software, and instant messaging.
Integer Error
Integer errors are a type of programmatic flaw
caused by a failure to properly handle variables of the integer data type. Integer errors can result in unexpected/unanticipated behavior in affectedprograms and can sometimes allow attackers tohijack the execution flow of the affected program.
Malicious Payload
Typically referred to as “Payload” because
“mali-
cious” is a major part of the definition. Maliciousactivities performed by a threat in addition to the self-replication routine of a virus. The majorityof viruses do not contain a payload, but simplyreplicate. Payloads include denial-of-service attacks,destruction or modification of data, changes to system settings, and information disclosure.
Mass Mailer
A threat that self-replicates by sending itself out by
email. Typically, the threat obtains email addressesby searching for email addresses in files on the system or responding to messages found in theemail client inbox.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report ATTACK TRENDS
13Symantec Internet Security Threat Report ATTACK TRENDS
14Netblock
A netblock is the “block” of IP addresses that have
been assigned to a network. The network may beassigned an entire address range, e.g., a Class Cnetwork that would have a maximum of 256 IPaddresses. Individual IP addresses can be assignedfrom within the netblock, or it can be segregatedinto smaller “subnets” within that overall netblockfor use.
Remotely Exploitable
Remotely exploitable vulnerabilities are those which
can be exploited by attackers across a network. Forexample, vulnerabilities in Web servers that can beexploited by Web clients are remotely exploitablevulnerabilities.
Side-Channel Attack
An attack that typically targets a weakness in the
implementation of a system rather than its design.Errors in implementations of systems can cause a leak of important information in the timing of specific events. By observing the amounts of timethat a system takes to perform certain behavior,attackers can sometimes obtain or infer valuableinformation. For example, knowledge of crucial timing information can possibly allow an attacker to compromise SSL/TLS sessions. Other reportedtiming-analysis attacks allowed attackers to guessvalid usernames or determine the existence of
confidential files. To a sophisticated attacker, timing-analysis and side-channel vulnerabilitiesoffer powerful new methods to penetrate highlysecure systems.Virus
A self-replicating computer program.
Vulnerability
A security vulnerability is a coding error within
a software system that can cause it to function outside of its documented design, violating its documented security policy. A vulnerability can be fixed with a patch or update.
Worm
A program that makes copies of itself on the net-
work; for example, from one network disk drive toanother, or by copying itself using email or anothertransport mechanism. Symantec, the Symantec logo, and DeepSight are U.S. registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation. Symantec AntiVirus, Symantec AntiVirus Research Automation (SARA), Symantec
Managed Security Services, and Symantec Security Response are trademarks of Symantec Corporation. Microsoft and Windows are reg istered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation.
Other brands and products are trademarks of their respective holder/s. Copyright © 2003 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserv ed. Any technical information that is made available by
Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec Corporation. NO WARRANTY. The tec hnical information is being delivered to you
AS-IS and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its accuracy or use. Any use of the technical documentation or the infor mation contained herein is at the risk of the user.
Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice. 10187538SYMANTEC, THE WORLD LEADER IN INTERNET SECURITY TECHNOLOGY, PROVIDES A BROAD RANGE OF CONTENT AND NETWORK SECURITY
SOFTWARE AND APPLIANCE SOLUTIONS TO INDIVIDUALS, ENTERPRISES AND SERVICE PROVIDERS. THE COMPANY IS A LEADING PROVIDEROF CLIENT, GATEWAY AND SERVER SECURITY SOLUTIONS FOR VIRUS PROTECTION, FIREWALL AND VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORK, VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT, INTRUSION DETECTION, INTERNET CONTENT AND EMAIL FILTERING, AND REMOTE MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGIES AND SECURITY SERVICES TO ENTERPRISES AND SERVICE PROVIDERS AROUND THE WORLD. SYMANTEC'S NORTON BRAND OFCONSUMER SECURITY PRODUCTS IS A LEADER IN WORLDWIDE RETAIL SALES AND INDUSTRY AWARDS. HEADQUARTERED IN CUPERTINO,
CALIF., SYMANTEC HAS WORLDWIDE OPERATIONS IN 36 COUNTRIES.
FOR MORE INFORMATION, PLEASE VISIT WWW.SYMANTEC.COM
WORLD HEADQUARTERS
20330 Stevens Creek Blvd.
Cupertino, CA 95014 U .S.A.408.517.8000800.721.3934
www .symantec.comFor Product Information
In the U.S., call toll-free
800-745-6054.
Symantec has worldwide operations
in 36 countries. For specific countryoffices and contact numbers pleasevisit our Web site.Symantec Internet Security
Symantec Internet Security
Threat Report
Trends for January 1, 2003 – June 30, 2003VULNERABILITY TRENDSSymantec Internet Security Threat Report VULNERABILITY TRENDS
2EXECUTIVE EDITOR
Linda McCarthy
Symantec Office of the CTO
MANAGER, DEVELOPMENT
David Ahmad
Symantec Security ResponseContents
Report Highlights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Vulnerability Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Vulnerability Preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10Symantec Internet Security Threat Report VULNERABILITY TRENDS
3Report Highlights
Overall threats remained significant during the
first half of 2003. Companies without adequatecontrols risk having their networks and applicationscompromised. This report discusses in depth somespecific findings that support this observation.
1
HIGHLIGHTS: VULNERABILITY TRENDS
•80% of all vulnerabilities are exploited remotely
•W eb application vulnerabilities are up 12%
•New vulnerabilities with a high severity rating
are being exploited faster
•Areas to watch for new vulnerabilities:
–Integer errors—introduced in routine
programming
–Timing analysis—subtle weaknesses that
may compromise cryptosystems
–Microsoft Internet Explorer—widespread
client systems continue to be affected by serious vulnerabilities
–Microsoft IIS—susceptible to blended threatsVulnerability Discovery
OVERVIEW
As attackers persist in finding new vulnerabilities,
the risk to the Internet community continues tointensify. Unfortunately, just a single vulnerabilityopens the door to a successful attack. Systemsthought to be secure are left vulnerable unlessproper controls are in place to fix new found flaws. To address these issues, organizations needproactive, early warning systems that alert IT organ-izations to new vulnerabilities and active attacks.
This section describes major trends seen during the
first half of 2003.
This section highlights:•Severity of vulnerabilities
•Ease of exploitation
•Attack prioritization
•Globalization
•Trends in vulnerabilitiesSymantec Internet Security Threat Report VULNERABILITY TRENDS
41All data analyzed in this report were captured between January 1, 2003, and June 30, 2003, and are compared with data captured between January 1, 2002, and
June 30, 2002, unless noted otherwise.GENERAL TRENDS
Overall Volume
For the six-month period ending June 30, 2003,
Symantec documented 1,432 new vulnerabilities, a 12% increase over the number found in the sameperiod the previous year (Figure 1) .
The rate of discovery for new vulnerabilities
continues to escalate—albeit at a slower rate thanin the previous six months. In the February 2003Threat Report, Symantec observed an 82% increase
in new vulnerability discoveries for 2002 compared with 2001. The high rate of growth resulted from aconvergence of several trends, such as increasedmedia exposure for vulnerabilities, gatheringmomentum of the responsible-disclosure,
2and a
dramatic rise in Web vulnerabilities. Symantec seesthese trends continuing to drive new discoveries in2003, but their influence is simply less pronouncedthan during the same time period in 2002. As oftoday potential attackers are aware of 8,000 vulner-abilities affecting over 4,000 different technologyproducts. This is why it is critical for enterprisesthat need to ensure the continuity of their opera-tions to be protected are protected. SEVERITY OF VULNERABILITIES
For the first six months of 2003, moderate- and
high-severity vulnerabilities were the most common.The number of new moderately severe vulnerabili-ties increased 21% and high severity vulnerabilitiesincreased 6% as compared with the same period in 2002, while the volume of low-severity vulnera-bilities actually decreased by 11% (Figure 2) .
This trend was first identified in the February
2003 Threat Report and is driven by the following:
Remote Exploitability —80% of vulnerabilities
discovered in the first half of 2003 can be exploited remotely. Since global access is a mandate in today’s business environment, com-panies have created numerous Internet-enabledapplications. Because of the severity of attacks that can occur across the network, Symantec ratesthe severity of remotely exploitable vulnerabilitiesbetween moderate and high. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report VULNERABILITY TRENDS
52Responsible-Disclosure refers to a policy of working with the vendor to ensure that patches are made available before or at the same time as the
announcement of the vulnerability. Adherents to responsible disclosure do not typically publish any exploit code.1,1501,2001,2501,3001,3501400,1,450Figure 1: Vulnerability Volume by Six-Month Period
(6 Months Ending June 2002 vs. 6 Months Ending June 2003)
Period I
(Jan 1, 2002 – June 30, 2002)1,276
Period II
(Jan 1, 2003 – June 30, 2003)1,432
Six-Month Period Source: Symantec CorporationTotal Documented VulnerabilitiesResearcher Interest —The relative “news-
worthiness” of severe vulnerabilities contributes to the rise in severity. Symantec is constantly monitoring the work of vulnerability researchers,who appear to have shown a decrease in interest invulnerabilities that pose little threat. The seemingdecline in low-severity vulnerabilities may simplyreflect the reluctance of researchers to announcetheir existence when they are found.
EASE OF EXPLOITATION
Vulnerabilities found during the first half of 2003
tended to be easier to exploit than those discoveredduring the first half of 2002.
Symantec documented a rise in vulnerabilities that
do not require an exploit, as well as a rise in thosefor which exploits are publicly available (Figure 3) .Symantec Internet Security Threat Report VULNERABILITY TRENDS
6-15%-10%-5%0%5%10%15%20%25%Figure 2: Percent Increase/Decrease in New Vulnerabilities by Severity
21%
6%
-11%
Vulnerability SeverityPercent Increase/Decrease
High Moderate Low
Source: Symantec CorporationThe increased ease of exploitation contrasts
with observations made during the second half of 2002, when Symantec reported vulnerabilitieswere harder to exploit. Symantec’s analysis deter-mined this change might result in part from the following factors:
Globalization of Vulnerability Research —
Over the past six months, Symantec has noted a dramatic rise in the number of exploits discoveredby researchers from outside North America andWestern Europe. Unfortunately, many independent
vulnerability researchers (particularly those fromAsia, Latin America, and Eastern Europe), becauseof language constraints or an unfamiliarity with concepts of responsible disclosure, do not com-municate security issues to vendors. Symantec recognizes that the globalization of vulnerabilityresearch will potentially increase the developmentof exploit code.Continued Increase of Web Application
Vulnerabilities —As mentioned earlier, Symantec
has documented a 12% increase since 2002 in the discovery of vulnerabilities in Web applications,(678 in the first half of 2003). These are particularlydangerous because attackers need only modestskills, as these vulnerabilities are derived frominput validation or configuration errors. Since noexploit is often required, attacks become easier and the danger to the enterprise rises. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report VULNERABILITY TRENDS
70%10%20%30%40%50%60%Figure 3: Percent of Vulnerabilities by Ease of Exploitation
(6 Months Ending June 2002 vs. 6 Months Ending June 2003)
Exploit Available13%17%39%
30%48%54%
No Exploit Available No Exploit Required
Vulnerability Cate gorizationPercentage of All VulnerabilitiesPeriod I (Jan 1, 2002 – June 30, 2002)
Period II (Jan 1, 2003 – June 30, 2003)
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report VULNERABILITY TRENDS
8Vulnerability Preferences
Symantec analyzed attacker vulnerability
preferences for the first time in this issue of theThreat Report, by evaluating the characteristics of
vulnerabilities that were targeted by new attacksfound in the first half of 2003. Understanding the
preferences of adversaries is important to assess-ing the relative risks created by different types of vulnerabilities. Security administrators must askthemselves several questions in order to prioritize vulnerabilities and their organization’s risk. Forinstance, which systems are at the most risk basedon the exploits in existence? Are attackers targetingnew or old vulnerabilities? Are they targeting high-or low-severity ones? Or are they selecting vulnera-bilities at random? Symantec has answered thesequestions based on the analysis of data generatedby our vulnerability database.
Analysis shows that attackers focused on the newer
vulnerabilities during the first half of 2003. Of allnew attacks observed, 64% targeted vulnerabilitiesless than one year old (Figure 4) . Attackers have also been focusing on vulnerabilities
with a higher severity rating that were relativelyeasy to exploit—an explosive combination designedto have high impact and damage potential. Of allnew attacks documented in the first half of 2003,66% targeted highly severe vulnerabilities and 79%focused on those that either had an exploit or did
not require one.
Attackers who are sophisticated enough to develop
new attacks are attracted by the newest, mostexciting vulnerabilities. Security teams must therefore be proactive in taking steps to patch newvulnerabilities, and must set priorities to addressexisting vulnerabilities based on severity.
0%5%10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%Figure 4: Vulnerabilities Targeted for New Attacks by Vulnerabilty Age
(January 1, 2003 – June 30, 2003)
Vulnerabilty Age Range0–6
Months6–12
Months12–18
Months18–24
Months24–30
Months30–36
Months36–42
Months42–48
Months39%
25%
14%
10%
4% 5%
1% 1%Percentage of New Attack Targets
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report VULNERABILITY TRENDS
9TRENDS IN VULNERABILITIES
Integer-Error Vulnerabilities
Apache, Sendmail, and OpenSSH have all been
affected by vulnerabilities introduced by errors inthe handling of integers. In the first half of 2003,Symantec analysts saw an increase in the numberof vulnerabilities due to integer errors, a relativelysimple type of programming flaw often made bydevelopers. Symantec documented 19 integer-error vulnerabilities during the first half of 2003, as compared to only 3 in the first half of 2002.Since vulnerabilities based on integer errors haveonly recently emerged, many programmers may notcheck their code for this type of error before releas-ing product. As a result, many applications, rangingfrom manufacturing to games, may silently housesuch vulnerabilities without the knowledge of theirdevelopers.
The sharp rise in integer-error vulnerabilities poses
a significant future threat to medium and largeorganizations due to the prevalence of such errorsand their high severity ratings.
Symantec’s analysis of integer-error vulnerabilities
shows that unforeseen behavior can be introducedin affected programs. For example, an integer overflow may result in an incorrect calculation that could lead to a buffer overflow. Errors in thecomparison of integers can result in the bypass ofcrucial security checks. Many such errors have cre-ated disastrous consequences within organizations.
TIMING ANALYSIS AND SIDE-CHANNEL
VULNERABILITIES
Symantec analysts saw timing-analysis vulnerabili-
ties, a relatively rare type, suddenly increase innumber during the first half of 2003. The suddenappearance of these vulnerabilities coincided withthe release of two papers discussing timing-analysisattacks against implementations of SSL/TLS.Although these weaknesses are still uncommon(Symantec documented only four in the first half of2003), their high severity makes them a noteworthyfuture concern.Timing analysis is a side-channel attack that
typically targets a weakness in the implementation
of a system rather than its design. Errors in systemimplementations may cause a leak of importantinformation in the timing of specific events. Bymeasuring the length of time that a system takes toperform certain functions, attackers can sometimesobtain or infer valuable information. For example,timing-analysis attacks have allowed attackers toguess valid usernames or determine the existenceof confidential files. To a sophisticated attacker,timing-analysis and side-channel vulnerabilitiesoffer powerful new methods to penetrate highlysecure systems.
Microsoft Internet Explorer Vulnerabilities
During the first half of 2003, Symantec documented
more than a dozen new vulnerabilities affecting various versions of Microsoft® Internet Explorer.
More important than the sheer volume of these vulnerabilities is their potential impact. Severalenable attackers to compromise client systemsthrough Web pages containing embedded maliciouscode. Others can enable the easy (and virtually
undetectable) installation of spyware.
The high market penetration of Microsoft Internet
Explorer, combined with the emergence of manyhigh-severity vulnerabilities, renders it increasinglyprone to attack. Vulnerable Internet Explorer applications could easily become effective tools tolaunch distributed denial-of-service attacks, installnew Trojan horse and spyware applications, and disperse blended threats.
Microsoft IIS Vulnerabilities
Microsoft IIS is one of the most widely deployed
Web servers throughout the world. Symantec has
documented several high-severity vulnerabilitiesduring the first half of 2003 (in addition to manyfound in the second half of 2002). At least a few of
these have characteristics that render them veryattractive targets for future blended threats. GivenMicrosoft IIS’s susceptibility to past blended threatssuch as Code Red and Nimda, Symantec believesthat this application may again be the target of ahighly destructive malicious code. Glossary
Blended Threat
Blended threats combine the characteristics of
viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and malicious codewith server and Internet vulnerabilities to initiate,transmit, and spread an attack. By using multiplemethods and techniques, blended threats can rapidly spread and cause widespread damage.
Buffer Overflow
A “buffer overflow” is a type of programmatic
flaw that is due to a programmer allowing for anunbounded operation on data. Buffer overflow conditions commonly occur during memory copyoperations. In these cases, a lack of bounds check-ing can allow for memory to be written beyond thebuffer, corrupting potentially sensitive values inadjacent memory. Buffer overflow conditions havetypically been exploited to hijack program execution
flow (i.e., execute arbitrary instructions) by over-writing activation records in stack memory. Bufferoverflows in the heap have also proven exploitable,allowing for attackers to have their own instructionsexecuted in the process space of the affected program.
Class A Network
A Class A network is the largest IP address class
of the three public use “classes” (Class A, Class B,and Class C) in the IP address space. There are 127Class A networks with each supporting around 16million hosts or individual IP addresses. ClasslessInter-Domain Routing (CIDR) is an updated address-ing scheme that provides more effective use of IPaddresses than the old Class A, B, and C scheme.You will now see Class A networks called a /8 (slash
eight) network, so called for the 8-bit network prefixassigned under CIDR.Exploit
A program or technique that takes advantage of a
vulnerability in software and that can be used forbreaking security or otherwise attacking a host.
Infection Vector
The method in which malicious code gains access
to a computer system. The most common infectionvector today is email. Other vectors of infectioninclude floppy disks, vulnerabilities in software,peer-to-peer software, and instant messaging.
Integer Error
Integer errors are a type of programmatic flaw
caused by a failure to properly handle variables of the integer data type. Integer errors can result in unexpected/unanticipated behavior in affectedprograms and can sometimes allow attackers tohijack the execution flow of the affected program.
Malicious Payload
Typically referred to as “Payload” because
“mali-
cious” is a major part of the definition. Maliciousactivities performed by a threat in addition to the self-replication routine of a virus. The majorityof viruses do not contain a payload, but simplyreplicate. Payloads include denial-of-service attacks,destruction or modification of data, changes to system settings, and information disclosure.
Mass Mailer
A threat that self-replicates by sending itself out by
email. Typically, the threat obtains email addressesby searching for email addresses in files on the system or responding to messages found in theemail client inbox.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report VULNERABILITY TRENDS
10Netblock
A netblock is the “block” of IP addresses that have
been assigned to a network. The network may beassigned an entire address range, e.g., a Class Cnetwork that would have a maximum of 256 IPaddresses. Individual IP addresses can be assignedfrom within the netblock, or it can be segregatedinto smaller “subnets” within that overall netblockfor use.
Remotely Exploitable
Remotely exploitable vulnerabilities are those which
can be exploited by attackers across a network. Forexample, vulnerabilities in Web servers that can beexploited by Web clients are remotely exploitablevulnerabilities.
Side-Channel Attack
An attack that typically targets a weakness in the
implementation of a system rather than its design.Errors in implementations of systems can cause a leak of important information in the timing of specific events. By observing the amounts of timethat a system takes to perform certain behavior,attackers can sometimes obtain or infer valuableinformation. For example, knowledge of crucial timing information can possibly allow an attacker to compromise SSL/TLS sessions. Other reportedtiming-analysis attacks allowed attackers to guessvalid usernames or determine the existence of
confidential files. To a sophisticated attacker, timing-analysis and side-channel vulnerabilitiesoffer powerful new methods to penetrate highlysecure systems.Virus
A self-replicating computer program.
Vulnerability
A security vulnerability is a coding error within
a software system that can cause it to function outside of its documented design, violating its documented security policy. A vulnerability can be fixed with a patch or update.
Worm
A program that makes copies of itself on the net-
work; for example, from one network disk drive toanother, or by copying itself using email or anothertransport mechanism.
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report VULNERABILITY TRENDS
11Symantec, the Symantec logo, and DeepSight are U.S. registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation. Symantec AntiVirus, Symantec AntiVirus Research Automation (SARA), Symantec
Managed Security Services, and Symantec Security Response are trademarks of Symantec Corporation. Microsoft and Windows are reg istered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation.
Other brands and products are trademarks of their respective holder/s. Copyright © 2003 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserv ed. Any technical information that is made available by
Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec Corporation. NO WARRANTY. The tec hnical information is being delivered to you
AS-IS and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its accuracy or use. Any use of the technical documentation or the infor mation contained herein is at the risk of the user.
Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice. 10187540SYMANTEC, THE WORLD LEADER IN INTERNET SECURITY TECHNOLOGY, PROVIDES A BROAD RANGE OF CONTENT AND NETWORK SECURITY
SOFTWARE AND APPLIANCE SOLUTIONS TO INDIVIDUALS, ENTERPRISES AND SERVICE PROVIDERS. THE COMPANY IS A LEADING PROVIDEROF CLIENT, GATEWAY AND SERVER SECURITY SOLUTIONS FOR VIRUS PROTECTION, FIREWALL AND VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORK, VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT, INTRUSION DETECTION, INTERNET CONTENT AND EMAIL FILTERING, AND REMOTE MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGIES AND SECURITY SERVICES TO ENTERPRISES AND SERVICE PROVIDERS AROUND THE WORLD. SYMANTEC'S NORTON BRAND OFCONSUMER SECURITY PRODUCTS IS A LEADER IN WORLDWIDE RETAIL SALES AND INDUSTRY AWARDS. HEADQUARTERED IN CUPERTINO,
CALIF., SYMANTEC HAS WORLDWIDE OPERATIONS IN 36 COUNTRIES.
FOR MORE INFORMATION, PLEASE VISIT WWW.SYMANTEC.COM
WORLD HEADQUARTERS
20330 Stevens Creek Blvd.
Cupertino, CA 95014 U .S.A.408.517.8000800.721.3934
www .symantec.comFor Product Information
In the U.S., call toll-free
800-745-6054.
Symantec has worldwide operations
in 36 countries. For specific countryoffices and contact numbers pleasevisit our Web site.Symantec Internet Security
Symantec Internet Security
Threat Report
Trends for January 1, 2003 – June 30, 2003MALICIOUS CODE TRENDSSymantec Internet Security Threat Report MALICIOUS CODE TRENDS
2EXECUTIVE EDITOR
Linda McCarthy
Symantec Office of the CTO
RESEARCH FELLOW
Sarah Gordon
Symantec Security ResponsePRINCIPAL TREND ANALYST
Mike Prosser
Symantec Security ServicesSECURITY ARCHITECT
Peter Szor
Symantec Security Response
SENIOR DIRECTOR,
DEVELOPMENT
Vincent Weafer
Symantec Security ResponseContents
Report Highlights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Emergence of Malicious Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Appendix—Closing Comments: Blaster, SoBig, and Welchia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Symantec Internet Security Threat Report MALICIOUS CODE TRENDS
3Report Highlights
Overall threats remained significant during the
first half of 2003. Companies without adequatecontrols risk having their networks and applicationscompromised. This report discusses in depth somespecific findings that support this observation.
1
HIGHLIGHTS: MALICIOUS CODE TRENDS
•Blended threats increased 20%
•60% of malicious code submissions were
blended threats
•Speed of propagation has increased
•Linux systems may be targeted for future attacks
•Increased theft of confidential data
•W indows 32—increased sophistication of
malicious code
•N e w infection vectors:
–Instant messaging
–Peer-to-peer services—19 new attacks
identified (up from four in 2002)Emergence of Malicious Code
OVERVIEW
The increasing prevalence of blended threats
remains the most pressing issue for companies that lack effective intrusion protection and patchmanagement policies. Blended threats use combi-nations of malicious code such as viruses, worms,and Trojan horses to exploit known vulnerabilities in application or system code. Other high-rankingconcerns are the rapid increase in the number ofWindows 32 (Win32) threats, the growing numberof threats targeting peer-to-peer services andinstant messaging clients, and the propagationspeed of new worms.
These combined trends suggest that malicious code
is becoming an increasingly significant danger toorganizations and individuals. Managers and homeusers alike must now implement security practicesfor maintaining antivirus and patch management
solutions. Only by recognizing and patching systemvulnerabilities can managers and users truly defendagainst the next major outbreak of a blended threat.
This section of the Internet Security Threat Report
analyzes current and future threats posed by malicious code and offers a comprehensive pictureof the current and future threat environment.Observations are based on trend data, qualitativeintelligence gathering, behavioral analysis, andadversary profiling.
Many trends seen in the first half of 2003, such
as the increasing danger of blended threats, buildon observations discussed in the February 2003
Threat Report. Such trends are based on statistical
analysis from the Symantec AntiVirus™ ResearchAutomation (SARA) system. For a detailed descrip-tion of research methods, see Threat Report
Methodology document.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report MALICIOUS CODE TRENDS
41All data analyzed in this report were captured between January 1, 2003, and June 30, 2003, and are compared with data captured between January 1, 2002, and
June 30, 2002, unless noted otherwise.This section highlights:
•Blended threats
•Speed of propagation
•W indows 32 viruses and worms
•Theft of confidential information
•M ass mailers with internal email engines
•New infection vectors
BLENDED THREATS
Symantec has determined that blended threats
are among the most significant trends to watch and guard against this year. In the first six monthsof 2003 blended threats increased nearly 20% over the previous six-month period. One blendedthreat alone, SQL Slammer, impacted systemsworldwide in less than an hour. Blended threats use combinations of malicious code to begin, transmit, and spread attacks. By using multipletypes and techniques, blended threats can spread
to large numbers of hosts, causing rapid and widespread damage.Blended threats impact personal productivity and
a company’s ability to do business. The multiplepropagation mechanisms of blended threats allowthem not only to compromise a company’s security,but also to overload system resources and saturatenetwork bandwidth. Examples of blended threatsinclude Klez, Bugbear, Slammer, SoBig, SQL Spida,and Code Red.
Symantec’s assessment of the growing danger of
blended threats in the February 2003 issue of theThreat Report was based on their predominance
in malicious code submission data, as well as on areview of the actual damage caused by several high-profile threats. Unfortunately, in the first half of2003, the danger from blended threats increased.Analysis shows that 31 of the top 50 submissionswere classed as blended threats, up from 26 in theprior six months—an increase of nearly 20%.
2One
of the most rapidly spreading blended threats onrecord, SQL Slammer, hit the Internet dramaticallySymantec Internet Security Threat Report MALICIOUS CODE TRENDS
5 2Data were compared with the last half of 2002 (rather than the first half) because comparative data was not available for the f irst half of 2002.W32.Klez
W32.Sobig
W32.Bugbear
W32.Yaha
W32.Nimda
W32.Opaserv
W32.Lirva
W32.SQLExp.Worm
CodeRed.WormMicrosoft IE MIME Header Attachment
Execution Vulnerability
Microsoft IE MIME Header Attachment
Execution Vulnerability
Microsoft IE MIME Header Attachment
Execution Vulnerability
Microsoft IE MIME Header Attachment
Execution Vulnerability
Microsoft IE MIME Header Attachment
Execution Vulnerability
Microsoft IIS/PWS Escaped Characters
Decoding Command Execution Vulnerability
Microsoft IIS and PWS Extended Unicode
Directory Traversal Vulnerability
Microsoft Windows 9x / Me Share Level
Password Bypass Vulnerability
Microsoft IE MIME Header Attachment
Execution Vulnerability
Microsoft SQL Server Resolution Service
buffer overflows allow arbitrary code execution
Microsoft Index Server and Indexing Service
ISAPI Extension Buffer Overflow VulnerabilityBlended
ThreatBugtraq ID
of Targeted
Vulnerability Vulnerability NameCVE
Reference
NumberDate of
Vulnerability
DiscoveryTime Delay
from
Discovery
to Outbreak
210 days
651 days550 days349 days538 days126 days336 days710 days649 days208 days
28 days25 Oct 2001
9 Jan 2003
30 Sep 2002
15 Feb 2002
18 Sep 2001
18 Sep 2001
18 Sep 200130 Sep 2002
7 Jan 2003
24 Jan 2003
16 Jul 200129 Mar 2001
29 Mar 200129 Mar 200129 Mar 200129 Mar 2001
15 May 2001
17 Oct 200010 Oct 2000
29 Mar 2001
25 Jul 2002
18 Jun 2001CVE-2001-0154
CVE2001-0154
CVE-2001-0154CVE-2001-0154CVE-2001-0154CVE-2001-0333CVE-2000-0884CVE-2000-0979CVE-2001-0154
CAN-2002-0649
CVE-2001-05002524
2524252425242524270818061780252453112880Date of
Blended
Threat
Outbreak
Figure 1: Blended Threats and Targeted Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporationon January 25, 2003. Slammer was the fastest
worm in history. Slammer’s speed of propagation,combined with poor configuration management onmany corporate sites, enabled it to dramaticallyinterrupt performance across the Internet.
Blended threats present three reasons for height-
ened concern. First, there are more of them.Second, the most effective blended threats spreadby exploiting numerous application and system vulnerabilities. Third, even when a vulnerability isfound, companies often fail to patch their systems
promptly which points to a lack of established patchmanagement policies by companies. Evidence ofthis failure is the length of time between the dis-covery of vulnerabilities and their exploitation by a blended threat. Figure 2 shows this trend by
detailing the top blended threats reported duringthe past 12 months. Recently, vulnerabilities thathave been well known for several months have hadnumerous versions of attack code written againstthem. For example, Klez, SoBig, Bugbear, Yaha, andNimda repeatedly exploit the same vulnerability.
While blended threats increase, corporate patch
management policies (a key defense against blendedthreats) continue to lag. To defend against futureblended threats, companies must identify and patchvulnerabilities on their networks quickly. The cost of
doing so will be far less than the lost productivityexperienced later.
Win32 Viruses and Worms
As Microsoft Windows expands its installed base,
Win32 threats have increased correspondingly.These threats are executable files that operate by using the Win32 application program interface(API), and work on at least one Win32 platform.
Over the past six months, Symantec has documented
more than 994 new Win32 viruses and worms, morethan double the 445 documented in the first half of2002. The total number of Win32 variants nowapproaches 4,000. Figure 2 shows the number of
new Win32 viruses and worms by six-month periodfrom January 1, 2001, through June 30, 2003.
Over a short period, Win32 attacks are more
common than script and macro-based threats. Inaddition to their rising volume, the complexity ofthe malicious code in Win32 attacks is increasing.For example, several recent attacks exploit complex
Win32 buffer-overflow vulnerabilities, while othersdemonstrate advanced evasion and sophisticatedanti-detection techniques. Several Win32 attacksleverage multiple exploits to maximize the potentialfor infection. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report MALICIOUS CODE TRENDS
63Zoo-based threats are those that exist only in virus and antivirus labs, not in the wild. Most zoo threats never get released i nto the wild and, as a result, rarely
threaten users.020040060080010001200Figure 2: New Documented Win32 Viruses and Worms
(January 1, 2001 – June 30, 2003)
Six-Month PeriodJan – June 2001 July – Dec 2001 Jan – June 2002 July – Dec 2002 Jan – June 2003308433445687994Total Viruses and Worms
Source: Symantec CorporationEven with the growing number and complexity
of Win32 viruses and worms, most market-leading,antivirus products like Symantec’s maintain robustdetection. When these solutions are deployed pro-actively and are well maintained on all platformsand across all tiers of a corporate network, com-panies are protected from most threats.
Linux
In 1998 Symantec observed the first example of a
successful Linux worm, the Linux.ADM.Worm,which exploited a widely known vulnerability andcompromised many systems. However, after thisoutbreak, there were few successful malicious-codeattacks on Linux. This period of inactivity suddenlychanged with the emergence of the Linux.Slapperworm in September 2002. The infection vector ofSlapper and its variants was based on a remotebuffer overflow vulnerability in the OpenSSL implementation of the SSL protocol, and the wormtargeted Apache Web servers on various versions of the Linux operating environment.
Although Symantec has not seen a major outbreak
of a Linux worm since Slapper, Symantec analystsremain concerned about several highly sophisticatedzoo-based Linux viruses and worms that have been
developed recently.
3Such threats are cause for con-
cern, as they show that malicious-code writers aredeveloping a greater sophistication in programmingand more familiarity with the Linux operating systemand its applications.
Symantec will monitor the evolution of Linux
attacks during the next 12 months. Such threatsare worrisome as Linux-based solutions becomemore popular among consumers.
4Unlike people
already familiar with various flavors of the Unixoperating system, new Linux users may be unawareof appropriate security practices.
Lifecycle of a Worm and Speed of Propagation
As soon as a computer worm, such as SQL
Slammer, is released into the wild, it spreads by infecting new systems. The worm may attackcomputers in specific locations (for instance, designated netblocks, domains, or computers resid-ing in certain countries), or it may indiscriminately
attack the entire computing population at random.
If successful, the worm then uses the infected sys-
tem as a platform from which to identify potentialnew victims. Each successful penetration followsthis pattern, and the number of infected systemsgrows until either all potential victims are infectedor countermeasures such as antivirus softwarebegin to halt the spread. Over time, as protectionbecomes more effective and ubiquitous, the rate of propagation slows, new infections decrease, andexisting infections are remedied. This pattern ofrelease, growth, and gradual decline is the lifecycleof a worm.
A critical factor shaping a worm’s lifecycle is the
speed at which it propagates. Propagation speed is governed by a variety of influences, such as the writer’s algorithm, the infection vectors used,and the available number of targeted systems. As worm writers improve their techniques, thespeed of propagation can rise dramatically. Greaterhomogeneity of Internet-connected systems,increased bandwidth capacity, and computingspeed of target systems have all assisted in improving speed of propagation.
The recent SQL Slammer worm used a propagation
strategy based on the exploitation of a well-known
buffer-overflow vulnerability in Microsoft’s popularSQL Server. In part the speed of propagation was sohigh because the worm spread via UDP, a connection-less protocol. By re lying on UDP, the worm used lit-
tle bandwidth and few system resources, enablingan extremely short time delay between new genera-tions of the worm.
In addition, the buffer-overflow vulnerability
that Slammer exploited was fairly short, so thatSlammer could probe many machines without consuming much bandwidth. Fortunately, despitethe speed of propagation, many companies wereable to stop Slammer at the firewall by closing asingle port. Systems administrators could thus contain Slammer relatively quickly. Companies hitby Slammer benefited by the fact the worm wasdesigned only to propagate and be a nuisance. ItSymantec Internet Security Threat Report MALICIOUS CODE TRENDS
74In 2001, according to IDC, the Linux Client Operating Environment (COE) grew at a 49% rate, especially in the emerging Asia/Pac ific market. Latin
America has also shown strong growth. As Linux becomes more of a “packaged” offering with equivalent component offerings to Win dows and major
Unix variants, this trend is forecasted to continue. “Worldwide Linux Operating Environments Forecast and Analysis, 2002–2006: A Market in Transition.”
IDC. July 2002. http://www.idc.comSymantec Internet Security Threat Report MALICIOUS CODE TRENDS
8did not carry a malicious payload. If this had been
the case, damage from the outbreak might havebeen catastrophic.
Symantec expects to see greater worm propagation
resulting in overloads to network hardware, crip-pling network traffic and seriously preventing bothindividuals and businesses from using the Internet.
Although it is hard to defend against swiftly
propagating worms, one way to limit damage is to deploy more effective processes for identifyingand promptly patching system vulnerabilities.Unfortunately, this is not yet happening. Patchesand security updates are usually implemented afterthe fact. However, virus protection has becomemore prevalent.
NEW INFECTION VECTORS
Instant Messaging and Peer-to-Peer Applications
As both legitimate and unapproved use of instant
messaging (IM) clients and peer-to-peer (P2P) networking increases, new worms and viruses usethese mechanisms to spread. A review of the top 50 virus and worms over the past six months shows19 malicious code submissions used P2P and IMapplications. This is an increase of almost 400% in only one year.
The two main reasons for this dramatic increase
are that these applications have become more popular among corporate and home users andthese services are relatively insecure. Unlike otheravenues for propagation such as email, IM and
P2P often have little to no security in place. Forexample, many IM products transmit unencrypteddata outside of the firewall, making it easy to inter-cept this traffic on a network. The minimal securityassociated with P2P and IM invites malicious codepropagation.
Fortunately, organizations can take steps to protect
IM and P2P users. The simplest is for organizationsto prohibit employees from using insecure versionsof these services. Companies should acquire IMapplications that are specifically developed for com-mercial use and include security. Finally, policiesmust be defined and enforced regarding restrictionson usage.
5Mass Mailers with Internal Email Engines
Mass-mailing viruses and worms spread by harvesting
and using email addresses from infected systems. Thetwo basic types of mass-mailing viruses are those
that use an existing email system to propagate, andthose that use a distinct email engine built into themalicious code itself.
Until recently, viruses and worms relied almost
exclusively on a user’s existing email engine toreplicate and send copies to potential victims. Once infected, however, users could often detectthe virus, as copies of suspicious mail would appearin their email inbox. They could then take counter-measures to limit its spread.
To bypass this limitation, virus writers create their
own email engines in an attempt to foster propaga-tion that is both efficient and harder to detect. Thenumber of viruses and worms with their own emailengines grew by more than 100% in the first half ofthis year, increasing from 8 to 19 in the six monthsending June 30, 2003.
Because emails generated by the self-contained
engine of malicious code do not interact with theuser’s email system, few users are able to detectthe code. Since the threats spoof the “From:”address on emails, victims cannot easily identifythe true originator of the infected email. This makestracking the sources of infection difficult andenables the virus to survive longer. Fortunately,most market-leading antivirus products with effec-tive heuristics-based detection can resist thesetypes of threats.
THEFT OF CONFIDENTIAL DATA
The best example of theft of confidential data is
the release of a new Bugbear variant, Bugbear.B,discovered in early June 2003. Once systems wereinfected, Bugbear.B began extracting confidentialdata, such as lists of file names, processes, usernames, and other critical system information.Bugbear.B also delivered logged keystrokes to athird party, potentially compromising importantinformation such as passwords and decryptionkeys. The discovery of this new variant of Bugbearraises serious concerns, since it appears that thecreator specifically targeted banking institutions.
5For a more complete description of the security risks of using instant messaging and guidelines for securing this technology,
see http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/secure.instant.messaging.pdfSymantec Internet Security Threat Report MALICIOUS CODE TRENDS
9Although the creator’s motivation is unknown,
he or she may have been specifically interested in obtaining either financial data or information,such as client usernames and passwords, thatwould allow future access to customer accounts.
Confidential data attacks increasingly use back-
doors. Submissions of malicious code with back-doors has risen nearly 50%, increasing from 11 submissions to 17 for the first half of 2003. By granting remote access to compromised sys-tems, backdoors allow the unauthorized export of any type of data that those systems contain. For example, keystroke loggers can be installed
and the keystrokes of infected systems can be sent to the attacker in an easy-to-read file. Entiresessions can be logged, and passwords for systemsor applications can be extracted. Attackers then use compromised systems as launching points forfuture attacks.
Finally, the confidentiality of data is increasingly
threatened by malicious code that tracks Internetbrowser usage. Such programs, commonly knownas spyware, are placed surreptitiously on a user’scomputer. As the data-export functions of spywaretypically operate using Web traffic (over Port 80),
firewalls usually fail to catch the intrusion. Spywareapplications can track and deliver to its creator thecritical browsing habits and other behavioral infor-mation of infected users.
In response to the potential danger of compromised
confidential data, corporate and home users mustdevelop stronger policies and procedures to pre-serve confidentiality. Browser and firewall policiesneed to be established and implemented to mitigatethe effects of spyware applications. Companiesshould install software that automatically deletesunwanted cookies, and implement security controlsthat make it more difficult for malicious code tocompromise confidential data. BLASTER
As this report goes to press, the Win32.Blaster,W32.SoBig.F, @mm, and Win32.Welchia worms are rapidly spreading worldwide. While Blasterappeared too late for analysis of its impact to beincluded in this report, the message is neverthelessclear: It is vital to ensure that all machines, bothpersonal and corporate, are patched up to date—especially in areas related to security. Symantec’scurrent data indicates that the threat posed bymalicious code continues to grow; this is especiallytrue in the areas of blended threats and Win32threats.
Other areas, which Symantec continues to care-
fully monitor, include the rise in P2P threats, mass mailers, and the theft or export of confidentialinformation. Despite the risks, the maintenance of a viable defensive stance is achievable: A good com-bination of procedural and technical prophylacticsis able to stave off and even reverse the rising tideof malicious code. Good, correctly maintained antivirus software and solid firewall/IDS solutionscombined with an aggressive yet calculatedresponse to security-related patches greatly miti-gate the risks. Furthermore, human factors, such aseducation and awareness, backed up by policy andprocedure, can go a long way to minimize losses.Appendix—Closing Comments: Blaster,
SoBig, and Welchia
As this report goes to press, three new threats—
W32.Blaster.worm, W32.SoBig.F@mm, andW32.Welchia.worm were responsible for the swiftand large-scale compromise of academic, corporate,and home user systems worldwide.
HISTORY
Blaster exploited a single vulnerability: theMicrosoft Windows DCOM RPC Interface Overrun.Microsoft announced the vulnerability on July 16,2003. In less than a month, Blaster appeared. Insome cases, automated scripts appear to have been used in deployment of the exploit code, dramatically increasing the number of hosts thatcould be attacked in a given time period. Reports of infection of over a 1,000 hosts per network were
not uncommon, and for a short time, Symantec data
showed as many as 2,500 computers per hourbecoming infected.
Academic networks were particularly hard hit by
the worm. Infected users were advised to patchtheir systems and utilize firewall rules to stop theworm from spreading further. However, their effortswere complicated by the fact that, in addition toexploiting the vulnerability, Blaster also containedcode written to keep infected users from obtainingthe necessary patch. The worm attempted to per-form a denial-of-service attack upon the Microsoft
Windows update site. As of August 15, 2003,Microsoft removed the DNS record for the specificupdate site used by the worm.
Shortly thereafter, SoBig appeared, using its own
SMTP engine to propagate via email. Like previousworms, it made use of a rudimentary social engi-neering technique: choosing the “to” and “from”addresses from an infected user’s address book.Coupled with realistic “Subject:” lines, SoBig wasable to exploit users’ trust and thus gain a globalfoothold extremely quickly. However, in addition to
utilizing these basic social engineering techniques,SoBig was programmed to act as both a commandand control center on infected machines. Carrying
a payload that would, when successfully deployed,download an update twice weekly, SoBig was ideallypositioned to obtain further instructions from theremote locations.
Finally, Welchia appeared. Welchia displayed yet
even more complexity. It exploited two vulnerabili-ties as it attempted to clean Blaster.A infected computers.
CONCLUSION
Whereas previous threats might not appear in the
wild until several months to a year or more after the disclosure of a vulnerability, Blaster andWelchia each appeared within approximately one
month of the vulnerability disclosure. Additionally,attacks are occurring with greater frequency andincreasingly larger target space. To ensure that systems are continuously protected, it is imperativethat all machines—corporate, academic, homeuser—be patched up to date.
The threat posed by malicious code is increasing
not only in rapidity of infection, but in complexity as well. This complexity not only mandates a strongcorporate security policy but also dictates a com-prehensive approach that makes use of strongheuristics, content filtering, and worm blockingtechniques. Patch management, antivirus, IDS, and firewall components all serve to provide thecomprehensive layered approach needed to reducethe risk from blended threats such as Blaster,SoBig, and Welchia.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report MALICIOUS CODE TRENDS
10Glossary
Blended Threat
Blended threats combine the characteristics of
viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and malicious codewith server and Internet vulnerabilities to initiate,transmit, and spread an attack. By using multiplemethods and techniques, blended threats can rapidly spread and cause widespread damage.
Buffer Overflow
A “buffer overflow” is a type of programmatic
flaw that is due to a programmer allowing for anunbounded operation on data. Buffer overflow conditions commonly occur during memory copyoperations. In these cases, a lack of bounds check-ing can allow for memory to be written beyond thebuffer, corrupting potentially sensitive values inadjacent memory. Buffer overflow conditions havetypically been exploited to hijack program execution
flow (i.e., execute arbitrary instructions) by over-writing activation records in stack memory. Bufferoverflows in the heap have also proven exploitable,allowing for attackers to have their own instructionsexecuted in the process space of the affected program.
Class A Network
A Class A network is the largest IP address class
of the three public use “classes” (Class A, Class B,and Class C) in the IP address space. There are 127Class A networks with each supporting around 16million hosts or individual IP addresses. ClasslessInter-Domain Routing (CIDR) is an updated address-ing scheme that provides more effective use of IPaddresses than the old Class A, B, and C scheme.You will now see Class A networks called a /8 (slash
eight) network, so called for the 8-bit network prefixassigned under CIDR.Exploit
A program or technique that takes advantage of a
vulnerability in software and that can be used forbreaking security or otherwise attacking a host.
Infection Vector
The method in which malicious code gains access
to a computer system. The most common infectionvector today is email. Other vectors of infectioninclude floppy disks, vulnerabilities in software,peer-to-peer software, and instant messaging.
Integer Error
Integer errors are a type of programmatic flaw
caused by a failure to properly handle variables of the integer data type. Integer errors can result in unexpected/unanticipated behavior in affectedprograms and can sometimes allow attackers tohijack the execution flow of the affected program.
Malicious Payload
Typically referred to as “Payload” because
“mali-
cious” is a major part of the definition. Maliciousactivities performed by a threat in addition to the self-replication routine of a virus. The majorityof viruses do not contain a payload, but simplyreplicate. Payloads include denial-of-service attacks,destruction or modification of data, changes to system settings, and information disclosure.
Mass Mailer
A threat that self-replicates by sending itself out by
email. Typically, the threat obtains email addressesby searching for email addresses in files on the system or responding to messages found in theemail client inbox.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report MALICIOUS CODE TRENDS
11Netblock
A netblock is the “block” of IP addresses that have
been assigned to a network. The network may beassigned an entire address range, e.g., a Class Cnetwork that would have a maximum of 256 IPaddresses. Individual IP addresses can be assignedfrom within the netblock, or it can be segregatedinto smaller “subnets” within that overall netblockfor use.
Remotely Exploitable
Remotely exploitable vulnerabilities are those which
can be exploited by attackers across a network. Forexample, vulnerabilities in Web servers that can beexploited by Web clients are remotely exploitablevulnerabilities.
Side-Channel Attack
An attack that typically targets a weakness in the
implementation of a system rather than its design.Errors in implementations of systems can cause a leak of important information in the timing of specific events. By observing the amounts of timethat a system takes to perform certain behavior,attackers can sometimes obtain or infer valuableinformation. For example, knowledge of crucial timing information can possibly allow an attacker to compromise SSL/TLS sessions. Other reportedtiming-analysis attacks allowed attackers to guessvalid usernames or determine the existence of
confidential files. To a sophisticated attacker, timing-analysis and side-channel vulnerabilitiesoffer powerful new methods to penetrate highlysecure systems.Virus
A self-replicating computer program.
Vulnerability
A security vulnerability is a coding error within
a software system that can cause it to function outside of its documented design, violating its documented security policy. A vulnerability can be fixed with a patch or update.
Worm
A program that makes copies of itself on the net-
work; for example, from one network disk drive toanother, or by copying itself using email or anothertransport mechanism.
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report MALICIOUS CODE TRENDS
12Symantec, the Symantec logo, and DeepSight are U.S. registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation. Symantec AntiVirus, Symantec AntiVirus Research Automation (SARA), Symantec
Managed Security Services, and Symantec Security Response are trademarks of Symantec Corporation. Microsoft and Windows are reg istered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation.
Other brands and products are trademarks of their respective holder/s. Copyright © 2003 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserv ed. Any technical information that is made available by
Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec Corporation. NO WARRANTY. The tec hnical information is being delivered to you
AS-IS and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its accuracy or use. Any use of the technical documentation or the infor mation contained herein is at the risk of the user.
Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice. 10187539SYMANTEC, THE WORLD LEADER IN INTERNET SECURITY TECHNOLOGY, PROVIDES A BROAD RANGE OF CONTENT AND NETWORK SECURITY
SOFTWARE AND APPLIANCE SOLUTIONS TO INDIVIDUALS, ENTERPRISES AND SERVICE PROVIDERS. THE COMPANY IS A LEADING PROVIDEROF CLIENT, GATEWAY AND SERVER SECURITY SOLUTIONS FOR VIRUS PROTECTION, FIREWALL AND VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORK, VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT, INTRUSION DETECTION, INTERNET CONTENT AND EMAIL FILTERING, AND REMOTE MANAGEMENT TECHNOLOGIES AND SECURITY SERVICES TO ENTERPRISES AND SERVICE PROVIDERS AROUND THE WORLD. SYMANTEC'S NORTON BRAND OFCONSUMER SECURITY PRODUCTS IS A LEADER IN WORLDWIDE RETAIL SALES AND INDUSTRY AWARDS. HEADQUARTERED IN CUPERTINO,
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Symantec Internet Security
Threat Report
Trends January 1, 2003 – June 30, 2003THREAT REPORT METHODOLOGYSymantec Internet Security Threat Report THREAT REPORT METHODOLOGY
2EXECUTIVE EDITOR
Linda McCarthy
Symantec Office of the CTO
MANAGER, DEVELOPMENT
David Ahmad
Symantec Security ResponseSENIOR THREAT ANALYST
Cori Lynn Arnold
Symantec Managed Security
Serv ices
SENIOR MANAGER, ANALYSIS
OPERATIONS
Brian Dunphy
Symantec Managed SecurityServ ices
SENIOR MANAGER,
DEVELOPMENT
Oliver Friedrichs
Symantec Security Response
RESEARCH FELLOW
Sarah Gordon
Symantec Security ResponseSECURITY ARCHITECT
Peter Szor
Symantec Security Response
PRINCIPAL TREND ANALYST
Mike Prosser
Symantec Security ServicesSENIOR DIRECTOR,
DEVELOPMENT
Vincent Weafer
Symantec Security ResponseContents
Appendix A—Network-Based Attack Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Appendix B—Vulnerability Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Appendix C—Malicious Code Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11Symantec Internet Security Threat Report THREAT REPORT METHODOLOGY
3Appendix A—Network-Based Attack
Methodology
OVERVIEW
Attack trends in this report are based on the analy-
sis from Symantec DeepSight Threat ManagementService (TMS) and Symantec Managed SecurityService (MSS). TMS and MSS have created a com-mon language to name specific types of attacks,enabling analysts to combine and analyze attacks in one database, as well as separately.
Symantec combines the TMS and MSS data sources
for analysis when appropriate—that is, when they
represent similar findings and trends. Symantecanalysts use the data source that is appropriate;with consideration to the level of review of the data
and the demographic makeup of the sources (both
in terms of vertical and geographic distribution).
By combining TMS and MSS data, Symantec dou-
bled the size of previous sample sets used in thisreport. The table below provides high-level detailsof the methods used by each service.
The remainder of this section explains the following
attributes of the sample set and research inquiries.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report THREAT REPORT METHODOLOGY
4The DeepSight Threat Management System collects IDS alerts and firewall logs on a voluntary
basis from more than 20,000 security devices deployed in more than 180 countries. For thisreport, a sample of data from more than 1,000 devices was studied.
Symantec’s Managed Security Service provides real-time monitoring and analysis of cyber
attack activity launched against more than 400 companies worldwide. Due to the nature of monitoring activity, some statistics, such as event severity, client tenure, and attacks percompany only apply to data received from Managed Security Service customers.Data Collection Methodology
Threat Management System
Managed Security ServiceData Source
59%
41%Percent of Companies
in Sample SetCOMPANY DEMOGRAPHICS
In addition to the sheer size of the sample set,
Symantec maintains a diverse mix of companies.Specifically, the sample set includes a broad arrayof organizations as measured by criteria such asindustry, ownership type, and company size. Aselection of these company characteristics is out-lined in greater detail below.INDUSTRY
The industry breakdown for TMS and MSS is listedby percentage. Industry groups are based on thereview of a variety of public and private references,as well as direct client interactions. It is importantto note that several classifications were alteredsince the February 2003 issue of the report.These changes were necessary to further refine thestandardized classification methodology that is now
employed throughout Symantec.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report THREAT REPORT METHODOLOGY
5High Tech 53%
Business and Legal Services 10%Small Business 9%Educa tion 6%Manufacturing 3%Healthcare 3%Finance and Insurance 3%Government 3%Retail Trade 2%Telecommunications 2%Community/Nonprofit 2%Media/Entertainment 2%Utilities 1%Other 1%
Source: Symantec Corporation
Figure 1: Breakdown of Companies by Industry—TMS Data
Figure 2: Breakdown of Companies by Industry—MSS Data
High Tech 12%
Business and Legal Services 8%
Small Business 16%
Education 1%
Manufacturing 5%
Healthcare 8%Finance and Insurance 15%Government 2%Retail Trade 8%Telecommunications 3%Community/Nonprofit 5%Media/Entertainment 4%Utilities3%Other 10%
Source: Symantec CorporationCOMPANY SIZE
Symantec used employee count as a proxy to
measure company size. This metric was selected
as the best proxy for company size because thenumber of employees typically correlates best tothe relative size of a company’s network. Employeecounts were gathered from public sources, as wellas engaging in direct client interaction. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report THREAT REPORT METHODOLOGY
65,000+
7%
1,000–4,999
6%
500–999
0%
1–499
87%
Figure 3: Breakdown of Companies by Size—TMS Data
Source: Symantec Corporation
5,000+
19%
1,000–4,999
11%
500–999
13%
1–499
57%
Source: Symantec Corporation
Figure 4: Breakdown of Companies by Size—MSS DataATTACK DEFINITIONS
The first step in analyzing attack activity is to define
precisely what an attack is. Rather than limiting theanalysis to only one metric of attack activity,Symantec uses several different metrics, each ofwhich is uniquely appropriate under a certain set ofcircumstances. Presented below is a high-levelsummary of the three metrics that are commonlyused in the report.
Attacks —Attacks are individual signs of malicious
network activity. Attacks can consist of one or moreIDS alerts and/or firewall logs that are indicative ofa single type of attacker action. For example, multi-ple firewall logs often indicate the occurrence of asingle network scan. The attack metric is the bestindicator of the overall volume of actual “attackeractions” detected over a specified period of time.
Events —Security events are logical groupings of
multiple attacks. A security event may include agroup of similar, but non-threatening, signs ofattack activity experienced by companies during the course of a day (for example, all non-threaten-ing HTTP scans experienced during a single day aregrouped into an event), or a security event mayinclude multiple attacks against a single companyby a single attacker during a specified period oftime. Security events are generated only by theSymantec Managed Security Service, and are onlyused in this report when discussing “Severe EventIncidence.”EXPLANATION OF RESEARCH INQUIRIES
The intent of this subsection is to provide moredetail on specific methodologies used to producethe data and statistics used in this report. Whilemost methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, the followinginvestigations warranted additional detail.
Event Severity
Event severity is only applicable to data generated
by MSS. Every event validated by Symantec securityanalysts is assigned to one of four severity classifi-cations: informational, warning, critical, and emer-gency. The primary purpose of this rating system isto prioritize client responses to malicious activitybased on the relative level of danger that the eventpresents to their environment. A determination ofseverity is based on characteristics of an attack,defensive controls of the client, value of the assetsat risk, and the relative success of the attack.
These four severity levels are further grouped into
two classifications: severe and non-severe events.
Severe events include activity classified as either“emergency” or “critical,” while non-severe events
include activity classified as either “informational”or “warning.” For example, a severe event requiresimmediate countermeasures from an organization,while a non-severe event is mainly informative.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report THREAT REPORT METHODOLOGY
7Symantec Internet Security Threat Report THREAT REPORT METHODOLOGY
8ATTACK SOURCE
Country
Symantec identified the national and regional
sources of attacks by automatically cross-referencingsource IP addresses of every attack with severalthird-party, subscription-based databases thatlink the geographic location of hosts to source IPaddresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error. Currently,Symantec cross-references source IP addresses ofattacks against every country in the world and alsoanalyzes attack trends according to the followingregions:It is important to note that while Symantec has a
reliable process for identifying the source IP of thehost that is directly responsible for launching anattack, it is impossible to verify (from the network)whether the attacker is actually physically presentat this location. It is probable that many (if notmost) of the apparent sources of attacks are, in
fact, systems that were used by attackers as a plat-
form to disguise their i dentity and true location.Description
Events consisting of scans for malicious services and IDS events that do not have a significant impact
on the client’s network.
Example:
Scans for vulnerable services where all connection attempts are dropped by the firewall.
Events consisting of malicious attacks that were unsuccessful in bypassing the firewall, and did not
compromise the intended target systems.
Example:
Scans and horizontal sweeps where some connections were allowed, but a compromise has not occurred.
These events are malicious in nature and require action on the part of Symantec or the client to fix
a weakness or actual exploit of the client network or devices. By definition, if a critical event is not addressed with countermeasures, it may result in a successful compromise of a system.
Examples:
Continuous attacks by a single IP address against the client network.• A significant vulnerability on the client's network that was identified by either an attacker or the Security Operations Center (SOC). For example, a Web exploit is observed and appears to
be successful, but there is no observed follow-up activity to take advantage of the vulnerability.
• Unknown suspicious traffic that warrants an investigation by the client to track or eliminate the traffic flow.
These events indicate that a security breach has occurred on the client’s protected network. An
emergency event requires the client to initiate some form of recovery procedure.
Example:
Successful exploit of a vulnerable Web server.Severity Classification
Non-Severe
SevereSeverity Level
Informational
Warning
Critical
EmergencyTable 2: Event Severity Metrics
•Africa
•Asia
•Caribbean
•Eastern Europe
•Latin America•M iddle East
•North America
•Oceania
•South America
•W estern EuropeSymantec Internet Security Threat Report THREAT REPORT METHODOLOGY
9Appendix B—Vulnerability Methodology
OVERVIEW
Symantec threat analysts continually search hun-
dreds of security vendor, industry, undergroundWeb sites, and mailing lists to document new
security vulnerabilities.
After the discovery of a new vulnerability, analysts
gather all information related to it and issue analert. Fields within the alert describe characteristicsof the vulnerability, such as severity, ease ofexploitation, and products affected. SymantecSecurity Response Service maintains a databasethat contains detailed reports describing more than8,000 distinct vulnerabilities.
This section explains several characteristics of
vulnerabilities stored in the Symantec database,and clarifies in greater detail several specificqueries used in our investigations.
CHARACTERISTICS OF VULNERABILITIES
After discovering a new vulnerability, threat analysts put it into one of 12 possible categories.The Symantec classification is based on TaimurAslam’s white paper, “A Taxonomy of Security Faults in the Unix Operating System.” This paper
fully describes the meaning of each classificationlisted here.
•Boundary Condition Error
•Access Validation Error
•Origin Validation Error
•Input Validation Error
•Failure to Handle Exceptional Conditions
•Race Condition Error
•Serialization Error
•Atomicity Error
•Environment Error
•Configuration Error
•Design Error
Severity
Symantec analysts calculate a severity score
on a scale of 1 to 10 for each new vulnerability discovery. This score is based on the following:
Impact —This measures the relative impact on the
affected systems if the vulnerability is exploited. Forexample, if the vulnerability enables the attacker togain root access to the system, it is classed as “high
impact.” A higher impact rating contributes to ahigher severity score.
Remote Exploitability —This measure indicates
whether or not the vulnerability can be exploitedremotely, in other words, using at least one methodto exploit the vulnerability from a host, distinctfrom the vulnerable system, via some type of com-munication protocol such as TCP/IP, IPX, or dial-up.Remotely exploitable vulnerabilities contribute to ahigher severity score.
Ease of Exploitation —How easily can a vulnerability
be exploited? Vulnerabilities for which an exploit iswidely available or for which an exploit is notrequired contribute to a higher severity score. Wedescribe this metric at the end of this section.
Authentication Requirements —This metric indi-
cates whether the vulnerability can be exploitedonly after some sort of credentials are provided tothe vulnerable system, or whether one can exploit it without supplying any authentication credentials.Vulnerabilities that require no authentication from
the attacker contribute to a higher severity score.After gathering information on these four attrib-utes, analysts use a pre-established algorithm togenerate a severity score that ranges from 1 to 10.Vulnerabilities are rated as being of high, moderate,
or low severity according to the following scores.
Ease of Exploitation
The vulnerability analyst assigns the ease of
exploitation rating after thoroughly researchingboth the need for and the availability of exploits forthe vulnerability. All vulnerabilities are classed intoone of three possible categories, listed next.
X 7
4 X < 7
X < 4Severity Score Range
High
Moderate
LowSeverity LevelTable 3: Vulnerability Severity ScaleExploit Available —Sophisticated exploit code
that enables the exploitation of the vulnerability is publicly available to all would-be attackers.
No Exploit Required —W ould-be attackers can
exploit the vulnerability without having to use anyform of sophisticated exploit code. In other words,
the attacker does not need to create or use complexscripts or tools.
No Exploit Available —Although would-be attackers
must use exploit code to make use of the vulnera-bility, no such exploit code is publicly available. Inthis report, the first two types of vulnerability areconsidered “easily exploitable” because the attackerneeds only limited sophistication. The last type ofvulnerability is considered “difficult to exploit”because the attacker must develop the exploit code required to make use of the vulnerability.
Appendix C—Malicious Code
Methodology
Observations in this section were based on empiri-
cal data and expert analysis. The data and analysisdraw primarily from two databases described below.
INFECTION DATABASE
To help detect and eradicate computer viruses,
Symantec developed the Symantec AntiVirusResearch Automation (SARA) technology. Symantecuses this technology to analyze, replicate, anddefine a large subset of the most common computerviruses that are quarantined by Symantec AntiViruscustomers. In an average month SARA receives hundred of thousands of suspect files daily fromboth enterprise and individual consumers locatedthroughout the world. These suspect files are thenanalyzed by Symantec and matched with virus definitions. An analysis of this aggregate data setprovides Symantec with statistics on infection ratesfor different types of malicious code.
MALICIOUS CODE DATABASE
In addition to infection data, Symantec Security
Response analyzes and documents attributes foreach new form of malicious code that emerges bothin the wild and in a zoo environment. Descriptiverecords of new forms of malicious code are thenentered into a database for future reference. Forthis report, historical trend analysis was performedon this database to reveal trends, such as the use
of different infection vectors and the frequency ofvarious types of payloads.
CONCLUSION
Whereas previous threats might not appear in the
wild until several months to a year or more after the disclosure of a vulnerability, Blaster andWelchia each appeared within approximately one
month of the vulnerability disclosure. Additionally,attacks are occurring with greater frequency andincreasingly larger target space. To ensure that systems are continuously protected, it is imperativethat all machines—corporate, academic, homeuser—be patched up to date.
The threat posed by malicious code is increasing
not only in rapidity of infection, but in complexity as well. This complexity not only mandates a strongcorporate security policy but also dictates a com-prehensive approach that makes use of strongheuristics, content filtering, and worm blockingtechniques. Patch management, antivirus, IDS, andfirewall components all serve to provide the com-prehensive layered approach needed to reduce therisk from blended threats such as Blaster, SoBig,and Welchia.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report THREAT REPORT METHODOLOGY
10Glossary
Blended Threat
Blended threats combine the characteristics of
viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and malicious codewith server and Internet vulnerabilities to initiate,transmit, and spread an attack. By using multiplemethods and techniques, blended threats can rapidly spread and cause widespread damage.
Buffer Overflow
A “buffer overflow” is a type of programmatic
flaw that is due to a programmer allowing for anunbounded operation on data. Buffer overflow conditions commonly occur during memory copyoperations. In these cases, a lack of bounds check-ing can allow for memory to be written beyond thebuffer, corrupting potentially sensitive values inadjacent memory. Buffer overflow conditions havetypically been exploited to hijack program execution
flow (i.e., execute arbitrary instructions) by over-writing activation records in stack memory. Bufferoverflows in the heap have also proven exploitable,allowing for attackers to have their own instructionsexecuted in the process space of the affected program.
Class A Network
A Class A network is the largest IP address class
of the three public use “classes” (Class A, Class B,and Class C) in the IP address space. There are 127Class A networks with each supporting around 16million hosts or individual IP addresses. ClasslessInter-Domain Routing (CIDR) is an updated address-ing scheme that provides more effective use of IPaddresses than the old Class A, B, and C scheme.You will now see Class A networks called a /8 (slash
eight) network, so called for the 8-bit network prefixassigned under CIDR.Exploit
A program or technique that takes advantage of a
vulnerability in software and that can be used forbreaking security or otherwise attacking a host.
Infection Vector
The method in which malicious code gains access
to a computer system. The most common infectionvector today is email. Other vectors of infectioninclude floppy disks, vulnerabilities in software,peer-to-peer software, and instant messaging.
Integer Error
Integer errors are a type of programmatic flaw
caused by a failure to properly handle variables of the integer data type. Integer errors can result in unexpected/unanticipated behavior in affectedprograms and can sometimes allow attackers tohijack the execution flow of the affected program.
Malicious Payload
Typically referred to as “Payload” because
“mali-
cious” is a major part of the definition. Maliciousactivities performed by a threat in addition to the self-replication routine of a virus. The majorityof viruses do not contain a payload, but simplyreplicate. Payloads include denial-of-service attacks,destruction or modification of data, changes to system settings, and information disclosure.
Mass Mailer
A threat that self-replicates by sending itself out by
email. Typically, the threat obtains email addressesby searching for email addresses in files on the system or responding to messages found in theemail client inbox.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report THREAT REPORT METHODOLOGY
11Netblock
A netblock is the “block” of IP addresses that have
been assigned to a network. The network may beassigned an entire address range, e.g., a Class Cnetwork that would have a maximum of 256 IPaddresses. Individual IP addresses can be assignedfrom within the netblock, or it can be segregatedinto smaller “subnets” within that overall netblockfor use.
Remotely Exploitable
Remotely exploitable vulnerabilities are those which
can be exploited by attackers across a network. Forexample, vulnerabilities in Web servers that can beexploited by Web clients are remotely exploitablevulnerabilities.
Side-Channel Attack
An attack that typically targets a weakness in the
implementation of a system rather than its design.Errors in implementations of systems can cause a leak of important information in the timing of specific events. By observing the amounts of timethat a system takes to perform certain behavior,attackers can sometimes obtain or infer valuableinformation. For example, knowledge of crucial timing information can possibly allow an attacker to compromise SSL/TLS sessions. Other reportedtiming-analysis attacks allowed attackers to guessvalid usernames or determine the existence of
confidential files. To a sophisticated attacker, timing-analysis and side-channel vulnerabilitiesoffer powerful new methods to penetrate highlysecure systems.Virus
A self-replicating computer program.
Vulnerability
A security vulnerability is a coding error within
a software system that can cause it to function outside of its documented design, violating its documented security policy. A vulnerability can be fixed with a patch or update.
Worm
A program that makes copies of itself on the net-
work; for example, from one network disk drive toanother, or by copying itself using email or anothertransport mechanism.
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report THREAT REPORT METHODOLOGY
12
|
Symantec Internet Security
Symantec Internet Security
Threat Report
Trends for July 1, 2003 – December 31, 2003Volume V, Published March 2004 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
2Contents
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Attack Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Vulnerability Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Malicious Code Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Appendix C—Vulnerability Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Appendix D—Malicious Code Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Appendix E—Glossary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
31The Symantec Security Response Threat Severity Assessment evaluates computer threats (viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and macros) and classifies them into one
of five cate gories, with Cate gory 5 being the mo st severe, and Cate gory 1 the least severe.
2Computer E conomics es timates the economic impact of these outbreaks: w ww.computereconomics. com /article. cfm?id=867. These numbers may not include costs
such as s tock v alue decline, cus tomer confidence, and ne gative publicit y.EXECUTIVE EDITOR
Oliver Friedrichs
Symantec S ecurity Response
EDITOR
Stephen Entwisle
Symantec S ecurity Response
DEEPSIGHT THREAT ANALYST
Daniel Hanson
Symantec S ecurity Response
MANAGER, DEVELOPMENT
Dave Ahmad
Symantec S ecurity Response
SENIOR RESE ARCH FELLOW
Sarah Gordon
Symantec S ecurity Response
DEEPSIGHT THRE AT ANALYST
Marc Fossi
Symantec Security Response
SECURITY ARCHITECT
Peter Sz or
Symantec Security Response
SECURITY RESEARCHER
Eric Chien
Symantec Security ResponseExecutive Summary
The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report provides a six-month update of Internet threat activity. This
issue includes an analysis of network-based attacks, known vulnerabilities, and malicious code for the periodof July 1 to December 31, 2003. It also examines how and why attacks have affected some organizationsmore severely than others and how current trends are expected to shape future Internet security threats.Symantec’s recommendations for best security practices can be found in Appendix A at the end of this report.
One of the mo st significant events of 2003 occurred in August when the Internet experienced three new
Category 4 worms in only 12 days.
1Blaster, Welchia, and Sobig.F infected millions of computers worldwide.
These threats alone may have resulted in as much as $2 billion in damages.2
Other Internet Security Threat Report highlights include:
• In the first half of 2003, only one-sixth of
the companies analyzed reported a serious
breach. In the second half of the year, half of the
companies reported a serious breach.
• Seven new vulnerabilities a day were announced
in 2003.
•More vulnerabilities are being published with
tools to exploit them, f orcing adminis trators
to react more quickly.
• Malicious code that exposes confidential data
increased significantly in 2003.
• Blended threats targeting Windows® operating
systems increased significantly in 2003.
• Attackers and blended threats are increasingly
utilizing previously compromised sys tems to
launch attacks.Attack Trend Highlights
• Worms remained the most common source of
attack activity.
• Almost one-third of all attacking systems targeted
the vulnerability exploited by Blaster.
• Attackers increasingly targeted backdoors left
by o ther attackers and worms.
• Attacking systems tended to target geographic
regions close to them.
• Financial services, healthcare, and power and
ener gy were among the indus tries hardest hit
by severe events.
• Increased client tenure continues to result in a
decrease of severe events. Over 70% of clientswith tenure of more than six months successfully
avoided a severe event. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
4Vulnerability Trend Highlights
• Symantec documented 2,636 new vulnerabilities
in 2003, an average of seven per day.
•Symantec data indicates that the rate of vulnera-
bility disclosure has leveled off.
• Newly discovered vulnerabilities are increasingly
severe.
• Newly discovered vulnerabilities are increasingly
easy to exploit.
• In 2003, 70% of vulnerabilities were classified as
easy to exploit.
• The percentage of vulnerabilities for which
exploit code was publicly available increased by
5% in 2003.
• The percentage of vulnerabilities that do not
require specializ ed tools to exploit them
increased by 6% in 2003.
Malicious Code Trend Highlights
• Blended threats make up 54% of the top ten
submissions over the pas t six months.
•Two and a half times the number of Win32
viruses and worms were observed by Symantec
than over the same period in 2002.•Within the top ten malicious code submissions,
the number of mass-mailer worms with their
own mail engine increased by 61% over the first half of 2003.
• Threats to privacy and confidentiality were
the fastest growing threat, with 519% growth in volume of submissions within the top ten.
Current Issues
• In January 2004, MyDoom began spreading
at rates similar to Sobig.F, exposing infected systems through a backdoor and carrying out
a targeted attack.
• Two new worms, Doomjuice and Deadhat,
followed MyDoom, bo th propagating via the
backdoor left by MyDoom.
• Blended threats continue to serve as vehicles
to launch large-scale denial-of-service attacks,
including Blaster in August and MyDoom and its successors (DeadHat and DoomJuice) in the
first two months of 2004.
ATTACKERS LEVERAGING EXISTING BACKDOORS
A large number of sensors observed activity that was targeting backdoors left behind by previous attacks and
blended threats. By leveraging exis ting backdoors to gain control of a target system, attackers can install their
own backdoor or use the compromised system to participate in a distributed denial-of-service attack (DDoS).
As of the firs t quarter of 2004, attackers and new blended threats are scanning networks seeking the
backdoor contained in the MyDoom worm. This backdoor allows attackers to install new malicious code, such
as key logging software, and compromise confidential data on infected systems. It also allows new blendedthreats to inf ect these systems.
VULNERABILITIES INCREASINGLY SEVERE AND EASY TO EXPLOIT
On a verage, over the pas t six months, 99 new high-severit y vulnerabilities a month were announced.
High-severit y threats give attackers increased privi leges and access to more prominent targets, thereby
offering greater po tential rewards. Researchers seek out severe vulnerabilities because they attract more
public and media attention. V ulnerabilities are becoming increasingly easy to exploit . This either means thatSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
5Vulnerabilities are becoming increasingly easy to exploit. This either means that no specialized knowledge
is required to gain unauthorized access to a network or that tools are readily available to help attackers do
so. This increases the likelihood of damaging intrusions. In 2003, 70% of vulnerabilities announced wereconsidered easy to exploit , up from 60% the previous year.
MALICIOUS CODE SUBMISSIONS CONTINUING TO INCREASE
Submissions of malicious code threats to Symantec™ Security Response have increased steadily over the past six
months. Blended threats continue to be a major concern, representing 54% of the top ten submissions. Blas ter,
Welchia, Sobig.F, and Dumaru are four blended threats that have spread rapidly over the past six months.
Malicious code that can expose confidential data such as passwords, decryption keys, and keystrokes has
increased dramatically over the past six months. The most prominent example of this is Bugbear.B, a blended
threat that was designed to extract confidential data. Other such threats include backdoors and spyware,
both of which may expose vital, confidential data.
LOOKING TO THE FUTURE
Symantec analys ts are clo sely monitoring several trends. Firs tly, many Windows operating systems use
components that are common to both corporate and consumer environments. Due to their extensive use,
vulnerabilities in these components may make rapid, widespread severe events more likely.
Secondly , client-side vulnerabilities in Microsoft® Internet Explorer are on the rise. These may allow attackers
to compromise the sys tems of client users who unwittingly visit malicious W eb sites. In the pas t six months,
researchers discovered 34 vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer.
Finally, the time between the disclosure and widespread exploitation of a vulnerability continues to shrink. In
the time between the announcement of a new vulnerability and the development and deployment of a patch,
companies are open to attack. As exploits are developed and released more quickly, companies are increasingly
vulnerable. The likelihood of blended threats that exploit unpublished vulnerabilities (otherwise known as “zero-day” blended threats) is increasing. Symantec believes that “zero-day” threats are imminent. A “zero-day” blendedthreat could tar get such a vulnerabilit y bef ore that vulnerabilit y is announced and a patch made a vailable. If such
an outbreak occurs, widespread damage could occur bef ore users are able to eff ectively patch their sys tems.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
6Attack Trends
Symantec has established one of the most compre-
hensive sources of Internet threat data in the world.Over 20,000 sensors deployed in over 180 countriesby Symantec DeepSight™ Threat ManagementSystem and Symantec Managed Security Servicesgather this data. With analysts located in fiveSecurit y Operations Centers throughout the world,
Symantec has an unparalleled ability to identify,
report on, and respond to emerging threats.
This section of the Symantec
Internet Security
Threat Report provides an analysis of Internet
attack activity for the six months ending
December 31, 2003. This activity will be comparedto data presented in the t wo previous
Internet
Security Threat Reports covering July 1, 2002–
June 30, 2003. Symantec’s recommendations for
best securit y practices can be f ound in Appendix A
at the end of this report.
For the purpo se of this report , attack activit y has
been divided into t wo categories: worm-related
activit y and non-worm-related activit y. This allows
Symantec analys ts to diff erentiate bet ween
autonomously propagating attacks and attacks
that require human inter vention. In some cases,
it is difficult to discern whether attack activit y is
worm-related. In these cases, attacks that are com-
monly associated with worms ha ve been classified
as worm attacks. This section of the Internet S ecurity Threat Report
will discuss:
• Attack activity by type
• The top Internet attacks• The top attacked ports • The top originating countries• The top industries experiencing severe events• The top targeted industries•The impact of client tenure on severe event
incidence
• Patterns of attack activity by time of day
• Patterns of attack activity by day of the week
ATTACK ACTIVITY BY TYPE
Attacks detected by network security devices can
generally be broken down into three categories:
pre-attack reconnaissance, exploit attempts, andworms and blended threats. In comparison to thesame six-month period in 2002, the percentage ofworm events declined dramatically in the secondhalf of 2003
(Figure 1). In the second half of
2002, worm activity accounted for 78% of total
activity. During this period, worm activity dropped
to 43% of the total, with the remaining 57% split:17% representing exploit attempts and 40% recon-
naissance. For the same period in 2002, exploit
attempts accounted for only 3.3%, and reconnais-sance 18% of the to tal.
Figure 1. Attack activity by type
Source: Symantec Corporation
TMS and MSS dataExploit Attempts
17%
Pre-Attack
Reconnaissance
40%Worms and
Blended Threats
43%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
7TOP INTERNET ATTACKS
The top attacks seen by both Symantec Managed
Security Services and Symantec DeepSight ThreatManagement System reflect those that administra-tors are likely to observe on their own networks.Worm attacks are included for this metric, as they
make up a significant portion of Internet attacks
for this period.
The most dominant attack, as measured by volume
of events
(Table 1) was related to the SQLExp
worm, also known as Slammer. It accounted for over one-quarter of the total attacks. SQLExp was
launched on January 24, 2003, and was already
over five months old at the beginning of the current reporting period. This illustrates that old
threats continue to affect organizations long afterthey surface.
SQLExp ’s rapid propagation led to the high number
of attacks. In an attempt to spread, the worm willsend out UDP packets from an inf ected system at
such a rate that it will frequently saturate the band -
width of connected networks. As a result, a single
SQLExp infection can result in a high volume of
attacks. Accordingly , a small number of inf ected
systems could account for its high ranking.
The SQLExp worm is no tably ab sent from the top
ten attacks according to the number of sensors
detecting the activit y
(Table 2). This indicates that
a lar ge number of networks may be filtering traffic
to Microsoft SQL Server, the target of this worm, at
the net work perimeter . On the other hand, attacks
related to the older , but still successful, CodeRed
and Nimda worms rank highly in both volume and
number of detecting sensors. These worms utiliz e
Director y Traversal Attacks, Indexing Server Attacks,
and Cmd.exe Attacks, all of which target Microsoft’s
IIS W eb ser ver.
Sensors frequently detected three attacks targeting
email infrastructure during this period. The GenericSMTP HELO Buffer Overflow Attack and the GenericSMTP Rcpt To Command Attack, third and fourth inattack volume respectively, are both attempts to com-promise SMTP (Simple Mail Transport Protocol) emailservers. These attacks may be related to the increaseof SP AM email that Internet users are receiving.The Matt Wright FormMail attack, which uses a
faulty Web script to perform malicious activity,occupies fifth spot in attacks by percentage ofdetecting sensors. The F ormMail script, used to
submit feedback from a Web page, can allow
delivery of email to arbitrary locations and has,theref ore, been associated with the relaying of
SPAM. Many automated scanners and penetration
testing tools include this attack and perform itagains t any Web server they find. It should be
noted that the tendency for many intrusion detec-
tion systems to falsely identify this attack may
artificially increase the numbers being reported.
Over the past six months, both the Blaster and
Welchia worms spread successfully.
3These two
threats were responsible for the presence of theDCOM RPC (Remote Procedure Call) Attack and
the Generic W ebDAV/Source Attack in these rank-
ings. Both worms caused widespread disruption
for organizations, even those with strong perimeter
filtering. This highlights the risk that a single
unpatched internal system can pose to the securityof a network.
In the two previous
Internet Security Threat Report s,
the top attacks were associated with the SQLExp ,
CodeRed, and Nimda worms. The current period saw
a similar trend, with Indexing Server Attacks, HTTPDirector y Traversal Attacks, and Cmd.exe Attacks all
appearing prominently in the top attacks.
Web-based attacks, occurring over HTTP, accounted
for a significant number of the top attacks. Whenranked by the volume of attacks, six of the top ten
attacks occur over the Web. When ranked by the
number of sensors detecting attacks, eight of the
top ten are associated with Web applications. As apublicly available service, Web traffic is not filteredas frequently at the network perimeter as manyother services.
3Please ref er to the “Malicious Code T rends ” section of this report for a more in-depth discussion of these worms. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
8
TOP ATTACKED PORTS
Symantec analyz es the top attacked ports by t wo
metrics: the percentage of attackers that tar get
each port and the number of sensors that detect
attacks agains t a given port . These t wo metrics
give ver y different views of attack patterns. The first
measures how many different attacking systems are
targeting a particular port . The second is a measure
of how widespread attacks are (that is, how many
security devices have seen activity on this port).
Worm activity is included in this list, as it reflects
activity that administrators will observe on theirown net works. Some ports frequently attacked by
worms may be under-represented due to adminis-trators turning off firewall logging for those ports.
TCP/80, TCP/445, TCP/139, and UDP/137 are allexamples of this.
In the second half of 2003, almost one third of all
attackers tar geted T CP/135
(Table 3). This is the
target port f or the Blas ter worm and a series of
automated threats, including the Gaobot family of
malicious code. The W elchia worm, released in the
wake of Blas ter, also targets TCP/135 as well as
TCP/80. The interest from worms and other auto-
mated tools marks a change from previous Internet
Securit y Threat Report s.During tho se reporting
periods, TCP/135 was the target of much less
threatening operations, primarily the deliver y of
“pop-up SP AM. ”
SQLExp Incoming Worm Attack
Muhammad A . Muquit Count.cgi Attack
Generic SMTP HEL O Buffer Overflow Attack
Generic SMTP Rcpt To Command Attack
Generic WebDAV/Source Disclosure “Translate: f” HTTP Header Request Attack
Microsoft Indexing Server/Indexing Services ISAPI Buffer Overflow Attack
Generic UTF8 Encoding in URL Attack
Generic HTTP Directory Traversal Attack
Generic HT TP ‘cmd.exe’ Request Attack
Microsoft Windows DCOM RPC Interface Buffer Overrun AttackAttack
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Rank
26.2%
9.0%
8.3%
6.2%
4.2%
3.8%
2.1%
2.1%
2.0%
1.8%Percent of Total
Attacks by VolumeTable 1. Top Internet attacks by percentage of total volumeSource: Symantec Corporation
TMS and MSS data
Microsoft Indexing Server/Indexing Services ISAPI Buffer Overflow Attack
Generic WebDAV/Source Disclosure “Translate: f” HTTP Header Request Attack
Microsoft FrontPage® Sensitive Page Attack
Microsoft IIS 4.0/5.0 Extended UNICODE Directory Traversal Attack
Matt Wright FormMail Attacks
Microsoft IIS 5.0 .printer ISAPI Extension Buffer Overflow Attack
Generic HTTP Directory Traversal Attack
Generic UNIX Portmapper Set RPC Attack
Microsoft UPnP NOTIFY Buffer Overflow Attack
Generic HTTP ‘cmd.exe’ Request AttackAttack
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Rank
18.5%
16.3%
14.8%
14.7%
13.5%
13.5%
13.1%
13.1%
13.1%
12.1%Percentage of Sensors
Detecting AttackTable 2. Top Internet attacks by percentage of reporting sensorsSource: Symantec Corporation
TMS and MSS dataSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
9A large number of attackers targeted common
peer-to-peer file sharing ports, including TCP/4662,TCP/6346, and UDP/41170. The presence of theseports in the ranking reflects the popularity of peer-to-peer file sharing and the tendency for organiza-tions to filter this traffic. In addition, new companieshave emerged, scanning and cataloging peer-to-peer clients in an effort to enforce copyright laws.These companies may also be contributing to therise in traffic on these ports.
Attackers also hea vily tar geted T CP/445 and
UDP /137, bo th of which are associated with
Windows file sharing. This is primarily due to theavailability of many automated tools used to attack
these ports. In the second half of 2002, Symantecanalysts noted a similar rise in scanning for Windowsystems with open shares and weak passwords.
UDP /1434 is the final entr y in the top ten ports
targeted by attackers f or this period. It was the
most frequently attacked port during the first
half of 2003 due in lar ge part to the SQLExp
worm. This change indicates that man y sys tems
have been patched but that worms and attackers
are s till tar geting vulnerabilities in Micro soft SQL
Server and Micro soft Desktop Engine environments.
The lower percentage of attackers also confirms
TCP/135
TCP/80
TCP/4662
TCP/6346
TCP/445
UDP/53
UDP/137
UDP/41170
TCP/7122
UDP/1434Microsoft/DCE-Remote Procedure Call (Blaster)
HTTP/Web
E-donkey/Peer-to-peer file sharing
Gnutella /Peer-to-peer file sharing
Microsoft CIFS Filesharing
DNS
Microsoft CIFS Filesharing
Blubster/Peer-to-peer Filesharing
Unknown
Microsoft SQL Server (Slammer)Port Description
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Rank
32.9%
19.7%
9.8%
8.9%
6.9%
5.9%
4.7%
3.2%
2.5%
2.4%Percentage of
AttackersTable 3. Top attacked ports by percentage of attackersSource: Symantec Corporation
TMS data
TCP/80
TCP/17300
TCP/445
TCP/27374
TCP/135
TCP/1433
TCP/21
TCP/139
TCP/443
TCP/1080HTTP/Web
Kuang2 backdoor
Microsoft CIFS Filesharing
SubSeven backdoor
Microsoft/DCE-Remote Procedure Call
Microsoft SQL Server
FTP
Microsoft CIFS File Sharing
HTTPS/Web
Socks ProxyPort Description
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Rank
59.6%
59.0%
57.7%
51.7%
51.3%
51.2%
50.4%
45.2%
44.6%
42.7%Percentage of
SensorsTable 4. Top attacked ports by percentage of reporting sensors4
Source: Symantec Corporation
TMS data
4Footnote copy needed.that the presence of the SQLExp worm in the top
Internet attacks table (Table 1) is due to high vol-
ume, not necessarily a large number of attackers.
Over half of the Symantec DeepSight Threat
Management System sensors detected activity on TCP/80
(Table 4). This makes TCP/80 the most
widely targeted port during this period.
The presence of TCP/17300, ranked second in
Table 4, is significant . In fact, TCP/17300 alone
almost displaces TCP/80 in the ranking. This port,
almost unseen prior to 2003, was the target of an
increasing number of scans throughout the year.
Investigation revealed that it hosted an old, out-of-date backdoor Trojan named Kuang2. Attackerstargeted this port in an effort to find systems
running this backdoor.
The presence of TCP/27374, another common back-
door port (SubSeven), ranked fourth on this list,
is also related to this trend. Attackers scan f or sys -
tems with SubSeven installed. They subsequently
compromise them via the backdoor and then installtheir own backdoor in order to build a net work of
remotely controlled zombies. Sensors have detected
a larger number of scans targeting these ports.However , the absence of the ports in
Table 3 indi-
cates that they have been scanned by a relativelysmall number of attackers. TOP ORIGINATING COUNTRIES
This section will discuss the top countries of
attack origin. It is important to note that the country of origin may not necessarily reflect theactual location of the attacker. It is simple to tracean attack back to the last IP address from which the attack was launched. However, the computerused to launch the attack may not be the attacker’sown sys tem. Because of this, attackers frequently
hop through numerous systems or use previously
compromised systems to hide their location prior tolaunching the actual attack. For example, an attackerin China could launch an attack from a compromisedsystem located in South Korea against a corporate
Web server in New York. International jurisdictionalissues often prevent proper investigation of an
attacker ’s real location.
Over the t wo previous six-month periods, computer
systems within the United States ha ve consis tently
been the most common source of attack activity.
This trend continued f or this period.
Table 5 identi -
fies the top originating countries, ex cluding worm
attacks, and includes their ranking over the two
previous six-month periods. (Entries lis ted as “NR”
were no t ranked in the top ten f or that reporting
period.) Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
10
United States
Canada
China
Japan
Australia
Germany
South Korea
Taiwan
France
ItalyCountry
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Rank
58%
8%
3%
3%
3%
2%
2%
2%
1%
1%1
5
2
9
NR
3
4
NR
6
10Position
January 1 – June 30, 2003
1
7
3
10
NR
4
2
6
5
8Position
July 1 – December 31, 2002Percent of
TotalTable 5. Top originating countries, excluding wormsSource: Symantec Corporation
TMS and MSS dataSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
11The ranking of top originating countries is similar to
those noted over the two previous six-month periods.Australia is the only new entry. Over the past sixmonths, bo th Canada (from fifth to second place)
and Japan (from ninth to third place) have climbed
in the rankings. While Canada has been steadilyclimbing over the past 18 months, Japan’s movementhas occurred primarily over the past six months.
Attacks originating in South K orea declined over
this reporting period. In the second half of 2002,
South Korea was responsible for four times more
attacks than Canada and was ranked second in the
top ten. For this period, attacks originating in South
Korea represented only 2% of the total.
For many threats, the attack rate from a country is
a function of the number of vulnerable systems in
that country. A reduction in the number of vulnera-ble machines will therefore result in a reduction of
the attack rate. For instance, South Korea was one
of the countries hit hardest by the SQLExp worm inJanuary 2003. Attacks originating from South Koreaat that time significantly disrupted Internet connec-
tivity.
5In November 2003, Microsoft announced
plans to work with the Korean Information SecurityAgency in an effort to improve computer securityawareness.
6The drop in attacks originating from
South Korea may indicate that Internet users in that countr y are becoming more diligent in patch
management .
TOP ORIGINA TING COUNTRIES BY
INTERNET CAPITA
The measurement of attack rates according to
the countr y of origin does no t take into account
the number of Internet users in each countr y. For
example, as the United States has one of the high-
est populations of Internet users, it is no t surprising
that it occupies a significant position in overall
attack rates. However, it does not have the highestnumber of attacks per Internet user , a measure of
the number of attacks launched from that country
per 100,000 Internet users. Instead, of countrieswith over 100,000 Internet users, Canada is the toporiginating country per Internet user
(Table 6). The
United States is the fourth highest country of attackorigin according to attacks per Internet user .REGION OF ATTACK TARGETS FOR TOP
ORIGINATING COUNTRIES
To determine whom attacking systems in the top
originating countries tar geted, attacks originating
in each countr y were ex amined and their tar get
locations grouped by region. The resulting regional
distributions of attacks were then compared with
the global re gional dis tribution seen by Symantec
DeepSight Threat Management System and
Symantec Managed Securit y Ser vices sensors.
The resulting ratio of attacks (Table 7) shows, at
least in part, that attacking systems prefer to target
countries that are geographically clo se to their own.
The “ratio of attacks” table is not indicative of over-
all attack rates for each of the countries. Rather, it
indicates whether the dis tribution of attacks from
a country targets some regions more than others.
For many of these countries, there is a tendency to tar get certain re gions at a significantly higher
rate than other regions. In most cases—especially
France, Italy, Germany and Australia—attacking systems pref er to attack targets that are located
in the same geographic region.
Canada
Kuwait
Ireland
United States
Nigeria
Cyprus
Finland
Iceland
Israel
AustraliaCountry
8,285
6,957
6,397
5,966
5,662
5,508
5,287
5,028
4,922
4,251Attacks per
100,000 Users
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10RankTable 6. Top originating countries
per Internet capitaSource: Symantec Corporation
TMS and MSS data
5Source: www.computerworld.com/securitytopics/security/holes/story/0,10801,77898,00.html
6Source: w ww.microsoft.com/presspass/press/2003/nov03/11-04KoreaInfoSecurityPR.asp
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
12Many factors may contribute to this tendency. The
first is the visibility of potential target organizationsin the daily lif e of citiz ens. Attackers tar get what
they know . The second factor is contiguous IP
address allocation. Sequential scans will clus ter in
networks numerically clo se to the source. The third
factor ma y be language issues. Attackers ma y ha ve
more difficulty compromising a system that uses
a language with which they are unfamiliar .
South Korea was the only country in the top ten
that did not show a preference for targets in itsown region. Instead, attacks from there seemed toprefer Australian and North American targets.
South America received less interes t from the top
ten originating countries than an y other re gion.
This may be because no South American countries
are represented in the top ten source countries,possibly lending weight to the h ypothesis that
source countries generally target their own regions
more than o thers.
ATTACK ACTIVITY BY INDUSTRY
Attackers choose their targets for many reasons.
In some cases, they may target a single company or a group of companies from a single indus try.
In other cases, an attacker may compromise a system regardless of its owner. Attacks targeting
specific industries can be examined in two ways:first, by comparing the number of severe events
experienced by an indus try to the number of
non-severe events and, second, by the number of
attacks specifically tar geting that indus try. Each
can result in diff erent conclusions. This section
will look at both perspectives.
TOP INDUS TRIES EXPERIENCING
SEVERE EVENT S
Symantec determines the severity of an event based
on the characteris tics of the attack, the defensive
controls of the client , the value of the assets at risk,
and the success of the attack . Severe events pose
the greatest threat to organizations. The number
of severe events that an indus try experiences is
one indicator of the amount of risk to which that
industry is exposed. Symantec ranks those indus-tries that ha ve received the highes t number of
severe events per 10,000 events
(Figure 2) .Many
factors contribute to the industry ranking, includingthe interes t from attackers, the skill level of attack -
ers, and the technologies deployed in that industry.
United States
Canada
China
Japan
Australia
Germany
South K orea
Taiwan
France
ItalySource C ountryTarget Region
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Rank
1.1
1.0
1.0
0.7
0.8
0.0
0.9
0.8
0.0
0.21.4
1.7
1.2
1.9
1.0
0.6
1.5
1.1
2.1
0.8North America
1.0
0.9
0.4
0.6
0.4
2.5
0.6
0.5
0.0
0.3Africa
0.6
0.3
0.7
0.4
0.6
3.6
0.7
0.8
4.4
5.2Europe
0.6
0.7
1.9
1.9
1.0
0.4
1.2
2.6
0.0
0.6Asia
0.8
1.0
1.1
1.0
6.8
0.0
2.0
1.6
0.0
0.0Australia South AmericaTable 7. Ratio of attacks by originating country according to target region7
Source: Symantec Corporation
TMS and MSS data
7In the ratio of attacks table, a value of 1 indicates that the regional attack distribution for that country is the same as the global regional attack distribution. If the
country’s attack distribution targeting a region is double the global average, this ratio would be 2. If a country’s attack distribution were half the global average,this ratio would be 0.5.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
13The rate of severe attacks experienced by the
top industries varies tremendously. The financialservices sector, which is ranked first, experiencedjust over four times the severe attack rate of the
telecommunications sector, which is ranked tenth.
Businesses with significant financial resources tendto experience a relatively high severe attack rate.Critical infrastructure industries also experiencehigh attack rates. The nonprofit sector, ranked in sixth place, is an
interesting entry. Although it likely has little appealfor attackers interested in financial rewards, thenonprofit indus try may attract attention for political
and social reasons. For instance, nonprofits are
often involved in high-profile, controversial issues.This ma y provoke severe attacks.
0369Figure 2. Severe events experienced by industries per 10,000 events
IndustriesFinancial
ServicesBusiness
ServicesHealthcarePower &
EnergyMedia/Ent. Nonprofit E-commerce Mfg.High-
TechTelco7.8
6.16.2
5.4
5.1
3.0 2.7
2.5 2.4
1.9Severe events
Source: Symantec Corporation
MSS data
0246Figure 3. Targeted industry attack rate
Targeted IndustriesHigh-
TechE-commerceHealthcareSmall
BusinessNonprofit Retail Business
ServicesEducationFinancial
ServicesMfg.4.9
2.93.6
2.5
2.0
1.3
1.21.1 1.11.0Percentage of Attackers
Source: Symantec Corporation
TMS and MSS dataSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
14TOP TARGETED INDUSTRIES BY RATE
OF ATTACK
The percentage of total attackers targeting only
a specific indus try indicates which industries are
more frequently the targets of directed, purposeful
attacks (Figure 3) .According to this ranking,
organizations with a more prominent Internet
presence seem to experience a greater rate of
targeted attacks. For instance, the high-tech and e-commerce industries (ranked first and secondrespectively) experience a much higher attack ratethan the remaining industries.
CLIENT TENURE AND SEVERE EVENT INCIDENCE
Client tenure is the length of time that an organiza-
tion has used Symantec Managed Securit y Ser vices.
This metric allows Symantec analysts to assess theresult of an organization’s investment in security. In
2003, as in 2002, the rate of severe events decreasedas client tenure increased. Over 70% of clients with a tenure of more than six months successfullyavoided experiencing a severe attack, while all newclients (less than three months tenure) did experi-ence such an attack. This indicates that organiza-
tions that have made a commitment to securing
their en vironment show a decrease in severe events
over time. The relationship bet ween client tenure and attack
activity for the second half of 2003 is shown in
Figure 4. It should be noted that, compared to pre-
vious reporting periods, the number of to tal organi-
zations experiencing severe events increased over
the past six months, regardless of tenure. The mostsignificant increases occurred in companies withone to three months of tenure. This rise is largelythe result of increasingly successful worms. Moreworms have been targeting vulnerabilities in coreWindows components. These components are morewidespread than the server software targeted byprevious network-based worms, resulting in a much
higher density of vulnerable systems. These wormsalso benefit from two other factors: the decrease in
time between vulnerability disclosure and release of exploit code, and the overall increase in exploitcode development .
PATTERNS OF ATTACK ACTIVITY BY TIME
Internet attacks can occur at an y time of the
day, any da y of the week. The global nature of
the Internet transcends local time patterns. As a
result, an attacker may launch an attack at 12:00
in the local time z one that is ob served by the tar get
system at 04:00 local time. This section of the
Internet Security Threat Report will discuss some
of the patterns of attack activit y according to the
time of da y and the da y of week .
0%20%40%60%80%100%Figure 4. Percentage of companies detecting severe events by client tenure
Client Tenure (Months)1 – 3 4 – 6 7 – 9 10 – 12 13 – 15 16 – 18 19+Percentage of Companies
Source: Symantec Corporation
MSS dataSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
15WORM ACTIVITY BY DAY OF THE WEEK
Symantec has noted a significant change in the
daily distribution of worm-related attacks for thisreporting period compared to the first half of 2003
(Figure 5). During that time, worm activity was
more common on weekdays (Monday–Friday) thanon weekends. However, in the second half of 2003,attack activity was more evenly distributed: roughlythe same percentage of worm-related attacksoccurred each day. This may be due to the predom-inant worm in each period.
In the firs t six months of 2003, the SQLExp
(Slammer) worm infected many computers running
Micro soft SQL Server or the Microsoft Desktop
Engine. These applications are usually f ound on
workstations in corporate environments and are
less likely to be deployed on personal desktop systems. As mo st work -related computers are not
used outside of business hours, propagation activit y
for worms targeting these systems would generally
be limited to business hours. The volume of attacks that inf ected systems are
able to sustain may also influence this trend.
SQLExp utilized a highly efficient method for propagation. As a result , it could send infection
packets at a far greater rate than previous worms.
During the second half of 2003, major outbreaks
included Blaster and Welchia, which affected allrecent versions of Windows. As a result, propaga-tion of these worms could be expected to continueoutside normal work hours, including weekends.Additionally, systems that remain infected by
SQLExp are those that are not rebooted on a daily
basis, as the worm is memory resident and cleaned
by such reboots. Although SQLExp is significant in
terms of the volume of attacks, when gauged by the
number of inf ected sys tems, it is far less significant
and can be expected to have less impact on day-of-week v ariability.
0%3%6%9%12%15%18%Figure 5. Daily distribution of worm-associated attacks
Day of WeekMonday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday SundayPercentage of Attackers
Worm events—second half of 2003
Worm events—first half of 2003
Source: Symantec Corporation
TMS and MSS dataSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
16NON-WORM ACTIVITY BY DAY OF THE WEEK
Worms require little human inter vention to spread.
On the other hand, non-worm attacks are normallyinitiated by humans, even tho se perf ormed by a
bot net work . The fact that these attacks are no t
automated will likely affect the times at which
they are launched. As a result , the time pattern
for non-worm attacks is likely to be diff erent from
that of worms.
The daily distribution of non-worm attacks and
severe attacks
(Figure 6) shows a decrease in non-worm activit y on F ridays, Saturdays, and
Sunda ys. These events seem more likely to occur
during the workweek. Severe event activity also
shows a definite decrease on the weekend, especiallyon Sunda y. A rise in activit y occurs on W ednesda y.
Regardless of what conclusions ma y be drawn from
this, attacks can s till occur on any day of the week.
Organizations mus t be prepared to monitor and
respond to these events at all times.
8For countries that ha ve multiple time zones such as the United States and Canada, the median time zone was chosen.
0%5%10%15%20%25%Figure 6. Daily distribution of events and severe events
Day of WeekMonday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Saturday SundayNon-worm events
Severe non-worm events
Source: Symantec Corporation
TMS and MSS dataPercentage of AttackersSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
17ATTACK ACTIVITY BY TIME OF DAY
The time of day at which attacks take place may
affect an organization’s security strategy. Symantec
analys ts ha ve analyz ed and plo tted Internet attack
activity according to the time of day at which it
occurred.8Attacks from three groups—worms and
blended threats, non-worm-associated attacks, and
severe events—were analyzed. Overall, the time ofattack launch indicates that attacking sys tems are
generally more active between the hours of 07:00and 20:00 local time.
The time distribution of worm activity
(Figure 7)
appears to be cyclical. The peak of activity occurs at
17:00 local time and the low point occurs at 05:00.This pattern is consistent with computers beingturned on and off. Non-worm events are distributedin a similar wave-like fashion, with a greater drop-off in the very early morning hours. The similaritybetween the worm and non-worm distributions isinteresting. It indicates that the systems performingthe non-worm attacks may also be influenced bywhether or not systems are turned on. Severe events are important because they are a
serious risk to or ganizations. These show a low
incidence in the early morning, followed by a rise
through the business day, and a high in the after-
noon and early evening. However , compared to
other attack events, severe events show a greater
variation from hour to hour and a more significantdrop from the late evening to early morning of each day. This variability is likely the result of therelatively low numbers of severe attacks. Because of the small sample siz e, a minor variance in the
number of attacks can result in a higher variance in the percentage of attacks.
0%2%4%6%8%
Worm
Non-Worm
SevereFigure 7. Time of day distribution of Internet attacks according to attacker’s local time
Attacker Time (24h)Percentage of Attackers
0:00 2:00 4:00 6:00 8:00 10:00 12:00 14:00 16:00 18:00 22:00 20:00
Source: Symantec Corporation
TMS and MSS dat aSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
18Vulnerability Trends
The ongoing discover y of new vulnerabilities in
information systems continues to pose serious
threats to organizations. Without warning, a singlecritical vulnerability can result in the exposure ofsystems that were previously considered secure.The fact that latent vulnerabilities can surface atany time is a frustrating fact of life for administra-tors. It seems that vulnerabilities are being discov-ered as quickly as they are being remedied.
This section of the Symantec
Internet Security
Threat Report discusses developments in vulnerabil-
ities disclosed over the past six months. The intent
of this section is to (1) examine the characteristicsof vulnerabilities disclosed during the second half of 2003, and (2) discuss potential future threats.
It will also analyze and compare vulnerability trends
observed in 2003 with tho se observed in 2002.
Symantec’s recommendations for best security
practices can be found in Appendix A at the end of
this report .
Symantec operates BugT raq, the mo st popular
forum for the disclosure and discussion of vulnera-bilities on the Internet. The BugTraq mailing list hasapproximately 50,000 individual subscribers who
receive, discuss, and contribute vulnerability infor-mation on a daily basis .
9Symantec also maintains
one of the world’s most comprehensive databases ofsecurity vulnerabilities, covering vulnerabilitiesaffecting over 20,000 technologies from over 2,000
vendors. This discussion of vulnerability trends is
based on a thorough analysis of that data.
OVERALL VOLUME
The Symantec vulnerability database documented
2,636 new vulnerabilities in 2003, compared to2,587 new instances in 2002.
10This equates to
220 new vulnerabilities published per month, or an average of 7.22 new vulnerabilities every day. This
represents a less than 2% increase in total volume
over 2002. Compared to the 81% increase from
2001 to 2002, this mar ginal level of growth sug-
gests that a plateau has been reached. A number of
factors may be influencing this, including a levelingoff in the number of new vulnerabilit y researchers,
a shif t toward keeping vulnerabilit y details priv ate,
and the number of easily discovered vulnerabilities
being exhausted.
Figure 8 depicts the volume of
vulnerabilities published monthly since Januar y 2002.
9The BugT raq mailing lis t is hosted by SecurityFocus at www.securityfocus.com. Archives are available at www.securityfocus.com/archive/1
10It should be no ted that no t all vulnerabilities that are discovered are disclo sed publicly . The data ref erred to in the Symantec Internet S ecurit y Threat Report includes
only tho se vulnerabilities that ha ve been made public.
050100150200250300350
Figure 8. Volume of new vulnerabilities per month
MonthJan02 Mar02 May02 Jul02 Sep02 Nov02 Jan03 Mar03 May03 Jul03 Sep03 Nov03New V ulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation226
195
171240 237
212228 228
212240
197201210 211244
213287304
240
183200191
165188Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
19There was a significant diff erence between the
number of vulnerabilities announced in the first
half of 2003 and the second half. Researchers dis-closed 21% more vulnerabilities in the first half
of 2003 than in the second half. In raw numbers,
this equates to 1,469 in the first half, compared to 1,167 in the second. In 2002, the opposite wastrue, although the difference was smaller: 1,281vulnerabilities were announced in the first half and 1,306 in the second half.
The total number of vulnerabilities published each
month has increased only slightly since 2002 (it has,
in fact, decreased in the most recent six months).
However, there are some noteworthy changes in
the types of vulnerabilities being discovered and
the ur genc y of tho se new issues. V ulnerabilities
discovered in 2003 were increasingly severe and
easier to exploit . These trends will be discussed in
the f ollowing sections.
SEVERIT Y
Symantec analysts rate vulnerabilities according to
their potential severity. Severity is defined as the
impact of a vulnerability on the confidentiality,integrity, and availability of the affected information
system. It is determined by the accessibility of the
target system to attackers, and the objects withinthe sys tem that may be affected. For the purposes of the Symantec
Internet S ecurity
Threat Report, each entry in the vulnerability data-
base is categorized as one of three severity levels.These levels are:
•
Low severity —vulnerabilities that constitute
a minor threat. Attackers cannot exploit such vulnerabilities across a network. In addition, the impact on the affected system’s confiden-tialit y, integrity, or availability is not a complete
compromise. Low-severity vulnerabilities include
non-critical losses of confidentiality (for example,
system configuration exposure) or non-critical
losses of integrity (for example, local file
corruption).
•
Moderate severity —vulnerabilities that result
in a partial compromise of the affected system,such as those by which an attacker gains elevatedprivileges but does not gain complete control
of the target system. Moderately severe vulnera-
bilities also include those for which the impact on systems is high but accessibility to attackers is limited. This includes vulnerabilities thatrequire the attacker to have local access to thesystem or to be authenticated before the systemcan be exploited.
050100150200250300350Figure 9. Breakdown of volume by severity
MonthJan02 Mar02 May02 Jul02 Sep02 Nov02 Jan03 Mar03 May03 Jul03 Sep03 Nov03New V ulnerabilities
Source: Symantec CorporationLow Severity Medium Severity High SeveritySymantec Internet Security Threat Report
20•High se verity —vulnerabilities that result in a
compromise of the entire system if exploited. In almost all cases, attackers can exploit high-severit y vulnerabilities across a network without
authentication.
Based on these criteria, the majority of security
vulnerabilities published in 2003 were classified as moderate- to high-severity threats
(Figure 9).
Accordingly , the number of low-severity threats
appears to be decreasing. In the second half of
2003, Symantec classified approximately five
vulnerabilities per month as low-severity threats.
This is down from the approximately eight low-
severity vulnerabilities published per month in
the first half of 2003.
On a year-by-year basis, the number of low-severity
vulnerabilities has also decreased. The previous twoSymantec
Internet Security Threat Report s indicated
that researchers were focusing on more severe vul-
nerabilities, with the number of low-severity vulner-abilities declining from July 2002 to June 2003.This trend continued through the remainder of2003. In 2002, eight vulnerabilities per month, onaverage, were classified as low severity. In 2003,Symantec considered six vulnerabilities per monthas low severity on average.
The continuing decline of low-severity vulnerabilities
may be driven by two factors:
• Vulnerabilities that are classified as remotely
exploitable are almost always rated at least moderately severe. This is because the vulnerable
component may be accessible to a larger numberof attackers, making the vulnerability more of a
threat. In 2003, 79% of vulnerabilities published
were classified as remotely exploitable, 80% inthe firs t half of the year and 78% in the second
half. This is nearly the same as the percentage
for 2002, 81%. Securit y researchers increasingly
pursue remotely exploitable vulnerabilities due
to the lar ger number of tar gets accessible by
interconnected net works. F urthermore, applica-
tions are increasingly network-capable and, as
a result , remo tely exploitable vulnerabilities
naturally f ollow .
•More researchers want to find high-severit y
threats and more attackers want to exploit
them. The potential for damage caused by high-severit y attacks is greater than lower-severity
ones. As a result, they often generate more
attention when published, both among theirpeers in the research communit y as well as in
the media. More importantly, higher-severity
vulnerabilities also allow attackers to gain higheraccess privileges on target systems.
Despite the fact that security researchers prize
them, the a verage number of high-severity vulnera-
bilities published per month dropped slightly over
the past year, from 109 per month in 2002 to 99
per month in 2003. Conversely, the number of
moderately severe vulnerabilities increased, froman average of 98 per month in 2002 to an averageof 115 per month in 2003. This trend is relatively
consis tent throughout 2003, with an a verage of 51%
of vulnerabilities per month rated as moderately
severe in the firs t half and 54% in the second half.
The increase may be due to the number of vulnera-
bilities affecting Web-based applications. Many ofthese vulnerabilities tend to be low impact but, inalmost every instance, remotely exploitable. As a
result, they are rated as moderately severe or higher.
The increase in vulnerabilities affecting Web-basedapplications is also driving the rising ease of exploita-tion. This will be discussed in the following section.
EASE OF EXPLOITATION
Ease of exploitation indicates how difficult it is for
an attacker to exploit a vulnerability to compromise
a target system. Symantec rates each vulnerabilityas either “Easily Exploitable ” or “No Exploit
Available” according to three criteria:
•
No exploit required —exploit code is not
required. With a reasonable amount of technicalknowledge, the attacker can exploit the vulnera -
bility without an y exploit code.
•
Exploit available —exploit code has been
developed and is publicly a vailable.
•No exploit available —exploit code would be
required to exploit the vulnerabilit y but, to the
best of Symantec’s knowledge, none is known
to exist.
Vulnerabilities that require no exploit or that ha ve
a required exploit a vailable are classified as “Easily
Exploitable. ” Generally, these vulnerabilities do not Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
21require sophisticated skills or knowledge to exploit.
Anyone with sufficient general technical knowledgeor with publicly a vailable tools can exploit them.
Examples of these are Web server vulnerabilities
that can be exploited by simply entering an appro-priate URL into a Web browser.
Vulnerabilities that are classified as “No Exploit
Available” are more difficult to exploit. This is
because attackers canno t exploit them using basic
knowledge alone and because no known tools to
exploit them have been written or made publiclyavailable. To exploit these vulnerabilities, an attacker
would be required to write custom exploit code
(assuming that there is none circulating in theunder ground). This significantly raises the level of
knowledge, expertise, and effort required for a suc-
cessful attack, thus increasing the difficulty andlowering the probabilit y of such an attack. It should
be pointed out that while no tools may be publicly
available, private exploits might exist. However,without a public exploit, these vulnerabilities won’tlikely be widely exploited.
Vulnerabilities are becoming easier to exploit. The
percentage of total vulnerabilities that are consid-ered “Easily Exploitable” rose by 10% over 2003.That increase was consistent for both the first andsecond half of the year. In 2001 and 2002, the per-
centage of all vulnerabilities classified as “EasilyExploitable ” was approximately 60%. In 2003, it
was approximately 70%. Two factors emerge as
likely reasons behind this increase:
1. More vulnerabilities require no exploit code.
The percentage of vulnerabilities that do no t
require an exploit rose 6% in 2003 over 2002.
This is lar gely due to an increase in vulnerabili-
ties that affect Web-based applications
(Figure
10). Web-based vulnerabilities tend to be easily
exploited input-v alidation errors such as cross-
site scripting and SQL injection attacks. They
are frequently rated “No Exploit Required.” Thenumber of vulnerabilities that aff ect Web-based
applications increased by 4% in 2003. This
increase corresponds closely to the increase in vulnerabilities requiring no exploit code.
2. More exploit code is being published. In 2003, 15%
of documented vulnerabilities had exploit codeassociated with them, compared with 10% in 2002.
In 2003, the percentage of vulnerabilities that
did no t require exploit code increased by 6%. This
was driven by a similar increase in the number of
Web application vulnerabilities. Exploit develop -
ment also increased by 5%. These t wo increases
0%5%10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%Figure 10. P ercentage of new vulnerabilities affecting web-based applications
MonthJan02 Mar02 May02 Jul02 Sep02 Nov02 Jan03 Mar03 May03 Jul03 Sep03 Nov03Percentage of V ulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation32%
30%32%34%
24%33%
24%
21%
18%27%
24% 24%40%
29%38%
32%37%
30%
27%30%32%
31%
25%28%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
22largely account for the 10% increase in easily
exploitable vulnerabilities. A small amount of overlap is attributable to exploit development for vulnerabilities requiring no exploit code (1.38% in 2003).
Figure 11 depicts the rise in
easily exploitable vulnerabilities. Figure 12 shows
the number of vulnerabilities according to ease of exploitation cate gories.EXPLOITS BY VULNERABILITY SEVERITY
To understand the threat posed by the increased
development of exploit code, it is important to lookat what types of vulnerabilities are being exploited.The majority of vulnerabilities with associatedexploit code in 2002 and 2003 are classified ashigh-severity
(Figure 13) .Most of the remaining
vulnerabilities with exploits are moderately severe.
050100150200250300350
Figure 12. Volume of vulnerabilities by ease of exploit
MonthNumber of V ulnerabilities
Source: Symantec CorporationJan02 Mar02 May02 Jul02 Sep02 Nov02 Jan03 Mar03 May03 Jul03 Sep03 Nov03Exploit Available No Exploit Available No Exploit Required
0%20%40%60%80%100%Figure 11. Percentage of easily exploitable new vulnerabilities
MonthJan02 Mar02 May02 Jul02 Sep02 Nov02 Jan03 Mar03 May03 Jul03 Sep03 Nov03Percentage of V ulnerabilities
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
23A relatively small number of exploits are developed f or
low-severity vulnerabilities. This is because researchers
and attackers will likely develop exploit code onlywhen the po tential reward justifies the effort.
FUTURE CONCERNS
In reality, few of the approximately 220 vulnerabili-
ties per month documented by Symantec pose a
serious threat to or ganizations. Unfortunately,
attackers need only one critical vulnerability to com-
pletely expose a network. The two major worms thatappeared in the summer of 2003—Blaster andWelchia—demonstrated this.
Symantec has identified three particular areas of
future concern: (1) blended threats exploiting so-called “zero-day” vulnerabilities, (2) vulnerabili-ties in core Windows operating system componentsin both corporate and consumer environments, and (3) the continued threat of client-side vulnerabilitiesin Microsoft Internet Explorer.
“ZERO-DAY” VULNERABILITY BLENDED THREATS
All blended threats to date ha ve exploited vulnera-
bilities that were known to the public. In many
cases, patches were already a vailable by the time the blended threat surfaced. F or ex ample,
26 days elapsed between the announcement of
the Microsoft DCOM RPC vulnerability and the
appearance of the Blas ter worm.11The application of
patches and other mitigating techniques, such as port filtering, reduces the number of potentialvictims. However, the likelihood of blended threats
that exploit unpublished vulnerabilities (otherwise
known as “zero-day” blended threats) is increasing.
It is almost certain that there are still unknown,
remotely exploitable vulnerabilities lurking in
widely used technologies. A “zero-day” blendedthreat could target such a vulnerability. If a “zero-day” outbreak occurs, patches are unlikely to beavailable for many days. Even identifying the meansby which such a worm is propagating may takelonger than the time required for it to compromiseall vulnerable systems.
It is surprising that this has not happened already.
The nearest miss thus far occurred when CodeRedappeared in July 2001, exploiting a vulnerability for which no functional exploit code had yet beenpublished. The near certainty of this threat shouldhighlight the need for administrators to alwaysemploy eff ective, preventive security measures.
050100150200250Figure 13. V ulnerabilities with exploit code, By severity
High Severit y175231
87161
610
Medium Severit y Low Severity
Severity RatingNumber of V ulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation2002
2003
11Source: www.securityfocus.com/bid/8205 12W32.Welchia.Worm, which exploited BID 8205, managed to infect a network of Diebold ATMs running Microsoft Windows XP
Embedded: www.securityfocus.com/news/7517
13For more information, see the article at news.zdnet.co.uk/internet/security/0,39020375,39117067,00.htm
14For more information, go to www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyID=7bd948d7-b791-40b6-8364-685b84158c78&DisplayLang=enSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
24VULNERABILITIES IN CORE WINDOWS
OPERATING SYSTEM COMPONENTS
The presence of vulnerabilities in components
that are used in bo th corporate and consumer
environments is worrisome. Between July 1, 2003,
and December 31, 2003, Symantec reported 13 vulnerabilities that aff ect both corporate and
consumer versions of Microsoft Windows.
Today, Microsoft operating systems that are
designed for both corporate and consumer environ-ments share common features and code. This makesdevelopment, maintenance, and support for these
systems more efficient. Unfortunately, it also meansthat vulnerabilities in shared components will affectall environments that use those components. A good
example of this is the Micro soft DCOM RPC Interface
Buffer Overflow Vulnerability. Both Windows 2000and Windows XP are vulnerable to this threat.
Exploitation of both corporate and consumer envi-
ronments contributed to the successful prolif eration
of Blas ter and W elchia.
12Even though corporate
environments tend to be more immune to infection,
due to the use of firewalls, inf ections in home en vi-
ronments ma y still aff ect them because of bandwidth
consumption and other consequences. Vulnerabilities
in shared components ma y also allow blended threats
that inf ect consumer sys tems to “ piggyback” their way
into otherwise secure corporate networks through
laptops, VPNs, and other mobile technologies.
MICROSOFT INTERNET EXPLORER
Client-side vulnerabilities in Microsoft Internet
Explorer continue to pose potential threats to organi-
zations. Vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer have been
mentioned as possible future threats in the two previ-ous Symantec
Internet Security Threat Report s. The
primary reason for concern is the huge market domi-nance that Internet Explorer enjoys. It is currently awidely used tool for business and personal communi-cations, particularly with the increasingly common-place use of Web-based applications.
Researchers continue to discover vulnerabilities
in Internet Explorer. The Symantec vulnerabilitydatabase contains 20 dis tinct vulnerabilities
affecting Internet Explorer that were published inthe firs t half of 2003. In the second half of 2003, 34
Internet Explorer vulnerabilities were published, a
70% increase. Many of these vulnerabilities allowattackers to compromise the sys tems of client users
who unwittingly visit malicious Web sites or Web
sites hosting malicious content, intentionally or not.
This risk is further complicated by applications
that use the modular nature of Internet Explorercomponents to render and displa y Web content
received through other applications. One type of
application that frequently does this is an emailclient. The situation is compounded by the fact thatmany organizations struggle to keep up with patch
management on critical servers, not to mention the
thousands of desktops and laptops that make up the
enterprise net work .
It is important to note, however, that because of the
highly composite nature of Internet Explorer and the
complexity of its security model, it is sometimes dif-
ficult to pinpoint the location of each distinct vul-nerability. What is reported as a single vulnerabilitycan be the result of multiple security weaknesses
linked together to form a more complex exploit.
These factors compound the difficulty in managingthe risk associated with Web browsers.
Further aggravating the problem is that it is
extremely difficult for firewalls, intrusion detection
systems, and other security mechanisms to preventexploitation. Mo st firewalls allow unrestricted
access to the Internet for HTTP traffic over standard
ports. It is not possible to enforce content policy atthe network level. It may not be possible to differen-
tiate between “good” and “bad” HTML content. As a
result, for many of the vulnerabilities, a victim needonly visit a malicious Web site in order to be compro-mised. Finally, parts of Internet Explorer are used inmany applications, such as Microsoft Outlook. ® It iscommon for vulnerabilities in these components toaffect applications that use them.
Micro soft has acknowledged man y securit y issues
associated with Internet Explorer .
13A document pub-
lished by Microsoft, listed changes to be made in
Windows XP SP2, including several securit y
enhancements f or Internet Explorer and related
components.14Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
25Malicious Code Trends
This section of the Symantec Internet Security
Threat Report will analyze current and future
malicious code threats. The trends in this report are based on statistics from malicious code samplessubmitted to Symantec for analysis. Symantec gathers data from over 120 million client, server,and gatewa y systems that have deployed Symantec’s
antivirus products in both consumer and corporate
environments. The Symantec Digital ImmuneSystem™ and Scan and Deliver technologies allowcustomers to automate this submission process.This report analyzes and discusses the submissions
in two ways: first, according to the number of
specific examples of malicious code, such asBlaster, Sobig.F, and Bugbear.B; and second,
according to the volume of all malicious code,
such as viruses and worms, combined.
While the number of unique individual threats has
not changed significantly in the past six months,
the overall volume of malicious code submissions
to Symantec Security Response has steadilyincreased. Based on the type and volume of thesamples submitted, threats to priv acy and confiden-
tialit y appear to be the mo st rapidly increasing
threats. Additionally, the risk from blended threats
continues to escalate, as man y companies continue
to fail to patch known vulnerabilities in a timely
manner. Finally, Win32 threats continue to increase,with four severe Win32 threats appearing duringthe past six months.
Increased propagation speed, aided in part by
increased bandwidth and decreased latency, meansthat any of these threats has the potential to causewidespread damage more quickly than ever before.Organizations can greatly limit exposure to mali-cious code by patching known vulnerabilities andadhering to good security policies. Symantec’s recommendations for protecting against maliciouscode attacks can be found in Appendix A at the endof this report.BLENDED THREATS
Blended threats use multiple methods and tech-
niques to spread. They combine the characteristicsof malicious code (such as viruses, worms, andTrojan horse programs) with the ability to exploitvulnerabilities. As a result, blended threats canspread to large numbers of systems in a very shorttime, causing widespread damage very quickly. The multiple propagation mechanisms of blendedthreats enable them to compromise a company’ssecurity posture and to simultaneously overloadsystem resources and saturate network bandwidth.Examples of blended threats include, but are notlimited to, Blaster, Sobig.F, and Bugbear.B.
In the previous issue of the
Internet S ecurit y Threat
Report, Symantec emphasized the growing danger
of blended threats. This assessment was based onincreased numbers of dis tinct blended threats
reported, overall prev alence of blended threats in
malicious code submission volume, and analysis
of actual damage incurred as a result of severalhigh-profile threats, such as Klez and Sobig.F .
In the past six months, Symantec analysts have
not seen a s tatistically significant increase in the
number of individual blended threats submitted
to Symantec. However, the volume of all blended
threats combined has increased. Within the top ten
submissions to Symantec
(Table 8) the volume of
blended threats has increased 59%.
Bugbear.B
Trojan.ByteVerify
Download.Adware.Lop
IRC Trojan
Sobig.F
Blaster
Redlof.A
Swen.A
Klez.H
Download.TrojanSample
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Rank
80,961
51,232
24,265
24,092
21,955
21,166
20,941
19,332
16,518
12,458SubmissionsTable 8. Top ten submissions received by SymantecSource: Symantec CorporationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
26Thus, while there has been no significant increase
in the number of specific blended threats reported,the volume of blended threats as a whole hasincreased. This trend indicates that blended threatsare affecting a larger number of systems and theimpact continues to be severe.
The severity of the impact is illustrated by one of
the top ten most reported submissions, Blaster,which accounted f or approximately 7% of the
top ten submissions during the second half of 2003
(see Table 9) .15According to Symantec DeepSight
Threat Management data, the worm infected anaverage of 2,500 computers per hour. Once an
attack was launched, the worm attempted to carry
out a denial-of-service attack against the Microsoft
Windows update site, in an attemp t to keep users
from obtaining the patch necessary to secure theirsystem. Fortunately, this attack was unsuccessful.
Symantec analysts have noticed that for some
high profile vulnerabilities the time betweenannouncement and widespread exploitation hasbeen decreasing. Blaster is an example of this phe-
nomenon. Unlike previous threats, which emerged
months or even years after initial announcement of a vulnerability, Blaster exploited the DCOM RPCvulnerability less than a month after the vulnerabilitywas publicly announced. Multiple vendors wereaffected
16and off ered workarounds.17
Blas ter was quickly followed by the release of
Welchia. This worm exploited the same vulnerability
in an attempt to “fix” Blaster infected computers. If the Blaster worm was found on a system, Welchia
would install the Microsoft DCOM RPC patch.
Another of the top ten reported submissions,
Sobig.F, also appeared in this reporting period.Using its own SMTP engine (also known as an emailengine) to propagate via email, the worm swampedmailbo xes of bo th corporations and consumers.
The Sobig.F family of viruses demonstrated greater
sophis tication than earlier malicious code in several
ways. No t only did it make use of social engineering
techniques, it was also programmed to act as a
command and control center , downloading abiweekly update. F urthermore, it was designed to
exploit open SMTP proxies to enhance its spread
rate. Sobig.F was able to exploit users’ trust success-fully, gaining a global foothold extremely quickly.
Blended threats are increasing in complexity as well
as in scope and speed. This complexity not onlymandates a strong corporate security policy, it also dictates a comprehensive approach that makes useof strong heuristics, content filtering, and worm-
blocking techniques. Patch management, antivirus,
IDS, and firewall components all serve to protect
against blended threats such as Blaster and Sobig.F.
Win32 VIRUSES/WORMS
The Win32 API provides a standard for the develop-
ment of software on the Windows platform, so itshould come as no surprise that malicious codeauthors are also benefiting by using it. Win32threats are executable files that operate by using theWin32 API. These forms of malicious code work onat least one Win32 platform. As Microsoft Windowscontinues to be ubiquitous, instances of Win32threats have shown a rise in volume. This rise wasfirst noted in the second half of 2002, and it contin-
ued to accelerate in the second half of 2003.
15See the Worm Lifecycle Speed of Propagation sub-section of this report for additional information on Blaster.
16For a lis t of aff ected vendors, see w ww.securit yfocus.com/bid/8371
17For a lis t of workarounds, see w ww.securityfocus.com/bid/8205/solution/
Bugbear.B
Blaster
Sobig.F
Redlof.A
Swen.A
Klez.H
Welchia
Dumaru
Exception.Exploit
Spybot Blended Threat
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10RankTable 9. Top ten blended threats submittedSource: Symantec CorporationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
27Symantec observed two and a half times the number
of Win32 viruses and worms in this period than overthe same period in 2002. Over the second half of2003, Symantec documented more than 1702 newWin32 viruses and worms compared to the 687 documented in the second half of 2002. Duringthat period, Win32 viruses in the top 50 Symantecmalicious code submissions decreased by 33%.However, over the past six months, they haveincreased by 64%. As of December 31, 2003, the total number of Win32 variants was approaching 5,500.
The number of unique Win32 viruses and worms
submitted to Symantec has remained relatively stable. However, the volume of submissions of all Win32 malicious code threats combined hasincreased approximately 64%. The increased volume and impact of these threats is cause for concern. There were four Category 4 outbreaks(Blaster, Welchia, Sobig.F and Dumaru) during the second half of 2003.
18
Symantec researchers have noted two particularly
disturbing trends. Firs t, as has been no ted elsewherein this report, the time between the announcement
and widespread exploitation of a vulnerability isdecreasing. Whereas in the past, months or evenyears could elapse between the announcement of
a vulnerability and the release of a worm, the
Gaobot worm exploited the Workstation ServiceVulnerability less than two weeks after it was first
published on November 11.
19
The second dis turbing trend is the use of packers
to obfuscate malicious code.20The Spybot worm
family has more than 500 documented variants, over 75% of which are packed with UPX or ASPack
packers. Antivirus products must make use of robust
binary unpackers to protect systems from this typeof malicious code.
Provided that antivirus solutions are implemented
proactively and well maintained on all platf orms and
acro ss all tiers of a corporate net work , companies
should be well pro tected from the majority of these
threats.
18The Symantec Security Response Threat Severity Assessment evaluates computer threats (viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and macros) and classifies them into one of five cate-
gories, with Cate gory 5 being the mo st severe, and Cate gory 1 the leas t severe.
19For more inf ormation, see http:// securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/threat.severity.html
www.securityfocus.com/bid/9011
20Packers are tools that compress and encr ypt Windows ex ecutable files. This is a concern f or securit y personnel because it makes detection by antivirus engines more difficult .
UPX and A SPack are specific t ypes of packers.
0400800120016002000Figure 14. New Win32 viruses and worms
Jan 1, 2001 –
Jun 30, 2001Jul 1, 2001 –
Dec 31, 2001Jan 1, 2002 –
Jun 30, 2002Jul 1, 2002 –
Dec 31, 2002Jan 1, 2003 –
Jun 30, 2003Jul 1, 2003 –
Dec 31, 20033084334456879941,702
PeriodNumber of Viruses and W orms
Source: Symantec Corporation
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
28WORM LIFECYCLE AND SPEED OF PROPAGATION
As soon as a worm is released into the wild, it
spreads by infecting new systems. The worm mayattack computers in specific locations (for instance,designated network blocks, domains, or computersresiding in certain countries) or it may indiscrimi-nately attack the entire Internet. If successful, theworm then uses the infected system as a platformfrom which to tar get new potential victims.
Each successful penetration follows this pattern,
and the number of infected systems grows until
either all po tential victims are infected or until
countermeasures (such as antivirus software) begin
to halt the spread. Over time, as eff ective protection
becomes ubiquitous and exis ting inf ections are
remedied, the rate of propagation slows and sup-
pressive factors begin to chip away at the overallworm population. This pattern of release, grow th,
and gradual decline is the lif ecycle of a worm.
The speed at which a worm propagates is a critical
factor in its lifecycle. Propagation speed is governedby a variety of influences, such as the algorithmsused by the worm writer, the infection vectors used
by the worm, and the number of available viable
systems. Other factors that can influence speed of propagation include greater homogeneity ofInternet-connected systems, increased bandwidthcapacit y, and computing speed of tar get sys tems.
LIFE CYCLE OF BLASTER
The Blaster worm, one of the top submissions to
Symantec Security Response, used a propagation
strate gy based on the exploitation of a well-known
buffer overflow vulnerabilit y in the widely deployed
Microsoft Windows NT®, 2000, XP and 2003 operat-
ing sys tems.21The worm was released less than a
month af ter the vulnerabilit y was announced and
the patch made publicly available. However, many
systems remained unpatched, enabling the worm
to spread rapidly among the vulnerable population.
Earlier worms, such as CodeRed and Slammer,
depended on special services such as those run byWeb or database servers running on their targets.Blas ter, on the o ther hand, enjoyed the advantage
that the vulnerability involved the DCOM RPC
(Remote Procedure Call) service, a service active by default on all computers running Windows NT ,2000, XP , and 2003. This vulnerable component is
common to both corporate and consumer systems.
The worm’s ability to enter corporate networks
directly from the Internet was limited, as firewallstypically block RPC traffic at the boundary betweenthe corporate intranet and the Internet. However,Blaster found its way inside intranets through othervectors. Vulnerable machines that had becomeinfected through direct exposure to the Internet or
other infected networks were connected to clean
company networks either directly or via a VPN con-
nection. Once inside an intranet, the worm could
spread freely due to the common nature of its targets.
Blaster produced disruption within affected environ-
ments by saturating local networks with the volume
of RPC traffic it generated. It also caused the RPC
service to crash on some systems that were not sus-ceptible to infection, effectively shutting down the
service on some targets and triggering immediate
reboots on others.
LIFECYCLE OF WELCHIA
Welchia followed Blaster by less than a week. The
Welchia worm spread to Windows XP machinesusing the same RPC vulnerabilit y. However, it
could also spread via HTTP traffic to Windows 2000
systems running Microsoft’s IIS 5.0 Web server byusing an older buffer overflow vulnerability.
22The
use of HTTP traffic allowed Welchia to sneak
through firewalls that block RPC traffic, thus
spreading more easily from the Internet to intranetsand vice versa. It is worth no ting that the W elchia
worm normally only propagates until January. Thus,
assuming machines are rebooted, this worm shouldexperience a natural decline in the field afterJanuary 2004.
Although Blas ter and W elchia caused temporar y
network disrup tions on corporate net works, neither
carried a destructive payload. If this had not been
the case, damage from the outbreaks would ha ve
been greater . Symantec expects to see greater
worm propagation, resulting in overloads to net-
work hardware. This ma y cripple net work traffic ,
diminish net work a vailability, and disrupt business
continuity, as well as impairing the Internet-based
communication abilit y of bo th corporate and end
users.
21The worm itself could spread only to hosts running Windows 2000 and XP.
22For a list of vulnerabilities, go to www.securityfocus.com/bid/7116 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
29Although it is hard to def end against swiftly propa-
gating worms, one way to limit damage is to deploy
more effective processes for identifying and promptlypatching sys tem vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, this
is not yet happening. Patches and security updates
are usually implemented after the fact, once thedamage is already done. Fortunately, virus protec-tion has become more prevalent, helping to inhibitproliferation. However, as viruses move faster, theimportance of thoroughly securing machines cannotbe overemphasized.
MASS MAILERS WITH INTERNAL EMAIL
ENGINES
Mass-mailing viruses and worms spread by harvest-
ing and using email addresses from infected systems.There are t wo basic t ypes of mass-mailing viruses:
those that use an existing email system to propa-
gate and those that use a distinct email engine built
into the malicious code itself .
Until recently , viruses and worms relied almo st
exclusively on a user’s existing email engine to
replicate and send copies to potential victims.
Once inf ected, however , users could of ten detect
the virus, as copies of bounced viral email would
appear in their inboxes. Once alerted, they couldtake countermeasures to limit its spread.
To bypass this limitation, virus writers create their
own email engines, known as SMTP engines, in an
attemp t to f oster propagation that is both more
efficient and harder to detect . The number of
unique viruses and worms in Symantec’s top ten
submissions that contain their own email enginesexperienced little fluctuation over the pas t six
months. However , the volume of all such threats
combined increased at a rate that was consistent
with the increase of overall submissions. Within the top ten submissions to Symantec, the volume of malicious code utilizing its own SMTP engineincreased by appro ximately 61%.
Because emails generated by the self-contained
engine of malicious code do no t interact with the
user’s email system, there are few telltale signs
of an active infection. Furthermore, since most of these threats spoof their origin, victims canno t easily identify the true originator . This makes track-
ing the sources of infection difficult and enables
the virus to survive longer.
Filtering of attachments, which can be done by
most antivirus SMTP gateway implementations, can help control initial spread until signatures arereleased. Fortunately, most market-leading antivirusproducts with effective heuristics-based detectioncan resis t these types of threats.
ADDITIONAL INFECTION VECTORS: INSTANT
MESSAGING, PEER-TO-PEER, CIFS
Several infection vectors merit discussion in this
six-month update: instant messaging (IM), Internetrelay chat (IRC), peer-to-peer (P2P) services, and
Windows file sharing (CIFS). Instant messagingworms use a v ariet y of methods to spread,
including:
• Utilizing APIs documented by the vendor. For
example, using an instant messaging applica-
tion’s file transmission API to send itself out
to contacts.
• Enumerating Windows via the Windows OS APIs
to interactively send a file, simulating the user .
•Sending a URL link ins tead of a file.
•Patching client DLLs to send itself along with
the original message.
Each of these methods exploits exis ting program
functionalit y or trus t relationships.
Several applications are available that allow
Internet users to communicate synchronously inreal time, particularly IM and IRC. A review of thetop 50 submissions to Symantec finds no ins tances
of threats to IM in the past six months. However,there were t wo reports of worms that used IRC to
spread: Swen and Spybot.
Interestingly, both Swen and Spybot used P2P and
IRC to spread. Overall, the volume of P2P threatswithin Symantec’ s top 50 submissions has
increased 46% over the previous six-month period.
Most of these P2P threats spread without anyknowledge of the P2P file-sharing pro tocol; rather ,
they simply copy themselves to directories that are
shared to others with enticing filenames. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
30One ex ample of this type of threat is the Spybot
worm. This worm searches the Windows Registry
for the Kazaa configuration keys. Once it has locatedthese, it adds a new key that configures Kazaa toshare out an additional directory. The worm thencopies itself to this directory using a number of filenames intended to entice users looking forpornography, software cracks, or other illicit contentinto downloading it.
When other users on the Kazaa file-sharing network
search for files matching these names, they will
connect to the infected user via the Kazaa network
and download the worm, believing (because of thefilename) that it is another program. New variantsof Spybot are discovered daily, with over 600 known
variants currently in exis tence. Ano ther P2P threat ,
Swen, works the same way. Swen is the eighth-
ranked threat in Symantec’ s top 50, with nearly
20,000 submissions in the pas t six months.
Worms using Windows file sharing (CIFS) to propa-
gate continued to appear in the past six months.
23
Malicious code often uses Windows file sharing tocopy itself onto o ther network-accessible systems
in order to propagate. Three of the submissions
within Symantec’s top ten reports made use of CIFS,including the mo st frequent submission, Bugbear.B.
Overall, the volume of submissions using IM, P2P,
and CIFS within Symantec’s top ten increased 57%in the past six months
(Figure 15). As both legiti-
mate and unapproved use of IM, IRC, P2P network-ing, and CIFS continue to increase, Symantecexpects to see more new worms and viruses usethese mechanisms to spread. Unlike other avenues
for propagation, such as email, these vectors often
have little corporate oversight, making management
difficult.
Fortunately, organizations can take steps to protect
users. A simple solution is for organizations to pro-
hibit employees from using insecure versions ofthese services. Finally, policies regarding proper
usage must be defined and enforced.
23CIFS is not unique to Windows; however, most, if not all of the threats apply only to Windows systems.
070,000140,000210,000280,000350,000Figure 15. Volume of submissions using IM, P2P, IRC, and CIFS
Jan 1, 2001 –
Jun 30, 2001Jan 1, 2002 –
Jun 30, 2002166,896292,920
PeriodNumber of Submissions
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
31THEFT OF CONFIDENTIAL DATA
Over the past six months, Symantec observed a
rise in malicious code that can expo se confidential
data. Older threats compromised confidentialit y
by exporting random documents. However, more
recent viruses and blended threats extract no t only
documents but also inf ormation such as passwords,
decr yption keys, and logged keystrokes. Analysis of
the data from this six-month period shows that the
impact of these threats has escalated. Previously,
22% of Symantec’ s top ten malicious code submis-
sions were a threat to privacy and confidentiality
(Figure 16). During the past six months this rose to
78%. Likewise, the to tal volume of top ten submis-
sions threatening privacy and confidentiality has
also increased by 519%.
BUGBEAR.B
Bugbear.B accounted for approximately 18% of
Symantec’s top 50 submission volume over the pastsix months. This blended threat was designed toextract confidential data, such as lists of file names,lists of processes, user names, processor type, OSversion, memory information, local drives, and network resource and type. Additionally, Bugbear.Bcan also deliver logged keystrokes to a third party,compromising important inf ormation such as pass-
words and decr yption keys. The creator of this
threat appears to have targeted banking institutions
in an attempt to export financial data or gain futureaccess to accounts by s tealing users ’ account
details and passwords.
BACKDOORS
Submissions to Symantec indicate a continued
focus on malicious backdoors. The volume of sub-
missions in Symantec’ s top ten reports shows an
increase of 276% in this category (Figure 17). Of
entries in Symantec’s top 50 submissions, back-doors increased by 123%.
Backdoors can facilitate the unauthorized export of
any type of data contained in or processed by thecompromised system by providing remote access to it. Once a machine is compromised, intruders caninstall keystroke loggers and the keystrokes of allusers can be exported to the attacker in an easy-to-read file. Entire sessions can be logged and passwords for any systems or applicationsaccessed, recorded, and exported. Once a system is compromised, it can be used to mail out confi-dential information automatically or as a launchingpoint for attacks against other systems.
0%20%40%60%80%100%Figure 16. Threats to confidential data as percentage of top ten submissions
Jul 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002 Jan 1, 2003 – Jun 30, 2003 Jul 1, 2003 – Dec 31, 200324.3%22.1%77.9%
PeriodPercentage of Submissions
Source: Symantec Corporation
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
32SPYWARE
Spyware programs track Internet browser usage,
jeopardizing user privacy and confidentiality. These
programs typically operate via Port 80; thus, they
are often able to slip past firewalls without arousingsuspicion. Spyware can deliver information aboutbrowser habits and user behavior to a third party.
The implications of spyware are inherently difficult
to quantify . However , Symantec’s research has
shown that even though good technical solutions
exist and man y companies ha ve security policies
in place, users often knowingly engage in activities
that risk exposure of confidential information.
24
Corporate and home users alike need to s trengthen
both technical and operational policies and proce-
dures in order to preserve privacy and confidentiality.For ins tance, correctly implemented browser and
firewall policies can help reduce the risks from
spyware, particularly when combined with softwarethat automatically deletes unwanted cookies. FUTURE CONCERNS: PERVASIVE COMPUTING
AND MOBILE DEVICES
Currently , the number of downloadable third-party
applications f or wireless computing is limited; thus,
malicious code threats that can be directed at the
devices are minimal. However, as pervasive comput-ing increases, users will adop t wireless devices that
are no t only connected to the Internet, but that
also have email and instant messaging capabilities.As that happens, the potential for these types ofthreats will increase. Symantec analysts continue
to monitor the pervasive computing landscape.
FUTURE CONCERNS: LINUX
In 1998, Symantec ob served the first example of
a successful Linux worm, the Linux.ADM.Worm,
which exploited a widely known vulnerabilit y and
compromised man y systems. Following this out-
break, there was a period of inactivity. This ended
with the appearance of the Slapper worm inSeptember 2002. Although a major outbreak of aLinux worm has not been observed since Slapper,Symantec analys ts continue to monitor the po ten-
tial for Linux-based malicious code.
0%10%20%30%40%50%Figure 17. Backdoors as percentage of top ten malicious code submissions
Jul 1, 2002 – Dec 31, 2002 Jan 1, 2003 – Jun 30, 2003 Jul 1, 2003 – Dec 31, 200321.2%22.1%47.3%
PeriodPercentage of Submissions
Source: Symantec Corporation
24Preliminary research findings are available at http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/privacy.attitudes.behaviors.pdf Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
33Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices
Enterprise best practices
1.Turn off and remove unneeded services.
2. If a blended threat exploits one or more network
services, disable, or block access to, those services until a patch is applied.
3. Always keep your patch levels up-to-date, espe-
cially on computers that host public servicesand are accessible through the firewall, such as HTTP, FTP, mail, and DNS services.
4. Enforce a password policy.
5. Configure your email server to block or remove
email that contains file attachments that are
commonly used to spread viruses, such as .vbs,.bat, .exe, .pif, and .scr files.
6.Isolate inf ected computers quickly to prevent
further compromising your organization.Perform a forensic analysis and restore the
computers using trus ted media.
7.Train employees no t to open attachments unless
they are expecting them. Also, do not executesoftware that is downloaded from the Internet
unless it has been scanned f or viruses.
8.Ensure that emer genc y response procedures are
in place.
9. Educate management on security budgeting
needs.
10. Test security to ensure that adequate controls
are in place.Consumer best practices
1. Use an Internet security solution that combines
antivirus, firewall, intrusion detection, and vul-nerabilit y management for maximum protection
against blended threats.
2. Ensure that security patches are up to date.
3. Ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and
numbers. Do not use dictionary words. Changepasswords often.
4. Never view, open, or execute any email attach-
ment unless the purpose of the attachment is
known.
5. Keep virus definitions updated. By deploying
the latest virus definitions, corporations andconsumers are protected against the latest
viruses known to be spreading “in the wild.”
6. Consumers should routinely check to see if their
PC or Macintosh system is vulnerable to threatsby using Symantec™ Securit y Check at
www.symantec.com/securitycheck.
7. All types of computer users need to know how
to recognize computer hoaxes, which typicallyinclude a bogus email warning to “ send this to
everyone you know” and improper technical
jargon to frighten or mislead users. Consumersand business prof essionals also need to consider
who is sending the inf ormation and determine if
it is a reliable source. The best course of action
is to simply delete these types of emails.
8. Consumers can get involved in fighting cyber
crime by tracking and reporting intruders.
With the Symantec Security Check tracing serv-ice, users can quickly identify the location ofpotential hackers and forward the informationto the attacker’s Internet service provider orlocal police.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
34Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology
Attack trends in this report are based on the
analysis of data derived from Symantec DeepSightThreat Management System and SymantecManaged Security Services. Both services use acommon naming convention for types of attacks,enabling analysts to combine and analyze attackstogether or separately .
Symantec combines these two data sources for
analysis when appropriate—that is, when they both
contain the attributes required for the particular
analysis. In some cases, only one data source isused if attributes required for a particular analysis
are not available in the other.
Table 10 provides high-level details of the methods
used by each service.
ATTACK DEFINITIONS
In order to avoid ambiguity with our findings,
Symantec’s methodology for identifying variousforms of attack activity is outlined clearly below.
This methodology is applied consistently through-
out our monitoring and analysis.
The first step in analyzing attack activity is to define
precisely what an attack is. Rather than limiting the analysis to only one metric of attack activit y,
Symantec uses several different metrics, each of
which is appropriate under a certain set of circum-stances. Presented below is a high-level summary
of the dis tinctions used in the report .Attacks —Attacks are individual signs of malicious
network activity. Attacks can consist of one or moreIDS or firewall alert that are indicative of a singletype of attacker action. For example, multiple fire-
wall logs often indicate the occurrence of a single
network scan. The attack metric is the best indica-tor of the overall volume of actual “attacker actions”detected over a specified period of time.
Worm Attacks —In order to better draw conclusions
regarding attack trends, activity related to autono-mously propagating worms has been identified. Anabsolute verification of the origin of some activity is often impossible, as certain scans from networks
containing a Trojan horse will look identical to a
worm attempting to propagate. The decision of
whether traffic originates from a worm is a judgment
based on the origin of the majority of the traffic.
Events —Security events are logical groupings of
multiple attacks. “Event” is a term that is used only
by Symantec Managed Security Services. A securityevent may include a group of similar, but non-threatening individual attacks experienced by companies during the course of a day (for example,all non-threatening HTTP scans experienced duringa single day are grouped into an event). A securityevent may also include multiple attacks against asingle company by a single attacker during a speci-fied period of time. Securit y events are generated
only by the Symantec Managed Securit y Ser vice,
and are only used in this report when discussing
“Severe Event Incidence.”
Data Collection Methodology Data Source
51%Percent of Companies
in Sample Set
Symantec DeepSight
Threat Management
SystemSymantec DeepSight Threat Management System collects IDS
and firewall events from more than 20,000 security devices
deployed in more than 180 countries.
49% Symantec Managed
Security ServicesSymantec Managed Security Services provides real-time
monitoring and analysis of attack activity launched against
more than 500 companies worldwide. Due to the nature of
monitoring activity, some statistics, such as event severity,
client tenure, and attacks per company only apply to data
received from Symantec Managed Security Services customers.Table 10. Data collection methods used by Symantec ServicesSource: Symantec CorporationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
35EVENT SEVERITY
Event severity is only applicable to data generated
by Symantec Managed Security Service. Every eventvalidated by Symantec security analysts is assignedto one of four severity classifications: informational,warning, critical, and emergency
(Table 11) . The pri-
mary purpose of this rating system is to prioritizeclient responses to malicious activity based on therelative level of danger that the event presents totheir environment. A determination of severity isbased on characteristics of an attack, defensivecontrols of the client, value of the assets at risk,and the relative success of the attack.
These f our severity levels are further grouped into
two classifications: severe and non-severe events.
Severe events include activity classified as either
“emergency” or “critical,” while non-severe eventsinclude activit y classified as either “inf ormational”
or “warning .” For ex ample, a severe event requires
immediate countermeasures from an organization,
while a non-severe event is mainly inf ormative.
EXPLANATION OF RESEARCH ENQUIRIES
This section will provide more detail on specific
methodologies used to produce the data and statisticsin this report. While most methodologies are ade-
quately explained in the analysis section of the report,
the f ollowing in vestigations warranted additional detail.TOP TEN INTERNET ATTACKS
Symantec identified and ranked the top attacks
seen on networks across the Symantec DeepSightThreat Management System and SymantecManaged Security Services base. This ranking does not differentiate between worm- and non-worm-related attacks and, instead, can be seen as indicative of the distribution of attacks that an Internet-connected ho st can be expected to
observe. Where certain attacks are strongly associ-
ated with worm activity, it is noted in the text.
TOP ATTACKED PORTS
The top port data is gathered solely from the
Symantec DeepSight Threat Management Sys tem,
and represents individual scan attempts from perime-
ter security devices throughout the world. Not everysingle port scan can be considered ho stile, but port
data is of ten indicative of wide-scale scanning f or
individual services being targeted for exploitation.
TOP ORIGINA TING C OUNTRIES
Symantec identified the national sources of attacks by
automatically cross-referencing source IP addressesof every attack with several third-party, subscription-based databases that link the geographic location ofsystems to source IP addresses. While these databas-es are generally reliable, there is a small mar gin of
Severity
LevelSeverity
Classifications
Informational
WarningDescription
Non-Severe Events consisting of scans for malicious services and IDS events that do not have a
significant impact on the client's network. Example: Scans for vulnerable services
where all connection attempts are dropped by the firewall.
Events consisting of malicious attacks that were unsuccessful in bypassing the firewall
and did not compromise the intended target systems. Example: Scans and horizontal
sweeps where some connections were allowed, but a compromise has not occurred.
Critical
EmergencySevere These events are malicious in nature and require action on the part of Symantec or the
client to fix a weakness or actual exploit of the client network or devices. By definition,
if a critical event is not addressed with countermeasures, it may result in a successful
compromise of a system. Examples: (1) Continuous attacks by a single IP address
against the client network or a significant vulnerability on the client’s network that
was identified by either an attacker or the Security Operations Center (SOC). For
example, a Web exploit is observed and appears to be successful, but there is no
observed follow-up activity to take advantage of the vulnerability. (2) Unknown
suspicious traffic that warrants an investigation by the client to track or eliminate the
traffic flow.
These events indicate that a security breach has occurred on the client’s protected
network. An emergency event requires the client to initiate some form of recovery
procedure. Example: Successful exploit of a vulnerable Web server.Table 11. Event severity classifications
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
36error. Currently, Symantec cross-references source IP
addresses of attacks against every country in the world.
It is important to note that while Symantec has a reli-
able process for identifying the source IP address ofthe host that is directly responsible for launching anattack, it is impossible to verify where the attacker isphysically located. It is probable that many of thesources of attack are intermediar y systems used to
disguise the attacker’s true identity and location.
ATTACKS PER INTERNET CAPITA
The number of Internet users was ob tained from
the CIA World Factbook.25The CIA World Factbook
provides a breakdown of the number of Internet
users per country.
REGION OF ATTACK TARGETS FOR TOP
ORIGINA TING C OUNTRIES
Symantec developed this metric as a representation
of how the attack distribution of each top countrycompares to the global average attack distributionhighlighted in the location of attack targets. For example, if the global distribution of attacks is
30% destined for North America, and only 15% of
distribution from a given country was destined forNorth America, this would be represented as 0.50;whereas if 60% of the traffic was destined for North America, this would be represented as a 2.0.
Table 12 reflects the meaning of the numbers used
in these dis tributions.
It should be noted that this metric is intended solely
to represent the degree to which a country deviates
from the global distribution, and is not an indica-tion of overall attack rates. ATTACK ACTIVITY BY INDUSTRY
For the purposes of the report, a targeted attacker
is one that is detected attacking at least three
companies in a specific industry, to the exclusion of all other industries.
Figures 18 and 19represent the industry break-
down of the sample set in percentage terms.Industries with less than ten sensors have beenexcluded from the resulting totals.
ATTACK SEVERITY BY INDUSTRY
The Symantec Managed Security Services infra-
structure allows ranking of attacks based on
severity of attacks. Symantec analysts classifyattacks for severity according to the attack beingperformed, exposure of the victim to the attack,
and indications as to whether it was successful.
TARGETED INDUSTRY ATTACK RATE
The targeted industry attack rate is a measure
of the percentage of total attackers that target onlyorganizations in a specific indus try. It can indicate
which industries are more frequently the targets
of directed attacks. This metric may be affected by
the overall attack rate experienced by each indus try;
nevertheless, it provides an indication of the interest
that an industry holds for targeted attackers.
CLIENT TENURE AND SEVERE EVENT INCIDENCE
Symantec analys ts have analyzed the average
number of severe attacks experienced per Symantec
Managed Securit y Ser vice cus tomer in each of the
tenure brackets. The tenure is the amount of time
the company has been a customer of SymantecManaged Securit y Ser vice, and is an indication of
the eff ect that can be seen when Symantec is driv-
ing security improvements in the organization.
25Source: www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook
No attacks destined for that region
Less than the global average destined for that region
Same distribution as global average
Greater than the global average destined for that regionHeading
0
<1
1
>1RankTable 12. Measurement of attack targets for top originating countriesSource: Symantec CorporationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
37PATTERNS OF A TTACK A CTIVITY BY TIME
Symantec analysts have analyzed and plotted
Internet attack activity according to the time of day. Taking into account the global nature of the
Internet, this data has been adjusted to the median
time zone of the originating country of the attack.The attacks analyz ed were from three groups:
worm-associated attacks, non-worm-associated
attacks, and severe attacks. Each attack detected by Symantec has a correspond-
ing time stamp (expressed in Greenwich MeanTime), which describes the precise time that theattack was detected. This time is extracted from thelog data (for example, firewall or IDS) produced bythe device that Symantec is monitoring. However, in order to evaluate what time of day attackers aremost active within specific locations throughout theworld, Symantec adap ted these time s tamp s by the
offset of the local time zone in which the attacking
system was located.
Figure 18. Symantec Managed Security Services sensor distribution by industry
Legal – 0%Transportation – 1%Government: State or Local – 1%
Federal Government – 1%
Other – 1%
Retail – 1%
Education – 2%
Telecommunications – 3%
Power & Energy – 3%
Media/Entertainment – 5%
Manufacturing – 5%
Nonprofit – 6%
Healthcare – 7%
E-commerce – 8%
Business Services – 9%High-Tech – 14%Financial Services – 16%Small Business – 17%
Source: Symantec Corporation
MSS data
Transportation – 0%
Home User – 0%Government: State or Local – 0% Agriculture, Construction, and Mining – 1%
Power & Energy – 1%
Federal Government – 1%
Media/Entertainment – 1%
Nonprofit – 3%
Telecommunications – 3%
Manufacturing – 3%
Retail – 4%
Healthcare – 4%
Financial Services – 4%
Education – 5%
Business Services – 9%
Small Business – 11%High-Tech – 47%
Source: Symantec Corporation
TMS dataFigure 19. Symantec DeepSight Threat Management System Sensor Distribution By Industry Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
38Appendix C—Vulnerability Trends
Methodology
The “ Vulnerability Trends” section of the Symantec
Internet Security Threat Report discusses develop-
ments in the discovery and exploitation of vulnera-bilities over the pas t six months. This methodology
section will discuss how the data was gathered and
how it was analyzed to come to the conclusions thatare presented in the “ Vulnerability Trends” section.
Symantec maintains one of the world’s most com-
prehensive databases of security vulnerabilities,
consisting of over 9,000 distinct entries. The infor-
mation presented in the “Vulnerability Trends”
section is based on the analysis of that data bySymantec researchers.
VULNERABILIT Y CLASSIFICATIONS
Following the discovery and/or announcement of
a new vulnerability, Symantec analysts gather allrelevant characteristics of the new vulnerability and
create an alert. This alert describes important traitsof the vulnerability, such as the severity, ease ofexploitation, and a list of affected products. These
traits are subsequently used both directly and indi-
rectly for this analysis.
VULNERABILITY TYPE
After discovering a new vulnerability, Symantec
threat analys ts classify the vulnerability into
one of 12 possible categories. The classification
system is based on Taimur Aslam et al (1996),who define the taxonomy used to classify vulnera-
bilities.
26Possible values are indicated below,
and the previously mentioned white paper provides a full description of the meaning behindeach classification:
• Boundary condition error
• Access validation error• Origin validation error• Input validation error• Failure to handle exceptional conditions• Race condition error• Serialization error• Atomicity error• Environment error• Configuration error•Design errorSEVERITY
Symantec analysts calculate a severity score
on a scale of 1 to 10 for each new vulnerability discovery. The severity score is based on the following factors:
•
Impact —the relative impact on the aff ected sys-
tems if the vulnerability is exploited. For example,
if the vulnerability enables the attacker to gainfull roo t access to the system, the vulnerability
is classified as “high impact.” Vulnerabilities
with a higher impact rating contribute to a higherseverit y score.
•
Remote exploitability —indicates whether the
vulnerability can be exploited remotely. Vulner-abilities are classified as remotely exploitable
when it is possible to exploit the vulnerability
using at least one method from a position external to the system, typically via some type of communication protocol, such as TCP/IP, IPX,
or dial-up. Vulnerabilities that are remotely
exploitable contribute to a higher severity score.
•
Authentication requirements —indicates
whether the vulnerability can be exploited only
after providing some sort of credentials to the
vulnerable sys tem, or whether it is po ssible to
exploit it without supplying any authentication
credentials. Vulnerabilities that require no
authentication on the part of the attacker
contribute to a higher severit y score.
•Availability of the affected system —rates how
accessible the system is to attackers in terms of exploitability. Some vulnerabilities are alwaysexploitable once the attacker has accessed the sys -
tem. Other vulnerabilities may be dependent on
timing, the interaction of other objects or subjects,or otherwise only circumstantially exploitable.Increased availability of the affected system toattackers will increase the calculated severity.
26“Use of a Taxonomy of Security Faults, ” ftp.cerias.purdue.edu/pub/papers/taimur-aslam/aslam-krsul-spaf-taxonomy.pdf Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
39After gathering information on these four attrib-
utes, analys ts use a pre-established algorithm to
generate a severity score that ranges from one to
ten. For the purposes of this report, vulnerabilities
are rated as high, moderate, or low severit y based
on the scores presented in Table 13.
EASE OF EXPL OITATION
The ease of exploitation metric indicates how easily
vulnerabilities can be exploited. The vulnerabilityanalyst assigns the ease rating after thoroughlyresearching the need for and availability of exploitsfor the vulnerability. All vulnerabilities are classifiedinto one of three possible categories, listed below.
•
Exploit available —sophisticated exploit code
to enable the exploitation of the vulnerability ispublicly a vailable to all would-be attackers.
•
No exploit required —would-be attackers can
exploit the vulnerability without having to use
any form of sophis ticated exploit code. In other
words, the attacker does not need to create or
use complex scripts or tools to exploit the vulnerabilit y.
•
No exploit available —would-be attackers must
use exploit code to make use of the vulnerability;however, no such exploit code is publicly available.
For the purpo ses of this report , the firs t two types
of vulnerabilities are considered “easily exploitable”
because the attacker requires only limited sophisti-cation to make use of it . The las t type of vulnerabilit y
is considered “difficult to exploit” because the
attacker mus t develop his /her own exploit code to
make use of the vulnerabilit y.Appendix D—Malicious C ode Trends
Methodology
The trends in the “Malicious Code ” section are
based on statistics from malicious code samplessubmitted to Symantec f or analysis. Symantec gath-
ers data from over 120 million client , ser ver and
gateway systems that have deployed Symantec’s
antivirus products in bo th consumer and corporate
environments. The Symantec Digital Immune
System and Scan and Deliver technologies allow
customers to automate this submission process.
Observations in the “Malicious Code Trends” section
are based on empirical data and expert analysis.
The data and analysis draw primarily from t wo
databases described below .
INFE CTION DATABASE
To help detect and eradicate computer viruses,
Symantec developed the Symantec AntiVirus ™
Research Automation (SARA) technology. Symantec
uses this technology to analyze, replicate, anddefine a large subset of the most common computerviruses that are quarantined by Symantec AntiViruscustomers. On average, SARA receives hundreds of thousands of suspect files daily from both enter-prise and individual consumers located throughoutthe world. Symantec then analyzes these suspectfiles, matching them with virus definitions. Ananalysis of this aggregate data set provides statistics on infection rates for different types of malicious code.
MALICIOUS C ODE DATABASE
In addition to inf ection data, Symantec Securit y
Response analyzes and documents attributes for
X ≥ 7
4 ≤ X < 7
X < 4Severity Score Range
High
Moderate
LowSeverity LevelTable 13. Measurement of severity level
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
40each new f orm of malicious code that emerges both
in the wild and in a “zoo” (or controlled laboratory)
environment. Descriptive records of new forms ofmalicious code are then entered into a database for future reference. For this report, historical trendanalysis was performed on this database to revealtrends, such as the use of different infection vectorsand the frequency of various types of payloads.
Appendix E—Glossary
ASPack packers
ASPack is a particular type of packer that
compresses Win32 executable files.
Blended threat
Blended threats combine the characteristics of
viruses, worms, Trojan horses, and malicious code
with server and Internet vulnerabilities to initiate,
transmit, and spread an attack. By using multiplemethods and techniques, blended threats can rap-idly spread and cause widespread damage.
Buffer overflow
A buff er overflow is a t ype of programmatic
flaw that is caused by a programmer allowing f or
an unbounded operation on data. Buff er overflow
conditions commonly occur during memor y copy
operations. In these cases, a lack of bounds check -
ing can allow f or memor y to be written beyond the
buffer, corrupting potentially sensitive values in
adjacent memor y. Buffer overflow conditions have
typically been exploited to hijack program execution
flow (i.e., execute arbitrary instructions) by over-writing activ ation records in s tack memory. Buffer
overflows in the heap have also proven exploitable,
allowing for attackers to have their own instructionsexecuted in the process space of the aff ected
program.
CIFS
Common Internet File Sys tem (known previously
as SMB) is the file-sharing pro tocol used natively by
Windows-based operating systems. Now supported
by man y other operating sys tems, CIFS has become
a standard by which files are transf erred over a
network.Client -side vulnerability
A vulnerability that is present in a computer or
device that requests and receives services fromanother computer known as a server. Common
clients are Web browsers, such as Internet Explorer,
and email clients, such as Outlook.
Exploit
A software program, hardware device, or technique
that takes advantage of a vulnerability in softwareand that can be used for breaking security or other-
wise attacking a computer.
Heuristics-based detection
Heuristics-based detection is an antivirus technique
that detects viruses by scanning files for anomalous
actions. A rule-based method, heuristic scanningsearches files for certain instructions or commands
that are not found in typical application programs.
This allows a heuristic engine to detect previouslyunknown malicious code.
Infection vector
The method by which malicious code gains access
to a computer sys tem. The mo st common inf ection
vector toda y is email. Other vectors of inf ection
include net work shares with weak or no password
protection, floppy disks, vulnerabilities in sof tware,
peer-to-peer sof tware, and ins tant messaging.
Internet R elay Chat (IRC)
An Internet-based sys tem f or multiple parties to com-
municate synchronously or asynchronously, often on
a specific topic of interes t. IRC is a concern f or securi -
ty personnel because it off ers a po tential inf ection
vector for the proliferation of malicious code.
Kazaa
A popular, free, peer-to-peer file-sharing network
that is often used to exchange audio and video files. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
41Malicious pa yload
Typically referred to as “payload” because it is
assumed to be malicious. Malicious activities per-formed by a threat in addition to the self-replication
routine of a virus. The majority of viruses do not
contain a payload, but simply replicate. Payloadsinclude denial-of -service attacks, destruction or
modification of data, changes to system settings,
and information disclosure.
Mass mailer
A threat that self-replicates by sending itself out by
email. Typically, the threat obtains email addresses
by searching files on the system or responding to
messages found in the email client inbox.
Netblock
A netblock is the “block” of IP addresses that have
been assigned to a network. The network may be
assigned an entire address range; for example, aClass C network that would have a maximum of 256 IP addresses. Individual IP addresses can beassigned from within the netblock, or it can be seg-regated into smaller “subnets” within that overallnetblock for use.
Packers
Packers are tools that compress and encr ypt
Windows ex ecutable files. This is a concern f or
security personnel because it makes detection
by antivirus engines more difficult.
Pervasive computing
The inte gration of computing and communications
technolog y into non-traditional contexts and appli -
cations, particularly small mobile devices that can
allow f or ubiquitous connectivit y to the Internet and
other communications net works.
Remotely exploitable
Remotely exploitable vulnerabilities are those that
can be exploited by attackers across a network. For example, vulnerabilities in Web servers that canbe exploited by W eb clients are remotely exploitable
vulnerabilities.SQL injection attack
An Internet-based database attack in which an
attacker obtains unauthorized access to informationsystems by manipulating SQL (structured query
language) code.
UPX packers
A specific type of packer that is free, publicly avail-
able, and compresses files for several different exe-cutable formats.
Virus
A self-replicating computer program.
Vulnerability
A security vulnerability is a condition affecting an
information system that can cause it to function
outside of its documented design such that it vio-
lates its documented security policy. Vulnerabilitiescan be the result of implementation errors, designoversights, and insecure default configurations. Avulnerabilit y can be fix ed with a patch or update.
Worm
A program that makes copies of itself on the net -
work: f or ex ample, from one net work disk drive to
another, or by using email or another transport
mechanism.
|
SYMANTEC ENTERPRISE SECURITY
Symantec Internet Security
Threat ReportTrends for July 04–December 04
Volume VII, Published March 2005Dean Turner
Executive EditorSymantec Security Response
Stephen Entwisle
Editor
Symantec Security Response
Oliver Friedrichs
Technical Advisor
Symantec Security Response
David Ahmad
Manager, DevelopmentSymantec Security Response
Daniel Hanson
DeepSight Threat AnalystSymantec Security Response
Marc Fossi
DeepSight Threat AnalystSymantec Security Response
Sarah Gordon
Sr. Principal Research EngineerSymantec Security Response
Peter Szor
Security ArchitectSymantec Security Response
Eric Chien
Security ResearcherSymantec Security Response
David Cowings
Sr. Business Intelligence ManagerSymantec Business Intelligence
Dylan Morss
Principal Business Intelligence AnalystSymantec Business Intelligence
Brad Bradley
Sr. Business Intelligence AnalystSymantec Business IntelligenceExecutive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Attack Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Vulnerability Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
Malicious Code Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Additional Security Risks Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
Future Watch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Appendix C—Vulnerability Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Appendix D—Malicious Code Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Appendix E—Additional Security Risks Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92ContentsVolume VII, Published March 2005
Symantec Internet Security Threat ReportSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Executive Summary
The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report provides a six-month update of Internet threat activity. It
includes analysis of network-based attacks, a review of known vulnerabilities, and highlights of maliciouscode and additional security risks. This summary of the current Internet Security Threat Report will alert
readers to current trends and impending threats. In addition, it will offer recommendations for protectionagainst and mitigation of these concerns. This volume covers the six-month period from July 1, 2004 toDecember 31, 2004.
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the world.
Symantec DeepSight™ Threat Management System and Symantec™ Managed Security Services consist ofover 20,000 sensors monitoring network activity in over 180 countries. Symantec also gathers maliciouscode data along with spyware and adware reports from over 120 million client, server, and gateway systemsthat have deployed Symantec’s antivirus products. In addition, Symantec maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive databases of security vulnerabilities, covering over 11,000 vulnerabilities affectingmore than 20,000 technologies from over 2,000 vendors. Furthermore, Symantec operates BugTraq™ , one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion of vulnerabilities on the Internet. Finally, theSymantec Probe Network, a system of over two million decoy accounts, attracts email messages from 20different countries around the world, allowing Symantec to gauge global spam and phishing activity. Theseresources give Symantec analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify emerging trends inattacks and malicious code activity.
The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report is grounded principally on the expert analysis of this data.
Based on Symantec’s expertise and experience, this analysis yields a highly informed commentary on currentInternet threat activity. By publishing the analysis of Internet security activity in the Internet Security
Threat Report, Symantec hopes to provide the computer security community with the information they
need to help effectively secure their systems now and in the future.
Phishing a growing threat
In the last volume of the Internet Security Threat Report, Symantec identified phishing as an emerging
security threat.1Phishing is an attempt by a third party to solicit confidential information from an individual,
group, or organization, often for illicit financial gain or other fraudulent purposes. These attempts areoften conducted through a Web browser and involve social engineering.
Phishing is a serious threat, not only to consumers but also to e-commerce companies, financial institutions,
and other organizations that conduct transactions over the Internet. Phishers often use spoofed email,malicious Web sites, or Trojans delivered surreptitiously through a Web browser to trick users into disclosingsensitive data, such as credit card numbers, online banking information and other confidential information. If consumers lose confidence in the security of transactions conducted over the Internet, businesses andorganizations that rely on such transactions could suffer serious financial losses.
Illustrating the prevalence of these threats is the increase in the number of phishing attempts being
blocked. In mid-July 2004, Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam™ antifraud filters were blocking 9 millionphishing attempts per week. By the end of December this number had increased to a weekly average ofover 33 million messages being blocked per week.
1The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, Volume VI (September 2004): p. 44
http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=15394Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Symantec expects that phishing will continue to be a very serious concern over the next year. Phishing
attacks are difficult to defend against. As the sophistication of spoofed email and Internet sites increases,it will become more difficult for users to determine what is legitimate and what is not. Symantecrecommends that in addition to following best practices, organizations ensure that end users are educatedabout phishing in general, and about the latest phishing scams in particular.
2Symantec advises that end
users never disclose any confidential personal or financial information if they have any doubts about theauthenticity of any email or Web site.
Web application security threats increasing
In the previous volume of the Internet Security Threat Report, Symantec noted that vulnerabilities in Web
applications were becoming more common.3This raised concerns that attackers would increasingly target
Web applications in the near future. Security activity over the past six months appears to have borne out
those concerns.
Web applications are technologies that rely on a browser for their user interface and are often hosted on
Web servers. They are a convenient way for users to share, create, or modify content through a Web browser.
Web application vulnerabilities are particularly worrisome because they can expose information publicly
over the Internet. They may allow an attacker to access confidential information from databases withouthaving to compromise any servers. They may also allow an attacker to circumvent traditional perimetersecurity measures, such as firewalls, and are particularly dangerous because they could allow an attackerto compromise an entire network by gaining access through a single local system.
Typically, Web application vulnerabilities are targeted by attacks that take advantage of input validation
errors and the improper handling of submitted requests. This could allow an attacker to execute maliciouscode on the target system. For instance, a worm targeting a Web application was detected in December2004. Dubbed Perl.Santy,
4it targeted the popular Web application phpBB.
2A good resource for information on the latest threats can be found at http://www,antiphishing.org
3The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, Volume VI (September 2004): p. 30
http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539
4http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/perl.santy.html 50200400600800
July–Dec 2003 Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004369491670
PeriodDocumented vulnerabilitiesSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 1. The increase in Web application vulnerabilities over 18 months
Source: Symantec Corporation
Between July 1 and December 31, 2004, Symantec catalogued 670 vulnerabilities affecting Web applications,
nearly half (48%) of the total vulnerabilities disclosed during this period (figure 1). This is substantially higherthan the 39% documented in the first six months of 2004. This indicates that Web applications will likely
continue to be a target of attack activity in the near future.
Symantec recommends that security administrators follow the best practices outlined in “Appendix A” of
this report. They should also continually audit their Web applications for possible vulnerabilities and patchthem as soon as possible. Finally, administrators should thoroughly review policy relevant to the deploymentand usage of Web applications, restricting deployment only to Web applications that are absolutely necessary for organizational purposes.
Vulnerabilities continue to increase in number and severity
Between July 1 and December 31, 2004, Symantec documented 1,403 new vulnerabilities. This is an
increase of 13% over the 1,237 vulnerabilities disclosed in the first six months of 2004. This indicates thatvulnerability research remains a popular activity and that enterprises need to stay informed of the latestvulnerabilities that may affect their environments.
During the second half of 2004 nearly 97% of all reported vulnerabilities were rated as moderate or high
severity, which could result in the complete or partial compromise of a system. In addition, over 70% of all the vulnerabilities reported during this period were easy to exploit. This means that no exploit code was needed or that exploit code was readily available, making the compromise of systems relatively easy.Compounding this problem is that nearly 80% of all the documented vulnerabilities in this reporting periodare remotely exploitable, which can increase the number of possible attackers.
60%10%20%30%40%50%60%
July–Dec 2003 Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 200436%44%54%
PeriodPercent of top 50 reportsSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Symantec recommends that in addition to following best practices, enterprises continue to monitor their
systems for known vulnerabilities and to patch them as soon as possible. Symantec also recommends that enterprises consider subscribing to a vulnerability alerting service that will provide them with earlynotification of new vulnerabilities.
Malicious code and exposure of confidential information
Some malicious code is created with the intent of stealing confidential information from a compromisedcomputer. Information exposure threats can be present in almost any type of malicious code, includingTrojan horses, worms, viruses, and back door server programs. Once a computer has been compromised
by malicious code, information such as email addresses, cached logon credentials, proprietary data, andfinancial information may be accessed, disclosed, or altered without authorization.
Threats with the potential to expose confidential information have continued to increase over the past
three reporting periods. Between July 1 and December 31, 2004, these threats represented 54% of the top 50 malicious code samples received by Symantec, up from 44% in the first half of 2004, and 36% in the second half of 2003. This represents a 23% increase between the current period and the first half of 2004, and a 50% increase over the same period the previous year (figure 2). This rise in information-exposure threats is partially due to the presence of bots and bot networks,
5which can expose confidential
information on compromised computers because of their remote access capabilities.
Figure 2. Malicious code threats to confidential information
Source: Symantec Corporation
5Bots (short for “robots”) are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s machine in order to allow an unauthorized user t o control the computer remotely. They
allow an attacker to remotely control the targeted system through a communication channel such as IRC. These communication chan nels are used to allow the remote
attacker to control a large number of compromised computers over a single, reliable channel in a bot network, which can then be used to launch coordinated attacks.7Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Trojans continue to be a particular threat to confidential information, representing 33% of the top 50
malicious code reported to Symantec between July 1 and December 31, 2004. This is a significant increase
over the first six months of the year when Trojans made up 17% of the top 50 malicious code reports. Therise in reported Trojans may be partially attributed to the increase in client-side exploits for Web browsers.
6
The Trojan program may be hosted on a malicious Web site that attempts to exploit a specific Web browser vulnerability to deliver the Trojan.
Users can protect themselves from these threats by never executing unknown applications, especially those
received in email or downloaded from sources that are not known to be trustworthy. Users should also avoidusing public computer terminals to logon to Web-based email or online banking sites, as the integrity of thesesystems cannot be verified. Users should also avoid using single passwords for authentication in multipleapplications, as the compromise of a single password may subsequently allow an attacker access to numeroussources of confidential data. Changing passwords frequently can also help protect against a password compro-mise. Finally, Symantec advises users not to allow Web browsers to cache logon credentials for Web sites.
Vulnerabilities affecting new alternative browser distributions
Historically, most of the exploits targeting Web browser vulnerabilities have been directed at Microsoft®
Internet Explorer, the most widely used Web browser. In response to this, many people in the Internet community have turned to browsers such as Mozilla, Mozilla Firefox, Opera, and Safari as more securealternatives. However, as security-conscious users have migrated away from Internet Explorer, attackershave followed suit. In response to the changing browser landscape, this volume of the Internet Security
Threat Report Symantec is including an analysis of vulnerabilities in different browsers.
The discovery of vulnerabilities affecting browsers appears to be on the rise (figure 3), with more Mozilla
vulnerabilities documented in this period than those affecting Microsoft Internet Explorer. This runs contrary to a trend seen in previous periods where nearly all browser vulnerabilities affected MicrosoftInternet Explorer exclusively.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2004, Symantec documented 13 vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft
Internet Explorer. This is notably lower than the 21 vulnerabilities affecting each of the Mozilla browsers that were documented during the same period. Six vulnerabilities were reported in Opera and none in Safari.
Though the share of vulnerabilities affecting the Mozilla browsers has increased, Microsoft Internet
Explorer still has a greater proportion of high-severity vulnerabilities. Of the 13 vulnerabilities affectingMicrosoft Internet Explorer documented by Symantec this period, nine were considered high severity. Ofthe 21 vulnerabilities affecting the Mozilla browsers, 11 were classified as high severity, while only sevenaffecting Firefox were highly severe. While there have been few, if any credible reports of attacks againstMozilla, Mozilla Firefox, Opera, or Safari in the wild, it remains to be seen whether these browsers will liveup to the expectations that many have for them.
6Client-side vulnerabilities target the computer systems of individual users rather than servers of an organization. They target applications such as Web browsers, email
clients, peer-to-peer networks, instant messaging clients, and media players. They are often, but not always, the result of log ic errors or flaws in access-control systems,
and they are often easily exploitable, particularly in browsers.80510152025
July–Dec 2003 Jan–June 2004 Jan–June 2003 July–Dec 2004
PeriodDocumented vulnerabilitiesMozilla Firefox Mozilla Browser Microsoft Internet Explorer Apple Safari Opera BrowserSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 3. Documented browser vulnerabilities, Jan. 2003–Dec. 2004
Source: Symantec Corporation
This data indicates that the attention of researchers may be shifting. In the rush to find more secure
alternatives to Microsoft’s Internet Explorer, organizations and end users should be cautious about choosing an alternative, as all browsers appear to be susceptible to vulnerabilities. Symantec recommendsthat enterprise security administrators and consumers take the time to research browser alternatives andto evaluate their level of security before deploying them on the desktop. Furthermore, administrators areadvised to subscribe to a vulnerability notification service, and to apply necessary patches across theenterprise in a timely manner.
U.K. has highest percentage of bo t-infected computers in world
For this edition of the Internet Security Threat Report, Symantec has assessed the distribution of bot-infected
computers across the Internet. In order to do this, Symantec calculated the number of computers worldwidethat are known to be infected with bots, and assessed what percentage are situated in each country. Theidentification of bot-infected computers is important, as a high percentage of infected machines couldindicate an increased likelihood of bot-related attacks. It could also indicate the level of patching and security awareness amongst computer users in a given region.
For the second half of 2004, 25.2% of the identified bots worldwide were located in the United Kingdom,
making it the highest ranked country. Bots, as observed by Symantec, tend to compromise computers that are connected to the Internet by high-speed broadband connectivity. One factor that is likely to contribute tothe rise of bot-infected computers in the United Kingdom is the rapid growth in broadband that is occurring
there.
7Symantec believes that new broadband customers may not be aware of the additional security
7http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4065047 .stm902,0004,0006,0008,000
Jan–June 2002 July–Dec 2002 Jan–June 2003 July–Dec 2003 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 20044456879941,7027,360
4,496Total viruses and worms
PeriodSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
precautions that need to be taken when using an always-on high-speed Internet connection. F urthermore, the
addition of many new customers, with the corresponding increase in infrastructure and support costs may slowthe response of Internet Service Providers (ISP) to reports of network abuse and infection.
Symantec recommends that organizations employ defense in-depth,
8including firewalls and adequate
perimeter filtering. Furthermore, administrators are advised to subscribe to a vulnerability notification service,and to apply necessary patches across the enterprise in a timely manner. End users should always deployantivirus software and a firewall. They should also ensure that antivirus definitions are updated regularly.
Win32 viruses and worms continue to rise
Win32 threats are executable programs that operate by using the Win32 application program interface(API), which provides the basis for all software development on the Microsoft Windows® platforms. Due to the widespread deployment of Microsoft Windows operating systems in enterprise and consumerenvironments, Win32 viruses and worms pose a serious threat to the security and integrity of thosesystems. A failure to prevent, detect, or remove these threats could result in severe financial losses, thedisclosure of confidential information, and or the loss of data.
Throughout 2004, Win32 virus and worm variants showed a significant increase in volume (figure 4).
9
Between July 1 and December 31, 2004, Symantec documented more than 7,360 new Win32 viruses and
worms. This is an increase of 64% over the 4,496 reported in the first half of the year, and 332% over the1,702 documented in the second half of 2003. As of December 31, 2004, the total number of Win32 variantswas approaching 17,500. They are now more common than script- and macro-based threats combined.
Figure 4. New Win32 viruses and worms by six-month period 2002–2004
Source: Symantec Corporation
8The security approach in which each system on the network is secured to the greatest possible degree. This should include the d eployment of antivirus, firewalls, and
intrusion detection systems, amongst other measures.
9In some cases, a particular family of malicious code, such as the Mydoom and Netsky families, may have multiple variants. A var iant is a new iteration of the same
family that may have minor differences but is still based on the original. In this report, variants of a family are counted as separate samples due to the variations in
functionality.10Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
The continued upward trend of these Win32 variants suggests that despite the rapid response to these
types of threats, malicious code authors continue to publish new variants—sometimes several in a day.
Symantec recommends that security administrators and users update their antivirus solutions frequentlyand ensure that recommend best practices are followed at all times.
Financial services receives highest ratio of severe attacks
As part of its analysis of Internet attack activity, Symantec compares industry segments based on the ratio of severe events originating from external attackers detected by sensors deployed in each industry.Symantec determines severity of an attack based on the characteristics of the attack, the defensive controlsof the client, the value of the assets at risk, and the success of the attack. Severe attacks pose the greatestthreat to organizations, as they can result in serious damage and compromise of the target network. Assuch, they may indicate the risk to which an industry is exposed.
During the second half of 2004, the financial services sector experienced the highest number of severe
events of any industry, 16 per 10,000 security events. This sector is likely an attractive target for attackersbecause of its high profile and association with financial transactions. It is clear that financial organizationsmust take appropriate steps to identify and mitigate risks of attack.
Due to the sensitive nature of the data in the financial services sector, Symantec recommends that security
administrators consistently audit their networks for vulnerabilities and patch as soon as possible. Securityadministrators should also restrict access only to those services deemed absolutely necessary and enforcestrong connectivity policies and procedures.
Internet Security Threat Report Highlights
11Vulnerability Trend Highlights
•The time between the disclosure of a vulnerability
and the release of an associated exploitincreased from 5.8 to 6.4 days.
•Symantec documented 1,403 new vulnerabilities,
a 13% increase over the previous six-monthperiod.
•W eb application vulnerabilities made up 48% of
all vulnerabilities disclosed, up from 39% in thefirst half of 2004.
•97% of vulnerabilities disclosed were rated as
moderately or highly severe.
•21 vulnerabilities affecting Mozilla browsers
were disclosed during the last six months of2004, compared to 13 vulnerabilities affectingMicrosoft Internet Explorer.
•70% of reported vulnerabilities were considered
easy to exploit.Attack Trend Highlights
•For the third straight reporting period, the
Microsoft SQL Server Resolution Service StackOverflow Attack (formerly referred to as theSlammer Attack) was the most common attack,used by 22% of all attackers.
•Organizations received 13.6 attacks per day, up
from 10.6 in the previous six months.
•Known bot network computers declined from
over 30,000 per day in late July to an average of below 5,000 per day by the end of the year.
•The United Kingdom had a higher percentage of
bot-infected computers than any other country.
•The United States continues to be the top
country of attack origin, followed by China and Germany.
•The financial services sector experienced 16
severe events per 10,000 security events, thehighest ratio of any industry.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Internet Security Threat Report Highlights continued
12Malicious Code Trend Highlights
•Variants of Netsky, MyDoom, and Beagle,
dominated the top ten malicious code samplesin the second half of 2004.
•Symantec documented more than 7,360 new
Win32 viruses and worms, an increase of 64%over the first half of the year.
•Malicious code that exposed confidential
information made up 54% of the top 50malicious code samples, up from 44% in theprevious reporting period.
•At the end of this reporting period there were
21 known samples of malicious code for mobileapplications, up from one in June 2004.
•Two bots were present in the top ten malicious
code samples, compared to just one in the previous reporting period.
•4,300 new distinct variants of Spybot were
reported, an increase of 180% over the previoussix months.Additional Security Risks Highlights
•In the last six months of 2004, adware programs
made up 5% of the top 50 Symantec customerreports, up from 4% in the previous report.
•Five of the top ten reported adware samples
were installed via a Web browser. Nine of the topten reported spyware programs were bundledwith other software.
•Iefeats was the most commonly reported adware
program, accounting for 36% of the top tenreports.
•W ebhancer was the most frequently reported
spyware program during the second half of2004, representing 38% of the top ten spywarereported.
•Between July 1 and December 31, 2004,
Symantec detected 10,310 new phishingattacks.
•By the end of December, Symantec antifraud
filters were blocking over 33 million phishingattempts per week on average, up from approximately 9 million per week at the beginning of July.
•Symantec reported a 77% growth in spam
for companies whose systems were monitored
for spam.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Attack Trends
This section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report will provide an analysis of Internet attack
activity for the six months ending December 31, 2004. An attack may be defined as any malicious activitycrossing a network that has been detected by an intrusion detection system or firewall. These attacks areusually an attempt to exploit a vulnerability in software or hardware. Attack activity for this period will becompared to data presented in the two previous Internet Security Threat Reports.
10Where applicable,
suggestions on attack remediation will be made, including references to Symantec’s best practicescontained in “Appendix A” of this report.
Symantec has established one of the most comprehensive sources of Internet attack data in the world.
Over 20,000 sensors deployed in more than 180 countries by Symantec DeepSight Threat ManagementSystem and Symantec Managed Security Services gather this data. In addition to these sources, Symantechas developed and deployed a honeypot system
11that is used to identify, observe, and study complete
instances of worm and non-worm attack activity. It provides qualitative data about some of the attackactivity identified in this section. These resources combine to give Symantec an unparalleled ability toidentify, investigate, and respond to emerging threats. This discussion will be based on data provided by all of these sources.
For the purposes of this report, attack activity is divided into three categories: reconnaissance (probes),
worm-related attacks, and non-worm related attacks (exploit activity). This allows Symantec analysts todifferentiate between attacks that propagate autonomously (worms), attacks that are launched manually(non-worm-related), and attacks that are intended to gather information.
It is sometimes difficult to discern whether attack activity is worm-related or not. In these cases, attacks
that are commonly associated with worms have been classified as worm-related. The use of back doors and remote-control software to create networks of zombie hosts called bot networks are classified asworm-related attacks for the purposes of this report.
Security devices can monitor for attacks and suspicious behavior at many different levels in the network.
Devices such as intrusion detection systems, intrusion protection systems, firewalls, proxy filters, andantivirus installations all contribute to the overall security of an organization. Symantec gathers data frommany of these devices. One consequence of this heterogeneous data gathering is that malicious code dataand attack trends data often address the same attacks, but view them in different ways. For instance, attacktrends data is ranked based on the number of infected sources attempting to spread, whereas malicious codedata is based on a number of sources, including reports of infection. This can lead to different rankings ofthreats presented in the “Attack Trends” and “Malicious Code” sections of this report.
This section of the Internet Security Threat Report will discuss:
•Top Internet attacks
•Attack activity per day
•Attack activity by type
•Top attacked ports
•Bot networks and denial of service attacks
•Denial of service attacks
10The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report Volumes V (March 2004) and VI (September 2004), both available at:
http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539
11A honeypot is an Internet-connected system that acts as a decoy, allowing attackers to enter the system in order to observe the attacker’s behavior once
he or she is inside it.13Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
•Top countries by bot-infected computers
•Top originating countries
•Top originating countries per Internet capita
•Targeted attack activity by industry
•Severe event ratio by industry
Top Internet attacks
The top attacks detected by Symantec Managed Security Services and Symantec DeepSight Threat
Management System largely reflect attacks that security administrators are likely to observe on their ownnetworks. Worm attacks are included in this metric, as they make up an important component of the riskthat organizations must continue to defend against.
The analysis of top attacks is based on the percentage of total attacking IP addresses performing a given
attack. In the first six months of 2004, six of the top ten attacks were new entries, indicating that significantchanges were occurring in the threat landscape. Over the last six months of the year, there were only threenew entrants in the top ten attacks (table 1), suggesting that a more stable information security threatenvironment may be prevailing.
Table 1. Top attacks
Source: Symantec Corporation
14Jul–Dec 2004 Jan–Jun 2004
Jul–Dec 2004 Jan–Jun 2004 Current percent Previous percent
Current rank Previous rank Attack of attackers of attackers
11 Microsoft SQL Server Resolution 22% 15%
Service Stack Overflow Attack
2N ot ranked (NR) Generic TCP Syn Flood Denial of 12% NA
Service Attack
31 0 Microsoft Windows DCOM RPC 7% 1%
Interface Buffer Overrun Attack
46 Generic SMTP Malformed 5% 2%
Command/Header Attack
52 W32.HLLW.Gaobot Attack Version 4% 4%
6N R Generic Invalid HTTP String Attack 4% NA
77 Generic ICMP Flood Attack 3% 2%
83 Generic WebDAV/Source Disclosure 2% 4%
“Translate: f” HTTP Header Request
Attack
99 Generic HTTP Directory Attack 2% 1%
10 NR Generic UTF8 Encoding in URL 2% NA
AttackSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Between July 1 and December 31, 2004, the Microsoft SQL Server Resolution Service Stack Overflow
Attack was the most common attack, accounting for 22% of attacking IP addresses. This continues thetrend seen during the first six months of 2004, during which this attack was also the most common. Itshould be noted that in the previous reporting period, this attack was identified as the Slammer attack, as the majority of the attack activity was associated with the original Slammer worm. However, other malicious code threats are now also known to be using this attack. As a result, Symantec has reverted to the original nomenclature of this attack.
This is the third consecutive reporting period for which the Microsoft SQL Server Overflow Attack has
been the most common attack. The continued prominence is related to three factors. First, many threats,including the original Slammer worm, use a single UDP packet to exploit this vulnerability. The use of UDPallows this attack to come from a spoofed
12source address, which may inflate the number of observed
source IP addresses. Spoofing source addresses increases the ability to obscure the source location of theattack, making investigation and response significantly more difficult. While Slammer did not spoof itssource, other mechanisms that use this attack may do so. Analysis of the source addresses indicates thatup to 10% of these attacks originate from spoofed addresses that do not exist.
Secondly, the use of UDP also allows an attacker to send a complete attack
13to every IP address, regardless
of whether SQL Server is installed or running. This means that intrusion detection systems will ofteninterpret every attack attempt as a full attack.
The third factor that can affect the number of systems vulnerable to this attack, and therefore the number
of attacking systems, is the deployment of MSDE, the Microsoft Desktop Engine. MSDE is included anddeployed by many third-party applications. It is a variant of the SQL Server engine, which means it is alsovulnerable to Slammer or Slammer-related attacks. Identifying and patching these systems is challenging,and the ongoing installation of software running vulnerable versions of MSDE can turn a previously securecomputer into a potential victim.
The second most common attack during the second half of 2004 was the TCP SYN Flood Denial of Service
Attack, which was launched by 12% of attackers. It should be noted that some IDS signatures associatedwith this attack may be prone to false positives, which may inflate the number of attacks detected. Despitethis, Symantec still believes that this attack is occurring at a significant rate. A generic denial of service(DoS) strategy, this attack has not previously been ranked as a top attack. It is characterized by an over-whelming flood of requests to an Internet service running on a computer. A SYN packet initiates each TCPsession. By overwhelming a target with SYN requests and not completing the initial request, the attackprevents other valid requests from being processed. This attack often relies on an attacker spoofing thesource of the packets for maximum effect, a characteristic that is likely to have increased the number ofsource attackers.
The appearance of this more traditional DoS attack is intriguing. It indicates that while attackers have
been experimenting with new forms of DoS attacks (primarily using bot networks), they may be migratingback to more traditional DoS methods.
14With the spread of bot networks, and the easy availability of victim
hosts (due to vulnerabilities in DCOM RPC, LSASS and other default Windows services), it had become relatively easy for an attacker to marshal hundreds or thousands of bots to overwhelm a victim with valid
12The term “spoofed” refers to the practice of establishing a connection with a forged sender address. This normally involves exp loiting a trust relationship that exists
between source and destination addresses or systems. The IP address that is used as the source address when spoofed may be a va lid address used elsewhere on the
Internet. It may also be from unallocated IP space and, therefore, unused.
13UDP does not require that any form of synchronization be done before data is sent and accepted by the target service. By contra st, an attack that uses TCP must go
through the three-way handshake to synchronize the systems prior to data being sent; therefore, a TCP-based attack will only be seen if the service being targeted is
accepting connections. In the case of UDP, the attacking system can simply send the complete attack without regard for whether the service is listening.
14This conclusion is further supported by the “Bot networks and denial of service” discussion, which is included below.15Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
requests. However, the introduction of Windows XP Service Pack 215and other mitigating measures appears to
have limited the number of computers available for compromise. This may have resulted in a correspondingdecline in the number of computers available for use in bot network scanning. With less bots available,attackers are again relying on older techniques to attack victims. (For a more in-depth discussion, pleasesee the “Bot networks and denial of services” section below.)
To protect against the threat of DoS attacks, different procedures can be used. In the case of a SYN flood
attack, computer operating systems and firewalls often have internal configuration parameters to ensurethat the resources necessary to service valid requests are available. Administrators should familiarizethemselves with proper tuning of their systems and ensure that they can engage their upstream Internetservice provider to help filter incoming DoS traffic.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2004, the Microsoft Windows DCOM RPC Interface Buffer Overflow
Attack was the third most common attack. It has regained prominence as a top attack after ranking tenthin the first six months of the year. This attack, most famously used by Blaster
16to spread in 2003, has
more recently been used by the different bot network applications, including Gaobot, Spybot and Randex.17
The prevalence of this attack indicates that attackers are continuing to use this vulnerability to target systems.Analysis of data from the Symantec honeypot system indicates that a majority of the attack attempts occurfrom systems infected with variants of Gaobot, Spybot, and other bot network applications.
Systems administrators can mitigate the threat of exploitation by ensuring that TCP ports 135 and 445 are
filtered at the network perimeter. However, worms and other malicious code targeting vulnerabilities overthis port may be able to bypass the network perimeter using a VPN or a mobile computer such as a laptop.As a result, to prevent further damage if an infection takes place, perimeter blocking should be implementedaccompanied by strong filtering between logical network segments to limit propagation. Strong systemconfiguration policy and audit control for all computers that do not remain behind a firewall can significantlydecrease chances of infection.
Gaobot has fallen from being the second most common attack over the first six months of 2004 to fifth in
the second half of the year. Gaobot, a type of bot, can allow an attacker to maintain control over a largenumber of discrete systems and instruct those systems to scan for, exploit, and control new systems. It can also be rapidly updated with exploits targeting new vulnerabilities, allowing widespread compromise ofunpatched systems shortly after an exploit is available publicly. As a result, it remains a significant threatfor any organization with Windows systems that are not rapidly patched for new vulnerabilities. In addition
to timely deployment of critical patches, the use of a personal or desktop firewall can significantly reducethe risk of compromise by bot applications. (For more on bot network activity please see the “MaliciousCode Trends” section of this report.)
15Microsoft released Windows XP Service Pack 2 in August 2004. The actual release date varied depending on the version and langua ge of Windows XP. XP Home first
received SP2 via Windows Update on August 16, 2004. The service pack included vulnerability fixes, activation of the XP firewal l, the ability to monitor the status of
third-party antivirus and firewall applications, and rate limiting to control the volume of outgoing connections each computer can make. Each of these steps lessens
the ability of attackers to use a computer as a participant in a distributed bot network.
16http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.blaster.worm.html
17A full discussion of the rise in bot variants can be found in the “Malicious Code Trends” section of this report. 16061218
July–Dec 2003 (ISTR V) Jan–June 2004 (ISTR VI) July–Dec 2004 (current)12.6
10.613.6
Period (ISTR version)Attacks per daySymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Attack activity per day
This section will discuss the number of attacks per day seen by organizations connected to the Internet.
The number of attack attempts an average organization experiences in a given period of time is taken to berepresentative of the overall attack rate on the Internet as a whole. The attack activity per day is determinedby the number of attacks detected against the median organization in the sample set.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2004, the average attack rate for an organization in the sample set was
13.6 attacks per day (figure 5). In the previous six-month period, the average attack rate for an organizationwas 10.6 attacks per day. By comparison, during the last six months of 2003, the average organizationexperienced 12.6 attacks per day.
The increase of three attacks per day is due to increases in the volume of probes and non-worm-based
attacks. Previously, in periods with an elevated daily attack rate, worm activity was the most significantcontributor to this increase. By contrast, in the current period, worm activity continued to decline fromprevious levels and the bulk of the rise in activity was related to non-worm attack activity. The changes in the attack breakdown are further detailed in the “Attack activity by type” section below.
Figure 5. Daily attack rate over the last three six-month periods
Source: Symantec Corporation
170%20%40%60%80%100%
Period (ISTR version)July–Dec 2003 (ISTR V) Jan–June 2004 (ISTR VI) July–Dec 2004 (current)Percent of all attacksNon-worm attacks Probes Worm attacks
41%
47%
12%42%
13%
45%34%
49%
17%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Attack activity by type
In order to better understand current Internet attack activity and how to best protect against it, it is helpful
to understand specifically what type of attacks are taking place. This section will discuss the attack activitythat has occurred over the past six months broken down by three types of attack: probes, worm-relatedattacks, and non-worm-related attacks. The type of attack is analyzed as a percentage of the total volumeof detected attacks (figure 6).
Figure 6. Breakdown of attack type July 1–December 31, 2004
Source: Symantec Corporation
From July 1 to December 31, 2004, 47% of detected attacks were classified as probes. This is similar to
the 49% of activity that was classified as probe activity in the first six months of the year. Scanning forback door services on high-level ports (that is, ports numbered higher than 1023) continues to contributeto the probe total. Widespread scanning for these back door services has been increasing over the pastthree report periods and is expected to continue.
Several mitigation measures should be put in place to ensure that these scans don’t find a viable target.
Administrators should ensure that systems are running antivirus software with up-to-date definitions.Symantec also recommends that strong perimeter filtering and connection logging be put in place. Finally,administrators should log outgoing connections to find internal machines that may have been compromised.
18Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
In the final six months of 2004, worms accounted for only 12% of attack activity (figure 6), the lowest level
in the last four six-month reporting periods. Worm attack activity has declined steadily from 59% in thefirst half of 2003. The most significant drop occurred between the last six months of 2003 and the first sixmonths of 2004, when worm attacks dropped from 45% to 17%.
The low rate of worm activity can be explained by the fact that no traditional worms were discovered to
be propagating widely during this period. In fact, the prevalence and popularity of bot networks and semi-autonomous exploitation tools is making the distinction between worm attacks and non-worm attacksmore difficult. As this trend continues, it may be necessary to stop attempting to distinguish betweenworm and non-worm activity.
While worm activity has decreased over the past three reporting periods, non-worm attack activity does not
appear to be following any long-term trend, as was noted in the previous volume of the Internet Security
Threat Report.
18Non-worm attacks have varied from a high of 42% of activity in the last half of 2003, to a
low of 34% in the first half of 2004. In the second half of 2004, they rose again to make up 41% of activity.Symantec believes that exploits for older vulnerabilities and emerging Web application and client-side vulnerabilities are being included in non-worm toolkits, which contributes to the static nature of non-wormattack trends.
Traditionally, network intrusion detection systems have provided adequate coverage of network-borne
threats. However, the increasing use of Web application attacks and client-side exploitation, particularlythrough browser attacks and through malformed files such as images, are proving problematic for traditionalintrusion detection systems. They are also making the classification of probes, attacks, and worm-relatedattacks increasingly difficult. As these trends evolve, particularly Web application attacks and client-sideattacks, new classification and detection systems will need to be developed to meet this need. By extension,this section of the Internet Security Threat Report will likely have to expand its traditional typology to
include the emerging class of Web application attacks.
Top attacked ports
Symantec DeepSight Threat Management System tracks the top attacked ports as detected by all
contributing firewall sensors (table 2). The best criterion for judging the top attacked ports is the numberof unique IP addresses that are targeting each port. This metric only reflects attacker interest in a givenport; it does not assume that there is necessarily an attack associated with it, such as the specific servicebeing targeted. Nor does it attempt to provide any attack information. The lack of definitive attack infor-mation means that it is impossible to separate out worm-related activity from information-gathering attacksor exploit attempts. This metric only identifies and measures rejected or denied connection attempts;therefore, legitimate port activity should not be represented in the data.
18Symantec Internet Security Threat Report Version VI, September 2004: p. 10
http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=153919Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Table 2. Top attacked ports
Source: Symantec Corporation
From July 1 to December 31, 2004, port 445 was the most frequently targeted port, with 35% of attackers
targeting it. Port 445 is the common port for Microsoft File and Printer Sharing (often referred to as SMBor CIFS). In addition to being used for file sharing, other remote management functionality is accessiblethrough this port, including some remote procedure call (RPC) functionality, which likely explains itswidespread appeal for attackers. In the first half of 2004, 445 was the second most attacked port. Asignificant portion of that attack activity was attributed to the continued activity of the Sasser worm.
19
Analysis of the Symantec honeypot system has shown that bot network applications, including variants ofSpybot and Gaobot, are heavy attackers of 445. Primarily, they target the Microsoft Windows LSASS BufferOverrun Vulnerability
20and the Microsoft Windows DCOM RPC Interface Buffer Overflow vulnerability21
through this port. In addition to exploitation of these vulnerabilities, some attacks are performed when aneasily guessable user name and password combination allows an attacker to access the file share directly.
TCP port 445 is usually well controlled at the network perimeter. However, worms and other malicious
code targeting vulnerabilities over this port may be able to bypass the network perimeter through a VPN orvia a mobile computer such as a laptop. As a result, to prevent further damage if an infection takes place,perimeter blocking should be implemented accompanied by stronger filtering between logical network segments to limit propagation. Strong system configuration policy and audit control for all computers thatdo not remain behind a firewall can significantly decrease chances of infection.
TCP port 135 was the second most frequently targeted port between July 1 and December 31, 2004. It had
been the third most attacked port in the first half of the year. There was a small rise in the percentage ofattackers targeting the port, from 15% in the first six months of 2004 to 17% the second half of the year.
19http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.sasser.worm.html
20http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10108
21http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/820520Jul–Dec 2004 Jan–Jun 2004
Jul–Dec 2004 Jan–Jun 2004 Percent of Percent of
rank rank Port Service description total attackers total attackers
12 445 TCP CIF (Microsoft file sharing) 35% 17%
23 135 TCP DCE-RPC (remote Microsoft 17% 15%
Windows communication)
37 1026 UDP Various dynamic services 8% 3%
44 4662 TCP Edonkey (file sharing) 6% 7%
5N R 1027 UDP Various dynamic services 5% NA
65 6346 TCP Gnutella (file sharing) 5% 5%
7N R 139 TCP SMB (Microsoft file sharing) 4% NA
81 01 025 TCP Various backdoors and 2% 3%
dynamic services
9N R 1434 UDP Microsoft SQL services 2% NA
10 NR 25 TCP SMTP services 2% NASymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Port 135 is associated with the Microsoft RPC service on computers running Microsoft Windows. Most of
the activity detected between July and December 2003 was related to the highly successful Blaster22and
Welchia23worms, which were propagating successfully at that time. In 2003, activity targeting TCP port
135 achieved its peak when almost a third of attacking hosts were targeting it. Since the outbreak of thoseworms, this port, along with TCP port 445, has been popular with attackers looking to build bot networks.Both ports are heavily targeted by Spybot and Gaobot.
Like TCP port 445, TCP port 135 is usually well controlled at the network perimeter; however, worms and
other malicious code can bypass perimeter protections by VPN connections and mobile laptop computers.
To limit the potential damage incurred by attacks against this port, Symantec recommends the deployment
of desktop or personal firewalls, and strong system configuration and policy controls, especially forcomputers that do not remain behind a firewall.
UDP port 1026 was the third most frequently targeted port during the last six months of 2004, with 8% of
attackers targeting it. This is up from 3% for the first half of 2004, when it was the seventh most commonlytargeted port. UDP port 1026 has been used in the past as a method of delivering RPC Messenger pop-up
spam to Microsoft Windows hosts. The spoofable nature of UDP means that the ranking of this port shouldbe treated cautiously. Without any indication of whether or not the addresses are spoofed, the true natureand source of this activity cannot be determined. Analysis of Symantec honeypot system activity indicatesthat pop-up spam continues to plague UDP 1026. While exploitation of the RPC DCOM overflow is possibleby this route, Symantec has not yet observed any widespread attack activity of this type on this port.
TCP port 80 has historically been the top attacked port. It hosts Web servers, which are popular targets
for worms such as Code Red and Nimda. It also hosts Web applications, which are an emerging target for
malicious code. However, over the last six months of 2004, port 80 did not rank as a top targeted port. This
is quite a change from the first six months of 2004, when it was the top scanned port, accounting for 30% of
the scanning IP addresses. The biggest reason for this decline was that Welchia.B stopped propagating inJune, at the end of the previous sample period. Welchia.B was written with an expiry date, beyond which itwould not attempt to spread.
Attacks targeting Web servers and Web applications continue to be feasible methods of compromising
information; however, as noted by the significant presence of TCP ports 445 and 135, the majority ofattacks remain attempts to compromise and control both desktop computers and servers alike. ThePerl.Santy
24worm shows that widespread scanning for a port is not necessary for a worm to successfully
target a Web technology.
Santy targeted the PHPBB Viewtopic.PHP PHP Script Injection Vulnerability25in the phpBB Web bulletin
board application. This worm chose its targets with a Google search rather than by scanning networks forWeb servers, as many traditional Web-based worms (such as Code Red and Nimda) have done. The lack of
scanning for targets ensured that activity associated with this worm would not appear in port 80 trafficactivity. Further, only those organizations that were running a potentially vulnerable application would betargeted, making a rise in scanning activity much more difficult to detect. (Santy is discussed in greaterdepth in the “Malicious Code Trends” section of this report.)
22http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.blaster.worm.html
23http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.welchia.worm.html
24http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/perl.santy.html
25http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/1070121Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
UDP port 1434, the ninth most widely targeted port, is the port affected by the Microsoft SQL Server
Resolution Service Stack Overflow Attack. The low rank that this port displays is likely due to securityadministrators deciding to disable the logging of infection attempts on this port for performance reasonsor to simplify log auditing.
Bot networks and denial of service attacks
Beginning with Volume VI of the Internet Security Threat Report (September 2004), Symantec has been
identifying groups of computers performing coordinated scanning or attack patterns. This allows Symantecto identify bot networks that are engaged in coordinated activity. This has the added advantage of detectingsome types of worms that would go undetected by other methods. Identification of these computers shouldnot be considered exhaustive: in order to limit the number of false positive identifications, multiplebehavioral requirements have to be met by each computer.
Bot networks are groups of compromised computers on which attackers have installed software that listens
for and responds to commands (usually via an IRC channel), allowing the attacker remote control over
the computers. The software currently being used can be upgraded to incorporate exploits targeting newvulnerabilities. Bot networks are often more dangerous to new vulnerabilities than worms are, as theydon’t require an attacker to write propagation code in order to exploit the vulnerability. This vastly simplifiesthe inclusion of new exploits. Additionally, any number of exploits can be included, making it difficult todifferentiate between a bot network attack and a targeted attack by a single attacker.
Over the first six months of 2004, Symantec analysts observed a persistent increase in the number of
computers identified as belonging to bot networks. During this period, the average number of computersidentified in daily bot network scanning increased to over 30,000 systems a day. This trend was expectedto continue as additional systems were added to these bot networks; however, as shown in figure 7, thisincreasing trend did not continue through the second half of the year.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2004, observed bot network computers actively scanning declined from
a peak of over 30,000 per day in late July to below 5,000 per day by the end of the year. The bulk of thisdecrease occurred in mid-August with a significant drop on August 19. The timing of this drop correspondsclosely with the availability of Windows XP Service Pack 2. It is reasonable to assume that this service packis responsible, along with other mitigation measures, for the decline in identified bot network computers.
It should be noted that this discussion is based on coordinated and focused bot network activity. Any
significant shift by attackers, particularly one towards smaller groups of computers scanning for a shorterperiod of time might reduce the effectiveness of this method of bot network identification and analysis.The analysis of bot network trends included in the “Malicious Code Trends” section of this report shows a significant rise in the number of variants and a rise in the number of reports of these bot applications.One possible explanation for these apparently divergent trends is the emergence of smaller bot networks.Smaller network sizes would make detection based on coordinated scanning more difficult.
2205,00010,00015,00020,00025,00030,00035,000
July 1, 2004
July 15, 2004 July 29, 2004
Aug 12, 2004
Aug 26, 2004
Sep 9, 2004
Sep 23, 2004
Oct 7, 2004
Oct 21, 2004
Nov 4, 2004
Nov 18, 2004
Dec 2, 2004
Dec 16, 2004 Dec 30, 2004DateNumber of active bot network computersDaily number of bots Moving averageSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 7. Known bot network computers, July 1–December 31, 2004
Source: Symantec Corporation
Symantec investigated the declining bot network scanning patterns (figure 8). This investigation showed
that the significant drop in bot network computers is largely associated with very large drops in thenumber of computers performing coordinated scanning for and attacking TCP port 445 and TCP port 135.The drop in computers participating in coordinated bot network scanning on these two ports largely accountsfor the decrease in identified bot systems. Both ports are common paths for bot networks to spread onto
computer systems, either through unpatched vulnerabilities or bad user name and password choices.
Many common bot network applications, including Gaobot, target vulnerabilities that are accessible
through these Windows ports as a method of infecting new systems. The sudden drop in bot network scanning indicates that Service Pack 2, in addition to cumulative patches, may have been successful atreducing the number vulnerabilities in Windows XP systems that are subject to remote compromise.
The inclusion of default firewall rules that block TCP port 135 and confine TCP port 445 activity to only
the local subnet may have helped to reduce the chances of compromising a badly secured machine for participation in a bot network. These bot networks are a significant threat to many Internet-connected systems, as they can easily be used to perform denial of service attacks. The loss of potential victim computers to serve in bot networks appears to also have changed denial of service attack patterns, which will be discussed in the following section.
23-90-80-70-60-50-40-30-20-10010
UDP port
1434TCP port
3127TCP port
139TCP ports
135 & 445TCP port
135TCP port
445421
-4
-12
-77
Bot scanning patternAverage daily change of bot computersSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 8. Changes in bot network scanning of ports
Source: Symantec Corporation
Denial of service attacks
Denial of service (DoS) attacks are a significant threat to organizations that depend on the Internet,
particularly those that depend on Internet connectivity to generate a significant portion of their revenue.The term denial of service is a generic description and simply defines an event that blocks or slowslegitimate access to a service provided by a computer.
As was noted previously in the “Top Internet Attacks” discussion, the second most common attack was the
Generic TCP SYN Flood Denial of Service Attack. This type of attack relies on overwhelming an Internetservice with connection attempts without completing the connection negotiation.
26Often, this type of
attack is performed by spoofing the source IP address, which results in unsolicited traffic called backscatterbeing sent to other systems on the Internet. Figure 9 shows DoS attack targets as determined by analyzingthe backscatter of attacks.
26The TCP protocol requires a three-way exchange before any data can be sent. The SYN packet is the initiation of this exchange. Once a SYN is received, the destination
system sends a SYN-ACK packet back and waits to receive an ACK, which completes the three-way exchange. By spoofing the source of the initial SYN packet, an attack
can cause the responding system to sit waiting indefinitely for the ACK after sending out the SYN-ACK, This enables the attacke r to keep a finite number of sessions
open, thereby creating the conditions for a DoS attack.24050100150200250300350400450
July 3, 2004
July 17, 2004 July 31, 2004
Aug 14, 2004
Aug 28, 2004
Sep 11, 2004
Sep 25, 2004
Oct 9, 2004
Oct 23, 2004
Nov 6, 2004
Nov 20, 2004
Dec 4, 2004
Dec 18, 2004 Dec 31, 2004DateNumber of affected hosts per dayDaily number of DoS attack victims Moving averageSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 9. Number of DoS victims per day
Source: Symantec Corporation
DoS attacks depending on spoofed source traffic increased notably in early August, 2004. This coincided
with the release of Windows XP Service Pack 2, which has been previously noted for its possible impact on the number of active computers involved in coordinated bot network scanning. Symantec believes theremay be a correlation in the drop in active bot-infected computers and the rise in the practice of attackingInternet servers with spoofed hosts.
Symantec believes that there is good reason to believe that as attackers are losing the ability to perform
DoS attacks that rely on large numbers of bot computers, they are reverting back to older methods, includingspoofing the source address as part of a SYN flood attack. The use of spoofed source addresses can allow anattacker to overwhelm a victim by using fewer attacking computers, an important consideration w hen the
supply of computers that can be used for an attack is dwindling.
Defending against spoofed-source DoS attacks is difficult, as the spoofing of the addresses makes filtering
based on the IP address much more complicated. Some systems have configuration options to make thesystem less prone to resource exhaustion.
27DoS victims will frequently need to engage their upstream
Internet service provider to help filter the traffic.
27Computers have finite resources that are related to the amount of memory, CPU power and network bandwidth available. Other limi ts can be imposed by the operating
system. When one of these limits is reached, or the memory, CPU or network bandwidth is saturated, it is referred to as resourc e exhaustion.25Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Top countries by bot-infected computers
For this edition of the Internet Security Threat Report, Symantec has assessed the distribution of bot-infected
computers across the Internet. In order to do this, Symantec calculated the number of computers worldwidethat are known to be infected with bots, and assessed what percentage are situated in each country. Thismeasure can help analysts understand how bot-infected systems are distributed globally. The identification of bot-infected computers is important, as a high percentage of infected machines could mean a greaterpotential for bot-related attacks. It could also indicate the level of patching and security awareness amongstcomputer users in a given region.
During the last six months of 2004, the highest percentage of identified worldwide bots was located in the
United Kingdom, with 25.2% (table 3). Bot networks, as observed by Symantec, tend to be dominated bycomputers on large Internet service providers, often providing high-speed broadband Internet connectivity.The rapid growth in broadband that is occurring in the United Kingdom is likely one factor to contributing to the bot network penetration.
28Symantec believes that new broadband customers may not be aware of the
additional security precautions that need to be taken when using an always-on high-speed Internet connection.Furthermore, the addition of many new customers, with the corresponding increase in infrastructure and
support costs may slow Internet service providers’ responses to reports of network abuse and infection.
Table 3. Top countries by percentage of bot-infected computers
Source: Symantec Corporation
The United States accounts for 24.6% of the bot-infected computers worldwide. The large number of
Internet users and high-speed broadband users in the United States—over 30 million users, the largest of any country—helps to explain the prominence of the United States in this metric.
29
China accounts for 7.8% of the bot-infected computers. China like many countries, is experiencing rapidgrowth in the population connecting to the Internet by high-speed broadband.
30This growth has not pushed
China into the prominent positions held by the United States and United Kingdom, but has positioned it inadvance of regional neighbors, such as South Korea and Japan. Symantec believes that the proportion ofbot-infected computers will continue to rise in China until the rate of broadband growth slows.
28http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4065047.stm
29http://www.point-topic.com/content/dslanalysis/Q304+BB+analysis+041215.htm (note that access to this site requires registration .)
30http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3699820.stm26Percent of bot
Rank Country infected computers
1 United Kingdom 25.2%
2 United States 24.6%
3 China 7.8%
4 Canada 4.9%
5 Spain 3.8%
6F rance 3.6%
7 Germany 3.5%
8T aiwan 3.1%
9 South Korea 3.0%
10 Japan 2.6%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Top originating countries
This section will discuss the top countries of attack origin (table 4). This metric only discusses the location
of the computer from which the attack originated and not the actual location of the attacker. While, it issimple to trace an attack back to the last computer from which the attack was launched, that computermay not be the attacker’s own system. Attackers frequently hop through numerous systems or usepreviously compromised systems to hide their location prior to launching the actual attack. For example,an attacker in China could launch an attack from a compromised system located in South Korea against aWeb server in New York. Further complicating the matter is that international jurisdictional issues often
prevent proper investigation of an attacker’s real location.
Table 4. Top originating countries
Source: Symantec Corporation
The United States continues to be the top source country of attacks; however, the percentage of attacks
originating in the United States declined for the third consecutive six-month reporting period. During thesecond half of 2004, 30% of attacks originated in the United States, down from 37% in the first half of theyear and 58% in the second half of 2003. As other countries continue to add to their Internet infrastructure,particularly their high-speed connections, attacks originating from those countries can be expected to rise,and the percentage of attacks originating in the United States to fall accordingly.
China was the second-ranked country of attack origin for the first six months of 2004, the same position
that it occupied in the first half of the year. The percentage of total worldwide events originating in Chinaincreased slightly from 6% in the first six months of 2004 to 8% in the second. Germany has moved up tothird position in the countries of attack origin for the second half of 2004. 8% of Internet attack activityoccurred there, compared to 5% in the first half of the year, when it was the fifth-ranked source country.
27Jul–Dec 2004 Jan-Jun 2004 Jul–Dec 2004 Jan-Jun 2004
rank rank Country percent of events percent of events
11 United States 30% 37%
22 China 8% 6%
35 Germany 8% 5%
49 South Korea 4% 3%
53 Canada 4% 6%
66 Great Britain 4% 4%
77 France 3% 4%
8N R Japan 3% NA
98 Spain 3% 3%
10 NR Italy 2% NASymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Top originating countries by Internet capita
The measurement of attack rates according to the country of origin does not take into account the number
of Internet users in each country. For example, as the United States has one of the highest populations ofInternet users, it is not surprising that it occupies a significant position in overall attack rates. This sectionwill discuss the top originating countries according to the number of attacks launched from that country per10,000 Internet users (table 5). This discussion includes all countries with over 100,000 Internet users.
31
Table 5. Top source countries per Internet capita
Source: Symantec Corporation
Except for Canada and Spain, none of the top countries of attack per Internet capita are present in the top
countries of attack origin for this period. Additionally, five of the top ten were not present on the list for theprevious six-month reporting period. This indicates significant changes in attack rates when adjusted forInternet users.
When examining the top originating countries on a per-capita basis, one pattern seems to emerge. Although,
there are some countries that remain relatively static in their attack-per-10,000-user ratio—namely Turkey,Israel, Spain and Canada—other countries are far more variable. One factor leading to this variability may bethe rapid increase of Internet use in these countries. One consequence of this is that the end users may nothave been adequately educated about best security practices. As a result, computers in countries experi-encing rapid Internet growth may be less rigorously secured than in countries with experienced end users.
Another consequence of this rapid rise in Internet usage is that it challenges the reporting of that Internet
use. Until the rate of Internet adoption slows in these countries, it is likely that considerable variability inthe ranking from year to year will be found. Countries with smaller base populations are likely to experiencethe more significant changes, some doubling or tripling in Internet usage and, therefore, Internet attackactivity, in a year.
31The data on number of Internet users in each country is gathered from the CIA World Factbook 2004
(http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/).28Rank Country ISTR VI rank
1P anama NR
2 Hong Kong SAR NR
3 Macau 2
4 Qatar NR
5 Israel 3
6T urkey 7
7B osnia and Herzegovina NR
8 Canada 9
9 Luxembourg NR
10 Spain 80%2%4%6%8%
Financial
ServicesHigh Tech Healthcare Media/
EntertainmentPower
& EnergyManufacturing Small
BusinessNonprofit Business
ServicesEducation
IndustryPercentSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Many of the new entrants to the top ten of per-capita attack rates are countries with an Internet user base
between 100,000 and 200,000 Internet users. These countries would likely not have had the minimum100,000 Internet users required for consideration in previous reporting periods. This indicates that each ofthese countries is experiencing significant growth, in many cases doubling or tripling the reported Internetpopulation. The growth of the Internet user base in these countries (including Panama, Qatar, Bosnia, andHerzegovina) is reflected in their positioning as a top per-capita attack source.
This metric is also affected by the lag between the actual growth in Internet usage and the documentation
of that growth in reference sources. One example of this was the presence in the last reporting period ofLatvia. The cited Internet user population of Latvia increased from 312,000 in the 2003 version to 936,000in the CIA World Factbook 2004. While the attack activity would have been affected by the rapid increase in
Internet usage, the numbers would not have been reflected in the sources on which this analysis is based.As a result, the ratio would have been skewed. The displacement of Latvia from the top-per-capita attackingcountry metric is more likely due to the fact that the numbers of documented Internet users has increased
(to reflect the rapid growth of Internet usage) while the number of attacks has remained relatively s teady. As
a result, the ratio of attack activity to known Internet users has dropped.
Targeted attack activity by industry
Attackers choose their targets for a number of reasons. In some cases, an attack may be targeted against
a single company or a group of companies from a single industry. In other cases, attacks may simply beopportunistic: the attacker may be interested in compromising a system regardless of its owner. This sectionwill discuss attackers who target a specific industry (figure 10). A targeted attacker is defined as anattacking IP address that has attacked at least three sensors in a given industry to the exclusion of allother industries in the sample period.
Figure 10. Targeted attacks by industry
Source: Symantec Corporation
29Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Between July 1 and December 31, 2004, the financial services industry was the most frequently targeted
industry. It experienced an increase from 4% to over 6% in targeted attacks. This increase continues thepattern seen during the previous six-month period, during which the targeted attacker rate rose from 1%to 4%. This increase was the most significant increase in targeted attack rates for any industry. Financialservices is generally regarded to be an attractive target for attackers hoping to profit from the attack, andthe continued increase in targeted attacker rates indicates that attackers are probing more financialorganizations for weaknesses.
The high tech industry was the second most frequently targeted industry between July 1 and December
31, 2004. It was the fourth most frequently targeted in the previous period. However, while the high techindustry rose in the rankings, the percentage of attacks targeting high tech organizations actually declined,from slightly under 4% in the first half of 2004 to just over 3% in the second half. In the second half of2003, the targeted attacker rate was slightly under 5%. It is possible that organizations in the high techindustry are more likely to have robust security systems in place; therefore, the attractiveness of thoseorganizations to targeted attackers is waning, as targeting other industries may lead to greater rewards.
As with high tech, the healthcare industry also rose in the ranking from ninth place in the first half of
2004 to third place in the second half of the year. Despite this significant jump, health care organizationsexperienced a marginal increase in targeted attack rates, with the percentage remaining very close to 2%.
The most significant decline from the first half of 2004 occurred in the small business industry. The second
most targeted industry in the first six months of 2004, it was the seventh most targeted industry in the second half of the year, with just over 1% of targeted attackers.
In the previous version of the Internet Security Threat Report, Symantec posited that the high ranking of
small businesses was related to the way small businesses access the Internet. Small organizations are more likely to use DSL or cable for Internet access and comparatively smaller address spaces are allocatedto each company. As a result, Symantec suggested that a concerted attack targeting a range of IP addressesbelonging to a DSL or cable Internet provider would be noted as a targeted attack, despite the opportunisticnature of that attack.
Symantec still maintains that this clustering will amplify any intense scanning directed at these Internet
segments, because of the amplification of certain classes of network scanning. It is likely that a spate of targeted scanning on these ranges can upwardly skew the targeted attack numbers in some sample periods,leading to tremendous variability in this industry.
The e-commerce industry, the top targeted industry in the first half of 2004 is notably absent from the
top attacked industries in the current period. During this period, the number of sensors required to ensure statistical validity was not maintained. As a result, Symantec has excluded this industry from this discussion.
It is possible that changes in industry classifications, specifically relating to a distinction between
e-commerce and so-called traditional bricks-and-mortar businesses is causing this decline in contributingsensor base of the e-commerce industry. As traditional companies continue to expand into the online worldwith e-offerings, the distinction between an e-commerce company and a traditional company may not be an appropriate separation.
30Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Severe event ratio by industry
This metric compares industry segments based on the ratio of severe events originating from external
attackers that are detected by sensors based in each industry. Symantec determines severity of an attackbased on the characteristics of the attack, the defensive controls of the client, the value of the assets at risk,and the success of the attack. Severe attacks pose the greatest threat to organizations. The number of severeevents that an industry experiences may indicate the risk to which it is exposed. This metric will discuss theindustries that have received the highest number of severe events per 10,000 events (figure 11).
The financial services sector experienced the highest number of severe events per 10,000 regular events.
This sector, with its high profile and involvement in financial transactions, is an attractive target for attackers.When considering the high placement of this industry in both the “severe event ratio” and the “targetedattacker” metrics, it is clear that organizations involved in this industry must take appropriate steps to identify and mitigate risks of attack.
Other industries are also heavily affected by a high severe event rate, including manufacturing, transportation,
and the media/entertainment industries. The high severe event rate of these industries compared to other coreinfrastructure industries, such as power and energy or healthcare, may indicate that extra security m easures
have been deployed in the power and energy and healthcare industries to better mitigate against successfulattacks.
The presence of the media and entertainment industry in fourth place may be noteworthy, particularly in
light of successful instances of media manipulation by Internet attackers. Because of their high visibility to the public, these sites are often targeted by “hacktivists”, who may deface the sites in order to conveytheir message.
Adrian Lamo performed some of the most high-profile examples of Web site manipulation. In one case, he
manipulated a story on the Yahoo news site
32in August 2001, subtly changing the facts reported. Lamo has
since been charged and has pleaded guilty for his behavior.33The possibility of high-profile manipulation
of events reported by news organizations should not be discounted given the high visability of Web sitesassociated with them.
32http://www.securityfocus.com/news/254
33http://www.securityfocus.com/news/9520310369121518
Financial
ServicesTelecom Transportation Media/
EntertainmentPower
& EnergyManufacturing Healthcare Nonprofit High Tech Business
Services
IndustrySevere events / 10,000 eventsSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 11. Severe event ratio by industry
Source: Symantec Corporation
32Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Vulnerability Trends
Vulnerabilities are design or implementation errors in information systems that can result in a compromise
of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information stored upon or transmitted by the affectedsystem. They are most often found in software, although they exist in all layers of information systems,from design or protocol specifications to physical hardware implementations.
Vulnerabilities may be exploited actively, either by malicious users or automated malicious code, or
triggered passively during system operation. New vulnerabilities are discovered and disclosed regularly bya sizeable community of end users, researchers, hackers, and security vendors. The disclosure of a singlevulnerability in a critical asset can seriously undermine the security posture of an organization.
Symantec carefully monitors vulnerability research, tracking vulnerabilities throughout their lifecycle, from
initial discussion to the issuance of a patch or other remediation measure. This section of the SymantecInternet Security Threat Report will discuss vulnerabilities that have been disclosed between July 1 and
December 31, 2004. It will compare them with those disclosed in the two previous six-month periods anddiscuss how current vulnerability trends may affect potential future threats. Where relevant, it will alsooffer mitigation strategies. Symantec’s recommendations for best security practices can be found in“Appendix A” at the end of this report.
34
This section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report will discuss:
•Total number of vulnerabilities disclosed
•Severity of vulnerabilities
•Ease of exploitation
•Exploit development time
•W eb application vulnerabilities
•W eb browser vulnerabilities
•W eb browser vulnerabilities by severity
Symantec operates one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion of vulnerabilities
on the Internet. The BugTraq mailing list35has approximately 50,000 individual subscribers, who receive,
discuss, and contribute vulnerability research on a daily basis. Symantec also maintains one of the world’smost comprehensive databases of security vulnerabilities, currently consisting of over 11,000 vulnerabilities(spanning more than a decade) affecting more than 20,000 technologies from over 2,000 vendors. Thisdiscussion of vulnerability trends is based on a thorough analysis of that data.
Total number of vulnerabilities disclosed
Symantec documented 1,403 new vulnerabilities during the six-month period between July 1 and December
31, 2004 (figure 12). This represents growth of 13% in total volume over the 1,237 vulnerabilities disclosedin the first six months of 2004. It is also a 19% increase over the 1,180 vulnerabilities disclosed bet ween
July 1 and December 31, 2003.
The second half of 2004 was the second consecutive period during which an increase in total volume was
observed. As figure 12 shows, disclosure activity rose continually between the first half of 2001 and thefirst half of 2003. After a drop-off in disclosure activity in the second half of 2003, it has risen again forthe past two six-month periods and is now near the peak established in the middle of 2003.
34Please note that all numbers presented in this discussion have been rounded off to the nearest whole number. As a result, some cumulative percentages may exceed 100%.
35The BugTraq mailing list is hosted by SecurityFocus (http://www.securityfocus.com). Archives are available at http://www.securi tyfocus.com/archive/13304008001,2001,600
Jan–June
2001July–Dec
2001Jan–June
2002July–Dec
2002July–Dec
2003Jan–June
2003July–Dec
2004Jan–June
20046807801,2851,310
1,1801,2371,4031,480Documented vulnerabilities
Period
0102030405060
July–Dec 2003 Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004485258
PeriodDocumented vulnerabilites70Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 12. Total volume of vulnerabilities documented by Symantec, 2001–04
Source: Symantec Corporation
Figure 13. Vulnerabilities per week over the past 18 months
Source: Symantec Corporation
34Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
The increase in vulnerability disclosure over the past two reporting periods is also apparent when assessed
on a weekly basis. Over the second half of 2004, an average of 58 new vulnerabilities per week were disclosed,an increase from 52 per week in the previous six-month period, or nearly one additional vulnerability a day(figure 13). Between July 1 and December 31, 2003, 48 new vulnerabilities were published per week. Thismeans that security administrators must currently protect against ten additional vulnerabilities per week,on average, than one year ago.
Severity of vulnerabilities
Vulnerability severity is a measure of the degree to which the vulnerability gives an attacker accessibility
to the targeted system. It also measures the potential impact that successful exploitation may have on theconfidentiality, integrity, and or availability of the affected system. For the purposes of the Internet Security
Threat Report, each vulnerability is categorized as one of three severity levels. These levels are:
Low severity —Vulnerabilities that constitute a minor threat. Attackers cannot exploit the vulnerability
across a network. As well, successful exploitation of the vulnerability would not result in a complete compromise of the information stored or transmitted on the system.
Moderate severity —Vulnerabilities that result in a partial compromise of the affected system, such as those
by which an attacker gains elevated privileges but does not gain complete control of the target system.
High severity —Vulnerabilities that result in a compromise of the entire system if exploited. In almost all
cases, successful exploitation can result in a complete loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability ofdata stored on or transmitted across the system.
For the period of July 1 through December 31, 2004, 696 of the vulnerabilities documented by Symantec,
or 50% of the total volume, were rated high severity (figure 14). This is a 4% increase over the first sixmonths of 2004, when 46% of all vulnerabilities were rated high severity. The number of high-severity vulnerabilities has increased by 6% over the same period one year ago.
Of the vulnerabilities that Symantec documented during the last six months of 2004, 667, or 48% of
the total volume, were considered moderately severe. This is a small decrease from the 50% rated asmoderately severe in the first half of the year. It is lower still than the 54% rated as moderately severebetween July 1 and December 31, 2003.
In the last six months of 2004, Symantec classified only 40 disclosed vulnerabilities as low severity,
amounting to 3% of the total volume. This is a smaller proportion than the previous reporting period during which 4% were rated low severity. However, it is a slight increase over the number of low-severityvulnerabilities noted during the same period a year ago, 2%.
The current reporting period continued an increase in moderate and high-severity vulnerabilities that was
observed in the two previous six-month periods. In the last six months of 2004, 97% of vulnerabilitieswere rated as moderate or high severity. This is up from 95% in the previous period.
3504008001,2001,600
PeriodJuly–Dec 2003 Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004Documented vulnerabilitiesHigh severity Moderate severity Low severity
69666740
51763528
56861851Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 14. Severity breakdown over the past 18 months
Source: Symantec Corporation
The increasing proportion of higher severity vulnerabilities is likely due to two factors. First, researchers
are more interested in finding and reporting high-severity vulnerabilities. The severity rating of a vulnerabilityreflects, among other things, the potential impact that an exploit may have on a compromised system.Researchers are not likely to expend the time and effort involved in researching and exploiting vulnerabilitiesunless the “reward” is worth it. Furthermore, Symantec believes it is reasonable to conclude that there is a correlation between the potential impact of a vulnerability on the system and the recognition of theresearcher among peers in the research community.
The second reason for the increase in more severe vulnerabilities is that over 80% of vulnerabilities
documented this period are remotely exploitable. Nearly 50% affect technologies associated with theWorld Wide Web. Most modern information technology systems either require or support network access,
which is increasingly accessed through Web interfaces or technologies associated with the World WideWeb. The changing composition of the vulnerability database reflects these developments. Because
vulnerabilities that can be exploited by attackers across a network are, by definition, at least moderatelysevere, the increase in remotely exploitable vulnerabilities has resulted in an increase in moderately tohighly severe classifications.
36050100150200250300350
MonthJuly August September October November DecemberDocumented vulnerabilitiesHigh severity Moderate severity Low severity
85109 110 119
9917494111 114124
109115
51442
312Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 15. Monthly volume, by severity
Source: Symantec Corporation
Ease of exploitation
Symantec rates each vulnerability according to how difficult it is for an attacker to exploit it and compromise
a targeted system. This ease of exploit rating assumes that potential attackers have a general knowledge ofvulnerability classes and how to exploit them, with or without an exploit, depending on the vulnerability.Symantec rates each vulnerability as either “easily exploitable,” if it requires no exploit or if a requiredexploit is known to be available, or “no exploit available,” if exploit code is required but is not yet availableto the public.
Generally speaking, “easily exploitable” vulnerabilities do not require sophisticated skills or knowledge to
exploit. Anyone with sufficient general technical knowledge or with publicly available tools can exploit them.Examples of these are Web server vulnerabilities that can be exploited by simply entering an appropriate URLinto a Web browser.
On the other hand, vulnerabilities that are classified as “no exploit available” are more difficult to exploit.
This is because attackers cannot exploit them using basic knowledge alone and because no known tools to exploit them have been written or made publicly available. To exploit these vulnerabilities an attackerwould be required to write custom exploit code (assuming that there is none circulating in the underground).This significantly raises the level of knowledge, expertise, and effort required for a successful attack, thuslowering the probability of such an attack. It should be pointed out that while no tools may be publiclyavailable, private exploits might exist. However, without a public exploit, these vulnerabilities won’t likely
be widely exploited.
370%20%40%60%80%100%
MonthJuly August September October November DecemberPercentEasy to exploit
0306090120150180
MonthJuly August September October NovemberNo exploit required
DecemberDocumented vulnerabilitiesNo exploit available Exploit availableSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 16. Vulnerabilities rated easy to exploit
Source: Symantec Corporation
Figure 17. Ease of exploit breakdown
Source: Symantec Corporation
38Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Between July 1 and December 31, 2004, Symantec classified 987 vulnerabilities as easily exploitable
(figure 16). This means that 70% of all vulnerabilities disclosed during this period require no exploit codeor had some type of exploit code available. 69% of the vulnerabilities documented in the first half of 2004were classified easy to exploit, as were 72% of the total in the second half of 2003. The proportion of easily exploitable vulnerabilities in this period remains virtually unchanged from what was noted in the twoprevious periods. A possible explanation for this is that the same researchers are finding the same types ofvulnerabilities. There are many researchers who post to mailing lists such as BugTraq who only ever findeasy-to-exploit Web application vulnerabilities.
The majority of the vulnerabilities classified as easy to exploit—53% between July 1 and December 31,
2004—do not require any exploit code at all. This is a small increase from the 52% noted in the previousperiod and 5% higher than in the same period one year ago. The apparent decline in easy-to-exploitvulnerabilities during the month of July, which is evident in figure 17, is due to the low volume ofvulnerabilities during that month.
The vulnerabilities classified as easy to exploit are nearly all input validation errors in Web-based applica-
tions. This includes cross-site scripting, HTML injection, and SQL injection. The proportion of vulnerabilitiesfor which no exploit is required has been steadily increasing with the proportion of Web application
vulnerabilities. (For more detail, please see the discussion on Web application vulnerabilities below.) Thisreflects the fact that many applications are now being delivered to users online via the Web. These remotelyaccessible applications are frequently susceptible to easy-to-find vulnerabilities.
Vulnerabilities with exploit code
Over the last six months of 2004, Symantec documented 201 vulnerabilities for which associated exploit
code was widely available (figure 18). Because of the availability of exploit code, these vulnerabilities areconsidered easy to exploit. The percentage of the total volume of vulnerabilities with exploit code, 14%, isslightly higher than what was observed between January 1 and June 30, 2004 (13%). The percentage seenduring the same period one year ago was 18%, which is substantially higher. The decrease in the proportionof vulnerabilities with exploit code is likely attributed to the fact that a larger portion of vulnerabilitiesdisclosed over the second half of 2004 affect Web applications, as these vulnerabilities typically do notrequire exploit code.
390%5%10%15%20%
July–Dec 2003 Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 200418%
14% 14%
PeriodPercentSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 18. Percentage of vulnerabilities with associated exploit code over 18 months
Source: Symantec Corporation
Of the 202 vulnerabilities documented in this period with associated exploit code, 76% were classified as
high-severity threats (figure 19). This is a substantial increase over the previous period, during which 64%of documented vulnerabilities were considered highly severe.
It is not surprising that the majority of vulnerabilities with associated exploit code are classified as high
severity; however, it is noteworthy that this proportion appears to be increasing. This reflects a desire onthe part of exploit authors to expend the effort required to create exploit code only when the potentialimpact is the greatest. This is a worrisome trend, as the availability of exploit code shortens the windowthat administrators have to patch their systems before the risk of compromise rises significantly. (For amore in-depth discussion of the disclosure-to-exploit window, please see the “Exploit development time”discussion, which follows.)
40020406080
July August SeptemberHigh severity
October November December
MonthDocumented vulnerabilitiesModerate severity Low se veritySymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 19. Monthly breakdown of vulnerabilities with associated exploit code, by severity
Source: Symantec Corporation
Exploit development time
A window of exposure exists between the disclosure of a vulnerability and the availability of a patch or
other remediation measure. If exploit code is created and made public during this time, computers may be
immediately vulnerable to widespread attack. The shorter the time between disclosure of a vulnerabilityand the release of an associated exploit, the more hosts are vulnerable to attack, until patches becomeavailable.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2004, the average time between the disclosure of a vulnerability and
the publication of its associated exploit was 6.4 days (figure 20). This is an increase of just over half a dayover the previous six months. Between January and June 2004, the time to exploit was 5.8 days after theannouncement of the associated vulnerability. Compared to the previous reporting, the average exploitdevelopment time increased by less than a day.
Continuing from the first half of 2004, the average amount of time between vulnerability publication and
the appearance of a third-party functional exploit remains less than one week. This highlights the need foradministrators to patch their systems or implement other measures to protect against new threats as soonas possible. This may be particularly difficult for large organizations, for which applying an enterprise-widepatching in a matter of days is very challenging. With the time between disclosure and exploit developmentso short, administrators would benefit from notification of a new vulnerability, and relevant mitigation orpatching information, as well as an understanding of the potential risk of the vulnerability.
410246810
Jan Feb March April May June July Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
MonthDaysSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 20. Average number of days for exploit development, by month, in 2004
Source: Symantec Corporation
Web application vulnerabilities
Web applications are technologies that rely on a browser for their user interface. They are often hosted
on Web servers. Vulnerabilities in Web applications are typically exploited by attacks such as cross-sitescripting, SQL injection, and HTML injection, and can allow an attacker to access confidential informationfrom databases without having to compromise any servers.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2004, Symantec catalogued 670 vulnerabilities affecting Web applica-
tions, nearly half (48%) of the total vulnerabilities disclosed during this reporting period (figure 21). This issubstantially higher than the 39% documented in the first six months of 2004 and the 32% documentedbetween July 1 and December 31, 2003.
As noted in the “ease of exploitation” discussion, vulnerabilities targeting Web applications are often
classified as easily exploitable, and their increase has contributed significantly to the high number of easily exploitable vulnerabilities. This is likely due to the increasing use of the World Wide Web as a tool for building and delivering applications. As Web applications are becoming more prevalent, vulnerabilities
associated with them are becoming a greater concern. As a case in point, the first worm based on a Webapplication, Perl.Santy,
36which targeted the popular phpBB application, was detected in December 2004.
This highlights the need for security personnel to keep abreast of new vulnerabilities, to deploy only Webapplications that are necessary for organizational purposes, and to audit all deployed Web applications for security.
36http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/perl.santy.html
For an in-depth discussion of the Santy worm, please see the “Malicious Code Trends” section of this report.420200400600800
July–Dec 2003 Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004369491670
PeriodDocumented vulnerabilitiesSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 21. The increase in Web application vulnerabilities over 18 months
Source: Symantec Corporation
Web browser vulnerabilities
The Web browser is a critical and ubiquitous application that has increasingly made security headlines
over the past few years. Traditionally, the focus of security strategies has been on the network perimeter:servers, firewalls, and other assets with outward-facing exposure. However, a notable shift has occurred,with security of client-side systems, primarily end-user desktop hosts, becoming increasingly important.The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report has anticipated and followed this trend over the past several
reporting periods.
Almost exclusively, vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft Internet Explorer, one of the most widely used
client-side applications, have brought client-side security to the forefront. Criticism of Microsoft’s InternetExplorer in response to many high profile vulnerabilities led to the popular promotion of other browsers—particularly Mozilla, Firefox, and Opera—as safe alternatives.
For the first time, the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report is including a comparison of vulnerability
data for different browsers, specifically Microsoft Internet Explorer, Mozilla, Mozilla Firefox, Opera, andApple’s Safari. The methodology section for this analysis, included in “Appendix C” of this report, includessome important caveats that should be noted before any conclusions are drawn from this discussion. Inaddition to those points, the following should be kept in mind while considering this data:
•Only verifiable vulnerabilities that were confirmed by the vendor were taken into consideration.
•W eb browser vulnerability counts may not match one-to-one with security bulletins or patches issued
by vendors. This is because of the complexity involved in identifying individual vulnerabilities in often-complex browser exploits.
430510152025
July–Dec 2003 Jan–June 2004 Jan–June 2003 July–Dec 2004
PeriodDocumented vulnerabilitiesMozilla Firefox Mozilla Browser Microsoft Internet Explorer Apple Safari Opera BrowserSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
•Not every vulnerability discovered is exploited. As of this writing, there has been no widespread
exploitation of any browser except Microsoft Internet Explorer. This is something that Symantec expectsto change as alternative browsers become more widely deployed.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2004, Symantec documented 13 vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft
Internet Explorer (figure 22). This is sharply higher than the three vulnerabilities documented by Symantecin the first half of 2004, during which reports of all browser vulnerabilities were lower. However, it is downfrom the peak of 17 vulnerabilities seen in the second half of 2003. This is likely due to two factors: theeffort that Microsoft has undertaken to secure Internet Explorer and patch latent vulnerabilities, and theshift of vulnerability researcher interest towards alternative browsers that are being marketed or promotedas secure.
Figure 22. Vulnerabilities affecting browsers, 2003–2004
Source: Symantec Corporation
During the last six months of 2004, 21 vulnerabilities affecting the Mozilla browsers were disclosed. This is
a massive increase over the single Mozilla vulnerability documented in the previous period and the sevennoted in the same reporting period one year ago. Notably, for the first time, there were more vulnerabilitiesdisclosed for Mozilla than for Microsoft Internet Explorer. Research into the security of Mozilla browsers isdirectly the result of the increased popularity and deployment of the browser, which is itself a reaction tothe widespread abuse of several high-profile vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer.
During the first six months of 2004, six Opera vulnerabilities were documented, an increase from the
four seen in the first six months of the year. In the last six months of 2003, Symantec documented three
vulnerabilities affecting Opera. This apparently steady increase over the past 18 months reflects growingresearcher interest in the alternative browser, though there has been interest in the browser for some time:the largest number of Opera vulnerabilities recorded in a six-month period was in the first half of 2003
44Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
(nine vulnerabilities). Interestingly, vulnerabilities affecting Opera have been reported regularly for at least
two years. The Opera browser has been popular with a niche group of dedicated users since its appearance.
It is likely that continued security research comes from this base of users.
Over the last six months of 2004, there were no vendor-confirmed Safari vulnerabilities. This is somewhat
surprising given the increasing popularity of Mac OS® X, which is in turn associated with the success of theiPod. In the first half of 2004, there were two vulnerabilities affecting Safari compared to a singlevulnerability in the second half of 2003.
The number of Safari vulnerabilities reported so far is too low to suggest any trends. This may be due to an
inability of researchers to find vulnerabilities, or it may simply be due to a lack of interest in the browserbecause of its recent entry into the market and subsequent limited deployment. However, Symantec believesthat as the browser becomes more entrenched in the market and as more users deploy it, researchers willcontinue to find security vulnerabilities in Safari.
The overall decline in Internet Explorer vulnerabilities seen during 2004 is likely due to a combination of the
security efforts of Microsoft and the shift of researchers’ attention to the increasingly popular alternativebrowsers. So far, nearly all reports of vulnerabilities exploited in the wild against browsers are associatedwith Microsoft Internet Explorer. While there have been few, if any, credible reports of attacks againstMozilla, Mozilla Firefox, Opera, or Safari in the wild, it remains to be seen whether these browsers will liveup to the expectations that many have for them.
Web browser vulnerabilities by severity
Of the 13 vulnerabilities affecting Microsoft Internet Explorer documented by Symantec between July 1 and
December 31, 2004, nine were classified as high severity. The three vulnerabilities noted in the first half of the year were all classified as highly severe. In the second half of 2003, 16 out of the total of 17 wereconsidered high severity. In all periods, the majority of vendor-confirmed vulnerabilities affecting MicrosoftInternet Explorer were high severity. The average severity of vendor-confirmed vulnerabilities affectingMicrosoft Internet Explorer falls just above the lower bound of the high severity classification range.
In the second half of 2004, 11 out of 21 vulnerabilities affecting the Mozilla browsers were classified as
high severity. In the first half of 2004, the single Mozilla vulnerability was considered high severity. Of theseven Mozilla vulnerabilities documented in the second half of 2003, four were rated as highly severe. Onaverage, Mozilla vulnerabilities are moderately severe; however, the average severity rating nears the
upper bound of the “moderately severe” severity range.
Only one of the six Opera vulnerabilities noted in the current period was classified as highly severe. In the
previous six-month period, none of the four vulnerabilities documented were high severity threats. In thesecond half of 2003, two of the three vulnerabilities affecting Opera that were catalogued by Symantecwere classified as highly severe. The average Opera vulnerability is moderately severe.
As was stated in the previous section, there were no Safari vulnerabilities disclosed between July 1 and
December 31, 2004. Furthermore, there were no high-severity vulnerabilities found in Safari in the previoussix-month period. In the last six months of 2003, the lone Safari vulnerability was rated high severity. Theaverage severity of Safari vulnerabilities (of which there are only four in the entire vulnerability database)
is within the high severity range, though it is skewed by the small sample set and the presence of a singlehigh-severity vulnerability.
37
37http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/751845Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Malicious Code Trends
This section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report will analyze developments in malicious code
over the second half of 2004. Symantec gathers data from over 120 million desktops that have deployedSymantec’s antivirus products in consumer and corporate environments. The Symantec Digital ImmuneSystem™ and Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting process. This discussion is based on malicious code samples reported to Symantec for analysis between July 1 andDecember 31, 2004.
This section analyzes and discusses malicious code in two ways: firstly, according to specific examples of
malicious code, such as MyDoom and Netsky, and secondly, according to the category or type of maliciouscode in question, such as viruses and worms. In some cases, a particular family of malicious code, such asthe aforementioned MyDoom and Netsky families, may have multiple variants. A variant is a new iterationof the same family that may have minor differences but is still based on the original. In this report, variantsof a family are counted as separate samples due to the variations in functionality.
In past editions of the Internet Security Threat Report, adware and spyware reported to Symantec was
included within this section. However, as these security risks continue to grow, they have been assigned a separate section for discussion. The “Malicious Code Trends” section will discuss:
•Top ten malicious code samples
•Win32 viruses and worms
•Malicious code for Linux®
•Exposure of confidential information
•Trojan horses
•Malicious code for mobile devices
•Malicious code for P2P (peer to peer), IM (instant messaging), IRC, and CIFS
•B o t s•New bot trends
•Malicious code for profit
While this discussion will include any prevention and mitigation information that might be relevant to the
particular threats being discussed, Symantec recommends that certain best security practices always befollowed to protect against malicious code attacks in general. In order to prevent malicious code infection, it
is crucial to employ best security practices. Administrators should keep patch levels up-to-date, especially on computers that host public services and are accessible through a firewall or placed in a DMZ, such asHTTP, FTP, SMTP, and DNS servers. Email servers should be configured to only allow file types that arerequired for business needs. Alternatively, other means can be used to transfer files such as file servers,FTP, or SSH. Security administrators should also remind employees to never run software that has not
been authorized by the organization.
End users should employ defense in-depth,
38including antivirus software and a firewall. Users should
update antivirus definitions regularly. They should also ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computersare updated with all necessary security patches from their operating system vendor. They should neverview, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is expected and comes from a knownand trusted source, and the purpose of the attachment is known.
38Defense in-depth is the security approach in which each system on the network is secured to the greatest possible degree. This should include the deployment of
antivirus, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems, among other security measures.46Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Top ten malicious code samples
As in previous volumes of the Internet Security Threat Report, mass-mailing worms39dominated the top
malicious code reported to Symantec over the last six months of 2004. Eight of the top ten samples reported to Symantec during this period were variants of mass-mailer worms that have been seen in previous reports: Netsky,
40Sober,41Beagle,42and MyDoom.43
Mass-mailing worms have the capacity to affect a large number of users because they proliferate via email, one of the most widely used applications on the Internet. However, they have had to become moresophisticated in response to the increasing security savvy of end users. As a result, successful mass-mailersnow employ additional propagation mechanisms, such as peer-to-peer networks, and are more difficult to eradicate. Four of the eight mass-mailing worms in the top ten reports used additional propagationmechanisms. An example of this is Beagle.AV,
44which used email and peer-to-peer networks to propagate,
and disabled antivirus products in order to hinder disinfection.
While several of the top ten samples in this reporting period were listed in previous Internet Security
Threat Reports, others, such as Beagle.AV, are new additions to the list (table 6). When a particular piece
of malicious code proves itself to be successful by infecting a large number of users, new variants are oftencreated since similar techniques will likely work again. For instance, the use of P2P networks in combinationwith mass-mailing worms has become such a common practice that four of the eight mass-mailing wormsin the top ten malicious code—all of which were variants of Netsky, Beagle or MyDoom—reported thisperiod employed this propagation mechanism.
Table 6. Top ten malicious code reported to Symantec
Source: Symantec Corporation
39A mass-mailing worm is an application that propagates primarily by attaching a copy of its executable to email messages that it sends to other users.
40http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/[email protected]
41http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/[email protected]
42http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/[email protected]
43http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/[email protected]
44http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/[email protected] Sample
1 Netsky.P
2 Sober.I
3 Gaobot
4 Spybot
5 Beagle.AV
6 Beagle.X
7 Mydoom.M
8 Netsky.Z
9 Netsky.D
10 Beagle.AWSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Netsky.P45was the most common malicious code sample reported to Symantec between July 1 and
December 31, 2004. Variants of Netsky, which was first seen on February 16, 2004, make up three of thetop ten malicious code submissions during this reporting period. Netsky sends itself in an archive using a.zip extension that allows it to bypass filtering measures. Because files with a .zip extension are generallytrusted, end users are likely to unzip the file and then inadvertently run the virus.
The second-ranked malicious code sample for this reporting period, Sober.I,
46is new to the top ten this
reporting period. A new variant of the Sober worm, Sober.I was initially reported on November 19, 2004and propagated rapidly. The original Sober worm was first reported on October 24, 2003. It was a mass-mailing worm that used its own SMTP engine to spread, sending itself as an email attachment to theaddresses gathered from the infected computer. Previous variants of the Sober family have also beensuccessful, with four other variants present in the top 50 reported malicious code samples over theprevious two reporting periods.
Bots continue to make inroads during the last six months of 2004, accounting for two of the top ten reported
samples, compared to just one in the previous reporting period. Gaobot was the third most frequentlyreported sample over the past six months, followed in fourth spot by Spybot. Gaobot also occupied thethird ranking in the previous reporting period, whereas Spybot was not included in the top ten at that time.
The presence of these two bots in the top ten may indicate that the use of bots is continuing to increase, as
was noted in the previous volume of the Internet Security Threat Report. This may be due to the variety of
functions they can perform on compromised computers. These are discussed in greater depth in the “Bots”discussion below.
The fifth and sixth most common malicious code samples during the second half of 2004 were variants of
the Beagle mass-mailer worm. In the previous reporting period, Beagle.M was the eighth most reportedsample. Beagle uses a similar propagation technique to that of Netsky. However, it took this technique onestep further by applying password protection to the .zip file.
47This tactic exploited the fact that users are
more likely to trust password-protected files. It also enabled the attachment to bypass many emailgateways and scanners, which are unable to scan password-protected files.
Win32 viruses and worms
Win32 threats are executable programs that operate by using the Win32 API (application programinterface),
48which provides a standard for the development of software on the Windows platform. These
forms of malicious code work on at least one Win32 platform. Win32 threats have shown a major rise in
volume during 2004 (figure 23). This rise was first noted in the second half of 2002 and it is clear that it
continues, al though the rate of increase has decreased over the second half of 2004.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2004, Symantec documented more than 7 ,360 new Win32 virus and
worm variants. This is an increase of 64% over the 4,496 reported in the first half of the year and anincrease of more than 332% over the 1,702 documented in the second half of 2003. As of December 31,2004, the total number of Win32 variants is approaching 17 ,500.
45http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/[email protected]
46http://securityresponse.symantec.com/sarc/sarc.nsf/html/[email protected]
47The password required to open the archive was included in the email message body or as a JPEG file attached to the message.
For details, please see: http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.beagle@mm!zip.html.
48An API (application program interface) is a set of tools that are specific to an operating system that allows programmers to wr ite software within that system.
The Win32 API provides a standard for the development of software on the Windows platform.4802,0004,0006,0008,000
Jan–June 2002 July–Dec 2002 Jan–June 2003 July–Dec 2003 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 20044456879941,7027,360
4,496Total viruses and worms
PeriodSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 23. New Win32 viruses and worms by six-month period 2002–2004
Source: Symantec Corporation
With their massive accumulation over the past few years, Win32 threats are now more common than
script- and macro-based threats combined. Initially, script- and macro-based threats were more prolific;however, this has quickly changed. This may be due to the ease of creating script and macro threats fornew technology. When a new technology is released, scripting languages are easier to learn and use thanmore complex compiled languages.
As malicious code authors become more familiar with the new technology and its APIs, it becomes more
beneficial for them to create compiled threats using native code. Script- or macro-based threats rely uponthe presence of an appropriate scripting host to interpret and execute it. If the interpreter is not present on the computer or if it has been disabled through policies, the script will not run. This is not the case withnative code, which does not require any specialized interpreter. Since script and macro threats are easierfor antivirus software to detect than a compiled application, there is greater incentive for malicious code
writers to use compiled languages in order to increase the effective lifespan of the malicious code.
During 2004 alone, Symantec documented over 11,800 unique samples of Win32 threats, a greater
number than the cumulative 10,000 DOS viruses
49documented between 1986–1996. In October of 2004
alone, Symantec documented 1,500 Win32 samples, almost as many as the 1,702 documented in theentire last six months of 2003.
49Prior to the release of Windows 95, DOS (Disk Operating System) was the primary operating system used by most personal computer s. Early versions of Windows
simply ran as an application within DOS. Therefore, most malicious code written prior to 1995 was intended to run on DOS just a s most current malicious code is
intended to run on Windows.49Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Malicious code for Linux
In the previous Internet Security Threat Report, Symantec cautioned that an exploit-based worm for Linux
and Linux-based applications could soon appear.50This warning appears to have been well founded. On
December 21, 2004, the Santy worm51was the first reported Web application worm to be detected propa-
gating in the wild. While other worms have exploited Web servers and their related components, this wasthe first time a worm exploited a vulnerability in a separate application running on the Web server.Specifically, it exploited a script injection vulnerability in phpBB.
52
Santy is interesting for a number of reasons. For one, while it affected primarily Linux systems, it couldalso affect computers running phpBB on Windows and other operating systems. Santy used the Googlesearch engine to locate vulnerable systems to exploit. It was also the first worm in the wild to exploit a vulnerability in a Web application rather than the underlying operating system or the Web server itself.Symantec expects that Santy is likely just the first in a new trend of worms exploiting these types of vulnerabilities.
Santy was implemented as a Perl script, making it easy to modify the worm and implement new
functionality. The first version of Santy would simply propagate to a vulnerable system and overwritecertain Web pages in order to deface the site. Two later versions, Santy.B and Santy.C, were modified toalso install a back door server and an IRC bot on infected systems and to use different search engines tolocate vulnerable systems. This was made necessary because Google began filtering search requests madeby the worm. Additionally, these Santy variants would exploit similar injection vulnerabilities in multipleWeb application scripts, not only phpBB.
The vulnerability exploited by Santy had been announced on the BugTraq mailing list on July 11, 2004. On
November 18, 2004, the vendor of phpBB confirmed the existence of this vulnerability and released a fixfor it the following day. Slightly more than a month passed before the Santy worm was initially reported,
adequate time for most users to test and apply the patch to vulnerable systems. Still, an abundance of vulnerable systems remained available for Santy to infect. This may reflect the fact that patching Linuxsystems involves a more complicated process than patching Microsoft systems.
When Santy overwrote Web pages on a compromised computer, it replaced them with a page containing
the text “This site is defaced!!! NeverEverNoSanity WebWorm generation X,” where X was the number ofsites defaced by that strain of the worm. At the time of writing, a Google search for this text returned over30,000 results.
53This demonstrates the need for users to remain informed of new vulnerabilities, as well
as the availability of patches, workarounds, and mitigation strategies.
In cases where a vulnerability affects an application or service that must be available to the public, such
as Web applications, patches should be applied as soon as possible. Vulnerabilities in Web services usuallycannot be mitigated using the common strategies normally recommended for other remote services, suchas using a firewall to block or filter traffic to a port, because they are critical enterprise services that mustexchange data with external users.
50Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, Volume VI, September 2004: p. 45
http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539
51http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/perl.santy.html
52http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10701
53This number may include Web pages that discuss the Santy worm, such as antivirus vendor sites.500%10%20%30%40%50%60%
July–Dec 2003 Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 200436%44%54%
PeriodPercent of top 50 reportsSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Exposure of confidential information
Almost every computer is likely to contain information that its owner would prefer to keep private.
Information such as email addresses, confidential documents, cached logon credentials, and financialinformation may all be found on the drives of corporate and home users alike. Once a computer has beencompromised by malicious code, all of this information may potentially be accessed, disclosed, and oraltered without authorization. In fact, some malicious code is created with the intent of purposely stealingconfidential information from a compromised computer.
Threats with the potential to expose confidential information have continued to increase over the past
three reporting periods. Between July 1 and December 31, 2004, malicious code that exposed confidentialinformation represented 54% of the top 50 malicious code samples received by Symantec, up from 44% in the first half of 2004, and 36% in the second half of 2003. This represents a 23% increase between the current period and the first half of 2004, and a 50% increase over the same period the previous year(figure 24). This is partially due to the increasing proliferation of bots, which expose all information on thecompromised computer due to their remote access capabilities. (For a more detailed discussion, see the“Bots” discussion below.)
Information exposure threats can be present in almost any type of malicious code, including Trojan horses,
worms, viruses, and back door server programs. Many worms and Trojans contain keystroke-logging andback door functionality in addition to their other components. For example, variants of the MyDoom wormcontained keystroke-logging functionality in addition to their propagation routines and other payloads.
Figure 24. Malicious code threats to confidential information
Source: Symantec Corporation
51Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Some malicious code that has keystroke-logging functionality, such as some variants of Spybot, may simply
log all keystrokes on the compromised computer. Others may perform more sophisticated information-exposure functions. For instance, the Banker Trojan,
54waits for a user to open a Web browser to an online
banking site and records the user’s authentication information. Others, such as the Bancos family,55will
wait for the user to visit certain online banking sites and mimic the bank’s online interface in order to capture the user’s confidential information. This information is then sent to a remote attacker and can beused for identity theft purposes or to simply logon as the user and transfer account funds. This techniqueis similar to phishing, which is discussed in the “Additional Security Risks” section of this report. However,whereas phishing consists of emails that attempt to lure users to a false Web site, these examples areactually Trojans that mimic the user interface.
Back door server programs, or simply back doors, allow a remote attacker nearly unfettered access to the
compromised computer. The attacker can use the back door to install other programs on the computer,such as keystroke-logging Trojans or other monitoring software. Additionally, the back door could allow theremote attacker to view the contents of files saved on the computer or to retrieve cached passwords. Thepassword cache could potentially contain logon information for online banking Web sites if the user haschosen to have their Web browser store their credentials for the site. Some back doors even allow a remoteattacker to turn on any Web cams attached to the computer and view the video stream without the user’sknowledge.
56
Users can protect themselves from these threats by never executing unknown applications, especiallythose received in email or downloaded from sources that are not certain to be trustworthy. Users shouldalso avoid using public computer terminals to logon to Web-based email or online banking sites, as theintegrity of these systems cannot be verified. They should also avoid using single passwords for authentica-tion in multiple applications, as the compromise of a single password may subsequently allow an attackeraccess to numerous sources of confidential data. Changing passwords frequently can also help protectagainst a password compromise. Finally, Symantec advises users not to allow Web browsers to cache logoncredentials for Web sites
Trojan horses
Trojan horses are a major source of information exposure. A Trojan horse (also referred to as a Trojan) is
a program that intentionally misrepresents its functionality through a filename, location, or appearance. A Trojan neither replicates nor copies itself, but may cause damage to or compromise the security of acomputer in some way. During the first six months of 2004, these programs were second only to theMyDoom worm in numbers reported by Symantec customers. During the last six months of the year,Trojans have become the most reported threat, representing 33% of the top 50 malicious code reported
to Symantec (figure 25).
54http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/pwsteal.banker.b.html
55http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/pwsteal.bancos.html
56http://www.securityfocus.com/news/8893520%7%14%21%28%35%
July–Dec 2003 Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 200415%17%33%
PeriodPercent of top 50 reportsSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 25. Trojans as percentage of top 50 malicious code submissions
Source: Symantec Corporation
The increase in reported Trojans may be partially attributed to the increase in client-side exploits for Web
browsers.57These exploits can allow a Trojan to be installed on a computer without the knowledge of the
user. Since Trojans do not have the means to propagate (if they did, they would be reclassified as worms orviruses), exploitation of these client-side vulnerabilities provides an effective mechanism for their delivery.
The Trojan program may be hosted on a malicious Web site that attempts to exploit a specific Web browser
vulnerability. The attacker then entices users to visit this Web page, possibly by including a link to the page in spam emails. When a user of a vulnerable Web browser views the page, the exploit code is executedand the Trojan is installed on the user’s computer. For example, the Phel Trojan
58is typically installed on a
computer by exploiting a vulnerability in Internet Explorer59that was unpatched at the time the Trojan was
initially released. Once this Trojan is running on a computer, it downloads and installs a back doorprogram
60from a remote Web site.
Users can take several steps to prevent applications from being installed on computers through client-side
vulnerabilities in Web browsers. Disabling the execution of script code and active content by the browserwill reduce the ability of malicious Web pages to download and execute code. Also, running the Web browseras an unprivileged user will limit the consequences of successful compromises.
57Client-side vulnerabilities target the computer systems of individual users rather than servers of an organization. They target applications such as Web browsers, email
clients, peer-to-peer networks, instant messaging clients, and media players. They are often, but not always, the result of log ic errors or flaws in access-control systems,
and they are often easily exploitable, particularly in browsers.
58http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/trojan.phel.a.html
59http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/11467
60http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/backdoor.coreflood.html53Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Malicious code for mobile devices
Smart phones are mobile phones that contain a full-fledged operating system with a wide variety of user-
installable software. Combined with increasingly common PDAs, these phones have created a new class of mobile computing devices. The popularity of these devices has been matched by an increased interestamong malicious code writers in producing creations for these platforms, particularly PocketPC, Symbian,®and Palm.™
As was reported in the previous Internet Security Threat Report, the first worm to target these mobile
devices, Cabir,
61was released in June 2004.62Multiple variants of the worm followed shortly thereafter.
Initially, these variants were simply created by using a hex code editor to change visible strings, such asthe filenames in the binary file of the original Cabir. However, in December 2004, the source code was publicly released and a variety of new variants were updated, recompiled, and released.
By the end of December 2004, 11 new variants of Cabir had been discovered. Many of these new variants
were actually included in a new Trojan, known as Skulls,
63which not only installed Cabir but also replaced
many of the system applications, thereby disrupting the targeted device’s functionality. While most ofthese variants have not been observed in the wild, some reports of Cabir in the wild have been fielded froma variety of Southeast Asian countries, including Singapore and the Philippines.
64
On July 17, 2004, the first threat to Windows CE was reported, a simple appending virus known as Duts.65
Duts would only infect ARM-based devices, such as Pocket PCs, and would merely append itself to all the.exe files in the root folder. Closely on the heels of Duts, the second Windows CE threat appeared on
August 5, 2004, a back door Trojan known as Brador.
66Brador opens a listening port on TCP 2989 and
waits for instructions from an attacker to perform a number of tasks, including: listing directory contents,uploading files, displaying message boxes, downloading files, and executing commands.
Finally, a Trojan was discovered in a Symbian game
67that would actually send an SMS (Simple Message
Service) message to a toll-charge phone number. This Trojan was named Mos.68The code in the game was
purposely included by the developer as a copy protection scheme in January 2004. While the developerremoved the code shortly thereafter, cracked versions of the game with the SMS code were found on somepopular software piracy sites in August 2004.
The absolute number of threats to mobile devices remains low; however, due to the discovery of multiple
variants of Cabir, it has increased dramatically over the past six months. In June 2004, the sum total of
malicious code threats targeting mobile devices was four: one worm (Cabir), one virus, and two Trojans. By the end of the year, there were thirteen worms (Cabir and Duts and their variants), one virus, and seven Trojans.
The number of mobile device threats reported in the wild is still extremely small. Most are proof-of-concept
threats that have not been released in the wild. Nevertheless, the types of threats created demonstratesome of the robust capabilities of these devices. For example, Mos demonstrates that mobile devices maywell serve as delivery vectors for spyware or adware in the near future.
61http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/epoc.cabir.html
62Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, Volume VI (September 2004): p. 37
http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539
63http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/symbos.skulls.html
64http://www.cellular-news.com/story/11546.shtml
65http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/wince.duts.a.html
66http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/backdoor.brador.a.html
67This game was called Mosquitos. Only early official versions of this game contained the code to dial the toll-charge numbers. T he developer terminated the
premium-rate contracts for the toll-charge numbers shortly after the Trojan was reported.
68http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/trojan.mos.html 540%10%20%30%40%50%60%
July–Dec 2003 Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 200432%36%50%
PeriodPercent of top 50 reportsSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Security products that can detect malicious code exist for most mobile device operating systems. In
addition, common safe computing practices such as not installing unknown programs or acceptingconnections from unknown sources will help prevent infection by these threats.
Malicious code for P2P, IM, IRC, and CIFS
Peer-to-peer services (P2P) and Windows file sharing (CIFS) continue to be propagation vectors used by
the top malicious code threats. However, contrary to widespread expectations, instant messaging (IM) hasnot become a widely used propagation mechanism. Furthermore, while IRC is a commonly used mechanismfor bot communication, none of the top 50 malicious code reported to Symantec in the last six months of
2004 use IRC as a propagation mechanism (although some bots do use IRC as a communication channel).Overall, the number of threats using P2P, IM, IRC, and CIFS within Symantec’s top 50 malicious codereports has increased by 39% over the previous six-month period (figure 26).
As was evident in the top ten malicious code samples discussed earlier in this section, variants of Netsky,
Beagle, and MyDoom continued to be predominant threats in the last six months of 2004. This was similarto the previous six-month reporting period. All three worms use P2P to spread. MyDoom simply copiesitself to the Kazaa-shared folder using enticing filenames. Netsky and Beagle search the hard drive for anydirectories that appear to be P2P-shared folders and copy themselves to these shared directories usingone of a number of commonly searched for filenames. When users search a P2P file-sharing network forfiles matching these filenames, they will download and execute the worm, allowing it to propagate further.
Figure 26. P2P, IM, IRC, and CIFS threats
Source: Symantec Corporation
55Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Windows file sharing (CIFS) continues to be a popular propagation vector for Windows bots. Threats such
as Gaobot and Spybot, both of which are in the top ten reports for this period, exploit weak passwords on Windows systems. Both threats use a dictionary of commonly used passwords to connect to a remoteWindows machine. Once connected, they copy themselves over to the machine and remotely executethemselves. 30% of the top fifty threats reported between July 1 and December 31, 2004, use CIFS as apropagation vector.
There has long been speculation, particularly in the media, that IM would at some point in time provide a
fertile infection vector for malicious code. Thus far, this has not been realized. As was the case in the first
six months of 2004, there were no IM threats in the top 50 malicious code reports during the second halfof the year. Symantec believes that this is probably because these applications rely on a central server torelay messages between users; it would therefore be easy for the Internet service provider or the IMprovider to filter messages carrying malicious code.
P2P and CIFS are commonly used on a daily basis for business and personal purposes. Symantec expects
to continue to see malicious code developed that will propagate through these services. In addition,mechanisms such as IRC are being used for command and control in bot networks. Organizations shouldensure that systems are audited for unauthorized usage of such applications and protocols. In addition,insecure versions of these services and their client applications should be avoided and organizationsshould ensure that strong password policies are followed.
Bots
Bots (short for “robots”) are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s computer in order to allow anunauthorized user to control the computer remotely. They are distinct from similar types of malicious codebecause of their unique networking functionality. Bots are designed to let an attacker create a network ofcompromised hosts (a bot network), which can then be remotely controlled to conduct malicious activitiescollectively. Once the bot network is established, the attacker can issue commands through broadcast communication channels, such as IRC. Bots can be used for a wide variety of malicious purposes, such asinformation theft, proxying network traffic such as SMTP and HTTP, and performing distributed denial ofservice (DDoS) attacks.
Bots often employ multiple propagation mechanisms to compromise other computers. They may copy
themselves to shared network drives with weak password protection or through P2P networks by copyingthemselves to the shared folders of the P2P client application. Most bots, such as Randex, Spybot, andGaobot, employ multiple propagation mechanisms that also include exploiting vulnerabilities in remotelyaccessible services, such as the Microsoft Windows LSASS Buffer Overrun Vulnerability.
69
Bots are steadily becoming more prevalent in malicious code reported to Symantec. During the last sixmonths of 2004, they accounted for 12% of the top 50 malicious code samples reported to Symantec. Thisis a significant increase over the 10% from the first six months of 2004 and the 9% of the last six monthsof 2003 (figure 27).
69http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/101085605001,0001,5002,0002,5003,0003,5004,0004,500
July–Dec 2003 Jan–Jun 2004 July–Dec 2004
PeriodNumber of new variantsGaobot Variants Randex Variants Spybot Variants
0%5%10%15%
July–Dec 2003 Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 20049%10%12%
PeriodPercent of top 50 reportsSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 27. Bots in top 50 malicious code reports
Source: Symantec Corporation
Figure 28. Number of new bot variants
Source: Symantec Corporation
57Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
As noted in the previous edition of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , the number of documented
variants of the major bots continues to increase. In the last six months, the three major bots—Randex,
Gaobot, and Spybot—represented a combined total of close to 6,000 new variants. This represents a 189%increase over the previous six-month period in which there were just over 3,100 new variants. Further, it isa 1063% increase over the same period last year, during which there were just over 550 new variants.
While the total number of variants increased between July 1 and December 31, 2004, only the number
of variants of Spybot increased, while the number of new Gaobot and Randex variants decreased slightly.Spybot showed a dramatic increase in new variants, adding close to 4,300 new distinct variants to its numbers (figure 28), a 180% increase over the previous six months. Randex and Gaobot added over 900and 700 variants respectively. These variants may incorporate different characteristics, such as employingruntime packers,
70leveraging different exploits, or performing different functionalities.
This does not necessarily imply that malicious code authors have abandoned Randex and Gaobot in favor
of Spybot. Rather, since the source code for all three of these bots is readily available on the Internet, malicious code authors are likely combining features from each to create new variants. In some cases, thefinished product may more closely resemble Spybot than the other two, leading them to be classified as anew Spybot variant. Additionally, the wide usage of run-time packers continues to create an increasingnumber of new variants.
New bot trends
Over the past six months, Symantec analysts have observed disturbing new trends in the evolution anddevelopment of bots. Most bots use IRC as a control channel. A bot will typically be programmed to connect to a predetermined IRC server and a specific channel to join. Once the bot joins the channel, it can receive commands from a remote attacker. The dependence on a centralized communication channelmakes the bot network fragile, since taking down the IRC server will effectively disable communicationbetween the bots and their master.
In response to this, bots that utilize new communication methods are emerging. In particular, two bots that
were captured by Symantec DeepSight Honeypots™ , Moonlit
71and Zincite,72were observed using their own
peer-to-peer networks for communication. This communication was encrypted and used random networkports in order to evade detection. Rather than connecting to a central server to receive commands, thesebots maintained a list of IP addresses that were also compromised. This way, the removal of any one peerfrom the network would have no impact on the rest, making it more difficult to shut down the network.
Another new development in bot communication is the use of POP3
73to send commands. This was seen in
Sconato,74a bot that also contained keystroke-logging functionality. The bot would connect to a predefined
mail server to retrieve email messages containing attachments. Embedded within the attachments werecommands that were able to direct the bot to manipulate various aspects of the compromised computer.Additionally, Sconato is able to respond to commands by sending email messages to the mail server. SincePOP3 communication is not uncommon on most networks, this traffic would be more likely to go undetectedthan a connection to an IRC server. Additionally, ports used for POP3 communication are less likely to befiltered or blocked at the network perimeter.
70Packers are tools that compress and encrypt Windows executable files. This is a concern for security personnel because it makes detection by antivirus
engineers more difficult.
71https://tms.symantec.com/downloads/040809-Analysis-Backdoor.Moonlit.pdf
72https://tms.symantec.com/downloads/040727-Analysis-Mydoom.M.pdf
73POP3 is a version of the post office protocol used to retrieve email from a server.
74https://tms.symantec.com/downloads/040821-Analysis-Trojan.SconatoPOP3CommunicationChannel.pdf580%10%20%30%40%50%60%
July–Dec 2003 Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 200437%47%53%
PeriodPercent of top 50 malicious code reportsSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Malicious code for profit
The use of malicious code for profit appears to be an increasing concern and bots are expected to be a big
part of this trend. A bot captured by the Symantec DeepSight Honeypot system appeared to be intended asa relay for bulk unsolicited email (spam). This bot, named Spammerbot,
75contains an SMTP proxy that is
used to send spam from computers controlled by a remote attacker.
It has long been rumored that networks of bots such as these have been traded or sold on IRC channels.
Due to blacklisting,76spammers are in constant need of new IP addresses from which to relay messages;
compromised home and corporate computers serve this purpose ideally. The top 50 malicious code reportedto Symantec saw an increase in malicious code containing SMTP relays, which seems to confirm that thisactivity is increasing. In the last six months of 2003, only 37% of the volume of the top 50 samples ofmalicious code reported to Symantec contained SMTP-relaying functionality. This rose to 47% in the firstsix months of 2004 and 53% in the last six months of the year (figure 29).
Beagle.AV was another example of malicious code being developed for profit. This variant of the Beagle
worm installed an SMTP relay, which was observed by Symantec DeepSight Honeypots being used to relayphishing email.
The inclusion of revenue generation mechanisms within malicious code is worrisome. Symantec expects
the trend towards monetization of malicious code to continue and extend into other forms, such as worms.As such, Symantec will continue to monitor this activity closely.
Figure 29. Malicious code that allows SMTP relaying
Source: Symantec Corporation
75https://tms.symantec.com/downloads/041203-Analysis-HarnessingBotNetworksForSpam.pdf
76Blacklisting is the practice of recording IP addresses of computers and networks that send spam. When an address is used consis tently to send spam, that address
may be blacklisted and mail servers configured to ignore connections from those addresses.59Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Additional Security Risks Report
Traditionally, the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report has broken security threats down into three
general categories: attacks, vulnerabilities, and malicious code. However, as Internet-based services andapplications have expanded and diversified, the potential for computer programs to introduce other typesof security risks has increased. The emergence of new threats, particularly spam, phishing, spyware, andadware, has necessitated an expansion of the traditional security taxonomy.
Symantec has monitored these new emerging security risks as they have developed, classifying them as
“additional security risks.” This section will examine developments in additional security risks over the last
six months of 2004. In particular, it will examine trends in spyware and adware, phishing, and spam.
Adware and spyware
Adware consists of programs that display advertising content on a user’s monitor, often without the user’s
prior consent or explicit knowledge. It is usually, but not always, presented in the form of pop-up windowsor bars that appear on the screen. Adware is not always a security risk. In some cases, it simply delivers anadvertising message that appears on the user’s screen. However, this is not always the case.
While much adware is benign, depending upon its functionality, some forms of adware are not. If attributes
of a security risk include the compromise of the confidentiality, availability, or integrity of data on acomputing system, some forms of adware qualify. It does so by:
•Tracking user Web use and compiling a profile on the user’s browsing habits.
•Occupying bandwidth, thereby diminishing the functionality and availability of a computing system.
•In some cases the adware may also modify the Winsock.dll
77in order to monitor the user’s Web browsing
habits, affecting the integrity of the computer.
Spyware refers to stand-alone programs that can secretly monitor system activity and relay the
information back to another computer. In some cases, spyware may be legitimate programs that areemployed by corporations to monitor employee Internet usage or by parents to monitor their children’sInternet usage. However, it may also represent less legitimate applications.
Spyware programs can be surreptitiously placed on users’ systems in order to gather confidential
information such as passwords, login details, and credit card details. This can be done through keystrokelogging and by capturing email and instant messaging traffic. Because spyware can capture sensitiveinformation bef ore it is encrypted for transmission, it can bypass security measures such as firewalls, secure
connections, and VPNs that may be in place. Spyware is a particular concern because of its potential use inidentity theft and fraud.
Volume of adware and spyware
Even though spyware and adware are not classified as malicious code, Symantec monitors and analyzes them
using the same methods as for malicious code. This involves an ongoing analysis of customer reports anddata delivered from over 120 million client, server, and gateway email systems,
78as well as filtration of 25
million email messages per day. Symantec then compiles the most common reports and analyzes them todetermine whether the activity they identify is related to adware and spyware as opposed to malicious code.
77Winsock, short for Windows Socket, is an API that allows Windows computers to communicate using the TCP/IP protocol.
78Systems deploying Symantec antivirus security solutions60Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Top ten adware reported
As was mentioned in the previous volume of the Internet Security Threat Report, adware is a growing
concern.79Over the past six months, the percentage of adware in the top 50 malicious code reports to
Symantec has increased over the first six months of 2004. Between January 1 and June 30, adware made up4% of the top 50 malicious code reported. Between July 1 and Dec 31, it made up 5% of the top 50 reports.
The top reported adware program between July 1 and December 31, 2004, was Iefeats (table 7), which
accounted for 36% of the top ten reports. Iefeats can be installed manually, but is sometimes bundled withother software. It possesses a variety of functionalities. When installed via the user’s browser, it registers
itself as a browser help object (BHO),
80and modifies registry keys to ensure its survival.
Iefeats also hijacks the browser start page to display its own search engine page. This can be used to track
any search terms the user enters, possibly to display only results that link to pages of paying advertisers.Not only does the program utilize system resources, it hijacks the browser start page and downloads a number of other programs to help it perform Web searches.
The second most common adware of the past six months was InstantAccess. Accounting for almost 11% of
the top ten reported adware, this program downloads pop-up ads onto the user’s computer. It is most likelybundled with software, so that the user downloads it when installing the desired software.
Gator was the third most commonly reported adware for the second half of 2004. During this period, it
made up just over 9% of the top ten adware reports. Gator downloads and displays advertisements. It alsotracks the user’s Web browsing habits and online purchasing and sends them to its centralized servers.
This adware program must be manually installed. However, there are several known programs that have
Gator bundled with them and that install it as the program itself is installed. This can happen in two ways.First, a program may tell the user in a complex end user license agreement (EULA) that Gator will be installed,and ask for consent to permit Gator’s installation. By accepting the EULA, the user (either knowingly or,due to the complexity of the EULA, unknowingly) agrees to have the adware installed on his or her computer.Second, some programs are bundled with Gator and install it without the user’s knowledge or consent.
Table 7. Top ten adware reports Table 8. Top ten spyware reports
Source: Symantec Corporation Source: Symantec Corporation
79The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, Volume VI (September 2004): p. 41
http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539
80Browser helper objects (BHOs) are add-on programs that can add legitimate features to a user’s browser (IE 4.X and up). For exa mple, document readers
used to read programs within the browser do so via BHOs.
61Rank Adware name
1 Iefeats
2 InstantAccess
3 Gator
4I stbar
5 VirtuMonde
6 Binet
7C D T8 MainSearch
9 180Search
10 NetOptimizerRank Spyware name
1W ebhancer
2 e2Give
3 Apropos
4L ook2Me
5 2020search
6D otcomtoolbar
7 Iwantsearch
8 ClientMan
9P erfect
10 ShopnavSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Top ten reported spyware
Webhancer was the most frequently reported spyware program during the second half of 2004,
representing 38% of the top ten spyware reported (table 8). It is a program that monitors the user’sbrowsing habits, sending the information back to its centralized servers. The program is capable ofupdating itself from the servers. This means that updated versions may contain additional functionalitythat the user may not have agreed to as part of the EULA. It is typically bundled with other programs,particularly certain peer-to-peer file sharing programs.
The second most common spyware reported between July 1 and December 31, 2004, was e2give, an
Internet Explorer browser helper object (BHO). This program accounted for over 30% of the top ten spyware reported to Symantec during this period. It tracks which Web sites the user visits and monitorsthe length of time a user spends at each site. e2give may also track the user’s country, zip code, and firstname as well as information about the user’s computer. e2give can be installed manually or by an ActiveXdownloader.
The third most common spyware program reported during the last six months of 2004 was Apropos, which
accounted for just under 10% of the top ten spyware reports. An Internet Explorer BHO, Apropos installs atoolbar that links to Web sites and sends information back to its server. It is installed via an ActiveX control.
Additionally, this application may download and install other files on the user’s computer. In some cases
these files contain functionality that the user consented to in the original EULA; however, in other casesthey may contain functionality to which the user has not consented.
Installation of adware and spyware
There are numerous different ways by which adware and spyware programs can be installed on a user’ssystem. The following sections will discuss some of those installation methods and offer suggestions forthe prevention of unauthorized installation. It should be noted that some additional security risks use more than one method of installation.
End user license agreements (EULAs)
Some companies justify the use of adware as a way of providing services while lowering costs to customers.
This is particularly true of software that is made available for users to download for free (popularly knownas freeware). These programs usually require the user to agree to a EULA.
Some EULAs can be complicated and confusing. While some adware presents the user with a EULA that
is easy to read, advising specifically and clearly what actions the program will take, this is not always thecase. Assuming the information in the EULA is correct and acceptable to the user, the risk presented by the introduction of this type of adware is minimal. However, other adware may be bundled with the desiredsoftware without the users’ knowledge. The user often unknowingly consents to the installation of thisadware by accepting the EULA because the agreement is so complex that the user is unable or unwilling to read and understand the terms and conditions before agreeing to it. Adware can also be installed by athird party after the user has accepted the EULA and installed the original software.
62Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Commercial spyware programs tend to have EULAs. However, as spyware is designed to be installed and
work without the target’s knowledge, the programs may contain an option that will allow for remoteinstallation without the presence of the EULA. Spyware has the capacity to log keystrokes, IM conversations,
email, and other communications that can contain personally identifiable information. As such, it canfacilitate not only monitoring by legitimate sources, but fraud and identity theft as well. Thus, securitysolutions that deal with spyware programs should detect spyware regardless of the presence of a EULA.
During the last six months of 2004, three of the top ten adware programs reported to Symantec —Gator,
NetOptimzer, and Binet—had EULAs. In the spyware category, one reported program, Webhancer, camewith a EULA.
Bundled with other software
As discussed in the previous section, some companies increase the distribution of their software by
offering it to users for free download. In order to monetize this software, the producers often “bundle” thefree software with adware. This is particularly true of peer-to-peer file sharing programs. In some cases,the user may be notified of this bundling in the EULA, but not always. When the software is run on theuser’s system, the adware is also installed, either with the user’s knowledge and consent or without it.
Spyware programs are sometimes bundled with other programs as well; however, rather than being
bundled intentionally by the program producer or distributor, spyware is likely to be inserted into a“desirable” program archive by someone who wishes to obtain confidential data. The software package is
then placed on a public download site, or sent to a newsgroup for maximum exposure.
81The spyware is
then executed when the user runs the desired program.
Of the top ten adware programs reported to Symantec over the last six months of 2004, nine came
bundled with other software, including Iefeats. Five of the top ten spyware were bundled, includingWebhancer.
Web browsers
Adware is often installed through the user’s Web browser. Often this is done through pop-up ads offering
free software to download. The pop-up offers the user a choice of clicking “Yes” or “No” to accept or rejectthe offer. In reality, though, clicking anywhere on the ad results in the download of adware. Browser-installed adware may also be installed through ActiveX controls or browser helper objects (BHOs). (For afull description of browser help objects, see “Functionality of adware and spyware” below.)
Five of the top ten adware programs reported to Symantec in the last six months of 2004 were installed
through Web browsers, including Istbar, the most common adware with this functionality. Spyware canalso be installed through a Web browser using ActiveX controls or BHOs. However, in this reporting periodnone of the top ten reported spyware were installed in this way.
To reduce the risk from adware or spyware that is installed through a Web browser, users should disable
ActiveX. It is important to note, however, that disabling ActiveX may also affect the functionality of the Webbrowser and may prevent certain Web sites and pages from rendering correctly. Some users require ActiveX,in which case they should configure their browser to require a prompt for ActiveX controls to execute. If thebrowser presents a dialogue box that is not expected, the user should not click anywhere on the dialogue box.Instead, they should close the browser window immediately. Finally, the user may also choose to disablethe acceptance of third-party cookies.
81Spyware is often downloaded along with hacking tools or sexually explicit programs.63Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Functionality of adware and spyware
Within the broad categories of adware and spyware are many programs that accomplish similar objectives
in different ways. This section will discuss some of the functions by which adware and spyware identifypotential targets and attain their objectives.
Hijacked browsers
If a user is browsing the Internet, an adware program may initiate search redirection. For example, the
program may redirect a search by replacing the users’ default search engine, or by replacing “404 page not found” messages with internal search queries. This is not only misleading for the end user but also represents a security risk, as the redirection may result in the user downloading malicious code from thenew page. Furthermore, a user might be redirected to a spoofed site and then prompted for personalinformation such as passwords, login IDs, financial information, or other confidential data. The data maythen be used to commit identity theft or fraud.
Five of the top ten adware programs reported in the last six months of 2004 hijacked browsers, with Istbar
being the most common. Spyware can also hijack browsers. The most commonly reported example of thisfunctionality during the last six months of 2004 was Shopnay.
Users should deploy security software that intercepts attempted browser hijacking. Furthermore, as
spyware can be placed on a user’s computer by exploiting vulnerabilities, operating system patches shouldbe kept updated.
Browser helper objects
BHOs are add-on programs that can add legitimate features to a user’s browser;
82for example, document
readers used to read files within the browser do so through BHOs. However, some adware programs alsoinstall BHOs onto a user’s system for less legitimate purposes. Amongst other things, BHOs can monitorWeb sites visited by the user, detect events, replace ads, change home pages, and create windows to display
information. Between July 1 and December 31, 2004, three of the top ten adware programs, such as Iefeats,
used BHOs.
BHOs can provide spyware with a wide range of functionality including, for example, the ability to down-
load program updates, or log and export confidential data. During this reporting period, three of the topten reported spyware programs, including Apropos, used BHOs.
Commercial monitoring tools
As has been established, spyware gathers information by logging keystrokes to obtain personal information,
such as user names, passwords, instant messaging transactions, and emails. Many spyware programs arecommercially produced and distributed monitoring programs, such as those employed in workplaces andpublic institutions to monitor users’ Internet use. However, much of the spyware reported is notcommercially produced.
Only one of the top ten spyware programs reported between July 1 and December 31, 2004, Perfect, was
a commercial tool. As previously discussed, legitimate tools can often be used for malicious activities, suchas keystroke logging, unauthorized viewing of email, and so on. As a result of those malicious activities,commercial programs may occasionally be included amongst spyware programs reported by customers to Symantec.
82For instance, in Microsoft Internet Explorer versions 4.0 and higher.64Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
As discussed previously, adware is used to gather information about browsing habits and preferences, to
create targeted advertising. As such, most adware programs are commercially produced. Thus, it is not surprising that of the top ten adware programs reported during the last six months of 2004, all werecommercially produced.
Adware and spyware—prevention and mitigation
Symantec recommends that users continue to update their antivirus software. Security administrators
should also take extra measures to ensure that client system patch levels are up-to-date. Symantec alsorecommends that users and administrators employ defense in-depth, including the use of a properlyconfigured firewall, as well as integrated antivirus and intrusion detection systems. Finally, Symantecadvises users to exercise caution when installing any software via a Web browser and to not downloadsoftware from sources that are not known and trusted.
In addition to the deployment of defense in-depth, Symantec recommends that acceptable usage policies
are put in place and enforced. System administrators should regularly audit the system to ensure that nounauthorized software is installed or operating on the system. Furthermore, administrators and end usersshould read the EULAs of all software programs before agreeing to their conditions.
Finally, as some spyware is installed using ActiveX controls, Symantec recommends that users consider
disabling ActiveX altogether. However, as was stated earlier in this discussion, some users may requireActiveX for some applications, in which case they should configure their browser to require a prompt forActiveX controls to execute. Finally, users should also consider disabling the acceptance of third partycookies.
One final note of caution should be raised. When removing spyware, Symantec recommends that users be
extremely cautious. Programs should be removed as non-intrusively as possible, in order to minimize anyproblems that might result from the removal of the program. In order to avoid such problems, it may benecessary to ignore some non-critical aspects of these programs such as benign registry keys left behindduring the uninstall process.
Phishing
This section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report looks at phishing attacks that have been
conducted between July 1 and December 31, 2004. Phishing is an attempt by a third party to solicitconfidential information from an individual, group, or organization, often for financial gain. Phishersattempt to trick users into disclosing personal data, such as credit card numbers, online bankingcredentials, and other sensitive information. They may then use it to commit fraudulent acts. In the lastvolume of the Internet Security Threat Report, Symantec identified phishing as one of the top threats to
watch for in the coming months.
83
83Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, Volume VI (September 2004): p. 44
http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=153965Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Phishing has evolved from simple attempts to obtain small items of information like gaming passwords to
all-out identity theft. It may be conducted through email, spyware, and blended threats.84An example
would be an attack that is propagated through an email that appears to come from a legitimate source(such as a bank), or a malicious Web site that has spoofed a legitimate site. When the email is viewed orthe Web site visited, an executable (.exe) file is inserted onto the user’s computer. The .exe file remainsdormant until the user’s browser attempts to access certain financial Web sites. It then begins saving data,such as user names and passwords, and transmitting it to the phisher’s server.
Phishing attacks may also use spoofed email to trick users into entering confidential information into
fraudulent Web sites or forms. Such phishing email often consists simply of a form that the user isrequested to fill out and return. The email may appear to be from a legitimate source but it actually directsthe victim to a malicious Web site. Browser vulnerabilities are often exploited so that a legitimate URLappears in the browser window when in fact the user is accessing a malicious Web site. The Web site mayalso be manipulated to make the lock icon appear in the lower right-hand side of the browser window,thereby misleading the user into believing that the Web site is secure when it is not. These Web sites oftenlook exactly like the real ones, thereby tricking users into thinking that they are providing their confidentialinformation to the legitimate site.
Among other tactics that phishers use are: schemes asking users to submit information via fax and phone;
Java script that use legitimate Web sites to install pop-up windows, which are intended to trick users intosubmitting personal information; and injecting legitimate Web sites with malicious code that will loadspyware onto an end users’ system. Vulnerabilities in legitimate Web sites also allow phishers to serve
spoofed phishing Web pages through the legitimate Web site or server.
This section discusses both phishing email messages as well as phishing attacks. A phishing email message
is any single email message that is sent to a single, unique user that attempts to gain confidential and orpersonal information from online users. An attack is defined as a group of email messages that have beensent by the same user, with similar basic properties, in a single batch.
The data provided in this section is based on the statistics returned from the Symantec Probe Network, a
system of over two million decoy accounts that attracts email messages from 20 different countries aroundthe world. The Symantec Probe Network attracts spam samples that are representative of over 250 millionmailboxes. Symantec’s Probe Network has over 600 participating enterprises and ISPs in the Americas,Europe, Asia, and Australia. It consists of both formerly active email addresses as well as email accounts
that have been generated solely for the purpose of attracting spam to the Symantec Probe Network.
This section will discuss the following:•Six-month growth in phishing
•Blocked phishing attempts
•Volume of phishing messages
•Phishing prevention and mitigation
84A blended threat is a type of malicious code that uses multiple methods and techniques to propagate. Blended threats typically combine the characteristics of different
types of malicious code (such as viruses, worms, and Trojan horse programs) as well as having the ability to exploit vulnerabil ities.66Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Six-month growth in phishing
Because this is the first time that Symantec has analyzed phishing activity in the Internet Security Threat
Report, it is not possible to offer a comparison between six-month periods. However, Symantec has
analyzed the patterns of phishing behavior for the last six months of 2004.
Between July 1 and Dec. 31, 2004, 10,310 new phishing attacks were detected. While phishing activity
was somewhat erratic on a week-to-week basis during this period, new phishing attacks increasedconsistently over the six-month reporting period (figure 30). (A moving average
85was added to figure 30
to more clearly depict the growth in phishing attacks during this period.) During the first week of July, the
Symantec Probe Network detected 193 new phishing attacks. This number rose fairly rapidly, reaching
a peak of 584 new attacks during the week of October 7 to 13. The rate then slowed somewhat beforeclimbing again in the final weeks of December, when 558 new phishing attacks were detected.
Within the security community, there has been a lot of discussion as to whether phishing is a fad or
whether it will continue to grow. Looking at the numbers observed in the Symantec Probe Network, itwould appear that phishing is not going away; rather, it will likely continue to increase. Symantec believesthat this activity will continue to grow as phishers continue to spread their target base.
Blocked phishing attempts
The most effective measure of the rise of phishing is the total number of phishing attempts (that is, phishingemail messages sent to end users) blocked in the field by Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam™ antifraud filters.(Antifraud filters are rules that are created by the Brightmail Logistics and Operations Center that target andblock phishing email messages.) In mid-July 2004, antifraud filters were blocking 9 million phishingattempts per week. By the end of December this number had increased to a weekly average of over 33 million blocked messages (figure 31). (A moving average was added to figure 31 to make identification of the trends more apparent.)
The peaks in the weekly phishing attempts blocked (figure 31) are closely correlated to the peaks seen in
new phishing attacks (figure 30). This is because as new phishing attacks are detected, Symantec is able to develop antifraud filters for those attacks, which in turn results in an increase in phishing attemptsbeing blocked.
85A moving average is a technique used to allow trending analysis of highly volatile and dynamic data. Data that has a lot of flu ctuations sometimes becomes difficult
to assess and analyze visually. Each new day’s or week’s data are added to the average while the oldest data are removed, there by moving the average over time.
The amount of time used to calculate the moving average will directly affect how volatile the trend-line appears (shorter timef rames equate to greater volatility).670M5M10M15M20M25M30M35M40M45MPhishing attemptsMoving average Phishing attempts
Date July 1, 2004
July 8, 2004
July 22, 2004
Aug 5, 2004
Aug 19, 2004
Sep 2, 2004
Sep 16, 2004 Sep 30, 2004
Oct 14, 2004
Oct 28, 2004
Nov 11, 2004
Nov 25, 2004
Dec 23, 2004Dec 9, 2004
0100200300400500600700Number of phishing attacksTwo per. mov. avg (weekly totals) Weekly totals
DateJuly 1, 2004
July 8, 2004
July 22, 2004
Aug 5, 2004
Aug 19, 2004
Sep 2, 2004
Sep 16, 2004
Sep 30, 2004
Oct 14, 2004
Oct 28, 2004
Nov 11, 2004
Nov 25, 2004
Dec 23, 2004Dec 9, 2004Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 30. Weekly growth in phishing attacks
Source: Symantec Corporation
Figure 31. Blocked phishing attempts
Source: Symantec Corporation
68Percent
0.0%0.3%0.6%0.9%1.2%1.5%
Aug 15, 2004Aug 1, 2004
Sep 1, 2004
Sep 15, 2004
Oct 1, 2004
Oct 15, 2004
Nov 1, 2004
Nov 15, 2004
Dec 1, 2004
Dec 31, 2004Dec 15, 2004
DateSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Volume of phishing messages
This section will discuss the volume of phishing messages as a percentage of total mail processed by the
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam solution. This number is determined by the number of messages that trigger antifraud filters in the field. These filters are distributed across the Symantec customer base.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2004, the percentage of messages that constitute phishing attempts
increased. The volume of phishing messages rose from 0.1 % of the messages processed, or an average of 1 million fraud messages per day, to 0.6 % of the messages processed, an average of approximately 4.5 million fraud messages per day (figure 32). Peak days during this period experienced numbers well inexcess of 9 million phishing messages per day.
Over this period the average percentage of phishing messages appearing in mail processed was 0.4%.
While this figure may appear small, it means that 1 out of every 250 email messages received was a phishing attack. At the peak of activity recorded this was as high as 1 in 100 messages. This is quite alarge jump, particularly considering that phishing was not considered a significant security threat asrecently as two years ago.
This data supports the notion that phishing continues to grow, and will continue to grow in the foreseeable
future. It is reasonable to conclude that phishers are actively seeking out and adding new targets forphishing attacks. The addition of new phishing targets (companies being phished) is a contributor to manyof the spikes in this data, since there seems to be a slight lag in time from the point where a new target isphished to when that target is properly monitored for phishing attacks.
Figure 32. Phishing as a percent of messages scanned
Source: Symantec Corporation
69Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Prevention and mitigation of phishing
Symantec recommends that enterprise users protect themselves against phishing threats primarily
through the detection and filtering of email at the server level via the MTA (mail transfer agent). Althoughthis level of filtering will likely remain one of the primary points at which filtering is performed for phishing,other attempts will be filtered utilizing upstream IP-based filtering, as well as providing filtering for HTTP.
DNS block lists (DNSBLs) offer more general protection and may mitigate some of the risk of phishingemails; however, they frequently run the risk of false positives. Sender policy frameworks (SPFs), domainkeys, and other similar solutions will not provide useful protection. Phishers can easily purchase domainsthat contain names similar to the targeted company and configure them to SPF and other standards toallow for their messages to be processed as SPF valid email.
General corporate best practices should also be followed, including Web log monitoring to make sure
that complete Web site downloads are not occurring. Organizations may want to monitor cousin domain
86
purchasing by other entities. Tracking the registration of new cousin domains allows for companies toidentify purchases that could be used to spoof their corporate domain. Symantec recommends that organizations ensure that their end users are educated about phishing in general, and are advised aboutthe latest phishing scams.
87
End users should also follow best security practices. As some phishing attacks may utilize spyware and keyloggers, Symantec advises end users to seek out software detection methods. Symantec also advises thatend users never disclose any confidential personal or financial information if they have any doubts aboutthe authenticity of an email or Web site requesting such information. They should never disclose sensitiveinformation unless they can confirm that the request is legitimate.
Spam
In the last volume of the Internet Security Threat Report, Symantec projected that spam and risks associated
with it would continue to rise.88Spam, usually defined as junk or unsolicited email from a third party, made
up over 60% of all email traffic during this reporting period. While it is certainly an annoyance to usersand administrators, spam is also a serious security concern, as it can be used to deliver Trojans, viruses,and phishing attempts. Furthermore, high volumes of spam can create DoS conditions wherein emailsystems are so overloaded that legitimate email and network traffic are unable to get through. This sectionof the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report will discuss developments in spam activity between July 1
and December 31, 2004.
The data used in this analysis is based on data returned from the Symantec Probe Network. The Symantec
Probe Network comprises millions of decoy email addresses that are configured to attract a large stream of spam attacks that are representative of spam being received by the Probe Network’s partner’s domain.An attack can consist of one or more messages, or a group of similar messages. All attacks are receivedand analyzed at Symantec Brightmail Logistics and Operation Centers (BLOCs) where anti-spam filters are produced.
86Cousin domains refers to domain names that include some of the key words of an organization’s domain name. For example, for cor porate domain “bigbank.com, ”
cousin domains could include “bigbank-alerts.com,” “big-bank-security.com” and so on.
87A good resource for information on the latest threats can be found at http://www.antiphishing.org
88Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, Volume VI (September 2004): p. 45
http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=153970Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
The goal of the Symantec Probe Network is to simulate a wide variety of Internet email users, thereby
attracting a true representation of the spam messages that are circulating on the Internet at any giventime. For this reason, the Probe Network is continuously optimized in order to attract new varieties ofspam attacks. This is accomplished through internal production changes made to the Probe Network thataffect the number of new spam attacks received by the Probe Network as a whole. All daily time periodsare reported in Greenwich Median Time.
This section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report will explore the following:
•Spam activity and growth projections
•Total messages from new attacks per day of the week
•Total messages versus existing spam attacks per day
Spam activity and growth projections
The data used in this analysis is based upon statistics reported from customers in the field. There are a
large number of variables affecting email infrastructure and although best practices are frequently shared,the manner in which companies implement email security solutions is often unique to their particularsituation. Different levels of email security will be deployed at the router, mail exchange (MX), or mailserver levels. The point at which an antispam solution is deployed will have a direct impact on the statisticsthe system returns.
This section will assess spam activity and growth projections by categorizing the severity of a company’s
spam problem. Figure 33 identifies the spam growth of 20 companies that were experiencing extremelyhigh percentages of spam for the month of July. The selected companies also had the largest total mail volumes (total mail volumes include the sum of all spam and non-spam email) during the month of July.The data represents this sampling of companies over a six-month period. There was little deviation in theemail not filtered as spam (which includes legitimate email and a small percentage of undetected spammessages). Therefore the volume of legitimate email stayed fairly constant during the six-month period.
The purpose for selecting these companies is that the companies with the largest mail volumes have the
lowest deviation in daily mail volumes. These companies also have more stringent change control policieson their email infrastructures, so there are fewer variables affecting the volume of mail being processed atthe MTA level.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2004, there was a 77% growth in spam for these companies (figure 33).
Companies experiencing significant spam problems continued to see a sharp increase in the amount ofspam they received. The weekly totals of spam rose from an average of 800 million spam messages perweek to well over 1.2 billion spam messages per week by the end of the six-month period.
Total messages from new attacks per day of the week
Between July 1 and December 31, 2004, the Symantec Probe Network received an average of 4,696,122
messages from new attacks (new groupings of probe email that are not currently tracked in the BLOCdatabase) per day. Mondays brought a larger quantity of new attacks to the Probe Network than any otherday of the week (figure 34). It could be speculated that spammers launch new tactics and subsequentlysend more attacks on Mondays. The number of total messages received by the Symantec Probe Networklevels off during the remainder of the week, with another slight increase seen on Fridays.
710M20M40M60M80M100M120M140M
111M128M
124M
121M122M125M
114MNew messages
Sundays Mondays Tuesdays Wednesdays Thursdays Fridays Saturdays
Day
0.0B0.5B1.0B1.5B2.0BEmail volumeTotal spam Total messages
DateJuly 1, 2004
July 8, 2004
July 22, 2004
Aug 5, 2004
Aug 19, 2004
Sep 2, 2004
Sep 16, 2004
Sep 30, 2004
Oct 14, 2004
Oct 28, 2004
Nov 11, 2004
Nov 25, 2004
Dec 23, 2004Dec 9, 2004Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 33. Weekly total spam for selected companies
Source: Symantec Corporation
Figure 34. Total message from new attacks per day of week
Source: Symantec Corporation
7203M6M9M12M15M18MMessagesExisting spam messages Total messages
DateJuly 1, 2004
July 11, 2004
July 21, 2004
July 31, 2004
Aug 10, 2004
Aug 20, 2004
Aug 30, 2004
Sep 9, 2004
Sep 29, 2004Sep 19, 2004
Oct 19, 2004Oct 9, 2004
Oct 29, 2004
Nov 8, 2004
Nov 18, 2004
Nov 28, 2004
Dec 28, 2004Dec 8, 2004
Dec 18, 2004Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
While Mondays brought more new spam attacks, the amount of change was small compared with total
messages. The quantity of existing spam attacks—that is, attacks for which antispam filters have alreadybeen detected—remained relatively static throughout the week, with Wednesdays seeing a slight slump.Saturdays and Sundays account for the least spam quantities of the week.
Total messages versus exis ting spam attacks per day
Between July 1 and December 31, 2004, the Symantec Probe Network received an average of 11,069,154
total messages per day, including messages that may contain new, unknown spam messages (figure 35).(Unknown spam messages are synonymous with new spam attacks, or attacks that have not previouslybeen tracked in the BLOC database). This compares with an average 6,373,032 messages from existingspam attacks.
Internal changes and optimizations to the Symantec Probe Network are apparent in this metric. As spam is
continuously evolving, production changes to the Probe Network are necessary to keep pace. These changesconsist of retiring poor spam-producing probes, as well as developing and activating new probes. Theseactions result in increased or decreased total quantity of email received by the Probe Network. This quantityis represented in dark gray in figure 35. The quantity of messages in existing spam attacks, protected withexisting filters, is represented in light gray.
Figure 35. Total messages, including new spam attacks, compared with known spam messages
Source: Symantec Corporation
73Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Changes to the quantity of existing spam attacks were less dramatic than the changes in total messages
received. These changes involve both acquiring more messages from new spam attacks and subsequentlyproducing antispam filters against them. For this reason, this analysis can be used to gauge productivityassociated with the Probe Network’s quantity of email received, as well as filter production against newspam attacks. Additionally, the changes in volume of messages received by the Probe Network do not necessarily reflect growth trends of spam on the Internet, only to the new attacks being attracted by theSymantec Probe Network for the purpose of filter development.
The increasing number of new attacks detected over the last three months of this reporting period is also
reflective of Symantec’s expansion of the Probe Network into new geographic regions and increasing theProbe Network’s coverage in specific countries. New probe accounts were initiated in early October 2004,consisting of many international and foreign language-attracting probes. The October activation of probesrestored the total quantity of inbound probe messages to July levels, and another activation in lateNovember increased the Probe Network’s total messages again.
The drastic increase in total messages brought with it a wider variety of spam. Filter production against
this new stream of spam attacks brought with it a gradual increase in messages filtered, or existing spamattacks, for the second half of the six-month period (October 1 to December 31, 2004).
The daily average of total messages and messages from existing attacks experienced very little growth
over the six-month period (July 1 to December 31, 2004). The messages seen on July 1, 2004 totaled11,822,284, compared to 12,671,366 total messages received on December 31, 2004. However, a 43%decline in total messages per day was experienced from July 1 to its lowest point of 6,704,900 total messages received on September 26.
One reason contributing to the decline in Probe Network messages during this six-month period was the
refinement and deactivation of probes that were attracting a low volume of spam (or unacceptable volumes ofinadvertent legitimate email). Initially, deactivating probes provides the Symantec BLOC more resources tofocus filter production against a leaner collection of spam email received. The deactivation of poor probes,
however, must be complemented by the activation of newly created probes in order to increase the trend ofinbound spam attacks.
74Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Future Watch
The previous sections of this report have discussed Internet security developments between July 1 and
December 31, 2004. This section of the Internet Security Threat Report will discuss emerging trends and
issues that Symantec believes will become prominent over the next year. These forecasts are based onemerging data that Symantec has collected during the current reporting period. In discussing potentialfuture trends, Symantec hopes to provide organizations with an opportunity to prepare themselves for rapidly evolving and complex security issues.
Viruses and worms targeting client-side exploits
Over the past two reporting periods, Symantec has cautioned users to be wary of vulnerabilities in client
software installed on both consumer and corporate desktops. As noted in the “Future Watch” section of the previous Internet Security Threat Report and discussed in greater detail in the “Vulnerability Trends”
and “Malicious Code Trends” sections of this report, client-side exploits are becoming an increasingsecurity concern.
Traditionally, the focus of security strategies has been on the network perimeter: servers, firewalls, and
other assets with outward-facing exposure. However, a notable shift has occurred, with the security of
client-side systems, primarily end-user desktop hosts, becoming increasingly important. This is because asadministrators have become more effective in securing network perimeters, attackers have had to searchfor alternative entry points into targeted computing systems. As a result, vulnerability researchers and
attackers are focusing more on client software installed on individual systems rather than on the underlyingoperating systems themselves. The Microsoft GDI+ Library JPEG Segment Length Integer UnderflowVulnerability
89is a good example of this.
Symantec feels that the current shift towards client-side attacks will result in the use of worms as an
initial propagation mechanism for attacks targeting specific vulnerabilities in client-side software. Virusesand worms are excellent ways for client-side attacks to propagate initially and Symantec believes thatworms propagating by this method will become more common.
90This could mean that traditional security
mechanisms and procedures will become less effective at protecting networks as a whole. Administratorsand end users alike will have to exercise extra vigilance to ensure that these new infection vectors are adequately secured.
Bots and bot networks for financial gain
As was discussed in the “Attack Trends” section of this report, although Symantec has observed a drop in the number of bot networks over the past six months, bot activity continues to be a source of concern.Symantec feels that the security threat from this form of attack will only get worse, especially in financialterms. In conjunction with a rise in the number of more sophisticated phishing and malicious code attacks,this edition of the Internet Security Threat Report noted that bots are increasingly used for financial gain.
Symantec expects this trend to escalate, as the diverse means of acquiring new bots and developing botnetworks become more prevalent.
89http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/11173
90http://tms.symantec.com/ClientSideExploitation.asp75Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
It is very easy for an attacker to create a bot with very specific functions. Since it is also possible for bots to
be remotely updated with new functionality, attackers can easily change the capabilities of their bot networks.This could allow the bot creators to modify their bot network for a variety of mercenary purposes. Forinstance, as was noted in the “Malicious Code Trends” section of this report, bots are frequently used asemail relays in order to disseminate spam and phishing messages. In the near future, Symantec believesthat it is reasonable to expect growth in the number of bot owners who modify their bot networks and rentthem out for these purposes, amongst others.
Bots are frequently used to perform DoS attacks against various organizations.
91Bot networks have
increasingly been used in online extortion schemes.92In such schemes, the attacker contacts the owner of
a Web site, usually an e-commerce site or online casino, and demands to be paid a sum of money. If thesedemands are not met, they threaten to launch a denial of service attack against the site, disrupting any
income it may generate. Police reports and anecdotal evidence have suggested that this type of extortion hasbeen known to be successful.
93Because of the increasing sophistication seen in newer bots, these bot networks
are becoming more difficult to shut down. Symantec believes that it is reasonable to conclude that thistype of activity will increase in the near future.
More damaging mobile device malicious code in the wild
As noted in the previous edition of the Internet Security Threat Report, malicious code has been developed
for mobile devices, namely a worm called Cabir.94As cellular telephones and PDAs become more sophisticated
and mobile connectivity increases, the potential for more malicious code that affects them to be developedincreases as well. Symantec feels that over the next six months, more malicious code of this nature will beseen in the wild.
In late December 2004, a Trojan was reported that would install the Cabir worm on mobile phones using
the Symbian operating system.
95This Trojan masqueraded as an installer for a popular video game in order
to entice users into downloading and installing it on their phones. While not devastating in its effects, theCabir worm demonstrated that more damaging payloads in malicious code of this type may be on the way.The SymbOS.Skulls Trojan,
96which was released in November 2004, reinforced this notion. It not only
replaced icons on the compromised mobile device but also caused most applications to no longer function.
In support of the theory that more dangerous and damaging exploits are on the horizon, the source code
of the Cabir worm was publicly released in late December 2004.97Based on instances of various bots that
have had their source code publicly released, Symantec expects to see numerous new variants of Cabir, orother malicious code based on its source code, released in the near future.
Until now, Cabir has been limited in its ability to propagate due to limitations and restrictions imposed by
Symbian operating systems. However, the availability of source code could allow others to develop newvariants that may be capable of bypassing these restrictions. With many groups researching vulnerabilities
in Bluetooth-enabled devices,
98the possibility that a worm or some other type of malicious code
propagating by exploiting these vulnerabilities increases.
91http://www.securityfocus.com/news/9411
92http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/07/21/cyber_shakedown_taken_down/
93http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/04_32/b3895106_mz063.htm
94http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/epoc.cabir.html
95http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/symbos.mgdropper.html
96http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/symbos.skulls.html
97http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/12/29/cabir_code_unleashed/
98http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/371443 and http://trifinite.org/trifinite_stuff.html76Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Embedded content processing in audio and video images
On September 14, 2004, Microsoft announced a vulnerability99in its implementation of the JFIF (JPEG)
image file format. The vulnerability potentially allowed for malicious image files to cause code to beexecuted on the host displaying the image. Eight days later, functional exploit code for the vulnerability waspublished. Exploitation of this vulnerability by malicious code in the wild was seen shortly afterwards.
100
Until this time, image files have generally been considered relatively trustworthy, even when embedded inexternally originating content such as Web pages and HTML email messages. Image data files, particularlycompressed images such as JPEGs, are complex data formats that require complicated code to render.Greater complexity usually means more potential vulnerabilities to be discovered. Several image file formatimplementations, such as those for PNG and TIFF, contain vulnerabilities.
This is worrisome because image files are ubiquitous, almost universally trusted, and an integral part of
modern day computing. For example, users browsing a trusted Web site, such as an online auction site, couldbe victimized by a maliciously crafted image uploaded to the Web site, which in turn could lead to the user’ssystem being compromised. The exploitable vulnerabilities found in image file format implementations give
rise to concern about other embedded or externally originating data, such as audio and video files.
The discovery of these vulnerabilities highlights the shift from perimeter attacks to client-side attacks that
is discussed throughout this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report. Symantec believes that attackers
will continue to harvest the vulnerabilities in code for processing complex data formats, such as audio andvideo files, in an attempt to find new vectors of attack against client-side systems.
Unauthorized third-party bundling of Trojans with software
With the increase in popularity of open source software packages over the past few years, a disturbingtrend has begun to emerge. In 2002, back doors were discovered in several popular open source softwarepackages, such as Sendmail
101and Fragrouter.102More recently, in late 2003, an attempt to place a back
door in the Linux kernel was discovered.103Since then, there have been very few discoveries of surreptitious
Trojans embedded in publicly available software, whether open or closed source.
It is unlikely that all software distribution points have become completely secure and untainted, or that
attackers—internal or external—have collectively decided not to back door software. Rather, Symantecfeels it is likely that back doors inserted into software at certain (perhaps stale) distribution sites persist
and remain undiscovered. The possibility of back door code being slipped into downloadable software bundles continues to remain a very real threat for users of all platforms.
The large number of mirror Web sites
104and FTP servers hosting copies of applications and packages is
especially worrisome. Compounding the problem is that most operating systems rely on regular downloadsof updated packages from Web sites or mirror sites. The authenticity of most downloadable software, suchas popular shareware applications, often cannot be verified, particularly as very few closed source vendorsor authors provide digital signatures
105of their packages.
99http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms04-028.mspx
100http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/trojan.ducky.html
101http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/5921/info/
102http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/296407
103http://www.securityfocus.com/news/7388
104Mirror sites are software repositories that are spread out geographically to balance downloading of software packages. Mirror s ites contain exact replicas of software
hosted on the primary site.
105Digitally signed packages ensure end users that the software they are downloading has not been tampered with or altered.77Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Open source developers are generally better in providing verification mechanisms such as MD5,106
although there are concerns that these too are vulnerable to attack.107Further, even though some have
automated authentication of downloaded updates, many do not. Any of these servers, if compromised,could potentially distribute maliciously modified software and could remain undetected until manynetworks and individual computers have become compromised.
Symantec is concerned that at a major back door will be discovered implanted in a popular application or
software repository. This may serve as a wake-up call for consumer and enterprise users to verify both theintegrity and authenticity of downloaded software prior to installation.
Emerging security concerns for Mac OS
Generally speaking, the Macintosh® operating system has been relatively immune to malicious activity, particularly compared to other operating systems like Linux and Microsoft. With the introduction and popularity of Mac OS X, however, Apple® Computer has become a target for new attacks and vulnerabilities.With a newly designed operating system based on a BSD-UNIX lineage, Mac OS X has begun to not onlycapture the attention of users but of vulnerability researchers as well.
Over the past year, Symantec has documented 37 high-severity vulnerabilities in Mac OS X.
108These
vulnerabilities have been confirmed by the vendor, which, in the Apple case, almost always means that the company has released a patch. The appearance of a rootkit
109called Opener in October 2004,110serves
to illustrate the growth in vulnerability research on the OS X platform. Additionally, multiple remote andlocal vulnerabilities
111have been disclosed that affect both the server and desktop versions of OS X.
Vulnerabilities in the Apple windowing system and development kit and in the Apple default Apache config-
urations are two of the nine vulnerabilities (not all of which were high severity) for which Apple releasedpatches. The various OS X vulnerabilities allow attackers to carry out information disclosure, authenticationbypass, code execution, privilege escalation, and DoS attacks.
Contrary to popular belief, the Macintosh operating system has not always been a safe haven from
malicious code.
112Out of the public eye for some time, it is now clear that the Mac OS is increasingly
becoming a target for the malicious activity that is more commonly associated with Microsoft and various
UNIX-based operating systems. Symantec believes that as the popularity of Apple’s new platform continuesto grow, so too will the number of attacks directed at it.
The market penetration of Macintosh platforms will be accelerated by the much lower priced Mac® mini,
which may be purchased by less security-savvy users. As a result, the number of vulnerabilities can beexpected to increase, as will malicious activity that targets them. However, it should be stated that whilethe number of vulnerabilities in Macintosh operating systems is expected to increase, they will likely beoutnumbered by vulnerabilities in other operating systems for some time to come.
106http://userpages.umbc.edu/~mabzug1/cs/md5/md5.html
107http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/383574
108Examples of some of these vulnerabilities can be found at http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/11802/info/
109A rootkit is a collection of tools designed to allow hackers unfettered access to a computer system, often in a manner that avo ids detection by others.
110http://www.securityfocus.com/news/9796
111http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/11802
112http://www.faqs.org/faqs/computer-virus/macintosh-faq/78Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Combating adware and spyware with legislation—the problems
As discussed in the “Additional Security Risks” section of this Internet Security Threat Report, adware and
spyware represent serious threats to privacy and confidentiality, as well as identity security. Symantec isconcerned that as adware and spyware become more prominent, legislation
113designed to protect against
illegitimate usage of these programs will prove to be an insufficient deterrent.
Over the next six months, the functionality and distribution of adware will come under increasing scrutiny
by groups concerned with privacy. It is expected that in the near future standards related to adware willevolve that will center on EULAs, product uninstall capabilities, and the level of stealth with which theseprograms install themselves on a user’s system. Another issue is the fact that some of them stubbornlyresist normal removal procedures.
Symantec expects that the bundling of adware with other programs will grow as a viable method of installing
adware. The explosion in adware over the past few years would suggest that its return on investment is relatively good. As such, Symantec feels that this will continue to drive the creation and implementation ofadware despite legislation aimed at curbing these technologies. Such laws are not expected to be effective.The transboundary nature of the Internet creates serious jurisdictional issues; particularly as distributionactivity may take place in locations not subject to jurisdiction of such laws. As such, adware could easilybecome more problematic for users, as prosecution will rely on jurisdictional cooperation, which is notalways forthcoming.
The risks from spyware will also continue to grow, compromising privacy and confidentiality and increasing
the risk of identity theft. This can present a challenge to corporations as well as end users. Victims mustdeal with the aftermath of a compromise not only at the technical, but also at operational levels: forinstance, by getting new credit cards, reviewing and correcting credit reports, challenging credit cardcharges, and tracking other uses of the stolen data.
113http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/03-04/bill/sen/sb_1401-1450/sb_1436_bill_20040928_chaptered.html79Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices
Enterprise best practices
1. Turn off and remove unneeded services.
2. If a blended threat exploits one or more network services, disable, or block access to, those services
until a patch is applied.
3. Always keep your patch levels up-to-date, especially on computers that host public services and are
accessible through the firewall, such as HTTP, FTP, mail, and DNS services.
4. Enforce a password policy. 5. Configure your email server to block or remove email that contains file attachments that are commonly
used to spread viruses, such as .VBS, .BAT, .EXE, .PIF, and .SCR files.
6. Isolate infected computers quickly to prevent further compromising your organization. Perform a
forensic analysis and restore the computers using trusted media.
7. Train employees not to open attachments unless they are expecting them. Also, do not execute software
that is downloaded from the Internet unless it has been scanned for viruses.
8. Ensure emergency response procedures are in place. 9. Educate management on security budgeting needs. 10.Test security to ensure adequate controls are in place.11.Both spyware and adware can be automatically installed on systems along with file-sharing programs,
free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software, by clicking on links or attachmentsin email messages, or via instant messaging clients. Ensure that only applications approved by yourorganization are deployed on the desktop.
Consumer best practices
1. Use an Internet security solution that combines antivirus, firewall, intrusion detection, and vulnerability
management for maximum protection against blended threats.
2. Ensure that security patches are up-to-date.3. Ensure passwords are a mix of letters and numbers. Do not use dictionary words. Change passwords
often.
4. Never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the purpose of the attachment is known.5. Keep virus definitions updated. By deploying the latest virus definitions, corporations, and consumers
are protected against the latest viruses known to be spreading “in the wild.”
6. Consumers should routinely check to see if their PC or Macintosh system is vulnerable to threats by
using Symantec Security Check at www.symantec.com/securitycheck.
80Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
7. All types of computer users need to know how to recognize computer hoaxes and phishing scams.
Hoaxes typically include a bogus email warning to “send this to everyone you know” and improper technical jargon to frighten or mislead users. Phishing scams are much more sophisticated. Often arriving in email, phishing scams appear to come from a legitimate organization and entice users toenter credit card or other confidential information into forms on a Web site designed to look like thelegitimate organization. Consumers and business professionals also need to consider who is sendingthe information and determine if it is a reliable source. The best course of action is to simply deletethese types of emails.
8. Consumers can get involved in fighting computer crime by tracking and reporting intruders. With
Symantec Security Check’s tracing service, users can quickly identify the location of potential hackersand forward the information to the attacker’s Internet Service Provider or local police.
9. Be aware of the differences between spyware and adware. Spyware has been used to perform malicious
attacks and identity theft, while adware is often used to gather data for marketing purposes and has avalid, generally benign purpose.
10.Both spyware and adware can be automatically installed on your system along with file-sharing
programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software, or by clicking on links orattachments in email messages, or via instant messaging clients. Therefore, be informed and selectiveabout what you install on your computer.
11.Don’t just click those “Yes, I accept” buttons on end user license licensing agreements (EULAs). Some
spyware and adware applications can be installed after, or as a by-product of, accepting the EULA.Read them carefully to examine what they mean in terms of privacy. The agreement should clearlyexplain what the product is doing and provide an uninstaller.
12.Beware of programs that flash ads in the user interface. Many spyware programs track how you
respond to these ads, and their presence is a red flag. When you see ads in a program’s user interface,you may be looking at a piece of spyware.
81Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology
Attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from Symantec DeepSight Threat
Management System and Symantec Managed Security Services. Both services use a common naming convention for types of attacks, enabling analysts to combine and analyze attacks together or separately.Symantec combines these two data sources for analysis when appropriate—that is, when they both containthe attributes required for the particular analysis. In some cases, only one data source is used if attributesrequired for a particular analysis are not available in the other. Table 9 provides high-level details of themethods used by each service.
Table 9. Data collection methods used by Symantec
Attack definitions
In order to avoid ambiguity with our findings, Symantec’s methodology for identifying various forms of
attack activity is outlined clearly below. This methodology is applied consistently throughout our monitor-ing and analysis. The first step in analyzing attack activity is to define precisely what an attack is. Ratherthan limiting the analysis to only one metric of attack activity, Symantec uses several different metrics,each of which is appropriate under a certain set of circumstances. A high-level summary of the distinctionsused in the report is used below.
Attacks —Attacks are individual signs of malicious network activity. Attacks can consist of one or more IDS
or firewall alerts that are indicative of a single type of attacker action. For example, multiple firewall logsoften indicate the occurrence of a single network scan. The attack metric is the best indicator of the overallvolume of actual “attacker actions” detected over a specified period of time.
Worm Attacks —In order to better draw conclusions regarding attack trends, activity related to autonomously
propagating worms has been identified. An absolute verification of the origin of some activity is oftenimpossible, as certain scans from networks containing a Trojan horse will look identical to a wormattempting to propagate. The decision of whether traffic originates from a worm is a judgment based onthe origin of the majority of the traffic.
82Percent of
companies in
Data source Data collection methodology sample set
Symantec DeepSight Threat Symantec DeepSight Threat Management System collects IDS 60%
Management System and firewall events from more than 20,000 security devices
deployed in more than 180 countries.
Symantec Managed Symantec Managed Security Services provides real-time 40%
Security Services monitoring and analysis of attack activity launched against
companies worldwide. Due to the nature of monitoring activity, some statistics, such as event severity, client tenure, and attacks per company only apply to data received from Symantec Managed Security Services customers. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Events —Security events are logical groupings of multiple attacks. “Event” is a term that is used only by
Symantec Managed Security Services. A security event may include a group of similar, but non-threateningindividual attacks experienced by companies during the course of a day (for example, all non-threateningHTTP scans experienced during a single day are grouped into an event). A security event may also includemultiple attacks against a single company by a single attacker during a specified period of time. Securityevents are generated only by the Symantec Managed Security Service, and are only used in this reportwhen discussing “Severe Event Incidence.”
Event Severity
Event severity is only applicable to data generated by Symantec Managed Security Services. Every event
validated by Symantec security analysts is assigned to one of four severity classifications: informational,
warning, critical, and emergency (table 10). The primary purpose of this rating system is to prioritize clientresponses to malicious activity based on the relative level of danger that the event presents to theirenvironment.
A determination of severity is based on characteristics of an attack, defensive controls of the client, value
of the assets at risk, and the relative success of the attack. These four severity levels are further groupedinto two classifications: severe and non-severe events. Severe events include activity classified as either“emergency” or “critical,” while non-severe events include activity classified as either “informational” or
“warning.” For example, a severe event requires immediate countermeasures from an organization, while
a non-severe event is mainly informative.
Table 10. Severity classifications
83Severity Classifications Definitions
Non-severe Informational Events consisting of scans for malicious services and IDS events that do not
have a significant impact on the client’s network.
Example: Scans for vulnerable services where all connection attempts are
dropped by the firewall.
Warning Events consisting of malicious attacks that were unsuccessful in bypassing
the firewall and did not compromise the intended target systems.
Example: Scans and horizontal sweeps where some connections were
allowed, but a compromise has not occurred.
Severe Critical These events are malicious in nature and require action on the part of
Symantec or the client to fix a weakness or actual exploit of the client network or devices. By definition, if a critical event is not addressed with countermeasures, it may result in a successful compromise of a system.
Examples: (1) Continuous attacks by a single IP address against the client
network or a significant vulnerability on the client’s network that was identified by either an attacker or the Symantec Managed Security Services Security Operations Center (SOC). For example, a Web exploit is observed
` and appears to be successful, but there is no observed follow-up activity
to take advantage of the vulnerability. (2) Unknown suspicious traffic that warrants an investigation by the client to track or eliminate the traffic flow.
Emergency These events indicate that a security breach has occurred on the client’s
protected network. An emergency event requires the client to initiate some form of recovery procedure.
Example: Successful exploit of a vulnerable Web server. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Explanation of research enquiries
This section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to produce the data and statistics in
this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, thefollowing investigations warranted additional detail.
Daily attack rate
Symantec uses a daily attack rate as a rough estimate of the rate of attack activity experienced by
networks connected to the Internet. This attack rate will be highly determinative of a large number offactors but is an indicator of whether the attack rates are rising or falling from between sample periods.
Previous volumes of the Internet Security Threat Report have used the average number of attacks detected
by Symantec Managed Security Services and Symantec DeepSight Threat Management System sensors togather this data. However, the mean average of this data could potentially be skewed if a small number oforganizations received a disproportionately high number of attacks. To mitigate this possibility, the medianaverage for all contributing data sensors was used. This approach more accurately represents the variations
in attack volume over time that a typical network (in size and defensive deployment) may see.
Top Internet attacks
Symantec identified and ranked the top attacks seen on networks across the Symantec DeepSight Threat
Management System and Symantec Managed Security Services base. This ranking does not differentiatebetween worm and non-worm-related attacks; instead, it can be seen as indicative of the distribution ofattacks that an Internet-connected host can be expected to observe. Where certain attacks are stronglyassociated with worm activity, it is noted in the text.
Symantec investigates and ranks attacks in three ways. Each approach can give visibility into certain
emerging trends. The three ways attacks are tracked and ranked are:
•The proportion of sensors that detect a given attack.
•The proportion of attacking IP addresses that perform a given attack.
•The proportion of aggregate attack volume that is a given attack.
Included in this report is the proportion of attacking IP addresses that perform a given attack.
84Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Top attacked ports
The top port data is gathered solely from the Symantec DeepSight Threat Management System, and
represents individual scan attempts from perimeter security devices throughout the world. Not every singleport scan can be considered hostile, but port data is often indicative of wide-scale scanning for individualservices being targeted for exploitation.
Symantec investigates and ranks targeted ports in three ways. Each approach can give visibility into
certain emerging trends. The three ways ports are tracked and ranked are:
•The proportion of sensors that detect a given attack.
•The proportion of attacking IP addresses that perform a given attack.
•The proportion of aggregate attack volume that is a given attack.
Included in this report is the proportion of attacking IP addresses that perform a given attack.
Bot networks and denial of service activity
Symantec identifies certain scanning patterns and observed network traffic and correlates this traffic to
rules that define specific coordinated scanning behavior. For an originating computer to be flagged as participating in this coordinated scanning, indicative of a bot network, it must fit into that scanning pattern to the exclusion of any other activity. This behavioral matching will not catch every bot networkinfected computer, and may identify other malicious code behaving in a coordinated way as a bot network.Denial of service activity is summarized by analyzing the backscatter from denial of service attacks thatutilize spoofed source addresses.
Top originating countries
Symantec identified the national sources of attacks by automatically cross-referencing source IP addresses
of every attack with several third-party, subscription-based databases that link the geographic location ofsystems to source IP addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin oferror. Currently, Symantec cross-references source IP addresses of attacks against every country in theworld. It is important to note that while Symantec has a reliable process for identifying the source IPaddress of the host that is directly responsible for launching an attack, it is impossible to verify where theattacker is physically located. It is probable that many of the sources of attack are intermediary systemsused to disguise the attacker’s true identity and location.
Attacks per Internet capita
The number of Internet users was obtained from the CIA World Factbook 2004. The CIA World Factbook
provides a breakdown of the number of Internet users per country.
85High Tech 26%Other 0%
Nonprofit 2%Government: State or Local 1%
Media/Entertainment 1%
Power and Energy 4%Transportation 2%
Retail 2%
Financial Services 20%Agriculture, Construction and Mining 1%
Home User 9%Business Services 7%Small Business 3%
Unknown 4%
Healthcare 6%Manufacturing 4%Telecommunications 2%
Government 3%Education 3%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Attack activity by industry
For the purposes of the report, a targeted attacker is one that is detected attacking at least three
companies in a specific industry, to the exclusion of all other industries. Figure 36 represents the industrybreakdown of the sample set in percentage terms. Industries with less than ten sensors have beenexcluded from the resulting totals.
Figure 36. Attack activity by industry
Source: Symantec Corporation
Attack severity by industry
The Symantec Managed Security Services infrastructure allows ranking of attacks based on severity of
attacks. Symantec analysts classify attacks for severity according to the attack being performed, exposureof the victim to the attack, and indications as to whether it was successful.
Targeted industry attack rate
The targeted industry attack rate is a measure of the percentage of total attackers that target only
organizations in a specific industry. It can indicate which industries are more frequently the targets ofdirected attacks. This metric may be affected by the overall attack rate experienced by each industry;nevertheless, it provides an indication of the interest that an industry holds for targeted attackers.
86Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix C—Vulnerability Trends Methodology
The “Vulnerability Trends” section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report discusses developments
in the discovery and exploitation of vulnerabilities over the past six months. This methodology section willdiscuss how the data was gathered and how it was analyzed to come to the conclusions that are presentedin the “Vulnerability Trends” section.
Symantec maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive databases of security vulnerabilities, consisting
of over 9,000 distinct entries. The information presented in the “Vulnerability Trends” section is based onthe analysis of that data by Symantec researchers.
Vulnerability classifications
Following the discovery and or announcement of a new vulnerability, Symantec analysts gather all relevant
characteristics of the new vulnerability and create an alert. This alert describes important traits of the vulnerability, such as the severity, ease of exploitation, and a list of affected products. These traits are subsequently used both directly and indirectly for this analysis.
Vulnerability type
After discovering a new vulnerability, Symantec threat analysts classify the vulnerability into one of
12 possible categories. The classification system is based on Taimur Aslam et al (1996),114who define
the taxonomy used to classify vulnerabilities. Possible values are indicated below, and the previously mentioned white paper provides a full description of the meaning behind each classification:
•Boundary condition error
•Access validation error
•Origin validation error
•Input validation error
•Failure to handle exceptional conditions
•Race condition error
•Serialization error
•Atomicity error
•Environment error
•Configuration error
•Design error
114“Use of a Taxonomy of Security Faults” http://ftp.cerias.purdue.edu/pub/papers/taimur-aslam/aslam-krsul-spaf-taxonomy.pdf87Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Severity
Vulnerability severity is a measure of the degree to which the vulnerability gives an attacker accessibility to
the targeted system. It also measures the potential impact that successful exploitation may have for theconfidentiality, integrity or availability of the affected system. Symantec analysts calculate a severity score ona scale of 1 to 10 for each new vulnerability discovery. The severity score is based on the following factors:
•Impact —The relative impact on the affected systems if the vulnerability is exploited. For example, if the
vulnerability enables the attacker to gain full root access to the system, the vulnerability is classified as“high impact.” Vulnerabilities with a higher impact rating contribute to a higher severity score.
•Remote exploitability —Indicates whether or not the vulnerability can be exploited remotely.
Vulnerabilities are classified as remotely exploitable when it is possible to exploit the vulnerability using
at least one method from a position external to the system, typically via some type of communicationprotocol, such as TCP/IP, IPX, or dial-up. Vulnerabilities that are remotely exploitable contribute to ahigher severity score.
•Authentication requirements —Indicates whether the vulnerability can be exploited only after providing
some sort of credentials to the vulnerable system, or whether it is possible to exploit it without supplyingany authentication credentials. Vulnerabilities that require no authentication on the part of the attackercontribute to a higher severity score.
•Availability of the affected system —Rates how accessible the system is to attackers in terms of
exploitability. Some vulnerabilities are always exploitable once the attacker has accessed the system.Other vulnerabilities may be dependent on timing, the interaction of other objects or subjects, orotherwise only circumstantially exploitable. Increased availability of the affected system to attackers
will increase the calculated severity.
After gathering information on these four attributes, analysts use a pre-established algorithm to generate
a severity score that ranges from one to ten. For the purposes of this report, vulnerabilities are rated ashigh, moderate, or low severity based on the scores presented in Table 3 below. For the purposes of theInternet Security Threat Report, each vulnerability is categorized as one of three severity levels. These
levels are:
Low severity (0–3) —Vulnerabilities that constitute a minor threat. Attackers cannot exploit the
vulnerability across a network. As well, successful exploitation of the vulnerability would not result in acomplete compromise of the information stored or transmitted on the system. Low-severity vulnerabilitiesinclude non-critical losses of confidentiality (for example, system configuration exposure) or non-criticallosses of integrity (for example, local file corruption).
Moderate severity (4–7) —Vulnerabilities that result in a partial compromise of the affected system, such
as those by which an attacker gains elevated privileges but does not gain complete control of the targetsystem. Moderately severe vulnerabilities include those for which the impact on systems is high butaccessibility to attackers is limited. This includes vulnerabilities that require the attacker to have localaccess to the system or to be authenticated before the system can be exploited.
High severity (8–10) —Vulnerabilities that result in a compromise of the entire system if exploited. In
almost all cases, successful exploitation can result in a complete loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data stored on or transmitted across the system. High severity vulnerabilities will allow
attackers access across a network without authentication.
88Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Table 11. Measurement of severity level
Source: Symantec Corporation
Ease of exploitation
The ease of exploitation metric indicates how easily vulnerabilities can be exploited. The vulnerability
analyst assigns the ease rating after thoroughly researching the need for and availability of exploits for the vulnerability. All vulnerabilities are classified into one of three possible categories, listed below.
•Exploit available —Sophisticated exploit code to enable the exploitation of the vulnerability is publicly
available to all would-be attackers.
•No exploit required —W ould-be attackers can exploit the vulnerability without having to use any form of
sophisticated exploit code. In other words, the attacker does not need to create or use complex scripts ortools to exploit the vulnerability.
•No exploit available —W ould-be attackers must use exploit code to make use of the vulnerability;
however, no such exploit code is publicly available.
For the purposes of this report, the first two types of vulnerabilities are considered “easily exploitable”
because the attacker requires only limited sophistication to make use of it. The last type of vulnerability is considered “difficult to exploit” because the attacker must develop his/her own exploit code to make use of the vulnerability.
Exploit development time
The ability to measure exploit development time is limited and applies only to the vulnerabilities thatwould normally require exploit code. Therefore, the metric is based on the following:
•Vulnerabilities that Symantec considers to be of sufficient complexity,
115and that did not have f unctional
exploit code until it was created by a third party.
Excluded are:•Vulnerabilities that do not require exploit code
•Vulnerabilities associated with exploit code published by the discoverer of the vulnerability
•Vulnerabilities associated with non-functional proof-of-concept code
The date of vulnerability disclosure is based on the date of the first reference found (such as a mailing list
post). The date of exploit publication is the date of the first reference to the exploit code found.
The delta between vulnerability disclosure and appearance of exploit code for each applicable vulnerability
is determined and computed into a monthly average.
115Memory corruption vulnerabilities. This includes buffer overflows, integer handling errors, format string vulnerabilities, and others which result in a
corruption of system memory.89Severity level Severity score range
High X ≥ 7Moderate 4 ≤ X< 7Low x < 4Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Browser Vulnerability Comparisons
Individual browser vulnerabilities are notoriously difficult to pinpoint and identify precisely. A reported
attack may be a combination of several conditions, each of which could be considered a vulnerability in its own right. This may distort the total vulnerability count. The following caveats should be kept in mindwhen interpreting the data:
•Because of the difficulty in comparing verifiable, confirmed, unique vulnerabilities, only those that were
confirmed by the vendor were taken into consideration.
•Individual browser vulnerabilities are notoriously difficult to pinpoint and identify precisely. A reported
attack may be a combination of several conditions, each of which could be considered a vulnerability intheir own right. This may distort the total vulnerability count.
•Not every vulnerability discovered is exploited. As of this writing, there has been no widespread
exploitation of any browser except Microsoft Internet Explorer. This is expected to change as otherbrowsers become more popular.
•Firefox is a relatively new browser. It is not represented in the data sets prior to the current reporting
period.
90Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix D—Malicious Code Trends Methodology
The trends in the “Malicious Code Trends” section are based on statistics from malicious code samples
reported to Symantec for analysis. Symantec gathers data from over 120 million client, server, and gateway systems that have deployed Symantec’s antivirus products in both consumer and corporate environments. The Symantec Digital Immune System and Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting process.
Observations in the “Malicious Code Trends” section are based on empirical data and expert analysis. The
data and analysis draw primarily from two databases described below.
Infection database
To help detect and eradicate computer viruses, Symantec developed the Symantec AntiVirus™ Research
Automation (SARA) technology. Symantec uses this technology to analyze, replicate, and define a largesubset of the most common computer viruses that are quarantined by Symantec AntiVirus customers. Onaverage SARA receives hundreds of thousands of suspect files daily from both enterprise and individual
consumers located throughout the world. Symantec then analyzes these suspect files, matching them withvirus definitions. An analysis of this aggregate data set provides statistics on infection rates for differenttypes of malicious code.
Malicious code database
In addition to infection data, Symantec Security Response analyzes and documents attributes for each new
form of malicious code that emerges both in the wild and in a “zoo” (or controlled laboratory) environment.
Descriptive records of new forms of malicious code are then entered into a database for future reference.For this report, historical trend analysis was performed on this database to reveal trends, such as the use
of different infection vectors and the frequency of various types of payloads.
In some cases, Symantec antivirus products may initially detect new malicious code heuristically or by
generic signatures. These may later be reclassified and given unique detections. Because of this, there maybe slight variances between some reports in the previous edition of the Internet Security Threat Report and
the current edition.
91Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix E—Additional Security Risks Methodology
Symantec products help users to protect their data not only from the threat of viruses, worms, and Trojan
horses, but to evaluate potential security risks from the introduction of other programs as well. SymantecAntiVirus classifies these other programs as additional security risks. Additional security risks includeprograms that may be categorized, based upon functional criteria, as adware or spyware. Symantec classifiesthese programs based on a number of characteristics. Once categorized, they can be detected, allowingusers to choose whether to keep or remove them based on their personal needs and security policies.
General criteria for additional security risks
A program classified as an additional security risk is an application or software-based executable that iseither independent or interdependent with another software program and meets the following criteria:
1. Is considered to be non-viral in nature.2. Meets criteria for programmatic functionality having potential to impact security.3. Has been submitted to Symantec for detection by a critical number of either corporate or individual
users within a given timeframe. The timeframe and number may vary by category or risk.
Symantec further classifies programs based upon functional criteria related to the result of the program’s
introduction to a computer system. The criterion considers stealth, privacy, performance impact, damage,and removal.
The trends in the “Additional Security Risks” section are based on Symantec’s ongoing research, reports
from customers, and data from over 120 million client, server, and gateway systems that have deployedSymantec’s products,
116as well as filtration of 25 million email messages per day by the Symantec Probe
Network. Symantec then analyzes the top reports and analyzes which of these are, in fact, adware andspyware as opposed to malicious code.
In this discussion, adware and spyware are discussed according to samples, or individual cases of adware
or spyware. However, in some cases, a particular sample may have multiple variants. A variant is a newiteration of the same family that may have minor differences but is still based on the original. For thepurposes of this report, all variants of a sample of adware or spyware are treated as a single sample.
Phishing methodology
Phishing attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec ProbeNetwork. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam data is utilized to gauge the growth in phishing attempts as wellas the percentage of Internet mail that is determined to be phishing attempts. Symantec BrightmailAntiSpam field data consists of statistics reported back from customer installations that provide feedbackabout the detection behaviors of antifraud filters as well as the overall volume of mail being processed.
116Systems deploying Symantec antivirus security solutions92Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Attack definition
Symantec Probe Network data is used to track the growth in new attacks. A fraud attack is a group of email
messages with similar messages sent to a unique user. The messages attempt to gain confidential and orpersonal information from online users. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data is used to identifygeneral trends in phishing email messages.
The following table provides high-level details of the methods used by each service.
Table 12. Phishing data collection methods
Source: Symantec Corporation
Explanation of research enquiries
This section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to produce the data and statistics in
this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, thefollowing investigations warranted additional detail.
Growth in phishing rate
Symantec maintains automated systems to identify new potential fraud attacks received by the Symantec
Probe Network. Messages are grouped into attacks based upon similarities in the message bodies andheaders. Sample messages are then passed through general fraud heuristics to identify messages aspotential fraud. The Brightmail Logistics and Operations Center (BLOC) reviews attacks that are identifiedfor confirmation and filter development. The Symantec Brightmail Business Intelligence department
reviews phishing attacks in order to develop predictive filters (Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam Heuristics).
The data presented in this section is based on weekly totals in the number of new phishing attacks ruled
upon by the BLOC. The BLOC addresses only those phishing attacks not caught by existing antispam andantifraud filters. Existing filters refers only to those antispam and antifraud filters used across theSymantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base. Some fraud messages will be captured in the field basedupon predictive filters (heuristics); however, not all of Symantec’s customer base utilize this technology orhave upgraded to this technology. Therefore, the messages are still reviewed by the BLOC for thedevelopment of filters that are more widely dispersed.
93Data source Data collection methodology
Symantec Probe Network The Symantec Probe Network has over 2 million probes with a statistical reach of over
250 million mailboxes. It is a vast array of email addresses (formerly live users as well as email accounts that have been generated solely for this purpose) that attracts junk email. Symantec’s Probe Network has over 600 participating enterprises and ISPs. The reach of the Probe Network covers countries in the Americas, Europe, Asia, and Australia.
Symantec Brightmail Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam software reports statistics to the Brightmail Logistics
AntiSpam field data and Operations Center (BLOC) indicating messages processed, messages filtered, and
filter specific data. Symantec has classified different filters so that spam statistics as well as phishing statistics can be separately determined. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Spam
Spam trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec Probe Network.
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data is utilized to gauge the growth in spam. Symantec BrightmailAntiSpam field data consists of statistics reported back from customer installations providing feedback as to firing characteristics of anti-spam filters as well as overall mail volume being processed.
Sample customer base
Due to the numerous variables influencing a company’s spam activity, Symantec focused on identifyingspam activity and growth projections based upon categorizing the severity of a company’s spam problem.The sample customer base (20 companies) was selected from those companies experiencing spam ratesexceeding 75% of their mail volume in the month of July. The selected companies also had the largest mailvolume during the month of July. The data represents weekly totals over a six-month period for thecombined message traffic of the 20 sample customers. The table below provides high-level details of themethods used by each service.
Table 13. Spam data collection methods
Source: Symantec Corporation
94Data source Data collection methodology
Symantec Probe Network The Symantec Probe Network has over 2 million probes with a statistical reach of over
250 million mailboxes. It is a vast array of email addresses (formerly live users as well as email accounts that have been generated solely for this purpose) that attracts junk email. Symantec’s Probe Network has over 600 participating enterprises and ISPs. The reach of the Probe Network covers countries in the Americas, Europe, Asia, and Australia.
Symantec Brightmail Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam software reports statistics to the BLOC indicating
AntiSpam field data messages processed, messages filtered, and filter specific data. Symantec has
classified different filters so that spam statistics as well as phishing statistics can be separately determined.NO WARRANTY. The technical information is being delivered to you AS-IS and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its acc uracy or use. Any use of the
technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user. Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical
errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice.
Symantec, the Symantec logo, Brightmail, and DeepSight are U.S. registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation. Brightmail AntiS pam, BugTraq, Digital Immune
System, Symantec AntiVirus, Symantec AntiVirus Research Automation (SARA), Symantec Managed Security Services, and Symantec Sec urity Response are
trademarks of Symantec Corporation. Microsoft, Windows, and Windows NT are registered trademarks of Microsoft Corporation. Maci ntosh, Mac, and Mac OS are
registered trademarks of Apple Computer, Inc. Linux is a registered trademark of Linus Torvalds. Other brands and products are trademarks of their respective
holder/s. Copyright © 2005 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved. Any technical information that is made available by Syman tec Corporation is the copyrighted
work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec Corporation.
|
SYMANTEC ENTERPRISE SECURITY
Symantec Internet Security
Threat ReportTrends for January 05–June 05
Volume VIII, Published September 2005Dean Turner
Executive EditorSymantec Security Response
Stephen Entwisle
EditorSymantec Security Response
Oliver Friedrichs
Technical AdvisorSymantec Security Response
David Ahmad
Manager, DevelopmentSymantec Security Response
Joseph Blackbird
Assoc. Software EngineerSymantec Security Response
Marc Fossi
DeepSight Threat AnalystSymantec Security Response
Daniel Hanson
DeepSight Threat AnalystSymantec Security Response
Sarah Gordon
Sr. Principal Research EngineerSymantec Security Response
David Cole
Director, Product ManagementSymantec Security Response
David Cowings
Sr. Business Intelligence ManagerSymantec Business Intelligence
Dylan Morss
Principal Business Intelligence AnalystSymantec Business Intelligence
Brad Bradley
Sr. Business Intelligence AnalystSymantec Business Intelligence
Peter Szor
Security ArchitectSymantec Security Response
Eric Chien
Security ResearcherSymantec Security Response
Jeremy Ward
Systems Engineer Mgr.U.K. Sales Communications
Jesse Gough
DeepSight Threat AnalystSymantec Security Response
Josh Talbot
DeepSight Threat AnalystSymantec Security ResponseInternet Security Threat Report Volume VIII—The Changing Threat Landscape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Internet Security Threat Report Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
Attack Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Vulnerability Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Malicious Code Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Additional Security Risks Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
Future Watch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
Appendix C—Vulnerability Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Appendix D—Malicious Code Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Appendix E—Additional Security Risks Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101ContentsVolume VIII, Published September 2005
Symantec Internet Security Threat ReportSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Internet Security Threat Report Volume VIII—The Changing Threat Landscape
This edition of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report marks a shift in the threat landscape.
Attackers are moving away from large, multipurpose attacks on network perimeters and towards smaller,more focused attacks on client-side targets. The new threat landscape will likely be dominated by emergingthreats such as bot networks, customizable modular malicious code, and targeted attacks on Webapplications and Web browsers. Whereas traditional attack activity has been motivated by curiosity and adesire to show off technical virtuosity, many current threats are motivated by profit. They often attempt to perpetrate criminal acts, such as identity theft, extortion, and fraud.
This volume of the Internet Security Threat Report will offer an overview of threat activity that took place
between January 1 and June 30, 2005. This brief summary and the overview that follows will offer asynopsis of the data and trends discussed in the main report. As the new threat landscape emerges,Symantec will continue to monitor and assess threat activity in order to best prepare consumers andenterprises for the complex Internet security issues to come.
Malicious code for profit
During the first six months of 2005, new methods of using malicious code for financial gain were observedwith increasing frequency. One example submitted to Symantec during this period was a malicious codeprogram that downloaded adware onto a compromised computer. Each time the program was downloaded,the malicious code author earned a fee. Symantec has also uncovered evidence indicating that botnetworks are available for hire. These can be used for malicious purposes, such as extorting money from e-commerce sites by threatening denial of service (DoS) attacks.
1
Exposure of confidential information
Threats to confidential information can result in significant financial loss, particularly if credit cardinformation or banking details are exposed. These concerns are becoming more worrisome as onlineshopping and Internet banking continue to increase. Between January 1 and June 30, 2005, maliciouscode that exposed confidential information represented 74% of the top 50 malicious code samplesreported to Symantec, up from 54% the previous six months. The rise in confidential information threats is probably due to the rapid proliferation of bots during this period.
Malicious code variants increase dramatically
Over the first half of 2005, Symantec documented more than 10,866 new Win32 viruses and worms, anincrease of 48% over the 7,360 documented in the second half of 2004. It is also an increase of 142%over the 4,496 documented in the first half of 2004. This massive increase in variants is importantbecause each variant represents a new, distinct threat against which administrators must protect theirsystems and for which antivirus vendors must create a new antivirus definition. This trend is alsoimportant because it signifies a shift away from broadly disseminated threats, such as mass-mailingworms, and towards malicious code that is modular and customizable.
1See http://www.newscientist.com/channel/info-tech/mg18725125.900 and http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/07/21/cyber_shakedown_ta ken_down/ for instance. 4Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Bot activity continues to increase
In the first six months of 2005, Symantec identified an average of 10,352 bots per day, up from less
than 5,000 per day in December 2004. Symantec believes that the increase in bot activity has driven acorresponding increase in DoS attacks. This may be related to financial motives, as DoS attacks have been reported in extortion attempts. Symantec also observed a dramatic increase in bot variants in thefirst half of 2005.
Malicious code for mobile devices
Malicious code for mobile devices continued to make headway in the first six months of 2005. In March,the first Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) worm was discovered. The threats created demonstratesome of the robust capabilities of malicious code for mobile devices despite the fact that the number ofthreats reported in the wild is still relatively small. This can be expected to change, as platform complexityand connectivity have risen to sufficient levels for a widespread outbreak.
Vulnerability disclosure increases substantially
Between January 1 and June 30, 2005, Symantec documented 1,862 new vulnerabilities. This is thehighest number recorded since the Internet Security Threat Report began tracking new vulnerabilities in
six-month intervals. 49% of these vulnerabilities were classified as high severity. 59% of all vulnerabilitieswere found in Web application technologies. These vulnerabilities are particularly dangerous because theycan allow an attacker to access confidential information from databases without having to compromise any servers.
Mozilla browsers have the most vulnerabilities
During the first half of 2005, 25 vendor confirmed vulnerabilities were disclosed for the Mozilla browsers,the most of any browser. 18 of these were classified as high severity. During the same period, 13 vendorconfirmed vulnerabilities were disclosed for Microsoft Internet Explorer, eight of which were high severity.
Six-month growth in phishing and spam
Phishing continued to increase over the first six months of 2005. During this reporting period, Symantecblocked 1.04 billion phishing attacks, compared to 546 million in the last six months of 2004, a 90%increase in messages blocked. This means that between January 1 and June 30, 2005, the volume ofphishing messages grew from an average of 2.99 million messages a day to 5.70 million. One out of every125 email messages scanned by the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam™ solution was a phishing attempt, anincrease of 100% from the last half of 2004. During this period, spam made up over 61% of all emailtraffic, a slight increase over the second half of 2004.
5Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Exploit development and patch development time
In the second half of 2005, the average time between the disclosure of a vulnerability and the release of an
associated exploit was 6.0 days. During the same period, on average, 54 days elapsed between disclosureof a vulnerability and the release of a patch by the vendor. This means that, on average, a period of 48days existed between the release of an exploit and the release of an associated patch. During this time,systems are either vulnerable or administrators are forced to create their own workarounds to protectagainst exploitation.
Internet Security Threat Report Highlights
6Vulnerability Trend Highlights
• Symantec documented 1,862 new
vulnerabilities, the highest number sinceSymantec started tracking vulnerabilities in six-month increments.
• The time between the disclosure of a
vulnerability and the release of an associatedexploit was 6.0 days.
• The average patch-release time for the past
6 months was 54 days. This means that, onaverage, 48 days elapsed between the release of an exploit and the release of an associatedpatch.
• 97% of vulnerabilities were either moderately
or highly severe.
• 73% of reported vulnerabilities this period were
classified as easily exploitable.
• 59% of vulnerabilities were associated with
Web application technologies.
• 25 vulnerabilities were disclosed for Mozilla
browsers and 13 for Microsoft® InternetExplorer. Attack Trend Highlights
• For the fourth consecutive reporting period, the
Microsoft SQL Server Resolution Service StackOverflow Attack was the most common attack,accounting for 33% of all attacks.
• Symantec sensors detected an average of 57
attacks per day.
• TCP port 445, commonly implemented for
Microsoft file and printer sharing, was the mostfrequently targeted port.
• Symantec identified an average of 10,352 bots
per day, up from 4,348 in December 2004.
• On average, the number of DoS attacks grew
from 119 to 927 per day, an increase of 679%over the previous reporting period.
• 33% of Internet attacks originated in the United
States, up from 30% last period.
• Between January 1 and June 30, 2005,
education was the most frequently targetedindustry followed by small business. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
7Malicious Code Trend Highlights
• Symantec documented more than 10, 866 new
Win32 virus and worm variants, a 48% increaseover the second half of 2004 and a 142%increase of the first half of 2004.
• For the second straight period, Netsky.P was
the most reported malicious code sample.Gaobot and Spybot were the second and thirdmost reported, respectively.
• Malicious code that exposes confidential
information represented 74% of the top 50malicious code samples received by Symantec.
• Bot-related malicious code reported to Symantec
made up 14% of the top 50 reports.
• 6,361 new variants of Spybot were reported to
Symantec, a 48% increase over the 4,288 newvariants documented in the second half of 2004.Additional Security Risks
• Adware made up 8% of the top 50 reported
programs, up from 5% in the previous reporting period.
• Eight of the top ten adware programs were
installed through Web browsers.
• Six of the top ten spyware programs were
bundled with other programs and six wereinstalled through Web browsers
• Of the top ten adware programs reported in the
first six months of 2005, five hijacked browsers.
• Messages that constitute phishing attempts
increased from an average of 2.99 million perday to approximately 5.70 million messages.
• Spam made up 61% of all email traffic.• 51% of all spam received worldwide originated
in the United States.Internet Security Threat Report Highlights continuedSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Internet Security Threat Report Overview
The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report provides a six-month update of Internet threat activity. It
includes analysis of network-based attacks, a review of known vulnerabilities, and highlights of maliciouscode and additional security risks. This overview of the current Internet Security Threat Report will alert
readers to current trends and impending threats. In addition, it will offer recommendations for protectionagainst and mitigation of these concerns. This volume covers the six-month period from January 1 to June 30, 2005.
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the world.
Symantec DeepSight™ Threat Management System and Symantec™ Managed Security Services consist ofmore than 24,000 sensors monitoring network activity in over 180 countries. As well, Symantec gathersmalicious code data along with spyware and adware reports from over 120 million client, server, andgateway systems that have deployed Symantec’s antivirus products. Symantec also maintains one of theworld’s largest databases of security vulnerabilities, detailing over 13,000 vulnerabilities affecting more than 30,000 technologies from over 4,000 vendors. In addition to the vulnerability database, Symantecoperates BugTraq™, one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion of vulnerabilities onthe Internet. Finally, the Symantec Probe Network, a system of over two million decoy accounts, attractsemail messages from 20 different countries around the world, allowing Symantec to gauge global spam and phishing activity. These resources give Symantec analysts an unparalleled pool of data with which toidentify and analyze emerging trends in Internet security activity.
Symantec calls this combination of capabilities for the collection, analysis, and interpretation of security
data the Global Intelligence Network. The Global Intelligence Network supports detailed analysis of emergingthreats and early access to unmatched security intelligence that organizations can trust and use to mitigaterisks and manage information security.
The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report is grounded principally on the expert analysis of this data.
Based on Symantec’s expertise and experience, this analysis yields a highly informed commentary on current Internet threat activity. By publishing this report, Symantec hopes to provide enterprises andconsumers with the information they need to help effectively secure their systems now and in the future.
Malicious code for profit
In the previous volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec stated that malicious code that
can be used to generate profit appears to be on the rise.2The discussion in that volume focused mainly
on the growing use of malicious code to relay bulk unsolicited email (spam) for profit. This trend hascontinued through the first half of 2005. During this period, 64% of the top 50 malicious code samplesreported to Symantec allowed email relaying,
3compared to 53% in the last six months of 2004 and 37%
in the first half of that year.
During the first six months of 2005, new methods of using malicious code for financial gain were observed
with increasing frequency. One example is Gpcoder.4This Trojan encrypts data files such as documents,
spreadsheets, and database files on the compromised computer. It then creates a file in each folder
2The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume VII (March 2005): p. 59: http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539
3Email relaying is the practice of sending spam through a compromised computer. Enterprises whose systems are detected sending s pam may be placed on a blacklist,
a list of email addresses or IP addresses from which spam is known to originate or which spammers are known to utilize. Blackli sts can be used to filter out unwanted
email, such as spam. Email that is sent by organizations that are placed on a blacklist may be blocked from reaching its destin ation.
4http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/trojan.gpcoder.html8Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
containing information on how the user can obtain a decoder for the files. Reportedly, the user must pay
$200 for the decoder software. Malicious code that downloads adware onto a compromised computer mayalso be used for profit. For example, the Lazar Trojan
5downloads and installs adware that displays pop-up
advertisements in the user’s Web browser. The malicious code author receives a fee each time the adwareis installed on a computer.
The Symantec DeepSight Threat analyst team has uncovered evidence indicating that bot networks that
can be used for malicious purposes are available for hire. In July 2005, in an Internet relay chat (IRC)discussion that the DeepSight team was monitoring, a self-proclaimed bot network owner revealed thesize, capacity, and price of a bot network that he was making available. Customized bot binary code wasalso available for between U.S.$200 and U.S.$300.
6These communications indicate that it is not
uncommon for those who maintain control of these bot networks to provide full or partial access to thecompromised systems for a fee.
Symantec believes that financial incentives will motivate malicious code authors to create more malicious
code and that it will become stealthier and more selective. Security administrators and consumers shouldpay special attention to the changing nature of these threats and ensure that their antivirus definitions are up-to-date.
Exposure of confidential information
Threats that expose confidential information on a compromised computer are a concern to all users. Thesethreats may expose system information, sensitive files and documents, and/or cached authenticationcredentials. Some threats, such as back doors, may give a remote attacker complete control over acompromised computer. With the increasing use of online shopping and Internet banking, compromises of this nature can result in significant financial loss, particularly if credit card information or bankingdetails are exposed.
7
Between January 1 and June 30, 2005, malicious code that exposed confidential information represented74% of the top 50 malicious code samples reported to Symantec. This is an increase over the previousreporting period, in which 54% of the top 50 samples exposed confidential information, and over the 44%reported in the first half of 2004.
The rise in confidential information threats is primarily due to the proliferation of bots; however, other new
threats also contributed to this trend. For example, the Mytob
8family of mass-mailing worms includes
remote access capabilities, which could allow remote attackers access to a compromised system and thedata stored on it. During the month of June 2005, 97 variants of Mytob were reported to Symantec. Thesevariants were produced in extremely rapid succession, with numerous new variants being observed in the wild on the same day. Such rapid production of new variants is likely intended to attempt to bypassexisting antivirus definitions and, by extension, to overwhelm security administrators trying to keep theirsystems up-to-date.
5http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/trojan.lazar.html
6This service is marketed with the claim that because such binaries are unique, they will not be detected by current antivirus d efinitions. Although it is
possible to create a unique binary to avoid detection by existing antivirus definitions, most antivirus products will often be able to identify the threat
using a generic definition or a heuristic signature.
7http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11219
8http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/[email protected]–June 2003 July–Dec 2003 Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Total number
Period994
1411,702
1844,496
1647,360
17110,866
170Total viruses and worms
Total families
03,0006,0009,00012,000Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Malicious code variants increase dramatically
The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report discusses malicious code in two ways: families and variants.
A family is a new, distinct sample of malicious code. For instance, W32.Netsky@mm would have been thefounding sample, or the primary source code, of the Netsky family. In some cases, a particular family ofmalicious code may have multiple variants. A variant is a new iteration of the same family, one that hasminor differences but that is still based on the original. For instance, a new variant is often created whenthe source code of a successful virus or worm is modified slightly to bypass antivirus detection definitionsdeveloped for the original.
Over the first half of 2005, Symantec documented more than 10,866 new Win32 viruses and worms, an
increase of 48% over the 7,360 documented in the second half of 2004 (figure 1). It is also an increase of142% over the 4,496 documented in the first half of 2004. As of June 30, 2005, the total number ofWin32 variants surpassed 28,000.
The massive increase over the past six months is due to the increase of Win32 variants that use and
implement bot features—such as remote access through IRC channels and denial of service capabilities—that attackers often use for financial gain.
9For instance, the bots Spybot,10Gaobot,11and Randex12have
risen dramatically because their source code is available to the public, making the creation of variantsrelatively quick and easy. The number of new variants is all the more remarkable considering that thenumber of existing families has not changed appreciably over the past four reporting periods.
Figure 1. New Win32 virus and worm variants, 2003–2005
9For example, there were 97 variants of the Mytob worm released in the month of June alone. This worm also implements bot featur es.
10http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.spybot.worm.html
11http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.hllw.gaobot.gen.html
12http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.randex.gen.html10Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
13Ingress traffic refers to traffic that is coming into a network from the Internet or another network. Egress traffic refers to traffic that is leaving a network,
bound for the Internet or another network.
14Defense in-depth emphasizes multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive systems to guard against single-point fail ures in any specific
technology or protection methodology. Defense in-depth should include the deployment of antivirus, firewalls, and intrusion det ection systems, among
other security measures.
15Regression analysis was performed on the data with the extreme outliers removed. The analysis produced a coefficient of determi nation of 0.85,
meaning that 85% of the variation in DoS attacks can be explained by the linear relationship between bot numbers and DoS attack s. Only 15% of the
variation remains unexplained.
16See http://www.newscientist.com/channel/info-tech/mg18725125.900 and http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/07/21/cyber_shakedown_ta ken_down/
for instance.11The increase in variants is problematic for organizations because each one represents a new threat
against which administrators must secure their systems and for which antivirus providers must developand provide updates. To protect against the numerous variants, Symantec recommends that best securitypractices always be followed.
Administrators should keep patch levels up-to-date, especially on computers that host public services—
such as HTTP, FTP, SMTP, and DNS servers—and are accessible through a firewall or placed in a DMZ.Email servers should be configured to only allow file types that are required for business needs.Additionally, Symantec recommends that ingress and egress
13filtering be put in place on perimeter
devices to detect anomalous activity.
End users should employ defense in-depth,14including antivirus software and a personal firewall. Users
should update antivirus definitions regularly. They should also ensure that all desktop, laptop, and servercomputers are updated with all necessary security patches from their operating system vendor. Theyshould never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is expected and comesfrom a trusted source, and the purpose of the attachment is known.
Bot activity continues to increase
Bots (short for “robots”) are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s computer in order to allow anunauthorized user to control the computer remotely. Bots are designed to let an attacker create a networkof compromised computers known as a bot network, which can be remotely controlled to collectivelyconduct malicious activities such as DoS attacks.
In the second half of 2004, the number of bot computers identified by Symantec fell from over 30,000 per
day in late July to below 5,000 per day by the end of December. However, in the first six months of 2005bot network activity experienced a resurgence, increasing to an average of 10,352 bots per day. Symantecbelieves this increase in bot network activity is due to attacker reaction to vendor patching and othersecurity measures that were put in place in the last half of 2004. It is likely that bot network owners havebeen required to modify their attack methods in order to maintain viability in the face of these changes.
One of the primary functions of bot networks is to perform DoS attacks. Between January 1 and June 30,
2005, the number of DoS attacks grew by more than 680% to 927 per day on average (figure 2). Symantecbelieves that this increase in DoS activity is largely due to the corresponding increase in bot networkactivity.
15It may be related, at least in part, to financial motivation, as DoS attacks have been reported in
extortion attempts.16Fortunately, while the number of DoS attacks appears to have increased substantially,
large enterprises have not experienced any notable impact from these attempts.Median DoS attacks per day
DateMoving average Median DoS attacks per day
03006009001,2001,500
June 17, 2004May 20, 2004Apr 22, 2004Mar 25, 2004Feb 26, 2004Jan 29, 2004Jan 1, 2004
July 15, 2004
Aug 12, 2004
Sep 9, 2004
Oct 7, 2004
Nov 4, 2004
Dec 2, 2004
Dec 30, 2004
Jan 27, 2005
Feb 24, 2005
June 16, 2005May 19, 2005Apr 21, 2005Mar 24, 2005Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 2. DoS attacks per day
Source: Symantec Corporation
The number of new bot variants continues to climb (figure 3). For instance, in the current period, 6,361 new
variants of Spybot were reported to Symantec, a 48% increase over the 4,288 new variants documented in the second half of 2004. While the number of new Gaobot
17and Randex18variants decreased slightly
between the first and second half of last year, they rose again in the first half of 2005. During this period,there were 1,412 new Randex variants, an increase of 54%, and 1,121 new Gaobot variants, an increase of 47%. As has been stated previously in this overview, the increase in variants is problematic fororganizations because each one represents a new threat against which administrators must secure theirsystems and for which antivirus providers must develop and provide updates.
17http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.hllw.gaobot.html
18http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.randex.gen.html1201,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,0007,000
Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Number of new variants
Period1,1041,167
892 7659194,288
1,1211,4126,361Gaobot Randex SpybotSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 3. Number of new bot variants
Source: Symantec Corporation
During the first six months of 2005, the United Kingdom was the country with the highest proportion of
bot-infected computers worldwide. 32% of known bot-infected computers were located there. The UnitedKingdom was also the highest ranked country in the second half of 2004, with 25% of all bot-infectedcomputers situated there. This increase in bot-infected computers is likely due to the rapid growth inbroadband Internet that the United Kingdom has experienced.
19
To help mitigate the risk of bot infection, Symantec recommends that Internet service providers (ISPs) andenterprises perform both ingress and egress filtering, blocking the most common services that are targetsfor bot network infection, and allowing only those services and IP address ranges that are required forenterprise operations. ISPs should also filter potentially malicious email attachments, as bots are oftenpropagated by malicious code. End users should employ the same methods on home routers and firewalls.Administrators and end users should update antivirus definitions regularly. As compromised computers canbe a threat to other systems, Symantec also recommends that enterprises notify their ISP of any maliciousactivity as part of an incident response plan.
Malicious code for mobile devices
In September 2004, the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report predicted that malicious code for mobile
devices would become a threat.20In the March 2005 volume, Symantec reported that the number of variants
of malicious code for mobile devices in the wild had indeed increased.21During the current reporting period,
malicious code for mobile devices continued to make headway; however, it consisted primarily of proof-of-concept malicious code (and variants thereof) for mobile devices, particularly smart phones.
22
19http://www.point-topic.com/content/dslanalysis/World%20Broadband%20Statistics%20Q1%202005.pdf (access requires registration)
20Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume VI (September 2004) p. 37: http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539
21The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, Volume VII (March 2005) p. 54: http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm ?articleid=1539
22Smart phones are mobile phones that contain a full-fledged operating system with a wide variety of user-installable software.13Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
In March, the first MMS worm, Commwarrior,23was discovered. While previous malicious code for Symbian
devices24used only Bluetooth as a propagation vector, Commwarrior also uses MMS. This is significant
because Bluetooth requires physical proximity between an infected device and a target in order to propagate.MMS requires only a connection between a phone and the network in order to send messages and files toother phones. This has the potential to expand the scope of an outbreak from the local to the global level.
The first half of 2005 saw a rise in the number of Skulls
25variants. Skulls is a Trojan that targets the
Symbian operating system, likely because it is the most robust operating system for phones. The Trojanoverwrites numerous default phone applications, such as the phone book, email viewer, and to-do list. Thiscan render the device inoperable as critical operating system files are also overwritten. Six new variants ofSkulls appeared in the first half of 2005, tripling the number of known variants.
While the number of mobile device threats continues to increase, the number reported in the wild is still
relatively small. The threats created demonstrate some of the robust capabilities of malicious code for thesedevices. It is somewhat surprising that no automatically propagating malicious code has yet been developedand released into the wild, particularly as platform complexity and connectivity have risen to sufficient levelsfor a widespread outbreak.
Vulnerabilities increase substantially
The first half of 2005 was marked by a substantial increase in the number of vulnerabilities disclosed.Between January 1 and June 30, 2005, Symantec documented 1,862 new vulnerabilities. This is the highest number recorded since the Internet Security Threat Report began tracking new vulnerabilities in
six-month intervals. It is an increase of 31% over the 1,416 new vulnerabilities documented in the last half of 2004. It is also 46% more than the 1,275 new vulnerabilities seen in the same six-month period one year ago. Of these vulnerabilities, Symantec classified 909, or 49% of the total volume, as high severity. This is one percentage point less than the previous six-month period, during which 50% were rated high severity.
Symantec recommends that administrators employ an asset management system and a vulnerability
alerting service, which can help to quickly assess whether a new vulnerability is a viable threat or not.Symantec also recommends that enterprises devote sufficient resources to alerting and patch-deploymentsolutions. They should also consider engaging a managed security service provider to assist them inmonitoring their networks. Administrators should also monitor vulnerability mailing lists and security Web sites for new developments in vulnerability disclosure.
Much of the increase in the total volume of vulnerabilities during this period was due to a substantial
rise in Web application vulnerabilities. During the first six months of 2005, 1,100 of all documentedvulnerabilities, or 59%, were found in Web application technologies. This is a 59% increase over the 694Web application vulnerabilities noted in the last six months of 2004 and a 109% increase over the 527disclosed during first half of that year.
Web applications are technologies that rely on a browser for their user interface; they are often hosted
on Web servers. Vulnerabilities in these technologies are particularly threatening because they are typically exposed to the Internet through a Web server. As such, they may allow an attacker to bypass
23http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/symbos.commwarrior.a.html
24Devices that use Symbian operating systems include mobile phones, smart phones and other mobile devices from assorted vendors i ncluding Nokia, Siemens, Sony,
Motorola, Arima and BenQ.
25http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/symbos.skulls.html14Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
traditional perimeter security measures, such as firewalls. Having done so, a successful attacker may
then compromise an entire network by gaining access through a single vulnerable system. Vulnerabilitiesin these technologies can also allow an attacker to access confidential information from databases without having to compromise any servers.
Security administrators are urged to follow the best practices outlined in “Appendix A” of this report.
Symantec also recommends that administrators audit their systems to ensure that no vulnerable Webapplications or scripts are being hosted. They should also thoroughly review the need for and use of allWeb applications. Only those Web applications that are required for enterprise operations should bedeployed.
Mozilla browsers have the most vulnerabilities
The Web browser is a critical and ubiquitous application that has become a frequent target forvulnerability researchers. In the past, the focus of security has been on the perimeter: servers, firewalls,and other systems with external exposure. However, a notable shift has occurred, with client-sidesystems—primarily end-user systems—becoming increasingly prominent targets of malicious activity.More and more, Web browser vulnerabilities are becoming a preferred entry point into systems.
During the first half of 2005, the Mozilla browsers, including Firefox, had the most vulnerabilities of all
browsers. During this period, 25 vendor confirmed Mozilla vulnerabilities were disclosed, compared to 32in the previous reporting period and two in the first half of 2004. 18 of the 25 Mozilla vulnerabilities in thisperiod, or 72%, were classified as high severity. This is up from the 14 high-severity Mozilla vulnerabilitiesin the second half of 2004 and one in the first half of 2004.
During the first six months of 2005, 13 vendor confirmed Microsoft Internet Explorer vulnerabilities were
disclosed. This is a decrease from the 31 documented in the second half of 2004.
26During the first half of
2004, seven Internet Explorer vulnerabilities were confirmed by Microsoft.
The average severity rating of the vulnerabilities associated with Internet Explorer during the first six
months of 2005 was high. Eight of the 13 Internet Explorer vulnerabilities disclosed during the currentperiod, or 62%, were considered high severity. 18 Internet Explorer vulnerabilities were considered high-severity in the last six months of 2004, amounting to 58%. In the first half of 2004, four of the seven, or 57%, were rated high severity.
26It should be noted that in the last Internet Security Threat Report , only 13 vulnerabilities associated with Internet Explorer were classified as vendor confirmed. This
number has since been revised to 31 post-publication due to delayed confirmation of the vulnerabilities by the vendor1503006009001,200
July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Number of blocked phishing attempts
Period545,745,6681,037,980,187MillionsSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Six-month growth in phishing and spam
In the two previous volumes of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec identified phishing as an
emerging security threat. Phishing is an attempt by a third party to solicit confidential information from anindividual, group, or organization, often for financial gain. These attempts are often conducted through aWeb browser using social engineering. In many cases, the information gathered is used to commitfraudulent acts.
During this reporting period, Symantec blocked 1.04 billion phishing attempts, compared to over 546
million in the last six months of 2004, a 90% increase in blocked attempts between the two periods (figure 4). This means that between January 1 and June 30, 2005, the volume of phishing messages grewfrom an average of 2.99 million attempts a day to 5.70 million.
Figure 4. Blocked phishing attempts, July 2004–June 2005
16Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Between January 1 and June 30, 2005, one out of every 125 email messages scanned was a found to be a
phishing email. This is an increase from one out of every 250 email messages in the second half of 2004.In reality, what this means is that if an end user were to receive an average of 25 email messages per day,that user would then be receiving at least one phishing message every week.
Spam is usually defined as junk or unsolicited email from a third party. While it is an annoyance to users
and administrators, spam is also a serious security concern, as it can be used to deliver Trojans, viruses,and phishing attempts. Furthermore, high volumes of spam can create denial of service conditions inwhich email systems are so overloaded that legitimate email and network traffic are unable to get through.
During the first six months of 2005, spam made up approximately 61% of all email traffic. This is a slight
increase over the last six months of 2004 when just over 60% of email was classified as spam. 51% of allspam received worldwide originated in the United States. To minimize the volume of spam on theirnetworks, Symantec recommends that administrators implement IP filtering and traffic shaping.
27
Symantec also recommends that ISPs employ outbound filtering, which can significantly reduce thedistribution of spam from compromised ISP accounts and bot networks. Administrators should considerblocking port 25 except for authorized network users who need to send SMTP mail. They should alsoconsider applying rate-limiting control in order to limit the ability of potential spam relays to send highvolumes of email.
All end users should follow best security practices to protect themselves against malicious code infection
that could turn their computers into spam relays. End users should also implement antispam technologyon their computers.
Patch development time
For the first time, Symantec is including a discussion of the average patch development time in this volumeof the Internet Security Threat Report . This is intended to assess time between the public disclosure date of
a vendor confirmed vulnerability and the release of an associated patch by the affected vendor. This time isvery important to system administrators because once a vulnerability is disclosed publicly, it is vulnerableto exploitation until the vendor releases an appropriate patch.
During the first half of 2005, on average, 54 days elapsed between disclosure of a vulnerability and the
release of a patch by the vendor (figure 5). This is a slight increase over the 49-day average of the previousperiod. This ends a two-year trend of decreasing response time. That trend was most likely due toincreased pressure from customers for vendors to address security concerns in response to high-profilevulnerabilities and malicious code.
27Traffic shaping is the use of different IP characteristics—for instance, if an originating IP is determined to be a known sourc e of spam—to selectively
determine what connections to allow, deny, or throttle (slow down).17Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
18
Jan–June 2003 July–Dec 2003 Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Average number of days to patch release
Period0306090120
81103
64
4954Figure 5. Average number of days to patch release
Source: Symantec Corporation
The 54-day average patch development time combined with the average exploit development time of 6.0
days means that there is an average time lapse of 48 days between the release of an exploit and therelease of an associated patch. To minimize the possibility of successful exploitation during this time,administrators need to be aware of and understand the vulnerabilities and be active in working aroundthem. This may involve making changes to firewall configurations, creating intrusion detection system(IDS) and intrusion protection system (IPS) signatures and rules, and locking down services. Administratorsshould monitor mailing lists devoted to the discussion of security incidents or specific technologies, onwhich prevention and mitigation strategies may be discussed.
Top adware and spyware programs
Traditionally, the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report has broken security threats down into three
general categories: attacks, vulnerabilities, and malicious code. However, as Internet-based services andapplications have expanded and diversified, the potential for computer programs to introduce other typesof security risks has increased. For the past several years, Symantec has monitored developments inadware and spyware, and for the past two reporting periods, Symantec has discussed these risks in theInternet Security Threat Report .Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
During the first six months of 2005, adware made up 8% of the top 50 programs reported to Symantec,
up from 5% in the previous reporting period. ShopAtHomeAgent, was the most common adware program,accounting for 18% of the top ten adware programs reported. Adware can be installed in a number ofways, including as part of an end user license agreement (EULA) for a third-party program, bundled withother software (usually freeware downloaded from the Internet), or through Web browsers. Eight of the top ten adware programs reported to Symantec in the first six months of 2005 were installed through Web browsers.
Webhancer was the top spyware program during the first six months of 2005, accounting for 29% of the
top ten spyware programs reported. Spyware programs are installed in much the same way as adwareprograms. During this reporting period, six of the top ten spyware programs were delivered by bundlingwith other programs and six were installed through Web browsers.
19
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
28Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume VI (January 1 to June 30, 2004) and Volume VIII (July 1 to December 31, 2004). Both are available at:
http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539
29A honeypot is an Internet-connected system that acts as a decoy, allowing an attacker to enter the system in order to observe t he attacker’s behavior inside the
compromised system.20Attack Trends
This section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report will provide an analysis of attack activity for
the period between January 1 and June 30, 2005. An attack is defined as any malicious activity carried out over a network that has been detected by an intrusion detection system or firewall. An attack istypically an attempt to exploit a vulnerability in software or hardware. Attack activity for this period will be compared to attack activity presented in the two previous Internet Security Threat Reports .
28Wherever
applicable, suggestions on attack remediation will be made along with references to Symantec’s bestpractices, which are outlined in “Appendix A” of this report.
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of Internet attack data in the world.
Over 24,000 sensors deployed in more than 180 countries by Symantec DeepSight Threat ManagementSystem and Symantec Managed Security Services gather this data. In addition to these sources, Symantechas developed and deployed a honeypot network
29that is used to identify, observe, and study complete
instances of attacker and malicious code activity. It helps provide details about some of the attack activityidentified in this section. These resources combine to give Symantec an unparalleled ability to identify,investigate, and respond to emerging threats. This discussion will be based on data provided by all of these sources.
Security devices can monitor for attacks and suspicious behavior at many different levels on the network.
Devices such as intrusion detection systems (IDS), intrusion protection systems (IPS), firewalls, proxyfilters, and antivirus installations all contribute to the overall security of an organization. Symantec gathersdata from many of these devices. One consequence of this heterogeneous data gathering is that maliciouscode data and attack trends data often address the same activity in different ways. For instance, attacktrends data is ranked based on the number of infected sources attempting to spread; on the other hand,malicious code data is based on a number of criteria, including reports of infection. This can lead todifferent rankings of threats presented in the “Attack Trends” and “Malicious Code” sections of this report.
This section of the Internet Security Threat Report will discuss:
• Top Internet attacks
• Top attacked ports• Attack activity per day • Bot networks• Denial of service attacks• Top bot-infected countries• Top originating countries• Targeted attack activity by industryRank
Jan–June
2005
1
2
3456
7
89
101
14
411144
8
12
16
3
10133%
7%
4%4%4%3%
3%
3%3%
2%22%
1%
<1%
2%
<1%
2%
2%
1%7%
<1%Rank
July–Dec
2004 AttackPercent of
attackers
Jan–June 2005Percent of
attackers
July–Dec 2004
Microsoft SQL Server Resolution Service Stack
Overflow Attack
Muhammad A. Muquit Count.cgi AttackGeneric HTTP Chunked Encoding Overflow AttackGeneric HTTP Directory Traversal AttackDebian Linux HTTPD AttackGeneric WebDAV/Source Disclosure HTTP Header
Request Attack
Generic X86 Buffer Overflow (TCP NOPS) AttackGeneric SMTP Pipe AttackMicrosoft Windows DCOM RPC Interface Buffer
Overrun Attack
Microsoft RPCSS DCOM Interface Long Filename
Heap Corruption AttackSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Top Internet attacks
For the purposes of this discussion, the top attacks are the most common attacks detected by Symantec
Managed Security Services and Symantec DeepSight Threat Management System. They are determined bythe percentage of the total attacking IP addresses performing a given attack. These attacks reflect attackactivity that security administrators are likely to observe on their own networks. The majority of theseattacks are carried out by malicious code and bot networks, while a smaller proportion are carried out byindividual attackers.
In the first six months of 2005, the top attacks changed considerably from those seen in the second half of
2004 (table 1). Seven of the top attacks for the current reporting period are new to the top ten, suggestingthat there has been a major shift in Internet attack activity. Symantec speculates that this change wascaused by effective patching and security precautions, such as those implemented by Microsoft® WindowsXP Service Pack 2, as well as ingress and egress
30filtering of known attacks at the router level, especially
by Internet service providers (ISPs). These factors have had the effect of reducing the number of computersthat are exposed to previously popular and effective attacks. As a result, attackers have been forced toadopt other attacks.
Table 1. Top Attacks, Jan–June 2005
Source: Symantec Corporation
30Ingress traffic refers to traffic that is coming into a network from the Internet or another network. Egress traffic refers to traffic that is leaving a network, bound
for the Internet or another network.21Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
The Microsoft SQL Server Resolution Service Stack Overflow Attack was the most common attack between
January 1 and June 30, 2005, accounting for 33% of attacking IP addresses. This is up from 22% in thelast half of 2004, an increase of 50%. This attack, sometimes referred to as the Slammer Attack becauseof its initial association with the Slammer worm,
31has been the most common attack for the past four
six-month reporting periods. As discussed in the “Malicious Code Trends” section of this report, twocommon bots
32—Gaobot33and Spybot34—have been known to exploit this vulnerability, which has likely
contributed to the frequent detection of this attack.
The continued prominence of this attack can be attributed to a number of other factors as well. The first is
that this attack is commonly carried out using a single UDP packet. The nature of UDP makes it possiblefor attackers and malicious code to forge the address of the sender when carrying out an attack (a practiceknown as spoofing). This may inflate the number of distinct IP addresses that Symantec observesperforming the attack. Spoofing is commonly used to obscure the origin of the attack. This tactic makesinvestigation and response more difficult by making infected computers and attackers untraceable.
Another reason for high detection rate of the Microsoft SQL Server Resolution Service Stack Overflow
Attack is that a complete attack can be conducted with a single UDP packet. This allows attackers tolaunch considerably more attacks, as the complexity of the required network communication is minimal.Furthermore, this allows a complete attack to be attempted whether SQL Server is running or not, causingmost network intrusion detection systems to categorize every attempted attack as a complete attack.
Finally, the success of this attack is aided by the high volume of computers running vulnerable software.
The Microsoft Desktop Engine (MSDE) is a variant of the SQL Server engine, which means it is alsovulnerable to Slammer or Slammer-related attacks. The MSDE is included in many third-party applicationsthat are widely deployed by organizations. This makes patching this vulnerability across the enterprise verydifficult, as each affected software package requires its own patch. Furthermore, this vulnerability will bereintroduced whenever a vulnerable application is installed. If patches are not applied to the softwareshortly after installation, it is likely that a compromise will occur.
The Muhammad A. Muquit Count.cgi Attack was the second most common attack during this reporting
period. It was performed by 7% of attacking IP addresses between January 1 and June 30, 2005, up from1% in the last six months of 2004, during which it was not ranked in the top ten attacks. This attacktargets a buffer overflow in the Count.cgi Web-based script,
35which was discovered in 1997.
The third most common attack between January 1 and June 30, 2005 was the Generic HTTP Chunked
Encoding Overflow Attack, which accounted for 4% of all attacking IP addresses. This is an increase fromless than 1% during the last six months of 2004, during which it was not included in the top ten attacks.
The Muhammad A. Muquit Count.cgi Attack and the Generic HTTP Chunked Encoding Overflow Attack
share certain similarities that likely contribute to the increased frequency of both attacks. Thesesimilarities include:
• Both attacks target computers hosting Web servers and other Internet services. Compromising
computers hosting Web servers may allow an attacker to subsequently carry out attacks againstvulnerable Web browsers.
31http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.sqlexp.worm.html
32Bots (short for “robots”) are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s machine in order to allow an unauthorized user t o control the computer remotely
through a communication channel such as IRC. These communication channels are used to allow the remote attacker to control a la rge number of compromised
computers over a single, reliable channel in a bot network, which can then be used to launch coordinated attacks.
33http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.hllw.gaobot.aa.html
34http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.spybot.worm.html
35http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/12822Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
36A public exploit for the Muhammad A. Muquit Count.cgi Attack can be viewed at http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/128.
37See the “Web browser vulnerabilities” discussion in the “Vulnerability Trends” section of this report.23• Both attacks utilize long-standing, publicly available exploits that can be easily incorporated into
existing malicious code, such as bots.36
• Complete attacks can be sent to target computers with a single request, allowing an entire attack to be
sent to a computer regardless of whether a vulnerable script or Web-server is present. Consequently,most intrusion detection systems will categorize every attempted attack as a complete attack. As a result, many alerts for these attacks will actually be false positives, thereby artificially inflating their frequency.
Despite the potential for high levels of false positives, these two attacks represent a particular danger to
organizations. In the past, attackers who gained access to a computer with the privilege level of the Webserver application could merely deface a Web site or conduct local privilege escalation attacks against thecompromised computer. However, due to the large number of high-profile Web browser vulnerabilities,
37
attackers can now use compromised Web servers to host exploits aimed at Web browsers. This could havea major impact on an organization that has been compromised, as attacks could be launched against theorganization’s Web-based customers.
Symantec recommends that administrators apply up-to-date patches to all Web server applications and
services. This will reduce exposure to the Generic HTTP Chunked Encoding Overflow as well as other Web-based attacks. Symantec also recommends that administrators audit their systems to ensure that no vulnerable Web applications or scripts are being hosted. This will reduce exposure to criticalvulnerabilities in Web applications.
Top attacked ports
Assessing the top attacked ports allows security personnel to understand which ports (and associatedservices) attackers may be paying particular interest to. This discussion is based on data that is derivedfrom firewall sensors that record each rejected or denied connection attempt; therefore, legitimate portactivity should not be represented. This metric does not attempt to provide any specific attack information.It reflects only attacker interest in a given port; it does not assume that there is necessarily an attackassociated with it, nor does it assume that a specific service is being targeted. The lack of definitive attack information means that it is impossible to distinguish between information-gathering attacks,exploit attempts, or any other type of potentially malicious activity. Administrators can use this data to assess which ports and services are most commonly being targeted and configure their systems’security accordingly.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
38http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10108
39http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/8205
40Port scanning is a reconnaissance attack used by attackers to determine whether a port is open prior to attacking it. 24Rank
Jan–June
2005
1
23
456
7
89
101
23
121310
4
5
15
618%
13%
9%
7%7%6%
5%
4%3%
3%35%
17%
8%
2%2%2%
6%
5%2%
5%Rank
July–Dec
2004 PortPercent of
attackers
Jan–June 2005Percent of
attackers
July–Dec 2004
445 TCP
135 TCP
1026 UDP
80 TCP
443 TCP
25 TCP
4662 TCP
1027 UDP
139 TCP
6346 TCPService
Description
CIFS/SMB
(Microsoft Windows File Sharing)
DCE-RPC (remote Microsoft
Windows communication)
Various dynamic servicesWorld Wide Web (HTTP) servicesSecure World Wide Web (HTTPS)Simple mail transfer protocol
(SMTP) services
Edonkey (file sharing)Various dynamic servicesNetBIOS
(Microsoft Windows File Sharing)
Gnutella (file sharing)
Table 2. Top attacked ports
Source: Symantec Corporation
During the first six months of 2005, TCP port 445 was the most targeted port (table 2). It was targeted by
18% of attacking IP addresses, a considerable drop from the second half of 2004, when it was targeted by 35% of attackers. The prominence of this port is likely due to the fact that it is it is commonly used forMicrosoft file and printer sharing. It is also used to implement remote procedure call (RPC) functionality.RPC is used in many widely deployed Microsoft Windows applications, and, as a result, is commonlytargeted by attackers. Furthermore, a number of remote vulnerabilities may be exploited through this port.
Thorough analysis of the Symantec honeypot system and DeepSight data has identified Gaobot and Spybot
variants as heavy attackers of TCP port 445. Both bots target this port in order to exploit the MicrosoftWindows LSASS Buffer Overrun Vulnerability
38and the Microsoft Windows DCOM RPC Interface Buffer
Overflow Vulnerability.39Attacks that attempt to gain access to file shares through brute-forced username
and password guessing also target this port. Furthermore, all services offered through TCP port 139 can be accessed through this port, further increasing its popularity amongst attackers.
The substantial decrease in attacker interest in this port over the past six months is likely a sign that
perimeter controls implemented with firewall rule sets and network intrusion detection signatures, among other measures, have been effective in slowing exploitation attempts. Due to the large number of high-severity vulnerabilities targeting this port, it has become common practice to restrict access to it using firewall rule sets. As a consequence, it is reasonable to assume that the majority of the activitytargeting this port is related to port scanning.
40This theory is substantiated by the fact that attacks
targeting vulnerabilities over port 445 have become less common in the top ten Internet attacks over the past six months.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Between January 1 and June 30, 2005, TCP port 135 was the second most targeted port. It was targeted by
13% of attackers. It was also the second most targeted port in the second half of 2004, when it wastargeted by 17% of attackers. Port 135 is proportionally at its lowest since 2003, when it accounted for33% of attacking hosts. At that time, both the Welchia
41and Blaster42worms were targeting vulnerabilities
in services that are accessible through port 135. The drop-off since 2003 may be partly attributed to theexpiry of the Welchia worm, which had an end-of-life date of January 1, 2004. As with the decrease in TCP port 445 activity, this decrease may also be due to effective configuration of perimeter security devicessuch as firewalls and intrusion detection systems.
The third most targeted port between January 1 and June 30, 2005 was UDP port 1026. This port was
targeted by 9% of attacking IP addresses during this period, up from 8% in the second half of 2004.However, this value may be inflated due to the ability of attackers to forge the source address in UDP messages.
TCP port 80 accounted for a total of 7% of attacking IP addresses in the first half of 2005. For the last six
months of 2003 and the first six months of 2004, TCP port 80 had ranked amongst the top two attackedports; however, in the last six months of 2004, it accounted for only 2% and did not rank among the topten attacked ports. Over the first half of 2005 it regained its popularity, rising to fourth position in the topten. The recent rise reflects an 86% increase in the number of attacking IP addresses targeting this port.
Symantec expects that, as more Web browser and Web application vulnerabilities are discovered, the
popularity of TCP port 80 relative to other ports will continue to rise. Attackers who can compromisecomputers hosting Web services can subsequently launch attacks against vulnerable Web browsers thataccess them. This trend is supported by observations made in the “Top Internet attacks” discussion above,which shows that attacks targeting computers hosting Web services are becoming more prominent.
Finally, UDP port 1434, the port affected by the Microsoft SQL Server Resolution Service Stack Overflow
Attack, the top attack for this reporting period, failed to rank among the top ten. The absence of this port in the top targeted ports is likely due to security policies implemented on many networks. Manyadministrators may have disabled logging of infection attempts on this port for performance reasons or to simplify log auditing.
Attack activity per day
This section will discuss the attack activity per day as observed by organizations connected to the Internet.The attack activity per day is determined by the number of attacks observed by the median organization in the sample set and, as such, is considered to be indicative of the number of attacks on the Internet as a whole. Organizations can use this metric to compare the number of attacks observed against theirnetworks, potentially giving them insight into any anomalous activity that may arise.
For this volume of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , this metric has been redesigned to include
all unauthorized access attempts blocked at the firewall and network intrusion detection system level.Previously, each attack was identified through an analyst’s observations, which would be centered only onthe most critical attacks. The new approach ensures that all malicious activity is included. As a result ofthis redesign, the number of attacks reported this period would be considerably higher than those seen in
41http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.welchia.worm.html
42http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.blaster.worm.html25020406080100
July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2004 Jan–June 2005Attacks per day
Period78
57 57Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
previous volumes of the Internet Security Threat Report . However, in order to maintain the validity of any
period-to-period comparisons, the number of attacks per day over the previous two reporting periods hasbeen adjusted according to this new approach. The numbers presented in the following discussion reflectthese adjustments.
Figure 6. Attacks per day, Jan–June, 2005
Source: Symantec Corporation
Between January 1 and June 30, 2005, Symantec detected an average of 57 attacks per day (figure 6).
This is consistent with the second half of 2004, when 57 attacks per day were also detected. The relativelyconstant rate of attacks per day for the last six months of 2004 and the first six months of 2005 is likelydue to the lack of any substantial worm outbreaks in that time. With this in mind, it should be noted that the attack activity per day would rise drastically over a very short period if a major malicious codeoutbreak occurs.
26Number of active bot network computersMoving average Bots
Date08,00016,00024,00032,00040,000
Jan 1, 2004
Mar 1, 2004
Apr 30, 2004
May 30, 2004
June 29, 2004
July 29, 2004
Oct 27, 2004
Jan 25, 2005
Mar 26, 2005
Apr 25, 2005
June 24, 2005Jan 31, 2004
Mar 31, 2004
Aug 28, 2004
Sep 27, 2004
Nov 26, 2004
Dec 26, 2004
Feb 24, 2005
May 25, 2005Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Bot networks
This metric will explore the proliferation and activity of bot networks. Bot networks are groups of
compromised computers on which attackers have installed software that listens for and responds tocommands—typically over an IRC channel—allowing the attacker remote control over the computers. Thesoftware currently being used can be upgraded to incorporate exploits targeting new vulnerabilities.
Bots can have numerous effects on an enterprise. A single infected host within a network (such as a laptop
that was compromised outside the local network and then connected to the network, either directly or byVPN) can allow a bot to propagate to other computers that are normally protected against external attacksby corporate firewalls. Additionally, bots can be used to perform DoS attacks against the enterprise’s Website, which can disrupt revenue for ecommerce companies, or against other organizations’ Web sites, whichcan have serious legal consequences.
Symantec identifies bot networks by analyzing coordinated scanning and attack patterns. This coordinated
activity allows Symantec to identify bot network computers that might otherwise go undetected. Sinceidentification of these computers is based on coordinated behaviors, it cannot be considered exhaustive.Nevertheless, the identified computers help provide an understanding of the current trends of bot networks.
Figure 7. Bot network computers
Source: Symantec Corporation
27Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
In the past six months bot network activity has increased to a median43average of 10,352 unique bots
identified per day (figure 7). This is an increase of over 138% from the average of 4,348 bots identified perday in December 2004. Symantec believes this increase in bot network activity is a reaction to securityimplementations put in place in the last half of 2004.
In the previous Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec speculated that a dramatic drop in bot network
activity that took place in August 2004 was due in part to the release of Microsoft Windows Service Pack 2,which included patches for vulnerabilities commonly exploited by bots. Furthermore, default blocking ofports that are associated with vulnerabilities commonly targeted by bot networks was also speculated tohave reduced bot network activity. As hosts vulnerable to exploitation become less common, bot networksmust work harder to maintain their current size and continue to grow. It is likely that in order to maintainviability, bot network owners stepped up their attack activity, resulting in increasingly coordinated efforts.
The rise in bot network activity is reflected in the increase in bot variants that is documented in the
“Malicious Code Trends” section of this document. The rise in the number of bot variants is likely a signthat the number of bot network owners is also increasing, as it is unlikely that an individual bot networkowner will use more than one variant.
Attack activities commonly associated with bot networks, such as DoS attacks, have grown in similar
fashion over the past six months (please see the “Denial of service” discussion below). Symantec believesthat this increase in DoS attack activity is an indicator that overall bot network activity has risen. Attackershave been forced to be more aggressive to maintain their collection of compromised computers and, byextension, DoS attacks have increased as well.
As shown by figure 7, bot network activity during the first half of 2005 peaked on or around February 24.
This may be due to the fact that a large number of new software and computers are typically deployed bynew users during and after the December holiday season. New users are less likely to be security minded,making them relatively easy targets for attackers.
The peak in activity may also coincide with infrastructure changes that are implemented during this
period by educational institutions and other organizations. Information technology infrastructure changesand updates typically take place during slow business periods such as the post-holiday season in NorthAmerica and Europe. This ultimately results in the deployment of large numbers of corporate and personalcomputers and new software during the period near the beginning of the year. It is likely that vulnerablecomputers and software are among those that are newly deployed or redeployed. This may also contributeto the increase in bot network activity.
To prevent bot infections, Symantec recommends that ISPs perform both ingress and egress filtering
to block known bot network traffic and that antivirus definitions are updated regularly. Furthermore, all systems within the organization’s network should be monitored for signs of bot infection, ensuring that any infections are detected and isolated as soon as possible. ISPs should also filter out potentiallymalicious email attachments to reduce exposure to enterprises and end users. As compromised computerscan be a threat to other systems, Symantec also recommends that the enterprises notify their ISPs of allmalicious activity.
28
43The median average was used here because the data was not normally distributed throughout both reporting periods; therefore, th e median provides a
more meaningful comparison between the two periods. Median DoS attacks per day
DateMoving average Median DoS attacks per day
03006009001,2001,500
June 17, 2004May 20, 2004Apr 22, 2004Mar 25, 2004Feb 26, 2004Jan 29, 2004Jan 1, 2004
July 15, 2004
Aug 12, 2004
Sep 9, 2004
Oct 7, 2004
Nov 4, 2004
Dec 2, 2004
Dec 30, 2004
Jan 27, 2005
Feb 24, 2005
June 16, 2005May 19, 2005Apr 21, 2005Mar 24, 2005Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
To reduce exposure to bot-related attacks, end users should employ defense in-depth,44including antivirus
software and a firewall. Users should update antivirus definitions regularly and ensure that all desktop,laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their operating systemvendor. Symantec also advises that users should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unlessthe attachment is expected and comes from a known and trusted source, and the purpose of the attachmentis known.
Denial of service attacks
DoS attacks are a major threat to corporations that rely on Internet connectivity to carry out theiroperations. These attacks are a particular threat to companies that rely primarily on the Internet to generaterevenue. DoS attacks are typically carried out by flooding a targeted computer with requests for data inorder to slow or block legitimate access to services it provides.
Although there are numerous methods for carrying out DoS attacks, Symantec derives the data for this
metric by measuring attacks carried out by flooding a target with SYN (short for synchronization) requests.
45
This type of attack works by overwhelming a target with SYN requests and not completing the initial request,which thus prevents other valid requests from being processed. In many cases, SYN requests with forged IP addresses are sent to a target, causing a single attacking computer to initiate multiple connections,resulting in unsolicited traffic referred to as backscatter being sent to other computers on the Internet. Thisbackscatter is used to derive the number of DoS attacks observed throughout the reporting period (figure 8).
Figure 8. DoS attacks per day
Source: Symantec Corporation
2944Defense in-depth emphasizes multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive systems to guard against single-point fail ures in any specific technology or
protection methodology. Defense in-depth should include the deployment of antivirus, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems , among other security measures.
45The TCP protocol requires a three-way exchange to be carried out before any data is sent. The SYN request is the first phase of the three-way exchange. Once a SYN
request is received by a server, a SYN-ACK is sent in response. The final step is an ACK response, completing the connection ne gotiation process. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
30Between January 1 and June 30, 2005, the number of DoS attacks grew by more than 680% to 927 per
day on average. This is an increase over the last six months of 2004, during which Symantec observed anaverage of 119 DoS attacks per day. Symantec believes that this increase strongly correlates to the rise botnetwork activity outlined previously in the “Bot networks” discussion and illustrated in figure 7.
46
As was stated previously, one of the primary functions of bot networks is to perform DoS attacks. Large botnetworks are able to conduct broadly based DoS attacks; however, smaller bot networks and bot networksthat do not wish to have their compromised computers identified must rely on other methods, such as SYNflood attacks using forged source addresses. Furthermore, functionality allowing for this type of DoS attackis likely incorporated into many bots, as public code for implementing it has been available for some time.Despite restrictions put in place in Microsoft Windows XP Service Pack 2 that are intended to prevent thistype of attack,
47publicly available network drivers exist that can be used to bypass it.48
As a consequence of this, it is likely that the increased bot activity seen in the first half of this year iscontributing to the increased DoS activity.
49This may be related to financial motivation, as DoS attacks
have reportedly been threatened in extortion attempts.50In order to inhibit the ability of computers on
their network to send data with forged source addresses, Symantec recommends that organizationsperform egress filtering on all outbound traffic. This will reduce the potential for SYN flood attacks.
Top bot-infected countries
Recognizing the ongoing threat posed by bot networks, Symantec tracks the distribution of bot-infectedcomputers worldwide. In order to do this, Symantec calculates the number of computers worldwide thatare known to be infected with bots and assesses what percentage are situated in each country. Thismeasure can help analysts understand how bot-infected systems are distributed globally. The identificationof bot-infected computers is important, as a high percentage of infected machines could mean a greaterpotential for bot-related attacks. It could also indicate the level of patching and security awarenessamongst computer administrators and users in a given region.
During the first six months of 2005, the country with the highest proportion of bot-infected computers
worldwide was the United Kingdom, with 32% (table 3). The United Kingdom was also the highest rankedcountry in the last half of 2004, with 25% of all bot-infected computers worldwide situated there.
Symantec has observed that bots predominantly infect computers connected to high-speed, broadband
Internet through large ISPs. It has also been observed that rapid expansion of broadband connectivityfacilitates the spread of malicious software, including bots. This is likely due to the failure of securityinfrastructures in keeping up with rapid broadband growth. As a result, Symantec believes it is reasonableto conclude that the increase in bot-infected computers in the United Kingdom is likely due to the rapidgrowth in broadband Internet there.
51
46Regression analysis was performed on the data with the extreme outliers removed. The analysis produced a coefficient of determi nation of 0.85, meaning
that 85% of the variation in DoS victims can be explained by the linear relationship between Bot numbers and DoS attacks. Only 15% of the variation
remains unexplained.
47http://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/winxppro/maintain/sp2netwk.mspx
48http://www.winpcap.org/
49It should be noted that it is possible that there is a confounding factor that Symantec does not have insight into. For instanc e, there may be another
variable influencing both the perceived bot network and DoS activity. Due to the strong correlation, however, Symantec believes that the bot network
activity is a major driving factor in the observed DoS attacks.
50http://www.newscientist.com/channel/info-tech/mg18725125.900
51http://www.point-topic.com/content/dslanalysis/World%20Broadband%20Statistics%20Q1%202005.pdf (access requires registration)Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
3152http://www.point-topic.com/content/dslanalysis/World%20Broadband%20Statistics%20Q1%202005.pdf (access requires registration)Table 3. Top countries by percentage of bot-infected computers
Source: Symantec Corporation
For the second straight reporting period, the United States had the second highest percentage of bot-
infected computers, with 19%. This is down from 25% in the second half of 2004. China was home to the third-highest percentage of bot-infected computers during the first six months of 2005, with 7%. Itmaintains the third position for the second straight six-month period, although its overall numbersdropped one percentage point over the past six months.
Top originating countries
This section will discuss the top countries of attack origin. This metric only discusses the location of thecomputer from which the attack originates and not the actual location of the attacker. While it is simple totrace an attack back to the computer from which it was launched, that computer may not be the attacker’sown system. Attackers frequently hop through numerous systems or use previously compromised systemsto hide their location prior to launching the actual attack. For example, an attacker in China could launchan attack from a compromised system located in South Korea against a Web server in New York. Furthercomplicating the matter is that international jurisdictional issues often prevent proper investigation of anattacker’s real location.
For the first six months of 2005, the United States continued to be the country from which the majority of
attacks originated (table 4). 33% of all attacks originated there. This represents a rise of three percentagepoints following three reporting periods of declining rates. In the last six months of 2004, 30% of attacksoriginated in the United States, down from 37% in the first half of the year. The high rate of attacksoriginating in the United States is attributable to the high rate of broadband use there. Symantec believesthat with the continued growth of broadband Internet in the United States
52it will likely be the highest
country of attack origin for the foreseeable future.Rank
Jan–June
2005
1
23456789
101
234697
10
5832%
19%
7%5%4%4%4%3%3%2%25%
25%
8%5%4%3%4%3%4%3%
Rank
July–Dec
2004 CountryPercent of
bot-infected computers
Jan–June 2005Percent of
bot-infected computers
July–Dec 2004
United Kingdom
United StatesChinaCanadaFranceSouth KoreaGermanyJapanSpainTaiwanSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
32Rank
Jan–June
2005
1
23456789
101
36279584
1033%
7%7%6%5%5%4%4%3%3%30%
8%4%8%3%3%4%3%4%2%
Rank
July–Dec
2004
1
562783
12
9
11Rank
Jan–June
2004 CountryPercent
of events
Jan–June
2005Percent
of events
July–Dec
2004
37%
5%4%6%4%3%6%1%3%2%Percent
of events
Jan–June
2004
United States
GermanyUnited KingdomChinaFranceSpainCanadaJapanSouth KoreaItaly
Table 4. Top originating countries
Source: Symantec Corporation
Germany was the second highest country of attack origin during the first six months of 2005, accounting
for 7% of attacks. This represents a jump from third position in the second half of 2004 despite a one-percentage point drop in the number of worldwide attacks originating there. The United Kingdom rosefrom sixth place in the second of 2004 to third position this period, accounting for 7% of Internet-wideattacks, an increase of three percentage points.
Targeted attack activity by industry
Attackers choose their targets for various reasons. Some attackers are simply opportunistic, randomlyattacking vulnerable computers regardless of the owner or organizational affiliation of the target. Otherattackers select their targets specifically in order to compromise computers within an organization or aspecific industry. This metric explores attacks targeted at specific industries. A targeted attack is identifiedas an IP address that has attacked at least three sensors in a given industry to the exclusion of all otherindustries within the reporting period.
For this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , this metric has been redesigned to include a broader
range of data than had been used for previous volumes of the report. A realignment of the existing sensorbase has given Symantec a more representative sample of attack data that includes all observed attacks,including those seen by firewall and intrusion detection system sensors. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
33
Education Small
BusinessFinancial
ServicesLocal
GovernmentHealthcare Information
TechnologyAccounting State
GovernmentManufacturing Utilities /
EnergyPercentage of attackers classified as targeted
Industry0.0%0.1%0.2%0.3%Figure 9. Targeted attacks by industry
Source: Symantec Corporation
Between January 1 and June 30, 2005, education was the most frequently targeted industry (figure 9).
This is likely due to the nature of networks in educational organizations. In addition to providing largenumbers of public terminals, a single educational institution must facilitate remote access for tens ofthousands of users requiring numerous different services. This can make it difficult for networkadministrators to actively defend against threats. Furthermore, the volume of computers that areconnected to the network, along with the network resources they possess, makes them very attractivetargets for attackers both inside and outside of the network.
Small business was the second most targeted industry between January 1 and June 30, 2005. Small
businesses are less likely to have a well established security infrastructure, making them more vulnerableto attacks. It should be noted that the number of targeted attacks against small businesses might beinflated due to the way in which they access the Internet. In the two previous volumes of the Internet
Security Threat Report , Symantec suggested that it is likely that multiple small businesses have networks
that span a single block of IP addresses. As a result, opportunistic attacks targeting a broadband ISP(rather than any of the specific small businesses hosted on its network) may be noted as targeted attacks,thereby artificially inflating the percentage of targeted attacks against this industry.
Financial services was the third most frequently targeted industry between January 1 and June 30, 2005.
This industry is generally considered to be a popular target for attackers hoping to profit from theirattacks. Symantec expects targeted attacks against the financial services industry to increase as the focusof attackers becomes increasingly profit driven.
53(For more on profit-driven attacks, please see “Malicious
code for profit” in the “Malicious Code Trends” report below.)
53See http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/278, for example. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
34Vulnerability Trends
Vulnerabilities are design or implementation errors in information systems that can result in a compromise
of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information stored upon or transmitted over the affectedsystem. They are most often found in software, although they exist in all layers of information systems,from design or protocol specifications to physical hardware implementations. Vulnerabilities may betriggered actively, either by malicious users or automated malicious code, or passively during systemoperation.
New vulnerabilities are discovered and disclosed regularly by a large community of end users, security
researchers, hackers, and security vendors. The discovery and disclosure of a single vulnerability in acritical asset can seriously undermine the security posture of an organization.
Symantec carefully monitors vulnerability research, tracking vulnerabilities throughout their lifecycle, from
initial disclosure and discussion to the development and release of a patch or other remediation measure.Symantec operates one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion of vulnerabilities onthe Internet. The BugTraq mailing list
54has approximately 50,000 direct subscribers, who receive, discuss,
and contribute vulnerability research on a daily basis. Symantec also maintains one of the world’s mostcomprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting of over 13,000 vulnerabilities (spanning morethan a decade) affecting more than 30,000 technologies from over 4,000 vendors. The following discussionof vulnerability trends is based on a thorough analysis of that data.
This section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report will discuss vulnerabilities that were disclosed
between January 1 and June 30, 2005. It will compare them with those disclosed in the two previous six-month periods and discuss how current vulnerability trends may affect future Internet security activity.Where relevant, it will also offer mitigation strategies. Symantec’s recommendations for best securitypractices can be found in “Appendix A” at the end of this report.
Readers should note that all numbers presented in this discussion have been rounded off to the nearest
whole number. As a result, some cumulative percentages may exceed 100%.
This section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report will discuss:
• Total number of vulnerabilities disclosed
• Severity of vulnerabilities• Adjusted severity of remotely exploitable vulnerabilities• Web application vulnerabilities • Ease of exploitation• Vulnerabilities with exploit code• Exploit development time• Patch development and availability time• Web browser vulnerabilities
54The BugTraq mailing list is hosted by SecurityFocus (http://www.securityfocus.com). Archives are available at http://www.securi tyfocus.com/archive/1Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
35
05001,0001,5002,000
Jan–June
2001July–Dec
2001Jan–June
2002July–Dec
2002Jan–June
2003July–Dec
2003Jan–June
2004July–Dec
2004Jan–June
2005Published vulnerabilities
Period1,862
1,416
1,275
1,1851,493
1,312 1,288
789
685It should be noted that, unlike other reports in the Internet Security Threat Report , the “Vulnerability
Trends” report is based on data that often changes over time. This is because entries in the vulnerabilitydatabase are frequently revised as new information emerges. For instance, due to additional informationthat has become available after the reporting period has ended, vulnerabilities may be attributed to aparticular reporting period after that time. Conversely, entries may be removed after a reporting periodbecause they are deemed to not be vulnerabilities after the reporting period has ended.
Because of this, statistics and percentages that are reported in one volume of the Internet Security Threat
Report may not agree with information presented in subsequent volumes. As a result, some of the
comparative data for previous reporting periods that is presented within this report may differ from thedata presented in previous volumes of the Internet Security Threat Report .
Total number of vulnerabilities disclosed
The first half of 2005 was marked by a substantial increase in the total number of vulnerabilities disclosed.
Between January 1 and June 30, 2005, Symantec documented 1,862 new vulnerabilities. This is thehighest number documented in one reporting period since the Internet Security Threat Report began
tracking new vulnerabilities in six-month intervals (figure 10). It also represents an increase of 31% overthe 1,416 new vulnerabilities documented in the second half of 2004 and an increase of 46% over the1,275 new vulnerabilities seen in the same six-month period one year ago.
Figure 10. Total vulnerabilities, Jan. 2001–June 2005
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
36The 1,862 vulnerabilities disclosed in the first six months of 2005 equates to an average of 72 new
vulnerabilities per week or just over 10 per day. This is 18 more vulnerabilities per week than the 54 seen inthe last six months of 2004. During the first six months of 2004, an average of 49 new vulnerabilities weredisclosed per week.
The increasing trend observed over the past 18 months has been driven by a sharp increase in Web
application vulnerabilities. As will be discussed in the “Web application vulnerabilities” section below, theseconstitute 59% of documented vulnerabilities in the current reporting period.
Symantec recommends that administrators employ a good asset management system or vulnerability
alerting service, both of which can help to quickly assess whether a new vulnerability is a viable threat ornot. Enterprises should devote sufficient resources to alerting and patch deployment solutions. They shouldalso consider engaging a managed security service provider to assist them in monitoring their networks.Administrators should also monitor vulnerability mailing lists and security Web sites for new developmentsin vulnerability research.
Severity of vulnerabilities
The severity of a vulnerability is a measure of the degree to which it gives an attacker access to the targetedsystem. It measures the potential impact that successful exploitation of the vulnerability may have on theconfidentiality, integrity, and/or availability of information stored on or transmitted across the affectedsystem. For the purposes of the Internet Security Threat Report , each vulnerability is classified in one of
three severity categories. These levels are as follows:
Low severity —vulnerabilities that constitute a minor threat. Attackers cannot exploit these vulnerabilities
across a network and successful exploitation does not result in a complete compromise of the informationstored on or transmitted across the system.
Moderate severity —vulnerabilities that result in a partial compromise of the affected system. An attacker
may gain elevated privileges but does not gain complete control of the targeted system. Moderately severevulnerabilities include those for which the impact on systems is high but accessibility to attackers is limited.This includes vulnerabilities that require the attacker to have local access to the system or to beauthenticated before the system can be exploited.
High severity —vulnerabilities that result in a compromise of the entire system if exploited. In almost all
cases, successful exploitation can result in a complete loss of confidentiality, integrity, and availability ofdata stored on or transmitted across the system. High-severity vulnerabilities will allow attackers accessacross a network (that is, remotely) without authentication.
Between January 1 and June 30, 2005, Symantec classified 909 vulnerabilities, or 49% of the total volume,
as high severity (figure 11). This is one percentage point lower than the previous six-month period in which704 vulnerabilities, or 50%, were rated high severity. It is also four percentage points higher than the firsthalf of 2004, when 577 vulnerabilities, or 45% of the total, were considered high severity. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
37
0%20%40%60%80%100%
Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Documented vulnerabilities
PeriodHigh severity Moderate severity Low severityFigure 11. Vulnerabilities by severity, Jan. 2004–June 2005
Source: Symantec Corporation
During the first half of 2005, 900 vulnerabilities, or 48% of the total volume, were classified as moderately
severe. The same percentage was seen in the second half of 2004 when 672 were rated moderately severe.This is slightly lower than the 646, or 51%, that were classified as moderately severe in the first half of 2004.
During the first half of 2005, 53 vulnerabilities, or 3% of the total volume, were categorized as low severity.
The same proportion was noted in the second half of 2004, down slightly from the 4% of the total volumethat was rated low severity in the first half of 2004.
As illustrated in figure 11, Symantec has rated the vast majority of vulnerabilities as either moderate or high
severity over the past three reporting periods. In previous volumes of the Internet Security Threat Report ,
Symantec has stated that it is reasonable to conclude that there is a correlation between the high severityrating of a vulnerability and the recognition accorded the researcher by peers in the research community. Asa result, researchers may not be particularly interested in finding or publishing low-severity threats. Low-severity threats may also be fewer because the “low hanging fruit” (that is, the more easily discoveredvulnerabilities) has already been picked, so that only more severe (presumably more difficult) vulnerabilitiesremain to be discovered.
A third reason for the small number of low-severity vulnerabilities may be the use of remote exploitability as
a criterion in the Symantec severity rating system. If a vulnerability is remotely exploitability (that is, it can be exploited across a network) it will be considered at least moderately severe. Low-severityvulnerabilities, by definition, are “those that attackers cannot exploit across a network;” that is, they are not remotely exploitable. The high prevalence of network connectivity means that most vulnerabilities Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
38will be accessed by attackers remotely across a network, so that locally exploitable vulnerabilities—that is,
low-severity vulnerabilities—are increasingly less common. The following section will discuss the severityratings with the criterion of remote exploitability removed from consideration.
Adjusted severity of remotely exploitable vulnerabilities
For some time, the majority of vulnerabilities documented by Symantec have been classified as remotelyexploitable. That is, most vulnerabilities reported can lead to attacks that occur from across a network,including the Internet. During the first half of 2005, 84% of the disclosed vulnerabilities were remotelyexploitable, compared to 82% in the second half of 2004 and 81% in the same period one year ago. The high numbers are likely due to the overwhelming prevalence of networked single-user workstations andclient-server applications as well as near universal acceptance of and reliance on the Internet.
In a world where accessible targets are just a few network hops away, locally exploitable vulnerabilities—that
is, those that require physical access on multi-user systems—are not likely to be appealing to vulnerabilityresearchers. This is because, in addition to requiring physical proximity, many of these vulnerabilities requireattackers to have valid user accounts. Each of these factors severely limits the pool of potential targets.Remote vulnerabilities, particularly those that do not require authentication, are much more appealing toattackers, as vulnerable systems will be more numerous and more accessible. Consequently, vulnerabilitiesthat are remotely exploitable have become much more common than those that are not.
As was stated previously, the high proportion of remotely exploitable vulnerabilities also explains the
prevalence of vulnerabilities that are rated moderately to highly severe. The Symantec vulnerability ratingformula considers any remotely exploitable vulnerability to be at least moderately severe. Therefore, thepresence of remote exploitability may cause an otherwise low-severity vulnerability to be given a higherseverity ranking. This will likely increase the number of vulnerabilities that are considered moderately tohighly severe. In order to assess whether this is in fact the case, Symantec assessed the severity ofvulnerabilities that would be ranked as moderately to highly severe (due to remote exploitability) with theremote exploitability criterion removed.
With the remote exploitability criterion removed from the severity rating formula, the distribution of
vulnerability severity ratings is slightly different than it is with remote exploitability included (figure 12). The most noteworthy change is that the proportion of moderately severe vulnerabilities increases when theremote exploitability criterion is removed. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
39
03006009001,2001,5001,800
Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Documented vulnerabilities
PeriodHigh severity Moderate severity Low severityFigure 12. Adjusted severity of remotely exploitable vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation
When evaluating the severity of vulnerabilities with remote exploitability removed from consideration, the
proportion of high-severity vulnerabilities decreases significantly. This is true for vulnerabilities disclosed ineach of the past three six-month periods. Of the remotely exploitable vulnerabilities disclosed in the firsthalf of 2005, when adjusted for remote exploitability, 532 vulnerabilities, or 29% of the total volume, wererated as highly severe compared to 49% prior to adjustment. In the second half of 2004, 40% of the totalvolume was considered high severity when adjusted for remote exploitability, compared to 50% prior toadjustment. 33% were considered high severity after adjustment during the same reporting period oneyear ago, compared to 45% with remote exploitability included.
When excluding remote exploitability from consideration, the proportion of vulnerabilities that were
considered to be moderately severe increased in each of the last two six-month reporting periods. In thefirst six-months of 2005, after adjustment 1,005 remotely exploitable vulnerabilities were rated moderatelysevere, which is 54% of the total volume, compared to 48% with remote exploitability included in thecategorization. This is a decrease of five percentage points from the 59% of the previous six-month period,compared with 48% prior to adjustment. It is a further decrease from the 65% disclosed in the first sixmonths of 2004, compared to 51% with remote exploitability taken into account.
When remote exploitation capability is removed from consideration, only 1% of all remotely exploitable
vulnerabilities disclosed between January 1 and June 30, 2005 were classified as low severity. This is down from the 3% that were considered low severity prior to adjustment. It is also lower than each of the two previous six-month periods, during which 2% of vulnerabilities would be ranked low severity after adjustment, compared to 3% prior to adjustment in the second half of 2004, and 4% in the first half of the year.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
40
04008001,2001,6002,000
Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Documented vulnerabilities
PeriodWeb application vulnerabilities Not affecting Web applications55Web scripts are small programs that provide application functionality to Web sites. For example, relatively simple Web scripts power most guest book
programs, Web site message forums, and photo galleries.When remotely exploitable vulnerabilities are re-evaluated based solely on criteria other than remote
exploitability, the majority documented in all periods is moderately severe. Interestingly, the proportion ofthe total rated as low severity remains low—lower, in fact, than in the general sample of vulnerabilities.
Web application vulnerabilities
Web applications are technologies that rely on a browser for their user interface; they are often hosted onWeb servers. An increasing number of software vendors deliver applications over the Web. Furthermore,many organizations have developed custom Web-based applications to provide various internal and externalservices. The increase in the use of the Web as an application platform has resulted in an increase in Webapplication vulnerability research.
Figure 13. Web applications vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation
During the first six months of 2005, the majority of vulnerabilities documented by Symantec affected Web
applications (figure 13). During this period, 1,100 vulnerabilities, or 59% of the total volume, were classifiedas Web application vulnerabilities. This is a 59% increase over the 694 Web application vulnerabilitiesdisclosed in the last six months of 2004 and a 109% increase over the 527 published during first half of 2004.
Vulnerabilities in Web-based applications are often underestimated as a security risk. Many of these
vulnerabilities are low-complexity bugs that are discovered in one of the many relatively simple customizedPHP, Perl, ASP, and other server-side Web scripts that are available on the Internet as freeware. For instance,there are thousands of Web scripts
55currently deployed in various contexts. Many of these are vulnerable Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
to cross-site scripting and SQL injection attacks56that exploit input validation57vulnerabilities. These
vulnerabilities may not pose severe threats in and of themselves due to minimal deployment; however,administrators are forced to deal with higher numbers of potential threats and must assess the risk that each one poses to the enterprise. More serious threats may be overlooked or missed because of the largenumber of these vulnerabilities and the time and attention administrators must dedicate to them, despitethe low risk that they may pose.
Vulnerabilities in these technologies are particularly threatening because they are typically exposed to the
Internet through a Web server. As such, they may allow an attacker to bypass traditional perimeter securitymeasures, such as firewalls. Having done so, a successful attacker may then compromise an entire networkby gaining access through a single vulnerable system. Vulnerabilities in these technologies can also allowan attacker to access confidential information from databases without having to compromise any servers.
Security administrators are urged to follow the best practices outlined in “Appendix A” of this report.
Symantec also recommends that administrators audit their systems to ensure that no vulnerable Webapplications or scripts are being hosted. They should also thoroughly review the need for and use of allWeb applications. Only those Web applications that are required for enterprise operations should bedeployed.
Ease of exploitation
Symantec rates each vulnerability according to how difficult it is for an attacker to exploit it to compromisea targeted system. This ease-of-exploit rating assumes that the attacker possesses a general knowledge of vulnerabilities and how to exploit them, with or without an exploit, depending on the vulnerability.Symantec rates a vulnerability as “easily exploitable” if it requires no exploit or if a required exploit isknown to be available. If exploit code is required but is not yet available to the public, Symantec will ratethe vulnerability as “no exploit available.”
Generally speaking, “easily exploitable” vulnerabilities do not require sophisticated skills or knowledge to
exploit. Anyone with sufficient general technical knowledge or with publicly available tools can exploitthem. Examples of these include Web server vulnerabilities that can be exploited by simply entering anappropriate URL into a Web browser.
On the other hand, vulnerabilities that are classified as “no exploit available” are more difficult to attack
successfully. This is because attackers cannot exploit them using basic knowledge alone and because noknown tools to exploit them have been written or made publicly available. To exploit these vulnerabilities,an attacker would be required to write custom exploit code. This significantly raises the level of knowledge,expertise, and effort required for a successful attack, thus increasing the difficulty and lowering theprobability of such an attack. It should be pointed out that while no tools may be publicly available, privateexploits might exist. For instance, some individuals or groups may choose to keep exploits private in orderto prevent the development of security countermeasures. However, without a public exploit, thesevulnerabilities won’t likely be widely exploited.
41
56Cross-site scripting attacks are a type of attack against users of a Web-based application rather than the server hosting the a pplication. They exploit vulnerabilities
in the application to spoof content. These attacks can have many possible consequences, including hijacked user accounts. SQL i njection attacks are attacks on the
database server used by a Web-based application that are made possible by inadequate security checks in the application. The co nsequences also vary, from
unauthorized disclosure of potentially sensitive data to complete compromise of the database.
57Input validation vulnerabilities occur when an application fails to check externally supplied data for validity (such as data f rom a user). Data of an unexpected form
can sometimes cause security failures if the vulnerable application has not implemented validation checks.
0%20%40%60%80%100%
Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Documented vulnerabilities
PeriodNo exploit required No exploit available Exploit availableSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
42During the first six months of 2005, 1,356 vulnerabilities were classified as easy to exploit (figure 14). This
means that 73% of all vulnerabilities disclosed during this period either required no exploit code or hadsome type of exploit code available. This is two percentage points higher than the 71% seen in last sixmonths of 2004. During the first half of 2004, 70% of all vulnerabilities were considered easy to exploit.
Figure 14. Ease of exploit breakdown, Jan 2004–June 2005
In the first half of 2005, 1,153 vulnerabilities, or 62% of the total, required no exploit code. This is upsubstantially from the previous six-month period, during which 54% of vulnerabilities required no exploitcode. In the same period one year ago, 53% of vulnerabilities required no exploit code.
The increase in the percentage of vulnerabilities requiring no exploit code corresponds to the increase
in Web-application vulnerabilities. Such an increase would reasonably be expected, as Web applicationvulnerabilities typically do not require sophisticated exploit tools or techniques for successful exploitation.However, the overall percentage of easy-to-exploit vulnerabilities has not increased to the same degreebecause there are fewer vulnerabilities, proportionately, that have exploit code available. 0%4%8%12%16%
Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Percent of total vulnerabilities
Period14%15%
13%
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Vulnerabilities with exploit code
Exploit code is sometimes included with the original advisory that describes the vulnerability. In other
cases, the author may develop it as a proof of concept. When exploit code is released to the public it istypically made available on mailing lists such as BugTraq or hacker Web sites. If exploit code is available,the vulnerability with which it is associated will be considered easy to exploit.
Of the vulnerabilities that were disclosed during the first half of 2005, associated exploit code was
available for 251, or 13% of the total volume (figure 15). In terms of raw numbers, this is greater than the last six months of 2004, during which exploit code was available for 201 vulnerabilities. However, thisnumber is proportionally lower than the 15% that was seen in the last half of 2004, which represented the18-month peak. The percentage for vulnerabilities published in the first half of 2004 was also 14%.
Figure 15. Vulnerabilities with associated exploit code
Source: Symantec Corporation
While the percentage of vulnerabilities with associated exploit code during this period has dropped, the
real number increased from 201 to 251. The increase in total vulnerabilities with associated exploit code is therefore still a concern, despite the proportional decrease. Furthermore, these percentages can beexpected to change slightly from volume to volume of the Internet Security Threat Report ¸ as new exploit
programs are added to older vulnerabilities and older vulnerabilities with associated exploit tools areadded to the database.
43Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
44
050100150200250300
Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Documented vulnerabilities
PeriodHigh severity Moderate severity Low severityThe amount of effort researchers will spend on developing exploit code may be determined by the impact
that a vulnerability is likely to have on a targeted system. They are not likely to expend time and energydeveloping exploit code for vulnerabilities that will not give them high-level access to the targeted systems.With this in mind, it is not surprising that most vulnerabilities for which an exploit tool is available areconsidered high severity. However, there has been a noteworthy change in proportions over the past tworeporting periods (figure 16). In the first half of 2005, 70% of vulnerabilities with associated exploit codewere rated high severity. This is a decrease from the 77% published in the previous period. For the firsthalf of 2004, this percentage was 64%.
Figure 16. Vulnerabilities with exploit code, by severity, over 18 months
Source: Symantec Corporation
Exploit development time
A window of exposure exists between the disclosure of a vulnerability and the availability of a patch or
other remediation measure. If exploit code is created and made public during this time, computers may beimmediately vulnerable to widespread attack. The shorter the time between disclosure of a vulnerabilityand the release of an associated exploit, the sooner computers are vulnerable to attack (until patchesbecome available).
Previous volumes of the Internet Security Threat Report have included analysis of the average time lapse
between the disclosure of a vulnerability and the publication of an associated exploit. During the first six months of 2005, the average time for exploit development was 6.0 days (figure 17). This is a slightdecrease from the average time of 6.4 days for exploits to be released in the previous six-month period.The average time for exploits to be developed and released in the first half of 2004 was 5.8 days.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
45
02468
Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Days
Period5.8 days6.4 days
6.0 daysAverage number of days for exploit developmentFigure 17. Exploit development time
Source: Symantec Corporation
The continued short time to exploit availability highlights the need for administrators to patch their
systems or implement other measures to protect against new threats as soon as possible. This may beparticularly difficult for large organizations, for which applying enterprise-wide patching in a matter ofdays is very challenging.
With the time between disclosure and exploit development so short, administrators would benefit from
notification of a new vulnerability, an understanding of the potential threat posed by the vulnerability andrelevant mitigation or patching information. Symantec recommends that administrators employ a goodasset management system or vulnerability alerting service, both of which can help to quickly assesswhether a new vulnerability is a viable threat or not. They should also monitor vulnerability mailing listsand security Web sites for new developments. Enterprises should devote sufficient resources to alertingand patch deployment solutions. They should also consider engaging a managed security service providerto assist them in monitoring their networks.
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
46
Jan–June 2003 July–Dec 2003 Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Average number of days to patch release
Period0306090120
81103
64
495458The date on which the vendor or patch provider first made the vulnerability fix available to consumers and enterprises.
59Microsoft, IBM, HP, Oracle, Symantec, McAfee, Sun, Computer Associates, and VeritasPatch development and availability time
For the first time, Symantec is assessing the average patch development and availability time in this volume
of the Internet Security Threat Report . This discussion will gauge the average time between the public
disclosure of a vulnerability and the release of an associated patch by the affected vendor. This analysis isbased on the patch and vulnerability data in the Symantec vulnerability database. The disclosure date ofeach vulnerability is stored in the vulnerability database, as is the release date of each patch by the affectedvendor.
58The time period between the disclosure date of a vulnerability and the release date of an associated
patch is referred to as “the time to patch.” It should be noted that this metric only considers specific file-based patches or upgrades issued by enterprise vendors
59and not general solutions. For example, instances
where the vendor provides a workaround or steps for a manual fix are not included.
During the first half of 2005, on average, 54 days elapsed between the publication of a vulnerability and
the release of an associated patch by an enterprise vendor (figure 18). This is an increase over the average of 49 days in the second half of 2004. This represents a slight reversal of a trend over the past two years,during which response times decreased. The trend towards decreasing times to patch, which started in the first half of 2004, was most likely due to increased pressure from customers for vendors to addresssecurity concerns, likely a response to high-profile vulnerabilities and malicious code.
Figure 18. Average number of days to patch releaseSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
It is unsettling to think of a situation in which an exploit is available to attackers within a week (as
indicated in the previous section) while there is no patch made available to administrators for nearly twomonths. This leaves a large window of opportunity for potential attackers. In fact, the 54-day averagepatch development time, combined with the average exploit development time of 6 days means that anaverage time of 48 days exists between the release of an exploit and the release of an associated patch.While the appearance of an exploit can speed patch release, there are still many instances where end usersand administrators are forced to implement security “workarounds” without an official fix. During thistime, networks will be vulnerable to compromise.
To minimize the possibility of successful exploitation, administrators need to be aware of and understand
the vulnerabilities and be active in working around them. This may involve making changes to firewallconfigurations, creating IDS/IPS signatures and rules, and locking down services. Administrators shouldmonitor mailing lists devoted to discussion of security incidents or specific technologies, on whichprevention and mitigation strategies may be discussed.
Web browser vulnerabilities
The Web browser is a critical and ubiquitous application that has, in the past few years, become a frequenttarget for vulnerability researchers. In the past, the focus of security has been on the perimeter: servers,firewalls, and other systems with external exposure. However, a notable shift has occurred, as client-sidesystems—primarily end-user desktop hosts—are becoming increasingly prominent. The Symantec Internet
Security Threat Report has monitored this trend over the past several reporting periods.
This metric will offer a comparison of vulnerability data for numerous browsers, namely: Microsoft Internet
Explorer, the Mozilla browsers (including Firefox), Opera, Safari, and KDE Konqueror. However, whenassessing the comparative data, the following important caveats should be kept in mind:
• Only verifiable vulnerabilities that were confirmed by the vendor were taken into consideration.• Web browser vulnerability counts may not match one-to-one with security bulletins or patches issued by
vendors. This is because of the complexity in identifying individual vulnerabilities in browser exploits.
• Not every vulnerability discovered is exploited. As of this writing, no widespread exploitation of any
browser except Microsoft Internet Explorer has occurred. However, Symantec expects this to change asalternative browsers become increasingly widely deployed.
As has been stated previously in this report, readers should be aware that this discussion is based on
data that may change over time, as entries in the vulnerability database are constantly revised as newinformation emerges. As vendors confirm vulnerabilities and/or release patches, vulnerability totals mayincrease. As a result, statistics and percentages reported in one volume of the Internet Security Threat
Report may not agree with the same information as it is presented in subsequent volumes.
During the first half of 2005, more vulnerabilities were disclosed for the Mozilla browsers, including
Firefox, than for any other browser (figure 19). During this period, 25 vulnerabilities affecting the Mozillafamily of browsers were disclosed, compared to 32 in the second half of 2004. During the first half of thatyear, only two vulnerabilities were disclosed for the Mozilla browsers.
47
010203040
Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Documented vulnerabilities
PeriodMSIE Mozilla Opera KDE Konqueror SafariSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
The average severity of the Mozilla vulnerabilities in the first half of 2005 was high. 18 of the 25 Mozilla
vulnerabilities in this period, or 72%, were rated high severity. This is up from 44% in the second half of2004. There was a single high-severity vulnerability associated with Mozilla browsers in the first half of2004. The increase of high-severity vulnerabilities may be due to attention being paid by researchers to the Firefox browser, which has been widely touted as a secure alternative to Microsoft Internet Explorer.
Figure 19. Browser vulnerabilities, Jan. 2004–June 2005
Source: Symantec Corporation
During the first six months of 2005, there were 13 vendor confirmed vulnerabilities disclosed for Microsoft
Internet Explorer. This is a sharp decrease from the 31 documented in the second half of 2004. (It shouldbe noted that in the last Internet Security Threat Report , only 13 vulnerabilities associated with Internet
Explorer were classified as vendor confirmed. After publication, this number was revised to 31 due todelayed confirmation of the vulnerabilities by the vendor.) During the first half of 2004, seven InternetExplorers vulnerabilities were disclosed and confirmed by Microsoft. The average severity rating of thevulnerabilities associated with Internet Explorer during the first six months of 2005 was high.
During the first half of 2005, eight of the 13 Internet Explorer vulnerabilities, or 62%, were considered
high severity. This is an increase over the 58% in the last six months of 2004 and the 57% ofvulnerabilities that were rated high severity in the first half of that year.
During the first six months of 2005, six new vulnerabilities were disclosed for the Opera browser. This is a
decrease from the previous reporting period, during which Symantec documented 11 Opera vulnerabilities.In the first half of 2004, five vulnerabilities were found for Opera.
480612182430
MSIE Mozilla Opera KDE Konqueror SafariDocumented vulnerabilities
Period58
718
33
51
1
1Moderate severity High severitySymantec Internet Security Threat Report
The Opera vulnerabilities disclosed during the first half of 2005 had an average severity rating of moderate.
Of the six vulnerabilities documented in the current reporting period, three were rated as high severity, or50%. 27% of Opera vulnerabilities disclosed in the second half of 2004 were considered high severity.There were no high-severity Opera vulnerabilities documented by Symantec in the first half of 2004.
Between January 1 and June 30, 2005, two vendor confirmed vulnerabilities were disclosed for Apple’s
browser for Mac OS X, Safari, the same number as in the preceding six-month reporting period. In the first half of 2004, three vulnerabilities for Safari were disclosed.
The average severity rating for Safari vulnerabilities disclosed during the first half of 2005 was moderate.
Only one of the two Safari vulnerabilities disclosed during this period was considered high severity. Therewere no high-severity Safari vulnerabilities disclosed in 2004.
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report Symantec is assessing vulnerabilities
for the Konqueror browser. Between January 1 and June 30, 2005, two vendor confirmed vulnerabilitieswere discovered in this browser. This is a decline from the six reported in the preceding six-month period.Konqueror was associated with a single vulnerability published in the first half of 2004.
The average severity rating for Konqueror vulnerabilities disclosed during the first half of 2005 was
moderate. Of the two Konqueror vulnerabilities documented by Symantec in the first half of 2005, only onewas rated high severity. In the previous six-month period, only one out of the six Konqueror vulnerabilitieswas considered high severity. The lone vulnerability associated with Konqueror from the first half of 2004was not high severity.
Figure 20. Browser vulnerabilities by severity, Jan 1–June 30, 2005
Source: Symantec Corporation
49Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
The fact that Mozilla browsers had the most vendor confirmed vulnerabilities over the past two six-month
periods may suggest that Mozilla is currently acknowledging and fixing vulnerabilities more quickly thanother vendors. This could be because the Mozilla browsers are open source and may be more responsive to reports of new vulnerabilities and subsequently developing and delivering associated patches. Forinstance, except in certain instances,
60Microsoft releases fixes on a relatively fixed schedule rather than
as needed, potentially increasing their acknowledgement time.
Overall, there are fewer high-profile Web-browser vulnerabilities in the current reporting period than have
been seen in previous reports; this is particularly notable in the case of Internet Explorer. This may reflectthe preventative security measures being taken by many vendors in response to widely exploited securitythreats. Drive-by-downloading—the use of vulnerabilities in browsers to force software installs (such asspyware, which itself has come to be associated with browser insecurity)—has also become common,forcing vendors to act quickly in response to user complaints.
5060For instance, MS04-037, a vulnerability exploitable through MSIE, was released outside of their regular cycle. See:
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/903144.mspxSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
51Malicious Code Trends
This section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report will analyze developments in malicious code
over the first half of 2005. Symantec gathers data from over 120 million desktops that have deployedSymantec’s antivirus products in consumer and corporate environments. The Symantec Digital ImmuneSystem™ and Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting process. Thisdiscussion is based on malicious code samples reported to Symantec for analysis between January 1 andJune 30, 2005.
Symantec categorizes malicious code in two categories: families and variants. A family is a new, distinct
sample of malicious code. For instance, W32.Netsky@mm would have been the founding sample, or theprimary source code, of the Netsky family. In some cases, a particular family of malicious code may havemultiple variants. A variant is a new iteration of the same family, one that has minor differences but that is still based on the original. A new variant is often created when the source code of a successful virus orworm is modified slightly to bypass antivirus detection definitions developed for the original. For instance,Netsky.P is a variant of Netsky.
The “Malicious Code Trends” section will discuss:• Top ten malicious code samples
• Win32 viruses and worms• Exposure of confidential information• Threats to mobile devices• Malicious code for P2P, IM, IRC, and CIFS•B o t s• Bot variants• Malicious code for profit
This discussion will include any prevention and mitigation measures that might be relevant to the
particular threats being discussed. However, Symantec recommends that certain best security practicesalways be followed to protect against malicious code infection. Administrators should keep patch levels up-to-date, especially on computers that host public services—such as HTTP, FTP, SMTP, and DNS servers—and are accessible through a firewall or placed in a DMZ. Email servers should be configured to only allowfile types that are required for business needs. Additionally, Symantec recommends that ingress andegress filtering be put in place on perimeter devices to detect anomalous activity.
End users should employ defense in-depth, including antivirus software and a personal firewall. Users
should update antivirus definitions regularly. They should also ensure that all desktop, laptop, and servercomputers are updated with all necessary security patches from their operating system vendor. Theyshould never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless it is expected and comes from trustedsource, and the purpose of the attachment is known.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Top ten malicious code samples
In previous editions of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , mass-mailing worms dominated the
top ten malicious code samples reported to Symantec. In this edition, there were only two mass-mailers in the top ten, Netsky.P and Sober.O (table 5). This is due, in part, to the lack of any successful new mass-mailers in the last six months, with the exception of Sober.O. While there were a large number ofmoderately successful Mytob variants, no single variant enjoyed the level of success that Netsky or Sober variants have had.
Table 5. Top ten malicious code samples reported to Symantec
Source: Symantec Corporation
As in the previous six-month period, Netsky.P61remained the most reported malicious code sample in the
first half of 2005. It has been one of the most widely reported samples of malicious code since itsdiscovery in March 2004.
This particular variant of Netsky utilizes multiple propagation techniques. It emails itself to addresses
gathered from a compromised computer. It also copies itself to shared network drives and to folderscommonly associated with various peer-to-peer file sharing programs. The mass-mailing technique alsoincorporates two additional mechanisms. In an attempt to bypass filtering mechanisms, the worm sendsitself in an archive using a .zip extension. It may also attempt to exploit a vulnerability
62so that the
message attachment is automatically executed when the message is viewed or previewed with a vulnerableemail client. Netsky.P exposes account information for e-Gold, an Internet payment system.
52Rank
1
2
3456
7
89
10Netsky.P
Gaobot
SpybotTooso.FTooso.BRedlof.A
Lemir
LineageSober.O
KillAVLogs e-Gold account information
Allows remote access
Allows remote accessDisables security applications,
downloads a remote file
Disables security applications,
downloads a remote file
Infects several file typesSteals account information for
Legend of Mir online game
Steals account information for
Lineage online game
Downloads and executes a remote fileDisables security applications
Sample
WormBot
BotTrojanTrojanVirus
Trojan
TrojanWorm
TrojanType Vectors Impact
SMTP, P2PCIFS, Remotely Exploitable
Vulnerability, Back doors
CIFS, Remotely Exploitable
Vulnerability, Back doors
NA
NAEmail
NA
NASMTP
NA
61http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/[email protected]
62http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/2524Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
5363http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/trojan.tooso.html
64http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/[email protected]
65Tooso.B was mass mailed by Beagle.BG and Beagle.BH while Tooso.F was mass mailed by Beagle.BN.Gaobot and Spybot remain in the top ten malicious code reports for this period, as they were for the second
half of 2004. As noted in previous editions of the Internet Security Threat Report , the use of bots continues
to increase, possibly due to the large amount of and variance in functionality they can incorporate. WhereasGaobot and Spybot were the third and fourth most reported malicious code samples in the second half of2004, they rose to second most and third most respectively in this period. This is likely due less to anyincrease in the prevalence of the two bots and more to the drop-off in Sober.I activity. This drop-off may be due to a combination of factors, including the fact that as users update their antivirus definitions,reports of the malicious code will drop off even though it may continue to circulate.
Between January and June 2005, Trojans dominated the top ten reported samples, most notably two
variants of the Tooso Trojan.
63The B and F variants of this Trojan do not contain any mass-mailing code,
but they were mass mailed by variants of the Beagle64worm.65These Trojans disable and remove several
antivirus and security applications from a compromised computer. They then disable access to antivirusand security-related Web sites by overwriting the HOSTS file to redirect requests. Finally, the Trojansattempt to download and execute a file from a remote Web site.
Win32 viruses and worms
Win32 threats are executable programs that operate by using the WIN32 API. These forms of maliciouscode work on at least one Win32 platform. During the first six months of 2005, Win32 threats continued the increase in volume that was first noted in 2003 (figure 21).
Over the first half of 2005, Symantec documented more than 10,866 new Win32 viruses and worms, an
increase of 48% over the 7,360 documented in the second half of 2004. It is also an increase of 142% over the 4,496 documented in the first half of 2004. As of June 30, 2005, the total number of Win32variants had surpassed 28,000. The substantial rise in numbers over the past six months is due to thetremendous increase of Win32 worms that implement bot features—such as remote access through IRCchannels and denial of service capability—that attackers can use for financial gain. (Please see the“Malicious code for profit” section below for an in-depth discussion of this recent development in malicious code.)Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
54
Jan–June 2003 July–Dec 2003 Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Total number
Period994
1411,702
1844,496
1647,360
17110,866
170Total viruses and worms
Total families
03,0006,0009,00012,000Figure 21. New Win32 virus and worm variants, 2003–2005
Source: Symantec Corporation
With the significant growth in Win32 viruses and worms, the number of new Win32 families could be
expected to also show a notable increase, but this has not been the case. The number of new familiesreported has remained relatively level for the past five reporting periods (figure 21), indicating that thevast majority of the new viruses and worms reported are variants of existing families.
In many cases, a successful worm is modified slightly in an effort to reproduce the success of the original,
thus creating a new variant. In other cases, the source code for a piece of malicious code may be readilyavailable, allowing even novices to create new malicious code variants. The rapid rise in variants isimportant because each variant represents a new, distinct threat against which administrators mustprotect their systems.
Despite the fact that only two individual mass-mailing worms were present in the top ten malicious code
during this period, this class of worm continues to be successful. In the first half of 2005, mass-mailingworms such as Sober.O and the Mytob family were amongst the most significant outbreaks.
It appears that development of classic virus code—that is, viruses that infect files in order to propagate—
is slowing. This may due to the increased success of criminal prosecutions against attackers. For example,the German author of the Sasser and Netsky worms, which accounted for 20% of all malicious codesamples reported to Symantec in 2004,
66was recently prosecuted,67along with several other high-profile
virus writers. The decline of the classic virus is also likely due to the high levels of Internet connectivity,which has increased the effectiveness of direct propagation techniques, such as host-to-host propagation,thereby diminishing the reliance on files as the infection vector.
66Please see the “Appendix D” of this report for details on how this figure was obtained.
67http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11238Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
5568http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/13132
69This feature warns the user that they may be executing unsigned code that could potentially be harmful to their computer.
70http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/downloader.reitrec.html
71http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11219Attackers continuously look for easy targets, those that will provide them with the maximum return on
the time they invest in writing malicious code. Since there have been fewer easily exploitable, remote code-execution vulnerabilities in Windows recently, attackers are moving towards applications and servicesprovided by third parties. At the same time, a number of Windows XP Service Pack 2 vulnerabilities havebeen reported. Interestingly, some of these vulnerabilities apply to the 64-bit Windows platforms, thusraising the possibility of exploitation of 64-bit Windows. For example, the Microsoft Windows Shell RemoteCode Execution Vulnerability
68affects Windows XP computers with Service Pack 2 as well as 64-bit versions
of Windows XP. This vulnerability can be exploited in a way that would bypass the unsigned contentexecution warning
69that was introduced as a security feature of Windows XP Service Pack 2.
Recent Win32 attacks have been specific to the Windows Security Center, a part of Windows XP Service
Pack 2. Such attacks perform a variety of tasks, including silently switching off the firewall and addingapplication-specific exclusions that allow an application to contact the Internet without producing warnings. For example, the Reitrec
70Trojan turns off the Windows XP Service Pack 2 firewall in order
to allow it to download remote files related to adware programs on a compromised computer.
To protect against threats that disable software firewalls, additional layers of security are needed.
Administrators can prevent these threats from accessing remote resources by using egress filtering anddeploying firewalls on host systems. This is particularly important in enterprise settings, in which a singlecompromise can result in additional compromises within the local network.
Exposure of confidential information
Threats that expose confidential information from a compromised computer are a concern to all users, inthe home and enterprise environment alike. These threats may expose system information, sensitive filesand documents, or cached logon credentials. Some threats, such as back doors, may give a remote attackercomplete control over a compromised computer. With the increasing use of online shopping and Internetbanking, compromises of this nature can result in significant financial loss, particularly if credit cardinformation or banking details are exposed.
71
During the first six months of 2005, threats with the potential to expose confidential information continuedto increase, as they have for the past three reporting periods (figure 22). Between January 1 and June 30,2005, malicious code that exposes confidential information represented 74% of the top 50 malicious codesamples reported to Symantec. This is an increase of 37% over the previous reporting period in which 54%of the top 50 malicious code samples exposed confidential information. It is a 68% increase over the 44%reported in the same period in 2004.
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
5672http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/[email protected]
73http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/symbos.cabir.html
0%20%40%60%80%
Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Percentage of top 50 reports
Period44%54%74%Figure 22. Threats to confidential information
Source: Symantec Corporation
As noted in the previous Internet Security Threat Report , the rise in confidential information threats may be
due, at least in part, to the increase in bots; however, other new threats also helped contribute to this trend.For example, the Mytob
72family of mass-mailing worms also includes remote access capabilities. During the
month of June 2005, 97 variants of Mytob were reported to Symantec. This family of worms was producedin extremely rapid succession, with multiple new variants of the family being observed in the wild on thesame day. Such rapid production of variants is likely intended to overwhelm security administrators who are trying to keep their systems up-to-date. In such a case, protective technology such as behavior-blockingtechnologies can be used to help secure users against these threats.
Mobile devices
Malicious code writers continue to create proof-of-concept malicious code for mobile devices, particularlysmart phones. Smart phones are mobile phones that contain a fully fledged operating system with a widevariety of user–installable software. They may be particularly vulnerable to malicious code, as they appearto have increased exposure through replication vectors such as MMS and other telephony protocols.
In the second half of 2004, multiple variants of Cabir,
73the first mobile device worm, which spreads via
Bluetooth, were detected due to the release of source code. However, the beginning of 2005 saw a declinein new variants with only two released in early January. Cabir was originally created as a proof of concept,but has now been reported in the wild in 17 countries. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
In the second half of 2004, two newly documented malicious code samples for the Windows CE operating
system—Duts74and Brador75—were documented. In the first half of 2005, Symantec did not document any
additional threats for this platform. This does not mean that research in this area has ceased entirely.However, because smart phones are widely used and offer high connectivity, they will likely constitute amore appealing target than Windows CE. Malicious code authors may be focusing their efforts on theseplatforms instead.
This suspicion was borne out in March when the first MMS worm, Commwarrior,
76was discovered. While
previous malicious code for Symbian devices used only Bluetooth as a propagation vector, Commwarrioralso uses MMS. This is significant because Bluetooth requires physical proximity between an infecteddevice and a target in order to propagate. MMS only requires a connection between a phone and thenetwork in order to send messages and files to other phones. This has the potential to expand the scope of an outbreak from the local to the global level.
Commwarrior randomly chooses a phone number from the compromised device’s phonebook. It then sends
an MMS message that contains the worm itself to that number as an attachment named commw.sis, whichthe recipient has to run for it to propagate. The MMS message contains one of a variety of subject headersand message bodies purporting to be a legitimate free software application. Within four months of initialdiscovery, Commwarrior had been detected in 15 countries.
77
The first half of 2005 saw a rise in the number of Skulls78variants. Skulls is a simple Symbian Trojan that
overlays existing applications, rendering the device inoperable by overwriting critical operating system files.Six new variants of Skulls appeared in the first half of 2005, tripling the number of known variants. A fewusers have reported being affected by Skulls but none of these reports have been confirmed. The inability of Skulls to replicate on its own means that it poses less of a threat than a worm or virus. However, it has been released on message boards as a program to bypass product activation keys for legitimatesoftware applications.
While the number of threats to mobile devices, particularly Symbian Series 60 smart phones, continues
to increase, the number reported in the wild is still small. To this point, most have been proof-of-conceptthreats that have found their way into the wild. Nevertheless, the types of threats created demonstratesome of the robust capabilities of these devices.
As is the case for most malicious code, users can protect themselves against these threats by practicing
safe computing practices. For instance, they can help prevent infection from these programs by notinstalling unknown programs or accepting connections from unknown sources. It is somewhat surprisingthat no automatically propagating malicious code has yet been developed and released into the wild,particularly as platform complexity and connectivity have risen to sufficient levels for a widespreadoutbreak.
57
74http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/wince.duts.a.html
75http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/backdoor.brador.a.html
76http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/symbos.commwarrior.a.html
77http://www.virus.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=118
78http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/symbos.skulls.html
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
5879http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/[email protected]
80http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.bropia.html
81http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.kelvir.a.html
0%20%40%60%
Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Percentage of top 50 reports
Period36%50%
19%P2P/IM/IRC/CIFS
While peer-to-peer services (P2P), instant messaging (IM), Internet relay chat (IRC), and network file
sharing (CIFS) continue to be used as propagation vectors for the top threats, their effectiveness appearsto be on the decline. In the first half of 2005, only 19% of the top 50 malicious code reported to Symantecused one of these replication vectors, compared with 50% in the previous six months and 36% one yearago (figure 23).
In the final six months of 2004, Mydoom,
79Netsky, and Beagle variants dominated the top ten malicious
code reports and all possessed the ability to spread via P2P. However, in the first half of 2005, of thosethree, only Netsky appeared in the top ten. As a result, the primary infection vector has shifted from P2Papplications to a combination of P2P applications and Windows CIFS. Nevertheless, a downward trend inthe use of these replication vectors continues.
Figure 23. P2P, IM, IRC, and CIFS threats
Source: Symantec Corporation
None of the top 50 reported malicious code samples this period used IM as a propagation mechanism.
However, the number of threats in the overall count of malicious code samples that used IM as apropagation vector did increase. This was mainly due to multiple variants of the Bropia
80and Kelvir81
families. Both are worms that send URL links via MSN Messenger to people on a compromised computer’scontact list. The URL link is either a link to the worm itself or to a variant of Spybot.
The first variant of Bropia was detected in January 2005, and 39 variants have been discovered since.
Kelvir was first spotted in March 2005; by the end of June, 130 variants had been discovered. However,neither worm has appeared in the top 50, demonstrating the general ineffectiveness of the propagationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
5982http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/12506vector compared to other common vectors, such as email. One likely reason for this is that the actual
executable file was not transferred through the instant messages but was hosted in a separate locationinstead. This means that once authorities removed access to the executable file from the hosting server,the worm could no longer propagate.
In addition, a buffer overflow in the image–processing component of Microsoft Messenger
82was made
public in February and led to speculation that it may be the next step in threats such as Bropia. However,days after the vulnerability was patched, Microsoft required all their MSN messenger clients to be updatedbefore users could join the network. This eliminated the possibility of the vulnerability being used as areplication vector. This mitigation strategy will likely prevent malicious threats from exploiting suchvulnerabilities in instant messaging systems.
Because these vectors continue to appear in the top ten threats, organizations should still audit networks
for rogue usage of peer-to-peer applications and protocols. In addition, any approved applications shouldbe regularly updated with all necessary security-related patches.
Bots
Bots (short for “robots”) are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s computer in order to allow anunauthorized user to control the computer remotely. Bots are designed to let an attacker create a networkof compromised computers known as a bot network, which can be remotely controlled to collectivelyconduct malicious activities such as DoS attacks.
Bots can have numerous effects on an enterprise. A single infected host within a network (such as a laptop
that was compromised outside the local network and then connected to the network, either directly or byVPN) can allow a bot to propagate to other computers that are normally protected against external attacksby corporate firewalls. Additionally, bots can be used to perform DoS attacks against the enterprise’s Website, which can disrupt revenue for ecommerce companies, or against other organizations’ Web sites, whichcan have serious legal consequences.
In the first half of 2005, the percentage of bot-related malicious code reported to Symantec increased,
accounting for 14% of the top 50 (figure 24). This represents a 17% increase since the last half of 2004,when bots accounted for 12% of the top 50 malicious code reports. It is also a 40% increase over the 10%from the six-month period prior to that.
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
60
0%4%8%12%16%
Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Percentage of top 50 reports
Period10%12%14%Figure 24. Bots in top 50 malicious code reports
Source: Symantec Corporation
Bots often employ multiple propagation mechanisms to compromise other computers. They may copy
themselves to shared network drives with weak password protection. They may also spread through P2Pnetworks by copying themselves to the shared folders of the P2P client application. Most bots, such asRandex,
83Spybot, and Gaobot, employ multiple propagation mechanisms that also include exploiting
vulnerabilities in remotely accessible services, such as the Microsoft Windows LSASS Buffer OverrunVulnerability.
84
The most significant new development in bot technology over the first six months of 2005 was the additionof a new propagation mechanism. In addition to propagating by traditional methods such as thosementioned above, Spybot.IVQ,
85propagated through Microsoft SQL and MySQL servers with weak
password protection. Symantec believes this is significant since it indicates that bot authors may belooking to increase the number of potential systems they can control.
83http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.randex.gen.html
84http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10108
85http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.spybot.ivq.htmlSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
61
01,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,0007,000
Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Number of new variants
Period1,1041,167
892 7659194,288
1,1211,4126,361Gaobot Randex SpybotBot variants
During the first six months of 2005, the number of new bot variants continued to climb, particularly the
number of new Spybot variants. In the current period 6,361 new variants of Spybot were reported toSymantec, a 48% increase over the 4,288 variants documented in the second half of 2004.
While the number of new Gaobot and Randex variants decreased slightly between the first and second half
of 2004, they rose again in the first half of 2005, although not to the same degree as Spybot. In the firsthalf of 2005, there were 1,412 new Randex variants and 1,121 new Gaobot variants, 54% and 47%increases over the previous six-month period respectively (figure 25).
While more variants of Spybot were created in the last two periods than Gaobot variants, Gaobot was
reported more often to Symantec. This is likely because Gaobot variants typically contain morepropagation mechanisms than Spybot variants. While a Spybot variant typically only propagates through afew vulnerabilities, a Gaobot variant may propagate through several different vulnerabilities as well asnetwork shares. Therefore, a single Gaobot variant can be used to spread to a large number of differentsystems, while a Spybot variant has a much more limited scope of potential targets. As a result, anattacker using Spybot is more likely to employ multiple variants, each of which exploits a different set ofvulnerabilities. This results in a large number of Spybot variants, each of which affects a smaller range ofvulnerable computers.
Figure 25. Number of new bot variants
Source: Symantec Corporation
0%25%50%75%
Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Percentage of programs in top 50 reports
Period47%53%64%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Malicious code for profit
In the previous edition of the Internet Security Threat Report ,86Symantec stated that malicious code that
can be used to generate profit appears to be on the rise. That discussion focused mainly on the growinguse of malicious code to relay bulk unsolicited email (spam) for profit. This trend continues. In the first half of 2005, 64% of the top 50 malicious code samples reported to Symantec allowed email relaying,compared to 53% in the last six months of 2004 and 37% in the first half of the year (figure 26).
Figure 26. Malicious code that allows email relaying
Source: Symantec Corporation
During the first six months of 2005, new methods of using malicious code for financial gain were observed
with increasing frequency. One example is the development of bot networks for financial gain. In the“Future Watch” section of the previous Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec stated that it was
realistic to “expect more growth in bot owners who modify their bot networks and rent them out for thesepurposes, amongst others.”
87The Symantec DeepSight threat analyst team has uncovered evidence
indicating that this is already happening.
The Symantec DeepSight Threat analyst team has uncovered evidence indicating that bot networks that
can be used for malicious purposes are available for hire. In July 2005, in an IRC conversation that theDeepSight team was monitoring, a self-proclaimed bot network owner revealed the size, capacity, and price of a bot network that he was making available.
62
86Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume VII (March 2005) p. 59: http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539
87Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume VII (March 2005) p. 75: http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
6388http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/trojan.gpcoder.html
89http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/trojan.lazar.html
90http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/trojan.vundo.html and http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/ven c/data/trojan.vundo.b.html
91http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.desktophijack.htmlThese discussions revealed that it is not uncommon for those who maintain control of these networks
to provide full or partial access to the compromised systems for a nominal fee. Users who desire thefunctionality of bot networks but who lack the skill or resources to develop their own can solicit thoseservices from bot network owners. These services are typically solicited for purposes of profit or generalmalicious activity.
Prices negotiated between these individuals will vary. The Symantec DeepSight investigation discovered,
however, that the use of a network as large as 150,000 bot computers can carry a cost as low asapproximately U.S.$300. This price may be influenced by the number of hosts within the bot network, aswell as the duration and level of access granted to the compromised hosts. Other factors may include thecollective bandwidth, the functionality of the actual bots deployed, and the stability of the network.
In addition to offering access to an existing bot network, conversations were observed in which unique
customized versions of a bot binary could reportedly be purchased. Claims were made that because suchbinaries are unique, they would not be detected by current antivirus definitions. While it is possible tocreate a unique binary to avoid detection by previous antivirus definitions, most antivirus products will be able to identify the threat using a generic definition or a heuristic signature. The cost associated withthis service was reportedly between U.S.$200 and U.S.$300.
Another method of using malicious code for profit is the use of Trojans. One such case that was reported
to Symantec in the first half of 2005 was the Gpcoder
88Trojan. This Trojan encrypts data files such as
documents, spreadsheets, and database files on the compromised computer. It then creates a file in eachfolder containing information on how the user can obtain a decoder for the encrypted files. Reportedly, ifthe user emails an address that is provided, he or she is instructed to pay $200 for the decoder application.
For enterprise systems, this Trojan can cause serious data loss if proper backup plans are not in place.
Effective disaster recovery strategies should always be part of security planning in order to protect againstattacks that are capable of destroying or modifying critical data.
Another example of malicious code for profit is malicious code that downloads adware onto a compromised
computer. For example, the Lazar Trojan
89downloads and installs adware that displays pop-up
advertisements in the user’s Web browser. The malicious code author earns a fee each time the adware is installed on a computer. Over the first six months of 2005, seven distinct malicious code samples thatdownloaded adware were present in the top 50 malicious code reports, including two variants of theVundo
90Trojan and the Desktophijack91virus. There was only one in the second half of 2004 and none
in the first six months of the year (figure 27). Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
6492http://www.wired.com/news/privacy/0,1848,67684,00.html?tw=rss.PRV
93http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/trojan.hotword.b.html
94http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11222
95http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/8835
96http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/trojan.mdropper.b.html and http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcente r/venc/data/trojan.riler.c.html
02468
Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Number of programs in top 50 reports
Period017Figure 27. Malicious code that downloads adware
A more worrisome trend in the use of malicious code for profit has been observed in the form of targeted
Trojan attacks. At the end of May, several executives at large companies in Israel were arrested for allegedlyusing Trojans to monitor their competitors.
92A private investigation firm was reported to have written
a custom Trojan program93that was then sent to users at the competing companies to entice them to
execute the application. Once installed, this Trojan would log keystrokes and allow remote access to thecompromised computer, allowing the authors to illicitly obtain sensitive information from their competitors.
Another targeted Trojan attack that was observed over the last six months was aimed at U.S. and U.K.
government agencies.
94These attacks are specific to the agency being targeted and may arrive as email
attachments or be installed by exploiting a vulnerability in Microsoft Word.95Once installed, these Trojans96
have the ability to download other applications and open back doors on the compromised computers.
The threat of targeted Trojan attacks is one that Symantec will continue to monitor closely. Since attacks
are usually targeted to a specific user or group of users, it is likely that social engineering will be used topersuade users to run the Trojan application. To protect against these threats, users should always verifythe authenticity of any application before running it on critical computers. Administrators should deploydefense in-depth strategies such as firewalls and email gateway protection to stop these threats fromreaching end users. Additionally, updated antivirus applications should be installed on every desktop toprotect users if the malicious code is able to get past external security layers.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Additional Security Risks
Traditionally, the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report has broken security threats down into three
general categories: attacks, vulnerabilities, and malicious code. However, as Internet-based services andapplications have expanded and diversified, the potential for computer programs to introduce other typesof security risks has increased. The emergence of new risks—particularly spam, phishing, spyware, andadware—has necessitated an expansion of the traditional security taxonomy.
Symantec has monitored these new concerns as they have developed, classifying them as “additional
security risks.” This section will examine developments in additional security risks over the first six monthsof 2005. In particular, it will examine trends in adware, spyware, phishing, and spam.
Adware and spyware
While adware and spyware are not categorized as malicious code, Symantec monitors them using many of the same methods used for tracking malicious code development and proliferation. This involves anongoing analysis of reports and data delivered from over 120 million client, server, and gateway emailsystems,
97as well as filtration of 25 million email messages per day. Symantec then compiles the most
common reports and analyzes them to determine the appropriate categorization. Steps for the protectionagainst and mitigation of these security risks are presented at the end of this discussion.
Adware
Adware programs are programs that facilitate the delivery and display of advertising content onto theuser’s display device.
98This may be done without the user’s prior consent or knowledge. It is often, but not
always, presented in the form of pop-up windows or bars that appear on the screen. In some cases, theseprograms may gather information from the user’s computer—such as information related to Internetbrowser usage or other computing habits—and relay this information back to a remote computer.
Adware is not always a security risk. In some cases, it simply delivers an advertising message that appears
on the user’s screen. However, this is not always the case. Depending upon its functionality and thecontext in which it is deployed, adware can constitute a security risk. If attributes of a security risk includethe compromise of the confidentiality, availability, or integrity of data on a computing system, some formsof adware qualify. For example, they may do so by:
• Tracking user Web use and compiling a profile on the user’s browsing habits.
• Occupying bandwidth, thereby diminishing the functionality and availability of a computing system.• Modifying the Winsock.dll
99in order to monitor the user’s Web browsing habits, thereby affecting the
integrity of the computer.
6597Systems deploying Symantec antivirus security solutions
98Typically a monitor, but may be any device including cellular telephone screen or PDA viewer.
99Winsock, short for Windows Socket, is an API that allows Windows computers to communicate using the TCP/IP protocol.
0%2%4%6%8%10%
Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Percentage of top 50 programs
Period4%5%8%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Volume of adware
During the first six months of 2005, the percentage of adware in the top 50 programs reports to Symantec
increased dramatically over the two previous reporting periods (figure 28). Between January 1 and June 30,2004, adware made up 4% of the top 50 programs reported. In the second half of 2004, it made up 5% ofthe top 50 reports. Between January 1 and June 30, 2005, however, it made up 8% of the top 50 reports.This increase is likely due to a combination of three factors: increased anti-adware capability in securityproducts, resulting in improved detection; an increase in adware itself; and increased use of productsdesigned to deal with unwanted adware.
Figure 28. Percentage of adware in top 50 reports
Source: Symantec Corporation
66Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Top ten reported adware
The most reported adware program between January 1 and June 30, 2005, was ShopAtHomeAgent,100
which accounted for 19% of the top ten adware programs reported (table 6). This program is a new
addition to the Internet Security Threat Report . It downloads and displays advertisements; however, it may
also redirect access to certain Web sites through www.shopathomeselect.com, depending on whether or notthe target site is affiliated with ShopAtHomeSelect.com. This redirection may result in insecuretransactions, putting the user’s confidential data at risk.
Table 6. Top ten adware
Source: Symantec Corporation
The second most common adware program over the first six months of 2005 was Istbar,101a program that
makes up 14% of the top ten reports. This program was previously ranked fourth. Istbar is a family ofadware programs that install via an Internet Explorer toolbar, often using aggressive, persistent techniques.Some versions of ISTbar hijack Internet Explorer home pages and search results as well as displaying pop-up advertisements. Depending on the version, the pop-up advertisements may be pornographic in nature.
CoolWebSearch
102was the third most commonly reported adware for the first half of 2005, making up just
over 13% of the top ten adware reports. This program is new to the top ten. CoolWebSearch is a largefamily of security risk programs that may be manually installed or bundled with another program. Theprograms in the CoolWebSearch family exhibit a variety of different behaviors, but have been observedhijacking searches, which are then redirected to their Web site or an affiliate. Programs in theCoolWebSearch family have used stealth behavior to remain undetected and installed on a system.
67
100http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/adware.sahagent.html
101http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/adware.istbar.html
102http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/adware.coolwebsearch.htmlRank
1
23456789
10ShopAtHomeAgent
Istbar CoolWebSearch SearchAssistantIefeats Gain BetterInternet VirtuMonde EliteBar NdotNet
Program nameSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Adware installation
There are numerous different ways by which adware can be installed on a user’s computer (table 7). The
following sections will discuss some of those installation methods and offer suggestions for the preventionof unauthorized installation. It should be noted that some additional security risks use more than onemethod of installation.
End user license agreements (EULAs)
Many companies use adware as a way of providing services while lowering costs to customers. This is
particularly true of software that is made available for users to download for free (popularly known asfreeware). These programs usually require the user to agree to an EULA.
A EULA is a legal contract between the manufacturer and/or the author, producer and/or vendor of an
application and the end user that stipulates the conditions under which the software may be obtained and used, and lists any restrictions that the author, producer and/or vendor may impose on the end user.EULAs can be complicated and confusing. While some adware presents the user with a EULA that is easy to read, advising specifically and clearly what actions the program will take, this is not always the case. The user may unknowingly consent to the installation of this adware by accepting the EULA because the agreement is so complex that the user is unable or unwilling to read and understand the terms andconditions before agreeing to them.
103Assuming that the information in the EULA is correct and
acceptable to the user, the risk presented by an introduction of this type of adware is minimal.
Adware can also be installed by a third-party software provider after the user has accepted the software
EULA and installed the program. During the first six months of 2005, five of the top ten adware programsreported to Symantec were installed as a result of accepting a third-party EULA (table 7): Betterinternet,ISTBar, GAIN, ShopAtHomeAgent and 180Search. This is an increase over the last six months of 2004,during which three of the top ten adware programs were installed as a result of the user accepting a EULA.
It should be noted that the presence of the EULA can be dependent upon the configuration of the adware
program (for instance, turning on registry keys, etc.), as well as upon the preferences and practices of thirdparty affiliates. As a result, different users are likely to have different experience with adware programs.
Bundling
As was discussed in the previous section, some companies increase the distribution of their software by
offering it to users for free download. In order to generate revenue from this software, the producers often“bundle” the free software with adware. This is particularly true of peer-to-peer file sharing programs. Insome cases, the user may be notified of this bundling in the EULA but not always. When the software is runon the user’s system, the adware is also installed, either with the user’s knowledge and consent or withoutit. In the first six months of 2005, seven of the top ten adware programs were bundled with otherprograms (table 7). In the last six months of 2004, nine of the top ten programs installed by bundling.
68
103It should be noted that users often accept the terms of a EULA as an acceptable cost to pay to obtain the software with which t he EULA is associated. As such, these
end users must accept the consequences of accepting the EULA.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Web browsing
Adware is often installed through the user’s Web browser. This can be done through pop-up ads offering
free software to download. The pop-up sometimes offers the user a choice of clicking “Yes” or “No” toaccept or reject the offer. In reality, though, clicking anywhere on the ad often results in the download of adware. Browser-installed adware may also be installed through ActiveX
104controls or browser helper
objects (BHOs).105Eight of the top ten adware programs reported to Symantec in the first six months of
2005 were installed through Web browsers (table 7). This is an increase over the five reported in the last six months of 2004.
Symantec has conducted an internal study designed to determine the relationship between the types of
sites visited and the adware or spyware downloaded on the user’s machine. Symantec security researchersspent one hour surfing well known Web sites and found that after one hour of navigating children’s Websites, 359 adware programs had been installed on the user’s computer. Of all the categories of Web sitesvisited, this was far and away the highest number of adware programs installed.
106This indicates that sites
targeting children may have a disproportionately high rate of adware installation. This could be becausechildren are more likely to click on prompts or buttons in order to quickly get to the activities they wish toexplore. It is possible that machines used predominately by children may not be regularly updated.
To reduce the risk from adware that is installed through a Web browser, users should consider disabling
ActiveX. It is important to note, however, that doing so may also affect the functionality of the Web browserand may prevent certain Web sites and pages from rendering correctly. Some users require ActiveX, inwhich case they should configure their browser to require a prompt for ActiveX controls to execute. If thebrowser presents a dialogue box that is not expected, the user should not click anywhere on the dialoguebox. Instead, they should close the browser window immediately.
Table 7. Adware installation methods
Source: Symantec Corporation
69104ActiveX is set of Microsoft technologies that allows users to share information among different programs. For more information on ActiveX, please visit:
http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/workshop/components/activex/intro.asp
105Browser helper objects (BHOs) are add-on programs that can add legitimate features to a user’s browser (Internet Explorer 4.X a nd up). For example, document
readers that used to read programs within the browser do so through BHOs.
106Other categories of Web sites include: sports, gaming, news, reseller (auction), shopping, and travel. 180Search
BetterInternetCoolWebSearchEliteBarGainIefeatsIstbarNdotNetShopAtHomeAgentVirtuMondeYes
Yes
NoNo
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
NoYes
Yes
NoNo
YesYes
No
YesYesYesSometimes
YesYesYes
Sometimes
YesYesYes
NoNo
Program name Displays EULA Bundled Uses BHOSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
70Spyware
Spyware programs are stand-alone programs that can secretly monitor system activity and either relay
the information back to another computer or hold it for subsequent retrieval. In some cases, spywareprograms may be utilized by organizations to monitor Internet usage or by parents to monitor theirchildren’s Internet usage.
Spyware programs can be surreptitiously placed on users’ systems in order to gather confidential
information such as usernames, passwords, banking information, and credit card details. This can be donethrough keystroke logging and by capturing email and instant messaging traffic. Because spyware cancapture sensitive information before it is encrypted for transmission, it can bypass security measures suchas firewalls, secure connections, and VPNs. Spyware is a particular concern because of its potential for usein identity theft and fraud.
Top ten reported spyware
In the first six months of 2005, Webhancer
107was the top spyware program, accounting for 29% of the top
ten spyware programs reported overall (table 8). It was also the most reported spyware program duringboth reporting periods of 2004. Webhancer monitors the user’s browsing habits, sending the informationback to its centralized servers. The program has a EULA; however, it is also capable of updating itself fromthe servers. This means that updated versions may contain additional functionality that the user may nothave agreed to as part of the original EULA. For example, the additional functionality may disable antivirussoftware or allow remote access of the machine.
Table 8. Top ten spyware reports
Source: Symantec Corporation
Apropos,108was the second most reported spyware program in the first six months of 2005, making up
27% of the top ten spyware reports. It was ranked third in the second half of 2004. An Internet Explorerbrowser helper object (BHO) installed by an ActiveX control, Apropos installs a toolbar that links to Websites and sends information back to its server. Additionally, the application may download and install other files on the user’s computer. In some cases these files contain functionality that the user consentedto in the original EULA; however, in other cases they may contain functionality to which the user has not consented. Rank
1
23456789
10Webhancer
Apropos Marketscore CometCursor e2give Perfect ISearch Goidr ISpynow KeyTick
Program name
107http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/spyware.webhancer.html
108http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/spyware.apropos.htmlSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
The third most reported spyware program, Marketscore,109is a new addition to the top ten most reported
spyware programs, making up 19% of the top ten reported spyware programs. When Marketscore isinstalled on a computer, it starts a proxy service. Once this service has executed, all the systems’ Internetconnections will be routed through the Marketscore’s proxy, called OSSProxy. The publisher states that theprogram is designed to improve the speed of the Internet connection by using OSSProxy. However, becauseall of the system’s Internet connections will go through the Marketscore proxy, Internet usage informationmay be logged and submitted to Marketscore’s customer companies. This could introduce a security risk,depending upon customer preferences and policies.
Spyware installation
As is the case with adware, there are numerous different ways by which spyware programs can be installed
on a user’s system. The following sections will discuss some of those installation methods and offersuggestions for the prevention of unauthorized installation. It should be noted that some additionalsecurity risks use more than one method of installation.
Spyware and EULAs
Commercial spyware programs tend to have EULAs. However, as some spyware may be designed to be
installed and work without the user’s knowledge, the programs may contain an option that will allow forremote installation without the presence of the EULA. In other cases, the software’s EULA may containterms that permit future installation of spyware programs onto the end user’s computer withoutnotification. Spyware has the capacity to log keystrokes, IM conversations, email, and othercommunications that can contain personal identification information. As such, it can facilitate not onlymonitoring by legitimate sources, but fraud and identity theft as well. In the spyware category, the mostreported program, Webhancer, was consistently reported to have a EULA. Other programs may displayEULAs depending on configuration by third-party affiliates.
Bundling
Similar to adware, spyware programs are sometimes bundled with other programs, such as freeware
downloaded from the Internet; however, rather than being bundled intentionally by the program produceror distributor, spyware is likely to be inserted into a “desirable” program archive by someone who wishes to use it to obtain confidential data. The software package is then placed on a public download site or sent to a newsgroup for maximum exposure. The spyware is then executed when the user runs the desiredprogram. Of the top ten spyware programs reported to Symantec over the first six months of 2005, sixcame bundled with other software, including the top reported spyware program, Webhancer.
Web Browsers
Like adware, spyware can also be installed through a Web browser using ActiveX controls or BHOs.
However, some adware programs also install BHOs onto a user’s system for less legitimate purposes.Amongst other things, BHOs can monitor Web sites visited by the user, detect events, replace ads, changehome pages, and create windows to display information. BHOs can provide spyware with a wide range of functionality including, for example, the ability to download program updates, or log and exportconfidential data. During this reporting period, six of the top ten reported spyware programs used BHOs to install themselves, including the most reported program, Webhancer.
71
109http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/spyware.marketscore.htmlSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
To reduce the risk from spyware that is installed through a Web browser, users should consider disabling
ActiveX. It is important to note, however, that disabling ActiveX may also affect the functionality of the Web browser and may prevent certain Web sites and pages from rendering correctly. Some users requireActiveX, in which case they should configure their browser to require a prompt for ActiveX controls toexecute. If the browser presents a dialogue box that is not expected, the user should not click anywhere on the dialogue box. Instead, they should close the browser window immediately.
Table 9. Spyware installation methods
Source: Symantec Corporation
Adware and spyware functionality—browser hijackers
If a user is browsing the Internet, an adware program may initiate search redirection. For example, the
program may redirect a search by replacing the user’s default search engine or by replacing “404 page not found” messages with internal search queries. This is not only misleading for the end user but alsorepresents a security risk, as the redirection may steer the user’s browser to a malicious Web site. Forinstance, a user might be redirected to a spoofed site
110and then be prompted for personal information
such as passwords, authentication credentials, financial information, or other confidential data. The datamay then be used to commit identity theft or fraud. For example, users of Wells Fargo Bank were recentlytargeted with emails suggesting the user go to the bank’s home page through a link that was convenientlyprovided. Clicking on the link took users not to the bank’s home page but to a look-alike site where anypersonal information they provided was stolen.
111
Of the top ten adware programs reported in the first six months of 2005, five hijacked browsers. Spywarecan also hijack browsers. During the first six months of 2005, two spyware programs performed thisfunction.
Users should follow security best practices as outlined in “Appendix A” of this report. Furthermore, as
spyware can be placed on a user’s computer by exploiting vulnerabilities, operating system patches shouldbe kept updated. Users should also avoid visiting unknown, untrustworthy, or otherwise potentiallymalicious Web sites.
72
110A spoofed Web site is an illegitimate Web site that is made to look like a legitimate site, usually for malicious purposes. For instance, people engaged in
online fraud may create a Web site to look like a bank’s Web site, prompting the user to enter authentication credentials or ac count information that can
subsequently be used for illicit purposes.
111http://www.antiphishing.org/phishing_archive/Wells_3-9-04.htmProgram name
Apropos
CometCursore2giveGoidrIsearchIspynowKeyTickMarketscorePerfectWebhancerNo
NoNoNoNoNoNoNo
Sometimes
Yes
Displays EULA
YesYes
No
YesYes
No
Yes
NoNo
YesBundled Uses BHO
YesYesYes
No
Yes
NoNoNo
YesYesSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Adware and spyware—prevention and mitigation
Symantec recommends that all users continue to update their antivirus software regularly. Security
administrators should also take extra measures to ensure that patch levels on all computers are up-to-date. Symantec also recommends that users and administrators employ defense in-depth, including theuse of a properly configured firewall, an integrated antivirus and intrusion detection systems. Finally,Symantec advises users to exercise caution when installing any software through a Web browser and to not download any software from sources that are not known and trusted.
As has been established in the preceding discussion, some spyware and adware programs are installed
using ActiveX controls, Symantec recommends that users consider disabling ActiveX altogether. However,as was also stated earlier, some users may require ActiveX for some applications, in which case theyshould configure their browser to require a prompt for ActiveX controls to execute.
In addition to the deployment of defense in-depth, Symantec recommends that acceptable usage policies
are put in place and enforced. System administrators should regularly audit the system to ensure that nounauthorized software is installed or operating on the system. Furthermore, administrators and end usersshould read the EULAs of all software programs before agreeing to their conditions.
One final note of caution should be raised. Symantec recommends that users exercise caution when
removing spyware. Programs should be removed as non-intrusively as possible, in order to minimize anyproblems that might result from the removal of the program. In order to avoid such problems, it may benecessary to ignore some non-critical aspects of these programs, such as benign registry keys left behindduring the uninstall process.
73Program Name
180Search
BetterInternetCoolWebSearchEliteBarGainIefeatsIstbarNdotNetShopAtHomeAgentVirtuMondeNo
YesYesYes
No
YesYes
NoNoNo
Hijacks Browser Program Name
AproposCometCursore2giveGoidrIsearchIspynowKeyTickMarketscorePerfectWebhancerNo
Yes
NoNo
Yes
NoNoNoNoNo
Hijacks Browser
Table 10. Adware functionality
Source: Symantec CorporationTable 11. Spyware functionality
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Phishing
This section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report will assess phishing activity that Symantec has
detected between January 1 and June 30, 2005. Phishing is an attempt by a third party to solicitconfidential information from an individual, group, or organization, often for financial gain. Phishers aregroups or individuals who attempt to trick users into disclosing personal data, such as credit card numbers,online banking credentials, and other sensitive information. They may then use the information to commitfraudulent acts.
The data provided in this section is based on statistics returned from the Symantec Probe Network, which
consists of over two million decoy accounts that attract email messages from 20 different countries aroundthe world. The network encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises in the Americas, Europe, Asia,Africa, and Australia/Oceania and attracts e-mail samples that are representative of traffic that would bereceived by over 250 million mailboxes. It consists of previously used email addresses as well as emailaccounts that have been generated solely to be used as probes. The main purpose of the network is toattract spam, phishing, viruses, and other email-borne threats.
Phishing is assessed according to two indicators: phishing messages and phishing attempts. A phishing
message is a single, unique message that is sent to targets with the intent of gaining confidential and/orpersonal information from online users. Each phishing message has different content and each one willrepresent a different way of trying to fool a user into disclosing information. A phishing message can beconsidered the “lure” with which a phisher attempts to entice a phishing target. A single message, or lure,can be used many times in phishing attacks.
A phishing attempt can be defined as an instance of a phishing message being sent to a single user.
Phishing attempts are email messages that have been sent by the same phisher to one or more targets. This means that an attempt may consist of one or more different unique email messages. For instance,different phishing attempts may consist of the same phishing message being sent to different targets,different phishing messages being sent to the same target, or a combination of the two. Extending thefishing analogy, an attack can be considered a single cast of the lure or one instance of a phisher using a phishing message, or lure, to try to ensnare a target.
It should be noted that variations in accounting methods for phishing attempts exist amongst different
monitoring organizations. Some groups may identify and count unique phishing messages based solely on specific content items such as subject headers or URLs. These differing methods can often lead todifferences in the number of phishing attacks being reported by different organizations.
Symantec detects and confirms messages in a two-step process. First, all messages in the Symantec Probe
Network are scanned with a set of low-level heuristics,
112which search for key triggers such as domain
names that are known to be frequently phished entities. Symantec analysts then confirm that thesuspicious messages are in fact phishing messages.
This confirmation is important, as the goal of phishing attempts is to deceive the end user. Many phishing
messages closely resemble email messages sent by the entities that are being phished. In many cases onlycareful scrutiny of multiple message parts such as headers and body content can confirm that suspiciousemail does in fact constitute a phishing attempt.
74
112Heuristics are a set of simple filters that analyze email messages for common characteristics that appear in phishing messages.030,00060,00090,000120,000
July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Number of messages
Period69,90697,592Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
This section will discuss the following:
• Six-month growth in phishing messages
• Number of blocked phishing attempts• Phishing as a percent of email scanned
Six-month growth in phishing messages
The number of phishing messages is determined by tracking the number of unique messages that appear ineach batch of messages that the Symantec Probe Network classifies as a phishing attempt. Over the first sixmonths of 2005, the Symantec Probe Network detected 97,592 unique phishing messages (figure 29). Thisis an increase of 40% over the 69,906 unique phishing messages that were detected in the second half of2004. This increase may be attributed to several factors. First as the Symantec Probe Network grows, thenumber of total messages detected by the network also grows, which would likely increase the number ofphishing messages detected. However, the Symantec Probe Network grew less than 3% during the currentreporting period, so this factor is not likely the cause for the current increase in phishing messages.
Figure 29. Unique phishing messages detected
Source: Symantec Corporation
A more likely contributing factor is that as the number of companies identified by Symantec as phishing
targets grows, so does the number of phishing messages detected. Targeted companies can be divided intotwo groups: those targets that were previously being phished but were undetected, and those targets thathad not previously been phished. The discovery of new targets aids in strengthening detection heuristics,which in turn assists in detecting more phishing attempts.
7503006009001,200
July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Number of blocked phishing attempts
Period545,745,6681,037,980,187MillionsSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
The third factor contributing to the growth in detected phishing messages is an increase in highly
randomized phishing attacks. There is some evidence that certain phishers are narrowing the focus of theiremail campaigns. This means that they are customizing phishing attempts to their targets, even going sofar as to include valid account information in messages. This would likely shrink the size of these moretargeted phishing spam campaigns. If all phishers were moving to this tactic there would be a discernabledecrease in the amount of phishing. However large scale spam blasting
113is still occurring. As a result,
phishers are still able to continue to send out large numbers of email messages that have been highlyrandomized, especially in areas that are somewhat invisible to the average end user, such as pixels inattachments, URLs, and other HTML code. Much of this randomization is implemented for the purpose ofbypassing antispam and antifraud filters. The result is that larger numbers of unique phishing messagesare being sent out, which likely means that more end users are at risk of being phished.
Blocked phishing attempts
The number of blocked phishing is derived from the total number of phishing email messages sent to users
that were blocked in the field by Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam antifraud filters. Antifraud filters are rulesthat are created by Symantec Security Response™ that detect and block known phishing messages. Oncethe filters have been created they are deployed to the customer base where they prohibit the phishingemail messages from reaching end users.
The number of phishing attempts blocked by Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam in the first six months of
2005 indicates a significant increase in phishing activity (figure 30). In the first half of 2005, Symantecblocked 1.04 billion phishing attempts, compared to 546 million in the last six months of 2004; this is a90% increase in attempts blocked between the two periods.
Figure 30. Blocked phishing attempts
Source: Symantec Corporation
76113Spam blasting is a term used to describe widespread unsolicited spam email attacks. A spammer will send thousands upon thousand s of messages in a
single burst or blast.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
This increase is also evident in the weekly average of messages blocked. Between July 1 and December 31,
2004, Symantec blocked an average of 21 million phishing attempts a week. Between January 1 and June30, 2005, the weekly average was 40 million phishing attempts blocked, a 90% increase.
This growth can be attributed in part to growth of the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base. As
the number of customers increases, so do the number of phishing attempts caught by antifraud filters. Thenumber of Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam customers increased over 12% during the six-month period ofJanuary 1 to June 30, 2005; as a result, it is not surprising that detected phishing attempts also increased.However, the phishing attempt data is also based on a dynamic set of antifraud filters. As phishing changesand new phishing targets are discovered, the composition and volume of antifraud filters increases. Thefact that new antifraud filters are continually being developed supports the notion that phishing is stillgrowing.
Phishing likely continues to grow because phishing attempts continue to succeed and to be lucrative. In
2004, the average loss to consumers who reported Internet-related fraud to the Internet Crime ComplaintCenter
114was U.S.$240.00 for credit card fraud and U.S.$907.30 for identity theft.115According to the FBI,
in one specific case, an identity theft ring was able to net over U.S.$2 million.116
For phishers, the amount of time required to send out phishing emails is negligible. However, forconsumers who must re-establish credit histories and other personal records after identity theft hasoccurred, the cost in time and effort is considerable.
Phishing as a percent of email scanned
This section will discuss the volume of phishing attempts as a percentage of the total email scanned by
the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam solution. This number is determined by dividing the total number ofemail messages scanned by the number of email messages that trigger antifraud filters. These filters aredistributed across the Symantec customer base.
Between January 1 and June 30, 2005, the percentage of email messages that constitute phishing attempts
increased from 0.4% of the messages processed, or an average of 2.99 million attempts per day, to 0.8% of the messages processed, an average of approximately 5.70 million phishing attempts per day (figure 31).Peak days during this period experienced numbers well in excess of 13 million phishing attempts per day.
77
114The Internet Crime Complaint Center or IC3 is a partnership between the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National White Collar Crime Center see
http://www.ic3.gov/ for more information.
115http://www.ifccfbi.gov/strategy/2004_IC3Report.pdf
116http://www.fbi.gov/congress/congress05/swecker041305.htmSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
78117Message transfer agents are programs that are responsible for routing email messages to the proper destination.
118A DNSBL is simply a list of IP addresses or blocks of IP addresses that are known to send unwanted email traffic. The DNSBL is used by email software to either allow
or reject mail coming from IP addresses on the list.
119Spoofing refers to instances where phishers forge the “From:” line of an email message using the domain of the entity they are targeting with the phishing attempt.
120For instance, the FTC has published some basic guidelines on how to avoid phishing. They are available at:
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/phishingalrt.htm
121A good resource for information on the latest phishing threats can be found at http://www.antiphishing.org
0.0%0.2%0.4%0.6%0.8%1.0%
July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Percent of scanned email
Period0.4%0.8%Figure 31. Phishing as a percentage of email scanned
Source: Symantec Corporation
The 0.8 % of email scanned that made up phishing attempts may appear small in terms of percentages;
however, it translates into significant numbers. What it means is that roughly one out of every 125 emailmessages scanned was a found to be a phishing attempt. This is an increase from roughly one out of every250 email messages that constituted phishing attempts in the second half of 2004. In reality, what thismeans is that if an end user were to receive an average of 25 email messages per day, that user would thenbe receiving at least one phishing message every week.
Prevention and mitigation of phishing
Symantec recommends that enterprise users protect themselves against phishing threats through the
detection and filtering of email at the server level via the mail transfer agent (MTA).
117Although this will
likely remain the primary point of filtering for phishing, IP-based filtering can be used upstream as well asproviding HTTP filtering. DNS block lists (DNSBLs),
118which offer more general protection and may
mitigate some of the risk of phishing emails, offer another preventative option. Domain levelauthentication, the process of verifying the actual origin of an email message, should provide someprotection from phishers who are spoofing mail domains.
119
In countering the threat posed by phishing, administrators should always follow Symantec best practicesas outlined in “Appendix A” of this report. Symantec also recommends that organizations ensure that theirend users are educated about phishing in general,
120and are advised about the latest phishing scams and
how to avoid falling victim to them.121Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Organizations can also employ Web-log monitoring to track if complete Web site downloads are occurring.
This may indicate that someone is using the legitimate site to create an illegitimate phishing Web site.Organizations can also be alerted to phishing attacks that use spoofing by monitoring non-deliverableemail addresses, or bounced email returned to non-existent users. They should also monitor cousindomain
122purchasing by other entities. Tracking the registration of new cousin domains allows for
companies to identify purchases that could be used to spoof their corporate domain. This can be done with the help of companies that specialize in domain monitoring, some registrars are even beginning toprovide this service as well.
123
End users should also follow best security practices. As some phishing attacks may utilize spyware andkeystroke loggers, Symantec advises end users to use antivirus software, firewalls, and other softwaredetection methods. Symantec also advises end users to never disclose any confidential personal or financial information unless and until they can confirm that the request is legitimate. Bank and credit cardinformation should be reviewed frequently. This can provide information on any irregular activities. Forfurther information, the Internet Fraud Complaint Center
124has also released a list of guidelines on how to
avoid Internet-related scams.125
Spam
Spam is usually defined as junk email or unsolicited email from a third party. While it is certainly anannoyance to users and administrators, spam is also a serious security concern, as it can be used todeliver Trojans, viruses, and phishing attempts. Furthermore, high volumes of spam can create denial ofservice conditions wherein email systems are so overloaded that legitimate email and network traffic areunable to get through. This section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report will discuss
developments in spam activity between January 1 and June 30, 2005.
This analysis is based on data returned from the Symantec Probe Network as well as data derived from a
statistical sampling of the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base. Specifically, statistics weregathered from the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam servers of enterprise customers that received more than1,000 total email messages per day. This normalization allows for a more accurate representation of databy removing extremely small data samples, such as smaller customers and test servers. The proportion ofemail that is spam is calculated by dividing the total inbound email messages received by the samplecustomer base the total spam filtered by Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam.
The Symantec Probe Network comprises millions of decoy email addresses that are configured to attract a
large stream of spam attacks. These attacks are representative of the spam that is being received by theProbe Network’s partner’s domain. An attack can consist of one or more messages, or a group of similarmessages. All attacks are received and analyzed by Symantec Brightmail analysts, who produce antispamfilters based on the characteristics of the attacks.
The goal of the Symantec Probe Network is to simulate a wide variety of Internet email users, thereby
attracting a true representation of the spam messages that are circulating on the Internet at any given time. For this reason, it is continuously optimized in order to attract new varieties of spam attacks. This is accomplished through internal production changes made to the Probe Network, which thus affect thenumber of new spam attacks it receives.
79
122“Cousin domains” refers to domain names that include some of the key words of an organization’s domain or brand name. For examp le, for the corporate domain
“bigbank.com,” cousin domains could include “bigbank-alerts.com”, “big-bank-security.com” and so on.
123See http://www.markmonitor.com/brandmanagement/index.html for instance.
124The IFCC (http://www.ifccfbi.gov/) is a partnership between the FBI and the National White Collar Crime Center:
125http://www.fbi.gov/cyberinvest/inetschemes.htm0%20%40%60%80%
Jan 2005 Feb 2005 Mar 2005 Apr 2005 May 2005 June 2005Spam as a percentage of email
Period67%65%
61%60%59%
53%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Readers should note that all numbers presented in this discussion have been rounded off to the nearest
whole number. As a result, some cumulative percentages may exceed 100%.
This section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report will explore the following:
• Spam as a percentage of email
• Top 10 countries of spam origin
Spam as a percentage of email
Between January 1 and June 30, 2005, spam made up approximately 61% of all email traffic. This is avery slight increase over the last six months of 2004 when just over 60% of email was classified as spam.
While the six-month average remains above 60%, analysis of the spam data reveals a month-to-month
decline in the percentage of email that is spam between January 1 and June 30, 2005 (figure 32). InJanuary 2005, 67% of email was categorized as spam. By the end of June, this number had declined to53%. In absolute terms this represents a decline of 14 percentage points; however, in proportionate terms,it is a 21% decrease.
Figure 32. Spam as percentage of email
Source: Symantec Corporation
Much of this decline is due to the fact that network and security administrators are using IP filtering and
traffic shaping to control spam. IP filtering simply involves comparing inbound connection attemptsagainst a preconfigured list of bad or suspicious IP addresses. Traffic shaping is the use of different IPcharacteristics—such as an originating IP address that is a known source of spam—to selectivelydetermine what connections to allow, deny, or throttle (slow down).
80Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Compared with other antispam techniques, the benefit of router-based IP filtering and traffic shaping
is that spam messages are filtered upstream from the MTA. This reduces the burden on the MTA, thusallowing it to better handle the transfer of legitimate email through its network of end users. This gain isespecially valuable for large enterprises and ISPs that manage large volumes of email traffic. It also allowsfor the implementation of more resource-intensive antispam filtering techniques, resulting in a reduction ofthe spam experienced by email users.
It is important to note that, due to IP filtering and traffic shaping, a denied email message is more likely
to be invisible to the network; therefore, it will not contribute to the data that is gathered. As a result,Symantec believes that the six-month decline in the percentage of email is due, at least in part, to thesuccessful implementation of these technologies. This does not necessarily signify any decrease in spamattack attempts to Internet email users. However, it does indicate that these attempts are meeting withdecreasing success.
Another factor contributing to the decline in spam over the first six months of 2005 was the implementation
of outbound filtering by major ISPs. Given the large volumes of spam that have historically originated fromcompromised ISP accounts, many ISPs are working with their vendors to implement measures to filter theiroutbound email traffic. This is partly because of the success of IP-filtering. As third party blacklists
126grow
in usage and popularity, ISPs that are unable to prevent their email servers from being used to send spamrisk being blacklisted. This would subsequently limit their end users’ ability to successfully send email.Outbound filtering by ISPs will not end spam on the Internet. However, it could significantly reduce thedistribution of spam from compromised ISP accounts and bot networks.
Top countries of spam origin
This section will discuss the top ten countries of spam origin. The nature of spam and its distribution on the Internet presents challenges when attempting to identify the geographic location of spammers. Manyspammers try to obscure their actual location. In an attempt to bypass blacklists, they build coordinatednetworks of compromised computers known as bot networks,
127allowing them to send spam from sites that
are distant from their physical location. Following this logic, the region from which the spam originates maynot correspond with the region in which the spammers are located.
This discussion is based on the data gathered and returned by customer installations of Symantec
Brightmail Anti Spam, including the IP addresses of the originating servers, against which frequencystatistics are summarized. Each IP address is mapped to a specific country and charted over time. Thislimits the number of countries that Symantec monitors for spam origination. For example, if no Symanteccustomers receive a large volume of email originating from a particular country, then that country wouldless likely be represented in this metric.
During the first six months of 2005, 51% of all spam received worldwide originated in the United States
(table 12). South Korea was the second highest country of origin, accounting for 14% of all spam in the firsthalf of 2005. Canada, with over 7% of Internet spam, was the third-ranked country during this reportingperiod followed by China providing over 5%.
81126A blacklist is a list of email addresses or IP addresses from which spam is known to originate or which spammers are known to u tilize. Blacklists can be used to
filter out unwanted email, such as spam. A popular example of third party blacklist is Spamhaus (http://www.spamhaus.org/)
127For more in-depth discussion, please see the “Bot network” discussion in the “Attack Trends” report of this document.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
With the rapid deployment of high-speed Internet in even the smallest of countries, it is reasonable to
assume that the number of countries from which spam originates can be expected to increase. This isevident when comparing the first six months of 2005 with the last six months of 2004. For example, spamoriginating in the United States decreased from 60% in the last six months of 2004 to 51% in the first sixmonths of 2005. Spam originating in nearly all other top ten countries increased over the same period.This growth, coupled with newly emerging spam-producing countries, accounts for the United States’reduced percentage of total spam. Symantec predicts that as broadband connectivity continues to expandaround the world, spam will originate in even more countries than it currently does.
Table 12. Monthly growth of top ten countries of spam origin
Source: Symantec Corporation
82Country
United States
KoreaCanadaChinaBelgiumGreat BritainFranceJapanSpainBrazilJan–June
2005
51%
14%
7%5%3%2%2%2%1%1%July–Dec
2004
60%
9%6%4%2%2%
n/a
2%
n/a
1%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Future Watch
The previous sections of this report have discussed Internet security developments between January 1 and
June 30, 2005. This section of the Internet Security Threat Report will discuss emerging trends and issues
that Symantec believes will become prominent over the next 12 to 18 months. These forecasts are basedon emerging data that Symantec has collected during the current reporting period and are speculative innature. In discussing potential future trends, Symantec hopes to provide organizations with an opportunityto prepare themselves for rapidly evolving and complex security issues.
Modular malicious code
Traditional malicious code usually incorporates a wide range of functions in one executable program or file.However, as security vendors have learned to protect against those attacks, malicious code authors havedeveloped increasingly more sophisticated methods.
Over the past 18 months, Symantec has observed a disturbing trend in malicious code. Malicious code
authors have been deploying modular malicious code. Modular malicious code is malicious code—such as worms, viruses and Trojans—that initially possesses limited functionality.
128However, once installed on
a target computer, it downloads other pieces (or modules) of malicious code with different functionalitiesand further compromises the infected computer.
The Tooso.I
129Trojan is an example of modular malicious code that, once installed, attempts to disable
antivirus solutions and then download further functionality from different sources. Because of its modularstructure, the majority of this additional functionality is hosted on machines distributed across theInternet. Attackers can easily modify extant malicious code into new variants in order to bypass antivirusdetection signatures or to add new or additional functionality. As a result, security administrators mayhave to deploy stricter access rules and limit sites that host machines are able to connect to.
In addition to following recommended best practices outlined in “Appendix A” of this report, Symantec
continues to advise all administrators and end users to ensure that their antivirus definitions are updatedregularly. Furthermore, administrators and end users should apply operating system patches as soon asthey become available.
Bot networks increase in number, diversity, and sophistication
As discussed in the “Attack Trends” section of this report, bot activity increased considerably in the first sixmonths of 2005. The number of DoS attack attacks also increased during this period—by more than 680%over the last six months of 2004.
Using statistical regression testing, Symantec has determined that there is strong correlation between the
number of bot computers and the number of DoS attacks.
130Due to this observation Symantec believes
that bot network activity is driving the number of DoS attacks. As a consequence, Symantec feels thatother bot-related activity—such as spam relaying and Internet-based extortion
131—may also be on the rise,
as this activity is also likely being driven by bot network activity.
83128Initial functionalities can include disabling antivirus and firewalls.
129http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/trojan.tooso.i.html
130Regression testing yielded a coefficient of determination of 85%.
131See http://www.newscientist.com/channel/info-tech/mg18725125.900 and http://www.theregister.co.uk/2004/07/21/cyber_shakedown_ta ken_down/ for instance.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Symantec speculates that over the next year there will be a more coordinated community of bot network
computers carrying out more sophisticated, targeted attacks. This may include the use of bot networks as a method of seeding compromised networks with other types of malicious code, which could be used forspam, phishing, and theft of confidential information. Symantec also expects that as bot networks continueto mature they will begin to employ more sophisticated methods to avoid detection, such as encryption,packing, and rootkits.
Users and security administrators should employ defense in-depth strategies to reduce the likelihood that
their computer infrastructure will become compromised. Furthermore, users should be educated to neverview, open, or execute any email attachment unless it is expected and comes from a known and trustedsource, and the purpose of the attachment is known. Administrators and end users should also ensure that antivirus definitions are current and up-to-date.
Due to the increase in bot networks, the United States Federal Trade Commission has been urging ISPs to
take more action against bot networks in their subscriber bases.
132It is reasonable to believe that legislative
action may not be far behind.
Phishing targets and methods continue to grow
In the “Additional Security Risks” section of this Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec observed that the
threat of phishing continues to grow as attackers take advantage of new targets. Due to the fact that thereare far more smaller targets (such as regional banks) than large ones (like credit card companies) and that smaller targets generally present fewer challenges for attackers, the number of phishing targetswill most likely continue to grow.
Phishing messages are continually being altered in order to evade antispam and antiphishing filters. This
is driving new innovation in methods of evasion, particularly in the use of randomized changes in phishingmessages.
133This can take the form of randomized pixels in attached images, as well as URL obfuscation
techniques such as the use of cousin domains,134and Web site redirection.
Many of these new attacks target personal information and there is ample reason to believe that this
practice will continue to flourish. Any method that is successful in fooling end users into providing validinformation or simply validating information will continue to be used. For instance, some targeted phishingattacks will include the user’s account number and ask the intended victim to click on it in order to verifythat it is the correct account information for that user. If the user does this, these numbers maysubsequently be used for fraudulent purposes.
135
Symantec urges security administrators to monitor the registration of cousin domain names and to educateusers on the increased sophistication of these types of attacks. Industries that are often targeted by theseattacks—such as financial services—need to pay particular attention and stay informed of emergingtechniques and threats.
84
132http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/edcams/spam/zombie/index.htm
133http://discussions.virtualdr.com/archive/index.php/t-174119.html
134Cousin domains are domains created to appear as if they are part of a target’s legitimate domain. For example, if the target ha s a domain registered as
biz.com, an attacker may register security-biz.com and attempt to trick users into responding to email coming from the illegiti mate domain.
135http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009_22-5706305.htmlSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Symantec recommends that enterprises deploy an antiphishing solution that blocks these types of threats.
Symantec also recommends that organizations ensure that their end users are educated about phishing.136
They should also monitor phishing activity and keep their users informed of the latest phishing scams andhow to avoid falling victim to them.
137End users should be educated about the types of threats they are
likely to encounter and to not respond to any requests for confidential or financial information withoutconfirming the source and validity of the request.
Adware/spyware future developments
During the first half of 2005, media attention on both adware and spyware programs continued toincrease. Ongoing efforts to create legislation continue and working groups to address these issues havebeen formed. Symantec predicts these types of efforts will continue as other stakeholders invest time and resources in research related to spyware and adware.
As cellular telephones, PDAs, and hybrid devices become more prevalent, it is reasonable to assume that
security risks, such as spyware and adware, will increasingly target them. However, the risks will varydepending on the operating system, application, and how the devices are configured and used.
138
Furthermore, Symantec expects to see an increase in spam targeting these devices.
Symantec expects to see more targeted spyware utilizing a variety of sophisticated techniques in an
attempt to avoid detection. As was discussed in the “Malicious code for profit” section of the “MaliciousCode” report, these programs may be related to corporate espionage with the delivery and installation ofthe spyware programs being achieved through social engineering. For example, prominent employees in anorganization may be easily identified, and their areas of interest determined using readily available searchengines. Information about those interests can be used to design and deliver social engineering bait that islikely to be executed by the recipient.
Wireless security threats
Over the past couple of years, the number of wireless local area networks (WLAN) in enterprises and otherlocations has increased noticeably. It is now common to find WLAN connections in such places as coffeeshops, airports, and hotels. Furthermore, many home users are enjoying the increased conveniencewireless connectivity offers. There have even been proposals for municipalities to implement low-cost orfree wireless access in public places such as parks and libraries.
139While these sorts of initiatives provide
an alternative method for users to connect to the Internet, they often neglect important securityimplications of wireless deployment.
140The growing number of people using wireless connectivity has
brought a corresponding increase in the number of concerns posed by insecure wireless access points.141
Symantec continues to monitor reports of attacks and vulnerabilities in wireless devices. Attackers are ableto monitor, capture, and hijack sessions taking place over wireless networks. These illegitimate uses aremade easier by poor configuration of these devices, a lack of encryption, and inadequate authenticationrequirements. These weaknesses are inherent in the fact that wireless access points often act as de facto
public terminals.
85136For instance, the FTC has published some basic guidelines on how to avoid phishing. They are available at:
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/phishingalrt.htm
137A good resource for information on the latest phishing threats can be found at http://www.antiphishing.org
138Bluetooth-enabled devices, for example, appear to have greater potential to allow exploitation than a non-Bluetooth-enabled dev ice.
139See http://www.wirelessphiladelphia.org for instance.
140http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1830998,00.asp
141Wireless access points are devices that allow laptops, mobile devices, and desktops to connect to a local area network without the need for network cabling. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
In some cases, attackers will impersonate the wireless access point itself in order to capture sensitive or
useful information from machines attempting to connect to it. This has led to a reported increase in thenumber of war drivers
142who use those connections to launch attacks and steal confidential information.
Malicious users may also surf other users’ Internet connections and, in the process, impersonate alegitimate user or anonymize their online activities.
143
Enterprises that deploy wireless networks are particularly at risk. Attackers can gain access to thesenetworks by bypassing the traditional perimeter security measures, such as IDS systems and firewalls,which are normally in place on wired networks. Symantec recommends that enterprises that use wirelessnetworks implement authentication and strong encryption such as 128-bit WEP
144or WPA.145Additionally,
enterprises should ensure that wireless networks operate over a VPN and that connections be placed in aDMZ,
146in which inbound and outbound connections are required to pass through a firewall. Mobile users
should ensure that they connect only to secure wireless access points and that, when not in use, wirelessnetwork devices are turned off or disabled.
VoIP threats expected to emerge
Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP)147is quickly becoming a widely adopted alternative to traditional
analogue phone systems. There are currently 23 million users of Skype VoIP alone with users expected tosurpass 160 million by the end of 2006.
148By that time, it is expected that two-thirds of the Global 2000
companies149will have adopted VoIP as their primary means of voice communication.150Designed to carry
voice and data over the same network connection, VoIP is subject to quality-of-service concerns whensecurity measures are implemented. Current standards such as Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
151could
be vulnerable to general protocol threats and cross platform vulnerabilities.
VoIP may be vulnerable to a wide range of possible attacks, including (but not necessarily limited to): • Attempts to discover legitimate IP phone addresses through directory harvesting.
152
• Clogging voicemail systems with voice spam sent as audio files.
• Voice phishing, in which voicemails urge users to return calls and leave personal financial information. • DoS attacks against voice servers.• Vulnerabilities in VoIP products
153that may be exploited for malicious purposes.
VoIP can also be subject to attacks that result in call redirection to another phone, the hijacking of ongoing
calls, and the ability to turn on other phones so they act as receivers of conversations. The introduction ofVoIP on enterprise networks in the absence of appropriate security measures could introduce anotherentry point for attackers to exploit.
86142War drivers are people who scan for available wireless networks and often hijack or join those networks without permission.
143An anonymized attack allows a person to launch an attack without being traced.
144Wireless equivalent protocol (WEP) is a security protocol for wireless local area networks that encrypts data over radio waves. While initially developed
for security, a number of flaws have been identified in WEP and it has since been superseded as a means of securing wireless co mputing.
145Wi-fi protected access (WPA) is a system to secure wireless networks that was designed to improve upon the security shortcoming s of WEP.
146A DMZ is subnetwork that is situated between a trusted internal network and an external public network such as the Internet. We b, email, and FTP
servers are often placed in DMZs.
147Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) is technology for transmitting ordinary telephone calls over the Internet.
148Evalueserve “The Impact of SKYPE on Telecom Industry(PDF)(Study by Evalueserve) http://www.evalueserve.com/Media_Center/mediace nternew.asp#
149The Global 2000 is a composite ranking of the world’s biggest companies as ranked by Forbes. http://www.forbes.com
150eWeek.com “VOIP: A New Day is Dawning” (December 6, 2004): http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1735347,00.asp
151Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), is a signaling protocol for Internet conferencing, telephony, presence, events notification, and instant messaging.
152Directory harvesting attacks occur when an attacker uses known email addresses to generate other valid addresses from corporate or ISP servers. Often
used by spammers, this technique allows attackers to send emails to randomly generated email addresses. Some of these email add resses are real
users in the organization; however, many of them are bogus addresses that flood the victim’s mail server.
153http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/14174/infoSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
While there are currently few reported attacks directed at VoIP systems, Symantec feels that as this new
communications technology gains widespread acceptance and deployment, it is only a matter of timebefore attackers target it more intensely. One possible scenario is the ability of IP-based attackers to gainaccess to tradition phone systems through IP-PSTN gateways.
154
Symantec advises that enterprises that are considering the adoption of VoIP perform a risk analysis priorto implementation. They should also put in place appropriate security measures, such as an SIP firewall on all systems that connect through VoIP. Organizations are also advised to consider separating VoIP anddata networks in order to address performance issues that security measures might introduce.
Continued security concerns for Mac OS®
In the “Future Watch” section of the previous Internet Security Threat Report ,155Symantec advised readers
that Apple’s Mac OS X was an emerging target for attacks. During the current reporting period, Symantecdocumented a noteworthy number of vulnerabilities and attacks directed at Mac OS X.
An ever-increasing number of users are adopting Mac OS X. Many of these users believe that this operating
system and the applications that run on it are immune to traditional security concerns. However, evidencesuggests that, increasingly, they may be operating under a false sense of security.
156
Mac OS X is based on a Berkeley Systems Design (BSD) UNIX-like environment. Many of the securityconcerns that UNIX users face are now shared by those who have adopted Mac OS X.
157As Mac OS X users
demand more features and implement more ports158of popular UNIX applications, vulnerabilities and
exploits targeting this operating system and its underlying code base are likely to increase.
Over the past two reporting periods, the number of vendor-confirmed vulnerabilities in Mac OS X has
remained relatively constant. None of these have been widely exploited. However, this could change in thenear future. During the writing of this report, an analysis was performed on a rootkit
159designed to take
advantage of Mac OS X.160Mac OS X/Weapox161is a rootkit based on the AdoreBSD rootkit. While there
have been no reports of widespread infection to date, this Trojan serves to demonstrate that as Mac OS Xincreases in popularity so too will the scrutiny it receives from potential attackers.
The discovery of Mac OS X/Weapox indicates that Mac OS X may no longer be immune from widespread
attack. As such, system administrators, security administrators, and end users should employ defense in-depth. Though vulnerabilities and malicious code targeting other operating systems continue to outnumberthose on Mac OS X, Symantec recommends that users continue to apply security patches as they becomeavailable and continue to educate themselves on security issues affecting Mac OS X.
87154An IP-PSTN gateway translates voice and data carried over a VOIP network to conventional telephone signaling so that calls can be routed over a conventional
telephone network.
155Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume VII (March 2005): http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539
156See the following URL, for instance:
http://www.securityfocus.com/swsearch?query=OS+X&sbm=bid&submit=Search%21&metaname=swishtitle&sort=swishlastmodified
157A recent announcement surrounding an audit of the underlying source code in Darwin, the implementation of UNIX that underlies Ap ple Computer Inc.’s Mac OS X
operating system, revealed kernel level vulnerabilities that could be exploited by remote attackers. (For more details, see:http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1759,1752632,00.asp)
158A port is application or piece of code written on one platform that is then modified to run on another.
159A rootkit is a collection of tools that allows an attacker to provide a back door into a system, collect information on other s ystems on the network, mask the fact that
the system is compromised, and perform other activities as desired by the attacker.
160Virus Bulletin July 2005: http://www.virusbtn.com
161http://pferrie.tripod.com/vb/weapox.pdfSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Advanced tools make finding vulnerabilities easier
Recent advances in technologies that analyze software code have made the discovery of vulnerabilities
and the creation of code designed to exploit those vulnerabilities easier than ever before. Traditionally,vulnerability research has been a time-intensive process requiring, in most cases, above averageprogramming and reverse engineering skills. Advances in software analysis tools
162 have made decompiling
software and binary patches quicker and easier than previous methods, particularly manual techniques.Specifically, advanced analysis tools are now available to help researchers to find vulnerabilities insoftware. These tools have abstracted program flow from machine code, providing researchers with avisual representation of program structure that may be even simpler, in some instances, than looking at source code.
As is the case with many security tools, these programs can be deployed for legitimate purposes by
security administrators. Some high-profile security researchers have been able to demonstrate how thesetools and new methods have made the discovery of vulnerabilities and the design of exploit code easier.
163
As the “Exploit development time” discussion in the “Vulnerability Trends” report of this paper points out,the average time for exploit development was 6.0 days. Advanced analysis tools may allow potentialattackers to narrow this window. The widespread availability of an exploit means that vulnerabilities areexposed to potential exploitation. By making the development of exploit code faster and easier, advancedanalysis tools increase the probability that vulnerabilities will be exploited before appropriate patches aremade available and applied.
Just as advances in programming techniques have opened the door to more programmers, Symantec
believes that advances in code debugging and analysis tools will increase the number of people who areable to discover and exploit vulnerabilities. It will also likely mean an increase in both the number and theseverity of vulnerabilities and the likelihood of zero-day exploits.
164
88162Sabre Security’s (http://www.sabre-security.com) BinDiff and BinNavi are examples of advanced analysis tools used by some resea rchers to find
vulnerabilities in software.
163Sabre Security demonstrates the use of its tool to quickly identify a vulnerability corrected by Microsoft via a binary-only pa tch:
http://www.sabre-security.com/products/flash_bindiff_png.html
164A zero-day exploit is a set of code that is developed to exploit a vulnerability before the vulnerability is disclosed publicly . Zero-day exploits are
particularly dangerous. Since the attack is completely unknown to the public it is impossible for administrators to protect the ir systems against it.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices
Enterprise Best Practices
1. Employ defense-in-depth practices, which emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive
defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protectionmethodology. This should include the deployment of antivirus, firewalls, intrusion detection andintrusion protection systems on client systems. Enterprises should also ensure that they are activelymonitoring their environments 24x7 against attack.
2. Turn off and remove unneeded services.3. If a blended threat exploits one or more network services, disable, or block access to those services
until a patch is applied.
4. Always keep patch levels up-to-date, especially on computers that host public services—such as HTTP,
FTP, SMTP, and DNS servers—and are accessible through a firewall.
5. Enforce a password policy.6. Configure email servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments that are commonly
used to spread viruses, such as .VBS, .BAT, .EXE, .PIF, and .SCR files.
7. Isolate infected computers quickly to prevent further compromise within the organization. Perform
a forensic analysis and restore the computers using trusted media.
8. Train employees not to open attachments unless they are expecting them. Also, do not execute
software that is downloaded from the Internet unless it has been scanned for viruses.
9. Ensure that emergency response procedures are in place. This includes having a backup-and-restore
solution in place in order to restore lost or compromised data in the event of successful attack orcatastrophic data loss.
10. Educate management on security budgeting needs.11. Test security to ensure that adequate controls are in place.12. Both spyware and adware can be automatically installed on systems along with file-sharing programs,
free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software, or by clicking on links orattachments in email messages, or via instant messaging clients. Ensure that only applicationsapproved by your organization are deployed on the desktop.
Consumer Best Practices
1. Use an Internet security solution that combines antivirus, firewall, intrusion detection, and
vulnerability management for maximum protection against blended threats.
2. Ensure that security patches are up-to-date.3. Ensure that passwords include a mix of symbols, letters, and numbers. Do not use dictionary words.
Change passwords often.
89Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
4. Never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
5. Keep virus definitions updated. By deploying the latest virus definitions, corporations and consumers
are protected against the latest viruses known to be spreading “in the wild.”
6. Consumers should routinely check to see if their PC or Macintosh system is vulnerable to threats by
using Symantec Security Check at www.symantec.com/securitycheck.
7. All types of computer users need to know how to recognize computer hoaxes and phishing scams.
Hoaxes typically include a bogus email warning to “send this to everyone you know” and impropertechnical jargon to frighten or mislead users. Phishing scams are much more sophisticated. Oftenarriving in email, phishing scams appear to come from a legitimate organization and entice users toenter credit card or other confidential information into forms on Web site designed to look like that of the legitimate organization. Consumers and business professionals also need to consider who issending the information and determine if it is a reliable source. The best course of action is to simplydelete these types of emails.
8. Consumers can get involved in fighting Internet crime by tracking and reporting intruders. With
Symantec Security Check’s tracing service, users can quickly identify the location of potential hackersand forward the information to the attacker’s Internet service provider or local police.
9. Be aware of the differences between spyware and adware. Spyware has been used for malicious
purposes, including identity theft, while adware is often used to gather data for marketing purposesand has a valid, generally benign purpose.
10. Both spyware and adware can be automatically installed on your system along with file-sharing
programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software, or by clicking on links orattachments in email messages, or via instant messaging clients. Therefore, be informed and selectiveabout what you install on your computer.
11. Don’t just click those “Yes, I accept” buttons on EULAs. Some spyware and adware applications can
be installed after, or as a by-product of, accepting the EULA. Read each EULA carefully to examine whatit means in terms of privacy. The agreement should clearly explain what the product is doing and provide an uninstaller.
12. Beware of programs that flash ads in the user interface. Many spyware programs track how you
respond to these ads. When you see ads in a program’s user interface, you may be looking at a piece of spyware.
90Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology
Attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from Symantec DeepSight Threat
Management System and Symantec Managed Security Services. Both services refer to attacks in the sameway, enabling analysts to combine and analyze attacks together. Symantec combines these two datasources for analysis. In some cases, only one data source is used if attributes required for a particularanalysis are not available in the other.
Attack definitions
In order to avoid ambiguity with the findings presented in this discussion, Symantec’s methodology foridentifying various forms of attack activity is outlined clearly below. This methodology is appliedconsistently throughout our monitoring and analysis. The first step in analyzing attack activity is to defineprecisely what an attack is.
Attacks are individual instances of malicious network activity. Attacks consist of one IDS or firewall alert
that is indicative of a single attack action. The “Top Internet attacks” metric is a good indicator of theoverall volume of actual “attack actions” detected over a specified period of time.
Explanation of research enquiries
This section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to gather and analyze the data andstatistics in this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, the following investigations warranted additional detail.
Top Internet attacks
Symantec identifies and ranks all the attacks that are detected on networks across the Symantec DeepSightThreat Management System and Symantec Managed Security Services base. This ranking can be seen asrepresentative of the distribution of attacks that an Internet-connected host can expect to observe.Symantec investigates and ranks attacks in three ways. Each approach can give visibility into certainemerging trends. The three ways attacks are tracked and ranked are:
• The proportion of sensors that detect a given attack.
• The proportion of attacking IP addresses that perform a given attack.• The proportion of aggregate attack volume that is attributable to a given attack.
The proportion of attacking IP addresses that perform a given attack is included in this report, as this
gives the best insight into the popularity of the attack.
165
91165In previous editions of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , both the attack volume and number of attackers were cited and compared.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Top attacked ports
The top port data is gathered solely from the Symantec DeepSight Threat Management System, and
represents individual scan attempts from perimeter security devices throughout the world. Not every singleport scan can be considered hostile, but port data is often indicative of wide-scale scanning for individualservices being targeted for exploitation.
Symantec investigates and ranks targeted ports in three ways. Each approach can give visibility into certain
emerging trends. The three ways ports are tracked and ranked are:
• The proportion of sensors that detect a given attack.
• The proportion of attacking IP addresses that perform a given attack.• The proportion of aggregate attack volume that is attributable to a given attack.
The proportion of attacking IP addresses that perform a given attack is included in this report.
Attack activity per day
Symantec uses a daily attack rate as a rough estimate of the rate of attack activity experienced by networks
connected to the Internet. This is used as an indicator of whether the attack rates are rising or fallingbetween sample periods.
Previous volumes of the Internet Security Threat Report have used the median number of attack events
determined by analyzing Symantec Managed Security Services and Symantec DeepSight ThreatManagement System sensors. Symantec analysts identified attack events formerly represented in thismetric such that a single attack event could be made up of multiple attacks conducted by a single source IP against a single company. However, this method had the affect of under-representing the number ofindividual attacks observed.
For this volume of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , this metric has been redesigned to include
all unauthorized access attempts denied
166at the firewall and the network intrusion detection system level.
This new method of determining the daily number of attacks is more representative of the rate of attackactivity experienced by networks connected to the Internet than the method previously used. Furthermore,the number of attacks used for this analysis is that of the company that observed the median number ofattacks in the sample set. Using the median organization assures that the daily attack rate is representativeof the attack activity across the Internet as a whole. A small number of companies with disproportionatelyhigh daily attack rates would cause the mean average to be skewed.
167
Bot networks
Symantec identifies certain scanning patterns and observed network traffic and cross-references this trafficwith rules that define specific coordinated scanning behavior. For an originating computer to be flagged asparticipating in this coordinated scanning, which would indicate bot network activity, it must fit into thatscanning pattern to the exclusion of any other activity. This behavioral matching will not catch every botnetwork computer, and may identify other malicious code behaving in a coordinated way as a bot network.
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166Symantec recognizes that not all attacks are denied at the firewall; however, only those connection attempts that are denied at the firewall (as opposed
to those that are permitted) can be treated as attacks.
167The mean average number of attacks per day for the companies observed was approximately 2,012 with a standard deviation of appr oximately 27,311
while the median was 57. This illustrates the large positive skew represented in the data.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Denial of service attacks
Although there are numerous methods for carrying out denial of service attacks, Symantec derives this
metric by measuring denial of service attacks carried out by flooding a target with SYN requests.168This
type of attack works by overwhelming a target with SYN requests and not completing the initial request,which thus prevents other valid requests from being processed. In many cases, SYN requests with forged IP addresses are sent to a target, causing a single attacking computer to initiate multiple connections,resulting in unsolicited traffic referred to as backscatter being sent to other computers on the Internet.This backscatter is used to derive the number of denial of service attacks observed throughout thereporting period.
Top bot-infected countries
Using the data derived from the “Bot network” discussion of the “Attacks Trends” report, Symantec cross-references the IP addresses of every identified bot-infected computer with several third-partysubscription-based databases that link the geographic location of systems to IP addresses. While thesedatabases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error. The data produced is then used todetermine the global distribution of bot-infected computers.
Top originating countries
Symantec identified the national sources of attacks by automatically cross-referencing source IP addressesof every attack with several third-party, subscription-based databases that link the geographic location ofsystems to source IP addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin oferror. Currently, Symantec cross-references source IP addresses of attacks against every country in theworld. It is important to note that while Symantec has a reliable process for identifying the source IPaddress of the host that is directly responsible for launching an attack, it is impossible to verify where theattacker is physically located. It is probable that many of the sources of attack are intermediary systemsused to disguise the attacker’s true identity and location.
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168The TCP protocol requires a three-way exchange to be carried out before any data is sent. The SYN request is the first phase of the three-way exchange. Once a
SYN request is received by a server, a SYN-ACK is sent in response. The final step is an ACK response, completing the connectio n negotiation process.Retail/wholesale/e-commerce 2%Telecommunications 2%
Small business 38%
Accounting 18%Education 7%Health care 4%Computer consulting 4%
Financial services 5%
Information technology 7%Transportation 1%Government–local 1%
Government–national 1%Government–state 1%
Manufacturing 2%
Computer software 3%Arts/media 2% Utilities/energy 1%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Targeted attack activity by industry
For the purposes of the report, a targeted attacker is one that is detected attacking at least three
companies in a specific industry, to the exclusion of all other industries. Figure 33 represents the industrybreakdown of the sample set in percentage terms. Industries with less than ten sensors have beenexcluded from the resulting totals.
The targeted industry attack rate is a measure of the percentage of total attackers that target only
organizations in a specific industry. It can indicate which industries are more frequently the targets ofdirected attacks. This metric may be affected by the overall attack rate experienced by each industry;nevertheless, it provides an indication of the interest that an industry holds for targeted attackers.
Figure 33. Attack activity by industry
Source: Symantec Corporation
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Appendix C—Vulnerability Trends Methodology
The “Vulnerability Trends” report of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report discusses developments
in the discovery and exploitation of vulnerabilities over the past six months. This methodology section willdiscuss how the data was gathered and how it was analyzed to come to the conclusions that are presentedin the “Vulnerability Trends” section.
Symantec maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive databases of security vulnerabilities,
consisting of over 13,000 distinct entries. The following metrics discussed in the “Vulnerability Trends”report are based on the analysis of that data by Symantec researchers:
• Total number of vulnerabilities disclosed
• Web application vulnerabilities• Vulnerabilities with exploit code
The ways in the data for the remaining metrics is gathered and analyzed will be discussed in the remainder
of this methodology.
Vulnerability classifications
Following the discovery and or announcement of a new vulnerability, Symantec analysts gather all relevantcharacteristics of the new vulnerability and create an alert. This alert describes important traits of thevulnerability, such as the severity, ease of exploitation, and a list of affected products. These traits aresubsequently used both directly and indirectly for this analysis.
Vulnerability type
After discovering a new vulnerability, Symantec threat analysts classify the vulnerability into one of 12possible categories. The classification system is based on Taimur Aslam et al (1996),
169who define the
taxonomy used to classify vulnerabilities. Possible values are indicated below, and the previouslymentioned white paper provides a full description of the meaning behind each classification:
• Boundary condition error
• Access validation error• Origin validation error• Input validation error• Failure to handle exceptional conditions• Race condition error• Serialization error• Atomicity error• Environment error• Configuration error• Design error
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169“Use of a Taxonomy of Security Faults” http://ftp.cerias.purdue.edu/pub/papers/taimur-aslam/aslam-krsul-spaf-taxonomy.pdfSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Severity of vulnerabilities
Vulnerability severity is a measure of the degree to which the vulnerability gives an attacker accessibility
to the targeted system. It also measures the potential impact that successful exploitation may have for the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the affected system. Symantec analysts calculate a severityscore on a scale of 1 to 10 for each new vulnerability discovery. The severity score is based on the following factors:
•Impact —the relative impact on the affected system if the vulnerability is exploited. For example, if the
vulnerability enables the attacker to gain full root access to the system, the vulnerability is classified as“high impact.” Vulnerabilities with a higher impact rating contribute to a higher severity score.
•Remote exploitability —indicates whether or not the vulnerability can be exploited remotely.
Vulnerabilities are classified as remotely exploitable when it is possible to exploit the vulnerability usingat least one method from a position external to the system, typically by some type of communicationprotocol, such as TCP/IP, IPX, or dial-up. Vulnerabilities that are remotely exploitable contribute to ahigher severity score.
•Authentication requirements —indicates whether the vulnerability can be exploited only after providing
some sort of credentials to the vulnerable system, or whether it is possible to exploit it without supplyingany authentication credentials. Vulnerabilities that require no authentication on the part of the attackercontribute to a higher severity score.
•Availability of the affected system —rates how accessible the system is to attackers in terms of
exploitability. Some vulnerabilities are always exploitable once the attacker has accessed the system.Other vulnerabilities may be dependent on timing, the interaction of other objects or subjects, orotherwise only circumstantially exploitable. Increased availability of the affected system to attackers will increase the calculated severity.
After gathering information on these four attributes, analysts use a pre-established algorithm to generate a
severity score that ranges from one to ten. For the purposes of this report, vulnerabilities are rated as high,moderate, or low severity based on the scores presented in table 13 below. For the purposes of the Internet
Security Threat Report , each vulnerability is categorized as one of three severity levels. These levels are:
Low severity (0–3) —vulnerabilities that constitute a minor threat. Attackers cannot exploit the vulnerability
across a network. As well, successful exploitation of the vulnerability would not result in a completecompromise of the information stored or transmitted on the system. Low-severity vulnerabilities includenon-critical losses of confidentiality (for example, system configuration exposure) or non-critical losses ofintegrity (for example, local file corruption).
Moderate severity (4–7) —vulnerabilities that result in a partial compromise of the affected system, such
as those by which an attacker gains elevated privileges but does not gain complete control of the targetsystem. Moderately severe vulnerabilities include those for which the impact on systems is high butaccessibility to attackers is limited. This includes vulnerabilities that require the attacker to have localaccess to the system or to be authenticated before the system can be exploited.
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High severity (8–10) —vulnerabilities that result in a compromise of the entire system if exploited. In
almost all cases, successful exploitation can result in a complete loss of confidentiality, integrity, andavailability of data stored on or transmitted across the system. High-severity vulnerabilities will allowattackers access across a network without authentication.
Table 13. Measurement of severity level
Remotely exploitable vulnerabilities, adjusted severity
Because the majority of vulnerabilities are remotely exploitable, and remote exploitability raises severity,the overall severity composition of vulnerabilities is skewed towards having a higher severity. This metricattempts to compensate for this. The metric is computed using the severity rating formula with the remoteexploitability criteria (as a weighted factor in the formula) removed. This metric only includes remotelyexploitable vulnerabilities.
Ease of exploitation
The ease of exploitation metric indicates how easily vulnerabilities can be exploited. The vulnerabilityanalyst assigns the ease rating after thoroughly researching the need for and availability of exploits for the vulnerability. All vulnerabilities are classified into one of three possible categories, listed below.
•Exploit available —exploit code to enable the exploitation of the vulnerability is publicly available to all
would-be attackers.
•No exploit required —would-be attackers can exploit the vulnerability without having to use any form of
exploit code. In other words, the attacker does not need to create or use complex scripts or tools toexploit the vulnerability.
•No exploit available —would-be attackers must use exploit code to make use of the vulnerability;
however, no such exploit code is publicly available.
For the purposes of this report, the first two types of vulnerabilities are considered “easily exploitable”
because the attacker requires only limited sophistication to make use of it. The last type of vulnerability isconsidered “difficult to exploit” because the attacker must develop his/her own exploit code to make use ofthe vulnerability.
97Severity level Severity score range
High X ≥ 8
Moderate 4 ≤ X≤ 7Low X ≤ 3Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Exploit development time
The ability to measure exploit development time is limited and applies only to the vulnerabilities that
would normally require exploit code. Therefore, the metric is based on vulnerabilities that Symantecconsiders to be of sufficient complexity,
170and that did not have functional exploit code until it was
created by a third party. This consideration excludes the following:
• Vulnerabilities that do not require exploit code
• Vulnerabilities associated with exploit code published by the discoverer of the vulnerability• Vulnerabilities associated with non-functional proof-of-concept code
The date of vulnerability disclosure is based on the date of the first reference found (such as a mailing
list post). The date of exploit publication is the date of the first reference to the exploit code found.
The time lapse between vulnerability disclosure and appearance of exploit code for each applicable
vulnerability is determined and computed into a monthly average.
Patch development and availability time
The time to patch metric measures the time lapse between the disclosure date of a vulnerability and therelease date of a patch. Only those patches that are independent objects (such as fixes, upgrades, etc.) canbe included. Other remediation solutions—such as workaround steps, for instance—are excluded.
Because of the large number of vendors with technologies that have a very low deployment (these form
the majority), only fixes for technologies from enterprise vendors are included. Those vendors are:
• Microsoft
• Sun™•H P ®• Symantec/VERITAS• EMC• IBM®• Cisco®• Oracle®
For each individual patch from these vendors, the time lapse between the patch release date and the
publish date of the vulnerability is computed. An average from the aggregate of these is computed for each period.
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170Memory corruption vulnerabilities. This includes buffer overflows, integer handling errors, format string vulnerabilities, and others which result in a
corruption of system memory.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Browser vulnerability comparisons
This metric will offer a comparison of vulnerability data for numerous browsers, namely: Microsoft Internet
Explorer, the Mozilla browsers (which includes Firefox), Opera, Safari and KDE Konqueror. However, inassessing the comparative data, the following important caveats should be kept in mind before making anyconclusions:
• Because of the difficulty in comparing verifiable, confirmed, unique vulnerabilities, only those that were
confirmed by the vendor were taken into consideration.
• Individual browser vulnerabilities are notoriously difficult to pinpoint and identify precisely. A reported
attack may be a combination of several conditions, each of which could be considered a vulnerability inits own right. This may distort the total vulnerability count.
• Not every vulnerability that is discovered is exploited. As of this writing, there has been no widespread
exploitation of any browser except Microsoft Internet Explorer. This is expected to change as otherbrowsers become more popular.
99Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix D—Malicious Code Trends Methodology
The trends in the “Malicious Code Trends” section are based on statistics from malicious code samples
reported to Symantec for analysis. Symantec gathers data from over 120 million client, server and gatewaysystems that have deployed Symantec’s antivirus products in both consumer and corporate environments.The Symantec Digital Immune System and Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate thisreporting process.
Observations in the “Malicious Code Trends” section are based on empirical data and expert analysis of
this data. The data and analysis draw primarily from two databases described below.
Infection database
To help detect and eradicate computer viruses, Symantec developed the Symantec AntiVirus™ ResearchAutomation (SARA) technology. Symantec uses this technology to analyze, replicate, and define a largesubset of the most common computer viruses that are quarantined by Symantec AntiVirus customers. Onaverage SARA receives hundreds of thousands of suspect files daily from both enterprise and individualconsumers located throughout the world. Symantec then analyzes these suspect files, matching them withvirus definitions. An analysis of this aggregate data set provides statistics on infection rates for differenttypes of malicious code.
Malicious code database
In addition to infection data, Symantec Security Response analyzes and documents attributes for each new form of malicious code that emerges both in the wild and in a “zoo” (or controlled laboratory)environment. Descriptive records of new forms of malicious code are then entered into a database forfuture reference. For this report, historical trend analysis was performed on this database to identify,assess and discuss any possible trends, such as the use of different infection vectors and the frequency of various types of payloads.
In some cases, Symantec antivirus products may initially detect new malicious code heuristically or by
generic signatures. These may later be reclassified and given unique detections. Because of this, there may be slight variance in the presentation of the same data set from one volume of the Internet Security
Threat Report to the next.
Sasser and Netsky calculation
In order to determine the percentage of malicious code for which the author of the Sasser and Netsky
worms was responsible, the total reports of all Sasser and Netsky variants received by Symantec in 2004was calculated. This number was then compared against the total malicious code reports received bySymantec for the same period. While the original author was not directly responsible for all variants ofSasser and Netsky, he is still considered to be indirectly responsible for their creation. Additionally, theauthor made the source code for Netsky publicly available, thus facilitating the creation of additionalvariants due to his actions.
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Appendix E—Additional Security Risks Methodology
Symantec products not only help users to protect their data from the threat of viruses, worms, and
Trojan horses, but to evaluate potential security risks from the introduction of other programs as well.Symantec AntiVirus classifies these other programs as additional security risks. Additional security risks include programs that may be categorized, based upon functional criteria, as adware or spyware.Symantec classifies these programs based on a number of characteristics. Once categorized, they can be detected, allowing users to choose whether to keep or remove them based on their personal needs and security policies.
General criteria for additional security risks
A program classified as an additional security risk is an application or software-based executable that iseither independent or interdependent on another software program and meets the following criteria:
1. It is considered to be non-viral in nature; 2. It meets criteria for programmatic functionality having potential to impact security;3. It has been reported to Symantec by a critical number of either corporate or individual users within
a given timeframe. The timeframe and number may vary by category or risk.
Symantec further classifies programs based upon functional criteria related to the result of the program’s
introduction to a computer system. The criteria take into consideration functionality that includes stealth,privacy, performance impact, damage, and removal.
Adware and spyware
Adware programs are those that facilitate the delivery and display of advertising content onto the user’sdisplay device. This may be done without the user’s prior consent or explicit knowledge. The advertising isoften, but not always, presented in the form of pop-up windows or bars that appear on the screen. In somecases, these programs may gather information from the user’s computer, including information related toInternet browser usage or other computing habits, and relay this information back to a remote computer.
Spyware programs are stand-alone programs that can unobtrusively monitor system activity and either
relay the information back to another computer or hold it for subsequent retrieval. In some cases, spywareprograms may be used by corporations to monitor employee Internet usage or by parents to monitor theirchildren’s Internet usage.
Spyware programs can be surreptitiously placed on users’ systems in order to gather confidential
information such as passwords, login details, and credit card details. This can be done through keystrokelogging and by capturing email and instant messaging traffic.
The potential security risks introduced by adware and spyware are discussed according to samples, or
individual cases of adware or spyware, reported to Symantec by customers deploying Symantec AntiVirus.While spyware and adware are not categorized as malicious code, Symantec monitors them using many of
101Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
the same types of methods used for tracking malicious code development and proliferation. This involves
an ongoing analysis of reports and data delivered from over 120 million client, server, and gateway emailsystems,
171as well as filtration of 25 million email messages per day. Symantec then compiles the most
common reports and analyzes them to determine the appropriate categorization. The discussion of adware and spyware included in the “Additional Security Risks” report is based on Symantec’s analysis of these reports.
Phishing
Phishing attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec ProbeNetwork. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam data is assessed to gauge the growth in phishing attempts as wellas the percentage of Internet mail that is determined to be phishing attempts. Symantec BrightmailAntiSpam field data consists of statistics reported back from customer installations that provide feedbackabout the detection behaviors of antifraud filters as well as the overall volume of mail being processed.
Phishing attempt definition
The Symantec Probe Network is a system of over two million decoy accounts that attracts email messages
from 20 different countries around the world. It encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises and attracts email samples that are representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 millionmailboxes. The Probe Network covers countries in the Americas, Europe, Asia, Africa andAustralia/Oceania.
Symantec Probe Network data is used to track the growth in new attacks. A phishing attempt is a group of
email messages with similar properties, such as headers and content, sent to unique users. The messagesattempt to gain confidential and personal information from online users.
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam software reports statistics to Security Response indicating messages
processed, messages filtered, and filter-specific data. Symantec has classified different filters so that spamstatistics as well as phishing statistics can be separately determined. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam fielddata is used to identify general trends in phishing email messages.
Explanation of research enquiries
This section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to produce the data and statistics in
this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, thefollowing investigations warranted additional detail.
Six-month growth in phishing messages
Symantec maintains automated systems to identify new potential fraud messages received by the
Symantec Probe Network. Messages are grouped into attacks based upon similarities in the messagebodies and headers. Sample messages are then passed through general fraud heuristics to identifymessages as potential phishing attempts. Symantec Security Response reviews events that are identifiedas attacks for the purposes of confirmation and filter development. The Symantec Brightmail BusinessIntelligence Department reviews phishing attacks in order to develop predictive filters known as SymantecBrightmail AntiSpam Heuristics.
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171Systems deploying Symantec AntiVirus security solutionsSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
The data presented in this section is based on the number of new unique phishing messages discovered
and ruled upon by Symantec Security Response. Security Response addresses only those phishingmessages not caught by existing antispam and antifraud filters. Existing filters refer only to thoseantispam and antifraud filters used across the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base. Some fraud messages will be captured in the field based upon predictive filters (heuristics); however, not all ofSymantec’s customer base utilize this technology or have upgraded to this technology. Therefore, themessages are still reviewed by Security Response for development of filters that are more widely dispersed.
Blocked phishing attempts
The number of blocked phishing attempts is calculated from the total number of phishing email messages
sent to users that were blocked in the field by Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam antifraud filters. The data forthis section is based on monthly totals.
Phishing as a percent of email scanned
The data for this section is determined by the number of email messages that trigger antifraud filters in
the field versus the total number of email messages scanned. These filters are distributed across theSymantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base. The data for this section is based on monthly totals.
Spam
The Symantec Probe Network is a system of over two million decoy accounts that attract email messagesfrom 20 different countries around the world. It encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises and attracts email samples that are representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 millionmailboxes. The Probe Network encompasses countries in the Americas, Europe, Asia, Africa andAustralia/Oceania.
Spam trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from both the Symantec Probe
Network as well as Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data. Symantec has classified different filters sothat spam statistics as well as phishing statistics can be separately determined. Symantec BrightmailAntiSpam field data includes data reported back from customer installations providing feedback fromantispam filters as well as overall mail volume being processed.
Sample Set Normalization
Due to the numerous variables influencing a company’s spam activity, Symantec focused on identifying
spam activity and growth projections with Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data from enterprisecustomer installations having more than 1,000 total messages per day. This normalization yields a moreaccurate summary of Internet spam trends by ruling out problematic and laboratory test servers thatproduce smaller sample sets.
103Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Explanation of research enquiries
This section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to produce the data and statistics in
this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, thefollowing investigations warranted additional detail.
Spam as a percent of email scanned
The data for this section is determined by the number of email messages that trigger antispam filters in
the field versus the total number of email messages scanned. These filters are distributed across theSymantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base. The data for this section is based on monthly totals.
Top countries of spam origin
The data for this section is determined by calculating the frequency of originating server IP addresses in
email messages that trigger antispam filters in the field. The IP addresses are mapped to the host countryof origin and the percentage of spam originating in each country is derived from the total volume of spamdetected in the field.
It should be noted that the location of the computer from which spam is detected being sent is not
necessarily the location of the spammer. Spammers can build networks of compromised computersglobally and thereby use networks that are geographically separate from their location. Following thislogic, the region from which the spam originates may not correspond with the region in which thespammers are located.
104Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec Corporation.
NO WARRANTY. The technical information is being delivered to you as is and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its acc uracy or use. Any use of the
technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user. Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical
errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice.
Copyright © 2005 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved. Symantec, the Symantec logo, Symantec AntiVirus, Symantec AntiVirus Research Automation (SARA),
Symantec Managed Security Services, Symantec Security Response, Brightmail, Brightmail AntiSpam, BugTraq and Digital Immune Sys tem are trademarks or
registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation. Additional company and product names may be trademarks or registered trademarks of the individual companies
and are respectfully acknowledged.
|
SYMANTEC ENTERPRISE SECURITY
Symantec Internet Security
Threat ReportTrends for July 05–December 05
Volume IX, Published March 2006Dean Turner
Executive EditorSymantec Security Response
Stephen Entwisle
EditorSymantec Security Response
Oliver Friedrichs
Technical AdvisorSymantec Security Response
David Ahmad
Manager, DevelopmentSymantec Security Response
Joseph Blackbird
Assoc. Software EngineerSymantec Security Response
Marc Fossi
DeepSight Threat AnalystSymantec Security Response
Daniel Hanson
DeepSight Threat AnalystSymantec Security Response
David Cowings
Sr. Business Intelligence ManagerSymantec Business Intelligence
Dylan Morss
Principal Business Intelligence AnalystSymantec Business Intelligence
Brad Bradley
Sr. Business Intelligence AnalystSymantec Business Intelligence
Peter Szor
Security ArchitectSymantec Security Response
Eric Chien
Security ResearcherSymantec Security Response
Andrew Burton
Sr. Product ManagerSymantec Business Intelligence
Tony Conneff
Development ManagerSymantec Security Response
Peter Ferrie
Sr. Principal Software EngSymantec Security Response
Tim Johnson
Manager, DevelopmentSymantec Business Intelligence
David McKinney
DeepSight Threat AnalystSymantec Security ResponseExecutive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
Future Watch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Attack Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Vulnerability Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Malicious Code Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
Additional Security Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Appendix C—Vulnerability Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Appendix D—Malicious Code Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
Appendix E—Additional Security Risks Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115ContentsVolume IX, Published March 2006
Symantec Internet Security Threat ReportSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Executive Summary
The previous edition of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report discussed a significant shift in the
threat landscape. In this edition, the new threat landscape is shown to be increasingly dominated by attacksand malicious code that are used to commit cybercrime, criminal acts that incorporate a computer orInternet component. Attackers have moved away from large, multipurpose attacks on network perimetersand toward smaller, more focused attacks on client-side targets.
The threat landscape is coming to be dominated by emerging threats such as bot networks and customizable
modular malicious code. Targeted attacks on Web applications and Web browsers are increasingly becomingthe focal point for cybercriminals. Whereas traditional attack activity has been motivated by curiosity and adesire to show off technical virtuosity, many current threats are motivated by profit. They often attempt toperpetrate criminal acts, such as identity theft, extortion, and fraud, for financial gain.
This volume of the Internet Security Threat Report will offer an overview of threat activity that took place
between July 1 and December 31, 2005. This brief summary will offer a synopsis of the data and trendsdiscussed in the main report. As the new threat landscape unfolds, Symantec will continue to monitor andassess threat activity in order to prepare consumers and enterprises for the complex Internet securityissues to come.
4Attack Trends Highlights
• For the fifth consecutive reporting period, the
Microsoft® SQL Server Resolution Service StackOverflow Attack was the most common attack,accounting for 45% of all attacks.
• Symantec detected an average of 39 attacks per
day, down from 57 attacks per day in the firsthalf of 2005.
• The average number of denial of service (DoS)
attacks detected per day was 1,402, an increaseof 51% from the first half of 2005.
• Of the Web servers that were tested, Windows®
2000 Server with no patches was compromisedin the shortest average time, roughly one hourand 17 minutes.• Symantec identified an average of 9,163 bot-
infected computers per day, down from 10,347last period.
• The United States was the location of 26% of
the world’s bot-infected computers, the most ofany country.
• Financial services was the most frequently
targeted industry.
• During the last six months of 2005, the United
States was the source country of 31% ofattacks, the most of any countrySymantec Internet Security Threat Report
5Vulnerability Trends Highlights
• Symantec documented 1,896 new vulnerabilities,
the highest recorded number since 1998.
• Symantec documented 40% more vulnerabilities
in 2005 than in 2004.
• Web application vulnerabilities made up 69%
of all vulnerabilities during this period.
• The average time between the announcement of
a vulnerability and the appearance of exploit code was 6.8 days, up from 6.0 days.
• On average, 49 days elapsed between the
disclosure of a vulnerability and the release ofan associated patch, down from 64 days.
• A 42-day window of exposure existed on average
between the release of an exploit and therelease of an associated patch by the vendor.
• Of vulnerabilities disclosed during this period,
79% were classified as “easy to exploit,” upfrom 73%.
• Microsoft Internet Explorer had the highest
number of new vulnerabilities (including bothvendor confirmed and non-vendor confirmed),with 24.
• The Mozilla Firefox browser had the highest
number of new vendor-confirmed vulnerabilities,with 13.
Malicious Code Trends Highlights
• Symantec documented more than 10,992 new
Win32 viruses and worms, up slightly from10,866 in the first half of 2005.
• Sober.X was the most widely reported malicious
code sample, followed by Nestky.P andMytob.ED.
• Excluding the high volume of Sober.X reports,
80% of malicious code threatened confidentialinformation, up from 74%.• Of malicious code targeting instant messaging
services, worms made up 91%, compared to83% in the first half of 2005.
• Modular malicious code accounted for 88%
of the top 50 malicious code reported, up from 77%.
• Bot-related malicious code reported to Symantec
accounted for 20% of the top 50 malicious codereports, up from 14%.
• Symantec documented 6,542 new variants
of Spybot, up from 6,361 in the first half of the year.
Additional Security Risks Highlights
• The most commonly reported adware program
was Websearch,
1which accounted for 19% of
the top ten adware programs reported.
• CometCursor was the most commonly reported
spyware program, accounting for 42% of the topten spyware programs.
• In the last half of 2005, Symantec blocked 1.5
billion phishing attempt, a 44% increase overthe first half of 2005.
• One in 119 emails was determined to be a
phishing attempt, up from one in 125.
• Symantec detected an average of 7.9 million
phishing attempts per day, an increase of 39%over the first half of 2005.
• Spam made up 50% of all monitored
email traffic.
• Spam associated with financial goods and
services was the most common type of spam.
• The United States was the country of origin of
56% of all spam.
1http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/adware.websearch.htmlSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report Overview
The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report provides a six-month update of Internet threat activity. It
includes analysis of network-based attacks, a review of known vulnerabilities, and highlights of maliciouscode and additional security risks. This summary of the current report will alert readers to current trendsand impending threats. In addition, it will offer recommendations for protection against and mitigation ofthese concerns. This volume of the Internet Security Threat Report covers the six-month period from July 1
to December 31, 2005.
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the world.
The Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network, which includes the Symantec DeepSight™ Threat ManagementSystem and Symantec™ Managed Security Services, consists of more than 40,000 sensors monitoringnetwork activity in more than 180 countries and comprehensively tracks attack activity across the entireInternet. As well, Symantec gathers malicious code data along with spyware and adware reports from over120 million client, server, and gateway systems that have deployed Symantec’s antivirus products.
Symantec also maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive databases of security vulnerabilities,
covering over 13,000 vulnerabilities affecting more than 30,000 technologies from over 4,000 vendors. Inaddition to the vulnerability database, Symantec operates BugTraq,™ one of the most popular forums forthe disclosure and discussion of vulnerabilities on the Internet. Finally, the Symantec Probe Network, asystem of over two million decoy accounts, attracts email messages from 20 different countries around theworld, allowing Symantec to gauge global spam and phishing activity.
These resources give Symantec analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify emerging
trends in attacks and malicious code activity. The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report is grounded
principally on the expert analysis of this data. Based on Symantec’s expertise and experience, this analysisyields a highly informed commentary on current Internet threat activity. By publishing the analysis ofInternet security activity in the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec intends to provide
enterprises and consumers with the information they need to help effectively secure their systems now andin the future.
Threats to confidential information
Threats that expose confidential information on a compromised computer are a concern to users in home,small business, and enterprise environments alike. These threats may expose sensitive data such assystem information, cached logon credentials, or confidential files and documents that could subsequentlybe used in cybercrime activities. With the increasing use of online shopping and Internet banking,compromises of this nature can result in significant financial loss, particularly if credit card information orbanking details are exposed. Furthermore, these losses can lead to a decline in consumer confidence,thereby affecting organizations that rely on the Internet for revenue generation.
During the last six months of 2005, the percentage of malicious code samples that threaten confidential
information declined somewhat. This is not necessarily due to a reduction in these threats; rather, it islikely due to the high volume of Sober.X reports. If Sober.X is removed from consideration, the percentage
6Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
2http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/pwsteal.bancos.html
3http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/pwsteal.banpaes.html
4http://www.owasp.org7of malicious code that threatens confidential information rose from 74% in the previous period to 80% in
the current period. This is a significant increase over the 54% of confidential information exposure threatsduring the same six-month period in 2004.
The increase in confidential information threats this period (Sober.X notwithstanding) can largely be
attributed to the large number of Mytob variants in the top 50 malicious code. Mytob variants allowattackers to log keystrokes, steal cached passwords, and download files, all of which are ways of exposingconfidential information, which can subsequently be used in cybercrime activities.
Other prevalent information exposure threats can also be used to generate monetary gain for their authors.
For instance, variants of the Bancos
2and Banpaes3password-stealing Trojans remained among the top 50
most reported malicious code samples this period. These crimeware threats can be used to steal a user’sonline banking credentials in order to transfer money out of the victim’s account.
Web application vulnerabilities
Web applications are technologies that rely on a browser for their user interface; they are often hosted onWeb servers. Vulnerabilities in these technologies are particularly threatening because they are typicallyexposed to the Internet through a Web server. Because traditional security solutions such as intrusiondetection systems and firewalls allow Web traffic onto a network by default, Web-based attacks can leaveorganizations exposed to attacks that are difficult to detect and prevent. As such, Web applicationvulnerabilities could allow an attacker to bypass traditional perimeter security measures, such as firewalls.This could enable a successful attacker to then compromise an entire network by gaining access through asingle vulnerable system. Vulnerabilities in these technologies can also give an attacker access toconfidential information from databases without having to compromise any servers.
Of the vulnerabilities disclosed between July and December 2005, 69% were associated with Web
applications. This represents a 15% increase over the first half of 2005 when they made up 60% of allvulnerabilities. In the second half of 2004 they accounted for 49% of all vulnerabilities.
As the number of Web application vulnerabilities grows, Symantec believes that they may serve as an
increasingly attractive target for potential attackers to exploit. Organizations should manage their Web-based assets carefully. If they are developing Web applications in-house, developers should be educatedabout secure development and the use of secure shared components. If possible, all Web applicationsshould be audited for security prior to deployment. Web application security solutions and a number ofproducts and services are available to detect and prevent attacks against these applications.
4
Web browser vulnerabilities
Browser vulnerabilities are a serious security concern due to their use in conducting online fraud. They mayalso be exploited for the propagation of spyware and adware in drive-by downloads and through maliciousWeb sites. Web browser vulnerabilities also allow attackers to circumvent traditional perimeter securitydevices such as firewalls and routers. With these protective measures being increasingly deployed in homeand enterprise environments alike, the exploitation of Web browser vulnerabilities has become one of theeasiest ways to attack users. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
During the last six months of 2005, 24 new vendor-confirmed and non-vendor-confirmed vulnerabilities
were disclosed that affected at least one version of Microsoft Internet Explorer (figure 1). This is the samenumber that was seen in the previous six-month period. During this reporting period, the increasinglypopular Firefox browser from Mozilla was affected by 17 new vendor-confirmed and non-vendor-confirmedvulnerabilities, down from the 32 seen in the previous period. Symantec believes that Internet Explorer willlikely remain a popular target for the foreseeable future because of its widespread deployment.
8Figure 1. Web Browser vulnerabilities, vendor confirmed and non-vendor confirmed
Source: Symantec Corporation
A slightly different picture appears when assessing only vendor-confirmed vulnerabilities. During this
reporting period, the Firefox browser from Mozilla had the highest count of vendor-confirmedvulnerabilities (figure 2). Thirteen out of the 17 vulnerabilities disclosed for Firefox were vendor confirmed,down from 27 out of 32 in the first half of 2005. Twelve out of the 24 vulnerabilities associated withMicrosoft Internet Explorer were confirmed by the vendor, a slight decrease from the 14 out of 24disclosed between January and June 2005.
01020304050
July–Dec 2005 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Documente d vu lnera bilities
Period Firefox Internet Explorer Opera KDE Konqueror SafariSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
9
0102030
July–Dec 2005 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Documente d vu lnera bilities
Period Firefox Internet Explorer Opera
KDE Konqueror SafariFigure 2. Web browser vulnerabilities, vendor confirmed
Source: Symantec Corporation
When taking only the vendor-confirmed browser vulnerabilities into consideration, Firefox has had the
highest vulnerability count for the last three reporting periods. This may be indicative of the transparencythat is inherent in the open-source development process. Due to the nature of the open-sourcedevelopment process, Firefox developers may be able to acknowledge and address vulnerabilities morequickly than developers of closed-source browsers.
Total volume of vulnerabilities
The second half of 2005 was marked by a slight increase in the total number of vulnerabilities disclosed.Between July 1 and December 31, 2005, Symantec documented 1,896 new vulnerabilities. This is anincrease of one percent over the 1,871 vulnerabilities disclosed in the first half of the year and 34% overthe 1,416 vulnerabilities disclosed in the second half of 2004. As was pointed out in the “Web applicationvulnerabilities” section above, 69% of all vulnerabilities documented by Symantec in the second half of2005 affected Web applications.
Between July and December 2005, Symantec rated 45% of new vulnerabilities as highly severe, down from
49% in the first half of the year. At the same time, vulnerabilities that were rated as moderately severeincreased from 48% to 52% over the past six months. Symantec believes that this is due to an increase invulnerabilities affecting Web applications, the majority of which are classified as moderately severe.
Symantec recommends that administrators employ an asset management system and a vulnerability
alerting service, which can help them to quickly assess the threat that new vulnerabilities pose to theirSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
organization. Symantec also recommends that enterprises invest in resources that provide alerting and
patch-deployment solutions. They should also consider engaging a managed security service provider toassist them in monitoring their networks. Administrators should also monitor vulnerability mailing listsand security Web sites for new developments in vulnerability disclosure.
Symantec also recommends that security administrators follow the best practices outlined in Appendix A
of this report. Administrators should audit their systems to ensure that no vulnerable Web applications or scripts are being hosted on them. Administrators should also thoroughly review the need for and use of all Web applications. Only those Web applications that are required for enterprise operations should be deployed.
Time to compromise for Internet-connected computers
For the first time, this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report is assessing the amount of time it
takes for attackers to compromise a newly installed operating system once it has been connected to theInternet. This metric has been developed to give insight into how quickly an Internet-connected computermay become compromised. This will help administrators and users to understand the immediacy ofpotential threats against Internet-facing computers.
Symantec defines the “time to compromise” as the time that elapses between connection of a computer
to the Internet and the instance when it is considered to be compromised.
5The first group of computers
assessed for this metric consisted of Web servers. Of the Web servers that were tes ted, Windows 2000
Server with no patches had the shortest average time to compromise, at roughly one hour and 17 minutes.6
Microsoft Windows 2000 Server with Service Pack 4 had the second fastest time to compromise, and the
unpatched Microsoft Windows 2003 Web Edition was compromised in the third shortest time. Theunpatched RedHat® Enterprise Linux® 3 was not compromised during the test period.
When the servers were fully patched, no compromise occurred. This supports Symantec’s assertion that
applying patches in a timely manner is an important component of an effective security strategy.
The second group of computers assessed for time to compromise consisted of desktop systems. Microsoft
Windows XP Professional with no patches applied had the shortest average time to compromise at onehour and 12 seconds. The Microsoft Windows 2000 Professional operating system without patches and theMicrosoft Windows 2000 Professional operating system with Service Pack 4 applied had the second andthird shortest times, respectively.
The SuSE™ Linux 9 Desktop, which was deployed in its default configuration and was not patched, was not
compromised during the testing period.
7Furthermore, Microsoft Windows 2000 Professional fully patched,
Microsoft Windows XP Professional with Service Pack 2, and Microsoft Windows XP Professional fullypatched were not compromised during the reporting period.
Symantec believes that these findings reinforce the notion that organizations should apply all necessary
patches in a timely manner. It also illustrates the need to apply updates to newly installed systems from asecure position; that is, prior to connection to the Internet.
5Symantec performs automated heuristic analysis on the computer to determine when it is considered to be compromised. It should be noted that multiple failed
compromise attempts are often observed prior to a successful compromise.
6For a complete listing of operating systems and their time to compromise statistics, please see the “Attack Trends” section of this report.
7The testing period for the time to compromise was from November 16 to December 31, 2005.10Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
11Window of exposure
Attackers use custom-developed code known as exploit code to take advantage of vulnerabilities to
compromise a computer. Once exploit code is developed and released, any unpatched vulnerabilities will be susceptible to compromise. Symantec records the window of time between the disclosure of avulnerability and the appearance of third-party exploit code designed to take advantage of it. The intent is to determine how long after a vulnerability is announced it will be susceptible to a successful attack.
During the second half of 2005, the average time for exploit code development was 6.8 days. This is an
increase of almost a full day over the average time of 6.0 days in the previous six-month period. This maybe due to the commercialization of exploit code, which is discussed at length in the “Attack Trends” sectionof this report. As a result of commercialization of vulnerabilities, the best exploit code developers may havestopped making their findings and creations public. Instead, they may be opting to sell their work toorganizations that are willing to pay for vulnerability research. As a result, publicly known exploit code isbeing created by less experienced exploit developers, leading to an increase in the average exploit codedevelopment time.
When a vulnerability is announced, the vendor in whose product it was found must develop and release a
set of code known as a patch that will secure the vulnerability. Until the patch is developed, released, andapplied computers on which the vulnerability resides may be susceptible to successful attack, particularlyif exploit code for that vulnerability is available. The time between the disclosure date of a vulnerabilityand the release date of a patch is known as the “time to patch.” During the second half of 2005, the timeto patch was, on average, 49 days. This means that, on average, seven weeks elapsed between thepublication of a vulnerability and the release of an associated patch. This is a sharp decrease from the 64days seen in the first half of the year.
In the time between the availability of exploit code and the application of a patch, computers hosting the
vulnerable applications will be exposed to potential compromise. Symantec refers to this time as the“window of exposure.” During the last six months of 2005, 42 days elapsed on average between theappearance of exploit code and the release of a patch by the vendor to fix the affected vulnerability. Thishas dropped considerably from the 58-day window of exposure in the first half of 2005. During this periodof time, and until a patch is released, end users and administrators may be forced to implement security“workarounds” without an official fix and networks could be vulnerable to compromise.
With the window of exposure so large, Symantec recommends that administrators employ a good asset
management system or vulnerability alerting service. Each of these services can provide an understandingof the threat posed by new vulnerabilities and provide relevant protection and mitigation information.Administrators should also monitor vulnerability mailing lists and security Web sites for newdevelopments. They should also consider installing an intrusion prevention system to block attackstargeting vulnerabilities. Finally, organizations should consider engaging a managed security serviceprovider to assist them in monitoring their networks.
Denial of service attacks
Denial of service (DoS) attacks attempt to limit the target computer’s ability to service legitimate networkrequests, therefore denying services the computer is supposed to provide to legitimate users. They are aSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
major threat to organizations, especially those that rely on the Internet for communication and to generate
revenue. They are particularly dangerous because they are very difficult to defend against. Over the last sixmonths of 2005, Symantec detected an average of 1,402 DoS attacks per day (figure 3). This is an increaseof 51% from the first half of 2005, when Symantec detected an average of 927 DoS attacks per day.
8Bots (short for “robots”) are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s machine in order to allow an unauthorized user t o control the computer remotely
through a communication channel such as IRC. These communication channels are used to allow the remote attacker to control a la rge number of compromised
computers over a single, reliable channel in a bot network, which can then be used to launch coordinated attacks.
9Symantec Internet Security Threat Report Volume VIII (September 2005) http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539: p. 11
10http://www.networkworld.com/news/2005/051605-ddos-extortion.html12Figure 3. DoS attacks per day
Source: Symantec Corporation
The rise in DoS attacks may indicate that an entrenched and well organized community of attackers is
beginning to utilize their resources to carry out more coordinated attacks. Many of these attackers arelikely to be owners of bot networks.
8As Symantec discussed in the previous volume of the Internet Security
Threat Report, criminal extortion schemes based on DoS attacks are becoming more common.9Further, it
appears that some of these schemes are achieving their objectives.10Symantec believes that as bot
networks become larger and more coordinated, and as organizations continue to relent and payextortionists, this form of attack will continue to increase.
Organizations should ensure that a documented procedure exists for responding to DoS events. Symantec
also recommends that organizations perform egress filtering on all outbound traffic. One the best ways tomitigate a DoS attack is to filter upstream of the target. For most organizations this filtering will involveworking in conjunction with their Internet service provider (ISP). Further, once a DoS attack is identified, the targeted organization will likely need to engage its ISP to help filter the traffic to minimize the impact of the attack.
Median DoS attacks per day
Date Moving average Median DoS attacks per day
03006009001,2001,5001,800
June 17, 2004May 20, 2004Apr 22, 2004Mar 25, 2004Feb 26, 2004Jan 29, 2004Jan 1, 2004
July 15, 2004
Aug 12, 2004
Sep 9, 2004
Oct 7, 2004
Nov 4, 2004
Dec 2, 2004
Dec 30, 2004
Jan 27, 2005
Feb 24, 2005
Dec 29, 2005Dec 1, 2005Nov 3, 2005Oct 6, 2005Sep 8, 2005Aug 11, 2005July 14, 2005June 16, 2005May 19, 2005Apr 21, 2005Mar 24, 2005Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Top bot-infected countries
Recognizing the ongoing threat posed by bot networks, Symantec tracks the distribution of bot-infected
computers worldwide. The identification of bot-infected computers is important, as a high percentageincreases the potential for bot-related attacks to occur. It could also indicate the level of patching andsecurity awareness amongst computer administrators and users in a given region.
Over the second half of 2005, the United States had the highest number of bot-infected computers of any
country (table 1). Twenty-six percent of bot-infected computers worldwide were situated there. Twenty-twopercent of all bot-infected computers worldwide were located in the United Kingdom, the second highestnumber during this period. Nine percent of detected bot-infected computers were located in China, placingit in third position worldwide.
11Bot command-and-control servers are computers that bot network owners use to relay commands and instructions to other computers on their bot networks.13Table 1. Top bot-infected countries
Source: Symantec Corporation
For this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report, Symantec has monitored the distribution of bot
command-and-control servers.11Over the last six months of 2005, the United States had the highest
proportion of command-and-control servers in the world, accounting for just over 48% of the global total.South Korea ranked second with nine percent of the total and Canada ranked third with six percent.
In addition to having the most bot-infected computers and the most command-and-control servers, the
United States also experienced the highest percentage of growth in bot-infected computers. The number ofbot-infected computers situated there increased by 39% in the second half of 2005. The rise in the numberof bots in the United States is likely closely linked with broadband Internet growth there. China had thesecond largest increase of bot-infected computers during the last six months of 2005, 37%. China’sincrease in bot-infected computers is also likely related to its growth in broadband Internet connections. It is also an indicator that China is a popular target for bot network owners.Rank
Jul–Dec
2005
1
23456789
102
13564
10
97826%
22%
9%4%4%4%3%3%3%2%19%
32%
7%4%4%5%2%3%4%3%
Rank
Jan–Jun
2005 CountryPercent of
bot-infected computers
July–Dec 2005Percent of
bot-infected computers
Jan–June 2005
United States
United Kingdom ChinaFranceSouth KoreaCanadaTaiwanSpainGermanyJapanSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Instant messaging threats
Instant messaging (IM) continues to grow rapidly, with users in both home and enterprise environments
estimated at 300 million in 2005. The three largest IM providers—AOL Instant Messenger, MSN Messenger,and Yahoo! Messenger—each report over 1 billion messages sent per day and IM traffic is expected to exceedemail traffic by the end of 2006.
Instant messaging can be a potent vector for the spread of malicious code. The infection of one computer
can result in messages being broadcast to all users contained in an IM contact list on that machine, creatingthe potential for rapid proliferation. Furthermore, social engineering tactics can be highly effective as theparties communicating by IM are inherently trusted.
In the second half of 2005, worms were the preferred type of malicious code on all three large IM networks,
making up 91% of IM-related malicious code during this period. This is a ten percent increase over the 83%in the first half of 2005. Worms were also used to download other non-IM malicious code during the period.For instance, a worm may send users a link to a Web page exploiting a vulnerability in a Web browser,
12such
as the Microsoft Windows Graphics Rendering Engine WMF SetAbortProc Code Execution Vulnerability.13This
would allow the malicious code hosted on the Web page to be automatically installed on the computer of auser running a vulnerable browser.
Phishing activity
Phishing is an attempt by a third party to solicit confidential information from an individual, group, ororganization, often for financial gain. Phishers are groups or individuals who attempt to trick users intodisclosing personal data such as credit card numbers, online banking credentials, and other sensitiveinformation. They may then use the information to conduct cybercrime activities for profit.
Over the last six months of 2005, the percentage of emails that Symantec identified as phishing messages
was nine percent higher than during the first half of the year. Between July 1 and December 31, 2005,phishing attempts made up 0.84% of the messages processed by Symantec. This is an increase over the firstsix months of 2005, when 0.77% of the messages processed were phishing messages. While 0.84% may notappear to be a significant number, it means that roughly one out of every 119 email messages scanned wasfound to be a phishing attempt. This is an increase from the roughly one out of 125 email messages thatconstituted phishing attempts in the first half of 2005.
The number of phishing attempts blocked by Symantec Brightmail™ AntiSpam in the last six months of 2005
also indicates that phishing activity continues to increase. During this period, Symantec blocked 1.5 billionphishing attempts, a 44% increase over the 1.04 billion phishing attempts detected in the first six months ofthe year. It is also a 175% increase over the 546 million blocked phishing attempts detected in the last sixmonths of 2004.
Phishing messages that are blocked at the mail servers of Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam customers are
reflective of phishing activity targeting email users globally. Based on the activity seen over the last sixmonths of 2005, Symantec believes that it is reasonable to conclude that phishing activity will continue to increase.
12http://tc.imlogic.com/threatcenterportal/pubThreatDetail.aspx?ThreatID=3505
13http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/1607414Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Symantec recommends that enterprise users protect themselves against phishing threats by filtering
email at the server level through the mail transfer agent (MTA).14Although this will likely remain the
primary point of filtering for phishing, organizations can also use upstream IP-based filtering, as well asHTTP filtering. DNS block lists (DNSBLs)
15also offer more general protection and may mitigate some of the
risk of phishing emails.
Administrators should always follow Symantec best practices as outlined in Appendix A of this report.
Symantec also recommends that organizations educate their end users about phishing.16Organizations
should also keep their employees notified of the latest phishing attacks and how to avoid falling victimto them.
17
Spam activity
Between July 1 and December 31, 2005, spam made up 50% of all monitored email traffic. This is adecrease from the first six months of 2005 when 61% of all email was classified as spam. It is also lowerthan the second half of 2004, when just over 60% of email was classified as spam.
This does not necessarily signify any decrease in spam attack attempts to Internet email users. As was the
case during the first six months of 2005, this decline is likely due to the fact that network and securityadministrators are using IP filtering and traffic shaping to control spam.
18If a message is blocked using
these methods, it will not be detected by the Symantec Probe Network, and will thus not contribute tostatistics gathered.
The most common type of spam detected in the first six months of 2005 was related to health services and
products, which made up 32% of all spam on the Internet during this time. The next largest spam categorywas commercial products, which made up 30% of all spam. The third most common type of spam was thatassociated with financial products and services, which made up 15% of all spam.
During the first six months of 2005, 56% of all spam received worldwide originated in the United States.
This is likely due to the high number broadband users in that country. The United States was also thecountry of origin of spam in the first half of 2004, when 51% of spam originated there. China was thesecond highest country of origin during the current reporting period with 12%, followed by South Koreawith nine percent.
Adware and spyware
Traditionally, the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report has broken security threats down into three
general categories: attacks, vulnerabilities, and malicious code. However, as Internet-based services andapplications have expanded and diversified, the potential for computer programs to introduce other typesof security risks has increased. For the past several years, Symantec has monitored developments in theseconcerns. For the past two reporting periods, Symantec has discussed these security risks in the Internet
Security Threat Report.
14Message transfer agents are programs that are responsible for routing email messages to the proper destination.
15A DNSBL is simply a list of IP addresses that are known to send unwanted email traffic. The DNSBL is used by email software to either allow or reject email coming from
IP addresses on the list.
16For instance, the United States Federal Trade Commission has published some basic guidelines on how to avoid phishing. They are available at:
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/phishingalrt.htm
17A good resource for information on the latest phishing threats can be found at http://www.antiphishing.org
18IP filtering simply involves comparing inbound connection attempts against a preconfigured list of bad or suspicious IP address es.Traffic shaping is the use of different
IP characteristics—for instance, if an originating IP is determined to be a known source of spam—to selectively determine what connections to allow, deny, or throttle
(slow down).15Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Between July 1 and December 31, 2005, the most commonly reported adware program was Websearch,19
which accounted for 19% of the top ten adware programs reported. This program was not present in the
top ten reported adware programs in the first six months of the year.
Websearch features a number of noteworthy attributes. It modifies the default home page and search
settings of Internet Explorer, installs itself as a toolbar to Internet Explorer, and adds a number of icons tothe system tray. It also sends user information to a predetermined Web site, including keywords fromsearches. It also uses an interesting technique known as a “watchdog process” to prevent manual removalof components of the program. If a user attempts to stop a process associated with the adware program, asecond running process restarts it as soon as it has been stopped, thereby increasing the difficulty ofremoving the program.
In the first six months of 2005, CometCursor
20was the most commonly reported spyware program,
accounting for 42% of the top ten spyware programs reported to Symantec. It was the fourth mostfrequently reported spyware program in the first half of 2005 but was not present in the top ten spywareprograms in the second half of 2004. CometCursor is an Internet Explorer browser help object (BHO) thatinstalls a toolbar that has links to affiliate sites.
21It is bundled with various programs or can be
downloaded from a Web page using an ActiveX installer. CometCursor also installs a search bar and logsthe compromised system’s usage statistics.
Programs that are used to detect and remove adware programs often do so by using signatures that are
based on known characteristics of the adware. Adware vendors will frequently update the program in orderto evade these signatures to avoid detection and subsequent removal from a system. In some cases thefunctionality of the adware program may also be updated. During the last six months of 2005 the adwareprogram that self-updated most frequently was Aurora,
22which did so 13.6 times per day. The top self-
updating spyware program was Apropos,23which self-updated 1.3 times per day.
Symantec rates the risk level of adware and spyware programs according to how they affect the
performance and privacy of compromised computers and whether the program exhibits stealth behaviorand/or resists removal from the compromised computer. During the last six months of 2005 Symantecgave three of the top ten adware programs a high risk rating: BetterInternet, Lop, and IEPlugin.
24A
program that is given a high risk rating will exhibit at least one of four characteristics. It may have asignificant impact on the system’s stability and/or performance. It may expose confidential, sensitiveinformation. It may resist complete removal. Or it may exhibit stealth behaviors, such as silent installation,the absence of a user interface, and concealment of application processes.
Modular malicious code
Modular malicious code initially possesses limited functionality, such as disabling antivirus software andfirewalls; however, once it has infected a computer, it can download additional code that has new,potentially more damaging capabilities. These may allow it to further compromise the target computer orto perform other malicious tasks. The intent of the initial modular code is only to establish an outpost onthe machine. As such, it is usually stealthy and very small—50kb or less—and difficult to detect.
19http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/adware.websearch.html
20http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/spyware.cometcursor.html
21Browser helper objects (BHOs) are add-on programs that can add legitimate features to a user’s browser (IE 4.X and up). For exa mple, document readers used to
read programs within the browser do so via BHOs. BHOs can also be used to install security risks on a user’s Web browser using ActiveX controls
22http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/adware.aurora.html
23http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/spyware.apropos.html
24For more details on Symantec’s risk levels, please see: http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/enterprise/security_risks /#riskAssessment16Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
In the previous volume of the Internet Security Threat Report, Symantec stated that modular malicious
code would likely be an issue of concern in the near future.25This appears to be the case. Between July and
December of 2005, modular malicious code accounted for 88% of the top 50 malicious code reported. Thisis an increase of 14% over the 77% reported from January to June 2005. It is a further increase of 40%over the 63% reported in the second half of 2004.
Frequently, modular malicious code is used to download applications that gather confidential information
without the knowledge and consent of the user. If these applications are used for financial gain, they arereferred to as “crimeware.”
26By using modular malicious code, attackers may download and simultaneously
install a confidential information threat on a large number of compromised computers. The confidentialinformation exposed by this threat could then be used for the attacker’s financial gain.
In order to protect against modular malicious code, administrators should implement strict egress
filtering,
27which can prevent compromised computers within their networks from contacting Web sites
where additional malicious code components are kept. This will prevent the second—and frequently moresevere—module of the malicious code from being installed on the compromised computer.
Win32 virus and worm variants
Over the second half of 2005, Symantec documented more than 10,992 new Win32 viruses and worms.While this is consistent with the 10,866 detected in the first half of the year, it is a 49% increase over the 7,360 documented in the second half of 2004 (figure 4). The significant increase over 2004 is due tothe continued development of Win32 worms that implement bot features that attackers can use forfinancial gain.
25Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume VIII (September 2005) http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539: p. 83
26Crimeware is an application that aids in the commission of cybercrime activity.
27Egress traffic refers to traffic that is leaving a network, bound for the Internet or another network.17
July–Dec 2005 July–Dec 2003 Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Tota l num ber
Period 1,702
1844,496
1647,360
17110,866
17010,992
104Total viruses and worms
Total families
03,0006,0009,00012,000Figure 4. New Win32 virus and worm variants
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
28SMTP is the protocol by which email is transmitted between mail servers.
29CIFS is used for file sharing.18While the number of new Win32 viruses and worms per period continues to grow, the number of new
Win32 families decreased over the second half of 2005. The number of new families per period hadremained relatively consistent over the previous four reporting periods. However, in the current period, the number of new families declined by 39%, from 170 new families in the first half of 2005 to 104 thisperiod. This indicates that there are currently far more variants of existing malicious code families beingproduced than previously. One example of this is the Spybot family, which now requires four letters todescribe a variant such as “W32.Spybot.ABCD”. The rise in variants paired with the decline in new familiescan be partially attributed to the availability of source code for some families.
As of December 31, 2005, the total number of Win32 virus and worm variants surpassed 39,257. In 2005
alone Symantec documented more than 21,830 Win32 variants. Thus, the total number of Win32 virus andworm threats more than doubled during 2005 alone, indicating that these threats will continue todominate the malicious code landscape for some time to come.
Malicious code propagation vectors
Worms and viruses use various means of transferring themselves from one computer to another. Thesetransportation vectors are collectively known as “propagation mechanisms.” Propagation mechanisms caninclude a number of different vectors, such as Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP),
28Common Internet
File System (CIFS),29peer-to-peer services (P2P), and remotely exploitable vulnerabilities.
SMTP was the most commonly used malicious code propagation vector in the second half of 2005. It was
employed by 26 of the top 50 malicious code samples that propagate, accounting for 92% of the volume oftop 50 malicious code reports with propagation mechanisms this period. In the first half of 2005 only 19 ofthe top 50 malicious code samples that propagate used SMTP, accounting for 52% of the volume of the top50 malicious code reports.
The prevalence of this vector is not surprising since email is one of the most widely employed applications
on the Internet. The increase in the use of SMTP this period can be attributed to Sober.X and multiplevariants of Mytob, both of which are mass-mailer worms that send copies of themselves from compromisedcomputers by email. In addition to being used as a malicious code propagation vector, SMTP is also used to send Trojans in spam email. This is worrisome for organizations, as Trojans can be used to exposeconfidential information and install other types of crimeware such as keystroke loggers on targeted systems.
Organizations can protect against SMTP threats by blocking all email attachments at the mail gateway. If
there is a business need for email attachments, only those that are considered safe (as determined by anorganization’s security policy) should be allowed. If other attachment types are accepted, they shouldalways be scanned by antivirus products with up-to-date definitions. Attachments should only be acceptedfrom trusted sources. End users should be educated to only open email attachments that come fromtrusted sources and that are expected.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Future Watch
The previous sections of the Internet Security Threat Report have discussed Internet security developments
between July 1 and December 31, 2005. This section will discuss emerging trends and issues that Symantecbelieves will become prominent over the next twelve to eighteen months. These forecasts are based onemerging data that Symantec has collected during the current reporting period and are speculative innature. In discussing potential future trends, Symantec hopes to provide organizations with an opportunityto prepare themselves for rapidly evolving and complex security issues.
Cybercrime expected to rise
Over the past two reporting periods Symantec has observed a worrisome trend in Internet attacks and inthe development and use of malicious code. In Volume VIII of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec
took special notice of the shift from hacking for fame to hacking for fortune.
30This shift in the threat
landscape is expected to escalate over the next six to eighteen months. Attackers appear to be movingaway from threats that destroy or compromise data and toward the theft of confidential, financial andpersonal information for financial gain.
Tools that are used in the commission of such activities are often referred to as crimeware. Symantec is
forecasting an increase in the number and type of crimeware. Symantec also expects the trade of maliciouscode in popular forums such as Internet Relay Chat (IRC), Web sites, and black market auction sites toexpand. Symantec research has found that the development of malicious code is becoming a coordinated,well funded effort by numerous development teams in different locales.
31During the last six months of
2005, over 80% of the Top 50 malicious code threats reported to Symantec had the potential for datatheft.
32Over the next twelve to eighteen months, Symantec expects to see an increase in malicious code
that is designed specifically to generate profit.
As discussed in this volume of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , criminals are using
technologies that assist them in generating and maximizing revenue. As a result, Symantec expects to seean increase in the number of threats designed specifically for these purposes. Keystroke loggers, spyware,phishing attacks, and Trojans are expected to increase in numbers and in severity. Symantec also expectsthat the purpose of network-based attacks will continue to shift from one-time compromises andinformational sorties to compromises designed to build supporting infrastructures for the facilitation andspread of crimeware.
Increase in malicious code utilizing stealth capabilities
Once malicious code infects a user’s computer, it often attempts to remain unnoticed, either by activelyhiding or by simply not making its presence on a system known to the user. It may employ differenttechniques to obscure its presence on the user’s computer. Symantec speculates that the number ofmalicious programs using these methods will continue to grow, with one of the more common—rootkittechniques—experiencing particular growth.
33
30Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, Volume VIII (September 2005) http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539, p. 4
31http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/cybercrime/index_page5.html
32This figure excludes from consideration reports of Sober.X, which was the most prominent malicious code report during this peri od. Please see the
“Threats to confidential information” section in the “Malicious Code Trends” report in this document
33Definitions of the term “rootkit” vary but for the purposes of this discussion, a rookit is defined as a set of tools designed to hide the presence of a
running process and avoid detection and removal of that process.
19Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
34https://www-secure.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/[email protected]
35http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/when.malware.meets.rootkits.pdf
36http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11372
37Non-disclosed vulnerabilities are often referred to in a process known as closed disclosure, which refers to the practice of di sclosing vulnerabilities to only a
commercial vulnerability vendor or the affected vendor without notifying other reporting organizations.
38http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11363
39http://www.security-express.com/archives/dailydave/2005-q2/0308.html
40http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11364
20Rootkit techniques allow certain programs to maintain a persistent and undetectable presence on a
machine. Rootkits do not infect machines by themselves, like viruses or worms; rather, they seek to providean undetectable environment in which malicious code and security risks can execute their functionalities.Attackers will typically exploit vulnerabilities in the target machine or use social engineering techniques to manually install rootkits. In some cases, rootkits can be installed automatically upon execution of asecurity risk. In other cases, a user could unknowingly download the rootkit simply by browsing to amalicious Web site. Once installed, a rootkit can allow the subversion of system reporting facilities to hidethe presence of an attacker, files, and communication, amongst other things.
Symantec speculates that by employing rootkit techniques to evade detection and removal, attackers and
cybercriminals may be able to further compromise systems by downloading additional malicious code and,in turn, hide their functions from the operating system and the user. If so, an attacker would be able toperform virtually any function on the system, including remote access, the theft and transmission ofconfidential information, and the installation of additional security risks such as adware and spyware.
The ability to use rootkit techniques has already been demonstrated in malicious code such as Fanbot
34
and security risks such as adware and spyware.35There has also been some discussion about the ability of
malicious code to utilize rootkit techniques and hide itself in flash memory on computer motherboards.36
With the shift in the threat landscape towards cybercrime and the generation of profit, Symantecspeculates that an increasing amount of malicious code will utilize rootkit techniques for these purposes.
Increased commercialization of vulnerability research
As discussed in the “Vulnerability Trends” section of this report, the commercialization of vulnerabilityresearch is a growing phenomenon. As more commercial vendors have begun purchasing vulnerabilityinformation, a marketplace for security research has emerged that extends beyond traditional disclosureforums such as mailing lists and Web sites. Symantec expects that this will have a profound effect onvulnerability research. It could also seriously affect the ability of enterprises and consumers to protectthemselves from non-disclosed vulnerabilities and zero-day exploit code.
37
In the past, unless employed by a vendor directly, a vulnerability researcher would generally disclose his or her work on security Web sites and mailing lists. However, with the emergence of a market forcommercialized vulnerability information, security researchers may able to sell vulnerabilities to differentpurchasers for a range of prices, depending on the severity of the vulnerability and its impact on anorganization. Symantec believes that as the market broadens, security researchers will find themselvesfacing a fractured marketplace that has few standards and regulations. This in turn could lead to calls forlegislating the sale of vulnerability information and the possible criminalization of vulnerability research.
As more security researchers choose to disclose their vulnerabilities to third-party commercial entities for
profit, Symantec expects that the number of commercially acquired vulnerabilities will increase. Recently,there have been attempts to use popular auctioning venues to sell vulnerabilities to the highest bidder.
38
There have also been attempts to establish specialized vulnerability auctioning venues (which have thusfar failed to materialize due to legal uncertainties).
39This is indicative of a desire within the security
community to establish alternative markets to facilitate the sale of vulnerability and exploit codeinformation.
40This raises the possibility that as competing markets emerge, black market bounties couldSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
be used to commercialize vulnerability research in order to generate exploit code for use in cybercrime,
spyware, and corporate espionage.
This could have profound implications for organizations and end users, as vulnerability information will be
given a financial value that may motivate researchers to sell that information on either the open market orthe black market to the highest bidder, rather than disclosing them publicly on mailing lists and Web sites.While this might stimulate an increase in vulnerability research, it could also force the disclosure of suchresearch underground. If such a situation develops, security administrators could be at risk of not beingaware of vulnerabilities on their systems, leaving them susceptible to zero-day attacks.
41
As a result, Symantec speculates that while the number of publicly disclosed vulnerabilities coulddecrease, the window of exposure to potential threats could increase, as details about vulnerabilities areheld privately for greater periods of time. This could in turn increase the likelihood of leaked vulnerabilitiesand the development of privately held exploit code. If vulnerability research becomes increasinglymarginalized and moves further underground, enterprises, consumers, and small businesses could facelonger windows of exposure, thereby increasing their exposure to potential threats.
It should be noted that some vendors may resist the commercialization of vulnerability information as a
matter of principle, choosing instead to follow published industry coalition guidelines for vulnerabilitydisclosure.
42Furthermore, smaller vendors or open-source projects with limited resources may be excluded
from the commercialization process if they cannot afford to pay for vulnerability research on their ownproducts. This may place these vendors and projects in a position of competitive disadvantage as well asplacing them and their customers at greater security risk.
Non-traditional platform threats expected to emerge
The expansion of consumer entertainment systems, integrated voice and data devices, and online gamingpresents new and interesting security challenges. As more of these devices become integrated into existingIP networks, they may present new vectors for attackers to exploit to gain access to more traditionalnetworks. For instance, gaming consoles such as Microsoft’s Xbox,® Sony’s Playstation® and Playstation®Portable (PSP™) and the Nintendo® DS have begun adding Internet connectivity to their products. This hasallowed these devices to connect to traditional IP networks. Networked devices could be compromised andused as platforms from which to launch attacks against other systems on the same network, including thepropagation of malicious code.
Sony’s PSP is a case in point. On October 6, 2005, it became one of the first handheld gaming devices to be
victimized by malicious code.
43While more traditional attacks such as viruses and worms have yet to
appear, these devices could become transfer platforms for malicious code through the use of memorycards, Bluetooth,® and IP technology. It appears that an established community of researchers is alreadyreverse engineering and modifying existing game console platforms.
44Symantec believes that these
consoles could become platforms from which to launch attacks against traditional computer systems. Thisis of particular concern for the consumer market, as the majority of these devices are connecting throughhome networks, which may not have the same level of security as enterprise environments.
41A zero-day attack is one that attacks a vulnerability for which there is no available patch. It also generally means an attack against a vulnerability that is not yet
public knowledge or even known of by the vendor of the affected technology.
42http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/vdwgreport.pdf
43http://www.sarc.com/avcenter/venc/data/trojan.pspbrick.html
44http://www.xbox-linux.org/wiki/Main_Page21Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Voice and data devices such as Research in Motion’s (RIM) Blackberry™ and Palm’s Treo™ 700w have
become increasingly popular, with Blackberry subscribers totaling over 1,340,000.45Over the past year
several vulnerabilities in RIM’s software have been disclosed.46While no vulnerabilities have been reported
in the Treo 700w at the time of writing of this report, its ability to run Window’s Mobile could make itsusceptible to vulnerabilities targeting applications running on that platform. As integrated voice and datadevices, Blackberry and Treo could also be susceptible to voice spam and malicious code directed towardsstandard wireless technologies.
Malicious code targeting online gaming has already been detected in significant volumes. The online game
Lineage has been the target of a Trojan horse that attempts to steal users’ passwords. The Lineage Trojanwas the most widely reported malicious code sample in the Asia Pacific region in 2005.
47Furthermore, in
August 2005 a worm that stole players’ usernames, passwords and other data caused an online game tosuspend the trading of users’ accounts.
48The data harvested by these attacks is likely intended to be used
in cybercrime activities for financial gain.
Furthermore, there have also been reports of phishing attacks targeting user account information for
multi-player online role-playing games. According to these reports, the information obtained throughsuccessful attacks is used to steal and sell virtual items on auction sites for real money. Symantecspeculates that as virtual online gaming communities increase in popularity, they will become a moreprominent target for cybercrime, particularly as the trade in stolen virtual goods is difficult to track.
A “boom” cycle for bots and bot networks
Much of the discussion in the “Vulnerability Trends” section of this report focused on the rise in Webapplication vulnerabilities and the large number of Web browser vulnerabilities. Symantec speculates thatthese developments will have important implications for the growth of bots and bot networks worldwide.
As was discussed in the “Attack Trends” section of this report, security administrators have implemented
measures such as port blocking to stop communication between bots and bot owners. As a result,attackers will likely adjust their methods of establishing and controlling bot networks. They may begin touse different communication channels and encryption as a means of avoiding capture and detection.
49This
ongoing battle between attackers and security administrators has resulted in a cyclical trend in botactivity. Symantec refers to this as a boom-and-bust cycle in the number of bots and bot networks.
50
Currently, there appears to be a lull in bot network growth. However, Symantec speculates that this willchange as new and more potent attack vectors are developed. The “Vulnerability Trends” section of thisreport documented the rise in Web application vulnerabilities and the growing number of Web browservulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities may create the potential for large increases in bots and bot networks.Attacks that target them are usually conducted by HTTP and, as such, may bypass filtering mechanismsthat are in place on the network perimeter. Additionally, Symantec has observed increased sophisticationin the exploitation of attacks against Web applications, culminating in the development of self-propagatingmalicious code targeting them. Attackers could exploit widely deployed Web applications and Webbrowsers to install malicious code, particularly bots.
45http://www.geekzone.co.nz/content.asp?contentid=2972
46http://search.securityfocus.com/swsearch?query=Blackberry&sbm=bid&submit=Search%21&metaname=alldoc&sort=swishrank
47http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/pwsteal.lineage.html
48http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/08/24/fantasy_role_play_worm/
49http://news.com.com/Bots+may+get+cloak+of+encryption/2100-7349_3-5952102.html
50For further discussion of this trend please see the “Attacks Trends” section of this report.
22Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
23The widespread deployment of Web applications and Web browsers presents attackers with a large number
of easily exploitable targets. For instance, Web browser vulnerabilities can lead to the exploitation ofvulnerabilities in operating system components and individual applications, which can lead to theinstallation of malicious code, including bots. Given the potential for widespread exploitation of Webapplication and Web browser vulnerabilities, Symantec speculates that a new vulnerability in a widelydeployed Web technology could mean a large and rapid increase in the number of bot networks.
Increase in phishing messages and malicious code distributed through instant messaging
As organizations adjust their security measures in response to the changing threat landscape, attackerscontinue to look for new methods and tactics to avoid detection. As discussed in the “Malicious CodeTrends” section of this report, malicious code propagating through instant messaging (IM) is on the rise.Symantec expects this to continue. The increasing adoption and use of IM clients and networks, includingthe newly released Google Talk™ service, will add to the attack vectors that are available. Additionally, ascorporations begin adopting internal IM networks that can connect to the public IM networks, thecomplexity of these networks and number of connected users will increase. As a result, the number ofpotential IM targets for malicious code is expected to expand, creating the likelihood for increased attackactivity against this vector.
Symantec speculates that phishing will become an increasing security concern for IM services. This activity
has traditionally been conducted by email, particularly using spam messages. However, phishers havebegun to leverage new delivery mechanisms, such as instant messaging. In 2005, Symantec detected fourphishing attempts that were conducted over IM networks, including two in the second half of the year.While this number is small, it indicates that attackers are becoming aware of the potential of IM for thismalicious activity.
Phishing is particularly dangerous for IM users because of the nature of IM communications. IM users are
inherently trusted by the people on their contact lists; as a result, IM users are less likely to suspect thatIM communications could constitute malicious activity. Symantec believes that as the use of IM servicesincreases, phishing attacks targeting IM users will increase accordingly.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
51Symantec Internet Security Threat Report Volume VII (March 2005) and Volume VIII (September 2005). Both are available at:
http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539
52A honeypot is an Internet-connected system that acts as a decoy, allowing an attacker to enter the system in order to observe t he attacker’s behavior inside the
compromised system.24Attack Trends
This section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report will provide an analysis of attack activity for
the period between July 1 and December 31, 2005. An attack is defined as any malicious activity carriedout over a network that has been detected by an intrusion detection system or firewall. An attack istypically an attempt to exploit a vulnerability in software or hardware. Attack activity for this period will be compared to that presented in the previous Internet Security Threat Report.
51Wherever applicable,
suggestions on attack remediation will be made along with references to Symantec’s best practices, whichare outlined in Appendix A of this report.
The Symantec Global Intelligence Network monitors attack activity across the entire Internet. Over
40,000 sensors deployed in more than 180 countries by Symantec DeepSight Threat Management Systemand Symantec Managed Security Services gather this data. In addition to these sources, Symantec hasdeveloped and deployed a honeypot network that is used to identify, observe, and study completeinstances of attacker and malicious code activity.
52It helps to provide details about how some of the attack
activity identified in this section is carried out. These resources combine to give Symantec an unparalleledability to identify, investigate, and respond to emerging threats. This discussion will be based on dataprovided by all of these sources.
Security devices can monitor for attacks and suspicious behavior at many different levels on the network.
Devices such as intrusion detection systems (IDS), intrusion protection systems (IPS), firewalls, proxyfilters, and antivirus installations all contribute to the overall security of an organization. Symantec gathersdata from many of these devices. One consequence of this data-gathering scheme is that malicious codedata and attack trends data often address the same activity in different ways. For instance, attack trendsdata is based on the number of infected sources that are attempting to spread. On the other hand,malicious code data is based primarily on reports of attempted propagation. This can lead to differentrankings of threats presented in the “Attack Trends” and “Malicious Code Trends” sections of this report.
This section of the Internet Security Threat Report will discuss:
• Top Internet attacks
• Top attacked ports• Attack activity per day• Time to compromise Internet-connected computers• Bot networks • Top bot-infected countries• Denial of service attacks• Top originating countries• Top targeted industries
Top Internet attacks
The attacks discussed in this section are the most common attacks detected by the Symantec GlobalIntelligence Network, which includes Symantec Managed Security Services and the Symantec DeepSightThreat Management System. They are determined by the percentage of the total attacking IP addressesSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
that perform a given attack. These attacks reflect activity that occurs across the Internet as a whole and is
thus indicative of activity that security administrators are likely to observe on their own networks. Themajority of these attacks are carried out by malicious code and bot networks, while a smaller proportionare carried out by individual attackers.
The top ten attacks changed significantly over the course of 2005. Six of the attacks for the second half of
the year were not in the top ten for the first half and attacks targeting Web-based and email-based serviceshave become more common. Accordingly, attacks that were previously popular have begun to drop off. Forexample, in the first half of 2005 the Microsoft Windows DCOM RPC Interface Buffer Overrun Attack wasthe ninth most common; however, over in the second half of the year, it was ranked nineteenth.
In the previous volume of the Internet Security Threat Report, Symantec speculated that as perimeter
defenses became more prominent, attacks against Web-based services and client-side vulnerabilities wouldbecome more common.
53Attack activity over the past six months appears to support this assertion, as
nearly half of the attacks in the top ten targeted Web-based technologies.
In the previous two versions of the Internet Security Threat Report (Volume VII and VIII), Symantec
speculated that this shift in attacks was due to effective patching and security precautions, as well asingress and egress filtering of known attacks at the router level, especially by ISPs.
54These factors have
had the effect of reducing the number of computers that are exposed to previously popular and effectiveattacks, thereby forcing attackers to adopt new tactics.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2005, the Microsoft SQL Server Resolution Service Stack Overflow
Attack was the most common attack (table 2). Also known as the Slammer Attack because of its initialassociation with the Slammer worm,
55this attack accounted for 45% of attacking IP addresses during this
period. This is an increase of 36% over the first half of 2005, when it accounted for only 33% of attackingIP addresses.
In spite of this increase in proportion, the actual number of IP addresses observed carrying out this attack
dropped slightly from the previous reporting period. This is due primarily to the drop in prominence ofother attacks. As has been discussed, previously popular attacks have become less common, likely as aresult of patching and widespread implementation of perimeter security measures. With the reduction inpreviously common attacks, the Microsoft SQL Server Resolution Service Stack Overflow Attack hasincreased proportionately despite an overall drop in volume.
The continued prominence of this attack can be attributed to a number of factors. The first is that it is
commonly carried out using a single UDP packet.
56The nature of UDP makes it possible for attackers and
malicious code to forge the address of the sender when carrying out an attack, a practice known asspoofing.
57This may inflate the number of distinct IP addresses that Symantec observes performing the
attack. Furthermore, a complete attack can be conducted with a single UDP packet. This allows attackers tolaunch considerably more attacks, as the complexity of the required network communication is minimal.
The success of this attack may also aided by two other factors. The first is that a number of highly
successful bots—such as Gaobot
58and Spybot59—use it. The second is the high volume of computers
running vulnerable software. This attack affects both the Microsoft SQL Server and the MSDE (MicrosoftDesktop Engine), which is included with some third-party software. This makes patching the exploited
53The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, Volume VIII (September 2005): p. 1
http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539
54The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, Volume VIII (September 2005): p. 21
55http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.sqlexp.worm.html
56User Datagram Protocol
57Spoofing is commonly used to obscure the origin of the attack. This tactic makes investigation and response more difficult by m aking infected computers and attackers
untraceable.
58http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.hllw.gaobot.aa.html
59http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.spybot.worm.html25Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
60An HTTP GET request is issued to a Web server to retrieve resources such as Web pages and image files.
61ICMP (Internet Control Message Protocol) is employed by the TCP/IP stack to handle error and control messages. 26
Rank
July–Dec
2005
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
101
4
15
6
12
23
10
13
7
1745%
5%
3%
3%
3%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%33%
4%
1%
3%
2%
1%
2%
2%
3%
1%Rank
Jan–June
2005Percent of
attackers
July–Dec 2005Percent of
attackers
Jan–June 2005 Attack
Microsoft SQL Server Resolution Service Stack
Overflow Attack
Generic HTTP Directory Traversal Attack
Generic ICMP Flood Attack
Generic WebDAV/Source Disclosure HTTP Header
Request Attack
Generic HTTP CONNECT TCP Tunnel Attack
Sendmail Header Processing/Prescan corruption
Buffer Overflow Attack
Generic Cross-Site Scripting in URL Attack
Microsoft FrontPage Sensitive Page Attack
Generic X86 Buffer Overflow (TCP NOPS) Attack
Possible Incoming Malicious Attachment Eventvulnerability across the enterprise very difficult, as each affected software package requires its own patch.
Furthermore, this vulnerability will be introduced whenever a vulnerable application is installed. If patchesare not applied to the software shortly after installation, it is likely that a compromise will occur.
Table 2. Top attacks
Source: Symantec Corporation
The Generic HTTP Directory Traversal Attack was the second most common attack during the second half
of 2005. It was used by five percent of the total attacking IP addresses during this period, up from fourpercent in the previous period. The increase in the prominence of this attack is likely due to a number ofreasons, including the shift of attack activity away from network perimeters and toward Web-basedapplications and services.
The prominence of this attack is also due to the ease with which directory traversal attacks can be
conducted, as well as the fact that they are effective against Web servers and a wide range of Webapplications. A directory traversal attack requires no complex computer code but only a single HTTP GETrequest.
60This allows attackers to issue many attacks against target systems. Furthermore, a successful
directory traversal attack offers high potential rewards, such as access to sensitive information—serverconfigurations and application data, for instance—that could, in turn, facilitate further compromise of thetarget computer.
The third most common attack in the last six months of 2005 was the Generic ICMP Flood Attack, which
accounted for three percent of the total attacking IP addresses. This attack was the fifteenth most commonin the first half of the year, when it accounted for only one percent of all attacking IP addresses. Denial ofservice (DoS) attacks that use ICMP flooding are carried out by bombarding a target computer with ICMPecho request or reply packets that are commonly utilized by ping utilities.
61Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
62See the Bot Networks discussion below for more information on bot network computers.
63Ingress traffic refers to traffic that is coming into a network from the Internet or another network. Egress traffic refers to traffic that is leaving a network,
bound for the Internet or another network.
64The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, Volume VIII (September 2005): p 11
65http://www.networkworld.com/news/2005/051605-ddos-extortion.html27The rise in popularity of this attack coincides with an increase in the popularity of other forms of DoS
attacks, such as SYN flood attacks, which are described in the “Denial of service attacks” discussion below.ICMP flood DoS attacks are popular because they are relatively easy to execute. Publicly available tools andcode for these attacks have existed for some time, allowing them to be easily incorporated into maliciouscode, such as bots.
62To defend against ICMP flood attacks, Symantec recommends that organizations
implement intrusion detection systems. They should also perform ingress and egress filtering on allnetwork communications.
63
DoS attacks in general appear to be gaining in popularity. The previous volume of the Internet Security
Threat Report discussed how DoS attacks have been reported in extortion attempts.64In such schemes,
criminals threaten to render the targeted organization’s Web site or online service inaccessible for a periodof time if their demands for payment are not met.
65These DoS extortion schemes are a prime example of
cybercrime, the use of computers and the Internet to conduct criminal activities, usually for financial gain.
Top attacked ports
Assessing the top attacked ports allows security personnel to understand which ports (and associatedservices) attackers may be targeting. This discussion is based on data that is derived from firewall sensorsthat record each rejected or denied connection attempt. As a result, legitimate port activity should not berepresented in the data. This metric does not attempt to provide any specific attack information. It merelyreflects attacker interest in a given port. It does not assume that there is necessarily an attack associatedwith it, nor does it assume that a specific service is being targeted.
The lack of definitive attack information means that it is impossible to distinguish between information-
gathering attacks, exploit attempts, or any other type of potentially malicious activity. However,administrators can use this data to assess which ports and services are most commonly being targeted and configure their systems’ security accordingly.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
28
Rank
July–Dec
200 5
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 3
1
5
4
6
2
10
9
7
17 17%
12%
8%
8%
8%
8%
5%
5%
3%
3% 9%
18%
7%
7%
6%
13%
3%
3%
5%
1% Rank
Jan– June
2005 Port Percent of
attack er s
July–Dec 2005 Percent of
attack er s
Jan– June 2005
1026 UDP
445 TC P
443 T CP
80 TC P
25 TC P
135 TC P
6346 TC P
139 TC P
4662 T CP
6881 UDP Ser vice Description
V arious dynamic services
CIFS/ SMB
(Microsoft Windows File Sharing)
Secure World Wide Web (HT TPS)
World Wide Web (HT TP) services
Simple Mail T ransfer Protocol
(SMTP) services
DCE-RPC (remote Microsof t
Windows communication)
Gnutella (file s haring)
NetBIOS
(Microsoft Windows File Sharing)
Edonkey (file sharing)
BitT orrent (file sharing) Table 3. Top attacked ports
Source: Symantec Corporation
In the second half of 2005, UDP port 1026 was the most frequently targeted port. It was targeted by 17%
of attackers (table 3). This is an 88% increase over the first half of 2005, when it was targeted by ninepercent of attackers. This port is typically associated with the Windows Messaging Service. WindowsMessaging Service is not related to Windows Messenger or MSN Messenger in any way; rather, it facilitatesthe Net Send functionality, which allows a user on one computer to send pop-up messages to users onanother computer.
The frequency of attacks against this port may be due to the nature of the UDP protocol, which allows
attackers to forge the address of the sender when carrying out an attack. This practice, known as spoofing,is commonly employed to obscure the attacker’s location. It could also inflate the number of attacking IPaddresses and thus increase the prominence of this port.
Activity over UDP port 1026 is also widely used to relay pop-up spam messages on Microsoft Windows
computers through the Windows Messenger Service. Although this port is usually strictly controlled byorganizations at the network perimeter, home users and small businesses without sufficient securityinfrastructure could be targeted by spammers. Furthermore, pop-up spam targeting this port is very simpleto construct and send in high volume as the entire pop-up can be sent in a single UDP packet. This allowsmessages to be sent to a large number of computers without requiring excessive resources.
Over the last six months of 2005, TCP port 445 was the second most frequently targeted port, accounting
for 12% of all attacking IP addresses. This is a 33% decrease from the first half of the year, when it wastargeted by 18% of attackers and was the most frequently targeted port. In the second half of 2004, it wastargeted by 35% of attackers.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
TCP port 445 has been a popular target due to the many services that run over it. These include Microsoft
File and Printer Sharing (often referred to as SMB or CIFS), as well as some remote managementfunctionality, including some remote procedure call (RPC) functionality. Furthermore, several high-profilevulnerabilities are exploitable through this port, such as Microsoft Windows LSASS Buffer OverrunVulnerability
66and the Microsoft Windows DCOM RPC Interface Buffer Overflow Vulnerability.67Each of
these has public exploit code available and each has been targeted by Spybot and Gaobot. This port is alsoexploitable through the Microsoft Windows Plug and Play Buffer Overflow Vulnerability,
68which was
targeted by Zotob.69
In spite of these considerations, attack activity targeting port 445 is dropping. This drop is related to adecline in the number of reports of Gaobot, which uses CIFS as a propagation vector, over the past sixmonths (for more discussion on this, please refer to the “Malicious Code Trends” report in this document).This is likely due to the implementation of stronger perimeter security defenses protecting this port.
Many organizations have secured port 445 and other ports offering Microsoft Windows services after they
were successfully targeted by rapidly propagating worms such as Slammer.
70Furthermore, the widespread
implementation of personal firewalls has made attacks against this port less successful, and subsequentlymade other targets—such as Web servers and Web applications—more desirable.
Over the second half of 2005, the third most frequently targeted port was TCP port 443, which accounted
for eight percent of all observed attacking IP addresses. This is a slight increase over the seven percent ofattackers who targeted this port in the first half of 2005 when it was the fifth most targeted port.
TCP port 443 is associated with HTTPS, which is used to conduct secure Web transactions. Symantec
believes that the prominence of this port—and TCP port 80 (HTTP), which followed very closely behind it inthe top attacked port rankings—is due to the changing focus of attackers. As they find attacks againstMicrosoft Windows-based services less fruitful due to perimeter security enforcement, attackers appearlikely to turn their attention to Web-based technologies and services. These technologies and services willoften be available over TCP ports 443 and 80. It therefore follows that increased attack activity againstthese Web-based applications and services will result in increased activity against these two ports.
Attacks against these ports can be very attractive to attackers. Web servers are popular targets for a number
of reasons. Attackers can exploit them to steal information that passes through them, such as credit cardand bank information. Furthermore, they can serve as potential jump-off points into databases that holdsensitive client or user information. Compromised Web servers can also be used to host phishing sites.Finally, Web servers can be exploited to launch attacks against Web browsers that access them. This trend issupported by observations made in the “Top Internet attacks” discussion above, which shows that attackstargeting computers hosting Web services are becoming more prominent.
Finally, it is interesting to note that UDP port 1434 failed to rank among the top ten targeted ports during
this reporting period. This is the port that is targeted by the Microsoft SQL Server Resolution Service StackOverflow Attack, the top attack for this reporting period. The absence of this port in the top targeted ports islikely due to security policies that have been implemented on many networks. It is likely that administratorshave disabled logging of infection attempts on this port for performance reasons or to simplify log auditing.
29
66http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10108
67http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/8205
68http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/14513
69http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.zotob.a.html
70At the time of its release, the SQL Slammer worm was the fastest propagating worm ever, infecting 90% of all vulnerable compute rs within the first 10 minutes of
its release. See the following link for further details: http://www.cs.berkeley.edu/~nweaver/sapphire/Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
30Attack activity per day
The attack activity per day is determined by the number of attacks observed by the median organization in
the sample set. As such, it is considered to be indicative of the number of attacks on the Internet as awhole. Organizations can use this metric to compare the number of attacks observed against theirnetworks, potentially giving them insight into any anomalous activity that may arise.
Attacks discussed in this section include all malicious attempts to access a network, including attacks
blocked at the firewall and network intrusion detection system levels. These attacks reflect attack activitythat security administrators are likely to observe on their own networks.
010203040506070
July–Dec 2004 July–Dec 2005 Jan–June 2005Attac ks per day
Period 3957 57
Figure 5. Attack activity per day
Source: Symantec Corporation
Between July 1 and December 31, 2005, Symantec detected an average of 39 attacks per day (figure 5). In
each of the two previous six-month periods, Symantec detected an average of 57 attacks per day. Thisequates to a decrease of 32% over the last six months of 2005.
Symantec speculates that this drop in the daily attack rate reflects a move away from conventional vectors
by attackers. As outlined in both the “Top Internet attacks” and “Top attacked ports” discussions, attackersappear to be shifting their focus away from attacks against Microsoft Windows operating systems servicesand toward Web-based targets.
While the number of attacks being detected is down, it is likely that attack activity has not diminished to
the same degree, if at all. Rather, attacks against Web-based technologies such as Web browsers and Webapplications are less likely to be detected using conventional perimeter defenses. As such, they are notlikely to be represented in this metric.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
3171Weakness refers to both programming weaknesses that may compromise security but are not necessarily vulnerabilities as well as weak security policies such as
poor password protection.
72Client-side services refer to those operations that are conducted by applications that reside on a desktop computer or workstat ion, such as a browser, an email
client, a word processing application. As such, they only provide services to the user that activated them, and are not accessi ble remotely through a network or
the Internet.Time to compromise of Internet-connected operating systems
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report Symantec is assessing the amount
of time it takes for attackers to compromise a newly installed operating system once it has been connectedto the Internet. This metric has been developed to give insight into how quickly an Internet-connectedcomputer may become compromised. This will help administrators and users to understand the immediacyof potential threats facing Internet-facing computers and to illustrate the need to apply updates to newlyinstalled systems from a secure position; that is, prior to connection to the Internet.
Attacks can be carried out by exploiting vulnerabilities or weaknesses in computers through two basic
vectors:
71remotely accessible services and client-side services.72Vulnerabilities in remotely accessible
services may be targeted against a computer on a network without requiring any interaction from a user of the target computer. On the other hand, client-side vulnerabilities require user interaction beforeexploitation can take place. This discussion only considers attacks against remotely exploitablevulnerabilities and does not consider attacks that require user interaction.
The amount of time a computer is likely to be online prior to being compromised is influenced by a large
number of factors, including: the computer’s operating system, its configuration, patch levels, the securityapplications that are installed, and the perimeter security behind which it is placed. Furthermore, thelocation of the computer on the Internet can also influence the time to compromise. Some ISPs filtercertain protocols at their boundary, resulting in reduced risk to computers on that ISP’s network. Also, if acomputer resides on a network that contains compromised computers, it is more likely to be attacked andcompromised itself.
Symantec defines the “time to compromise” as the time that elapses between the moment at which the
computer is made available on the network until the moment when it is considered to be compromised.Symantec performs automated heuristic analysis on the computer to determine when it is considered to be compromised. It should be noted that multiple failed attempts to compromise a computer are oftenobserved prior to a successful compromise.
Because filtering and ISP policy can significantly affect the time to compromise of a computer, the data
and the related discussion presented in this section may not be directly applicable to computer systemsdeployed on other ISPs or IP ranges. Rather, this discussion should simply be taken as a comparison of thepotential time to compromise of various operating systems and configurations.
In order to assess the time to compromise, Symantec deployed honeypot systems running a cross-section
of operating systems: Microsoft Windows 2000, Windows XP, and Windows 2003, as well as Red HatEnterprise Linux 3 and SuSE Linux 9 Desktop. The Windows systems were deployed with three patch levels:unpatched, patched with the latest service pack, and fully patched. The computer systems were placedonline between November 16 and December 31, 2005. All fully patched windows systems were deployedwith full patches as of November 16, 2005. This discussion is based on data gathered during that period.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
3273DotNetNuke is an open-source Web application framework designed to facilitate the implementation of Web applications including commercial Web sites, online
publishing, and custom applications. No public vulnerabilities were reported or patches were applied to this application after it was deployedTime to compromise—Web servers
The first group of computers assessed for the time to compromise metric consisted of Web servers
(table 4). Seven different Web servers and configurations were tested. Where applicable, all installationdefault settings were maintained. When third-party installations were performed, the installationinstructions provided by the vendor were used with no additional security measures taken. All WindowsWeb systems were deployed with the off-the-shelf version of IIS and the DotNetNuke content managementsoftware.
73Microsoft Desktop Engine (MSDE), a version of the Microsoft SQL Server, was used to provide
database support.
Symantec attempted to simulate computers deployed by a moderately experienced administrator with no
significant security knowledge. As such, from a security perspective, all of the data described can beregarded as being derived from a worst-case system default installation. Symantec acknowledges andsupports the statement that security can be significantly enhanced by hardening systems to minimize theattack profile. For further recommendations, please consult Symantec best practices, which are outlined inAppendix A of this report.
Table 4. Time to compromise, Web servers
Source: Symantec Corporation
Of the Web servers that were tested, Windows 2000 Server with no patches had the shortest average time
to compromise, roughly one hour and 17 minutes. The minimum time for this server was one minute and14 seconds and the longest was roughly 18 hours and 28 minutes. As can be seen from the maximum timebetween successful compromises and the shortest time between successful compromises, a considerablevariation is possible. This was true of all three of the servers that were compromised.
Configuration
Microsoft Windows 2000 Server –
No Patches
Microsoft Windows 2000 Server –
Service Pack 4
Microsoft Windows 2003 Web Edition –
No Patches
RedHat Enterprise Linux 3 Web –
Unpatched
Microsoft Windows 2000 Server –
Fully Patched
Microsoft Windows 2003 Web Edition –
Fully Patched
Microsoft Windows 2003 Web Edition –
Service Pack 11:16:55
1:32:08
4:36:55
Not Compromised
Not Compromised
Not Compromised
Not CompromisedMedian Average
(h:m:s)
18:27:47
17:12:54
23:00:13
Not Compromised
Not Compromised
Not Compromised
Not CompromisedMax
(h:m:s)Min
(h:m:s)
0:01:14
0:00:41
0:02:08
Not Compromised
Not Compromised
Not Compromised
Not CompromisedSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
33The Web server with the second shortest time to compromise was the Microsoft Windows 2000 Server with
Service Pack 4 applied. It had a median average compromise time of one hour and 32 minutes. Theminimum time to compromise for this setup was 41 seconds, the fastest time of any system. The maximumtime was roughly 17 hours and 13 minutes.
Of the three servers that were compromised during this test, the unpatched Microsoft Windows 2003 Web
Edition had the longest time to compromise. It had a median average time to compromise of roughly fourhours and 37 minutes. The fastest time to compromise for this setup was two minutes and eight seconds.The slowest time was 23 hours.
RedHat Enterprise Linux 3 was tested in an unpatched deployment and running Apache, Mod-PHP, MySQL
and PHPNuke. It was not compromised during the assessment period.
In the case of each of the servers tested in this assessment, when the servers were fully patched, no
compromise occurred. This supports the assertion that applying patches in a timely manner is part of aneffective security strategy.
Time to compromise—desktop computers
The second group of computers assessed for the time to compromise metric consisted of desktop servers.Symantec assessed the time to compromise of seven different desktop operating systems andconfigurations (table 5). Where applicable, all installation default settings were maintained with theexception of firewalls, which were deactivated. If firewalls are appropriately configured, they would simplynot allow any connections to the computer and comparisons between operating systems or patch levelswould not be possible.
Configuration
Microsoft Windows XP Professional –
No Patches
Microsoft Windows 2000 Professional –
No Patches
Microsoft Windows 2000 Professional –
Service Pack 4
SuSE Linux 9 Desktop
Microsoft Windows 2000 Professional –
Full Patch
Microsoft Windows XP Professional –
Full Patch
Microsoft Windows XP Professional –
Service Pack 21:00:12
1:03:18
1:14:20
Not Compromised
Not Compromised
Not Compromised
Not CompromisedMedian Average
(h:m:s)
22:13:18
20:18:03
21:02:48
Not Compromised
Not Compromised
Not Compromised
Not CompromisedMax
(h:m:s)Min
(h:m:s)
0:00:37
0:01:19
0:00:39
Not Compromised
Not Compromised
Not Compromised
Not Compromised
Table 5. Time to compromise, desktop computers with firewalls deactivated
Source: Symantec Corporation Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
34All of the desktop operating system implementations that were compromised during the assessment
period had similar average times to compromise. Furthermore, they all had similar maximum andminimum times to compromise. This is likely due to the fact that they are all vulnerable to many high-profile vulnerabilities, such as the Microsoft Windows LSASS Buffer Overrun Vulnerability
74and the
Microsoft Windows DCOM RPC Interface Buffer Overflow Vulnerability,75which are known to be exploited
by malicious code.
Of the desktop computers that were assessed, Microsoft Windows XP Professional with no patches had
the shortest average time to compromise at one hour and 12 seconds. The maximum time to compromisefor this operating system was roughly 22 hours and 13 minutes, while the minimum time was a mere 37 seconds.
The Microsoft Windows 2000 Professional operating system without patches had the second shortest
average time to compromise, approximately one hour and three minutes. It had a maximum time ofroughly 20 hours and 18 minutes and a minimum time of one minute and 19 seconds.
The Microsoft Windows 2000 Professional operating system with Service Pack 4 applied had the third
longest average time to compromise, approximately one hour and fourteen minutes. It had a maximumtime of roughly 21 hours and two minutes and a minimum time of 39 seconds, the second shortest of anydesktop system tested.
The SuSE Linux 9 Desktop version 9.3 was deployed in its default desktop configuration and was not
patched. It was not compromised during the testing period.
Microsoft Windows 2000 Professional fully patched, Microsoft Windows XP Professional with Service Pack 2,
and Microsoft Windows XP Professional fully patched were not compromised during the assessmentperiod. This is likely due to a lag time between the release of patches and the production of exploits thatcan reliably compromise them. These findings enforce the importance of maintaining up-to-date patchinglevels, as fully patched computers are less likely to be compromised.
Bot networks
Bot networks are groups of compromised computers on which attackers have installed software thatlistens for and responds to commands, typically using IRC, thereby giving the attacker remote control overthe computers. The software used to compromise and control these computers, known as bot software,may be upgraded to include new functionality, including exploit code that can target new vulnerabilities.
Bots can have numerous effects on an all Internet users, including home users, small businesses, and large
organizations. A single infected host within a network (such as a laptop that was compromised outside thelocal network and then connected to the network, either directly or by VPN) can allow a bot to propagate toother computers that are normally protected against external attacks by corporate firewalls. Bots can beused by external attackers to perform DoS attacks against the enterprise’s Web site, which can disruptrevenue for e-commerce companies. Furthermore, bots within an organization’s network can be used toattack other organizations’ Web sites, which can have serious legal consequences.
74http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10108
75http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/8205Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
35
Active bot-infected computers
Date Moving average Bots
010,00020,00030,00040,000
June 17, 2004May 20, 2004Apr 22, 2004Mar 25, 2004Feb 26, 2004Jan 29, 2004Jan 1, 2004
July 15, 2004
Aug 12, 2004
Sep 9, 2004
Oct 7, 2004
Nov 4, 2004
Dec 2, 2004
Dec 30, 2004
Jan 27, 2005
Feb 24, 2005
Dec 29, 2005Dec 1, 2005Nov 3, 2005Oct 6, 2005Sep 8, 2005Aug 11, 2005July 14, 2005June 16, 2005May 19, 2005Apr 21, 2005Mar 24, 2005This metric explores the number of active bot network computers that the Symantec™ Global Intelligence
Network detected and identified during the last six months of 2005. Identification is carried out on anindividual basis by analyzing attack and scanning patterns. Computers generating attack patterns thatshow a high degree of coordination will be considered bot-infected computers.
As a consequence of this, Symantec does not identify all bot-infected computers but only those that are
working in a well coordinated and aggressive fashion. Given Symantec’s extensive and globally distributedsensor base, it reasonable to assume that the bot activities discussed here are representative of the world-wide bot activity, and thus can provide an understanding of the current bot activity across the Internet as a whole.
76The measure of variance in this case is the difference in the numbers of bots seen each day. When evaluating the standard devia tion of the daily bot numbers
Symantec has observed a 52% decrease, indicating that the variance is dropping and the daily rate of bot-computers is becoming regular and more predictable.Figure 6. Bot-infected computers detected per day
Source: Symantec Corporation
Over the last six months of 2005, Symantec identified an average of 9,163 bot-infected computers per day
(figure 6). This is a drop of 11% from the first half of the year, during which Symantec identified 10,347bot-infected computers per day. Despite the decrease over the past six months, the number of bot-infectedcomputers that Symantec has detected over the past year appears to have leveled off around the 10,000bot mark. This leveling off is evident in the daily variance,
76which has dropped from the previous reporting
period (figure 7). As a result, the daily rate of bot-infected computers is becoming regular and morepredictable.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
36
Standard deviation
Date Moving average Standard deviation
02,0004,0006,0008,00010,000
June 17, 2004May 20, 2004Apr 22, 2004Mar 25, 2004Feb 26, 2004Jan 29, 2004Jan 1, 2004
July 15, 2004
Aug 12, 2004
Sep 9, 2004
Oct 7, 2004
Nov 4, 2004
Dec 2, 2004
Dec 30, 2004
Jan 27, 2005
Feb 24, 2005
Dec 29, 2005Dec 1, 2005Nov 3, 2005Oct 6, 2005Sep 8, 2005Aug 11, 2005July 14, 2005June 16, 2005May 19, 2005Apr 21, 2005Mar 24, 2005Figure 7. Daily variance in bot-infected computers
Source: Symantec Corporation
Having monitored the daily rates of bot-infected computers since the beginning of January 2004,
Symantec has concluded that bot-infected computers follow a boom-and-bust population curve. BetweenFebruary and June 2004, the number of bot-infected computers experienced significant growth. This boomperiod was driven by the rapid spread of Spybot and Gaobot.
77
A subsequent bust cycle occurred between July and December 2004. As security professionals began toharden their computers and networks against the new bot threats, the number of bot infections dropped.Furthermore, the widespread deployment of perimeter security measures, such as firewalls, limited theability for bots to propagate. As a result, bot infections lessened and the population decreased.Accordingly, during 2005 the number of bot-infected computers appears to have reached the carryingcapacity of its environment.
Symantec speculates that if bots begin to exploit an attack vector that bypasses firewalls and perimeter
defenses, the population of bot-infected computers could increase rapidly again. This impending boomperiod could have a greater impact on the Internet than the earlier one because bot network owners havebecome more organized and experienced. Furthermore, bot technology is much more entrenched due tothe public disclosure of bot source code.
Symantec believes that vulnerabilities in Web browsers could fuel the next bot population boom. The
widespread deployment of Web browsers, the large number of high-profile vulnerabilities affecting them,
77See the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report Volume VI (Jan–June 2004) for further information on the spread of Gaobot and Spybot.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
78Defense in-depth emphasizes multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive systems to guard against single-point fail ures in any specific
technology or protection methodology. Defense in-depth should include the deployment of antivirus, firewalls, and intrusion det ection systems, among
other security measures.37and the relatively immature security infrastructure currently protecting them makes them a prime target
for widespread bot infection. It is reasonable to conclude that if bot network owners begin to target Webbrowser vulnerabilities, the population of bot-infected computers will increase rapidly.
To prevent bot infections, Symantec recommends that ISPs perform both ingress and egress filtering to
block known bot network traffic. ISPs should also filter out potentially malicious email attachments toreduce exposure to enterprises and end users. Organizations should monitor all network-connectedcomputers for signs of bot infection, ensuring that any infections are detected and isolated as soon aspossible. They should also ensure that all antivirus definitions are updated regularly. As compromisedcomputers can be a threat to other systems, Symantec also recommends that the enterprises notify theirISPs of all potentially malicious activity.
To reduce exposure to bot-related attacks, end users should employ defense in-depth strategies, including
the deployment of antivirus software and a firewall.
78Creating and enforcing policies that identify and limit
applications that can access the network may also be helpful in limiting the spread of bot networks. Usersshould update antivirus definitions regularly and ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers areupdated with all necessary security patches from their operating system vendor. Symantec also advisesthat users never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is expected and comesfrom a known and trusted source, and the purpose of the attachment is known.
Top bot-infected countries
Recognizing the ongoing threat posed by bot networks, Symantec tracks the distribution of bot-infectedcomputers worldwide. In order to do this, Symantec calculates the number of computers worldwide thatare known to be infected with bots and assesses what percentage are situated in each country. Thismeasure can help analysts understand how bot-infected computers are distributed globally. Theidentification of bot-infected computers is important, as a high percentage of infected machines likelyindicates a greater potential for bot-related attacks. It could also indicate the level of patching and securityawareness amongst computer administrators and users in a given region.
For this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report Symantec has also included an analysis of the
distribution of bot command-and-control servers. Bot command-and-control servers are computers thatbot network owners use to relay commands and instructions to other computers on their bot networks.This analysis should allow administrators to identify and understand the locations from which bot networksare being administered as well as the geographical distribution of bot networks.
Over the last six months of 2005, the United States was the site of the highest number of bot-infected
computers of any country (table 6). Twenty-six percent of bot-infected computers worldwide were situatedthere. This is up from the first half of the year, during which 19% of bot-infected computers were locatedin the United States, the second highest number of bot-infected computers to the United Kingdom. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
79http://www.point-topic.com/contentDownload/dslanalysis/world%20broadband%20statistics%20q3%202005.pdf (access requires registra tion)38Table 6. Top bot-infected countries
Source: Symantec Corporation
During the second half of 2005, 22% of all bot-infected computers worldwide were located in the United
Kingdom, the second highest number during this period. This is down from the previous six-month periodwhen the United Kingdom had the highest number of bot-infected computers with 32%.
Symantec has observed that bots usually infect computers connected to high-speed broadband Internet
through large ISPs and that the expansion of broadband connectivity often facilitates the spread of bots.Frequently, ISPs will focus their resources on meeting growing broadband demand at the expense ofimplementing security measures, such as port blocking and ingress and egress filtering. As a result, ISPsthat are growing or expanding their services rapidly may have security infrastructures that areunderdeveloped relative to their needs.
The decrease in the percentage of bot-infected computers in the United Kingdom may indicate that the
security infrastructure there is beginning to catch up to the growth of Internet connectivity. As aconsequence, the United States, which has extremely high broadband penetration and growth,
79has
regained its place as the most bot-infected country.
Over the last six months of 2005, nine percent of known bot-infected computers were located in China,
placing it in third position worldwide. It was also the third ranked country in the first half of 2005, withseven percent of bot-infected computers. China will likely continue to be prominent in this category, asbroadband penetration and expansion rates in that country continue to grow at a rapid pace.
In addition to the overall proportion of bot-infected computers residing in each country, Symantec believes
that it is also important to monitor which countries are experiencing the largest increase in thesecompromised systems. During the last six months of 2005, the United States experienced a 39% increasein bot-infected computers, the highest of any country. This rate of growth was 26 percentage points higherthan the average increase, 13%. This rise in the number of bots in the United States is likely closely linkedwith broadband Internet growth there. Rank
July–Dec
2005
1
23456789
102
13564
10
97826%
22%
9%4%4%4%3%3%3%2%19%
32%
7%4%4%5%2%3%4%3%
Rank
Jan–June
2005 CountryPercent of
bot-infected computers
July–Dec 2005Percent of
bot-infected computers
Jan–June 2005
United States
United Kingdom ChinaFranceSouth KoreaCanadaTaiwanSpainGermanyJapanSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
39China had the second largest increase of bot-infected computers during the last six months of 2005, with
37% growth, which was 24 percentage points above the average increase. China’s increase in bot-infectedcomputers is also likely related to its growth in broadband Internet connections. It is also an indicator thatChina is a popular target for bot network owners. The third largest increase in bot-infected computers tookplace in France, which had 23% growth in the second half of 2005.
Over the last six months of 2005, the United States had the highest proportion of bot command-and-
control servers in the world, accounting for 48% of the total (table 7). South Korea ranked second withnine percent of the total and Canada ranked third with six percent. The global distribution of command-and-control computers does not match the distribution of bot-infected computers in general. This wouldseem to indicate that many bot network owners control computers in countries outside of their own.
Bot network owners may be inclined to attack computers outside of their country of residence in order to
help maintain their anonymity. Doing so may make it difficult for law enforcement agencies to track them.By hopping through a number of computers in different countries attackers can ensure that it is difficult, ifnot impossible, to determine their geographical location. Furthermore, the likelihood of criminalprosecution for Internet-related crimes may be reduced due to differences in national and Internationallaws and jurisdictional differences.
Attackers are also likely driven to control bot-infected computers outside of their resident country by the
need to locate vulnerable targets. The United Kingdom may serve as an example of this. As discussedabove and in the previous volume of the Internet Security Threat Report, the United Kingdom’s rapidly
expanding Internet infrastructure has made it difficult for its security infrastructure to keep pace. This inturn has made it a prime target for attackers attempting to expand their bot networks.
Rank
July–Dec
2005
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Percent of
bot-infected
computers
July–Dec 2005
48%
9%
6%
5%
4%
4%
3%
3%
2%
2%United States
South Korea
Canada
Germany
China
Taiwan
Sweden
Japan
Argentina
United KingdomCountry
Table 7. Top command-and-control countries
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
4080The TCP protocol requires a three-way exchange to be carried out before any data is sent. The SYN request is the first phase of the three-way exchange. Once
a SYN request is received by a server, a SYN-ACK is sent in response. The final step is an ACK response, completing the connect ion negotiation process. Denial of service attacks
Denial of service (DoS) attacks are a major threat to organizations, especially those that rely on the
Internet for communication and to generate revenue. The term “denial of service” refers an attempt to limitthe target computer’s ability to service legitimate network requests, thereby denying services the computeris supposed to provide to legitimate users.
Although there are numerous methods for carrying out DoS attacks, Symantec derives the data for this
metric by measuring attacks carried out by flooding a target with SYN requests.
80This type of attack works
by overwhelming a target with SYN requests and not completing the initial request, which thus preventsother valid requests from being processed. In many cases, SYN requests with forged IP addresses are sentto a target, causing a single attacking computer to initiate multiple connections. This results in unsolicitedtraffic, known as backscatter, being sent to other computers on the Internet. This backscatter is used toderive the number of DoS victims observed throughout the reporting period.
Figure 8. DoS attacks per week
Source: Symantec Corporation
Average daly DoS attacks per week
DateMoving average Median DoS attacks per day
03006009001,2001,5001,800
June 17, 2004May 20, 2004Apr 22, 2004Mar 25, 2004Feb 26, 2004Jan 29, 2004Jan 1, 2004
July 15, 2004
Aug 12, 2004
Sep 9, 2004
Oct 7, 2004
Nov 4, 2004
Dec 2, 2004
Dec 30, 2004
Jan 27, 2005
Feb 24, 2005
Dec 29, 2005Dec 1, 2005Nov 3, 2005Oct 6, 2005Sep 8, 2005Aug 11, 2005July 14, 2005June 16, 2005May 19, 2005Apr 21, 2005Mar 24, 2005Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
4181http://www.networkworld.com/news/2005/051605-ddos-extortion.htmlDuring last six months of 2005, Symantec detected and identified an average of 1,402 DoS attacks per day
(figure 8). This is an increase of 51% over the first half of 2005 when Symantec detected an average of927 DoS attacks per day.
The rise in DoS attacks indicates that an entrenched and well organized community of attackers—likely bot
network owners—may be beginning to better utilize their resources to carry out more attacks. As wasdiscussed in the “Top Internet attacks” section of this discussion, criminal extortion schemes based on DoSattacks are becoming more common.
81Symantec speculates that as bot networks grow in size and
coordination this form of attack will continue to increase.
Defending against DoS attacks that use forged source addresses is difficult, as spoofed addresses make
filtering based on the IP address much more complicated. Some operating systems have configurationoptions that may be utilized to make the computers less prone to resource exhaustion; administratorsshould optimize this to minimize the effects of DoS attacks.
Organizations should ensure that a documented procedure exists for responding to denial of service
events. One the best ways to mitigate a DoS attack is to filter upstream of the target. For mostorganizations this filtering will involve working in conjunction with their ISP. Symantec also recommendsthat organizations perform egress filtering on all outbound traffic. DoS victims will frequently need toengage their upstream ISP to help filter the traffic to mitigate the effects of attacks.
Top originating countries
This section will discuss the top countries of attack origin. This metric only discusses the location of thecomputer from which the attack originates and not the actual location of the attacker. While it is simple totrace an attack back to the computer from which it was launched, that computer may not be the attacker’sown system. Attackers frequently hop through numerous systems or use previously compromised systemsto obscure their location prior to launching the actual attack. For example, an attacker in China couldlaunch an attack from a compromised system located in South Korea against a Web server in New York.Further complicating the matter is that international jurisdictional issues often prevent properinvestigation of an attacker’s real location.
During the last six months of 2005, the United States was the country of origin of 31% of attacks (table 8),
the most of any country. This is a slight drop from the 33% of attacks that originated there in the first halfof the year and slightly more than the 30% that originated there in the second half of 2004. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
42
Rank
July–Dec
2005
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
101
4
3
2
5
7
6
8
10
931%
7%
6%
5%
4%
4%
3%
3%
2%
2%Rank
Jan–June
2005 CountryPercent of events
July–Dec 2005
33%
6%
7%
7%
5%
4%
5%
4%
3%
3%Percent of events
Jan–June 2005
United States
China
United Kingdom
Germany
France
Canada
Spain
Japan
Italy
South KoreaTable 8. Top originating countries
Source: Symantec Corporation
The position of the United States as the highest source country is not surprising; it has a widespread
broadband infrastructure and high Internet usage, providing more platforms from which to launch attacks.However, as other countries continue to add to their Internet infrastructure, particularly their high-speedconnections, attacks originating from those countries can be expected to rise. The percentage of attacksoriginating in the United States can be expected to fall accordingly.
China moved up to the second position for the last six months of 2005, seven percent of the all attacks
originated there. The increase of one percentage point from the first six months of 2005 corresponds to a153% increase in the volume attacks originating in China.
The United Kingdom was the source country for the third highest number of attacks for the second straight
reporting period. Attacks originating in the UK accounted for six percent of all attacks. This is a drop fromthe seven percent of attacks that originated there in the first six months of 2005, when it was also thethird highest source country.
Germany had been the source country for seven percent of all attacks in the first half of 2005, when it was
the second highest country of attack origin. However, in the second half of the year, only five percent of allattacks originated there, dropping it to fourth position.
In addition to assessing which countries were the sources of the most attacks, it is also worth discussing
which of those countries experienced the largest increase in the number of attacks originating there. Chinaexperienced the largest overall increase in originating attacks by a large margin. As mentioned previously,attacks originating in China increased by 153%, which is 72 percentage points above the average increase.This increase is likely driven by the growth in Internet connectivity in China. It is also likely a sign thatmore attackers have become active within the country. Attacks originating in the United States increasedby 88%, seven percentage points above the average growth. The United Kingdom had the third highestgrowth at 80%, which was one percentage point lower than the average increase.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
43Top targeted industries
This discussion will explore attacks that target specific industries. Although attackers choose their targets
for numerous reasons, some select them to compromise computers within a specific industry or organiza-tion. For this discussion, a targeted attack is identified as an IP address that has attacked at least threesensors in a given industry to the exclusion of all other industries during the reporting period.
Figure 9. Top targeted industries
Source: Symantec Corporation
Financial services was the most frequently targeted industry between July 1 and December 31, 2005
(figure 9). As has been alluded to elsewhere in this report, Symantec believes that attackers may be turningtheir attention to cybercrime; that is, criminal activities conducted over the Internet, usually for profit. Thefinancial services industry is typically considered a popular target for attackers hoping to profit from theirattacks. The financial services sector was the third most frequent target of targeted attacks in the first halfof 2005. Symantec expects that attacks targeted against the financial services industry will continue to riseas attackers become more profit driven.
Education was the second most targeted industry in the last six months of 2005. Educational institutions
must provide remote access to tens of thousands of students and staff requiring a wide range of differentservices. Furthermore, universities often provide access to public terminals that may be abused by bothstudents and the general public. This can make it difficult for network administrators to actively defendagainst threats. The volume of computers that are connected to this type of network, along with thenetwork resources they possess, makes them very attractive targets for attackers both inside and outsideof the network.
Education Small
BusinessFinancial
ServicesArts/Media Healthcare Information
TechnologyAccounting Government Manufacturing TelecommPercentage of targeted attacks
Industry 0.00%0.05%0.10%0.15%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
44Small business was the third most targeted industry during the second half of 2005. Small businesses are
less likely to have a well established security infrastructure, making them more vulnerable to attacks. Itshould be noted that the number of targeted attacks against small businesses might be inflated due to theway in which they access the Internet. In the two previous volumes of the Internet Security Threat Report,
Symantec suggested that it is likely that multiple small businesses share networks that span a single blockof IP addresses. As a result, opportunistic attacks targeting a broadband ISP (rather than any of thespecific small businesses hosted on its network) may be noted as targeted attacks, thereby artificiallyinflating the percentage of targeted attacks against this industry.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
4582The BugTraq mailing list is hosted by SecurityFocus (http://www.securityfocus.com). Archives are available at http://www.securi tyfocus.com/archive/1Vulnerability Trends
Vulnerabilities are design or implementation errors in information systems that can result in a compromise
of the confidentiality, integrity, and/or availability of information stored upon and/or transmitted over the affected system. They are most often found in software, although they exist in all layers of informationsystems, from design or protocol specifications to physical hardware implementations. Vulnerabilities may be triggered either actively, by malicious users or automated malicious code, or passively, duringsystem operation.
The discovery and disclosure of a single vulnerability in a critical asset can seriously undermine the
security posture of an organization. New vulnerabilities are discovered and disclosed regularly by asizeable community of end users, security researchers, hackers, and security vendors.
Symantec carefully monitors vulnerability research, tracking vulnerabilities throughout their lifecycle,
from initial disclosure and discussion of the vulnerability to the development and release of a patch orother remediation measure. Symantec operates one of the most popular forums for the disclosure anddiscussion of vulnerabilities on the Internet. The BugTraq mailing list has approximately 50,000 directsubscribers who receive, discuss, and contribute vulnerability research on a daily basis.
82Symantec also
maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting of morethan 13,000 vulnerabilities (spanning more than a decade) affecting more than 30,000 technologies from over 4,000 vendors. The following discussion of vulnerability trends is based on a thorough analysisof that data.
This section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report will discuss vulnerabilities that have been
disclosed between July 1 and December 31, 2005. It will compare them with those disclosed in the twoprevious six-month periods and discuss how current vulnerability trends may affect potential futureInternet security activity. Where relevant, it will also offer protection and mitigation strategies. Symantec’srecommendations for best security practices can be found in Appendix A at the end of this report. Readersshould note that all numbers presented in this discussion have been rounded off to the nearest wholenumber. As a result, some cumulative percentages may exceed 100%.
This section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report will discuss:
• Total number of vulnerabilities disclosed
• Severity of vulnerabilities• Web application vulnerabilities • Vulnerabilities with exploit code• Ease of exploitation• Exploit code development time• Patch development and availability time• Commercial acquisition and disclosure of vulnerabilities• Web browser vulnerabilities
It should be noted that, unlike other reports in the Internet Security Threat Report , the “Vulnerability
Trends” report is based on data that often changes over time. This is because entries in the vulnerabilitydatabase are frequently revised as new information emerges. For instance, vulnerabilities may beSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
46attributed to a particular reporting period after that period has ended. Conversely, entries may be removed
after a reporting period because they are deemed to have not been vulnerabilities after the period hasended. Because of this, statistics and percentages reported in one volume of the Internet Security Threat
Report may not agree with information presented in previous and/or subsequent volumes. As a result,
some of the comparative data for previous reporting periods that is presented within this report may differfrom the data presented in previous volumes of the Internet Security Threat Report .
Total number of vulnerabilities disclosed
The second half of 2005 was marked by a slight increase in the total number of vulnerabilities disclosed.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2005 Symantec documented 1,896 new vulnerabilities. This is anincrease of one percent over the 1,871 vulnerabilities disclosed in the first half of the year. However, it is amore significant increase of 34% over the 1,416 vulnerabilities disclosed in the second half of 2004.
While the increase over the first half of 2005 is slight, the volume seen in the second half of the year is the
highest ever recorded. Furthermore, over the past year Symantec documented the highest yearly totalvolume of vulnerabilities since the establishment of the vulnerability database in 1998. In 2005 Symantecdocumented 3,767 vulnerabilities, compared to 2,691 in 2004, an increase of 40% (figure 10). The growthin the number of vulnerabilities over the past year has been driven primarily by an increase in discoveryand disclosure of vulnerabilities in Web applications.
05001,0001,5002,000
Jan–June
2001July–Dec
2001Jan–June
2002July–Dec
2002Jan–June
2003July–Dec
2003Jan–June
2004July–Dec
2004July–Dec
2005Jan–June
2005Published vu lnera bilities
Period 1,8961,871
1,416
1,275
1,1831,493
1,3151,289
787
685
Figure 10. Total volume of vulnerabilities, 2001-2005
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
As will be discussed in further detail in the “Web application vulnerabilities” section below, 69% of the
vulnerabilities documented by Symantec in the second half of 2005 affected Web applications. Theincreased focus on Web application vulnerabilities reflects the shift toward the World Wide Web as aplatform for applications. Many applications that were once stand-alone software suites or client-serversolutions are now being implemented as Web applications. Some well-known examples include theOutlook® Web Access email client, the phpMyAdmin database administrator, and the Webmin UNIX systemadministration application. This has opened the door to new classes of attacks against these newimplementations.
The development of advanced research tools has contributed to the high rate of vulnerability discovery
over the past year. In the previous volume of the Internet Security Threat Report,
83Symantec stated that
recent advances in technologies that analyze software code have made the discovery of vulnerabilities andthe creation of associated exploit code easier than ever before. Disassembly, debugging, and virtualizationhave all been made easier by the increased availability of associated tools and programs. These tools allowresearchers to trigger and then isolate vulnerabilities in closed-source software running in controlledenvironments. In the past, closed-source software—software that is distributed in a pre-compiled binaryformat—has been more difficult to analyze. This is because compilation obfuscates program design byreducing high-level software logic to binary machine code. However, technological advancement andresearch in the area of binary analysis has made auditing binary code for security flaws easier. Symantecbelieves that this has led to the discovery of greater numbers of vulnerabilities, many of which werepreviously made inaccessible to researchers by privately held source code.
Symantec recommends that administrators employ a good asset management system or vulnerability
alerting service, both of which can help to quickly assess whether a new vulnerability is a viable threat ornot. Enterprises should devote sufficient resources to alerting and patch deployment solutions. Theyshould also consider engaging a managed security service provider to assist them in monitoring theirnetworks. Administrators should also monitor vulnerability mailing lists and security Web sites for newdevelopments in vulnerability research.
Severity of vulnerabilities
The severity of a vulnerability is a measure of the degree to which the it allows an attacker access to the targeted system. It measures the potential impact that successful exploitation may have on theconfidentiality, integrity, or availability of data stored upon or transmitted over the affected system. For the purposes of the Internet Security Threat Report , each vulnerability is categorized in one of three
severity levels. These levels are:
Low severity —Vulnerabilities that constitute a minor threat, such as those for which successful exploitation
does not result in a complete compromise of the information stored on or transmitted across the system.
Moderate severity —Vulnerabilities that could result in a partial compromise of the affected system, such as
those by which an attacker gains elevated privileges but does not gain complete control of the target system.
47
83Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume VIII (September 2005), p. 88Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
High severity —Vulnerabilities that, if exploited successfully, could result in a compromise of the entire
system. In almost all cases, successful exploitation can result in a complete loss of confidentiality,integrity, and availability of data stored on or transmitted across the system.
84In the previous volume of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , the severity metric was adjusted to remove the bias of remote exploitability. This was done
because remotely exploitable vulnerabilities are always rated at least moderately severe. Assessing the severity of vulnerabili ties with the criteria of remote
exploitability removed presented a different severity composition. The result was that a majority of vulnerabilities were rated moderately severe at the expense of the
number of high-severity vulnerabilities. This was true for all periods.48
0%20%40%60%80%100%
July–Dec 2005 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Percentage
Period High severity Moderate severity Low severity Figure 11. Volume by severity
Source: Symantec Corporation
Over the past four six-month reporting periods Symantec has rated the vast majority of vulnerabilities as
either moderate or high severity, with only a small percentage rated low severity.84This pattern continued
over the current reporting period. During the final six months of 2005, most of the vulnerabilities thatSymantec documented were either moderately or highly severe. There were very few low-severityvulnerabilities reported.
Between July and December 2005, Symantec rated 45 % of reported vulnerabilities as high severity
(figure 11). This is a decrease of eight percent from the 49% that were rated high severity in the first halfof the year. It is also ten percent lower than the second half of 2004 when 50% of vulnerabilities wererated high severity.
During the current reporting period, 52% of vulnerabilities were rated moderately severe. This is eight
percent higher than the 48% seen in the first six months of the year. Forty-seven percent of vulnerabilitiespublished in the last six months of 2004 were rated moderately severe. This increase in moderately severevulnerabilities has occurred at the expense of the high-severity vulnerabilities. Symantec believes that this is due to an increase in Web application vulnerabilities, the majority of which are classified asmoderately severe. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Over the past six months, three percent of all vulnerabilities were classified as low severity. This is
consistent with the numbers seen in the two previous reporting periods. In each of those periods, threepercent of all vulnerabilities were low severity.
Symantec believes that there are several reasons for the greater number of moderately to highly severe
vulnerabilities. First, these vulnerabilities provide researchers with the most reward in terms of the level ofpotential compromise and peer recognition in the researcher community. It is further likely that asignificant number of low-severity vulnerabilities are discovered and not reported because there is littlevalue or attention placed on them.
A second factor may be the use of remote exploitability as a criterion in the Symantec severity rating
system. If a vulnerability is remotely exploitable, it will be considered at least moderately severe. Low-severity vulnerabilities, by definition, are “those that attackers cannot exploit across a network.” The highprevalence of network connectivity means that most vulnerabilities will be accessed by attackers remotelyacross a network, so that locally exploitable vulnerabilities—that is, low severity vulnerabilities—are eitherless common or less commonly reported.
A final factor contributing to this trend is the commercialization of vulnerability information, which will be
discussed at greater length later in this section. With the apparent increase in the commercialization ofvulnerability research, there appears to be increased financial incentives for researchers to find moresevere vulnerabilities.
Web application vulnerabilities
Web applications are technologies that rely on a browser for their user interface, rely on HTTP as thetransport protocol, and reside on Web servers. Examples of Web applications include message forums, e-commerce suites (such as “shopping cart” implementations), Web logs, and Web-based email. Anincreasing number of traditional software vendors are implementing their existing applications with Web-based user interfaces.
Many application service providers deliver their applications to their users exclusively over the Web.
Furthermore, many organizations use custom Web applications to provide various internal and externalservices. For example, intranets are often a combination of commercially developed applications, such as PeopleSoft, and internally developed custom tools.
49Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
5085“Asynchronous Javascript + XML” - http://www.adaptivepath.com/publications/essays/archives/000385.php
86http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/perl.santy.html
87http://www.betanews.com/article/CrossSite_Scripting_Worm_Hits_MySpace/112932391
88http://www.uniras.gov.uk/niscc/docs/br-20051206-01073.html?lang=en
04008001,2001,6002,000
July–Dec 2005 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Documente d vu lnera bilities
Period Affecting Web applications
Not affecting Web applicationsFigure 12. Web application vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation
Over the past several reporting periods Web application vulnerabilities have increased significantly, a
trend that continued over the last six months of 2005. Between July and December 2005, 69% ofvulnerabilities were associated with Web applications (figure 12). This is a 15% increase over the first half of 2005 when they made up 60% of all vulnerabilities. In the second half of 2004 they accounted for49% of all vulnerabilities.
Symantec believes that the rise of Web application vulnerabilities may be due to the ease with which they
can be introduced into source code. Furthermore, many small Web applications are developed on an ad
hoc basis. Advances in Web-based development methods such as AJAX
85provide a rich set of application
capabilities, allowing more people to develop such programs in a shorter period of time. As a result, Web-application developers may not be adequately trained to incorporate security into the programs theydevelop. Furthermore, the programs may not be sufficiently audited for potential security issues prior to implementation.
As the number of vulnerabilities associated with Web applications grows, Symantec fears that they may
serve as an increasingly attractive target for potential attackers to exploit. So far, three instances ofmalicious code or self-propagating code have been detected that propagate by exploiting vulnerabilities inWeb-based applications or services. The first known Web-application worm was Perl.Santy,
86which affected
the widely deployed phpBB forum. The next was a segment of JavaScript code that quickly propagatedthrough Web sites of MySpace users by taking advantage of a vulnerability in the social networking Website.
87Most recently, an example of propagating code was reported that exploited a vulnerability in the
Mambo content management system.88Symantec believes that these are the first examples of what may
soon become commonplace: malicious code that spreads through vulnerabilities in Web applications. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
51Adding to the importance of Web applications is the fact that the Web is a ubiquitous medium for the
delivery of products and services. This makes understanding and securing against Web-based attacks animportant security objective.
Web application vulnerabilities are a particular security concern because they are typically exposed to the
Internet through Web servers, which are often the external face of an organization on the Internet. Becausetraditional security solutions such as intrusion detection systems and firewalls allow Web traffic onto anetwork by default, Web-based attacks can leave organizations that host Web applications exposed toattacks that are difficult to detect and prevent.
Traditional client-server applications were easy to filter because of their association with specific port
numbers. However, with Web applications, data associated with multiple applications can be transmittedthrough the same ports, making it more difficult to apply appropriate access controls on a per-applicationbasis. Furthermore, it is often difficult to detect attacks reliably in network intrusion detection systemsbecause of the complexity permitted in Web traffic.
89
Another source of concern is the way in which vulnerable Web applications can be patched. Organizationsthat rely on the application must wait for the maintainers of the application to apply patches according totheir own development and patching schedules. The development and implementation of patches couldtake a considerably long time, during which organizations deploying the affected application could bevulnerable to compromise.
Finally, the high volume of new vulnerabilities affecting seldom-used technologies could potentially prevent
administrators from attending to more serious concerns. Organizations should manage their Web-basedassets carefully. If they are developing Web applications in-house, developers should be educated aboutsecure development practices. If possible, all Web applications should be audited for security prior todeployment. Web application security solutions and a number of products and services are available todetect and prevent attacks against Web applications.
90
Symantec recommends that administrators employ a good asset management system to better track whichassets are deployed on the network. They should also consider employing a vulnerability alerting servicethat will notify them of new vulnerabilities and help to quickly assess whether a new vulnerability is aviable threat to the organization or not. Finally, system administrators should also monitor vulnerabilitymailing lists and security Web sites for relevant new developments.
89Web requests and content can be encoded, encrypted (SSL), or otherwise obfuscated rather easily, making reliable detection of a ttacks in network traffic often
infeasible. HTTP proxies may aid against some attacks, though they lack understanding of the application logic.
90http://www.owasp.orgSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Vulnerabilities with exploit code
Exploit code is custom-designed programming code that allows attackers to exploit a specific vulnerability.
Also known as an exploit, it is sometimes included with the original advisory that describes thevulnerability. In some cases, the exploit code is written well, so that it reliably exploits the vulnerability insuch a way as to maximize its potential to compromise the target. In other cases, it may be developed bythe author as proof-of-concept exploit code, which works in some instances but is not robust or well tested.When exploit code is released to the public it is typically made available on security mailing lists and Websites or on hacker Web sites. If exploit code is available, the vulnerability with which it is associated will beconsidered easy to exploit.
52
91http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2000-02.html
92http://www.redherring.com/article.aspx?a=14475
http://www.techworld.com/security/features/index.cfm?fuseaction=displayfeatures&featureid=2125&page=1&pagepos=0
0%6%12%18%
July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Percent of total vulnerabilities
Period 12%15%
14%
July–Dec 2005Figure 13. Vulnerabilities with associated exploit code
Source: Symantec Corporation
The proportion of vulnerabilities with exploit code continued to decline in the second half of 2005 (figure
13). Between July and December 2005, exploit code was available for 12% of the vulnerabilities disclosed.This is lower than the 14% proportion seen in the first half of the year. During the same reporting periodone year ago, exploit code was available for 15% of all vulnerabilities. The decrease in vulnerabilities withassociated exploit code is due to the proportional increase in vulnerabilities that do not require exploitcode. These are primarily input validation vulnerabilities affecting Web applications, such as cross-sitescripting attacks.
91
Symantec believes that the decrease may also be related to the commercialization of vulnerabilities andexploit code. There are now several organizations that will buy unpublished vulnerabilities from individualsor groups who discover them.
92There is no public disclosure of the vulnerability details at the time that theSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
53information is transferred from discoverer to purchaser. Once the rights to the vulnerability details, which
can often include proof-of-concept code or exploit code, have been transferred, the details can remain inlimbo until the vulnerability is reported to the vendor and fixed, leaked, or independently rediscovered andreported publicly.
Vulnerabilities that require exploit code tend to be more severe in nature than those that don’t. As a
result, the decline in vulnerabilities with exploit code may be attributed to an increasing reluctance by exploit developers to publicize their exploit code, as these exploits have more inherent value. Thecommercialization of vulnerabilities will be discussed at greater length below.
Figure 14. Vulnerabilities with exploit code, by severity
Source: Symantec Corporation
Figure 14 depicts the breakdown of severity of vulnerabilities for which exploit code was available. The
basic composition has remained largely consistent over the past three reporting periods. During the last sixmonths of 2005, 72% of vulnerabilities for which there was associated exploit code were rated highseverity. This is very similar to the previous period, 70%, and the last six months of 2004, 77%.
Twenty six percent of vulnerabilities with exploit code published in the second half of 2005 were rated
moderately severe. This is also quite similar to proportions seen in the past: 29% in the first half of 2005and 22% in the second half of 2004.
Symantec believes that exploit code writers are focusing their efforts on high-severity vulnerabilities, which
are often sufficiently complex to require the use of exploit code. Creating exploit code can require asubstantial amount of time and effort. Researchers do not want to spend their limited resources on toolsfor attacks that do not result in significant impact on the target system.
050100150200250300
July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Documente d vu lnera bilities
Period High severity Moderate severity Low severity
July–Dec 2005Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
54Ease of Exploitation
Symantec rates each vulnerability according to how difficult it is for an attacker to exploit it to compromise
a targeted system. This “ease of exploit” rating assumes that the attacker possesses a general knowledgeof vulnerabilities and how to leverage them, with or without exploit code, depending on the vulnerability.Symantec rates each vulnerability as either “easily exploitable,” if it requires no exploit or if a requiredexploit is known to be available, or as “no exploit available,” if exploit code is required but is not yetavailable to the public.
Generally speaking, easily exploitable vulnerabilities do not require sophisticated skills or knowledge for
successful exploitation. Anyone with sufficient general technical knowledge or with publicly availableexploit code can exploit them. Examples of these are Web server vulnerabilities that can be exploited bysimply entering an appropriate URL into a Web browser.
93
On the other hand, vulnerabilities that are classified as “no exploit available” are more difficult to attack.This is because attackers cannot exploit them using basic knowledge alone and because no known tools toexploit them have been written or made publicly available. To exploit these vulnerabilities, an attackerwould be required to write custom exploit code. This significantly raises the level of knowledge, expertise,and effort required for a successful attack, thereby increasing the difficulty and lowering the probability ofsuch an attack. It should be pointed out that while no tools may be publicly available, private exploit codemight exist.
In the second half of 2005, 79% of disclosed vulnerabilities were classified as “easy to exploit” (figure 15).
This is an increase of eight percent over the first half of the year when 73% of vulnerabilities wereconsidered easy to exploit. In the second half of 2004, 71% of vulnerabilities were easily exploitable. Theincrease in the current period is primarily due to the increase in vulnerabilities for which no exploit isrequired. This is almost certainly related to the increase in Web application vulnerabilities, many of whichare rated “no exploit required.”
93For example, the Extensis Portfolio Netpublish Server Server.NP Directory Traversal Vulnerability (http://www.securityfocus.com /bid/15974), a directory traversal
vulnerability where a user could specify as a filename a path relative to the script’s working directory and obtain unauthorize d access to arbitrary files on the Web
server file system.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
55
050100150200250300
July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Documente d vu lnera bilities
Period High severity Moderate severity Low severity
July–Dec 2005Figure 15. Volume by ease of exploit
Source: Symantec Corporation
In the second half of 2005, 73% of vulnerabilities did not require exploit code. This is 18% higher than the
number for the previous six-month period, 62%. In the second half of 2004, 54% percent of vulnerabilitiesrequired no exploit code. This increase corresponds with the rise in Web application vulnerabilities, themajority of which can be exploited by a moderately skilled attacker without specific exploit tools. This maybe significant because with the rise in easy-to-exploit Web application vulnerabilities, exploitation is open toattackers who previously would have been unable to successfully exploit such vulnerabilities. This couldcreate the potential for a significantly larger pool of attackers.
Exploit code development time
Symantec records the window of time between the publication of an initial vulnerability report and theappearance of third-party exploit code. The intent is to determine how long it takes an individual or groupwho is not the discoverer of the vulnerability to develop functional exploit code for certain classes ofvulnerabilities. The shorter the time between disclosure of a vulnerability and the release of an associatedexploit, the more affected computers are vulnerable to attack (until patches become available and areapplied). When juxtaposed with the average patch development time, which will be discussed in the nextsection, this metric is useful in determining a window of exposure to exploitation.
During the second half of 2005, the average time for exploit development was 6.8 days (figure 16). This is
an increase of almost a full day over the average time of 6.0 days in the first half of 2005. In the second halfof 2004, the average time between the disclosure of a vulnerability and the release of an associated exploitwas 6.4 days. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
56One explanation for the increase observed over the past six months is that the best exploit developers have
stopped making their findings and creations public because of the commercialization of exploit code. Instead,they may be opting to sell their work to organizations that are willing to pay for vulnerability research. As aresult, publicly known exploit code is likely being produced by less experienced exploit developers, leadingto an increase in the average exploit development time. The increase in exploit development time does notappear to signal a trend; however, Symantec will continue to monitor future developments.
Figure 16. Exploit code development time
Source: Symantec Corporation
The relatively short exploit development time highlights the need for administrators to patch their systems
or implement other protective measures as soon as possible. This may be particularly difficult for largeorganizations, for which applying enterprise-wide patching in a matter of days is very challenging. With thetime between vulnerability disclosure and exploit development so short, administrators would benefit fromnotification of new vulnerabilities and the provision of relevant mitigation or patching information, as wellas an understanding of the potential risk of the vulnerabilities.
Patch development and availability time
The time period between the disclosure date of a vulnerability and the release date of an associated patchis known as the “time to patch.” If exploit code is created and made public during this time, computersmay be immediately vulnerable to widespread attack. An assessment of patch development times wasintroduced in the previous volume of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report.
02468
July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Days
Period 6.8 days
6.4 days
6.0 daysAverage number of days for exploit development
July–Dec 2005Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
This metric only considers specific file-based patches or upgrades, not general solutions. Instances in which
the vendor provides a workaround or manual fix steps, for example, are not included. As only vulnerabilitieswith vendor-issued patches are taken into account, all vulnerabilities considered for this metric are vendorconfirmed. It is important to note that the set of vulnerabilities included in this metric is limited: it does notencompass all software from all possible vendors, only software from vendors that are classified asenterprise vendors.
During the second half of 2005, 49 days elapsed on average between the publication of a vulnerability and
the release of an associated patch. This is down sharply from the 64 days seen in the first half of the year.In the second half of 2004 the average time was 40 days.
While the time to patch has decreased since the last reporting period, the window of exposure remains
considerable. If the average time to exploit development—6.8 days in the last six months of 2005—is takeninto account, the window of exposure was 42 days on average. This leaves a large window of opportunity forpotential attackers. Until a patch is released, end users and administrators are forced to implement security“workarounds” without an official fix. During this time networks could be vulnerable to compromise.
To minimize the possibility of successful exploitation, administrators need to understand the vulnerabilities
and be active in working around them. This may involve making changes to firewall configurations, creatingor obtaining IDS/IPS signatures and rules, and locking down services. Administrators should also monitorvulnerability mailing lists and security Web sites for new developments in vulnerability research. Theyshould also monitor mailing lists devoted to the discussion of security incidents or specific technologies, onwhich prevention and mitigation strategies may be discussed.
Commercial acquisition and disclosure of vulnerabilities
Over the last few years, a number of companies have formed to fill a demand for the commercial acquisitionof vulnerability and exploit code information from independent security researchers. This has resulted inthe establishment of an ad hoc marketplace wherein security researchers may approach companies with
their vulnerability and exploit code discoveries and attempt to sell them for financial gain. The emergenceof such a market may indicate a shift in the motivation of some security researchers. While manyresearchers are still motivated by intellectual curiosity, a concern for security issues, or recognition frompeers in the security community, more independent security researchers appear to be motivated by theopportunity to sell their research for profit.
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report, Symantec has begun tracking the
number of vulnerabilities that are researched and disclosed for commercial profit. This discussion coversthose vulnerabilities that were independently researched and then acquired by a third-party commercialentity other than the vendor that is affected by the vulnerability. The information on which this discussionis based was gathered from publicly disclosed vulnerability reports that have been released by theaforementioned commercial entities. This data has been collected by correlating vulnerabilities that weredisclosed by companies that engage in this practice and then selecting those vulnerabilities that are knownto have been sold to the companies by an independent party.
57Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
58Commercial entities that engage in the purchase of vulnerabilities and exploits often do so to drive their
own business. There are a number of benefits to acquiring vulnerability information before it is madepublic. First, the information may be redistributed at a price to customers of the entity. Second, it may beincorporated into security products that are maintained by the entity in order to gain an advantage over itscompetitors. For instance, IDS vendors may use commercially acquired vulnerability information to developIDS signatures to protect against zero-day exploits.
Total number of commercially acquired vulnerabilities
The first public marketplace for the acquisition of vulnerability and exploit code information was foundedin 2002. To establish the history of this marketplace, a sampling of data covering this reporting period andthe previous four Internet Security Threat Report reporting periods has been included.
Over the last few reporting periods, the number of vulnerabilities that have been commercially disclosed
and acquired has increased (figure 17). However, this trend appears to have been reversed over the last sixmonths of 2005. During this period there were 54 commercial vulnerabilities, a decline of 21% from the68 commercial vulnerabilities in the first half of 2005.
The total number of commercial vulnerabilities has increased steadily on a yearly basis. However, during
the current reporting period, two new commercial vulnerability acquisition programs were started. Thedecline in this period could be attributed to the diversification of the marketplace. Security researchersnow have two more options when deciding where to sell their vulnerabilities and exploit code, and theirability to shop around may have affected the rate at which these vulnerabilities have been disclosed. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
5994For a more in-depth explanation of the Symantec vulnerability severity ratings, please see Appendix C of this report.
020406080
July–Dec 2003 Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 July–Dec 2005 Jan–June 2005Documented vulnerabilities
Period 5468
41
18
3Figure 17. Total number of commercially acquired vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation
Commercial vulnerabilities—average severity rating
Symantec rates vulnerabilities on a numerical scale based on a number of criteria in order to determine
the severity of the vulnerability. Vulnerabilities that are given a numerical rating of seven or higher areconsidered high severity.
94An assessment of the average severity rating of commercial vulnerabilities over
the past five reporting periods demonstrates that only certain types of vulnerabilities are being purchasedby commercial entities.
Over the past five reporting periods, the average commercial vulnerability has been given a high severity
rating (figure 18). In the second half of 2005, the average commercial vulnerability was rated 7.9. This ishigher than the first half of 2005, when the average was 7.7, and the second half of 2004, when it was 7.8.These averages indicate that the average commercial vulnerability is rated high severity. That is, theaverage commercial vulnerability is remotely exploitable, poses a high level of privilege compromise, and isrelatively easy to exploit. Furthermore, it is likely that the vulnerability affects a widely deployedtechnology.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
60Figure 18. Average security rating, commercially acquired vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation
Commercial vulnerabilities continue to account for a notable percentage of the total number of high-
severity vulnerabilities (figure 19), although the number has declined over the past three reporting periods.In the second half of 2005, commercial vulnerabilities made up four percent of all high-severityvulnerabilities. This is down from five percent in the first half of the year and six percent in the second half of 2004.
This decline means that slightly more high-severity vulnerabilities were reported by sources other than
commercial vulnerability vendors, including other vendors and independent researchers, in the last sixmonths of 2005. This could indicate that commercial vulnerability vendors are not providing sufficiententicement to bring in a larger proportion of high-severity vulnerabilities. On the other hand, it couldindicate that the vendors and/or researchers are taking longer to publicize the vulnerabilities. However,there is no conclusive publicly available information to make a strong case for this assertion at this point in time.
Another factor in the reduced proportion of high-severity commercial vulnerabilities may be the existence
of a black market economy for the sale of vulnerabilities. As independent researchers look for alternativemarketplaces for their vulnerabilities, some are sure to resort to selling their vulnerabilities through theseblack market venues. Sellers and buyers in such black market economies do not stand to benefit frompublic disclosure of these vulnerabilities; therefore, it is in their best interest to keep this informationprivate for as long as possible. This has likely limited the number high-severity commercial vulnerabilitiesthat have been disclosed publicly.
7.07.58.08.5
July–Dec 2003 Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 July–Dec 2005 Jan–June 2005Average severity rating
Period 7.9
7.727.79
7.438.16Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
61Figure 19. Percentage, high-severity vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation
The increasing market for commercial vulnerability information poses a potential risk to organizations
because information regarding publicly undisclosed vulnerabilities and exploit code may be leaked beforethey are addressed by the vendor. To address this, Symantec recommends that organizations deploydefense in-depth, including the deployment of intrusion prevention systems and other end-point securitysolutions. These technologies can harden computers against unknown security threats through host-basedbehavior blocking and memory corruption protection schemes.
Web browser vulnerabilities
The Web browser is a critical and ubiquitous application that has, in the past few years, become a frequenttarget for vulnerability researchers. Traditionally, the focus of security researchers has been on theperimeter: servers, firewalls, and other assets with external exposure. However, a notable shift hasoccurred, as researchers are increasingly targeting client-side systems, particularly desktop computers.
As part of this shift toward client-side issues, vulnerabilities in Web browsers have become increasingly
prominent. This metric will offer a comparison of vulnerability data for numerous browsers, namelyMicrosoft Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Opera, Safari and KDE Konqueror. The following importantcaveats should be kept in mind before making any conclusions based on the data:
• This discussion will incorporate two metrics: vendor-confirmed vulnerabilities, and non-vendor-
confirmed vulnerabilities.
0%1%2%3%4%5%6%7%
July–Dec 2003 Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 July–Dec 2005 Jan–June 2005Percentage
Period 4%5%6%
2%
1%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
• Web browser vulnerability counts may not match one-to-one with security bulletins or patches issued by
vendors. This is because of the difficult in identifying individual vulnerabilities in often complex browserexploits.
• Not every vulnerability discovered is exploited. As of this writing, there has been no widespread
exploitation of any browser except Microsoft Internet Explorer. This is something that Symantec expectsto change as alternative browsers become increasingly popular.
• Whereas previous volumes of the Internet Security Threat Report have assessed vulnerabilities in all
Mozilla browsers, this volume will discuss only the Firefox browser. Firefox is the most popular of theMozilla browsers (which include the Mozilla browser and Camino) and has become the most widelydeployed of the group. The browsers, however, all share the same code base, and, frequently, the samevulnerabilities.
Web browser vulnerabilities—Vendor confirmed and non-vendor confirmed
This section will discuss the total number of Web browser vulnerabilities disclosed over the past six
months, including both vendor-confirmed and non-vendor-confirmed vulnerabilities. It will also discuss theaverage severity rating for these vulnerabilities. As was explained in the “Commercial vulnerabilities”section above, Symantec rates vulnerabilities on a numerical scale based on a number of criteria in orderto determine the severity of the vulnerability. Vulnerabilities that are given a numerical rating of seven orhigher are considered high severity.
95
Between July and December 2005, Symantec documented 24 new vulnerabilities that affected at least oneversion of Microsoft Internet Explorer (figure 20). This is the same number as was seen in the previous six-month period. The totals seen in both periods are still substantially less than the 45 new vulnerabilitiesseen in the second half of 2004.
The average severity rating for Internet Explorer vulnerabilities was 7.1 during the second half of 2005, up
from 7.0 in the first half of the year. According to Symantec’s severity rating system, this means that theaverage Internet Explorer vulnerability was rated high severity.
Of more recent concern are vulnerabilities in the Windows subsystem that may be exposed through
Microsoft Internet Explorer. The Windows Metafile Remote Code Execution Vulnerability was a recent high-profile example of this.
96While this was not an Internet Explorer vulnerability per se, it could be exploited
automatically through the browser because of Internet Explorer’s integration with the operating system. Itshould be noted that other browsers also present an attack vector to the vulnerability; however, successfulexploitation requires additional user intervention because those browsers are not integrated in theoperating system.
62
95For a more in-depth explanation of the Symantec vulnerability severity ratings, please see Appendix C of this report.
96http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16074Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
6397When taking these numbers into consideration, it should be noted some browsers such as Opera, KDE Konqueror, and Safari may not have a large sampling of
vulnerabilities to draw upon. Therefore, the average severity rating may not be a conclusive measure of the typical vulnerabili ty found in these browsers.The increasingly popular Firefox browser from Mozilla was affected by 17 new vulnerabilities in the second
half of 2005. This is a decrease of 15 vulnerabilities from the 32 that were disclosed in the first half of2005. In the second half of 2004, Symantec documented 29 vulnerabilities disclosed for Firefox.
The average severity rating for Firefox vulnerabilities was 7.20 in the second half of 2005, up from 7.14 in
the first half of the year. According to Symantec’s severity rating system, this means that the averageFirefox vulnerability was rated high severity.
01020304050
July–Dec 2005 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Documente d vu lnera bilities
Period Firefox Internet Explorer Opera KDE Konqueror Safari
Figure 20. Web Browser vulnerabilities, including vendor confirmed and non-vendor confirmed
Source: Symantec Corporation
Between July and December 2005, Symantec documented nine vulnerabilities in the Opera Web browser, a
slight increase over the seven that were disclosed in the first half of the year. Fifteen vulnerabilities weredisclosed between July and December 2004. The average severity rating for Opera vulnerabilities in thefirst half of 2005 was 6.86. In the second half of 2005, the average severity rating was 6.48. This meansthat, according to Symantec’s vulnerability severity rating system, Opera vulnerabilities in 2005 were ratedas moderately severe.
97
During the second half of 2005, there was a single vulnerability associated with the KDE Konquerorbrowser. This is down from the previous six-month period when two vulnerabilities for this browser wereannounced. In the second half of 2004, eight Konqueror vulnerabilities were disclosed.
In the second half of 2005, the average Konqueror had a severity rating of 5.30, which is moderately
severe. In the first half of 2005, Konqueror vulnerabilities had an average severity rating of 7.25, whichwould indicate an average rating of high severity. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
64Apple’s Safari™ was affected by six vulnerabilities between July and December 2005. Symantec
documented three Safari vulnerabilities in the first half of the year. This is down from the second half of2004, when seven vulnerabilities were disclosed for Safari. In the second half of 2005, Safari vulnerabilitiesscored average severity ratings of 7.73, up from 7.03 in the first half of the year. According to Symantec’sseverity rating system, this means that the average Safari vulnerability was rated high severity for bothreporting periods of 2005.
The vulnerabilities disclosed during the last six months of 2005 appear to indicate a return to a trend seen
in earlier reporting periods during which researchers and attackers focused much of their attention onInternet Explorer. Symantec believes that the Microsoft browser will remain a popular target because of itswidespread deployment. Researcher interest in Mozilla Firefox remained high during this reporting period.As this and other alternative browsers gain in popularity, it is reasonable to assume that they will alsoattract greater interest from vulnerability researchers and attackers.
Taking into account both vendor-confirmed and non-vendor-confirmed vulnerabilities, browser vulnerability
counts were lower in the second half of 2005 than in previous periods. This may be due to increasedawareness of issues related to browser security.
Web browser vulnerabilities—Vendor confirmed
The number of vendor-confirmed Web browser vulnerabilities disclosed during the second half of 2005 isconsiderably less than the total number of vendor-confirmed and non-confirmed vulnerabilities. WhereasMicrosoft Internet Explorer had the highest number of total vulnerabilities over the past six months, theFirefox browser from Mozilla had the highest number of vendor-confirmed vulnerabilities during the sametime period (figure 21). Between July and December 2005, 13 out of the 17 vulnerabilities disclosed forFirefox were vendor confirmed. This is down from 27 out of 32 in the first half of 2005 and 26 out of 29 inthe second half of 2004.
When taking only the vendor-confirmed browser vulnerabilities into consideration, Firefox has had the
highest vulnerability count for the last three reporting periods. This may be indicative of the transparencythat is inherent in the open-source development process. Due to the nature of the open-sourcedevelopment process, Firefox developers may be able to acknowledge and address vulnerabilities morequickly than developers of closed-source browsers.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
65Figure 21. Web browser vulnerabilities, vendor confirmed
Source: Symantec Corporation
During this reporting period, 12 out of the 24 vulnerabilities associated with Microsoft Internet Explorer
were confirmed by the vendor. This is a slight decrease from the 14 out of 24 disclosed in the first half of2005 and the 19 vendor-confirmed vulnerabilities out of 45 in the second half of 2004.
In the second half of 2005, there were seven vendor-confirmed Opera vulnerabilities out of a total of nine
disclosed vulnerabilities. This is one more than was seen in the previous period, when six new vendor-confirmed vulnerabilities out of a total of seven were published. In the second half of 2004, 11 new Operavulnerabilities were confirmed by the vendor out of the 15 that were published.
Between July and December 2005, no vendor-confirmed vulnerabilities were disclosed for the Konqueror
browser from KDE. The one vulnerability published in this period was not vendor confirmed. The twovulnerabilities published in the first half of 2005 were both vendor confirmed and six of eightvulnerabilities in the second half of 2004 were vendor confirmed.
Of the six vulnerabilities published for the Apple Safari browser during this reporting period, three were
vendor confirmed. In the first half of the year, two out of the three disclosed vulnerabilities were vendorconfirmed, as were four of the seven published in the second half of 2004.
Browser vulnerabilities are a serious security concern, particularly due to their use in online fraud and the
propagation of spyware and adware. Organizations should closely monitor vulnerability mailing lists andapply necessary patches as required in a timely manner.
0102030
July–Dec 2005 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Documente d vu lnera bilities
Period Firefox Internet Explorer Opera
KDE Konqueror SafariSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Malicious Code Trends
Symantec gathers malicious code data from over 120 million desktops that have deployed Symantec’s
antivirus products in consumer and corporate environments. The Symantec Digital Immune System™ andScan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting process. This discussion is basedon malicious code samples reported to Symantec for analysis between July 1 and December 31, 2005.
Symantec categorizes malicious code in two ways: families and variants. A family is a new, distinct sample
of malicious code. For instance, W32.Sober@mm would have been the founding sample, or the primarysource code, of the Sober family. In some cases, a particular family of malicious code may have multiplevariants. A variant is a new iteration of the same family, one that has minor differences but that is stillbased on the original. For instance, Sober.X is a variant of Sober. A new variant is often created when thesource code of a successful virus or worm is modified slightly to bypass antivirus detection definitionsdeveloped for the original.
The “Malicious Code Trends” section will discuss:• Top ten malicious code samples
• Win32 viruses and worms• Exposure of confidential information• Instant messaging threats• Modular malicious code• Propagation vectors•B o t s• Bot variants
This discussion will include any prevention and mitigation measures that might be relevant to the particular
threats being discussed. However, Symantec recommends that certain best security practices always befollowed to protect against malicious code infection. Administrators should keep patch levels up-to-date,especially on computers that host public services—such as HTTP, FTP, SMTP, and DNS servers—and areaccessible through a firewall or placed in a DMZ. Email servers should be configured to only allow fileattachment types that are required for business needs. Additionally, Symantec recommends that ingressand egress filtering be put in place on perimeter devices to detect anomalous activity.
End users should employ defense in-depth, including the deployment of antivirus software and a personal
firewall. Users should update antivirus definitions regularly. They should also ensure that all desktop,laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their operating systemvendor. They should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless it is expected and comesfrom a trusted source and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
Top ten malicious code samples
Traditionally, mass-mailing worms have dominated the top ten malicious code samples reported toSymantec. In the last edition of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , however, there were only two
mass-mailing worms present in the top ten. The current period represents a return to earlier form, as eight
66Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
of the top ten samples reported to Symantec propagated by a mass-mailing component (as indicated by the
SMTP vector in table 9). This may indicate that users are still falling victim to social engineering methodsthat entice them to click on malicious attachments in email.
6798http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/[email protected]
99A category 3 threat is a malicious code sample that is considered a moderate threat. It is either currently spreading among com puter users but reasonably harmless
and easy to contain or has not been released into the wild but is potentially dangerous and difficult to contain.Rank
1
2345
6
7
8
9
10Sober.X
Netsky.PMytob.EDMytob.DFSpybot
Mytob.EE
Tooso.L
Mytob.KU
Netsky.ZMytobDownloads a remote file
Logs e-Gold account informationAllows remote accessAllows remote accessAllows remote access
Allows remote access
Disables security applications,
downloads a remote file
Allows remote accessDownloads a remote fileAllows remote accessSample
WormWormWorm, BotWorm, BotBot
Worm, Bot
Trojan
Worm, Bot
WormWorm, BotType Vectors Impact
SMTPSMTP, P2PSMTPSMTPCIFS, Remotely Exploitable
Vulnerability, Back doors
SMTPN/A
SMTP
SMTPSMTP, CIFS, Remotely
Exploitable Vulnerability
Table 9. Top ten malicious code samples
Source: Symantec Corporation
In the last six months of 2005, Sober.X98was the most widely reported malicious code sample (table 9).
This worm was initially discovered on November 19, 2005 and was upgraded to a category 3 threat onNovember 22.
99Despite the fact that it has been in the wild for just over a month, Sober.X was reported
more frequently than any other malicious code sample in the entire six-month period.
Sober.X is a mass-mailing worm that relies on social engineering to persuade a user to run its email
attachment. Similar to previous variants of the Sober worm, it propagates by sending email messages inboth English and German, depending on the Windows regional settings on the compromised computer.Some of the messages it uses to propagate purport to be from the FBI while others appear to be SMTPdelivery failure messages. This form of social engineering allowed the worm to propagate rapidly amongsta large number of users.
Additionally, a single computer compromised by a mass-mailing worm can be responsible for sending out
a high volume of email messages. Sober.X is programmed to contact several remote Web sites to downloada file and execute it on the compromised computer if the date is January 6, 2006 or later. It checks thedate by contacting several NTP (Network Time Protocol) servers. However, on January 6 the file was notavailable. This is likely due to the amount of media attention Sober.X received, which allowed administratorsto prepare by blocking network access to the download sites. There is also a possibility that the worm’sauthor was aware that the sites would be monitored by law enforcement officials and did not upload theintended payload to avoid detection.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Netsky.P was the second most frequently reported malicious code sample in the second half of 2005.100It
was first reported in March 2004 and continues to be one of the most frequently reported malicious codesamples documented by Symantec. The continued success of this threat is due to its effective socialengineering and multiple propagation mechanisms. Netsky.P copies itself to shared network drives and tofolders commonly associated with various peer-to-peer file-sharing programs. It also emails itself toaddresses gathered from a compromised computer.
The mass-mailing technique also incorporates two additional mechanisms. In an attempt to bypass
filtering mechanisms, the worm sends itself in an archive using a .ZIP extension. It may also attempt toexploit a MIME processing vulnerability in Internet Explorer
101so that the message attachment is
automatically executed when the message is viewed or previewed with a vulnerable email client. Netsky.Pexposes account information for e-Gold, an Internet payment system.
Mytob.ED was the third most frequently reported malicious code sample during this reporting period.
102It
was one of several variants of the Mytob worm that were widely reported in the current period.103This
worm contains a bot component that allows an attacker to gain remote control over the compromisedcomputer. It then enables the attacker to perform various actions, including logging keystrokes, stealingcached passwords, and downloading files. Some variants may also propagate by exploiting remotevulnerabilities in Windows services, such as the DCOM RPC vulnerability,
104the LSASS vulnerability,105and
the Windows Plug and Play buffer overflow vulnerability.106
Win32 viruses and worms
Win32 threats are executable files that operate by using the Win32 API (application program interface),which provides a standard for the development of software on the Windows platform. These forms ofmalicious code work on at least one Win32 platform.
Win32 threats continued to experience a major rise in volume during 2005. This rise was first noted in the
2003 volumes of the Internet Security Threat Report , and it is clear that the tendency continues in the
second half of 2005. Over the second half of 2005, Symantec documented more than 10,992 new Win32viruses and worms (figure 22). While this is consistent with the 10,866 detected in the first half of theyear, it is a 49% increase over the 7,360 documented in the second half of 2004.
The significant increase over the last year is due to the continued development of Win32 worms that
implement bot features that attackers can use for financial gain. One example of this is the Spybotfamily,
107which now requires four letters to describe a variant such as “W32.Spybot.ABCD”.108As of
December 31, Symantec had catalogued 19,545 Spybot variants.
68100http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/[email protected]
101http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/2524
102http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/[email protected]
103http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/[email protected]
104http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/8205
105http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10108
106http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/14513
107http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.spybot.worm.html
108Malicious code variants are named using the family name plus an identifying letter for the variant. Therefore, Spybot.A would b e the original sample and subsequent
variants are assigned sequential letters, such as Spybot.B, Spybot.C, etc. When Spybot.Z is reached, two letters are used to id entify the variant, such as Spybot.AB. So
a family with four variant letters has over 17,500 variants.July–Dec 2005 July–Dec 2003 Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Tota l num ber
Period 1,702
1844,496
1647,360
17110,866
17010,992
104Total viruses and worms
Total families
03,0006,0009,00012,000
July–Dec 2005 July–Dec 2003 Jan–June 2004 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Tota l num ber
Period 1,702
1844,496
1647,360
17110,866
17010,992
104Total viruses and worms
Total families
03,0006,0009,00012,000Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
69Figure 22. New Win32 viruses and worm variants
Source: Symantec Corporation
Throughout 2005, the number of new Win32 threat variants remained consistently high. As of December
31, 2005 the total number of Win32 variants had surpassed 39,257. In 2005 alone Symantec documented21,858 Win32 viruses and worms. Thus, the total number of Win32 virus and worm threats more thandoubled during 2005 alone, indicating that these threats will continue to dominate the malicious codelandscape for some time to come.
While the number of new Win32 viruses and worms continues to grow, the number of new Win32 families
decreased in the second half of 2005. The number of new families per period had remained relativelyconsistent over the previous four periods. However, over the past six months, the number of new familiesdeclined by 39%, from 170 new families in the first half of 2005 to 104 in the second half.
The continued rise of Win32 viruses and worms, along with the decrease in the number of new families,
indicates that there are far more variants of existing malicious code families being produced thanpreviously. This can partially be attributed to the availability of source code for some families. For example,the source code for some bots, such as Spybot, Gaobot, and, more recently, Mytob, is readily availableonline. Since it is easier to modify an existing piece of malicious code than to create a new family, it is notsurprising to see a large number of variants of existing families rather than entirely new families. Asdiscussed in the “Bot variant” section below, the number of variants for these samples makes up a largeportion of the new Win32 variants documented by Symantec.
One of the reasons for the sustained popularity of Win32 malicious code has been the continued success
of mass-mailing worms, such as the Sober and Beagle families, which were among the most significantSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
70outbreaks of the year. Because of the predominance of Windows platforms, any mass-mailer worm that
hopes to enjoy widespread propagation will target these platforms, thereby leading to the increaseddevelopment of Win32 viruses and worms.
On the other hand, traditional file infector viruses are less prominent than ever before, primarily because
of their limited ability to propagate rapidly. A file infector virus only propagates when an infected host fileis shared and executed on another computer. Since an infected file may never be shared, mass mailing is amuch more reliable means of propagation. If the malicious code is financially motivated, its creator willlikely want it to be installed on the greatest number of computers possible in a short period of time,something that can be accomplished much more readily with a mass-mailer than with a file infection virus.
In the second half of 2005 attackers continued to exploit Windows XP SP2 and Windows Server 2003
systems with increasing success. For example, the Microsoft Windows Graphics Rendering Engine WMFSetAbortProc Code Execution Vulnerability
109was a zero-day attack, one that required very little
understanding for successful exploitation. This vulnerability exists on a variety of platforms going all theway back to Windows 3.0 and up to the 64-bit versions of Windows; however, it was only remotelyexploitable on more recent versions.
During the ten days prior to the official release of the patch by Microsoft, 200 individual variations of
the attack were reported.
110Despite the patch, variations of the attack continued to appear, albeit with
decreasing frequency. Normally, attackers will “clone” attack code, but in this case many individualattackers were willing to take advantage of the vulnerability by writing their own code prior to the patch. In addition to individual exploits, malicious code written for profit—such as the Bankash.G
111password-
stealing Trojan—also took advantage of this vulnerability.
Exposure of confidential information
Threats that expose confidential information from a compromised computer are a concern to all users, inhome, small business, and enterprise environments alike. These threats may expose sensitive data such assystem information, confidential files and documents, or cached logon credentials. Some threats, such asback doors, may give a remote attacker complete control over a compromised computer.
Threats to confidential information are a particular concern because of their potential use in cybercrime
activities. With the increasing use of online shopping and Internet banking, compromises of this nature canresult in significant financial loss, particularly if credit card information or banking details are exposed. Forinstance, online brokerage accounts have recently been targeted by these threats.
112
During the last six months of 2005, the percentage of malicious code samples that threaten confidentialinformation in the top 50 malicious code reports declined somewhat. This is not necessarily due to areduction in these threats; rather, it is likely due to the high volume of Sober.X reports. Since thispercentage is derived from the overall volume of the top 50 malicious code reports, the high volume ofSober.X reports during this period may have caused the percentage to seem abnormally low. If Sober.X isremoved from consideration, the percentage of malicious code threats to confidential information rosefrom 74% in the previous period to 80% in the current period (figure 23). This is a significant increaseover the 54% of confidential information exposure threats during the same six-month period in 2004.
109http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16074
110These utilized the same exploit for this vulnerability, but there were over 200 different shellcode payloads incorporated into the exploit. Each payload is capable of
performing different actions on a compromised computer, such as opening a back door or installing malicious code.
111http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/pwsteal.bankash.g.html
112http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/onlinebrokerage.htmSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
71113http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/backdoor.graybird.html
114http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/backdoor.ranky.html
115Examples of Webmail sites include Hotmail, Yahoo!, and Gmail.
116http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/pwsteal.bancos.html
117http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/pwsteal.banpaes.htmlFigure 23. Threats to confidential information, with Sober.X removed from consideration
Source: Symantec Corporation
The increase in confidential information threats this period (Sober.X notwithstanding) can largely be
attributed to the number of Mytob variants in the top 50 malicious code reports. Thirteen of the top 50reports were variants of Mytob, including five of the top ten. As was established in the “Top ten maliciouscode reports” section above, Mytob variants allow attackers to log keystrokes, steal cached passwords, anddownload files from the compromised host, all of which are ways of exposing confidential information.
In addition to the Mytob variants, a great number of other threats to confidential information were widely
reported this period. Back door server programs such as Graybird
113and Ranky114were seen in significant
numbers. These applications allow a remote attacker full access to a compromised computer and alldocuments stored on them. Graybird also intercepts keystrokes, allowing it to log information such asusernames and passwords entered into various Web pages and applications.
As noted above, the Bankash.G Trojan was installed on computers by exploiting a zero-day vulnerability in
Internet Explorer. This Trojan gathers all cached passwords from the compromised computer and alsomonitors user input on certain Web pages to gather more authentication information. Interestingly, theWeb pages this Trojan monitors are not online banking sites, as is common with most password stealers.Instead, Bankash.G monitors several Webmail sites,
115as well as online commerce sites and other sites,
such as Monster.com. Information an attacker could gather by gaining access to a user’s Webmail orMonster.com account, such as addresses, phone numbers, social security numbers, and other data, couldeasily be used to perform identity theft.
Other prevalent information exposure threats can be used to generate monetary gain for their authors. For
instance, variants of the Bancos
116and Banpaes117password-stealing Trojans remained among the top 50
0%20%40%60%80%100%
July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Percentage of top 50 reports
Period 54%74%80%
July–Dec 2005Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
most reported samples this period. These crimeware threats can be used to steal a user’s online banking
authentication credentials in order to transfer money out of the victim’s account. In the case of Banpaes,the Trojan actually mimics the interface of online banking Web sites. To protect against threats such asthese, when connecting to online banking sites, users should ensure that they are connected to thelegitimate site through a secure connection. Additionally, the use of a URL verification service can notifyusers when they are connected to a site that is attempting to mimic a legitimate site.
Malicious code for mobile devices
Malicious code that targets mobile devices continued to grow through the second half of 2005. The lastthree volumes of the Internet Security Threat Report have discussed the development of malicious code for
smart phones. Smart phones are mobile phones that contain a fully-fledged operating system with a widevariety of user-installable software. They may be particularly vulnerable to malicious code, as they appearto have increased exposure through replication vectors such as Multimedia messaging (MMS) and othertelephony protocols. Between July and December 2005, new variants of Cabir,
118Commwarrior,119and
Skulls120were reported.
Additionally, new malicious code for these platforms was developed in the last six months of 2005. The
most interesting new sample was the Cardtrp Trojan.121Cardtrp was the first cross-platform malicious code
with the ability to affect both Symbian and Windows operating systems. When executed on a smart phone,the Trojan will install a variant of Cabir and attempt to copy files to the memory card. If the memory card isthen inserted into a card reader on a Windows computer, one or more of these files will automatically beexecuted. Files that are known to have been copied to the memory card have included various samples ofmalicious code, including back doors, such as Berbew.N,
122and worms, such as Wullik123and Cydog.124
Another new development in smart phone malicious code is the Pbstealer family of Trojans.125Pbstealer
may be distributed as a file that represents itself as a phone book utility for smart phones in order toentice a user to download and execute it. Once a device has been compromised by one of these Trojans,information such as the user’s phonebook, notepad, and calendar to-do list will be transmitted toBluetooth-enabled devices that are within range. This may pose a serious breach of confidentiality if a corporate device is compromised in this manner, as sensitive contact information and appointmentscould be transmitted.
As is the case for most malicious code, users can protect themselves against these threats by practicing
safe computing behaviors. For instance, they can help prevent infection from these programs by notinstalling unknown programs or accepting connections from unknown sources.
72
118http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/symbos.cabir.html
119http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/symbos.commwarrior.a.html
120http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/symbos.skulls.html
121http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/symbos.cardtrp.a.html
122http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/backdoor.berbew.n.html
123http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/[email protected]
124http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/[email protected]
125http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/symbos.pbstealer.a.htmlSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Instant messaging threats
Instant Messaging (IM) continues to grow rapidly, with users in both home and enterprise environments
estimated at 300 million in 2005. The three largest IM providers—AOL Instant Messenger, MSN Messenger,and Yahoo! Messenger—each report over one billion messages sent per day, and some observers believethat IM traffic will exceed email traffic by the end of 2006.
However, though widespread in adoption, IM is generally unprotected and unmonitored in consumer and
enterprise environments, leaving it vulnerable to attacks. This is particularly worrisome for corporateentities, as IM is rapidly becoming a key part of enterprise communications. As one of the most successfuland widely deployed applications on the Internet, IM has increasingly become a means for the propagationof viruses, worms, and phishing attacks.
Instant messaging can be a potent vector for the spread of malicious code. The infection of one computer
can result in messages being broadcast to all users contained in an IM contact list on that machine,creating the potential for rapid proliferation. Furthermore, social engineering tactics can be highlyeffective, as the parties communicating by IM are inherently trusted.
In the second half of 2005, worms were the preferred type of malicious code on all three large IM
networks. In the second half of 2005, worms constituted 91% of IM-related malicious code, a ten percentincrease over the 83% in the first half of 2005 (figure 24). In one instance that Symantec documented, aworm would reply to IM messages in order to make it appear as though the user was legitimately sending alink to a file to their contacts.
126If a user followed the link, a Spybot variant would be downloaded and
potentially executed if the user opened the file.127
Worms were also used to download other non-IM malicious code during the period. For instance, a wormmay send users a link to a Web page that exploits a vulnerability in a Web browser,
128such as the Microsoft
Windows Graphics Rendering Engine WMF SetAbortProc Code Execution Vulnerability.129This would allow
the malicious code hosted on the Web page to be automatically installed on the computer of a userrunning a vulnerable browser.
73126http://tc.imlogic.com/threatcenterportal/pubThreatDetail.aspx?ThreatID=3255
127Detection for this variant was included in the generic W32.Spybot.Worm family detection
http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.spybot.worm.html
128http://tc.imlogic.com/threatcenterportal/pubThreatDetail.aspx?ThreatID=3505
129http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/16074Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
74130Initial functionalities can include attempting to disable antivirus and firewalls.
Feb Mar Jan Aug June July Apr May Oct Nov Dec SepPercentage of threats
Month0%20%40%60%80%100%
Virus Trojan WormFigure 24. Instant messaging threats
Source: Symantec Corporation
While the number of IM-related worms increased in the second half of 2005, the proportion of Trojans
and other malicious code targeting IM either remained steady or decreased slightly. Trojans accounted fornine percent of IM-related malicious code, down 47% from the 17% in the first half of 2005. Viruses, onthe other hand, accounted for less than one percent in each period.
To protect against instant messaging threats, users should employ defense in-depth, including the
deployment of antivirus software and a personal firewall. Users should also update their antivirusdefinitions regularly. They should never view, open, or execute any file that is transferred by IM unless it is expected and comes from a trusted source and unless the purpose of the file or link is known. Finally, they should never follow any links sent in an instant message unless the link is sent by a known and trusted source.
Modular malicious code
Modular malicious code is malicious code that initially possesses limited functionality,130but that, once
installed on a target host, downloads other pieces (or modules) of code with different, usually malicious,functionalities. In the previous volume of the Internet Security Threat Report, Symantec stated that
modular malicious code would be an issue of concern in the near future. This speculation appears to have been borne out.
Between July and December of 2005, modular malicious code accounted for 88% of the top 50 malicious
code reported to Symantec (figure 25). This is a 14% increase over the 77% reported from January to June2005 and a 40% increase over the 63% in the second half of 2004.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 25. Modular malicious code
Source: Symantec Corporation
Modularity in malicious code can serve different purposes. The malicious code may simply attempt to
update itself to a more recent version, as is often the case for bots and back door servers. More Trojans andworms are beginning to employ modularity. This allows a smaller executable with limited functionality toinfect a computer and subsequently download a larger executable containing new functionality, such as abot or back door.
Typically, Trojans and worms that are part of a modular attack will attempt to disable security applications
on the computer and, in the case of worms, propagate. The more severe impact from these threats usuallycomes from the secondary component they download. This may be a Trojan that performs a wider range ofactions on the computer, such as logging keystrokes or acting as a proxy server, or, in some cases, adwaremay be downloaded and installed.
Frequently, modular malicious code is used to download a crimeware application to gather confidential
information. As previously noted, threats to confidential information may be used by attackers for financialgain. By using modular malicious code, attackers may download and simultaneously install a confidentialinformation threat on a large number of compromised computers.
The most notable current example of modular malicious code in the second half of 2005 was the Sober.X
worm. It began propagating at the end of November 2005 and was upgraded to a Category 3 threat withindays. The worm contained an algorithm to begin downloading files from a number of Web sites on January6, 2006 and every week thereafter.
75
0%20%40%60%80%100%
July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Percentage of top 50 reports
Period 63%77%88%
July–Dec 2005Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
In order to protect against modular malicious code, administrators may have to implement strict egress
filtering against known URLs to prevent compromised computers within their networks from contactingWeb sites where additional components are known to be stored. This will prevent the second—andfrequently more severe—module of the malicious code from being installed.
Propagation mechanisms
Worms and viruses use various means of transferring themselves from one computer to another. Thesetransportation vectors are collectively referred to as propagation mechanisms. Propagation mechanismscan include a number of different vectors, such as Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), Common InternetFile System (CIFS), peer-to-peer services (P2P), and remotely exploitable vulnerabilities. Some maliciouscode may even use other malicious code as a propagation vector by locating a computer that has beencompromised by a back door server and using that back door to upload and install itself. It is important tonote that many malicious code samples employ multiple vectors in an effort to increase the probability ofsuccessful propagation.
In the second half of 2005, SMTP was the most commonly used malicious code propagation vector (figure
26). This is not surprising, as this protocol is heavily involved in the delivery of email, one of the mostwidely employed applications on the Internet. Twenty-six of the top 50 malicious code samples thatpropagate did so by SMTP. These samples accounted for 92% of the volume of top 50 malicious codereports with propagation mechanisms this period. In the first half of 2005, only 19 of the top 50 maliciouscode samples that propagate used SMTP, accounting for 52% of the volume of the top 50 malicious codereports. In the second half of 2004, 34 samples used SMTP, accounting for 81% of the volume of maliciouscode that propagates. In addition to being used as a malicious code infection vector, SMTP is also used tosend Trojans in spam email.
76Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
77
0%20%40%60%80%100%
July–Dec 2005 July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Percentage of top 50 reports
Period SMTP P2P CIFS Back door Remote vulnerability
81%
58%
26%
14%11%52%
43%46%
35%38%92%
14%
9%
5%13%Figure 26. Propagation mechanisms by volume of malicious code reports
Source: Symantec Corporation
In the second half of 2004, the top 50 reported malicious code samples was dominated by variants of the
Netsky, Beagle, and Mydoom worms, all of which were mass-mailing worms. As a result, malicious code thatpropagated by SMTP accounted for 81% of malicious code reports. In the first half of 2005, however, fewersamples of these worms were reported (figure 26) and reported SMTP usage dropped accordingly. Theincrease in the use of SMTP this period can be attributed to Sober.X and multiple variants of Mytob. Sober.Xuses SMTP as its sole propagation vector, as do the majority of Mytob variants. The high number of mass-mailing worms resulted in a decrease of other propagation methods in the top fifty reported samples duringthis period.
SMTP is a highly effective propagation vector, as proven by the Sober.X worm. This variant accounted for
52% of the volume of the top 50 malicious code reports that propagate. Organizations can protect againstSMTP threats by blocking all email attachments at the mail gateway. If there is a business need for emailattachments, only those that are considered safe should be allowed. If other attachment types areaccepted, they should always be scanned by antivirus products with up-to-date definitions and should onlyaccepted from trusted sources.
In the current period, seven of the top 50 malicious code samples that propagate used CIFS as a vector,
accounting for nine percent of reported malicious code that propagates (figure 26). This shows a declinefrom January to June 2005 when nine of the top 50 samples used this vector, accounting for 46% ofmalicious code reports that propagate for that period. While 16 unique samples employed CIFS in July toDecember 2004, these only accounted for 26% of malicious code reports that propagate for the period. Thedecline in the use of CIFS as a propagation mechanism may be attributed partially to the decline in reportsof Gaobot and Randex variants, which make heavy use of this vector.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
78131http://www.securityfocus.com/news/10123
132http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.esbot.a.html
133http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/14513As was discussed in the introductory paragraph to this section, some malicious code actually uses other
malicious code to propagate. Specifically, some samples, such as Gaobot and Randex variants, will searchfor back door servers that are installed on previously compromised computers and use the back door toinstall themselves. A fairly recent development in malicious code programming, this strategy takesadvantage of the fact that if a computer has already been compromised, it is likely to have a weak securityposture. This could allow additional malicious code installations to go undetected.
In the first half of 2005, four of the top 50 samples that propagate did so by this method, accounting for
35% of the top 50 reports for the period. However, it has since declined (figure 26). In the second half ofthe year, only two of the unique samples in the top 50 malicious code that propagates used this vector,accounting for five percent of the volume of top 50 reports. In the second half of 2004, two samplesaccounting for 14% of top 50 reports used this vector. As has been noted previously in this discussion, thedecline in the current period can likely be attributed to the large volume of Sober.X reports and thedecrease in Gaobot and Randex reports.
The use of peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing networks as a propagation vector for malicious code also
appears to be on the decline. Between July and December 2005, only eight of the top 50 samples—accounting for 14% of the top 50 reports—used P2P networks as a propagation mechanism (figure 26).This is down from nine samples accounting for 43% of reports in the previous period and 19 samplesaccounting for 58% of reports for the same period in 2004.
The second half of 2004 was dominated by reports of Netsky, Mydoom, and Beagle worm variants, all of
which used P2P propagation routines. Since that period, reports of these worms have declinedsignificantly. Additionally, P2P networks have faced several legal challenges in the last year, particularlythose networks that may be used to share pirated content.
131Since most worms that make use of P2P
networks use enticing filenames that mimic illicit content, it is possible that malicious code authors havediscontinued their use to focus on other propagation mechanisms.
Malicious code that uses remotely exploitable vulnerabilities to propagate is heavily dependent upon the
existence of unpatched computers for their ability to spread. The discovery of new remote vulnerabilitiesthat allow code execution also affects the success of this vector. In the current period, ten of the uniquesamples in the top 50 reports that propagate utilized a remotely exploitable vulnerability to do so (figure26). This is an increase over the five samples that used this vector in the previous two periods.
While more unique samples employed this vector in the current period, they appear to have been less
successful than in the previous period. Between July and December 2005, 13% of malicious code samplesthat propagate were reported to exploit vulnerabilities. This is down from the 38% of reports in theprevious period, but a slight increase over the 11% in the same period last year.
Two of the samples that exploited remote vulnerabilities to propagate in the last six months of 2005 are
members of the Esbot family.
132These bots exploited the Microsoft Windows Plug and Play Buffer Overflow
Vulnerability to propagate.133Since this vulnerability can only be exploited on Windows 2000 operating
systems by a remote, anonymous attacker, the bot’s potential infection base is limited, which may accountfor the lower report volume. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
It is also notable that for the first time since their initial discoveries, variants of the Nimda134and Sasser135
worms were absent from the top 50 reported malicious code samples. This may indicate that more
users are patching computers or implementing firewalls and intrusion detection systems to protect against
these threats.
Other infection vectors that have been used in the past were not represented in the top 50 malicious code
samples this period. These vectors include Network News Transport Protocol (NNTP), and Internet RelayChat (IRC). While mechanisms to propagate through these vectors were not widely reported, that is not tosay that they were not used at all.
Bots
Bots (short for “robots”) are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s computer in order to allow anunauthorized user to control the computer remotely. Bots are designed to let an attacker create a networkof compromised computers known as a bot network, which can be remotely controlled to collectivelyconduct malicious activities such as DoS attacks.
136
Bots can have numerous effects on an enterprise. A single infected host within a network (such as a laptopthat was compromised outside the local network and then connected to the network, either directly or byVPN) can allow a bot to propagate to other computers that are normally protected against external attacksby corporate firewalls. Bots can be used by external attackers to perform DoS attacks against theenterprise’s Web site, which can disrupt revenue for e-commerce companies. Furthermore, bots within anorganization’s network can be used to attack other organizations’ Web sites, which can have serious legalconsequences for the organization.
In the second half of 2005, the percentage of bot-related malicious code reported to Symantec increased
significantly, accounting for 20% of the top 50 (figure 27). This represents a 43% increase over the firsthalf of 2005, when bots accounted for 14% of the top 50 malicious code reports. It is also a 67% increaseover the 12% in the second half of 2004. This is likely due to the high number and pervasiveness ofvariants of the Mytob worm, which installs a bot on compromised computers.
79
134http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/[email protected]
135http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.sasser.b.worm.html
136For a more in-depth discussion on bot networks and bot network activity, please see the “Bot network” section in the “Attack Tr ends” report in this document.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 27. Bots in top 50 malicious code reports
Source: Symantec Corporation
As previously noted, due to the widespread use of email, SMTP is the most commonly used malicious code
propagation vector. Mytob is the first bot to rely mainly on SMTP as a propagation vector rather than CIFSand remotely exploitable vulnerabilities, both of which were commonly employed by Gaobot, Spybot, andRandex variants. This shift towards employing new propagation mechanisms in bots may reflect theincreasing competition among bot authors for systems to compromise. Because mass mailers are soeffective at propagating widely, the incorporation of SMTP as a bot propagation vector may create thepotential for much larger bot networks than previous vectors. This development could represent aconvergence between traditional malicious code authors and bot network owners.
Bots are frequently used in the commission of cybercrimes. There is evidence to suggest that the original
authors of Mytob and Zotob
137created these bots to aid them in a credit card fraud ring.138The bots were
used to allow the authors to retrieve financial information from compromised computers, information thatcould then be used to commit fraud.
Bots can also be used in another aspect of cybercrime called denial of service (DoS) extortion. This type of
cybercrime involves an attacker threatening to launch a DoS attack against an organization’s Web sites ifthe organization does not pay the attacker an established amount of money.
139In another type of bot-
conducted cybercrime, companies have reportedly hired attackers to launch DoS attacks againstcompetitors using bot networks.
140
It should be noted that while there was a significant increase in the number of reported bot samples, botactivity discussed in the “Attack Trends” section of this report did not increase proportionately. There maybe a number of reasons for this discrepancy. Since one person may control a number of different bot
137http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/w32.zotob.a.html
138http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/08/26/AR2005082601201.html
139http://www.smh.com.au/news/breaking/hackers-demand-ransom/2006/01/19/1137553695238.html
140http://www.techworld.com/security/features/index.cfm?FeatureID=171180
0%5%10%15%20%25%
July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Percentage of top 50 reports
Period 12%14%20%
July–Dec 2005Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
networks, it is likely that he or she would only activate or use a limited number of these networks at once.
This way, if one net work is discovered by authorities and deactivated, the bot controller will still have other
undiscovered networks to fall back on. Additionally, a report of a malicious code sample does not alwaysmean that a computer was successfully compromised.
Bot variants
New variants of existing bots continue to be created at a high rate. Between July 1 and December 31, 2005,Symantec Security Response documented 6,542 new variants of Spybot, a three percent increase over the6,361 variants in the first half of this year and a 53% increase over the 4,288 samples documented duringthis period in 2004 (figure 28). Spybot variants typically exploit a single vulnerability as their propagationmechanism. Therefore, the steady increase in variants of this bot may be due to attackers creating multiplevariants, each of which is designed to exploit a different vulnerability, which would give the attacker thechance to compromise a wide range of computers.
81
Number of new variants
PeriodJuly–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005 July–Dec 200501,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,0007,000
Spybot Randex Gaobot
765 9194,288
1,1211,4126,361
5377906,542Figure 28. New bot variants
Source: Symantec Corporation
While Spybot variants have been increasing at a steady pace, the production of new variants of Gaobot
and Randex appear to have declined in the current period. During the second half of 2005, Symantecdocumented 790 new variants of Randex, a decline of 44% from the first half of the year when 1,412 new variants were documented. Gaobot also experienced a similar decline. Symantec documented 537 new Gaobot variants in the current period, down 52% from the 1,121 in the first half of the year. As aresult, overall Gaobot and Randex reports have declined in the current period while Spybot reports haveremained high. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Even though production of new variants of Gaobot and Randex has declined, the number of variants
currently documented is still significant. Other than Spybot, no other malicious code families in this periodhad as many documented variants as these bots. One possible reason for the decline in Gaobot and Randexvariants could be interest in newer bot families. For example, Mytob was first reported to Symantec onFebruary 26, 2005. Between that date and December 31, 2005, Symantec documented 430 variants,indicating that there may be a shift towards this newer bot. This may be attributed to the use of SMTP as a propagation mechanism in Mytob.
The continuing increase in the production of bot variants may be driven by a desire on the part of bot
authors for maximum return on the time invested in bot creation. Those that produce bots for financialgain may prefer to produce a larger number of variants than create entirely new bots, which can be timeconsuming. Furthermore, the ease with which an existing bot can be modified to create a new variant mayenable less skilled attackers to create a bot network, which might otherwise be beyond their capabilities.
82Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Additional Security Risks
Traditionally, the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report has broken security threats down into three
general categories: attacks, vulnerabilities, and malicious code. However, as Internet-based services andapplications have expanded and diversified, the potential for computer programs to introduce other typesof security risks has increased. The emergence of new risks, particularly spam, phishing, spyware, andadware, has necessitated an expansion of the traditional security taxonomy.
Symantec has monitored these new concerns as they have developed, classifying them as “additional
security risks.” This section will examine developments in additional security risks over the last six monthsof 2005. In particular, it will examine trends in spyware and adware, phishing, and spam.
Spyware and Adware
While spyware and adware are not categorized as malicious code, Symantec monitors them using many ofthe same methods used for tracking malicious code. This involves an ongoing analysis of reports and datadelivered from over 120 million client, server, and gateway email systems deploying Symantec antivirussecurity solutions, as well as filtration of 25 million email messages per day. Steps for protection againstand mitigation of these security risks are presented at the end of the “Spyware and Adware” section.
Adware
Adware programs are those that facilitate the delivery and display of advertising content onto the user’sdisplay device.
141This may be done without the user’s prior consent or explicit knowledge. Adware can be
downloaded from Web sites (typically bundled with shareware or freeware), email messages, and/or instantmessenger systems. Additionally, a user may unknowingly receive and/or trigger adware by accepting anend user license agreement (EULA) from a software program linked to the adware or by visiting a Web sitethat downloads the adware.
Depending upon its functionality and the context in which it is deployed, adware can constitute a security
risk. In some cases, these programs may gather data from the user’s computer, including informationrelated to Internet browser usage or other computing habits, and relay this information back to a remotecomputer. It may also do so by occupying bandwidth, thereby diminishing the functionality and availabilityof a computing system.
Top ten reported adware
Between July 1 and December 31, 2005, the most commonly reported adware program was Websearch,
142
which accounted for 19.1% of the top ten adware programs reported (table 10). This program was not
present in the top ten adware programs in the first six months of the year.
This program features a number of noteworthy attributes. It modifies Internet Explorer’s default home
page and search settings, it installs itself as a toolbar to Internet Explorer, and it adds a number of icons tothe system tray. This could result in unwanted applications being installed on the system, which couldconsume system resources. It could also result in the user’s browser being redirected to potentiallymalicious Internet sites.
83
141Typically a monitor, but may be any device including cellular telephone screen or PDA viewer.
142http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/adware.websearch.htmlSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
84143http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/adware.hotbar.html
144A skin is an element of a graphical user interface that can be changed to alter the look of the interface without affecting its functionality. Skins can give
an interface an entirely different look than what it originally came with. (Webopaedia: http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/s/skin.ht ml)
145http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/adware.betterinternet.html
146As the information it gathers is system information rather than personally identifiable information, and as its ad-displaying b ehavior is relatively
aggressive, Symantec categorizes this program as adware rather than as spyware.Rank
1
23456789
10Websearch
HotbarBetterInternetIstbarGAINCDTAuroraLopBargainBuddyIEPlugin
Risk nameWebsearch also sends user information to a predetermined Web site, including keywords from searches.
One interesting technique that Websearch uses to prevent manual removal of components of the program is a so-called “watchdog process,” will be discussed at greater length in the “Anti-removal techniques”section below.
Table 10. Top ten adware programs
Source: Symantec Corporation
Over the last six months of 2005, Hotbarwas the second most frequently reported adware program.143It
made up 18.5% of the top ten adware programs. Hotbar is a new entry to the top ten reported adware.First detected in 2003, it adds graphical skins to Internet Explorer, Microsoft Outlook, and Outlook Expresstoolbars.
144It also adds its own toolbar and search button to Internet Explorer. These custom toolbars have
keyword-triggered advertisements built into them. For example, if a user searches for “mortgages,” thetoolbar will display mortgage-related advertisements and links from Hotbar’s advertising affiliates. Hotbaralso monitors the user’s Web browsing habits for information that may be used for targeted marketing.
BetterInternet was the third most commonly reported adware program in the second half of 2005,
145
making up 15% of the top ten adware programs. It was the seventh most commonly reported adware
program in the first half of 2005. BetterInternet is a browser helper object (BHO) that displaysadvertisements and downloads and installs files onto the compromised computer. It also gathers systeminformation from a compromised computer, which it may send it to a remote third-party computer.
146Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
85147For more information on risk levels, please see http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/enterprise/security_risks/#riskAs sessmentTop ten adware programs—risk levels
Symantec categorizes adware programs and rates their risk level based on a number of criteria, including
the following:
• The degree to which the presence of a security risk affects the compromised computer’s performance.
• The level of privacy that is lost due to the presence of the security risk on a computer.• The difficulty in removing a security risk from a compromised computer. • The degree to which the security risk is able to obscure its presence on a computer.
147
In the second half of 2005, three of the top ten reported adware programs were given a low risk rating(table 11). This means that the presence of the adware program had very little effect on the performanceof the computer and the privacy of the user. Furthermore, the adware was installed using normalinstallation methods and was not difficult to remove using standard uninstall procedures.
Risk name
Websearch
HotbarBetterInternetIstbarGAINCDTAuroraLopBargainBuddyIEPluginLow
Low
High
Medium
Low
MediumMedium
High
Medium
HighRisk rating
Table 11. Risk ratings of top ten adware
Source: Symantec Corporation
Four of the top ten reported adware programs during this period were given a medium risk rating (table
11). This means that the program had one or more of the following risk factors:
• It affected computer performance by creating pop-up windows, replacing the browser’s home page,
and/or redirecting Web pages and search results.
• It affected the user’s privacy by tracking Web browsing and similar user behavior. Further, it either did
not have a privacy policy (in a EULA, for instance), or the privacy policy it had was inconsistent withobserved behaviors.
• Once installed, it either did not provide uninstall capability or did not provide the user with uninstall
instructions.
• Finally, it obscured its presence on the computer by employing some, but not all, stealth techniques,
such as silent install, a lack of user interface, or the concealment of application processes.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Three of the top ten adware programs reported during the last six months of 2005 were rated as high risk
(table 11). This means that the program exhibited one or more of the following characteristics:
• It had a significant impact on the system’s stability and/or performance.• It exposed confidential, sensitive information such as account numbers, passwords, or credit card
information. It may have also exposed personal identity information, such as social security numbers (orinternational equivalents).
• It resisted removal or would only facilitate a partial uninstall.• It exhibited most or all stealth behaviors, such as silent installation, lack of a user interface, and/or the
concealment of application processes.
Top ten reported adware—notable characteristics
Different adware programs have different characteristics. These may relate to the ways in which the
adware is installed on the user’s computer, the ways in which they resist attempts to remove them, and the risks that the adware programs pose to the security of the user’s data. The following sections willdiscuss some of the characteristics that were seen in the top ten adware programs reported in the secondhalf of 2005.
Anti-removal techniques
Adware programs may use numerous different techniques to resist removal from the user’s computer. Five
of the top ten adware programs anti-removal techniques (table 12). The following paragraphs will describesome of the anti-removal techniques that Symantec has observed over the past six months.
86Table 12. Anti-removal techniques in top ten adware
Source: Symantec CorporationRisk name
Websearch
HotbarBetterInternetIstbarGAINCDTAuroraLop
BargainBuddy
IEPluginWatchdog processes
NANAExclusive file lockNAAdds to list of trusted sitesProcess injectionAuto-updates with automatically
repacked versions
NANA
Anti-removalSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Watchdog processes may be part of an adware program. They typically monitor each other to prevent easy
removal of the program. If one process is stopped, a second process automatically restarts it and vice
versa. Of the top ten adware programs reported during the last six months of 2005, only Websearch uses
watchdog processes to resist removal.
File locking is a technique that adware programmers employ in order to make it difficult for the file to be
scanned by antispyware and antivirus applications. File locking restricts access to a file to one user orprocess. While this is sometimes done by legitimate applications to prevent sharing violations, it is alsoused by programs to prevents the file from being read or scanned. Such files need to be accessed by akernel-mode driver in order to be scanned. Of the top ten adware programs reported to Symantec in thesecond half of 2005, only ISTBar employs file locking.
Some adware programs lower the overall security of the system by surreptitiously adding unauthorized
sites to the list of Web sites that have been designated as trusted by the browser. This allows the adware to download content from Web sites for which a user might otherwise be prompted to authorize, such asActiveX controls. Content from the unauthorized sites may be automatically installed since they are trustedby the browser. This reduces the security of the targeted computer. Of the top ten adware programs of thisreporting period, only CDT adds unauthorized sites to the list of trusted zones in Internet Explorer.
Code injection allows a program to maintain stealth while remaining actively running and gives it access
to other processes’ address space.
148Should the injected code be poorly written, it can cause system
instability and degrade performance. It can also reduce the security of the system on which it is installed.
Code that is injected into a process may bypass measures such as desktop firewalls, allowing it to do such
things as download updates to itself or recreate files or registry keys that are deleted by security softwarethat is attempting to remove the program. For example, Aurora injects itself into explorer.exe to make itdifficult to remove and to recreate itself on the system should deletion be attempted. If the copy of Auroraon the computer’s disk is deleted, it copies itself to the disk again. This can make it very difficult for systemadministrators or home users to remove these programs by hand without specialized tools or in-depthknowledge. Of the top ten adware programs this period, only Aurora deployed process injection.
Run-time packers are programs that are used to reduce the size of programs so that they require less
time to download. A packer may also be used to obscure the content of a file, so that it cannot be easilyrecognized by antivirus or antispyware programs (unless they understand the packer format). Thistechnique is commonly used by creators of adware and spyware programs as well as malicious codeauthors. The adware program Lop is dynamically repacked each time it is downloaded, thereby makingdetection and removal more difficult.
Self-updating
Programs that are used to detect and remove adware programs often do so by using signatures that are
based on known characteristics of the adware. Consequently, some adware vendors update their programsin order to evade detection and removal by these signatures. If the software is updated, then signature-based antispyware products are less likely to recognize it and, therefore, may not be able to remove it. Insome cases, the functionality of the adware program may also be updated. Table 13 outlines the top tenmost frequently updated adware programs reported to Symantec in the second half of 2005.
87
148Code injection means that the code is either copied to part of the memory address space of another process or that the applicat ion initialization registry key is
modified to point to a DLL to be loaded by all running applications for the Windows session. This ensures that the code runs ea ch time the system is started.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
88149See http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/download.ject.html, for example.
150See http://www.180solutions.com/Press/ReadArticle.aspx?id=30 and http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/08/16/180_sues_bad_actors/, for example.
151See http://blogs.zdnet.com/Spyware/?p=745 and http://blogs.zdnet.com/Spyware/?p=750, for example.
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1830072,00.aspRisk name
Aurora
BetterInternetIstbarLopSurfSideKickWebsearchHenbangIefeats-UserAgentSAHAgentNaughtyPops13.6
4.44.13.61.81.61.30.90.90.7
Updates per day
Rogue affiliates
Adware companies often pay affiliate companies for each install of their software that the affiliate
company facilitates. This is typically done by making the adware program available for download on theaffiliate’s Web site. However, in some cases, companies will forcibly install adware programs—that is,without the user’s consent—on a user’s system by taking advantage of vulnerabilities in a user’s Webbrowser.
149These firms are known as rogue affiliates. During this reporting period, all of the top ten adware
programs except Websearch were installed by rogue affiliates in addition to legitimate affiliates (table 14).
It should be noted that this practice may not continue at the same level in the future. In the second half of
2005, some of the larger adware vendors, such as 180Solutions, stated that they would be distancingthemselves from so-called rogue affiliates.
150However, at this point in time, it is difficult to know whether
or not this approach will effectively discourage the practice.151
Browser helper objects
Browser helper objects (BHOs) are add-on programs that can add legitimate features to a user’s browser.
For example, document readers that read programs within the browser do so with BHOs. Some BHOs,however, are used for less legitimate purposes, such as monitoring Web browser usage, detecting events,replacing ads, changing home pages, and creating windows to display information. They can also downloadprogram updates or log and export confidential data.
This strategy allows for tight integration with Internet Explorer and facilitates close monitoring of a
computer user’s Web browsing habits. Six of the top ten adware programs reported in the second half of2005 were BHOs (table 15). Risk name
Websearch
HotbarBetterInternetIstbarGAINCDTAuroraLopBargainBuddyIEPluginNo
YesYesYesYesYesYesYesYesYes
Rogue install
Table 14. Rogue install in top ten adware
Source: Symantec CorporationTable 13. Top ten self-updating adware programs
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Drive-by downloading
Drive-by downloading is the practice of prompting a user to install a program as they browse the Web
without the user requesting the installation of the program in the first place. A drive-by download isusually invoked through an automatic Web page refresh or by ActiveX control installers.
152Five of the top
ten adware programs reported in the first half of 2005 are known to have been installed by drive-bydownload (table 16)
To reduce the risk from adware that is installed through a Web browser, users should consider disabling
ActiveX. It is important to note, however, that doing so may also affect the functionality of the Web browserand may prevent certain Web sites and pages from rendering correctly. Some users and applications mayrequire ActiveX, in which case browsers should be configured to require a prompt for ActiveX controls toexecute. If the browser presents a dialogue box that is not expected, the user should not click anywhere onthe dialogue box. Instead, they should close the browser window immediately.
Spyware
Spyware programs are stand-alone programs that have the ability to scan systems or monitor activity andrelay information to other computers or hold it for subsequent retrieval. The data that may be monitoredby spyware programs can include, but is not limited to, passwords, log-in details, account numbers,personal information, individual files and/or other personal documents. This can be done throughkeystroke logging and/or by capturing email and instant messaging traffic.
Spyware may also gather and distribute information related to the user’s computer, applications running
on the computer, or Internet browser usage. Some spyware applications may be used to monitor userbehavior. For example, they may be utilized by corporations to monitor employee Internet usage or byparents to monitor their children’s Internet usage. Spyware is a particular concern because of its potentialuse in identity theft and fraud.
152For more information on ActiveX, please visit: http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/default.asp?url=/workshop/components/activex/i ntro.asp89Risk name
Websearch
HotbarBetterInternetIstbarGAINCDTAuroraLopBargainBuddyIEPluginYes
YesYesYes
NoNoNo
YesYes
No
BHO/Toolbar Risk name
WebsearchHotbarBetterInternetIstbarGAINCDTAuroraLopBargainBuddyIEPluginYes
Yes
No
Yes
No
Yes
NoNo
Yes
NoDrive-by download
Table 16. Drive-by downloading in top ten adware
Source: Symantec CorporationTable 15. BHOs in top ten adware
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
End users may unknowingly download spyware programs from Web sites (typically in shareware or
freeware), email messages, and instant messaging programs. In some cases, the user may unknowinglyreceive and/or trigger spyware by accepting an end-user license agreement (EULA) from a softwareprogram linked to the spyware or by visiting a Web site that downloads the spyware.
It is worth noting that only seven of the top 100 security risk programs reported to Symantec are spyware
programs. This may be because many of the programs that steal confidential information and/or that areused in phishing scams are considered by Symantec to be malicious code.
153
Top ten reported spyware
Over the last six months of 2005, CometCursor154was the most commonly reported spyware program,
accounting for 42% of the top ten spyware programs reported during this period (table 17). First detected in September 2004, it was the fourth most reported spyware program in the first half of 2005.CometCursor is an Internet Explorer BHO. It installs a toolbar that has links to affiliate Web sites.CometCursor can be bundled with various programs or downloaded from a Web page using an ActiveXinstaller. It installs a search bar and logs Web browsing activity from the machine on which it is installed.It also gathers the MAC address of the computer on which it is installed and conveys the information backto a remote computer.
90Rank
1
23456789
10CometCursor
AproposMarketscoreISearche2giveActivMonAgentQuickSearchShopnavGoidrPerfect
Risk name
Table 17. Top ten spyware programs
Source: Symantec Corporation
Apropos was the second most reported spyware program over the last six months of 2005.155It made up
25% of the top ten spyware reports. It was also ranked second in the first half of the year and third in thesecond half of 2004. An Internet Explorer BHO that is installed via an ActiveX control, Apropos installs atoolbar that links to Web sites and sends information back to its server. This information could includeWeb search keywords, Web sites visited by the user, software installed on the user’s computer, and the IP
153http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/enterprise/security_risks/
154http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/spyware.cometcursor.html
155http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/spyware.apropos.htmlSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
address and computer name of the compromised computer. Generally speaking, the main purpose of this
spyware application is to create a profile of the user in order to facilitate delivery of customizedadvertisements.
Additionally, the application may download and install other files on the user’s computer. These files could
include adware, spyware, or some sort of malicious code, depending on the wishes of the author or vendor.In some cases, these files may contain functionality that the user consented to in the original EULA;however, in other cases they may contain functionality to which the user has not consented.
The third most reported spyware program in the second half of 2005 was Marketscore.
156It is a new
addition to the top ten, making up nine percent of the top ten reported spyware programs. WhenMarketscore is installed on a computer it starts a proxy service called OSSProxy. Once this service hasexecuted, all the systems’ Internet connections will be routed through the proxy. Subsequently, all traffictransmitted through the proxy can be read by Marketscore, including potentially sensitive information thatwould normally go over SSL/TLS connections.
157
Even though Marketscore was the third most commonly reported spyware program this period, it is nolonger available for download. Despite this, users are still discovering old installations of it on theircomputers when they install security software and/or update their definitions.
Adware and spyware—prevention and mitigation
In order to protect against security risks such as adware and spyware, Symantec recommends that all users continue to update their antivirus software regularly. Security administrators and end users shouldalso take extra measures to ensure that patch levels on all computers are up-to-date. Symantec alsorecommends that users and administrators employ defense in-depth, including the use of a properlyconfigured firewall, regularly updated antivirus software and an intrusion detection system. Finally,Symantec advises users to exercise caution when installing any software through a Web browser and to not download any software from sources that are not known and trusted.
As was established in the preceding discussion, some spyware and adware programs are installed using
ActiveX controls. Symantec recommends disabling ActiveX. However, as was also stated earlier, some usersand applications may require ActiveX, in which case browsers should be configured to prompt a user beforeallowing the ActiveX controls to execute.
Symantec recommends that organizations develop, implement, and enforce acceptable usage policies.
System administrators should regularly audit the system to ensure that no unauthorized software isinstalled or operating on the system. Furthermore, administrators and end users should read the EULAs of all software programs before agreeing to their conditions.
One final note of caution should be raised. Symantec recommends that users exercise caution when
removing spyware. Programs should be removed as non-intrusively as possible in order to minimize anyproblems that might result from the removal of the program. In order to avoid such problems, it may benecessary to ignore some non-critical aspects of these programs, such as benign registry keys left behindduring the uninstall process, as these keys may be necessary for other programs to run.
91
156http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/spyware.marketscore.html
157SSL (Secure Sockets Layer) and TLS (Transport Layer Security) are both protocols that use encryption for the secure for transmi ssion of documents over the
Internet.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Phishing
Phishing is an attempt by a third party to solicit confidential information from an individual, group, or
organization, often for financial gain. Phishers are groups or individuals who attempt to trick users intodisclosing personal data, such as credit card numbers, online banking credentials, and other sensitiveinformation. They may then use the information to commit fraudulent acts. This section of the SymantecInternet Security Threat Report looks at phishing activity that Symantec detected between July 1 and
December 31, 2005.
The data provided in this section is based on statistics derived from the Symantec Probe Network, which
consists of over two million decoy email accounts that attract email messages from 20 different countriesaround the world. The network encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises around the world. It attracts email samples that are representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 millionmailboxes. It consists of previously used email addresses as well as email accounts that have beengenerated solely to be used as probes. The main purpose of the network is to attract spam, phishing,viruses, and other email-borne threats.
Phishing is assessed according to two indicators: phishing messages and phishing attempts. A phishing
message is a single, unique message that is sent to targets with the intent of gaining confidential and/orpersonal information from computer users. Each phishing message has different content and each one willrepresent a different way of trying to fool a user into disclosing information. A phishing message can beconsidered the “lure” with which a phisher attempts to entice a phishing target to disclose confidentialinformation. A single message, or lure, can be used many times in phishing attacks.
A phishing attempt, on the other hand, can be defined as an instance of a phishing message being sent to a
single user. An attempt may consist of one or more different unique phishing messages being sent to thesame target. Extending the fishing analogy, a phishing attempt can be considered a single cast of the lure(the phishing message) to try to ensnare a target.
It should be noted that different monitoring organizations use different methods to track phishing
attempts. Some groups may identify and count unique phishing messages based solely on specific contentitems such as subject headers or URLs. These varied methods can often lead to differences in the numberof phishing attempts reported by different organizations.
This section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report will discuss the following:
• Six-month volume of phishing messages
• Number of blocked phishing attempts• Phishing as a percent of email scanned
Six-month volume of phishing messages
The number of phishing messages is determined by tracking the number of unique messages that appear
in each batch of messages that the Symantec Probe Network classifies as a phishing attempt. Over the last six months of 2005, the Symantec Probe Network detected 86,906 unique phishing messages (figure29). This is a decrease of 11% from the 97,592 unique phishing messages that were detected in the firsthalf of 2005.
92Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
93
020,00040,00060,00080,000100,000120,000
July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Number of messages
Period 69.90697,592
86,906
July–Dec 2005Figure 29. Number of unique phishing messages
Source: Symantec Corporation
Part of this decrease may be due to changes in the data-gathering methods that were used for this report.
As stated in the previous Internet Security Threat Report, phishers continue to utilize highly randomized
phishing attacks in which several sections of email messages, such as the subject line or the domain, arerapidly changed in an attempt to avoid filtering. In order to counter this strategy, during this reportingperiod, Symantec realigned the low-level heuristics that are used in the first step of phishing discovery. Asa result, the number of entities that are actively searched for was reduced by over 25% in an attempt tofine tune sensor performance. This does not mean that phishing attempts for these entities were no longerseen. Rather, it is reflective of the fact that the means by which Symantec detected those attacks wasmade more focused, so that the results of that search were more meaningful.
More importantly, this should not be interpreted to mean that phishing activity has decreased. For example,
in the first half of 2005, it was 40% higher than the second half of 2004. Instead, the change has resultedin a new baseline against which to measure future activity. Symantec’s belief that phishing continues to bean area of growth is supported by the data provided in the following two sections of this report.
Blocked phishing attempts
The number of blocked phishing attempts is derived from the total number of phishing messages sent to
users that Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam antifraud filters block. Antifraud filters are rules that are createdby Symantec Security Response that detect and block known phishing messages. Once the filters havebeen created they are deployed across the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base where theyprohibit known phishing email messages from reaching end users.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
The number of phishing attempts blocked by Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam in the last six months of 2005
indicates a continuation of the increasing phishing activity noted in the previous reporting period (figure30). In the last half of 2005, Symantec blocked 1.5 billion phishing attempts, a 44% increase over the 1.04billion phishing attempts detected in the first six months of 2005. It is also a 175% increase over the 546million blocked phishing attempts detected in the last six months of 2004.
94Figure 30. Blocked phishing attempts
Source: Symantec Corporation
Phishing messages that are blocked at the mail servers of Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam customers are
reflective of phishing activity targeting email users globally. As a result, Symantec believes that theincrease in blocked messages is indicative of a continued growth in phishing activity. Phishing likelycontinues to increase for three basic reasons: it is relatively easy to perform, it is often effective, and it can be profitable.
Phishing as a percent of email scanned
Symantec calculates phishing attempts as a percentage of the total email scanned by dividing the total
number of email messages that trigger antifraud filters by the number of email messages that theSymantec Brightmail AntiSpam solution receives and assesses. These filters are distributed across theSymantec customer base.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2005, phishing attempts made up 0.84% of the email messages
processed, or an average of 7.92 million phishing attempts per day (figure 31). This is an increase over thefirst six months of 2005 when 0.77% of the messages processed were phishing messages, which equated
0400M800M1,200M1,600M
July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Number of blocked phishing attempts
Period July–Dec 2005Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
to 5.70 million phishing attempts per day. In terms of proportions, the percentage of emails that were
phishing messages was nine percent higher in the second half of 2005 than the first half. Peak activityduring the current reporting period exceeded 17 million phishing attempts per day.
While 0.84% may not appear to be a significant number, it means that roughly one out of every 119 email
messages scanned was found to be a phishing attempt. This is an increase from the roughly one out ofevery 125 email messages that constituted phishing attempts in the first half of 2005.
95158Spoofing refers to instances where phishers forge the “From:” line of an email message using the domain of the entity they are targeting with the phishing
attempt.
159For instance the United States Federal Trade Commission has published some basic guidelines on how to avoid phishing. They are available at:
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/phishingalrt.htm
160A good resource for information on the latest phishing threats can be found at http://www.antiphishing.org
0.0%0.2%0.4%0.6%0.8%1.0%
July–Dec 2004 Jan–June 2005Percent of scanned email
Period .42%.77%.84%
July–Dec 2005Figure 31. Phishing as a percentage of email scanned
Source: Symantec Corporation
Phishing—prevention and mitigation
Symantec recommends that enterprise users protect themselves against phishing threats by filtering email
at the server level through the mail transfer agent (MTA). Although this will likely remain the primary pointof filtering for phishing, organizations can also use IP-based filtering upstream, as well as HTTP filtering.DNS block lists also offer protection against potential phishing emails. Symantec also recommends thatorganizations use domain-level or email authentication in order to verify the actual origin of an emailmessage. This can protect against phishers who are spoofing mail domains.
158
To protect against potential phishing activity, administrators should always follow Symantec best practicesas outlined in Appendix A of this report. Symantec also recommends that organizations educate their endusers about phishing.
159They should also keep their employees notified of the latest phishing attacks and
how to avoid falling victim to them.160Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Organizations can also employ Web server log monitoring to track if and when complete downloads of their
Web sites are occurring. Such activity may indicate that someone is using the legitimate Web site to createan illegitimate Web site that could be used for phishing. Organizations can detect phishing attacks that usespoofing by monitoring non-deliverable email addresses or bounced email returned to non-existent users.They should also monitor the purchasing of cousin domain names by other entities to identify purchasesthat could be used to spoof their corporate domains.
161This can be done with the help of companies that
specialize in domain monitoring; some registrars even provide this service.162
End users should also follow best security practices. As some phishing attacks may use spyware and/orkeystroke loggers, Symantec advises end users to use antivirus software, antispam software, firewalls,toolbar blockers, and other software detection methods. Symantec also advises end users to never discloseany confidential personal or financial information unless and until they can confirm that the request islegitimate.
Users should review bank, credit card, and credit information frequently. This can provide information on
any irregular activities. For further information, the Internet Fraud Complaint Center (IFCC) has alsoreleased a set of guidelines on how to avoid Internet-related scams.
163
Spam
Spam is usually defined as junk or unsolicited email from a third party. While it is certainly an annoyance to users and administrators, spam is also a serious security concern as it can be used to deliver Trojans,viruses, and phishing attempts. This section of the Internet Security Threat Report will discuss developments
in spam activity between July 1 and December 31, 2005.
The data used in this analysis is based on data returned from the Symantec Probe Network as well as data
gathered from a statistical sampling of the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base. Specifically,statistics are gathered from enterprise customers’ Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam servers that receive morethan 1,000 email messages per day. This normalization allows for a more accurate representation of data,removing extremely small data samples (that is, smaller customers and test servers).
The Symantec Probe Network consists of millions of decoy email addresses that are configured to attract a
large stream of spam attacks. An attack can consist of one or more messages. The goal of the ProbeNetwork is to simulate a wide variety of Internet email users, thereby attracting a stream of traffic that isrepresentative of spam activity across the Internet as a whole. For this reason, the Probe Network iscontinuously optimized in order to attract new varieties of spam attacks. This is accomplished throughinternal production changes that are made to the network, which thus affect the number of new spamattacks it receives as a whole.
This section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report will explore the following:
• Spam as a percentage of all email
• Spam categories• Top ten countries of spam origin
161“Cousin domains” refers to domain names that include some of the key words of an organization’s domain or brand name. For examp le, for the corporate domain
“bigbank.com” cousin domains could include “bigbank-alerts.com”,”big-bank-security.com” and so on.
162See http://markmonitor.com/brandmanagement/index.html for instance.
163The IFCC (http://www.ifccfbi.gov/) is a partnership between the FBI and the National White Collar Crime Center:96Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Spam as a percentage of all email
Symantec calculates the percentage of email that is spam by dividing the total number of emails that are
identified as spam by Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam filters by the total of the inbound email messagesreceived by the sample customer base. Between July 1 and December 31, 2005, spam made up 50% of all monitored email traffic. This is a decrease from the first six months of 2005 when 61% of email wasclassified as spam. It is also lower than the second half of 2004, when just over 60% of email wasclassified as spam.
While the six-month average remains above 50%, analysis of the month-to-month spam data reveals a
decline in the percentage of email that was determined to be spam between July 1 and December 31, 2005(figure 32). In July, 54% of email was categorized as spam. By the end of December, this number haddeclined to 50%, a decrease of seven percent over the six-month period.
97Figure 32. Spam as percentage of email
Source: Symantec Corporation
This does not necessarily signify any decrease in attempts to send spam to Internet email users. Rather,
this decline is likely due to the fact that network and security administrators are using IP filtering andtraffic shaping to control spam. If a message is blocked using these methods, it will not be detected by theProbe Network and will thus not contribute to statistics gathered. This could contribute to the decrease indetected spam activity over the past six months.
Policy changes made by ISPs may be another factor contributing to the decrease in detected spam. Given
the large numbers of spam that have historically originated from compromised ISP accounts, many ISPshave been working with their vendors to implement measures to filter their outbound email traffic. Most
40%45%50%55%60%
July 2005 Aug 2005 Sep 2005 Oct 2005 Nov 2005 Dec 2005Percent of spam email per month
Period 54%
50%
49%52%
49% 50%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
ISPs are thus changing their policies to prohibit their users from sending email directly to the Internet. This
prevents users—or, more importantly, Trojans that have been installed on the user’s computer—frombypassing the ISP’s outbound mail servers and allows the ISP to prevent potential spam from being sent.
Given the large numbers of spam that have historically originated from compromised ISP accounts, many
ISPs have been working with their vendors to implement measures to filter their outbound email traffic.The decline in the amount of spam detected over the last six months may be partly because of the successof IP-filtering and traffic shaping in limiting spam. It may also be due to the development of DNS block lists.
Top spam categories For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report, Symantec will assess the most
common categories of spam detected on the Internet during the six-month reporting period. The spamcategories are assigned by Symantec Email Unit analysts based on spam activity that is detected by the Symantec Probe Network. While some of the categories may overlap, this data provides a generaloverview of the types of spam that are most commonly seen on the Internet today.
It is important to note that this data is restricted to spam attacks that are detected and processed by the
Symantec Probe Network. Internal upstream processing may weed out particular spam attacks, such asthose determined to be potential fraud attacks.
The most common type of spam detected in the first six months of 2005 was related to health services
and products (figure 33). Health-related spam made up 32% of all spam on the Internet during this time.The next largest spam category was commercial products, which made up 30% of all spam. The next mostcommon type of spam was related to financial products and services. It made up 15% of all spam.
98
Health 32%
Commercial products 30%Financial 15%Leisure 3%Scams 3%
Internet 5%
Adult 10%Fraud 2%
Figure 33. Spam categories
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
“Adult” spam messages are those that contain pornographic content, sell products of a sexually explicit
nature, and/or direct users to a sexually explicit Web site. Adult spam is frequently cited as a concern fororganizations because of the need to keep sexually explicit material out of the workplace for legal andhuman resources concerns. Because of the attention it receives, adult spam is often thought to be themost common type of spam. However, this category has historically only made up around ten percent of all spam.
Although this percentage is low, it should be noted that adult spam has recently made a transition from
more sexually explicit, HTML-based graphic content to shorter plain text messages. This is being done to circumvent current detection and prevention methods. It may result in an increase in the amount ofsexually explicit spam activity in the near future.
Top ten countries of spam origin
This section will discuss the top ten countries of spam origin. The nature of spam and its distribution
on the Internet presents challenges in identifying the location of spammers. Many spammers attempt to redirect attention away from their actual location. In an attempt to bypass block lists, they buildcoordinated networks of compromised computers known as bot networks, which allow them to send spamfrom sites that are distant from their physical location (for a more in-depth discussion of bot networks,please refer to the “Attack Trends” report of this Internet Security Threat Report). In doing so, they will
likely focus on compromised computers in those regions with the largest bandwidth capabilities. Followingthis logic, the region from which the spam originates may not correspond with the region in which thespammers are located.
This discussion is based on data gathered and returned by customer installations of Symantec Brightmail
AntiSpam. This data includes the originating server’s IP address, against which frequency statistics aresummarized. Each IP address is mapped to a specific country and charted over time. This limits the numberof countries that Symantec monitors for spam origination. For example, if no Symantec customers receivea large volume of email from a particular country, then that country would be less likely to be representedin this metric.
During the last six months of 2005, 56% of all spam detected worldwide originated in the United States
(figure 34). This is likely due to the high number of broadband users in that country. The United States wasalso the top country of spam origin in the first half of 2005, when 51% of spam originated there.
99Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
100
Remaining EU countries 2%
Spain 2%
United States 56%
China 12%Belgium 4%United Kingdom 3%
Canada 7%
South Korea 9%France 2%
Japan 3%Figure 34. Top ten spam producing countries
Source: Symantec Corporation
During the second half of 2005, China surpassed South Korea as the second highest country of spam
origin. Twelve percent of spam during this period originated there, compared to five percent in the firsthalf of the year. Symantec believes that this increase is likely related to the technological, industrial, andpolitical advancements being made in China. Korea followed China in third place. Nine percent of spamoriginated there during this reporting period. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
101164Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume VIII (September 2005): p. 82Country
United States
ChinaSouth KoreaCanadaBelgiumUnited KingdomJapanFranceRemaining
EU countries
SpainJuly–Dec
2005
56%
12%
9%7%4%3%3%2%2%
2%Jan–June
2005
51%
5%
14%
7%3%2%2%2%
n/a
1%
Table 18. Top ten countries of spam origin
Source: Symantec Corporation
In the last volume of the Internet Security Threat Report, Symantec predicted that the technological
advancements of smaller countries would begin to result in higher volumes of spam originating there.164
Over the past six months evidence has begun to emerge that this is indeed the case. For instance, in thesecond half of 2005, all of top ten countries outside of the leading four (US, China, South Korea andCanada) experienced an increased share of spam origination (table 18). Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices
Enterprise Best Practices
1. Employ defense-in-depth strategies, which emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive
defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protectionmethod. This should include the deployment of antivirus, firewalls, intrusion detection, and intrusionprotection systems on client systems.
2. Turn off and remove services that are not needed.3. If malicious code or some other threat exploits one or more network services, disable or block access to
those services until a patch is applied.
4. Always keep patch levels up-to-date, especially on computers that host public services and are
accessible through the firewall, such as HTTP, FTP, mail, and DNS services.
5. Enforce an effective password policy.6. Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments that are commonly used
to spread viruses, such as .VBS, .BAT, .EXE, .PIF, and .SCR files.
7. Isolate infected computers quickly to prevent the risk of further infection within the organization.
Perform a forensic analysis and restore the computers using trusted media.
8. Train employees to not open attachments unless they are expected and come from a known and
trusted source, and to not execute software that is downloaded from the Internet unless it has beenscanned for viruses.
9. Ensure that emergency response procedures are in place. This includes having a backup-and-restore
solution in place in order to restore lost or compromised data in the event of successful attack orcatastrophic data loss.
10. Educate management on security budgeting needs.11. Test security to ensure that adequate controls are in place.12. Both spyware and adware can be automatically installed on computers along with file-sharing
programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software, or by clicking on linksand/or attachments in email messages, or via instant messaging clients. Ensure that only applicationsapproved by the organization are deployed on the desktop.
Consumer Best Practices
1. Use an Internet security solution that combines antivirus, firewall, intrusion detection, and
vulnerability management for maximum protection against malicious code and other threats.
2. Ensure that security patches are up-to-date and that they are applied to all vulnerable applications in a
timely manner.
102Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
3. Ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers. Do not use dictionary words. Change
passwords often.
4. Never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is expected and the purpose
of the attachment is known.
5. Keep virus definitions updated regularly. By deploying the latest virus definitions, consumers can
protect their computers against the latest viruses known to be spreading “in the wild.”
6. Consumers should routinely check to see if their PC or Macintosh system is vulnerable to threats by
using Symantec Security Check at www.symantec.com/securitycheck.
7. All computer users need to know how to recognize computer hoaxes and phishing scams. Hoaxes
typically include a bogus email warning to “send this to everyone you know” and/or improper technicaljargon that is intended to frighten or mislead users. Phishing scams are much more sophisticated.Often arriving in email, phishing scams appear to come from a legitimate organization and entice usersto enter credit card or other confidential information into forms on a Web site designed to look like thatof the legitimate organization. Computer users also need to consider who is sending the informationand determine if the sender is a trustworthy, reliable source. The best course of action is to simplydelete these types of emails.
8. Consumers can get involved in fighting cybercrime by tracking and reporting intruders. With Symantec
Security Check’s tracing service, users can quickly identify the location of potential hackers andforward the information to the attacker’s ISP or local police.
9. Be aware of the differences between adware and spyware. Adware is often used to gather data for
marketing purposes and generally has a valid, benign purpose. Spyware, on the other hand, may beused for malicious purposes, such as identity theft.
10. Both spyware and adware can be automatically installed on a computer along with file-sharing
programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software, or by clicking on linksand/or attachments in e-mail messages, or via instant messaging clients. Therefore, users should beinformed and selective about what they install on their computer.
11. Don’t just click those “Yes, I accept” buttons on end-user licensing agreements (EULAs). Some spyware
and adware applications can be installed after an end user has accept the EULA, or as a consequenceof that acceptance. Read EULAs carefully to examine what they mean in terms of privacy. Theagreement should clearly explain what the product is doing and provide an uninstaller.
12. Beware of programs that flash ads in the user interface. Many spyware programs track how users
respond to these ads, and their presence is a red flag. When users see ads in a program’s userinterface, they may be looking at a piece of spyware.
103Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix B - Attack Trends Methodology
Attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec™ Global
Intelligence Network, which includes the Symantec DeepSight™ Threat Management System andSymantec™ Managed Security Services. Both services refer to attacks in the same way, enabling analysts to combine and analyze attacks together. Symantec combines these two data sources for analysis. In some cases, only one data source is used if attributes required for a particular analysis are not available in the other.
Attack definitions
In order to avoid ambiguity with the findings presented in this discussion, Symantec’s methodology for identifying various forms of attack activity is outlined clearly below. This methodology is appliedconsistently throughout our monitoring and analysis. The first step in analyzing attack activity is to define precisely what an attack is.
Attacks are individual instances of malicious network activity. Attacks consist of one IDS or firewall alert
that is indicative of a single attack action. The “Top Internet attacks” metric is a good indicator of theoverall volume of actual “attack actions” detected over a specified period of time, while the “Attacks perday” metric is a good indicator of the number of attacks observed on a daily basis.
Explanation of research enquiries
This section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to gather and analyze the data andstatistics in this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of thereport, the following investigations warranted additional detail.
Top Internet attacks
Symantec identifies and ranks all the attacks that are detected on networks across the SymantecDeepSight Threat Management System and Symantec Managed Security Services base. This ranking can be seen as representative of the distribution of attacks that an Internet-connected host can expect toobserve. Symantec investigates and ranks attacks in three ways. Each approach can give visibility intocertain emerging trends. The three ways attacks are tracked and ranked are:
• By the proportion of sensors that detect a given attack.
• By the proportion of attacking IP addresses that perform a given attack.• By the proportion of aggregate attack volume that is attributable to a given attack.
The proportion of attacking IP addresses that perform a given attack is included in this report, as this gives
the best insight into the popularity of the attack.
104Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Top attacked ports
The top port data is gathered solely from the Symantec DeepSight Threat Management System, and
represents individual scan attempts from perimeter security devices throughout the world. Not every singleport scan can be considered hostile, but port data is often indicative of wide-scale scanning for individualservices being targeted for exploitation.
Symantec investigates and ranks targeted ports in three ways. Each approach can give visibility into
certain emerging trends. The three ways ports are tracked and ranked are:
• By the proportion of sensors that detect a given attack.
• By the proportion of attacking IP addresses that perform a given attack.• By the proportion of aggregate attack volume that is attributable to a given attack.
The proportion of attacking IP addresses that perform a given attack is included in this report.
Attack activity per day
Symantec uses a daily attack rate as a rough estimate of the rate of attack activity experienced by
networks connected to the Internet. This is used as an indicator of whether the attack rates are rising or falling between reporting periods.
This metric includes all unauthorized access attempts denied at the firewall and the network intrusion
detection system level.
165The number of attacks used for this analysis is the number of attacks that
targeted the company that observed the median number of attacks in the sample set. Using the medianorganization ensures that the daily attack rate is representative of the attack activity across the Internet as a whole. A small number of companies with disproportionately high daily attack rates would cause the mean average to be skewed.
Time to system compromise
Symantec determined the time to system compromise by utilizing data derived from Symantec’s honeypotsystem during the period spanning November 16 – December 31, 2005. Specifically, the average timebefore a system becomes compromised is calculated as the amount of time between when the computerbecomes available on a network until an external connection originating from a malicious application is observed.
In order to accurately evaluate the time to system compromise, Symantec deployed computers running
Microsoft Windows 2000, XP, 2003, and two variants of Linux operating systems configured as typicaldesktop systems and Web server systems with various patching levels.
The desktop configurations were deployed with the default settings for each operating system with the
exception of firewall software. As these systems passively wait to be compromised, appropriatelyconfigured firewalls would simply not allow any connections to the computer and comparisons betweenoperating systems or patch levels would not be possible. For each Microsoft Windows-based desktopsystem three levels of patching were maintained: no patching, with the latest service pack, and fullypatched, which included up to date patches.
165Symantec recognizes that not all attacks are denied at the firewall; however, only those connection attempts that are denied at the firewall (as opposed
to those that are permitted) can be treated as attacks.105Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
The Microsoft Windows Web server configurations were deployed with their included version of IIS,
DotNetNuke content management software, and MSDE, a version of the Microsoft SQL Server was used to provide database support. The Redhat Enterprise Linux Web server configuration was deployed withApache, Mod-PHP, MySQL and PHPNuke. All installation default settings were maintained. When third-party installations were performed, the installation instructions identified in the package were used withno additional regard for security. Symantec attempted to simulate computers deployed by a moderatelyexperienced administrator with no significant security knowledge. For each Microsoft Windows-based Webserver configuration, three levels of patching were maintained: no patching, with the latest service pack,and fully patched, which included up-to-date patches.
Each of the computers on the honeypot system was deployed within a single ISP. As such, the data in this
section should not necessarily be compared to computer systems deployed on other ISPs, or IP ranges, asfiltering and ISP policy can significantly affect the time-to-compromise of a system.
Bot networks
Symantec identifies certain scanning patterns and network traffic and cross-references this traffic withrules that define specific coordinated scanning behavior, which would indicate bot network activity. For an originating computer to be flagged as participating in this coordinated scanning, it must fit into thatscanning pattern to the exclusion of any other activity. This behavioral matching will not catch every botnetwork computer, and may identify other malicious code behaving in a coordinated way as a bot network.This behavioral matching will, however, identify many of the most coordinated and aggressive bot-infectedcomputers and ultimately will give insight into the population trends of bot network computers.
Top bot-infected countries
Using the data derived from the “Bot network” discussion of the “Attacks Trends” report, Symantec cross-references the IP addresses of every identified bot-infected computer with several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic location of systems to IP addresses. While these databases aregenerally reliable, there is a small margin of error. The data produced is then used to determine the globaldistribution of bot-infected computers.
Denial of service attacks
Although there are numerous methods for carrying out denial of service attacks, Symantec derives thismetric by measuring denial of service attacks carried out by flooding a target with SYN requests, oftenreferred to as SYN flood attacks. This type of attack works by overwhelming a target with SYN requests andnot completing the initial request, which thus prevents other valid requests from being processed. In manycases, SYN requests with forged IP addresses are sent to a target, causing a single attacking computer toinitiate multiple connections, resulting in unsolicited traffic, known as backscatter, being sent to othercomputers on the Internet. This backscatter is used to derive the number of denial of service attacksobserved throughout the reporting period.
106Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
SYN flood attacks should not be confused with other types of denial of service attacks. ICMP flooding is
another method of carrying out a denial of service attack.166This attack is carried out by bombarding a
target computer with ICMP messages until it becomes overwhelmed by them, so that it cannot servicelegitimate requests. ICMP flooding is also employed when carrying out Smurf DoS attacks.
167
UDP flooding is another popular form of denial of service attack. This type of attack is typically carried out by flooding a target with an excessive number of UDP packets in an attempt to tie up the networkresources of the target computer so that it cannot service legitimate requests.
There are other types of denial of service attacks, most of which are based on the exploitation of
vulnerabilities in target services. In most cases, sending a malformed message to a target computer hostinga vulnerable service may cause it to crash or freeze, subsequently denying service to legitimate users.
Top originating countries
Symantec identified the national sources of attacks by automatically cross-referencing source IP addressesof every attack with several third-party, subscription-based databases that link the geographic location of systems to source IP addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin oferror. Currently, Symantec cross-references source IP addresses of attacks against every country in theworld. It is important to note that while Symantec has a reliable process for identifying the source IPaddress of the host that is directly responsible for launching an attack, it is impossible to verify where theattacker is physically located. It is probable that many of the sources of attack are intermediary systemsused to disguise the attacker’s true identity and location.
Top targeted industries
For the purposes of the Internet Security Threat Report, a targeted attacker is one that is detected
attacking at least three companies in a specific industry, to the exclusion of all other industries. Figure 35represents the industry breakdown of the sensor distribution in the sample set in percentage terms.Industries with less than ten sensors have been excluded from the resulting totals.
The targeted industry attack rate is a measure of the percentage of total attackers that target only
organizations in a specific industry. It can indicate which industries are more frequently the targets offocused attacks. This metric may be affected by the overall attack rate experienced by each industry;nevertheless, it provides an indication of the interest that an industry holds for targeted attackers.
166Internet Control Message Protocol. ICMP is employed by the TCP/IP stack to handle error and control messages. Its most commonly known functionality,
and that exploited by ICMP Flood attacks is the Echo Request, Echo Reply sequence used by ping utilities.
167http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/smurf.dos.attack.html107Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
108
Health care 3%
Accounting 53%Information technology 4%
Small business 24%Transportation 1%Arts/media 1%Government 1%
Community/non-profit 1%Telecommunications 1%
Financial services 4%
Education 4%Manufacturing 2%Utilities/energy 1%Figure 35. Attack activity by industry
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix C—Vulnerability Trends Methodology
The “Vulnerability Trends” report of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report discusses developments
in the discovery and exploitation of vulnerabilities over the past six months. This methodology section willdiscuss how the data was gathered and how it was analyzed to come to the conclusions that are presentedin the “Vulnerability Trends” section.
Symantec maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive databases of security vulnerabilities,
consisting of over 16,000 distinct entries. Each distinct entry is created and maintained by Symantecthreat analysts who assess the content for accuracy, veracity, and the applicability of its inclusion in thevulnerability database based on available information. The following metrics discussed in the“Vulnerability Trends” report are based on the analysis of that data by Symantec researchers:
• Total number of vulnerabilities disclosed
• Web application vulnerabilities• Vulnerabilities with exploit code• Commercialization of vulnerabilities
The ways in the data for the remaining metrics is gathered and analyzed will be discussed in the remainder
of this methodology.
Vulnerability classifications
Following the discovery and or announcement of a new vulnerability, Symantec analysts gather all relevantcharacteristics of the new vulnerability and create an alert. This alert describes important traits of thevulnerability, such as the severity, ease of exploitation, and a list of affected products. These traits aresubsequently used both directly and indirectly for this analysis.
Vulnerability type
After discovering a new vulnerability, Symantec threat analysts classify the vulnerability into one of 12possible categories based on the available information. These categories focus on defining the core causeof the vulnerability, as opposed to classifying the vulnerability merely by its effect. The classificationsystem is derived from the academic taxonomy presented by Taimur Aslam et al (1996),
168which defines
the classifications of vulnerabilities. Possible values are indicated below, and the previously mentionedwhite paper provides a full description of the meaning behind each classification:
• Boundary condition error
• Access validation error• Origin validation error• Input validation error• Failure to handle exceptional conditions• Race condition error• Serialization error
109
168“Use of a Taxonomy of Security Faults” (http://ftp.cerias.purdue.edu/pub/papers/taimur-aslam/aslam-krsul-spaf-taxonomy.pdf)Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
• Atomicity error
• Environment error• Configuration error• Design error
Severity of vulnerabilities
Vulnerability severity is a measure of the degree to which the vulnerability gives an attacker accessibility tothe targeted system. It also measures the potential impact that successful exploitation may have for theconfidentiality, integrity, and/or availability of the affected system. Symantec analysts calculate a severityscore on a scale of one to ten for each newly disclosed vulnerability. The severity score is based on thefollowing factors:
•Impact —the relative impact on the affected system if the vulnerability is exploited. For example, if the
vulnerability enables the attacker to gain full root access to the system, the vulnerability is classified as“high impact.” Vulnerabilities with a higher impact rating contribute to a higher severity score.
•Remote exploitability —indicates whether or not the vulnerability can be exploited remotely.
Vulnerabilities are classified as remotely exploitable when it is possible to exploit the vulnerability usingat least one method from a position external to the system, typically by some type of communicationprotocol, such as TCP/IP, IPX, or dial-up. Vulnerabilities that are remotely exploitable contribute to ahigher severity score.
•Authentication requirements —indicates whether the vulnerability can be exploited only after providing
some sort of authentication credentials (such as a username and/or password) to the vulnerable system,or whether it is possible to exploit it without supplying any authentication credentials. Vulnerabilitiesthat require no authentication on the part of the attacker contribute to a higher severity score.
•Availability of the affected system —rates how accessible the system is to attackers in terms of
exploitability. Some vulnerabilities are always exploitable once the attacker has accessed the system.Other vulnerabilities may be dependent on timing, the interaction of other objects or subjects, or beotherwise only circumstantially exploitable. Increased availability of the affected system to attackers will increase the calculated severity.
After gathering information on these four attributes, analysts use a pre-established algorithm to generate
a severity score that ranges from one to ten. This system provides for a level of granularity that accountsfor various characteristics that are common to all vulnerabilities. The Symantec severity rating systemhelped to serve as a model for the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) standard. For the purposesof this report, vulnerabilities are rated as high, moderate, or low severity based on the scores presented intable 19 below. For the purposes of the Internet Security Threat Report, each vulnerability is categorized
in one of three severity levels. These levels are:
•Low severity (0–3) —vulnerabilities that constitute a minor threat. Attackers cannot exploit the
vulnerability across a network and successful exploitation of the vulnerability would not result in acomplete compromise of the information stored or transmitted on the system. Low-severity vulnerabilitiesinclude non-critical losses of confidentiality (for example, system configuration exposure) or non-criticallosses of integrity (for example, local file corruption).
110Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
•Moderate severity (4–6) —vulnerabilities that result in a partial compromise of the affected system,
such as those by which an attacker gains elevated privileges but does not gain complete control of thetarget system. Moderately severe vulnerabilities include those for which the impact on systems is highbut accessibility to attackers is limited. This includes vulnerabilities that require the attacker to havelocal access to the system or to be authenticated before the system can be exploited.
•High severity (7–10 )—vulnerabilities that result in a compromise of the entire system if exploited. In
almost all cases, successful exploitation can result in a complete loss of confidentiality, integrity, andavailability of data stored on or transmitted across the system. High-severity vulnerabilities will allowattackers access across a network without authentication.
111Severity level Severity score range
High X ≥ 7
Moderate 4 ≤ X ≤ 6Low X ≤ 3
Table 19. Vulnerability severity range
Ease of exploitation
The ease of exploitation metric indicates how easily vulnerabilities can be exploited. The vulnerability
analyst assigns the ease of exploitation rating after thoroughly researching the need for and availability of exploit code for the vulnerability. All vulnerabilities are classified into one of three possible categories,listed below:
•Exploit code available —exploit code to enable the exploitation of the vulnerability is publicly available
to all would-be attackers.
•No exploit code required —would-be attackers can exploit the vulnerability without having to use any
form of exploit code. In other words, the attacker does not need to create or use complex scripts or toolsto exploit the vulnerability.
•No exploit code available —would-be attackers must use exploit code to make use of the vulnerability;
however, no such exploit code is publicly available.
For the purposes of this report, the first two types of vulnerabilities are considered “easily exploitable”
because the attacker requires only limited sophistication to make use of it. The last type of vulnerability is considered “difficult to exploit” because the attacker must develop his/her own exploit code to make use of the vulnerability.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Exploit code development time
The ability to measure exploit code development time is limited and applies only to vulnerabilities that
would normally require exploit code. Therefore, the metric is based on vulnerabilities that Symantecconsiders to be of sufficient complexity,
169 and that did not have functional exploit code until it was created
by a third party. This consideration excludes the following:
• Vulnerabilities that do not require exploit code
• Vulnerabilities with associated exploit code published by the discoverer of the vulnerability• Vulnerabilities associated with non-functional proof-of-concept code
The date of vulnerability disclosure is based on the date of the first reference found (such as a mailing list
post). The date of exploit code publication is the date of the first reference to the exploit code found.
The time lapse between the disclosure of a vulnerability and appearance of exploit code for each applicable
vulnerability is determined and computed into a monthly average.
Vulnerability Commercialization
This metric is determined by quantifying the number of vulnerabilities that were disclosed by commercialentities that are involved in the practice of acquiring vulnerability information. As some entities maintainstaff to conduct their own vulnerability research, only information regarding those vulnerabilities that werediscovered by a party that is known to be independent of the commercial entity are included in the data.
Patch development and availability time
The discussion is based on analysis of the patch and vulnerability data in the Symantec vulnerabilitydatabase and is intended to assess the average time between the public disclosure date of a vulnerabilityand the release of an associated patch by the affected vendor. This time lapse is referred to as the “time topatch.” The disclosure date of each vulnerability is stored in the vulnerability database, as is the releasedate of each patch by the vendor.
The time-to-patch metric measures the time lapse between the disclosure date of a vulnerability and the
release date of an associated patch by the vendor. Only those patches that are independent objects (suchas fixes, upgrades, etc.) can be included. Other remediation solutions—such as workaround steps, forinstance—are excluded.
Because of the large number of vendors with technologies that have a very low deployment (these form the
majority), only fixes for technologies from enterprise vendors are included. Those vendors are:
• Microsoft
• Sun™•H P ®• Symantec/VERITAS
169Memory corruption vulnerabilities. This includes buffer overflows, integer handling errors, format string vulnerabilities, and others which result in a corruption of
system memory.112Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
• EMC®
• IBM®• Cisco®• Oracle®
For each individual patch from these vendors, the time lapse between the patch release date and the
publishing date of the vulnerability is computed. An average from the aggregate of these is computed foreach period.
Web browser vulnerabilities
This metric will offer a comparison of vulnerability data for numerous browsers, namely: Microsoft InternetExplorer, Mozilla Firefox, Opera, Safari and KDE Konqueror. However, in assessing the comparative data, the
following important caveats should be kept in mind before making any conclusions:
• The total number of vulnerabilities in the aforementioned browsers were computed for this report. This
includes vulnerabilities that have been confirmed by the vendor and those that are not vendor confirmed.This version of the Internet Security Threat Report differs from the previous version in that vulnerabilities
that are not confirmed are also included in the data. These vulnerabilities were found to be statisticallysignificant, especially given the disparity in patch times between vendors.
• Individual browser vulnerabilities are notoriously difficult to pinpoint and identify precisely. A reported
attack may be a combination of several conditions, each of which could be considered a vulnerability inits own right. This may distort the total vulnerability count. Some browser issues have also beenimproperly identified as operating system vulnerabilities or vice versa. This is, in part, due to increasingoperating system integration that makes it difficult to correctly identify the affected component in manycases. Many vulnerabilities in shared operating system components can potentially be exposed toattacks through the browser. This report, where sufficient information is available to make the distinct,enumerates only those vulnerabilities that are known to affect the browser itself.
• Not every vulnerability that is discovered is exploited. As of this writing, there has been no widespread
exploitation of any browser except Microsoft Internet Explorer. This is expected to change as otherbrowsers become more popular.
113Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix D—Malicious Code Trends Methodology
The trends in the “Malicious Code Trends” section are based on statistics from malicious code samples
reported to Symantec for analysis. Symantec gathers data from over 120 million client, server, andgateway systems that have deployed Symantec’s antivirus products in both consumer and corporateenvironments. The Symantec Digital Immune System and Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting process.
Observations in the “Malicious Code Trends” section are based on empirical data and expert analysis of
this data. The data and analysis draw primarily from two databases described below.
Infection database
To help detect and eradicate computer viruses, Symantec developed the Symantec AntiVirus™ ResearchAutomation (SARA) technology. Symantec uses this technology to analyze, replicate, and define a largesubset of the most common computer viruses that are quarantined by Symantec Antivirus customers. On average, SARA receives hundreds of thousands of suspect files daily from both enterprise andindividual consumers located throughout the world. Symantec then analyzes these suspect files, matchingthem with virus definitions. An analysis of this aggregate data set provides statistics on infection rates fordifferent types of malicious code.
Malicious code database
In addition to infection data, Symantec Security Response analyzes and documents attributes for each new forms of malicious code that emerges both in the wild and in a “zoo” (or controlled laboratory)environment. Descriptive records of new forms of malicious code are then entered into a database forfuture reference. For this report, historical trend analysis was performed on this database to identify,assess and discuss any possible trends, such as the use of different infection vectors and the frequency of various types of payloads.
In some cases, Symantec antivirus products may initially detect new malicious code heuristically or by
generic signatures. These may later be reclassified and given unique detections. Because of this, there may be slight variance in the presentation of the same data set from one volume of the Internet Security
Threat Report to the next.
114Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix E—Additional Security Risks Methodology
Symantec products not only help users to protect their data from the threat of viruses, worms, and Trojan
horses, but also to evaluate potential security risks from the introduction of other programs as well.Symantec AntiVirus classifies these other programs as additional security risks. Additional security risksinclude programs that may be categorized, based upon functional criteria, as adware or spyware.Symantec classifies these programs based on a number of characteristics. Once categorized, they can bedetected, allowing users to choose whether to keep or remove them based on their personal needs andsecurity policies.
General criteria for additional security risks
A program classified as an additional security risk is an application or software-based executable that iseither independent or interdependent on another software program and meets the following criteria:
1. It is considered to be non-viral in nature; 2. It meets criteria for programmatic functionality having potential to affect security;3. It has been reported to Symantec by a critical number of either corporate or individual users within a
given timeframe. The timeframe and number may vary by category or risk.
Symantec further classifies programs based upon functional criteria related to the result of the program’s
introduction to a computer system. The criteria take into consideration functionality that includes stealth,privacy, performance impact, damage, and removal.
Adware and Spyware
Adware programs are those that facilitate the delivery and display of advertising content onto the user’sdisplay device. This may be done without the user’s prior consent or explicit knowledge. The advertising isoften, but not always, presented in the form of pop-up windows or bars that appear on the screen. In somecases, these programs may gather information from the user's computer, including information related toInternet browser usage or other computing habits, and relay this information back to a remote computer.
Spyware programs are stand-alone programs that can unobtrusively monitor system activity and either
relay the information back to another computer or hold it for subsequent retrieval. In some cases, spywareprograms may be used by corporations to monitor employee Internet usage or by parents to monitor theirchildren’s Internet usage.
Spyware programs can be surreptitiously placed on users’ systems in order to gather confidential
information such as passwords, login details, and credit card details. This can be done through keystrokelogging and by capturing email and instant messaging traffic.
The potential security risks introduced by adware and spyware are discussed according to samples, or
individual cases of adware or spyware, reported to Symantec by customers deploying Symantec AntiVirus.While spyware and adware are not categorized as malicious code, Symantec monitors them using many of
115170Systems deploying Symantec antivirus security solutionsSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
the same types of methods used for tracking malicious code development and proliferation. This involves
an ongoing analysis of reports and data delivered from over 120 million client, server, and gateway emailsystems,
170as well as filtration of 25 million email messages per day. Symantec then compiles the most
common reports and analyzes them to determine the appropriate categorization. The discussion of adware and spyware included in the “Additional Security Risks” report is based on Symantec’s analysis of these reports.
Phishing
Phishing attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec ProbeNetwork. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam data is assessed to gauge the growth in phishing attempts as wellas the percentage of Internet mail that is determined to be phishing attempts. Symantec BrightmailAntiSpam field data consists of statistics reported back from customer installations that provide feedbackabout the detection behaviors of antifraud filters as well as the overall volume of mail being processed.
Phishing attempt definition
The Symantec Probe Network is a system of over two million decoy accounts that attract email messagesfrom 20 different countries around the world. It encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises and attracts email samples that are representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 millionmailboxes. The Probe Network covers countries in the Americas, Europe, Asia, Africa andAustralia/Oceania.
The Symantec Probe Network data is used to track the growth in new attacks. A phishing attempt is a
group of email messages with similar properties, such as headers and content, that are sent to uniqueusers. The messages attempt to gain confidential and personal information from online users.
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam software reports statistics to Symantec Security Response that indicate
messages processed, messages filtered, and filter specific data. Symantec has classified different filters so that spam statistics as well as phishing statistics can be separately determined. Symantec BrightmailAntiSpam field data is used to identify general trends in phishing email messages.
Explanation of research enquiries
This section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to produce the data and statistics inthis report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, thefollowing investigations warrant additional detail.
Six-month growth in phishing messages
Symantec maintains automated systems to identify new potential fraud messages received by theSymantec Probe Network. Messages are grouped into attacks based on similarities in the message bodiesand headers. Sample messages are then passed through general fraud heuristics to identify messages as
116Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
potential phishing attempts. Symantec Security Response reviews events that are identified as attacks for
the purposes of confirmation and filter development. The Symantec Brightmail Business IntelligenceDepartment reviews phishing attacks in order to develop predictive filters known as Symantec BrightmailAntiSpam Heuristics.
The data presented in this section is based on monthly totals in the number of new unique phishing
messages discovered and ruled upon by Symantec Security Response. Security Response addresses onlythose phishing messages not caught by existing antispam and antifraud filters. Existing filters refer only to those antispam and antifraud filters used across the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base.Some fraud messages will be captured in the field based upon predictive filters (heuristics); however, notall of Symantec’s customers utilize this technology or have upgraded to this technology. Therefore, themessages are still reviewed by Security Response for development of filters that are more widely dispersed.
Blocked phishing attempts
The number of blocked phishing attempts is calculated from the total number of phishing email messagesthat were blocked in the field by Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam antifraud filters. The data for this sectionis based on monthly totals.
Phishing as a percent of email scanned
The data for this section is determined by the number of email messages that trigger antifraud filters in the field versus the total number of email messages scanned. These filters are distributed across theSymantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base. The data for this section is based on monthly totals.
Spam
The Symantec Probe Network is a system of over two million decoy accounts that attract email messagesfrom 20 different countries around the world. It encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises and attracts email samples that are representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 millionmailboxes. The Probe Network encompasses countries in the Americas, Europe, Asia, Africa andAustralia/Oceania.
Spam trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from both the Symantec Probe
Network as well as Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam softwarereports statistics to the Brightmail Logistical Operations Center (BLOC) indicating messages processed,messages filtered, and filter-specific data. Symantec has classified different filters so that spam statisticsas well as phishing statistics can be separately determined. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field dataincludes data reported back from customer installations providing feedback from antispam filters as well as overall mail volume being processed.
117171Please note that all numbers presented in this discussion have been rounded off to the nearest whole number. As a result, some cumulative percentages
may exceed 100%.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Sample Set Normalization
Due to the numerous variables influencing a company’s spam activity, Symantec focused on identifying
spam activity and growth projections with Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data from enterprisecustomer installations having more than 1,000 total messages per day. This normalization yields a moreaccurate summary of Internet spam trends by ruling out problematic and laboratory test servers thatproduce smaller sample sets.
171
Explanation of research inquiries
This section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to produce the data and statistics inthis report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, thefollowing investigations warranted additional detail.
Spam as a percent of email scanned
The data for this section is determined by the number of email messages that trigger antispam filters inthe field versus the total number of email messages scanned. These filters are distributed across theSymantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base. The data for this section is based on monthly totals.
Top ten countries of spam origin
The data for this section is determined by calculating the frequency of originating server IP addresses inemail messages that trigger antispam filters in the field. The IP addresses are mapped to their host countryof origin and the data is summarized by country based on monthly totals. The percentage of spam percountry is calculated from the total spam detected in the field.
It should be noted that the location of the computer from which spam is detected being sent is not
necessarily the location of the spammer. Spammers can build networks of compromised computersglobally and thereby use computers that are geographically separate from their location. Following thislogic, the region from which the spam originates may not correspond with the region in which thespammer is located.
118Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec Corporation.
Copyright © 2006 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved.
Symantec, the Symantec Logo, Brightmail, BugTraq, DeepSight, Digital Immune System, Symantec AntiVirus, Symantec AntiVirus Rese arch Automation (SARA),
Symantec Global Intelligence Network, Symantec Managed Security Services, and Symantec Security Response are trademarks or regi stered trademarks of
Symantec Corporation or its affiliates in the U.S. and other countries. Other names may be trademarks of their respective owner s.
NO WARRANTY. The technical information is being delivered to you AS-IS and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its acc uracy or use. Any use of the
technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user. Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical
errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice.
|
SYMANTEC ENTERPRISE SECURITY
Symantec Internet Security
Threat ReportTrends for January 06–June 06
Volume X, Published September 2006Dean Turner
Executive EditorSymantec Security Response
Stephen Entwisle
EditorSymantec Security Response
Marc Fossi
Analyst—DeepSight Threat AnalystSymantec Security Response
Joseph Blackbird
Analyst—Assoc. Software EngineerSymantec Security Response
David McKinney
Analyst—Manager Software EngineeringSymantec Security Response
Tony Conneff
Analyst—Development ManagerSymantec Security Response
Ollie Whitehouse
Technical Advisor—Security ArchitectSymantec Security Response
Contributors
Dave Cole
Director, Product ManagementSymantec Security Response
Peter Szor
Security ArchitectSymantec Security Response
Peter Ferrie
Sr. Principal Software EngineerSymantec Security Response
David Cowings
Sr. Business Intelligence ManagerSymantec Business Intelligence
Dylan Morss
Principal Business Intelligence ManagerSymantec Business Intelligence
Scott Carlton
Manager, IT OperationsProduct Operations
Igor Moochnick
Sr. Software EngineerInstant Messaging SecuritySeptember 25, 2006
A message from the Executive Editor On January 28, 2002, the first Internet Security Threat Report was published by Riptech, a Managed
Security Services company that was acquired by Symantec in July 2002. At a little over 33 pages, theinitial Internet Security Threat Report was one of the first reports to summarize and analyze network
attack trends in a single, comprehensive document. The premiere issue was based on data captured byRiptech’s firewall and intrusion detection systems, which the company’s analysts used to produce afirst-of-its kind report on attack trends. In that first issue, Code Red and Nimda dominated the threatlandscape and large blended threats and perimeter attacks were the attackers’ modus operandi.
Since that first report, much has changed. Large Internet worms targeting everything and everyone
have given way to smaller, more targeted attacks focusing on fraud, data theft, and criminal activity.The days of Web site defacements and low-level information gathering attacks are behind us. Today we are seeing encrypted bot networks, remotely initiated database breaches, sophisticated phishingscams, and customized malicious code targeting specific companies. As threats have evolved, so toohas the job of tracking and reporting on them.
Over the past four years, the Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network has expanded to include data
from millions of antivirus products and thousands of intrusion detection sensors deployed around theglobe, as well as data gathered from Symantec antifraud solutions. This exponential growth in datacollection has allowed us to produce one of the most thorough and complete analyses of currentInternet threat activity in the world.
Utilizing a team of more than 1,600 dedicated security analysts around the globe, the Internet Security
Threat Report has become much more than just a collection of facts and figures. It has become an
invaluable tool in helping enterprise organizations, small businesses, and consumers to make sense of the ever-changing threat landscape and secure their systems accordingly.
Today, Symantec is pleased to announce the latest Internet Security Threat Report , Volume X. Four
years and nine reports after Riptech’s innovative first effort, this edition incorporates a number ofchanges to both the look and feel of the report, as well as new metrics analyzing and discussingemerging threat trends. The dedicated team of individuals who write, compile, and edit the report have spent hundreds of hours analyzing data and trends to bring you what we hope is the mostcomprehensive and thought-provoking report to date.
On behalf of the entire Symantec team, I hope you find this report as interesting and informative to
read as we have found it to research, develop, and publish.
Sincerely,Dean Turner
Executive EditorInternet Security Threat Report Volume X Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Internet Security Threat Report Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Future Watch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Attack Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Vulnerability Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Malicious Code Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Phishing, Spam, and Security Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Appendix C—Vulnerability Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
Appendix D—Malicious Code Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Appendix E—Phishing, Spam, and Security Risks Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111ContentsVolume X, Published September 2006
Symantec Internet Security Threat ReportSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Internet Security Threat Report Volume X Executive Summary
Previous editions of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report have discussed a shift in the threat
landscape. In contrast to previously observed widespread, network-based attacks, attackers today tend tobe more focused, often targeting client-side applications. This has had numerous effects on security issues.
As vendors and enterprises have adapted to the changing threat environment by implementing best
security practices and defense in-depth strategies, attackers have begun to adopt new techniques. In part,this has resulted in more targeted malicious code and targeted attacks aimed at client-side applications,such as Web browsers, email clients, and other applications. These applications are used to communicateover networks and interact with Web-based services and applications and Web sites. They may also includeprograms such as word processing or spreadsheet programs, which can open untrusted content that isdownloaded or received by a network client.
As security technologies have matured to address the types of flaws typically exploited by traditional
attacks, attackers have shifted their focus to new attack vectors. Further, as technological solutions areproving increasingly more effective, attackers are reverting to older, non-technical means of compromise,such as social engineering, in order to launch successful attacks.
1Attackers are thus shifting attack activity
away from network infrastructures and operating system services toward attacks that focus on the enduser as the weakest link in the security chain.
The current threat landscape is populated by lower profile, more targeted attacks, attacks that propagate
at a slower rate in order to avoid detection and thereby increase the likelihood of successful compromise.Instead of exploiting vulnerabilities in servers, as traditional attacks often did, these threats tend to exploitvulnerabilities in client-side applications that require a degree of user interaction, such as word processingand spreadsheet programs. A number of these have been zero-day vulnerabilities.
2These types of threats
also attempt to escape detection in order to remain on host systems for longer periods so that they cansteal information or provide remote access.
Previous editions of the Internet Security Threat Report have also remarked that attack activity has
shifted from being motivated by status for technical prowess to being motivated by financial gain. Many of today’s threats are designed to gather information that has some value to the attacker. This may consist of personal information that can be used for the purpose of identity theft or fraud, or it may havethe potential to be used for corporate espionage, as in the case of the Hotword Trojan
3and more recently
the Ginwui4and PPDropper Trojans.5In the enterprise environment, such targeted threats could be used
to gain unauthorized access to privileged, proprietary information, thereby threatening the intellectualproperty of the organization.
This volume of the Internet Security Threat Report will offer an analysis and discussion of threat activity
that took place between January 1 and June 30, 2006. This brief summary will offer a synopsis of the dataand trends discussed in the main report. Symantec will continue to monitor and assess threat activity inorder to best prepare consumers and enterprises for the complex Internet security issues to come.
1Social engineering refers to the use of persuasive techniques, manipulation, and/or deception to persuade or fool a computer us er into disclosing confidential
information that can then be used to gain unauthorized access to computers or information stored upon computers, usually for ma licious purposes.
2A zero-day vulnerability is one that has not yet been disclosed publicly and that may not yet be known of by the vendor of the affected technology.
3http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11209
4http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-051914-5151-99
5http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1992128,00.asp4Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
5Attack Trend Highlights
• Microsoft Internet Explorer was the most
frequently targeted Web browser, accounting for 47% of all Web browser attacks.
• Symantec observed an average of 6,110 DoS
attacks per day.
• The United States was the target of the most
DoS attacks, accounting for 54% of the worldwide total.
• The Internet service provider (ISP) sector was
the most frequently targeted by DoS attacks.
• China had the highest number of bot-infected
computers during the first half of 2006,accounting for 20% of the worldwide total.
• The United States had the highest percentage
of bot command-and-control servers with 42%.
• Beijing was the city with the most bot-infected
computers in the world.
• The United States ranked as the top country
of attack origin, accounting for 37% of theworldwide total.
• The home user sector was the most highly
targeted sector, accounting for 86% of all targeted attacks. Vulnerability Trend Highlights
• Symantec documented 2,249 new
vulnerabilities, up 18% over the second half of2005. This is the highest number ever recordedfor a six-month period.
• Web application vulnerabilities made up 69% of
all vulnerabilities this period.
• Mozilla browsers had the most vulnerabilities, 47,
compared to 38 in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
• In the first six months of 2006, 80% of
vulnerabilities were considered easily exploitable,up from 79%.
• Seventy-eight percent of easily exploitable
vulnerabilities affected Web applications.
• The window of exposure for enterprise
vulnerabilities was 28 days.
• Internet Explorer had an average window of
exposure of nine days, the largest of any Webbrowser. Apple Safari averaged five days, followedby Opera with two days and Mozilla with one day.
• In the first half of 2006, Sun operating systems
had the highest average patch development time,with 89 days, followed by Hewlett Packard with 53 days, Apple with 37 days and Microsoft andRed Hat with 13 days. Internet Security Threat Report HighlightsSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
6Malicious Code Trend Highlights
• Eighteen percent of all distinct malicious code
samples detected by Symantec honeypots were new.
• Five of the top ten new malicious code families
reported were Trojan horse programs.
• The most prevalent new malicious code family
this period was that of the Polip virus.
• Worms made up 38 of the top 50 malicious
code samples.
• Worms made up 75% of the volume of top 50
malicious code reports.
• Symantec documented 6,784 new Win32 viruses
and worms.
• Bots accounted for 22% of the top 50 malicious
code reports, up slightly from the 20% reportedin the last period.
• Thirty of the top 50 malicious code samples
exposed confidential information.
• Modular malicious code accounted for 79% of
the volume of top 50 malicious code, down from88% in the second half of 2005.Phishing, Spam and Security Risks
• The Symantec Probe Network detected 157,477
unique phishing messages, an increase of 81%.
• Financial services was the most heavily phished
sector, accounting for 84% of phishing activity.
• Spam made up 54% of all monitored email
traffic, up from 50% in the last period.
• The most common type of spam detected in the
first six months of 2006 was related to healthservices and products.
• Fifty-eight percent of all spam detected
worldwide originated in the United States
• Eight of the top ten reported security risks were
adware programs.
• Three of the top ten new security risks are what
Symantec calls “misleading applications.”Internet Security Threat Report Highlights continuedSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Internet Security Threat Report Overview
The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report provides a six-month update of Internet threat activity.
It includes an analysis of network-based attacks, disclosed vulnerabilities, malicious code reports, andsecurity risks. This summary of the most recent Internet Security Threat Report will alert readers to current
trends and impending threats. In addition, it will offer recommendations for protection against andmitigation of these concerns. This volume covers the six-month period from January 1 to June 30, 2006.
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the world.
The Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network comprehensively tracks attack activity across the entireInternet. The Global Intelligence Network, which includes the Symantec DeepSight™ Threat ManagementSystem and Symantec™ Managed Security Services, consists of over 40,000 sensors monitoring networkactivity in over 180 countries. As well, Symantec gathers malicious code data along with spyware andadware reports from over 120 million client, server, and gateway systems that have deployed Symantec’santivirus products.
Symantec also maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive databases of security vulnerabilities,
covering over 18,000 vulnerabilities affecting more than 30,000 technologies from over 4,000 vendors. In addition to the vulnerability database, Symantec operates BugTraq™, one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion of vulnerabilities on the Internet. The Symantec Probe Network, a system of over two million decoy accounts, attracts email messages from 20 different countries around the world,allowing Symantec to gauge global spam and phishing activity. Finally, the Symantec Phish Report Networkis an extensive antifraud community in which members contribute and receive fraudulent Web siteaddresses for alerting and filtering across a broad range of solutions. These resources give Symantecanalysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify emerging trends in attacks and malicious code activity.
The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report is grounded principally on the expert analysis of this data.
Based on Symantec’s expertise and experience, this analysis yields a highly informed commentary oncurrent Internet threat activity. By publishing the analysis of Internet security activity in the Internet
Security Threat Report , Symantec hopes to provide enterprises and consumers with the information
they need to help effectively secure their systems now and in the future.
Distribution of attacks targeting Web browsers
In the first six months of 2006, Microsoft Internet Explorer was the most frequently targeted Web browser.Attacks targeting it accounted for 47% of all attacking computers targeting Web browsers (figure 1). Theprominence of Microsoft Internet Explorer is not surprising, as it is the most widely deployed browserworldwide. Furthermore, it had the second highest number of vulnerabilities of all Web browsers duringthis period.
7Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 1. Distribution of attacks targeting Web browsers
Source: Symantec Corporation
Some attacks target vulnerabilities that are present in more than one Web browser. These vulnerabilities,
which are referred to here as “multiple browser vulnerabilities,” are typically present in numerous browsersbecause of shared source code, although this is not always the case. Multiple browser vulnerabilities mayaffect Apple Safari, KDE Konqueror, the Mozilla Browser family, Netscape, Opera, and/or Internet Explorer.Attacks targeting multiple browsers were the second most common Web browser attacks during the firsthalf of 2006, accounting for 31% of all attacks targeting Web browsers.
Mozilla Firefox was targeted by the third highest number of detected Web browser attacks during the first
half of 2006. Twenty percent of all attacking IP addresses targeted the Firefox browser during this period.
In order to protect against Web browser attacks, Symantec advises users and administrators to upgrade
all browsers to the latest, patched versions. To reduce exposure to attacks, Symantec recommends thatorganizations educate users to be extremely cautious about visiting unknown or untrusted Web sites and/or viewing or following links in unsolicited emails.Mozilla
Firefox20%Microsoft
Internet Explorer47%
Multiple
Browsers31%
NetscapeBrowser2%
8Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Top targeted sectors
Although many attackers choose targets randomly, some target computers within a specific sector, industry,
or organization. Symantec refers to these as “targeted attacks.” For the purposes of this metric, a targetedattack is identified as an IP address that has attacked at least three sensors in a given industry to theexclusion of all other industries during the reporting period.
Table 1. Top targeted sectors
Source: Symantec Corporation
Between January 1 and June 30, 2006, the home user sector was the most highly targeted sector,
accounting for 86% of all targeted attacks (table 1). As computers in the home users sector are less likely to have well established security measures and practices in place than other sectors, they are muchmore vulnerable to targeted attacks. Furthermore, as home users represent a fertile resource for identitytheft, it is likely that many of the targeted attacks against them are used for fraud or other financiallymotivated crime.
The number of targeted attacks detected against home users might be inflated due to the way in which
they connect to the Internet. Because home users generally connect to the Internet through Internet service providers (ISPs), it is likely that the majority of them share networks that span a single block of IP addresses. As a result, opportunistic attacks targeting a broadband ISP may be noted as targetedattacks, thereby artificially inflating the percentage of targeted attacks against this sector.
Financial services was the second most frequently targeted sector in the first half of 2006. Symantec
believes that attackers are increasingly motivated by financial gain; as such, the financial services industryis a logical target for attackers hoping to profit from attack activity. Symantec expects that attacks targetedagainst the financial services industry will continue to rise as attackers become more profit driven.
The sector most frequently targeted by DoS attacks in the first half of 2006 was the Internet service
provider (ISP) sector,
6which was targeted by 38% of all DoS attacks (table 2). ISPs are popular targets for
several reasons. Firstly, they are responsible for providing Internet service to a high number of users. ByCurrent
Rank Previous
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6 7 8 9
10 1
2
6
3
8
7 5
10
4
14 86%
14%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1% <1% <1% <1% <1% Sector Current Proportion of
Targeted attacks
93%
4%
<1%
2%
<1%
<1% <1% <1% <1% <1% Previous Proportion of
Targeted attacks
Home user
Financial Services
Government
Education
Information Technology
Health care Accounting Telecommunications Small Business Utilities / Energy
6The Internet service provider sector is made up of organizations whose primary function is providing Internet as a service.9Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
successfully attacking an ISP, an attacker can effectively create denial of service conditions for a high
number of users at one time. Secondly, ISPs also host Web sites and provide Internet access to manypotential target organizations. Attackers wanting to target an organization’s Web site or networks could do so by targeting the organization’s ISP.
Table 2. Top sectors targeted by denial of service attacks
Source: Symantec Corporation
Organizations should ensure that a documented procedure exists for responding to DoS events. One of the
best ways to mitigate a DoS attack is to filter upstream of the target. For most organizations, this filteringwill involve working in conjunction with their Internet service provider (ISP). Symantec also recommendsthat organizations perform egress filtering on all outbound traffic.
7
Total number of vulnerabilities disclosed
Symantec documented 2,249 new vulnerabilities in the first half of 2006. This is an increase of 18% overthe 1,912 vulnerabilities that were documented in the second half of 2005. It is also a 20% increase overthe 1,874 vulnerabilities that were reported in the first half of 2005. Symantec documented a highervolume of vulnerabilities in this reporting period than in any other previous six-month period.
8
The marked increase in the number of vulnerabilities can be attributed to the continued growth in thosethat affect Web applications. Web applications are technologies that rely on a Web browser for their userinterface, rely on HTTP as the transport protocol, and reside on Web servers. Vulnerabilities affecting Webapplications accounted for 69% of all vulnerabilities that were documented by Symantec in the first half of 2006. This is a slight increase over the 68% disclosed in the second half of 2005. It is also a ninepercentage point increase over the 60% documented in the first half of 2005.
The high number of these vulnerabilities is due in part to the popularity of Web applications and to
the relative ease of discovering vulnerabilities in Web applications compared to other platforms. Webapplications are required to accept and interpret input from many different sources, and there are very few restrictions to distinguish valid input from invalid. This is further complicated because Web browsers,the application through which most Web applications operate, are very liberal in what they will accept and interpret as valid input. Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 Proportion of
attacks
38%
32%
8%
4%
3%
3%
3%
3%
2%
2% Internet Service Provider
Government
Telecommunications
Transportation
Education
Accounting
Utilities / Energy
Insurance
Financial Services
Information Technology Sector
7Egress traffic refers to traffic that is leaving a network, bound for the Internet or another network.
8The Internet Security Threat Report has been tracking vulnerabilities in six-month periods since January 2002.10Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
9Cross-site scripting is a vulnerability that allows attackers to inject hostile HTML and script code into the browser session o f a Web application user. SQL injection is
a vulnerability that can affect Web applications, allowing an attacker to inject their own SQL code into a database query that is made by the vulnerable application.
10The Secure Development Lifecycle is a development paradigm that incorporates security at every stage from the initial architect ure to programming and in the
quality assurance/testing phases. Threat modeling is a security auditing methodology that involves formally identifying and map ping out all possible attack vectors
for an application.
11Vendors included in this metric are: Microsoft, Sun™, HP®, Symantec/VERITAS, EMC, IBM®, Cisco®, Oracle®, CA™ (Computer Associat es), and McAfee®.11Additionally, Web applications generally have quicker release cycles than traditional desktop and server
applications. This provides security researchers with a continually growing source of new applications toaudit, particularly as, in many cases, Web applications do not undergo the same degree of qualityassurance and testing as other applications.
Web applications also present relatively easy targets. This is because the source code is often readily
available to be audited (although in many cases security researchers can also quickly discovervulnerabilities on live Web sites). Compared to other types of applications, researchers can often find manymore vulnerabilities in Web applications in a shorter period of time. For instance, Web applications areoften susceptible to common types of input validation vulnerabilities, such as cross-site scripting and SQLinjection, that are typically easy to discover with a minimal amount of effort and skill.
9
Symantec recommends that administrators employ a good asset management system or vulnerabilityalerting service and management system, both of which can help to quickly assess whether a newvulnerability is a viable threat or not. Enterprises should devote sufficient resources to alerting and patchdeployment solutions. They should also consider engaging a managed security service provider to assistthem in monitoring their networks. Administrators should also monitor vulnerability mailing lists andsecurity Web sites for new developments in vulnerability research.
In order to protect against the exploitation of Web application vulnerabilities, organizations should
manage their Web-based assets carefully. If they are developing Web applications in-house, developersshould be educated about secure development practices, such as the Secure Development Lifecycle and threat modeling.
10Symantec recommends the use of secure shared components that have been
audited for common Web application vulnerabilities to limit the risk of introducing new vulnerabilitieswhen implementing features from scratch. If possible, all Web applications should be audited for securityprior to deployment. Web application security solutions and a number of products and services areavailable to detect and prevent attacks against these applications.
Window of exposure, enterprise vendors
The window of exposure is the difference in days between the time at which exploit code affecting avulnerability is made public and the time at which the affected vendor makes a patch available to thepublic for that vulnerability. During this time, the computer or system on which the affected application is deployed may be susceptible to attack, as administrators will likely have no official recourse against a vulnerability and instead will have to resort to best practices and workarounds to reduce the risk ofsuccessful compromise.
The set of vulnerabilities included in this metric is limited and does not represent all software from all
possible vendors. Instead, it only includes vendors who are classified as enterprise vendors. The purpose of this metric is to illustrate the window of exposure for widely deployed mission-critical software. Becauseof the large number of vendors with technologies that have a very low deployment (these form themajority), only exploits for technologies from enterprise vendors (that is, those that generally havewidespread deployment) are included.
11Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
In the first six months of 2006, the average patch development time for software developed by enterprise
vendors was 31 days. The average exploit code development time during the same period was three days.As a result, the window of exposure for this reporting period was 28 days (figure 2). In the second half of2005, the window of exposure was 50 days. In the first half of 2005, it was 60 days.
Figure 2. Window of exposure, enterprise vendors
Source: Symantec Corporation
The window of exposure for vulnerabilities in applications developed by enterprise vendors is thus
narrowing. While there has been a slight reduction in exploit code development time, the main reason for this narrowing is that patch development time has dropped significantly.
Exploit code for enterprise-vendor vulnerabilities is still being released quickly, forcing administrators to
respond rapidly despite a lack of vendor-supplied remediation. However, the decreasing patch developmenttime indicates that enterprise vendors are responding more quickly to vulnerabilities. Despite this, it iscritical that organizations follow up with installation of patches.
To minimize the possibility of successful exploitation, administrators need to understand the vulnerabilities
and be active in working around them. This may involve making changes to firewall configurations, creatingor obtaining IDS/IPS signatures and rules, and locking down services. Administrators should monitorvulnerability mailing lists and security Web sites for new developments in vulnerability research. Theyshould also monitor mailing lists devoted to discussion of security incidents or specific technologies, onwhich prevention and mitigation strategies may be discussed.60
7550
328
01020304050607065
57
31Exploit development time
Patch development time
Window of exposureTime in days
Jan–Jun 2005 Jul–Dec 2005 Jan–Jun 2006
Period
12Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Patch development time, operating systems
The time period between the disclosure date of a vulnerability and the release date of an associated patch
is known as the “patch development time.” If exploit code is created and made public during this time,computers may be immediately vulnerable to widespread attack.
During the first six months of 2006, Microsoft had an average patch development time of 13 days (figure 3),
a significant decrease from 34 days in the last half of 2005. Red Hat also had an average patch developmenttime of 13 days for the first six months of 2006, a drop from 28 days in the last half of 2005. Apple hadthe third shortest time to patch at 37 days. This is a significant reduction from the 73-day average for 27 vulnerabilities in the second half of 2005.
Figure 3. Operating system patch development time
Source: Symantec Corporation
Over the past three reporting periods, Microsoft has had the shortest patch development time of all the
operating system vendors. There are many reasons that consumer-oriented vendors such as Microsoft andApple have lower patch development times than some of the other vendors. Threats to desktop users andconsumers generally carry a higher public profile and so there is likely more public pressure for vendors tobe responsive and accountable.
Along with Microsoft, Red Hat also had the lowest patch development time during this reporting period.
This is likely related to open-source collaboration. If a vendor or a member of the open-source communityprovides a patch, other vendors can share that patch and incorporate it into their distribution. Linuxpatches are not released on a fixed schedule; instead, they are often released on a daily basis. Thisapproach differs from Microsoft and Apple, both of whom release their patches less frequently and in large batches to address as many vulnerabilities as possible at a time.0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140Apple
HPMicrosoftRed HatSun
Average time in daysPeriod
Jul–Dec 2005
Jan–Jun 200673
3765
5334
1328
13119
89
13Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Window of exposure, Web browsers
The window of exposure is the difference in days between the time at which exploit code affecting a
vulnerability is made public and the time at which the affected vendor makes a patch available to thepublic for that vulnerability. During this time, the computer or system on which the affected application is deployed may be susceptible to attack, as administrators will likely have no official recourse against avulnerability and instead will have to resort to best practices and workarounds to reduce the risk ofsuccessful compromise.
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is assessing the window
of exposure for Web browsers. In the first half of 2006, Internet Explorer had a window of exposure of ninedays, down considerably from 25 days in the second half of 2005 (figure 4). Apple Safari had a window ofexposure of five days, up from zero days in the second half of 2005.
12
In the first half of 2006, Opera had a window of exposure of two days, down considerably from 18 daysduring the second half of 2005. In the first half of this year, Mozilla had a window of exposure of one day.In the second half of 2005, Mozilla had a window of exposure of negative two days, meaning that exploitcode in that period was generally released after patches were available.
Figure 4. Web browsers window of exposure
Source: Symantec Corporation
In the first half of 2006, the window of exposure for most vendors was smaller than for the second half
of 2005. Vendor responsiveness is the key factor in this change, particularly as exploit code developmenttime averages are still very short. It should also be noted that these averages may be influenced by thenumber of vulnerabilities that are disclosed for each browser. Jul–Dec 2005
PeriodJan–Jun 2006Average time in daysApple Safari
Internet ExplorerMozilla Firefox
Opera
-5051015203025
0- 218
9
5
1225
12All patched vulnerabilities affecting Safari in the second half of 2005 were addressed by the vendor at the time of their annou ncement.14Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Average patch development times are lower for Web browsers than in other contexts, such as enterprise
vendor applications and operating systems. This is noteworthy because some vendors, such as Apple andMicrosoft, are included in all of these metrics. This discrepancy may indicate that the patching of browservulnerabilities is given a higher priority than the patching of other types of vulnerabilities that affect thosevendors. This could be attributed to the ubiquity of the Web browser and its high profile as a target forexploitation, which has effectively forced vendors such as Apple and Microsoft to respond more quickly tobrowser vulnerabilities.
To protect against the exploitation of unpatched vulnerabilities affecting Web browsers, Symantec
recommends the deployment of intrusion prevention systems and antivirus at gateways and workstations.Organizations should also closely monitor vulnerability mailing lists and apply necessary patches asrequired, in a timely manner.
Web browser vulnerabilities
The Web browser is a critical and ubiquitous application that has become a significant target forvulnerability researchers. Traditionally, the focus of security researchers has been on the perimeter: servers, firewalls, and other assets with external exposure. However, a notable shift has occurred, asresearchers are increasingly targeting client-side systems, primarily end-user desktop hosts. As part of this shift toward client-side issues, vulnerabilities in Web browsers have become increasingly prominent.
Figure 5. Web browser vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation
In the first six months of 2006, Symantec documented 47 vulnerabilities that affected Mozilla browsers,
including Mozilla Firefox and the Mozilla Browser (figure 5). This is a significant increase over the 17vulnerabilities that were disclosed in the second half of 2005. The Mozilla Foundation released multiplerevisions of Firefox and Mozilla during this period to address the majority of these vulnerabilities. Jan–Jun 2005
Jul–Dec 2005Period
Jan–Jun 2006
Documented vulnerabilitiesInternet Explorer
MozillaOperaSafari
0 1 02 03 04 05 047
9
6
12732
38
4725
25
17
15Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
In the first half of 2006, Symantec documented 38 new vulnerabilities in Microsoft Internet Explorer.13
This is a 52% increase over the 25 vulnerabilities published in the preceding six-month period. Many of
the Internet Explorer vulnerabilities were reported privately to Microsoft and addressed in cumulativesecurity updates over the course of the reporting period. The continued prevalence of Internet Explorervulnerabilities is likely due to the widespread deployment of the browser.
During this reporting period, 12 vulnerabilities were disclosed that affected Apple Safari. This is double the
six reported in the second half of 2005 and triple the four that were disclosed in the first half of 2005. Thesharp increase in the number of Apple Safari vulnerabilities over the past 12 months offers evidence thatsecurity researchers are increasingly turning their attention to Mac OS X.
Browsers are becoming more complex and feature-rich, which can expose them to vulnerabilities
in newly implemented features. Due to the integration of various content-handling applications, such as productivity suites and media players, browsers remain a viable attack vector for many client-sidevulnerabilities.
14This is particularly true of Microsoft Windows and other operating systems in which
the browser is not disassociated from many other operating system processes and features. This wasillustrated by the Excel “zero-day” vulnerability,
15which Symantec observed in the wild being employed
in targeted attacks. The low-key nature of client-side attacks makes them ideal for targeted “zero-day” attacks.
16
Browser vulnerabilities are a serious security concern, particularly due to their role in online fraud and thepropagation of spyware and adware. Organizations should closely monitor vulnerability mailing lists andapply necessary patches as required, in a timely manner. They should also scan their hosts for vulnerablesystems to identify hosts that are missing the required patches.
Denial of service attacks
Denial of service (DoS) attacks are a major threat to organizations. A successful DoS attack can render Websites or other network services inaccessible to customers and employees. This could result in the disruptionof organizational communications, a significant loss of revenue, and/or damage to the organization’sreputation. Furthermore, as Symantec discussed in a previous Internet Security Threat Report (September
2005), criminal extortion schemes based on DoS attacks are becoming more common.
17During the first six
months of 2006, Symantec observed an average of 6,110 DoS attacks per day.
13It should be noted that this metric does not include third-party components such as ActiveX components or browser plug-ins; how ever, if the vendor ships their own
ActiveX components or browser plug-ins with the browser, vulnerabilities affecting those components are considered.
14Client-side vulnerabilities are those that affect network client applications or that require some degree of user-interaction w ith data that originates from an external
source to be successfully exploited.
15http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/18422
16A zero-day attack is one that attacks a vulnerability for which there is no available patch. It also generally means an attack against a vulnerability that is not yet
public knowledge or known of by the vendor of the affected technology.
17Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume VIII (September): https://enterprise.symantec.com/enterprise/whitepaper.cfm?id=2238, pp. 11 and 3016Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
The United States was the location of the most DoS targets, accounting for 54% of the worldwide total.
The prominence of the United States as a target is not surprising: the country’s extensive broadband-Internet infrastructure and the high proportion of Internet-connected organizations situated there make it a very attractive target. China was targeted by the second highest number of DoS attacks, accounting for 12% of the total.
The sector most frequently targeted by DoS attacks in the first half of 2006 was the Internet service
provider (ISP) sector, which was targeted by 38% of all DoS attacks. ISPs are popular targets for severalreasons. Firstly, they are responsible for providing Internet service to a high number of users. Bysuccessfully attacking an ISP, an attacker may be able to effectively create denial of service conditions for a high number of individuals and organizations at one time. Secondly, ISPs also host Web sites and provideInternet access to many potential target organizations. Attackers wanting to target an organization’s Website or networks could do so by targeting the organization’s ISP.
Organizations should ensure that a documented procedure exists for responding to DoS events. One of the
best ways to mitigate a DoS attack is to filter upstream of the target. For most organizations this filteringwill involve working in conjunction with their Internet service provider (ISP). Symantec also recommendsthat organizations perform egress filtering on all outbound traffic. DoS victims frequently need to engagetheir upstream ISP to help filter the traffic to mitigate the effects of attacks.
Bot networks
Bot networks are groups of compromised computers on which attackers have installed software thatlistens for and responds to commands, typically using Internet relay chat (IRC), thereby giving the attackerremote control over the computers. Bots can be used by external attackers to perform DoS attacks againstan organization’s Web site, which could result in the disruption of organizational communications, asignificant loss of revenue, and/or damage to the organization’s reputation. Furthermore, bots within anorganization’s network can be used to attack other organizations’ Web sites as well as spread maliciouscode, both of which can have serious legal and business consequences. Finally, bots can be used byattackers to harvest confidential information from compromised computers.
17Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
18http://www.oecd.org/document/39/0,2340,en_2649_34449_36459431_1_1_1_1,00.html18In the first six months of 2006, Symantec observed an average of 57,717 active bot network computers per
day (figure 6). During this period, Symantec observed 4,696,903 distinct bot network computers that were
identified as being active at any point in time during the six-month period.
If bots begin to exploit an attack vector that bypasses firewalls and perimeter defenses, the population of
bot-infected computers could increase rapidly. This could be particularly dangerous because bot networkowners have become more organized and experienced. Furthermore, bot technology is much moreestablished and is more readily available to the public due to the disclosure of bot source code. Finally,some bots and bot networks are reportedly using encrypted channels to communicate, which could makethem much more difficult to detect.
Symantec also tracks the number of bot command-and-control servers worldwide. Bot command-and-
control servers are computers that bot network owners use to relay commands to bot-infected computerson their bot networks. Symantec identified 6,337 bot command-and-control servers during the first sixmonths of 2006.
The United States had the highest percentage of bot command-and-control computers, with 42% of the
worldwide total. The high proportion of command-and-control servers likely indicates that servers in theUnited States control not only bot networks within the country but offshore as well. The high proportion of bot-infected computers and bot command-and-control servers in the United States is driven by itsextensive Internet and technology infrastructure as well as the fact that more than 49 million broadbandInternet users are located there.
18Figure 6. Active bot network computers per day
Source: Symantec CorporationJan 01, 2006 Jan 29, 2006
Date
Moving averageActive botsFeb 26, 2006Active bot network computers30,00050,00060,00070,000
010,00020,00040,00080,00090,000
Apr 23, 2006 May 21, 2006 Jun 18, 2006 Mar 26, 2006Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
China had the highest number of bot-infected computers during the first half of 2006, accounting for 20%
of the worldwide total. This ranking represents a rise from third place in the second half of 2005. Thiscoincides with and illustrates a trend that began in 2005, which saw an increase in bot activity in Chinaduring that period. Symantec has observed that bots usually infect computers connected to high-speedbroadband Internet through large ISPs and that the expansion of broadband connectivity often facilitatesthe spread of bots.
During the first half of 2006, Beijing was the city with the most bot-infected computers in the world,
accounting for almost three percent of the worldwide total. Guangzhou, China ranked second, with justunder two percent of the world’s bot-infected computers. Seoul, South Korea had the third highest numberof bot-infected computers worldwide, accounting for slightly less than two percent of the total. All of thetop three cities are large population centers that are cultural and economic centers in their respectivecountries. Furthermore, all have a large broadband Internet infrastructure.
To prevent bot infections, Symantec recommends that ISPs perform both ingress and egress filtering to
block known bot network traffic.
19They should also filter out potentially malicious email attachments.
Organizations should monitor all network-connected computers for signs of bot infection, ensuring thatany infections are detected and isolated as soon as possible. They should also ensure that all antivirusdefinitions are updated regularly. As compromised computers can be a threat to other systems, Symantecalso recommends that enterprises notify their ISPs of any potentially malicious activity.
End users should employ defense in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software
and a firewall.
20Users should update antivirus definitions regularly and ensure that all desktop, laptop,
and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their operating system vendor. Symantec also advises that users never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is expected and comes from a known and trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
Previously unseen malicious code threats
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is tracking the proportion
of previously unseen malicious code threats. These are defined as distinct malicious code threats that aredetected on Symantec’s honeypot computers for the first time before they are detected by other means.
21
This information offers insight into emerging attacker activity, particularly the speed with which attackersare adopting new malicious code tools for use against target computers.
Between January 1 and June 30, 2006, 18% of all distinct malicious code samples detected by the
Symantec honeypot had not previously been seen. A high proportion of previously unseen malicious codelikely indicates that attackers are more actively attempting to evade detection by signature-based antivirusand intrusion detection systems.
One of the major factors contributing to the increase in previously unseen threats is the number of variants
within malicious code families. This indicates that attackers are commonly updating current malicious codeto create new variants instead of creating new malicious code “from scratch.” This is particularly evident in
19Ingress traffic refers to traffic that is coming into a network from the Internet or another network. Egress traffic refers to traffic that is leaving a network, bound for
the Internet or another network.
20Defense in-depth emphasizes multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive systems to guard against single-point fail ures in any specific technology or
protection methodology. Defense in-depth should include the deployment of antivirus, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems , among other security measures.
21A honeypot is an Internet-connected system that acts as a decoy, allowing an attacker to enter the system so that the attacker’ s behavior inside the compromised
system can be observed.19Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
22Metamorphic code evolution describes a method used by malicious code writers that allows a piece of malicious code to change it self autonomously.
23Run-time packing utilities, also known as run-time packers, are traditionally used to make files smaller. Malicious code writer s use them to make antivirus
detection more difficult. See the “Win32 Viruses and Bots” discussion of the “Malicious Code Trends” section in this document f or a more detailed discussion
on run-time packers.
24Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume VIII (September 2005): http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539, p. 8320the extremely high number of variants in malicious code families such as the Mytob or Beagle families.
Attackers and malicious code writers can create new variants in a number of ways, including metamorphiccode evolution,
22changes to the functionality, and run-time packing utilities.23The increase in new threats
detected during the first six months of 2006 indicates that attackers may be employing these tactics moreactively in order to avoid being detected by antivirus software.
Previously unseen threats are particularly dangerous because traditional defenses, such as some
signature-based antivirus products, are typically unable to detect them. Administrators should ensure that their networks are protected by perimeter security tools such as intrusion prevention systems (IPS),which will ultimately provide better protection than intrusion detection systems (IDS) or firewalls, neitherof which will have rules to protect from previously unseen threats. Organizations should also considernetwork compliance solutions that will help keep infected mobile users out of the network (and disinfectthem before entering). Administrators should also be sure to maintain up-to-date antivirus definitions to ensure that their computers are protected from new threats at the earliest possible time.
Modular malicious code
In the “Future Watch” section of the September 2005 volume of the Internet Security Threat Report ,
Symantec predicted that modular malicious code would become a more prominent security issue in the near future.
24Modular malicious code works by compromising a computer and then downloading
other pieces of code with added functionalities. It initially possesses limited functionality, such as disabling antivirus software and firewalls, but can update itself with code that has new, potentially more damaging capabilities. These may allow it to further compromise the target computer or to perform other malicious tasks.
Modularity in malicious code can serve different purposes. The malicious code may simply attempt to
update itself to a more recent version, as is often the case for bots and back door servers. Frequently,modular malicious code is used to download an application that can gather confidential information, which may then be used by attackers for financial gain. By using modular malicious code, attackers may download and simultaneously install a confidential information threat on a large number ofcompromised computers.
Between January 1 and June 30, 2006, modular malicious code accounted for 79% of the volume of the
top 50 malicious code reported to Symantec. This represents a significant decrease from the 88% reportedfrom July to December 2005. The decline in the volume of modular malicious code this period can mainlybe attributed to the prevalence of the Blackmal.E worm (also known as the Kama Sutra worm). This wormwas the second most widely reported malicious code sample in the current period; however, it did notattempt to download additional components or threats and so is not considered modular. The large volume of Blackmal.E reports thereby caused the overall volume of modular malicious code in the top 50 to decline.
While the volume of modular malicious code has declined since the previous period, the number of
modular malicious code samples in the top 50 has remained constant. In both the first half of 2006 and the second half of 2005, 36 unique samples were reported.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
In order to protect against modular malicious code, administrators should implement proxy-based Internet
access from inside the organization. This will allow administrators to control which sites can be visited and,in cases of infection, identify hosts that have visited URLs in order to download malicious code updates.
Malicious code threats that expose confidential information
Some malicious code programs are designed specifically to expose confidential information from aninfected computer. Threats that expose confidential information may expose sensitive data such as systeminformation, confidential files and documents, or logon credentials. Some malicious code threats, such asback doors, can give a remote attacker complete control over a compromised computer.
Threats to confidential information are a particular concern because of their potential use in criminal
activities. With the widespread use of online shopping and Internet banking, compromises of this naturecan result in significant financial loss, particularly if credit card information or banking details are exposed.
In the current period, 30 of the top 50 malicious code samples exposed a user’s confidential information in
some way. This is the same number as was reported in the previous reporting period but ten more than the20 reported in the first half of 2005.
Symantec believes that the number of threats to confidential information will likely hold steady or increase
in the next six months. In the current period, variants of Mytob accounted for 16 of the 30 information-exposure threats in the top 50 malicious code reports. Bots such as Mytob will likely continue to becommon amongst the top 50 reported malicious code samples, as their versatility and modularity makethem very popular with attackers.
Trojans
While Trojans dominated the malicious code landscape a year ago, making up 21 of the top 50 maliciouscode samples, they currently account for only ten of the top 50. They account for less than a quarter of the volume of the top 50 malicious code reported to Symantec during this period.
While some industry observers have claimed that the number of Trojans outnumbers worms and viruses
overall, this has not been borne out in the data that Symantec has received from enterprise and consumercustomers worldwide. Due to a lack of propagation mechanisms, Trojans are not likely to be seen by asmany users or in such high volume as mass-mailing worms.
That said, Trojans are still an important security threat. Five of the top ten new malicious code families
reported during the first six months of 2006 were Trojans. Attackers appear to be making a shift towardtargeted attacks using these threats. Mass-mailing worms tend to use a “shotgun” approach, sending large quantities of themselves to as many users as possible. However, Trojans are now frequently produced to target specific users and groups. For example, the Mdropper.H Trojan exploited a zero-dayvulnerability in Microsoft Word in order to install a variant of the Ginwui back door program.
25The Word
document containing the Mdropper Trojan was spammed to a selected user base using a message withsocial engineering that was tailored to entice the recipients into opening it. Because of the targeted nature of these attacks, the Trojan was sent to a smaller group of users, making it less conspicuous andless likely to be submitted to antivirus vendors for analysis.
25http://www.symantec.com/outbreak/word_exploit.html21Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
To protect against Trojans and to mitigate their effectiveness in the case of infection, users should deploy
regularly updated antivirus software and a personal firewall. They should also ensure that all desktop,laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their operating systemvendor. They should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless it is expected and comesfrom trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
Number of unique phishing messages
Over the first six months of 2006, the Symantec Probe Network detected 157,477 unique phishingmessages (figure 7). This is an increase of 81% over the 86,906 unique phishing messages that weredetected in the last half of 2005. It is also an increase of 61% over the 97,592 messages detected in the first half of 2005.
Figure 7. Number of unique phishing messages
Source: Symantec Corporation
This sharp increase over the previous six-month period may be a result of attempts by attackers to
bypass filtering technologies by creating multiple randomized messages. These messages attempt to phish the same brands, but include slight variances—such as variations in the URLs included in thephishing message—in order to bypass the use of MD5 checksums or other basic email scanningtechniques.
26Attackers tend to rotate their usage of a particular domain frequently. By using a large
number of domains in a short period, they make it more difficult for authorities to shut them down due to the amount of effort involved in tracking and taking down each domain used. Number of messages0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000Period
157,477 Jan–Jun 2006Jul–Dec 2005 86,906Jan–Jun 2005 97,592
26An MD5 checksum is obtained when a message is hashed through an algorithm to obtain a unique value. This technique can be used to identify known spam,
phishing, and malicious code email messages.22Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
27For instance, the United States Federal Trade Commission has published some basic guidelines on how to avoid phishing. They are available at:
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/phishingalrt.htm.
28A good resource for information on the latest phishing threats can be found at http://www.antiphishing.org.
29“Cousin domains” refers to domain names that include some of the key words of an organization’s domain or brand name; for examp le, for the corporate
domain “bigbank.com” cousin domains could include “bigbank-alerts.com”,”big-bank-security.com”, and so on.
30See http://markmonitor.com/brandmanagement/index.html for instance.23Phishing activity by sector
For the first time, in this edition of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is tracking the sectors
of brands being targeting by phishing attacks. Not surprisingly, the financial sector is the most heavilyphished, accounting for 84% of phishing sites tracked by the Symantec Phish Report Network andSymantec Brightmail AntiSpam™ this period (figure 8).
Figure 8. Phishing activity by sector
Source: Symantec Corporation
Phishing attacks against the financial services sector are most likely to produce the greatest monetary gain
for attackers. Once an attacker gains access to a target’s account through one of these attacks, he or shecan initiate wire transfers to remove funds, apply for loans, credit lines, or credit cards. Further evidence ofthe high concentration of phishing activity targeting the financial sector is the fact that nine of the top tenbrands phished this period were from that sector.
To protect against potential phishing activity, administrators should always follow Symantec best practices
as outlined in Appendix A of this report. Symantec also recommends that organizations educate their endusers about phishing.
27They should also keep their employees notified of the latest phishing attacks and
how to avoid falling victim to them.28
Symantec recommends that organizations sign up for a fraud alerting service or employ Web server logmonitoring to track if and when complete downloads of their Web sites are occurring. Such activity mayindicate that someone is using the legitimate Web site to create an illegitimate site that could be used forphishing. Organizations should also monitor the purchasing of cousin domain names by other entities toidentify purchases that could be used to spoof their corporate domains.
29This can be done with the help
of companies that specialize in domain monitoring; some registrars even provide this service.30Financial 84% Other 16%ISP 8%Hardware 1%
Retail 5%Software 1%Government 1%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
31Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume VIII (September 2005): http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539, pp. 15 and 97.24End users should follow best security practices as outlined in Appendix A of this report. As some phishing
attacks may use spyware and/or keystroke loggers, Symantec advises end users to use antivirus software,antispam software, firewalls, toolbar blockers, and other software detection methods. Symantec alsoadvises end users to never disclose any confidential personal or financial information unless and until they can confirm that any request for such information is legitimate.
Six-month volume of spam
Spam is usually defined as junk or unsolicited email sent by a third party. While it is certainly anannoyance to end users and administrators, spam is also a serious security concern as it can be used todeliver Trojans, viruses, and phishing attempts. It can also be sent in sufficient quantities to cause denialof service conditions.
Between January 1 and June 30, 2006, spam made up 54% of all monitored email traffic. This is an
increase from the last six months of 2005 when 50% of email was classified as spam. However, it is lowerthan the first half of 2005, when 61% of email was classified as spam.
In the previous Internet Security Threat Report (March 2006), Symantec speculated that the decline of
spam detected during that reporting period was due to the implementation of IP filtering, traffic shaping,and ISP policy changes to control spam.
31The current reversal of this trend indicates that spammers may
have found means to circumvent these measures, such as utilizing image-based spam. Since the financialgains from spam are directly related to the number of messages that reach end users, it is in thespammers’ best interests to find ways to bypass any defenses that administrators put in place.
Percentage of spam containing malicious code
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec will assess the
percentage of spam messages containing malicious code. In the first six months of 2006, 0.81% of spam email contained malicious code. This means that one out of every 122 spam messages blocked bySymantec Brightmail AntiSpam during this period contained malicious code. Between January and May,spam containing malicious code dropped steadily before rising again slightly in June. At the beginning of the year, 1.27% of spam email contained malicious code compared to 0.56% at the end of June.
This decline is likely due to two factors. The first is that attaching malicious code to a message increases
its chances of being blocked by various means. In some cases, administrators may block all incomingmessages with attachments or executable type attachments. Additionally, spam messages with maliciouscode attachments may be detected by both spam-filtering software and antivirus scanners, decreasingtheir chances of reaching end users.
The second factor, which is likely a response to the first, is the inclusion of links to Web sites hosting
malicious code in spam messages. Rather than attach a malicious code executable to a message,spammers will instead include a link to a Web site that is hosting malicious code. In many cases, the Web site may exploit a client-side vulnerability in the user’s browser to install the malicious code Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
without the user’s knowledge or consent. This technique helps reduce the number of messages that are
blocked before reaching the end user and still allows spammers to have their malicious code installed on a recipient’s computer.
To protect against malicious code received through spam, users should follow the same precautions used
to protect against any malicious code infections, such as employing defense in-depth strategies, includingthe deployment of antivirus software and a personal firewall. Users should update antivirus definitionsregularly and ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary securitypatches from their operating system vendor. They should never view, open, or execute any email attachmentunless it is expected and comes from a trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
Misleading applications
Misleading applications give false or exaggerated reports of security threats on a user’s system in order topersuade users to pay money to purchase software or upgrade to a version of security software that willpurportedly remove the “threats” that were found. They are an example of a security risk that uses socialengineering to achieve its end.
Misleading applications pose a risk to the user’s security in a number of ways. Firstly, the consumer may be
unprotected against a wide variety of threats that the fraudulent security product claims to protect themagainst. A bad or misleading security product can be worse than no security at all because of the illusorysense of protection provided. Secondly, in paying for the fraudulent security product, the end user maydisclose personal information, such as banking or credit card information, that could then be used forcriminal purposes, such as identity theft or credit card fraud.
During the first six months of 2006, three of the top ten new security risks were misleading applications.
They accounted for 50% of the volume of reports for the top ten new security risks in the first half of 2006.Two of the top three reported security risks during this period were misleading applications, includingErrorSafe,
32which accounted for 30% of submissions of the top ten new security risks.
In order to mitigate the threat posed by misleading applications, Symantec recommends that administrators
and users follow the recommended best practices outlined in Appendix A of this report, and exercise cautionwhen installing applications that purport to solve security issues. Enterprises should only install applicationsthat have been reviewed and certified as legitimate applications. Any application should only be deployed aspart of an approved security policy.
32http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-012017-0346-99&tabid=125Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Future Watch
The previous sections of the Internet Security Threat Report have discussed some of the Internet security
developments that Symantec observed between January 1 and June 30, 2006. This section will discussemerging trends and issues that Symantec believes will become prominent over the next six to twenty-fourmonths. These forecasts are based on emerging research that Symantec has collected during the currentreporting period and are speculative in nature. In discussing potential future trends, Symantec hopes to provide organizations with an opportunity to prepare themselves for rapidly evolving and complexsecurity issues.
Increased polymorphism in Win32 malicious code
In the first half of 2006, Symantec Security Response noticed a renewed interest in polymorphic viruses. A polymorphic virus is one that can change its byte pattern when it replicates, thereby avoiding detectionby simple string-scanning antivirus techniques. In essence, polymorphic viruses make changes to their code to avoid detection.
Polymorphic and self-mutating viruses appear to be enjoying renewed popularity. Over the past several
years, malicious code authors have been developing increasingly sophisticated malicious code that employsthese techniques. However, due to the difficulty in implementing these techniques, malicious code authorsfocused their efforts on developing run-time packers as a means of mass propagation,
33as opposed to
sophisticated malicious code that avoids detection.
With the success of large-scale worms such as Nimda and Code Red and viruses like I Love You, it became
apparent that malicious code did not need to be sophisticated in order to infect large numbers of machines.Today, there is an increased focus on targeted attacks and more subtle infection methods. As a result,attackers are increasingly using polymorphic techniques to avoid detection and aid in propagation.
As noted in the “Malicious Code Trends” section of this report, improved unpacking support has reduced
the effectiveness of using run-time packers to obfuscate malicious code. As a result, malicious code authorshave been forced to employ different means to avoid detection while infecting host systems. This may bethe main factor in the emergence of polymorphic malicious code activity observed by Symantec.
During March and April of 2006, a worldwide outbreak of two viruses, Polip
34and Detnat,35signified that
polymorphic viruses may be regaining prominence. Detection of complex polymorphic viruses is much moretechnologically dependent than other types of malicious code. It involves a complex process of cryptologicaland statistical analysis along with code emulation and data-driven engine designs. It therefore requiresexperienced analysts to develop detection and removal techniques.
As Polip and Detnat showed, security and antivirus vendors may have difficulty in detecting and
protecting against these threats. Symantec has increasingly observed the use of polymorphic techniques in packers, which could lead to increasingly sophisticated and potentially more damaging malicious codebeing circulated worldwide. This is of particular concern to organizations, as Symantec has observed an increase in the number of attacks and malicious code specifically designed to target specific, individual organizations.
33Run-time packers are compression routines that allow an executable file to run even though they are compressed.
34http://securityresponse.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-042309-1842-99
35http://securityresponse.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-032912-3047-9926Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Due to the difficulty in detecting and removing polymorphic viruses, Symantec speculates that
more malicious code authors may begin to use polymorphic techniques at all levels of malicious code development. For enterprises, this could result in increased volumes of targeted malicious code from which they have limited protection. Should more malicious code use these techniques, targetedorganizations may be increasingly at risk, as obtaining samples to develop detection signatures will likely be difficult.
To protect against these anticipated threats, Symantec recommends that organizations deploy intrusion
prevention solutions on host systems and ensure that their antivirus solutions are able to detect and protectagainst these types of threats. They should also always ensure that their antivirus definitions are up-to-date.
Web 2.0 security threats and AJAX attacks expected to increase
Web 2.0 is term used to describe Web application technologies and Web sites that use the Internet in acollaborative way to provide services to its users. Web 2.0 technologies rely in large part on the user-as-publisher model of interaction and allow for user-created content to be developed and implemented bylarge groups of individuals.
Web 2.0 technologies present a number of areas for security concern. Because individuals are able to
create and host content on various collaboration platforms such as Weblogs, the possibility exists for those platforms to host exploits and become distribution points for links to fraudulent Web sites, malicious code, and other security threats, such as spyware. Attackers will often take advantage of the implied trust between the community of individual developers and the sites hosting content tocompromise individual users and/or Web sites.
Additionally, Web 2.0 technologies rely heavily upon Web services. Web services are services that are
designed to support interoperability between hosts over a network. Symantec has already observed oneworm that used the Google Search Web service.
36This attack provided evidence that well-known services
are not immune to these sorts of attacks and that the number of users these services have present anattractive opportunity to maximize attackers’ efforts. Symantec is concerned that in the rush to developWeb services, the underlying Web applications that use them are not receiving the same level of securityauditing as traditional client-based applications and services.
The last several Internet Security Threat Reports have highlighted the high percentage of Web application
vulnerabilities reported to Symantec. AJAX, which is short for asynchronous JavaScript and XML, is aninteractive Web development technique used in Web applications to create a more seamless user experienceby exchanging small amounts of data between various Web services used in Web applications. It does thiswithout the knowledge of the user initiating the request in order to present a quicker and smoother userexperience, much like a desktop application.
As Web applications continue to gain in popularity, Symantec expects to see an increase in the number
of attacks taking advantage of the interconnected, interactive nature of AJAX to increase the number ofpotential targets. Whereas traditional client-server models process the majority of requests on the serverside, AJAX allows for a larger portion of those requests to be processed on the client side. The net result is
36http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-122109-4444-9927Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
that attackers have a greater ability to examine Web application code and, in turn, to develop attacks by
exploiting newly exposed Web applications through malicious AJAX applications.
Because AJAX can be used in conjunction with a large number of Web services and enables connectivity
between them, this could present additional attack vectors into which attackers could inject hostile content.The potential also exists in AJAX for attackers to exploit the trust relationship inherent in the client-servermodel utilized in Web applications by creating exploits hosted by malicious Web services that steal poorlystored state or login information on the client-side.
One example of this is cross-site scripting. Cross-site scripting attacks take place when Web applications
gather data from a user or other source and then create an output of that data on a user’s Web browser. Not only could this allow an attacker to steal confidential information, it could also allow an attacker toinsert malicious code onto the host through malicious scripts.
The combination of increased attack surfaces with greater cross-site scripting and content injection attacks
unique to AJAX has the potential to expose users to a larger number of attacks that would escape the noticeof traditional security solutions. As most servers interpret AJAX-submitted data as valid requests, it is nearly impossible to determine what constitutes malicious activity.
In addition to following the best practices outlined in Appendix A of this report, Symantec recommends that
enterprises ensure that access to Web applications, whether in-house or external, are limited to approvedapplications only. Symantec also recommends that before any Web service or application is implemented, it undergo a secure code audit to ensure that it is not vulnerable to possible attack.
Microsoft Windows Vista™
Microsoft’s latest desktop operating system, Windows Vista™, is scheduled for release in 2007. With thevarious Windows operating systems deployed on an estimated 90% of desktop systems around the world,the introduction of Windows Vista is expected to present new and unique security concerns. In anticipationof its release, security researchers have begun releasing preliminary security analyses of beta versions ofthe operating system that have been made available to the development community.
37
The preponderance of malicious code, vulnerabilities, and attacks targeting Microsoft Windows today is due in large part to the widespread deployment of the Microsoft operating systems. In response to this,Microsoft has devoted substantial resources to securing Windows Vista. With the release of Vista, Microsoft has rewritten significant portions of its code base and has performed ongoing exhaustive source code audits in hopes of addressing many of the security issues that are present in its currentproducts. Microsoft believes that the combination of new security technologies that have been (and are still being) integrated into Windows Vista will dramatically decrease its potential susceptibility to attack.
Symantec expects to see a concerted effort by the research community to discover and document
shortcomings in Windows Vista as attackers attempt to circumvent these new technologies. If successfullyimplemented, these new technologies may play a role in decreasing the overall volume of malicious codethreats affecting the Windows platform. However, it is not yet clear to what degree they will succeed.
28
37For example, please see “Windows Vista Network Attack Surface Analysis” available at http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/securit y_response/whitepapers.jspSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Research to date has shown increased risk in some of the new technologies, such as the new Vista network
stack,38while others can still be disabled or bypassed by attackers, such as driver signing and PatchGuard.39
Symantec speculates that the new features and changes to Windows Vista’s code base, in conjunction withincreased scrutiny from security researchers and malicious code authors, will result in previously unseenattacks. Organizations considering a move to Windows Vista will need to plan their migration carefully.Symantec recommends that they do so first in small, non-critical environments, and that they conductthorough security audits to reduce possible exposure to attack. Based on currently available research,Symantec suggests that until its public release, Windows Vista should be deployed only in an isolated lab environment.
Increase in number of vulnerabilities reported due to the use of fuzzers
In Volume VIII of the Internet Security Threat Report (September 2005), Symantec speculated that the
number of newly discovered vulnerabilities would increase due to the use of sophisticated tools fordecompiling and analyzing software.
40As discussed in the “Vulnerability Trends” section of this report,
the number of vulnerabilities reported has continued to increase over the past several reporting periods.
The introduction of fuzzers—programs or scripts that are designed to find vulnerabilities in software code
or scripts—has automated many of the code auditing tasks that security researchers had previously donemanually. When fuzzers are combined with modern debugging and disassembly tools, more vulnerabilitiescan be discovered and analyzed in less time, resulting in more products receiving increased scrutiny.
These advances in code auditing reduce both the time and the effort involved in finding new vulnerabilities.
The use of fuzzers does not require advanced security skills; as a result, the number of amateur researchersdiscovering security flaws has increased. This may result in a larger number of vulnerabilities being reportedthat may not be exploitable while lowering the overall quality of vulnerability research. Symantec speculatesthat if this trend continues, security administrators may pay less attention to vulnerability research and, bydoing so, leave their systems susceptible to exploitation of high-severity vulnerabilities.
The advent of fuzzing as a mainstream security research technique will increase the number of
vulnerabilities reported. As a result, organizations may well be forced to deal with an increased number of vulnerabilities in the software and technologies deployed in their environments. They may therefore need to devote more resources to vulnerability management.
Furthermore, fuzzing tools have the potential to discover new vulnerabilities in heavily audited programs in
which fewer vulnerabilities have been found using traditional source code and binary analysis techniques.Symantec speculates that this may result in more vulnerabilities being discovered in technologies andsoftware previously thought to be patched or secure. In addition to following the best practices outlined in Appendix A of this report, organizations should develop a vulnerability management process that alertssecurity administrators to potential issues.
29
38http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/ATR-VistaAttackSurface.pdf
39http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/Windows_Vista_Kernel_Mode_Security.pdf
40Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume VIII (September 2005): http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539, p. 88Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
30Attack Trends
This section of the Internet Security Threat Report will provide an analysis of attack activity that Symantec
observed during the period between January 1 and June 30, 2006. An attack is defined as any maliciousactivity carried out over a network that has been detected by an IDS or firewall. An attack is typically anattempt to exploit a vulnerability in software or hardware. When applicable, attack activity for this periodwill be compared to that presented in the previous Internet Security Threat Report .
41However, in some
cases methodological changes that have been implemented for this reporting period may preclude validcomparison. Wherever appropriate, suggestions for attack remediation will be made along with referencesto Symantec’s best practices, which are outlined in Appendix A of this report.
The Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network monitors attack activity across the entire Internet. Over
40,000 sensors deployed in more than 180 countries by Symantec DeepSight™ Threat ManagementSystem and Symantec™ Managed Security Services gather this data. In addition to these sources,Symantec has developed and deployed a honeypot network that is used to identify, observe, and studycomplete instances of attacker and malicious code activity. This data can help to provide details about how some of the attack activity identified in this section is carried out. These resources combine to giveSymantec an unparalleled ability to identify, investigate, and respond to emerging threats. This discussionwill be based on data provided by all of these sources.
Security devices can monitor for attacks and suspicious behavior at many different levels on the network.
Devices such as IDS/IPS, firewalls, proxy filters, and antivirus installations all contribute to the security of an organization. Symantec gathers data from many of these devices. One consequence of this data-gathering scheme is that malicious code data and attack trend data often address the same activity indifferent ways. For instance, attack trends data is based on the number of infected sources that areattempting to spread through network-based attacks. On the other hand, malicious code data is basedprimarily on reports of attempted propagation, which includes network-based attacks as well as othermethods such as mass mailing. This can lead to different rankings for the same threats presented in the “Attack Trends” and “Malicious Code Trends” sections of this report.
This section of the Internet Security Threat Report will discuss:
• Top Web browser attacks
• Distribution of Web browser attacks• Top wireless threats• Denial of service attacks• Top countries targeted by denial of service attacks• Top sectors targeted by denial of service attacks• Bot networks• Bot-infected computers by country• Bot-infected computers by city• Top originating countries• Top targeted sectors
41Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume VIII (September 2005) and Volume IX (March 2006). Both are available at:
http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
3142http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/5665
43This issue affects Netscape versions 6.2 through 6.2.3, Mozilla Browser versions 0.9.5 through 1.0, and Galleon Browser version s 1.2.4 through 1.2.6
and 5.1.2 through 6.0.1.Top Web browser attacks
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is tracking the top attacks
carried out against Web browsers. Attacks targeting Web browsers can be launched from malicious Websites, bulletin board sites, legitimate Web sites that have been compromised and, in some cases, throughmalicious emails. Since Web browser attacks are carried out over network ports that are traditionally notfiltered, they represent a serious threat because they cannot be blocked using some traditional perimetersecurity tools such as firewalls. It should be noted that attacks discussed in this metric include only thosethat specifically target Web browsers and not libraries or other applications that are accessible throughWeb browsers.
Successful attacks targeting Web browsers typically allow an attacker to compromise a vulnerable
computer and gain the privileges of the user currently logged into the computer. For example, if a user with administrator privileges was running the compromised browser, the attacker could gainadministrator privileges.
Once a successful Web browser attack is carried out, the attacker could use the compromised computer
as a platform from which to launch further attacks against the network from behind perimeter securitydefenses. This could allow an attacker to launch attacks against other computers on the network oreavesdrop on internal network traffic. It could also allow an attacker to carry out further Web browserattacks by using DNS manipulation tools and Web servers on the compromised computer to redirect users on the network to a malicious Web site.
The attacks discussed in this section are the most common Web browser attacks detected by the Symantec
Global Intelligence Network during the first six months of 2006. They are determined by the percentage ofall attacking IP addresses that perform a given Web browser attack. These attacks reflect those carried outon the Internet as a whole and are thus indicative of activity that security administrators are likely toobserve on their own networks.
The most common attack carried out against Web browsers between January 1 and June 30, 2006 was
the Multiple Browser Zero Width GIF Image Memory Corruption Attack, which accounted for 31% of alldetected Web browser attacks (table 3). This attack exploits the vulnerability of the same name,
42which
was first disclosed in September 2002 and affects older Netscape, Mozilla, Galleon, and Opera Webbrowsers.
43This attack is carried out when a user loads a Web site containing a graphics interchange
format (GIF) image file with a width field that is set to zero. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
32Table 3. Top Web browser attacks
Source: Symantec Corporation
One reason that this attack is so common is that the affected vulnerability is relatively easy to exploit. A
publicly available proof-of-concept exploit has been available for some time, allowing attackers to use anddistribute malicious image files. Furthermore, using bulletin board and Webmail software, it is very easyfor attackers to distribute malicious files to targeted users. Unlike browser attacks that require the browserto load malicious HTML or script code (which is typically filtered and restricted by bulletin board andWebmail software), this attack requires only that a user attempt to view a malicious GIF image.
The second most common attack targeting Web browsers during the first half of 2006 was the Microsoft
Internet Explorer DHTML Object Race Condition Memory Corruption Attack, which was used by 19% of all attacking IP addresses. This attack is carried out against the vulnerability of the same name,
44which
was first disclosed in April 2005. The third most popular Web browser attack in the first half of 2006 wasthe Microsoft Internet Explorer Remote URLMON.DLL Buffer Overflow Attack. It was used by 17% of alldetected attacking IP addresses. This attack targets the vulnerability of the same name,
45which was first
disclosed in April 2003. Both of these attacks are likely prominent because of the availability of long-standing publicly available exploit code and the widespread deployment of the Microsoft Internet Explorer Web browser.
In order to protect against Web browser attacks, Symantec advises users and administrators to upgrade
all browsers to the latest, patched versions. To reduce exposure to attacks, Symantec recommends thatorganizations educate users to be extremely cautious about visiting unknown or untrusted Web sites or1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10 31%
19%
17%
8%
7%
3%
3%
3%
2% Jan–June
2006
rank Jan–June 2006
percent of
attackers Attack
Multiple Browser Zero Width GIF Image Memory
Corruption Attack
Microsoft Internet Explorer DHTML Object Race
Condition Memory Corruption Attack
Microsoft Internet Explorer Remote URLMON.DLL
Buffer Overflow Attack
Mozilla JavaScript URL Host Spoofing Arbitrary
Cookie Access Attack
Mozilla Browser BMP Image Decoding Multiple Integer
Overflow Attack
Microsoft Internet Explorer Bitmap Processing Integer
Overflow Attack
Mozilla Browser Non-ASCII Hostname Heap
Overflow Attack
Microsoft Internet Explorer Drag and Drop Attack
9 2% Mozilla Multiple URI Processing Heap Based Buffer
Overflow Attack
Microsoft Internet Explorer HTML Document Directive
Buffer Overflow Attack
44http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/13120
45http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/7419Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
33viewing or following links in unsolicited emails. Administrators should also deploy Web proxies in order to
block potentially malicious script code and implement ActiveX controls in order to stop attacks before theycan be carried out.
Distribution of Web browser attacks
This metric will assess the number of attacks that targeted each Web browser during the first six monthsof 2006. The purpose of this metric is to assess which browsers attackers are targeting the most frequently so that administrators whose networks deploy them can take the appropriate protective measures. Thebrowsers included in this analysis are Microsoft Internet Explorer, Apple Safari, the Mozilla family(including Firefox and the Mozilla browser), Opera, Netscape, and KDE Konqueror.
During the first six months of 2006, Microsoft Internet Explorer was the most frequently targeted Web
browser. It was targeted by 47% of all known attacking IP addresses (figure 9). The prominence ofMicrosoft Internet Explorer is not surprising considering the number of vulnerabilities that affect it.Furthermore, on a worldwide basis, it is the most widely deployed browser.
Figure 9. Distribution of attacks targeting Web browsers
Source: Symantec Corporation
Some attacks target vulnerabilities that are present in multiple Web browsers. These vulnerabilities are
typically present in numerous browsers because of shared source code, although this is not always thecase. Browsers that fall within the “multiple browsers” category include Apple Safari, KDE Konqueror, the Mozilla Browser family, Netscape, Opera, Microsoft Internet Explorer and others.
46Attacks targeting
multiple browsers were the second most common during the first half of 2006, accounting for 31% of all attacking IP addresses.Mozilla
Firefox20%Microsoft
Internet Explorer47%
Multiple
Browsers31%
NetscapeBrowser2%
46Safari, Konqueror, and Opera are included in the multiple browsers category but are not listed individually because there were no detected attacks that
targeted them as individual browsers.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
34Mozilla Firefox was the Web browser targeted by the third highest number of detected Web browser attacks
during the first half of 2006. Twenty percent of all attacking IP addresses targeted Firefox during this period.
In order to protect against Web browser attacks, Symantec advises users and administrators to upgrade
all browsers to the latest, patched versions. To reduce exposure to attacks, Symantec recommends thatorganizations educate users to be extremely cautious about visiting unknown or untrusted Web sites orviewing or following links in unsolicited emails. Administrators should also deploy Web proxies in order to block potentially malicious script code and implement ActiveX controls in order to stop attacks beforethey can be carried out.
Top wireless threats
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is tracking threats against
wireless network infrastructures. Although many of the security issues facing wireless networks are similarto traditional wired networks, there are some that specifically affect the former. Many new wireless networkimplementations are insecure, leaving them susceptible to attacks that could allow attackers to stealbandwidth, view or manipulate confidential information, or use compromised networks to carry out further attacks.
The wireless threats discussed in this section are those that Symantec detected being launched against a
sample of wireless local area networks between January 1 and June 30, 2006. This discussion will only dealwith threats against the wireless network infrastructure itself, it will not deal with attacks against computersdeployed on wireless networks.
Table 4. Top attacks against wireless networks
Source: Symantec Corporation
The most common wireless threat detected between January 1 and June 30, 2006 was a device probing
for an access point, which accounted for 30% of all threatening activity (table 4). A device probing for awireless network access point is one that is noisily trying to connect with an access point using any serviceset identifier (SSID).
471
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
10 30%
17%
16%
8%
6%
4%
3%
2%
2% Current
rank Proportion
of total
threats Threat
Device Probing for an Access Point
Spoofed MAC Address
Unauthorized NetStumbler Client
Rogue Wireless Access Point
Unauthentication Association Denial of Service Attack
Radio Frequency Jamming Denial of Service Attack
CTS Flood Denial of Service Attack
Illegal 802.11 Packet
9 2% Potential Honeypot Access Point
Authentication Flood Denial of Service Attack
47A Service Set Identifier (SSID) is the public name of a wireless network. It is used to allow computer nodes to differentiate o ne wireless network from another.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
35An organization’s wireless security can be threatened by devices probing for an access point in two ways.
The first is by attackers roaming urban areas attempting to locate and connect to wireless networks, a practice that is known as war driving.
48Attackers carrying out this type of attack often do so using
wireless network tools. This type of activity may lead to the compromise of an organization’s internalnetwork, potentially giving attackers access to sensitive information through open network shares or by eavesdropping on network communications. It may also give attackers a platform from which to carry out further attacks against other targets anonymously.
The second way in which an organization can be threatened by devices probing for wireless access points is
through authorized, albeit poorly configured, computers trying to connect to an access point using any SSID.Although apparently innocuous, this could be more damaging to an organization than war driving.
An attacker may take advantage of authorized computers that are probing for access points in two different
ways. The first is through the use of a rogue access point.
49In this case, an authorized computer probing for
an access point might connect to the rogue access point, allowing the attacker to eavesdrop on wirelessnetwork communications and potentially gain access to sensitive information.
The second is by using the authorized computer to gain access to the organization’s wired local network.
It is not uncommon for computers with wireless network hardware to also be connected to a wired networkwithin an office environment. An attacker may take advantage of such computers that are probing for anaccess point by creating a rogue access point and allowing the authorized computer to connect to it. Once the connection is in place, the attacker may use the authorized computer as a bridge to gain access to thelocal wired network.
To protect against threats from devices probing for access points, administrators should make certain that
their wireless access points are not publicly broadcasting their SSIDs. This will ensure that wireless accesspoints cannot be detected by traditional war-driving tools.
50Furthermore, users should be taught safe
wireless practices, including disabling wireless network software unless it is in use and allowing it to connect to only known and trusted access points.
The second most common wireless threat during the first six months of 2006 was the use of a spoofed MAC
address, which accounted for 17% of all wireless threats observed during this period. Access control lists are commonly used to ensure that only legitimate computers are allowed to access wireless networks. These access control lists are often implemented by validating computers based on the MAC address of their network interface card.
51Since MAC addresses were not developed for purposes of security, an attacker
can bypass these access control lists by changing their computer’s MAC address to correspond with one that is authorized to access the target network, a practice known as spoofing.
An attacker using a computer with a spoofed MAC address can masquerade as an authorized computer,
allowing the attacker to gain access to an organization’s internal network. This may allow him or her to gainaccess to potentially sensitive information through open network shares or by eavesdropping on networkcommunications.
48War driving is the commonly used term inspired by war dialing; however, similar attacks have been called war walking, war cycli ng, war flying, and war busing depending on
the attacker’s mode of transportation. Furthermore, war chalking includes marking (using chalk) urban areas that can be used to access various wireless network resources.
49A rogue access point is a wireless network access point placed by an attacker to attempt to intercept communications between au thorized host computers on a local
network. If an authorized computer associates with a rogue access point, the owner of the rogue access point will be able to ea vesdrop on communications before
forwarding them to a legitimate access point.
50Wireless access points that do not broadcast their SSID will go unnoticed by tools that strictly attempt to connect to an acces s point with any SSID. There are some tools,
however, that allow attackers to passively scan for access points by eavesdropping on wireless network traffic.
51Media Access Control (MAC) addresses are used to uniquely identify a network interface card on a local area network.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
36To protect against malicious computers with spoofed MAC addresses, Symantec advises administrators to
deploy tools that allow for the identification and tracking of such computers. Furthermore, by ensuring that all communications carrying sensitive information on a local wireless network are encrypted, it may be possible to reduce the impact of a successful attack.
The third most common threat detected targeting wireless networks during the first six months of
2006 was unauthorized NetStumbler clients,
52which accounted for 16% of all detected wireless threats.
NetStumbler is a freely available wireless network utility that allows users to identify wireless networkaccess points and attain general information about them. NetStumbler may be used by a networkadministrator to monitor local network settings and detect rogue access points; however, detection ofunauthorized NetStumbler clients typically indicates that a network is being targeted by a war driver.
Although NetStumbler attempts to identify wireless networks by probing for an access point (that is,
requesting connection to an access point using any SSID, as discussed above), it is possible to specificallyidentify NetStumbler versions prior to version 0.4.0. This is because the tool transmits unique data whenrequesting additional information from a discovered access point.
It is important to be able to distinguish between unauthorized NetStumbler clients and devices that are
simply probing for access points. The unauthorized use of a NetStumbler likely indicates malicious activity(such as war driving), rather than a poorly configured authorized computer. Administrators can protect theirnetworks against war drivers who are using NetStumbler by ensuring that their wireless access points are not publicly broadcasting their SSIDs.
Denial of service attacks
Denial of service (DoS) attacks are a major threat to organizations. A successful DoS attack can render Websites or other network services inaccessible to customers and employees. This could result in the disruptionof organizational communications, a significant loss of revenue, and/or damage to the organization’sreputation. Furthermore, as Symantec discussed in a previous Internet Security Threat Report (September
2005), criminal extortion schemes based on DoS attacks are becoming more common.
53
For this version of the Internet Security Threat Report, Symantec has changed the methodology used toobtain and record attack data. As a consequence of this methodological change, any comparison withattack data gathered in previous periods would be invalid; therefore, this discussion will focus only on the period between January 1 and June 30, 2006.
Although there are numerous methods for carrying out DoS attacks, Symantec derives the data for this
metric by measuring attacks carried out by flooding a target with SYN requests.
54This type of attack works
by overwhelming a target with SYN requests and not completing the initial request, which prevents othervalid requests from being processed. In many cases, SYN requests with forged IP addresses are used to carry out an attack, allowing a single attacking computer to initiate multiple connections. This results in unsolicited traffic, known as backscatter, being sent to other computers on the Internet (whose IP addresseswere spoofed). This backscatter is used to derive the number of DoS targets observed throughout the reportingperiod. Backscatter is only one method of obtaining DoS statistics and for the purposes of this report is onlyintended to provide a high-level overview of overall DoS activity.
52http://www.stumbler.net
53Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume VIII (September 2005): https://enterprise.symantec.com/enterprise/whitepaper.cfm?id=2238, p. 11 and 30
54The TCP protocol requires a three-way exchange to be carried out before any data is sent. The SYN request is the first phase of the three-way exchange. Once a SYN
request is received by a server, a SYN-ACK is sent in response. The final step is an ACK response, completing the connection ne gotiation process.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
37During the first six months of 2006, Symantec observed an average of 6,110 DoS attacks per day (figure
10). DoS attacks are generally carried out by a wide variety of attackers, from amateurs who simplydownload a freely available tool, to owners of highly organized bot networks whose primary purpose is to carry out coordinated attacks.
55
Defending against DoS attacks that use forged source addresses is difficult, as spoofed addresses makefiltering based on the IP address very complicated. Some operating systems have configuration optionsthat may be used to make the computers less prone to resource exhaustion, thereby making them moreresilient against DoS attacks. Administrators should optimize this to minimize the effects of DoS attacks.
Organizations should ensure that a documented procedure exists for responding to DoS events. One of the
best ways to mitigate a DoS attack is to filter upstream of the target. For most organizations, this filteringwill involve working in conjunction with their Internet service provider (ISP). Symantec also recommendsthat organizations perform egress filtering on all outbound traffic.Figure 10. Denial of service attacks per day
Source: Symantec CorporationJan 01, 2006 Jan 29, 2006
Date
Moving averageMedian denial
of service attacksFeb 26, 2006Denial of service attacks6,000
02,0004,0008,00010,000
Apr 23, 2006 May 21, 2006 Jun 18, 2006 Mar 26, 2006
55An example of a denial of service attack tool is the Smurf tool, which is designed to carry out ICMP flood attacks against targ et computers.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
38Top countries targeted by denial of service attacks
Figure 11. Top countries targeted by denial of service attacks
Source: Symantec Corporation
For the first time, in this volume of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is tracking
the geographic location of targets of denial of service (DoS) attacks. Insight into the locations targeted by these attacks is valuable in determining global trends in DoS attack patterns. It may also helpadministrators and organizations in affected countries to take the necessary steps to protect against or minimize the effects of DoS attacks.
Between January 1 and June 30, 2006 the United States was the location of the most DoS targets,
accounting for 54% of the worldwide total (figure 11). The prominence of the United States as a target is not surprising. The country’s extensive broadband Internet infrastructure and its high proportion ofInternet-connected organizations make it a very attractive target.
China was targeted by the second highest number of DoS attacks, accounting for 12% of the total. The
United Kingdom was the third most common target, accounting for 11% of all detected attacks. Like theUnited States, both China and the United Kingdom have an extensive broadband Internet infrastructure.Both countries are also regional and global political and economic centers. As a result, attackers who areacting on financial or political motives may choose to target these countries.
Organizations should ensure that a documented procedure exists for responding to DoS events. One of the
best ways to mitigate a DoS attack is to filter upstream of the target. For most organizations, this filteringwill involve working in conjunction with their Internet service provider (ISP). Symantec also recommendsthat organizations perform egress filtering on all outbound traffic. DoS victims frequently need to engagetheir upstream ISP to help filter the traffic to mitigate the effects of attacks.Germany
3%
United States
54%Canada
2%
France
2%United Kingdom
11%
Netherlands
2%
Taiwan
2%China
12%Italy
1%
South Korea
2%
Key
% = Proportion of attacksSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
39Top sectors targeted by denial of service attacks
Table 5. Top sectors targeted by denial of service attacks
Source: Symantec Corporation
This metric will assess the sectors that are most commonly targeted by DoS attacks. This data could help
administrators and organizations in affected sectors take the necessary steps to prepare defenses againstDoS attacks.
The sector most frequently targeted by DoS attacks in the first half of 2006 was the Internet service
provider (ISP) sector, which was targeted by 38% of all DoS attacks (table 5). ISPs are popular targets forseveral reasons. First, they are responsible for providing Internet service to a high number of users. Bysuccessfully attacking an ISP, an attacker can effectively create denial of service conditions for a highnumber of users at one time. Second, ISPs also host Web sites and provide Internet access to manypotential target organizations. Attackers wanting to target an organization’s Web sites or networks could do so by launching a DoS attack against the organization’s ISP.
The second most popular target of DoS attacks during the first half of 2006 was the government sector,
which was targeted by 32% of all detected attacks. Government Web sites typically provide essentialservices and information. They are also high-profile sites, so it is logical that the government sector is a popular target for DoS attacks.
The telecommunications sector was the third most popular target of DoS attacks,
56accounting for eight
percent of all detected attacks during the period. The telecommunications sector is likely an attractivetarget to attackers attempting to deny access to telecommunications services, such as voice over IP (VoIP),and the companies that host them. Also, many telecommunications companies also provide Internetservices, similar to the ISP sector, and so will be popular targets for the same reasons as organizations in that sector.Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 Proportion of
attacks
38%
32%
8%
4%
3%
3%
3%
3%
2%
2% Internet Service Provider
Government
Telecommunications
Transportation
Education
Accounting
Utilities / Energy
Insurance
Financial Services
Information Technology Sector
56The telecommunications sector is made up of organizations that provide various telecommunications services. While this could in clude the provision of Internet
services, it is not usually their primary function.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
4057It should be noted that Symantec has identified a number of bots that propagate through means other than exploiting network-bas ed vulnerabilities. In spite
of this, Symantec believes that the population of network propagating bots is a good indicator of overall bot activity trends.Organizations should ensure that a documented procedure exists for responding to DoS events. One of the
best ways to mitigate a DoS attack is to filter upstream of the target. For most organizations, this filteringwill involve working in conjunction with their Internet service provider (ISP). Symantec also recommendsthat organizations perform egress filtering on all outbound traffic.
Bot networks
Bot networks are groups of compromised computers on which attackers have installed software that listensfor and responds to commands, typically using Internet relay chat (IRC), thereby giving the attacker remotecontrol over the computers. The software used to compromise and control these computers, known as botsoftware, is often modular malicious code. As such, after it has infected a computer, it may be upgraded toinclude new functionality, including exploit code that can target new vulnerabilities. (For more informationon modular malicious code, please see the “Malicious Code Trends” section of this report).
Bots can have numerous effects on Internet users, including home users, small businesses, and large
organizations. A single infected host within a network (such as a laptop that was compromised outside thelocal network and then connected to the network, either directly or by VPN) can allow a bot to propagate to other computers that are normally protected against external attacks by corporate firewalls.
Bots can be used by external attackers to perform DoS attacks against an organization’s Web site, which
can render Web sites or other network services inaccessible to customers and employees. This could resultin the disruption of organizational communications, a significant loss of revenue, and/or damage to theorganization’s reputation. Furthermore, bots within an organization’s network can be used to attack otherorganizations’ Web sites, which can have serious business and legal consequences. Finally, bots can beused by attackers to harvest confidential information from compromised computers.
This metric explores the number of active bot network computers that the Symantec™ Global Intelligence
Network has detected and identified during the first six months of 2006. Identification is carried out on an individual basis by analyzing attack and scanning patterns. Computers generating attack patterns that show a high degree of coordination are considered to be bot-infected computers.
57
As a consequence of this, Symantec does not identify all bot network computers but only those that areactively working in a well coordinated and aggressive fashion. Given Symantec’s extensive and globallydistributed sensor base, it is reasonable to assume that the bot activities discussed here are representativeof worldwide bot activity, and can thus provide an understanding of current bot activity across the Internetas a whole.
As has been mentioned previously, for this version of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec has
implemented new methodologies to obtain and record attack data. This extends to the identification of bot network activity. These methodological changes have expanded Symantec’s insight into attack and bot network activity to give a more accurate view of global trends. As a consequence of these changes, any comparison with attack data gathered in previous periods would be invalid. As a result, this discussion will focus only on the current period between January 1 and June 30, 2006.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
During this period, Symantec observed an average of 57,717 active bot network computers per day (figure
12). Symantec also observed 4,696,903 distinct bot network computers that were identified as being activeat any one (or more) point in time during the six-month period.
Symantec also tracks the number of bot command-and-control servers worldwide. Bot command-and-
control servers are computers that bot network owners use to relay commands to bot-infected computerson their bot networks. Symantec identified 6,337 bot command-and-control servers during the first sixmonths of 2006.
Throughout this reporting period the number of active bot network computers each day remained relatively
constant. As discussed in the previous volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , this behavior likely
indicates that the population of network-propagating bot-infected computers has reached the saturationpoint.
58In the same discussion, Symantec speculated that bot network populations rise and fall in a boom-
and-bust cycle in which numbers of bot-infected computers will increase for a period of time, level off, then decrease for another period before beginning the cycle again. The current leveling off is consistentwith that cycle.
Symantec believes that bot network owners are increasingly discreet about the number of machines they
bring online at any one time. This is due to the increased awareness among end users and organizations of bots and bot networks. Large numbers of bot network machines acting in a coordinated fashion areoften easily identifiable, making it easier for ISPs to detect and shutdown bot networks. Figure 12. Active bot network computers per day
Source: Symantec CorporationJan 01, 2006 Jan 29, 2006
Date
Moving averageActive botsFeb 26, 2006Active bot network computers30,00050,00060,00070,000
010,00020,00040,00080,00090,000
Apr 23, 2006 May 21, 2006 Jun 18, 2006 Mar 26, 2006
4158Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume IX (March 2006): http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539, pp. 36Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
59For instance, W32.Nugache.A@mm was used to encrypt peer-to-peer communication to talk to other bots in a bot network. For more details, please see
http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-043016-0900-9942If bots begin to exploit an attack vector that bypasses firewalls and perimeter defenses, the population of
bot-infected computers could increase rapidly. This possible boom period could have a greater impact onthe Internet than earlier ones because bot network owners have become more organized and experienced.Furthermore, bot technology is much more entrenched due to the public disclosure of bot source code.Finally, some bots and bot networks are reportedly using encrypted channels to communicate, which could make them much more difficult to detect.
59
To prevent bot infections, Symantec recommends that ISPs perform both ingress and egress filtering toblock known bot network traffic. ISPs should also filter out potentially malicious email attachments toreduce exposure to enterprises and end users. Organizations should monitor all network-connectedcomputers for signs of bot infection, ensuring that any infections are detected and isolated as soon aspossible. They should also ensure that all antivirus definitions are updated regularly. As compromisedcomputers can be a threat to other systems, Symantec also recommends that the enterprises notify their ISPs of any potentially malicious activity.
To reduce exposure to bot-related attacks, end users should employ defense in-depth strategies, including
the deployment of antivirus software and a firewall. Creating and enforcing policies that identify and limitapplications that can access the network may also be helpful in limiting the spread of bot networks. Usersshould update antivirus definitions regularly and ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers areupdated with all necessary security patches from their operating system vendor. Symantec also advisesthat users never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is expected andcomes from a known and trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
Bot-infected computers by country
Recognizing the ongoing threat posed by bot networks, Symantec tracks the distribution of bot-infectedcomputers worldwide. In order to do this, Symantec calculates the number of computers worldwide thatare known to be infected with bots and assesses what percentage are situated in each country.
This metric can help analysts understand how bot-infected computers are distributed globally. The
identification of bot-infected computers is important, as a high percentage likely indicates a greaterpotential for bot-related attacks. It could also give insight into the level of patching and security awareness amongst computer administrators and users in a given region.
Furthermore, Symantec tracks the global distribution of bot command-and-control servers. Bot command-
and-control servers are computers that bot network owners use to relay commands and instructions toother computers on their bot networks. This analysis will allow administrators to identify and understandthe locations from which bot networks are being controlled as well as the geographic distribution of bot networks.
For this version of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec has implemented new methodologies to
obtain and record attack data as well as to identify bot network activity. These changes have expandedSymantec’s view into attack and bot network activity to give a more accurate view of global trends. As aconsequence of these methodological changes, any direct comparison between bot network data from Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
the current period and the previous periods would be invalid. Despite this, the relative ranks of bot network
countries will be included in this discussion, as Symantec believes that they can still offer some insight intoglobal bot network trends.
Figure 13. Top countries by bot-infected computers
Source: Symantec Corporation
China had the highest number of bot-infected computers during the first half of 2006, accounting for
20% of the worldwide total (figure 13). This ranking represents a rise from third place in the second half of 2005. This coincides with and illustrates a trend that Symantec first discussed in 2005, which saw an increase in bot activity in China during that period.
Symantec has observed that bots usually infect computers that are connected to high-speed broadband
Internet through large ISPs and that the expansion of broadband connectivity often facilitates the spreadof bots. Frequently, ISPs will focus their resources on meeting growing broadband demand at the expenseof implementing security measures, such as port blocking and ingress and egress filtering. As a result, ISPs that are expanding their services rapidly may have security infrastructures that are underdevelopedrelative to their needs. Symantec believes that bot activity in China will continue to rise as broadbandInternet continues to be adopted at a rapid rate.Key
(X) = Rank% = Current proportionBrazil
(9) 3%Germany
(6) 4%
Spain
(8) 3%Japan
(10) 2%
Taiwan
(4) 6%South Korea
(7) 3%United States
(2) 19%
France
(5) 6%United Kingdom
(3) 7%
China
(1) 20%
43Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
60http://www.oecd.org/document/39/0,2340,en_2649_34449_36459431_1_1_1_1,00.html44Figure 14. Distribution of command-and-control servers in top ten bot-infected countries
Source: Symantec Corporation
Although China had the most bot-infected computers worldwide, it had only the fourth highest number
of known command-and-control servers worldwide (figure 14). This discrepancy likely indicates that themajority of bot-infected computers within China are being controlled from servers in other countries.However, this does not mean the person controlling the server is necessarily situated elsewhere. While it is simple to trace a command-and-control server to its location, the server may not reside in the samelocation as the person who controls it. Attackers frequently use previously compromised computers to host command-and-control servers, allowing them to obscure their actual location. For example, anattacker in China could control a command-and-control server in South Korea to administer bot-infectedcomputers all over the world.
In the first six months of 2006, the United States had the second highest number of bot-infected
computers. Nineteen percent of bot-infected computers worldwide were situated there. The United Stateswas also the site of 42% of all known command-and-control servers, making it the highest ranked countryin this category. The high proportion of command-and-control servers likely indicates that servers in theUnited States control not only bot networks within the country but offshore as well. The high proportion of bot-infected computers and bot command-and-control servers in the United States is driven by itsextensive Internet and technology infrastructure and the fact that more than 49 million broadbandInternet users are located there.
60
The United Kingdom had the third highest number of bot-infected computers worldwide, accounting forseven percent of the worldwide total. It ranked second in the world in the second half of 2005. This drop is likely an indication that the security infrastructure in the United Kingdom is beginning to catch up to the growth of Internet connectivity. The United Kingdom accounted for only two percent of all knowncommand-and-control servers worldwide. This indicates that the majority of bot network computers inside the country are likely controlled by servers in other countries.Key
(X) = Rank% = Current proportionBrazil
(17) 1%Germany
(5) 5%
Spain
(22) 1%Japan
(8) 3%
Taiwan
(6) 3%South Korea
(2) 8%United States
(1) 42%France
(14) 1%United Kingdom
(12) 2%
China
(4) 6%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
45Bot-infected computers by city
Table 6. Top cities by bot-infected computers
Source: Symantec Corporation
In addition to identifying top bot-infected countries, Symantec also tracks the distribution of bot-infected
computers by city. As with the previous metric, the identification of bot-infected computers is important, asa high percentage of infected machines likely indicates a greater potential for bot-related attacks. It couldalso give insight into the level of patching and security awareness amongst computer administrators andusers in a given city.
During the first half of 2006, Beijing was the city with the most bot-infected computers in the world,
accounting for almost three percent of the worldwide total (table 6). Guangzhou, China ranked second,with just under two percent of the world’s bot-infected computers. Seoul, South Korea had the thirdhighest number of bot-infected computers worldwide, accounting for slightly less than two percent of thetotal. All of the top three cities in this category are large population centers that are cultural and economiccenters in their respective countries. Furthermore, all have a large broadband Internet infrastructure.
In previous volumes of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec speculated that the number of
computers with high-speed Internet in a region is a significant factor in determining the number of bot-infected computers. Considerations such as the type of industries situated in a city may also have a strong influence on the percentage of bot-infected computers.
Another factor may be the rate of growth in broadband connectivity. Symantec believes that new
broadband customers may not be aware of the additional security precautions that need to be taken whenexposing a computer to an always-on high-speed Internet connection. Furthermore, the addition of manynew customers, with the corresponding increase in infrastructure and support costs, may inhibit the abilityof ISPs to respond to reports of network abuse and infection. Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7 8 9
10 Proportion
2.91%
1.67%
1.61%
1.50%
1.41%
1.20%
1.10% 1.02% 0.99% 0.99% Beijing
Guangzhou
Seoul
Madrid
Hangzhou
Los Angeles
Taipei Shanghai Paris Chicago City
China
China
South Korea
Spain
China
United States
China China France United States Country Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
4661http://www.oecd.org/document/39/0,2340,en_2649_34449_36459431_1_1_1_1,00.htmlSymantec recommends that organizations employ defense in-depth strategies, including firewalls and
adequate perimeter filtering. Furthermore, administrators are advised to subscribe to a vulnerability alerting service, and to apply necessary patches across the enterprise in a timely manner. End users should always deploy antivirus software and a firewall and should ensure that antivirus definitions are updated regularly.
Top originating countries
Figure 15. Top originating countries
Source: Symantec Corporation
This section will discuss the top countries of attack origin. This metric only discusses the location of the
computer from which the attack originates and not the actual location of the attacker. While it is simple totrace an attack back to the computer from which it was launched, that computer may not be the attacker’sown system. Attackers frequently hop through numerous systems or use previously compromised systems toobscure their location prior to launching the actual attack. For example, an attacker in China could launchan attack from a compromised system located in South Korea against a Web server in New York. Furthercomplicating the matter is that international jurisdictional issues often prevent proper investigation of anattacker’s real location.
During the first six months of 2006, the United States ranked as the top country of attack origin, accounting
for 37% of the worldwide total (figure 15). Attack activity originating in the United States increased by 29%in this period, which is 13 percentage points above the average increase of 16%. This is likely driven byrecent growth in broadband infrastructure there. As has been stated in previous volumes of the Internet
Security Threat Report , an increase in broadband connectivity in a country often leads to an increase in
attacks and bot infections originating there. During the last half of 2005, the number of broadband Internetusers in the United States increased by nearly seven million,
61which is the largest increase in volume in the
country’s history. Germany
(3) 6%
United States
(1) 37%Canada
(6) 4%
France
(5) 5%United Kingdom
(4) 5%
Spain
(7) 3%Japan
(8) 3%
China
(2) 10%Italy
(9) 2%
South Korea
(10) 2%
Key
(X) = Rank% = Current percent of eventsSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
China remained in second position for the first half of 2006, accounting for ten percent of all attacking IP
addresses. Attack activity originating in China increased by 37% over the previous reporting period, wellabove the 16% average increase. Symantec expects attack activity originating in China to continue to riseas broadband Internet continues to be adopted there.
Germany rose from fourth position during the last half of 2005 to third position in this reporting period.
Six percent of all attacking IP addresses were situated there. The United Kingdom dropped from thirdposition to fourth with five percent of observed attacking IP addresses. The United Kingdom’s drop is likelyan indicator that computer security infrastructure there is catching up with its broadband growth, whichmay have resulted in sufficient security measures being put in place.
Top targeted sectors
Table 7. Top targeted sectors by proportion of targeted attacks
Source: Symantec Corporation
Although many attackers select targets randomly, some attack computers within a specific sector, industry,
or organization. For the purposes of this metric, these attacks are referred to as “targeted attacks.” For thisdiscussion, a targeted attack is identified as an IP address that has attacked at least three sensors in agiven industry to the exclusion of all other industries during the reporting period. This metric has beenredesigned from previous volumes of the Internet Security Threat Report to include home users as well
those sectors that were previously assessed.
Between January 1 and June 30, 2006, the home user sector was the most highly targeted sector,
accounting for 86% of all targeted attacks (table 7). As computers in the home user sector are less likely to have well established security measures and practices in place, they may be more vulnerable to targetedattacks. Furthermore, as home users represent a fertile resource for identity theft, it is likely that many ofthe targeted attacks are used for fraud or other financially motivated crime. Current
Rank Previous
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6 7 8 9
10 1
2
6
3
8
7 5
10
4
14 86%
14%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1% <1% <1% <1% <1% Sector Current Proportion of
Targeted attacks
93%
4%
<1%
2%
<1%
<1% <1% <1% <1% <1% Previous Proportion of
Targeted attacks
Home user
Financial Services
Government
Education
Information Technology
Health care Accounting Telecommunications Small Business Utilities / Energy
47Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
It should be noted that the number of targeted attacks detected against home users might be inflated due
to the way in which they access the Internet. It is likely that the majority of home users share networks thatspan a single block of IP addresses. As a result, opportunistic attacks targeting a broadband ISP may benoted as targeted attacks, thereby artificially inflating the percentage of targeted attacks against this sector.This assertion is supported by findings outlined in the “Top sectors targeted by denial of service attacks”section above that show ISPs as the primary target of DoS attacks.
Financial services was the second most frequently targeted sector in the first half of 2006. As was
discussed in the previous Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec believes that attackers are
increasingly motivated to conduct on-line criminal activities by financial gain.
62The financial services
industry is typically considered a popular target for attackers hoping to profit from attack activity. Symantec expects that attacks targeted against the financial services industry will continue to rise asattackers become more profit-driven.
Government was the third most frequently targeted sector during the first half of 2006, although it
accounted for less than one percent of all targeted attacks. Attackers may target government organizationsfor many reasons, including politically motivated attacks and attempts to gain access to government recordsfor the purposes of identity theft.
62Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume VIII (September 2005) p. 4, and Volume IX (March 2006) p. 19. Both are available at:
http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=153948Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Vulnerability Trends
Vulnerabilities are design or implementation errors in information systems that can result in a compromise
of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information stored upon or transmitted over the affectedsystem. They are most often found in software, although they exist in all layers of information systems,from design or protocol specifications to physical hardware implementations. Vulnerabilities may betriggered actively, either by malicious users or automated malicious code, or passively during systemoperation. The discovery and disclosure of a single vulnerability in a critical asset can seriously underminethe security posture of an organization.
New vulnerabilities are discovered and disclosed regularly by a sizeable community of end users, security
researchers, hackers, security vendors, and occasionally by the software vendors themselves. Symanteccarefully monitors vulnerability research, tracking vulnerabilities throughout their lifecycle, from initialdisclosure and discussion to the development and release of a patch or other remediation measure.Symantec operates one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion of vulnerabilities onthe Internet, the BugTraq™ mailing list, which has approximately 50,000 direct subscribers who contribute,receive, and discuss vulnerability research on a daily basis.
63Symantec also maintains one of the world’s
most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting of over 18,000 vulnerabilities (spanningmore than a decade) affecting more than 30,000 technologies from over 4,000 vendors. The followingdiscussion of vulnerability trends is based on a thorough analysis of that data. (Please note that allnumbers presented in this discussion have been rounded off to the nearest whole number. As a result, some cumulative percentages may exceed 100%.)
This section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report will discuss vulnerabilities that have been
disclosed between January 1 and June 30, 2006. It will compare them with those disclosed in the twoprevious six-month periods and discuss how current vulnerability trends may affect potential futureInternet security activity. Where relevant, it will also offer protection and mitigation strategies. Symantec’s recommendations for best security practices can be found in Appendix A at the end of this report.
This section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report will discuss:
• Total number of vulnerabilities disclosed
• Web application vulnerabilities • Easily exploitable vulnerabilities• Easily exploitable vulnerabilities by type• Patch development time for operating systems • Window of exposure for enterprise vendors (consisting of patch development time and exploit
code development time)
• Window of exposure for Web browsers (consisting of patch development time and exploit
code development time)
• Web browser vulnerabilities • Exploit code release period
49
63The BugTraq mailing list is hosted by SecurityFocus (http://www.securityfocus.com). Archives are available at http://www.securi tyfocus.com/archive/1Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
It should be noted that, unlike other reports in the Internet Security Threat Report , the “Vulnerability
Trends Report” is based on data that often changes over time. This is because entries in the vulnerabilitydatabase are frequently revised as new information emerges. For instance, vulnerabilities may beattributed to a particular reporting period after that period has ended because additional information hasbecome available after that time. Conversely, entries may be removed after a reporting period has endedbecause they are subsequently deemed not to have been vulnerabilities. Because of this, statistics andpercentages reported in one volume of the Internet Security Threat Report may not agree with information
presented in subsequent volumes. As a result, some of the comparative data for previous reporting periodsthat is presented within this report may differ from the data presented in previous volumes of the Internet
Security Threat Report .
Total number of vulnerabilities disclosed
Symantec documented 2,249 new vulnerabilities in the first half of 2006 (figure 16). This is an increase
of 18% over the 1,912 vulnerabilities that were documented in the second half of 2005. It is also a 20%increase over the 1,874 vulnerabilities that were reported in the first half of 2005. Symantec documenteda higher volume of vulnerabilities in this reporting period than in any other previous six-month period.
64
Figure 16. Total volume of vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec CorporationPeriodDocumented vulnerabilities
Jan – Jun 20062,249
Jul – Dec 20051,912
Jan – Jun 20051,874
64The Internet Security Threat Report has been tracking vulnerabilities in six-month periods since January 2002.50Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
51The marked increase in the number of vulnerabilities can be attributed to the continued growth in those that
affect Web applications. This is due to the relative ease of discovering vulnerabilities in Web applicationscompared to other applications. Additionally, Web applications generally have quicker release cycles thantraditional desktop and server applications. This provides security researchers with a continually growingsource of new applications to audit, particularly as, in many cases, Web applications do not undergo thesame degree of quality assurance and testing as other applications. This will be discussed in greater detailin the “Web application vulnerabilities” section below.
Another factor in the general growth of vulnerability volume is that security researchers have better
tools at their disposal than in previous periods. In a previous Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec
speculated that advanced research tools would make the discovery of vulnerabilities easier than everbefore.
65That appears to be the case. For example, recent advances in fuzzing tools and techniques have
made it easier for security researchers to automate vulnerability discovery.66As well, there are numerous
disassembly and debugger tools that are specifically customized for security research.67Furthermore,
virtualization appears to be becoming more accessible to security researchers due to the availability of new virtualization software.
68
Symantec recommends that administrators employ a good asset management system, patch managementsystem or service, and a vulnerability alerting service, all of which can help to quickly assess whether a newvulnerability is a viable threat or not. They should also monitor vulnerability mailing lists and security Websites for new developments in vulnerability research.
Web application vulnerabilities
Web applications are technologies that use a browser for their user interface, rely on HTTP as the transportprotocol, and reside on Web servers. Examples of Web-based applications include content managementsystems, e-commerce suites (such as “shopping cart” implementations), Weblogs, and Web-based email. An increasing number of traditional software vendors are re-implementing their existing applications withWeb-based user interfaces.
Vulnerabilities in these technologies are particularly threatening because they are typically exposed to the
Internet through a Web server and because they are often required to be publicly available. Web-basedattacks may be challenging to detect and prevent because they are often easy to obfuscate. While many IDS vendors provide generic signatures for these attacks, there may not be signatures that are application-specific or that account for all variants of an attack. In the worst case scenario, exploitation of Webapplication vulnerabilities could enable a successful attacker to compromise an entire network by gainingaccess through a single vulnerable system. Vulnerabilities in these technologies can also give an attackeraccess to confidential information from databases without having to compromise any servers.
65Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume VIII (September 2005): http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539, p. 88
66Fuzzing is a testing, quality assurance, and security research technique that typically involves randomly generating data to us e as input to an application.
67Security researchers and reverse engineers have developed a number of plug-ins for Data Rescue IDA Pro disassembler and Ollydbg debugger, such as those
found here: http://www.openrce.org/downloads/
68http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/397Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Vulnerabilities affecting Web applications accounted for 69% of all vulnerabilities that were documented
by Symantec in the first half of 2006 (figure 17). This is a slight increase over the 68% seen in the secondhalf of 2005. It is also higher than the 60% proportion in the first half of 2005.
Figure 17. Web application vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation
As was discussed in the “Total vulnerabilities disclosed” section, Web applications generally have quicker
release cycles than traditional desktop and server applications. This provides security researchers with acontinually growing source of new applications to audit, particularly as, in many cases, Web applicationsdo not undergo the same degree of quality assurance and testing as other applications.
Web applications are required to accept and interpret input from many different sources, and there
are often very few restrictions to distinguish valid input from invalid input. Web applications can hostmalicious content that may affect clients but be otherwise innocuous to the server. This trait increases the susceptibility of Web applications to attack, as the application must also be aware of malicious input that is hostile to its clients and not just itself.
This is further complicated because Web browsers, the application through which most Web applications
operate, are very liberal in what they will accept and interpret as valid input. Because of different browserimplementations, some malicious content may be harmful to one browser but not to another. This createsfurther confusion for a Web application that is trying to determine which input is invalid and which ispotentially malicious.
Many security researchers opt for a “quantity” over “quality” approach, meaning that the vulnerabilities
that can be discovered most easily will take precedence over those that take longer to research.Researchers who favor this approach often choose Web applications because they present easy targets.Percentage of documented vulnerabilities
PeriodJan – Jun 200669%
Jul – Dec 200568%
Jan – Jun 200560%
52Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
5369Cross-site scripting is a vulnerability that allows attackers to inject hostile HTML and script code into the browser session o f a Web application user. SQL injection is
a vulnerability that can affect Web applications, allowing an attacker to inject their own SQL code into a database query that is made by the vulnerable application.
70The Secure Development Lifecycle is a development paradigm that incorporates security at every stage from the initial architect ure to programming, and in the
quality assurance/testing phases. Threat modeling is a security auditing methodology that involves formally identifying and map ping out all possible attack vectors
for an application.
71http://www.first.org/cvss/This is because the source code is often readily available to be audited (although in many cases security
researchers can also quickly discover vulnerabilities on live Web sites). As a result, researchers can often find many more vulnerabilities in Web applications in a shorter period of time than in other applications. For instance, Web applications are often susceptible to common types of input validation vulnerabilities such as cross-site scripting and SQL injection that are typically easy to discover with a minimal amount of effort and skill.
69
In order to protect against the exploitation of Web application vulnerabilities, Symantec recommends thatadministrators employ a good asset management system to track what assets are deployed and which may be affected by the discovery of new vulnerabilities. Vulnerability assessment technologies may also be used to detect known vulnerabilities in deployed assets. Administrators should monitor vulnerabilitymailing lists and security Web sites to keep abreast of new vulnerabilities in Web applications. Enterprisesshould subscribe to a vulnerability alerting service in order to be notified of new vulnerabilities.
Organizations should manage their Web-based assets carefully. If they are developing Web applications in-
house, developers should be educated about secure development practices, such as the Secure DevelopmentLifecycle and threat modeling.
70Symantec recommends the use of secure shared components that have been
audited for common Web application vulnerabilities to limit the risk of introducing new vulnerabilities whenimplementing features from scratch. If possible, all Web applications should be audited for security prior todeployment. Web application security solutions and a number of products and services are available todetect and prevent attacks against these applications.
Easily exploitable vulnerabilities
Previous versions of the Internet Security Threat Report assessed vulnerabilities according to their ease
of exploitation. However, over the past six months, the Symantec Vulnerability Database has adopted theCommon Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
71Various criteria for the previous “ease of exploit” metric are
incompatible with the CVSS standard and thus that method of categorizing and analyzing vulnerabilities is no longer supported by the Symantec Vulnerability Database. This version of the Internet Security Threat
Report will instead discuss the volume of easily exploitable vulnerabilities.
Easily exploitable vulnerabilities present a serious threat to organizations because they can be exploited
with a minimal amount of skill and effort. Easily exploitable vulnerabilities fall into one of two classes:
• Vulnerabilities that have exploit code associated with them or for which exploit code is known to be
available. Previous versions of the Internet Security Threat Report referred to this class as “exploit
code available.”
• Vulnerabilities that do not require exploit code for successful exploitation. Previous versions of the
Internet Security Threat Report referred to this class as “no exploit code required.”Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
54In the first six months of 2006, 80% of newly disclosed vulnerabilities were considered easily exploitable
(figure 18). This is a slight increase over the 79% of the easily exploitable vulnerabilities that were disclosedin the second half of 2005 and a larger increase over the 73% of vulnerabilities that were considered easilyexploitable in the first half of 2005.
Figure 18. Easily exploitable vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation
The rise in the percentage of easily exploitable vulnerabilities is due mainly to the continued increase in
Web application vulnerabilities. They make up the majority of easily exploitability vulnerabilities, althoughexploit code is also being actively developed for other threats as well. At any given time, four out of fivevulnerabilities either have exploit code available or are easily exploitable without exploit code. This givesattackers a large pool of vulnerabilities to exploit. Given this high percentage, there is a reasonableprobability that an organization will be affected by one or more of these vulnerabilities.Percentage of documented vulnerabilities
PeriodJan – Jun 200680%
Jul – Dec 200579%
Jan – Jun 200573%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
5572These categories are explained in-depth in Appendix C of this report.Easily exploitable vulnerabilities by type
To give enterprises an idea of the distribution of easily exploitable vulnerabilities, this version of the Internet
Security Threat Report will provide a breakdown of easily exploitable vulnerabilities according to the type of
affected application. The purpose of this metric is to assess which types of applications are currently beingaffected by easily exploitable vulnerabilities so that organizations that deploy these applications can takeany steps necessary to protect their assets. For the purposes of this discussion, Symantec analyzes easilyexploitable vulnerabilities according to the following six categories:
72
• Browser vulnerabilities• Client-side vulnerabilities • Local vulnerabilities (those that do not require remote access but instead require only local access
to exploit)
• Server vulnerabilities• Web application vulnerabilities • Other vulnerabilities (those that do not discretely fall into the previous categories)
Figure 19. Easily exploitable vulnerabilities by type
Source: Symantec Corporation
Over the first six months of 2006, 78% of easily exploitable vulnerabilities affected Web applications
(figure 19). This continued the increase that was evident in the two previous six-month periods, duringwhich Web applications accounted for 69% and 61% of easily exploitable vulnerabilities respectively. Inpart, Web applications dominate this metric because they make up the majority of vulnerabilities that weredocumented over the last three periods. Furthermore, because many common Web application vulnerabilitytypes, such as cross-site scripting or SQL injection, do not require exploit code for successful exploitation,they are considered easily exploitable. Jan–Jun 2006 Jul–Dec 2005
PeriodLocal 10%
Server 10%Web application 69%Other 6%Browser 2%
Client-side 3%
Web application 78 %
Server 7%Local 6%Client-side 4%Browser 1%
Other 4%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
5673Address space layout randomization is a security feature that can prevent exploitation of buffer overflows and other memory cor ruption vulnerabilities
by randomizing certain sections within the address space of a process.Server vulnerabilities made up seven percent of easily exploitable vulnerabilities in the first half of 2006.
This is down from ten percent in the second half of 2005 and 14% in the first half of that year. The drop inthe proportion of easily exploitable server vulnerabilities is a reflection of an overall drop in vulnerabilitiesaffecting servers. However, servers, which have traditionally been the target of network worms, are still ahigher risk than the other categories because attackers still see them as attractive targets.
Network perimeter defenses such as firewalls are effective measures against server attacks. Enterprises
should restrict access to all ports and services that are not required to be publicly accessible. While manyserver attacks can be prevented with perimeter security measures, there are some public services thatmust accept traffic from arbitrary hosts on the Internet. Symantec recommends NIDS/NIPS to detect andprotect against these attacks.
Over the past three reporting periods, local vulnerabilities accounted for the third highest percentage of
easily exploitable vulnerabilities, with six percent in the first six months of 2006, ten percent in the secondhalf of 2005, and 11% in the first half of 2005. In general, it is relatively easy to develop exploit code forlocal vulnerabilities because of the amount of control that the attacker has over the local environment,particularly as local attacks are generally executed by insiders who already have access to affected hosts. A local attacker can gather more information from the host operating system and has fewer of thevariables to deal with that can often complicate the exploitation of remote vulnerabilities. Local attacksmay also be used when remote attackers compromise a low-privileged service and need a means of gaining administrative access.
Host-based IDS/IPS systems can help to prevent local attacks. Features such as file integrity checking,
behavioral intrusion prevention, and memory protection in the form of address space layout randomization(ASLR) can help to prevent or complicate attacks.
73Organizations should also limit local access to critical
hosts.
Patch development time for operating systems
The time period between the disclosure date of a vulnerability and the release date of an associated patchis known as the “patch development time.” If exploit code is created and made public during this time,computers may be immediately vulnerable to widespread attack. This metric will assess and compare theaverage patch development times for five different widely deployed operating systems: Apple Mac OS X,Hewlett-Packard HP-UX, Microsoft Windows, Red Hat Linux (including enterprise versions and Red HatFedora), and Sun Microsystems Solaris.
During this period, Microsoft had a patch development time of 13 days, based on a sample set of 22
vulnerabilities (figure 20), a significant decrease from the 34 days in the last half of 2005, with 27vulnerabilities patched. Red Hat, with 42 vulnerabilities to patch during this period, also had an averagepatch development time of 13 days for the first six months of 2006, a drop from the 28 days in the lasthalf of 2005, when there were 98 Red Hat vulnerabilities. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
For the current reporting period, Apple had the third shortest time to patch at 37 days for 21 vulnerabilities.
This is a significant reduction from the 73-day average for 27 vulnerabilities in the second half of 2005.During this period, HP had an average patch development time of 53 days for the seven vulnerabilities it hadto patch. This is down from 65-day average for the 15 patched vulnerabilities over the previous six months.Finally, in the first six months of 2006, Sun had an average patch development time of 89 days for sixteenpatched vulnerabilities, down from 119 days in the second half of 2005 for 18 patched vulnerabilities.
Figure 20. Operating system patch development time
Source: Symantec Corporation
Over the past six months, each of the five vendors had shorter average patch development times than in the
previous two six-month periods. Linux vendor patch development times were generally shorter than those of the commercial UNIX vendors, HP and Sun. Over the past three reporting periods, Microsoft has had theshortest patch development time of all the operating system vendors.
Along with Microsoft, Red Hat had the lowest patch-development time during this reporting period. This is
likely related to open-source collaboration. If a vendor or a member of the open-source community providesa patch, other vendors can share that patch and incorporate it into their distribution. Linux patches are notreleased on a fixed schedule; instead, they are often released on a daily basis. This approach differs fromMicrosoft and Apple, both of whom release their patches less frequently and in large batches to address as many vulnerabilities as possible at a time.
There are many reasons that the consumer-oriented vendors such as Microsoft and Apple have lower patch
development times than some of the other vendors. Threats to desktop users and consumers generally carry a higher public profile and so there is likely more public pressure for vendors to be responsive and accountable. 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140Apple
HPMicrosoftRed HatSun
Average time in daysPeriod
Jul–Dec 2005
Jan–Jun 200673
3765
5334
1328
13119
89
57Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
5874It should be noted that the data included in this discussion is limited to public examples of exploit code that Symantec has as sociated with specific vulnerabilities.
There are many instances in which a private or commercial exploit may be available, but this data cannot be consistently tracke d since exploit publication dates are
not available.
75Vendors included in this metric are: Microsoft, Sun™, HP®, Symantec, EMC, IBM®, Cisco®, Oracle®, CA™ (Computer Associates), and McAfee®.The commercial UNIX vendors, HP and Sun, have the longest average patch development times. While
both vendors release patches frequently, in many cases patches for optional third-party components arereleased later than patches for core operating system components. This likely drove up the average patch development time for these vendors during the first six months of 2006.
Window of exposure
Attackers use custom-developed code known as exploit code or exploits to take advantage of vulnerabilitiesto compromise a computer. The time lapse between the publication of an initial vulnerability report andthe appearance of third-party exploit code is known as the “exploit code development time.”
74Exploit code
development time is a concern to enterprises because it is a measurement of how long it takes for theaverage exploit to become public. If an exploit is published before a patch is available, administrators mustimplement other protective measures to reduce the risk of attack.
When a vulnerability is announced, the vendor in whose product it was found must develop and release
a set of code known as a patch that will secure the vulnerability. The time period between the disclosuredate of a vulnerability and the release date of an associated patch is known as the “patch developmenttime.” Until a patch is developed, released, and applied, computers on which the vulnerability resides maybe susceptible to successful attack, particularly if exploit code developed for that vulnerability is available.
The difference between the exploit code development time and the patch development time is known as
the “window of exposure.” During this period of time, and until a patch is released, computers on whichthe vulnerable applications reside may be susceptible to successful compromise. This metric will assessthe window of exposure in two contexts: applications developed by enterprise vendors and Web browsers.
The intent of this metric is to determine for how long after a vulnerability is announced a computer on
which a vulnerable application resides is likely to be susceptible to a successful attack. The window ofexposure is calculated by subtracting the exploit code development time from the patch availability time in each for the three contexts.
Window of exposure for enterprise vendors
It is also important to note that the set of vulnerabilities included in this metric is limited and does not
represent all software from all possible vendors. Instead, it only includes vendors that are classified asenterprise vendors. The purpose is to illustrate the window of exposure for widely deployed mission-criticalsoftware. Because of the large number of vendors with technologies that have a very low deployment(which form the majority), only exploits for technologies from enterprise vendors (that is, those that aregenerally widely deployed) are included.
75
In the first six months of 2006, the average patch development time for enterprise vendors was 31 days(figure 21). During the same period, the average exploit code development time for vulnerabilities affectingenterprise vendors was three days. As a result, the window of exposure for this reporting period was 28 days. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
59In the second half of 2005, the window of exposure for vulnerabilities affecting enterprise vendors was
50 days, based on a patch development time of 57 days and an exploit code development time of sevendays. The window of exposure for the first half of 2005 was 60 days, based on a patch development time of 65 days and an exploit code development time of five days.
Figure 21. Window of exposure, enterprise vendors
Source: Symantec Corporation
The window of exposure for vulnerabilities in applications developed by enterprise vendors is thus
narrowing. While there has been a slight reduction in the average exploit code development time, the main reason for this narrowing is that the average patch development time has dropped significantly.
Exploits for enterprise-vendor vulnerabilities are still being released quickly, forcing administrators to
respond rapidly despite a lack of vendor-supplied remediation. However, the decreasing average patchdevelopment time indicates that enterprise vendors are responding more quickly to vulnerabilities. Despite this, it is critical that organizations follow up with the timely installation of patches, as attackers are still actively exploiting old vulnerabilities.
To minimize the possibility of successful exploitation, administrators need to understand newly disclosed
vulnerabilities and be active in working around them. This may involve making changes to firewallconfigurations, creating or obtaining IDS/IPS signatures and rules, and locking down services. Symantecrecommends that administrators employ a good asset management system or vulnerability alertingservice. Both of these services can provide an understanding of the potential risk of new vulnerabilities,help to quickly assess whether they are a viable threat or not, and provide relevant protection/mitigationinformation. Administrators should monitor vulnerability mailing lists and security Web sites for newdevelopments. They should also monitor mailing lists devoted to the discussion of security incidents orspecific technologies, on which prevention and mitigation strategies may be discussed.60
7550
328
01020304050607065
57
31Exploit development time
Patch development time
Window of exposureTime in days
Jan–Jun 2005 Jul–Dec 2005 Jan–Jun 2006
PeriodSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
60Window of exposure for Web browsers
This metric will assess the windows of exposure for four widely deployed Web browsers: Microsoft Internet
Explorer, Mozilla (including Firefox and the Mozilla browser), Opera, and Apple Safari. The window ofexposure will be calculated by computing the difference in days between the average patch developmenttime and the average exploit code development time for vulnerabilities in these operating systems. Due tothe number of browsers assessed in this metric, it will be necessary to chart exploit development time andpatch development time separately.
Exploit code development time, Web browsers
The time lapse between the publication of an initial vulnerability report and the appearance of third-party
exploit code is known as the “exploit code development time.” In the first half of 2006, the average exploitcode time for vulnerabilities in Apple Safari was zero days, the same average it had in the second half of2005. In the first half of 2006, vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer had an average exploit codedevelopment time of one day, an increase over the second half of 2005, when it was zero days.
Between January 1 and June 30, 2006, the average exploit code development time for vulnerabilities in the
Mozilla family of browsers was two days, down from seven days in the second half of 2005. In the first halfof 2006, the average exploit code development time for Opera vulnerabilities was zero days, the same as inthe second half of 2005.
The limited number of exploits that have been developed for vulnerabilities in Apple Safari and Opera
make it difficult to perceive a long-term trend. In each case, the sample set includes only one or two publicexploits, which were released within the first day of the initial disclosure of the affected vulnerability.
On the other hand, there are more exploits available for Internet Explorer and Mozilla vulnerabilities. As
such, a more accurate understanding can be gained for Internet Explorer and Mozilla. The average exploitdevelopment time for Internet Explorer is still very short, as it is a high priority for attackers who areactively researching vulnerabilities and developing exploit code. This is likely because of the widespreaddeployment of the Microsoft browser.
Patch development time, Web browsers
The time period between the disclosure date of a vulnerability and the release date of an associated patch
is known as the “time to patch.” If exploit code is created and made public during this time, computersmay be immediately vulnerable to widespread attack. It should be noted that this metric includes allpatched vulnerabilities affecting the browser, regardless of their severity.
During the current reporting period, Apple Safari had an average patch development time average of five
days, up from zero days in the second half of 2005 (figure 22).
76In the first six months of 2006, Microsoft
had an average patch development time of ten days for Internet Explorer vulnerabilities, down from the 25 days in the second half of 2005.
Between January and June 2006, Mozilla had an average patch development time of three days, slightly
lower than the five-day average during the second half of 2005. During this reporting period, Opera had an average patch development time of two days. In the second half of 2005, it was 18 days.
76All patched vulnerabilities affecting Safari in the second half of 2005 were addressed by the vendor at the time of their annou ncement.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
61Figure 22. Patch development time, Web browsers
Source: Symantec Corporation
There does not appear to be any discernible trend in patch development times for Web browsers. This may
be because these times are influenced by the number of vulnerabilities that are disclosed for each browser.Mozilla is the only vendor whose patch development time has decreased consistently over the past threesix-month periods. Generally speaking, Internet Explorer has the longest patch development times of anybrowser. This may be due to the vendor’s practice of issuing patches on a regular monthly schedule.
Window of exposure, Web browsers
The window of exposure is the difference between the average patch development time and the average
exploit code development time for vulnerabilities in the selected Web browsers. In the first half of 2006,Internet Explorer had a window of exposure of nine days, down considerably from 25 days in the secondhalf of 2005 (figure 23). During this reporting period, Apple Safari had a window of exposure of five days,up from zero days in the second half of 2005.
In the first half of 2006, Opera had a window of exposure of two days, down considerably from 18 days
during the second half of 2005. In the first six months of 2006, Mozilla had a window of exposure of oneday. In the second half of 2005, Mozilla had a window of exposure of negative two days, meaning thatexploits were generally released after patches were available. 05101520253025
18
510
325
0Apple Safari
Internet ExplorerMozillaOpera
Jan–Jun 2006 Jul–Dec 2005
PeriodAverage time in daysSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 23. Window of exposure, Web browsers
Source: Symantec Corporation
In the first half of 2006, the window of exposure for most vendors was smaller than for the second half
of 2005. Vendor responsiveness appears to be the key factor in this change, particularly as exploitdevelopment time averages are still very short.
Average patch development times for browsers are generally shorter than the patch development times in
other contexts, such as enterprise and operating system. This is noteworthy because some vendors, suchas Apple and Microsoft, are included in all of these metrics. This may indicate that these vendors are givinga higher priority to vulnerabilities in browsers than in other contexts. This may be because of the ubiquityof the Web browser and its high profile as a target for exploitation, effectively forcing vendors such Appleand Microsoft to respond more quickly to browser vulnerabilities.
Browser vulnerabilities are a serious security concern, particularly due to their role in online fraud and
the propagation of spyware and adware. Web browsers are particularly prone to security concerns becausethey come in contact with more potentially untrusted or hostile content than other applications. In order toprovide protection against the exploitation of unpatched vulnerabilities affecting Web browsers, Symantecrecommends that organizations deploy intrusion prevention systems and regularly updated antivirussoftware at gateways and workstations. Organizations should also closely monitor vulnerability mailinglists and apply necessary patches as required, in a timely manner.
In order to protect against Web browser attacks, Symantec advises users and administrators to upgrade
all browsers to the latest, patched versions. To reduce exposure to attacks, Symantec recommends thatorganizations educate users to be extremely cautious about visiting unknown or untrusted Web sites andviewing or following links in unsolicited emails. Administrators should also deploy Web proxies in order to block potentially malicious script code and implement ActiveX controls to stop attacks before they can be carried out. -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Time in daysBrowser
Apple
Internet
Explorer
Mozilla
Opera0
5
25
9
-2
1
18
2Jul – Dec 2005
Jan – Jun 2006
62Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
6377It should be noted that this metric does not include third-party components such as ActiveX components or browser plug-ins. How ever, if the vendor ships their
own ActiveX components or browser plug-ins with the browser, vulnerabilities affecting those components will be considered.Web browser vulnerabilities
The Web browser is a critical and ubiquitous application that has, in the past few years, been a growing
target for vulnerability researchers. Traditionally, the focus of security researchers has been on theperimeter: servers, firewalls, and other assets with external exposure. However, a notable shift hasoccurred, as researchers are more frequently targeting client-side systems, primarily end-user desktophosts. As part of this shift toward client-side issues, vulnerabilities in Web browsers have becomeincreasingly prominent.
Figure 24. Web browser vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation
In the first six months of 2006, Symantec documented 47 vulnerabilities that affected Mozilla browsers,
including Mozilla Firefox and the Mozilla Browser (figure 24). This is a significant increase over the 17vulnerabilities that were disclosed in the second half of 2005. The Mozilla Foundation released multiplerevisions of Firefox and Mozilla during this period to address the majority of these vulnerabilities.
In the first half of 2006, Symantec documented 38 new vulnerabilities in Microsoft Internet Explorer.
77
This is a 52% increase over the 25 vulnerabilities published in the preceding six-month period. Many of
the Internet Explorer vulnerabilities were also reported privately to Microsoft and addressed in cumulativesecurity updates over the course the reporting period. The continued prevalence of Internet Explorervulnerabilities is likely due to its widespread deployment.
During this reporting period, Symantec documented 12 vulnerabilities that affected Apple Safari, double
the six reported in the second half of 2006 and triple the four that were disclosed in the first half of 2006.The sharp increase in the number of Apple Safari vulnerabilities over the past twelve months offersevidence that security researchers are increasingly turning their attention Mac OS X. Jan–Jun 2005
Jul–Dec 2005Period
Jan–Jun 2006
Documented vulnerabilitiesInternet Explorer
MozillaOperaSafari
0 1 02 03 04 05 047
9
6
12732
38
4725
25
17Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
64Browser fuzzing is an automated vulnerability discovery technique that works by testing the browser against
randomly generated input. It has been a noticeable factor in the prominence of browser vulnerabilities,particularly for Internet Explorer and Safari. Both of these browsers have a high number of vulnerabilitiesthat are known to have been discovered using fuzzing techniques. While fuzzing is not a new technique,improved browser-fuzzing tools have made it easier to discover vulnerabilities in more obscure and less-audited code paths. (For more on browser fuzzing, please refer to the “Future Watch” section of this report.)
Browsers are complex and feature-rich, traits that can expose them to vulnerabilities in newly implemented
features. Due to the integration of various content-handling applications, such as productivity suites andmedia players, browsers are a viable attack vector for many client-side vulnerabilities. This is particularlytrue of Microsoft Windows and other operating systems in which the browser is not disassociated frommany other operating system processes and features.
Browser vulnerabilities are a serious security concern, particularly due to their role in online fraud and the
propagation of spyware and adware. Web browsers are particularly prone to security concerns because they come in contact with more potentially untrusted or hostile content than other applications. In order to provide protection against the exploitation of unpatched vulnerabilities affecting Web browsers,Symantec recommends that organizations deploy intrusion prevention systems and regularly updatedantivirus software at gateways and workstations. Organizations should also closely monitor vulnerabilitymailing lists and apply necessary patches as required, in a timely manner.
In order to protect against Web browser attacks, Symantec advises users and administrators to upgrade
all browsers to the latest, patched versions. Symantec recommends that organizations educate users to be extremely cautious about visiting unknown or untrusted Web sites and viewing or following links inunsolicited emails. Administrators should also deploy Web proxies in order to block potentially maliciousscript code and implement ActiveX controls to stop attacks before they can be carried out.
Exploit code release period
While exploit code development times provide an estimate of the time it takes for exploit code to bedeveloped, the exploit code release period measures the period of time after vulnerability disclosure during which associated exploit code continues to be developed and released. This is an important security consideration because a significant number of exploits are published months after the initialdisclosure of the affected vulnerability and many of those may be improved versions of earlier exploit code. These exploits may be released after a vendor-developed patch has been made available; however,some enterprises may delay patching a vulnerability for which there is no publicly available exploit code orknown attacks. This discussion is limited to exploit code for vulnerabilities that affect enterprise vendors.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Exploit code release periods are broken down into five categories: less than one day, one to six days, seven
to thirty days, 31 to 100 days, and more than 100 days. In the first half of 2006, 25% of exploit code wasreleased in less than one day, which is a decrease from 33% in the second half of 2005 (figure 25). Duringthe first six months of 2006, 33% of exploits were released one to six days after initial vulnerabilitydisclosure, an increase over the 19% in the second half of 2005.
The proportion of exploit code released between seven and thirty days was relatively unchanged. During
the current reporting period, it was 25%, down slightly from 26% in the second half of 2005. In the firsthalf of 2006, 17% exploits were released between 31 and 100 days after the release of the associatedvulnerability. This is an increase over the ten percent proportion in the second half of 2005.
During the first six months of 2006, no exploit code was released in the 100+ day range. In the second half
of 2005, 12% of exploit code was released during this period, as was 11% of exploit code in the first halfof that year. It should be noted that data for the 100+ day range may change, as exploits may be releasedafter the current reporting period. The data from the current reporting period will likely change afterpublication of the Internet Security Threat Report to reflect the addition of exploit development in the
100+ day range.
The current reporting period was marked by a drop in same-day exploit code and a rise in exploit code
published in one to six days. This is likely due to a number of factors. Firstly, some security researchersappear to be withholding proof-of-concept exploit code and technical vulnerability details for a certainamount of time or indefinitely. This is usually due to an agreement that is made with the vendor when the researcher privately reports the vulnerability to the vendor. While this may be effective in limiting the amount of publicly available information about the vulnerability, which could subsequently delay the development of public exploits, it is not an altogether effective protective measure.Jan–Jun 2006 Jul–Dec 2005
Period12%
33%
10%
26% 19%17%25%
33%25%
100+ days
31–100 days7–30 days1–6 daysLess than 1 dayFigure 25. Exploit code release period
Source: Symantec Corporation
65Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Secondly, many exploits that are publicly released come from a source other than the researcher who
discovered the vulnerability, so there is frequently a time lapse between the initial vulnerability publicationand the release of an exploit. Furthermore, private exploit code may be available for some time beforebeing made public. Since there is no way to measure how long a private exploit has been circulating, theexploit publication date is the date on which the exploit first becomes general public knowledge.
While much of the security emphasis is placed on short exploit code development time, long exploit code
release periods are also a cause of concern to organizations. For instance, a vulnerability may initially be considered low risk due to lack of immediate public exploit code and exploitation; because of this,administrators may delay the patching process. If exploit code surfaces a relatively long time after thevulnerability is disclosed, the organization may be caught off guard because the threat was initiallyperceived as low risk and therefore not addressed in a timely manner. Longer exploit release periods can also result in the development of more reliable exploit code due to the increased time for testing and quality assurance.
Data in other sections of the Internet Security Threat Report suggests that older vulnerabilities are still
a viable attack vector. When determining the remediation priority, it is important for organizations toevaluate the potential risk of the vulnerability if an exploit is available. Vulnerability managers shouldincorporate ratings systems that account for the potential risk that vulnerabilities may pose to applicationsand devices on their network. The Common Vulnerability Scoring System is an example of such a system.
78
6678http://www.first.org/cvss/Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Malicious Code Trends
Symantec gathers malicious code data from over 120 million desktops that have deployed Symantec’s
antivirus products in consumer and corporate environments. The Symantec Digital Immune System andScan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting process. This discussion is basedon malicious code samples reported to Symantec for analysis between January 1 and June 30, 2006.
Symantec categorizes malicious code in two ways: families and variants. A family is a new, distinct sample
of malicious code. For instance, W32.Sober@mm (also known as Sober) was the founding sample, or theprimary source code, of the Sober family. In some cases, a malicious code family may have variants. Avariant is a new iteration of the same family, one that has minor differences but that is still based on theoriginal. A new variant is created when the source code of a successful virus or worm is modified slightly to bypass antivirus detection definitions developed for the original sample. For instance, Sober.X is avariant of Sober.
The “Malicious Code Trends” section will discuss: • Top ten new malicious code families
• Previously unseen malicious code threats• Malicious code types and worms• Win32 viruses and bots • Exposure of confidential information • Instant messaging threats • Modular malicious code • Propagation vectors
This discussion will include any prevention and mitigation measures that might be relevant to the particular
threats being discussed. However, Symantec recommends that certain best security practices always befollowed to protect against malicious code infection. Administrators should keep patch levels up-to-date,especially on computers that host public services—such as HTTP, FTP, SMTP, and DNS servers—and areaccessible through a firewall or placed in a DMZ. Email servers should be configured to only allow fileattachment types that are required for business needs. Additionally, Symantec recommends that ingressand egress filtering be put in place on perimeter devices to detect anomalous activity.
End users should employ defense in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software and
a personal firewall. Users should update antivirus definitions regularly. They should also ensure that alldesktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their operatingsystem vendor. They should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless it is expected andcomes from a trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
67Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Top ten new malicious code families
While mass-mailing worms typically dominate the top 50 malicious code samples reported to Symantec,
five of the top ten new malicious code families reported during the first six months of 2006 were Trojanhorse programs. The rest of the top ten new families consisted of two viruses, two worms and one backdoor server (table 8).
Table 8. Top ten new malicious code families
Source: Symantec Corporation
The most prevalent new malicious code family this period was that of the Polip virus.79Polip is a
polymorphic virus; that is, it can change its byte pattern when it replicates, thereby avoiding detection bysimple string-scanning techniques. (For more discussion on polymorphic viruses, please see the “FutureWatch” section in this report.)
Polip attempts to attach its code to all .exe and .scr files on an infected computer when they are opened.
The virus also has the ability to update itself through the Gnutella peer-to-peer network to allow remoteaccess to the infected computer. It can also make itself available for download by other users from theGnutella network even if Gnutella software is not installed on the infected computer. Instead, the virusconnects to the network to make itself available to Gnutella clients on the network for download. Finally,Polip tries to lower the overall security of the computer by deleting files related to certain antivirusapplications.
The second most common new malicious code family reported between January 1 and June 30, 2006
was Bomka.
80This Trojan is downloaded from a link that is included in spam email sent by another Trojan
program named Spamlia.81The email uses social engineering techniques to convince its recipients that
the link is the download location for a video clip. Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 Polip
Bomka
Gobrena
Detnat
Ecup
Rajump
Nebuler
Awax
Yamanner
TopFox Lowers security settings
Drops other malcode
Downloads Goldun Trojan
Downloads Lineage Trojan
Allows remote access
Sends information to remote sites,
downloads other threats
Downloads and installs other threats
Sends email addresses from contact
list to a remote host
Logs keystrokes Sample
Virus
Trojan, Backdoor
Trojan
Virus
Worm
Backdoor
Trojan
Trojan
Worm
Trojan Type Vectors Impact
File sharing, P2P
Spam
Spam
Filesharing
P2P
N/A
N/A
N/A
Yahoo! Web mail
N/A
6879http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-042309-1842-99
80http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-012514-0250-99
81http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-122917-3955-99Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
When Bomka is installed on a victim’s computer, it uses rootkit techniques in order to obscure its presence.82
Bomka also allows a remote attacker to gain full access to the compromised computer by including a back
door server component. This could result in the exposure of confidential information. This threat attempts to generate revenue for the attacker by installing a Trojan named Adclicker on the infected computer.
83
Adclicker then drives traffic to certain Web sites that simulate clicks on banner advertisements, a practiceknown as “click fraud.”
84
The third most frequently reported new malicious code family during this reporting period was also a Trojan, Gobrena.
85Similar to Bomka, this Trojan is most commonly transmitted through spam email.
However, Gobrena is sent as an attachment to the spam email instead of being downloaded through an embedded link. When executed, Gobrena simply downloads and executes the Goldun Trojan on the compromised computer.
86When Goldun is installed, it attempts to steal the user’s e-Gold account
information.87Modular malicious code combinations such as this will be discussed at greater length in
the “Modular malicious code” section below.
Previously unseen malicious code threats
Figure 26. Previously unseen threats as a proportion of all threats
Source: Symantec Corporation
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is tracking the proportion
of previously unseen malicious code threats. These are defined as distinct malicious code threats that aredetected on Symantec’s honeypot computers for the first time before they are detected by other means. Thisinformation offers insight into emerging attacker activity, particularly the speed with which attackers adoptnew malicious code tools for use against target computers.PeriodProportion of unseen threats
Jan – Jun 200618%
Jul – Dec 20057%
Jan – Jun 200511%
6982A rootkit is a component that uses stealth to maintain a persistent and undetectable presence on the machine. Actions performed by a rootkit, such as installation
and any form of code execution, are done without end user consent or knowledge.
83http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2002-091214-5754-99
84Click fraud is the act of using illegitimate means, such as a script or program, to imitate the act of a legitimate user clicki ng on a pay-per-click banner advertisement
on a Web page. This act generates revenue for the owner of the page hosting the advertisement. Click fraud is a felony in some jurisdictions.
85http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-052911-1759-99
86http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-010715-5330-99
87e-Gold is an Internet payment system.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
70Between January 1 and June 30, 2006, 18% of all distinct malicious code samples detected by the
Symantec honeypot had not previously been seen (figure 26). A high proportion of previously unseenmalicious code likely indicates that attackers are more actively attempting to evade detection by signature-based antivirus and IDS.
One of the major factors contributing to the increase in previously unseen threats is the number of variants
within malicious code families. This indicates that attackers are commonly updating current malicious codeto create new variants instead of creating new malicious code “from scratch.” This is particularly evident inthe extremely high number of variants in malicious code families such as the Mytob or Beagle families.Attackers and malicious code writers can create new variants in a number of ways, including metamorphiccode evolution,
88changes to the functionality, and run-time packing utilities. The increase in new threats
detected during the first six months of 2006 indicates that attackers may be employing these tactics moreactively in order to avoid being detected by antivirus software.
Previously unseen threats are particularly dangerous because traditional defenses, such as some signature-
based antivirus products, are typically unable to detect them. Administrators should ensure that theirnetworks are protected by perimeter security tools such as intrusion prevention systems, which willultimately provide better protection than IDS or firewalls, neither of which will have rules to protect frompreviously unseen threats. Organizations should also consider network compliance solutions that will helpkeep infected mobile users out of the network (and disinfect them before entering). Administrators shouldalso be sure to maintain up-to-date antivirus definitions to ensure that their computers are protected fromnew threats at the earliest possible time.
Malicious code types and worms
In the first six months of 2006, worms continued to dominate the top 50 malicious code reports. They madeup 38 of the top 50 unique malicious code samples, accounting for 75% of the volume of top 50 maliciouscode reports between January 1 and June 30, 2006. This is an increase over 60% in the previous periodand 24% in the first half of 2005 (figure 27). (It is important to note that a malicious code sample can beclassified in more than one threat type category. For example, bots such as variants of the Mytob family are classified as both a worm and a back door. As a result, cumulative numbers of malicious code types in the Top 50 malicious code reports may exceed 50 and cumulative percentages may exceed 100%.)
88Metamorphic code evolution describes a method used by malicious code writers that allows a piece of malicious code to change it self autonomously.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 27. Malicious code types by volume
Source: Symantec Corporation
The increase in worms can largely be attributed to the dominance of mass-mailing worms such as Sober,
Netsky, Beagle, and Mytob variants. Additionally, since mass-mailing worms have efficient propagationmechanisms, they are more likely to be reported in high volumes than Trojans, which have no propagationmechanisms.
Back doors were the second most frequently reported malicious code type during the second half of 2006,
accounting for 24 of the top 50 malicious code samples. They made up 40% of the volume of the top 50malicious code reports, a decrease from 49% the second half of 2005, but still significantly higher than the first half of 2005 when they accounted for only 14% of the volume.
The prevalence of back doors in the top 50 samples is due to the number of variants of the Mytob family,
89
which accounted for 16 of the top 50 samples during the first six months of 2006. The slight decline from
the previous period is mainly due to the decline in reports of Spybot,90Gaobot,91and Randex92variants, of
which only Spybot remains in the top 50 malicious code samples. This will be discussed further in the“Win32 viruses and bots” section below.
While Trojans dominated the malicious code landscape a year ago, making up 21 of the top 50 malicious
code samples, they currently account for only ten of the top 50 samples. They also account for less than a quarter of the volume of the top 50 malicious code reported to Symantec during this period. 0 1 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 0
Percentage of top 50Type
Virus
Worm
Back door
Trojan5%
1%1%
24%
60%
75%
14%
40%49%
72%
38%
23%Jan – Jun 2005
Jul – Dec 2005
Jan – Jun 2006
7189http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-022614-4627-99
90http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2003-053013-5943-99
91http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2003-112112-1102-99
92http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-072612-2522-99Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
While some industry observers have claimed that Trojans outnumber worms and viruses overall, this has
not been supported by the data that Symantec has received from enterprise and consumer customersworldwide. Due to a lack of propagation mechanisms, Trojans are not likely to be seen by as many users or in such high volume as mass-mailing worms.
Additionally, attackers appear to be making a shift towards targeted attacks using Trojans. Mass-mailing
worms tend to use a “shotgun” approach, sending large quantities of themselves to as many users aspossible. However, Trojans are now frequently being designed to target specific users and groups. Forexample, the Mdropper.H
93Trojan exploited a zero-day vulnerability in Microsoft Word in order to install
a variant of the Ginwui back door program.94The Word document containing the Mdropper Trojan was
spammed to a selected user base using a message with social engineering tailored to entice the users intoopening it. Because of the targeted nature of these attacks, the Trojan was sent to a smaller group of users,making it less conspicuous and less likely to be submitted to antivirus vendors for analysis.
Win32 viruses, worms, and bots
Win32 threats are executable programs that operate by using the Win32 API (application programinterface), which provides a document interface by which software can interact with different componentsof the Windows platform. These forms of malicious code work on at least one Win32 platform.
95For the
first time in years, Win32 threats have shown a decline; however, this may be due to changes in Symantec’sreporting methods that were made during this period. The change in reporting is due to the fact thatSymantec developed new run-time unpacking technology in response to the increase in worm variants,especially those that contain “bot” components, such as the Spybot family,
96that consists of thousands
of variants.97
Over the last two years, attackers have intensively utilized run-time packers and wrappers to create newvariants in order to “hide” known code from pattern-matching antivirus techniques.
98Using these tools,
attackers could rapidly generate new variants without needing to write new code. As a result, antivirusvendors were required to create new definitions each time the same piece of malicious code was packed or wrapped. Vendors were thus forced to create new antivirus definitions for each variant.
To counter these tactics, over the past six months Symantec has made numerous scanning engine
improvements to detect packed threats without needing to create new variant definitions. As a result,Symantec Security Response needs to release far fewer new definitions. Consequently, the number ofWin32 variants being identified has decreased.
72
93http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-051911-0706-99
94http://www.symantec.com/outbreak/word_exploit.html
95Win32 platforms include Windows 2000 and XP as well as 32-bit versions of Windows 2003 and Vista.
96http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2003-053013-5943-99
97For more on the rise of variants, please see the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume IX (March 2006):
http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539, pp. 18, 69
98A wrapper is similar to a run-time packer but can allow a script file, such as JavaScript, to be presented in executable file f ormat.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
New Win32 viruses and worms
As of June 30, 2006, the total number of Win32 variants had surpassed 46,000. In the first half of 2006,
Symantec documented 6,784 new Win32 viruses and worms (figure 28), almost 40% less than in the sameperiod last year. This decline is largely attributed to the new technology and reporting features of packedthreats in Symantec products that were described above. Due to these changes, Symantec anticipates thatthere will be a similar decline of Win32 threats for the second half of 2006 as well.
Figure 28. New Win32 virus and worm variants
Source: Symantec Corporation
During the first six months of this year, the number of new Win32 families has also declined. During this
period, 101 new Win32 families were detected, down from 104 in the second half of 2005 and 170 in thefirst half of that year. As discussed in the previous edition of the Internet Security Threat Report , the ready
availability of source code for various malicious code families makes it easier to modify an existing familyto create a new variant than to create an entirely new family.
99This is likely the reason for the decline in
the number of new families over the past two reporting periods.0 2,000 4,000 6,000 8,000 10,000 12,000Period
Total numberJan 1, 2004 –
Jun 30, 2004New viruses and worms
New families
Jul 1, 2004 –
Dec 31, 2004
Jan 1, 2005 –
Jun 30, 2005
Jul 1, 2005 –
Dec 31, 2005
Jan 1, 2006 –
Jun 30, 20061644,496
7,360
171
17010,866
10410,992
6,784
101
7399Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume IX (March 2006): http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539, pp. 18 and 69.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Win32 bots
In the “Attack Trends” section of the previous Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec reported that “the
number of bot-infected computers appears to have reached the carrying capacity of its environment.”100
The “leveling off” that was observed at that time continued through this reporting period. In the first sixmonths of 2006, bots accounted for 22% of the top 50 malicious code, up slightly from the 20% reported in the second half of 2005 (figure29).
Figure 29. Volume of bots reported
Source: Symantec Corporation
At that time, Symantec speculated that the leveling off of bot infection was due to the widespread and
effective implementation of anti-bot security measures, such as firewalls and other perimeter defenses.101
The apparent success of these measures may have caused malicious code authors to concentrate theirefforts on other areas, such as more targeted attacks using Trojans, as was discussed in the “Malicious code types and worms” section above.
It appears that attackers prefer to create variants of existing bots rather than creating entirely new families.
102
There were 23 bot variants in the top 50 malicious code reports belonging to only five different families this
period, compared to 21 bot variants from eight different families in the second half of 2006. It is likely thatthis is due to the desire of attackers to gain the maximum return on their investment of time.
A drop in the number of new remotely exploitable vulnerabilities in Windows services with available
exploit code may also be contributing to this leveling off of reported bots. The decreased availability and effectiveness of remotely exploitable vulnerabilities in default services, which is discussed in the“Propagation vectors” section below, has likely necessitated a change in tactics. PeriodPercentage of top 50
Jan – Jun 200410%14%20%
12%22%
Jul – Dec 2004 Jan – Jun 2005 Jul – Dec 2005 Jan – Jun 20060%10%20%30%40%50%
74100Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume IX (March 2006): http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539, pp. 36
101Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume IX (March 2006): http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539, pp. 36
102Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume IX (March 2006): http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539, pp. 81-82Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Attackers appear to have moved away from previous favorites such as Spybot, Gaobot, and Randex to
Mytob. This is supported by the fact that, with the exception of Spybot, previously prevalent bots that focuson exploiting service vulnerabilities—such as Gaobot and Randex—are absent from the top 50 maliciouscode reports in this reporting period. Since Mytob uses SMTP as a propagation vector, as well as the abilityto exploit remote vulnerabilities, it is more likely to reach a large number of targets. That said, it should benoted that the discovery of a new remotely exploitable vulnerability with reliable exploit code could easilytrigger a resurgence of these bots once the code has been added to their propagation mechanisms.
Exposure of confidential information
Threats that expose confidential information on a compromised computer are a concern to all users, inhome, small business, and enterprise environments alike. These threats may expose sensitive data such assystem information, confidential files and documents, or cached logon credentials. Some threats, such asback doors, could give a remote attacker complete control over a compromised computer.
Threats to confidential information are a particular concern because of their potential use in criminal
activities. With the widespread use of online shopping and Internet banking, compromises of this nature canresult in significant financial loss, particularly if credit card information or banking details are exposed.
In the first six months of 2006, 30 of the top 50 malicious code samples exposed a user’s confidential
information in some way. This is the same number as was reported in the second half of 2005 but ten morethan the 20 reported in the first half of 2005 (figure 30).
Figure 30. Exposure of confidential information
Source: Symantec CorporationJan – Jun 200630
Jul – Dec 2005
Period30
Jan – Jun 200520Number of samples in top 50
75Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Symantec believes that the number of threats to confidential information will likely hold steady or increase
over the next six months. In the current period, variants of Mytob accounted for 16 of the 30 information-exposure threats in the top 50 malicious code reports. Bots such as Mytob will likely continue to be commonamongst the top 50 reported malicious code samples, as their versatility and modularity make them verypopular with attackers.
Instant messaging threats
Instant messaging (IM) is widely deployed by users in both home and enterprise environments. However, it isgenerally unprotected and unmonitored in both contexts, leaving it vulnerable to attacks. This is particularlyworrisome for corporate entities, as IM is rapidly becoming a key part of enterprise communications andbecause confidential information is often exchanged on these networks.
As one of the most successful and widely deployed applications on the Internet, IM has become a potent
means for the propagation of viruses, worms, and other threats. The infection of one computer can result in messages being sent to all users in an IM contact list on that machine, creating the potential for rapidproliferation. Furthermore, social engineering tactics are particularly well suited to IM, as the partiescommunicating over it are inherently trusted.
During the first six months of 2006, AOL Instant Messenger was the IM protocol most commonly used by
IM-related malicious code to propagate, accounting for 59%. This is an increase over the 44% of IM-relatedmalicious code that used this protocol in the second half of 2005 (figure 31). It is important to note that just as some malicious code may use multiple propagation vectors, some IM malicious code can also employ multiple IM protocols; as a result, the cumulative percentages presented in this discussion may exceed 100%.
Figure 31. Percentage of instant messaging threat propagation by protocol
Source: Symantec Corporation0 2 04 06 08 0 1 0 0Period
Percentage of threats44%
86%59%
19%
32%Jul – Dec 2005
Jan – Jun 2006
49%MSNYahooAIM
Jul – Dec 2005
Jan – Jun 2006
Jul – Dec 2005
Jan – Jun 2006
76Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Some bots, such as variants of Spybot, Gaobot, and Randex, commonly used AOL Instant Messenger (AIM)
to propagate during the first six months of 2006, as did variants of Esbot.103This may indicate that it is
easier for attackers to incorporate propagation components for this protocol than for others and that areliable propagation component exists.
The next most frequently targeted IM protocol was MSN Messenger, which was used by 49% of IM-related
malicious code this period. This represents a decrease from the previous period when 86% of IM-relatedmalicious code used this protocol. This decline may indicate that changes were made to the MSN protocolthat required attackers to write new propagation modules for it. Once the changes have been examined bymalicious code authors, they may make necessary adjustments to existing modules, and this protocol mayexperience renewed malicious code activity.
Yahoo! Instant Messenger was used by 32% of IM-related malicious code to propagate. This makes it the
third most frequently targeted protocol for the period. This represents a sharp increase over the 19% ofmalicious code using this protocol in the previous period.
With the latest releases of Yahoo! Instant Messenger and Windows Live Messenger (formerly MSN
Messenger), it was announced that the two protocols would be interoperable.
104This will allow users from
one network to communicate with users of the other without having to install multiple IM clients. Thischange may also encourage attackers to concentrate their efforts on these protocols, since they will likelyenable attackers to reach a larger group of users. It is likely that any malicious code that propagatesthrough one of these protocols in the future will also propagate through the other, allowing attackers to reach a larger user base with minimal effort.
Modular malicious code
In the “Future Watch” section of the September 2005 volume of the Internet Security Threat Report ,
Symantec predicted that malicious code would become a more prominent security issue.105Modular
malicious code works by compromising a computer and then downloading other pieces of code with added functionalities. It initially possesses limited functionality, such as disabling antivirus software andfirewalls, but can update itself with additional code that has new, potentially more damaging capabilities.These may allow it to further compromise the target computer or to perform other malicious tasks.
Modularity in malicious code can serve different purposes. The malicious code may simply attempt to
update itself to a more recent version, as is often the case for bots and back door servers. Frequently,modular malicious code is used to download another application to gather confidential information. Aspreviously noted, threats to confidential information may be used by attackers for financial gain. By usingmodular malicious code, attackers may be able to download and simultaneously install a confidentialinformation threat on a large number of compromised computers.
77
103http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-070512-0211-99
104http://get.live.com/messenger/overview
105Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume VIII (September 2005): http://enterprisesecurity.symantec.com/content.cfm?articleid=1539, p. 83.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
78106http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-111915-0848-99Between January 1 and June 30, 2006, modular malicious code accounted for 79% of the volume of top
50 malicious code reported to Symantec (figure 32). This represents a significant decrease from the 88%reported from July to December 2005. The decline in volume of modular malicious code this period canmainly be attributed to the prevalence of the Blackmal.E worm (also known as the Kama Sutra worm). Thisworm was the second most widely reported malicious code sample in the current period; however, it did not attempt to download additional components or threats and so is not considered modular. The largevolume of Blackmal.E reports thereby caused the overall volume of modular malicious code in the top 50 to decline.
Figure 32. Volume of modular malicious code
Source: Symantec Corporation
While the volume of modular malicious code has declined since the previous period, the number of modular
malicious code samples in the top 50 has remained constant. In both the first half of 2006 and the secondhalf of 2005, 36 unique samples were reported to Symantec (figure 33). The most widely reported maliciouscode sample this period—Sober.X
106—is a modular malicious code sample that employs a downloader
component. The worm contains an algorithm to begin downloading files from a number of Web sites onJanuary 6, 2006 and every week thereafter.Jan – Jun 200679%
Jul – Dec 2005
Period88%
Jan – Jun 200577%Percentage of top 50Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 33. Modular malicious code samples
Source: Symantec Corporation
Propagation vectors
Worms and viruses use various means to transfer themselves, or propagate, from one computer to another.
These are collectively referred to as propagation mechanisms. Propagation mechanisms can include anumber of different vectors, such as Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), Common Internet File System(CIFS), peer-to-peer services (P2P), and remotely exploitable vulnerabilities. Some malicious code mayeven use other malicious code as a propagation vector by locating a computer that has been compromisedby a back door server and using it to upload and install itself. (It is important to note that many maliciouscode samples employ multiple vectors in an effort to increase the probability of successful propagation, asa result, cumulative percentages included in this discussion may exceed 100%.)
In the first half of 2006, SMTP was the most commonly used propagation vector (figure 34). This is not
surprising, as this protocol is heavily involved in the delivery of email, one of the most widely employedapplications on the Internet. In addition to being used as a malicious code infection vector, SMTP is alsoused to send Trojans in spam email. Jan – Jun 200636
Jul – Dec 2005
Period36
Jan – Jun 200518Number of samples in top 50
79Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 34. Malicious code propagation vectors
Source: Symantec Corporation
In the first half of 2006, 38 of the top 50 malicious code samples that propagate did so by SMTP, an
increase over the 26 in the second half of 2005. Put another way, during this period one out of every 122email messages scanned by Symantec Brightmail Antispam contained malicious code. Malicious code thatpropagates by SMTP accounted for 98% of the volume of top 50 malicious code reports with propagationmechanisms this period.
In the first half of 2006, the top 50 malicious code samples was dominated by variants of the Netsky,
Beagle, and Mytob worms, all of which are mass-mailing worms. As a result, malicious code thatpropagated by SMTP accounted for 98% of malicious code in the top 50 samples that propagate (figure34). This is an increase over the 92% of the volume of the top 50 malicious code reports in the second half of 2005. All of the top ten malicious code samples this period utilized SMTP as a propagation vector,demonstrating the continued effectiveness of this vector. Furthermore, the most prolific mass-mailingworm this period, Sober.X, uses SMTP as its sole propagation vector, as do multiple variants of Mytob.
Organizations can protect against SMTP threats by blocking all email attachments at the mail gateway. If
there is a business need for email attachments, only those that are considered safe should be allowed. Ifother attachment types are accepted, they should always be scanned by antivirus products with up-to-datedefinitions and should only be accepted from trusted sources.
In the first six months of 2006, six of the top 50 malicious code samples that propagate used CIFS as a
vector, accounting for 16% of the total volume. This is a slight increase over the second half of 2005, when seven of the top 50 samples used this vector, accounting for nine percent of the total volume for that period. The rise in the use of CIFS as a propagation mechanism in this period is mainly due to its use by the Blackmal.E worm, which was the second most frequently reported malicious code sample during this period.0%20%40%60%80%100%
PeriodPercentage of malicious code
that propagates
Jan–Jun 2006 Jul–Dec 2005SMTP
P2PCIFSBackdoor
Remote
Vulnerability92%
14%
9%
5%13%98%
23%
16%
1%13%
80Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
As was discussed in the introductory paragraph to this section, some malicious code actually uses other
malicious code to propagate. For instance, some variants of Spybot will search for back door servers thatare installed on previously compromised computers and use the back door to install themselves. Thisstrategy takes advantage of the fact that if a computer has already been compromised it is likely to have a weak security posture, which could allow subsequent malicious code installations to go undetected.
In the first half of 2006, only one of the top 50 samples that propagate did so by this method, accounting
for one percent of the volume of top 50 reports for the period. In the second half of last year, only two of the top 50 malicious code samples that propagate used this vector, accounting for five percent of thevolume of top 50 reports. In the first half of 2005, four samples accounting for 35% of the volume of top50 reports used this vector. As has been noted previously in this discussion, the decline in the currentperiod can likely be attributed to the drop of Gaobot and Randex from the top 50 malicious code reports.
The use of peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing networks as a propagation vector for malicious code experienced
a slight increase this period. Between January and June 2006, 12 of the top 50 samples, accounting for23% of the volume of top 50 reports, used P2P networks as a propagation mechanism (figure 34). This isup from eight samples accounting for 14% of the total volume of reports in the previous period.
The slight increase in worms propagating through P2P networks this period can largely be attributed to the
recent Feebs worm,
107as well as the presence of highly reported variants of Beagle108and Netsky,109both of
which utilize this vector. Additionally, two of the top ten new malicious code families—Polip and Ecup110—
also use P2P as a propagation mechanism. It is likely that P2P will remain a vector that is employed bymalicious code authors in the future, but it is unlikely to regain the prominence it achieved in the past.
Malicious code that uses remotely exploitable vulnerabilities to propagate is heavily dependent upon
unpatched computers to spread. Use of this vector thus relies upon the discovery of new remote servicevulnerabilities that allow code execution. In the current period, eight malicious code samples in the top 50 samples that propagate utilized a remotely exploitable vulnerability to do so (figure 34). This is a slightdecrease from the ten samples that used this vector in the previous period but still higher than the fivesamples using this vector in the same period last year. This is supported by the drop in exploits by type for the server category, from 154 to 129, as was discussed in “easily exploitable vulnerabilities by type”discussion of the “Vulnerability Trends” section in this report.
While fewer unique samples employed this vector in the current period, they appear to have experienced
only slightly less success than in the previous period. In the current period, ten percent of the total volumeof malicious code samples that propagate were reported to exploit vulnerabilities, compared to 13% in theprevious period. This is down from the 38% of reports in the same period last year.
During this period, the majority of the malicious code samples that exploit vulnerabilities to propagate
were Mytob variants. Seven of the eight malicious code samples using this vector were variants of this bot.The remaining sample was Spybot.
81107http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-013122-5631-99
108http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-020216-2847-99
109http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-032110-4938-99
110http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-053111-0818-99Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Phishing, Spam, and Security Risks
Traditionally, the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report has broken security threats down into three
general categories: attacks, vulnerabilities, and malicious code. However, as Internet-based services andapplications have expanded and diversified, the potential for computer programs to introduce other types of security risks has increased. The emergence of new risks, particularly spam, phishing, spyware, adwareand misleading applications has necessitated an expansion of the traditional security taxonomy.
Symantec has monitored these new concerns as they have developed. This section will examine
developments in these risks over the first six months of 2006. In particular, it will consist of three sub-sections, which will discuss:
• Phishing
• Spam• Security risks, particularly adware, spyware and misleading applications
Phishing
Phishing is an attempt by a third party to solicit confidential information from an individual, group, ororganization, often for financial gain. Phishers are groups or individuals who attempt to trick users intodisclosing personal data, such as credit card numbers, online banking credentials, and other sensitiveinformation. They may then use the information to commit fraudulent acts. This section of the SymantecInternet Security Threat Report will discuss phishing activity that Symantec detected between January 1
and June 30, 2006.
The data provided in this section is based on statistics derived from the Symantec Probe Network, which
consists of over two million decoy email accounts that attract email messages from 20 different countriesaround the world. The main purpose of the network is to attract spam, phishing, viruses, and other email-borne threats. It encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises around the world, attracting emailthat is representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 million mailboxes. The Probe Networkconsists of previously used email addresses as well as email accounts that have been generated solely to be used as probes. In addition to the Probe Network, Symantec also gathers phishing information throughthe the Symantec Phish Report Network, an extensive antifraud community in which members contributeand receive fraudulent Web site addresses for alerting and filtering across a broad range of solutions.
Phishing is assessed according to two indicators: phishing messages and phishing attempts. A phishing
message is a single, unique message that is sent to targets with the intent of gaining confidential and/orpersonal information from computer users. Each phishing message has different content and each one will represent a different way of trying to fool a user into disclosing information. A phishing message can be considered the “lure” with which a phisher attempts to entice a phishing target to disclose confidentialinformation. A single message, or lure, can be used many times in different phishing attempts.
A phishing attempt can be defined as an instance of a phishing message being sent to a single user. A
single phishing message can be used in numerous distinct phishing attempts, usually targeting differentend users. Extending the fishing analogy, a phishing attempt can be considered a single cast of the lure(the phishing message) to try to ensnare a target.
82Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
This section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report will discuss the following:
• Number of unique phishing messages
• Number of blocked phishing attempts • Phishing activity by sector• Number of unique phishing Web sites and/or brands being phished
Number of unique phishing messages
Over the first six months of 2006, the Symantec Probe Network detected 157,477 unique phishing messages
(figure 35). This equates to 865 unique phishing messages a day. It represents an 81% increase over the86,906 unique phishing messages that were detected in the last half of 2005. It is also an increase of 61%over the 97,592 messages detected in the first half of 2005.
Figure 35. Number of unique phishing messages
Source: Symantec Corporation
The sharp increase over the previous six-month period may be a result of attempts by attackers to bypass
filtering technologies by creating multiple randomized messages. These messages may attempt to phish the same brands but include slight variations in order to bypass the use of MD5 checksums or other basicemail scanning techniques such as Bayesian filters.
111These variations often consist of minor changes or
differences in the URLs that are included in the email messages. By using a large number of domains in a short period, attackers are able to increase the longevity of each one, making it more difficult forauthorities to shut them down because of the amount of effort involved in tracking and taking down each domain used.Number of messages0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000Period
157,477 Jan–Jun 2006Jul–Dec 2005 86,906Jan–Jun 2005 97,592
83111An MD5 checksum is obtained when a message is hashed through an algorithm to obtain a unique value. This technique can be used to identify known spam,
phishing, and malicious code email messages. Bayesian filters use mathematical probabilities to determine whether a message is spam or not based on the
usage of certain words.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Blocked phishing attempts
The number of blocked phishing attempts is derived from the total number of phishing messages that
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam antifraud filters block. Antifraud filters are rules that are created bySymantec Security Response that detect and block known phishing messages. Once the filters have beencreated they are deployed across the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam global customer base where theyprevent known phishing email messages from reaching end users.
The number of phishing attempts blocked by Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam in the first six months of
2006 indicates a decrease in phishing activity from the previous reporting period. In the first half of 2006,Symantec blocked 1.30 billion phishing attempts, an 11% decrease from the 1.46 billion phishingattempts detected in the last six months of 2005 (figure 36). It is still 25% higher than the 1.04 billionblocked phishing attempts detected in the first six months of 2005.
Figure 36. Blocked phishing attempts
Source: Symantec Corporation
Phishing messages that are blocked at the globally distributed mail servers of Symantec Brightmail
AntiSpam customers are reflective of phishing activity targeting email users across the Internet. As aresult, Symantec believes that the slight decrease in blocked messages may be indicative of more targetedattacks in phishing activity. As noted previously, the number of unique phishing messages is on the rise;this likely reflects an attempt by phishers to bypass current filtering attempts, most of which use previousphishing messages as the basis of detection and subsequent blockage. For this reason, attackers may be sending a higher number of unique messages but in lower volumes and to more focused groups andindividuals. For example, if the brand being phished is an Australian bank, the attacker may limit the list of recipients to those with email addresses in the .au domain since those are the users most likely to associate with that brand. PeriodNumber of blocked phishing attempts
Jan–Jun 2006 Jul–Dec 2005 Jan–Jun 20050300 million600 million900 million1,200 million1,500 million
84Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Phishing activity by sector
For the first time, in this edition of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is tracking the sectors of
companies that are being targeted by phishing attacks. Not surprisingly, the financial sector is the mostheavily phished, accounting for 84% of phishing sites tracked by the Symantec Phish Report Network andSymantec Brightmail AntiSpam during this period (figure 37).
As was established in the introduction to this section, phishing is usually conducted for financial gain.
Phishing attacks against the financial services sector are most likely to produce the greatest monetary gainfor attackers. Once an attacker gains access to a target’s account through one of these attacks, he or shemay be able to initiate wire transfers to remove funds, or apply for loans, credit lines, or credit cards.
Figure 37. Phishing activity by sector
Source: Symantec Corporation
Phishing activity that targeted Internet service provider (ISP) accounts made up the second largest
percentage of attacks this period, accounting for eight percent of the total volume. While access to a user’sISP account may not provide immediate financial gain for the attacker, it could benefit them in other ways.The attacker could use these accounts to access the ISP’s outgoing email servers in order to send morespam or phishing messages. Since a major ISP’s email servers are less likely to be on DNS blocklists(DNSBL),
112this tactic increases the probability that the attacker’s emails will reach their destination.
The third most widely phished industry in the first half of 2006 was the retail sector. This sector is mostly
made up of online retailers or e-commerce sites. Access to a user’s e-commerce site account does notprovide the immediate financial benefit that an online bank account would, but it could still hold potentialrewards for the attacker. The attacker could log on to the user’s account and order products by paying withany credit cards that are stored in the system for that user. He or she could then specify a shipping addressto which they have access during the checkout process. Once the goods are delivered, the attacker couldthen resell the merchandise for profit. Since there are more steps involved and the gain is not immediate, it is easy to see why phishing attacks conducted through the retail sector are less desirable to phishers than would be those through financial sector.Financial 84% Other 16%ISP 8%Hardware 1%
Retail 5%Software 1%Government 1%
85112A DNS blocklist (DNSBL) is a list of IP addresses that are known to send unwanted email traffic. The DNSBL is used by email sof tware to either allow or reject email
coming from IP addresses on the list.`Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Phishing—prevention and mitigation
Symantec recommends that enterprise users protect themselves against phishing threats by filtering email
at the server level through the mail transfer agent (MTA). Although this will likely remain the primary pointof filtering for phishing, organizations can also use IP-based filtering upstream, as well as HTTP filtering.
DNS block lists also offer protection against potential phishing emails. Organizations could also consider
using domain-level or email authentication in order to verify the actual origin of an email message. This can protect against phishers who are spoofing mail domains.
113
To protect against potential phishing activity, administrators should always follow Symantec best practicesas outlined in Appendix A of this report. Symantec also recommends that organizations educate their endusers about phishing.
114They should also keep their employees notified of the latest phishing attacks and
how to avoid falling victim to them.115
Organizations can also employ Web server log monitoring to track if and when complete downloads of theirWeb sites are occurring. Such activity may indicate that someone is using the legitimate Web site to createan illegitimate Web site that could be used for phishing.
Organizations can detect phishing attacks that use spoofing by monitoring non-deliverable email addresses
or bounced email that is returned to non-existent users. They should also monitor the purchasing of cousindomain names by other entities to identify purchases that could be used to spoof their corporatedomains.
116This can be done with the help of companies that specialize in domain monitoring; some
registrars even provide this service.117
End users should follow best security practices, as outlined in Appendix A of this report. As some phishingattacks may use spyware and/or keystroke loggers, Symantec advises end users to use antivirus software,antispam software, firewalls, toolbar blockers, and other software detection methods. Symantec also advises end users to never disclose any confidential personal or financial information unless and until they can confirm that any request for such information is legitimate.
Users should review bank, credit card, and credit information frequently. This can provide information
on any irregular activities. For further information, the Internet Fraud Complaint Center (IFCC) has alsoreleased a set of guidelines on how to avoid Internet-related scams.
118Additionally, network administrators
can review Web proxy logs to determine if any users have visited known phishing sites.
Spam
Spam is usually defined as junk or unsolicited email sent by a third party. While it is certainly an annoyanceto users and administrators, spam is also a serious security concern as it can be used to deliver Trojans,viruses, and phishing attempts. It could also cause a loss of service or degradation in the performance ofnetwork resources and email gateways. This section of the Internet Security Threat Report will discuss
developments in spam activity between January 1 and June 30, 2006.
86113Spoofing refers to instances where phishers forge the “From:” line of an email message using the domain of the entity they are targeting with
the phishing attempt.
114For instance the United States Federal Trade Commission has published some basic guidelines on how to avoid phishing. They are available at:
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/phishingalrt.htm
115A good resource for information on the latest phishing threats can be found at http://www.antiphishing.org
116“Cousin domains” refers to domain names that include some of the key words of an organization’s domain or brand name; for examp le, for the
corporate domain “bigbank.com” cousin domains could include “bigbank-alerts.com”,”big-bank-security.com”, and so on.
117See http://markmonitor.com/brandmanagement/index.html for instance.
118http://www.fbi.gov/cyberinvest/inetschemes.htmSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
The data used in this analysis is based on data returned from the Symantec Probe Network as well as data
gathered from a statistical sampling of the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base. Specifically,statistics are gathered from enterprise customers’ Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam servers that receive morethan 1,000 email messages per day. This removes the smaller data samples (that is, smaller customers andtest servers), thereby allowing for a more accurate representation of data.
The Symantec Probe Network consists of millions of decoy email addresses that are configured to attract
a large stream of spam attacks. An attack can consist of one or more messages. The goal of the ProbeNetwork is to simulate a wide variety of Internet email users, thereby attracting a stream of traffic that is representative of spam activity across the Internet as a whole. For this reason, the Probe Network iscontinuously optimized in order to attract new varieties of spam attacks. This is accomplished throughinternal production changes that are made to the network, which thus affect the number of new spamattacks it receives as a whole.
This section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report will explore the following:
• Spam as a percentage of all email
• Top spam categories • Top ten countries of spam origin • Percentage of spam containing malicious code
Spam as a percentage of all email
Symantec calculates the percentage of email that is spam by dividing the total number of emails that are
identified as spam by Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam filters by the total of the inbound email messagesreceived by the sample customer base. Between January 1 and June 30, 2006, spam made up 54% of all monitored email traffic. This is an increase over the last six months of 2005 when 50% of email wasclassified as spam. However, it is lower than the first half of 2005, when 61% of email was classified as spam.
While the six-month average was 54%, analysis of the month-to-month spam data reveals a decline and
subsequent rise in the percentage of email that was determined to be spam between January 1 and June 30,2006. In January, 55% of email was categorized as spam. By March this number had declined to 51%, butby the end of June it had climbed back up to 55%.
The temporary mid-term decline likely did not reflect an actual decrease in overall spam activity but
instead was likely a statistical anomaly caused by an increase in image spam.
119Since this type of spam
does not contain any text, it is more difficult to block using traditional means. To respond to this, Symantecdeveloped a new class of effective detection technology. After the deployment of this technology, spamactivity recorded by Symantec returned to previous levels, indicating that the new measures were effective.
Additional methods can be implemented to block image spam, such as blocking email messages with image
file attachments or stripping the attachments at the mail gateway. It should be noted that this would alsopotentially block any legitimate email messages containing these file types. Administrators should carefullyexamine the business effects of this type of mitigation before implementing it in the enterprise.
87
119Image spam is a spam email message that does not contain any regular text. Instead, the spam message is implemented as an image , either attached to the email
or downloaded from a remote Web site.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Top spam categories
Spam categories are assigned by Symantec Email Security Group analysts based on spam activity that is
detected by the Symantec Probe Network. While some of the categories may overlap, this data provides ageneral overview of the types of spam that are most commonly seen on the Internet today.
It is important to note that this data is restricted to spam attacks that are detected and processed by the
Symantec Probe Network. Internal upstream processing may weed out particular spam attacks, such asthose that are determined to be potential fraud attacks.
The most common type of spam detected in the first six months of 2006 was related to health services and
products (figure 38). Health-related spam made up 26% of all spam on the Internet during this time. Thenext largest spam category was adult spam, which made up 22% of all spam. The next most common typeof spam was related to commercial products. It made up 19% of all spam.
It is not surprising that health-related and adult spam make up close to half of all spam. These categories
traditionally have the highest “click-through” rates, as they tend to be more difficult to market throughmore legitimate and traditional means. “Click-through” is a term to describe when a user clicks a link thatcontains uniquely identifiable information about its originator. Typically, the originator receives financialcompensation for each click-through. As spammers have an economic incentive to have a high click-throughrate, in order to increase their return on investment, it is reasonable to conclude that they could bechanging their content to that which has a higher click-through rates. This in turn makes sending highervolumes of spam in these categories more appealing.
Figure 38. Spam categories
Source: Symantec CorporationCommercial products
19%Adult
22%Scams
2%
Leisure
6%
Internet
6%
Health
26%Finance
15%
Fraud
4%
88Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
“Adult” spam messages are those that contain pornographic content, sell products of a sexually explicit
nature, and/or direct users to a sexually explicit Web site. This category of spam is frequently cited as aconcern for organizations because of the need to keep sexually explicit material out of the workplace,primarily for legal issues.
In the previous edition of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , it was speculated that the amount
of adult spam activity would likely increase due to a transition from traditional sexually explicit, HTML-based content to shorter plain-text messages that are more likely to bypass upstream filtering. Thisprediction appears to have been borne out, as the percentage of adult spam rose during the currentreporting period.
Because of the attention it receives, adult spam is often thought to be the most common type of spam.
Historically, however, adult spam has only made up around ten percent of all spam. In the current period,however, it accounted for 22%. This rise is likely due to the previously noted transition away fromtraditional sexually explicit, HTML-based content to shorter plain-text messages.
Top ten countries of spam origin
This section will discuss the top ten countries of spam origin. The nature of spam and its distribution on
the Internet presents challenges in identifying the location of people who are sending spam. Many spammerstry to redirect attention away from their actual geographic location. In an attempt to bypass DNS block lists,they build coordinated networks of compromised computers known as bot networks, which allow them tosend spam from sites that are distant from their physical location. In doing so, they will likely focus oncompromised computers in those regions with the largest bandwidth capabilities (for a more in-depthdiscussion of this, please refer to the “Attack Trends” report of this report). Following this logic, the regionfrom which the spam originates may not correspond with the region in which the spammers are located.
This discussion is based on data gathered by customer installations of Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam. This
data includes the originating server’s IP address, against which frequency statistics are summarized. Each IPaddress is mapped to a specific country and charted over time.
During the first six months of 2006, 58% of all spam detected worldwide originated in the United States
(figure 39). This is likely due to the high number of broadband users in that country and the high percentageof bot-infected computers located there, as was discussed in the “Attack Trends” section of this report. Sincespammers often use bots to send their bulk mailings, this correlation is not surprising. The United Stateswas also the top country of spam origin in the second half of 2005, when 56% of spam originated there(table 9).
89Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 39. Top ten countries of spam origin
Source: Symantec Corporation
China remained the second highest country of spam origin in the first half of 2006. Thirteen percent of
spam during this period originated there, compared to 12% in the second half of last year. Symantecbelieves that this continuing increase is likely related to technological advancements being made in China,particularly the continued growth in broadband connectivity there. As noted in the “Attack Trends” sectionof this report, China was also the country with the highest number of bot-infected computers during thefirst six months of 2006, likely as a result of wider adoption of broadband Internet usage.
Table 9. Top ten countries of spam origin
Source: Symantec CorporationCountry
United States
China
Canada
South Korea
United Kingdom
Remaining EU
Countries
Belgium
Japan
France
Poland Jan–Jun
2006
58%
13%
5%
5%
4%
4%
4%
3%
2%
2% Jul–Dec
2005
56%
12%
7%
9%
3%
2%
4%
3%
2%
N/A 4%2% 2%
4%
5%
13%3%
58%4%
5%United States
ChinaCanadaSouth Korea
United KingdomRemaining EU countries
Belgium
Japan
France
Poland
90Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Percentage of spam containing malicious code
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is assessing the
percentage of spam messages that contain malicious code. Malicious code that is delivered by spam isoften a bot that can be used in turn to deliver more spam. If an end user has a sufficiently low securityposture that they could receive spam messages with malicious attachments in the first place, theircomputer would also make a good candidate to send spam. Such activity would also be more likely toremain undetected by the user for an extended period of time, although it may be detected by a third party and added to a DNS block list. For organizations, this could prevent users’ emails from successfullyreaching their intended recipients.
In the first six months of 2006, 0.81% of all spam email contained malicious code. This means that one
out of every 122 spam messages blocked by Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam contained malicious code. This is worrisome, as 54% of all email during this period was identified as spam, as was established in the“Spam as a percentage of all email” discussion above.
Since January 2006, spam containing malicious code dropped steadily before rising again slightly in June.
At the beginning of the year, 1.27% of spam email contained malicious code compared to 0.56% at theend of June (figure 40).
Figure 40. Spam containing malicious code
Source: Symantec Corporation
The five-month decline is likely influenced by two factors. The first is that attaching malicious code to a
message increases its chances of being blocked by various means. In some cases, administrators may blockall incoming messages with attachments or executable type attachments. Additionally, spam messageswith malicious code attachments may be detected by both spam-filtering software and antivirus scanners,decreasing their chances of reaching end users.Jan 2006
MonthFeb 2006Percent of spam with malicious attachments1.00%
0.60%0.80%1.20%1.40%
Apr 2006 May 2006 Jun 2006 Mar 20060.00%0.40%
0.20%1.27%
0.54% 0.56%0.91%
0.75%
0.66%
91Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
The second factor, which is likely a response to the first, is the inclusion of links to Web sites hosting
malicious code in spam messages. Rather than attach a malicious code executable to a message,spammers will include a link to a Web site that is hosting malicious code instead. In many cases, the Website may exploit a client-side vulnerability in the user’s browser to install the malicious code without theirknowledge or consent. This technique helps reduce the number of messages that are blocked beforereaching the end user and still allows the spammer to install malicious code on a recipient’s computer.
As discussed in the “Attack Trends” section of this report, bots may be reaching a saturation point.
Because it is more difficult for spammers to infect new hosts with their bots, they may also have movedaway from attaching them to spam messages because it is simply no longer worth the added effortinvolved.
To protect against malicious code that is received through spam, users should follow the same precautions
used to protect against any malicious code infections. Employing defense in-depth strategies, including thedeployment of antivirus software and a personal firewall will help protect against these threats. Usersshould update antivirus definitions regularly and ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers areupdated with all necessary security patches from their operating system vendor. They should never view,open, or execute any email attachment unless it is expected and comes from a trusted source, and unlessthe purpose of the attachment is known. Finally, users should always perform daily tasks such as browsingWeb sites and reading email as an unprivileged user with minimal access rights in order to limit theconsequences of a potential malicious code infection.
Security Risks
Symantec uses the term “security risks” to refer to a number of malicious programs, such as adware,spyware, misleading applications, and other programs that users may not want on their system.
120While
security risks are not categorized as malicious code, Symantec monitors them using many of the samemethods used for tracking malicious code. This involves an ongoing analysis of reports and data deliveredfrom over 120 million client, server, and gateway email systems deploying Symantec antivirus securitysolutions, as well as filtration of 25 million email messages per day by Symantec Brightmail AntiSpamantifraud filters. Symantec then compiles the most common reports and analyzes them to determine theappropriate categorization. Steps for the protection against and mitigation of these security risks arepresented at the end of the “Security Risks” section.
Top ten security risks
There was little change in the top ten security risks over the first six months of 2006. Most new activity
observed during this period consisted of new variants of previously reported security risk programs. Thetop three security risk programs reported in the first half of 2006 were the same as those reported in thesecond half of 2005. All three are adware programs, as were eight of the top ten security risks.
Depending upon its functionality and the context in which it is deployed, adware can constitute a security
risk. In some cases, these programs may gather information from the user’s computer, such as Internetbrowser usage or other computing habits, and relay this information back to a remote computer. It mayalso do so by occupying bandwidth, thereby diminishing the functionality and availability of a computingsystem. Adware can also gather details about the user’s computer, which can create a security risk.
92
120Other examples of security risks reported to Symantec in this reporting period are trackware—programs that track system activit y, gather system
information, or track user habits and relay this information to a third-party organizations—and dialers—programs that use a com puter or modem to
dial out to a toll number or Internet site, typically to accrue charges.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Between January 1 and June 30, 2006, the most frequently reported security risk program was Hotbar,121
an adware program that accounted for 24% of the top ten security risks reported to Symantec (table 10).
It was the second most frequently reported security risk program in the last six months of 2005.
First detected in 2003, Hotbar adds graphical skins to Internet Explorer, Microsoft Outlook, and Outlook
Express toolbars. It also adds its own toolbar and search button to Internet Explorer. These custom toolbarshave keyword-targeted advertisements built into them. For example, if a user searches for “mortgages,” thetoolbar will display mortgage-related advertisements and links from Hotbar’s advertising affiliates. Hotbaralso monitors Web browsing habits, which may be used for targeted marketing.
Table 10. Top ten security risks
Source: Symantec Corporation
Websearch was the second most frequently reported security risk program over the first six months of
2006.122An adware program, it made up 22% of the top ten security risks reported to Symantec during this
period. Websearch features a number of noteworthy attributes. It modifies Internet Explorer’s default homepage and search settings, installs itself as a toolbar to Internet Explorer, and adds a number of icons to thesystem tray. It also sends user information to a predetermined Web site, including keywords from searches.
One interesting technique that Websearch uses is a “watchdog process,” which prevents the manual removal
of components of the program.
123If a user attempts to stop a process associated with the adware program, a
second running process restarts it as soon as it has been stopped. This increases the difficulty of removingthe program.
BetterInternet was the third most commonly reported security risk in the first half of 2006,
124making up
nine percent of the top ten security risks. It was also the third most common security risk in the second half of 2005. BetterInternet is a browser helper object (BHO),
125which means that it may display advertisements
on the computer on which it is installed. It may also download and install files on the compromisedcomputer, such as other security risks from the same vendor, updates, and/or other applications from the vendor’s partners. Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 Risk type
Adware
Adware
Adware
Dialer
Adware
Adware
Adware
Adware
Adware
Spyware Hotbar
Websearch
BetterInternet
InstantAccess
NDotNet
Aurora
Lop
Iefeats
Istbar
ISearch Risk name
93121http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2003-080410-3847-99&tabid=1
122http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/adware.websearch.html
123http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/techniques.of.adware.and.spyware.pdf
124http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/adware.betterinternet.html
125Browser helper objects (BHOs) are add-on programs that can add legitimate features to a user’s browser (IE 4.X and up). For exa mple, document readers that are
used to read programs within the browser do so with BHOs. BHOs can also be used to install security risks on a user’s Web brows er using ActiveX controls.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
BetterInternet also gathers system information from the computer on which it is installed. It also sends
information that is not personally identifiable—such as running processes, registry entries, hostname,Windows serial number and product ID, network card MAC address, and software version information—to a remote server.
Top ten reported security risks—notable characteristics
Different security risk programs have different characteristics. These may relate to ways in which the
program is placed on the user’s computer, the ways in which it resists attempts to remove it, and the risksthat the program poses to the confidentiality of the user’s data. The following sections will discuss some of the characteristics inherent in the top ten security risk programs reported in the first half of 2006.
As the previous section noted, there was little significant change between the top ten security risks
detected in each of the last two reporting periods. As a result, there has been little significant changeobserved in techniques used by the most common security risks. Instead, these applications are still using similar tricks to those observed in the last six months of 2005.
The lack of new techniques used by the top ten most security risks may indicate that the creators of
security risks are switching their focus to areas requiring less effort for greater return. As security vendorshave improved their products to deal with the various tricks used by security risk vendors, circumventingsecurity products requires increasingly sophisticated ways to install a security risk on a system and preventeasy removal. This would appear to be borne out by the sharp increase over last six months in whatSymantec terms “misleading applications,” which will be discussed at greater length in “Top ten newsecurity risks” section below.
Anti-removal techniques
Security risks may implement different techniques to resist attempts to remove them from the user’s
computer. In the first six months of 2006, five of the top ten security risks employed various techniques toavoid removal from systems (table 11). The following paragraphs will describe some of the anti-removaltechniques that Symantec has observed over the past six months.
Table 11. Anti-removal techniques in top ten security risks
Source: Symantec CorporationRisk type
Adware
Adware
Adware
Dialer
Adware
Adware
Adware
Adware
Adware
Spyware Anti-removal technique
N/A
Watchdog processes
N/A
N/A
N/A
Process injection
Auto-updates with automatically repacked versions
Hides part of program in alternate data stream
Exclusive file lock
Hooks Kernel APIs to prevent its files from being removed Hotbar
Websearch
BetterInternet
InstantAccess
NDotNet
Aurora
Lop
Iefeats
Istbar
ISearch Risk name
94Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Some security risks inject their own code into processes running on the system to make themselves more
difficult to remove. This can cause system instability, degrade performance, and reduce security. It may alsoallow the security risk program to run with the same permissions as the program into which it has beeninjected. This can make it very difficult for administrators or users to remove these programs manually,without specialized tools or in-depth knowledge. Of the top ten security risks this period, only the adwareprogram Aurora deployed process injection.
Run-time packers are programs that are used to reduce the size of programs.
126As a result, the programs
require less time to download. Run-time packers can also obfuscate the content of a file, so that it cannotbe easily recognized by antivirus or antispyware programs, unless they understand the packer format. This technique is commonly used by creators of adware and spyware programs, as well as malicious codeauthors. For instance, the adware program Lop is dynamically repacked each time it is downloaded, thereby making detection and removal more difficult.
As was discussed in the “Top security risks” section above, watchdog processes may be used by a security
risk to avoid removal. They do this by allowing security risks to monitor each other. If one process isstopped, a second process automatically restarts it, and vice versa. Of the top ten security risks reportedthis period, only the adware program Websearch used watchdog processes to resist removal.
ISearch uses a slightly different anti-removal technique. It hooks kernel mode APIs (application program
interfaces)
127to check if the user is attempting to delete a file or registry key associated with it, and returns
access denied, preventing removal of its components. ISearch was not included in the top ten security risks in the last half of 2005.
Stealth techniques
Some security risks use stealth techniques to hide from antivirus and antispyware scanners. Of the top
ten security risks reported this period, IEFeats uses a stealth technique whereby it hides part of itself in an alternate data stream.
Alternate data streams were created by Microsoft to provide compatibility with Apple’s HFS file system
in order to allow Macintosh files to be copied to Windows fileshares without being corrupted.
128Alternate
data streams are not typically scanned by many security products. Attackers can use a simple technique to create an alternate data stream to hide content within otherwise innocuous files.
129The adware program
IEFeats uses this technique to hide some of its files.
Symantec has determined that while this technique is not in common use among security risk programs,
it has been used for a number of Trojan horse programs, such asRustock.B,130Comxt.B,131and Fugif.132
While it is possible that this technique could become more widespread, given the fact that it has been in the public domain for a number of years, a sharp increase in its usage seems unlikely.
95126For more on run-time packers, please see the “Win32 viruses, worms, and bots” discussion in the “Malicious Code Trends” section of this report.
127Kernel mode APIs (application programming interfaces) are part of the Microsoft Win32 API. A detailed description of the Win32 API and of kernel mode is outside
the scope of this report; however, suffice it to say that these are low-level system calls, which are associated with commands to delete files, which the security risk
intercepts to prevent its deletion from the system.
128Alternate data streams were provided as part of the NTFS file system for Windows NT and later versions of Windows to provide co mpatibility with Apple’s old
Hierarchical File System (HFS). Files on HFS consist of a data fork, containing the contents of the file, and the resource fork , containing metadata, such as file type
and other relevant details. A common problem when copying HFS files to the Windows FAT or FAT32 file system was that the resour ce fork information would be
lost, thereby corrupting the file.
129More information on alternate data streams may be found at the following Web sites: http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference/ ntfs.streams.a.primer.pdf and
http://www.securityfocus.com/infocus/1822
130http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/backdoor.rustock.b.html
131http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/trojan.comxt.b.html
132http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/pf/downloader.fugif.htmlSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Self-updating
Programs that are used to detect and remove adware programs often do so by using signatures that are
based on known characteristics of the adware. As a result, adware vendors will often update the program in order to alter those characteristics, thereby evading those signatures. If the software is updated, thensignature-based antispyware products are less likely to recognize it and therefore may not be able toremove it. In some cases, the functionality of the adware program may also be updated. Table 12 lists the top ten most frequently updated security risks in the first half of 2006.
Table 12. Top ten self-updating security risks
Source: Symantec Corporation
Top ten new security risks
Three of the top ten new security risks detected during the first six months of 2006 are what Symantec calls
“misleading applications”. Misleading applications are programs that intentionally misrepresent the securitystatus of a computer by informing the user that a threat—usually nonexistent or fake—is on the user’scomputer. This is usually done in order to persuade users to pay money to purchase software or upgrade toa version of security software that will purportedly remove the “threats” that were found. This is a becomingan increasingly common tactic. Misleading applications accounted for 50% of the volume of the top ten newsecurity risks reported to Symantec in the first half of 2006.
Misleading applications can constitute a security risk for a number of reasons. First, the consumer will likely
get little or no security protection from the upgraded “security software.” The purchase of the upgradedsoftware therefore may give users a false sense that their computer is secure, which may be worse thanhaving no security at all. Second, in purchasing the upgrade, the user will likely have disclosed his or hercredit card information to the owner of the misleading application, who may then be able to use it forfurther fraudulent purposes.
Third, the initial downloader program that installed the misleading application may download other security
risks or malicious code onto the target system. Many downloaders can be reconfigured to download otherprograms from different locations, meaning that they could potentially open the doorto a wider variety ofprograms being installed on the target system. Finally, misleading applications also represent a threat toorganizations because of the time and effort that may be wasted in removing such applications from users’systems.Risk type
Dialer
Adware
Adware
Dialer
Adware
Adware
Adware
Adware
Adware
Adware Updates per days
11.9
10.7
8.3
7.5
6.2
3.6
3.6
2.9
2.9
2.7 Dial Platform
ZangoSearch
Aurora
Sfonditalia
SpySheriff
Istbar
Lop
BetterInternet
SurfSideKick
DollarRevenue Risk name
96Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Between January 1 and June 30, 2006, the most frequently reported new security risk was ErrorSafe,133
a misleading application that accounted for 30% of the volume of the top ten new security risks (table 13).
ErrorSafe gives exaggerated reports of threats on the computer and then prompts the user to purchase a registered version of the software in order to remove the reported threats.
Table 13. Top ten new security risks
Source: Symantec Corporation
DesktopMedia was the second most common new security risk reported to Symantec in the first half
of 2006.134This adware program installs a download manager toolbar for Internet Explorer and displays
advertisements from a Chinese Web site. It accounted for 30% of the reports in the top ten new securityrisks in the first half of 2006.
SpyFalcon was the third most common new security risk that Symantec detected in the first six months
of 2006.
135Like ErrorSafe, it is a misleading application. It accounted for 19% of reports of the top ten new
security risks.
In order to mitigate the threat posed by misleading applications, Symantec recommends that administrators
and users follow the recommended best practices outlined in Appendix A of this report, and exercisecaution when installing applications that purport to solve security issues. Enterprises should only installapplications that have been reviewed and certified as legitimate applications. Any application should onlybe deployed as part of an approved security policy.
Security risks—prevention and mitigation
In order to protect against security risks such as adware, spyware, and misleading applications, Symantec
recommends that all users continue to update their antivirus software regularly. Security administratorsshould also take extra measures to ensure that patch levels on all computers are up-to-date. Organizationscan develop and implement “whitelists” of permitted applications that are known to be trustworthy.
Symantec recommends that users and administrators employ defense in-depth, including the use of a
properly configured firewall, regularly updated antivirus, and IDS. Symantec also advises users to exercisecaution when installing any software through a Web browser and to not download any software fromsources that are not known and trusted.Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 Risk type
Misleading Application
Adware
Misleading Application
Adware
Adware
Adware
Adware
Adware
Trackware
Misleading Application ErrorSafe
DesktopMedia
SpyFalcon
NewWeb
AdvertMen
FCHelp
Caishow
BMCentral
ActivShopper
MalwareWipe Risk name
97133http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-012017-0346-99&tabid=1
134http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-050112-5838-99
135http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/spyfalcon.htmlSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Some security risks are installed using ActiveX controls. Symantec recommends that users either disable
ActiveX or use a Web browser that does not support ActiveX. However, as was also stated earlier, someusers may require ActiveX for some applications, in which case they should configure their browser torequire a prompt for ActiveX controls to execute.
Symantec recommends that organizations implement and enforce acceptable usage policies. System
administrators should regularly audit the system to ensure that no unauthorized software is installed oroperating on the system. Furthermore, administrators and end users should read the end-user licenseagreements (EULAs) of all software programs before agreeing to their conditions.
One final note of caution should be raised. Symantec recommends that users exercise caution when
removing spyware. Programs should be removed as non-intrusively as possible in order to minimize anyproblems that might result from the removal of the program. In order to avoid such problems, it may benecessary to ignore some non-critical aspects of these programs. Some components, such as registry keys,may also be used by other legitimate programs. Thus, if the artifacts are non-critical, it will not cause harmto leave them behind in the uninstall process.
98Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices
Enterprise Best Practices
1. Employ defense-in-depth strategies, which emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive
defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protectionmethod. This should include the deployment of regularly updated antivirus, firewalls, intrusiondetection, and intrusion protection systems on client systems.
2. Turn off and remove services that are not needed.3. If malicious code or some other threat exploits one or more network services, disable or block
access to those services until a patch is applied.
4. Always keep patch levels up-to-date, especially on computers that host public services and are
accessible through the firewall, such as HTTP, FTP, mail, and DNS services.
5. Consider implementing network compliance solutions that will help keep infected mobile users
out of the network (and clean them up before entering).
6. Enforce an effective password policy.7. Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments that are commonly
used to spread viruses, such as .VBS, .BAT, .EXE, .PIF, and .SCR files.
8. Isolate infected computers quickly to prevent the risk of further infection within the organization.
Perform a forensic analysis and restore the computers using trusted media.
9. Train employees to not open attachments unless they are expected and come from a known and trusted
source, and to not execute software that is downloaded from the Internet unless it has been scanned for viruses.
10. Ensure that emergency response procedures are in place. This includes having a backup-and-restore
solution in place in order to restore lost or compromised data in the event of successful attack orcatastrophic data loss.
11. Educate management on security budgeting needs.12. Test security to ensure that adequate controls are in place.13. Both spyware and adware can be automatically installed on computers along with file-sharing
programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software, or by clicking on linksand/or attachments in email messages, or via instant messaging clients. Ensure that only applicationsapproved by the organization are deployed on the desktop.
99Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Consumer Best Practices
1. Use an Internet security solution that combines antivirus, firewall, intrusion detection, and
vulnerability management for maximum protection against malicious code and other threats.
2. Ensure that security patches are up-to-date and that they are applied to all vulnerable applications
in a timely manner.
3. Ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers. Do not use dictionary words. Change
passwords often.
4. Never view, open or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is expected and the
purpose of the attachment is known.
5. Keep virus definitions updated regularly. By deploying the latest virus definitions, consumers can
protect their computers against the latest viruses known to be spreading “in the wild.”
6. Consumers should routinely check to see if their PC or Macintosh system is vulnerable to threats by
using Symantec Security Check at www.symantec.com/securitycheck.
7. All computer users need to know how to recognize computer hoaxes and phishing scams. Hoaxes
typically include a bogus email warning to “send this to everyone you know” and/or improper technicaljargon that is intended to frighten or mislead users. Phishing scams are much more sophisticated.Often arriving in email, phishing scams appear to come from a legitimate organization and entice users to enter credit card or other confidential information into forms on a Web site designed to looklike that of the legitimate organization. Computer users also need to consider who is sending theinformation and determine if the sender is a trustworthy, reliable source. The best course of action is to simply delete these types of emails.
8. Consumers can get involved in fighting cybercrime by tracking and reporting intruders. With Symantec
Security Check’s tracing service, users can quickly identify the location of potential hackers andforward the information to the attacker’s ISP or local police.
9. Be aware of the differences between adware and spyware. Adware is often used to gather data for
marketing purposes and generally has a valid, benign purpose. Spyware, on the other hand, may beused for malicious purposes, such as identity theft.
10. Both spyware and adware can be automatically installed on a computer with the installation of file-
sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software, or by clicking onlinks and/or attachments in e-mail messages, or via instant messaging clients. Therefore, users shouldbe informed and selective about what they install on their computer.
11. Don’t just click those “Yes, I accept” buttons on end-user license agreements (EULAs). Some spyware
and adware applications can be installed after an end user has accept the EULA, or as a consequenceof that acceptance. Read EULAs carefully to examine what they mean in terms of privacy. Theagreement should clearly explain what the product is doing and provide an uninstaller.
12. Beware of programs that flash ads in the user interface. Many spyware programs track how users
respond to these ads, and their presence is a red flag. When users see ads in a program’s userinterface, they may be looking at a piece of spyware.
100Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology
Attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec™ Global
Intelligence Network, which includes the Symantec DeepSight™ Threat Management System, Symantec™Managed Security Services, and the Symantec Honeypot Network. Both the Symantec DeepSight ThreatManagement System and the Symantec™ Managed Security Services refer to attacks in the same way,enabling analysts to combine and analyze attacks together. Symantec combines data derived from thesesources for analysis. In some cases, only one data source is used if attributes required for a particularanalysis are not available in the other.
Attack definitions
In order to avoid ambiguity with the findings presented in this discussion, Symantec’s methodology foridentifying various forms of attack activity is outlined clearly below. This methodology is applied consistentlythroughout our monitoring and analysis. The first step in analyzing attack activity is to define precisely whatan attack is. Attacks are individual instances of malicious network activity. Attacks consist of one IDS orfirewall alert that is indicative of a single attack action.
Explanation of research enquiries
This section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to gather and analyze the data andstatistics in this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of thereport, the following investigations warranted additional detail.
Top Web browser attacks
Symantec identifies and ranks attacks that are detected being carried out against Web browsers across the Symantec Deepsight Threat Management System and Managed Security Services base. This ranking is representative of the distribution of attacks that the average Web browser user can expect to observe.Symantec derives this rank by determining the proportion of IP addresses that carry out each attack, as this gives the best insight into the popularity of the attack.
Wireless threats
Symantec identifies and ranks threats posed against a sample of wireless networks using wireless securitytools. This ranking is representative of the relative popularity of each threat, and represents what a typicalwireless network administrator is expected to observe. The threats identified against wireless networks forthis metric do not deal with attacks against vulnerabilities on computers deployed on wireless networks, butthreats against the wireless network infrastructure itself. The threats are ranked according to the number ofthreats observed, giving greatest insight into threatening activity posed against wireless networks.
Denial of service attacks
Although there are numerous methods for carrying out denial of service (DoS) attacks, Symantec derives this metric by measuring denial of service attacks carried out by flooding a target with SYN requests, oftenreferred to as SYN flood attacks. This type of attack works by overwhelming a target with SYN requests andnot completing the initial request, which thus prevents other valid requests from being processed. In many
101Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
cases, SYN requests with forged IP addresses are sent to a target, causing a single attacking computer to
initiate multiple connections, resulting in unsolicited traffic, known as backscatter, being sent to othercomputers on the Internet. This backscatter is used to derive the number of DoS attacks observedthroughout the reporting period. Backscatter is only one method of obtaining DoS statistics and for thepurposes of this report is only intended to provide a high-level overview of overall DoS activity. Although thevalues Symantec derives from this metric will not identify all DoS attacks carried out, it will provide insightinto high-level DoS attack trends.
SYN flood attacks should not be confused with other types of DoS attacks. ICMP flooding is another method
of carrying out a DoS attack.
136This attack is carried out by bombarding a target computer with ICMP
messages until it becomes overwhelmed by them, so that it cannot service legitimate requests. ICMPflooding is also employed when carrying out Smurf DoS attacks.
137UDP flooding is another popular form of
DoS attack. This type of attack is typically carried out by flooding a target with an excessive number of UDPpackets in an attempt to tie up the network resources of the target computer so that it cannot servicelegitimate requests.
There are other types of DoS attacks, most of which are based on the exploitation of vulnerabilities in target
services. In most cases, sending a malformed message to a target computer hosting a vulnerable servicemay cause it to crash or freeze, subsequently denying service to legitimate users.
To determine the countries targeted by DoS attacks, Symantec cross-referenced the target IP addresses
of every attack with several third-party, subscription-based databases that link the geographic location of systems to source IP addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error. Targeted sectors were identified using the same methodology as targeted countries; however,attackers considered were those carrying out a set of denial of service attacks that were detected by IDS and IPS software.
Bot networks
Symantec identifies certain scanning patterns and network traffic and cross-references this traffic with rules that define specific coordinated scanning behavior, which would indicate bot network activity. For thisvolume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec implemented a new behavioral matching scheme to
expand our view into potential bot threats.
For an originating computer to be flagged as participating in this coordinated scanning, it must fit into that
scanning pattern to the exclusion of any other activity. This behavioral matching will not catch every botnetwork computer, and may identify other malicious code or individual attackers behaving in a coordinatedway as a bot network. This behavioral matching will, however, identify many of the most coordinated andaggressive bot-infected computers and ultimately will give insight into the population trends of bot networkcomputers.
Top bot network countries and cities
Using the data derived from the “Bot network” discussion of the “Attacks Trends” report, Symantec cross-references the IP addresses of every identified bot-infected computer with several third-partysubscription-based databases that link the geographic location of systems to IP addresses. While thesedatabases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error. The data produced is then used todetermine the global distribution of bot-infected computers.
102
136Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) is employed by the TCP/IP stack to handle error and control messages. Its most commonl y known
functionality, and that exploited by ICMP Flood attacks, is the Echo Request, Echo Reply sequence used by ping utilities.
137http://securityresponse.symantec.com/avcenter/venc/data/smurf.dos.attack.htmlSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Top originating countries
Symantec identified the national sources of attacks by automatically cross-referencing source IP addresses
of every attack with several third-party, subscription-based databases that link the geographic location ofsystems to source IP addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error.
Currently, Symantec cross-references source IP addresses of attacks against every country in the world.
It is important to note that while Symantec has a reliable process for identifying the source IP address of the host that is directly responsible for launching an attack, it is impossible to verify where the attackeris physically located. It is probable that many of the sources of attack are intermediary systems used todisguise the attacker’s true identity and location.
Top targeted sectors
For the purposes of the Internet Security Threat Report , a targeted attacker is one that is detected
attacking at least three users or organizations in a specific sector, to the exclusion of all other sectors.Figure 41 represents the sector breakdown of the sensor distribution in the sample set in percentageterms. Sectors with less than ten sensors have been excluded from the resulting totals.
The targeted sector attack rate is a measure of the percentage of total attackers that target only
organizations or users in a specific sector and is represented as a proportion of all targeted attacks. It canindicate which sectors are more frequently the targets of focused attacks. This metric may be affected bythe overall attack rate experienced by each sector; nevertheless, it provides an indication of the interestthat a sector holds for targeted attackers.
Figure 41. Industry representational breakdown
Source: Symantec CorporationHome user 93% Other 7%Accounting 4%Telecommunication >1%Small business 2%
Utilities/energy >1%
Community/
non-P >1%
Transportation
>1%
Manufacturing >1%
Arts/media >1%
Engineering >1%Financial
services >1%Government
– state >1%Education >1%Information
technology >1%Healthcare >1%
103Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix C—Vulnerability Trends Methodology
The “Vulnerability Trends” report of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report discusses developments
in the discovery and exploitation of vulnerabilities over the past six months. This methodology section willdiscuss how the data was gathered and how it was analyzed to come to the conclusions that are presentedin the “Vulnerability Trends” section.
Symantec maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive databases of security vulnerabilities, consisting
of over 18,000 distinct entries. Each distinct entry is created and maintained by Symantec threat analystswho vet the content for accuracy, veracity, and the applicability of its inclusion in the vulnerability databasebased on available information. The following metrics discussed in the “Vulnerability Trends” report arebased on the analysis of that data by Symantec researchers:
• Total number of vulnerabilities disclosed
• Web application vulnerabilities• Easily exploitable vulnerabilities (Total, and breakdown by type)• Patch development time (Enterprise, Operating System, Browser)• Exploit development time (Enterprise, Operating System, Browser)• Web browser vulnerabilities
The ways in which the data for the remaining metrics is gathered and analyzed will be discussed in the
remainder of this methodology.
Vulnerability classifications
Following the discovery and/or announcement of a new vulnerability, Symantec analysts gather all relevantcharacteristics of the new vulnerability and create an alert. This alert describes important traits of thevulnerability, such as the severity, ease of exploitation, and a list of affected products. These traits aresubsequently used both directly and indirectly for this analysis.
Vulnerability type
After discovering a new vulnerability, Symantec threat analysts classify the vulnerability into one of 12possible categories based on the available information. These categories focus on defining the core causeof the vulnerability, as opposed to classifying the vulnerability merely by its effect. The classificationsystem is derived from the academic taxonomy presented by Taimur Aslam et al (1996),
138to define
classifications of vulnerabilities. Possible values are indicated below, and the previously mentioned white paper provides a full description of the meaning behind each classification:
• Boundary condition error
• Access validation error• Origin validation error• Input validation error• Failure to handle exceptional conditions• Race condition error• Serialization error• Atomicity error
138“Use of a Taxonomy of Security Faults” http://ftp.cerias.purdue.edu/pub/papers/taimur-aslam/aslam-krsul-spaf-taxonomy.pdf104Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
• Environment error
• Configuration error• Design error
Easily exploitable vulnerabilities
The easily exploitable vulnerabilities metric covers vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit with littleeffort based on publicly available information. The vulnerability analyst assigns an exploit availabilityrating after thoroughly researching the need for and availability of exploits for the vulnerability. The “Easilyexploitable vulnerabilities” metric replaces the “Ease of exploitation” metric from previous versions of theInternet Security Threat Report . This change was made to accommodate adoption of the exploitability
rating in the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
139
All vulnerabilities are classified into one of four possible categories defined by the CVSS, listed below.
•Unconfirmed: Would-be attackers must use exploit code to make use of the vulnerability; however, no
such exploit code is publicly available.
•Proof-of-concept: Would-be attacks must use exploit code to make use of the vulnerability; however,
there is only proof-of-concept exploit available that is not functional enough to fully exploit thevulnerability.
•Functional: This rating is used under the following circumstances:
1. Exploit code to enable the exploitation of the vulnerability is publicly available to all would-be
attackers.
2. Would-be attackers can exploit the vulnerability without having to use any form of exploit code.
In other words, the attacker does not need to create or use complex scripts or tools to exploit the vulnerability.
•High: the vulnerability is reliably exploitable and there have been instances of self-propagating malicious
code exploiting the vulnerability in the wild.
For the purposes of this report, the last two categories of vulnerabilities are considered “easily exploitable”
because the attacker requires only limited sophistication to exploit the vulnerability. The first two categoriesof vulnerability are considered more difficult to exploit because attackers must develop their own exploitcode or improve an existing proof-of-concept to make use of the vulnerability.
Easily exploitable vulnerabilities by type
This version of the Internet Security Threat Report includes an analysis of the easily exploitable
vulnerabilities by type. To provide further insight into the types of vulnerabilities that are considered easilyexploitable, Symantec has categorized these vulnerabilities into several categories. They are as follows:
•Browser vulnerabilities: These vulnerabilities threaten Web browser applications through remote
attack vectors.
139http://www.first.org/cvss/105Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
•Client-side vulnerabilities: These vulnerabilities threaten network client applications or non-networked
applications that process malicious data that may arrive through another networked application. Remoteattack vectors may exist but client-side vulnerabilities usually require some amount of user-interactionon the part of the victim to be exploited.
•Local vulnerabilities: These are vulnerabilities that require local access to exploit. Local attacks may
affect a large variety of applications that may or may not include network capabilities. The differentiatoris that these vulnerabilities are not exploitable by remote attackers unless they can log on to the systemand interactively run commands as an unprivileged user.
•Server vulnerabilities: These are vulnerabilities that affect server applications. Server applications are
typically defined as applications that are accessible to remote clients via connections on a range of TCPports. Server vulnerabilities generally do not require user-interaction on the part of the victim beyondenabling and starting the service so that it listens for incoming requests.
•Web Applications: These vulnerabilities affect applications that are deployed on a Web server platform
variety of some sort. Such applications are usually in a server side scripting language such as PHP orASP.NET and accessed through the HTTP/HTTPS protocols.
•Other: There are vulnerabilities that do not discretely fall into the above categories. This can include
applications for which the distinction is blurred between server and client, or hardware platforms wherethe affected component cannot be described by any of the other categories.
The specific categories themselves were devised so that the majority of vulnerabilities could easily be
classified with little overlap between categories so that the total percentage of all categories equals 100%.These categories are defined in general by the attack vector and by the type of application that isthreatened.
Operating system patch development time
This metric has a similar methodology to the “Operating system, enterprise vendors” metric, which wasexplained previously in this methodology. However, instead of applying it to enterprise-scale vendors, the patch development time average is calculated from patched vulnerabilities for the following operating systems:
• Apple Mac OS X
• Hewlett-Packard HP-UX• Microsoft Windows• Red Hat Linux (including enterprise versions and Red Hat Fedora)• Sun Microsystems Solaris
An average is calculated from the patch release times for each vulnerability in the reporting period per
operating system. The patch development time average for each operating system is then compared. This metric is incorporated when computing the “window of exposure”, which amounts to the patchdevelopment time average minus the exploit development time average.
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Window of exposure, enterprise vendors
Symantec records the window of time between the publication of an initial vulnerability report and the
appearance of third-party exploit code; this is known as the exploit development time. The time periodbetween the disclosure date of a vulnerability and the release date of an associated patch is known as thepatch development time.
140The time lapse between the public release of exploit code and the time that the
affected vendor releases a patch for the affected vulnerability is known as the window of exposure.
The window of exposure is calculated as the difference in days between the exploit development time
average and the patch development time average. During this time, the computer or system on which theaffected application is deployed may be susceptible to attack, as administrators have no official recourseagainst a vulnerability and must resort to best practices and workarounds to reduce the risk of attacks.Explanations of the exploit development time average and the patch development time average are included below.
It is also important to note that the set of vulnerabilities included in this metric is limited and does not
represent all software from all possible vendors. Instead, it only includes vendors who are classified asenterprise vendors. The purpose is to illustrate the window of exposure for widely deployed mission-criticalsoftware. Because of the large number of vendors with technologies that have a very low deployment(these form the majority), only exploits for technologies from enterprise vendors (that is, those thatgenerally have widespread deployment) are included. Those vendors are:
• Microsoft
• Sun™•H P ®• Symantec• EMC• IBM®• Cisco®• Oracle®• CA™ (Computer Associates)• McAfee®
Patch development time, enterprise vendors
The time to patch metric measures the time lapse between the disclosure date of a vulnerability and the release date of a patch that is developed to repair that vulnerability. Only those patches that areindependent objects (such as fixes, upgrades, etc.) are included in this analysis. Other remediationsolutions—such as workaround steps, for instance—are excluded.
For each individual patch from these vendors, the time lapse between the patch release date and the
publish date of the vulnerability is computed. An average from the aggregate of these is computed for eachperiod. As some vendors may release more patches than others for a particular vulnerability, Symantecconsiders only the first instance of a single patch for each vulnerability. This metric is incorporated whencomputing the “window of exposure”, which is calculated as the difference between the average patchdevelopment time and the average exploit development time.
140This statistic only considers specific file-based patches or upgrades, and not general solutions. Instances in which the vendor provides a workaround or
manual fix steps, for example, are not included.107Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Exploit code development time, enterprise vendors
The ability to measure exploit code development time is limited and applies only to vulnerabilities that would
normally require exploit code. Therefore, the metric is based on vulnerabilities that Symantec considers to beof sufficient complexity, and for which functional exploit code was not available until it was created by a thirdparty. This consideration therefore excludes the following:
• Vulnerabilities that do not require exploit code (unconfirmed exploitability)
• Vulnerabilities associated with non-functional proof-of-concept code (proof-of-concept exploitability)
The date of vulnerability disclosure is based on the date of the first reference found (such as a mailing list
post). The date of exploit code publication is the date of the first reference to the exploit code found. As thepurpose of this metric is to estimate the time it takes for exploit code to materialize as a result of activedevelopment, exploit code publication dates that fall outside of 30 day range from initial vulnerabilitypublication are excluded from this metric. It is assumed that exploit code that was published after thisperiod was not actively developed from the initial announcement of the vulnerability.
Since this metric only considers the appearance of the first functional exploit, it is possible that reliable
exploits may materialize later that improve upon initial exploits. These exploits may take much longer todevelop, but are not considered because the window of exposure begins as soon as the first functionalexploit surfaces.
The time lapse between the disclosure of a vulnerability and the appearance of exploit code for that
vulnerability is determined. The aggregate time for all vulnerabilities is determined and the average time iscalculated. This metric is incorporated when computing the “window of exposure”, which is the differencebetween the average patch development time and the average exploit development time average.
Window of exposure, Web browsers
This metric has a similar methodology to the “Window of exposure, enterprise vendors” metric. However,instead of applying it to enterprise-scale vendors, the window of exposure is calculated for vulnerabilitiesassociated with the following Web browsers:
• Microsoft Internet Explorer
• Mozilla Firefox and Mozilla browser• Opera• Apple Safari
Symantec records the window of time between the publication of an initial vulnerability report and the
appearance of third-party exploit code; this is known as the exploit code development time. The time periodbetween the disclosure date of a vulnerability and the release date of an associated patch is known as thepatch development time.
141The time lapse between the public release of exploit code and the time that the
affected vendor releases a patch for the affected vulnerability is known as the window of exposure.
The window of exposure is calculated as the difference in days between the average patch development time
average and the average exploit code development time average. During this time, the computer or systemon which the affected application is deployed may be susceptible to attack, as administrators may have no
141This statistic only considers specific file-based patches or upgrades, and not general solutions. Instances in which the vendor provides a workaround or manual
fix steps, for example, are not included.108Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
official recourse against a vulnerability and must resort to best practices and workarounds to reduce the risk
of attacks. Explanations of the exploit development time average and the patch development time averageare included below.
Web browser patch development time
An average is calculated from the patch release time for each vulnerability affecting each Web browserduring the reporting period. The patch development time average for each browser is then compared. This metric is incorporated when computing the “window of exposure,” which amounts to the differencebetween the average patch development time and the average exploit code development time.
Web browser exploit development time
An average is calculated from the exploit release time for each vulnerability affecting each Web browserduring the reporting period. The exploit development time average for each browser is then compared. This metric is incorporated when computing the “window of exposure,” which amounts to the differencebetween the average patch development time and the average exploit code development time.
Web browser vulnerabilities
This metric will offer a comparison of vulnerability data for numerous Web browsers, namely: MicrosoftInternet Explorer, the Mozilla browsers (which includes Firefox), Opera, and Safari. However, in assessing thecomparative data, the following important caveats should be kept in mind before making any conclusions:
• The total number of vulnerabilities in the aforementioned Web browsers were computed for this report.
This includes vulnerabilities that have been confirmed by the vendor and those that are not vendorconfirmed. This version of the Internet Security Threat Report differs from the previous version in that
vulnerabilities that are not confirmed are also included in the data. These vulnerabilities were found to bestatistically significant, especially given the disparity in patch times between vendors. This version of thereport does not differentiate between vendor-confirmed and non-vendor-confirmed when calculating thetotal number of vulnerabilities.
• Individual browser vulnerabilities are notoriously difficult to pinpoint and identify precisely. A reported
attack may be a combination of several conditions, each of which could be considered a vulnerability in its own right. This may distort the total vulnerability count. Some browser issues have also beenimproperly identified as operating system vulnerabilities or vice versa. This is, in part, due to increasingoperating system integration that makes it difficult to correctly identify the affected component in many cases.
Many vulnerabilities in shared operating system components can potentially be exposed to attacks
through the browser. This report, where sufficient information is available to make the distinction,enumerates only those vulnerabilities that are known to affect the browser itself.
• Not every vulnerability that is discovered is exploited. As of this writing, there has been no widespread
exploitation of any browser except Microsoft Internet Explorer. This is expected to change as otherbrowsers become more widely deployed.
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Appendix D—Malicious Code Trends Methodology
The trends in the “Malicious Code Trends” section are based on statistics from malicious code samples
reported to Symantec for analysis. Symantec gathers data from over 120 million client, server, and gatewaysystems that have deployed Symantec’s antivirus products in both consumer and corporate environments.The Symantec Digital Immune System and Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting process.
Observations in the “Malicious Code Trends” section are based on empirical data and expert analysis of this
data. The data and analysis draw primarily from two databases described below.
Infection database
To help detect and eradicate computer viruses, Symantec developed the Symantec AntiVirus™ ResearchAutomation (SARA) technology. Symantec uses this technology to analyze, replicate, and define a largesubset of the most common computer viruses that are quarantined by Symantec Antivirus customers.
On average, SARA receives hundreds of thousands of suspect files daily from both enterprise and individual
consumers located throughout the world. Symantec then analyzes these suspect files, matching them withvirus definitions. An analysis of this aggregate data set provides statistics on infection rates for differenttypes of malicious code.
Malicious code database
In addition to infection data, Symantec Security Response analyzes and documents attributes for each newform of malicious code that emerges both in the wild and in a “zoo” (or controlled laboratory) environment.Descriptive records of new forms of malicious code are then entered into a database for future reference.For this report, a historical trend analysis was performed on this database to identify, assess and discussany possible trends, such as the use of different infection vectors and the frequency of various types ofpayloads.
In some cases, Symantec antivirus products may initially detect new malicious code heuristically or by
generic signatures. These may later be reclassified and given unique detections. Because of this, there maybe slight variance in the presentation of the same data set from one volume of the Internet Security Threat
Report to the next.
Previously unseen malicious code threats
This metric derives its data from the Symantec Honeypot Network. Computers compromised on the honeypot
network track and analyze each piece of malicious code that is installed by the attacker. Symantec definespreviously unseen malicious threats as those that are detected on Symantec’s honeypot computers for thefirst time before they are detected by other means. The proportion of previously unseen malicious codethreats is derived by comparison with the total number of distinct malicious code threats observed.
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Appendix E—Phishing, Spam, and Security Risks Methodology
Traditionally, the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report has broken security threats down into three
general categories: attacks, vulnerabilities, and malicious code. However, as Internet-based services andapplications have expanded and diversified, the potential for computer programs to introduce other typesof security risks has increased. The emergence of new risks, particularly spam, phishing, spyware, adware,and misleading applications has necessitated an expansion of the traditional security taxonomy.
Symantec has monitored these new concerns as they have developed. This section will examine
developments in these risks over the first six months of 2006. In particular, it will consist of three sub-sections, which will discuss:
• Phishing
• Spam• Security risks, particularly adware, spyware and misleading applications
Phishing
Phishing attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec ProbeNetwork. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam data is assessed to gauge the growth in phishing attempts as well as the percentage of Internet mail that is determined to be phishing attempts. Symantec BrightmailAntiSpam field data consists of statistics reported back from customer installations that provide feedbackabout the detection behaviors of antifraud filters as well as the overall volume of mail being processed.
It should be noted that different monitoring organizations use different methods to track phishing
attempts. Some groups may identify and count unique phishing messages based solely on specific contentitems such as subject headers or URLs. These varied methods can often lead to differences in the numberof phishing attempts reported by different organizations.
Phishing attempt definition
The Symantec Probe Network is a system of over two million decoy accounts that attract email messages
from 20 different countries around the world. It encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises and attracts email samples that are representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 millionmailboxes. The Probe Network covers countries in the Americas, Europe, Asia, Africa andAustralia/Oceania.
The Symantec Probe Network data is used to track the growth in new attacks. A phishing attempt is a
group of email messages with similar properties, such as headers and content, that are sent to uniqueusers. The messages attempt to gain confidential and personal information from online users.
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam software reports statistics to Symantec Security Response that indicate
messages processed, messages filtered, and filter specific data. Symantec has classified different filters sothat spam statistics and phishing statistics can be determined separately. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpamfield data is used to identify general trends in phishing email messages.
111Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Explanation of research enquiries
This section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to produce the data and statistics in
this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, thefollowing investigations warrant additional detail.
Six-month growth in phishing messages
Symantec maintains automated systems to identify new potential fraud messages received by the
Symantec Probe Network. Messages are grouped into attacks based on similarities in the message bodiesand headers. Sample messages are then passed through general fraud heuristics to identify messages aspotential phishing attempts. Symantec Security Response reviews events that are identified as attacks for the purposes of confirmation and filter development. The Symantec Brightmail Business IntelligenceDepartment reviews phishing attacks in order to develop predictive filters known as Symantec BrightmailAntiSpam heuristics.
The data presented in this section is based on monthly totals in the number of new unique phishing
messages discovered and ruled upon by Symantec Security Response. Security Response addresses onlythose phishing messages not caught by existing antispam and antifraud filters. Existing filters refer only to those antispam and antifraud filters used across the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base.
Some fraud messages will be captured in the field based upon predictive filters (heuristics); however, not
all of Symantec’s customers utilize this technology or have upgraded to this technology. Therefore, themessages are still reviewed by Security Response for development of filters that are more widely dispersed.
Blocked phishing attempts
The number of blocked phishing attempts is calculated from the total number of phishing email messages
that were blocked in the field by Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam antifraud filters. The data for this sectionis based on monthly totals.
Phishing as a percent of email scanned
The data for this section is determined by the number of email messages that trigger antifraud filters in
the field versus the total number of email messages scanned. These filters are distributed across theSymantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base. The data for this section is based on monthly totals.
Phishing activity by sector
The Symantec Phish Report Network is an extensive antifraud community where members contribute and
receive fraudulent Web site addresses for alerting and filtering across a broad range of solutions. Thesesites are categorized according to the brand being phished and its industry sector. The Phish ReportNetwork has senders that send in phishing attacks from many different sources. They include a clientdetection network that detects phishing Web sites as the clients visit various Web sites on the Internet.There is also server detection from spam emails.
The sender confirms all spoof sites before sending the address of the Web site into the Phish Report
Network. After the spoof site is sent into the Phish Report Network, Symantec spoof detection technology
112Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
is used to verify that the Web site is a spoof site. Research analysts manage the Phish Report Network
Console 24x7x365 and manually review all spoof sites sent into the Phish Report Network to eliminate falsepositives.
Spam
The Symantec Probe Network is a system of over two million decoy accounts that attract email messagesfrom 20 different countries around the world. It encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises and attracts email samples that are representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 millionmailboxes. The Probe Network includes accounts in countries in the Americas, Europe, Asia, Africa andAustralia/Oceania.
Spam trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from both the Symantec Probe
Network as well as Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam softwarereports statistics to the Brightmail Logistical Operations Center (BLOC) indicating messages processed,messages filtered, and filter-specific data. Symantec has classified different filters so that spam statisticsand phishing statistics can be determined separately. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data includesdata reported back from customer installations providing feedback from antispam filters as well as overallmail volume being processed.
Sample set normalization
Due to the numerous variables influencing a company’s spam activity, Symantec focused on identifying
spam activity and growth projections with Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data from enterprisecustomer installations having more than 1,000 total messages per day. This normalization yields a moreaccurate summary of Internet spam trends by ruling out problematic and laboratory test servers thatproduce smaller sample sets.
Explanation of research inquiries
This section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to produce the data and statistics in
this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, thefollowing investigations warranted additional detail.
Spam as a percentage of email scanned
The data for this section is determined by the number of email messages that trigger antispam filters in the
field versus the total number of email messages scanned. These filters are distributed across the SymantecBrightmail AntiSpam customer base. The data for this section is based on monthly totals.
Top ten countries of spam origin
The data for this section is determined by calculating the frequency of originating server IP addresses in
email messages that trigger antispam filters in the field. The IP addresses are mapped to their host countryof origin and the data is summarized by country based on monthly totals. The percentage of spam percountry is calculated from the total spam detected in the field.
113Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
It should be noted that the location of the computer from which spam is detected being sent is not
necessarily the location of the spammer. Spammers can build networks of compromised computersglobally and thereby use computers that are geographically separate from their location. Following thislogic, the region from which the spam originates may not correspond with the region in which thespammer is located.
Security Risks
Symantec products not only help users to protect their data from the threat of viruses, worms, and Trojanhorses, but to evaluate potential security risks from the introduction of other programs as well. SymantecAntiVirus classifies these other programs as additional security risks. Security risks include programs thatmay be categorized, based upon functional criteria, as adware, spyware, or misleading applications.Symantec classifies these programs based on a number of characteristics. Once categorized, they can bedetected, allowing users to choose whether to keep or remove them based on their personal needs andsecurity policies.
General criteria for security risks
A program classified as an additional security risk is an application or software-based executable that is
either independent or interdependent on another software program and meets the following criteria:
1. It is considered to be non-viral in nature; 2. It meets criteria for programmatic functionality having potential to affect security;3. It has been reported to Symantec by a critical number of either corporate or individual users within
a given timeframe. The timeframe and number may vary by category or risk.
Symantec further classifies programs based upon functional criteria related to the result of the program’s
introduction to a computer system. The criteria take into consideration functionality that includes stealth,privacy, performance impact, damage, and removal.
Adware, spyware, and misleading applications
Adware programs are those that facilitate the delivery and display of advertising content onto the user’s
display device. This may be done without the user’s prior consent or explicit knowledge. The advertising isoften, but not always, presented in the form of pop-up windows or bars that appear on the screen. In somecases, these programs may gather information from the user’s computer, including information related toInternet browser usage or other computing habits, and relay this information back to a remote computer.
Spyware programs are stand-alone programs that can unobtrusively monitor system activity and either
relay the information back to another computer or hold it for subsequent retrieval. In some cases, spywareprograms may be used by corporations to monitor employee Internet usage or by parents to monitor theirchildren’s Internet usage.
114Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Spyware programs can be surreptitiously placed on users’ systems in order to gather confidential
information such as passwords, login details, and credit card details. This can be done through keystrokelogging and by capturing email and instant messaging traffic.
Misleading applications are programs that intentionally misrepresent the security status of a computer by
informing the user that a threat, usually nonexistent or fake, is on the user’s computer. This is usually donein order to persuade the user to pay money to upgrade to a paid-for version of the software that willremove the “threats” that are claimed to be found.
The potential security risks introduced by adware, spyware, and misleading applications are discussed
according to samples, or individual cases of each security risk, reported to Symantec by customersdeploying Symantec AntiVirus. While security risks are not categorized as malicious code, Symantecmonitors them using many of the same methods used for tracking malicious code development andproliferation. This involves an ongoing analysis of reports and data delivered from over 120 million client,server, and gateway email systems, as well as filtration of 25 million email messages per day. Symantecthen compiles the most common reports and analyzes them to determine the appropriate categorization.The discussion included in the “Security Risks” report is based on Symantec’s analysis of these reports.
115Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
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117Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
118Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec Corporation.
NO WARRANTY. The technical information is being delivered to you as is and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its acc uracy or use. Any use of the
technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user. Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical
errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice.
Copyright © 2006 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved. Symantec, the Symantec logo, Brightmail, DeepSight, Digital Immune System, and Symantec AntiVirus
are trademarks or registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation or its affiliates in the U.S. and other countries. Apple and Ma c OS are registered trademarks of
Apple Computer, Inc. Safari is a trademark of Apple Computer, Inc. Microsoft, ActiveX, Excel, MSN, Win32, Windows, and Windows Vista are either registered
trademarks or trademarks of Microsoft Corporation in the United States and/or other countries. Sun, JavaScript, and Solaris are trademarks or registered
trademarks of Sun Microsystems, Inc., in the U.S. or other countries. Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners.
|
SYMANTEC ENTERPRISE SECURITY
Symantec Internet Security
Threat ReportTrends for July–December 06
Volume XI, Published March 2007Dean Turner
Executive EditorSymantec Security Response
Stephen Entwisle
Senior EditorSymantec Security Response
Marci Denesiuk
EditorSymantec Security Response
Marc Fossi
Analyst Symantec Security Response
Joseph Blackbird
Analyst Symantec Security Response
David McKinney
Analyst Symantec Security Response
Ronald Bowes
AnalystSymantec Security Response
Nicholas Sullivan
AnalystSymantec Security Response
Peter Coogan
Analyst Symantec Security Response
Candid Wueest
AnalystSymantec Security Response
Ollie Whitehouse
Security Architect—Advanced Threat ResearchSymantec Security Response
Zulfikar Ramzan
Analyst—Advanced Threat ResearchSymantec Security Response
Contributors
David Cole
Director Product ManagementSymantec Security Response
Peter Szor
Security ArchitectSymantec Security Response
David Cowings
Sr. Business Intelligence ManagerSymantec Business Intelligence
Shravan Shashikant
Pr. Business Intelligence ManagerSymantec Business Intelligence
Igor Moochnick
Sr. Software EngineerSymantec Instant Messaging SecurityInternet Security Threat Report Volume XI Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Internet Security Threat Report Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
Future Watch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Attack Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Vulnerability Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Malicious Code Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Phishing, Spam, and Security Risks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Appendix C—Vulnerability Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
Appendix D—Malicious Code Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
Appendix E—Phishing, Spam, and Security Risks Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98ContentsVolume XI, Published March 2007
Symantec Internet Security Threat ReportSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Internet Security Threat Report Volume XI Executive Summary
Over the past two reporting periods, Symantec has observed a fundamental shift in Internet security
activity. The current threat environment is characterized by an increase in data theft and data leakage, and the creation of malicious code that targets specific organizations for information that can be used
for financial gain.
Instead of exploiting high-severity vulnerabilities in direct attacks, attackers are now discovering and
exploiting medium-severity vulnerabilities in third-party applications, such as Web applications and Webbrowsers. Those vulnerabilities are often used in “gateway” attacks, in which an initial exploitation takesplace not to breach data immediately, but to establish a foothold from which subsequent, more maliciousattacks can be launched.
Symantec has observed high levels of malicious activity across the Internet, with increases in phishing,
spam, bot networks, Trojans, and zero-day threats. However, whereas in the past these threats were often
used separately, attackers are now refining their methods and consolidating their assets to create globalnetworks that support coordinated criminal activity.
This has resulted in an increasing interoperability between diverse threats and methods. For example,
targeted malicious code may take advantage of Web-enabled technologies and third-party applications toinstall a back door, which then downloads and installs bot software. These bots can, in turn, be used todistribute spam, host phishing sites, or launch attacks in such a way as to create a single coordinatednetwork of malicious activity. Once entrenched, these networks can be used in concert as global networksof malicious activity that support their own continued growth.
This volume of the Internet Security Threat Report will offer an overview of threat activity that took place
between July 1 and December 31, 2006. This brief summary and the discussion that follows will offer a
synopsis of the data and trends that are presented in the main report. Symantec will continue to monitorand assess threat activity in order to best prepare consumers and enterprises for the complex Internetsecurity issues to come.
Internet Security Threat Report Overview
The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report provides a six-month update of Internet threat activity. It
includes analysis of network-based attacks, a review of known vulnerabilities, and highlights of malicious
code. It also assesses numerous issues related to online fraud, including phishing, spam, and security risks
such as adware, spyware, and misleading applications. This summary of the Internet Security Threat Report
will alert readers to current trends and impending threats. In addition, it will offer recommendations for
protection against and mitigation of these concerns. This volume covers the six-month period from
July 1 to December 31, 2006.
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the world.
The Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network, which includes Symantec DeepSight™ Threat ManagementSystem and Symantec™ Managed Security Services, tracks attack activity across the entire Internet. It
consists of over 40,000 sensors monitoring network activity in over 180 countries. As well, Symantecgathers malicious code data along with spyware and adware reports from over 120 million client, server,and gateway systems that have deployed Symantec’s antivirus products.
4Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
1The BugTraq mailing list is hosted by SecurityFocus (http://www.securityfocus.com). Archives are available at http://www.securi tyfocus.com/archive/15Symantec operates one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion of vulnerabilities on
the Internet, the BugTraq™ mailing list, which has approximately 50,000 direct subscribers who contribute,receive, and discuss vulnerability research on a daily basis.
1Symantec also maintains one of the world’s
most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting of over 20,000 vulnerabilities (spanningmore than a decade) affecting more than 45,000 technologies from over 7,000 vendors. Symantec alsotracks and assesses certain criminal activities using online fraud monitoring tools.
Finally, the Symantec Probe Network, a system of over two million decoy accounts, attracts email messages
from 20 different countries around the world, allowing Symantec to gauge global spam and phishing activity.These resources give Symantec analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify emerging trendsin attacks and malicious code activity. Symantec also gathers phishing information through the SymantecPhish Report Network, an extensive antifraud community of enterprises and consumers. Members of thenetwork contribute and receive fraudulent Web site addresses for alerting and filtering across a broad range of solutions.
The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report is grounded principally on the expert analysis of data provided
by all of these sources. Based on Symantec’s expertise and experience, this analysis yields a highly informedcommentary on current Internet threat activity. By publishing the analysis of Internet security activity in theSymantec Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec hopes to provide enterprises and consumers with the
information they need to help effectively secure their systems now and in the future.
Executive Summary Highlights
The following section will offer a brief summary of the security trends that Symantec observed during thisperiod based on data provided by the sources listed above. This summary includes all of the metrics that are included in the main report. Following this overview, the Executive Summary will discuss selectedmetrics in greater depth.
Attack Trends Highlights
• The government sector accounted for 25 percent of all identity theft-related data breaches, more than
any other sector.
• The theft or loss of a computer or other data-storage medium made up 54 percent of all identity theft-
related data breaches during this period.
• The United States was the top country of attack origin, accounting for 33 percent of worldwide attack
activity.
• Symantec recorded an average of 5,213 denial of service (DoS) attacks per day, down from 6,110 in the
first half of the year.
• The United States was the target of most DoS attacks, accounting for 52 percent of the worldwide total. • The government sector was the sector most frequently targeted by DoS attacks, accounting for 30 percent
of all detected attacks.
• Microsoft Internet Explorer was targeted by 77 percent of all attacks specifically targeting Web browsers. • Home users were the most highly targeted sector, accounting for 93 percent of all targeted attacks. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
2The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report has been tracking vulnerabilities in six-month periods since January 2002.6• Symantec observed an average of 63,912 active bot-infected computers per day, an 11 percent increase
from the previous period.
• China had 26 percent of the world’s bot-infected computers, more than any other country.
• The United States had the highest number of bot command-and-control computers, accounting for
40 percent of the worldwide total.
• Beijing was the city with the most bot-infected computers in the world, accounting for just over five
percent of the worldwide total.
• The United States accounted for 31 percent of all malicious activity during this period, more than any
other country.
• Israel was the highest ranked country for malicious activity per Internet user, followed by Taiwan and
Poland.
• Fifty-one percent of all underground economy servers known to Symantec were located in the United
States, the highest total of any country.
• Eighty-six percent of the credit and debit cards advertised for sale on underground economy servers
known to Symantec were issued by banks in the United States.
Vulnerability Trends Highlights
• Symantec documented 2,526 vulnerabilities in the second half of 2006, 12 percent higher than the first
half of 2006, and a higher volume than in any other previous six-month period.2
• Symantec classified four percent of all vulnerabilities disclosed during this period as high severity,
69 percent were medium severity, and 27 percent were low severity.
• Sixty-six percent of vulnerabilities disclosed during this period affected Web applications.
• Seventy-nine percent of all vulnerabilities documented in this reporting period were considered to be
easily exploitable.
• Seventy-seven percent of all easily exploitable vulnerabilities affected Web applications, and seven
percent affected servers.
• Ninety-four percent of all easily exploitable vulnerabilities disclosed in the second half of 2006 were
remotely exploitable.
• In the second half of 2006, all the operating system vendors that were studied had longer average patch
development times than in the first half of the year.
• Sun Solaris had an average patch development time of 122 days in the second half of 2006, the highest
of any operating system.
• Sixty-eight percent of the vulnerabilities documented during this period were not confirmed by the
affected vendor.
• The window of exposure for vulnerabilities affecting enterprise vendors was 47 days.
• Symantec documented 54 vulnerabilities in Microsoft Internet Explorer, 40 in the Mozilla browsers,
and four each in Apple Safari and Opera.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
• Mozilla had a window of exposure of two days, the shortest of any Web browser during this period.
• Twenty-five percent of exploit code was released less than one day after vulnerability publication.
Thirty-one percent was released in one to six days after vulnerability publication.
• Symantec documented 12 zero-day vulnerabilities during this period, a significant increase from the
one documented in the first half of 2006.
• Symantec documented 168 vulnerabilities in Oracle database implementations, more than any
other database.
Malicious Code Trends Highlights
• Of the top ten new malicious code families detected in the last six months of 2006, five were Trojans,
four were worms, and one was a virus.
• The most widely reported new malicious code family this period was that of the Stration worm.3
• Symantec honeypot computers captured a total of 136 previously unseen malicious code threats
between July 1 and December 31, 2006.
• During this period, 8,258 new Win32 variants were reported to Symantec, an increase of 22 percent
over the first half of 2006.
• Worms made up 52 percent of the volume of malicious code threats, down from 75 percent in the
previous period.
• The volume of Trojans in the top 50 malicious code samples reported to Symantec increased from
23 percent to 45 percent.
• Trojans accounted for 60 percent of the top 50 malicious code samples when measured by potential
infections.
• Polymorphic threats accounted for three percent of the volume of top 50 malicious code reports this
period, up from one percent in the two previous periods.
• Bots made up only 14 percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code reports.• Threats to confidential information made up 66 percent of the top 50 malicious code reported
to Symantec.
• Keystroke logging threats made up 79 percent of confidential information threats by volume of reports,
up from 57 percent in the first half of the year and 66 percent in the second half of 2005.
• Seventy-eight percent of malicious code that propagated did so over SMTP, making it the most commonly
used propagation mechanism.
• Malicious code using peer-to-peer to propagate rose from 23 percent of all propagating malicious code
in the first six months of 2006 to 29 percent in the last half of the year.
• The majority of malicious code reports during this period originated in the United States.
3http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-092111-0525-997Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
• During the second half of 2006, 23 percent of the 1,318 documented malicious code instances exploited
vulnerabilities.
• MSN Messenger was affected by 35 percent of new instant messaging threats in the second half of
the year.
Phishing, Spam, and Security Risks Highlights
• The Symantec Probe Network detected a total of 166,248 unique phishing messages, a six percent
increase over the first six months of 2006. This equates to an average of 904 unique phishing messagesper day for the second half of 2006.
• Symantec blocked over 1.5 billion phishing messages, an increase of 19 percent over the first half
of 2006.
• Throughout 2006, Symantec detected an average of 27 percent fewer unique phishing messages on
weekends than the weekday average of 961.
• On weekends, the number of blocked phishing attempts was seven percent lower than the weekday
average of 7,958,323 attempts per day.
• Organizations in the financial services sector accounted for 84 percent of the unique brands that were
phished during this period.
• Forty-six percent of all known phishing Web sites were located in the United States, a much higher
proportion than in any other country.
• Between July 1 and December 31, 2006, spam made up 59 percent of all monitored email traffic. This
is an increase over the first six months of 2006 when 54 percent of email was classified as spam.
• Sixty-five percent of all spam detected during this period was written in English.• In the last six months of 2006, 0.68 percent of all spam email contained malicious code. This means
that one out of every 147 spam messages blocked by Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam containedmalicious code.
• Spam related to financial services made up 30 percent of all spam during this period, the most of any
category.
• During the last six months of 2006, 44 percent of all spam detected worldwide originated in the United
States.
• The United States hosted the largest proportion of spam zombies, with 10 percent of the worldwide
total.
• The most commonly reported security risk was an adware program named ZangoSearch.• All of the top ten security risks reported in the last six months of 2006 employ at least one anti-removal
technique compared to only five of the top ten security risks in the last reporting period.
• All of the top ten security risks reported during this period employ self-updating. • Potentially unwanted applications accounted for 41 percent of reports in the top ten new security risks
in the second half of 2006.
• Misleading application detections increased by 40 percent in the second half of 2006.
8Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Executive Summary Discussion
This section will discuss selected metrics from the Internet Security Threat Report in greater depth, providing
analysis and discussion of the trends indicated by the data. The following metrics will be discussed:
• Malicious activity by country
• Data breaches that could lead to identity theft• Underground economy servers• Zero-day vulnerabilities • Threats to confidential information• Malicious code types • Phishing • Spam • Bot-infected computers
Malicious activity by country
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is evaluating the countries
in which malicious activity takes place or originates. To determine this, Symantec has compiled geographicaldata on numerous malicious activities, namely: bot-infected computers, bot command-and-control servers,phishing Web sites, malicious code reports, spam relay hosts, and Internet attacks.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2006, the United States was the top country for malicious activity,
accounting for 31 percent of the worldwide total (table 1). For each of the malicious activities taken into account for this measurement, the United States ranked number one by a large margin with theexception of bot-infected computers. It ranked second for that criterion, 12 percentage points lower than China.
Table 1. Malicious activity by country
Source: Symantec CorporationOverall
Rank
1
23456789
10Country
United States
ChinaGermanyFranceUnited KingdomSouth KoreaCanadaSpainTaiwanItalyOverall
Proportion
31%
10%
7%4%4%4%3%3%3%3%Malicious
Code Rank
1
3794
12
5
13
82Spam Host
Rank
1
234
13
9
23
5
11
8Command
and Control
Server Rank
1
43
14
925
15
6
10Phishing
Host Rank
1
824397
16
6
14Bot
Rank
2
1436
1110
57
12Attack
Rank
1
2346957
1110
9Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
The high degree of malicious activity originating in the United States is likely driven by the expansive
Internet infrastructure there. The United States accounts for 19 percent of the world’s Internet users.4
Furthermore, the number of broadband Internet users in that country grew by 14 percent betweenDecember 2005 and July 2006.
5Despite the relatively well developed security infrastructure in the United
States, the high number of Internet-connected computers there presents more targets for attackers tocompromise for malicious use. Symantec predicts that the United States will remain the highest ranked
country for malicious activity until another country exceeds it in numbers of Internet users and
broadband connectivity.
China was the second highest country for malicious activity during this six-month reporting period,
accounting for 10 percent of all worldwide malicious activity. Germany was third, with seven percent. Theprominence of both of these countries can likely be attributed to the high number of Internet users there,as well as the rapid growth in the country’s Internet infrastructure.
Having determined the top countries by malicious activity, Symantec evaluated the top 25 of these
countries according to the number of Internet users located there. This measure is intended to remove
the bias of high numbers of Internet users from the “Malicious activity by country” measurement. Thepercentage assigned to each country in this discussion equates to the proportion of malicious activity that could be attributed to a single (average) Internet user in that country.
Israel was the most highly ranked country for malicious activity per Internet user. If one person from
each of the top 25 countries were to represent their country’s Internet-connected population, the averageInternet user in Israel would carry out nine percent of the group’s malicious activity. Taiwan had the secondmost malicious activity per Internet user, accounting for eight percent of the sample group’s activity.Poland ranked third, accounting for six percent.
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft
Identity theft is an increasingly prevalent security issue. Organizations that store and manage personal
identification information must take care to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of such data. Anycompromise that results in the leakage of personal identity information could result in a loss of publicconfidence, legal liability, and/or costly litigation.
In the second half of 2006, the government sector accounted for the majority of data breaches that could
lead to identity theft, making up 25 percent of the total (figure 1). Government organizations store a lot of personal information that could be used for the purposes of identity theft. Furthermore, they oftenconsist of numerous semi-independent departments. As a consequence, sensitive personal identificationinformation may be stored in separate locations and be available to numerous people. This increases theopportunity for attackers to gain unauthorized access to this data. Governments may also be more likely toreport such breaches than private organizations, which may fear negative market reaction.
4http://www.internetworldstats.com
5http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,2340,en_2649_34225_37529673_1_1_1_1,00.html10Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
11Figure 1. Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by sector
Source: Based on data provided by Privacy Rights Clearinghouse and Attrition.org
During this period, 54 percent of all data breaches that could lead to identity theft were caused by the theft
or loss of a computer or data-storage medium (such as a USB memory key or back-up media). Twenty-eightpercent of such breaches were caused by insecure policy, which includes a failure to develop, implement,and/or comply with adequate security policy. For example, this could mean posting personal identificationinformation on a publicly available Web site or sending it through unencrypted email.
Most breaches of this type are avoidable. In the case of theft or loss, the compromise of data could be
averted by encrypting all sensitive data. This would ensure that even if the data were lost or stolen, it would not be accessible to unauthorized third parties. This step should be part of a broader security policy that organizations should develop, implement, and enforce in order to ensure that all sensitive data is protected from unauthorized access.
Underground economy servers
Underground economy servers are used by criminals and criminal organizations to sell stolen information,
typically for subsequent use in identity theft. This data can include government-issued identity numbers,credit cards, bank cards and personal identification numbers (PINs), user accounts, and email address lists.
During the second half of 2006, 51 percent of all underground economy servers known to Symantec
were located in the United States, the highest total of any country (figure 2). The prominence of the UnitedStates is no surprise, as the expansive Internet infrastructure and continual broadband growth there createnumerous opportunities for criminals to carry out malicious activities. Sweden ranked second, accountingfor 15 percent of the worldwide total, and Canada ranked third, accounting for seven percent. Law enforcement 2%Biotech/pharmaceutical 2%Retail and wholesale and e-commerce 4%Other 9%
Insurance 6%Financial services 9%Health care 14%Government 25%
Education 20%
Transportation 2%Telecommunications 3%Military 4%
20%25%2%
2%
2%3%
4%4%
6%
9%
9%
14%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 2. Location of underground economy servers
Source: Symantec Corporation
By far the most credit and debit cards advertised for sale on underground economy servers were issued
by banks in the United States. The prominence of the United States is not entirely unexpected, as the vastmajority of the data breaches that could lead to identity theft reported during this period took place there.
In order to reduce the likelihood of facilitating identity theft, it is important that organizations take the
necessary steps to protect data stored on their computers or transmitted over networks. This should includethe development and implementation of a policy requiring that all sensitive data is encrypted. This wouldensure that, even if the data were lost or stolen, it would not be accessible. This step should be part of a broader security policy that organizations should develop and implement in order to ensure that anysensitive data is protected from unauthorized access.
Zero-day vulnerabilities
A zero-day vulnerability is one for which there is sufficient public evidence to indicate that the vulnerability
has been exploited in the wild prior to being publicly known. It may not have been known to the vendor prior to exploitation, and the vendor had not released a patch at the time of the exploit activity.
Zero-day vulnerabilities represent a serious threat in many cases because there is no patch available for
them and because they will likely be able to evade purely signature-based detection. They may be used in targeted attacks and in the propagation of malicious code. As Symantec predicted in Volume IX of theInternet Security Threat Report , a black market for zero-day vulnerabilities has emerged that has the
potential to put them into the hands of criminals and other interested parties.
6
In the second half of 2006, Symantec documented 12 zero-day vulnerabilities. This is a significant
increase over the first half of 2006 and the second half of 2005 when only one zero-day vulnerability was documented for each reporting period.
The second half of 2006 saw a large number of high-profile zero-day vulnerabilities. This activity peaked
in September of 2006, when four zero-day vulnerabilities were made known. The majority of these wereclient-side vulnerabilities that affected Office applications, Internet Explorer, and ActiveX controls. Many of these may have been discovered through the use of fuzzing technologies.United States
(1) 51%Canada
(3) 7%Germany
(4) 6%
France
(5) 3%Sweden
(2) 15%
Israel
(9) 1%Bulgaria
(8) 1%Hungary
(10) 1%Netherlands
(7) 1%
United
Kingdom
(6) 2%
Key
(X) = Rank
% = Current proportion
6Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume IX (March 2006):
http://eval.veritas.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_report_ix.pdf : p. 2112Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Zero-day threats appear to be occurring more frequently than in the past. While it is believed that zero-day
vulnerabilities have previously posed a threat, the recent rise in incidents may be partially accounted for byincreasing capabilities to detect these attacks in the wild. Such capabilities include improved vulnerability-handling procedures within organizations, improved cooperation between enterprises and vendors, andbetter technologies for the detection and analysis of exploits and malicious code.
In order to protect against zero-day vulnerabilities, Symantec recommends that administrators deploy
intrusion detection/intrusion prevention systems (IDS/IPS) and regularly updated antivirus software.Security vendors may be able to provide rapid response to recently discovered zero-day vulnerabilities in the wild by developing and implementing new or updated IDS/IPS and antivirus signatures before theaffected vendor has released a patch. Generic signatures may also block zero-day threats, as may behavior-blocking solutions and heuristic technologies.
Threats to confidential information
Some malicious code programs are designed specifically to expose confidential information that is stored
on an infected computer. Threats to confidential information are a particular concern because of theirpotential use in criminal activities. Compromises of this nature can result in significant financial loss,particularly if credit card information or banking details are exposed.
Exposure of confidential information within the enterprise can lead to significant data leakage. If it involves
customer-related data—such as credit card information—it can severely undermine customer confidenceas well as violate local laws. Sensitive corporate information, including financial details, business plans,and proprietary technologies, could also be leaked from compromised computers.
In the last six months of 2006, threats to confidential information made up 66 percent of the volume of the
top 50 malicious code reported to Symantec (figure 3). This is an increase over the 48 percent reported inthe first half of the year and the 55 percent reported during the second half of 2005.
Figure 3. Threats to confidential information
Source: Symantec Corporation55%
48%66%
Jul–Dec 2005 Jan–Jun 2006 Jul–Dec 2006Percentage of top 50 malicious code
13Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
In the second half of the 2006, threats that allow remote access, such as back doors, made up 84 percent
of the volume of confidential information threats. Keystroke logging threats made up 79 percent ofconfidential information threats by volume of reports, and threats that could be used to export user dataaccounted for 62 percent of confidential information threats during this reporting period.
Malicious code types
During the current reporting period, worms made up 52 percent of the volume of malicious code threats,
down from 75 percent in the previous period.
7However, the number of unique samples of worms in the top
50 malicious code reports remained fairly constant over the last six months of 2006. During this period, 36 worms were reported to Symantec, compared to 38 in the previous period.
The volume of Trojans in the top 50 malicious code samples reported to Symantec increased significantly
in the last six months of 2006. During this period, they constituted 45 percent of the volume of the top 50malicious code samples, a significant increase over the 23 percent last period and the 38 percent reportedin the second half of 2005.
As is discussed in the “Future Watch” section of this report, attackers are moving towards staged
downloaders, also referred to as modular malicious code. These are small, specialized Trojans thatdownload and install other malicious programs such as a back door or worm. During the current period, 75 percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code reports contained a modular component such as this.
For the first time, in this edition of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is assessing malicious
code according to the number of unique samples reported to Symantec and the number of potentialinfections. This is an important distinction. In some cases, a threat that may create a large number ofreports may not cause a large number of potential infections and vice versa .
For instance, worms made up 52 percent of malicious code reports in the second half of 2006, but caused
only 37 percent of potential infections (figure 4). The main reason for this is that mass-mailing wormsgenerate a significant number of email messages to which they attach their malicious code. Each messagethat is detected will generate a malicious code report. Because of the high volume of email that one wormcan generate, a single infection can result in many reports. However, once a malicious code sample isdetected, antivirus signatures are quickly developed that can protect against subsequent infections by thatsample. Furthermore, gateway policies and technologies can block the executable attachments that alsocome with a mass mailer. So, only a small percentage of the high volume of email messages will result inadditional infections.
7It is important to note that a malicious code sample can be classified in more than one threat type category. For example, bots such as variants of the Mytob family
are classified as both a worm and a back door. As a result, cumulative percentages of threat types in the top 50 malicious code reports may exceed 100.14Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 4. Malicious code types, by reports and by potential infections, July–December 2006
Source: Symantec Corporation
Trojans, on the other hand, only constituted 45 percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code reports
during the last six months of 2006. However, they accounted for 60 percent of potential infections by thetop 50 malicious code samples during the same period. Since Trojans do not contain any propagationmechanisms, they do not proliferate as widely as mass-mailing worms, resulting in fewer reports. Becausethey are frequently installed by exploiting Web browser and zero-day vulnerabilities, a Trojan report is morelikely to be the result of an infection. Consequently, the ratio of potential infections to reports is likely to be higher for Trojans than for worms.
Phishing
Over the last six months of 2006, the Symantec Probe Network detected a total of 166,248 unique
phishing messages, an average of 904 per day. This total is a six percent increase over the first six monthsof 2006 when 157,477 unique phishing messages were detected.
In the second half of 2006, Symantec blocked over 1.5 billion phishing messages, an increase of 19
percent over the first half of 2006, and a six percent increase over the second half of 2005. This meansthat Symantec blocked an average of 8.48 million phishing emails per day over the last six months of 2006.
In the second half of 2006, 46 percent of all known phishing Web sites were located in the United States,
a much higher proportion than in any other country. This is likely because a large number of Web-hostingproviders—particularly free Web hosts—are located in the United States. Furthermore, the United Stateshas the highest number of Internet users in the world, and it is home to a large number of Internet-connected organizations, both large and small. 52%
TypeVirus Worm Back doorPercentage of top 50 threats
TrojanInfectionsReports
45%60%
11%15%37%
9%
5%
15Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Most of the unique brands phished in the last six months of 2006 were in the financial services sector.
Organizations in that sector accounted for 84 percent of the brands that were used in phishing attacks thisperiod. This is not surprising, as most phishing attacks are motivated by profit. A successful phishing attackon a financial entity is likely to yield information that an attacker could subsequently use for financial gain.
Spam
Between July 1 and December 31, 2006, spam made up 59 percent of all email traffic monitored by
Symantec. This is an increase over the first six months of 2006 when Symantec classified 54 percent ofemail as spam.
The most common type of spam detected in the latter half of 2006 was related to financial services, which
made up 30 percent of all spam on the Internet during this period. Spam related to health services andproducts made up 23 percent of all spam, while spam related to commercial products was the third mostcommon type of spam, accounting for 21 percent of the total.
The rise in financially-related spam was due mainly to a noticeable increase in stock market “pump and
dump” spam. Pump and dump is the name given to schemes in which criminals profit by creating anartificial interest in a stock they own. They buy a penny stock when the price is low. They then artificiallypump up demand for the stock by sending out spam that appears to be from a respected stock advisor, but that actually contains false predictions of high performance for the stock. Recipients of the message,trusting the spam content, buy the stock, creating demand for it and thereby raising the price. When theprices are high, the perpetrators of the scheme sell their stock for a profit.
8
This type of spam has been proven to allow the spammers to generate revenue directly and almostimmediately.
9This alone is likely to make it more appealing than other types of spam.
A spam zombie is a computer infected with a bot or some other malicious code that allows email messages
to be relayed through it. Between July 1 and December 31, 2006, ten percent of all spam zombies werelocated in the United States, making it the highest country in this category. During this period, the UnitedStates was one of the top reporting countries for bots such as Spybot and Mytob, which are commonly usedto send spam.
China and Germany were the second and third highest countries for spam zombies, hosting nine and eight
percent of the worldwide total, respectively. The small variance between the top countries hosting spamzombies is quite different from the distribution of bots during this period. This indicates that not all spamzombies are necessarily bots and that not all bots are used to send spam.
Bot-infected computers
Bots are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s machine in order to allow an unauthorized user to
control the computer remotely through a communication channel such as IRC. These channels allow theremote attacker to control a large number of compromised computers over a single, reliable channel in abot network, which can then be used to launch coordinated attacks.
8http://www.sec.gov/answers/pumpdump.htm
9http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=92055316Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Bots allow for a wide range of functionality and most can be updated to assume new functionality by
downloading new code and features. Bots can be used by external attackers to perform DoS attacksagainst an organization’s Web site. Furthermore, bots within an organization’s network can be used toattack other organizations’ Web sites, which can have serious business and legal consequences. Bots can be used by attackers to harvest confidential information from compromised computers, which can lead to identity theft. Bots can also be used to distribute spam and phishing attacks, as well as spyware,adware, and misleading applications.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2006, Symantec observed an average of 63,912 active bot-infected
computers per day. This is an 11 percent increase over the previous six-month period. Furthermore,Symantec observed 6,049,594 distinct bot-infected computers during the current reporting period, a 29 percent increase from the previous period. This increase is largely driven by a peak in bot activity inSeptember when a number of vulnerabilities were disclosed that were actively exploited by bots.
Command-and-control servers are computers that bot network owners use to relay commands to bot-
infected computers on their networks. In the last six months of 2006, Symantec identified 4,746 botcommand-and-control servers, a 25 percent decrease from the first six months of 2006.
A drop in the number of command-and-control servers combined with a rise in the number of bot-infected
computers indicates that, on average, bot networks are increasing in size. Bot networks are thus becomingmore consolidated. Consolidated bot networks will likely mean that organizations will have to deal with a well entrenched, experienced, and dedicated group of bot network owners instead of a population ofhobby hackers.
It could also signal a fundamental change in the way bots communicate with one another. Symantec has
seen bots that are structured on a peer-to-peer model, in which the machines connect together rather than connecting to a central command-and-control server. Symantec has also observed that command-and-control servers are beginning to adopt encryption, so that they are less visible.
China had the highest number of bot-infected computers during the second half of 2006, accounting
for 26 percent of the worldwide total (figure 5). This is an increase of six percentage points over theprevious six months. This increase was driven by a rise in the number of bots in the country rather than a decrease in other countries. This coincides with and illustrates a trend that Symantec first discussed in 2005, in which bot activity in China appeared to be increasing.
10During the second half of 2006, the
United States had the second highest number of bot-infected computers, accounting for 14 percent of the worldwide total.
10Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume VII (March 2005):
http://eval.veritas.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_report_vii.pdf : p. 2 6 17Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
11Ingress traffic refers to traffic that is coming into a network from the Internet or another network. Egress traffic refers to traffic that is leaving a network, bound for
the Internet or another network.
12Defense in-depth emphasizes multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive systems to guard against single-point fail ures in any specific technology or
protection methodology. Defense in-depth should include the deployment of antivirus, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems , among other security measures.18Figure 5. Bot-infected computers by country
Source: Symantec Corporation
The United States was the site of 40 percent of all known command-and-control servers, making it the
highest ranked country in this category. The high proportion of command-and-control servers likelyindicates that servers in the United States control not only bot networks within the country but offshore
as well.
Organizations should monitor all network-connected computers for signs of bot infection, ensuring that
any infections are detected and isolated as soon as possible. They should also ensure that all antivirusdefinitions are updated regularly. As compromised computers can be a threat to other systems, Symantecalso recommends that the enterprises notify their ISPs of any potentially malicious activity. Creating andenforcing policies that identify and limit applications that can access the network may also be helpful inlimiting the spread of bot infections.
To prevent bot infections, Symantec recommends that ISPs perform both ingress and egress filtering to
block known bot traffic.
11ISPs should also filter out potentially malicious email attachments to reduce
exposure to enterprises and end users.
End users should employ defense-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software
and a firewall.12They should update antivirus definitions regularly and ensure that all desktop, laptop,
and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their operating system
vendor. Symantec also advises that users never view, open, or execute any email attachments unless
the attachment is expected and comes from a known and trusted source, and unless the purpose of
the attachment is known.Key
(X) = Current rank% = Current proportionUnited
Kingdom
(6) 4%
France
(3) 6%
Spain
(5) 5%China
(1) 26% Germany
(4) 6%Poland
(8) 3%
Taiwan
(7) 4%
Brazil
(9) 3%Canada
(10) 2%
United States
(2) 14%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Future Watch
This section of the Internet Security Threat Report will discuss emerging trends and issues that Symantec
believes will become prominent over the next six to twenty-four months. These forecasts are based onemerging research that Symantec has collected during the current reporting period and are speculative innature. In discussing potential future trends, Symantec hopes to provide organizations and end users withan opportunity to prepare themselves for rapidly evolving and complex security issues. This section willdiscuss potential security issues associated with the following:
• Windows Vista™
• Windows Vista and third-party software• New phishing targets and methods• Spam and phishing targeting mobile devices• Virtualization
Threats posed to Windows Vista becoming evident
Microsoft’s latest operating system, Windows Vista, was released publicly in January 2007. The release of an operating system that is expected to be widely adopted will likely have a significant effect on thesecurity landscape. The previous Internet Security Threat Report discussed some of the general security
concerns that may be associated with Windows Vista.
13Over the past six months, Symantec has continued
to research potential issues associated with the new Microsoft operating system, which this section willdiscuss. These issues fall into three categories: vulnerabilities, malicious code, and attacks against theTeredo protocol.
In December 2006, Symantec reported a vulnerability in previous versions of Windows that also affects
the version of Windows Vista that was released to consumers in January.
14This indicates that Microsoft’s
Security Development Lifecycle,15while thorough, does not necessarily identify all potential vulnerabilities.
This may be because some vulnerabilities can be extremely subtle.
That said, it appears that Microsoft’s implementation of mitigating technologies such as address space
layout randomization (ASLR), GS,16and data execution prevention (DEP) could reduce the successful
exploitation of any vulnerabilities that are discovered. Nevertheless, Symantec expects that new threats for Windows Vista will utilize older exploitation techniques that have been previously successful—such asthose developed to successfully exploit Windows XP SP2—in order to bypass improvements in WindowsVista. For example, attackers may revert to attacks that utilize email, P2P, and other social engineeringtechniques.
Existing malicious code may also pose a problem for Windows Vista. According to research conducted by
Symantec, some malicious code that did not originally target Windows Vista may affect the new operatingsystem. This could be problematic because some enterprises may act on the belief that their installationsof Windows Vista are immune from older malicious code samples. As a result, they may not deployappropriate security solutions on new Windows Vista hosts, potentially leaving them vulnerable to infectionby older malicious code samples. For instance, Symantec has already noted that some malicious codesamples can infect Windows Vista.
17
13Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume X (September 2006):
http://www.symantec.com/specprog/threatreport/ent-whitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_report_x_09_2006.en-us.pdf : p. 28
14http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2006/12/vista_vulnerable.html
15The Secure Development Lifecycle is a development paradigm that incorporates security at every stage from the initial architect ure to programming and in the quality
assurance/testing phases. Threat modeling is a security auditing methodology that involves formally identifying and mapping out all possible attack vectors for an
application. See the following for more information: http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/2005/nov05/11-21SecurityDevelo pmentLifecycle.mspx
16GS is a compiler technology. The name is derived from the compiler parameter that is used to enable this functionality. The use of GS will enable stack cookies to be
placed around vulnerable functions in order to mitigate stack-based overflows.
17For example, please see: http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2006/12/hit_or_miss_vista_and_current.html19Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
18For a more in-depth discussion on the security consequences of Teredo, please visit: http://www.symantec.com/avcenter/reference /Teredo_Security.pdf
19Microsoft Visual Studio is important as it introduces a number of security features that can be enabled for unmanaged code. The se features include enabling
key security features for the application when executed under Windows Vista.
20A zero-day attack is one that attacks a vulnerability for which there is no available patch. It also generally means an attack against a vulnerability that is not
yet publicly known or known of by the vendor of the affected technology. For example, Justsystem’s Ichitaro zero-day was used t o transmit a Trojan:
http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2006/08/justsystems_ichitaro_0day_used.html20The third potential Windows Vista security issue identified by Symantec for this discussion is Teredo. Teredo
is a protocol developed by Microsoft to enable the transition between versions of Internet protocol (IP), one of the protocols underlying all Internet-based communications. Teredo is enabled by default in WindowsVista. Computers using Windows Vista can easily be identified through Teredo.
Attacks sent over Teredo will often bypass organizations’ network security controls since the protocol is
tunneled through network address translation (NAT) over an IPv4 UDP connection. Many security productsdon’t support Teredo and thus would not inspect it. This could make Windows Vista susceptible to attacks through Teredo.
18
Symantec recommends that enterprises planning a migration to Windows Vista do so first in small, non-critical environments, and that thorough security audits be conducted to reduce possible exposure toattack. In addition, enterprises should ensure that any third-party security solutions they currently use will run on Windows Vista and are deployed in accordance with any existing security policies. Organizationscontemplating using IPv6 within Windows Vista rather than Teredo should plan the IPv6 transition carefully, including native access and updated security controls.
Windows Vista release makes third-party software security paramount
With the advent of Windows Vista and the continued use of the Security Development Lifecycle, it is likelythat Microsoft-authored code will become more difficult to exploit. As a result, attackers may turn theirfocus to common third-party applications that are authored by companies that have not employed theSecurity Development Lifecycle. These third-party applications may not use accepted best software-development practices, such as secure design, secure coding practices, code reviews, or secure developertools such as Microsoft’s Visual Studio.
19As a result, they may be less secure than Microsoft applications
or the Windows Vista platform on which they are deployed.
These third-party applications could include third-party security software (such as antivirus), Web
browsers, instant message clients, email clients, and office suites. They may include applications that have a significant user base, either globally or regionally. Symantec has already observed the emergence of a number of zero-day vulnerabilities being exploited in targeted attacks against office suites that aredeployed in particular regions.
20
Due to the security improvements in Windows Vista, third-party drivers may be targeted as a means ofgaining kernel-level access on compromised hosts. This is because these applications may not have beendeveloped using the Security Development Lifecycle or other secure development practices. As a result, they may be susceptible to compromise. This could allow attackers to bypass the security improvements in Windows Vista, which are designed to prevent complete compromises, by running applications with non-administrative user privileges.
Only by implementing secure development practices can developers ensure the optimal security of their
applications. Failure to employ all available secure coding measures will likely increase the probability of the discovery and successful exploitation of vulnerabilities.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
New phishing economies
As phishing becomes entrenched as a mainstream attack activity, antiphishing techniques are improving
and phishers are being forced to focus on new targets and adopt new methods. Symantec believes that, in the near future, phishers will expand the scope of their targets to include new industry sectors. For example, they will likely start to target a number of the secondary economies introduced through so-called massively multiplayer online games (MMOGs).
21MMOGs have become big business and are
already attracting large groups of organized criminals who are using digital attacks for financial gain. In December 2006, forty-four suspects were arrested for stealing $90,000 USD worth of digital assets from a single game.
22
Symantec also expects that phishers will develop new techniques to evade antiphishing solutions.Symantec has already started to see techniques to counter the effectiveness of block lists. For instance,phishers can use multiple unique URLs to direct users to a single Web site. Each URL is discarded after oneuse, so that even if they are placed on a block list, the lists still will not be able to block other URLs thatdirect potential victims to the same Web site. In some cases, Symantec has observed thousands of distinctURLs directing users to a single Web site.
23Finally, attackers may already be using ready-made phishing
kits. A phishing kit is a set of tools that an attacker can use to easily construct phishing email messagesand Web sites based on a template.
Symantec has also observed that phishers are starting to adopt a technique known as intelligence lead
phishing. This is a practice in which the phisher compromises a database or social networking site toobtain user information. This information is then used in a targeted phishing attempt against the user inquestion. The high degree of personalization made possible by the illicitly gained information can increasethe effectiveness of the phishing attempt significantly. As widespread phishing attempts are increasinglychoked off by antiphishing technologies, Symantec expects to see more phishing attacks that use theseintelligence techniques.
In addition to the evolved phishing techniques outlined above, Symantec expects to see more generic
phishing attacks; that is, attacks that are not restricted to spoofing a particular brand. For instance,instead of being required to know which bank the targeted user currently uses, a generic phishing attackcould instead prompt the victim to “switch to Bank XYZ.” These more generic phishing attempts can berestricted to a particular country if the phished institution is nationally based, thereby increasing thephisher’s chance of success.
These recently evolved techniques illustrate the need for enterprises and end users to deploy effective
antiphishing and antifraud solutions. Enterprises should be aware of and implement effective antiphishingtechnologies and practices. Enterprises that engage their clients over the Internet should continue to stayabreast of new phishing methods and techniques.
24They should also monitor abuses of their brand in
order to react appropriately and minimize potential damage to the company’s reputation.
End users should follow best security practices, including the use of regularly updated antivirus software,
antispam software, firewalls, toolbar blockers, and other software detection methods. Symantec alsoadvises end users to never disclose any confidential personal or financial information unless and until they can confirm that any request for such information is legitimate.
21A massively multiplayer online game is an Internet-based computer game on which hundreds to thousands of players are capable of participating simultaneously.
22Please see “Virtual Item Theft Ring Busted” http://playnoevil.com/serendipity/index.php?/archives/1051-Virtual-Item-Theft-Ring- Busted.html
23http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2006/12/phishing_2006_the_year_in_revi.html
24See the Symantec Phish Report Network, an extensive antifraud community where members contribute and receive fraudulent Web sit e addresses for alerting and
blocking attacks across a broad range of solutions. It is available at: http://www.phishreport.net21Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
25http://www.fbi.gov/majcases/fraud/internetschemes.htm
26SMS (short messaging service) is a service that is used for sending short text messages to mobile phones and other mobile text devices such as pagers. MMS
(multimedia messaging service) is a service that allows mobile devices to send phone messages as well as multimedia files, such as images, audio, and video.
27http://www.grumbletext.co.uk
28http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/4708167.stm22Enterprises that use the Internet for any transaction-based activity should ensure that they have
implemented phishing detection and response processes and procedures. In addition to providing astructured, standardized response to a phishing incident, this will also ensure that information is passedon to the appropriate resources, thereby protecting against subsequent use of the same attack.
Enterprises should ensure that their users are educated about phishing techniques and are informed of the
latest phishing scams. For further information, the Internet Fraud Complaint Center (IFCC) has released aset of guidelines on how to avoid Internet-related scams.
25
SMiShing—Spam and phishing go mobile
In July 2006, Symantec reported that SMS and MMS had emerged as new vectors for spam and phishingactivity.
26Subsequently, the term SMiShing was coined by the industry to describe this class of threat.
There is a logical evolution from email to SMS and MMS as transport mechanisms for spam and phishing
attacks. This is due in part to the fact that the technological and procedural defenses for devices deployingthese services may not be as well developed or as widely deployed as those for other platforms.Additionally, users of mobile devices typically perceive messages received by SMS and MMS as being morepersonal than those received by email on a desktop computer. Furthermore, threats against these surfaceshave been rare thus far. As a result, users are more likely to trust those messages and to act on them.
Targeting SMS and MMS may also offer attackers a significant benefit over targeting a specific mobile
operating system. SMS and MMS are sufficiently well established and are deployed widely enough thatthey are available on almost all handsets on all networks. Most legacy and proprietary operating systemhandsets will support both of these technologies. As a result, they have a much larger target user basethan smartphones.
There has been a rise in the amount of SMS-based premium-rate spam over the past few years since the
introduction of subscriber-billed SMS.
27This is a payment model in which the subscriber is billed a
considerably higher cost for receiving a message than for sending one. This mechanism is typically usedlawfully by the suppliers of ring tones, wallpapers, and other mobile content such as games. It is aconvenient way of making micro-payments without having to introduce another payment tool such as adebit or credit card. However, some criminals have utilized the technology to obtain money, which hasresulted in a number of national telecommunications regulators stamping out the practice.
28
Symantec speculates that SMS- and MMS-based phishing and spam will continue to increase. Cellularoperators will likely be forced to invest in filtering technologies to combat this growing problem. This issuewill be compounded by the fact that there are a number of different Internet-based SMS gateways thatcould allow users to supply their own originating number or name, which could be spoofed and used tosend spam. As the costs of SMS services goes down, the likelihood that these gateways will be used forspam activities will increase.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
29http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/2055923Software virtualization brings new security threats
Software virtualization is a technology that allows one computer (the host) to run one or more distinct
virtual computers (the guests). These virtual computers each run independently of the others and have theirown virtual hardware, allowing the user to run multiple different operating systems on the same physicalhardware.
Software virtualization has become a very powerful tool, bringing with it numerous benefits. However,
many users assume that virtual machines provide a foolproof security barrier, leading to a false sense ofsecurity. While it is true that virtual machines can insulate against some current attacks, there are othersagainst which they offer no protection. Further, they could potentially make new classes of attack possible.Symantec believes that the potential security implications of software virtualization have not yet been fully investigated and understood.
Guest virtual machines may not run the same security software as the host. For instance, they may not
include antivirus software, personal firewalls, or host-based intrusion prevention products. As a result of these omissions, the virtual machines may be more exposed to threats than if they were run onindependent hardware. Furthermore, virtual machines will do little to protect the data on the host.Consequently, virtualization technology may not diminish or protect against the threat of application-oriented threats such as phishing and data theft.
Symantec also believes that threats that are specific to virtualization technologies could emerge. With
many different virtual machines being used, Symantec believes that these virtualization-specific threatscould fall into two distinct classes of threat.
The first type of threat targets the use of real hardware in virtualized machines. Hardware drivers that
provide software emulation of hardware acceleration outside of the virtual machine in the host operatingsystem could be targeted from inside the guest operating system. An example of a vulnerability thatillustrated this principle was the NVIDIA Binary Graphics Driver for Linux Buffer Overflow Vulnerability.
29
Symantec speculates that this type of vulnerability could be exploited from within the guest operatingsystem to break into the host system. For enterprises that rely on separation through the use of softwarevirtualization technology, the impact of this type of threat could be considerable.
The second type of threat that Symantec believes could emerge is related to the impact that software-
virtualized computers may have on random number generators that are used inside guest operatingsystems on virtual machines. This speculation is based on some initial work done by Symantec AdvancedThreat Research in a paper on GS and ASLR in Windows Vista. This research showed that the method used to generate the random locations employed in some security technologies would, under certaincircumstances, differ wildly in a software-virtualized instance of the operating system. If this proves to be true, it could have considerable implications for a number of different technologies that rely on goodrandomness, such as unique identifiers, as well as the seeds used in encryption.
In the short to medium term, enterprises need to fully understand any potential impact that the use of
software virtualization may have on the security of their environment and plan accordingly. They shouldcontrol and monitor host operating systems very strictly, as the expected activity would likely be limited tothe starting and stopping of virtual machines. Symantec feels that these threats constitute an importantarea of research and will continue to investigate and monitor these issues.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
30Data is made available by Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, a non-profit consumer information and advocacy organization: http://www .privacyrights.org24Attack Trends
This section of the Internet Security Threat Report will provide an analysis of attack activity, identity
theft-related data breaches, and the trade of illegal information that Symantec observed between July 1and December 31, 2006. Attacks are defined as any malicious activity carried out over a network that has been detected by an intrusion detection system (IDS) or firewall.
Attack activity is monitored by the Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network across the entire Internet.
Over 40,000 sensors deployed in more than 180 countries by Symantec DeepSight™ Threat ManagementSystem and Symantec™ Managed Security Services gather this data.
Furthermore, Symantec uses proprietary technologies to monitor bot command-and-control servers and
underground economy servers across the Internet. Finally, Symantec uses publicly available information toassess identity theft-related data breaches.
30These resources combine to give Symantec an unparalleled
ability to identify, investigate, and respond to emerging threats. This discussion will be based on dataprovided by all of these sources.
Attack Trends Highlights
The following section will offer a brief summary of some of the attack trends that Symantec observedduring this period based on data provided by the sources listed above. Following this overview, the Internet
Security Threat Report will discuss selected metrics in greater depth, providing analysis and discussion of
the trends indicated by the data.
• The government sector accounted for 25 percent of all identity theft-related data breaches, more than
any other sector.
• The theft or loss of a computer or other data-storage medium made up 54 percent of all identity theft-
related data breaches during this period.
• The United States was the top country of attack origin, accounting for 33 percent of worldwide
attack activity.
• Symantec recorded an average of 5,213 denial of service (DoS) attacks per day, down from 6,110 in
the first half of the year.
• The United States was the target of most DoS attacks, accounting for 52 percent of the worldwide total. • The government sector was the sector most frequently targeted by DoS attacks, accounting for 30
percent of all detected attacks.
• Microsoft Internet Explorer was targeted by 77 percent of all attacks specifically targeting Web browsers. • Home users were the most highly targeted sector, accounting for 93 percent of all targeted attacks. • Symantec observed an average of 63,912 active bot-infected computers per day, an 11 percent increase
from the previous period. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
• China had 26 percent of the world’s bot-infected computers, more than any other country.
• The United States had the highest number of bot command-and-control computers, accounting for
40 percent of the worldwide total.
• Beijing was the city with the most bot-infected computers in the world, accounting for just over five
percent of the worldwide total.
• The United States accounted for 31 percent of all malicious activity during this period, more than any
other country.
• Israel was the most highly ranked country for malicious activity per Internet user followed by Taiwan
and Poland.
• Fifty-one percent of all underground economy servers known to Symantec were located in the United
States, the highest total of any country.
• Eighty-six percent of the credit and debit cards advertised for sale on underground economy servers
known to Symantec were issued by banks in the United States.
Attack Trends Discussion
This section will discuss selected “Attack Trends” metrics in greater depth, providing analysis anddiscussion of the trends indicated by the data. The following metrics will be discussed:
• Malicious activity by country
• Malicious activity by country per Internet user • Data breaches that could lead to identity theft• Underground economy servers• Bot-infected computers• Bot-infected computers by country
Malicious activity by country
In this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is evaluating the countries in which the
highest amount of malicious activity takes place or originates. To determine this, Symantec has compiledgeographical data on numerous malicious activities, namely: bot-infected computers, bot command-and-control servers, phishing Web sites, malicious code reports, spam relay hosts, and Internet attacks.
To determine the proportion of Internet-wide malicious activity that originated in each country, the mean of
the proportion of all of the considered malicious activities that originated in each country was calculated.This average determined the proportion of overall malicious activity that originated from the country inquestion and was used to rank each country. This section will discuss those findings.
25Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
31http://www.internetworldstats.com
32http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,2340,en_2649_34225_37529673_1_1_1_1,00.html
33http://www.internetworldstats.com
34http://www.internetworldstats.com
35http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,2340,en_2649_34225_37529673_1_1_1_1,00.html26Between July 1 and December 31, 2006 the United States was the top country for malicious activity,
making up 31 percent of worldwide malicious activity (table 2). For each of the malicious activities takeninto account for this measurement, the United States ranked number one by a large margin with theexception of bot-infected computers. It ranked second for that criteria, 12 percentage points lower than China.
Table 2. Malicious activity by country
Source: Symantec Corporation
The high degree of malicious activity originating in the United States is likely driven by the expansive
Internet infrastructure there. The United States accounts for 19 percent of the world’s Internet users.31
Furthermore, the number of broadband Internet users in that country grew by 14 percent betweenDecember 2005 and July 2006.
32Despite the relatively well developed security infrastructure in the United
States, the high number of Internet-connected computers there presents more opportunities for maliciousactivities to take place. Symantec predicts that the United States will remain the highest ranked country formalicious activity until another country exceeds it in numbers of Internet users and broadband connectivity.
China was the second highest country for malicious activity during this six-month reporting period,
accounting for 10 percent. China’s prominence, like that of the United States, is likely driven by the highnumber of Internet users there, as well as the rapid growth in the country’s Internet infrastructure. Chinahas the second highest Internet usership in the world, accounting for 11 percent of the world’s users and, as has been stated previously in this report, is expected to surpass the United States in usership in the next year.
33
In the last six months of 2006, Germany was the third ranked country for malicious activity. Seven percentof all Internet-wide malicious activity originated there during this period. Germany ranked highly in all themalicious activities considered for this metric. The prominence of Germany, like that of both China and theUnited States, is likely influenced by its Internet infrastructure and growth. Germany has the fifth highestInternet usership in the world, boasting five percent of the world’s users.
34Furthermore, the number of
broadband users increased by 16 percent between December 2005 and July 2006.35Overall
Rank
1
23456789
10Country
United States
ChinaGermanyFranceUnited KingdomSouth KoreaCanadaSpainTaiwanItalyOverall
Proportion
31%
10%
7%4%4%4%3%3%3%3%Malicious
Code Rank
1
3794
12
5
13
82Spam Host
Rank
1
234
13
9
23
5
11
8Command
and Control
Server Rank
1
43
14
925
15
6
10Phishing
Host Rank
1
824397
16
6
14Bot
Rank
2
1436
1110
57
12Attack
Rank
1
2346957
1110Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Malicious activity by country per Internet user
Having assessed the top countries by malicious activity, Symantec also evaluated the top 25 of these
countries according to the number of Internet users located there. This measure is intended to remove the bias of high Internet users from the consideration of the “Malicious activity by country” metric.
In order to determine this, Symantec divided the amount of malicious activity originating in each of the top
25 countries by the number of worldwide Internet users who are located in that country. The proportionassigned to each country in this discussion thus equates to the proportion of malicious activity that couldbe attributed to a single (average) Internet user in that country.
Israel was the most highly ranked country for malicious activity per Internet user. If one person from each
of the top 25 countries were assessed as a representation of their country’s Internet users, the averageuser in Israel would carry out nine percent of the group’s malicious activity (figure 6).
Figure 6. Malicious activity by country per Internet user
Source: Symantec Corporation
Taiwan ranked second, accounting for eight percent of malicious activity per Internet user. Poland ranked
third, accounting for six percent. Although these countries both have a high proportion of maliciousactivity per Internet user, they account for a relatively low proportion of malicious activity worldwide.
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is assessing data
breaches that have exposed information that could lead to identity theft. Using publicly available data,
36
Symantec has determined the sectors that were most often affected by these data breaches, as well as the most common causes of data loss.
Identity theft is an increasingly prevalent security issue. Many organizations manage information
that could facilitate identity theft. Compromises that result in the loss of personal data could be quitecostly, not only to the people whose identity may be at risk and to their respective financial institutions,but also to the organization. Data leaks that lead to identity theft could damage the organization’sreputation, thereby potentially undermining customer confidence. They could also result in criminalcharges and/or litigation. Germany
(10) 5%
France
(9) 5%Sweden
(8) 5%
Israel
(1) 9%Taiwan
(2) 8%Poland
(3) 6%
Switzerland
(7) 5%Spain
(6) 5%
Key
(X) = Rank% = Current proportionUnited States
(4) 6%Canada
(5) 5%
36http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches.htm27Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
In the second half of 2006, the government sector accounted for the majority of data breaches that could
lead to identity theft, making up 25 percent of the total (figure 7). Government organizations store a lot of personal information that could be used for the purposes of identity theft. These organizations oftenconsist of numerous semi-independent departments. As a consequence, sensitive personally identifiableinformation may be stored in separate locations and be accessible by numerous people. This increases the opportunities for attackers to gain unauthorized access to this data.
Figure 7. Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by sector
Source: Based on data provided by Privacy Rights Clearinghouse and Attrition.org
The second factor relates to the reporting of such breaches. Government organizations are more likely
to report data breaches, either due to legislative obligation,37or due to publicly accessible audits and
performance reports. As well, companies that rely on consumer confidence may be less inclined to report such breaches for fear of negative market reaction.
During this reporting period, the education sector accounted for 20 percent of data breaches that
could lead to identity theft. Health care accounted for 14 percent of the total, the third highest number.Organizations in both of these sectors store and manage a significant amount of sensitive personalinformation that can be used for the purposes of identity theft. Furthermore, health organizations storeinformation related to personal health that could result in damaging breaches of privacy if viewed byunauthorized personnel. Educational organizations such as research hospitals may also store suchinformation.Law enforcement 2%Biotech/pharmaceutical 2%Retail, wholesale, and e-commerce 4%Other 9%
Insurance 6%Financial services 9%Health care 14%Government 25%
Education 20%
Transportation 2%Telecommunications 3%Military 4%
20%25%2%
2%
2%3%
4%4%
6%
9%
9%
14%
2837An example is the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA) of California. For more on this act, please see:
http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs6a-facta.htmSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 8. Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by cause
Source: Based on data provided by Privacy Rights Clearinghouse and Attrition.org
In the second half of 2006, the primary cause of data breaches that could facilitate identity theft was theft
or loss of a computer or other medium on which the data is stored or transmitted, such as a USB key orback-up medium (figure 8). These made up 54 percent of all identity theft-related data breaches duringthis period. In many cases, computers that were lost or stolen were laptop computers.
The second most common cause of data breaches that could lead to identity theft during this period was
insecure policy, which made up 28 percent of all incidents. A data breach is considered to be caused byinsecure policy if it can be attributed to a failure to develop, implement, and/or comply with adequatesecurity policy. For example, this could mean posting personally identifiable information on a publiclyavailable Web site, sending it through unencrypted email, or storing it in unencrypted form.
Together, theft and loss along with insecure policy made up 82 percent of all data breaches in the second
half of 2006. Most breaches of this type are avoidable. In the case of theft or loss, the compromise of datacould be averted by encrypting all sensitive data. This would ensure that even if the data were stolen, itwould not be accessible to unauthorized third parties. This step should be part of a broader security policythat organizations should develop, implement, and enforce in order to ensure that all sensitive data isprotected from unauthorized access. Theft or loss 54%
Insecure policy 28%Hacking 13%Insider attack 4%
Unknown 1%
29Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
30Underground economy servers
Underground economy servers are used by criminals and criminal organizations to sell stolen information,
typically for subsequent use in identity theft. This data can include government-issued identificationnumbers, credit cards, bank cards and personal identification numbers (PINs), user accounts, and emailaddress lists. Symantec tracks and assesses underground economy servers across the Internet usingproprietary online fraud monitoring tools.
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec will assess underground
economy servers. It will do so in two ways: according to their geographic location and according to thelocation of banks that issued credit and debit cards that were being sold on underground economy servers. This discussion will also look at the types of information that are being exchanged throughunderground economy servers.
During the last six months of 2006, 51 percent of all known underground economy servers in the world
were located in the United States, the highest total of any country (figure 9). The prominence of the UnitedStates is no surprise, as the expansive Internet infrastructure and continual broadband growth therecreate numerous opportunities for criminals to carry out malicious activities. Sweden ranked second,accounting for 15 percent, and Canada ranked third, accounting for seven percent of all undergroundeconomy servers.
Figure 9. Location of underground economy servers
Source: Symantec Corporation
During the last six months of 2006, Symantec observed 4,943 credit cards being traded on underground
economy servers.38Symantec also determined that, by far, most of the credit and debit cards advertised for
sale on underground economy servers were issued by banks in the United States (figure 10). Theprominence of the United States is not entirely unexpected. As was discussed earlier in this report, the vast majority of the identity theft-related data breaches reported during the last six months of 2006 took place in the United States. United States
(1) 51%Canada
(3) 7%Germany
(4) 6%
France
(5) 3%Sweden
(2) 15%
Israel
(9) 1%Bulgaria
(8) 1%Hungary
(10) 1%Netherlands
(7) 1%
United
Kingdom
(6) 2%
Key(X) = Rank
% = Current proportion
38It should be noted that this discussion is not necessarily representative of Internet-wide activity; rather, it is intended as a snapshot of the limited activity
that Symantec monitored during this period.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
31Figure 10. Location of banks whose cards were sold on underground economy servers
Source: Symantec Corporation
Cards from the United States are generally advertised for about half as much as those from the United
Kingdom. For instance, credit cards from United States-based banks have been advertised for $3.00 USD,while credit cards from United Kingdom-based banks are advertised for $6.00 USD. This could be becausethere are a much higher number of cards from the United States available for sale. It could also be becausethe UK pound is currently stronger than the US dollar. Finally, it could indicate that buyers in the UnitedKingdom, and other countries, are unlikely to want to purchase cards from the United States.
In addition to bank and credit cards, Symantec has discovered other items that are being sold on
underground economy servers (table 3). These include full identities, which typically involve government-issued identification numbers (such as social security numbers), bank account information (includingpasswords), personal information (such as date of birth), as well as identity verification information (such as a person’s mother’s maiden name). Key
(X) = Rank% = Current proportionUnited
Kingdom
(2) 7%
France
(6) <1%
Mexico
(8) <1%Japan
(7) <1%Germany
(4) 1%Netherlands
(10) <1%
Australia
(5) 1%United States
(1) 86%Canada
(3) 1%
Brazil
(9) <1%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
32Table 3. Advertised prices of items traded on underground economy servers
Source: Symantec Corporation
Advertised prices for identities range from $14.00 USD to $18.00 USD. Other items that can be purchased
on underground economy servers include lists of email addresses, stolen gift certificates, compromisedcomputers, one-month “World of Warcraft” accounts, as well as a number of email and Web-basedaccounts, which include usernames and passwords.
In order to reduce the likelihood of identity theft, organizations that store personal information should
take the necessary steps to protect data transmitted over the Internet or stored on their computers. Thisshould include the development, implementation, and enforcement of a secure policy requiring that allsensitive data is encrypted. This would ensure that even if the computer or medium on which the data was stored were lost or stolen, the data would not be accessible. This step should be part of a broadersecurity policy that organizations should develop and implement in order to ensure that any sensitive datais protected from unauthorized access.
Bot-infected computers
Bots are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s machine in order to allow an unauthorized user to
control the computer remotely. They allow an attacker to remotely control the targeted system through acommunication channel such as IRC. These channels allow the remote attacker to control a large number ofcompromised computers over a single, reliable channel in a bot network, which can then be used to launchcoordinated attacks.Item
United States-based credit card with card verification value
United Kingdom-based credit card with card verification valueAn identity (including US bank account, credit card, date of birth, and
government issued identification number)
List of 29,000 emailsOnline banking account with a $9,900 balanceYahoo Mail cookie exploit—advertised to facilitate full access when successfulValid Yahoo and Hotmail email cookiesCompromised computerPhishing Web site hosting—per site
Verified PayPal account with balance (balance varies)
Unverified PayPal account with balance (balance varies)
Skype accountWorld of Warcraft account—one month durationAdvertised Price
(in US Dollars)
$1–$6
$2–$12
$14–$18
$5
$300
$3$3
$6–$20
$3–5
$50–$500
$10–$50
$12$10Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
33Bots allow for a wide range of functionality and most can be updated to assume new functionality by
downloading new code and features. Bots can be used by external attackers to perform DoS attacksagainst an organization’s Web site. Furthermore, bots within an organization’s network can be used toattack other organizations’ Web sites, which can have serious business and legal consequences. Bots canbe used by attackers to harvest confidential information from compromised computers, which can lead toidentity theft. Bots can also be used to distribute spam and phishing attacks, as well as spyware, adware,and misleading applications.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2006, Symantec observed an average of 63,912 active bot-infected
computers per day (figure 11). This is an 11 percent increase from the previous period when Symantecobserved an average of 57,717 active bots per day. Furthermore, Symantec observed 6,049,594 distinctbot-infected computers during the current reporting period, a 29 percent increase from the previous periodwhen 4,696,903 distinct bot-instinct computers were identified.
Figure 11. Active bot-infected computers per day
Source: Symantec Corporation
This increase is largely driven by a peak in bot activity in September. During this month, a number of
vulnerabilities that had previously been disclosed were actively exploited by bots, including the MicrosoftWindows Server Service Remote Buffer Overflow Vulnerability as well as the Microsoft Internet ExplorerVector Markup Language Buffer Overflow Vulnerability.
39DateActive bots
Feb Mar Apr May Jul Jun Sep Aug020,00040,00060,00080,000
10,00030,00050,00070,000100,000
Oct Nov Dec Jan Moving averageMedian daily
active bots90,000
39Please see http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/19409 and http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/20096, respectively.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
34In Volume IX (March 2006) of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec speculated that bot networks
had likely reached their saturation point.40The slight increase in bot computers in the second half of 2006,
along with the lack of an increase in attacks, likely indicates that bots are slowly making up a greaterproportion of attacking computers. That is, it is likely that attackers who use means other than bot-infected computers in coordinated bot networks are becoming less common.
It may also be possible that the increase in bot-infected computers is a sign of an impending boom cycle
in bots. In the same discussion cited in the previous paragraph, Symantec speculated that if bots begin toexploit an attack vector that bypasses firewalls and perimeter defenses, the population of bot-infectedcomputers could rapidly increase.
41It is possible that the increased focus on Web browsers may be
facilitating this. As a result, Symantec believes that it is reasonable to speculate that a boom period forbots is possible in the near future.
Symantec also tracks the number of bot command-and-control servers worldwide. Command-and-control
servers are computers that bot network owners use to relay commands to bot-infected computers on theirnetworks. In the last six months of 2006, Symantec identified 4,746 bot command-and-control servers.This is a 25 percent decrease from the 6,337 detected during the first six months of 2006.
A drop in the number of command-and-control servers combined with a rise in the number of bot-infected
computers indicates that, on average, bot networks are increasing in size. Bot networks are thus becomingmore consolidated. Consolidated bot networks will likely mean that organizations will have to deal with a well entrenched, experienced, and dedicated group of bot network owners instead of a population ofhobby hackers.
It could also signal a fundamental change in the way bots communicate with one another. Symantec has
seen bots that are structured on a peer-to-peer model, in which the machines connect together rather thanconnecting to a central command-and-control server. Symantec has also observed that command-and-control servers are beginning to adopt encryption so that they are less visible.
To prevent bot infections, Symantec recommends that ISPs perform both ingress and egress filtering to
block known bot traffic.
42ISPs should also filter out potentially malicious email attachments to reduce
exposure to enterprises and end users.
Organizations should monitor all network-connected computers for signs of bot infection, ensuring that
any infections are detected and isolated as soon as possible. They should also ensure that all antivirusdefinitions are updated regularly. As compromised computers can be a threat to other systems, Symantecalso recommends that enterprises notify their ISPs of any potentially malicious activity.
Organizations should also perform egress filtering on outgoing network traffic, ensuring that malicious
activity and unauthorized communications are not taking place. They should also create and enforcepolicies that identify and restrict applications that can access the network.
40Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume IX (March 2006):
http://eval.veritas.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_report_ix.pdf : p.36
41Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume IX (March 2006):
http://eval.veritas.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_report_ix.pdf : p.36
42Ingress traffic refers to traffic that is coming into a network from the Internet or another network. Egress traffic refers to traffic that is leaving a network,
bound for the Internet or another network.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
35To reduce exposure to bot-related attacks, end users should employ defense-in-depth strategies, including
the deployment of antivirus software and a firewall. Users should update antivirus definitions regularly andensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches fromtheir operating system vendor. Symantec also advises that users never view, open, or execute any emailattachment unless the attachment is expected and comes from a known and trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
Bot-infected computers by country
Recognizing the ongoing threat posed by bot networks, Symantec tracks the distribution of bot-infected
computers worldwide. This can help analysts understand how bot-infected computers are distributedglobally. This is important, as a high percentage of bot-infected computers likely indicates a greaterpotential for bot-related attacks. It could also give insight into the level of patching and security awarenessamongst computer administrators and users in a given region.
China had the highest number of bot-infected computers during the second half of 2006, accounting for
26 percent of the worldwide total (figure 12). This is an increase of six percentage points over the previous six months. This increase was driven by a rise in the number of bots in the country rather than a decrease in other countries. This coincides with and illustrates a trend that Symantec first discussed in 2005, whichsaw an increase in bot activity in China during that period.
43
Figure 12. Bot-infected computers by country
Source: Symantec CorporationKey
(X) = Current rank% = Current proportionUnited
Kingdom
(6) 4%
France
(3) 6%
Spain
(5) 5%China
(1) 26% Germany
(4) 6%Poland
(8) 3%
Taiwan
(7) 4%
Brazil
(9) 3%Canada
(10) 2%
United States
(2) 14%
43Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume VII (March 2005):
http://eval.veritas.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_report_vii.pdf : p. 2 6 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
36Symantec has observed that bots usually infect computers that are connected to high-speed broadband
Internet through large ISPs and that the expansion of broadband connectivity often facilitates the spread of bots. China’s Internet infrastructure is currently expanding rapidly. The number of broadbandsubscribers located there is expected to surpass that of the United States in the next year.
44
Frequently, rapidly expanding ISPs will focus their resources on meeting growing broadband demand at the expense of implementing adequate security measures, such as port blocking and ingress and egressfiltering. As a result, they may have security infrastructures and practices that are insufficient for theirneeds. Furthermore, it is also likely that home users and system administrators in China are also strugglingto adapt their security practices and policies to deal with broadband Internet. Symantec believes that botactivity in China will continue to rise as long as broadband Internet in China continues to be adopted at arapid rate.
Symantec also tracks the global distribution of bot command-and-control servers. These are computers
that bot network owners use to relay commands and instructions to the bot-infected computers that makeup their networks. This analysis will allow administrators to identify and understand the locations fromwhich bot networks are being controlled as well as the geographic distribution of bot networks.
Although China had the most bot-infected computers worldwide, it had only the fourth highest number
of known command-and-control servers worldwide (table 4). This discrepancy likely indicates that themajority of bot-infected computers in China are being controlled from servers in other countries. While it is simple to trace a command-and-control server to its location, the server may not reside in the samelocation as the person who controls it. For example, an attacker in the United States could control a command-and-control server in the United Kingdom to administer bot-infected computers all over the world.
Table 4. Command-and-control servers by country
Source: Symantec CorporationCurrent
Rank
1
234567
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
254367
8
12
10Country
United States
South KoreaGermanyChinaCanadaTaiwanSweden
Japan
United Kingdom
ItalyCurrent
Proportion
40%
10%
6%5%4%3%3%
2%
2%
2%Previous
Proportion
42%
8%5%6%7%3%3%
3%
2%
2%
44http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/news/2163552/china-lead-broadband-worldSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
37In the last six months of 2006, the United States had the second highest number of bot-infected
computers, accounting for 14 percent of the worldwide total. The United States was also the site of 40percent of all known command-and-control servers, making it the highest ranked country in that category.
The high proportion of command-and-control servers in the United States likely indicates that servers there
control not only bot networks within the country but offshore as well. The high proportion of bot-infectedcomputers and command-and-control servers in the United States is driven by that country’s extensiveInternet and technology infrastructure. As of June 2006, more than 57 million broadband Internet userswere located there, the highest number in the world.
45
France had the third highest proportion of bot-infected computers, accounting for six percent of theworldwide total. The rise of France to the third position is driven primarily by a drop in the percentage of bot-infected computers located in the United Kingdom. This drop likely indicates that the securityawareness and infrastructure in the United Kingdom are catching up to the growth of Internet connectivity there.
45http://www.oecd.org/document/9/0,2340,en_2825_495656_37529673_1_1_1_1,00.htmlSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
46The BugTraq mailing list is hosted by SecurityFocus (http://www.securityfocus.com). Archives are available at http://www.securi tyfocus.com/archive/1
47The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report has been tracking vulnerabilities in six-month periods since January 2002.38Vulnerability Trends
Vulnerabilities are design or implementation errors in information systems that can result in a compromise
of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information stored upon or transmitted over the affectedsystem. They are most often found in software, although they exist in all layers of information systems,from design or protocol specifications to physical hardware implementations. Vulnerabilities may betriggered actively, either by malicious users or automated malicious code, or passively during systemoperation. The discovery and disclosure of a single vulnerability in a critical asset can seriously underminethe security posture of an organization.
New vulnerabilities are discovered and disclosed regularly by a sizeable community of end users, security
researchers, hackers, security vendors, and occasionally by the software vendors themselves. Symanteccarefully monitors vulnerability research, tracking vulnerabilities throughout their lifecycle, from initialdisclosure and discussion to the development and release of a patch or other remediation measure.
Symantec operates one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion of vulnerabilities on
the Internet, the BugTraq™ mailing list, which has approximately 50,000 direct subscribers who contribute,receive, and discuss vulnerability research on a daily basis.
46Symantec also maintains one of the world’s
most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting of over 20,000 vulnerabilities (spanningmore than a decade) affecting more than 45,000 technologies from over 7,000 vendors. The followingdiscussion of vulnerability trends is based on a thorough analysis of that data.
This section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report will discuss vulnerabilities that have been
disclosed between July 1 and December 31, 2006. It will compare them with those disclosed in theprevious six-month period and discuss how current vulnerability trends may affect potential future Internet security activity.
Vulnerability Trends Highlights
The following section will offer a brief summary of some of the vulnerability trends that Symantecobserved during this period based on data provided by the sources listed above. Following this overview,the Internet Security Threat Report will discuss selected metrics in greater depth, providing analysis and
discussion of the trends indicated by the data.
• Symantec documented 2,526 vulnerabilities in the second half of 2006, 12 percent higher than the
first half of 2006, and a higher volume than in any other previous six-month period.
47
• Symantec classified four percent of all vulnerabilities disclosed during this period as high severity,
69 percent were medium severity, and 27 percent were low severity.
• Sixty-six percent of vulnerabilities disclosed during this period affected Web applications.• Seventy-nine percent of all vulnerabilities documented in this reporting period were considered to
be easily exploitable.
• Seventy-seven percent of all easily exploitable vulnerabilities affected Web applications, and seven
percent affected servers.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
39• Ninety-four percent of all easily exploitable vulnerabilities disclosed in the second half of 2006 were
remotely exploitable.
• In the second half of 2006, all the operating system vendors that were studied had longer average
patch development times than in the first half of the year.
• Sun Solaris had an average patch development time of 122 days in the second half of 2006, the
highest of any operating system.
• Sixty-eight percent of the vulnerabilities documented during this period were not confirmed by the
affected vendor.
• The window of exposure for vulnerabilities affecting enterprise vendors was 47 days.• Symantec documented 54 vulnerabilities in Microsoft Internet Explorer, 40 in the Mozilla browsers,
and four each in Apple Safari and Opera.
• Mozilla had a window of exposure of two days, the shortest of any Web browser during this period.• Twenty-five percent of exploit code was released less than one day after vulnerability publication.
Thirty-one percent was released in one to six days after vulnerability publication.
• Symantec documented 12 zero-day vulnerabilities during this period, a significant increase from the
one documented in the first half of 2006.
• Symantec documented 168 vulnerabilities in Oracle database implementations, more than any
other database.
Vulnerability Trends Discussion
This section will discuss selected “Vulnerability Trends” metrics in greater depth, providing analysis anddiscussion of the trends indicated by the data. The following metrics will be discussed:
• Patch development time for operating systems
• Vendor responsiveness• Web browser vulnerabilities• Window of exposure for Web browsers• Zero-day vulnerabilities• Database vulnerabilities• Vulnerabilities—protection and mitigation
Patch development time for operating systems
The time period between the disclosure date of a vulnerability and the release date of an associated patch
is known as the “patch development time.” If exploit code is created and made public during this time,computers may be immediately vulnerable to widespread attack. This metric will assess and compare theaverage patch development times for five different operating systems: Apple Mac OS X, Hewlett-PackardHP-UX, Microsoft Windows, Red Hat Linux (including enterprise versions and Red Hat Fedora), and SunMicrosystems Solaris.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
40Microsoft Windows had the shortest average patch development time of the five operating systems in the
last six months of 2006. During this period, Windows had an average patch development time of 21 daysbased on a sample set of 39 patched vulnerabilities (figure 13). This represents an increase over the firstsix months of 2006, when Windows had an average patch development time of 13 days based on a sampleset of 22 vulnerabilities.
Of the 39 Microsoft vulnerabilities disclosed during this period, 12 were considered high severity, 20 were
medium severity, and seven were low. In the first half of 2006, of the 22 Microsoft vulnerabilities, five wereconsidered high severity, 11 were medium severity and six were low.
Figure 13. Patch development time for operating systems
Source: Symantec Corporation
Red Hat Linux had the second shortest average patch development time during this reporting period, with
an average of 58 days for a sample set of 208 vulnerabilities. However, this is a significant increase fromthe 13-day average in the first half of 2006, when there were 42 patched vulnerabilities in Red Hat.
Of the 208 Red Hat vulnerabilities during the second half of 2006, two were considered high severity, 130
were medium severity, and 76 were considered low. During the first half of 2006, of the 42 vulnerabilitiesin Red Hat, one was considered high severity, 21 were medium severity, and 20 were low severity.
Apple Mac OS X had the third shortest average patch development time in the second half of 2006, at
66 days for a sample set of 43 vulnerabilities. This is an increase from the 37-day average in the first half of 2006 for a sample set of 21 vulnerabilities.
Out of 43 vulnerabilities in Mac OS X during the current period, one was considered high severity, 31 were
medium severity, and 11 were low. In the first half of 2006, 21 vulnerabilities were documented for Apple.Of these, three were considered high severity, 12 were medium severity, and six were low. 58
21Apple
Avera ge time in days0 20 40 60 80 100Period
Jan–Jun 2006
Jul–Dec 2006
120 14089
13
1353
37
122
101
66Sun
Red Hat
MicrosoftHPSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Hewlett Packard HP-UX and Sun Solaris were ranked fourth and fifth respectively for patch development
times during this period. HP had an average patch development time of 101 days for a sample set of 98 vulnerabilities. This is a significant increase from 53 days in the first half of 2006 for a sample set of seven vulnerabilities.
Of the 98 HP-UX vulnerabilities disclosed in the second half of 2006, two were considered high severity,
55 were medium severity and 41 were low. During the first half of 2006, seven vulnerabilities weredisclosed for HP-UX. Of these, one was considered high severity, one was medium severity, and five were low.
Sun Solaris had an average patch development time of 122 days in the second half of 2006 for a sample
set of 63 vulnerabilities. This is an increase over the 89 days documented in the first half of 2006 for asample set of 16 vulnerabilities.
Of the 63 Sun Solaris vulnerabilities in the second half of 2006, one was considered high severity, 34
were medium severity, and 28 were low. In the first half of 2006, 16 vulnerabilities were disclosed for Sun Solaris. Of these, two vulnerabilities were considered high severity, five were medium severity, andnine were low.
In the second half of 2006, all the vendors that were studied had longer average patch development times
than in the first half of the year. This corresponds to an increase in the number of patched vulnerabilitiesin this period. This may be because as more vulnerabilities are discovered and need to be addressed, moretime is required to develop, test, and roll out patches. It may also be because vulnerabilities of highercomplexity result in more complex patch development processes.
With the exception of Microsoft, all vendors were affected by longer turnarounds for patches for third-
party components that are distributed with each operating system. Upon examining the sample set of vulnerabilities during this period, Symantec has observed that vulnerabilities with longer patchdevelopment times generally affected third-party components. The previous issue of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report commented on the relevance of this issue for commercial UNIX vendors
such as HP and Sun,
48but it holds true for all vendors of UNIX/Linux–based operating systems.
The data suggests that third-party components are considered a lower priority than those components
that are developed by the operating system vendor. However, the third-party components in question areoften open source, and security patches are often provided from an upstream vendor, such as the maindeveloper of the component. Depending on the specific operating system, many third-party componentsprovide core functionality and are enabled by default. These components can, therefore, provide a meansby which attackers can compromise computers on which they are deployed. However, administrators havesome recourse if a third-party component vendor has released a patch before the operating system vendor.
The risk of exploitation in the wild is a major driving force in the development of patches. As with
previous periods, Microsoft Windows was the operating system that had the most vulnerabilities withassociated exploit code and exploit activity in the wild. This may have pressured Microsoft to develop and issue patches more quickly than other vendors. Another pressure that may have influenced Microsoft’s relatively short patch development time is the development of unofficial patches by third-parties in response to high-profile vulnerabilities.
49
4148Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume X (September 2006):
http://www.symantec.com/specprog/threatreport/ent-whitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_report_x_09_2006.en-us.pdf : p.5 8
49http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/318Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
50Vulnerabilities that are not vendor confirmed are generally assumed to be unpatched because the vendor has not otherwise made a public statement that a patch is
available. Symantec has no insight into the number of vulnerabilities that have not been publicly confirmed by the vendor but m ay otherwise have been patched.
51Hobbyist applications include non-commercial applications that often have limited development resources. With rare exception, t hese applications have smaller
deployment than enterprise applications and present a smaller overall risk to the Internet at large; however, vulnerabilities i n these applications could pose a threat
to networks on which they are deployed.42Vendor responsiveness
Vendor responsiveness is measured by the proportion of vulnerabilities that remains unconfirmed by the
vendor and, therefore, unpatched over time.50This metric takes into account all vendors who were affected
by vulnerabilities during the last three six-month reporting periods, including large-scale enterprisevendors as well as hobbyist and small commercial vendors.
51
Vendor responsiveness is an important security consideration because, in many cases, unsanctioned,unsupported, and unmaintained software may be deployed within the organization. Software that isaffected by vulnerabilities that are unconfirmed and unpatched for long periods of time may present adormant threat to organizations.
In the second half of 2006, 68 percent of documented vulnerabilities were not confirmed by the affected
vendor (figure 14). This is an increase from the first half of the year, when 61 percent of vulnerabilitieswere not confirmed by the vendor. In the second half of 2005, 55 percent of documented vulnerabilitieswere not vendor confirmed.
Figure 14. Vendor responsiveness
Source: Symantec CorporationNot vendor confirmed
PeriodJul–Dec 2005 Jan–Jun 2006 Jul–Dec 2006Percentage of unconfirmed vulnerabilities
Vendor confirmed
55%
45%61%
39%68%
32%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
In each of the last three six-month reporting periods, the majority of the documented vulnerabilities
were not confirmed by vendors.52The proportion of non-confirmed vulnerabilities is highest in the current
reporting period, likely because less time has elapsed since the vulnerabilities were initially published.However, the vulnerabilities that remain unconfirmed from previous periods still have not been confirmedin the time since initial disclosure.
It is worrisome that vendors can let vulnerabilities go unconfirmed for prolonged periods. The bulk of
vulnerabilities documented in any given reporting period are associated with smaller commercial orhobbyist vendors. So, the lack of vendor confirmation can often be attributed to smaller-scale vendors who may not have dedicated security resources. In many cases, these vendors likely do not monitorsecurity mailing lists or other resources for reports of vulnerabilities in their products. Web applicationvendors are also common among the list of vendors with unconfirmed vulnerabilities. In many cases,vendors have discontinued vulnerable applications or have ceased to operate, leaving administrators with no recourse other than best practices.
Symantec recommends that administrators employ vulnerability assessment services, a vulnerability
management solution, and vulnerability assessment tools to evaluate the security posture of theenterprise. Where possible, problematic applications should be removed or isolated, especially if there is no vendor-provided remediation available. IPS systems can aid in detecting known attacks against such applications.
When deploying applications, administrators should ensure that secure, up-to-date versions are used, and
that applications are properly configured to avoid the exploitation of latent vulnerabilities. As much aspossible, enterprises are advised to avoid deploying products that are not regularly maintained or that arenot supported by the vendor.
Web browser vulnerabilities
The Web browser is a critical and ubiquitous application that has become an increasingly popular subject
for vulnerability researchers over the past few years. Traditionally, the focus of security researchers hasbeen on the perimeter: servers, firewalls, and other assets with external exposure. However, securityresearchers and attackers now consider client-side vulnerabilities to be a more fruitful area of researchand attacks. As part of this shift toward client-side issues, vulnerabilities in Web browsers have becomeincreasingly prominent, which in turn poses a threat to end-user desktop computers.
Browsers are complex and feature rich, traits that can expose them to vulnerabilities in newly implemented
features. Due to the integration of various content-handling applications—such as productivity suites andmedia players—browsers are a viable attack vector for many client-side vulnerabilities. This is particularlytrue of operating systems in which the browser is not disassociated from many other operating systemprocesses and features.
Web browser vulnerabilities are a serious security concern, particularly due to their role in online fraud and
the propagation of spyware and adware. Web browsers are particularly prone to security concerns becausethey come in contact with more potentially untrusted or hostile content than other applications.
52This discussion is based on data that was gathered at the time of writing, so data from previous periods is representative of v ulnerabilities that are still
unconfirmed by the vendor.43Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
44In the second half of 2006, Symantec documented 54 vulnerabilities in Microsoft Internet Explorer
(figure 15). Of these, one was considered to be high severity, 13 were medium severity, and 40 wereclassified as low severity. This total is an increase from the 38 vulnerabilities documented in the first half of 2006. Of these, one was considered high severity, 21 were medium severity, and 16 were lowseverity. In the second half of 2005, 25 Internet Explorer vulnerabilities were documented.
Figure 15. Web browser vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation
During the second half of 2006, 40 vulnerabilities affected the Mozilla browsers. Of these, 35 were
considered to be medium severity and five were considered low. This total is a decrease from the 47vulnerabilities that affected Mozilla browsers in the first half of 2006. Of those, 40 were consideredmedium severity and seven were low severity. In the second half of 2005, 17 vulnerabilities affectedMozilla browsers.
During the second half of 2006, four vulnerabilities were disclosed that affected Opera. Of these, two
were low severity and the other two were medium severity. The total of four is a decrease from the sevenvulnerabilities that affected Opera in the first half of 2006. Of those seven, four were considered mediumseverity and three were low. Symantec documented nine vulnerabilities in Opera in the second half of 2005.
Safari was also affected by four vulnerabilities in the second half of 2006. Two of these were medium-
severity vulnerabilities and the other two were low severity. This is a decrease from the 12 vulnerabilitiesthat were documented to affect Safari in the first half of 2006. Of these 12 vulnerabilities, nine weremedium severity and the remaining three were low. Six vulnerabilities affected Safari in the second half of 2005.38MozillaInternet Explorer
Documented vulnerabilities0 10 20 30 40 50Period
6054
Jul–Dec 20064
44025
Jul–Dec 20056
917
Safari
Opera
Jan–Jun 200612
747Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
45During this reporting period, Internet Explorer was particularly affected by concerted efforts to “fuzz” the
browser for new vulnerabilities. Fuzzing is a security research and quality assurance method that generallyentails providing randomly generated inputs in an attempt to discover vulnerabilities and bugs. In the“Future Watch” section of the previous Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec predicted that the use of
fuzzing technologies and techniques would result in the discovery and disclosure of new vulnerabilities.
53
It appears that prediction is being borne out. In July 2006, security researchers embarked on a “Month ofBrowser Bugs,” which employed various browser fuzzing tools to generate a new vulnerability for each dayof the month.
54The majority of vulnerabilities reported as a result of this project affected Internet Explorer
or Windows components that were accessible through the Web browser.
In the second half of 2006, there were numerous advisories and corresponding security upgrades to
Mozilla Firefox. Most of the vulnerabilities during this period were initially reported by the vendor, but werebased on audits from independent researchers working in concert with the vendor. This is in contrast withInternet Explorer, for which a large number of vulnerabilities were disclosed prior to vendor notification onsecurity mailing lists or through the “Month of Browser Bugs” initiative.
In order to protect against successful exploitation of Web browser vulnerabilities, Symantec advises users
and administrators to upgrade all browsers to the latest, patched versions. Symantec recommends thatorganizations educate users to be extremely cautious about visiting unknown or untrusted Web sites andviewing or following links in unsolicited emails. Administrators should also deploy Web proxies in order toblock potentially malicious script code.
Window of exposure for Web browsers
The window of exposure is the difference in days between the time at which exploit code affecting a
vulnerability is made public and the time at which the affected vendor makes a patch available to thepublic for that vulnerability. During this time, the computer or system on which the affected application isdeployed may be susceptible to attack, as administrators will have no official recourse against exploitationof the vulnerability. Instead they will have to resort to best practices and workarounds to reduce the risk of successful compromise.
This metric will assess the window of exposure for vulnerabilities in selected Web browsers. For this
version of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec will be supplementing the Web browser window
of exposure discussion with the maximum amount of time that elapsed between the disclosure of a singlevulnerability and the release of an associated patch. Maximum patch times indicate the longest period oftime required for a patch to be released to the public.
In the second half of 2006, Mozilla had a window of exposure of two days based on a sample set of 36
patched vulnerabilities. This is a small increase over the window of exposure of one day in the first half of 2006, which was based on three patched vulnerabilities. In the second half of 2006, Mozilla had amaximum patch development time of 33 days. In the first half of the year, the maximum patchdevelopment time was eight days.
53Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume X (September 2006):
http://www.symantec.com/specprog/threatreport/ent-whitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_report_x_09_2006.en-us.pdf : p. 29
54http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/411Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
4655http://www.mozilla.org/security/bug-bounty.htmlMozilla has consistently had a lower average patch development time than other vendors. This may be due
to security initiatives that have been undertaken by the vendor. Open-source collaboration may have alsocontributed to this trend since it is possible for vulnerability researchers and other volunteers to submitsecurity patches. The majority of Mozilla vulnerabilities disclosed in the second half of 2006 were reportedby the vendor when new versions of Firefox were released, as opposed to being disclosed on securitymailing lists prior to vendor notification.
Interestingly, the Mozilla Foundation is one of the few vendors to offer a “bug bounty” program, which
provides monetary rewards to security researchers for discovering and reporting vulnerabilities to thevendor.
55This can affect the patch development times because it may attract security researchers who
might otherwise disclose vulnerabilities prior to notifying the vendor. It may also discourage them frompursuing monetary rewards from other legitimate or black market parties.
While this does encourage some financially motivated researchers to report vulnerabilities to the vendor,
it could ultimately place the vendor in the situation of bidding against others for vulnerability information,including black market or criminal buyers. Such a trend could also negatively affect smaller vendors withlimited resources who are not able to pay to obtain reports of vulnerabilities in their own products.
In the second half of 2006, Microsoft Internet Explorer had a window of exposure of 10 days based on a
sample set of 15 patched vulnerabilities. This is an increase from the nine-day time period in the first halfof 2006, which was based on a sample set of 20 patched vulnerabilities. The maximum patch developmenttime during the current reporting period was 78 days. In the first half of 2006, the maximum patchdevelopment time was 71 days.
The market share of Internet Explorer and Mozilla have traditionally made them more attractive targets
than Opera and Safari. As a result, trends in these browsers are based on a larger data set and are lesslikely to be skewed by anomalous results in one or two vulnerabilities.
In the second half of 2006, Opera had a window of exposure of 23 days based on a sample set of three
patched vulnerabilities. This is an increase over the window of exposure of two days in the first six monthsof 2006, which was based on a sample set of four patched vulnerabilities. In the second half of 2006,Opera had maximum patch development time of 46 days. This can be attributed to a few vulnerabilities in a small sample data set that disproportionately affected the average. In the first half of 2006, a maximum of seven days elapsed before a patch was available.
During the second half of 2006, Safari had a window of exposure of 62 days, an increase over the five-day
window in the first half of 2006. However, this increase is based on a sample set of only one vulnerability, a sample size that is too small to ensure valid conclusions. This vulnerability affected a third-party HTMLrendering component, so it is possible that the third-party nature may have slowed the patch release time.In the first half of 2006, the maximum patch development time was 21 days for a sample set of fourvulnerabilities.
All browser vendors experienced a longer window of exposure during the current reporting period. In some
cases, the increase was relatively small, as was the case with Internet Explorer and Mozilla. With Operaand Safari, however, the window of exposure experienced a large increase, although this is skewed by asmaller sample set of patched vulnerabilities and exploits. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Opera and Safari both had instances in which a relatively longer patch development time for a single
vulnerability caused the average patch development time to be longer than those for the first half of 2006.None of the vulnerabilities affecting Opera and Safari during this period had any indication of exploitactivity in the wild, and so the relative level of risk may be an influence in how quickly the vulnerability has been patched.
Zero-day vulnerabilities
A zero-day vulnerability is one for which there is sufficient public evidence to indicate that the vulnerability
has been exploited in the wild prior to being publicly known. It may not have been known to the vendorprior to exploitation, and the vendor had not released a patch at the time of the exploit activity.
Zero-day vulnerabilities represent a serious threat in many cases because there is no patch available for
them and because they will likely be able to evade purely signature-based detection. It is the unexpectednature of zero-day threats that causes concern, especially because they may be used in targeted attacksand in the propagation of malicious code. As Symantec predicted in Volume IX of the Internet Security
Threat Report , a black market for zero-day vulnerabilities has emerged that has the potential to put them
into the hands of criminals and other interested parties.
56
In the second half of 2006, Symantec documented 12 zero-day vulnerabilities (figure 16). This is asignificant increase compared to the first half of 2006 and the second half of 2005 when only one zero-day vulnerability was documented for each reporting period.
Figure 16. Zero-day vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec CorporationPeriodJul–Dec 2005 Jan–Jun 2006 Jul–Dec 2006Documented vulnerabilities
12
11
56Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume IX (March 2006):
http://eval.veritas.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_report_ix.pdf : p. 2147Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Numerous high-profile zero-day vulnerabilities were discovered in the second half of 2006. This activity
peaked in September of 2006, when four zero-day vulnerabilities were documented. The majority of thesewere client-side vulnerabilities that affected Office applications, Internet Explorer, and ActiveX controls.Many of these may have been discovered through the use of fuzzing technologies.
In August 2006, Microsoft released a security bulletin to address a zero-day vulnerability in the
Windows Server Service.
57This vulnerability was not publicly known prior to the release of the bulletin,
but Microsoft,58SANS,59and US-CERT made statements that it was being actively exploited in the wild
prior to the bulletin.60
While it is believed that zero-day vulnerabilities have been a threat in the past, the recent increase in incidents may be partially due to improvements in capabilities to detect these attacks in the wild. Such capabilities include improved vulnerability-handling procedures within organizations, improvedcooperation between enterprises and vendors, and better technologies for the detection and analysis of exploits and malicious code.
In order to protect against zero-day vulnerabilities, Symantec recommends that administrators deploy
IDS/IPS systems and regularly updated antivirus software. Security vendors may provide rapid response to recently discovered zero-day vulnerabilities in the wild by developing and implementing new or updatedIDS/IPS and antivirus signatures before a patch has been released by the affected vendor. Behavior-blocking solutions and heuristic signatures may also provide protection against zero-day vulnerabilities.
In addition, some IPS systems may provide further protection against memory corruption vulnerabilities
in the form of ASLR and by making memory segments non-executable. These measures may complicate the exploitation of such vulnerabilities and make it more difficult for attack payloads to execute; however,they may not protect all applications by default.
Database vulnerabilities
Data is one the most important assets of any organization and is, therefore, a valuable target for attackers.
Securing the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data should be among the top priorities forenterprises. While databases are usually deployed deep within the organization’s infrastructure, they areoften accessed by middle-ware and third-party components that are granted a certain degree of trust.
61
This can expose database implementations to a variety of attacks that fall outside of the protection oftraditional network security mechanisms, such as firewalls and IDS systems.
With this version of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec will assess database vulnerabilities
for the first time. This report will discuss vulnerabilities that affected the following major databaseimplementations during the second half of 2006: IBM DB2, Microsoft SQL Server, MySQL, Oracle, andPostgreSQL.
In the second half of 2006, 168 vulnerabilities were documented that affected Oracle databases (figure 17).
This is a slight decrease from the 169 vulnerabilities disclosed in the first half of 2006 and an increase overthe 131 in the second half of 2005.
57http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/19409/info
58http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms06-040.mspx
59http://isc.incidents.org/diary.html?storyid=1556&dshield=938c1242911bc722f0c63baf4a21df2c
60http://www.us-cert.gov/cas/techalerts/TA06-220A.html
61Database middle-ware is defined as services and applications that provide database access and interconnectivity.48Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
During the second half of 2006, five vulnerabilities were documented in IBM DB2 databases. This is a
slight increase from the four vulnerabilities documented during the first half of 2006. Seven vulnerabilitiesaffected IBM DB2 during the second half of 2005.
Symantec documented five vulnerabilities in MySQL during the second half of 2006. This is a slight
decrease from the six vulnerabilities that affected it during the first half of 2006. One vulnerability wasdocumented in MySQL in the second half of 2005.
Figure 17. Database vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation
PostgreSQL was affected by three vulnerabilities in the second half of 2006. This is a decrease from the
five vulnerabilities that affected PostgreSQL during the first half of 2006. No vulnerabilities in PostgreSQLwere document in the second half of 2005.
Microsoft SQL Server was the final database that was assessed for this discussion. It was not affected
by any vulnerabilities during any of the reporting periods.
Oracle has traditionally presented the most high-profile target to attackers due to its large market share.
In addition to this, Oracle’s database implementations offer a greater feature set and a broader range ofdatabase products than many of the other database vendors. The more features an application has, themore code that is available in which to find vulnerabilities, and the more code that must be audited forvulnerabilities. This can equate to a higher proportion of vulnerabilities, depending on the nature andcomplexity of the features. Microsoft SQL
ServerIBM DB2Oracle
Documented vulnerabilities02 0 4 0 6 0 80 100 140Period
Jan–Jun 2006
Jul–Dec 2006
120Jul–Dec 2005MySQL
PostgreSQL
180 1607
0131
1
0
4
0169
6
5
5
0168
5
3
49Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Other database implementations such as MySQL and PostgreSQL have been more conservative when
introducing new features. They have only recently adopted many features common to commercial databaseimplementations such as Oracle, IBM DB2, and Microsoft SQL Server. This may account for the significantlylower volume of vulnerabilities in MySQL and PostgreSQL, but it also presents the possibility that, as theybecome more complex and more widely adopted, their share of vulnerabilities may also increase.
In contrast, Microsoft SQL Server has been free of vulnerabilities throughout the past three six-month
reporting periods. Some sources have attributed this trend to Microsoft security initiatives such as theSecurity Development Lifecycle, which was employed during the development of SQL Server 2005.
62
That said, Microsoft SQL Server 2000 has been the only database to suffer from a widespread maliciouscode attack, namely SQL Slammer (also known as the W32.SQLExp.Worm), which was first detected inJanuary 2003.
63This may have been a major reason for developing future versions that would not be
susceptible to such attacks.
Symantec recommends that administrators configure firewalls to restrict all external access to database
servers and minimize the risk of direct remote attacks against databases. Database intrusion detectionsystems should also be deployed to detect and provide audit logs for unauthorized access attempts.
Data security and integrity is often a requirement for policy compliance, and organizations and individuals
may be held responsible for data breaches that threaten personal information. Symantec recommends thatenterprises engage in auditing for policy compliance and encourages the use of policy compliance tools.Databases may also be exposed to attacks in components that interface with the database, such as Webapplications. Web application firewalls may help to detect and prevent Web-based attacks on the database.
Vulnerabilities—protection and mitigation
Administrators should employ a good asset management system to track what assets are deployed
on the network and to determine which ones may be affected by the discovery of new vulnerabilities.Vulnerability assessment technologies should also be used to detect known vulnerabilities in deployedassets. Administrators should monitor vulnerability mailing lists and security Web sites to keep abreast of new vulnerabilities in Web applications.
Enterprises should subscribe to a vulnerability alerting service in order to be notified of new
vulnerabilities. They should also manage their Web-based assets carefully. If they are developing Webapplications in-house, developers should be educated about secure development practices, such as theSecurity Development Lifecycle and threat modeling.
64
Symantec recommends the use of secure shared components that have been audited for common Webapplication vulnerabilities. If possible, all Web applications should be audited for security prior todeployment. Web application security solutions and a number of products and services are available todetect and prevent attacks against these applications.
62David Litchfield, “Which database is more secure? Oracle vs. Microsoft” (Nov. 21, 2006): http://www.databasesecurity.com/dbsec/ comparison.pdf : p. 3
63http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2003-012502-3306-99
64The Security Development Lifecycle is a development paradigm that incorporates security at every stage from the initial archite cture to programming, and in the
quality assurance/testing phases. Threat modeling is a security auditing methodology that involves formally identifying and map ping out all possible attack
vectors for an application.50Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
51Malicious Code Trends
Symantec gathers malicious code data from over 120 million desktops that have deployed Symantec’s
antivirus products in consumer and corporate environments. The Symantec Digital Immune System andScan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting process. This discussion is basedon malicious code samples reported to Symantec for analysis between July 1 and December 31, 2006.
In previous editions of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , the number and volume of threats
analyzed were based upon the number of reports received by enterprise and home users. For the first time, this report will also examine malicious code types and propagation vectors based upon potentialinfections. This allows Symantec to determine which sample of malicious code attempted to infect acomputer and the volume of potential infections worldwide.
Symantec categorizes malicious code in two ways: families and variants. A family is a new, distinct sample
of malicious code. For instance, W32.Sober@mm (also known as Sober) was the founding sample, or theprimary source code, of the Sober family. In some cases, a malicious code family may have variants. Avariant is a new iteration of the same family, one that has minor differences but that is still based on theoriginal. A new variant is created when the source code of a successful virus or worm is modified slightly tobypass antivirus detection definitions developed for the original sample. For instance, Sober.X is a variantof Sober.
This discussion will include any prevention and mitigation measures that might be relevant to the particular
threats being discussed. However, Symantec recommends that certain best security practices always befollowed to protect against malicious code infection. Administrators should keep patch levels up to date,especially on computers that host public services—such as HTTP, FTP, SMTP, and DNS servers—and areaccessible through a firewall or placed in a DMZ. Email servers should be configured to only allow fileattachment types that are required for business needs and to not accept email that appears to come fromwithin the company but that actually originates from external sources. Additionally, Symantec recommendsthat ingress and egress filtering be put in place on perimeter devices to prevent unwanted activity.
End users should employ defense-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software and
a personal firewall. Users should update antivirus definitions regularly. They should also ensure that alldesktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their softwarevendors. They should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless it is expected and comesfrom a trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Malicious Code Trends Highlights
The following section will offer highlights of the malicious code trends that Symantec observed during this
period. Following this overview, the Internet Security Threat Report will discuss selected metrics in greater
depth, providing analysis and discussion of the trends indicated by the data.
• Of the top ten new malicious code families detected in the last six months of 2006, five were Trojans,
four were worms, and one was a virus.
• The most widely reported new malicious code family this period was that of the Stration worm.65
• Symantec honeypot computers captured a total of 136 previously unseen malicious code threats
between July 1 and December 31, 2006.
• During this period, 8,258 new Win32 variants were reported to Symantec, an increase of 22 percent
over the first half of 2006.
• Worms made up 52 percent of the volume of malicious code threats, down from 75 percent in the
previous period.
• The volume of Trojans in the top 50 malicious code samples reported to Symantec increased from
23 percent to 45 percent.
• Trojans accounted for 60 percent of the top 50 malicious code samples when measured by potential
infections.
• Polymorphic threats accounted for three percent of the volume of top 50 malicious code reports this
period, up from one percent in the two previous periods.
• Bots made up only 14 percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code reports.• Threats to confidential information made up 66 percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code
reported to Symantec.
• Keystroke logging threats made up 79 percent of confidential information threats by volume of reports.• Seventy-eight percent of malicious code that propagated did so over SMTP, making it the most
commonly used propagation mechanism.
• Malicious code using peer-to-peer to propagate rose from 23 percent of all propagating malicious
code in the first six months of 2006 to 29 percent in the last half of the year.
• The majority of malicious code reports during this period originated in the United States.• During the second half of 2006, 23 percent of the 1,318 documented malicious code instances
exploited vulnerabilities.
• MSN Messenger was affected by 35 percent of new instant messaging threats in the second half
of the year.
52
65http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-092111-0525-99Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
5366http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-092111-0525-99
67http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-111201-3853-99
68http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-080815-5056-99Malicious Code Trends Discussion
This section will discuss selected malicious code metrics in greater depth, providing analysis and
discussion of the trends indicated by the data. The following metrics will be discussed in depth:
• Top ten new malicious code families
• Previously unseen malicious code• Malicious code types• Threats to confidential information • Propagation vectors • Malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities
Top ten new malicious code families
Of the top ten new malicious code families detected in the last six months of 2006, five were Trojans,
four were worms, and one was a virus (table 5). One of the Trojans also had back door capabilities. Thisindicates that attackers may be moving towards using Trojans as a means of installing malicious code oncomputers. As Trojans do not propagate, they allow attackers to perform targeted attacks without drawingattention to themselves. The longer a threat remains undiscovered in the wild, the more opportunity it hasto compromise computers before measures can be taken to protect against it.
Table 5. Top ten new malicious code families
Source: Symantec Corporation
The most widely reported new malicious code family during this reporting period was that of the Stration
worm.66More than 150 variants of this worm were discovered in the last six months of 2006. Stration
sends copies of itself with various subject headers, messages, and attachment names to email addressesthat are gathered from compromised computers. Once installed on a computer, the worm also attempts to download and execute remote files from predetermined Web sites.
The Gampass
67information-stealing Trojan and the Shufa68worm were the second and third most common
new families, respectively, in the second half of 2006. They are part of a growing trend towards threatsthat steal account information for online games. Rank
1
23456789
10Sample
Stration
GampassShufaBacalidHorstAnnunciPasobirJakposhLinkmediacZonebacType
Worm
TrojanWormVirusTrojan, Back doorWormWormTrojanTrojanTrojanVectors
SMTP
N/AYahoo! IM, SMTPFile sharingN/ASMTPFile sharingN/AN/AN/AImpacts/Features
Downloads and installs other threats
Steals online gaming passwordsSteals passwords for Lineage online gamePolymorphic virus that can download malicious filesRelays email for spamDials a high-cost phone numberSteals instant messenger passwordsRedirects search queries to other Web sitesDisplays pop-up ads and sends system data to an attackerLowers Internet Explorer security settingsSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
54A secondary economy has emerged on various online auction sites in which users buy and sell items (such
as those that players are awarded for accomplishing goals within these games). As the popularity of thesegames continues to grow, so does the potential for attackers to exploit them for financial gain. Once anattacker has stolen a user’s account information, he or she can sell the user’s items and keep the profits.Symantec expects to continue to see new threats that target online gamers.
As noted in the “Future Watch” section of the previous edition of the Internet Security Threat Report , there
appears to be renewed interest in polymorphic viruses among malicious code authors.
69The Bacalid family
of polymorphic viruses was the fourth most prolific new threat in the second half of 2006.70While most
viruses simply replicate by infecting executable files, Bacalid also attempts to download and execute othermalicious threats from a list of Web sites contained within its code. As malicious code authors continue tocounter effective antivirus defenses, Symantec anticipates that they will increasingly adopt polymorphictechniques to evade detection.
Previously unseen malicious code
Previously unseen malicious code refers to samples captured by Symantec’s honeypot network that have
not been previously detected and for which antivirus signatures have not yet been developed.
71This metric
is intended to give readers an understanding of the number of new threats that may exist for which thereare no antivirus signatures available, which could leave users’ computers susceptible to compromise.
This metric was introduced in the previous volume of the Internet Security Threat Report . However, since
that time the methodology has been revised in order to offer a more complete picture of previously unseenmalicious code threats that are captured by Symantec’s honeypot computers.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2006, Symantec honeypot computers captured a total of 136 previously
unseen malicious code threats. This is up from 98 new malicious code threats that were captured in theprevious period. In other words, there were more than five compromises per week, on average, bypreviously unseen threats in the second half of 2006 compared to less than four per week in the first halfof the year. Antivirus programs did not previously detect these threats, resulting in the need to create newdetection signatures for them.
Previously unseen threats are particularly dangerous because traditional defenses, such as some
signature-based antivirus products, are typically unable to detect them. Until antivirus signatures aredeveloped and antivirus programs updated, computers could be susceptible to infection by these threats.Generic signatures may also block previously unseen threats. Behavior-blocking solutions and heuristictechnologies may also provide protection against previously unseen malicious code.
Administrators should also maintain up-to-date antivirus definitions to ensure that their computers are
protected from new threats at the earliest possible time. Enabling heuristic detection within antivirusproducts may also help detect previously unseen threats before traditional antivirus signatures areavailable. In the case of previously unseen threats that exploit vulnerabilities in order to propagate,applying appropriate patches as soon as they are available will prevent exploitation. If patches are notavailable, blocking access to the vulnerable service at the firewall will help protect against exploitation by previously unseen malicious code.
69Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume X (September 2006):
http://www.symantec.com/specprog/threatreport/ent-whitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_report_x_09_2006.en-us.pdf : p. 26
70http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-090109-5610-99
71A honeypot is an Internet-connected system that acts as a decoy, allowing an attacker to enter the system so that the attacker’ s behavior inside the compromised
system can be observed.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
5572It is important to note that a malicious code sample can be classified in more than one threat type category. For example, bots such as variants of the Mytob family
are classified as both a worm and a back door. As a result, cumulative percentages of threat types in the top 50 malicious code reports may exceed 100.
73http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-111915-0848-99
74http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-011712-2537-99
75http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-032110-4938-99Malicious code types
During the current reporting period, worms made up 52 percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code
reports, down from 75 percent in the previous period (figure 18).72This drop can largely be attributed
to the decline in reports of major worms such as Sober.X,73Blackmal.E,74and Netsky.P75since the first
half of 2006. The longer a threat has been in the wild, the more time users will have had to update theirdetection signatures. The volume of these worms has likely declined because users have installed antivirusdefinitions that detect them. This idea is enforced by the fact the number of unique samples of worms in the top 50 malicious code reports remained fairly constant over the last six months of 2006. During this period, 36 worms were reported to Symantec, compared to 38 in the previous period.
Figure 18. Malicious code types by volume
Source: Symantec Corporation
The volume of Trojans in the top 50 malicious code samples reported to Symantec increased significantly
in the last six months of 2006. During this period, they constituted 45 percent of the volume of the top 50malicious code samples, a significant increase over the 23 percent last period.
As is discussed in the “Future Watch” section of this report, attackers are moving towards staged
downloaders, also referred to as modular malicious code. These are small, specialized Trojans thatdownload and install other malicious programs, such as back doors or worms. Many of these Trojans are installed using Web browser vulnerabilities and zero-day vulnerabilities in other applications (asdiscussed in the “Zero-day vulnerabilities” section of this report). During the current period, 75 percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code reports contained a modular component such as this.01 0 2 0 3 0 40 50 70 60Jul–Dec 2005
Jan–Jun 2006
Jul–Dec 2006
8040%49%
15%
23%38%
45%
Percenta ge of to p 50Type
Virus
Worm
Back door
Trojan1%1%
9%
75%60%
52%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
5676http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-103115-0022-99
77http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-042013-1813-99
78http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-032311-1146-99Back doors made up only 15 percent of the volume of top 50 malicious code reports during this reporting
period, down from 40 percent in the first half of 2006. While the volume of back door programs hasdeclined, this does not necessarily mean that they are being used less. As described above, many Trojansdownload back doors after compromising a computer. This allows attackers to initially compromise acomputer with a new, previously unseen malicious code sample in order to disable security applications and install a known back door program.
In many cases, because of security measures that are in place, only the first stage of this process will be
successful. For instance, a firewall may prevent the Trojan from downloading further components orauthorities may detect the additional threats and shut down the computer hosting them.
An example of this is the system consisting of Mixor.C,
76Galapoper.A,77and Abwiz.F.78Mixor.C is a mass-
mailing worm that installs a copy of the Galapoper.A Trojan on a compromised computer. This Trojan then connects to a remote Web site and downloads an instruction list of actions to perform. One of theseactions is to download and execute a copy of the Abwiz.F Trojan. Abwiz.F then uploads information aboutthe compromised computer to a Web site and allows the computer to be used by the attacker to relay spam email.
Spam can cause significant problems for a user. High volumes of email originating from a computer can
cause it to be added to a block list or the user’s Internet connectivity to be suspended by his or her Internetservice provider. This could also affect the connectivity of other end users, as the network block to whichthe user’s IP address belongs could also be added to the block list.
Spam can also be problematic for enterprises. If an organization’s address space is blocked, it could
prevent business-related email from meeting its intended destination, which could be disruptive tobusiness communications.
In the current period, there were a large number of Mixor.C infections, but a smaller number of Galapoper.A
infections and an even smaller number of Abwiz.F infections. This indicates that not all Mixor.C infectionswere successful in installing Galapoper.A. In turn, the Trojan was not always successful in downloadingAbwiz.F. This could be due to firewalls or because the initial infection was discovered before all thecomponents were able to perform all their functions. Additionally, authorities may have shut down the Web sites hosting the downloaded components before the earlier stages were activated.
For the first time, in this edition of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is assessing malicious
code according to the number of unique samples reported to Symantec and the number of potentialinfections. This is an important distinction. In some cases, a threat that may trigger a high number ofreports may not cause a large number of potential infections and vice versa . The reasons for this will be
made clear in the ensuing discussion.
The distinction between malicious code reports and infections is well illustrated by comparing worm and
Trojan activity. While worms made up 52 percent of malicious code reports in the second half of 2006, they caused only 37 percent of potential infections (figure 19). The main reason for this is that mass-mailing worms generate a significant number of email messages to which they attach their malicious Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
code. Each message that is detected will generate a malicious code report. Because of the high volume of
email that one worm can generate, a single infection can result in many reports. However, once a maliciouscode sample is detected, antivirus signatures are quickly developed that can protect against subsequentpotential infections by that sample. So, only a small percentage of the high volume of email messages will result in additional infections.
Figure 19. Malicious code types by source, July–December 2006
Source: Symantec Corporation
Trojans, on the other hand, only constituted 45 percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code
samples reported during the last six months of 2006. However, they accounted for 60 percent of potentialinfections by the top 50 malicious code samples during the same period. Since Trojans do not contain anypropagation mechanisms, they do not proliferate as widely as mass-mailing worms, resulting in fewerreports. Because they are frequently installed by exploiting Web browser and zero-day vulnerabilities, a Trojan report is more likely to be the result of an infection. Consequently, the ratio of infections to reports is likely to be higher for Trojans than for worms.
Symantec expects the proportion of Trojans to increase as long as they remain a reliable means for
attackers to compromise computers. Worms will likely continue to decline somewhat; however, a highlysuccessful new worm could cause the proportion to increase to previous levels. For example, a new easilyexploitable remote vulnerability in a network service could be exploited by a worm, resulting in rapidpropagation and a high volume of infections.52%
TypeVirus Worm Back doorPercentage of top 50 threats
TrojanInfectionsReports
45%60%
11%15%37%
9%
5%
57Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
5879Many countries have implemented their own laws in this regard, such as the UK Data Protection Act, which can be found at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts1998/19980029.htmThreats to confidential information
Some malicious code programs are designed specifically to expose confidential information that is stored
on an infected computer. These threats may expose sensitive data such as system information, confidentialfiles and documents, or logon credentials. Some malicious code threats, such as back doors, can give aremote attacker complete control over a compromised computer.
Threats to confidential information are a particular concern because of their potential for use in criminal
activities. With the widespread use of online shopping and Internet banking, compromises of this naturecan result in significant financial loss, particularly if credit card information or banking details areexposed.
Within the enterprise, exposure of confidential information can lead to significant data leakage. If it
involves customer-related data—such as credit card information—this can severely undermine customerconfidence as well as violate local laws.
79Sensitive corporate information, including financial details,
business plans, and proprietary technologies, could also be leaked from compromised computers.
In the last six months of 2006, threats to confidential information made up 66 percent of the volume of top
50 malicious code reported to Symantec (figure 20). This is an increase over the 48 percent reported in the first half of the year and the 55 percent reported during the second half of 2005.
Figure 20. Threats to confidential information by volume
Source: Symantec Corporation
Malicious code can expose confidential information in a variety of ways. The most common method is by
allowing remote access to the compromised computer through a back door. In this method, the attackertypically uses a specialized application to connect to the compromised computer. He or she can thenperform numerous actions such as taking screenshots, changing configuration settings, and uploading,downloading, or deleting files.55%
48%66%
Jul–Dec 2005 Jan–Jun 2006 Jul–Dec 2006Percentage of top 50 malicious codeSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
59Figure 21. Threats to confidential information by type
Source: Symantec Corporation
In the second half of the 2006, threats that allow remote access, such as back doors, made up 84 percent
of confidential information threats by volume of reports, the same as in the first half of the year, but adecrease from 90 percent in the second half of 2005 (figure 21). During this reporting period, threats thatallow remote access made up 87 percent of threats by potential infection (figure 22). While a threat thatallows remote access, such as a back door, could give an attacker full access to a computer, the attackermust typically access it manually. This likely explains why the numbers of reports (84 percent) are similarto the number of potential infections during this reporting period (87 percent).PeriodPercentage of confidential information
exposure threats
Jul–Dec 2006Exports user data
Exports system data Allows remote accessKeystroke logger
Exports email addresses
Jan–Jun 2006 Jul–Dec 200584%
79%
62%59%63%84%
57%
41%
38%38%90%
66%
57%
51%52%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
60Figure 22. Threats to confidential information types by source, July–December 2006
Source: Symantec Corporation
While the volume of threats that allow remote access has decreased, the volume of threats that log
keystrokes and export user and system data have all increased. Keystroke logging threats made up 79percent of confidential information threats by volume of reports, up from 57 percent in the first half of theyear and 66 percent in the second half of 2005 (figure 21). During the current reporting period, keystrokeloggers made up 76 percent of confidential information threats by infection (figure 22). A keystroke loggerwill record keystrokes on the compromised computer. It usually either emails the log to the attacker oruploads it to a Web site that is under the attacker’s control. This makes it easier for an attacker to gatherconfidential information from a large number of compromised computers with minimal effort.
Threats that could be employed to export user data accounted for 62 percent of confidential information
threats by volume during this reporting period, up from 38 percent in the first half of the year.Furthermore, 63 percent of threats to confidential information reported during the last six months of 2006could be used to export system data, compared to 41 percent in the first half of 2006. These forms of dataleakage can aid an attacker in stealing a user’s identity or launching further attacks. If the attacker hasaccess to the user’s personal and system data, they can use this to craft a more targeted social engineeringattack tailored to that particular user.SourcePercentage of threats that expose
confidential information
Exports email addressesExports user data
Exports system data
Infections Reports87%
76%
67%69%
69%84%
79%
62%59%63%Keystroke logger
Allows remote access
hgshgsSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
61Propagation mechanisms
Worms and viruses use various means to transfer themselves, or propagate, from one computer to
another. These are collectively referred to as propagation mechanisms. This section will assess some of the propagation mechanisms used by malicious code samples reported to Symantec in the second half of 2006.
80
In the second half of 2006, SMTP remained the most commonly used propagation mechanism. During thisperiod, 78 percent of malicious code that propagated did so over SMTP (figure 23). This is a decrease from98 percent in the first half of the year. It can largely be attributed to a decrease in reports of mass-mailingworms, including Blackmal.E and Sober.X, as was discussed previously in the “Malicious code types” section.
Figure 23. Propagation mechanisms
Source: Symantec Corporation
While malicious code propagating over SMTP decreased during this period, all other vectors experienced
an increase. This is likely the result of an effort by attackers to diversify the way their threats proliferate.Good email scanning applications and increased user knowledge of mass-mailing threats have reduced the effectiveness of email as a propagation mechanism. As a result, some attackers are resorting to otherpropagation mechanisms or incorporating additional propagation mechanisms into a mass-mailing worm.
Malicious code that propagated by CIFS made up 32 percent of malicious code that propagated in
the second half of 2006. This is a 100 percent increase over the first half of 2006 when 16 percent ofpropagating code spread by this mechanism. This is largely due to the proliferation of the Looked.P worm.
81This worm not only copies itself to network shares with weak password protection, it also contains
a viral component to infect executable files on a compromised computer. Other variants of this worm alsoexperienced some success during this reporting period, particularly Looked.O,
82which shared an almost
identical feature set with Looked.P.P2P
PeriodPercentage of malicious code that propagates
CIFSRemote vulnerabilities
Jul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 2006 Jul–Dec 200578%
32%29%
15%
4%98%
16%23%
10%
1%92%
9%14%13%
5%Back door
SMTP
80It should be noted that some malicious code samples use more than one mechanism to propagate. As a result, cumulative percentag es presented in this
discussion may exceed 100 percent.
81http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-071212-0124-99
82http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-071212-0828-99Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 24. Propagation mechanisms by source, July–December, 2006
Source: Symantec Corporation
In the second half of 2006, there were significant differences in propagation mechanisms employed by
reported threats and potential infections (figure 24). For instance, SMTP was used by 78 percent ofreported malicious code threats that propagate; however, based on potential infections, only 47 percent of the top 50 samples that propagate did so through SMTP. This difference may be due to the higherlikelihood of mass-mailing worms being reported, which is because of their highly prolific nature. Since a single mass-mailing worm can generate a high volume of messages, it is likely to cause a larger numberof reports than actual infections, as was discussed previously in the “Malicious code types” section.
The P2P propagation vector has been steadily climbing over the last 18 months. Malicious code reports
using this vector to propagate rose from 23 percent of all propagating malicious code in the first sixmonths of 2006 to 29 percent in the last half of the year. Based on potential infections, P2P was used by47 percent of malicious code that propagated during the second half of 2006.
The use of P2P as a propagation mechanism is likely to continue to grow in the foreseeable future. P2P
networks are effective mechanisms for propagation since there are an immense number of files—possiblyincluding pirated software and programs to bypass copy protection on software—present at any time andbecause they are largely unregulated. There is little, if any, security in place between computers on a P2Pnetwork. Furthermore, social engineering attacks are easy to carry out through P2P. Attackers can simplygive a malicious code sample the same name as a popular download and make it available over P2P. Manyusers will inherently trust the malicious file and download it.
Enterprises should take measures to prevent P2P clients from being installed on any computers on
their networks. They should also block any ports used by these applications at the network boundary. End users who download files from P2P networks should scan all such files with a regularly updatedantivirus product.Remote vulnerability
SourcePercentage of malicious code
propagation mechanisms
CIFSBack door
Infections Reports3%47%
47%
16%5%78%
32%29%
15%
4%P2P
SMTP
62Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
6383It should be noted that the number of documented malicious code instances differs from the number of malicious code submissions . Documented malicious code
instances are those that have been analyzed and documented within the Symantec malicious code database.
84http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-092715-1534-99
85http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/20226/info
86http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-051914-5151-99Malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities
The exploitation of vulnerabilities as a means of malicious code propagation is an ongoing concern for
enterprises. This section of the Internet Security Threat Report will examine the relationship between
vulnerabilities and malicious code by assessing the proportion of malicious code that exploitsvulnerabilities.
During the second half of 2006, 23 percent of the 1,318 documented malicious code instances exploited
vulnerabilities (figure 25).
83This is higher than the 17 percent proportion of the 1,249 malicious code
instances documented in the first half of 2006. In the second half of 2005, 22 percent of the 1,077documented malicious code instances exploited vulnerabilities.
While the majority of malicious code uses vectors other than vulnerabilities as a means to spread, the
proportion that does employ vulnerabilities is significant. During the current reporting period, there havebeen a number of noteworthy malicious code events that do so, such as the use of client-side MicrosoftOffice vulnerabilities by Trojans. One specific instance of this was Trojan.PPDropper.F.
84This Trojan
infected targeted computers by exploiting the Microsoft PowerPoint Unspecified Remote Code ExecutionVulnerability.
85The Ginwui back door also exploited a Microsoft Word zero-day vulnerability.86
Figure 25. Malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation
In the second half of 2006, five zero-day exploits were released for vulnerabilities in Microsoft Office.
This accounts for a significant proportion of malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities during the secondhalf of 2006. Zero-day vulnerabilities present attackers with an opportunity to evade detection whencompromising computers. In the context of malicious code, this will also increase the success rate whencompromising computers, as the malicious code will appear to spread through an unknown vector until it has been discovered, analyzed, and mitigated by security and antivirus vendors.Jan–Jun 2006 Jul–Dec 2005
Period78% 83% 77%
Jul–Dec 2006
Remainder of malicious code
Malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities17% 22% 23%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
64Phishing, Spam, and Security Risks
Traditionally, the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report has broken security threats down into three
general categories: attacks, vulnerabilities, and malicious code. However, as Internet-based services andapplications have expanded and diversified, the potential for computer programs to introduce other typesof security risks has increased. The emergence of new risks, particularly spam, phishing, spyware, adware,and misleading applications, has necessitated an expansion of the traditional security taxonomy.
Symantec has monitored these new concerns as they have developed. This section will examine
developments in these risks over the last six months of 2006. In particular, it will consist of three subsections, which will discuss:
• Phishing
• Spam• Security risks, particularly adware, spyware, and misleading applications
Phishing
Phishing is an attempt by a third party to solicit confidential information from an individual, group, ororganization, usually for financial gain. Phishers are groups or individuals who attempt to trick users intodisclosing personal data, such as credit card numbers, online banking credentials, and other sensitiveinformation. They may then use the information to commit fraudulent acts. This section of the Internet
Security Threat Report will discuss phishing activity that Symantec detected between July 1 and
December 31, 2006.
The data provided in this section is based on statistics derived from the Symantec Probe Network, which
consists of over two million decoy email accounts that attract email messages from 20 different countriesaround the world. The main purpose of the network is to attract spam, phishing, viruses, and other email-borne threats. It encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises around the world, attracting emailthat is representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 million mailboxes. The Probe Networkconsists of previously used email addresses as well as email accounts that have been generated solely tobe used as probes.
In addition to the Probe Network, Symantec also gathers phishing information through the Symantec Phish
Report Network, an extensive antifraud community of enterprises and consumers. Members of the PhishReport Network contribute and receive fraudulent Web site addresses for alerting and filtering across abroad range of solutions.
Phishing is assessed according to two indicators: phishing messages and phishing attempts. A phishing
message is a single, unique message that is sent to targets with the intent of gaining confidential and/orpersonal information from computer users. Each phishing message has different content and each one willrepresent a different way of trying to fool a user into disclosing information. A phishing message can beconsidered the “lure” with which a phisher attempts to entice a phishing target to disclose confidentialinformation. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
A single phishing message can be used in numerous distinct phishing attempts, usually targeting different
end users. A phishing attempt can be defined as an instance of a phishing message being sent to a singleuser. Extending the fishing analogy, a phishing attempt can be considered a single cast of the lure (thephishing message) to try to ensnare a target.
Phishing Highlights
The following section will offer a brief summary of some of the phishing trends that Symantec observed
during this period based on data provided by the sources listed above. Following this overview, the Internet
Security Threat Report will discuss selected metrics in greater depth, providing analysis and discussion of
the trends indicated by the data.
• The Symantec Probe Network detected a total of 166,248 unique phishing messages, a six percent
increase over the first six months of 2006. This equates to an average of 904 unique phishing messagesper day for the second half of 2006.
• Symantec blocked over 1.5 billion phishing messages, an increase of 19 percent over the first half
of 2006. This means that Symantec blocked an average of 8.48 million phishing emails per day over the last six months of 2006.
• Throughout 2006, Symantec detected an average of 27 percent fewer unique phishing messages on
weekends than the weekday average of 961.
• On weekends, the number of blocked phishing attempts was seven percent lower than the weekday
average of 7,958,323 attempts per day.
• Organizations in the financial services sector accounted for 84 percent of the unique brands that
were phished during this period.
• Forty-six percent of all known phishing Web sites were located in the United States, a much higher
proportion than in any other country.
Phishing Discussion
This section will discuss selected phishing metrics in greater depth, providing analysis and discussion
of the trends indicated by the data. The following metrics will be discussed:
• Daily and seasonal variations in phishing activity
• Phishing activity by sector • Top countries hosting phishing Web sites• Phishing—prevention and mitigation
Daily and seasonal variations in phishing activity
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is analyzing the effects
that the day of the week and seasonal events may have on phishing activity. To that end, Symanteccalculated the average number of blocked phishing attempts and unique phishing messages on each day of the week for the year 2006. On average, Symantec detected 961 unique phishing messages eachweekday (Monday through Friday) (figure 26). Throughout 2006, Symantec detected an average of
65Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
27 percent fewer unique phishing messages on weekends than the weekday average of 961. On weekends,
the number of blocked phishing attempts was, on average, seven percent lower than the average of 7,958,323 attempts per weekday (figure 27).
Figure 26. Unique phishing messages per day
Source: Symantec Corporation
Figure 27. Blocked phishing messages per day
Source: Symantec CorporationDay of weekNumber of messages blocked
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday7,200,0007,400,0007,600,0007,800,0008,000,000
7,300,0007,500,0007,700,0007,900,0008,100,000
Saturday Sunday7,999,609
7,941,780
7,913,8977,998,451
7,937,878
7,312,8447,530,184Day of weekUnique phishing messages per day
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday6007008009001,000
6507508509501,050
Saturday Sunday9601,0171,008
934
887
709697
66Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
The decline in phishing activity on the weekends indicates that phishing activity mirrors the business
week. Since legitimate companies are more likely to send email on weekdays, it may follow that attackersare emulating this pattern in their attacks. However, this pattern may also be due to the fact that phishingcampaigns are generally short lived and, therefore, are most effective when people receive and read the phishing emails soon after they were sent, which may not be the case on weekends. Additionally, thiscould be a sign that phishing is beginning to follow a business model in which attackers work Mondaythrough Friday.
Big events or holidays like Christmas and New Year appear to increase the amount of phishing activity.
Attackers may find it easier to craft social engineering attacks around themes surrounding special eventssuch as these. During the Christmas season of 2006, the number of blocked phishing messages climbed to a high of 29 percent above the average.
In 2006, Symantec observed a clear increase in blocked phishing attempts around the week of the
Super Bowl final, which took place on February 5. Symantec blocked 33 percent more phishing messagesduring this period than on average (figure 28). Furthermore, during the week of the FIFA World Cup final(July 7, 2006) blocked phishing attempts were 40 percent higher than the average after having alreadybeen higher than normal for the beginning of the competition.
Figure 28. Blocked phishing messages per week
Source: Symantec Corporation
It should be noted that, in addition to the day of the week and the season, the amount of phishing
attempts may be influenced by other factors, such as the release of new security products, the disclosureof vulnerabilities, and the availability of patches. Furthermore, the number of existing bot-infectedcomputers could influence the number of phishing attacks, as they are often used to send phishingmessages. If a number of bot-infected computers are disinfected or removed from the Internet at one time, the number of phishing attacks would likely drop.Weeks in 2006Blocked phishing attempts
Jan Feb Mar Apr May30,000,00040,000,00050,000,00060,000,00070,000,000
35,000,00045,000,00055,000,00065,000,00080,000,000
Jun Jul75,000,000
Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
67Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Companies whose brands are frequently targeted by phishing attacks—that is, the company whose brand
is spoofed in a phishing attack—should be aware of seasonal influences on phishing campaigns in order to counter them before they occur. Such organizations may want to warn customers of potential phishingactivity prior to seasons or events that could be associated with increased phishing activity.
Phishing activity by sector
In the previous edition of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec began tracking the sectors of
companies whose brands were being used in phishing attacks. Since that report, the Symantec PhishReport Network has grown substantially, which has had an effect upon the overall volume of phishing Web sites
87tracked by Symantec this period. As a result, a broader range of phished industries was
reported this period. This metric is important for enterprises because the use of an organization’s brandcan undermine consumer confidence and damage the organization’s reputation. Furthermore, the companymay be required to compensate victims of any phishing scams that use the company’s brand.
Most of the unique brands phished in the last six months of 2006 were in the financial services sector.
Organizations in that sector accounted for 84 percent of the brands that were phished during this period(figure 29). This is not surprising, as most phishing attacks are motivated by profit. A successful phishingattack that mimics the brand of a financial entity is most likely to yield data that could be used forfinancial gain.
Figure 29. Brands used in phishing attacks by sector
Source: Symantec CorporationInternet communities 2%ISP 7%
Retail 5%
Government 1%7%5%
<1%<1%2%
Other 16%
Insurance <1%
Hardware <1%1%
Financial 84%
6887A phishing Web site is the site set up by the attacker to capture a victim’s authentication information. In many cases, these s ites are designed to mimic the actual site
of the brand being spoofed.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Organizations in the Internet service provider (ISP) sector made up seven percent of the unique brands
phished this period. ISP accounts can be valuable targets for phishers. While users may not think that their email accounts contain information that is of value to attackers, this may be misguided. In manycases, people reuse the same authentication credentials (such as usernames and passwords) for multipleaccounts, including the email accounts. Additionally, most online banking and brokerage accounts have a utility to reset forgotten passwords for a user. If an attacker gains access to the email account used forthis, they can submit a password reset request to the site in question and easily gain access to crucialaccounts. Finally, free Web-hosting space that is often provided with these accounts can also be used to host phishing Web sites.
While the financial sector accounted for 84 percent of the unique brands being phished in the second
half of 2006, it only made up 64 percent of the total phishing Web sites reported to Symantec (figure 30).Conversely, the retail sector accounted for only five percent of the unique brands phished, but 34 percentof the volume of phishing Web sites. The ISP sector accounted for approximately two percent of phishingWeb sites, while the remaining sectors accounted for less than one percent.
Figure 30. Sectors of unique brands being phished by volume
Source: Symantec Corporation
The high volume of phishing Web sites reported for a relatively small number of retail sector brands
indicates that attackers are concentrating a large number of phishing attacks against a small number of brands. This suggests that attackers may feel that only a few retail brands are significant enough toprovide an economic return or that they have experienced enough success attacking these few brands thatthey do not need to attack other retail brands. Some attackers may also be using ready-made phishing“kits” that are likely to focus on a small number of retail brands.
88ISP 2%
Government <1%
Internet communities <1%2%<1% <1% <1%
Other 2%
Insurance <1%
Hardware <1%<1%
Financial 64%Retail 34%
6988A phishing kit is a set of tools that an attacker can use to easily construct phishing email messages and Web sites based on a template.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
7089Two-factor authentication consists of using a password or PIN number generated by the user plus a physical device such as a one -time password list or physical token
that generates random numbers.If the revenue generated by phishing these brands diminishes, it is likely that attackers will move their
efforts to other sectors and that the volume of phishing attacks in the retail sector will subsequently drop.On the other hand, the number of retail brands being phished could increase as attackers are forced toexpand their efforts. This pattern has already been seen in the financial sector when some of the largerinstitutions began taking aggressive steps, such as two-factor authentication, to protect their brand andcustomers from phishing attacks.
89As a result of this, phishers have begun to attack smaller brands,
although larger brands are still used in the majority of phishing attacks.
Top countries hosting phishing Web sites
For the first time, in this edition of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is assessing the countries
in which the most phishing Web sites are hosted. This data is a snapshot in time, and does not offer insightinto changes in the locations of certain phishing sites over the course of the reporting period. It shouldalso be noted that the fact that a phishing site is hosted in a certain country does not necessarily meanthat the attacker is located in that country.
In the second half of 2006, 46 percent of all known phishing sites were located in the United States
(figure 31), a much higher proportion than in any other country. This is likely because a large number ofWeb-hosting providers—particularly free Web hosts— are located in the United States. Furthermore, theUnited States has the highest number of Internet users in the world and is home to a large number ofInternet-connected organizations, both large and small.
A Web server belonging to a small company makes an ideal platform for phishers to use as a host. In many
cases, these servers do not have full-time administrative or security staff. As a result, the security patchlevel of these computers may not be up to date, and other security measures may not have been fullyimplemented. An attacker could thus compromise the computer with less chance of the illicit Web sitebeing discovered right away. Since the compromised computer already hosts a Web site, browser trafficdestined to it will likely escape notice.
Figure 31. Top countries hosting phishing Web sites
Source: Symantec CorporationKey
(X) = Rank% = Current proportionChina
(8) 2% Germany
(2) 11%
Taiwan
(6) 3%France
(4) 3%Netherlands
(10) 2%
United States
(1) 46%Canada
(7) 2%
Japan
(5) 3%United
Kingdom
(3) 3%South Korea
(9) 2%Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Germany was home to the second highest percentage of phishing Web sites in the second half of 2006,
with 11 percent of the worldwide total. It also has the largest number of Web-hosting providers in Europe.90
By hosting their sites with large providers, phishers may be able to gain the advantage of obscurity. With so many sites hosted by a single provider, it may take days for the provider to discover a phishing site andshut it down.
Phishing—prevention and mitigation
Symantec recommends that enterprise users protect themselves against phishing threats by filtering email
at the server level through the mail transfer agent (MTA). Although this will likely remain the primary pointof filtering for phishing, organizations can also use IP-based filtering upstream, as well as HTTP filtering.
DNS block lists also offer protection against potential phishing emails.
91Organizations could also consider
using domain-level or email authentication in order to verify the actual origin of an email message. This can protect against phishers who are spoofing mail domains.
92
To protect against potential phishing activity, administrators should always follow Symantec best practicesas outlined in Appendix A of this report. Symantec also recommends that organizations educate their endusers about phishing.
93They should also keep their employees notified of the latest phishing attacks and
how to avoid falling victim to them.94
Organizations can also employ Web server log monitoring to track if and when complete downloads of theirWeb sites are occurring. Such activity may indicate that someone is using the legitimate Web site to createan illegitimate Web site that could be used for phishing.
Organizations can detect phishing attacks that use spoofing by monitoring non-deliverable email addresses
or bounced email that is returned to non-existent users. They should also monitor the purchasing of cousindomain names by other entities to identify purchases that could be used to spoof their corporate domains.
95
This can be done with the help of companies that specialize in domain monitoring; some registrars evenprovide this service.
96
The use of antiphishing toolbars and components in Web browsers can also help protect users fromphishing attacks. These measures notify the user if a Web page being visited does not appear to belegitimate. This way, even if a phishing email reaches a user’s inbox, the user can still be alerted to thepotential threat.
End users should follow best security practices, as outlined in Appendix A of this report. They should
deploy an antiphishing solution. As some phishing attacks may use spyware and/or keystroke loggers,Symantec advises end users to use antivirus software, antispam software, firewalls, toolbar blockers, andother software detection methods. Symantec also advises end users to never disclose any confidentialpersonal or financial information unless and until they can confirm that any request for such information is legitimate.
Users should review bank, credit card, and credit information frequently. This can provide information
on any irregular activities. For further information, the Internet Fraud Complaint Center (IFCC) has alsoreleased a set of guidelines on how to avoid Internet-related scams.
97Additionally, network administrators
can review Web proxy logs to determine if any users have visited known phishing sites.
7190http://www.webhosting.info/webhosts/tophosts/global
91A DNS block list (sometimes referred to as a black list) is simply a list of IP addresses that are known to send unwanted email traffic. It is used by email software to
either allow or reject email coming from IP addresses on the list.
92Spoofing refers to instances where phishers forge the “From:” line of an email message using the domain of the entity they are targeting with the phishing attempt.
93For instance the United States Federal Trade Commission has published some basic guidelines on how to avoid phishing. They are available at:
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/alt127.htm
94A good resource for information on the latest phishing threats can be found at: http://www.antiphishing.org
95“Cousin domains” refers to domain names that include some of the key words of an organization’s domain or brand name; for examp le, for the corporate domain
“bigbank.com” cousin domains could include “bigbank-alerts.com”, “big-bank-security.com”, and so on.
96See http://markmonitor.com/brandmanagement/index.html for instance.
97http://www.fbi.gov/majcases/fraud/internetschemes.htmSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Spam
Spam is usually defined as junk or unsolicited email sent by a third party. While it is certainly an
annoyance to users and administrators, spam is also a serious security concern as it can be used to deliver Trojans, viruses, and phishing attempts. It could also cause a loss of service or degradation in the performance of network resources and email gateways. This section of the Internet Security
Threat Report will discuss developments in spam activity between July 1 and December 31, 2006.
The data used in this analysis is based on data returned from the Symantec Probe Network as well as data
gathered from a statistical sampling of the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base. Specifically,statistics are gathered from enterprise customers’ Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam servers that receivemore than 1,000 email messages per day. This removes the smaller data samples (that is, smallercustomers and test servers), thereby allowing for a more accurate representation of data.
The Symantec Probe Network consists of millions of decoy email addresses that are configured to attract
a large stream of spam attacks. An attack can consist of one or more messages. The goal of the ProbeNetwork is to simulate a wide variety of Internet email users, thereby attracting a stream of traffic that is representative of spam activity across the Internet as a whole. For this reason, the Probe Network iscontinuously optimized in order to attract new varieties of spam attacks. This is accomplished throughinternal production changes that are made to the network, which thus affect the number of new spamattacks it receives as a whole.
Spam Highlights
The following section will offer a brief summary of some of the spam trends that Symantec observed
during this period based on data provided by the sources listed above. Following this overview, the Internet
Security Threat Report will discuss selected metrics in greater depth, providing analysis and discussion of
the trends indicated by the data.
• Between July 1 and December 31, 2006, spam made up 59 percent of all monitored email traffic. This
is an increase over the first six months of 2006 when 54 percent of email was classified as spam.
• Sixty-five percent of all spam detected during this period was composed in English.• In the last six months of 2006, 0.68 percent of all spam email contained malicious code. This means
that one out of every 147 spam messages blocked by Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam containedmalicious code.
• Spam related to financial services made up 30 percent of all spam during this period, the most of
any category.
• During the last six months of 2006, 44 percent of all spam detected worldwide originated in the
United States.
• The United States hosted the largest proportion of spam zombies, with 10 percent of the
worldwide total.
72Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Spam Discussion
This section will discuss selected spam metrics in greater depth, providing analysis and discussion of
the trends indicated by the data. The following metrics will be discussed:
• Top spam categories
• Top countries of spam origin • Distribution of spam zombies
Top spam categories
Spam categories are assigned by Symantec Email Security Group analysts based on spam activity that is
detected by the Symantec Probe Network. While some of the categories may overlap, this data provides a general overview of the types of spam that are most commonly seen on the Internet today.
It is important to note that this data is restricted to spam attacks that are detected and processed by the
Symantec Probe Network. Internal upstream processing may weed out particular spam attacks, such asthose that are determined to be potential fraud attacks.
The most common type of spam detected in the latter half of 2006 was related to financial services
(figure 32), which made up 30 percent of all spam during this period. Spam related to health services andproducts made up 23 percent of all spam, and spam related to commercial products made up 21 percent of the total during this period.
Figure 32. Spam categories
Source: Symantec CorporationFraud 3%
Health 23%Finance 30%Internet 10%Leisure 5%
Commercial products 21%Scams 4%
Adult 4%
73Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
The rise in financially-related spam in the second half of 2006 was due mainly to a noticeable increase in
stock market “pump and dump” spam. Pump and dump is the name given to schemes in which criminalsprofit by creating an artificial interest in a stock they own. They buy a penny stock when the price is low.They then artificially pump up demand for the stock by sending out spam that appears to be from arespected stock advisor, but that actually contains false predictions of high performance for the stock.Recipients of the message, trusting the spam content, buy the stock, creating demand for it and therebyraising the price. When the prices are high, the perpetrators of the scheme sell their stock for a profit.
98
This type of spam has been proven to allow the spammers to generate revenue directly and almostimmediately.
99This factor alone is likely to make stock market spam more appealing than other types
of spam.
The increase in financial services spam was almost in direct proportion to the decrease in adult-related
spam this period. In the previous edition of the Internet Security Threat Report , adult-related spam
accounted for 22 percent of spam on the Internet. However, it dropped sharply over the last half of 2006,making up only four percent of all spam during this period. This is likely because a large portion of profit-driven spammers shifted their efforts towards the more lucrative stock market spam.
The second most common type of spam detected in the last six months of 2006 was related to health
services and products, which accounted for 23 percent of all spam. It is not surprising that health-related spam makes up such a high proportion of the total. This category traditionally has one of thehighest “click-through” rates, as it tends to be more difficult to market through more legitimate andtraditional means. A click-through is a link that is embedded in a spam message. The link containsuniquely identifiable information about its originator. Each time a user clicks on the link, it is considered a click-through. Typically, the originator receives financial compensation for each click-through. Spammers have an economic incentive to have a high click-through rate in order to increase their return on investment. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that they would use spam content that has a high click-through rate.
Top countries of spam origin
This section will discuss the top ten countries of spam origin. The nature of spam and its distribution
on the Internet presents challenges in identifying the location of people who are sending spam. Manyspammers try to redirect attention away from their actual geographic location. In an attempt to bypassDNS block lists, they build coordinated networks of compromised computers known as bot networks, which allow them to send spam from sites that are distant from their physical location. In doing so, theywill likely focus on compromised computers in those regions with the largest bandwidth capabilities (for a more in-depth discussion of this, please refer to the “Attack Trends” report of this report). Following this logic, the region from which the spam originates may not correspond with the region in which thespammers are located.
74
98http://www.sec.gov/answers/pumpdump.htm
99http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=920553Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
During the last six months of 2006, 44 percent of all spam detected worldwide originated in the United
States (table 6), more than in any other country during this period. This is likely due to the high number ofbroadband users in that country and the high percentage of bot-infected computers located there, as wasdiscussed in the “Attack Trends” section of this report. The United States was also the top country of spamorigin in the first half of 2006, when 49 percent of spam originated there.
The second highest source of spam this period was a group of undetermined European Union countries.
In this group, the specific source countries cannot be definitively identified because the ISPs throughwhose networks the spam was sent operate in more than one EU country.
China was the third highest country of spam origin in the second half of 2006. Six percent of spam
detected by Symantec during this period originated there, compared to 11 percent in the first half of theyear. Symantec believes the drop since last period may have occurred because some companies that do not do business in China automatically block all email originating there.
Table 6. Top ten countries of spam origin
Source: Symantec Corporation
Distribution of spam zombies
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is tracking countries that
host spam zombies. A spam zombie is a computer infected with a bot or some other malicious code thatallows email messages to be relayed through it.
It should be noted that the data on which the “Countries of spam origin” discussion was based includes
spam messages that may also be sent from legitimate email servers as well as those that were sentthrough spam zombies. Since spam zombies are the result of an infection by a bot, worm, or Trojan, there is a wider distribution among the top countries for spam zombies than is evident in the “Countries of spam origin” discussion. Country
United States
Undetermined EU CountriesChinaCanadaUnited KingdomSouth KoreaJapan
France
Spain
PolandJul–Dec 2006
44%
7%6%4%3%3%3%
3%
3%
3%Jan–Jun 2006
49%
4%
11%
5%4%5%
2%
2%
2%
2%
75Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Between July 1 and December 31, 2006, the United States hosted the largest proportion of spam zombies,
but only by a small margin. Ten percent of spam zombies were located there (figure 33). This is drasticallydifferent from the top countries of spam origin, in which the United States accounted for nearly half thetotal volume. During this period, the United States was one of the top reporting countries of bots such asSpybot and Mytob, both of which can be used to send spam.
Figure 33. Distribution of spam zombies
Source: Symantec Corporation
China and Germany were the second and third highest countries for spam zombies, hosting nine and eight
percent respectively. France, Spain, and Brazil followed closely at seven percent each. The small variancebetween the top countries hosting spam zombies is quite different from the distribution of bots during thisperiod (as was discussed in the “Bot-infected computers by country” metric in the “Attack Trends” sectionof this report). This indicates that not all spam zombies are necessarily bots and that not all bots are usedto send spam.
Security Risks
Symantec uses the term “security risk” to describe adware, spyware, misleading applications, and otherprograms that users may not want on their system. While these risks are not categorized as maliciouscode, Symantec monitors them with many of the same methods employed in tracking malicious code. Thisinvolves an ongoing analysis of reports and data delivered from over 120 million client server and gatewayemail systems deploying Symantec antivirus security solutions, as well as filtration of 25 million emailmessages per day by Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam antifraud filters. Symantec then compiles the mostcommon reports and analyzes them to determine the appropriate categorization. Steps for the protectionagainst and mitigation of these security risks are presented at the end of the “Security Risks” section. Key
(X) = Rank % = Current proportionGermany
(3) 8%
France
(4) 7%
Spain
(5) 7%China
(2) 9% Italy
(8) 4%Poland
(7) 5%
South Korea
(9) 3%
Brazil
(6) 7%Turkey
(10) 3%United States
(1) 10%
76Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Security Risk Highlights
The following section will offer a brief summary of some of the security risks that Symantec observed
during this period based on data provided by the sources listed above. Following this overview, the Internet
Security Threat Report will discuss selected metrics in greater depth, providing analysis and discussion of
the trends indicated by the data.
• The most commonly reported security risk was an adware program named ZangoSearch.• All of the top ten security risks reported in the last six months of 2006 employ at least one anti-removal
technique compared to only five of the top ten security risks in the last reporting period.
• All of the top ten security risks reported during this period employ self-updating.• Potentially unwanted applications accounted for 41 percent of reports in the top ten new security risks
in the second half of 2006.
• Misleading application detections increased by 40 percent in the second half of 2006.
Security Risks Discussion
This section will discuss selected security risks metrics in greater depth, providing analysis and discussion
of the trends indicated by the data. The following metrics will be discussed:
• Top ten reported security risks
• Top ten new security risks
Top ten reported security risks
Between July 1 and December 31, 2006, the most commonly reported security risk was ZangoSearch
(table 7).100This is an adware program that accounted for 13 percent of the top ten reported security risks.
A new entry in the top ten, ZangoSearch monitors the contents of Web browser windows. When certainkeywords are detected in Internet search or shopping browser windows, ZangoSearch opens the Web sites of companies whose products ZangoSearch has agreed to promote.
It has been reported that ZangoSearch uses questionable methods to install itself on users’ computers.
101
By clicking on misleading video links on certain MySpace sites, users would inadvertently visit a fake
YouTube site, which would then download a Zango Cash toolbar on the unsuspecting user’s computer.
Earlier in 2006, Zango merged with another adware toolbar provider named Hotbar. Hotbar was the most
prevalent security risk in the first six months of 2006, accounting for 24 percent of the top ten security riskreports during that period. In the current reporting period, however, Hotbar was the fifth most commonsecurity risk, accounting for 11 percent of the top ten submissions. This decrease may be the result of themerge and the promotion of one unified product.
77
100http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-050416-3519-99&tabid=1
101http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,2052998,00.aspSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
78102http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-122910-4625-99
103http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2003-090516-2325-99Table 7. Top ten reported security risks
Source: Symantec Corporation
The second most common security risk in the second half of 2006 was SpySheriff,102a misleading
application. A new entry to the top ten, SpySheriff was first discovered in December 2005 and accountedfor 12 percent of security risks in the top ten during this period.
SpySheriff purportedly detects and removes programs such as keystroke loggers, Trojan horses, and
password-stealing applications. Consumers can install SpySheriff from the company’s Web site, but manyconsumers encounter SpySheriff through misleading banner advertisements, full-screen pop-up windows,and misleading Web sites. Once installed, the program reports on false security risks. To remove thesefalse security risks the end user is asked to register the program and pay for its usage.
The third most commonly reported security risk over the last six months of 2006 was Purityscan,
103
another new entry into the top ten. The first variant of this adware was detected in September 2003. In the
second half of 2006, it accounted for 12 percent of the submissions in the top ten. Purityscan is an adwareprogram that downloads and displays advertisements on a computer. Once it is installed on a user’scomputer, it is also capable of downloading and installing programs automatically without user consent.Risk Name
ZangoSearch
SpySheriffPurityscanWebsearchHotbar Borlan QoolAid
Look2Me
NDotNet
PigSearchRisk Type
Adware
Misleading applicationAdwareAdwareAdwareAdwareAdware
Adware
Adware
AdwareRank
1
234567
8
9
10Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Top ten new security risks
Between July 1 and December 31, 2006, Symantec saw a slight drop in the detection of new security risks.
This may be an indication that security risk developers are trying to create alternative sources of revenue.
Table 8. Top ten new security risks
Source: Symantec Corporation
The top new security risk falls under the category of a potentially unwanted application (table 8). This is a
new category that Symantec recently introduced to allow for the detection of applications that have animpact on security, privacy, resource consumption, or are associated with other security risks. Potentiallyunwanted applications accounted for 41 percent of reports in the top ten new security risks in the secondhalf of 2006 (table 9).
The most common new security risk during this period was Movieland,
104a potentially unwanted application
that accounted for 41 percent of reports. Movieland is installed on a user’s computer surreptitiously,causing unwanted pop-up advertisements to appear on the computer. It is very difficult to remove thisapplication. In January 2007, Movieland entered into stipulated interim agreements with the U.S. FederalTrade Commission to provide disclosures relating to their practices.
SearchNet was the second most common new security risk during the second half of 2006,
105accounting
for 21 percent of reports. An adware program, SearchNet is a Browser Helper Object (BHO) that replaces the default search page in Internet Explorer.
106Risk Name
Movieland
SearchnetVirusBurstRoogooTrustyhoundBaigooVirusBlast
2AntiSpyware
DoctorAdwarePro
NetmediaRisk Type
Potentially unwanted application
AdwareMisleading application AdwareSpywareTrackwareMisleading application
Spyware
Adware
AdwareRank
1
234567
8
9
10
79104http://www.symantec.com/smb/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-091511-1921-99
105http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-071912-4640-99
106Browser helper objects (BHOs) are add on programs that can add legitimate features to a user’s browser (IE 4.x and up). For exa mple, document readers used to read
programs within the browser do so via BHOs. BHOs can also be used to install security risks on a user’s Web browser using Activ eX controls. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
The third most common new security risk in the second half of 2006 was VirusBurst.107This is a misleading
application that accounts for 16 percent of reports. VirusBurst gives exaggerated reports of threats on thecomputer. It is installed surreptitiously by a Trojan, which it later detects as a threat. The program thenprompts the user to purchase a registered version of the software in order to remove the reported threats.
Table 9. New security risks by category
Source: Symantec Corporation
Towards the end of 2006, Symantec was seeing a lot of new clones of misleading applications. A clone
refers to the same basic program with a new name and graphical user interface (GUI). Clones are oftenused in an attempt to avoid antispyware detection as a misleading application. For example, a companynamed KlikSoftware.com appears to have been responsible for a number of clones of rogue antispyware.
108
Some of their programs, such as Remedy AntiSpy, Adware Bazooka, and HitVirus, are clones of a securityrisk known as Punisher.
109Risk Type
Potentially unwanted applications
AdwareMisleading applicationsDialers Security assessment toolsSpywareSecurity risk
TrackwarePercent of New Risks
41%
35%18%
0%0%5%0%4%
80107http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-090516-0204-99
108http://spywarewarrior.com/rogue_anti-spyware.htm
109http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2006/06/rogue_antispyware_in_action.htmlSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices
Enterprise Best Practices
1. Employ defense-in-depth strategies, which emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive
defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protectionmethod. This should include the deployment of regularly updated antivirus, firewalls, intrusiondetection, and intrusion protection systems on client systems.
2. Turn off and remove services that are not needed.3. If malicious code or some other threat exploits one or more network services, disable or block access
to those services until a patch is applied.
4. Always keep patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host public services and are
accessible through the firewall, such as HTTP, FTP, mail, and DNS services.
5. Consider implementing network compliance solutions that will help keep infected mobile users out
of the network (and disinfect them before rejoining the network).
6. Enforce an effective password policy.7. Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments that are commonly
used to spread viruses, such as .VBS, .BAT, .EXE, .PIF, and .SCR files.
8. Isolate infected computers quickly to prevent the risk of further infection within the organization.
Perform a forensic analysis and restore the computers using trusted media.
9. Train employees to not open attachments unless they are expected and come from a known and
trusted source, and to not execute software that is downloaded from the Internet unless it has beenscanned for viruses.
10. Ensure that emergency response procedures are in place. This includes having a backup-and-restore
solution in place in order to restore lost or compromised data in the event of successful attack orcatastrophic data loss.
11. Educate management on security budgeting needs.12. Test security to ensure that adequate controls are in place.13. Be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file-
sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software. Clicking on linksand/or attachments in email messages (or IM messages) may also expose computers to unnecessaryrisks. Ensure that only applications approved by the organization are deployed on desktop computers.
81Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Consumer Best Practices
1. Consumers should use an Internet security solution that combines antivirus, firewall, intrusion
detection, and vulnerability management for maximum protection against malicious code and other threats.
2. Consumers should ensure that security patches are up to date and that they are applied to all
vulnerable applications in a timely manner.
3. Consumers should ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers, and should change them
often. Passwords should not consist of words from the dictionary.
4. Consumers should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is
expected and the purpose of the attachment is known.
5. Consumers should keep virus definitions updated regularly. By deploying the latest virus definitions,
consumers can protect their computers against the latest viruses known to be spreading “in the wild.”
6. Consumers should routinely check to see if their PC or Macintosh system is vulnerable to threats by
using Symantec Security Check at www.symantec.com/securitycheck.
7. Consumers should deploy an antiphishing solution. They should never disclose any confidential
personal or financial information unless and until they can confirm that any request for suchinformation is legitimate.
8. Consumers can get involved in fighting cybercrime by tracking and reporting intruders. With Symantec
Security Check’s tracing service, users can quickly identify the location of potential hackers andforward the information to the attacker’s ISP or local police.
9. Consumers should be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with
the installation of file-sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions ofsoftware. Clicking on links and/or attachments in email messages (or IM messages) may also exposecomputers to unnecessary risks. Ensure that only applications approved by the organization aredeployed on desktop computers.
10. Some spyware and adware applications can be installed after an end user has accepted the end-user
license agreement (EULA), or as a consequence of that acceptance. Consumers should read EULAscarefully and understand all terms before agreeing to them.
11. Consumers should beware of programs that flash ads in the user interface. Many spyware programs
track how users respond to these ads, and their presence is a red flag. When users see ads in aprogram’s user interface, they may be looking at a piece of spyware.
82Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology
Attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec™ Global
Intelligence Network, which includes the Symantec DeepSight™ Threat Management System, Symantec™Managed Security Services, and the Symantec Honeypot Network. Symantec combines data derived fromthese sources for analysis.
Attack definitions
In order to avoid ambiguity with the findings presented in this discussion, Symantec’s methodology for identifying various forms of attack activity is outlined clearly below. This methodology is appliedconsistently throughout our monitoring and analysis. The first step in analyzing attack activity is to define precisely what an attack is. Attacks are individual instances of malicious network activity. Attacks consist of one IDS or firewall alert that is indicative of a single attack action.
Explanation of research inquiries
This section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to gather and analyze the data and statistics in this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, the following investigations warranted additional detail.
Targeted Web browsers
Symantec identifies attacks that are detected being carried out against Web browsers across theSymantec™ Global Intelligence Network, assesses which of these attacks target Web browsers, anddetermines which specific Web browser(s) is targeted by the attack. The distribution of targeted Webbrowsers is derived by determining what proportion of the source IP addresses of Web browser attacks is targeting each of the specific Web browsers.
Denial of service attacks
Although there are numerous methods for carrying out denial of service (DoS) attacks, Symantec derivesthis metric by measuring DoS attacks that are carried out by flooding a target with SYN requests. These are often referred to as SYN flood attacks. This type of attack works by overwhelming a target with SYN requests and not completing the initial request, which thus prevents other valid requests from being processed.
83Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
In many cases, SYN requests with forged IP addresses are sent to a target, allowing a single attacking
computer to initiate multiple connections, resulting in unsolicited traffic, known as backscatter, being sentto other computers on the Internet. This backscatter is used to derive the number of DoS attacks observedthroughout the reporting period. Although the values Symantec derives from this metric will not identify all DoS attacks carried out, it will highlight DoS attack trends.
To determine the countries targeted by DoS attacks, Symantec cross-references the target IP addresses of
every attack with several third-party, subscription-based databases that link the geographic location ofsystems to source IP addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin oferror.
Sectors targeted by DoS attacks were identified using the same methodology as targeted countries.
However, in this case, attackers who were considered were those carrying out a set of DoS attacks thatwere detected by IDS and IPS software.
Identity theft data breaches
Symantec identifies the proportional distribution of cause and sector for data breaches that may facilitateidentity theft based on data provided by the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse,
110who in turn derived the
data from Attrition.org.111The sector that experienced the loss along with the cause of loss that occurred is
determined through analysis of the organization reporting the loss and the method that facilitated the loss.
Bot-infected computers
Symantec identifies bots based on coordinated scanning and attack behavior observed in network traffic.For an attacking computer to be considered to be participating in this coordinated scanning and attacking,it must fit into that pattern to the exclusion of any other activity. This behavioral matching will not catchevery bot network computer, and may identify other malicious code or individual attackers behaving in asimilarly coordinated way as a bot network. This behavioral matching will, however, identify many of themost coordinated and aggressive bot-infected computers and will give insight into the population trends of bot network computers, including those that are considered to be actively working in a well coordinatedand aggressive fashion at some point in time during the reporting period.
This metric explores the number of active bot-infected computers that the Symantec™ Global Intelligence
Network has detected and identified during the last six months of 2006. Identification is carried out on an individual basis by analyzing attack and scanning patterns. Computers generating attack patterns thatshow a high degree of coordination are considered to be bot-infected computers.
84
110http://www.privacyrights.org
111http://www.attrition.orgSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
As a consequence of this, Symantec does not identify all bot-infected computers, but only those that are
actively working in a well coordinated and aggressive fashion. Given Symantec’s extensive and globallydistributed sensor base, it is reasonable to assume that the bot activities discussed here are representativeof worldwide bot trends, and can thus provide an understanding of current bot activity across the Internetas a whole.
Bot-infected computers by countries and cities
This metric is based on the same data as the “Active bot-infected computers” discussion of the “AttacksTrends” section of the report. Symantec cross-references the IP addresses of every identified bot-infectedcomputer with several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic location ofsystems to IP addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error. Only cities that can be determined with a confidence rating of at least four out of five are included forconsideration. The data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of bot-infectedcomputers.
Top originating countries
Symantec identifies the national sources of attacks by automatically cross-referencing source IP addressesof every attacking IP with several third-party, subscription-based databases that link the geographiclocation of systems to source IP addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a smallmargin of error.
Top targeted sectors
For the purposes of the Internet Security Threat Report , a targeted attacker is defined as one that is
detected attacking at least three users or organizations in a specific sector, to the exclusion of all othersectors. The targeted sector attack rate is a measure of the percentage of all attackers that target onlyorganizations or users in a specific sector and is represented as a proportion of all targeted attacks. Figure 34 represents the proportional sensor distribution for each sector. Sectors with less than tensensors have been excluded from the resulting totals.
85Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Figure 34. Distribution of sensors by sector
Source: Symantec Corporation<1%
Home user 89%Other 3%
Government/local <1%Education <1%Construction <1%
Engineering <1%Manufacturing 1%Computer consulting 1%
Aerospace <1%Information technology 1%
Small business 1%Financial services 2%
VAR/VAD <1%Agriculture <1%
Computer hardware <1%Community/non-profit <1%Communication/public relations <1%Biotech/pharmaceutical <1%Arts/media <1%Architectural <1%
Computer software <1%Military <1%Law enforcement <1%
Hospitality <1%Health care <1%Government/state <1%Government/national <1%Internet service provider <1%
Insurance <1%Legal <1%
Utilities/energy <1%Telecommunications <1%Retail, wholesale, and e-commerce <1%
Transportation <1%<1%
<1%
<1%<1% <1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1% <1% <1% <1% <1%<1%
<1%
<1%Accounting 2%<1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1% <1%
86Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Malicious activity by country
To determine the top countries for the “Malicious activity by country” metric, Symantec compiled
geographical data on each type of malicious activity to be considered, which included: bot networkcomputers, bot command-and-control servers, phishing Web sites, malicious code submissions, spam relay hosts, and Internet attacks. The proportion of each activity originating in each country wasdetermined. The mean of the proportions of each malicious activity that originated in each country was calculated. This average determined the proportion of overall malicious activity that originated from the country in question and was used to rank each country.
Symantec also evaluated the top 25 of these countries according to the percentage of worldwide Internet
users located there. Symantec determined the top 25 countries for malicious activity per Internet users byemploying the same data as above. This measure is meant to remove the bias of high Internet users fromthe consideration of the “Malicious activity by country” metric. In order to determine this, Symantecdivided the amount of malicious activity originating in each of the top 25 countries for malicious activity bythe percentage of worldwide Internet users who are located in that country.
The proportion assigned to each country in the discussion thus corresponds to the proportion of malicious
activity that could be attributed to a single (average) Internet user in that country. That is, Symantecestimates the amount of malicious activity that could be attributed to the average Internet user from eachof the top 25 countries. The proportion of malicious activity that would be carried out by each person isthe proportion assigned to each country.
Underground economy servers
This metric is based on data gathered by proprietary Symantec technologies. These technologies monitoractivity and collect data on underground economy servers. Underground economy servers are typicallychat servers where stolen data, such as identities, credit card numbers, access to compromised computers,and email accounts are bought and sold. Symantec monitors this activity by recording communicationsthat take place on these chat servers, which typically includes advertisements for stolen data. This datawas used to derive the data presented in this metric.
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Appendix C—Vulnerability Trends Methodology
The “Vulnerability Trends” section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report discusses developments
in the discovery and exploitation of vulnerabilities over the past six months and compares that activity toactivity observed in the two previous six-month periods. This methodology section will discuss how thedata was gathered and how it was analyzed to come to the conclusions that are presented in the“Vulnerability Trends” section.
Symantec maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive databases of security vulnerabilities,
consisting of over 20,000 distinct entries. Each distinct entry is created and maintained by Symantecthreat analysts who vet the content for accuracy, veracity, and the applicability of its inclusion in thevulnerability database based on available information. The following metrics discussed in the “Vulnerability Trends” report are based on the analysis of that data by Symantec researchers:
• Total number of vulnerabilities disclosed
• Severity of vulnerabilities• Web application vulnerabilities• Easily exploitable vulnerabilities (Total, and breakdown by type)• Web browser vulnerabilities
The ways in which the data for the remaining metrics is gathered and analyzed will be discussed in the
remainder of this methodology.
Vulnerability classifications
Following the discovery and/or announcement of a new vulnerability, Symantec analysts gather all relevantcharacteristics of the new vulnerability and create an alert. This alert describes important traits of thevulnerability, such as the severity, ease of exploitation, and a list of affected products. These traits aresubsequently used both directly and indirectly for this analysis.
Vulnerability type
After discovering a new vulnerability, Symantec threat analysts classify the vulnerability into one of 12 possible categories based on the available information. These categories focus on defining the corecause of the vulnerability, as opposed to classifying the vulnerability merely by its effect.
The classification system is derived from the academic taxonomy presented by Taimur Aslam et al (1996)
to define classifications of vulnerabilities.
112Possible values are indicated below; the previously mentioned
white paper provides a full description of the meaning behind each classification:
• Boundary condition error
• Access validation error• Origin validation error• Input validation error• Failure to handle exceptional conditions
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112“Use of a Taxonomy of Security Faults” http://ftp.cerias.purdue.edu/pub/papers/taimur-aslam/aslam-krsul-spaf-taxonomy.pdfSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
• Race condition error
• Serialization error• Atomicity error• Environment error• Configuration error• Design error
Severity of vulnerabilities
Severity of vulnerabilities has been discussed in previous versions of the Symantec Internet Security Threat
Report ; however, it was omitted in Volume X of the report (September 2006) to account for Symantec’s
adoption of the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).113
The “Severity of vulnerabilities” metric that has been included in this report corresponds to the base scorefield of the CVSS. The base score is representative of the inherent properties of a vulnerability, such as: thedegree of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of data that may be affected by the vulnerability; localversus remote exploitability; whether or not authentication is required for exploitation; and/or if there areadditional factors that may complicate exploitation of the vulnerability.
These values are not adjusted for temporal factors such as the availability of exploit code. The base score
is meant to be a static value that should only change if additional information is made available thatchanges the inherent characteristics of the vulnerability. The base score can have a value of zero to 10. For the sake of categorizing vulnerabilities by their respective severities, the following standard is used:
•Low severity (base score of 0–3). Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities will have a minimal
impact on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data stored upon or transmitted over systemson which the vulnerability may be found. These vulnerabilities also tend to be local in nature, have ahigh degree of access complexity, and may require authentication to be exploited successfully.
•Medium severity (base score of 4–7). Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities may allow a
“partial” compromise of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data stored upon or transmittedover systems on which the vulnerability may be found, although this may not always be the case. Thesevulnerabilities can be exploited remotely over a network and may have a lower access complexity or mayor may not require authentication to successfully exploit.
•High severity (base score of 8–10). These vulnerabilities have innate characteristics that present
the highest threat profile. Successful exploitation often allows a “complete” compromise of theconfidentiality, integrity, and availability of data stored upon or transmitted over systems on which thevulnerability may be found. These vulnerabilities are exploited remotely across a network, have a lowdegree of access complexity, and usually do not require authentication prior to successful exploitation.
Base scores are computed from related fields in the Symantec Vulnerability Database. They are then
categorized into low, medium, and high, as described above, and broken out by reporting period.
113http://www.first.org/cvss/cvss-guide.html89Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Easily exploitable vulnerabilities
The “Easily exploitable vulnerabilities” metric covers vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit with little
effort based on publicly available information. The vulnerability analyst assigns an exploit availabilityrating after thoroughly researching the need for and availability of exploits for the vulnerability.
The “Easily exploitable vulnerabilities” metric replaces the “Ease of exploitation” metric, which was
included in previous versions of the Internet Security Threat Report . This change was made to
accommodate Symantec’s adoption of the exploitability rating in the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS).
114
All vulnerabilities are classified into one of four possible categories defined by the CVSS, as describedbelow:
•Unconfirmed. Would-be attackers must use exploit code to make use of the vulnerability; however,
no such exploit code is publicly available.
•Proof-of-concept. Would-be attacks must use exploit code to make use of the vulnerability; however,
there is only proof-of-concept exploit available that is not functional enough to fully exploit thevulnerability.
•Functional. This rating is used under the following circumstances:
1. Exploit code to enable the exploitation of the vulnerability is publicly available to all would-be
attackers; and/or,
2. Would-be attackers can exploit the vulnerability without having to use any form of exploit code.In other words, the attacker does not need to create or use complex scripts or tools to exploit the
vulnerability.
•High. The vulnerability is reliably exploitable and there have been instances of self-propagating
malicious code exploiting the vulnerability in the wild.
For the purposes of this report, the last two categories of vulnerabilities are considered “easily exploitable”
because the attacker requires only limited sophistication to exploit the vulnerability. The first twocategories of vulnerability are considered more difficult to exploit because attackers must develop theirown exploit code or improve an existing proof-of-concept to make use of the vulnerability.
Easily exploitable vulnerabilities by type
This version of the Internet Security Threat Report includes an analysis of easily exploitable vulnerabilities
by type. To provide further insight into the types of vulnerabilities that are considered easily exploitable,Symantec has categorized them into several categories. They are as follows:
•Browser vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities threaten Web browser applications through remote
attack vectors.
•Client-side vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities threaten network client applications or non-networked
applications that process malicious data that may arrive through another networked application. Remote
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114http://www.first.org/cvssSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
attack vectors may exist, but client-side vulnerabilities usually require some amount of user interaction
on the part of the victim to be exploited.
•Local vulnerabilities. These are vulnerabilities that require local access in order to be successfully
exploited. Local attacks may affect a large variety of applications that may or may not include networkcapabilities. The differentiator is that these vulnerabilities are not exploitable by remote attackers unlessthey can log on to the system and interactively run commands as an unprivileged user.
•Server vulnerabilities. These are vulnerabilities that affect server applications. Server applications
are typically defined as applications that are accessible to remote clients via connections on a range ofTCP/UDP ports. Server vulnerabilities generally do not require user interaction on the part of the victimbeyond enabling and starting the service so that it listens for incoming requests.
•Web application vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities affect applications that use a browser for their
user interface, rely on HTTP as the transport protocol, and reside on Web servers. Such applications are usually implemented in a server-side scripting language such as PHP or ASP.NET and are accessedthrough the HTTP/HTTPS protocols.
•Other. These are vulnerabilities that do not fall discretely into any of the previous categories. They
can include applications for which the distinction is blurred between server and client, or hardwareplatforms in which the affected component cannot be described by any of the other categories.
These categories are generally defined by the attack vector and by the type of application that is affected.
The specific categories were devised so that the majority of vulnerabilities could easily be classified withinthem, with little overlap between categories, so that the total percentage of all categories would equal 100 percent.
Window of exposure for enterprise vendors
Symantec records the time lapse between the publication of an initial vulnerability report and the
appearance of third-party exploit code; this is known as the exploit development time. The time periodbetween the disclosure date of a vulnerability and the release date of an associated patch is known as thepatch development time.
115The time lapse between the public release of exploit code and the time that the
affected vendor releases a patch for the affected vulnerability is known as the window of exposure.
The window of exposure is calculated as the difference in days between the average exploit development
time and the average patch development time. (Explanations of the exploit development time average andthe patch development time average are included below.) During this time, the computer or system onwhich the affected application is deployed may be susceptible to attack, as administrators have no officialrecourse against the vulnerability and must resort to best practices and workarounds to reduce the risk ofsuccessful exploitation.
It is also important to note that the set of vulnerabilities included in this metric is limited and does not
represent all software from all possible vendors. Instead, it only includes vendors who are classified asenterprise vendors. The purpose is to illustrate the window of exposure for widely deployed mission-criticalsoftware. Because of the large number of vendors with technologies that have a very low deployment
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115This statistic only considers specific file-based patches or upgrades, and not general solutions. Instances in which the vendor provides a workaround or manual fix
steps, for example, are not included.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
(which form the majority), only exploits for technologies from enterprise vendors (that is, those that
generally have widespread deployment) are included. Vulnerabilities in those vendors’ products will likelyaffect more enterprises than those in less widely deployed technologies. Those vendors are:
• CA™ (Computer Associates)
• Cisco®• EMC •H P ® • IBM® • McAfee® • Microsoft • Oracle®• Sun™• Symantec
Patch development time for enterprise vendors
The patch development time is the time period between the disclosure date of a vulnerability and therelease date of an associated patch. Only those patches that are independent objects (such as fixes,upgrades, etc.) are included in this analysis. Other remediation solutions—such as workaround steps, forinstance—are excluded.
For each individual patch from these vendors, the time lapse between the patch release date and the
publish date of the vulnerability is computed. The mean average is calculated from the aggregate of these.As some vendors may release more patches than others for a particular vulnerability, Symantec considersonly the first instance of a single patch for each vulnerability. This metric is incorporated when computingthe window of exposure, which is calculated as the difference between the average patch developmenttime and the average exploit development time.
Exploit code development time for enterprise vendors
The ability to measure exploit code development time is limited and applies only to vulnerabilities thatwould normally require exploit code. Therefore, the metric is based on vulnerabilities that Symantecconsiders to be of sufficient complexity, and for which functional exploit code was not available until it was created by a third party. This consideration, therefore, excludes the following:
• Vulnerabilities that do not require exploit code (unconfirmed exploitability)
• Vulnerabilities associated with non-functional proof-of-concept code (proof-of-concept exploitability)
The date of vulnerability disclosure is based on the date of the first publicly available reference (such as
a mailing list post). The date of exploit code publication is the date of the first publicly known reference to the exploit code. Because the purpose of this metric is to estimate the time it takes for exploit code to materialize as a result of active development, exploit code publication dates that fall outside of the 30-day range from initial vulnerability publication are excluded from this metric. It is assumed that exploit code that was published after this period was not actively developed from the initial announcement of the vulnerability.
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Since this metric only considers the appearance of the first functional exploit, it is possible that reliable
exploits that improve upon the initial exploit may appear later. These exploits may take much longer todevelop, but are not considered because the window of exposure begins as soon as the first functionalexploit surfaces.
The time lapse between the disclosure of a vulnerability and the appearance of exploit code for that
vulnerability is determined. The aggregate time for all vulnerabilities is determined and the average time iscalculated. This metric is incorporated when computing the window of exposure, which is the differencebetween the average patch development time and the average exploit development time.
Operating system patch development time
This metric has a similar methodology to the “Patch development time for enterprise vendors” metric,which was explained earlier in this methodology. However, instead of applying it to enterprise-scalevendors, the patch development time average is calculated from patched vulnerabilities for the followingoperating systems:
• Apple Mac OS X
• Hewlett-Packard HP-UX• Microsoft Windows• Red Hat Linux (including enterprise versions and Red Hat Fedora)• Sun Microsystems Solaris
An average is calculated from the patch release times for each vulnerability in the reporting period per
operating system. The patch development time average for each operating system is then compared.
Window of exposure for Web browsers
This metric has a similar methodology to the “Window of exposure for enterprise vendors” metric.
However, instead of applying it to enterprise-scale vendors, the window of exposure is calculated forvulnerabilities associated with the following Web browsers:
• Apple Safari
• Microsoft Internet Explorer• Mozilla Firefox and Mozilla browsers• Opera
Symantec records the window of time between the publication of an initial vulnerability report and the
appearance of third-party exploit code; this is known as the exploit code development time. The timeperiod between the disclosure date of a vulnerability and the release date of an associated patch is knownas the patch development time.
116The time lapse between the public release of exploit code and the time
that the affected vendor releases a patch for the affected vulnerability is known as the window of exposure.
The window of exposure is calculated as the difference in days between the average patch development
time and the average exploit code development time. During this time, the computer or system on whichthe affected application is deployed may be susceptible to attack, as administrators may have no official
93116This statistic only considers specific file-based patches or upgrades, and not general solutions. Instances in which the vendor provides a workaround or manual
repair steps, for example, are not included.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
recourse against a vulnerability and must resort to best practices and workarounds to reduce the risk of
attacks. Explanations of the average exploit development time and the average patch development time are included below.
Patch development time for Web browsers
The cumulative patch development time for vulnerabilities affecting each browser is calculated. Eachcumulative time is then divided by the number of vulnerabilities affecting that browser to determine theaverage patch development time for that browser. The patch development time average for each browser is then compared. This metric is used to compute the window of exposure for Web browsers, whichamounts to the difference between the average patch development time and the average exploit codedevelopment time.
Exploit code development time for Web browsers
The cumulative exploit code development time for each vulnerability affecting a Web browser is calculated.Each cumulative time is then divided by the number of vulnerabilities affecting that browser to determinethe average exploit code development time for that browser. The exploit development time average foreach browser is then compared. This metric is used to compute the window of exposure, which amounts to the difference between the average patch development time and the average exploit code development time.
Web browser vulnerabilities
This metric will offer a comparison of vulnerability data for numerous Web browsers, namely: MicrosoftInternet Explorer, the Mozilla browsers (which includes Firefox), Opera, and Safari. However, in assessingthe comparative data, the following important caveats should be kept in mind before making anyconclusions:
• The total number of vulnerabilities in the aforementioned Web browsers was computed for this report.
This includes vulnerabilities that have been confirmed by the vendor and those that are not vendorconfirmed.
Previous versions of the Internet Security Threat Report have discussed vulnerabilities according to
whether they were vendor confirmed or non-vendor confirmed in that vulnerabilities that are notconfirmed are also included in the data. This differentiation was important, especially given the disparityin patch times between vendors. However, starting with Volume X of the Internet Security Threat Report ,
this convention was no longer followed. This version of the report does not differentiate between vendor-confirmed vulnerabilities and non-vendor-confirmed vulnerabilities when calculating the total number of vulnerabilities.
• Individual browser vulnerabilities are notoriously difficult to pinpoint and identify precisely. A reported
attack may be a combination of several conditions, each of which could be considered a vulnerability in its own right. This may distort the total vulnerability count. Some browser issues have also been
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improperly identified as operating system vulnerabilities or vice versa. This is, in part, due to increasing
operating system integration that makes it difficult to correctly identify the affected component in many cases.
Many vulnerabilities in shared operating system components can potentially be exposed to attacks
through the browser. This report, where sufficient information is available to make the distinction,enumerates only those vulnerabilities that are known to affect the browser itself.
• Not every vulnerability that is discovered is exploited. As of this writing, there has been no widespread
exploitation of any browser except Microsoft Internet Explorer. This is expected to change as otherbrowsers become more widely deployed.
Exploit code release period
This metric provides a breakdown of the number of exploits according to the length of time that haselapsed between the publication of a vulnerability and the release of the exploit code. The exploit coderelease periods have been categorized in the following increments: less than one day, one to six days, seven to 30 days, 31 to 100 days, and more than 100 days. This is computed by comparing thevulnerability publication date against the date that an instance of exploit code was published, and then categorizing it in the appropriate time period.
Unlike the “Exploit code development time” metrics that are described previously in this methodology,
this metric does include multiple instances of exploits for a single vulnerability. Additional exploit code of varying quality and reliability may be released after the initial appearance of a first exploit for avulnerability. Some exploit code may not be developed until well after the release of a vulnerability for several reasons. These could include:
• The vulnerability is particularly difficult to exploit. • The exploit code is advanced and improves upon previous exploit code. • The vulnerability is considered to be a lower priority for attackers and thus have not received the
concerted exploit development effort associated with high profile vulnerabilities.
There have also been instances where exploit code surfaces in the wild much after the initial publication
of a vulnerability.
Zero-day vulnerabilities
This metric quantifies the number of zero-day vulnerabilities that have been documented during therelevant reporting periods of the current Internet Security Threat Report .
For the purpose of this metric, a zero-day vulnerability is one for which there is sufficient public evidence
to indicate that the vulnerability has been exploited in the wild prior to being publicly known. It may nothave been known to the vendor prior to exploitation, and the vendor had not released a patch at the timeof the exploit activity.
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This metric is derived from a mix of data from public sources and the Symantec vulnerability database.
This metric is meant to calculate the number of high-profile, publicly documented zero-day vulnerabilityinstances during the relevant reporting periods.
Vendor responsiveness
This metric quantifies the number of vulnerabilities that have not been confirmed by vendors over therelevant reporting periods. The metric is calculated by determining the number of vulnerabilities that arenot considered to be “vendor confirmed,” or confirmed and patched by the vendor, and comparing them to the total number of vulnerabilities documented in the period. This gives insight into the number ofvulnerabilities that remain unconfirmed and unpatched over time.
Database vulnerabilities
This metric offers a comparison of the vulnerabilities across multiple database vendors andimplementations. For the purpose of this report, databases to be assessed were chosen to reflect the mostwidely deployed database implementations and to compare commercial and open source vendors.
117To
this end, the following five database implementations are discussed:
• IBM® DB2
• Microsoft® SQL Server• MySQL• Oracle®• PostgreSQL
The volume of database vulnerabilities is determined by querying the vulnerability database for
vulnerabilities that affect the aforementioned database implementations. The results are broken out by implementation and reporting period.
117Oracle, DB2, and Microsoft SQL Server are the three most widely deployed commercial database implementations (http://databases. about.com/b/a/016881.htm).
MySQL and PostgreSQL are the two most popular open-source databases (http://www.mysql.com/why-mysql/marketshare).96Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix D—Malicious Code Trends Methodology
The trends in the “Malicious Code Trends” section are based on statistics from malicious code samples
reported to Symantec for analysis. Symantec gathers data from over 120 million client, server, and gatewaysystems that have deployed Symantec’s antivirus products in both consumer and corporate environments.The Symantec Digital Immune System and Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate thisreporting process.
Observations in the “Malicious Code Trends” section are based on empirical data and expert analysis of this
data. The data and analysis draw primarily from two databases described below.
Infection database
To help detect and eradicate computer viruses, Symantec developed the Symantec AntiVirus™ ResearchAutomation (SARA) technology. Symantec uses this technology to analyze, replicate, and define a largesubset of the most common computer viruses that are quarantined by Symantec Antivirus customers.
On average, SARA receives hundreds of thousands of suspect files daily from both enterprise and individual
consumers located throughout the world. Symantec then analyzes these suspect files, matching them withvirus definitions. An analysis of this aggregate data set provides statistics on infection rates for differenttypes of malicious code.
Malicious code database
In addition to infection data, Symantec Security Response analyzes and documents attributes for each newform of malicious code that emerges both in the wild and in a “zoo” (or controlled laboratory) environment.Descriptive records of new forms of malicious code are then entered into a database for future reference.For this report, a historical trend analysis was performed on this database to identify, assess, and discussany possible trends, such as the use of different infection vectors and the frequency of various types ofpayloads.
In some cases, Symantec antivirus products may initially detect new malicious code heuristically or by
generic signatures. These may later be reclassified and given unique detections. Because of this, there maybe slight variance in the presentation of the same data set from one volume of the Internet Security Threat
Report to the next.
Previously unseen malicious code threats
This metric derives its data from the Symantec Honeypot Network. Computers compromised on the
honeypot network track and analyze each piece of malicious code that is installed by the attacker.Symantec defines previously unseen malicious threats as those that have not been installed by attackerson the Symantec Honeypot Network. The proportion of previously unseen malicious code threats is derived by comparison with the total number of distinct malicious code threats observed.
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Percentage of malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities
Symantec maintains a malicious code database to analyze and document individual instances of malicious
code. This database contains 8,000 distinct entries, with the earliest discovery dating back to 1998. Thedatabase includes metadata for classifying malicious code by type, discovery date, and by threat profile, in addition to providing mitigating factors and manual removal steps. Where applicable, this databaseincludes correlations between malicious code instances and vulnerabilities from the Symantec vulnerabilitydatabase. This capability was used as a basis for the data in this metric. Symantec examined the means bywhich the malicious code propagated, and counted those that propagate by exploiting vulnerabilities.
Appendix E—Phishing, Spam, and Security Risks Methodology
Traditionally, the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , has broken security threats down into three
general categories: attacks, vulnerabilities, and malicious code. However, as Internet-based services andapplications have expanded and diversified, the potential for computer programs to introduce other typesof security risks has increased. The emergence of new risks, particularly spam, phishing, spyware, adware,and misleading applications has necessitated an expansion of the traditional security taxonomy.
Symantec has monitored these new concerns as they have developed. In particular, the Internet Security
Threat Report assess these risks according to three categories:
• Phishing
• Spam • Security risks, particularly adware, spyware, and misleading applications
The methodology for each of these discussions will be discussed in the sections below.
Phishing
Phishing attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec Probe
Network. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam data is assessed to gauge the growth in phishing attempts as well as the percentage of Internet mail that is determined to be phishing attempts. Symantec BrightmailAntiSpam field data consists of statistics reported back from customer installations that provide feedbackabout the detection behaviors of antifraud filters as well as the overall volume of mail being processed.
It should be noted that different monitoring organizations use different methods to track phishing
attempts. Some groups may identify and count unique phishing messages based solely on specific contentitems such as subject headers or URLs. These varied methods can often lead to differences in the numberof phishing attempts reported by different organizations.
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Phishing attempt definition
The Symantec Probe Network is a system of over two million decoy accounts that attract email messages
from 20 different countries around the world. It encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises and attracts email samples that are representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 millionmailboxes. The Probe Network covers countries in the Americas, Europe, Asia, Africa, andAustralia/Oceania.
The Symantec Probe Network data is used to track the growth in new phishing activity. A phishing attempt
is a group of email messages with similar properties, such as headers and content, that are sent to uniqueusers. The messages attempt to gain confidential and personal information from online users.
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam software reports statistics to Symantec Security Response that indicate
messages processed, messages filtered, and filter-specific data. Symantec has classified different filters sothat spam statistics and phishing statistics can be determined separately. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpamfield data is used to identify general trends in phishing email messages.
Explanation of research inquiries
This section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to produce the data and statistics in
this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, thefollowing investigations warrant additional detail.
Daily and seasonal variations in phishing activity
The data for this section is determined by the number of email messages that trigger antifraud filters
in the field versus the total number of email messages scanned. These filters are distributed across theSymantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base. The data for this section is based on daily totals for each day of the week.
Unique phishing messages
Symantec maintains automated systems to identify new unique phishing messages received by the
Symantec Probe Network. Messages are grouped into attacks based on similarities in the message bodiesand headers. Sample messages are then passed through general fraud heuristics to identify messages aspotential phishing attempts. Symantec reviews events that are identified as phishing attempts for thepurposes of confirmation and to develop filters.
The data presented in this section is based on monthly totals in the number of new unique phishing
messages discovered and ruled upon by Symantec Security Response. Security Response addresses onlythose phishing messages not caught by existing antispam and antifraud filters. Existing filters refer only tothose antispam and antifraud filters used across the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base.
Some phishing messages will be captured in the field based upon predictive filters (heuristics); however,
not all of Symantec’s customers utilize this technology or have upgraded to this technology. Therefore, themessages are still reviewed by Security Response for development of filters that are more widely dispersed.
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Blocked phishing attempts
The number of blocked phishing attempts is calculated from the total number of phishing email messages
that were blocked in the field by Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam antifraud filters. The data for this sectionis based on monthly totals.
Phishing activity by sector
The Symantec Phish Report Network is an extensive antifraud community where members contribute and
receive fraudulent Web site addresses for alerting and filtering across a broad range of solutions.
118These
sites are categorized according to the brand being phished and the industry to which it belongs. The PhishReport Network has members and contributors that send in phishing attacks from many different sources.This includes a client detection network that detects phishing Web sites as the clients visit various Websites on the Internet. It also includes server detection from spam emails.
The sender confirms all spoofed Web sites before sending the address of the Web site into the Phish
Report Network. After the spoofed site is sent into the Phish Report Network, Symantec spoof detectiontechnology is used to verify that the Web site is a spoof site. Research analysts manage the Phish ReportNetwork Console 24 hours a day, 365 days of the year, and manually review all spoof sites sent into thePhish Report Network to eliminate false positives.
Top countries hosting phishing sites
The data for this section is determined by gathering links in phishing email messages and cross-
referencing the addresses with several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographiclocations of systems to IP addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small marginof error. The data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of phishing Web sites.
Spam
The Symantec Probe Network is a system of over two million decoy accounts that attract email messagesfrom 20 different countries around the world. It encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises and attracts email samples that are representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 millionmailboxes. The Probe Network includes accounts in countries in the Americas, Europe, Asia, Africa, andAustralia/Oceania.
Spam trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from both the Symantec Probe
Network as well as Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam softwarereports statistics to the Brightmail Logistical Operations Center (BLOC) indicating messages processed,messages filtered, and filter-specific data.
Symantec has classified different filters so that spam statistics and phishing statistics can be determined
separately. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data includes data reported back from customerinstallations providing feedback from antispam filters as well as overall mail volume being processed.
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam only gathers data at the SMTP layer and not the network layer, where DNS
block lists typically operate. This is because SMTP-layer spam filtering is more robust than network-layerfiltering and is able to block spam missed at the network layer. Network layer-filtering takes place beforeemail reaches the enterprise mail server. As a result, data from the SMTP layer is a more accuratereflection of the impact of spam on the mail server itself.
118http://www.phishreport.net100Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Sample set normalization
Due to the numerous variables influencing a company’s spam activity, Symantec focuses on identifying
spam activity and growth projections with Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data from enterprisecustomer installations having more than 1,000 total messages per day. This normalization yields a moreaccurate summary of Internet spam trends by ruling out problematic and laboratory test servers thatproduce smaller sample sets.
Explanation of research inquiries
This section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to produce the data and statistics in
this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, thefollowing investigations warranted additional detail.
Spam as a percentage of email scanned
The data for this section is determined by dividing the number of email messages that trigger antispam
filters in the field by the total number of email messages scanned. These filters are distributed across theSymantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base. The data for this section is based on monthly totals.
Top ten countries of spam origin
The data for this section is determined by calculating the frequency of originating server IP addresses in
email messages that trigger antispam filters in the field. The IP addresses are mapped to their host countryof origin and the data is summarized by country based on monthly totals. The percentage of spam percountry is calculated from the total spam detected in the field.
It should be noted that the location of the computer from which spam is detected being sent is not
necessarily the location of the spammer. Spammers can build networks of compromised computersglobally and thereby use computers that are geographically separate from their location.
Top countries by spam zombies
The data for this section is determined by examining the IP addresses in spam messages received by the
Symantec Probe Network. Only IP addresses that are dynamically assigned are examined. If the computersat those IP addresses do not appear to be email servers—for example, if they do not respond to requestson TCP port 25—they are classified as spam zombies. Symantec then cross-references the addresses withseveral third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic locations of systems to IPaddresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error. The data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of spam zombies.
Security Risks
Symantec products not only help users to protect their data from the threat of viruses, worms, and Trojanhorses, but to evaluate potential security risks from the introduction of other programs as well. SymantecAntiVirus classifies these other programs as additional security risks. Security risks include programs that may be categorized, based upon functional criteria, as adware, spyware, and misleading applications.Symantec classifies these programs based on a number of characteristics. Once categorized, they can bedetected, allowing users to choose whether to keep or remove them based on their personal needs andsecurity policies.
101Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
General criteria for security risks
A program classified as an additional security risk is an application or software-based executable that is
either independent or interdependent on another software program and meets the following criteria:
• It is considered to be non-viral in nature; • It meets criteria for programmatic functionality having potential to impact security; and/or,• It has been reported to Symantec by a critical number of either corporate or individual users within
a given time frame. The time frame and number may vary by category or risk.
Symantec further classifies programs based upon functional criteria related to the result of the program’s
introduction to a computer system. The criteria take into consideration functionality that includes stealth,privacy, performance impact, damage, and removal.
Adware, spyware, and misleading applications
Adware programs are those that facilitate the delivery and display of advertising content onto the user’s
display device. This may be done without the user’s prior consent or explicit knowledge. The advertising isoften, but not always, presented in the form of pop-up windows or bars that appear on the screen. In somecases, these programs may gather information from the user’s computer, including information related toInternet browser usage or other computing habits, and relay this information back to a remote computer.
Spyware programs are stand-alone programs that can unobtrusively monitor system activity and either
relay the information back to another computer or hold it for subsequent retrieval. In some cases, spywareprograms may be used by corporations to monitor employee Internet usage or by parents to monitor theirchildren’s Internet usage.
Spyware programs can be surreptitiously placed on users’ systems in order to gather confidential
information such as passwords, login details, and credit card details. This can be done through keystrokelogging and by capturing email and instant messaging traffic.
Misleading applications are programs that intentionally misrepresent the security status of a computer by
informing the user that a threat, usually nonexistent or fake, is on the user’s computer. This is usually donein order to persuade the user to pay money to upgrade to a paid-for version of the software that willremove the “threats” that are claimed to be found.
The potential security risks introduced by adware, spyware, and misleading applications are discussed
according to samples, or individual cases of each security risk, reported to Symantec by customersdeploying Symantec AntiVirus. While security risks are not categorized as malicious code, Symantecmonitors them using many of the same types of methods used for tracking malicious code developmentand proliferation. This involves an ongoing analysis of reports and data delivered from over 120 millionclient, server, and gateway email systems, as well as filtration of 25 million email messages per day.Symantec then compiles the most common reports and analyzes them to determine the appropriatecategorization. The discussion included in the “Security Risks” section is based on Symantec’s analysis of these reports.
102Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec Corporation.
NO WARRANTY. The technical information is being delivered to you as is and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its acc uracy or use. Any use of the
technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user. Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical
errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice.
Copyright © 2007 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved. Symantec, the Symantec Logo, Brightmail, DeepSight, Digital Immune System, and Symantec
AntiVirus are trademarks or registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation or its affiliates in the U.S. and other countries. Ap ple, Mac OS, and Macintosh are
registered trademarks of Apple Inc. Safari is a trademark of Apple Inc. IBM and DB2 are trademarks of International Business Ma chines Corporation in the United
States, other countries, or both. Microsoft, ActiveX, MSN, PowerPoint, Visual Studio, Win32, Windows, and Windows Vista are eit her registered trademarks or
trademarks of Microsoft Corporation in the United States and/or other countries. Sun and Solaris are trademarks or registered t rademarks of Sun Microsystems,
Inc., in the U.S. or other countries. Other names may be trademarks of their respective owners.
|
SYMANTEC ENTERPRISE SECURITY
Symantec EMEA Internet
Security Threat ReportTrends for January–June 07
Volume XII, Published September 2007Dean Turner
Executive EditorSymantec Security Response
Stephen Entwisle
Senior EditorSymantec Security Response
Eric Johnson
EditorSymantec Security Response
Marc Fossi
Analyst
Symantec Security Response
Joseph Blackbird
Analyst Symantec Security Response
David McKinney
Analyst Symantec Security Response
Ronald Bowes
AnalystSymantec Security Response
Nicholas Sullivan
AnalystSymantec Security Response
Candid Wueest
AnalystSymantec Security Response
Ollie Whitehouse
Security Architect—Advanced Threat ResearchSymantec Security Response
Zulfikar Ramzan
Analyst—Advanced Threat ResearchSymantec Security Response
Jim Hoagland
Principal Software Engineer Symantec Security Response
Chris Wee
Manager, DevelopmentSymantec Security Response
Contributors
David Cowings
Sr. Manager of OperationsSymantec Business Intelligence
Dylan Morss
ManagerSymantec Business Intelligence
Shravan Shashikant
Principal Business Intelligence AnalystSymantec Business IntelligenceEMEA Internet Security Threat Report Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
Attack Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6
Malicious Code Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Phishing Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Spam Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Appendix C—Malicious Code Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Appendix D—Phishing Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Appendix E—Spam Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45ContentsVolume XII, Published September 2007
Symantec EMEA Internet
Security Threat ReportSymantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
EMEA Internet Security Threat Report Overview
The Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report provides a six-month update of Internet threat activity
that Symantec has observed in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa (EMEA) region. It includes analysis of network-based attacks, a review of known vulnerabilities, and highlights of malicious code. It also discusses numerous issues related to online fraud, including phishing and spam. This volume covers the six-month period from January 1 to June 30, 2007.
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the world. The
Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network tracks attack activity across the entire Internet. It consists of over 40,000 sensors monitoring network activity in over 180 countries. As well, Symantec gathers malicious code reports from over 120 million client, server, and gateway systems that have deployed Symantec’s antivirus products.
Symantec operates one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion of vulnerabilities on
the Internet, the BugTraq™ mailing list, which has approximately 50,000 direct subscribers who contribute, receive, and discuss vulnerability research on a daily basis.
1 Symantec also maintains one of the world’s
most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting of over 22,000 vulnerabilities (spanning more than a decade) affecting more than 50,000 technologies from over 8,000 vendors.
Finally, the Symantec Probe Network, a system of over two million decoy accounts, attracts email messages
from 20 different countries around the world, allowing Symantec to gauge global spam and phishing activity. These resources give Symantec analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify emerging trends in attacks and malicious code activity. Symantec also gathers phishing information through the Symantec Phish Report Network, an extensive antifraud community of enterprises and consumers. Members of the network contribute and receive fraudulent Web site addresses for alerting and filtering across a broad range of solutions.
The Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report is grounded principally on the expert analysis of data
provided by all of these sources. By publishing the analysis of Internet security activity in this report, Symantec hopes to provide enterprises and consumers in the EMEA region with the information they need to help effectively secure their systems now and in the future.
Executive Summary
The following section will offer a brief summary of the security trends that Symantec observed during the first half of 2007 based on data provided by the sources listed above. This summary includes all of the metrics that are included in the EMEA Internet Security Threat Report .
Attack Trends Highlights
• The United States was the country of origin of the most attacks against EMEA-based computers,
accounting for 35 percent of attacks detected there.
• The United Kingdom was the EMEA country most frequently targeted by denial of service (DoS) attacks,
accounting for 46 percent of attacks in the region during this period.
1 The BugTraq mailing list is hosted by SecurityFocus (http://www.securityfocus.com). Archives are available at http://www.secur ityfocus.com/archive/1
4Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
5• Symantec observed an average of 18,616 active bot-infected computers per day in EMEA, 35 percent of
the worldwide daily average of 52,771.
• Germany had the most bot-infected computers in EMEA, accounting for 23 percent of the total, up
from 16 percent in the second half of 2006.
• Madrid, Spain had the most bot-infected computers of any EMEA city, as it did in the second half of 2006.• Germany accounted for 19 percent of malicious activity in EMEA, the most of any country and the same
percentage as in the second half of 2006.
• Israel had the most malicious activity per Internet user in EMEA, followed by Poland and Spain.
Malicious Code Highlights
• Trojans were the most common malicious code type in EMEA, accounting for 68 percent of potential
malicious code infections in the region.
• The United Kingdom was the top EMEA country for potential infections of back doors and Trojans.• India was the top EMEA country for potential virus and worm infections.• The Netsky.P mass-mailing worm was the most frequently reported malicious code sample for the
EMEA region.
• The most prevalent new malicious code family reported in the EMEA region was the Metajuan Trojan.• Threats to confidential information made up 61 percent of potential infections by the top 50 malicious
code samples in the EMEA region, less than the worldwide percentage of 65 percent.
• Threats that allow remote access, such as back doors, made up 87 percent of potential infections by
confidential information threats.
• Email attachments were the most common propagation mechanism used in EMEA; they were used by
49 percent of propagating malicious code this period.
Phishing Trends Highlights
• Germany was home to the most phishing Web sites in EMEA, with 22 percent of the region’s total.
• Karlsruhe, Germany was the city with the most phishing Web sites in the EMEA region, as it was in the
second half of 2006.
Spam Trends Highlights
• Measured by country, the highest source of spam in EMEA originated in the United Kingdom, which
accounted for 12 percent of the regional total.
• Germany had more spam zombies than any other EMEA country, with 17 percent of the regional total.• In the EMEA region, spam made up 67 percent of all monitored email traffic during this reporting period.• Of the top 20 email-producing countries in the EMEA region, Poland had the highest percentage of email
that was spam, with 86 percent.Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
2 http://www.point-topic.com
3 http://www.internetworldstats.com
6Attack Trends
This section of the EMEA Internet Security Threat Report will provide an analysis of attack activity that
Symantec observed in the EMEA region between January 1 and June 30, 2007. Attacks are defined as any malicious activity carried out over a network that has been detected by an intrusion detection system (IDS) or firewall.
The Symantec Global Intelligence Network monitors attack activity across the entire Internet. Over 40,000
sensors deployed in more than 180 countries by Symantec DeepSight™ Threat Management System and Symantec™ Managed Security Services gather this data. Furthermore, Symantec uses proprietary technologies to monitor bot command-and-control servers across the Internet. These resources give Symantec an unparalleled ability to identify, investigate, and respond to emerging threats. This discussion will be based on data provided by all of these sources.
This section of the EMEA Internet Security Threat Report will discuss:
• Top countries targeted by denial of service attacks
• Active bot-infected computers• Bot-infected computers by country• Bot-infected computers by city• Malicious activity by country• Malicious activity by country per Internet user
Over the first six months of 2007, the United States was the country of origin of the most attacks
against EMEA-based computers, accounting for 35 percent of all attacks detected by sensors in the region (table 1). This is slightly higher than the worldwide attacks from the United States, which was 25 percent. This indicates that attacks originating in the United States were likely not targeting the EMEA region in particular.
The high rate of attacks is likely due to the United States having the highest number of broadband
connections in the world, with 20 percent of all connections.
2 The United States also hosts 18 percent of
all worldwide Internet connections.3 As a result, computers there are more likely to become infected with
worm or bot software, which are likely to launch subsequent attacks.Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
Regional
Rank
1
23456789
10Previous
Regional
Rank
1
325467
10
9
11Country
United States
United KingdomChinaNorwayGermanyItalyFranceCanadaSpainPoland Percentage
of Regional
Attacks
35%
15%14%13%
5%3%2%1%1%1%Previous
Percentage of
Regional Attacks
33%
13%19%
3%4%3%3%1%1%1%
Percentage
of Worldwide
Attacks
25%
5%
13%
<1%
8%3%6%4%5%2%
Table 1. Top countries of origin of attacks targeting the EMEA region
Source: Symantec Corporation
The United Kingdom was the country of origin of the second highest percentage of attacks detected by
sensors in the EMEA region during this period, accounting for 15 percent of the total. This is a small increase from 13 percent during the previous reporting period, when it ranked third place. The regional percentage is significantly larger than the five percent of worldwide attacks that originated in the United Kingdom, which indicates that attack activity originating in the United Kingdom was targeting the EMEA region in particular.
In the previous version of the EMEA Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec has noted the tendency
for attacks to target computers situated in the region from which they originate.
4 This is likely because
organizations have a higher profile in their local area; therefore, they make more attractive targets for attackers from the region. It may also be related to factors such as shared language and living in a proximate time zone.
Further, the United Kingdom has a well established Internet infrastructure. It has the second highest
number of broadband connections in EMEA, with 14 percent,
5 and the third highest number of Internet
users, with nine percent.6
China was the source country of the third highest number of attacks detected by sensors deployed in the
EMEA region during the first six months of 2007, accounting for 14 percent of the total. Previously, China was ranked second place with 19 percent of attacks against EMEA. China was the originating country for 13 percent of attack activity, so attacks originating there do not appear to be targeting EMEA in particular.
China’s position here is likely driven by the number of broadband connections in the country. China has
the second highest number of broadband connections in the world, with 20 percent of all connections.
7
The high percentage of attacks originating China may also be linked to its high percentage of bots, as 29 percent of bot-infected computers worldwide are located there. Bot-infected computers are often used by attackers to launch attack activity. However, as these computers are often controlled by attackers in other countries, the fact that the attacks originate in China does not necessarily mean that the attackers are located there.
4 Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report (March 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xi_emea_03_2007.en-us. pdf : p. 8
5 http://www.point-topic.com
6 http://www.internetworldstats.com
7 http://www.point-topic.com. Although the U.S. and China have the same rounded percentages (20 percent), the United States act ually has 20.4 percent of worldwide
broadband connections while China has 19.7 percent.
7Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
Top countries targeted by denial of service attacks
This metric will assess the geographic location of targets of denial of service (DoS) attacks. Insight into
the locations targeted by these attacks is valuable in determining global trends in DoS attack patterns. It may also help administrators and organizations in affected countries to take the necessary steps to protect against or minimize the effects of DoS attacks.
DoS attacks are a major threat to Internet-dependent organizations. A successful DoS attack can render Web
sites or other network services inaccessible to customers and employees. This could result in the disruption of organizational communications, a significant loss of revenue, and/or damage to the organization’s reputation. Furthermore, as Symantec discussed in a previous Internet Security Threat Report , criminals
have been known to use DoS attacks in extortion schemes.
8
Over the first six months of 2007, the United Kingdom was the EMEA country most frequently targeted
by DoS attacks, accounting for 46 percent of attacks in the region during this period (table 2). This is a decrease from 49 percent during the second half of 2006, when it was also the top-ranked country in EMEA.
In the previous volume of the EMEA Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec speculated that some DoS
attacks against the United Kingdom may have been conducted to protest a legislation outlawing DoS attacks there.
9 It speculated that groups of so-called hacktivists, attackers that make politically motivated attacks,
performed DoS attacks against the United Kingdom in an attempt to protest this new legislation. Another example of this type of Internet-based activism seen during this reporting period took place in Estonia, as is discussed later in this section. The drop in DoS attacks targeting the United Kingdom may indicate that the attackers either feel that they have accomplished their objective or that the targets of the attack have been able to protect themselves against this type of attack.
Regional
Rank
1
23456789
10Previous
Regional
Rank
1
243567
11
9
14Country
United Kingdom
GermanyNetherlandsFranceItalySpainSwedenRussiaIrelandPoland Percentage
of Regional
Attacks
46%
10%
7%7%4%3%2%2%2%2%Previous
Percentage of
Regional Attacks
49%
11%
6%8%4%4%2%1%1%1%
Percentage
of Worldwide
Attacks
12%
2%2%2%1%1%1%1%0%0%
Table 2. Top countries targeted by DoS attacks, EMEA region
Source: Symantec Corporation
8 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume VIII (September 2005):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_report_viii.pdf : p. 11 and 30
9 http://news.com.com/2100-7348_3-6134472.html
8Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
Germany was targeted by 10 percent of attacks in EMEA during this period, the second highest number
in the region. This is a slight decrease from 11 percent in the second half of 2006, when it was also the second ranked country. DoS attacks are generally conducted against Web sites, rather than other organizational resources or individual users. As Germany has the highest number of Web sites in the EMEA region,
10 it is logical that it should be targeted by a high number of DoS attacks.
The Netherlands was targeted by the third highest number of DoS attacks in the EMEA region, accounting
for seven percent of attacks during this period. This is up slightly from six percent in the previous period, when the Netherlands was targeted by the fourth highest number of DoS attacks. Although the percentage of attacks against the Netherlands has remained largely unchanged since last period, the percentage of attacks targeting France has fallen, which has resulted in a proportionate increase in the Netherlands.
As was mentioned earlier in this discussion, Estonia appeared to be the target of politically motivated DoS
attacks in the first half of 2007. It was targeted by a number of attacks when an unpopular decision made by the Estonian government led to widespread protests both in the physical world and online.
11 The attacks
were made against a variety of targets, including government, bank, and newspaper Web sites, although some reports stated that a number of people may have been unable to connect to any Web sites at all.
12
This type of event illustrates the potential impact that DoS attacks can have.
Organizations should ensure that a documented procedure exists for responding to DoS events. One of the
best ways to mitigate a DoS attack is to filter upstream of the target. For most organizations, this filtering will involve working in conjunction with their Internet service provider (ISP). Symantec also recommends that organizations perform egress filtering on all outbound traffic. DoS victims frequently need to engage their upstream ISP to help filter the traffic to mitigate the effects of attacks.
Active bot-infected computers
Bots are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s machine in order to allow an attacker to remotely control the targeted system through a communication channel such as Internet relay chat (IRC). These channels allow the remote attacker to control a large number of compromised computers over a single, reliable channel in a bot network, which can then be used to launch coordinated attacks.
Bots allow for a wide range of functionality, and most can be updated to assume new functionality by
downloading new code and features. They can be used by external attackers to perform DoS attacks against an organization’s Web site. Furthermore, bots within an organization’s network can be used to attack other organizations’ Web sites, which can have serious business and legal consequences.
Bots can also be used by attackers to harvest confidential information from compromised computers,
which can lead to identity theft. They can also be used to distribute spam and phishing attacks, as well as spyware, adware, and misleading applications.
10 Based on the number of unique domain names registered: http://www.webhosting.info/domains/country_stats/
11 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/06/politics_on_the_wire.html
12 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/19/world/europe/19russia.html?ex=1337227200&en=4817e43658c91382&ei=5088
9Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
An active bot-infected computer is one that carries out at least one attack per day. This does not have to
be continuous; rather, a single computer can be active on a number of different days. Between January 1 and June 30, 2007, Symantec observed an average of 18,616 active distinct bot-infected computers per day in the EMEA region, down from the 21,707 seen during the previous reporting period (figure 1). The worldwide average for active bots detected on any given day was 52,771, so the EMEA region accounted for about 35 percent of active bots on an average day.
DateActive bot-infected computers by day
1/18/2007
3/09/20074/28/20076/17/2007020,00040,00060,00080,000
10,00030,00050,00070,000
11/29/200690,000
7/02/2006
10/10/20068/21/2006Worldwide
EMEA
Moving average
Figure 1. Active bot-infected computers per day, EMEA region
Source: Symantec Corporation
As is evident in figure 1, the number of bot-infected computers by day in EMEA has remained consistent
with the worldwide number the past 12 months. This likely indicates that no recent bot infection has specifically propagated in the EMEA region.
One notable exception to this occurred during April of this year, when the worldwide number dropped
without a corresponding decrease in bot-infections in the EMEA region. This may be related to the Operation Bot Roast project of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
13 which is an ongoing initiative
dedicated to detecting, disrupting, and dismantling bot networks in the United States. The FBI announced that it had detected over a million bot-infected computers. Since this project is based in the United States, it is possible that it has had a more noticeable effect on the proportion of bot-infected computers in the United States than in other regions. This could cause a drop in bot-infected computers in the North American region, and therefore worldwide, without a corresponding drop in EMEA.
13 http://www.fbi.gov/page2/june07/botnet061307.htm
10Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
14 For instance, please see Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume IX (March 2006):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_report_ix.pdf : p. 30
15 Defense-in-depth strategies emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive systems to guard against singl e-point failures in any specific
technology or protection methodology. They should include the deployment of antivirus, firewalls, and intrusion detection syste ms, among other security measures.
11A distinct bot-infected computer is a computer that has been determined to be active at any one point
in time (or more) during the period. In the first half of 2007, Symantec identified 2,084,189 distinct bot-infected computers that were considered active in EMEA. This is 41 percent of the 5,029,309 active distinct bots detected worldwide during this period. It is also 10 percent lower than the 2,312,267 active bot-infected computers that Symantec identified in the EMEA region during the second half of 2006.
The decrease in bots observed over the past six months is likely due to a change in bot attack methods. As
has been discussed in previous volumes of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , the exploitation
of network-based vulnerabilities to spread bots is likely being slowly abandoned for methods that are more likely to succeed, such as bots that send a mass mailing of themselves.
14 The introduction of default
firewalls in popular operating systems such as Microsoft® Windows® XP, as well as a generally increasing awareness of computer security issues among organizations and computer users has made these forms of attack less likely to succeed. As a result, their use has declined.
Furthermore, as an extension of computer security awareness, law enforcement initiatives targeting bot
networks may also be having some effect, as is illustrated by the FBI’s Operation Bot Roast discussed previously. Since American-based bot networks are likely to make use of bot-infected computers worldwide, Initiatives such as these may result in a reduction in bots in the EMEA region, albeit less than the reduction of bots worldwide. Additionally, as bot networks are dismantled, less bot activity will be observed. Also, bot network owners may also become more careful with their bot networks to avoid detection. This may make them more difficult or impossible to detect.
Symantec also tracks the number of bot command-and-control servers in each region. Bot command-and-
control servers are computers that bot network owners use to relay commands to bot-infected computers on their networks. During the first six months of 2007, 25 percent of worldwide command-and-control servers were located in the EMEA region, compared to the 41 percent of active bots that are located in the region. In the previous reporting period, 27 percent of command-and-control servers were located in the EMEA region, as were 39 percent of active bot-infected computers.
The discrepancy between command-and-control servers and bot-infected computers is important, as
it indicates that bots in EMEA are likely being controlled by command-and-control servers that are situated outside the region. This means that some of the attack activity originating in the region is not necessarily being initiated by computers located in the EMEA region. This supports the speculation in the “Top countries of attack origin” section in this report that the prevalence of attack activity originating in the United Kingdom and other EMEA-based countries may be partly due to attack activity controlled by attackers in countries outside the EMEA region.
To reduce exposure to bot-related attacks, end users should employ defense-in-depth strategies, including
the deployment of antivirus software and a firewall.
15 Creating and enforcing policies that identify and limit
applications that can access the network may also help to limit the spread of bot networks. Users should update antivirus definitions regularly and ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their operating system vendor. Symantec also advises that users never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is expected and comes from a known and trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
Bot-infected computers by country
Recognizing the ongoing threat posed by bot networks, Symantec tracks the distribution of bot-infected
computers both worldwide and across the EMEA region. In order to do this, Symantec calculates the number of computers worldwide that are known to be infected with bots, and assesses which countries within the EMEA region are home to high percentages of these computers. The identification of bot-infected computers is important, as a high percentage of infected machines could mean a greater potential for bot-related attacks. It may also indicate the level of patching and security awareness in the region.
Between January 1 and June 30, 2007, Germany had the highest number of bot-infected computers in the
EMEA region, accounting for 23 percent of the total (table 3). This is an increase from 16 percent in the second half of 2006, when Germany was ranked second in EMEA for bot-infected computers. The increase in Germany during this period may be due to a decrease in France, where the percentage of bot-infected computers fell from 16 percent to 11 percent in the first half of 2007.
Regional
Rank
1
23456789
10Previous
Regional
Rank
2
31647598
10Country
Germany
SpainFranceItalyUnited KingdomIsraelPolandPortugalTurkeyIndia
Percentage
of Regional
Bots
23%
15%11%
9%9%6%6%2%2%2%Previous
Percentage of
Regional Bots
16%
14%16%
6%
11%
5%8%2%3%2%Percentage
of Worldwide
Bots
9%
6%5%4%4%3%3%1%1%1%Average
Lifespan
(days)
1
223333424Command-
and-
Control
25%
2%5%6%
11%
2%2%0%5%3%
Table 3. Bot-infected computers by country, EMEA region
Source: Symantec Corporation
Germany’s rank is likely related to its well established, but still expanding, broadband infrastructure.
Germany is home to more broadband connections than any other country in EMEA, with 16 percent of the region.
16 It also added more broadband connections between May 2006 and May 2007 than any other
country in EMEA.17
In Volume XI of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec speculated that the number of new users
adopting high-speed Internet in a country may be a significant factor in the rate of bot infections.18
Frequently, rapidly expanding ISPs will focus their resources on meeting growing broadband demand at the expense of implementing adequate security measures, such as port blocking and ingress and egress filtering. As a result, they may have security infrastructures and practices that are insufficient for their needs. Furthermore, it is also likely that home users and system administrators in countries with a rapidly expanding Internet infrastructure are also struggling to adapt their security practices and policies to deal with broadband Internet.
16 http://www.point-topic.com
17 http://www.point-topic.com
18 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xi_03_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 36
12Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
Germany had the shortest lifespan of bot-infected computers of the top ten bot-infected countries in
EMEA, with an average of only a single day, a quarter of the worldwide average lifespan of four days. This means that there is very little delay between a German computer becoming infected and then being detected and subsequently disinfected. This likely indicates that German users and ISPs respond to bot infections much more quickly than average users. As such, it is likely that the high proportion of bot infections in Germany are linked more to the sheer number of users than other factors, such as insufficient security measures or awareness.
Spain accounted for 15 percent of bot-infected computers in the EMEA region in the first half of 2007,
the second highest total in the region. This is an increase from 14 percent and third place in the second half of 2006. Spain’s position in second place is surprising, given that it has only the fifth highest number of broadband connections in the region. This activity may be a result of broadband growth, as Spain had the fifth highest number of broadband connections added between May 2006 and May 2007. As has been stated previously, an ISP focusing on expansion may do so at the expense of security controls. For example, a large Spanish ISP, Telefónica de España, became a stakeholder in one of the largest Italian ISPs, Telecom Italia, in April of 2007.
19
In Volume XI of the Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec speculated that the increase
in Spain’s bot infections was a result of its broadband growth.20 The report stated that Spain would likely
follow the same trend as the United Kingdom; that is, the percentage of bot-infected computers in Spain would increase then, as broadband in Spain became more established, the proportion of infections would plateau and may eventually fall. This occurs because users and ISPs become more experienced and aware of security issues, and begin to put sufficient security controls into place. The percentage of bot-infected computers in Spain appears to have leveled off. As such, Symantec expects the percentage to remain steady or to fall during the upcoming period.
France had the third highest number of bot-infected computers in the EMEA region, with 11 percent
of the total, down from 16 percent and first place in the previous period. The decrease in bot-infected computers in France mirrors a decrease in spam zombies there. France now accounts for nine percent of spam zombies in EMEA, down from 14 percent during the previous reporting period. At least one large ISP in France, Orange, has taken steps to block Internet attacks, particularly by providing antivirus and firewall protection,
21 which may account for the falling number of bot infections there.
In the second half of 2005, the United Kingdom had the most bot-infected computers in the region.22
Since that period, the percentage of bot-infected computers has steadily fallen, with the United Kingdom currently ranking fifth place in EMEA with only nine percent of bot-infected computers in the region. This fall is likely due to the amount of publicity and media attention in the United Kingdom due to the number of bot infections.
23 It is likely that some ISPs in the UK have taken precautions to help prevent
bot infections.24
19 http://point-topic.com/content/operatorSource/profiles2/telefonica-de-espana.htm
20 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xi_emea_03_2007.en-us .pdf : p. 13
21 http://assistance.orange.fr/1308.php?dub=2
22 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_report_ix.pdf : p. 38
23 http://news.zdnet.co.uk/security/0,1000000189,39192117,00.htm
24 Some ISPs have recently blocked access to known bot servers: http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2007/Jul/0388.html
13Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
This decrease may also be driven by changes in bot-distribution methods. Bot-infections often propagate
by launching attacks at randomly selected IP addresses on the Internet. These attacks are typically noisy and aggressive, making them easy to detect as bots. Since this method of bot propagation can be easily detected, ISPs and law enforcement can determine that they are occurring much more easily. As a result, attackers may attempt to spread bots more quietly, not attacking aggressively. In that case, they may only be detected as attacks, not as bots, which may allow them to appear to be Internet background noise caused by either worms, misconfigured systems, or ordinary traffic that is detected as malicious.
25
Many smaller countries, such as Israel, Italy, and Spain, have shown increases in bot-infected computers
over the previous reporting period. For instance, Israel reached six percent from five percent, and Italy is up to nine percent from six percent. These countries have not traditionally been targeted by attacks and malicious code, likely because targeting attacking larger countries with more established Internet populations—such as the United Kingdom, France, and Germany—could potentially affect more users. However, the increase seen in these countries may indicate a shift in the focus of attackers, who may be making efforts to target other countries.
Bot-infected computers by city
Madrid, Spain was the EMEA city with the highest number of bot-infected computers during the first six months of 2007 (table 4), which is unchanged from the previous reporting period. Spain had the second most bot-infected computers in the EMEA region during this period, with 15 percent of all bots in the region. The one country with a higher rating, Germany, does not have any cities in the top ten for bot-infections. This is likely due to the fact that bots in Germany are spread out over many different cities, each of which contribute to its overall ranking, while most bots in Spain appear to be concentrated in Madrid.
Regional
Rank
1
234567
8
9
10Previous
Regional Rank
1
975234
8
6
12Country
Spain
IsraelItalyItalyUnited KingdomFranceTurkey
Portugal
Poland
IsraelCity
Madrid
Petah TiqwaRomeMilanLondonParisAnkara
Lisbon
Warsaw
Haifa
Table 4. Bot-infected computers by city, EMEA region
Source: Symantec Corporation
25 For more information on Internet background noise, see http://www.switch.ch/security/services/IBN/
14Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
Petah Tiqwa, Israel had the second highest number of bot-infected computers in the EMEA region, a
considerable jump from the previous rank of ninth. This increase may be related to the privatization of a large Israeli ISP. When companies become privatized, their budgets and operating practices may be changed, and focus may be diverted away from activities that don’t generate direct revenue streams, such as security. If less attention is focused on security, it is possible that bot-infected computers can operate more easily in Israeli cities.
Furthermore, computer security law enforcement resources in Israel may be insufficient to meet current
demands. This prompted a reorganization in 2005 that was intended to create a single information technology authority in the country to deal with computer and Internet crime.
26 As this authority becomes
established and takes the necessary measures to prevent bot network activity, bot infections may drop to a level more appropriate for Israel’s population of Internet users.
Rome, Italy had the third highest number of bot-infected computers among EMEA cities during this period,
a significant increase from the previous period, when it was ranked seventh. Milan, Italy also increased in rank during this period, to fourth from fifth place. As discussed in the “Bot-infected computers by country” section of this report, large Spanish ISP, Telefónica de España, became a stakeholder in one of the largest Italian ISPs, Telecom Italia, in April 2007. The recent rise in bot network activity in Italian cities may be related to the rise in bot network activity in Spanish cities, since the two ISPs may implement similar security controls. Additionally, the expansion may have come at the expense of security infrastructure.
To prevent against bot infection, Symantec recommends that end users practice defense-in-depth
strategies, including the deployment of antivirus, firewall, and intrusion detection solutions. Security administrators should also ensure that ingress and egress filtering is in place to block known bot-network traffic and that antivirus definitions are updated regularly.
Malicious activity by country
This metric will assess the countries in which the highest amount of malicious activity takes place or originates. To determine this, Symantec has compiled geographical data on numerous malicious activities that are based in EMEA countries, namely: bot-infected computers, bot command-and-control servers, phishing Web sites, malicious code reports, spam relay hosts, and Internet attacks.
To determine the proportion of Internet-wide malicious activity that originated in each country, the
mean of the proportion of all of the considered malicious activities that originated in each country was calculated. This average determined the proportion of overall malicious activity that originated from the country in question and was used to rank each country within the EMEA region. This section will discuss those findings.
In the first six months of 2007, Germany accounted for 19 percent of malicious activity in the EMEA
region, the most of any country (table 5). Germany’s rank and percentage of malicious activity have both remained unchanged since the last six months of 2006. Germany’s overall high rankings are likely due to its developed broadband infrastructure. Germany has 16 percent of all broadband connections in EMEA, which is more than any other EMEA-based country, thus exposing it to more attacks of opportunity than other countries in the region.
26 http://www.crime-research.org/news/30.09.2005/1522
15Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
During this period, Germany passed strict laws against computer crimes.27 These laws make it illegal to
penetrate a computer system for any reason, including legitimate ones, which makes security research more difficult. For example, performing an authorized penetration test on a company’s network may now be considered illegal in Germany. As such, computer systems may be less protected than systems in other countries.
28 Since this law is new, it will likely have a more noticeable effect over the upcoming
reporting period.
Germany ranked first for all of the considered activities with the exception of malicious code, for which
it ranked third. These rankings likely indicate high levels of bot activity. Some bots can be used to relay spam,
29 and bot-infected computers frequently launch attacks in an attempt to infect more systems.
Overall
Rank
1
23456789
10Previous
Rank
1
32546
12
78
10Country
Germany
United KingdomFranceItalySpainPolandIndiaNetherlandsTurkeyRussiaOverall
Proportion
19%
11%
9%8%8%5%4%4%3%3%
Previous
Overall
Proportion
19%
10%11%
8%8%5%2%4%3%3%Malicious
Code
Rank
3
1526947
1225Spam
Zombies
Rank
1
10
43627
17
59Command-
and-Control
Server Rank
1
273
131110
659Phishing
Web
sites
1
25786
14
3
20
4Bot
Rank
1
53427
1012
9
11Attack
Rank
1
32546
14
87
15
Table 5. Malicious activity by country, EMEA region
Source: Symantec Corporation
The United Kingdom had the second highest percentage of malicious activity in the EMEA region during
this six-month reporting period, accounting for 11 percent of the regional total. This was a small increase over 10 percent and third place during the last six months of 2006. The United Kingdom ranked first place for malicious code, second for phishing Web sites and command-and-control servers, and third or lower for every other activity.
The numbers of bots and spam zombies detected in the United Kingdom were low this period and have
been consistently falling over the previous two periods (the United Kingdom accounted for nine percent of bots detected in EMEA this period, 11 percent in the previous period, and 22 percent in the period before that). This indicates that efforts are likely being made to clean up bot networks and bot network activity there. At least one major broadband provider in the United Kingdom, BT, offers a low-cost package that includes antivirus and firewall software.
30 This type of package may encourage more users to run antivirus
software, helping to clean up bot infections.
In the first six months of 2007, France was the third ranked EMEA country for malicious activity, accounting
for nine percent of the regional total. This is a small drop from 11 percent and second place in the previous reporting period. France’s ranking in the various categories varied a great deal, from being the second highest source of attacks to the seventh highest location of command-and-control servers. France also had a high percentage of bot-infected computers, ranking third place in EMEA.
27 http://www.computerworlduk.com/management/security/cybercrime/news/index.cfm?newsid=3194
28 http://www.infoworld.com/article/07/08/13/German-antihacker-law_1.html
29 http://news.zdnet.co.uk/security/0,1000000189,39167561,00.htm
30 http://www.btnetprotect.bt.com/
16Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
While France ranked highly for both bot-infected computers and attacks, it has dropped in both since the
previous reporting period, after a sharp increase in the period before that. France is a country that has had expanding broadband infrastructure and, in recent periods, has been a target of bot infections. This fall likely indicates that security controls and education have caught up to the broadband growth and penetration. As discussed in the “Bot-infected computers by country” section of this report, users who obtain a new broadband connection may not understand or implement proper Internet security controls, and ISPs that are focusing on expanding may do so at the expense of providing security controls.
Although the United Kingdom and France have switched positions since the previous reporting period, the
percentages and, for the most part, positions of the top few countries by malicious activity have remained nearly constant. This supports an assertion made in the “Malicious activity by country” section of the main Internet Security Threat Report , which stated that, once malicious activity becomes entrenched within a
country, it tends to be difficult to displace unless new security measures are put in place.
Malicious activity by country per Internet user
Having evaluated the top countries in EMEA by malicious activity, Symantec also evaluated the top 15 of these countries according to the number of Internet users located there. This measure is intended to remove the bias of countries with a large population of Internet users from the consideration of the “Malicious activity by country” metric.
In order to determine this, Symantec divided the amount of malicious activity originating in each of the
top 15 countries in the EMEA region by the number of Internet users who are located in that country. The proportion assigned to each country in this discussion thus equates to the proportion of malicious activity that could be attributed to a single (average) Internet user in that country. The proportion of malicious activity that would be carried out by each person is the proportion assigned to each country in the discussion below.
During the first six months of 2007, Israel was the most highly ranked country for malicious activity per
Internet user. If one person from each of the top 15 countries in EMEA were assessed as a representation of their country’s Internet users, the average user in Israel would carry out 19 percent of the group’s malicious activity (table 6). The ranking has remained unchanged since the previous period.
The prominence of Israel in malicious activity per Internet user is likely influenced by the average hours
spent online per user. Israel had the highest hours spent online per unique user in EMEA.
31 Computers that
are online more often will allow for more opportunities for attackers to compromise them. It is also possible that the computer security infrastructure implemented by ISPs in Israel is not equipped to handle the load placed upon it.
Furthermore, as was discussed in the “Bot-infected computers by city” section of this report, enforcement
efforts in Israel may be insufficient to meet current demands. This prompted a reorganization in 2005 that created a single information technology authority in the country to deal with computer and Internet crime.
32 A regulatory body that is relatively new may not be able to deal with activities such as bot networks
as easily. As this authority becomes established and takes the necessary measures to prevent bot network activity, bot infections may drop to a level more appropriate for Israel’s population of Internet users.
31 http://www.websiteoptimization.com/bw/0703
32 http://www.crime-research.org/news/30.09.2005/1522
17Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
33 The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume XI (March 2006):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xi_03_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 17
18Country
Israel
PolandSpainGermanyFranceNetherlandsSwitzerlandUnited KingdomBelgiumItalyRegional Rank
1
23456789
10Previous
Regional Rank
1
2487
10
5
12
9
11Malicious Activity
by Internet User
19%
11%
9%8%7%6%6%5%5%5%
Table 6. Malicious activity by country per Internet user
Source: Symantec Corporation
Poland accounted for 11 percent of malicious activity per Internet user, the second highest percentage in
the region. Poland’s position has also remained constant since the previous reporting period. Poland’s rank is largely influenced by high numbers of bot-infected computers as well as a high number of spam zombies, relative to the population. The percentage of bots in Poland has decreased during this period while the number of spam zombies has increased. This might be a sign that spam zombies are able to survive more successfully than bots that are attacking. This could be an indication that little or no spam filtering is done by Polish networks or ISPs.
Spain ranked third, accounting for nine percent of malicious activity per Internet user. Spain’s position has
increased to third from fourth, filling in Sweden’s place; Sweden dropped from 3rd to 12th.
Sweden’s previous position was largely related to the number of bot command-and-control servers
located there. Sweden now hosts about five percent of command-and-control servers in EMEA, down from 12 percent during the previous reporting period. This may be a sign that bot owners are consolidating their bots, keeping more bots on fewer servers. This is indicative of a broader trend towards the consolidation of bot networks that was discussed in the previous volume of the Internet Security Threat Report .
33 Additionally,
because it’s possible to host a command-and-control server in any country, bot owners using Swedish servers may have moved their bots elsewhere. This may be a sign that police or ISPs have taken additional measures against bots, or are taking enough measures to scare bot owners into keeping them elsewhere. Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
Malicious Code Trends
Symantec gathers malicious code data from over 120 million desktops that have deployed Symantec’s
antivirus products in consumer and corporate environments. The Symantec Digital Immune System™ and Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting process. This discussion is based on malicious code samples causing potential infections reported to Symantec for analysis from the EMEA region between January 1 and June 30, 2007.
The “Malicious Code Trends” section will discuss: • Malicious code types
• Top country of malicious code infection by type• Top ten malicious code samples• Top three new malicious code families• Threats to confidential information• Propagation mechanisms
This discussion will include any prevention and mitigation measures that might be relevant to the
particular threats being discussed. However, Symantec recommends that certain best security practices always be followed to protect against malicious code infection.
Administrators should keep patch levels up-to-date, especially on computers that host public services and
applications—such as HTTP, FTP, SMTP, and DNS servers—and are accessible through a firewall or placed in a DMZ. Email servers should be configured to only allow file attachment types that are required for business needs. Additionally, Symantec recommends that ingress and egress filtering be put in place on perimeter devices to detect anomalous activity.
End users should employ defense-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software and
a personal firewall. Users should update antivirus definitions regularly. They should also ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their operating system vendor. They should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless it is expected and comes from a trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
Malicious code types
During the first six months of 2007, Trojans accounted for 68 percent of the potential malicious code infections in the EMEA region (figure 2). During the same period, they made up 73 percent of the volume of potential malicious code infections worldwide.
34
34 It should be noted that several malicious code samples reported in this period are categorized under more than one type, as a result, cumulative
percentages included in this discussion may exceed 100 percent.
19Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
2012%26%
TypeVirus Worm Back doorPercentage of top 50 by potential infection
TrojanWorldwideEMEA
68%73%
8%8%22%
10%
Figure 2. Malicious code types by potential infection
Source: Symantec Corporation
As will be discussed in the “Top ten malicious code samples” section below, three of the top five malicious
code samples responsible for potential infections in the region were Trojans. Also, two of the top three new malicious code families in the EMEA region this period—Metajuan and Peacomm—were Trojans.
Trojans are likely gaining prominence because they generate a low volume of traffic compared to network
and mass-mailing worms. As a result, they are less likely to draw attention than threats that generate high volumes of email messages or network traffic. The longer a threat remains unnoticed and active on a computer the greater an opportunity it will have to gather more confidential information or cause more damage.
Trojans can expose confidential information, and can be used to install other malicious programs.
Furthermore, they can often be used to download subsequent malicious code modules that can be used in subsequent attack activity. These Trojans are referred to as “staged downloaders” and are becoming increasingly common. Staged downloaders are small, specialized Trojans that establish a “beachhead” on a compromised computer in order to download and install other malicious programs, such as back doors or other Trojans. Many of these Trojans are installed using Web browser vulnerabilities and zero-day vulnerabilities in other applications.
To protect against Trojans, users should avoid executing software that is downloaded from the Internet
unless it has been scanned for viruses. They should also ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their operating system vendor. Simply visiting a compromised Web site can cause infection if certain browser vulnerabilities are not patched.Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
In the first half of 2007, worms made up 26 percent of the volume of malicious code reports in the
EMEA region and 22 percent of the volume worldwide. Many established ISPs in Western Europe are likely implementing a degree of port blocking to prevent the propagation of network worms and email attachment scanning to protect against mass-mailing worms. However, in countries with relatively new ISPs or where demand is extremely high, these measures are most likely not yet in place.
The percentages of viruses and back doors in the EMEA region were in line with worldwide percentages
this period, at eight percent both worldwide and in EMEA. Many of the viruses and back doors in the top 50 malicious code causing potential infections were present in both EMEA and worldwide. Since viruses only require a user to execute an infected file to spread, they are not dependent on languages, as is the case with many mass-mailing worms. Similarly, back doors are not dependent upon the language of the victim.
Top country of malicious code infection by type
For the first time, in this edition of the EMEA Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is examining the
top countries reporting potential malicious code infections as well as the types of malicious code that are causing potential infections in each country. Because of the different propagation mechanisms used by different malicious code types, and the different effects that each type may have, the geographic distribution of malicious code can indicate where network administrators in different regions can best increase the focus of their security efforts.
The United Kingdom was the top country for potential infections of back doors and Trojans in the first
half of 2007 (tables 7 and 8). The top three countries for back doors and Trojans were rounded out by Italy and Germany. This may indicate that ISPs in these countries have begun implementing port blocking and more aggressive email gateway filtering for executable files to reduce mass-mailing and network worms. As a result, attackers targeting users in these countries will likely begin shifting their efforts towards more effective attacks, such as Trojans that are installed when a user visits a Web site exploiting a browser vulnerability. Many of these Trojans will, in turn, download back door server programs onto the compromised computer.
Rank
1
23Top Country
United Kingdom
ItalyGermany
Table 7. Top three countries for back doors, EMEA
Source: Symantec Corporation
Rank
1
23Top Country
United Kingdom
ItalyGermany
Table 8. Top three countries for Trojans, EMEA
Source: Symantec Corporation
21Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
35 http://www.isp-planet.com/cplanet/tech/2007/prime_letter_070628_india_russia.html
36 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-032110-4938-99
37 http://www.tmcnet.com/usubmit/2006/06/27/1696993.htm
22India was the EMEA country that reported the highest number of potential infections of both viruses and
worms (tables 9 and 10). India is currently experiencing a rapid growth in broadband Internet users.35 It
is likely that this means a number of new users have not adjusted to the always-on nature of broadband Internet connections and the increased security vigilance they require, particularly to protect them from network worms. The growth may also indicate that local ISPs are concentrating their efforts on providing new users with service rather than on security matters such as monitoring worm activity on their networks and blocking ports used by many network worms.
Rank
1
23Top Country
India
United KingdomEgypt
Table 9. Top three countries for viruses, EMEA
Source: Symantec Corporation
The high number of viruses causing potential infections in India can also be attributed to broadband growth.
If the demand for new broadband connections is higher than the ability of ISPs to fulfill them, some users may share their connections through a router or wireless access point with neighbors awaiting service. If these users share files and folders, this can provide an ideal environment for viruses to propagate. For example, the Sality.U virus was one of the top malicious code samples in the EMEA region this period and caused more potential infections in India than any other country in the region. This virus is able to infect executable files it locates on network shares as well as on local computers.
Rank
1
23Top Country
India
United KingdomSpain
Table 10. Top three countries for worms, EMEA
Source: Symantec Corporation
Top ten malicious code samples
The top reported malicious code sample for the EMEA region was the Netsky.P36 mass-mailing worm
(table 11). It was also the second most common malicious code sample in the second half of 2006. This worm was mainly reported to have caused potential infections in Spain and Italy; however it was reported almost four times more in Spain than Italy.
This worm propagates through email and peer-to-peer (P2P) file-sharing networks; however, P2P file sharing
has been outlawed in Spain since 2006.
37 This means it is likely that most, if not all, Spanish users affected
by Netsky.P receive it through email. This may indicate that Spanish ISPs are not performing adequate email gateway antivirus scanning or that users are susceptible to the social engineering techniques used by the worm’s email messages.Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
38 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-112111-3912-99
39 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-042316-2917-99
40 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-121317-1003-99
41 Staged downloaders, sometimes called modular malicious code, are threats that download and install other malicious code onto a compromised computer.
42 For an in-depth discussion of staged downloaders, see the “Staged downloaders” section in volume XII of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report .
43 MPack was one of the notable security threats that emerged in the first half of 2007. It is a commercially available black ma rket attack toolkit. It can launch
exploits for browser and client-side vulnerabilities against users who visit a malicious or compromised Web site. For more info rmation on MPack activity in
Italy, please see: http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/06/italy_under_attack_mpack_gang.html
23Regional
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
67
8
9
10Sample
Netsky.P
Vundo
Zlob
Skintrim
Rontokbro
Sality.URahack.W
Alcra.F
Ecup
Mixor.QType
Worm,
Virus
Trojan
Trojan
Trojan
Worm
VirusWorm
Worm
Worm
WormPropagation
Vectors
SMTP, P2P
N/A
N/A
N/A
SMTP
CIFSCIFS
P2P
P2P
SMTPImpact
Keystroke logger targets
www.e-gold.com
Displays advertisements,
downloads and installs additional threats
Downloads and installs
additional threats
Displays advertisements,
downloads and installs
additional threats
Performs denial of
service attacks
Injects itself into all processes,
consuming system resources
Modifies HTML files
Installs Spybot
Displays a message
Installs PeacommTop
Reporting
Country
Spain
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
France
India
IndiaGermany
United Kingdom
Spain
GermanySecond
Reporting
Country
Italy
Netherlands
Germany
Spain
U.A.E.
U.A.E.Norway
Netherlands
Italy
United Kingdom
Table 11. Top ten malicious code samples
Source: Symantec Corporation
The Vundo,38 Zlob,39 and Skintrim40 Trojans were the second, third, and fourth most frequently reported
malicious code samples in the EMEA region, respectively, in the first half of 2007. These Trojans all download and install additional threats onto the compromised computer, while Vundo and Skintrim also display advertisements.
These staged downloaders are capable of downloading and installing other malicious code onto a
compromised computer.
41 They allow an attacker to change the downloadable component to any type
of threat that suits his or her objectives. As the attacker’s needs change, he or she can change any components that are downloaded by the initial Trojan.
42 The adware components of Vundo and Skintrim
also likely provide revenue to the authors of these threats.
These three Trojans were mainly seen in western European countries in the EMEA region. This indicates
that they may have been installed through Web sites that are frequently visited by users in these countries that were compromised by attackers. Attackers may also place links to Web sites that install these threats on Web forums frequented by users in these countries. This was observed in Italy during this period when several Web sites were compromised by the MPack kit.
43 It is likely that more Trojans installed by exploiting
Web browser vulnerabilities will be observed as ISPs in these countries implement more aggressive email attachment scanning, which will force attackers to find new methods to compromise users.Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
44 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-092311-2608-99
45 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-043010-5416-99&tabid=1
46 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-030112-0714-99
47 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-011917-1403-99
48 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-122917-0740-99
49 A Category 3 threat is a malicious code sample that is considered a moderate threat. It is either currently spreading among com puter users but reasonably
harmless and easy to contain or has not been released into the wild but is potentially dangerous and difficult to contain.
50 Rootkit techniques are used by malicious code to hide their presence on a compromised computer.
51 Overnet is a decentralized peer-to-peer file-sharing protocol. It was taken down due to legal action in September 2006, but due to its decentralized nature,
clients are still able to function.
52 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-020915-2914-99
53 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-032311-1146-99
24Some worms use region-specific subject lines and text in their email messages. For example, the Rontokbro
worm was the fifth most commonly reported malicious code sample in EMEA during the first six months of 2007.
44 It generated email messages that were composed in Indonesian. This worm was seen in India more
than any other country. Similarly, the Sober.AA45 mass-mailing worm used both German and English for its
email messages. It was responsible for a large number of potential infections in EMEA.
Top three new malicious code families
The most prevalent new malicious code family reported in the EMEA region during the first six months of 2007 was the Metajuan Trojan (table 12).
46 Metajuan was also the third most frequently reported new
malicious code family worldwide this period. This Trojan may be installed by other malicious code samples or installed by Web pages that are designed to exploit Internet Explorer vulnerabilities. This means that a computer will be compromised by visiting a malicious Web site rather than receiving the Trojan through email.
Trojans that are installed by malicious Web sites are more difficult to detect than those that propagate
through email messages. This represents a trend in which attackers are relying upon users to retrieve threats instead of sending the threat to potential victims. Once installed, the Trojan contacts a remote Web site and can download and execute other malicious files on the compromised computer. Metajuan may also display advertisements when the user visits certain Web pages.
Regional
Rank
1
23Sample
Metajuan
PeacommKakavexType
Trojan
TrojanVirusPropagation
Vectors
N/A
Spam/
Mixor.Q
File SharingImpact
Downloads other threats
and displays ads
Creates an encrypted peer-to-peer
network and downloads other threats
Steals credit card informationTop
Reporting
Country
United Kingdom
United KingdomUnited Kingdom
Table 12. Top three new malicious code families
Source: Symantec Corporation
In the first half of 2007, the second most widely reported new malicious code family in the EMEA region
was the Peacomm Trojan,47 also known as the Storm Trojan. This Trojan was spammed in high volumes
by the Mixor.Q worm,48 which prompted Symantec to classify it as a Category 3 threat in January 2007.49
When Peacomm installs itself on a computer, it attempts to hide itself using rootkit techniques.50 It also
contains a list of other compromised computers that it uses to build an encrypted network of peers, similar to a bot network, although it uses the Overnet peer-to-peer protocol rather than Internet Relay Chat (IRC) in order to make the network more resilient since there is not a single point of failure.
51
Peacomm listens for commands passed through its peer-to-peer network and downloads and installs other
files, such as the Mespam52 and Abwiz.F Trojans.53 This can be of particular concern, since a Trojan like
Abwiz.F can send confidential information to the remote attacker and relay spam.Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
Kakavex was the third most common new malicious code family in the EMEA region during the first six
months of 2007.54 This virus is notable because it may represent the beginning of an interesting trend.
Traditionally, most viruses simply infected executable files and may have contained some form of damaging payload. However, in addition to infecting files, the Kakavex virus also attempts to steal credit card information. The virus monitors Internet usage on the infected computer and, under certain circumstances, may display a dialogue box prompting the user for their credit card information. The information is then sent to a remote Web site.
This virus shows that identity thieves appear to be expanding into new territory to steal personal
information. In the past they mainly used back doors and Trojans to steal this kind of information; however Kakavex indicates that they are now using viruses to do the same thing, thereby expanding the number of tools available to them for this objective.
Threats to confidential information
Some malicious code programs are designed specifically to expose confidential information that is stored on an infected computer. These threats may expose sensitive data such as system information, confidential files and documents, and/or logon credentials. Some malicious code threats, such as back doors, can give a remote attacker complete control over a compromised computer.
Threats to confidential information are a particular concern because of their potential for use in criminal
activities. With the widespread use of online shopping and Internet banking, compromises of this nature can result in significant financial loss, particularly if credit card information or banking details are exposed.
Within the enterprise, exposure of confidential information can lead to significant data leakage. If it
involves customer-related data—such as credit card information—this can also severely undermine customer confidence as well as violate local laws.
55 Sensitive corporate information could also be leaked
from compromised computers, including financial details, business plans, and proprietary technologies.
In the first six months of 2007, threats to confidential information made up 61 percent of potential
infections by the top 50 malicious code samples in the EMEA region. This is somewhat less than the worldwide percentage of 65 percent.
In the EMEA region, threats that allow remote access, such as back doors, made up 87 percent of potential
infections by confidential information threats, slightly less than the 88 percent that was reported worldwide during this period (figure 3). Remote access threats tend to be favored by attackers since they are able to perform almost any action on the compromised computer.
54 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-011014-1759-99
55 Many countries have implemented their own laws in this regard, such as the UK Data Protection Act, which can be found at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts1998/19980029.htm
25Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
2687%
86%88%
88%
76% 75%
RegionPercentage of exposure by type
Exports email addressesExports user data
Exports system data
Worldwide EMEA79%
80%78%Keystroke logger
Allows remote access
77%
Figure 3. Threats to confidential information by type
Source: Symantec Corporation
Threats that could be used to export user data accounted for 77 percent of potential infections by
confidential-information threats in the EMEA region during this reporting period. Across the Internet as a whole, these threats made up 80 percent of potential infections by threats to confidential information during this period.
Seventy eight percent of confidential-information threats in the EMEA region during the first six months
of 2007 could be used to export system data, compared to 79 percent of the Internet-wide confidential-information threats. These forms of data leakage can enable an attacker to steal a user’s identity or launch further attacks. If the attacker has access to the user’s personal and system data, he or she can use this to craft a targeted social engineering attack that is highly tailored to that particular user.
Threats that had a keystroke-logging component made up 86 percent of confidential information threats
in the EMEA region by potential infection during this six-month period. This is slightly lower than the 88 percent globally. A keystroke logger will record keystrokes on the compromised computer and, in most cases, email the log to the attacker or upload it to a Web site that is under the attacker’s control. This makes it easier for an attacker to gather confidential information from a large number of compromised computers with minimal effort.
Threats that could be used to export email addresses accounted for 75 percent of confidential information
threats in the EMEA region, compared to 76 percent worldwide. This form of information harvesting is often used to compile lists of valid email addresses, which are subsequently sold to spammers.Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
Overall, the percentage of threats to confidential information in the top 50 malicious code samples in the
EMEA region is very close to the worldwide percentage. This shows that attackers in EMEA are not using confidential information threats significantly more or less than across the Internet as a whole.
One threat to personal information in EMEA that wasn’t commonly seen worldwide was the Bifrose back
door.
56 This threat exports documents and system data, sending them to a preconfigured server. Bifrose is
a back door program that originated in Sweden. As Symantec has discussed in previous Internet Security
Threat Reports , attackers are more likely to target their own region than others. This is true for a variety
of reasons, including the fact that organizations in the same region likely have a higher profile to local attackers. It may also be related to having a shared language.
Rustock.B
57 was another confidential information threat that was more commonly seen in the EMEA region
than worldwide. Once a user is infected with this Trojan, it uses advanced rootkit techniques to hide itself.58
It then uses the infected computer as a platform to send “pump and dump” stock spam email messages.
Rustock.B is believed to have originated in Russia, so its higher position in EMEA rankings may be explained
the same way as Bifrose. Trojans that spread manually will have higher infection rates locally.
Propagation mechanisms
Worms and viruses use various means to transfer themselves, or propagate, from one computer to another. These are collectively referred to as propagation mechanisms. Propagation mechanisms can include a number of different vectors, such as Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP), Common Internet File System (CIFS),
59 peer-to-peer services (P2P), and remotely exploitable vulnerabilities. Some malicious code may
even use other malicious code as a propagation vector by locating a computer that has been compromised by a back door server and using it to upload and install itself.
This metric will discuss some of the propagation mechanisms used by malicious code samples reported to
Symantec during the first six months of 2007. It should be noted that many malicious code samples employ multiple propagation mechanisms in an effort to increase the probability of successful propagation. As a result, cumulative percentages included in this discussion may exceed 100 percent.
Due to some methodological changes that Symantec made for this reporting period, this volume of the
Internet Security Threat Report is able to examine propagation mechanisms with increased specificity. For
example, where possible, the specific peer-to-peer protocols employed as propagation mechanisms have been identified. This will allow administrators to look at more specific port blocking and protocol filtering based upon the specific propagation mechanisms being discussed. It is also important to note that due to this change, any comparisons to previous reporting periods would not be valid; therefore, they have not been presented here.
Email attachments were used by 49 percent of the propagating malicious code samples detected in
the EMEA region during this period, making it the most common propagation mechanism in the region (table 13). It also accounted for 46 percent of the volume of the propagating samples worldwide. Propagation through email attachments is thus very common in both EMEA and worldwide. This is not surprising, as email is one of the most widely employed applications on the Internet and is used by both corporate and home users.
56 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-101214-5358-99
57 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-070513-1305-99
58 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2006/06/raising_the_bar_rustocka_advan.html
59 Common Internet File Sharing (CIFS) is a protocol that defines a standard for remote file access. CIFS allows applications to o pen and share files across the Internet.
27Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
Regional
Rank
1
234567
8
9
10Propagation Mechanism
File Transfer/Email Attachment
File Sharing/Peer-to-PeerRemotely Exploitable VulnerabilityFile Sharing/Peer-to-Peer/KazaaFile Sharing/ExecutablesFile Transfer/CIFSFile Sharing/Peer-to-Peer/Morpheus
File Sharing/Peer-to-Peer/eDonkey
Back door/Kuang2
Back door/SubSevenRegional Percentage
of Threats
49%
25%21%21%20%18%17%
17%
3%
3%Worldwide Percentage
of Threats
46%
22%18%18%22%24%15%
15%
3%
3%
Table 13. Propagation mechanisms
Source: Symantec Corporation
Propagation through email attachments accounts for a slightly higher percentage of propagating malicious
code in EMEA than it does worldwide. This may be caused by threats targeted specifically towards this region, such as the Sober.AA
60 mass-mailing worm. Sober.AA is present in the top 50 malicious code
samples in EMEA, but not worldwide. Emails from Sober.AA are sent in English and German.61 This has
proven an effective propagation technique, particularly as Germany has one of the highest populations of Internet users in EMEA. By tailoring the email messages to specific regions, especially to regions with high populations or to regions where mass-mailing worms are less common, a malicious code author can cause more infections than one who composes emails exclusively in English.
To limit the propagation of these threats, administrators should ensure that all email attachments are
scanned at the gateway. Additionally, all executable files originating from external sources, such as email attachments or downloaded from Web sites should be treated as suspicious. All executable files should be checked by antivirus scanners using the most current definitions.
The peer-to-peer propagation vector was used by 25 percent of malicious code threats in the EMEA region
to propagate in the first half of 2007, three percent more than the Internet-wide total. The most common P2P protocols used to propagate were Kazaa, at 21 percent, Morpheus, at 17 percent, and eDonkey, also at 17 percent. The higher ranking of P2P propagation in EMEA than worldwide is mostly due to two pieces of malicious code: the Ecup worm
62 and the Fontra virus.63
Ecup propagates by copying itself to folders of various file-sharing programs, on both English and Spanish
versions of Windows, under a variety of filenames. Because it uses file and folder paths used to install Spanish versions of software in addition to those used in English software, Ecup, like Sober.AA, takes advantage of multiple languages to spread more easily on non-English systems. Because it uses both English and Spanish paths, this worm can be spread by English and Spanish users, thereby increasing the number of potential infections.
28
60 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-043010-5416-99
61 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-043010-5416-99
62 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-053111-0818-99
63 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-051116-5811-99Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
Fontra propagates by infecting files that are already shared by various file-sharing programs. By infecting
the files a user already has, Fontra will likely be less auspicious to the eventual targets that download the infected files. Many users’ files are likely language-specific. For example, software and movies are typically tailored to a language. As such, this type of virus will initially be limited to infecting people who are downloading programs in that language. For example, a French user will typically download French programs, since that’s their native language. Since the majority of Fontra’s infections were in EMEA, it is likely that it originated in an EMEA country.
Malicious code that propagates by remotely exploitable vulnerabilities made up 21 percent of malicious
code that propagated in the EMEA region in the first half of 2007. By comparison, remotely exploitable vulnerabilities were used by 18 percent of worldwide reports of malicious code that propagates.
Malicious code that spreads through this mechanism will exploit vulnerabilities in remotely accessible
services and applications, such as a Web browser, to spread to new computers. The exploitation of remote vulnerabilities was used by two of the top 50 malicious code samples detected in EMEA, the Licum worm
64
and the Spybot worm.65
Users and administrators can protect against malicious code that propagates by exploiting vulnerabilities
by using a firewall to block incoming connections on any ports that don’t require external access. Additionally, the potential for infection by this type of attack can be reduced by keeping software up-to-date or by using an IPS system to block improperly formed traffic at the network boundary.
Propagation by CIFS was used by 18 percent of malicious code in EMEA that propagates, significantly
lower than 24 percent of malicious code worldwide. The majority of infections by CIFS occurred in the Asia-Pacific/Japan (APJ) region during this period, inflating the worldwide number significantly. For more discussion on propagation over CIFS in APJ, please see the “Propagation mechanisms” discussion in the APJ Internet Security Threat Report .
29
64 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-071316-2523-99
65 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2003-053013-5943-99Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
30Phishing Trends
Phishing is an attempt by a third party to solicit confidential information from an individual, group, or
organization, often for financial gain. Phishers are groups or individuals who attempt to trick users into disclosing personal data, such as credit card numbers, online banking credentials, and other sensitive information. They may then use the information to commit fraudulent acts. This section of the Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report will discuss phishing activity that Symantec detected in the EMEA
region between January 1 and June 30, 2007.
The data provided in this section is based on statistics derived from the Symantec Probe Network, which
consists of over two million decoy email accounts that attract email messages from 20 different countries around the world. The main purpose of the network is to attract spam, phishing, viruses, and other email-borne threats. It encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises around the world, attracting email that is representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 million mailboxes. The Probe Network consists of previously used email addresses as well as email accounts that have been generated solely to be used as probes.
This section of the EMEA Internet Security Threat Report will discuss:
• Top countries hosting phishing Web sites
• Top cities hosting phishing Web sites• Phishing—prevention and mitigation
Top countries hosting phishing Web sites
A phishing Web site is a site that is designed to mimic the legitimate Web site of the company whose brand is being spoofed, often an online bank or e-commerce retailer. In many cases, they are set up by the attacker to capture a victim’s authentication information or other personal identification information, which can subsequently be used in identity theft or other fraudulent activity.
This section of the Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report will discuss the top countries and cities
in which phishing sites are hosted. This data is a snapshot in time and, therefore, does not have insight into changes in the locations of certain phishing sites throughout the period. It should also be noted that because a phishing Web site is hosted in a certain country, this does not mean that the attacker is located in the same country. However, it is likely that a phishing site will be located in the same country as the intended victims of the attack.
During the first six months of 2007, Germany was home to the highest percentage of phishing Web sites
in EMEA (table 14) with 22 percent of the region’s total. It was the second highest country in the world for phishing Web sites after the United States. The proportion of phishing sites hosted in Germany has declined since the last six months of 2006 when 32 percent of phishing Web sites in the region were located there. This may indicate a shift towards the use of phishing Trojans in Germany.
66 These Trojans
are already widely used in Brazil as evidenced by the Bancos67 and Banpaes68 information-stealing Trojans.
These Trojans steal users’ online banking information by presenting fake login pages when the users navigate to their bank’s Web site, so there are not any phishing Web sites associated with them.
66 http://www.bsi.de/english/publications/securitysituation/Lagebericht_2007_englisch.pdf
67 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2003-071710-2826-99
68 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2003-101416-4837-99Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
31 69 http://www.webhosting.info/webhosts/globalstats/
70 http://www.technologieregion-karlsruhe.de/WirtschaftsRegion/kommunikation.en
71 http://www.webhosting.info/webhosts/tophosts/Country/DERegional
Rank
1
234567
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
245387
9
13
6Country
Germany
United KingdomNetherlandsRussiaFrancePolandItaly
Spain
Czech Republic
DenmarkPrevious
Regional
Percentage
32%
9%5%5%8%3%4%
3%
2%
4%Regional
Percentage
22%
9%9%8%8%4%4%
4%
3%
3%Worldwide
Percentage
6%
3%2%2%2%1%1%
1%
1%
1%Previous
Worldwide
Percentage
11%
3%2%2%3%1%1%
1%
1%
1%
Table 14. Top countries hosting phishing Web sites
Source: Symantec Corporation
The United Kingdom had the second highest number of phishing Web sites in the EMEA region in this
reporting period. The proportion of phishing sites hosted in the United Kingdom has remained steady since last reporting period. The United Kingdom is an affluent country with a large Internet population and many small Web-hosting companies. Both of these factors make the country a good platform for hosting phishing Web sites.
Between January 1 and June 30, 2007, the Netherlands had the third highest number of phishing Web
sites in the EMEA region, with nine percent of the total. This is a significant increase from the five percent of phishing sites hosted there in the previous period. The Netherlands was not in the top ten countries in EMEA for bot-infected computers during this period, suggesting that most of the phishing sites are hosted through Web-hosting companies.
There are several major ISPs in the Netherlands that allow the hosting of Web sites. There are also over
a thousand Web-hosting companies in the Netherlands that could be used to illicitly host phishing Web sites.
69 If a phishing Web site is hosted on a large provider, it may take days for the provider to discover
the illegal site and shut the site down.
Top cities hosting phishing Web sites
Karlsruhe, Germany was the city with the most phishing Web sites in the EMEA region in the first six months of 2007 (table 15). This is unchanged from last period. Karlsruhe is referred to as the “Internet capital of Germany,”
70 as there are a number of Internet companies located there, and it is home to some
of the largest Web-hosting providers in Germany.71 As Germany hosted the highest number of phishing
Web sites in the region during this reporting period, it is logical that Karlsruhe—and the various Internet providers in the city—should host a significant number of them.Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
32Regional
Rank
1
234567
8
9
10Previous
Regional Rank
1
4327
13
5
12
19
6Country
Germany
RussiaUnited KingdomFranceNetherlandsRomaniaGermany
Denmark
Czech Republic
FranceCity
Karlsruhe
MoscowLondonParisAmsterdamBucharestMunich
Copenhagen
Prague
Roubaix
Table 15. Top cities by phishing Web sites
Source: Symantec Corporation
Moscow hosted the second most phishing Web sites in the EMEA region during this reporting period. This is
a jump from last period when Moscow was ranked fourth in EMEA in this category. Russia has recently seen a large increase in broadband usage, posting a 55 percent increase from the first quarter of 2006 to the first quarter of 2007.
72
London was host to the third most phishing Web sites in the EMEA region. London is home to many
small Web-hosting companies and is the third highest bot-infected city in EMEA. Bot-infected computers are frequently used to host phishing Web sites by downloading other threats. This means that phishing Web sites are probably hosted on both compromised machines and with small Web-hosting companies in London.
Using a small Web-hosting company to host a phishing site can be advantageous for an attacker. These
companies may not have the same amount of security resources as larger Web-hosting companies. As a result, they may not have adequate security measures in place to prevent, detect, or remove the illicit hosting of phishing Web sites.
Phishing—prevention and mitigation
Symantec recommends that enterprise users protect themselves against phishing threats by filtering email at the server level through the mail transfer agent (MTA). Although this will likely remain the primary point of filtering for phishing, organizations can also use IP-based filtering upstream, as well as HTTP filtering.
DNS block lists also offer protection against potential phishing emails.
73 Organizations could also consider
using domain-level or email authentication in order to verify the actual origin of an email message. This can protect against phishers who are spoofing email domains.
74
To protect against potential phishing activity, administrators should always follow Symantec best practices
as outlined in Appendix A of this report. Symantec also recommends that organizations educate their end users about phishing.
75 They should also keep their employees notified of the latest phishing attacks and
how to avoid falling victim to them, as well as provide a means to report suspected phishing sites.76
72 http://point-topic.com
73 A DNS block list (sometimes referred to as a black list) is simply a list of IP addresses that are known to send unwanted email traffic. It is used by email software to
either allow or reject email coming from IP addresses on the list.
74 Spoofing refers to instances where phishers forge the “From:” line of an email message using the domain of the entity they are targeting with the phishing attempt.
75 For instance the United States Federal Trade Commission has published some basic guidelines on how to avoid phishing. They are available at:
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/alt127.htm
76 A good resource for information on the latest phishing threats can be found at: http://www.antiphishing.orgSymantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
33Organizations can also employ Web server log monitoring to track if and when complete downloads of their
Web sites, logos, and images are occurring. Such activity may indicate that someone is using the legitimate Web site to create an illegitimate Web site that could be used for phishing.
Organizations can detect phishing attacks that use spoofing by monitoring non-deliverable email addresses
or bounced email that is returned to non-existent users. They should also monitor the purchasing of cousin domain names by other entities to identify purchases that could be used to spoof their corporate domains.
77
So-called typo domains and homographic domains should also be monitored.78 This can be done with the
help of companies that specialize in domain monitoring; some registrars also provide this service.
The use of antiphishing toolbars and components in Web browsers can also help protect users from
phishing attacks. These measures notify the user if a Web page being visited does not appear to be legitimate. This way, even if a phishing email reaches a user’s inbox, the user can still be alerted to the potential threat.
End users should follow best security practices, as outlined in Appendix A of this report. They should use
an antiphishing solution. As some phishing attacks may use spyware and/or keystroke loggers, Symantec advises end users to use antivirus software, antispam software, firewalls, toolbar blockers, and other software detection methods.
Symantec also advises end users to never disclose any confidential personal or financial information unless
and until they can confirm that any request for such information is legitimate.
Users should review bank, credit card, and credit information frequently. This can provide information
on any irregular activities. For further information, the Internet Fraud Complaint Center (IFCC) has also released a set of guidelines on how to avoid Internet-related scams.
79 Additionally, network administrators
can review Web proxy logs to determine if any users have visited known phishing sites.
77 The term cousin domain refers to domain names that include some of the key words of an organization’s domain or brand name; for example, for the
corporate domain “bigbank.com” cousin domains could include “bigbank-alerts.com”, ”big-bank-security.com”, and so on.
78 Typo domains are domain names that use common misspellings of a legitimate domain name, for example the domain “symatnec.com” w ould be a typo
domain for “symantec.com”. A homographic domain name uses numbers that look similar to letters in the domain name, for example the character for the
number “1” can look like the letter “l”.
79 http://www.fbi.gov/majcases/fraud/internetschemes.htmSymantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
34Spam Trends
Spam is usually defined as junk or unsolicited email sent by a third party. While it is certainly an annoyance
to users and administrators, spam is also a serious security concern as it can be used to deliver Trojans, viruses, and phishing attempts. It could also cause a loss of service or degradation in the performance of network resources and email gateways. This section of the EMEA Internet Security Threat Report will discuss
developments in spam activity in the EMEA region between January 1 and June 30, 2007.
The data used in this analysis is based on data returned from the Symantec Probe Network as well as data
gathered from a statistical sampling of the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base. Specifically, statistics are gathered from enterprise customers’ Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam™ servers that receive more than 1,000 email messages per day. This removes the smaller data samples (that is, smaller customers and test servers), thereby allowing for a more accurate representation of data.
The Symantec Probe Network consists of millions of decoy email addresses that are configured to attract
a large stream of spam attacks. An attack can consist of one or more messages. The goal of the Probe Network is to simulate a wide variety of Internet email users, thereby attracting a stream of traffic that is representative of spam activity across the Internet as a whole. For this reason, it is continuously optimized in order to attract new varieties of spam attacks. This is accomplished through internal production changes that are made to the network, which thus affect the number of new spam attacks it receives as a whole.
This section of the Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report will explore the following:
• Top ten countries of spam origin
• Top spam zombie countries and cities • Spam as a percentage of all email by country
Top ten countries of spam origin
This section will discuss the top ten countries of spam origin in the EMEA region. The nature of spam makes it difficult to identify the location of people who are sending spam. Many spammers try to redirect attention away from their actual geographic location. In an attempt to bypass DNS block lists, they build coordinated networks of bot-infected computers, which allow them to send spam from sites that are distant from their physical location. Following this logic, the region from which the spam originates may not correspond with the region in which the spammers are located.
This discussion is based on data gathered by customer installations of Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam. This
data includes the originating server’s IP address, against which frequency statistics are summarized. Each IP address is mapped to a specific country and charted over time.
The highest source of spam in EMEA this period was a collection of undetermined European countries
(table 16). Symantec determines the country of origin of spam by identifying the owner of the IP address from which the spam was sent and then determining the country in which that owner—typically an ISP—operates. However, some ISPs in the EU operate in more than one country. As a result, the country of origin cannot be definitively determined.Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
35Regional
Rank
1
2
345
6
7
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
2
569
3
8
7
10
4Country
Undetermined
European Countries
United KingdomPoland
GermanySwitzerland
France
Italy
Belgium
Russia
SpainPrevious
Regional
Percentage
20%
10%
8%7%4%
9%
4%
6%
3%
8%Regional
Percentage
21%
12%
8%7%6%
5%
5%
5%
5%
4%Previous
Worldwide
Percentage
7%
3%
3%2%1%
3%
1%
2%
1%
3%Percent of
Email That
is Spam
83%
43%
86%64%66%
60%
75%
60%
81%
82%Previous
Percent of
Email That
is Spam
81%
42%
87%66%56%
67%
74%
61%
68%
84%Worldwide
Percentage
7%
4%
3%2%2%
2%
2%
2%
2%
1%
Table 16. Top ten countries of spam origin, EMEA region
Source: Symantec Corporation
The second highest volume of spam detected being sent from the EMEA region during this period
originated in the United Kingdom, which accounted for 12 percent of the total. This is an increase over last period when the United Kingdom was still the top country but contributed only 10 percent of the spam coming from EMEA.
Spam can be sent using a compromised computer by either using it as a spam server, which is known
as a spam zombie, or by using it to send mail through legitimate mail servers hosted by ISPs or other organizations using the computer user’s email account. When a country has numerous legitimate mail servers, it is likely that many of them are used to surreptitiously send spam. This is especially true if any of the servers are misconfigured and can be used as open relays. Since the United Kingdom had only the eighth most spam zombies in the EMEA region during this period, it is likely that a large amount of the spam from the United Kingdom is sent through compromised legitimate mail servers.
English is by far the most popular language used in spam. Sixty percent of all spam detected worldwide
during this period was composed in English, down from 65 percent in the previous reporting period. Finely tuned spam filters in English-speaking countries are sensitive to both the country of origin of a spam message and its language. Because of this, an English language spam directed at an English-speaking country is less likely to be detected as spam if it is coming from another English-speaking country than if it comes from a place that is less likely to send English-language mail.
Poland had the third highest volume of spam in the EMEA region in the first six months of 2007,
accounting for eight percent of the region’s total. Poland produced the same level of spam as last period but moved into third place in the region because of sharply reduced levels of spam from France and Spain.
Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
36Poland experienced a 46 percent increase in broadband connectivity from the first quarter of 2006 to the
first quarter of 2007.80 This likely created the opportunity for many compromised computers that could be
used as spam zombies, particularly as Poland was ranked second in this region for this category. A large Internet service provider has been identified as the source of many of the spam messages originating from Poland.
France and Spain both experienced significant drops in their levels of spam over the previous six months.
During this period, spam zombies in both countries dropped by a comparable amount, which likely contributed to the declining levels of spam.
Top spam zombie countries and cities
A spam zombie is a computer infected with a bot or some other malicious code that allows email messages to be relayed. Between January 1 and June 30, 2007, Germany had more spam zombies than any other EMEA country, with 17 percent of the regional total (table 17). This is similar to the last six months of 2006, when Germany hosted 16 percent of spam zombies in EMEA and was also the top-ranked EMEA country. The only country with more spam zombies in the world during this period was the United States.
Germany likely ranks high on the list because it has the highest number of broadband-connected
computers in the region.
81 Broadband-connected computers make ideal spam zombies because they are
always connected to the Internet and have enough bandwidth to send many spam messages at once. Germany is also home to the second most bot-infected computers in the region, many of which are probably used to send spam.
Regional
Rank
1
234567
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
45263
10
7
9
8Country
Germany
PolandItalyFranceTurkeySpainIndia
Israel
Russia
United KingdomPrevious
Regional
Percentage
16%
9%8%
14%
6%
13%
4%
5%
4%
5%Regional
Percentage
17%
11%10%
9%6%
6%6%
6%
5%
4%Previous
Worldwide
Percentage
8%
5%4%7%3%7%2%
3%
2%
3%Worldwide
Percentage
9%
6%5%5%3%3%3%
3%
3%
2%
Table 17. Top spam zombie countries
Source: Symantec Corporation
Poland accounted for the second most spam zombies in the EMEA region with 11 percent. This is an
increase from the last six months of 2006, when Poland accounted for nine percent of the region’s spam zombies and was the fourth-ranked country in the region.
80 http://www.point-topic.com
81 http://www.point-topic.comSymantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
37This increase is likely due to the rapid growth of broadband connectivity in Poland. As mentioned above,
broadband-connected computers make ideal spam zombies because, often, they are always connected to the Internet and have enough bandwidth to send many spam messages at once. Further, in countries in which rapid expansion of connectivity is taking place, many users who connected to the Internet are not well informed about computer security practices. These users’ computers are more likely to be infected by a bot or other malicious code and thus used as spam zombies. Further, once infected, these machines are likely to remain undetected for extended periods of time.
Italy had the third highest number of spam zombies in the EMEA region during the first half of 2007, with
10 percent of the region’s total. This is an increase from last period when Italy only accounted for eight percent of the region’s spam zombies. This increase is likely related to the June 2007 MPack attack in Italy, which was previously discussed in the “Top ten malicious code samples” section of this report. There is a high likelihood that many computers that were lured to MPack servers in this attack had Trojans installed on them that relay spam.
Madrid had the highest number of spam zombies of any city in the EMEA region (table 18). This city has
maintained its position at the top of this list despite dropping numbers of spam zombies in Spain. Most Spanish users are connected to the Internet through the country’s dominant ISP, which is located in Madrid. This means that many of the actual spam zombie computers may be in other cities close to Madrid, but the centralized location of the ISP makes it appear as though they are located within that city.
Regional
Rank
1
234567
8
9
10Previous
Regional Rank
1
486
N/A
3
13
10
15
21Country
Spain
IsraelItalyRussiaTurkeyTurkeyHungary
Poland
Poland
PolandCity
Madrid
Petah TiqwaMilanMoscowIstanbulAnkaraBudapest
Warsaw
Katowice
Poznan
Table 18. Top spam zombie cities
Source: Symantec Corporation
Petah Tiqwa had the second highest number of spam zombies in the EMEA region. Despite its small
population, Petah Tiqwa is home to a number of large ISPs that serve the surrounding areas. Just like in Madrid, many of the actual spam zombie computers may be in other cities close to Petah Tiqwa, but the location of the ISP makes it appear as though they are located within that city. As was discussed in the “Bot-infected computers by city” section of this report, Petah Tiqwa had the second highest number of bot-infected computers in the EMEA region during this period. Many of these bots were likely used as spam zombies.Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
82 Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam only gathers data at the SMTP layer and not at the network layer, where DNS block lists typicall y operate. This is because SMTP-
layer spam filtering is more accurate than network-layer filtering and is able to block spam missed at the network layer. Netwo rk-layer filtering takes place before
email reaches the enterprise mail server. As a result, data from the SMTP layer is a more accurate reflection of the impact of spam on the mail server itself.
83 http://www.mt.gov.pl/article/english/press_releases/article.php/id_art/9d754fd47e6dc6f7490ade74c1aeefcf
38Milan had the third highest number of spam zombies of EMEA cities during this period. Milan was fourth
in the region for bots, indicating that many of the bots located in Milan are used for sending spam rather than for attacks. The increase in Milan’s ranking may indicate that many of the spam-sending Trojans detected in Italy in this period could be located there.
Spam as a percentage of all email by country
Symantec calculates the percentage of email that is spam by dividing the total number of emails that are identified as spam by Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam filters by the total of the inbound email messages received by the sample customer base.
82 Between January 1 and June 30, 2007, spam made up 61 percent
of all monitored email traffic across the Internet as a whole. In the EMEA region alone, spam made up 67 percent of all monitored email traffic during this reporting period.
Of the top 20 email-producing countries in the EMEA region, the top five countries according to the
percent of spam by volume are listed in table 19. It is important to note that these percentages are not related to the total volume of spam produced by these countries, but are instead a representation of the percentage of all email originating from each country that Symantec has identified as spam.
Percent
86%
82%82%81%75%Previous
Percent
87%
84%81%68%74%Country
Poland
SpainHungaryRussiaItaly
Table 19. Top five EMEA countries by percentage of spam
Source: Symantec Corporation
Of the top 20 email-producing countries in the EMEA region, Poland produced the highest percentage
of spam, with 86 percent. Poland has a history of high percentages of spam. It was the second highest country in EMEA in the previous six-month when 87 percent of email was spam. Since that time, no noteworthy changes have been made to address the issue. New Polish antispam regulations could have an effect on this percentage but they did not come into effect until July 3, 2007, at which time this report was already in production.
83
Spain had the second highest percentage of spam; 82 percent of all mail originating there was classified
as spam. Hungary also had a spam percentage of 82 percent, making it the third highest spam-producing country in the EMEA region. Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
39Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices
Enterprise Best Practices
1. Employ defense-in-depth strategies, which emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive
defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protection method. This should include the deployment of regularly updated antivirus, firewalls, intrusion detection, and intrusion protection systems on client systems.
2. Turn off and remove services that are not needed.3. If malicious code or some other threat exploits one or more network services, disable or block access
to those services until a patch is applied.
4. Always keep patch levels up-to-date, especially on computers that host public services and are
accessible through the firewall, such as HTTP, FTP, mail, and DNS services.
5. Consider implementing network compliance solutions that will help keep infected mobile users out
of the network (and disinfect them before rejoining the network).
6. Enforce an effective password policy.7. Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments that are commonly
used to spread viruses, such as .VBS, .BAT, .EXE, .PIF, and .SCR files.
8. Isolate infected computers quickly to prevent the risk of further infection within the organization.
Perform a forensic analysis and restore the computers using trusted media.
9. Train employees to not open attachments unless they are expected and come from a known and trusted
source, and to not execute software that is downloaded from the Internet unless it has been scanned for viruses.
10. Ensure that emergency response procedures are in place. This includes having a backup-and-restore
solution in place in order to restore lost or compromised data in the event of successful attack or catastrophic data loss.
11. Educate management on security budgeting needs.12. Test security to ensure that adequate controls are in place.13. Be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file-
sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software. Clicking on links and/or attachments in email messages (or IM messages) may also expose computers to unnecessary risks. Ensure that only applications approved by the organization are deployed on desktop computers.Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
40Consumer Best Practices
1. Consumers should use an Internet security solution that combines antivirus, firewall, intrusion
detection, and vulnerability management for maximum protection against malicious code and other threats.
2. Consumers should ensure that security patches are up-to-date and that they are applied to all
vulnerable applications in a timely manner.
3. Consumers should ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers, and should change them
often. Passwords should not consist of words from the dictionary.
4. Consumers should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is
expected and the purpose of the attachment is known.
5. Consumers should keep virus definitions updated regularly. By deploying the latest virus definitions,
consumers can protect their computers against the latest viruses known to be spreading in the wild.
6. Consumers should routinely check to see if their operating system is vulnerable to threats by using
Symantec Security Check at www.symantec.com/securitycheck.
7. Consumers should deploy an antiphishing solution. They should never disclose any confidential
personal or financial information unless and until they can confirm that any request for such information is legitimate.
8. Consumers can get involved in fighting cybercrime by tracking and reporting intruders. With Symantec
Security Check’s tracing service, users can quickly identify the location of potential hackers and forward the information to the attacker’s ISP or local police.
9. Consumers should be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with
the installation of file-sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software. Clicking on links and/or attachments in email messages (or IM messages) may also expose computers to unnecessary risks. Ensure that only applications approved by the organization are deployed on desktop computers.
10. Some security risks can be installed after an end user has accepted the end-user license agreement
(EULA), or as a consequence of that acceptance. Consumers should read EULAs carefully and understand all terms before agreeing to them.
11. Consumers should beware of programs that flash ads in the user interface. Many spyware programs
track how users respond to these ads, and their presence is a red flag. When users see ads in a program’s user interface, they may be looking at a piece of spyware.Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology
Attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec Global
Intelligence Network, which includes the Symantec DeepSight Threat Management System, Symantec Managed Security Services, and the Symantec Honeypot Network. Symantec combines data derived from these sources for analysis.
Attack definitions
In order to avoid ambiguity with the findings presented in this discussion, Symantec’s methodology for identifying various forms of attack activity is outlined clearly below. This methodology is applied consistently throughout our monitoring and analysis. The first step in analyzing attack activity is to define precisely what an attack is. Attacks are individual instances of malicious network activity. Attacks consist of one IDS or firewall alert that is indicative of a single attack action.
Explanation of research inquiries
This section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to gather and analyze the data and statistics in this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, the following investigations warranted additional detail.
Denial of service attacks
Although there are numerous methods for carrying out denial of service (DoS) attacks, Symantec derives this metric by measuring DoS attacks that are carried out by flooding a target with SYN requests. These are often referred to as SYN flood attacks. This type of attack works by overwhelming a target with SYN requests and not completing the initial request, which thus prevents other valid requests from being processed.
In many cases, SYN requests with forged IP addresses are sent to a target, allowing a single attacking
computer to initiate multiple connections, resulting in unsolicited traffic, known as backscatter, being sent to other computers on the Internet. This backscatter is used to derive the number of DoS attacks observed throughout the reporting period. Although the values Symantec derives from this metric will not identify all DoS attacks carried out, it will highlight DoS attack trends.
To determine the countries targeted by DoS attacks, Symantec cross-references the target IP addresses
of every attack with several third-party, subscription-based databases that link the geographic location of systems to source IP addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error.
Sectors targeted by DoS attacks were identified using the same methodology as targeted countries.
However, in this case, attackers who were considered were those carrying out a set of DoS attacks that were detected by IDS and IPS software.
41Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
42Bot-infected computers
Symantec identifies bots based on coordinated scanning and attack behavior observed in network traffic.
For an attacking computer to be considered to be participating in this coordinated scanning and attacking, it must fit into that pattern to the exclusion of any other activity. This behavioral matching will not catch every bot network computer, and may identify other malicious code or individual attackers behaving in a similarly coordinated way as a bot network. This behavioral matching will, however, identify many of the most coordinated and aggressive bot-infected computers and will give insight into the population trends of bot network computers, including those that are considered to be actively working in a well coordinated and aggressive fashion at some point in time during the reporting period.
This metric explores the number of active bot-infected computers that the Symantec Global Intelligence
Network has detected and identified during the first six months of 2007. Identification is carried out on an individual basis by analyzing attack and scanning patterns. Computers generating attack patterns that show a high degree of coordination are considered to be bot-infected computers.
As a consequence of this, Symantec does not identify all bot-infected computers, but only those that are
actively working in a well coordinated and aggressive fashion. Given Symantec’s extensive and globally distributed sensor base, it is reasonable to assume that the bot activities discussed here are representative of worldwide bot trends, and can thus provide an understanding of current bot activity across the Internet as a whole.
Bot-infected computers by countries and cities
This metric is based on the same data as the “Bot-infected computers” discussion of the “Attacks Trends” section of the report. Symantec cross-references the IP addresses of every identified bot-infected computer with several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic location of systems to IP addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error. Only cities that can be determined with a confidence rating of at least four out of five are included for consideration. The data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of bot-infected computers.
Lifespan of bot-infected computers
Using previously identified bot-infected computers, Symantec determined the life span of these infections by measuring the time between their first and last detected activity. However, to ensure that the lifespan reflects a continuous bot infection, if the identified computer was inactive for 30 days or longer it was considered to be disinfected. As such, any further bot-like activity would be considered a new infection.
Top originating countries
Symantec identifies the national sources of attacks by automatically cross-referencing source IP addresses of every attacking IP with several third-party, subscription-based databases that link the geographic location of systems to source IP addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error. Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix C—Malicious Code Trends Methodology
The trends in the “Malicious Code Trends” section are based on statistics from malicious code samples
reported to Symantec for analysis. Symantec gathers data from over 120 million client, server, and gateway systems that have deployed Symantec’s antivirus products in both consumer and corporate environments. The Symantec Digital Immune System and Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting process.
Observations in the “Malicious Code Trends” section are based on empirical data and expert analysis of
this data. The data and analysis draw primarily from two databases described below.
Infection database
To help detect and eradicate computer viruses, Symantec developed the Symantec AntiVirus™ Research Automation (SARA) technology. Symantec uses this technology to analyze, replicate, and define a large subset of the most common computer viruses that are quarantined by Symantec AntiVirus customers.
On average, SARA receives hundreds of thousands of suspect files daily from both enterprise and
individual consumers located throughout the world. Symantec then analyzes these suspect files, matching them with virus definitions. An analysis of this aggregate data set provides statistics on infection rates for different types of malicious code.
Malicious code database
In addition to infection data, Symantec Security Response analyzes and documents attributes for each new form of malicious code that emerges both in the wild and in a “zoo” (or controlled laboratory) environment. Descriptive records of new forms of malicious code are then entered into a database for future reference. For this report, a historical trend analysis was performed on this database to identify, assess, and discuss any possible trends, such as the use of different infection vectors and the frequency of various types of payloads.
In some cases, Symantec antivirus products may initially detect new malicious code heuristically or by
generic signatures. These may later be reclassified and given unique detections. Because of this, there may be slight variance in the presentation of the same data set from one volume of the Internet Security Threat
Report to the next.
Geographic location of malicious code instances
Several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic locations of systems to IP
addresses are used along with proprietary Symantec technology to determine the location of computers reporting malicious code instances. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error. The data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of malicious code instances.
43Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
44Appendix D—Phishing Trends Methodology
Phishing attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec Probe
Network. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam data is assessed to gauge the growth in phishing attempts as well as the percentage of Internet mail that is determined to be phishing attempts. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data consists of statistics reported back from customer installations that provide feedback about the detection behaviors of antifraud filters as well as the overall volume of mail being processed.
It should be noted that different monitoring organizations use different methods to track phishing
attempts. Some groups may identify and count unique phishing messages based solely on specific content items such as subject headers or URLs. These varied methods can often lead to differences in the number of phishing attempts reported by different organizations.
Phishing attempt definition
The Symantec Probe Network is a system of over two million decoy accounts that attract email messages from 20 different countries around the world. It encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises and attracts email samples that are representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 million mailboxes. The Probe Network covers countries in the Americas, Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia/Oceania.
The Symantec Probe Network data is used to track the growth in new phishing activity. A phishing attempt
is a group of email messages with similar properties, such as headers and content, that are sent to unique users. The messages attempt to gain confidential and personal information from online users.
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam software reports statistics to Symantec Security Response that indicate
messages processed, messages filtered, and filter-specific data. Symantec has classified different filters so that spam statistics and phishing statistics can be determined separately. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data is used to identify general trends in phishing email messages.
Top countries and cities hosting phishing Web sites
The data for this section is determined by gathering links in phishing email messages and cross-referencing the addresses with several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic locations of systems to IP addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error. The data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of phishing Web sites.Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
45Appendix E—Spam Trends Methodology
The Symantec Probe Network is a system of over two million decoy accounts that attract email messages
from 20 different countries around the world. It encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises and attracts email samples that are representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 million mailboxes. The Probe Network includes accounts in countries in the Americas, Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia/Oceania.
Spam trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from both the Symantec Probe
Network as well as Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam software reports statistics to the Brightmail Logistical Operations Center (BLOC) indicating messages processed, messages filtered, and filter-specific data.
Symantec has classified different filters so that spam statistics and phishing statistics can be determined
separately. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data includes data reported back from customer installations providing feedback from antispam filters as well as overall mail volume being processed.
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam only gathers data at the SMTP layer and not the network layer, where DNS
block lists typically operate. This is because SMTP-layer spam filtering is more accurate than network-layer filtering and is able to block spam missed at the network layer. Network layer-filtering takes place before email reaches the enterprise mail server. As a result, data from the SMTP layer is a more accurate reflection of the impact of spam on the mail server itself.
Sample set normalization
Due to the numerous variables influencing a company’s spam activity, Symantec focuses on identifying spam activity and growth projections with Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data from enterprise customer installations having more than 1,000 total messages per day. This normalization yields a more accurate summary of Internet spam trends by ruling out problematic and laboratory test servers that produce smaller sample sets.
Explanation of research inquiries
This section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to produce the data and statistics in this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, the following investigations warranted additional detail.
Top countries and cities of spam origin
The data for this section is determined by calculating the frequency of originating server IP addresses in email messages that trigger antispam filters in the field. The IP addresses are mapped to their host country of origin and the data is summarized by country based on monthly totals. The percentage of spam per country is calculated from the total spam detected in the field.Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report
46It should be noted that the location of the computer from which spam is detected being sent is not
necessarily the location of the spammer. Spammers can build networks of compromised computers globally and thereby use computers that are geographically separate from their location.
Top countries and cities by spam zombies
The data in this section is determined by examining the logical connecting IP addresses in spam messages received by the Symantec Probe Network. IP addresses that meet a certain volume requirement are processed through a set of heuristics to determine if they are behaving like zombie servers. If an IP address meets some or all of the heuristic requirements it will be listed as a zombie IP address. Symantec then cross-references the addresses with several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic locations of systems to IP addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error. The data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of spam zombies.
Spam as a percentage of email scanned
The data for this section is determined by dividing the number of email messages that trigger antispam filters in the field by the total number of email messages scanned. These filters are distributed across the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base. The data for this section is based on monthly totals.Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec
Corporation.
NO WARRANTY. The technical information is being delivered to you as is and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its acc uracy or use. Any use of the
technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user. Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical
errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice.
Copyright © 2007 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved. Symantec, the Symantec Logo, BugTraq, Symantec AntiVirus, Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam,
Symantec DeepSight, and Symantec Digital Immune System are trademarks or registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation or its a ffiliates in the U.S. and other
countries. Microsoft and Windows are either registered trademarks or trademarks of Microsoft Corporation in the United States a nd/or other countries. Other
names may be trademarks of their respective owners.
|
SYMANTEC ENTERPRISE SECURITY
Symantec Internet Security
Threat ReportTrends for January–June 07
Volume XII, Published September 2007Dean Turner
Executive EditorSymantec Security Response
Stephen Entwisle
Senior EditorSymantec Security Response
Eric Johnson
EditorSymantec Security Response
Marc Fossi
Analyst
Symantec Security Response
Joseph Blackbird
Analyst Symantec Security Response
David McKinney
Analyst Symantec Security Response
Ronald Bowes
AnalystSymantec Security Response
Nicholas Sullivan
AnalystSymantec Security Response
Candid Wueest
AnalystSymantec Security Response
Ollie Whitehouse
Security Architect—Advanced Threat ResearchSymantec Security Response
Zulfikar Ramzan
Analyst—Advanced Threat ResearchSymantec Security Response
Jim Hoagland
Principal Software Engineer Symantec Security Response
Chris Wee
Manager, DevelopmentSymantec Security Response
Contributors
David Cowings
Sr. Manager of OperationsSymantec Business Intelligence
Dylan Morss
ManagerSymantec Business Intelligence
Shravan Shashikant
Principal Business Intelligence AnalystSymantec Business IntelligenceSymantec Internet Security Threat Report Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
Future Watch . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Attack Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Vulnerability Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
Malicious Code Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Phishing Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
Spam Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Appendix C—Vulnerability Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Appendix D—Malicious Code Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
Appendix E—Phishing and Spam Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128ContentsVolume XII, Published September 2007
Symantec Internet Security Threat ReportSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report Executive Summary
The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report provides a six-month update of Internet threat activity. It
includes analysis of network-based attacks, a review of known vulnerabilities, and highlights of malicious code. It will also assess trends in phishing and spam activity. This summary of the Internet Security Threat
Report will alert readers to current trends and impending threats. It will also offer recommendations
for protection against and mitigation of these concerns. This volume covers the six-month period from January 1 to June 30, 2007.
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the world.
The Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network tracks attack activity across the entire Internet. It consists of over 40,000 sensors monitoring network activity in over 180 countries. As well, Symantec gathers malicious code reports from over 120 million client, server, and gateway systems that have deployed Symantec’s antivirus products.
Symantec operates one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion of vulnerabilities on
the Internet, the BugTraq™ mailing list, which has approximately 50,000 direct subscribers who contribute, receive, and discuss vulnerability research on a daily basis.
1 Symantec also maintains one of the world’s
most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting of over 22,000 vulnerabilities (spanning more than a decade) affecting more than 50,000 technologies from over 8,000 vendors. The following discussion of vulnerability trends is based on a thorough analysis of that data.
Finally, the Symantec Probe Network, a system of over two million decoy accounts, attracts email messages
from 20 different countries around the world, allowing Symantec to gauge global spam and phishing activity. These resources give Symantec analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify emerging trends in attacks and malicious code activity. Symantec also gathers phishing information through the Symantec Phish Report Network, an extensive antifraud community of enterprises and consumers. Members of the network contribute and receive fraudulent Web site addresses for alerting and filtering across a broad range of solutions.
The Symantec Internet Security Threat Report is grounded principally on the expert analysis of data
provided by all of these sources. Based on Symantec’s expertise and experience, this analysis yields a highly informed commentary on current Internet threat activity. By publishing the Symantec Internet Security
Threat Report , Symantec hopes to provide enterprises and consumers with the information they need to
help effectively secure their systems now and in the future.
Executive Summary Highlights
The following section will offer a brief summary of the security trends that Symantec observed during this period based on data provided by the sources listed above. This summary includes all of the metrics that are included in the main report. Following this overview, the Executive Summary of the Internet Security
Threat Report will discuss selected metrics in greater depth.
1 The BugTraq mailing list is hosted by SecurityFocus (http://www.securityfocus.com). Archives are available at http://www.secur ityfocus.com/archive/1
4Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
5Attack Trends Highlights
• The United States was the country targeted by the most denial of service (DoS) attacks, accounting for
61 percent of the worldwide total in the first half of 2007.
• The United States was the top country of attack origin in the first six months of 2007, accounting for
25 percent of the worldwide attack activity.
• During this period, the United States accounted for 30 percent of all malicious activity during the period,
more than any other country.
• Israel was the country with the most malicious activity per Internet user in the first six months of 2007,
followed by Canada and the United States.
• Four percent of all malicious activity detected during the first six months of 2007 originated from IP
space registered to Fortune 100 companies.
• The education sector accounted for 30 percent of data breaches that could lead to identity theft during
this period, more than any other sector.
• Theft or loss of computer or other data-storage medium made up 46 percent of all data breaches that
could lead to identity theft during this period.
• The United States was the top country for underground economy servers, accounting for 64 percent of
the total known to Symantec.
• Credit cards were the most common commodity advertised on underground economy servers known to
Symantec, accounting for 22 percent of all items.
• Eighty-five percent of credit cards advertised for sale on underground economy servers known to
Symantec were issued by banks in the United States.
• Symantec observed an average of 52,771 active bot-infected computers per day in the first half of 2007,
a 17 percent decrease from the previous period.
• China had 29 percent of the world’s bot-infected computers, more than any other country. • The United States had the highest number of bot command-and-control servers, accounting for
43 percent of the worldwide total.
• Beijing was the city with the most bot-infected computers, accounting for seven percent of the
worldwide total.
• The average lifespan of a bot-infected computer during the first six months of 2007 was four days,
up from three days in the second half of 2006.
• Home users were the most highly targeted sector, accounting for 95 percent of all targeted attacks.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
6Vulnerability Trends Highlights
• Symantec documented 2,461 vulnerabilities in the first half of 2007, three percent less than the
second half of 2006.
• Symantec classified nine percent of all vulnerabilities disclosed during this period as high severity,
51 percent were medium severity, and 40 percent were low. In the second half of 2006, four percent of newly disclosed vulnerabilities were high severity, 69 percent were medium severity, and 27 percent were low severity.
• Sixty-one percent of vulnerabilities disclosed during this period affected Web applications, down from
66 percent in the second half of 2006.
• Seventy-two percent of vulnerabilities documented in this reporting period were easily exploitable.
This is a decrease from 79 percent in the previous reporting period.
• In the first half of 2007, all operating systems except Hewlett Packard® HP-UX® had shorter average
patch development times than in the second half of 2006.
• Hewlett-Packard HP-UX had an average patch development time of 112 days in the first half of 2007,
the highest of any operating system. Sun had the highest average patch development time in the second half of 2006, with 145 days.
• The average window of exposure for vulnerabilities affecting enterprise vendors was 55 days. This is an
increase over the 47-day average in the second half of 2006.
• Symantec documented 39 vulnerabilities in Microsoft® Internet Explorer, 34 in Mozilla browsers, 25 in
Apple® Safari™, and seven in Opera. In the second half of 2006, 54 vulnerabilities were disclosed for Internet Explorer, 40 for Mozilla browsers, four for Apple Safari, and four for Opera.
• Apple Safari had an average window of exposure of three days in the first half of 2007, the shortest of
any browser reviewed during this period. Mozilla browsers had the shortest average window of exposure in the second half of 2006, two days.
• Symantec documented six zero-day vulnerabilities in the first half of 2007, down from the 12 that were
reported during the second half of 2006.
• Ninety-seven vulnerabilities were documented in Oracle®, more than any other database during the first
half of 2007. Oracle also had the most database vulnerabilities in the second half of 2006, with 168.
• There were 90 unpatched enterprise vendor vulnerabilities in the first half of 2007, which is down from
the 94 documented in the second half of 2006. Microsoft had the most unpatched vulnerabilities of any enterprise vendor during both of these periods.
• In the first half of 2007, Symantec documented 237 vulnerabilities in Web browser plug-ins. This is a
significant increase over 74 in the second half of 2006, and 34 in the first half of 2006.
• During the first half of 2007, 89 percent of plug-in vulnerabilities disclosed affected ActiveX®
components for Internet Explorer. ActiveX components accounted for 58 percent of plug-in vulnerabilities in the second half of 2006.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
• Symantec found that more than 50 percent of medium- and high-severity vulnerabilities patched by
operating system vendors affected Web browsers or had other client-side attack vectors during this and the previous reporting period. Apple was the sole exception, with 49 percent of the vulnerabilities examined in the first half of 2007 affecting browsers or having client-side attack vectors.
Malicious code trend highlights
• Of the top ten new malicious code families detected in the first six months of 2007, four were Trojans,
three were viruses, one was a worm, and two were worms with a virus component.
• In the first half of 2007, 212,101 new malicious code threats were reported to Symantec. This is a
185 percent increase over the second half of 2006.
• During the first half of 2007, Trojans made up 54 percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code
reports, an increase over the 45 percent reported in the final six months of 2006.
• When measured by potential infections, Trojans accounted for 73 percent of the top 50 malicious code
samples, up from 60 percent in the previous period.
• During this period, 43 percent of worm infections were reported in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa
(EMEA) region.
• North America accounted for 44 percent of Trojans reported this period.• Threats to confidential information made up 65 percent of the top 50 potential malicious code samples
by potential infection reported to Symantec.
• Threats with keystroke-logging capacity made up 88 percent of confidential information threats during
this period, as did threats with remote access capability, such as back doors. This is an increase from 76 percent and 87 percent respectively over the previous period.
• Forty-six percent of malicious code that propagated did so over SMTP, making it the most commonly
used propagation mechanism.
• During the first half of 2007, 18 percent of the 1,509 documented malicious code instances exploited
vulnerabilities.
• Thirty-five percent of infected computers reported more than one infection in the first half of 2007.• Eight of the top ten staged downloaders this period were Trojans and two were worms. • Seven of the top ten downloaded components were Trojans and three were back doors. • Malicious code that targets online games made up five percent of the top 50 malicious code samples
by potential infection.
• Lineage and World of Warcraft were the two most frequently targeted online games in the first half
of 2007.
7Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Phishing Highlights
• The Symantec Probe Network detected a total of 196,860 unique phishing messages, an 18 percent
increase over the last six months of 2006. This equates to an average of 1,088 unique phishing messages per day for the first half of 2007.
• Symantec blocked over 2.3 billion phishing messages, an increase of 53 percent over the second half
of 2006. This means that Symantec blocked an average of roughly 12.5 million phishing emails per day over the first six months of 2007.
• Organizations in the financial services sector accounted for 79 percent of the unique brands that were
used in phishing attacks during this period.
• The brands of organizations in the financial services sector were spoofed by 72 percent of all phishing
Web sites.
• Fifty-nine percent of all known phishing Web sites were located in the United States, a much higher
proportion than in any other country.
• Three phishing toolkits were responsible for 42 percent of all phishing attacks observed by Symantec in
the first half of 2007.
• Eighty-six percent of all phishing Web sites were hosted on only 30 percent of IP addresses known to be
phishing Web servers.
Spam Highlights
• Between January 1 and June 30, 2007, spam made up 61 percent of all monitored email traffic. This is
a slight increase over the last six months of 2006 when 59 percent of email was classified as spam.
• Sixty percent of all spam detected during this period was composed in English, down from 65 percent
in the previous reporting period.
• In the first half of 2007, 0.43 percent of all spam email contained malicious code compared to
0.68 percent in the second half of 2006. This means that one out of every 233 spam messages blocked by Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam™ in the current reporting period contained malicious code.
• Spam related to commercial products made up 22 percent of all spam during this period, the most of
any category.
• During the first six months of 2007, 47 percent of all spam detected worldwide originated in the United
States, compared to 44 percent in the previous period.
• In the first six months of 2007, 10 percent of all spam zombies in the world were located in the United
States, more than any other country.
• In the first half of 2007, 27 percent of all spam blocked by Symantec was image spam.
8Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Executive Summary Discussion
This section will discuss selected security metrics from the Internet Security Threat Report in greater depth,
providing analysis and discussion of the trends indicated by the data. The following metrics will be discussed:
• Malicious activity originating from Fortune 100 companies
• Data breaches that could lead to identity theft• Underground economy servers• Bot-infected computers • Browser plug-in vulnerabilities• New malicious code threats• Trojans• Threats to confidential information• Malicious code that targets online games• Phishing • Spam
Malicious activity originating from Fortune 100 companies
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is evaluating the amount
of malicious activity originating from the IP space of computers and networks that are known to belong to Fortune 100 organizations. Briefly, these are the companies that are determined by Fortune magazine to be the 100 highest grossing companies in the world.
2 Symantec has compiled data on numerous malicious
activities that were detected originating from the IP address space of these companies.3 These activities
include: bot-infected computers, phishing Web sites, spam zombies, and Internet attacks.
This metric is significant because it indicates the level to which Fortune 100 organizations have been
compromised and are being used by attackers as launching pads for malicious activity. This could affect the performance of the company’s networks, thereby reducing employee productivity and limiting the ability of customers to access organizational resources. It could also potentially expose proprietary information, which could have serious business ramifications. Finally, attack activity originating from the organization’s network could have serious legal consequences for the company.
Between January 1 and June 30, 2007, four percent of malicious activity detected by Symantec originated
from the IP address space of Fortune 100 companies. The IP space of Fortune 100 organizations constitutes just over seven percent of the world’s active and advertised IP space.
4 Since the proportion of malicious
activity originating from Fortune 100 IP space is lower than the proportion of the world’s active and advertised IP space that is assigned to these organizations, less attack activity is originating from Fortune 100 companies than other IP spaces. It is likely that security measures put in place on Fortune 100 networks make it difficult for attackers to compromise them, or to use them to launch attack activity. It could also be due to the fact that some Fortune 100 companies may not use all of the IP space allotted to them. Despite this, networks and computers within these organizations are likely enticing targets for attackers.
2 http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2007
3 IP addresses for Fortune 100 companies were determined using autonomous system number (ASN) information.
4 IP addresses used to determine this proportion were derived from autonomous system number (ASN) information.
9Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
There are a number of reasons an attacker may specifically target a Fortune 100 company. By initially
targeting well known companies such as these, attackers are targeting victims indirectly by first exploiting trusted entities and then using their position on the network of the trusted company to attack the real victims. Computers within a Fortune 100 company offer attackers many benefits not offered by other computers. For instance, a single compromised computer within such an organization could allow an attacker to gain access to other computers within the organization. This could allow the attacker to harvest various types of information, including the organization’s customer database, financial activities of the organization, and proprietary technology or software, to name a few.
Fortune 100 companies also present an attractive target for phishers. For example, an attacker could use
a compromised Web server within a Fortune 100 retail company to host phishing Web sites that target customers of the company. Since the phishing Web site would actually be on the compromised company’s Web server, customers may be unable to identify it as being fraudulent. An attacker could also send phishing emails from a compromised mail server within a Fortune 100 company’s network, which would have a similar obfuscating effect.
To maintain secure networks, organizations should employ defense-in-depth strategies,
5 including
the deployment of intrusion detection/intrusion prevention systems (IDS/IPS), antivirus and antifraud solutions and a firewall. Users should update antivirus definitions regularly and ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers within an organization are updated with all necessary security patches from their respective vendors. Symantec also advises that policies exist that prevent users from viewing, opening, or executing any email attachment unless the attachment is expected and comes from a known and trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft
Identity theft is an increasingly prevalent security issue, particularly for organizations that store and
manage information that could facilitate identity theft. Compromises that result in the loss of personal data could be quite costly, not only to the people whose identity may be at risk and their respective financial institutions, but also to the organization responsible for collecting the data.
Data breaches that lead to identity theft could damage an organization’s reputation, and undermine
customer and institutional confidence in the organization. With the implementation of recent legislation in some jurisdictions,
6 organizations could also be held liable for data breaches and losses, which may result
in fines or litigation.7
In the first half of 2007, the education sector accounted for more data breaches that could lead to identity
theft than any other sector, making up 30 percent of the total (figure 1). This is up from the previous period when the education sector accounted for only 22 percent of the total and ranked second.
5 Defense-in-depth emphasizes multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive systems to guard against single-point fa ilures in any specific technology or
protection methodology. Defense-in-depth should include the deployment of antivirus, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems , among other security measures.
6 http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmbills/001/2000001.htm
7 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2007/021.shtml
10Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
8 http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/441
9 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/05/04/txj_nonfeasance/
11Telecom 1%Arts/media 1%Computer software 1%Transportation 1%
Manufacturing 1%
Military 1%Community/non-profit 2%
Health care 15%
Financial 14%Government 26%1%
Other 6%1%1%
1%
1%1%Retail/wholesale 6%
Education 30%
Figure 1. Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by sector
Source: Based on data provided by Attrition.org
Educational organizations store a lot of personal information that could be used for the purposes of identity
theft. These organizations—particularly larger universities—often consist of many semi-independent departments in which sensitive personal identification information may be stored in separate locations and be accessible by many people. This increases the opportunities for attackers to gain unauthorized access to this data. Adding to this is the fact that research hospitals, which are considered part of the education sector, store considerable amounts of patients’ personal data, including medical information.
During the first half of 2007, the retail/wholesale sector accounted for only six percent of all data breaches
that could lead to identity theft, making it the fifth ranked sector during this period. However, the sector was responsible for the largest number of exposed identities, accounting for 85 percent. Breaches in this sector were thus more likely to lead to wide-scale identity theft than any other sector.
The prominence of the retail/wholesale sector was primarily due to the data breach involving the TJX group
of retail companies.
8 TJX was a victim of an extensive attack that exposed over 45 million credit and debit
card numbers. The number of identities exposed through this breach alone made up over 70 percent of all identities exposed during the period. Due to the nature and extended time span of the compromise, it is likely that these breaches were due to a failure of effective security policies.
9
In the first half of 2007, the primary cause of data breaches that could facilitate identity theft was the
theft or loss of a computer or other medium on which data is stored or transmitted, such as a USB key or a back-up medium. These made up 46 percent of all such data breaches during this period. Theft or loss accounted for 57 percent of all reported breaches in the previous reporting period. Despite this, theft or loss of a computers and storage media only accounted for 11 percent of all identities exposed. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Thus, although theft or loss of computers and computer media is extremely common, it can be considered
less likely to lead to wide-scale identity theft than other causes, as it results in relatively fewer exposed identities. This is likely because, in many cases, theft or loss of a computer or computer media is driven not by a desire to steal data, but to steal the hardware itself. A person who steals a laptop is likely driven by the desire to simply sell the laptop for financial gain, and not to harvest the data it may store.
In the first six months of 2007, hacking was the third leading cause of data breaches that could lead
to identity theft, accounting for 16 percent of the total. However, it was responsible for 73 percent of identities compromised during the period. A data breach is considered to be caused by hacking if identity theft-related data was exposed by an attacker or attackers by gaining unauthorized access to computers or networks. The prominence of hacking as a cause of compromised identities was largely driven by the TJX breach that was discussed previously in this section.
Because it is responsible for a large number of identities being compromised, hacking is considered one of
the causes of data breaches most likely to lead to wide-scale identity theft. This is likely because hacking is more clearly purpose-driven than lost devices or insecure policy. It is an intentional act with a clearly defined purpose—to steal data that can be used for purposes of identity theft or other fraud.
Most breaches that could lead to identity theft are avoidable. In the case of theft or loss, the compromise
of data could be averted by encrypting all sensitive data. This would ensure that even if the data is lost or stolen, it would not be accessible to unauthorized third parties. This step should be part of a broader security policy that organizations should develop, implement, and enforce in order to ensure that all sensitive data is protected from unauthorized access.
Organizations can further protect against security breaches that may lead to identity theft by employing
defense-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of IDS/IPS solutions, antivirus and antifraud solutions, and a firewall. Antivirus definitions should be updated regularly and all desktop, laptop, and server computers within the organization should be updated with all necessary security patches from their respective vendors.
To help prevent accidental or intentional data leaks, organizations should employ data leakage prevention
solutions. Symantec also advises organizations to develop and implement policies that prevent users from viewing, opening, or executing any email attachment unless the attachment is expected and comes from a known and trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
Underground economy servers
Underground economy servers are used by criminals and criminal organizations to sell stolen information,
typically for subsequent use in identity theft. This data can include government-issued identification numbers, credit cards, bank cards, personal identification numbers (PINs), user accounts, and email address lists. The emergence of underground economy servers as the de facto trading place for illicit
information is indicative of the increased professionalization and commercialization of malicious activities over the past several years.
12Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Symantec tracks and assesses underground economy servers across the Internet using proprietary online
fraud monitoring tools. For the first time, in this issue of the Internet Security Threat Report ¸ Symantec
is assessing the types of goods that are most frequently offered for sale on underground economy servers. During the first half of 2007, credit cards were the most frequently advertised item, making up 22 percent of all goods advertised on underground economy servers (table 1).
Rank
1
23456789
10Item
Credit Cards
Bank AccountsEmail PasswordsMailersEmail AddressesProxiesFull IdentityScamsSocial Security NumbersCompromised UNIX® ShellsPercentage
22%
21%
8%8%6%6%6%6%3%2%Range of Prices
$0.50–$5
$30–$400 $1–$350$8–$10$2/MB–$4/MB$0.50–$3$10–$150$10/week$5–$7$2–$10
Table 1. Breakdown of goods available for sale on underground economy servers
Source: Symantec Corporation
During the first six months of 2007, Symantec observed 8,011 distinct credit cards being advertised
for exchange on underground economy servers. This is only a small proportion of the credit cards sold, however. Typically, users selling credit card information advertise bulk rates and merely give examples of credit card information to attract buyers. Common bulk amounts and rates seen by Symantec during the first six months of 2007 were: 10 credit card numbers for $20 USD; 50 credit card numbers for $70 USD; and 100 credit card numbers for $100 USD.
Symantec also determined that the 85 percent of credit and debit cards advertised for sale on underground
economy servers in the first half of 2007 were issued by banks in the United States. This is down slightly from 86 percent in the last six months of 2006.
At the end of 2005, there were approximately 1.3 billion credit cards in circulation in the United States,
substantially more than any other country. This likely explains the prominence of US banks in this consideration.
10 Furthermore, the average citizen of the United States has just over four credit cards.11
If a credit card holder has a large number of credit cards, and uses them all on a regular basis, it is reasonable to assume that monitoring them for illicit use could become difficult.
Identifying fraudulent charges may be even more difficult if they are small or relatively insignificant. For
example, small charges may occur when a fraudster attempts to verify whether a card is active by using the stolen card to donate a small amount of money to a charity.
12 If the transaction is successful, the credit
card information is then sold or bought. If such a small charge is not identified, the stolen card will likely be used later to commit greater fraud.
10 http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss78p2.pdf
11 http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss78p2.pdf
12 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/07/scammers_make_friends_with_cha.html
13Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
The proportion of credit cards advertised matches closely with the market share of each brand of credit
card.13 This implies that the identity-theft community is not specifically targeting any credit card brand.
In order to reduce the likelihood of data breaches that could lead to identity theft, organizations that
store personal information should take the necessary steps to protect data transmitted over the Internet or stored on their computers. This should include the development, implementation, and enforcement of secure policy requiring that all sensitive data is encrypted. This would ensure that, even if the computer or medium on which the data were lost or stolen, the data would not be accessible. This step should be part of a broader security policy that organizations should develop and implement in order to ensure that any sensitive data is protected from unauthorized access.
Bot-infected computers
Bots are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s machine in order to allow an unauthorized user to
control the computer remotely. They allow an attacker to remotely control the targeted system through a communication channel such as IRC. These channels allow the remote attacker to control a large number of compromised computers over a single, reliable channel in a bot network, which can then be used to launch coordinated attacks.
Bots allow for a wide range of functionality and most can be updated to assume new functionality by
downloading new code and features. Bots can be used by external attackers to perform DoS attacks against an organization’s Web site. Furthermore, bots within an organization’s network can be used to attack other organizations’ Web sites, which can have serious business and legal consequences. They can be used by attackers to harvest confidential information from compromised computers, which can lead to identity theft. Bots can also be used to distribute spam and phishing attacks, as well as spyware, adware, and misleading applications.
An active bot-infected computer is one that carries out at least one attack per day. This does not have to be
continuous; rather, a single computer can be active on a number of different days. Between January 1 and June 30, 2007, Symantec observed an average of 52,771 active bot-infected computers per day (figure 2), a 17 percent decrease from the previous reporting period.
13 http://www.cardweb.com/cardtrak/pastissues/december2004.html
14Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
DateActive bot-infected computers
Apr 11, 2006 Jul 20, 2006 Oct 28, 2006 Feb 05, 2007020,00040,00060,00080,000
10,00030,00050,00070,000100,000
May 16, 2007 Jan 01, 2006Moving averageMedian daily
active bots90,000
Figure 2. Active bot-infected computers per day
Source: Symantec Corporation
A distinct bot-infected computer is a distinct computer that was active at least once during the period.
Symantec also observed 5,029,309 distinct bot-infected computers during this period, a 17 percent decrease from the last six months of 2006.
The decrease in bots observed over the past six months is likely due to a number of reasons, the primary
one likely being a change in bot attack methods. As has been discussed in previous volumes of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , the exploitation of network-based vulnerabilities to spread bots
is being slowly abandoned for methods that are more likely to succeed, such as bots that send a mass mailing of themselves.
14 Network-based attacks have been limited somewhat by the introduction of default
firewalls in popular operating systems such as Microsoft Windows® XP, as well as an increasing awareness of computer security issues among organizations and computer users. As a result, their use has declined, which has had the effect of limiting the propagation of bots.
Furthermore, law enforcement initiatives targeting bot-networks may also be having some effect. Recently
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States released information on Operation Bot Roast. This is an ongoing cyber-crime initiative aimed at dismantling bot networks by identifying and arresting bot network owners and taking down the command-and-control servers by which they control their networks.
15
Initiatives such as these will likely result in a reduction in bots for a number of reasons. Firstly, as bot networks are dismantled, less bot activity will be observed. Secondly, as bot network owners become aware of the scrutiny of law enforcement agencies, they are likely to alter their tactics to avoid detection.
The lifespan of a bot is defined as the amount of time that elapses between the first detection of a bot-
infected computer until the time that the computer is no longer actively attacking for 30 days, after which time it is assumed to have been disinfected. Gauging the average lifespan of bot-infected computers is important because it allows Symantec to assess how long bot-infected computers are present on a particular network prior to removal.
14 For instance, please see Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume IX (March 2006):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_report_ix.pdf : p. 3 0
15 http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel07/botnet061307.htm
15Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
During the first six months of 2007, the lifespan of the average bot-infected computer was four days. This
is an increase from the previous period, where the average lifespan for a bot-infected computer was three days. The median lifespan of a bot-infected computer during both periods was one day. This indicates that the majority of bot-infected computers are only active for a short period, after which they are identified and disabled, or they are used for activities other than carrying out Internet attacks. The longest lifespan of a bot-infected computer during the period was 3.2 years. However, bots with such long life spans are rare.
The change in the average number of days from three to four from the previous period to the current is likely
insignificant. Since the median remained the same, the change in overall average is driven by the longer-lasting bot-infected computers. Given that more time has passed, the age of the longer-lasting bot-infected computers has increased, and so has increased the mean lifespan. Thus, the bot lifespan is holding steady.
It appears that initiatives such as the FBI’s Operation Bot Roast, which was discussed previously in this
section, are not reducing the lifespan of bot-infected computers. This is likely because the focus of those methods is to eliminate infections and keep infected computers free of bot software, and not necessarily to shorten their effective lives. This is supported by the fact that the number of bot-infected computers has decreased while their lifespan remains steady.
China had the highest number of bot-infected computers during the first half of 2007, accounting for
29 percent of the worldwide total (figure 3), up from 26 percent in the second half of 2006. This continues a trend that was first discussed in the first half of 2005, which saw an increase in bot activity in China during that period.
Key
(X) = Current rank% = Current proportionUnited
Kingdom
(7) 4%
France
(5) 5%
Spain
(4) 6%China
(1) 29%Germany
(3) 9%
Poland
(10) 3%
Israel
(9) 3%Italy
(6) 4%Canada
(8) 3%
United States
(2) 13%
Figure 3. Bot-infected computers by country
Source: Symantec Corporation
Symantec has observed that bots usually infect computers that are connected to high-speed broadband
Internet through large Internet service providers (ISPs) and that the expansion of broadband connectivity often facilitates the spread of bots. China’s Internet infrastructure is currently expanding rapidly.
16 However,
it is worth noting that China’s increase in bot-infected computers appears to be slowing. This may be a sign that the security infrastructure as well as awareness is beginning to catch up with Internet user growth.
16 http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/news/2163552/china-lead-broadband-world
16Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Command-and-control servers are computers that bot network owners use to relay commands to bot-
infected computers on their networks. During the first half of 2007, the United States had the most known command-and-control servers worldwide, accounted for 43 percent of the total. This is a marginal increase over the second half of 2006, when 40 percent of all command-and-control servers were located there.
The high proportion of command-and-control servers in the United States likely indicates that servers
there control not only bot networks within the country but elsewhere as well. The high proportion of bot-infected computers and command-and-control servers in the United States is driven by its extensive Internet and technology infrastructure. As of June 2006, more than 58 million broadband Internet users were located there, the highest number in the world.
17
Browser plug-in vulnerabilities
Browser plug-ins are technologies that run inside the Web browser and extend the browser’s features.
They can include plug-ins that permit additional multimedia content from Web pages to be rendered in the browser. They also includes execution environments that allow applications to be run inside the browser.
In the first half of 2007, Symantec documented 237 vulnerabilities affecting browser plug-ins (figure 4).
Of these, 210 affected ActiveX components, 18 affected the Apple QuickTime® plug-in, four affected the Sun™ Java™ browser plug-in, three affected extensions for Mozilla browsers, and two affected the Adobe Acrobat plug-in. Adobe Flash, Microsoft Windows Media Player, and Opera widgets were not affected by any browser plug-in vulnerabilities during this period.
Mozilla extensions 1%Windows Media Player 4%
Acrobat 11%
Java 5%
QuickTime 11%ActiveX 58%
Flash 11%Percentage of vulnerabilities
Jul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 2007ActiveX 89%
QuickTime 8%Java 2%Acrobat <1%Mozilla extensions 1%
Figure 4. Browser plug-in vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation
17 http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3343,en_2649_34223_38446855_1_1_1_1,00.html
17Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
18 ActiveX components are a type of COM (Component Object Model) object that may provide a programming interface that is accessi ble through Internet Explorer.
If exposed through Internet Explorer, attackers may exploit latent vulnerabilities in an ActiveX component through malicious HT ML content. The study cited is
available at: http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/01/a_sudden_rise_in_activex_vulne.html
19 Fuzzing is a security research and quality assurance method that generally entails providing randomly generated inputs in an attempt to discover vulnerabilities
and bugs. Fuzzers are programs or scripts that are designed to find vulnerabilities in software code or scripts. They have auto mated many of the code auditing
tasks that security researchers had previously done manually.
20 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/21829
21 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/21060
22 http:/www.securityfocus.com/bid/19030
23 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/06/mpack_the_strange_case_of_the.html
18There were 74 browser plug-in vulnerabilities documented during the second half of 2006. Of those,
43 vulnerabilities affected ActiveX components, eight affected Adobe Flash, eight affected the Apple QuickTime plug-in, seven affected the Adobe Acrobat plug-in, four affected the Sun Java plug-in, three affected Windows Media Player, and one was documented in Mozilla extensions. Opera widgets were not affected by any vulnerabilities in the second half of 2006.
The rise in browser plug-in vulnerabilities is indicative of an increasing focus on client-side vulnerabilities
by both security researchers and attackers. The growth corresponds to an increase in the number of vulnerabilities in ActiveX components. This report expands on a previous Symantec study that observed the initial rise in vulnerabilities in ActiveX components.
18 It was determined that the use of fuzzers designed
specifically to target insecure ActiveX components has expedited discovery of these vulnerabilities.19 In
addition, it is relatively easy to develop exploits for these types of vulnerabilities due to a high number of previous exploit examples that serve as a template.
These vulnerabilities affect a diverse group of vendors, including Microsoft, enterprise vendors, and
smaller vendors. The sheer number of vulnerabilities gives attackers a wide range of potential targets. The installation and execution of ActiveX components is typically transparent to the user, while the removal of such components is not simple for the average end user. As a result, users may not be aware that they are prone to exploitation through vulnerable ActiveX components that have been installed on their computer.
Plug-in vulnerabilities have been the subject of exploit activity in the wild. For example, they were leveraged
by many of the exploits employed by the MPack attack framework. In particular, MPack exploits a QuickTime vulnerability,
20 an issue in the WinZip ActiveX component,21 and various other plug-in vulnerabilities such as
the Microsoft WebViewFolderIcon issue.22
Client-side attacks have typically originated from questionable sources such as malicious Web sites or
spam. As a result, best practices have advised end users to avoid this type of content. However, it appears that attackers are increasingly using legitimate and trusted sites as a basis for attacks. Symantec has observed that MPack includes functionality to serve malicious payloads through legitimate Web sites that have been compromised.
23 MPack is also indicative of a current trend towards multiple staged attacks in
which an initial compromise is used to establish a beachhead from which subsequent attacks are launched.
End users and administrators can use a number of measures to protect against the effects of vulnerabilities.
IPS technologies can prevent exploitation of some browser plug-in vulnerabilities through signature or behavior-based approaches in addition to address space layout randomization (ASLR). Antivirus software may also aid in protecting organizations from browser plug-in exploits through heuristic signatures. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
While attacks are likely to originate from Web sites that are trusted as well as those that are not, Web
browser security features can help reduce exposure to browser plug-in exploits, as can white-listing. Specifically, administrators and end users should actively maintain a white-list of trusted Web sites, and should disable individual plug-ins and scripting capabilities for all other sites. This will not prevent exploitation attempts from white-listed sites but may aid in preventing exploits from all other sites. Organizations can also implement a white-list policy at the network perimeter to regulate outgoing access by end users.
Trojans
Of the top ten new malicious code families detected in the first six months of 2007, four were Trojans,
three were viruses, one was a worm, and two were worms with a virus component. One of the Trojans also had back door capabilities. This indicates that attackers may be moving towards using Trojans as a means of installing malicious code on computers. This is typical of the multiple staged attacks that Symantec is observing with increasing frequency. In these attacks, an initial compromise is not intended to perform malicious activity directly, but is intended to provide a launching point for subsequent, more malicious attack activity.
As Trojans do not propagate, they allow attackers to perform targeted attacks without drawing attention
to themselves. Worms, on the other hand, propagate by sending themselves in high volumes of email messages, thereby increasing the likelihood of being noticed by network administrators who can take immediate action. A Trojan that is installed when a user visits a malicious Web site is much more likely to escape notice, as there will be no high-volume traffic associated with it. This increases the Trojan’s effectiveness. The longer a threat remains undiscovered in the wild, the more opportunity it has to compromise computers before measures can be taken to protect against it. Furthermore, the longer it can remain resident on a compromised computer, the more confidential information it will be able to steal.
During the first half of 2007, Trojans made up 54 percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code
reports, an increase over the 45 percent reported in the final six months of 2006. While part of this increase can be attributed to the success of the Peacomm Trojan,
24 there were also a wide variety of other Trojans
present in the top 50 malicious code reports.
As previously mentioned, Trojans are likely gaining prominence because they generate a low volume of
traffic compared to network and mass-mailing worms. As a result, they are less likely to draw the attention of higher-profile threats. Furthermore, malicious code writers may be turning to Trojans because network perimeter defenses and desktop firewalls, neither of which affect Trojans, make it harder for network worms to propagate widely.
The most widely reported new malicious code family during this reporting period was the Peacomm Trojan,
also known as the Storm Trojan. This Trojan was spammed in high volumes by the Mixor.Q worm,25 which
prompted Symantec to classify it as a Category 3 threat in January.26 When Peacomm installs itself on a
computer, it attempts to hide itself using rootkit techniques.27 It also contains a list of other compromised
computers that it uses to build an encrypted network of peers, similar to a bot network, although it uses the Overnet peer-to-peer protocol rather than Internet Relay Chat (IRC).
28
24 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-011917-1403-99
25 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-122917-0740-99
26 A Category 3 threat is a malicious code sample that is considered a moderate threat. It is either currently spreading among c omputer users but
reasonably harmless and easy to contain, or has not been released into the wild but is potentially dangerous and difficult to c ontain.
27 Rootkit techniques are used by malicious code to hide their presence on a compromised computer.
28 Overnet is a decentralized peer-to-peer file-sharing protocol. It was taken down due to legal action in September 2006, but d ue to its
decentralized nature, clients are still able to function.
19Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
29 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-020915-2914-99
30 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-032311-1146-99
31 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-112111-3912-99
32 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2002-091214-5754-99
33 Click fraud is the act of using illegitimate means, such as a script or program, to imitate the act of a legitimate user clic king on a pay-per-click banner
advertisement on a Web page. This act generates revenue for the owner of the page hosting the advertisement. Click fraud is a f elony in some jurisdictions.
34 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-030413-5303-99
20Peacomm listens for commands passed through its peer-to-peer (P2P) network and downloads and installs
other files, such as the Mespam29 and Abwiz.F Trojans.30 This can be of particular concern, since a Trojan
like Abwiz.F can send confidential information to the remote attacker and relay spam.
Trojan activity increased from 60 percent of potential infections in the last half of 2006 to 73 percent in
the current period. While part of this increase can be attributed to the outbreak of Peacomm in January, there were also a wide variety of other Trojans present in the top 50 malicious code reports. As previously mentioned, Trojans are likely gaining prominence because they generate a low volume of traffic compared to network and mass-mailing worms. As a result, they are less likely to draw the attention of higher-profile threats.
Trojans may also be gaining popularity because they are well suited to meet the objectives of attackers.
Trojans are able to perform numerous diverse functions. For example, the Vundo Trojan installs adware on a compromised computer.
31 Variants of the Adclicker Trojan can be used to generate traffic to Web sites
in order to increase revenue from banner ads.32 This practice is frequently referred to as click fraud.33
Additionally, other Trojans can be used to relay spam email or in phishing attacks. For instance, the Flush Trojan modifies the DNS settings on a compromised computer,
34 which can cause the user’s Web browser
to be redirected to a phishing site when he or she attempts to connect to an online banking site. The high volume of these Trojans in the top 50 malicious code reports demonstrates the popularity among attackers of utilizing malicious code to generate revenue.
In order to protect against Trojans, administrators and end users should employ defense-in-depth
strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software and a personal firewall. Users should update antivirus definitions regularly. They should also ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their software vendors. They should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless it is expected and comes from a trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
Threats to confidential information
Some malicious code programs are designed specifically to expose confidential information that is stored
on an infected computer. These threats may expose sensitive data such as system information, confidential files and documents, or logon credentials. Some malicious code threats, such as back doors, can give a remote attacker complete control over a compromised computer.
Threats to confidential information are a particular concern because of their potential for use in criminal
activities. With the widespread use of online shopping and Internet banking, compromises of this nature can result in significant financial loss, particularly if credit card information or banking details are exposed.
Within the enterprise, exposure of confidential information can lead to significant data leakage. If it involves
customer-related data—such as credit card information—this can severely undermine customer confidence as well as violate local laws. Sensitive corporate information, including financial details, business plans, and proprietary technologies, could also be leaked from compromised computers.
In the first six months of 2007, threats to confidential information made up 65 percent of potential
infections by the top 50 malicious code samples. This is an increase from 53 percent in the second half of 2006.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
In this reporting period, remote access threats, such as back door servers, made up 88 percent of
confidential information threats (figure 5). They made up 87 percent of confidential information threats in the second half of 2006. Back doors typically require a two-way communication channel between the attacker and the compromised computer in order to access unauthorized information. As such, they can be less efficient than an automated mechanism, such as a keystroke logger. This may indicate why threats that allow remote access only increased marginally this period while other information exposure types increased more significantly.
PeriodPercentage of exposure threats
Exports email addressesExports user data
Exports system data
Jul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 200787%
76%
67%69%
69%88%
88%
80% 76%79%Keystroke logger
Allows remote access
Figure 5. Threats to confidential information by type
Source: Symantec Corporation
Keystroke logging threats made up 88 percent of threats to confidential information, up from 76 percent in
the second half of last year. A keystroke logger records keystrokes on a compromised computer and either emails the log to the attacker or uploads it to a Web site under the attacker’s control. This makes it easier for the attacker to gather confidential information from a large number of compromised computers than if he or she had to manually connect to back doors installed on various computers.
Malicious code that targets online games
Online gaming is becoming one of the most popular Internet activities. Recently, a study indicated that
unique visitors to online gaming sites reached 217 million worldwide. In 2007, the online game market in China alone is expected to grow by 35 percent, where there were 30 million Internet gamers by the end of 2006. Online games often feature goods, such as prizes, that are exchanged by players, often for money. The total annual wealth created within virtual worlds has been placed at approximately 10 billion USD. As such, it is not surprising that attackers appear to be turning their attention to these games.
21Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
35 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-111201-3853-99
36 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-011211-3355-99
22In the first six months of 2007, five percent of the top 50 malicious code samples reported to Symantec
attempted to steal account information for online games. This demonstrates that there is likely considerable financial gain to be made from online gaming accounts, so that attackers are deploying these threats in substantial numbers.
In the first half of 2007, the two most common malicious code sample targeting online games were the
Gampass Trojan
35 and the Lineage Trojan.36 These were also two of the most frequently downloaded
components of multistaged downloaders this period. This indicates that attackers see value in targeting online gamers since many of the other top downloaded components are used for more common types of identity theft such as stealing online banking account credentials. Furthermore, the popularity of these staged downloaders illustrates the tendency towards multiple staged attacks that has already been noted in this Executive Summary.
Further reinforcing this notion is the fact that two of the top three malicious code threats targeting online
games disable security applications on the compromised computer. This could leave the computer open to other threats even if the user does not participate in any of these online games. Combined with the ability to download other threats, this means that attackers can install a wider range of threats on compromised computers once they have the user’s online gaming account information.
Phishing
The Symantec Probe Network blocked over 2.3 billion phishing messages, an increase of 53 percent over
the last half of 2007. This means that Symantec blocked an average of roughly 12.5 million phishing emails per day over the first six months of 2007. During this period, Symantec detected a total of 196,860 unique phishing messages, an 18 percent increase over the last six months of 2007. This is an average of 1,088 unique phishing messages per day for the first half of 2007.
For the first time in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is analyzing the usage of
automated phishing toolkits in phishing attacks. A phishing toolkit is a set of scripts that allow an attacker to automatically set up phishing Web sites for numerous different brands, including the images and logos associated with those brands. The development and sale of phishing kits is indicative of the increasing professionalization and commercialization in the development and distribution of malicious code and malicious services.
Three phishing toolkits were responsible for 42 percent of all phishing attacks observed by Symantec in
the first half of 2007. This shows the high percentage of automation used in phishing attacks. Automation allows attackers to send a high volume of phishing messages that spoof several brands to a large number of recipients with minimal effort. Of the 58 percent of remaining attacks, some may have used phishing toolkits other than the three that are currently known to Symantec, while others used techniques other than toolkits. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
37 For the purposes of this discussion, MMOGs also include massively multiplayer online role-playing games (MMORPG), which some people consider to be
distinct from MMOGs.
38 http://games.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=07/06/14/100255&tid=209
23Future Watch
This section of the Internet Security Threat Report will discuss emerging trends and issues that Symantec
believes will become prominent over the next six to twenty-four months. These forecasts are based on emerging research that Symantec has collected during the current reporting period and are speculative in nature. In discussing potential future trends, Symantec hopes to provide organizations and end users with an opportunity to prepare themselves for rapidly evolving and complex security issues. This section will discuss potential security issues associated with the following:
• Malicious code and virtual worlds
• Automated evasion processes—hide and seek for the security generation• Advanced Web threats—laundering origins through the Web• Diversification of bot usage
Malicious code and virtual worlds
A persistent virtual world (PVW) is a simulated online environment in which users are able to create personas known as avatars. These avatars are able to interact with each other in a simulated reality environment, 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Second Life is probably the best known example of a PVW.
Virtual worlds often serve as environments in which numerous online users interact in massively multiplayer
online games (MMOGs).
37 Popular examples of MMOGs include World of Warcraft and Lineage, both of which
allow thousands of players to interact online simultaneously. PVWs and MMOGs are extremely popular, and have been widely adopted in areas like China and South Korea. Symantec believes that as the use of these virtual environments expands, a number of security concerns will emerge.
One simple reason for this is that the main audience of PVWs and MMOGs are early adopters, people who
frequently use computers already. As MMOGs become more mainstream, and more commonly played by novice computer users, attack tactics targeting these environments will likely become more effective. The general population (that is, casual players) is probably an audience that attackers will start targeting more.
Many PVWs and MMOGs allow players to conduct real-money transactions (RMTs) in virtual worlds. Players
can use credit cards or other payment methods to purchase virtual credits and then exchange those credits with players in other countries, where they may be withdrawn back into local currencies. These RMTs give rise to a de facto international monetary system. There are even exchanges in place for trading (virtual) currency across virtual worlds or different games.
38
These markets (also referred to as secondary economies) are currently unregulated and are still too small
to attract serious attention from law enforcement and securities regulators. Symantec believes that these characteristics could allow criminals to use them for illicit activities. For example, because of the anonymity offered by PVWs, in which all identities are virtual, criminals may be able to launder money through the use of RMTs. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
39 http://online.wsj.com/public/article/SB117519670114653518-dn8gNFq5f7FniF4G8iQ_gbzDKug_20080328.html
40 http://www.shacknews.com/onearticle.x/47408
41 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-073115-1710-99
24To facilitate this, a criminal enterprise could open several thousand MMOG accounts. Each account could
be used to trade with other players in the purchase or sale of in-game assets, the funds from which would ultimately be withdrawn from the accounts in question. Since thousands of accounts may engage in millions of transactions, each with small profits or losses, it would be difficult to trace the true source of the funds when they are withdrawn. These transactions can be conducted worldwide without the oversight that typically accompanies international bank remittances. In fact, in February 2007, China’s central bank and finance ministries called upon companies to stop trading QQ coins and virtual currencies, presumably to curb the unregulated exchange of currency.
39
Furthermore, Sparter has created an inter-game currency trading exchange called Gamer2Gamer that permits players to sell their MMOG wares and currencies.
40 Currently, Blizzard Entertainment’s World of
Warcraft, Turbine’s Lord of the Rings Online, Sony Online Entertainment’s EverQuest II, and CCP’s EVE Online games are supported. Availability of such platforms will further encourage the use of PVWs and MMOGs by attackers as money laundering vehicles.
Symantec also believes that attackers will use PVWs and MMOGs to trick victims into installing malicious
software under the pretense that the software improves functionality in the virtual world. For example, virtual worlds have embraced the concept of scripted bots that serve, entertain, and protect avatars within the virtual environment. This could provide attackers with an opportunity to compromise the environment itself.
Although most MMOGs are designed to be played by players, automated tools can be used to enhance
play and avoid some tedious, repetitive activities. The downloading and use of these tools presents an opportunity to attackers to incorporate malicious programs such as keystroke loggers and password and information stealers, which the user may unknowingly install on their computer. Symantec has already observed malicious code that attempts to steal information and passwords from players, such as infostealer.wowcraft.
41 Symantec expects that, as in-game toolkits become more popular and are used by
more players, attackers will shift their efforts to infecting in-game extensions.
MMOG players and “residents” of virtual communities may also be targeted by phishers and spammers. For
instance, users in these environments may receive emails that claim to be from a game’s administrators that direct users to spoofed Web sites that are designed to capture account information, such as the player’s username and password. The phisher will thus have access to the legitimate player’s account, from which they can then distribute the player’s assets to other avatars, or sell the account to another player. Despite this risk, the allure of purchasing an established account, with an existing high playing level and established assets at a relative discount (compared to spending thousands of hours playing the game, gaining that level and accumulating similar assets) continues to entice buyers.
Similar to phishing, Symantec also expects to see an increase in the amount of spam that is sent over
in-game channels. Spammers will try to collect character names from Web sites that display the standings of the game, or they may use automated scripts to collect player names. Once spam arrives via in-game communications—which may consist of instant messaging clients that are built into the game environment itself—it could be used to deliver phishing attacks or malicious code, or to direct users to malicious Web sites. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Automated evasion processes—hide and seek for the security generation
Current antivirus engines are not solely behavior based. Some detect malicious files using static signatures,
which simply involve searching for a unique string in a particular file. Others use dynamic analysis, which requires executing the potentially malicious code in a controlled environment. To develop these signatures, antivirus vendors must first acquire malicious code samples through means such as customer submissions, honey pots, or zoo submissions.
42 The samples must then be analyzed, after which signatures are produced
and deployed to customers.
The longer a malicious code writer’s newest creation goes undetected, the greater the likelihood it will
propagate successfully. As malicious code writers put more effort into their creations, the need to evade detection increases. As a result, they have developed numerous evasion mechanisms.
Historically, polymorphism
43 and metamorphism,44 as well as packers,45 have been used to evade detection,
thereby increasing the effective lifetime of malicious code. However, advances in detecting polymorphic and metamorphic threats and in unpacking malicious code have enabled antivirus vendors to produce signatures that are capable of catching most variations. Malicious code authors have thus been forced to adopt new tactics.
Some of the new techniques center on the distribution point, the point where the malicious code is hosted,
such as a Web server. With the significant decline of network-based worms over the past several years (as is discussed in the “Malicious Code Trends” section of this report), current malicious code frequently relies on the exploitation of client-side vulnerabilities. These exploits often use the staged downloader model in which an initial Trojan is installed on the machine and then downloads the most up-to-date version of the malicious code from a distribution point.
Symantec has observed malicious code authors employing numerous techniques to protect the Web servers
that are used as distribution points. The most basic is to configure a distributing Web server to serve only one copy of the malicious code per IP address, after which it serves up only a benign executable. The purpose of this is to evade detection and acquisition by security companies who would require samples of the original Trojan in order to produce signatures. This delay in the ability of security companies in acquiring samples increases the chances the malicious code will spread further before detection.
This would have two different consequences. On the one hand, computers behind a Web-proxy or a network
address translation device are less likely to become infected since all the computers behind one of these devices share a single IP address. On the other hand, a computer security researcher or malicious code analyst trying to investigate the infection will have trouble obtaining a sample. This difficulty occurs because the same technique could be used to deliberately block IP addresses registered to certain organizations such as antivirus vendors, security consultancies or computer emergency response teams. This phenomenon occurred recently during the MPack Trojan incidents.
46 Malicious code distributors can accomplish these
aims either through blacklisting of known IP address ranges or programmatically relying on WHOIS data and performing a keyword search.
47 Symantec expects the prevalence of this defense technique to be more
widely deployed in the future due to documented success in instances where it has been used previously.
42 Malicious code that is developed “in the zoo” is developed in a controlled laboratory environment.
43 A polymorphic virus is one that can change its byte pattern when it replicates, thereby avoiding detection by simple string-sca nning antivirus techniques.
In essence, polymorphic viruses make changes to their code to avoid detection.
44 Metamorphic code evolution describes a method used by malicious code writers that allows a piece of malicious code to change it self autonomously.
45 Run-time packing utilities, also known as run-time packers, are traditionally used to make files smaller. Malicious code writer s use them to make antivirus
detection more difficult.
46 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-052712-1531-99
47 WHOIS data stores the name of the person or company who registers a domain and owns IP address space.
25Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
48 The same origin policy dictates that a document or script loaded from one origin (defined with respect to the domain, protocol, and port number) cannot access or
modify a document obtained from a different origin. Note that a document or script from one origin can issue a request for a do cument or script from another origin;
however, the first document or script cannot actually read the contents of the other document or script.
49 http://news.com.com/2100-1002_3-6169034.html
26Another, more worrisome, technique is known as x-morphism. Borrowing from an idea originally presented
by IBM, the concept is simple: the distribution point can serve up a different copy of the malicious code to each visitor. In this scenario, the malicious code no longer has to carry its own metamorphic or polymorphic engine. Instead, the server retains the engine. With this approach, the polymorphic and metamorphic methods that are used to change each instance are hidden, thus making it difficult to produce signatures that reliably work on all variants. Another option available to the malicious code distributor is that the remote site can host a copy of the original source code so any x-morphism can occur in the higher-level programming language before compilation, after which compiler optimization can be used to further obfuscate the sample.
Advanced Web threats—laundering origins through the Web
As the number of available Web services increases and as browsers continue to converge on a uniform interpretation standard for scripting languages such as JavaScript, Symantec expects the number of new Web-based threats to continue increasing. One interesting class of threats includes those that circumvent the same origin policy (SOP) in Web browsers.
48
One concept that lends itself to SOP circumvention is the mash-up. Mash-ups involve a Web service that
collects data from other Web services and then aggregates that data into one view. If data collected from two separate origins is “mashed” through an appropriate Web service, then the end user’s Web browser receives the two pieces of data through the same web site. As a result, they appear to have the same origin, even though they may originate from two different sources. Therefore, JavaScript code from one of the origins can obtain and modify properties of the data obtained through the second origin after the two pieces of data have been mashed.
Similar functionality can also be provided by non-transparent Web proxies, like Google Translate. Such
proxies generally act as a channel that funnels any content a user desires. Because the content is funneled, from the browser’s perspective, the content appears as if it originated from the proxy, when really it might have originated elsewhere. This distinction is important since it might lift restrictions associated with the SOP.
For example, Jikto is a tool that leverages such proxies to scan sites for Web vulnerabilities.
49 The site being
scanned and the site containing the scanning code are both loaded through the same proxying service. Therefore, from the Web browser’s perspective, they appear to have the same origin, although their actual origins are likely different. As a result, the scanning code can successfully make requests to and read the responses from the site being scanned without being encumbered by the SOP.
Jikto is written entirely in JavaScript so it can run in the user’s browser. Any user who visits a page
containing the appropriate Jikto source will inadvertently perform a vulnerability scan on a different Web site. That site’s Web logs will trace back to the user, and not necessarily to the Web server on which the Jikto source was located. Therefore, since the vulnerability scan is actually being performed by an end user, the attacker’s location will be effectively hidden.
Symantec expects that research will continue into novel techniques for SOP circumvention. It is still unclear
whether the vulnerabilities found will be exploited in the wild on a wide-scale basis. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Diversification of bot usage
Bots are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s machine in order to allow an unauthorized user to
control the computer remotely. They allow an attacker to remotely control the targeted system through a communication channel such as IRC. These channels allow the remote attacker to control a large number of compromised computers over a single, reliable channel in a bot network, which can then be used to launch coordinated attacks.
Bots allow for a wide range of functionality and most can be updated to assume new capabilities by
downloading new code and features. They can be used by external attackers to perform DoS attacks against an organization’s Web site. Furthermore, bots within an organization’s network can be used to attack other organizations’ Web sites, which can have serious business and legal consequences. Bots can be used by attackers to harvest confidential information from compromised computers, which can lead to identity theft. They can also be used to distribute spam and phishing attacks, as well as spyware, adware, and misleading applications.
Bots tend to be “early adopters” of new functionality because, due to their design, they can easily
incorporate new code across widely dispersed bot networks. As such, they can be used as test environments, deploying new malicious functionalities on a variety of targets before making widespread use of them. Because of this capability, Symantec believes that bots and bot networks will likely be used in an increasingly diverse number of ways in the near future.
For instance, bots may be used in client-side phishing attacks against the legitimate owner or users of an
infected computer. Malicious code on an infected computer could be used to mimic the legitimate Web site of an organization whose brand is being used in the phishing attack. As a result, the intended victim could be tricked into disclosing personal identity information, which could subsequently be used in fraudulent activity. This approach allows phishers to bypass some traditional phishing protection mechanisms. Further, a phisher using this technique would not have to rely on a Web site that could be taken down if detected.
In another example, bots can give attackers specific access to infected computers that attackers can
then use to their advantage. Bot owners may extract location-identifying information such as domain names from infected computers and subsequently advertise that they control a computer within a specific organization. Parties with interest in the targeted organization might pay for the use of the compromised computer to gather information or to conduct attacks. This approach could greatly increase the risk a bot infection poses to an organization.
In a final example of possible new malicious functionality, bots may be used to artificially increase
apparent traffic to certain Web sites. In a twist on the traditional concept of click fraud, bots may be used to hijack browsers, steering them toward sites that allow users to submit and vote upon or recommend Web sites. The idea behind this is to falsely improve search engine ratings, giving the impression of high traffic to a particular site, thereby driving traffic to that site. This could be then used to generate advertising revenue or to serve malicious code, which can then be used in subsequent fraudulent activities.
27Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Attack Trends
This section of the Internet Security Threat Report will provide an analysis of attack activity, data breaches
that could lead to identity theft, and the trade of illicit information that Symantec observed between January 1 and June 30, 2007. Attacks are defined as any malicious activity carried out over a network that has been detected by an intrusion detection system (IDS) or firewall.
The Symantec Global Intelligence Network, which includes Symantec DeepSight™ Threat Management
System and Symantec Managed Security Services, tracks attack activity across the entire Internet. It consists of over 40,000 sensors monitoring network activity in over 180 countries.
Symantec also uses proprietary technologies to monitor bot command-and-control servers and
underground economy servers across the Internet. Additionally, Symantec uses publicly available information to assess data breaches that could lead to identity theft.
50 These resources combine to give
Symantec an unparalleled ability to identify, investigate, and respond to emerging threats. This discussion will be based on data provided by all of these sources.
Attack Trends Highlights
The following section will offer a brief summary of some of the attack trends that Symantec observed during this period based on data provided by the sources listed above. Following this overview, the Internet
Security Threat Report will discuss selected metrics in greater depth, providing analysis and discussion of
the trends indicated by the data.
• The United States was the country targeted by the most DoS attacks, accounting for 61 percent of the
worldwide total in the first half of 2007.
• The United States was the top country of attack origin in the first six months of 2007, accounting for
25 percent of the worldwide attack activity.
• During this period, the United States accounted for 30 percent of all malicious activity, more than any
other country.
• Israel was the country with the most malicious activity per Internet user in the first six months of 2007,
followed by Canada and the United States.
• Four percent of all malicious activity detected during the first six months of 2007 originated from IP
space registered to Fortune 100 companies.
• The education sector accounted for 30 percent of data breaches that could lead to identity theft during
this period, more than any other sector.
• Theft or loss of computer or other data-storage medium made up 46 percent of all data breaches that
could lead to identity theft during this period.
• The United States was the top country for underground economy servers, accounting for 64 percent of
the total known to Symantec.
28 50 Data is made available by Attrition.org, a non-profit computer-security related organization: http://www.attrition.org.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
• Credit cards were the most common commodity advertised on underground economy servers known to
Symantec, accounting for 22 percent of all items.
• Eighty-five percent of credit cards advertised for sale on underground economy servers known to
Symantec were issued by banks in the United States.
• Symantec observed an average of 52,771 active bot-infected computers per day in the first half of 2007,
a 17 percent decrease from the previous period.
• China had 29 percent of the world’s bot-infected computers, more than any other country. • The United States had the highest number of bot command-and-control servers, accounting for 43
percent of the worldwide total.
• Beijing was the city with the most bot-infected computers, accounting for seven percent of the
worldwide total.
• The average lifespan of a bot-infected computer during the first six months of 2007 was four days, up
from three days in the second half of 2006.
• Home users were the most highly targeted sector, accounting for 95 percent of all targeted attacks.
Attack Trends Discussion
This section will discuss selected “Attack Trends” metrics in greater depth, providing analysis and
discussion of the trends indicated by the data. The following metrics will be discussed:
• Malicious activity by country
• Malicious activity by country per Internet user• Malicious activity originating from Fortune 100 companies• Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by sector• Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by cause• Underground economy servers by location• Underground economy servers—credit cards• Underground economy servers—goods available for sale• Bot-infected computers• Lifespan of bot-infected computers• Bot-infected computers by country
Malicious activity by country
This metric will assess the countries in which the highest amount of malicious activity takes place or
originates. To determine this, Symantec has compiled geographical data on numerous malicious activities, namely: bot-infected computers, bot command-and-control servers, phishing Web sites, malicious code reports, spam zombies, and Internet attacks. In addition to data gathered from the Global Intelligence Network, this metric is based on data gathered from the other sources mentioned in the introduction to this report.
29Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
30To determine the amount of Internet-wide malicious activity that originated in each country, Symantec
calculated the mean average of the proportions of all of the aforementioned activities that originated in each country. This average was taken to represent the proportion of overall malicious activity that originated in the country in question and was used to rank each country. This section will discuss those findings.
Between January 1 and June 30, 2007, the United States was the top country for malicious activity,
making up 30 percent of worldwide malicious activity (table 2). This represents a minimal change from the second half of 2006, when the United States was also the highest ranked country, accounting for 31 percent of the world’s malicious activity. For each of the malicious activities taken into account for this measurement, the United States ranked number one by a large margin with the exception of bot-infected computers. It ranked second for that criteria behind only China.
Overall
Rank
1
23456789
10Previous
Rank
1
235478
10
6
11Country
United States
ChinaGermanyUnited KingdomFranceCanadaSpainItalySouth Korea JapanOverall
Proportion
30%
10%
7%4%4%4%3%3%3%2%
Previous
Overall
Proportion
31%
10%
7%4%4%3%3%3%4%2%Malicious
Code
Rank
1
27396
10
5
26
4Spam
Zombies
Rank
1
32
15
7
3110
68
20Command-
and-Control
Server Rank
1
526
12
3
22
84
13Phishing
Web
sites
1
18
2367
131210
8Bot
Rank
2
1375846
1316Attack
Rank
1
2354768
1210
Table 2. Malicious activity by country
Source: Symantec Corporation
It is not surprising that the United States was the site of the most malicious activity, as 18 percent of the
world’s Internet users are located there, more than any other country.51 Furthermore, it has a well established
and relatively long-standing Internet infrastructure. As a result, not only are there a lot of attackers there, but they have had a long time to understand the technologies and to hone their skills. Attackers in countries that have less well established traditions of Internet usage or that are still experiencing rapid growth in their Internet infrastructure may not have the same level of user sophistication.
In previous versions of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec has argued that as Internet
infrastructure becomes established, network and end user security should improve. As Internet users become more sophisticated, so does their knowledge of computer security issues overall. However, the prominence of the United States in this discussion, and the attendant level of malicious activity originating there, indicates that this is not always the case. This is likely because attackers are constantly adapting their attacks to circumvent effective security measures, meaning that even users with a high degree of computer security awareness may be at risk of new attack tactics. Given these considerations, and the country’s consistently high ranking in each of the high attack categories, the United States will likely remain number one for malicious activity for some time because of this.
51 http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats14.htmSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
31 52 http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm
53 http://www.forbes.com/2006/03/31/china-internet-usage-cx_nwp_0403china.html
54 http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/12/03/tech/main531567.shtml
55 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2264508.stm
56 It should be noted that the location of the command-and-control server does not necessarily correspond to the location of the b ot-network owner.
57 http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats4.htm
58 Ingress traffic refers to traffic that is coming into a network from the Internet or another network. Egress traffic refers to traffic that is leaving a
network, bound for the Internet or another network.China had the second highest amount of malicious activity during the first six months of 2007, accounting
for 10 percent of malicious activity detected worldwide, the same rank and percentage as in the previous reporting period. China has the second highest number of Internet users in the world, surpassed only by the United States.
52 However, users in China spend more time online, on average, than those in the
United States.53
While China ranked highly overall in most of the contributing criteria, it ranked only eighteenth in the
world for phishing Web sites. The relatively low ranking of phishing Web sites in China may be linked to the strict regulation of Web sites by the Chinese government,
54 which is enforced through Internet filtering
tools on every level from ISPs to Internet cafes.55
China also ranked only fifth for bot command-and-control servers, despite the fact that it ranked number
one for bot-infected computers. This discrepancy in numbers may indicate that bot-infected computers in China are being controlled by command-and-control servers outside of China. Since the United States has the highest number of command-and-control servers by a large margin, it is likely that bot-network owners in that country are using bot-infected computers in China to conduct attack activity.
56 Thus, some
malicious activity attributed to China may not be the result of attackers located there, although the same caveat would also apply to malicious activity originating in other countries as well.
In the first six months of 2007, Germany was the third ranked country for malicious activity. Seven
percent of all Internet-wide malicious activity originated there during this period, the same percentage as the second half of 2006 when it was also the third ranked country in this metric. Like both China and the United States, Germany has a well established Internet infrastructure. Furthermore, it has the fourth highest number of Internet users in the world, boasting five percent of the total.
57
Germany ranks highly in spam zombies, phishing Web sites, bot-infected computers, and command-
and-control servers. These activities are often associated with bot networks. As a result, it is likely that bot-networks are prominent in Germany, which would contribute to the high amount of malicious activity originating there.
On a global scale the distribution of the world’s malicious activity seems to be relatively static. It appears
that a country that is established as a frequent source of malicious activity tends to remain so. This seems to suggest that once an attack infrastructure is established in a country, it becomes entrenched and difficult to remove. Although malicious tools and methods may change, the proportion of malicious activity that originates within a country tends to remain relatively static. This is likely to remain the case until new and more effective measures are taken by countries to reduce the malicious activity originating from their networks.
There are a number of measures that enterprises, administrators, and end users can take to protect
against malicious activity. To prevent bot infections, Symantec recommends that ISPs perform both ingress and egress filtering to block known bot traffic.
58 ISPs should also filter out potentially malicious email
attachments to reduce exposure to enterprises and end users.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
32Enterprises should monitor all network-connected computers for signs of malicious activity, ensuring
that any infected computers are removed from the network and disinfected as soon as possible. They should also ensure that all antivirus definitions are updated regularly. As compromised computers can be a threat to other systems, Symantec also recommends that enterprises notify their ISPs of any potentially malicious activity.
Organizations should also perform filtering on outgoing network traffic, ensuring that malicious activity
and unauthorized communications are not taking place. They should also create and enforce policies that identify and restrict applications that can access the network.
End users should employ defense-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software and a
firewall. Users should update antivirus definitions regularly and ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their operating system vendor. Symantec also advises that users never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is expected and comes from a known and trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
Malicious activity by country per Internet user
Having assessed the top countries by malicious activity, Symantec has also evaluated the top 25 of these
countries according to the number of Internet users located there. This measure is intended to remove the bias of high numbers of Internet users from the consideration of the “Malicious activity by country” metric.
In order to determine this, Symantec divided the amount of malicious activity originating in each of the top
25 countries by the number of Internet users who are located in that country. The proportion assigned to each country in this discussion thus equates to the proportion of malicious activity that could be attributed to a single, or average, Internet user in that country. The percentage of malicious activity that would be carried out by each person is the amount assigned to each country in the discussion below.
During the first six months of 2007, Israel was the most highly ranked country for malicious activity per
Internet user. If one person from each of the top 25 countries were assessed as a representation of their country’s Internet users, the average user in Israel would carry out 11 percent of the group’s malicious activity (figure 6). This is a small increase from nine percent in the previous period.
Germany
(7) 5%
France
(9) 4%Netherlands
(8) 5%
Israel
(1) 11%Taiwan
(6) 6%Poland
(4) 6%
Switzerland
(10) 4%Spain
(5) 6%
Key
(X) = Rank% = Current proportionUnited States
(3) 6%Canada
(2) 6%
Figure 6. Malicious activity by country per Internet user
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
33This increase was likely due to a higher proportion of bot-infected computers, bot command-and-control
servers, and spam zombies located in Israel during this reporting period. This reflects the fact that bots are gaining prominence in Israel; in fact, the number of bot-infected computers located there increased by 15 percent between the second half of 2006 and the end of June 2007.
The prominence of Israel in this metric is likely influenced by the amount of time computer users there
spend online. According to a survey released in January 2007, users in Israel spend the second highest number of hours online, on average, less than only users in Canada, which ranked second in this metric.
59 The longer computers are online, the greater the opportunity for attackers to compromise them,
particularly through potential vulnerabilities in Internet-based services such as RPC-DCOM and/or client-side applications such as Web browsers.
Furthermore, computer security law enforcement resources in Israel may be insufficient to meet current
demands. This prompted a reorganization in 2005 that was intended to create a single information technology authority in the country to deal with computer and Internet crime.
60 As a result of these recent
changes, the new security organization may be experiencing difficulties in detecting and eliminating security issues. This is corroborated by the extensive industrial espionage scandal that was uncovered in Israel in 2005.
61
Finally, ISPs in Israel may not be adequately maintaining secure networks in the country. In 2005, a major
Israeli ISP was privatized.62 The ensuing competition amongst ISPs may have forced those organizations
to focus more on expanding their market share than providing the necessary measures for effective computer security.
Canada had the second most malicious activity per Internet user, accounting for six percent of the
worldwide total. In the previous reporting period, Canada ranked fifth in this category, with five percent of malicious activity per Internet user. As was discussed previously in this section, Canada had the highest number of hours spent online per person in the first half of 2007. This likely contributes to the country’s prominence.
The United States ranked third, accounting for six percent of malicious activity per Internet user. In
the second half of 2006, the United States was fourth in this category, but had the same proportion of malicious activity per Internet user. The United States had the fourth highest number of hours spent online per unique Internet user.
63
The prominence of both Canada and the United states is likely due to the number of hours spent online
by the average user and the well established Internet infrastructure in both countries. As was discussed in the “Malicious Activity per Country” metric, the population of Internet users in a country with a well established tradition of usership is more likely to have the skills and experience necessary to conduct sophisticated attack activity. As such it is likely that a higher proportion of the Internet user population would be able to carry out malicious activity, such as creating bot networks, which can then be used for subsequent attack activity.
59 http://www.websiteoptimization.com/bw/0703
60 http://www.crime-research.org/news/30.09.2005/1522
61 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8064757
62 http://globaltechforum.eiu.com/index.asp?layout=newdebi&country_id=IL&channelid=6&country=Israel&title=Doing+e-business+in+Isra el
63 http://www.websiteoptimization.com/bw/0703/Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
34Both Canada and the United States both ranked lower for malicious activity per Internet user in the second
half of 2006 than in the current reporting period. The current increase is primarily driven by a drop in malicious activity per Internet user in Taiwan, which came primarily from a drop in both malicious code infections and bot-infected computers. This is likely due to the fact that bot-infected computers in Taiwan dropped by 46 percent between the second half of 2006 and the end of the first half of 2007.
Malicious activity originating from Fortune 100 companies
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is evaluating the amount
of malicious activity originating from the IP space of computers and networks that are known to belong to Fortune 100 organizations. Briefly, these are the companies that are determined by Fortune magazine to be the 100 highest grossing companies in the world.
64 Symantec has compiled data on numerous malicious
activities that were detected originating from the IP address space of these companies.65 These activities
include: bot-infected computers, phishing Web sites, spam zombies, and Internet attacks.
This metric is significant because it indicates the level to which Fortune 100 organizations have been
compromised and are being used by attackers as launching pads for malicious activity. This could affect the performance of the company’s networks, thereby reducing employee productivity and limiting the ability of customers to access organizational resources. It could also potentially expose proprietary information, which could have serious business ramifications. Finally, attack activity originating from the organization’s network could have serious legal consequences for the company.
Between January 1 and June 30, 2007, four percent of malicious activity detected by Symantec originated
from the IP address space of Fortune 100 companies (figure 7). The IP space of Fortune 100 organizations constitutes just over seven percent of the world’s active and advertised IP space.
66 Since the proportion of
malicious activity originating from Fortune 100 IP space is lower than the proportion of the world’s active and advertised IP space that is assigned to these organizations, less attack activity is originating from Fortune 100 companies than other IP spaces. It is likely that security measures put in place on Fortune 100 networks make it difficult for attackers to compromise them, or to use them to launch attack activity. It could also be due to the fact that some Fortune 100 companies may not use all of the IP space allotted to them. Despite this, networks and computers within these organizations are likely enticing targets for attackers.
64 http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/2007
65 IP addresses for Fortune 100 companies were determined using autonomous system number (ASN) information.
66 IP addresses used to determine this proportion were derived from autonomous system number (ASN) information.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
35Fortune 100
companies 4%
Other 96%
Figure 7. Malicious activity originating from Fortune 100 companies
Source: Symantec Corporation
There are a number of reasons an attacker may specifically target a Fortune 100 company. Computers
within a Fortune 100 company offer attackers many benefits not offered by other computers. For instance, a single compromised computer within such an organization could allow an attacker to gain access to other computers within the organization. This could allow the attacker to harvest various types of information, including the organization’s customer database, financial activities of the organization, and proprietary technology or software to name a few.
A prominent example of this type of incident is the TJX compromise.
67 TJX is not a Fortune 100 company,
but it is a large organization that operates many different retail outlets including T.J. Maxx, T.K. Maxx, Marshalls, and Winners. Attackers compromised the wireless networks of the company, allowing them to steal the personal information of over 45 million customers, including credit card information, which was later used to commit fraud.
68
Attackers may also be enticed to target Fortune 100 companies in order to gain access to their
considerable network resources. Large organizations typically have much higher bandwidth networks than are available to home users. These would give an attacker access to much higher-speed and higher-capacity communications than would attacks against small office and home user computers. This could facilitate a wide variety of attack activity, such as large DoS attacks. It could also potentially allow small attacks to go unnoticed amidst the high volume of standard business traffic.
Fortune 100 companies also present an attractive target for phishers. For example, an attacker could use
a compromised Web server within a Fortune 100 retail company to host phishing Web sites that target customers of the company. Since the phishing Web site would actually be on the compromised company’s Web server customers may be unable to identify it as being fraudulent. An attacker could send also phishing emails from a compromised mail server within a Fortune 100 company’s network, which would have a similar obfuscating effect.
67 http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/441
68 http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11438Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
36To maintain secure networks, organizations should employ defense-in-depth strategies, including the
deployment of IDS/IPS solutions, antivirus and antifraud solutions and a firewall. Users should update antivirus definitions regularly and ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers within an organization are updated with all necessary security patches from their respective vendors. Symantec also advises that policies exist that prevent users from viewing, opening, or executing any email attachment unless the attachment is expected and comes from a known and trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft
Identity theft is an increasingly prevalent security issue, particularly for organizations that store and
manage information that could facilitate identity theft. Compromises that result in the loss of personal data could be quite costly, not only to the people whose identity may be at risk and their respective financial institutions, but also to the organization responsible for collecting the data. The metrics that follow will assess data breaches that may have exposed information that could lead to identity theft.
Data breaches that lead to identity theft could damage an organization’s reputation, and undermine
customer and institutional confidence in the organization. With the implementation of recent legislation in some jurisdictions,
69 organizations can also be held liable for data breaches and losses, which may
result in fines or litigation.70 Examples of such legislation include the Health Insurance Probability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA),71 enacted in the United States in 1996, and the Plastic Card Security Act,
which was enacted in Minnesota in April 2007.72 The latter is based on the Payment Card Industry (PCI)
Compliance standard.73
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by sector
Using publicly available data,74 Symantec has determined the sectors that were most often affected by
these breaches, as well as the most common causes of data loss. This metric will also explore the number of identities exposed due to these data breaches using the same publicly available data. An identity is considered to be exposed if personal or financial data related to the identity is exposed through the breach.
It should be noted that some sectors may need to comply with more stringent data breach reporting
requirements than others. For instance, government organizations are more likely to report data breaches, either due to regulatory obligations or in conjunction with publicly accessible audits and performance reports.
75 Furthermore, organizations that rely on consumer confidence may be less inclined to report
such breaches for fear of negative consumer, industry, or market reaction. As a result, sectors that are not required or encouraged to report may be under-represented in this data set.
In the first half of 2007, the education sector accounted for 30 percent of all known data breaches that
could lead to identity theft, more than any other sector (figure 8). This is up from the previous period when education accounted for only 22 percent of the total and was the second ranked sector.
69 http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmbills/001/2000001.htm
70 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2007/021.shtml
71 http://www.cms.hhs.gov/HIPAAGenInfo/
72 http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/bin/bldbill.php?bill=S1574.2.html&session=ls85
73 Payment Card Industry (PCI) Compliance is a set of security standards that were created by numerous major credit card companies to protect their customers from
increasing identity theft and security breaches. For more information, please see: http://www.pcicomplianceguide.org/businessco mpliance.html
74 http://attrition.org/dataloss/
75 For example, the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA) of California. For more on this act, please see: htt p://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs6a-facta.htm.
Another example is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. For more information see: http://www.cms.hh s.gov/HIPAAGenInfo/Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
37Telecom 1%Arts/media 1%Computer software 1%Transportation 1%
Manufacturing 1%
Military 1%Community/non-profit 2%
Health care 15%
Financial 14%Government 26%1%
Other 6%1%1%
1%
1%1%Retail/wholesale 6%
Education 30%
Figure 8. Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by sector
Source: Based on data provided by Attrition.org
Educational organizations store a lot of personal information that could be used for the purposes
of identity theft. These organizations—particularly larger universities—often consist of many semi-independent departments in which sensitive personal identification information may be stored in separate locations and be accessible by many people. This increases the opportunities for attackers to gain unauthorized access to this data. Adding to this is the fact that research hospitals, which are considered part of the education sector, store considerable amounts of patients’ personal data, including medical information.
In spite of the high number of data breaches that occurred in the education sector during the first six
months of 2007, it only accounted for one percent of all identities exposed during the period (figure 9). This is likely because most data breaches within the education sector were caused by theft or loss of computers or data-storage devices. Unlike hacking, in which data breaches can last for an extended period and expose numerous identities, breaches caused by theft or loss can only be opportunistically taken advantage of and cannot provide long term access to large amounts of data.
76 Breaches that occur in the
education sector are therefore not as likely to result in wide-scale identity theft because they result in the exposure of relatively few identities.
76 A data breach is considered to be caused by hacking if identity theft-related data was exposed by an attacker or attackers by g aining unauthorized
access to computers or networks.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
38Health care 1%Financial 1%
Retail/wholesale 85%Government 12%
Other <1%Education 1%
Figure 9. Identities exposed by sector
Source: Based on data provided by Attrition.org
During this reporting period, the government sector accounted for 26 percent of data breaches that could
lead to identity theft, making it the second highest sector for this consideration. This sector had the most breaches that could lead to identity theft in the second half of 2006, accounting for 33 percent of the total during that period.
Government organizations, like educational organizations, store a considerable amount of information
that could be used for identity theft. Similar to the educational sector, these organizations often consist of numerous semi-independent departments. As a consequence, sensitive personal identification information may be stored in separate locations and be accessible by numerous people. This increases the opportunities for attackers to gain unauthorized access to this data.
The government sector also ranked second for the overall number of identities exposed during the
period, accounting for 12 percent of the total. As was the case with the educational sector, the number of identities exposed is relatively small compared to the number of data breaches in this sector. Thus, breaches that occur in the government sector are less likely to result in wide-scale identity theft than those in other sectors.
The health care sector accounted for 15 percent of data breaches that could lead to identity theft in
the first half of 2007. Health care ranked fourth in the previous period, accounting for 11 percent of all breaches that could lead to identity theft. The prominence of the health care sector in this metric is likely due to similar factors that influence the prominence of both education and government as outlined previously. Furthermore, health organizations store information related to personal health, which could result in damaging breaches of privacy if viewed by unauthorized people.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
39The health care sector ranked fifth for the overall number of identities exposed, accounting for just over
one percent. So, like both education and government sectors, data breaches within the health care sector resulted in a relatively low number of exposed identities. Thus, breaches in this sector are relatively less likely to result in wide-scale identity theft than those in other sectors because they expose less identity-theft related data.
During the first half of 2007, the retail/wholesale sector accounted for only six percent of all data breaches
that could lead to identity theft, making it the fifth ranked sector during this period. However, the sector was responsible for the largest number of exposed identities, accounting for 85 percent. Breaches in this sector were thus far more likely to result in wide-scale identity theft than any other sector. Each data breach would facilitate identity theft to a much greater degree.
The prominence of the retail/wholesale sector was primarily due to the data breach involving the TJX group
of retail companies. TJX was a victim of an extensive attack that exposed over 45 million credit and debit card numbers. The number of identities exposed through this breach alone made up over 70 percent of all identities exposed during the period. Due to the nature and extended time span of the compromise, it is likely that these breaches were due to a failure of effective security policies.
77
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by cause
In the first half of 2007, the primary cause of data breaches that could facilitate identity theft was the
theft or loss of a computer or other medium on which data is stored or transmitted, such as a USB key or a back-up medium (figure 10). These made up 46 percent of all such data breaches during this period. Theft or loss accounted for 57 percent of all reported breaches in the previous reporting period. Despite this, theft or loss of a computers and storage media only accounted for 11 percent of all identities exposed (figure 11). Thus, although theft or loss of computers and computer media is extremely common, it can be considered less likely to result in wide-scale identity theft than other causes, as it results in relatively fewer exposed identities.
This is likely because in many cases, theft or loss of a computer or computer media is driven not by a
desire to steal data, but to steal the hardware itself. A person who steals a laptop is likely driven by the desire to simply sell the laptop for financial gain, and not to harvest the data it may store.
77 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/05/04/txj_nonfeasance/Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
40Hacking 16%
Insider 2%
Theft/loss 46%Unknown 2%Insecure policy 34%
Figure 10. Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by cause
Source: Based on data provided by Attrition.org
The second most common cause of data breaches that could lead to identity theft during this period was
insecure policy, which made up 34 percent of all incidents. A data breach is considered to be caused by insecure policy if it can be attributed to a failure to develop, implement, and/or comply with adequate security policy. In the previous period, insecure policy also ranked second, accounting for 27 percent of such data breaches.
In the first half of 2007, insecure policy accounted for only three percent of exposed identities (figure 11).
Thus, each breach exposed relatively little personal identity information. This implies that breaches caused by insecure policy are not currently considered particularly likely to result in wide-scale identity theft.
In the first six months of 2007, hacking was the third leading cause of data breaches that could lead to
identity theft, accounting for 16 percent of the total. A data breach is considered to be caused by hacking if identity theft-related data was exposed by an attacker or attackers by gaining unauthorized access to computers or networks. During the last six months of 2006, hacking also ranked third, accounting for 11 percent of breaches that could facilitate identity theft.
Hacking was responsible for 73 percent of identities exposed during the period. The prominence of hacking
as a cause of exposed identities was largely driven by the TJX breach that was discussed previously in this section. This shows clearly that hacking is the cause of data breaches that is most likely to lead to wide-scale identity theft. This is likely because hacking is more clearly purpose-driven than insecure policy or the loss or theft of devices. It is an intentional act with a clearly defined purpose: to steal data that can be used for purposes of identity theft or other fraud.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Hacking 73%Insider 13%
Theft/loss 11%Unknown <1%
Insecure policy 3%
Figure 11. Number of identities exposed by cause
Source: Based on data provided by Attrition.org
Most breaches that could lead to identity theft are avoidable. In the case of theft or loss, the compromise
of data could be averted by encrypting all sensitive data. This would ensure that even if the data is lost or stolen, it would not be accessible to unauthorized third parties. This step should be part of a broader security policy that organizations should develop, implement, and enforce in order to ensure that all sensitive data is protected from unauthorized access.
Organizations can further protect against security breaches that may lead to identity theft by employing
defense-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of IDS/IPS solutions, antivirus and antifraud solutions, and a firewall. Antivirus definitions should be updated regularly and all desktop, laptop, and server computers within the organization should be updated with all necessary security patches from their respective vendors.
To help prevent accidental or intentional data leaks, organizations should employ data leakage prevention
solutions. Symantec also advises organizations to develop and implement policies that prevent users from viewing, opening, or executing any email attachment unless the attachment is expected and comes from a known and trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
Underground economy servers
Underground economy servers are used by criminals and criminal organizations to sell stolen information,
typically for subsequent use in identity theft. This data can include government-issued identification numbers (such as Social Security numbers), credit cards, bank cards, personal identification numbers (PINs), user accounts, and email address lists. Symantec tracks and assesses underground economy servers across the Internet using proprietary online fraud monitoring tools.
41Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
78 http://internetworldstats.com/top20.htm
42This discussion will assess underground economy servers in two ways: according to the location of the
underground economy server and according to the location of banks that issued credit and debit cards that were being advertised on underground economy servers. It will also look at the different types of items that are being exchanged through underground economy servers as well as the different credit cards and credit card information that is available for sale. It should be noted that this discussion may not necessarily be representative of Internet-wide activity; rather, it is intended as a snapshot of the activity that Symantec monitored during this period.
Underground economy servers by location
During the first six months of 2007, 64 percent of all underground economy servers identified by Symantec
were located in the United States, by far the highest total of any country (figure 12). During the last half of 2006, the United States was home to the majority of underground economy servers as well, accounting for 51 percent of the total known to Symantec. The prominence of the United States is likely associated with the relatively high level of malicious activity there, as was discussed previously in this report. This is likely influenced most strongly by the fact that the United States has the highest number of Internet users in the world.
78
Key
(X) = Rank% = Current proportionUnited
Kingdom
(4) 4%
France
(6) 1% Turkey
(7) 1%Sweden
(3) 9%
Germany
(2) 12%
Australia
(9) 1%United States
(1) 64%Canada
(5) 3%Ukraine
(10) <1%
Romania
(8) 1%
Figure 12. Location of underground economy servers
Source: Symantec Corporation
Germany had the second most economy servers during the first half of 2007, accounting for 12 percent of
the worldwide total. In the previous reporting period, Germany ranked fourth, accounting for six percent. Sweden ranked third, accounting for nine percent of worldwide underground economy servers. During the last half of 2006 Sweden ranked second and accounted for 15 percent of all economy servers observed by Symantec.
For each of the top ten countries, the proportion of underground economy servers changed considerably
from the previous period. This can be attributed to the nature of these servers, which are often hosted as channels on public IRC servers. Once a fraud-related IRC channel becomes popular, it is often either shut down by the IRC server administrators or abandoned by its users due to legal liability and the increased Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
possibility of being caught. As such, the location of an underground economy server is primarily driven by
convenience. Furthermore, the geographic location of the server is typically not of any consequence to those involved; users of underground economy servers do most of their business electronically so they have no geographical restrictions.
Underground economy servers—credit cards
During the first six months of 2007, Symantec observed 8,011 distinct credit cards being advertised
for exchange on underground economy servers. This is only a small proportion of the credit cards sold, however. Typically, users selling credit card information advertise bulk rates and merely give examples of credit card information to attract buyers. Common bulk amounts and rates seen by Symantec during the first six months of 2007 were: 10 credit card numbers for $20 USD; 50 credit card numbers for $70 USD; and 100 credit card numbers for $100 USD.
Symantec also determined that the 85 percent of credit and debit cards advertised for sale on underground
economy servers in the first half of 2007 were issued by banks in the United States (figure 13). This is down slightly from 86 percent in the last six months of 2006.
Key
(X) = Rank% = Current proportionUnited
Kingdom
(2) 8%
France
(5) <1%
Mexico
(4) 1%Japan
(7) <1%Germany
(9) <1%
Italy
(10) <1%
Australia
(6) <1%United States
(1) 85%Canada
(3) 1%
New Zealand
(8) <1%
Figure 13. Location of banks whose cards were sold on underground economy servers
Source: Symantec Corporation
At the end of 2005, there were approximately 1.3 billion credit cards in circulation in the United States,
substantially more than any other country. This likely explains the prominence of US banks in this consideration.
79 Furthermore, the average citizen of the United States has just over four credit cards.80
If a credit card holder has a large number of credit cards, and uses them all on a regular basis, it is reasonable to assume that monitoring them for illicit use could become difficult.
Identifying fraudulent charges may be even more difficult if they are small or relatively insignificant. For
example, small charges may occur when a fraudster attempts to verify whether a card is active by using the stolen card to donate a small amount of money to a charity.
81 If the transaction is successful, the credit card
information is then sold or bought. If such a small charge is not identified, the stolen card will likely be used later to commit greater fraud.
79 http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss78p2.pdf
80 http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss78p2.pdf
81 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/07/scammers_make_friends_with_cha.html
43Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
82 http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss78p2.pdf
83 http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss78p2.pdf
84 http://www.cardweb.com/cardtrak/pastissues/december2004.html
44During the first six months of 2007, eight percent of all credit and debit cards advertised on underground
economy servers were issued by banks in the United Kingdom, making it the second ranked country, albeit well behind the United States. With just under 70 million credit cards in circulation in the United Kingdom, just over five percent of the number circulating in the United States, the position of the former relative to the latter is not surprising.
82
Canada ranked third, accounting for one percent of all credit and debit cards advertised on underground
economy servers, the same rank and percentage as in the previous six-month period. Canada had just over 60 million credit cards in circulation in 2005.
83 The high number of cards likely has an influence
on Canada’s ranking. However, Canadian credit cards may be less desirable because criminals using stolen cards may have more trouble using them outside of Canada because of the credit card monitoring practices of Canadian banks.
The proportion of credit cards advertised matches closely with their respective market share.
84 This implies
that the identity-theft community is not specifically targeting any credit card brand.
Underground economy servers—goods available for sale
For the first time, in this issue of the Internet Security Threat Report ¸ Symantec is assessing the types of
goods that are most frequently offered for sale on underground economy servers. During the first half of 2007, credit cards were the most frequently advertised item, making up 22 percent of all goods (table 3).
Rank
1
23456789
10Item
Credit Cards
Bank AccountsEmail PasswordsMailersEmail AddressesProxiesFull IdentityScamsSocial Security NumbersCompromised UNIX ShellsPercentage
22%
21%
8%8%6%6%6%6%3%2%Range of Prices
$0.50–$5
$30–$400 $1–$350$8–$10$2/MB–$4/MB$0.50–$3$10–$150$10/week$5–$7$2–$10
Table 3. Breakdown of goods available for sale on underground economy servers
Source: Symantec Corporation
Bank account credentials, including account numbers and authentication information, were the second
most commonly advertised item on underground economy servers during the period, accounting for 21 percent of all advertised goods. The advertised price for bank account credentials varied widely, ranging between $30 and $400 USD, and was dependent on the funds available in the account. Bank accounts that included higher balances were worth considerably more. Furthermore, bank account information that included personal information of the victim was more highly valued.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
45Email passwords were the third most common item advertised for sale, making up eight percent of all
advertised goods. Email passwords allow access to an email account and are typically used for sending spam. They can also be used to recover a user’s passwords from various Web sites that will email password-reset information to the user’s email account. The prices for advertised email passwords ranged between $1 USD and $350 USD, depending on whether the account had been used for spamming previously. Furthermore, the value of the account was also based on the username in the email itself; email accounts with usernames that were standard English terms were generally very highly priced.
In order to reduce the likelihood of identity theft, organizations that store personal information should take
the necessary steps to protect data transmitted over the Internet or stored on their computers. This should include the development, implementation, and enforcement of secure policy requiring that all sensitive data is encrypted. Also, organizations should enforce compliance to information storage and transmission standards such as the PCI standard. This would ensure that even if the computer or medium on which the data were lost or stolen, the data would not be accessible. This step should be part of a broader security policy that organizations should develop and implement in order to ensure that any sensitive data is protected from unauthorized access.
Bot-infected computers
Bots are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s machine in order to allow an unauthorized user to
control the computer remotely. They allow an attacker to remotely control the targeted system through a communication channel such as IRC. These channels allow the remote attacker to control a large number of compromised computers in a bot network, which can then be used to launch coordinated attacks.
Bots allow for a wide range of functionality and most can be updated to assume new functionality by
downloading new code and features. Bots can be used by external attackers to perform DoS attacks against an organization’s Web site. Furthermore, bots within an organization’s network can be used to attack other organizations’ Web sites, which can have serious business and legal consequences. Bots can also be used by attackers to harvest confidential information from compromised computers, which can lead to identity theft. Furthermore, they can be used to distribute spam and phishing attacks, as well as spyware and adware.
An active bot-infected computer is one that carries out at least one attack per day. This does not have to
be continuous; rather, a single computer can be active on a number of different days. Between January 1 and June 30, 2007, Symantec observed an average of 52,771 active bot-infected computers per day (figure 14), a 17 percent decrease from the previous reporting period. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
46 85 For instance, please see Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume IX (March 2006):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_report_ix.pdf : p. 3 0
86 http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel07/botnet061307.htmDateActive bot-infected computers
Apr 11, 2006 Jul 20, 2006 Oct 28, 2006 Feb 05, 2007020,00040,00060,00080,000
10,00030,00050,00070,000100,000
May 16, 2007 Jan 01, 2006Moving averageMedian daily
active bots90,000
Figure 14. Active bot-infected computers per day
Source: Symantec Corporation
A distinct bot-infected computer is a distinct computer that was active at least once during the period.
Symantec also observed 5,029,309 distinct bot-infected computers during this period, a 17 percent decrease from the last six months of 2006.
The decrease in bots observed over the past six months is likely due to a number of reasons, the primary
one likely being a change in bot attack methods. As has been discussed in previous volumes of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , the exploitation of network-based vulnerabilities to spread bots
is being slowly abandoned for methods that are more likely to succeed, such as bots that send a mass mailing of themselves.
85 Network-based attacks have been limited somewhat by the introduction of default
firewalls in popular operating systems such as Microsoft Windows XP, as well as an increasing awareness of computer security issues among organizations and computer users. As a result, their use has declined, which has had the effect of limiting the propagation of bots.
Furthermore, law enforcement initiatives targeting bot-networks may also be having some effect. Recently
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States released information on Operation Bot Roast. This is an ongoing cyber-crime initiative aimed at dismantling bot networks by identifying and arresting bot network owners and taking down the command-and-control servers by which they control their networks.
86
Initiatives such as these will likely result in a reduction in bots for a number of reasons. Firstly, as bot networks are dismantled, less bot activity will be observed. Secondly, as bot network owners become aware of the scrutiny of law enforcement agencies, they are likely to alter their tactics to avoid detection. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Lifespan of bot-infected computers
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is assessing the average
lifespan of bot-infected computers. The lifespan of a bot is defined as the amount of time that elapses between the first detection of a bot-infected computer and the time that the computer is no longer actively attacking for 30 days, after which time it is assumed to have been disinfected. Gauging the average lifespan of bot-infected computers is important because it allows Symantec to assess how long bot-infected computers are present on a particular network prior to removal.
During the first six months of 2007, the lifespan of the average bot-infected computer was four days
(figure 15). This is an increase from the previous period, when the average lifespan was three days. The median lifespan of a bot-infected computer during both periods was one day. This indicates that the majority of bot-infected computers only participate in attacking behavior for a short period, after which they are either identified and disinfected, or are used for activities other than carrying out Internet attacks, such as hosting spam zombies or phishing Web sites. The longest lifespan of a bot-infected computer during the period was 3.2 years. However, bots with such long life spans are rare.
PeriodJul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 20074 days
3 days
Figure 15. Average lifespan of bot-infected computers
Source: Symantec Corporation
The increase in the average lifespan from three to four days over the first six months of 2007 is not likely
indicative of a fundamental change. Since the median remained the same, the change in overall average is driven by the longer-lasting bot-infected computers. The increased lifespan of the longer-lasting bot-infected computers has thereby increased the average lifespan. Thus, the bot lifespan is holding steady.
47Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
It therefore appears that law enforcement efforts, such as the FBI Bot Roast discussed above, as well
as other security measures designed to identify and disinfect bot-infected computers are not reducing the lifespan of bot-infected computers. This is likely because the focus of those methods is to eliminate infections and keep infected computers free of bot software, and not necessarily to shorten the effective lives of bot-infected computers. This is supported by the fact that the number of bot-infected computers has decreased during the period while their lifespan remains steady.
Symantec also tracks the number of bot command-and-control servers worldwide. Command-and-control
servers are computers that bot network owners use to relay commands to bot-infected computers on their networks, usually through IRC channels. In the first six months of 2007, Symantec identified 4,622 bot command-and-control servers (figure 16). This is a three percent decrease from the previous period, when 4,746 command-and-control servers were identified.
PeriodJan–Jun 2006 Jul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 20074,6226,337
4,746
Figure 16. Command-and-control servers
Source: Symantec Corporation
The decrease in command-and-control servers reflects a consolidation of bot networks that Symantec
first observed in second half of 2006.87 During that period, the number of command-and-control servers
decreased and the average size of bot networks increased. As a result, over the past year, bot networks appear to have become more concentrated in the hands of fewer bot network owners.
87 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume XI (March 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xi_03_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 17, 34
48Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
The marginal drop observed in the first six months of 2007 is likely due to a change in the fundamental
methods that bots use to communicate. That is, bot network owners are moving away from using command-and-control servers and adopting new methods instead. One example is the fast flux domain name service scheme.
88 In this scheme, control of bot networks is diffused through a number of computers
within the bot network. This removed the need for a single command-and-control server, and as such may represent a future trend that will make command-and-control servers less common. Other trends in methods of communication such as peer-to-peer communication will also lend to the decrease in the number of command-and-control servers.
To prevent bot infections, Symantec recommends that ISPs perform both ingress and egress filtering to
block known bot traffic. ISPs should also filter out potentially malicious email attachments to reduce exposure to enterprises and end users.
Organizations should monitor all network-connected computers for signs of bot infection, ensuring that
any infections are detected and isolated as soon as possible. They should also ensure that all antivirus definitions are updated regularly. As compromised computers can be a threat to other systems, Symantec also recommends that enterprises notify their ISPs of any potentially malicious activity.
Organizations should also perform egress filtering on outgoing network traffic, ensuring that malicious
activity and unauthorized communications are not taking place. They should also create and enforce policies that identify and restrict applications that can access the network.
To reduce exposure to bot-related attacks, end users should employ defense-in-depth strategies, including
the deployment of antivirus software and a firewall. Users should update antivirus definitions regularly and ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their operating system vendor. Symantec also advises that users never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is expected and comes from a known and trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
Bot-infected computers by country
Recognizing the ongoing threat posed by bot networks, Symantec tracks the distribution of bot-infected
computers worldwide. This can help analysts understand how bot-infected computers, and the networks they constitute, are distributed globally. This is important, as a high percentage of bot-infected computers likely indicates a greater potential for bot-related attacks. It could also give insight into the level of patching and security awareness amongst computer administrators and users in a given region, as initial bot infections usually take advantage of unpatched computer systems.
China had the highest number of bot-infected computers during the first half of 2007, accounting for
29 percent of the worldwide total (figure 17). This is a slight increase from 26 percent in the second half of 2006, when China also had the highest number of bot-infected computers.
49
88 http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11473Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Key
(X) = Current rank% = Current proportionUnited
Kingdom
(7) 4%
France
(5) 5%
Spain
(4) 6%China
(1) 29%Germany
(3) 9%
Poland
(10) 3%
Israel
(9) 3%Italy
(6) 4%Canada
(8) 3%
United States
(2) 13%
Figure 17. Bot-infected computers by country
Source: Symantec Corporation
Symantec has observed that bots usually infect computers that are connected to high-speed broadband
Internet through large ISPs and that the expansion of broadband connectivity often facilitates the spread of bots. China’s Internet infrastructure is currently expanding rapidly.
89 Between May 2006 and May 2007,
China added more broadband lines than any other country.90
However, it is worth noting that China’s increase in bot-infected computers seems to be slowing. In the first
half of 2006, the percentage of worldwide bot-infected computers situated in China increased from nine percent to 20 percent. In the second half of 2006, the rate of increase slowed to six percentage points, from 20 percent to 26 percent. In the first half of 2007, it went up only three percentage points. This may be a sign that security awareness, practices and infrastructure are beginning to catch up with the rapid growth of Internet usage in China.
In the first six months of 2007, the United States had the second highest number of bot-infected
computers, accounting for 13 percent of the worldwide total. This is almost unchanged from the second half of 2006, when the United States ranked second, accounting for 14 percent of the world’s bot-infected computers. Germany had the third highest number of bot-infected computers during the first half of 2007, accounting for nine percent of the worldwide total. During the second half of 2006, Germany ranked fourth and accounted for six percent of the world’s bot-infected computers.
During the first half of 2007, the United States had the most known command-and-control servers
worldwide (table 4), accounting for 43 percent of the worldwide total. This is a marginal increase from the previous period, when the United States was also the site of the most command-and-control servers, accounting for 40 percent of the worldwide total.
89 http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/news/2163552/china-lead-broadband-world
90 http://www.point-topic.com
50Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
51The high proportion of command-and-control servers in the United States likely indicates that servers there
control not only bot networks within the country but elsewhere as well. The high proportion of bot-infected computers and command-and-control servers in the United States is driven by that country’s extensive Internet and technology infrastructure. As of June 2006, more than 58 million broadband Internet users were located there, the highest number in the world.
91
Current
Rank
1
234567
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
352496
10
7
11Country
United States
GermanyCanadaSouth KoreaChinaUnited KingdomTaiwan
Italy
Sweden
TurkeyCurrent
Proportion
43%
7%7%6%3%3%3%
2%
2%
2%Previous
Proportion
40%
6%4%
10%
5%2%3%
2%
3%
2%
Table 4. Command-and-control servers by country
Source: Symantec Corporation
Germany had the second highest number of command-and-control servers in the first six months of 2007,
accounting for seven percent of the worldwide total. During the previous period, Germany ranked third and accounted for six percent of the worldwide total. During the current reporting period, Canada had the third most command-and-control servers in the world, accounting for seven percent of the total. This is an increase over the second half of 2006, when Canada ranked fifth and accounted for four percent of the world’s total.
91 http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3343,en_2649_34223_38446855_1_1_1_1,00.htmlSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Vulnerability Trends
Vulnerabilities are design or implementation errors in information systems that can result in a compromise
of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information stored upon or transmitted over the affected system. They are most often found in software; however, they exist in all layers of information systems, from design or protocol specifications to physical hardware implementations. Vulnerabilities may be triggered actively—either by malicious users or automated malicious code—or passively during system operation. The discovery and disclosure of a single vulnerability in a critical asset can seriously undermine the security posture of an organization.
New vulnerabilities are discovered and disclosed regularly by a sizeable community of end users, security
researchers, hackers, security vendors, and occasionally by the software vendors themselves. Symantec carefully monitors vulnerability research, tracking vulnerabilities throughout their lifecycle, from initial disclosure and discussion to the development and release of a patch or other remediation measure.
Symantec operates one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion of vulnerabilities on
the Internet, the BugTraq mailing list, which has approximately 50,000 direct subscribers who contribute, receive, and discuss vulnerability research on a daily basis.
92 Symantec also maintains one of the world’s
most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting of over 22,000 vulnerabilities (spanning more than a decade) affecting more than 50,000 technologies from over 8,000 vendors. The following discussion of vulnerability trends is based on a thorough analysis of that data.
This section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report will discuss vulnerabilities that have
been disclosed between January 1 and June 30, 2007. It will compare them with those disclosed in the previous six-month period and discuss how current vulnerability trends may affect potential future Internet security activity.
Vulnerability trends highlights
The following section will offer a brief summary of some of the vulnerability trends that Symantec observed during this reporting period based on data provided by the sources listed above. Following this overview, the Internet Security Threat Report will discuss selected vulnerability metrics in greater depth, providing
analysis and discussion of the trends indicated by the data.
• Symantec documented 2,461 vulnerabilities in the first half of 2007, three percent less than the second
half of 2006.
• Symantec classified nine percent of all vulnerabilities disclosed during this period as high severity,
51 percent were medium severity, and 40 percent were low. In the second half of 2006, four percent of newly disclosed vulnerabilities were high severity, 69 percent were medium severity, and 27 percent were low severity.
• Sixty-one percent of vulnerabilities disclosed during this period affected Web applications, down from
66 percent in the second half of 2006.
52
92 The BugTraq mailing list is hosted by SecurityFocus (http://www.securityfocus.com). Archives are available at http://www.secur ityfocus.com/archive/1Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
53• Seventy-two percent of vulnerabilities documented in this reporting period were easily exploitable.
This is a decrease from 79 percent in the previous reporting period.
• In the first half of 2007, all operating systems except Hewlett Packard HP-UX had shorter average patch
development times than in the second half of 2006.
• Hewlett-Packard HP-UX had an average patch development time of 112 days in the first half of 2007,
the highest of any operating system. Sun had the highest average patch development time in the second half of 2006, with 145 days.
• The average window of exposure for vulnerabilities affecting enterprise vendors was 55 days. This is an
increase over the 47-day average in the second half of 2006.
• Symantec documented 39 vulnerabilities in Microsoft Internet Explorer, 34 in Mozilla browsers, 25 in
Apple Safari, and seven in Opera. In the second half of 2006, 54 vulnerabilities were disclosed for Internet Explorer, 40 for Mozilla browsers, four for Apple Safari, and four for Opera.
• Apple Safari had an average window of exposure of three days in the first half of 2007, the shortest of
any browser reviewed during this period. Mozilla browsers had the shortest average window of exposure in the second half of 2006, two days.
• Symantec documented six zero-day vulnerabilities in the first half of 2007, down from the 12 that were
reported during the second half of 2006.
• Ninety-seven vulnerabilities were documented in Oracle, more than any other database during the first
half of 2007. Oracle also had the most database vulnerabilities in the second half of 2006, with 168.
• There were 90 unpatched enterprise vendor vulnerabilities in the first half of 2007, which is down from
the 94 documented in the second half of 2006. Microsoft had the most unpatched vulnerabilities of any enterprise vendor during both of these periods.
• In the first half of 2007, Symantec documented 237 vulnerabilities in Web browser plug-ins. This is
a significant increase over 74 in the second half of 2006.
• During the first half of 2007, 89 percent of plug-in vulnerabilities disclosed affected ActiveX components
for Internet Explorer. ActiveX components accounted for 58 percent of plug-in vulnerabilities in the second half of 2006.
• Symantec found that more than 50 percent of medium- and high-severity vulnerabilities patched by
operating system vendors affected Web browsers or had other client-side attack vectors during this and the previous reporting period. Apple was the sole exception, with 49 percent of the vulnerabilities examined in the first half of 2007 affecting browsers or having client-side attack vectors.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
54Vulnerability Trends Discussion
This section will discuss selected vulnerability trends in greater depth, providing analysis and discussion
of the trends indicated by the data. The following metrics will be discussed:
• Patch development time for operating systems
• Patched operating system vulnerability by type• Window of exposure for enterprise vendors• Web application vulnerabilities• Web browser vulnerabilities• Window of exposure for Web browsers • Zero-day vulnerabilities• Unpatched enterprise vendor vulnerabilities• Browser plug-in vulnerabilities• Vulnerabilities—protection and mitigation
Patch development time for operating systems
The time period between the disclosure date of a vulnerability and the release date of an associated patch
is known as the patch development time. If exploit code is created and made public during this time, computers may be immediately vulnerable to widespread attack. This metric will assess and compare the average patch development times of medium- and high-severity vulnerabilities affecting five different operating systems: Apple Mac OS® X, Hewlett-Packard HP-UX, Microsoft Windows, Red Hat® Linux (including enterprise versions and Red Hat Fedora), and Sun Microsystems Solaris™.
Of the five operating systems tracked in the first six months of 2007 (figure 18), Microsoft had the shortest
average patch development time at 18 days, based on a sample set of 38 patched vulnerabilities. Of the 38 vulnerabilities, two affected third-party applications. This is lower than the average patch development time of 23 days in the second half of 2006 based on a sample set of 50 vulnerabilities, seven of which affected third-party applications.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
5549
23Jul–Dec 2006145
87
49
Apple
Avera ge time in days0 20 40 60 80 100Period
140 160Jan–Jun 2007110
36
18112
43
120Sun
Red Hat
MicrosoftHP
Figure 18. Patch development time for operating systems
Source: Symantec Corporation
Red Hat had the second shortest average patch development time in the first six months of 2007, with
an average of 36 days for a sample set of 91 vulnerabilities. Of these, 90 affected third-party applications. The average patch development time is down from 49 days in the second half of 2006, which was based on 149 vulnerabilities, all of which affected third-party applications.
Apple had the third shortest average patch development time in the first half of 2007; it was 43 days for
a sample set of 59 vulnerabilities. Nine of those vulnerabilities affected third-party applications. This is a shorter average patch development time than the 49 days reported in the second half of 2006, which was based on a sample set of 32 vulnerabilities, including 12 that affected third-party applications.
Sun had the fourth shortest average patch development time in the first half of 2007, at 110 days for a
sample set of 73 vulnerabilities. Sixty-seven of those affected third-party applications. This figure is down from the 145 day patch development time in the second half of 2006. This was based on a sample set of 35 vulnerabilities, 32 of which affected third-party applications.
HP had the longest average patch development time during this reporting period, at 112 days. This
was based on a total of 30 vulnerabilities, 28 of which affected third-party applications. The average patch development time for this period was higher than the 87 days reported in the second half of 2006. The previous period was based on a sample set of 70 vulnerabilities, 68 of which affected third-party applications.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
56Vulnerabilities affecting third-party applications are still a factor in the average patch development time
for operating systems. Vendors with fewer third-party applications to patch generally have an advantage over those whose operating systems comprise many third-party components. However, the vulnerabilities affecting these vendors often affect core proprietary components; therefore, the operating systems are more likely to be vulnerable in their default installation.
The numbers from this and previous volumes of the report demonstrate that Red Hat has had the best track
record in dealing with third-party vulnerabilities. This may be due to the extent of their involvement with third-party vendors and the open-source community, as they often contribute their own patches and work closely with third-party vendors.
Patched operating system vulnerability by type
In this version of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec will be discussing the types of vulnerabilities
that are assessed in the “Patch development time for operating systems” metric. It will also consider vulnerabilities affecting the same group of vendors. This will provide insight into the types of applications and vulnerabilities that are present in the operating systems that are examined in the previous metric.
The sample sets are limited to vulnerabilities that are considered medium or high severity. Vulnerabilities
are divided into the following categories:
• Web browser
• Client-side• Local• Server
Some vulnerabilities did not fit into these categories and these cases are noted in the discussion.Of the 59 patched vulnerabilities that affected Apple Mac OS X in the first half of 2007, eight affected
browsers, 21 were client-side vulnerabilities, 17 were local, 11 affected servers, and two vulnerabilities did not fit into any of these categories (figure 19). During the last six months of 2006, Apple had one patched browser vulnerability, 18 client-side vulnerabilities, seven that were local, four in servers, and two that could not be categorized.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Apple
Sun3%
HP Microsoft
Red Hat19%
29%36%13%
30%
10%7%
10%43%21%
34%5%
40%
14%
11%21%
34%20% 12%
15%5%
12%56%
OtherServer
Local
Client-side
Browser
Figure 19. Patched operating system vulnerability by type
Source: Symantec Corporation
There were 30 patched vulnerabilities disclosed during this period that affected HP-UX. Of these, 13 affected
browsers, three were client-side, three were local, nine affected servers, and two could not be categorized. From a sample set of 70 patched vulnerabilities in the second half of 2006, 50 affected browsers, four were
client-side issues, one was locally exploitable, 13 affected servers, and two fell outside of these categories.
In the first half of 2007, Symantec disclosed 38 vulnerabilities for Microsoft Windows that were patched.
Fifteen affected Web browsers, 13 were client-side issues, eight were locally exploitable, and two affected servers. The 50 vulnerabilities patched by Microsoft during the second half of 2006 consisted of 15 browser issues, 20 client-side vulnerabilities, three issues that were local, and 12 that affected servers.
The set of patched vulnerabilities for Red Hat Linux during this reporting period consisted of 91 vulnerabilities.
Eighteen of these issues affected browsers, 31 were client-side, 10 were local, and 13 affected servers. The remaining 19 were unclassifiable according to the criteria for this metric. Of the 149 Red Hat Linux
vulnerabilities in the previous reporting period, 47 affected browsers, 53 were client-side issues, 22 were local, 12 affected servers, and 15 did not fit into any of these categories.
Of 73 patched vulnerabilities in Sun Solaris during the first six months of 2007, 41 affected browsers,
nine were client-side issues, 11 were local, nine affected servers, and three could not be categorized. During the second half of 2006, 35 patched vulnerabilities were categorized. Of these, 25 affected browsers, one was a client-side vulnerability, four were local, and four affected servers. One vulnerability could not be categorized.
57Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
58 93 It should be noted that the data included in this discussion is limited to public examples of exploit code that Symantec has as sociated with specific vulnerabilities.
There are many instances in which a private or commercial exploit may be available, but this data cannot be consistently tracke d since exploit publication dates
are not available.
94 Vendors included in this metric are: Microsoft, Sun, HP, Symantec, EMC, IBM, Cisco, Oracle, CA (Computer Associates), and McAfe e.
95 For a discussion of the window of exposure for enterprise vendors in the first half of 2006, please see the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume X
(September 2006): http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_re port_x_09_2006.en-us.pdf : p. 58For all vendors, the majority of patched vulnerabilities affected Web browsers or were client-side issues.
Browser and client-side vulnerabilities are similar in that they typically require a user to interact with malicious content, whether it is a Web-page or a malicious file. As such, the attacker must usually present the content to the user in a manner that is enticing and seems innocuous. This tactic is typical of targeted attacks, which may be directed at users within a specific organization or who visit a particular Web site that the attacker has compromised.
Exploits of browser and client-side vulnerabilities may not necessarily result in a complete compromise
of the affected computer. This is because they can only perform actions in the context of the currently logged-in user, who may not possess administrative access. In previous issues of this report, Symantec has emphasized a shift from attacks that target servers or network assets to those that target desktop users through a myriad of application-level vulnerabilities. The data for this metric demonstrates that these types of applications appear to be a priority for security researchers and attackers. Since all of the vulnerabilities that were examined are patched, it also shows that vendors are responding to this threat.
Window of exposure for enterprise vendors
Attackers use custom-developed code known as exploit code, or exploits, to take advantage of vulnerabilities
to compromise a computer. The time lapse between the publication of an initial vulnerability report and the appearance of third-party exploit code is known as the “exploit code development time.”
93 This is a
concern to enterprises because it is a measurement of how long it takes for the average exploit to become public. If an exploit is published before a patch is available, administrators must implement other protective measures to reduce the risk of attack.
It is important to note that the set of vulnerabilities included in this metric is limited and does not represent
all software from all possible vendors. Instead, it only includes vendors that are classified as enterprise vendors. The purpose is to illustrate the window of exposure for widely deployed, mission-critical software. Because of the large number of vendors with technologies that have a very low deployment, only exploits for technologies from enterprise vendors are included.
94
In the first half of 2007, the window of exposure for enterprise vendors was 55 days. This was based on
an average exploit development time of six days and an average patch development time of 61 days. The enterprise window of exposure for the second half of 2006 was 47 days. The average exploit development time was five days and the average patch development time for enterprise vendors was 52 days.
The window of exposure has risen over the last three reporting periods.
95 This is primarily due to the
influence of longer patch times required for vulnerabilities that affect third-party components in some operating system vendors, such as browser plug-ins (which are discussed in the “Browser plug-in vulnerabilities” metric below). Compared to operating system vendors, other vendors have a relatively short average patch development time. Non-operating system vendors are less dependent on the developers of third-party components to develop patches for vulnerabilities in their products. This gives them an advantage over vendors who distribute and maintain products containing third-party applications.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
59Other enterprise vendors, including security vendors, have demonstrated better responsiveness to
vulnerabilities than the operating system vendors. Vendor responsiveness is especially important to security vendors, who are often targeted by security researchers and attackers in order to either improve the security products or damage the credibility of such vendors.
Web application vulnerabilities
Web applications are technologies that use a browser for their user interface, rely on HTTP as the transport
protocol, and reside on Web servers. Examples of Web-based applications include content management systems, e-commerce suites (such as shopping cart implementations), Weblogs, and Web-based email.
The online presence of an organization is often facilitated through Web applications, particularly as an
increasing number of traditional software vendors are bolstering their existing applications with Web-based user interfaces, or converting them over entirely. Web applications may be the site of vulnerabilities that can be exploited to gain unauthorized access to computers on which they are deployed. Users within the organization may also be affected by insecure Web sites, which may present a risk of compromise and/or a threat to confidential information.
In the first half of 2007, 61 percent of all vulnerabilities affected Web applications (figure 20). This is a
drop from the 66 percent reported in the second half of 2006, and a further decrease from the 69 percent of all vulnerabilities that affected Web applications in the first half of 2006.
Percentage of vulnerabilities
0%20%40%60%80%100%
Non-Web application vulnerabilities
Web-application vulnerabilitiesPeriodJul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 20071,501
(61%)1,666
(66%)860
(34%)960
(39%)
10%30%50%70%90%
Figure 20. Web application vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
60Prior to this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec had observed that the proportion of
Web application vulnerabilities had been on the rise. This trend persisted for five reporting periods starting in the first half of 2004 and ending in the first half of 2006. Because of their increasing prevalence, Web application vulnerabilities appear to have influenced other vulnerability trends discussed in this report during each period.
This is true for the current period as well. For instance, the decrease in Web application vulnerabilities
during the first six months of 2007 has contributed to the drop in the total number of vulnerabilities documented this period. As well, Web application vulnerabilities are typically classified as easily exploitable; therefore, the current decrease likely accounts for the drop in easily exploitable vulnerabilities over the past six months. Furthermore, a lower percentage of Web application vulnerabilities may have resulted in a higher percentage of high-severity vulnerabilities. (Each of these metrics will be discussed subsequently in this section.)
The decrease in Web application vulnerabilities that was observed during this period may be due to
security researchers focusing more of their efforts on finding vulnerabilities that are specific to a particular Web site. These site-specific vulnerabilities are often discovered during an unauthorized audit of the Web site and usually require the same amount of research effort as other Web application vulnerabilities.
The legality of discovering and disclosing site-specific vulnerabilities is in question, as well, because it
often requires that the researcher performs attacks on the affected site.
96 Both security researchers and
attackers have various incentives for seeking out site-specific vulnerabilities. Researchers may garner more attention for themselves if they report a vulnerability in a popular Web site than if they discover a similar vulnerability in a lesser-known Web application. These vulnerabilities are also appealing to attackers because they may provide a means of compromising a Web site that can be employed in other attacks. In such a scenario, the attacker may use the legitimacy of the Web site to attract victims of subsequent attacks. Sites with large user bases, such as MySpace, have already been abused in this manner.
97
In the first half of 2007, security researchers staged a “Month of MySpace Bugs”98 and a “Month of Search
Engine Bugs”99 to bring various site-specific vulnerabilities into the public spotlight. However, because
of the legal concerns for the researchers reporting these issues and for any site or database that collects reports of these issues, it may be difficult to verify the number of legitimate site-specific vulnerabilities that are being discovered and reported. In addition, when the administrator of a Web site patches a site-specific vulnerability, it no longer exists. As such, Symantec has no insight into the number of site-specific vulnerabilities that are being discovered and reported. However, some resources have emerged to facilitate the full disclosure of site-specific vulnerabilities.
100 There have also been public incidents that suggest that
attackers are discovering these vulnerabilities in bulk.101
Web application vulnerabilities are also likely candidates for multistaged attacks. During the first half
of 2007, an unspecified cPanel exploit was used to compromise legitimate Web sites hosted through a common Web hosting provider. These were then used by MPack
102 to launch client-side exploits on
unsuspecting users.103 It is also possible that attackers could exploit this or a similar vulnerability to set
up phishing Web sites or other malicious sites through the Web-hosting provider. Vulnerabilities that let attackers inject arbitrary content such as cross-site scripting into Web sites may be employed in a similar manner to launch attacks against users of legitimate sites.
96 http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=125984&WT.svl=news1_1
97 http://blog.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2007/06/web_2pointuhoh_worm_whacks_mys.html
98 http://momby.livejournal.com/7285.html
99 http://Websecurity.com.ua/1114
100 http://www.xssed.com
101 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/06/20/youtube_security_ultimatum
102 MPack is a commercially available black market attack toolkit. It can launch exploits for browser and client-side vulnerabiliti es against users who visit a malicious or
compromised Web site. For more information, see http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/05/mpack_packe d_full_of_badness.html
103 http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=3015&rssSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
61Web browser vulnerabilities
The Web browser is a critical and ubiquitous application that has become an increasingly popular subject
for vulnerability researchers over the past few years. Traditionally, the focus of security researchers has been on the perimeter: servers, firewalls, and other assets with external exposure. However, security researchers and attackers now consider client-side vulnerabilities to be a fruitful area of research and attacks. As part of this shift toward client-side issues, vulnerabilities in Web browsers have become increasingly prominent, which in turn pose a threat to end users’ desktop computers.
Browsers are complex and feature rich, traits that can expose them to vulnerabilities in newly implemented
features. Due to the integration of various content-handling applications—such as productivity suites and media players—browsers have become a viable attack vector for many client-side vulnerabilities. This is particularly true of operating systems in which the browser is not disassociated from many other operating system processes and features.
Web browser vulnerabilities are a serious security concern due to their role in online fraud and the
propagation of spyware and adware. They are particularly prone to security concerns because they come in contact with more potentially untrusted or hostile content than other applications. This metric will examine vulnerabilities that were disclosed for a number of Web browsers during the first six months of 2007.
During this period, Symantec documented 39 vulnerabilities in Microsoft Internet Explorer (figure 21). Of
these, one was considered to be high severity, 15 were medium severity, and 23 were low. This total is a decrease from the 54 vulnerabilities documented in the second half of 2006. Of those, one was considered high severity, 13 were medium severity, and 40 were low.
254
3954
4
Safari
Opera
Documented vulnerabilities0 10 20 30 40 50Period
607Jan–Jun 200734
MozillaInternet ExplorerJul–Dec 200640
Figure 21. Web browser vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
During the first half of 2007, 34 vulnerabilities were disclosed that affected Mozilla browsers. Of these,
12 were considered to be medium severity and 22 were considered low. This total is a decrease from the 40 vulnerabilities that affected Mozilla browsers in the second half of 2006. Of those, 35 were considered medium severity and five were low severity.
Safari was affected by 25 vulnerabilities in the first half of 2007. Seven of these were medium-severity
vulnerabilities, and the other 18 were low severity. This is an increase from the four Safari vulnerabilities that were documented in the second half of 2006. Of these, two were medium severity and two were low severity.
In the first six months of 2007, Symantec documented seven vulnerabilities that affected Opera. Of these,
three were medium severity and the other four were low. The total of seven is an increase from the four vulnerabilities that affected Opera in the second half of 2006, two of which were considered medium severity and two of which were low.
During the current reporting period, the majority of vulnerabilities documented in all browsers were
low severity. These vulnerabilities consisted of denial of service, information disclosure, and spoofing issues. This may be indicative of improvements in the security of the current generation of browsers. It is possible that many of the higher-severity vulnerabilities have been discovered by the current generation of fuzzers.
104 Such improvements are likely to be short-lived due to the evolution of fuzzing techniques and
competition among browser vendors to include more features that will likely expose new vulnerabilities. In spite of the trend towards lower-severity vulnerabilities, Web browsers are still implicated in attacks through vulnerabilities in browser plug-in attacks and client-side issues.
With the exception of denial of service vulnerabilities, many of the low-severity issues are still a concern,
as they may facilitate phishing attacks or allow attackers to gain access to sensitive information. These vulnerabilities are symbolic because they represent subtle attacks against the security model of the browser. The current generation of browsers includes security features that are intended to protect users against attacks such as phishing. It is reasonable to speculate that these new security features may become the focus of security researchers and attackers alike.
Safari was subject to the greatest change in the number of vulnerabilities over previous reporting
periods. During first half of 2007, Apple released beta versions of Safari for Windows.
105 This event
drew the attention of security researchers, who discovered a number of vulnerabilities shortly after the release.
106 Beta software does not carry the same guarantees of security as production versions,
so it is not surprising to see that vulnerabilities were quickly discovered in the beta Safari for Windows. However, some of the issues were also found to affect production Safari releases for Mac OS X. As Safari becomes more accessible and its market share increases, it is likely to receive more attention from security researchers and attackers.
62 104 Fuzzing is a security research and quality assurance method that generally entails providing randomly generated inputs in an at tempt to discover vulnerabilities and
bugs. Fuzzers are programs or scripts that are designed to find vulnerabilities in software code or scripts. They have automate d many of the code auditing tasks that
security researchers had previously done manually.
105 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/06/new_technologies_from_apple.html
106 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/06/vulnerabilities_for_safari_on.htmlSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
63In order to protect against successful exploitation of Web browser vulnerabilities, Symantec advises
administrators and end users to upgrade all browsers to the latest, patched versions. Symantec recommends that organizations educate users to be extremely cautious about visiting unknown or untrusted Web sites and viewing or following links in unsolicited emails. Administrators should also deploy Web proxies in order to block potentially malicious script code. Administrators and end users should actively maintain a white-list of trusted sites and disable individual plug-ins and scripting capabilities for all other sites. This will not prevent exploitation attempts from white-listed sites, but may aid in preventing exploits from all other sites. Organizations can also implement a white-list policy at the network perimeter to regulate outgoing access by end users.
Window of exposure for Web browsers
The window of exposure is the difference in days between the time at which exploit code affecting a
vulnerability is made public and the time at which the affected vendor makes a patch available to the public for that vulnerability. During this time, the computer or system on which the affected application is deployed may be susceptible to attack, as administrators will have no official recourse against exploitation of the vulnerability. Instead they will have to resort to best practices and workarounds to reduce the risk of successful compromise.
This metric will assess the window of exposure for vulnerabilities in selected Web browsers. For this version
of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec will be supplementing the Web browser window of exposure
discussion with the maximum amount of time that elapsed between the disclosure of a single vulnerability and the release of an associated patch. Maximum patch times indicate the longest period of time required for a patch to be released to the public.
During the first half of 2007, Apple Safari had a window of exposure of three days, a decrease over the
62-day window in the second half of 2006 (figure 22). The window of exposure for the first half of 2007 was based on a sample set of 13 vulnerabilities, with a maximum patch time of eight days. The results for the second half of 2006 were based on a sample set of one vulnerability with a patch time of 62 days.
Safari had the smallest window of exposure of any browser. As discussed in the “Browser vulnerabilities”
section of this report, Apple released the Safari for Windows beta. A number of vulnerabilities were discovered in the browser shortly after its release. The quick response to these vulnerabilities by Apple resulted in a shorter window of exposure.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
64510
362
OperaSafari2
Internet Explorer
Mozilla
Average time in days0 10 20 30 40 50Period
705Jan–Jun 20074Jul–Dec 200623
60
Figure 22. Window of exposure for Web browsers
Source: Symantec Corporation
In the first six months of 2007, Opera had a window of exposure of four days based on a sample set of
five patched vulnerabilities. This is an increase over the 23-day window in the second half of 2006, which was based on a sample set of three patched vulnerabilities. In the current reporting period, Opera had maximum patch development time of 23 days. This can be attributed to a few vulnerabilities in a small sample data set that disproportionately affected the average. In the previous six-month period, a maximum of 46 days elapsed before a patch was available for vulnerabilities in Opera.
In the first half of 2007, Microsoft Internet Explorer had a window of exposure of five days based on a
sample set of 17 patched vulnerabilities. This is a decrease from the 10-day time period in the second half of 2006, which was based on a sample set of 15 patched vulnerabilities. The maximum patch development time for Internet Explorer vulnerabilities during the current reporting period was 90 days. In the second half of 2006, the maximum patch development time was 78 days.
During the first six months of 2007, Mozilla had a window of exposure of five days based on a sample set
of 22 patched vulnerabilities. This is an increase over the window of exposure of two days in the second half of 2006, which was based on 36 patched vulnerabilities. During the current reporting period, Mozilla had a maximum patch development time of 83 days. In the second half of the year, the maximum patch development time was 33 days. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
With the exception of Mozilla, all the Web browser vendors had a shorter window of exposure in the first
half of 2007. However, readers should note that Opera and Safari figures for the last six months of 2006 were skewed by small sample sets, so this may a factor in their shorter window of exposure during the current period.
Exploitation of Internet Explorer and ActiveX vulnerabilities in the wild may have contributed to the shorter
window of exposure for Internet Explorer. The majority of Internet Explorer vulnerabilities in this period were announced by the vendor and patched when they were announced. Slower patch times for lower-severity vulnerabilities were a factor in the longer window of exposure for Mozilla.
The average time for an exploit to emerge remains minimal; many exploits are released at the same
time that vulnerabilities are announced or shortly afterwards. The low average patch development times indicate that vendors are also quick to respond, which is likely due to the high likelihood that browser vulnerabilities will be exploited in the wild. Responsible disclosure efforts contribute to these low numbers, as many of the vulnerabilities were discovered by third-parties but publicly announced only when patches were made available.
Zero-day vulnerabilities
A zero-day vulnerability is one that appears to have been exploited in the wild prior to being publicly
known. It may not have been known to the vendor prior to exploitation, and the vendor had not released a patch at the time of the exploit activity.
Zero-day vulnerabilities represent a serious threat in many cases, because there is no patch available for
them and because they will likely be able to evade purely signature-based detection. It is the unexpected nature of zero-day threats that causes concern, especially because they may be used in targeted attacks and in the propagation of malicious code. As Symantec predicted in the Volume IX of the Internet Security
Threat Report , a black market for zero-day vulnerabilities has emerged that has the potential to put them
into the hands of criminals and other interested parties.
107
In the second half of 2006, Symantec documented six zero-day vulnerabilities (figure 23). In the previous
six-month period, Symantec documented 12 zero-day vulnerabilities. In the first half of 2006, only one zero-day vulnerability was documented.
65 107 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume IX (March 2006):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_report_ix.pdf : p. 2 0Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
PeriodJul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 2007612
Figure 23. Zero-day vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation
Of the zero-day vulnerabilities documented during this period, three of the vulnerabilities affected
Microsoft Office applications. This is a drop from the six zero-day vulnerabilities that affected Office in the second half of 2006. The number of zero-day Office vulnerabilities may have dropped due to measures taken by Microsoft to patch as many pending Office vulnerabilities as possible. During this reporting period, Microsoft also released an advisory describing the Microsoft Office Isolated Conversion Environment (MOICE) and File Block features and their applicability in mitigating zero-day vulnerabilities.
108 As the
complexity of Microsoft Office contributes to the potential for vulnerabilities, these measures have been introduced by Microsoft to help users protect their computers against zero-day vulnerabilities.
In order to protect against zero-day vulnerabilities, Symantec recommends that administrators deploy
network and host-based IDS/IPS systems as well as regularly updated antivirus software. Security vendors may provide rapid response to recently discovered zero-day vulnerabilities in the wild by developing and implementing new or updated IDS/IPS and antivirus signatures before a patch has been released by the affected vendor. Behavior-blocking solutions and heuristic signatures may also provide protection against zero-day vulnerabilities.
In addition, some IPS systems may provide further protection against memory corruption vulnerabilities
in the form of address space layout randomization (ASLR),
109 and by making memory segments non-
executable. These measures may complicate the exploitation of such vulnerabilities and make it more difficult for attack payloads to execute; however, this security measure may not protect all applications by default.
66 108 http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/937696.mspx
109 Address space layout randomization is a security measure to complicate exploitation of some classes of vulnerabilities by rando mizing the layout of process address
space to make it less predictable to attackers.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Unpatched enterprise vendor vulnerabilities
In the previous volume of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec studied the
vendor responsiveness to vulnerabilities and found that the majority of vulnerabilities were not being acknowledged, and therefore patched, by vendors.
110 That analysis provided insight into unpatched
vulnerabilities without considering the size of the vendors affected.
This report expands on this study by examining the number of unpatched vulnerabilities affecting
enterprise vendors whose applications are widely deployed and considered to be mission-critical in nature. The following enterprise vendors are reviewed in this section:
• Computer Associates
• Cisco• EMC• HP• IBM• McAfee• Microsoft• Oracle• Sun• Symantec
Unpatched vulnerabilities are publicly documented security issues that are not known to be patched
by the vendor responsible for maintaining the affected application. Readers should note that the vulnerabilities discussed in this section were known to be unpatched at the time that the data was gathered for this report. They may have been patched in the meantime. There is also a likelihood that some of the vulnerabilities were patched by the vendor without a public announcement; in such cases there is insufficient publicly available information to label these issues as patched. It is also important to note that some unpatched vulnerabilities remain in this state because they affect unsupported products, or because the vendor has provided specific workarounds that address the vulnerability until a patch is available.
These vulnerabilities are a serious concern for enterprises because they cannot be resolved without
applying best practices, workarounds, and mitigations. In many circumstances these measures will not provide complete protection against unpatched vulnerabilities.
In the first half of 2007, Symantec documented 90 unpatched enterprise vulnerabilities that were
published during this period (table 5). Of these, 64 affected Microsoft, 13 affected Oracle, four affected Computer Associates, four affected HP, two affected IBM, two affected Symantec, and one vulnerability affected Sun. The rest of the vendors in the enterprise subset had no known vulnerabilities that were unpatched in this period.
67
110 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume XI (March 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xi_03_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 42Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Enterprise Vendors
Microsoft
OracleComputer Associates HPIBMSymantecSun
McAfeeJan–Jun 2007
64
13
44221
0Jul–Dec 2006
75
701513
2
Table 5. Unpatched enterprise vulnerabilities by vendor
Source: Symantec Corporation
Of the enterprise vulnerabilities published in the second half of 2006, 94 were unpatched. 75 affected
Microsoft, seven affected Oracle, five affected IBM, three affected Sun, two affected McAfee, one affected HP, and one vulnerability affected Symantec. No other enterprise vendors had vulnerabilities published during this period that remain unpatched.
Microsoft had the most unpatched vulnerabilities that were disclosed during the second half of 2006 and
the first half of 2007. Many of the vulnerabilities in the sample set are considered lower severity, such as denial of service issues affecting client or desktop software. These issues may be considered a low priority by Microsoft. As a result, they may not typically be addressed in monthly security bulletins, but in service packs and other major version updates instead.
While it is likely that many of these vulnerabilities will have minimal impact on enterprises, some
denial of service vulnerabilities have the potential for more severe effects such as code execution. Some vulnerabilities are prematurely thought to be limited to denial of service capabilities because the researcher has not completely investigated the vulnerability or because his or her skills are inadequate to conclusively determine the nature of the vulnerability.
The first half of 2007 did not show an improvement in the number of unpatched Oracle vulnerabilities
over the second half of 2006. In addition to that, many vulnerabilities still remain unpatched from that period. In many cases, this may be due to lack of acknowledgement or correlation with publicly available vulnerability reports. When Oracle announces vulnerabilities, many of the issues are identified by an internal tracking number, but are not adequately mapped to other external vulnerability identifies such as the CVE dictionary.
111 This could cause many publicly known vulnerabilities to remain classified as
unpatched because the vendor has not explicitly identified the vulnerabilities by their common names in security bulletins and product updates.
Recently, Oracle made improvements to their security reporting procedures, including providing pre-
release notification for the security updates and including Common Vulnerability Scoring System ratings in their advisories.
112 The expectation is that these changes will have a positive effect on security reporting
and vulnerability remediation. As a result, it is likely that fewer vulnerabilities will remain unpatched for extended periods of time.
68 111 http://cve.mitre.org
112 http://www.vnunet.com/articles/print/2172404Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Browser plug-in vulnerabilities
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report ¸ Symantec is assessing
vulnerabilities in browser plug-ins. These are technologies that run inside the Web browser and extend the browser’s features. They can include plug-ins that permit additional multimedia content from Web pages to be rendered in the browser. It also includes execution environments that allow applications to be run inside the browser.
Many browsers include various plug-ins in their default installation and provide a framework to ease the
installation of additional plug-ins. Plug-ins provide much of the expected or desired functionality of Web browsers. Some plug-ins may even be required to use public Web sites and/or an organization’s internal sites. Browser plug-in vulnerabilities are implicated in some client-side attacks and present similar challenges to the enterprise.
This section examines vulnerabilities in the following browser plug-in technologies:• Adobe Acrobat
• Adobe Flash®• Apple QuickTime• Microsoft ActiveX• Microsoft Windows Media Player• Mozilla browser extensions• Opera widgets• Sun Java
In the first half of 2007, Symantec documented 237 vulnerabilities affecting browser plug-ins (figure 24).
Of these, 210 affected ActiveX components, 18 affected the Apple QuickTime plug-in, four affected the Sun Java plug-in, three affected extensions for Mozilla browsers, and two affected the Adobe Acrobat plug-in. Adobe Flash, Microsoft Windows Media Player, and Opera widgets were not affected by any browser plug-in vulnerabilities during this period.
There were 74 browser plug-in vulnerabilities documented during the second half of 2006. Of those,
43 vulnerabilities affected ActiveX components, eight affected Adobe Flash, eight affected the Apple QuickTime plug-in, seven affected the Adobe Acrobat plug-in, four affected the Sun Java plug-in, three affected Windows Media Player, and one was documented in Mozilla extensions. Opera widgets were not affected by any documented vulnerabilities in the second half of 2006.
69Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
70 113 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/01/a_sudden_rise_in_activex_vulne.html
114 ActiveX components are a type of COM (Component Object Model) object that may provide a programming interface that is accessibl e through Internet Explorer.
If exposed through Internet Explorer, attackers may exploit latent vulnerabilities in ActiveX components through malicious HTML content.
115 http://www.metasploit.com/users/hdm/tools/axman
116 http://labs.idefense.com/software/fuzzing.php#more_comraider
117 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/21829
118 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/21060
119 http:/www.securityfocus.com/bid/19030Mozilla extensions 1%Windows Media Player 4%
Acrobat 11%
Java 5%
QuickTime 11%ActiveX 58%
Flash 11%Percentage of vulnerabilities
Jul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 2007ActiveX 89%
QuickTime 8%Java 2%Acrobat <1%Mozilla extensions 1%
Figure 24. Browser plug-in vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation
The rise in browser plug-in vulnerabilities is indicative of an increasing focus on client-side vulnerabilities
by both security researchers and attackers. The growth corresponds to an increase in the number of vulnerabilities in ActiveX components. This report expands on a previous Symantec study that observed the initial rise in ActiveX vulnerabilities.
113 That study determined that the use of fuzzers designed
specifically to target insecure ActiveX components,114 such as AxMan115 and COMRaider,116 has automated
the discovery of these vulnerabilities. In addition, it is relatively easy to develop exploits for these types of vulnerabilities due to numerous examples of previous similar exploits that serve as a template.
These vulnerabilities affect a diverse group of vendors, including Microsoft, enterprise vendors, and
smaller vendors. The sheer number of vulnerabilities gives attackers a wide range of potential targets. It should be noted that in addition to Windows Media Player, many of the affected ActiveX components may be included in default installations of Windows. Further, the installation and execution of ActiveX components is typically not evident to the user, while the removal of such components is difficult for the average end user. As a result, users may not be aware that they are prone to exploitation through vulnerable ActiveX components that have been installed on their computer.
Plug-in vulnerabilities have been the subject of exploit activity in the wild. For example, they were
leveraged by many of the exploits employed by the MPack attack framework. In particular, MPack exploits a QuickTime vulnerability,
117 an issue in the WinZip ActiveX component,118 and various other plug-in
vulnerabilities such as the Microsoft WebView FolderIcon issue.119 While some plug-ins may be specific
to Internet Explorer, MPack also targets vulnerabilities in cross-browser plug-ins. This exposes users of alternate browsers on Windows by targeting shared weaknesses that are not necessarily dependant on how secure the browser itself is. The reliability and robustness of MPack implies that it benefited from professional development. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Client-side attacks have typically originated from questionable sources such as malicious Web sites or spam.
As a result, best practices have advised end users to avoid this type of content. However, it appears that attackers are increasingly using legitimate and trusted sites as a basis for attacks. Symantec has observed that MPack includes functionality to deliver malicious payloads through legitimate Web sites that have been compromised.
120 In this scenario, it is necessary to exploit other unrelated vulnerabilities to deploy
the attack framework to launch attacks against Web users. It integrates Web application vulnerabilities into attacks on the browser, whether directly or through plug-in and client-side vulnerabilities.
End users and administrators can use a number of measures to protect against the effects of vulnerabilities.
IPS technologies can prevent exploitation of some browser plug-in vulnerabilities through signature- or behavior-based approaches in addition to ASLR. Antivirus software may also aid in protecting organizations from browser plug-in exploits through heuristic signatures.
While attacks are likely to originate from Web sites that are trusted as well as those that are not, Web
browser security features can help reduce exposure to browser plug-in exploits, as can white-listing. Specifically, administrators and end users should actively maintain a white-list of trusted Web sites, and should disable individual plug-ins and scripting capabilities for all other sites. This will not prevent exploitation attempts from white-listed sites but may aid in preventing exploits from all other sites. Organizations can also implement a white-list policy at the network perimeter to regulate outgoing access by end users. Content filtering may also be employed to strip malicious content from trusted and untrusted sites.
Vulnerabilities—protection and mitigation
In addition to the specific steps required to protect against the vulnerabilities discussed in this section, there
are general steps that should be taken to protect against the exploitation of vulnerabilities. Administrators should employ a good asset management system to track what assets are deployed on the network and to determine which ones may be affected by the discovery of new vulnerabilities. Vulnerability management technologies should also be used to detect known vulnerabilities in deployed assets. Administrators should monitor vulnerability mailing lists and security Web sites to keep abreast of new vulnerabilities in Web applications.
Symantec recommends that administrators employ vulnerability assessment services, a vulnerability
management solution, and vulnerability assessment tools to evaluate the security posture of the enterprise. Unpatched vulnerabilities should be identified by administrators, and assessed and mitigated according to the risk they present. Where possible, problematic applications with many unpatched vulnerabilities should be removed or isolated. IPS systems can aid in detecting known attacks against such applications.
71
120 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/06/mpack_the_strange_case_of_the.htmlSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Enterprises should subscribe to a vulnerability alerting service in order to be notified of new vulnerabilities.
They should also manage their Web-based assets carefully. If they are developing Web applications in-house, developers should be educated about secure development practices, such as the Security Development Lifecycle and threat modeling.
121 If possible, all Web applications should be audited for
security prior to deployment. Web application security solutions and a number of products and services are available to detect and prevent attacks against these applications.
When deploying applications, administrators should ensure that secure, up-to-date versions are used,
and that applications are properly configured to avoid the exploitation of latent vulnerabilities. Symantec recommends the use of secure shared components that have been audited for common Web application vulnerabilities. As much as possible, enterprises are advised to avoid deploying products that are not regularly maintained or that are not supported by the vendor.
72
121 The Security Development Lifecycle is a development paradigm that incorporates security at every stage from the initial archite cture to programming, and in
the quality assurance/testing phases. Threat modeling is a security auditing methodology that involves formally identifying and mapping out all possible attack
vectors for an application.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Malicious Code Trends
Symantec gathers malicious code data from over 120 million desktops that have deployed Symantec’s
antivirus products in consumer and corporate environments. The Symantec Digital Immune System and Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting process. This discussion is based on malicious code samples reported to Symantec for analysis between January 1 and June 30, 2007.
In previous editions of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , the number and volume of threats
analyzed were based upon the number of malicious code reports received from enterprise and home users. This report will also examine malicious code according to potential infections. This allows Symantec to determine which malicious code sample was attempting to infect computers and the number of potential infections worldwide.
This discussion will include any prevention and mitigation measures that might be relevant to the
particular threats being discussed. However, Symantec recommends that certain best security practices always be followed to protect against malicious code infection. Administrators should keep patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host public services and applications—such as HTTP, FTP, SMTP, and DNS servers—and that are accessible through a firewall or placed in a DMZ. For organizations and businesses, email servers should be configured to only allow file attachment types that are required for business needs and to not accept email that appears to come from within the company but originates from external sources. Additionally, Symantec recommends that ingress and egress filtering be put in place on perimeter devices to prevent unwanted activity.
End users should employ defense-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software and
a personal firewall. Users should update antivirus definitions regularly. They should also ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their software vendors. They should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless it is expected and comes from a trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
Malicious Code Trends Highlights
The following section will offer highlights of the malicious code trends that Symantec observed during this period. Following this overview, the Internet Security Threat Report will discuss selected metrics in greater
depth, providing analysis and discussion of the trends indicated by the data.
• Of the top ten new malicious code families detected in the first six months of 2007, four were Trojans,
three were viruses, one was a worm, and two were worms with a virus component.
• In the first half of 2007, 212,101 new malicious code threats were reported to Symantec. This is a
185 percent increase over the second half of 2006.
• During the first half of 2007, Trojans made up 54 percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code
reports, an increase over the 45 percent reported in the final six months of 2006.
• When measured by potential infections, Trojans accounted for 73 percent of the top 50 malicious code
samples, up from 60 percent in the previous period.
73Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
• 43 percent of worms reported this period originated in the Europe, Middle East, and Africa
(EMEA) region.
• North America accounted for 44 percent of Trojans reported this period.• Threats to confidential information made up 65 percent of the top 50 potential malicious code infections
reported to Symantec.
• Of all confidential information threats detected this period, 88 percent had a keystroke logging
component and 88 percent had remote access capabilities, an increase from 76 percent and 87 percent, respectively, over the previous period.
• Forty-six percent of malicious code that propagated did so over SMTP, making it the most commonly
used propagation mechanism.
• During the first half of 2007, 18 percent of the 1,509 documented malicious code instances exploited
vulnerabilities.
• Thirty-five percent of infected computers reported more than one infection in the first half of 2007.• Eight of the top ten staged downloaders this period were Trojans and two were worms. • Seven of the top ten downloaded components were Trojans and three were back doors. • Malicious code that targets online games made up five percent of the top 50 potential malicious
code infections.
• Lineage and World of Warcraft were the two most frequently targeted online games in the first half
of 2007.
Malicious Code Trends Discussion
This section will discuss selected “Malicious Code Trends” metrics in greater depth, providing analysis and discussion of the trends indicated by the data. The following metrics will be discussed:
• Top ten new malicious code families
• New malicious code threats• Malicious code types• Geolocation by type• Threats to confidential information• Propagation mechanisms• Malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities• Percentage of computers with multiple infections• Staged downloaders—multiple infections by type• Malicious code targeting online gaming• Malicious code—prevention and mitigation
74Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Top ten new malicious code families
Of the top ten new malicious code families detected in the first six months of 2007, four were Trojans,
three were viruses, one was a worm, and two were worms with a virus component (table 6). One of the Trojans also had back door capabilities. This indicates that attackers may be moving towards using Trojans as a means of installing malicious code on computers. This is indicative of multistaged attacks, in which an initial compromise takes place that is not intended to perform malicious activities immediately, but that is used to facilitate the launch of subsequent attack activity. Symantec believes that multistaged attacks are becoming more common, as attackers adopt new tactics to circumvent effective security measures that have evolved to prevent previous attack methods.
As Trojans do not propagate, they allow attackers to perform targeted attacks without drawing attention
to themselves. Worms, on the other hand, propagate by sending themselves in high volumes of email messages or by attacking other computers, thereby increasing the likelihood of being noticed by network administrators who can take immediate action. A Trojan that is installed when a user visits a malicious Web site or downloads and opens a malicious file is much more likely to escape notice, as there will be no high-volume traffic associated with it. This degree of stealth increases the Trojan’s effectiveness. The longer a threat remains undiscovered in the wild, the more opportunity it has to compromise computers before measures can be taken to protect against it. Furthermore, its ability to steal information increases the longer it remains undetected on a compromised computer.
Rank
1
2
34
5
678
9
10Sample
Peacomm
Whybo
MetajuanAnivip
Kakavex
PandexFakerecyValidin
Fubalca
MespamType
Trojan
Virus
TrojanVirus
Virus
TrojanWormWorm/Virus
Worm/Virus
TrojanVectors
Spam/Mixor.Q
File Sharing
N/AFile Sharing/
Remote Vulnerability
File SharingN/AFile SharingFile Sharing
File Sharing
PeacommImpacts/Features
Creates an encrypted peer-to-peer network and
downloads other threats
Downloads and executes other filesDownloads other threats and displays adsDownloads other threats
Steals credit card information
Gathers email addresses and relays spamCopies itself to all fixed, removable, and network drivesDownloads other threats
Downloads other threats
Sends instant messages containing a malicious URL
Table 6. Top ten new malicious code families
Source: Symantec Corporation
The most widely reported new malicious code family during this reporting period was the Peacomm
Trojan,122 also known as the Storm Trojan. This Trojan was spammed in high volumes by the Mixor.Q
worm,123 which prompted Symantec to classify it as a Category 3 threat in January 2007.124
75 122 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-011917-1403-99
123 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-122917-0740-99
124 A Category 3 threat is a malicious code sample that is considered a moderate threat. It is either currently spreading among com puter users but reasonably harmless
and easy to contain, or has not been released into the wild but is potentially dangerous and difficult to contain.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
When Peacomm installs itself on a computer, it attempts to hide itself using rootkit techniques.125 It also
contains a list of other compromised computers that it uses to build an encrypted network of peers. This is similar to a bot network; however, rather than using IRC to communicate, as bot networks traditionally do, it uses the Overnet peer-to-peer protocol in order to make the network more resilient since this approach has no single point of failure.
126
Peacomm listens for commands passed through its peer-to-peer network and then downloads and installs
other files, such as the Mespam127 and Abwiz.F Trojans.128 This can be of particular concern, since a Trojan
like Abwiz.F can send confidential information to the remote attacker and relay spam.
The Whybo virus was the second most common new malicious code family in the first half of 2007.129
This virus infects portable executable files on all drives from C to Z on the compromised computer. It also retrieves an encrypted file from a remote computer and executes it. Plus, it closes open windows with certain strings in their titles, some of which are related to security applications. Interestingly, the virus matches these strings in both English and Chinese, indicating that it was likely written by someone familiar with both languages. It may also indicate that Whybo was intended to particularly target users in China.
The Metajuan Trojan was the third most frequently reported new malicious code family this period.
130
This Trojan may be installed by other malicious code samples or installed by Web pages that are designed to exploit Internet Explorer vulnerabilities. This means that the user will be compromised by visiting a malicious Web site rather than receiving the Trojan through email. This represents a trend in which attackers are relying upon users to retrieve threats instead of sending the threat directly to potential victims.
Metajuan also illustrates the current trend towards multistaged attacks. Once installed, the Trojan contacts
a remote Web site and can download and execute other malicious files on the compromised computer. Metajuan may also display advertisements when the user visits certain Web pages.
Kakavex was the fifth most common new malicious code family in the first half of 2007.
131 This virus is
notable because it may represent the beginning of an interesting trend. Traditionally, most viruses simply infect executable files and perform some form of damaging action. However, in addition to infecting files, the Kakavex virus also attempts to steal credit card information. The virus monitors Internet usage on the infected computer and, under certain circumstances, may display a dialogue box prompting the user for his or her credit card information. The information is then sent to a remote Web site.
This virus shows that identity thieves appear to be expanding into new territory to steal personal
information. In the past they mainly used back doors and Trojans to steal this kind of information; however, Kakavex indicates that they are now using viruses to do the same thing, thereby expanding the number of tools available to them for this objective.
76
125 Rootkit techniques are used by malicious code to hide their presence on a compromised computer.
126 Overnet is a decentralized peer-to-peer file-sharing protocol. It was taken down due to legal action in September 2006, but due to its decentralized nature,
clients are still able to function.
127 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-020915-2914-99
128 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-032311-1146-99
129 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-040316-2416-99
130 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-030112-0714-99
131 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-011014-1759-99Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
New malicious code threats
The number of new malicious code threats detected by Symantec in a given reporting period allows
administrators and users to keep track of the productivity of malicious code writers in a given period. These malicious code samples are collected through submissions received from Symantec customers as well as from Symantec honeypot computers.
132 Periods in which large amounts of new malicious code are created
require frequent updating of antivirus signatures, as well as the implementation of other security measures, such as patching against Web browser vulnerabilities that are frequently exploited to install malicious code on computers.
In the first six months of 2007, Symantec detected 212,101 new malicious code threats (figure 25).
This is a 185 percent increase over the previous period when 74,482 new threats were detected and a 318 percent increase over the first half of 2006. This brings the total amount of threats identified by Symantec to 622,500 as of the end of June 2007. This means that more than one third of all malicious code threats currently detected were created in the first six months of 2007.
Number of new threats
050,000150,000250,000
Period100,000200,000
Jan–Jun
200213,141
Jul–Dec
20026,260
Jan–Jun
20039,138
Jul–Dec
20038,475
Jan–Jun
200420,451
Jul–Dec
200442,523
Jan–Jun
200548,226
Jul–Dec
200553,410
Jan–Jun
200650,761
Jul–Dec
200674,482
Jan–Jun
2007212,101
Figure 25. New malicious code threats
Source: Symantec Corporation
77 132 A honeypot is an Internet-connected system that acts as a decoy, allowing an attacker to enter the system so that the attacker’ s behavior inside the
compromised system can be observed.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
78The increase in threats this period can mainly be attributed to an increase in new Trojans, including
staged downloaders, which consist of a small Trojan that downloads and installs other malicious code on a computer. The initial Trojan is frequently written for a specific purpose or target. For example, the initial stage may be installed by a Web page that exploits a browser vulnerability. In some cases, the downloader may be written to only download and install a particular file from a specific location. To avoid being noticed, this Trojan is usually quite small in size to avoid detection and establish a “beachhead” for subsequent infections. The main functionality of a staged downloader system is contained in the second or possibly third stage.
The high quantity of production of these downloaders demonstrates the need to ensure that antivirus
signatures are kept up-to-date on a regular basis. Since signatures are created in response to new threats in the wild, it is vital that end users and enterprises maintain the most current antivirus definitions in order to protect against rapidly launched new threats.
Malicious code types
During the first half of 2007, Trojans made up 54 percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code
reports, an increase over the 45 percent reported in the final six months of 2006 (figure 26). While part of this increase can be attributed to the success of the Peacomm Trojan, there were also a wide variety of other Trojans present in the top 50 malicious code reports. As previously mentioned, Trojans are likely gaining prominence because they generate a low volume of traffic compared to network and mass-mailing worms. As a result, they are less likely to draw the attention of higher-profile threats. Furthermore, malicious code writers may be turning to Trojans because network perimeter defenses and desktop firewalls, neither of which affects Trojans, make it harder for network worms to propagate widely.
01 0 2 0 3 0 40 50 70 60Jul–Dec 2006
Jan–Jun 2007
80
Percentage of top 50 by volume of reportsType
15%
9%Back door
45%
54%TrojanVirus9%
11%
Worm52%
46%
Figure 26. Malicious code types by volume
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Trojans may also be gaining popularity because they are better suited to meet the objectives of attackers.
As was stated previously, Trojans are likely able to reside on infected computers for longer periods of time. This allows them to remain active on the computer longer, enhancing the opportunity to gather confidential information, download malicious components for subsequent attacks, and/or cause more damage. For example, the Vundo Trojan installs adware on a compromised computer.
133 Variants of the Adclicker Trojan
can be used to generate traffic to Web sites in order to increase revenue from banner ads,134 a practice
commonly referred to as click fraud.
Additionally, other Trojans can be used to relay spam email or in phishing attacks. For instance, the Flush
Trojan modifies the DNS settings on a compromised computer,135 which can cause the user’s Web browser
to be redirected to a phishing site when he or she attempts to connect to an online banking site. The high volume of these Trojans in the top 50 malicious code reports demonstrates the popularity among attackers of utilizing malicious code to generate revenue.
During the first six months of 2007, worms made up 46 percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code
samples reported to Symantec, down from 52 percent in the previous period. This is a continuation of a downward trend in worm reports over the last year, which has been caused by a combination of a decrease in the volume of worms, as well as an increase in the volume of Trojans and viruses.
Worm numbers in the first half of 2007 were bolstered by Blackmal.E
136 and several variants of Mytob.137
While reports of these worms continue to persist, they are nowhere near the levels of a year ago, when they made up 75 percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code samples. The Mixor.Q worm, which was discovered at the end of 2006, was reported in significant numbers this period. However, this worm emailed copies of the Peacomm Trojan in significant numbers, which increased the volume of Trojans reported this period.
Part of the reason for the decline in worms has been due to security measures put in place, such as email
attachment blocking at the SMTP gateway and blocking ports used by peer-to-peer file-sharing applications to prevent their propagation within the enterprise’s network space. As a result, malicious code authors are likely looking for additional mechanisms to allow their creations to propagate, such as including a viral propagation component in traditionally non-viral malicious code.
Viruses made up 11 percent of the volume of top 50 malicious code reports in the first six months of 2007,
a slight increase over the nine percent in the previous six-month period. The increase in viruses is related to a rise in the number of worms that also employ a file infection component, which causes them to also be classified as viruses. One example of this is Looked.BK,
138 which infects executable files in local drives and
network shares.
79 133 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-112111-3912-99
134 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2002-091214-5754-99
135 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-030413-5303-99
136 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-011712-2537-99
137 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-022614-4627-99
138 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-112813-0222-99Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
In addition to assessing malicious code according to the volume of unique samples reported to Symantec,
the Internet Security Threat Report assesses it according to the number of potential infections. This is an
important distinction. In some cases, a threat that may be widely reported may not cause a large number of potential infections and vice versa.
The distinction between malicious code reports and infections is well illustrated by comparing worm and
Trojan activity. While worms made up 46 percent the volume of the top 50 malicious code reports in the first half of 2007, they caused only 22 percent of potential infections (figure 27). The main reason for this is that mass-mailing worms generate a significant number of email messages to which they attach their malicious code. Each message that is detected will generate a malicious code report. Because of the high volume of email that one worm can generate, a single infection can result in many reports. However, once a malicious code sample is detected, antivirus signatures are quickly developed that can protect against subsequent potential infections by that sample. So, only a small percentage of the high volume of email messages will result in potential infections.
37%
TypeVirus Worm Back door TrojanJan–Jun 2007Jul–Dec 2006
60% 73%
8%11% 22%
5%
10%
Figure 27. Malicious code types by potential infections
Source: Symantec Corporation
As was mentioned previously in this section, Trojans made up 54 percent of the volume of the top 50
malicious code reports the first half of 2007. In terms of potential infections, Trojan activity represented 73 percent of malicious code activity during this period, up from 60 percent in the second half of 2006. At the same time, potential infections caused by worms declined from 37 percent in the second half of 2006 to 22 percent in the first six months of 2007. It stands to reason that since users are seeing fewer worms—for example, fewer email messages from mass-mailing worms in their inboxes—as indicated by the decline in reports above, they are also less likely to be infected by a worm. The number of unique Trojans and worms in the top 50 potential infections is close, at 22 and 20 respectively, but the volume of Trojans far outweighs the volume of worms in the period.
80Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Viruses experienced significant growth in potential infections during the first six months of 2007. While
viruses increased slightly in the volume of the top 50 malicious code reports, the number of potential infections doubled from five percent in the previous period to ten percent in the current period. As previously stated, this is likely a result of new worms that also employ a viral component in order to propagate.
Geolocation by type
For the first time, in this edition of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is examining the top
regions reporting potential malicious code infections, as well as the types of malicious code causing potential infections in each region. The increasing regionalization of threats can cause differences between the types of malicious code being observed from one area to the next. For example, threats may use certain languages or localized events as part of their social engineering techniques. Threats that steal confidential information can also be tailored to steal information that is more common in some countries than in others. Trojans that steal account information for Brazilian banks are quite common in the Latin America region, while malicious code that steals online gaming account information is most frequently observed in the Asia-Pacific and Japan region. Because of the different propagation mechanisms used by different malicious code types, and the different effects that each malicious code type may have, the geographic distribution of malicious code can illustrate how network administrators in different regions can best increase the focus of their security efforts.
Between January and June of 2007, 44 percent of Trojans were reported from North America, while
37 percent were reported from the EMEA region (figure 28). This is significantly higher than the 15 percent reported from the Asia-Pacific and Japan (APJ) region and the four percent from Latin America.
Percentage of malicious code types
Trojan
Back door4%
Worm
Virus37%44%15%5%29%
43%23%
6%
45%22%27%5%22%
40%33%EMEA
North America
APJ
Latin America
Figure 28. Location of malicious code by type
Source: Symantec Corporation
81Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
The concentration of Trojans in North America may be indicative of enterprises and ISPs taking more active
steps to prevent the propagation of worms. Steps include more aggressive blocking and filtering of email attachments at the email gateway to prevent the propagation of mass-mailing worms, and port blocking to prevent the spread of network worms. The prevalence of Trojans in North America could be reflective of the resultant drop in network worms in the region. On the other hand, it could reflect a conscious decision by attackers to move towards Trojans in reaction to the success of tactics that have successfully thwarted worm attacks.
As discussed in the “Malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities” section below, many Trojans are now being
installed by Web pages that exploit vulnerabilities. This indicates that users and enterprises in regions with higher Trojan concentrations should ensure that their Web browsers, as well as related components and plug-ins, are patched for any potential vulnerabilities.
During this period, EMEA accounted for 43 percent of global potential infections caused by worms. This was
followed by the APJ region, which accounted for 29 percent of potential worm infections. North America only accounted for 23 percent of reported worms this period. This may indicate that North American ISPs are implementing more rigid port blocking to limit the spread of network worms, as well as antivirus filtering at the email gateway to limit mass-mailing worms.
Some worms use region-specific subject lines and text in their email messages. For example, the Rontokbro
worm’s email messages are in Indonesian.
139 However, this worm was seen more in India than in any other
country. There is a great deal of commerce between India and Indonesia,140 which means that it is highly
likely that many enterprise users in Indonesia communicate with counterparts in India by email. Since Rontokbro sends its email messages to all the addresses it gathers from files on a compromised computer, it stands to reason that this worm was sent to many Indian users from business contacts in Indonesia. Rontokbro was also one of the top ten malicious code samples resulting in potential infections in the EMEA region.
The EMEA region accounted for the highest percentage of viruses this period, with 45 percent of the total.
The APJ and North America regions accounted for 27 and 22 percent of viruses respectively, while Latin America only accounted for six percent.
As is noted in the “Malicious code types” section of this report, many worms are incorporating a viral
component that causes them to be classified as both worms and viruses. Many of the worms causing potential infections in EMEA also employ a viral component, which explains why this region also accounts for the greatest percentage of viruses and worms this period.
Potential infections caused by back doors were most frequently reported from the EMEA region, which
accounted for 40 percent of all back doors worldwide. North America accounted for 33 percent of potential back door infections in the first half of 2007, while APJ accounted for 22 percent and Latin America accounted for five percent. It is important to note that while the regional percentages of potential back door infections show a fairly wide variance during this period, the worldwide volume of back door threats this period was significantly lower than Trojans and worms. As a result, the percentage variance between regions actually represents a much smaller difference in raw numbers than the percentage differences between worms and Trojans.
139 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-092311-2608-99
140 http://www.hindu.com/2005/11/24/stories/2005112405871200.htm
82Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Threats to confidential information
Some malicious code programs are designed specifically to expose confidential information that is stored on
an infected computer. These threats may expose sensitive data such as system information, confidential files and documents, or logon credentials. Some malicious code threats, such as back doors, can give a remote attacker complete control over a compromised computer.
Threats to confidential information are a particular concern because of their potential for use in criminal
activities. With the widespread use of online shopping and Internet banking, compromises of this nature can result in significant financial loss, particularly if credit card information or banking details are exposed.
Within the enterprise, exposure of confidential information can lead to significant data leakage. If it involves
customer-related data—such as credit card information—this can severely undermine customer confidence as well as violate local laws. Sensitive corporate information, including financial details, business plans, and proprietary technologies, could also be leaked from compromised computers. It should be noted that threats that expose confidential information may employ more than one method to do so; as a result, cumulative percentages discussed in this metric may exceed 100 percent.
In the first six months of 2007, threats to confidential information made up 65 percent of potential
infections by the top 50 malicious code samples (figure 29). This is an increase over the 53 percent of potential infections in the second half of 2006.
PeriodJul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 2007Percentage of top 50 threats that expose
confidential information
65%
53%
Figure 29. Threats to confidential information by volume
Source: Symantec Corporation
83Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Malicious code can expose confidential information in a variety of ways. The most common method is by
allowing remote access to the compromised computer through a back door. In this method, the attacker typically uses a specialized application to connect to the compromised computer. He or she can then perform numerous actions such as taking screenshots, changing configuration settings, and uploading, downloading, or deleting files.
In this reporting period, 88 percent of confidential information threats had a remote access component
(figure 30). Remote access threats made up 87 percent of confidential information threats in the second half of 2006. Back doors typically require a two-way communication channel between the attacker and the compromised computer in order to access unauthorized information. As such, they may be less efficient than an automated mechanism, such as a keystroke logger. This may indicate why threats that allow remote access only increased marginally this period while other information exposure types increased more significantly.
PeriodPercentage of exposure threats
Exports email addressesExports user data
Exports system data
Jul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 200787%
76%
67%69%
69%88%
88%
80% 76%79%Keystroke logger
Allows remote access
Figure 30. Threats to confidential information by type
Source: Symantec Corporation
Confidential information threats with keystroke logging capability made up 88 percent of threats to
confidential information, up from 76 percent in the second half of last year. A keystroke logger records keystrokes on a compromised computer and either emails the log to the attacker or uploads it to a Web site under the attacker’s control. This makes it easier for the attacker to gather confidential information from a large number of compromised computers than if he or she had to manually connect to back doors installed on various computers. The attacker can use these logs to find the user’s credentials for different types of accounts, such as online banking and trading accounts, as well as ISP accounts. The attacker can then use this information as a stepping stone to launch further attacks.
84Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Threats that could be employed to export user data accounted for 80 percent of confidential information
threats during the first six months of 2007, up from 69 percent in the previous reporting period. Furthermore, in the first half of 2007, 79 percent of threats to confidential information could be used to export system data, compared to 69 percent in the second half of 2006. These forms of data leakage can be used to steal a user’s identity or launch further attacks. Attackers with access to the user’s personal and system data can use it to craft a more targeted social engineering attack tailored to that particular user.
Organizations can take several steps to limit the exposure of confidential information by successful
intrusions. Encrypting sensitive data that is stored in databases will limit an attacker’s ability to view and/or use the data. However, this step will require that sufficient computing resources be made available, as encrypting and decrypting the data for business use consumes processing cycles on servers. Furthermore, encrypting stored data will not protect against so-called man-in-the-middle attacks that intercept data before it is encrypted.
141 As a result, data should always be transmitted through secure channels such as
SSH, SSL, and IPSec.
Propagation mechanisms
Worms and viruses use various means to transfer themselves, or propagate, from one computer to another.
These means are collectively referred to as propagation mechanisms. This section will assess some of the propagation mechanisms used by malicious code samples that were reported to Symantec in the first half of 2007. It will assess these samples according to the percentage of potential infections. Readers should note that some malicious code samples use more than one mechanism to propagate. As a result, cumulative percentages presented in this discussion may exceed 100 percent.
Due to some methodological changes that Symantec made for this reporting period, this volume of the
Internet Security Threat Report is able to examine propagation mechanisms with increased specificity. For
example, where possible, the specific peer-to-peer protocols employed as propagation mechanisms have been identified. This will allow administrators to look at more specific port blocking and protocol filtering based upon the specific propagation mechanisms being discussed. It is also important to note that, due to this change, any comparisons to previous reporting periods would not be valid; therefore, they have not been presented here.
In the second half of 2007, 46 percent of malicious code that propagated did so in email attachments
(table 7). This is not surprising, given the pervasive use of email. However, as noted in the “Top ten new malicious code families” section of this report, malicious code authors seem to be diversifying their propagation mechanisms by combining worms with a viral file-infection component.
To limit the propagation of email-borne threats, administrators should ensure that all email attachments
are scanned at the gateway. Additionally, all executable files originating from external sources, such as email attachments or downloaded from Web sites should be treated as suspicious. All executable files should be checked by antivirus scanners using the most current definitions.
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141 A “man-in-the-middle attack” is a form of attack in which a third party intercepts communications between two computers. The “m an in the middle” captures the
data, but still relays it to the intended destination to avoid detection. This can allow the attacker to intercept communicatio ns on a secure or encrypted channel.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Rank
1
2
3
4
567
8
9
10Propagation Mechanism
File Transfer/Email Attachment
File Transfer/CIFSFile Sharing/Peer-to-PeerFile Sharing/ExecutablesFile Sharing/Peer-to-Peer/Kazaa
Remotely Exploitable VulnerabilityFile Sharing/Peer-to-Peer/Morpheus
File Sharing/Peer-to-Peer/eDonkey
File Sharing/Peer-to-Peer/Winny
Backdoor/Kuang2Percentage
of Threats
46%
24%
22%22%18%
18%15%
15%
5%
3%
Table 7. Propagation mechanisms
Source: Symantec Corporation
Of the malicious code that propagated during the first half of 2007, 24 percent did so by the Common
Internet File Sharing (CIFS) protocol.142 Malicious code samples such as Fujacks.E143 and variants of the
Looked144 family both propagated in significant numbers this period by copying themselves to CIFS shares
with weak password protection. Both of these worms also contain a viral component to infect portable executable files. Since they try to infect files on both local and mapped network drives, they effectively
use this propagation mechanism multiple times.
This propagation mechanism can be threatening to organizations because file servers use CIFS to give
users access to their file shares. If a computer with access to a file server becomes infected by a threat that propagates through CIFS, it could spread to the file server. Since multiple computers within a corporation likely access the same file server, this could facilitate the rapid propagation of the threat within the enterprise.
To protect against threats that use the CIFS protocol to propagate, all shares should be protected with
strong passwords, and only users who require the resources should be given access to them. If other users
do not need to write to a share, they should only be given “read” permissions. This will prevent malicious code from copying itself to the shared directory or modifying shared files. Finally, CIFS shares should not be exposed to the Internet. Blocking TCP port 445 at the network boundary will help to protect against threats that propagate using CIFS.
Malicious code using peer-to-peer (P2P) protocols to propagate accounted for 22 percent of all potential
infections this period. These samples typically do not attempt to use a specific P2P protocol to propagate; rather they copy themselves to all folders on a computer containing the string “shar”. P2P applications commonly create folders containing the word “share”—such as “shared folder”—so these malicious code samples will successfully propagate through many of them.
Four specific P2P protocols were commonly used by malicious code to propagate during the first six months
of 2007. The Kazaa file-sharing service was used by 18 percent of malicious code samples that propagated, while Morpheus and eDonkey were each used by 15 percent. Finally, the Winny protocol was used by five percent of propagating malicious code this period.
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142 CIFS is a file sharing protocol that allows files and other resources on a computer to be shared with other computers across th e Internet. One or more
directories on a computer can be shared to allow other computers to access the files within.
143 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-010509-0134-99
144 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-121709-0657-99Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Since P2P applications are typically not permitted on corporate networks, any P2P clients are likely
installed without the knowledge or consent of network administrators. Enterprises should take measures to prevent P2P clients from being installed on any computers on the network. They should also block any ports used by these applications at the network boundary. End users who download files from P2P networks should scan all such files with a regularly updated antivirus product.
Malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities
The exploitation of vulnerabilities as a means of malicious code propagation is an ongoing concern for
enterprises. This section of the Internet Security Threat Report will assess the proportion of malicious
code that exploits vulnerabilities. This can provide some insight into how popular are vulnerabilities among malicious code authors when developing malicious code and variants thereof. The number of malicious code samples exploiting vulnerabilities gives administrators an indication of the need to apply patches in a timely manner.
During the first half of 2007, 18 percent of the 1,509 documented malicious code instances exploited
vulnerabilities (figure 31).
145 This is lower than the 23 percent of the 1,318 malicious code instances
documented in the second half of 2006. While the number of new samples exploiting vulnerabilities declined in the current reporting period, this method of propagation remains effective, as is illustrated by its presence in the top ten propagation mechanisms (table 7).
Documented malicious code
0%20%40%60%80%100%
Remainder of malicious code
Malicious code that exploits
vulnerabilitiesPeriodJan–Jun 2006 Jul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 200718%23%77%
17%83%82%
10%30%50%70%90%
Figure 31. Malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation
87 145 It should be noted that the number of documented malicious code instances differs from the number of malicious code submissions . Documented malicious code
instances are those that have been analyzed and documented within the Symantec malicious code database.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
The recent decline in the number of malicious code samples exploiting vulnerabilities is related to the drop
in the number of zero-day vulnerabilities during this period. As discussed in the “Vulnerability Trends” section of this report, the number of new zero-day vulnerabilities documented decreased from 12 in the
second half of 2006 to six in the first six months of 2007. Since a patch does not exist for a zero-day
vulnerability, it is an effective way for malicious code to be installed on a vulnerable computer. As a result, the number of new zero-day vulnerabilities in a period can have a direct effect on the number of threats that are known to exploit vulnerabilities in the same period.
While the number of malicious code samples that propagate by exploiting vulnerabilities has decreased
this period, the number is still significant. Many of the samples exploiting vulnerabilities this period were bots. Bots can allow a remote attacker to perform numerous actions on a compromised computer,
including stealing confidential information, launching DoS attacks, and installing additional threats.
Another growing shift in malicious code is in how it is reaching users. Traditionally, malicious code was
delivered to the intended target. However, increasingly, malicious code samples are installed by attackers who lure users into visiting Web pages that exploit vulnerabilities in the user’s browser or its components. The malicious code itself does not directly exploit any vulnerabilities in this scenario, but instead, is installed on a computer after a vulnerability is exploited.
For example, during the current reporting period, the MPack kit was used to install malicious code on
computers.
146 Legitimate Web sites were compromised and legitimate Web pages were modified to include
code to redirect the user’s browser to a malicious server. The malicious MPack server then attempted to
exploit one of a number of vulnerabilities to install the first stage of a multistaged downloader on the
compromised computer.
This shift towards malicious code being installed through browser vulnerabilities can present challenges
to network administrators. The variety of Web browsers and the number of components and plug-ins available for each can be daunting to keep track of and patch.
147 Antivirus software can detect malicious
code samples that are installed by exploiting vulnerabilities. IPS technologies can also prevent exploitation
of browser and plug-in vulnerabilities through signatures and behavior-based detection, as well as ASLR.
Percentage of computers with multiple infections
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is assessing the number
of times potential malicious code infections are reported from the same computer. This is done using
data gathered by proprietary Symantec technologies. While many users may only experience one or two malicious code instances on their computers, some may become infected frequently within a single six-month period. Multiple infections may be due to a lack of knowledge on the user’s part or out-of-date antivirus definitions. In some cases, multiple infections may also indicate that the computer was infected by a staged downloader, which will be discussed in the “Staged downloaders” metric below.
In the current period, 65 percent of computers reporting potential malicious code infections reported only
a single instance of malicious code (figure 32). Thus, the majority of potentially infected users are likely to only experience a single malicious code instance in a period. This may be because many experienced computer users now make it a practice to update their antivirus signatures regularly. It should be noted that this data only takes into account malicious code infections over the current six-month period. A computer that only reported a single infection in the current period may have reported one in the previous period or may report one in the next.
88
146 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/05/mpack_packed_full_of_badness.html
147 For a more detailed discussion of Web browser plug-in vulnerabilities, see the “Vulnerability Trends” section of this report.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Five or more instances 8%
Three instances 7%
One instance 65%Four instances 3%
Two instances 17%
Figure 32. Percentage of computers with multiple infections
Source: Symantec Corporation
Thirty-five percent of computers reporting potential malicious code infections this period reported more
than once. Seventeen percent of all computers reporting potential infections reported two potential infections. Some of these computers may report two potential infections because of staged downloaders or malicious code that downloads a second component. For example, the Mixor.Q worm also downloaded copies of the Peacomm Trojan on compromised computers.
Worth noting is that, in the first half of 2007, eight percent of computers reporting potential malicious
code infections reported five or more potential infections. These users may engage in higher risk online behavior, such as following unknown links posted in forums, which could lead to malicious Web sites, or not keeping the patch levels of their software up-to-date. This type of behavior presents a risk to other users, particularly in corporate environments. A single compromised computer can potentially facilitate the infection of other users and servers on the network.
Users who experience multiple infections increase their likelihood of suffering serious consequences.
Each time they are infected, they risk the theft of confidential information or loss of data. While a user may discover the first infection before the malicious code is able to send personal information back to the attacker, they might not be as fortunate with subsequent infections. For example, in the case of a staged downloader, the first infection may disable the security applications on a compromised computer, while the second infection contains a keystroke logger or some other remote access threat.
89Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Staged downloaders—multiple infections by type
Staged downloaders, sometimes called modular malicious code, are threats that download and install
other malicious code onto a compromised computer. These threats allow an attacker to change the downloadable component to any type of threat that suits their objectives. As the attacker’s objectives change, he or she can change any later components that will be downloaded to perform the requisite tasks.
In the first half of 2007, the most prevalent downloader component was the Zlob Trojan (table 8).
148
This Trojan sets the user’s Internet Explorer home, search, and “not found” pages to Web pages hosting malicious code. It also periodically displays fake security alerts from the System Tray that claim that the computer is infected. If the user clicks one of the error messages they will be directed to a Web page hosting malicious code.
Rank
1
2345678
9
10Sample
Zlob
VundoMixor.QAnicmooSkintrimMetajuanStrationWimad
Nebuler
SecupType
Trojan
TrojanWormTrojanTrojanTrojanWormTrojan
Trojan
TrojanDownload Mechanism
Redirects browser to malicious Web page
Downloads files from remote addressesDownloads files from remote addressesDownloads files from remote addressesDownloads files from remote addressesDownloads files from remote addressesDownloads files from remote addressesUses Microsoft Windows Media® Digital Rights Manager to trick
user into downloading files
Downloads files from remote addresses
Displays fake security alerts to trick user into downloading files
Table 8. Top staged downloaders
Source: Symantec Corporation
The Vundo Trojan was the second most common staged downloader by potential infections this period.
Once Vundo is installed on a computer, it attempts to contact certain IP addresses to download and install its secondary components. One of the files it attempts to install is an adware program that will cause
pop-up advertisements to be displayed periodically. The adware component likely provides revenue to the
malicious code author.
Mixor.Q was the third most common staged downloader in the first six months of 2007. It is a mass-mailing
worm that was also responsible for part of the Peacomm outbreak. This worm sends out a mass-mailing of itself in order to propagate and is also known to install either Peacomm or Galapoper.A.
149 Both of these
secondary stages also download additional threats onto compromised computers. Galapoper can also be used to relay spam.
All of the top ten second-stage components downloaded this period were Trojans or back doors. Some
of these Trojans simply download another threat to the compromised computer, while others steal confidential information or compromise the computer’s security, leaving it open to further compromise.
90
148 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-042316-2917-99
149 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-042013-1813-99Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
The most prevalent downloaded component in the first six months of 2007 was the Adclicker Trojan
(table 9).150 This simple Trojan is intended to drive traffic to Web pages and banner advertisements.
Banner advertisements compensate the owner of the Web site they are hosted on for each view or click-through.
151 Generating fraudulent traffic to these advertisements is commonly referred to as click fraud.
Rank
1
23456789
10Sample
Adclicker
GampassZonebacKillAVLineagePeacommRustock.BBzupGraybirdHaxdoorType
Trojan
TrojanTrojanTrojanTrojanTrojanBack doorTrojanBack doorBack doorImpact
Generates traffic to Web sites and banner ads
Steals online gaming account informationLowers Internet Explorer security settingsDisables security applicationsSteals online gaming account informationCreates a peer network and downloads other threatsAllows remote access and relays spamSteals online banking account informationAllows remote access, logs keystrokes, and steals passwordsAllows remote access
Table 9. Top downloaded components
Source: Symantec Corporation
The Gampass Trojan was the second most commonly downloaded component this period.152 It is primarily
used to steal a user’s online gaming account information and send it to the attacker. This Trojan is discussed in greater detail in the “Malicious code targeting online gaming” section below.
Zonebac was the third most commonly downloaded component in the first six months of 2007. It is a
Trojan that lowers the Internet Explorer security zone settings.
153 These settings prevent Web sites from
automatically downloading and executing files through the browser. Zonebac also starts a hidden process to connect to certain Web sites, which will likely attempt to take advantage of the lowered security zone settings to install other threats on the compromised computer.
All of the top ten staged downloaders and eight of the top ten downloaded components were also among
the top 50 malicious code samples by potential infections this period. Twenty-eight of the top 50 samples accounting for 79 percent of potential infections included the ability to download additional components. This illustrates the prevalence of staged downloaders during the current reporting period. Since many staged downloaders consist of Trojans, this also relates to the increase in Trojans causing potential infections as discussed in the “Malicious code types” section of this report.
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150 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2002-091214-5754-99
151 A click-through is a link that contains uniquely identifiable information about its originator that a user clicks on. Typically , the originator receives
financial compensation for each click-through.
152 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-111201-3853-99
153 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-091612-5500-99Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Malicious code targeting online gaming
Online gaming is becoming one of the most popular activities on the Internet. Recently, a study indicated
that unique visitors to online gaming sites reached 217 million worldwide.154 In 2007, the online gaming
market in China, where there were 30 million Internet gamers by the end of 2006,155 is expected to grow
by 35 percent.156
Online games often feature goods, such as prizes, that can be exchanged by players for money. The total
annual wealth created within virtual worlds has been placed at approximately 10 billion USD.157 As such, it
is not surprising that attackers appear to be turning their attention to these games. This metric will assess malicious code that targets online gaming, including:
• The top three malicious code samples targeting online gaming sites
• The percentage of the top 50 malicious code samples that target these sites• The most commonly targeted gaming sites
In the first half of 2007, the most common malicious code sample targeting online games was the
Gampass Trojan (table 10). This Trojan is notable because the attacker can use it to target one of several online games, including the Lineage, Ragnarok Online, Rohan, and Rexue Jianghue games. These games are more popular in the APJ region than the rest of the world. As a result, 84 percent of worldwide potential infections by Gampass during this period originated in that region.
The ability of this threat to be configured to target multiple games likely contributes to its popularity
among attackers. When it is installed, the Trojan will log keystrokes when the user connects to a specified online gaming site. It will then send the log to a Web site or email address. Gampass may also attempt to disable the processes of antivirus and other security products, leaving compromised users open to additional threats.
Sample
Gampass
LineageDowiexType
Trojan
TrojanVirus, TrojanGame(s) Targeted
Configurable for many
LineageWorld of Warcraft
Table 10. Top three malicious code samples targeting online gaming sites
Source: Symantec Corporation
The second most common malicious code sample targeting online games this period was the Lineage
Trojan.158 This Trojan steals account information for the Lineage online game and emails it to the attacker.
Interestingly, this Trojan was first seen on January 11, 2005, yet it still remains one of the top 50 malicious code samples reported to Symantec two years later. The persistence of this Trojan is likely due to the fact that authors are continually creating new variants to bypass antivirus signatures. This indicates that the Trojan has been proven to be effective and successful, or attackers would most likely have created newer threats to accomplish their goals.
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154 http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=1521
155 http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/wireStory?id=3386396
156 http://uk.reuters.com/article/internetNews/idUKSHA27160820070628
157 http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,128270-page,2-c,onlineentertainment/article.html
158 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-011211-3355-99Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Dowiex was the third most common malicious code sample targeting online games during the first six
months of 2007.159 This threat downloads the Wowcraft Trojan160 onto compromised computers. This
Trojan, in turn, logs keystrokes in windows with certain titles associated with the World of Warcraft game. Like Gampass, Wowcraft also disables processes associated with security applications. It can also download and install other threats on the compromised computer.
In the first six months of 2007, five percent of the top 50 malicious code samples reported to Symantec
attempted to steal account information for online games. This is likely due to the fact that there is considerable financial gain to be made from online gaming accounts, so that attackers are deploying these threats in substantial numbers.
Another indication of the growing appeal of targeting online gaming is that both Gampass and Lineage
were also two of the most downloaded components of multistaged downloaders this period. This indicates that attackers see value in targeting online gamers since many of the other top downloaded components are used for more common types of identity theft such as stealing online banking account credentials.
Of further concern is that two of the top three malicious code threats targeting online games also disable
security applications on the compromised computer. This could leave the computer open to other threats even if the user does not participate in any of these online games. Combined with the ability to download other threats, this means that attackers can install a wide range of threats on compromised computers once they have the user’s online gaming account information.
Malicious code—prevention and mitigation
Symantec recommends that certain best security practices always be followed to protect against malicious
code infection. Administrators should keep patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host public services and applications—such as HTTP, FTP, SMTP, and DNS servers—and that are accessible through a firewall or placed in a DMZ. Email servers should be configured to only allow file attachment types that are required for business needs and to block email that appears to come from within the company, but that actually originates from external sources. Additionally, Symantec recommends that ingress and egress filtering be put in place on perimeter devices to prevent unwanted activity.
To protect against malicious code that installs itself through a Web browser, additional measures should be
taken. The use of IPS technologies can prevent exploitation of browser and plug-in vulnerabilities through signatures and behavior-based detection in addition to ASLR.
End users should employ defense-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software and
a personal firewall. Users should update antivirus definitions regularly. They should also ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their software vendors. They should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless it is expected and comes from a trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
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159 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-101716-2136-99
160 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-073115-1710-99Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Phishing Trends
Phishing is an attempt by a third party to solicit confidential information from an individual, group, or
organization by spoofing a specific, well known brand, usually for financial gain. Phishers are groups or individuals who attempt to trick users into disclosing personal data, such as credit card numbers, online banking credentials, and other sensitive information. They may then use the information to commit fraudulent acts. This section of the Internet Security Threat Report will discuss phishing activity that
Symantec detected between January 1 and June 30, 2007.
The data provided in this section is based on statistics derived from the Symantec Probe Network, which
consists of over two million decoy email accounts that attract email messages from 20 different countries around the world. The main purpose of the network is to attract spam, phishing, viruses, and other email-borne threats. It encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises around the world, attracting email that is representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 million mailboxes. The Probe Network consists of previously used email addresses as well as email accounts that have been generated solely to be used as probes.
In addition to the Probe Network, Symantec also gathers phishing information through the Symantec
Phish Report Network, an extensive antiphishing community of enterprises and consumers.
161 Members of
the Phish Report Network contribute and receive fraudulent Web site addresses for alerting and filtering across a broad range of solutions.
Symantec assesses phishing according to two indicators: phishing messages and phishing attempts. A
phishing message is a single, unique message that is sent to targets with the intent of gaining confidential and/or personal information from computer users by directing them to a Web site where the user’s information is fraudulently obtained. Each phishing message has different content and each one will represent a different way of trying to fool a user into disclosing information by spoofing a known brand. A phishing message can be considered the “lure” with which a phisher attempts to entice a phishing target to disclose confidential information.
A phishing attempt can be defined as an instance of a phishing message being sent to a single user.
Extending the fishing analogy, a phishing attempt can be considered a single cast of the lure (the phishing message) to try to ensnare a target. A single phishing message can be used in numerous distinct phishing attempts, usually targeting different end users.
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161 http://www.phishreport.netSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
Phishing Highlights
The following section will offer a brief summary of some of the phishing trends that Symantec observed
during this period, based on data provided by the sources listed above. Following this overview, the Internet Security Threat Report will discuss selected phishing metrics in greater depth, providing analysis
and discussion of the trends indicated by the data.
• The Symantec Probe Network detected a total of 196,860 unique phishing messages, an 18 percent
increase over the last six months of 2006. This equates to an average of 1,088 unique phishing messages per day for the first half of 2007.
• Symantec blocked over 2.3 billion phishing messages in the first half of 2007, an increase of 53 percent
over the second half of 2006. This means that Symantec blocked an average of roughly 12.5 million phishing emails per day over the first six months of 2007.
• Organizations in the financial services sector accounted for 79 percent of the unique brands that were
used in phishing attacks during this period.
• The brands of organizations in the financial services sector were spoofed by 72 percent of all phishing
Web sites.
• Fifty-nine percent of all phishing Web sites detected in the first half of 2007 were located in the United
States, a much higher proportion than in any other country.
• Three phishing toolkits were responsible for 42 percent of all phishing attacks observed by Symantec
in the first half of 2007.
• Eighty-six percent of all known phishing Web sites were hosted on only 30 percent of IP addresses
known to be phishing Web servers.
Phishing Discussion
This section will discuss selected phishing metrics in greater depth, providing analysis and discussion of the trends indicated by the data. The following metrics will be discussed:
• Phishing activity by sector
• Top countries hosting phishing Web sites• Automated phishing toolkits • Core brands being phished• Phishing—prevention and mitigation
95Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Phishing activity by sector
This metric will assess phishing activity by sector. It will do this in two ways. First, it will identify the
sectors in which the organizations that were most commonly phished belong. This means that the organization’s brand was used in phishing attacks. Second, it will assess which sectors were targeted by the highest volume of phishing attacks. These considerations are important for enterprises because the use of an organization’s brand in phishing activity can have significant negative consequences. It can undermine consumer confidence and damage the organization’s reputation. Furthermore, the company may be required to compensate victims of any phishing scams that use the company’s brand.
Most of the organizations whose brands were used in phishing attacks in the first six months of 2007
were part of the financial services sector. Organizations in that sector accounted for 79 percent of the brands that were used for phishing during this period (figure 33), compared to the previous period when they accounted for 84 percent. The financial services sector also accounted for the highest volume of phishing Web sites during this period, making up 72 percent of all phishing Web sites reported to Symantec (figure 34). Financial services made up 64 percent of all phishing Web sites in the last half of 2006.
Non-profit <1%Government 1%
Software 1%1%1%
Other 2%<1%
Financial 79%Retail 3%
ISP 11% Internet
community 2%
Hardware 1%Insurance 2%
Figure 33. Brands phished by sector
Source: Symantec Corporation
Most phishing activity is conducted for financial gain. A successful phishing attack that mimics the brand
of a financial entity is most likely to yield data that can be used for immediate financial gain. It is therefore logical that phishing attacks focus on brands within the financial services sector.
96Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Other <1%
Financial 72%Retail 16%ISP 3%
Internet
community 9%
Figure 34. Phished sectors by phishing Web sites
Source: Symantec Corporation
Organizations in the Internet service provider (ISP) sector made up 11 percent of the unique brands used
in phishing attacks during this period, making it the second ranked sector. This is an increase over the seven percent of phishing attacks that spoofed ISP brands in the second half of 2006.
As noted in the previous edition of the Internet Security Threat Report , ISP accounts can be valuable
targets for phishers.
162 People frequently use the same authentication credentials (such as usernames and
passwords) for multiple accounts, including their email accounts.163 Thus, information gleaned through
phishing attacks may provide access to other accounts, such as online banking.
Additionally, attackers could use the free Web-hosting space that is often provided with these accounts
to host phishing Web sites, or they could use the accompanying email accounts to send spam or launch further phishing attacks. In some cases, compromised ISP Web-hosting may also be used to plant links to other Web sites the attacker controls in order to boost the rating of the Web site in search engines.
164
Email account passwords were also the third most common item advertised for sale on underground economy servers this period, as described in the “Underground economy servers” discussion in the “Attack Trends” section of this report.
The retail services sector only accounted for three percent of organizations whose brands were spoofed in
phishing activity in the first half of 2007; however, it accounted for 16 percent of the volume of phishing Web sites. In the previous reporting period, it accounted for five percent of the unique brands spoofed and 34 percent of phishing Web sites.
97
162 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume XI (March 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xi_03_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 69
163 http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2006/proceedings/p44_gaw.pdf
164 For a more detailed discussion of search engine rankings, see the “Malicious Code Trends” section of this report.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
The disproportionate number of phishing Web sites in the retail services sector indicates that a small
number of retail brands were being heavily phished. This is illustrated by the fact that a large volume of phishing attacks were reported that attempted to spoof the eBay brand. This is not surprising, as an attacker can use a user’s eBay account credentials in various ways. First, many eBay accounts are linked to the user’s PayPal account. As users often use the same passwords for these accounts, compromising one could give an attacker access to both, which would allow the attacker to transfer funds to him- or herself. Additionally, the attacker could use the account to buy goods from other users and default on the transaction, sell items that do not exist, or even use the account to sell stolen goods or goods purchased from an online retailer using a hijacked account or stolen credit card.
While the retail services sector made up 16 percent of phishing Web sites, this is a significant decrease
from the 34 percent reported in the previous six-month period. This is mainly due to a significant rise in the volume of phishing sites targeting the financial sector. Attackers have also started exploring other means of perpetrating fraud upon customers of retail organizations such as eBay. For instance, some Trojans and other attacks
165 can also facilitate identity theft.
Eight of the top ten brands spoofed by attackers in phishing attacks during this period were in the
financial sector. Interestingly, one of the most frequently spoofed brands this period was an Internet community. While there is no immediate financial gain to be obtained by attackers who steal a user’s account information, it may provide other returns. The attacker could use the account to gather information from the hijacked account’s friends, such as email addresses, by sending messages that appear to come from the legitimate user, who would likely be implicitly trusted by the message recipient.
166
Additionally, the attacker can send messages containing links to Web sites that are designed to download malicious code on visitors’ computers.
167 Since the link comes from a user’s friend, they may be more likely
to trust the link and visit the site.168
Top countries hosting phishing Web sites
A phishing Web site is a site that is designed to mimic the legitimate Web site of the organization whose
brand is being spoofed, often an online bank or e-commerce retailer. In many cases, it is set up by the attacker to capture a victim’s authentication information or other personal identification information, which can subsequently be used in identity theft or other fraudulent activity.
This metric will assess the countries in which the most phishing Web sites were hosted in the first six
months of 2007. In this case, Symantec counts phishing Web sites as the number of unique IP addresses hosting Web pages used for phishing. This data is a snapshot in time, and does not offer insight into changes in the locations of certain phishing sites over the course of the reporting period. It should also be noted that the fact that a phishing Web site is hosted in a certain country does not necessarily mean that the attacker is located in that country.
98
165 Please see http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/03/ebay_motor_scam_update.html and
http://redtape.msnbc.com/2007/03/how_far_has_vla.html, respectively, for more in-depth discussions.
166 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2006/11/an_imaginative_phishing_attack_1.html
167 http://blog.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2007/06/web_2pointuhoh_worm_whacks_mys.html
168 For more on phishing attacks that target social networking sites, please see: http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2006/09/contextaware_phishing_realized.htmlSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
In the first half of 2007, 59 percent of all known phishing Web sites were located in the United States
(table 11), a considerable increase over the previous period when 46 percent of phishing Web sites were located there. The United States is home to a large number of Web-hosting providers, including over 30 percent of registered domains.
169 It is also home to the highest number of Internet users in the world.170
The increase in phishing Web sites located there during this reporting period is also likely related to the high number of Trojans reported from North America this period, as is discussed in the “Malicious Code Trends” section of this report. Trojans are frequently used for hosting Web sites used in phishing attacks.
Rank
1
23456789
10Previous Rank
1
23
1011
47586Country
United States
GermanyUnited KingdomNetherlandsRussiaFranceCanadaJapanChinaTaiwanCurrent Period
59%
6%3%2%2%2%2%2%1%1%Previous Period
46%
11%
3%2%2%3%2%3%2%3%
Table 11. Top countries hosting phishing Web sites
Source: Symantec Corporation
Germany was once again the location of the second-highest percentage of phishing Web sites this period,
with six percent of the worldwide total. This is, however, a decrease from the last six months of 2006 when 11 percent of phishing Web sites were located there. Variations in percentages between periods are likely a result of the opportunistic nature of attackers. Attackers are most likely to host phishing Web sites on any computer they are able to compromise. In many cases, attackers host their phishing Web sites on a computer that was compromised by a bot. Because bots compromise any computer that is vulnerable to the exploits they use to propagate, there is little control on the part of the attacker as to the physical location of computers in their bot network.
The United Kingdom hosted the third highest number of phishing Web sites this period. It held steady at
three percent of worldwide phishing Web sites reported in the previous period. The percentage of bots in the United Kingdom has been dropping in recent periods; however, it is the top country reporting potential malicious code infections in the EMEA region. This may indicate that attackers are using bots less frequently in phishing attacks and are instead using other malicious code to host phishing Web sites.
169 http://www.webhosting.info/webhosts/tophosts/global/
170 http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/218/report_display.asp
99Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Automated phishing toolkits
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is assessing the usage of
automated phishing toolkits. A phishing toolkit is a set of scripts that allows an attacker to automatically set up phishing Web sites that spoof the legitimate Web sites of different brands, including the images and logos associated with those brands. The scripts also help to generate corresponding phishing email messages. As each script generates pseudo-random phishing URLs with a distinctive pattern, the particular script used to generate a particular phishing URL can be identified from that pattern. All phishing URLs reported to Symantec can be sorted and grouped according to those specific patterns.
Phishing toolkits are developed by groups or individuals and are sold on the underground market. As
such, they illustrate the trend that Symantec has observed towards an increase in the commercialization, development and distribution in threats and malicious services. This trend also indicates that phishing is becoming an increasingly organized activity. These sophisticated phishing kits are sold for a lot of money, so it’s unlikely they would be available to an average user.
The three phishing kits examined in this discussion are quite a bit more robust than others Symantec has
analyzed. For example, these kits include tools to construct the phishing Web sites and they allow multiple phishing Web sites to be created on the same compromised computer. They also enable the attacker to automate the creation and sending of the phishing email messages. Other kits often only include scripts to send email messages or tools for creating the phishing Web site.
A look at the three most widely used phishing toolkits reveals that, on average, they alone were responsible
for 42 percent of all phishing attacks detected in the first half of 2007 (figure 35).
171 This shows the high
percentage of complete automation used in phishing attacks compared to attacks that are only partially automated. Automation allows attackers to send a high volume of phishing messages that spoof several brands to a large number of recipients with minimal effort. Of the 58 percent of remaining attacks, some may have used phishing toolkits other than the three that are currently known to Symantec, while others used techniques other than toolkits.
171 It should be noted that most of the remaining phishing attacks likely use simple scripts at some point in their attack process to simplify certain repetitive tasks,
but for this analysis, the focus was on the three most widely used and completely automated phishing toolkits that generate pse udo-random URL links.
100Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
101DatePercentage of phishing URLs
Feb Mar Apr May020%40%60%80%
10%30%50%70%100%
Jun Jan90%
Toolkit 3Toolkit 1
Other methodsToolkit 2
45%
15%
8%33%35%
31%32%
2%15%
3%71%
12%
2% 3%88%
7%
1%17%74%
9%
3%37%52%
8%
Figure 35. Use of automated phishing toolkits
Source: Symantec Corporation
There is significant dynamism in the toolkits that are used at any one point in time. For instance, Toolkit 1
declined from 45 percent usage in January to only three percent usage in June. This suggests that the attackers using it may have stopped because they moved to a different version of this toolkit or some other entirely different toolkit. This adaptation is typical as new detection and protection methods are introduced over time.
One indicator that a phishing toolkit has been used is that a number of phishing Web sites are hosted
on a single IP address. A toolkit can easily set up phishing Web sites that spoof a number of different brands on the same compromised computer. Hosting multiple phishing Web sites on a single computer offers numerous advantages. For instance, the attacker doesn’t need to worry about maintaining multiple computers and can instead use a toolkit to easily host Web sites that mimic several brands on the single computer. However, doing so creates a single point of failure for the attacker. If authorities discover the host computer before the attacker can gather the information collected from victims, he or she loses much more data than if each phishing site had been hosted on a separate computer.
During the first half of 2006, 86 percent of all phishing Web sites reported to Symantec were hosted on
only 30 percent of phishing IP addresses. Examining the data throughout the period reveals a strong link between the number of phishing IP addresses and the use of phishing toolkits, as described above. There is a strong correlation between months with a high number of phishing URLs not generated by toolkits and months with a decrease in phishing Web sites hosted on the same IP addresses (figure 36). MonthPhishing Web sites hosted
on the same IP address
Feb Mar Apr May020%40%60%80%
10%30%50%70%100%
Jun Jan90%54%
48%62%83%89%
71%
Figure 36. Phishing Web sites that use the same IP address
Source: Symantec Corporation
The percentage of phishing Web sites hosted on a single IP address was high during January and February,
but was significantly lower from March through May. These months also saw a decrease in phishing URLs that were generated by the three major phishing kits and an increase in phishing URLs generated by other means. For example, in April only 48 percent of phishing Web sites were hosted on the same IP address. This is consistent with the use of phishing toolkits to create phishing Web sites for multiple brands on a single computer.
In addition to phishing toolkits, the use of Web hosting services to host phishing Web sites also contributes
to multiple phishing Web sites residing on the same IP address. While one or more attackers may use multiple accounts with the same hosting company to host phishing Web sites, they may still physically reside on the same server or on a group of servers using the same gateway IP address. This can also present difficulties for the Web hosting provider. Since their IP addresses can potentially be included on DNS block lists if a phishing Web site resides on their servers, this can also cause legitimate Web sites they host to be blocked.
Core brands being phished
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is analyzing the core
brands that were spoofed, or mimicked, during phishing attacks. Core brands are brands that are spoofed at least once each month in a phishing attack. These core brands were determined by identifying six lists of brands, one per month from January through June 2007, in which a new Web site spoofing that brand was reported. The core brands, then, are those that were present on each of these lists. In other words, the core brands were those for which a new phishing Web site was known to have been created in each month of this reporting period. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
102During the first six months of 2007, Symantec classified 78 of the 359 brands mimicked in a phishing
attack as core brands. Symantec then compared the core brands with the most frequently spoofed brands; that is, the brands for which the greatest number of spoofed phishing Web sites were detected. While many core brands are among the most frequently spoofed brands, there are also significant differences.
In particular, among the top 78 most frequently spoofed brands, only 61 were core brands. The ninth
most frequently spoofed brand was actually not a core brand. This is primarily because Symantec did not see any reports of Web sites spoofing this specific brand during the month of April. The eleventh most frequently spoofed brand was also not a core brand. In fact, this brand was only spoofed during the month of February, and 98 percent of the phishing sites that spoofed it were observed during a one-week period. This spike in activity might suggest that phishers unearthed some temporary security weakness in the site, such as an easy cash-out mechanism, and decided to target it. The weakness might have been shored up or the phishers efforts might have otherwise been unsuccessful, causing them to look elsewhere.
At the other end of the spectrum, the least frequently spoofed core brand was ranked 112th out of 359
among the most frequently spoofed brands. Only 12 phishing sites were set up to spoof this core brand. Three phishing sites spoofing that brand were reported in each of January, March, and April, and only one new site was reported in each of February, May, and June.
These numbers suggest that phishers do not always take a scatter-shot approach in their attack attempts.
Instead, for specific targets, they prefer methodical smaller-scaled approaches, albeit at a consistent pace. In general, the data seems to suggest that phishers vary their approach depending on the brand. Some brands are continuously spoofed whereas others are consistently, but less frequently, spoofed. Phishers may be adapting their behavior to optimize for profitability.
Phishing—prevention and mitigation
Symantec recommends that enterprise users protect themselves against phishing threats by filtering email
at the server level through the mail transfer agent (MTA). Although this will likely remain the primary point of filtering for phishing, organizations can also use IP-based filtering upstream, as well as HTTP filtering.
DNS block lists also offer protection against potential phishing emails.
172 Organizations could also consider
using domain-level or email authentication in order to verify the actual origin of an email message. This can protect against phishers who are spoofing email domains.
173
To protect against potential phishing activity, administrators should always follow Symantec best practices
as outlined in Appendix A of this report. Symantec also recommends that organizations educate their end users about phishing.
174 They should also keep their employees notified of the latest phishing attacks and
how to avoid falling victim to them, as well as provide a means to report suspected phishing sites.175
Organizations can also employ Web server log monitoring to track if and when complete downloads of their
Web sites, logos, and images are occurring. Such activity may indicate that someone is using the legitimate Web site to create an illegitimate Web site that could be used for phishing. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
172 A DNS block list (sometimes referred to as a black list) is simply a list of IP addresses that are known to send unwanted email traffic. It is used by email
software to either allow or reject email coming from IP addresses on the list.
173 Spoofing refers to instances where phishers forge the “From:” line of an email message using the domain of the entity they are targeting with the
phishing attempt.
174 For instance the United States Federal Trade Commission has published some basic guidelines on how to avoid phishing. They are available at:
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/alt127.htm
175 A good resource for information on the latest phishing threats can be found at: http://www.antiphishing.org
103Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
Organizations can detect phishing attacks that use spoofing by monitoring non-deliverable email addresses
or bounced email that is returned to non-existent users. They should also monitor the purchasing of cousin domain names by other entities to identify purchases that could be used to spoof their corporate domains.
176 So-called typo domains177 and homographic domains178 should also be monitored. This can
be done with the help of companies that specialize in domain monitoring; some registrars also provide this service.
The use of anti-phishing toolbars and components in Web browsers can also help protect users from
phishing attacks. These measures notify the user if a Web page being visited does not appear to be legitimate. This way, even if a phishing email reaches a user’s inbox, the user can still be alerted to the potential threat.
End users should follow best security practices, as outlined in Appendix A of this report. They should use
an antiphishing solution. As some phishing attacks may use spyware and/or keystroke loggers, Symantec advises end users to use antivirus software, antispam software, firewalls, toolbar blockers, and other software detection methods. Symantec also advises end users to never disclose any confidential personal or financial information unless and until they can confirm that any request for such information is legitimate.
Users should review bank, credit card, and credit information frequently. This can provide information
on any irregular activities. For further information, the Internet Fraud Complaint Center (IFCC) has also released a set of guidelines on how to avoid Internet-related scams.
179 Additionally, network administrators
can review Web proxy logs to determine if any users have visited known phishing sites.
104 176 Cousin domains refers to domain names that include some of the key words of an organization’s domain or brand name; for example , for the
corporate domain “bigbank.com”, cousin domains could include “bigbank-alerts.com”, ”big-bank-security.com”, and so on.
177 Typo domains are domain names that use common misspellings of a legitimate domain name, for example the domain “symatnec.com” w ould
be a typo domain for “symantec.com”.
178 A homographic domain name uses numbers that look similar to letters in the domain name, for example the character for the numbe r “1” can
look like the letter “l”.
179 http://www.fbi.gov/majcases/fraud/internetschemes.htmSpam Trends
Spam is usually defined as junk or unsolicited email sent by a third party. While it is certainly an
annoyance to users and administrators, spam is also a serious security concern as it can be used to deliver Trojans, viruses, and phishing attempts.
180 It could also cause a loss of service or degradation in the
performance of network resources and email gateways. This section of the Internet Security Threat Report
will discuss developments in spam activity between January 1 and June 30, 2007.
The data used in this analysis is based on data returned from the Symantec Probe Network as well as data
gathered from a statistical sampling of the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base. Specifically, statistics are gathered from enterprise customers’ Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam servers that receive more than 1,000 email messages per day. This removes the smaller data samples (that is, smaller customers and test servers), thereby allowing for a more accurate representation of data.
The Symantec Probe Network consists of millions of decoy email addresses that are configured to attract
a large stream of spam attacks. An attack can consist of one or more messages. The goal of the Probe Network is to simulate a wide variety of Internet email users, thereby attracting a stream of traffic that is representative of spam activity across the Internet as a whole. For this reason, the Probe Network is continuously optimized in order to attract new varieties of spam attacks. This is accomplished through internal production changes that are made to the network, which thus affect the number of new spam attacks it receives as a whole.
Spam Highlights
The following section will offer a brief summary of some of the spam trends that Symantec observed during this period based on data provided by the sources listed above. Following this overview, this section will discuss selected metrics in greater depth, providing analysis and discussion of the trends indicated by the data.
• Between January 1 and June 30, 2007, spam made up 61 percent of all email traffic monitored at
the gateway. This is a slight increase over the last six months of 2006 when 59 percent of email was classified as spam.
• Sixty percent of all spam detected during this period was composed in English, down from 65 percent
in the previous reporting period.
• In the first half of 2007, 0.43 percent of all spam email contained malicious code, compared to 0.68
percent of spam that contained malicious code in the second half of 2006. This means that one out of every 233 spam messages blocked by Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam contained malicious code.
• Spam related to commercial products made up 22 percent of all spam during this period, the most of
any category.
• During the first six months of 2007, 47 percent of all spam detected worldwide originated in the United
States compared to 44 percent in the previous period.
• The United States hosted the most spam zombies of any country, with 10 percent of the worldwide total.• In the first half of 2007, 27 percent of all spam blocked by Symantec was image spam.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
180 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6676819.stm
105Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
106Spam Discussion
This section will discuss selected spam metrics in greater depth, providing analysis and discussion of the
trends indicated by the data. The following metrics will be discussed:
• Top spam categories
• Top countries of spam origin• Image spam
Top spam categories
Spam categories are assigned by Symantec Email Security Group analysts based on spam activity that is
detected by the Symantec Probe Network. While some of the categories may overlap, this data provides a general overview of the types of spam that are most commonly seen on the Internet today. It is important to note that this data is restricted to spam attacks that are detected and processed by the Symantec Probe Network. Internal upstream processing may weed out particular spam attacks, such as those that are determined to be potential fraud attacks.
The most common type of spam detected in the first half of 2007 was related to commercial products
(figure 37), which made up 22 percent of all spam detected by Symantec sensors during this period. This is a slight increase from the previous period when this category made up 21 percent of detected spam. Commercial product spam usually consists of advertisements for commercial goods and services. It is frequently used to sell designer goods, such as watches, handbags, and sunglasses. There is financial motivation since the goods sold are often counterfeit and can be sold at a profit. In some cases the spammers may simply be collecting credit card and personal information for use in identity theft.
Fraud 3%
Health 20%Finance 21%
Internet 17%Leisure 5%Commercial products 22%Scams 8%Adult 4%
Figure 37. Top spam categories
Source: Symantec CorporationSpam related to financial services made up 21 percent of all spam in the first six months of 2007, making
it the second most common type of spam during this period. The previous edition of the Internet Security
Threat Report reported that Symantec had detected an increase in spam related to the financial services
sector over the last six months of 2006. This was primarily due to an abundance of stock market “pump and dump” spam.
181 However, in the current period, there has been a 30 percent decline in this type of
spam from the previous period. This is due to a decline in spam touting penny stocks that was triggered by actions taken by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission,
182 which limited the profitability
of this type of spam by suspending trading of the stocks that are touted.
Spam related to health products and services made up 20 percent of all spam detected during this period
compared to 23 percent in the second half of 2006. This category traditionally has one of the highest click-through rates, as it tends to be more difficult to market through more legitimate and traditional means. A click-through is a link that is embedded in a spam message. The link contains uniquely identifiable information about its originator. Each time a user clicks on the link, it is considered a click-through. Typically, the originator receives financial compensation for each click-through. Spammers have an economic incentive to have a high click-through rate in order to increase their return on investment. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that they would use spam content that has a high click-through rate.
Internet-related spam rose to 17 percent this period from 10 percent in the last half of 2006. This type
of spam is typically used to promote Web hosting and design, as well as other online commodities like phishing and spam toolkits. Since phishing and spam toolkits cannot typically be advertised by legitimate means, such as through banner ads on Web sites, spam tends to be the only way to promote them.
Top countries of spam origin
This section will discuss the top ten countries of spam origin. The nature of spam and its distribution on the
Internet presents challenges in identifying the location of people who are sending it. Many spammers try to redirect attention away from their actual geographic location. In an attempt to bypass DNS block lists, they use Trojans that relay email, which allow them to send spam from sites that are distinct from their physical location. In doing so, they will likely focus on compromised computers in those regions with the largest bandwidth capabilities. Following this logic, the region in which the spam originates may not correspond with the region in which the spammers are located.
This discussion is based on data gathered by customer installations of Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam.
This data includes the originating server’s IP address, against which frequency statistics are summarized. Each IP address is mapped to a specific country and charted over time.
During the first six months of 2007, 47 percent of all spam detected worldwide originated in the United
States (table 12). This is likely due to the high number of broadband users in that country and the high percentage of bot-infected computers located there, as was discussed in the “Attack Trends” section of this report. The United States was also the top country of spam origin in the second half of 2006, when 44 percent of spam originated there.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
181 For a more in-depth discussion of pump-and-dump spam, please see the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume 11 (March 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xi_03_2007.en-us.pdf : p.16
182 http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-34.htm
107Top Ten Countries of Spam Origin
United States
Undetermined EU CountriesChinaUnited KingdomJapanSouth KoreaTaiwan
Poland
Germany
SwitzerlandJan–Jun 2007
47%
7%4%4%4%3%3%
3%
2%
2%Jul–Dec 2006
44%
7%6%3%3%3%1%
3%
2%
1%
Table 12. Top ten countries of spam origin
Source: Symantec Corporation
The second highest source of spam this period was a group of undetermined European Union countries.
Seven percent of all detected spam originated there this period, the same amount as the second half of 2006. In this group, the specific source countries cannot be definitively identified because the ISPs through whose networks the spam was sent operate in more than one EU country.
China was the third highest country of spam origin in the first half of 2007. Four percent of spam detected
by Symantec during this period originated there, compared to six percent in the last half of 2006. This is a continuation of the drop that was first noted in the previous edition of the Internet Security Threat Report .
This drop may be due to an increasing focus on computer security in China as Internet regulation, such as port blocking by service providers,
183 begins to catch up with its rapid growth and users become more
knowledgeable.184 This can also be seen in the slowing increase of bots in China as discussed in the “Attack
Trends” section of this report. It is reasonable to speculate that this could be because some companies that do not do business in China automatically block all email originating there.
Image spam
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is assessing the
percentage of spam that is image spam. Image spam is a spam email that does not use text in the body of the message to convey its message; instead, it uses an image embedded in the email. This enables the spam to evade blocking techniques, such as Bayesian filtering,
185 that rely on words in the body of the email.
Other methods for detecting spam, such as comparing the MD5 checksum value of known image spam to an incoming email, can also be defeated by making minor changes to the image, such as to the color and size.
During the first half of 2007, 27 percent of all spam blocked by Symantec consisted of image spam
(figure 38). While image spam started at a higher level at the beginning of the period, reaching nearly 50 percent of all spam in the first week of January, it showed a marked decline beginning in April and continuing throughout May. The January level is likely due in large part to the rise of the Peacomm Trojan, which sent image spam.
186 While the decline of image spam subsided in June, it did not regain
the prominence it achieved at the beginning of the period.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
183 Many Internet service providers block incoming network connections to residential users on certain ports. This can prevent some network worms from
propagating, block access to back door servers, and prevent computers from relaying spam.
184 http://www.networkworld.com/news/2007/012307-china-internet-market-grows-to.html
185 Bayesian filtering assigns numerical values to certain words that are commonly found in spam. The sum of these values in a part icular message is then
compared to a score. If the sum exceeds the score, then the message is classified as spam.
186 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/01/storm_trojan_outbreak_a_spamce.html
108DatePercentage of image spam
0%20%40%
10%30%50%60%
1/1/07
1/8/07
1/15/07
1/22/07
1/29/07
2/5/07
2/12/07
2/19/07
2/26/07
3/5/07
3/12/07
3/19/07
3/26/07
4/2/07
4/9/07
4/16/07
4/23/07
4/30/07
5/7/07
5/14/07
5/21/07
5/28/07
6/4/07
6/11/076/18/07
6/25/07
Figure 38. Image spam as a percentage of all spam
Source: Symantec Corporation
The decline in image spam is likely a result of the increased ability of antispam solutions to detect and
block it. Also, a vast majority of image spam in the previous reporting was pump and dump stock spam. As was described in the “Top spam categories” of this report, this type of spam has experienced a significant decline, which has likely contributed to the decline of image spam.
Another change of note is that more spam messages are linking to an image hosted on remote servers
instead of embedding the image in the message itself. The HTML code in the email will retrieve the image when the user views the message, so the image never passes through antispam filtering. This shows that, as one method of delivering spam loses its effectiveness, spammers will adapt other techniques. Users and network administrators should ensure that their antispam measures are not static—as in the case of many antispam scripts and simple Bayesian filters—and are capable of evolving as attacks change. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
109Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
110Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices
Enterprise Best Practices
1. Employ defense-in-depth strategies, which emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive
defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protection method. This should include the deployment of regularly updated antivirus, firewalls, intrusion detection, and intrusion protection systems on client systems.
2. Turn off and remove services that are not needed.3. If malicious code or some other threat exploits one or more network services, disable or block access
to those services until a patch is applied.
4. Always keep patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host public services and are
accessible through the firewall, such as HTTP, FTP, mail, and DNS services.
5. Consider implementing network compliance solutions that will help keep infected mobile users out
of the network (and disinfect them before rejoining the network).
6. Enforce an effective password policy.7. Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments that are commonly
used to spread viruses, such as .VBS, .BAT, .EXE, .PIF, and .SCR files.
8. Isolate infected computers quickly to prevent the risk of further infection within the organization.
Perform a forensic analysis and restore the computers using trusted media.
9. Train employees to not open attachments unless they are expected and come from a known and trusted
source, and to not execute software that is downloaded from the Internet unless it has been scanned for viruses.
10. Ensure that emergency response procedures are in place. This includes having a backup-and-restore
solution in place in order to restore lost or compromised data in the event of successful attack or catastrophic data loss.
11. Educate management on security budgeting needs.12. Test security to ensure that adequate controls are in place.13. Be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file-
sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software. Clicking on links and/or attachments in email messages (or IM messages) may also expose computers to unnecessary risks. Ensure that only applications approved by the organization are deployed on desktop computers.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
111Consumer Best Practices
1. Consumers should use an Internet security solution that combines antivirus, firewall, intrusion
detection, and vulnerability management for maximum protection against malicious code and other threats.
2. Consumers should ensure that security patches are up-to-date and that they are applied to all
vulnerable applications in a timely manner.
3. Consumers should ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers, and should change them
often. Passwords should not consist of words from the dictionary.
4. Consumers should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is
expected and the purpose of the attachment is known.
5. Consumers should keep virus definitions updated regularly. By deploying the latest virus definitions,
consumers can protect their computers against the latest viruses known to be spreading in the wild.
6. Consumers should routinely check to see if their operating system is vulnerable to threats by using
Symantec Security Check at www.symantec.com/securitycheck.
7. Consumers should deploy an antiphishing solution. They should never disclose any confidential
personal or financial information unless and until they can confirm that any request for such information is legitimate.
8. Consumers can get involved in fighting cybercrime by tracking and reporting intruders. With Symantec
Security Check’s tracing service, users can quickly identify the location of potential hackers and forward the information to the attacker’s ISP or local police.
9. Consumers should be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with
the installation of file-sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software. Clicking on links and/or attachments in email messages (or IM messages) may also expose computers to unnecessary risks. Ensure that only applications approved by the organization are deployed on desktop computers.
10. Some security risks can be installed after an end user has accepted the end-user license agreement
(EULA), or as a consequence of that acceptance. Consumers should read EULAs carefully and understand all terms before agreeing to them.
11. Consumers should beware of programs that flash ads in the user interface. Many spyware programs
track how users respond to these ads, and their presence is a red flag. When users see ads in a program’s user interface, they may be looking at a piece of spyware.Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology
Attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec Global
Intelligence Network, which includes the Symantec DeepSight Threat Management System, Symantec Managed Security Services, the Symantec Honeypot Network, and proprietary Symantec technologies. Symantec combines data derived from these sources for analysis.
Denial of service attacks
Although there are numerous methods for carrying out denial of service (DoS) attacks, Symantec derives this metric by measuring DoS attacks that are carried out by flooding a target with SYN requests.
187 These
are often referred to as SYN flood attacks. This type of attack works by overwhelming a target with SYN requests and not completing the initial request, which thus prevents other valid requests from being processed.
In many cases, SYN requests with forged IP addresses are sent to a target, allowing a single attacking
computer to initiate multiple connections, resulting in unsolicited traffic, known as backscatter, being sent to other computers on the Internet. This backscatter is used to derive the number of DoS attacks observed throughout the reporting period. Although this methodology will not identify all DoS attacks carried out, it does allow Symantec to assess high-level DoS attack trends.
To determine the countries targeted by DoS attacks, Symantec cross-references the target IP addresses
of every detected attack with several third-party, subscription-based databases that link the source IP addresses with the geographic location of the originating computer. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error.
Sectors targeted by DoS attacks were identified using the same methodology as targeted countries.
However, in this case, the only attackers considered were those carrying out DoS attacks that were detected by IDS and IPS software.
Top originating countries
Symantec identifies the country of origin of attacks by automatically cross-referencing source IP addresses of every attacking IP address with several third-party, subscription-based databases that link the source IP address with the geographic location of the originating computer. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error.
Malicious activity by country
To determine the top countries for the “Malicious activity by country” metric, Symantec compiled geographical data on each type of malicious activity to be considered, which included: bot-infected computers, bot command-and-control servers, phishing Web sites, malicious code infections, spam relay hosts, and Internet attacks. The proportion of each activity originating in each country was determined. The mean of the percentages of each malicious activity that originated in each country was calculated. This average determined the proportion of overall malicious activity that originated from the country in question and was used to rank each country.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
187 The TCP protocol requires a three-way exchange to be carried out before any data is sent. The SYN request is the first phase of the three-way exchange. Once a
SYN request is received by a server, a SYN-ACK is sent in response. The final step is an ACK response, completing the connectio n negotiation process.
112Symantec also evaluated the top 25 of these countries according to the number of Internet users located
there. This measure is meant to remove the bias of high Internet users from the consideration of the “Malicious activity by country” metric. Symantec determined the top 25 countries for network corruption as a percentage of Internet users by using the same data as above. In order to determine this, Symantec divided the amount of malicious activity originating in each of the top 25 countries for malicious activity by the percentage of worldwide Internet users located in that country.
The percentage assigned to each country in the discussion thus corresponds to the proportion of malicious
activity that could be attributed to a single (average) Internet user in that country. That is, we first take one average Internet user from each of the top 25 countries and measure their collective malicious activity. The percentage of malicious activity that would be carried out by each person is the proportion assigned to each country.
Malicious activity originating from Fortune 100 organizations
To determine the proportion of malicious activity originating from Fortune 100 organizations, Symantec determined IP address ranges of the Fortune 100 organizations. These IP addresses were determined using autonomous system numbers (ASN). That is, the IP addresses that were registered by the Fortune 100 companies were used to determine the malicious activity originating from them. These IP ranges were in turn used to determine the percentage of malicious activity originating from computers determined to belong to those organizations, including Internet attacks, active bot-infected computers, phishing Web sites, and spam zombies. The attack activity carried out by Fortune 100 companies was compared to the world total to determine the percentage of overall attack activity originating from each organization.
For a number of reasons, the IP addresses used for this analysis may not be exact. For instance, an IP
address may be assigned to one company but be used by another. This is particularly true for companies that own many IP addresses. It is also possible for attackers to spoof IP addresses, making it look like their attacks originate from Fortune 100 organizations when they do not. As a consequence, some attacks that are either spoofed or originate from organizations other than Fortune 100 companies may be inadvertently included in this discussion.
Identity theft data breaches
Symantec identifies the proportional distribution of cause and sector for data breaches that may facilitate identity theft based on data provided by Attrition.org.
188 The sector that experienced the loss along with
the cause of loss that occurred is determined through analysis of the organization reporting the loss and the method that facilitated the loss.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
188 http://www.attrition.org
113Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
114Underground economy servers
This metric is based on data that is gathered by proprietary Symantec technologies. These technologies
monitor activity on underground economy servers and collect data. Underground economy servers are typically chat servers on which stolen data, such as identities, credit card numbers, access to compromised computers, and email accounts are bought and sold. Each server is monitored by recording communications that take place on them, which typically includes advertisements for stolen data. This data was used to derive the data presented in this metric.
Active bot-infected computers
Symantec identifies bot-infected computers based on coordinated scanning and attack behavior that is observed in network traffic. For an attacking computer to be considered to be participating in coordinated scanning and attacking, it must fit into that pattern to the exclusion of any other activity. This behavioral matching will not catch every bot-infected computer, and may identify other malicious code or individual attackers behaving in a coordinated way as a bot network. This behavioral matching will, however, identify many of the most coordinated and aggressive bot-infected computers. It will also give insight into the population trends of bot-infected computers, including those that are considered to be actively working in a well coordinated and aggressive fashion at some point in time during the reporting period.
Lifespan of bot-infected computers
Using previously identified bot-infected computers, Symantec determined the life span of these infections by measuring the time between their first and last detected activity. However, to ensure that the lifespan reflects a continuous bot infection, if the identified computer was inactive for 30 days or longer it was considered to be disinfected. As such, any further bot-like activity would be considered a new infection.
Bot-infected computers by countries and cities
This metric is based on the same data as “Active bot networks” discussion of the “Attacks Trends” section of the report. Symantec cross-references the IP addresses of every identified bot-infected computer with several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic location of systems to IP addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error. The data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of bot-infected computers.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
115Top targeted sectors
For the purposes of the Internet Security Threat Report , a targeted attacker is defined as one that is
detected attacking at least three users or organizations in a specific sector, to the exclusion of all other sectors. The targeted sector attack rate is a measure of the percentage of all attackers that target only organizations or users in a specific sector and is represented as a proportion of all targeted attacks. Figure 39 represents the proportional sensor distribution for each sector. (Due to rounding of numbers, the cumulative percentage of sensors may exceed 100.) Sectors with less than 10 sensors have been excluded from the resulting totals.
Home user 90%Utilities/energy 1%Financial services 1%Small business 1%
Information technology 1%Accounting 2%
Manufacturing 2%
Other 3%
Figure 39. Distribution of sensors by sector
Source: Symantec CorporationAppendix C—Vulnerability Trends Methodology
The “Vulnerability Trends” section of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report discusses developments
in the discovery and exploitation of vulnerabilities over the six-month reporting period and compares it to activity observed in the previous six-month period. This section will discuss the methods by which the data was gathered and analyzed to come to the conclusions that are presented in the “Vulnerability Trends” section.
Symantec maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive databases of security vulnerabilities,
consisting of over 22,000 distinct entries. Each distinct entry is created and maintained by Symantec threat analysts who vet the content for accuracy, veracity, and the applicability of its inclusion in the vulnerability database based on available information. The following metrics are based on the analysis of that data by Symantec researchers:
• Total number of vulnerabilities disclosed
• Severity of vulnerabilities• Web application vulnerabilities• Easily exploitable vulnerabilities• Operating system patch development time• Web browser vulnerabilities• Zero-day vulnerabilities• Database vulnerabilities• Unpatched enterprise vulnerabilities
The ways in which the data for the remaining metrics is gathered and analyzed will be discussed in the
remainder of this methodology.
Vulnerability classifications
Following the discovery and/or disclosure of a new vulnerability, Symantec analysts gather all relevant characteristics of the new vulnerability and create an alert. This alert describes important traits of the vulnerability, such as the severity, ease of exploitation, and a list of affected products. These traits are subsequently used both directly and indirectly for this analysis.
Vulnerability type
After discovering a new vulnerability, Symantec threat analysts classify the vulnerability into one of 12 possible categories based on the available information. These categories focus on defining the core cause of the vulnerability, as opposed to classifying the vulnerability merely by its effect.
The classification system is derived from the academic taxonomy presented by Taimur Aslam, et al (1996)
to define classifications of vulnerabilities.
189 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
189 “Use of a Taxonomy of Security Faults” http://ftp.cerias.purdue.edu/pub/papers/taimur-aslam/aslam-krsul-spaf-taxonomy.pdf
116Possible values are indicated below; the previously mentioned white paper provides a full description of
the meaning behind each classification:
• Boundary condition error
• Access validation error• Origin validation error• Input validation error• Failure to handle exceptional conditions• Race condition error• Serialization error• Atomicity error• Environment error• Configuration error• Design error
Severity of vulnerabilities
Severity of vulnerabilities has been discussed in previous versions of the Symantec Internet Security Threat
Report , however, it was omitted in Volume X of the report (September 2006) because Symantec’s adoption
of the Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) V1.0.190
The “Severity of vulnerabilities” metric that has been included in this report corresponds to the base score
field of the CVSS. The base score is representative of the inherent properties of a vulnerability, such as:
• The degree of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of data that may be affected by the vulnerability
• Local versus remote exploitability • Whether or not authentication is required for exploitation • If there are additional factors that may complicate exploitation of the vulnerability
These values are not adjusted for temporal factors such as the availability of exploit code. The base score
is intended to be a static value that should only change if additional information is made available that changes the inherent characteristics of the vulnerability. The base score can have a value of zero to 10.
For the sake of categorizing vulnerabilities by their respective severities, the following standard is used:• Low severity (base score of 0–3): Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities will have a minimal
impact on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data stored upon or transmitted over systems on which the vulnerability may be found. These vulnerabilities also tend to be local in nature, have a high degree of access complexity, and may require authentication to be exploited successfully.
• Medium severity (base score of 4–7): Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow a
partial compromise of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data stored upon or transmitted over systems on which the vulnerability may be found, although this may not always be the case. These vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely over a network and may have a lower access complexity or may or may not require authentication to successfully exploit.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
190 http://www.first.org/cvss/v1
117• High severity (base score of 8–10): These vulnerabilities have innate characteristics that present the
highest threat profile. Successful exploitation often allows a complete compromise of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data stored upon or transmitted over systems on which the vulnerability may be found. These vulnerabilities are exploited remotely across a network, have a low degree of access complexity, and usually do not require authentication prior to successful exploitation.
Base scores are computed from related fields in the Symantec Vulnerability Database. They are then
categorized into low, medium, and high, as described above, and broken out by reporting period.
Easily exploitable vulnerabilities
The “Easily exploitable vulnerabilities” metric covers vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit with little effort based on publicly available information. The vulnerability analyst assigns an exploit availability rating after thoroughly researching the need for and availability of exploits for the vulnerability.
The “Easily exploitable vulnerabilities” metric replaces the “Ease of exploitation” metric, which was
included in the Internet Security Threat Report prior to Volume XI (March 2007). This change was made
to accommodate Symantec’s adoption of the exploitability rating in the CVSS.
All vulnerabilities are classified into one of four possible categories defined by the CVSS, as described below:1. Unconfirmed: Would-be attackers must use exploit code to make use of the vulnerability; however, no
such exploit code is publicly available.
2. Proof-of-concept: Would-be attacks must use exploit code to make use of the vulnerability; however,
there is only proof-of-concept exploit available that is not functional enough to fully exploit the vulnerability.
3. Functional: This rating is used under the following circumstances:
• Exploit code to enable the exploitation of the vulnerability is publicly available to all would-be
attackers; and/or,
• Would-be attackers can exploit the vulnerability without having to use any form of exploit code; • In other words, the attacker does not need to create or use complex scripts or tools to exploit the
vulnerability.
4. High: The vulnerability is reliably exploitable and there have been instances of self-propagating
malicious code exploiting the vulnerability in the wild.
For the purposes of this report, the last two categories of vulnerabilities are considered “easily exploitable”
because the attacker requires only limited sophistication to exploit the vulnerability. The first two categories of vulnerability are considered more difficult to exploit because attackers must develop their own exploit code or improve an existing proof-of-concept to make use of the vulnerability.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
118Window of exposure for enterprise vendors
Symantec records the time lapse between the publication of an initial vulnerability report and the
appearance of third-party exploit code; this is known as the exploit development time. The time period between the disclosure date of a vulnerability and the release date of an associated patch is known as the patch development time.
191 The time lapse between the public release of exploit code and the time that
the affected vendor releases a patch for the affected vulnerability is known as the window of exposure.
The average window of exposure is calculated as the difference in days between the average exploit
development time and the average patch development time. (Explanations of the exploit development time average and the patch development time average are included below.) During this time, the computer or system on which the affected application is deployed may be susceptible to attack, as administrators have no official recourse against the vulnerability and must resort to best practices and workarounds to reduce the risk of exploitation.
It is important to note that the set of vulnerabilities included in this metric is limited and does not
represent all software from all possible vendors. Instead, it only includes vendors who are classified as enterprise vendors. The purpose is to illustrate the window of exposure for widely deployed mission-critical software. Because of the large number of vendors with technologies that have a very low deployment (which form the majority), only exploits for technologies from enterprise vendors (that is, those that generally have widespread deployment) are included. Vulnerabilities in those vendors’ products will likely affect more enterprises than those in less widely deployed technologies. Those vendors are:
• CA (Computer Associates)
• Cisco• EMC• HP• IBM• McAfee• Microsoft• Oracle• Sun• Symantec
Patch development time for enterprise vendors
The patch development time is the time period between the disclosure date of a vulnerability and the release date of an associated patch. Only those patches that are independent objects (such as fixes, upgrades, etc.) are included in this analysis. Other remediation solutions—such as workaround steps, for instance—are excluded.
For each individual patch from these vendors, the time lapse between the patch release date and the
publish date of the vulnerability is computed. The mean average is calculated from the aggregate of these. As some vendors may release more patches than others for a particular vulnerability, Symantec considers only the first instance of a single patch for each vulnerability. This metric is incorporated when computing the window of exposure, which is calculated as the difference between the average patch development time and the average exploit development time.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
191 This statistic only considers specific file-based patches or upgrades, and not general solutions. Instances in which the vendor provides a workaround
or manual fix, for example, are not included.
119Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
120Exploit code development time for enterprise vendors
The ability to measure exploit code development time is limited and applies only to vulnerabilities that
would normally require exploit code. Therefore, the metric is based on vulnerabilities that Symantec considers to be of sufficient complexity, and for which functional exploit code was not available until it was created by a third party. This consideration, therefore, excludes the following:
• Vulnerabilities that do not require exploit code (unconfirmed exploitability);
• Vulnerabilities associated with non-functional proof-of-concept code (proof-of-concept exploitability).
The date of vulnerability disclosure is based on the date of the first publicly available reference (such as
a mailing-list post). The date of exploit code publication is the date of the first publicly known reference to the exploit code. Because the purpose of this metric is to estimate the time it takes for exploit code to materialize as a result of active development, exploit code publication dates that fall outside of the 30-day range from initial vulnerability publication are excluded from this metric. It is assumed that exploit code that was published after this period was not actively developed from the initial announcement of the vulnerability.
Because this metric only considers the appearance of the first functional exploit, it is possible that reliable
exploits that improve upon the initial exploit may appear later. These exploits may take much longer to develop, but are not considered because the window of exposure begins as soon as the first functional exploit surfaces.
The time lapse between the disclosure of a vulnerability and the appearance of exploit code for that
vulnerability is determined. The aggregate time for all vulnerabilities is determined and the average time is calculated. This metric is incorporated when computing the window of exposure, which is the difference between the average patch development time and the average exploit development time.
Operating system patch development time
This metric has a similar methodology to the “Patch development time for enterprise vendors” metric, which was explained earlier in this methodology. However, instead of applying it to enterprise-scale vendors, the patch development time average is calculated from patched vulnerabilities for the following operating systems:
• Apple Mac OS X
• Hewlett-Packard HP-UX• Microsoft Windows• Red Hat Linux (including enterprise versions and Red Hat Fedora)• Sun Microsystems Solaris
The sample set includes only vulnerabilities that are considered medium severity or higher, based on
their CVSS base score. An average is calculated from the patch release times for each vulnerability in the reporting period per operating system. The patch development time average for each operating system is then compared.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
121Operating system time to patch by type
This is an analysis of the patched vulnerabilities in the data set for the “Operating system patch
development time” metric. For each vendor studied in that metric, each vulnerability is divided into one of the following categories:
• Browser vulnerabilities: These vulnerabilities threaten Web browser applications through remote
attack vectors.
• Client-side vulnerabilities: These vulnerabilities threaten network client applications or non-networked
applications that process malicious data that may arrive through another networked application. Remote attack vectors may exist, but client-side vulnerabilities usually require some amount of user interaction on the part of the victim to be exploited.
• Local vulnerabilities: These are vulnerabilities that require local access in order to be successfully
exploited. Local attacks may affect a large variety of applications that may or may not include network capabilities. The differentiator is that these vulnerabilities are not exploitable by remote attackers unless they can log on to the system and run commands as an unprivileged user.
• Server vulnerabilities: These are vulnerabilities that affect server applications. Server applications
are typically defined as applications that are accessible to remote clients via connections on a range of TCP/UDP ports. Server vulnerabilities generally do not require user interaction on the part of the victim beyond enabling and starting the service so that it listens for incoming requests.
• Other: These are vulnerabilities that do not fall discretely into any of the previous categories. They
can include applications for which the distinction is blurred between server and client, or hardware platforms in which the affected component cannot be described by any of the other categories.
These categories are generally defined by the attack vector and by the type of application that is affected.
The specific categories were devised so that the majority of vulnerabilities could easily be classified within them, with little overlap between categories, so that the total percentage of all categories would equal 100 percent.
Window of exposure for Web browsers
This metric has a similar methodology to the “Window of exposure for enterprise vendors” metric. However, instead of applying it to enterprise-scale vendors, the window of exposure is calculated for vulnerabilities associated with the following Web browsers:
• Apple Safari
• Microsoft Internet Explorer• Mozilla Firefox and Mozilla browsers• OperaSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
122Symantec records the window of time between the publication of an initial vulnerability report and the
appearance of third-party exploit code; this is known as the exploit code development time. The time period between the disclosure date of a vulnerability and the release date of an associated patch is known as the patch development time. The time lapse between the public release of exploit code and the time that the affected vendor releases a patch for the affected vulnerability is known as the window of exposure.
The average window of exposure is calculated as the difference in days between the average patch
development time and the average exploit code development time. During this time, the computer or system on which the affected application is deployed may be susceptible to attack, as administrators may have no official recourse against a vulnerability and must resort to best practices and workarounds to reduce the risk of attacks. Explanations of the average exploit development time and the average patch development time are included below.
Patch development time for Web browsers
The cumulative patch development time for vulnerabilities affecting each browser is calculated. Each cumulative time is then divided by the number of vulnerabilities affecting that browser to determine the average patch development time for that browser. The patch development time average for each browser is then compared. This metric is used to compute the window of exposure for Web browsers, which amounts to the difference between the average patch development time and the average exploit code development time.
Exploit code development time for Web browsers
The cumulative exploit code development time for each vulnerability affecting a Web browser is calculated. Each cumulative time is then divided by the number of vulnerabilities affecting that browser to determine the average exploit code development time for that browser. The exploit development time average for each browser is then compared. This metric is used to compute the window of exposure, which amounts to the difference between the average patch development time and the average exploit code development time.
Web browser vulnerabilities
This metric will offer a comparison of vulnerability data for numerous Web browsers, namely: Microsoft Internet Explorer, the Mozilla browsers (which includes Firefox), Opera, and Safari. However, in assessing the comparative data, the following important caveats should be kept in mind before making any conclusions:
• The total number of vulnerabilities in the aforementioned Web browsers was computed for this report;• This includes vulnerabilities that have been confirmed by the vendor and those that are not
vendor confirmed.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
123Previous versions of the Internet Security Threat Report have discussed vulnerabilities according to
whether they were vendor confirmed or non-vendor confirmed because vulnerabilities that were not confirmed were also included in the data. This differentiation was important, especially given the disparity in patch times between vendors. However, starting with Volume X of the Internet Security Threat Report ,
this convention was no longer followed. This version of the report does not differentiate between vendor-confirmed vulnerabilities and non-vendor-confirmed vulnerabilities when calculating the total number of vulnerabilities.
Individual browser vulnerabilities are notoriously difficult to pinpoint and identify precisely. A reported
attack may be a combination of several conditions, each of which could be considered a vulnerability in its own right. This may distort the total vulnerability count. Some browser issues have also been improperly identified as operating system vulnerabilities or vice versa. This is, in part, due to increasing operating system integration that makes it difficult to correctly identify the affected component in many cases.
• Many vulnerabilities in shared operating system components can be exposed to attacks through the
browser. This report enumerates only those vulnerabilities that are known to affect the browser itself where sufficient information is available to make the distinction.
• Not every vulnerability that is discovered is exploited. As of this writing, there has been no widespread
exploitation of any browser except Microsoft Internet Explorer. This is expected to change as other browsers become more widely deployed.
Browser plug-in vulnerabilities
Browser plug-ins are technologies that extend the functionality of the Web browser. They may be developed by the vendor or by a third party. Some plug-ins provide support for additional application programming languages or environments, such as Java or Flash. Others are applications in their own right that run in the browser. Examples of these include ActiveX objects for Internet Explorer, Firefox extensions, or Opera widgets.
This metric enumerates publicly documented vulnerabilities that affect browser plug-ins. These
vulnerabilities are further classified, when applicable, into general groups of browser plug-in technologies.
Symantec makes an effort to identify all vulnerabilities affecting the various classes of browser plug-in.
Vulnerabilities that affect the browser itself are not included in the data for this metric when it is possible to make this distinction. In cases where a Web browser ships with a particular plug-in, vulnerabilities affecting that plug-in will be counted. Although in this case, the plug-in may be included in the default browser installation, it is still considered a separate technology and not a native feature of the browser.
Native feature are considered to be features intrinsic to the primary function of the browser such as
support for HTTP/HTTPS, HTML rendering, JavaScript, and other standards that are commonly implemented in most Web browsers. Technologies such as Java and Flash may be common to many Web browsers but they are intended to extend their functionality to support additional types of content and are typically optional components. The definition of browser plug-in for this report is limited to technologies that are hosted on the same
computer as the browser, and whose installation and configuration is managed through the browser or operating system. This distinguishes them from content that is intended to run inside the browser but is typically external to the browser such as Java applets or Flash movies. This content is rendered or executed by a browser plug-in but is not considered to be a plug-in in its own right.
Zero-day vulnerabilities
This metric quantifies the number of zero-day vulnerabilities that have been documented during the relevant reporting periods of the current Internet Security Threat Report . For the purpose of this metric, a
zero-day vulnerability is one for which there is sufficient public evidence to indicate that the vulnerability has been exploited in the wild prior to being publicly known. It may not have been known to the vendor prior to exploitation, and the vendor had not released a patch at the time of the exploit activity.
This metric is derived from public sources and the Symantec vulnerability database. This metric is meant
to calculate the number of high-profile, publicly documented zero-day vulnerability instances during the relevant reporting periods.
Database vulnerabilities
This metric offers a comparison of the vulnerabilities across multiple database vendors and implementations. For the purpose of this report, databases to be assessed were chosen to reflect the most widely deployed database implementations and to compare commercial and open source vendors.
192
To this end, the following five database implementations are discussed:
• IBM® DB2®
• Microsoft SQL Server• MySQL• Oracle• PostgreSQL
The volume of database vulnerabilities is determined by querying the vulnerability database for
vulnerabilities that affect the aforementioned database implementations. The results are broken out by implementation and reporting period.
Unpatched enterprise vulnerabilities
Unpatched vulnerabilities are vulnerabilities that have no vendor remediation at the time that data for the report was collected.
193 This metric tracks the number of unpatched vulnerabilities affecting
enterprise-scale technologies. Individual vendors are identified and correlated with the number of unpatched vulnerabilities affecting them. It is possible that some vendors will have no vulnerabilities affecting them during a given reporting period or that none of the vulnerabilities affecting them are considered unpatched. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
192 Oracle, DB2, and Microsoft SQL Server are the three most widely deployed commercial database implementations (http://databases. about.com/b/a/016881.htm).
MySQL and PostgreSQL are the two most popular open-source databases (http://www.mysql.com/why-mysql/marketshare).
193 For the purpose of this report, patched vulnerabilities are those with vendor-supplied patches or upgrades. Vendor-supplied or third-party workarounds are not
counted as patches.
124The status of some vulnerabilities may have changed since data was collected; vendors may have released
patches for vulnerabilities included in the data set and new vulnerabilities may have been published that are considered unpatched. The nature of unpatched vulnerabilities means that the data may include vulnerabilities that are unverified and may have been reported by a single source with no other corroboration. However, the data also includes vulnerabilities that have been acknowledged but not fixed by the vendor. In rare instances, the legitimacy of a vulnerability may be in dispute, but in all such cases these disputes remain unresolved at the time of data collection. Symantec excludes all vulnerabilities that are provably false from this and other metrics in the report.
It is also important to note that the set of vulnerabilities included in this metric is limited and does not
represent all software from all possible vendors. Instead, it only includes vendors who are classified as enterprise vendors. The purpose is to illustrate the window of exposure for widely deployed mission-critical software. Because of the large number of vendors with technologies that have a very low deployment (which form the majority), only exploits for technologies from enterprise vendors (that is, those that generally have widespread deployment) are included. Vulnerabilities in those vendors’ products will likely affect more enterprises than those in less widely deployed technologies. Those vendors are:
• CA (Computer Associates)
• Cisco• EMC• HP• IBM• McAfee• Microsoft• Oracle• Sun• SymantecSymantec Internet Security Threat Report
125Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
126Appendix D—Malicious Code Trends Methodology
The trends in the “Malicious Code Trends” section are based on statistics from malicious code samples
reported to Symantec for analysis. Symantec gathers data from over 120 million client, server, and gateway systems that have deployed Symantec’s antivirus products in both consumer and corporate environments. The Symantec Digital Immune System and Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting process. Observations in the “Malicious Code Trends” section are based on empirical data and expert analysis of this data. The data and analysis draw primarily from two databases described below.
Infection database
To help detect and eradicate computer viruses, Symantec developed the Symantec AntiVirus Research Automation (SARA) technology. Symantec uses this technology to analyze, replicate, and define a large subset of the most common computer viruses that are quarantined by Symantec Antivirus customers.
On average, SARA receives hundreds of thousands of suspect files daily from both enterprise and individual
consumers located throughout the world. Symantec then analyzes these suspect files, matching them with virus definitions. An analysis of this aggregate data set provides statistics on infection rates for different types of malicious code.
Malicious code database
In addition to infection data, Symantec Security Response analyzes and documents attributes for each new form of malicious code that emerges both in the wild and in a “zoo” (or controlled laboratory) environment. Descriptive records of new forms of malicious code are then entered into a database for future reference. For this report, a historical trend analysis was performed on this database to identify, assess, and discuss any possible trends, such as the use of different infection vectors and the frequency of various types of payloads.
In some cases, Symantec antivirus products may initially detect new malicious code heuristically or by
generic signatures. These may later be reclassified and given unique detections. Because of this, there may be slight variance in the presentation of the same data set from one volume of the Internet Security Threat
Report to the next.
Geographic location of malicious code instances
Several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic locations of systems to IP
addresses are used along with proprietary Symantec technology to determine the location of computers reporting malicious code instances. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error. The data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of malicious code instances.Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
127Previously unseen malicious code threats
This metric derives its data from the Symantec Honeypot Network. Computers compromised on the
honeypot network track and analyze each piece of malicious code that is installed by the attacker. Symantec defines previously unseen malicious threats as those that have not been installed by attackers on the Symantec Honeypot Network. The proportion of previously unseen malicious code threats is derived by comparison with the total number of distinct malicious code threats observed.
Percentage of malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities
Symantec maintains a malicious code database to analyze and document individual instances of malicious code. This database contains 8,000 distinct entries, with the earliest discovery dating back to 1998. The database includes metadata for classifying malicious code by type, discovery date, and by threat profile, in addition to providing mitigating factors and manual removal steps. Where applicable, this database includes correlations between malicious code instances and vulnerabilities from the Symantec vulnerability database. This capability was used as a basis for the data in this metric. Symantec examined the means by which the malicious code propagated, and counted those that propagate by exploiting vulnerabilities. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
128Appendix E—Phishing and Spam Trends Methodology
Traditionally, the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report has broken security threats down into three
general categories: attacks, vulnerabilities, and malicious code. However, as Internet-based services and applications have expanded and diversified, the potential for computer programs to introduce other types of security risks has increased. The emergence of new risks, particularly spam and phishing has necessitated an expansion of the traditional security taxonomy.
Symantec has monitored these new concerns as they have developed. In particular, the Internet Security
Threat Report assesses these risks according to two categories: phishing and spam. The methodology for
each of these discussions will be discussed in the sections below.
Phishing
Phishing attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec Probe Network. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam data is assessed to gauge the growth in phishing attempts as well as the percentage of Internet mail that is determined to be phishing attempts. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data consists of statistics reported back from customer installations that provide feedback about the detection behaviors of antifraud filters as well as the overall volume of mail being processed.
It should be noted that different monitoring organizations use different methods to track phishing
attempts. Some groups may identify and count unique phishing messages based solely on specific content items such as subject headers or URLs. These varied methods can often lead to differences in the number of phishing attempts reported by different organizations.
Phishing attempt definition
The Symantec Probe Network is a system of over two million decoy accounts that attract email messages
from 20 different countries around the world. It encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises and attracts email samples that are representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 million mailboxes. The Probe Network covers countries in the Americas, Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia/Oceania.
The Symantec Probe Network data is used to track the growth in new phishing activity. A phishing attempt
is a group of email messages with similar properties, such as headers and content, that is sent to unique users. The messages attempt to gain confidential and personal information from online users.
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam software reports statistics to Symantec Security Response that indicate
messages processed, messages filtered, and filter-specific data. Symantec has classified different filters so that spam statistics and phishing statistics can be determined separately. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data is used to identify general trends in phishing email messages. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
129Explanation of research inquiries
This section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to produce the data and statistics in
this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, the following investigations warrant additional detail.
Unique phishing messages
Symantec maintains automated systems to identify new unique phishing messages received by the
Symantec Probe Network. Messages are grouped into attacks based on similarities in the message bodies and headers. Sample messages are then passed through general fraud heuristics to identify messages as potential phishing attempts. Symantec reviews events that are identified as phishing attempts for the purposes of confirmation and to develop filters for those messages.
The data presented in this section is based on monthly totals in the number of new unique phishing
messages discovered and ruled upon by Symantec Security Response. Security Response addresses only those phishing messages not caught by existing antispam and antifraud filters. Existing filters refer only to those antispam and antifraud filters used across the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base.
Some phishing messages will be captured in the field based upon predictive filters (heuristics); however,
not all of Symantec’s customers utilize this technology or have upgraded to this technology. Therefore, the messages are still reviewed by Security Response for development of filters that are more widely dispersed.
Blocked phishing attempts
The number of blocked phishing attempts is calculated from the total number of phishing email messages
that were blocked in the field by Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam antifraud filters. The data for this section is based on monthly totals.
Phishing activity by sector
The Symantec Phish Report Network is an extensive antifraud community in which members contribute
and receive fraudulent Web site addresses for alerting and filtering across a broad range of solutions. These sites are categorized according to the brand being phished and the industry to which it belongs. The Phish Report Network has members and contributors that send in phishing attacks from many different sources. This includes a client detection network that detects phishing Web sites as the clients visit various Web sites on the Internet. It also includes server detection from spam emails.
The sender confirms all spoofed Web sites before sending the address of the Web site into the Phish
Report Network. After the spoofed site is sent into the Phish Report Network, Symantec spoof detection technology is used to verify that the Web site is a spoof site. Research analysts manage the Phish Report Network console 24 hours a day, 365 days of the year, and manually review all spoof sites sent into the Phish Report Network to eliminate false positives. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
130Top countries hosting phishing Web sites
The data for this section is determined by gathering links in phishing email messages and cross-
referencing the addresses with several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic locations of systems to IP addresses. In this case, Symantec counts phishing Web sites as the number of unique IP addresses hosting Web pages used for phishing. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error. The data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of phishing Web sites.
Phishing Web sites hosted on the same IP address
This data is compiled by comparing phishing URLs to the IP addresses to which they resolve. The number
of URLs resolving to the same addresses are then calculated to determine the number of sites hosted.
Automated phishing toolkits
The data in this section is derived from URLs gathered by the Symantec Phish Report Network. The URLs
are sorted and grouped according to specific patterns indicating they were generated by an automated script or phishing kit. Each phishing kit generates URLs with a distinct signature and can be grouped according to these distinguishing characteristics. The monthly total of each group of URLs indicates the level of use of each automated phishing kit.
Core brands being phished
For each phishing Web site Symantec observed during this period, the date and time of the detection
was noted along with the name of the brand being spoofed by the Web site. The brand being spoofed is identified using a combination of automated tools and assessment by a Symantec analyst.
Core brands were determined by identifying six lists of brands, one for each month from January through
June 2007, in which a new Web site spoofing that brand was reported. The core brands, then, are those that were present on each of these lists. In other words, the core brands were those for which a new phishing Web site was known to have been created in each month of this reporting period. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
131Spam
The Symantec Probe Network is a system of over two million decoy accounts that attract email messages
from 20 different countries around the world. It encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises and attracts email samples that are representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 million mailboxes. The Probe Network includes accounts in countries in the Americas, Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia/Oceania.
Spam trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from both the Symantec Probe
Network as well as Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam software reports statistics to the Brightmail Logistical Operations Center (BLOC) indicating messages processed, messages filtered, and filter-specific data.
Symantec has classified different filters so that spam statistics and phishing statistics can be determined
separately. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data includes data reported back from customer installations providing feedback from antispam filters as well as overall mail volume being processed.
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam only gathers data at the SMTP layer and not the network layer, where DNS
block lists typically operate. This is because SMTP-layer spam filtering is more accurate than network-layer filtering and is able to block spam missed at the network layer. Network layer-filtering takes place before email reaches the enterprise mail server. As a result, data from the SMTP layer is a more accurate reflection of the impact of spam on the mail server itself.
Sample set normalization
Due to the numerous variables influencing a company’s spam activity, Symantec focuses on identifying
spam activity and growth projections with Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data from enterprise customer installations having more than 1,000 total messages per day. This normalization yields a more accurate summary of Internet spam trends by ruling out problematic and laboratory test servers that produce smaller sample sets.
Explanation of research inquiries
This section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to produce the data and statistics in
this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, the following investigations warranted additional detail.
Spam as a percentage of email scanned
The data for this section is determined by dividing the number of email messages that trigger antispam
filters in the field by the total number of email messages scanned. These filters are distributed across the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base. The data for this section is based on monthly totals. Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
132Top ten countries of spam origin
The data for this section is determined by calculating the frequency of originating server IP addresses in
email messages that trigger antispam filters in the field. The IP addresses are mapped to their host country of origin and the data is summarized by country based on monthly totals. The percentage of spam per country is calculated from the total spam detected in the field.
It should be noted that the location of the computer from which spam is detected being sent is not
necessarily the location of the spammer. Spammers can build networks of compromised computers globally and thereby use computers that are geographically separate from their location.
Top countries by spam zombies
The data in this section is determined by examining the IP addresses in spam messages received by the
Symantec Probe Network. IP addresses that meet a certain volume requirement are processed through a set of heuristics to determine if they are behaving like zombie servers. If an IP address meets some or all of the heuristic requirements, it will be listed as a zombie IP address. Symantec then cross-references the addresses with several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic locations of systems to IP addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error. The data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of spam zombies. Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec
Corporation.
NO WARRANTY. The technical information is being delivered to you as is and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its acc uracy or use. Any use of the
technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user. Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical
errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice.
Copyright © 2007 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved. Symantec, the Symantec Logo, BugTraq, Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam, and Symantec DeepSight
are trademarks or registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation or its affiliates in the U.S. and other countries. Apple, Mac O S, and QuickTime are trademarks
of Apple Inc., registered in the U.S. and other countries. Safari is a trademark of Apple Inc. Microsoft, ActiveX, Windows, and Windows Media are either registered
trademarks or trademarks of Microsoft Corporation in the United States and/or other countries. Sun, Java, and Solaris are trade marks or registered trademarks of
Sun Microsystems, Inc. in the United States and other countries.
|
SYMANTEC ENTERPRISE SECURITY
Symantec Government Internet
Security Threat ReportTrends for January–June 07
Volume XII, Published September 2007Dean Turner
Executive EditorSymantec Security Response
Stephen Entwisle
Senior EditorSymantec Security Response
Eric Johnson
EditorSymantec Security Response
Marc Fossi
Analyst
Symantec Security Response
Joseph Blackbird
Analyst Symantec Security Response
David McKinney
Analyst Symantec Security Response
Ronald Bowes
AnalystSymantec Security Response
Nicholas Sullivan
AnalystSymantec Security Response
Candid Wueest
AnalystSymantec Security Response
Ollie Whitehouse
Security Architect—Advanced Threat ResearchSymantec Security Response
Zulfikar Ramzan
Analyst—Advanced Threat ResearchSymantec Security Response
Jim Hoagland
Principal Software Engineer Symantec Security Response
Chris Wee
Manager, DevelopmentSymantec Security Response
Contributors
David Cowings
Sr. Manager of OperationsSymantec Business Intelligence
Dylan Morss
ManagerSymantec Business Intelligence
Shravan Shashikant
Principal Business Intelligence AnalystSymantec Business IntelligenceGovernment Internet Security Threat Report Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
Attack Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
Vulnerability Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Malicious Code Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Phishing Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Spam Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
Appendix C—Vulnerability Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Appendix D—Malicious Code Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Appendix E—Phishing Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Appendix F—Spam Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81ContentsVolume XII, Published September 2007
Symantec Government Internet Security
Threat ReportSymantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Government Internet Security Threat Report Overview
The Government Internet Security Threat Report provides a six-month summary and analysis of trends in
attacks, vulnerabilities, malicious code, phishing, and spam as they pertain to organizations in government and critical infrastructure sectors. Where possible, it will also include an overview of legislative efforts to combat these activities.
Over the past several reporting periods, Symantec has observed a shift in the threat landscape in which
attackers have increasingly moved away from nuisance and destructive attacks towards targets and methods that are driven by financial motives. Today’s attackers are increasingly sophisticated and organized, and have begun to adopt methods that are similar to traditional software development and business practices.
In the previous Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec observed that global, decentralized networks
of malicious activity continued to rise and that, increasingly, regional threat patterns were beginning to emerge. Today, the threat landscape is arguably more dynamic than ever. As security measures are developed and implemented to protect the computers of end users and organizations, attackers are rapidly adapting new techniques and strategies to circumvent them. As a result, the identification, analysis and trending of these techniques and strategies must also evolve.
The ensuing changes have been evident over the first six months of 2007. Based on the data collected during
that period, Symantec has observed that the current Internet security threat landscape is characterized by the following:
• Increased professionalization and commercialization of malicious activities
• Threats that are increasingly tailored for specific regions • Increasing numbers of multistaged attacks • Attackers targeting victims by first exploiting trusted entities • Increased convergence of malicious activities
The Government Internet Security Threat Report will provide an analysis of attack activity that Symantec
observed between January 1 and June 30, 2007 that targets or affects services, organizations, and/or industries of concern to government organizations around the world. For the purposes of this discussion, these government organizations include national, state/provincial, and municipal governments. Furthermore, this discussion will incorporate data and discussion that is relevant to threat activity that affects critical infrastructure industries that support or affect government and military institutions, which include:
• Aerospace
• Agriculture• Biotech/pharmaceutical• Government• Financial services• Health care• Internet service providers
4Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
1 The BugTraq mailing list is hosted by SecurityFocus (http://www.securityfocus.com). Archives are available at http://www.secur ityfocus.com/archive/1
5• Law enforcement
• Manufacturing• Military• Telecommunications• Transportation• Utilities and energy
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the world. The
Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network tracks attack activity across the entire Internet. Over 40,000 sensors deployed in more than 180 countries by Symantec DeepSight™ Threat Management System and Symantec™ Managed Security Services gather this data. As well, Symantec gathers malicious code data reports from over 120 million client, server, and gateway systems that have deployed Symantec’s antivirus products.
Symantec operates one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion of vulnerabilities on
the Internet, the BugTraq™ mailing list, which has approximately 50,000 direct subscribers who contribute, receive, and discuss vulnerability research on a daily basis.
1 Symantec also maintains one of the world’s
most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting of over 22,000 vulnerabilities (spanning more than a decade) affecting more than 50,000 technologies from over 8,000 vendors.
Finally, the Symantec Probe Network, a system of over two million decoy accounts, attracts email messages
from 20 different countries around the world, allowing Symantec to gauge global spam and phishing activity. Symantec also gathers phishing information through the Symantec Phish Report Network, an extensive antifraud community of enterprises and consumers. Members of the network contribute and receive fraudulent Web site addresses for alerting and filtering across a broad range of solutions. Symantec also tracks and assesses some criminal activities using online fraud monitoring tools.
These resources give Symantec analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify emerging trends
in malicious activity. The Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report is grounded on the expert
analysis of data provided by all of these sources. By publishing the analysis of Internet security activity in this report, Symantec hopes to provide enterprises and consumers in the government sector with the information they need to help effectively secure their systems now and in the future. Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
6Executive Summary
The following section will offer a brief summary of the security trends that Symantec observed during the
first half of 2007 based on data provided by the sources listed above. This summary includes all of the metrics that are included in the Government Internet Security Threat Report .
Attack Trends Highlights
• The United States was the top country for malicious activity, accounting for 30 percent of malicious
activity detected worldwide.
• Israel had the most malicious activity per Internet user, followed by Canada and the United States. • The telecommunications sector accounted for 90 percent of all malicious activity originating from critical
infrastructure sectors.
• The government sector accounted for 26 percent of data breaches that could lead to identity theft, the
second most of any sector.
• The primary cause of data breaches that could facilitate identity theft was the theft or loss of a
computer or other medium on which data is stored or transmitted, such as a USB key or a back-up medium.
• Hacking was responsible for 73 percent of identities exposed during this period.• The United States was the target of the most denial of service attacks, accounting for 61 percent of all
attacks during this period.
• Symantec observed an average of 52,771 active bot-infected computers per day, a 17 percent decrease
from the previous reporting period.
• The lifespan of the average bot-infected computer was four days, an increase from three days in the
second half of 2006.
• China had the highest number of bot-infected computers during the first half of 2007, accounting for
29 percent of the worldwide total.
• The United States had the most known command-and-control servers worldwide, accounting for
43 percent of the worldwide total.
• The United States was the top country of attack origin, accounting for 25 percent of worldwide attack
activity.
• The top country of origin for attacks targeting the government sector was the United States, which
accounted for 19 percent of the total.
• The most common attacks targeting government and critical infrastructure organizations were
SMTP-based attacks, which accounted for 36 percent of the top ten attacks.Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Vulnerability Trends Highlights
• Of the five operating systems tracked, Microsoft had the shortest average patch development time,
at 18 days.
• Symantec documented six zero-day vulnerabilities during this period, down from 12 zero-day
vulnerabilities in the second half of 2006.
• Symantec documented 90 unpatched enterprise vulnerabilities during this period.
Malicious Code Trends Highlights
• Threats to confidential information made up 65 percent of potential infections by the top 50 malicious
code samples, up from 53 percent in the second half of 2006.
• Eighty-eight percent of confidential information threats had remote access capabilities, up slightly
from 87 percent last period.
• Eighty-eight percent of confidential information threats had keystroke-logging capabilities, up from
76 percent in the second half of 2006.
• Of malicious code that propagated, 46 percent did so in email attachments.• The United States had the highest number of multiple malicious code infections in the world, followed
by China and Japan.
• During this period, 44 percent of Trojans were reported from North America, more than any other region.• EMEA accounted for 43 percent of potential infections caused by worms, more than any other region.• EMEA accounted for 45 percent of potential virus infections this period, more than any other region.• EMEA accounted for 40 percent of all potential back door infections worldwide, more than any
other region.
Phishing Trends Highlights
• Seventy-nine percent of organizations whose brands were used in phishing attacks were in the financial
services sector, down from 84 percent in the second half of 2006.
• The financial services sector accounted for 72 percent of all phishing Web sites, up from 64 percent in the
previous period.
• Of all known phishing Web sites, 59 percent were located in the United States, compared with 46 percent
in the previous six-month period.
• Domains registered to the government of Thailand were used in 16 percent of phishing URLs hosted on
government servers.
• Of the unique government domains used to host phishing Web sites, 23 percent were located in Thailand.
7Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Attack Trends
This section of the Government Internet Security Threat Report will provide an analysis of attack
activity that Symantec observed between January 1 and June 30, 2007 that targets or affects services, organizations, and/or industries of concern to government organizations around the world. For the purposes of this discussion, attacks are defined as any malicious activity carried out over a network that has been detected by an intrusion detection system (IDS) or firewall.
Attack activity is monitored by the Symantec Global Intelligence Network across the entire Internet.
Over 40,000 sensors deployed in more than 180 countries by Symantec DeepSight Threat Management System and Symantec Managed Security Services gather this data. Furthermore, Symantec uses proprietary technologies to monitor bot command-and-control servers and underground economy servers across the Internet.
2 These resources combine to give Symantec an unparalleled ability to
identify, investigate, and respond to emerging security threats. This discussion will be based on data provided by all of these sources.
This section of the Government Internet Security Threat Report will discuss:
• Malicious activity by country
• Malicious activity by country per Internet user• Malicious activity originating in government/critical infrastructure• Data breaches that could lead to identity theft• Top countries targeted by denial of service attacks• Bot-infected computers• Lifespan of bot-infected computers• Bot-infected computers by country• Command-and-control servers by country• Top countries of attack origin• Top countries of origin for government-targeted attacks• Attacks by type—notable critical infrastructure sectors
Malicious activity by country
This metric will assess the countries in which the highest amount of malicious activity takes place or originates. To determine this, Symantec has compiled geographical data on numerous malicious activities, namely: bot-infected computers, bot command-and-control servers, phishing Web sites,
3 malicious code
reports, spam zombies,4 and Internet attacks.
To determine the amount of Internet-wide malicious activity that originated in each country, the mean of
the proportion of all of the considered malicious activities that originated in each country was calculated. This average determined the proportion of overall malicious activity that originated from the country in question and was used to rank each country. This section will discuss those findings.
2 Underground economy servers are used by criminals and criminal organizations to sell stolen information, typically for subseq uent use in identity theft. This data
can include government-issued identity numbers, credit cards, bank cards and personal identification numbers (PINs), user accou nts, and email address lists.
3 As will be discussed in greater length in the “Phishing Trends” section below, a phishing Web site is one that is designed to m imic the legitimate Web site of the
organization whose brand is being spoofed.
4 A spam zombie is a computer infected with a bot or some other malicious code that allows email messages to be relayed through t he infected computer.
8Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Between January 1 and June 30, 2007, the United States was the top country for malicious activity,
accounting for 30 percent of activity detected worldwide (table 1). This represents a minimal change from the second half of 2006, when the United States was also the highest ranked country, accounting for 31 percent of the world’s malicious activity. For each of the malicious activities taken into account for this metric, the United States ranked number one by a large margin with the exception of bot-infected computers, for which it ranked second behind only China.
Overall
Rank
1
23456789
10Previous
Rank
1
235478
10
6
11Country
United States
ChinaGermanyUnited KingdomFranceCanadaSpainItalySouth Korea JapanOverall
Proportion
30%
10%
7%4%4%4%3%3%3%2%
Previous
Overall
Proportion
31%
10%
7%4%4%3%3%3%4%2%Malicious
Code
Rank
1
27396
10
5
26
4Spam
Zombies
Rank
1
32
15
7
3110
68
20Command-
and-Control
Server Rank
1
526
12
3
22
84
13Phishing
Web
sites
1
18
2367
131210
8Bot
Rank
2
1375846
1316Attack
Rank
1
2354768
1210
Table 1. Malicious activity by country
Source: Symantec Corporation
It is not surprising that the United States was the site of the most malicious activity, as it is home to
18 percent of the world’s Internet users, more than any other country.5 Furthermore, it has a well established
and relatively long-standing Internet infrastructure. As a result, not only are there a lot of attackers there, but they have had a long time to understand the technologies and to hone their skills. Attackers in countries that have less well established traditions of Internet usage or that are still experiencing rapid growth in their Internet infrastructure may not have the same level of user sophistication.
In previous versions of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec has argued that as Internet
infrastructure becomes established, network and end user security should improve. As Internet users become more sophisticated, so does their knowledge of computer security issues overall. However, the prominence of the United States in this discussion, and the attendant level of malicious activity originating there, indicates that this is not always the case. This is likely because attackers are constantly adapting their attacks to circumvent effective security measures, meaning that even users with a high degree of computer security awareness may be at risk of new attack tactics. Given these considerations, and the country’s consistently high ranking in each of the high attack categories, the United States will likely remain number one for malicious activity for some time.
China had the second highest amount of malicious activity during the first six months of 2007, accounting
for 10 percent of activity detected worldwide, the same rank and percentage as in the previous reporting period. China has the second highest number of Internet users in the world, surpassed only by the United States.
6 However, users in China spend about two billion hours online each week, more than users in the
United States, who spend only 129 million hours online.7
5 http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats14.htm
6 http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm
7 http://www.forbes.com/2006/03/31/china-internet-usage-cx_nwp_0403china.html
9Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
China ranked in the top three countries for four of the six activities considered for this metric. However, it
ranked only 18th in the world for phishing Web sites. The relatively low ranking of phishing Web sites in China may be linked to the strict regulation of Web sites by the Chinese government,
8 which is enforced
through Internet filtering tools on every level from Internet service providers (ISPs) to Internet cafés.9
China also ranked only fifth for bot command-and-control servers, despite the fact that it ranked number
one for bot-infected computers. This discrepancy indicates that many bot-infected computers in China are being controlled by command-and-control servers outside the country. Since the United States has the highest number of command-and-control servers by a large margin, it is likely that bot-network owners in that country are using bot-infected computers in China to conduct attack activity.
10 Thus, some malicious
activity attributed to China may not be the result of attackers located there, although the same caveat would also apply to malicious activity originating in other countries as well.
In the first six months of 2007, Germany was the third ranked country for malicious activity. Seven
percent of all Internet-wide malicious activity originated there during this period, the same percentage as the second half of 2006, when it was also the third ranked country in this metric. Like both China and the United States, Germany has a well established Internet infrastructure. Furthermore, it has the fourth highest number of Internet users in the world, boasting five percent of the world’s Internet users.
11
Germany ranks highly in spam zombies, phishing Web sites, bot-infected computers, and command-and-
control servers. As a result, it is likely that bot networks are prominent in Germany, which would contribute to the high amount of malicious activity originating there.
Having a higher proportion of malicious activity indicates that each computer in the country is more likely
to be involved with some form of attack activity. Symantec has observed previously that computers often target computers within their own region or country. As a result, countries with higher proportions of malicious activity are more likely to suffer the effects of such malicious activity. That includes computers in the government sector, as well as other sectors that make up critical infrastructure.
Furthermore, a country in which a high proportion of malicious activity is based is likely to be the country
of origin for much of the malicious activity that is aimed at other countries. High volumes of malicious activity originating from any country could have a potential impact on that country’s ability to conduct Internet transactions. It is reasonable to speculate that high volumes of malicious activity from a particular country could result in the blocking of traffic originating from individual servers and organizations within that country.
Countries with a high number of Internet users tend to display higher levels of malicious activity (although
this is not always the case). For example, the United States has the highest number of Internet users.
12 It
also had the highest amount of malicious activity during this period, with 31 percent. China has the second highest number of Internet users,
13 and the second highest amount of malicious activity, with 10 percent.
On a global scale, the distribution of the world’s malicious activity seems to be relatively static. It appears
that a country that is established as a site of high levels of malicious activity tends to remain so. This suggests that once an attack infrastructure is established in a country, it can be difficult to remove. Although malicious tools and methods may change, the proportion of malicious activity that originates within a country tends to remain relatively static. This is likely to remain the case until new and more effective measures are taken by countries to reduce the malicious activity originating from their networks.
8 http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/12/03/tech/main531567.shtml
9 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/2264508.stm
10 It should be noted that the location of the command-and-control server does not necessarily correspond to the location of the b ot-network owner.
11 http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats4.htm
12 http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats14.htm
13 http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm
10Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
14 For instance, please see Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume XI (March 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xi_03_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 36
15 Defense-in-depth strategies emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive systems to guard against singl e-point failures in any specific
technology or protection methodology. They should include the deployment of antivirus, firewalls, and intrusion detection syste ms, among other security measures.
16 Ingress traffic refers to traffic that is coming into a network from the Internet or another network. Egress traffic refers t o traffic that is leaving a network, bound for
the Internet or another network.
11Furthermore, in previous volumes of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec has observed that
attacker motivation has changed from fame to fortune.14 That is, attackers have become increasingly
motivated by profit. As a consequence, attacks and malicious activity are likely to remain prominent within a country as long as they remain profitable.
Due to the relative anonymity of online users and the constantly changing threat environment, attempts at
legislating behavior may not meet with much success. Rather than relying on legislation to limit malicious activity, it is likely that end users will need to take responsibility for the security of their own computers. For example, they should follow best security practices, use defense-in-depth strategies, and implement sufficient security technologies.
15
ISPs can play a central role in mitigating malicious activity over the Internet. They have the ability to filter
malicious code, attacks, spam, and other forms of malicious traffic as it enters or leaves their networks. Unfortunately, ISPs will often focus their resources on meeting growing broadband demand at the expense of implementing security measures, such as port blocking and ingress and egress filtering.
16 As a result,
ISPs that are growing or expanding their services rapidly may have security infrastructures that are underdeveloped relative to their needs.
Symantec recommends that ISPs perform both ingress and egress filtering to block known bot traffic.
They should also filter out potentially malicious email attachments to reduce exposure to enterprises and end users.
Enterprises should monitor all network-connected computers for signs of malicious activity, ensuring
that any infected computers are removed from the network and disinfected as soon as possible. They should also ensure that all antivirus definitions are updated regularly. As compromised computers can be a threat to other systems, Symantec also recommends that enterprises notify their ISPs of any potentially malicious activity.
Enterprises should also perform filtering on outgoing network traffic, ensuring that malicious activity
and unauthorized communications are not taking place. They should also create and enforce policies that identify and restrict applications that can access the network.
Malicious activity by country per Internet user
Having assessed the top countries by malicious activity, Symantec has also evaluated the top 25 of these countries according to the number of Internet users located there. This measure is intended to remove the bias of high numbers of Internet users from the consideration of the “Malicious activity by country” metric.
In order to determine this, Symantec divided the amount of malicious activity originating in each of the top
25 countries by the number of worldwide Internet users who are located in that country. The proportion assigned to each country in this discussion thus equates to the proportion of malicious activity that could be attributed to a single (average) Internet user in that country. The percentage of malicious activity that would be carried out by each person is the amount assigned to each country in the discussion below. Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
During the first six months of 2007, Israel had the most malicious activity per Internet user of any country
in the group. If one person from each of the top 25 countries were assessed as a representation of their country’s Internet users, the average user in Israel would carry out 11 percent of the group’s malicious activity (table 2). This is a small increase from nine percent in the previous period.
This increase was likely due to a higher proportion of bot-infected computers, command-and-control
servers, and spam zombies located in Israel during this reporting period. This indicates that bots are gaining prominence in Israel; in fact, the number of bot-infected computers located there increased by 15 percent between the second half of 2006 and the end of June 2007.
The prominence of Israel in this metric is likely influenced by the amount of time computer users there
spend online. According to a survey released in January 2007, users in Israel spend the second highest number of hours online, on average, less than only users in Canada, which ranked second in this metric.
17
The longer computers are online, the greater is the opportunity for attackers to compromise them.
Furthermore, computer security law enforcement resources in Israel may be insufficient to meet current
demands. This prompted a reorganization in 2005 that was intended to create a single information technology authority in the country to deal with computer and Internet crime.
18 As a result of these recent
changes, the new security organization may be experiencing difficulties in detecting and eliminating security issues. This is corroborated by the extensive industrial espionage scandal that was uncovered in Israel in 2005.
19
Finally, ISPs in Israel may be failing to help maintain secure networks in the country. This increase may
be related to the recent privatization of a large Israeli ISP. When companies become privatized, their budgets and operating practices may be changed, and focus may be diverted away from activities that don’t generate direct revenue streams, such as security. If less attention is focused on security, it is possible that bot-infected computers can operate more easily in Israeli cities.
Current
Rank
1
234567
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
54362
10
12
9
7Country
Israel
CanadaUnited StatesPolandSpainTaiwanGermany
Netherlands
France
SwitzerlandPrevious
Proportion
9%
5%6%6%5%8%5%
4%
5%
5%Current
Proportion
11%
6%6%6%6%6%5%
5%
4%
4%
Table 2. Malicious activity by country per Internet user
Source: Symantec Corporation
17 http://www.websiteoptimization.com/bw/0703
18 http://www.crime-research.org/news/30.09.2005/152
19 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/8064757
12Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Canada had the second most malicious activity per Internet user, accounting for six percent of the
worldwide total. In the previous reporting period, Canada ranked fifth in this category, with five percent of malicious activity per Internet user. Canada had the highest number of hours spent online per person in the first half of 2007.
20 This likely contributes to the country’s prominence in this category.
The United States ranked third, accounting for six percent of malicious activity per Internet user. In
the second half of 2006, the United States was fourth in this category, but had the same proportion of malicious activity per Internet user. The United States has the highest number of broadband connections in the world, and had the fourth highest number of hours spent online per unique Internet user in the first half of 2007.
21
The prominence of both Canada and the United states is likely due to the number of hours spent online
by the average user and the well established Internet infrastructure in both countries. As was discussed in the “Malicious Activity per Country” metric, the population of Internet users in a country with a well established tradition of Internet use is more likely to have the skills and experience necessary to conduct sophisticated attack activity. As such, it is likely that a higher proportion of the Internet user population would be able to carry out malicious activity, such as creating bot networks, which can then be used for subsequent attack activity.
Both Canada and the United States ranked higher for malicious activity per Internet user in the current
period than in the second half of 2006. The current increase is likely driven by a drop in malicious activity per Internet user in both Taiwan and Poland.
Malicious activity by critical infrastructure sectors
For the first time, in this volume of the Government Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is evaluating
the amount of malicious activity originating from computers and networks that are known to belong to government and critical infrastructure sectors. To do this, Symantec cross-references the IP addresses of known malicious computers with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes
22 assigned to each industry
and provided by a third-party service.23 Symantec has compiled data on numerous malicious activities that
were detected originating from the IP address space of these organizations. These activities include: bot-infected computers, phishing Web sites, spam zombies, and Internet attacks.
This metric is significant because it indicates the level to which government and critical infrastructure
organizations have been compromised and are being used by attackers as launching pads for malicious activity. This could potentially expose sensitive information, which could have serious ramifications for government and critical infrastructure organizations.
In the first six months of 2007, 90 percent of all malicious activity originating from critical infrastructure
sectors originated from telecommunications organizations (table 3). Attackers may target computers in the telecommunications sector for a number of reasons. These organizations are likely to have a large number of Internet-facing computers. For example, call centers often use a large number of Internet-facing computers to interact with customers. The challenges of managing such computers may contribute to the extremely high proportion of malicious activity originating from this sector. As a consequence, computers in telecommunications organizations likely represent fertile targets for attackers.
20 http://www.websiteoptimization.com/bw/0703
21 http://www.websiteoptimization.com/bw/0703
22 SIC codes are the standard industry codes that are used by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission to identify o rganizations belonging
to each industry. For more, on this, please see http://www.sec.gov
23 http://www.digitalenvoy.net/
13Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Rank
1
234567
8
9
10
11Sector
Telecommunications
ManufacturingFinancial ServicesHealth CareMilitaryUtilities/EnergyTransportation
Government
Biotech/Pharmaceutical
Agriculture
Law EnforcementTotal
Percent
90%
7%1%1%
<1%<1%<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%Phishing
Web Sites
77%
22%
1%
<1%<1%<1%<1%<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%Spam
Zombies
99%
<1%<1%<1%<1%<1%<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%Bot-infected
computers
94%
2%1%1%1%1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%Attacks
91%
4%2%1%1%1%
<1%
1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
Table 3. Malicious activity by critical infrastructure sector
Source: Symantec Corporation
Attackers may view telecommunications organizations as excellent platforms from which to launch
attacks. Organizations within this sector are likely to have high-bandwidth and high-traffic networks. Such networks would allow an attacker to carry out large attacks, such as DoS attacks, or other malicious activity, such as spam hosting. This is illustrated by the high percentage of spam zombies found in telecommunications, 99 percent of spam zombies in critical infrastructure sectors. High-capacity networks may also allow an attacker to hide attack and bot traffic more effectively. During the current reporting period, 91 percent of attacks and 94 percent of bot-infected computers were situated on telecommunications organizations’ networks.
As telecommunications organizations control the flow of data through networks, attackers may be enticed
to compromise strategically located computers inside organizations within the industry. Furthermore, the telecommunications sector provides communications for other sectors as well, including government. Successful compromise of computers in the telecommunications industry could thus allow an attacker to eavesdrop on or disrupt key communications in other sectors.
Furthermore, computers within telecommunications organizations may effectively serve as platforms from
which to launch attacks against organizations served by the telecommunications firms. As such, attackers who are seeking confidential or sensitive information may specifically target this sector.
Finally, using compromised computers within telecommunications organizations could allow an attacker
to deny access to confidential communications by authorized personnel, allowing the attacker to impose his or her own command, control, and communication processes on the compromised systems. This could result in the loss of situational awareness. Were such an attack to be state or group sponsored, access to critical infrastructures could be used to disable key services as a prelude to a larger event or attack.
The manufacturing sector was the origin of the second highest amount of malicious activity during the first
half of 2007, accounting for seven percent of the total. Although this proportion is relatively low compared to the telecommunications sector, it is still noteworthy for a number of reasons.
14Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Twenty-two percent of all phishing Web sites within critical infrastructure sectors were found on networks
owned by organizations in the manufacturing sector. This is considerably more than the proportion of all other malicious activities originating from the sector and is likely a sign that manufacturing organizations are specifically being targeted by phishers. In the case of manufacturing, phishers are likely using computers within manufacturing organizations to host phishing Web sites to target individuals within those organizations.
It is also worth noting that the manufacturing sector represents a considerably higher proportion of
phishing Web sites than the financial sector. This is surprising because, as is discussed in the “Phishing Trends” section of this report, most of the organizations whose brands were used in phishing attacks in the first six months of 2007 were part of the financial services sector. However, what this data points out is that financial services organizations do not actually host many phishing Web sites. This is likely because financial services are a common target of phishing attacks. As a result, financial services organizations are likely well aware of phishing attacks and have taken steps to protect their networks from hosting phishing Web sites.
Finally, due to the potentially fragile nature of process control systems that are used to run manufacturing
equipment, the manufacturing industry may be particularly at risk of damages due to bot infections. A single bot-infected computer can disrupt the production of an entire facility with a targeted attack against a vulnerable process control system. This could have significant economic and strategic consequences.
The financial services sector ranked third for malicious activity within critical infrastructure sectors,
accounting for one percent of the total detected during this period. Financial services also ranked third in the second half of 2006, also with one percent of malicious activity. Although computers in the financial services sector may represent a lucrative opportunity for attackers with profit motive, due to the small proportion of bots within the sector, it is likely that much of the malicious activity was driven by attacks of opportunity.
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft
Identity theft is an increasingly prevalent security issue, particularly for government organizations, many of which store and manage information that could facilitate identity theft. Compromises that result in the loss of personal data can be quite costly, not only to the people whose identity may be at risk and their respective financial institutions, but also to the organization responsible for collecting and managing the compromised data.
Data breaches that lead to identity theft could damage an organization’s reputation, and undermine
customer and institutional confidence. With the implementation of recent legislation in some jurisdictions,
24
organizations may also be held liable for data breaches and losses, which could result in fines or litigation.25
Furthermore, breaches of this sort that take place in government organizations could be used to access sensitive information, which could have significant consequences for a country’s national security.
24 http://www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmbills/001/2000001.htm
25 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/PR/2007/021.shtml
15Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Using publicly available data,26 Symantec has determined the sectors that were most often affected by
these breaches, as well as the most common causes of data loss. Using the same publicly available data, this metric will also explore the number of identities exposed due to these data breaches. An identity is considered to be exposed if personal or financial data related to the identity is made available for unauthorized viewing or use through the breach.
It should be noted that some sectors may need to comply with more stringent data-breach reporting
requirements than others. For instance, government organizations are more likely to be required to report data breaches, either due to regulatory obligation or as part of publicly accessible audits and/or performance reports.
27 Furthermore, organizations that rely on consumer confidence may be less inclined
to report such breaches for fear of negative consumer, industry, or market reaction. As a result, sectors that are not required or encouraged to report may be under-represented in this data set.
In the first half of 2007, the education sector accounted for 30 percent of all known data breaches that
could lead to identity theft, more than any other sector (figure 1). This is up from the previous period when education accounted for only 22 percent of the total and was the second ranked sector.
Telecom 1%Arts/media 1%Computer software 1%Transportation 1%
Manufacturing 1%
Military 1%Community/non-profit 2%
Health care 15%
Financial 14%Government 26%1%
Other 6%1%1%
1%
1%1%Retail/wholesale 6%
Education 30%
Figure 1. Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by sector
Source: Based on data provided by Attrition.org
Educational organizations store a lot of personal information that could be used for the purposes of identity
theft. These organizations—particularly larger universities—often consist of many semi-independent departments in which sensitive personal identification information may be stored in separate locations and be accessible by many people. This increases the opportunities for attackers to gain unauthorized access to this data. Adding to this is the fact that research hospitals, which are considered part of the education sector, store considerable amounts of patients’ personal data, including medical information.
26 http://www.attrition.org/dataloss/
27 For example, the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (FACTA) of California. For more on this act, please see http ://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs6a-facta.htm
Another example is the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996. For more information, see http://www.cms.hh s.gov/HIPAAGenInfo/
16Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
In spite of the high number of data breaches that occurred in the education sector during the first six
months of 2007, it only accounted for one percent of all identities exposed during the period (figure 2). This is likely because most data breaches within the education sector were caused by theft or loss of computers or data storage devices. The theft or loss of computers containing identity theft-related information would likely be either opportunistic or motivated by the possibility of more immediate profit generated by selling the found or stolen computer or storage media. Hacking, on the other hand, is more likely to be motivated by the acquisition of valuable data that may facilitate identity theft.
28 Breaches that
occur in the education sector are therefore less likely to result in large-scale identity fraud because they result in the exposure of relatively few identities.
Health care 1%Financial 1%
Retail/wholesale 85%Government 12%
Other <1%Education 1%
Figure 2. Exposed identities by sector
Source: Based on data provided by Attrition.org
During this reporting period, the government sector accounted for 26 percent of data breaches that could
lead to identity theft, making it the second highest sector for this consideration. This sector has the most breaches that could lead to identity theft in the second half of 2006, accounting for 33 percent of the total during that period.
Government organizations, like educational organizations, store a considerable amount of information
that could be used for identity theft. Similar to the education sector, these organizations often consist of numerous semi-independent departments. As a consequence, sensitive personal identification information may be stored in separate locations and be accessible by numerous people. This increases the opportunities for attackers to gain unauthorized access to this data.
28 A data breach is considered to be caused by hacking if identity theft-related data was exposed by an attacker or attackers by gaining unauthorized
access to computers or networks through Internet-based attacks.
17Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
29 http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/441
30 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/05/04/txj_nonfeasance/
31 Payment Card Industry (PCI) Compliance is a set of security standards that were created by numerous major credit card companies to protect their customers from
increasing identity theft and security breaches. For more information, please see http://www.pcicomplianceguide.org/businesscom pliance.html
32 https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/tech/
33 http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/496
34 http://pcidss.wordpress.com/2007/05/11/pci-codified-into-texas-law-nearly/
35 http://computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&taxonomyName=standards_and_legal_issues&articleId=293804&ta xonomyId=146
18The government sector also ranked second for the overall number of identities exposed during the period,
accounting for 12 percent of the total. As was the case with the educational sector, the number of identities exposed is relatively small compared to the number of data breaches in this sector. Thus, breaches that occur in the government sector can be considered less likely to lead to large-scale identity theft than those in other sectors.
The health care sector accounted for 15 percent of data breaches that could lead to identity theft in
the first half of 2007. Health care ranked fourth in the previous period, accounting for 11 percent of all breaches that could lead to identity theft. The prominence of the health care sector in this metric is likely due to similar factors that influence the prominence of both education and government as outlined previously. Furthermore, health care organizations store information related to personal health, which could result in damaging breaches of privacy if viewed by unauthorized people.
The health care sector ranked fifth for the overall number of identities exposed, accounting for just over one
percent. So, like both education and government sectors, data breaches within the health care sector are less likely to lead to large-scale identity theft than those in other sectors because they expose less identity theft-related data.
During the first half of 2007, the retail/wholesale sector accounted for only six percent of all data breaches
that could lead to identity theft, making it the fifth ranked sector during this period. However, the sector was responsible for the largest number of exposed identities, accounting for 85 percent of the total. Breaches in this sector were thus more likely to lead to large-scale identity theft than any other sector. Each data breach would facilitate identity theft to a much greater degree.
The prominence of the retail/wholesale sector was primarily due to the data breach involving the TJX group
of retail companies.
29 TJX was a victim of an extensive attack that exposed over 45 million credit and debit
card numbers. The number of identities exposed through this breach alone made up over 70 percent of all identities exposed during the period. Due to the nature and extended time span of the compromise, it is likely that these breaches were due to a failure of effective security policies.
30
Breaches like this may be less likely to occur in the future as the Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security
Standard (DSS) becomes more widely adopted.31 The PCI DSS requires vendors accepting payment through
credit cards to implement various security measures to protect credit card data.32 This includes, among
other things, the use of strong encryption to transmit credit card data through open networks. In the case of the TJX breach discussed above, the data breach was likely caused by a failure of the company to use secure encryption to protect data transmitted over a wireless network.
33
Different legislative bodies have also begun passing laws that have been influenced by the PCI DSS. The
state of Texas is currently hoping to pass a law that will put PCI DSS into effect.34 In spring 2007, the state
of Minnesota passed the Plastic Card Security Act.35 The act holds the organizations that collect or manage
data that may be exposed in data breaches to also be responsible for the costs of repairing the damages caused by the breach. Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
The added consideration of punitive costs may influence large companies to more adequately secure
data for which they are deemed responsible, and therefore help reduce the number of breaches overall. However, it is worth noting that this will likely be enforceable only with large breaches, as it may be difficult to trace the source of most instances of identity theft with the breach that originally exposed the identity. Furthermore, Minnesota’s Plastic Card Security Act only applies to companies that process more than 20,000 transactions per year. As such, attackers may target smaller companies in the future.
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by cause
In the first half of 2007, the primary cause of data breaches that could facilitate identity theft was the theft or loss of a computer or other medium on which data is stored or transmitted, such as a USB key or a backup medium (figure 3). These made up 46 percent of all such data breaches during this period. Theft or loss accounted for 57 percent of all reported breaches in the previous reporting period. Despite the high percentage of breaches, the theft of loss of computers and storage media only accounted for 11 percent of all identities exposed. Thus, although theft or loss of computers and storage media is extremely common, it can be considered less likely to lead to large-scale identity theft than other causes, as it results in relatively fewer exposed identities.
This is likely because, in many cases, theft or loss of a computer or storage media is driven not by a desire
to steal data, but to steal the hardware itself. A person who steals a laptop is likely driven by the desire to simply sell the laptop for financial gain, and not to harvest the data it may store.
Hacking 16%
Insider 2%
Theft/loss 46%Unknown 2%Insecure policy 34%
Figure 3. Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by cause
Source: Based on data provided by Attrition.org
19Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
36 http://www.boston.com/business/ticker/2007/01/tjx_intruders_s.html
20The second most common cause of data breaches that could lead to identity theft during this period was
insecure policy, which made up 34 percent of all incidents. For the purposes of this discussion, insecure policy is defined as a failure to develop, implement, and/or comply with adequate security policy. An example of insecure policy would be exposing information that could lead to identity by emailing unencrypted data to an unauthorized recipient or posting it on a publicly available Web site. In the previous period, insecure policy also ranked second, accounting for 27 percent of such data breaches.
In the first half of 2007, insecure policy accounted for only three percent of exposed identities. Thus,
each breach exposed relatively little personal identity information. This implies that breaches caused by insecure policy are not likely to lead to large-scale identity theft.
In the first six months of 2007, hacking was the third leading cause of data breaches that could lead to
identity theft, accounting for 16 percent of the total. A data breach is considered to be caused by hacking if identity theft-related data was exposed by an attacker or attackers by gaining unauthorized access to computers or networks. During the last six months of 2006 hacking also ranked third, accounting for 11 percent of breaches that could facilitate identity theft.
Hacking was responsible for 73 percent of identities exposed during the period (figure 4). The prominence
of hacking as a cause of exposed identities was largely driven by the TJX breach that was discussed previously in this section.
36 This high percentage indicates that hacking is more likely to result in wide-
scale identity fraud than other causes of data breaches. This is likely because hacking is more clearly purpose-driven than insecure policy or the loss or theft of devices. It is an intentional act with a clearly defined purpose: to steal data that can be used for purposes of identity theft or other fraud.
Hacking 73%Insider 13%
Theft/loss 11%Unknown <1%
Insecure policy 3%
Figure 4. Exposed identities by cause
Source: Based on data provided by Attrition.orgSymantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Security policies, such as the PCI DSS discussed earlier, can help to protect data and prevent breaches
caused by everything from hacking to theft and loss. The measures recommended by the PCI DSS are standard security best practices; they are discussed in detail in the following paragraphs.
37
Organizations should use strong encryption to store identity-related data. This would ensure that even
if the data is lost or stolen, it would not be accessible to unauthorized third parties. This step should be part of a broader security policy that organizations should develop, implement, and enforce in order to ensure that all sensitive data is protected from unauthorized access. Furthermore, policies that ensure that computers containing sensitive information are kept in secure locations and are accessed only by authorized individuals should be put in place and enforced. Sensitive data should not be stored on mobile devices that could be easily misplaced or stolen.
Implementing secure policies surrounding networks and the communication of sensitive data can prevent
breaches that may lead to identity theft perpetrated by attackers. Strong encryption should always be used to communicate sensitive data over networks.
Organizations can further protect against security breaches that may lead to identity theft from attackers
by employing defense-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of IDS/IPS solutions, antivirus and antifraud solutions and a firewall. Antivirus definitions should be updated regularly and all desktop, laptop, and server computers within an organization should be updated with all necessary security patches from their respective vendors.
To help prevent accidental or intentional data leaks, organizations should employ data leakage prevention
solutions. Symantec also advises that organizations implement policies that prevent users from viewing, opening, or executing any email attachment unless the attachment is expected and comes from a known and trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
Top countries targeted by denial of service attacks
Denial of service (DoS) attacks are a significant threat to government organizations. A successful DoS attack can render Web sites or other network services inaccessible to users and employees. This could result in the disruption of internal and external communications, making it difficult or impossible for employees and users to access potentially critical information. It could also result in significant damage to the organization’s reputation that could severely undermine people’s confidence in government competence, defense of government networks, and national security issues.
Although there are numerous methods for carrying out DoS attacks, for the purposes of this discussion,
Symantec gauges them by measuring attacks that are carried out by flooding a target with SYN requests.
38
This type of attack works by overwhelming a target with SYN requests and not completing the initial request, which prevents other valid requests from being processed.
In many cases, SYN requests with forged IP addresses are used to carry out an attack, allowing a
single attacking computer to initiate multiple connections. This results in unsolicited traffic, known as backscatter, being sent to other computers on the Internet (whose IP addresses were spoofed). Symantec uses this backscatter to determine the number of computers targeted by DoS attacks. Backscatter is only one method of obtaining DoS statistics and for the purposes of this report is only intended to provide a high-level overview of overall DoS activity.
37 https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/tech/pci_dss.htm
38 The TCP protocol requires a three-way exchange to be carried out before any data is sent. The SYN request is the first phase of the three-way exchange. Once
a SYN request is received by a server, a SYN-ACK is sent in response. The final step is an ACK response, completing the connect ion negotiation process.
21Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
39 For example, please see http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,43137,00.html
40 http://www.terra.net.lb/wp/Articles/DesktopArticle.aspx?ArticleID=260955&ChannelId=16
41 http://www.webhosting.info/domains/country_stats
22DoS attacks that are not driven by profit may be motivated by social or political ends. An attack that disrupts
the availability of a high-profile Web site, particularly one belonging to a government organization, will get much wider notice than one that takes a single user offline. Some DoS attacks may be used as a means to express the attacker’s disagreement with actions or policies associated with the targeted organization.
Governments are often targeted by these attacks. There have been numerous examples of DoS attacks
against governments or transnational organizations such as the World Trade Organization.
39 DoS attacks
could also be used by governments, militaries, or other groups in the form of sponsored attacks. Although Symantec has limited visibility into such attacks, media reports suggest that DoS and other attacks can and do occur.
40
At a military and tactical level, DoS attacks are likely to be unsuccessful due to highly sophisticated and redundant communications networks. However, when these types of attacks target public infrastructures that are used by governments or other critical infrastructure organizations, they can meet with some measure of success. In the event of such an attack, important governmental and critical infrastructure communications may be disrupted.
Symantec tracks the geographic location of targets of DoS attacks. Insight into the locations targeted
by these attacks is valuable in determining global trends in DoS attack patterns. It may also help administrators and organizations in affected countries to take the necessary steps to protect against or minimize the effects of DoS attacks.
Between January 1 and June 30, 2007, the United States was the target of the most DoS attacks, accounting
for 61 percent of all attacks during this period (table 4). The prominence of the United States as a target is not surprising. The country’s extensive broadband Internet infrastructure and its high proportion of Internet-connected organizations make it a very attractive target. Also, based on the number of registered domain names, the United States has the most Web sites in the world, with over 55 million.
41 With such a
high number of Web sites, the opportunity for a DoS attack is greatly increased. This, along with the fact that a number of high-profile Web-based organizations are based there, likely explains why the United States is the target of so many of these attacks.
Current
Rank
1
234567
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
234796
11
10
13Country
United States
United KingdomChinaGermanyCanadaNetherlandsFrance
Australia
Italy
SpainPrevious
Proportion
52%
12%12%
3%2%2%2%1%
1%
1%Current
Proportion
61%
12%
8%2%2%2%2%
1%
1%
1%
Table 4. Top countries targeted by DoS attacks
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
42 http://www.point-topic.com
43 http://www.point-topic.com/contentDownload/dslanalysis/world%20broadband%20statistics%20q1%202006.pdf (access requires registra tion)
44 http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm
23The current global political climate also makes the United States a popular target of DoS attacks. The
United States is a political, economic, and military superpower, which makes it a very high-profile target. It is likely that many DoS attacks targeting computers based in the United States are intended to express disagreement with policies developed and implemented by the United States government. They may also represent an attempt to disrupt the execution of those policies.
The United Kingdom was targeted by the second highest number of DoS attacks, accounting for 12 percent
of the worldwide total. This is the same percentage and rank as in the second half of 2006. The United Kingdom is likely targeted for similar reasons as the United States.
China was targeted by the third highest number of DoS attacks in the first half of 2007, accounting for
eight percent of all detected attacks, down from 12 percent in the previous period. The prominence of China is likely related to its burgeoning Internet infrastructure. Broadband use there is currently expanding rapidly, as it added more broadband connections than any other country in the world between May 2006 and May 2007.
42 Furthermore, China has the second highest number of broadband users in the world.43
It currently accounts for 13 percent of the world’s users and is expected to surpass the United States in users in the next year.
44
As was noted for the United States and United Kingdom, DoS attacks against targets in China may be
politically motivated. China is emerging as a global economic, political, and military power. DoS attackers may be targeting organizations in China because they disagree with policies that are developed and implemented by the Chinese government.
Organizations should ensure that a documented procedure exists for responding to DoS events. One of the
best ways to mitigate a DoS attack is to filter upstream of the target. For most organizations, this filtering will involve working in conjunction with their ISP. Symantec also recommends that organizations perform egress filtering on all outbound traffic. DoS victims frequently need to engage their upstream ISP to help filter the traffic to mitigate the effects of attacks.
Bot-infected computers
Bots are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s machine in order to allow an attacker to remotely control the targeted system through communication channels such as IRC. These channels allow the remote attacker to compromise and control a large number of computers over a single, reliable channel in a bot network, which can then be used to launch coordinated attacks.
Bots are a significant threat to government organizations. Bot-infected computers that have penetrated
a government organization’s network can be used to harvest potentially sensitive data and/or gain access to sensitive software and hardware resources. Government organizations may be particularly valued by attackers because they often house collections of data gathered from numerous other government or critical infrastructure resources. This can be especially valuable for financially motivated attackers, who use confidential information to perpetrate online fraud—such as identity theft and phishing—that can be facilitated by such data.Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
45 For instance, please see Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume IX (March 2006):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_report_ix.pdf : p. 3 0
46 http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel07/botnet061307.htm
24An active bot-infected computer is one that carries out at least one attack per day. This does not have to be
continuous; rather, a single computer can be active on a number of different days. Between January 1 and June 30, 2007, Symantec observed an average of 52,771 active bot-infected computers per day (figure 5), a 17 percent decrease from the previous reporting period.
DateActive bot-infected computers
Apr 11, 2006 Jul 20, 2006 Oct 28, 2006 Feb 05, 2007020,00040,00060,00080,000
10,00030,00050,00070,000100,000
May 16, 2007 Jan 01, 2006Moving averageMedian daily
active bots90,000
Figure 5. Active bot-infected computers per day
Source: Symantec Corporation
A distinct bot-infected computer is a computer that was active at least once during the period. Symantec
observed 5,029,309 distinct bot-infected computers during this period, a 17 percent decrease from the last six months of 2006.
The decrease in bots observed over the past six months is likely due to a change in bot attack methods. As
has been discussed in previous volumes of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , the exploitation of
network-based vulnerabilities to spread bots is being slowly abandoned for methods that are more likely to succeed, such as bots that send a mass mailing of themselves.
45 Network-based attacks have been limited
somewhat by the introduction of default firewalls in popular operating systems such as Microsoft® Windows® XP, as well as an increasing awareness of computer security issues among organizations and computer users. As a result, their use has declined, which has had the effect of limiting the propagation of bots.
Furthermore, law enforcement initiatives targeting bot networks may also be having some effect. Recently
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in the United States released information on Operation Bot Roast.
46 This is an ongoing initiative aimed at dismantling bot networks by identifying and arresting bot
network owners and taking down the command-and-control servers with which they control their networks. Initiatives such as these could result in a reduction in bots for a number of reasons. Firstly, as bot networks are dismantled, less bot activity will be observed. Secondly, as bot network owners become aware of the scrutiny of law enforcement agencies, they are likely to alter their tactics to avoid detection.Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Bot-infected computers and bot networks have the potential to be problematic for government and
critical infrastructure organizations in a number of different ways. The versatility of bot software allows an attacker to remotely control a compromised system. As a result, the possibilities for their use are nearly limitless.
Bots may be used to carry out DoS attacks against government resources as well as organizations that are
identified as critical infrastructure sectors. They can also be used in a coordinated effort to gain access to sensitive critical infrastructure systems, such as military, transportation, and utilities and energy. Once access to an organization’s network has been obtained, an attacker or bot network owner could easily inflict damage on critical systems, which could result in the destruction, theft, or alteration of confidential or sensitive information.
In some cases, access to confidential information by authorized personnel may be denied or altered,
allowing attackers to impose their own command, control, and communication processes on the compromised systems. This could result in the loss of situational awareness. Were such an attack to be state or group sponsored, access to critical infrastructures could be used to disable key services as a prelude to a larger event or attack.
Bot networks can also be used to harvest information in order to facilitate identity theft.
47 There have
been several examples of attackers compromising government and military computers to gain access to potentially sensitive information.
48 Such information could be used for strategic purposes in the case of
state- or group-sponsored attacks.
Identity theft-related data breaches are particularly sensitive for government and critical infrastructure
organizations. Many organizations in these sectors house a significant amount of sensitive personal information that could be used to facilitate identity theft. Furthermore, organizations such as these are often large and complex, which presents increased opportunities for attackers to use social engineering techniques to gain access to potentially sensitive information. As a consequence, attackers targeting this type of data may focus their efforts on government, health care, and other critical infrastructures.
To reduce exposure to bot-related attacks, end users should employ defense-in-depth strategies, including
the deployment of antivirus software and a firewall. Creating and enforcing policies that identify and limit applications that can access the network may also help to limit the spread of bot networks. Users should update antivirus definitions regularly and ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their operating system vendor. Symantec also advises that users never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is expected and comes from a known and trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
47 Toxbot is an example of bot network software designed to harvest information for identity theft purposes. For more informatio n on Toxbot, please see
http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-031012-0442-99
48 http://www.information-age.com/home/information_age_today/hackers_steal_US_gov_information
25Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
26Lifespan of bot-infected computers
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is assessing the average
lifespan of bot-infected computers. The lifespan of a bot is defined as the amount of time that elapses between the first detection of a bot-infected computer and the time that the computer is no longer actively attacking for 30 days, after which time it is assumed to have been disinfected. Gauging the average lifespan of bot-infected computers is important because it allows Symantec to assess how long bot-infected computers are present on a particular network prior to removal.
During the first six months of 2007, the lifespan of the average bot-infected computer was four days
(figure 6). This is an increase from the previous period, when the average lifespan was three days. The median lifespan of a bot-infected computer during both periods was one day, which was the same as during the last six months of 2006. This indicates that the majority of bot-infected computers only participated in attacking behavior for a short period, after which they are either identified and disinfected, or are used for activities other than carrying out Internet attacks, such as hosting spam zombies or phishing Web sites. The longest lifespan of a bot-infected computer during the period was 3.2 years. However, bots with such long life spans are rare.
PeriodJul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 20074 days
3 days
Figure 6. Average lifespan of bot-infected computers
Source: Symantec Corporation
The increase in the average lifespan from three to four days is likely not indicative of a fundamental
change. Since the median remained the same, the change in overall average is driven by the longer-lasting bot-infected computers. The increased lifespan of the longer-lasting bot-infected computers has thereby increased the average lifespan. Thus, the bot lifespan is holding steady. Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
It therefore appears that law enforcement efforts, such as the FBI Bot Roast (which was discussed
previously in this document) are not reducing the lifespan of bot-infected computers. This is likely because the focus of those methods is to eliminate infections and keep infected computers free of bot software, and not necessarily to shorten their effective lives. This is supported by the fact that the number of bot-infected computers has decreased during the period (as was discussed in the “Bot-infected computers” section of this report) while their lifespan remains steady.
Bot-infected computers by country
Recognizing the ongoing threat posed by bot networks, Symantec tracks the distribution of bot-infected computers worldwide. This can help analysts understand how bot-infected computers are distributed globally. This is important, as a high percentage of bot-infected computers means a greater potential for bot-related attacks. It could also provide insight into the level of patching and security awareness amongst computer administrators and users in a given region, as initial bot infections usually take advantage of unpatched computer systems.
China had the highest number of bot-infected computers during the first half of 2007, accounting for
29 percent of the worldwide total (table 5). This is a moderate increase from 26 percent in the second half of 2006, when China also had the highest number of bot-infected computers.
Current
Rank
1
234567
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
2453
12
6
10
13
8Country
China
United StatesGermanySpainFranceItalyUnited Kingdom
Canada
Israel
PolandPrevious
Percentage
26%
14%
6%5%6%2%4%
2%
2%
3%Average Bot
Lifespam (Days)
3
10
12233
19
3
3Current
Percentage
29%
13%
9%6%5%4%4%
3%
3%
3%
Table 5. Bot-infected computers by country
Source: Symantec Corporation
Symantec has observed that bots usually infect computers that are connected to high-speed broadband
Internet through large ISPs and that the expansion of broadband connectivity often facilitates the spread of bots. China’s Internet infrastructure is currently expanding rapidly.
49 In fact, between May 2006 and
May 2007, China added more broadband lines than any other country.50 China currently has the second
highest number of Internet users in the world, with 13 percent of the total.51
49 http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/news/2163552/china-lead-broadband-world
50 This data was provided by Point Topic. For more information, please go to http://www.point-topic.com
51 http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm
27Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
In the first half of 2006, the percentage of worldwide bot-infected computers situated in China increased
from nine percent to 20 percent. In the second half of 2006, the rate of increase slowed six percentage points, from 20 percent to 26 percent. In the first half of 2007, it went up only three percentage points. This may be a sign that security awareness, practices and infrastructure are beginning to catch up with the rapid growth of Internet usage in China.
In the first six months of 2007, the United States had the second highest number of bot-infected computers,
accounting for 13 percent of the worldwide total. This is almost unchanged from the second half of 2006, when the United States ranked second, accounting for 14 percent of the world’s bot-infected computers.
It is not surprising that the United States was the site of the most bot-infected computers, as 18 percent
of the world’s Internet users are located there, more than any other country.
52 Furthermore, it has a well
established and relatively long-standing Internet infrastructure. As a result, not only are there a lot of attackers there, but they have had a long time to understand the technologies and to hone their skills.
Germany had the third highest number of bot-infected computers during this period, accounting for nine
percent of the worldwide total. During the second half of 2006, Germany ranked fourth and accounted for six percent of the world’s bot-infected computers. Like both China and the United States, Germany has a well established Internet infrastructure. Furthermore, it has the fourth highest number of Internet users in the world, boasting five percent of the world’s Internet users.
53
Command-and-control servers by country
Command-and-control servers are computers that bot network owners use to relay commands to bot-infected computers on their networks. Symantec tracks the global distribution of bot command-and-control servers. During the first half of 2007, the United States had the most known command-and-control servers worldwide (table 6), accounting for 43 percent of the worldwide total. This is a marginal increase from the previous period, when the United States was also the site of the most command-and-control servers, accounting for 40 percent of the worldwide total.
The high proportion of command-and-control servers in the United States indicates that servers there likely
control not only bot networks within the country but elsewhere as well. The high proportion of bot-infected computers and command-and-control servers in the United States is driven by that country’s extensive Internet and technology infrastructure. As of June 2006, more than 58 million broadband Internet users were located there, the highest number in the world.
54
28 52 http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats14.htm
53 http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats4.htm
54 http://www.oecd.org/document/7/0,3343,en_2649_34223_38446855_1_1_1_1,00.htmlSymantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Current
Rank
1
234567
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
352496
10
7
11Country
United States
GermanyCanadaSouth Korea ChinaUnited KingdomTaiwan
Italy
Sweden
TurkeyPrevious
Proportion
40%
6%4%
10%
5%2%3%
2%
3%
2%Current
Proportion
43%
7%7%6%3%3%3%
2%
2%
2%
Table 6. Command-and-control servers by country
Source: Symantec Corporation
Germany had the second highest number of command-and-control servers in the first six months of 2007,
accounting for seven percent of the worldwide total. This is a slight change from the previous six-month period when Germany accounted for six percent of worldwide command-and-control servers and ranked third in the world.
During the current reporting period, Canada had the third most command-and-control servers in the world,
accounting for seven percent of the total. This is an increase from the second half of 2006, when Canada ranked fifth and accounted for four percent of the world’s total.
Top countries of attack origin
This section will discuss the top countries of attack origin. This metric only discusses the location of the computer from which the attack originates and not the actual location of the attacker. While it is simple to trace an attack back to the computer from which it was launched, that computer may not be the attacker’s own system. Attackers frequently hop through numerous systems or use previously compromised systems to obscure their location prior to launching the actual attack. For example, an attacker in China could launch an attack from a compromised system located in South Korea against a Web server in New York. Further complicating the matter is that international jurisdictional issues often prevent proper investigation of an attacker’s real location.
Over the first six months of 2007, the United States was the top country of attack origin, accounting for
25 percent of worldwide attack activity (table 7). This represents a decrease from 33 percent during the last half of 2006. Although it is impossible to identify a single cause for the decrease, it is likely that it is at least partly due to the FBI Bot Roast program, which was discussed earlier in this report.
The prominence of the United States as a country of attack origin is likely due to its large population of
Internet users. Further, attackers in the United States have had a longer period to develop the knowledge, skills, and methods to conduct sophisticated attacks than those in some other countries.
29Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
30Current
Rank
1
234567
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
234675
10
12
8Country
United States
ChinaGermanyFranceUnited KingdomSpainCanada
Italy
Brazil
JapanPrevious Percentage
of Events
33%
11%
7%6%5%4%5%
2%
2%
3%Current Percentage
of Events
25%
13%
8%6%5%5%4%
3%
2%
2%
Table 7. Top countries of attack origin
Source: Symantec Corporation
In an effort to limit attack activity in the country, the United States has had legislation in place since
the 1986, when the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act passed into law. Furthermore, the Cyber Security Enhancement Act of 2002 was enacted to increase sentences for computer crimes under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act. Although there have been many convictions under these laws,
55 they appear to
have had little effect on attack activity within the country, as is illustrated by the high number of attacks originating in the United States.
The second highest number of attacks detected in the first half of 2007 originated in China, which
accounted for 13 percent of all attacking IP addresses. This is a slight increase from the previous period when China accounted for 11 percent of attacking IP addresses. The high number of attacks that originated in China is likely driven by the rapid broadband Internet growth that is taking place there.
56
In fact, between May 2006 and May 2007, China added more broadband lines than any other country.57
China currently has the second highest number of Internet users in the world, with 13 percent of the total.
58 It is also likely due to the high number of bot-infected computers there, many of which would
be used to launch attacks against computers in other countries.
China has had computer crime laws in place since 1997.59 Despite these laws, China has continued to
account for a high percentage of worldwide attack activity over the past two years.60 This is an indication
that, as has been the case in the United States, computer crime laws do not effectively deter computer criminals and attackers. Attacks originating from China are likely motivated by profit, and will likely remain prominent until such activity is no longer profitable.
Germany was the country of origin of the third highest number of attacks in the first half of 2007,
accounting for eight percent of all attacking IP addresses. This is a marginal change from the previous period when Germany accounted for seven percent of all attacking IP addresses. Germany has the fourth highest number of broadband Internet users in the world, which may account for its high attack levels.
61
55 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6719246/
56 http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/news/2163552/china-lead-broadband-world
57 This data was provided by Point Topic. For more information, please go to http://www.point-topic.com
58 http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm
59 http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/laws/countries/china.html
60 For example, please see the Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report (March 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xi_govt_03_2007.en-us. pdf : p. 23
61 http://www.point-topic.comSymantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
31 62 http://www.cybercrimelaw.net/laws/countries/germany.htmlIn general, Europe has high levels of Internet connectivity, which is a necessary precondition to elevated
levels of attack activity. Like China and the United States, Germany has several laws regarding computer crime;
62 however, also like those countries, those laws do not seem to be effectively deterring attackers
from carrying out attacks. As with China and the United States, these attacks are likely profit driven and will also likely remain prominent until such activity is no longer profitable.
Top countries of origin for government-targeted attacks
Attacks targeting government are driven by a number of factors. The first is criminal intent, as governments store considerable amounts of personal identification data that could be used for fraudulent purposes, such as identity theft. Government databases also store sensitive information that could facilitate criminal activities. This could include critical infrastructure information, sensitive but unclassified information, or other intelligence. In the first half of 2007, the government sector ranked second and accounted for 26 percent of all identity theft-related data breaches.
The second factor motivating attack activity against government targets is political. Government
organizations often have a high profile in their region or country. Attacks may target government organizations in order to deny crucial communications services as a means of expressing disagreement with policies and programs that the government has developed and implemented. These attacks are likely a form of protest and are also likely to be made up of attacks such as DoS attacks. For example, during the first half of 2007, the government sector was the sector most frequently targeted by DoS attacks, accounting for 30 percent of all detected attacks. Some attacks, on the other hand, may simply be mischievous in nature. While such attacks may have relatively innocuous intentions, they may still result in the disruption of critical services or the exposure of highly sensitive information.
The top country of origin for attacks detected by sensors based in the government sector in the first half
of 2007 was the United States, which accounted for 19 percent of the total (table 8). Attacks against government organizations that originated in the United States are six percentage points lower than Internet-wide attacks originating there. This indicates that attacks originating from within the United States are not targeting the government sector in particular. Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
32Current
Rank
1
234567
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
325647
10
13
12Country
United States
SpainFranceGermanyItalyChinaUnited Kingdom
Canada
Israel
PolandPrevious Percentage
of Events
20%
11%12%
8%5%
8%4%
3%
2%
2%Current Percentage
of Events
19%
14%10%
9%7%
6%4%
3%
3%
3%
Table 8. Top countries attacking government sectors
Source: Symantec Corporation
Spain accounted for 14 percent of attacks targeting government, which is nine percentage points higher
than the proportion of total attacks originating there. This indicates that a disproportionate number of attacks originating in Spain target the government sector. There are a number of factors that likely contribute to this.
Spain has experienced a 23 percent increase in broadband connections between May 2006 and May 2007,
adding over 1.3 million broadband users during that period.
63 In previous volumes of the Internet Security
Threat Report , Symantec has observed that a rapid increase in broadband often coincides with a rapid
increase in malicious Internet activity such as network-based attacks and bot-infected computers.64 This
is because rapidly expanding ISPs are more likely to focus their resources on meeting growing demand at the expense of implementing security measures, such as port blocking and ingress and egress filtering. As a result, ISPs that are expanding their services rapidly may have security infrastructures that are underdeveloped relative to their needs.
Over the past several reporting periods, malicious activity in Spain has increased noticeably. The country
ranked seventh for worldwide malicious activity and fifth for malicious activity per Internet user during this reporting period.
Some of this malicious activity may also involve politically motivated attacks. Politically motivated attacks
are likely to be carried out for a number of reasons including blocking access to government Internet-based resources, gaining access to potentially sensitive information, and discrediting the government itself.
The current political climate in Spain may contribute to the high number of attacks targeting the
government there. A ceasefire between the national government of Spain and the militant Basque separatist movement known as the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna, or ETA, was threatened by violence early in 2007.
65 The government’s attempts to work towards peace with the ETA have met with widespread
opposition among the non-Basque population in Spain.66 This issue is likely to contribute to attack activity
targeting government organizations.
63 This data was provided by Point Topic. For more information, please go to http://www.point-topic.com
64 For example, please see the Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report (September 2006):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_report_x_09_2006.en- us.pdf : p. 43
65 http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/01/14/news/spain.php
66 http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/03/11/news/spain.phpSymantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
33France accounted for 10 percent of attacks targeting government organizations, which is four percentage
points higher than the proportion of total attacks originating from there. The discrepancy, although less significant than that of Spain, indicates that attacks originating from France are targeting government organizations.
France, like Spain, increased its Internet infrastructure substantially between May 2006 and May 2007,
increasing it by 23 percent, or just over 2.5 million new users.
67 Also, France had the fifth most malicious
activity worldwide during this period, as well as the ninth most malicious activity per Internet user.
Despite ranking highly in overall worldwide malicious activity as well as worldwide attack activity, China
ranked only sixth for attacks targeting the government sector. Furthermore, China’s ranking dropped from the fourth position in the last six months of 2006. As discussed in the previous Government Internet
Security Threat Report , this is surprising for a number of factors. China is a world economic, political,
and military power. Given this, it would be reasonable to conclude that the Chinese government may be targeted by attacks that were intended to express opposition to its policies. However, this appears not to be the case.
In the previous Government Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec speculated that this may because
the majority of attacking computers in China are targeting organizations with the intent of generating profit. Symantec concluded this because China had the highest number of bot-infected computers in the world during this period, but only the fourth highest number of command-and-control computers. During this period, this gap has widened, as China dropped to the fifth highest number of bot command-and-control servers. This would indicate that many of the attacks originating in China are coming from computers that are controlled by servers—and possibly attackers—outside the country. As a consequence, these attacks are likely motivated by profit rather than politics, so that targets within government organizations are not a priority.
Attacks by type—notable critical infrastructure sectors
This section of the Government Internet Security Threat Report will focus on the types of attacks detected
by sensors deployed in notable critical infrastructure sectors. After outlining the attacks against government and critical sectors as a whole, the following sectors will be discussed in detail:
• Government
• Biotech/pharmaceutical• Health care• Financial services• Transportation
The ability to identify attacks by type assists security administrators in evaluating which assets may
be targeted. In doing so, this may assist security administrators in focusing attention on those assets receiving a disproportionate number of attacks.
67 http://www.point-topic.comSymantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
34Critical infrastructure organizations are the target of a wide variety of attack types. This reinforces
Symantec’s assertion that attackers are using numerous methods to compromise and use assets in those sectors. The majority of attacks seen by all sensors in the government and critical infrastructure sectors in the first six months of 2007 were SMTP-based attacks (figure 7), which accounted for 36 percent of the top ten attacks.
Other <1%
STMP (email) 36%Web (server) 1%
DoS 35%Backscatter 15%Misc 7%
Shellcode/exploit 5%
Figure 7. Top ten attack types, government and critical infrastructure
Source: Symantec Corporation
SMTP, or simple mail transfer protocol, is designed to facilitate the delivery of email messages across the
Internet. Email servers are likely targeted because, in order to deliver email, external access is required. While most services can be blocked to protect against external attack, allowing access only to trusted users and entities, for email to function effectively it has to be available both internally and externally. The necessity of allowing both internal and external access increases the probability that a successful attack will facilitate access to the network.
Additionally, attackers who are able to compromise email servers can use them to send spam,
harvest email addresses for targeted phishing attacks and, in some instances, disrupt email service. Successful SMTP attacks against government organizations could allow attackers to spoof official government communications. Because government and critical information industries rely on email as a communication method, it is essential that they are secured. Symantec recommends that government and critical information industries use secure email protocols. They should also deploy antispam and antifraud solutions and ensure that operating and email solutions are fully patched against all known vulnerabilities.Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
35Top attacks by type—government sector
Backscatter was the most common type of attack observed by sensors deployed in the government sector
in the first half of 2007 (figure 8). These attacks made up 66 percent of the top ten attacks observed by government sensors, compared to 22 percent for all government and critical infrastructure sectors.
Other <1%STMP (email) 6%
DNS 1%
DoS 1%
Backscatter 66%Misc 7%
Shellcode/exploit 20%
Figure 8. Top ten attack types, government sector
Source: Symantec Corporation
Backscatter, while not a direct attack, is evidence that a DoS attack against another server on the Internet
is taking place and is making use of spoofed IP addresses. When one of these spoofed IP addresses matches the address of a Symantec sensor, any error messages that the attacked server sends to the spoofed address will be detected by a Symantec sensor as backscatter.
Generally, backscatter is considered to be a type of Internet background noise,
68 which is typically
ignored. However, the percentage of backscatter detected by government sensors is significantly higher than the average detected across all government and critical infrastructure sectors. This may be caused by several factors.
One possible explanation is that stronger policies and procedures are in place to prevent attacks before
reaching the network. If potentially malicious traffic is blocked before reaching the network boundary while background noise is ignored, sensors will see a higher percentage of background noise than potentially malicious traffic.
68 For more information on Internet background noise, see http://www.switch.ch/security/services/IBN/Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
36Another possible explanation for the high percentage of backscatter detected by government sensors
may be that attackers launching DoS attacks are intentionally spoofing the IP addresses of government organizations. This may be done to trick the targeted organization into thinking it is being attacked by a government. This tactic may have been used in the first half of 2007 in a number of well documented DoS attacks against Estonia, some of which were said to come from the Russian government.
69 The Russian
government denied launching these attacks. However, it may be that the IPs didn’t actually belong to the Russian government but were spoofed to make it seem as though the government had launched the attacks.
Top attacks by type—biotech/pharmaceutical sector
The most common attacks detected by sensors deployed in the biotech/pharmaceutical sector in the first six months of 2007 were DoS attacks, which constituted 49 percent of all attacks during this period (figure 9). This is significantly higher than the 35 percent of these attacks that were detected across government and critical infrastructure sectors as a whole during this period.
Other <1%STMP (email) 42%
DoS 49%Backscatter 3%Misc 5%
Shellcode/exploit 1%
Figure 9. Top ten attack types, biotech/pharmaceutical sector
Source: Symantec Corporation
DoS attacks are often associated with protests, since they are intended to render a site inaccessible
in the same way that a physical protest attempts to block access to a service or location. As such, the high percentage of DoS attacks may be an attempt to express disagreement with policies developed and implemented by the targeted organization.
69 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/19/world/europe/19russia.html?ex=1337227200&en=4817e43658c91382&ei=5088Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
37Additionally, some organizations that are categorized as biotech/pharmaceutical companies may rely
heavily on an online presence for their operations, particularly online pharmaceutical retailers. These sites may be more liable to be adversely affected by DoS attacks and, as such, targeted by DoS-based extortion schemes. By using a sustained DoS attack to hold this type of site offline, an attacker can disrupt the organization’s revenue, and may thus threaten such an attack to extort money from the organization.
Top attacks by type—health care sector
SMTP-based attacks were the most common attacks detected by sensors deployed in the health care sector in the first six months of 2007, accounting for 75 percent of the top ten attacks against the industry (figure 10). This is a higher than the 36 percent of these attacks detected across government and critical infrastructure sectors as a whole during this period, which indicates that attackers using these attacks are specifically trying to compromise email servers in the health care industry. These attacks are likely due to spammers who are attempting to spoof legitimate health care companies in order to sell illegitimate products. If attackers are successful in attempts to send email through compromised servers, consumers could be at risk from misleading or false solicitations, which could in turn affect the reputation of the targeted company.
Other <1%
STMP (email) 75%Web (server) 1%DoS 17%
Misc 1%Shellcode/exploit 6%
Figure 10. Top ten attack types, health care sector
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
38Top attacks by type—financial services sector
SMTP-based attacks were the most frequent type of attack targeting the financial services sector in the
first half of 2007. They accounted for 48 percent of the top ten attacks detected by sensors deployed in the financial services sector (figure 11). Attackers deploying these attacks are likely attempting to compromise email servers for the purpose of sending spam or harvesting email addresses for targeted phishing attacks.
Financial institutions are frequently targeted by phishing attacks, so it is likely that many of the SMTP
attacks are related to phishing activity that is attempting to spoof the email addresses of financial institutions. Using an email server that belongs to a financial services institution would lend credibility to a phishing attack targeting the customers of a financial service organization. If phishers are able to take advantage of SMTP servers in financial institutions, it is likely that customers will be more easily phished.
Other <1%
STMP (email) 48%DoS 34%Backscatter 10%
Misc 6%
Shellcode/exploit 2%
Figure 11. Top ten attack types, financial services
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
39Top attacks by type—transportation sector
During this reporting period, the transportation sector was the target of a high number of DoS attacks
(figure 12). Ninety-three percent of the top ten attacks detected by sensors in this sector were identified as DoS attacks, while only 35 percent of top attacks against all government and critical infrastructure were detected as DoS. This indicates that attackers deploying these attacks are targeting the transportation sector specifically. As was discussed in the “Denial of service attacks” section of this report, DoS attacks are generally used to disrupt services and communications. A large-scale attack of this nature could result in the inability to coordinate communications or relief efforts in the event of a national emergency.
Other <1%
DoS 93%Misc 4%Shellcode/exploit 2%
Web (server) 1%
Figure 12. Top ten attack types, transportation sector
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
40 70 The BugTraq mailing list is hosted by SecurityFocus (http://www.securityfocus.com). Archives are available at http://www.secur ityfocus.com/archive/1Vulnerability Trends
Vulnerabilities are design or implementation errors in information systems that can result in the
compromise of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information stored upon or transmitted over the affected system. They are most often found in software, although they exist in all layers of information systems, from design or protocol specifications to physical hardware implementations. Vulnerabilities may be triggered actively, either by malicious users or automated malicious code, or passively during system operation. The discovery and disclosure of a single vulnerability in a critical asset can seriously undermine the security posture of an organization.
New vulnerabilities are discovered and disclosed regularly by a sizeable community made up of end users,
security researchers, hackers, security vendors, and, occasionally, by the software vendors themselves. Symantec carefully monitors vulnerability research, tracking vulnerabilities throughout their lifecycle, from initial disclosure and discussion to the development and release of a patch or other remediation measures.
Symantec operates one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion of vulnerabilities on
the Internet, the BugTraq mailing list, which has approximately 50,000 direct subscribers who contribute, receive, and discuss vulnerability research on a daily basis.
70 Symantec also maintains one of the world’s
most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting of over 22,000 vulnerabilities (spanning more than a decade) affecting more than 50,000 technologies from over 8,000 vendors. The following discussion of vulnerability trends is based on a thorough analysis of that data.
This section of the Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report will discuss vulnerabilities
that were disclosed between January 1 and June 30, 2007. It will compare them with those disclosed in the previous six-month period, and discuss how current vulnerability trends may affect potential future Internet security activity. The following metrics will be discussed:
• Patch development time for operating systems
• Zero-day vulnerabilities • Unpatched enterprise vendor vulnerabilities• Vulnerabilities—protection and mitigation
Patch development time for operating systems
The time period between the disclosure date of a vulnerability and the release date of an associated patch is known as the patch development time. If exploit code is created and made public during this time, computers may be immediately vulnerable to widespread attack. This metric will assess and compare the average patch development times of medium and high-severity vulnerabilities affecting five different operating systems: Apple® Mac OS® X, Hewlett-Packard HP-UX®, Microsoft Windows, Red Hat® Linux® (including enterprise versions and Red Hat Fedora), and Sun Microsystems Solaris™.
Of the five operating systems tracked in the first six months of 2007 (figure 13), Microsoft had the shortest
average patch development time at 18 days, based on a sample set of 38 patched vulnerabilities. Of the 38 vulnerabilities, two affected third-party applications. This is lower than the average patch development time of 23 days in the second half of 2006 based on a sample set of 50 vulnerabilities, seven of which affected third-party applications.Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
49
23Jul–Dec 2006145
87
49
Apple
Avera ge time in days0 20 40 60 80 100Period
140 160Jan–Jun 2007110
36
18112
43
120Sun
Red Hat
MicrosoftHP
Figure 13. Patch development time for operating systems
Source: Symantec Corporation
Red Hat had the second shortest average patch development time in the first six months of 2007, with an
average of 36 days for a sample set of 91 vulnerabilities. Of these, 90 affected third-party applications. The average patch development time is down from 49 days in the second half of 2006, which was based on 149 vulnerabilities, all of which affected third-party applications.
Apple had the third shortest average patch development time in the first half of 2007; it was 43 days for
a sample set of 59 vulnerabilities. Nine of those vulnerabilities affected third-party applications. This is a shorter average patch development time than the 49 days reported in the second half of 2006, which was based on a sample set of 32 vulnerabilities, including 12 that affected third-party applications.
Sun had the fourth shortest average patch development time in the first half of 2007, at 110 days for a
sample set of 73 vulnerabilities. Sixty-seven of those affected third-party applications. This figure is down from the 145-day patch development time in the second half of 2006. This was based on a sample set of 35 vulnerabilities, 32 of which affected third-party applications.
HP had the longest average patch development time during this reporting period, at 112 days. This
was based on a total of 30 vulnerabilities, 28 of which affected third-party applications. The average patch development time for this period was higher than the 87 days reported in the second half of 2006. The previous period was based on a sample set of 70 vulnerabilities, 68 of which affected third-party applications.
Vulnerabilities affecting third-party applications are still a factor in the average patch development time
for operating systems. Vendors with fewer third-party applications to patch generally have an advantage over those whose operating systems comprise many third-party components. However, the vulnerabilities affecting these vendors often affect core proprietary components; therefore, the operating systems are more likely to be vulnerable in their default installation.
41Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
42The numbers from this and previous volumes of the report demonstrate that Red Hat has had the best
track record in dealing with third-party vulnerabilities. This may be due to the extent of their involvement with third-party vendors and the open source community, as they often contribute their own patches and work closely with third-party vendors.
Zero-day vulnerabilities
A zero-day vulnerability is one that appears to have been exploited in the wild prior to being publicly known. It may not have been known to the vendor prior to exploitation, and the vendor had not released a patch at the time of the exploit activity.
Zero-day vulnerabilities represent a serious threat in many cases because there is no patch available for
them and because they will likely be able to evade purely signature-based detection. It is the unexpected nature of zero-day threats that causes concern, especially because they may be used in targeted attacks and in the propagation of malicious code.
In the first half of 2007, Symantec documented six zero-day vulnerabilities (figure 14). In the previous six-
month period, Symantec documented 12 zero-day vulnerabilities, whereas in the first half of 2006, only one zero-day vulnerability was documented.
PeriodJul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 2007612
Figure 14. Zero-day vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation
Of the zero-day vulnerabilities documented during this period, three have affected Microsoft Office
applications. This is a drop from the six zero-day vulnerabilities that affected Office in the second half of 2006. The incidence of zero-day Office vulnerabilities may have dropped due to measures taken by Microsoft to patch as many pending Office vulnerabilities as possible. Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Microsoft Office has previously been implicated in zero-day attacks against the government sector. In April
2007, the United States Department of State released a statement about a targeted attack on their network that occurred between May and July of 2006.
71 This attack exploited a zero-day vulnerability in Microsoft
Word that was addressed by the vendor in August 2006.72
In this attack, the attacker employed social engineering to target a specific employee in the East Asia-Pacific
region with a malicious document that was crafted to appear relevant to operations in that region. This mode of attack differs from the typical scenario, in which attackers increase their chances of success by casting a wide net over a large number of targets with the belief that compromising a small portion of those targets will yield sufficient returns.
The client-side nature of the vulnerability also limited the number of successful attacks to the number of
times the malicious document was opened by potential victims. This instance implies a certain level of confidence and sophistication on the part of the attacker because it appears that a small number of users was targeted and the malicious document would have been opened a limited number of times. The unknown and unpatched nature of zero-day vulnerabilities and the increasing sophistication of attackers suggest that they will likely be deployed in similar low-key targeted attacks.
In Volume IX of the Internet Security Threat Report (March 2006), Symantec predicted that a number of
official markets and some black markets would emerge for the trading of vulnerability information.
73 Since
that report, Symantec has observed the emergence of further venues to sell information about zero-day vulnerabilities.
74 The commercialization of zero-day vulnerabilities is a concern for governments. Various
corporate, government, and criminal organizations are competing to acquire information about zero-day vulnerabilities. There is anecdotal evidence that United States government agencies have been involved in the purchase of zero-day vulnerability information.
75
In order to protect against zero-day vulnerabilities, Symantec recommends that administrators deploy
network- and host-based IDS/IPS systems and regularly updated antivirus software. Security vendors may provide rapid response to recently discovered zero-day vulnerabilities in the wild by developing and implementing new or updated IDS/IPS and antivirus signatures before a patch has been released by the affected vendor. Behavior-blocking solutions and heuristic signatures may also provide protection against zero-day vulnerabilities.
In addition, some IPS systems may provide further protection against memory corruption vulnerabilities in
the form of address space layout randomization (ASLR)
76 and by making memory segments non-executable.
These measures may complicate the exploitation of such vulnerabilities and make it more difficult for attack payloads to execute; however, this security measure may not protect all applications by default.
71 http://www.state.gov/m/ds/rls/rm/83256.htm
72 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/04/19/us_state_dept_rooted/
73 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report (March 2006):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_report_ix.pdf : p. 2 0
74 http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11474/1
75 http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11468
76 Address space layout randomization is a security measure to complicate exploitation of some classes of vulnerabilities by ran domizing the layout of
process address space to make it less predictable to attackers.
43Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
77 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume XI (March 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xi_03_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 42
44Unpatched enterprise vendor vulnerabilities
In the previous volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec studied the vendor responsiveness
to vulnerabilities and found that the majority were not being acknowledged, and therefore patched, by vendors.
77 That analysis provided insight into unpatched vulnerabilities without considering the size of the
vendors affected.
This report expands on that analysis by examining the number of unpatched vulnerabilities affecting
enterprise vendors whose applications are widely deployed and considered to be mission-critical in nature. The following enterprise vendors are reviewed in this section:
• Computer Associates
• Cisco• EMC• HP• IBM• McAfee• Microsoft• Oracle• Sun• Symantec
Unpatched vulnerabilities are publicly documented security issues that are not known to be patched by the
vendor responsible for maintaining the affected application. Readers should note that the vulnerabilities discussed in this section were known to be unpatched at the time that the data was gathered for this report. They may have been patched in the meantime. It is also possible that some of the vulnerabilities were patched by the vendor without a public announcement; in such cases, there is insufficient publicly available information to label these issues as patched. It is also important to note that some unpatched vulnerabilities remain in this state because they affect unsupported products, or because the vendor has provided specific workarounds that address the vulnerability until a patch is available.
These vulnerabilities are a serious concern for enterprises because they cannot be resolved without
applying best practices, workarounds, and mitigations. In many circumstances these measures will not provide complete protection against unpatched vulnerabilities.
In the first half of 2007, Symantec documented 90 unpatched enterprise vulnerabilities that were
published during this period (table 9). Of these, 64 affected Microsoft, 13 affected Oracle, four affected Computer Associates, four affected HP, two affected IBM, two affected Symantec, and one vulnerability affected Sun. The rest of the vendors in the enterprise subset had no known vulnerabilities that were unpatched in this period.Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
45Enterprise Vendors
Microsoft
OracleComputer Associates HPIBMSymantecSun
McAfeeJan–Jun 2007
64
13
44221
0Jul–Dec 2006
75
701513
2
Table 9. Unpatched enterprise vulnerabilities, by vendor
Symantec Corporation
Of the enterprise vulnerabilities published in the second half of 2006, 94 were unpatched. Seventy-five
affected Microsoft, seven affected Oracle, five affected IBM, three affected Sun, two affected McAfee, one affected HP, and one vulnerability affected Symantec. No other enterprise vendors had vulnerabilities published during this period that remain unpatched.
Microsoft had the most unpatched vulnerabilities that were disclosed during the second half of 2006 and
the first half of 2007. Many of the vulnerabilities in the sample set are considered lower severity, such as denial of service issues affecting client or desktop software. These issues may be considered a low priority by Microsoft. As a result, they may not typically be addressed in monthly security bulletins, but in service packs and other major version updates instead.
While it is likely that many of these vulnerabilities will have minimal impact on enterprises, some
denial of service vulnerabilities have the potential for more severe effects, such as code execution. Some vulnerabilities are prematurely thought to be limited to denial of service capabilities because the researcher has not completely investigated the vulnerability or because his or her skills are inadequate to conclusively determine the nature of the vulnerability.
The first half of 2007 did not show an improvement in the number of unpatched Oracle vulnerabilities
over the second half of 2006. In addition to that, many vulnerabilities still remain unpatched from that period. In many cases, this may be due to lack of acknowledgement or correlation with publicly available vulnerability reports. When Oracle announces vulnerabilities, many of the issues are identified by an internal tracking number, but are not adequately mapped to other external vulnerability identifiers such as the CVE dictionary.
78 This could cause many publicly known vulnerabilities to remain classified as
unpatched because the vendor has not explicitly identified the vulnerabilities by their common names in security bulletins and product updates.
78 http://cve.mitre.orgSymantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
46 78 http://cve.mitre.org
79 http://www.vnunet.com/articles/print/2172404
80 http://www.hipaa.org
81 http://www.sarbanes-oxley.com
82 http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/privacyinitiatives/glbact.html
83 The Security Development Lifecycle is a development paradigm that incorporates security at every stage from the initial archi tecture to programming,
and in the quality assurance/testing phases. Threat modeling is a security auditing methodology that involves formally identify ing and mapping out all
possible attack vectors for an application.Recently, Oracle made improvements to their security reporting procedures, including providing pre-
release notification for the security updates and including Common Vulnerability Scoring System ratings in their advisories.
79 The expectation is that these changes will have a positive effect on security reporting
and vulnerability remediation. As a result, it is likely that fewer vulnerabilities will remain unpatched for extended periods of time.
Governments should be concerned about unpatched Oracle vulnerabilities in particular because they have
the potential to expose confidential or classified information. These vulnerabilities can also have critical implications for organizations that are required to comply with regulatory and legal standards such as HIPAA,
80 Sarbanes-Oxley,81 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.82
Vulnerabilities—protection and mitigation
In addition to the specific steps required to protect against the vulnerabilities discussed in this section, there are general steps that should be taken to protect against the exploitation of vulnerabilities. Administrators should employ a good asset management system to track what assets are deployed on the network and to determine which ones may be affected by the discovery of new vulnerabilities. Vulnerability management technologies should also be used to detect known vulnerabilities in deployed assets. Administrators should monitor vulnerability mailing lists and security Web sites to keep abreast of new vulnerabilities in Web applications.
Symantec recommends that administrators employ vulnerability assessment services, a vulnerability
management solution, and vulnerability assessment tools to evaluate the security posture of the enterprise. Unpatched vulnerabilities should be identified by administrators, and assessed and mitigated according to the risk they present. Where possible, problematic applications with many unpatched vulnerabilities should be removed or isolated. IPS systems can aid in detecting known attacks against such applications.
Enterprises should subscribe to a vulnerability alerting service in order to be notified of new vulnerabilities.
They should also manage their Web-based assets carefully. If they are developing Web applications in-house, developers should be educated about secure development practices, such as the Security Development Lifecycle and threat modeling.
83 If possible, all Web applications should be audited for
security prior to deployment. Web application security solutions and a number of products and services are available to detect and prevent attacks against these applications.
When deploying applications, administrators should ensure that secure, up-to-date versions are used,
and that applications are properly configured to avoid the exploitation of latent vulnerabilities. Symantec recommends the use of secure shared components that have been audited for common Web application vulnerabilities. As much as possible, enterprises are advised to avoid deploying products that are not regularly maintained or that are not supported by the vendor.Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Malicious Code Trends
Symantec gathers malicious code data from over 120 million desktops that have deployed Symantec’s
antivirus products in consumer and corporate environments. The Symantec Digital Immune System™ and Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting process. This discussion is based on malicious code samples reported to Symantec for analysis between January 1 and June 30, 2007. This section of the Government Internet Security Threat Report will discuss:
• Threats to confidential information
• Propagation mechanisms• Computers with multiple infections by country• Geolocation by type• Malicious code—prevention and mitigation
This report examines the number and volume of malicious code threats based upon the number of reports
received from enterprise and home users. It will also examine malicious code types and propagation vectors based upon potential infections. This allows Symantec to determine which sample of malicious code attempted to infect a computer and the volume of potential infections worldwide.
Threats to confidential information
Some malicious code programs are designed specifically to expose confidential information that is stored on an infected computer. These threats may expose sensitive data such as system information, confidential files and documents, or logon credentials. Some malicious code threats, such as back doors, can give a remote attacker complete control over a compromised computer.
Threats to confidential information are a particular concern because of their potential use in criminal
activities such as identity theft, which was the most common consumer complaint received by the United States Federal Trade Commission in 2006.
84 With the widespread use of online shopping and Internet
banking, compromises that result in unauthorized access to confidential information can result in significant financial loss, particularly if credit card information or banking details are exposed.
Within organizations, exposure of confidential information can lead to significant data leakage. If this
involves customer-related data, such as credit card information, it can severely undermine customer confidence as well as violate local laws.
85 Sensitive corporate information—including financial details,
business plans, and proprietary technologies—could also be leaked from compromised computers
Government agencies are also at risk from threats to confidential information. If employee data is exposed
by these threats, the data could be used to facilitate identity theft, which could then lead to further security compromises. For instance, if the attacker gains access to a user’s personal and system information, he or she can use it to craft a targeted social engineering attack tailored to that particular user. Additionally, certain agencies—such as those dealing with health care, revenue and taxation, and pensions—may store personally identifiable information of citizens, including government-issued identification numbers, that could be used for identity theft or related fraud.
84 http://ftc.gov/opa/2007/02/topcomplaints.htm
85 Many countries have implemented their own laws in this regard, such as the United Kingdom’s Data Protection Act, which can be found at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACTS/acts1998/19980029.htm
47Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
In the first six months of 2007, threats to confidential information made up 65 percent of potential
infections by the top 50 malicious code samples (figure 15). This is an increase over the 53 percent of potential infections in the second half of 2006.
PeriodJul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 2007Percentage of top 50 threats that expose
confidential information
65%
53%
Figure 15. Threats to confidential information
Source: Symantec Corporation
Malicious code can expose confidential information in a variety of ways. The most common method is by
allowing remote access to the compromised computer through a back door. In this method, the attacker typically uses a specialized application to connect to the compromised computer. He or she can then perform numerous actions such as taking screenshots, changing configuration settings, and uploading, downloading, or deleting files.
In this reporting period, remote access threats made up 88 percent of confidential information threats
(figure 16), up from 87 percent in the second half of 2006. Back doors typically require a two-way communication channel between the attacker and the compromised computer in order to access unauthorized information. As such, they can be less efficient than an automated mechanism, such as a keystroke logger. This may indicate why threats that allow remote access increased only marginally this period while other types of information-exposure threats increased more significantly.
48Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
PeriodPercentage of exposure threats
Exports email addressesExports user data
Exports system data
Jul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 200787%
76%
67%69%
69%88%
88%
80% 76%79%Keystroke logger
Allows remote access
Figure 16. Threats to confidential information by type
Source: Symantec Corporation
Keystroke logging threats made up 88 percent of threats to confidential information, up from 76 percent
in the second half of last year. A keystroke logger records keystrokes on a compromised computer and either emails the log to the attacker or uploads it to a Web site under the attacker’s control. The attacker can use these logs to find the user’s credentials for different types of accounts, such as online banking and trading accounts, as well as ISP accounts. The attacker can then use this information as a stepping stone to launch further attacks. This makes it easier for the attacker to gather confidential information from a large number of compromised computers than if they had to manually connect to back doors installed on a number of individual computers.
Threats that could be employed to export user data accounted for 80 percent of confidential information
threats during the first six months of 2007, up from 69 percent in the previous reporting period. Furthermore, in the first half of 2007, 79 percent of threats to confidential information could be used to export system data, compared to 69 percent in the second half of 2006. These forms of data leakage can be used to steal a user’s identity or launch further attacks. Attackers with access to the user’s personal and system data can use it to craft a more targeted social engineering attack tailored to that particular user.
49Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Organizations can take several steps to limit the exposure of confidential information by successful
intrusions. Encrypting sensitive data that is stored in databases will limit an attacker’s ability to view and/or use the data. However, this step will require that sufficient computing resources be made available, as encrypting and decrypting the data for business use consumes processing cycles on servers. Furthermore, encrypting stored data will not protect against so-called man-in-the-middle attacks that intercept data before it is encrypted.
86 As a result, data should always be transmitted through secure channels such as
SSH, SSL, and IPSec.
Propagation mechanisms
Worms and viruses use various means to transfer themselves, or propagate, from one computer to another. These means are collectively referred to as propagation mechanisms. This section will assess some of the propagation mechanisms used by malicious code samples that were reported to Symantec in the first half of 2007. It will assess these samples according to the percentage of potential infections caused by each sample. Readers should note that some malicious code samples use more than one mechanism to propagate. As a result, cumulative percentages presented in this discussion may exceed 100 percent.
Due to some methodological changes that Symantec made for this reporting period, this volume of the
Government Internet Security Threat Report is able to examine propagation mechanisms with increased
specificity. For example, where possible, the specific peer-to-peer (P2P) protocols employed as propagation mechanisms have been identified. This will allow administrators to look at more specific port blocking and protocol filtering based upon the specific propagation mechanisms being discussed. It is also important to note that, due to this change, any comparisons to previous reporting periods would not be valid; therefore, they have not been presented here.
In the second half of 2007, 46 percent of malicious code that propagated did so in email attachments
(table 10). This is not surprising, given the pervasive use of email. However, as noted in the “Top ten new malicious code families” section of the current Internet Security Threat Report (Volume XII), malicious
code authors seem to be diversifying their propagation mechanisms by combining worms with a viral file-infection component.
To limit the propagation of email-borne threats, administrators should ensure that all email attachments
are scanned at the gateway. Additionally, all executable files originating from external sources, such as email attachments or downloaded from Web sites, should be treated as suspicious. All executable files should be checked by antivirus scanners using the most current definitions.
86 A man-in-the-middle attack is a form of attack in which a third party intercepts communications between two computers. The “m an in the middle” captures the
data but still relays it to the intended destination to avoid detection. This can allow the attacker to intercept communication s on a secure or encrypted channel.
50Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
51Rank
1
234567
8
9
10Propagation Mechanism
File Transfer/Email Attachment
File Transfer/CIFSFile Sharing/Peer-to-PeerFile Sharing/ExecutablesFile Sharing/Peer-to-Peer/KazaaRemotely Exploitable VulnerabilityFile Sharing/Peer-to-Peer/Morpheus
File Sharing/Peer-to-Peer/eDonkey
File Sharing/Peer-to-Peer/Winny
Backdoor/Kuang2Percentage
of Threats
46%
24%22%22%18%18%15%
15%
5%
3%
Table 10. Propagation mechanisms
Source: Symantec Corporation
Of the malicious code that propagated during the first half of 2007, 24 percent did so by the Common
Internet File Sharing (CIFS) protocol.87 Malicious code samples such as Fujacks.E88 and variants of the
Looked89 family both propagated in significant numbers this period by copying themselves to CIFS shares
with weak password protection. Both of these worms also contain a viral component to infect portable executable files. Since they try to infect files on both local and mapped network drives, they effectively use this propagation mechanism multiple times.
This propagation mechanism can be threatening to organizations because file servers use CIFS to give
users access to their file shares. If a computer with access to a file server becomes infected by a threat that propagates through CIFS, it could spread to the file server. Since multiple computers within a corporation likely access the same file server, this could facilitate the rapid propagation of the threat within the enterprise.
To protect against threats that use the CIFS protocol to propagate, all network shares should be protected
with strong passwords, and only users who require the resources should be given access to them. If other users do not need to write to a share, they should only be given “read” permissions. This will prevent malicious code from copying itself to the shared directory or modifying shared files. Finally, CIFS shares should not be exposed to the Internet. Blocking TCP port 445 at the network boundary will help to protect against threats that propagate using CIFS.
Malicious code using peer-to-peer (P2P) protocols to propagate accounted for 22 percent of all potential
infections this period. These samples typically do not attempt to use a specific P2P protocol to propagate; rather they copy themselves to all folders on the compromised computer that contains the character string “shar”. P2P applications commonly create folders containing the word “share”—such as “shared folder”—so these malicious code samples will successfully propagate through many of them.
87 CIFS is a file-sharing protocol that allows files and other resources on a computer to be shared with other computers across the Internet. One or more directories
on a computer can be shared to allow other computers to access the files within.
88 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-010509-0134-99
89 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-121709-0657-99Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Four specific P2P protocols were commonly used by malicious code to propagate during the first six
months of 2007. The Kazaa file-sharing service was used by 18 percent of malicious code samples that propagated, while Morpheus and eDonkey were each used by 15 percent. Finally, the Winny protocol was used by five percent of propagating malicious code this period.
Since P2P applications are typically not permitted on corporate networks, any P2P clients are likely
installed without the knowledge or consent of network administrators. Enterprises should take measures to prevent P2P clients from being installed on any computers on the network. They should also block any ports used by these applications at the network boundary. End users who download files from P2P networks should scan all such files with a regularly updated antivirus product.
Computers with multiple infections by country
For the first time, in this volume of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is assessing the number
of times potential malicious code infections are reported from the same computer. This is done using data gathered by proprietary Symantec technologies. While many users may only experience one or two malicious code instances on their computers, some may become infected frequently within a single six-month period. Multiple infections may be due to a lack of knowledge on the user’s part or out-of-date antivirus definitions. In some cases, multiple infections may also indicate that the computer was infected by a staged downloader, which is discussed in further detail in the “Staged downloaders—multiple infections by type” section of the current Symantec Internet Security Threat Report .
In the current period, the United States was the country with the highest number of multiple infections in
the world (table 11). The United States has the highest number of broadband Internet users in the world.
90
Countries with high numbers of online users will likely experience the most potential infections. Since many new malicious code threats download additional components, it stands to reason that computers infected with those threats will also experience the highest number of multiple infections as well. These staged downloaders are mainly Trojans that are installed by malicious Web pages when a user views the page with a vulnerable browser. The initial Trojan usually disables security applications on the computer and downloads and installs additional threats.
Rank
1
234567
8
9
10Region
North America
APJAPJEMEANorth AmericaEMEAEMEA
EMEA
EMEA
EMEACountry
United States
ChinaJapanUnited KingdomCanadaIndiaItaly
France
Spain
Germany
Table 11. Computers with multiple infections by country
Source: Symantec Corporation
5290 http://www.point-topic.comSymantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
5391 http://www.point-topic.comChina had the second highest number of multiple infections in the current period. China has the second
highest number of broadband users and also experienced 24 percent growth in new broadband users in the first half of 2007.
91 With so many new users coming online at such a high rate, it is likely that many of
them are unaware of the threats they may encounter.
There appears to have been an increase in regionalized threats during this period. For example, many of
the threats observed in China were Trojans designed to steal online gaming account information, while others appear to specifically target Chinese users. These Trojans are usually downloaded onto a computer as the second stage of a multistaged threat, which explains a large bulk of the multiple infections there.
The country experiencing the third highest number of multiple infections in the first half of 2007 was
Japan. Japan is also the country with the third highest number of broadband users. This likely indicates that multistaged threats are more successful at installing their secondary components on broadband computers. Because computers with broadband Internet connections are almost always online when the computer is turned on, it allows the Trojan a greater opportunity to download its additional components, particularly if it only performs the downloads at specific times.
Users who experience multiple infections increase their likelihood of suffering serious consequences.
Each time they are infected, they risk the theft of confidential information or loss of data. While a user may discover the first infection before the malicious code is able to send personal information back to the attacker, they might not be as fortunate with subsequent infections. For example, in the case of a staged downloader, the first infection may disable the security applications on a compromised computer, while the second infection contains a keystroke logger or some other remote access threat.
Geolocation by type
For the first time, in this edition of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is examining the top
regions reporting potential malicious code infections, as well as the types of malicious code causing potential infections in each region. The increasing regionalization of threats can cause differences between the types of malicious code being observed from one area to the next. For example, threats may use certain languages or localized events as part of their social engineering techniques. Threats that steal confidential information can also be tailored to steal information that is more common in some countries than in others. For example, Trojans that steal account information for Brazilian banks are quite common in the Latin America region, while malicious code that steals online gaming account information is most frequently observed in the APJ region. Because of the different propagation mechanisms used by different malicious code types, and the different effects that each malicious code type may have, the geographic distribution of malicious code can illustrate how network administrators in different regions can best direct their security efforts.
Between January and June of 2007, 44 percent of Trojans were reported from North America, while
37 percent were reported from the EMEA region (figure 17). This is significantly higher than the 15 percent reported from the APJ region and the four percent from Latin America.Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
54Percentage of malicious code types
Trojan
Back door4%
Worm
Virus37%44%15%5%29%
43%23%
6%
45%22%27%5%22%
40%33%EMEA
North America
APJ
Latin America
Figure 17. Location of malicious code by type
Source: Symantec Corporation
The concentration of Trojans in North America may be indicative of enterprises and ISPs taking more active
steps to prevent the propagation of worms. Such steps include more aggressive blocking and filtering of email attachments at the email gateway to prevent the propagation of mass-mailing worms, and port blocking to prevent the spread of network worms. The prevalence of Trojans in North America could be reflective of the resultant drop in network worms in the region. On the other hand, it could reflect a conscious decision by attackers to move towards Trojans in reaction to the success of tactics that have successfully thwarted worm attacks.
As discussed in the “Malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities” section in the current Internet Security
Threat Report , many Trojans are now being installed by Web pages that exploit vulnerabilities. This
indicates that users and enterprises in regions with higher Trojan concentrations should ensure that their Web browsers, as well as related components and plug-ins, are patched for any potential vulnerabilities.
During this period, EMEA accounted for 43 percent of global potential infections caused by worms.
This was followed by the APJ region, which accounted for 29 percent of potential worm infections. North America only accounted for 23 percent of reported worms this period. This may indicate that North American ISPs are implementing more rigid port blocking to limit the spread of network worms, as well as deploying antivirus filtering at the email gateway to limit mass-mailing worms.
Some worms use region-specific subject lines and text in their email messages. For example, the Rontokbro
worm’s email messages are in Indonesian.
92 However, this worm was seen more in India than in any other
country. There is a great deal of commerce between India and Indonesia,93 which means that it is likely Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
5592 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-092311-2608-99
93 http://www.hindu.com/2005/11/24/stories/2005112405871200.htm
94 Ingress traffic refers to traffic that is coming into a network from the Internet or another network. Egress traffic refers t o traffic that is leaving a network, bound for
the Internet or another network.that many enterprise users in Indonesia communicate with counterparts in India by email. Since Rontokbro
sends its email messages to all the addresses it gathers from files on a compromised computer, it stands to reason that this worm was sent to many Indian users from business contacts in Indonesia. Rontokbro was also one of the top ten malicious code samples resulting in potential infections in the EMEA region.
The EMEA region accounted for the highest percentage of viruses this period, with 45 percent of the total.
The APJ and North America regions accounted for 27 and 22 percent of viruses respectively, while Latin America only accounted for six percent.
As is noted in the “Malicious code types” section of the current Internet Security Threat Report , many
worms are incorporating a viral component that causes them to be classified as both worms and viruses. Many of the worms causing potential infections in EMEA also employ a viral component, which explains why this region accounts for the greatest percentage of viruses and worms this period.
Potential infections caused by back doors were most frequently reported from the EMEA region, which
accounted for 40 percent of all back doors worldwide. North America accounted for 33 percent of potential back door infections in the first half of 2007, while APJ accounted for 22 percent and Latin America accounted for five percent. It is important to note that while the regional percentages of potential back door infections show a fairly wide variance during this period, the worldwide volume of back door threats this period was significantly lower than Trojans and worms. As a result, the percentage variance between regions actually represents a much smaller difference in raw numbers than the percentage differences between worms and Trojans.
Malicious code—prevention and mitigation
Symantec recommends that certain best security practices always be followed to protect against malicious code infection. Administrators should keep patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host public services and applications—such as HTTP, FTP, SMTP, and DNS servers—and are accessible through a firewall or placed in a DMZ. Email servers should be configured to only allow file attachment types that are required for business needs and to block email that appears to come from within the company but that actually originates from external sources. Additionally, Symantec recommends that ingress and egress filtering be put in place on perimeter devices to prevent unwanted activity.
94
To protect against malicious code that installs itself through a Web browser, additional measures should be
taken. The use of IPS technologies can prevent exploitation of browser and plug-in vulnerabilities through signatures and behavior-based detection in addition to ASLR.
End users should employ defense-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software and
a personal firewall. Users should update antivirus definitions regularly. They should also ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their software vendors. They should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless it is expected and comes from a trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known. Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
56Phishing Trends
Phishing is an attempt by a third party to solicit confidential information from an individual, group,
or organization, usually for financial gain. Phishers are groups or individuals who attempt to trick users into disclosing personal data, such as credit card numbers, online banking credentials, and other sensitive information. They may then use the information to commit fraudulent acts. This section of the Government
Internet Security Threat Report will discuss phishing activity that Symantec detected in the first half
of 2007.
The data provided in this section is based on statistics derived from the Symantec Probe Network, which
consists of over two million decoy email accounts that attract email messages from 20 different countries around the world. The main purpose of the network is to attract spam, phishing, viruses, and other email-borne threats. It encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises around the world, attracting email that is representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 million mailboxes. The Probe Network consists of previously used email addresses as well as email accounts that have been generated solely to be used as probes.
In addition to the Probe Network, Symantec also gathers phishing information through the Symantec Phish
Report Network, an extensive antifraud community of organizations and end users. Members of the Phish Report Network contribute and receive fraudulent Web site addresses for alerting and filtering across a broad range of solutions.
Phishing is assessed according to two indicators: phishing messages and phishing attempts. A phishing
message is a single, unique message that is sent to targets with the intent of gaining confidential and/or personal information from computer users. Each phishing message has different content, and each one will represent a different way of trying to fool a user into disclosing information. A phishing message can be considered the “lure” with which a phisher attempts to entice a phishing target to disclose confidential information.
A single phishing message can be used in numerous distinct phishing attempts, usually targeting different
end users. A phishing attempt can be defined as an instance of a phishing message being sent to a single user. Extending the fishing analogy, a phishing attempt can be considered a single cast of the lure (the phishing message) to try to ensnare a target.
This section of the Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report will discuss the following:
• Phishing activity by sector
• Top countries hosting phishing Web sites• Government servers hosting Web sites• Phishing—protection and mitigationSymantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Phishing activity by sector
This metric will assess phishing activity by sector. It will do this in two ways. First, it will identify the
sectors in which the organizations that were most commonly phished belong. This means that the organization’s brand was used in phishing attacks. Second, it will assess which sectors were targeted by the highest volume of phishing attacks. These considerations are important for enterprises because the use of an organization’s brand in phishing activity can have significant negative consequences. It can undermine consumer confidence and damage the organization’s reputation. Furthermore, the company may be required to compensate victims of any phishing scams that use the company’s brand.
Most of the organizations whose brands were used in phishing attacks in the first six months of 2007 were
part of the financial services sector. Organizations in that sector accounted for 79 percent of the brands that were used for phishing during this period (figure 18), compared to the previous period when they accounted for 84 percent. The financial services sector also accounted for the highest volume of phishing Web sites during this period, making up 72 percent of all phishing Web sites reported to Symantec (figure 19). Financial services made up 64 percent of all phishing Web sites in the last half of 2006.
Most phishing activity is conducted for financial gain. A successful phishing attack that mimics the brand
of a financial entity is most likely to yield data that can be used for immediate financial gain. It is therefore logical that phishing attacks focus on brands within the financial services sector.
Non-profit <1%Government 1%
Software 1%1%1%
Other 2%<1%
Financial 79%Retail 3%
ISP 11% Internet
community 2%
Hardware 1%Insurance 2%
Figure 18. Brands phished by sector
Source: Symantec Corporation
57Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
58 95 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume XI (March 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xi_03_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 69
96 http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2006/proceedings/p44_gaw.pdf
97 For a more detailed discussion of search engine rankings, see the “Malicious Code Trends” section of this report.Organizations in the Internet service provider (ISP) sector made up 11 percent of the unique brands used
in phishing attacks during this period, making it the second ranked sector. This is an increase over the seven percent of phishing attacks that spoofed ISP brands in the second half of 2006. As noted in the previous edition of the Internet Security Threat Report , ISP accounts can be valuable targets for phishers.
95
People frequently use the same authentication credentials (such as usernames and passwords) for multiple accounts, including their email accounts.
96 Thus, information gleaned through phishing attacks
may provide access to other accounts, such as online banking. Additionally, attackers could use the free Web-hosting space that is often provided with these accounts to host phishing Web sites, or they could use the accompanying email accounts to send spam or launch further phishing attacks. In some cases, compromised ISP Web-hosting can be used to plant links to other Web sites that the attacker controls in order to boost the rating of the Web site in search engines.
97 Email account passwords were the third
most common item advertised for sale on underground economy servers this period, as described in the “Underground economy servers” discussion in the “Attack Trends” section of the current Internet Security
Threat Report .
Other <1%
Financial 72%Retail 16%ISP 3%
Internet
community 9%
Figure 19. Phished sectors by volume
Source: Symantec Corporation
The retail services sector only accounted for three percent of organizations whose brands were spoofed in
phishing activity in the first half of 2007; however, it accounted for 16 percent of the volume of phishing Web sites. In the previous reporting period, the retail sector accounted for five percent of the unique brands spoofed and 34 percent of phishing Web sites. Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
59 98 Please see http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/03/ebay_motor_scam_update.html and
http://redtape.msnbc.com/2007/03/how_far_has_vla.html, respectively, for more in-depth discussions.
99 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2006/11/an_imaginative_phishing_attack_1.html
100 http://blog.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2007/06/web_2pointuhoh_worm_whacks_mys.html
101 For more on phishing attacks that target social networking sites, please see:
http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2006/09/contextaware_phishing_realized.htmlThe disproportionate number of phishing Web sites in the retail services sector indicates that a small
number of retail brands were being heavily phished. This is illustrated by the fact that a large volume of phishing attacks were reported that attempted to spoof the eBay brand. This is not surprising, as an attacker can use a user’s eBay account credentials in various ways. First, many eBay accounts are linked to the user’s PayPal account. As users often use the same passwords for these accounts, compromising one could give an attacker access to both, which would allow the attacker to transfer funds to him- or herself. Additionally, the attacker could use the account to buy goods from other users and default on the transaction, sell items that do not exist, or even use the account to sell stolen goods or goods purchased from an online retailer using a hijacked account or stolen credit card.
While the retail services sector made up 16 percent of phishing Web sites, this is a significant decrease
from the 34 percent reported in the previous six-month period. This is mainly due to a significant rise in the volume of phishing sites targeting the financial sector. Attackers have also started exploring other means of perpetrating fraud upon customers of retail organizations such as eBay. For instance, some Trojans and other attacks
98 can also facilitate identity theft.
Eight of the top ten brands spoofed by attackers in phishing attacks during this period were in the financial
sector. Interestingly, one of the most frequently spoofed brands this period was an Internet community. While there is no immediate financial gain to be obtained by attackers who steal a user’s account information, it may provide other returns. The attacker could use the account to gather information from the hijacked account’s friends, such as email addresses, by sending messages that appear to come from the legitimate user, who would likely be implicitly trusted by the message recipient.
99 Additionally, the
attacker can send messages containing links to Web sites that are designed to download malicious code on visitors’ computers.
100 Since the link comes from a user’s friend, they may be more likely to trust the
link and visit the site.101
Top countries hosting phishing Web sites
A phishing Web site is a site that is designed to mimic the legitimate Web site of the organization whose brand is being spoofed, often an online bank or e-commerce retailer. In many cases, it is set up by the attacker to capture a victim’s authentication information or other personal identification information, which can subsequently be used in identity theft or other fraudulent activity.
This metric will assess the countries in which the most phishing Web sites were hosted in the first six
months of 2007. In this case, Symantec counts phishing Web sites as the number of unique IP addresses hosting Web pages used for phishing. This data is a snapshot in time, and does not offer insight into changes in the locations of certain phishing sites over the course of the reporting period. It should also be noted that the fact that a phishing Web site is hosted in a certain country does not necessarily mean that the attacker is located in that country. Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
60In the first half of 2007, 59 percent of all known phishing Web sites were located in the United States
(table 12), a considerable increase over the previous period when 46 percent of phishing Web sites were located there. The United States is home to a large number of Web-hosting providers, including over 30 percent of registered domains.
102 It is also home to the highest number of Internet users in the world.103
The increase in phishing Web sites located there during this reporting period is likely related to the high number of Trojans reported from North America this period, as is discussed in the “Malicious Code Trends” section of this report. Trojans are frequently used for hosting Web sites used in phishing attacks.
Rank
1
234567
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
23
1011
47
5
8
6Country
United States
GermanyUnited KingdomNetherlandsRussiaFranceCanada
Japan
China
TaiwanPrevious
Percentage
46%
11%
3%2%2%3%2%
3%
2%
3%Current
Percentage
59%
6%3%2%2%2%2%
2%
1%
1%
Table 12. Top countries hosting phishing Web sites
Source: Symantec Corporation
Germany was once again the location of the second highest percentage of phishing Web sites this period,
with six percent of the worldwide total. This is, however, a decrease from the last six months of 2006 when 11 percent of phishing Web sites were located there. Variations in percentages between periods are likely a result of the opportunistic nature of attackers. Attackers are most likely to host phishing Web sites on any computer they are able to compromise. In many cases, attackers host their phishing Web sites on a computer that was compromised by a bot. Because bots compromise any computer that is vulnerable to the exploits they use to propagate, there is little control on the part of the attacker as to the physical location of computers in their bot network.
The United Kingdom hosted the third highest number of phishing Web sites this period. It held steady at
the three percent of worldwide phishing Web sites reported in the previous period. The percentage of bots in the United Kingdom has been dropping in recent periods; however, it is the top country reporting potential malicious code infections in the EMEA region. This may indicate that attackers are using bots less frequently in phishing attacks and are instead using other malicious code to host phishing Web sites.
102 http://www.webhosting.info/webhosts/tophosts/global/
103 http://www.pewinternet.org/PPF/r/218/report_display.aspSymantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
61Government servers hosting phishing sites
For the first time, in this report, Symantec is examining government servers that were reported to be
hosting phishing Web sites. These are domains that are registered to government entities that were most likely compromised and used to host phishing sites. In addition to hosting the phishing Web site, the compromised server may contain confidential or sensitive information that the attackers could potentially access.
During the first six months of 2007, domains registered to the government of Thailand were used in
16 percent of phishing URLs hosted on government servers (table 13). At the same time, 23 percent of the unique government domains used to host phishing sites were located in Thailand (table 14). This indicates that Thai government servers were each used to host only a few phishing Web sites. The relatively high number of Thai government domains used in phishing attacks could mean that many of the domains are hosted on a small number of servers. In such a case, compromising a single server hosting multiple domains would give the attacker access to each hosted site.
Country
Thailand
ArgentinaUnited StatesBrazilColombiaIndonesiaEcuadorPhilippinesTurkeyParaguayRank
1
23456789
10Percentage of Phishing URLs
on Government Servers
16%
11%10%
8%8%8%8%5%5%3%
Table 13. Top government domains used in phishing URLs
Source: Symantec Corporation
Domains registered to the government of Argentina were used in the second most phishing URLs this
period, 11 percent. They also hosted eight percent of the unique government domains hosting phishing Web sites this period. As was the case with Thailand, domains of the government of Argentina appear to only have been used to host a few phishing sites each. This indicates that the phishing attacks hosted on Argentinean domains were likely not as sophisticated as attacks that use phishing toolkits, which generally host many phishing sites on a single domain or server.
104
104 A phishing toolkit is a set of scripts that allows an attacker to automatically set up phishing Web sites that spoof the legi timate Web sites of different brands,
including the images and logos associated with those brands. The scripts also help to generate corresponding phishing email mes sages.Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Country
Thailand
IndonesiaArgentinaBrazilColombiaEcuadorChinaPalestinian TerritoryPhilippinesTurkeyRank
1
23456789
10Percentage of Government
Phishing Sites
23%
12%
8%8%7%6%5%4%4%4%
Table 14. Top government domains hosting unique phishing Web sites
Source: Symantec Corporation
United States government domains were used in 10 percent of phishing URLs hosted on government
servers. However, this was the result of a single government server that was compromised to host multiple phishing Web sites. A large number of phishing URLs were used for the same phishing site, so it is likely that a phishing kit was installed on the server. All of the phishing messages containing URLs pointing to this domain were observed in a short time span, so it is likely that the phishing site was detected soon after these messages were sent, and was subsequently removed.
Phishing—prevention and mitigation
Symantec recommends that enterprise users protect themselves against phishing threats by filtering email at the server level through the mail transfer agent (MTA). Although this will likely remain the primary point of filtering for phishing, organizations can also use IP-based filtering upstream, as well as HTTP filtering.
DNS block lists also offer protection against potential phishing emails.
105 Organizations could also consider
using domain-level or email authentication in order to verify the actual origin of an email message. This can protect against phishers who are spoofing email domains.
106
To protect against potential phishing activity, administrators should always follow Symantec best practices
as outlined in Appendix A of this report. Symantec also recommends that organizations educate their end users about phishing.
107 They should also keep their employees notified of the latest phishing attacks and
how to avoid falling victim to them as well as provide a means to report suspected phishing sites.108
Organizations can also employ Web server log monitoring to track if and when complete downloads of their
Web sites or logos and other images are occurring. Such activity may indicate that someone is using the legitimate Web site to create an illegitimate Web site that could be used for phishing.
62 105 A DNS block list (sometimes referred to as a black list) is simply a list of IP addresses that are known to send unwanted ema il traffic. It is used by email
software to either allow or reject email coming from IP addresses on the list.
106 Spoofing refers to instances where phishers forge the “From:” line of an email message using the domain of the entity they ar e targeting with the phishing
attempt.
107 For instance, the United States Federal Trade Commission has published some basic guidelines on how to avoid phishing. They a re available at:
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/alt127.htm
108 A good resource for information on the latest phishing threats can be found at: http://www.antiphishing.orgSymantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
63 109 The term cousin domains refers to domain names that include some of the key words of an organization’s domain or brand name; for example, for the corporate
domain “bigbank.com” cousin domains could include “bigbank-alerts.com,” ”big-bank-security.com,” and so on.
110 Typo domains are domain names that use common misspellings of a legitimate domain name, for example the domain symatnec.com wou ld be a typo domain
for symantec.com. A homographic domain name uses numbers that look similar to letters in the domain name, for example the chara cter for the number “1”
can look like the letter “l.”
111 http://www.fbi.gov/majcases/fraud/internetschemes.htmOrganizations can detect phishing attacks that use spoofing by monitoring non-deliverable email addresses
or bounced email that is returned to non-existent users. They should also monitor the purchasing of cousin domain names by other entities to identify purchases that could be used to spoof their corporate domains.
109
So-called typo domains and homographic domains should also be monitored.110 This can be done with the
help of companies that specialize in domain monitoring; some registrars also provide this service.
The use of antiphishing toolbars and components in Web browsers can also help protect users from
phishing attacks. These measures notify the user if a Web page being visited does not appear to be legitimate. This way, even if a phishing email reaches a user’s inbox, the user can still be alerted to the potential threat.
End users should follow best security practices, as outlined in Appendix A of this report. They should
deploy an antiphishing solution. As some phishing attacks may use spyware and/or keystroke loggers, Symantec advises end users to use antivirus software, antispam software, firewalls, toolbar blockers, and other software detection methods. Symantec also advises end users to never disclose any confidential personal or financial information unless and until they can confirm that any request for such information is legitimate.
Users should review bank, credit card, and credit information frequently. This can provide information on any
irregular activities. For further information, the Internet Fraud Complaint Center (IFCC) has also released a set of guidelines on how to avoid Internet-related scams.
111 Additionally, network administrators can review
Web proxy logs to determine if any users have visited known phishing sites. Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
64Spam Trends
Spam is usually defined as junk or unsolicited email sent by a third party. While it is certainly an
annoyance to users and administrators, spam is also a serious security concern as it can be used to deliver Trojans, viruses, and phishing attempts. It could also cause a loss of service or degradation in the performance of network resources and email gateways. This section of the Government Internet Security
Threat Report will discuss recent developments in spam.
The data used in this analysis is based on data returned from the Symantec Probe Network as well as data
gathered from a statistical sampling of the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam™ customer base. Specifically, statistics are gathered from enterprise customers’ Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam servers that receive more than 1,000 email messages per day. This removes the smaller data samples (that is, smaller customers and test servers), thereby allowing for a more accurate representation of data.
The Symantec Probe Network consists of millions of decoy email addresses that are configured to attract
a large stream of spam attacks. An attack can consist of one or more messages. The goal of the Probe Network is to simulate a wide variety of Internet email users, thereby attracting a stream of traffic that is representative of spam activity across the Internet as a whole. For this reason, the Probe Network is continuously optimized in order to attract new varieties of spam attacks. This is accomplished through internal production changes that are made to the network, which thus affect the number of new spam attacks it receives as a whole.
This section of the Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report will discuss the selected
legislative approaches to combating spam. In recent years, many countries have adopted specific antispam legislation in order to provide governments with the ability to prosecute spammers. This section will examine the approaches taken by several countries and assess their effectiveness in limiting spam. Before entering into too much detail on the specific legislation enacted, we will identify the key points that spam laws often address.
1. Consent: The type of consent that must be given by an email recipient in order to receive electronic
messages from a given sender. Common examples of this include: opt-in, according to which the receiver must explicitly request that the messages be sent; and opt-out, according to which the sender must provide the receiver with adequate and effective means to request that no more messages are sent.
2. Misleading information: In which the sender provides a false return address or falsifies the origin
of the message.
3. Content Identification: Some laws require that email that has commercial or sexual content be labeled
as such by including a specified phrase, or tag, into the header.
4. Scope: The extent to which the law applies. Some laws only apply to spam sent from within the country
and some apply much more broadly.
The approaches taken by recently enacted antispam laws in Singapore, New Zealand, and Switzerland are
examined below. Each of these discussions will include a graph outlining the percentage of spam detected in each country from July 2006 through June 2007. Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Singapore—Spam Control Act
The Spam Control Act is intended to provide a legal framework to help combat spam in Singapore.113
The key points addressed by this act are:
• Consent
– Recipients have the right to opt-out of further commercial email.– The sender must use approved methods to obtain a recipient’s email address.
• Misleading information
– Headers and subject descriptions should be accurate.– The email must include an accurate and functional email address or telephone number by which
the sender can be readily contacted.
• Content identification
– The letters “<ADV>” with a space before the title must be included in the subject field or at the
beginning of the message if there is no subject header.
• Scope
– The law only applies to electronic messages that originate in Singapore, are received in Singapore,
or are accessed by methods that are based in Singapore.
Civil action can be taken under this act against the sender of bulk unsolicited email that does not meet the
requirements of this law. Statutory damages under the law are set at 25 Singapore dollars per message up to a maximum of one million Singapore dollars. Additionally, the plaintiff is entitled to damages equal to the amount of their loss and the cost of their legal fees.
This law was put into effect on June 15, 2007. Laws such as this one are often criticized because they
require an opt-out method of consent, instead of an opt-in method. Under this type of law, users will receive unsolicited messages until they explicitly state a desire not to. Spammers often implement a fake opt-out mechanism in order to verify whether or not a given email address is active. Although the fake opt-out mechanism is now illegal in Singapore, this trick is still widely used in spam from around the world.
Once an email account is verified as active, it becomes a valuable commodity and is often sold to other
spammers, after which the address will likely receive even more spam. This illustrates the problem associated with relying on opt-out methods. Since the process is not standardized and not accountable, users do not know whether they can trust the opt-out mechanism or if opting out will, in fact, result in the receipt of more unsolicited email messages.
65
113 http://www.parliament.gov.sg/Publications/070006.pdfSymantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
MonthPercentage of spam messages
Sep Nov Jan Mar0%20%40%60%
10%30%50%70%
May Jul Oct Dec Feb Apr Aug Jun63%63%66%
62%60% 61%
55%
52%
49%
38%42%48%
Figure 20. Spam as a percentage of all email from Singapore
Source: Symantec Corporation
Figure 20 shows the percentage of mail sent from Singapore from July 2006 through June 2007 that
Symantec identified as spam, as well as the corresponding spam activity on, or around, the dates of these events. Interestingly, it seems the spam law in Singapore was introduced just when it was needed. The percentage of spam email originating in Singapore had been steadily increasing from a low point in September 2006 to the introduction of the law in June 2007. Unfortunately, the cut-off point for the collection of spam data was June 30, 2007, so it is impossible to gauge the effectiveness of the law in this report. If this law is effective, there should be a decrease in the level of spam originating in Singapore in the next period.
66Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
New Zealand—Unsolicited Electronic Messages Act
The Unsolicited Electronic Messages Act makes it illegal to send unsolicited commercial email messages
without express, inferred, or deemed consent.113 Inferred consent means consent that may reasonably
be inferred from the conduct and the business or family relationships of the recipient individual or organization. Someone is said to have given deemed consent if their email address was posted online without an express “do not email” notice. The sender of the message and anybody knowingly concerned in a violation is liable under this act. The key points addressed in this act are:
• Consent
– Senders need express, inferred, or deemed consent.– Every message requires a functional opt-out mechanism.
• Misleading information
– Accurate information about the individual or organization that authorized the sending of the
message is required.
• Content identification
– No content identification is required.
• Scope
– The law only applies to electronic messages that originate in New Zealand, are received in New
Zealand, or are accessed by a method that is based in New Zealand.
The maximum fine for individuals is $200,000 NZD for individuals and $500,000 NZD for organizations.
The law can also be used as a basis for civil actions. This law is very similar to Australia’s spam law, which was introduced in 2003. The Australian law was initially well received because of its opt-in approach to consent, placing the choice to receive commercial messages on the recipient. Some criticisms of this law have arisen because there have been very few convictions under the Australian law and it has not had its full intended effect. The particulars of this law were examined in the previous Symantec Government
Internet Security Threat Report .
114
The New Zealand law mirrors the Australian law with the crucial difference in that it extends the definition
of consent to include “deemed consent.” This type of consent is considered to be given if a person makes a work-related email address available on a publicly accessible site, such as on a Web site, without the inclusion of a disclaimer that states that the individual does not wish to receive unsolicited email at that address.
115 Allowing this type of consent weakens the spam law considerably because posting an email
address on a Web site is common practice of many people who do not necessarily want to receive spam, but are unaware of the necessity of posting the disclaimer.
67113 http://www.parliament.nz/NR/rdonlyres/69F835AC-2468-40F8-94E4-240800EE762F/51659/DBHOH_BILL_6896_353991.pdf
114 Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report (March 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xi_govt_03_2007.en-us. pdf : p. 61
115 http://www.netconcepts.com/nz-anti-spam-act/Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
The spam law was passed in February 2007, but was not scheduled to come into effect until September
2007. Figure 21 shows the percentage of mail being sent from New Zealand that Symantec identified as spam from July 2006 to June 2007. Spam levels were between 50 and 60 percent from July through October 2006, when they started declining to around 25 to 35 percent range for the first half of 2007. This gives New Zealand the lowest spam percentage among countries in the APJ region.
MonthPercentage of spam messages
Sep Nov Jan Mar0%20%40%60%
10%30%50%70%
May Jul Oct Dec Feb Apr Aug Jun28%27%32%35%33%32% 32%42%59%60%
55%54%
Figure 21. Spam as a percentage of all email from New Zealand
Source: Symantec Corporation
Although the spam law is not yet enforced, spam from New Zealand has already decreased dramatically
since the third quarter of 2006. It is possible that this can be attributed to spammers from New Zealand using spam zombies in other countries to send their spam in anticipation of the new legislation. A more likely explanation is that ISPs in New Zealand have decided to implement new security measures in an effort to reduce spam. In June 2007, The Internet Society of New Zealand,
116 the group that oversees the
Internet in that country, proposed a code of conduct for ISPs to help them deal with issues related to spam.
117 Many ISPs have already implemented some of the suggestions.
68116 http://www.internetnz.net.nz/
117 http://www.nbr.co.nz/home/column_article.asp?id=18282&cid=3&cname=TechnologySymantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Switzerland—amendment of the anti-competition law
The new amendment of the Swiss anti-competition law includes the first set of spam-specific laws in
Switzerland.118 The new laws provide a legal framework for reducing the levels of spam originating in
Switzerland. This amendment prohibits the use of computers to send unauthorized bulk emails. The main provisions of these measures are:
• Consent
– The sender requires prior consent to send email.– The receiver must be given a valid opt-out mechanism.
• Misleading information
– The sender must be accurately identified in messages.– The physical address of the sender must be included.
• Content identification
– None
• Scope
– This law only applies to spam that was sent from Switzerland to recipients in Switzerland.
The maximum fine for sending spam under these measures is 100,000 Swiss francs. In addition, Switzerland
imposes some strict regulations on ISPs. If a case of spam is reported to an ISP, they must attempt to identify the perpetrator and notify law enforcement. Furthermore, owners of computers that have been used as spam zombies will be held responsible for the spam that is sent through their computers. In the first half of 2006, 54,146 spam zombies were detected in Switzerland, making up just over one percent of the spam zombies in the EMEA region.
One criticism of the law is its limited scope, as it applies only to spam sent from within Switzerland to other
computers in Switzerland. The amount of spam sent within Switzerland is a small percentage of the total sent from Switzerland. Even if all the spam of this type were eliminated, the effect on global levels of spam will likely be minimal.
69
118 http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/ff/2003/7245.pdf, p7285 and http://www.admin.ch/ch/f/rs/2/241.fr.pdfSymantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
70MonthPercentage of spam messages
Sep Nov Jan Mar0%20%40%60%
10%30%50%80%
May Jul Oct Dec Feb Apr Aug Jun60%62%67%
62%67%70%68%
64%
51%
46%44% 44%70%
Figure 22. Spam as a percentage of all email from Switzerland
Source: Symantec Corporation
These measures went into effect in April 2007. Figure 22 shows the percentage of mail that was sent from
Switzerland that Symantec identified as spam from July 2006 to June 2007 (it should be noted that this data is not restricted to spam that was sent to targets within Switzerland). In the last half of 2006, spam from Switzerland accounted for 56 percent of all email from that country, compared to 66 percent in the first half of 2007. The levels of spam increased from the middle of 2006 to around the time the law came into effect but began falling slightly in the month after the introduction of the law. It is too soon to tell if this decrease in spam is related to the introduction of the legislative measures taken or just a natural fluctuation in the levels of spam. However, as there isn’t anything in the law to prevent Swiss spammers from spamming people in other countries, it may not lead to a noticeable decrease in the amount of spam originating there.Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices
Enterprise Best Practices
1. Employ defense-in-depth strategies, which emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive
defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protection method. This should include the deployment of regularly updated antivirus, firewalls, intrusion detection, and intrusion protection systems on client systems.
2. Turn off and remove services that are not needed.3. If malicious code, or some other threat, exploits one or more network services, disable or block access
to those services until a patch is applied.
4. Always keep patch levels up-to-date, especially on computers that host public services and are
accessible through the firewall, such as HTTP, FTP, mail, and DNS services.
5. Consider implementing network compliance solutions that will help keep infected mobile users out
of the network (and disinfect them before rejoining the network).
6. Enforce an effective password policy.7. Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments that are commonly
used to spread viruses, such as .VBS, .BAT, .EXE, .PIF, and .SCR files.
8. Isolate infected computers quickly to prevent the risk of further infection within the organization.
Perform a forensic analysis and restore the computers using trusted media.
9. Train employees to not open attachments unless they are expected and come from a known and trusted
source, and to not execute software that is downloaded from the Internet unless it has been scanned for viruses.
10. Ensure that emergency response procedures are in place. This includes having a backup-and-restore
solution in place in order to restore lost or compromised data in the event of successful attack or catastrophic data loss.
11. Educate management on security budgeting needs.12. Test security to ensure that adequate controls are in place.13. Be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file-
sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software. Clicking on links and/or attachments in email messages (or IM messages) may also expose computers to unnecessary risks. Ensure that only applications approved by the organization are deployed on desktop computers.
71Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Consumer Best Practices
1. Consumers should use an Internet security solution that combines antivirus, firewall, intrusion
detection, and vulnerability management for maximum protection against malicious code and other threats.
2. Consumers should ensure that security patches are up-to-date and that they are applied to all
vulnerable applications in a timely manner.
3. Consumers should ensure that passwords are a combination of letters and numbers, and should
change them often. Passwords should not consist of words from the dictionary.
4. Consumers should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is
expected and the purpose of the attachment is known.
5. Consumers should keep virus definitions updated regularly. By deploying the latest virus definitions,
consumers can protect their computers against the latest viruses known to be spreading in the wild.
6. Consumers should routinely check to see if their operating system is vulnerable to threats by
using Symantec Security Check at www.symantec.com/securitycheck.
7. Consumers should deploy an antiphishing solution. They should never disclose any confidential
personal or financial information unless and until they can confirm that any request for such information is legitimate.
8. Consumers can get involved in fighting cybercrime by tracking and reporting intruders. With Symantec
Security Check’s tracing service, users can quickly identify the location of potential hackers and forward the information to the attacker’s ISP or local police.
9. Consumers should be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with
the installation of file-sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software. Clicking on links and/or attachments in email messages (or IM messages) may also expose computers to unnecessary risks. Ensure that only applications approved by the organization are deployed on desktop computers.
10. Some security risks can be installed after an end user has accepted the end-user license agreement
(EULA), or as a consequence of that acceptance. Consumers should read EULAs carefully and understand all terms before agreeing to them.
11. Consumers should be cautious of programs that flash ads in the user interface. Many spyware
programs track how users respond to these ads, and their presence is a red flag. When users see ads in a program’s user interface, they may be looking at a piece of spyware.
72Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology
Attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec Global
Intelligence Network, which includes the Symantec DeepSight Threat Management System, Symantec Managed Security Services, and the Symantec Honeypot Network. Symantec combines data derived from these sources for analysis.
Attack definitions
In order to avoid ambiguity with the findings presented in this discussion, Symantec’s methodology for identifying various forms of attack activity is outlined clearly below. This methodology is applied consistently throughout our monitoring and analysis. The first step in analyzing attack activity is to define precisely what an attack is. Attacks are individual instances of malicious network activity. Attacks consist of one IDS or firewall alert that is indicative of a single attack action.
Explanation of research inquiries
This section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to gather and analyze the data and statistics in this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, the following investigations warranted additional detail.
Malicious activity by country
To determine the top countries for the “Malicious activity by country” metric, Symantec compiled geographical data on each type of malicious activity to be considered, which included: bot network computers, bot command-and-control servers, phishing Web sites, malicious code submissions, spam relay hosts, and Internet attacks. The proportion of each activity originating in each country was determined. The mean of the proportions of each malicious activity that originated in each country was calculated. This average determined the proportion of overall malicious activity that originated from the country in question and was used to rank each country.
Symantec also evaluated the top 25 of these countries according to the percentage of worldwide Internet
users located there. Symantec determined the top 25 countries for malicious activity as a proportion of Internet users by employing the same data as above. This measure is meant to remove the bias of high Internet users from the consideration of the “Malicious activity by country” metric. In order to determine this, Symantec divided the amount of malicious activity originating in each of the top 25 countries for malicious activity by the percentage of worldwide Internet users who are located in that country.
The proportion assigned to each country in the discussion thus corresponds to the proportion of malicious
activity that could be attributed to a single (average) Internet user in that country. That is, Symantec estimates the amount of malicious activity that could be attributed to the average Internet user from each of the top 25 countries. The proportion of malicious activity that would be carried out by each person is the proportion assigned to each country.
73Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Malicious activity originating from critical infrastructure sectors
To determine the proportion of malicious activity originating from critical infrastructure sectors, Symantec
cross-references the IP addresses of known malicious computers with Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes assigned to each industry.
119 Symantec has compiled data on numerous malicious activities
that were detected originating from the IP address space of these organizations, namely: bot-infected computers, phishing Web sites, spam zombies, and Internet attacks.
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft
Symantec identifies the proportional distribution of cause and sector for data breaches that may facilitate identity theft based on data provided by Attrition.org.
120 The sector that experienced the loss along with
the cause of loss that occurred is determined through analysis of the organization reporting the loss and the method that facilitated the loss.
Denial of service attacks
Although there are numerous methods for carrying out denial of service (DoS) attacks, Symantec derives this metric by measuring DoS attacks that are carried out by flooding a target with SYN requests. These are often referred to as SYN flood attacks. This type of attack works by overwhelming a target with SYN requests and not completing the initial request, which thus prevents other valid requests from being processed.
In many cases, SYN requests with forged IP addresses are sent to a target, allowing a single attacking
computer to initiate multiple connections, resulting in unsolicited traffic, known as backscatter, being sent to other computers on the Internet. This backscatter is used to derive the number of DoS attacks observed throughout the reporting period. Although the values Symantec derives from this metric will not identify all DoS attacks carried out, it will highlight DoS attack trends.
To determine the countries targeted by DoS attacks, Symantec cross-references the target IP addresses
of every attack with several third-party, subscription-based databases that link the geographic location of systems to source IP addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error.
Bot-infected computers
Symantec identifies bots based on coordinated scanning and attack behavior observed in network traffic. For an attacking computer to be considered to be participating in this coordinated scanning and attacking, it must fit into that pattern to the exclusion of any other activity. This behavioral matching will not catch every bot network computer, and may identify other malicious code or individual attackers behaving in a similarly coordinated way as a bot network. This behavioral matching will, however, identify many of the most coordinated and aggressive bot-infected computers and will give insight into the population trends of bot network computers, including those that are considered to be actively working in a well coordinated and aggressive fashion at some point in time during the reporting period.
74
119 SIC codes are the standard industry codes that are used by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission to identify o rganizations belonging
to each industry. For more, on this, please see http://www.sec.gov
120 http://www.attrition.orgSymantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
This metric explores the number of active bot-infected computers that the Symantec Global Intelligence
Network has detected and identified during the first six months of 2007. Identification is carried out on an individual basis by analyzing attack and scanning patterns. Computers generating attack patterns that show a high degree of coordination are considered to be bot-infected computers.
As a consequence of this, Symantec does not identify all bot-infected computers, but only those that are
actively working in a well coordinated and aggressive fashion. Given Symantec’s extensive and globally distributed sensor base, it is reasonable to assume that the bot activities discussed here are representative of worldwide bot trends, and can thus provide an understanding of current bot activity across the Internet as a whole.
Lifespan of bot-infected computers
Using previously identified bot-infected computers, Symantec determined the life span of these infections by measuring the time between their first and last detected activity. However, to ensure that the lifespan reflects a continuous bot infection, if the identified computer was inactive for 30 days or longer it was considered to be disinfected. As such, any further bot-like activity would be considered a new infection.
Bot-infected computers by countries and cities
This metric is based on the same data as the “Bot-infected computers” discussion of the “Attacks Trends” section of the report. Symantec cross-references the IP addresses of every identified bot-infected computer with several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic location of systems to IP addresses.
Bot-infected computers by critical infrastructure sector
In assessing the top sectors by bot-infected computers, Symantec uses Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, which are standard industry codes that are used by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission to identify organizations belonging to each industry.
121 Symantec cross-references the IP
addresses of known bot-infected computers with the SIC codes assigned to those IPs in order to determine the distribution of bot-infected computers with critical infrastructure sectors.
Top countries of attack origin
Symantec identifies the national sources of attacks by automatically cross-referencing source IP addresses of every attacking IP with several third-party, subscription-based databases that link the geographic location of systems to source IP addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error.
75
121 SIC codes are the standard industry codes that are used by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission to identify o rganizations belonging
to each industry. For more, on this, please see http://www.sec.govSymantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix C—Vulnerability Trends Methodology
The “Vulnerability Trends” report of the Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report discusses
developments in the discovery and exploitation of vulnerabilities over the six-month reporting period. This methodology section will discuss how the data was gathered and how it was analyzed to come to the conclusions that are presented in the “Vulnerability Trends” section.
Symantec maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive databases of security vulnerabilities,
consisting of over 22,000 distinct entries. Each distinct entry is created and maintained by Symantec threat analysts who vet the content for accuracy, veracity, and suitability for inclusion in the Symantec Vulnerability Database based on available information. The following metrics discussed in the “Vulnerability Trends” section are based on the analysis of that data by Symantec researchers:
• Patch development time for operating systems
• Zero-day vulnerabilities• Vendor responsiveness• Database vulnerabilities
The ways in which the data for the remaining metrics is gathered and analyzed will be discussed in the
remainder of this methodology.
Vulnerability classifications
Following the discovery and/or announcement of a new vulnerability, Symantec analysts gather all relevant characteristics of the new vulnerability and create an alert. This alert describes important traits of the vulnerability, such as the severity, ease of exploitation, and affected products. These traits are subsequently used, both directly and indirectly, for this analysis.
Vulnerability type
After discovering a new vulnerability, Symantec threat analysts classify the vulnerability into one of 12 possible categories based on the available information. These categories focus on defining the core cause of the vulnerability, as opposed to classifying the vulnerability merely by its effect. The classification system is derived from the academic taxonomy presented by Taimur Aslam et al. (1996)
122 to define
classifications of vulnerabilities. Possible values are indicated below, and the previously mentioned white paper provides a full description of the meaning behind each classification:
• Boundary condition error
• Access validation error• Origin validation error• Input validation error• Failure to handle exceptional conditions• Race condition error
76
122 “Use of a Taxonomy of Security Faults” http://ftp.cerias.purdue.edu/pub/papers/taimur-aslam/aslam-krsul-spaf-taxonomy.pdfSymantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
• Serialization error
• Atomicity error• Environment error• Configuration error• Design error
Operating system patch development time
This metric has a similar methodology to the “Patch development time, enterprise vendors” metric, which was explained later in this methodology. However, instead of applying it to enterprise-scale vendors, the patch development time average is calculated from patched vulnerabilities for the following operating systems:
• Apple Mac OS X
• Hewlett-Packard HP-UX• Microsoft Windows• Red Hat Linux (including enterprise versions and Red Hat Fedora)• Sun Microsystems Solaris
An average is calculated from the patch release times for each vulnerability in the reporting period per
operating system. The patch development time average for each operating system is then compared.
Zero-day vulnerabilities
This metric quantifies the number of zero-day vulnerabilities that have been documented during the relevant reporting periods of the current Internet Security Threat Report . For the purpose of this metric, a
zero-day vulnerability is one for which there is sufficient public evidence to indicate that the vulnerability has been exploited in the wild prior to being publicly known. It may not have been known to the vendor prior to exploitation, and the vendor had not released a patch at the time of the exploit activity.
This metric is derived from public sources and the Symantec vulnerability database. This metric is meant
to calculate the number of high-profile, publicly documented zero-day vulnerability instances during the relevant reporting periods.
Unpatched enterprise vulnerabilities
This metric tracks the number of unpatched vulnerabilities affecting enterprise-scale technologies. Individual vendors are identified and correlated with the number of unpatched vulnerabilities affecting them. It is possible that some vendors will have no vulnerabilities affecting them during a given reporting period or that none of the vulnerabilities affecting them are considered unpatched.
Unpatched vulnerabilities are vulnerabilities that have no vendor remediation at the time that data for
the report was collected.
123 This means that the status of some vulnerabilities may have changed since
data was collected; vendors may have released patches for vulnerabilities included in the data set and
77123 For the purpose of this report patched vulnerabilities are those with vendor-supplied patches or upgrades. Vendor-supplied or third-party workarounds
are not counted as patches.Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
78new vulnerabilities may have been published that are considered unpatched. The nature of unpatched
vulnerabilities means that the data may include vulnerabilities that are unverified and may have been reported by a single source with no other corroboration. However, the data also includes vulnerabilities that have been acknowledged but not fixed by the vendor. In rare instances, the legitimacy of a vulnerability may be in dispute, but in all such cases these disputes remain unresolved at the time of data collection. Symantec excludes all vulnerabilities that are provably false from this and other metrics in the report.
It is also important to note that the set of vulnerabilities included in this metric is limited and does not
represent all software from all possible vendors. Instead, it only includes vendors that are classified as enterprise vendors. The purpose is to illustrate the window of exposure for widely deployed mission-critical software. Because of the large number of vendors that produce technologies that have a very low deployment (which form the majority), only exploits for technologies from enterprise vendors (that is, those that generally have widespread deployment) are included. Vulnerabilities in those vendors’ products will likely affect more enterprises than those in less widely deployed technologies. Those vendors are:
• CA™ (Computer Associates)
• Cisco®• EMC• HP®• IBM®• McAfee®• Microsoft• Oracle®• Sun™• Symantec
Database vulnerabilities
This metric offers a comparison of the vulnerabilities across multiple database vendors and implementations. For the purpose of this report, the following five database implementations are discussed:
• IBM DB2®
• Microsoft SQL Server• MySQL• Oracle• PostgreSQL
The volume of database vulnerabilities is determined by querying the vulnerability database for specific
vulnerabilities affecting the aforementioned database implementations. The results are broken out by implementation and reporting period.Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix D—Malicious Code Trends Methodology
The trends in the “Malicious Code Trends” section are based on statistics from malicious code samples
reported to Symantec for analysis. Symantec gathers data from over 120 million client, server, and gateway systems that have deployed Symantec’s antivirus products in both consumer and corporate environments. The Symantec Digital Immune System and Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting process.
Observations in the “Malicious Code Trends” section are based on empirical data and expert analysis of this
data. The data and analysis draw primarily from two databases described below.
Infection database
To help detect and eradicate computer viruses, Symantec developed the Symantec AntiVirus Research Automation (SARA) technology. Symantec uses this technology to analyze, replicate, and define a large subset of the most common computer viruses that are quarantined by Symantec AntiVirus™ customers.
On average, SARA receives hundreds of thousands of suspect files daily from both enterprise and individual
consumers located throughout the world. Symantec then analyzes these suspect files, matching them with virus definitions. An analysis of this aggregate data set provides statistics on infection rates for different types of malicious code.
Malicious code database
In addition to infection data, Symantec Security Response analyzes and documents attributes for each new form of malicious code that emerges both in the wild and in a “zoo” (or controlled laboratory) environment. Descriptive records of new forms of malicious code are then entered into a database for future reference. For this report, a historical trend analysis was performed on this database to identify, assess, and discuss any possible trends, such as the use of different infection vectors and the frequency of various types of payloads.
In some cases, Symantec antivirus products may initially detect new malicious code heuristically or by
generic signatures. These may later be reclassified and given unique detections. Because of this, there may be slight variance in the presentation of the same data set from one volume of the Government Internet
Security Threat Report to the next.
Geographic location of malicious code instances
Several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic locations of systems to IP
addresses are used along with proprietary Symantec technology to determine the location of computers reporting malicious code instances. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error. The data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of malicious code instances.
79
Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix E—Phishing Trends Methodology
Phishing attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec Probe
Network. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam data is assessed to gauge the growth in phishing attempts as well as the percentage of Internet mail that is determined to be phishing attempts. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data consists of statistics reported back from customer installations that provide feedback about the detection behaviors of antifraud filters as well as the overall volume of mail being processed.
It should be noted that different monitoring organizations use different methods to track phishing
attempts. Some groups may identify and count unique phishing messages based solely on specific content items such as subject headers or URLs. These varied methods can often lead to differences in the number of phishing attempts reported by different organizations.
Phishing attempt definition
The Symantec Probe Network is a system of over two million decoy accounts that attract email messages from 20 different countries around the world. It encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises and attracts email samples that are representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 million mailboxes. The Probe Network covers countries in the Americas, Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia/Oceania.
The Symantec Probe Network data is used to track the growth in new phishing activity. A phishing attempt
is a group of email messages with similar properties, such as headers and content, that are sent to unique users. The messages attempt to gain confidential and personal information from online users.
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam software reports statistics to Symantec Security Response that indicate
messages processed, messages filtered, and filter-specific data. Symantec has classified different filters so that spam statistics and phishing statistics can be determined separately. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data is used to identify general trends in phishing email messages.
Explanation of research inquiries
This section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to produce the data and statistics in this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, the following investigations warrant additional detail.
Top countries and cities hosting phishing Web sites
The data for this section is determined by gathering links in phishing email messages and cross-referencing the addresses with several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic locations of systems to IP addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error. The data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of phishing Web sites.
80Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
Appendix F—Spam Trends Methodology
The Symantec Probe Network is a system of over two million decoy accounts that attract email messages
from 20 different countries around the world. It encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises and attracts email samples that are representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 million mailboxes. The Probe Network includes accounts in countries in the Americas, Europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia/Oceania.
Spam trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from both the Symantec Probe Network
as well as Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam software reports statistics to the Brightmail Logistical Operations Center (BLOC) indicating messages processed, messages filtered, and filter-specific data.
Symantec has classified different filters so that spam statistics and phishing statistics can be determined
separately. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data includes data reported back from customer installations providing feedback from antispam filters as well as overall mail volume being processed.
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam only gathers data at the SMTP layer and not the network layer, where DNS
block lists typically operate. This is because SMTP-layer spam filtering is more accurate than network-layer filtering and is able to block spam missed at the network layer. Network-layer filtering takes place before email reaches the enterprise mail server. As a result, data from the SMTP layer is a more accurate reflection of the impact of spam on the mail server itself.
Sample set normalization
Due to the numerous variables influencing a company’s spam activity, Symantec focuses on identifying spam activity and growth projections with Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data from enterprise customer installations having more than 1,000 total messages per day. This normalization yields a more accurate summary of Internet spam trends by ruling out problematic and laboratory test servers that produce smaller sample sets.
Spam as a percentage of all email
The data for this calculation is determined by dividing the number of email messages that trigger antispam filters in the field by the total number of email messages scanned. These filters are distributed across the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base. The data for this section is based on monthly totals.
81Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec
Corporation.
NO WARRANTY. The technical information is being delivered to you as is and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its acc uracy or use. Any use of the
technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user. Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical
errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice.
Copyright © 2007 Symantec Corporation. All rights reserved. Symantec, the Symantec Logo, BugTraq, Symantec AntiVirus, Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam,
Symantec DeepSight, and Symantec Digital Immune System are trademarks or registered trademarks of Symantec Corporation or its a ffiliates in the U.S. and other
countries. Apple and Mac OS are registered trademarks of Apple Inc. IBM and DB2 are trademarks of International Business Machin es Corporation in the United
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|
S yM An t e C e n t e r p r i Se SeC Ur i t ySymantec APJ Internet Security
Threat Report
trends for July–December 07
Volume Xiii, published April 2008Dean Turner
executive editor
Director, Global intelligence network
Symantec Security response
Marc Fossi
Manager, DevelopmentSymantec Security response
Eric Johnsoneditor
Symantec Security response
Trevor MackAssociate editor
Symantec Security response
Joseph Blackbirdthreat Analyst
Symantec Security response
Stephen Entwisle
threat Analyst
Symantec Security response
Mo King Low
threat Analyst
Symantec Security response
David McKinney
threat Analyst
Symantec Security response
Candid Wueest
Analyst
Symantec Security responseOverview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Highlights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Attack Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Malicious Code Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Phishing Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Spam Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Appendix C—Malicious Code Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Appendix D— Phishing Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Appendix E— Spam Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44ContentsVolume Xiii, published April 2008
APJ Symantec Internet Security
Threat ReportSymantec Ap J internet Security threat report
Overview
the Symantec APJ Internet Security Threat Report provides a six-month update of internet threat activity
that Symantec has observed in the Asia- pacific/Japan (A pJ) region. it includes analysis of network-based
attacks, a review of known vulnerabilities, and highlights of malicious code. it also discusses numerous
issues related to online fraud, including phishing and spam. this volume covers the six-month period from
July 1 to December 31, 2007.
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of internet threat data in the world.
the Symantec™ Global intelligence network encompasses worldwide security intelligence data gathered
from a wide range of sources, including more than 40,000 sensors monitoring networks in over 180
countries through Symantec products and services such as Symantec DeepSight™ threat Management
System and Symantec™ Managed Security Services, and from other third-party sources.
Symantec gathers malicious code reports from over 120 million client, server, and gateway systems
that have deployed its antivirus product, and also maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive
vulnerability databases, currently consisting of over 25,000 recorded vulnerabilities (spanning more
than two decades) affecting more than 55,000 technologies from over 8,000 vendors. Symantec also operates the Bug traq™ mailing list, one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion of
vulnerabilities on the internet, which has approximately 50,000 direct subscribers who contribute, receive,
and discuss vulnerability research on a daily basis.
As well, the Symantec probe network, a system of over two million decoy accounts in more than 30
countries, attracts email from around the world to gauge global spam and phishing activity. Symantec
also gathers phishing information through the Symantec phish report network, an extensive antifraud
community of enterprises and consumers whose members contribute and receive fraudulent Web site
addresses for alerting and filtering across a broad range of solutions.
these resources give Symantec’s analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze, and
provide informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and spam.
the Symantec APJ Internet Security Threat Report gives enterprises and consumers essential information to
effectively secure their systems now and into the future.
4Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
5Highlights
the following section will offer a brief summary of the security trends that Symantec observed during the
second half of 2007 based on data provided by the sources listed above. these highlights include all of
the metrics that are discussed in the rest of this report.
Attack Trends Highlights
• With 38 percent of the total, China ranked first for malicious activity within A pJ in this period, as it did
for the previous six-month period.
• Between July 1 and December 31, 2007, China ranked first for originating attacks in A pJ, with 32 percent
of the total, significantly more than the 18 percent recorded in the previous period.
• China was targeted by the most denial-of-service attacks in the A pJ region, with 44 percent of the total,
a significant decrease from 74 percent in the previous period.
• Symantec observed an average of 7,640 active bot-infected computers per day in the A pJ region, a
52 percent decrease from the 15,447 average recorded in the previous reporting period.
• Symantec identified 901,648 distinct bot-infected computers in the A pJ region, which is 18 percent of
the 5,060,187 distinct bot-infected computers detected worldwide during this period. it is 49 percent
less than the 1,782,416 active bot-infected computers that Symantec identified in the A pJ region during
the first half of 2007.
• China had the most bot-infected computers in the A pJ region during this period, with 43 percent of the
total, down from 78 percent of the regional total in the first half of 2007.
• Kuala Lumpur had the most bot infections in the A pJ region in the second half of 2007, a significant rise
from seventh rank in the first half of the year. Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
6Malicious Code Trends Highlights
• For the second half of 2007, trojans were the top type of malicious code causing potential infections in
ApJ, amounting to 47 percent of the volume of the top 50 by potential infections.
• China was the top country for all malicious code types during this period.
• the top malicious code sample causing potential infections for the last six months of 2007 in the A pJ
region was the Gampass trojan.
• the most widely reported new malicious code family during this reporting period, both in A pJ and
worldwide, was the invadesys worm.
• For the last six months of 2007, confidential information threats made up 51 percent of malicious code
threats, a decrease from 57 percent observed in the first six months of the year.
• For the second half of 2007 in A pJ, 74 percent of the threats to confidential information had a keystroke
logging capability.
• the top propagation vector in A pJ during this period was executable file sharing, which was employed
by 55 percent of regional threats. in the first half of 2007, this vector ranked third, with 33 percent of
regional threats.
• For the last six months of 2007, 18 percent of malicious code samples originating in the A pJ region had
the ability to modify Web pages, substantially higher than the 5 percent recorded in the first half of 2007.
Spam and Phishing Trends Highlights
• During the last six months of 2007, China was home to the highest percentage of phishing Web sites in
ApJ, with 69 percent of the regional total.
• the most common top-level domain used by phishing Web sites in the A pJ region during this period was
.cn, which was used by 37 percent of phishing sites in the region.
• twenty-four percent of all spam detected from the A pJ region during this period originated in China, the
most of any country in the region and the same percentage as originated there in the first half of the year.Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
Attack Trends
the malicious activity discussed in this section includes not only attack activity, but also phishing Web
sites hosted, malicious code, spam zombies, bot-infected computers, and command-and-control server
activity. Attacks are defined as any malicious activity carried out over a network that has been detected
by an intrusion detection system ( iDS) or firewall. Definitions for the other types of malicious activity can
be found in their respective sections of this report. this section of the APJ Internet Security Threat Report
will analyze the following attack activities that Symantec observed in the A pJ region between July 1 and
December 31, 2007:
• Malicious activity by country
• top countries of attack origin
• top countries targeted by denial-of-service attacks
• Bot-infected computers
• Bot-infected computers by country
• Bot-infected computers by city
• Attacks—protection and mitigation
Malicious activity by country
this metric will assess the countries in which the largest amount of malicious activity takes place or
originates. to determine this, Symantec has compiled geographic data on numerous malicious activities,
namely: bot-infected computers, bot command-and-control servers, phishing Web site hosts, malicious
code reports, spam zombies, and internet attack origins. the rankings are determined by calculating the
mean average of the proportion of these malicious activities that originated in each country.
China ranked first for malicious activity within A pJ in this period, as it did for the previous six-month
period. While still ranked first within the region, China’s proportion of aggregate malicious activity in
ApJ dropped slightly to 38 percent, from 42 percent previously (table 1). China’s rank is not surprising
considering that it has the second highest number of broadband subscribers in the world, with over 63 million, behind only the United States.
1 China ranks first in all malicious activity metrics in A pJ for
this period, with the exception of bot command-and-control servers, for which it ranks second in the
region. this is nearly identical to the first half of 2007, when China ranked first in all categories except
for bot command-and-control servers and phishing servers.
1 http://www.point-topic.com
7Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
Current
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
2
4
3
5
6
7
8
9
10Country/
Region
China
South Korea
Taiwan
Japan
India
Australia
Thailand
Malaysia
Singapore
PhilippinesCurrent
Percentage
38%
14%
12%
8%
6%
5%
4%
4%
2%
2%Previous
Percentage
42%
14%
12%
13%
7%
5%
4%
2%
2%
1%Malicious
Code
Rank
1
5
2
3
2
4
11
7
6
8Spam
Zombies
Rank
1
2
4
6
9
10
3
7
9
8Command-
and-Control
Server Rank
2
1
3
4
11
5
6
7
8
10Phishing
Web
Sites
Host
Rank
1
2
5
4
13
3
6
7
10
14Bot
Rank
1
3
2
4
11
5
9
6
7
8Attack
Origin
Rank
1
2
3
4
16
5
9
7
6
8
Table 1. Malicious activity by country, APJ
Source: Symantec Corporation
South Korea ranked second for malicious activity, unchanged from the first half of 2007. its share of total
regional malicious activity remained unchanged as well, at 14 percent for both the current and previous
reporting periods. South Korea has one of the highest household broadband penetration rates in the
world, with 92 percent of households having access to broadband connections.2 this likely contributes
to its high rank for malicious activity within the region.
taiwan ranked third for malicious activity in A pJ, up from fourth in the first half of the year. taiwan’s
percentage of activity remained unchanged for both periods, at 12 percent, and its rise in rank is partly
due to the drop in percentage of Japan, which decreased from 13 percent in the first six months of 2007
to eight percent for this period.
Only two of the countries or regions in the top 10 increased their percentage of malicious activity within
ApJ this period. this is likely due to an increase in the aggregate malicious activity of A pJ countries with
smaller numbers of broadband subscribers outside of the top 10, many of which are experiencing rapid
growth in broadband infrastructure and subscribers.
Top countries of attack origin
this version of the APJ Internet Security Threat Report will measure the top countries targeting the A pJ
region for attacks. the analysis is based on aggregate iDS and firewall event data collected through the
Symantec Global intelligence network.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2007, China ranked first for originating attacks in A pJ, with 32 percent
of the total (table 2). this is significantly more than the previous period, when attacks on the A pJ region
originating in China made up 18 percent of the total. With this increase, China has displaced the United
States as the top originating country for attacks on the A pJ region. Globally, China ranked second, with
10 percent of total originating attacks.
2 http://www.point-topic.com
8Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
in the second half of 2007, there was a noticeable decrease in the number of active bots in China. this is
likely due to a significant reduction in the availability of many Web sites and interactive sites, such as Web
forums and blogs, for several months in China during this period.3 the increased share of attacks originating
in China may represent attempts by bot controllers to find new hosts to infect while their existing bot
networks were unavailable during this period, as one of the main methods for bot propagation is through
malicious or compromised Web site forums, using tools such as M pack.4
Current
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Previous
Rank
2
1
15
3
4
8
7
11
42
10Country/Region
China
United States
South Korea
Japan
Australia
United Kingdom
Canada
Taiwan
Thailand
FranceCurrent Regional
Percentage
32%
19%
10%
6%
4%
3%
3%
3%
2%
1%Current Global
Percentage
10%
24%
2%
1%
1%
4%
5%
1%
<1%
1%Previous Regional
Percentage
18%
29%
1%
9%
7%
2%
3%
2%
<1%
2%
Table 2. Top countries/regions of attack origin, APJ
Source: Symantec Corporation
the United States ranked second for originating attacks on A pJ, with 19 percent, down from 29 percent and
the top rank in the first half of 2007. Globally, 24 percent of attacks originated in the United States. the
declining proportion of the United States as a source for attacks targeting A pJ countries suggests a broader
trend of increasing intra-regional attack activity within A pJ. Many countries within the region are rapidly
expanding their broadband networks, and attackers could be attracted to the opportunities afforded by a
localized network where linguistic or cultural similarities may serve to enhance the success of attacks.
One example of a regional attack trend is the reported attacks on virtual-item markets serving game players
within the region. At least four such Web sites had suspicious outages that were initially attributed to
technical problems, but were later described as targeted DoS attacks, possibly as part of an extortion attempt.5
South Korea ranked third for this period, with 10 percent of the total. it did not rank in the top 10 countries
for originating attacks on A pJ last period, though it did rank fifth in the second half of 2006. Attacks
originating in South Korea were responsible for two percent of attacks worldwide. One reason for South
Korea’s drop in the first half of 2007 from the period before that may have been from increased vigilance
from law enforcement in response to at least two high-profile incidents that occurred at the beginning of
the year.
in the first, two individuals associated with spam operations were arrested in South Korea in January 2007
for transmitting over 1.6 billion spam messages.6 they had also reportedly obtained and sold personal
information that affected over 12,000 victims. the second incident occurred in February 2007, when there
were attacks against a number of D nS servers, a critical component of the internet’s infrastructure.7 the
attacks were reputed to have originated in South Korea as part of an underground economy advertisement
3 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21268635/
4 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/05/mpack_packed_full_of_badness.html
5 http://www.itweek.co.uk/vnunet/news/2201049/hackers-korea-game-traders
6 http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/news/2173771/korean-duo-accused-sending
7 http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=119128&W t.svl=news1_2
9Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
to tout the effectiveness of a particular bot network (botnet). the occurrence of these two high-profile
incidents may have prompted law enforcement to clamp down on reported attack activity for the following
months, resulting in lower attack activity seen originating in South Korea. this vigilance may have eased
over the remainder of 2007, and resulted in attacks originating from South Korea increasing in percentage
enough to return it to a ranking in line with what was seen in the second half of 2006.
Top countries targeted by denial-of-service attacks
Denial-of-service attacks are a major threat to internet-dependent organizations. A successful DoS attack
can render Web sites or other network services inaccessible to customers and employees, which could
result in the disruption of organizational communications, a significant loss of revenue, and/or damage to the organization’s reputation. insight into the locations targeted by DoS attacks is valuable in determining
global trends in DoS attack patterns, and may also help administrators and organizations in affected
countries to take the necessary steps to protect against or minimize the damages of DoS attacks.
China was the top ranked country for DoS attacks in the region for this period, with 44 percent of the total (table 3). With China’s massive internet presence in the region, it is not surprising that it is the target of
the most DoS attacks. However, in spite of its top ranking in the region this period, there was a substantial
decrease from the previous period, when 74 percent of all DoS attacks within the region targeted systems
in China.
the decline was likely due to a diminished attack capacity because many Web sites and online forums in
China went offline during this period, as discussed in “ top countries of attack origin”, on previous page.
Current
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
3
6
2
9
4
5
7
10
11Country/Region
China
South Korea
Taiwan
Australia
Thailand
Japan
India
Singapore
Malaysia
IndonesiaCurrent Regional
Percentage
44%
24%
9%
7%
4%
4%
3%
2%
1%
1%Current Global
Percentage
11%
6%
2%
2%
1%
1%
1%
<1%
<1%
<1%Previous Regional
Percentage
74%
5%
2%
11%
1%
4%
3%
1%
<1%
<1%
Table 3. Top countries/regions targeted by DoS attacks, APJ
Source: Symantec Corporation
10Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
8 http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/12/17/business/skvote.php
9 http://opennet.net/research/profiles/south-korea
10 Hacktivism = hacking + activism: writing code to promote political ideology
11 http://www.redorbit.com/news/technology/1204169/chinese_hackers_attacking_computers_of_taiwan_election_body__lawmaker/index.html
11South Korea was the second ranked country in the A pJ region targeted by DoS attacks, with 24 percent
of the total. in the first six months of 2007, South Korea ranked third, with five percent. One reason for
the substantial increase may have been due to the presidential elections held in December 2007, during
which the internet emerged as an important campaign tool.8 there were reports of government controls on
internet discussion sites,9 forcing many to use other forms of media, such as internet video to express their
opinions and political messages. in this environment, DoS attacks could have been used to block or disrupt
access to specific content, such as online videos or blogs. Additionally, the decline in bot activity seen
during this period within China may have resulted in a corresponding reduction of DoS attacks targeting
that country, which would account for the proportional increase of South Korea during the
second half of 2007.
taiwan ranked third as the target of DoS attacks in A pJ this period, with nine percent of the total, up from
two percent in the first six months of 2007. DoS attacks targeting taiwan amounted to two percent of
global DoS attacks this period. the increase may stem from increasing activity in the run up to two major
elections in taiwan in 2008—a legislative election in January, and a presidential election in March. With the
emergence of the internet as an effective tool for influencing campaigns, the increased DoS activity may
be due to hacktivism10 by supporters of political parties in taiwan. there were also reports that targeted
attacks around the election were originating in mainland China.11
Bot-infected computers
Bots are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s machine in order to allow an attacker to remotely
control the targeted system through a communication channel such as internet relay chat ( irC), peer-to-
peer ( p2p), and H ttp. these channels allow the remote attacker to control a large number of compromised
computers over a single, reliable channel in a botnet, which can then be used to launch coordinated attacks.
Bots allow for a wide range of functionality and most can be updated to assume new functionality by
downloading new code and features. Bots can be used by external attackers to perform DoS attacks
against a Web site. Furthermore, bots within a network can be used to attack external sites, which can have
serious business and legal consequences for an organization if its network is thus compromised. Bots can
be used by attackers to distribute spam and phishing attacks, as well as spyware, adware, and misleading applications. they can also harvest confidential information from compromised computers, which can lead
to identity theft.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2007, Symantec observed an average of 7,640 active bot-infected computers per day in the A pJ region (figure 1), a 52 percent decrease from the 15,447 average recorded in
the previous reporting period. An active bot-infected computer is one that carries out, on average, at least one attack per day over the reporting period. this does not have to be continuous; rather, a single computer
can be active on a number of different days. the A pJ region accounted for approximately 12 percent of the
61,940 active bot-infected computers worldwide on an average day.Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
At the beginning of this reporting period, the number of bots within A pJ was relatively low, with an
average of 3073 active bot-infected computers per day recorded for the first 12 days of July. On July 13,
the active bot-infected computers recorded jumped to 7361 per day. this increase is likely related to an
outbreak of the Mubla worm.12 these Mubla variants attempt to send themselves to user contacts through
the MS n instant Messenger network, turning the recipient’s system into a bot if they are run.Active bot-infected computers by da y
020,00040,00060,00080,000
10,00030,00050,00070,00090,000
DateWorldwide
APJ
2 per . moving average
Oct 2, 2006 Jan 1, 2007 Apr 2, 2007 Jul 2, 2007 Oct 1, 2007 Jul 3, 2006 Dec 31, 2007
Figure 1. Active bot-infected computers per day, APJ and Global
Source: Symantec Corporation
One reason for the overall decline in bot activity was due to the previously discussed drop in active
bots in China during this reporting period. Globally, China dropped to third for bot-infected computers
in the second half of 2007, with eight percent, a large decrease from the first half of 2007, when it had
29 percent and ranked first. the decline in active bots in China also correlates to the decrease in spam
zombies there. For spam zombies, which are often associated with bot-infected computers, China dropped
to fourth in the current period, with six percent of the global total, from third previously and nine percent.
in the second half of 2007, Symantec identified 901,648 distinct bot-infected computers, which amounts
to 18 percent of the 5,060,187 distinct bot-infected computers detected worldwide during this period. it
is 49 percent less than the 1,782,416 active bot-infected computers that Symantec identified in the A pJ
region during the first half of 2007. A distinct bot-infected computer is a computer that was active at least
once during the period. this large decrease in the total number of regional bots is primarily due to the
effect of events in China during this period, as discussed previously.
12 http://www.cisrt.org/enblog/read.php?133
12Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
Bot-infected computers by country
recognizing the ongoing threat posed by bot networks, Symantec tracks the distribution of bot-infected
computers both worldwide and regionally. to do this, Symantec calculates the number of computers
worldwide that are known to be infected with bots, and assesses which countries within a region are home
to high percentages of these computers. the identification of bot-infected computers is important, as a
high percentage of infected machines could mean a greater potential for bot-related attacks. it may also
indicate the level of patching and security awareness in the region.
For the A pJ region, the rankings for the second half of 2007 are nearly identical to what was observed in the
first half of the year, although the percentages for a number of countries and regions changed substantially.
China again ranked first for bot-infected computers in the A pJ region for the second half of 2007, but its
percentage dropped substantially to 43 percent this period from 78 percent in the previous period (table 4).
this is due to the overall decrease in bot activity in China during this period, discussed previously.
Current
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
2
3
4
6
7
5
8
9
10Country/Region
China
Taiwan
South Korea
Japan
Australia
Malaysia
India
Singapore
Philippines
ThailandCurrent
Regional
Percentage
43%
15%
11%
6%
5%
4%
4%
3%
2%
2%Previous
Regional
Percentage
78%
7%
5%
2%
2%
1%
2%
1%
1%
1%Current
Global
Percentage
8%
3%
2%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
<1%
<1%Average
Lifespan
(days)
2.6
2
4
4
4
3
4
4
4
6Command-
and-
Control
Percentage
26%
17%
29%
9%
5%
3%
4%
2%
0%
3%
Table 4. Bot-infected computers by country, APJ
Source: Symantec Corporation
All of the remaining countries and regions in the top 10 for bot-infected computers increased their share of bot activity this period. this is mainly due to the substantial drop in the number of bot-infected
computers in China, which is further borne out by comparing the regional percentages against global proportions. For example, taiwan’s proportion of bots in the region more than doubled to 15 percent
from seven percent previously, while its proportion of bot-infections worldwide remained unchanged at three percent for both the current and previous reporting periods. the same is true for South Korea, which
more than doubled its share for bot infections regionally this period, to 11 percent from five percent,
while its global proportion remained at two percent for both this and the previous reporting period.
13Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
Bot-infected computers by city
the top ranked city in the A pJ region for bot infections in the second half of 2007 was Kuala Lumpur,
Malaysia, which rose to first from seventh in the first half of the year (table 5). One possible explanation
for the rise is that Malaysia has a sophisticated telecommunications infrastructure and its broadband
penetration is still rapidly growing. Another reason may simply be due to the drop in Chinese cities in this
metric for this period because of the substantial drop in bot-infections in China, discussed above.
Current
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Previous
Rank
7
1
12
2
15
83
13
19
4
18Current Regional
Percentage
11%
9%
7%
6%
4%
4%
4%
4%
3%
3%Previous Regional
Percentage
3%
17%
2%
11%
1%
<1%
2%
1%
4%
1%Country/Region
Malaysia
China
Thailand
China
China
Philippines
Taiwan
Singapore
China
South Kore aCity
Kuala Lumpur
Beijing
Bangkok
Guangzhou
Hong Kong
Manila
Taipei
Singapor e
Shanghai
Seoul
Table 5. Bot-infected computers by city, APJ
Source: Symantec Corporation
Beijing ranked second for bot infections in the A pJ region, from first in the previous reporting period.
Again, the change in rank for Beijing—as well as for Guangzhou, Shanghai—can be explained by the drop
in bot-infections in China during this period.
the third ranked city for bot infections in the A pJ region this period is Bangkok, which is a significant
increase from the previous period, when it ranked twelfth. Along with rising in rank due to the proportional
drop of Chinese cities this period, the increase may be partly due to cybercrime laws in thailand that
compel iSps to record the internet activity of their subscribers.13 it is possible that their ability to respond
to security incidents may have been affected by the increased responsibility of complying with the
regulations.
Attacks—protection and mitigation
there are a number of measures that enterprises, administrators, and end users can take to protect
against malicious activity. Organizations should monitor all network-connected computers for signs
of malicious activity, including bot activity and potential security breaches, ensuring that any infected
computers are removed from the network and disinfected as soon as possible. Organizations should
employ defense-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software and a firewall.
Administrators should update antivirus definitions regularly and ensure that all desktop, laptop, and
server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their operating system vendor. As compromised computers can be a threat to other systems, Symantec also recommends that enterprises
notify their iSps of any potentially malicious activity.
13 http://www.asiasentinel.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=499&itemid=31
14Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
Symantec recommends that organizations perform both ingress and egress filtering on all network traffic
to ensure that malicious activity and unauthorized communications are not taking place.14 Organizations
should also filter out potentially malicious email attachments to reduce exposure to enterprises and
end users. in addition, the egress filtering is one of the best ways to mitigate a DoS attack. DoS victims
frequently need to engage their upstream iSp to help filter the traffic to mitigate the effects of attacks.
Symantec also advises that users never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment
is expected and comes from a known and trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment
is known. By creating and enforcing policies that identify and restrict applications that can access the
network, organizations can minimize the effect of malicious activity, and hence, minimize the effect on
day-to-day operations.
to reduce exposure to bot-related attacks, end users should employ defense-in-depth strategies, including
the deployment of antivirus software and a firewall. Creating and enforcing policies that identify and
limit applications that can access the network may also help to limit the spread of bot networks. Users
should update antivirus definitions regularly and ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers are
updated with all necessary security patches from their operating system vendor. Symantec also advises
that users never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is expected and
comes from a known and trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
14 ingress traffic refers to traffic that is coming into a network from the internet or another network. egress traffic refers to traffic that is leaving a network, bound for
the internet or another network.
15Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
Malicious Code Trends
Symantec gathers malicious code data from over 120 million desktops that have deployed Symantec’s
antivirus products in consumer and corporate environments. the Symantec Digital immune System and
Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting process. this discussion is
based on malicious code samples reported to Symantec for analysis from the A pJ region between July 1
and December 31, 2007.
this section will discuss:
• Malicious code types
• Geolocation by type
• top malicious code samples
• top new malicious code families
• threats to confidential information
• propagation mechanisms
• Malicious code that modifies Web pages
• Malicious code—protection and mitigation
Malicious code types
For the second half of 2007, trojans were the top type of malicious code causing potential infections in
ApJ, amounting to 47 percent of the volume of the top 50 by potential infections (figure 2). this is close to
what was seen in the previous period, when 51 percent of the volume of the top 50 by potential infections
within A pJ was classified as trojans. Worldwide, trojans were again the top potential infection type, with
71 percent of the volume. the reason for the large percentage of trojans within A pJ is largely due to the
Gampass trojan,15 which ranked first in the top 10 malicious code samples this period.
15 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-111201-3853-99
16Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
29%42%
TypeVirus Worm Back doorPercentage of top 50 by potential infection
TrojanGlobalAPJ
47%71%
13%5%22%
15%
Figure 2. Malicious code types, APJ and Global
Source: Symantec Corporation
Worms made up 42 percent of volume of the top 50 by potential infection within A pJ during this period,
the same proportion seen in the region during the previous period. Globally, worms accounted for 22
percent of the total volume this period. in the previous volume of the APJ Internet Security Threat Report ,
it was speculated that the differences observed between the A pJ region and globally could be due to a
lack of port blocking and email attachment scanning in the region. However, seven of the top 10 malicious code types causing potential infections in A pJ were classified as worms. Some of these worms target
the region specifically, including Looked,16 which is notable for disabling Chinese-language security
applications, and Antinny, a worm that propagated over the Japanese Winny p2p file sharing network.
the proportion of viruses seen in the region during this period increased to 29 percent in the second half
of 2007 from 21 percent previously. this is largely due to the appearance of Fujacks17, classified as both a
worm and, because of its file infector capabilities, a virus.
16 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-112813-0222-99
17 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-010509-0134-99
17Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
18 http://www.thestreet.com/p/pf/rmoney/gamesandgadgets/10379996.html
19 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-052305-2411-99&tabid=2
20 http://w3.bsa.org/globalstudy//upload/2007-Global-piracy-Study-en.pdf
21 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-051402-1930-99
18Geolocation by type
Symantec examines the top countries reporting potential malicious code infections by type. Because of
the different propagation mechanisms used by different malicious code types, and the different effects
that each malicious code type may have, the geographic distribution of malicious code can indicate where
network administrators in different regions can increase the focus of their security efforts.
China, with the largest number of broadband subscribers in the region, was the top country for each of the
four major malicious code classifications. Japan was third in all categories except back doors, for which it
ranked second.
the rankings within the region for trojans are largely due to the Gampass trojan, the top ranked sample in
ApJ, which heavily affected users in China and taiwan (table 6). the online gaming market in China alone
is projected to top $1 billion USD by the end of 2007.18 With such a large number of online gamers, it is not
surprising that Chinese users would be heavily targeted by Gampass and similar trojans that aim to steal
online gaming account credentials.One high-profile outbreak of worms seen in the region occurred in november 2007, when it was discovered
that a number of Maxtor portable hard drives had been delivered from production with a worm that
was designed to run when the drive was used through the Windows auto-run feature.19 the drives were
manufactured in thailand and sold within the region. the incident was blamed on a Chinese subcontractor
who may have handled the devices at some point before they reached retail customers. the malicious code
attempted to download and install the Gampass trojan.
Fujacks, the number two worm sample in the region, was mostly seen in China and india, which ranked
number one and two for worms, respectively (table 7). As it is classified as both a virus and a worm,
Fujacks is also a driver for the virus rankings for China and india (table 8). An additional explanation,
however, may be the high rates of piracy in these two countries, estimated at 82 percent for China,
and 71 percent for india.20 Viruses typically spread through the copying and use of executable files,
especially those that are from disreputable or unknown sources, as is the case when pirated software
is bought or shared.
As noted above, China was the top country in the region for virus potential infections. As a result, variants
of the Virut family caused a high number of potential infections there.21 this virus also contains back door
capabilities, which may explain why China also had the highest number of back door potential infections in
the region this period (table 9).Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
Rank
1
2
3Top Country/Regio n
China
Taiwan
Japan
Table 6. Top countries/regions for Trojans, APJ
Source: Symantec Corporation
Rank
1
2
3Top Country/Regio n
China
India
Japan
Table 7. Top countries/regions for worms, APJ
Source: Symantec Corporation
Rank
1
2
3Top Country/Regio n
China
India
Japan
Table 8. Top countries/regions for viruses, APJ
Source: Symantec Corporation
Rank
1
2
3Top Country/Regio n
China
Japan
Taiwan
Table 9. Top countries/regions for back doors, APJ
Source: Symantec Corporation
Top malicious code samples
the top malicious code sample causing potential infections for the last six months of 2007 within the A pJ
region was the Gampass trojan (table 10).22 it was also the most commonly reported sample within A pJ in
the previous period. it is not surprising that this is the top sample in A pJ, as online gaming is very popular
in the region and these games are the favorite target of Gampass. popular targets include Lineage, based
in South Korea with millions of players,23 rexue Jianghu, and rohan. Further boosting the overall infection
rate of Gampass is that it is loaded onto a compromised computer by the Mumawow worm,24 the third
ranked sample in A pJ this reporting period.
22 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-111201-3853-99
23 http://pc.gamezone.com/news/12_14_07_04_42pM.htm
24 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-061400-4037-99
19Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
20Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Sample
Gampass
Fujacks
Mumawow
Gammima
Looked
Rontokbro
Netsky
Fubalca
Looked.P
AdclickerType
Trojan
Worm/virus
Virus
Worm
Worm/virus
Worm
Worm
Worm/virus
Worm/virus
TrojanVectors
N/A
CIFS
CIFS
CIFS
CIFS
SMTP
SMTP
CIFS
CIFS
N/AImpact
Steals online gaming
passwords
Modifies HTML files
Downloads other threats
Steals online gaming
passwords
Disables security
applications
Performs DoS attacks
Logs keystrokes
Downloads other threats
and modifies HTML files
Disables security
applications
Clicks advertisements
to generate revenueTop
Reporting
Country/
Region
China
India
China
Taiwan
Taiwan
India
Japan
China
Taiwan
ChinaSecond
Reporting
Country/
Region
Taiwan
China
Taiwan
Australia
China
China
Singapore
Japan
China
Australia
Table 10. Top 10 regional malicious code samples, APJ
Source: Symantec Corporation
Fujacks was the second most common sample causing potential infections in the region. this instance of
malicious code is interesting for two reasons. First, it attempts to modify H tML files on a local file system
by seeking out common Web format files (.html, .aspx, etc), and any such files it locates will be appended
with an invisible iframe. Second, if and when a browser views that H tML content, either locally or remotely,
the browser will be redirected to a malicious Web site where a code download is attempted.
the most substantial change in the malicious code landscape within A pJ has been the arrival of the Fujacks
worm. this instance of malicious code appears to have had great success in propagation, with nearly as
many potential infections this period as top-ranked Gampass. this may have contributed to its high rate
of potential infections during this period, and may result in other malicious code authors attempting to adopt
and improve on this type of file infector for future attacks. the characteristics that Fujacks exhibits are part
of a rising trend in malicious code targeting removable media that Symantec has observed recently, as
discussed in the current volume of the Internet Security Threat Report Executive Summary .
the third ranked malicious code sample causing potential infections in A pJ was the Mumawow worm.
this is a file-infector virus that spreads over C iFS file shares and, as mentioned above, attempts to load
a variant of Gampass onto a user’s computer.Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
Top new malicious code families
the top new malicious code families observed in A pJ for the last six months of 2007 closely correlate with
the top families observed globally. the top ranked new malicious code family during this reporting period,
both in A pJ and worldwide, was the invadesys25 worm (table 11). this worm propagates by copying itself
to all fixed, removable, and mapped network drives. it also lowers security settings on the compromised
computer by terminating certain processes. the worm may also delete files with certain extensions such
as .avi and .mpg; however, the most notable impact of this worm is that it prepends its code to any Web
pages on the compromised computer.
Users frequently store the pages for personal Web sites on their local drive and upload any modified
pages. Web pages that are infected by invadesys would potentially be uploaded to the user’s hosting
provider the next time modifications were uploaded. this could result in visitors to the user’s site being
compromised when they view an infected page.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Sample
Invadesys
Niuniu
Farfli
Blastclan
Pidief
Pagipe f
Mondezimia
Reapall
Kaxela
MimbotType
Worm
Worm/virus
Trojan
Worm
Trojan
Worm/virus
Virus
Trojan
Worm
WormPropagation
Vectors
CIFS
CIFS
N/A
CIFS
N/A
CIFS
CIFS
N/A
Worm
MSN MessengerImpact
Lowers security settings and
modifies Web pages
Modifies Web pages
Downloads other threats and
modifies Internet Explorer®
Start Page
Disables security applications
Exploits Adobe Acrobat
vulnerability to lower security
settings and download
other threats
Modifies Web pages
Modifies Web pages
Downloads other threats
Downloads other threats
Allows remote accessTop
Reporting
Country/
Region
China
China
China
India
Japan
China
Singapor e
China
China
Singapor eSecond
Reporting
Country/
Region
Taiwan
Malaysia
Taiwan
Nepal
Australia
Taiwan
Malaysia
Taiwan
Taiwan
Australia
Table 11. Top 10 new malicious code families, APJ
Source: Symantec Corporation
the niuniu26 worm was the second ranked new malicious code family in the A pJ region this period. this
worm is similar to the invadesys worm in that it propagates by copying itself to all fixed, removable,
and mapped network drives on the compromised computer. the worm also modifies the user’s internet
explorer start page to a Web site that the attacker likely controls.
25 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-111215-5430-99
26 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-101018-5756-99
21Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
27 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-072901-5957-99
28 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume Xii (September 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_09_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 75
29 Maxthon and theWorld are Web browsers that make use of the internet explorer and Firefox rendering engines. As a result, they behave in a similar manner
to these browsers and are also susceptible to the same vulnerabilities.
30 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume Xii (September 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_09_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 81
22Also, like invadesys, niuniu adds code to any Web pages it finds on the compromised computer. However,
rather than adding code to infect users who view the pages, niuniu adds an invisible iframe H tML tag to
the pages. this tag will redirect the user’s browser without his or her knowledge to a Web page that is likely
under the attacker’s control. this technique is similar to that employed in the M pack attack seen in the first
half of 2007.
the Farfli trojan27 was the third most common new malicious code family in the second half of 2007 in
the A pJ region. this trojan is capable of downloading and installing other threats onto the compromised
computer. this is a continuation of the trend of increasing multistage attacks that was noted in the
previous version of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report .28 in a multistage attack, an initial
compromise takes place that is intended to facilitate the launch of subsequent attack activity.in addition to installing other threats on the compromised computer, Farfli also changes the user’s internet
explorer homepage to one the attacker likely controls. this is presumably done to generate revenue for
the attacker through affiliate advertising clicks. For each compromised computer that opens the page, the
attacker would receive payment from banner advertising. it is also notable that this trojan changes the search settings for the Maxthon and theWorld Web
browsers.29 the settings are changed to use the same revenue-generating pages as previously described.
these two Web browsers do not have the same market share as other browsers that are more commonly
targeted. this may indicate that Farfli was written to target a certain group of users. Both of these browsers
are developed and maintained by Chinese companies, which may indicate that the author of the trojan is
specifically targeting Chinese users. Another indication that Chinese users are specifically targeted is that
Farfli changes the search settings to use a popular Chinese search engine. this exemplifies the continuing
trend of regionalization of malicious code that was noted in the previous version of the Symantec Internet
Security Threat Report .30
Threats to confidential information
Some malicious code programs are designed specifically to expose confidential information that is stored on an infected computer. these threats may expose sensitive data such as system information, confidential
files and documents, or logon credentials. Some malicious code threats, such as back doors, can give a remote attacker complete control over a compromised computer. threats to confidential information are
a particular concern because of their potential for use in criminal activities. With the widespread use of online shopping and internet banking, compromises of this nature can result in significant financial loss,
particularly if credit card information or banking details are exposed.
Within the enterprise, exposure of confidential information can lead to significant data leakage. if it
involves customer-related data—such as credit card information—customer confidence in the enterprise
can be severely undermined. Moreover, it can also violate local laws. Sensitive corporate information,
including financial details, business plans, and proprietary technologies, could also be leaked from
compromised computers. Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
23it should be noted that threats that expose confidential information may employ more than one method to
do so. As a result, cumulative percentages discussed in this metric may exceed 100 percent.
For the last six months of 2007 in the A pJ region, 51 percent of the malicious code threats observed in
the A pJ region constituted a threat to confidential information (figure 3). this is a slight decrease from
57 percent observed in the first six months of the year. Worldwide, 68 percent of threats were classified
as a potential threat to confidential information.
PeriodJan–Jun 200751%
Jul–Dec 200757%Percentage of top 50 threats that expose
confidential information
Figure 3. Threats to confidential information by volume, APJ
Source: Symantec Corporation
Confidential information threats with keystroke logging capability were the most common method employed by malicious code targeting the A pJ region for this period, with 74 percent of the threats
having this capability (figure 4). this is a slight decrease from the previous period, when 78 percent
of regional threats had keystroke logging functionality.
A keystroke logger records keystrokes on a compromised computer and either emails the log to the attacker or uploads it to a Web site under the attacker’s control. the attacker can use these logs to
extract the user’s credentials for different types of accounts, such as online banking, trading sites,
or iSp account access. the information can then be used as a stepping stone to launch further attacks.
Keystroke logging may rank especially high in relation to other information retrieval methods in A pJ
because of the popularity of online games and attempts by attackers to steal gaming credentials from users. to steal game credentials, it would be easier to use a keystroke logger than to write specialized
code that interfaces with the game, especially if several different online games are targeted.Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
31 http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/biz_view.asp?newsidx=2660&categoryCode=123
2456%
74%86%
76%
68%
49%
RegionPercentage of confidential
information exposure threat s
Exports email addresse sExports user data
Exports system data
Globa l APJ71%
71%69%Keystroke logger
Allows remote access
65%
Figure 4. Threats to confidential information by type, APJ
Source: Symantec Corporation
threats that export user data reported amounted to 65 percent of regional threat volume in A pJ for this
period, a decrease from the 79 percent observed in the first half of the year. Of the top 50 threats in the
region, twelve have functionality that allow for the export of user data. the number one threat in the
region, Gampass, attempts to obtain credentials for various online games popular in A pJ countries. the
overall proportional decrease may mean that malicious code authors targeting the region are focusing
their efforts on obtaining information related to online game activities, rather than personal information. the market at this point for virtual items may be better than for personal information.
31
the proportion of threats in A pJ for the second half of the year that attempt to extract email addresses is
much lower than what was seen globally, 49 percent compared to 68 percent, respectively. the regional
proportion in the first half of the year was 51 percent. in the previous APJ Internet Security Threat Report ,
the disparity between the percentages for attempts to export email addresses in A pJ and worldwide was
thought to be due to the higher proportion of spam that is composed in english. Symantec believes that
this is still true, and anticipates that spam will continue grow in the A pJ region. Malicious code will likely
reflect this trend by including email harvesting features in the future.Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
Propagation mechanisms
Worms and viruses use various means to transfer themselves, or propagate, from one computer to another.
these are collectively referred to as propagation mechanisms. propagation mechanisms can include a
number of different vectors, such as Simple Mail transfer protocol (SM tp), Common internet File System
(CiFS), peer-to-peer ( p2p), and remotely exploitable vulnerabilities. Some malicious code may even use
other malicious code as a propagation vector by locating a computer that has been compromised by a back
door server and using it to upload and install itself.
this metric will discuss some of the propagation mechanisms used by malicious code samples in A pJ
reported to Symantec during the second half of 2007. it should be noted that many malicious code samples
employ multiple propagation mechanisms in an effort to increase the probability of successful propagation.
As a result, cumulative percentages included in this discussion may exceed 100 percent.the top propagation vector in A pJ during this period was file sharing executables, with 55 percent of the
total (table 12). this vector has increased in rank and proportion since the last reporting period, when
it ranked third with 33 percent of regional threats. Globally, file sharing executables ranked first, with
40 percent of the total.
this propagation vector is usually associated with physical sharing of files, the traditional method
employed by the original file infecting computer viruses. Overall, there is a trend indicating the increasing
effectiveness of this classic propagation path, which is largely attributable to the increasing capacity
and use of removable media, such as USB keys and portable hard drives. these high-capacity and highly
portable storage devices allow individuals to easily exchange large amounts of data. the higher proportion
within A pJ may also be due to the higher levels of software piracy in the region.32
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Propagation Mechanism
File sharing executables
File transfer/CIFS
File transfer/email attachment
File sharing/P2P
Remotely exploitable vulnerability
File transfer
File transfer/HTTP/embedded URI/Yahoo! Messenger
Web
Email
File transfer/Yahoo! MessengerRegional
Percentage
55%
30%
24%
15%
11%
40%
30%
10%
10%
10%Global
Percentage
40%
28%
32%
19%
17%
2%
2%
1%
1%
2%
Table 12. Propagation vectors, APJ
Source: Symantec Corporation
32 http://www.zdnetasia.com/news/software/0,39044164,62013101,00.htm
25Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
33 CiFS is a file sharing protocol that allows files and other resources on a computer to be shared with other computers across the internet. One or more directories
on a computer can be shared to allow other computers to access the files within.
34 http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-052712-1531-99
35 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/05/mpack_packed_full_of_badness.html
26transfers using the Windows® file sharing protocol (C iFS) was the second ranked propagation vector in A pJ
for the last six months of 2007, with 30 percent of the total.33 this is slightly more than the 28 percent
reported globally, but less than the 34 percent reported for the region in the first half of 2007. the large
proportions and the fact that five of the top 10 submissions in this period propagate via C iFS shares
indicate that this vector is still effective.
the third most commonly seen propagation vector is transmission via email attachment. this method
declined substantially in A pJ this period from last, dropping to 24 percent for the last six months of the
year from 37 percent in the first half. File transfers using email attachments also declined worldwide,
although the global proportion remains higher, at 32 percent, than the 24 percent reported in A pJ.
Malicious code that modifies Web pages
in May 2007, the attack kit M pack34 was observed in the wild. this kit compromised Web pages, typically
through the insertion of iframes, to redirect users to an M pack server that attempted to exploit Web
browser and plug-in vulnerabilities and install malicious code on computers.35 this kit experienced
great success because it took advantage of users visiting legitimate, trusted Web pages that had been compromised. Since the Web browser is a user’s primary gateway to the internet, frequently visited, trusted
sites—such as online forums and other internet communities—are a valuable attack vector.
For the first time, in this volume of the APJ Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is examining malicious
code that modifies Web pages on a compromised computer in the region. Only threats that modify pages in order to propagate or redirect users were examined. those that simply deface the pages by adding text or
simple images are not included in this metric.
For the last six months of 2007, 18 percent of malicious code samples in the A pJ region had the ability
to modify Web pages (figure 5). this is significantly more than the seven percent observed globally, and
a substantial increase from the five percent recorded in the A pJ region during the first half of 2007. One
explanation for the greater percentage in A pJ is because three of the top malicious code samples and three
of the top new malicious code families in the region modify H tML code as a means of propagation. Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
PeriodJul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 20075%
Jul–Dec 200718%
0%
Figure 5. Malicious code modifying Web pages, APJ
Source: Symantec Corporation
the 18 percent observed in A pJ indicates the success of this propagation vector for developers of malicious
code. For example, the number two ranked malicious code sample, Fujacks, was designed to modify local
HtML code. As mentioned previously, the number of potential infections associated with Fujacks was very
high in A pJ. this may be partly due to its modification of H tML content to propagate. Also contributing to
the proportion seen this period is Fubalca,36 which loads Gampass on infected computers and attempts to
spread via removable media and H tML files.
Adoption of this technique has also been seen in three of the top new malicious code families within A pJ
in this reporting period. this includes: second ranked niuniu, discussed earlier; pagipef37, which attempts
to write to H tML files found on a compromised system, as well as attempting to spread over removable
media; and Mondezimia,38 which attempts to add malicious code to both H tML and VBS files, as well as
attempting to spread through removable media.
the increasing development of attacks designed to modify Web pages continues a trend being observed
by Symantec indicating that the Web has become the primary target as an attack vector. this may be
partly due to improvements in security measures in areas such as software and network infrastructures,
but it could also be the result of the success attackers are having in targeting end users through the Web.
36 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-040106-1154-99
37 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-111716-1413-99
38 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-102617-2436-99
27Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
Malicious code—protection and mitigation
Symantec recommends that certain best security practices always be followed to protect against
malicious code infection. Administrators should keep patch levels up to date, especially on computers
that host public services and applications—such as H ttp, Ftp, SM tp, and D nS servers—and that are
accessible through a firewall or placed in a DMZ. email servers should be configured to only allow file
attachment types that are required for business needs and to block email that appears to come from
within the company, but that actually originates from external sources. Additionally, Symantec recommends
that ingress and egress filtering be put in place on perimeter devices to prevent unwanted activity.
to protect against malicious code that installs itself through a Web browser, additional measures should
be taken. the use of ipS technologies can prevent exploitation of browser and plug-in vulnerabilities
through signatures and behavior-based detection in addition to ASL r.
end users should employ defense-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software
and a personal firewall. Users should update antivirus definitions regularly. they should also ensure that
all desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their
software vendors. they should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless it is expected
and comes from a trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
28Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
Phishing Trends
phishing is an attempt by a third party to solicit confidential information from an individual, group, or
organization, often for financial gain. phishers are groups or individuals who attempt to trick users into
disclosing personal data, such as credit card numbers, online banking credentials, and other sensitive
information. they may then use the information to commit fraudulent acts.
the data provided in this section is based on statistics derived from the Symantec probe network, a
system of over two million decoy accounts in more than 30 countries that attracts email from around the world to gauge global spam and phishing activity. it encompasses more than 600 participating
enterprises worldwide, attracting email that is representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 million mailboxes. the probe network consists of previously used email addresses as well as email
accounts that have been generated solely to be used as probes.
this section of the Symantec APJ Internet Security Threat Report will discuss the following specific
phishing activities that Symantec detected in the A pJ region between July 1 and December 31, 2007:
• top countries hosting phishing Web sites and top targets phished
• phishing Web site top-level domains
• phishing—protection and mitigation
Top countries hosting phishing Web sites and top targets phished
A phishing Web site is a site that is designed to mimic the legitimate Web site of the organization whose
brand is being spoofed, often an online bank or e-commerce retailer. in many cases, it is set up by the
attacker to capture a victim’s authentication information or other personal identification information,
which can then be used in identity theft or other fraudulent activity.
this section of the Symantec APJ Internet Security Threat Report will discuss the top A pJ countries in
which phishing attacks associated with phishing sites were hosted, and the type of service offered by
the organizations whose brands those phishing Web sites most frequently spoofed. readers should
note that phishing Web sites differ from phishing hosts, which are computers that can host one or more
phishing Web sites, and which are discussed in “Malicious activity by country” in the “Attack trends” section
of this report.
the data discussed in this section is a snapshot in time and, therefore, does not have insight into changes
in the locations of certain phishing Web sites throughout the period. it should also be noted that just
because a phishing Web site is hosted in a certain country, it does not necessarily mean that the attacker
is located in the same country.
During the last six months of 2007, China was home to the highest percentage of phishing attacks
associated with phishing Web sites in A pJ, with 69 percent of the region’s total (table 13). China had the
second highest number of phishing attacks associated with phishing Web sites worldwide during this
period, accounting for 14 percent of the total.
29Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
30China’s high ranking in this category is not surprising, as it was the top A pJ country for all malicious
activities during the last half of the year except for bot command-and-control servers, for which it ranked
second. Some of these categories could contribute to phishing activity. For instance, spam zombies are
compromised computers that are used to relay spam messages, some of which could include links to
phishing Web sites. Additionally, bot-infected computers can be used to host phishing Web sites on a
compromised computer, and phishing hosts are used to host one or more phishing Web sites. A high
ranking in all of these categories is likely to contribute to a high number of phishing Web sites.
two other considerations may also influence the number of phishing Web sites located in a country—
the number of domains hosted there and the number of Web-hosting companies. the number of domain
names registered to a country could correlate to the number of Web sites hosted there. As of January
2008, China had the highest number of domain names in the A pJ region and the fifth highest number of
domain names in the world. it is not surprising that it also had the highest number of phishing Web sites.
the higher number of domain names will not necessarily contribute to a higher number of phishing Web
sites; however, it could indicate a higher probability of phishing Web sites, if only as a percentage of the
higher number of domain names.
the second consideration is the number of Web-hosting companies located in the country in question.
phishers can use Web-hosting companies to host phishing Web sites in two ways. First, they can employ
the hosting company to host a Web site legitimately, but use that site for phishing. Second, they can
compromise legitimate Web sites hosted by the company and use them for phishing. At the end of 2007,
China had only the fifth most Web-hosting companies in the A pJ region, behind india, Australia, Japan,
and South Korea. Given this relatively low ranking, it would appear that the high numbers of phishing Web
sites hosted in China are hosted on compromised computers, particularly as the number of bot-infected
computers and spam zombies located there is very high.
in the current volume of the Global Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec observed that many bot
networks are now using a fast-flux domain name service scheme, in which control of the botnet is not
managed through a centralized command-and-control server, but is instead set up as a decentralized
network (somewhat like the internet itself). this makes botnets more difficult to detect and disable. this is
relevant to phishing Web sites because fast-flux allows a single U rL to resolve to a number of different ip
addresses, or computers, by changing the D nS mapping of the U rL rapidly and constantly. in other words,
a single U rL can be used to point to a number of different computers at different times. this functionality
has allowed phishers to host phishing Web sites across a botnet. Because of the decentralized nature of fast-flux, when one phishing Web host is blocked or taken down, the attacker can change the D nS entry
so that the U rL will point to a different computer that has not been blocked or taken down, but that is
hosting the same phishing Web page, allowing the phisher to carry out phishing attacks for longer periods.
As a result, a high number of bot-infected computers may lead to a high number of phishing Web sites.Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
3139 http://www.rsa.com/solutions/consumer_authentication/intelreport/FrArpt_DS_1007.pd f
40 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/12/getting_acquainted_with_rock_p.html
41 http://www.rsa.com/solutions/consumer_authentication/intelreport/FrArpt_DS_1007.pd f
42 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2006/09/contextaware_phishing_realized.html
43 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2006/07/myspace_shockwave_flash_hack.htmlSome observers believe that a substantial number of phishing Web sites located in China may be due to a
single group of phishers known as rock phish,39 who are known for employing particularly sophisticated
phishing techniques.40 they may be using phishing sites in China because these sites may be left in place
for longer periods, making hosting a site there more desirable and allowing attackers to carry out more
attacks. China has the highest amount of malicious activity in the region and the second highest amount worldwide, as discussed in the “Attack trends” section. registrars are also reputed to be more permissive
in China.41 these factors make it reasonable to assume that phishers have an easier time hosting and
maintaining their phishing sites in China.
the top target of phishing attacks associated with Web sites hosted in China during this period was a
social networking site. Social networking pages are easy to obtain and, because these pages are generally
trusted by users, phishing attacks spoofing them may have a better chance of success.42 Once a social
networking page is obtained, it could be used to carry out subsequent attacks, which could be successful
because the page would already be on the network’s domain.these spoofed pages can include links to false downloads that require users to enter confidential
information, such as authentication information or credit card information, that can subsequently be used
for fraudulent purposes. Furthermore, phishers may be able to upload content, such as Flash videos, onto
a spoofed page that will allow the attacker to hijack the page of anyone who visits that page.43
Regional
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Global
Rank
2
4
12
15
18
20
21
23
38
39Country/Region
China
Guam
South Korea
Japan
Taiwan
Thailand
Australia
Malaysia
Indonesia
BangladeshRegional
Percentage
69%
25%
2%
1%
1%
1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%Top Target
Social networking site
Social networking site
Banking site
Online payment system
Banking site
Banking site
Online payment system
Social networking site
Online payment system
Online payment system
Table 13. Top countries/regions hosting phishing Web sites and top targets, APJ
Source: Symantec Corporation
Guam had the second highest number of phishing attacks associated with Web sites in the A pJ region in
this reporting period, with 25 percent of the total. As was the case with China, the top target of phishing
attacks associated with Web sites hosted in Guam during this period was a social networking site. Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
32Guam also had the fourth highest number of phishing attacks associated with Web sites worldwide during
this period, accounting for five percent of all phishing sites globally, a significant percentage for such a
small country. the high rank of Guam for hosting phishing sites, as well as for other malicious activities
this period, is surprising. As of January 2008, Guam had only 2,700 broadband internet subscribers.44
Furthermore, at that time, it had only 1,687 Web domains registered, which is 132nd in the world.45
However, it has well-established broadband internet infrastructure likely because of the importance
of Guam as a U.S. military base—the island is home to six U.S. military installations. An Australian iSp
is even laying an underwater cable from Guam to Sydney to facilitate additional high-speed internet
for Australian users.46 Guam also has significant connectivity to Japan and the United States.47 thus
it appears that broadband connectivity in Guam is expanding rapidly. the security infrastructure may
currently be insufficient for this growth.
phishing Web sites in Guam could be hosted on compromised computers. However, less than one percent
of bot-infected computers in the A pJ region are located in Guam.48 On the other hand, Guam was home to
four percent of the phishing hosts in the A pJ region during this period. this could mean that phishers are
using legitimately hosted Web sites for phishing purposes, or it could mean that they have compromised the
iSps’ servers and are hosting phishing Web sites on them surreptitiously. As of January 2008, Guam was
home to seven Web-hosting companies.49 it is thus likely that phishing Web sites are hosted as legitimate
Web sites on a Guam-based iSp or Web-hosting company. these Web sites may not have been detected.
Currently, broadband connectivity in Guam is expanding rapidly. As Symantec has stated in previous
Internet Security Threat Reports , rapidly expanding iSps are less likely to have sufficient resources to
meet their expanding security needs.
in the second half of 2007, South Korea ranked third for phishing attacks associated with Web sites in the
ApJ region, with two percent of the total. South Korea had the twelfth highest number of phishing attacks
associated with sites worldwide. the presence of South Korea in this category is not particularly surprising, as it has a reasonably well
established history of malicious activity, including phishing.50 During this reporting period, South Korea
had the second most overall malicious activity of any A pJ country, including the second highest number
of phishing hosts in the region. As phishing hosts can host one or more phishing Web sites, this would
obviously contribute to a high number of phishing attacks associated with Web sites located there.
Furthermore, South Korea had the third highest number of bot-infected computers, which could be used to
host phishing sites.in addition to these considerations, South Korea had the fourth highest number of domain names in A pJ.
51
A high number of domain names will not, in and of itself, contribute to a higher number of phishing Web
sites; however, it will indicate a higher probability of phishing Web sites, if only as a percentage of the
higher number Web sites indicated by the higher number of domain names.
44 http://www.point-topic.com
45 http://www.webhosting.info/domains/country_stats/?pi=2&ob=t OtA%20L&oo=DeSC
46 http://whirlpool.net.au/article.cfm/1772
47 http://whirlpool.net.au/article.cfm/1772
48 0.3 percent of bot-infected computers in the Ap J region were located in Guam.
49 http://webhosting.info/webhosts/globalstats/?pi=14&ob=HC&oo=DeSC
50 For instance, in each of the two previous reporting periods, South Korea had the second most malicious activity in the Ap J region.
51 http://www.webhosting.info/domainsSymantec Ap J internet Security threat report
33South Korea had only the sixth highest number of Web-hosting companies at that time despite the higher
number of domains,52 suggesting that these Web-hosting companies were relatively large. Large Web-
hosting companies may be susceptible to hosting phishing Web sites because the larger number of Web
sites managed by those companies may allow phishing sites to exist for a long period in time in relative
obscurity, undetected by the hosting provider.
the top target spoofed by phishing attacks associated with Web sites located in South Korea was a bank
based in the United States. phishing attacks are often motivated by financial gain and organizations in the
financial sector, such as banks, are particularly attractive targets for phishers. it is likely that phishing Web
sites based in South Korea spoofed this bank in order to try to lure customers into entering their banking
information into the fraudulent Web page. this information could then be used by phishers to obtain funds
from the account or use credit cards associated with the account. it is likely that, as the bank is based in
the United States, phishers are targeting users there, as that is where most of the bank’s non-commercial
operations are located.
Phishing Web site top-level domains
Domain names are the words that are used in U rLs to identify particular Web pages, such as www.symantec.com.
they resolve to a specific ip address for a particular Web site and are used because names are easier to
remember than a long string of numbers. the highest level of domain names is the top-level domain ( tLD).
examples include .com (generally used by businesses, but available to anyone), .edu (used by organizations
in the education sector), and .org (predominantly used by non-profit organizations). Understanding the tLDs that are most commonly used in phishing Web sites may help end users, security administrators, and
organizations to understand which of these domains could be most prone to hosting phishing Web sites, and help alert them to potentially malicious sites. it may also help security analysts further identify which
countries or sectors are hosting the most phishing Web sites.
During the last six months of 2007, .cn was the most common tLD used by phishing Web sites in the A pJ
region, accounting for 37 percent of the total (table 14). During this reporting period, the .cn tLD was used
by only 23 percent of phishing Web sites on the internet as a whole, indicating that phishing Web sites
using this tLD were concentrated in the A pJ region. this is not surprising as the .cn domain name is the
assigned country domain of China, which was home to by far the highest percentage of phishing Web sites
in the A pJ region during this reporting period, with 69 percent of the region’s total.
the .cn tLD is currently used by less than one percent of domain names on the internet as a whole.53
However, 23 percent of phishing Web sites worldwide uses this tLD. thus, the number of phishing Web
sites using this tLD is disproportionately very high. this does not necessarily mean that the phishers
using these sites are in China; although the .cn tLD was originally restricted to domain names registered
in China, it has since been made available internationally.54 As a result, it is difficult to ascertain whether
the phishing Web sites using this tLD are located in China or not. rather, it likely indicates that phishers
in indeterminate locations have compromised Chinese Web sites or iSps located in China to host their
phishing Web sites. this supports the previous discussion, in “ top countries hosting phishing Web sites
and top targets phished”, that phishers are taking advantage of permissive domain registration rules in
China to register Web sites in that country that will be used for phishing activity.
52 http://webhosting.info/webhosts/globalstats/?pi=2&ob=HC&oo=DeSC
53 http://www.neulevel.cn/
54 http://www.neulevel.cn/Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
34China was the top A pJ country for all malicious activities during the last six months of the year except for
bot command-and-control servers, for which it ranked second. For the A pJ region during this period, China
had the most bot-infected computers, which can be used to host phishing Web sites. it also had the most
phishing hosts.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Top-level Domain
.cn
.com
.net
.tw
.co.kr
.au
.org
.jp
.kr
.ac.thRegional
Percentage
37%
31%
6%
4%
3%
2%
2%
2%
1%
1%Global
Percentage
23%
44%
6%
0%
0%
0%
3%
0%
0%
0%
Table 14. Top phishing Web sites by top-level domain, APJ
Source: Symantec Corporation
in the second half of 2007, the second most common tLD used by phishing Web sites located in the A pJ
region was .com, which was used by 31 percent of the total. this is not surprising, as .com is the most common
tLD on the internet. it is used by roughly 73 percent of all registered general top-level domain names.55
During this reporting period, it was used by 44 percent of all phishing Web sites detected worldwide.
the percentage of phishing Web sites using the .com tLD is thus somewhat lower than the internet-wide
number, indicating that this tLD is not used by phishing Web sites in the A pJ region in particular. Further,
the number of phishing Web sites in the A pJ region was significantly lower than those using this tLD across
the internet as a whole. this may indicate that phishers in the A pJ region are using phishing Web sites
that are hosted on local tLDs, such as those indicating specific countries. this may indicate that phishing
Web sites located in region are likely targeting clients and customers of local organizations, such as local
financial organizations. Using local tLDs may assist them in this process.
the comparatively low number of .com tLDs in A pJ phishing Web sites may also illustrate the distribution
of tLDs across the internet. By far the majority of domain names using .com are situated in the United
States.56 therefore, it is logical that the number of phishing Web sites using .com is lower in A pJ than
across the internet as a whole.
the third most common tLD used by phishing Web sites in the A pJ region during this period was .net, which
was used by six percent of the total. it was used by the same percentage of phishing Web sites across the
internet as a whole, so it does not appear that phishing sites using .net are particularly concentrated in this
region. this is likely because, similar to the .com tLD, .net is a generic designation, meaning that it may be
used by any number of different organizations or individuals and is not specific to any country or region. it is
currently used by approximately 11 percent of all general top-level domains.57 therefore, the number
of ApJ phishing Web sites using .net is in keeping with its distribution on the internet.
55 http://www.icannwiki.org/Domain_Statistics
56 http://www.webhosting.info/registries/country_stats/US
57 http://www.icannwiki.org/Domain_StatisticsSymantec Ap J internet Security threat report
35Phishing—protection and mitigation
Symantec recommends that enterprise users protect themselves against phishing threats by filtering email
at the server level through the mail transfer agent (M tA). Although this will likely remain the primary point
of filtering for phishing, organizations can also use ip-based filtering upstream, as well as H ttp filtering.
DnS block lists also offer protection against potential phishing emails. Organizations could also consider
using domain-level or email authentication in order to verify the actual origin of an email message. this can
protect against phishers who are spoofing mail domains.58
to protect against potential phishing activity, administrators should always follow Symantec best practices
as outlined in Appendix A of this report. Symantec also recommends that organizations educate their end users about phishing. they should also keep their employees notified of the latest phishing attacks and
how to avoid falling victim to them, and should provide a means to report suspected phishing sites.59
Organizations can also employ Web server log monitoring to track if and when complete downloads of their
Web sites are occurring. Such activity may indicate that someone is using the legitimate Web site to create
an illegitimate Web site that could be used for phishing.
Organizations can detect phishing attacks that use spoofing by monitoring non-deliverable email addresses or bounced email that is returned to non-existent users. they should also monitor the purchasing of
cousin domain names by other entities to identify purchases that could be used to spoof their corporate
domains.60 this can be done with the help of companies that specialize in domain monitoring; some
registrars even provide this service. end users should follow best security practices, as outlined in
“Appendix A” of this report. As some phishing attacks may use spyware and/or keystroke loggers,
Symantec advises end users to use antivirus software, antispam software, firewalls, toolbar blockers, and
other software detection methods. Symantec also advises end users to never disclose any confidential
personal or financial information unless and until they can confirm that any request for such information is
legitimate.
Users should review bank, credit card, and credit information frequently. this can provide information on
any irregular activities. For further information, the internet Computer Complaint Center ( iC3) has also
released a set of guidelines on how to avoid internet-related scams.61 Additionally, network administrators
can review Web proxy logs to determine if any users have visited known phishing sites.
58 Spoofing refers to instances where phishers forge the “From:” line of an email message using the domain of the entity they are targeting with the phishing attempt.
59 A good resource for information on the latest phishing threats can be found at http://www.antiphishing.org
60 “Cousin domains” refers to domain names that include some of the key words of an organization’s domain or brand name; for example, for the corporate domain
“bigbank.com” cousin domains could include “bigbank-alerts.com,” “big-bank-security.com,” and so on.
61 http://www.ic3.gov/preventiontips.aspxSymantec Ap J internet Security threat report
36Spam Trends
Spam is usually defined as junk or unsolicited email sent by a third party. While it is certainly an annoyance
to users and administrators, spam is also a serious security concern as it can be used to deliver trojans,
viruses, and phishing attempts, as well as links to malicious Web sites. it could also cause a loss of service
or degradation in the performance of network resources and email gateways.
this section of the APJ Internet Security Threat Report will discuss developments in spam activity in the A pJ
region between July 1 and December 31, 2007. the following metric will be discussed:
• top countries of spam origin
Top countries of spam origin
the nature of spam makes it difficult to identify the location of people who are sending spam. Many
spammers try to redirect attention away from their actual geographic location. in an attempt to bypass
DnS block lists, they build coordinated networks of bot-infected computers, which allow them to send
spam from sites that are distant from their physical location. Following this logic, the region from which
the spam originates may not correspond with the region in which the spammers are located. this section
will discuss the top 10 originating countries of spam sent from the A pJ region during the last six months
of 2007.
this discussion is based on data gathered by customer installations of Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam™.
this data includes the originating server’s ip address, against which frequency statistics are summarized.
each ip address is mapped to a specific country and charted over time.
twenty-four percent of all spam detected from the A pJ region during this period originated in China, the
most of any country in the region (table 15). this is the same percentage as originated there in the first
half of the year.62 China accounted for four percent of all worldwide spam in the second half of the year.
Sixty-nine percent of all email detected being sent from China during this period was determined to be
spam. this is slightly higher than the previous six-month period.
During this period, China had by far the highest number of spam zombies in the region, accounting for 39 percent of the total. A spam zombie is a computer infected with a bot or some other malicious code that
allows email messages to be relayed. the high number of spam zombies in China contributed to the high
amount of spam originating there in the second half of 2007. this was also likely influenced by the fact
that China had the highest number of bots in the region as well. Many bots are designed to be used mainly
to send spam and are detected as spam zombies.
62 the previous APJ Internet Security Threat Report listed this number as 25 percent; however, due to methodological changes over the past six months, figures for the
previous reporting period have been revised.Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
37Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Current Regiona l
Percentage
24%
20%
20%
17%
5%
4%
2%
2%
2%
1%Country/Regio n
China
Taiwan
Japan
South Korea
India
Malaysia
Thailand
Vietnam
Australia
Singapor ePrevious Regional
Percentage
24%
19%
23%
19%
4%
2%
1%
2%
2%
1%Current Global
Percentage
4%
3%
3%
3%
1%
1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
Table 15. Top 10 countries/regions of spam origin, APJ
Source: Symantec Corporation
the second highest volume of spam detected from the A pJ region during this reporting period originated
in taiwan, which accounted for 20 percent of the total, slightly more than the 19 percent recorded in the
previous period. the number is likely due to the fact that taiwan is home to the fourth highest number of
spam zombies in the A pJ region, with nine percent of the total. it also had the second most bot-infected
computers in the region, many of which could be used to send spam.
taiwan experienced the most dramatic increase in spam in the A pJ region in the first half of 2007. At that
time, Symantec posited that this may have been due to one or two high-volume, short-term campaigns.
However, taiwan’s continued high standing indicates that spammers have become entrenched there.
Given the high number of spam zombies and bot-infected computers, it is likely that spammers are using
compromised computers, as opposed to legitimate mail servers, as spam relays.
Japan had the third highest volume of spam in the A pJ region in the last six months of 2007, accounting
for 20 percent of the region’s total. this is a decrease from the 23 percent of A pJ spam that originated in
Japan in the first half of 2007. Japan had the fourth highest number of bot-infected computers in the region during this period. it
also had the sixth highest number of spam zombies in the region. the relatively low numbers for these
considerations, combined with the high volume of spam originating in Japan, may indicate that spammers
in that country are using compromised mail servers elsewhere to send their bulk messages. Japan has a
high number of legitimate email servers that could be used illicitly to relay spam. it is also home to a large
number of iSps. A compromised computer can be used to gain access to the computer’s iSp mail server
or any other email server that can be accessed by the computer’s owner, including free email accounts.
Spam can then be sent through the compromised computer to the legitimate mail server and through to
its destination. When a country has numerous legitimate mail servers, it is likely that many of them will be used to send spam. this is especially true if any of the servers are wrongly configured and can be used as
open relays.63
63 An open mail relay is an SMtp (email) server configured in such a way that it allows anyone on the internet to relay (i.e. send) email through it.Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
38Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices
Enterprise Best Practices
• employ defense-in-depth strategies, which emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive
defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protection method.
this should include the deployment of regularly updated antivirus, firewalls, intrusion detection, and
intrusion protection systems on client systems.
• turn off and remove services that are not needed.
• if malicious code or some other threat exploits one or more network services, disable or block access
to those services until a patch is applied.
• Always keep patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host public services and are accessible
through the firewall, such as H ttp, Ftp, mail, and D nS services.
• Consider implementing network compliance solutions that will help keep infected mobile users out
of the network (and disinfect them before rejoining the network).
• enforce an effective password policy.
• Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments that are commonly
used to spread viruses, such as .VBS, .BA t, .eXe, .piF, and .SC r files.
• isolate infected computers quickly to prevent the risk of further infection within the organization.
perform a forensic analysis and restore the computers using trusted media.
• train employees to not open attachments unless they are expected and come from a known and
trusted source, and to not execute software that is downloaded from the internet unless it has
been scanned for viruses.
• ensure that emergency response procedures are in place. this includes having a backup-and-restore
solution in place in order to restore lost or compromised data in the event of successful attack or
catastrophic data loss.
• educate management on security budgeting needs.
• test security to ensure that adequate controls are in place.
• Be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file-
sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software. Clicking on links
and/or attachments in email messages (or iM messages) may also expose computers to unnecessary
risks. ensure that only applications approved by the organization are deployed on desktop computers.Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
39Consumer Best Practices
• Consumers should use an internet security solution that combines antivirus, firewall, intrusion
detection, and vulnerability management for maximum protection against malicious code and
other threats.
• Consumers should ensure that security patches are up to date and that they are applied to all
vulnerable applications in a timely manner.
• Consumers should ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers, and should change them
often. passwords should not consist of words from the dictionary.
• Consumers should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is
expected and the purpose of the attachment is known.
• Consumers should keep virus definitions updated regularly. By deploying the latest virus definitions,
consumers can protect their computers against the latest viruses known to be spreading in the wild.
• Consumers should routinely check to see if their operating system is vulnerable to threats by using
Symantec Security Check at www.symantec.com/securitycheck.
• Consumers should deploy an antiphishing solution. they should never disclose any confidential
personal or financial information unless and until they can confirm that any request for such
information is legitimate.
• Consumers can get involved in fighting cybercrime by tracking and reporting intruders. With Symantec
Security Check’s tracing service, users can quickly identify the location of potential hackers and forward the information to the attacker’s iSp or local police.
• Consumers should be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with the
installation of file-sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software. Clicking on links and/or attachments in email messages (or iM messages) may also expose computers to
unnecessary risks. ensure that only applications approved by the organization are deployed on desktop
computers.
• Some security risks can be installed after an end user has accepted the end-user license agreement (eULA), or as a consequence of that acceptance. Consumers should read eULAs carefully and
understand all terms before agreeing to them.
• Consumers should be aware of programs that flash ads in the user interface. Many spyware programs
track how users respond to these ads, and their presence is a red flag. When users see ads in a
program’s user interface, they may be looking at a piece of spyware.Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
40Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology
Attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec Global
intelligence network, which includes the Symantec DeepSight threat Management System, Symantec
Managed Security Services, and the Symantec Honeypot network. Symantec combines data derived from
these sources for analysis.
Malicious activity by country
to determine the top countries for the “Malicious activity by country” metric, Symantec compiles
geographical data on each type of malicious activity to be considered. this includes bot-infected
computers, bot command-and-control servers, phishing Web sites, malicious code infections, spam relay hosts, and internet attacks. the proportion of each activity originating in each country is then
determined. the mean of the percentages of each malicious activity that originates in each country
is calculated. this average determines the proportion of overall malicious activity that originates from
the country in question and is used to rank each country.
Top countries of attack origin
Symantec identifies the national sources of attacks by automatically cross-referencing source ip addresses
of every attacking ip with several third-party, subscription-based databases that link the geographic
location of systems to source ip addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small
margin of error.
Denial-of-service attacks
Although there are numerous methods for carrying out DoS attacks, Symantec derives this metric by measuring DoS attacks that are carried out by flooding a target with S yn requests. these are often referred
to as S yn flood attacks. this type of attack works by overwhelming a target with S yn requests and not
completing the initial request, which thus prevents other valid requests from being processed.
in many cases, S yn requests with forged ip addresses are sent to a target, allowing a single attacking
computer to initiate multiple connections, resulting in unsolicited traffic, known as backscatter, being sent
to other computers on the internet. this backscatter is used to derive the number of DoS attacks observed
throughout the reporting period. Although the values Symantec derives from this metric will not identify
all DoS attacks carried out, it will highlight DoS attack trends.
to determine the countries targeted by DoS attacks, Symantec cross-references the target ip addresses
of every attack with several third-party, subscription-based databases that link the geographic location
of systems to source ip addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin
of error.
Sectors targeted by DoS attacks were identified using the same methodology as targeted countries.
However, in this case, attackers who were considered were those carrying out a set of DoS attacks that were detected by iDS and ipS software.Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
Bot-infected computers
Symantec identifies bot-infected computers based on coordinated scanning and attack behavior that is
observed in global network traffic. An active bot-infected computer is one that carries out at least one
attack per day. this does not have to be continuous; rather, a single computer can be active on a number
of different days. Attacks are defined as any malicious activity carried out over a network that has been detected by an iDS or firewall.
For an attacking computer to be considered to be participating in coordinated scanning and attacking, it must fit into that pattern to the exclusion of any other activity. this behavioral matching will not catch
every bot-infected computer, and may identify other malicious code or individual attackers behaving in a coordinated way as a botnet. this behavioral matching will, however, identify many of the most
coordinated and aggressive bot-infected computers. it will also give insight into the population trends of
bot-infected computers, including those that are considered to be actively working in a well coordinated
and aggressive fashion at some point in time during the reporting period.
Bot-infected computers by countries and cities
to determine the geolocation of bot-infected computers, Symantec cross-references the ip addresses of
every identified bot-infected computer with several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic location of systems to ip addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a
small margin of error. Only cities that can be determined with a confidence rating of at least four out of
five are included for consideration. the data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of
bot-infected computers.
41Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
42Appendix C—Malicious Code Trends Methodology
Malicious code trends are based on statistics from malicious code samples reported to Symantec for
analysis. Symantec gathers data from over 120 million client, server, and gateway systems that have
deployed Symantec’s antivirus products in both consumer and corporate environments. the Symantec
Digital immune System and Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting
process. Observations in this section are based on empirical data and expert analysis of this data. the
data and analysis draw primarily from the two databases described below.
Infection database
to help detect and eradicate computer viruses, Symantec developed the Symantec AntiVirus research
Automation (SA rA) technology. Symantec uses this technology to analyze, replicate, and define a large
subset of the most common computer viruses that are quarantined by Symantec Antivirus customers.
On average, SA rA receives hundreds of thousands of suspect files daily from both enterprise and individual
consumers located throughout the world. Symantec then analyzes these suspect files, matching them with
virus definitions. An analysis of this aggregate data set provides statistics on infection rates for different
types of malicious code.
Malicious code database
in addition to infection data, Symantec Security response analyzes and documents attributes for each
new form of malicious code that emerges both in the wild and in a “zoo” (or controlled laboratory)
environment. Descriptive records of new forms of malicious code are then entered into a database for
future reference. For this report, a historical trend analysis was performed on this database to identify,
assess, and discuss any possible trends, such as the use of different infection vectors and the frequency
of various types of payloads. in some cases, Symantec antivirus products may initially detect new malicious code heuristically or by
generic signatures. these may later be reclassified and given unique detections. Because of this, there
may be slight variance in the presentation of the same data set from one volume of the Internet Security
Threat Report to the next.
Geographic location of malicious code instances
Several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic locations of systems to ip
addresses are used along with proprietary Symantec technology to determine the location of computers
reporting malicious code instances. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin
of error. the data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of malicious code instances. Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
Appendix D—Phishing Trends Methodology
phishing attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec probe
network. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam data is assessed to gauge the growth in phishing attempts as
well as the percentage of internet mail that is determined to be phishing attempts. Symantec Brightmail
AntiSpam field data consists of statistics reported back from customer installations that provide feedback
about the detection behaviors of antifraud filters as well as the overall volume of mail being processed.
it should be noted that different monitoring organizations use different methods to track phishing
attempts. Some groups may identify and count unique phishing messages based solely on specific content
items such as subject headers or U rLs. these varied methods can often lead to differences in the number
of phishing attempts reported by different organizations.
Top countries hosting phishing Web sites
the data for this section is determined by gathering links in phishing email messages and cross-referencing
the addresses with several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic locations of systems to ip addresses. in this case, Symantec counts phishing Web sites as the number of unique ip
addresses hosting Web pages used for phishing. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error. the data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of phishing
Web sites.
Phishing Web site top-level domains
the data for this section is determined by deriving the top-level domains of each distinct phishing Web site
UrL. the resulting top-level domains are tabulated and compared proportionately.
43Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
44Appendix E—Spam Trends Methodology
the Symantec probe network is a system of over two million decoy accounts in over 30 countries that
attract email messages from around the world. it encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises
and attracts email samples that are representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 million
mailboxes. the probe network includes accounts in countries in the Americas, europe, Asia, Africa, and
Australia/Oceania.
Spam trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from both the Symantec probe
network as well as Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam software
reports statistics to the Brightmail Logistical Operations Center (BLOC) indicating messages processed,
messages filtered, and filter-specific data.
Symantec has classified different filters so that spam statistics and phishing statistics can be determined
separately. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data includes data reported back from customer
installations providing feedback from antispam filters as well as overall mail volume being processed.Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam only gathers data at the SM tp layer and not the network layer, where D nS
block lists typically operate. this is because SM tp-layer spam filtering is more accurate than network-
layer filtering and is able to block spam missed at the network layer. network-layer filtering takes place
before email reaches the enterprise mail server. As a result, data from the SM tp layer is a more accurate
reflection of the impact of spam on the mail server itself.
Sample set normalization
Due to the numerous variables influencing a company’s spam activity, Symantec focuses on identifying
spam activity and growth projections with Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data from enterprise
customer installations. this normalization yields a more accurate summary of internet spam trends by
ruling out problematic and laboratory test servers that produce smaller sample sets.
Top countries of spam origin
the data for this section is determined by calculating the frequency of originating server ip addresses
in email messages that trigger antispam filters in the field. the ip addresses are mapped to their host
country of origin and the data is summarized by country based on monthly totals. the percentage of spam
per country is calculated from the total spam detected in the field.
it should be noted that the location of the computer from which spam is detected being sent is not
necessarily the location of the spammer. Spammers can build networks of compromised computers
globally and thereby use computers that are geographically separate from their location.Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec
Corporation.
nO WArrAnty . the technical information is being delivered to you as is and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its accuracy or use. Any use of the
technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user. Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical
errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice.
|
S yM An t e C e n t e r p r i Se SeC Ur i t ySymantec EMEA Internet
Security Threat Report
trends for July–December 07
Volume Xiii, published April 2008Dean Turner
executive editor
Director, Global intelligence network
Symantec Security response
Marc Fossi
Manager, DevelopmentSymantec Security response
Eric Johnsoneditor
Symantec Security response
Trevor MackAssociate editor
Symantec Security response
Joseph Blackbirdthreat Analyst
Symantec Security response
Stephen Entwisle
threat Analyst
Symantec Security response
Mo King Low
threat Analyst
Symantec Security response
David McKinney
threat Analyst
Symantec Security response
Candid Wueest
Analyst
Symantec Security responseOverview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
Highlights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Attack Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Malicious Code Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Phishing Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
Spam Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
Appendix C—Malicious Code Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Appendix D— Phishing Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Appendix E— Spam Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46ContentsVolume
.
XIII,
.
Published
.
April
.
2008
Symantec EMEA Internet
Security Threat ReportSymantec eMeA internet Security threat report
Overview
the Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report provides a six-month update of internet threat activity
that Symantec has observed in the europe, Middle east, and Africa ( eMeA) region. it includes analysis
of network-based attacks, a review of known vulnerabilities, and highlights of malicious code. it also
discusses numerous issues related to online fraud, including phishing and spam. this volume covers
the six-month period from July 1 to December 31, 2007.
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of internet threat data in the world.
the Symantec™ Global intelligence network encompasses worldwide security intelligence data gathered
from a wide range of sources, including more than 40,000 sensors monitoring networks in over 180
countries through Symantec products and services such as Symantec DeepSight™ threat Management
System and Symantec™ Managed Security Services, and from other third-party sources.
Symantec gathers malicious code reports from over 120 million client, server, and gateway systems
that have deployed its antivirus product, and also maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive
vulnerability databases, currently consisting of over 25,000 recorded vulnerabilities (spanning more
than two decades) affecting more than 55,000 technologies from over 8,000 vendors. Symantec also operates the Bug traq™ mailing list, one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion
of vulnerabilities on the internet, which has approximately 50,000 direct subscribers who contribute,
receive, and discuss vulnerability research on a daily basis.
As well, the Symantec probe network, a system of over two million decoy accounts in more than 30
countries, attracts email from around the world to gauge global spam and phishing activity. Symantec
also gathers phishing information through the Symantec phish report network, an extensive antifraud
community of enterprises and consumers whose members contribute and receive fraudulent Web site
addresses for alerting and filtering across a broad range of solutions.
these resources give Symantec’s analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify, analyse, and
provide informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and spam.
the Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report gives enterprises and consumers essential information
to effectively secure their systems now and into the future.
4Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
5Highlights
the following section will offer a brief summary of the security trends that Symantec observed during the
second half of 2007 based on data provided by the sources listed above. these highlights include all of
the metrics that are discussed in the EMEA Internet Security Threat Report .
Attack Trends Highlights
• Germany ranked first for malicious activity in eMeA during the second half of 2007, with 18 percent of
the regional total, a slight drop from 19 percent in the previous period.
• Fifty-two percent of attacks targeting eMeA in the last six months of 2007 originated in the United
States, the top ranked country, compared to 35 percent in the previous reporting period.
• During this period, the United Kingdom was the top ranked country in eMeA for denial-of-service
attacks, with 32 percent of the total, down from 46 percent in the first half of the year.
• Symantec observed an average of 25,344 active bots per day in eMeA for the last six months of 2007,
an increase from the first half of the year when the average was 18,616 active bots per day.
• For the second period in a row, Germany was the top ranked country in eMeA for bot infections, with
18 percent of the total, a decrease from 23 percent in the first half of 2007.
• Madrid was the top city for bot infections in eMeA in the second half of 2007, as it was for the previous
two reporting periods.
Malicious Code Highlights
• trojans were the most common type of malicious code, accounting for 68 percent of the top 50
potential infections in the region, the same percentage as in the first half of the year.
• the United Kingdom was the top reporting country for back doors, trojans, viruses, and worms.
• the Vundo trojan was the top malicious code sample by potential infection in eMeA during the current
reporting period; it was also the top ranked sample globally.
• the top new malicious code family reported in eMeA this period was pidief, which exploits a
vulnerability in pDF software.
• in the last six months of 2007, 67 percent of the malicious activity observed in eMeA was considered
a threat to confidential information, an increase from 61 percent in the previous period.
• in the last six months of 2007 in eMeA, 91 percent of confidential information threats had remote
access capabilities, compared to 87 percent in the previous six months.Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
6• During the current reporting period, the most common propagation method for malicious code was
through email attachments, making up 37 percent of potential infections in eMeA, a decline from
49 percent in the previous reporting period.
• in the second half of 2007, five percent of the volume of the top 50 samples in eMeA had the capability
to modify Web pages, unchanged from the first half of 2007.
Phishing and Spam Trends Highlights
• in the second half of 2007, romania was home to the most phishing Web sites in eMeA, with 46 percent
of the regional total. the most commonly spoofed brand for phishing Web sites hosted in romania was
a social networking site.
• in the second half of 2007, the most common top-level domain used by known phishing Web sites
situated in the eMeA region was .com, which was used by 24 percent of the total.
• the highest source of spam in eMeA this period was the United Kingdom, with 15 percent of the
region’s total, the same percentage and rank as the previous reporting period.Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
Attack Trends
the malicious activity discussed in this section includes not only attack activity, but also phishing Web
sites hosted, malicious code, spam zombies, bot-infected computers, and command-and-control server
activity. Attacks are defined as any malicious activity carried out over a network that has been detected by
an intrusion detection system ( iDS) or firewall. Definitions for the other types of malicious activity can be
found in their respective sections of this report.
this section of the EMEA Internet Security Threat Report will analyse the following attack activities that
Symantec observed in eMeA between July 1 and December 31, 2007:
• Malicious activity by country
• top countries of attack origin
• top countries targeted by denial of service attacks
• Bot-infected computers
• Bot-infected computers by country
• Bot-infected computers by city
• Attacks—protection and mitigation
Malicious activity by country
this metric will assess the countries in which the most malicious activity took place or originated in eMeA.
to determine this, Symantec compiles geographical data on numerous malicious activities, including bot-
infected computers, bot command-and-control servers, phishing Web site hosts, malicious code incidents,
spam relay hosts, and internet attacks.
to determine the proportion of internet-wide malicious activity that originated in each country, the mean of
the proportion of all the considered malicious activities that originated in each country was calculated. this
average determined the proportion of overall malicious activity that originated from the country in question and was used to rank each country within the eMeA region. this section will discuss those findings.
Germany ranked first for malicious activity in eMeA during the second half of 2007, with 18 percent, a
slight drop from 19 percent in the previous period (table 1). it is not surprising that, within the region, the
country with the highest number of broadband subscribers has the greatest proportion of malicious activity.
As was seen in the previous reporting period, Germany ranks first in all categories except malicious code, which reflects its dominance in broadband subscribers and overall internet usage within eMeA.
7Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
Current
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
2
3
5
4
6
9
8
10
11Country
Germany
United Kingdom
France
Spain
Italy
Polan d
Turkey
Netherlands
Russi a
SwedenCurrent
Percentage
18%
11%
9%
8%
8%
5%
5%
5%
4%
3%Previous
Percentage
19%
11%
9%
8%
8%
5%
3%
4%
3%
2%Malicious
Code
Rank
3
1
6
4
5
10
12
9
17
16Spam
Zombies
Rank
1
8
4
6
3
5
2
19
7
34Command-
and-Control
Server Rank
1
2
6
10
4
13
8
5
9
3Phishing
Web
Sites
Host
Rank
1
4
3
9
7
8
20
2
5
6Bot
Rank
1
6
5
2
3
4
7
15
9
17Attack
Origin
Rank
1
3
4
2
5
6
7
10
14
9
ETableXX_MalicousCountry_v1. epsTable 1. Malicious activity by country, EMEA
Source: Symantec Corporation
Hosts based in the United Kingdom were responsible for the second highest proportion of malicious
activity in eMeA during this period, with 11 percent of the total, unchanged from the previous six months.
the only category in which the United Kingdom ranked first is for malicious code activity, which may
correlate to its rank as the top country for trojans and back door submissions, the two most prevalent
classes of malicious code.
One area of change for the United Kingdom is in its ranking for hosted phishing sites, which dropped to
fourth this period from second in the previous period. the Office of Fair trading (OF t),1 the department
of the UK government responsible for consumer protection, has been working to increase awareness of phishing and other internet scams since 2005.
2 the private sector is also working to combat the problem.
For example, a campaign in 2007 by nationwide Building Society involved the formation of an anti-fraud
group devoted to the implementation of new solutions to automatically track phishing Web sites.3 the
result of these initiatives may have contributed to the reduction in phishing activity in the United Kingdom.
Because awareness of phishing by end-users and customers may reduce the success for operators of
phishing sites, they may be compelled to use other attack methods, such as keystroke loggers, resulting
in a reduction in the number of detected phishing hosts.
Malicious code trends may be influencing phishing activity. Historically, many phishing sites were hosted
on compromised servers, where they would run until they were detected and taken offline. to be successful,
phishing sites must remain undetected for some time because there is a delay between the transmission of phishing email messages, for example, and users actually visiting the site. the increased vigilance in
detecting and removing these Web sites may have contributed to the decline in phishing site rank for the
United Kingdom.
1 http://www.oft.gov.uk/
2 http://www.publictechnology.net/modules.php?op=modload&name= news&file=article&sid=2585
3 http://www.computing.co.uk/computing/news/2188055/nationwide-cracks-phishing
8Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
As well, Symantec is observing the increasing use of malicious code that modifies Web pages. Attackers
may be adopting this tactic because they can no longer as easily create and maintain phishing sites
through traditional means, such as by compromising a Web server. One example is the discovery and
break-up of a major phishing case that included over 10,000 Web sites that had been compromised and
used for phishing attacks.4
France again ranked third in malicious activity for this period, with nine percent of the regional total. For
bot activity, it dropped to fifth for this period, from third previously. For attack activity, it dropped from
third to fourth. For phishing hosts, France went up from fifth in the first half of 2007 to third in this period.
the new French president, nicolas Sarkozy, elected in May 2007, has taken a strong stance against
illegal peer-to-peer ( p2p) file sharing. the French anti-file sharing initiative,5 sponsored by industries
and endorsed by Sarkozy, may affect how iSps operating in France respond to security incidents in the
future. According to the plan, iSps bear the responsibility of enforcing copyright protection within their
networks. this will necessitate the use of advanced content monitoring technologies to detect and stop
transmission of pirated media by their customers. the deployment of these technologies will likely come
at great expense and effort, and may add increased pressure on the security response resources of the
iSps. the initiative is new and the consequences may not be seen for some time. the UK government is
pushing for a similar plan for iSps operating there.6
Germany, the United Kingdom and France are the eMeA countries with the most broadband subscribers
and well-established internet communities and it is not surprising that they also have the biggest share
of malicious activity within eMeA.
Top countries of attack origin
Measurement of the top countries targeting the region for attacks is based on aggregate iDS and firewall
event data collected through the Symantec Global intelligence network. these events include intrusions,
attempted intrusions and reconnaissance activity. this activity is initiated by both attackers targeting
specific individuals or organisations, and automated attacks—such as bots and other types of malicious code—that may not be targeting specific internet addresses.
Fifty-two percent of attacks targeting eMeA countries in the last six months of 2007 originated in the
United States (table 2), a substantial increase from 35 percent in the previous period. this is more than
double the 24 percent of attacks that originated in the United States worldwide for this period.
Malicious activity usually affects computers that are connected to high-speed broadband internet
because broadband connections provide larger bandwidth capacities than other connection types, and
the connections are frequently continuous. it is thus not surprising that the United States had the most
malicious activity as it has the most established broadband infrastructure in the world: 94 percent of U.S.
households have access to available broadband connections, and its 65.5 million broadband subscribers
represent over 20 percent of the world’s total, more than any other country.7
the proportional increase in attacks from the United States targeting eMeA in this period, however,
may also be due to a decrease in activity originating in China. As well, the percentage of attacks on
eMeA originating in norway decreased from 13 percent in the first six months of 2007 to two percent
during this period.
4 http://www.itpro.co.uk/security/news/123003/italian-police-arrest-phishing-gang.html
5 http://arstechnica.com/news.ars/post/20071125-the-insanity-and-genius-of-frances-anti-file-sharing-plan.html
6 http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/feb/22/filesharing?gusrc=rss&feed=technology
7 http://point-topic.com/content/operatorSource/profiles2/usa-broadband-overview.htm
9Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
Current
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
2
3
36
5
8
6
4
7
9Country
United States
United Kingdom
China
Slovenia
Germany
Canada
Italy
Norway
France
SpainCurrent Regional
Percentage
52%
11%
5%
4%
4%
3%
3%
2%
2%
1%Current Global
Percentage
24%
5%
10%
1%
2%
5%
1%
1%
1%
1%Previous Regional
Percentage
35%
15%
14%
<1%
5%
1%
3%
13%
2%
1%
ETableXX_CountAttackEMEA_v1. epsTable 2. Top countries of attack origin, EMEA
Source: Symantec Corporation
the United Kingdom ranked second for originating attacks on eMeA, with 11 percent, a decrease from
15 percent in the previous period. in the last six months of 2007, five percent of attacks worldwide
originated in the United Kingdom. As noted in the previous volume of the EMEA Internet Security Threat
Report , the difference in proportions between attacks originating in the United Kingdom targeting eMeA
and attacks with global targets indicate that much of the attack volume originating in the United Kingdom
is targeting eMeA.
China again ranked third for originating attacks on eMeA this period, with five percent of the total,
although this is substantially less than the 14 percent recorded in the first half of the year. the five
percent of attacks targeting eMeA originating in China is also less than its 10 percent total for worldwide
attacks. Overall, there has been a decline in attacks originating in China.
One reason for this drop may be that there was a noticeable decrease in the number of active bots in
China in the second half of 2007, which is attributable to a significant reduction in the availability of
many Web sites, forums, and blogs in China for several months during this period.8 Symantec believes
that, because of their scalability, bots are responsible for much of the malicious attack activity that is
observed, and any serious reduction in the number of bots should result in a corresponding drop in total
attack activity. Although the proportion of attacks originating in China dropped, perception of China as
a source of attacks in the region remains; in the second half of 2007, sources in the governments of both
the United Kingdom9 and France10 claimed to have directly observed attacks from China.
Slovenia ranked fourth for originating attacks targeting eMeA, with four percent of the total. this is
noteworthy since it was not ranked in the top 10 previously. this is much higher than Slovenia’s one
percent share of attacks globally, and indicates that attacks originating in Slovenia are targeting the eMeA
region specifically.
8 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21268635/
9 http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/sep/04/news.internet
10 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/09/12/french_cyberattacks/
10Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
11 http://networks.silicon.com/webwatch/0,39024667,39118605,00.htm
12 Malicious activity carried out for a social, political, or religious cause that the attacker(s) identify with, rather than for fun or commercial reasons
13 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/11/12/uk_bans_denial_of_service_attacks/
14 http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/article1824601.ece
11Six of the top 10 countries targeting eMeA are situated in the region. previously, the EMEA Internet
Security Threat Report has attributed this to several factors. Many targets, such as businesses,
governmental organisations and even individuals, have a higher profile locally, making them natural
targets for attackers based in the region. Linguistic and cultural similarities throughout the region may
also contribute to intra-regional attack volumes.
Top countries targeted by denial of service attacks
this metric will assess the geographic location of targets of DoS attacks. insight into the locations
targeted by these attacks is valuable in determining global trends in DoS attack patterns. it may also help
administrators and organisations in affected countries to take the necessary steps to protect against or
minimise the effects of such attacks.
DoS attacks are a major threat to internet-dependent organisations, as a successful attack can render
Web sites or other network services inaccessible to customers and employees. this could result in
the disruption of organisational communications, a significant loss of revenue, and/or damage to the
organisation’s reputation. Furthermore, as discussed in previous volumes of the Internet Security Threat
Report , criminals have been known to use DoS attacks in extortion schemes.11
the United Kingdom was again the top country in eMeA targeted by DoS attacks in the second half of
2007, with 32 percent of the regional total (table 3). this is down from the 46 percent recorded in the first
half of the year. it was speculated in previous volumes that hacktivism,12 specifically in response to
legislation outlawing DoS attacks, might be responsible for DoS attacks.13 While the decrease may be
indicative of a decline of hacktivists activity, the United Kingdom’s 32 percent is still a very large share
relative to the other countries. One widely reported incident occurred in May 2007, when access to the
Web site of the Daily telegraph newspaper was blocked by a DoS attack.14 Other attacks, including
extortion attacks, have been reported in the United Kingdom in the past.Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
Current
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
2
4
3
5
8
6
7
9
12Country
United Kingdom
Germany
France
Netherlands
Italy
Russi a
Spain
Sweden
Ireland
BelgiumCurrent Regiona l
Percentage
32%
12%
10%
7%
5%
5%
4%
3%
2%
2%Current Global
Percentage
6%
2%
2%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
<1%
<1%Previous Regional
Percentage
46%
10%
7%
7%
4%
2%
3%
2%
2%
<1%
ETableXX_T opTargetedDoS_v1. epsTable 3. Top countries targeted by DoS attacks, EMEA
Source: Symantec Corporation
Germany ranked second for this period, increasing to 12 percent from 10 percent in the previous period.
Again, hacktivism may be responsible for Germany’s position here, since new legislation implementing the
eU Framework Decision on Attacks against information Systems went into effect in Germany in August
2007.15 the law clarified and extended the criminality of offences considered cybercrime. there was
considerable concern in the security research community about the implications of this law, because it
could be interpreted to make possession or use of security tools a criminal offence.16 Several German
security research groups, such as phenoelit, took their content offline because it could be considered
illegal under the new law.17 the increase in DoS attacks within Germany may be evidence of retaliation by
hackers against this new legislation.
France replaced the netherlands this period as the third ranked country targeted by DoS attacks in eMeA,
with an increase to 10 percent, up from seven percent in the first six months of 2007. Given that the
United Kingdom, France, and Germany have the most established internet infrastructures in eMeA, it
is natural for these three countries to rank high in DoS attacks, especially considering that the Web has
become a major platform for personal, business and government purposes in these countries, and the disruption of internet services is of real consequences.
Bot-infected computers
Bots are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s machine to allow an unauthorised user to remotely control the targeted system through a communication channel, such as irC, p2p, or H ttp. these
channels allow the remote attacker to control a large number of compromised computers in a bot network
(botnet), which can then be used to launch coordinated attacks.
Bots allow for a wide range of functionality and most can be updated to assume new functionality by
downloading new code and features. Attackers can use bots to perform a variety of tasks, such as setting
up DoS attacks against an organisation’s Web site, distributing spam and phishing attacks, distributing
spyware and adware, propagating malicious code, and harvesting confidential information from
compromised computers that may be used in identity theft, all of which can have serious financial
and legal consequences.
15 http://www.securityfocus.com/columnists/448
16 http://www.oreillynet.com/sysadmin/blog/2007/08/german_antihacker_law_starts_t.html
17 http://www.phenoelit.de/202/202.html
12Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
Symantec identifies bot-infected computers based on coordinated scanning and attack behaviour
that is observed in network traffic. the bot-infected computers identified have attempted to exploit
vulnerabilities in network services to propagate and may include bot-infected computers that are part of botnets controlled by various communication channels such as irC, p2p, or H ttp. this behavioural
matching will not catch every bot-infected computer, specifically bot-infected computers that have used
non-traditional propagation methods, and may identify other malicious code or individual attackers
behaving in a coordinated way like a bot network. However, this behavioural matching will identify many
of the most coordinated and aggressive bot-infected computers.
An active bot-infected computer is one that carries out at least one attack per day. this does not have to
be continuous; rather, a single computer can be active on a number of different days. in the second half of
2007, Symantec observed an average of 25,344 active bots per day in the eMeA region (figure 1). this is
a greater number than seen in either of the two previous reporting periods, when 18,616 active bots were
detected in the first half of 2007, and 21,707 in the last half of 2006. in the second half of 2007, active
bots in the eMeA region accounted for 41 percent of global bot activity.
DateActive bot-infected computers by da y
020,00040,00060,00080,000
10,00030,00050,00070,000EFig01_Act_Bot_Day_EMEA_v1. eps
90,000
Worldwide
EMEA
2 per . moving average
Oct 2, 2006 Jan 1, 2007 Apr 2, 2007 Jul 2, 2007 Oct 1, 2007 Jul 3, 2006 Dec 31, 2007
Figure 1. Active bot-infected computers by day, EMEA and Global
Source: Symantec Corporation
A distinct bot-infected computer is a computer that has been determined to be active at any point in the reporting period. there were 2,885,129 distinct bot-infected computers recorded in the eMeA region in
the last six months of 2007. this is 38 percent more than the 2,084,189 observed in eMeA in the previous
reporting period. the rise in the detection of distinct bot-infected computers in eMeA this period is likely
attributable to an overall increase in broadband subscriptions in eMeA countries during this time. Along
with continued growth in Western europe, broadband subscriptions are rapidly increasing in many eastern
european countries; for example, russia ranked eighth globally for broadband growth last period.
18 this
increase may also be due to the shorter lifespan of bots because of improved detection rates in countries
18 http://www.point-topic.com
13Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
such as Germany, where the average lifespan of a bot is one day, compared to an average of three days in
eMeA overall. this forces botnet controllers to actively seek out new, replacement bots, driving the overall
number of distinct bots higher for the period.
to reduce exposure to bot-related attacks, end users should employ defence-in-depth strategies,19
including the deployment of antivirus software and a firewall. Creating and enforcing policies that identify
and limit applications that can access the network may also help to limit the spread of bot networks. Users
should update antivirus definitions regularly and ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers are
updated with all necessary security patches from their operating system vendor. Users should never view,
open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is expected and comes from a known and
trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
Bot-infected computers by country
recognizing the ongoing threat posed by botnets, Symantec tracks the distribution of bot-infected
computers worldwide as well as regionally. For regions, Symantec calculates the number of computers
globally that are known to be infected with bots, and assesses which countries within the region are
home to highest percentages of these computers. A high percentage of infected machines could mean
a greater potential for bot-related attacks, as well as indicating the level of patching and security
awareness in the region.For eMeA, Germany ranked first for bot-infected computers detected in the last six months of 2007, with
18 percent of the regional total (table 4), a decrease from 23 percent in the first six months of the year.
the reduction may be due to the increased enforcement of laws against cybercrime in Germany after the
implementation of the eU Framework Decision on Attacks against information Systems in August of 2007,
mentioned previously. the law clarified the criminality of unauthorised access to computer systems and
DoS attacks. prior to the passing of the legislation, the German penal code may not have considered DoS
attacks against non-commercial targets illegal. the law also specifically criminalised access to computer
systems. prior to the passage of the law, unauthorised access to computer systems may have been
technically legal if it could not be proven that there were other, specifically criminal aspects to the incident.
As noted in the previous volume of the EMEA Internet Security Threat Report , the high proportion of bot
activity in Germany is likely due to the high number of broadband subscribers there, rather than poor
security awareness or a lack of response capability.20
19 Defence-in-depth emphasizes multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific
technology or protection methodology. Defence-in-depth should include the deployment of antivirus, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems, among other
security measures.
20 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_emea_09_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 12
14Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
Current
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
2
4
7
3
5
9
6
11
8Country
Germany
Spain
Italy
Poland
France
United Kingdom
Turkey
Israel
Russia
PortugalCurrent
Regional
Percentage
18%
14%
10%
10%
9%
7%
6%
5%
3%
3%Previous
Regional
Percentage
23%
15%
9%
6%
11%
9%
2%
6%
2%
2%Current
Global
Percentage
10%
7%
6%
6%
5%
4%
3%
3%
1%
1%Average
Lifespan
(days)
1
3
3
3
3
4
2
3
7
2Command-
and-
Control
Percentage
22%
3%
6%
2%
6%
11%
5%
2%
5%
1%
ETableXX_Bot_Infect_Count_v2. epsTable 4. Bot-infected computers by country, EMEA
Source: Symantec Corporation
Spain was the second ranked country in the second half of 2007, with 14 percent of bot-infected
computers detected, down slightly from 15 percent in the previous period. in the previous report, it was
noted that Spain had the fifth highest number of broadband connections added between May 2006 and
May 2007. Spain also recently ranked tenth for total broadband connections globally.21
italy ranked third for malicious activity in eMeA this period, up from fourth in the first half of 2007. in the
same period one year ago, italy was ranked sixth. this rise over the past 12 months may reflect increasing
broadband subscription rates and the growing deployment of F ttH within the country.22
in Volumes X i and X ii of the Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec speculated that the number of new
users adopting high-speed internet in a country may be a significant factor in the rate of bot infections.
rapidly growing iSps may be focused on growth and slow to implement effective measures to protect
against threats such as botnets. in many countries, iSps and law enforcement are still developing their
own response to the problem of bot activity in their region.
For example, Botswana’s cybercrime bill passed its second parliamentary reading on December 3, 2007
and it may become law in 2008.23 the bill defines offences associated with cybercrime activity, such
as unauthorised system access or interference. it also specifies jurisdiction parameters, allowing for a
framework to be built for cooperation with other governments in dealing with incidents. this law may be
a response to a serious incident in 2006 involving a local bank in Botswana, in which attackers allegedly
compromised the systems of a local bank and transmitted funds to South Africa.24 Further raising the
profile of cybercrime within Botswana was that it was identified as a source of click-fraud activity, which
may indicate local cyber-criminals or an unusually high pattern of infection with malicious code designed
to commit click-fraud.25
21 point topic World Broadband Statistics: Q3 2007 report
22 http://point-topic.com/content/operatorSource/profiles2/italy-broadband-overview.htm
23 http://allafrica.com/stories/200712040992.html
24 http://www.mmegi.bw/2007/October/Friday5/30.php
25 http://www.mmegi.bw/2007/September/Friday14/29.php
15Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
Another example is in estonia, where the government is attempting to amend its penal code so that cyber-
attacks can be considered terrorism, which would allow for imposing harsher punishment.26 this is likely
a response to the DoS attacks in estonia in May 2007, and meant to serve as deterrence to such attacks
in the future.27
User awareness is another factor. Broadband users are often unaware of the malicious dangers on the
internet until they are directly affected, and only then do they implement security solutions such as
antivirus and personal firewalls. Moreover, subscribers may be foregoing extra premium security options from their iSp to reduce monthly costs, increasing their risk of exposure to malicious activities.
Bot-infected computers by city
Madrid was the top ranked city for bot-infected hosts in the last six months of 2007, the same position it
has held in the previous two periods (table 5). One possible reason for this is the high proportion of bot activity in Spain, as it ranks second in eMeA behind only Germany. Also, as discussed in Volume X ii of the
EMEA Internet Security Threat Report , the continued prominence of Madrid in this metric is likely due to
much of Spain’s internet infrastructure and iSps being concentrated in Madrid, as opposed to Germany,
where iSps are spread more evenly across the country.28
Another reason may stem from fibre-to-the-home (F ttH) trials conducted in Madrid.29 With F ttH, also
known as F ttp (fibre-to-the-premises), the fibre-optic cable is connected directly to the end-point, in
contrast to traditional broadband connections where the transmission to the end-point occurs over
telecommunications infrastructure not originally designed for high-capacity data transmission, such as the
telephone network. Since botnet operators seek bots with two important properties—that they are online as continuously as possible and that they have high-bandwidth connections—F ttH connections are ideal
targets since they have superior bandwidth capacity, typically higher average speeds and the possibility of
continuous connections.
Current
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
7
20
9
12
3
8
4
13
11Current Regional
Percentage
7%
6%
3%
3%
3%
2%
2%
2%
2%
2%Previous Regional
Percentage
8%
2%
1%
2%
2%
3%
2%
3%
2%
2%Country
Spain
Turkey
Italy
Polan d
Polan d
Italy
Portugal
Italy
Morocco
Russi aCity
Madrid
Ankara
Cagliari
Warsaw
Wroclaw
Rome
Lisbon
Milan
Raba t
Moscow
ETableXX_BotCity_v2. epsTable 5. Bot-infected computers by city, EMEA
Source: Symantec Corporation
26 http://www.baltictimes.com/news/articles/18815/
27 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6665145.stm
28 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_emea_09_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 14
29 http://www.ecommercetimes.com/story/60791.html?welcome=1202749024
16Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
Beyond Spain, F ttH may be an important trend to watch in eMeA and elsewhere. this technology is
the next step in broadband connectivity, bringing much higher bandwidth capacity to both personal
and commercial users. the technology is growing, although the level of deployment varies among
countries in the eMeA region. Many telecommunications companies are conducting trials and phasing
in deployment city by city. For this reason, it is important to look at bot-infected computers by city, since
FttH connections will be appealing targets for botnet controllers. trials or deployment of F ttH services
in cities may affect bot activity because botnet operators may target these cities in an attempt to secure
these high-bandwidth hosts.
Ankara, turkey jumped to second for this reporting period, up from seventh in the first half of 2007. the
concentration of bot activity in Ankara may be because a major Ankara-based iSp is working to roll out
fibre-optic lines to increase bandwidth availability in the country.30
Cagliari, the capital city of Sardinia, italy, significantly increased in rank for bot activity by city this
period, from twentieth in the last period to third for the second half of 2007. its rise may be due to recent
ownership changes to the major iSps providing service there and the possible subsequent challenges to
providing effective security.31
30 http://www.point-topic.com
31 http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/04/29/business/italia.php
17Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
32 ingress traffic refers to traffic that is coming into a network from the internet or another network. egress traffic refers to traffic that is leaving a network,
bound for the internet or another network.
18Attacks—protection and mitigation
there are a number of measures that enterprises, administrators, and end users can take to protect
against malicious activity. Organisations should monitor all network-connected computers for signs
of malicious activity, including bot activity and potential security breaches, ensuring that any infected
computers are removed from the network and disinfected as soon as possible. Organisations should
employ defence-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software and a firewall.
Administrators should update antivirus definitions regularly and ensure that all desktop, laptop, and
server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their operating system vendor. As
compromised computers can be a threat to other systems, Symantec also recommends that enterprises
notify their iSps of any potentially malicious activity.
Symantec recommends that organisations perform both ingress and egress filtering on all network traffic
to ensure that malicious activity and unauthorised communications are not taking place.32 Organisations
should also filter out potentially malicious email attachments to reduce exposure to enterprises and end users. in addition, the egress filtering is one of the best ways to mitigate a DoS attack. DoS victims
frequently need to engage their upstream iSp to help filter the traffic to mitigate the effects of attacks.
Symantec also advises that users never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the
attachment is expected and comes from a known and trusted source, and unless the purpose of the
attachment is known. By creating and enforcing policies that identify and restrict applications that can
access the network, organisations can minimise the effect of malicious activity, and hence, minimise the
effect on day-to-day operations. Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
Malicious Code Trends
Symantec gathers malicious code data from over 120 million desktops that have deployed Symantec’s
antivirus products in consumer and corporate environments. the Symantec Digital immune System, and
Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting process. in previous editions
of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , the number and volume of threats analysed were based
upon the number of malicious code reports received from enterprise and home users. this report will
also examine malicious code according to potential infections. this allows Symantec to determine which
malicious code sample was attempting to infect computers and the number of potential infections in eMeA.
this section of the EMEA Internet Security Threat Report will analyse the following malicious code threats
that Symantec observed in eMeA between July 1 and December 31, 2007:
• Malicious code types
• Geolocation by type
• top malicious code samples
• top new malicious code families
• threats to confidential information
• propagation mechanisms
• Malicious code that modifies Web pages
• Malicious code—protection and mitigation
Malicious code types
the proportions of potential malicious code infections reported in eMeA closely correlate with the numbers
observed globally. For example, between July 1 and December 31, 2007, trojans made up 68 percent of
the volume of the top 50 potential infections in eMeA and 71 percent globally (figure 2). For trojans, the
percentages are also virtually the same for this reporting period as in the first half of the year, when the volume of trojans made up 68 percent of the top 50 potential infections in eMeA and 73 percent globally.
19Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
2014%24%FigXX_EMEA_MalCode_T yp_v1. eps
TypeVirus Worm Back doorPercentage of top 50 by potential infection
TrojanGloba lEMEA
68%
71%
13%15%22%
15%
Figure 2. Potential infections by type, EMEA
Source: Symantec Corporation
trojans remain popular for the same reasons speculated in the previous volume of the EMEA Internet
Security Threat Report . First, they do not produce the often disruptive network noise associated with other
types of malicious code. For example, mass-mailing worms produce a lot of email communication, while
worms that attack network services can cause service outages or consume large amounts of bandwidth.
trojan attacks, on the other hand, are more point-to-point and harder to identify through the same type
of network noise detection. trojans can also expose confidential information, and can be used to install
other malicious programs. Furthermore, they can often be used to download subsequent malicious code
modules, which can then be used for further attack activity. Commonly known as staged downloaders, these trojans are becoming increasingly common. Staged downloaders are small, specialised trojans
that establish a beachhead on a compromised computer in order to download and install other malicious programs, such as back doors or other trojans. Many of these trojans are installed using Web browser
vulnerabilities and zero day vulnerabilities in other applications.
Worms made up 24 percent of potential infections originating in eMeA, compared to 22 percent observed
globally. this is also very close to proportions observed in the previous six months when 26 percent of
potential infections in eMeA were classified as worms, with a slightly larger gap between the proportions
of worms seen in eMeA and the global volume. Worms are on the decline, partly because of a lack of
major vulnerabilities through which they can propagate. increased blocking by iSps, deployment of
security patches, antivirus use and operating system upgrades will reduce the worm submission count by
attrition, and older, still-propagating worms should slowly die out. Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
Geolocation by type
this metric examines top countries for potential malicious code infections in eMeA by malicious code type.
Because of the different propagation mechanisms used by different malicious code types, and the different
affect that each may have, the geographic distribution of malicious code can indicate where network
administrators in different regions may want to increase their security measures.
Along with ranking first for other three malicious code types in this metric, the United Kingdom was the
top country for back doors in eMeA this period (table 6). the remaining two top countries for back doors
in eMeA were Germany in second, and France in third. As these countries have the highest number of
broadband connections and the most well-established internet communities, it is not surprising that they
are the top three countries for back doors, which are one of the most common classes of malicious code. it is worth noting that Vundo
33 and Virut,34 two of the top 10 malicious code samples seen in the United
Kingdom during the second half of 2007, had back door components.
ETableXX_Backdoors_v1. epsRank
1
2
3Top Country
United Kingdom
Germany
France
Table 6. Location of back doors, EMEA
Source: Symantec Corporation
For trojans, the top three countries were, in order, the United Kingdom, Germany, and italy (table 7).
Again, as with the first two countries and France, italy has a high number of broadband connections
and its appearance here is not surprising.
Rank
1
2
3Top Country
United Kingdom
Germany
Italy
ETableXX_T rojans. epsTable 7. Location of Trojans, EMEA
Source: Symantec Corporation
33 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-112111-3912-99
34 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-092718-3700-99
21Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
35 http://w3.bsa.org/globalstudy//upload/2007-Global- piracy-Study- en.pdf
36 http://www.point-topic.com
22the top three ranked countries for viruses this period were the United Kingdom, egypt and poland
(table 8). the high rank of the latter two countries may have to do with the high rates of piracy in each.
File infection is characteristic of the virus class of malicious code. One way that viruses spread is through
pirated software as executable files from disreputable sources are copied and shared. According to a
recent study, the piracy rate in poland is 57 percent, while in egypt it is 63 percent.35 Additionally, egypt
and poland are both experiencing high growth in broadband deployment.36 Lack of security awareness
and a lack of protective measures, such as gateway filters, by iSps may contribute to the propagation
of viruses through vectors such as C iFS file shares. the increasing availability and use of high-volume
portable storage devices, such as USB keys and portable hard drives, may also contribute to the re-
emergence of classic viruses.
ETableXX_Viruses. epsRank
1
2
3Top Country
United Kingdom
Egypt
Polan d
Table 8. Location of viruses, EMEA
Source: Symantec Corporation
the top three countries for worms this period were the United Kingdom, Germany and Spain (table 9).
the United Kingdom and Germany are the two eMeA countries with the highest number of broadband
users. Spain ranked second for attacks in the malicious activity by country ranking, and those attacks
may be related to the high submission rate for worm samples.
ETableXX_W orms. epsRank
1
2
3Top Country
United Kingdom
Germany
Spain
Table 9. Location of worms, EMEA
Source: Symantec Corporation
Top malicious code samples
the top malicious code sample in eMeA in the second half of 2007 was Vundo, a trojan with a back door
component (table 10). Vundo was also the top sample causing potential infections globally this period. in
the first half of the year, it ranked second in eMeA. the United Kingdom was the top country for potential
infections caused by Vundo in both this and the previous period.
the second ranked sample for this report, the Zlob trojan, ranked third in the first half of 2007. Both of
these malicious code instances are staged downloaders and can augment their functionality with updates
downloaded from remote locations on the internet. Vundo also attempts to generate revenue from
infections through its adware component.Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
37 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-010509-0134-99
38 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-102310-3513-99
39 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25748
23Regional
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Sample
Vundo
Zlob
Fujacks
Netsky
Rontokbro
Virut
Metajuan
Rahack
Licum
AdclickerType
Trojan,
back door
Trojan
Worm,
virus
Worm
Worm
Virus,
back door
Trojan
Worm
Worm,
virus
TrojanPropagation
Vectors
N/A
N/A
CIFS
SMTP, P2P
SMTP
CIFS
N/A
CIFS
CIFS, remote
vulnerability
N/AImpact
Displays advertisements,
downloads and installs
additional threats
Downloads and installs
additional threats
Modifies HTML files
Keystroke logger targets
www.e-gold.com
Performs DoS attacks
Downloads and installs
additional threats
Downloads and installs
additional threats
Modifies HTML files
Downloads and installs
additional threats
Clicks advertisements to
generate revenueTop
Reporting
Country
United Kingdom
Germany
United Arab Emirates
Spain
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Germany
Italy
United KingdomSecond
Reporting
Country
Spain
France
Ethiopia
Poland
France
Poland
Spain
Austria
Germany
Italy
ETableXX_10NewMalic_v1. epsTable 10. Top malicious code samples, EMEA
Source: Symantec Corporation
the third most common sample, Fujacks37 is a file infector that also modifies H tML files, a recent trend
that Symantec has observed and continues to monitor. When Fujacks runs on a computer, it scans the
file system for common file extensions associated with Web content, such as .html and .aspx. it then
appends invisible iframe code to these files that will redirect the browser that renders them to a Web site to download additional malicious code. An iframe is an H tML element that can include Web content
from other pages or Web servers to be rendered when the user visits the original page. this tag can be
constructed so that it is effectively invisible and the user will not see any of the embedded content when
viewing the original page.
Top new malicious code families
the most reported new malicious code family in eMeA during the second half of 2007 was pidief
(table 11).38 instances of malicious code belonging to this family were the fourth most commonly reported
globally. pidief is interesting because it exploits a vulnerability in Adobe pDF reader software.39 Several
factors may explain the high rank of pidief for this period. Organisations within eMeA may be more
resistant, on average, to typical malicious code threats as there may be more widespread deployment
of security technologies such as gateway filtering and more user awareness in the region than across the internet as a whole. Furthermore, pDF documents are widely used and trusted within corporate
environments, resulting in a vector for propagation which may be, for now, very successful. Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
40 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-091208-1650-99
41 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-081716-1758-99
42 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-092816-1332-99&tabid=2
24Regional
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Sample
Pidief
Neeris
Scrimge
Blastclan
Farfli
Ascesso
Fakeavalert
Mimbot
Mabezat
Vispat Type
Trojan
Worm,
back door
Worm,
back door
Worm
Trojan
Trojan
Trojan
Worm
Worm,
virus
Worm Propagation
Vectors
N/A
IM
IM
CIFS
N/A
N/A
N/A
MSN
Messenger
SMTP, CIFS
SMTP Impact
Exploits Adobe Acrobat
vulnerability to lower
security settings and
download other threats
Allows remote access
Allows remote access
Disables security
applications
Downloads other threats
and modifies Internet
Explorer® start page
Downloads other threats
and sends spam
Displays fake antivirus
alerts and lowers security
settings
Allows remote access
Encrypts data files
Modifies Internet Explorer
start page and lowers
security settings Top
Reporting
Country
United Kingdom
Spain
Spain
United Arab
Emirates
France
Germany
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Saudi Arabia
Italy Second
Reporting
Country
Germany
United Kingdom
United Kingdom
Egypt
Italy
United Kingdom
Germany
Italy
Oman
Belgium
ETableXX_10MalF amilies_v1. epsTable 11. Top new malicious code families, EMEA
Source: Symantec Corporation
neeris,40 which spreads over the MS n instant messaging network, was the second most commonly seen
new family of malicious code in eMeA for this period. it ranked seventh globally. the prominence of neeris
in the eMeA region relative to its rank globally is due its use of european languages in its propagation
attempts. to spread, neeris sends messages to users on a victim’s contact list in Spanish, French,
German, italian and english.
the third most widely reported new malicious code family was Scrimge,41 another instance of malicious
code that attempts to spread through the MS n network. Like neeris, variants of the Scrimge family send
messages with file transfer requests to the contacts of infected users to propagate. Various languages are
used, depending on the variant. For example, Scrimge42 sends messages in different languages, including
english and French. the Scrimge family ranked sixth globally for this period.Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
Threats to confidential information
Some malicious code programs are designed specifically to expose confidential information that is
stored on an infected computer. these threats may expose sensitive data such as system information,
confidential files and documents, or logon credentials. Some malicious code threats, such as back doors, can give a remote attacker complete control over a compromised computer. threats to confidential
information are a particular concern because of their potential for use in criminal activities. With the widespread use of online shopping and internet banking, compromises of this nature can result in
significant financial loss, particularly if credit card information or banking details are exposed.
Within the enterprise, exposure of confidential information can lead to significant data leakage. if it
involves customer-related data—such as credit card information—customer confidence in the enterprise
can be severely undermined. Moreover, it can also violate local laws. Sensitive corporate information,
including financial details, business plans, and proprietary technologies, could also be leaked from
compromised computers. it should be noted that threats that expose confidential information may employ
more than one method to do so; as a result, cumulative percentages discussed in this metric may exceed
100 percent.
During this reporting period, for all types of confidential information exposure classifications, proportions observed in eMeA closely correlate with global numbers. Of the top 50 threats in eMeA, 67 percent of
malicious code instances are considered threats to confidential information, compared to 68 percent reported globally. in the first half of 2007, 61 percent of threats in eMeA were classified as threats to
confidential information.
91%
77%86%
76%
68% 70%FigXX_EMEA_Exp_by_T yp_v1. eps
RegionPercentage of exposure by type
Exports email addresse sExports user data
Exports system data
Global EMEA71%
71%69%Keystroke logge r
Allows remote access
69%
01836547290Figure 3. Threats to confidential information, EMEA and Global
Source: Symantec Corporation
25Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
26Sixty-nine percent of the threats to confidential information reported in eMeA for this period were
classified as threats that can export user data, compared to 71 percent globally (figure 3). this is a
decrease from the first half of the year both in eMeA and globally, when the percentages were 77 percent
and 80 percent, respectively.
instances of malicious code that have the capability to transmit system data made up 69 percent of all
threats to confidential information reported in the eMeA region this period, compared to 71 percent
globally. in the previous reporting period, 78 percent of threats originating in eMeA had this capability,
compared to 76 percent worldwide. these forms of data leakage can enable an attacker to steal a user’s
identity or launch further attacks. An attacker with access to a user’s personal and system data can use it
to craft a targeted social engineering attack as though it were originating from that particular user.Seventy percent of threats to confidential information in eMeA this period had the ability to extract and
transmit email addresses, compared to 68 percent globally. in the first half of 2007, the numbers were
75 percent in eMeA and 76 percent worldwide. these email addresses may be used in spamming
operations or sold in bulk to other individuals or groups.Seventy-seven percent of the threats to confidential information reported in eMeA during this period
had a keystroke logger component, compared to 76 percent globally. this is a decline from the previous
period, when the proportions were 86 percent in eMeA and 88 percent worldwide. Keystroke loggers are
popular tools because they allow an attacker to steal credentials from any interface or Web site, without
specific customisation. the increasing use of two-factor identification by online banks, which can limit
the usefulness of keystroke loggers in obtaining useful credentials from compromised hosts, may explain
the decline.
instances of malicious code that facilitated remote access made up 91 percent of confidential-information
threats reported in eMeA for this period, compared to 86 percent globally. in the first half of the year,
87 percent of potential infections in eMeA had back door capabilities, compared to 88 percent globally.
Propagation mechanisms
Worms and viruses use various means to transfer themselves, or propagate, from one computer to
another. these are collectively referred to as propagation mechanisms. propagation mechanisms can
include a number of different vectors, such as instant messaging ( iM), Simple Mail transfer protocol
(SMtp), Common internet File System (C iFS), p2p, and remotely exploitable vulnerabilities. Some
malicious code may even use other malicious code as a propagation vector by locating a computer that
has been compromised via a back door server and using it to upload and install itself.
this metric will discuss some of the propagation mechanisms used by malicious code samples in eMeA
during the first six months of 2007. it should be noted that many malicious code samples employ multiple
propagation mechanisms in an effort to increase the probability of successful propagation. As a result,
cumulative percentages included in this discussion may exceed 100 percent.Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
email attachments remained the most commonly used vector of propagation within eMeA for the last
six months of 2007, with 37 percent of all samples using this vector (table 12). this is a decline from
the first half of the year, when 49 percent of all samples were classified as propagating through email
attachments. this may be due to the decline in submissions of netSky, a mass-mailing worm that also
propagates over p2p file sharing networks. the prominence of email attachments as a propagation vector
is not surprising because email is one of the most widely used applications on the internet. Furthermore,
the current volume of samples using this propagation vector include all the existing and still-spreading
instances of malicious code which use mass-mailing spam as their propagation mechanism.
Regional
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Propagation Mechanism
File transfer/email attachment
File sharing executables
File transfer/CIFS
File sharing/P2P
Remotely exploitable vulnerability
SQL
Back door/Kuang2
Back door/SubSeven
File transfer/MSN instant messenger
File transfer/HTTP/embedded URI/Yahoo! MessengerRegional
Percentage
37%
27%
26%
25%
24%
4%
4%
4%
4%
2%Global
Percentage
32%
40%
28%
19%
17%
3%
3%
3%
1%
2%
ETableXX_PropagationMech.epsTable 12. Top propagation vectors, EMEA
Source: Symantec Corporation
executable files are the second ranked propagation vector in eMeA, with 27 percent of the volume.
Commonly associated with file infector viruses, this vector ranked fifth in the first half of the year. it is
worth noting that the proportion for eMeA is much lower than the 40 percent of total submission volume
that was observed globally.
the third most commonly seen propagation vector in this period was Windows® file sharing, or C iFS. in
the second half of 2007, 26 percent of samples originating in eMeA propagated over C iFS shares. this is
close to the 28 percent observed globally. in the previous report, this vector ranked sixth, with 18 percent
of the regional volume. the increase in rank for C iFS as a propagation vector in eMeA for the second half
of 2007 may be because this vector is used by several instances of the top 10 malicious code samples
observed this period, including Fujacks, Virut, rahack, and Licum.
A vector to continue watching for in eMeA is iM. it is a successful propagation vector because there is
more trust built into the social networks of iM systems than there is with email. Some of the samples
that use local european languages have likely been successful for this reason. two of the three top new
families in eMeA this period propagate over iM networks. Another interesting trend is propagation
through Web-applications and modification of Web pages. this class of malicious code is seen by
Symantec as on the rise, and accurately capturing this trend may require definition of new propagation
vectors in the future.
27Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
Malicious code that modifies Web pages
For the first time, in this volume of the EMEA Internet Security Threat Report, Symantec is examining
malicious code samples that modify Web pages on a compromised computer. Only threats that modify
pages in order to propagate or redirect users were examined. those that simply deface the pages by
adding text or simple images are not included in this metric.
in May 2007, a new attack kit called M pack was observed in the wild.43 this kit compromised Web pages,
typically through the insertion of iframes, to redirect users to an M pack server that attempted to exploit
Web browser and plug-in vulnerabilities and install malicious code on computers.44 this kit experienced
great success because it took advantage of users visiting trusted legitimate Web pages that had been
compromised. Since the Web browser is a primary gateway to the internet, Web pages that users visit
frequently—such as online forums and other internet communities—are a valuable attack vector.
During this reporting period, five percent of malicious code samples within eMeA could modify Web pages
(figure 4), the same proportion observed in the first half of 2007. Globally, seven percent of samples had the ability to modify Web pages this period, compared to three percent in the previous period. there are
unique dynamics with this class of attacks: compromised Web sites often only attract users who can read
the language of the site, putting constraints on and directing attacks in ways that may not be seen with other classes of malicious code, such as typical mass email propagation. this may explain the different
proportions seen between the regional and global volume, especially when compared to the proportions
seen in the previous period.EFigXX_MalCodeModW ebPg_v1. eps
PeriodJul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 20075%
Jul–Dec 20075%
0%
Figure 4. Malicious code that modifies Web pages, EMEA
Source: Symantec Corporation
2843 http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-052712-1531-99
44 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/05/mpack_packed_full_of_badness.htmlSymantec eMeA internet Security threat report
One instance of malicious code designed to seek out and modify H tML, the Fujacks worm, was in the
top 10 new malicious code samples in eMeA for this period, and was most commonly reported in the
United Arab emirates and ethiopia. Like M pack, this worm adds an invisible iframe to H tML documents
on the compromised host. it then redirects users’ browsers to a malicious Web site, which could then
exploit vulnerabilities in the users’ Web browser to download and install further threats.
During this period, there was at least one major incident involving malicious code designed to modify
Web pages. in August 2007, italian police uncovered a large-scale phishing operation that had allegedly
compromised over 10,000 Web sites, which were being used to launch phishing attacks and targeting users of the italian post office and various financial institutions in europe.
45 According to reports, once
credentials were obtained, the group attempted to transfer funds to poste pay cards belonging to members
of the group. the group allegedly used M pack or a variant to carry out these attacks.
in many cases, the Web pages modified by malicious code do not reside on Web servers. However, users
who maintain their own Web sites often keep a copy of the site on their own computer. When they want to update their Web site, they will upload pages to their Web hosting providers. these updated pages could
likely include the modifications made by the malicious code, which would be included in the upload. As a
result, other users who trust the compromised user’s site would be at risk.
Malicious code—protection and mitigation
Symantec recommends that certain best security practices always be followed to protect against malicious
code infection. Administrators should keep patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host public services and applications—such as H ttp, Ftp, SM tp, and D nS servers—and that are accessible
through a firewall or placed in a DMZ. email servers should be configured to only allow file attachment
types that are required for business needs and to block email that appears to come from within the
company, but that actually originates from external sources. Additionally, Symantec recommends that
ingress and egress filtering be put in place on perimeter devices to prevent unwanted activity.
to protect against malicious code that installs itself through a Web browser, additional measures should
be taken. the use of ipS technologies can prevent exploitation of browser and plug-in vulnerabilities
through signatures and behaviour-based detection in addition to ASL r.
end users should employ defence-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software
and a personal firewall. Users should update antivirus definitions regularly. they should also ensure that
all desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their
software vendors. they should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless it is expected
and comes from a trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
2945 http://www.itpro.co.uk/security/news/123003/italian-police-arrest-phishing-gang.htmlSymantec eMeA internet Security threat report
30Phishing Trends
phishing is an attempt by a third party to solicit confidential information from an individual, group, or
organisation, often for financial gain. phishers are groups or individuals who attempt to trick users into
disclosing personal data, such as credit card numbers, online banking credentials, and other sensitive
information. they may then use the information to commit fraudulent acts.
the data provided in this section is based on statistics derived from the Symantec probe network, a
system of over two million decoy accounts in more than 30 countries that attracts email from around the world to gauge global spam and phishing activity. it encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises
worldwide, attracting email that is representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 million mailboxes. the probe network consists of previously used email addresses as well as email accounts
that have been generated solely to be used as probes.
this section of the Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report will discuss the following phishing
activity that Symantec detected in the eMeA region between July 1 and December 31, 2007:
• top countries hosting phishing Web sites and top targets phished
• phishing Web site top-level domains
• phishing—protection and mitigation
Top countries hosting phishing Web sites and top targets phished
A phishing Web site is a site that is designed to mimic the legitimate Web site of the organisation whose
brand is being spoofed, often an online bank or e-commerce retailer. in many cases, it is set up by the
attacker to capture a victim’s authentication information or other personal identification information,
which can then be used in identity theft or other fraudulent activity.
this section of the Symantec EMEA Internet Security Threat Report will discuss the eMeA countries in
which the most phishing Web sites were hosted, and the type of service offered by the organisations
whose brands were most frequently spoofed. readers should note that phishing Web sites differ from
phishing hosts, which are computers that can host one or more phishing Web sites, and which are discussed in the “Malicious activity by country” metric in the “Attack trends” section of this report.
the data discussed in this section is a snapshot in time and, therefore, does not have insight into changes
in the locations of certain phishing Web sites throughout the period. it should also be noted that just
because a phishing Web site is hosted in a certain country, it does not necessarily mean that the attacker
is located in the same country.
During the last six months of 2007, romania was home to the most phishing Web sites in eMeA (table 13)
with 46 percent of the total. Globally, romania ranked third for hosting phishing Web sites during this
period, with five percent, behind only the United States and China.
Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
31 46 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3344721.stm
47 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3344721.stm
48 http://bucharest.usembassy.gov/US_Citizen_Services/Visiting_Living/Corruption.html
49 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2006/09/contextaware_phishing_realized.html
50 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2006/07/myspace_shockwave_flash_hack.htmlRegional
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Global
Rank
3
5
6
7
9
10
11
13
14
17Country
Romania
France
Germany
Italy
Sweden
Netherlands
Russia
United Kingdom
Poland
SpainRegional
Percentage
46%
8%
8%
7%
6%
6%
4%
3%
2%
1%Type of Organisation
Social networking site
Online auction site
Online payment system
Online auction site
Telecommunications site
Social networking site
Online auction site
Online payment system
Social networking site
Online auction site
ETableXX_HostPhishSector_v1. epsTable 13. Top countries hosting phishing Web sites and top targets, EMEA
Source: Symantec Corporation
the presence of romania in this position is somewhat surprising, as it ranked only sixteenth in eMeA
and thirty-fifth worldwide for malicious activity during this period. However, for phishing hosts it ranked
tenth in eMeA and fifteenth worldwide, which would indicate that phishing is the most common malicious
activity originating in romania. this is borne out by numerous reports that indicate that romania has
become a growing source of malicious activity, particularly online auction fraud.46 there is a well-
established tradition of computer skills in the country dating back to the early 1980s.47 Combined
with the slow economic growth in romania since the fall of communism, this has led to an increase
in on-line fraud.48
the most commonly spoofed Web site in romania was a social networking site, which accounted for
98 percent of the top 10 brands phished by Web sites hosted in romania. these sites are relatively easy
to phish because they are generally trusted by users. As a result, phishing attacks spoofing them may
have a good chance of success.49 in fact, in five of the top 10 countries for hosting phishing Web sites
globally during this reporting period, social networking sites were the most commonly spoofed sites.
Spoofed social networking pages can include links to malicious downloads that require users to enter
confidential information, such as authentication information or credit card information, that can
subsequently be used for fraudulent purposes. Further, in some cases, phishers may be able to upload
content, such as Flash videos, onto a spoofed social networking page that will allow the attacker to hijack
the page of anyone who visits the spoofed page.50
France ranked second for hosting phishing Web sites in eMeA this period, with eight percent. Worldwide,
France ranked fifth, with one percent. France had the third highest amount of malicious activity in eMeA
this period. France’s ranking in several other malicious code categories could contribute to the high number of phishing Web sites hosted there. in eMeA this period, France had the fourth highest number
of spam zombies, which are compromised computers used to relay spam messages, some of which could Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
32include links to phishing Web sites. it had the fifth highest number of bot-infected computers in eMeA,
which could contribute to the number of phishing Web sites because a computer that is compromised by
a bot can be used to host phishing sites. France also had the third highest number of phishing hosts in
eMeA during this period. Since phishing hosts can host one or more phishing Web sites, this would likely
contribute to a high number of phishing Web sites.
in addition to these considerations, at the end of 2007, France had the third highest number of domain
names in the eMeA region.51 the higher number of domain names will not, in and of itself, contribute to a
higher number of phishing Web sites, but it will likely indicate a higher probability of phishing Web sites,
if only as a percentage of the higher number of domain names.
During this period, France had only the eighth highest number of Web-hosting companies in the world,
despite the high number of domains, suggesting that these Web-hosting companies were relatively large.
Large Web-hosting companies may be susceptible to hosting phishing Web sites because those sites may
be able to exist for a long period in time in relative obscurity and undetected by the hosting provider.the top target of phishing Web sites hosted in France was an online auction site. these sites are
commonly targeted for fraudulent activity as they are a forum for the sale of goods and may, as a result,
involve significant financial transactions. they can be used by fraudsters in a number of ways. A genuine
user’s online auction account could be hijacked by phishers who can then use it to post fraudulent listings
for which an unsuspecting buyer pays money while receiving no goods in return. Another method would
be to divert the legitimate user to a spoofed online auction page into which the target would be asked to
enter credit card information, which could then be used for fraudulent financial gain.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2007, Germany ranked third for hosting phishing Web sites in eMeA,
with eight percent, and sixth worldwide, with one percent. Germany ranks first in Web domains in eMeA
by a wide margin.52 this means that there is a significant chance that many of these domains were used
as phishing Web sites. this is supported by the fact that the .de domain name, which is assigned to the
country domain of Germany, was the second highest top level domain used by phishing Web sites in
eMeA during this reporting period.
Germany also had the second most Web-hosting companies in the eMeA region, behind only the United
Kingdom.53 Web-hosting companies can be used to host phishing Web sites in two ways. First, they
can employ the hosting company to host a Web site legitimately, but use that site for phishing. Second,
they can compromise legitimate Web sites hosted by the company and use them for phishing purposes.
A high number of Web hosting companies increases the number of potential hosts for phishers to use,
legitimately or not, for phishing purposes.the top target of phishing Web sites in Germany during this period was an online payment system.
this is a secure third-party payment service that allows users to pay for on-line goods and services
without entering their credit card or banking information into e-commerce Web sites that may not be
secure. As part of this process, users’ accounts contain their credit card information. phishing attempts
that spoof these Web pages will often attempt to fool the user into using his or her account information,
which will allow phishers to access their credit card information or to use the victim’s account to make
purchases online.
51 http://www.webhosting.info/domains/
52 http://webhosting.info/domains/countrystats
53 http://www.webhosting.info/webhosts/globalstatsSymantec eMeA internet Security threat report
33Phishing Web site top-level domains
the domain name system was developed to translate the unique ip addresses assigned to computers
on the internet from complicated series of numbers into familiar words. ip addresses are translated into
domain names by domain name servers. end users are thus able to navigate the internet using names
rather than ip addresses.
the highest level of domain names is the top-level domain ( tLD). examples include .com (which is
generally used by businesses but available to anyone), .edu (which is used by organisations in the
education sector), and .org (which is predominantly used by non-profit organisations).
Understanding the tLDs that are most commonly used in phishing Web sites may help end users, security
administrators, and organisations to understand which tLDs may be most prone to hosting phishing Web
sites, which could help alert them to potentially malicious sites. it may also help security analysts further
identify which countries or sectors are hosting the most phishing Web sites. readers should note that this
is the first reporting period for which Symantec tracked this data; therefore, period-to-period comparisons
are not possible.in the second half of 2007, the most common tLD used by known phishing Web sites situated in the
eMeA region was .com, which was used by 24 percent of the total (table 14). this is not surprising, as
.com is the most common tLD on the internet and is used by approximately 74 percent of all registered
general top-level domain.54 During this reporting period, it was used by 44 percent of phishing Web sites
detected worldwide.
While .com was originally employed to designate a Web site that is used by a commercial organisation, it
has expanded to include many different types of organisations, as well as individuals. it is an unrestricted
tLD, meaning that anyone can register a domain name using it, thus making it easy for phishers to use. As
it is the most commonly used tLD, and is thus familiar to users, .com may be inherently more trusted than
other less widely employed tLDs, thereby making it more effective for phishing Web sites.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Top-level Domain
.com
.de
.ru
.net
.fr
.cn
.es
.org
.tk
.plRegional
Percentage
24%
9%
7%
6%
5%
4%
4%
4%
3%
3%Global
Percentage
44%
2%
2%
6%
1%
23%
1%
3%
1%
1%
ETableXX_PhishTLD_v1. epsTable 14. Phishing Web sites by top-level domain, EMEA
Source: Symantec Corporation
54 http://www.icannwiki.org/Domain_StatisticsSymantec eMeA internet Security threat report
34the percentage of phishing Web sites using the .com tLD in eMeA is somewhat lower than the worldwide
numbers, indicating that phishing Web sites using this tLD are less concentrated in eMeA than globally
and, thus, are not targeting users in the eMeA region specifically. Furthermore, the proportion of phishing
Web sites using this tLD in the eMeA region was significantly lower than those across the internet as a
whole. this may indicate that phishers in the eMeA region are using phishing sites that are hosted on
local tLDs, such as those indicating specific countries. this suggests that phishing Web sites located
in eMeA are likely targeting clients and customers of regional organisations, such as local financial
organisations. Spoofing the brands of local organisations, and using local tLDs, would allow phishers to
craft the phishing messages in the local language, thereby increasing the credibility of the fraudulent Web
site and enhancing its chances of success.
the comparatively low number of .com tLDs in eMeA phishing Web sites may also be due to the
distribution of tLDs across the internet. By far the majority of domain names using .com are situated in
the United States.55 it is therefore logical that the number of phishing Web sites using this tDL is lower
in eMeA than elsewhere.
During the last six months of 2007, .de was the second most common tLD used by phishing Web sites
in the eMeA region, accounting for nine percent of the total. Only two percent of all registered Web
sites globally use this tLD, making it the seventh most commonly used tLD. this would indicate that
phishing Web sites using .de are concentrated in eMeA and, thus, are targeting users in the eMeA
region specifically. the .de domain name is assigned to Germany and this indicates that these phishing Web sites are located
on address space registered in that country. However, readers should note that not all countries require a
domain registrant to be situated in the country. As a result, there is not necessarily a correlation between
the use of a tLD and the involvement of a national of that country being involved in that activity. the
.de tLD is currently used by less than one percent of domain names across the internet as a whole.56
the number of phishing Web sites using this tLD is highly concentrated in the eMeA region and, thus,
targeting users in the eMeA region, most likely those in Germany itself. During the current reporting
period, Germany had the third highest number of phishing Web sites in eMeA, and in the first six months
of the year it had the highest number. it is likely that many of these employed the .de tLD.
As of January 2008, Germany had the highest number of Web domains in the eMeA region and the
second highest number in the world.57 Germany also had the second highest number of Web-hosting
companies in eMeA during this period.58 the high number of phishing Web sites using the .de tLD is
likely a reflection of Germany’s high ranking in these two considerations. that having been said, the high
number of phishing Web sites using the .de tLD does not necessarily mean that the phishers using these
sites are located in Germany. rather, it may be that phishers in indeterminate locations have compromised
Web sites or iSps located in Germany to host their phishing Web sites or are hosting their phishing Web
sites on German domains.
55 http://www.webhosting.info/registries/country_stats/US
56 http://populicio.us/toptlds.html
57 http://webhosting.info/domains/countrystats
58 http://www.webhosting.info/webhosts/globalstatsSymantec eMeA internet Security threat report
35the third most common tLD used by phishing Web sites in the eMeA region during this period was .ru,
which was used by seven percent of the total. the .ru tLD is the country domain assigned to russia. Only
two percent of global phishing Web sites used this tLD. Furthermore, only about 0.5 percent of internet-
wide Web sites use .ru, indicating that phishing Web sites using this tLD were heavily concentrated in
the eMeA region. in the first half of the year, russia hosted eight percent of phishing Web sites in the
eMeA region, the fifth highest total. Many of these likely employed the .ru tLD, leading to its prominence
in this category.
the disproportionately high number of phishing Web sites using .ru in the eMeA region is also likely due
to the involvement of organised criminals conducting phishing activity based in russia. According to
some reports, russian organisations may be responsible for up to 60 percent of phishing activity on the
internet.59 prominent amongst these is the russia Business network ( rBn), which has been implicated in
widespread malicious activity over the past two years.60 the rBn reputedly specialises in the distribution
of malicious code, hosting malicious Web sites, and other malicious activity, specifically the development
and sale of the M pack toolkit. this organisation illustrates the professionalisation of malicious activities
and the burgeoning underground economy that Symantec has discussed in previous volumes of the
Internet Security Threat Report . rBn was reported to have dropped offline in november 2007.61 As a result,
it is likely that phishing Web sites using the .ru tLD will diminish over the foreseeable future.
Phishing—protection and mitigation
Symantec recommends that enterprise users protect themselves against phishing threats by filtering email at the server level through the mail transfer agent (M tA). Although this will likely remain the primary point
of filtering for phishing, organisations can also use ip-based filtering upstream, as well as H ttp filtering.
DnS block lists also offer protection against potential phishing emails.
62 Organisations could also consider
using domain-level or email authentication in order to verify the actual origin of an email message. this
can protect against phishers who are spoofing email domains.63
to protect against potential phishing activity, administrators should always follow Symantec best practices
as outlined in Appendix A of this report. Symantec also recommends that organisations educate their end
users about phishing.64 they should also keep their employees notified of the latest phishing attacks and
how to avoid falling victim to them, and should provide a means to report suspected phishing sites.65
Organisations can also employ Web-server log monitoring to track if and when complete downloads of their
Web sites, logos, and images are occurring. Such activity may indicate that someone is attempting to use
the legitimate Web site to create an illegitimate Web site for phishing.
59 http://www.smh.com.au/news/security/the-hunt-for-russias-web-crims/2007/12/12/1197135470386.html
60 http://www.zdnet.com.au/news/security/soa/ infamous-porn-and-phishing- iSp-rolls-Bank-of- india/0,130061744,339281722,00.htm
61 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/11/08/rbn_offline/
62 A DnS block list (sometimes referred to as a black list) is simply a list of ip addresses that are known to send unwanted email traffic. it is used by email software to
either allow or reject email coming from ip addresses on the list.
63 Spoofing refers to instances where phishers forge the “From:” line of an email message using the domain of the entity they are targeting with the phishing attempt.
64 For instance the United States Federal trade Commission has published some basic guidelines on how to avoid phishing. they are available at:
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/alt127.htm
65 A good resource for information on the latest phishing threats can be found at: http://www.antiphishing.orgSymantec eMeA internet Security threat report
36Organisations can detect phishing attacks that use spoofing by monitoring non-deliverable email
addresses or bounced email that is returned to non-existent users. they should also monitor the
purchasing of cousin domain names by other entities to identify purchases that could be used to spoof
their corporate domains.66 So-called typo domains67 and homographic domains68 should also be
monitored. this can be done with the help of companies that specialise in domain monitoring; some
registrars also provide this service.
the use of antiphishing toolbars and components in Web browsers can also help protect users from
phishing attacks. these measures notify the user if a Web page being visited does not appear to be
legitimate. this way, even if a phishing email reaches a user’s inbox, the user can still be alerted to the
potential threat.end users should follow best security practices, as outlined in “Appendix A” of this report. they should
use an antiphishing solution. As some phishing attacks may use spyware and/or keystroke loggers,
Symantec advises end users to use antivirus software, antispam software, firewalls, toolbar blockers, and
other software detection methods. Symantec also advises end users to never disclose any confidential
personal or financial information unless and until they can confirm that any request for such information
is legitimate. Users should review bank, credit card, and credit information frequently. this can provide information
on any irregular activities. For further information, the internet Fraud Complaint Center ( iFCC) has also
released a set of guidelines on how to avoid internet-related scams.
69 Additionally, network administrators
can review Web proxy logs to determine if any users have visited known phishing sites.
66 “Cousin domains” refers to domain names that include some of the key words of an organisation’s domain or brand name; for example, for the corporate domain
“bigbank.com”, cousin domains could include “bigbank-alerts.com”, ”big-bank-security.com”, and so on.
67 typo domains are domain names that use common misspellings of a legitimate domain name, for example the domain “symatnec.com” would be a typo domain for
“symantec.com”.
68 A homographic domain name uses numbers that look similar to letters in the domain name, for example the character for the number “1” can look like the letter “l”.
69 http://www.fbi.gov/majcases/fraud/internetschemes.htmSymantec eMeA internet Security threat report
37Spam Trends
Spam is usually defined as junk or unsolicited email sent by a third party. While it is certainly an annoyance
to users and administrators, spam is also a serious security concern as it can be used to deliver trojans,
viruses, and phishing attempts. it could also cause a loss of service or degradation in the performance of
network resources and email gateways. this section of the EMEA Internet Security Threat Report will discuss
developments in spam activity in the eMeA region between July 1 and December 31, 2007.
the data used in this analysis is based on data returned from the Symantec probe network as well as data
gathered from a statistical sampling of the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base. Specifically,
statistics are gathered from enterprise customers’ Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam servers that receive more than 1,000 email messages per day. this removes the smaller data samples (that is, smaller customers and
test servers), thereby allowing for a more accurate representation of data.
the Symantec probe network consists of millions of decoy email addresses that are configured to attract
a large stream of spam attacks. An attack can consist of one or more messages. the goal of the probe
network is to simulate a wide variety of internet email users, thereby attracting a stream of traffic that is
representative of spam activity across the internet as a whole. For this reason, it is continuously optimised
in order to attract new varieties of spam attacks. this is accomplished through internal production changes
that are made to the network, which thus affect the number of new spam attacks it receives as a whole. the following metric will be discussed for this report period:
• top countries of spam origin
Top countries of spam origin
the nature of spam makes it difficult to identify the location of people who are sending spam. Many
spammers try to redirect attention away from their actual geographic location. in an attempt to bypass
DnS block lists, they build coordinated networks of bot-infected computers, which allow them to send
spam from sites that are distant from their physical location. Following this logic, the region from which
the spam originates may not correspond with the region in which the spammers are located.this discussion is based on data gathered by customer installations of Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam.
this data includes the originating server’s ip address, against which frequency statistics are summarised.
each ip address is mapped to a specific country and charted over time.
the top source of spam in eMeA this period was the United Kingdom, with 15 percent of the regional
total (table 15).70 this is the same percentage of eMeA-based spam that originated in the United Kingdom
in the first half of 2007. the amount of spam originating in the United Kingdom is in close proportion
to the overall amount of malicious activity that originated there during this reporting period, which
was 11 percent.
70 the previous EMEA Internet Security Threat Report listed this number as 25 percent; however, due to methodological changes over the past six months, figures for
the previous reporting period have been revised.Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
38Current
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
2
5
6
9
3
8
7
10
4Country
United Kingdom
Russia
Poland
Germany
Spain
Italy
France
Turkey
Netherlands
IsraelCurrent
Percentage
15%
12%
10%
10%
7%
6%
6%
5%
3%
3%Previous
Percentage
15%
6%
11%
9%
5%
7%
7%
2%
3%
3%
ETableXX_SpamOrigin_v1. epsTable 15. Top countries of spam origin, EMEA
Source: Symantec Corporation
Spam can be sent by either using a compromised computer as a spam server itself, which is known as
a spam zombie, or by using it to send mail through legitimate mail servers using the server itself or the
computer user’s email account. the United Kingdom was only the eighth ranked country for spam zombies
in the eMeA region during this period, accounting for five percent of the total. As a result, it is likely that
most of the spam originating in the United Kingdom is being sent by compromised computers and relayed
through legitimate email servers.
the second highest volume of spam detected being sent from the eMeA region during this period
originated in russia, which accounted for 12 percent of the total. this is an increase over the first six
months of 2007 when only six percent of eMeA spam originated there.
Symantec observed a 231 percent increase in the number of spam zombies detected in russia during
the current reporting period. Despite this rapid increase, only seven percent of eMeA spam zombies
were located in russia, making it the seventh ranked country in the region. therefore, the number of
spam zombies in russia was low compared to the amount of spam originating in there. russia was only
ranked ninth for bot-infected computers in eMeA during this period, so it is unlikely that the high volumes
of spam originating there were tied to bot-infected computers. Given russia’s prominence in the “ phishing Web site by top-level domain” metric, it is likely that the high
volume of spam originating there is related to other malicious activities. For instance, it is possible that
this is due to the activity of the russian Business network ( rBn), also discussed in the above mentioned
metric. this group, which is referred to as both an iSp and an online service provider, likely used its own
servers to launch high volumes of spam messages. Many of these would be malicious messages that
would entice unknowing users to click on a malicious link that would take them to a Web site that could
harvest confidential information to be used in phishing activity. As the group appears to have been shut down, or at least relocated, it is likely that spam activity originating in russia will return to lower levels in
ensuing reporting periods.Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
39poland had the third highest volume of spam in the eMeA region in the last six months of 2007, accounting
for 10 percent of the region’s total, down slightly from 11 percent in the first six months of the year. in
the first six months of 2007, poland had the third highest volume of spam in the eMeA region, accounting
for eight percent of the region’s total, both of which are very close to the current period’s numbers. it was
also the country of origin for eight percent of spam detected in eMeA in the last six months of 2006, so it
appears that the percentage of spam originating in poland is fairly stable.
poland had the fifth highest number of spam zombies in the eMeA region during this period, with seven
percent of the total. it also had the fourth highest number of bot-infected computers in the eMeA region
during this period, with 10 percent of the total, which is proportionate to the amount of spam originating
there. it is likely that these two factors were responsible for the volume of spam originating in poland
during this period.Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
40Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices
Enterprise Best Practices
• employ defence-in-depth strategies, which emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive
defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protection
method. this should include the deployment of regularly updated antivirus, firewalls, intrusion
detection, and intrusion protection systems on client systems.
• turn off and remove services that are not needed.
• if malicious code or some other threat exploits one or more network services, disable or block access
to those services until a patch is applied.
• Always keep patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host public services and are
accessible through the firewall, such as H ttp, Ftp, mail, and D nS services.
• Consider implementing network compliance solutions that will help keep infected mobile users out
of the network (and disinfect them before rejoining the network).
• enforce an effective password policy.
• Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments that are commonly
used to spread viruses, such as .VBS, .BA t, .eXe, .piF, and .SC r files.
• isolate infected computers quickly to prevent the risk of further infection within the organisation.
perform a forensic analysis and restore the computers using trusted media.
• train employees to not open attachments unless they are expected and come from a known and
trusted source, and to not execute software that is downloaded from the internet unless it has
been scanned for viruses.
• ensure that emergency response procedures are in place. this includes having a backup-and-restore
solution in place in order to restore lost or compromised data in the event of successful attack or
catastrophic data loss.
• educate management on security budgeting needs.
• test security to ensure that adequate controls are in place.
• Be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file-
sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software. Clicking on links
and/or attachments in email messages (or iM messages) may also expose computers to unnecessary
risks. ensure that only applications approved by the organisation are deployed on desktop computers.Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
Consumer Best Practices
• Consumers should use an internet security solution that combines antivirus, firewall, intrusion
detection, and vulnerability management for maximum protection against malicious code and
other threats.
• Consumers should ensure that security patches are up to date and that they are applied to all
vulnerable applications in a timely manner.
• Consumers should ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers, and should change them
often. passwords should not consist of words from the dictionary.
• Consumers should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is
expected and the purpose of the attachment is known.
• Consumers should keep virus definitions updated regularly. By deploying the latest virus definitions,
consumers can protect their computers against the latest viruses known to be spreading in the wild.
• Consumers should routinely check to see if their operating system is vulnerable to threats by using
Symantec Security Check at www.symantec.com/securitycheck.
• Consumers should deploy an antiphishing solution. they should never disclose any confidential
personal or financial information unless and until they can confirm that any request for such
information is legitimate.
• Consumers can get involved in fighting cybercrime by tracking and reporting intruders. With Symantec
Security Check’s tracing service, users can quickly identify the location of potential hackers and forward the information to the attacker’s iSp or local police.
• Consumers should be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with the
installation of file-sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software. Clicking on links and/or attachments in email messages (or iM messages) may also expose computers to
unnecessary risks. ensure that only applications approved by the organisation are deployed on desktop
computers.
• Some security risks can be installed after an end user has accepted the end-user license agreement (eULA), or as a consequence of that acceptance. Consumers should read eULAs carefully and
understand all terms before agreeing to them.
• Consumers should be aware of programs that flash ads in the user interface. Many spyware programs
track how users respond to these ads, and their presence is a red flag. When users see ads in a
program’s user interface, they may be looking at a piece of spyware.
41Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
42Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology
Attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec Global
intelligence network, which includes the Symantec DeepSight threat Management System, Symantec
Managed Security Services, and the Symantec Honeypot network. Symantec combines data derived
from these sources for analysis.
Malicious activity by country
to determine the top countries for the “Malicious activity by country” metric, Symantec compiles
geographical data on each type of malicious activity to be considered. this includes bot-infected
computers, bot command-and-control servers, phishing Web sites, malicious code infections, spam relay hosts, and internet attacks. the proportion of each activity originating in each country is then determined.
the mean of the percentages of each malicious activity that originates in each country is calculated.
this average determines the proportion of overall malicious activity that originates from the country in
question and is used to rank each country.
Top countries of attack origin
Symantec identifies the national sources of attacks by automatically cross-referencing source ip
addresses of every attacking ip with several third-party, subscription-based databases that link the
geographic location of systems to source ip addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there
is a small margin of error.
Denial of service attacks
Although there are numerous methods for carrying out DoS attacks, Symantec derives this metric by measuring DoS attacks that are carried out by flooding a target with S yn requests. these are often
referred to as S yn flood attacks. this type of attack works by overwhelming a target with S yn requests
and not completing the initial request, which thus prevents other valid requests from being processed.
in many cases, S yn requests with forged ip addresses are sent to a target, allowing a single attacking
computer to initiate multiple connections, resulting in unsolicited traffic, known as backscatter, being
sent to other computers on the internet. this backscatter is used to derive the number of DoS attacks
observed throughout the reporting period. Although the values Symantec derives from this metric will
not identify all DoS attacks carried out, it will highlight DoS attack trends.to determine the countries targeted by DoS attacks, Symantec cross-references the target ip addresses
of every attack with several third-party, subscription-based databases that link the geographic location
of systems to source ip addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin
of error.Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
Sectors targeted by DoS attacks were identified using the same methodology as targeted countries.
However, in this case, attackers who were considered were those carrying out a set of DoS attacks that
were detected by iDS and ipS software.
Bot-infected computers
Symantec identifies bot-infected computers based on coordinated scanning and attack behaviour that is
observed in global network traffic. An active bot-infected computer is one that carries out at least one attack per day. this does not have to be continuous; rather, a single computer can be active on a number
of different days. Attacks are defined as any malicious activity carried out over a network that has been detected by an intrusion detection system ( iDS) or firewall.
For an attacking computer to be considered to be participating in coordinated scanning and attacking, it must fit into that pattern to the exclusion of any other activity. this behavioural matching will not catch
every bot-infected computer, and may identify other malicious code or individual attackers behaving in a coordinated way as a botnet. this behavioural matching will, however, identify many of the most
coordinated and aggressive bot-infected computers. it will also give insight into the population trends of
bot-infected computers, including those that are considered to be actively working in a well coordinated
and aggressive fashion at some point in time during the reporting period.
Bot-infected computers by countries and cities
to determine the geolocation of bot-infected computers, Symantec cross-references the ip addresses of
every identified bot-infected computer with several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic location of systems to ip addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there is
a small margin of error. Only cities that can be determined with a confidence rating of at least four out of five are included for consideration. the data produced is then used to determine the global distribution
of bot-infected computers.
43Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
44Appendix C—Malicious Code Trends Methodology
Malicious code trends are based on statistics from malicious code samples reported to Symantec for
analysis. Symantec gathers data from over 120 million client, server, and gateway systems that have
deployed Symantec’s antivirus products in both consumer and corporate environments. the Symantec
Digital immune System and Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting
process. Observations in this section are based on empirical data and expert analysis of this data. the
data and analysis draw primarily from the two databases described below.
Infection database
to help detect and eradicate computer viruses, Symantec developed the Symantec AntiVirus research
Automation (SA rA) technology. Symantec uses this technology to analyse, replicate, and define a large
subset of the most common computer viruses that are quarantined by Symantec Antivirus customers.
On average, SA rA receives hundreds of thousands of suspect files daily from both enterprise and
individual consumers located throughout the world. Symantec then analyses these suspect files, matching
them with virus definitions. An analysis of this aggregate data set provides statistics on infection rates for
different types of malicious code.
Malicious code database
in addition to infection data, Symantec Security response analyses and documents attributes for each new
form of malicious code that emerges both in the wild and in a “zoo” (or controlled laboratory) environment.
Descriptive records of new forms of malicious code are then entered into a database for future reference.
For this report, a historical trend analysis was performed on this database to identify, assess, and discuss
any possible trends, such as the use of different infection vectors and the frequency of various types of
payloads. in some cases, Symantec antivirus products may initially detect new malicious code heuristically or by
generic signatures. these may later be reclassified and given unique detections. Because of this, there may
be slight variance in the presentation of the same data set from one volume of the Internet Security Threat
Report to the next.
Geographic location of malicious code instances
Several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic locations of systems to ip
addresses are used along with proprietary Symantec technology to determine the location of computers
reporting malicious code instances. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin
of error. the data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of malicious code instances.Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
45Appendix D—Phishing Trends Methodology
phishing attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec probe
network. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam data is assessed to gauge the growth in phishing attempts as
well as the percentage of internet mail that is determined to be phishing attempts. Symantec Brightmail
AntiSpam field data consists of statistics reported back from customer installations that provide feedback
about the detection behaviours of antifraud filters as well as the overall volume of mail being processed.
it should be noted that different monitoring organisations use different methods to track phishing
attempts. Some groups may identify and count unique phishing messages based solely on specific content
items such as subject headers or U rLs. these varied methods can often lead to differences in the number
of phishing attempts reported by different organisations.
Top countries hosting phishing Web sites
the data for this section is determined by gathering links in phishing email messages and cross-
referencing the addresses with several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic locations of systems to ip addresses. in this case, Symantec counts phishing Web sites as the number of
unique ip addresses hosting Web pages used for phishing. While these databases are generally reliable,
there is a small margin of error. the data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of
phishing Web sites.
Phishing Web site top-level domains
the data for this section is determined by deriving the top-level domains of each distinct phishing Web
site U rL. the resulting top-level domains are tabulated and compared proportionately.Symantec eMeA internet Security threat report
46Appendix E—Spam Trends Methodology
the Symantec probe network is a system of over two million decoy accounts in over 30 countries that
attract email messages from around the world. it encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises
and attracts email samples that are representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 million
mailboxes. the probe network includes accounts in countries in the Americas, europe, Asia, Africa, and
Australia/Oceania.
Spam trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from both the Symantec probe
network as well as Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam software
reports statistics to the Brightmail Logistical Operations Center (BLOC) indicating messages processed,
messages filtered, and filter-specific data.
Symantec has classified different filters so that spam statistics and phishing statistics can be determined
separately. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data includes data reported back from customer
installations providing feedback from antispam filters as well as overall mail volume being processed.Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam only gathers data at the SM tp layer and not the network layer, where D nS
block lists typically operate. this is because SM tp-layer spam filtering is more accurate than network-
layer filtering and is able to block spam missed at the network layer. network-layer filtering takes place
before email reaches the enterprise mail server. As a result, data from the SM tp layer is a more accurate
reflection of the impact of spam on the mail server itself.
Sample set normalization
Due to the numerous variables influencing a company’s spam activity, Symantec focuses on identifying
spam activity and growth projections with Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data from enterprise
customer installations. this normalization yields a more accurate summary of internet spam trends by
ruling out problematic and laboratory test servers that produce smaller sample sets.
Top countries spam origin
the data for this section is determined by calculating the frequency of originating server ip addresses in
email messages that trigger antispam filters in the field. the ip addresses are mapped to their host
country of origin and the data is summarised by country based on monthly totals. the percentage of spam
per country is calculated from the total spam detected in the field.
it should be noted that the location of the computer from which spam is detected being sent is not
necessarily the location of the spammer. Spammers can build networks of compromised computers
globally and thereby use computers that are geographically separate from their location.Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec
Corporation.
nO WArrAnty . the technical information is being delivered to you as is and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its accuracy or use. Any use of the
technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user. Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical
errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice.
|
S yM An t e C e n t e r p r i Se SeC Ur i t ySymantec Global Internet
Security Threat Report
trends for July–December 07
Volume Xiii, published April 2008Dean Turner
executive editor
Director, Global intelligence network
Symantec Security response
Marc Fossi
Manager, DevelopmentSymantec Security response
Eric Johnsoneditor
Symantec Security response
Trevor MackAssociate editor
Symantec Security response
Joseph Blackbirdthreat Analyst
Symantec Security response
Stephen Entwisle
threat Analyst
Symantec Security response
Mo King Low
threat Analyst
Symantec Security response
David McKinney
threat Analyst
Symantec Security response
Candid Wueest
Analyst
Symantec Security responseIntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
Highlights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Attack Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Vulnerability Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Malicious Code Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Phishing Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Spam Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
Appendix C—Vulnerability Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
Appendix D—Malicious Code Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
Appendix E— Phishing and Spam Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95ContentsVolume Xiii, published April 2008
Symantec Global Internet Security
Threat ReportSymantec Global internet Security threat report
Introduction
the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report provides a six-month update of worldwide internet
threat activity. it includes analysis of network-based attacks, a review of known vulnerabilities, and
highlights of malicious code. it also assesses trends in phishing and spam activity. the report also
provides protection and mitigation recommendations for these concerns. this volume covers the six-
month period from July 1 to December 31, 2007.
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of internet threat data in the
world. the Symantec™ Global intelligence network encompasses worldwide security intelligence data
gathered from a wide range of sources, including more than 40,000 sensors monitoring networks in over
180 countries through Symantec products and services such as Symantec DeepSight™ threat
Management System and Symantec Managed Security Services™, and from other third-party sources.
Symantec gathers malicious code reports from over 120 million client, server, and gateway systems
that have deployed its antivirus product, and also maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive
vulnerability databases, currently consisting of over 25,000 recorded vulnerabilities (spanning more
than two decades) affecting more than 55,000 technologies from over 8,000 vendors. Symantec also
operates the Bug traq™ mailing list, one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion
of vulnerabilities on the internet, which has approximately 50,000 direct subscribers who contribute,
receive, and discuss vulnerability research on a daily basis.
As well, the Symantec probe network, a system of over two million decoy accounts in more than
30 countries, attracts email from around the world to gauge global spam and phishing activity. Symantec
also gathers phishing information through the Symantec phish report network, an extensive antifraud
community of enterprises and consumers whose members contribute and receive fraudulent Web site
addresses for alerting and filtering across a broad range of solutions.
these resources give Symantec’s analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze,
and provide informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and
spam. the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report gives enterprises and consumers essential
information to effectively secure their systems now and into the future.
4Symantec Global internet Security threat report
5Highlights
this section provides highlights of the security trends that Symantec observed during this period based
on the data gathered from the sources listed above. Selected metrics will be discussed in greater depth
in their respective sections following these highlights.
Attack Trends Highlights
• During this reporting period, the United States accounted for 31 percent of all malicious activity,
an increase from 30 percent in the first half of 2007.
• the United States was the top country of attack origin in the second half of 2007, accounting for
24 percent of worldwide activity, a decrease from 25 percent in the first half of 2007.
• the education sector accounted for 24 percent of data breaches that could lead to identity theft
during this period, more than any other sector. this was a decrease from the previous reporting
period, when it accounted for 30 percent of the total.
• Government was the top sector for identities exposed, accounting for 60 percent of the total, a
significant increase from 12 percent in the first half of 2007.
• theft or loss of computer or other data-storage medium was the cause of the most data breaches
that could lead to identity theft during this reporting period, accounting for 57 percent of the total.
it accounted for 61 percent of the identities exposed in the second half of 2007, more than any
other sector.
• the United States was the top country for hosting underground economy servers, accounting for
58 percent of the total identified by Symantec, a decrease from the first half of 2007, when it
accounted for 64 percent of the total.
• Bank accounts were the most commonly advertised item for sale on underground economy servers
known to Symantec, accounting for 22 percent of all items, an increase from the first half of 2007,
when they made up 21 percent.
• Symantec observed an average of 61,940 active bot-infected computers per day in the second half
of 2007, an increase of 17 percent from the previous period.
• the average lifespan of a bot-infected computer during the last six months of 2007 was four days,
unchanged from the first half of 2007.
• the United States had the most bot-infected computers, accounting for 14 percent of the worldwide
total, a slight increase from 13 percent in first half of 2007.
• Madrid was the city with the most bot-infected computers, accounting for three percent of the
worldwide total.
• in the last six months of 2007, Symantec identified 4,091 bot command-and-control servers. this is an
11 percent decrease from the previous reporting period, when 4,622 bot command-and-control servers
were identified. Of these, 45 percent were located in the United States, more than any other country.
• the United States was the country most frequently targeted by denial-of-service attacks, accounting for
56 percent of the worldwide total. this is a decrease from 61 percent reported in the first half of 2007.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
6Vulnerability Trends Highlights
• not including site-specific vulnerabilities, Symantec documented 2,134 vulnerabilities in the second
half of 2007, 13 percent less than the first half of 2007.
• three percent of vulnerabilities documented in this period were classified as high severity, 61 percent
as medium, and 36 percent as low. in the first half of 2007, nine percent of documented vulnerabilities
were considered high severity, 51 percent medium, and 40 percent low.
• Fifty-eight percent of vulnerabilities documented in the second half of 2007 affected Web applications,
down from 61 percent in the first half of 2007.
• Seventy-three percent of vulnerabilities documented in this period were classified as easily exploitable,
compared to 72 percent in the first half of 2007.
• All operating system vendors except Apple® and Sun® had shorter average patch development
times. Microsoft® had the shortest patch development time, at six days; Sun had the longest patch
development time, at 157 days.
• Over half of patched medium- and high-severity operating system vulnerabilities for Microsoft, H p®,
and Sun in the second half of 2007 were browser and client-side vulnerabilities. During the first half
of 2007, browser and client-side vulnerabilities made up the majority of patched operating system
vulnerabilities for all vendors but Apple.
• the window of exposure for enterprise vendors was 46 days in the last six months of 2007, compared
to 55 days in the previous six months.
• Safari had the shortest window of exposure of any browser in the last six months of 2007, with an
average exposure of less than one day from a sample set of 18 patched vulnerabilities. Safari also
had the shortest window of exposure during the first six months of 2007, an average of three days
from a sample set of 13 patched vulnerabilities.
• During the second half of 2007, there were 88 vulnerabilities reported in Mozilla browsers, 22 in Safari,
18 in internet explorer, and 12 in Opera. in the previous six month period, internet explorer was subject
to 39 vulnerabilities, Mozilla to 34, Safari to 25, and Opera to seven.
• Symantec documented 239 browser plug-in vulnerabilities in the last six months of 2007, compared
to 237 during the first six months. During the second half of 2007, 79 percent of these vulnerabilities
affected ActiveX components, compared to 89 percent in the first half.
• in the second half of 2007, 58 percent of all vulnerabilities affected Web applications. this is less than
the 61 percent in the first half of 2007.
• Symantec identified 11,253 site-specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities in the last six months of
2007, compared to 6,961 in the first half (though with measurement beginning only in February).
• Symantec documented nine zero-day vulnerabilities in the second half of 2007, all of which affected
third-party applications for the Windows platform. there were six zero-day vulnerabilities in the first
half of 2007.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
• eighty-eight vulnerabilities that affected enterprise vendors in the second half of 2007 remain unpatched
at the end of the reporting period. this is an increase over the 81 unpatched enterprise vulnerabilities in
the first half of 2007. Microsoft had the most unpatched vulnerabilities in both reporting periods.
• Symantec documented 92 vulnerabilities that affected security products during the second half of 2007,
down from 113 in the first half of the year. Of the 92 vulnerabilities, 15 were classified as high severity,
48 as medium, and 29 as low.
Malicious Code Trends Highlights
• in the second half of 2007, 499,811 new malicious code threats were reported to Symantec, a 136 percent
increase over the first half of 2007.
• Of the top 10 new malicious code families detected in the last six months of 2007, five were trojans, two
were worms, two were worms with a back door component, and one was a worm with a virus component.
• During the second half of 2007, trojans made up 71 percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code
samples, a decrease from 73 percent in the first six months of 2007.
• Forty-three percent of worms originated in the europe, Middle east, and Africa ( eMeA) region.
• north America accounted for 46 percent of trojans for this period.
• threats to confidential information made up 68 percent of the volume of the top 50 potential malicious
code infections reported to Symantec.
• Of all confidential information threats detected this period, 76 percent had a keystroke logging
component and 86 percent had remote access capabilities, a decrease for each from 88 percent
in the previous period.
• Forty percent of malicious code that propagated did so through executable file sharing, a significant
increase from 14 percent in the first half of 2007, making this the most commonly used propagation
mechanism during this period.
• Seven percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code samples modified Web pages this period,
up from three percent in the previous period.
• During the second half of 2007, 10 percent of the 1,032 documented malicious code samples exploited
vulnerabilities. this is lower than the 18 percent proportion of the 1,509 malicious code instances
documented in the first half of 2007.
• Seven of the top 10 staged downloaders this period were trojans, two were worms, and one was
a worm with a viral infection component.
• Of the top 10 downloaded components for this period, eight were trojans and two were back doors.
• Malicious code that targets online games made up eight percent of the volume of the top 50 potential
malicious code infections, up from five percent in the previous period.
7Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Phishing Trends Highlights
• the Symantec probe network detected a total of 207,547 unique phishing messages, a five percent
increase over the first six months of 2007. this equates to an average of 1,134 unique phishing
messages per day for the second half of 2007.
• eighty percent of all unique brands used in phishing attacks were in the financial sector, compared
to 79 percent in the previous period.
• During this period, 66 percent of all phishing Web sites spoofed financial services brands, down from
72 percent in the first half of 2007.
• in the second half of 2007, 66 percent of all phishing attacks detected by Symantec were associated
with Web sites located in the United States. two social networking sites together were the target of
91 percent of phishing attacks with Web sites hosted in the United States.
• the most common top-level domain used in phishing Web sites for this period was .com, accounting for
44 percent; the second most common top-level domain used by phishing Web sites was .cn, accounting
for 23 percent.
• Symantec observed 87,963 phishing hosts worldwide this period, an increase of 167 percent from
the 32,939 observed in the first half of the year.
• Sixty-three percent of all phishing hosts identified were in the United States, a much higher proportion
than in any other country.
• three phishing toolkits were responsible for 26 percent of all phishing attacks observed by Symantec
in the second half of 2007.
Spam Trends Highlights• Between July 1 and December 31, 2007, spam made up 71 percent of all email traffic monitored at the
gateway, a 16 percent increase over the last six months of 2006, when 61 percent of email was
classified as spam.
• eighty percent of all spam detected during this period was composed in english, up from 60 percent
in the previous reporting period.
• in the second half of 2007, 0.16 percent of all spam email contained malicious code, compared to
0.43 percent of spam that contained malicious code in the first half of 2007. this means that one out
of every 617 spam messages blocked by Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam contained malicious code.
• Spam related to commercial products made up 27 percent of all spam during this period, the most of
any category and an increase from 22 percent in the previous period.
• During the last six months of 2007, 42 percent of all spam detected worldwide originated in the United
States, compared to 50 percent in the previous period.
• the United States hosted the most spam zombies of any country, with 10 percent of the worldwide
total, representing no change from the first six months of 2007.
• in the second half of 2007, the daily average percentage of image spam was seven percent. this is
down from a daily average of 27 percent during the first six months of 2007.
8Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Attack Trends
this section of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report will provide an analysis of attack
activity, as well as other malicious activity, data breaches, and the trade of illicit information that
Symantec observed between July 1 and December 31, 2007. the malicious activity discussed in this
section includes not only attack activity, but also phishing, malicious code, spam zombie, and command-
and-control server activity. Attacks are defined as any malicious activity carried out over a network that has been detected by an intrusion detection system ( iDS) or firewall. Definitions for the other types of
malicious activity can be found in the sections following “Attack trends.”
this section will discuss the following metrics, providing analysis and discussion of the trends indicated
by the data:
• Malicious activity by country
• Data breaches that could lead to identity theft
• Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by sector
• Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by cause
• Underground economy servers
• Underground economy servers—goods and services available for sale
• Bot-infected computers
• Bot command-and-control servers
• Attacks—protection and mitigation
Malicious activity by country
this metric will assess the countries in which the largest amount of malicious activity takes place or
originates. to determine this, Symantec has compiled geographical data on numerous malicious activities,
namely: bot-infected computers, bot command-and-control servers, phishing Web site hosts, malicious
code reports, spam zombies, and internet attacks. the rankings are determined by calculating the mean
average of the proportion of these malicious activities that originated in each country.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2007, the United States was the top country for malicious activity, making up 31 percent of worldwide malicious activity (table 1). this represents a small change from
the first half of 2007, when the United States was also first, with 30 percent. For each of the malicious
activities in this metric, the United States ranked first by a large margin.
9Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Current
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
2
3
4
7
5
6
8
12
9Country
United States
China
Germany
United Kingdom
Spain
France
Canada
Italy
Brazi l
South KoreaCurrent
Percentage
31%
7%
7%
4%
4%
4%
3%
3%
3%
2%Previous
Percentage
30%
10%
7%
4%
3%
4%
4%
3%
2%
3%Malicious
Code
Rank
1
2
7
3
9
11
4
10
21
14Spam
Zombies
Rank
1
4
2
12
9
7
35
6
3
13Command-
and-Control
Server Rank
1
5
2
6
19
13
3
10
7
4Phishing
Web
Sites
Host
Rank
1
2
3
7
15
6
5
11
13
9Bot
Rank
1
3
2
9
4
8
13
5
6
15Attack
Origin
Rank
1
2
3
5
4
6
7
8
9
10
TableXX_MalicousCountry_v4. epsTable 1. Malicious activity by country
Source: Symantec Corporation
Malicious activity usually affects computers that are connected to high-speed broadband internet.
Since broadband connections provide larger bandwidth capacities than other connection types, and the
connections are frequently continuous, it is not surprising that the United States had the most malicious
activity, since it has the most established broadband infrastructure in the world: 94 percent of U.S.
households have access to available broadband connections, and its 65.5 million broadband subscribers
represent 20 percent of the world’s total, more than any other country.1
China had the second highest amount of worldwide malicious activity during the last six months of 2007,
accounting for seven percent, a decrease from 10 percent in the previous reporting period. China ranked
high in most of the contributing criteria, which is not surprising since China has the second highest number
of broadband subscribers in the world, with 19 percent of the worldwide broadband total.2
the main reason for China’s percentage decrease was the large drop in bot-infected computers there in
the second half of 2007. China dropped to third for bot-infected computers in the second half of 2007,
with eight percent, a large decrease from the first half of 2007, when it had 29 percent and ranked first.
this decrease is attributable to a significant reduction in the availability of many Web sites, forums, and
blogs in China for several months during this period.3 Dynamic sites such as forums and blogs are prime
targets for attackers using bots to propagate and host malicious content. Symantec believes that, because
of their scalability, bots are responsible for much of the malicious attack activity that is observed, and any serious reduction in the number of bots should result in a corresponding drop in total attack activity. this
is also supported by the decrease in China of spam zombies, which are often associated with bot-infected
computers. China dropped from third in spam zombies in the first half of 2007, with nine percent of the
worldwide total, to fourth and six percent in the second half of 2007.
1 http://www.point-topic.com
2 http://www.point-topic.com
3 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21268635/
10Symantec Global internet Security threat report
4 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/11/scam_related_to_the_2008_beiji.html and
http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/it/2007/10/10/man-convicted-of-fraud-for-phony-olympics-web-site/
5 http://www.scmagazineus.com/ is-this-the-end-of-the- russian-Business- network/article/96289/ and
http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,139465-page,1-c,privacysecurity/article.htm l
6 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/05/mpack_packed_full_of_badness.html
7 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/12/A r2007101202461_pf.html
8 http://www.point-topic.com
9 http://www.point-topic.com
10 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_09_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 31.
11Another possible reason for the change in malicious activity originating in China this period was that China
ranked second for hosting phishing Web sites, accounting for four percent of the worldwide total. this was
a large increase from the previous reporting period, when it ranked eighteenth with one percent of the
total. One possible cause for the increase may be the recent rise in phishing scams and fraudulent Web
sites attempting to exploit the popularity of the upcoming 2008 Beijing Olympics.4 Such activities will
likely continue in the lead-up to the August 8, 2008 Olympics start date.
Furthermore, the increase may have been influenced by the shutdown of the russian Business network
(rBn) in november 2007 and its subsequent emergence in China, which may have a less well-established
security infrastructure or security laws than russia.5 russia dropped in rank for hosting phishing Web sites,
from fifth in the previous period to eighth in this period. the rBn reputedly specializes in the distribution
of malicious code, hosting malicious Web sites, and other malicious activity, including the development
and sale of the M pack toolkit.6 the rBn has been credited for creating approximately half of the phishing
incidents that occurred worldwide last year, and hosts Web sites that are responsible for a large amount
of the world’s internet crime.7
in the last six months of 2007, Germany again ranked third, with seven percent of all internet-wide
malicious activity, the same percentage as in the first half of 2007. As with the previous reporting period,
Germany ranked high in spam zombies, command-and-control servers, hosting phishing Web sites,
and bot-infected computers. Factors that influence its high rank include a well-established internet
infrastructure and a high number of broadband subscribers, as Germany ranks in the top five countries
for broadband subscribers in the world, with six percent of the total.8
it is reasonable to expect that the United States, Germany, and China will continue to rank as the top
three countries for the highest amount of malicious activity as they also added the greatest number
of broadband subscribers over the course of 2007: the United States added 4.2 million broadband
subscribers, China added 6.8 million, and Germany added 2.4 million.9
On a global scale, the distribution of malicious activity seems to be relatively static, with the countries listed in the top 20 remaining unchanged from the first half of 2007. this follows a trend first noted in
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report Volume XII that a country that is established as a frequent source
of malicious activity tends to remain so.10 this is likely to remain the case until more effective measures—
such as increased filtering for malicious activity, securely-coded applications, and more education for end
users—are taken to reduce the amount of originating malicious activity. Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft
identity theft continues to be a high-profile security issue, particularly for organizations that store and
manage large amounts of personal information. not only can compromises that result in the loss of
personal data undermine customer and institutional confidence and result in costly damage to an
organization’s reputation, but data breaches can also be financially costly to organizations: the average
cost per incident of a data breach in the United States was $6.3 million and lost business amounted to
an average of $4.1 million.11 Also, organizations can be held liable for breaches and losses, which may
result in fines or litigation.12
By the end of 2007, 39 states in the United States had introduced breach notification legislation that
regulates the responsibilities of organizations conducting business within the particular state after a data
breach has occurred.13 the state of California was the benchmark for such legislation, adopting data breach
notification laws in 2003.14 the laws require anyone who conducts business in the state to notify owners of
the information exposed immediately after a security breach, with failure to do so resulting in possible civil
action and fines. Other countries have also introduced legislation to tackle identity fraud, including Canada
and new Zealand, both of whom issued guidelines for dealing with privacy breach notification in 2007.15
Other initiatives in the United States include the Federal Agency Data Breach protection Act, which requires
federal agencies to notify citizens whose information has been compromised by a data breach,16 and the
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), enacted in 2002, which stipulates that financial institutions must ensure the security of clients’ nonpublic personal information. the added consideration of punitive costs may
influence organizations to develop more robust security strategies, which may help reduce the number of
breaches overall.
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by sector
Using publicly available data,17 Symantec has determined the sectors that were most often affected by
these breaches, as well as the most common causes of data loss. this metric will also explore the severity of
the breach by measuring the total number of identities exposed to attackers through the data breach, using
the same publicly available data. An identity is considered to be exposed if personal or financial data related
to the identity is made available through the data breach.
it should be noted that some sectors may need to comply with more stringent reporting requirements for
data breaches than others. For instance, government organizations are more likely to report data breaches,
either due to regulatory obligations or in conjunction with publicly accessible audits and performance
reports.18 Conversely, organizations that rely on consumer confidence may be less inclined to report such
breaches for fear of negative consumer, industry, or market reaction. As a result, sectors that are not
required or encouraged to report data breaches may be under-represented in this data set. in the second half of 2007, the education sector represented the highest number of known data breaches
that could lead to identity theft, accounting for 24 percent of the total (figure 1). this is a decrease from
the previous reporting period when the education sector accounted for 30 percent of the total, when it also
ranked first.
11 http://www.vontu.com/uploadedfiles/global/ ponemon-Cost-of-a-Data-Breach-2007.pdf : the report defines per incident costs as including “process-related
activities” such as investigations into the breach, breach notification to affected individuals, credit report monitoring for customers and/or the reissuing of a new
account or credit card.
12 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/ pr/2007/021.shtml
13 http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/priv/breachlaws.htm
14 http://www.news.com/Law-aims-to-reduce-identity-theft/2100-1017_3-1022341.html
15 http://www.privcom.gc.ca/information/guide/2007/gl_070801_01_e.asp and http://www.privacy.org.nz/the-privacy-act-and-codes/
16 http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h109-6163
17 http://attrition.org/dataloss/
18 For example, the Fair and Accurate Credit transactions Act of 2003 (FAC tA) of California. For more on this act, please see:
http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs6a-facta.htm. Another example is the Health insurance portability and Accountability Act of 1996.
For more information see: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/H ipAAGen info/
12Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Attacks — data breaches by sector v1
02-19-08
2%
2%
1%
1%
1%
1%
Data breaches Identities expose d6%14%
Health careEducation
Government
Financial 3%
3%
2%
2%
2%
1%1%
4%16%
20%
24%
Militar yRetail/ wholesale
Telecommunications
Computer software 24%
Computer hardwareTransportation
Insurance
Othe r
Biotech /pharmaceutical33%
60%8%
Figure 1. Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by sector and identities exposed
Source: Based on data provided by Attrition.org
educational institutions store a large amount of personal information on students, faculty, and staff that
could be used for the purposes of identity theft, including government-issued identification numbers,
names, addresses, and birthdates. these institutions—particularly larger universities—often consist of
many semi-independent departments in which sensitive personal identification information may be stored in separate locations and be accessible to many people. this may increase the opportunities for attackers
to gain unauthorized access to this data since it may be more difficult to standardize the security and
access control of these dispersed databases.
Despite the high number of data breaches that occurred in the education sector during the last six
months of 2007, it only accounted for one percent of all identities exposed during the period (figure 1). this is likely because 43 percent of the data breaches in the education sector this period were caused
by the theft or loss of computers or data-storage devices. Unlike hacking,19 in which data breaches can
last for an extended period and expose numerous identities, breaches caused by theft or loss can only
be opportunistically taken advantage of. As such, data breaches that occurred in the education sector in
this reporting period were not as likely to result in wide-scale identity theft because they resulted in the
exposure of fewer identities.
19 A data breach is considered to be caused by hacking if identity theft-related data was exposed by an attacker or attackers by gaining unauthorized access to
computers or networks.
13Symantec Global internet Security threat report
During this reporting period, the government sector ranked second and accounted for 20 percent of data
breaches that could lead to identity theft. this is a decrease from the previous reporting period, when the
government sector represented 26 percent of the total, though still ranking second.
Government organizations, like educational institutions, store large amounts of information that could be
used for purposes of identity theft. Similar to the education sector, these organizations often consist of
numerous semi-independent departments that store sensitive personal information in separate locations
and are accessible to numerous people. As a consequence, government organizations face the same
security and control issues as educational institutions.
the government sector had the highest overall number of identities exposed during the period, accounting
for 60 percent of the total. there were a number of high profile data loss incidents during the period.
One incident involved Her Majesty’s revenue and Customs (HM rC) in the United Kingdom, when two
unencrypted disks containing personal records on 25 million people were lost during transfer from HM rC
to the national Audit Office.20 there were also other breaches reported in the UK, including the theft of
a laptop containing military applicants’ details.21 Although the HM rC disks have not been recovered and
there have been no subsequent incidents to suggest that the information involved is in the public domain,
high profile breaches such as these underscore the vital importance of implementing the latest data loss
prevention technologies and strategies.the health care sector ranked third for this period, accounting for 16 percent of data breaches that
could lead to identity theft. it also ranked third in the previous period, accounting for 15 percent. the
prominence of the health care sector may be due to similar factors that influenced the prominence
of both the education and government sectors, such as the storage of large amounts of sensitive
personal information in many locations. Furthermore, health care organizations store sensitive medical
information, which could result in potentially even more damaging breaches of privacy.the health care sector ranked fifth for the number of identities exposed this period, accounting for just
over one percent of the total. As with the education sector, data breaches within the health care sector
resulted in a relatively low number of identities exposed. thus, breaches in this sector were less likely to
result in wide-scale identity theft than in the other sectors since they exposed a small number of identity-
theft related data, such as financial information or government-issued identity numbers.
the financial sector was ranked fourth in the number of data breaches that could lead to identity theft
in the second half of 2007, accounting for 14 percent of the total. However, the sector accounted for
33 percent of the overall number of identities exposed, ranking second. the Fidelity national information
Services data breach, in which information on 8.5 million credit cards, bank accounts, and personal data
was stolen by a former employee, contributed to the large percentage of identities exposed in this
sector in the second half of 2007.22
20 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7103566.stm
21 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article3213274.ece
22 http://jacksonville.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/stories/2007/11/26/daily23.html
14Symantec Global internet Security threat report
the distribution of data breaches that could lead to identity theft by sector appears to be relatively
constant, as the sectors listed in the top four have not varied from Symantec Internet Security Threat
Report XI. Since these four sectors—education, government, heath care, and financial—are required to
store large amounts of personal information on an ongoing basis, this trend seems likely to continue.
Moreover, Symantec has observed that the top sector for the number of identities exposed correlates
with large-scale breaches that occur in the reporting period. in other words, the large-scale breaches
associated with those organizations are the main contributors for the disproportionate amount of
identities exposed in their sector.
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by cause
in the second half of 2007, the primary cause of data breaches that could facilitate identity theft was the
theft or loss of a computer or other medium on which data is stored or transmitted, such as a USB key or a
back-up medium.23 theft or loss made up 57 percent of all data breaches during the second half of 2007,
and accounted for 46 percent of all reported breaches in the previous reporting period (figure 2). Attacks — data breaches by cause v1
02-19-08
Data breaches Identities exposedInsider 21%
Unknown 2%
Insecure policy 2%Hacking 13%
Theft /loss 61 %Insecure policy 21%
Insider 6%Hacking 13 %
Unknown 4%
Fraud 1%
Thef t/loss 57%
Figure 2. Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by cause and identities exposed
Source: Based on data provided by Attrition.org
theft or loss accounted for 61 percent of all identities exposed in the second half of 2007, more than any
other cause (figure 2). this was a large increase from first half of 2007, when the number of identities
exposed from theft or loss accounted for 11 percent of the total. it is likely that theft is opportunistic and
motivated by the hardware itself and not necessarily its contents, and as such, may not lead to wide-scale identity theft. examples of data breaches due to theft or loss that contribute to these increased
percentages include the HM rC loss in the United Kingdom, and the resona Bank loss in Japan, in which
980,000 customers’ names and account numbers went missing.24
23 this cause will be referred to as theft or loss in the remainder of the report.
24 http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=128692
15Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Although laptops and other storage devices, such as USB memory keys, have become smaller and easier
to use, their compact size and larger storage capability increases the opportunity for theft, loss or
misplacement, as well as the potential amount of information breached. to protect against data theft or
loss, organizations should restrict the use of outside personal storage devices within their network, and
monitor the usage of such hardware when permitted.
the second most common cause of data breaches that could lead to identity theft during this period was
insecure policy, which represented 21 percent of all incidents. A data breach is considered to be caused
by insecure policy if it can be attributed to a failure to develop, implement, and/or comply with adequate
security policy. in the first half of 2007, insecure policy also ranked second, accounting for 34 percent of
such data breaches. this decrease in the number of data breaches may be due to organizations becoming
more diligent and producing stronger security policies.
in the second half of 2007, insecure policy accounted for only two percent of exposed identities. therefore,
each breach exposed a relatively small number of identities and, thus, breaches caused by insecure policy
in the second half of 2007 were not likely to result in wide-scale identity theft. in the last six months of 2007, hacking was the third leading cause of data breaches that could lead to
identity theft, accounting for 13 percent of the total. A data breach is considered to be caused by hacking
if data related to identity theft was exposed by attackers external to an organization gaining unauthorized
access to computers or networks. During the first six months of 2007, hacking also ranked third,
accounting for 16 percent of breaches that could facilitate identity theft.
Hacking was responsible for 13 percent of identities exposed during the period, ranking third in the second
half of 2007. the prominence of hacking in this reporting period was primarily due to the tD Ameritrade
data breach, in which hackers using pump-and-dump spam compromised a database that contained
contact information on 6.3 million customers of one of the largest discount brokers in the United States.25
Hacking is more purpose-driven than insecure policy, theft, or loss; it is an intentional act with a defined
purpose to steal data that can be used for purposes of identity theft or other fraud.
Most breaches that could lead to identity theft are avoidable. in the case of theft or loss and hacking, the
compromise of data could be averted by strongly encrypting all sensitive data and educating users on the
proper procedures for using such programs. Although it is likely that theft is motivated by a desire for the
hardware itself and not the contents of it, encryption would ensure that even if the data is lost or stolen,
it would not be accessible to unauthorized third parties. Also, network administrators should be closely
monitoring network traffic and tracking all activity to ensure that access to data is controlled. Security
processes and systems should be regularly tested to ensure their integrity. these steps should be part
of a broader security policy that organizations should develop, implement, and enforce in order to
ensure that all sensitive data is protected from unauthorized access.
25 http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11488
16Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Underground economy servers
Underground economy servers are black market forums used by criminals and criminal organizations to
advertise and trade stolen information and services, typically for use in identity theft. this information
can include government-issued identification numbers such as Social Security numbers, credit cards, credit verification values, debit cards, personal identification numbers ( pins), user accounts, email
address lists, and bank accounts. Services include cashiers, scam page hosting, and job advertisements
such as for scam developers or phishing partners.
the geographic locations of underground economy servers are constantly changing due to the nature
of these servers, which are often hosted as channels on public irC servers. Once a fraud-related irC
channel becomes popular, it is often either shut down by the irC server administrators or abandoned
by its users due to legal liability and the increased possibility of being caught. As such, the location of
an underground economy server is primarily driven by convenience and the lifespan of a server may be
short. Furthermore, the geographic location of the server is typically not of any consequence to those
involved because users of underground economy servers do most of their business electronically. Criminals advertise their goods and services on irC servers by listing available items and their prices.
potential buyers will privately contact the sellers to make the deal and finalize payment. payment
options for these goods are either conducted through online currency exchange services or exchange of
goods. Unwilling to risk exposure, many purchasers will use the services of cashiers who will convert the
information for a fee into true currency, either in the form of online currency accounts or through money
transfers. in exchange for the service, cashiers will take a percentage of the cash-out amount.26 Members
of underground economy servers are usually self-policing, reporting rippers27 to the administrators of
the irC servers, and also broadcasting this information to warn each other. Often, repeat rippers will be
kicked off and banned from the servers.
Underground economy servers—goods and services available for sale
this discussion will assess underground economy servers according to the different types of goods and
services advertised. it should be noted that this discussion may not necessarily be representative of
internet-wide activity; rather, it is intended as a snapshot of the activity that Symantec monitored during
this period.
During the second half of 2007, bank account credentials, including account numbers and authentication
information, were the most frequently advertised item observed on underground economy servers, making up 22 percent of all goods (table 2). this was a slight increase from 21 percent in the first half
of 2007. the advertised price for bank account credentials varied as widely as it did in the first six months
of 2007, with prices ranging from $10 to $1,000 USD, depending on the amount of funds available and
the location of the account. Bank accounts that included higher balances, such as business accounts,
and eU accounts, were advertised for considerably more. Furthermore, bank accounts that bundled in
personal information such as names, addresses and dates of birth were advertised at higher prices.
26 Cash-out is a term used on underground economy servers where purchases are converted into true currency. this could be in the form of online
currency accounts or through money transfer systems.
27 rippers are vendors on underground economy servers that conduct fraudulent transactions.
17Symantec Global internet Security threat report
28 Descriptions and definitions for the goods and services discussed in this section can be found in “Appendix B—Attack trends Methodology.”
29 http://www.asianagold.com/faq.html
30 http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2007/tc20071120_575440.htm?campaign_id=rss_tech
18Current
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Previous
Rank
2
1
7
N/A
8
4
5
3
N/A
6Goods and Services
Bank accounts
Credit cards
Full identities
Online auction site accounts
Scams
Mailers
Email addresses
Email passwords
Drop (request or offer)
ProxiesCurrent
Percentage
22%
13%
9%
7%
7%
6%
5%
5%
5%
5%Previous
Percentage
21%
22%
6%
N/A
6%
8%
6%
8%
N/A
6%Range of Prices
$10–$1000
$0.40–$20
$1–$15
$1–$8
$2.50/week–$50/week for hosting,
$25 for design
$1–$10
$0.83/MB–$10/MB
$4–$30
10%–50% of total drop amount
$1.50–$30
TableXX_UndGrndEconServ_v2. epsTable 2. Breakdown of goods and services available for sale on underground economy servers28
Source: Symantec Corporation
the small increase in the proportion of bank account credentials advertised may be due to a number of
reasons. it is easier to withdraw funds from bank accounts compared to other financial means, such as
credit cards, since fraud detection is not as effective. One of the main goals of most criminals who conduct
business on underground economy servers is to easily cash out their purchases. Criminals can quickly
cash out bank accounts to secure, untraceable drops using wire transfers or services offered by cashiers,
sometimes in less than 15 minutes. Also, many wire transfer companies and currency exchange services
no longer accept credit cards as forms of payment for all countries.29
Another possible reason for the continued prominence and increased availability of bank account
credentials advertised is that Symantec observed an 86 percent increase in potential banking trojan
infections in the second half of 2007, which could result in more bank account credentials being stolen
and then advertised on underground economy servers.
Credit cards were the second most commonly advertised item on underground economy servers during this reporting period, accounting for 13 percent of all advertised goods. this was a decrease from 22 percent in
the first six months of 2007. the decrease in credit cards being advertised may be due to several reasons.
With the recent high-profile reports on lost credit card data, such as the tJX loss, consumers and credit
card companies may be more diligent in monitoring customers’ credit card activities and quicker to inform
customers of suspicious transactions, and subsequently, reducing the window of opportunity for criminals
to exploit stolen credit cards. Also, as stated above, it is more difficult to cash out credit cards as many
wire transfer companies and currency exchange services do not accept them as a form of payment.
Furthermore, consumers, fearing identity theft and payment fraud, have been moving away from paying for online purchases with credit cards and towards internet-based payment services, such as paypal and other
non-credit card electronic payment services. these types of services have become more popular because
they do not expose the credit or debit card information that is used to set up the accounts and often offer full protection from unauthorized payments. they accounted for over 30 percent of the U.S. online
payment market, a volume increase of 34 percent from 2006.30 Symantec Global internet Security threat report
the price range of credit cards in the second half of 2007 remained consistent with the prices from the
first half of the year, ranging from $0.40 to $20 USD per card number. two of the main factors affecting
the cost of credit cards on underground economy servers were the location of the issuing bank and the
rarity of the card. Cards from the european Union cost more than those from the United States. One
reason for the higher prices may be due to the availability of credit cards, since there was eight times
the number of credit cards in circulation in the United States than in the european Union.31 rarer cards,
such as those from smaller countries or smaller credit card companies, were typically twice as expensive
as their more popular counterparts.
Credit cards issued by banks in the United States constituted 62 percent of the total credit cards advertised
in the second half of 2007, a drop from 85 percent in the first half of 2007. it may be possible that demand
for credit cards from banks in the United States may have fallen due to a decrease in popularity and hence,
their selling price on underground economy servers is lower.
Criminals who sell credit cards on underground economy servers will advertise bulk rates and give samples
to attract buyers. Once the buyer is satisfied that the card is still active, an exchange can be made. Some
bulk amounts and rates observed by Symantec during the last six months of 2007 were 50 credit card numbers for $40 USD ($0.80 each), and 500 credit card numbers for $200 USD ($0.40 each). this is a
decrease from the bulk rates advertised in the first half of 2007, when the lowest bulk purchase price identified was $1 USD each for 100 cards. it is possible that, as credit cards lose their popularity on
underground economy servers, vendors will lower their prices to try to sell them off.
Full identities were the third most common item advertised for sale on underground economy servers,
making up nine percent of all advertised goods, an increase from six percent in the first half of 2007.
the popularity of full identities may be due to their versatility and ease of use. With a full identity, a
criminal can easily obtain government issued documents, commit credit card fraud, open bank accounts,
obtain credit, purchase and/or steal homes,32 or even evade arrest by masquerading as someone else.
in one case, the C eO of an identity theft prevention company was a victim of identity theft when someone
used his social security number, which was prominently displayed on the company’s Web site, to obtain
a $500 loan.33
Symantec observed that the cost of full identities depended on the location of the identity. As with bank accounts and credit cards, eU identities were advertised at prices half again higher than U.S. identities. the
higher prices may be indicative of increased demand and lower supplies of identities from the european
Union. the popularity of eU identities may be due to the flexibility of their use, since citizens there are able
to travel and conduct business freely throughout the union without a passport.34 this flexibility may allow
criminals to use the identities easily across all eU countries.
the distribution of goods and services advertised on underground economy servers continues to be
focused on financial information, such as bank account credentials and credit card information. this is
not surprising, as one of the main objectives for criminal activities in underground economy servers is to generate money. this seems to suggest that criminals are more focused on purchasing goods that allow
them to make large quantities of money quickly on underground economy servers rather than on exploits that require more time and resources, such as scam pages and email lists for spamming. this trend is likely
to continue until steps are taken to make it more difficult to obtain and use this financial information.
31 http://www.ecb.int/stats/payments/paym/html/index.en.html and http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss78p2.pdf
32 http://www.citynews.ca/news/news_3092.aspx
33 http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2007/06/lifelock_founde_1.html
34 http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/freetravel/frontiers/fsj_freetravel_schengen_en.htm
19Symantec Global internet Security threat report
35 Multi-factor authentication depends on two or more of the following factors for a user: something they have (bank card, rSA token, smart card),
something they know (password, pin), and something they are (retinal scan, fingerprint). For example, online banking is a single-factor authentication
while banking at an A tM is multi-factor.
36 http://www.ffiec.gov/press/pr081506.htm
37 eMV is a standard for authenticating credit and debit card payments. the name originates from the initial letters of europay, MasterCard and V iSA,
who together developed the standard. See http://www.emvco.com/about.asp for more information.
38 http://www.incard.com/products.html
20to help prevent fraud, credit card companies and banks could take more secure measures to verify and
authenticate users. the Federal Financial institutions examination Council (FF ieC) requires banks in the
United States to upgrade to a multi-factor authentication (MFA) security system for online banking.35 the
FFieC also projected that 67 percent of Canadian banks will have a MFA solution in place by the end of
2007, even though banks there are not bound by any requirement to upgrade.36 By instituting effective
multi-factor authentication and multi-level security systems, banks and credit card companies can make
it more difficult for criminals to exploit stolen financial information. Also, security features such as Smart
Card-based credit cards using the eMV standard for security verification,37 or an embedded security token
in a credit card that generates one-time pass codes,38 can make it more difficult for criminals to obtain
and use financial information.
Consumers could also take more security precautions to ensure that their information will not be compromised. When conducting higher-risk internet activities, such as online banking or purchases,
consumers should do so only on their own computers and not public ones. Further, they should not store passwords or bank card numbers. they should also avoid following links from emails as these may be
links to spoofed Web sites. instead, they should manually type in the U rL of the Web site. Also, consumers
should be aware of the amount of personal information that they post on the internet, as criminals may
take advantage of this public information in malicious activities such as phishing scams.
Bot-infected computers
Bots are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s machine to allow an unauthorized user to remotely control the targeted system through a communication channel, such as irC, peer-to-peer ( p2p),
or H ttp. these channels allow the remote attacker to control a large number of compromised computers
in a botnet, which can then be used to launch coordinated attacks.
Bots allow for a wide range of functionality and most can be updated to assume new functionality by
downloading new code and features. Attackers can use bots to perform a variety of tasks, such as setting
up DoS attacks against an organization’s Web site, distributing spam and phishing attacks, distributing
spyware and adware, propagating malicious code, and harvesting confidential information that may be
used in identity theft; all of which can have serious financial and legal consequences.
Symantec identifies bot-infected computers based on coordinated scanning and attack behavior
that is observed in network traffic. the bot-infected computers identified have attempted to exploit
vulnerabilities in network services to propagate and may include bot-infected computers that are part
of networks controlled by various communication channels such as irC, p2p, or H ttp. this behavioral
matching will not catch every bot-infected computer, specifically bot-infected computers that have used
non-traditional propagation methods, and may identify other malicious code or individual attackers
behaving in a coordinated way like a botnet. However, this behavioral matching will identify many of
the most coordinated and aggressive bot-infected computers. Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Between July 1 and December 31, 2007, Symantec observed an average of 61,940 active bot-infected
computers per day (figure 3), a 17 percent increase from the previous reporting period. An active
bot-infected computer is one that carries out an average of at least one attack per day. this does not have
to be continuous; rather, a single computer can be active on a number of different days. Symantec also
observed 5,060,187 distinct bot-infected computers during this period, a one percent increase from
the first six months of 2007. A distinct bot-infected computer is a distinct computer that was active
at least once during the period.
DateActive bot-infected computers
Oct 2, 2006 Jan 1, 2007 Apr 2, 2007 Jul2, 2007020,00040,00060,00080,000
10,00030,00050,00070,000100,00 0
Oct 1, 2007 Jul 3, 20062 per . moving averag eMedian daily
active bots90,000
Dec 31, 2007Attacks — active bot-infected computers v1
02-19-08
Figure 3. Active bot-infected computers by day
Source: Symantec Corporation
the increase in both active and distinct bot-infected computers observed in the second half of 2007 may
be due to their popularity among attackers, and because platforms such as p2p and H ttp increase their
effectiveness. Attackers may favor bot-infected computers because they are able to perform a wide range
of functions, are effective in the attacks they mount, and are relatively easy and inexpensive to propagate.
they are also difficult to disable with a decentralized command-and-control model, and most importantly,
can be used for substantial financial gain. illegal botnet activity can be highly lucrative and this may be
one of the reasons they continue to be so popular. it is reasonable to speculate that most botnet owners
profit from their activities; in one case, an owner admitted to earning $19,000 USD for illegally installing
adware through bots he controlled.39
39 http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11495
21Symantec Global internet Security threat report
40 http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=117924
41 http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid14_gci1286808,00.htm l
42 http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009_22-6222896.html ; Fast-flux basically allows a single U rL to resolve to a number of different ip address, or computers, by
changing the U rL’s D nS mapping rapidly and constantly.
43 http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel07/botroast112907.htm
44 http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel07/botroast112907.htm
22Bot command-and-control servers
Bot command-and-control servers are computers that botnet owners use to relay commands to bot-
infected computers on their networks, usually through irC channels. in the last six months of 2007,
Symantec identified 4,091 bot command-and-control servers (figure 4). this is an 11 percent decrease
from the previous reporting period, when 4,622 bot command-and-control servers were identified.
PeriodJan–Jun 2006 Jul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 20074,6226,337
4,746
Jul–Dec 20074,091Attacks — bot c&c servers v1
02-15-08
Figure 4. Bot command-and-control servers
Source: Symantec Corporation
the decrease in the number of bot command-and-control servers detected reflects the growing trend in
the methods botnet owners are using to communicate with their bot-infected computers. there is a large
shift away from traditional irC bot command-and-control communication frameworks for botnet owners.40
they are adopting new platforms and communication channels that have a decentralized command-and-
control architecture, thus providing better security for their botnets and making them more difficult to detect and disable. examples of these are p2p networks such as the botnets associated with the peacomm
and nugache trojans.
41 p2p botnet owners typically use a fast-flux domain name service scheme,42 where
control of the botnet is diffused through a number of computers within the network. Because the botnet does not have a centralized command-and-control server, p2p botnets can be broken up into smaller
pieces for more stealthy operations, making them difficult to detect and disable.
Law enforcement initiatives targeting botnets and bot command-and-control servers also may have
contributed to the decrease in the number of command-and-control servers in the second half of 2007.
in Operation Bot roast ii, the second phase of an ongoing investigation into the criminal use of botnets
in the United States, the Federal Bureau of investigation (FB i) arrested suspected botnet owners from
across the United States who were linked to multi-million dollar phishing and spamming scams, and
stealing personal information that could lead to identity theft.43 Since the investigation began in June
2007, eight people have been indicted for crimes related to botnet activity, over one million victim
computers have been uncovered, and over $20 million in economic losses have been reported.44 Symantec Global internet Security threat report
45 Defense-in-depth emphasizes multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or
protection methodology. Defense-in-depth should include the deployment of antivirus, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems, among other security measures.23initiatives such as these will likely result in a reduction in bot-infected computers and bot command-and-
control servers. As botnet owners become aware of the scrutiny of law enforcement agencies, they are
likely to alter their tactics to avoid detection, such as breaking the botnet into smaller sizes in attacks or
using a decentralized command-and-control structure. Also, as botnets are disabled by the authorities,
less bot activity and bot command-and-control servers will be observed.
Attacks—protection and mitigation
there are a number of measures that enterprises, administrators, and end users can employ to protect
against malicious activity. Organizations should monitor all network-connected computers for signs
of malicious activity including bot activity and potential security breaches, ensuring that any infected
computers are removed from the network and disinfected as soon as possible. Organizations should
employ defense-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software and a firewall.45
Administrators should update antivirus definitions regularly and ensure that all desktop, laptop, and
server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their operating system vendor.
As compromised computers can be a threat to other systems, Symantec also recommends that
enterprises notify their iSps of any potentially malicious activity.
Symantec recommends that organizations perform both ingress and egress filtering on all network traffic
to ensure that malicious activity and unauthorized communications are not taking place. Organizations
should also filter out potentially malicious email attachments to reduce exposure to enterprises and end
users. in addition, egress filtering is one of the best ways to mitigate a DoS attack. DoS victims frequently
need to engage their upstream iSp to help filter the traffic to mitigate the effects of attacks.
Symantec also advises that users never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment
is expected and comes from a known and trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment
is known. By creating and enforcing policies that identify and restrict applications that can access the
network, organizations can minimize the effect of malicious activity, and hence, minimize the effect on
day-to-day operations.
to reduce the likelihood of identity theft, organizations that store personal information should take the
necessary steps to protect data transmitted over the internet or stored on their computers. this should
include the development, implementation, and enforcement of secure policy requiring that all sensitive
data is encrypted. Also, organizations should enforce compliance to information storage and transmission
standards such as the pCi standard. this would ensure that even if the computer or medium on which the
data were lost or stolen, the data would not be accessible. this step should be part of a broader security
policy that organizations should develop and implement in order to ensure that any sensitive data is
protected from unauthorized access. Symantec Global internet Security threat report
46 Many operating system vendors ship and maintain third-party applications such as Web browsers, servers, office suites, etc. with their operating systems. these
are applications that are developed by a third-party vendor but because they are distributed with the operating system, patches for these applications are usually
distributed to users by the operating system vendor.
47 the term “sample set” is used throughout the report and is meant to refer to all data that matches the criteria laid out in the methodology and not a random
sampling of data.
48 Microsoft differs from other vendors because Windows does not ship with many third-party applications. As a result, Microsoft does not generally release patches
for third-party applications.
24Vulnerability Trends
Vulnerabilities are design or implementation errors in information systems that can result in a compromise
of the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information stored upon or transmitted over the affected
system. they are most often found in software, although they exist in all layers of information systems,
from design or protocol specifications to physical hardware implementations. Vulnerabilities may be
triggered actively, either by malicious users or automated malicious code, or passively during system operation. the discovery and disclosure of a single vulnerability in a critical asset can seriously undermine
the security posture of an organization.
this section of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report will provide a thorough analysis and
discussion of vulnerabilities that have been disclosed between July 1 and December 31, 2007. it will
compare these with those disclosed previously and discuss how current vulnerability trends may affect
potential future internet security activity. the following metrics will be discussed:
• patch development time for operating systems
• patch development time for operating systems by type of vulnerability
• Window of exposure for Web browsers
• Web browser vulnerabilities
• Browser plug-in vulnerabilities
• Web application vulnerabilities
• Site-specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities
• Zero-day vulnerabilities
• Unpatched enterprise vendor vulnerabilities
• Vulnerabilities in security products
• Vulnerabilities—protection and mitigation
Patch development time for operating systems
the time period between the disclosure date of a vulnerability and the release date of an associated patch
is known as the patch development time. if exploit code is created and made available during this time,
computers may be immediately vulnerable to widespread attack. this metric will assess and compare the
average patch development times for five different operating systems: Apple Mac OS X, Hewlett- packard
Hp-UX, Microsoft Windows, red Hat® Linux (including enterprise versions and red Hat Fedora), and Sun
Microsystems Solaris. Since third-party applications are often a factor in the average patch development
time, the number of third-party applications in the data set for each vendor is also discussed.46
Of the five operating systems assessed in the last six months of 2007, Microsoft Windows had the
shortest average patch development time of six days based on a sample set of 22 patched vulnerabilities
(figure 5).47 none of the vulnerabilities affected third-party applications.48 this is shorter than the
average patch development time of 18 days in the first six months of 2007, based on a sample set of
38 vulnerabilities, including two vulnerabilities that affected third-party applications. Symantec Global internet Security threat report
32
6Jul–Dec 2007157
79
59
Apple
Average time in daysFigXX_Patch_Dev_Time_v1. eps
0 2 0 4 0 6 0 80 100Period
140 160 180Jan–Jun 2007110
36
1843
112
120Sun
Red Ha t
Microsof tHP
Figure 5. Patch development time for operating systems
Source: Symantec Corporation
red Hat had the second shortest average patch development time during this reporting period, with an
average of 32 days for a sample set of 136 vulnerabilities. All of these vulnerabilities affected third-party
applications. this figure is less than the average of 36 days in the first half of 2007, which was derived
from a sample set of 91 vulnerabilities. ninety of these vulnerabilities affected third-party applications.
Hp had the third shortest average patch development time in the second half of 2007, at 59 days for a
sample set of 21 vulnerabilities, 20 of which affected third-party applications. this is an improvement
over the first half of 2007, in which it had an average patch development time of 112 days for a sample
set of 30 vulnerabilities, 28 of which affected third-party applications.
Apple had the fourth shortest average patch development time during this reporting period. its average
was 79 days for 86 vulnerabilities, including 47 third-party vulnerabilities. this period is longer than the
43-day average recorded in the first six months of 2007, during which the average was calculated from
a sample set of 59 vulnerabilities, nine of which affected third-party applications.
Sun had the longest average patch development time in the second half of 2007, at 157 days for a sample
set of 27 vulnerabilities, 23 of which affected third-party applications. this is longer than the 110-day
average in the first half of 2007, which was calculated from 73 vulnerabilities and of which 67 affected
third-party applications.
Apple and Sun were the vendors most challenged by the task of maintaining a large body of third-party
applications that ship with their operating systems. this is in contrast to red Hat, which has demonstrated
consistently lower average patch development times than these vendors despite having a larger number of
third-party vulnerabilities to patch.
25Symantec Global internet Security threat report
49 ASLr on Windows Vista does not protect third-party applications by default. third-party applications must be recompiled with the appropriate security flags to
receive the benefits of this security measure.
26Hp showed an improvement over the previous period, due to faster patch times with specific applications,
such as Mozilla browsers. this may indicate that H p has made browser vulnerabilities a priority. third-
party software exposes operating systems to attack, and vendors that distribute third-party software
in their operating systems are uniquely challenged because the effectiveness of their patch deployment
regimen relies on external factors such as the availability of a patch from the third-party vendor.
Organizations often depend upon the updates provided by their operating system vendors, as opposed
to seeking out patches from upstream vendors. therefore, operating system vendors should put a high
priority on patching the third-party applications that ship with their products.
Microsoft fares well in this comparison because it does not generally maintain many third-party
applications. However, because of variables such as market share among desktop users and enterprises,
in addition to security enhancements in Microsoft’s later operating system releases, many of the third-
party applications that are attacked in the wild are running on Microsoft Windows, as discussed later in the “Browser plug-in vulnerabilities” section. this is due to the fact that security enhancements in Microsoft
Windows provide less protection for third-party applications than they do for Microsoft applications.49
enterprises must thus depend more on after-market security products to mitigate vulnerabilities in
third-party applications. Conversely, other operating systems have developed security measures that are intended to prevent attacks against the operating system and its third-party applications. it is reasonable
to speculate that this trend will continue until there is a change in the variables that make third-party
applications on Microsoft Windows an attractive target, such as market-share and the lack of default
protection for third-party applications.
Patch development time for operating systems by type of vulnerability
Assessing the patch development time for operating systems provides insight into the types of applications and vulnerabilities that are present in the operating systems that are examined in the previous metric. the
sample sets are limited to vulnerabilities that are considered medium or high severity and are divided into
the following categories:
• Web browser: Vulnerabilities affecting Web browsers that ship with the operating systems discussed.
• Client-side: Vulnerabilities that affect network client software and software that accepts content from
network clients. these vulnerabilities do not directly affect Web browsers; however, in many cases the
Web browser is a means of exploiting these issues.
• Local: Vulnerabilities that affect applications that can only be exploited by a user who is logged in locally
to the operating system.
• Server: Vulnerabilities that affect network server software.
Some vulnerabilities did not fit into these categories because they lack common characteristics or do not
fit discretely into the categories described above. these uncategorized cases are noted in the discussion. Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Of the 86 patched vulnerabilities that affected Apple Mac OS X in the second half of 2007, eight affected
browsers, 31 were client-side vulnerabilities, 15 were local, 15 affected servers, and 17 did not fall into
any of these categories (figure 6). in the first half of 2007, Apple patched eight browser vulnerabilities,
21 on the client-side, 17 that were local, 11 server vulnerabilities, and two that could not be categorized
according to the criteria described above.Vulnerabilities — patched operating system vulnerability by type v4
03-11-08
Percentage
Apple
Sun20%
HP Microsoft
Red Ha t9%
36%
17%17%
19%52%14%32%
50%5%
33%
7%10%
36% 41%
11%26%
19%Othe rBrowse r
Client-side
Serve r
Local14%
14%
13%4%
Figure 6. Operating system time to patch by type of vulnerability
Source: Symantec Corporation
From the sample set of 21 vulnerabilities for H p in the last six months of 2007, 11 affected browsers,
four were client-side vulnerabilities, three affected servers, and three did not fit into any category. this is
compared to 30 patched vulnerabilities in the first six months of 2007, which were made up of 13 browser
vulnerabilities, three client-side, three local, nine affecting servers, and two that could not be categorized.
in the second half of 2007, 22 patched vulnerabilities in Microsoft Windows were categorized. Seven of
these affected browsers, 11 were client-side vulnerabilities, one was local, and three affected servers. in
the first half of 2007, Microsoft Windows had 38 patched vulnerabilities, of which 15 affected browsers,
13 were client-side, eight were local, and two affected servers.
red Hat had 136 patched vulnerabilities during the last six months of 2007, 14 of which were browser
vulnerabilities, 45 that were client-side, 18 that were local, 10 that affected servers, and 49 that did not
fit into these categories. Of 91 patched vulnerabilities during the first half of 2007, 18 affected browsers,
31 were client-side, 10 were local, 13 affected servers, and 19 did not fall into any category.
27Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Of the 27 patched vulnerabilities in Sun Solaris during the second half of 2007, 11 affected browsers, three
were client-side, one was local, five affected servers, and seven could not be categorized. the 73 patched
vulnerabilities in the first half of 2007 consisted of 41 browser vulnerabilities, of which nine were client-
side, 11 were local, nine affected servers, and three did not fall into the above categories.
Browser and client-side vulnerabilities continue to make up a large portion of the patched operating system
vulnerabilities. For vendors such as Microsoft, as much as 82 percent of patched medium- to high-severity vulnerabilities affected browsers or were client-side issues. the types of applications affected by these
vulnerabilities are often less secure than traditionally more exposed server applications.
in many cases client-side vulnerabilities are caused by errors in parsing irregular or malformed files and
other content. Applications that support complex file and data formats are particularly prone to this type
of vulnerability, making them an ideal target for fuzzers. As a result, attackers and security researchers
have concentrated their efforts on these applications. Likewise, vendors are struggling to secure these
applications and make them more robust when handling irregular input.
Many browser and client-side vulnerabilities affect software that is installed by default or required for
business operations. Desktop users within the enterprise are exposed to attack as they perform normal
business operations such as sharing documents and files, browsing the Web, and reading email. As detailed
in the discussion of browser plug-in vulnerabilities and site-specific cross-site specific vulnerabilities,
Symantec has found that legitimate Web sites are being compromised to serve malicious content to users;
enterprise users are even more threatened since trusted Web sites may be the source of attacks.
Window of exposure for Web browsers
the window of exposure is the difference in days between the time when exploit code affecting a
vulnerability is made public and the time when the affected vendor makes a patch publicly available for
that vulnerability. During this time, the computer or system on which the affected application is deployed
may be susceptible to attack. this metric will assess the window of exposure for vulnerabilities in selected Web browsers. For this
version of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec will be supplementing the
discussion of the Web browser window of exposure with the maximum amount of time that elapsed
between the disclosure of a single vulnerability and the release of an associated patch. Maximum patch
times indicate the longest period of time required for a patch to be released to the public.
During the second half of 2007, Safari had a window of exposure of less than one day,50 a decrease from
the three-day window in the first half of 2007 (figure 7). the sample set for Safari in the second half of
2007 was 18 vulnerabilities, compared to 13 vulnerabilities in the first half of 2007. the maximum patch
time for Safari was eight days in the last six months of 2007, and eight days in the first six months as well. in the last six months of 2007, Opera had a window of exposure of two days based on a sample set of
nine patched vulnerabilities. this is a decrease from the window of exposure of four days in the first half
of 2007, which was based on a sample set of five patched vulnerabilities. in the current reporting period,
Opera had a maximum patch development time of 21 days. the maximum in the previous reporting period
was 23 days.
28 50 the actual average was 0.4 days, which rounds down to 0.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
42
511
Opera
Safari<1
Internet Explorer
MozillaFigXX_Brows_Wind_Exp_v2 .eps
Average time in days0 2 4 6 8 10Period
123Jan–Jun 20075Jul–Dec 20073
Figure 7. Window of exposure for Web browsers
Source: Symantec Corporation
During the last six months of 2007, Mozilla had a window of exposure of three days based on a sample
set of 82 patched vulnerabilities. this is a decrease from the window of exposure of five days in the first
half of 2007, which was based on 22 patched vulnerabilities. During the current reporting period, Mozilla had a maximum patch development time of 109 days. in the first half of the year, the maximum patch
development time was 83 days.
in the second half of 2007, Microsoft internet explorer had a window of exposure of 11 days based on a
sample set of 11 patched vulnerabilities. this is an increase from the five-day time period in the first half
of 2007, which was based on a sample set of 17 patched vulnerabilities. the maximum patch development
time for internet explorer vulnerabilities during the current reporting period was 87 days. in the first half
of 2007, the maximum patch development time was 90 days.During the second half of 2007, Microsoft internet explorer experienced an increased window of
exposure because of a delayed response to a handful of vulnerabilities that were independently
announced by security researchers. All other vendors were subject to shorter windows of exposure
during the same period. the exploit development time for all vendors in both reporting periods was zero days. this indicates that
exploits were released within a day of vulnerability publication and often in tandem with a vulnerability
announcement. this shows a tendency on the part of security researchers to release exploits as they
announce vulnerabilities, but may also indicate that exploit development for browsers has been refined to the point where exploits can be developed with little delay. this practice puts pressure on the vendor to
address the vulnerability in a shorter time frame because the availability of exploit code puts users at risk.
29Symantec Global internet Security threat report
30the window of exposure of browsers remains quite short in comparison to the amount of time that
operating systems are typically exposed. this may be because operating systems require more resources
to maintain due to their complexity and the number of applications that are included. it is also likely
that browser vendors acknowledge the serious risk posed to desktop users by vulnerabilities in browser
software. However, the prevalence of browser plug-in vulnerabilities, discussed below, is an indicator
that browsers are still a major target of malicious activity.
Web browser vulnerabilities
the Web browser is a critical and ubiquitous application that has become an increasingly popular subject
for vulnerability researchers over the past few years. traditionally, the focus of security researchers has
been on the perimeter—servers firewalls, and other assets with external exposure. However, client-side
vulnerabilities are now becoming a focus for research and attacks, alike. As part of this shift toward client-
side issues, vulnerabilities in Web browsers have become increasingly prominent, which in turn poses a
threat to end-users.
Web browser vulnerabilities are a serious security concern due to their role in online fraud and the
propagation of spyware and adware. they are particularly prone to security concerns because they come
in contact with more potentially untrusted or hostile content than most other applications. this is a
concern because attacks can originate from malicious Web sites or legitimate Web sites that have been compromised to serve malicious content. it is also true that browsers can play a role in client-side attacks
because of their ability to invoke plug-ins and other applications when handling potentially malicious
content served from the Web such as documents and media files.
During the second half of 2007, 88 vulnerabilities affected Mozilla browsers (figure 8). Of these, 19 were considered to be medium severity and 69 were considered low. this total is an increase from the
34 vulnerabilities that affected Mozilla browsers in the first half of 2007. Of those, 12 were considered
medium severity and 22 were low.
Safari was affected by 22 vulnerabilities in the second half of 2007. One was considered high severity, 12 were medium, and nine were low. this is a decrease from the 25 Safari vulnerabilities that were
documented in the first half of 2007, of which seven were medium severity and 18 were low.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
31 51 http://www.w3schools.com/browsers/browsers_stats.asp3918
3488
12
Safari
Oper a
Documented vulnerabilitie s0 1 0 2 0 3 0 40 50Period
60 100 90 80 707Jan–Jun 200725 Mozilla
Internet Explore rJul–Dec 200722FigXX_Brows_V ul_v1. eps
Figure 8. Web browser vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation
in the second half of 2007, Symantec documented 18 vulnerabilities in internet explorer. Of these, 13 were
considered medium severity and five were low. this is less than the 39 vulnerabilities documented in the
first half of 2007, of which one was considered high severity, 15 were medium, and 23 were low.
in the last six months of 2007, 12 vulnerabilities were documented in Opera. Of these, eight were medium
severity and four were low. this is fewer than the seven vulnerabilities that affected Opera in the first half
of 2007, of which three were considered medium severity and four were low. While fewer vulnerabilities were discovered in internet explorer during this period, Mozilla was subject to
a sharp increase. the decrease in internet explorer vulnerabilities may be due to the focus on security in
internet explorer 7. the increase in Mozilla vulnerabilities was a by-product of internal and community-
driven security audits of the browser. the number of vulnerabilities in Safari also exceeded those reported in internet explorer. increased
adoption of browsers from vendors such as Mozilla and Apple has driven increased interest by security
researchers. However, as security researchers have focused more efforts in discovering vulnerabilities
in these browsers, the theory that this would result in much greater levels of malicious activity targeting
these browsers in the wild has not yet been borne out. the growth in browser market-share for browsers
such as Mozilla Firefox is a driving factor in the increased attention by security researchers.51 However, Symantec Global internet Security threat report
32this does not necessarily result in more attack activity in the wild. Although internet explorer was subject
to fewer vulnerabilities that are inherent to the browser in comparison to Mozilla, exploit activity in the
wild indicates that it is still the gateway for third-party vulnerabilities affecting ActiveX and other browser
plug-in technologies.
Browser plug-in vulnerabilities
Browser plug-ins are technologies that run inside the Web browser and extend its features. they can
include plug-ins that allow additional multimedia content from Web pages to be rendered in the browser.
they can also include execution environments that allow applications to be run inside the browser.
Many browsers include various plug-ins in their default installation and provide a framework to ease the installation of additional plug-ins. plug-ins now provide much of the expected or desired functionality
of Web browsers. Some plug-ins may even be required to use public Web sites and/or an organization’s
internal sites. Browser plug-in vulnerabilities are implicated in some client-side attacks and present
similar challenges to the enterprise.
the following browser plug-in technologies were examined for vulnerabilities:
• Adobe Acrobat®
• Adobe Flash®
• Apple Quick time®
• Microsoft ActiveX®
• Microsoft Windows Media® player
• Mozilla® browser extensions
• Opera™ widgets
• Sun Java™
in the second half of 2007, Symantec documented 239 vulnerabilities affecting browser plug-ins
(figure 9). Of these, 190 affected ActiveX components, 19 affected the Apple Quick time plug-in,
13 affected the Sun Java plug-in, 11 affected Adobe Flash, four affected the Windows Media player
plug-in, one affected Adobe Acrobat, and one vulnerability affected Mozilla browser extensions. in the first half of 2007, 237 vulnerabilities were documented in browser plug-ins. Of these, 210 affected
ActiveX components, 18 affected the Apple Quick time plug-in, four affected the Sun Java plug-in, three
affected Mozilla extensions, and two vulnerabilities affected Adobe Acrobat.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
33Vulnerabilities — browser plug-in vulnerabilities type v2
03-26-08
Jan–Jun 2007 Jul–Dec 2007QuickTime 8%
Acrobat 1%Mozilla Extensions 1%
Java 2%
ActiveX 89 %QuickTime 8%Java 5%
ActiveX 79%Flash 5%Windows Media Player 2%
Figure 9. Browser plug-in vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation
Browser plug-in vulnerabilities continue to be prevalent because technologies such as ActiveX remain an
easy target for security researchers and attackers alike, mostly due to fuzzer programs such as AxMan52
and COM raider.53 this may indicate that there is a lack of secure development practices among ActiveX
application developers. However, ActiveX is also an attractive target because many users may not be aware
that they have installed vulnerable controls, and because of the relative difficulty of removing or patching
ActiveX controls once they have been installed. the largest proportion of plug-in vulnerabilities affects
ActiveX, which indicates that internet explorer is still the primary attack vector for plug-in vulnerabilities.
However, the vast majority of these vulnerabilities affect third-party ActiveX controls.
the release of internet explorer 7 included security enhancements to limit the exploitation of ActiveX
vulnerabilities; however, this has not appeared to have reduced the prevalence of ActiveX vulnerabilities.
this may be a measure of the effectiveness of these security enhancements or it may indicate that many
at-risks users have not upgraded to internet explorer 7. enterprises may be reluctant to upgrade due to
potential incompatibilities with corporate and external Web sites, or with business applications. While
Microsoft has gone a long way to improve the security of Microsoft Windows and its applications,
ActiveX is still a critical security exposure on the Microsoft Windows platform.
in August 2007, Symantec observed in-the-wild exploitation of a Microsoft DirectX ActiveX vulnerability.54
An exploit for this vulnerability was later incorporated into the icepack Web-attack toolkit.55 in the last
six months of 2007, Symantec has also detected zero-day exploitation of many ActiveX vulnerabilities in
the wild, including vulnerabilities in GlobalLink,56 real networks realplayer,57 and SS reader Ultra Star
reader.58 A significant ActiveX vulnerability was also discovered in December 2007 that affected many
Hp laptop models.59 A vulnerability in Apple Quick time was also subject to in-the-wild exploitation
during this period.60
52 http://www.metasploit.com/users/hdm/tools/axman
53 http://labs.idefense.com/software/fuzzing.php#more_comraider
54 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25279
55 http://explabs.blogspot.com/2007/09/new-exploit-this-weekend.html
56 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/26244
57 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/26130
58 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/26247
59 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/26950
60 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/26549Symantec Global internet Security threat report
34Shotgun attacks from trusted Web sites are often the modus operandi for attackers who are exploiting
browser plug-in vulnerabilities. A shotgun attack is one that attempts to compromise a victim by exploiting
multiple vulnerabilities. Attackers choose this method to improve the likelihood of successful compromise
since the victim may be patched against some of the vulnerabilities, or there may be other factors that
impact the reliability of the attack. Sophisticated shotgun attacks also employ browser version detection
to avoid attacking clients that do not run vulnerable versions of affected applications.
plug-in vulnerabilities figured into the compromises of a number of high-profile and trusted Web sites
during this reporting period. in September, the Syrian embassy of London was compromised by attackers
and used to serve browser plug-in exploits using the M pack toolkit.61 A similar attack also occurred in
August against the indian Syndicate Bank.62 When attackers compromise trusted sites in this manner, the
attack is engineered to make it appear as though the Web site is functioning normally, while malicious
content is served to users of the site through embedded iframes that otherwise render the attack invisible
to the victim. this can pose a greater risk if the site is designated by the browser to be a trusted site,
which means that fewer security restrictions are placed on the site. Lowered security settings for trusted sites increase the exposure of vulnerable plug-ins. this is especially true in case of ActiveX because
the security measures imposed by internet explorer depend on the trust level assigned to the Web site,
although similar scenarios also exist with other plug-in technologies.
the fact that many zero-day vulnerabilities and attacks-in-the-wild exploit plug-in vulnerabilities is an
indicator of their importance in the threat landscape. Many enterprises have enacted restrictive policies
to limit the sites users may access. Attackers are overcoming this hurdle by compromising even those
limited sites and using them as a means to exploit plug-in and other client-side vulnerabilities. However,
it may also be the case that, while organizations often implement a security policy to limit the sites
and applications that may be used, this policy may not extend to cover browser plug-ins. Furthermore,
attackers risk arousing suspicion when they attempt to use social engineering techniques to entice victims
into visiting a malicious Web site. if they can launch their attacks through a Web site that the user visits
regularly and trusts, then they avoid having to entice users into visiting suspicious Web sites.
end users and administrators can use a number of measures to protect against the effects of
vulnerabilities. ipS technologies can prevent exploitation of some browser plug-in vulnerabilities through
signature- or behavior-based approaches in addition to ASL r and memory protection.63 Antivirus software
may also aid in protecting organizations from browser plug-in exploits through heuristic signatures.
While attacks are likely to originate from Web sites that are trusted as well as those that are not, Web
browser security features can help reduce exposure to browser plug-in exploits, as can whitelisting.
Specifically, administrators and end users should actively maintain a whitelist of trusted Web sites,
and should disable individual plug-ins and scripting capabilities for all other sites. this will not prevent
exploitation attempts from whitelisted sites but may aid in preventing exploits from all other sites.
Only plug-ins that have been audited and certified should be installed on workstations throughout the
organization. Organizations can also implement a whitelist policy at the network perimeter to regulate
outgoing access by end-users. Content filtering may also be employed to strip potentially malicious
content from trusted and untrusted sites.
61 http://www.websense.com/securitylabs/alerts/alert.php?Alert iD=806
62 http://www.websense.com/securitylabs/alerts/alert.php?Alert iD=794
63 Address space layout randomization is a security measure to complicate exploitation of some classes of vulnerabilities by randomizing the layout of
process address space to make it less predictable to attackers.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
35Web application vulnerabilities
Web applications are technologies that use a browser for their user interface, rely on H ttp as the
transport protocol, and reside on Web servers. examples of Web-based applications include content
management systems, e-commerce suites (such as shopping cart implementations), Weblogs, and
Web-based email.
the online presence of an organization is often facilitated through Web applications, particularly as an
increasing number of traditional software vendors are bolstering their existing applications with Web-
based user interfaces, or converting them over entirely. Web applications may be the site of vulnerabilities
that can be exploited to gain unauthorized access to computers on which they are deployed. Users within
the organization may also be affected by insecure Web sites, which may present a risk of compromise
and/or a threat to confidential information.
Web security is becoming more important as more enterprises outsource their business applications to
a software-as-a-service model.64 the integrity and security of these services is critical to the enterprises
that depend on them. this trend means that enterprises have less control over the security of business
applications and must place more trust in vendors who provide business services over the Web.
Furthermore, these services are a valuable asset to attackers because they provide a means of distributing
exploit code and malicious code to unsuspecting users. in addition, Web applications may be deployed
across a number of individual servers and can have an impact on these systems and other systems that
interact with the application.
in the second half of 2007, 58 percent of all vulnerabilities affected Web applications (figure 10). this
is less than the 61 percent in the first half of 2007. this drop in the proportion of Web application
vulnerabilities is a continuing trend. in the previous volume of the Symantec Internet Security Threat
Report , the potential impact of site-specific vulnerability findings was discussed as a possible cause for
this trend.65 From an attacker’s standpoint, rather than try to compromise numerous smaller sites, it is
better to compromise a specific popular site with a single vulnerability as this increases the chances of
compromising a larger number of hosts.
64 Software-as-a-service is when a software application is accessed over the internet rather than being installed directly on the user’s computer.
65 Site-specific vulnerabilities are those that affect the custom or proprietary Web-application code for a specific Web site.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
36
Percentage of vulnerabilities
0%20%40%60%80%100%FigXX_W eb_Appl_V ulner_v1. eps
Non-Web application vulnerabilitie s
Web-application vulnerabilitie sPeriodJul–Dec 2007 Jan–Jun 20071,501
(61%)1,245
(58%)889
(42%)960
(39%)
10%30%50%70%90%
Figure 10. Web application vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation
Given that they can facilitate more sophisticated or multistage attacks, vulnerabilities in Web sites are a
significant part of the threat landscape. Web application vulnerabilities provide attackers with a diverse
set of targets because the majority of these issues affect obscure applications that are deployed on a small
number of sites. However, attackers are discovering that they can reach a greater number of targets by
focusing on major sites with broad user-bases. Attackers can benefit from the trust in the brand of such
sites, but it also allows them to steal credentials or launch other attacks en masse. Social networking sites
are especially attractive because they can allow attacks to propagate quickly through a victim’s social
network. this is the reason for the shift to site-specific vulnerabilities.
Site-specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities
in the previous volume of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , site-specific vulnerabilities
were discussed as a possible cause for the drop in Web applications as a proportion of all documented vulnerabilities. in this report, Symantec investigates this trend in detail using data provided by a site-
specific vulnerability database.66 in particular, this section will discuss a sub-category of Web-application
vulnerabilities known as cross-site scripting. it should be noted that the data included in this metric does
not cover all known public reports of site-specific vulnerabilities but is limited to user-submitted data gathered by the XSSed project.
66 Data was provided by the XSSed project, a site devoted to tracking and verifying reports of site-specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities: http://www.xssed.com.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
37Vulnerabilities that are specific to particular Web sites are a concern because compromised Web sites
serve as a means of launching other attacks against users, especially if those sites are trusted. As is
discussed throughout this report, this has shown to be an effective strategy in launching multistage
attacks and exploiting client-side vulnerabilities.
Cross-site scripting vulnerabilities present a direct threat to users of affected Web sites because they allow
attackers to access session cookies. A successful cross-site scripting attack can let an attacker hijack a
user’s session on an affected Web site, effectively stealing his or her credentials and allowing the attacker
to perform actions posing as the user. they also play an important role in more sophisticated attacks
because they have the potential to let attackers distribute malicious content through a compromised site.
Malicious content can take the form of exploits, malicious code, defacement of site content, or phishing attacks. this can compromise an enterprise’s trust in legitimate Web sites since attacks can originate from
sites deemed safe by the security and usage policies of the organization.
During the last six months of 2007, there were 11,253 site-specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities
(figure 11) that were documented by the XSSed project. At the time of writing, only 473 of these vulnerabilities had been fixed by the maintainer of the affected Web site. in the first six months of 2007,
the total was 6,961, although data collection only began in February,67 which factors into the lower total.
Of the 6,961, only 330 had been fixed at the time of writing.68 FigXX_NumSiteSpecificCS_V ulner_v1. eps
PeriodJul–Dec 2007 Jan–Jun 20076,96 111,253
Figure 11. Site-specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities
Source: Based on data provided by the XSSed Project
the average patch development time for site-specific cross-site vulnerabilities can be determined by
measuring elapsed time between the publication date of the vulnerability and the patch date by the maintainer of the affected Web site. in the second half of 2007, the average patch development time
was 52 days (figure 12), down from the average of 57 days in the first half of 2007.
67 the XSSed project started in February 2007.
68 this report was written at the end of 2007.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
38FigXX_SiteSpecCSPatchTime_V ulner_v1. eps
PeriodJul–Dec 2007 Jan–Jun 200757
52
Figure 12. Site-specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities time to patch, in days
Source: Based on data provided by the XSSed Project
Site-specific vulnerabilities are a growing concern. the number of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities that
affected specific sites in 2007 exceeds the total number of traditional vulnerabilities tracked. Moreover,
the numbers presented in this section are also only representative of site-specific vulnerabilities that are
reported voluntarily by security researchers to the XSSed project archive. Other types of Web-application
vulnerabilities are not covered. Symantec also has no insight into privately discovered vulnerabilities that have not been reported to the public. this would imply that there are many more vulnerabilities that are
not publicly known. Furthermore, the numbers show that very few of these issues are being remedied by
the maintainers of the vulnerable Web sites. Additionally, the average patch development time is greater
than 50 days for the minority of vulnerabilities that are being addressed.
this trend is a concern because it indicates that site maintainers in general have a very poor track record
of addressing vulnerabilities in their Web sites. When attackers discover a vulnerability in a site, they
can expect that the site maintainer will not address the vulnerability in a reasonable amount of time, if
at all. therefore, any malicious content that is injected into a vulnerable site, such as exploits for other
vulnerabilities, will likely remain for a prolonged period or indefinitely. this can have a negative impact on
the brand of a vulnerable site, but it is also a concern for businesses that rely on services provided by the site as part of their day-to-day operations. not only do these vulnerabilities pose a risk to the confidential
information that is stored on the sites, but they are also increasingly implicated in multistage attacks that
compromise desktop systems.
Web site maintainers can reduce their exposure to site-specific vulnerabilities by conducting a security
audit for common vulnerabilities affecting their sites. Web application code should be audited prior to
being released to production systems. When developing Web applications, organizations should investigate Symantec Global internet Security threat report
39the availability and applicability of secure libraries to perform validation of user-supplied input. Secure
development practices and threat modeling should also be employed when developing Web-based
applications. Web-application firewalls may also detect and prevent exploitation of Web-based
vulnerabilities on production sites.
individual Web users should also exercise caution when browsing the Web. Since these attacks can
result in hijacking of open sessions, users should make sure to log out of Web sites when their session is
complete. Users should also be wary of visiting untrusted or unfamiliar sites. Scripting and active content
can also be disabled when casually browsing the Web.
Zero-day vulnerabilities
A zero-day vulnerability is one that appears to have been exploited in the wild prior to being publicly
known. it may not have been known to the vendor prior to exploitation and the vendor had not released
a patch at the time of the exploit activity.
in the absence of available patches, zero-day vulnerabilities represent a serious threat since, in many
cases, they likely will be able to evade purely signature-based detection. it is the unexpected nature of
zero-day threats that causes concern, especially because they may be used in targeted attacks and in
the propagation of malicious code. A black market for zero-day vulnerabilities has emerged that has the
potential to put them into the hands of criminals and other interested parties.69
in the second half of 2007, Symantec documented nine zero-day vulnerabilities, compared to six in the
first half of the year. All the zero-day vulnerabilities documented during this period targeted third-party
applications for Microsoft Windows. this is a shift from previous reporting periods, where a portion of
the zero-day vulnerabilities affected Microsoft Office™. eight of the nine zero-day vulnerabilities were
also client-side in nature, the majority of which affected ActiveX components. Seven of the nine targeted popular Japanese and Chinese applications such as JustSystem ichitaro, Lhaz, GlobalLink, SS reader
Ultra Star reader, and Xunlei Web thunder.
in this period, it appears that attackers have shifted from exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities in globally-
deployed applications such as Microsoft Office to more regionally-oriented applications. Attackers tend to
be opportunistic in nature; once an avenue of attack has proven successful, they often search for similar vulnerabilities in the same types of applications. it is likely that there is an active community of attackers
based in the respective regions who have discovered that it is lucrative enough to focus on users within their own region instead of exploiting vulnerabilities with a higher profile on the global scale. this makes
sense because it is in their best interest to strike a balance between vulnerabilities that affect a large user
base versus lower profile issues that are less likely to draw public attention. High profile vulnerabilities are
more likely to be patched or mitigated by organizations, whereas there is a greater likelihood that lower
profile vulnerabilities will remain unpatched for a longer period.
in order to protect against zero-day vulnerabilities, Symantec recommends that administrators deploy
network and host-based iDS/ipS70 systems as well as regularly updated antivirus software. Security
vendors may provide rapid response to recently discovered zero-day vulnerabilities in the wild by
69 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume iX (March 2006):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_report_ix.pdf : p. 20
70 intrusion detection (iDS) and intrusion prevention (ipS) software.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
40developing and implementing new or updated iDS/ipS and antivirus signatures before a patch has been
released by the affected vendor. Behavior-blocking solutions and heuristic signatures may also provide
protection against zero-day vulnerabilities.
in addition, some ipS systems may provide further protection against memory corruption vulnerabilities
in the form of address space layout randomization (ASL r), and by making memory segments non-
executable. these measures may complicate the exploitation of such vulnerabilities and make it more
difficult for attack payloads to execute; however, this security measure may not protect all applications by
default.
Unpatched enterprise vendor vulnerabilities
Symantec examines the number of unpatched vulnerabilities affecting enterprise vendors whose
applications are widely deployed and considered to be mission-critical in nature. the following enterprise
vendors are examined in this section:
• CA™
• Cisco®
• eMC®
• Hp
• iBM®
• McAfee®
• Microsoft
• Oracle™
• Sun
• Symantec
Unpatched vulnerabilities are publicly documented security issues that are not known to be patched by
the vendor responsible for maintaining the affected application. it should be noted that the vulnerabilities
discussed were known to be unpatched when the data was gathered and may have since been patched by the time of publication. there is also the chance that some vulnerabilities were patched by the vendor
without a public announcement; in such cases there is insufficient publicly available information to label these issues as patched. it is also important to note that some unpatched vulnerabilities remain
in this state because they affect unsupported products, or because the vendor has provided specific
workarounds that address the vulnerability until a patch is available.
these vulnerabilities are a serious concern for enterprises because they cannot be resolved without
applying best practices, workarounds, and/or mitigations. in many circumstances these measures will
not provide complete protection against unpatched vulnerabilities. in the second half of 2007, Symantec documented 88 unpatched enterprise vulnerabilities that were
published during this period (table 3). Of these, 39 affected Microsoft, 22 affected iBM, 10 affected
Computer Associates, eight affected H p, five affected Sun, three affected Oracle, and one affected
Symantec. no other vendor was subject to unpatched vulnerabilities during this period.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Enterprise Vendors
Microsoft
IBM
Computer Associates
HP
Sun
Oracle
Symantec
McAfeeCurren t
39
22
10
8
5
3
1
0Previous
61
1
1
3
1
13
1
0
TableXX_Unpatch_Vulner_Vend_v2.epsTable 3. Unpatched vulnerabilities, by vendor
Source: Symantec Corporation
in the first half of 2007, Symantec documented 81 unpatched enterprise vulnerabilities. While some
vendors addressed unpatched vulnerabilities, the majority remain unpatched six months later. Of the
81 unpatched enterprise vulnerabilities remaining, 61 affected Microsoft, 13 affected Oracle, three
affected H p, one affected Computer Associates, one affected iBM, one affected Sun, and one affected
Symantec. no other enterprise vendors had outstanding vulnerabilities during this time.
During the first and second half of 2007, Microsoft was affected by more unpatched vulnerabilities
than any other vendor. Many of the unpatched vulnerabilities are lower-impact issues such as DoS vulnerabilities against internet explorer and other applications. it is still the case that these issues may
be addressed outside of Microsoft’s monthly security patches. it is also possible, however, that some
vulnerabilities may be deemed higher severity if new information or exploits surface that increase the
risk to users.
Such was the case with a particular iiS vulnerability that was initially published in 2005.71 it remained
unpatched until July 2007 because the issue was originally believed to be limited to DoS and considered
low priority to Microsoft. the vulnerability fell into a category of software bugs previously thought to be
non-exploitable to execute arbitrary code. However, security researchers investigated the vulnerability
further and discovered a way that remote attackers might exploit the issue.72 it is rare for security
researchers to find a method of exploiting software bugs that were previously considered non-exploitable.
However, many DoS vulnerabilities are simply not researched enough to eliminate the possibility of executing arbitrary code. this lack of research presents an opportunity for attackers, especially if it has
caused vendors to delay releasing patches because they underestimate the potential threat.
iBM was affected by more unpatched vulnerabilities than all vendors other than Microsoft in the last
six months of 2007. this is likely due to outstanding vulnerabilities affecting products such as Lotus
notes® and Domino®, the tivoli line of products, and iBM WebSphere, which is a concern given the
widespread enterprise deployment of these products.
41 71 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/15921
72 http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11477Symantec Global internet Security threat report
42Vulnerabilities in security products
in this report, Symantec discusses vulnerabilities affecting security products, which should be critical
to the operational and security infrastructure of any organization. Vulnerabilities in these products
can weaken the security posture of any organization and can potentially compromise the ability of an
enterprise to prevent attackers from threatening critical assets. Vulnerabilities in security products can
also prevent organizations from performing essential security functions such as implementing best
practices, mitigating vulnerabilities, fending off malicious code, securing the network perimeter and
other layers, and enforcing policy compliance.
For the purpose of this discussion, Symantec examines vulnerabilities that affect the following categories
of security product:
• Antivirus
• Firewalls
• intrusion detection systems (host- and network-based)
• intrusion prevention systems (host- and network-based)
• network access control ( nAC)
Symantec documented 92 vulnerabilities that affected security products during the second half of 2007
(figure 13). Of these, 15 were classified as high severity, 48 as medium, and 29 as low. this is fewer
than the 113 vulnerabilities that affected security products during the first half of 2007, of which 23
were classified as high severity, 58 as medium, and 32 as low. During the last six months of 2007,
four percent of all vulnerabilities documented during the period affected security products, down
slightly from five percent during the first six months of the year.FigXX_V ulnerSecureProd_v1. eps
PeriodJul–Dec 2007 Jan–Jun 2007113
92
Figure 13. Vulnerabilities in security products
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Global internet Security threat report
it is worth noting that during both reporting periods in 2007 the majority of vulnerabilities in security
products affected antivirus technologies, though the number declined over the two periods from
67 percent to 53 percent. However, that antivirus technologies still comprise the majority is an indicator
that both security researchers and attackers are focusing on antivirus technologies.
this trend is significant because antivirus technologies often provide a layer of defense against client-
side attacks and other malicious activity targeted at desktop users. As these attacks become more
common, antivirus and other desktop security technologies have become prone to scrutiny by security
researchers. it is important to the enterprises that invest in these products that they are relatively free of
vulnerabilities when they ship. Many vulnerabilities in security products are actually discovered as a result of security vendors conducting research into competitors’ products. this competition will likely benefit
security products in the long run and result in fewer vulnerabilities in production security software. in
the meantime, the cost to enterprises remains high due to the exposure that these vulnerabilities present
and the overhead associated with patching vulnerabilities affecting critical security systems.
Vulnerabilities—protection and mitigation
in addition to the specific steps required to protect against the vulnerabilities discussed in this section,
there are general steps that should be taken to protect against the exploitation of vulnerabilities.
Administrators should employ a good asset management system to track what assets are deployed
on the network and to determine which ones may be affected by the discovery of new vulnerabilities.
Vulnerability management technologies should also be used to detect known vulnerabilities in deployed
assets. Administrators should monitor vulnerability mailing lists and security Web sites to keep abreast
of new vulnerabilities in Web applications.
Symantec recommends that administrators employ vulnerability assessment services, a vulnerability
management solution, and vulnerability assessment tools to evaluate the security posture of the enterprise. these measures should be incorporated into infrastructure change management processes.
Unpatched vulnerabilities should be identified by administrators, and assessed and mitigated according
to the risk they present. Where possible, problematic applications with many unpatched vulnerabilities should be removed or isolated. ipS systems can aid in detecting known attacks against such applications.
event management should also be integrated into the enterprise infrastructure to aid in policy compliance.
in order to protect against successful exploitation of Web browser vulnerabilities, Symantec advises users
and administrators to upgrade all browsers to the latest, patched versions. Symantec recommends that
organizations educate users to be extremely cautious about visiting unknown or untrusted Web sites and
viewing or following links in unsolicited emails. Administrators should also deploy Web proxies in order to
block potentially malicious script code. Administrators and end users should actively maintain a whitelist of trusted sites and disable individual plug-ins and scripting capabilities for all other sites. this will not
prevent exploitation attempts from whitelisted sites, but may aid in preventing exploits from all other
sites. Organizations can also implement an egress filtering policy at the network perimeter to regulate outgoing access by end-users. Antivirus and host-based iDS and ipS solutions at the desktop level also
provide a layer of protection against attacks that originate from the Web.
43Symantec Global internet Security threat report
73 the Security Development Lifecycle is a development paradigm that incorporates security at every stage from the initial architecture to programming, and in the
quality assurance/testing phases. threat modeling is a security auditing methodology that involves formally identifying and mapping out all possible attack vectors
for an application.
44enterprises should subscribe to a vulnerability alerting service in order to be notified of new
vulnerabilities. they should also manage their Web-based assets carefully. if they are developing Web
applications in-house, developers should be educated about secure development practices, such as the
Security Development Lifecycle and threat modeling.73 if possible, all Web applications should be audited
for security prior to deployment and only those applications that have been certified should be deployed.
Web application security solutions and a number of products and services are available to detect and
prevent attacks against these applications.
When deploying applications, administrators should ensure that secure, up-to-date versions are used,
and that applications are properly configured to avoid the exploitation of latent vulnerabilities. Symantec
recommends the use of secure shared components that have been audited for common Web application
vulnerabilities. As much as possible, enterprises are advised to avoid deploying products that are not
regularly maintained or that are not supported by the vendor.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
45Malicious Code Trends
Symantec gathers malicious code data from over 120 million desktops that have deployed Symantec
antivirus products in consumer and corporate environments. the Symantec Digital immune System and
Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting process. this discussion is based
on malicious code samples analyzed by Symantec for analysis between July 1 and December 31, 2007.
in previous editions of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , the number and volume of threats
analyzed were based upon the number of malicious code instances received from enterprise and home
users. this report will also examine malicious code according to potential infections. this allows Symantec
to determine which malicious code sample was attempting to infect computers and the number of potential
infections worldwide.
this section will discuss selected malicious code trends in greater depth, providing analysis and discussion
of the trends indicated by the data. the following metrics will be discussed:
• new malicious code threats
• top 10 new malicious code families
• Malicious code types
• Geolocation by type
• threats to confidential information
• propagation mechanisms
• Malicious code that modifies Web pages
• Malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities
• Staged downloaders—multiple infections by type
• Malicious code—protection and mitigation
New malicious code threats
the number of new malicious code threats detected by Symantec in a given reporting period allows
administrators and users to keep track of the productivity of malicious code writers during that time.
periods in which large amounts of new malicious code are created require frequent updating of antivirus
signatures, as well as the implementation of other security measures such as patching against Web-
browser and browser plug-in vulnerabilities that are frequently exploited to install malicious code on computers. As noted in the “Vulnerability trends” section of this report, there were 140 documented
vulnerabilities in the most popular Web browsers this period, compared to 105 in the previous period.
the growing number of browser vulnerabilities provides attackers with greater opportunities to exploit
the browser in order to install malicious code.
in the last six months of 2007, Symantec detected 499,811 new malicious code threats (figure 14).
this is a 136 percent increase over the previous period, when 212,101 new threats were detected, and
a 571 percent increase over the last half of 2006. in total, there were 711,912 new threats detected in
2007, compared to 125,243 threats in 2006, an increase of 468 percent. this brings the overall number
of malicious code threats identified by Symantec to 1,122,311, as of the end of 2007. this means that
almost two thirds of all malicious code threats currently detected were created during 2007.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
46 74 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume Xii (September 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_09_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 78
Number of new threats
0150,000
100,000
50,000350,000
300,000550,000
500,000FigXX_Mal_Code_Threats_v1. eps
Period250,000
200,000450,000
400,000
Jul–Dec
20026,260
Jan–Ju n
20039,138
Jul–De c
20038,475
Jan–Ju n
200420,451
Jul–Dec
200442,523
Jan–Ju n
200548,226
Jul–De c
200553,410
Jan–Ju n
200650,761
Jul–De c
200674,482
Jan–Ju n
2007212,101
Jul–De c
2007499,811
Figure 14. New malicious code threats
Source: Symantec Corporation
the continued increase in threats this period is mainly attributed to the continuing increase in new
trojans. As noted in Volume X ii of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report ,74 the prevalence of staged
downloaders consisting of an initial trojan designed to establish a beachhead from which additional
threats can be installed contributed significantly to the number of new threats. Since the initial stage
usually involves minimal functionality, it is relatively easy for attackers to create numerous variations of
these simple trojans.
the significant increase in new threats over the past year is also indicative of the increasing
professionalization of malicious code and the existence of organizations that employ programmers
dedicated to the production of these threats. A group of programmers can create a larger number of
new threats than can a single malicious code author. As these groups of programmers must be paid, professionally written malicious code requires a profit return. it is in the interests of these organizations
to constantly produce new threats to infect the largest number of computers. Many of these threats
can be used for financial gain by performing actions such as stealing confidential information that can
be sold online. these proceeds can then be used to pay the programmers to continue creating new
threats. the combination of these factors results in a high volume of new malicious code samples
that threaten users online.
it is vital that end users and enterprises maintain the most current antivirus definitions to protect against
the high quantity of rapidly launched new malicious code threats. iDS/ipS and other behavior-blocking
technologies should also be employed to prevent compromise by new threats. Use of a firewall can also
prevent threats that send information back to the attacker from opening a communication channel.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Top 10 new malicious code families
Of the top 10 new malicious code families detected in the last six months of 2007, five were trojans, two
were worms, two were worms with a back door component, and one was a worm with a virus component
(table 4). As noted in the previous edition of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , the prevalence
of trojans in the top new malicious code families is indicative of multistage attacks. these are attacks
in which an initial compromise takes place in order to install another piece of malicious code, such as a
trojan, which then downloads and installs additional threats.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Sample
Invadesys
Niuniu
Farfli
Pidief
Blastclan
Scrimge
Neeris
Advatrix
Fakeavalert
AscessoType
Worm
Worm/virus
Trojan
Trojan
Worm
Worm/back door
Worm/back door
Trojan
Trojan
TrojanVectors
CIFS
CIFS
N/A
N/A
CIFS
IM
IM
N/A
N/A
N/AImpacts/Features
Lowers security settings and modifies Web pages
Modifies Web pages
Downloads other threats and modifies Internet Explorer start page
Exploits Adobe Acrobat vulnerability to lower security settings
and download other threats
Disables security applications
Allows remote access
Allows remote access
Lowers security settings and displays targeted advertising
Displays fake antivirus alerts and lowers security setting s
Downloads other threats and sends spam
TableXX_10NewMalicious_v2. epsTable 4. Top 10 new malicious code families
Source: Symantec Corporation
the most widely reported new malicious code family during this reporting period was the invadesys
worm.75 this worm propagates by copying itself to all fixed, removable, and mapped network drives.
it lowers security settings on the compromised computer by terminating certain processes. the worm
may also delete files with certain extensions such as .avi and .mpg. However, the most notable impact
of this worm is that it prepends its code to any Web pages on the compromised computer.
Users frequently store the pages for personal Web sites on their local drive and upload any modified pages. Web pages that are infected by invadesys would potentially be uploaded to the user’s hosting
provider the next time modifications are uploaded. this could result in visitors to the user’s site being
compromised when they view an infected page. the tendency of malicious code modifying Web pages
is part of a growing trend, as is discussed in the “Malicious code that modifies Web pages” section
in this report.
the niuniu76 worm was the second most common new malicious code family this period. this worm is
similar to the invadesys worm in that it propagates by copying itself to all fixed, removable, and mapped
network drives on the compromised computer. the worm also modifies the user’s internet explorer start
page to a Web site that the attacker likely controls.
75 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-111215-5430-99
76 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-101018-5756-99
47Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Also, like invadesys, niuniu adds code to any Web pages it finds on the compromised computer. However,
rather than adding code to infect users who view the pages, niuniu adds an invisible iframe H tML tag
to the pages. this tag will redirect the user’s browser without his or her knowledge to a Web page that
is likely under the attacker’s control. this can be used to redirect the user to a Web page that hosts
malicious code or attempts to exploit a Web browser vulnerability. this technique is similar to that
employed in the M pack attack seen in the first half of 2007.
the Farfli trojan77 was the third most commonly reported new malicious code family in the second half of
2007. this trojan is capable of downloading and installing other threats onto the compromised computer.
this is a continuation of the trend of increasing multistage attacks that was noted in the previous version
of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report .78 in a multistage attack, an initial compromise takes place
that is intended to facilitate the launch of subsequent attack activity.
in addition to installing other threats on the compromised computer, Farfli also changes the user’s
internet explorer homepage to one the attacker likely controls. this is presumably done to generate
revenue for the attacker through affiliate advertising clicks. For each compromised computer that opens
the page, the attacker would receive payment from banner advertising. it is also notable that this trojan changes the search settings for the Maxthon and theWorld Web
browsers.79 the settings are changed to use the same revenue-generating pages as previously described.
What is noteworthy is that these two Web browsers do not have the same market share as other browsers
that are more commonly targeted. this may indicate that Farfli was written to target a certain group of
users. Both of these browsers are developed and maintained by Chinese companies, which may indicate that the author of the trojan is specifically targeting Chinese users. Further, since the trojan changes
the search settings to use a popular Chinese search engine, this may also indicate that Chinese users
are being targeted. this exemplifies the continuing trend of regionalization of malicious code that
was noted in the previous version of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report .80
it is interesting to note that in the current period two of the top 10 new families, Scrimge81 and neeris,82
both used instant messaging as a propagation vector. instant messaging appears to have lost favor as a
propagation vector amongst malicious code authors who have shifted towards the use of malicious Web pages to install trojans. However, these worms send instant messages in various languages including
english, French, German, Spanish, and italian. As a result, these families were most frequently reported
to cause potential infections in the eMeA region. More than half of worldwide potential infections of these
malicious code families occurred in that region. it is likely that the presence of these samples in the top 10
new malicious code families this period is not indicative of a widespread resurgence of instant messaging
as a propagation mechanism, but rather demonstrates the success of regionalized threats.
77 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-072901-5957-99
78 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, Volume Xii (September 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_09_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 75
79 Maxthon and theWorld are Web browsers that make use of the internet explorer and Firefox rendering engines. As a result, they behave in a similar manner to these
browsers and are also susceptible to the same vulnerabilities.
80 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume Xii (September 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_09_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 81
81 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-080614-3458-99
82 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-091208-1650-99
48Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Malicious code types
During the current reporting period, trojans made up 71 percent of the volume of the top 50 potential
malicious code infections (figure 15), a slight decrease from 73 percent in the first half of 2007, but still
more than the 60 percent in the same period of 2006. it is interesting to note that, while the volume of
trojans in the top 50 decreased only slightly since the first half of the year, the number of distinct trojans
in the top 50 decreased from 22 in the first half of the year to 16 in the last six months of 2007.
this may indicate that attackers are gravitating towards the use of a smaller number of more successful
trojans. Once attackers discover that a trojan has had a moderate degree of success, they usually begin
creating minor variations of it. As a result, there will be a large number of different trojans, each producing
a smaller number of potential infections combined with heavy usage of those that have the greatest
success in compromising users and executing their payload. this is reflected in the decrease of trojans in
the top 50 samples and the large increase in new malicious code threats. Six of the top 10 malicious code samples causing potential infections this period were trojans.FigXX_Mal_Code_T ype_1_v2. eps
0 10 20 30 40 50 70 60Jan–Jun 2007Jul–Dec 2006
Jul–Dec 2007
80
Percentage of top 50 by potential infection sType
8%11%
13%Back doo r
73%60%
71%TrojanVirus 10%5%
15%
Worm 22%37%
22%
Figure 15. Malicious code types by potential infections
Source: Symantec Corporation
the top malicious code sample causing potential infections this period was the Vundo trojan,83 which
downloads and installs an adware component. it is not surprising that attackers favor this threat since
the adware component allows the attacker to generate revenue from every compromised computer. As is discussed in the “ new malicious code threats” discussion in this report, attackers are usually motivated by
financial gain. this revenue generation may also be further indicative of the increasing commercialization
and professionalization of malicious code. Since commercial and professional malicious code may involve
the employment of individuals to create and maintain the code, income is required to compensate the work.
49 83 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-112111-3912-99Symantec Global internet Security threat report
trojans are also frequently used to steal information that an attacker can sell or profit from in other ways.
For example, the Gampass trojan84 can be used to steal a user’s online gaming account information,
which can then be sold to other gamers.
the Silentbanker trojan85 can be used to steal a user’s online banking credentials and divert legitimate
transactions. this trojan includes sophisticated mechanisms to steal funds from a user’s online banking
account. Silentbanker is also able to modify information in the transaction summary Web page that
the bank displays to the user, fooling the user into thinking that the transaction has been successfully
completed. this trojan also has the ability to intercept secure communications and bypass two-factor
authentication.86 the techniques employed by this trojan indicate that it was most likely created by
an attacker or group of attackers with advanced programming skills. this may be indicative of the
professionalization of malicious code. Since Silentbanker targets over 400 different online banking Web
sites, it is likely that the attackers are attempting to maximize the financial return for the time and skill invested in creating the trojan.
During the last six months of 2007, worms made up 22 percent of the volume of the top 50 potential malicious code infections reported to Symantec, unchanged from the first half of the year. previously,
Symantec had speculated that the reason the percentage of worms had declined was from an increase in trojans and viruses, but it appears that the decline of worms may have leveled off. While worms have
declined in popularity among attackers who prefer the stealth of trojans, there will likely always be a
certain number of new worms created along with continued incidences of older worms.
in the second half of 2007, worm numbers were bolstered by the netsky87 and rontokbro88 mass-
mailers. it is interesting to note that these worms were discovered in 2004 and 2005, respectively.
this is indicative of the success these worms have had, and how threats that propagate through social
engineering such as these will continue to affect users long after their initial outbreaks. typically, worms
that propagate by exploiting vulnerabilities tend to decrease in volume as computers are patched or
upgraded to newer operating system versions that are secured against the same issue.
Viruses made up 15 percent of the volume of the top 50 potential malicious code infections in the last six
months of 2007, up from 10 percent in the previous six-month period and five percent in the last half of
2006. As noted in the previous edition of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report ,89 the increase in
viruses is mainly due to new worms that also incorporate a viral infection component. in this period, there were also viruses such as Mumawow,
90 which downloads other threats onto a
compromised computer. previously, worms and trojans were the primary malicious code types that were
used as the first stage of multistage attacks. this shows that attackers are experimenting and evolving
their techniques. Since attackers are always looking for new ways to compromise computers, it is not
surprising that they have varied their methods by using viruses.
84 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-111201-3853-99
85 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-121718-1009-99
86 two-factor authentication involves the use of two separate mechanisms to verify a person’s identity such as the combination of a password and a token or
biometric device.
87 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-032110-4938-99
88 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-092311-2608-99
89 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume Xii (September 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_09_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 79
90 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-061400-4037-99
50Symantec Global internet Security threat report
51the increasing use of firewalls has limited the ability of network worms to propagate and effective
file-attachment blocking has also slowed the distribution of mass-mailing worms. However, there has
been an increase in the use of removable media in both home and enterprise environments.91 USB
drives are increasingly used to transfer files too large to email or that consume too much bandwidth
over the network. these devices are prime targets for attackers to use for propagating traditional
file-infector viruses.
in addition to USB drives, many portable media players can also act as removable drives. A user may
unknowingly copy an infected file onto the device from his or her home computer, then connect it to a
computer inside the enterprise, resulting in potential infections. this is the same principle that allowed
viruses to propagate through floppy disks before the widespread expansion of the internet.
Geolocation by type
Symantec examines the top regions reporting potential malicious code infections, as well as the types of malicious code causing potential infections in each region. the increasing regionalization of threats
can cause differences between the types of malicious code being observed from one area to the next.
For example, threats may use certain languages or localized events as part of their social engineering techniques. threats that steal confidential information can also be tailored to steal information that
is more common in some countries than in others. trojans that steal account information for Brazilian
banks are quite common in the Latin America region, while malicious code that steals online gaming account information is most frequently observed in the Asia- pacific and Japan (A pJ) region. Because of
the different propagation mechanisms used by different malicious code types, and the different effects
that each malicious code type may have, the geographic distribution of malicious code can help network
administrators in specific regions improve their security efforts.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2007, 46 percent of trojans were reported from north America,
31 percent from eMeA, 20 percent from A pJ, and three percent from Latin America (table 5). there
were only slight changes in the geographic distribution of potential infections from trojans this period
compared to the first half of 2007. in the previous period, trojans originating in eMeA were bolstered
by high profile attacks from the peacomm trojan92 and M pack kit.93 Since there were fewer single,
large, trojan-based attacks centered in eMeA this period, the concentration of trojans reported there
subsequently declined.
Region
North America
EMEA
APJ
Latin AmericaPrevious
43%
36%
17%
4%Current
46%
31%
20%
3%
Table 5. Location of Trojans
Source: Symantec Corporation
91 http://www.us-tech.com/relid/669342/iSvars/default/new_production_t echnologies_fo.htm
92 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/01/trojanpeacomm_building_a_peert.html
93 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/06/italy_under_attack_mpack_gang.htmlSymantec Global internet Security threat report
the continued concentration of trojans in north America is likely a continuation of the trend that was
reported in the previous edition of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report ,94 in which it was
speculated that the concentration of trojans in north America may be indicative of enterprises and iSps
taking more active steps to prevent the propagation of worms. As a result, attackers may consciously be
moving towards trojans because of successful efforts to thwart worm attacks.
During this period, eMeA accounted for 43 percent of global potential infections caused by worms,
followed by A pJ at 33 percent, and north America at 18 percent (table 6). this may indicate that north
American iSps are implementing more rigid port blocking to limit the spread of network worms, as well
as antivirus filtering at the email gateway to limit mass-mailing worms.
Region
North America
EMEA
APJ
Latin AmericaPrevious
23%
36%
35%
6%Current
18%
43%
33%
6%
Table 6. Location of worms
Source: Symantec Corporation
north America and eMeA experienced the greatest changes in the proportion of potential infections
caused by worms this period. However, the change is not due to a change in the concentration of worms in north America, but from the increase in the proportion in eMeA. As noted above, the concentration
of trojans in eMeA decreased this period, which caused an increase in the proportion of reported worms
in the region. For example, the Stration worm95 was one of the top 50 malicious code samples causing
potential infections in eMeA, but not in north America. However, the proportion of the volume of this
worm observed in eMeA was lower than north America because of the much higher volume of trojans
in the north America region.
potential infections caused by back doors were most frequently reported from eMeA, which accounted for
40 percent of all back doors worldwide. north America accounted for 30 percent of potential back door
infections in the second half of 2007, while A pJ accounted for 26 percent and Latin America accounted for
four percent (table 7). it is important to note that, while the regional percentages of potential back door
infections show a fairly wide variance during this period, the worldwide volume of back door threats was significantly lower than trojans and worms. As a result, the percentage variance between regions actually
represents a much smaller difference in raw numbers than the percentage differences between worms and trojans.
52 94 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume Xii (September 2007):
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95 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-092111-0525-99Symantec Global internet Security threat report
53Region
North America
EMEA
APJ
Latin AmericaPrevious
33%
38%
24%
5%Current
30%
40%
26%
4%
Table 7. Location of back doors
Source: Symantec Corporation
the A pJ region accounted for the highest percentage of viruses this period, with 44 percent of the
total, while eMeA and north America accounted for 34 and 19 percent, respectively. Latin America
only accounted for three percent of the total (table 8).
Region
North America
EMEA
APJ
Latin AmericaPrevious
21%
27%
45%
7%Current
19%
34%
44%
3%
Table 8. Location of viruses
Source: Symantec Corporation
the increased proportion of viruses in eMeA is linked to the proportion of worms there. Many new worms
also contain a viral infection component to aid in propagation. For example, one of the top reported
malicious code samples from the eMeA region this period, the Fujacks worm, also infects files on a
compromised computer. Other worms causing potential infections reported in eMeA also employ a viral
component, which may be a contributing factor in the proportional increase of viruses and worms from
this region.
Threats to confidential information
Some malicious code programs are designed specifically to expose confidential information that is stored on an infected computer. these threats may expose sensitive data such as system information,
confidential files and documents, or logon credentials. Some malicious code threats, such as back doors, can give a remote attacker complete control over a compromised computer. threats to confidential
information are a particular concern because of their potential for use in criminal activities. With the widespread use of online shopping and internet banking, compromises of this nature can result in
significant financial loss, particularly if credit card information or banking details are exposed. Symantec Global internet Security threat report
54Within the enterprise, exposure of confidential information can lead to significant data leakage. if it
involves customer-related data—such as credit card information—customer confidence in the enterprise
can be severely undermined. Moreover, it can also violate local laws. Sensitive corporate information,
including financial details, business plans, and proprietary technologies, could also be leaked from
compromised computers. it should be noted that threats that expose confidential information may
employ more than one method to do so; as a result, cumulative percentages discussed in this metric
may exceed 100 percent.
in the last six months of 2007, threats to confidential information made up 68 percent of the volume of
the top 50 malicious code samples causing potential infections (figure 16). this is an increase over the
65 percent reported in the first half of 2007 and the 53 percent from the same period in 2006.FigXX_P ercent_T op_50_v1. eps
PeriodJul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 2007Percentage of top 50 threats that expose
confidential information
65%
Jul–Dec 200768%
53%
Figure 16. Threats to confidential information by volume
Source: Symantec Corporation
Malicious code can expose confidential information in a variety of ways. the most common method is by
allowing remote access to the compromised computer through a back door. in this method, the attacker
typically uses a specialized application to connect to the compromised computer. He or she can then
perform numerous actions such as taking screenshots, changing configuration settings, and uploading,
downloading, or deleting files. Symantec Global internet Security threat report
55in this reporting period, 86 percent of confidential information threats had a remote access component
(figure 17), compared to 88 percent in the first half of 2007 and 87 percent in the last half of 2006.
While this exposure type dropped slightly in the current period, it still remains more popular than other
techniques. this is likely because remote access, such as a back door, gives the attacker extensive
control over the compromised computer, allowing for the theft of any information on the computer, the
installation of other threats, or the use of the computer for other purposes, such as relaying spam or
hosting a phishing Web site.FigXX_Threat_Info_T yp_v1. eps
PeriodPercentage of confidential information
exposure threats
Jul–Dec 2007Exports user data
Exports system data Allows remote accessKeystroke logge r
Exports email addresse s
Jan–Jun 2007 Jul–Dec 200686%
76%
71%68%71%88%
88%
79%
76% 80%87%
76%
69%67%69%
Figure 17. Threats to confidential information by type
Source: Symantec Corporation
Confidential information threats with keystroke logging capability made up 76 percent of threats to
confidential information, down from 88 percent in the first six months of 2007, although 76 percent was
recorded in the second half of 2006. A keystroke logger records keystrokes on a compromised computer and either emails the log to the attacker, or uploads it to a Web site under the attacker’s control. the
attacker can use these logs to extract the user’s credentials for different types of accounts, such as
online banking, trading sites, or iSp account access. the information can then be used as a stepping stone
to launch further attacks. For example, the attacker could use the stolen iSp account credentials to set
up a phishing site on the free hosting space typically included with these accounts.
threats that could be employed to export user data accounted for 71 percent of confidential information
threats during the last six months of 2007, down from 80 percent in the previous reporting period, but
still higher than the 69 percent in the last six months of 2006. in the second half of 2007, 71 percent of
threats to confidential information could be used to export system data, compared to 79 percent in the Symantec Global internet Security threat report
56 96 A “man-in-the-middle attack” is a form of attack in which a third party intercepts communications between two computers. the “man in the middle” captures the data,
but still relays it to the intended destination to avoid detection. this can allow the attacker to intercept communications on a secure or encrypted channel.first half of 2007 and 69 percent in the last half of 2006. these forms of data leakage can be used to steal
a user’s identity or launch further attacks. Attackers with access to the user’s personal and system data
can use it to craft a more targeted social-engineering attack tailored to that particular user.
in the first half of 2007, all of the confidential information exposure types experienced an increase as
more threats employed multiple mechanisms; however, in the current reporting period all exposure types
declined. this means that in the current period a greater percentage of threats only employed one or
two mechanisms. this may be a result of attackers attempting to produce more specialized confidential
information threats that target specific information. A threat that employs fewer exposure mechanisms
will typically be smaller in size than one that employs more. Smaller threats leave less of a footprint on
the resources of the compromised computer and may remain unnoticed for a longer period of time.
Organizations can take several steps to limit the exposure of confidential information by successful
intrusions. Data leakage prevention solutions can prevent sensitive data from being stored on endpoint computers. encrypting sensitive data that is stored in databases will limit an attacker’s ability to view and/
or use the data. However, this step will require that sufficient computing resources be made available, as
encrypting and decrypting the data for business use consumes processing cycles on servers. Furthermore,
encrypting stored data will not protect against man-in-the-middle attacks that intercept data before it is
encrypted.96 As a result, data should always be transmitted through secure channels such as SSH, SSL,
and ipSec.
Propagation mechanisms
Worms and viruses use various means to transfer themselves, or propagate, from one computer to another. these means are collectively referred to as propagation mechanisms. the samples are assessed
according to the percentage of potential infections. readers should note that some malicious code
samples use more than one mechanism to propagate, which may cause cumulative percentages presented
in this discussion to exceed 100 percent.
in the second half of 2007, 40 percent of malicious code that propagated did so as shared executable files
(table 9), a significant increase from 14 percent in the first half of 2007. Shared executable files are the
propagation mechanism employed by viruses and some worms that copy themselves to removable media.
As stated in the “Malicious code types” section above, the increasing use of USB drives and media players
has resulted in a resurgence of malicious code that propagates through this vector.this vector lost popularity among malicious code authors when the use of floppy disks declined and
attackers instead concentrated on other more widely used file transfer mechanisms such as email and
shared network drives. However, as use of removable drives has become more widespread, attackers
have again begun to employ this propagation technique. Although current removable drives differ from
floppy disks, the principle remains the same, enabling attackers to make simple modifications to old
propagation techniques.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
to limit the propagation of threats through removable drives, administrators should ensure that all
such devices are scanned for viruses when they are connected to a computer. if removable drives are not
needed, endpoint security and policy can prevent computers from recognizing these drives when they are
attached. Additionally, policy and user education should be implemented to prevent users from attaching
unauthorized devices to computers within the enterprise.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Propagation Mechanism
File sharing executables
File transfer/email attachment
File transfer/CIFS
File sharing/P2P
Remotely exploitable vulnerability
SQL
Back door/Kuang2
Back door/SubSeven
File transfer/embedded HTTP URI/Yahoo! Messenger
WebCurrent
40%
32%
28%
19%
17%
3%
3%
3%
2%
1%Previous
14%
30%
15%
20%
12%
<1%
2%
2%
<1%
1%
TableXX_PropagationMech_v4.epsTable 9. Propagation mechanisms
Source: Symantec Corporation
in the last six months of 2007, 32 percent of malicious code that propagated did so in email attachments.
While the percentage increased slightly over the 30 percent in the first six months of 2007, executable file
sharing overtook this vector, as previously noted. the previous edition of the Symantec Internet Security
Threat Report97 noted that this is likely due to diversification of malicious code authors, although email
attachments still remain an attractive propagation mechanism for malicious code because of the
pervasive use of email.
to limit the propagation of email-borne threats, administrators should ensure that all email attachments
are scanned at the gateway. Additionally, all executable files originating from external sources, such as
email attachments or downloaded from Web sites should be treated as suspicious. All executable files
should be checked by antivirus scanners using the most current definitions.Malicious code that propagated by the Common internet File Sharing (C iFS) protocol
98 made up
28 percent of malicious code that propagated in the second half of 2007, an increase over the 15 percent
in the previous period. As noted in the previous version of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report ,99
this propagation vector was employed by samples such as Fujacks, which remains one of the top three
malicious code samples causing potential infections.the C iFS propagation mechanism can be a threat to organizations because file servers use C iFS to give
users access to their shared files. if a computer with access to a file server becomes infected by a threat
that propagates through C iFS, the infection could spread to the file server. Since multiple computers
within an organization likely access the same file server, this could facilitate the rapid propagation of the
threat within the enterprise.
57 97 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume Xii (September 2007):
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98 CiFS is a file sharing protocol that allows files and other resources on a computer to be shared with other computers across the internet. One or more directories
on a computer can be shared to allow other computers to access the files within.
99 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume Xii (September 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_09_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 86Symantec Global internet Security threat report
58to protect against threats that use the C iFS protocol to propagate, all shares should be protected with
strong passwords, and only users who require the resources should be given access to them. if other users
do not need to write to a share, they should only be given “read” permissions. this will prevent malicious
code from copying itself to the shared directory or modifying shared files. Finally, C iFS shares should not
be exposed to the internet. Blocking tCp port 445 at the network boundary will help to protect against
threats that propagate using C iFS.
Malicious code using peer-to-peer ( p2p) protocols to propagate accounted for 19 percent of all potential
infections this period. Since there are a wide variety of p2p protocols available for malicious code to use as
propagation mechanisms, they have been further broken down by protocol in the discussion that follows.
the most frequently used methods of p2p propagation employed by malicious code this period did not
attempt to use a specific p2p protocol to propagate; rather, they copied themselves to all folders on a
computer containing the character string “shar”. p2p applications commonly create folders containing
the word “share”—such as “shared folder”—so these malicious code samples will successfully propagate
through many of them. these threats accounted for 66 percent of all p2p threats this period (table 10).
Rank
1
2
3
4
5Peer-to-Peer Protocol/Method
File sharing/P2P/shared directories
File sharing/P2P/Kazaa
File sharing/P2P/eDonkey
File sharing/P2P/Morpheus
File sharing/P2P/WinnyPercentage
of P2P
66%
60%
46%
46%
14%
TableXX_P2PPropagation_v1.epsTable 10. P2P propagation mechanisms
Source: Symantec Corporation
the Kazaa file-sharing service was used by 60 percent of malicious code samples that propagated through
p2p networks, while Morpheus and eDonkey were each used by 46 percent. Finally, the Winny protocol was
used by 14 percent of malicious code propagating through various p2p protocols this period.
Since p2p applications are typically not permitted on corporate networks, any p2p clients are likely
installed without the knowledge or consent of network administrators. enterprises should take measures
to prevent p2p clients from being installed on any computers on the network. they should also block
any ports used by these applications at the network boundary. end users who download files from p2p
networks should scan all such files with a regularly updated antivirus product.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
59 100 http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-052712-1531-99Malicious code that modifies Web pages
in late May, 2007, the M pack100 attack kit was first observed in the wild. this kit relied on compromised
Web pages to redirect users to an M pack server that attempted to exploit Web browser and plug-in
vulnerabilities in order to install malicious code on computers. this kit experienced great success because
it took advantage of the trust many users place in certain Web sites. Since the Web browser is the primary
gateway to the internet for most users, Web pages that they visit frequently—such as online forums and
other internet communities—are a useful means of compromising computers for attackers. this method
of shotgun attacks is described in more detail in the “Vulnerability trends” section of this report.
For the first time in this edition of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is
examining malicious code samples that modify Web pages on a compromised computer. Only threats that modify pages in order to propagate or redirect users were examined. those that simply deface the pages
by adding text or simple images are not included in this metric.
in the last six months of 2007, seven percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code samples modified
Web pages, up from three percent in the first half of the year (figure 18). in the second half of 2006, none
of the top 50 malicious code samples attempted to modify Web pages on the compromised computer. it is
likely that the success of threats like the M pack kit has encouraged attackers to use Web pages to install
malicious code in recent months.FigXX_MalCodeModW ebPg_v1. eps
PeriodJul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 20073%
Jul–Dec 20077%
0%
Figure 18. Malicious code that modifies Web pages
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Global internet Security threat report
60there were two common themes to the top malicious code samples that modified Web pages this period.
the first was threats that added their own code to Web pages, like the invadesys worm. When a user
visits a Web page infected by this worm, it will attempt to execute its code on the computer when the
Web browser renders the page. Since the worm is written in Visual Basic script, it is a format that
browsers can interpret and execute, which in turn infects the visiting user.
the other common method of modifying Web pages this period was to add an iframe tag to the page.
An iframe is an H tML element that can include Web content from other pages or Web servers to be
rendered when the user visits the original page. An iframe can be invisible and the user will not see any
of the embedded content when viewing the original page. the Fujacks worm101 employs this method to
redirect the user’s browser to a malicious Web site. this site can then exploit vulnerabilities in the user’s
browser to download and install further threats.in many cases, the Web pages modified by malicious code do not reside on Web servers. However, if
users maintain their own sites, it is likely that they would keep a copy of the site on their own computers
and upload pages to their hosting providers whenever they make updates. When the updated pages are
uploaded, they would likely include the modifications made by the malicious code. As a result, other users
who trust the compromised sites would be at risk. this could be particularly harmful if the compromised
user maintains a popular software application because a greater number of users are likely to visit the
site. Additionally, an enterprise employee responsible for maintaining pages on a public-facing Web site who becomes infected by one of these threats may unknowingly upload malicious pages. this could
significantly harm the reputation of the affected organization.
When mass-mailing worms dominated the top malicious code samples, users’ email address books
mainly determined their circle of contacts. While this is still the case, users also now frequently keep in contact with friends, family, and associates through personal Web sites and social networking sites. in
many cases, users’ social networking profiles will also link to their personal Web site. Since many sites
incorporate dynamic content that requires a certain trust level in the user’s browser in order to render
correctly, this can also allow malicious content to execute through the browser.
Malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities
Assessing the proportion of malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities helps to show how popular
this technique is for developing new variants of malicious code. the exploitation of vulnerabilities as a
means of malicious code propagation is an ongoing concern for enterprises as it illustrates the need for
administrators to apply patches in a timely manner. During the second half of 2007, 10 percent of the
1,032 documented malicious code instances exploited vulnerabilities (figure 19).102 this is lower than the
18 percent proportion of the 1,509 malicious code instances documented in the first half of 2007. While
the number of new samples exploiting vulnerabilities declined in the current reporting period, this method
of propagation remains effective, as is illustrated by its presence in the top 10 propagation mechanisms,
discussed above.
101 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-010509-0134-99
102 the number of documented malicious code instances differs from the number of malicious code submissions. Documented malicious code instances are those that
have been analyzed and documented within the Symantec malicious code database.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
61Documented malicious code
0%20%40%60%80%100%FigXX_P ercent_Mal_Code_Exploit_v1. eps
Remainder of malicious code
Malicious code that exploit s
vulnerabilitie sPeriodJul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 2007 Jul–Dec 200710%18%82%
23%77%90%
10%30%50%70%90%
Figure 19. Malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec Corporation
the decline in the number of malicious code samples exploiting vulnerabilities may be related to the
increasing use of the Web to install malicious code on computers. For example, the number of site-specific
cross-site scripting vulnerabilities is increasing, as is noted in the “Vulnerability trends” section of this
report. these vulnerabilities can be used to install malicious code on the computers of users visiting the
affected Web sites. Since the vulnerability affects the Web site itself and the exploit is not a component
of the malicious code sample, those samples will not be counted as malicious code that exploits
vulnerabilities.
While the number of malicious code samples exploiting vulnerabilities has dropped, it is important
to note that the pidief trojan,103 one of the top 10 new malicious code families this period, exploits a
vulnerability in Adobe Acrobat to execute its code.104 the trojan arrives as a portable document format
(pDF) file that exploits the vulnerability to execute the trojan’s code when the document is viewed on a
computer running a vulnerable version of the software. this trojan also disables the Windows firewall
and downloads and executes additional threats on the computer.
this illustrates that even though there are fewer new malicious code samples exploiting vulnerabilities,
they can still have success in compromising unpatched computers. As well, while fewer new malicious
code samples exploit vulnerabilities in operating systems, popular third-party client-side applications
are still a viable target for malicious code. Users should avoid becoming complacent and ensure that
they patch vulnerabilities in affected software when fixes become available. intrusion prevention systems
and antivirus software can help protect against malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities for which no
patch is available.
103 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-102310-3513-99
104 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/25748Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Staged downloaders—multiple infections by type
Staged downloaders are threats that download and install other malicious code onto a compromised
computer. these threats allow an attacker to change the downloadable component to any type of threat
that suits his or her objectives, or to match the profile of the computer being targeted. For example, if the targeted computer contains no data of interest, the attacker can install a trojan that relays spam rather
than one that steals confidential information. As the attacker’s objectives change, he or she can change
any later components that will be downloaded to perform the requisite tasks.
in the second half of 2007, the most prevalent downloader component was the Vundo trojan (table 11).105
Once this trojan is installed on a computer, it attempts to contact certain ip addresses to download
and install its secondary components. One of the files it attempts to install is an adware program that
will periodically display pop-up advertisements. this adware program likely generates revenue for the
malicious code author.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Sample
Vundo
Zlob
Metajuan
Pandex
Fujacks
Stration
Nebuler
Skintrim
Linkoptimizer
SvichType
Trojan
Trojan
Trojan
Trojan
Worm/virus
Worm
Trojan
Trojan
Trojan
WormDownload Mechanism
Redirects browser to malicious Web pag e
Downloads files from remote addresses
Downloads files from remote addresses
Downloads files from remote addresses
Downloads files from remote addresses
Downloads files from remote addresses
Downloads files from remote addresses
Downloads files from remote addresses
Downloads files from remote addresses
Downloads files from remote addresses
TableXX_10StagedDownloaders_v2. epsTable 11. Top 10 staged downloaders
Source: Symantec Corporation
the Zlob trojan106 was the second most common staged downloader in the current period. this trojan sets
the user’s internet explorer home, search, and “not found” pages to Web pages hosting malicious code.
it also periodically displays fake security alerts that claim that the computer is infected. When users click
the error messages, they will be directed to a Web page hosting malicious code.
Metajuan107 was the third most common staged downloader in the second half of 2007. this trojan
attempts to contact a remote Web site and downloads and installs other threats from it. the trojan may
also display advertisements when the user visits certain Web sites, likely in an effort to provide revenue
for the malicious code author.
the most prevalent downloaded component in the second half of 2007 was the Adclicker trojan
(table 12).108 this simple trojan is intended to drive traffic to Web pages and banner advertisements.
Banner advertisements compensate the owner of the Web site they are hosted on for each view or click-
through.109 Generating fraudulent traffic to these advertisements is commonly referred to as click fraud.
62 105 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-112111-3912-99
106 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-042316-2917-99
107 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-030112-0714-99
108 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2002-091214-5754-99
109 A click-through is a link that contains uniquely identifiable information about its originator that a user clicks on. typically, the originator receives financial
compensation for each click-through.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
63 110 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2003-040217-2506-99
111 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-011211-3355-99Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Sampl e
Adclicker
Graybir d
Lineage
Formador
Gamania
LowZones
KillAV
SpamThru
Bancos
AnserinType
Trojan
Back door
Trojan
Back door
Trojan
Trojan
Trojan
Trojan
Trojan
TrojanImpact
Generates traffic to Web sites and banner ads
Allows remote access, logs keystrokes, and steals passwords
Steals online gaming account information
Allows remote access, logs keystrokes, and steals passwords
Steals online gaming account information
Lowers Internet Explorer security settings
Disables security applications
Relays spam email message s
Steals online banking account information
Logs keystrokes and steals online banking account information
TableXX_10DownloadedComponents_v1. epsTable 12. Top 10 downloaded components
Source: Symantec Corporation
Graybird110 was the second most frequently downloaded component this period. this back door gives
an attacker full remote access to the compromised computer. it also steals cached passwords and logs
keystrokes, and sends this information to the remote attacker. Further, Graybird allows the attacker to
download and install additional threats on the computer.
the third most commonly downloaded component this period was the Lineage trojan.111 this trojan steals
account information for the Lineage online game and emails it to the attacker. this account information
can be sold to other users or the attacker can sell individual game items from the account.
Malicious code—protection and mitigation
Symantec recommends that certain best security practices always be followed to protect against malicious
code infection. Administrators should keep patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host
public services and applications—such as H ttp, Ftp, SM tp, and D nS servers—and that are accessible
through a firewall or placed in a DMZ. email servers should be configured to only allow file attachment
types that are required for business needs and to block email that appears to come from within the
company, but that actually originates from external sources. Additionally, Symantec recommends that
ingress and egress filtering be put in place on perimeter devices to prevent unwanted activity.
to protect against malicious code that installs itself through a Web browser, additional measures should
be taken. the use of ipS technologies can prevent exploitation of browser and plug-in vulnerabilities
through signatures and behavior-based detection in addition to ASL r.
end users should employ defense-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software
and a personal firewall. Users should update antivirus definitions regularly. they should also ensure that
all desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their
software vendors. they should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless it is expected
and comes from a trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known. Symantec Global internet Security threat report
64Phishing Trends
phishing is an attempt by a third party to solicit confidential information from an individual, group, or
organization by mimicking, or spoofing, a specific, usually well-known brand, usually for financial gain.
phishers attempt to trick users into disclosing personal data, such as credit card numbers, online banking
credentials, and other sensitive information, which they may then use to commit fraudulent acts.
Symantec assesses phishing according to two indicators: phishing attempts and phishing messages.
A phishing attempt can be defined as an instance of a phishing message being sent to a single user. extending the fishing analogy, a phishing attempt can be considered a single cast of the lure (the phishing
message) to try to catch a target. A single phishing message can be used in numerous distinct phishing
attempts, usually targeting different end users.
A phishing Web site is a site that is designed to mimic the legitimate Web site of the organization whose brand is being spoofed. in many cases, it is set up by the attacker to capture a victim’s authentication
information or other personal identification information, which can then be used in identity theft or other
fraudulent activity.
this section will discuss selected phishing metrics in greater depth, providing analysis and discussion
of the data gathered by Symantec between July 1 and December 31, 2007. the following metrics will
be discussed:• phishing activity by sector
• top countries hosting phishing Web sites and top targets phished
• phishing site top-level domains
• phishing Web site hosts
• Automated phishing toolkits
• phishing—protection and mitigation
Phishing activity by sector
this section will explore phishing activity in two ways. First it will analyze the unique brands phished by
their sector, which looks at only the number of brands used and their corresponding sectors that were
phished, and not each specific phishing attack. Second, it will explore which sectors were targeted by the
highest volume of phishing attacks. these considerations are important for an enterprise because the use
of its brand in phishing activity can significantly undermine consumer confidence in its reputation.
the majority of brands used in phishing attacks in the last six months of 2007 were in the financial
services sector, accounting for 80 percent (figure 20), virtually unchanged from the 79 percent reported in
the previous period. the financial services sector also accounted for the highest volume of phishing Web
sites during this period, at 66 percent (figure 21), down from 72 percent in the first half of 2007. Since
most phishing activity pursues financial gain, successful attacks using brands in this sector are most likely
to yield profitable data, such as bank account credentials, making this sector an obvious focus for attacks. Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Spam Phishing — unique brands phished by sector v1
02-20-0 8
Transportation 1%Computer hardware 1%
Government 1%1%0.9% 1%
Financial 80 %Retail 4%
ISP 8%
Interne t
community 2%
Insurance 2%
Computer consulting 0.1%Computer software 0.9%0.1%
1%
Figure 20. Unique brands phished by sector
Source: Symantec Corporation
the drop in volume of phishing Web sites targeting financial organizations during the period is worth
noting. the drop is potentially driven by the increased knowledge and awareness of phishing schemes,
and how to avoid falling victim to them. information campaigns driven by financial institutions, as well as
warning emails and a general heightened awareness of phishing schemes targeting financial services has
likely made it more difficult for phishers to carry out successful phishing attacks against them.
internet service providers ( iSps) were ranked second in unique brands used in phishing attacks during
this period, at eight percent. this is a slight decrease from 11 percent in the first half of 2007. the iSp
sector also accounted for the second highest volume of phishing attacks during the period, accounting
for 18 percent.
As noted in previous editions of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report ,112 iSp accounts can be
valuable targets for phishers because people frequently use the same authentication credentials (such
as usernames and passwords) for multiple accounts, including email accounts.113 this information may
provide access to other accounts, such as online banking.
Additionally, attackers could use the free Web-hosting space often included in these accounts to put up
phishing sites, or use the accompanying email accounts to send spam or launch further phishing attacks.
Compromised iSp Web-hosting accounts can also be used to host Web-based exploits, which would give
an attacker a greater number of potential targets. Also, compromised Web space can be used to plant
links to other sites the attacker controls in order to boost the search engine rankings of those sites.
65 112 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume Xi (March 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xi_03_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 69
113 http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2006/proceedings/p44_gaw.pdfSymantec Global internet Security threat report
not coincidentally, email account passwords rank in the top 10 most common items advertised for sale on
underground economy servers this period, as described in the “Underground economy servers” discussion
in the “Attack trends” section of this report.Spam Phishing — phished sector by volume of phishing websites v1
02-20-0 8
Transportation 0.1%Computer hardware 0.7%
Insurance 0.11%0.11% 0.09%
Financial 66 %Retail 11 %
ISP 18 % Internet
community 3%
Government 1%
Computer consulting 0.09%0.1%
0.7%
Figure 21. Phished sectors by volume of phishing Web sites
Source: Symantec Corporation
the retail services sector accounted for four percent of organizations whose brands were spoofed by
phishing attacks in the second half of 2007, and for 11 percent of the volume of phishing Web sites. in
the previous reporting period, the retail sector accounted for three percent of the unique brands spoofed and 16 percent of the volume. this represents a continuing trend towards a shrinking gap between brands
phished and the volume of phishing Web sites targeting this sector.
the higher number of Web sites used to carry out attacks spoofing retail brands during previous periods
was likely part of an exploratory phase for phishers to establish the value of successful phishing attacks
targeting organizations in this sector. the shrinking gap between brands phished and the volume of
phishing Web sites, which is driven by a drop in the volume of phishing Web sites, indicates an end to this
exploratory phase. As the possible financial gains of spoofing retail organizations are established, phishers
will adjust their rate of attacks accordingly.
Also, the drop in the volume of attacks may be because successful phishing attacks that spoof retail
organizations may require more effort on the attacker’s behalf to achieve financial gain compared to the
financial sector, and therefore may be less profitable. A phisher gaining access to bank account information
simply has to cash out the account to get at the funds, while having access to online retailer accounts may
require goods to be shipped to a physical address and involve more risk of discovery for the attacker.
66Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Six of the top 10 brands spoofed by attackers in phishing attacks during this period were in the financial
sector. interestingly, the second most frequently spoofed brand was a social networking site.114 While
there may seem to be no immediate financial gain from stealing account information from a social
networking site, attackers could use the compromised account to gather detailed information about the
user and the user’s friends.115 Furthermore, many social networking sites allow their users to control
the content of their associated site, which would allow an attacker that has compromised such a site to
host seemingly legitimate links that point to malicious Web sites, to host malicious code, to spam users
associated with the compromised account, and to even host phishing Web sites.116 Using a compromised
social networking site account to host a phishing Web site that targets the social networking site itself will
increase the chances of such an attack at being successful.
Top countries hosting phishing Web sites and top targets phished
this metric will assess the countries in which the most phishing Web sites were hosted and the most
popular targets within each country. phishing Web sites differ from phishing hosts, which are computers
that can host one or more phishing Web sites, and which are discussed in the “ phishing activity by sector”
metric above, as well as in the “Malicious activity by country” metric in the “Attack trends” section of this
report. this data is a snapshot in time, and does not offer insight into changes in the locations of certain
phishing sites since the data was analyzed. it should also be noted that the fact that a phishing Web site is
hosted in a certain country does not necessarily mean that the site is being controlled by attackers located
in that country.
in the second half of 2007, 66 percent of all phishing attacks detected by Symantec were associated
with Web sites located in the United States (table 13). For phishing attacks with Web sites hosted in the
United States, all of the top 10 targets are also headquartered there. the top target phished on Web sites
hosted in the United States was a social networking site. together with another social networking site,
these two sites accounted for 91 percent of phishing attacks with Web sites hosted in the United States.
Of the remaining top 10 targets phished in the United States, four were financial services, though they
only accounted for three percent of phishing attacks with Web sites hosted in the United States. Since
the majority of phishing attacks that were detected were associated with Web sites that spoof social
networking sites, it is plausible to assume that phishing these is more lucrative than phishing financial organizations, as discussed previously in “ phishing activity by sector.”
67 114 For more on phishing attacks that target social networking sites, please see:
http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2006/09/contextaware_phishing_realized.html
115 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2006/11/an_imaginative_phishing_attack_1.html
116 http://blog.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2007/06/web_2pointuhoh_worm_whacks_mys.htmlSymantec Global internet Security threat report
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Country
United States
China
Romania
Guam
France
Germany
Italy
Canada
Sweden
NetherlandsPercentage
66%
14%
5%
5%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%Top Target Phished
Social networking site
Social networking site
Social networking site
Social networking site
Online auction site
Online payment system
Online auction site
Online portal
Telecommunications provider
Social networking site
TableXX_T opCountBrandPhish_v2. epsTable 13. Top countries hosting phishing Web sites and top targets phished
Source: Symantec Corporation
During the last six months of 2007, China hosted the second most phishing Web sites, with 14 percent of
the total. the top target phished by Web sites hosted in China was the same social networking site most
commonly phished by Web sites in the United States, accounting for 96 percent of phishing Web sites hosted in China. the second ranked target of phishing Web sites hosted in China was a popular Chinese
online retailer; despite ranking second, it accounted for only one percent of the phishing Web sites there.
Of the top 10 targets phished by Web sites hosted in China, seven had head offices in the United States. these seven accounted for 98 percent of the phishing sites in China. the other three targets
phished by hosts in China were organizations with head offices in China, although all three also operate internationally. the focus on phishing targets based in the United States shows that these organizations
are a lucrative target for phishers who host their sites on computers in China. this could mean that
phishers hosting sites in China are actually located in the United States, as stolen information would be
easier for people in the United States to use. For example, cashing out a U.S. bank account could be done
more easily and without arousing as much suspicion from a location within the United States than would
cashing out the bank account from China. Because banks monitor spending activities on bank accounts
to detect fraudulent activity, withdrawing money from a U.S. bank account from a location in China is
more likely to be flagged and blocked than would withdrawing money from the same bank account
from a location in the United States.
Furthermore, it is possible that phishing Web sites in China may be left in place for longer periods, making
hosting a site there more desirable. China has the second highest amount of malicious activity worldwide, as is discussed in the “Attack trends” section of this report. therefore, it is reasonable to assume that
phishers have an easier time hosting and maintaining their phishing sites there. it could also be that the
stolen information is being sold in the underground economy, meaning that the phishers hosting sites on
computers in China are simply stealing the most profitable information and are not necessarily located in
the United States.
68Symantec Global internet Security threat report
romania ranked third for phishing Web sites during the period, accounting for five percent of all phishing
Web sites detected. the prominence of romania for phishing Web sites is indicative of the amount of
internet-fraud related activity originating there. romania is not only prominent in phishing activity, but
it ranks high (relative to its population) in various other forms of internet-related fraud, including online
auction fraud.117 it has been speculated that the prominence of romania in internet fraud as well as other
malicious activity is related to the culture surrounding computers there. in the social and intellectual
climate in romania, computer knowledge is viewed as very desirable and has been since the country
was a satellite of the Soviet Union.118 As a consequence, a high proportion of computer users in romania
are technically knowledgeable and, thus, there exists the likelihood that a higher number of users
there could be using their knowledge for malicious activity.
the same social networking site that was most commonly targeted in the United States and China
was also the most common target of phishing attacked with sites hosted on computers in romania,
accounting for 98 percent of the total. Seven of the top 10 targets phished in romania during this
period were organizations with head offices in the United States, three of which were financial services
organizations. An italian iSp and a bank in the United Kingdom were also among the targets spoofed
by Web sites hosted on computers in romania.
Phishing site top-level domains
For the first time, this volume of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report will discuss top-
level domains ( tLDs) associated with all phishing Web sites detected by Symantec.119 this discussion is
important because it illustrates the tLDs that are the most commonly used in phishing attacks, beneficial
in aiding phishing attacks, and easily used by phishers.
the most common tLD used in phishing Web sites between July 1 and December 31, 2007 was .com,
accounting for 44 percent of the total (table 14). this is not surprising for a number of reasons. phishers
not only benefit from its familiarity, but since it is the most common tLD overall,120 it is natural that it
is also the most commonly used tLD for phishing Web sites. the .com domain is also unrestricted and is
available to anyone who wishes to register a .com domain name, making it easy for phishers to register
these domains.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Top-level Domain
.com
.cn
.net
.org
.de
.ru
.fr
.co.uk
.info
.esPercentage
44%
23%
6%
3%
2%
2%
1%
1%
1%
1%Description
Unrestricted commercial
China
Unrestricted
Unrestricted
Germany
Russia
France
United Kingdom commercial
Unrestricted
Spain
TableXX_PhishW ebTopDomains_v1. epsTable 14. Top 10 phishing site top-level domains
Source: Symantec Corporation
69 117 http://www.ic3.gov/crimeschemes.aspx#item-2
118 http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/10/20/tech/main578965.shtml
119 in a domain name, the top-level domain is the part that is furthest to the right. For example, the “.com” in symantec.com. there are two types of top-level domains:
generic and country specific. examples of generic domains are .com, .net, and .org, while country-specific top-level domains include .cn for China, and .uk for the
United Kingdom, as well as others.
120 http://www.verisign.com/static/043379.pdfSymantec Global internet Security threat report
70 121 http://www.neulevel.cn/
122 http://www.icannwiki.org/Domain_Statisticsthe second most commonly used tLD by phishing Web sites was .cn, accounting for 23 percent of the
total. Although .cn was originally restricted to domain names registered in China, it has since been made
available internationally.121 the prominence of .cn is not surprising due to its prevalence in China. China
has ranked consistently high in the past two years for hosting phishing Web sites, for housing active bot-
infected computers, and for originating attacks. it has also ranked second for overall malicious activity
for the past year, as is discussed in the “Attack trends” section of this report. it is likely that, because
China has such high levels of malicious activity in general, phishers have an easier time attaining and
maintaining phishing Web sites in the country.
the third most common tLD used by phishing Web sites during this reporting period was .net, which
accounted for only six percent of the total. Compared to both the .com and .cn top-level domains, the
percentage of phishing sites using .net is quite low. the ranking of .net is likely attributable to two
factors. First, it is one of the most common tLDs,122 and phishers may use it because it is well known
and relatively unsuspicious. Second, it is also unrestricted, making it easy for phishers to register
domain names with it.
Phishing Web site hosts
For the first time, this volume of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report will be discussing
the volume of distinct phishing Web site hosts observed by Symantec. A phishing Web site host is a
computer that is identified to have been hosting one or more phishing Web sites during the period. Some
phishing hosts may host numerous different phishing Web sites; however, these hosts are counted only once for the purpose of this discussion. this consideration is important because it allows Symantec to
gauge and understand increases or decreases in phishing activity.
Between July 1, 2007 and December 31, 2007, Symantec observed 87,963 phishing hosts (figure 22).
this is an increase of 167 percent from the first half of 2007, when Symantec detected only 32,939
phishing Web site hosts. Between the second half of 2006, when 13,353 phishing Web site hosts were
detected, and the second half of 2007, Symantec observed a dramatic increase of 559 percent in
phishing Web site hosts.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
FigXX_NumV ulner_v1. eps
PeriodJul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 2007 Jul–Dec 200787,963
13,35332,939
Figure 22. Phishing Web site hosts
Source: Symantec Corporation
there are several factors contributing to this increasing trend that Symantec is observing. Along with the
growth in availability and adaptability of phishing toolkits that allow phishers to work faster with greater
efficiency, the adoption of fast-flux botnet communication infrastructure in botnets has also facilitated
the growth in the number of phishing Web site hosts. Fast-flux basically allows a single U rL to resolve
to a number of different ip addresses, or computers, by changing the D nS mapping of the U rL rapidly
and constantly. in other words, a single U rL can be used to point to a number of different computers
at different times. this functionality has allowed phishers to host phishing Web sites across a botnet.
through fast-flux, when one phishing Web host is blocked or taken down, the attacker can change the
DnS entry so that the U rL will point to a different computer that has not been blocked or taken down,
but that is hosting the same phishing Web page, allowing the phisher to carry out phishing attacks for longer periods. this is a major contributor to the rise in phishing Web site hosts over the past year.
phishing toolkits have also allowed phishers to carry out phishing attacks much more easily by automating
the construction of a phishing Web site; attackers can concentrate on identifying and procuring phishing Web site hosts instead of the tedious job of building phishing Web sites from by hand. the adoption of
phishing Web site toolkits is a prominent trend, as noted in the “Automated phishing toolkits” discussion
on the next page. During this period, the top three phishing toolkits accounted for 26 percent of all phishing attacks, whereas the top three toolkits accounted for 42 percent in the previous period. the
indication is that, because the top three toolkits did not dominate as much this period, there are more
toolkits sharing the workload, which highlights the widespread adoption of toolkits as a valuable tool
for malicious activity. Consequently, carrying out phishing attacks and deploying phishing Web sites has
become easier and is facilitating the growth in phishing Web site hosts.
71Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Overall, since phishing is a financially lucrative type of attack, Symantec predicts that the number of
phishing Web site hosts will continue to rise until effective means of countering them are put in place.
Furthermore, as the adoption of fast-flux type communication schemes continues to grow, so will the
number of phishing Web site hosts.
Automated phishing toolkits
A phishing toolkit is a set of scripts that allows an attacker to automatically set up phishing Web sites
that spoof the legitimate Web sites of different brands, including the images and logos associated with
those brands. the scripts also help to generate corresponding phishing email messages. As each script
generates pseudo-random phishing U rLs with a distinctive pattern, the particular script used to generate
a particular phishing U rL can be identified from that pattern. All phishing U rLs reported to Symantec can
be sorted and grouped according to those specific patterns.
phishing toolkits are developed by groups or individuals and are sold in the underground economy. As
such, they illustrate the trend that Symantec has observed towards an increase in the commercialization
of the development and distribution of threats and malicious services. this trend also indicates that
phishing is an organized and commercial activity. toolkits sold on the underground economy often go
unnamed. Unlike legitimate software, where naming plays a large role in marketing the product, phishing
toolkits often become popular based on who has produced them. As a consequence, phishing toolkits
discussed here cannot be named specifically.
three phishing toolkits were responsible for 26 percent of all phishing attacks observed by Symantec in
the second half of 2007 (figure 23). this is a decrease from the first half of 2007, when three phishing
toolkits were responsible for 42 percent of all phishing attacks. Furthermore, two of the three most
prevalent phishing toolkits from the first half of 2007 were no longer commonly used in the second half
of the year and, as such, are not discussed here. this is one indication that the popularity of phishing
toolkits changes quickly.
72Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Spam Phishing — automated phishing toolkits v3
03-27-08
MonthAug Sep Oct Nov0%10%20%30%
5%15%25%35%40%
Dec Jul8.7614.6313.6
5.6710.649.9933.53
16.5
010.32
6.311.05
0.725.37
2.373.15
2.02
0Phishing toolkit 1
Phishing toolkit 2
Phishing toolkit 3Percentage
Figure 23. Use of automated phishing toolkits
Source: Symantec Corporation
the rapid change in preferred toolkits is likely driven by a need for phishers to adapt and constantly
change the toolkits they use to avoid detection by antiphishing software. this is likely the driving factor
behind the dramatic upward spike and subsequent decline of phishing toolkit 3 during this period. its
drop in popularity between August and October likely indicates that the phishing kit was identified by
antiphishing software, and so it became ineffective and had to be replaced. this also indicates that
the number of toolkits is increasing and that attackers are using a greater number of different toolkits,
resulting in the total amount of attacks being distributed over more toolkits.
the results still indicate a high percentage of automation used in phishing attacks, which allows attackers
to quickly set up a fraudulent Web site and to send a high volume of phishing messages that spoof
several brands to a large number of recipients with minimal effort. Being able to deploy a large number
of phishing Web sites increases an attacker’s chances of a successful attack. it is also likely that as the
awareness around phishing grows, phishing attacks will become less successful, forcing phishers to
deploy more Web sites to remain successful. Of the remaining attacks, some did use phishing toolkits
other than the three most prevalent ones, while others used techniques other than phishing toolkits.
73Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Phishing—protection and mitigation
Symantec recommends that enterprise users protect themselves against phishing threats by filtering
email at the server level through the mail transfer agent (M tA). Although this will likely remain the primary
point of filtering for phishing, organizations can also use ip-based filtering upstream, as well as H ttp
filtering.
DnS block lists also offer protection against potential phishing emails.123 Organizations could also
consider using domain-level or email authentication in order to verify the actual origin of an email
message. this can protect against phishers who are spoofing email domains.124
to protect against potential phishing activity, administrators should always follow Symantec best
practices as outlined in “Appendix A” of this report. Symantec also recommends that organizations
educate their end users about phishing.125 they should also keep their employees notified of the latest
phishing attacks and how to avoid falling victim to them, as well as provide a means to report suspected
phishing sites.126
Organizations can also employ Web-server log monitoring to track if and when complete downloads of
their Web sites, logos, and images are occurring. Such activity may indicate that someone is attempting
to use the legitimate Web site to create an illegitimate Web site for phishing.
Organizations can detect phishing attacks that use spoofing by monitoring non-deliverable email addresses or bounced email that is returned to non-existent users. they should also monitor the
purchasing of cousin domain names by other entities to identify purchases that could be used to spoof
their corporate domains.127 So-called typo domains128 and homographic domains129 should also be
monitored. this can be done with the help of companies that specialize in domain monitoring; some
registrars also provide this service.
the use of antiphishing toolbars and components in Web browsers can also help protect users from
phishing attacks. these measures notify the user if a Web page being visited does not appear to be
legitimate. this way, even if a phishing email reaches a user’s inbox, the user can still be alerted to the
potential threat.end users should follow best security practices, as outlined in “Appendix A” of this report. they should
use an antiphishing solution. As some phishing attacks may use spyware and/or keystroke logging
applications, Symantec advises end users to use antivirus software, antispam software, firewalls, toolbar
blockers, and other software detection methods. Symantec also advises end users to never disclose any
confidential personal or financial information unless and until they can confirm that any request for such
information is legitimate. Users should review bank, credit card, and credit information frequently. this can provide information
on any irregular activities. For further information, the internet Fraud Complaint Center ( iFCC) has
also released a set of guidelines on how to avoid internet-related scams.130 Additionally, network
administrators can review Web proxy logs to determine if any users have visited known phishing sites.
74 123 A DnS block list (sometimes referred to as a black list) is simply a list of ip addresses that are known to send unwanted email traffic. it is used by email software to
either allow or reject email coming from ip addresses on the list.
124 Spoofing refers to instances where phishers forge the “From:” line of an email message using the domain of the entity they are targeting with the phishing attempt.
125 For instance, the United States Federal trade Commission has published some basic guidelines on how to avoid phishing. they are available at:
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/alt127.htm
126 A good resource for information on the latest phishing threats can be found at: http://www.antiphishing.org
127 “Cousin domains” refers to domain names that include some of the key words of an organization’s domain or brand name; for example, for the corporate domain
“bigbank.com”, cousin domains could include “bigbank-alerts.com”, “big-bank-security.com”, and so on.
128 typo domains are domain names that use common misspellings of a legitimate domain name, for example the domain “symatnec.com” would be a typo domain for
“symantec.com”.
129 A homographic domain name uses numbers that look similar to letters in the domain name, for example the character for the number “1” can look like the letter “l”.
130 http://www.fbi.gov/majcases/fraud/internetschemes.htmSymantec Global internet Security threat report
Spam Trends
Spam is usually defined as junk or unsolicited email sent by a third party. While it is certainly an annoyance
to users and administrators, spam is also a serious security concern as it can be used to deliver trojans,
viruses, and phishing attempts.131 it could also cause a loss of service or degradation in the performance
of network resources and email gateways. this section of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat
Report will discuss developments in spam activity between July 1 and December 31, 2007.
the results used in this analysis are based on data returned from the Symantec probe network, as well as
the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam™ customer base. Specifically, statistics are gathered from enterprise
customers’ Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam servers that receive more than 1,000 email messages per day. this removes the smaller data samples (that is, smaller customers and test servers), thereby allowing for
a more accurate representation of data.
the Symantec probe network consists of millions of decoy email addresses that are configured to attract
a large stream of spam attacks. An attack can consist of one or more messages. the goal of the probe
network is to simulate a wide variety of internet email users, thereby attracting a stream of traffic that
is representative of spam activity across the internet as a whole. For this reason, the probe network is
continuously optimized in order to attract new varieties of spam attacks. this section will discuss selected spam metrics in greater depth, providing analysis and discussion of
the trends indicated by the data. the following metrics will be discussed:
• top spam categories
• top countries of spam origin
Top spam categories
Spam categories are assigned based on spam activity that is detected by the Symantec probe network.
While some of the categories may overlap, this data provides a general overview of the types of spam that
are most commonly seen on the internet today. it is important to note that this data is restricted to spam
attacks that are detected and processed by the Symantec probe network. internal upstream processing
may weed out particular spam attacks, such as those that are determined to be potential fraud attacks.
the most common type of spam detected in the first half of 2007 was related to commercial products,
which made up 27 percent of all spam detected by Symantec sensors, an increase from the 22 percent
detected in the previous period (figure 24). Commercial products spam usually consists of advertisements
for commercial goods and services. it is frequently used to sell designer goods, such as watches, handbags,
and sunglasses, the profits from which can be substantial given that the goods sold are often cheaply-
made counterfeits. in other cases the spammers may simply be attempting to collect credit card and
personal information for use in identity theft.
75 131 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6676819.stmSymantec Global internet Security threat report
Spam Phishing — top spam categories v1
02-20-0 8
Fraud 7%
Health 10 %
Finance 13 %Internet 20 %Leisure 6%
Commercial products 27%
Scams 10%Adult 7%
Figure 24. Top spam categories
Source: Symantec Corporation
internet-related spam rose to 20 percent this period, from 17 percent in the first half of 2007. this type
of spam is typically used to promote Web hosting and design, as well as other online commodities like
phishing and spam toolkits. Since phishing and spam toolkits cannot typically be advertised by legitimate
means, such as through banner ads on Web sites, spam tends to be the only way to promote them. Along
with the more common use of phishing toolkits, this can account for the increase in internet-related spam.
Spam related to financial services made up 13 percent of all spam detected in the last six months of 2007, making it the third most common type of spam during this period. this continues a decline first observed
in the first six months of 2007, when it ranked second and accounted for 21 percent of all spam detected. this was driven by the continuing decline in stock market pump-and-dump spam.
132 the drop in pump-
and-dump spam was triggered by actions taken by the U.S. Securities and exchange Commission, which
limited the profitability of this type of spam by suspending trading of the touted stocks.133
Top countries of spam origin
this section will discuss the top 10 countries of spam origin. the nature of spam and its distribution on
the internet presents challenges in identifying the location of people who are sending it because many
spammers try to redirect attention away from their actual geographic location. in an attempt to bypass
DnS block lists, they use trojans that relay email, which allows them to send spam from sites distinct from
their physical location. in doing so, they tend to focus on compromised computers in those regions with
the largest bandwidth capabilities. As such, the region in which the spam originates may not correspond
with the region in which the spammers are located.
76 132 For further discussion on pump-and-dump spam, please see the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report Volume Xii (September 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_09_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 107
133 http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-34.htmSymantec Global internet Security threat report
this discussion is based on data gathered by customer installations of Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam.
this data includes the originating server’s ip address, against which frequency statistics are compared.
each ip address is mapped to a specific country and charted over time.
During the second half of 2007, 42 percent of all spam originated in the United States (table 15), a
decrease from 50 percent in the previous period. Despite the decrease, the United States had an eight
percent increase in volume of spam messages. the drop in percentage from the United States can be
explained by the increase in volume of spam originating in other countries, namely russia, which will
be discussed below.
the prominence of the United States is not surprising, given that it has the highest number of broadband
internet users in the world.134 the United States was the top country of spam origin for the first half of
2007, as well as the last half of 2006.
Current
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
3
14
2
7
6
4
8
5
15Country/Region
United States
United Kingdom
Russia
China
Poland
Taiwan
Japan
Germany
South Korea
SpainCurrent
Percentage
42%
5%
4%
4%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
2%Previous
Percentage
50%
4%
2%
4%
3%
3%
4%
2%
3%
1%
TableXX_T opCountSpamOrigin_v3. epsTable 15. Top 10 countries/regions of spam origin
Source: Symantec Corporation
the United Kingdom ranked second for spam origin in the second half of 2007, accounting for five
percent. During the first half of 2007, the United Kingdom ranked third and accounted for four percent.
Although the rise in rank and percentage of the United Kingdom did correspond to a moderate rise in
spam volume from the country, the changes are due primarily to changes in the volume percentages and
rank of other countries, primarily russia and China.
China fell from second to fourth during the period, with a corresponding decrease in spam volume of
131 percent. this drop is considerable, and is likely linked to the drop in bot-infected computers in the
country.135 One possible explanation is the unavailability of a number of Web sites, forums, and blogs
in China for several months during this period.136 Dynamic Web sites are often used by attackers to
propagate and host malicious content, which in turn is often used to send spam.
77 134 http://www.point-topic.com
135 For a discussion on bot-infected computers, please see the “Attack trends” discussion in this report.
136 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21268635/Symantec Global internet Security threat report
78137 http://blog.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2007/10/mapping_the_russian_business_n.html
138 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/11/08/rbn_offline/
139 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/12/Ar2007101202461_pf.html
140 http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/011408-crime-hubs-can-be-downed.html?fsrc=rss-securityrussia was the third ranked country during the second half of 2007, accounting for four percent of all
spam volume. this corresponds to a 236 percent increase over the first half of 2007 when russia ranked
fourteenth and accounted for only two percent of all spam detected. Symantec also observed a 231 percent
increase in the number of spam zombies detected in russia during the current reporting period. As well,
there was a 107 percent increase in active bot-infected computers in russia over the previous period.
this increase in malicious activity is likely attributable to the russian Business network ( rBn) and its
facilitation of malicious activity. earlier this year, it was reported that the rBn allowed malicious content
to be hosted on their Web space, thereby potentially facilitating malicious activity originating from russia.
137 it is likely that the rBn’s involvement in malicious activity contributed to this rise before it
dropped offline in november.138
Over time, the rBn has been blamed for a large amount of malicious activity.139 it has been suggested
that the publicity surrounding the organization was partly responsible for its disappearance.140 With the
rBn’s disappearance, there could be a corresponding drop in malicious activity originating from russia in
the coming months. However, it is also possible that the group did not discontinue its activities, but are
attempting to avoid further publicity by taking its activities underground.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices
Enterprise Best Practices
• employ defense-in-depth strategies, which emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive
defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protection method.
this should include the deployment of regularly updated antivirus, firewalls, intrusion detection, and
intrusion protection systems on client systems.
• turn off and remove services that are not needed.
• if malicious code or some other threat exploits one or more network services, disable or block access
to those services until a patch is applied.
• Always keep patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host public services and are accessible through the firewall, such as H ttp, Ftp, mail, and D nS services.
• Consider implementing network compliance solutions that will help keep infected mobile users out
of the network (and disinfect them before rejoining the network).
• enforce an effective password policy.
• Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments that are commonly
used to spread viruses, such as .VBS, .BA t, .eXe, .piF, and .SC r files.
• isolate infected computers quickly to prevent the risk of further infection within the organization.
perform a forensic analysis and restore the computers using trusted media.
• train employees to not open attachments unless they are expected and come from a known and
trusted source, and to not execute software that is downloaded from the internet unless it has
been scanned for viruses.
• ensure that emergency response procedures are in place. this includes having a backup-and-restore
solution in place in order to restore lost or compromised data in the event of successful attack or
catastrophic data loss.
• educate management on security budgeting needs.
• test security to ensure that adequate controls are in place.
• Be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file-
sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software. Clicking on links and/or attachments in email messages (or iM messages) may also expose computers to unnecessary
risks. ensure that only applications approved by the organization are deployed on desktop computers.
79Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Consumer Best Practices
• Consumers should use an internet security solution that combines antivirus, firewall, intrusion detection,
and vulnerability management for maximum protection against malicious code and
other threats.
• Consumers should ensure that security patches are up to date and that they are applied to all vulnerable
applications in a timely manner.
• Consumers should ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers, and should change them
often. passwords should not consist of words from the dictionary.
• Consumers should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is expected
and the purpose of the attachment is known.
• Consumers should keep virus definitions updated regularly. By deploying the latest virus definitions,
consumers can protect their computers against the latest viruses known to be spreading in the wild.
• Consumers should routinely check to see if their operating system is vulnerable to threats by using
Symantec Security Check at www.symantec.com/securitycheck.
• Consumers should deploy an antiphishing solution. they should never disclose any confidential personal
or financial information unless and until they can confirm that any request for such information is
legitimate.
• Consumers can get involved in fighting cybercrime by tracking and reporting intruders. With Symantec
Security Check’s tracing service, users can quickly identify the location of potential hackers and forward the information to the attacker’s iSp or local police.
• Consumers should be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with the
installation of file-sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software. Clicking on links and/or attachments in email messages (or iM messages) may also expose computers to
unnecessary risks. ensure that only applications approved by the organization are deployed on desktop
computers.
• Some security risks can be installed after an end user has accepted the end-user license agreement (eULA), or as a consequence of that acceptance. Consumers should read eULAs carefully and understand
all terms before agreeing to them.
• Consumers should be aware of programs that flash ads in the user interface. Many spyware programs
track how users respond to these ads, and their presence is a red flag. When users see ads in a program’s
user interface, they may be looking at a piece of spyware.
80Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology
Attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec™ Global
intelligence network, which includes the Symantec DeepSight™ threat Management System, Symantec™
Managed Security Services, the Symantec Honeypot network, and proprietary Symantec technologies.
Symantec combines data derived from these sources for analysis.
Malicious activity by country
to determine the top countries for the “Malicious activity by country” metric, Symantec compiles
geographical data on each type of malicious activity to be considered. this includes bot-infected
computers, bot command-and-control servers, phishing Web sites, malicious code infections, spam relay hosts, and internet attacks. the proportion of each activity originating in each country is then determined.
the mean of the percentages of each malicious activity that originates in each country is calculated.
this average determines the proportion of overall malicious activity that originates from the country in
question and is used to rank each country.
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft
Symantec identifies the proportional distribution of cause and sector for data breaches that may facilitate
identity theft based on data provided by Attrition.org.141 Attrition.org reports data breaches that have
been reported by legitimate media sources and have exposed personal information including name, address, Social Security number, credit card number, or medical history. the sector that experienced
the loss along with the cause of loss that occurred is determined through analysis of the organization
reporting the loss and the method that facilitated the loss.
Underground economy servers
this metric is based on data that is gathered by proprietary Symantec technologies that monitor activity
on underground economy servers and collect data. Underground economy servers are typically chat
servers on which stolen data, such as identities, credit card numbers, access to compromised computers, and email accounts are bought and sold. each server is monitored by recording communications that take
place on them, which typically includes advertisements for stolen data. this data is used to derive the data
presented in this metric.
Description of goods and services advertised on underground economy servers may vary from vendor to vendor. the following list shows typical goods and services that are found on these servers and general
descriptions of each:
Full identities: Full identities may consist of name, address, date of birth, phone number, and Social
Security number. it may also include extras such as driver’s license number, mother’s maiden name,
email address, or “secret” questions/answers.
Credit cards: Credit cards may include name, credit card number, pin, billing address, phone number, and
company name (for a corporate card). Credit Verification Values (CVV) typically are not included in this and
can be purchased separately.
81 141 http://www.attrition.org/dataloss/dlunplugged.htmlSymantec Global internet Security threat report
Bank accounts: Bank accounts may consist of name, bank account number (including transit and
branch number), address, and phone number. Online banking logins and passwords are often sold
as a separate item.
Email passwords: these can include account information for emails including users iD, email address
and password. in addition, the account will contain personal information and email addresses in the
contact list.
Mailers: A mailer is an application that is used to send out mass emails (spam) for phishing attacks.
examples of this are worms and viruses.
Email addresses: these consist of lists of email addresses used for spam or phishing activities. the sizes
of lists sold can range from 1 MB to 150 MB.
Proxies: proxy services provide access to a software agent, often a firewall mechanism, which performs
a function or operation on behalf of another application or system while hiding the details involved,
allowing attackers to obscure their path and make tracing back to the source difficult or impossible. this
can involve sending email from the proxy, or connecting to the proxy and then out to an underground irC
server to sell credit cards or other stolen goods.
Scams: Vendors sell malicious Web pages that pose as legitimate pages for phishing scams. they also
offer services for hosting the pages, usually priced per week, given the transitory lifespan of many phishing
sites.
Online auction site accounts: information for online auction site accounts is often put up for sale,
including user iD and password. in addition, the account will contain personal information such as name,
address, phone number and email address.
Drop (request or offer): A drop is either a secure location where goods or cash can be delivered or a bank
account through which money can be moved. the drop locations may be an empty apartment or some
other scouted location. Criminals often change the billing addresses of credit cards and bank accounts
to safe drops that are untraceable. Bank account drops are a convenient way to cash out bank accounts, credit cards, or other online financial accounts such as paypal or eGold. Services for drops can often be
accompanied by cashier services.
Bot-infected computers
Symantec identifies bot-infected computers based on coordinated scanning and attack behavior that is
observed in global network traffic. An active bot-infected computer is one that carries out at least one attack per day. this does not have to be continuous; rather, a single computer can be active on a number
of different days. Attacks are defined as any malicious activity carried out over a network that has been detected by an intrusion detection system ( iDS) or firewall.
For an attacking computer to be considered to be participating in coordinated scanning and attacking, it must fit into that pattern to the exclusion of any other activity. this behavioral matching will not catch
every bot-infected computer, and may identify other malicious code or individual attackers behaving in a coordinated way as a botnet. this behavioral matching will, however, identify many of the most
coordinated and aggressive bot-infected computers. it will also give insight into the population trends of
bot-infected computers, including those that are considered to be actively working in a well coordinated
and aggressive fashion at some point in time during the reporting period.
82Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Appendix C—Vulnerability Trends Methodology
Symantec operates one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion of vulnerabilities on
the internet, the Bug traq™ mailing list, which has approximately 50,000 direct subscribers who contribute,
receive, and discuss vulnerability research on a daily basis.142 Symantec also maintains one of the most
comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting of over 25,000 vulnerabilities (spanning more
than two decades) affecting more than 55,000 technologies from over 8,000 vendors.
Vulnerability classifications
Following the discovery and/or disclosure of a new vulnerability, Symantec analysts gather all relevant characteristics of the new vulnerability and create an alert. this alert describes important traits of the
vulnerability, such as the severity, ease of exploitation, and a list of affected products. these traits are
subsequently used both directly and indirectly for this analysis.
Vulnerability type
After discovering a new vulnerability, Symantec threat analysts classify the vulnerability into one of
12 possible categories based on the available information. these categories focus on defining the core
cause of the vulnerability, as opposed to classifying the vulnerability merely by its effect. the classification
system is derived from the academic taxonomy presented by taimur Aslam, et al (1996),143 which provides
a full description of the possible values below:
• Boundary condition error
• Access validation error
• Origin validation error
• input validation error
• Failure to handle exceptional conditions
• race condition error
• Serialization error
• Atomicity error
• environment error
• Configuration error
• Design error
Patch development time for operating systems
this metric has a similar methodology to the “ patch development time for enterprise vendors” metric,
which was explained earlier in this methodology. However, instead of applying it to enterprise-scale
vendors, the patch development time average is calculated from patched vulnerabilities for the following
operating systems:• Apple Mac OS X
• Hewlett- packard H p-UX
• Microsoft Windows
• red Hat Linux (including enterprise versions and red Hat Fedora)
• Sun Microsystems Solaris
83 142 the Bug traq mailing list is hosted by SecurityFocus (http://www.securityfocus.com). Archives are available at http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1
143 “Use of a taxonomy of Security Faults” http://ftp.cerias.purdue.edu/pub/papers/taimur-aslam/aslam-krsul-spaf-taxonomy.pdfSymantec Global internet Security threat report
the sample set includes only vulnerabilities that are considered medium severity or higher, based on
their CVSS base score. An average is calculated from the patch release times for each vulnerability in the
reporting period per operating system. the patch development time average for each operating system is
then compared.
Window of exposure for Web browsers
this metric has a similar methodology to the “Window of exposure for enterprise vendors” metric.
However, instead of applying it to enterprise-scale vendors, the window of exposure is calculated for
vulnerabilities associated with the following Web browsers:
• Safari
• internet explorer
• Mozilla browsers
• Opera
Symantec records the window of time between the publication of an initial vulnerability report and the
appearance of third-party exploit code; this is known as the exploit code development time. the time
period between the disclosure date of a vulnerability and the release date of an associated patch is
known as the patch development time. the time lapse between the public release of exploit code and
the time that the affected vendor releases a patch for the affected vulnerability is known as the window
of exposure.
the average window of exposure is calculated as the difference in days between the average patch
development time and the average exploit code development time. During this time, the computer or
system on which the affected application is deployed may be susceptible to attack, as administrators
may have no official recourse against a vulnerability and must resort to best practices and workarounds
to reduce the risk of attacks. explanations of the average exploit development time and the average
patch development time are included on the next page.
Web browser vulnerabilities
this metric compares vulnerability data for major Web browsers, namely: internet explorer, Mozilla
browsers (including Firefox), Opera, and Safari. However, in assessing the comparative data, it should be
noted that for this report the total number of vulnerabilities in these Web browsers is computed, including
both vendor confirmed and non-vendor confirmed vulnerabilities.previous versions of the Symantec
Internet Security Threat Report have discussed vulnerabilities according
to whether they were vendor confirmed or non-vendor confirmed, because vulnerabilities that were not
confirmed were also included in the data. this differentiation was important, especially given the disparity
in patch times between vendors. However, starting with Volume X of the Symantec Internet Security
Threat Report , this convention is no longer followed and no differentiation is made between vendor-
confirmed vulnerabilities and non-vendor-confirmed vulnerabilities when calculating the total number
of vulnerabilities.
84Symantec Global internet Security threat report
individual browser vulnerabilities are notoriously difficult to precisely identify. A reported attack may be
a combination of several conditions, each of which could be considered a vulnerability in its own right,
which may distort the total vulnerability count. Some browser issues have also been improperly identified
as operating system vulnerabilities or vice versa. this is partly due to increased operating system
integration that makes it difficult to correctly identify the affected component in many cases:
• Many vulnerabilities in shared operating system components can be exposed to attacks through the
browser. this report enumerates only those vulnerabilities that are known to affect the browser itself
where sufficient information is available to make the distinction.
• not every vulnerability that is discovered is exploited. For the most part, there has been no widespread
exploitation of any browser except internet explorer. this is expected to change as other browsers
become more widely deployed.
Browser plug-in vulnerabilities
Browser plug-ins are technologies that extend the functionality of the Web browser. they may be
developed by the vendor or by a third-party. Some plug-ins provide support for additional application
programming languages or environments, such as Java or Flash. Others are applications in their own right that run in the browser. examples of these include ActiveX objects for internet explorer, Mozilla
extensions, or Opera widgets.
this metric enumerates publicly documented vulnerabilities that affect browser plug-ins. these
vulnerabilities are further classified, when applicable, into general groups of browser plug-in technologies.
Symantec makes an effort to identify all vulnerabilities affecting the various classes of browser plug-in.
Vulnerabilities that affect the browser itself are not included in the data for this metric when it is possible
to make this distinction. in cases where a Web browser ships with a particular plug-in, vulnerabilities
affecting that plug-in will be counted. Although in this case, the plug-in may be included in the default
browser installation, it is still considered a separate technology and not a native feature of the browser.
native features are considered to be features intrinsic to the primary function of the browser such
as support for H ttp/HttpS, H tML rendering, JavaScript, and other standards that are commonly
implemented in most Web browsers. technologies such as Java and Flash may be common to many Web
browsers but they are intended to extend their functionality to support additional types of content and
are typically optional components. the definition of browser plug-ins for this report is limited to technologies that are hosted on the same
computer as the browser, and whose installation and configuration is managed through the browser or
operating system. this distinguishes them from content that is intended to run inside the browser but
is typically external to the browser such as Java applets or Flash movies. this content is rendered or
executed by a browser plug-in but is not considered to be a plug-in in its own right.
85Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Site-specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities
Data for this metric is provided by the XSSed project, an online archive of publicly known cross-site
scripting vulnerabilities that affect specific Web sites.
the XSSed project gathers its data from security researchers who report specific instances of
vulnerabilities in Web sites. each submission is verified before it is published in the XSSed archive. the
archive stores additional information such as the publication date, affected domain, proof-of-concept
examples, and the fix status of the vulnerability. this information allows for the following statistics to
be gathered:
• the number of vulnerabilities reported over a specific period of time;
• the number of vulnerabilities patched by the maintainers of the affected sites;
• the average time that it took for site maintainers to patch vulnerabilities.
the data in this metric is limited to the vulnerabilities that security researchers report to the XSSed
project, which is not intended to be a complete database of all publicly known site-specific cross-
site scripting vulnerabilities. therefore, the metric is intended to provide insight into site-specific
vulnerabilities, but does not provide a complete picture of all publicly known activity.
Zero-day vulnerabilities
this metric quantifies the number of zero-day vulnerabilities that have been documented during the
relevant reporting periods of the current Internet Security Threat Report . For the purpose of this metric, a
zero-day vulnerability is one for which there is sufficient public evidence to indicate that the vulnerability
has been exploited in the wild prior to being publicly known. it may not have been known to the vendor
prior to exploitation, and the vendor had not released a patch at the time of the exploit activity.
this metric is derived from public sources and the Symantec vulnerability database. this metric is meant
to calculate the number of high-profile, publicly documented zero-day vulnerability instances during the
relevant reporting periods.
Unpatched enterprise vendor vulnerabilities
Unpatched vulnerabilities are vulnerabilities that have no vendor remediation at the time that data
for the report was collected.144 this metric tracks the number of unpatched vulnerabilities affecting
enterprise-scale technologies. individual vendors are identified and correlated with the number of
unpatched vulnerabilities affecting them. it is possible that some vendors will have no vulnerabilities
affecting them during a given reporting period or that none of the vulnerabilities affecting them are
considered unpatched. the status of some vulnerabilities may have changed since data was collected; vendors may have released
patches for vulnerabilities included in the data set and new vulnerabilities may have been published
that are considered unpatched. the nature of unpatched vulnerabilities means that the data may
include vulnerabilities that are unverified and may have been reported by a single source with no other
corroboration. However, the data also includes vulnerabilities that have been acknowledged but not fixed
86144 For the purpose of this report, patched vulnerabilities are those with vendor-supplied patches or upgrades. Vendor-supplied or third-party workarounds are
not counted as patches.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
by the vendor. in rare instances, the legitimacy of a vulnerability may be in dispute, but in all such cases
these disputes remain unresolved at the time of data collection. Symantec excludes all vulnerabilities that
are provably false from this and other metrics in the report.
it is also important to note that the set of vulnerabilities included in this metric is limited and does not
represent all software from all possible vendors. instead, it only includes vendors who are classified as
enterprise vendors. the purpose is to illustrate the window of exposure for widely deployed mission-
critical software. Because of the large number of vendors with technologies that have a very low
deployment (which form the majority), only exploits for technologies from enterprise vendors (that is,
those that generally have widespread deployment) are included. Vulnerabilities in those vendors’ products
will likely affect more enterprises than those in less widely deployed technologies. those vendors are:
• CA
• Cisco
• eMC
• Hp
• iBM
• McAfee
• Microsoft
• Oracle
• Sun
• Symantec
Vulnerabilities in security products
Symantec keeps track of products that are affected by vulnerabilities. each product is classified into one
or more categories based on the functions it performs. in this manner, it is possible to determine which
vulnerabilities affect security products. Since many products may have security features, it is necessary to identify products whose main purpose is to provide security to enterprise and desktop systems. therefore,
each vulnerability is analyzed to determine whether it affects a product in one of the following categories:
• Antivirus
• Firewalls
• intrusion detection systems (host- and network-based)
• intrusion prevention systems (host- and network-based)
• network Access Control ( nAC)
each vulnerability is further categorized based its severity, which is done using the same methodology as
the “Severity of vulnerabilities” metric.
87Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Exploit code development time for Web browsers
the cumulative exploit code development time for each vulnerability affecting a Web browser is
calculated. each cumulative time is then divided by the number of vulnerabilities affecting that browser
to determine the average exploit code development time for that browser. the exploit development time
average for each browser is then compared. this metric is used to compute the window of exposure, which
amounts to the difference between the average patch development time and the average exploit code
development time.
Patch development time for Web browsers
the cumulative patch development time for vulnerabilities affecting each browser is calculated. each
cumulative time is then divided by the number of vulnerabilities affecting that browser to determine
the average patch development time for that browser. the patch development time average for each
browser is then compared. this metric is used to compute the window of exposure for Web browsers,
which amounts to the difference between the average patch development time and the average exploit
code development time.
Exploit code development time for enterprise vendors
the ability to measure exploit code development time is limited and applies only to vulnerabilities that
would normally require exploit code. therefore, this metric is based on vulnerabilities that Symantec
considers to be of sufficient complexity, and for which functional exploit code was not available until
it was created by a third party. this consideration, therefore, excludes the following:
• Vulnerabilities that do not require exploit code (unconfirmed exploitability);
• Vulnerabilities associated with non-functional proof-of-concept code (proof-of-concept exploitability).
the date of vulnerability disclosure is based on the date of the first publicly available reference (such as
a mailing list post). the date of exploit code publication is the date of the first publicly known reference
to the exploit code. Because the purpose of this metric is to estimate the time it takes for exploit code
to materialize as a result of active development, exploit code publication dates that fall outside of the
30-day range from initial vulnerability publication are excluded from this metric. it is assumed that
exploit code that was published after this period was not actively developed from the initial
announcement of the vulnerability.
Because this metric only considers the appearance of the first functional exploit, it is possible that reliable
exploits that improve upon the initial exploit may appear later. these exploits may take much longer to
develop, but are not considered because the window of exposure begins as soon as the first functional
exploit surfaces.
88Symantec Global internet Security threat report
the time lapse between the disclosure of a vulnerability and the appearance of exploit code for that
vulnerability is determined. the aggregate time for all vulnerabilities is determined and the average time
is calculated. this metric is incorporated when computing the window of exposure, which is the difference
between the average patch development time and the average exploit development time.
Patch development time for enterprise vendors
the patch development time is the time period between the disclosure date of a vulnerability and the
release date of an associated patch. Only those patches that are independent objects (such as fixes,
upgrades, etc.) are included in this analysis. Other remediation solutions—such as workaround steps,
for instance—are excluded.
For each individual patch from these vendors, the time lapse between the patch release date and the
publish date of the vulnerability is computed. the mean average is calculated from the aggregate of these.
As some vendors may release more patches than others for a particular vulnerability, Symantec considers only the first instance of a single patch for each vulnerability. this metric is incorporated when computing
the window of exposure, which is calculated as the difference between the average patch development
time and the average exploit development time.
Window of exposure for enterprise vendors
Symantec records the time lapse between the publication of an initial vulnerability report and the appearance of third-party exploit code; this is known as the exploit development time. the time period
between the disclosure date of a vulnerability and the release date of an associated patch is known as the
patch development time.145 the time lapse between the public release of exploit code and the time that
the affected vendor releases a patch for the affected vulnerability is known as the window of exposure.
the average window of exposure is calculated as the difference in days between the average exploit
development time and the average patch development time. ( explanations of the exploit development
time average and the patch development time average are included below.) During this time, the computer
or system on which the affected application is deployed may be susceptible to attack, as administrators
have no official recourse against the vulnerability and must resort to best practices and workarounds to
reduce the risk of exploitation.it is important to note that the set of vulnerabilities included in this metric is limited and does not
represent all software from all possible vendors. instead, it only includes vendors who are classified as
enterprise vendors. the purpose is to illustrate the window of exposure for widely deployed mission-
critical software.
145 this statistic only considers specific file-based patches or upgrades, and not general solutions. instances in which the vendor provides a workaround or manual fix, for
example, are not included.
89Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Because of the large number of vendors with technologies that have a very low deployment (which form
the majority), only exploits for technologies from enterprise vendors (that is, those that generally have
widespread deployment) are included. Vulnerabilities in those vendors’ products will likely affect more
enterprises than those in less widely deployed technologies. Vendors included are:
• CA
• Cisco
• eMC
• Hp
• iBM
• McAfee
• Microsoft
• Oracle
• Sun
• Symantec
Operating system time to patch by type
this is an analysis of the patched vulnerabilities in the data set for the “Operating system patch
development time” metric. For each vendor studied in that metric, each vulnerability is divided into one
of the following categories:
Browser vulnerabilities: these vulnerabilities threaten Web browser applications through remote
attack vectors.
Client-side vulnerabilities: these vulnerabilities threaten network client applications or non-networked
applications that process malicious data that may arrive through another networked application. remote
attack vectors may exist, but client-side vulnerabilities usually require some amount of user interaction
on the part of the victim to be exploited.
Local vulnerabilities: these are vulnerabilities that require local access in order to be successfully
exploited. Local attacks may affect a large variety of applications that may or may not include network
capabilities. the differentiator is that these vulnerabilities are not exploitable by remote attackers unless
they can log on to the system and run commands as an unprivileged user.
Server vulnerabilities: these are vulnerabilities that affect server applications. Server applications
are typically defined as applications that are accessible to remote clients via connections on a range of tCp/UDp ports. Server vulnerabilities generally do not require user interaction on the part of the victim
beyond enabling and starting the service so that it listens for incoming requests.
Other: these are vulnerabilities that do not fall discretely into any of the previous categories. they can
include applications for which the distinction is blurred between server and client, or hardware platforms
in which the affected component cannot be described by any of the other categories.
90Symantec Global internet Security threat report
these categories are generally defined by the attack vector and by the type of application that is affected.
the specific categories were devised so that the majority of vulnerabilities could easily be classified within
them, with little overlap between categories, so that the total percentage of all categories would equal
100 percent.
Easily exploitable vulnerabilities
this metric covers vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit with little effort based on publicly available
information. the vulnerability analyst assigns an exploit availability rating after thoroughly researching
the need for and availability of exploits for the vulnerability.
this metric replaces the “ ease of exploitation” metric (in the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
prior to Volume X i), to accommodate Symantec’s adoption of the exploitability rating in the Common
Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) V1.0.146
CVSS classifies all vulnerabilities into one of four possible categories:
Unconfirmed: Would-be attackers must use exploit code to make use of the vulnerability; however, no
such exploit code is publicly available.
Proof-of-concept: Would-be attacks must use exploit code to make use of the vulnerability; however,
there is only proof-of-concept exploit available that is not functional enough to fully exploit the
vulnerability.
Functional: this rating is used under the following circumstances:
• exploit code to enable the exploitation of the vulnerability is publicly available to all would-be attackers;
and/or,
• Would-be attackers can exploit the vulnerability without having to use any form of exploit code;
in other words, the attacker does not need to create or use complex scripts or tools to exploit the
vulnerability.
High: the vulnerability is reliably exploitable and there have been instances of self-propagating malicious
code exploiting the vulnerability in the wild.
For the purposes of this report, the last two categories are considered “easily exploitable” because the
attacker requires only limited sophistication to exploit the vulnerability. the first two categories are
considered more difficult to exploit because attackers must develop their own exploit code or improve an
existing proof-of-concept to make use of the vulnerability.
91146 http://www.first.org/cvss/v1Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Severity of vulnerabilities
this metric also employs the CVSS, using its base score field criteria to determine the inherent properties
of a vulnerability, such as:
• the degree of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of data that may be affected by the vulnerability;
• Local versus remote exploitability;
• Whether or not authentication is required for exploitation;
• And/or if there are additional factors that may complicate exploitation of the vulnerability.
these values are not adjusted for temporal factors such as the availability of exploit code. the base score
is intended to be a static value that should only change if additional information is made available that
changes the inherent characteristics of the vulnerability. the base score can have a value of zero to 10.
For the sake of categorizing vulnerabilities by their respective severities, the following standard is used:
Low severity (base score of 0–3): Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities will have a minimal
impact on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data stored upon or transmitted over systems on which the vulnerability may be found. these vulnerabilities also tend to be local in nature, have a high
degree of access complexity, and may require authentication to be exploited successfully.
Medium severity (base score of 4–7): Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow a
partial compromise of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data stored upon or transmitted over systems on which the vulnerability may be found, although this may not always be the case. these
vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely over a network and may have a lower access complexity or may
or may not require authentication to successfully exploit.
High severity (base score of 8–10): these vulnerabilities have innate characteristics that present the
highest threat profile. Successful exploitation often allows a complete compromise of the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of data stored upon or transmitted over systems on which the vulnerability may be found. these vulnerabilities are exploited remotely across a network, have a low degree of access
complexity, and usually do not require authentication prior to successful exploitation.
Base scores are computed from related fields in the Symantec Vulnerability Database. they are then
categorized into low, medium, and high, as described above, and broken out by reporting period.
92Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Appendix D—Malicious Code Trends Methodology
Malicious code trends are based on statistics from malicious code samples reported to Symantec for
analysis. Symantec gathers data from over 120 million client, server, and gateway systems that have
deployed Symantec’s antivirus products in both consumer and corporate environments. the Symantec
Digital immune System and Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting
process. Observations in this section are based on empirical data and expert analysis of this data. the
data and analysis draw primarily from the two databases described below.
Infection database
to help detect and eradicate computer viruses, Symantec developed the Symantec AntiVirus research
Automation (SA rA) technology. Symantec uses this technology to analyze, replicate, and define a large
subset of the most common computer viruses that are quarantined by Symantec Antivirus customers.
On average, SA rA receives hundreds of thousands of suspect files daily from both enterprise and
individual consumers located throughout the world. Symantec then analyzes these suspect files, matching
them with virus definitions. An analysis of this aggregate data set provides statistics on infection rates for
different types of malicious code.
Malicious code database
in addition to infection data, Symantec Security response analyzes and documents attributes for each
new form of malicious code that emerges both in the wild and in a “zoo” (or controlled laboratory)
environment. Descriptive records of new forms of malicious code are then entered into a database for
future reference. For this report, a historical trend analysis was performed on this database to identify,
assess, and discuss any possible trends, such as the use of different infection vectors and the frequency
of various types of payloads. in some cases, Symantec antivirus products may initially detect new malicious code heuristically or by
generic signatures. these may later be reclassified and given unique detections. Because of this, there
may be slight variance in the presentation of the same data set from one volume of the Symantec Internet
Security Threat Report to the next.
93Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Geographic location of malicious code instances
Several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic locations of systems to ip
addresses are used along with proprietary Symantec technology to determine the location of computers
reporting malicious code instances. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin
of error. the data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of malicious code instances.
Percentage of malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities
Symantec maintains a malicious code database to analyze and document individual instances of malicious code. this database contains 8,000 distinct entries, with the earliest discovery dating back to 1998.
the database includes metadata for classifying malicious code by type, discovery date, and by threat
profile, in addition to providing mitigating factors and manual removal steps. Where applicable, this
database includes correlations between malicious code instances and vulnerabilities from the Symantec vulnerability database. this capability was used as a basis for the data in this metric. Symantec examined
the means by which the malicious code propagated, and counted those that propagate by exploiting
vulnerabilities.
94Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Appendix E—Phishing and Spam Methodology
phishing and spam attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec
probe network and from Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam data.
the Symantec probe network is a system of over two million decoy accounts that attract email messages
from 20 different countries around the world. it encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises
and attracts email samples that are representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 million
mailboxes. the probe network covers countries in the Americas, europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia/Oceania.
the Symantec probe network data is used to track the growth in new phishing activity. it should be noted
that different monitoring organizations use different methods to track phishing attempts. Some groups
may identify and count unique phishing messages based solely on specific content items such as subject headers or U rLs. these varied methods can often lead to differences in the number of phishing attempts
reported by different organizations.
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam data is also used to gauge the growth in phishing attempts as well as the percentage of internet mail determined to be phishing attempts. Data returned includes messages
processed, messages filtered, and filter-specific data.
Symantec has classified different filters so that spam statistics and phishing statistics can be determined
separately. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data includes data reported back from customer
installations providing feedback from antispam filters as well as overall mail volume being processed. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam only gathers data at the SM tp layer and not the network layer, where
DnS block lists typically operate because SM tp-layer spam filtering is more accurate than network-layer
filtering and is able to block spam missed at the network layer. network layer-filtering takes place before
email reaches the enterprise mail server. As a result, data from the SM tp layer is a more accurate
reflection of the impact of spam on the mail server itself.
Due to the numerous variables influencing a company’s spam activity, Symantec focuses on identifying
spam activity and growth projections with Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data from enterprise customer installations having more than 1,000 total messages per day. this normalization yields a more
accurate summary of internet spam trends by ruling out problematic and laboratory test servers that
produce smaller sample sets.
this section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to produce the data and statistics in
this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, the
following investigations warrant additional detail.
95Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Phishing
Phishing activity by sector
the Symantec phish report network ( prn) is an extensive antifraud community whose members
contribute and receive fraudulent Web site addresses for alerting and filtering across a broad range of
solutions. these sites are categorized according to the brand being phished and its sector. prn members
and contributors send in phishing attacks from many different sources. this includes a client detection
network that detects phishing Web sites as the clients visit various Web sites on the internet. it also
includes server detection from spam emails. the sender confirms all spoofed Web sites before sending the
address of the Web site into the prn . After it is received by the prn , Symantec spoof detection technology
is used to verify that the Web site is a spoof site. research analysts manage the prn console 24 hours
a day, 365 days of the year, and manually review all spoof sites sent into the prn to eliminate false
positives.
Top countries hosting phishing Web sites
the data for this section is determined by gathering links in phishing email messages and cross-
referencing the addresses with several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic
locations of systems to ip addresses. in this case, Symantec counts phishing Web sites as the number of
unique ip addresses hosting Web pages used for phishing. While these databases are generally reliable,
there is a small margin of error. the data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of
phishing Web sites.
Phishing site top-level domains
the data for this section is determined by deriving the top-level domains of each distinct phishing Web
site U rL. the resulting top-level domains are tabulated and compared proportionately.
Automated phishing toolkitsthe data in this section is derived from U rLs gathered by the Symantec prn . the U rLs are sorted and
grouped according to specific patterns indicating they were generated by an automated script or phishing
kit. each phishing kit generates U rLs with a distinct signature and can be grouped according to these
distinguishing characteristics. the monthly total of each group of U rLs indicates the level of use of each
automated phishing kit.
96Symantec Global internet Security threat report
Spam
Top countries of spam origin
the data for this section is determined by calculating the frequency of originating server ip addresses
in email messages that trigger antispam filters in the field. the ip addresses are mapped to their host
country of origin and the data is summarized by country based on monthly totals. the percentage of spam
per country is calculated from the total spam detected in the field.
it should be noted that the location of the computer from which spam is detected being sent is not
necessarily the location of the spammer. Spammers can build networks of compromised computers
globally and thereby use computers that are geographically separate from their location.
97Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec
Corporation.
nO WArrAnty . the technical information is being delivered to you as is and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its accuracy or use. Any use of the
technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user. Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical
errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice.
|
S yM An t e C e n t e r p r i Se SeC Ur i t ySymantec Government Internet
Security Threat Report
trends for July–December 07
Volume Xiii, published April 2008Dean Turner
executive editor
Director, Global intelligence network
Symantec Security response
Marc Fossi
Manager, DevelopmentSymantec Security response
Eric Johnsoneditor
Symantec Security response
Trevor MackAssociate editor
Symantec Security response
Joseph Blackbirdthreat Analyst
Symantec Security response
Stephen Entwisle
threat Analyst
Symantec Security response
Mo King Low
threat Analyst
Symantec Security response
David McKinney
threat Analyst
Symantec Security response
Candid Wueest
Analyst
Symantec Security responseOverview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Highlights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Attack Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Malicious Code Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Phishing Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Spam Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
Appendix C—Malicious Code Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
Appendix D— Phishing and Spam Trends Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65ContentsVolume Xiii, published April 2008
Symantec Government Internet
Security Threat ReportSymantec Government internet Security threat report
Overview
the Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report provides a six-month summary and analysis
of trends in attacks, vulnerabilities, malicious code, phishing, and spam as they pertain to organizations
in government and critical infrastructure sectors. Where possible, it will also include an overview of
legislative efforts to combat these activities.
Over the past several reporting periods, Symantec has observed a shift in the threat landscape in
which attackers have increasingly moved away from nuisance and destructive attacks towards targets
and methods that are driven by financial motives. today’s attackers are increasingly sophisticated,
determined, and organized, and have begun to adopt methods that are similar to traditional software
development and business practices.
the previous volume of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report observed that global, decentralized
networks of malicious activity were continuing to rise and that, increasingly, regional threat patterns
were beginning to emerge. today, the threat landscape is arguably more dynamic than ever. As security
measures are developed and implemented to protect the data of end users and organizations, attackers
are rapidly adapting new techniques and strategies to circumvent them. As a result, the identification,
analysis, and trending of these techniques and strategies must also evolve.
the Government Internet Security Threat Report will provide an analysis of attack activity that Symantec
observed between July 1 and December 31, 2007 that targets or affects services, organizations, and/or
industries of concern to government organizations around the world. For the purposes of this discussion,
these government organizations include national, state/provincial, and municipal governments.
Furthermore, this discussion will incorporate data and discussion that is relevant to threat activity that
affects critical infrastructure industries that support or affect government and military institutions,
which include: • Aerospace
• Agriculture
• Biotech/pharmaceutical
• Financial services
• Health care
• internet service providers
• Manufacturing
• telecommunications
• transportation
• Utilities and energy
4Symantec Government internet Security threat report
5Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of internet threat data in the
world. the Symantec™ Global intelligence network encompasses worldwide security intelligence data
gathered from a wide range of sources, including more than 40,000 sensors monitoring networks in
over 180 countries through Symantec products and services such as Symantec DeepSight™ threat
Management System and Symantec™ Managed Security Services, and from other third-party sources.
Symantec gathers malicious code reports from over 120 million client, server, and gateway systems
that have deployed its antivirus product, and also maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive
vulnerability databases, currently consisting of over 25,000 recorded vulnerabilities (spanning more
than two decades) affecting more than 55,000 technologies from over 8,000 vendors. Symantec also operates the Bug traq™ mailing list, one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion
of vulnerabilities on the internet, which has approximately 50,000 direct subscribers who contribute,
receive, and discuss vulnerability research on a daily basis.
As well, the Symantec probe network, a system of over two million decoy accounts in more than
30 countries, attracts email from around the world to gauge global spam and phishing activity. Symantec
also gathers phishing information through the Symantec phish report network, an extensive antifraud
community of enterprises and consumers whose members contribute and receive fraudulent Web site
addresses for alerting and filtering across a broad range of solutions.
these resources give Symantec’s analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze,
and provide informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and
spam. the Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report gives government organizations essential
information to effectively secure their systems now and into the future.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
6Highlights
this section provides highlights of the security trends that Symantec observed during this period based
on the data gathered from the sources listed above. Selected metrics will be discussed in greater depth
in their respective sections following these highlights.
Attack Trends Highlights
• During this reporting period, the United States accounted for 31 percent of all malicious activity,
an increase from 30 percent in the first half of 2007.
• the United States was the top country of attack origin in the second half of 2007, accounting for
24 percent of worldwide activity, a decrease from 25 percent in the first half of 2007.
• telecommunications was the top critical infrastructure sector for malicious activity in the last half
of 2007, accounting for 95 percent of the total. this was an increase from 90 percent in the first
half of 2007.
• the education sector accounted for 24 percent of data breaches that could lead to identity theft
during this period, more than any other sector. this was a decrease from the previous reporting
period, when it accounted for 30 percent of the total.
• Government was the top sector for identities exposed, accounting for 60 percent of the total, a
significant increase from 12 percent in the first half of 2007.
• theft or loss of computer or other data-storage medium was the cause of the most data breaches
that could lead to identity theft during this reporting period, accounting for 57 percent of the total.
it accounted for 61 percent of the identities exposed in the second half of 2007, more than any
other sector.
• the United States was the top country for hosting underground economy servers, accounting for
58 percent of the total identified by Symantec, a decrease from the first half of 2007, when it
accounted for 64 percent of the total.
• Bank accounts were the most commonly advertised item for sale on underground economy servers
known to Symantec, accounting for 22 percent of all items, an increase from the first half of 2007,
when they made up 21 percent.
• Symantec observed an average of 61,940 active bot-infected computers per day in the second half of
2007, an increase of 17 percent from the previous period.
• the average lifespan of a bot-infected computer during the last six months of 2007 was four days,
unchanged from the first half of 2007.
• the United States had the most bot-infected computers, accounting for 14 percent of the worldwide
total, a slight increase from 13 percent in first half of 2007.
• Madrid was the city with the most bot-infected computers, accounting for three percent of the
worldwide total.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
• in the last six months of 2007, Symantec identified 4,091 bot command-and-control servers. this is an
11 percent decrease from the previous reporting period, when 4,622 bot command-and-control servers
were identified. Of these, 45 percent were located in the United States, more than any other country.
• the United States was the country most frequently targeted by denial-of-service attacks, accounting for
56 percent of the worldwide total. this is a decrease from 61 percent reported in the first half of 2007.
• the top country of origin for attacks targeting the government sector was the United States, which
accounted for 21 percent of the total. this was an increase from the first half of 2007 when the United
States accounted for 19 percent of the total.
• Denial-of-service attacks were the most common attack type targeting government and critical
infrastructure organizations, accounting for 46 percent of the top 10 attacks. this is a decrease
from the first half of 2007, when denial-of-service attacks accounted for 35 percent of the top 10
and ranked second.
Malicious Code Trends Highlights
• in the second half of 2007, 499,811 new malicious code threats were reported to Symantec, a
136 percent increase over the first half of 2007.
• Of the top 10 new malicious code families detected in the last six months of 2007, five were trojans, two
were worms, two were worms with a back door component, and one was a worm with a virus component.
• During the second half of 2007, trojans made up 71 percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code
samples, a decrease from 73 percent in the first six months of 2007.
• Forty-three percent of worms originated in the europe, Middle east, and Africa ( eMeA) region.
• north America accounted for 46 percent of trojans for this period.
• threats to confidential information made up 68 percent of the volume of the top 50 potential malicious
code infections reported to Symantec.
• Of all confidential information threats detected this period, 76 percent had a keystroke logging
component and 86 percent had remote access capabilities, a decrease for each from 88 percent in
the previous period.
• Forty percent of malicious code that propagated did so through executable file sharing, a significant
increase from 14 percent in the first half of 2007, making this the most commonly used propagation
mechanism during this period.
• Seven percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code samples modified Web pages this period,
up from three percent in the previous period.
• During the second half of 2007, 10 percent of the 1,032 documented malicious code samples exploited vulnerabilities. this is lower than the 18 percent proportion of the 1,509 malicious code instances
documented in the first half of 2007.
7Symantec Government internet Security threat report
• Seven of the top 10 staged downloaders this period were trojans, two were worms, and one was
a worm with a viral infection component.
• Of the top 10 downloaded components for this period, eight were trojans and two were back doors.
• Malicious code that targets online games made up eight percent of the volume of the top 50 potential
malicious code infections, up from five percent in the previous period.
Phishing Trends Highlights
• the Symantec probe network detected a total of 207,547 unique phishing messages, a five percent
increase over the first six months of 2007. this equates to an average of 1,134 unique phishing
messages per day for the second half of 2007.
• eighty percent of all unique brands used in phishing attacks were in the financial sector, compared
to 79 percent in the previous period. One percent of phishing attacks spoofed the government sector
this period.
• During this period, 66 percent of all phishing Web sites spoofed financial services brands, down from
72 percent in the first half of 2007.
• in the second half of 2007, 66 percent of all phishing Web sites identified by Symantec were located
in the United States. two social networking sites together were the target of 91 percent of phishing
attacks for Web sites hosted in the United States.
• the most common top-level domain used in phishing Web sites for this period was .com, accounting for
44 percent; the second most common top-level domain used by phishing Web sites was .cn, accounting
for 23 percent.
• the most common government top-level domain used in phishing Web sites for this period was
gov.br, which was used by Web sites that are registered to the government of Brazil, with 19 percent
of the total.
• Symantec observed 87,963 phishing hosts worldwide this period, an increase of 167 percent from the
32,939 observed in the first half of the year.
• Sixty-three percent of all phishing hosts identified were in the United States, a much higher proportion
than any other country.
• three phishing toolkits were responsible for 26 percent of all phishing attacks observed by Symantec
in the second half of 2007.
8Symantec Government internet Security threat report
Spam Highlights
• Between July 1 and December 31, 2007, spam made up 71 percent of all email traffic monitored
at the gateway, a 16 percent increase over the first six months of 2007, when 61 percent of email
was classified as spam.
• eighty percent of all spam detected during this period was composed in english, up from 60 percent
in the previous reporting period.
• in the second half of 2007, 0.16 percent of all spam email contained malicious code, compared to
0.43 percent of spam that contained malicious code in the first half of 2007. this means that one out
of every 617 spam messages blocked by Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam™ contained malicious code.
• Spam related to commercial products made up 27 percent of all spam during this period, the most of
any category and an increase from 22 percent in the previous period.
• During the last six months of 2007, 42 percent of all spam detected worldwide originated in the United
States, compared to 50 percent in the previous period.
• the United States hosted the most spam zombies of any country, with 10 percent of the worldwide total,
representing no change from the first six months of 2007.
• in the second half of 2007, the daily average percentage of spam that was image spam was seven
percent. this is down from a daily average of 27 percent during the first six months of 2007.
9Symantec Government internet Security threat report
Attack Trends
this section of the Government Internet Security Threat Report will provide an analysis of attack activity,
data breaches that could lead to identity theft, and the advertisement and trade of stolen information
and services on underground economy servers that Symantec observed between July 1 and December 31,
2007. the malicious activity discussed in this section includes not only attack activity, but also phishing
Web site hosts, malicious code, spam zombies, and command-and-control server activity. Attacks are
defined as any malicious activity carried out over a network that has been detected by an intrusion detection system ( iDS) or firewall. Definitions for the other types of malicious activity can be found in
their respective sections of this report.
this section will discuss the following metrics in greater depth, providing analysis and discussion of the
trends indicated by the data:• Malicious activity by country
• Malicious activity by critical infrastructure sectors
• top countries of origin for government-targeted attacks
• Attacks by type—notable critical infrastructure sectors
• Data breaches that could lead to identity theft
• Underground economy servers
• Bot-infected computers
• Bot command-and-control servers
• Attacks—protection and mitigation
Malicious activity by country
this metric will assess the countries in which the largest amount of malicious activity takes place or
originates. to determine this, Symantec has compiled geographic data on numerous malicious activities,
namely: bot-infected computers, bot command-and-control servers, phishing Web site hosts, malicious
code reports, spam zombies, and internet attack origins. the rankings are determined by calculating the
mean average of the proportion of these malicious activities that originated in each country.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2007, the United States was the top country for malicious activity, making up 31 percent of worldwide malicious activity (table 1). this represents a small change from
the first half of 2007, when the United States was also first, with 30 percent. For each of the malicious
activities in this metric, the United States ranked first by a large margin.
10Symantec Government internet Security threat report
1 http://www.point-topic.com
2 http://www.point-topic.com
3 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21268635/
11Current
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
2
3
4
7
5
6
8
12
9Country
United States
China
Germany
United Kingdom
Spain
France
Canada
Italy
Brazi l
South KoreaCurrent
Percentage
31%
7%
7%
4%
4%
4%
3%
3%
3%
2%Previous
Percentage
30%
10%
7%
4%
3%
4%
4%
3%
2%
3%Malicious
Code
Rank
1
2
7
3
9
11
4
10
21
14Spam
Zombies
Rank
1
4
2
12
9
7
35
6
3
13Command-
and-Control
Server Rank
1
5
2
6
19
13
3
10
7
4Phishing
Web
Sites
Host
Rank
1
2
3
7
15
6
5
11
13
9Bot
Rank
1
3
2
9
4
8
13
5
6
15Attack
Origin
Rank
1
2
3
5
4
6
7
8
9
10
TableXX_MalicousCountry_v4. epsTable 1. Malicious activity by country
Source: Symantec Corporation
Malicious activity usually affects computers that are connected to high-speed broadband internet.
Broadband connections provide larger bandwidth capacities than other connection types, and the
connections are frequently continuous. the United States has the most established broadband
infrastructure in the world: 94 percent of U.S. households have access to broadband connectivity.
Furthermore, the 65.5 million broadband subscribers there represent over 20 percent of the world’s total,
the most of any country. As a result, it is not surprising that the U.S. is the site of the most malicious
activity in the world.1
China had the second highest amount of worldwide malicious activity during the last six months of 2007,
accounting for seven percent, a decrease from 10 percent in the previous reporting period. China ranked
high in most of the contributing criteria, which is not surprising since China has the second highest number
of broadband subscribers in the world, with 19 percent of the worldwide broadband total.2
the main reason for China’s percentage decrease was the large drop in bot-infected computers there in
the second half of 2007. China dropped to third for bot-infected computers in the second half of 2007,
with eight percent, a large decrease from the first half of 2007, when it had 29 percent and ranked first. this decrease is attributable to a significant reduction in the availability of many Web sites, forums, and
blogs in China for several months during this period.3 Dynamic sites such as forums and blogs are prime
targets for attackers using bots to propagate and host malicious content. Symantec believes that, because
of their scalability, bots are responsible for much of the malicious attack activity that is observed, and any serious reduction in the number of bots should result in a corresponding drop in total attack activity. this
is also supported by the decrease in China of spam zombies, which are often associated with bot-infected
computers. China dropped from third in spam zombies in the first half of 2007, with nine percent of the
worldwide total, to fourth and six percent in the second half of 2007. Symantec Government internet Security threat report
Another possible reason for the change in malicious activity originating in China this period was that
China ranked second for hosting phishing Web sites, accounting for four percent of the worldwide total.
this was a large increase from the previous reporting period, when it ranked eighteenth with one percent
of the total. One possible cause for the increase may be the recent rise in phishing scams and fraudulent
Web sites attempting to exploit the popularity of the upcoming 2008 Beijing Olympics.4 Such activities will
likely continue in the lead-up to the August 8, 2008 Olympics start date.
Furthermore, the increase may have been influenced by the shutdown of the russian Business network
(rBn) in november 2007 and its subsequent emergence in China, which may have a less well-established
security infrastructure or security laws than russia.5 russia dropped in rank for hosting phishing Web
sites, from fifth in the previous period to eighth in this period. the rBn reputedly specializes in the
distribution of malicious code, hosting malicious Web sites, and other malicious activities, including the
development and sale of the M pack toolkit. the rBn has been credited for creating approximately half of
the phishing incidents that occurred worldwide last year, and hosts Web sites that are responsible for a large amount of the world’s internet crime.
6
in the last six months of 2007, Germany again ranked third, with seven percent of all internet-wide
malicious activity, the same percentage as in the first half of 2007. As with the previous reporting period,
Germany ranked high in spam zombies, command-and-control servers, hosting phishing Web sites, and bot-infected computers. Factors that influence its high rank include a well-established internet
infrastructure and a high number of broadband subscribers, as Germany ranks in the top five countries
for broadband subscribers in the world, with six percent of the total.7
it is reasonable to expect that the United States, Germany, and China will continue to rank as the top
three countries for the highest amount of malicious activity since they also added the greatest number
of broadband subscribers over the course of 2007: the United States added 4.2 million broadband
subscribers, China added 6.8 million, and Germany added 2.4 million.8
On a global scale, the distribution of malicious activity seems to be relatively static, with the countries listed in the top 20 remaining unchanged from the first half of 2007. this follows a trend first noted in the
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report Volume X ii that a country that is established as a frequent source
of malicious activity tends to remain so.9 this is likely to remain the case until more effective measures—
such as increased filtering for malicious activity, securely-coded applications, and more education for
end users—are taken to reduce the amount of originating malicious activity. Also, increased cooperation
between government agencies, private sector iSps and vendors, and law enforcement may help reduce
the amount of malicious activity in countries.
Having a higher proportion of malicious activity indicates that each computer in the country is more likely
to be involved with some form of attack activity. Symantec has observed previously that computers often
target computers within their own region or country.10 As a result, countries with higher proportions of
malicious activity are more likely to suffer the effects of such malicious activity. this includes computers
in the government sector, as well as other sectors that make up critical infrastructure.
4 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/11/scam_related_to_the_2008_beiji.html and
http://www.chinaeconomicreview.com/it/2007/10/10/man-convicted-of-fraud-for-phony-olympics-web-site/
5 http://www.scmagazineus.com/ is-this-the-end-of-the- russian-Business- network/article/96289/ and
http://www.pcworld.com/article/id,139465-page,1-c,privacysecurity/article.htm l
6 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/12/A r2007101202461_pf.html
7 http://www.point-topic.com
8 http://www.point-topic.com
9 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_09_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 31
10 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_gov_09_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 10
12Symantec Government internet Security threat report
Furthermore, as discussed in the “Underground economy servers” metric, Symantec has observed that
attackers may be more motivated by profit from their activities. Many malicious activities reported in this
metric can be made profitable using the sensitive personal, financial, and proprietary information often
gained from these attacks. As a result, attacks and malicious activity are likely to remain prominent within
a country as long as they remain profitable.
Malicious activity by critical infrastructure sectors
this metric will evaluate the amount of malicious activity originating from computers and networks that
are known to belong to government and critical infrastructure sectors. Symantec cross-references the ip
addresses of known malicious computers with Standard industrial Classification (S iC) codes11 assigned
to each industry and provided by a third-party service.12 Symantec has compiled data on numerous
malicious activities that were detected originating from the ip address space of these organizations. these
activities include: bot-infected computers, hosting phishing Web sites, spam zombies, and attack origins.
this metric is significant because it indicates the level to which government and critical infrastructure
organizations may have been compromised and are being used by attackers as launching pads for
malicious activity. these attacks could potentially expose sensitive information, which could have serious
ramifications for government and critical infrastructure organizations. Such information could be used for
strategic purposes in the case of state- or group-sponsored attacks, especially since attackers who use
compromised computers for malicious activity can mask their actual location. For instance, it was recently
reported that each month approximately 500,000 attacks are attempted against Kazakhstan’s state
information networks.13
in the last six months of 2007, 95 percent of all malicious activity originating from critical infrastructure
sectors originated from telecommunications organizations (table 2). this was an increase from the first
half of 2007 when telecommunications accounted for 90 percent of the total. For each of the malicious
activities in this metric, telecommunications ranked first by a significant margin.
Current
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
2
3
4
7
6
5
10
9
11Sector
Telecommunications
Manufacturing
Financial services
Health care
Transportation
Utilities/energy
Military
Agriculture
Biotech/pharmaceutical
Law enforcementCurrent
Percentage
95%
2%
1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%Previous
Percentage
90%
7%
1%
1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
Table03_GovMaliciousCIS_v1. epsTable 2. Malicious activity by critical infrastructure sector
Source: Symantec Corporation
11 SiC codes are the standard industry codes that are used by the United States Securities and exchange Commission to identify organizations belonging to
each industry. For more, on this, please see http://www.sec.gov
12 http://www.digitalenvoy.net
13 http://www.crime-research.org/analytics/Cybercrimes3078/
13Symantec Government internet Security threat report
there are several reasons why attackers may target computers in the telecommunications sector.
these organizations, which include iSps and Web hosting companies, are likely to have a large number
of internet-facing computers. For example, call centers often use a large number of computers to
interact with customers; the challenges of managing such computers may contribute to the extremely
high proportion of malicious activity originating from this sector. As a consequence, computers in
telecommunications organizations likely represent fertile targets for attackers.
Attackers may also view telecommunications organizations as excellent platforms for launching
subsequent attacks, as organizations within this sector are likely to have high-bandwidth and high-
traffic networks. this would enable an attacker to carry out large attacks, such as denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks, or other malicious activity, such as spam hosting. this is illustrated by the high percentage of
spam zombies found in the telecommunications sector. High-bandwidth capacity networks may also
allow an attacker to hide attack and bot traffic more effectively.
During the current reporting period, 94 percent of attacks and 96 percent of bot-infected computers
were situated on the networks of telecommunications organizations. Also, Symantec observed that
73 percent of attacks against the telecommunications sector were shellcode exploits,14 which may
indicate that attackers are attempting to take control of computers in this sector and use them to
conduct malicious activity.
Since telecommunications organizations typically control the flow of data through networks, attackers may compromise strategically located computers inside organizations within the industry. this is
important as government organizations, such as the military, are reliant on the telecommunications
sector for their day-to-day communications and command-and-control systems. Computers within
telecommunications organizations may effectively serve as platforms from which to launch attacks
against organizations served by telecommunications firms because they provide communications
for other sectors as well, including government. As such, attackers who are seeking confidential or
sensitive information may specifically target this sector. Successful compromise of computers in the
telecommunications sector could allow an attacker to eavesdrop on or disrupt key communications in
other sectors.
Finally, attackers using compromised computers within telecommunications organizations could deny
access to confidential communications by authorized personnel, allowing the attacker to impose his or her own command, control, and communication processes on the compromised systems. this could result in
the loss of situational awareness. Were such an attack to be state- or group-sponsored, access to critical
infrastructures could be used to disable key services as a prelude to a larger event or attack.
the manufacturing sector was the origin of the second highest amount of malicious activity during
the last half of 2007, accounting for two percent of the total. this was a decrease from the first half of
2007, when it accounted for seven percent of the total. the manufacturing sector is highly competitive,
with organizations investing large amounts of time and money into research and development into new
methods and products, as well as using the internet to sell their products online. the importance of
implementing effective security measures to prevent industrial espionage and data leakage has become
a major issue with many organizations in this sector as these issues can result in the loss of intellectual
property, resulting in financial loss.
14 Shellcode is a small piece of code used as the payload in the exploitation of a vulnerability.
14Symantec Government internet Security threat report
the main reason for the drop in percentage was the large decrease in phishing Web sites hosted, from
22 percent in the first half of 2007 to four percent in this reporting period. this decrease is due to the
proportional increase in phishing Web sites hosts in the telecommunications sector, which rose from
77 percent in the first half of 2007 to 90 percent in the second half of 2007. Because attackers can more
easily hide their traffic in larger bandwidths, they may be targeting the higher number of servers in the
telecommunications sector.
the financial services sector ranked third for malicious activity within critical infrastructure sectors,
accounting for one percent of the total detected during this period. Financial services also ranked third in
the first half of 2007, also with one percent of malicious activity.
Computers in the financial services sector may represent a lucrative opportunity for attackers with profit
motives. this sector increased in phishing Web sites hosts from one percent in the first half of 2007 to
three percent in the second half of 2007. Attackers are likely using financial services servers to host
phishing Web sites because this adds legitimacy to their phishing sites and can more easily fool consumers.
Top countries of origin for government-targeted attacks
Attacks targeting governments are largely driven by criminal intent and political motivation. Governments
store considerable amounts of personal identification data that could be used for fraudulent purposes,
such as identity theft, which could be exploited for profit (as discussed in “Data breaches that could lead to
identity theft” section, in this report). Government databases also store sensitive information that
could facilitate politically motivated attacks, including critical infrastructure information, sensitive
but unclassified information, or other intelligence.
Attacks targeting government organizations may serve as a means of expressing disagreement with policies and programs that the government has developed and implemented. these attacks may
result in the disruption of critical services, as with DoS attacks, or the exposure of highly sensitive
information. An attack that disrupts the availability of a high-profile government organization Web
site, such as the DoS attacks on estonia in 2007,15 will get much wider notice than one that takes a
single user offline. in addition, attacks may also be motivated by espionage and attempts to steal
government classified information.
in the second half of 2007, the top country of origin for attacks that targeted the government sector was
the United States, which accounted for 21 percent of the total (table 3), an increase from 19 percent in
the first half of 2007. the percentage of attacks against government organizations that originated in the
United States was lower than the number of internet-wide attacks originating there, which accounted for
24 percent of the total in the last half of 2007. this may indicate that attacks originating from within the
United States were not specifically targeting the government sector.
15 http://www.infoworld.com/article/08/01/24/Student-fined-for-attack-against- estonian-Web-site_1.html
15Symantec Government internet Security threat report
Current
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
2
6
13
3
4
5
7
8
12Country/Region
United States
Spain
China
South Korea
France
Germany
Italy
United Kingdom
Canada
TaiwanCurrent
Percentage
21%
11%
8%
7%
7%
7%
6%
4%
4%
3%Previous
Percentage
19%
14%
6%
2%
10%
9%
7%
4%
3%
2%
Table04_Gov AttackOrigin_v1. epsTable 3. Top countries/regions of origin for government-targeted attacks
Source: Symantec Corporation
Spain accounted for 11 percent of attacks targeting government in the last half of 2007, a decrease
from 14 percent in the first half of 2007. this percentage was five points higher than the percentage of
worldwide attacks originating there. this indicates that a large number of attacks originating in Spain
are targeting the government sector.
there are a number of factors that likely contribute to this. Spain ranked high in bot-infected computers
and originating attacks worldwide, which may indicate politically motivated attacks against government
organizations. Such attacks are likely to be carried out for a variety of reasons, including blocking
access to government internet-based resources, gaining access to potentially sensitive information, and
discrediting the government itself.
in the case of Spain, the current political climate there may contribute to the high number of attacks
targeting the government. Spain is conducting general elections in March 2008, and there have been
protests against the current government, which is seeking re-election. the protests have been from
groups who are in favor of traditional family views and are against controversial legislation introduced by
the current government.16 Many young voters are also dissatisfied with low wages and job opportunities
available in the country.17
Also, ongoing government negotiations with the Basque separatist organization, euskadi ta Askatasuna
(etA), have met with widespread opposition among the population in Spain, who accuse the government
of easing up on etA.18 Supporters of etA have held demonstrations protesting judicial orders to dissolve
a Basque-affiliated political wing as well as the government’s ban of Basque political parties from the
federal government.19 these political issues may contribute to the motivation of attackers targeting
Spanish government organizations.
China accounted for eight percent of attacks targeting government organizations, which is two percent less than the ten percent of worldwide attacks that originate there. the small difference indicates that
attacks originating from China are not specifically targeting government organizations in China, but are
part of worldwide attacks in general.
16 http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/12/31/2129362.htm
17 http://www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2007/12/30/europe/OUKWD-UK-S pAin-CAtHOL iCS.php
18 http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/09/world/europe/09eta.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
19 http://www.haaba.com/news/2008/01/26/7-81815/thousands-protest-ruling-against-basque-politicians-tv.html
16Symantec Government internet Security threat report
China’s increase in rank to third for this period from sixth in the previous period may be attributable
to attacks originating in China that were reputed to be specifically targeting foreign governments,
including the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany and France. Chinese hackers are suspected
of compromising the servers of high-security government networks, such as the pentagon in the United
States, the office of the Chancellor of Germany, and French government systems.20,21,22,23
Attacks by type—notable critical infrastructure sectors
this section of the Government Internet Security Threat Report will focus on the types of attacks detected
by sensors deployed in notable critical infrastructure sectors. the ability to identify attacks by type assists
security administrators in evaluating which assets may be targeted. in doing so, this may assist security
administrators in securing those assets receiving a disproportionate number of attacks. the following
sectors will be discussed in detail:
• Government and critical infrastructure organizations
• Government
• Biotech/pharmaceutical
• Health care
• Financial services
• transportation
Government and critical infrastructure organizations
Government and critical infrastructure organizations are the target of a wide variety of attack types. the
most common attack type seen by all sensors in the government and critical infrastructure sectors in the
last six months of 2007 was DoS attacks, which accounted for 46 percent of the top 10 attacks (figure 1).Government – Fig1_v1
03-24-08
Backscatter 12 %
DoS 46%SMTP (email) 38%
Shellcode /exploit 5%
Figure 1. Top attack types, government and critical infrastructure24
Source: Symantec Corporation
20 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/9dba9ba2-5a3b-11dc-9bcd-0000779fd2ac.html?nclick_check=1
21 http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/news/2198370/france-joins-chinese-hacking
22 http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/577
23 http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/588
24 Due to rounding, percentages may not add up to 100 percent.
17Symantec Government internet Security threat report
25 http://www.wired.com/politics/security/magazine/15-09/ff_estonia?current page=all
26 Due to rounding, percentages may not add up to 100 percent.
18DoS attacks are a threat to government and critical infrastructures, since the purpose of such attacks is
to disrupt the availability of high-profile Web sites or other network services and make them inaccessible
to users and employees. this could result in the disruption of internal and external communications,
making it practically impossible for employees and users to access potentially critical information. Since
these attacks often get wider exposure than those that take a single user offline, they could also result
in damage to the organization’s reputation. A successful DoS attack on a government network could also
severely undermine confidence in government competence, and impair the defense and protection of
government networks.
DoS attacks are often associated with protests, since they are intended to render a site inaccessible in
the same way that a physical protest attempts to block access to a service or location. As such, the high
percentage of DoS attacks may be an attempt to express disagreement with policies developed and implemented by the targeted organization. One example is the DoS attacks reported in estonia in May
2007, which took down a range of Web sites for several weeks, including that of the prime Minister. the
attacks were preceded by protests and riots in the capital in April.25
Top attacks by type—government sector
Backscatter was the most common type of attack observed by sensors deployed in the government sector in the last half of 2007 (figure 2). these attacks made up 75 percent of the attacks observed by
government sensors, compared to 12 percent for all government and critical infrastructure sectors.Government – Fig2_v1
03-24-08
Shellcode /exploit 19 %
DNS 1%
Backscatter 75 %Web (server) 3%
SMTP (email) 1%DoS 2%
Figure 2. Top attack types, government sector26
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Government internet Security threat report
Backscatter, while not a direct attack, is evidence that a DoS attack against another server on the internet
is taking place and is making use of spoofed ip addresses. When one of these spoofed ip addresses
matches the address of a Symantec sensor, any error messages that the attacked server sends to the
spoofed address will be detected by a Symantec sensor as backscatter.
Generally, backscatter is considered to be a type of internet background noise,27 which is typically ignored.
However, the percentage of backscatter detected by government sensors is significantly higher than the
average detected across all government and critical infrastructure sectors. this may be caused by several
factors.
One possible explanation is that stronger policies and procedures are in place to prevent attacks before reaching the network. if potentially malicious traffic is blocked before reaching the network boundary while
background noise is ignored, sensors will see a higher percentage of background noise than potentially
malicious traffic.
Another possible explanation for the high percentage of backscatter detected by government sensors may be that attackers launching DoS attacks may be spoofing the ip addresses of government organizations.
this may be done to trick the targeted organization into thinking it is being attacked by a government.
Top attacks by type—biotech/pharmaceutical sector
in the last six months of 2007, the most common attack type detected by sensors deployed in the biotech/
pharmaceutical sector was SM tp-based attacks, which accounted for 80 percent of all attacks on this
sector (figure 3). this is higher than the 38 percent of these attacks that were detected across government
and critical infrastructure sectors as a whole during this period, which may indicate that these types of
attacks are specifically targeting the biotech/pharmaceutical sector.Government – Fig3_v1
03-24-08
Backscatter 1%
SMTP (email) 80%DoS 19%
Figure 3. Top attack types, biotech/pharmaceutical sector
Source: Symantec Corporation
27 For more information on internet background noise, see http://www.switch.ch/security/services/ iBn/
19Symantec Government internet Security threat report
28 Due to rounding, percentages may not add up to 100 percent.
20Simple Mail transfer protocol (SM tp) is designed to facilitate the delivery of email messages across
the internet. email servers are likely targeted because external access is required to deliver email. While
most services can be blocked to protect against external attack and allow access only to trusted users
and entities, for email to function effectively it has to be available both internally and externally. the
necessity of allowing both internal and external access increases an attackers’ chances of gaining access
to the network.
these attacks on biotech/pharmaceutical sectors are likely due to spammers who are attempting to spoof
legitimate companies to sell illegitimate pharmaceutical products. if attackers can successfully send email
through compromised servers of a known and trusted brand in the biotech/pharmaceutical sector, the
chances of that email being considered valid are greatly enhanced. in turn, this could have a negative effect
on the reputation of the targeted company.
Additionally, attackers who are able to compromise email servers can use them to send spam and harvest email addresses for targeted phishing attacks. in some instances, they could also disrupt email service,
since sending spam results in unauthorized consumption of network bandwidth. Successful SM tp attacks
against government organizations could also allow attackers to spoof official government communications.
Because governments and critical information industries rely on email as a communication method, it
is essential that email traffic is secured. Symantec recommends the use of secure email protocols, the
deployment of antispam and antifraud solutions, and ensuring that operating and email solutions are fully
patched against all known vulnerabilities.
Top attacks by type—health care sector
SMtp-based attacks were the most common attacks detected by sensors deployed in the health care sector
in the last six months of 2007, accounting for 42 percent of the attacks against the sector (figure 4). Government – Fig4_v1
03-24-08
Web (browser) 3%
SMTP (email) 42%Shellcod e/exploit 31 %DoS 19%
Web (server) 6%
Figure 4. Top attack types, health care sector28
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec Government internet Security threat report
Similar to the biotech/pharmaceutical sector, it is likely that these attacks against the health care
sector may be from spammers trying to compromise email servers to sell unlawful health care services
and products. Malicious attackers may be able to use SM tp-based attacks to distribute confidential,
misleading, or false information that could put patients and providers at risk.
Top attacks by type—financial services sector
SMtp-based attacks were the most frequent type of attack targeting the financial services sector in
the last half of 2007. they accounted for 57 percent of the attacks detected by sensors deployed in the
financial services sector (figure 5). Attackers deploying these attacks are likely attempting to compromise
email servers for the purpose of sending spam or harvesting email addresses for targeted phishing
attacks.Government – Fig5_v1
03-24-08
DoS 39%
Backscatter 1%
SMTP (email) 57%Web (server) 3%
Figure 5. Top attack types, financial services
Source: Symantec Corporation
Financial institutions are frequently targeted by phishing attacks that attempt to collect personal
information for financial gain. As is discussed in the “ phishing activity by sector” section of this report,
financial institutions accounted for 80 percent of all unique brands used in such attacks in the last half
of 2007. it is likely that many of the SM tp attacks are related to phishing activity that is attempting to
spoof the email addresses of financial institutions. Using an email server that belongs to a financial
services institution would lend credibility to a phishing attack targeting the customers of a financial service organization. if phishers are able to take advantage of SM tp servers in financial institutions, it is
likely that customers may be more easily phished, and hence, release valuable financial information such
as bank account credentials.
21Symantec Government internet Security threat report
29 Due to rounding, percentages may not add up to 100 percent.
30 http://www.vontu.com/uploadedfiles/global/ ponemon-Cost-of-a-Data-Breach-2007.pdf : the report defines per incident costs as including “process-related
activities” such as investigations into the breach, breach notification to affected individuals, credit report monitoring for customers and/or the reissuing of a
new account or credit card.
31 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/ pr/2007/021.shtml
22Top attacks by type—transportation sector
During this reporting period, DoS attacks were by far the most common attack observed in the
transportation sector, accounting for 95 percent of the total (figure 6). Since DoS attacks accounted for
46 percent of the attacks on government and critical infrastructure, this difference may indicate that
attackers deploying these attacks are targeting the transportation sector specifically. DoS attacks against
this sector may be used to disrupt services and communications. the dangers of a large-scale attack of
this nature succeeding include the inability to coordinate communications or relief efforts in the event
of an emergency, or the inability to move of supplies and goods for the military during a war or crisis.Government – Fig6_v1
03-24-08
Web (server) 2%
Shellcode /exploit 1%
DoS 95%SMTP (email) 3%
Figure 6. Top attack types, transportation sector29
Source: Symantec Corporation
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft
identity theft continues to be a high-profile security issue, particularly for organizations that store
and manage large amounts of personal information. not only can compromises that result in the loss
of personal data undermine customer and institutional confidence and result in costly damage to an
organization’s reputation, but data breaches can also be financially costly to organizations: the average
cost per incident of a data breach in the United States was $6.3 million and lost business amounted to
an average of $4.1 million.30 Also, organizations can be held liable for breaches and losses, which may
result in fines or litigation.31 Symantec Government internet Security threat report
32 http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/priv/breachlaws.htm
33 http://www.news.com/Law-aims-to-reduce-identity-theft/2100-1017_3-1022341.html
34 http://www.privcom.gc.ca/information/guide/2007/gl_070801_01_e.asp and http://www.privacy.org.nz/the-privacy-act-and-codes/
35 http://republicans.oversight.house.gov/ news/ prArticle.aspx? newsiD=160
36 http://attrition.org/dataloss/
37 For example, the Fair and Accurate Credit transactions Act of 2003 (FAC tA) of California. For more on this act, please see:
http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs6a-facta.htm. Another example is the Health insurance portability and Accountability Act of 1996.
For more information see: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/H ipAAGen info/
23By the end of 2007, 39 states in the United States had introduced breach notification legislation that
regulates the responsibilities of organizations conducting business within the particular state after a
data breach has occurred.32 the state of California was the benchmark for such legislation, adopting data
breach notification laws in 2003.33 the laws require anyone who conducts business in the state to notify
owners of the information exposed immediately after a security breach, with failure to do so resulting in
possible civil action and fines. Other countries have also introduced legislation to tackle identity fraud,
including Canada and new Zealand, both of whom issued guidelines for dealing with privacy breach
notification in 2007.34
Other initiatives in the United States include the Federal Agency Data Breach protection Act, which
requires federal agencies to notify citizens whose information has been compromised by a data breach,35
and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA), enacted in 2002, which stipulates that financial institutions must ensure the security of clients’ nonpublic personal information. the added consideration of punitive costs
may influence organizations to develop more robust security strategies, which may help reduce the number
of breaches overall.
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by sector
Using publicly available data,36 Symantec has determined the sectors that were most often affected by
these breaches, as well as the most common causes of data loss. this metric will also explore the severity
of the breach by measuring the total number of identities exposed due to these data breaches using the
same publicly available data. An identity is considered to be exposed if personal or financial data related
to the identity is exposed through the data breach.
it should be noted that some sectors may need to comply with more stringent reporting requirements than
others for data breaches. For instance, government organizations are more likely to report data breaches,
either due to regulatory obligations or in conjunction with publicly accessible audits and performance
reports.37 Conversely, organizations that rely on consumer confidence may be less inclined to report such
breaches for fear of negative consumer, industry, or market reaction. As a result, sectors that are not
required or encouraged to report data breaches may be under-represented in this data set. in the last half of 2007, the education sector represented the highest number of all known data breaches
that could lead to identity theft, accounting for 24 percent of the total (figure 7). this is a decrease from
the previous reporting period when the education sector accounted for 30 percent of the total, when it
also ranked first. Symantec Government internet Security threat report
38 A data breach is considered to be caused by hacking if identity theft-related data was exposed by an attacker or attackers by gaining unauthorized access to
computers or networks.
24Attacks — data breaches by sector v1
02-19-08
2%
2%
1%
1%
1%
1%
Data breaches Identities expose d6%14%
Health careEducation
Government
Financial 3%
3%
2%
2%
2%
1%1%
4%16%
20%
24%
Militar yRetail/ wholesale
Telecommunications
Computer software 24%
Computer hardwareTransportation
Insurance
Othe r
Biotech /pharmaceutical33%
60%8%
Figure 7. Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by sector and identities exposed
Source: Based on data provided by Attrition.org
educational institutions store a large amount of personal information on students, faculty, and staff that
could be used for the purposes of identity theft, including government-issued identification numbers,
names, addresses, and birthdates. these institutions—particularly larger universities—often consist of
many semi-independent departments in which sensitive personal identification information may be stored in separate locations and be accessible to many people. this may increase the opportunities for attackers
to gain unauthorized access to this data since it may be more difficult to standardize the security and
access control of these dispersed databases.
Despite the high number of data breaches that occurred in the education sector during the last six
months of 2007, it only accounted for one percent of all identities exposed during the period (figure 7). this is likely because 43 percent of the data breaches in the education sector this period were caused
by the theft or loss of computers or data-storage devices. Unlike hacking,38 in which data breaches can
last for an extended period and expose numerous identities, breaches caused by theft or loss can only
be opportunistically taken advantage of. As such, data breaches that occurred in the education sector in
this reporting period were not as likely to result in wide-scale identity theft because they resulted in the
exposure of fewer identities.
During this reporting period, the government sector ranked second and accounted for 20 percent of data breaches that could lead to identity theft. this is a decrease from the previous reporting period, when the
government sector represented 26 percent of the total, though still ranking second. Symantec Government internet Security threat report
Government organizations, like educational institutions, store large amounts of information that could be
used for purposes of identity theft. Similar to the education sector, these organizations often consist of
numerous semi-independent departments that store sensitive personal information in separate locations
and are accessible to numerous people. As a consequence, government organizations face the same
security and control issues as educational institutions.
the government sector had the highest overall number of identities exposed during the period, accounting
for 60 percent of the total. there were a number of high profile data loss incidents during the period.
One incident involved Her Majesty’s revenue and Customs (HM rC) in the United Kingdom, when two
unencrypted disks containing personal records on 25 million people were lost during transfer from HM rC
to the national Audit Office.39 there were also other breaches reported in the UK, including the theft of
a laptop containing military applicants’ details.40 Although the HM rC disks have not been recovered and
there have been no subsequent incidents to suggest that the information involved is in the public domain,
high profile breaches such as these underscore the vital importance of implementing the latest data loss
prevention technologies and strategies.the health care sector ranked third for this period, accounting for 16 percent of data breaches that
could lead to identity theft. it also ranked third in the previous period, accounting for 15 percent. the
prominence of the health care sector may be due to similar factors that influenced the prominence
of both the education and government sectors, such as the storage of large amounts of sensitive
personal information in many locations. Furthermore, health care organizations store sensitive medical
information, which could result in potentially even more damaging breaches of privacy.the health care sector ranked fifth for the number of identities exposed this period, accounting for just
over one percent of the total. As with the education sector, data breaches within the health care sector
resulted in a relatively low number of identities exposed. thus, breaches in this sector were less likely to
result in wide-scale identity theft than in the other sectors since they exposed a small number of identity-
theft related data, such as financial information or government-issued identity numbers.
the financial sector was ranked fourth in the number of data breaches that could lead to identity theft
in the second half of 2007, accounting for 14 percent of the total. However, the sector accounted for
33 percent of the overall number of identities exposed, ranking second. the Fidelity national information
Services data breach, in which information on 8.5 million credit cards, bank accounts, and personal data
was stolen by a former employee, contributed to the large percentage of identities exposed in this sector
in the second half of 2007.41
the distribution of data breaches that could lead to identity theft by sector appears to be relatively
constant, as the sectors listed in the top four have not varied from Internet Security Threat Report Volume
Xi. Since these four sectors—education, government, heath care, and financial—are required to store
large amounts of personal information on an ongoing basis, this trend seems likely to continue. Moreover,
Symantec has observed that the top sector for the number of identities exposed correlates with large-
scale breaches that occur in the reporting period. in other words, the large-scale breaches associated with
those organizations are the main contributors for the disproportionate amount of identities exposed in
their sector.
39 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/7103566.stm
40 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article3213274.ece
41 http://jacksonville.bizjournals.com/jacksonville/stories/2007/11/26/daily23.html
25Symantec Government internet Security threat report
42 this cause will be referred to as theft or loss in the remainder of the report
43 http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article3213274.ece
44 http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=128692
26Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by cause
in the second half of 2007, the primary cause of data breaches that could facilitate identity theft was the
theft or loss of a computer or other medium on which data is stored or transmitted, such as a USB key or a
back-up medium.42 theft or loss made up 57 percent of all data breaches during the second half of 2007,
and accounted for 46 percent of all reported breaches in the previous reporting period (figure 8). Attacks — data breaches by cause v1
02-19-08
Data breaches Identities exposedInsider 21%
Unknown 2%
Insecure policy 2%Hacking 13%
Theft /loss 61 %Insecure policy 21%
Insider 6%Hacking 13 %
Unknown 4%
Fraud 1%
Thef t/loss 57%
Figure 8. Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by cause and identities exposed
Source: Based on data provided by Attrition.org
theft or loss accounted for 61 percent of all identities exposed in the second half of 2007, more than any
other cause (figure 8). this was a large increase from first half of 2007, when the number of identities
exposed from theft or loss accounted for 11 percent of the total. it is likely that theft is opportunistic and
motivated by the hardware itself and not necessarily its contents, and as such, may not lead to wide-scale
identity theft. Along with the HM rC loss mentioned above, other examples of data breaches due to theft
or loss that contribute to these increased percentages include the theft of a laptop containing military
applicants’ details in the UK,43 and a significant breach in Japan in which 980,000 customers’ names and
account numbers went missing.44
Although laptops and other storage devices, such as USB memory keys, have become smaller and easier
to use, their compact size and larger storage capability increases the opportunity for theft, loss or
misplacement, as well as the potential amount of information breached. Organizations should control
access to, and monitor the usage of, external personal storage devices.
the second most common cause of data breaches that could lead to identity theft during this period was
insecure policy, which represented 21 percent of all incidents. A data breach is considered to be caused
by insecure policy if it can be attributed to a failure to develop, implement, and/or comply with adequate
security policy. in the first half of 2007, insecure policy also ranked second, accounting for 34 percent of
such data breaches. this decrease in the number of data breaches may be due to organizations becoming
more diligent and producing stronger security policies.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
in the second half of 2007, insecure policy accounted for only two percent of exposed identities.
therefore, each breach exposed a relatively small number of identities and, thus, breaches caused by
insecure policy in the second half of 2007 were not likely to result in wide-scale identity theft.
in the last six months of 2007, hacking was the third leading cause of data breaches that could lead to
identity theft, accounting for 13 percent of the total. A data breach is considered to be caused by hacking
if data related to identity theft was exposed by attackers external to an organization gaining unauthorized
access to computers or networks. During the first six months of 2007, hacking also ranked third,
accounting for 16 percent of breaches that could facilitate identity theft.
Hacking was responsible for 13 percent of identities exposed during the period, ranking third in the
second half of 2007. the prominence of hacking in this reporting period was primarily due to the tD
Ameritrade data breach, in which hackers using pump-and-dump spam compromised a database that
contained contact information on 6.3 million customers of one of the largest discount brokers in the
United States.45 Hacking is more purpose-driven than insecure policy, theft, or loss; it is an intentional act
with a defined purpose to steal data that can be used for purposes of identity theft or other fraud.
Most breaches that could lead to identity theft are avoidable. in the case of theft or loss and hacking, the
compromise of data could be averted by strongly encrypting all sensitive data and educating users on the
proper procedures for using such programs. Although it is likely that theft is motivated by a desire for the
hardware itself and not the contents of it, encryption would ensure that even if the data is lost or stolen,
it would not be accessible to unauthorized third parties. Also, network administrators should be closely
monitoring network traffic and tracking all activity to ensure that access to data is controlled. Security
processes and systems should be regularly tested to ensure their integrity. these steps should be part
of a broader security policy that organizations should develop, implement, and enforce in order to
ensure that all sensitive data is protected from unauthorized access.
Underground economy servers
For the first time in the Government Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec will evaluate the goods
and services advertised for sale on underground economy servers. Underground economy servers
are black market forums used by criminals and criminal organizations to advertise and trade stolen information and services, typically for use in identity theft. this information can include government-
issued identification numbers such as Social Security numbers, credit cards, credit verification values, debit cards, personal identification numbers ( pins), internet user accounts, email address lists, and
bank accounts. Services include cashiers, scam page hosting, and job advertisements such as for
scam developers or phishing partners.
the geographical locations of underground economy servers are constantly changing due to the nature of
these servers, which are often hosted as channels on public irC servers. Once a fraud-related irC channel
becomes popular, it is often either shut down by the irC server administrators or abandoned by its users
due to legal liability and the increased possibility of being caught. As such, the location of an underground
economy server is primarily driven by convenience and the lifespan of a server may be short. Furthermore,
the geographic location of the server is typically not of any consequence to those involved, as users of
underground economy servers do most of their business electronically.
45 http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11488
27Symantec Government internet Security threat report
Criminals advertise their goods and services on irC servers by listing available items and their prices.
potential buyers will privately contact the sellers to make the deal and finalize payment. payment
options for these goods are either conducted through online currency exchange services or exchange of
goods. Unwilling to risk exposure, many purchasers will use the services of cashiers who will convert the
information for a fee into true currency, either in the form of online currency accounts or through money
transfers. in exchange for the service, cashiers will take a percentage of the cash-out amount.46 Members
of underground economy servers are usually self-policing, reporting rippers47 to the administrators of
the irC servers, and also broadcasting this information to warn each other. Often, repeat rippers will be
kicked off and banned from the servers.
Underground economy servers—goods and services available for sale
Symantec tracks and assesses underground economy servers across the internet using proprietary
online fraud monitoring tools. this discussion will assess underground economy servers according to
the different types of goods and services advertised. it should be noted that this discussion may not
necessarily be representative of internet-wide activity; rather, it is intended as a snapshot of the activity
that Symantec monitored during this period.
During the second half of 2007, bank account credentials, including account numbers and authentication
information, were the most frequently advertised item, making up 22 percent of all goods (table 4).
this was a slight increase from 21 percent in the first half of 2007. the advertised price for bank
account credentials varied as widely as it did in the first six months of 2007, with prices ranging from
$10 to $1,000 USD, depending on the amount of funds available and the location of the account. Bank accounts that included higher balances, such as business accounts, and eU accounts, were advertised
for considerably more. Furthermore, bank accounts that bundled in personal information such as names,
addresses and dates of birth were advertised at higher prices.
Current
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Previous
Rank
2
1
7
N/A
8
4
5
3
N/A
6Goods and Services
Bank accounts
Credit cards
Full identities
Online auction site accounts
Scams
Mailers
Email addresses
Email passwords
Drop (request or offer)
ProxiesCurrent
Percentage
22%
13%
9%
7%
7%
6%
5%
5%
5%
5%Previous
Percentage
21%
22%
6%
N/A
6%
8%
6%
8%
N/A
6%Range of Prices
$10–$1000
$0.40–$20
$1–$15
$1–$8
$2.50/week–$50/week for hosting,
$25 for design
$1–$10
$0.83/MB–$10/MB
$4–$30
10%–50% of total drop amount
$1.50–$30
TableXX_UndGrndEconServ_v2. epsTable 4. Underground economy servers—goods and services available for sale48
Source: Symantec Corporation
2846 Cash-out is term used on underground economy servers where purchases are converted into true currency. this could be in the form of online currency accounts
or through money transfer systems.
47 rippers are vendors on underground economy servers that conduct fraudulent transactions.
48 Descriptions and definitions for the goods and services discussed in this section can be found in “Appendix B—Attack trends Methodology”Symantec Government internet Security threat report
the small increase in the proportion of bank account credentials advertised may be due to a number of
reasons. it is easier to withdrawal funds from bank accounts compared to other financial means, such
as credit cards, since fraud detection is not as effective. One of the main goals of most criminals who
conduct business on underground economy servers is to easily cash out their purchases. Criminals can
quickly cash out bank accounts to secure, untraceable drops using wire transfers or services offered by
cashiers, sometimes in less than 15 minutes. Also, many wire transfer companies and currency exchange
services no longer accept credit cards as forms of payment for all countries.49
One reason for the continued popularity of bank account credentials may be partly due to the increase
in the number of banking trojan infections in the second half of 2007. Symantec observed an 86 percent
increase in the number of potential banking trojan infections over the previous reporting period; this likely
increased the number of bank account credentials stolen and their availability on underground economy
servers during this period.
Credit cards were the second most commonly advertised item on underground economy servers during this reporting period, accounting for 13 percent of all advertised goods. this was a decrease from
22 percent in the first six months of 2007. the decrease in credit cards being advertised may be due
to several reasons. With the recent high-profile reports on lost credit card data, such as the tJX loss,
consumers and credit card companies may be more diligent in monitoring customers’ credit card activities
and quicker to inform customers of suspicious transactions, and subsequently, reducing the window of
opportunity for criminals to exploit stolen credit cards. Also, as stated above, it is more difficult to cash
out credit cards as many wire transfer companies and currency exchange services do not accept them
as a form of payment.
Furthermore, consumers, fearing identity theft and payment fraud, have been moving away from paying for online purchases with credit cards and towards internet-based payment services, such as paypal and
other non-credit card electronic payment services. these types of services have become more popular
because they do not expose the credit or debit card information that is used to set up the accounts and often offer full protection from unauthorized payments. they accounted for over 30 percent of the U.S.
online payment market in 2007, a volume increase of 34 percent from 2006.50
the price range of credit cards in the second half of 2007 remained consistent with the prices from the
first half of the year, ranging from $0.40 to $20 USD per card number. two of the main factors affecting
the cost of credit cards on underground economy servers were the location of the issuing bank and the
rarity of the card. Cards from the european Union cost more than those from the United States. One
reason for the higher prices may be due to the availability of credit cards, since there was eight times the
number of credit cards in circulation in the United States than in the european Union.51 rarer cards, such
as those from smaller countries or smaller credit card companies, were typically twice as expensive as
their more popular counterparts.
Credit cards issued by banks in the United States constituted 62 percent of the total credit cards advertised in the second half of 2007, a drop from 85 percent in the first half of 2007. it may be possible
that demand for credit cards from banks in the United States may have fallen due to a decrease in
popularity and hence, their selling price on underground economy servers is lower.
2949 http://www.asianagold.com/faq.html
50 http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2007/tc20071120_575440.htm?campaign_id=rss_tech
51 http://www.ecb.int/stats/payments/paym/html/index.en.html and http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss78p2.pdfSymantec Government internet Security threat report
30Criminals who sell credit cards on underground economy servers will advertise bulk rates and give
samples to attract buyers. Once the buyer is satisfied that the card is still active, an exchange can be
made. Some bulk amounts and rates observed by Symantec during the last six months of 2007 were 50
credit card numbers for $40 USD ($0.80 each), and 500 credit card numbers for $200 USD ($0.40 each).
this is a decrease from the bulk rates advertised in the first half of 2007, when the lowest bulk purchase
price identified was $1 USD each for 100 cards. it is possible that, as credit cards lose their popularity on
underground economy servers, vendors will lower their prices to try to sell them off.
Full identities were the third most common item advertised for sale on underground economy servers, making up nine percent of all advertised goods, an increase from six percent in the first half of 2007. the
popularity of full identities may be due to their versatility and ease of use. With a full identity, a criminal
can easily obtain government issued documents, commit credit card fraud, open bank accounts, obtain
credit, purchase and/or steal homes,52 or even evade arrest by masquerading as someone else. Some
government organizations do not have a standard method across their agencies to verify identities and
often depend on checking the individual against documents which could be easily forged such as driver’s
licenses or utility bills.53 A criminal recently arrested through the FB i’s “Operation Bot roast ii” used
stolen identities to open fraudulent bank accounts, which he then used as a drop to transfer money from
his victims’ bank accounts.54 the Federal trade Commission estimates that there were approximately
8.3 million identity theft victims in the United States in 2005 and estimates the total losses at
$15.6 billion USD.55
Symantec observed that the cost of full identities depended on the location of the identity. As with bank accounts and credit cards, eU identities were advertised at prices half again higher than U.S. identities.
the higher prices may be indicative of increased demand and lower supplies of identities from the
european Union. the popularity of eU identities may be due to the flexibility of their use, since citizens
there are able to travel and conduct business freely throughout the union without a passport.56 this
flexibility may allow criminals to use the identities easily across all european Union countries.
the distribution of goods and services advertised on underground economy servers continues to be
focused on financial information, such as bank account credentials and credit card information. this
is not surprising, as one of the main objectives for criminal activities in underground economy servers is to generate money. this seems to suggest that criminals are more focused on purchasing goods that
allow them to make large quantities of money quickly on underground economy servers rather than on
exploits that require more time and resources, such as scam pages and email lists for spamming. this
trend is likely to continue until steps are taken to make it more difficult to obtain and use this financial
information.
to help prevent fraud, credit card companies and banks could take more secure measures to verify and
authenticate users. the Federal Financial institutions examination Council (FF ieC) requires banks in the
United States to upgrade to a multi-factor authentication (MFA) security system for online banking.57 the
FFieC also projected that 67 percent of Canadian banks will have a MFA solution in place by the end of
2007, even though banks there are not bound by any requirement to upgrade.58 By instituting effective
multi-factor authentication and multi-level security systems, banks and credit card companies can make
it more difficult for criminals to exploit stolen financial information. Also, security features such as Smart
52 http://www.citynews.ca/news/news_3092.aspx
53 http://www.ips.gov.uk/identity/scheme-why.asp
54 http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel07/botroast112907.htm
55 http://www.ftc.gov/os/2007/11/SynovateFinal report iDtheft2006.pdf
56 http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/freetravel/frontiers/fsj_freetravel_schengen_en.htm
57 Multi-factor authentication depends on two or more of the following factors for a user: something they have (bank card, rSA token, smart card), something they
know (password, pin), and something they are (retinal scan, fingerprint). For example, online banking is a single-factor authentication while banking at an A tM
is multi-factor.
58 http://www.ffiec.gov/press/pr081506.htmSymantec Government internet Security threat report
31 59 eMV is a standard for authenticating credit and debit card payments. the name originates from the initial letters of europay, MasterCard and V iSA, who together
developed the standard. See http://www.emvco.com/about.asp for more information.
60 http://www.incard.com/products.html
61 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-121718-1009-99&tabid=2Card-based credit cards using the eMV standard for security verification,59 or an embedded security token
in a credit card that generates one-time pass codes,60 can make it more difficult for criminals to obtain
and use financial information.
these security features should be part of a wider security policy since attackers have been anticipating
these upgrades and have created malicious code to try to counter these efforts. For example, the
Silentbanker trojan can intercept and redirect legitimate online banking requests and can capture screen
shots to gain access to bank accounts, thereby circumventing multi-level authentication.61
Consumers could also take more security precautions to ensure that their information will not be compromised. When conducting potentially risky internet activities, such as online banking or purchases,
consumers should do so only on their own computers and not public ones. Further, they should not store passwords or bank card numbers. they should also avoid following links from emails as these may be links
to spoofed Web sites. instead, they should manually type in the U rL of the Web site.
Bot-infected computers
Bots are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s machine to allow an unauthorized user to remotely control the targeted system through a communication channel, such as irC, peer-to-peer ( p2p),
or H ttp. these channels allow the remote attacker to control a large number of compromised computers
in a botnet, which can then be used to launch coordinated attacks.
Bots allow for a wide range of functionality and most can be updated to assume new functionality by
downloading new code and features. Also, the versatility of bot software allows an attacker to remotely control a compromised system. these traits give bot-infected computers the potential to inflict a large
amount of damage to government and critical infrastructure organizations. Attackers can use bots to
perform a variety of tasks such as DoS attacks against an organization’s Web site, distribute spam and
phishing attacks, distribute spyware and adware, spread malicious code to propagate, and harvest
confidential information from compromised computers that may be used in identity theft; all of which
can have serious financial and legal consequences.
in particular, bots may be used to carry out DoS attacks against government resources as well as
organizations that are identified as critical infrastructure sectors. they can also be used in a coordinated
effort to gain access to sensitive critical infrastructure systems, such as military, transportation, utilities,
and energy. Once access to an organization’s network has been compromised, an attacker or botnet owner
could easily inflict damage on critical systems, which could result in the destruction, theft, or alteration of
confidential or sensitive information.
Symantec identifies bot-infected computers based on coordinated scanning and attack behavior
that is observed in network traffic. the bot-infected computers identified have attempted to exploit
vulnerabilities in network services to propagate and may include bot-infected computers that are part
of networks controlled by various communication channels such as irC, p2p, or H ttp. this behavioral
matching will not catch every bot-infected computer, specifically bot-infected computers that have used
non-traditional propagation methods, and may identify other malicious code or individual attackers
behaving in a coordinated way like a botnet. However, this behavioral matching will identify many of the
most coordinated and aggressive bot-infected computers. Symantec Government internet Security threat report
32Between July 1 and December 31, 2007, Symantec observed an average of 61,940 active bot-infected
computers per day (figure 9), a 17 percent increase from the previous reporting period. An active bot-
infected computer is one that carries out at least one attack per day. this does not have to be continuous;
rather, a single computer can be active on a number of different days. Symantec also observed 5,060,187
distinct bot-infected computers during this period, a one percent increase from the first six months of
2007. A distinct bot-infected computer is a distinct computer that was active at least once during the
period.
DateActive bot-infected computers
Oct 2, 2006 Jan 1, 2007 Apr 2, 2007 Jul2, 2007020,00040,00060,00080,000
10,00030,00050,00070,000100,00 0
Oct 1, 2007 Jul 3, 20062 per . moving averag eMedian daily
active bots90,000
Dec 31, 2007Attacks — active bot-infected computers v1
02-19-08
Figure 9. Active bot-infected computers by day
Source: Symantec Corporation
the increase in both active and distinct bot-infected computers observed in the second half of 2007 may
be due to their popularity among attackers, and because platforms such as p2p and H ttp increase their
effectiveness. Attackers may favor bot-infected computers because they are able to perform a wide range
of functions, are effective in the attacks they mount, and are relatively easy and inexpensive to propagate. they are also difficult to disable with a decentralized command-and-control model, and most importantly,
can be used for substantial financial gain. illegal botnet activity can be highly lucrative and this may be
one of the reasons they continue to be so popular. it is reasonable to speculate that most botnet owners
profit from their activities; in one case, an owner admitted to earning $19,000 USD for illegally installing
adware through bots he controlled.62
62 http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11495Symantec Government internet Security threat report
33Bot command-and-control servers
Bot command-and-control servers are computers that botnet owners use to relay commands to bot-
infected computers on their networks, usually through irC channels. in the last six months of 2007,
Symantec identified 4,091 bot command-and-control servers (figure 10). this is an 11 percent decrease
from the previous reporting period, when 4,622 bot command-and-control servers were identified.
PeriodJan–Jun 2006 Jul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 20074,6226,337
4,746
Jul–Dec 20074,091Attacks — bot c&c servers v1
02-15-08
Figure 10. Bot command-and-control servers
Source: Symantec Corporation
the decrease in the number of bot command-and-control servers detected reflects the growing trend
in the methods botnet owners are using to communicate with their bot-infected computers. there is a
large shift away from traditional irC bot command-and-control communication frameworks for botnet
owners.63 they are adopting new platforms and communication channels that have a decentralized
command-and-control architecture, thus providing better security for their botnets and making them more difficult to detect and disable. examples of these are p2p networks such as the botnets associated
with the peacomm and nugache trojans.
64 p2p botnet owners typically use a fast-flux domain name
service scheme,65 where control of the botnet is diffused through a number of computers within the
network. Because the botnet does not have a centralized command-and-control server, p2p botnets can
be broken up into smaller pieces for more stealthy operations, making them difficult to detect and disable.
Law enforcement initiatives targeting botnets and bot command-and-control servers also may have
contributed to the decrease in the number of command-and-control servers in the second half of 2007.
in Operation Bot roast ii, the second phase of an ongoing investigation into the criminal use of botnets in
the United States, the Federal Bureau of investigation (FB i) arrested suspected botnet owners from across
the United States who were linked to multi-million dollar phishing and spamming scams, and stealing
personal information that could lead to identity theft.66 Since the investigation began in June 2007, eight
people have been indicted for crimes related to botnet activity, over one million victim computers have
been uncovered, and over $20 million in economic losses have been reported.67
63 http://www.darkreading.com/document.asp?doc_id=117924
64 http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/news/article/0,289142,sid14_gci1286808,00.htm l
65 http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009_22-6222896.html : Fast-flux basically allows a single U rL to resolve to a number of different ip address, or
computers, by changing the U rL’s D nS mapping rapidly and constantly.
66 http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel07/botroast112907.htm
67 http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel07/botroast112907.htmSymantec Government internet Security threat report
34initiatives such as these will likely result in a reduction in bot-infected computers and bot command-and-
control servers. As botnet owners become aware of the scrutiny of law enforcement agencies, they are
likely to alter their tactics to avoid detection, such as breaking the botnet into smaller sizes in attacks or
using a decentralized command-and-control structure. Also, as botnets are disabled by the authorities, less
bot activity and bot command-and-control servers will be observed.
Attacks—protection and mitigation
there are a number of measures that enterprises, administrators, and end users can take to protect
against malicious activity. Organizations should monitor all network-connected computers for signs
of malicious activity including bot activity and potential security breaches, ensuring that any infected
computers are removed from the network and disinfected as soon as possible. Organizations should
employ defense-in-depth strategies,68 including the deployment of antivirus software, firewalls, and
intrusion detection systems, among other security measures. Administrators should update antivirus
definitions regularly and ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all
necessary security patches from their operating system vendor. As compromised computers can be a
threat to other systems, Symantec also recommends that enterprises notify their iSps of any potentially
malicious activity.
Symantec recommends that organizations, especially iSps, perform both ingress and egress filtering
on all network traffic to ensure that malicious activity and unauthorized communications are not taking
place. Organizations should also filter out potentially malicious email attachments to reduce the risk
to enterprises and end users. in addition, the egress filtering is one of the best ways to mitigate a DoS
attack. DoS victims frequently need to engage their upstream iSp to help filter the traffic to mitigate
the effects of attacks.
Symantec also advises that users never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment
is expected and comes from a known and trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment
is known. By creating and enforcing policies that identify and restrict applications that can access the
network, organizations can minimize the effect of malicious activity, and hence, minimize the effect on
day-to-day operations. Organizations must have a robust security awareness plan for users,
with at least yearly reviews and monthly newsletters to ensure that users understand the risks.to reduce the likelihood of data breaches that may lead to identity theft, organizations that store
personal information should take the necessary steps to protect data transmitted over the internet or
stored on their computers. this should include the development, implementation, and enforcement
of secure policy requiring that all sensitive data is strongly encrypted. this would ensure that even if
the computer or medium on which the data were lost or stolen, the data would not be accessible to
unauthorized third-parties.
Also, organizations should enforce compliance with information storage and transmission standards such
as the pCi standard.69 policies that ensure that computers containing sensitive information are kept in
secure locations and are accessed only by authorized individuals should be put in place and enforced. Sensitive data should not be stored on mobile devices that could be easily misplaced or stolen. this step
should be part of a broader security policy that organizations should develop and implement in order to
ensure that any sensitive data is protected from unauthorized access.
68 Defense-in-depth strategies emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific
technology or protection methodology.
69 https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/Symantec Government internet Security threat report
35Malicious Code Trends
Symantec gathers malicious code data from over 120 million desktops that have deployed Symantec’s
antivirus products in consumer and corporate environments. the Symantec Digital immune System and
Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting process. this discussion is based
on malicious code samples reported to Symantec for analysis between July 1 and December 31, 2007.
this report examines the number and volume of malicious code threats based upon the number of reports
received from enterprise and home users. it will also examine malicious code types and propagation
vectors based upon potential infections. this allows Symantec to determine which sample of malicious code
attempted to infect a computer and the volume of potential infections worldwide.this section of the
Government Internet Security Threat Report will discuss:
• threats to confidential information
• propagation mechanisms
• Malicious code that modifies Web pages
• Geolocation by type
• Malicious code—protection and mitigation
Threats to confidential information
Some malicious code programs are designed specifically to expose confidential information that is stored
on an infected computer. these threats may expose sensitive data such as system information, confidential
files and documents, or logon credentials. Some malicious code threats, such as back doors, can give a
remote attacker complete control over a compromised computer and unfettered access to their network
resources, including sensitive data.
threats to confidential information are a particular concern because of their potential use in criminal
activities such as identity theft, which has been the most common consumer complaint received by the
U.S. Federal trade Commission for the past seven years.70 With the widespread use of online shopping and
internet banking, compromises that result in unauthorized access to confidential information can result in
significant financial loss, particularly if credit card information or banking details are exposed.
Within organizations, exposure of confidential information can lead to significant data leakage. As noted
in the “Attack trends” section of this report, the government sector accounted for 60 percent of identities
exposed. if this involves customer-related data, such as credit card information, it can severely undermine
customer confidence as well as violate local laws.71 Sensitive information—including financial details,
business plans, and proprietary technologies—could also be leaked from compromised computers.
Government agencies are also at risk from threats to confidential information. if employee data is
exposed by these threats, the data could be used to facilitate exfiltration of confidential data or identity
theft, which could then lead to further security compromises. For instance, if the attacker gains access to
a user’s personal and system information, he or she can use it to craft a targeted social engineering attack
tailored to that particular user. Additionally, certain agencies—such as those dealing with health care,
revenue and taxation, and pensions—may store personally identifiable information of citizens, including
government-issued identification numbers, that could be used for identity theft or related fraud. it should
be noted that threats that expose confidential information may employ more than one method to do so;
as a result, cumulative percentages discussed in this metric may exceed 100 percent.
70 http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/02/fraud.shtm
71 Many countries have implemented their own laws in this regard, such as the United Kingdom’s Data protection Act, which can be found at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/
ACtS/acts1998/19980029.htmSymantec Government internet Security threat report
36in the last six months of 2007, threats to confidential information made up 68 percent of the volume of
the top 50 malicious code samples causing potential infections (figure 11). this is an increase over the
65 percent reported in the first half of 2007 and the 53 percent from the same period in 2006.FigXX_P ercent_T op_50_v1. eps
PeriodJul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 2007Percentage of top 50 threats that expose
confidential information
65%
Jul–Dec 200768%
53%
Figure 11. Threats to confidential information by volume
Source: Symantec Corporation
Malicious code can expose confidential information in a variety of ways. the most common method is by
allowing remote access to the compromised computer through a back door. in this method, the attacker
typically uses a specialized application to connect to the compromised computer. He or she can then
perform numerous actions such as taking screenshots, changing configuration settings, and uploading,
downloading, or deleting files.
in this reporting period, 86 percent of confidential information threats had a remote access component
(figure 12), compared to 88 percent in the first half of 2007 and 87 percent in the last half of 2006.
While this exposure type dropped slightly in the current period, it still remains more popular than other
techniques. this is likely because remote access, such as a back door, gives the attacker extensive
control over the compromised computer, allowing for the theft of any information from the computer,
the installation of other threats, or to use the computer for other purposes, such as burrowing into the
network to access other resources and data, relaying spam or hosting a phishing Web site.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
37FigXX_Threat_Info_T yp_v1. eps
PeriodPercentage of confidential information
exposure threats
Jul–Dec 2007Exports user data
Exports system data Allows remote accessKeystroke logge r
Exports email addresse s
Jan–Jun 2007 Jul–Dec 200686%
76%
71%68%71%88%
88%
79%
76% 80%87%
76%
69%67%69%
Figure 12. Threats to confidential information by type
Source: Symantec Corporation
Confidential information threats with keystroke logging capability made up 76 percent of threats to
confidential information, down from 88 percent in the first six months of 2007, although the same as the
76 percent recorded in the second half of 2006. A keystroke logger records keystrokes on a compromised
computer and either emails the log to the attacker, or uploads it to a Web site under the attacker’s control.
the attacker can use these logs to extract the user’s credentials for different types of accounts, such
as online banking, trading sites, or iSp access. the information can then be used as a stepping stone to
launch further attacks. For example, the attacker could use the stolen iSp account credentials to set up a
phishing site on the free hosting space typically included with these accounts.
threats that could be employed to export user data accounted for 71 percent of confidential information
threats during the last six months of 2007, down from 80 percent in the previous reporting period, but
still higher than the 69 percent in the last six months of 2006. in the second half of 2007, 71 percent of
threats to confidential information could be used to export system data, compared to 79 percent in the first half of 2007 and 69 percent in the last half of 2006. these forms of data leakage can be used to steal
a user’s identity or launch further attacks. Attackers with access to the user’s personal and system data
can use it to craft a more targeted social-engineering attack tailored to that particular user.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
72 A “man-in-the-middle attack” is a form of attack in which a third party intercepts communications between two computers. the “man in the middle” captures
the data, but still relays it to the intended destination to avoid detection. this can allow the attacker to intercept communications on a secure or encrypted
channel.
38in the first half of 2007, all of the confidential information exposure types experienced an increase as
more threats employed multiple mechanisms; however, in the current reporting period all exposure types
declined. this means that in the current period a greater percentage of threats only employed one or
two mechanisms. this may be a result of attackers attempting to produce more specialized confidential
information threats that target specific information. A threat that employs fewer exposure mechanisms
will typically be smaller in size than one that employs more. Smaller threats leave less of a footprint on
the resources of the compromised computer and may remain unnoticed for a longer period of time.
Organizations can take several steps to limit the exposure of confidential information by successful
intrusions. Data leakage prevention solutions can prevent sensitive data from being stored on endpoint computers. encrypting sensitive data that is stored in databases will limit an attacker’s ability to view and/
or use the data. However, this step will require that sufficient computing resources be made available, as
encrypting and decrypting the data for business use consumes processing cycles on servers. Furthermore,
encrypting stored data will not protect against so-called man-in-the-middle attacks that intercept data
before it is encrypted.72 As a result, data should always be transmitted through secure channels such as
SSH, SSL, and ipSec.
Propagation mechanisms
Worms and viruses use various means to transfer themselves, or propagate, from one computer to another. these means are collectively referred to as propagation mechanisms. the samples are assessed
according to the percentage of potential infections. readers should note that some malicious code
samples use more than one mechanism to propagate, which may cause cumulative percentages presented
in this discussion to exceed 100 percent.
in the second half of 2007, 40 percent of malicious code that propagated did so as shared executable files
(table 5), a significant increase from 14 percent in the first half of 2007. Shared executable files are the
propagation mechanism employed by viruses and some worms that copy themselves to removable media.
As stated in the “Malicious code types” section above, the increasing use of USB drives and media players
has resulted in a resurgence of malicious code that propagates through this vector.this vector lost popularity among malicious code authors when the use of floppy disks declined and
attackers instead concentrated on other more widely used file transfer mechanisms such as email and
shared network drives. However, as the use of removable drives has become more widespread, attackers
have again begun to employ this propagation technique. Although current removable drives differ from
floppy disks, the principle remains the same, enabling attackers to make simple modifications to old
propagation techniques.to limit the propagation of threats through removable drives, administrators should ensure that all such
devices are scanned for viruses when they are connected to a computer. if removable drives are not
needed, endpoint security and policy can prevent computers from recognizing these drives when they are
attached. Additionally, policy and user education should be implemented to prevent users from attaching
unauthorized devices to computers within the enterprise.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
39Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Propagation Mechanism
File sharing executables
File transfer/email attachment
File transfer/CIFS
File sharing/P2P
Remotely exploitable vulnerability
SQL
Back door/Kuang2
Back door/SubSeven
File transfer/embedded HTTP URI/Yahoo! Messenger
WebCurrent
40%
32%
28%
19%
17%
3%
3%
3%
2%
1%Previous
14%
30%
15%
20%
12%
<1%
2%
2%
<1%
1%
TableXX_PropagationMech_v4.epsTable 5. Propagation mechanisms
Source: Symantec Corporation
in the last six months of 2007, 32 percent of malicious code that propagated did so in email attachments.
While the percentage increased slightly over the 30 percent in the first six months of 2007, executable file
sharing overtook this vector, as previously noted. the previous edition of the Internet Security Threat Report
noted that this is likely due to diversification of malicious code authors, although email attachments still
remain an attractive propagation mechanism for malicious code because of the pervasive use of email.73
to limit the propagation of email-borne threats, administrators should ensure that all email attachments
are scanned at the gateway. Additionally, all executable files originating from external sources, such as
email attachments or downloaded from Web sites should be treated as suspicious. All executable files
should be checked by antivirus scanners using the most current definitions.
Malicious code that propagated by the Common internet File Sharing (C iFS) protocol74 made up 28 percent
of malicious code that propagated in the last half of 2007, an increase over the 15 percent in the previous
period. As noted in the previous version of the Government Internet Security Threat Report , this propagation
vector was employed by samples such as Fujacks, which remains one of the top three malicious code
samples causing potential infections.75
the C iFS propagation mechanism can be a threat to organizations because file servers use C iFS to give
users access to their shared files. if a computer with access to a file server becomes infected by a threat
that propagates through C iFS, it could spread to the file server. Since multiple computers within an
organization likely access the same file server, this could facilitate the rapid propagation of the threat
within the enterprise.to protect against threats that use the C iFS protocol to propagate, all shares should be protected with
strong passwords, and only users who require the resources should be given access to them. if other users
do not need to write to a share, they should only be given “read” permissions. this will prevent malicious
code from copying itself to the shared directory or modifying shared files. Finally, C iFS shares should not
be exposed to the internet. Blocking tCp port 445 at the network boundary will help to protect against
threats that propagate using C iFS.
73 Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report , (September 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_gov_09_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 50
74 CiFS is a file sharing protocol that allows files and other resources on a computer to be shared with other computers across the internet. One or more directories
on a computer can be shared to allow other computers to access the files within.
75 Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report , (September 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_gov_09_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 51Symantec Government internet Security threat report
4076 http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-052712-1531-99
77 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/05/mpack_packed_full_of_badness.htmlMalicious code using p2p protocols to propagate accounted for 19 percent of all potential infections this
period. Since there are a wide variety of p2p protocols available for malicious code to use as propagation
mechanisms, they have been further broken down by protocol in the discussion that follows.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5Peer-to-Peer Protocol/Method
File sharing/P2P/shared directories
File sharing/P2P/Kazaa
File sharing/P2P/eDonkey
File sharing/P2P/Morpheus
File sharing/P2P/WinnyPercentage
of P2P
66%
60%
46%
46%
14%
TableXX_P2PPropagation_v1.epsTable 6. P2P propagation mechanisms
Source: Symantec Corporation
the most frequently used methods of p2p propagation employed by malicious code this period did not
attempt to use a specific p2p protocol to propagate; rather, they copied themselves to all folders on a
computer containing the character string “shar”. p2p applications commonly create folders containing
the word “share”—such as “shared folder”—so these malicious code samples will successfully propagate
through many of them. these threats accounted for 66 percent of all p2p threats this period (table 6).
the Kazaa file-sharing service was used by 60 percent of malicious code samples that propagated through
p2p networks, while Morpheus and eDonkey were each used by 46 percent. Finally, the Winny protocol
was used by 14 percent of malicious code propagating through various p2p protocols this period.
Since p2p applications are typically not permitted on government networks, any p2p clients are likely
installed without the knowledge or consent of network administrators. Government agencies should take measures to prevent p2p clients from being installed on any computers on the network. they should also
block any ports used by these applications at the network boundary. end users who download files from
p2p networks should scan all such files with a regularly updated antivirus product.
Malicious code that modifies Web pages
in late May 2007, a new attack kit called M pack76 was observed in the wild. this kit relied on compromised
Web pages to redirect users to an M pack server that attempted to exploit Web browser and plug-in
vulnerabilities in order to install malicious code on computers.77 this kit experienced great success
because it took advantage of the trust many users place in certain Web sites. Since the Web browser is the primary gateway to the internet for most users, Web pages that they visit frequently—such as online
forums and other internet communities—are a useful means of compromising computers for attackers.
For the first time in this edition of the Government Internet Security Threat Report , Symantec is examining
malicious code samples that modify Web pages on a compromised computer. Only threats that modify pages in order to propagate or redirect users were examined. those that simply deface the pages by
adding text or simple images are not included in this metric.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
in the last six months of 2007, seven percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code samples modified
Web pages, up from three percent in the first half of the year (figure 13). in the second half of 2006, none
of the top 50 malicious code samples attempted to modify Web pages on the compromised computer. it is
likely that the success of threats like the M pack kit has encouraged attackers to use Web pages to install
malicious code in recent months.FigXX_MalCodeModW ebPg_v1. eps
PeriodJul–Dec 2006 Jan–Jun 20073%
Jul–Dec 20077%
0%
Figure 13. Malicious code that modifies Web pages
Source: Symantec Corporation
there were two common themes to the top malicious code samples that modified Web pages this period.
the first was threats that added their own code to Web pages, like the invadesys worm.78 When a user
visits a Web page infected by this worm, it will attempt to execute its code on the computer when the Web
browser renders the page. Since the worm is written in Visual Basic script, it is a format that browsers can
interpret and execute, which in turn infects the visiting user.
the other common method of modifying Web pages this period was to add an iframe H tML tag to the
page. An iframe is an H tML element that can include Web content from other pages or Web servers to be
rendered when the user visits the original page. Additionally, this tag can be “invisible” so that the user
will not see any of the embedded content when viewing the original page. the Fujacks worm79 employs
this method to redirect user’s browser to a malicious Web site. this site can then exploit vulnerabilities
in the user’s browser to download and install further threats.
in many cases, the Web pages modified by malicious code do not reside on Web servers. However, if
users maintain their own sites, it is likely that they would keep a copy of the site on their own computer
and upload pages to their hosting providers whenever they make updates. When the updated pages are
uploaded, they would likely include the modifications made by the malicious code. As a result, other users
who trust the compromised sites would be at risk. this could be particularly harmful if the compromised
4178 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-111215-5430-99
79 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-010509-0134-99Symantec Government internet Security threat report
80 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/01/trojanpeacomm_building_a_peert.html
81 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/06/italy_under_attack_mpack_gang.html
42user maintains a popular software application because a greater number of users are likely to visit the
site. Additionally, an enterprise or government employee responsible for maintaining pages on a public-
facing Web site who becomes infected by one of these threats may unknowingly upload malicious pages.
this could significantly harm the reputation of the affected organization and erode public confidence. For
example, a government tax agency Web site affected by such a threat around taxes deadlines could be
used to compromise computers of a large number of both home and enterprise users.
When mass-mailing worms dominated the top malicious code samples, users’ email address books mainly
determined their circle of contacts. While this is still the case, users also now frequently keep in contact with friends, family, and associates through personal Web sites and social networking sites. in many
cases, a user’s social networking profile will also link to a personal Web site. Since many sites incorporate
dynamic content that requires a certain trust level in the user’s browser in order to render correctly, this
can also allow malicious content to execute through the browser.
Geolocation by type
Symantec examines the top regions reporting potential malicious code infections, as well as the types of malicious code causing potential infections in each region. the increasing regionalization of threats
can cause differences between the types of malicious code being observed from one area to the next.
For example, threats may use certain languages or localized events as part of their social engineering techniques. threats that steal confidential information can also be tailored to steal information that is
more common in some countries than in others. trojans that steal account information for Brazilian banks
are quite common in the Latin America (LAM) region, while malicious code that steals online gaming account information is most frequently observed in the Asia- pacific and Japan (A pJ) region. Because of
the different propagation mechanisms used by different malicious code types, and the different effects
that each malicious code type may have, the geographic distribution of malicious code can help network
administrators in specific regions improve their security efforts.
Between July 1 and December 31, 2007, 46 percent of trojans were reported from north America,
31 percent from eMeA, 20 percent from A pJ, and three percent from Latin America (table 7). there
were only slight changes in the geographic distribution of potential infections from trojans this period
compared to the first half of 2007. in the previous period, trojans originating in eMeA were bolstered
by high-profile attacks from the peacomm trojan80 and M pack kit.81 Since there were fewer single,
large, trojan-based attacks centered in eMeA this period, the concentration of trojans reported there
subsequently declined.
Region
North America
EMEA
APJ
Latin AmericaPrevious
43%
36%
17%
4%Current
46%
31%
20%
3%
Table 7. Location of Trojans
Source: Symantec Corporation Symantec Government internet Security threat report
this concentration of trojans in north America is likely a continuation of the trend that was reported in
the previous edition of the Internet Security Threat Report .82 Symantec speculated that the concentration
of trojans in north America may be indicative of enterprises and iSps taking more active steps to prevent
the propagation of worms. As a result, attackers may consciously be moving towards trojans because of
successful efforts to thwart worm attacks.
During this period, eMeA accounted for 43 percent of global potential infections caused by worms,
followed by A pJ at 33 percent, and north America at 18 percent (table 8). this may indicate that north
American iSps are implementing more rigid port blocking to limit the spread of network worms, as well
as antivirus filtering at the email gateway to limit mass-mailing worms.
Region
North America
EMEA
APJ
Latin AmericaPrevious
23%
36%
35%
6%Current
18%
43%
33%
6%
Table 8. Location of worms
Source: Symantec Corporation
north America and eMeA experienced the greatest changes in the proportion of potential infections
caused by worms this period. However, this is not due to a change in the concentration of worms in north
America, but to the increase in the proportion in eMeA. As noted above, the concentration of trojans
in eMeA decreased this period, which caused an increase in the proportion of reported worms in the
region. For example, the Stration worm83 was one of the top 50 malicious code samples causing potential
infections in eMeA, but not in north America. However, the proportion of the volume of this worm
observed in eMeA was lower than north America because of the much higher volume of trojans in the
north America region.
potential infections caused by back doors were most frequently reported from eMeA, which accounted for
40 percent of all back doors worldwide. north America accounted for 30 percent of potential back door
infections in the second half of 2007, while A pJ accounted for 26 percent and Latin America accounted for
four percent (table 9). it is important to note that, while the regional percentages of potential back door
infections show a fairly wide variance during this period, the worldwide volume of back door threats was
significantly lower than trojans and worms. As a result, the percentage variance between regions actually
represents a much smaller difference in raw numbers than the percentage differences between worms
and trojans.
Region
North America
EMEA
APJ
Latin AmericaPrevious
33%
38%
24%
5%Current
30%
40%
26%
4%
Table 9. Location of back doors
Source: Symantec Corporation
82 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume X ii (September 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_09_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 82
83 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-092111-0525-99
43Symantec Government internet Security threat report
44the A pJ region accounted for the highest percentage of viruses this period, with 44 percent of the
total, while eMeA and north America accounted for 34 and 19 percent, respectively. Latin America only
accounted for three percent of the total (table 10).
Region
North America
EMEA
APJ
Latin AmericaPrevious
21%
27%
45%
7%Current
19%
34%
44%
3%
Table 10. Location of viruses
Source: Symantec Corporation
the increased proportion of viruses in eMeA is linked to the proportion of worms there. Many new worms
also contain a viral infection component to aid in propagation. For example, one of the top reported
malicious code samples from the eMeA region this period, the Fujacks worm, also infects files on a
compromised computer. Other worms causing potential infections reported in eMeA also employ a viral
component, which may be a contributing factor in the proportional increase of viruses and worms from
this region.
Malicious code—protection and mitigation
Symantec recommends that certain best security practices always be followed to protect against malicious
code infection. Administrators should keep patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host public services and applications—such as H ttp, Ftp, SM tp, and D nS servers—and that are accessible
through a firewall or placed in a DMZ. email servers should be configured to only allow file attachment
types that are required for business needs and to block email that appears to come from within the
company but that actually originates from external sources. Additionally, Symantec recommends that
ingress and egress filtering be put in place on perimeter devices to prevent unwanted activity.
to protect against malicious code that installs itself through a Web browser, additional measures should be
taken. the use of ipS technologies can prevent exploitation of browser and plug-in vulnerabilities through
signatures and behavior-based detection in addition to ASL r.
end users should employ defense-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software and
personal firewall. Users should update antivirus definitions regularly. they should also ensure that all
desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their software
vendors. they should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless it is expected and comes
from a trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known. Symantec Government internet Security threat report
45Phishing Trends
phishing is an attempt by a third party to solicit confidential information from an individual, group, or
organization by mimicking, or spoofing, a specific, usually well-known brand, usually for financial gain.
phishers attempt to trick users into disclosing personal data, such as credit card numbers, online banking
credentials, and other sensitive information, which they may then use to commit fraudulent acts.
Symantec assesses phishing according to two indicators: phishing attempts and phishing messages.
A phishing attempt can be defined as an instance of a phishing message being sent to a single user. A
phishing attempt can be considered a single cast of the lure (the phishing message) to try to catch a
target. A single phishing message can be used in numerous distinct phishing attempts, usually targeting
different end users.
A phishing Web site is a site that is designed to mimic the legitimate Web site of the organization whose brand is being spoofed. in many cases, it is set up by the attacker to capture a victim’s authentication
information or other personal identification information, which can then be used in identity theft or other
fraudulent activity.
this section of the Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report will discuss the following metrics
in greater depth, providing analysis and discussion of the trends indicated by the data:• phishing activity by sector
• top countries hosting phishing Web sites and top targets phished
• phishing Web site top-level domains
• phishing Web sites by government top-level domains
• phishing—protection and mitigation
Phishing activity by sector
this section will explore phishing activity in two ways. First it will analyze the unique brands phished by
their sector, which looks at only the number of brands used and their corresponding sectors that were
phished, and not each specific phishing attack. Second, it will explore which sectors were targeted by the
highest volume of phishing attacks. these considerations are important for an enterprise because the use
of its brand in phishing activity can significantly undermine consumer confidence in its reputation.
the majority of brands used in phishing attacks in the last six months of 2007 were in the financial
services sector, accounting for 80 percent (figure 14), virtually unchanged from the 79 percent reported in
the previous period. the financial services sector also accounted for the highest volume of phishing Web
sites during this period, at 66 percent (figure 15), down from 72 percent in the first half of 2007. Since
most phishing activity pursues financial gain, successful attacks using brands in this sector are most likely
to yield profitable data, such as bank account credentials, making this sector an obvious focus for attacks. Symantec Government internet Security threat report
46 84 Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , Volume X ii (September 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_09_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 97the drop in volume of phishing Web sites during the period is worth noting. the drop is potentially
driven by the increased knowledge and awareness of phishing schemes, and how to avoid falling victim
to them. information campaigns driven by financial institutions, as well as warning emails and a general
heightened awareness of phishing schemes targeting financial services has likely made it more difficult
for phishers to carry out successful phishing attacks against them.Spam Phishing — unique brands phished by sector v1
02-20-0 8
Transportation 1%Computer hardware 1%
Government 1%1%0.9% 1%
Financial 80 %Retail 4%
ISP 8%
Interne t
community 2%
Insurance 2%
Computer consulting 0.1%Computer software 0.9%0.1%
1%
Figure 14. Unique brands phished by sector
Source: Symantec Corporation
internet service providers ( iSps) were ranked second in unique brands used in phishing attacks during
this period, at eight percent. this is a slight decrease from 11 percent in the first half of 2007. the iSp
sector also accounted for the second highest volume of phishing attacks during the period, accounting
for 18 percent. in the first half of the year, the organizations in the iSp sector were used in 11 percent
of phishing attacks, which was also the second highest total.
As has been noted in previous editions of the Internet Security Threat Report , iSp accounts can be
valuable targets for phishers because people frequently use the same authentication credentials (such
as usernames and passwords) for multiple accounts, including email accounts.84 information gleaned
from iSp accounts could thus provide access to other accounts, such as online banking. Symantec Government internet Security threat report
Attackers could also use the free Web-hosting space that is often included in these accounts to put up
phishing Web sites, or use the accompanying email accounts to send spam or launch further phishing
attacks. Compromised iSp Web-hosting accounts can also be used to plant links to other Web sites the
attacker controls in order to boost the search engine rankings of those sites. not coincidentally, email
account passwords rank in the top 10 most common items advertised for sale on underground economy servers this period, as described in the “Underground economy servers” discussion in the “Attack trends”
section of this report.Spam Phishing — phished sector by volume of phishing websites v1
02-20-0 8
Transportation 0.1%Computer hardware 0.7%
Insurance 0.11%0.11% 0.09%
Financial 66 %Retail 11 %
ISP 18 % Internet
community 3%
Government 1%
Computer consulting 0.09%0.1%
0.7%
Figure 15. Phished sectors by volume of phishing Web sites
Source: Symantec Corporation
the retail services sector accounted for four percent of organizations whose brands were spoofed in
phishing activity in the last half of 2007 and for 11 percent of the volume of phishing Web sites. in the
previous reporting period, the retail sector accounted for three percent of the unique brands spoofed and 16 percent of the volume. this represents a shrinking gap between brands phished and the volume of
phishing Web sites targeting this sector.
the higher number of Web sites used to carry out attacks spoofing retail brands during previous periods
was likely part of an exploratory phase for phishers to establish the value of successful phishing attacks
targeting organizations in this sector. the shrinking gap between brands phished and the volume of
phishing Web sites likely indicates an end to this exploratory phase. As the possible financial gains of
spoofing retail organizations are established, phishers will adjust their rate of attacks accordingly.
47Symantec Government internet Security threat report
the drop in the volume of attacks may also be because successful phishing attacks that spoof retail
organizations may require more effort on the attacker’s behalf to achieve financial gain compared to the
financial sector. A phisher gaining access to bank account information simply has to cash out the account
to get at the funds, while having access to online retailer accounts may require goods to be shipped to a
physical address and involve more risk of discovery for the attacker.
Six of the top 10 brands spoofed by attackers in phishing attacks during this period were in the financial
sector. interestingly, the second most frequently spoofed brand was a social networking site.85 While there
may seem to be no immediate financial gain from stealing account information from a social networking
site, attackers could use the compromised account to gather detailed information about the user and the
user’s friends.86 Furthermore, many social networking sites allow their users to control the content of
their associated site, which would allow an attacker that has compromised such a site to host seemingly
legitimate links that point to malicious Web sites, to host malicious code, to spam users associated with
the compromised account, and to even host phishing Web sites.87 Using a compromised social networking
site account to host a phishing Web site that targets the social networking site itself will increase the
chances of such an attack at being successful.
Top countries hosting phishing Web sites and top targets phished
this metric will assess the countries in which the most phishing Web sites were hosted and the most
popular targets within each country. phishing Web sites differ from phishing hosts, which are computers
that can host one or more phishing Web sites, and which are discussed in the “ phishing activity by sector”
metric previously mentioned, as well as in the “Malicious activity by country” metric in the “Attack trends”
section of this report. this data is a snapshot in time, and does not offer insight into changes in the
locations of certain phishing sites since the data was analyzed. it should also be noted that the fact that a
phishing Web site is hosted in a certain country does not necessarily mean that the site is being controlled
by attackers located in that country.
in the second half of 2007, 66 percent of all phishing attacks detected by Symantec were associated with
Web sites located in the United States (table 11). For phishing attacks with Web sites hosted in the United
States, all of the top 10 targets are also headquartered there. the top target phished on Web sites hosted
in the United States was a social networking site. together with another social networking site, these two
sites accounted for 91 percent of phishing attacks with Web sites hosted in the United States. these sites
are relatively easy to phish because they are inherently trusted by users, giving phishing attacks spoofing
them a better chance of success.88
Spoofed social networking Web pages can include links to phony downloads that require users to
enter confidential information, such as authentication information or credit card information, that can
subsequently be used for fraudulent purposes. Further, in some cases, phishers may be able to upload
content, such as Flash videos, onto a spoofed social networking page that will allow the attacker to hijack
the page of anyone who visits the spoofed page.89
85 For more on phishing attacks that target social networking sites, please see:
http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2006/09/contextaware_phishing_realized.html
86 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2006/11/an_imaginative_phishing_attack_1.html
87 http://blog.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2007/06/web_2pointuhoh_worm_whacks_mys.html
88 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2006/09/contextaware_phishing_realized.html
89 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2006/07/myspace_shockwave_flash_hack.html
48Symantec Government internet Security threat report
Of the remaining top 10 targets phished in the United States, four were financial services organizations,
though they only accounted for three percent of phishing attacks with Web sites hosted in the United
States. Since the majority of phishing attacks that were detected were associated with Web sites that
spoof social networking sites, it is plausible to assume that phishing these is more lucrative than phishing
financial organizations, as discussed in “ phishing activity by sector” of this report.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Country
United States
China
Romania
Guam
France
Germany
Italy
Canada
Sweden
NetherlandsPercentage
66%
14%
5%
5%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
1%Top Target Phished
Social networking site
Social networking site
Social networking site
Social networking site
Online auction site
Online payment system
Online auction site
Online portal
Telecommunications provider
Social networking site
TableXX_T opCountBrandPhish_v2. epsTable 11. Top countries hosting phishing Web sites and top targets phished
Source: Symantec Corporation
During the last six months of 2007, China hosted the second most phishing Web sites, accounting for
14 percent of the total. the top brand phished by Web sites hosted in China was a social networking site,
which made up 96 percent of Web sites targeting the top 10 brands phished that were hosted in China. the brand that was spoofed by the second highest number of phishing Web sites hosted in China was a
popular online retailer in China; however, it only made up one percent of the Web sites targeting the top
10 brands phished in China.
China’s high ranking in this category is not surprising, as it was the second highest country in the world for all malicious activities during this reporting period. it had the second highest number of phishing
hosts, the third most bot-infected computers, and the fourth highest number of spam zombies during
this period, all of which indicate the potential for high volumes of phishing activity. Spam zombies are
compromised computers that are used to relay spam messages, some of which could include links to
phishing Web sites. Bot-infected computers can be used to host phishing Web sites on the infected
computer. Finally, phishing hosts are used to host phishing Web sites, and are often used to host more
than one. A high ranking in all of these categories is highly likely to contribute to the hosting of a high
number of phishing Web sites.
two other considerations may also influence the number of phishing Web sites located in a country—
the number of domains hosted there and the number of Web-hosting companies. the number of domain
names registered to a country is likely indicative of the number of Web sites hosted there. As of January
2008, China had the fifth highest number of domain names in the world. the higher number of domain
names will not necessarily contribute to a higher number of phishing Web sites; however, it could indicate
a higher probability of phishing Web sites, if only as a percentage of the higher number of Web sites
hosted there.
49Symantec Government internet Security threat report
the second consideration, Web-hosting companies, can be used by phishers to host phishing Web sites
in two ways. First, they can employ the hosting company to host a Web site legitimately, but use that site
for phishing. Second, they can compromise legitimate Web sites hosted by the company and use them for
phishing. As of January 2008, China had only the fourteenth most Web-hosting companies in the world.
Given this relatively low ranking, it would appear that the high numbers of phishing Web sites hosted in
China are hosted on compromised computers, particularly as the number of bot-infected computers and
spam zombies located there are very high.90
Some observers believe that a substantial number of phishing Web sites located in China may be due to a
single group of phishers known as rock phish,91 who are known for employing particularly sophisticated
phishing techniques.92 they may be using phishing sites in China because these sites may be left in place
for longer periods, making hosting a site there more desirable and allowing attackers to carry out more
attacks. China has the highest amount of malicious activity in the region and the second highest amount worldwide, as discussed in the “Attack trends” section. registrars are also reputed to be more permissive
in China.93 these factors make it reasonable to assume that phishers have an easier time hosting and
maintaining their phishing sites in China.
Of the top 10 brands phished by Web sites hosted in China, seven were headquartered in the United States. these seven accounted for 98 percent of the top 10 brands phished. the focus on phishing brands
whose organizations are headquartered in the United States shows that the United States is a lucrative target for phishers who host their sites on computers in China. this could mean that phishers hosting sites
in China are actually located in the United States.
romania ranked third for phishing Web sites during the period, accounting for five percent of all phishing
Web sites detected. As was the case with the United States and China, a social networking site was the
brand most commonly spoofed by phishing Web sites hosted on computers in romania. it accounted for
98 percent of the top 10 brands phished by Web sites hosted there.
the presence of romania in this position is somewhat surprising, as it ranked only thirty-fifth worldwide
for malicious activity during this period. However, it was the fifteenth ranked country in the world for
phishing hosts, which would indicate that phishing is the most common malicious activity originating
in romania. this is borne out by numerous reports that indicate that romania has become the site of
considerable fraudulent activity, particularly online auction fraud.94 there is a well-established tradition
of computer skills in the country dating back to the early 1980s.95 Combined with the slow economic
growth in romania since the fall of communism, this has led to an increase in online fraud.96
90 http://webhosting.info/webhosts/globalstats/?pi=2&ob=HC&oo=D eSC
91 http://www.rsa.com/solutions/consumer_authentication/intelreport/F rArpt_DS_1007.pd f
92 http://www.symantec.com/enterprise/security_response/weblog/2007/12/getting_acquainted_with_rock_p.html
93 http://www.rsa.com/solutions/consumer_authentication/intelreport/F rArpt_DS_1007.pdf
94 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3344721.stm
95 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/3344721.stm
96 http://bucharest.usembassy.gov/US_Citizen_Services/Visiting_Living/Corruption.html
50Symantec Government internet Security threat report
51Phishing Web sites by top-level domains
the domain name system was developed to translate the unique ip addresses assigned to computers
on the internet from complicated series of numbers into familiar words. ip addresses are translated into
domain names by domain name servers. end users are thus able to navigate the internet using names
rather than ip addresses.
the highest domain level is the top-level domain ( tLD), which can be identified by the final two or
three letters in the domain name. examples of top-level domains are .com, (which is generally used by
businesses but available to anyone, .edu (which is used by organizations in the education sector) and .org
(which is predominantly used by non-profit organizations).
Understanding the tLDs that are most commonly used in phishing Web sites may help end users, security
administrators, and organizations to understand which tLDs may be most prone to hosting phishing Web
sites, which could help alert them to potentially malicious sites. it may also help security analysts further
identify which countries or sectors are hosting the most phishing Web sites. readers should note that this
is the first reporting period for which Symantec tracked this data; therefore, period-to-period comparisons
are not possible.the most common top-level domain used in phishing Web sites between July 1 and December 31, 2007
was .com, which was used by 44 percent of all phishing Web sites during this period (table 12). this is not
surprising, as .com is the most common tLD on the internet, being used by approximately 58 percent of all
registered domain names.97
While .com was originally employed to designate a Web site that is used by a commercial organization, it
has expanded to include many different types of organizations as well as individuals. it is an unrestricted
tLD, meaning that anyone can register a domain name using it, thus making it easy for phishers to use. As
it is the most commonly used tLD, and is thus familiar to users, .com may be inherently more trusted than
other less widely employed tLDs, thereby making it more effective for phishing Web sites.
it is somewhat surprising that the percentage of phishing Web sites using this tLD is not higher; however,
this may indicate a shift towards more localized tLDs, particularly country-specific tLDs. Local tLDs are
likely to be used by phishing Web sites that spoof local organizations, such as banks.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Top-level Domain
.com
.cn
.net
.org
.de
.ru
.fr
.co.uk
.info
.esPercentage
44%
23%
6%
3%
2%
2%
1%
1%
1%
1%Description
Unrestricted commercial
China
Unrestricted
Unrestricted
Germany
Russia
France
United Kingdom commercial
Unrestricted
Spain
TableXX_PhishW ebTopDomains_v1. epsTable 12. Top phishing Web site top-level domains
Source: Symantec Corporation
97 http://populicio.us/toptlds.htmlSymantec Government internet Security threat report
the second most common tLD used by phishing Web sites was .cn, which was used by 23 percent of
phishing Web sites during this period. this tLD represents the national domain of China. the .cn tLD is
currently used by less than one percent of domain names on the internet as a whole. thus the number of
phishing Web sites using this tLD is disproportionately very high. this does not necessarily mean that the
phishers using these sites are Chinese.
Although the .cn tLD was originally restricted to domain names registered in China, it has since been made
available internationally.98 As a result, it is difficult to ascertain whether the phishing Web sites using this
tLD are located in China or not. rather, it likely indicates that phishers in indeterminate locations have
compromised Chinese Web sites or iSps located in China to host their phishing Web sites. this supports
the assertion, made in the “ top countries hosting phishing Web sites” discussion above, that phishers are
taking advantage of potentially permissive domain registration rules in China to register Web sites in that
country that will be used for phishing activity.the third most common top-level domain used by phishing Web sites during the period was .net, which
accounted for only six percent. Compared to both the .com and .cn top-level domains, the percentage of
phishing sites using .net is considerably low. the ranking of .net is likely attributable to two factors. First, it is one of the most common top-level
domains, and phishers may use it because it is well-known and relatively unsuspicious. Second, it is also an
unrestricted top-level domain, making it easy for phishers to register domain names with it.
Phishing Web sites by government top-level domains
this metric will assess the geographic distribution of phishing Web sites that use government tLDs.
phishing Web sites may be hosted on domains that are registered to government entities, likely as a result
of legitimate servers on these domains that have been compromised. in addition to hosting a phishing
Web site, the compromised server may contain confidential or sensitive information that the attackers
could potentially access. it should also be noted that while these phishing Web sites use government domain names, they may in
fact not be hosted on government servers. instead, they may be using spoofed domains. As a result, it is
difficult to assess the use of each country’s tLD individually. However, there are a number of reasons that
phishers may want to use government tLDs for phishing Web sites. primary amongst these is that using a
government tLD adds trust and credibility to phishing attacks that spoof government Web sites. Unwary
end users are more likely to trust these sites because of the authority of government institutions.
Further, phishing Web sites spoofing these sites would likely be successful in the harvesting of personal
information. Many government agencies ask citizens for personal information to confirm their identity.
phishing Web sites spoofing government agencies would likely do so in order to obtain users’ confidential
information, which could then be used for identity theft and other fraudulent purposes.
52 98 http://www.neulevel.cn/Symantec Government internet Security threat report
53During the second half of 2007, 19 percent of phishing Web sites that use government tLDs used the gov.
br tLD (table 13). this tLD is used by Web sites that are registered to the government of Brazil. Brazil
was ranked sixteenth in the world for phishing Web sites, with less than one percent of the global total.
However, it should be noted that just because the phishing Web site uses a Brazilian tLD, it doesn’t
mean that the site is based in, or even associated with, Brazil. rather, it is likely that phishers are using
a Brazilian government tLD to give the intended target the impression that the Web site is associated
with the government, thereby enhancing the credibility of the Web site and increasing the probability
of a successful attack.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Top-level Domain
gov.br
gov.cn
gov.ua
gov.ar
go.ro
gov.ec
gov.my
gov.lk
gov.ph
gov.coPercentage
19%
17%
6%
6%
6%
5%
4%
4%
3%
3%
TableXX_PhishW ebTopDomains_v1. epsTable 13. Top government domains hosting phishing Web sites
Source: Symantec Corporation
the gov.cn tLD was used by 17 percent of phishing Web sites using government tLDs. this tLD indicates
domain names registered to the government of China. As was noted in the “ phishing Web sites by top-
level
domains” discussion above, the .cn was the second most common tLD used by phishing Web sites in this
reporting period, and by far the highest country-specific tLD. it may be that the high number of phishing
Web sites using the gov.cn is just an extension of this tendency.
the gov.ua tLD was used by six percent of phishing Web sites using government tLDs during this period.
this tLD is used by Web sites belonging to the government of Ukraine. Ukraine ranked twenty-fifth in the
world for phishing Web sites, with less than one percent of the total. it also ranked thirteenth in the eMeA
region, with one percent of the regional total. Again, the use of a tLD that is associated with the Ukrainian
government does not mean that the Web site is actually based in Ukraine.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
54Phishing—protection and mitigation
Symantec recommends that enterprise users protect themselves against phishing threats by filtering
email at the server level through the mail transfer agent (M tA). Although this will likely remain the primary
point of filtering for phishing, organizations can also use ip-based filtering upstream, as well as H ttp
filtering.
DnS block lists also offer protection against potential phishing emails. Organizations could also consider
using domain-level or email authentication in order to verify the actual origin of an email message. this
can protect against phishers who are spoofing email domains. to protect against potential phishing activity, administrators should always follow Symantec best
practices as outlined in Appendix A of this report. Symantec also recommends that organizations educate
their end users about phishing. they should also keep their employees notified of the latest phishing
attacks and how to avoid falling victim to them as well as provide a means to report suspected phishing
sites.
Organizations can also employ Web server log monitoring to track if and when complete downloads of
their Web sites or logos and other images are occurring. Such activity may indicate that someone is using
the legitimate Web site to create an illegitimate Web site that could be used for phishing.
Organizations can detect phishing attacks that use spoofing by monitoring non-deliverable email addresses or bounced email that is returned to non-existent users. they should also monitor the
purchasing of cousin domain names by other entities to identify purchases that could be used to spoof
their corporate domains. So-called “typo domains” and homographic domains should also be monitored. this can be done with the help of companies that specialize in domain monitoring; some registrars also
provide this service.
the use of antiphishing toolbars and components in Web browsers can also help protect users from
phishing attacks. these measures notify the user if a Web page being visited does not appear to be
legitimate. this way, even if a phishing email reaches a user’s inbox, the user can still be alerted to the
potential threat.end users should follow best security practices, as outlined in Appendix A of this report. they should
deploy an antiphishing solution. As some phishing attacks may use spyware and/or keystroke loggers,
Symantec advises end users to use antivirus software, antispam software, firewalls, toolbar blockers, and
other software detection methods. Symantec also advises end users to never disclose any confidential
personal or financial information unless and until they can confirm that any request for such information
is legitimate. Users should review bank, credit card, and credit information frequently. this can provide information
on any irregular activities. For further information, the internet Fraud Complaint Center ( iFCC) has also
released a set of guidelines on how to avoid internet-related scams. Additionally, network administrators
can review Web proxy logs to determine if any users have visited known phishing sites. Symantec Government internet Security threat report
55 99 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6676819.stmSpam Trends
Spam is usually defined as junk or unsolicited email sent by a third party. While it is certainly an annoyance
to users and administrators, spam is also a serious security concern as it can be used to deliver trojans,
viruses, and phishing attempts.99 it could also cause a loss of service or degradation in the performance
of network resources and email gateways.
the results used in this analysis are based on data returned from the Symantec probe network, as well
as the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam customer base. Specifically, statistics are gathered from enterprise
customers’ Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam servers that receive more than 1,000 email messages per day.
this removes the smaller data samples (that is, smaller customers and test servers), thereby allowing for
a more accurate representation of data.
the Symantec probe network consists of millions of decoy email addresses that are configured to attract
a large stream of spam attacks. An attack can consist of one or more messages. the goal of the probe
network is to simulate a wide variety of internet email users, thereby attracting a stream of traffic that
is representative of spam activity across the internet as a whole. For this reason, the probe network is
continuously optimized in order to attract new varieties of spam attacks. this section of the
Government Internet Security Threat Report will discuss developments in spam activity
between July 1 and December 31, 2007. the following selected metrics will be discussed in greater depth:
• top spam categories
• top countries of spam origin
Top spam categories
Spam categories are assigned based on spam activity that is detected by the Symantec probe network.
While some of the categories may overlap, this data provides a general overview of the types of spam that
are most commonly seen on the internet today. it is important to note that this data is restricted to spam
attacks that are detected and processed by the Symantec probe network. internal upstream processing
may weed out particular spam attacks, such as those that are determined to be potential fraud attacks.
the most common type of spam detected in the first half of 2007 was related to commercial products,
which made up 27 percent of all spam detected by Symantec sensors, an increase from the 22 percent
detected in the previous period (figure 16). Commercial-product spam usually consists of advertisements
for commercial goods and services. it is frequently used to sell designer goods, such as watches, handbags,
and sunglasses, the profits from which can be substantial given that the goods sold are often cheaply-made counterfeits. in other cases the spammers may simply be attempting to collect credit card and
personal information for use in identity theft. Symantec Government internet Security threat report
56100 For further discussion on pump and dump spam please see the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report Volume X ii (Sept 2007):
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_09_2007.en-us.pdf : p.107
101 http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-34.htmSpam Phishing — top spam categories v1
02-20-0 8
Fraud 7%
Health 10 %
Finance 13 %Internet 20 %Leisure 6%
Commercial products 27%
Scams 10%Adult 7%
Figure 16. Top spam categories
Source: Symantec Corporation
internet-related spam rose to 20 percent this period, from 17 percent in the first half of 2007. this type
of spam is typically used to promote Web hosting and design, as well as other online commodities like
phishing and spam toolkits. Since phishing and spam toolkits cannot typically be advertised by legitimate
means, such as through banner ads on Web sites, spam tends to be the only way to promote them. Over
the past year, phishing toolkits have become more common. these are likely advertised using internet-
related spam, so it is not surprising that this type of spam has also increased.
Spam related to financial services made up 13 percent of all spam detected in the last six months of 2007, making it the third most common type of spam during this period. this continues a decline first observed
in the first six months of 2007, when it ranked second and accounted for 21 percent of all spam detected. this was driven by the continuing decline in stock market pump-and-dump spam. the drop in pump-and-
dump100 spam was triggered by actions taken by the U.S. Securities and exchange Commission, which
limited the profitability of this type of spam by suspending trading of the touted stocks.101
Top countries of spam origin
this section will discuss the top 10 countries of spam origin. the nature of spam and its distribution on
the internet presents challenges in identifying the location of people who are sending it because many
spammers try to redirect attention away from their actual geographic location. in an attempt to bypass
DnS block lists, they use trojans that relay email, which allows them to send spam from sites distinct from
their physical location. in doing so, they tend to focus on compromised computers in those regions with
the largest bandwidth capabilities. As such, the region in which the spam originates may not correspond
with the region in which the spammers are located.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
this discussion is based on data gathered by customer installations of Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam. this
data includes the originating server’s ip address, against which frequency statistics are summarized. each
ip address is mapped to a specific country and charted over time.
During the last half of 2007, 42 percent of all spam originated in the United States (table 14), a decrease
from the 50 percent reported in the previous period. Despite the decrease, the United States had an eight
percent increase in volume of spam messages. this would indicate that there has been an internet-wide
increase in the volume of spam. the drop in percentage from the United States can be explained by the
increase in volume of spam originating in other countries, namely russia, which will be discussed below.
the prominence of the United States is not surprising, given that it has the highest number of broadband
internet users in the world.102 the United States was the top country of spam origin for the first half of
2007 as well as the last half of 2006.
Current
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Previous
Rank
1
3
14
2
7
6
4
8
5
15Country/Region
United States
United Kingdom
Russia
China
Poland
Taiwan
Japan
Germany
South Korea
SpainCurrent
Percentage
42%
5%
4%
4%
3%
3%
3%
3%
3%
2%Previous
Percentage
50%
4%
2%
4%
3%
3%
4%
2%
3%
1%
TableXX_T opCountSpamOrigin_v3. epsTable 14. Top 10 countries/regions of spam origin
Source: Symantec Corporation
the United Kingdom ranked second for spam origin in the second half of 2007, accounting for five percent.
During the first half of 2007, the United Kingdom ranked third and accounted for four percent. Although
the rise in rank and percentage of the United Kingdom did correspond to a moderate rise in spam volume
from the country, the changes are due primarily to changes in the volume percentages and rank of other countries, primarily russia and China.
China fell from second to fourth during the period, with a corresponding decrease in spam volume of
131 percent. this drop is considerable, and is likely linked to the drop in bot-infected computers in the
country.103 One possible explanation is the unavailability of a number of Web sites, forums, and blogs
in China for several months during this period.104 Dynamic Web sites are often used by attackers to
propagate and host malicious content, which in turn is often used to send spam.
57 102 http://www.point-topic.com
103 For a discussion on bot-infected computers, please see the “Attack trends” discussion in this report.
104 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21268635/Symantec Government internet Security threat report
58105 http://blog.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2007/10/mapping_the_russian_business_n.html
106 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/11/08/rbn_offline/
107 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/10/12/A r2007101202461_pf.html
108 http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/011408-crime-hubs-can-be-downed.html?fsrc=rss-securityrussia was the third ranked country during the second half of 2007, accounting for four percent of all
spam volume. this corresponds to a 236 percent increase over the first half of 2007 when russia ranked
fourteenth and accounted for only two percent of all spam detected. Symantec also observed a 231 percent
increase in the number of spam zombies detected in russia during the current reporting period. As well,
there was a 107 percent increase in active bot-infected computers in russia over the previous period.
this increase in malicious activity is likely attributable to the russian Business network ( rBn) and its
facilitation of malicious activity. earlier this year, it was reported that the rBn allowed malicious content to
be hosted on their Web space, thereby potentially facilitating malicious activity originating from russia.105
it is likely that the rBn’s involvement in malicious activity contributed to this rise before it dropped offline
in november.106
Over time, the rBn has been blamed for a large amount of malicious activity.107 it has been suggested
that the publicity surrounding the organization was partly responsible for its disappearance.108 With the
rBn’s disappearance, there could be a corresponding drop in malicious activity originating from russia
in the coming months. However, it is also possible that the group did not discontinue its activities, but are
attempting to avoid further publicity by taking its activities underground.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
59Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices
Enterprise Best Practices
• employ defense-in-depth strategies, which emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive
defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protection method.
this should include the deployment of regularly updated antivirus, firewalls, intrusion detection, and
intrusion protection systems on client systems.
• turn off and remove services that are not needed.
• if malicious code or some other threat exploits one or more network services, disable or block access
to those services until a patch is applied.
• Always keep patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host public services and are accessible through the firewall, such as H ttp, Ftp, mail, and D nS services.
• Consider implementing network compliance solutions that will help keep infected mobile users out
of the network (and disinfect them before rejoining the network).
• enforce an effective password policy.
• Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments that are commonly
used to spread viruses, such as .VBS, .BA t, .eXe, .piF, and .SC r files.
• isolate infected computers quickly to prevent the risk of further infection within the organization.
perform a forensic analysis and restore the computers using trusted media.
• train employees to not open attachments unless they are expected and come from a known and
trusted source, and to not execute software that is downloaded from the internet unless it has
been scanned for viruses.
• ensure that emergency response procedures are in place. this includes having a backup-and-restore
solution in place in order to restore lost or compromised data in the event of successful attack or
catastrophic data loss.
• educate management on security budgeting needs.
• test security to ensure that adequate controls are in place.
• Be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file-
sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software. Clicking on links and/or attachments in email messages (or iM messages) may also expose computers to unnecessary
risks. ensure that only applications approved by the organization are deployed on desktop computers.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
60Consumer Best Practices
• Consumers should use an internet security solution that combines antivirus, firewall, intrusion
detection, and vulnerability management for maximum protection against malicious code and
other threats.
• Consumers should ensure that security patches are up to date and that they are applied to all
vulnerable applications in a timely manner.
• Consumers should ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers, and should change them
often. passwords should not consist of words from the dictionary.
• Consumers should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is
expected and the purpose of the attachment is known.
• Consumers should keep virus definitions updated regularly. By deploying the latest virus definitions,
consumers can protect their computers against the latest viruses known to be spreading in the wild.
• Consumers should routinely check to see if their operating system is vulnerable to threats by using
Symantec Security Check at www.symantec.com/securitycheck.
• Consumers should deploy an antiphishing solution. they should never disclose any confidential
personal or financial information unless and until they can confirm that any request for such
information is legitimate.
• Consumers can get involved in fighting cybercrime by tracking and reporting intruders. With Symantec
Security Check’s tracing service, users can quickly identify the location of potential hackers and forward the information to the attacker’s iSp or local police.
• Consumers should be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with the
installation of file-sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software. Clicking on links and/or attachments in email messages (or iM messages) may also expose computers to
unnecessary risks. ensure that only applications approved by the organization are deployed on desktop
computers.
• Some security risks can be installed after an end user has accepted the end-user license agreement (eULA), or as a consequence of that acceptance. Consumers should read eULAs carefully and
understand all terms before agreeing to them.
• Consumers should be aware of programs that flash ads in the user interface. Many spyware programs
track how users respond to these ads, and their presence is a red flag. When users see ads in a
program’s user interface, they may be looking at a piece of spyware.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
61Appendix B—Attack Trends Methodology
Attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec Global
intelligence network, which includes the Symantec DeepSight threat Management System, Symantec
Managed Security Services, the Symantec Honeypot network, and proprietary Symantec technologies.
Symantec combines data derived from these sources for analysis.
Attacks by type—notable critical infrastructure sectors
Symantec identifies attack types on notable critical infrastructure sectors that are determined by analysis of the iDS attack signatures. Attack types include: backscatter, DoS, domain name system (D nS),
shellcode/exploit, SM tp, Web (server), and Web (browser).
Bot-infected computers
Symantec identifies bot-infected computers based on coordinated scanning and attack behavior that is
observed in global network traffic. An active bot-infected computer is one that carries out at least one attack per day. this does not have to be continuous; rather, a single computer can be active on a number
of different days. Attacks are defined as any malicious activity carried out over a network that has been detected by an intrusion detection system ( iDS) or firewall.
For an attacking computer to be considered to be participating in coordinated scanning and attacking, it must fit into that pattern to the exclusion of any other activity. this behavioral matching will not catch
every bot-infected computer, and may identify other malicious code or individual attackers behaving in a coordinated way as a botnet. this behavioral matching will, however, identify many of the most
coordinated and aggressive bot-infected computers. it will also give insight into the population trends of
bot-infected computers, including those that are considered to be actively working in a well coordinated
and aggressive fashion at some point in time during the reporting period.
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft
Symantec identifies the proportional distribution of cause and sector for data breaches that may facilitate
identity theft based on data provided by Attrition.org.109 Attrition.org reports data breaches that have
been reported by legitimate media sources and have exposed personal information including name, address, Social Security number, credit card number, or medical history. the sector that experienced
the loss along with the cause of loss that occurred is determined through analysis of the organization
reporting the loss and the method that facilitated the loss.
109 http://www.attrition.org/dataloss/dlunplugged.htmlSymantec Government internet Security threat report
Malicious activity by country
to determine the top countries for the “Malicious activity by country” metric, Symantec compiles
geographical data on each type of malicious activity to be considered. this includes bot-infected
computers, bot command-and-control servers, phishing Web sites, malicious code infections, spam relay
hosts, and internet attacks. the proportion of each activity originating in each country is then determined.
the mean of the percentages of each malicious activity that originates in each country is calculated.
this average determines the proportion of overall malicious activity that originates from the country in
question and is used to rank each country.
Malicious activity by critical infrastructure sectors
this metric evaluates the amount of malicious activity originating from computers and networks that
are known to belong to government and critical infrastructure sectors. Symantec cross-referenced the ip
addresses of known malicious computers with Standard industrial Classification (S iC) codes110 assigned
to each industry and provided by a third-party service.111 Symantec has compiled data on numerous
malicious activities that were detected originating from the ip address space of these organizations. these
activities include: bot-infected computers, phishing Web sites hosts, spam zombies, and attack origin.
Top countries for government-targeted attacks
Symantec identifies the national sources of attacks by automatically cross-referencing source ip
addresses of every attacking ip with several third-party, subscription-based databases that link the
geographic location of systems to source ip addresses. While these databases are generally reliable, there
is a small margin of error.
Underground economy servers
this metric is based on data that is gathered by proprietary Symantec technologies that monitor activity
on underground economy servers and collect data. Underground economy servers are typically chat
servers on which stolen data, such as identities, credit card numbers, access to compromised computers, and email accounts are bought and sold. each server is monitored by recording communications that take
place on them, which typically includes advertisements for stolen data. this data is used to derive the
data presented in this metric.
Description of goods and services advertised on underground economy servers may vary from vendor to vendor. the following list shows typical goods and services that are found on these servers and general
descriptions of each:
• Full identities: Full identities may consist of name, date of birth, address, phone number, and Social
Security number. it may also include extras such as driver’s license number, mother’s maiden name,
email address, or “secret” questions/answers.
62110 SiC codes are the standard industry codes that are used by the United States Securities and exchange Commission to identify organizations belonging to each
industry. For more, on this, please see http://www.sec.gov
111 http://www.digitalenvoy.netSymantec Government internet Security threat report
63• Credit cards: Credit cards may include name, credit card number, pin, billing address, phone number,
and company name (for a corporate card). Credit Verification Values (CVV) typically are not included in
this and can be purchased separately.
• Bank accounts: Bank accounts may consist of names, bank account number (including transit and
branch number), address, and phone number. Online banking logins and passwords are often sold
as a separate item.
• Email passwords: these can include account information for emails including users iD, email address
and password. in addition, the account will contain personal information and email addresses in the
contact list.
• Mailers: A mailer is an application that is used to send out mass emails (spam) for phishing attacks.
examples of this are worms and viruses.
• Email addresses: these consist of lists of email addresses used for spam or phishing activities. the
sizes of lists sold can range from 1 MB to 150 MB.
• Proxies: proxy services provide access to a software agent, often a firewall mechanism, which
performs a function or operation on behalf of another application or system while hiding the details
involved, allowing attackers to obscure their path and make tracing back to the source difficult or
impossible. this can involve sending email from the proxy, or connecting to the proxy and then out
to an underground irC server to sell credit cards or other stolen goods.
• Scams: Vendors sell malicious Web pages that pose as legitimate pages for phishing scams. they also
offer services for hosting the pages, usually priced per week, given the transitory lifespan of many
phishing sites.
• Online auction site accounts: information for online auction site accounts is often put up for sale,
including user iD and password. in addition, the account will contain personal information such as
name, address, phone number and email address.
• Drop (request or offer): A drop is either a secure location where goods or cash can be delivered or a
bank account through which money can be moved. the drop locations may be an empty apartment
or some other scouted location. Criminals often change the billing addresses of credit cards and bank
accounts to safe drops that are untraceable. Bank account drops are a convenient way to cash out bank
accounts, credit cards, or other online financial accounts such as paypal or eGold. Services for drops
can often be accompanied by cashier services.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
64Appendix C—Malicious Code Trends Methodology
Malicious code trends are based on statistics from malicious code samples reported to Symantec for
analysis. Symantec gathers data from over 120 million client, server, and gateway systems that have
deployed Symantec’s antivirus products in both consumer and corporate environments. the Symantec
Digital immune System and Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting
process. Observations in this section are based on empirical data and expert analysis of this data. the
data and analysis draw primarily from the two databases described below.
Infection database
to help detect and eradicate computer viruses, Symantec developed the Symantec AntiVirus research
Automation (SA rA) technology. Symantec uses this technology to analyze, replicate, and define a large
subset of the most common computer viruses that are quarantined by Symantec Antivirus customers.
On average, SA rA receives hundreds of thousands of suspect files daily from both enterprise and
individual consumers located throughout the world. Symantec then analyzes these suspect files, matching
them with virus definitions. An analysis of this aggregate data set provides statistics on infection rates for
different types of malicious code.
Malicious code database
in addition to infection data, Symantec Security response analyzes and documents attributes for each
new form of malicious code that emerges both in the wild and in a “zoo” (or controlled laboratory)
environment. Descriptive records of new forms of malicious code are then entered into a database for
future reference. For this report, a historical trend analysis was performed on this database to identify,
assess, and discuss any possible trends, such as the use of different infection vectors and the frequency
of various types of payloads. in some cases, Symantec antivirus products may initially detect new malicious code heuristically or by
generic signatures. these may later be reclassified and given unique detections. Because of this, there
may be slight variance in the presentation of the same data set from one volume of the Internet Security
Threat Report to the next.
Geographic location of malicious code instances
Several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic locations of systems to ip
addresses are used along with proprietary Symantec technology to determine the location of computers
reporting malicious code instances. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin
of error. the data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of malicious code instances.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
Appendix D—Phishing and Spam Methodology
phishing and spam attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the
Symantec probe network and from Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam data.
the Symantec probe network is a system of over two million decoy accounts that attract email messages
from 20 different countries around the world. it encompasses more than 600 participating enterprises
and attracts email samples that are representative of traffic that would be received by over 250 million
mailboxes. the probe network covers countries in the Americas, europe, Asia, Africa, and Australia/
Oceania.
the Symantec probe network data is used to track the growth in new phishing activity. it should be noted
that different monitoring organizations use different methods to track phishing attempts. Some groups
may identify and count unique phishing messages based solely on specific content items such as subject
headers or U rLs. these varied methods can often lead to differences in the number of phishing attempts
reported
by different organizations.
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam data is also used to gauge the growth in phishing attempts as well as the percentage of internet mail determined to be phishing attempts. Data returned includes messages
processed, messages filtered, and filter-specific data.
Symantec has classified different filters so that spam statistics and phishing statistics can be determined
separately. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data includes data reported back from customer
installations providing feedback from antispam filters as well as overall mail volume being processed. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam only gathers data at the SM tp layer and not the network layer, where
DnS block lists typically operate because SM tp-layer spam filtering is more accurate than network-
layer filtering and is able to block spam missed at the network layer. network layer-filtering takes place
before email reaches the enterprise mail server. As a result, data from the SM tp layer is a more accurate
reflection of the impact of spam on the mail server itself.
Due to the numerous variables influencing a company’s spam activity, Symantec focuses on identifying
spam activity and growth projections with Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data from enterprise customer installations having more than 1,000 total messages per day. this normalization yields a more
accurate summary of internet spam trends by ruling out problematic and laboratory test servers that
produce smaller sample sets.
this section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to produce the data and statistics in
this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, the
following investigations warrant additional detail.
65Symantec Government internet Security threat report
Phishing
Phishing activity by sector
the Symantec phish report network ( prn) is an extensive antifraud community whose members
contribute and receive fraudulent Web site addresses for alerting and filtering across a broad range of
solutions. these sites are categorized according to the brand being phished and its sector. prn members
and contributors send in phishing attacks from many different sources. this includes a client detection
network that detects phishing Web sites as the clients visit various Web sites on the internet. it also
includes server detection from spam emails. the sender confirms all spoofed Web sites before sending
the address of the Web site into the prn . After it is received by the prn , Symantec spoof detection
technology is used to verify that the Web site is a spoof site. research analysts manage the prn console 24
hours a day, 365 days of the year, and manually review all spoof sites sent into the prn to eliminate false
positives.
Top countries hosting phishing Web sites
the data for this section is determined by gathering links in phishing email messages and cross-
referencing the addresses with several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic
locations of systems to ip addresses. in this case, Symantec counts phishing Web sites as the number of
unique ip addresses hosting Web pages used for phishing. While these databases are generally reliable,
there is a small margin of error. the data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of
phishing Web sites.
Phishing Web site top-level domains
the data for this section is determined by deriving the top-level domains of each distinct phishing Web site
UrL. the resulting top-level domains are tabulated and compared proportionately.
Spam
Top countries of spam origin the data for this section is determined by calculating the frequency of originating server ip addresses
in email messages that trigger antispam filters in the field. the ip addresses are mapped to their host
country of origin and the data is summarized by country based on monthly totals. the percentage of spam
per country is calculated from the total spam detected in the field.
it should be noted that the location of the computer from which spam is detected being sent is not
necessarily the location of the spammer. Spammers can build networks of compromised computers
globally and thereby use computers that are geographically separate from their location.
66Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec
Corporation.
nO WArrAnty . the technical information is being delivered to you as is and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its accuracy or use. Any use of the
technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user. Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical
errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice.
|
SymAnte C enterpriSe SeCUritySymantec Government Internet
Security Threat Report
trends for 2008
Volume XiV, published April 2009Marc Fossi
executive editor
manager, DevelopmentSecurity technology and response
Eric Johnsoneditor
Security technology and response
Trevor Mack
Associate editor
Security technology and response
Dean Turner
Director, Global intelligence network
Security technology and response
Gary Kevelson
Global manager
Symantec Cyber threat Analysis program
Andrew J. Rogers
Cyber threat Analyst
Symantec Cyber threat Analysis program
Joseph Blackbirdthreat Analyst
Symantec Security response
Mo King Low
threat AnalystSecurity technology and response
Teo Adamsthreat Analyst
Security technology and response
David McKinney
threat AnalystSecurity technology and response
Stephen Entwislethreat AnalystSecurity technology and response
Marika Pauls Lauchtthreat AnalystSecurity technology and response
Greg Ahmadthreat AnalystSecurity technology and response
Darren Kempthreat AnalystSecurity technology and response
Ashif Samnanithreat Analyst
Security technology and responseIntroduction ............................................................................... 4
Executive Summary ........................................................................ 5
Highlights ............................................................................... 11
Threat Activity Trends .................................................................... 14
Malicious Code Trends .................................................................... 43
Phishing, Underground Economy Servers and Spam Trends .................................... 53
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices ...................................................... 69
Appendix B—Threat Activity Trends Methodology ............................................ 71
Appendix C—Malicious Code Trends Methodology ........................................... 73
Appendix D—Phishing, Underground Economy Servers, and Spam Trends Methodology ........... 74ContentsVolume XiV, published April 2009
Symantec Government Internet Security
Threat ReportSymantec Government internet Security threat report
4Introduction
the Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report provides an annual summary and analysis of
trends in attacks, vulnerabilities, malicious code, phishing, and spam as they pertain to organizations in
government and critical infrastructure sectors. this volume will also provide an overview of observed
activities on underground economy servers. Where possible, it will also include an overview of legislative efforts to combat these attack patterns and activities. For the purposes of this discussion, government
organizations include national, state/provincial, and municipal governments. this report also incorporates
data and discussions relevant to threat activity that affects critical infrastructure industries that support or are involved with government and military institutions.
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of internet threat data in the world
through the Symantec™ Global intelligence network. more than 240,000 sensors in over 200 countries
monitor attack activity through a combination of Symantec products and services such as Symantec
DeepSight™ threat management System, Symantec managed Security Services and norton™ consumer
products, as well as additional third-party data sources.
Symantec also gathers malicious code intelligence from more than 130 million client, server, and gateway
systems that have deployed its antivirus products. Additionally, Symantec’s distributed honeypot network
collects data from around the globe, capturing previously unseen threats and attacks and providing
valuable insight into attacker methods.
Symantec maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting
of more than 32,000 recorded vulnerabilities (spanning more than two decades), affecting more than
72,000 technologies from more than 11,000 vendors. Symantec also facilitates the Bugt raq™ mailing list,
one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion of vulnerabilities on the internet, which
has approximately 50,000 subscribers who contribute, receive, and discuss vulnerability research on a daily basis.
Spam and phishing data is captured through a variety of sources including: the Symantec probe network,
a system of more than 2.5 million decoy accounts; messageLabs intelligence, a respected source of data
and analysis for messaging security issues, trends and statistics; and other Symantec technologies. Data
is collected in more than 86 countries from around the globe. Over eight billion email messages, as well
as over one billion Web requests are processed per day across 16 data centers. Symantec also gathers
phishing information through an extensive antifraud community of enterprises, security vendors and
more than 50 million consumers.
these resources give Symantec’s analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze, and
provide informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and spam.
the result gives enterprises and consumers the essential information to effectively secure their systems
now and into the future. this volume of the Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report will alert
readers to current trends and impending threats that Symantec has observed for 2008.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
5Executive Summary
the recent global economic crisis has shown how extensively interconnected the global economy has
become. the repercussions of failing companies and industries have reached far beyond what many
people might have expected. even experienced practitioners find themselves in uncharted territories.
this is spurring changing patterns in both international government and commercial relations. these are
expanding in many new ways, some in response to the crisis, and others in support of intended growth.
Similarly, as the internet and broadband interconnectivity continue to expand, so does the mutual
risk inherent in these regional and global relationships.1 One commonality demonstrated by the report
data is that globalization continues to change traditional boundaries and alliances for both attackers
and defenders.
Along with these issues, this summary will discuss the increasing sophistication of attackers and their tools
against traditional defense mechanisms. in past reports, Symantec has identified that malicious activity
has increasingly become Web-based, that attackers are targeting end users instead of computers, and
that attackers are able to rapidly adapt their attack activities.2 these trends are expected to continue,
as are the increasingly sophisticated social engineering methods employed by attackers.
Attackers continue to diversify their range of threat options and in some cases have expanded the reach
of their operations. As in previous years, Symantec continues to observe increasingly sophisticated attack
techniques and the ability of attackers to rapidly adept their methods. in this reporting period, the
increasing trend toward interoperability between threats, methods, and multistage attacks has continued.
For example, trojans often install additional back door threats that then download and install bots. these
can then enable additional compromises, such as using the compromised computers as spam zombies. All of these threats work in concert to provide a coordinated and sophisticated network of malicious activity.
threats due to data breaches and theft also continue to be dangerous, especially to governmental and
critical infrastructure organizations, since these threats are often exploited for financial gain or intelligence
gathering. As attackers refine their methods and consolidate their assets, they may be able to create global
networks that support coordinated malicious activity.
Following a traditional network penetration approach sequence, successful internet Control message
protocol (iCmp) messages (otherwise known as pings) can be used to produce additional scanning attempts.
Successful scans can then produce penetration attempts, which if properly executed can lead to malware
deployment. if these attacks are identified as originating from multiple ip addresses, it would indicate more
coordinated operations. this scenario would suggest that enhanced security intelligence could help to
reduce the risk of further network compromises.
in the global and regional threat patterns observed by Symantec, attacks often target other computers
within the same country or region.
3 in this reporting period, Symantec examined the top regions reporting
malicious code infections, as well as the types of malicious code causing potential infections in each region. the regionalization of threats can cause differences between the types of malicious code being observed
from one area to the next. For example, threats may use certain languages or localized events as part of
their social engineering techniques. Because of the different propagation mechanisms used by different
1 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08588.pdf : p. 1
2 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_gov_09_2008.en-us.pdf : p. 4
3 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_gov_09_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 10Symantec Government internet Security threat report
6malicious code types, and the different effects that each malicious code type may have, information
about the geographic distribution of malicious code can help network administrators improve their
security efforts.
this is illustrated by potential malicious code infections. Symantec examines the top regions reporting
potential malicious code infections, as well as the main types of malicious code causing potential infections
in each region. threats that steal confidential information can also be tailored to steal information that is
more commonly available in some countries than in others. For instance, trojans that attempt to steal
account information for Brazilian banks are quite common in the Latin America region. Because of the
increasing ability for attacks to be quite specifically and geographically targeted, governments should pay
close attention to malicious events originating regionally.
the United States remained the top country for overall malicious activity in 2008, and again ranked first for
a number of categories within this, including for malicious code, phishing website hosts, and originating
attacks. rounding out the top three countries in overall malicious activity were China and Germany, in
second and third place, respectively. One notable change is the rise of Brazil from eighth rank in the previous report to fourth in 2008.
the most obvious explanation for a great deal of the attack patterns is the correlation between high-speed
connectivity infrastructure in a country or region and the accompanying amount of malicious activity.
An example of this is with spam bots, which typically require excessive bandwidth in order to propagate large amounts of email. Symantec has noted that spam bots are often concentrated in regions with well-
established high-speed broadband infrastructures. High-bandwidth capacity networks may also enable attackers to hide attack and bot traffic more effectively, especially through Http -based command-and-
control servers, where they can effectively hide malicious Http bot traffic within legitimate traffic—thus confounding efforts to filter for threats.
in 2008, China surpassed the United States for the largest number of broadband subscribers for the
first time. this was likely a significant reason for China’s continued prominence in many malicious code
categories. Another reason for China’s prominence is likely related to the fact that internet users in China
spend more of their leisure time online than users in any other country.
4 Online leisure activities are
typically more likely to include activities that are popular and, in many instances, vulnerable attack targets.
this includes social networking websites, online gaming sites, forums, blogs, and online shopping sites.
Dynamic sites, such as forums are prime targets for attackers using bot-infected computers to host and
propagate malicious content, as Web application and site-specific vulnerabilities can put these types of
site at risk.
For attacks specifically targeting the government sector, 2008 marked the first time that the United States
was not the top country of origin, as it was surpassed by China, which ranked first with 22 percent of the
attacks on the government sector. China’s rise in this category represented an increase from 8 percent in 2007, when it was ranked fourth. the United States ranked second, and Spain ranked third in this metric.
malicious code attacks targeting governments on the Web can be motivated by a number of factors. profit is
often a motive because governments store considerable amounts of personal identification data, which if
stolen can be exploited for profit. in addition, attacks may also be motivated by attempts to steal
government-classified information.
4 http://www.tnsglobal.com/_assets/files/ tnS_market_research_Digital_World_Digital_Life.pdfSymantec Government internet Security threat report
7in 2008, some actions taken by governments were effective at reducing malicious threat activity. China
initiated a large security effort to block address websites potentially most susceptible to fraud in an effort
to increase online security for users ahead of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.5 thousands of websites
were either shut down or blacklisted as part of this effort, including a substantial number of message
forums, which are popular attack targets, as mentioned. Additionally, the Chinese government created a
special response team to monitor systems for potential internet attacks and malicious activity.6 Lastly,
many unlicensed internet cafés there were also shut down and supervision was tightened on the cafés
remaining to help address online security risks associated with the casual use of public computers.7 public
computers tend to be more susceptible to attacks because of the significant amount of varied traffic on
such computers. public computers are frequently used by a great variety of people for many different
activities such as email, online shopping, and gaming. the variety of usage and the likelihood that
transient users are less aware of—or concerned with—security makes such computers attractive to attackers. Shutting down the internet cafés in China thus removed possible channels for malicious activity.
Along with such actions taken by governments, the actions of regional commercial entities’ were also effective at reducing security threats, and also demonstrate how interconnected the threat landscape has
become. One example occurred when two iSps in the United States were shut down by their upstream iSps
in September and november 2008. this resulted in a dramatic drop worldwide in both bot command-and-
control servers and bot-infected computers. Bot network activity associated with spam distribution
decreased substantially after both shutdowns.
8 Unfortunately, these slowdowns were only temporary,
as the botnet controllers were able to reestablish their operations elsewhere soon afterward.
in this report period, Symantec also examined the SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition)
security threat landscape. this includes, but is not limited to, industries such as power generation,
manufacturing, oil and gas, water treatment, and waste management. the security of SCADA technologies
and protocols can be of concern because the disruption of related services can result in the failure of critical infrastructure. Due to the potential for disruption of critical services, these vulnerabilities may
be the target of politically motivated or state-sponsored attacks.
Given their role in critical infrastructure and the severity of potential vulnerabilities, SCADA security is
largely a private affair between SCADA vendors and the industries and government agencies that rely on
these specific protocols and technologies. As such, Symantec does not report on any private research,
although it does report on public research for the Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report.
the findings showed that SCADA technologies are affected by many of the same types of vulnerabilities that affect desktop and enterprise software. One noteworthy event took place in September 2008, when
a security researcher publicly released exploit code for a SCADA vulnerability because the researcher believed that the reporting vendor did not adequately emphasize the risk of the vulnerability.
9
During this reporting period, the most common attacks targeting government organizations were
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, representing a continued trend from the previous reporting period. this
is problematic because much of the critical infrastructure that performs essential functions in many countries remains at risk to attackers who might choose to exploit operations with this type of attack. Sectors that were most often the subject of DoS attacks included the financial, biotech/pharmaceutical,
and transportation industries. Within the transportation industry in particular, DoS attacks were the most
5 See http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/news/2207878/china-cracks-web-porn and http://english.gov.cn/2008-03/29/content_931872.htm
6 http://www.infoworld.com/article/08/04/24/China-worries-hackers-will-strike-during-Beijing-Olympics_1.html
7 http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/rt GAm.20080212.wgtchina0212/BnStory/ technology/home
8 See http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-021215-0628-99 and
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/10/spam_volumes_plummet_after_atr.html
9 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/09/08/scada_exploit_released/Symantec Government internet Security threat report
8common attack by a significant margin, accounting for 74 percent of attacks in 2008, indicating that this
industry may have been singled out and specifically targeted for this type of attack. the goal of attackers
may be to cause large-scale disruptions in the services that this sector provides or these attacks may simply be out of spite due to dissatisfaction with those services.
the second most common type of attack against government networks was through Simple mail transfer
protocol (Smtp), the protocol through which the vast majority of email is transferred. if compromised,
Smtp offers attackers an excellent access vector into internal network resources. While compromised
email servers could be used to overwhelm networks with unauthorized bandwidth requests, the more
likely motivation for compromising email servers lies in their usefulness for sending out spam, as well
as harvesting email addresses for targeted phishing attacks. these attacks also offer the ability to spoof
government communications and to obtain credentials to launch further attacks. Given how integral— and often trusted—email is that originates with government entities, these types of attacks offer the potential for compromising the integrity of information and communications within governments.
Although dropping from first to second in the attack-by-type ranking for the biotech/pharmaceutical and
financial sectors, Smtp -based attacks remain a relatively large threat to these critical sectors, likely
because of the value in spoofing their goods and services in attacks. Similarly, the manufacturing sector
ranked very high for phishing website hosts, likely due to the fact that attackers rely upon the trust that
users often have for well-known commercial brands.
Symantec also measures the level to which government and critical infrastructure organizations may have
been compromised and are being used by attackers as launching pads for malicious activity. in 2008, the
telecommunications sector again accounted for the highest proportion of attacks of this nature by a
significant margin, with an overwhelming 97 percent of the total.
Attackers continue to target the telecommunications sector for a number of reasons. Organizations in this
sector include iSps and Web-hosting companies, which often have a large number of internet-facing
computers and broadband connections. in 2008, the majority of attacks against this sector were shellcode
exploits.
10 this may indicate that attackers are attempting to take control of computers in this sector to
use them to conduct malicious activity. Compromises to the servers or networks of these companies would
also potentially expose a great number of their customers to a range of malicious attacks.
moreover, governments and critical infrastructure organizations rely on the availability of public
communication networks and the telecommunication sector for day-to-day operations. Since
telecommunications organizations have a certain amount of control on the flow of data through networks,
successful compromises of these networks could give attackers the ability to compromise targeted
computers inside specific governmental or critical infrastructure organizations.
As mentioned, attacks targeting these large government repositories are often motivated by profit since
governments store considerable amounts of personal identification that, if fraudulently obtained, can be
sold on underground economy servers. this can also include sensitive information such as patent data,
scientific research, and technology exports—all of which would be valuable information that could be sold to competing companies or other governments.
10 Shellcode is a small piece of code used as the payload in the exploitation of a vulnerability.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
9One important and rising area of concern to governments is the increased use (and capacity) of removable
media over the past few years. in 2008, 66 percent of potential malicious code infections propagated as
shared executable files, up significantly from 44 percent in 2007. Shared executable files are the propagation mechanisms employed by viruses and some worms to copy themselves onto removable media.
the resurgence in this vector over the past few years coincides with the increased use of removable drives
and other portable devices. it is also an easy vector to exploit because old malicious code exploits developed
for floppy disks can be easily modified for current removable media devices. increasing the danger of this
resurgence is that many organizations lack effective security measures to protect against such dangers.
in a recent study, 59 percent of employees admitted to taking company information—such as email
addresses, contact information of customers, employee records, and financial records—when leaving the
organization.
11 Of those who admitted to taking data, 53 percent downloaded information onto a CD or DVD,
42 percent took data using a USB drive, and 38 percent sent attachments to a personal email account.
For data breaches that could lead to identity theft, the government sector continued to be prominent again
in 2008, ranking second in both the number of breaches, with 20 percent, and in the number of identities
exposed, with 17 percent. One example of a breach in 2008 occurred when confidential information on six million Chilean people was exposed after being illegally obtained from government databases by a hacker,
who then publicly posted the information.
12 Although it would be unrealistic to think that all of this data
would be exploited, the potential profit for the perpetrators of the attack is still substantial; for example,
in 2008 Symantec observed advertised prices for full identities on underground economy servers for as
much as $60 each.13
Symantec also assesses the distribution of phishing websites that use government top-level domains (tLDs).
14 in 2008, thailand’s tLD accounted for the highest amount of phishing sites, followed by romania
and then indonesia. As with most phishing attacks, profit seems to be the primary reason for phishing
attacks using government tLDs. the more credible a phishing attack can appear, the more likely it is to
succeed. people tend to trust that the content they are presented with on government websites is valid. Also,
many governments are putting an increasing amount of services online and, as with online banking, people are becoming accustomed to providing sensitive information in online forms in order to receive services.
Attackers may also embed these websites with malicious code designed to compromise the computers of
any subsequent site visitors. the compromised computers could then be mined for any worthwhile data or
used as a bot to send out spam and mount phishing campaigns. Social engineering exploits such as these are becoming very sophisticated and demonstrate the continued trend noted by Symantec toward focused
attacks on end users. For example, in 2008, 95 percent of attacked vulnerabilities were identified as client-
side vulnerabilities as opposed to server-side vulnerabilities.
trends point to a maturing and self-sustaining market within the online underground economy, as fraud
and identity theft continue to evolve. Within this, targeted phishing attacks on government users will
likely remain popular due to the wealth of information data government databases contain and the
potential to convert this data into profit through fraud. the valuation of the underground economy is
a reliable indicator of the degree of compromise of information systems and networks throughout the
world, and serves as a warning sign for government and critical infrastructure networks
11 http://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20090223_01
12 See http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7395295.stm and http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23678909/
13 All figures are provided in U.S. dollars
14 in a domain name, the top level domain is the part that is furthest to the right. For example, the “com” in symantec.com. there are two types of top level domains:
generic and country specific. examples of generic domains are com, net, and org, while country-specific top level domains include .cn for China, and .uk for the
United Kingdom, as well as others.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
10in 2008, Symantec observed heightened levels of malicious activity with specific increases in phishing,
spam, bot networks, trojans, and zero-day attacks. these threats coupled with the increased sophistication
and coordinated activities of attackers may have further implications for government and critical infrastructure organizations, who should be particularly concerned with the ability of malicious code
developers to target specific entities and websites.
Attackers will continue to rapidly adapt and engineer new techniques and strategies to circumvent security
measures, and the identification, analysis, and trending of these techniques across the threat landscape
are essential. it is becoming increasingly clear that security groups need to cooperate to develop effective
countermeasures and intelligence to respond to the evolving threat landscape. the large increase in the
number of new malicious code threats, coupled with the use of the Web as a distribution mechanism, also
demonstrates the growing need for more responsive and cooperative security measures. Symantec Government internet Security threat report
11Highlights
Threat Activity Trends Highlights
During this reporting period, 23 percent of all malicious activity measured by Symantec in 2008 was •
located in the United States; this is a decrease from 26 percent in 2007.
the United States was the top country of attack origin in 2008, accounting for 25 percent of worldwide •
activity; this is a decrease from 29 percent in 2007.
telecommunications was the top critical infrastructure sector for malicious activity in 2008, accounting •
for 97 percent of the total; this is a slight increase from 96 percent in 2007 when it also ranked first.in 2008, Symantec documented six public SCADA vulnerabilities. this was a decrease from 2007 when •
there were 15 documented SCADA vulnerabilities.the education sector accounted for 27 percent of data breaches that could lead to identity theft during •
this period, more than any other sector and a slight increase from 26 percent in 2007. the financial sector was the top sector for identities exposed in 2008, accounting for 29 percent of the •
total and an increase from 10 percent in 2007.in 2008, the theft or loss of a computer or other data-storage devices accounted for 48 percent of data •
breaches that could lead to identity theft and for 66 percent of the identities exposed.Symantec observed an average of 75,158 active bot-infected computers per day in 2008, an increase of •
31 percent from the previous period.
China had the most bot-infected computers in 2008, accounting for 13 percent of the worldwide total; •
this is a decrease from 19 percent in 2007.Buenos Aires was the city with the most bot-infected computers in 2008, accounting for 4 percent of the •
worldwide total.in 2008, Symantec identified 15,197 distinct new bot command-and-control servers; of these, •
43 percent operated through irC channels and 57 percent used Http .
the United States was the location for the most bot command-and-control servers in 2008, with •
33 percent of the total, more than any other country.
the top Web-based attack in 2008 was associated with the microsoft® internet explorer® ADODB.Stream •
Object File installation Weakness vulnerability, which accounted for 30 percent of the total.
the United States was the top country of origin for Web-based attacks in 2008, accounting for •
38 percent of the worldwide total.the United States was the country most frequently targeted by denial-of-service attacks in 2008, •
accounting for 51 percent of the worldwide total.the top country of origin for attacks targeting the government sector was China, which accounted for •
22 percent of the total. this was an increase from 8 percent in 2007.
the most common type of attack this period targeting government and critical infrastructure •
organizations was denial-of-service attacks, accounting for 49 percent of the top 10 in 2008.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
12Malicious Code Trends Highlights
in 2008, the number of new malicious code signatures increased by 265 percent over 2007; over •
60 percent of all currently detected malicious code threats were detected in 2008
Of the top 10 new malicious code families detected in 2008, three were trojans, three were trojans with •
a back door component, two were worms, one was a worm with a back door component, and one was a
worm with back door and virus components.
trojans made up 68 percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code samples reported in 2008, •
a minor decrease from 69 percent in 2007.Five of the top 10 staged downloaders in 2008 were trojans, two were trojans that incorporated a back •
door component, one was a worm, one of was a worm that incorporated a back door, and one was a
worm that incorporated a virus component.
in 2008, the proportional increase of potential malicious code infections was greatest in the europe, •
the middle east and Africa region.
the percentage of threats to confidential information that incorporate remote access capabilities •
declined to 83 percent in 2008; this is a decrease from 91 percent in 2007, although such threats
remained the most prevalent exposure type.
in 2008, 78 percent of threats to confidential information exported user data and 76 percent had •
a keystroke-logging component; these are increases from 74 percent and 72 percent, respectively,
in 2007.
propagation through executable file sharing continued to increase in 2008, accounting for 66 percent of •
malicious code that propagates—up from 44 percent in 2007.One percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code samples modified Web pages in 2008, down •
from 2 percent in 2007. the percentage of documented malicious code samples that exploit vulnerabilities declined substantially, •
from 13 percent in 2007 to 3 percent in 2008.in 2008, eight of the top 10 downloaded components were trojans, one was a trojan with a back door •
component, and one was a back door.
malicious code that targets online games accounted for 10 percent of the volume of the top 50 potential •
malicious code infections, up from 7 percent in 2007.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
13Phishing, Underground Economy Servers, and Spam Trends Highlights
the majority of brands used in phishing attacks in 2008 were in the financial services sector, accounting •
for 79 percent, down slightly from 83 percent identified in 2007.
the financial services sector accounted for the highest volume of phishing lures during this period, with •
76 percent of the total; this is considerably higher than 2007, when the volume for financial services was
52 percent.
in 2008, Symantec detected 55,389 phishing website hosts, an increase of 66 percent over 2007, when •
Symantec detected 33,428 phishing hosts.in 2008, 43 percent of all phishing websites identified by Symantec were located in the United States; •
this is considerably less than 2007, when 69 percent of such sites were based there.the most common top-level domain used in phishing lures detected in 2008 was .com, accounting for •
39 percent of the total; it was also the highest ranking top-level domain in 2007, when it accounted for
46 percent of the total.
the top government top-level domain that was detected as being used by phishing lures in 2008 was •
.go.th, the tLD for websites associated with the government of thailand.
One particular automated phishing toolkit identified by Symantec was responsible for an average of •
14 percent of all phishing attacks during 2008.Credit card information was the most commonly advertised item for sale on underground economy •
servers known to Symantec, accounting for 32 percent of all goods and services; this is an increase from
2007 when credit card information accounted for 21 percent of the total.
the United States was the top country for credit cards advertised on underground economy servers, •
accounting for 67 percent of the total; this is a decrease from 2007 when it accounted for 83 percent
of the total.
the most common type of spam detected in 2008 was related to internet- or computer-related goods and •
services, which made up 24 percent of all detected spam; in 2007, this was the second most common
type of spam, accounting for 19 percent of the total.
Symantec observed a 192 percent increase in spam detected across the internet, from 119.6 billion •
messages in 2007 to 349.6 billion in 2008. in 2008, 29 percent of all spam recorded by Symantec originated in the United States, a substantial •
decrease from 45 percent in 2007, when the United States was also the top ranked country of origin.in 2008, bot networks were responsible for the distribution of approximately 90 percent of all •
spam email. Symantec Government internet Security threat report
14Threat Activity Trends
this section of the Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report will provide an analysis of threat
activity, as well as other malicious activity, data breaches, and Web-based attacks that Symantec observed
in 2008 that are of interest to governments and those in the critical infrastructure sector. the malicious
activity discussed in this section not only includes threat activity, but also phishing, malicious code, spam zombies, bot-infected computers, and bot command-and-control (C&C) server activity. Attacks are defined
as any malicious activity carried out over a network that has been detected by an intrusion detection system
(iDS) or firewall. Definitions for the other types of malicious activities can be found in their respective
sections within this report.
this section will discuss the following metrics, providing analysis and discussion of the trends indicated by
the data:
malicious activity by country•
malicious activity by critical infrastructure sectors•
top countries of origin for government-targeted attacks•
Attacks by type—notable critical infrastructure sectors•
SCADA vulnerabilities•
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft•
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft, by sector•
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft, by cause•
Bot-infected computers•
Bot command-and-control servers•
top Web-based attacks•
top countries of origin for Web-based attacks•
threat activity—protection and mitigation•
Malicious activity by country
this metric will assess the countries in which the largest amount of malicious activity takes place or originates. to determine this, Symantec has compiled geographical data on numerous malicious activities,
including: bot-infected computers, phishing website hosts, malicious code reports, spam zombies, and attack origin. the rankings are determined by calculating the mean average of the proportion of these
malicious activities that originated in each country.
malicious activity usually affects computers that are connected to high-speed broadband internet because
these connections are attractive targets for attackers. Broadband connections provide larger bandwidth
capacities than other connection types, faster speeds, the potential of constantly connected systems, and
typically more stable connections. the top three countries in this metric—the United States, China, and
Germany—all have extensively developed and growing broadband infrastructures.
15 China, which passed
the United States for the largest number of broadband subscribers for the first time in 2008, has 21 percent of the worldwide broadband subscriber total with 83.3 million subscribers. the United States is second
with 20 percent, while Germany is fourth with 6 percent. each country also experienced a growth of over
20 percent in broadband subscribers from 2007.
15 http://www.point-topic.comSymantec Government internet Security threat report
15in 2008, the United States was the top country for overall malicious activity, making up 23 percent of the
total (table 1). this is a decrease from 2007 when the United States was also first, with 26 percent. Within
specific category measurements, the United States ranked first in malicious code, phishing website hosts, and attack origin.
2008
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
78
9
102007
Rank
1
2
3
4
8
6
75
15
12Country
United States
China
Germany
United Kingdom
Brazil
Spain
ItalyFrance
Turkey
Poland2008
Overall
Percentage
23%
9%
6%
5%
4%
4%
3%3%
3%
3%2007
Overall
Percentage
26%
11%
7%
4%
3%
3%
3%4%
2%
2%Malicious
Code
Rank
1
2
12
4
16
10
11
8
15
23Spam
Zombies
Rank
3
4
2
10
1
8
6
14
5
9Phishing
Websites
Host Rank
1
6
2
5
16
13
14
9
24
8Bot
Rank
2
1
4
9
5
3
6
10
8
7Attack
Origin
Rank
1
2
4
3
9
6
8
5
12
17
Table 1. Malicious activity by country
Source: Symantec Corporation
the slight decrease in overall malicious activity for the United States can be attributed to the drop in
spam zombies there. this is likely due to the shutdown of two U.S.-based Web hosting companies that
were allegedly hosting a large number of bot C&C servers associated with spam distribution bot networks
(botnets).16 Spam activity decreased worldwide after both shutdowns. in one case, Symantec observed a
65 percent decrease in spam traffic in the 24 hours that followed.17 Both companies allegedly hosted a
large number of bot C&C servers for several large spam botnets: Srizbi,18 rustock,19 and Ozdok (mega-D).20
Spam zombies that lack a critical command system are unable to send out spam.
China had the second highest amount of overall worldwide malicious activity in 2008, accounting for
9 percent; this is a decrease from 11 percent in the previous reporting period. Along with the fact that
China has the most broadband subscribers in the world, the amount of time spent online by users there could contribute to the high percentage of malicious activity in China. the longer a user is online, the longer
the computer is exposed to malicious attack or compromise, and internet users in China spend more of
their leisure time online than users in any other country.
21 Online leisure activities are also typically more
likely to include activities on sites that may be vulnerable to attacks. this includes social networking
websites, online gaming sites, forums, blogs, and online shopping sites. Dynamic sites, such as forums, for example, are prime targets for attackers using bot-infected computers to propagate and host malicious
content since Web application and site-specific vulnerabilities can put these types of site at risk.
16 http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/10/spam_volumes_plummet_after_atr.html
17 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/other_resources/b-state_of_spam_report_12-2008.en-us.pdf
18 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-062007-0946-99
19 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-011309-5412-99
20 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-021215-0628-99
21 http://www.tnsglobal.com/_assets/files/ tnS_market_research_Digital_World_Digital_Life.pdfSymantec Government internet Security threat report
16the slight drop in China’s percentage of malicious activity in 2008 was mainly due to the drop in phishing
website hosts and bot-infected computers. China dropped from third for phishing website hosts in 2007
to sixth in 2008, with just under 3 percent of the global total; and, although China maintained its top ranking for bot-infected computers, its global share in this regard decreased from 19 percent in 2007 to
13 percent in 2008.
One possible cause for the decreases may be national initiatives to block websites potentially most
susceptible to fraud in an effort to increase online security for users ahead of the 2008 Beijing Olympic
Games. thousands of websites were either shut down or blacklisted as part of this effort, including a
substantial number of message forums,
22 which, as noted previously, are popular targets of attack from
Web application and site-specific vulnerabilities. thus, any reduction in the number of bot-infected
computers should result in a corresponding drop in other attack activity categories, such as spam zombies, because these are often associated with bot-infected computers. China dropped from third in spam
zombies in 2007, with 7 percent of the worldwide total, to fourth and 6 percent in 2008.
Another factor that may have contributed to the lower percentage of bot-infected computers in China in
2008 was that many unlicensed internet cafés there were also shut down and supervision was tightened
on the remaining cafés to help address online security risks associated with the casual use of public computers.
23 public computers tend to be more susceptible to attacks because of the significant amount
of varied traffic on such computer terminals. public computers are frequently used by a great variety of
people for many different activities such as email, online shopping, and gaming. the variety of usage and
likelihood that transient users are less aware of—or concerned with—security makes such computers attractive to attackers.
in 2008, Germany again ranked third with 6 percent of all internet-wide malicious activity, down slightly
from 7 percent in 2007. in both years, Germany ranked highly in spam zombies and hosting phishing
websites—activities that are often associated with bot networks. in 2008, Germany ranked fourth for bot
C&C servers, with 5 percent of the total. this high number of bot C&C servers likely indicates that botnets
are prominent in Germany, which would contribute to the high amount of overall malicious activity
originating there. Also, spam zombies are often focused in regions with high broadband penetration and
bandwidth capacity because these conditions facilitate sending out large amounts of spam quickly.
it is reasonable to expect that the United States, China and Germany will continue to outrank other
countries in this measurement as they have done so for the past several reports. Beyond these three,
however, countries such as Brazil, turkey, poland, india, and russia are expected to continue to increase
their share of overall malicious activity because they all have rapidly growing internet infrastructures and
growing broadband populations.
24 Countries that have a relatively new and growing internet infrastructure
tend to experience increasing levels of malicious activity until security protocols and measures are improved to counter these activities.
2 2 See http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/news/2207878/china-cracks-web-porn and http://english.gov.cn/2008-03/29/content_931872.htm
23 http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/rt GAm.20080212.wgtchina0212/BnStory/ technology/home
24 http://www.point-topic.comSymantec Government internet Security threat report
17Malicious activity by critical infrastructure sectors
this metric will evaluate the amount of malicious activity originating from computers and networks that
are known to belong to government and critical infrastructure sectors. to measure this, Symantec cross-
references the ip addresses of known malicious computers with Standard industrial Classification (SiC)
codes25 that are assigned to each industry and provided by a third-party service.26 Symantec has compiled
data on numerous malicious activities that were detected originating from the ip address space of these
organizations. these activities include bot-infected computers, hosting phishing websites, spam zombies,
and attack origins.
this metric indicates the level to which government and critical infrastructure organizations may have
been compromised and are being used by attackers as launching pads for malicious activity. these attacks
could potentially expose sensitive and confidential information, which could have serious ramifications for
government and critical infrastructure organizations. Such information could be used for strategic purposes
in the case of state- or group-sponsored attacks, especially since attackers who use compromised
computers for malicious activity can mask their actual location.
in 2008, 97 percent of all malicious activity originating from critical infrastructure sectors originated from
telecommunications organizations (table 2). this was an increase from 2007 when telecommunications
accounted for 96 percent of the total. For each of the malicious activities in this metric, telecommunications ranked first by a significant margin.
2008 Rank
1
23
4
5
67
8
9
102007 Rank
1
23
4
5
67
8
9
10Sector
Telecommunications
ManufacturingFinancial services
Health care
Transportation
Utilities/energyMilitary
Agriculture
Biotech/pharmaceutical
Law enforcement2008 Percentage
97%
1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%2007 Percentage
96%
2%
1%
<1%<1%
<1%<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
Table 2. Malicious activity by critical infrastructure sector
Source: Symantec
25 SiC codes are the standard industry codes that are used by the United States Securities and exchange Commission to identify organizations belonging to each
industry. For more, on this, please see http://www.sec.gov
26 http://www.digitalenvoy.netSymantec Government internet Security threat report
18Attackers may be targeting the telecommunications sector for a number of reasons. Organizations in this
sector include iSps and Web-hosting companies and they often have a large number of computers that are
directly connected to the internet. these publicly accessible computers may present more opportunities
for attackers to compromise because they do not have to break into a network to gain access to them.
Organizations in this sector have a challenging task to manage these large numbers of internet-facing
computers and, hence, computers in telecommunications organizations likely represent attractive targets for attackers. As such, this likely contributes to the high amount of malicious activity originating from this
sector. Also, Symantec observed that 84 percent of attacks against the telecommunications sector were
shellcode exploits,
27 which may indicate that attackers are attempting to take control of computers in this
sector and use them to conduct malicious activity.
Attackers may view telecommunications organizations as excellent platforms for launching subsequent
attacks because organizations within this sector are likely to have extensive broadband infrastructures with
high-bandwidth and high-traffic networks. this would enable an attacker to carry out large attacks, such
as DoS attacks to disrupt services, which deny access to organizations/individuals that subscribe to their
services, or other malicious activity, such as relaying spam. this is illustrated by the high percentage of
spam zombies and bot-infected computers found in the telecommunications sector. High-bandwidth capacity networks may also allow an attacker to hide attack and bot traffic more effectively, especially for
Http -based bot C&C servers, where Http bot traffic is virtually indistinguishable from regular traffic,
making it difficult to filter.
Since organizations in the telecommunications sector likely have numerous servers, once an attacker gains
access to the organization, he or she can potentially infect all websites that are hosted on those servers with
malicious code for Web-based attacks, or compromise them for phishing attacks or malicious code delivery
systems. in a recent example, attackers were able to gain access to a bill payment service website through
the internet domain registry and reroute all traffic to malicious sites hosted on servers in Ukraine.
28
Government and critical infrastructure organizations rely on the availability of public communication
networks and the telecommunication sector for day-to-day operations. Since telecommunications
organizations typically control the flow of data through networks, attackers may compromise strategically
located computers inside organizations. Computers within telecommunications organizations may
effectively serve as platforms from which attacks can be launched against organizations served by
telecommunications firms because they provide communications for other sectors as well, including
government. As such, attackers who are seeking confidential or sensitive information may specifically
target this sector. Successful compromise of computers in the telecommunications sector could allow
an attacker to eavesdrop on or disrupt key communications in other sectors.
the manufacturing sector was the origin of the second highest amount of malicious activity during 2008,
accounting for 1 percent of the total. this was a decrease from 2007, when it accounted for 2 percent of
the total. Organizations in the manufacturing sector invest large amounts of time and money into research and development into new methods and products. As stated in the “SCADA vulnerabilities ” discussion
below, malicious activity in the manufacturing sector can be a national security concern due to the
repercussions of disruptions to critical infrastructure. in this highly competitive sector, many organizations
use websites as a tool to market and sell their products online. Attackers likely rely upon the trust that users
27 Shellcode is a small piece of code used as the payload in the exploitation of a vulnerability.
28 http://www.csoonline.com/article/474365/CheckFree_Warns_million_Customers_After_HackSymantec Government internet Security threat report
19have for these brands, as the manufacturing sector ranked high for phishing website hosts. Once an attacker
compromises a manufacturer’s website, visitors thinking they are browsing on a legitimate site may become
victims of malicious activity such as downloaded trojans or keystroke loggers.
Top countries of origin for government-targeted attacks
Attacks targeting governments can be motivated by a number of factors. profit is often a motive because
governments store considerable amounts of personal identification data that could be used for fraudulent purposes, such as identity theft. personal data can include names, addresses, government-issued
identification numbers, and bank account credentials, all of which can be effectively exploited for fraud by attackers. Government databases also store information that could attract politically motivated attacks,
including critical infrastructure information and other sensitive intelligence. As a recent study discussed,
attacks on government computer networks in the United States that resulted in a compromise or stolen
information increased by 40 percent from 2007 to 2008.
29
in 2008, China was the top country of origin for attacks that targeted the government sector, with 22 percent of the total (table 3), an increase from 8 percent in 2007 when it ranked fourth. For internet-wide attacks in
2008, 13 percent of that total originated in China.
A number of media reports allege that attacks on government computer networks in countries such as the
United States, india and Belgium had originated in China.
30 nevertheless, it should be noted that attackers
often attempt to obscure their tracks by redirecting attacks through one or more servers that may be located anywhere in the world; this means that the attacker may be located elsewhere than the country from where
the attacks appear to originate.
2008 Rank
1
2
3
4
56
7
89
102007 Rank
4
1
2
3
86
5
10
1918Country
China
United States
Spain
France
United KingdomItaly
Germany
BrazilTurkeyRussia2008 Percentage
22%
12%
6%
5%
5%4%
4%
3%3%2%2007 Percentage
8%
20%
10%
9%4%7%
8%
2%1%1%
Table 3. Top countries of origin for government-targeted attacks
Source: Symantec
29 http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2009-02-16-cyber-attacks_n.htm
30 http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2931c542-ac35-11dd-bf71-000077b07658.html,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Cyber_attacks_by_China_on_indian_sites/articleshow/3010288.cms,
and http://www.dofonline.co.uk/economy/chinese-espionage-alert-in-belgium5458.htmlSymantec Government internet Security threat report
20the United States ranked second in 2008 for attacks targeting government, with 12 percent of the total,
a decrease from 20 percent in 2007. this drop is likely due to the shutdown of two iSps in September
and november 2008, which resulted in a dramatic drop in bot activity worldwide. Because bot-infected
computers are used for large-scale attacks, such as DoS attacks, a significant drop in their numbers
would result in a corresponding decrease in the number of malicious attacks detected.
the percentage of government-targeted attacks launched from the United States was less than half of its
percentage for internet-wide attacks, which accounted for 25 percent of that total in 2008. this indicates
that the attacks originating from the United States were not specifically targeting government organizations, but were instead part of more general, widespread attacks.
Spain ranked third in this metric and accounted for 6 percent of attacks targeting government organizations
in 2008, down from 10 percent in 2007. the 6 percent is twice the 3 percent of internet-wide attacks that
originated there, indicating that attacks originating in Spain may have been specifically targeting government organizations.
One reason for Spain’s ranking here is due to the activities of a group of hackers located there. the group
was arrested for compromising and defacing governmental websites in the United States, Asia, Latin
America, and Spain.
31 investigations show that the group was responsible for having disabled 21,000 Web
pages over a two-year period.32
Attacks by type—notable critical infrastructure sectors
this section of the Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report will focus on the types of attacks
detected by sensors deployed in notable critical infrastructure sectors. the ability to identify attacks by type
assists security administrators in evaluating which assets may be targeted. in doing so, this may assist
security administrators in securing those assets receiving a disproportionate number of attacks. the
following sectors will be discussed in detail:
Government and critical infrastructure organizations•
Government •
Biotech/pharmaceutical•
Health care•
Financial services•
transportation•
31 http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/computersecurity/hacking/2008-05-17-hackers-spain_n.htm
32 http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2008/05/18/2248032.htmSymantec Government internet Security threat report
21Government and critical infrastructure organizations
Government and critical infrastructure organizations are the target of a wide variety of attack types. the
most common attack type seen by all sensors in the government and critical infrastructure sectors in 2008
was DoS attacks, which accounted for 49 percent of the top 10 attacks (figure 1). Smtp attacks were the
second most common accounting for 44 percent of the top 10 attacks.
SMTP (email) 44%DoS 49%Web (server) 6%
Figure 1. Top attack types, government and critical infrastructure33
Source: Symantec
DoS attacks are a threat to government and critical infrastructures because the purpose of such attacks is
to disrupt the availability of high-profile websites or other network services, and make them inaccessible to
users and employees. this could result in the disruption of internal and external communications, making
it practically impossible for employees and users to access potentially critical information. Because these
attacks often receive greater exposure than those that take a single user offline, especially for high-profile
government websites, they could also result in damage to the organization’s reputation. A successful DoS
attack on a government network could also severely undermine confidence in government competence,
and impair the defense and protection of government networks.
DoS attacks can often be associated with political protests, since they are intended to render a site
inaccessible in the same way that a physical protest attempts to block access to a service or location. they
can also be associated with conflict whereby one country may attempt to block Web traffic or take websites offline. As such, the high percentage of DoS attacks may be an attempt to express disagreement with
targeted organizations or countries.
33 Due to rounding, percentages may not add up to 100 percent. Symantec Government internet Security threat report
22Smtp , or simple mail transfer protocol, is designed to facilitate the delivery of email messages across the
internet. email servers using Smtp as a service are likely targeted by attackers because external access is
required to deliver email. While most services can be blocked by a firewall to protect against external attacks
and allow access only to trusted users and entities, for email to function effectively for organizations, it has
to be available both internally and externally to other email servers. the necessity of allowing both internal
and external access increases the probability that a successful attack will improve the attackers’ chances of gaining access to the network.
in addition to illegally accessing networks, attackers who compromise email servers may also be
attempting to use the email servers to send spam or harvest email addresses for targeted phishing attacks.
Because spam can often consume high quantities of unauthorized network bandwidth, these emails can
disrupt or overwhelm email services, which could result in DoS conditions. Successful Smtp attacks against
government and critical infrastructure organizations could also allow attackers to spoof official government communications and obtain credentials in order to launch further attacks. these organizations heavily rely
on email as a communication method and, as such, it is essential that email traffic be secured. Symantec recommends that administrators use secure email protocols, deploy anti-spam and antifraud solutions,
and ensure that operating and email solutions are fully patched against all known vulnerabilities.
Top attacks by types, by sectors
DoS attacks were the most common type of attack observed by sensors deployed in the government, biotech/
pharmaceutical, financial services, and transportation sectors in 2008 (figure 2). these attacks made up
48 percent of the top 10 attacks observed by government sensors, 54 percent in the biotech/pharmaceutical
sector, 48 percent in the financial services sector, and 74 percent of the transportation sector.
As discussed above, it is likely these attacks were conducted to disrupt services in these sectors as a form
of either protest or retaliation. Also, by denying access to these websites, these attacks could result in a
significant loss of revenue for organizations in these sectors.
DoS attacks were by far the most common attack observed in the transportation sector. Since DoS attacks
accounted for 49 percent of the attacks on government and critical infrastructure, this difference may
indicate that attackers deploying these attacks are specifically targeting the transportation sector. Attackers
may be using this type of attack to disrupt services and communications within the transportation sector.
Large-scale attacks of this nature may leave organizations unable to coordinate communications or relief
efforts in the event of an emergency, or the inability to move supplies and goods for a military during a war or crisis. Also, because delays in the transportation sector often have a domino effect, in which delays in one
city will cause delays in another due to scheduling, attacks on a relatively small part of this sector could have
a significant effect on these situations.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
23DNS
Web (server )DoS
STMP (email)Percentage
11%
Biotech /pharmaceutical Financial services
Transportation5%
4% 48%1%
54%
97%4%
48%6%46%
8%
16%1%
74%Shellcode /exploit
Web (browser)Government
<1%1%1%
Health care14%18%
Backscatter41%
Figure 2. Top attack types, by sectors34
Source: Symantec
Smtp -based attacks were the most common attacks detected by sensors deployed in the health care
sector in 2008, accounting for 97 percent of the top 10 attacks against the sector. these attacks against
the health care sector may be from spammers trying to compromise email servers of legitimate companies
in order to sell health care services and products. malicious attackers may be able to use Smtp -based
attacks to distribute confidential, misleading, or false information that could put patients and providers at
risk. Also, by harvesting email addresses from such companies, attackers can use the trusted brand of that company to enhance their chances that their email is accepted as valid. this could, in turn, negatively effect
the reputation of the targeted company.
it is worth noting that Smtp -based attacks fell from ranking first in 2007 to second in 2008 for the biotech/
pharmaceutical and financial sectors, which may indicate that organizations in these sectors may be
mitigating against these types of attacks by implementing better filters for internet traffic and monitoring
activity that enters the network. Although Smtp -based attacks did rank second for these two sectors,
they still accounted for a large number of the top 10 attacks, likely for the same reasons as in the
health care sector.
SCADA vulnerabilities
this metric will examine the SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) security threat landscape.
SCADA represents a wide range of protocols and technologies for monitoring and managing equipment and
machinery in various sectors of critical infrastructure and industry. this includes, but is not limited to, power
generation, manufacturing, oil and gas, water treatment, and waste management. therefore, the security of
SCADA technologies and protocols is a concern related to national security because the disruption of related services can result in failure of infrastructure and potential loss of life—among other consequences.
34 Due to rounding, percentages may not add up to 100 percent. Symantec Government internet Security threat report
24this discussion is based on data surrounding publicly known vulnerabilities affecting SCADA technologies.
the purpose of the metric is to provide insight into the state of security research as it affects to SCADA
systems. to a lesser degree, this may provide insight into the overall state of SCADA security. Vulnerabilities
affecting SCADA systems may present a threat to critical infrastructure that relies on these systems. Due
to the potential for disruption of critical services, these vulnerabilities may be associated with politically
motivated or state-sponsored attacks. this is a concern for governments and/or enterprises that are
involved in the critical infrastructure sector. While this metric provides insight into public SCADA vulnerability disclosures, due to the sensitive nature of vulnerabilities affecting critical infrastructure, there is likely private security research conducted by SCADA technology and security vendors. Symantec does not
have insight into any private research because the results of such research are not publicly disclosed.
in 2008, Symantec documented six public SCADA vulnerabilities. this is fewer than the 15 public SCADA
vulnerabilities documented by Symantec in 2007. there were more publicly reported SCADA vulnerabilities
in 2007 due to multiple similar vulnerabilities affecting a single implementation that were reported in a
single announcement.
35 therefore, the difference between 2007 and 2008 does not appear to be a
significant trend.
the number of public SCADA vulnerabilities is relatively small and represents the research efforts of a
small community of specialized researchers. Security research in the field of SCADA often requires
specialized knowledge and resources. Due to their role in critical infrastructure and the severity of potential vulnerabilities, SCADA security is often a private affair between industries that use SCADA protocols and
technologies, the vendors themselves, and other stakeholders such as computer emergency response
teams (Cert s) and government agencies. the close-knit nature of the SCADA industry means that
vulnerability announcements are not necessarily made public. information about vulnerabilities or general
bugs is more likely to be exchanged in private between vendors, their customers, and other interested
parties. these factors limit the number publicly disclosed SCADA vulnerabilities. the number of public
vulnerabilities is not likely to increase until more security researchers become involved in this area of interest or until vendors change their policies about public vulnerability disclosure.
information about SCADA-related incidents, whether accidental or malicious, has been tracked by
organizations such as the British Columbia institute of technology (BCit ), which maintained, for a number
of years, a non-public database of SCADA incidents called the industrial Security incident Database (iSiD).
efforts such as the iSiD have been able to provide credible incidence data that can be used to gauge the
amount and severity of attack activity affecting SCADA environments. A Symantec-sponsored report assessing data in iSiD was published in 2007.
36 in June of 2006, the database had tracked 105 legitimate
incidents, with the earliest dating back to 1982. However, more recent data is not available because the iSiD was not maintained after this point.
37
in February of 2008, the SCADASe C-L mailing list was created to foster public discussion of SCADA security
issues.38 However, unlike other mainstream security mailing lists, SCADASe C-L discourages discussion of
technical details surrounding vulnerabilities. the notion of the full-disclosure of security vulnerabilities is
unpopular in SCADA security circles due to the elevated risk to critical infrastructure that is posed by
vulnerabilities in SCADA technologies. this means that those affected by vulnerabilities are largely
dependent on vendors reporting security issues as well as efforts by Cert organizations to disseminate
35 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/23059
36 http://ethernet.industrial-networking.com/articles/articledisplay.asp?id=1823
37 http://www.automationworld.com/news-4144
38 http://www.infracritical.com/usage-scadasec.htmlSymantec Government internet Security threat report
25information about vulnerabilities. in September of 2008, a security researcher publicly released exploit
code for a vulnerability in CitectSCADA because the researcher believed that the vendor reporting did not
adequately emphasize the risk of the vulnerability.39
Governments have also expressed criticism toward the private sector regarding its ability to manage and
prevent vulnerabilities that may affect critical infrastructure. in may of 2008, a government representative
from the U.S. House Subcommittee on emerging threats, Cybersecurity and Science and technology
criticized the north American electric reliability Corporation (nerC) for its handling of potential threats
to the electrical grid.40
in December of 2006, tenable Security announced the release of SCADA plug-ins for the nessus
vulnerability assessment tool.41 this demonstrated converging interests between the SCADA community
and the mainstream security community. From this point on, security researchers began to discover
vulnerabilities in SCADA-related technologies. it has since been realized that SCADA technologies are
affected by many of the same types of vulnerabilities that affect desktop and enterprise software.
For example, some functions are implemented as ActiveX® controls and are therefore prone to similar
vulnerabilities that have been identified in other ActiveX controls in general. many of the vulnerabilities
documented in 2007 and 2008 affect ActiveX controls that implement functionality, such as OpC servers. this will allow a microsoft Windows®-based computer to communicate with other applications and devices
in a SCADA environment. Software such as this is more accessible to security researchers than other SCADA-related applications and hardware. therefore, security researchers are able to discover
vulnerabilities in these applications without requiring access to a complete SCADA environment.
Additionally, network-accessible devices may use either common or specialized networking protocols
that are prone to attacks such as DoS attacks. malformed network traffic may affect these devices in
a manner similar to other network-accessible services within the enterprise. While security researchers
have pinpointed vulnerabilities specific to SCADA technologies, there is also a potential threat from
vulnerabilities in components connected to SCADA systems. this can include operating systems hosting
the SCADA technologies or other components such as database software. Additionally, many SCADA environments employ legacy technologies that are not equipped with mechanisms for authentication
or measures to ensure the availability, integrity, and confidentiality of data. these systems may be
particularly at risk, especially if they are not fault tolerant or designed to handle exceptional conditions such as malformed input.
to limit exposure to attacks, networks running SCADA protocols and devices should be isolated from other
networks. these assets should not be connected to the internet and incoming/outgoing traffic should be
limited to only those protocols that are required. A defense-in-depth strategy should be deployed so that
security risks elsewhere in the organization cannot affect the control network. Additional layers of defense
should be deployed to protect key assets. Securing a SCADA environment may present different challenges than those faced when securing an enterprise. in many cases it may not be possible to create a test
environment for auditing purposes. Furthermore, any disruption of services may be costly or damaging. therefore, both passive asset discovery as well as vulnerability scanning technologies are best applied to
limit the potential for side effects. Antivirus and patch management measures should be undertaken with
care and organizations should consult security and control system vendors for support in applying these solutions in a manner that minimizes risk and downtime.
39 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/09/08/scada_exploit_released/
40 http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/146153/lawmakers_see_cyber_threats_to_electrical_grid.html
41 http://blog.tenablesecurity.com/2006/12/nessus_3_scada_.htmlSymantec Government internet Security threat report
26Data breaches that could lead to identity theft
identity theft continues to be a high-profile security issue, particularly for organizations that store and
manage large amounts of personal information. Based on the most recent information available from
2007, roughly 8.4 million U.S. residents were victims of identity theft, which represents approximately
3 percent of the adult population.42 not only can compromises that result in the loss of personal data
undermine customer and institutional confidence, result in costly damage to an organization’s reputation,
and be costly for individuals to recover from the resulting identity theft, they can also be financially costly
to organizations. in 2008, the average cost per incident of a data breach in the United States was $6.7
million,43 an increase of 5 percent from 2007, and lost business amounted to an average of $4.6 million.44
Also, organizations can be held liable for breaches and losses, which may result in fines or litigation.45
By the end of 2008, 44 states in the United States (along with the District of Columbia, puerto rico, and
the Virgin islands) had enacted legislation requiring notification of breaches involving personal information.
the legislation regulates the responsibilities of organizations conducting business within the particular state after a data breach has occurred.
46 the laws require anyone who conducts business in the state to
notify owners of the information exposed immediately after a security breach, with failure to do so
resulting in possible civil action and fines.
Governments in other countries have also taken steps to embark on the issue of identity fraud, including
Canada, Australia and new Zealand, who issued guidelines for dealing with privacy breach notification in
2007-2008.47 Unlike legislation, guidelines may not have penalties associated with them, but they are a
step toward creating accountability for data breaches that occur. meanwhile, Australia is considering the
recommendations by the Australian Law reform Commission, in its review of the privacy Act, to make data
breach notification mandatory. 48
in the United Kingdom, only government organizations are currently required to report all data breaches
to the information Commissioner’s Officer (iCO) as part of the Data protection Act, and there are no plans
to implement breach notification laws.49 Following the examples in the United States, recommendations
have been made to the european Union by the european network and information Security Agency and the
european Data protection Supervisor to establish data breach notification laws.50 Currently, the european
parliament states that organizations should report the breach but are not required to do so by law.51
However, discussions are at the moment underway in Brussels, as part of the review of the european
telecommunications regulatory Framework, on the possible introduction of a data breach notification law
to the privacy and electronic Communications Directive for the european telecommunications sector.
42 http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/idtheftsurveys.htm#Jav2007
43 All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.
44 http://www.encryptionreports.com/download/p onemon_COB_2008_US_090201.pdf
45 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/pr/2007/021.shtml
46 http://www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/cip/priv/breachlaws.htm
47 http://www.privcom.gc.ca/information/guide/2007/gl_070801_01_e.asp, http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/breach_guide.html,
and http://www.privacy.org.nz/the-privacy-act-and-codes/
48 http://www.dpmc.gov.au/privacy/alrc.cfm and http://www.alrc.gov.au/media/2008/mr11108.html
49 http://www.justice.gov.uk/docs/response-data-sharing-review.pdf, recommendation 11
50 http://www.enisa.europa.eu/doc/pdf/deliverables/enisa_privacy_wg_report.pdf and
http://www.edps.europa.eu/eDpSWeB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Opinions/2008/08-04-10_e-privacy_en.pdf
51 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubref=-//ep //teXt+tA+p6- tA-2008-0452+0+DOC+XmL+V0//en&language=enSymantec Government internet Security threat report
27there are other notable initiatives that exist in the United States for the safeguarding of personal
information. they include the red Flags rules as part of the Fair and Accurate Credit transactions (FACt )
Act of 2003, which requires all financial institutions and creditors to develop identity theft prevention programs,
52 and the payment Card industry Data Security Standards (pCi DSS), which lists a set of
requirements for enhancing payment account data security such as network requirements, encryption
transmission requirements, security assessments to eliminate security vulnerabilities, and maintaining
security policies.53 the updated version will include incorporating best practices and improving reporting
requirements.54 the added consideration of punitive costs may influence organizations to develop more
robust security strategies, which may help reduce the number of breaches overall.
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by sector
Using publicly available data, Symantec has determined the sectors that were most often affected by these breaches, as well as the most common causes of data loss.
55 this discussion will also explore the severity
of the breach by measuring the total number of identities exposed to attackers, using the same publicly
available data. An identity is considered to be exposed if personal or financial data related to the identity
is made available through the data breach.56
it should be noted that some sectors may need to comply with more stringent reporting requirements for
data breaches than others. For instance, government organizations are more likely to report data breaches,
either due to regulatory obligations or in conjunction with publicly accessible audits and performance
reports.57 Conversely, organizations that rely on consumer confidence may be less inclined to report such
breaches for fear of negative consumer, industry, or market reaction. As a result, sectors that are not
required or encouraged to report data breaches may be under-represented in this data set.
in 2008, the education sector represented the highest number of known data breaches that could lead to
identity theft, accounting for 27 percent of the total (figure 3). this is a slight increase from 2007 when the
education sector also ranked first with 26 percent of the total.
52 http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/alerts/alt050.shtm
53 https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/security_standards/pci_dss.shtml
54 https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/pdfs/08-18-08_2.pdf
55 Open Security Foundation (OSF) Dataloss DB, see http://datalossdb.org
56 An identity is considered to be exposed if personal or financial data related to the identity is made available through the data breach.
57 Cf. http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs6a-facta.htm and http://www.cms.hhs.gov/HealthplansGeninfo/12_Hip AA.aspSymantec Government internet Security threat report
284% 5%
29%
20%13%6%
Data breaches Identities exposed2%10%
Health careEducation
Government
Financial 2%2%2%2%
20%5%
14%
15%
Retail/ wholesale
Arts/media
Manufacturing 27%
TelecomBusiness consulting
Insurance
Other
Biotech /pharmaceutical4%
17%2%
Utilities/ ener gy
Figure 3. Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by sector and identities exposed by sector58
Source: Based on data provided by OSF DataLoss DB
educational institutions store a large amount of personal information on students, faculty, and staff that
could be used for the purposes of identity theft, including government-issued identification numbers,
names, and addresses. Finance departments in these institutions also store bank account information for
payroll and may also hold credit card information for people who use this method to pay for tuition and
fees. these institutions—particularly larger universities—often consist of many autonomous departments
within which sensitive personal identification information may be stored in separate locations and be accessible to many people. this may increase the opportunities for attackers to gain unauthorized access
to this data since it may be more difficult to standardize the security, educate everyone with access to the data on the policies, and control access to these dispersed databases.
58 Due to rounding, percentages might not equal 100 percent. Symantec Government internet Security threat report
29Despite the high number of data breaches that occurred in the education sector during 2008, it only
accounted for 4 percent of all identities exposed during the period and ranked seventh (figure 1). this
may be because the educational institutions have relatively smaller databases than those of financial or government institutions and, hence, fewer identities would be exposed in a data breach. One of the largest
universities in the United States accounted for less than 80,000 students and employees, while financial
and government institutions may store information on millions of people.
59
Also, one-third of the data breaches in the education sector this period were caused by the theft or loss
of computers or data-storage devices. As such, data breaches that occurred in the education sector in
this reporting period were not as likely to result in wide-scale identity theft because they resulted in the exposure of fewer identities. these types of breaches only expose the limited amount of data that is
stored on the devices.
in 2008, the government sector ranked second and accounted for 20 percent of data breaches that could
lead to identity theft. this is a decrease from the previous year, when the government sector represented
23 percent of the total, though still ranking second. this trend is reinforced by the annual Federal Computer
Security report card, where the number of government agencies with a failing grade decreased by almost
half.
60 the health care sector ranked third in 2008, accounting for 15 percent of data breaches that could
lead to identity theft. it also ranked third in 2007, accounting for 14 percent.
Government and health care organizations, like educational institutions, store large amounts of information
that could be used for identity theft. Similar to the education sector, these organizations often consist of
numerous autonomous departments that store sensitive personal information in separate locations and
are accessible to numerous people. As a consequence, these organizations face the same security and
control issues as educational institutions. Furthermore, health care organizations store sensitive medical
information in addition to personal information, which could result in even more damaging breaches
of privacy.
the government sector ranked third for identities exposed during 2008, accounting for 17 percent of
the total while the health care sector ranked sixth, accounting for 5 percent of the total. As with the
education sector, data breaches within the health care sector resulted in a relatively low number of
identities exposed.
59 http://www.osu.edu/osutoday/stuinfo.php
60 http://republicans.oversight.house.gov/media/pDFs/reports/F y2007FiSmAreportCard.pdfSymantec Government internet Security threat report
30Data breaches that could lead to identity theft, by cause
in 2008, the primary cause of data breaches that could facilitate identity theft was the theft or loss of
a computer or other medium on which data is stored or transmitted, such as a USB key or a back-up
medium.61 theft or loss made up 48 percent of all data breaches in 2008, a decrease from the
previous reporting period when it accounted for 52 percent of all reported breaches (figure 4).
Data breaches Identities exposedInsider 4%
Unknown <1%Insecure policy 8%
Hacking 22%
Theft /loss 66%Insecure policy 21%Insider 7%
Hacking 17%
Unknown 7%
Fraud 1%
Theft /loss 48%Fraud <1%
Figure 4. Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by cause and identities exposed62
Source: Based on data provided by OSF DataLoss DB
theft or loss accounted for 66 percent of all identities exposed in 2008, more than any other cause
(figure 4). this was a large increase from 2007, when the number of identities exposed from theft or loss
accounted for 24 percent of the total. the main reason for this dramatic increase is that theft or loss was
the cause for the three largest breaches that exposed the highest number of identities reported in 2008.
these breaches were due to lost or missing disks and exposed personal information relating to an
estimated 41 million people.
Although laptops and other storage devices, such as USB memory keys, portable hard drives, and disks,
have become smaller, less expensive, and easier to use, their compact size and larger storage capability has
increased the opportunity for theft, loss, or misplacement, as well as the potential amount of information
breached; a single DVD disk can contain personal information on millions of people. in a recent survey, one
in 10 people have lost a laptop, smart phone, or USB flash drive with corporate information stored on it.63 it
may be that the theft of a computer or data-storage device is opportunistic and motivated by the hardware
itself and not necessarily its contents, and as such, may not lead to wide-scale identity theft, although there
have been cases where information obtained from on a lost disk was discovered in advertisements in the
underground economy.
61 this cause will be referred to as theft or loss for the remainder of the report.
62 Due to rounding, percentages might not equal 100 percent.
63 http://www.rsa.com/press_release.aspx?id=9703Symantec Government internet Security threat report
31to protect against data theft or loss, organizations should restrict the use of outside personal storage
devices within their network, monitor the usage of such hardware when permitted, and educate employees
on proper usage. Organizations should also include reviews and audits of electronic documents used by
employees upon leaving the company. in a recent study, 59 percent of employees admitted to taking
company information, such as email addresses, contact information of customers, employee records,
and financial records, when leaving the organization.64 Of these former employees, 79 percent took the
information without consent from the company. in 92 percent of the instances, the information was taken
on disk, while 73 percent was on removable drives. it is worth noting that only 15 percent of the companies
polled had conducted a review or audit of electronic documents taken by employees. Also, sensitive data
should be strongly encrypted on any laptop or storage device that may be used outside of the enterprise.
the second most common cause of data breaches that could lead to identity theft during 2008 was
insecure policy, which represented 21 percent of all incidents. A data breach is considered to be caused
by insecure policy if it can be attributed to a failure to develop, implement, and/or comply with adequate
security policy. in 2007, insecure policy also ranked second, accounting for 28 percent of such data
breaches. this decrease in the number of data breaches may be due to organizations becoming more
diligent and producing stronger security policies such as limiting access to sensitive information to required
personnel and the documentation of document transfers. insecure policy accounted for only 8 percent of
exposed identities in 2008 and, thus, each breach exposed only a relatively small number of identities. Although breaches caused by insecure policy in 2008 were not likely to result in wide-scale identity theft, the breaches still exposed approximately 6.5 million identities.
65
in 2008, hacking was the third leading cause of data breaches that could lead to identity theft, accounting for 17 percent of the total. A data breach is considered to be caused by hacking if data related to identity
theft was exposed by attackers external to an organization gaining unauthorized access to computers or
networks. Hacking also ranked third in 2007, accounting for 14 percent of breaches that could facilitate
identity theft. Hacking is more purpose-driven than insecure policy, theft, or loss: in 2008, over half of the
breaches that exposed credit card information were due to hacking. Attackers can take advantage of site-
specific and Web-application vulnerabilities to gain access to networks and steal personal information. For
this discussion, Symantec considers hacking to be an intentional act with a defined purpose to steal data
that can be used for purposes of identity theft or other fraud.
Hacking ranked second for identities exposed in 2008, with 22 percent; this is a large decrease from 2007,
when hacking accounted for 62 percent of total identities exposed. the contributing factor for its high
ranking in 2007 was a significant data breach in which data on over 94 million credit cards was stolen by attackers hacking into a company’s database through unencrypted wireless transmissions and installing
programs to capture credit card information.
66 it is estimated that between $63 million and $83 million
in credit card fraud across 13 countries can be attributed to this single data breach.67
in 2008, two breaches contributed significantly to the high ranking of hacking in this metric: in the
first, confidential information on six million Chileans was illegally obtained from government databases
by a hacker who publicly posted the information afterward; in the second, credit card information from
4.2 million customers was stolen from a U.S.-based grocery chain by hackers monitoring the credit
64 http://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20090223_01
65 http://datalossdb.org
66 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21454847/
67 http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11493Symantec Government internet Security threat report
32authorization process.68 Because of the motivation of attackers who use hacking to steal personal financial
information, the impact of data breaches due to hacking are severe because they are likely to result in large-
scale fraud and high financial cost to affected organizations, credit card issuers, and consumers.
even though they constitute one of the most challenging issues faced by organizations, data breaches
that could lead to identity theft are mostly preventable. For any department that manages or requires
access to sensitive information, organizations should develop strong security policies such as strongly
encrypting all data, ensuring there are controls in place that restricts access to such information to required
personnel, and providing education and resources for all employees on proper security procedures. network
administrators should be closely monitoring network traffic and tracking all activity to ensure that there is no illegal access to databases, as well as testing security processes and systems regularly to ensure their
integrity. Organizations should include these steps as part of a broader security policy, and ensure that any
security policy is implemented and enforced to protect all sensitive data from unauthorized access.
Bot-infected computers
Bots are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s machine in order to allow an attacker to
remotely control the targeted system through a communication channel, such as internet relay chat
(irC), peer-to-peer (p2p), or Http . these channels allow the remote attacker to control a large number
of compromised computers over a single, reliable channel in a botnet, which can then be used to launch
coordinated attacks.
Bots allow for a wide range of functionality and most can be updated to assume new functionality by
downloading new code and features. Attackers can use bots to perform a variety of tasks, such as setting up
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against an organization’s website, distributing spam and phishing attacks,
distributing spyware and adware, propagating malicious code, and harvesting confidential information from
compromised computers that may be used in identity theft, all of which can have serious financial and legal
consequences. Bots are also inexpensive and relatively easy to propagate. in 2008, Symantec observed
underground economy advertisements for as little as $0.04 per bot. this is much cheaper than in 2007,
when $1 was the cheapest price advertised for bots. Bot-infected computers with a decentralized bot C&C
model are favored by attackers because they are difficult to disable, and most importantly, can be lucrative for their controllers. in one example, a botnet owner arrested in new Zealand admitted to earning $21,500
over a two-year span from his activities.
69
A bot-infected computer is considered active on a given day if it carries out at least one attack on that day. this does not have to be continuous; rather, a single such computer can be active on a number of different
days. A distinct bot-infected computer is a distinct computer that was active at least once during the period.
in 2008, Symantec observed an average of 75,158 active bot-infected computers per day (figure 5), a
31 percent increase from 2007. Symantec also observed 9,437,536 distinct bot-infected computers
during this period, a 1 percent increase from 2007.
68 Cf. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7395295.stm or http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23678909/
69 http://www.itworld.com/security/58670/botnet-master-sees-himself-next-bill-gatesSymantec Government internet Security threat report
33DateActive bot-infected computers
Apr 4, 2007 Jul 4, 2007 Oct 3, 2007 Jan 2, 2008020,00040,00060,00080,000100,000120,000
Apr 2, 2008 Jul 2, 2008 Oct 1, 2008 Jan 3, 20074 per . moving averageMedian daily
active bots
Dec 31, 2008
Figure 5. Active bot-infected computers, by day
Source: Symantec
the decrease in active bot-infected computers at the beginning of 2008 may be due to the reduction in
size of the botnet associated with the peacomm trojan.70 the number of bot-infected computers in the
botnet was reduced to 5 percent of its previous estimated size, from 2 million bot-infected computers
to 100,000.71 in addition, as stated in “Malicious activity by country,” the shutdown of two U.S.-based
hosting companies responsible for hosting bot C&C servers for a number of major botnets likely contributed
to the decrease in active bot-infected computers in September and november 2008. After the shutdown
in September, major botnets, including Srizbi and pandex,72 were able to find alternate hosting, which
resulted in an increase in bot-infected computers back to pre-shutdown levels. However, the shutdown
in november severely crippled Srizbi and Ozdok, and as a consequence, competing botnets, including
pandex, were able to fill the void.73
Although the number of active bot-infected computers decreased at the end of the year, it is assumed that
botnet owners will seek out new hosts to get their botnets back online, and it is expected that bot numbers
will rise again in 2009.74 One result of all the activity in 2008 is that this shows that botnets can be crippled
by identifying and shutting down their bot C&C server hosts, but that this strategy is difficult to implement given the various global hosting options that botnet controllers have at their disposal.
70 Also known as the Storm botnet.
71 http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/mLireport_Annual_2008_FinAL.pdf : p. 32
72 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-042001-1448-99
73 http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/mLireport_Annual_2008_FinAL.pdf : p. 25–26
74 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/other_resources/b-state_of_spam_report_12-2008.en-us.pdfSymantec Government internet Security threat report
34Bot command-and-control servers
Symantec tracks the number of bot C&C servers globally because these are what botnet owners use to relay
commands to bot-infected computers on their networks. For the first time, in this volume of the Symantec
Government Internet Security Threat Report, bot C&C servers controlled over Http are included in this
analysis alongside irC bot C&C servers.75 this change in measurement was made due to the trend of botnet
owners shifting away from traditional irC bot C&C communication frameworks and toward managing their
botnets through Http bot C&C servers. in 2008, Symantec identified 15,197 distinct new bot C&C servers
(figure 6), of which 43 percent were over irC channels and 57 percent over Http .
IRC 43%HTTP 57%
Figure 6. Bot command-and-control servers, by type
Source: Symantec
Botnet owners are moving away from traditional irC-based botnets since they are easier to detect,
track, filter, and block than botnets based on Http traffic. Http communications can be used to disguise
botnet traffic among other Web traffic in order to make it difficult to distinguish malicious traffic from
legitimate Http traffic. (most Http bot transmissions are encrypted to avoid detection.) to filter the traffic,
organizations would have to inspect the encrypted Http traffic and identify and remove bot-related traffic while still allowing legitimate traffic to pass through. Because of this, it is very difficult to pinpoint and disable a bot C&C structure. it is also unreasonable to block Http traffic since organizations depend on
legitimate Http traffic to conduct day-to-day business. Botnet owners have also been switching away
from using p2p for bot C&C server communications because such traffic is more easily detected due
to the “noise” it creates in transmission. moreover, many enterprises and other organizations also
block p2p ports to prevent such high-bandwidth traffic from entering their networks.
75 not included in this measurement are bot C&C servers over p2p protocols; also, as this is the first report in which Http bot C&C servers are included in this analysis,
2007 comparisons are unavailable. Symantec Government internet Security threat report
35Symantec also observed an average of 42 new active bot C&C servers per day in 2008, of which 18 were
irC-based and 24 were Http (figure 7). the three largest botnets identified by Symantec in 2008—Srizbi,
rustock, and pandex—are all Http -based.
DateBot comand-and-control servers
0103050
204060
HTTP
IRC
3 per . moving average (H TTP)
3 per . moving average (IRC )
Apr 2, 2008 Jul 2, 2008 Oct 1, 2008 Jan 2, 2008 Dec 31, 2008
Figure 7. Bot command-and-control servers, by day
Source: Symantec
the drop in new and active Http bot C&C servers in February 2008 is likely due to bot C&C servers for a
major Http -based botnet, Ozdok, going offline for 10 days during that month.76 Also, the significant
reductions that occurred in September and november 2008 are likely due to the shutdown of two U.S.-
based iSps, as was noted previously in this discussion. the September shutdown resulted in an immediate
decrease in activity associated with the Srizbi and pandex botnets.77 As mentioned, it is assumed that
these botnets found alternate hosting, which would explain the subsequent rise in activity.
the second shutdown in november resulted in a 30 percent decrease in overall botnet traffic and is
thought to have severely weakened two of the largest botnets, Srizbi and rustock.78 the significant drop in
new and active Http bot C&C servers in november 2008 may be because one of these iSps was allegedly
hosting a large number of bot C&C servers for Srizbi and rustock, and bots were hard-coded to connect to
these servers.79 it was estimated that the Srizbi botnet had 300,000 bots prior to the shutdown80 and the
rustock botnet had included over 150,000 bots.81
76 http://www.scmagazineus.com/ trACe-Six-botnets-generate-85-percent-of-spam/article/107603/
77 http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/mLireport_Annual_2008_FinAL.pdf : p. 25
78 http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/mLireport_Annual_2008_FinAL.pdf : p. 26
79 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/other_resources/b-state_of_spam_report_12-2008.en-us.pdf
80 http://itknowledgeexchange.techtarget.com/security-bytes/srizbi-botnet-is-the-biggest-but-does-size-matter/
81 http://www.scmagazineus.com/ the-rustock-botnet-spams-again/article/112940/Symantec Government internet Security threat report
36Top Web-based attacks
the widespread deployment of Web applications along with the ubiquity of easy-to-exploit Web application
security vulnerabilities have resulted in the prevalence of Web-based threats. Attackers wanting to take
advantage of client-side vulnerabilities no longer need to actively compromise specific networks to gain
access to those computers. instead, they are now focused on attacking and compromising websites in
order to mount additional, client-side attacks.
these attack types can be found globally and Symantec identifies each by an associated distinct detection
signature. most attack types target specific vulnerabilities or weaknesses in Web browsers or other client-
side applications that process content originating from the Web. this metric will assess the top distinct
Web-based attacks originating from compromised legitimate sites and malicious sites that have been
created to intentionally target Web users.
the attacks discussed can involve social engineering to entice a victim to view a malicious website, but
most attacks exploit trusted high-traffic websites. When the user visits a compromised website, a number
of attack methods are used. malicious content from the website can directly exploit a vulnerability in the
browser, a browser plug-in, or a desktop application. An attack such as this may require nothing more than
the user visiting the site from where the attack originates. in the case of a drive-by download, the attack
will occur without any interaction required from the user.82
Attackers also use malicious websites for compromises, such as misleading the user to indirectly authorize
a specific technology that then downloads malicious code, or prompting the user to click on a pop-up or banner ad. Attackers can also redirect all traffic from a legitimate website to a malicious website from
which the user’s computer will then be attacked. in all of these types of Web-based attacks, the user is
unaware of the compromise. Once an attacker has compromised a website and injected malicious content, he or she can passively attack visitors of the compromised site. this type of attack is very efficient for
attackers because they only have to compromise one Web page in order to affect multiple users. When a user visits a compromised Web page, the attack is carried out through the user’s browser. the attack will
either target vulnerabilities in the browser itself or it will target third-party applications that are activated
by the browser.
All Web-based attack traffic goes through the Http or HttpS protocols. the benefit of this for attackers
is that it is unreasonable to block these protocols because legitimate organizations depend on them for
their day-to-day business. in addition, filtering a large volume of Http traffic would significantly slow
throughput traffic. Http traffic is also difficult to filter with intrusion detection/intrusion prevention systems (iDS/ipS) because it is difficult to distinguish malicious traffic from legitimate traffic, and Http
traffic can be encrypted, thus enabling attacks to be obfuscated within legitimate traffic.
Attackers are not only employing manual methods to exploit these issues, but they are also using
automated tools, such as neosploit,
83 to exploit client-side vulnerabilities on a massive scale. Such toolkits
are widely available and prepackaged so that people with minimal technical knowledge are able to use them effectively.
82 A drive-by download is any download that occurs without a user’s prior knowledge or authorization and does not require user interaction. typically this is
an executable file.
83 http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&taxonomyname=Security&articleid=9115599&taxonomyid=17&pagenumber=1Symantec Government internet Security threat report
37Another attraction of the Web for exploitation is the profusion of dynamic sites that use Web-based
applications, such as forums, photo-sharing galleries, blogs, and online shopping applications. Dynamic
sites are prime targets for attackers using bot-infected computers to propagate and host malicious
content since Web application and site-specific vulnerabilities can put these types of site at risk.
Attackers are also especially attracted to large, popular websites with trusted reputations. this is not only
because a successful compromise can reach a greater number of people (who tend to have an inherent
trust for legitimate websites and are thus more susceptible to attack), but, as mentioned, it may be difficult
to block attacks to these sites using security tools without disrupting legitimate traffic.
these developments and trends indicate that Web-based threats have not only become widespread, but
that they also have increased in sophistication and severity. in particular, Symantec has noticed that
botnets (such as Asprox,84 which was initially used for phishing scams) are being redesigned to specifically
exploit cross-site scripting vulnerabilities and inject malicious code into compromised websites.85
many Web-based attacks exploit vulnerabilities that are considered medium severity. this means that
they can compromise the account of the currently logged in user because the user does not require
administrative privileges to run the affected applications. While the danger of client-side vulnerabilities
may be limited by best practices, such as restricting Web applications to the administrative level, this is often unreasonable given how integral Web applications are to the delivery of content for many businesses.
medium-severity vulnerabilities affecting client or desktop applications are often sufficient for an attacker
to mount successful malicious attacks on single clients, as well as at the enterprise level.
in 2008, the top Web-based attack was associated with the microsoft internet explorer ADODB.Stream
Object File installation Weakness,
86 which accounted for 29 percent of the total globally (table 4).
the weakness allows attackers to install malicious files on a vulnerable computer when a user visits
a website hosting an exploit. to carry out this attack, an attacker must exploit another vulnerability that
bypasses internet explorer security settings to allow the attacker to execute malicious files installed by
the initial security weakness. this issue was published on August 23, 2003, and fixes have been available
since July 2, 2004. Since this was the top Web-based attack in 2008, this may indicate that many
computers running internet explorer have not been patched or updated and are running with this
exposed vulnerability.
Rank
1
2
3
4
56
789
10Web-based Attack
Microsoft Internet Explorer ADODB.Stream Object File Installation Weakness
Acrobat PDF Suspicious File Download
ANI File Header Size Buffer Overflow
Adobe SWF Remote Code Executable
Microsoft Internet Explorer DHTML CreateControlRange Code ExecutableSnapShot Viewer ActiveX File Download
Microsoft Internet Explorer XML Core Services XMLHTTP Buffer OverloadQuicktime RTSP URI Buffer OverloadAOL SuperBuddy ActiveX Code ExecutableMicrosoft Internet Explorer WebViewFolderIcon ActiveX Control Buffer OverflowPercentage
30%
11%
7%
7%
6%5%
4%3%3%2%
Table 4. Top Web-based attacks
Source: Symantec
84 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-060812-4603-99
85 http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/mLireport_Annual_2008_FinAL.pdf : p. 33
86 Cf. http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid=50031 or http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10514Symantec Government internet Security threat report
38A large number of exploits and malicious applications may depend on this vulnerability as a common
way of compromising computers, in tandem with other known vulnerabilities. therefore, the amount of
attack activity is related to the cumulative number of exploits, attack toolkits, and worms targeting this
vulnerability as one possible means of compromising computers. it is also likely that the large market
share of microsoft internet explorer plays a role in the popularity of this attack.87 While the vulnerability
was patched in 2004, there are likely still enough unpatched computers that are affected by this
vulnerability for attackers to benefit.
the second most common Web-based attack in 2008 was related to malicious Adobe® Acrobat® pDF
activity,88 which accounted for 11 percent of Web-based attacks. Specifically, attempts to download
suspicious pDF documents were observed. this may indicate attempts by attackers to distribute malicious
pDF content to victims via the Web. the attack is not directly related to any specific vulnerability, although
the contents of the malicious file would be designed to exploit an arbitrary vulnerability in an application
that processes it, such as Adobe Acrobat reader®. A successful attack could ultimately result in the
compromise of the integrity and security of an affected computer. this attack is assumed to be popular
to due the common use and distribution of pDF documents on the Web. Also, browsers can be set up to
automatically render a pDF document by default. Specific exploit activity related to malicious pDF files
was observed in 2008.89
in 2008, the third most common Web-based attack exploited the microsoft Windows User32.DLL Ani File
Header Handling Stack-Based Buffer Overflow Vulnerability,90 accounting for 7 percent of Web-based
attacks in 2008. the Ani (animated cursor file) handler is a default component of the microsoft Windows
operating system and is used by a significant number of widely used microsoft applications as well as the
Windows shell. if successfully exploited, the vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code
embedded in a malformed Ani file originating from the Web or other sources. this vulnerability was
published on January 11, 2005, and fixes have also been available since that time. exploit code was publicly
available the following day. As with the microsoft internet explorer ADODB.Stream Object File installation
Weakness, the prominence of this type of attack indicates that computers in the region are likely not being sufficiently patched and updated.
Vulnerabilities such as those discussed here continue to generate a large amount of observed attack activity
because they can be reliably exploited. this makes these vulnerabilities prime candidates for automation.
Despite the fact that fixes are available, as mentioned, it is likely that there are still enough unpatched systems in existence that these attacks continue to enjoy success. When attacks prove successful, they
are often adopted by a large number malicious code variants and attack toolkits. this can cumulatively
create a large amount of observed attack activity. it is also likely that older malicious code variants
continue to attempt to automatically exploit these vulnerabilities as a means of propagation.
87 http://marketshare.hitslink.com/browser-market-share.aspx?qprid=0&qpmr=100&qpdt=1&qpct=3&qptimeframe=y &qpsp=2008&qpnp=2
88 http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid=23153
89 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/Vulnerabilities-exploits/pidief-the-Word-for-exploits/ba-p/305564#A141
90 Cf. http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid=21719 or http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/12233Symantec Government internet Security threat report
39Top countries of origin for Web-based attacks
this metric will assess the top countries of origin for Web-based attacks against users in 2008 by
determining the location of computers from which the attacks occurred. note that attackers, in order
to hide their tracks, often redirect users through one or more servers that may be located virtually anywhere globally.
Once an attacker has compromised a legitimate website, users who visit the website will be attacked by
several additional means. One way is through a drive-by download, which results in the installation of
malicious code without the user’s knowledge or consent. Another way is to redirect the user to another
website that is used to host malicious code. Sites and servers hosting a variety of malicious exploits can
be found worldwide. multiple domains can be associated with one compromised site, which is used to
exploit one or more security vulnerabilities in affected client browsers.
in 2008, computers from the United States were the leading source of Web-based attacks against users,
accounting for 38 percent of the total (table 5). there are a number of factors that make the United States
the top country of origin for Web-based attacks. this ranking may be due to the more than half a million
websites that were compromised in may 2008 with malicious code that was hosted in russia and the
United States. Web forums hosted by pHp -based bulletin board applications were exploited to inject
malicious JavaScript™ into forum content. these forums would then infect visitors with variants of the Zlob
trojan
91 disguised as a video codec installer. the exploit changes browser and DnS settings on the infected
computer and enables additional attacks, including turning the infected computer into a zombie.92 this
attack follows the trend of attackers inserting malicious code into legitimate high-traffic websites where
users are likely to be more trusting of the content, rather than attempting to lure users to visit specially
designed malicious sites.
Rank
1
23
4
5
6
78
9
10Country
United States
ChinaUkraine
Netherlands
Russia
United Kingdom
CanadaJapan
Latvia
FrancePercentage
38%13%12%
8%5%
5%
3%2%
1%
1%
Table 5. Top countries of origin for Web-based attacks
Source: Symantec
91 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-042316-2917-99
92 http://www.channelregister.co.uk/2008/05/13/zlob_trojan_forum_compromise_attack/Symantec Government internet Security threat report
40in 2008, China ranked as the second country of origin for Web-based attacks, with 13 percent of the
worldwide total. the main reason for the high rank of China in 2008 is due to compromised websites
relating to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. the games were one of the largest events of 2008 and
attackers exploited the popularity of the event in their attempts to lure and compromise users, as has been
seen previously with other major sporting and entertainment events.93 One example is the rustock botnet,
which sent out emails with links to a news report about the games. Users were prompted to click a link in the email and visit a site, which then prompted them to download a missing codec in order to launch a
video. Clicking to obtain the codec actually resulted in the installation of a trojan.
Attackers may have also used social engineering to lure users to compromised websites under the guise
of being associated with the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, as attacks against Chinese-language websites
increased significantly during the games.
94 the extent of these attacks was mitigated, however, by
initiatives to increase online security for users ahead of the Games by shutting down or blacklisting thousands of websites potentially most susceptible to fraud, which are popular targets of attack from Web
application and site-specific vulnerabilities. Also, thousands of websites in China were compromised when
certain Web applications were infected with malicious JavaScript that was planted through the use of SQL-
injection attacks.
95 Visitors to these compromised sites had their computers attacked and, if the attacks
were successful, trojans were downloaded onto the computers.96
Ukraine ranked third in 2008 for top country of origin for Web-based attacks, accounting for 12 percent
of such attacks worldwide. the prominence of Ukraine in this metric is likely due to the compromise of the
website of a U.S.-based electronic bill payment processing company.97 the attackers were able to obtain
account credentials to the company’s domain using a phishing attack, and were then able to gain access
to the company’s website. Customers, thinking they were visiting the legitimate website, were redirected
to a malicious website hosted on servers in Ukraine where they were attacked with a trojan.98 in addition
to the compromise of the bill payment company’s website, there were at least 71 domains that were
redirected to the malicious Ukrainian server during this time.99
Of note, six of the top 10 countries for Web-based attacks in the europe, middle east, and Africa (emeA)
region were also in the top 10 countries of origin for Web-based attacks globally, and countries in the emeA region accounted for 41 percent of the worldwide total, more than any other region. exploit packs
may be one of reasons behind the prominence of the emeA region in this measurement. many exploit
packs, including mpack,
100 icep ack,101 and neosploit,102 originated in russia and it is likely that the
russians who developed these attack kits are responsible for much of their continued propagation. these
attackers could possibly be compromising websites around the world and redirecting visitors to computers in emeA that host the exploit code being used to target client-side vulnerabilities in Web browsers.
93 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/7548870.stm
94 http://www.networkworld.com/newsletters/gwm/2008/090808msg1.html
95 http://www.h-online.com/security/Chinese-websites-under-mass-attack--/news/110764
96 ibid.
97 http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/120508-network-solutions-phishing-came-before.html
98 http://www.csoonline.com/article/474365/CheckFree_Warns_million_Customers_After_Hack
99 http://blog.kievukraine.info/2008/12/digging-deeper-into-checkfree-attack.html
100 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/blogs/blogarticlepage/blog-id/vulnerabilities_exploits/article-id/93#m93
101 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/blogs/blogarticlepage/blog-id/grab_bag/article-id/81
102 http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1593Symantec Government internet Security threat report
41Also contributing to the prominence of the emeA region this period were a number of high-profile Web-
based attacks that occurred there. One example was in January 2008, when the embassy website of the
netherlands in russia was compromised and visitors to the site were misled into installing malicious
code.103 Another example occurred in August 2008 when several hundred domains in the netherlands were
compromised and defaced.104 A third case was when more than a thousand UK websites were compromised
and users visiting these sites risked being infected with the Asprox trojan.105 the success of these attacks
on government sites can be attributed, in part, to the inherent trust that visitors to such sites will have, making these visitors more liable to accept prompts to download files if requested.
Web-based attacks are a major threat to computer networks for both enterprises and end users. Attacks
such as drive-by downloads are covert and very difficult to mitigate because most users are unaware that they are being attacked. Organizations are thus confronted with the complicated task of having to detect
and filter attack traffic from legitimate traffic. Since many organizations rely on Web-based tools and
applications to conduct business, it is likely that the Web will continue to be the primary conduit for attack
activity favored by malicious code developers.
Threat activity—protection and mitigation
there are a number of measures that enterprises, administrators, and end users can employ to protect
against malicious activity. Organizations should monitor all network-connected computers for signs of
malicious activity, including bot activity and potential security breaches, ensuring that any infected
computers are removed from the network and disinfected as soon as possible. Organizations should employ
defense-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software and a firewall.106 Administrators
should update antivirus definitions regularly and ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their operating system vendor. As compromised computers
can be a threat to other systems, Symantec also recommends that enterprises notify their iSps of any
potentially malicious activity.
Symantec recommends that organizations perform both ingress and egress filtering on all network traffic to
ensure that malicious activity and unauthorized communications are not taking place. Organizations should
also filter out potentially malicious email attachments to reduce exposure to enterprises and end users. in
addition, egress filtering is one of the best ways to mitigate a DoS attack. DoS victims frequently need to engage their upstream iSp to help filter the traffic to mitigate the effects of attacks.
Symantec also advises that users never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment
is expected and comes from a known and trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is
known. By creating and enforcing policies that identify and restrict applications that can access the
network, organizations can minimize the effect of malicious activity, and hence, minimize the effect on
day-to-day operations. Also, administrators should limit privileges on systems for users that do not require such access and they should also restrict unauthorized devices, such as external portable hard-drives and
other removable media.
103 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/01/23/embassy_sites_serve_malware/
104 http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1788
105 http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/the_web/article4381034.ece
106 Defense-in-depth emphasizes multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or
protection methodology. Defense-in-depth should include the deployment of antivirus, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems, among other security measures.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
42to reduce the likelihood of identity theft, organizations that store personal information should take the
necessary steps to protect data transmitted over the internet or stored on their computers. this should
include the development, implementation, and enforcement of a secure policy requiring that all sensitive
data is encrypted. Organizations should implement a data loss protection (DLp) solution that not only
prevents data breaches, but also mitigates potential data leaks from within an organization. Access to
sensitive information should be restricted and organizations should also enforce compliance to information
storage and transmission standards such as the pCi standard.107 policies that ensure that computers
containing sensitive information are kept in secure locations and are accessed only by authorized individuals should be put in place and enforced. Sensitive data should not be stored on mobile devices that
could be easily misplaced or stolen. this step should be part of a broader security policy that organizations
should develop and implement in order to ensure that any sensitive data is protected from unauthorized access. this would ensure that even if the computer or medium on which the data were lost or stolen, the
data would not be accessible. this step should be part of a broader security policy that organizations should
develop and implement in order to ensure that any sensitive data is protected from unauthorized access.
107 https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/Symantec Government internet Security threat report
43Malicious Code Trends
Symantec also gathers malicious code intelligence from more than 130 million client, server, and gateway
systems that have deployed its antivirus products. Underpinning these products are the Symantec Digital
immune System and Symantec Scan and Deliver technologies, as well as norton Community Watch, which
allow customers to automate the process of reporting viruses and other malicious code threats.
this section of the Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report will discuss the following
malicious code trends for 2008:
new malicious code threats•
Geolocation by type of malicious code•
threats to confidential information •
propagation mechanisms •
malicious code—protection and mitigation •
New malicious code threats
Symantec monitors the proliferation of malicious code by examining the number of new malicious code
signatures created to detect threats from period to period. Comparing new signatures against signatures
created previously indicates how quickly new malicious code threats are being developed. periods in
which a significant number of new malicious code threats are created indicates how critical it is for both enterprises and home users to maintain updated antivirus signatures, and to implement and maintain
robust security measures such as software patches.
in 2008, Symantec created 1,656,227 new malicious code signatures (figure 8). this is a 265 percent
increase over 2007, when 624,267 new malicious code signatures were added. Although the percentage
increase in signatures added is less than the fairly staggering 445 percent increase from 2006 to 2007,
the overall number of malicious code signatures by the end of 2008 grew to 2,674,171. this means that
of all the malicious code signatures created by Symantec, more than 60 percent of that total was created
in 2008. Furthermore, Symantec blocked an average of more than 245 million attempted malicious code
attacks worldwide each month in 2008.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
44
Number of new threats
0200,0001,000,000
800,0001,800,000
1,600,000
Period600,000
400,0001,400,000
1,200,000
200220,547
200318,827
200469,107
2005113,025
2006140,690
2007624,267
20081,656,227
Figure 8. New malicious code signatures
Source: Symantec
previous volumes of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report have discussed the increasing
professionalization of malicious code development.108 the result is an increase in the speed and efficiency
with which malicious code is “brought to market,” which would enable an increased number of threats to
be developed. A driving force behind the growing speed and efficiency of these developments is the demand
for goods and services that facilitate online fraud. this is exemplified by the flourishing profitability of
confidential information sales, as was discussed in the recently published Symantec Report on the
Underground Economy.109 For example, Symantec estimated the value of total advertised goods on
underground economy servers between July 2007 and June 2008 to be $276 million.
Of particular value in the underground economy is malicious code that exposes confidential information.
this is because confidential information is critical to several illegal practices, such as identity theft
and credit card fraud. Symantec has determined that, in many instances, this code is being developed
on a large scale by well-organized programmers, much as applications are developed in a legitimate software enterprise. the demand for malicious code in the underground economy is further illustrated by
advertisements specific to such goods, with some advertisers selling the malicious code itself and others
requesting the services of malicious code authors. Advertisements for malicious code authors are often looking for the one-time development of specific code to create new variants of existing threats, rather than
developing entirely new threats. this is likely because variants of existing malicious code can be developed
more easily, and can therefore be brought to market in the underground economy much more quickly.
108 Cf. http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 9 and
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_09_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 12
109 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_underground_economy_report_11-2008-14525717.en-us.pdf : p. 6Symantec Government internet Security threat report
45Geolocation by type of malicious code
Symantec examines the top regions reporting potential malicious code infections as well as the types of
malicious code causing potential infections in each region. the increasing regionalization of threats can
cause differences between the types of malicious code being observed from one area to the next, such as when threats employ certain languages or localized events as part of their social engineering techniques.
threats that steal confidential information can also be tailored to steal information that is more commonly
available in some countries than in others. For instance, trojans that attempt to steal account information
for Brazilian banks are quite common in the Latin America (LAm) region, while malicious code that steals online gaming account information is most frequently observed in the Ap J region.
110 Because of the
different propagation mechanisms used by different malicious code types, and the different effects that
each malicious code type may have, information about the geographic distribution of malicious code can help network administrators improve their security efforts.
it should be noted that the numbers presented in this discussion represent proportional geographic
percentages. therefore, proportional percentage fluctuation from the previous period to the current period
does not indicate a change in the absolute number of reports from a specific region.
in 2008, the regional proportion of potential infections from malicious code remained largely unchanged;
however, in all cases, the actual number of reports for each malicious code type from each region increased.
111 While there were small variances in some regions, the changes were not representative
of significant shifts in the threat landscape. the proportion of reports from the emeA region increased,
which may indicate that the concentration of threats targeting countries in emeA is growing faster than
the concentration in other regions. this may also be a sign that the concentration of malicious code
authors, or organizations employing those authors, is greater in emeA than in other regions. One possible
reason for a higher concentration in this region may be due to recent reports of politically motivated attacks
during this period.112 this sort of activity may have increased the demand for capable authors in emeA.
Trojans
in 2008, 35 percent of trojans were reported from the north America (nAm) region, 34 percent from emeA,
24 percent from Ap J, and 6 percent from LAm (table 6). Although the number of trojans reported from nAm
appears to have dropped significantly, this is mainly attributable to the proportional increase in trojans
reported from emeA, indicating that a similar amount of trojan activity was reported in both nAm and
emeA in 2008.
Region
NAM
EMEA
APJ
LAM2007 Percentage
46%
28%
22%
4%2008 Percentage
35%
34%
24%
6%
Table 6. Geolocation of Trojans
Source: Symantec
110 Cf. http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=2504 or
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_09_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 81
111 Cumulative totals might not equal 100 percent due to rounding.
112 See http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1670 and http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/10/report_russian_hacker_forums_f.htmlSymantec Government internet Security threat report
46the previous edition of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report discussed the continued
concentration of trojans in north America, and posited that attackers may consciously be moving toward
trojan attacks there because of successful efforts by north American-based enterprises and iSps to thwart
worm attacks.113 in 2008, the number of trojans reported in emeA was similar to the number reported in
nAm. While the increase in emeA could be attributed to similar reasons as those given in the previous
paragraph, the proportional increase in reports of other malicious code types in emeA suggests that the
increased activity is not a reaction to any specific mitigation efforts.
One possible explanation for the increase in emeA is that there were a number of attacks against
prominent government and corporate websites in the region during 2008.114 For example, one attack
that targeted the websites of both the United nations and the UK government, among others, injected
malicious code that was designed to load content from an attacker-controlled location into visitors’
browsers.115 Another separate attack successfully defaced the national Albanian postal service website.116
Such attacks are a perfect beachhead for distributing malicious code because they target high-traffic
websites of reputable organizations. Successful distribution of malicious code using this method of
delivery may have contributed to the increased proportion of trojans in emeA in 2008.
Worms
Forty percent of the potential infections caused by worms in 2008 were reported from the Ap J region,
followed by emeA with 36 percent, nAm with 13 percent, and LAm with 11 percent (table 7). the drop
in proportion of worms in Ap J is mainly attributed to the increase in emeA and may indicate that worm
activity in emeA will eventually surpass that of Ap J. the emergence of the Downadup worm may offset
this, however, and cause the percentage of potential worm infections in Ap J to rise in 2009 since that is
where it has been initially concentrated.
Region
APJ
EMEA
NAM
LAM2007 Percentage
44%
32%
16%
9%2008 Percentage
40%
36%
13%
11%
Table 7. Geolocation of worms
Source: Symantec
Back door infections
emeA accounted for the largest proportion of potential back door infections reported worldwide in 2008,
with 39 percent of the total. Ap J accounted for the second largest percentage, with 29 percent, followed by
nAm at 23 percent, and LAm at 9 percent (table 8). As with the previously discussed types of potential malicious code infection, the proportional increase in reports from emeA is the primary contributor to
decreases in other regions. As is discussed elsewhere in this report, there are indications that back doors are increasingly being incorporated as secondary stages of multistage attacks. Because of this, the
proportional increase of back doors in emeA may be closely related to the observed increase of trojans
reported there.
113 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 52
114 http://news.cnet.com/8301-10789_3-9983940-57.html
115 http://news.cnet.com/8301-10789_3-9925637-57.html
116 http://albmasters.com/?p=3Symantec Government internet Security threat report
47Region
EMEA
APJNAM
LAM2007 Percentage
36%
30%28%
5%2008 Percentage
39%
29%23%
9%
Table 8. Geolocation of back door infections
Source: Symantec
While the regional percentages of potential back door infections can show fairly wide variances, it is
important to note that the worldwide volume of back door threats was significantly lower than trojans
and worms. therefore, the percentage variance between regions actually represents a much smaller
difference in raw numbers than the percentage differences between worms and trojans.
Viruses
the Ap J region continued to hold the highest concentration of reported potential infections caused by
viruses in 2008, with 41 percent of the worldwide total, although this is a decrease from its 53 percent
share in 2007 (table 9). the emeA region again ranked second, with its share growing to 38 percent in
2008 from 27 percent in 2007. the proportion of potential virus infections concentrated in nAm dropped
to 15 percent in 2008 from 17 percent previously, while LAm increased to 6 percent this period from
4 percent previously.
Region
APJ
EMEA
NAM
LAM2007 Percentage
53%
27%
17%
4%2008 Percentage
41%
38%
15%
6%
Table 9. Geolocation of viruses
Source: Symantec
As was the case with the previous reporting period, the increased proportion of viruses in emeA was linked
to the greater proportion of worms reported from the region, which is because viral infection functionality
is a common component incorporated into worms.117 For example, the mabezat worm includes a viral
infection component and was heavily concentrated in the emeA region in 2008 (it was one of the top 10
potential infections reported from the region).
117 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 53Symantec Government internet Security threat report
48Threats to confidential information
Some malicious code programs are designed specifically to expose confidential information that is stored
on an infected computer. these threats may expose sensitive data such as system information, confidential
files and documents, or logon credentials. Some malicious code threats, such as back doors, can give a remote attacker complete control over a compromised computer.
threats to confidential information are a particular concern because of their potential use in criminal
activities such as identity theft. As mentioned in the previous Symantec Government Internet Security
Threat Report, identity theft was the most common consumer complaint received by the United States Federal trade Commission in 2007 by a significant margin and is likely to continue being a primary
concern.
118 With the widespread use of online shopping and internet banking, compromises that result in
unauthorized access to confidential information can result in significant financial loss, particularly if credit
card information or banking details are exposed.
Within organizations, exposure of confidential information can lead to significant data leakage. if it
involves customer-related data, such as credit card information, it can severely undermine customer
confidence as well as violate local laws.119 Compromised computers can also contain sensitive information
such as financial details, business plans, and proprietary technologies, which could also be leaked.
Government agencies are also at risk from threats to confidential information. if employee data is
exposed by these threats, the data could be used to facilitate exfiltration of confidential data or identity
theft, which could then lead to further security compromises. For instance, if the attacker gains access to
a user’s personal and system information, he or she can use it to craft a targeted social engineering attack
tailored to that particular user. Additionally, certain agencies—such as those dealing with health care,
revenue and taxation, and pensions—may store personally identifiable information of citizens, including
government-issued identification numbers, that could be used for identity theft or related fraud.
in 2008, 83 percent of confidential information threats had a remote access component (figure 9). this
was a decrease from 91 percent in 2007. this decrease is mainly attributable to an increase in malicious
code that exports user data or logs keystrokes, along with the decrease in the percentage of potential
infections from back doors. Another reason may be that attackers are less interested in administering
individual compromised computers than they are in simply gathering the available information, which
can be accomplished without installing a back door.
118 http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/02/fraud.shtm
119 many countries have implemented their own laws in this regard, such as the United Kingdom’s Data protection Act, which can be found at
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/ACt S/acts1998/19980029.htmSymantec Government internet Security threat report
49Exports system dataExports email addresses Keystroke loggerAllows remote access
83%
78%91%
74%
PeriodPercentage of exposure threats
Exports user data
2008 200765%76%
61%68% 72%
67%
Figure 9. Threats to confidential information, by type
Source: Symantec
malicious code that could export user data accounted for 78 percent of threats to confidential information
in 2008, up from 74 percent in 2007. Such threats are useful because leaked data can be used to steal a
user’s identity or aid in further attacks. increases in this type of exposure are not surprising considering
the potential value of harvested information. the third highest exposure type, keystroke logging, further
supports this.
Confidential information threats with a keystroke-logging capability made up 76 percent of threats to
confidential information, up from 72 percent in 2007. malicious code incorporating keystroke loggers that
target online gaming account credentials continues to be popular. the Wowinzi worm is one such threat and
was one of the top 10 new malicious code samples in 2008. Several trojans and worms such as Gampass,
Gammima,120 and mumawow121 have been around for some time and are specifically designed to steal
online gaming credentials, and they continue to account for a significant number of potential infections.
Organizations can take several steps to limit the exposure of confidential information by successful
intrusions. Data leakage prevention solutions can prevent sensitive data from being stored on endpoint
computers. encrypting sensitive data that is stored in databases will limit an attacker’s ability to view and/
or use the data. However, this step may require sufficient resources to be made available, as adequately
managing encryption keys and ensuring that archived data is actually encrypted can be costly. Furthermore,
encrypting stored data will not protect against man-in-the-middle attacks that intercept data before it is
encrypted.122 As a result, data should always be transmitted through secure channels such as SSH, SSL,
and ipSec.
120 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-032206-2043-99
121 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-032015-4300-99
122 A “man-in-the-middle attack” is an attack in which a third party intercepts communications between two computers. the “man in the middle” captures the data,
but still relays it to the intended destination to avoid detection.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
50Propagation mechanisms
Worms and viruses use various means to transfer themselves, or propagate, from one computer to
another. these means are collectively referred to as propagation mechanisms. propagation mechanisms
can include a number of different vectors, such as instant messaging (im), Simple mail transfer protocol
(Smtp), Common internet File System (CiFS), p2p, and remotely exploitable vulnerabilities. Some malicious
code may even use other malicious code as a propagation vector by locating a computer that has been
compromised via a back door server and using it to upload and install itself. the samples discussed here
are assessed according to the percentage of potential infections.
in 2008, 66 percent of potential malicious code infections propagated as shared executable files, up
significantly from 44 percent in 2007 (table 10).123 Shared executable files are the propagation mechanisms
employed by viruses and some worms to copy themselves onto removable media. the resurgence in this
vector over the past few years coincides with the increased use of removable drives and other portable
devices. it is also an easy vector to exploit because old malicious code exploits developed for floppy disks
can be easily modified for current removable media devices.
to limit the propagation of threats through removable drives, administrators should ensure that all such
devices are scanned for viruses when they are connected to a computer. if removable drives are not needed
within the enterprise, endpoint security and policy can prevent computers from recognizing these drives
when they are attached. Additionally, best practices policies should be implemented to mitigate the dangers
of attaching unauthorized devices to computers within the enterprise.
2008 Rank
1
23
4
56
7
8
9
102007 Percentage
44%
32%26%
15%
17%
3%
3%
3%3%1%66%
31%30%
12%
10%
4%
3%
3%
3%
2%2008 Percentage
File-sharing executables
File transfer/email attachment
File transfer/CIFS
Remotely exploitable vulnerability
File sharing/P2P
File transfer/embedded HTTP URI/instant messenger
SQL
Back door/Kuang2Back door/SubSevenFile transfer/instant messengerPropagation Mechanism
Table 10. Propagation mechanisms
Source: Symantec
in 2008, 31 percent of malicious code that propagated did so in email attachments, a slight decrease
from 32 percent in 2007. the previous volume of the Symantec Government Internet Security Threat Report
stated that, despite a small increase for the reporting period, propagation through email attachments was
surpassed by propagation through file sharing executables.124 this was noted to likely be the result of
diversification by malicious code authors. Although there was an increase again in 2008, the gap
between the first and second ranked propagation mechanisms has widened substantially.
123 Because malicious code samples often use more than one mechanism to propagate, cumulative percentages may exceed 100 percent.
124 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 57Symantec Government internet Security threat report
51One possible reason for the diversification of propagation methods, as well as the resulting gap, is that
malicious code authors may not be experiencing as much success with attacks using email attachments
as in past years. increased user awareness and prevention against email-based attacks may be a factor.
However, the number of potential infections that use email-based propagation appears to be stable, which
may be a result of attackers experiencing increased success with other propagation vectors and opting to
use those instead. Despite such factors, email attachments continue to be a common and attractive
propagation mechanism for malicious code.
to limit the propagation of email-borne threats, administrators should ensure that all email attachments
are scanned at the gateway. Additionally, all executable files originating from external sources such as email
attachments or those downloaded from websites should be treated as suspicious. All executable files should
be checked by antivirus scanners using the most current definitions.
malicious code that propagated by the CiFS protocol made up 30 percent of malicious code that propagated
in 2008, up from 26 percent in 2007.125 this indicates that this protocol continues to be a common and
effective means for the propagation of malicious threats. the increase may be linked to the diversification
of mechanisms discussed above. two of the top 10 malicious code threats for 2008 employed this
propagation mechanism. this includes the Fujacks worm,126 a long-standing malicious code family in
top 10 lists, and the Almanahe worm,127 a modular threat that includes a viral component that has
steadily increased in potential infections since its discovery early in 2007.
the CiFS propagation mechanism can be a threat to organizations because file servers use CiFS to give
users access to their shared files. if a computer with access to a file server becomes infected by a threat
that propagates through CiFS, the infection could spread to the file server. Since multiple computers within
an organization likely access the same file server, this could facilitate the rapid propagation of the threat
within the enterprise. this is increasingly becoming a threat to home environments as well, because home
networks with multiple devices are becoming more commonplace.
to protect against threats that use the CiFS protocol to propagate, all shares should be protected with
strong passwords, and only users who require the resources should be given access to them. if other users
do not need to write to a share, they should only be given “read” permissions. this will prevent malicious
code from copying itself to the shared directory or modifying shared files. Finally, CiFS shares should not be
exposed to the internet. Blocking tCp port 445 at the network boundary will help to protect against threats
that propagate using CiFS.128
An interesting decrease of note during 2008 was in the percentage of threats that propagate by exploiting
remote vulnerabilities. While there was relatively stable activity in this type of threat through the majority
of the year, that changed when the Downadup worm was discovered late in 2008. Downadup propagates by
exploiting the microsoft Windows Server Service rpC Handling remote Code execution Vulnerability.129 this
worm has attracted a lot of attention because of its sophistication and aggressive infection routine. the
first variant of Downadup is estimated to have infected over half a million computers, primarily in the Ap J
and LAm regions.130 Symantec is monitoring its evolution to how Downadup affects the percentage of
threats that propagate by exploiting remote vulnerabilities into 2009.131
125 CiFS is a file sharing protocol that allows files and other resources on a computer to be shared with other computers across the internet. One or more directories on a
computer can be shared to allow other computers to access the files within.
126 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-111415-0546-99
127 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-041317-4330-99
128 tCp port 445 is the default port used to run CiFS on tCp.
129 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/31874
130 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/malicious-Code/W32-Downadup-infection-Statistics/ba-p/376744
131 please see https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/blogs/blogarticlepage/blog-id/malicious_code/article-id/225,
https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/blogs/blogarticlepage/blog-id/malicious_code/article-id/227, and
https://forums.symantec.com/t5/malicious-Code/Downadup-Small-improvements- yield-Big-returns/ba-p/381717Symantec Government internet Security threat report
52Malicious code—protection and mitigation
it is critical that end users and enterprises maintain the most current antivirus definitions to protect
against the high quantity of new malicious code threats. iDS, ipS, and other behavior-blocking technologies
should also be employed to prevent compromise by new threats. Using a firewall can also prevent threats that send information back to the attacker from opening a communication channel.
Symantec recommends that certain best security practices always be followed to protect against malicious
code infection. Administrators should keep patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host public
services and applications—such as Http , Ftp, Smtp , and DnS servers—and that are accessible through a
firewall or placed in a DmZ. email servers should be configured to only allow file attachment types that are
required for business needs and to block email that appears to come from within the company, but that
actually originates from external sources. Additionally, Symantec recommends that ingress and egress
filtering be put in place on perimeter devices to prevent unwanted activity.
to protect against malicious code that installs itself through a Web browser, additional measures should be
taken. the use of ipS technologies can prevent exploitation of browser and plug-in vulnerabilities through
signatures and behavior-based detection in addition to address space layout randomization (ASLr).
132 end
users should employ defense-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software and a
personal firewall. Users should update antivirus definitions regularly. they should also ensure that all
desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their software vendors. they should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless it is expected and comes
from a trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
132 ASLr is a security mechanism that randomizes data in memory to prevent the success of attacks that leverage memory corruption vulnerabilities,
such as buffer overflows.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
53Phishing, Underground Economy Servers, and Spam Trends
phishing is an attempt by a third party to solicit confidential information from an individual, group, or
organization by mimicking (or spoofing) a specific brand, usually one that is well known, often for financial
gain. phishers attempt to trick users into disclosing personal data, such as credit card numbers, online
banking credentials, and other sensitive information, which they may then use to commit fraudulent acts.
phishing generally requires an end user to enter his or her credentials into an online data entry field.
this is one of the characteristics that distinguishes phishing from spam-based scams (such as the widely
disseminated 419 scam and other social engineering scams).133 the data that end users enter can then
be used for fraudulent purposes.
Spam is usually defined as junk or unsolicited email sent by a third party. While it is certainly an annoyance
to users and administrators, spam is also a serious security concern because it can be used to deliver
trojans, viruses, and phishing attempts.134 Spam can also be used to deliver drive-by downloaders, which
require no other end user interaction than navigation to the UrLs contained in the spam messages. Large
volumes of spam could also cause a loss of service or degradation in the performance of network resources
and email gateways.
this section will assess phishing and spam trends that Symantec observed in 2008; it will also discuss
items that were offered for sale on underground economy servers during this time period, as this is where
much of the profit is made from phishing and spam attacks. Underground economy servers are black
market forums for advertising and trading stolen information and services. this discussion will assess
underground economy servers according to the different types of goods and services advertised. it should
be noted that this discussion may not necessarily be representative of internet-wide activity; rather, it is
intended as a snapshot of the activity that Symantec monitored during this period.
the results used in this analysis are based on data returned from the Symantec probe network, as well as
the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam™ customer base. Specifically, statistics are gathered from enterprise
customers’ Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam servers that receive more than 1,000 email messages per day.
this removes the smaller data samples (that is, smaller customers and test servers), thereby allowing for
a more accurate representation of data.
the Symantec probe network consists of millions of decoy email addresses that are configured to attract
a large stream of spam attacks. An attack can consist of one or more messages. the goal of the Symantec
probe network is to simulate a wide variety of internet email users, thereby attracting a stream of traffic
that is representative of spam activity across the internet as a whole. For this reason, this network is
continuously optimized in order to attract new varieties of spam attacks.
in addition to the Symantec probe network, phishing information is also gathered through the Symantec
phish report network, an extensive antifraud community of organizations and end users.135 members of
the Symantec phish report network contribute and receive fraudulent website addresses for alerting and
filtering across a broad range of solutions.
133 http://nortontoday.symantec.com/features/security_at_30.php
134 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6676819.stm
135 http://www.phishreport.net/Symantec Government internet Security threat report
54this section will address the following metrics:
phishing activity by sector•
top countries hosting phishing websites and top targeted sectors•
phishing websites by government top-level domains •
Underground economy servers—goods and services available for sale•
Spam by category•
phishing, underground economy servers, and spam—protection and mitigation •
Phishing activity by sector
this section will explore phishing activity in two ways. First, it will analyze the unique brands being spoofed
in phishing attacks according to the sector to which they belong. Second, it will explore the sectors whose
brands were most frequently spoofed by phishing lures. these considerations are important for an
enterprise because the use of its brand in phishing activity can significantly undermine consumer confidence in its reputation.
previous volumes of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report assessed phishing data based
on the number of phishing websites that were targeted by the highest volume of phishing attacks.
136
However, in this volume, phishing activity will be assessed by sector according to the number of so-called
phishing lures that are detected spoofing a company’s brand. phishing lures are UrLs that lead end users
to phishing websites and are usually delivered by spam email (also known as phishing email). multiple
lures can lead to the same phishing website.
phishers are becoming increasingly adept at adapting their lures in order to direct end users to their
phishing sites. For instance, in economically constrained circumstances, phishers may adopt lures that
spoof well-known financial institutions and promise users access to low-interest loans. As a result, tracking
phishing lures may give security analysts insight into what new tactics phishers are using.
the majority of brands used in phishing attacks in 2008 were in the financial services sector, accounting
for 79 percent of the total, down slightly from the 83 percent reported in 2007 (table 11). the financial
services sector also accounted for the highest volume of phishing lures during this period, at 76 percent, considerably higher than 2007 when the volume for financial services was 52 percent (figure 10).
it is likely that the increase in the percentage of phishing lures spoofing financial services is not so much
due to an increase in the number of these lures, but to a drop in the number of lures spoofing internet
community-related brands, particularly social networking sites, as will be discussed later in this section. the rise in phishing lures that spoof financial services is reflected in the significant amount of credit
card information that was offered on underground economy servers in 2008, as is discussed in the
“Underground economy servers ” discussion.
136 A phishing website is a site that is designed to mimic the legitimate website of the organization whose brand is being spoofed. in many cases, it is set up by the
attacker to capture authentication information or other personal identification information from victims; any information gathered is then typically used in identity
theft or other fraudulent activity.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
55Sector
Financial
ISPRetail
Insurance
Internet communityTelecom
Computer hardware
Government
Computer software
Transportation2008 Percentage
79%
8%
4%
2%
2%2%
1%
1%
<1%
<1%2007 Percentage
83%
7%
4%
2%
2%
<1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
Table 11. Unique brands phished, by sector
Source: Symantec
phishing is often carried out for the purpose of financial gain. Brands and activities associated with the
financial sector are most likely to yield data that could be used in financially motivated attacks, such as
bank account credentials. As a result, it is not surprising that the majority of phishing activity detected in
2008 targeted brands in the financial sector.
4%
1%
<1%
<1%
<1%<1%<1%11%
76%
RetailFinancial
ISP
Internet community
Government8%
Computer hardwareOnline gaming
Insurance
Computer softwareTelecom
Figure 10. Phished sectors by volume of phishing lures
Source: SymantecSymantec Government internet Security threat report
56there are several items in the “Underground economy servers” discussion that illustrate the preponderance
of financial services in phishing activity. the top two most frequently advertised items observed on
underground economy servers during 2008 were credit card information and bank account credentials,
in that order. together, these two categories accounted for more than half of the goods and services
advertised in 2008.
many phishing attacks that spoof financial services brands will prompt users to enter credit card
information or banking credentials into fraudulent sites. if this is done, the phishers can then capture and
sell such information in the underground economy. this has been made easier for phishers because of the
increasingly widespread acceptance of online banking. For example, 44 percent of internet users in the
United States perform some degree of online banking, as do 64 percent of users in Canada and 46 percent of those in France.
137 Because of this, end users may be more easily fooled into entering their information
into fraudulent websites that mimic the brand of their financial services provider.
the 4 percent reduction in the number of financial sector brands being spoofed by phishing lures during
2008 may indicate increased awareness of phishing schemes and how to avoid falling victim to them.
information campaigns driven by specific financial institutions, as well as a heightened awareness of phishing schemes targeting financial services, have likely made it more difficult for phishers to carry out
successful phishing attacks against companies offering those services. By the same token, it may also be
a reflection of the fact that a number of financial institutions either ceased operations or changed their business offerings during 2008, thereby reducing the number of financial service brands available for
phishers to spoof.
138
iSps were the second ranked sector for brands spoofed by phishing lures in 2007, making up 8 percent
of the total. this is a 1 percentage point increase from 2007, when it also ranked second. the iSp sector
also ranked second in the volume of phishing lures for 2008, accounting for 11 percent of the total, up
from 4 percent in 2007. Again, the percentage increase in the volume of lures spoofing iSps was likely
due to a drop in the number of lures spoofing brands associated with internet communities, as will be
discussed shortly.
iSp accounts, which often include email accounts, can be valuable targets for phishers because people
frequently use the same authentication credentials (such as usernames and passwords) for multiple
accounts, including email accounts. With a little effort on the part of the attacker, this information could
provide access to other accounts, such as online banking accounts.
Attackers also sometimes use the free Web-hosting space that is often included in iSp accounts to put
up phishing websites, or use the accompanying email accounts to send spam or launch further phishing
attacks. Compromised iSp Web-hosting accounts can also be used to host Web-based exploits, which
would give an attacker a greater number of potential targets. Compromised Web space can also be used
to plant links to other websites that an attacker controls in order to boost the search engine rankings of those sites.
in addition, having access to an email account could allow the attacker to spam the victim’s contact list—
and likely enjoy greater success with this ploy because people tend to trust email from people they know.
this assertion is enforced by email accounts/passwords and addresses being the third and fourth most
common goods available on underground economy servers in 2008, respectively.
137 http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=2524
138 http://www.economist.com/finance/displayStory.cfm?story_id=12294688&source=features_box_mainSymantec Government internet Security threat report
57the third most spoofed sector for 2008 was retail services, which accounted for 4 percent of organizations
whose brands were spoofed by phishing attacks in 2008, the same percentage as 2007. the retail sector
also ranked third in volume of phishing lures, accounting for 8 percent of the total for 2008, down from
12 percent recorded in 2007.
the retail sector is a logical target of phishers for several reasons. First, online retailers regularly conduct
transactions that require the input of financial information, which could be fraudulently obtained and used
for financial gain. By successfully mimicking a retailer’s website, phishers will try to persuade users to
attempt a purchase and enter their credit card information. they may also be able to persuade users to
enter account information (such as usernames and passwords) that can then be used to access the account on the retailer’s legitimate website. this can in turn be used to fraudulently order goods that are charged
to the user’s account. many online stores give customers the option of storing credit card and billing
information to facilitate the checkout process. Access to this information also gives phishers access to
the victim’s billing address, which is used by merchants as a security feature.
As has been mentioned previously, the volume of phishing lures spoofing brands associated with internet
communities, such as social networking sites, dropped significantly over the past year, from 31 percent in
2007 to only 4 percent in 2008. the previous two volumes of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat
Report discussed the rapid rise in lures targeting this sector and postulated that it was likely due to the
increase in usage of these sites, as well as the fact that users associated with these communities generally
tend to be trusted by other users.
Given the rapid rise of phishing activity targeting this sector in previous years, and the notable drop in
volume in 2008, it is likely that companies in this sector have taken steps to either bolster security against
phishing activity or limit its effectiveness. this could include increased network security measures and
increased user awareness and education.
it is also likely that many of these communities have improved their ability to quickly identify phishing
websites and have them taken down, reducing the window of exposure of end users to such websites. it may
also be the case that phishers have concluded that there are more direct ways to obtain information that can be used for financial gain, such as spoofing brands associated with financial services organizations.
Top countries hosting phishing websites and top targeted sectors
this metric will assess the countries in which the most phishing websites were hosted in 2008. this data
is a snapshot in time, and does not offer insight into changes in the locations of certain phishing sites over
the course of the reporting period. it should also be noted that the fact that a phishing website is hosted in
a certain country does not necessarily mean that the attacker is located in that country.
in 2008, 43 percent of all phishing websites detected by Symantec were located in the United States
(table 12). this is considerably less than 2007, when 69 percent of phishing websites originated there. Of
the phishing websites situated in the United States, 82 percent spoofed brands associated with financial
services. this is in keeping with the internet-wide average, since 76 percent of phishing websites detected
across the internet as a whole were associated with financial service organizations. Symantec Government internet Security threat report
58it is worth noting that of the top 10 countries for phishing websites in 2008, only the United States
experienced a drop in activity. All other countries in the top 10 experienced growth (albeit relatively minor
in most cases) or stayed relatively the same. Because the United States hosted such a vast majority of
phishing websites in 2008, it is reasonable to conclude that the changes in percentage were due to a drop
in the absolute number of these websites being hosted in the United States, rather than a rise in those
situated in other countries. this could be related to the shutdown of iSps that were being used for large
volumes of spam activity.
Rank
1
23
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Country
United States
PolandChina
France
South Korea
Russia
Germany
United Kingdom
Canada
Italy2008
Percentage
43%
6%
4%
4%
4%
3%
3%
3%
3%
2%2007
Percentage
69%
1%
3%
2%
4%
2%
3%
3%
2%
<1%2008 Top Sector
Targeted in Country
Financial services
Financial services
ISP
Financial services
Financial services
Financial services
Financial services
Financial services
Financial services
Financial services2008 Percentage of Lures
Targeting Top Sector
82%
94%50%
87%
88%
60%
79%
86%
77%
67%
Table 12. Top countries hosting phishing websites and top targeted sectors
Source: Symantec
Of the phishing websites hosted in the United States in 2008, 82 percent targeted the financial services
sector. As noted in “phishing activity by sector,” attacks that spoof financial companies give phishers the
best opportunity to attain information that can be used for financially rewarding attacks. in 2007, the
internet community sector was the sector most commonly spoofed by phishing websites based in
the United States, accounting for 55 percent of the total, while financial services ranked second
with 41 percent.
it is likely that phishers based in the United States have moved away from internet community-based
phishing websites due to countermeasures undertaken by companies in this sector to guard against
phishing attacks—most likely through user-education campaigns. it may also be that phishers have moved
toward financial services because this sector provides more opportunities for profit. With the current economic downturn, end users may be more susceptible to phishing attacks that advertise low interest
rates for mortgages and credit cards or that claim to be associated with the administration of financial
institutions that are undergoing some sort of restructuring or cessation.
poland hosted the second highest percentage of phishing websites in 2008, with 6 percent of the total.
this is a significant change from 2007, when poland hosted just 1 percent of phishing websites and was
only the fourteenth-ranked country in this category. poland’s increased rank in 2008 may also be due to
remotely situated attackers compromising computers in poland to use them to host phishing websites,
possibly due to recent crackdowns on fraudulent activity in other countries. For instance, in november
2007, the russia-based operations of the russian Business network (rBn) were reportedly shut down.
139
the rBn reputedly specializes in the distribution of malicious code, hosting malicious websites, and other
malicious activity, including the development and sale of the mpack toolkit. the rBn has been credited for
139 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 11Symantec Government internet Security threat report
59creating approximately half of the phishing incidents that occurred worldwide last year, and reputedly
associated with a significant amount of malicious internet and computer activities in 2007. it is possible
that when its operations in russia were shut down, it relocated some of its operations to poland, therefore
contributing to the high number of phishing websites detected there in 2008.
China hosted the third highest percentage of phishing websites in 2008, with 4 percent of the total. this
is up from fourth rank and 3 percent in 2007. the sector most commonly targeted by phishing websites
hosted in China in 2008 was the iSp sector, which was spoofed by 50 percent of all known sites there. in
2007, the financial services sector was the sector most commonly spoofed by phishing websites based
in China, with 44 percent of the total.
Of the top 10 countries for phishing websites, China was the only one in which the top targeted sector was
iSps. Financial services was the most commonly targeted sector for all of the other top 10 countries. As
discussed previously in “Phishing activity by sector,” iSps make valuable targets for phishers because of
the potential wealth of personal information from the iSp accounts of end users that is often fairly easily
accessed by skilled attackers and which provides many avenues for further malicious exploits.
Phishing websites by government top-level domains
this metric will assess the distribution of phishing websites that use government top-level domains ( tLDs)
by country in 2008. 140 phishing websites may be hosted on domains that are registered to government
entities, likely as a result of legitimate servers on these domains that have been compromised. in addition
to hosting a phishing website, the compromised server may contain confidential or sensitive information
that the attackers could potentially access.
it should also be noted that while these phishing websites use government domain names, it is possible that
they are not being hosted on government servers. instead, it is likely that they are using spoofed domains or
the website is a legitimate site that has been compromised so that end users are being redirected to phishing/malicious sites —which could be an indication that governments are insufficiently protecting their tLDs
against misuse. As a result of this spoofing, it is difficult to assess the use of each country’s tLD individually.
there are a number of reasons why phishers may want to use government tLDs for phishing websites.
primary among these is that using a government tLD adds credibility to phishing attacks that spoof
government websites. phishing websites spoofing these sites would likely be successful in the harvesting of
personal information because many government agencies typically demand confirmation of identity from citizens in order to provide services, and many governments are providing an increasing number of services
online. Further, government websites are often high-traffic sites that attract a lot of traffic, thereby making
them attractive for phishers to spoof in order to attract a high number of potential victims.
phishing websites spoofing government agencies would likely do so in order to obtain users’ confidential
information, which could then be used for identity theft and other fraudulent purposes. One common purpose
for attacking this sector was to obtain personal information from end users through fraudulent emails that
referred to tax refunds. these attacks have been documented in both Canada and the United States.
141
140 in a domain name, the top level domain is the part that is furthest to the right. For example, the “com” in symantec.com. there are two types of top level domains:
generic and country specific. examples of generic domains are com, net, and org, while country-specific top level domains include .cn for China, and .uk for the United
Kingdom, as well as others.
141 http://www.phishbucket.org/main/content/view/4135/103/Symantec Government internet Security threat report
60the top government tLD detected as being used by phishing websites in 2008 was .go.th, with 23 percent
of the total. this tLD is used for websites associated with the government of thailand. in 2007, this
tLD ranked 18th and was used by 2 percent of government tLDs that were detected being used by
phishing lures.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
67
8
9
10Top-level Domain
.go.th
.go.ro
.go.id
.gov.co
.go.ke.gov.br
.gov.ph.gov.in.go.kr.gov.ecPercentage
23%
13%
8%
7%
5%
4%
4%
3%
3%
3%
Figure 13. Top government TLDs being used by phishing websites
Source: Symantec
thailand accounted for 1 percent of all malicious activity observed by Symantec on the internet in 2008,
making it the twenty-sixth ranked country for this consideration, although it was the seventeenth ranked
country for spam zombies and eighteenth for phishing hosts for 2008.
the second most commonly used government tLD for phishing sites was .go.ro, with 13 percent of the total.
this is the tLD used by romanian government websites. in 2007, .go.ro was the fifth most commonly used
government tLD, accounting for 6 percent of the total. romania ranked 27th for overall malicious activity in
2008, with approximately 1 percent of that total. the third most commonly used government tLD in phishing lures detected in 2008 was .go.id, with
8 percent. this is the tLD for the government of indonesia. in 2007, .go.id ranked 19th for government
tLDs used in phishing lures, accounting for approximately 2 percent of the total. Less than 1 percent of all
malicious activity detected in 2008 originated in indonesia, making it the 41st ranked country for the year.
Underground economy servers—goods and services available for sale
this discussion focuses on the most frequently advertised items for sale observed on underground economy servers. Underground economy servers are black market forums for the promotion and trade of stolen
information and services. this information can include government-issued identification numbers, credit
cards, credit verification values, debit cards, personal identification numbers (pins), user accounts, email address lists, and bank accounts. Services include cashiers, scam page hosting, and job advertisements
such as for scam developers or phishing partners. much of this commerce occurs within channels on
internet relay Chat (irC) servers. For an in-depth analysis of how the underground internet economy
functions, please see the Symantec Report on the Underground Economy, published november 2008.
142
142 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_underground_economy_report_11-2008-14525717.en-us.pdfSymantec Government internet Security threat report
61the measure of goods and services available for sale is by distinct messages, which are considered to be
single advertisements for a good or service, though the same advertisement may appear thousands of
times. to qualify as a new message there must be variations, such as price changes or other alterations in
the message.
in 2008, the most frequently advertised item observed on underground economy servers was credit card
information, accounting for 32 percent of all goods (table 14). this was an increase from 21 percent in
2007. Credit card information advertised on the underground economy consists of the credit card number and expiry date, and may also include the name on the card (or business name for corporate cards), billing
address, phone number, CVV2 number, and pin.
143 One reason for this ranking may be because there are
many ways credit card information can be obtained for fraud. this includes phishing schemes, monitoring
merchant card authorizations, the use of magnetic stripe skimmers, or breaking into databases and other
data breaches that expose sensitive information.144
2008
Rank
1
2
3
4
56
78
9
102007
Rank
1
2
9
3
12
4
65
17
8Item
Credit card information
Bank account credentials
Email accounts
Email addresses
Proxies Full identities
Mailers Cash out services
Shell scripts Scams 2008
Percentage
32%
19%
5%
5%
4%4%
3%3%
3%
3%2007
Percentage
21%
17%
4%
6%
3%6%
5%5%
2%
5%Range of Prices
$0.06–$30
$10–$1000$0.10–$100
$0.33/MB–$100/MB
$0.16–$20$0.70–$60
$2–$408%–50% or flat rate of
$200–$2000 per item
$2–$20$3–$40/week for hosting,
$2–$20 design
Table 14. Goods and services available for sale on underground economy servers145
Source: Symantec
the frequent use of credit cards also influenced their high rank in 2008. For example, the 23.6 billion credit
card transactions in the United States in 2007 represent a growth of 6 percent over the previous year.146
High frequency use and the range of available methods for capturing credit card data would generate more opportunities for theft and compromise and, thus, lead to an increased supply on underground economy
servers. Despite the economic slowdown of the last half of 2008, both the number of online purchases by
credit card and the amount of purchases increased. Online spending for 2008 has been growing since the previous year with sales increased.
143 Card Verification Value 2 (CVV2) is a three- or four-digit number on the credit card that is used for card-not-present transactions, such as purchases over the internet
or telephone. this is meant to improve security for credit cards and to verify that the person completing the transaction is in fact, in possession of the card.
144 magnetic stripe skimming devices are small machines designed to scan and retain data contained in the magnetic stripes on credit and debit cards.
145 Descriptions and definitions for the goods and services discussed in this section can be found in Appendix D—phishing and Spam trends methodology
146 http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss85p2.pdf : table 7Symantec Government internet Security threat report
62Credit cards may also be popular on underground economy servers because using fraudulent credit card
information for activities such as making online purchases is relatively easy. Online shopping can be easy
and fast, and a final sale often requires only basic credit card information. Someone knowledgeable enough
could potentially make many transactions with a stolen card before the suspicious activity is detected and
the card is suspended. Once the purchases have been completed and the merchandise delivered, it can then
be fenced for a profit. Also, online merchants who have yet to implement multi-level security features are
likely attractive to criminals who wish to conduct fraudulent transactions without hassle.
Another factor that contributes to the popularity of credit cards is that they are typically sold in bulk
packages on underground economy servers. not only do advertisers offer discounts for bulk purchases or
include free numbers with larger purchases, but having an extensive list of cards enables individuals to quickly try a new number if a card number does not work or is suspended. Also, having a larger number of
credit cards numbers included should theoretically increase the likelihood of having active/valid cards in
the bulk package.
the price range of credit cards in 2008 remained consistent with the prices from the previous year, ranging
from $0.06 to $30 per card number. there were three main factors that influenced the price of credit cards:
the amount of information included with the card, rarity of the card type, and bulk purchase sizes. Credit
cards that bundled in personal information—such as government-issued identification numbers, addresses,
phone numbers, and email addresses—were offered at higher prices. Cards that included security features
such as CVV2 numbers, pins, and online verification service passwords were also offered at higher prices.
the rarity of the credit card information is often associated with the location of the issuing bank and the type of card. information from regions such as europe, Asia, and the middle east is typically offered at
higher prices than elsewhere because the supply of credit card information for these regions is rarer. For example, cards from countries such as Sweden or Belgium were the most costly, at an average of $20 each,
while cards issued from the United States were the least expensive.
the lower price range for credit cards was also due to bulk purchase discounts offered by sellers. Credit
cards are typically sold in bulk, with lot sizes from as few as 10 credit cards to as many as 5,000. Common
bulk amounts and rates observed by Symantec during this reporting period were 100 credit cards for $150
($1.50 each), 140 credit cards for $120 ($0.86 each), and 5,000 credit cards for $300 ($0.06 each).
As with other areas of the underground economy, the availability of the item seems to determine its price:
an increase in supply will decrease the price of the goods. there are more credit cards in circulation in the
United States than in any other country in the world—1.3 billion cards by the end of 2007, which is an
average of over four credit cards per person.
147 in comparison, there were only 67 million credit cards in
circulation in the United Kingdom, which is an average of one per inhabitant and only 5 percent of the U.S.
total. this correlates with the originating location percentages of credit cards advertised on underground
economy servers for this reporting period: cards issued by U.S.-based institutions accounted for 67 percent of the total, while cards from UK-based institutions accounted for 11 percent. this ratio also corresponds
to advertised bulk package prices: UK cards were typically advertised at rates three to four times higher
than U.S. cards.
147 http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss85p2.pdf : tables 10 and 10bSymantec Government internet Security threat report
63the second most commonly advertised good on underground economy servers during 2008 was bank
account credentials, accounting for 19 percent of all advertised goods. this was a slight increase from
17 percent observed in 2007. Bank account credentials may consist of account numbers, bank transit numbers, account holder names and/or company names, and may include online banking passwords. Also,
most sellers advertised the type of account and the balances for the stolen bank accounts. Attackers can
steal bank account credentials using the same methods as were outlined in the discussion of credit cards
previously in this section.
the popularity of bank account credentials may be due to a shift toward online banking. As mentioned
earlier, in the United States, 44 percent of internet users perform some degree of online banking.
148 that
number is even higher in Canada and France, where 64 percent and 46 percent of internet users bank
online, respectively.149 the potential increased availability of such sensitive information would likely also
result in an increase in attempts to steal banking credentials through phishing attempts or the use of malicious code such as banking trojans. For example, Symantec observed an 86 percent increase in
potential banking trojan infections in the second half of 2007.
Bank account credentials are attractive to attackers because they offer the opportunity to withdraw
currency directly. Withdrawing currency from a bank account has the advantage of a more immediate
payout than with online purchases, which would need to be sold to realize a purely financial reward. Also,
attackers have access to the full balances in the bank accounts, unlike credit cards where the credit limits
imposed will not allow access to the maximum potential balances. Bank account balances advertised were
also considerably higher than credit card limits; in 2008, the average advertised bank account balance was
just over $176,000, while the average credit card limit was just over $3,400. it is likely that advertisers are
skewing the average by promoting bank accounts with high balances, specifically from corporate accounts, to attract customers. Symantec observed advertisements with balances ranging from $3,000 to one
with over $2.4 million. Beyond straightforward account cash outs, bank accounts can also be used as
intermediary channels to launder money or to fund other online currency accounts that only accept
bank transfers for payments.
the advertised price for bank account credentials varied as widely as it did in 2007, with prices ranging
from $10 to $1,000, depending on the amount of funds available, the location of the account, and the
type of account. Corporate and business accounts were advertised for considerably higher prices than
those of personal bank accounts as they typically had higher balances on average. Symantec observed
one eU business bank account—purportedly holding a balance of $400,000—being advertised for sale
for $600. in addition, eU accounts were advertised at a considerably higher average price than their U.S.
counterparts, which may be because eU accounts are rarer than U.S. accounts on underground economy
servers. Furthermore, bank account credentials that bundled in additional information such as names,
addresses, dates of birth, and mothers’ maiden names were advertised at higher prices, presumably
because this added information could potentially be used for further identity fraud.
148 http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=2318
149 http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=2524Symantec Government internet Security threat report
64email accounts were the third most common item advertised for sale on underground economy servers
in 2008, making up 5 percent of all advertised goods, an increase from 4 percent in 2007. Gaining
possession of email passwords can allow access to email accounts, which can be used for sending out
spam and/or for harvesting additional email addresses from contact lists. recipients of the spam emails
may be more trusting of emails coming from a known email address. moreover, along with email, many
iSps include free Web space in their account packages, which many people rarely access. Once the iSp
accounts are compromised, these free spaces can be used to host phishing sites or malicious code
without the knowledge of the victims.
in addition, compromised email accounts will often provide access to additional sensitive personal
information such as bank account data, student identification numbers, mailing address and phone
numbers, or access to other online accounts (such as social networking pages, online stock accounts, etc.)
that is stored in saved personal emails. From there, it is often simple for someone to use the password recovery option offered on most online registration sites and have a new password sent via email to gain
complete access to these accounts. this danger is compounded by the fact that many people have of using
the same password for multiple accounts. the fraudulently gained personal information can then be used
to conduct identity theft and fraud.
the advertised prices of email accounts depended on the iSp of the account; larger iSps that offered large
amounts of Web space were advertised at higher prices than ones with smaller space. Web-based email
accounts from various iSps around the world were advertised, although the location used to register the
account did not factor into the advertised price since users could obtain the same type of access worldwide. Accounts registered in europe, the United States, and the middle east were advertised at the
same prices for this reporting period, ranging from $1 to $100 for each account.
the distribution of goods and services advertised on underground economy servers continues to be
focused on financial information, such as credit card information and bank account credentials. this
seems to suggest that criminals are more focused on purchasing goods that allow them to make large quantities of money quickly on underground economy servers rather than on exploits that require more
time and resources, such as scam pages and email lists for spamming. this trend is likely to continue
until steps are taken to make it more difficult to obtain and use this financial information.
As part of their best practices to help prevent fraud, credit card companies, credit card issuers, and
banks have been taking more secure measures to verify and authenticate users, such as multi-factor
authorization or using technologies such as chip and pin on the credit cards they issue.
150 By instituting
effective multi-factor authentication and multi-level security systems, banks and credit card companies
can make it more difficult for criminals to exploit stolen financial information. Also, security features such
as Smart Card-based credit cards using the emV standard for security verification,151 or credit cards with
chip & pin technology for card-present transactions can make it more difficult for criminals to obtain
and use financial information.
150 http://www.chipandpin.co.uk/reflib/Consumer_digi-guide_p ost_14_Feb_FinAL.pDF
151 emV is a standard for authenticating credit and debit card payments. the name originates from the initial letters of europay, masterCard, and ViSA, who together
developed the standard. Cf. http://www.emvco.com/about_aspx Symantec Government internet Security threat report
65Another technology currently being tested in the United Kingdom for card-not-present transactions, such
as online shopping, are credit cards with one-time codes. to complete the transaction, credit card holders
enter their pin into the built-in keypad on the back of the card. Once the correct pin is entered, the card
will display a six-digit one-time code to be used to authenticate the transaction.152 this code would be
unique for each specific transaction. even if the card is stolen or lost, a criminal would need the pin to
use the card.
moreover, consumers who fear identity theft and payment fraud may be moving toward internet-based
payment services and other non-credit card electronic payment services. these types of services have
become more popular because they do not expose the credit or debit card information that is used to set
up the accounts and, as with some credit card issuers, often offer full protection from unauthorized
transactions. in addition, they allow people without credit cards to make online purchases.
nonetheless, even though consumers seem to be moving toward other non-credit card electronic payment services for online payments, credit cards are still the most popular payment method. people may prefer
to use credit cards over other payment options because of the added bonuses sometimes associated with using them, such as zero liability, flight points, cash-back options, travel options, or dividend bonuses. in
the United States, the value of credit card transactions for 2006 was estimated at just over $2.1 trillion—the equivalent of nearly $7,000 for each person in the United States.
153
Spam by category
Spam categories are assigned based on spam activity that is detected by the Symantec probe network.
While some of the categories may overlap, this data provides a general overview of the types of spam that
are most commonly seen on the internet today. it is important to note that this data is restricted to spam
attacks that are detected and processed by the Symantec probe network. internal upstream processing
may weed out particular spam attacks, such as those that are determined to be potential fraud attacks.
the most common type of spam detected in 2008 associated with internet- or computer-related goods and
services, which made up 24 percent of all detected spam (figure 11). in 2007, this was the second most
common type of spam, accounting for 19 percent of the total. this type of spam is typically used to
promote Web hosting and design, as well as other online commodities such as phishing and spam toolkits.
Since phishing and spam toolkits cannot typically be advertised by legitimate means, such as through
banner ads on websites, spam may be the most effective way to promote them.
the increase in spam associated with internet- or computer-related goods and services is reflected in
the items that were most commonly available on underground economy servers in 2008, as discussed in
“Underground economy servers ” previously. email addresses, which are usually purchased for the sake
of spamming, were the fourth most commonly advertised good.
152 http://www.visaeurope.com/pressandmedia/newsreleases/press377_pressreleases.jsp
153 http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss85p2.pdf : tables 9 and 9dSymantec Government internet Security threat report
66Furthermore, scams ranked tenth in items for sale on underground economy servers in 2008. Scams
advertised on these servers consist of creating scam Web pages, creating and disseminating scams, or
hosting scam pages. Fraudsters promote these items, and buyers can often find them advertised on
underground economy servers. this spamming activity in turn adds to the growth of the underground
economy servers. Some of the phishing scams result in the harvesting of credit card and bank account credentials, which are then sold on underground economy servers.
2007
FinancialInternet
Commercial products
HealthLeisure
Scams
Fraud
PoliticalAdult15%<1%9%
6%6%5%
25%17%19%
15%1%
8%7%5% 5%
19% 16%24%
2008
Figure 11. Top spam categories
Source: Symantec
the second most common type of spam detected in 2008 was related to commercial products, which made
up 19 percent of all spam detected by Symantec sensors. in 2007, commercial spam was the most common
type of spam, accounting for 25 percent of the total. Commercial products spam usually consists of advertisements for commercial goods and services. Such spam is frequently used to sell designer goods
such as watches, handbags, and sunglasses. the profits from the sale of these products can be substantial
given that the goods sold are often cheaply made counterfeits. Symantec Government internet Security threat report
67For 2008, internet-related spam and commercial-products spam not only switched places from the previous
year, but also percentages. Symantec believes this may be the result of the economic downturn. it is possible
that, with the drop in consumer confidence, people are less inclined to buy the types of goods and services
advertised by commercial-product spam.
Spam related to financial services made up 16 percent of all spam detected in 2008, making it the third
most common type of spam during this period. Financial services spam contains references or offers related
to money, the stock market, or other financial “opportunities.” this is almost unchanged from 2007, when
financial services spam was also the third most common type of spam, with 17 percent of the total. While
it might be expected that spam offering stock market tips or other financial opportunities would drop off
during a period of market uncertainty, it is likely that such a drop-off would be negated by an increase in
spam offering such recession-related enticements as low-interest loans and easy access to credit.
Phishing, underground economy servers, and spam—protection and mitigation
Symantec recommends that enterprise users protect themselves against phishing threats by filtering email
at the server level through the mail transfer agent (mt A). Although this will likely remain the primary point
of filtering for phishing, organizations can also use ip-based filtering upstream, as well as Http filtering.
DnS block lists also offer protection against potential phishing emails.154 Organizations could also consider
using domain-level or email authentication in order to verify the actual origin of an email message. this can
protect against phishers who are spoofing email domains.155
to protect against potential phishing activity, administrators should always follow Symantec best practices,
as outlined in Appendix A of this report. Symantec also recommends that organizations educate their end users about phishing.
156 they should also keep their employees notified of the latest phishing attacks and
how to avoid falling victim to them, and provide a means to report suspected phishing sites.157
Organizations can also employ Web-server log monitoring to track if and when complete downloads of their
websites, logos, and images are occurring. Such activity may indicate that someone is attempting to use the
legitimate website to create an illegitimate website for phishing.
Organizations can detect phishing attacks that use spoofing by monitoring non-deliverable email addresses
or bounced email that is returned to non-existent users. they should also monitor the purchasing of cousin
domain names by other entities to identify purchases that could be used to spoof their corporate domains.158
So-called typo domains and homographic domains should also be monitored.159 this can be done with the
help of companies that specialize in domain monitoring; some registrars also provide this service.
the use of antiphishing toolbars and components in Web browsers can also help protect users from phishing
attacks. these measures notify the user if a Web page being visited does not appear to be legitimate. this
way, even if a phishing email reaches a user’s inbox, the user can still be alerted to the potential threat.
154 A DnS block list (sometimes referred to as a black list) is simply a list of ip addresses that are known to send unwanted email traffic. it is used by email software to
either allow or reject email coming from ip addresses on the list.
155 Spoofing refers to instances where phishers forge the “From:” line of an email message using the domain of the entity they are targeting with the phishing attempt.
156 Cf., basic guidelines on how to avoid phishing at the United States Federal trade Commission: http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/alt127.htm
157 Cf. http://www.antiphishing.org for information on the latest phishing threats.
158 “Cousin domains” refers to domain names that include some of the key words of an organization’s domain or brand name; for example, for the corporate domain
“bigbank.com”, cousin domains could include “bigbank-alerts.com”, ”big-bank-security.com”, and so on.
159 typo domains are domain names that use common misspellings of a legitimate domain name, for example the domain “symatnec.com” would be a typo domain for
“symantec.com”. A homographic domain name uses numbers that look similar to letters in the domain name, for example the character for the number “1” can look like the letter “l”.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
68end users should follow best security practices, as outlined in Appendix A of this report. they should use
an antiphishing solution. As some phishing attacks may use spyware and/or keystroke-logging applications,
Symantec advises end users to use antivirus software, antispam software, firewalls, toolbar blockers, and
other software-detection methods. Symantec also advises end users to never disclose any confidential
personal or financial information unless and until they can confirm that any request for such information
is legitimate.
Users should review bank, credit card, and credit information frequently. this can provide information
on any irregular activities. For further information, the internet Fraud Complaint Center (iFCC) has also
released a set of guidelines on how to avoid internet-related scams.160 Additionally, network administrators
can review Web proxy logs to determine if any users have visited known phishing sites. Consumers could also take more security precautions to ensure that their information will not be
compromised. When conducting higher-risk internet activities, such as online banking or purchases,
consumers should do so only on their own computers and not public ones. Further, they should not store
passwords or bank card numbers. they should also avoid following links from within messages (whether
in email, instant messages, online forums, etc.) as these may be links to spoofed websites; instead, they should manually type in the UrL of the website. Also, consumers should be aware of the amount of
personal information that they post on the internet, as criminals may take advantage of this public
information in malicious activities such as phishing scams.
160 http://www.fbi.gov/majcases/fraud/internetschemes.htmSymantec Government internet Security threat report
69Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices
Enterprise best practices
employ defense-in-depth strategies, which emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive •
defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protection method.
this should include the deployment of regularly updated antivirus, firewalls, intrusion detection, and
intrusion protection systems on client systems.
turn off and remove services that are not needed.•
if malicious code or some other threat exploits one or more network services, disable or block access to •
those services until a patch is applied.Always keep patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host public services and are accessible •
through the firewall, such as Http , Ftp, email, and DnS services.
Consider implementing network compliance solutions that will help keep infected mobile users out of •
the network (and disinfect them before rejoining the network).enforce an effective password policy.•
Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments that are commonly used •
to spread viruses, such as .VBS, .BA t, .eXe , .piF, and .SCr files.
isolate infected computers quickly to prevent the risk of further infection within the organization.•
perform a forensic analysis and restore the computers using trusted media.•
train employees to not open attachments unless they are expected and come from a known and trusted •
source, and to not execute software that is downloaded from the internet unless it has been scanned
for viruses.ensure that emergency response procedures are in place. this includes having a backup-and-restore •
solution in place in order to restore lost or compromised data in the event of successful attack or
catastrophic data loss.
educate management on security budgeting needs.•
test security to ensure that adequate controls are in place.•
Be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file-•
sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software.
Clicking on links and/or attachments in email messages (or im messages) may also expose computers •
to unnecessary risks. ensure that only applications approved by the organization are deployed on
desktop computers.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
70Consumer best practices
Use an internet security solution that combines antivirus, firewall, intrusion detection, and vulnerability •
management for maximum protection against malicious code and other threats.
ensure that security patches are up to date and that they are applied to all vulnerable applications in a •
timely manner.
ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers, and change them often. passwords should not •
consist of words from the dictionary.never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is expected and the purpose •
of the attachment is known.Keep virus definitions updated regularly. By deploying the latest virus definitions, you can protect your •
computer against the latest viruses known to be spreading in the wild.
routinely check to see if your operating system is vulnerable to threats by using Symantec Security •
Check at www.symantec.com/securitycheck.Deploy an antiphishing solution. Also, never disclose any confidential personal or financial information •
unless and until you can confirm that any request for such information is legitimate.Get involved by tracking and reporting attack attempts. With Symantec Security Check’s tracing service, •
users can quickly identify the location of potential hackers and forward the information to the attacker’s
iSp or local police.
Be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file-•
sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software.Avoid clicking on links and/or attachments in email or im messages, as these may also expose computers •
to unnecessary risks.
read end-user license agreements (eULAs) carefully and understand all terms before agreeing to them •
as some security risks can be installed after an end user has accepted the eULA or as a consequence of
that acceptance. Be aware of programs that flash ads in the user interface. many spyware programs track how users •
respond to these ads, and their presence is a red flag. these ads may be spyware.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
71Appendix B—Threat Activity Trends Methodology
threat activity trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec Global
intelligence network, which includes the Symantec DeepSight™ threat management System, Symantec
managed Security Services, the Symantec Honeypot network, and proprietary Symantec technologies. Symantec combines data derived from these sources for analysis.
Malicious activity by country
to determine the top countries for the “malicious activity by country” metric, Symantec compiles
geographical data on each type of malicious activity to be considered, namely: bot-infected computers,
phishing website hosts, malicious code reports, spam zombies, and attack origin. the proportion of
each activity originating in each country is then determined. the mean of the percentages of each
malicious activity that originates in each country is calculated. this average determines the proportion
of overall malicious activity that originates from the country in question and the rankings are determined
by calculating the mean average of the proportion of these malicious activities that originated in
each country.
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft
Symantec identifies the proportional distribution of cause and sector for data breaches that may facilitate
identity theft based on data provided by the Open Security Foundation (OSF) Dataloss DB.161 OSF reports
data breaches that have been reported by legitimate media sources and have exposed personal information
including name, address, Social Security number, credit card number, or medical history. the sector that
experienced the loss along with the cause of loss that occurred is determined through analysis of the organization reporting the loss and the method that facilitated the loss.
Bot-infected computers
Symantec identifies bot-infected computers based on coordinated scanning and attack behavior that is
observed in global network traffic. An active bot-infected computer is one that carries out at least one
attack per day. this does not have to be continuous; rather, a single computer can be active on a number
of different days. Attacks are defined as any malicious activity carried out over a network that has been detected by an intrusion detection system (iDS) or firewall.
For an attacking computer to be considered to be participating in coordinated scanning and attacking,
it must fit into that pattern to the exclusion of any other activity. this behavioral matching will not catch
every bot-infected computer, and may identify other malicious code or individual attackers behaving in a
coordinated way as a botnet. this behavioral matching will, however, identify many of the most coordinated
and aggressive bot-infected computers. it will also give insight into the population trends of bot-infected
computers, including those that are considered to be actively working in a well-coordinated and aggressive
fashion at some point in time during the reporting period.
161 http://datalossdb.orgSymantec Government internet Security threat report
72Bot command-and-control servers
Symantec tracks the number of new bot C&C servers detected worldwide. Only irC and Http bot C&C
server trends will be evaluated in the methods botnet owners are using to communicate with their
bot-infected computers.
Top Web-based attacks
to evaluate this metric, Symantec identifies each distinct attack delivered via the Web, hereafter referred to
as Web-based attack, hosted on malicious websites that are detected by intrusion prevention technology. A
Web-based attack is any attack that is carried out against a client-side application originating from the Web.
Symantec determines the top Web-based attacks based by determining the most common attacks carried
out against users. Due to the nature of Web-based attacks, the total number of attacks carried out is a
good measure of the success and popularity of the attack.
each attack discussed targets a specific vulnerability or weakness in Web browsers or other client-side
applications that process content originating from the Web. these attacks can vary in their delivery
methods; some rely on misleading a user into downloading a malicious file, while others occur without
any knowledge or interaction by the user.
Top countries of origin for Web-based attacks
Symantec identifies the Web-based attacks by country by determining the geographic origin that
conducts the attack on computers upon visiting a website. note that the server hosting the exploit may not
necessarily be the same server that the user has visited due to redirection. A user could visit a website that redirects their Web browser to a malicious server in another country.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
73Appendix C—Malicious Code Trends Methodology
malicious code trends are based on statistics from malicious code samples reported to Symantec for
analysis. the data is gathered from over 130 million client, server, and gateway systems that have deployed
Symantec’s antivirus products in both consumer and corporate environments. the Symantec Digital
immune System and Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting process.
Observations in this section are based on empirical data and expert analysis of this data. the data and
analysis draw primarily from the two databases described below.
Infection database
Symantec developed the Symantec AntiVirus research Automation (SArA) technology to help detect and
eradicate computer viruses. this technology is used to analyze, replicate, and define a large subset of the
most common computer viruses that are quarantined by Symantec Antivirus customers.
On average, SArA receives hundreds of thousands of suspect files daily from both enterprise and individual
consumers located throughout the world. Symantec then analyzes these suspect files, matching them with virus definitions. An analysis of this aggregate data set provides statistics on infection rates for different
types of malicious code.
Malicious code database
in addition to infection data, Symantec Security response analyzes and documents attributes for each new
form of malicious code that emerges both in the wild and in a “zoo” (or controlled laboratory) environment.
Descriptive records of new forms of malicious code are then entered into a database for future reference.
For this report, a historical trend analysis was performed on this database to identify, assess, and discuss
any possible trends, such as the use of different infection vectors and the frequency of various types of
payloads. in some cases, Symantec antivirus products may initially detect new malicious code heuristically
or by generic signatures. these may later be reclassified and given unique detections. Because of this, there
may be slight variance in the presentation of the same data set from one volume of the Symantec
Government Internet Security Threat Report to the next.
Geographic location of malicious code instances
Several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic locations of systems to ip
addresses are used along with proprietary Symantec technology to determine the location of computers reporting malicious code instances. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of
error. the data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of malicious code instances. Symantec Government internet Security threat report
74Appendix D—Phishing, Underground Economy Servers, and Spam
Trends Methodology
phishing and spam attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data captured through the
Symantec probe network, a system of more than 2.5 million decoy accounts, messageLabs intelligence,
and other Symantec technologies in more than 86 countries from around the globe. Over eight billion email messages, as well as over one billion Web requests are scanned per day across 16 data centers. Symantec
also gathers phishing information through an extensive antifraud community of enterprises, security
vendors and more than 50 million consumers.
the Symantec probe network data is used to track the growth in new phishing activity. it should be noted
that different monitoring organizations use different methods to track phishing attempts. Some groups
may identify and count unique phishing messages based solely on specific content items such as subject
headers or UrLs. these varied methods can often lead to differences in the number of phishing attempts
reported by different organizations.
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam data is also used to gauge the growth in phishing attempts as well as the
percentage of internet mail determined to be phishing attempts. Data returned includes messages
processed, messages filtered, and filter-specific data.
Symantec has classified different filters so that spam statistics and phishing statistics can be determined
separately. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data includes data reported back from customer
installations providing feedback from antispam filters as well as overall mail volume being processed.
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam only gathers data at the Smtp layer and not the network layer, where DnS
block lists typically operate because Smtp -layer spam filtering is more accurate than network-layer
filtering and is able to block spam missed at the network layer. network layer-filtering takes place before
email reaches the enterprise mail server. As a result, data from the Smtp layer is a more accurate
reflection of the impact of spam on the mail server itself.
Due to the numerous variables influencing a company’s spam activity, Symantec focuses on identifying
spam activity and growth projections with Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data from enterprise
customer installations having more than 1,000 total messages per day. this normalization yields a more
accurate summary of internet spam trends by ruling out problematic and laboratory test servers that
produce smaller sample sets.
this section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to produce the data and statistics in
this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, the
following investigations warrant additional detail.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
75Phishing activity by sector
the Symantec phish report network (prn) is an extensive antifraud community whose members
contribute and receive fraudulent website addresses for alerting and filtering across a broad range of
solutions. these sites are categorized according to the brand being phished and its sector. prn members
and contributors send in phishing attacks from many different sources. this includes a client detection
network that detects phishing websites as the clients visit various websites on the internet. it also includes
server detection from spam emails. the sender confirms all spoofed websites before sending the address
of the website into the prn. After it is received by the prn, Symantec spoof detection technology is used to
verify that the website is a spoof site. research analysts manage the prn console 24 hours a day, 365 days
of the year, and manually review all spoof sites sent into the prn to eliminate false positives.
Top countries hosting phishing websites and top targeted sectors
the data for this section is determined by gathering links in phishing email messages and cross-
referencing the addresses with several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic
locations of systems to ip addresses. in this case, Symantec counts phishing websites as the number of
unique ip addresses hosting Web pages used for phishing. While these databases are generally reliable,
there is a small margin of error. the data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of
phishing websites.
Phishing site top-level domains
the data for this section is determined by deriving the top-level domains of each distinct phishing website
UrL. the resulting top-level domains are tabulated and compared proportionately.
Underground economy servers—goods and services available for sale
this metric is based on data that is gathered by proprietary Symantec technologies that observe activity on underground economy servers and collect data. Underground economy servers are typically chat servers
on which stolen data, such as identities, credit card numbers, access to compromised computers, and
email accounts are bought and sold. each server is monitored by recording communications that take
place on them, which typically includes advertisements for stolen data. this data is used to derive the data
presented in this metric. it should be noted that this discussion might not necessarily be representative of
internet-wide activity; rather, it is intended as a snapshot of the activity that Symantec observed during this period.Symantec Government internet Security threat report
76Description of goods and services advertised on underground economy servers may vary from vendor to
vendor. the following list shows typical goods and services that are found on these servers and general
descriptions of each:
Bank account credentials:• may consist of name, bank account number (including transit and branch
number), address, and phone number. Online banking logins and passwords are often sold as a
separate item.
Cash out:• a withdrawal service where purchases are converted into true currency. this could be in the
form of online currency accounts or through money transfer systems and typically, the requester is
charged a percentage of the cashout value as a fee.
Credit card information:• includes credit card number and expiry date. it may also contain the
cardholder name, Credit Verification Value 2 (CVV2) number, pin, billing address, phone number, and
company name (for a corporate card). CVV2 is a three or four-digit number on the credit card and used
for card-not-present transactions such as internet or phone purchases. this was created to add an extra
layer of security for credit cards and to verify that the person completing the transaction was in fact, in possession of the card.
Email accounts:• includes user iD, email address, password. in addition, the account may contain
personal information such as addresses, other account information, and email addresses in the
contact list.
Email addresses:• consists of lists of email addresses used for spam or phishing activities. the email
addresses can be harvested from hacking databases, public sites on the internet, or from stolen email
accounts. the sizes of lists sold can range from 1 mB to 150 mB.
Full identities:• may consist of name, address, date of birth, phone number, and government-issued
number. it may also include extras such as driver’s license number, mother’s maiden name, email
address, or “secret” questions/answers for password recovery.Mailers:• an application that is used to send out mass emails (spam) for phishing attacks. examples of
this are worms and viruses.
Proxies:• proxy services provide access to a software agent, often a firewall mechanism, which performs
a function or operation on behalf of another application or system while hiding the details involved,
allowing attackers to obscure their path and make tracing back to the source difficult or impossible. this
can involve sending email from the proxy, or connecting to the proxy and then out to an underground irC server to sell credit cards or other stolen goods.
Shell scripts:• used to perform operations such as file manipulation and program execution. they can
also be used as a command line interface for various operating systems.Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec
Corporation.
nO WArrAnty . the technical information is being delivered to you as is and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its accuracy or use. Any use of the
technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user. Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical
errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice.
|
Symantec enterpriSe SecuritySymantec Internet Security Threat Report
april 2009
regional Data Sheet—Latin america
An important note about these statistics
the statistics discussed in this document are based on attacks against an extensive sample of Symantec
customers. the attack activity was detected by the Symantec™ Global intelligence network, which
includes Symantec managed Security Services and Symantec DeepSight™ threat management System,
both of which use automated systems to map the ip address of the attacking system to identify the
country in which it is located. However, because attackers frequently use compromised systems situated
around the world to launch attacks remotely, the location of the attacking system may differ from the
location of the attacker.
Introduction
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of internet threat data in the world
through the Symantec Global intelligence network. more than 240,000 sensors in over 200 countries
monitor attack activity through a combination of Symantec products and services such as Symantec
DeepSight™ threat management System, Symantec managed Security Services and norton™ consumer
products, as well as additional third-party data sources.
Symantec also gathers malicious code intelligence from more than 130 million client, server, and gateway
systems that have deployed its antivirus products. additionally, Symantec’s distributed honeypot network
collects data from around the globe, capturing previously unseen threats and attacks and providing valuable insight into attacker methods.
Spam data is captured through the Symantec probe network, a system of more than 2.5 million decoy
email accounts, Symantec messageLabs intelligence, and other Symantec technologies in more than
86 countries from around the globe. Over eight billion email messages, as well as over one billion Web
requests, are scanned per day across 16 data centers. Symantec also gathers phishing information through
an extensive antifraud community of enterprises, security vendors, and more than 50 million consumers.
these resources give Symantec’s analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze,
and provide informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and
spam. the result is the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report , which gives enterprises and consumers
the essential information to effectively secure their systems now and into the future.
in addition to gathering internet-wide attack data for the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report ,
Symantec also gathers and analyzes attack data that is detected by sensors deployed in specific regions.
this regional data sheet will discuss notable aspects of malicious activity Symantec has observed in the
Latin america (L am) region for 2008.Latin america Data Sheet
2Highlights
• Brazil was the top country for malicious activity in LAM during 2008, accounting for 34 percent of the
total. Globally, Brazil ranked fifth, with 4 percent of the total for malicious activity by country.
• The United States was the top country of origin for attacks detected by LAM-based sensors in 2008,
accounting for 58 percent of all detected attacks. the united States also maintained its top ranking for
originating attacks against global targets in 2008, with 25 percent.
• Brazil was the top country for bot-infected computers in the LAM region for 2008, with 42 percent of
the total; Brazil had 6 percent of the total of bot-infected computers globally.
• In 2008, the most frequently observed malicious code sample by potential infection in LAM was the
Gammima. aG worm; this worm ranked seventh globally in 2008.
• In 2008, 29 percent of all spam detected in LAM originated in Brazil; globally, Brazil accounted for
4 percent of spam detected worldwide.
Malicious activity by country
this metric will assess the countries in L am in which the highest amount of malicious activity took place or
originated in 2008. to determine this, Symantec has compiled geographical data on numerous malicious
activities, including bot-infected computers, phishing website hosts, malicious code reports, spam
zombies, and attack origins. the rankings are determined by calculating the average of the proportion of
these malicious activities that originated in each country.
malicious activity usually affects computers that are connected to high-speed broadband internet because
these connections make attractive targets for attackers. Broadband connections provide larger bandwidth
capacities than other connection types, faster speeds, the potential of constantly connected systems,
and typically more stable connections. Symantec has also noted in the past that malicious activity in a
country tends to increase in relation to growth in broadband infrastructure. One particular reason for this
is because new users may be unaccustomed to, or unaware of, the increased risk of exposure to malicious
attacks from such robust connections.
each of the top three countries in this metric has a well developed and growing broadband infrastructure:
Brazil experienced a growth of 27 percent in broadband subscribers between 2007 and 2008, and both
mexico and argentina experienced a growth of over 40 percent during the same period.1 Brazil has the
most broadband subscribers in L am, with 39 percent of the regional total, while mexico and argentina
currently have 24 percent and 12 percent, respectively.2
Brazil was the top ranked country for malicious activity in L am in 2008, making up 34 percent of the regional
total (table 1). Globally, Brazil ranked fifth in this measurement, accounting for 4 percent of the worldwide total—an increase from 3 percent and eighth rank in 2007. Brazil ranked first in all of the considered malicious
activities in the L am region with the exception of malicious code, for which it ranked second.
1 http://www.point-topic.com
2 ibíd. Latin america Data Sheet
32008
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
102007
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Country
Brazil
Mexico
Argentina
Chile
Colombia
Peru
Venezuela
Puerto Rico
Dominican
Republic
Ecuador2008
Overall
Percentage
34%
17%
15%
8%7%
4%
3%
2%
1%
1%2007
Overall
Percentage
31%
22%13%
8%
6%
5%
3%
2%
1%
1%Malicious
Code
Rank
2
16
5
3
8
4
7
12
9Spam
Zombies
Rank
1
52
4
3
6
9
10
7
18Phishing
Websites
Host Rank
1
42
3
5
8
6
10
18
7Bot
Rank
1
52
4
6
3
10
8
7
19Attack
Origin
Rank
1
23
5
4
7
6
8
10
14
Table 1. Malicious activity by country, LAM
Source: Symantec Corporation
although it is the most populous country in the L am region, Brazil’s prominence in this metric may also
be influenced by certain attacks originating in that country during 2008. in august 2008, it is alleged
that attacks on a micro-blogging site originated in Brazil.3 in this particular attack, a fake user profile was
created on the site, which was used to display a link to a video. When followed, the link actually redirected
users to download malicious code masquerading as a video player. the malicious code was a banking
trojan designed to steal online banking credentials. also, a popular social networking site—the majority
of whose members are in Brazil—was the target of attack of the Bancorkut worm, which downloads
malicious files and then attempts to steal login credentials and email addresses from users’ accounts.4
mexico ranked second in L am for malicious activity in 2008, accounting for 17 percent of the regional total,
while argentina ranked third, accounting for 15 percent. Globally, mexico ranked seventeenth with 2 percent
of the total and argentina ranked eighteenth accounting for 1 percent. One reason for the high rankings of
these countries may be due to the Downadup worm, discovered at the end of 2008.5 the top five countries
in this metric also ranked in the top 10 countries most affected by the Downadup worm during its initial
spread. these five countries accounted for 27 percent of the global infection rate of Downadup in 2008.6
3 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/7543014.stm
4 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-032608-3206-99
5 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-112203-2408-99
6 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/malicious-code/Downadup-Geo-location-Fingerprinting-and-piracy/ba-p/380993Latin america Data Sheet
Top countries of attack origin
this discussion measures countries as the originating sources of attacks targeting L am. an attack is
generally considered to be any malicious activity carried out over a network that has been detected by
an intrusion detection system ( iDS) or firewall. in 2008, the united States was the top country of origin
for attacks on L am detected by Symantec sensors based in the region, accounting for 58 percent of all
detected attacks (table 2). this result is likely due to the high level of attack activity originating in the
united States generally, as it was also the top country of origin for attacks against global targets, with
25 percent of that total in 2008.
Rank
1
23
4
5
6
78
9
10Country
United States
ChinaChile
Argentina
Brazil
Spain
CanadaNetherlands
United Kingdom
ColombiaGlobal Percentage
25%13%
1%
1%
3%
3%
3%1%
6%
1%LAM Percentage
58%
8%
3%
3%
3%
2%2%
1%1%1%
Table 2. Top countries of attack origin targeting LAM
Source: Symantec
as mentioned previously, malicious activity is most often associated with computers that are connected
to high-speed broadband internet; the united States ranked second worldwide for broadband subscribers
in 2008, behind only china, which ranked second as the country of origin for attacks targeting L am,
accounting for 8 percent of all attacks in 2008.7
Of the top 10 originating countries of attacks targeting L am, only four are located in the region itself. Of
these, chile, argentina, and Brazil ranked third, fourth, and fifth in this measurement, respectively, with
3 percent of the total each, while colombia ranked tenth, with 1 percent. the regional percentages for
chile and argentina were higher than the global percentages, indicating that attacks from these countries
may be targeting the L am region specifically. Symantec has noted that attacks often target the region in
which they originate due to proximity, shared language, or often similar social and cultural interests.8
7 http://www.websiteoptimization.com/bw/0812/
8 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_symantec_internet_security_threat_report_v.pdf : p. 11
4Top bot-infected computers by country
Bots are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s machine in order to allow an attacker to remotely
control the targeted system through a communication channel, such as internet relay chat ( irc), peer-to-
peer ( p2p), or H ttp. these channels allow the remote attacker to control a large number of compromised
computers over a single, reliable channel in a botnet, which can then be used to launch coordinated attacks.
recognizing the ongoing threat posed by botnets, Symantec tracks the distribution of bot-infected
computers both worldwide and regionally. For regions, Symantec calculates the number of computers
worldwide that are known to be infected with bots, and then assesses which countries within a region
are home to high percentages of bot-infected computers. a high percentage of infected machines could
mean a greater potential for bot-related attacks, as well as indicating the level of patching and security awareness in the region.
in 2008, the L am region accounted for 13 percent of the total bot-infected computers detected globally.
Within the region, Brazil had the highest percentage of bot-infected computers, with 42 percent of the
total (table 3). Globally, Brazil had 6 percent of the total. argentina ranked second in 2008 for bot-infected
computers in L am, with 17 percent of the total, and peru ranked third, with 10 percent.
While the high ranking of these countries is most likely due to their proportionally high number of
broadband subscribers in the region, Symantec data also shows that the global percentage for spam
originating in L am doubled in 2008, from 2 percent to 4 percent.
9 Bot-infected computers are often
associated with spam because they can be programmed to automatically send out a large amount of email. the reason for the percentage increase in these countries may be due to events surrounding the
shutdown of a u.S.-based iSp that was alleged to be hosting bot command-and-control servers for several
major botnets.
10 Following the takedown of this iSp toward the end of 2008, several botnets were briefly
rendered inoperable and global spam levels dropped dramatically. although global spam levels had
returned to previous levels by the end of the year, the drop in spam generation elsewhere may explain the
percentage increase in L am.
LAM Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Country
Brazil
Argentina
Peru
Chile
Mexico
Colombia
Dominican Republic
Puerto Rico
Uruguay
VenezuelaGlobal Percentage
6%
2%
1%
1%
1%
1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%LAM Percentage
42%
17%
10%
9%7%
4%
3%
2%1%1%Global Rank
5
12
18
19
21
29
35
42
55
57
Table 3. Bot-infected computers by country, LAM
Source: Symantec
9 http://www.point-topic.com
10 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/other_resources/b-state_of_spam_report_02-2009.en-us.pdf : p. 7Latin america Data Sheet
5Latin america Data Sheet
to reduce exposure to bot-related attacks, end users should employ defense-in-depth strategies, including
the deployment of antivirus software and a personal firewall.11 users should update antivirus definitions
regularly and ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary
security patches from their operating system vendor. Symantec advises that users never view, open, or
execute any email attachment unless the attachment is expected and comes from a known and trusted
source and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
Top malicious code samples
the most common malicious code sample by potential infections in L am in 2008 was the Gammima. aG
worm (table 4).12 this worm was ranked seventh globally. Gammima. aG propagates by copying itself to
removable media storage devices, such as uSB drives and portable audio players. the Gammima. aG worm
also steals account credentials for popular online games, and it is one of three top 10 malicious code
samples in L am to do so.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
789
10Type
Worm, virus
Worm
Worm
Trojan
Worm
Trojan
Trojan,
back door
Worm, virus
Worm
WormInfection
Vector(s)
Removable
drives
Mapped,
removable
drives
SMTP
N/A
Removable
drives
N/A
N/ARemovable
drives
SMTP
Mapped,
removable
drivesImpact
Steals online game account credentials
Downloads and installs additional threats
Performs DoS attacks
Steals online game account credentials
Downloads and installs additional threats
Exploits DRM technology to download
additional threats
Displays advertisements, and downloads
and installs additional threats
Steals online game account credentials
Performs DoS attacks
Modifies registries to display offensive
text in browser windowsBrazil
Brazil
Chile
Brazil
Colombia
Brazil
Brazil
Brazil
Colombia
BrazilSecond
RankedCountry
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
Mexico
MexicoMexico
Mexico
MexicoTop
Ranked
Country
Gammima.AG
SillyFDC
Rontokbro
Gampass
SillyDC
Wimad
Vundo
GammimaRontokbro.K
RunautoSample
Table 4. Top malicious code samples, LAM
Source: Symantec
the second ranked malicious code sample causing potential infections in L am during 2008 was the
SillyFD c worm.13 as with Gammima. aG, SillyFD c propagates by copying itself to any removable media
storage devices attached to the compromised computer. Once the worm is installed on a computer it also
attempts to download and install additional threats onto the computer.
11 Defense-in-depth emphasizes multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or
protection methodology.
12 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-082706-1742-99&tabid=1
13 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-071111-0646-99
6Latin america Data Sheet
the third most frequently reported malicious code sample causing potential infections in L am during this
period was the rontokbro worm.14 this worm ranked first in L am during 2007; it was also one of the top
10 malicious code samples globally in both 2007 and 2008. rontokbro is mass-mailing worm that gathers
email addresses from certain files on compromised computers and then sends copies of itself as an email
attachment to those addresses. the worm can also be instructed to launch denial-of-service (DoS) attacks
against websites, which can negatively affect network performance on the compromised computer.
Symantec recommends that certain best security practices always be followed to protect against malicious
code infection. administrators should keep patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host
public services and applications (such as H ttp, Ftp, Smtp , and D nS servers) and which are accessible
through a firewall or placed in a D mZ.15 email servers should be configured to only allow file attachment
types that are required for business needs and to block email that appears to come from within the company, but that actually originates from external sources. additionally, Symantec recommends that
ingress and egress filtering be put in place on perimeter devices to prevent unwanted activity. to protect
against malicious code that installs itself through a Web browser, additional measures should be taken.
the use of intrusion prevention system ( ipS) technologies can prevent the exploitation of browser and
plug-in vulnerabilities through signatures and behavior-based detection, in addition to aSLr.
16
end users should employ defense-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software and
a personal firewall. users should update antivirus definitions regularly. they should also ensure that all
desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their software vendors. they should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless it is expected and comes
from a trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
14 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-092311-2608-99
15 a demilitarized zone (DmZ) is an area within a network that purposely does not have any protection, such as a firewall or port trigger. it also limits access to
protected computers on the network.
16 address space layout randomization is a security measure used to complicate exploitation of some classes of vulnerabilities by randomizing the layout of process
address space to make it less predictable to attackers.
7Latin america Data Sheet
8Top countries of spam origin
this section will discuss the top 10 countries of spam origin. the nature of spam and its distribution on
the internet presents challenges in identifying the location of people who are sending it because many
spammers try to redirect attention away from their location. as such, the region in which the spam
originates may not correspond with the region in which the spammers are located.
in 2008, 12 percent of all spam detected worldwide originated in L am. On a country basis, Brazil ranked
fifth globally and first regionally, which represents 4 percent of the global total and 29 percent of the
regional total (table 5). aside from the fact that Brazil is by far the most populous country in L am with
the most broadband subscribers, the high rate of regional spam from Brazil is likely due to its first-place ranking in both L am and globally in 2008 for spam zombies. Spam zombies are used to send bulk spam,
and Brazil was host to 9 percent of the worldwide total in 2008.
Rank
1
23
4
5
6
78
9
10Country
Brazil
ArgentinaColombia
Chile
Peru
Mexico
BoliviaDominica
Venezuela
Dominican RepublicGlobal Percentage
4%2%1%
1%
1%
1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%LAM Percentage
29%
15%
12%
9%9%
6%3%
3%2%2%
Table 5. Top countries of spam origin, LAM
Source: Symantec
argentina ranked second for originating spam in the L am region in 2008, with 15 percent of the total,
and colombia ranked third, with 12 percent. as with Brazil, the prominence of these two countries is
likely due to their high ranking for spam zombies in the region, since they ranked second and third in this
measurement, respectively.
|
SymAnte C enterpriSe SeCUritySymantec APJ Internet
Security Threat Report
trends for 2008
Volume XiV, published April 2009Marc Fossi
executive editor
manager, DevelopmentSecurity technology and response
Eric Johnsoneditor
Security technology and response
Trevor Mack
Associate editor
Security technology and response
Dean Turner
Director, Global intelligence network
Security technology and response
Joseph Blackbird
threat Analyst
Symantec Security response
Mo King Lowthreat AnalystSecurity technology and response
Teo Adamsthreat Analyst
Security technology and response
David McKinney
threat AnalystSecurity technology and response
Stephen Entwislethreat Analyst
Security technology and response
Marika Pauls Laucht
threat AnalystSecurity technology and response
Candid Wueestthreat AnalystSecurity technology and response
Greg Ahmadthreat AnalystSecurity technology and response
Darren Kempthreat AnalystSecurity technology and response
Ashif Samnanithreat AnalystSecurity technology and responseIntroduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Highlights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Threat Activity Trends ...................................................................... 7
Malicious Code Trends .................................................................... 24
Phishing and Spam Trends ................................................................ 35
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices ...................................................... 42
Appendix B—Threat Activity Trends Methodology ............................................ 44
Appendix C—Malicious Code Trends Methodology ........................................... 46
Appendix D—Phishing and Spam Trends Methodology ........................................ 47ContentsVolume XiV, published April 2009
Symantec APJ Internet Security
Threat ReportSymantec Ap J internet Security threat report
4Introduction
the Symantec APJ Internet Security Threat Report provides an annual overview and analysis of internet
threat activity, a review of known vulnerabilities, and highlights of malicious code in the Asia-p acific/Japan
(ApJ) region. trends in phishing and spam are also assessed. previously, Symantec presented data on a
six-month basis. this volume of the Symantec APJ Internet Security Threat Report will alert readers to
current trends and impending threats that Symantec has observed for all of 2008.
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of internet threat data in the world
through the Symantec™ Global intelligence network. more than 240,000 sensors in over 200 countries
monitor attack activity through a combination of Symantec products and services such as Symantec
DeepSight™ threat management System, Symantec managed Security Services and norton™ consumer
products, as well as additional third-party data sources.
Symantec also gathers malicious code intelligence from more than 130 million client, server, and gateway
systems that have deployed its antivirus products. Additionally, Symantec’s distributed honeypot network
collects data from around the globe, capturing previously unseen threats and attacks and providing
valuable insight into attacker methods.
Symantec maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting
of more than 32,000 recorded vulnerabilities (spanning more than two decades), affecting more than
72,000 technologies from more than 11,000 vendors. Symantec also facilitates the Bugt raq™ mailing list,
one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion of vulnerabilities on the internet, which
has approximately 50,000 subscribers who contribute, receive, and discuss vulnerability research on a
daily basis.
Spam data is captured through the Symantec probe network, a system of more than 2.5 million decoy
accounts, messageLabs intelligence, and other Symantec technologies in more than 86 countries from
around the globe. Over eight billion email messages, as well as over one billion Web requests are scanned
per day across 16 data centers. Symantec also gathers phishing information through an extensive
antifraud community of enterprises, security vendors and more than 50 million consumers.
these resources give Symantec’s analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze, and
provide informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and spam.
the result is the Symantec APJ Internet Security Threat Report, which gives enterprises and consumers in
the region the essential information to effectively secure their systems now and into the future.Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
5Highlights
the following section will offer a brief summary of the security trends that Symantec observed in the Ap J
region in 2008. this includes highlights of the metrics that are discussed in the remainder of the Symantec
APJ Internet Security Threat Report that follows these highlights.
Threat Activity Trends Highlights
China ranked first for malicious activity within Ap J in 2008, with 41 percent of the total; China also •
ranked first in 2007, with 42 percent of the total.
in 2008, the United States ranked first for originating attacks targeting the Ap J region, with 28 percent •
of the total; this is an increase from 24 percent in 2007, when it also ranked first.Symantec observed an average of 11,683 active bot-infected computers per day in the Ap J region in •
2008, which is a 3 percent increase from the 11,329 recorded in 2007.
China had the most bot-infected computers in the Ap J region during this period, with 58 percent of the •
total—down from 66 percent in 2007.taipei was the top city for bot infections in the Ap J region in 2008, accounting for 9 percent of all bot •
infections in the Ap J region.
in 2008, Symantec identified 3,567 distinct new bot command-and-control servers in the Ap J region, of •
which 30 percent were controlled through irC channels and 70 percent were managed over Http .
China was the top country for bot command-and-control servers in Ap J, with 63 percent of the •
regional total.the most common Web-based attack in 2008 against users in Ap J was associated with the Adobe® SWF •
remote Code executable vulnerability, which accounted for 32 percent of the regional total.
in 2008, China was the top country of origin for Web-based attacks in the Ap J region, accounting for •
79 percent of the regional total.
Malicious Code Trends Highlights
trojans were the most common type of malicious code in 2008, accounting for 55 percent of the volume •
of the top 50 potential infections in the region—an increase from 46 percent in 2007.Worms accounted for 43 percent of malicious code in the Ap J region in 2008, compared to 29 percent •
globally.in 2008, China was the top country for back doors and trojans in the Ap J region, while india was the top •
country for viruses and worms.the Gampass trojan was the top malicious code sample by potential infection in the Ap J region in 2008— •
unchanged from 2007. Globally, it was also the most downloaded component in multistage attacks. the Brisv trojan was the top new malicious code family in the Ap J region in 2008. • Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
6in 2008, 82 percent of confidential information threats detected in the Ap J region exported user data, •
compared to 85 percent in 2007.
the most common propagation method for malicious code in the Ap J region in 2008 was through •
shared executable files, which accounted for 65 percent of potential infections—a slight increase
from 63 percent in 2007.
Phishing and Spam Trends Highlights
China hosted the highest percentage of phishing websites in 2008, with 35 percent of the regional total. •
in 2007, China ranked second with 28 percent.
in 2008, China had the highest percentage of spam detected in Ap J, with 22 percent; this is down •
slightly from 24 percent in 2007, when China also ranked first for spam origin. the most common tLD used in phishing lures detected in Ap J in 2008 was .com, accounting for •
30 percent. in 2007, .com was the second most common tLD in Ap J after .cn.Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
7Threat Activity Trends
this section of the Symantec APJ Internet Security Threat Report will provide an analysis of threat activity
that Symantec observed in 2008 in the Ap J region. the malicious activity discussed in this section not only
includes attack activity, but also phishing websites hosted, malicious code, spam zombies, bot-infected
computers, and bot command-and-control (C&C) server activity. Attacks are defined as any malicious
activity carried out over a network that has been detected by an intrusion detection system (iDS) or
firewall. Definitions for the other types of malicious activity can be found in their respective sections
within this report.
this section will discuss the following metrics, providing analysis and discussion of the trends indicated by
the data:
malicious activity by country/region •
top countries/regions of attack origin•
Bot-infected computers•
Bot-infected computers by country/region•
Bot command-and-control servers•
Bot command-and-control servers by country/region•
top Web-based attacks•
top countries/regions of origin for Web-based attacks•
threat activity—protection and mitigation•
Malicious activity by country/region
this metric will assess the countries or regions in which the most malicious activity takes place or
originates in the Ap J region. to determine this, Symantec has compiled geographical data on numerous
malicious activities, including: bot-infected computers, phishing website hosts, malicious code reports, spam zombies, and attack origin. the rankings are determined by calculating the mean average of the
proportion of these malicious activities that originated in each country.
China ranked first for aggregate malicious activity within the Ap J region in 2008, as it did in 2007, though
its proportion dropped slightly to 41 percent from 42 percent previously (table 1). China continues to
maintain its prominence in this metric for a number of reasons. First, it has maintained a high rank in most
of the contributing criteria, meaning that, logically, it will continue to challenge for the highest overall
ranking. Second, in 2008, China overtook the United States for the highest number of broadband
subscribers in the world.
1 Broadband subscriptions in China grew 24 percent from 2007 to 83.3 million
subscribers, and now represent 21 percent of broadband subscribers worldwide. malicious activity usually
affects computers that are connected to high-speed broadband connections. these connections are
attractive targets for attackers because broadband provides large bandwidth capacities, stable connections, fast transfer speeds, and the potential for constantly connected systems.
1 http://www.point-topic.comSymantec Ap J internet Security threat report
82008
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
102007
Rank
1
2
3
5
4
6
7
10
11
9Country/Region
China
South Korea
India
Taiwan
Japan
Australia
Thailand
Vietnam
Singapore
Philippines2008
Percentage
41%
11%
10%
8%
7%
5%
4%
3%
2%
2%2007
Percentage
42%
11%
9%
9%
9%
5%
4%
2%
2%
2%Malicious
Code
Rank
1
6
2
4
3
5
12
11
10
7Spam
Zombies
Rank
1
4
2
6
7
11
3
5
9
8Phishing
Websites
Host Rank
2
1
7
4
3
5
6
11
10
12Bot
Rank
1
3
4
2
5
7
8
11
6
10Attack
Origin
Rank
1
26
5
3
4
87
9
11
Table 1. Malicious activity by country/region, APJ
Source: Symantec Corporation
Another reason for China’s rank in this measurement may be because internet users in China spend more
of their leisure time online than users in any other country.2 Online leisure activities are typically more
likely to include activities on sites that are vulnerable to attacks. this includes social networking websites,
online gaming sites, forums, blogs, and online shopping sites. Dynamic sites, such as forums, for example,
are prime targets for attackers using bot-infected computers to propagate and host malicious content
since Web application and site-specific vulnerabilities can put these types of site at risk.
the slight drop in China’s percentage of malicious activity in 2008 was mainly due to the drop in phishing
website hosts and bot-infected computers. China dropped from first for phishing website hosts in 2007
to second in 2008, with 22 percent of the regional total. For bot-infected computers, although China maintained its top ranking, its regional percentage fell to 58 percent in 2008 from 66 percent in 2007.
One possible cause for the decreases may be national initiatives to block websites potentially most
susceptible to fraud in an effort to increase online security for users ahead of the 2008 Beijing Olympic
Games. thousands of websites were either shut down or blacklisted as part of this effort, including a
substantial number of message forums,
3 which, as noted above, are popular targets of attack from Web
application and site-specific vulnerabilities. thus, any reduction in the number of bot-infected computers
should result in a corresponding drop in other attack activity categories, such as spam zombies, because these are often associated with bot-infected computers.
Another factor that may have contributed to the lower percentage of bot-infected computers in China in
2008 was that many unlicensed internet cafés there were shut down. Supervision was tightened on the
remaining cafés to help address online security risks associated with the casual use of public computers.
4
public computers tend to be more susceptible to attacks because of the significant amount of varied traffic
on such computer terminals. public computers are frequently used by a great variety of people for many
different activities such as email, online shopping, and gaming. the variety of usage and likelihood that
transient users are less aware of—or concerned with—security makes such computers attractive to attackers.
2 http://www.tnsglobal.com/_assets/files/ tnS_market_research_Digital_World_Digital_Life.pdf
3 Cf. http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/news/2207878/china-cracks-web-porn and http://english.gov.cn/2008-03/29/content_931872.htm
4 http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/rt GAm.20080212.wgtchina0212/BnStory/ technology/homeSymantec Ap J internet Security threat report
9South Korea ranked second for malicious activity in 2008, as it did in 2007. its share of total regional
malicious activity remained unchanged at 11 percent for both years. One reason for South Korea’s
continued high ranking in this metric may be because of its high rate of fiber-to-the-home (F ttH)
deployment over other countries in the region. As noted, malicious activity tends to follow increased broadband capacity and F ttH connections currently provide the highest bandwidth capacities, over
traditional DSL or cable lines. Of the 32 million F ttH connections existing globally, 27 million are in Asia
and nearly 37 percent of all homes in South Korea use F ttH to connect to the internet.
5 Attackers in
control of computers with high-bandwidth capacity can quickly mount numerous large-scale attacks. moreover, the faster an attack is executed, the less likely it is that it will be detected. Attackers also
prefer the reliability of potentially continuous connections, which allow attacks to be mounted with
great frequency.
india maintained its third-place ranking in 2008, accounting for 10 percent of the malicious activity in
ApJ—a slight increase from 9 percent in 2007. india increased its proportion of activity in almost every
category, though its rankings remained mostly constant. Furthermore, as noted in the “Geolocation by
type of malicious code ” discussion of this report, india ranked first for viruses and worms and second
for trojans and back doors, which likely contributed to its high ranking in this metric.
Another factor that explains the prominence of india in this metric is that internet cafés are still the
most popular venue for its citizens to access the internet, with 37 percent of the population using this
method to go online.
6 As noted, transient users of public terminals are less likely to follow adequate
security measures—such as not opening email attachments or not visiting insecure websites—thus increasing the exposure of these café terminals to infection. the indian government has responded by
tightening regulations on internet cafés through measures such as increased licensing requirements.
7
As well, customers are required to present valid identification before being allowed to use a terminal in
an internet café.
it is worth noting that the Ap J region has the highest percentage of internet activity in the world and it has
the highest global broadband population by regional breakdown, accounting for 38 percent of the world’s
users.8 this high rate of broadband penetration may account for the high rates of malicious activity found
there overall.
Top countries/regions of attack origin
this discussion measures the top originating countries for attacks that target the Ap J region. the analysis
is based on aggregate iDS and firewall event data collected through the Symantec Global intelligence
network. As discussed in “malicious activity by country/region,” above, malicious activity usually affects computers that are connected to high-speed broadband internet. most of the countries that ranked in this
discussion have highly developed broadband infrastructures. this includes the top three ranked countries:
the United States, China, and South Korea (table 2). the United States represents 20 percent of the global
broadband population.
9 China, which passed the United States for the largest number of broadband
subscribers for the first time in 2008, represents 21 percent of that total, while South Korea represents
4 percent of the total.10
5 http://troulos.wordpress.com/2008/07/24/ftth-global-rankings-mid-2008/
6 http://www.iamai.in/prelease_detail.aspx?nid=1785&nmonth=1&ny ear=2009
7 http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/jul2008/gb20080715_536817.htm?chan=technology_technology+index+page_top+stories
8 http://www.point-topic.com
9 http://www.point-topic.com
10 http://www.point-topic.comSymantec Ap J internet Security threat report
10in 2008, the United States ranked first for originating attacks against the Ap J region, with 28 percent of the
total, which is an increase from 24 percent in 2007, when the United States also ranked first. it should be
noted that in 2008 the United States also ranked first in this category globally, as well as in the europe,
middle east and Africa (emeA) region, with 25 percent and 28 percent, respectively. Because the global
and regional proportions are so similar, it is likely that attacks originating from the United States are not
specifically targeting any one region, but instead are responsible for many attacks worldwide.
2008 APJ
Rank
1
2
3
4
56
789
102007 APJ
Rank
1
2
4
3
59
11
6
16
24Country/Region
United States
China
South Korea
Japan
AustraliaUnited Kingdom
ThailandCanadaRussiaTurkey2008 APJ
Percentage
28%
15%
11%
5%
4%3%
3%3%2%2%2008 Global
Percentage
25%
13%
3%
2%
2%6%
<1%
3%
2%2%
2007 APJ
Percentage
24%
19%
6%
10%
6%
2%
2%3%1%1%
Table 2. Top countries/regions of attack origin, APJ
Source: Symantec
China ranked second for originating attacks on Ap J in 2008, with 15 percent—down from 19 percent in
2007 when it also ranked second. As noted above in “Malicious activity by country/region,” the drop in
activity originating in China is likely due to the increased security measures that were put into place in
advance of the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, including the active blocking of potentially fraudulent
websites and forums, the closure of many unlicensed internet cafés, and increased security over the
internet cafés that remained open.
An explanation for China’s high ranking in this metric may be due to a number of circumstances that lead
to a general lack of security awareness and reporting by newer internet users in China. there may not be
adequate mechanisms for users in China to identify and report harmful websites, as is the case with users in other countries.
11 the public consequences of hosting infected sites are relatively minimal in China and
iSps there may have little incentive to clean up or remove infected sites. this could result in malicious
content remaining online for longer periods.
As well, websites and computers in China show higher infection rates than those found in other countries
as is demonstrated by the fact that the top five Autonomous System numbers (ASn) in China host more
than 50 percent of the infected websites globally.12 in comparison, the top five ASns in the rest of the world
account for only 8 percent of infected websites globally.13 Given the relative ease of infection and its large
number of broadband users, China may be an attractive location from which to launch attacks.
11 http://weis2008.econinfosec.org/papers/Greenstadt.pdf : p. 15
12 An Autonomous System number is an officially registered number that iSps are required to have for each ip network that has a clearly defined routing policy.
13 http://weis2008.econinfosec.org/papers/Greenstadt.pdf : p. 15Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
11South Korea ranked third in this measurement for this period, with 11 percent of the total. South Korea’s
proportion of activity increased from 6 percent in 2007 when it ranked fourth. South Korea’s high ranking
in the metric is likely due to the high amount of malicious activity found there. in particular, South Korea
accounted for 25 percent of the phishing activity found in the region. the fact that South Korea’s global
percentage is only 3 percent while its regional percentage is 11 percent indicates that targets within South
Korea and the region as a whole may be more attractive to local attackers due to regional proximity and
similar online social interests.
Bot-infected computers
Bots are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s machine in order to allow an attacker to remotely
control the targeted system through a communication channel, such as internet relay chat (irC), peer-to-
peer (p2p), or Http . these channels allow the remote attacker to control a large number of compromised
computers over a single, reliable channel in a bot network (botnet), which can then be used to launch
coordinated attacks.
Bots allow for a wide range of functionality and most can be updated to assume new functionality by
downloading new code and features. Attackers can use bots to perform a variety of tasks, such as setting
up denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against an organization’s website, distributing spam and phishing
attacks, distributing spyware and adware, propagating malicious code, and harvesting confidential
information from compromised computers that may be used in identity theft, all of which can have serious
financial and legal consequences. Bots are also inexpensive and relatively easy to propagate. in 2008,
Symantec observed advertisements for bot-infected computers in the underground economy for as little as $0.04 per bot.
14 this is much cheaper than in 2007, when $1 was the cheapest price advertised for bots.
Bot-infected computers with a decentralized bot C&C model are favored by attackers because they are difficult to disable, and most importantly, can be lucrative for their controllers. in one example, a botnet
owner arrested in new Zealand admitted to earning $21,500 over a two-year span from his activities.
15
A bot-infected computer is considered active on a given day if it carries out at least one attack on that day.
this does not have to be continuous; rather, a single such computer can be active on a number of different
days. in 2008, Symantec observed an average of 11,683 active bots per day in the Ap J region (figure 1),
which is a 3 percent increase from the number seen in 2007, when 11,329 active bots were detected.
14 All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.
15 http://www.itworld.com/security/58670/botnet-master-sees-himself-next-bill-gatesSymantec Ap J internet Security threat report
12DateActive bot-infected computers by da y
020,00040,00060,000100,000
80,000120,000
Global
APJ
4 per . moving average
Apr 4, 2007 Jul 4, 2007 Oct 3, 2007 Jan 2, 2008 Apr 2, 2008 Jul 2, 2008 Oct 1, 2008 Jan 3, 2007 Dec 31, 2008
Figure 1. Active bot-infected computers per day, APJ
Source: Symantec
Symantec also measures distinct bot-infected computers, which are computers that were active at least
once during the reporting period. in 2008, Symantec identified 2,075,968 distinct bot-infected computers
in the Ap J region, which amounts to 22 percent of the 9,437,536 distinct bot-infected computers detected
worldwide during this period. it is 21 percent less than the 2,628,906 distinct bot-infected computers that
Symantec identified in the Ap J region during 2007.
the overall decline in bot activity is likely due to a drop in the number of bots found in China. regionally,
China’s percentage of bot activity dropped from 66 percent in 2007 to 58 percent in 2008. this decrease
is discussed in “Bot-infected computers by country/region,” which follows.
Symantec noted that bot activity in the emeA region in 2008 closely paralleled global bot activity; however,
the same cannot be said for the bot activity in the Ap J region. One major difference in the global and Ap J
bot activity occurs at the end of the year, when bot activity in Ap J increased. this increase may be due
to the outbreak of the Downadup worm (also known as Conficker),16 which will also be discussed
immediately below.
16 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-112203-2408-99&tabid=1Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
13Bot-infected computers by country/region
recognizing the ongoing threat posed by botnets, Symantec tracks the distribution of bot-infected
computers both worldwide and regionally. For regions, Symantec calculates the number of computers
worldwide that are known to be infected with bots, and assesses which countries within the region are
home to high percentages of these computers. A high percentage of infected machines could mean a
greater potential for bot-related attacks, as well as indicating the level of patching and security awareness
in the region.
For the Ap J region, the bot activity rankings for 2008 are very similar to those observed in 2007, with
only a few changes in the regional percentages. the biggest change in proportion of activity occurred in
China. Although China maintained its first-place ranking globally and within the Ap J region in 2008, its
global percentage dropped to 13 percent, from 19 percent in 2007, and its regional percentage dropped
to 58 percent, from 66 percent (table 3). As discussed previously, the drop is due to increased internet
security measures implemented in preparation for the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.17 Because malicious
or compromised websites are commonly used to propagate bots, a reduction in vulnerable websites may
result in fewer avenues of attack for botnets.
2008 APJ
Rank
1
23
4
5
6
7
8
9
102007 APJ
Rank
1
23
5
4
8
7
10
6
9Country/Region
China
TaiwanSouth Korea
India
Japan
Singapore
Australia
Thailand
MalaysiaPhilippines2008 APJ
Percentage
58%
12%
8%
5%
4%
3%
3%
2%
2%1%2008 Global
Percentage
13%
3%
2%
1%
1%
1%
1%
<1%
<1%<1%2007 APJ
Percentage
66%
10%
7%
3%
4%
2%
2%1%2%1%
Table 3. Bot-infected computers by country/region, APJ
Source: Symantec
Despite the drop in regional percentage, China’s continued first-place ranking may have been due, in part,
to the outbreak of the Downadup worm. When this worm was discovered toward the end of 2008, the
infections seemed to be largely prevalent in Asia, with the largest concentrations found in the Greater
China region.18 the initial widespread expansion of the worm in Ap J may be due to a significant percentage
of computers running unpatched operating systems there when the worm spread. Unpatched computers
are less likely to be protected against new threats such as the Downadup worm.
17 http://www.interfax.cn/news/4327/
18 http://www.scmagazineus.com/new-worm-exploiting-microsoft-vulnerability/article/120399/Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
14An additional factor for the Greater China region’s top rankings was the relocation of bot-infected
computers that made up the botnet associated with the peacomm trojan. this botnet first appeared in
January 2007.19 Following a significant drop in size in April 2008 and inactivity after September 2008, the
peacomm botnet reappeared as Waledac20 toward the end of 2008. After the botnet was disabled, the
botnet operators found new computers to infect, many of which were located in the Greater China region
and turkey.21
South Korea retained its third-place ranking for bot infections in Ap J in 2008, accounting for 8 percent of
the regional activity—a slight increase from 7 percent in 2007. South Korea’s increase is likely due to the decrease in activity in China, rather than to any increase in the activity in South Korea.
South Korea’s high ranking may also be due to the high levels of F ttH deployment within the country. As
noted previously, F ttH connections are attractive to attackers because of their high speed, capacity, and
reliability; nearly 37 percent of all homes in South Korea use F ttH to connect to the internet.
22
Bot command-and-control servers
Bot command-and-control (C&C) servers are computers that botnet owners use to relay commands to bot-
infected computers on their networks. Symantec tracks the number of bot C&C servers worldwide as well
as regionally. For the first time, in this volume of the Symantec APJ Internet Security Threat Report, bot
C&C servers controlled over Http are included in this analysis alongside traditional irC bot C&C servers.23
this change in measurement was made due to the trend of botnet owners shifting away from traditional irC bot C&C communication frameworks and toward managing their botnets through Http bot C&C
servers, which is reflected in the percentages for this reporting period. in 2008, Symantec identified
3,567 distinct new bot C&C servers in Ap J, of which 30 percent were controlled through irC channels,
while 70 percent were managed over Http (figure 2).
Botnet owners are moving away from traditional irC-based botnets since they are easier to detect, track,
filter, and block than botnets based on Http traffic. this is because malicious botnet traffic can be hidden
within legitimate traffic over Http . (most Http bot transmissions are encrypted to avoid detection.) to
filter the traffic, organizations would have to inspect the encrypted Http traffic and identify and remove
bot-related traffic while still allowing legitimate traffic to pass through. Because of this, it is very difficult
to pinpoint and disable a bot C&C structure. it is also unreasonable to block all Http traffic since that
would restrict all access to the Web. Botnet owners have also been switching away from using p2p for bot
C&C server communications because such traffic is more easily detected due to the “noise” it creates in
transmission. moreover, many enterprises and other organizations also block p2p ports to prevent such
high-bandwidth traffic from entering their networks.
19 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-011917-1403-99
20 http://www.symantec.com/en/th/enterprise/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-122308-1429-99
21 http://www.scmagazineus.com/Botnet-storms-on-the-horizon/article/119586/
22 http://troulos.wordpress.com/2008/07/24/ftth-global-rankings-mid-2008/
23 not included in this measurement are bot C&C servers over p2p protocols; also, as this is the first report in which Http bot C&C servers are included in this analysis,
2007 comparisons are unavailable. Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
15HTTP 70%IRC 30%
Figure 2. Bot command-and-control servers, by type, APJ
Source: Symantec
As noted in the Symantec Report on the Underground Economy,24 in some countries such as China, users
may not be overly familiar with irC servers, which may be one reason for the smaller percentage of irC
servers in the Ap J region as a whole.25 As well, a number of countries in the region exercise a measure
of control by actively monitoring and filtering internet content. this control may be more difficult to
implement on irC servers than on those based on Http and likely contributes to the lower percentage
of irC servers found in Ap J, since these countries would restrict irC access when possible.
Symantec also observed an average of 10 new active bot C&C servers per day in 2008: three irC-based
and seven on Http (figure 3). Since most of the major botnets have an Http bot C&C architecture,
fluctuations in their activity and testing of the botnet structure will contribute to the variations in the
pattern observed.
24 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_underground_economy_report_11-2008-14525717.en-us.pdf : p. 57
25 http://honeyblog.org/junkyard/reports/www-china- tr.pdf : Section 5.1 Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
16DateBot comand-and-control servers
02612
4818
16
14
10HTTP
IRC
3 per . moving average (H TTP)
3 per . moving average (IRC )
Apr 2, 2008 Jul 2, 2008 Oct 1, 2008 Jan 2, 2008 Dec 31, 2008
Figure 3. Bot command-and-control servers by day, APJ
Source: Symantec
Bot C&C server activity also exemplifies the trend toward the globalization of malicious activity, as is
demonstrated in the way that activity in the Ap J region closely follows global patterns. While there is a
difference in scale because there are fewer servers hosted in the Ap J region overall, the increases and
decreases observed in activity occur at precisely the same time, both in Ap J and globally. thus, fluctuations
in the number of servers active at a given time in the Ap J region are probably due to fluctuations in global
activity, rather than specific changes within the region.
Bot command-and-control servers by country/region
recognizing the ongoing threat posed by bot C&C servers, Symantec tracks their distribution both worldwide
and regionally. For the first time, in this volume of the Symantec APJ Internet Security Threat Report, the
location of bot C&C servers is being assessed. Bot controllers look for hosting services with stable internet
connections, high bandwidth, and whose security measures may not be fully developed or rigidly enforced. therefore, comparing areas with high proportions of bot C&C servers may indicate the level of end-user education and implementation of security practices in those areas. it may also demonstrate the potential for
the infrastructures to withstand penetration by bot-infected computers. note that bot C&C servers might
not be located in the same place as the person controlling the botnet.
Additionally, it is worth noting that “normal” bot-infected computers can often become bot C&C servers.
Botnet owners commonly use a fast-flux domain name service scheme, where the control of a botnet is
decentralized, using a number of computers throughout the network.
26 Because there is no centralized bot
C&C server, the botnet can be broken up into smaller pieces, therefore making its activities more difficult
to detect and disable. in this way, bot C&C server distribution can sometimes mirror bot distribution.
26 http://news.zdnet.com/2100-1009_22-180416.htmlSymantec Ap J internet Security threat report
17in 2008, mainland China ranked first for bot C&C servers in Ap J with 63 percent of the regional total
(table 4). Of the bot C&C servers found in China, only 8 percent were irC-based while the remaining
92 percent used the Http protocol for communication. As noted above, in “Bot command-and-control
servers,” irC may not be very widespread in China, which would explain why only 8 percent of the servers
found there communicate over irC networks.
Http -based bot C&C servers communicate with bots by relaying their commands through Web proxies.
China has more domains registered than any other country/region in Ap J, with over 3 million domains.27
Because China has a considerable amount of Http traffic, given its high number of domains, it is likely
easier for attackers to hide illegal bot communications within legitimate Web traffic. Security
administrators may find it more difficult to filter the large amounts of traffic and identify illegal activity
while still maintaining an acceptable standard of service for legitimate users. thus, it is reasonable to
propose that the country/region with the most domains would have a great number of bot C&C servers.
C&C Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Country/Region
China
South Korea
Taiwan
Malaysia
Japan
Singapore
Australia
India
Thailand
IndonesiaC&C Percentage
63%
14%
6%
5%
4%
2%
2%
2%
2%
<1%
Table 4. Bot command-and-control servers by country/region, APJ
Source: Symantec
South Korea ranked second for bot C&C servers with 14 percent of the total. Fifty-four percent of South
Korea’s bot C&C servers functioned over irC while 46 percent used Http . As noted previously, the high
deployment of F ttH there makes South Korea an attractive target for attackers. to function effectively, bot
C&C servers must be able to receive communications from a large number of computers simultaneously,
and they must be able to process large amounts of information quickly from multiple sources; F ttH
meets many of the requirements for supporting bot C&C servers and makes for much more efficient
and frequent attacks.
the taiwan region ranked third for bot C&C servers in Ap J, accounting for 6 percent of the bot C&C activity
in Ap J. Forty-one percent of the servers in taiwan were irC-based while the remaining 59 percent used
Http . As with South Korea, taiwan’s ranking in this metric may be due to the high level of F ttH deployment
found there, as F ttH penetration there is nearly 8 percent of the connected population.28
27 http://www.webhosting.info/domains/
28 http://troulos.wordpress.com/2008/07/24/ftth-global-rankings-mid-2008/Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
18Top Web-based attacks
the widespread deployment of Web applications along with the ubiquity of easy-to-exploit Web application
security vulnerabilities have resulted in the prevalence of Web-based threats. Attackers wanting to take
advantage of client-side vulnerabilities no longer need to actively compromise or break into specific networks
to gain access to those computers. instead they are now focused on attacking and compromising websites
in order to use them to mount additional, client-side attacks.
these attack types can be found globally and Symantec identifies each by an associated distinct detection
signature. most attack types target specific vulnerabilities or weaknesses in Web browsers or other client-
side applications that process content originating from the Web. this metric will assess the top distinct
Web-based attacks originating from compromised legitimate sites as well as malicious sites that have been
created to intentionally target Web users in the Ap J region.
the attacks discussed can involve social engineering to entice a victim to view a malicious website, but
most attacks exploit trusted high-traffic websites. When the user visits a compromised website, a number
of attack methods are used. malicious content from the website can directly exploit a vulnerability in the
browser, a browser plug-in, or a desktop application. An attack such as this may require nothing more than
the user visiting the site from which the attack originates. in the case of a drive-by download,29 the attack
will occur without any interaction required from the user.
Attackers also use malicious websites for compromises, such as misleading the user to indirectly authorize
a specific technology that then downloads malicious code, or prompting the user to click on a pop-up or
banner ad. Attackers can also redirect all traffic from a legitimate website to a malicious website from which the user’s computer will then be attacked. in all of these types of Web-based attacks, the user is
unaware of the compromise.
Once an attacker has compromised a website and injected malicious content, they can passively attack
visitors to the compromised site. this type of attack is very efficient for attackers because they only have to
compromise one Web page in order to affect multiple users. When a user visits a compromised Web page,
the attack is carried out through the user’s browser. the attack will either target vulnerabilities in the
browser itself or it will target third-party applications that are activated by the browser.
All Web-based attack traffic goes through Http (or HttpS) protocols. the benefit of this for attackers is
that it is unreasonable to block these protocols because legitimate organizations depend on them for their
day-to-day business. in addition, filtering a large volume of Http traffic would significantly slow throughput
traffic. Http traffic is also difficult to filter with intrusion detection/intrusion prevention systems (iDS/ipS) because it is difficult to distinguish malicious traffic from legitimate traffic, and Http traffic can be
encrypted, thus enabling attacks to be obfuscated within legitimate traffic.
Attackers are not only employing manual methods to exploit these issues, but they are also using
automated tools, such as neosploit,
30 to exploit client-side vulnerabilities. Such toolkits are widely available
and prepackaged so that people with minimal technical knowledge are able to use them effectively. Once a
computer is compromised, the attacker can then gain access to any connected networks and steal private
information and/or system resources.
29 A drive-by download is any download that occurs without a user’s prior knowledge or authorization and does not require user interaction. typically this is an
executable file.
30 http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&taxonomyname=Security&articleid=9115599&taxonomyid=17&pagenumber=1Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
19Another attraction of the Web for exploitation is the profusion of dynamic sites that use Web-based
applications, such as forums, photo-sharing galleries, blogs, and online shopping applications. Dynamic
sites are prime targets for attackers using bot-infected computers to propagate and host malicious content
because Web application and site-specific vulnerabilities can put these types of site at risk.
Attackers are also especially attracted to large, popular websites with trusted reputations. this is not only
because a successful compromise can reach a greater number of people (who tend to have an inherent
trust for legitimate websites and are thus more susceptible to attack), but it may also be difficult to block
attacks to these sites using security tools without disrupting legitimate traffic.
these developments and trends indicate that Web-based threats have not only become widespread, but
they also have increased in sophistication and severity. in particular, Symantec has noticed that botnets
(such as Asprox,31 which was initially used for phishing scams) are being redesigned to specifically exploit
cross-site scripting vulnerabilities and inject malicious code into compromised websites.32
many Web-based attacks exploit vulnerabilities that are considered medium severity. this means that
they can compromise the account of the user who is currently logged in. this typically means that the user
does not require administrative privileges to run the affected applications. While the danger of client-side vulnerabilities may be limited by best practices, such as restricting Web applications to the administrative level, such measures are often impractical given how integral Web applications are to the delivery of
content for many businesses. medium-severity vulnerabilities affecting client or desktop applications
are often sufficient for an attacker to engage in revenue-generating malicious activities and the further propagation of attacks and malicious code.
in 2008, the most common Web-based attack targeting the Ap J region exploited the Adobe SWF remote
Code executable vulnerability.
33 this attack accounted for 32 percent of Web-based attacks in the Ap J
region (table 5). the vulnerability exploited in this attack was published April 8, 2008, and fixes have been
available since that day. the vulnerability is also exploited by the Swif.C trojan to install additional
malicious code onto compromised computers.34
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
89
10Attack
Adobe SWF Remote Code Executable
SnapShot Viewer ActiveX File Download
ANI File Header Size Buffer Overflow
Acrobat PDF Suspicious File Download
Microsoft Internet Explorer Malformed XML Buffer Overflow
Windows Media Encoder ActiveX Buffer Overflow
Microsoft Internet Explorer VML RecolorInfo Code Executable
Sina Downloader ActiveX Unsafe UsageAOL SuperBuddy ActiveX Code ExecutableUUSee UUUpgrade ActiveX Arbitrary File DownloadPercentage
32%
5%
3%
2%
1%
1%
1%
<1%
<1%<1%
Table 5. Top Web-based attacks, APJ
Source: Symantec
31 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-060812-4603-99
32 http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/mLireport_Annual_2008_FinAL.pdf : p. 33
33 See http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid=22964 and http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/28695
34 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-052714-3021-99Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
20the Adobe Flash® player is a popular multimedia technology with a substantial install base35 and many
websites now commonly employ Flash Shockwave (SWF) files to present content, especially streaming
video.36 Launching successful attacks may be quite simple once a successful exploit is developed because
the attacker just has to compromise a high-traffic website with a specially crafted SWF. Since this technology is very common, users typically do not suspect it for malicious content. moreover, if the user
already has the player installed there is no further interaction involved for the attack to be successful.
the second most common Web-based attack targeting users in Ap J during 2008 exploited the Snapshot
Viewer for microsoft® Access® ActiveX® Control Arbitrary File Download Vulnerability.
37 this attack
accounted for 5 percent of Web-based attacks observed by Symantec affecting users in Ap J. the affected
Snapshot Viewer, which is available as an ActiveX control, is used to view snapshots created with microsoft
Access and can download temporary files to temporary locations on a computer.38 in addition, since the
viewer is provided as part of microsoft Office® 2000, Office Xp , and Office 2003, and can also be installed
without the Office software, this may have contributed to its popularity in this metric.the attack exploits the vulnerability, which allows it to download malicious files to arbitrary locations on
a vulnerable computer when a user visits a malicious website. When the user’s computer processes the
file, the attacker’s malicious code is executed and can compromise the computer. Also, attackers exploiting
this vulnerability can force computers without the Snapshot Viewer to automatically download and install
the control without the user’s interaction or knowledge.
39 Once the viewer is installed, attackers can take
advantage of this vulnerability in their attacks. in addition, this exploit is now part of the neosploit toolkit,
which has resurfaced and which may facilitate the ease with which attackers are taking advantage of
this vulnerability.40
in 2008, the third most common Web-based attack exploited the microsoft Windows® User32.DLL Ani
File Header Handling Stack-Based Buffer Overflow Vulnerability.41 this attack accounted for 3 percent of
Web-based attacks in 2008. the Ani (animated cursor file) handler is a default component of the microsoft
Windows operating system and is used by a significant number of widely used microsoft applications as
well as the Windows shell. if successfully exploited, the vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary
code embedded in a malformed Ani file originating from the Web or other sources.
this vulnerability was published on January 11, 2005, and fixes have been available since that time.
exploit code was publicly available the following day. As with the microsoft internet explorer® ADODB.
Stream Object File installation Weakness, the prominence of this type of attack indicates that computers
in the region are likely not being sufficiently patched and updated.
Vulnerabilities such as those discussed here continue to generate a large amount of observed attack
activity because they can be reliably exploited. this makes these vulnerabilities prime candidates for
automation. Despite the fact that fixes are available, as mentioned, it is likely that there are still enough unpatched systems in existence that these attacks continue to enjoy success. When attacks prove successful, they are often adopted by a large number of malicious code variants and attack toolkits. this can cumulatively
create a large amount of attack activity. it is also likely that older malicious code variants continue to attempt
to automatically exploit these vulnerabilities as a means of propagation.
35 http://www.adobe.com/products/player_census/flashplayer/
36 Shock Wave File is the file format for multimedia that is played using Adobe Flash player.
37 See http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid=23034 and http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30114
38 http://www.kb.cert.org/vuls/id/837785
39 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30114 and
https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/Vulnerabilities-exploits/ActiveX-Vulnerabilities-e ven-When- you-Aren-t-Vulnerable- you-may/ba-p/341705 - A165
40 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/blogs/blogarticlepage/blog-id/vulnerabilities_exploits/article-id/164
41 See http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid=21719 and http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/12233Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
21Top countries/regions of origin for Web-based attacks
Once an attacker has compromised a legitimate website, users who visit the website may be attacked by
several additional means. One way is through a drive-by download, which can include installation of
malicious code without the user’s knowledge, or which will mislead the user to indirectly authorize a
malicious download via a fake client-side application authorization request. Another way is to redirect the
user to another website that is used to host malicious code. Sites and servers hosting a variety of malicious
exploits can be found worldwide. multiple domains can be associated with one compromised site, which
is used to exploit one or more security vulnerabilities in affected client browsers.
this metric will assess the top countries of origin for Web-based attacks against users in Ap J by determining
the location of computers from which the attack occurred. note that the server hosting the exploit may not
necessarily be the same server that the user has visited due to redirection. A user could visit a website that
redirects his or her browser to a malicious server in another country.
in 2008, China was the top country of origin for Web-based attacks against users in Ap J, accounting for
79 percent of the regional total (table 6). Worldwide, China ranked second for Web-based attacks, with
13 percent of the global total. One reason for the high rank of China regionally in 2008 is due to compromised
websites relating to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. the games were one of the largest events of 2008
and attackers exploited the popularity of the event in their attempts to lure and compromise users, as has
been seen previously with other major sporting and entertainment events round the world.42 One example
of this is the rustock43 botnet, which sent out emails with links to a news report about the games. Users
were prompted to click a link in the email and visit a website, which then prompted them to download a missing codec in order to launch a video. Clicking to obtain the codec actually resulted in the installation
of a trojan.
2008 APJ
Rank
1
23
4
5
6
78
9
102008 Global
Rank
2
8
16
18
26
27
2933
46
48Country/Region
ChinaJapanTaiwan
South Korea
Singapore
Australia
MalaysiaBangladesh
Thailand
India2008 APJ
Percentage
79%
9%3%
3%
2%
2%
1%1%
<1%
<1%2008 Global
Percentage
13%
2%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%<1%
<1%
<1%
Table 6. Top countries/regions of origin for Web-based attacks, APJ
Source: Symantec
42 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/7548870.stm
43 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-011309-5412-99Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
22Attackers may have also used social engineering to lure users to compromised websites under the guise
of being associated with the 2008 Beijing Olympic games, as attacks against Chinese-language websites
increased during the games.44 the extent of these attacks was, however, mitigated by national initiatives
to increase online security for users ahead of the games by shutting down or blacklisting thousands of websites that were considered most susceptible to fraud, many of which are popular targets of attack from
Web application and site-specific vulnerabilities. Also, thousands of websites in the Greater China region
were compromised when certain Web applications were infected with malicious JavaScript™ that was
planted through the use of SQL-injection attacks.
45 Visitors to these compromised sites had their computers
attacked and, if the attacks were successful, trojans were downloaded onto the computers.46
Japan was the second ranked country of origin for Web-based attacks targeting users in the Ap J region, with
9 percent of the regional total. Japan had 2 percent of the global total. Japan’s second-place ranking may be
because Web hosting is a fast growing industry in Japan. many countries in the region and elsewhere are
setting up Web servers in Japan because it is one of the major internet hubs in Asia, with the ability to
handle and quickly transfer large amounts of traffic, all factors which are also attractive to attackers due
to the increased capacity to mount attacks.47
the taiwan region ranked third for originating Web-based attacks in 2008, accounting for 3 percent of
the Ap J total. it may be ranked highly because thousands of websites in the Greater China region were
compromised with an automated SQL-injection attack engine in may that attacked visitors to those sites
with malicious code.48 the attacks targeted a number of vulnerabilities in internet explorer and related
plug-ins that are popular in the region.
Another event worth noting here is the spread in late 2008 of the Downadup worm, which has been
infecting computers through compromised websites that attack via drive-by downloads.49 As discussed in
“Bot-infected computers by country/region,” Downadup initially spread in the Ap J region and the majority
of its infections have occurred there. Although its spread seems to be slowing—due in part to a concerted
effort from antivirus companies, governments, and institutions—it is expected to continue to proliferate in
2009 and will likely affect malicious code percentages in that year as well.
Threat Activity—protection and mitigation
there are a number of measures that enterprises, administrators, and end users can employ to protect against malicious activity. Organizations should monitor all network-connected computers for signs of
malicious activity, including bot activity and potential security breaches, ensuring that any infected
computers are removed from the network and disinfected as soon as possible. Organizations should employ
defense-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software and a firewall.
50 Administrators
should update antivirus definitions regularly and ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers are
updated with all necessary security patches from their operating system vendor. As compromised computers
can be a threat to other systems, Symantec also recommends that enterprises notify their iSps of any
potentially malicious activity.
44 http://www.networkworld.com/newsletters/gwm/2008/090808msg1.html
45 http://www.h-online.com/security/Chinese-websites-under-mass-attack--/news/110764
46 Ibid.
47 http://www.free-press-release.com/news/200807/1216248319.html
48 http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&articleid=9086658&source=rss_topic85
49 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/malicious-Code/Downadup-Geo-location-Fingerprinting-and-piracy/ba-p/380993
50 Defense-in-depth emphasizes multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or
protection methodology. Defense-in-depth should include the deployment of antivirus, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems, among other security measures.Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
23Symantec recommends that organizations perform both ingress and egress filtering on all network traffic
to ensure that malicious activity and unauthorized communications are not taking place. Organizations
should also filter out potentially malicious email attachments to reduce exposure to enterprises and end
users. in addition, egress filtering is one of the best ways to mitigate a DoS attack. DoS victims frequently
need to engage their upstream iSp to help filter the traffic to mitigate the effects of attacks.
Symantec also advises that users never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the
attachment is expected and comes from a known and trusted source, and unless the purpose of the
attachment is known. By creating and enforcing policies that identify and restrict applications that can
access the network, organizations can minimize the effect of malicious activity, and hence, minimize the
effect on day-to-day operations. Also, administrators should limit privileges on systems for users who do
not require such access and they should also restrict unauthorized devices, such as external portable
hard-drives and other removable media.
to reduce the likelihood of identity theft, organizations that store personal information should take the
necessary steps to protect data transmitted over the internet or stored on their computers. this should
include the development, implementation, and enforcement of a secure policy requiring that all sensitive
data is encrypted. Organizations should implement a data loss protection (DLp) solution that not only prevents data breaches, but also mitigates potential data leaks from within an organization. Access to
sensitive information should be restricted and organizations should also enforce compliance to
information storage and transmission standards such as the pCi standard.
51 policies that ensure that
computers containing sensitive information are kept in secure locations and are accessed only by
authorized individuals should be put in place and enforced. Sensitive data should not be stored on mobile
devices that could be easily misplaced or stolen. this step should be part of a broader security policy that
organizations should develop and implement in order to ensure that any sensitive data is protected from unauthorized access. this would ensure that even if the computer or medium on which the data were lost
or stolen, the data would not be accessible. this step should be part of a broader security policy that
organizations should develop and implement in order to ensure that any sensitive data is protected from
unauthorized access.
51 https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
24Malicious Code Trends
Symantec gathers malicious code intelligence from more than 130 million client, server, and gateway
systems that have deployed its antivirus products. Underpinning these products are the Symantec Digital
immune System and Symantec Scan and Deliver technologies, as well as norton Community Watch, which
allow customers to automate the process of reporting viruses and other malicious code threats.
this discussion is based on malicious code samples detected by Symantec in 2008 in the Ap J region, with
the following trends being analyzed:
malicious code types •
Geolocation by type of malicious code •
top malicious code samples •
top new malicious code families •
threats to confidential information •
propagation mechanisms •
malicious code—protection and mitigation •
Malicious code types
Analyzing the prevalence of malicious code types provides insight into the general diversity in the threat
landscape and, combined with the data of other metrics, helps Symantec more accurately determine
emerging trends in malicious code. there were substantial variations between the proportions of malicious
code types in Ap J and those detected globally during 2008. the proportion of trojans made up 55 percent
of the volume of the top 50 potential infections in Ap J, lower than the global proportion at 68 percent
(figure 4). this was an increase from 2007, when trojans accounted for 46 percent of the volume of the top
50 potential infections in Ap J.
18%19%
01 02 03 0 40 50 70 60APJGlobal
80Type
Back door7%15%
VirusTrojan55%68%
Worm43%29%
Figure 4. Potential infections by type, APJ
Source: Symantec Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
25the primary reason for the substantial difference between the percentage of trojans in Ap J and globally is
the concentration of worms in Ap J. Worms accounted for 43 percent of the volume of the top 50 potential
infections in Ap J—identical to the 2007 percentage. this was greater than the global percentage of
29 percent. Similar differences between Ap J and global percentages were discussed in the Symantec APJ
Internet Security Threat Report, Vol. XIII, in which it was reported that seven of the top 10 malicious code
types causing potential infections in Ap J were worms.52 Symantec observed a similar distribution in 2008,
when eight of the top 10 malicious code types causing potential infections in Ap J were worms.
Worms are expected to make up an even greater proportion in 2009 due to the recent propagation of the
Downadup worm. this worm attracted a lot of attention during its initial proliferation in late 2008 because
of its sophistication and aggressive infection routine. Since it was still spreading at the time of publication,
Downadup is expected to affect percentages in 2009.
in 2008, 18 percent of the volume of the top 50 potential infections in Ap J was made up of viruses, down
from 20 percent in 2007. this was slightly lower than the global percentage of 19 percent, but indicates
that virus activity in Ap J is consistent with that of other regions. many of the viruses affecting Ap J are
worm components, which is also consistent with viruses affecting other regions.the percentage of back doors that make up the volume of the top 50 malicious code samples in Ap J
declined to 7 percent in 2008, down from 11 percent in the previous year. Similar to the year-over-year
decline in back door reports globally—down to 15 percent in 2008 from 21 percent in 2007—this is an indication that, rather than being incorporated into new frontline threats, back door threats are instead
being used in the later stages of attacks due to the trend toward multistage attacks. Because some
malicious code disables or ends security software processes, these later-stage attacks may potentially go
undetected. the smaller percentage of back doors in Ap J is also likely related to the significantly lower
percentage of trojans in the region because back doors are often components of trojans.
Geolocation by type of malicious code
this metric examines top countries for potential malicious code infections in Ap J by malicious code type.
Because of the different propagation mechanisms used by different malicious code types, and the different effects that each malicious code type may have, information about the geographic distribution of malicious
code can help network administrators improve their security efforts. table 7 shows the top three countries
in Ap J in 2008 for each of the main malicious code categories.
Rank
1
2
3Back DoorsTop Countries
China
India
JapanTrojans
China
India
JapanViruses
India
China
IndonesiaWorms
India
China
Japan
Table 7. Location of malicious code, APJ
Source: Symantec
52 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_apj_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 17Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
26Back doors
China and india accounted for the highest numbers of potential malicious code infections for each
malicious code type in Ap J in 2008. Of these, China ranked first for back doors in 2008, followed by india
and Japan. While similar back door numbers were observed in both india and Japan, over two and a half
times as many back doors were detected in China than in india. Back doors are often incorporated into
trojans; therefore, the large gap in numbers between China and india is primarily attributed to a similar
gap observed in trojans, as will be discussed below.
Trojans
in 2008, the top three ranked countries for trojans in Ap J were identical to those of back doors. China
ranked first, followed by india and Japan. Similar to back doors, the number of trojans from China was
nearly three times that of india. these gaps in numbers are similar to those in 2007, when China ranked
first for back doors and trojans by a substantial margin. this illustrates the close interrelation between the
two types of malicious code. For example, the Graybird53 trojan—the third most downloaded component
globally in multistage attacks—incorporates a back door component and accounts for a significant number
of potential infections in the region.
Viruses
the top three ranked countries for number of potential virus infections during this period were, in order,
india, China, and indonesia. While india and China also ranked in the top three in 2007, indonesia moved
up significantly from ranking eighth in 2007 to third in 2008. the change in ranking for indonesia is
primarily due to substantial increases of potential infections by the Almanahe54 and Sality55 worms,
both of which incorporate a virus component.
Worms
the distribution of potential worm infections in Ap J remained consistent in 2008, with only minor increases
or drops in low ranking countries. the top three ranked countries for the number of potential worm
infections during this period were india, China, and Japan, in that order. China and india were the top
countries for the eight worms that ranked in the top 10 malicious code samples in 2008, so it is not
surprising that they continue to account for a significantly large number of worm reports.
Worm rankings in A pJ may shift more substantially in 2009, depending on the progression of the Downadup
worm, discussed earlier. this worm has already had a notable impact in Ap J and is likely to continue to be a
factor in future reports.56 Downadup propagates by exploiting a vulnerability in microsoft Windows. Although
a patch is available to address the issue, a large percentage of unpatched computers in the region may have
facilitated the propagation of Downadup. Another factor is that this worm uses ip geolocation techniques
(along with rudimentary guesswork) to determine the language version of the operating system on each computer it attacks.
57 the current Downadup samples are quite capable of successfully determining
locations in Ap J and Latin America, with Chinese- and Brazilian-language systems specifically seeming
to be most prone to infection.
53 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2003-040217-2506-99
54 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-041317-4330-99
55 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-042106-1847-99
56 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/malicious-Code/Downadup-Geo-location-Fingerprinting-and-piracy/ba-p/380993
57 ip-based geolocation uses a computer’s ip address to determine the location of the computer by referencing a database or DnSBL (Domain name System Black List) to
determine the region, country, or city associated with an ip. there are varying levels of accuracy depending on the quality of the data. Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
27Top malicious code samples
Since 2007, the Gampass58 trojan has been the most common malicious code sample in the Ap J region
(table 8). the continued prevalence of Gampass is not surprising considering the popularity of online
gaming in Ap J and the fact that the trojan is designed to steal online game account credentials.59 One
reason for this continued high ranking is that Gampass is loaded onto compromised computers by the
mumawow60 worm. in 2007, mumawow ranked as the third most common malicious code sample in Ap J.
in 2008, however, the number of potential mumawow infections dropped by nearly 50 percent, dropping
it down to be the seventeenth-ranked malicious code sample in Ap J. regardless of the decrease for
mumawow, Gampass continued to be prevalent through 2008, with nearly twice as many potential infections as those of the second ranked sample. part of this success is also attributed to the Wowinzi
61
worm, which was the third most prevalent new malicious code family in Ap J in 2008. As with mumawow,
Wowinzi loads Gampass onto compromised computers. Gampass was also the most downloaded
component in multistage attacks globally in 2008.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Sample
Gampass
Gammima
Fujacks
Pagipef
Runauto
Almanahe
Rontokbro
Imaut
Sality
VundoType
Trojan
Worm/virus
Worm/virus
Worm/virus
Worm
Worm/virus
Worm
Worm
Worm/virus
Trojan/
back doorPropagation
Vectors
N/A
Removable drives
CIFS and executables
Executables, mapped
and removable drives
Mapped and
removable drives
CIFS, mapped and
removable drives
SMTP
Instant messages
Executables
N/AImpact
Steals online game
account credentials
Steals online game
account credentials
Ends security software-
related processes and
modifies HTML files
Infects executables and
modifies HTML files
Modifies registries to
display offensive text in
browser windows
Infects executable files,
ends security software-
related processes and
downloads additional threats
Performs DoS attacks
Ends security software-
related processes and
downloads additional threats
Removes security
applications and services
Displays advertisements,
and downloads additional
threatsTop
Reporting
Country/
Region
China
Taiwan
India
China
India
India
India
India
India
AustraliaSecond
Reporting
Country/
Region
Taiwan
India
China
India
China
China
China
Philippines
Indonesia
India
Table 8. Top malicious code samples, APJ
Source: Symantec
58 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-111201-3853-99
59 http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=2504
60 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-032015-4300-99
61 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-050714-5642-99Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
28the second most common sample in Ap J in 2008 was the Gammima62 worm. taiwan reported the highest
number of potential infections by this worm in 2008, followed by india. Like the Gampass trojan, Gammima
steals passwords for online games—primarily games that are popular in Ap J—and has accounted for a
large number of potential infections in previous periods. Gammima ranked fourth in Ap J during 2007.
the third most common malicious code sample in Ap J during 2008 was the Fujacks63 worm. Fujacks
was very prevalent during 2007 when it accounted for the largest number of potential infections in Ap J.
Although the number of reported potential infections in 2008 was slightly less than those in 2007, the
worm continued to have a strong presence in the region. Once installed on a compromised computer,
Fujacks modifies local HtmL files so that, when opened using a browser, the modified files redirect the
browser to a malicious website. Code on the website then attempts to load additional threats onto
the computer.
Top new malicious code families
the most common new malicious code family in Ap J in 2008 was the Brisv64 trojan, which also ranked
first globally (table 9). india reported the highest number of potential infections by this trojan, followed
by Australia. Brisv scans computers for multimedia files including .asf, .mp2, .mp3, .wma, and .wmv. the
trojan then modifies a data marker in the files with a malicious UrL. the marker is a part of the Windows
media Audio (WmA) format. Although other applications appear to be unaffected, when the files are opened using Windows media player, the marker is automatically processed, causing the application to open a
Web browser window and access the malicious UrL. Accessing the malicious UrL may expose the user
to additional threats. the effectiveness of Brisv is heightened by the possibility that unknowing victims
may share the compromised multimedia files with others, through p2p or email, etc. As a result, the
compromised files can potentially affect users whose computers were not exposed to the trojan itself.
interestingly, when Brisv scans for multimedia files, it converts all .mp2 and .mp3 files it encounters into the .wma format prior to injecting the malicious code, even while preserving the original file extensions of
the (now) converted files. the reason for converting files into the .wma format is so that Windows media
player will process the injected marker data properly. this is an example of increased sophistication in
malicious code development.
62 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-032206-2043-99
63 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-111415-0546-99
64 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-071823-1655-99Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
29Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Sample
Brisv
Auraax
Wowinzi
Drondog
Ircbrute
Hibik
Downadup
Blusod
Stayt
CetedType
Trojan
Worm
Worm/
virus/
back door
Trojan
Worm/
back door
Trojan
Worm
Trojan
Virus
WormPropagation
Vectors
N/A
CIFS
CIFS, mapped and
removable drives
N/A
Removable drives
N/A
Exploits a remote
vulnerability
N/A
N/A
CIFS and
removable drivesImpact
Modifies multimedia files,
causing Windows Media Player to open malicious URLs
Downloads additional threats
Steals confidential
information, downloads
additional threats, and
allows remote access
Downloads additional threats
Allows remote access and
performs DOS attacks
Steals confidential information
Downloads additional threats
Displays fake antivirus alerts
and downloads additional
threats
Ends security software-related
processes and downloads
additional threats
Redirects Internet searches
to customized search resultsTop
Reporting
Country/
Region
India
Japan
China
China
India
China
India
India
China
IndiaSecond
Reporting
Country/
Region
Australia
Australia
Taiwan
Taiwan
Malaysia
Taiwan
Indonesia
Australia
India
Australia
Table 9. Top new malicious code families, APJ
Source: Symantec
the Auraax worm65 was the second most common new malicious code family in Ap J during this reporting
period. On a per-country basis, the most reports of potential Auraax infections in Ap J came from Japan,
followed by Australia. this worm propagates by copying itself to all removable drives and network shares
that it can locate. An autorun instruction file is also created in these drives or shares that automatically
executes Auraax whenever the drives or shares are accessed. the worm obfuscates itself by overwriting
certain kernel drivers with a rootkit to avoid detection.66 this worm also downloads additional threats onto
compromised computers.
Auraax protects itself on affected computers by modifying the “hosts” file to prevent users from accessing a
variety of computer security websites.67 the U rLs of these sites are added to the hosts file and configured so
that access to the UrLs is redirected to the local address. interestingly, Auraax also adds several advertising
websites to the hosts file and makes them inaccessible. this is somewhat peculiar behavior because
malicious code is sometimes used to distribute advertisements and increase hits to advertising Web pages, rather than to hide them. this could be because some of the additional threats downloaded by Auraax
attempt to target and replace legitimate advertisements. By making the destination websites inaccessible, the worm may be attempting to increase the chances that UrLs in the illegitimate advertisements are
accessed instead of those in the legitimate advertisements. this could be particularly deceiving for users
because the maliciously placed advertisements may appear in the same locations and styles as those of the legitimate advertisements.
65 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-092409-4704-99&tabid=2
66 A collection of tools (programs) that enable administrator-level access to a computer or network.
67 the “hosts” file contains a lists of hostnames mapped to ip addresses. this information is used by computers, in conjunction with or in lieu of DnS (domain name
system), to locate nodes on the network.Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
30the third most common new malicious code family in Ap J during 2008 was the Wowinzi worm. this worm is
particularly interesting because it incorporates a back door and a virus component, and also uses multistage
attack techniques. China accounted for the highest number of reported potential infections in Ap J, followed
by the taiwan region.
Wowinzi installs additional threats, including the previously mentioned Gampass trojan, and also opens a
back door on compromised computers. Confidential information, including email addresses, is collected from compromised computers and posted to an attacker-controlled website. the worm propagates by
copying itself to network shares as well as mapped and removable drives, and has a virus component used to infect executable files. HtmL files on the infected computer and local network are injected with malicious
code that, when opened with a browser, will potentially expose the user to additional threats by redirecting
browser traffic to malicious websites.
the multitude of components and actions employed by Wowinzi, in addition to downloading additional
threats, are interesting because the worm operates differently than many malicious code families that are
involved in multistage attacks. One of the benefits of multistage attacks is that the primary attack code
does not need to incorporate a large variety of operations, because functionality secondary to the initial
compromise of a computer can be downloaded in later stages. the prominence of Wowinzi in Ap J, however,
shows that malicious code used as a beachhead in multistage attacks can include a robust feature set and
still be highly successful.
Threats to confidential information
Some malicious code programs are designed specifically to expose confidential information that is stored
on an infected computer. these threats may expose sensitive data such as system information, confidential
files and documents, or logon credentials. Some malicious code threats, such as back doors, can give a remote attacker complete control over a compromised computer. threats to confidential information are
a particular concern because of their potential for use in fraudulent activities. With the widespread use of online shopping and internet banking, compromises of this nature can result in significant financial loss,
particularly if credit card information or banking details are exposed.
Within an enterprise, the exposure of confidential information can lead to significant data leakage. if it
involves customer-related data such as credit card information, customer confidence in the enterprise
can be severely undermined. moreover, it can also violate local laws. Sensitive corporate information,
including financial details, business plans, and proprietary technologies, could also be leaked from
compromised computers.
During 2008, 82 percent of the threats to confidential information were classified as threats that export
user data. this was slightly less than the previous year, at 85 percent, but was higher than the global
percentage of 78 percent. threats that are capable of this type of information exposure are favorable to
attackers because leaked data can be used to steal a user’s identity or aid in further attacks. Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
3169%82%83%
78%
PercentageExports email addresses
Exports system data Allows remote accessExports user data
Keystroke logge r
APJ Global65%76%
61%60%80%
65%
Figure 5. Threats to confidential information, global and APJ
Source: Symantec
the prevalence of this threat in Ap J is linked to the prevalence of threats that steal online game credentials.
As discussed in the Symantec APJ Internet Security Threat Report, Vol. Xiii,68 there are several malicious
code threats that target online games that are particularly popular in the region. this includes the Gampass
trojan and Gammima worm, which ranked first and second respectively for top malicious code samples in
ApJ. this also heavily influences the percentage of threats that incorporate keystroke logging components.
eighty percent of the threats to confidential information observed in Ap J in 2008 incorporated keystroke
loggers, which is a minor decrease from 81 percent in 2007. this was higher than the percentage of
global reports, which were measured at 76 percent. Keystroke loggers record keystrokes on compromised
computers and return the data to the attacker. this can be achieved by emailing it to the attacker or by
uploading the data to an attacker-controlled website. the attacker can process the keystroke data to
extract user account credentials such as those for online game accounts, online banking websites, or
stock-trading websites. Additional data such as information typed in email messages or other documents could also be exposed. this information can then be sold or used to launch further attacks.
68 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_apj_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 19Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
32threats that allowed remote access made up the third highest percentage of observed threats to confidential
information in Ap J in 2008. At 69 percent, this was a slight decrease from 71 percent in 2007. this was
significantly less than the global percentage of 83 percent and is attributed to the smaller proportion of back doors in Ap J. this is also is linked to the lower proportion of trojans in Ap J, relative to the global
percentage. Considering the popularity of stealing online game account credentials in the region, this suggests that attackers may be focusing more on threats that automatically harvest confidential
information and export it, as opposed to installing back doors that often require manually accessing
and controlling compromised computers.
Propagation mechanisms
Worms and viruses use various means to transfer themselves, or propagate, from one computer to another. these means are collectively referred to as propagation mechanisms. propagation mechanisms can include
a number of different vectors, such as instant messaging ( im), Simple mail transfer protocol (S mtp ), Common
internet File System (CiFS), p2p, and remotely exploitable vulnerabilities. Some malicious code may even use
other malicious code as a propagation vector by locating a computer that has been compromised via a back door server and using it to upload and install itself. this metric will discuss the most popular propagation
mechanisms that were detected being used by malicious code samples in Ap J in 2008.
malicious code that propagated as shared executable files accounted for 65 percent of potential infections
in Ap J in 2008, compared to 66 percent globally (table 10). Shared executable files are the propagation
mechanisms employed by viruses and some worms that copy themselves to removable media. the increased
use of USB drives, media players, and other removable hardware devices—many of which also have auto-play functions and initiate as soon as they are connected—has resulted in a resurgence of malicious code
that propagates through this vector. many high-profile worms employ this mechanism, including four of the
top malicious code samples and three of the top new malicious code families in Ap J—Gammima, pagipef,
69
runauto,70 Almanahe, Wowinzi, ircbrute,71 and Ceted.72
APJ
Rank
1
23
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Propagation Mechanism
File-sharing executables
File transfer/CIFS
File transfer/email attachment
File sharing/P2P
Remotely exploitable vulnerability
File transfer/ embedded HTTP URI/instant messenger
File transfer/instant messenger
SQL
Back door/Kuang2
Back door/SubSevenAPJ
Percentage
65%
25%
19%
8%7%
6%
2%
1%
1%
1%Global
Percentage
66%
30%
31%
10%
12%
4%
2%
3%
3%
3%
Table 10. Top propagation mechanisms, APJ73
Source: Symantec
69 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-112909-3431-99
70 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-110209-2903-99
71 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-062014-2448-99
72 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-010915-0259-99
73 it should be noted that many malicious code samples employ multiple propagation mechanisms in an effort to increase the probability of successful propagation. As a
result, cumulative percentages may exceed 100 percent.Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
33to limit the propagation of threats that propagate through removable drives, administrators should ensure
that all such devices are scanned for viruses when they are connected to a computer. if removable drives
are not needed within the enterprise, endpoint security and policy can prevent computers from recognizing
these drives when they are attached. Additionally, policies and user education should be implemented to
prevent users from attaching unauthorized devices to computers within the enterprise. Disabling autorun,
or similar functionality, can also deny attempted attacks.74
in 2008, 25 percent of malicious code in Ap J used the CiFS protocol to propagate, slightly lower than
27 percent in 2007 and 30 percent reported globally in 2008. this percentage has remained somewhat
consistent due to the continued relevance of threats such as Fujacks, Almanahe, and pinfi,75 which have
all ranked in the top 50 malicious threats in Ap J for several reporting periods.
to protect against threats that use the CiFS protocol to propagate, all shares should be protected with
strong passwords, and only users who require the resources should be given access to them. if other users
do not need to write to a shared directory or file, they should only be given “read” permissions. this will
prevent malicious code from copying itself to the shared directory or modifying shared files. Finally, CiFS
shares should not be exposed to the internet. Blocking tCp port 445 at the network boundary will help to
protect against threats that propagate using CiFS.
the percentage of malicious code in Ap J that propagates by email attachments was 19 percent in 2008, a
slight decrease from 21 percent in 2007. this percentage was lower than the global percentage for 2008
of 31 percent. this difference is primarily attributed to the rontokbro76 and netsky77 worms, which were
the only two prominent threats during 2007 and 2008 that used email attachments as their primary
propagation mechanism. this not only indicates that this mechanism continues to be a common and
reliable means of propagation in the region, but also that attackers may prefer to use previously effective mass-mailing threats rather than developing new ones. it is also possible that compromised computers
affected by these worms are continuously used for email-based propagation long after the initial attack. For example, a computer compromised in 2006 that has yet to be patched and is still sending out
propagation emails would be contributing to the number of potential infections in 2008.
Malicious code—protection and mitigation
it is critical that end users and enterprises maintain the most current antivirus definitions to protect
against the high quantity of new malicious code threats. iDS, ipS, and other behavior-blocking technologies
should also be employed to prevent compromise by new threats. Using a firewall can also prevent threats that send information back to the attacker from opening a communication channel.
Symantec recommends that certain best security practices always be followed to protect against malicious
code infection. Administrators should keep patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host
public services and applications—such as Http , Ftp, Smtp , and DnS servers—and that are accessible
through a firewall or placed in a DmZ. email servers should be configured to only allow file attachment
types that are required for business needs and to block email that appears to come from within the company, but that actually originates from external sources. Additionally, Symantec recommends that
ingress and egress filtering be put in place on perimeter devices to prevent unwanted activity.
74 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/blogs/blogarticlepage/blog-id/grab_bag/article-id/109
75 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2003-011708-2030-99
76 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-042312-4644-99
77 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-021615-4827-99Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
34to protect against malicious code that installs itself through a Web browser, additional measures should be
taken. the use of ipS technologies can prevent exploitation of browser and plug-in vulnerabilities through
signatures and behavior-based detection, in addition to address space layout randomization (ASLr).78 end
users should employ defense-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software and a
personal firewall. Users should update antivirus definitions regularly. they should also ensure that all
desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their software vendors. they should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless it is expected and comes
from a trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
78 ASLr is a security mechanism that randomizes data in memory to prevent the success of attacks that leverage memory corruption vulnerabilities,
such as buffer overflows.Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
35Phishing and Spam Trends
phishing is an attempt by a third party to solicit confidential information from an individual, group, or
organization by mimicking (or spoofing) a specific brand, usually one that is well known, often for financial
gain. phishers attempt to trick users into disclosing personal data, such as credit card numbers, online
banking credentials, and other sensitive information, which they may then use to commit fraudulent acts.
phishing generally requires an end user to enter his or her credentials into an online data entry field.
this is one of the characteristics that distinguishes phishing from spam-based scams (such as the widely
disseminated 419 scam and other social engineering scams).79 the data that end users enter can then
be used for fraudulent purposes.
Spam is usually defined as junk or unsolicited email sent by a third party. While it is certainly an
annoyance to users and administrators, spam is also a serious security concern because it can be used to
deliver trojans, viruses, and phishing attempts.80 Spam can also be used to deliver drive-by downloaders,
which require no other end-user interaction than navigation to the UrLs contained in the spam messages.
Large volumes of spam could also cause a loss of service or degradation in the performance of network
resources and email gateways.
the results used in this analysis are based on data returned from the Symantec probe network, as well as
the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam™ customer base. Specifically, statistics are gathered from enterprise
customers’ Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam servers that receive more than 1,000 email messages per day.
this removes the smaller data samples (that is, smaller customers and test servers), thereby allowing for
a more accurate representation of data.
the Symantec probe network consists of millions of decoy email addresses that are configured to attract
a large stream of spam attacks. An attack can consist of one or more messages. the goal of the Symantec
probe network is to simulate a wide variety of internet email users, thereby attracting a stream of traffic
that is representative of spam activity across the internet as a whole. For this reason, this network is
continuously optimized in order to attract new varieties of spam attacks.
in addition to the Symantec probe network, phishing information is also gathered through the Symantec
phish report network, which is an extensive antifraud community of organizations and end users.81
members of the Symantec phish report network contribute and receive fraudulent website addresses for
alerting and filtering across a broad range of solutions.this section will discuss the following trends that Symantec identified in the Ap J region in 2008:
top countries/regions hosting phishing websites and top targeted sectors •
top countries/regions of spam origin•
79 http://nortontoday.symantec.com/features/security_at_30.php
80 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6676819.stm
81 http://www.phishreport.net/Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
36Top countries/regions hosting phishing websites and top targeted sectors
this metric will assess the Ap J countries and regions in which the most phishing websites were hosted in
2008. this data is a snapshot in time, and does not offer insight into changes in the locations of certain
phishing sites over the course of the reporting period. it should also be noted that the fact that a phishing
website is hosted in a certain country does not necessarily mean that the attacker is located in that country.
China was the Ap J country or region with the most phishing websites in 2008, with 35 percent of the
regional total (table 11). in 2007, China had the second highest number of phishing websites in the
region, with 28 percent. it is not surprising that China is the country with the most phishing websites in
the Ap J region since it has the most broadband subscribers in the region (and worldwide).82 Broadband
offers the opportunity to have constantly connected systems, provides faster bandwidth capacities, and
typically offers more reliable connections than other types of connections. As a result, phishers are more
likely to attempt to compromise these computers and use them as platforms from which to launch their
phishing activities.
China was the country of origin of the most malicious activity in the Ap J region in 2008. it ranked second for
phishing website hosts in the region, with 22 percent. China also had the most bots in the region in 2008,
with 58 percent of the total. Further, it had the most spam zombies during 2008, with 39 percent the total.
Both bots and spam zombies can be used to disseminate high volumes of spam, which can contain phishing
lures that are intended to direct users to phishing websites.
2008
Rank
1
23
4
5
6
789
102007
Rank
2
16
3
5
4
7
10
89Country/Region
China
South KoreaTaiwan
Japan
Australia
Thailand
IndiaIndonesiaMalaysiaSingapore2008 Top
Targeted Sector
ISP
FinancialFinancial
Financial
Financial
Financial
FinancialFinancialFinancialFinancial2008
Percentage
35%
29%10%
9%5%
4%
2%2%1%1%Percentage of
Lures in Country
Targeting Top Sector
46%
80%79%
61%
75%
74%
68%76%47%57%
2007
Percentage
28%
28%
5%
9%
7%9%
4%2%2%2%
Table 11. Top countries/regions hosting phishing websites and top targeted sectors
Source: Symantec
82 http://www.point-topic.comSymantec Ap J internet Security threat report
37the top sector spoofed by phishing websites in China in 2008 was the iSp sector, with 46 percent of
the total identified. Globally in 2008, the iSp sector was spoofed by 10 percent of all known phishing
websites across the internet; this is second only to the financial services sector, which accounted for an
overwhelming 76 percent of the total. iSp accounts can be valuable targets for phishers because people
frequently use the same authentication credentials (such as usernames and passwords) for multiple
accounts, including email accounts.83 this information may provide access to other accounts, such as
online banking accounts. this is illustrated by the fact that email accounts/passwords and addresses
were the third and fourth most common goods, respectively, available on underground economy servers monitored by Symantec in 2008.
84
Attackers could use the free Web-hosting space that is often included with these accounts to put up
phishing websites, or use the accompanying email accounts to send spam or launch further phishing
attacks. Compromised iSp Web-hosting accounts can also be used to host Web-based exploits, which
would give an attacker a greater number of potential targets. Compromised Web space can also be used
to plant links to other websites the attacker controls in order to boost the search engine rankings of
those sites.
Compromised email accounts will often provide access to additional sensitive personal information such
as bank account data, student identification numbers, mailing address and phone numbers, or access to
other online accounts (social networking pages, online stock accounts, etc.). Furthermore, they may
provide access to address books that can yield email addresses that can then be sold to spammers.
South Korea had the second highest number of phishing websites in Ap J in 2008, with 29 percent of the
regional total. this is an increase in percentage but a drop in rank from 2007, when it was the highest
ranked country with 28 percent. South Korea has the third highest number of broadband subscribers in
the Ap J region, which is likely the main reason for the country’s high ranking in this category.
South Korea had the second highest amount of malicious activity in the region in 2008. it had the most
phishing website hosts in 2008, with 25 percent of the regional total. South Korea also had the fourth
highest number of spam zombies in the region, with 7 percent of the regional total, as well as the third
highest number of bots, with 8 percent of the regional total. Both spam zombies and bots can be used to
disseminate spam messages that contain phishing lures.
the sector most commonly spoofed by phishing websites in South Korea during 2008 was the financial
services sector, which was used by 80 percent of identified phishing websites in South Korea during this
period. Across the internet as a whole, the financial services sector also accounted for the highest volume
of phishing lures during this period, at 76 percent.
phishing is often carried out for the purpose of financial gain. Brands and activities associated with the
financial sector are most likely to yield data that could be used in financially motivated attacks. As a result, it is not surprising that the majority of phishing activity targets brands in the financial sector.
83 http://cups.cs.cmu.edu/soups/2006/proceedings/p44_gaw.pdf
84 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiv_04-2009.en-us.pdf : p. 77Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
38the most frequently advertised item observed on underground economy servers during 2008 was credit
card information. Furthermore, the second most commonly advertised good on underground economy
servers during 2008 was bank account credentials. Overall, more than half of the goods and services
advertised in 2008 were credit card and bank account credentials.
many phishing attacks spoofing financial services brands will fraudulently prompt users to enter credit
card information or banking credentials, which phishers can then capture and sell on the underground
economy. this has been made easier for phishers because of the widespread acceptance of online banking
activity. in countries where internet usage is well established, significant numbers of end users perform at
least some banking online.85 Because of the widespread use of online banking services, users may be more
easily persuaded to enter their information into fraudulent websites that mimic the brand of their financial services provider.
the third-highest percentage of phishing websites in the Ap J region in 2008 was in the taiwan region,
which hosted 10 percent of the regional total. this is twice as much as 2007, when taiwan had 5 percent
of the regional total and ranked sixth in the Ap J region.
in 2008, taiwan had the sixth highest number of broadband subscribers in Ap J and ranked fourth for the
volume of malicious activity in the region. it also had the fourth highest percentage of bots in Ap J in 2008,
with 11 percent of the regional total. taiwan also had the sixth highest number of spam zombies in the
region, with 6 percent of the total in 2008.the prominence of taiwan in this metric is likely due to the high number phishing hosts and bots located
there. taiwan ranked second in the Ap J region for bots during this period, with 12 percent of the regional
total, and fourth for phishing website hosts, with 11 percent of the total. there are relatively few Web-
hosting companies in taiwan, so phishers likely host many of their sites on compromised computers.
86
Furthermore, many of the taiwanese phishing websites are hosted on users’ personal Web pages. Because
of the high number of bots, there are many computers available to host phishing sites in this manner. the
high number of bots also means that there are many computers available to disseminate spam that could
contain phishing lures.
Top countries/regions of spam origin
this section will discuss the top 10 countries/regions of spam origin in Ap J in 2008. this discussion is
based on data gathered by customer installations of Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam. this data includes
the originating server’s ip address, against which frequency statistics are compared. each ip address is
mapped to a specific country and charted over time. the nature of spam and its distribution on the
internet presents challenges in identifying the location of people who are sending it because many
spammers try to redirect attention away from their actual geographic location. in an attempt to bypass
DnS block lists, they use trojans that relay email, which allow them to send spam from sites distinct from
their physical location. in doing so, they tend to focus on compromised computers in those regions with
the largest bandwidth capabilities. As such, the region in which the spam originates may not correspond to the region in which the spammers are located.
85 http://www.computing.co.uk/computing/news/2222583/online-banking-soars
86 http://www.webhosting.info/webhosts/tophosts/global/Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
39in 2008, the country with the highest percent of detected spam in the Ap J region was China, with
22 percent (table 12). this is a slight change from 2007, when China was also the highest country of spam
origin, with 24 percent. China was also the country with the most malicious activity in the region during
this period, with 41 percent of the regional total. Other factors that explain China’s rank here are that
it also had the highest percentage of spam zombies and bots in 2008, with 39 percent and 58 percent
of the regional totals, respectively. Bots are often used as spam servers for the rapid and widespread
dissemination of spam.
it is also not surprising that China would be the foremost country of spam origin as it has by far the
highest number of broadband subscribers in the Ap J region.87 As mentioned, broadband-connected
computers are attractive to attackers because of the increased capability to mount attacks. in this case,
spammers who are able to compromise broadband-connected computers can use them to send increased
amounts of spam.
2008 APJ
Rank
1
23
4
5
6
7
8
9
102007 APJ
Rank
1
45
7
2
3
8
9
6
312008 Global
Rank
4
12
13
15
17
18
32354143Country/Region
China
South KoreaIndia
Thailand
Taiwan
Japan
VietnamAustraliaMalaysiaPapua New Guinea2008 APJ
Percentage
22%
13%12%
11%
10%
9%
3%3%2%2%2007 APJ
Percentage
24%
18%
4%
2%
19%
21%
2%
2%3%
<1%
Table 12. Top countries/regions of spam origin, APJ
Source: Symantec
the country/region with the second highest percentage of originating spam was South Korea, where
13 percent of the total originated. While this is an increase from fourth rank in 2007, it represents a
decrease from 18 percent. the reasons for the high percentage of Ap J spam originating in South Korea
are similar to those for China. South Korea is home to the third highest number of broadband subscribers
in the region. it was home to the second highest percentage of malicious activity in the region during
2008, with 11 percent of the total. South Korea was ranked fourth for spam zombies, with 4 percent of
the regional total, and third for bots, with 8 percent of the total.
twelve percent of spam detected in the Ap J region in 2008 originated in india, making it the third-ranked
country for this category. in 2007, india was the fifth-ranked country, accounting for only 4 percent of
spam in the region. india had the fifth highest number of broadband subscribers in the Ap J region in 2008
and the third highest volume of malicious activity, with 10 percent of the regional total. it had the second
highest number of spam zombies, with 17 percent of the regional total, and the fourth highest number of
bots, with 5 percent of the total. the high ranking of india in these categories is the main reason for the
high volume of spam originating there.
87 http://www.point-topic.comSymantec Ap J internet Security threat report
40it should be noted that one of the most dramatic changes in this metric in 2008 was the distribution
of spam throughout the region. Several countries/regions experienced dramatic drops in the percentage
of spam originating there during this year, including, most notably, Japan (from 21 percent to 9 percent)
and taiwan (from 19 percent to 10 percent). the apparent drop in the percentage of spam from these
traditionally high areas of origin is likely due less to a decrease in volume from these areas than it
is to an increase in the percentage of spam originating in india (from 4 percent to 12 percent) and in
thailand (from 2 percent to 11 percent).
Phishing and spam—protection and mitigation
Symantec recommends that enterprise users protect themselves against phishing threats by filtering email at the server level through the mail transfer agent (mt A). Although this will likely remain the primary point
of filtering for phishing, organizations can also use ip-based filtering upstream, as well as Http filtering.
DnS block lists also offer protection against potential phishing emails.
88 Organizations could also consider
using domain-level or email authentication in order to verify the actual origin of an email message. this can
protect against phishers who are spoofing email domains.89
to protect against potential phishing activity, administrators should always follow Symantec best practices,
as outlined in Appendix A of this report. Symantec also recommends that organizations educate their end
users about phishing.90 they should also keep their employees notified of the latest phishing attacks and
how to avoid falling victim to them, and provide a means to report suspected phishing sites.91
Organizations can also employ Web-server log monitoring to track if and when complete downloads of their
websites, logos, and images are occurring. Such activity may indicate that someone is attempting to use the
legitimate website to create an illegitimate website for phishing.
Organizations can detect phishing attacks that use spoofing by monitoring non-deliverable email addresses
or bounced email that is returned to non-existent users. they should also monitor the purchasing of cousin
domain names by other entities to identify purchases that could be used to spoof their corporate domains.92
So-called typo domains and homographic domains should also be monitored. 93 this can be done with the
help of companies that specialize in domain monitoring; some registrars also provide this service.
the use of antiphishing toolbars and components in Web browsers can also help protect users from
phishing attacks. these measures notify the user if a Web page being visited does not appear to be
legitimate. this way, even if a phishing email reaches a user’s inbox, the user can still be alerted to the
potential threat.
end users should follow best security practices, as outlined in Appendix A of this report. they should use
an antiphishing solution. As some phishing attacks may use spyware and/or keystroke-logging applications,
Symantec advises end users to use antivirus software, antispam software, firewalls, toolbar blockers, and
other software-detection methods. Symantec also advises end users to never disclose any confidential
personal or financial information unless and until they can confirm that any request for such information
is legitimate.
88 A DnS block list (sometimes referred to as a black list) is simply a list of ip addresses that are known to send unwanted email traffic. it is used by email software to
either allow or reject email coming from ip addresses on the list.
89 Spoofing refers to instances where phishers forge the “From:” line of an email message using the domain of the entity they are targeting with the phishing attempt.
90 Cf., basic guidelines on how to avoid phishing at the United States Federal trade Commission: http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/alt127.htm
91 Cf. http://www.antiphishing.org for information on the latest phishing threats.
92 “Cousin domains” refers to domain names that include some of the key words of an organization’s domain or brand name; for example, for the corporate domain
“bigbank.com”, cousin domains could include “bigbank-alerts.com”, ”big-bank-security.com”, and so on.
93 typo domains are domain names that use common misspellings of a legitimate domain name, for example the domain “symatnec.com” would be a typo domain for
“symantec.com”. A homographic domain name uses numbers that look similar to letters in the domain name, for example the character for the number “1” can look like the letter “l”.Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
41Users should review bank, credit card, and credit information frequently. this can provide information
on any irregular activities. For further information, the internet Fraud Complaint Center (iFCC) has also
released a set of guidelines on how to avoid internet-related scams.94 Additionally, network administrators
can review Web proxy logs to determine if any users have visited known phishing sites.
Consumers could also take more security precautions to ensure that their information will not be
compromised. When conducting higher-risk internet activities, such as online banking or purchases,
consumers should do so only on their own computers and not public ones. Further, they should not store
passwords or bank card numbers. they should also avoid following links from within messages (whether
in email, instant messages, online forums, etc.) as these may be links to spoofed websites; instead, they should manually type in the UrL of the website. Also, consumers should be aware of the amount of
personal information that they post on the internet, as criminals may take advantage of this public
information in malicious activities such as phishing scams.
94 http://www.fbi.gov/majcases/fraud/internetschemes.htmSymantec Ap J internet Security threat report
42Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices
Enterprise best practices
employ defense-in-depth strategies, which emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive •
defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protection method.
this should include the deployment of regularly updated antivirus, firewalls, intrusion detection, and
intrusion protection systems on client systems.
turn off and remove services that are not needed.•
if malicious code or some other threat exploits one or more network services, disable or block access to •
those services until a patch is applied.Always keep patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host public services and are accessible •
through the firewall, such as Http , Ftp, email, and DnS services.
Consider implementing network compliance solutions that will help keep infected mobile users out of the •
network (and disinfect them before rejoining the network).enforce an effective password policy.•
Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments that are commonly used •
to spread viruses, such as .VBS, .BA t, .eXe , .piF, and .SCr files.
isolate infected computers quickly to prevent the risk of further infection within the organization.•
perform a forensic analysis and restore the computers using trusted media.•
train employees to not open attachments unless they are expected and come from a known and trusted •
source, and to not execute software that is downloaded from the internet unless it has been scanned
for viruses.ensure that emergency response procedures are in place. this includes having a backup-and-restore •
solution in place in order to restore lost or compromised data in the event of successful attack or
catastrophic data loss.
educate management on security budgeting needs.•
test security to ensure that adequate controls are in place.•
Be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file-•
sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software.
ensure that only applications approved by the organization are deployed on desktop computers, as •
clicking on links and/or attachments in email messages (or im messages) may also expose computers to
unnecessary risks.Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
43Consumer best practices
Use an internet security solution that combines antivirus, firewall, intrusion detection, and vulnerability •
management for maximum protection against malicious code and other threats.
ensure that security patches are up to date and that they are applied to all vulnerable applications in a •
timely manner.
ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers, and change them often. passwords should not •
consist of words from the dictionary.never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is expected and the purpose •
of the attachment is known.Keep virus definitions updated regularly. By deploying the latest virus definitions, you can protect your •
computer against the latest viruses known to be spreading in the wild.
routinely check to see if your operating system is vulnerable to threats by using Symantec Security •
Check at www.symantec.com/securitycheck.Deploy an antiphishing solution. Also, never disclose any confidential personal or financial information •
unless and until you can confirm that any request for such information is legitimate.Get involved by tracking and reporting attack attempts. With Symantec Security Check’s tracing service, •
users can quickly identify the location of potential hackers and forward the information to the attacker’s
iSp or local police.
Be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file-•
sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software.Avoid clicking on links and/or attachments in email or im messages, as these may also expose computers •
to unnecessary risks.
read end-user license agreements (eULAs) carefully and understand all terms before agreeing to them •
as some security risks can be installed after an end user has accepted the eULA or as a consequence of
that acceptance. Be aware of programs that flash ads in the user interface. many spyware programs track how users •
respond to these ads, and their presence is a red flag. these ads may be spyware.Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
44Appendix B—Threat Activity Trends Methodology
threat activity trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec Global
intelligence network, which includes the Symantec DeepSight™ threat management System, Symantec
managed Security Services, the Symantec Honeypot network, and proprietary Symantec technologies. Symantec combines data derived from these sources for analysis.
Malicious activity by country/region
to determine the top countries or regions for the “malicious activity by country/region” metric, Symantec
compiles geographical data on each type of malicious activity to be considered, namely: bot-infected
computers, phishing website hosts, malicious code reports, spam zombies, and attack origins. the
proportion of each activity originating in each country/region is then determined. the mean of the
percentages of each malicious activity that originates in each country/region is calculated. this average
determines the proportion of overall malicious activity that originates from the country or region in question and the rankings are determined by calculating the mean average of the proportion of these
malicious activities that originated in each country or region.
Bot-infected computers
Symantec identifies bot-infected computers based on coordinated scanning and attack behavior that is observed in global network traffic. An active bot-infected computer is one that carries out at least one
attack per day. this does not have to be continuous; rather, a single computer can be active on a number
of different days. Attacks are defined as any malicious activity carried out over a network that has been detected by an intrusion detection system (iDS) or firewall.
For an attacking computer to be considered to be participating in coordinated scanning and attacking, it
must fit into that pattern to the exclusion of any other activity. this behavioral matching will not catch
every bot-infected computer, and may identify other malicious code or individual attackers behaving in a coordinated way as a bot network (botnet). this behavioral matching will, however, identify many of the
most coordinated and aggressive bot-infected computers. it will also give insight into the population trends
of bot-infected computers, including those that are considered to be actively working in a well-coordinated
and aggressive fashion at some point in time during the reporting period.
Bot command-and-control servers
Symantec tracks the number of new bot command-and-control (C&C) servers detected worldwide. Only irC
and Http bot C&C server trends will be evaluated in the methods botnet owners are using to communicate
with their bot-infected computers. Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
45Top Web-based attacks
to evaluate this metric, Symantec identifies each distinct attack delivered via the Web, hereafter referred
to as Web-based attack, hosted on malicious websites that are detected by intrusion prevention technology.
A Web-based attack is any attack that is carried out against a client-side application originating from the
Web. Symantec determines the top Web-based attacks by determining the most common attacks carried
out against users. Due to the nature of Web-based attacks, the total number of attacks carried out is a
good measure of the success and popularity of the attack.
each attack discussed targets a specific vulnerability or weakness in Web browsers or other client-side
applications that process content originating from the Web. these attacks can vary in their delivery
methods; some rely on misleading a user into downloading a malicious file, while others occur without
any knowledge or interaction by the user.
Top countries/regions of origin for Web-based attacks
Web-based attacks can be found globally and Symantec identifies each by an associated distinct detection signature. most attack types target specific vulnerabilities or weaknesses in Web browsers or other client-
side applications that process content originating from the Web. note that the server hosting the exploit
may not necessarily be the same server that the user has visited due to redirection. A user could visit a
website that redirects his or her Web browser to a malicious server in another country or region.Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
46Appendix C—Malicious Code Trends Methodology
malicious code trends are based on statistics from malicious code samples reported to Symantec for
analysis. the data is gathered from over 130 million client, server, and gateway systems that have
deployed Symantec’s antivirus products in both consumer and corporate environments. the Symantec
Digital immune System and Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting
process. Observations in this section are based on empirical data and expert analysis of this data. the
data and analysis draw primarily from the two databases described below.
Infection database
Symantec developed the Symantec AntiVirus research Automation (SArA) technology to help detect and eradicate computer viruses. this technology is used to analyze, replicate, and define a large subset of the
most common computer viruses that are quarantined by Symantec Antivirus customers.
On average, SArA receives hundreds of thousands of suspect files daily from both enterprise and
individual consumers located throughout the world. Symantec then analyzes these suspect files, matching them with virus definitions. An analysis of this aggregate data set provides statistics on infection rates for
different types of malicious code.
Malicious code database
in addition to infection data, Symantec Security response analyzes and documents attributes for each new
form of malicious code that emerges both in the wild and in a “zoo” (or controlled laboratory) environment.
Descriptive records of new forms of malicious code are then entered into a database for future reference.
For this report, a historical trend analysis was performed on this database to identify, assess, and discuss
any possible trends, such as the use of different infection vectors and the frequency of various types of
payloads. in some cases, Symantec antivirus products may initially detect new malicious code heuristically
or by generic signatures. these may later be reclassified and given unique detections. Because of this,
there may be slight variance in the presentation of the same data set from one volume of the Symantec
APJ Internet Security Threat Report to the next.
Geographic location of malicious code instances
Several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic locations of systems to ip
addresses are used along with proprietary Symantec technology to determine the location of computers
reporting malicious code instances. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of
error. the data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of malicious code instances. Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
47Appendix D—Phishing and Spam Trends Methodology
phishing and spam attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data captured through the
Symantec probe network, a system of more than 2.5 million decoy accounts, messageLabs intelligence,
and other Symantec technologies in more than 86 countries around the globe. Over eight billion email messages, as well as over one billion Web requests, are scanned per day across 16 data centers. Symantec
also gathers phishing information through an extensive antifraud community of enterprises, security
vendors and more than 50 million consumers.
the Symantec probe network data is used to track the growth in new phishing activity. it should be noted
that different monitoring organizations use different methods to track phishing attempts. Some groups
may identify and count unique phishing messages based solely on specific content items such as subject
headers or UrLs. these varied methods can often lead to differences in the number of phishing attempts
reported by different organizations.
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam data is also used to gauge the growth in phishing attempts as well as the
percentage of mail that is determined to be phishing attempts. Data returned includes messages
processed, messages filtered, and filter-specific data.
Symantec has classified different filters so that spam statistics and phishing statistics can be determined
separately. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data includes data reported back from customer
installations that provide feedback from antispam filters as well as overall mail volume being processed.
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam only gathers data at the Smtp layer and not the network layer, where
DnS block lists typically operate because Smtp -layer spam filtering is more accurate than network-layer
filtering and is able to block spam missed at the network layer. network layer-filtering takes place before
email reaches the enterprise mail server. As a result, data from the Smtp layer is a more accurate reflection of the impact of spam on the mail server itself.
Due to the numerous variables influencing a company’s spam activity, Symantec focuses on identifying
spam activity and growth projections with Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data from enterprise
customer installations having more than 1,000 total messages per day. this normalization yields a more
accurate summary of internet spam trends by ruling out problematic and laboratory test servers that
produce smaller sample sets.
this section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to produce the data and statistics in
this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, the
following investigations warrant additional detail.Symantec Ap J internet Security threat report
48Top countries/regions hosting phishing websites
the data for this section is determined by gathering links in phishing email messages and cross-
referencing the addresses with several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic
locations of systems to ip addresses. in this case, Symantec counts phishing websites as the number of
unique ip addresses hosting Web pages used for phishing. While these databases are generally reliable,
there is a small margin of error. the data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of
phishing websites.
Top countries/regions of spam origin
the data for this section is determined by calculating the frequency of originating server ip addresses in
email messages that trigger antispam filters in the field. the ip addresses are mapped to their host country
of origin and the data is summarized by country based on monthly totals. the percentage of spam per
country is calculated from the total spam detected in the field.
it should be noted that the location of the computer from which spam is detected being sent is not
necessarily the location of the spammer. Spammers can build networks of compromised computers
globally and thereby use computers that are geographically separate from their locationAny technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec
Corporation.
nO WArrAnty . the technical information is being delivered to you as is and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its accuracy or use. Any use of the
technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user. Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical
errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice.
|
SymAnte C enterpriSe SeCUritySymantec Internet Security Threat Report
trends for 2008
Volume XiV, published April 2009
Executive Summary
the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report consists primarily of four reports: the Global Internet Security
Threat Report; the EMEA Internet Security Threat Report, for the europe, the middle east, and Africa (emeA)
region; the APJ Internet Security Threat Report, for the Asia-p acific/Japan (Ap J) region; and the Government
Internet Security Threat Report, which focuses on threats of specific interest to governments and critical
infrastructure sectors. together, these reports provide a detailed overview and analysis of internet threat
activity, malicious code, and known vulnerabilities. trends in phishing and spam are also assessed, as are
observed activities on underground economy servers.
this summary will discuss current trends, impending threats, and the continuing evolution of the internet
threat landscape based on data for 2008 discussed within the four reports. this summary will also discuss
how regional differences can affect malicious activity globally.
there are a number of trends noted in previous volumes of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
that continued in 2008: malicious activity has increasingly become Web-based; attackers are targeting end
users instead of computers; the online underground economy has consolidated and matured; and attackers
are able to rapidly adapt their attack activities.1
Symantec recently examined these trends along with the continued consolidation of malicious activities in the online underground economy in the Symantec Report on the Underground Economy.
2 that report found
that the underground economy is geographically diverse and able to generate millions of dollars in revenue
for (often) well-organized groups. the underground economy is also increasingly becoming a self-sustaining
1 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_exec_summary_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf
2 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_underground_economy_report_11-2008-14525717.en-us.pdf
Marc Fossi
executive editor
manager, DevelopmentSecurity technology and response
Eric Johnson
editor
Security technology and response
Trevor MackAssociate editor
Security technology and response
Dean TurnerDirector, Global intelligence network
Security technology and response
Joseph Blackbird
threat Analyst
Symantec Security responseMo King Low
threat Analyst
Security technology and response
Teo Adams
threat Analyst
Security technology and response
David McKinney
threat Analyst
Security technology and response
Stephen Entwisle
threat Analyst
Security technology and response
Marika Pauls Laucht
threat AnalystSecurity technology and response
Candid Wueestthreat AnalystSecurity technology and responsePaul WoodSenior Analyst
messageLabs intelligence, Symantec
Dan Bleaken
threat Analyst
messageLabs intelligence, Symantec
Greg Ahmad
threat Analyst
Security technology and response
Darren Kemp
threat Analyst
Security technology and response
Ashif Samnani
threat AnalystSecurity technology and responseSymantec internet Security threat report
2system where tools specifically developed to facilitate fraud and theft are freely bought and sold. these
tools are then used for information theft that may then be converted into profit to fund the development of
additional tools.
Based on the data and discussions presented in the current Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, this
summary will examine the primary methods being used to compromise end users and organizations, who is
generating these attacks, and what these attackers are after. Finally, this summary will look at emerging
trends that Symantec believes will become prevalent in the immediate future.
How users are being compromised
Web-based attacks are now the primary vector for malicious activity over the internet. the continued
growth of the internet and the number of people increasingly using it for an extensive array of activities
presents attackers with a growing range of targets as well as various means to launch malicious activity.3
Within this activity, Symantec has noted that most Web-based attacks are launched against users who visit legitimate websites that have been compromised by attackers in order to serve malicious content.
Some of the common techniques used by attackers to compromise a website include exploiting a vulnerable
Web application running on the server (by attacking through improperly secured input fields), or exploiting some vulnerability present in the underlying host operating system. in 2008 alone, there were 12,885 site-
specific vulnerabilities identified (figure 1) and 63 percent of vulnerabilities documented by Symantec affected Web applications. Attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities in a website or underlying application
to modify the pages served to users visiting the site. this can include directly serving malicious content
from the site itself, or embedding a malicious iframe on pages that can redirect a user’s browser to another Web server that is under the attacker’s control.
4 in this way, the compromise of a single website can cause
attacks to be launched against every visitor to that site.
Period2007 200812,88517,697
Figure 1. Site-specific vulnerabilities
Source: Based on data provided by the XSSed Project5
3 http://www.verisign.com/static/043939.pdf
4 An iframe is an HtmL element that can include Web content from other pages or Web servers to be rendered when the user visits the original page. this tag can be
constructed so that it is effectively invisible and the user will not see any of the embedded content when viewing the original page.
5 Data was provided by the XSSed project, a site devoted to tracking and verifying reports of site-specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities: http://www.xssed.com.Symantec internet Security threat report
3in the case of a popular, trusted site with a large number of visitors, this can yield thousands of
compromises from a single attack. For example, one attack that targeted the websites of both the United
nations and the UK government, among others, injected malicious code that was designed to load content
from an attacker-controlled location into visitors’ browsers.6 Another separate attack successfully defaced
the national Albanian postal service website.7 these types of attacks provide an optimal beachhead for
distributing malicious code because they target high-traffic websites of reputable organizations.
in order to compromise the largest possible number of websites with a single mechanism, attackers will
attempt to compromise an entire class of vulnerability by searching for commonalities within them and
generically automating their discovery and exploitation. this allows attackers to compromise websites
with the efficiency commonly found in network worms.
the lengthy and complicated steps being pursued to launch successful Web-based attacks also demonstrate
the increasing complexity of the methods used by attackers. While a single high-severity flaw can be
exploited to fully compromise a user, attackers are now frequently stringing together multiple exploits for medium-severity vulnerabilities to achieve the same goal. An indication of this is that eight of the top 10
vulnerabilities exploited in 2008 were rated as medium severity.
many enterprises and end users will often make patching high-severity vulnerabilities a top priority,
while medium- and low-severity vulnerabilities may be ignored. this could result in the possibility of more
computers remaining exposed for longer periods to these vulnerabilities. For example, of the 12,885 site-
specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities identified by Symantec in 2008, only 394 (3 percent) are known
by Symantec to have been fixed.
8
these developments and trends indicate that Web-based threats have not only become widespread, but that they have also increased in sophistication. in particular, Symantec has noticed that some botnets (such as
Asprox,
9 which was initially used for phishing scams) are being redesigned to specifically exploit cross-site
scripting vulnerabilities in order to inject malicious code into compromised websites.10
in many cases, medium-severity vulnerabilities are sufficient to mount successful attacks if attackers
are able to execute arbitrary code and perform actions such as accessing confidential information or
making network connections. this is made possible because many end users do not require administrative
privileges to run or modify the targeted applications. While the danger of client-side vulnerabilities may
be limited by best practices, such as restricting Web applications at the administrative level, this is often
unrealistic given how integral Web applications are to the delivery of content for many businesses. medium-
severity vulnerabilities affecting client or desktop applications are often sufficient for an attacker to mount
successful malicious attacks on individual end users as well as at the enterprise level.
that said, however, a single high-severity vulnerability was the top attacked flaw in 2008. previous editions
of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report noted that there has been a decrease in the volume of
network worms, partly due to a lack of easily exploitable remote vulnerabilities in default operating system
components. many network worms exploited such vulnerabilities in order to propagate. Highly successful
worms—such as Codered,11 nimda,12 and Slammer13—all exploited high-severity vulnerabilities in remotely
6 http://news.cnet.com/8301-10789_3-9925637-57.html
7 http://albmasters.com/?p=3
8 For the purpose of this report, the term cross-site scripting encapsulates two broad classes of vulnerability; this includes traditional cross-site scripting and a category
known as HtmL injection (or persistent cross-site scripting).
9 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-060812-4603-99
10 http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/mLireport_Annual_2008_FinAL.pdf : p. 33
11 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2001-071911-5755-99
12 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2001-091816-3508-99
13 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2003-012502-3306-99Symantec internet Security threat report
4accessible services to spread. these worms prompted changes in security measures, such as the inclusion
of personal firewall applications in operating systems that are turned on by default. this helped protect
users from most network worms, even if the vulnerability being exploited was not immediately patched.
the high-severity vulnerability in question was a zero-day vulnerability that was discovered in late 2008 in
the microsoft® Windows® Server Service rpC Handling component that allowed remote code execution.14
Because remote communication with this service is allowed through the Windows firewall when file and print sharing is turned on, many users would have to apply the patch to be protected from exploitation
attempts. Soon after, a new worm called Downadup (also known as Conficker) emerged that exploited
this vulnerability.
15 Downadup was able to spread rapidly, partially due to its advanced propagation
mechanisms and its ability to spread through removable media devices.16 By the end of 2008 there were
well over a million individual computers infected by Downadup. Once Downadup has infected a computer,
it uses a Web or peer-to-peer (p2p) update mechanism to download updated versions of itself, or to install
other malicious code onto the compromised computer.
Downadup has been particularly prolific in the Ap J and Latin America (LAm) regions.17 these regions are
also where some of the highest software piracy rates are recorded.18 Because pirated versions of software
are frequently unable to use automated update mechanisms for security patches (in case they are detected
and disabled), it is likely many computers in these two regions have not been patched against Downadup.
Software piracy rates are often high in many emerging markets with rapidly growing internet and
broadband infrastructures.19
From the data gathered for this reporting period, Symantec has also noted other significant malicious activities occurring in countries with rapidly emerging internet infrastructures. For example, while the
United States is still home to a large amount of threat activity and continues to be the top ranked country for malicious activity—mainly due to its extensive broadband penetration and significantly developed
internet infrastructure—Symantec has noted a steady increase in malicious activity in countries not
previously associated with such activities. One result of this trend is that these countries can appeal to
attackers as potential bases for hosting phishing websites, spam relays, and other malicious content,
possibly because rapidly growing iSps in these areas may have difficulty monitoring and filtering the
growing volume of traffic across their networks.
Attackers are also organized enough to implement contingency plans in case their activities are detected.
By relocating their activities to a variety of countries, attackers can minimize the chances of being partially
or completely shut down. this is demonstrated by events after the shutdown of a U.S.-based iSp toward
the end of 2008.
20 it seems that the bot controllers generating much of the attack activity from this iSp
had alternative hosting plans.21 As a result, although Symantec noted a significant drop in malicious
activity after the shutdown, particularly in spam, the numbers returned to previous levels soon afterward.
it became apparent that the botnet controllers had been able to successfully relocate enough of their bot
command-and-control (C&C) servers to other hosts, and were thus able to rebuild their botnets back up to
previous numbers. Given that the affected botnets were three of the world’s largest, it is not surprising that
new locations were quickly found to host these servers due to the significant profits such botnets are able to generate.
14 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/31874
15 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-112203-2408-99
16 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/malicious-Code/Downadup-Attempts-at-Smart-network-Scanning/ba-p/382114 - A233
17 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/malicious-Code/Downadup-Geo-location-Fingerprinting-and-piracy/ba-p/380993 - A228
18 http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/01/bsa-piracy-economic-impact-is-tens-of-billions-of-dollars.ars
19 http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0ein/is_2008_may_14/ai_n25411795
20 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/other_resources/b-state_of_spam_report_12-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 7
21 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/11/18/short_mccolo_resurrection/Symantec internet Security threat report
5What attackers want
more than ever before, attackers are concentrating on compromising end users for financial gain. in 2008,
78 percent of confidential information threats exported user data, and 76 percent used a keystroke-logging
component to steal information such as online banking account credentials. Additionally, 76 percent of
phishing lures targeted brands in the financial services sector (figure 2) and this sector also had the most
identities exposed due to data breaches. Similarly, 12 percent of all data breaches that occurred in 2008
exposed credit card information. in 2008 the average cost per incident of a data breach in the United
States was $6.7 million—which is an increase of 5 percent from 2007—and lost business amounted to
an average of $4.6 million.22
4%
1%
<1%
<1%
<1%<1%
<1%11%
76%
RetailFinancial
ISP
Internet community
Government8%
Computer hardwareOnline gaming
Insurance
Computer softwareTelecom
Figure 2. Phished sectors by volume of phishing lures
Source: Symantec Corporation
22 http://www.encryptionreports.com/download/p onemon_COB_2008_US_090201.pdf Symantec internet Security threat report
6Once attackers have obtained financial information or other personal details—such as names, addresses,
and government identification numbers—they frequently sell that data on the underground economy.23 the
most popular item for sale on underground economy servers in 2008 was credit card information, accounting for 32 percent of the total (table 1). this is likely due to the fact that there are numerous ways for credit card
information to be stolen, and that stolen card data can be easily cashed out. this is because the underground
economy has a well-established infrastructure for monetizing such information, again indicating the
increased sophistication of the underground economy. Also, because of the large quantity of credit card
numbers available, the price for each card can be as low as 6 cents when they are purchased in bulk. Some
groups in the underground economy also specialize in manufacturing blank plastic cards with magnetic
stripes destined to be encoded with stolen credit card and bankcard data. the manufacture and distribution
of these cards requires a well-organized level of sophistication since the cards are often produced in one
country, imprinted, and then shipped to the countries from where the stolen data originated.
2008
Rank
1
2
3
4
56
78
9
102007
Rank
1
2
9
3
12
4
65
17
8Item
Credit card information
Bank account credentials
Email accounts
Email addresses
Proxies Full identities
Mailers Cash out services
Shell scripts Scams 2008
Percentage
32%
19%
5%
5%
4%4%
3%3%
3%
3%2007
Percentage
21%
17%
4%
6%
3%6%
5%5%
2%
5%Range of Prices
$0.06–$30
$10–$1000$0.10–$100
$0.33/MB–$100/MB
$0.16–$20$0.70–$60
$2–$408%–50% or flat rate of
$200–$2000 per item
$2–$20$3–$40/week for hosting,
$2–$20 design
Table 1. Goods and services available for sale on underground economy servers
Source: Symantec
One result that Symantec has drawn from the observance of increased professionalization in the
underground economy is that the coordination of specialized and, in some cases, competitive groups for
the production and distribution of items such as customized malicious code and phishing kits has led to a
dramatic increase in the general proliferation of malicious code. in 2008, Symantec detected 1,656,227
malicious code threats (figure 3). this represents over 60 percent of the approximately 2.6 million
malicious code threats that Symantec has detected in total over time.
23 the underground economy comprises various forums, such as websites and internet relay Chat (irC) channels,
which allow criminals to buy, sell, and trade illicit goods and services. For more information see:
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_underground_economy_report_11-2008-14525717.en-us.pdfSymantec internet Security threat report
7Number of new threats
0200,0001,000,000
800,0001,800,000
1,600,000
Period600,000
400,0001,400,000
1,200,000
200220,547
200318,827
200469,107
2005113,025
2006140,690
2007624,267
20081,656,227
Figure 3. New malicious code threats
Source: Symantec
A prime example of this type of underground professional organization is the russian Business network
(rBn). the rBn reputedly specializes in the distribution of malicious code, hosting malicious websites,
and other malicious activity. the rBn has been credited with creating approximately half of the phishing
incidents that occurred worldwide last year. it is also thought to be associated with a significant amount
of the malicious activities on the internet in 2007.
Since that time there have been two significant cases of iSps that were shut down because of malicious
activity. these iSps were hosting malicious code, phishing websites, bot C&C servers, and spam relays.
this includes the instance noted above, when Symantec saw a 65 percent drop in spam and a 30 percent
decrease in bot activity within 24 hours of one particular iSp being taken offline.24 While it may seem
remarkable that the shutdown of a single iSp can result in such drastic decreases in malicious activity
within a short time period, as noted, malicious activity is increasingly organized and attackers are now readily prepared for contingencies that might affect their operations. much of the malicious activity was
simply shifted to other locations. in this instance, the iSp even resurfaced briefly to afford the group an
opportunity to update the botnets under their control.
25
in this increasingly sophisticated internet threat landscape, there is a growing impetus for greater
cooperation to address the high degree of organization of groups creating threats on the internet. this
was demonstrated by the aggressive spread of the Downadup worm in the latter months of 2008 and into 2009. Due to its multiple propagation mechanisms, the worm was able to spread rapidly. more worrisome
is the fact that the worm contains an update mechanism that could allow new versions of the worm or
other threats, such as a bot, to be installed on compromised computers. to combat its rapid spread and
aggressive profile, a coalition was formed by stakeholders involved in internet security.
26 the success of
this coalition of identifying how the worm operates, slowing its growth, and limiting its potential danger
demonstrates the benefits of increased cooperation among internet security stakeholders.
24 Cf. http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/other_resources/b-state_of_spam_report_12-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 7
and http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/mLireport_Annual_2008_FinAL.pdf : p. 26
25 http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/154554/spammers_regaining_control_over_srizbi_botnet.html
26 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/malicious-Code/Coalition-Formed-in-response-to-W32-Downadup/ba-p/388129 - A241Symantec internet Security threat report
8Conclusion
Changes in the current threat landscape—such as the increasing complexity and sophistication of
attacks, the evolution of attackers and attack patterns, and malicious activities being pushed to emerging
countries—show not just the benefits of, but also the need for increased cooperation among security
companies, governments, academics, and other organizations and individuals to combat these changes.
Symantec expects malicious activity to continue to be pushed to regions with emerging infrastructures
that may still lack the resources to combat the growing involvement of organized crime in the online underground economy. the onus will be on organizations, institutions, and other knowledgeable groups to
come together for the benefit of the affected regions. internet threat activity is truly global, and malicious
activity allowed to flourish in one area could quickly spread worldwide.
With the increasing adaptability of malicious code developers and their ability to evade detection,
Symantec also expects that overt attack activities will either be abandoned or pushed further underground.
For example, if the effort to set up malicious iSps outweighs the return for attackers before being taken
offline, it is likely that attackers will abandon this approach for other attack vectors in order to continue to evade detection and potential apprehension or prosecution. this has already been seen with the use of
Http and p2p communication channels in threats such as Downadup. Because of the distributed nature of
these control channels, it is much more difficult to disable an entire network and locate the individual or group behind the attacks.
the large increase in the number of new malicious code threats, coupled with the use of the Web as a
distribution mechanism, also demonstrates the growing need for more responsive and cooperative security
measures. While antivirus signature scanning, heuristic detection, and intrusion prevention continue to be
vital for the security of organizations as well as end users, newer technologies, such as reputation-based
security, will become increasingly important.
the focus of threats in 2008 continued to be aimed at exploiting end users for profit, and attackers
have continued to evolve and refine their abilities for online fraud. While some criminal groups have come
and gone, other large organizations persist and continue to consolidate their activities. these pseudo-
corporations and their up-and-coming competitors will likely remain at the forefront of malicious activity
in the coming year.Symantec internet Security threat report
9Global Internet Security Threat Report, Volume XIV Highlights
the following section provides highlights of the security trends that Symantec observed in 2008 that are
included in the current volume of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report.
Threat Activity Trends Highlights
During this reporting period, 23 percent of all malicious activity measured by Symantec in 2008 was •
located in the United States; this is a decrease from 26 percent in 2007.
the United States was the top country of attack origin in 2008, accounting for 25 percent of worldwide •
activity; this is a decrease from 29 percent in 2007.the education sector accounted for 27 percent of data breaches that could lead to identity theft during •
this period, more than any other sector and a slight increase from 26 percent in 2007.the financial sector was the top sector for identities exposed in 2008, accounting for 29 percent of the •
total, an increase from 10 percent in 2007.
in 2008, the theft or loss of a computer or other data-storage devices accounted for 48 percent of data •
breaches that could lead to identity theft and for 66 percent of the identities exposed.Symantec observed an average of 75,158 active bot-infected computers per day in 2008, an increase of •
31 percent from the previous period.China had the most bot-infected computers in 2008, accounting for 13 percent of the worldwide total; •
this is a decrease from 19 percent in 2007.
Buenos Aires was the city with the most bot-infected computers in 2008, accounting for 4 percent of the •
worldwide total. in 2008, Symantec identified 15,197 distinct new bot command-and-control servers; of these, •
43 percent operated through irC channels and 57 percent used Http .
the United States was the location for the most bot command-and-control servers in 2008, with •
33 percent of the total, more than any other country. the top Web-based attack in 2008 was associated with the microsoft® internet explorer® ADODB.Stream •
Object File installation Weakness vulnerability, which accounted for 30 percent of the total.
the United States was the top country of origin for Web-based attacks in 2008, accounting for •
38 percent of the worldwide total.the United States was the country most frequently targeted by denial-of-service attacks in 2008, •
accounting for 51 percent of the worldwide total. Symantec internet Security threat report
10Vulnerability Trends Highlights
Symantec documented 5,491 vulnerabilities in 2008; this is a 19 percent increase over the •
4,625 vulnerabilities documented in 2007.
two percent of vulnerabilities in 2008 were classified as high severity, 67 percent as medium severity, •
and 30 percent as low severity. in 2007, 4 percent of vulnerabilities were classified as high severity,
61 percent as medium severity, and 35 percent as low severity.
eighty percent of documented vulnerabilities were classified as easily exploitable in 2008; this is an •
increase from 2007, when 74 percent of documented vulnerabilities were classified as easily exploitable.Of any browser analyzed in 2008, Apple® Safari® had the longest window of exposure (the time between •
the release of exploit code for a vulnerability and a vendor releasing a patch), with a nine-day average;
mozilla® browsers had the shortest window of exposure in 2008, averaging less than one day.
mozilla browsers were affected by 99 new vulnerabilities in 2008, more than any other browser; there •
were 47 new vulnerabilities identified in internet explorer, 40 in Apple Safari, 35 in Opera™, and 11 in
Google® Chrome. there were 415 browser plug-in vulnerabilities identified in 2008, fewer than the 475 identified in 2007. •
ActiveX® technologies still constituted the majority of new browser plug-in vulnerabilities, with a total of
287; however, this is substantially down from the 399 ActiveX vulnerabilities identified in 2007.
memory corruption vulnerabilities again made up the majority of the type of vulnerabilities in browser •
plug-in technologies for 2008, with 271 vulnerabilities classified as such. in 2008, 63 percent of vulnerabilities affected Web applications, an increase from 59 percent in 2007. •
During 2008, there were 12,885 site-specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities identified, compared to •
17,697 in 2007; of the vulnerabilities identified in 2008, only 3 percent (394 vulnerabilities) had been
fixed at the time of writing.
in 2008, Symantec documented nine zero-day vulnerabilities, compared to 15 in 2007.•
the top attacked vulnerability for 2008 was the microsoft Windows® Server Service rpC Handling •
remote Code execution Vulnerability.
in 2008, 95 percent of attacked vulnerabilities were client-side vulnerabilities and 5 percent were •
server-side vulnerabilities, compared to 93 percent and 7 percent, respectively, in 2007.Symantec internet Security threat report
11Malicious Code Trends Highlights
in 2008, the number of new malicious code signatures increased by 265 percent over 2007; over •
60 percent of all currently detected malicious code threats were detected in 2008.
Of the top 10 new malicious code families detected in 2008, three were trojans, three were trojans with •
a back door component, two were worms, one was a worm with a back door component, and one was a
worm with back door and virus components.
trojans made up 68 percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code samples reported in 2008, a •
minor decrease from 69 percent in 2007.Five of the top 10 staged downloaders in 2008 were trojans, two were trojans that incorporated a back •
door component, one was a worm, one was a worm that incorporated a back door, and one was a worm
that incorporated a virus component.
in 2008, the proportional increase of potential malicious code infections was greatest in the europe, the •
middle east, and Africa region.
the percentage of threats to confidential information that incorporate remote access capabilities •
declined to 83 percent in 2008 from 91 percent in 2007, although such threats remained the most
prevalent exposure type.
in 2008, 78 percent of threats to confidential information exported user data and 76 percent had a •
keystroke-logging component; these are increases from 74 percent and 72 percent, respectively, in 2007. propagation through executable file sharing continued to increase in 2008, accounting for 66 percent of •
malicious code that propagates—up from 44 percent in 2007. One percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code samples modified Web pages in 2008, down from •
2 percent in 2007.
the percentage of documented malicious code samples that exploit vulnerabilities declined substantially, •
from 13 percent in 2007 to 3 percent in 2008. in 2008, eight of the top 10 downloaded components were trojans, one was a trojan with a back door •
component, and one was a back door. malicious code that targets online games accounted for 10 percent of the volume of the top 50 potential •
malicious code infections, up from 7 percent in 2007. Symantec internet Security threat report
12Phishing, Underground Economy Servers, and Spam Trends Highlights
the majority of brands used in phishing attacks in 2008 were in the financial services sector, accounting •
for 79 percent, down slightly from 83 percent identified in 2007.
the financial services sector accounted for the highest volume of phishing lures during this period, with •
76 percent of the total; this is considerably higher than 2007, when the volume for financial services was
52 percent.
in 2008, Symantec detected 55,389 phishing website hosts, an increase of 66 percent over 2007, •
when 33,428 phishing hosts were detected. in 2008, 43 percent of all phishing websites identified by Symantec were located in the United States, •
considerably less than 2007, when 69 percent of such sites were based there. the most common top-level domain used in phishing lures detected in 2008 was .com, accounting for •
39 percent of the total; it was also the highest ranking top-level domain in 2007, when it accounted
for 46 percent of the total.the top government top-level domain that was detected as being used by phishing lures in 2008 was •
.go.th, the tLD for websites associated with the government of thailand.
One particular automated phishing toolkit identified by Symantec was responsible for an average of •
14 percent of all phishing attacks during 2008.Credit card information was the most commonly advertised item for sale on underground economy •
servers known to Symantec, accounting for 32 percent of all goods and services; this is an increase
from 2007 when credit card information accounted for 21 percent of the total.
the United States was the top country for credit cards advertised on underground economy servers, •
accounting for 67 percent of the total; this is a decrease from 2007 when it accounted for 83 percent
of the total.
the most common type of spam detected in 2008 was related to internet- or computer-related goods •
and services, which made up 24 percent of all detected spam; this was the second most common type
of spam in 2007, accounting for 19 percent of the total.Symantec observed a 192 percent increase in spam detected across the internet, from 119.6 billion •
messages in 2007 to 349.6 billion in 2008. in 2008, 29 percent of all spam recorded by Symantec originated in the United States, a substantial •
decrease from 45 percent in 2007, when the United States was also the top ranked country of origin
for spam.
in 2008, bot networks were responsible for the distribution of approximately 90 percent of all •
spam email.Symantec internet Security threat report
13Government Internet Security Threat Report, Volume XIV Highlights
the following section provides a summary of the threat activity that Symantec observed taking place in
government and infrastructure sectors in 2008. this includes only highlights specific to the Symantec
Government Internet Security Threat Report that are not also included in the Symantec Global Internet
Security Threat Report highlights, listed above.
Threat Activity Trends Highlights
telecommunications was the top critical infrastructure sector for malicious activity in 2008, accounting •
for 97 percent of the total; this is a slight increase from 96 percent in 2007, when it also ranked first.
the top country of origin for attacks targeting the government sector was China, which accounted for •
22 percent of the total; this was an increase from 8 percent in 2007.the most common type of attack this period targeting government and critical infrastructure •
organizations was denial-of-service attacks, accounting for 49 percent of the top 10 in 2008.in 2008, Symantec documented six public SCADA vulnerabilities. this was a decrease from 2007 •
when there were 15 documented SCADA vulnerabilities.
Phishing, Underground Economy Servers, and Spam Trends Highlights
the top government top-level domain that was detected as being used by phishing lures in 2008 •
was .go.th, the tLD for websites associated with the government of thailand.Symantec internet Security threat report
14EMEA Internet Security Threat Report, Volume XIV Highlights
the following section provides highlights of the security trends that Symantec observed in the europe, the
middle east, and Africa (emeA) region in 2008.
Threat Activity Trends Highlights
Germany ranked first for malicious activity in emeA during 2008 with 14 percent, a slight drop from •
18 percent in the previous period.
twenty-eight percent of attacks targeting emeA in 2008 originated in the United States, the top ranked •
country, compared to 22 percent in 2007.Symantec observed an average of 32,188 active bots per day in the emeA region in 2008, a 47 percent •
increase from 2007, when 21,864 active bots were detected.Spain was the top ranked country in emeA for bot infections in 2008, with 15 percent of the total. •
Lisbon was the top city for bot infections in emeA in 2008, accounting for 5 percent of all bot infections •
in the region.in 2008, Symantec identified 5,147 distinct new bot command-and-control servers in emeA, of which •
40 percent were through irC channels and 60 percent on Http .
russia was the top country for bot command-and-control servers in emeA, with 20 percent of the •
regional total.the most common Web-based attack in 2008 against users in emeA was associated with the Adobe SWF •
remote Code executable vulnerability, which accounted for 22 percent of the regional total.
in 2008, Ukraine was the top country of origin for Web-based attacks in the emeA region, accounting for •
31 percent of the regional total.
Malicious Code Trends Highlights
trojans were the most common type of malicious code in emeA during 2008, accounting for 66 percent •
of the top 50 potential infections in the region—a minor increase from 64 percent in 2007.the United Kingdom was the top ranked country for back doors and trojans; egypt was the top ranked •
country for viruses; and Saudi Arabia was the top ranked country for worms.the Vundo trojan was the top malicious code sample by potential infection in emeA during the current •
reporting period, unchanged from 2007; it was also the top ranked sample globally.Symantec internet Security threat report
15the Brisv worm, which modifies multimedia files to open malicious UrLs, was the top new malicious •
code family reported in 2008 in the emeA region, as well as globally.
in emeA during 2008, 87 percent of confidential information threats had remote access capabilities, •
compared to 94 percent in 2007.
the most common propagation method for malicious code was through shared executable files, •
accounting for 65 percent of potential infections in emeA—a substantial increase from 37 percent
in 2007.in 2008, 1 percent of the volume of the top 50 samples in emeA had the capability to modify Web pages, •
unchanged from 2007.
Phishing and Spam Trends Highlights
poland hosted the highest percentage of phishing websites to which emeA users were directed by •
phishing lures in 2008, with 18 percent of all known lures. the financial services sector was the sector
most targeted by these lures in poland.
the highest percentage of spam detected in emeA in 2008 originated in russia, which accounted for •
14 percent of the regional total.the most common top-level domain used in phishing lures detected in emeA in 2008 was .com, which •
accounted for 25 percent of the totalSymantec internet Security threat report
16APJ Internet Security Threat Report, Volume XIV Highlights
the following section provides highlights of the security trends that Symantec observed in the Asia-p acific/
Japan (Ap J) region in 2008.
Threat Activity Trends Highlights
China ranked first for malicious activity within Ap J in 2008, with 41 percent of the total; China also •
ranked first in 2007, with 42 percent of the total.
in 2008, the United States ranked first for originating attacks targeting the Ap J region, with 28 percent •
of the total; this is an increase from 24 percent in 2007, when it also ranked first.Symantec observed an average of 11,683 active bot-infected computers per day in the Ap J region in •
2008, which is a 3 percent increase from the 11,329 recorded in 2007.China had the most bot-infected computers in the Ap J region during this period, with 58 percent of the •
total—down from 66 percent in 2007.
taipei was the top city for bot infections in the Ap J region in 2008, accounting for 9 percent of all bot •
infections in the Ap J region.
in 2008, Symantec identified 3,567 distinct new bot command-and-control servers in the Ap J region, of •
which 30 percent were controlled through irC channels and 70 percent were managed over Http .
China was the top country for bot command-and-control servers in the Ap J region, with 63 percent •
of the regional total.
the most common Web-based attack in 2008 against users in the Ap J region was associated with the •
Adobe SWF remote Code executable vulnerability, which accounted for 32 percent of the regional total.
in 2008, China was the top country of origin for Web-based attacks in the Ap J region, accounting for •
79 percent of the regional total.
Malicious Code Trends Highlights
trojans were the most common type of malicious code in 2008 in the Ap J region, accounting for •
55 percent of the volume of the top 50 potential infections in the region—an increase from
46 percent in 2007.Worms accounted for 43 percent of malicious code in the Ap J region in 2008, compared to •
29 percent globally.in 2008, China was the top country for back doors and trojans in the Ap J region, while india was •
the top country for viruses and worms.the Gampass trojan was the top malicious code sample by potential infection in the Ap J region in •
2008—unchanged from 2007. Symantec internet Security threat report
17the Brisv worm was the top new malicious code family in the Ap J region in 2008. •
in 2008, 82 percent of confidential information threats detected in the Ap J region exported user data, •
compared to 85 percent in 2007.
the most common propagation method for malicious code in the Ap J region in 2008 was through •
shared executable files, which accounted for 65 percent of potential infections, a slight increase
from 63 percent in 2007.
Phishing and Spam Trends Highlights
China hosted the highest percentage of phishing websites in 2008, with 35 percent of the regional total; •
in 2007, China ranked second with 28 percent.in 2008, China had the highest percentage of spam detected in Ap J, with 22 percent; this is down •
slightly from 24 percent in 2007, when China also ranked first for spam origin.the most common tLD used in phishing lures detected in Ap J in 2008 was .com, accounting for •
30 percent. in 2007, .com was the second most common tLD in Ap J after .cn.Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec
Corporation.
nO WArrAnty . the technical information is being delivered to you as is and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its accuracy or use. Any use of the
technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user. Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical
errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice.
|
Symantec enterpriSe SecuritySymantec Global Internet
Security Threat Reporttrends for 2009
Volume XV, published april 2010Marc Fossi
Executive EditorManager, DevelopmentSecurity technology and response
Dean TurnerDirector, Global intelligence network
Security technology and response
Eric JohnsonEditorSecurity technology and response
Trevor MackAssociate EditorSecurity technology and response
Téo Adamsthreat AnalystSecurity technology and response
Joseph Blackbirdthreat AnalystSymantec Security response
Stephen Entwislethreat AnalystSymantec Security response
Brent Gravelandthreat AnalystSecurity technology and response
David McKinneythreat AnalystSecurity technology and response
Joanne MulcahySenior AnalystSecurity technology and response
Candid Wueestthreat AnalystSecurity technology and responseContents
Introduction ............................................................................... 6
Executive Summary ........................................................................ 7
Highlights ............................................................................... 16
Threat Activity Trends .................................................................... 19
Vulnerability Trends ...................................................................... 35
Malicious Code Trends .................................................................... 47
Phishing, Underground Economy Servers, and Spam Trends ................................... 65
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices ...................................................... 84
Appendix B—Threat Activities Trends Methodologies ......................................... 87
Appendix C—Vulnerability Trends Methodologies ............................................ 89
Appendix D—Malicious Code Trends Methodologies .......................................... 92
Appendix E—Phishing, Underground Economy Servers, and Spam Trends Methodologies ......... 93Volume XV, published April 2010
Symantec Global Internet Security
Threat ReportSymantec Global internet Security threat report
4Contents for Tables and Figures
Table 1. Malicious activity by country ...................................................... 7
Figure 1 Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by cause and identities exposed ......... 9
Table 2. Top attacked vulnerabilities, 2009 ................................................ 10
Table 3. Top Web-based attacks ......................................................... 11
Figure 2. Threats to confidential information, by type ....................................... 12
Table 4. Unique brands phished, by sector ................................................ 13
Figure 3. Top spam categories ............................................................ 14
Table 5. Goods and services advertised on underground economy servers .................... 15
Table 6. Malicious activity by country .................................................... 19
Table 7. Top Web-based attacks ......................................................... 22
Table 8. Top countries of origin for Web-based attacks ..................................... 25
Figure 4. Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by sector and
identities exposed by sector ..................................................... 27
Figure 5. Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by cause and identities exposed ....... 29
Figure 6. Active bot-infected computers, by day ............................................ 31
Figure 7. Web browser vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Figure 8. Window of exposure for Web browsers ............................................ 38
Figure 9. Web browser plug-in vulnerabilities .............................................. 41
Table 9. Top attacked vulnerabilities, 2009 ................................................ 43
Table 10. Top attacked vulnerabilities, 2008 ................................................ 44
Figure 10. New malicious code signatures .................................................. 48
Table 11. Top new malicious code families ................................................. 49
Figure 11. Prevalence of malicious code types by potential infections .......................... 51
Table 12. Top staged downloaders ........................................................ 53Symantec Global internet Security threat report
5Table 13. Top downloaded components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Table 14. Geolocation of Trojans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
Table 15. Geolocation of worms ........................................................... 56
Table 16. Geolocation of back doors ....................................................... 57
Table 17. Geolocation of viruses .......................................................... 58
Figure 12. Threats to confidential information, by type ....................................... 59
Table 18. Propagation mechanisms ........................................................ 61
Table 19. Unique brands phished, by sector ................................................ 67
Figure 13. Phished sectors by volume of phishing URLs ....................................... 68
Table 20. Top countries hosting phishing URLs and top-targeted sectors ....................... 70
Figure 14. Automated phishing toolkits ..................................................... 72
Table 21. Goods and services advertised for sale on underground economy servers ............. 73
Figure 15. Spam by category .............................................................. 78
Table 22. Top countries of spam origin ..................................................... 80
Table 23. Percentage of spam from botnets ................................................ 81Symantec Global internet Security threat report
6Introduction
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of internet threat data in the world
through the Symantec™ Global intelligence network. More than 240,000 sensors in over 200 countries
and territories monitor attack activity through a combination of Symantec products and services such as
Symantec DeepSight™ threat Management System, Symantec Managed Security Services and norton™
consumer products, as well as additional third-party data sources.
Symantec also gathers malicious code intelligence from more than 133 million client, server, and gateway
systems that have deployed its antivirus products. Additionally, Symantec’s distributed honeypot network collects data from around the globe, capturing previously unseen threats and attacks and providing valuable insight into attacker methods.
Spam and phishing data is captured through a variety of sources including: the Symantec probe network,
a system of more than 5 million decoy accounts; MessageLabs intelligence, a respected source of data and
analysis for messaging security issues, trends and statistics; and other Symantec technologies. Data is
collected in more than 86 countries. Over 8 billion email messages, as well as over 1 billion Web requests, are processed per day across 16 data centers. Symantec also gathers phishing information through an extensive antifraud community of enterprises, security vendors and more than 50 million consumers.
these resources give Symantec’s analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze, and
provide informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and spam. the result is the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report, which gives enterprises and consumers
essential information to effectively secure their systems now and into the future.
Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report now has tweetable stats
Click the links wherever this symbol • Tweet appears to tweet stats from this report.
Follow the #iS tr hashtag to particpate in the iStr discussion on twitter. •
Follow us on twitter @threatintel. • Symantec Global internet Security threat report
7Executive Summary
this summary will discuss current trends, impending threats, and the continuing evolution of the internet
threat landscape in 2009 based on data discussed within the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat
Report. there are a number of recent and growing trends in the threat activity landscape that were
observed by Symantec in 2009. these trends include that malicious activity continues to be pushed to
emerging countries, targeted attacks on enterprises are increasing, with Web-based attacks continuing to
be a favored attack vector, readily available malicious code kits are making it simple for neophyte attackers to mount attacks, and the online underground economy and malicious activity are benefiting from the downturn in the global economy.
Emerging countries
the previous edition of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report noted a shift in malicious
activity to emerging countries.1 in 2009, this trend became more pronounced. For example, for the first
time since Symantec began examining malicious activity by country in 2006, a country other than the United States, China, or Germany has ranked in the top three, as Brazil ranked third in malicious activity in 2009, behind the United States and China, respectively (table 1).
2009
1
23
4
5
6
7
89
102008
1
25
3
11
4
1210
76CountryPercentage2009 Activity Rank
Overall Rank
United States
ChinaBrazil
Germany
India
United Kingdom
Russia
PolandItalySpain2009
19%
8%
6%
5%
4%
3%
3%
3%3%3%2008
23%
9%
4%
6%
3%
5%
2%
3%3%4%Malicious
Code
1
35
21
2
4
12231614Spam
Zombies
6
81
7
3
19
2
49
11Phishing
Hosts
1
6
12
2
21
75
8
1811Bots
1
23
5
2014
19
8
67
Attack
Origin
1
26
3
18
4
1017
89
Table 1. Malicious activity by country
Source: Symantec Corporation
Brazil became more prominent in all of the specific category measurements in 2009 except for spam
zombies, where it was already the top-ranked country. Brazil’s significant increases across all categories are related to the growing internet infrastructure and broadband usage there. the growing level of
malicious code activity affecting Brazil has also resulted in the proposal of a new cybercrime bill in the country.
2 the initiative may also be a result of a number high-profile cyber attacks there in recent years.3
One of the attacks resulted in a massive power grid blackout, while another resulted in the exposure of valuable data and a $350,000 ransom request after a government website was compromised.
4 the latter
case resulted in over 3,000 employees being unable to access the site for 24 hours.
1 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_exec_summary_internet_security_threat_report_xiv_04-2009.en-us.pdf : p. 4
2 http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/07/lula-and-cybercrime
3 http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2009/11/15/brazils-next-battlefield-cyberspace/
4 All currency in U.S. dollars.TweetSymantec Global internet Security threat report
8India also experienced a surge in malicious activity in 2009, moving from 11th for overall malicious
activity in 2008 to fifth in this period. in 2009, india also accounted for 15 percent of all malicious activity
in the Asia-p acific/Japan (Ap J) region, an increase from 10 percent in 2008. For specific categories of
measurement in the Ap J region, india increased rank in malicious code, spam zombies and phishing hosts
from 2008. its high ranking in spam zombies also contributed to india being the third highest country of
spam origin globally. Malicious activity tends to increase in countries experiencing rapid growth in broadband infrastructure and connectivity, and the level of malicious activity occurring in india has been
increasing steadily over several reporting periods as its broadband infrastructure and user base grows.
5
Targeted attacks focus on enterprises
targeted attacks using advanced persistent threats (Apt ) that occurred in 2009 made headlines in early
2010.6 Most notable of these was the Hydraq trojan (a.k.a., Aurora).7 in January 2010, reports emerged
that dozens of large companies had been compromised by attackers using this trojan.8 While these attacks
were not novel in approach, they highlighted the methods by which large enterprises could be compromised.
typically, this type of attack begins with some reconnaissance on the part of attackers. this can include
researching publicly available information about the company and its employees, such as from social
networking sites. this information is then used to create specifically crafted phishing email messages,
often referred to as spear phishing, that target the company or even specific staff members.9 these email
messages often contain attachments that exploit vulnerabilities in client-side applications, or links to websites that exploit vulnerabilities in Web browsers or browser plug-ins. A successful attack could give the attacker access to the enterprise’s network.
in the case of the Hydraq attack, a previously unknown vulnerability in Microsoft® internet Explorer® and a
patched vulnerability in Adobe® reader® and Adobe Flash® player are exploited to install the trojan.
10 Once
the trojan is installed, it lets attackers perform various actions on the compromised computer, including
giving them full remote access. typically, once they have established access within the enterprise, attackers
will use the foothold that they have established to attempt to connect to other computers and servers and
compromise them as well. they can do this by stealing credentials on the local computer or capturing data
by installing a keystroke logger.
Usually, when this type of attack is performed against individuals or by less sophisticated attackers, the
attack is used to gather all the information immediately available and move on to the next target. However, Apt attacks are designed to remain undetected in order to gather information over prolonged periods. this
type of attack has been observed in other large-scale data breaches that caused large numbers of identities to be exposed (figure 1).
11
5 http://point-topic.com/dslanalysis.php and/or
http://www.indiabroadband.net/india-broadband-telecom-news/11682-india-register-500-growth-broadband-services-within-5-years.html
6 An advanced persistent threat (Apt ) is usually a sophisticated threat that hides its presence to remain installed and undetected on a computer.
7 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-011114-1830-99
8 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/hydraq-attack-mythical-proportions
9 Spear phishing is a targeted form of phishing where the apparent source of the email is likely to be an individual within the recipients’ company and generally someone in a position of authority. this is discussed in greater detail in “phishing activity by sector,” further down in the report.
10 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/37815
11 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7970471.stmTweetSymantec Global internet Security threat report
9Data breaches Identities exposedTheft/loss 37%Fraud 2%Insider 9%
Hacking 15%
Insecure policy 26%Unknown 11%Theft/loss 4%
Hacking 60%Insider <1%
Unknown <1%
Insecure policy 35%Fraud <1%
Figure 1. Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by cause and identities exposed12
Source: Based on data provided by OSF DataLoss DB
In 2009, 60 percent of identities exposed were compromised by hacking attacks, which are another
form of targeted attack. the majority of these were the result of a successful hacking attack on a single
credit card payment processor.13 the hackers gained access to the company’s payment processing
network using an SQL-injection attack. the attackers then installed malicious code designed to gather
sensitive information from the network, which allowed them to easily access the network at their convenience. the attacks resulted in the theft of approximately 130 million credit card numbers. An
investigation was undertaken when the company began receiving reports of fraudulent activity on credit cards that the company itself had processed. the attackers were eventually tracked down and
charged by federal authorities.
this type of targeted hacking attack is further evidence of the significant role that malicious code can
play in data breaches. Although data breaches occur due to a number of causes, the covert nature of malicious code is an efficient and enticing means for attackers to remotely acquire sensitive information. Furthermore, as is discussed in the “Threats to confidential information” metric, the frequency of
malicious code threats that expose confidential information underscores the significance of identity theft to attackers who author and deploy malicious code.
According to the Symantec State of Enterprise Security Report 2010, 75 percent of enterprises
surveyed experienced some form of cyber attack in 2009, showing that this issue is not limited to a few larger enterprises.
14 protecting the enterprise infrastructure and information, developing and
enforcing it policies, and properly managing systems can help mitigate or prevent targeted attacks.
Administrators can limit potential exposure to attack activity by securing endpoints, messaging, and Web environments, as well as by implementing policies to remediate threats. Distributing patches and enforcing patch levels through automated processes can also prevent exploitation of known vulnerabilities.
12 Due to rounding, percentages might not equal 100 percent.
13 http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2009/01/payment_processor_breach_may_b.html
14 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/presskits/SES_report_Feb2010.pdf : p. 8Tweet
TweetSymantec Global internet Security threat report
10Web-based attacks take on all comers
While targeted attacks frequently use zero-day vulnerabilities and social engineering to compromise
enterprise users on a network, similar techniques are also employed to compromise individual users. in
the late 1990s and early 2000s, mass-mailing worms were the most common means of malicious code infection. Over the past few years, Web-based attacks have replaced the mass-mailing worm in this position. Attackers may use social engineering—such as in spam messages, as previously mentioned—to lure a user to a website that exploits browser and plug-in vulnerabilities. these attacks are then used to
install malicious code or other applications such as rogue security software on the victim’s computer.
15
Of the top-attacked vulnerabilities that Symantec observed in 2009, four of the top five being exploited were client-side vulnerabilities that were frequently targeted by Web-based attacks (table 2). two of these
vulnerabilities were in Adobe reader, while one was in Microsoft internet Explorer and the fourth was in an
ActiveX® control. this shows that while vulnerabilities in other network services are being targeted by
attackers, vulnerabilities in Web browsers and associated technologies are favored. this may be because
attacks against browsers are typically conducted through the Http protocol that is used for the majority of Web traffic. Since so much legitimate traffic uses this protocol and its associated ports, it can be difficult to detect or block malicious activity using Http .
Rank
1
23
4
5BID
362993575933627
35558
34169Vulnerabilities
Microsoft Windows SMB2 ‘_Smb2ValidateProviderCallback()’ Remote Code Execution
Adobe Reader and Flash Player Remote Code Execution Microsoft Internet Explorer 7 Uninitialized Memory Code Execution
Microsoft Windows ‘MPEG2TuneRequest’ ActiveX Control Remote Code Execution
Adobe Reader Collab ‘getIcon()’ JavaScript Method Remote Code Execution
Table 2. Top attacked vulnerabilities, 2009
Source: Symantec
The top Web-based attacks observed in 2009 primarily targeted vulnerabilities in Internet Explorer
and applications that process PDF files (table 3). Because these two technologies are widely deployed, it is likely that attackers are targeting them to compromise the largest number of computers possible. As is discussed in the “Web browser vulnerabilities” discussion in this report, Mozilla® Firefox® had the most
reported vulnerabilities in 2009, with 169, while internet Explorer had just 45, yet internet Explorer was
still the most attacked browser. this shows that attacks on software are not necessarily based on the
number of vulnerabilities in a piece of software, but on its market share and the availability of exploit code as well.
16
15 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-symc_report_on_rogue_security_software_Wp_20100385.en-us.pdf
16 http://marketshare.hitslink.com/browser-market-share.aspx?qprid=0TweetSymantec Global internet Security threat report
112009
1
23
4
56
78
9
102008
21
N/A
64
14
5
20
N/A
N/AAttackPercentage Overall Rank
PDF Suspicious File DownloadMicrosoft Internet Explorer ADODB.Stream Object File Installation WeaknessMicrosoft Internet Explorer 7 Uninitialized Memory Code Execution
Microsoft Internet Explorer MS Snapshot ActiveX File Download
Adobe SWF Remote Code ExecutableMicrosoft Internet Explorer Malformed XML Buffer Overflow
Microsoft Internet Explorer DHTML CreateControlRange Code ExecutableMicrosoft Internet Explorer WPAD Spoofing
Microsoft MPEG2TuneRequestControl ActiveX Buffer Overflow
Microsoft MPEG2TuneRequestControl ActiveX Instantiation2009
49%
18%
6%
4%
3%3%
3%3%
2%
1%2008
11%
30%
N/A
5%7%1%
6%1%
N/A
N/A
Table 3. Top Web-based attacks
Source: Symantec
Many of the vulnerabilities observed through Web-based attacks in 2009 have been known and patched for
some time. For example, the Microsoft internet Explorer ADODB.Stream Object File installation Weakness17
was published on August 23, 2003, and fixes have been available since July 2, 2004, yet it remains the second-ranked Web-based attack. this is likely because of the use of Web attack kits like Fragus,
18
Eleonore,19 and neosploit.20 these kits come bundled with a variety of different exploits, including some
exploits for older vulnerabilities. Because an older vulnerability is likely to be included in more kits, it will probably be seen in more attacks than many of the newer vulnerabilities. these exploit and attack kits are
often frequently used in conjunction with some of the crimeware kits available in the underground economy, as is discussed in the next section.
Lowering the bar
A crimeware kit is a toolkit that allows people to customize a piece of malicious code designed to steal data and other personal information. the Zeus
21 kit can be purchased for as low as $700, but can also
be found for free on some forums.22 these kits can be bought in the underground economy and various
Web forums. Crimeware kits like Zeus make it easier for unskilled attackers to compromise computers
and steal information.23 these kits allow anyone who buys them to customize them to their own needs.
In 2009, Symantec observed nearly 90,000 unique variants of the basic Zeus toolkit and it was the second most common new malicious code family observed in the Ap J region during this time.
Variants of the Zeus kit use spam to lure users to a website that uses social engineering or that exploits a Web browser vulnerability to install the bot on a victim’s computer. the bot then allows remote access to
the computer and can be used to steal information such as the user’s online banking credentials. Each bot can then be used to send additional spam runs to compromise new users.
17 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10514/discuss
18 http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid=23391
19 http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid=23481
20 http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid=23588
21 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-011016-3514-99
22 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/zeus_king_of_bots.pdf : p. 1
23 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/zeus-king-underground-crimeware-toolkitsTweet
TweetSymantec Global internet Security threat report
12these kits have gained enough popularity among cybercriminals that competition and new business models
have arisen. For example, the SpyEye kit, in addition to stealing information, also has the ability to detect if a computer already has Zeus installed and, if so, to intercept its communications.
24 in another example, the
Fragus exploit kit contains mechanisms to prevent buyers from reselling their copies of it.25
A side effect of these kits is the creation of tens of thousands of new malicious code variants that may only each be seen by a single user. in 2009, Symantec observed nearly 90,000 unique variants of binary files
created by the Zeus toolkit. Approximately 57 percent of threat instances that Symantec protected its customers from via reputation-based techniques corresponded to singletons.
26 this suggests that security
technologies that rely on signatures should be complemented with heuristics, behavioral monitoring techniques, and reputation-based security.
the lowering of barriers for neophyte attackers to enter into the cybercrime realm is evident in the increase
in malicious code that steals confidential information. For example, the percentage of threats to confidential information that incorporate remote access capabilities increased to 98 percent in 2009, from 83 percent in 2008 (figure 2). One reason for the popularity of this attack vector is that there is an increasing number of people performing online banking. For instance, in the United Kingdom and France, more than 50 percent of internet users perform online banking, while in Canada the number rises to 60 percent.
27 in the United
States, eight out of 10 online households now bank online.28 in addition, with the availability of online
banking continuing to grow, there is no shortage of potential victims. these factors helped to contribute to
the over $120 million in reported losses due to online banking fraud reported in the third quarter of 2009.29
Exports system dataExports email addresses Keystroke loggerAllows remote access
83%
78%98%
89%
PeriodPercentage of exposure threats
Exports user data
2009 200865%76%
61%78% 86%
72%
Figure 2. Threats to confidential information, by type
Source: Symantec
24 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/spyeye-bot-versus-zeus-bot
25 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/fragus-exploit-kit-changes-business-model
26 Singletons are file instances that are seen on only one computer.
27 See http://www.ukpayments.org.uk/media_centre/press_releases/-/page/871/ and http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=2524
28 https://www.javelinstrategy.com/research/brochures/brochure-150
29 http://ecommerce-journal.com/news/27287_online-banking-fraud-hovered-120-million-third-quarter-2009-fdci-reportsSymantec Global internet Security threat report
13No financial crisis for cybercriminals
A number of large financial institutions in many countries were severely affected by the latest global
financial crisis, resulting in some banks being acquired or merging with others. the downturn, though, does
not appear to have hindered the underground economy or cybercrime targeting financial services in any significant way. in 2009, the financial sector remained the sector most heavily targeted by phishing attacks,
accounting for 74 percent of the brands used in phishing campaigns (table 4). the next closest sector was
internet service providers, at only 9 percent. this indicates that phishing financial services brands
continues to be lucrative for attackers or they would likely have abandoned it in favor of other targets.
Sector
Financial
ISPRetail
Insurance
Internet communityTelecomComputer hardware
Government
Computer software
Transportation2009 Percentage
74%
9%
6%
3%
2%2%1%
1%
<1%<1%2008 Percentage
79%
8%
4%
2%
2%2%1%
1%
<1%<1%
Table 4. Unique brands phished, by sector
Source: Symantec
the volume of financial services spam also remained relatively unchanged in 2009 (figure 3). While the
levels of financially oriented spam and phishing have remained relatively constant despite the recent economic downturn, attackers have made adjustments in their tactics. For example, Symantec observed more messages advertising refinancing of debts and mortgages along with offers of loans or opportunities to earn money while working from home. this shows that attackers are able to rapidly adapt their social
engineering techniques to better take advantage of current events and situations.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
142008
Leisure
ScamsPolitical15%1%
8%7%5% 5%
19% 16%7%24%
29%
17%5%
2%
3%
15%
2009
InternetHealthFraud
FinancialCommercial productsAdult“419” type15%7%
Figure 3. Top spam categories
Source: Symantec
While financial phishing and spam did not experience significant changes in 2009, the percentage of
advertisements for credit card information on underground economy servers decreased (table 5). Although the drop from 32 percent in 2008 to 19 percent in 2009 appears to be significant, the percentage observed in 2007 was 21 percent, which may indicate that there was higher availability of credit card numbers on underground economy servers in 2008. the number of data breaches reported in those years is a further
indication of this. there were over twice as many data breaches reported in 2008 than in 2007. Similarly,
there were almost twice as many data breaches reported in 2008 than there were in 2009.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
152009
1
23
4
56
78
9
102008
123
4
96
13
78
12ItemPercentage
Range of PricesOverall Rank
Credit card informationBank account credentialsEmail accounts
Email addresses
Shell scriptsFull identities
Credit card dumpsMailers
Cash-out services
Website administration credentials2009
19%
19%
7%
7%
6%5%
5%4%
4%
4%
2008
32%
19%
5%
5%
3%4%
2%3%
3%
3%$0.85–$30
$15–$850$1–$20
$1.70/MB–$15/MB
$2–$5$0.70–$20
$4–$150$4–$10
$0–$600 plus 50%–60%
$2–$30
Table 5. Goods and services advertised on underground economy servers
Source: Symantec
While there was a decline in credit card advertisements in 2009, it is likely that they will continue to be
a significant factor in the underground economy. With the wide availability of the previously mentioned crimeware kits, it is becoming easier for neophytes to operate in the online underground economy. this
will likely increase the availability of credit cards on underground economy servers.
Conclusion
As government agencies and industries in many countries increase their efforts to combat malicious code activity, that activity is increasingly shifting to emerging countries with rapidly growing internet
infrastructures. Meanwhile, some emerging countries may experience an even greater influx of malicious activity due to the aforementioned increased ease of mounting attacks for neophyte cybercriminals. that
said, it is critical to note that, just because attackers are relocating malicious activities such as phishing hosts, bot networks, and spam zombies to other countries, these attacks can still be directed at targets anywhere worldwide.
targeted attacks against enterprises have been occurring for some time now. However, during 2009 a
large-scale targeted attack occurred that brought these types of incidents into the spotlight.
30 the wide-
scale reporting of this attack impelled many organizations to re-examine their security postures and
mitigation strategies against zero-day vulnerabilities.31 Symantec believes it is likely that targeted attacks
of this nature will continue to play a large part in the threat landscape in the near future.
Financially motivated attacks against both enterprises and individuals remain a large part of the threat
landscape. the underground economy continues to flourish even while the mainstream economy begins
recovering from the financial crisis. Many cybercriminals have shifted their efforts toward creating kits they can sell to new entrants in the underground economy. this enables relatively inexperienced attackers
with little technical knowledge to mount attacks without too much difficulty. As these developments make it easier for more attackers to enter into the online underground economy, Symantec expects attacks against Web browsers and malicious code variants installed through these attacks to increase. this
increases the importance of reputation-based security techniques and other technologies that act to catch malicious code beyond simple signature-based detection.
30 http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html
31 http://www.informationweek.com/news/services/disaster_recovery/showArticle.jhtml?articleiD=222301351Symantec Global internet Security threat report
16Highlights
Threat Activity Trends Highlights
• In 2009, the United States had the most overall malicious activity measured by Symantec, with
19 percent of the total; this is a decrease from 23 percent in 2008, when the United States also ranked first.
the United States was the top country of attack origin in 2009, accounting for 23 percent of worldwide •
activity; this is a decrease from 25 percent in 2008.
• The top Web-based attack in 2009 was associated with malicious PDF activity, which accounted for
49 percent of the total.
• The United States was the top country of origin for Web-based attacks in 2009, accounting for 34 percent of the worldwide total.
• The education sector accounted for 20 percent of data breaches that could lead to identity theft during this period, more than any other sector; this is a decrease from 27 percent in 2008, when it was also the highest ranked sector for data breaches.
the financial sector was the top sector for identities exposed in 2009, accounting for 60 percent of the •
total; this is a significant increase from 29 percent in 2008.
• In 2009 physical theft or loss accounted for 37 percent of data breaches that could lead to identity
theft—a decrease from 48 percent in 2008.
• Hacking accounted for 60 percent of the identities exposed in 2009, a marked increase from 22 percent in 2008.
Symantec observed an average of 46,541 active bot-infected computers per day in 2009; this is a •
38 percent decrease from the 75,158 per day average observed in 2008. Symantec observed 6,798,338 distinct bot-infected computers during this period; this is a 28 percent •
decrease from 2008.the United States was the country of the most bot-infected computers observed by Symantec in 2009, •
accounting for 11 percent of the global total—a slight decrease from 12 percent in 2008.taipei was the city with the most bot-infected computers in 2009, accounting for 5 percent of the •
worldwide total.in 2009 Symantec identified 17,432 distinct new bot command-and-control servers, an increase from •
15,197 in 2008; of these, 31 percent operated through irC channels and 69 percent used Http .
the United States was the country with the most bot command-and-control servers in 2009, with •
34 percent of the total observed by Symantec; this is an increase from 33 percent in 2008, when the
United States also ranked first.
the United States was again the country most frequently targeted by denial-of-service attacks in 2009, •
accounting for 56 percent of the worldwide total—an increase from 51 percent in 2008.Tweet
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17Vulnerability Trends Highlights
Symantec documented 4,501 vulnerabilities in 2009. this is a decrease from the 5,491 vulnerabilities •
documented in 2008.
• Mozilla Firefox was affected by 169 new vulnerabilities in 2009, more than any other browser;
there were 94 new vulnerabilities identified in Apple® Safari®, 45 in Microsoft internet Explorer,
41 in Google® Chrome and 25 in Opera™.
Of the 374 vulnerabilities documented in Web browsers in 2009, 14 percent remain unpatched by the •
vendors at the time of writing. Of the 232 Web browser vulnerabilities documented in 2008, 18 percent
remain unpatched.
• Of all browsers Symantec analyzed in 2009, Safari had the longest window of exposure (the time between the release of exploit code for a vulnerability and a vendor releasing a patch), with a 13-day average; Internet Explorer, Firefox, and Opera had the shortest windows of exposure in
2009, averaging less than one day each.
• There were 321 browser plug-in vulnerabilities identified in 2009, fewer than the 410 identified in 2008. ActiveX technologies still constituted the majority of new browser plug-in vulnerabilities, with 134; however, this is a 53 percent decrease from the 287 ActiveX vulnerabilities identified in 2008.
the top attacked vulnerability for 2009 was the Microsoft Windows® SMB2 •
‘_Smb2ValidateproviderCallback()’ remote Code Execution Vulnerability.
• In 2009, Symantec documented 12 zero-day vulnerabilities, compared to nine in 2008.
Malicious Code Trends Highlights
• Symantec created 2,895,802 new malicious code signatures in 2009, a 71 percent increase over
2008; the 2009 figure represents 51 percent of all malicious code signatures ever created by Symantec.
Of the top 10 new malicious code families detected in 2009, six were trojans, two were worms with •
back door components, one was a worm, and one was a virus.
• Trojans made up 51 percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code samples reported in 2009,
a decrease from 68 percent in 2008.
Four of the top 10 staged downloaders in 2009 were trojans, two were worms that incorporated a •
back door component, three were worms, and one was a worm that incorporated a virus component.in 2009, eight of the top 10 threat components downloaded by modular malicious software were •
trojans, one was a worm, and one was a back door.
in 2009, the proportional increase of potential malicious code infections was greatest in the Europe, •
the Middle East, and Africa region.
• The percentage of threats to confidential information that incorporate remote access capabilities
increased to 98 percent in 2009, a significant increase from 83 percent in 2008.
in 2009, 89 percent of threats to confidential information exported user data and 86 percent had •
a keystroke-logging component; these are increases from 78 percent and 76 percent, respectively,
in 2008.Tweet
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18in 2009 propagation through file-sharing executables accounted for 72 percent of malicious code that •
propagates—up from 66 percent in 2008.
the percentage of documented malicious code samples that exploit vulnerabilities increased from •
3 percent in 2008 to 6 percent in 2009.the top potential infections in 2009 were, in order, the Sality.AE virus, the Brisv trojan, and the •
SillyFDC worm.
Phishing, Underground Economy Servers, and Spam Trends Highlights
• The majority of brands used in phishing attacks in 2009 were in the financial services sector,
accounting for 74 percent, down from the 79 percent identified in 2008.
in 2009, Symantec detected 59,526 phishing hosts, an increase of 7 percent over 2008 when Symantec •
detected 55,389 phishing hosts.
• In 2009, 36 percent of all phishing URLs identified by Symantec were located in the United States,
considerably less than 2008 when 43 percent of such sites were based there.
the most common top-level domain used in phishing lures detected in 2009 was .com, accounting for •
68 percent of the total; it was also the highest ranking top-level domain in 2008 when it accounted for
39 percent of the total.
the five top phishing toolkits observed by Symantec in 2009 were responsible for a combined average •
of 23 percent of all observed phishing attacks for the year.
• Credit card information was the most commonly advertised item for sale on underground economy
servers known to Symantec, accounting for 19 percent of all goods and services advertised; this is a decrease from 2008 when credit card information accounted for 32 percent of the total.
• Credit card information was advertised on underground economy servers known to Symantec for $0.85 to $30 per credit card number, depending on factors such as bulk purchase sizes, rarity of the card type, and the amount of personal information bundled with the card number.
the United States was the top country for credit cards advertised on underground economy servers, •
accounting for 67 percent of the total; this is unchanged from 2008.
• The most common type of spam detected in 2009 was related to Internet-related goods and services
such as online degrees, which made up 29 percent of all detected spam; in 2008, this was also the most common type of spam, accounting for 24 percent of the total.
in 2009, spam made up 88 percent of all email observed by Symantec.•
in 2009, the United States was again the top-ranked country for originating spam, with 23 percent •
of the global total. this is a decrease from 29 percent in 2008.
• In 2009, bot networks were responsible for the distribution of approximately 85 percent of all
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19Threat Activity Trends
this section of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report will provide an analysis of threat
activity, as well as other malicious activity, data breaches, and Web-based attacks that Symantec observed
in 2009. the malicious activity discussed in this section not only includes threat activity, but also phishing
hosts, malicious code, spam zombies, bot-infected computers, and bot command-and-control (C&C) server activity. Attacks are defined as any malicious activity carried out over a network that has been detected by an intrusion detection system (iDS), intrusion prevention system (ipS), or firewall. Definitions for the other types of malicious activities can be found in their respective sections within this report.
this section will discuss the following metrics, providing analysis and discussion of the trends indicated by
the data:
Malicious activity by country •
Web-based attacks•
Countries of origin for Web-based attacks•
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft, by sector•
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft, by cause•
Bot-infected computers•
threat activity—protection and mitigation•
Malicious activity by country
this metric will assess the countries in which the largest amount of malicious activity takes place or originates. to determine this, Symantec has compiled geographical data on numerous malicious activities,
including bot-infected computers, phishing hosts, malicious code reports, spam zombies, and attack origin. the rankings are determined by calculating the average of the proportion of these malicious activities that originated in each country.
in 2009, the United States was again the top country for overall malicious activity observed by Symantec,
making up 19 percent of the total (table 6), a decrease from 2008 when the United States had 23 percent of the total. Within specific category measurements, the United States maintained first rank in malicious code, phishing hosts, bot C&C servers, and originating attacks.
2009
1
23
4
5
6
7
89
102008
1
25
3
11
4
1210
76CountryPercentage2009 Activity Rank
Overall Rank
United States
ChinaBrazil
Germany
India
United Kingdom
Russia
PolandItalySpain2009
19%
8%
6%
5%
4%
3%
3%
3%3%3%2008
23%
9%
4%
6%
3%
5%
2%
3%3%4%Malicious
Code
1
35
21
2
4
12231614Spam
Zombies
6
81
7
3
19
2
49
11Phishing
Hosts
1
6
12
2
21
75
8
1811Bots
1
23
5
2014
19
8
67
Attack
Origin
1
26
3
18
4
10
17
8
9
Table 6. Malicious activity by country
Source: Symantec Symantec Global internet Security threat report
20the decreased proportion of overall malicious activity for the United States is attributable to increased
activity in other countries and to its lower percentage for spam zombies. this is similar to the decrease in
2008, as discussed in Volume XiV of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report.32 in 2009, the
Federal trade Commission shut down an internet service provider (iSp) that was known to host or actively
distribute malicious code, bot C&C servers, and illegal pornography, among other content.33
One of the botnets linked to this iSp was pandex (a.k.a., Cutwail).34 this botnet was responsible for as
much as 35 percent of spam observed globally before dropping to 8 percent after the iSp was shut down.35
Spam zombies that lack a critical command system are unable to send out spam. Additionally, a security researcher allegedly attacked and disabled 250,000 computers associated with the Ozdok (a.k.a., Mega-D) botnet.
36 the volume of spam sent by both botnets recovered several days afterwards because unaffected
zombies were instructed to significantly increase their spam output, indicating that these events may have been a large factor in the decrease of spam zombies in the United States.
China had the second highest amount of overall worldwide malicious activity in 2009, accounting for
8 percent of the total; this is a decrease from 9 percent in 2008. China’s rankings within most specific category measurements remained consistent with those of 2008, except for spam zombies. For example, its rank for phishing hosts and attack origin remained unchanged, while its rank for malicious code and bot-infected computers dropped by one place for each. For spam zombies, China dropped from fourth in 2008 to eighth in 2009.
China’s rank may decline further in 2010 because of an enhanced domain registration procedure
introduced by China’s internet network information Center (CnniC) on December 11, 2009.
37 the changes
require domain applications to include paper copies of the application form, the official business seal, and the registrant’s personal identification. prior to this change, registrants could register a .cn domain in the
guise of a legitimate company and send spam from that domain, which could be interpreted by the spam recipient as coming from a legitimate source. Early observations indicate that the daily volume of spam originating from .cn domains fluctuated around 20 percent after the changes were implemented, down from an average of around 40 percent prior to the changes.
Brazil ranked third for malicious activity in 2009 with 6 percent of the total. this is an increase from
4 percent in 2008 and is the first time since Symantec introduced this metric in 2006 that a country other
than the United States, China, or Germany has ranked in the top three. Brazil became more prominent in all of the specific category measurements except for spam zombies, where it was already the top-ranked country. Brazil’s significant increases across all categories are related to the growing internet infrastructure
and broadband usage there, as has been discussed in previous versions of the Symantec Global Internet
Security Threat Report.
38
32 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiv_04-2009.en-us.pdf : p. 18
33 http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/06/3fn.shtm
34 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-042001-1448-99
35 http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com.au/articles/32685-rogue-iSp -shutdown-slows-spam-torrent
36 See http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-021215-0628-99,
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2009/111009-fireeye-moves-quickly-to-quash.html, and http://blog.fireeye.com/research/2009/11/smashing-the-ozdok.html
37 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/drop-cn-spam
38 http://www.point-topic.comSymantec Global internet Security threat report
21Brazil’s rise as a source of malicious activity to third place in 2009 was mainly due to a significant increase
in its ranking for malicious code, for which it rose up to fifth in 2009 from 16th in 2008. One possible reason for the large increase in malicious code ranking for Brazil was the Downadup (a.k.a., Conficker) worm.
39 this worm drew a lot of attention in late 2008 and early 2009 by infecting a large number of
computers worldwide. Brazil was one of the most affected countries, ranking fourth for countries by number of Downadup infections. One explanation for the success of Downadup in Brazil is that it is able to specifically target certain regions based on the identification of the language setting of the computer, one of which is was “p ortuguese (Brazilian).”
40
in addition, Brazil ranked third globally for potential infections by viruses and fourth for potential infections by worms. these rankings represent large increases from previous reporting periods. Brazil
has been a major source of successful malicious code that steals banking information, and some very successful malicious code that has originated from Brazil remains active.
41 For example, the Bancos
trojan was first discovered there in 2003 and was still one of the top 50 malicious code samples for
potential infections in 2009, mainly due to the continuous release of new variants.42
the growing level of malicious code activity affecting Brazil has resulted in the proposal of a new cybercrime bill in the country.
43 the initiative may also be a result of a number high-profile cyber attacks
there in recent years.44 One of the attacks resulted in a massive power grid blackout, while another
resulted in the exposure of valuable data and a $350,000 ransom request after a government website was compromised, which also resulted in over 3,000 employees being unable to access the site for 24 hours.
in previous reports, Symantec has observed and discussed indications that countries such as Brazil,
turkey, poland, india, and russia would continue to increase their overall share of malicious activity
because of their rapidly growing broadband populations and expanding internet infrastructures.
45 this
trend has continued and, with the exception of turkey ranking 12th, these countries now all rank in the
top 10 for malicious activity. Even though it dropped in ranking, and despite increases in the malicious code and phishing hosts categories, turkey’s decrease is attributed mostly to larger increases in overall
malicious activity in russia, india, and poland. these countries may continue to account for larger
percentages within specific categories because their relatively new and growing internet infrastructures
could be exposed to increasing levels of malicious activity until security protocols and measures mature enough to counter these activities. the United States and China account for large enough percentages
within specific category measurements that they will likely continue to outrank other countries for overall malicious activity unless there are fundamental changes to internet usage governance and infrastructure.
there needs to be continued coordinated efforts among law enforcement to address malicious activity occurring globally. this is especially critical in the absence of an agreed-upon international framework for
combating cybercrime.
Finally, it is worth noting that malicious activity in countries where the overall percentage dropped, such as
the United Kingdom and Germany, was relatively consistent with previous years. the reduced percentages
for these countries in 2009 are primarily the result of the increased activity in emergent countries such as Brazil and india.
39 See http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the_downadup_codex_ed1.pdf and
http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-112203-2408-99
40 http://www.symantec.com/connect/sites/default/files/the_downadup_codex_ed1_0.pdf : p. 16
41 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/brazilian-msn-worm-looks-familiar
42 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2003-071710-2826-99
43 http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2009/07/lula-and-cybercrime
44 http://www.foreignpolicyjournal.com/2009/11/15/brazils-next-battlefield-cyberspace/
45 http://www.point-topic.comSymantec Global internet Security threat report
22Web-based Attacks
this metric will assess the top distinct Web-based attacks originating from compromised legitimate sites
and intentionally malicious sites set up to target Web users. the increasing pervasiveness of Web browser
applications along with increasingly common, easily exploited Web browser application security vulnerabilities (as noted in the “Vulnerabilities Trends” section) has resulted in the widespread growth
of Web-based threats. Attackers wanting to take advantage of client-side vulnerabilities no longer need to actively compromise specific networks to gain access to those computers. instead, they can focus on
attacking and compromising websites to mount additional, client-side attacks.
these attack types can be found globally and Symantec identifies each by an associated distinct detection
signature. Most attack types target specific vulnerabilities or weaknesses in Web browsers or other client-side applications that process content originating from the Web.
the most common Web-based attack observed in 2009 was related to malicious pDF activity,
46 which
accounted for 49 percent of Web-based attacks (table 7). this is a sizeable increase from 11 percent in
2008. Specifically, this attack consists of attempts by attackers to distribute malicious pDF content to
victims through the Web. the attack is not directly related to any specific vulnerability, although the
contents of the malicious pDF file would be designed to exploit arbitrary vulnerabilities in applications that
are able to process pDFs. Successful attacks could ultimately result in the compromise of the integrity and
security of the affected computers. this attack is assumed to be popular due to the common use and distribution of pDF documents on the
Web. in addition, browsers can be set up to automatically render a pDF document. Specific exploit activity
related to malicious pDF files was observed in 2009, including an attack that preyed on public concerns
about the H1n1 virus,
47 an attack against the Adobe reader Collab.geticon vulnerability,48 and an attack
that exploits a vulnerability in Foxit reader.49
2009
1
23
4
56
78
9
102008
21
N/A
64
14
5
20
N/A
N/AAttackPercentage Overall Rank
PDF Suspicious File DownloadMicrosoft Internet Explorer ADODB.Stream Object File Installation WeaknessMicrosoft Internet Explorer 7 Uninitialized Memory Code Execution
Microsoft Internet Explorer MS Snapshot ActiveX File Download
Adobe SWF Remote Code ExecutableMicrosoft Internet Explorer Malformed XML Buffer Overflow
Microsoft Internet Explorer DHTML CreateControlRange Code ExecutableMicrosoft Internet Explorer WPAD Spoofing
Microsoft MPEG2TuneRequestControl ActiveX Buffer Overflow
Microsoft MPEG2TuneRequestControl ActiveX Instantiation2009
49%
18%
6%
4%
3%3%
3%3%
2%
1%2008
11%
30%
N/A
5%7%1%
6%1%
N/A
N/A
Table 7. Top Web-based attacks
Source: Symantec
46 http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid=23153
47 See http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/malicious-code-authors-jump-swine-flu-bandwagon and http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/33751/info
48 See http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/yet-another-pdf-vulnerability-exploited-collabgeticon and http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/34169
49 See http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/foxit-pdf-reader-being-exploited-wild-so-now-where-do-we-go#M192 and http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/34035Symantec Global internet Security threat report
23the “Vulnerability Trends” section of this report notes that the percentage of plug-in vulnerabilities
affecting Adobe reader in comparison to the total number of browser plug-in vulnerabilities increased to
15 percent in 2009, from 4 percent in 2008 (figure 9). in the previous volume of this report, Symantec
noted that attackers are increasingly targeting Adobe reader. the large growth of Web-based attacks using
malicious pDF files and plug-in vulnerabilities affecting Adobe reader—as observed in 2009 and noted
above—indicates that this is a continuing trend. Considering that some users may be unaware of the
danger or are slow to install patches for the issue, it is reasonable to assume that attacks against existing pDF-related vulnerabilities will continue in the near future.
in 2009, the second most common Web-based attack was associated with the Microsoft internet Explorer
ADODB.Stream Object File installation Weakness,
50 which accounted for 18 percent of the global total—
a decrease from 2008 when this vulnerability accounted for 30 percent of the total during that reporting
period. this vulnerability allows attackers to install malicious files on a vulnerable computer when a
user visits a website hosting an exploit. to carry out this attack, an attacker must exploit an arbitrary
vulnerability that bypasses internet Explorer security settings. the attacker can then execute malicious
files installed by the initial security weakness. this vulnerability was disclosed on August 23, 2003, and
fixes have been available since July 2, 2004. this indicates that a large percentage of computers are not
being adequately patched in a timely manner.
in their efforts to exploit vulnerabilities, attackers not only employ manual methods, but they also
use automated tools, such as neosploit to exploit client-side vulnerabilities on a massive scale.51 Such
toolkits have become widely available and are easy enough to implement that even people with minimal technical knowledge can use them effectively. the market for these toolkits is now sophisticated enough
that updated versions are released on a development schedule, advertising the inclusion of exploits for the latest vulnerabilities while retaining previous exploits. this may well contribute to the continued
prevalence of the Microsoft internet Explorer ADODB.Stream Object File installation Weakness. Despite a
patch being released in 2004, there are still a significant number of toolkit-based attacks occurring that attempt to exploit this issue. this underlines the importance of security measures and patches that
address old issues as well as new ones.
the Microsoft internet Explorer ADODB.Stream Object File installation Weakness was the most common
Web-based attack in 2008, and the reduced activity observed in 2009 may indicate that fewer computers
are running older, susceptible versions of internet Explorer (as is discussed in the “Web browser
vulnerabilities” metric). it is reasonable to assume that the prominence of this attack will continue to
decline as more users make the switch to browser versions that are not affected by the weakness.
the third most common Web-based attack in 2009 exploited the internet Explorer 7 Uninitialized Memory
Code Execution Vulnerability,
52 accounting for 6 percent of the total. this vulnerability was published on
February 10, 2009, and fixes have been available since that time. Seven days after that date, the issue was
being actively exploited in the wild and exploit code was publicly available on February 18, 2009.
50 See http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid=50031 or http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10514
51 http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&taxonomyname=Security&articleid=9115599&taxonomyid=17&pagenumber=1
52 See http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid=23291 or http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/33627Symantec Global internet Security threat report
24An attacker can exploit this vulnerability by enticing a victim to open a malicious Web page. A successful
attack will allow an attacker to execute remote code on a victim’s computer. this vulnerability may be
appealing to attackers because, rather than relying on a plug-in that may or may not be installed on a target computer, it relies only on the use of a version of a popular browser, thereby increasing the number of potential victims.
53
Vulnerabilities such as those in the top 10 for 2009 continue to generate a large amount of observed attack activity because they can be reliably exploited on systems that are not routinely kept up to date. this makes these vulnerabilities prime candidates for automation. Despite the fact that fixes are available, as mentioned, it is likely that there are still enough unpatched systems in existence that these attacks continue to enjoy success. When attacks prove successful, they are often adopted by attack toolkits. this
can cumulatively create a large amount of observed attack activity. it is also likely that older malicious
code variants continue to attempt to automatically exploit these vulnerabilities as a means of propagation.
Countries of origin for Web-based attacks
this metric will assess the top countries of origin for Web-based attacks against users in 2009 by determining the location of computers from which the attacks occurred. note that an attacker in one
country can compromise a Web server in another country that is visited by a user from another country. therefore, the location of attacks does not dictate the location of the actual attacker, who could be located elsewhere.
Once an attacker has compromised a legitimate website, users who visit the website can be attacked by
several additional means. One method is a drive-by download, which results in the installation of malicious code without the user’s knowledge or consent.
54 Another way is to redirect the user to another website that
is hosting malicious code. Sites and servers hosting a variety of malicious exploits can be found worldwide, and multiple domains can be associated with a single compromised site that is being used to exploit one or more security vulnerabilities in affected client browsers.
Computers located in the United States were the leading source of Web-based attacks against users
globally in 2009, accounting for 34 percent of the total (table 8). this is a slight decrease from 38 percent
in 2008. Computers in the United States continue to account for a large percentage of Web-based attacks compared to other high-ranking countries. this is not surprising considering the extent of the internet
infrastructure in the country, as well as the amount of malicious activity occurring on computers there, as previously discussed in “Malicious activity by country.” Furthermore, the United States accounts for
a significant percentage of worldwide broadband usage, meaning that there are a greater number of computers that could potentially be used to launch attacks.
55 All of these factors combined to create
a convenient and established launching point for some attackers.
53 See http://marketshare.hitslink.com/browser-market-share.aspx?qprid=2 and http://www.w3schools.com/browsers/browsers_stats.asp
54 A drive-by download is any download that occurs without a user’s prior knowledge or authorization and does not require user interaction. typically, this is an
executable file.
55 http://www.point-topic.comSymantec Global internet Security threat report
25Rank
1
23
4
567
8
9
10Country
United States
ChinaBrazil
United Kingdom
RussiaGermanyIndia
Italy
Netherlands
FrancePercentage
34%
7%
4%
4%
4%4%3%
2%
2%
2%
Table 8. Top countries of origin for Web-based attacks
Source: Symantec
in 2009, 7 percent of Web attacks originated from computers in China, which is a decrease from
13 percent in 2008. As was discussed in the previous version of this report, the higher percentage in 2008 was likely due to compromised websites relating to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.
56 it is reasonable
to assume that the number of attacks from these websites has tapered off since the conclusion of the games and may be a significant factor in the decrease of Web attacks originating from computers in China in 2009.
Brazil was the third-ranked country of origin for Web-based attacks in 2009, accounting for 4 percent of
the total. While there were no noteworthy high-profile Web-based attacks in Brazil in 2009, the amount of overall malicious activity increased significantly, particularly in regards to malicious code. Web-based attacks are an effective means of installing malicious code on the computers of unsuspecting users, indicating that the increase in malicious activity in Brazil may be closely related to increases in Web-based attacks originating there. Furthermore, the growth in bot-infected computers in Brazil may also have been a contributing factor because bots are commonly used to launch Web-based attacks.
Web-based attacks are a major threat to computer networks for both enterprises and consumers. the
covert nature of these types of attacks (such as drive-by downloads) makes them very difficult to protect
against because most users are unaware that they are being attacked. Organizations are thus confronted with the complicated task of having to detect and filter attack traffic from legitimate traffic. Since many organizations now rely on Web-based tools and applications to conduct business, it is likely that the Web will continue to be the primary conduit for attack activity favored by malicious code developers. to avoid
the likelihood of threats, organizations can implement strong security policies and the latest software patches as well as educate staff about potential security issues and how to prevent becoming a victim.
56 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiv_04-2009.en-us.pdf : p. 18Symantec Global internet Security threat report
26Data breaches that could lead to identity theft, by sector
identity theft continues to be a high-profile security issue. in a recent survey, 65 percent of U.S.-based poll
respondents said that they were either “very concerned” or “extremely concerned” about identity theft.57
Furthermore, 100 percent of enterprise-level respondents surveyed for the Symantec State of Enterprise
Security Report 2010 experienced loss or theft of data.58
the danger of data breaches is of particular importance for organizations that store and manage large
amounts of personal information. not only can compromises that result in the loss of personal data
undermine customer and institutional confidence, result in costly damage to an organization’s reputation, and result in identity theft that may be costly for individuals to recover from, they can also be financially debilitating to organizations.
59 in 2009, the average cost per incident of a data breach in the United States
was $6.75 million, which is slightly higher than the average for 2008. Considering that the average cost per incident has also been rising in recent years (having risen from $4.5 million in 2005, for example), it is reasonable to assume that average costs will continue to rise in coming years. reported costs of lost
business ranged from $750,000 to $31 million.
60
Using publicly available data, Symantec has determined the sectors that were most often affected by these breaches and the most common causes of data loss.
61 Using the same publicly available data, this
discussion will also explore the severity of the breach in question by measuring the total number of identities exposed to attackers.
62
it should be noted that some sectors might need to comply with more stringent reporting requirements for data breaches than others. For instance, government organizations are more likely to report data breaches, either due to regulatory obligations or in conjunction with publicly accessible audits and performance reports.
63 Conversely, organizations that rely on consumer confidence may be less inclined to report such
breaches for fear of negative consumer, industry, or market reaction. As a result, sectors that are not required or encouraged to report data breaches may be under-represented in this data set.
the education sector accounted for the highest number of known data breaches that could lead to identity
theft, accounting for 20 percent of the total (figure 4). this was a decrease from 27 percent in 2008 when
the education sector also ranked first.
57 http://arstechnica.com/security/news/2009/10/americans-fear-online-robberies-more-than-meatspace-muggings.ars
58 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/presskits/SES_report_Feb2010.pdf
59 http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/11/pos?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+wired%2Findex+%28Wired%3A+
index+3+%28t op+Stories+2%29%29
60 http://www.encryptionreports.com/download/p onemon_COB_2009_US.pdf
61 Open Security Foundation (OSF) Dataloss DB, see http://datalossdb.org
62 An identity is considered to be exposed if personal or financial data related to the identity is made available through the data breach.
63 please see http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs6a-facta.htm and http://www.cms.hhs.gov/HealthplansGeninfo/12_Hip AA.aspSymantec Global internet Security threat report
27Data breaches Identities exposed4%
Health careEducation
GovernmentFinancial Computer software
HospitalityManufacturing Insurance
OtherLaw enforcement
MilitaryInformation technolog y
Arts/media
Business consultingBiotech /pharmaceuticalAdministration /human resources
Computer hardwareCommunity /non-profitRetail/wholesale
Telecom
TransportationReal estate
Utilities/ ener gy 2%
2%2%3%
10%2%3%2%
10%
20%<1%
<1%
<1%35%
10%
15%<1%2%3%
2%
2%
2%
1%
1%
1%1%
<1%
13%60%
Figure 4. Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by sector and identities exposed by sector64
Source: Based on data provided by OSF DataLoss DB
institutions in the education sector often store a wide range of personal information belonging to students,
faculty, and staff. this information may include government-issued identification numbers, names, or
addresses that could be used for the purposes of identity theft. Finance departments in these institutions also store bank account information for payroll purposes and may hold credit card information for people who use this method to pay for tuition and fees. these institutions—particularly larger universities—
often consist of many autonomous departments. Sensitive personal identification information held by these individual departments may be stored in separate locations and be accessible to many people using separate and distinct control systems. Educational institutions are faced with the difficult task of standardizing and enforcing security across dispersed locations, as well as educating everyone with access to the data on the security policies. this may increase the opportunities for an attacker to gain
unauthorized access to data because there are multiple points of potential security weakness or failure.
64 Due to rounding, percentages might not equal 100 percent.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
28Although the education sector accounted for the largest percentage of data breaches in 2009, those
breaches accounted for less than 1 percent of all identities exposed during the reporting period and ranked fourth (figure 4). this is similar to 2008, when a significant percentage of breaches affected
the education sector but only accounted for 4 percent of all identities exposed that year. this is mainly
attributed to the relatively small size of databases at educational institutions compared to those in the financial or government sectors. Each year, even the largest universities in the United States only account for students and faculty numbering in the tens of thousands, whereas financial and government institutions store information on millions of people.
65 As such, data breaches in those sectors can result
in much larger numbers of exposed identities.
in 2009, the health care sector ranked second, accounting for 15 percent of data breaches that could lead
to identity theft. in 2008, this sector also accounted for 15 percent, but ranked third. this rise in rank is
most likely due to the decreased percentage of breaches that could lead to identity theft in the government sector. the health care sector accounted for less than 1 percent of exposed identities in 2009—a decrease
from 5 percent in 2008. Like the education sector, health care institutions store data for a relatively small number of patients and staff compared to some organizations in the financial and government sectors.
Additionally, health care organizations often store information that may be more sensitive than that stored
by organizations in other sectors and this may be a factor in the implementation of certain regulatory measures. For instance, as of 2010, greater responsibility for data breaches will be enforced for health care organizations in United States because of regulations introduced by the Health information
technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act (HitECH).
66
the government sector accounted for 13 percent of breaches that could lead to identity theft in 2009 and ranked third. this is a decrease from 20 percent in 2008 when the government sector ranked second.
Although the percentage of these breaches has decreased in recent years, they account for a larger percentage of exposed identities. in 2009, data breaches in the government sector exposed 35 percent
of reported identities exposures, an increase from 17 percent in 2008.
the increase in percentage of identity exposures in the government sector is primarily due to a breach
attributed to insecure policy from the national Archives and records Administration in the United States.
67
A faulty hard drive containing unencrypted personal information on 76 million military veterans was sent to a third-party electronics recycler without first removing the data. this was the largest ever exposure of
personal information by the United States government. Earlier in 2009, another hard drive belonging to the national Archives and records Administration was either lost or stolen; it is believed to have contained
highly sensitive information about White House and Secret Service operating procedures, as well as data on more than 100,000 officials from the Clinton administration.
68
the financial sector was subject to one of the most notable data breaches reported in 2009. this sector
ranked fifth for breaches with 10 percent of the total, but accounted for the largest number of identities exposed with 60 percent. the majority of this percentage was the result of a successful hacking attack on a
single credit card payment processor.
69 the attackers gained access to the company’s payment processing
network using an SQL-injection attack. they then installed malicious code designed to gather sensitive
information from the network on the compromised computers, which also allowed them to easily access the network at their convenience. the attack resulted in the theft of approximately 130 million credit card
65 http://www.osu.edu/osutoday/stuinfo.php
66 http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_hb4365/is_21_42/ai_n47569144/
67 http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/10/probe-targets-archives-handling-of-data-on-70-million-vets/
68 http://fcw.com/Articles/2009/05/20/Web-nArA-missing-hard-drive.aspx
69 http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2009/01/payment_processor_breach_may_b.htmlSymantec Global internet Security threat report
29numbers. An investigation began when the company began receiving reports of fraudulent activity on credit
cards that the company itself had processed. the attackers were eventually tracked down and charged by
federal authorities.
notably, one of the hackers was Albert “Segvec” Gonzalez, who had been previously convicted of other
attacks. He plead guilty to 19 counts of conspiracy, wire fraud and aggravated identity theft charges in March 2010 and was sentenced to serve up to 25 years in prison. He had also worked as an FBi informant at one point, providing information about the underground economy.
70 these attacks and the events
surrounding them were discussed previously in the Symantec Report on the Underground Economy.71
this attack is evidence of the significant role that malicious code can play in data breaches. Although data breaches occur due to a number of causes, the covert nature of malicious code is an efficient and enticing means for attackers to remotely acquire sensitive information. Furthermore, the frequency of malicious code threats that expose confidential information, which is discussed in the “Threats to confidential
information” metric, underscores the significance of identity theft to attackers who author and deploy malicious code.
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft, by cause
the primary cause of data breaches, across all sectors, that could facilitate identity theft in 2009 was the theft or loss of a computer or other medium on which data is stored or transmitted, such as a USB key or a back-up medium.
72 theft or loss made up 37 percent of all data breaches in 2009, a decrease from the
previous reporting period when it accounted for 48 percent of all reported breaches (figure 5).
Data breaches Identities exposedTheft/loss 37%Fraud 2%Insider 9%
Hacking 15%
Insecure policy 26%Unknown 11%Theft/loss 4%
Hacking 60%Insider <1%
Unknown <1%
Insecure policy 35%Fraud <1%
Figure 5. Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by cause and identities exposed73
Source: Based on data provided by OSF DataLoss DB
70 See http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/12/gonzalez-heartland-plea/ and http://yro.slashdot.org/article.pl?sid=10/03/26/124256
71 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_underground_economy_report_11-2008-14525717.en-us.pdf
72 this cause will be referred to as “theft or loss” for the remainder of the report.
73 Due to rounding, percentages might not equal 100 percent. Symantec Global internet Security threat report
30Despite the significant percentage of reported breaches, theft or loss accounted for only 4 percent of all
identities exposed in 2009 (figure 5). this was a large decrease from 2008, when the number of identities
exposed from theft or loss accounted for 66 percent of the total. this is a dramatic decrease in identities
exposed; however, as was discussed in the previous version of this report, the three largest data breaches reported in 2008 resulted from lost or missing disks and exposed personal information relating to an estimated 41 million people. therefore, this decrease is primarily due to the lack of large-scale identity
exposures by theft or loss as well as the large-scale increases to exposed identities due to insecure policy.
insecure policy was the second most common cause of data breaches across all sectors that could lead to
identity theft in 2009, accounting for 26 percent of all incidents. A data breach is considered to be caused by insecure policy if it can be attributed to a failure to develop, implement, and/or comply with adequate security policy. this is an increase from 21 percent in 2008, when insecure policy also ranked second.
the increase in exposed identities was much more significant. insecure policy accounted for the second
largest number of exposed identities in 2009, with 35 percent of the total. this is a significant increase
from 2008, when insecure policy accounted for only 8 percent of exposed identities. this is primarily
attributed to the breach of national Archives and records Administration data that was discussed above.
that incident alone exposed 76 million identities, which is much greater than the combined exposures due to insecure policy that were reported in 2008, totaling only 6.5 million.
74
the third most common cause of data breaches that could lead to identity theft in 2009 was hacking, which accounted for 15 percent of the total. A data breach is considered to be caused by hacking if data related to identity theft was exposed by attackers external to an organization gaining unauthorized access to computers or networks. Hacking also ranked third in 2008 for breaches that could facilitate identity theft, when it accounted for 17 percent of the total.
Hacking was the leading source for reported identities exposed in 2009, increasing substantially to
60 percent of the total, from 22 percent in 2008. For this discussion, Symantec considers hacking to be an intentional act with to the objective of stealing data that can be used for purposes of identity theft or other fraud. Attackers can take advantage of site-specific and Web-application vulnerabilities to gain access to networks and steal personal information. this is exemplified by the attack on the credit card
payment processor, discussed above, that used malicious code to steal approximately 130 million credit card numbers. this breach is also the primary reason that hacking as a cause for reported identities
exposed surged as much as it did in 2009.
Bot-infected computers
Bots are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s computer to allow an attacker to remotely control the targeted computer through a communication channel, such as internet relay chat (irC),
peer-to-peer (p2p), or Http . these channels allow the remote attacker to control a large number of
compromised computers over a single, reliable channel in a botnet, which can then be used to launch coordinated attacks.
74 http://datalossdb.orgSymantec Global internet Security threat report
31Bots allow for a wide range of functionality and most can be updated to assume increased functionality by
downloading new code and features. Attackers can use bots to perform a variety of tasks, such as setting up denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against an organization’s website, distributing spam and phishing attacks, distributing spyware and adware, propagating malicious code, and harvesting confidential information that may be used in identity theft from compromised computers—all of which can lead to serious financial and legal consequences. Attackers favor bot-infected computers with a decentralized C&C model because they are difficult to disable and allow the attackers to hide in plain site among the massive amounts of unrelated traffic occurring over the same communication channels, such as p2p.
Most importantly, botnet operations can be lucrative for their controllers because bots are also inexpensive and relatively easy to propagate.
in 2009, Symantec observed underground economy advertisements for as little as $0.03 per bot. this is
similar to 2008, when $0.04 was the cheapest price advertised for bots. it should be noted that botnets
generally consist of large numbers of bot-infected computers and despite the low cost per bot, they are
typically sold in bulk lots ranging from hundreds to tens-of-thousands of bots per lot, meaning that the actual cost of a botnet is significantly higher than the per-bot price.
A bot-infected computer is considered active on a given day if it carries out at least one attack on that
day. this does not have to be continuous; rather, a single such computer can be active on a number of
different days. A distinct bot-infected computer is a distinct computer that was active at least once during the period. in 2009, Symantec observed an average of 46,541 active bot-infected computers
per day (figure 6), which is a 38 percent decrease from 2008. Symantec also observed 6,798,338 distinct bot-infected computers during this period, which is a 28 percent decrease from 2008. this decrease is
primarily considered the result of bots sending larger volumes of spam instead of propagating, as is discussed below. Another possible reason for this decrease is that some bots may be performing non-typical activity that is not being monitored.
DateActive bot-infected computers
Apr 5, 2008 Jul 5, 2008 Oct 4, 2008 Jan 3, 2009020,00040,00060,00080,000100,000120,000
Apr 4, 2009 Jul 4, 2009 Oct 3, 2009 Jan 5, 20084 per . moving averageMedian daily
active bots
Dec 31, 2009
Figure 6. Active bot-infected computers, by day
Source: SymantecSymantec Global internet Security threat report
32the Downadup worm, which first appeared late in 2008, attracted a lot of attention in the first half of 2009
because it was used to rapidly create a large botnet. this contributed significantly to daily activity levels
observed during this reporting period, particularly at the beginning of the year. the increase in active bots
per day is also indicative of the predicted growth and recovery of several prominent botnets—Srizbi,75
rustock,76 Ozdok, and pandex—following the shutdown of two U.S.-based Web hosting companies late in
2008.77 the Web hosts were allegedly hosting large numbers of C&C servers and there was a noticeable
decline in botnet activity following the shutdowns. As these botnets recovered and grew, so did their levels of technical sophistication. this was apparent when, following the shutdown of two other botnet hosts in
2009 and a subsequent decrease in spam levels, the volume of spam returned to normal soon afterward, indicating that the botnet controllers had implemented contingency plans in case of shutdown.
the dip in activity between March and July 2009 coincides in part with the release of two Downadup
variants as well as with increased spam output from the pandex botnet. the first of the Downadup
variants, Downadup.B,
78 was released in March and lacked a propagation routine, which may have
contributed to the downward slope toward April, until the release of the second variant, Downadup.C,79
which did include a propagation routine. the increased spam output by pandex, one of the most prominent
botnets following the previously mentioned iSp shutdowns in 2008, was likely achieved at the expense of
further propagation. the increased output of spam was observed from April to June and the lack of
propagation activity may have contributed to the drop in overall botnet activity.
there are several possible contributing factors to the large decline in botnet activity that began in late
June and continued through to november. Between July and november, four notable botnets—Grum,80
Maazben,81 Festi,82 and rustock—increased their spam output volumes significantly during overlapping
one- to three-month periods.83 Additionally, Symantec observed increased spam output from the Donbot84
botnet from April to December. As mentioned, increased spam output may come at the cost of propagation activity and may have contributed to the reduced activity observed during 2009.
there were also two iSp shutdowns in 2009 that could be related to the decline. the first shutdown in late
June was the previously discussed shutdown ordered by the United States Federal trade Commission and
the second was an iSp in Latvia.
85 Both of these iSp shutdowns resulted in an immediately noticeable
reduction in spam volume, particularly from pandex; however, spam volumes returned to normal levels
within a matter of days. this may have been the result of continued increases to spam output at the cost
of propagation as well as redundancies built into the botnet.Another contributing factor to the decline in botnet activity during the second half of 2009 may have been
that there was a notable increase in spam containing malicious code in both September and October.
86
this may have resulted from botnet administrators wanting to maintain the increased spam output per bot while offsetting the reduction in propagation through irC, p2p, and Http channels.
75 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-062007-0946-99
76 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-011309-5412-99
77 See http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/other_resources/b-state_of_spam_report_12-2008.en-us.pdf and
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiv_04-2009.en-us.pdf
78 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-123015-3826-99
79 http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2009-010717-4209-99
80 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-033016-1857-99&tabid=1
81 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/evaluating-botnet-capacity
82 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/festi-botnet-spins-become-one-main-spamming-botnets
83 http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/MLireport_Annual_2008_FinAL.pdf : p. 8–10
84 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2009-012112-4859-99
85 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/latvian-isp-closure-dents-cutwail-botnet
86 See http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/other_resources/b-state_of_spam_report_10-2009.en-us.pdf and http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/other_resources/b-state_of_spam_report_11-2009.en-us.pdfSymantec Global internet Security threat report
33As mentioned previously, the technical sophistication of bots increased during this reporting period. As
such, the authors of these threats may be shifting toward different channels of propagation, such as p2p.
this may also explain the decline in activity observed from July through September. Consumer reaction to Downadup may also have contributed to this decline. As public attention to Downadup grew, users may have become more active in patching and protecting their computers from infection by the worm. Similarly, the attention may have alerted users already infected with Downadup who would not have otherwise been aware of the problem. As the number of computers secured against the worm increases, the activity levels of the worm should decline. Furthermore, no other Downadup variants have been released that could exploit other vulnerabilities and counteract the actions taken by users.
in 2009, the day-to-day bot activity levels were less sporadic than they were in 2008. Significant increases
and decreases in activity occurred gradually over the course of several days or months. One possible explanation is that, following the shutdown of the two U.S.-based Web hosting companies discussed above, botnets may have been managed with more consistent commands in an effort to bolster against future shutdown attempts or to make up for decreased resources following shutdowns.
the levels of bot activity are always in flux as new techniques are deployed for existing bots or new
families of malicious code are launched, and in the last quarter of 2009, bot activity began to rise again. As mentioned in the “Malicious activity by country” metric, CnniC made substantial changes to the .cn
domain registration procedure, which appeared to have an immediate effect on spam levels. this change
may continue to have a noticeable effect on the activity levels of botnets that send spam in 2010.
Threat activity—protection and mitigation
there are a number of measures that enterprises, administrators, and end users can employ to protect against malicious activity. Organizations should monitor all network-connected computers for signs of malicious activity including bot activity and potential security breaches, ensuring that any infected computers are removed from the network and disinfected as soon as possible. Organizations should employ defense-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software and a firewall.
87 Administrators
should update antivirus definitions regularly and ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their operating system vendor. As compromised computers can be a threat to other systems, Symantec also recommends that enterprises notify their iSps
of any potentially malicious activity.
Symantec recommends that organizations perform both ingress and egress filtering on all network traffic to
ensure that malicious activity and unauthorized communications are not taking place. Organizations should also filter out potentially malicious email attachments to reduce exposure to enterprises and end users. in
addition, egress filtering is one of the best ways to mitigate a DoS attack. DoS victims frequently need to engage their upstream iSp to help filter the traffic to mitigate the effects of attacks.
87 Defense-in-depth emphasizes multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or
protection methodology. Defense-in-depth should include the deployment of antivirus, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems, among other security measures.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
34Symantec also advises that users never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment
is expected and comes from a known and trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known. By creating and enforcing policies that identify and restrict applications that can access the network, organizations can minimize the effect of malicious activity, and hence, minimize the effect on day-to-day operations. in addition, administrators should limit privileges on systems for users that do not
require such access and they should restrict unauthorized devices such as external portable hard-drives and other removable media.
to reduce the likelihood of identity theft, organizations that store personal information should take the
necessary steps to protect data transmitted over the internet or stored on their computers. this should
include the development, implementation, and enforcement of a secure policy requiring that all sensitive
data be encrypted. Organizations should implement a data loss protection (DLp) solution that not only serves to prevent data breaches but that can also mitigate potential data leaks from within an organization. Access to sensitive information should be restricted and organizations should enforce compliance to information storage and transmission standards such as the payment Card industry (pCi)
standard.
88 policies that ensure that computers containing sensitive information are kept in secure
locations and are accessed only by authorized individuals should be put in place and enforced. Sensitive data should not be stored on mobile devices that could be easily misplaced or stolen. this step should be
part of a broader security policy that organizations should develop and implement in order to ensure that any sensitive data is protected from unauthorized access. this would ensure that even if the computer or
medium on which the data were stored, lost, or stolen, the data would not be accessible. this step should
be part of a broader security policy that organizations should develop and implement in order to ensure that any sensitive data is protected from unauthorized access.
88 https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/Symantec Global internet Security threat report
35Vulnerability Trends
this section will discuss selected vulnerability trends in greater depth, providing analysis and discussion
of the trends indicated by the data. the following metrics will be discussed:
Web browser vulnerabilities •
Window of exposure for Web browsers •
Web browser plug-in vulnerabilities•
top attacked vulnerabilities•
Zero-day vulnerabilities•
Vulnerabilities—protection and mitigation•
Web browser vulnerabilities
Web browser vulnerabilities are a serious security concern due to their role in online fraud and in the propagation of malicious code, spyware, and adware. Web browsers are particular security concerns because they are exposed to a greater amount of potentially untrusted or hostile content than most other applications. this is a concern because every year there is an increased reliance on browsers and their
plug-ins as the internet becomes more integral to business and leisure activities. Attacks can originate
from malicious websites as well as legitimate websites that have been compromised to serve malicious content. Browsers can also facilitate client-side attacks because of their use of plug-ins and other applications in handling potentially malicious content served from the Web, such as compromised documents and media files.
this metric will examine the total number of vulnerabilities affecting the following Web browsers:
Apple Safari•
Google Chrome•
Microsoft internet Explorer •
Mozilla Firefox•
89
Opera• During 2009, 169 vulnerabilities affected Firefox (figure 7). this is more than the 99 vulnerabilities that
were documented in 2008 for Mozilla browsers.
89 As of this report, Symantec has limited the Mozilla browsers studied to include only Firefox because the Mozilla suite is no longer supported
by the Mozilla Foundation.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
36SafariFirefox
4799169
OperaInternet Explorer
Chrome
Documented vulnerabilities02 06 0 100 160Period
18011
352008402009
140 12045
4194
25
40 80
Figure 7. Web browser vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
internet Explorer was subject to 45 new vulnerabilities in 2009. this is fewer than the 47 new
vulnerabilities documented in internet Explorer in 2008. One particular vulnerability in internet Explorer
was the third most attacked of all of the vulnerabilities discovered in 2009.90 interestingly, reports of
attacks in the wild began to surface seven days after the vulnerability was announced by Microsoft.
patches were available when Microsoft first published the vulnerability. numerous publicly and
commercially available exploits were subsequently made available. the potential for reliable exploitation
and the market share of internet Explorer were factors in the large number of attacks targeting this
vulnerability. this demonstrates that internet Explorer is still a popular target of internet attackers despite
the trend toward attacks on browser plug-ins and other client-side vulnerabilities that do not target the browser directly.
the results for the remaining three browsers analyzed in 2009 were as follows: Safari was affected by
94 new vulnerabilities, which is more than double the 40 vulnerabilities identified in Safari in 2008; Symantec documented 25 new vulnerabilities in Opera, which is down from 35 in 2008; finally, Chrome was affected by 41 vulnerabilities, which is significantly more than the 11 documented for 2008—although it should be noted that Chrome was only officially released in September 2008.
90 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/33627Symantec Global internet Security threat report
37According to recent statistics from late 2009, there was an increase in the market share of Chrome,
Firefox, and Safari at the expense of internet Explorer over the course of the year.91 Symantec speculates
that security concerns may have been a factor in the shifting browser demographics. While it is certain that the increase in the percentage of internet Explorer 8 users is due to installations of Windows 7, which
includes the browser by default, enhanced security is also believed to be a factor in its increased use even as internet Explorer loses market share overall. that said, the shifting market share should not significantly
endanger browsers other than internet Explorer in terms of attacks in the wild as it is unlikely that a tipping
point has yet been reached that will make the development of concerted attacks on other browsers sufficiently profitable to be viable.
in order to reduce the threat of successful exploitation of Web browsers, administrators should maintain
a restrictive policy regarding which applications are allowed within the organization. the security of
applications should be evaluated on a platform-by-platform basis to ensure that platform-specific security issues do not arise when the application is installed. this will ensure that desktops within the organization
are not running unauthorized software. Browser security features and add-ons should be employed wherever possible to disable JavaScript™, Adobe Flash player, and other content that may present a risk to
the user when visiting untrusted sites. Organizations should consider adopting a policy of identifying a list of whitelisted, trusted, or authorized websites and block access to all other sites. Whitelists must be actively maintained due to the risk presented when trusted sites are compromised and used to host attacks or malicious software.
Window of exposure for Web browsers
the window of exposure for Web browsers is the difference in days between the time when exploit code affecting a vulnerability is made public and the time when the affected vendor makes a patch publicly available for that vulnerability. During this time, the computer or system on which the affected application is deployed may be susceptible to attack. the metric is derived from the average amount of time it takes to
release a patch in comparison to the average amount of time it takes for exploit code to be made publicly available. this metric also includes maximum patch times, which is the maximum amount of time required
to release a patch for all of the patched vulnerabilities in the data set.
Measuring the time that it takes for vendors to release patches for vulnerabilities may provide insight into
overall vendor security responsiveness. Some vulnerabilities examined were patched by the vendor at the time they were announced. this may be due to an internal security audit by the vendor, which may have
revealed the vulnerability, or it may have been because security researchers discovered the vulnerability and responsibly disclosed it to the vendor. Other vulnerabilities are independently reported by security researchers prior to the release of a patch, indicating that security researchers may not have coordinated with the vendor to disclose the vulnerability. this may be because the researcher did not responsibly
disclose the vulnerability, or else it is possible that the researcher attempted to responsibly report the vulnerability but the vendor was unresponsive. the patch release time is compared against the average
time for vulnerability exploits to become publicly available in order to determine the window of exposure.
91 http://www.w3schools.com/browsers/browsers_stats.aspSymantec Global internet Security threat report
38this metric will examine the window of exposure for the following Web browsers:92
Apple Safari•
Google Chrome•
Microsoft internet Explorer •
Mozilla Firefox •
Opera•
in 2009, the average window of exposure for Safari was 13 days, based on a sample set of 78 patched
vulnerabilities (figure 8). it should be noted that there are now full versions of Safari for both Macintosh®
and Windows. the window of exposure for Safari in 2008 was nine days, based on a sample set of
31 patched vulnerabilities. the maximum time for Apple to patch a Safari vulnerability in 2009 was
145 days. the maximum time to release a patch in 2008 was 156 days.
in 2009, there were a number of vulnerabilities targeting cross-browser JavaScript, HtML, and graphics rendering engines. this accounts for the increase in the window of exposure because, in some cases,
Apple released patches for these vulnerabilities later than other patches. this could reflect the difficulty
of testing and patching these vulnerabilities. Other browser vendors were similarly affected because many browsers are now using third-party and/or open-source engines and components. While browsers have been prone to similar attacks in the past because they have had to implement the same features as competitors, the use of shared components puts multiple vendors at risk when a vulnerability is discovered in an affected component.
913
Opera
FirefoxInternet Explorer
Chrome
Average time in days0 2468Period
142008
<11
12 102009
Safari
7
32<1
<1
<1
Figure 8. Window of exposure for Web browsers
Source: Symantec
92 it should be noted that this metric examines all versions of each browser; vulnerabilities affecting multiple versions of a browser are counted
as a single vulnerability.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
39the average window of exposure for internet Explorer in 2009 was less than one day, based on a sample
set of 28 patched vulnerabilities. Eighteen days was the maximum amount of time to release a patch for
internet Explorer in 2009. internet Explorer had an average window of exposure of seven days in 2008,
based on a sample set of 31 patched vulnerabilities. the maximum amount of time to release a patch in
2008 was 147 days.
it took an average of one day for Microsoft to release a patch for internet Explorer, while on average
public exploits emerged two days after vulnerability publication. Usually, Microsoft has kept the window
of exposure to a minimum; however, its monthly patch cycles can potentially introduce important exceptions in cases where vulnerabilities are disclosed publicly. in november 2009, exploit code was
released for a new vulnerability in internet Explorer.
93 A patch was released for the vulnerability (18 days
after the release of the exploit code) as part of the monthly Microsoft patch release for December. While, in general, Microsoft was able to release patches before exploit code was publicly available, the longest patch turnaround time for the year was in relation to a vulnerability with working public exploit code.
Chrome had a window of exposure of two days in 2009, from a sample set of 29 patched vulnerabilities.
in 2009, the maximum of amount time for a patch to become available for Chrome was 16 days. in 2008,
Symantec documented an average window of exposure of three days for Chrome, based on a sample set of six patched vulnerabilities.
94 the maximum patch time for a vulnerability was 11 days.
in 2009, the window of exposure for Opera was less than one day, based on a sample set of 16 patched vulnerabilities—the maximum patch time was three days. the window of exposure for Opera in 2008 was
one day, based on a sample set of 33 patched vulnerabilities. in 2008, the maximum time to patch a
vulnerability was 29 days.
in 2009, Firefox had a window of exposure of less than one day for a sample set of 151 vulnerabilities and
the maximum patch time was 75 days. Firefox had a window of exposure of less than one day in 2008, based on a sample set of 83 patched vulnerabilities, and the maximum patch time was 30 days.
Mozilla continues to maintain a narrow window of exposure despite the challenges of patching the largest
number of vulnerabilities of any browser vendor. this is due to factors such as aggressive auditing from
the security and development community in addition to Mozilla’s security bug bounty program that compensates security researchers for responsibly disclosing vulnerabilities in Mozilla products.
95
the browsers analyzed in 2009 all had an average window of exposure of less than one day except for Chrome and Safari. Additionally, all browsers except Safari either remained status quo or showed an
improvement in the window of exposure. this demonstrates an increased effort by vendors to minimize the
amount of time that users are exposed to exploits. While internet Explorer remains the most targeted of the
browsers and the most likely to be associated with zero-day and malicious code attacks, other browser vendors enjoying an increase in market share seem to be anticipating the risks posed by such attacks.
93 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/37085
94 it should be noted for comparison that Google Chrome data for the previous year begins in September 2008 because that is when Chrome was officially
released to the public.
95 http://www.mozilla.org/security/bug-bounty.htmlSymantec Global internet Security threat report
40During the window of exposure, administrators and end users need to mitigate the possibility of
exploitation by employing current best practices and the best available mitigation technologies. to reduce
the risk posed by unpatched browsers during the windows of exposure, organizations should subscribe to security intelligence alerting services to track vulnerabilities, mitigations, best practices, and patch information. intrusion prevention and detection systems, in combination with antivirus solutions, can help
repel attacks on the browser. Organizations should actively maintain a whitelist of trusted websites and implement policies to limit access to all other sites. it is important to keep whitelists up to date because of
the risk that trusted websites might be compromised to host attacks and malicious software. Organizations can temporarily remove such sites from the whitelist at their discretion to limit the risk to users. Browser security features and add-ons can allow users to block access to certain content such as JavaScript and Flash. this security measure should be implemented when visiting sites that are untrusted or unfamiliar.
Web browser plug-in vulnerabilities
this metric will examine the number of vulnerabilities affecting plug-ins for Web browsers. Browser plug-ins are technologies that run inside the Web browser and extend its features. Often, these plug-ins allow additional multimedia content from Web pages to be rendered in the browser. they can also enable
execution environments that allow applications to be run inside the browser. Browser plug-in vulnerabilities are also used in a range of client-side attacks. Many browsers include various plug-ins in their default installation and provide a framework to ease the installation of additional plug-ins. plug-ins now provide
much of the expected or desired functionality of Web browsers and some may even be required to effectively use the internal sites of enterprises.
the following plug-in technologies will be examined:
Adobe reader •
Adobe Flash player •
Apple Quickt ime® •
Microsoft ActiveX•
Mozilla Firefox extensions •
Java platform Standard Edition (Java SE) • in 2009, Symantec documented 321 vulnerabilities affecting plug-ins for Web browsers (figure 9).
ActiveX technologies were affected by 134 vulnerabilities, which was the highest among the plug-in technologies examined. Of the remaining technologies, Java SE had 84 vulnerabilities, Adobe reader
had 49 vulnerabilities, Quickt ime had 27 vulnerabilities, and Adobe Flash player was subject to
23 vulnerabilities. the remaining four vulnerabilities affected extensions for Firefox.
it should be noted that, in 2009, some vulnerabilities fell into multiple categories. For example, the Java SE ActiveX vulnerability
96 counts in two categories, ActiveX and Java SE. this is because there is
a version of Java SE that is implemented as an ActiveX control. Similarly, the Firefox plug-in for the Adobe reader vulnerability
97 counts in both the Adobe reader and Firefox extensions categories; this
is because Adobe has released a version of Adobe reader that is implemented as a plug-in for Firefox.
96 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/34931/
97 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/36669Symantec Global internet Security threat report
41the 321 total vulnerabilities in plug-in technologies for Web browsers for 2009 is less than the 424 in
2008. Of the total for 2008, 287 vulnerabilities affected ActiveX, which is significantly more than any other plug-in technology. Of the remaining plug-ins for which vulnerabilities were documented, there were 54 vulnerabilities identified in Java SE, 40 in Quickt ime, 17 in Adobe reader, 16 in Adobe Flash player,
and 5 vulnerabilities in Firefox extensions.
2009 2008QuickTime 10%Adobe Reader 4%
Mozilla extensions 1%
Java SE 11 %
Java SE 26 %
ActiveX 70%Adobe Flash Player 4%
Mozilla extensions 1%Adobe Flash Player 7%
QuickTime 8%Adobe Reader 15%
ActiveX 42%
Figure 9. Web browser plug-in vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
the decrease of ActiveX plug-in vulnerabilities to 42 percent of the total in 2009 from 70 percent of the
total in 2008 is influenced by a number of factors. Symantec has observed that automated vulnerability discovery tools such as fuzzers were a large factor in the number of ActiveX vulnerabilities published in previous years. As of 2009, hundreds or possibly thousands of ActiveX components have been audited by the security research community. Since much of the vulnerability research can be attributed to a few popular tools, it is likely that these tools are beginning to reach their limitations. new approaches or more
in-depth security research techniques may change this trend and result in the discovery of increasingly more ActiveX vulnerabilities per year. However, for the moment it appears that this trend is on the decline. interestingly, a number of vulnerabilities were discovered in one of the tools used for conducting ActiveX vulnerability research. in March 2009, a vulnerability was discovered in the iDefense COMraider ActiveX
fuzzing software.
98 Later, in July 2009, two vulnerabilities were discovered in the same software.99
98 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/33942
99 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/35725Symantec Global internet Security threat report
42Volume XiV of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report questioned whether the security
enhancements in internet Explorer 8 would further limit the viability of ActiveX vulnerabilities.100 in 2009,
internet Explorer 8 went from 0.6 percent market share at the beginning of the year to 13.5 percent market
share at the end of the year.101 As a result, internet Explorer 8 is now the most widely used version of the
internet Explorer browser. this may correlate to the decline of ActiveX vulnerabilities because ActiveX
security has been further enhanced in this version, potentially limiting the viability of many ActiveX vulnerabilities.
While ActiveX vulnerabilities are currently on the decline, vulnerabilities in other plug-in technologies such
as Java SE and Adobe reader are on the rise. the prior focus on ActiveX vulnerabilities among security
researchers and attackers was due to the ubiquity of ActiveX technologies as a whole—mostly because of the high market share of internet Explorer. However, the vulnerabilities themselves were scattered among
hundreds of disparate vendors. in contrast, Java SE and Adobe reader are not only ubiquitous, but they
are cross-browser and cross-platform technologies.
Among the vulnerabilities discovered in 2009, a vulnerability affecting both Adobe reader and Flash player
was the second most attacked vulnerability.
102 this was also one of four zero-day vulnerabilities affecting
Adobe plug-ins during 2009. two of the vulnerabilities were in the top five attacked vulnerabilities for 2009.
Additionally, Adobe vulnerabilities have been associated with malicious code attacks such as the pidief.E
trojan.103 Symantec observed the use of targeted pDFs for trojan attacks earlier in the year.104 Among the
vulnerabilities discovered in 2008, a vulnerability in Java SE was the second most attacked vulnerability.105
Ultimately, both security researchers and attackers have diverted their efforts to these platforms. Organizations should employ vulnerability assessment and policy compliance software to ensure that
unauthorized software is not installed on desktops. this may help remove the risk presented by software
that was intentionally or unintentionally installed by users within the organization. Users should use browser security features and add-ons to prevent their browser from invoking plug-in functionality to render or display potentially harmful content.
Top attacked vulnerabilities
this metric will examine the top attacked vulnerabilities. this data is based on events collected from
Symantec ipS and Symantec’s Global intelligence network. the events are triggered by ipS signatures that
are specifically designed to detect unique vulnerabilities. When an event is triggered, it does not necessarily indicate that the exploit was successful, but merely that the activity identified by the signature has been detected. this normally indicates an attempted attack.
For the purposes of this discussion, the attacked vulnerabilities are divided by their year of publication. this provides insight into which vulnerabilities published in 2008 and 2009 are being attacked in the wild. the discussion will cover the top five attacked vulnerabilities from each year, according to the amount of activity associated with each vulnerability. this will help to pinpoint trends, such as the types of
vulnerabilities that are associated with most attack activity, and the degree to which exploitation for
100 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiv_04-2009.en-us.pdf : p. 41
101 http://www.w3schools.com/browsers/browsers_explorer.asp
102 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/35759
103 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2009-021212-5523-99
104 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/targeted-pdfs-used-exploits
105 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/32608Symantec Global internet Security threat report
43these vulnerabilities has been automated by attackers. Enterprises may benefit from this information
because it provides an indication of the types of vulnerabilities that attackers are most likely to employ in attacks and how to best protect against these vulnerabilities.
the top attacked vulnerability in 2009 was the Microsoft Windows SMB2 ‘_Smb2ValidateproviderCallback()’
remote Code Execution Vulnerability (table 9).
106 publicly announced in September 2009, this vulnerability
was initially believed to be a DoS vulnerability that would let attackers crash Windows.107 However, within a
week it was discovered that the vulnerability could let attackers execute arbitrary code and completely compromise affected computers.
108 A number of publicly and commercially available exploits for the
vulnerability were subsequently released. in October 2009, Microsoft released patches to address the
vulnerability. Considering that exploits for this vulnerability can be easily automated, it is interesting that the vulnerability has not been associated with any worm activity. Symantec believes that the cause of the attack activity is due to the availability of reliable exploits that are either standalone or bundled with a number of freely and commercially available penetration testing tools.
the vulnerability is limited to Windows Vista®, Windows Server® 2008, and pre-release versions of
Windows 7. the security features in these newer versions have been an obstacle for attackers, who have
thus far relied on vulnerabilities in third-party software such as Web browsers and browser plug-ins to gain a foothold on these new versions. However, a successful exploit of this vulnerability will compromise the affected computer at the kernel level, which could let attackers install rootkits once the computer has been compromised. these factors could indicate that attackers are increasingly targeting newer versions of the
Windows operating system. Additionally, since the attacker does not need to entice the victim to perform actions such as visiting a malicious Web page, it is possible for attackers to scan the internet for potential
targets and initiate attacks at random. Since the attack can be automated at little cost to the attacker, they can reach a large number of publicly facing targets that are affected by the vulnerability. this is in contrast
to the other vulnerabilities on the top five, which are client-side in nature. Client-side vulnerabilities can be used to attack harder to reach targets on the internal network of an organization. the top attacked
vulnerability from 2008 could also be exploited in the same automated fashion (table 10). When vulnerabilities possess the characteristics necessary to facilitate automated scanning and exploitation, attackers will continue to capitalize on them.
Rank
1
23
4
5BID
362993575933627
35558
34169Vulnerabilities
Microsoft Windows SMB2 ‘_Smb2ValidateProviderCallback()’ Remote Code Execution
Adobe Reader and Flash Player Remote Code Execution Microsoft Internet Explorer 7 Uninitialized Memory Code Execution
Microsoft Windows ‘MPEG2TuneRequest’ ActiveX Control Remote Code Execution
Adobe Reader Collab ‘getIcon()’ JavaScript Method Remote Code Execution
Table 9. Top attacked vulnerabilities, 2009
Source: Symantec
106 it should be noted that Symantec uses the same signature to detect BiD 36594 Microsoft Windows SMB2 Command Value remote Code Execution Vulnerability;
however, Symantec believes that the majority of attack activity was associated with the Smb2ValidateproviderCallBack vulnerability due to the number of public
exploits associated with that vulnerability.
107 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/36299
108 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/bsod-and-possibly-moreSymantec Global internet Security threat report
44the remainder of the top attacked vulnerabilities in 2009 comprised several client-side vulnerabilities. in
July 2009, Symantec observed widespread attacks on the MpEG2t unerequest vulnerability in relation to
the Fostrem Downloader.109 in this report, the Fostrem Downloader was the eighth-highest ranked new
malicious code sample for 2009. the Adobe reader Collab geticon vulnerability was found to be associated
with the neoSploit attack toolkit.110
Attacks continue to evolve for the purpose of evading detection by intrusion detection and prevention
systems and improving the reliability of exploitation. in February 2009, Symantec noted new attempts to
obfuscate attacks on vulnerabilities, including the second-top attacked vulnerability for 2008.111 these
attacks were also associated with various trojans and rogue security applications. in September 2009,
Symantec published a blog analyzing various techniques employed in the wild to obfuscate malicious pDFs
to evade detection by security software.112 Additionally, a Symantec blog discussed various techniques
(presented at the Black Hat® technical Security Conference in 2009) that were being used in drive-by
attacks to better guide exploits against browsers, plug-ins, and client software.113 these techniques are
already deployed in attack toolkits such as Mp ack,114 Firepack, neosploit, and Luckysploit.115 Lastly,
Symantec observed a malicious pDF attack that attempted to exploit three separate vulnerabilities with the
same malicious file.116 the goal of the attack was to install malicious code to steal sensitive information.
Rank
1
23
4
5BID
318743260830114
32721
28157Vulnerabilities
Microsoft Windows Server Service RPC Handling Remote Code Execution
Java SE Runtime Environment and Java SE Development Kit Multiple Security Vulnerability Snapshot Viewer for Microsoft Access® ActiveX Control Arbitrary File Download
Microsoft Internet Explorer XML Handling Remote Code Execution
RealNetworks RealPlayer® ‘rmoc3260.dll’ ActiveX Control Memory Corruption
Table 10. Top attacked vulnerabilities, 2008
Source: Symantec
to limit exposure to attacks, organizations should deploy iDS and ipS systems along with antivirus on
desktops within the enterprise. this may aid in detecting and preventing client-side, malicious code, and
other attacks on users within the organization. Heuristic detections within these products may block
malformed content and prevent unknown attacks. Behavioral detection may detect and prevent attacks that result in anomalous behavior. Organizations should consider running operating systems that include address space layout randomization (ASLr)
117 and other memory protection technologies that can
complicate the exploitation of many vulnerabilities. third-party intrusion prevention products often offer
ASLr and memory protection capabilities.
109 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/another-unpatched-vulnerability-being-massively-exploited-internet-explorer
110 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/yet-another-pdf-vulnerability-exploited-collabgeticon
111 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/new-obfuscated-scripts-wild-lgpl
112 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/fight-against-malicious-pdfs-using-ascii85decode-filter
113 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/black-hat-2009-drive-improvements
114 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/mpack-packed-full-badness#M93
115 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/black-hat-2009-drive-improvements
116 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/has-elvis-left-building
117 ASLr is a security mechanism that randomizes data in memory to prevent the success of attacks that leverage memory corruption vulnerabilities,
such as buffer overflows.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
45Zero-day vulnerabilities
A zero-day vulnerability is one that appears to have been exploited in the wild prior to being publicly
known. it may not have been known to the affected vendor prior to exploitation and that at the time
of the exploit activity the vendor had not released a patch. in the absence of available patches, zero-day
vulnerabilities represent a serious threat since, in many cases, they likely will be able to evade purely signature-based detection. it is the unexpected nature of zero-day threats that causes concern, especially
because they may be used in targeted attacks and in the propagation of malicious code.
in 2009, Symantec documented 12 zero-day vulnerabilities, which is more than the nine zero-day
vulnerabilities documented in 2008. in 2009, there was some diversification in the types of zero-day
vulnerability documented. in previous years, Symantec observed a trend toward targeting Microsoft Office®
suite and internet Explorer. in 2009, four zero-day vulnerabilities were related to Adobe reader, while six
were related to various Microsoft components including DirectX®, iiS, and Office. Additionally, there were
no “region-specific” applications targeted in 2009, as was seen in previous years. it may be that attackers
no longer view attacks on region-specific applications as profitable.
Zero-day vulnerabilities continue to be employed in malicious code attacks. in June 2009, a zero-day
vulnerability affecting Microsoft DirectShow® was exploited to install trojan.Cipevas on vulnerable
computers.
118 in early attacks for this vulnerability, malicious web pages that exploited the vulnerability
were linked to phishing sites. in addition to attempting to steal credentials in phishing attacks, these
attacks also directed to malicious pages that were attempting to exploit the vulnerability. in February of 2009, attackers were exploiting a zero-day vulnerability in Microsoft Excel® to install the
Mdropper.AC trojan horse.
119 Attacks exploiting this vulnerability used various techniques to try to evade
detection. Firstly, to avoid arousing suspicion when the victim of the attack opened a malicious document, the exploit presented a legitimate spreadsheet. Secondly, binary code embedded in the malicious spreadsheet was obfuscated to make it more difficult to detect the payload of the attack. these types of
techniques are becoming standard practice in client-side attacks because of heuristic detections that have been able to identify suspicious and malformed files in a generic manner. thus, attacks employing
malformed documents and files must implement sufficient obfuscation or appear normal enough to not trigger heuristic detections.
Another zero-day vulnerability was exploited in February of 2009 in pidief.E trojan attacks targeting Adobe
reader. Symantec believes that the motive for these attacks was to compromise high-ranking individuals
within different organizations.
120 the exploit attempts also used the ability to embed JavaScript within pDF
documents as means to improve the reliability of exploitation. Adobe reader was the target of other zero-
day attacks during the year, such as the pidief.H attack that occurred in December of 2009.121
Vulnerabilities—protection and mitigation
in addition to the specific steps required to protect against the vulnerabilities discussed in this section, there are general steps that should be taken to protect against the exploitation of vulnerabilities. Administrators should employ a good asset management system to track the assets that are deployed on the network and to determine which ones may be affected by the discovery of new vulnerabilities.
118 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/directshow-exploit-wild
119 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2009-022310-4202-99
120 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/targeted-pdfs-used-exploits
121 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/zero-day-xmas-presentSymantec Global internet Security threat report
46Administrators should monitor vulnerability mailing lists and security websites to keep abreast of new
vulnerabilities affecting their assets. Where possible, patch deployments should be automated to ensure that vulnerabilities are addressed across the organization in a timely manner.
Symantec recommends that administrators employ vulnerability assessment services, a vulnerability
management solution, and vulnerability assessment tools to evaluate the security posture of the enterprise. these measures should be incorporated into infrastructure change management processes.
Organizations should employ third-party consulting and penetration testing services to identify security exposures. For any products or applications developed by the organization, code auditing software and services may help to identify and address vulnerabilities at various stages of development.
Unpatched vulnerabilities should be identified by administrators, and assessed and mitigated according
to the risk they present. Where possible, problematic applications with many unpatched vulnerabilities should be removed or isolated. ipS systems can aid in detecting known attacks against such applications
and provide generic protection against vulnerabilities. Security information and event management should be deployed to assist in data management within the enterprise infrastructure and aid in policy compliance.
in order to protect against successful exploitation of Web browser vulnerabilities, Symantec advises users
and administrators to upgrade all browsers to the latest, patched versions. Symantec recommends that organizations educate users to be extremely cautious about visiting unknown or untrusted websites and viewing or following links in unsolicited emails. Administrators should also deploy Web proxies in order to block potentially malicious script code. Administrators and end users should actively maintain a whitelist of trusted sites and disable individual plug-ins and scripting capabilities for all other sites. this will not
prevent exploitation attempts from whitelisted sites, but may aid in preventing exploits from all other sites. Organizations can also implement an egress filtering policy at the network perimeter to regulate outgoing access by end users. Antivirus and host-based iDS and ipS solutions at the desktop level also provide a
layer of protection against attacks that originate from the Web.
Enterprises should subscribe to a vulnerability alerting service in order to be notified of new vulnerabilities.
they should also manage their Web-based assets carefully. if they are developing Web applications
in-house, developers should be educated about secure development practices, such as the Security Development Lifecycle and threat modeling.
122 if possible, all Web applications should be audited for
security prior to deployment and only those applications that have been certified should be deployed. Web application security solutions and a number of products and services are available to detect and prevent attacks against these applications.
When deploying applications, administrators should ensure that secure, up-to-date versions are used,
and that applications are properly configured to avoid the exploitation of latent vulnerabilities. Symantec recommends the use of secure shared components that have been audited for common Web application vulnerabilities. As much as possible, enterprises are advised to avoid deploying products that are not regularly maintained or that are not supported by the vendor.
122 the Security Development Lifecycle is a development paradigm that incorporates security at every stage from the initial architecture to programming, and in the
quality assurance/testing phases; threat modeling is a security auditing methodology to identify and map out all possible attack vectors for an application.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
47Malicious Code Trends
Symantec gathers malicious code intelligence from more than 133 million client, server, and gateway
systems that have deployed its antivirus products. Underpinning these products are the Symantec Digital immune System and Symantec Scan and Deliver technologies, as well as norton Community Watch, which
allow customers to automate the process of reporting viruses and other malicious code threats.
this discussion is based on malicious code samples reported in 2009, with the following trends
being analyzed:
Malicious code signatures•
new malicious code families•
prevalence of malicious code types•
Staged downloaders—multiple infections by type•
Downloaded components•
Geolocation by type of malicious code•
threats to confidential information•
propagation mechanisms•
Malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities•
Malicious code—protection and mitigation•
Malicious code signatures
Symantec monitors the proliferation of malicious code by examining the number of new malicious code signatures created to detect threats from each reporting period. Monitoring trends in the number of new malicious threats can help improve awareness of their danger and underscores the importance of maintaining robust security, including up-to-date antivirus signatures and software patches.
in 2009, Symantec created 2,895,802 new malicious code signatures (figure 10). this is a 71 percent
increase over 2008, when 1,691,323 new malicious code signatures were added. Although the percentage
increase in signatures added is less than the 139 percent increase from 2007 to 2008, the overall number of malicious code signatures by the end of 2009 grew to 5,724,106. this means that of all the malicious
code signatures created by Symantec, 51 percent of that total was created in 2009. this is slightly less
than 2008, when approximately 60 percent of all signatures at the time were created.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
48
Number of new signatures
01,500,0003,000,000
2,500,000
Period1,000,000
500,0002,000,000
200220,254
200319,159
200474,981
2005113,081
2006167,069
2007708,742
20092,895,80 2
20081,691,323
Figure 10. New malicious code signatures
Source: Symantec.
the number of new malicious code signatures has shown significant growth by more than doubling on a
year-to-year basis between 2006 and 2008. new signature creation in 2009 continued the upward trend
and resulted in a near doubling of the total number of signatures. the previous Symantec Global Internet
Security Threat Report noted that malicious code being developed for the underground economy is increasingly well organized and professional.
123 this trend is likely continuing to drive the creation of
malicious software because of the lucrative nature of online fraud.
the slight decline in the rate of growth should not discount the significant number of new signatures
created in 2009. Signature-based detection is lagging behind the creation of malicious threats—something which makes newer antivirus technologies and techniques, such as behavioral-based detection, increasingly important. For example, of the threat instances that Symantec’s reputation-based techniques protected users from in 2009, approximately 57 percent corresponded to singletons. this finding is consistent with
the overall observation that malicious code authors are creating unique threats using techniques such as packing, obfuscation, and server-side polymorphism. this trend suggests that security technologies that
rely on signatures should be complemented with additional heuristics, behavioral monitoring techniques, and reputation-based security. Moreover, with the advent of malicious software toolkits (such as Zeus), relatively inexperienced users can quickly create targeted threats.
124 For example, in 2009 an unnamed
but targeted trojan successfully stole bank account credentials and was directly responsible for the theft
of thousands of dollars.125
123 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiv_04-2009.en-us.pdf : p. 10
124 http://securitywatch.eweek.com/botnets/playing_god_zeus_diy_botnet_kit_evolves.html
125 http://www.krebsonsecurity.com/2010/01/money-mules-helped-to-rob-w-va-bank/Symantec Global internet Security threat report
49New malicious code families
Symantec analyzes new malicious code families detected during each reporting period to determine
which threat types and attack vectors are being employed in the most prevalent of the new threats. this
information also allows administrators and users to gain familiarity with threats that attackers may favor in their exploits. insight into emerging threat development trends can help bolster security measures and
mitigate future attacks.
in 2009, there were six trojans, three worms, and one virus in the top 10 new malicious code families
detected (table 11). two of the three worms include a back door component.
126 Volume Xiii of the
Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report noted that the growing prevalence of trojans is indicative
of multistage attacks.127 A multistage attack typically involves an initial compromise followed by the
installation of an additional piece of malicious code, such as a trojan that downloads and installs adware.
As with 2008, in 2009 four of the top 10 new malicious code families downloaded additional threats
(these multistage attacks are examined in detail in “Staged downloaders—multiple infections by type”).
it should also be noted that, although Downadup was a major threat and received significant media attention, it was discovered in 2008 and is, therefore, not considered a new malicious code family for this reporting period.
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Sample
Induc
Changeup
BredolabErgrun
Pilleuz
Mibling
Kuaiput
FostremInterrupdate
SwifiType
Virus
Worm
Trojan
Trojan
Worm, back door
Worm, back door
Trojan
Trojan
Trojan
TrojanVectors
Delphi® files
Mapped and
removable drives
N/A
N/A
File-sharing, instant
messages, removable drives
Instant messages
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/AImpact
Infects the Delphi compilation process to spread to
all compiled Delphi files
Downloads additional threats
Downloads additional threats, including
Trojan.Fakeavalert
Downloads additional threats
Allows remote access
Allows remote access and lowers security settings
Downloads additional threats
Downloads additional threats
Blocks security-related updates and sniffs
network traffic
Exploits a vulnerability in Adobe Flash Player
and may lower security settings
Table 11. Top new malicious code families
Source: Symantec
126 Back door components allow attackers to remotely connect to a compromised computer, typically using a specialized application. Once connected, the attacker can
perform numerous actions such as taking screenshots, changing configuration settings, and uploading, downloading, or deleting files.
127 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 46Symantec Global internet Security threat report
50During this reporting period the induc virus128 was the most widely observed new malicious code family.
this virus is notable because it does not perform any known malicious actions other than proliferating.
induc propagates by embedding itself into installations of the Delphi129 application development
environment.130 When the virus first runs, it attempts to locate an installation of Delphi, specifically
targeting versions 4.0 through to 7.0. if it fails to find an appropriate Delphi installation, nothing else
happens. this means that the virus is benign for users who do not have Delphi installed.131
the primary reason for the prevalence of induc in 2009 is that developers using an infected Delphi
installation were unknowingly including induc in their released products. induc would be included with
every new build, resulting in legitimate, official installation packages that included the virus. this resulted
in the virus spreading directly through multiple vendors’ software distribution channels, such as automatic software updates and trusted download locations. there were multiple reported cases of legitimate
applications inadvertently including the induc virus.
132
it is possible that induc was created as a proof-of-concept method of spreading malicious software.
Other development environments are equally susceptible to this form of subversion, leading to potentially widespread infection. the successful spreading of the induc virus may mean that there will be more
viruses exploiting this technique in the future.
the second most observed new malicious code family in 2009 was the Changeup
133 worm. this worm
propagates by copying itself to removable and mapped drives, using an autorun instruction file to trigger
the worm’s automatic execution whenever a local or shared drive is accessed.134 Changeup also connects
to tCp port 8000 on a remote website and downloads additional threats, possibly including trojans or
back doors.
the Bredolab135 trojan was the third most observed new malicious code family in 2009. Along with using
a range of obfuscation techniques to avoid detection, Bredolab uses several different advanced tactics to
propagate, including social engineering, server-side polymorphism, and encrypted communications. it is
primarily distributed through spam and drive-by-download attacks. When Bredolab is executed, it copies itself to a computer and creates a registry entry to ensure that it is run every time the computer starts.
Bredolab has been observed downloading numerous other disparate malicious threats, including password
stealers, rootkits, back doors, and misleading applications, and its C&C server operators can determine what additional components are downloaded at any time.
136 Servers have been observed hosting Bredolab
in China, Germany, and Ukraine. it has been used to target social networking sites and to advertise
fraudulent money-making scams.137 the popularity of Bredolab in the underground economy potentially
stems from its flexibility and robustness, making it a threat that Symantec expects will likely remain popular with attackers into the near future.
128 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2009-081816-3934-99
129 http://www.embarcadero.com/products/delphi
130 http://edn.embarcadero.com/article/39851
131 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/delphi-falls-prey
132 http://channel.hexus.net/content/item.php?item=19853
133 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2009-081806-2906-99
134 Autorun is a function of the Windows operating system that launches newly detected processes or applications (e.g., the insertion of a CD-rOM or USB drive).
Windows searches the root directory of the drive for an autorun information file that contains instructions for what process or application to launch.
135 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2009-052907-2436-99
136 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/taking-closer-look-trojanbredolab
137 See http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/bredolab-trojan-now-using-popular-social-networking-brand-spread and http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/bredolab-delivers-more-parcels-and-cashSymantec Global internet Security threat report
51Prevalence of malicious code types
Analyzing the prevalence of malicious code types provides insight into the general diversity of the threat
landscape. Combined with the data from other metrics, this helps Symantec more accurately determine emerging trends in malicious code. During this reporting period, the overall volume of the top 50 potential malicious code infections doubled from 2008 to 2009; therefore, decreases in percentages do not likely indicate a year-over-year decline in potential infections. As in previous reporting periods, trojans
composed the highest percentage of the volume of the top 50 potential malicious code infections (figure 11), although the percentage dropped from 68 percent in 2008 to 56 percent in 2009.
138
01 02 03 0 40 50 70 6020082009
80
Percentage of top 50 by potential infectionsType
32%
19%Virus
13%
15%Back doorTrojan56%
68%
Worm43%
29%
Figure 11. Prevalence of malicious code types by potential infections
Source: Symantec
the previous two volumes of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report discussed the possibility
that attackers are gravitating toward the extensive use of a smaller number of more successful trojans.139
the Bredolab trojan is a good example of this: its flexibility, style of downloading new threats, obfuscation,
and polymorphism mechanisms together enable it to be easily customized for specific targets. its success
corroborates the hypothesis of attackers using smaller numbers of more successful trojans more often.
the proportionate decline in trojan activity observed in 2009 is also likely due to the rise in worm and
virus activity. For example, the top malicious code sample causing potential infections in 2009 was the
Sality.AE140 virus. the main goal of Sality.AE is to download and install additional malicious software on
a victim’s computer. the virus also prevents access to various security-related domains, stops security-
related services, and deletes security-related files. the virus also infects .exe and .scr files on a victim’s
local drive as well as on any writable network resource. it also spreads by copying itself to attached
removable drives.
138 Because malicious code samples may be comprised of multiple components that are each classified as different types, cumulative percentages discussed
in this metric may exceed 100 percent.
139 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiv_04-2009.en-us.pdf and http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf
140 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-042106-1847-99Symantec Global internet Security threat report
52in 2008, the Brisv141 trojan was the most widely reported new malicious code family. its prevalence rose in
2009 to the point that it was the second ranked sample causing potential infection. Brisv scans computers
for a range of multimedia files.142 the trojan then modifies a data marker in the files with a malicious UrL.
the marker is a part of the Windows Media® Audio (WMA) format. Although other applications appear to be unaffected, when the files are opened using Windows Media player the marker is automatically processed,
causing the application to open a Web browser window and access the malicious UrL. Accessing the malicious UrL may expose the user to additional threats.
the effectiveness of Brisv is heightened by the possibility that unknowing victims may share the
compromised multimedia files with others, through p2p networks, or email, etc. As a result, the
compromised files can potentially affect users whose computers were not exposed to the trojan itself.
Moreover, when Brisv scans for multimedia files, it converts all Mp2 and Mp3 files it encounters into the WMA format prior to injecting the malicious code, even while preserving the original file extensions of the (now) converted files. the reason for converting files into the WMA format is so that Windows media player
will process the injected marker data properly. this is an example of increased sophistication in malicious
code development.
the second highest percentage of the top 50 potential malicious code infections for 2009 belonged to
worms, which increased to 43 percent from 29 percent in 2008. Six of the top 10 threats in 2009 had worm components, compared with only four in 2008. the Downadup worm is likely responsible for a
significant amount of the increase in worm activity. nonetheless, although Downadup maintained a high
profile in 2009, SillyFDC
143 and Sality.AE were both more prolific.
Viruses made up the third highest percentage of the top 50 potential malicious code infections in 2009 increasing to 32 percent in 2009 from 19 percent previously. in total, five of the top 10 malicious code
samples in 2009 were classified as viruses. Along with Sality.AE, the others were Brisv, Mabezat,
144
Gammima,145 and Almanahe.146 in 2008, only three of the top 10 samples were classified as viruses.
Back doors continued to decline in 2009, dropping from 15 percent in 2008 to 13 percent in 2009. in
2008, there were two threats with back door components in the top 10. in 2009, Downadup was the only
sample in the top 10 with a back door component to it.
Staged downloaders—multiple infections by type
Staged downloaders are threats that download and install other malicious code onto a compromised computer. these threats allow attackers to alter the downloadable component to any type of threat to suit
their changing objectives over time. For example, attackers can install a trojan that relays spam, rather
than one that steals confidential information. As the attackers’ objectives change, they can change any later components that will be downloaded to perform the requisite tasks.
Of the top 50 potential malicious code infections, 75 percent downloaded additional threats, down from
79 percent in 2008. in 2009, the Brisv trojan was the most prevalent downloader component (table 12).
As noted previously, the Brisv trojan was also the second-ranked overall malicious code threat in 2009,
moving up from 10th overall in 2008, when it was the top-ranked new malicious code family detected.
141 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-071823-1655-99
142 primarily .asf, .mp2, .mp3, .wma, and .wmv
143 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2009-081106-1401-99
144 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-111202-0601-99
145 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-032206-2043-99
146 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-041317-4330-99Symantec Global internet Security threat report
53Rank
1
23
4
56
7
8
9
10Type
Trojan
Virus, wormTrojan
Trojan
WormWorm, back door
Worm
Worm, back door
TrojanWormSample
Brisv
Sality.AEWimad
Vundo
SillyFDCDownadup.B
Imaut
Spybot
ZlobImaut.AAImpact
Infects media files and downloads files from remote addresses
Downloads files from remote addressesUses Microsoft Windows Media Digital Rights Manager to trick
user into downloading files
Redirects browser to malicious Web page
Downloads files from remote addressesDownloads files from remote addresses
Downloads files from remote addresses
Downloads files from remote addresses
Downloads files from remote addresses
Downloads files from remote addresses
Table 12. Top staged downloaders
Source: Symantec.
the second most prevalent downloader component observed by Symantec in 2009 was the Sality.AE virus.
Once it is installed on a computer, Sality.AE attempts to contact certain ip addresses to download and
install its secondary components. One of the files it attempts to install is an adware program that will periodically display pop-up advertisements. if clicked, these ads will generate income for the malicious
code author (and possibly the adware developer, if they happen to be separate people).
the Wimad trojan
147 was the third most common staged downloader component in 2008. this trojan
arrives on computers as a license-protected multimedia file. When the file is opened, Wimad exploits the
intended functionality of digital rights management (DrM) technology in order to open a window and access an attacker-controlled UrL. When an attacker’s Web page is processed, a deceptive message is displayed that asks the user to click a button. if clicked, the trojan will download other threats, including
adware and spyware.
Downloaded components
the most prevalent downloaded component in 2009 was the Gampass148 trojan (table 13). Gampass uses
keystroke-logging functionality to steal authentication credentials for online gaming accounts. popular
targets include Lineage,149 rexue, Jianghu, and rohan, which are all popular games in the Ap J region.
Gampass is commonly downloaded by worms such as Mummawow,150 Wowinzi,151 and Fubalca.152
147 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-011213-2709-99
148 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-111201-3853-99
149 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-011211-3355-99
150 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-032015-4300-99
151 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-050714-5642-99
152 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-062214-3636-99Symantec Global internet Security threat report
54Rank
1
23
4
567
8
9
10Type
Trojan
TrojanBack door
Worm
TrojanTrojanTrojan
Trojan
Trojan
TrojanSample
Gampass
FakeAVGraybird
Gammima
AdclickerOnlinegameBancos
Banker.C
Lineage
KillAVImpact
Steals online gaming account information
Displays false antivirus alerts and lowers security settingsAllows remote access, logs keystrokes, and steals passwords
Steals online gaming account informationGenerates traffic to websites and banner ads
Steals online gaming account informationSteals online banking account information
Steals online banking account information
Steals online gaming account information
Disables security applications
Table 13. Top downloaded components
Source: Symantec
the second most downloaded component observed by Symantec in 2009 was the FakeAV153 trojan. this
trojan displays false antivirus alerts and lowers security settings on compromised computers. the fake
security alert attempts to trick users into visiting a website in order to download a fake antivirus application
or spyware removal application. these types of rogue security software applications and components
flourished in 2009. it is common for these applications to attempt to scare users into purchasing the
software in order to resolve fake or overblown issues.154 if malicious software authors cannot directly
coerce users to install the misleading applications, installing them as a component to a staged downloader is an attractive alternative.
Graybird
155 was the third most frequently downloaded component in 2009. this back door gives an attacker
full remote access to a compromised computer. it also captures cached passwords, logs keystrokes, and
then sends all of this information to the remote attacker. Graybird also allows the attacker to download and
install additional threats on the computer.
Many of the top downloaded components in 2009 were similarly ranked in 2008, indicating that these
families continue to be prevalent and effective threats. in 2008, six of the 10 most downloaded components
involved password stealing, keystroke logging, or advertisement promotion. in 2009, this has increased to
nine of the top 10 most downloaded components, strongly indicating that profit continues to be the driving motivation for malicious code authors.
Exemplifying this trend in 2009 was the Banker.C
156 trojan. it was used in two notable attacks on a bank in
2009.157 Bank employee computers were compromised with the trojan, allowing attackers to gain access to
bank account credentials. One company lost $179,000 in a transfer to a russian bank account, and another
company lost $81,000 to an unspecified offshore location.
153 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-101013-3606-99
154 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-symc_report_on_rogue_security_software_Wp_20100385.en-us.pdf
155 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2003-040217-2506-99
156 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-040208-5335-99
157 http://www.krebsonsecurity.com/2010/02/a-tale-of-two-victims/Symantec Global internet Security threat report
55Banker.C is part of the Zeus crimeware kit (a.k.a., Zbot158), which is designed to steal sensitive information
relating to online banking, social networking sites, Web-based email sites, and saved passwords. it also
downloads further threats based on a configuration file that allows malicious software authors to easily
modify Zeus’s behavior. Zeus is readily available for sale in underground forums and is relatively simple to use, allowing novice attackers to create customized trojans and C&C servers for attacks—typically spread
through spam and drive-by downloads.
159 this may explain why Zeus has become a prevalent threat that is
responsible for widespread bot networks.
Geolocation by type of malicious code
Symantec examines the types of malicious code causing potential infections in each region. the increasing
regionalization of threats can cause differences between the types of malicious code being observed from one area to the next, such as when threats employ certain languages or localized events as part of their social engineering techniques. threats that steal confidential information can also be tailored to steal
information that is more commonly available in some countries than in others. Because of the varying propagation mechanisms used by different malicious code types, and the diverse effects that each malicious code type may have, information about the geographic distribution of malicious code can help network administrators improve their security efforts. it should be noted that the numbers below represent
proportional geographic percentages, and that proportional percentage fluctuations over time may not indicate an actual change to the raw number of reports from a specific region.
in 2009, the regional proportion of potential infections from malicious code remained largely unchanged;
however, in all cases, the actual number of reports for each malicious code type from each region increased.
160 While there were small variances in some regions, the changes were not representative of
significant shifts in the threat landscape. the numbers of reports from Europe, the Middle East, and Africa
(EMEA) increased proportionally more than the other regions, which may indicate that the concentration of threats targeting countries in EMEA is growing faster than the concentration in other regions. this may
also signal that there is a greater concentration of malicious code authors, or organizations employing those authors, in EMEA than elsewhere.
regionally, the overall infection counts changed proportionally according to the global prevalence of
malicious code types. As an example, trojans had slightly less activity compared to worms in infection
counts, but proportionately in each region, they did not change substantially. this is due to users being
targeted in an increasingly equal fashion worldwide even though attack origins changed over time.
158 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2010-011016-3514-99
159 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/zeus-king-underground-crimeware-toolkits
160 Due to rounding, cumulative totals might not equal 100 percent.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
56Trojans
in 2009, 34 percent of trojans were reported from north America (nAM) region, 30 percent from EMEA,
28 percent from Ap J, and 8 percent from Latin America (LAM) (table 14). Although the number of trojans
reported from nAM and EMEA appears to have dropped slightly, this is mainly attributable to the
proportional increase in trojans reported from Ap J and LAM, indicating that a similar amount of trojan
activity was reported in both nAM and EMEA in 2009. Although the 2009 percentages are similar to 2008
percentages, it should be noted that the volume of infection counts for all regions approximately doubled
in 2009.
Region
NAM
EMEAAPJ
LAM2009 Percentage
34%
30%28%
8%2008 Percentage
35%34%24%
6%
Table 14. Geolocation of Trojans
Source: Symantec
trojan infection counts in the Ap J region continued to gain on EMEA in 2009 and were close enough that
ApJ could potentially overtake EMEA in 2010. Even though both the proportionate increase and absolute
counts for LAM were comparatively small, infection counts in that region increased the most, more than
doubling in 2009.
Worms
the EMEA region reported 39 percent of the potential worm infections 2009, followed by Ap J with
37 percent, LAM with 14 percent, and nAM with 10 percent (table 15). EMEA overtook Ap J as the leader
in worm infections in 2009, although the numbers are close enough that it may not suggest a significant
shift in the threat landscape. the drop in Ap J and nAM is only due to the larger proportionate increases in
EMEA and LAM. All regions have approximately doubled in infection counts, but the infection count in LAM increased the most, increasing by 187 percent, followed by EMEA increasing by 150 percent.
Region
EMEA
APJLAM
NAM2009 Percentage
39%
37%14%
10%2008 Percentage
36%
40%11%
13%
Table 15. Geolocation of worms
Source: SymantecSymantec Global internet Security threat report
57Of particular note for infections in 2009 is the Downadup worm. it appeared in late november 2008, but
was most prevalent in 2009. China was by far the most infected country by the height of the spread of
Downadup into 2009.161 the prevalence of Downadup points out the need to keep computers updated
as much as possible. For example, although Microsoft patched the specific vulnerability that the worm exploits to propagate on October 23, 2008, Symantec recorded an infection count for Downadup of more than 1.5 million in December 2009 alone, more than a year after the vulnerability had been patched.
162
Back door infections
EMEA again accounted for the largest proportion of potential back door infections reported worldwide
in 2009, with 37 percent of the total—a slight decrease from 39 percent in 2008. Ap J accounted for the
second largest percentage, with 31 percent, followed by nAM again at 23 percent, and LAM at 10 percent
(table 16). All regions worldwide approximately doubled in potential infection counts for back doors.
Region
EMEA
APJNAM
LAM2009 Percentage
37%
31%23%
10%2008 Percentage
39%
29%23%
9%
Table 16. Geolocation of back doors
Source: Symantec
While the regional percentages of potential back door infections can show wide variances, it is important
to note that the worldwide volume of back door threats was significantly lower than trojans and worms.
therefore, the percentage variance between regions actually represents a much smaller difference in raw numbers than the percentage differences between worms and trojans. With the worldwide volume of
potential back door infections being a much smaller number compared to other infection types, the proportionate rise in infections can likely be attributed to the spread of the Downadup worm with its back door functionality.
Viruses
the EMEA region overtook the Ap J region for the highest concentration of reported potential infections
caused by viruses in 2009. EMEA rose to 45 percent, with Ap J dropping to 40 percent (table 17). LAM
and nAM also exchanged proportionate positions in 2009. LAM increased its proportionate share from
6 percent of the total in 2008 to 9 percent in 2009. Meanwhile, virus proportions in nAM dropped from
15 percent in 2008 to 6 percent in 2009. it should be noted that, although Ap J and nAM decreased in
proportional percentage total, there was a rise in potential virus counts in all of the regions in 2009. in
fact, potential infection counts for viruses rose significantly more than any other infection type in 2009.
proportions in LAM increased by 389 percent, followed by EMEA at 314 percent, Ap J at 238 percent, and
nAM by only 27 percent. thus, although it appears as though there was a large drop in nAM, the decrease
is attributed to the significant proportional rise in other regions with much larger infection counts.
161 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the_downadup_codex_ed2.pdf : p. 12
162 http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/security/dd452420.aspxSymantec Global internet Security threat report
58Region
EMEA
APJLAM
NAM2009 Percentage
45%
40%
9%
6%2008 Percentage
38%
41%
6%
15%
Table 17. Geolocation of viruses
Source: Symantec
the Sality.AE virus was the top overall malicious threat in both Ap J and EMEA, and the Mabezat.B virus
was the second overall malicious threat in EMEA. these two threats are the primary cause for the disparity
in infection counts between the top two and bottom two regions for virus activity in 2009.
the largest contributing countries for virus threats in 2009 were india, Egypt, and Brazil, with top-ranked
india having approximately twice the infection count of second-ranked Egypt. As noted in the “Executive
Summary,” india and Brazil are two countries specifically cited as countries expected to increase in their
share of malicious activity.163 the growth of viruses in 2009 in these countries bears this out.
Although the 2009 increase in LAM is quite large, the actual infection counts are only approximately
20 percent as high as second-ranked Ap J. Meanwhile, the EMEA and Ap J regions are within a few
percentage points of each other in infection counts, which likely makes their swapped positions are merely due to typical variances in potential infection counts.
Threats to confidential information
Some malicious code programs are designed specifically to expose confidential information that is stored on an infected computer. these threats may expose sensitive data such as system information, confidential
files and documents, or logon credentials. Some malicious code threats, such as back doors, can give a remote attacker complete control over a compromised computer. threats to confidential information are
a particular concern because of their potential for use in criminal activities. With the widespread use of online shopping and internet banking, compromises of this nature can result in significant financial loss,
particularly if credit card information or banking details are exposed.
in 2009, four of the top 10 most prevalent malicious threats observed expose confidential information or
provide remote access. three of the top 10 new threats directly expose information, while four are staged
downloaders that might also expose information, depending on the downloaded components. Operators in the underground economy use these malicious threats to gain access to banking and credit card information, online credentials, and to target specific enterprises.
Within the enterprise, the exposure of confidential information can lead to significant data loss. if it
involves customer-related data such as credit card information, customer confidence in the enterprise
can be severely undermined. Moreover, it can also violate local laws. Sensitive corporate information, including financial details, business plans, and proprietary technologies could also be leaked from compromised computers.
163 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiv_04-2009.en-us.pdf : p. 19 Symantec Global internet Security threat report
59in 2009, 98 percent of confidential information threats had a remote access component (figure 12). this
was an increase from 83 percent in 2008. the continued increase is likely because the addition of remote
access features (as well as other confidential information threats) to malicious software has become fairly
simple for authors to do; thus, almost all new threats include them. the sophistication and effectiveness of
malicious software creation toolkits has also likely contributed to the increase.
Exports system dataExports email addresses Keystroke loggerAllows remote access
83%
78%98%
89%
PeriodPercentage of exposure threats
Exports user data
2009 200865%76%
61%78% 86%
72%
Figure 12. Threats to confidential information, by type
Source: Symantec
Malicious code that exports user data accounted for 89 percent of threats to confidential information in
2009, up from 78 percent in 2008. this is unsurprising since threats that attempt to steal bank account
information, authentication credentials, and other confidential information could lead to monetary gain.
Confidential information threats with a keystroke logging capability made up 86 percent of threats to
confidential information, up from 76 percent in 2008. Malicious code incorporating keystroke loggers that target online gaming account credentials continues to be popular. Four of the top 10 threats downloaded by modular malicious software specifically target online game account information. these are Gampass,
Gammima, Onlinegame,
164 and Lineage, and they continue to account for a significant number of potential
infections, with three of the four (excepting Gammima) also ranking in the top 10 downloaded components in 2008.
164 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-011012-0102-99Symantec Global internet Security threat report
60Overall, every category of threats to confidential information increased in 2009. this is considered to be
due to the continuing increased professionalization of the threat landscape. the creation of toolkits
designed specifically to create malicious packages is making it relatively easy for even neophyte attackers
to create threats with increasing complexity and sophistication over time.
Organizations can take several steps to limit the exposure of confidential information by successful
intrusions. Data loss prevention solutions can block sensitive data from being stored on endpoint computers. Encrypting sensitive data that is stored in databases will limit an attacker’s ability to view and/or use the data. However, this step may require sufficient resources to be made available since adequately managing encryption keys and ensuring that archived data is actually encrypted can be costly. Furthermore, encrypting stored data will not protect against man-in-the-middle attacks that intercept data before it is encrypted.
165 As a result, data should always be transmitted through secure channels such as SSH, SSL,
and ipSec.166
Propagation mechanisms
Worms and viruses use various means to transfer themselves, or propagate, from one computer to another. these means are collectively referred to as propagation mechanisms. propagation mechanisms
can include a number of different vectors, such as instant messaging (iM), Simple Mail transfer protocol
(SMtp), Common internet File System (CiFS), p2p, and remotely exploitable vulnerabilities.
167 Some
malicious code may even use other malicious code as a propagation vector by locating a computer that has been compromised through a back door server and using it to upload and install itself. the samples
discussed here are assessed according to the percentage of potential infections.
in 2009, 72 percent of potential malicious code infections propagated as file-sharing executables, up from
66 percent in 2008 (table 18).
168 File-sharing executables are the propagation mechanisms employed by
viruses and some worms to copy themselves onto removable media. the continuing resurgence in this
vector over the past few years coincides with the increased use of removable drives and other portable devices. it is also an easy vector to exploit because old malicious code developed for floppy disks can be
easily modified for current removable media devices. Downadup.B was the most prolific threat globally in 2009 that employed this propagation method, potentially accounting for this increase.
to limit the propagation of threats through removable drives, administrators should ensure that all such
devices are scanned for viruses when they are connected to a computer. if removable drives are not needed
within the enterprise, endpoint security and policies can prevent computers from recognizing these drives
when they are attached. Additionally, best practices policies should be implemented to mitigate the dangers of attaching unauthorized devices to computers within the enterprise.
165 A “man-in-the-middle attack” is an attack in which a third party intercepts communications between two computers. the “man in the middle” captures the data,
but still relays it to the intended destination to avoid detection.
166 Secure shell (SSH) is a network protocol that allows data to be exchanged using a secure channel between two networked devices; Secure Sockets Layer (SSL)
is a cryptographic protocol that provides security for communications over networks such as the internet; internet protocol Security (ipsec) is a protocol suite for
securing internet protocol (ip) communications by authenticating and encrypting each ip packet of a data stream.
167 CiFS is a file sharing protocol that allows files and other resources on a computer to be shared with other computers across the internet. One or more directories
on a computer can be shared to allow other computers to access the files within.
168 Because malicious code samples often use more than one mechanism to propagate, cumulative percentages may exceed 100 percent.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
611
23
45
67
8
9
10File-sharing executablesFile transfer, CIFSFile transfer, email attachment
Remotely exploitable vulnerabilityFile sharing , P2P
File transfer, HTTP, embedded URI, instant messengerSQL
Back door, Kuang2
Back door, SubSeven
File sharing, data files 2009 Percentage
72%
42%25%
24%
5%
4%2%
2%
2%
1%2008 Percentage
66%
30%31%
12%10%
4%
3%
3%
3%
1%Propagation Mechanisms Rank
Table 18. Propagation mechanisms
Source: Symantec
in 2009, 42 percent of malicious code that propagated did so through the CiFS protocol, up from
30 percent in 2008. propagation through the CiFS protocol overtook propagation through email in 2009.
the increase may be linked to the diversification of mechanisms discussed above. three of the top 10
malicious code threats for 2009 employed the CiFS propagation mechanism, up from two in 2008. this
includes the Downadup, Mabezat and Almanahe worms.
the CiFS propagation mechanism can be a threat to organizations because file servers use CiFS to give
users access to their shared files. if a computer with access to a file server becomes infected by a threat
that propagates through CiFS, the infection could spread to the file server. Since multiple computers within an organization likely access the same file server, this could facilitate the rapid propagation of the threat within the enterprise. if malicious software can infect a single computer through any other propagation
method such as email or malicious websites, the CiFS propagation method can rapidly spread infection throughout an entire organization. this is increasingly becoming a threat to home environments as well,
because home networks with multiple devices are becoming more commonplace.
to protect against threats that use the CiFS protocol to propagate, all shares should be protected with
strong passwords, and only users who require the resources should be given access to them. if other users
do not need to write to a share, they should only be given “read” permissions. this will prevent malicious
code from copying itself to the shared directory or modifying shared files. Finally, CiFS shares should not
be exposed to the internet. Blocking tCp port 445 at the network boundary will help to protect against
threats that propagate using CiFS.
169
propagation occurring through email attachments dropped from 31 percent in 2008 to 25 percent in 2009, continuing its decline from 32 percent in 2007. Email attachments have now been surpassed by both executable file sharing and CiFS propagation methods.
169 tCp port 445 is the default port used to run CiFS on tCp.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
62the previous volume of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report surmised that the growing
gap in email propagation was because malicious code authors may not have been experiencing as much
success with attacks using email attachments as in past years.170 increased user awareness and greater
vigilance and accuracy for email protection mechanisms may be a factor in this decrease. Another factor in the decrease in email attachment propagation is that there was a 23 percent increase in malicious code variants propagating through email in 2009, but only half the email per variant, resulting in an overall decrease in malicious email.
171
One specific example of the propagation of malicious code through email was through the pandex botnet
in 2009.172 this botnet sent approximately 3.6 billion spam messages containing the Bredolab trojan per
day in October 2009 alone. Bredolab was the third-ranked top new malicious software threat in 2009.
With over 87 percent of all email reported as spam, the prevalence of distributing malicious threats
through email remains a viable propagation method. to limit the propagation of email-borne threats,
administrators should ensure that all email attachments are scanned at the gateway. Additionally, all executable files originating from external sources such as email attachments or those downloaded from websites should be treated as suspicious. All executable files should be checked by antivirus scanners using the most current definitions.
the propagation of malicious code by remotely exploiting vulnerabilities doubled between 2008 and
2009. this potentially can be explained by the success of the Downadup worm. in 2009, Downadup and
Downadup.B were both highly ranked malicious code threats and accounted for a significant increase in the propagation by remote vulnerabilities.
Malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities
Assessing the proportion of malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities helps to show how popular this technique is for distributing new variants of malicious code. the popularity of exploiting vulnerabilities
(and especially vulnerabilities that have available fixes) as a means of malicious code propagation illustrates the need for administrators to apply patches in a timely manner. Applying all available patches in a timely manner can greatly reduce propagation through vulnerabilities.
in 2009, 6 percent of the 1,560 documented malicious code instances exploited vulnerabilities.
173 this
is an increase from the 3 percent proportion of the malicious code instances documented for 2008. in
2009, four of the top 50 global malicious threats exploited vulnerabilities, up from three in 2008. the
effectiveness of this method of propagation is borne out by the fact it was the fourth-ranked propagation
mechanism in both 2008 and 2009.
Malicious threats that do not themselves exploit vulnerabilities to propagate may still be installed on
computers through threats that do. the primary example of this is with modular threats. One example
is worms that exploit vulnerabilities to gain initial access to a computer and then download and install further threats. Another example is drive-by downloads, in which the exploitation of a vulnerability in a Web browser allows a modular threat to also download and install further threats.
170 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiv_04-2009.en-us.pdf : p. 69
171 http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/2009MLiAnnualreport_Final_printresolution.pdf : p. 30
172 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/2009-year-worth-learning
173 the number of documented malicious code instances differs from the number of malicious code submissions; documented malicious code instances are those that
have been analyzed and documented within the Symantec malicious code database.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
63Of significant note regarding this propagation method is Downadup. Since november 2008 it has risen to
be the sixth-ranked staged downloader component and, overall, the fifth-ranked potential infection for
2009. As noted earlier, there were more than 1.5 million infection counts of the Downadup worm observed by Symantec in December 2009 alone, and it was estimated that Downadup was on more than 6 million pCs worldwide at the end of 2009, even though Microsoft issued a patch for it on October 23. 2008.
174
Downadup exploits a vulnerability in Microsoft Windows that allows attackers to remotely gain administrative privileges on computers. Microsoft states that there were limited and targeted attacks up to two weeks prior to patching the issue.
175 proof-of-concept exploit code was released October 24, 2008,
and the first worm exploiting the vulnerability was Wecorl,176 which was discovered on november 2, 2008.
Downadup was discovered on november 21. Approximately four weeks elapsed between the availability
of the patch addressing the vulnerability that Downadup exploits and Downadup’s discovery.
the A and B variants of Downadup account for the vast majority of infections worldwide, with Downadup.C
infecting less than half a million computers by the end of 2009. Successive variants after C affect even fewer computers.
the success of Downadup illustrates that, even though there are small numbers of samples that exploit
vulnerabilities, they have great success in compromising unpatched computers. End users and enterprises should ensure that vulnerabilities in affected software are patched as soon as fixes are available. the
continuing prevalence of the older A and B variants of Downadup, in particular, illustrate the importance of software updates. intrusion prevention systems and antivirus software can help protect against malicious
code that exploits vulnerabilities for which no patch is available.
Malicious code—protection and mitigation
it is critical that end users and enterprises maintain the most current antivirus definitions to protect against the high quantity of new malicious code threats. iDS, ipS, and other behavior-blocking technologies
should also be employed to prevent compromise by new threats. Using a firewall can also prevent threats that send information back to the attacker from opening a communication channel.
Symantec recommends that certain best security practices always be followed to protect against malicious
code infection. Administrators should keep patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host public services and applications—such as Http , Ftp, SMtp , and DnS servers—and that are accessible
through a firewall or placed in a DMZ. Email servers should be configured to only allow file attachment types that are required for business needs and to block email that appears to come from within the company, but that actually originates from external sources. Additionally, Symantec recommends that ingress and egress filtering be put in place on perimeter devices to prevent unwanted activity.
174 See http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php/Stats/Conficker and http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/MS08-067.mspx
175 http://blogs.technet.com/msrc/archive/2008/10/23/ms08-067-released.aspx
176 http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-110306-2212-99Symantec Global internet Security threat report
64to protect against malicious code that installs itself through a Web browser, additional measures should be
taken. the use of ipS technologies can prevent exploitation of browser and plug-in vulnerabilities through
signatures and behavior-based detection in addition to ASLr . End users should employ defense-in-depth
strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software and a personal firewall. Users should update
antivirus definitions regularly. they should also ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers are
updated with all necessary security patches from their software vendors. they should never view, open, or
execute any email attachment unless it is expected and comes from a trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
65Phishing, Underground Economy Servers, and Spam Trends
phishing is an attempt by a third party to solicit confidential information from an individual, group, or
organization by mimicking (or spoofing) a specific brand, usually one that is well known, often for financial gain. phishers attempt to trick users into disclosing personal data, such as credit card numbers, online
banking credentials, and other sensitive information, which they may then use to commit fraudulent acts.
phishing generally requires end users to enter their credentials into an online data entry field. this is one
of the characteristics that distinguishes phishing from spam-based scams (such as the widely disseminated
“419 scam” and other social engineering scams).
177 the data that end users enter can then be used for
fraudulent purposes.
Spam is usually defined as junk or unsolicited email sent by a third party. While it is certainly an annoyance
to users and administrators, spam is also a serious security concern because it can be used to deliver trojans, viruses, and phishing attempts.
178 Spam can also be used to deliver drive-by downloaders, which
require no end user interaction other than navigation to the UrLs contained in the spam messages. Large volumes of spam could also cause a loss of service or degradation in the performance of network resources and email gateways.
this section will assess phishing and spam trends that Symantec observed in 2009. it will also discuss
items that were offered for sale on underground economy servers during this time, since this is where much
of the profit is made from phishing and spam attacks. Underground economy servers are black market forums for advertising and trading stolen information and services. this discussion will assess underground
economy servers according to the different types of goods and services advertised. it should be noted that
this discussion might not necessarily be representative of internet-wide activity; rather, it is intended as a
snapshot of the activity that Symantec monitored during this period.
the results used in this analysis are based on data returned from the Symantec probe network, as well as
the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam™ customer base and MessageLabs intelligence. Specifically, statistics
are only gathered from enterprise customers’ Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam servers that each receive
more than 1,000 email messages per day. this ensures that smaller data samples (that is, smaller
customers and test servers) are excluded, thereby allowing for a more accurate representation of data. Statistics obtained on underground economy servers are gathered by proprietary Symantec technologies that monitor communications on those servers.
the Symantec probe network consists of millions of decoy email addresses that are configured to attract
a large stream of spam attacks. An attack can consist of one or more messages. the goal of the Symantec
probe network is to simulate a wide variety of internet email users, thereby attracting a stream of traffic
that is representative of spam activity across the internet as a whole. For this reason, this network is
continuously optimized in order to attract new varieties of spam attacks.
177 the scam is referred to as such because 419 is the section of nigerian criminal code that deals with fraud; nigeria has become notorious as the source for
this sort of scam. http://nortontoday.symantec.com/features/security_at_30.php
178 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6676819.stmSymantec Global internet Security threat report
66this section will address the following metrics:
phishing activity by sector•
Countries hosting phishing UrLs and top targeted sectors•
Automated phishing toolkits •
Underground economy servers—goods and services available for sale•
Spam by category•
Countries of spam origin•
Spam delivered by botnets•
phishing, underground economy servers, and spam—protection and mitigation•
Phishing activity by sector
this section will explore phishing activity in two ways. First, it will analyze the unique brands being spoofed
in phishing attacks according to the sector to which they belong. Second, it will explore the sectors whose brands were most frequently spoofed by phishing UrLs. these considerations are important for an
enterprise because the use of its brand(s) in phishing activity can significantly undermine consumer confidence in its reputation.
phishing UrLs are usually delivered by spam email (in which case it is known as phishing email) and
multiple UrLs can lead to the same phishing website. A phishing website is a site that is designed to mimic the legitimate website of the organization whose brand is being spoofed. in many cases, it is set up by the
attacker to capture authentication information or other personal identification information from victims; any information gathered is then typically used in identity theft or other fraudulent activity.
the motive behind most—if not all—phishing is for financial gain. phishers typically exploit brands
associated with the financial sector because data garnered from phished financial websites is likely to yield
online banking account and login details. One element that greatly facilitates the success of phishing attempts is the increased use of the internet for financial transactions. For instance, in the United Kingdom
and France, more than 50 percent of internet users perform online banking, while in Canada the number
rises to 60 percent. in the United States, eight out of 10 online households now bank online. it is not
surprising then that, given its gainful capability, the majority of phishing activity targets brands in the financial sector. the prosperous nature of these phished credentials is borne out by the fact that credit
card details and banking credentials remained the most frequently advertised items on underground economy servers observed by Symantec in 2009.
the majority of brands used in phishing attacks in 2009 were from the financial services sector, accounting
for 74 percent of the total (table 19). this was a decrease of 5 percentage points from the 79 percent
reported in 2008, but is still 65 percentage points above the second-ranked sector during this reporting period. the number of uniquely phished brands also decreased by 13 percent in 2009. this may be a
reflection of the turbulence in the global banking sector in 2009 that saw a number of changes in the ownership and solvency of a number of significant institutions.
179 the decline in the number of banks
resulted in there being fewer appealing brands to phish. Another possibility could be that phishers are refocusing their efforts more on larger, more profitable banks, which is indicated by the most phished brands (discussed in “Countries hosting phishing websites and top targeted sectors”).
179 http://www.financialexpress.com/news/us-bank-collapse-toll-touches-94-so-far-this-year/520225/Symantec Global internet Security threat report
67Sector
Financial
ISPRetail
Insurance
Internet communityTelecomComputer hardware
Government
Computer software
Transportation2009 Percentage
74%
9%
6%
3%
2%2%1%
1%
<1%<1%2008 Percentage
79%
8%
4%
2%
2%2%1%
1%
<1%<1%
Table 19. Unique brands phished, by sector
Source: Symantec
Analysis of the data for phishing websites in 2009 indicates that the financial services sector also
accounted for 78 percent of that total, which was slightly higher than 2008, when the volume of phishing websites for financial services was 76 percent (figure 13). Although this may not seem to be a significant percentage change, the number of phishing UrLs targeting the financial services sector in 2009 increased by 35 percent. As previously mentioned, the number of brands targeted by phishing attacks in 2009 decreased by 13 percent when compared to 2008. An increase in the number of phishing UrLs targeting fewer brands may indicate that phishers narrowed the focus of their phishing attacks during 2009. this
becomes evident when the top phished brands in 2009 are compared with the same brands phished in 2008. in 2009, the top two brands phished belonged to the largest U.S.-based multinational banks. in
2008, these brands ranked 17th and seventh in 2008, respectively. there was nearly a sevenfold increase
in phishing UrLs that targeted the top-phished brand in 2009 over the previous reporting period, while the second-ranked brand had almost a threefold increase. this indicates that phishers are narrowing their
focus. rather than targeting a wider range of smaller financial institutions, they are specifically targeting
the largest banks that are more likely to have a higher number of customers banking online.
One development that Symantec has observed from the increased sophistication of targeting phishing
attacks is an increase in spear-phishing campaigns. Spear phishing is a targeted form of phishing in which the apparent source of the email is likely to be an individual within the recipients’ company and generally someone in a position of authority. Victims are much more likely to fall for a spearphishing attempt because of the level of familiarity with the sender and the contents of the message, given that the contents would have been specifically crafted for the recipients. Spear phishing is a growing concern as attackers turn their attention toward targeted attacks aimed at stealing an organization’s intellectual property. these
attacks are likely to target senior officials of organizations who have access to significant amounts of their organization’s intellectual property because successful attacks are likely to garner greater financial yield for attackers. Symantec anticipates that this trend will increase through 2010.
180
180 http://www.symantec.com/business/resources/articles/article.jsp?aid=20091110_multi_channel_securitySymantec Global internet Security threat report
68Financial
Retail Internet communityISP
Government Online gaming78%12%5%3% 1%
1%
Figure 13. Phished sectors by volume of phishing URLs
Source: Symantec
in 2009, the iSp sector ranked second for spoofed brands, accounting for 9 percent of the total. the iSp
sector also ranked second for volume of phishing lures in 2009, accounting for 12 percent of the total—a
slight increase from the 10 percent recorded in 2008. Although there was little change in the number of unique brands phished in this sector, the volume of lures targeting these brands increased by 50 percent.
the increase in the volume of lures targeting this sector was likely due the financially advantageous nature
of these accounts. Once phishers gain access to Webmail accounts they could sell them in the underground economy. While credentials stolen during iSp-targeted attacks do not offer much direct financial gain for
the phishers, they do offer a wealth of user information that can be used in other phishing, spear phishing, or social engineering attacks.
181 At the very least, phishers can harvest the user’s address list for further
spamming opportunities. it has also been observed by Symantec that phishers sometimes use the free
Web-hosting space often included with these iSp accounts to set up fraudulent websites, from which they
launch new attacks.
the third most phished sector for 2009 was the retail services sector. this accounted for 6 percent of
organizations whose brands were spoofed by phishing attacks in 2009, an increase of 2 percentage points
from the 4 percent recorded in 2008; this also accounted for a 36 percent increase in the number of unique phished brands in the retail sector. the retail sector is an attractive target for phishers for
numerous reasons.
181 in spear phishing attempts, the email appears to be from organizations or individuals the potential victims would normally get emails from; for more information
see: http://www.symantec.com/norton/products/library/article.jsp?aid=spear_phishing_scam_not_sportSymantec Global internet Security threat report
69the growth of the online retail sector has been considerable over the last several years and this is one
sector seemingly unaffected by the global recession; for example, one survey found that, in 2009, shoppers were spending 94 percent more per order online and that, in the United States, online retail sales increased over 14 percent from 2008.
182 phishers are capitalizing on the fact that online retailers regularly require the
input of financial information that, if obtained by the phishers, can be sold or used for fraudulent financial gain. if phishing attempts to acquire usernames, passwords, and credit card information prove successful,
then the resultant information can be used on legitimate websites to purchase goods using the stolen credit card information.
Despite the fact that it offers promise for potential gain, it would appear that phishers did not target the
retail sector in 2009 as much as in previous years. Even though the number of unique phished brands increased by 36 percent, the number of phishing UrLs targeting those brands decreased by almost 20 percent when compared to 2008 data. this suggests that it is probably easier and more lucrative for
an attacker to buy a credit card number on the underground economy or obtain credit card details via an online banking scam, rather than taking the time to phish a retail account. For example, stolen credit can be easily laundered online, such as through online gambling sites where a number of “players” could populate an entire poker game and arrange to lose money to one another, which is easier than having to fence products procured from phished retail accounts that could be easily traced. this is another possible
explanation for the significant increase in the number of UrLs targeting the financial sector and the reduction in the number of UrLs targeting the retail sector in 2009. Symantec predicts that this trend will continue through 2010.
Countries hosting phishing URLs and top targeted sectors
this metric will assess the countries in which the most phishing UrLs were hosted in 2009. this data is a
snapshot in time and does not offer insight into changes in the locations of certain phishing sites over the course of the reporting period. it should also be noted that the fact that a phishing UrL is hosted in a
certain country does not necessarily mean that the attacker is located in that country.
in 2009, 36 percent of all phishing UrLs detected by Symantec were located in the United States (table 20).
this is considerably less than 2008 and 2007, when 43 percent and 69 percent of phishing UrLs originated there, respectively. this declining trend was discussed in the previous version of the Symantec Global
Internet Security Threat Report, which suggested that the threat landscape was shifting from the United States to emerging countries with rapidly expanding broadband infrastructures.
183
Of the phishing UrLs situated in the United States, 70 percent of phished brands were associated with financial services. this is in keeping with the global trend, in which 74 percent of phishing UrLs detected
across the internet as a whole were associated with the financial services sector. this is in keeping with the
global trend, since 74 percent of phishing UrLs detected across the internet as a whole were associated
with financial service organizations. this trend of targeting the financial sector is reflected in the top 10
countries hosting phishing UrLs in 2009. As previously discussed in “Phishing activity by sector,” the
financial sector offers the best chance of lucrative financial reward for phishers.
182 http://www.coremetrics.com/company/2009/pr12-21-09-online_retail_sales.php
183 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_exec_summary_internet_security_threat_report_xiv_04-2009.en-us.pdf : p. 8Symantec Global internet Security threat report
701
23
4
567
8
9
10CountryPercentage
Rank
United StatesSouth KoreaSpain
Poland
RomaniaRussiaUnited Kingdom
Germany
Canada
France2009
36%
5%
4%
4%
4%4%3%
3%
3%
2%2008
43%
4%
2%
6%
<1%
3%
3%
3%
3%
4%2009 Top Sector
Targeted in Country
Financial services
Financial servicesFinancial services
Financial services
Financial servicesFinancial servicesFinancial services
Financial services
Financial services
Financial services2009 Percentage of URLs
Targeting Top Sector
70%
91%
88%89%
89%73%70%
76%
61%
74%
Table 20. Top countries hosting phishing URLs and top-targeted sectors
Source: Symantec
in 2009, South Korea had 5 percent of the total of phishing UrLs observed globally, up from 4 percent in
2008 when it ranked fourth in this measurement. the reason for South Korea’s high ranking here may be
its extensive broadband infrastructure, which makes an appealing target for attackers looking to host phishing and spam sites. According to a recent survey, South Korea ranked second globally for online connectivity.
184 internet users in South Korea spend an average of 11.5 hours a week on the Web; in 2008,
household broadband penetration was at 97 percent.185 Moreover, the previous volume of the Symantec
Global Internet Security Threat Report noted the increasing levels of fiber-to-the-home/building (F ttH/B)
deployment in South Korea.186 FttH/B connections currently provide the highest bandwidth capacities,
compared to traditional DSL or cable lines, and South Korea has the highest penetration of F ttH/B
worldwide. With a strong culture of internet usage with high-speed available broadband and a thriving
personal computer market, it is easy to see why attackers might favor South Korea as a location for sending spam and hosting phishing attacks.
Spain moved into third place in 2009, accounting for four percent of the total for countries hosting
phishing UrLs. this was an increase of two percentage points over 2008 when it ranked 13th. Symantec
also recorded that this two percent change accounted for a fourfold increase in the numbers of lures seen emanating from Spain in 2009. this is not unusual when considering recent trends in Spain. the most
recent report on global broadband subscriptions shows Spain as having the fifth highest rate of broadband subscription globally.
187 Spain is also ranked 14th for countries sending the most spam in 2009. Given
these factors, it is probable that a higher percentage of broadband-connected computers in Spain are susceptible to compromise and are likely serving as hosts for phishing UrLs and spam servers, both of which could be used to generate and distribute phishing lures.
184 http://www.google.com/publicdata?ds=wb-wdi&met=it_net_user_p2&tdim=true&dl=en&hl=en&q=global+internet+usage#met=it_net_user_p2&idim=country:
USA:KOr:FrA:DEU:ESp:it A:CAn:GBr&tdim=true
185 http://news.zdnet.com/2100-3513_22-137772.html
186 http://www.ftthcouncil.org/en/newsroom/2010/02/26/g-20-need-to-speed-up-on-fiber-to-the-home
187 http://point-topic.com/contentDownload/operatorsource/dslreports/world%20broadband%20statistics%20q1%202009.pdf : p. 25Symantec Global internet Security threat report
71romania moved into fifth place and accounted for four percent of the total for countries hosting phishing
UrLs in 2009. this was a dramatic change compared to 2008, when romania ranked 28th, and accounted
for less than one percent of the total for countries hosting phishing UrLs. the four percent increase noted
by Symantec, accounted for approximately an eighteen-fold increase in the number of phishing UrLs originating from romania during 2009. romania’s broadband sector has also developed rapidly in recent
years.
188 in addition to hosting phishing UrLs, it was noted by Symantec that romania moved from 20th
position in 2008 to 12th position in 2009 for countries sending the most spam. Given these facts, it is clear that attackers are looking at romania as a favorable target for hosting malicious activity. Symantec
anticipates this trend will continue through 2010.
Another significant change in the rankings in 2009 was China’s move from third-ranked position in 2008
for countries responsible for hosting phishing UrLs to 18th in 2009. One reason for this drop may be that Chinese companies and government organizations last year formed an antiphishing group that may have helped reduce phishing incidents.
189
Automated phishing toolkits
A phishing toolkit is a set of scripts that allows an attacker to automatically create websites that spoof the legitimate websites of different brands, including the images and logos associated with those brands. the scripts also help to generate corresponding phishing email messages. Because each script generates pseudo-random phishing UrLs with a distinctive pattern, the particular script used to generate a particular phishing UrL can be identified from that pattern. All phishing UrLs reported to Symantec can be sorted and grouped according to those specific patterns.
phishing toolkits are developed by groups or individuals who, along with using the kits themselves, sell
the kits in the underground economy. therefore, independent groups can use the same toolkit. note that
toolkits sold in the underground economy often go unnamed. Unlike legitimate software, for which naming plays an important marketing role, phishing toolkits often become popular based on who has produced them. Moreover, their names are usually not integral given the limited lifespan of a great many of them. Consequently, phishing toolkits discussed here cannot be named specifically and will instead be referred to by numbers.
phishing Kit 1 relies on a strong social engineering component and is typically active only around holiday
seasons. this explains why it was responsible for more than 29 percent of all phishing campaigns, in
January 2009, but then its activity dropped to an average of 6.35 percent for the year overall (figure 14). Kit 1 only targets one popular Webmail service and uses domain names that are often related to images or pictures, such as “ellie.cool-xmas-pics.com” or “kyleman.cool-xmas-pics.com.” they are often sent using
the same targeted Webmail service to other users, with text such as “Hey is this you on [sic] this picture?”
phishing Kit 1 is a domain-based phishing toolkit. Domain-based phishing toolkits require the phisher to
own or register a unique domain such as “aphishingsite.com” and host it on a bot network or on an iSp.
the phisher can then create phishing links with random subdomains, such as “mybank.aphishingsite.com,” “anotherbank.aphishingsite.com,” and so on.
188 http://www.mindbranch.com/romania- telecommunications-Q1-r302-9378/
189 http://news.techworld.com/security/3208909/chinese-virus-makers-end-up-in-jail/Symantec Global internet Security threat report
72On the other hand, defacement-based phishing toolkits do not require the registration of domains or
DnS servers, so they are easier to set up. Defacement-based phishing toolkits require a phisher to compromise existing Web pages, after which the phisher can simply upload the page of the spoofed brand. Defacement-based toolkits are often favored by phishers because of their ease of use and the fact that they can piggyback on the reputation of the original domain. For example, in 2009 Symantec detected many image-hosting sites that were compromised and used for phishing attacks.
MonthApr JunA ug Oct0%10%20%30%
5%15%25%35%
Dec FebPhishing toolkit 1
Phishing toolkit 2
Phishing toolkit 3PercentagePhishing toolkit 5Phishing toolkit 4
Mar MayJ uly Sep Nov Jan
Figure 14. Automated phishing toolkits
Source: Symantec
phishing Kit 5 appeared in May 2009. it was responsible for 20 percent of that month’s phishing attacks,
followed by 32 percent in June and 17 percent in July. After this spike, its usage dropped to less than
two percent and then it vanished completely. Volume Xiii of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat
Report discussed this tendency and noted that the rapid change in preferred toolkits is likely driven by a need for phishers to adapt and constantly change the toolkits they use to avoid detection by antiphishing software.
190 this is likely the driving factor behind the dramatic upward spike and subsequent decline of
many toolkits. Moreover, this specific attack used one single domain, which made it easier for security companies to block once it was detected.
On average, each of the top five phishing kits was responsible for nearly 5 percent of all the attacks
observed in 2009, with small fluctuations over time. Overall, there was an increase in the total number of different phishing kits used. Most kits are becoming more sophisticated in an attempt to make it harder for security researchers and users to detect them.
190 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 73Symantec Global internet Security threat report
73Underground economy servers—goods and services available for sale
this discussion focuses on the most frequently advertised items for sale on underground economy servers
observed by Symantec. the underground economy is an evolving and self-sustaining black market where
underground economy servers, or black market forums, are used for the promotion and trade of stolen information and services. this information can include government-issued identification numbers such as
Social Security numbers (SSns), credit card numbers, debit card information, user accounts, email address lists, and bank accounts. Services include cashiers, scam page hosting, and job advertisements such as for scam developers or phishing partners. Much of this commerce is built within channels on irC servers. For
an in-depth analysis of how the underground internet economy functions, please see the Symantec Report
on the Underground Economy, published november 2008.
191
the measure of goods and services available for sale is by distinct messages, which are considered as single advertisements for a good or service, though the same advertisement may appear thousands of times. to qualify as a new message there must be variations such as price changes or other alterations in
the message.
in 2009, credit card information was the good most frequently advertised for sale on underground
economy servers observed by Symantec, accounting for 19 percent of all advertised items (table 21). this
was a decrease from 32 percent in 2008. Although this appears to be a significant drop, the percentage observed in 2007 was 21 percent, which may indicate that there was higher availability of credit card numbers on underground economy servers in 2008. the number of data breaches reported in those years
is a further indication of this. there were more than twice as many data breaches reported in 2008 than in
2007. Similarly, there were almost twice as many data breaches reported in 2008 than there were in 2009. Credit card information advertised on the underground economy consists of the credit card number and expiry date, and may include the name on the card (or business name for corporate cards), billing address, phone number, CVV2 number, and pin.
192
2009
1
23
4
567
89
102008
1
23
4
96
13
7
8
12ItemPercentage
Range of PricesOverall Rank
Credit card information
Bank account credentialsEmail accounts
Email addresses
Shell scriptsFull identitiesCredit card dumps
MailersCash-out servicesWebsite administration credentials2009
19%
19%
7%
7%
6%5%5%
4%4%4%
2008
32%
19%
5%
5%
3%4%2%
3%3%3%$0.85–$30
$15–$850$1–$20
$1.70/MB–$15/MB
$2–$5$0.70–$20$4–$150
$4–$10$0–$600 plus 50%–60%$2–$30
Table 21. Goods and services advertised for sale on underground economy servers
Source: Symantec
191 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_underground_economy_report_11-2008-14525717.en-us.pdf
192 Card Verification Value 2 (CVV2) is a three- or four-digit number on the credit card and used for card-not-present transactions, such as internet or phone purchases.
this was created to add an extra layer of security for credit cards and to verify that the person completing the transaction was in fact, in possession of the card.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
74Another contributing factor for the drop in the percentage of advertisements for credit card information
may have been the increase in advertisements for credit card dumps; these increased in rank from 13th in 2008 to seventh in 2009. While credit card information includes things such as the credit card number, expiry date, and account holder name, a credit card dump is an exact copy of the encoded data contained in the magnetic stripe on a credit card.
193 the dump data can be written to the magnetic stripes of
counterfeit credit cards and then the duplicates can be used as though they were the original card.
the drop in percentage may also be related to credit card companies, credit card issuers, and banks taking
more secure precautions to verify and authenticate users. Multi-level security systems for card-present transactions (such as EMV chip-based cards) can make it more difficult for criminals to obtain and use financial information.
194 these technologies are being increasingly implemented as more companies opt
for compliance with new security standards. As the usage of this technology grows, criminals may resort to other means of making fraudulent transactions.
Stolen credit card information can be quickly and easily used to purchase goods online because, often,
only minimal credit card information is required for online purchases. in addition to physical goods
purchased online for subsequent delivery, criminals can purchase digital goods such as domain registrations, music, software, and gift certificates for online stores, which they receive immediately. Someone with sufficient knowledge could make many transactions with a stolen card before the suspicious activity is detected and the card is suspended. However, there is a chance that the activity will be detected and if this happens before physical goods are shipped, the fraudulent transaction will have failed. Additionally, a shipping address must be provided for physical goods, which may help law enforcement agents in locating the criminal. However, criminals often obfuscate their connections to fraudulent online transactions by having the purchased goods delivered to the address of an intermediary (referred to as a mule or a drop) who then ships the goods to the criminal.
195
Aside from the shipping address, these mules may have no obvious ties to the initial transaction and are often unaware that they are facilitating illegal transactions and money laundering. the service of mules is
even advertised on underground economy servers by scammers who have deceived unsuspecting people into carrying out a seemingly legitimate job.
Scammers acquire mules by attracting unsuspecting victims with work-from-home job opportunities
advertised in the guise of legitimate employment. the job requires the mule to receive packages at a
personal address or a post box that they set up on the scammer’s behalf. the mule then resends the
packages to addresses specified by the scammer. the mule is typically required to pay for any set-up costs
and shipping fees out of their own pocket, with promises of reimbursement and an enticing paycheck later. Many victims of mule scams are never paid or reimbursed and end up losing thousands of dollars before realizing that they have been victimized.
193 information contained within the magnetic stripe on a credit card, which is made up of two tracks. Both tracks contain the primary account number and expiration
date; the first track will contain the cardholder name and CVV. Each credit card issuer will have their own standards for encoding the information in the tracks.
194 EMV is a standard for authenticating credit and debit card payments (http://www.emvco.com/about.asp); see also
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/10/card-fraud/
195 http://information-security-resources.com/2009/11/20/online-money-mules-aide-theft-and-fraud/Symantec Global internet Security threat report
75Counterfeit credit cards made using data dumps can add a sense of legitimacy to fraudulent transactions
by allowing criminals to make purchases in person. By immediately acquiring purchased goods during the transaction instead of waiting for delivery, the scammer does not have to worry about the credit card company noticing the purchase and freezing the account because the goods are already in the scammer’s possession. However, it is reasonable to assume that even when using counterfeit cards, some scammers will employ a third party to make in-person transactions, thereby reducing personal exposure to surveillance systems that could be monitoring the fraudulent purchase.
Credit card information can be obtained through a variety of means such as monitoring merchant card
authorizations or breaking into databases. Data breaches can be very lucrative in the underground economy. For example, the previously mentioned security breach of the credit card payment processor in January 2009 resulted in the exposure of more than 130 million credit card numbers. Even using the lowest advertised price-per-card number in 2009, this breach represents over $110 million in potential profit.
Credit card dumps are harder for underground economy sellers to acquire because they can only be
obtained by using skimming machines that physically scan the magnetic stripe of the legitimate card.
196
Because of this, and the pseudo-legitimacy that dumps can provide through counterfeit cards, dumps are rarer and are often advertised at higher rates than credit card information.
the prices of credit card information advertised in 2009 ranged from $0.85 to $30 per card number, a
slight change from 2008 when prices ranged from $0.06 to $30. the difference in prices may be a further
indication of higher availability in 2008; the low-end price observed in 2007 was $0.40. this is a reflection
of simple supply and demand, where higher bulk availability results in lower prices. there were three main
factors that influenced the prices: the amount of information included with the card, rarity of the card type, and bulk purchase sizes. Credit cards that bundled in personal information—such as government-issued identification numbers, addresses, phone numbers, and email addresses—were offered at higher prices. Cards that included security features such as CVV2 numbers, pins, and online verification service
passwords were also offered at higher prices.
the value of credit card information is also influenced by the location of the issuing bank as well as
the type and rarity of the credit card. Credit cards issued in regions such as Asia, the Middle East, and some European countries are often advertised at higher prices than those in other regions because the availability of information in these regions is lower. in 2009, for example, credit card information from
countries such as italy and France was commonly listed for $6 to $10 each, while cards issued from
the United Kingdom, Canada, and the United States were commonly listed at $5 or less per card.
While the maximum advertised price per card number remained the same in 2009 as the previous year,
the minimum price of $0.06 was higher than the 2008 minimum price per card number. the primary
reason for the rise in minimum price per card number is that there was a notable lack of bulk pricing in advertisements observed in 2009. the bulk rates that were advertised applied to smaller lots of card
numbers than has been previously observed. For example, the largest advertised bulk quantity observed by Symantec in 2009 was for 100 credit cards, as opposed to 5,000 credit cards in 2008.
196 Magnetic stripe skimming devices are small machines designed to scan and retain data contained in the magnetic stripes on credit and debit cards.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
76Some advertisements mentioned the availability of bulk purchasing but did not mention card number
volumes or pricing. this may suggest that some advertisers prefer to negotiate bulk rates on a per-
customer basis rather than being locked into offering a set rate. Sellers often make a sample allotment of their credit card numbers available to potential buyers who can use a number checking service to verify that the numbers are valid. the amount of valid numbers would obviously influence negotiated
rates. Considering the wide range of prices advertised, this would also allow the seller to increase his or her competitiveness and profit margins by being able to adjust the prices at any time based on rates advertised by other sellers.
As new security technologies evolve and become more commonly integrated, they may make it more
difficult for criminals to obtain credit card information, which will likely reduce the utility of the information. For example, cards with a built-in code generator were pilot tested in 2009 and may provide a means of securing card-not-present purchases such as those made online.
197 these cards have an
integrated keypad on the back that will generate a one-time verification code whenever the correct pin
is entered. Even if the card is stolen or lost, a criminal would need the pin to use the card.
Bank account credentials were the second most commonly advertised item on underground economy servers observed by Symantec in 2009, accounting for 19 percent of all advertised goods. this was the
same percentage as was observed in 2008. Bank account credentials may consist of account numbers, bank transit numbers, account holder names and/or company names, and may include online banking passwords. Advertisements often include the account type and balance as well as name and location of the financial institution.
the ability to directly withdraw currency from a bank account is advantageous and attractive to criminals,
who can realize a more immediate payout than with online purchases, which need to be sold to realize a purely financial reward. Bank account credentials also allow access to full balances in the bank accounts, whereas credit cards may have daily or other transaction limitations on accessing the maximum available credit. Criminals can also use bank accounts as intermediary channels for money laundering or to fund other online currency accounts that only accept bank transfers for payments.
Bank account credentials have been some of the most commonly advertised goods on underground
economy servers for the past several years. As noted in the previous Symantec Global Internet Security
Threat Report, the shift toward online banking provides the potentially increased availability of sensitive information through methods such as phishing or malicious code attacks, which can expose the credentials of both personal and business accounts alike.
198 the availability of sensitive information will
likely continue to increase as online financial transactions continue to grow, notwithstanding the recent setbacks in the availability of credit due to the recent global financial crisis.
199
the advertised prices for bank account credentials depend on the account type, location, and the funds advertised as available. in 2009, prices for these credentials observed on underground economy
servers ranged from $15 to $850, a slightly smaller range than in 2008 when prices ranged from $10 to $1,000. the advertised account balances ranged from $1,000 to $177,000; however, the most common
advertisements were for bank accounts with balances between $10,000 and $50,000. As in previous years, corporate accounts were typically advertised for a higher price than personal accounts. these bank
197 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8046492.stm
198 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiv_04-2009.en-us.pdf : p. 76
199 http://www.comscore.com/press_Events/press_releases/2009/4/2009_State_of_Online_Banking_reportSymantec Global internet Security threat report
77accounts often have larger balances than those of personal accounts, resulting in significant losses when
corporate account credentials are stolen. in 2009, for example, criminals used the valid online banking
credentials of a business to steal over $800,000.200
Although the country in which the bank is located was sometimes included in advertisements, it did not noticeably affect the prices for this reporting period. Some advertisements for bank account credentials listed minimal details, such as the banking organization only. As with bulk credit card information, this may suggest that some advertisers prefer to negotiate rates on a per-customer basis rather than locking themselves into a set price.
the third most common item advertised for sale on underground economy servers observed by Symantec
in 2009 was email accounts, making up 7 percent of the total. this was an increase from 5 percent in
2008. Having access to stolen email accounts has many benefits for criminals. the accounts can be used
for sending out spam and/or harvesting additional email addresses from contact lists. recipients of spam
email coming from a known email address may be more likely to trust the validity of the message.
Compromised email accounts can also often provide access to additional sensitive personal information
such as bank account data, student identification numbers, mailing addresses and phone numbers, or access to other online accounts (social networking pages, online stock accounts, etc.) that people often store in saved personal emails. Such information can often be used for the password recovery option offered on many online registration sites that send the account holder a new password via email, potentially giving the fraudster complete access to these accounts. this danger is further compounded by
the habit many people have of using the same password for multiple accounts. For example, in a major recent data breach it was discovered that simple passwords remain alarmingly popular, despite the risks of hacking.
201 the fraudulently gained personal information can then be used to conduct additional identity
theft and fraud.
the advertised prices of email accounts in 2009 ranged between $1 and $20 for each account. Most
advertisements listed a flat rate, although some sellers also listed bulk purchase prices such as “30 for $150,” or “$1 each on bulk purchase.” Very few details regarding the email accounts were provided, indicating that the buyers may not be concerned with whether the accounts are for personal or business use. in addition, some of the advertisements stated that Web space was included with the email account
and were listed at higher prices. iSps often include free Web space along with email accounts as a part of
the service, which many people never use. Criminals who compromise these accounts can use the space to host phishing sites or malicious code without the knowledge of the account owner.
As in previous reporting periods, the observed distribution of goods and services advertised on
underground economy servers continues to be focused on financial information, such as credit card information and bank account credentials. this suggests a trend in which criminals are more focused on
purchasing goods that allow them to make a quick profit rather than on exploits that require more time and resources, such as scam pages and email lists for spamming. As steps are taken to make it more difficult to obtain and use this financial information, this trend will likely change, albeit gradually as new security technologies take time to be refined and implemented.
200 http://www.krebsonsecurity.com/2010/01/texas-bank-sues-customer-hit-by-800000-cyber-heist/
201 http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/21/technology/21password.html?partner=rss&emc=rssSymantec Global internet Security threat report
78Spam by category
Spam categories are assigned based on spam activity that is detected by the Symantec probe network.
While some of the categories may overlap, this data provides a general overview of the types of spam that
are most commonly seen on the internet today. it is important to note that this data is restricted to spam
attacks that are detected and processed by the Symantec probe network. internal upstream processing
may filter out particular spam attacks, such as those that are determined to be potential fraud attacks.
the most common type of spam detected by Symantec in 2009 was related to internet-related goods
and services, which contributed 29 percent of all spam observed—an increase from 24 percent in 2008
(figure 15). this category of spam typically contains spam relating to online commodities such as online
educational diplomas and degrees. Although “degree spam” is not a new trend, 2009 saw spammers capitalize on the economic recession by advertising online degree courses to all sectors of the workforce. Some of these online educational scams requested financial-related information in the initial application stage, thus providing spammers with an additional way to procure credit card information under the pretense of a legitimate educational facility.
2008
Leisure
ScamsPolitical15%1%
8%7%5% 5%
19% 16%7%24%
29%
17%5%
2%
3%
15%
2009
InternetHealthFraud
FinancialCommercial productsAdult“419” type15%7%
Figure 15. Spam by category
Source: SymantecSymantec Global internet Security threat report
79the second most common type of spam detected was related to commercial products, which accounted for
17 percent of the spam observed by Symantec in 2009. While some categories had spikes at certain times of the year, the levels of product spam remained constant from January to December. From early January, Symantec noted product spam promoting roses and chocolates for Valentine’s Day, to designer watches and footwear in the summer months, to household trinkets for thanksgiving and Christmas in november and
December. this category has also remained relatively constant year after year, while selling commercial
paraphernalia remains a fruitful source of revenue for spammers.
Financial services spam remained the third most popular spam category in 2009, accounting for 15 percent
of all spam observed. Financial spam contains references to money, the stock market, or other financial opportunities. Even though the percentage of financial spam remains relatively unchanged as far back as 2007, what has changed is the subject lines used to convey the spam in this category. in the early days of
the global boom, penny stock was the most common type of financial spam observed by Symantec; these scams attempted to entice recipients to purchase penny stocks and shares, often as part of a pump-and-dump ploy to over-promote certain stocks.
As discussed previously, spammers frequently exploit current events to garner attention for their
merchandise. this reporting period was no exception, with spam subject lines preying on the financially
vulnerable by offering a risk-free way out of the financial crisis. this includes a barrage of “fear of
foreclosure” spam upon the collapse of the real estate bubble, as well as “make $$$ working from home” messages. it has also been noted by Symantec that these work from home scams can often be vehicles for
receiving stolen goods or transferring money stolen from online banking.
Countries of spam origin
this section will discuss the top 10 countries of spam origin. this discussion is based on data gathered
by customer installations of Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam. the data includes the originating server’s
ip address, against which frequency statistics are compared. Each ip address is mapped to a specific
country and charted over time. the nature of spam and its distribution on the internet presents challenges
in identifying the location of people who are sending it because many spammers try to redirect attention away from their actual geographic location. in an attempt to bypass ip block lists, the spammers use
trojans that relay email, which allow them to send spam from sites distinct from their physical location.
to send large volumes of spam, spammers tend to take advantage of geographic areas with large networks
of available broadband connections. As a result, the origin of spam tends to increase in countries that have more insecure broadband connections. these high-speed connections are often constantly connected to
the internet. this allows spammers to send out high volumes of spam by zombie connections at any time
of the day.
in 2009 the United States remained the top-ranked country for spam origin, accounting for 23 percent of
all spam observed by Symantec (table 22). this is down six percentage points from 29 percent in 2008 and
down considerably from 45 percent in 2007. the ranking of the United States is not surprising given that it
has the second highest number of broadband users globally.
202
202 http://point-topic.comSymantec Global internet Security threat report
802009
1
2
34
567
8
9
102008
15
13
12
9
43
2
3219CountryPercentage Overall Rank
United States
Brazil
IndiaSouth Korea
PolandChinaTurkey
Russia
Vietnam
Colombia2009
23%
11%
4%
4%
4%3%3%
3%
3%
2%2008
25%
4%2%2%
3%4%5%
6%
1%
1%
Table 22. Top countries of spam origin
Source: Symantec
Brazil ranked second for originating spam in 2009 with 11 percent of the total observed by Symantec.
this is a significant increase from 2008, when Brazil accounted for 4 percent of the total and was ranked fifth. the spam increase noted in Brazil can be attributed to the increased availability of broadband
connections there. there has been an enormous increase in investment in it infrastructure, making Brazil
one of the fastest growing global it markets.
203 this has enabled huge growth in broadband services in
Brazil—a recent report showed that broadband adoption in Brazil had 16 percent growth in 2009.204 in
addition, as previously discussed in the “threat Activity” section of this report, Brazil ranked first for the country hosting the most spam zombies, a rank which it also held in 2008. the substantial growth in
broadband availability, along with a thriving market in computer sales,
205 provides a prime environment
for spammers looking for a platform to launch their spam attacks.
india ranked third for originating spam observed by Symantec in 2009, accounting for 4 percent of
the total. in 2008, india ranked 15th with 2 percent of the total. Similar to Brazil, india has recently
seen unprecedented levels of growth in both it infrastructure and broadband development.206 Although
india’s broadband penetration is still expanding to meet its burgeoning economy and large population, it is estimated that india will continue to rise in the rankings for broadband connectivity in the
coming future.
207
Spam delivered by botnets
in 2009, botnets became the dominant force in terms of distributing not only spam, but also malicious code and phishing scams. the processing power of large botnets allows them to generate high volumes of
spam. the distributed processing power of botnets makes them an ideal platform for launching large-scale
spam campaigns. Because of their distributed nature, even taking down a large number of individual bots has little effect on the percentage of spam delivered by bots.
203 http://www.officialwire.com/main.php?action=posted_news&rid=50513&catid=1042
204 http://newsroom.cisco.com/dlls/2009/prod_100209b.html
205 http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSn0332584720080403
206 http://point-topic.com/dslanalysis.php
207 http://www.indiabroadband.net/india-broadband-telecom-news/11682-india-register-500-growth-broadband-services-within-5-years.htmlSymantec Global internet Security threat report
81in 2009, botnets were responsible for approximately 85 percent of all spam observed by MessageLabs
intelligence. in 2008, Srizbi, one of the largest botnets observed, had been responsible for almost
26 percent of spam that same year, but after the november 2008 shutdown of an iSp that was believed to
be responsible for a considerable amount of spam activity, it virtually disappeared and, by 2009, accounted for less than 1 percent of all spam observed.
208 this resulted in a dramatic fall-off in global spam levels.
this void was soon filled by the pandex and rustock botnets. pandex increased from less than 1 percent of
botnet-related spam in 2008 to approximately 18 percent in 2009 (table 23). rustock experienced similar
growth, from less than 2 percent of botnet-related spam in 2008 to 18 percent in 2009.
2009
1
23
4
56
789
102008
14
7
3
101919
13
692BotnetPercentage Overall Rank
Pandex
RustockMega_d
Grum
DonbotXarvester
BagleOther botnetsBobaxGheg2009
18%
15%10%
8%6%5%
5%5%2%2%
2008
<1%
2%
13%
1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
2%2%1%
Table 23. Percentage of spam from botnets209
Source: Symantec
By June 2009, spam levels were at approximately 90 percent of all email. in the same month, there was
another shutdown of a rogue iSp, pricewert LLC.210 Despite the shutdown, Symantec noted that there was
minimal impact to overall spam volumes.
Of all the botnet statistics tracked by Symantec, the pandex botnet appeared to be the only botnet affected
by this iSp closure, with the spam volumes from pandex dropping by 78 percent before recovering a few
days later. A similar pattern was detected by Symantec in August, when real Host, an iSp based in Latvia,
was taken offline by its upstream providers. Again, pandex appeared to be the only botnet significantly
affected by this iSp closure; Symantec noted an 87 percent reduction in spam originating from pandex after
the shutdown. However, unlike the Srizbi botnet that was nearly eliminated by the shutdown of McColo (the
iSp that was shut down in november 2008, noted above), Symantec noted that within 24 hours pandex was
again reporting similar volumes of spam messages prior to the realhost iSp closure.
it appears that the pandex controllers had learned from the McColo shutdown to incorporate redundancy
into their business continuity plans for 2009, as evidenced by how quickly they got back online after the closure of the aforementioned iSps. this can be attributed to the fact that attackers are using fast-flux
domain-named services into the botnet structure,
211 making it less susceptible to a single point of failure
such as a single rogue iSp.212
208 See http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiv_04-2009.en-us.pdf : p. 89 and
http://www.messagelabs.com/intelligence.aspx MessageLabs intelligence: 2009 Annual Security report
209 Due to rounding, totals may not equal 100 percent
210 http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2009/06/3fn.shtm
211 Fast flux is a technique used by some botnets, such as the Storm botnet, to hide phishing and malicious websites behind an ever-changing network of compromised hosts acting as proxies. Using a combination of p2p networking, distributed C&C, Web-based load balancing and proxy redirection makes it difficult to trace the
botnets’ original geolocation. As industry countermeasures continue to reduce the effectiveness of traditional botnets, Symantec expects to see more attacks using this technique.
212 http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/2009MLiAnnualreport_Final_printresolution.pdf : p. 12Symantec Global internet Security threat report
82Other notable botnets that decreased considerably in 2009 were Gheg,213 Cimbot, and Warezov_stration.214
Gheg, which had been responsible for 15 percent of all spam in 2008, was responsible for less than
2 percent of spam in 2009. Cimbot and Warezov_stration were each responsible for 10 percent of observed spam in 2008, but only responsible for less than 1 percent each of observed spam in 2009. As discussed above, it is likely that attackers moved away from these botnets in favor of newer botnets that are more difficult to detect and less susceptible to being taken offline. Symantec believes that the newer p2p
botnets will continue to be dominant in 2010 and that older, less sophisticated botnets will be rebuilt or discontinued.
in 2009, two new botnets were observed: Maazben and Festi. Maazben began low-volume spamming
in March and continued spamming erratically until it reached a peak during August and September. in
total, Maazben was responsible for just under 1 percent of all spam in 2009. Festi was first detected by Symantec in August 2009 and has steadily continued broadcasting, albeit with low volumes, up to the end of 2009. Festi accounted for less than 1 percent of all spam in 2009.
Phishing, underground economy servers, and spam—protection and mitigation
Symantec recommends that enterprise users protect themselves against phishing threats by filtering email at the server level through the mail transfer agent (Mt A). Although this will likely remain the primary point
of filtering for phishing, organizations can also use ip-based filtering upstream, as well as Http filtering.
DnS block lists also offer protection against potential phishing emails.
215 Organizations could also consider
using domain-level or email authentication in order to verify the actual origin of an email message. this
can protect against phishers who are spoofing email domains.216
to protect against potential phishing activity, administrators should always follow Symantec best practices
as outlined in “Appendix A” of this report. Symantec also recommends that organizations educate their
end users about phishing.217 they should also keep their employees notified of the latest phishing attacks
and how to avoid falling victim to them, as well as provide a means to report suspected phishing sites.218
Organizations can also employ Web-server log monitoring to track if and when complete downloads of their websites, logos, and images are occurring. Such activity may indicate that someone is attempting to use the legitimate website to create an illegitimate website for phishing.
Organizations can detect phishing attacks that use spoofing by monitoring non-deliverable email addresses
or bounced email that is returned to non-existent users. they should also monitor the purchasing of
cousin domain names by other entities to identify purchases that could be used to spoof their corporate domains.
219 So-called typo domains and homographic domains should also be monitored.220 this can
be done with the help of companies that specialize in domain monitoring; some registrars also provide this service.
213 http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/MLireport_2009.06_June_FinAL.pdf
214 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-091012-5303-99
215 A DnS block list (sometimes referred to as a black list) is simply a list of ip addresses that are known to send unwanted email traffic. it is used by email software to
either allow or reject email coming from ip addresses on the list.
216 Spoofing refers to instances where phishers forge the “From:” line of an email message using the domain of the entity they are targeting with the phishing attempt.
217 See basic guidelines on how to avoid phishing at the United States Federal trade Commission: http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/alt127.htm
218 See http://www.antiphishing.org for information on the latest phishing threats.
219 “Cousin domains” refers to domain names that include some of the key words of an organization’s domain or brand name; for example, for the corporate domain
“bigbank.com”, cousin domains could include “bigbank-alerts.com”, ”big-bank-security.com”, and so on.
220 typo domains are domain names that use common misspellings of a legitimate domain name; for example, the domain “symatnec.com” would be a typo domain for
“symantec.com”. A homographic domain name uses numbers that look similar to letters in the domain name; for example, the character for the number “1” can look like the letter “l”.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
83the use of antiphishing toolbars and components in Web browsers can also help protect users from
phishing attacks. these measures notify the user if a Web page being visited does not appear to be
legitimate. this way, even if a phishing email reaches a user’s inbox, the user can still be alerted to the
potential threat.
End users should follow best security practices, as outlined in “Appendix A” of this report. they should use
an antiphishing solution. As some phishing attacks may use spyware and/or keystroke-logging applications,
Symantec advises end users to use antivirus software, antispam software, firewalls, toolbar blockers, and other software-detection methods. Symantec also advises end users to never disclose any confidential personal or financial information unless and until they can confirm that any request for such information is legitimate.
Users should review bank, credit card, and credit information frequently. this can provide information
on any irregular activities. For further information, the internet Fraud Complaint Center (iFCC) has also
released a set of guidelines on how to avoid internet-related scams.
221 Additionally, network administrators
can review Web proxy logs to determine if any users have visited known phishing sites. Consumers could also take more security precautions to ensure that their information will not be
compromised. When conducting higher-risk internet activities, such as online banking or purchases,
consumers should do so only on their own computers and not public ones. Further, they should not store passwords or bank card numbers. they should also avoid following links from within messages (whether
in email, instant messages, online forums, etc.) as these may be links to spoofed websites; instead, they should manually type in the UrL of the website. in addition, consumers should be aware of the amount
of personal information that they post on the internet, as criminals may take advantage of this public
information in malicious activities such as phishing scams.
221 http://www.fbi.gov/majcases/fraud/internetschemes.htmSymantec Global internet Security threat report
84Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices
Symantec encourages all users and administrators to adhere to the following basic security best practices:
Enterprise best practices
Employ defense-in-depth strategies, which emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive •
defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protection method.
this should include the deployment of regularly updated antivirus, firewalls, intrusion detection, and intrusion protection systems on client systems. Using a firewall can also prevent threats that send information back to the attacker from opening a communication channel.
Administrators should limit privileges on systems for users that do not require such access and they •
should restrict unauthorized devices, such as external portable hard-drives and other removable media.turn off and remove services that are not needed for normal company network operations.•
test security regularly to ensure that adequate controls are in place.•
Educate management on security budgeting needs.•
if malicious code or some other threat exploits one or more network services, disable or block access to •
those services until a patch is applied.Administrators should update antivirus definitions regularly to protect against the high quantity of new •
malicious code threats and ensure that all desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all
necessary security patches from their operating system vendor. iDS, ipS, and other behavior-blocking
technologies should also be employed to prevent compromise by new threats.
Always keep patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host public services and applications—•
such as Http , Ftp, SMtp , and DnS servers—and that are accessible through a firewall or placed in a DMZ.
As compromised computers can be a threat to other systems, Symantec recommends that affected •
enterprises notify their iSps of any potentially malicious activity.
Consider implementing network compliance solutions that will help keep infected mobile users out of the •
network (and disinfect them before rejoining the network).Enforce an effective password policy. Ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers, and •
change them often. passwords should not consist of words from the dictionary.
perform both ingress and egress filtering on all network traffic to ensure that malicious activity and •
unauthorized communications are not taking place.Mail servers should be configured to block email that appears to come from within the company, but that •
actually originates from external sources.Consider using domain-level or email authentication in order to verify the actual origin of an email •
message to protect against phishers who are spoofing email domains.Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments that are commonly used to •
spread viruses, such as .vbs, .bat, .exe, .pif, and .scr files.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
85Clicking on links and/or attachments in email messages (or iM messages) may also expose computers •
to unnecessary risks. Ensure that only applications approved by the organization are deployed on
desktop computers.
isolate infected computers quickly to prevent the risk of further infection within the organization.•
train employees to not open attachments unless they are expected and come from a known and trusted •
source, and to not execute software that is downloaded from the internet unless it has been scanned
for viruses.perform a forensic analysis and restore the computers using trusted media.•
Ensure that emergency response procedures are in place. this includes having a backup-and-restore •
solution in place in order to restore lost or compromised data in the event of successful attack or
catastrophic data loss.
Be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file-•
sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software.Employ Web-server log monitoring to track if and when complete downloads of company websites, logos, •
and images are occurring, as this may indicate that someone is attempting to use the legitimate website
to create an illegitimate website for phishing.
network administrators should review Web proxy logs to determine if any users have visited known •
blacklisted sites.
Consumer best practices
Use an internet security solution that combines antivirus, firewall, intrusion detection, and vulnerability •
management for maximum protection against malicious code and other threats.Ensure that security patches are up to date and that they are applied to all vulnerable applications in a •
timely manner.Ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers, and change them often. passwords should not •
consist of words from the dictionary.never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is expected and the purpose •
of the attachment is known.Keep virus definitions updated regularly. By deploying the latest virus definitions, you can protect your •
computer against the latest viruses known to be spreading in the wild.routinely check to see if your operating system is vulnerable to threats. A free security scan is available •
through the Symantec Security Check at www.symantec.com/securitycheck.Get involved by tracking and reporting attack attempts. With Symantec Security Check’s tracing service, •
users can quickly identify the location of potential hackers and forward the information to the attacker’s
iSp or local police.
Deploy an antiphishing solution, such as an antiphishing toolbar for Web browsers. Also, never disclose •
any confidential personal or financial information unless and until you can confirm that any request for
such information is legitimate.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
86When conducting higher-risk internet activities, such as online banking or purchases, consumers should •
do so only on their own computers and not public ones. Further, they should not store passwords or
bankcard numbers.
review bank, credit card, and credit information frequently to monitor any irregular activities. For •
further information, the internet Crime Complaint Center (iC3) has also released a set of guidelines on
how to avoid internet-related scams. See http://www.ic3.gov/default.aspx for more information.
Be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file-•
sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software.Avoid clicking on links and/or attachments in email or iM messages, as these may also expose computers •
to unnecessary risks.read end-user license agreements (EULAs) carefully and understand all terms before agreeing to •
them as some security risks can be installed after an end user has accepted the EULA or because of
that acceptance.
Be aware of programs that flash ads in the user interface. Many spyware programs track how users •
respond to these ads, and their presence is a red flag. these ads may be spyware.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
87Appendix B—Threat Activities Trends Methodologies
threat activity trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec Global
intelligence network, which includes the Symantec DeepSight threat Management System, Symantec
Managed Security Services, the Symantec Honeypot network, and proprietary Symantec technologies.
Symantec combines data derived from these sources for analysis.
Malicious activity by country
to determine the top countries for the “Malicious activity by country” metric, Symantec compiles
geographical data on each type of malicious activity to be considered, namely: bot-infected computers, phishing website hosts, malicious code reports, spam zombies, and attack origin. the proportion of
each activity originating in each country is then determined. the mean of the percentages of each
malicious activity that originates in each country is calculated. this average determines the proportion
of overall malicious activity that originates from the country in question and the rankings are determined by calculating the mean average of the proportion of these malicious activities that originated in each country.
Web-based attacks
to evaluate this metric, Symantec identifies each distinct attack delivered through the Web, hereafter
referred to as Web-based attack, hosted on malicious websites that are detected by intrusion prevention technology. A Web-based attack is any attack that is carried out against a client-side application originating from the Web. Symantec determines the top Web-based attacks by determining the most common attacks carried out against users. Due to the nature of Web-based attacks, the total number of attacks carried out is a good measure of the success and popularity of the attack.
Each attack discussed targets a specific vulnerability or weakness in Web browsers or other client-side
applications that process content originating from the Web. these attacks can vary in their delivery
methods; some rely on misleading a user into downloading a malicious file, while others occur without any knowledge or interaction by the user.
Countries of origin for Web-based attacks
Symantec identifies the Web-based attacks by country by determining the geographic origin that conducts the attack on computers upon visiting a website. note that the server hosting the exploit may
not necessarily be the same server that the user has visited due to redirection. A user could visit a website that redirects their Web browser to a malicious server in another country.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
88Data breaches that could lead to identity theft
Symantec identifies the proportional distribution of cause and sector for data breaches that may
facilitate identity theft based on data provided by the Open Security Foundation (OSF) Dataloss DB.222
OSF reports data breaches that have been reported by legitimate media sources and have exposed personal information including name, address, Social Security number, credit card number, or medical history. the sector that experienced the loss along with the cause of loss that occurred is determined
through analysis of the organization reporting the loss and the method that facilitated the loss.
Bot-infected computers
Symantec identifies bot-infected computers based on coordinated scanning and attack behavior that is observed in global network traffic. An active bot-infected computer is one that carries out at least one attack per day. this does not have to be continuous; rather, a single computer can be active on a number
of different days. Attacks are defined as any malicious activity carried out over a network that has been detected by an iDS or firewall.
For an attacking computer to be considered to be participating in coordinated scanning and attacking, it must fit into that pattern to the exclusion of any other activity. this behavioral matching will not catch
every bot-infected computer and may identify other malicious code or individual attackers behaving in a coordinated way as a botnet. this behavioral matching will, however, identify many of the most
coordinated and aggressive bot-infected computers. it will also give insight into the population trends of
bot-infected computers, including those that are considered to be actively working in a coordinated and aggressive fashion at some point in time during the reporting period.
222 http://datalossdb.orgSymantec Global internet Security threat report
89Appendix C—Vulnerability Trends Methodologies
Symantec operates one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion of vulnerabilities
on the internet, the Bugtraq™ mailing list,223 which has approximately 50,000 direct subscribers who
contribute, receive, and discuss vulnerability research on a daily basis. Symantec also maintains one of the most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting of over 35,000 vulnerabilities (spanning more than two decades) affecting more than 80,000 technologies from over 11,000 vendors.
Vulnerability classifications
Following the discovery and/or disclosure of a new vulnerability, Symantec analysts gather all relevant characteristics of the new vulnerability and create an alert. this alert describes important traits of the
vulnerability, such as the severity, ease of exploitation, and a list of affected products. these traits are
subsequently used both directly and indirectly for this analysis.
Vulnerability types
After discovering a new vulnerability, Symantec threat analysts classify the vulnerability into one of 12 possible categories based on the available information. these categories focus on defining the core
cause of the vulnerability, as opposed to classifying the vulnerability merely by its effect.
the classification system is derived from the academic taxonomy presented by taimur Aslam, et al
(1996),
224 which provides a full description of the possible values below:
Boundary condition error •
Access validation error •
Origin validation error •
input validation error •
Failure to handle exceptional conditions •
race condition error •
Serialization error •
Atomicity error •
Environment error •
Configuration error •
Design error •
Web browser vulnerabilities
this metric compares vulnerability data for major Web browsers, namely: Google Chrome, Microsoft
internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Opera, and Apple Safari. However, in assessing the comparative data, it should be noted that for this report the total number of vulnerabilities in these Web browsers is computed, including both vendor confirmed and non-vendor confirmed vulnerabilities.
223 the Bugtraq mailing list is hosted by SecurityFocus (http://www.securityfocus.com). Archives are available at http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1
224 “Use of a taxonomy of Security Faults”: http://ftp.cerias.purdue.edu/pub/papers/taimur-aslam/aslam-krsul-spaf-taxonomy.pdfSymantec Global internet Security threat report
90previous versions of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report have discussed vulnerabilities
according to whether they were vendor confirmed or non-vendor confirmed, because vulnerabilities that
were not confirmed were also included in the data. this differentiation was important, especially given the
disparity in patch times between vendors. However, starting with Volume X of the Symantec Internet
Security Threat Report, this convention is no longer followed and no differentiation is made between vendor-confirmed vulnerabilities and non-vendor-confirmed vulnerabilities when calculating the total number of vulnerabilities.
individual browser vulnerabilities are difficult to precisely identify. A reported attack may be a combination
of several conditions, each of which could be considered a vulnerability in its own right, which may distort the total vulnerability count. Some browser issues have also been improperly identified as operating system vulnerabilities or vice versa. this is partly due to increased operating system integration that makes
it difficult to correctly identify the affected component in many cases. Additionally, some browsers are available for mobile and desktop platforms. therefore, the following caveats exist for this metric:
Many vulnerabilities in shared operating system components can be exposed to attacks through the •
browser. this report enumerates only those vulnerabilities that are known to affect the browser itself
where sufficient information is available to make the distinction.
Vulnerabilities in mobile versions of a browser are only counted if they also affect the desktop version of •
the browser application. this metric is mainly concerned with evaluating vulnerabilities in desktop Web
browsers and not their mobile equivalents.
Window of exposure for Web browsers
the window of exposure is calculated for vulnerabilities associated with the following Web browsers:
Google Chrome•
Apple Safari •
Microsoft internet Explorer •
Mozilla Firefox •
Opera • Symantec records the window of time between the publication of an initial vulnerability report and the
appearance of third-party exploit code; this is known as the exploit code development time. the time
between the disclosure date of a vulnerability and the release date of an associated patch is known as the patch development time. the time lapse between the public release of exploit code and the time that
the affected vendor releases a patch for the affected vulnerability is known as the window of exposure. the average window of exposure is calculated as the difference in days between the average patch development time and the average exploit code development time. During this time, the computer or system on which the affected application is deployed may be susceptible to attack, as administrators may have no official recourse against a vulnerability and must resort to best practices and workarounds to reduce the risk of attacks. Symantec Global internet Security threat report
91Web browser plug-in vulnerabilities
Browser plug-ins are technologies that extend the functionality of the Web browser. they may be developed
by the vendor or by a third party. Some plug-ins provide support for additional application programming
languages or environments, such as Java SE or Adobe Flash player. Others are applications in their own
right that run in the browser. Examples of these include ActiveX objects for internet Explorer, and Mozilla
extensions and add-ons.
this metric enumerates publicly documented vulnerabilities that affect browser plug-ins. these
vulnerabilities are further classified, when applicable, into general groups of browser plug-in technologies.
Symantec makes an effort to identify all vulnerabilities affecting the various classes of browser plug-in.
Vulnerabilities that affect the browser itself are not included in the data for this metric when it is possible
to make this distinction. in cases where a Web browser ships with a particular plug-in, vulnerabilities
affecting that plug-in will be counted. Although in this case, the plug-in may be included in the default browser installation, it is still considered a separate technology and not a native feature of the browser. native features are considered to be features intrinsic to the primary function of the browser such as support for Http /HttpS, HtML rendering, JavaScript, and other standards that are commonly implemented
in most Web browsers. technologies such as Java SE and Flash may be common to many Web browsers but
they are intended to extend their functionality to support additional types of content and are typically optional components.
the definition of browser plug-ins for this report is limited to technologies that are hosted on the same
computer as the browser, and whose installation and configuration is managed through the browser or operating system. this distinguishes them from content that is intended to run inside the browser but is
typically external to the browser such as Java SE applets or Flash movies. this content is rendered or
executed by a browser plug-in but is not considered to be a plug-in in its own right.
Zero-day vulnerabilities
For the purpose of this metric, a zero-day vulnerability is one for which there is sufficient public evidence to indicate that the vulnerability has been exploited in the wild prior to being publicly known. it may not have
been known to the vendor prior to exploitation, and the vendor had not released a patch at the time of the exploit activity. this metric is derived from public sources and the Symantec vulnerability database. this
metric is meant to calculate the number of high-profile, publicly documented zero-day vulnerability instances during the relevant reporting periods.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
92Appendix D—Malicious Code Trends Methodologies
Malicious code trends are based on statistics from malicious code samples reported to Symantec for
analysis. the data is gathered from over 130 million client, server, and gateway systems that have
deployed Symantec’s antivirus products in both consumer and corporate environments. the Symantec
Digital immune System and Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting
process. Observations in this section are based on empirical data and expert analysis of this data. the
data and analysis draw primarily from the two databases described below.
Infection database
the Symantec AntiVirus research Automation (SArA) technology is a technology that helps detect and
eradicate computer viruses. it is used to analyze, replicate, and define a large subset of the most common
computer viruses that are quarantined by Symantec Antivirus customers.
On average, SArA receives hundreds of thousands of suspect files daily from both enterprise and
individual consumers located throughout the world. Symantec then analyzes these suspect files, matching them with virus definitions. An analysis of this aggregate data set provides statistics on infection rates for different types of malicious code.
Malicious code database
in addition to infection data, Symantec Security response analyzes and documents attributes for each new
form of malicious code that emerges both in the wild and in a “zoo” (or controlled laboratory) environment. Descriptive records of new forms of malicious code are then entered into a database for future reference. For this report, a historical trend analysis was performed on this database to identify, assess, and discuss any possible trends, such as the use of different infection vectors and the frequency of various types of payloads. in some cases, Symantec antivirus products may initially detect new malicious code heuristically
or by generic signatures. these may later be reclassified and given unique detections. Because of this,
there may be slight variance in the presentation of the same data set from one volume of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report to the next.
Geographic location of malicious code instances
Several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic locations of systems to ip
addresses are used along with proprietary Symantec technology to determine the location of computers reporting malicious code instances. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error. the data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of malicious code instances.
Malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities
Symantec maintains a malicious code database to analyze and document individual instances of malicious code dating back to 1998. the database includes metadata for classifying malicious code by type,
discovery date, and by threat profile, in addition to providing mitigating factors and manual removal steps. Where applicable, this database includes correlations between malicious code instances and vulnerabilities from the Symantec vulnerability database. this capability was used as a basis for the data in this metric.
Symantec examined the means by which the malicious code propagated, and counted those that propagate by exploiting vulnerabilities. Symantec Global internet Security threat report
93Appendix E—Phishing, Underground Economy Servers, and
Spam Trends Methodologies
phishing and spam attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data captured through the
Symantec probe network, a system of more than 2.5 million decoy accounts, MessageLabs intelligence,
and other Symantec technologies in more than 86 countries from around the globe. Five billion email connections, as well as over one billion Web requests are scanned per day across 16 data centers. Symantec also gathers phishing information through an extensive antifraud community of enterprises, security vendors and more than 50 million consumers.
the Symantec probe network data is used to track the growth in new phishing activity. it should be noted
that different monitoring organizations use different methods to track phishing attempts. Some groups
may identify and count unique phishing messages based solely on specific content items such as subject headers or UrLs. these varied methods can often lead to differences in the number of phishing attempts
reported by different organizations.
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam data is also used to gauge the growth in phishing attempts as well as the
percentage of internet mail determined to be phishing attempts. Data returned includes messages
processed, messages filtered, and filter-specific data.
Symantec has classified different filters so that spam statistics and phishing statistics can be determined
separately. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data includes data reported back from customer installations providing feedback from antispam filters as well as overall mail volume being processed.
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam only gathers data at the SMtp layer and not the network layer, where DnS
block lists typically operate because SMtp -layer spam filtering is more accurate than network-layer filtering and is able to block spam missed at the network layer. network layer-filtering takes place before
email reaches the enterprise mail server. As a result, data from the SMtp layer is a more accurate reflection of the impact of spam on the mail server itself.
Due to the numerous variables influencing a company’s spam activity, Symantec focuses on identifying
spam activity and growth projections with Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data from enterprise customer installations having more than 1,000 total messages per day. this normalization yields a more
accurate summary of internet spam trends by ruling out problematic and laboratory test servers that
produce smaller sample sets.
this section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to produce the data and statistics in
this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, the following investigations warrant additional detail.
Phishing activity by sector
the phishing data in this report are aggregated from a combination of sources including Symantec’s sensors, strategic partners, customers and security solutions. phishing sites are categorized according to
the brand being phished and its sector. After phishing data are received, Symantec spoof detection technology is used to verify that the website is a spoof site. Symantec Global internet Security threat report
94Countries hosting phishing URLs and top targeted sectors
the data for this section is determined by gathering links in phishing email messages and cross-referencing
the addresses with several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic locations of systems to ip addresses. in this case, Symantec counts phishing UrLs as the number of unique ip addresses
hosting Web pages used for phishing. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of error. the data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of phishing UrLs.
Phishing site top-level domains
the data for this section is determined by deriving the top-level domains of each distinct phishing website UrL. the resulting top-level domains are tabulated and compared proportionately.
Automated phishing toolkits
the data in this section is derived from UrLs gathered by the Symantec prn. the UrLs are sorted and
grouped according to specific patterns indicating they were generated by an automated script or phishing kit. Each phishing kit generates UrLs with a distinct signature and can be grouped according to these distinguishing characteristics. the monthly total of each group of UrLs indicates the level of use of each
automated phishing kit.
Underground economy servers—goods and services available for sale
this metric is based on data that is gathered by proprietary Symantec technologies that observe activity on underground economy servers and collect data. Underground economy servers are typically chat servers on which stolen data, such as identities, credit card numbers, access to compromised computers, and email accounts are bought and sold. Each server is monitored by recording communications that take place on them, which typically includes advertisements for stolen data. this data is used to derive the data presented
in this metric. it should be noted that this discussion might not necessarily be representative of internet-
wide activity; rather, it is intended as a snapshot of the activity that Symantec observed during this period.
Description of goods and services advertised on underground economy servers may vary from vendor to
vendor. the following list shows typical goods and services that are found on these servers and general
descriptions of each:
Bank account credentials• —may consist of name, bank account number (including transit and
branch number), address, and phone number. Online banking logins and passwords are often sold as a separate item.
Cash out• —a withdrawal service where purchases are converted into true currency. this could be in the
form of online currency accounts or through money transfer systems and typically, the requester is
charged a percentage of the cashout value as a fee.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
95Credit card information• —includes credit card number and expiry date. it may also contain the
cardholder name, Credit Verification Value 2 (CVV2) number, pin, billing address, phone number, and
company name (for a corporate card). CVV2 is a three or four-digit number on the credit card and used
for card-not-present transactions such as internet or phone purchases. this was created to add an extra
layer of security for credit cards and to verify that the person completing the transaction was in fact, in possession of the card.
Email accounts• —includes user iD, email address, password. in addition, the account may contain
personal information such as addresses, other account information, and email addresses in the
contact list.
Email addresses• —consists of lists of email addresses used for spam or phishing activities. the email
addresses can be harvested from hacking databases, public sites on the internet, or from stolen email
accounts. the sizes of lists sold can range from 1 MB to 150 MB.
Full identities• —may consist of name, address, date of birth, phone number, and government-issued
number. it may also include extras such as driver’s license number, mother’s maiden name, email
address, or “secret” questions/answers for password recovery.Mailers• —an application that is used to send out mass emails (spam) for phishing attacks. Examples of
this are worms and viruses. Proxies• —proxy services provide access to a software agent, often a firewall mechanism, which
performs a function or operation on behalf of another application or system while hiding the details
involved, allowing attackers to obscure their path and make tracing back to the source difficult or impossible. this can involve sending email from the proxy, or connecting to the proxy and then out
to an underground irC server to sell credit cards or other stolen goods.
Shell scripts• —used to perform operations such as file manipulation and program execution. they can
also be used as a command line interface for various operating systems.
Countries of spam origin
the data for this section is determined by calculating the frequency of originating server ip addresses in
email messages that trigger antispam filters in the field. the ip addresses are mapped to their host country
of origin and the data is summarized by country based on monthly totals. the percentage of spam per
country is calculated from the total spam detected in the field.
it should be noted that the location of the computer from which spam is detected being sent is not
necessarily the location of the spammer. Spammers can build networks of compromised computers globally and thereby use computers that are geographically separate from their location
Spam delivered by botnets
the data for this section is determined by an analysis of emails that trigger antispam filters and the proportion that is detected as originating from a known botnet. the identity and location of spam-sending
botnets that is tracked by Symantec MessageLabs intelligence knowledge base, and is based on the profile
of the spam and its headers as it is being transmitted. Each botnet exhibits a unique profile and the information is tracked accordingly, including its location.Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec
Corporation.
nO WArrAnty . Symantec makes this document available AS-iS, and makes no warranty as to its accuracy or use. the information in contained in this document
may include inaccuracies or typographical errors, and may not reflect the most current developments, and Symantec does not represent, warrant or guarantee
that it is complete, accurate, or up-to-date, nor does Symantec offer any certification or guarantee with respect to any opinions expressed herein or any references provided. Changing circumstances may change the accuracy of the content herein. Opinions presented in this document reflect judgment at the time of publication and are subject to change. Any use of the information contained in this document is at the risk of the user. Symantec assumes no responsibility for errors, omissions, or damages resulting from the use of or reliance on the information herein. Symantec reserves the right to make changes at any time without prior notice.
|
S yM An tE C En tEr p r i S E S E C U r i t ySymantec Internet Security Threat Report
trends for 2010
Volume 16, published April 2011
About this report
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of internet threat data in the world
through the Symantec™ Global intelligence network. More than 240,000 sensors in more than 200
countries and territories monitor attack activity through a combination of Symantec products and services
such as Symantec DeepSight™ threat Management System, Symantec™ Managed Security Services,
norton™ consumer products, and additional third-party data sources.
Symantec gathers malicious code intelligence from more than 133 million client, server, and gateway
systems that have deployed its antivirus products. Additionally, Symantec’s distributed honeypot network
collects data from around the globe, capturing previously unseen threats and attacks that provide valuable
insight into attacker methods.
in addition, Symantec maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently
consisting of more than 40,000 recorded vulnerabilities (spanning more than two decades) affecting more
than 105,000 technologies from more than 14,000 vendors. Symantec also facilitates the Bugt raq mailing
list, one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion of vulnerabilities on the internet,
which has approximately 24,000 subscribers who contribute, receive, and discuss vulnerability research on
a daily basis.
Marc Fossi
Executive Editor
Manager, Development
Security technology and response
Gerry Egan
Director, product Management
Security technology and response
Kevin Haley Director, product Management
Security technology and response
Eric JohnsonEditor
Security technology and responseTrevor MackAssociate Editor
Security technology and response
Téo Adams
threat Analyst
Security technology and response
Joseph Blackbird
threat Analyst
Security technology and response
Mo King Low
threat Analyst
Security technology and responseDebbie Mazurek
threat Analyst
Security technology and response
David McKinney
threat Analyst
Security technology and response
Paul Wood
MessageLabs intelligence Senior Analyst
Symantec.cloudSymantec internet Security threat report
2Spam and phishing data is captured through a variety of sources, including the Symantec probe network,
a system of more than 5 million decoy accounts; MessageLabs™ intelligence, a respected source of data
and analysis for messaging security issues, trends and statistics; as well as other Symantec technologies.
Data is collected in more than 86 countries from around the globe. Over 8 billion email messages, as well
as over 1 billion Web requests are processed per day across 16 data centers. Symantec also gathers
phishing information through an extensive antifraud community of enterprises, security vendors, and more
than 50 million consumers.
these resources give Symantec’s analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze, and
provide informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and spam.
the result is the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, which gives enterprises and consumers the
essential information to secure their systems effectively now and into the future.Symantec internet Security threat report
320092010115163VULNERABILITIES
EXPLOIT LIBRARY
COMMAND & CONTROL
USER INTERFACE
UPDATABILITY ENGINE
OBFUSCATION2010 in Review
Targeted Attacks continue to evolve
Attack Kits get a caffeine boostSocial Networking + social engineering = compromise
Hide and Seek (zero-day vulnerabilities and rootkits)
Mobile Threats increaseTargeted attacks, while not new, gained notoriety
from high-profile attacks against major organizations
(Hydraq) and significant targets (Stuxnet).
The ability to research a target online has enabled
hackers to create powerful social engineering attacks that easily fool even sophisticated users.
Targeted attacks depend on their ability to get inside an organization and stay hidden in plain site. Zero-day vulnerabilities and rootkits have made this possible.
Innovations from targeted attacks will make their way into massive attacks, most likely via toolkits.
All these types of attacks are moving to mobile devices, limited only by attackers getting a return on their investment.
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec internet Security threat report
4Executive summary
Symantec recorded over 3 billion malware attacks in 2010 and yet one stands out more than the rest—
Stuxnet . this attack captured the attention of many and led to wild speculation on the target of the attacks
and who was behind them. this is not surprising in an attack as complex and with such significant
consequences as Stuxnet. in a look back at 2010, we saw five recurring themes:
1) Targeted attacks. Almost forgotten in the wake of Stuxnet was Hydraq. Hydraq’s intentions were old-
fashioned compared to the cybersabotage of Stuxnet—it attempted to steal. What made Hydraq stand
out was what and from whom it attempted to steal—intellectual property from major corporations.
Targeted attacks did not start in 2010 and will not end there. in addition, while Hydraq was quickly
forgotten and, in time, Stuxnet may be forgotten as well, their influence will be felt in malware attacks to come. Stuxnet and Hydraq teach future attackers that the easiest vulnerability to exploit is our trust
of friends and colleagues. Stuxnet could not have breached its target without someone being given
trusted access with a USB key. Meanwhile, Hydraq would not have been successful without convincing
users that the links and attachments they received in an email were from a trusted source.
2) Social networks. Whether the attacker is targeting a CEO or a member of the QA staff, the internet and
social networks provide rich research for tailoring an attack. By sneaking in among our friends,
hackers can learn our interests, gain our trust, and convincingly masquerade as friends. Long gone are
the days of strange email addresses, bad grammar, and obviously malicious links. A well-executed
social engineering attack has become almost impossible to spot.
3) Zero-day vulnerabilities and rootkits. Once inside an organization, a targeted attack attempts to avoid detection until its objective is met. Exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities is one part of keeping an attack
stealthy since these enable attackers to get malicious applications installed on a computer without the user’s knowledge. in 2010, 14 such vulnerabilities were discovered. Rootkits also play a role. While
rootkits are not a new concept, techniques continue to be refined and redeveloped as attackers strive to stay ahead of detection tools. Many of these rootkits are developed for use in stealthy attacks. there
were also reports in 2010 of targeted attacks using common hacker tools. these are similar to building
products—in this case attack tools—with “off-the-shelf” parts in order to save money and get to
market faster. However, innovation runs in both directions, and attacks such as Stuxnet will certainly
provide an example of how targeted attacks are studied and their techniques copied and adapted for massive attacks.Symantec internet Security threat report
54) Attack kits. What brings these techniques to the common cybercriminal are attack kits. Zero-day
vulnerabilities become everyday vulnerabilities via attack kits; inevitably, some of the vulnerabilities
used on Stuxnet as well as the other 6,253 new vulnerabilities discovered in 2010 will find their way
into attack kits sold in the underground economy. these tools—easily available to cybercriminals—also
played a role in the creation of the more than 286 million new malware variants Symantec detected in 2010.
5) Mobile threats. As toolkits make clear, cybercrime is a business. Moreover, as with a legitimate business, cybercrime is driven by a return on investment. Symantec believes that this explains the
current state of cybercrime on mobile threats. All of the requirements for an active threat landscape
existed in 2010. the installed base of smart phones and other mobile devices had grown to an attractive
size. the devices ran sophisticated operating systems that come with the inevitable vulnerabilities—163
in 2010. in addition, trojans hiding in legitimate applications sold on app stores provided a simple and
effective propagation method. What was missing was the ability to turn all this into a profit center
equivalent to that offered by personal computers. But, that was 2010; 2011 will be a new year.
this report discusses these trends, impending threats, and the continuing evolution of the internet threat
landscape in 2010. Supporting the commentary are four appendices of data collected over the course of the
year covering the following categories:
• threat activity
• Vulnerabilities
• Malicious code
• Fraud activity
Along with this analysis, Symantec provides a comprehensive guide to best practices for both enterprises
and consumers to adhere to in order to reduce their risk from the dangers of the current internet security
threat landscape. to access the supplemental analysis and best practices, please visit the Symantec Internet
Security Threat Report online.Symantec internet Security threat report
6286M+
Threats
Polymorphism and new delivery mechanisms such as Web-attack toolkits continued to drive up the number of malware
variants in common circulation. In 2010, Symantec encountered more than 286 million unique variants of malware.The Year in Numbers
Some of the more noteworthy statistics that represent the security landscape in 2010
93%
Increase in Web Attacks
A growing proliferation of Web-
attack toolkits drove a 93% increase
in the volume of Web-based attacks in 2010 over the volume observed
in 2009. Shortened URLs appear to be playing a role here too. During a three-month observation period in
2010, 65% of the malicious URLs
observed on social networks were
shortened URLs.260,000
Identities Exposed per Breach
This was the average number of
identities exposed in each of the data breaches caused by hacking throughout the year.
1M+
Bots
Rustock, the largest botnet observed in 2010, had well over 1 million bots under its control. Grum and Cutwail followed, each with many hundreds of thousands of bots.$0.07 to $100
per Credit Card
This was the range of prices seen advertised in the underground economy for each “stolen” credit card number, and, as in the real economy, bulk buying usually gets the buyer a significant discount.6,253
New Vulnerabilities
Symantec recorded more vulnerabilities in 2010 than in any previous year since starting this report. Furthermore, the new vendors affected by a vulnerability rose to 1,914, a 161% increase over the prior year.’09 ’10VULNERABILITIES115
163
ID ID
74%
Pharmaceutical Spam
Approximately three-quarters of all spam in 2010 was related to pharmaceutical products—a great deal of which was related to “Canadian Pharmacy” websites and related brands.
$15
per 10,000 Bots
Symantec observed an underground economy advertisement in 2010 promoting 10,000 bots for $15. Bots are typically used for spam or rogueware campaigns, but are increasingly also used for Distributed Denial of Service attacks.42%
More Mobile Vulnerabilities
In a sign that the mobile space is starting to garner more attentionfrom both security researchers and cybercriminals, there was a sharp rise in the number of reported new mobile operating system vulnerabilities—up to 163 from 115 in 2009.
14
New Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
The 14 zero-day vulnerabilities in 2010 were found in widely used applications such as Internet Explorer, Adobe Reader, and Adobe Flash Player. Industrial Control System software was also exploited. In a sign of its sophistication,
Stuxnet alone used four different
zero-days.
Source: Symantec Corporation
Note: All currency in USDSymantec internet Security threat report
7Targeted attacks continue to evolve
20092010115163VULNERABILITIES
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the year was book-ended by two significant targeted attacks:
Hydraq (a.k.a. Aurora) rang in the new year, while Stuxnet, though
discovered in the summer, garnered significant attention through to the end of the year as information around this threat was
uncovered. Although these threats have been analyzed in depth,
there are lessons to be learned from these targeted attacks.
there were large differences in some of the most publicized
targeted attacks in 2010. the scale of attacks ranged from publicly
traded, multinational corporations and governmental organizations to smaller companies. in addition, the motivations and backgrounds
of the alleged attackers varied widely. Some attacks were also much
more effective—and dangerous—than others. All the victims had one thing in common, though—they were
specifically targeted and compromised.
Many organizations have implemented robust security measures such as isolated networks to protect
sensitive computers against worms and other network intrusions. the Stuxnet worm, though, proved that
these “air-gapped” networks can be compromised and that they still require additional layers of security.
While Stuxnet is a very complex threat, not all malicious code requires this level of complexity to breach an
isolated network. Because an increasing amount of malicious code incorporates mechanisms to propagate
through removable media such as USB drives, isolated networks require some of the same policies and
protection as user networks to prevent compromise. Endpoint protection that blocks access to external
ports, such as a device control policy, can help defend against these threats.
Rank Propagation Mechanisms 2010% 2009%
1 Executable file sharing. The malicious code creates copies of itself or infects executable files. The
files are distributed to other users, often by copying them to removable drives such as USB thumb
drives and setting up an autorun routine.74%
72%
2 File transfer , CIFS. CIFS is a file-sharing protocol that allows files and other resources on a computer
to be shared with other computers across the Internet. One or more directories on a computer can be shared to allow other computers to access the files within. Malicious code creates copies of itself on
shared directories to affect other users who have access to the share.47%
42%
3 Remotely exploitable vulnerability. The malicious code exploits a vulnerability that allows it to
copy itself to or infect another computer .24% 24%
4 File transfer , email attachment . The malicious code sends spam email that contains a copy of the
malicious code. Should a recipient of the spam open the attachment , the malicious code will run and
the recipient’s computer may be compromised.18%
25%
5 File sharing, P2P . The malicious code copies itself to folders on an infected computer that are
associated with P2P file-sharing applications. When the application runs, the malicious file will be
shared with other users on the same P2P network .8%
5%
6 File transfer , HTTP, embedded URI, instant messenger . The malicious code sends or modifies
instant messages with an embedded URI that , when clicked by the recipient , will launch an attack
and install a copy of the malicious code.4%
5%
7 File transfer , instant messenger . The malicious code uses an instant messaging client to initiate a
file transfer of itself to a recipient in the victim ’s contact lis t.2%
1%
8 SQL The malicious code accesses SQL servers, by exploiting a latent SQL vulnerability or by trying
default or guessable administrator passwords, and copies itself to the server .1%
2%
9 File transfer , HTTP, embedded URI, email message body . The malicious code sends spam email
containing a malicious URI that , when clicked by the recipient , will launch an attack and install a
copy of the malicious code.< 1% < 1%
10 File transfer , MMS attachment . The malicious code uses Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) to
send spam messages containing a copy of itself .< 1% < 1%
Propagation mechanisms in 2010
Source: Symantec CorporationSymantec internet Security threat report
8While many targeted attacks are directed at large enterprises and governmental organizations, they can
also target SMBs and individuals. Similarly, senior executives are not the only employees being targeted. in
most cases, a successful compromise only requires victimizing a user with access to just limited network or administrative resources. A single negligent user or unpatched computer is enough to give attackers a
beachhead into an organization from which to mount additional attacks on the enterprise from within,
often using the credentials of the compromised user.
While Stuxnet included exploit code for an unprecedented number of zero-day vulnerabilities, such code is
not a requirement for targeted attacks. More commonly, research and reconnaissance are used to mount
effective social engineering attacks. Attackers can construct plausible deceptions using publicly available
information from company websites, social networks, and other sources. Malicious files or links to
malicious websites can then be attached to or embedded in email messages directed at certain employees
using information gathered through this research to make the messages seem legitimate. this tactic is
commonly called spear phishing.
Spear-phishing attacks can target anyone. While the high-profile, targeted attacks that received a high
degree of media attention such as Stuxnet and Hydraq attempted to steal intellectual property or cause
physical damage, many of these attacks simply prey on individuals for their personal information. in 2010,
for example, data breaches caused by hacking resulted in an average of over 260,000 identities exposed per breach—far more than any other cause. Breaches such as these can be especially damaging for enterprises because they may contain sensitive data on customers as well as employees that even an
average attacker can sell on the underground economy.
Average Number of Identities Exposed per Data Breach by Cause
68,418
67,528Hacking
Insider
= 25,000 identitiesTheft/loss
Fraud
6,35330,572Insecure policy262,767
Average number of identities exposed per data breach, by cause, 2010
Source: Based on data provided by OSF DataLoss DB
While much of the attention focused on targeted attacks is fueled by the sophisticated methods attackers
use to breach their targets, the analysis often overlooks prevention and mitigation. in many cases,
implementing best practices, sufficient policies, and a program of user education can prevent or expose a targeted attack. For example, restricting the use of USB devices limits exposure to threats designed to
propagate through removable media. Educating users not to open email attachments and not to click on
links in email or instant messages can also help prevent breaches. Symantec internet Security threat report
9if a breach occurs, strong password policies that require the use of different passwords across multiple
systems can prevent the attack from expanding further into the network. Limiting user privileges can help
to reduce the number of network resources that can be accessed from a compromised computer.
Since one of the primary goals of targeted attacks is information theft, whether the attackers seek customer
records or intellectual property, proper egress filtering should be performed and data loss prevention solutions employed. this can alert network operations personnel to confidential information leaving the
organization.
While Stuxnet is a very sophisticated threat, not all targeted attacks need to employ such a high degree of
complexity in order to succeed. ignoring best practices enables less sophisticated attacks to be successful.
However, it is almost certain that we will continue to see targeted attacks and that the tactics used will
evolve and change. Stuxnet may have provided less sophisticated attackers with a blueprint to construct
new threats. At the very least, administrators responsible for supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) systems should review security measures and policies to protect against possible future threats.
Social networking + social engineering = compromise
20092010115163VULNERABILITIES
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Social networks continue to be a security concern for
organizations. Companies and government agencies are
trying to make the most of the advantages of social
networking and keep employees happy while, at the
same time, limiting the dangers posed by the increased
exposure of potentially sensitive and exploitable
information. Additionally, malicious code that uses
social networking sites to propagate remains a significant concern.
Attackers exploit the profile information available on social networking sites to mount targeted attacks. For example, many people list employment details in their profiles, such as the company they work for, the
department they work in, other colleagues with profiles, and so on. While this information might seem
harmless enough to divulge, it is often a simple task for an attacker to discover a company’s email address
protocol (e.g., [email protected]) and, armed with this information along with any other personal information exposed on the victim’s profile, create a convincing ruse to dupe the victim. For
example, by finding other members of the victim’s social network who also work for the same organization,
the attacker can spoof a message from that person to lend an air of additional credibility. this might be
presented as an email message from a coworker who is also a friend and that contains a link purporting to have pictures from a recent vacation (the details of which would have been gathered from the social
networking site). With a tantalizing enough subject line, the ruse can be difficult for most people to resist
because the point of social networking sites is to share this type of information.
Attackers can also gather other information from social networking sites that can indirectly be used in
attacks on an enterprise. For example, an employee may post details about changes to the company’s
internal software or hardware profile that may give an attacker insight into which technologies to target in
an attack.
While increased privacy settings can reduce the likelihood of a profile being spoofed, a user can still be
exploited if an attacker successfully compromises one of the user’s friends. Because of this, organizations
should educate their employees about the dangers of posting sensitive information. Clearly defined and
enforced security policies should also be employed.Symantec internet Security threat report
10Malicious code that uses social networking sites to infect users in a concerted attack is also a threat . For
example, current variants of the Koobface worm can not only send direct messages from an infected user’s
account on a site to all of that user’s friends in the network, but also are capable of updating status
messages or adding text to profile pages. Moreover, in addition to possibly giving attackers access to an
infected user’s social networking site account, some threats can also infect the user’s computer. in the
case of Koobface, the worm attempts to download fake antivirus applications onto compromised
computers. these threats should be a concern for network administrators because many users access their
social networks from work computers.
A favorite method used to distribute an attack from a compromised profile is to post links to malicious
websites from that profile so that the links appear in the news feeds of the victim’s friends. in addition,
attackers are increasingly using shortened UrLs for this because the actual destination of the link is obscured from the user.
1 During a three-month period in 2010, nearly two-thirds of malicious links in news
feeds observed by Symantec used shortened UrLs.
URLs
Shortened URLs
65%35%Malicious shortened URLs #2
Malicious URLs targeting social networking users over a three-month period in 2010
Source: Symantec Corporation
An indication of the success of using shortened UrLs that lead to malicious websites is the measure of how
often these links are clicked. Of the shortened UrLs leading to malicious websites that Symantec observed
on social networking sites over the three-month period in 2010, 73 percent were clicked 11 times or more,
with 33 percent receiving between 11 and 50 clicks. Only 12 percent of the links were never clicked.
Currently, most malicious UrLs on social networking sites lead to websites hosting attack toolkits.
1 UrL shortening services allow people to submit a UrL and receive a specially coded shortened UrL that redirects to the submitted UrL.Symantec internet Security threat report
11010203040
0 1 to 10
Number of clicksPercentage of URLs
11 to 50 51 to 100 101 to 250 251 or more7%12%15%33%
19%
14%(A23) Malicious shortened URLs, clicks per malicious shortened URL
Clicks per malicious shortened URL during three-month period in 2010
Source: Symantec Corporation
Other applications on social networking sites that appear to be innocuous may have a more malicious
motive. Many surveys and quizzes ask questions designed to get the user to reveal a great deal of personal
information. While such questions often focus on generic details (shopping tastes, etc.), they may also ask
the user to provide details such as his or her elementary school name, pets’ names, mother’s maiden name,
and other questions that, not coincidentally, are frequently used by many applications as forgotten-
password reminders.
As more people join social networking sites and the sophistication of these sites grows, it is likely that
increasingly complex attacks will be perpetrated through them. Users should ensure that they monitor the
security settings of their profiles on these sites as often as possible, especially because many settings are automatically set to share a lot of potentially exploitable information and it is up to users to restrict access
themselves.
Attack kits get a caffeine boost
20092010115163VULNERABILITIES
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While targeted attacks are focused on compromising specific
organizations or individuals, attack toolkits are the opposite side of
the coin, using broadcast, blanket attacks that attempt to exploit
anyone unfortunate enough to visit a compromised website. the
previous edition of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
discussed the growing prevalence of Web-based attacks and the increased use of attack toolkits. in 2010, these kits continued to see
widespread use with the addition of new tactics. Symantec internet Security threat report
12the phoenix toolkit was responsible for the largest amount of Web-based attack activity in 2010. this kit,
as well as many others, also incorporates exploits for Java® vulnerabilities. the sixth highest ranked
Web-based attack during the reporting period was also an attempt to exploit Java technology. One of the
appeals of Java to attackers is that it is a cross-browser, multi-platform technology. this means that it runs
on almost every Web browser and operating system available—a claim few other technologies can make. As such, Java can present an appealing target to attackers.
0%5%10%15%20%25%30%35%
1% 1%40%
18% 18%
8% 8%
3%2% 2%39%Top W eb-based attacks
Phoenix toolkit activit y
NeoSploit toolkit activit y
Nukesploit P4ck toolkit activit y
JavaScript buffer overflow attack
Adobe Reader attack activit ySun Java attack activit y
Eleonore toolkit activit y
Malicious toolkit variant activity
Fragus toolkit activit y
Unique Pack toolkit activityAttack typePercentage of top 10
Web-based attack activity, 2010
Source: Symantec Corporation
the volume of Web-based attacks per day increased by 93 percent in 2010 compared to 2009. Because
two-thirds of all Web-based threat activity observed by Symantec is directly attributable to attack kits,
these kits are likely responsible for a large part of this increase. the increased volume of Web-based attack
activity in 2010 is not a sudden change. Although the average number of attacks per day often fluctuates substantially from month to month, depending on current events and other factors, Web-based attacks
have risen steadily since Symantec began tracking this data from the beginning of 2009 through to the end
of 2010. Along with other indications of increased Web-based attack usage, such as the rise in attack
toolkit development and deployment, Symantec expects this trend to continue through 2011 and beyond.Symantec internet Security threat report
1345,000,000
40,000,00035,000,000
30,000,000Average W eb attacks per da y
25,000,000
20,000,000
15,000,000
10,000,000
5,000,000
0
MonthJan Mar May Jul Sep Nov Jan Mar May Jul Sep Nov
2009 2010
Average Web-based attacks per day, by month, 2009–2010
Source: Symantec Corporation
Because users are more likely to be protected against older vulnerabilities, attack toolkit developers
advertise their toolkits based on the rate of success of the vulnerabilities that are included and the newness
of the exploits. to remain competitive and successful, attack kit developers must update their toolkits to
exploit new vulnerabilities as they emerge on the threat landscape. thus, the kit developers must either
discontinue the use of less-successful exploits in favor of newer ones with higher success rates, or
incorporate new exploits that the kits are programmed to try first. in the future, Java exploits may be
dropped or marginalized in favor of other technologies that developers consider more vulnerable. to protect
against all Web-based attacks, users should employ intrusion protection systems and avoid visiting
unknown websites.
Hide and seek
20092010115163VULNERABILITIES
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A rootkit is a collection of tools that allow an attacker to hide traces of
a computer compromise from the operating system and, by extension,
the user. they use hooks into the operating system to prevent files
and processes from being displayed and prevent events from being logged. rootkits have been around for some time—the Brain virus was
the first identified rootkit to employ these techniques on the pC
platform in 1986—and they have increased in sophistication and complexity since then.
the primary goal of malicious code that employs rootkit techniques is
to evade detection. this allows the threat to remain running on a
compromised computer longer and, consequently, increases the potential harm it can do. if a trojan or
backdoor is detected on a computer, the victim may take steps to limit the damage, such as changing online
banking passwords and canceling credit cards. However, if the threat goes undetected for an extended
period, this not only increases the possibility of theft of confidential information, but also gives the attacker more time to capitalize on this information.Symantec internet Security threat report
the current frontrunners in the rootkit arena are tidserv , Mebratix , and Mebroot . these samples all modify
the master boot record (MBr) on Windows® computers in order to gain control of the computer before the
operating system is loaded. While rootkits themselves are not new, this technique is a more recent
development. this makes these threats even more difficult to detect by security software.
Application
File system
Disk class PortKernel Hardware
Standard
rootkits
Mebroot and
Tidserv
Tidserv and Mebroot infection process
Source: Symantec Corporation
Many tidserv infections were discovered by chance in February 2010 when they were uncovered by a
patch issued by Microsoft® for an unrelated security issue in Windows. the malicious code made some
changes to the Windows kernel that caused infected computers to “blue screen” every time they rebooted after the patch was applied. Because the file infected by tidserv is critical to Windows startup, the
computers would not even start properly in Safe Mode, forcing users to replace the infected driver files with known good copies from a Windows installation CD.
tidserv also made news in 2010 when a version was discovered that was capable of injecting itself into
64-bit driver processes on 64-bit versions of Windows. this shows that tidserv developers are not only still
active, but they are seeking out new techniques to allow their creation to infect the most computers
possible. Since the primary purpose of tidserv is to generate revenue, this comes as no surprise.
Computers infected with tidserv have search queries redirected to sites hosting fake antivirus applications.
By hijacking the search results, tidserv exploits the user’s trust in the search engine being used. Since the
search terms are intercepted by the threat, the subsequently hijacked results can also be tailored to mirror the original search terms to lend a sense of credibility and potentially increase the likelihood of users
falling prey to the ruse.
to date, many trojans seen in targeted attacks have not been very advanced in features or capabilities,
with their primary purpose being to steal as much information as quickly as possible before discovery.
However, the longer a targeted attack remains undetected, the more likely it is that information will be compromised. Considering the media attention given to recent high-profile targeted attacks such as
Hydraq and Stuxnet, many network security professionals are likely operating with increased vigilance for
these threats. As such, to circumvent the increased attention, attackers will likely modify their attacks and
employ techniques such as rootkit exploits. Symantec expects any advancement in rootkits to eventually be
incorporated into targeted attacks.
14Symantec internet Security threat report
Mobile threats
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Since the first smartphone arrived in the hands of consumers,
speculation about threats targeting these devices has abounded.
While threats targeted early “smart” devices such as Symbian and
palm in the past, none of these threats ever became widespread
and many remained proof-of-concept. recently, with the growing
uptake in smartphones and tablets, and their increasing
connectivity and capability, there has been a corresponding
increase in attention, both from threat developers and security
researchers.
While the number of immediate threats to mobile devices remains
relatively low in comparison to threats targeting pCs, there have
been new developments in the field. As more users download and install third-party applications for these devices, the chances of
installing malicious applications also increases. in addition, because most malicious code now is designed
to generate revenue, there are likely to be more threats created for these devices as people increasingly
use them for sensitive transactions such as online shopping and banking.
As with desktop computers, the exploitation of a vulnerability can be a way for malicious code to be
installed on a mobile device. in 2010, there were a significant number of vulnerabilities reported that
affect mobile devices. Symantec documented 163 vulnerabilities in mobile device operating systems in 2010, compared to 115 in 2009. While it may be difficult to exploit many of these vulnerabilities
successfully, there were two vulnerabilities that affected Apple’s iphone iOS operating platform that
allowed users to “jailbreak” their devices. the process of jailbreaking a device through exploits is not very
different from using exploits to install malicious code. in this case, though, users would have been
exploiting their own devices.
Currently most malicious code for mobile devices consists of trojans that pose as legitimate applications.
these applications are uploaded to mobile “app” marketplaces in the hopes that users will download and
install them. in March 2011, Google reported that it had removed several malicious Android applications
from the Android Market and even deleted them from users’ phones remotely. Attackers have also taken a
popular legitimate application and added additional code to it, as happened in the case of the pjapps
trojan for Android devices. Astute users were able to spot that something was amiss when the application
was requesting more permissions than should have been necessary.
15Symantec internet Security threat report
Pjapps installation screen
Source: Symantec Corporation
Until recently, most trojans for mobile devices simply dialed or texted premium rate numbers from the
phone. While pjapps also contains this capability, it also attempts to create a bot network out of
compromised Android devices. While the command-and-control servers that pjapps is programmed to
contact no longer appear to be active, the attempt to create a botnet out of mobile devices demonstrates
that attackers are actively researching these devices as a platform for cybercrime.
Over the last several years, most malicious online activity has focused on generating revenue. While
mobile-device trojans have made attempts at revenue generation through premium-rate services, this is
still not as profitable as credit card fraud and the theft of online banking credentials. Some of the first threats of this kind to arrive will likely be either phishing attacks or trojans that steal data from mobile
devices. Because the blueprints for such threats are already well established on personal computers, adapting them to mobile devices should be relatively easy. For example, as mobile devices introduce new
features such as wireless payments, it is likely that attackers will seek ways to profit from them the way
they have with personal computers. Attackers are constantly looking for new avenues to exploit and profit from unsuspecting users, but until there is adequate return on investment to be found from exploiting new devices, they will likely continue to use tried and true methods.
16Symantec internet Security threat report
Conclusion
the volume and sophistication of malicious activity increased substantially in 2010. the Stuxnet worm
became the first piece of malicious code able to affect physical devices while simultaneously attempting
exploits for an unprecedented number of zero-day vulnerabilities. While it is highly unlikely that threats
such as Stuxnet will become commonplace because of the immense resources required to create it, it does
show what a skilled group of highly organized attackers can accomplish. targeted attacks of this nature,
along with Hydraq and others, have shown that determined attackers have the ability to infiltrate targets with research and social engineering tactics alone. this matters because recent studies have shown that
the average cost per incident of a data breach in the United States was $7.2 million, with the largest breach costing one organization $35.3 million to resolve. With stakes so high, organizations need to focus
their security efforts to prevent breaches.
Social networking sites provide companies with a mechanism to market themselves online, but can also
have serious consequences. information posted by employees on social networking sites can be used in
social engineering tactics as part of targeted attacks. Additionally, these sites also serve as a vector for malicious code infection. Organizations need to create specific policies for sensitive information, which
may inadvertently be posted by employees, and at the same time be aware that users visiting these sites
from work computers may introduce an avenue of infection into the enterprise network. Home users also
need to be aware of these dangers because they are at equal risk from following malicious links on these
sites.
Attack toolkits continue to lead in Web-based attack activity. their ease of use combined with advanced
capabilities make them an attractive investment for attackers. Since exploits for some vulnerabilities will
eventually cease to be effective, toolkit authors must incorporate new vulnerabilities to stay competitive in
the marketplace. Currently, attackers are targeting certain exploits, such as those for Java vulnerabilities.
However, this could change if their effectiveness diminishes. toolkit authors are constantly adapting in
order to maximize the value of their kits.
While the purpose of most malicious code has not changed over the past few years as attackers seek ways
to profit from unsuspecting users, the sophistication of these threats has increased as attackers employ
more features to evade detection. these features allow malicious code to remain resident on infected
computers longer, thus allowing attackers to steal more information and giving them more time to use the
stolen information before the infections are discovered. As more users become aware of these threats and
competition among attackers increases, it is likely that more threats will incorporate rootkit techniques to
thwart security software.
Currently, mobile threats have been very limited in the number of devices they affect as well as their
impact. While these threats are not likely to make significant inroads right away, their impact is likely to
increase in the near future. to avoid the threats that currently exist, users should only download
applications from regulated marketplaces. Checking the comments for applications can also indicate if
other users have already noticed suspicious activity from installed applications.
17Symantec internet Security threat report
18March
Chile Earthquake
Spammers leverage
the Chilean earthquake for spam campaigns.12010 Timeline
A look back at some of the more newsworthy security-related events that took place in 2010
January
Trojan.Hydraq
News breaks of a high-profile targeted threat affecting multinational corporations
around the globe.
iPad Announced
A whole new computing platform launches,
marking yet another
seismic shift in computing
platforms. Hackers immediately launch SEO poisoning campaigns to leverage the worldwide interest.
SpyEye1
February
SpyEye vs. ZeuS—
Cybercriminal Toolkit Rivalry
ZeuS, king of the kits, is usurped by a new
clone called SpyEye.1527September
Imsolk.B
In a remembrance of
things past, an email worm called Imsolk.B—
a.k.a. “Here you Have”—
erupts to take the world by storm, spreading rapidly in a matter of hours.
Major ZeuS Bust
In a victory against cybercrime, UK police arrest 19 individuals believed to be part of an organized cybercrime network that used the ZeuS Trojan to steal $9.5 million from bank accounts there.9
29June
FIFA World Cup
Yet more fodder for
spam and SEO
poisoning.
Stuxnet
The first reports of a new
threat leveraging a zero-day vulnerability. This threat would go on to become one of the biggest malware events of the year.11
17
July
August
First Android Trojan
Discovered
AndroidOS.Tapsnake: Watching your every move.18April
May
25October
Trojan.Jnanabot
In perhaps a sign of things to come, researchers discover a Trojan that leverages Java to get on many different platforms, including Windows, OS X, and Linux.
1December
WikiLeaks and “Hacktivism”
The events highlight the new security issues
of our age: protecting
sensitive information
and defending against
hacktivism attacks.NovemberNo notable events
No notable events
No notable events
No notable events
Source: Symantec CorporationAny technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec
Corporation.
nO WArrAnty . Symantec makes this document available AS-iS, and makes no warranty as to its accuracy or use. the information contained in this document may
include inaccuracies or typographical errors and may not reflect the most current developments, and Symantec does not represent, warrant, or guarantee
that it is complete, accurate, or up-to-date, nor does Symantec offer any certification or guarantee with respect to any opinions expressed herein or any references
provided. Changing circumstances may change the accuracy of the content herein. Opinions presented in this document reflect judgment at the time of publication and are subject to change. Any use of the information contained in this document is at the risk of the user. Symantec assumes no responsibility for errors,
omissions, or damages resulting from the use of or reliance on the information herein. Symantec reserves the right to make changes at any time without
prior notice.
|
2011 Trends
Volume 17
Published April 2012INTERNETSECURITYTHREATREPORTINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
2Paul Wood
Executive EditorManager, Cyber Security IntelligenceSecurity Technology and Response
Gerry Egan
Sr. Director, Product ManagementSecurity Technology and Response
Kevin Haley
Director, Product ManagementSecurity Technology and Response
Tuan-Khanh Tran
Group Product ManagerSecurity Technology and Response
Orla Cox
Sr. Manager, Security OperationsSecurity Technology and Response
Hon Lau
Manager, DevelopmentSecurity Technology and Response
Candid Wueest
Principal Software EngineerSecurity Technology and Response
David McKinney
Principal Threat AnalystSecurity Technology and Response
Tony Millington
Associate Software EngineerSecurity Technology and Response
Benjamin Nahorney
Senior Information DeveloperSecurity Technology and Response
Joanne Mulcahy
Technical Product ManagerSecurity Technology and Response
John Harrison
Group Product ManagerSecurity Technology and Response
Thomas Parsons
Director, DevelopmentSecurity Technology and Response
Andrew Watson
Sr. Software EngineerSecurity Technology and ResponseMathew NisbetMalware Data AnalystSecurity Technology and Response
Nicholas Johnston
Sr. Software EngineerSecurity Technology and Response
Bhaskar Krishnappa
Sr. Software EngineerSecurity Technology and Response
Irfan Asrar
Security Response ManagerSecurity Technology and Response
Sean Hittel
Principal Software Engineer Security Technology and Response
Eric Chien
Technical DirectorSecurity Technology and Response
Eric Park
Sr. Business Intelligence AnalystAnti-Spam Engineering
Mathew Maniyara
Security Response AnalystAnti-Fraud Response
Olivier Thonnard
Sr. Research EngineerSymantec Research Laboratories
Pierre-Antoine Vervier
Network Systems EngineerSymantec Research Laboratories
Martin Lee
Sr. Security AnalystSymantec.cloud
Daren Lewis
Principal Strategic Planning SpecialstSymantec.cloud
Scott Wallace
Sr. Graphic DesignerSymantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
3Table Of C OnTenT s
Introduction .......................................................... 5
2011 By Month .................................................... 6
2011 In Numbers ............................................... 9
Executive Summary ..................................... 12
Safeguarding Secrets:
Industrial Espionage In Cyberspace
................................................... 14
Cyber-Espionage In 2011 ........................................ 14
Advanced Persistent Threats .................................. 15
Targeted Attacks ....................................................... 16
Case Study ................................................................. 16
Where Attacks Come From ...................................... 19
Against The Breach: Securing Trust
And Data Protection
.................................... 20
Data Breaches In 2011 ............................................ 21
Certificate Authorities Under Attack ..................... 23
Building Trust And Securing
The Weakest Links .................................................... 24Consumerization
And Mobile Computing:
Balancing The Risks
And Benefits In The Cloud ....................... 25
Risks With ‘Bring Your Own Device’ ....................... 25
Threats Against Mobile Devices ............................. 25
Consumerization Of It And Cloud Computing .....26
Quick Response (QR) codes .................................... 27
What Mobile Malware Does With Your Phone .....27
Confidence In The Cloud: Balancing Risks ........... 28
Spam Activity Trends .................................. 29
Spam In 2011 ............................................................ 29
Impact Of Botnets On Spam ................................... 30
The Changing Face Of Spam ................................... 30
URL Shortening And Spam ...................................... 31
Malicious Code Trends ............................... 32
Malware In 2011 ....................................................... 32
Website Malware ....................................................... 33
Email-Borne Malware ............................................... 34
Border Gateway Protocol
(BGP) Hijacking ......................................................... 35
Polymorphic Threats ................................................ 35
Dangerous Web Sites ............................................... 36
Exploiting The Web: Attack Toolkits, Rootkits And Social Networking Threats
.............. 37
Macs Are Not Immune .............................................. 38
Rootkits ....................................................................... 39
Social Media Threats ................................................ 39INTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
4Closing The Window
Of Vulnerability: Exploits
And Zero-Day Attacks ................................. 40
Number Of Vulnerabilities ...................................... 40
Weaknesses in Critical
Infrastructure Systems ............................................ 41
Old Vulnerabilities Are Still Under Attack ............ 41
Web Browser Vulnerabilities .................................. 41
New Zero-day Vulnerabilities Create Big Risks
....................................................... 42
Conclusion:
What’s Ahead In 2012 ................................. 43Best Practice Guidelines For Businesses
................................................. 44
Best Practice Guidelines For Consumers
................................................ 46
More Information .......................................... 48
About Symantec .............................................. 48
Endnotes ............................................................... 49
figures
Figure 1
Targeted a ttacks Trend showing a verage
number Of a ttacks identified each Month, 2011 ......... 15
Figure 2
Targeted email a ttacks,
by Top-Ten industry sectors, 2011 ................................ 16
Figure 3
attacks by size Of Targeted Organization .................... 17
Figure 4
analysis Of Job f unctions
Of recipients being Targeted ......................................... 18
Figure 5
geographical l ocations
Of a ttackers’ iP addresses ............................................. 19
Figure 6
Timeline Of Data breaches
showing identities breached in 2011 ............................ 21
Figure 7
Top-Ten sectors by number Of Data breaches, 2011 .............................. 22
Figure 8
Top-Ten sectors by number Of identities exposed, 2011 ........................ 22
Figure 9
Total Mobile Malware f amily Count 2010-2012 ........... 26Figure 10
Key f unctionality Of Mobile risks .................................. 27
Figure 11
Percentage Of email identified as spam, 2011 ............ 30
Figure 12
Top Ten spam email Categories, 2010-2011 ................ 31
Figure 13
average number Of Malicious Web sites
identified Per Day, 2011 ................................................ 33
Figure 14
ratio Of Malware in email Traffic, 2011 ........................ 34
Figure 15
rise in email-borne bredolab Polymorphic Malware a ttacks Per Month, 2011 ................................ 35
Figure 16
Most Dangerous Web site Categories, 2011 ................. 36
Figure 17
Macdefender Trojan screenshot .................................... 38
Figure 18
Total number Of Vulnerabilities identified, 2006-2011 ..................................................................... 40
Figure 19
browser Vulnerabilities in 2010 and 2011 ................... 41
Figure 20
Web browser Plug-in Vulnerabilities ............................. 42Symantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
5Introduction
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources
of Internet threat data in the world through the Symantec™ Global
Intelligence Network, which is made up of more than 64.6 million
attack sensors and records thousands of events per second. This network
monitors attack activity in more than 200 countries and territories through a combination of Symantec products and services such as Symantec DeepSight™
Threat Management System, Symantec™ Managed Security Services and
Norton™ consumer products, and other third-party data sources.
In addition, Symantec maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive
vulnerability databases, currently consisting of more than 47,662 recorded
vulnerabilities (spanning more than two decades) from over 15,967 vendors
representing over 40,006 products.
Spam, phishing and malware data is captured through a variety of sources,
including the Symantec Probe Network, a system of more than 5 million
decoy accounts; Symantec.cloud and a number of other Symantec security
technologies. Skeptic™, the Symantec.cloud proprietary heuristic technology is able to detect new and sophisticated targeted threats before reaching customers’ networks. Over 8 billion email messages and more than 1.4 billion
Web requests are processed each day across 15 data centers. Symantec also
gathers phishing information through an extensive antifraud community of enterprises, security vendors, and more than 50 million consumers.
These resources give Symantec’s analysts unparalleled sources of data with
which to identify, analyze, and provide informed commentary on emerging
trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and spam. The result is the annual Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, which gives enterprises and
consumers the essential information to secure their systems effectively now
and into the future.INTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
6 MOBILE
THREATSHACKSBOTNET
TAKEDOWNSTHREAT
SPECIFICSPAM
PHISHING & 419SOCIAL
NETWORKING2011 BY MONTH
JANUARY
Applications bundled with Android.
Geinimi back door appear in unregulated Android marketplaces.
Scam masquerades as Indonesian Facebook app to steal login credentials.
Scammers use Serrana Flood in Brazil to solicit fake donations.
FEBRUARY
Security firm HBGary Federal hacked by Anonymous.
Android.Pjapps, another Android-based back door trojan, appears in unregulated Android marketplaces.
Spammers target unrest in Egypt and Libya with 419 scams and targeted attacks.MARCH
Microsoft and US law enforcements take down the Rustock botnet.
Android.Rootcager appears on official Android Market.
Spammers exploit Japanese Earthquake with 419 scams, fake donation sites, and malicious attachments.
Hackers take Google’s tool for removing Android.Rootcager and repackage it with a new trojan, Android.Bgserv.
Comodo Registration Authorities, InstantSSL.it and GlobalTrust.it hacked. Fake certificates for the likes of Google,
Hotmail, Yahoo!, Skype, and Mozilla created.
APRIL
Sony discovers that Playstation Network
has been compromised by hackers. Shuts down service while security is restored.Symantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
7
Iran claims another Stuxnet-
style attack, called “Stars”.
Malware found registering Facebook applications.
FBI awarded court order to shut down the Coreflood botnet by sending a “delete” command (included in the threats
design) to compromised computers.
Spammers and FakeAV peddlers
use British Royal Wedding for campaigns and SEO poisoning.
MAY
Scripting attack generates Facebook invites.
Osama bin Laden’s death sparks malware and phishing attacks.
LulzSec hacking group emerges, ‘in it for the “LULZ.”’
Spammers found setting up their own URL shortening services.
“Tagging” spam campaign spreads across Facebook.
Facebook tokens being leaked to third parties through apps.
A free version of the popular Blackhole exploit kit released/leaked.JUNE
LulzSec hacks Black & Berg Cybersecurity Consulting, refuses $10k previously offered as “prize”.
LulzSec hacks US Senate, CIA, FBI affiliates in response to US Government declaring cyber-attacks could be perceived as an act of war.
Operation AntiSec begins, hackers are encouraged to attack government web sites, publish data found.
LulzSec finds itself the victim of an attack by TeaMp0isoN/th3j35t3r, who feels the group receives an unjust amount of attention.
A currency exchange service for the Bitcoin virtual currency is hacked.
DigiNotar certificate authority hacked, leading to the demise of the company.
JULY
Microsoft offers $250,000 reward for information leading to the arrest of the Rustock creators.
Amy Winehouse’s death is used to spread Infostealer.Bancos.
AUGUST
Trojan.Badminer discovered, offloads bitcoin mining to the GPU (Graphics Processing Unit). INTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
8Phishing attacks found
containing fake trust seals.
SEPTEMBER
Spammers exploit the tenth anniversary of 9/11 to harvest email addresses.
Pharmaceutical spam exploits Delhi bomb blast.
Kelihos botnet shut down by Microsoft.
OCTOBER
W32.Duqu officially discovered. May be threat Iran publicized in April.
Attackers behind Blackhole exploit kit kick-off spam campaign surrounding Steve Jobs’ death.
Nitro Attacks whitepaper released, detailing a targeted attack against the chemical sector.
Java becomes most exploited software, surpassing Adobe and Microsoft, according to Microsoft Security
Intelligence Report, volume 11.
Libyan leader Muammar Gadhafi’s death
leads to spam campaign spreading malware.
Anti-CSRF Token attacks found on Facebook.DECEMBER
Stratfor global affairs analysis company hacked.
Spam falls to lowest levels in 3 years.Symantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
95.5 Billion
1245
VS.
3 BILLION IN 2010TOTAL ATTACKS BLOCKED IN 2011
1.1
MILLION
IDENTITIES
EXPOS ED
PER
BREACH62Billion in 2010
42Billion in 2011ESTIMATED
GLOBAL
SPAM
PER DA Y1
IN
299
OVERALL
PHISHING
RATE2011 IN NUMBERS
4,595INTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
104,989
40% 201174% 2010
-34%
CHANGE
FROM 2010% OF ALL SPAM
PHARMACEUTICALBOT
ZOMBIES2011
3,065,030 2010
4,500,000 V
U
L
NE
R
AB
I
L
I
T
I
E
SNEW
1–2500 2500+ EMPLOYEES18%
Small
Business50%
Small–Medium
Business50%
Big Business
42%
OF
MAILBOXES
TARGETED
FOR
ATTACK
ARE
HIGH-LEVEL
EXECUTIVES,
SENIOR
MANAGERS
AND
PEOPLE
IN
R&DTARGETED
ATTACKSSymantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
1155,294
UNIQUE
MALICIOUS
WEB DOMAINS
VS.
42,926
IN 20102010
86%
2011
75%OVERALL
SPAM
RATE8
4MON 5TUE
LAUNCH
DAYNEW ZERO-DAY
VULNERABILITIES
2011
315
2010
163NEW MOBILE
VULNERABILITIES
OVERALL
EMAIL VIRUS
RATE
1 IN 239
INTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
12Executive Summary
Symantec blocked more than 5.5 billion malicious attacks in 20111; an increase of more than 81%
from the previous year. This increase was in large part a result of a surge in polymorphic malware
attacks, particularly from those found in Web attack kits and socially engineered attacks using
email-borne malware. Targeted attacks exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities were potentially the most insidious of these attacks. With a targeted attack, it is almost impossible to know when you are being targeted, as by their very nature they are designed to slip under the radar and evade detection. Unlike these chronic problems, targeted attacks, politically-motivated hacktivist attacks, data breaches and
attacks on Certificate Authorities made the headlines in 2011. Looking back at the year, we saw a number
of broad trends, including (in roughly the order they are covered in the main report):
Malicious Attacks Skyrocket By 81%
In addition to the 81% surge in attacks, the number of unique
malware variants also increased by 41% and the number of Web attacks blocked per day also increased dramatically, by
36%. Greater numbers of more widespread attacks employed
advanced techniques, such as server-side polymorphism to colossal effect. This technique enables attackers to generate an almost unique version of their malware for each potential
victim.
At the same time, Spam levels fell considerably and the re -
port shows a decrease in total new vulnerabilities discovered
(-20%). These statistics compared to the continued growth in malware paint an interesting picture. Attacks are ris -
ing, but the number of new vulnerabilities is decreasing. Unfortunately, helped by toolkits, cyber criminals are able to
efficiently use existing vulnerabilities. The decrease in Spam
- another popular and well known attack vector did not impact the number of attacks. One reason is likely the vast adoption
of social networks as a propagation vector. Today these sites
attract millions of users and provide fertile ground for cyber
criminals. The very nature of social networks make users feel that they are amongst friends and perhaps not at risk. Unfortunately, it’s exactly the opposite and attackers are turn-ing to these sites to target new victims. Also, due to social en-
gineering techniques and the viral nature social networks, it’s
much easier for threats to spread from one person to the next. Cyber Espionage And Business:
Targeted Attacks Target Everyone
We saw a rising tide of advanced targeted attacks in 2011 (94 per day on average at the end of November 2011). The report data also showed that targeted threats are not limited to the
Enterprises and executive level personnel. 50% of attacks fo -
cused on companies with less than 2500 employees, and 18%
of attacks were focused on organizations with less than 250 employees. It’s possible that smaller companies are now being
targeted as a stepping stone to a larger organization because
they may be in the partner ecosystem and less well-defended. Targeted attacks are a risk for businesses of all sizes – no one is immune to these attacks.
In terms of people who are being targeted, it’s no longer only
the CEOs and senior level staff. 58% of the attacks are going to people in other job functions such as Sales, HR, Executives
Assistants, and Media/Public Relations. This could represent
a trend in attackers focusing their attention on lower hanging fruit. If they cannot get to the CEOs and senior staff, they can get to other links inside the organizations. It is also interest -
ing to note that these roles are highly public and also likely to receive a lot of attachments from outside sources. For example, an HR or recruiter staff member would regularly receive and open CVs and other attachments from strangers. Symantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
13Mobile Phones Under Attack
Growth of mobile malware requires a large installed base to at -
tack and a profit motive to drive it. The analyst firm, Gartner,
predicts sales of smartphones to end users will reach 461.5
million in 2011 and rise to 645 million in 2012. In 2011, sales
of smartphones will overtake shipments of PCs (364 million)2.
And while profits remain lucrative in the PC space, mobile of-fers new opportunities to cybercriminals that potentially are
more profitable. A stolen credit card may go for as little as USD
40-80 cents. Malware that sends premium SMS text messages can pay the author USD $9.99 for each text and for victims not watching their phone bill could pay off the cybercriminal
countless times. With the number of vulnerabilities in the
mobile space rising (a 93.3% increase over 2010) and malware authors not only reinventing existing malware for mobile devices but creating mobile specific malware geared to the
unique opportunities mobile present, 2011 was the first year
that mobile malware presented a tangible threat to enterprises and consumers.
Mobile also creates an urgent concern to organizations around
the possibility of breaches. Given the intertwining of work and personal information on mobile devices the loss of confidential
information presents a real risk to businesses. And unlike a
desktop computer, or even a laptop, mobile devices are eas-ily lost. Recent research by Symantec shows that 50% of lost phones will not be returned. And that for unprotected phones,
96% of lost phones will have the data on that phone breached.
Certificate Authorities And Transport
Layer Security (TLS) V1.0 Are
Targeted As SSL Use Increases
High-profile hacks of Certificate Authorities, providers of
Secure Sockets layer (SSL) Certificates, threatened the systems that underpin trust in the internet itself. However, SSL tech-
nology wasn’t the weak link in the DigiNotar breach and other
similar hacks; instead, these attacks highlighted the need for organizations in the Certificate Authority supply chain to harden their infrastructures and adopt stronger security pro -
cedures and policies. A malware dependent exploit concept against TLS 1.0 highlighted the need for the SSL ecosystem to upgrade to newer versions of TLS, such as TLS 1.2 or higher. Website owners recognized the need to adopt SSL more broadly to combat Man-In-The-Middle (MITM) attacks, notably for se -
curing non-transactional pages, as exemplified by Facebook,
Google, Microsoft, and Twitter adoption of Always On SSL
3.
232 Million Identities Stolen
More than 232.4 million identities were exposed overall during
2011. Although not the most frequent cause of data breaches, breaches caused by hacking attacks had the greatest impact
and exposed more than 187.2 million identities, the greatest
number for any type of breach in 2011, according to analysis from the Norton Cybercrime Index
4. The most frequent cause
of data breaches (across all sectors) was theft or loss of a com-puter or other medium on which data is stored or transmitted,
such as a USB key or a back-up medium. Theft or loss account -
ed for 34.3% of breaches that could lead to identities exposed.
Botnet Takedowns Reduce
Spam Volumes
It isn’t all bad news; the overall number of spam fell consider -
ably in the year from 88.5% of all email in 2010 to 75.1% in
2011. This was largely thanks to law enforcement action which
shut down Rustock, a massive, worldwide botnet that was
responsible for sending out large amounts of spam. In 2010, Rustock was the largest spam-sending botnet in the world, and with its demise, rival botnets were seemingly unable or unwill-
ing to take its place. At the same time, spammers are increas-
ing their focus on social networking, URL shorteners and other technology to make spam-blocking harder.
Taken together, these changes suggest that a growing number
of untargeted but high-volume malware and spam attacks is matched by an increasingly sophisticated hard core of tar -
geted attacks, advanced persistent threats and attacks on the infrastructure of the Internet itself. Organizations should take
this message to heart. They need to be successful every time
against criminals, hackers and spies. The bad guys only need to be lucky once.INTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
14Safeguarding Secrets:
Industrial Espionage In Cyberspace
Cyber-Espionage In 2011
The number of targeted attacks increased
dramatically during 2011 from an average
of 77 per day in 2010 to 82 per day in 2011.
And advanced persistent threats (APTs) attracted
more public attention as the result of some well publicized incidents.
Targeted attacks use customized malware and
refined targeted social engineering to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information. This is the next evolution of social engineering, where
victims are researched in advance and specifically
targeted. Typically, criminals use targeted attacks to steal valuable information such as customer data for financial gain. Advanced persistent threats
use targeted attacks as part of a longer-term
campaign of espionage, typically targeting high-value information or systems in government and
industry. In 2010, Stuxnet grabbed headlines. It is a worm that spreads widely but carried a specialized
payload designed to target systems that control and monitor industrial processes, creating suspicion
that it was being used to target nuclear facilities in
Iran. It showed that targeted attacks could be used to cause physical damage in the real world, making real the specter of cyber-sabotage.
In October 2011, Duqu came to light
5. This is a
descendent of Stuxnet. It used a zero-day exploit
to install spyware that recorded keystrokes and
other system information. It presages a resurgence of Stuxnet-like attacks but we have yet to see any version of Duqu built to cause cyber-sabotage.
Various long term attacks against the petroleum
industry, NGOs and the chemical industry
6
also came to light in 2011. And hactivism by
Anonymous, LulzSec and others dominated
security news in 2011. Targeted attacks use
customized malware
and refined targeted
social engineering
to gain unauthorized
access to sensitive
information. This is
the next evolution of
social engineering,
where victims are
researched in advance
and specifically
targeted. Symantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
15
Source: Symantec.cloudFigure 1
Targeted Attacks Trend Showing Average Number
Of Attacks Identified Each Month, 2011Targeted Attacks Trend Showing Average Number
Of Attacks Identified Each Month, 2011
Source: Symantec2080
60
40100140
120160180
26154
2011
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC
Advanced Persistent Threats
Advanced persistent threats (APTs) have become a buzzword
used and misused by the media but they do represent a real danger. For example, a reported attack in March 2011 resulted
in the theft of 24,000 files from a US defense contractor. The
files related to a weapons system under development for the US Department of Defense (DOD).
Government agencies take this type of threat very seriously.
For example, the US DOD has committed at least $500 (USD) million to cyber security research and development and the
UK Government recently released its Cyber Security Strategy,
outlining a National Cyber Security Programme of work funded by the GBP £650 million investments made to address the continuously evolving cyber risks, such as e-crime as well as threats to national security
7.
All advanced persistent threats rely on targeted attacks as their main delivery vehicle, using a variety of vectors such as drive-by-downloads, SQL injection, malware, phishing and spam.
APTs differ from conventional targeted attacks in significant
ways:
1 They use highly customized tools and intrusion techniques.
2 They use stealthy, patient, persistent methods to
reduce the risk of detection.3 They aim to gather high-value, national objectives
such as military, political or economic intelligence.
4 They are well-funded and well-staffed, perhaps
operating with the support of military or state in-telligence organizations.
5 They are m ore likely to target organizations of
strategic importance, such as government agen-cies, defense contractors, high profile manufac-
turers, critical infrastructure operators and their
partner ecosystem.
The hype surrounding APTs masks an underlying reality—these threats are, in fact, a special case within the much broad-er category of attacks targeted at specific organizations of all kinds. As APTs continue to appear on the threat landscape, we expect to see other cybercriminals learn new techniques from
these attacks. For example, we’re already seeing polymorphic
code used in mass malware attacks and we see spammers ex -
ploit social engineering on social networks. Moreover, the fact that APTs are often aimed at stealing intellectual property sug-gests new roles for cybercriminals as information brokers in
industrial espionage schemes.
While the odds of an APT affecting most organizations may
be relatively low, the chances that you may be the victim of a targeted attack are, unfortunately, quite high. The best way to prepare for an APT is to ensure you are well defended against
targeted attacks in general. INTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
16Targeted Attacks
Targeted attacks affect all sectors of the economy.
However, two-thirds of attack campaigns focus on
a single or a very limited number of organizations
in a given sector and more than half focus on the defense and aerospace sector, sometimes attacking the same company in different countries at the
same time. On average they used two different
exploits in each campaign, sometimes using zero-
day exploits to make them especially potent.Figure 2
Targeted Email Attacks,
By Top-Ten Industry
Sectors, 2011Targeted Email Attacks,
By Top-ten Industry Sectors, 2011
25%14%6%6%6%4%3%3%3%
15%
Government & Public SectorFinanceIT ServicesChemical PharmaceuticalTransport & UtilitiesNon /uni2010ProfitMarketing & MediaEducationRetail
Manufacturing
Source: Symantec.cloud2011
Source: Symantec.cloudCase Study
In 2011, we saw 29 companies
in the chemical sector (among others) targeted with emails
that appeared to be meeting
invitations from known suppliers. These emails installed a well-known backdoor trojan with the
intention of stealing valuable
intellectual property such as design documents and formulas.Symantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
17It is, however, a mistake to assume that only large companies
suffer from targeted attacks. In fact, while many small busi-ness owners believe that they would never be the victim of a
targeted attack, more than half were directed at organizations
with fewer than 2,500 employees; in addition, 17.8% were di-rected at companies with fewer than 250 employees. It is pos-sible that smaller companies are targeted as a stepping-stone
to a larger organization because they may be in the supply
chain or partner ecosystem of larger, but more well-defended companies.
While 42% of the mailboxes targeted for attack are high-level
executives, senior managers and people in R&D, the major -
ity of targets were people without direct access to confidential information. For an attacker, this kind of indirect attack can be
highly effective in getting a foot in the door of a well-protected
organization. For example, people with HR and recruitment responsibilities are targeted 6% of the time, perhaps because they are used to getting email attachments such as CVs from
strangers.
Source: Symantec.cloud
5001000150020002500
2501+ 1501-25009%
1001-15005%50%
1-2500
501-10008%
251-50010%
1-25018%Attacks By Size Of Targeted Organization
50%
Source: Symantec.cloudFigure 3
Attacks By Size Of
Targeted Organization INTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
18Figure 4
Analysis Of Job Functions Of Recipients Being Targeted
Source: SymantecAnalysis Of Job Functions Of Recipients Being Targeted
Media
10%Senior Level
8%Executive Level
25%
5101520
Sales
12%Research & Development
9%
Primary Assistant
6%Shared Mailbox
23%
Recruitment
6%
Source: SymantecSymantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
19Where Attacks Come From
Figure 5 represents the geographical distribution of attacking machines’ IP addresses for all
targeted attacks in 2011. It doesn’t necessarily represent the location of the perpetrators.
Geographical locations of attackers' IP addresses
Source: SymantecFigure 5
Geographical Locations Of Attackers’ IP AddressesINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
20Against The Breach:
Securing Trust
And Data Protection
Political activism and hacking were two big themes in 2011; themes
that are continuing into 2012. There were many attacks last year that
received lots of media attention. Hacking can undermine institutional
confidence in a company, and loss of personal data can result in damage to an
organization’s reputation.
Although not the most frequent cause of data breaches, hacking attacks
had potentially the greatest impact and exposed more than 187.2 million
identities, the greatest number for any type of breach in 2011, analysis from the Norton Cybercrime Index revealed. Despite the media interest around these breaches, old-fashioned theft was the most frequent cause of data
breaches in 2011.DATA
Names
NamesSS# BANKINGCREDIT CARD NUMBERS PURCHASES
DATES OF BIRTHDATES OF BIRTHDATES OF BIRTH
ACCOUNT INFOUSER IDS
USER IDSUSER IDSEMAIL CONTACTS
EMAIL ADDRESSMEDICAL RECORDS MEDICAL RECORDS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERSSOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERSPASSWORDS BANKING INFO
IP ADDRESSES
IP ADDRESSESNamesNames
NamesNamesSS#
BANKINGCREDIT CARD NUMBERS
CREDIT CARD NUMBERSPURCHASES
DATES OF BIRTHDATES OF BIRTHDATES OF BIRTH
ACCOUNT INFO
ACCOUNT INFOUSER IDSUSER IDS
USER IDSUSER IDSEMAIL
CONTACTS
EMAIL ADDRESS DATES Of BIRTHMEDICAL RECORDS SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERSSOCIAL SECURITY #sSOCIAL
SECURITY
NUMBERS
PASSWORDS BANKING INFO
BANKING INFOIP ADDRESSES
Names
NamesADDRESSES
CREDIT CARD NUMBERSPURCHASES
DATES OF BIRTH
DATES OF BIRTHDATES OF BIRTH
ACCOUNT INFO
DATAUSER IDS
USER IDS
EMAIL CONTACTSEMAIL ADDRESS MEDICAL RECORDS
SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERSSOCIAL SECURITY NUMBERS
PASSWORDS
BANKING INFOIP ADDRESSESDespite the media interest around these
breaches, old-fashioned theft was the most
frequent cause of data breaches in 2011.Symantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
21Data Breaches In 2011
2011 was the year of data breaches. Analysis of
the industry sectors showed that companies in
the Computer Software, IT and healthcare sectors
accounted for 93.0% of the total number of identities stolen. It is likely that hackers perceived
some of the victims as softer targets, focused on
consumer markets and not information security.
Theft or loss was the most frequent cause, across all sectors, accounting for 34.3%, or approximately 18.5 million identities exposed in 2011.
Worldwide, approximately 1.1 million identities
were exposed per breach, mainly owing to the large number of identities breached though hacking attacks. More than 232.4 million identities were
exposed overall during 2011. Deliberate breaches
mainly targeted customer-related information, primarily because it can be used for fraud.
A recent study
8 from the Ponemon Institute,
commissioned by Symantec, looked at 36 data
breaches in the UK9 and found the average per
capita cost was GBP £79 and an average incident costs GBP £1.75 million in total. Similarly in the
US, Ponemon examined 49 companies and found the per capita cost of a breach was USD $194 and an average incident costs USD $5.5 million in total. Echoing the Norton Cybercrime Index data above,
the Ponemon study also found that negligence
(36% of cases in the UK and 39% in the US) and malicious or criminal attacks (31% in the UK and 37% in the US) were the main causes.
The study’s findings revealed that more
organizations were using data loss prevention technologies in 2011 and that fewer records were being lost, with lower levels of customer
churn than in previous years. Taking steps to
keep customers loyal and repair any damage to reputation and brand can help reduce the cost of a data breach.Figure 6
Timeline Of Data Breaches Showing Identities Breached In 2011
Source: SymantecTimeline Of Data Breaches Showing Identities Breached In 2011
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC102030405060708074
35
222011MILLION
Source: SymantecINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
22Figure 8
Top-Ten Sectors By Number
Of Identities Exposed, 2011Top-ten Sectors By Number Of Identities Exposed, 2011
Source: Symantec44% Computer Software
8% Healthcare 2% Insurance
1.7% Community & Non-Profit 1.7% Government 41% Information Technology
0.7% Arts & Media 0.4% Financial 0.2% Retail 0.1% Utilities & Energy 2011
Source: SymantecTop-ten sectors by number of data breaches, 2011
Source: Symantec43% Healthcare
13% Education
8% Financial
5% Arts & Media 5% Computer Software 14% Government
4% Retail 3% Hospitality 3% Insurance 3% Information Technology 2011Figure 7
Top-Ten Sectors By Number
Of Data Breaches, 2011
Source: SymantecSymantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
23Certificate Authorities
Under Attack
Certificate Authorities (CAs), which issue SSL certificates that
help encrypt and authenticate websites and other online ser -
vices, saw an unprecedented number of attacks in 2011.
Notable examples of attacks against CAs in 2011 included:
MARCH
1 An attack compromised the access credentials of
a Comodo partner in Italy and used the partner’s privileges to generate fraudulent SSL certificates
10.
MAY
2 It was reported that another Comodo partner was hacked: ComodoBR in Brazil
11.
JUNE
3 StartCom, the CA operating StartSSL was attacked unsuccessfully in June
12.
4 Diginotar was hacked in June. But no certificates were issued at first
13.
JULY
5 An internal audit discovered an intrusion within DigiNotar’s infrastructure indicating compromise of their cryptographic keys. Fraudulent certifi-
cates are issued as a result of the DigiNotar hack
for Google, Mozilla add-ons, Microsoft Update and others
14.AUGUST
6 Fraudulent certificates from the DigiNotar compromise are discovered in the wild. Hacker (dubbed ComodoHacker) claims credit for Comodo
and DigiNotar attacks and claims to have attacked
other certificate authorities as well. Hacker claims to be from Iran.
SEPTEMBER
7 Security researchers demonstrate “Browser Exploit Against SSL/TLS” (BEAST for short)
15,
a technique to take advantage of a vulnerability in the encryption technology of TLS 1.0, a stan-
dard used by Browsers, Servers and Certificate
Authorities.
8 GlobalSign attacked, although the Certificate Authority was not breached, their web server was compromised
16, but nothing else17. ComodoHacker
claims credit for this attack as well.
9 Dutch government and other Diginotar cus-tomers suddenly had to replace all Diginotar certificates as the major Web browser vendors
removed Diginotar from their trusted root stores
18.
DigiNotar files for bankruptcy.
NOVEMBER
10 Digicert Sdn. Bhd. (Digicert Malaysia) an inter -
mediate certificate authority that chained up to
Entrust (and is no relation to the well-known CA,
Digicert Inc.) issued certificates with weak private
keys and without appropriate usage extensions or revocation information. As a result Microsoft, Google and Mozilla removed the Digicert Malaysia
roots from their trusted root stores
19. This was not
as the result of a hacking attack; this was a result
of poor security practices by Digicert Sdn. Bhd.
These attacks have demonstrated that not all CAs are created equal. These attacks raise the stakes for Certificate Authorities and require a consistently high level of security across the industry. For business users, they underline the importance
of choosing a trustworthy, well-secured Certificate Authority.
Lastly, consumers should be using modern up-to-date browsers and become more diligent about checking to verify that sites they visit are using SSL issued by a major trusted CA and we have included some advice in the best practices section at the
end of this report.INTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
24Building Trust And Securing
The Weakest Links
Law-abiding users have a vested interest in building a secure,
reliable, trustworthy Internet. The latest developments show
that the battle for end-users’ trust is still going on:
■■Always On SSL. Online Trust Alliance20 endorses Always On SSL, a
new approach to implementing SSL across a website. Companies like
Facebook21, Google, PayPal, and Twitter22 are offering users the option of
persistent SSL encryption and authentication across all the pages of their services (not just login pages). Not only does this mitigate man-in-the-
middle attacks like Firesheep
23, but it also offers end-to-end security that
can help secure every Web page that visitors to the site use, not just the
pages used for logging-in and for financial transactions.
■■Extended V alidation SSL Certificates. EV SSL Certificates offer the high -
est level of authentication and trigger browsers to give users a very vis-
ible indicator that the user is on a secured site by turning the address
bar green. This is valuable protection against a range of online attacks.
A Symantec sponsored consumer survey of internet shoppers in Europe, the US and Australia showed the SSL EV green bar increases the feeling of security for most (60%) shoppers
24. Conversely, in a US online consumer
study, 90% of respondents would not continue a transaction if they see a browser warning page, indicating the absence of a secure connection
25.
■■Baseline Requirements for SSL/TLS Certificates. The CA/Browser Forum
released “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates”, the first international baseline standard
for the operation of Certification Authorities (CAs) issuing SSL/TLS digital
certificates natively trusted in browser software. The new baseline stan-dard was announced in December 2011 and goes into effect July 1, 2012.
■■Code signing certificates and private key security. High profile thefts of
code signing private keys highlighted the need for companies to secure and protect their private keys if they hold digital certificates
26. Stealing
code signing keys enables hackers to use those certificates to digitally sign malware and that can help to make attacks using that malware much
harder to recognize. That is exactly what happened with the Stuxnet and
Duqu attacks.
■■DNSSEC. This technology is gaining momentum as a method of preserv-
ing the integrity of the domain name system (DNS). However, it is not a panacea for all online security needs, it does not provide website identity
authentication nor does it provide encryption. DNSSEC should be used in
conjunction with Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) technology and other secu-rity mechanisms.
■■Legal requirements. Many countries, including the EU Member States27
and the United States (46 states)28 have at least sectoral data breach noti-
fication legislation, which mea ns that companies must notify authorities
and, where appropriate, affected individuals if their data is affected by a
data breach. As well as a spur to encourage other territories with less regu-
lation, these requirements can reassure users that in the event of a breach they will be quickly notified and will be able take some action to mitigate against potential impact, including changing account passwords.Symantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
25Consumerization And Mobile
Computing: Balancing The Risks And Benefits In The Cloud
Risks With ‘Bring Your Own Device’
Employees are increasingly bringing their
own smartphones, tablets or laptops to work.
In addition, many companies are giving
employees an allowance or subsidy to buy their
own computer equipment. These trends, known as ‘bring your own device’, present a major challenge
to IT departments more used to having greater
control over every device on the network. There is also the risk that a device owned by an employee might be used for non-work activity that may
expose it to more malware than a device strictly
used for business purposes only. The proliferation in mobile devices in the home and in busi-
ness has been fueled in large part by the growth in cloud-based services and applications, without access to the Internet many
mobile devices lack a great deal of the functionality that has
made them attractive in the first place.
Threats Against Mobile Devices
Over the past ten years we have seen a proliferation of mobile devices but there has not yet been a corresponding rise in mo -
bile threats on the same level as we have seen in PC malware.
If we look at how PC malware evolved, there are three factors
needed before a major increase of mobile malware will occur: a widespread platform, readily accessible development tools, and sufficient attacker motivation (usually financial). The first
has been fulfilled most recently with the advent of Android. Its
growing market share parallels the rise in the number of mo -
bile threats during 2011.Over the past
ten years we
have seen a
proliferation of
mobile devices
but there has
not yet been a
corresponding
rise in mobile
threats on the
same level as
we have seen
in PC malware. INTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
26Unlike closed systems such as Apple’s iPhone, Android is a
relatively open platform. It is easier for developers, including malware writers, to write and distribute applications. In 2011,
we saw malware families, such as Opfake; migrate from older
platforms to Android. The latest strains of Opfake have used server-side polymorphism in order to evade traditional signa-ture-based detection. Without a single Android marketplace
for apps and central control over what is published, it is easy
for malware authors to create trojans that are very similar to popular apps, although Android users must explicitly approve the set of permissions that is outlined for each app.
Currently, more than half of all Android threats collect device
data or track users’ activities. Almost a quarter of the mobile threats identified in 2011 were designed to send content and
one of the most popular ways for phone malware authors
to make money is by sending premium SMS messages from infected phones. This technique was used by 18% of mobile threats identified in 2011. Increasingly, phone malware does more than send SMS. For example, we see attacks that track
the user’s position with GPS and steal information.
The message that is coming through loud and clear is that the
creators of these threats are getting more strategic and bolder
in their efforts. People regard their phones as personal, pri-vate, intimate parts of their life and view phone attacks with alarm. The motivations for such attacks are not always mon-
etary: in this example, it was about gathering intelligence and
personal information.
Mobile threats are now employing server-side polymorphic
techniques and the number of variants of mobile malware attacks is currently rising faster than the number of unique families of mobile malware. Monetization is still a key driver behind the growth in mobile malware and the current mobile technology landscape provides some malicious opportunities; however, there are none at the same revenue scale achievable
in Windows, yet.
Consumerization Of IT
And Cloud Computing
As more people are bringing their own devices to work, con-
sumer technology is invading the office.. They’re also using social networking sites for a variety of purposes, including
marketing. And they’re using cloud applications instead of
company-managed software to store files or communicate.
In some cases, this is being done ‘below the radar’ by individu-
al employees without the support of the company. In other cas-es, businesses are embracing the benefits of cloud computing, mobile working and the price/performance of consumer devic-es to reduce costs and improve productivity. For example, 37%
of businesses globally are already adopting cloud solutions
29.
The risks of unmanaged employee adoption of cloud comput -
ing or the use of consumer devices and consumer websites in
business are clear. But even if companies deliberately choose
consumerization, there are still security challenges. It makes
it harder for companies to erect an impermeable boundary around the business and control exactly what is on employees’ PCs and how data is stored, managed and transferred, espe -
cially when tracking how and where corporate data and infor -
mation is being used.Total Mobile Threat Family Count From 2010-2012
20406080100
Source: Symantec67
62010 2011 JAN DEC JAN DECFigure 9
Total Mobile Malware Family Count 2010-2012
Source: SymantecSymantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
27Quick Response
(QR) Codes
QR codes have sprung up everywhere in the
last couple of years. They are a way for people to convert a barcode into a Web site link
using a camera app on their smartphone. It’s
fast, convenient and dangerous. Spammers are already using it to promote black-market pharmaceuticals and malware authors have
used it to install a trojan on Android phones.
In combination with link shortening, it can be very hard for users to tell in advance if a given QR code is safe or not, so consider a QR reader that can check a Web site’s reputation
before visiting it.
Once the bait has been taken the victim
must be reeled in. The next step in these attacks fools the user into taking an action to
propagate the threat, for example installing
an app, downloading ‘update’ to your video software or clicking on a button to prove you’re human. The attackers persuade their
victims to infect themselves and spread the
bait to everyone in their social circles.
It must be stated that this is not just a
Facebook issue; variations of these threats
run on all social media platforms. The number
of threats on each of these platforms is directly proportional to the number of users on these sites. It is not indication of the “security” or safety of a site.What Mobile Malware
Does With Your Phone
Figure 10
Key Functionality Of Mobile Risks
2 0 1 1Key Functionality Of Mobile Risks
Source: Symantec24%
Send
Content25%
Track
User
16%
Traditional
Threats7%
Change
Settings28%
Collect
Data
Source: SymantecINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
2801001
0100 01
101001 010 1001 010001 101001 01001 01001 0
010010 010 0100101 010001 010 10010100010010010
1010010 0100101010 010
01010 010101001 01011010010001 01010 1001
01001 01001 01001001001 0100 101 0 101001 10010 1 1001 010010 100101 101010 10010 10010 10010 1001011110 100101 000101001 01010010 01010
01 0100101 010
0101 01001 01010010 1001001
10100101001 0010
10100100101001 010 1001 01001 01
1010010 1001 01 01010 0100100101
10100100010001010 010010101010001 10100100100 010 100
01 01001 01010
01001 1010 1001010010001 01001 01
01001 01001 01001 010 00100100
0100010001
01001 010 101 10 010 10001010010010010 10101 1010 01 01001 010 1001 0101 1001 1010010010 1001 010 010010
010010000
1010101010
010001 010 01 0100100 010 01
01 01001 01001 0101000 1010 1001110111010 1010110
101000100101110010
010010 0100010110010010101010000 10
01010 00 010010
01010 01 0110101001010010 01010
00110100 01o1
011010100010 0101
0101001 01101
010101101001000101001010 001010 010 0101000101010
o1o10101 0101110010101001 0100100100 010100 01010 1001
0101101
1010101000100010001000 00101
Confidence In The Cloud:
Balancing Risks
Many companies are keen to adopt cloud computing. It can
reduce costs by outsourcing routine services, such as email or CRM, to third-party specialists and by swapping upfront
capital expenditure with lower, more predictable per-user
fees. It can also give companies access to newer and better technology without the difficulties of installing or upgrading in-house hardware.
However, it is not without its risks. The first risk is unman-
aged employee use of cloud services. For example, an em-
ployee starts using a file sharing Web site to transfer large
documents to clients or suppliers, or sets-up an unofficial company page or discussion forum on a popular social net -
working site. In fact, the tighter the IT department holds the reins, the more likely it is that employees will work around
limitations using third party Web sites.
The main risks involved in the use of ad-hoc cloud computing
services include:
1 Security and compliance - the interfaces between
users, endpoints and backend systems all need to be secure with appropriate levels of access con-
trol in place.
2 Is data encrypted as it is transferred over the
internet?
3 Non-compliance with data protection regula-tions –for example, if the data is hosted overseas, from a European standpoint this could result in a
breach of privacy legislation.4 Lack of vendor validation – is the service reputa-
ble and secure? Can the users easily transfer their data to another vendor should the need arise?
5 Public and private cloud providers depend on system availability and strong service level agreements (SLAs) can help to promote high
availability.
6 Secure access control over company data stored
on third party systems. Does the service offer control over how the data is stored and how it can
be accessed?
7 If the service is unavailable for any reason, the
company may be unable to access its own data.
8 Are there legal risks and liabilities that may arise as a result of vendor terms and conditions? Always make sure the terms and conditions are clear and service level performance can be moni-
tored against the agreed SLAs.
IT managers and CISOs can address these concerns by vali-dating an approved list of cloud applications in the same way
that they would authorize on-premise software. This needs to be backed-up with the appropriate acceptable usage policies,
employee training and, if necessary, enforcement using Web
site access control technology. In addition, where employees access consumer sites for business use, such as using social networking services for marketing, companies need to protect users against potential attacks from Web-hosted malware and
spam.Many companies are keen to adopt cloud computing.
However, it is not without its risks.Symantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
29Spam Activity Trends
Spam In 2011
Despite a significant drop in email spam in
2011 (dropping to an average of 75.1% of
all email in 2011 compared with 88.5% in
2010), spam continues to be a chronic problem
for many organizations and can be a silent-killer for smaller businesses, particularly if their email
servers become overwhelmed by millions of spam
emails each day. With the power of botnets, robot networks of computers infected with malware and
under the control of cybercriminals, spammers
can pump out billions of spam emails every day,
clogging-up company networks and slowing down communications. There were, on average, 42 billion
spam messages a day in global circulation in 2011,
compared with 61.6 billion in 2010.In 2011, we saw spam, phishing and 419 scams exploit political unrest (e.g. the Arab spring), the
deaths of public figures (e.g. Muammar Gadhafi,
Steve Jobs and Amy Winehouse) and natural disasters (e.g. the Japanese tsunami). They are the same topics that newspapers cover and for the
same reasons: they attract readers’ attention.
Unlike spam, phishing activity continued to rise
(up to 0.33% or 1 in 298.0 of all email in 2011, from 0.23% or 1 in 442.1 in 2010). The proportion of
phishing emails varied considerably by company
size with the smallest and largest companies attracting the most, but the proportion of spam was almost identical for all sizes of business. The proportion
of phishing
emails varied
considerably by
company size
with the smallest
and largest
companies
attracting the
most, but the
proportion
of spam was
almost identical
for all sizes
of business. INTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
30The Changing Face Of Spam
Between 2010 and 2011, pharmaceutical spam fell by 34%, in
large part owing to the demise of the Rustock botnet, which was mainly used to pump-out pharmaceutical spam. In con-
trast, messages about watches and jewelry, and sex and dat -
ing both increased as a percentage. Not only were there fewer
spam emails in circulation, but smaller message sizes were the most common and English remained the lingua franca of
spam
30, with Portuguese, Russian and Dutch the next most
popular languages (albeit with a much smaller ‘market share’).
As the popularity of social networking and micro-blogging
sites continues to grow, spammers increasingly target them as well as traditional email for their messages. Having your con-
tent go viral is not just the dream of legitimate marketers, but
cybercriminals distributing malware and spam are also finding new ways to exploit the power of social media and are even tricking users into spreading their links for them. Impact Of Botnets On Spam
Overall in 2011, botnets produced approximately 81.2% of all spam in circulation, compared with 88.2% in 2010. Between March 16th and March 17th, 2011, many Rustock command
and control (C&C) servers located in the US were seized and
shut down by US federal law enforcement agents, resulting in an immediate drop in the global spam volume from 51 billion spam messages a day in the week before the shutdown to 31.7
billion a day in the week afterwards.Figure 11
Percentage Of Email Identified As Spam, 2011
Source: SymantecPercentage Of Email Identified As Spam, 2011
Source: Symantec100%
90
807060
50
403020102010 2011 JAN DEC JAN DEC
68%Symantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
31URL Shortening And Spam
Spammers are making greater use of URL shortening
services, even establishing their own shortening services along the way. These sites take a long website address and
shorten them, making them easier to share. This has many
legitimate uses and is popular on social networking and micro-blogging sites. Spammers take advantage of these services to hide the true destination of links in their un-
wanted messages. This makes it harder for users to know
what they are clicking on and it increases the work needed for spam filtering software to check if a link in an email is legitimate or not.
Spammers sometimes redirect a website address through
many different shortened links. There are so many short -
ening services that if one gets shut down or improves
security, spammers can move on to the next site. In May
2011, the first evidence
31 of spammers using their own URL
shortening services appeared, and spammers were host -
ing their own shortened Web sites redirecting visitors to
spam Web sites. These shortened links first pass through
bona fide URL shortening services, in a bid to hide the true nature of the spam URL from the legitimate shortening service.
Initially, spammer-operated link shorteners were rudi-
mentary and based on freely-available open source tools.
Spammers used these services to make it more difficult to
detect and block spam activity based on the URLs involved, and further conceal the true location of the promoted sites. They generated different URLs for use in different environments, such as social networking, micro-blogging
and email campaigns. Spammers also used fake profiles on
Twitter to send messages containing the same shortened links, with each profile using different trending topics to promote their messages.
As an added bonus, link shortening sites can give them
feedback through a dashboard provided by the URL short -
ening service about the number of click-throughs on a given link so that they can use this information to target the messages better. In other words, they can find out what people like to click and send out more of that, increasing the effectiveness of their campaigns.2011
CHANGE2010
PHARMACEUTICAL
WATCHES /JEWELR Y
SEXUAL/DATING
UNSOLICITED
NEWSLETTERS
CASINO/ GAMBLING
DIET/WEIGHT LO SS
MALWARE
UNKNOWN /OTHER
SCAMS /FRAUD/419S
SOFT WARE39.6%
18.6%
14.7%
10.1%
7.9%
3.5%
3%
2.8%
1.8%
.8%74%
6.5%
3.3%
9.3%
7.0%
.5%
.5%
.5%
.5%
1.4%-34.4%
12.1%
11.4%
.8%
.9%
3%
2.5%
2.3%
1.3%NEWS!
-.6%
Figure 12
Top Ten Spam Email
Categories, 2010-2011
Source: Symantec.cloudINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
32Malicious Code Trends
Malware In 2011
By analyzing malicious code we can determine which threats types and
attack vectors are being employed. The endpoint is often the last line
of defense, but it can often be the first-line of defense against attacks
that spread using USB storage devices, insecure network connections and
compromised, infected websites. Symantec’s cloud-based technology and reputation systems can also help to identify and block new and emerging
attacks that haven’t been seen before, such as new targeted attacks employing
previously unknown zero-day exploits. Analysis of malware activity trends both in the cloud and at the endpoint can help to shed light on the wider nature of threats confronting businesses, especially from blended attacks and
threats facing mobile workers.
Corresponding to their large internet populations, the United States, China
and India remained the top sources for overall malicious activity. The overall average proportion of attacks originating from the United States increased by
one percentage point compared with 2010, while the same figure for China saw
a decrease by approximately 10 percentage points compared with 2010.
The United States was the number one source of all activities, except for
malicious code and spam zombies, where India took first place. Around 12.6%
of bot activity originated in the USA as did 33.5% of web-based attacks, 16.7 %
of network attacks and 48.5% of phishing websites.Symantec’s cloud-based technology and reputation systems can also help to
identify and block new and emerging attacks that haven’t been seen before,
such as new targeted attacks employing previously unknown zero-day exploits.Symantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
33Website Malware
Drive-by attacks continue to be a challenge for consumers and
businesses. They are responsible for hundreds of millions of attempted infections every year. This happens when users visit
a website that is host to malware. It can happen when they
click on a link in an email or a link from social networking site or they can visit a legitimate website that has, itself, been infected.
Attackers keep changing their technique and they have become
very sophisticated. Badly-spelled, implausible email has been
replaced by techniques such as ‘clickjacking’ or ‘likejacking’
where a user visits a website to watch a tempting video and the attackers use that click to post a comment to all the user’s friends on Facebook, thereby enticing them to click on the same malicious link.
As result, Facebook has implemented a ‘Clickjacking Domain
Reputation System’ that has eliminated the bulk of clickjack -
ing attacks by asking a user to confirm a Like before it posts, if the domain is considered untrusted.
Based on Norton Safe Web
32 data – Symantec technology that
scans the Web looking for websites hosting malware – we’ve
determined that 61% of malicious sites are actually regular
Web sites that have been compromised and infected with mali-
cious code. By Category, The Top-5 Most
Infected Websites Are:
VOLUME 1VOLUME 21 Blogs & Web communications
2 Hosting/Personal hosted sites3 Business/Economy
4 Shopping
5 Education & Reference
It is interesting to note that Web sites hosting adult/porno -
graphic content are not in the top five, but ranked tenth. The
full list can be seen in figure 16.
Moreover, religious and ideological sites were found to have
triple the average number of threats per infected site than
adult/pornographic sites. We hypothesize that this is because
pornographic website owners already make money from the internet and, as a result, have a vested interest in keeping their sites malware-free – it’s not good for repeat business.
Source: SymantecWeb Sites Blocked Per Day
JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC2,0004,0006,0008,00010,000
6,0519,3149,314
2011
2010Figure 13
Average Number Of Malicious Web Sites
Identified Per Day, 2011
Source: Symantec.cloudINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
34In 2011, the Symantec VeriSign website malware scanning ser -
vice33 scanned over 8.2 Billion URLs for malware infection and
approximately 1 in 156 unique websites were found to contain
malware. Websites with vulnerabilities are more risk of mal-
ware infection and Symantec began offering its SSL customers
a website vulnerability assessment scan from October 2011. Between October and the end of the year, Symantec identi-fied that 35.8% of websites had at least one vulnerability and
25.3% had a least one critical vulnerability.
Email-Borne Malware
The number of malicious emails as a proportion of total email
traffic increased in 2011. Large companies saw the greatest rise, with 1 in 205.1 emails being identified as malicious for
large enterprises with more than 2,500 employees. For small to
medium-sized businesses with up to 250 employees, 1 in 267.9 emails were identified as malicious.
Criminals disguise the malware hidden in many of these
emails using a range of different attachment types, such as PDF files and Microsoft Office documents. Many of these data file attachments include malicious code that takes advantage of vulnerabilities in the parent applications, and at least two of
these attacks have exploited zero-day vulnerabilities in Adobe
Reader.
Malware authors rely on social engineering to make their
infected attachments more clickable. For example, recent at -
tacks appeared to be messages sent from well-known courier and parcel delivery companies regarding failed deliveries. In
another example, emails purporting to contain attachments
of scanned images sent from network-attached scanners and photocopiers. The old guidance about not clicking on unknown attachments is, unfortunately, still relevant.
Moreover, further analysis revealed that 39.1% of email-borne
malware comprised hyperlinks that referenced malicious code, rather than malware contained in an attachment. This is an
escalation on the 23.7% figure in 2010, and a further indica-
tion that cybercriminals are attempting to circumvent security countermeasures by changing the vector of attacks from pure -
ly email-based, to using the Web.
Source: SymantecRatio of malware in email traffic, 2011
JAN DEC JAN DEC1 in 0
1 in 501 in 1001 in 1501 in 2001 in 2501 in 3001 in 350
2011 2010Figure 14
Ratio Of Malware In Email Traffic, 2011
Source: Symantec.cloudSymantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
35Border Gateway Protocol
(BGP) Hijacking
In 2011 we investigated34 a case where a Russian telecommuni-
cations company had had its network hijacked by a spammer.
They were able to subvert a fundamental Internet technology
- the Border Gateway Protocol - itself to send spam messages
that appeared to come from a legitimate (but hijacked) source. Since spam filters rely, in part, on blacklists of known spam senders, this technique could allow a spammer to bypass them.
Over the course of the year, we found a number of cases like
this. Even though this phenomenon remains marginal at this time, compared to spam sent from large botnets, it is one to watch in the coming year.Polymorphic Threats
Polymorphic malware or specifically, “server-side” poly-morphism is the latest escalation in the arms race between malware authors and vendors of scanning software. The poly-
morphic technique works by constantly varying the internal
structure or content of a piece of malware. This makes it much more challenging for traditional pattern-matching based anti-malware to detect. For example, by performing this function on
a Web server, or in the cloud, an attacker can generate a unique
version of the malware for each attack.
In 2011, the Symantec.cloud email scanner frequently identi-
fied a polymorphic threat, Trojan.Bredolab, in large volumes. It accounted for 7.5% of all email malware blocked, equivalent to approximately 35 million potential attacks throughout the whole year. It used a range of techniques for stealth including
server-side polymorphism, customized packers, and encrypted
communications. Figure 15 below, illustrates this rise in Bredolab polymorphic malware threats being identified using cloud-based technology. This chart shows detection for emails
that contained a document-style attachment purporting to be
an invoice or a receipt, and prompting the user to open the attachment. Source: Symantec10,00020,00030,00040,00050,00060,00070,00080,00090,000100,000
MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DECRise in email-borne Bredolab polymorphic malware
attacks per month, 2011Figure 15
Rise In Email-Borne Bredolab Polymorphic
Malware Attacks Per Month, 2011
Source: Symantec.cloudINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
36
Dangerous Web Sites
Figure 16
Most Dangerous Web Site Categories, 2011
Pornograph yHealth & MedicineEntertainment
& Music
Automo tiveEducation /
Reference
VOLUME 1 VOLUME 2
Technolog y
Computer & InternetShoppingHosting/Personal
hosted sitesBlogs /Web
CommunicationsTop-10 Most Frequently Exploited
Categories Of Web SitesRank% Of Total Number
Of Infected Web Sites
Business /
Econom y
2.4%2.7%3.8%
3.8%6.9%
6.9%7.7%15.6%19.8%
10.0%1
234
5
678
9
10
Source: SymantecSymantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
37Attackers Are Using Web Attack Toolkits In Two Main Ways:
1 Targeted attacks . The attacker selects a type of user he would like to
target. The toolkit creates emails, IMs, blog posts to entice the target
audience to the infected content. Typically, this will be a link to a ma-
licious website that will install the malware on the victim’s system.
2 Broadcast attacks. The attacker starts by targeting a broad range of
websites using SQL injection, web software, or server exploitation.
The objective is to insert a link from an infected website to a mali-
cious site that will infect visitors. Once successful, each subsequent visitor will be attacked.Exploiting The Web: Attack
Toolkits, Rootkits And Social
Networking Threats
Attack toolkits, which allow criminals to create new malware and assemble an entire attack without
having to write the software from scratch, account
for nearly two-thirds (61%) of all threat activity on malicious websites. As these kits become more widespread, robust and easier to use, this number
is expected to climb. New exploits are quickly
incorporated into attack kits. Each new toolkit version released during the year is accompanied with increased malicious Web attack activity. As a
new version emerges that incorporates new exploit
functionality, we see an increased use of it in the wild, making as much use of the new exploits until potential victims have patched their systems. For example, the number of attacks using the Blackhole toolkit, which was very active in 2010, dropped to a few hundred attacks per day in the middle of 2011,
but re-emerged with newer versions generating
hundreds of thousands of infection attempts per day towards the end of the year.
On average, attack toolkits contain around 10
different exploits, mostly focusing on browser
independent plug-in vulnerabilities like Adobe Flash Player, Adobe Reader and Java. Popular kits can be updated every few days and each update
may trigger a wave of new attacks.
They are relatively easy to find and sold on the
underground black market and web forums. Prices range from $40 to $4,000.INTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
38Macs Are Not Immune
The first known Mac-based bot network emerged in 2009 and 2011 saw a number of
new threats emerge for Mac OS X, including trojans like MacDefender, a fake anti-virus program. It looks convincing and it installs without requiring admin permission first.
Mac users are exposed to sites that push trojans by means of SEO poisoning and social
networking. In May 2011, Symantec found a malware kit for Mac (Weyland-Yutani BOT) the first of its kind to attack the Mac OS X platform, and Web injections as a means of attack. While this type of crime kit is common on the Windows platform, this new
Mac kit is being marketed as the first of its kind
35. In addition, many attack tools have
become cross-platform, exploiting Java exploits whether they are on Macs or Windows
PCs. As a result of these trends, Mac users need to be more mindful of security risks
and can’t afford to assume that they are automatically immune from all threats.
Figure 17
Macdefender Trojan Screenshot
Source: SymantecSymantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
39Rootkits
A rootkit is software that enables continued privileged access
to a computer while actively hiding its presence from adminis-trators by subverting standard operating system functionality.
Rootkits have been around for some time—the Brain virus was
the first identified rootkit to employ these techniques on the PC platform in 1986—and they have increased in sophistica -
tion and complexity since then.
Rootkits represent a small percentage of attacks but they are
a growing problem and, because they are deeply hidden, they
can be difficult to detect and remove. The current frontrunners
in the rootkit arena are Tidserv, Mebratix, and Mebroot. These samples all modify the master boot record (MBR) on Windows computers in order to gain control of the computer before the operating system is loaded. Variants of Downadup (aka
Conficker), Zbot (aka ZeuS), as well as Stuxnet all use rootkit
techniques to varying degrees.
As malicious code becomes more sophisticated it is likely
that they will increasingly turn to rootkit techniques to evade detection and hinder removal. As users become more aware of malicious code that steals confidential information and
competition among attackers increases, it is likely that more
threats will incorporate rootkit techniques to thwart security software.
Social Media Threats
With hundreds of millions of people on social networking sites, it is inevitable that online criminals would attack them there. A social medium is perfect for social engineering: it’s
easier to fool someone when they think they’re surrounded by friends. More than half of all attacks identified on social
networking Web sites were related to malware hosted on com-
promised Blogs/Web Communications Web sites. This is where
a hyperlink for a compromised Web site was shared on a social network. It is also increasingly used for sending spam mes -
sages for the same reasons.
All social media platforms are being exploited and in many dif-
ferent ways. But Facebook, as the most popular, provides some excellent examples on how social engineering flourishes in
social media. Criminals take advantage of people’s needs and
expectations. For example, Facebook doesn’t provide a ‘dislike’ button or the ability to see who has viewed your profile, so criminals have exploited both concepts.
INTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
40Closing The Window Of Vulnerability:
Exploits And Zero-Day Attacks
A vulnerability is a weakness, such as a coding
error or design flaw that allows an attacker
to compromise availability, confidentiality,
or integrity of a computer system. Early detection
and responsible reporting helps to reduce the risk that a vulnerability might be exploited before it is
repaired.Number Of Vulnerabilities
We identified 4,989 new vulnerabilities in 2011, compared to
6,253 the year before. (See Appendix D for more historical data and details on our methodology.) Despite this decline, the gen-
eral trend over time is still upward and Symantec discovered
approximately 95 new vulnerabilities per week.
4,8145,562
4,6444,842
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 20114,9896,253
Source: SymantecFigure 18
Total Number Of Vulnerabilities Identified, 2006-2011
Source: SymantecSymantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
41Weaknesses in Critical
Infrastructure Systems
SCADA systems (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition)
are widely used in industry and utilities such as power stations for monitoring and control. We saw a dramatic increase in the
number of publicly-reported SCADA vulnerabilities from 15 in
2010 to 129 in 2011. Since the emergence of the Stuxnet worm in 2010
36, SCADA systems have attracted wider attention from
security researchers. However, 93 of the 129 new published vulnerabilities were the product of just one security researcher.
Old Vulnerabilities Are
Still Under Attack
On PCs, a four-year old vulnerability37 in many Microsoft oper -
ating systems was, by far, the most frequently attacked vulner -
ability in 2011, clocking in at over 61 million attacks against
the Microsoft Windows RPC component38. It was more heavily
attacked than the next four vulnerabilities put together39.
The most commonly exploited data file format in 2011 was
PDF. For example, one PDF-related vulnerability attracted more than a million attacks in 2011.
Patches are available for all five of the most-attacked vulner -
abilities, so why do criminals still target them? There are sev -
eral explanations.
1 They are cheaper to attack. Criminals have to pay
a premium on black market exchanges40 for infor -
mation about newer vulnerabilities but they can buy malware off the shelf to target old ones.
2 Attacking newer vulnerabilities may attract more
attention than going after older, well-known weaknesses. Some online criminals prefer a lower
profile.
3 There is a still a large pool of potential victims be -
cause a proportion of the user base can’t, won’t or
don’t install patches or install a current and active
endpoint security product. Web Browser Vulnerabilities
Web browsers are a popular target for criminals and they
exploit vulnerabilities in browsers such as Internet Explorer, Firefox or Chrome as well as plugins such as PDF readers.
Criminals can buy toolkits for between USD $100 and USD
$1,000 that will check up to 25 different vulnerabilities when someone visits an infected Web site.
In 2011, we saw a big drop off in reported vulnerabilities in all
the popular browsers from a total of 500 in 2010 to a total of 351 in 2011. Much of this improvement was due to a big reduc-
tion in vulnerabilities in Google Chrome.
Overall, the number of vulnerabilities affecting browser plug-
ins dropped very slightly from 346 to 308.
Browser vulnerabilities in 2010 and 2011
Opera
Mozilla Firefox
Microsoft Internet ExplorerGoogle ChromeApple Safari
50 100 150 200
Source: Symantec2010
2011Figure 19
Browser Vulnerabilities
In 2010 And 2011
Source: SymantecINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
42New Zero-day Vulnerabilities Create Big Risks
A zero-day attack exploits an unreported vulnerability for which no vendor
has released a patch. This makes them especially serious because they are
much more infective. If a non-zero-day attack gets past security, it can still be
thwarted by properly-patched software. Not so a zero-day attack.
For example, in 2011 we saw vigorous attacks against a vulnerability41 in
Adobe Reader and Adobe Acrobat that lasted for more than two weeks. It
peaked at more than 500 attacks a day before Adobe released a patch on
December 16, 2011.
The good news is that 2011 had the lowest number of zero day vulnerabilities
in the past 6 years. While the overall number of zero day vulnerabilities is
down, attacks using these vulnerabilities continue to be successful which is
why they are often used in targeted attacks, such as W32.Duqu.
Figure 20
Web Browser Plug-In Vulnerabilities
19% 20% 29% 10% 20%
17% 10% 34% 18% 21%Acrobat Reader Adobe Flash Active X Apple Quicktime Oracle Sun Java
<1%TOTAL
346308
100%Firefox Extension Web browser plug-in vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec20102011
Source: SymantecSymantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
43Conclusion:
What’s Ahead In 2012
A wise man once said, ‘Never make predictions, especially about the
future’. Well, this report has looked back at 2011 but in the conclusion
we’d like to take a hesitant peak into the future, projecting the trends we
have seen into 2012 and beyond.
■■Targeted attacks and APTs will continue to be a serious issue and the frequency and sophis-
tication of these attacks will increase.
■■Techniques and exploits developed for targeted attacks will trickle down to the broader un-
derground economy and be used to make regular malware more dangerous.
■■Malware authors and spammers will increase their use of social networking sites still
further.
■■The CA/Browser Forum42 will release additional security standards for companies issuing
digital certificates to secure the internet trust model against possible future attacks.
■■Consumerization and cloud computing will continue to evolve, perhaps changing the way
we do business and forcing IT departments to adapt and find new ways to protect end users
and corporate systems.
■■Malware authors will continue to explore ways to attack mobile phones and tablets and, as
they find something effective and money-making, they will exploit it ruthlessly.
■■In 2011, malicious code targeting Macs was in wider circulation as Mac users were exposed
to websites that were able to drop trojans. This trend is expected to continue through 2012 as attack code exploiting Macs becomes more integrated with the wider web-attack toolkits.
■■While external threats will continue to multiply, the insider threat will also create head-
lines, as employees act intentionally – and unintentionally – to leak or steal valuable data.
■■The foundation for the next Stuxnet-like APT attack may have already been laid. Indeed
Duqu may have been the first tremors of a new earthquake, but it may take longer for the
aftershock to reach the public domain.INTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
44Best Practice Guidelines
For Businesses
Employ Defense-In-Depth Strategies:
Emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive
defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protection method. This should
include the deployment of regularly updated firewalls, as well
as gateway antivirus, intrusion detection, intrusion protection systems, and Web security gateway solutions throughout the network.
Monitor For Network Threat,
Vulnerabilities And Brand Abuse.
Monitor for network intrusions, propagation attempts and other suspicious traffic patterns, identify attempted connec-tions to known malicious or suspicious hosts. Receive alerts
for new vulnerabilities and threats across vendor platforms for
proactive remediation. Track brand abuse via domain alerting and fictitious Web site reporting.
Antivirus On Endpoints Is Not Enough:
On endpoints, signature-based antivirus alone is not enough to protect against today’s threats and Web-based attack toolkits. Deploy and use a comprehensive endpoint security product
that includes additional layers of protection including:
■■Endpoint intrusion prevention that protects against un-
patched vulnerabilities from being exploited, protects
against social engineering attacks and stops malware from
reaching endpoints;
■■Browser protection for protection against obfuscated Web-
based attacks;
■■Consider cloud-based malware prevention to provide pro -
active protection against unknown threats;
■■File and Web-based reputation solutions that provide a
risk-and-reputation rating of any application and Web site
to prevent rapidly mutating and polymorphic malware;
■■Behavioral prevention capabilities that look at the behav-
ior of applications and malware and prevent malware;
■■Application control settings that can prevent applications and browser plug-ins from downloading unauthorized ma-licious content;
■■Device control settings that prevent and limit the types of
USB devices to be used.
Secure Your Websites Against MITM
Attacks And Malware Infection:
Avoid compromising your trusted relationship with your cus-tomers by:
■■Implementing Always On SSL;
■■Scanning your website daily for malware;
■■Setting the secure flag for all session cookies;
■■Regularly assessing your website for vulnerabilities;
■■Choosing SSL Certificates with Extended Validation to dis -
play the green browser address bar to website users;
■■Displaying recognized trust marks in highly visible loca-
tions on your website to inspire trust and show customers your commitment to their security.
Make sure to get your digital certificates from an established, trustworthy certificate authority who demonstrates excellent
security practices. Protect your private keys: Implement strong
security practices to secure and protect your private keys, es-pecially if you use digital certificates. Symantec recommends that organizations:
■■Use separate Test Signing and Release
Signing infrastructures,
■■Store keys in secure, tamper-proof, cryptographic hard -
ware devices, and
■■Implement physical security to protect your assets from
theft.
Use Encryption To Protect Sensitive Data:
Implement and enforce a security policy whereby sensitive data is encrypted. Access to sensitive information should be restricted. This should include a Data Loss Protection (DLP) so -
lution, which is a system to identify, monitor, and protect data. This not only serves to prevent data breaches, but can also help mitigate the damage of potential data leaks from within an organization.Symantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
45Use Data Loss Prevention To
Help Prevent Data Breaches:
Implement a DLP solution that can discover where sensitive
data resides, monitor its use and protect it from loss. Data loss prevention should be implemented to monitor the flow of data
as it leaves the organization over the network and monitor
copying sensitive data to external devices or Web sites. DLP should be configured to identify and block suspicious copying or downloading of sensitive data. DLP should also be used to
identify confidential or sensitive data assets on network file
systems and PCs so that appropriate data protection measures like encryption can be used to reduce the risk of loss.
Implement A Removable Media Policy.
Where practical, restrict unauthorized devices such as external portable hard-drives and other removable media. Such devices can both introduce malware as well as facilitate intellectual
property breaches—intentional or unintentional. If external
media devices are permitted, automatically scan them for vi-ruses upon connection to the network and use a DLP solution to monitor and restrict copying confidential data to unencrypt -
ed external storage devices.
Update Your Security Countermeasures
Frequently And Rapidly:
With more than 403 million unique variants of malware de -
tected by Symantec in 2011, enterprises should be updating se -
curity virus and intrusion prevention definitions at least daily,
if not multiple times a day.
Be Aggressive On Your
Updating And Patching:
Update, patch and migrate from outdated and insecure brows-
ers, applications and browser plug-ins to the latest available versions using the vendors’ automatic update mechanisms.
Most software vendors work diligently to patch exploited software vulnerabilities; however, such patches can only be effective if adopted in the field. Be wary of deploying standard corporate images containing older versions of bro wsers, appli-
cations, and browser plug-ins that are outdated and insecure. Wherever possible, automate patch deployments to maintain
protection against vulnerabilities across the organization.
Enforce An Effective Password Policy.
Ensure passwords are strong; at least 8-10 characters long and
include a mixture of letters and numbers. Encourage users to avoid re-using the same passwords on multiple Web sites
and sharing of passwords with others should be forbidden.
Passwords should be changed regularly, at least every 90 days. Avoid writing down passwords.Restrict Email Attachments:
Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments that are commonly used to spread viruses, such as . VBS, .BAT, .EXE, .PIF, and .SCR files. Enterprises
should investigate policies for .PDFs that are allowed to be in-cluded as email attachments.
Ensure That You Have Infection And
Incident Response Procedures In Place:
■■Ensure that you have your security vendors contact infor -
mation, know who you will call, and what steps you will take if you have one or more infected systems;
■■Ensure that a backup-and-restore solution is in place in
order to restore lost or compromised data in the event of
successful attack or catastrophic data loss;
■■Make use of post-infection detection capabilities from Web
gateway, endpoint security solutions and firewalls to iden-
tify infected systems;
■■Isolate infected computers to prevent the risk of further
infection within the organization;
■■If network services are exploited by malicious code or
some other threat, disable or block access to those services until a patch is applied;
■■Perform a forensic analysis on any infected computers and
restore those using trusted media.
Educate Users On The Changed
Threat Landscape:
■■Do not open attachments unless they are expected and
come from a known and trusted source, and do not ex-ecute software that is downloaded from the Internet (if
such actions are permitted) unless the download has been
scanned for viruses;
■■Be cautious when clicking on URLs in emails or social me -
dia programs, even when coming from trusted sources and friends;
■■Do not click on shortened URLs without previewing or ex-
panding them first using available tools and plug-ins;
■■Recommend that users be cautious of information they
provide on social networking solutions that could be used to target them in an attack or trick them to open malicious
URLs or attachments;INTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
46■■Be suspicious of search engine results and only click
through to trusted sources when conducting searches—es-
pecially on topics that are hot in the media;
■■Deploy Web browser URL reputation plug-in solutions that
display the reputation of Web sites from searches;
■■Only download software (if allowed) from corporate shares
or directly from the vendors Web site;
■■If Windows users see a warning indicating that they are “infected” after clicking on a URL or using a search engine (fake antivirus infections), have users close or quit the browser using Alt-F4, CTRL+W or the task manager.
■■Advise users to make sure they are using a modern brows-
er and operating system and to keep their systems current with security updates.
■■Instruct users to look for a green browser address bar,
HTTPS, and trust marks on any websites where they login or share any personal information.
Best Practice Guidelines
For Consumers
Protect Yourself:
Use a modern Internet security solution that includes the fol-lowing capabilities for maximum protection against malicious code and other threats:
■■Antivirus (file and heuristic based) and malware behav-
ioral prevention can prevents unknown malicious threats from executing;
■■Bidirectional firewalls will block malware from exploiting
potentially vulnerable applications and services running on your computer;
■■Intrusion prevention to protection against Web-attack
toolkits, unpatched vulnerabilities, and social engineering attacks;
■■Browser protection to protect against obfuscated Web-
based attacks;
■■Reputation-based tools that check the reputation and trust
of a file and Web site before downloading; URL reputation and safety ratings for Web sites found through search
engines.
■■Consider options for implementing cross-platform paren-
tal controls, such as Norton Online Family43.
Keep Up To Date:
Keep virus definitions and security content updated at least
daily if not hourly. By deploying the latest virus definitions, you can protect your computer against the latest viruses and
malware known to be spreading in the wild. Update your oper -
ating system, Web browser, browser plug-ins, and applications
to the latest updated versions using the automatic updating capability of your programs, if available. Running out-of-date versions can put you at risk from being exploited by Web-based
attacks.
Know What You Are Doing:
Be aware that malware or applications that try to trick you
into thinking your computer is infected can be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file-sharing
programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware ver -
sions of software.
■■Downloading “free,” “cracked” or “pirated” versions of
software can also contain malware or include social engi-
neering attacks that include programs that try to trick you
into thinking your computer is infected and getting you to
pay money to have it removed.
■■Be careful which Web sites you visit on the Web. While
malware can still come from mainstream Web sites, it can easily come from less reputable Web sites sharing pornog-
raphy, gambling and stolen software.
■■Read end-user license agreements (EULAs) carefully and
understand all terms before agreeing to them as some se -
curity risks can be installed after an end user has accepted the EULA or because of that acceptance.
Use An Effective Password Policy:
■■Ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers,
and change them often. Passwords should not consist of
words from the dictionary. Do not use the same password
for multiple applications or Web sites. Use complex pass-
words (upper/lowercase and punctuation) or passphrases.Symantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
47Think Before You Click:
Never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless you
expect it and trust the sender. Even from trusted users, be suspicious.
■■Be cautious when clicking on URLs in emails, social media
programs even when coming from trusted sources and friends. Do not blindly click on shortened URLs without
expanding them first using previews or plug-ins.
■■Do not click on links in social media applications with
catchy titles or phrases even from friends. If you do click
on the URL, you may end up “liking it” and sending it to
all of your friends even by clicking anywhere on the page.
Close or quit your browser instead.
■■Use a Web browser URL reputation solution that shows
the reputation and safety rating of Web sites from
searches. Be suspicious of search engine results; only click
through to trusted sources when conducting searches, es-pecially on topics that are hot in the media.
■■Be suspicious of warnings that pop-up asking you to
install media players, document viewers and security up -
dates; only download software directly from the vendor’s
Web site.
Guard Your Personal Data:
Limit the amount of personal information you make publicly
available on the Internet (including and especially via social networks) as it may be harvested and used in malicious activi -
ties such as targeted attacks and phishing scams.
■■Never disclose any confidential personal or financial
information unless and until you can confirm that any re -
quest for such information is legitimate.
■■Review your bank, credit card, and credit information fre -
quently for irregular activity. Avoid banking or shopping online from public computers (such as libraries, Internet
cafes, etc.) or from unencrypted Wi-Fi connections.
■■Use HTTPS when connecting via Wi-Fi networks to your
email, social media and sharing Web sites. Check the set -
tings and preferences of the applications and Web sites you are using.
■■Look for the green browser address bar, HTTPS, and rec-
ognizable trust marks when you visit websites where you
login or share any personal information.
■■Configure your home Wi-Fi network for strong authentica -
tion and always require a unique password for access to it.INTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
48More Information
■■Symantec.cloud Global Threats: http://www.symanteccloud.com/en/gb/globalthreats/
■■Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/
■■Internet Security Threat Report Resource Page: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
■■Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer/
■■Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex/
About Symantec
Symantec is a global leader in providing security, storage, and systems
management solutions to help consumers and organizations secure and
manage their information-driven world. Our software and services protect
against more risks at more points, more completely and efficiently, enabling confidence wherever information is used or stored. Headquartered in Mountain View, Calif., Symantec has operations in 40 countries. More
information is available at www.symantec.com.Symantec CorporationINTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
49Endnotes
1 NB. This figure includes attack data from Symantec.cloud for the first time. Excluding these figures for comparison
with 2010, the total figure would be 5.1 billion attacks.
2 Gartner Press Release, Gartner Says Consumerization Will Drive At Least Four Mobile Management Styles, November 8, 2011. http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=1842615
3 https://otalliance.org/resources/AOSSL/index.html
4 http://www.nortoncybercrimeindex.com/
5 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/w32_duqu_the_precur -
sor_to_the_next_stuxnet.pdf
6 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the_nitro_attacks.pdf
7 http://www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/sites/default/files/resources/WMS_The_UK_Cyber_Security_Strategy.pdf
8 http://www.symantec.com/about/news/resources/press_kits/detail.jsp?pkid=ponemon-cost-of-a-data-breach-2011
9 2011 Cost of Data Breach Study: United Kingdom, Ponemon Institute, March 2012
10 Certificate Authority hacks (Comodohacker), breaches & trust revocations in 2011: Comodo (2 RAs hacked), https://www-secure.symantec.com/connect/blogs/how-avoid-fraudulent-ssl, http://www.thetechherald.com/articles/
InstantSSL-it-named-as-source-of-Comodo-breach-by-attacker/13145/
11 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/05/24/comodo_reseller_hacked /
12 StartCom attacked, http://www.internet-security.ca/internet-security-news-archives-031/security-firm-start-ssl-suffered-a-security-attack.html, http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/attacks/231601037
13 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/09/06/diginotar_audit_damning_fail /
14 DigiNotar breached & put out of business, https://www-secure.symantec.com/connect/blogs/why -your-ca-matters,
https://www-secure.symantec.com/connect/blogs/diginotar -ssl-breach-update , http://www.arnnet.com.au/ar -
ticle/399812/comodo_hacker_claims_credit_diginotar_attack /, http://arstechnica.com/security/news/2011/09/como -
do-hacker-i-hacked-diginotar-too-other-cas-breached.ars, http://www.darkreading.com/authentication/167901072/
security/attacks-breaches/231600865/comodo-hacker-takes-credit-for-massive-diginotar-hack.html http://www.
pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/239534/comodo_hacker_claims_credit_for_diginotar_attack.html
15 Attacks & Academic proof of concept demos: BEAST ( http://blog.ivanristic.com/2011/10/mitigating-the-beast-at -
tack-on-tls.html ) and TLS 1.1/1.2, THC-SSL-DOS, LinkedIn SSL Cookie Vulnerability ( http://www.wtfuzz.com/blogs/
linkedin-ssl-cookie-vulnerability/),
16 http://www.itproportal.com/2011/09/13/globalsign-hack-was-isolated-server-business-resumes/
17 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/09/07/globalsign_suspends_ssl_cert_biz/
18 http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/239639/dutch_government_struggles_to_deal_with_diginotar_hack.html
19 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2011/11/03/certificate_authority_banished /
20 https://otalliance.org/resources/AOSSL/index.html
21 http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=486790652130
22 http://blog.twitter.com/2011/03/making-twitter-more-secure-https.html
23 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/launch-always-ssl-and-firesheep-attacks-page
24 Symantec-sponsored consumer web survey of internet shoppers in the UK, France, Germany, Benelux, the US, and INTERNET SE CURIT Y THREA T REPORT
Symantec Corporation
50Australia in December 2010 and January 2011 (Study conducted March 2011).
25 http://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20111129_01
26 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/protecting-digital-certificates-everyone-s-responsibility/
27 http://www.enisa.europa.eu/act/it/library/deliverables/dbn/at_download/fullReport
28 http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/TelecommunicationsInformationTechnology/SecurityBreachNotificationLaws/
tabid/13489/
29 AMD 2011 Global Cloud Computing Adoption, Attitudes and Approaches Study, http://www.slideshare.net/AMDUnprocessed/amd-cloud-adoption-approaches-and-attitudes-research-report
30 Appendix C: Spam and Fraud Activity Trends
31 http://www.symanteccloud.com/en/gb/mlireport/MLI_2011_05_May_FINAL-en.pdf
32 For more information on Norton Safe Web, please visit http://safeweb.norton.com
33 For more information on the Symantec website vulnerability assessment service: http://www.symantec.com/theme.
jsp?themeid=ssl-resources
34 Further information can be found in Appendix C: Spam and Fraud Activity Trends
35 http://krebsonsecurity.com/tag/weyland-yutani-bot/
36 For more on Stuxnet see: http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/hackers-behind-stuxnet and http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cf0jlzVCyOI
37 CVE-2008-4250 See http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/31874
38 61.2 million attacks were identified against Microsoft Windows RPC component in 2011, and were mostly using the Microsoft Windows Server Service RPC Handling Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (BID 31874). See http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/31874
39 Appendix D: Vulnerability Trends: Figure D.3
40 See http://www.darkreading.com/vulnerability-management/167901026/security/attacks-breaches/231900575/
more-exploits-for-sale-means-better-security.html
41 CVE-2011-2462 See Adobe Security Advisory: http://www.adobe.com/support/security/advisories/apsa11-04.html.
Attack volume data from Symantec.cloud between 1 December 2011 and 16 December 2011.
42 http://www.cabforum.org/
43 For more information about Norton Online Family, please visit https://onlinefamily.norton.com/Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted
work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec Corporation.
NO WARRANTY. Symantec makes this document available AS-IS, and makes no warranty as to its
accuracy or use. The information contained in this document may include inaccuracies or
typographical errors and may not reflect the most current developments, and Symantec does not
represent, warrant, or guarantee that it is complete, accurate, or up-to-date, nor does Symantec offer any certification or guarantee with respect to any opinions expressed herein or any references
provided. Changing circumstances may change the accuracy of the content herein. Opinions
presented in this document reflect judgment at the time of publication and are subject to change. Any use of the information contained in this document is at the risk of the user. Symantec assumes
no responsibility for errors, omissions, or damages resulting from the use of or reliance on the
information herein. Symantec reserves the right to make changes at any time without prior notice.
|
internet security t HreAt rePOrt 20132012 T rends, Volume 18, Published April 2013p. 2
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2013 :: Volume 18
CONTENTS
03 Introduction
04 Executive Summary
06 2012 Security Timeline
09 2012 in Numbers
13 Targeted Attacks, Hacktivism, and Data Breaches
14 Introduction14 Data17
DDoS Used as a Diversion
17 Data Breaches
19 Analysis19
Cyberwarfare, Cybersabotage, and Industrial Espionage
20 Advanced Persistent Threats and Targeted Attacks
20 Social Engineering and Indirect Attacks
21 Watering Hole Attacks
23 Vulnerabilities, Exploits, and Toolkits
24 Introduction
24 Data
26 Analysis26
Web-based Attacks on the Rise
27 The Arms Race to Exploit New Vulnerabilities
27 Malvertising and Website Hacking
28 Web Attack Toolkits
29 Website Malware Scanning and Website
Vulnerability Assessment
29 The Growth of Secured Connections
29 Norton Secured Seal and Trust Marks
29 Stolen Key-signing Certificates 31 Social Networking, Mobile, and the Cloud
32 Introduction
32 Data
35 Analysis35
Spam and Phishing Move to Social Media
37 Mobile Threats
38 Cloud Computing Risks
40 Malware, Spam, and Phishing
41 Introduction
42 Data
42 Spam
45 Phishing
46 Malware
48 Website Exploits by Type of Website
49 Analysis49
Macs Under Attack
50 Rise of Ransomware
51 Long-term Stealthy Malware
51 Email Spam Volume Down
51 Advanced Phishing
53 Looking ahead
56 Endnotes
57 About Symantec
57 More Informationp. 3
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2013 :: Volume 18
Introduction
Symantec has established some of the most
comprehensive sources of Internet threat
data in the world through the Symantec™
Global Intelligence Network, which is made
up of approximately 69 million attack
sensors and records thousands of events
per second. This network monitors threat
activity in over 157 countries and territories through a combination of Symantec
products and services such as Symantec
DeepSight™ Threat Management System, Symantec™ Managed Security Services and
Norton™ consumer products, and other
third-party data sources.In addition, Symantec maintains one of the world’s most
comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting of
more than 51,644 recorded vulnerabilities (spanning more than
two decades) from over 16,687 vendors representing over 43,391 products.
Spam, phishing, and malware data is captured through a variety
of sources, including the Symantec Probe Network, a system of more than 5 million decoy accounts; Symantec.cloud and
a number of other Symantec security technologies. Skeptic™,
the Symantec.cloud proprietary heuristic technology, is able to detect new and sophisticated targeted threats before reaching
customers’ networks. Over 3 billion email messages and more
than 1.4 billion Web requests are processed each day across 14 data centers. Symantec also gathers phishing information
through an extensive antifraud community of enterprises,
security vendors, and more than 50 million consumers.
Symantec Trust Services provides 100 percent availability and
processes over 4.5 billion Online Certificate Status Protocol
(OCSP) look-ups per day, which are used for obtaining the revocation status of X.509 digital certificates around the world.
These resources give Symantec’s analysts unparalleled sources
of data with which to identify, analyze, and provide informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code
activity, phishing, and spam. The result is the annual Symantec
Internet Security Threat Report, which gives enterprises, small businesses, and consumers the essential information to secure
their systems effectively now and into the future.
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Internet Security Threat Report 2013 :: Volume 18
Executive Summary
Threats to online security have grown and evolved considerably in 2012. From the threats of
cyberespionage and industrial espionage to the widespread, chronic problems of malware
and phishing, we have seen constant innovation from malware authors.
We have also seen an expansion of traditional threats into new forums. In particular, social
media and mobile devices have come under increasing attack in 2012, even as spam and
phishing attacks via traditional routes have fallen. Online criminals are following users onto
these new platforms.
The most important trends in 2012 were:
Small Businesses Are the Path of Least Resistance
for Attackers
Last year’s data made it clear that any business, no matter its
size, was a potential target for attackers. This was not a fluke. In
2012, 50 percent of all targeted attacks were aimed at businesses
with fewer than 2,500 employees. In fact, the largest growth area for targeted attacks in 2012 was businesses with fewer than 250
employees; 31 percent of all attacks targeted them.
This is especially bad news because based on surveys conducted
by Symantec, small businesses believe they are immune to
attacks targeted at them. However, money stolen from a small business is as easy to spend as money stolen from a large
business. And while small businesses may assume that they
have nothing a targeted attacker would want to steal, they forget that they retain customer information, create intellectual
property, and keep money in the bank. While it can be argued
that the rewards of attacking a small business are less than what can be gained from a large enterprise, this is more than compensated by the fact that many small companies are
typically less careful in their cyberdefenses. Criminal activity is
often driven by crimes of opportunity. With cybercrimes, that opportunity appears to be with small businesses.
Even worse, the lack of adequate security practices by small
businesses threatens all of us. Attackers deterred by a large company’s defenses often choose to breach the lesser defenses
of a small business that has a business relationship with the
attacker’s ultimate target, using the smaller company to leap frog into the larger one.
Additionally, small businesses and organizations can become
pawns in more sophisticated attacks. Driven by attack toolkits, in 2012 the number of Web-based attacks increased by one third
and many of these attacks originated from the compromised
websites of small businesses. These massive attacks increase the risk of infection for all of us. But even more nefariously, as reported in our Elderwood white paper last year, the websites
of small businesses and organizations are even being used
in targeted attacks. Supplementing their phishing attacks, cyberespionage gangs now hijack these websites, lying in wait
for their targets to visit so that they can infect them. This
type of attack, called a watering hole, is another way attackers leverage weak security of one entity to defeat the strong security
of another.
Malware Authors Act as Big Brother
If you think someone is violating your privacy online, you are
probably right. Fifty percent of mobile malware created in 2012
attempted to steal our information or track our movements.
Whether they are attacking our computers, mobile phones or social networks, Cyber-criminals are looking to profit by spying
on us. Their ultimate goal is to make money. Their method is to
learn our banking information, the phone numbers and email addresses of our friends and business associates, our personal
information, and even how to become us by stealing our identity.
But the most ominous example of malware authors knowing
all about us is in targeted attacks. Creating successful targeted
attacks requires attackers to learn about us. They will research
our email addresses, our job, our professional interests, and even the conferences we attend and the websites we frequent. All
of this information is compiled to launch a successful targeted
attack. Once on our devices, the attacker’s tools are designed to pull as much data as possible. Undiscovered targeted attacks
can collect years of our email, files, and contact information.
These tools also contain the ability to log our keystrokes, view our computer screens, and turn on our computers’ microphones
and cameras. Targeted attackers truly act as an Orwellian
incarnation of Big Brother.
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Internet Security Threat Report 2013 :: Volume 18
Those jobs most targeted for attack in 2012 were knowledge
workers who create the intellectual property that attackers want
(27 percent of all targets in 2012) and those in sales (24 percent
in 2012). Interest in targeting the CEO of an organization waned in 2012; those attacks decreased by 8 percent.
With Mobile, It’s Not the Vulnerability that Will Get You
As expected, the amount of mobile malware in 2012 continues to rise. 2012 saw a 58 percent increase in mobile malware families
compared to 2011. The year’s total now accounts for 59 percent
of all malware to-date. With a 32 percent increase in the number of vulnerabilities reported in mobile operating systems, it might
be tempting to blame them for the increase. However, this would
be wrong. In the PC space, a vulnerability drives attacks as new vulnerabilities are incorporated into commonly available
toolkits. The more they’re used, the faster they spread. This is
not occurring in the mobile space. Today, mobile vulnerabilities have little or no correlation to mobile malware. In fact, while
Apple’s iOS had the most documented vulnerabilities in 2012,
there was only one threat created for the platform. Compare this
to the Android OS; although only thirteen vulnerabilities were
reported, it led all mobile operating systems in the amount of malware written for the platform.
Vulnerabilities likely will become a factor in mobile malware,
but today Android’s market share, the openness of the platform, and the multiple distribution methods available to applications
embedded with malware make it the go-to platform of malware
authors.
Zero-day Vulnerabilities Available When Attackers
Need Them
Zero-day vulnerabilities continue to trend upward; 14 were
reported in 2012. In the last three years much of the growth
in zero-day vulnerabilities used in attacks can be attributed to
two groups; the authors of Stuxnet and the Elderwood Gang. In 2010, Stuxnet was responsible for 4 of the 14 discovered zero-day
vulnerabilities. The Elderwood Gang was responsible for 4 of the
14 discovered in 2012. The Elderwood Gang also used zero-day threats in 2010 and 2011, and they’ve used at least one so
far in 2013.
Attackers use as many zero-day vulnerabilities as they need, not
as many as they have. And Stuxnet and Elderwood make for an
interesting contrast in the strategy of their use. Stuxnet remains
the aberration, using multiple zero-day exploits in one attack. From what we know today, it was a single attack that was directed
at a single target. Multiple zero-day exploits were used to ensure
success so they would not need to attack a second time.By contrast the Elderwood Gang has used one zero-day exploit
in each attack, using it continually until that exploit becomes
public. Once that occurs they move on to a new exploit. This makes it seem that the Elderwood Gang has a limitless supply
of zero-day vulnerabilities and is able to move to a new exploit
as soon as one is needed. It is our hope that this is not the case.
Attribution Is Never Easy
Some targeted attacks make no attempt to stay undetected. A piece of malware named Shamoon was discovered in August. Its purpose was to wipe computer hard drives of energy companies
in the Middle East. A group calling itself the “Cutting Sword of
Justice” claimed responsibility. Throughout 2012, DDoS attacks were launched against financial institutions. A group called Izz
ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters claimed responsibility.
These attacks and others appear to be classic cases of
hacktivism. However, proving attribution and motive are not
easy, even when someone claims responsibility. There has
been much speculation, some reportedly from the intelligence community, that the Cutting Sword of Justice and the Qassam
Cyber Fighters are fronts for a nation state. Complicating
what appeared to be simple hactivism even further is the FBI’s warning to financial institutions that some DDoS
attacks are actually being used as a “distraction.” These
attacks are launched before or after cybercriminals engage in an unauthorized transaction, and are an attempt to avoid
discovery of the fraud and prevent attempts to stop it.
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Internet Security Threat Report 2013 :: Volume 18
2012 SECURITY TIMELINEp. 7
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2013 :: Volume 18
2012 Security Timeline
Data breach:
24 million identities stolen in data breach at
Zappos apparel company.
Malcode:
A scam involving malicious browser plug-ins for Firefox and Chrome is discovered.01
January04
April
02
February05
May
03
March
06
JuneMac:
Over 600,000 Mac computers are infected by the OSX.Flashback Trojan through an
unpatched Java exploit.
Mac:
A second Mac Trojan is discovered,
OSX.Sabpab, which also uses Java exploits
to compromise a computer.
Botnet:
Kelihos botnet returns, four months after being
taken down.
Mobile:
Google announces Google Bouncer, an app scanner for the Google Play market.Social networking:
Scammers are discovered leveraging social networks Tumblr and Pinterest.
Malware:
The cyberespionage threat W32.Flamer is discovered.
Certificate Authorities:
Comodo, a large Certificate Authority, authenticated and issued a legitimate code-
signing certificate to a fictitious organization
run by cybercriminals. This was not discovered until August.Botnet:
Researchers take down new variant of the Kelihos botnet, which reappears in a new form later in
the month.
Hacks:
Six individuals are arrested as alleged members
of the hacking collective LulzSec.
Botnet:
Security researchers take down key servers for the Zeus botnet.
Data breach:
A payment processor for a number of well-known credit card companies, including Visa and
MasterCard was compromised, exposing details
of 1.5 million accounts.
1
Mobile:
A non-malware-based scam involving the Opfake gang is found that targets iPhone users.01 See http://krebsonsecurity.
com/2012/03/mastercard-
visa-warn-of-processor-
breach/ .Data breach:
LinkedIn suffers data breach, exposing millions
of accounts.
Malware:
A Trojan by the name of Trojan.Milicenso is
discovered, which causes networked printers
to print large print jobs containing illegible
characters. p. 8
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Internet Security Threat Report 2013 :: Volume 18
Botnet:
Security researchers disable the Grum botnet.
Malware:
Windows malware is discovered in Apple’s App
Store, embedded in an application.
Mac:
A new Mac threat called OSX.Crisis opens a back door on compromised computers.
Botnet:
DNS servers, maintained by the FBI in order to keep computers previously infected with the
DNSChanger Trojan safe, are shut off.
Malware:
A Trojan used to steal information from the
Japanese government is discovered after
being in operation for two years.
Malware:
A second printer-related threat called
W32.Printlove, which causes large print jobs to
print garbage, is discovered.Malware:
A new version of the Blackhole attack toolkit,
dubbed Blackhole 2.0, is discovered.
Botnet:
Security researchers disable an up-and-coming botnet known as “Nitol.”
Mobile:
A vulnerability is discovered in Samsung’s version of Android™ that allows a phone to be
remotely wiped.
DDoS:
FBI issues warning about possible DDoS attacks
against financial institutions as part of a
“distraction” technique.2
02 See http://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf
Hacks:
Burglars found using a known exploit in a brand
of hotel locks to break into hotel rooms.Malware:
A ransomware threat distributed through Skype IM is discovered.
Data breach:
Customer data is stolen from Barnes & Noble payment keypads.
Attackers are discovered using a DDoS attack
as a distraction in order to gather information that allowed them to later steal money from a
targeted bank.
Malware:
Infostealer.Dexter Trojan horse discovered
targeting point-of-sale systems.
Hacks:
Attackers exploit a vulnerability in Tumblr, spreading spam throughout the social network.Hacks:
Reuters news service suffers a series of hacks resulting in fake news stories posted on its
website and Twitter account.
Malware:
Crisis malware is discovered targeting VMware®
virtual machine images.
Malware:
W32.Gauss is discovered. The scope of the threat is concentrated in the Middle East, in a similar
way to W32.Flamer.
Certificate Authorities:
Comodo incident from May discovered and
details published.09
September07
July
10
October
11
November
12
December08
Augustp. 9
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2013 :: Volume 18
2012 IN NUM bERSp. 10
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2013 :: Volume 18
2012 IN NUMbERS
New Vulnerabilities
New Vulnerabilities
4,989
4,989
2011
6,253
2010
5,291
5,291
2012
Average Number of
Identities ExposedPer Breach in 2012Average Number of
Identities ExposedPer Breach in 2012
20113152012415
2010163
Mobile
VulnerabilitiesMobile
Vulnerabilities
Targeted
Attacks
in 2012TargetedAttacks
in 201242% INCREASE
604,826
2012 in NumbersSHARE
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Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2013 :: Volume 18
2012 IN NUMbERS
Estimated Global
Email Spam Per Day
(in billions)
Estimated Global
Email Spam Per Day
(in billions)
OVERALL SPAM RATE
6289%
2010
4275%
2011
3069%
2012
291
Overall Email Virus Rate, 1 In:Overall Email Virus Rate, 1 In:
2010
20122011
414
Overall Email Phishing Rate, 1 In:Overall Email Phishing Rate, 1 In:
2010
201220112011
20122011
2012
% of All Email
Malware as
URL% of All Email
Malware as
URL
24%
39%
23%2010 2010
% of All Spam
with Dating
& Sexual% of All Spam
with Dating & Sexual
15%
55%3%
442
299239282
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Internet Security Threat Report 2013 :: Volume 18
2012 IN NUMbERS
4.5
Bot Zombies
(in millions)Bot Zombies
(in millions)
Mobile Malware
Families Increase
2011–2012
Mobile Malware
Families Increase
2011–2012
New Zero-Day
VulnerabilitiesNew Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
Web Attacks
Blocked Per Day
Web Attacks Blocked Per Day
2010 2011 201214 8 14
3.4
20113.1
20122010
New Unique
Malicious Web Domains
New Unique Malicious Web Domains
2012 74,000
2011 55,000
2010 43,000
2011
190,370190,370
247,350
2012
58%
p. 13
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Internet Security Threat Report 2013 :: Volume 18
TaRgETEd aTTaCkS
haCkTIVISM
aNd da Ta bRE aChESp. 14
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Internet Security Threat Report 2013 :: Volume 18
TaRgETEd a TTaCkS, ha CkTIVISM, aNd da Ta bREa ChES
“Just as nuclear was the strategic warfare of the industrial
era, cyberwarfare has become the strategic war of the
information era,” says U.S. Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta.3
Cyberespionage and cybersabotage are already a reality.
Outside the realm of states and their proxies, corporate spies
are using increasingly advanced techniques to steal company
secrets or customer data for profit. Hactivists with political and antibusiness agendas are also busy.
The string of media revelations about security breaches this
year suggests that the business world is just as vulnerable to attack as ever.03 Aviation Week & Space
Technology, October 22, 2012, 82.at a glance
• Targeted attack global average per day: 116.
• Increasing levels of industrial espionage and data theft.
• More insidious targeted attacks, with new “watering hole”
attacks and sophisticated social engineering.
• Fewer big data breaches, but the median number of identities stolen per breach has increased by 3.5 times.Introduction
255075100125150175200225250
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
data
This client was a large banking organization, who had not previously
been a Symantec customer, and approached Symantec for help to
remove an existing infection. The infection was removed; however,
a large wave of targeted attacks followed as the attackers sought to regain access, ultimately failing. We witnessed one large attack in April against a single client that more than doubled the number of attacks per day for that month;
and while events like this are extremely rare, we have not included
it in this calculation in order to portray a more realistic outlook. This incident would have skewed the global annual average number of
attacks per day from 116 to 143.Targeted a ttacks Per d ay in 2012
Source: Symantecp. 15
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Internet Security Threat Report 2013 :: Volume 18
TaRgETEd a TTaCkS, ha CkTIVISM, aNd da Ta bREa ChES
Manufacturing was the most-targeted sector in 2012, with 24 percent of targeted attacks destined for this
sector, compared with 15 percent in 2011. Attacks against government and public sector organizations
fell from 25 percent in 2011, when it was the most targeted sector, to 12 percent in 2012. It’s likely the
frontline attacks are moving down the supply chain, particularly for small to medium-sized businesses. (Categories based on Standard Industrial Classification codes.)Top 10 Industries a ttacked in 2012
Source: Symantec
0 5 10 15 20 25%
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate 19
Services – Non-Traditional 17
Energy/Utilities 10
Government 12
Services – Professional 8
Aerospace 2
Retail2
Wholesale 2
Transportation,
Communications, Electric, Gas 1
Manufacturing 24%
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Internet Security Threat Report 2013 :: Volume 18
TaRgETEd a TTaCkS, ha CkTIVISM, aNd da Ta bREa ChES
attacks by Size of Targeted Organization
Source: Symantec
1 to 250251 to 500501 to 1,0001,001 to 1,5001,501 to 2,500
50% 2,501+50% 2,501+
50% 1 to 2,50050% 1 to 2,500 Employees
2,501+
50%
50%
31%
31%9%
3%2%
5%
18%
in 201150%
in 2011
Targeted attacks destined for Small Business
(1 to 250 employees) accounted for 31 percent
of all attacks, compared with 18 percent in 2011,
an increase of 13 percentage points.
The volume of attacks against SMBs increased
threefold, compared with 2011, resulting in its
percentage almost doubling from 18 percent
to 31 percent.Organizations with 2,501+ employees were the most targeted with 50 percent of targeted attacks
destined for this size of organization, almost
exactly the same percentage as in 2011.
The volume of targeted attacks against
organizations with 2,501+ employees doubled
compared with 2011, although its overall percentage remains the same at 50 percent.SHARE
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Internet Security Threat Report 2013 :: Volume 18
TaRgETEd a TTaCkS, ha CkTIVISM, aNd da Ta bREa ChES
In 2012, the most frequently
targeted job role was in R&D,
which accounted for 27
percent of attacks (9 percent in 2011). The second most
notable increase was against
sales representatives, probably because their contact details
are more widely available in the
public domain, with 24 percent of attacks in 2012 versus 12
percent in 2011. In 2011,
C-level executives were the most targeted, with 25 percent, but
this number fell to 17 percent
in 2012.
-15%
-10% -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30%
2012 % CHANGE 2011
Shared Mailbox
info@, sales@, etc.Senior ManagementSalesHuman ResourcesResearch & DevelopmentPersonal AssistantPR and MarketingChief Exec. or Board Level
Targeted a ttack Recipients by Role in 2012
Source: Symantec
DDoS Used as a Diversion
In September, the FBI issued a warning to financial institutions
that some DDoS attacks are actually being used as a “distraction.”
These attacks are launched before or after cybercriminals engage
in an unauthorized transaction and are an attempt to avoid
discovery of the fraud and prevent attempts to stop it.
In these scenarios, attackers target a company’s website with
a DDoS attack. They may or may not bring the website down,
but that’s not the main focus of such an attack; the real goal is
to divert the attention of the company’s IT staff towards the DDoS attack. Meanwhile, the hackers attempt to break into the
company’s network using any number of other methods that may
go unnoticed as the DDoS attack continues in the background.
4
Data Breaches
The overall number of data breaches is down by 26 percent, according to the Norton Cybercrime Index,
5 though over 93
million identities were exposed during the year, a decrease of 60
percent over last year. The average number of identities stolen
is also down this year: at 604,826 per breach, this is significantly
smaller than the 1.1 million per breach in 2011.So why are the number of breaches and identities stolen down in 2012? For starters, there were five attacks in which more than 10
million identities were stolen in 2011. In 2012 there was only one, which results in a much smaller spread from the smallest to the
largest data breach. However, the median number—the midpoint
of the data set—increased by 3.5 times in 2012, from 2,400 to 8,350 per breach. Using the median is a useful measure because
it ignores the extremes, the rare events that resulted in large
numbers of identities being exposed, and is more representative of the underlying trend.
Part of the wide difference between data breaches in 2011 and
2012 is likely down due to a concerted effort by the notorious hacker groups Anonymous and LulzSec to publicize hacks
during 2011—something that was not seen to the same extent in
2012. It’s possible that companies are paying more attention to protecting customer databases or that hackers have found other,
more valuable targets, or that they are still stealing the data but
not being detected. 04 See http://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/
FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf
05 The data for the data breaches that could lead to identity
theft is procured from the Norton Cybercrime Index (CCI). The Norton CCI is a statistical model that measures the
levels of threats including malicious software, fraud,
identity theft, spam, phishing, and social engineering daily. Data for the CCI is primarily derived from Symantec Global Intelligence Network and for certain data from ID
Analytics. The majority of the Norton CCI’s data comes
from Symantec’s Global Intelligence Network, one of the industry’s most comprehensive sources of intelligence about online threats. The data breach section of the Norton CCI is derived from data breaches that have been
reported by legitimate media sources and have exposed
personal information, including name, address, Social Security numbers, credit card numbers, or medical history. Using publicly available data the Norton CCI
determines the sectors that were most often affected by
data breaches, as well as the most common causes of data loss.SHARE
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TaRgETEd a TTaCkS, ha CkTIVISM, aNd da Ta bREa ChES
Healthcare, education, and government accounted for nearly
two-thirds of all identities breached in 2012. This suggests
that the public sector should further increase efforts to
protect personal information, particularly considering how these organizations are often looked upon as the
custodians of information for the most vulnerable in society.
Alternatively, this could indicate that the private sector may not be reporting all data breaches, given how many public
sector organizations are required by law to report breaches.
The vast majority (88 percent) of reported data breaches
were due to attacks by outsiders. But it is safe to assume that
unreported data breaches outnumber reported ones. Whether
it is lost laptops, misplaced memory sticks, deliberate data theft by employees or accidents, the insider threat also
remains high. To illustrate this point, the UK Information
Commissioner’s Office fined and prosecuted more businesses because of insider slipups than because of outsider attacks.
Most SMBs should worry about someone in accounts just as
much as they should worry about an anonymous hacker. At 36 percent, the healthcare industry continues to be the sector responsible for the largest percentage of disclosed
data breaches by industry.
Healthcare
36%Education
16%Government
13%
9% Accounting
6% Computer Software
6% Financial
5% Information Technology
4% Telecom
3% Computer Hardware
3% Community and Nonprofitdata b reaches by Sector in 2012
Source: Symantec
January saw the largest number
of identities stolen in 2012, due
to one breach of over 24 million
identities, while the numbers of the rest of the year mostly
fluctuated between one and
12 million identities stolen per month.
The average number of breaches
for the first half of the year was 11, and rose to 15 in the second
half of the year– a 44 percent
increase.Timeline of d ata b reaches
Source: Symantec
INCIDENTS SUM
05101520253035
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
05101520253035
DEC
NOV
OCT
SEP
AUG
JUL
JUN
MAY
APR
MAR
FEB
JANSUM OF IDENTITIES BREACHED (MILLIONS)
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS31
MILLION
BREACHES IN JAN.SHARE
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Hackers continue to be responsible for the largest number of
data breaches, making up 40 percent of all breaches.At US$194, the United States is the country with highest in cost
per capita, with Denmark a close second at $191 per capita.Top Causes of d ata b reaches in 2012
Source: Symantecaverage Cost Per Capita of a d ata b reach 6
Source: Symantec06 See http://www.
symantec.com/content/
en/us/about/media/
pdfs/b-ponemon-2011-
cost-of-data-breach-global.en-us.pdf .Country Average Cost Per Capita
u.s. $194
Denmark $191
France $159
Australia $145
Japan $132
uK $124
italy $102
indonesia $42
0
10
20
30
40
50
40%
Hackers
23% Accidentally
made public
Insider theft23%
8%
Unknown6%
Fraud1%Theft or loss
of computeror drive
analysis
Cyberwarfare, Cybersabotage,
and Industrial Espionage
Targeted attacks have become an established part of the threat
landscape and safeguarding against them has become one of
the main concerns of CISOs and IT managers. Targeted attacks
are commonly used for the purposes of industrial espionage to gain access to the confidential information on a compromised
computer system or network. They are rare but potentially the
most difficult attacks to defend against.
It is difficult to attribute an attack to a specific group or a
government without sufficient evidence. The motivation and
the resources of the attacker sometimes hint to the possibility that the attacker could be state sponsored, but finding clear
evidence is difficult. Attacks that could be state sponsored,
but appear to be rare in comparison with regular cybercrime, have often gained more notoriety. They can be among the
most sophisticated and damaging of these types of threats.
Governments are undoubtedly devoting more resources to defensive and offensive cyberwarfare capabilities. In 2012, it
was still unlikely that most businesses would encounter such
an attack, and the greatest risk comes from the more prevalent targeted attacks that are created for the purposes of industrial
espionage. Increasingly, small to medium-sized businesses
(SMB) are finding themselves on the frontline of these targeted attacks as they have fewer resources to combat the threat
and a successful attack here may subsequently be used as the
springboard to further attacks against a larger organization to which they may be a supplier.
Malware such as Stuxnet in 2010, Duqu in 2011, and Flamer and
Disttrack in 2012 show increasing levels of sophistication and danger. For example, the malware used in the Shamoon attacks
on a Saudi oil firm had the ability to wipe hard drives.
7
The same techniques used by cybercriminals for industrial
espionage, may also be used by states and state proxies for
cyber attacks and political espionage. Sophisticated attacks may
be reverse-engineered and copied so that the same or similar 07 See http://www.symantec.
com/connect/blogs/
shamoon-attacks.p. 20
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TaRgETEd a TTaCkS, ha CkTIVISM, aNd da Ta bREa ChES
techniques can be used in less discriminate attacks. A further
risk is that malware developed for cybersabotage may spread
beyond its intended target and infect other computers in a kind
of collateral damage.
Advanced Persistent Threats and Targeted Attacks
Targeted attacks combine social engineering and malware to target individuals in specific companies with the objective
of stealing confidential information such as trade secrets or
customer data. They often use custom-written malware and sometimes exploit zero-day vulnerabilities, which makes them
harder to detect and potentially more infective.
Targeted attacks use a variety of vectors as their main delivery
mechanism, such as malware delivered in an email, or drive-
by downloads from an infected website the intended recipient
is known to frequent, a technique known as a ”watering hole” attack.
APTs are often highly sophisticated and more insidious than
traditional attacks, relying on highly customized intrusion techniques. While targeted attacks are growing increasingly
more common, the resources required to launch an advanced persistent threat campaign means they are limited to well-
funded groups attacking high-value targets.
Symantec saw a 42 percent increase in the targeted attack rate
in 2012 compared with the preceding 12 months. While the manufacturing industry has become the main target accounting for 24 percent of attacks, we also saw a wide range of companies
coming under attack, not only large businesses, but increasingly
SMBs as well. In 2011, 18 percent of targeted attacks were aimed at companies with fewer than 250 employees, but by the end of
2012, they accounted for 31 percent.
Social Engineering and Indirect Attacks
Attackers may be targeting smaller businesses in the supply
chain because they are more vulnerable, have access to
important intellectual property, and offer a stepping stone
into larger organizations. In addition, they are also targeted in their own right. They are more numerous than enterprises,
have valuable data, and are often less well-protected than
larger companies. For example, an attacker may infiltrate a small supplier in order to use it as a spring board into a larger
company. They might use personal information, emails, and files
from an individual in such a smaller company to create a well-
2012 2011 2010 2009
RSA Attacks
• August 2011
Hydraq
• January 2010
• Operation “Aurora”
Sykipot / Taidoor
Attacks
• Targeting Defense
Industry and
Governments
Elderwood Project
• September 2012
• Main Target: Defense.
Same group identified
using Hydraq (Aurora)
in 2009
Ghostnet
• March 2009
• Large-scale
Cyberspying
Operation
Stuxnet
• June 2010
Nitro Attacks
• July–October 2011
• Against Chemical
Industry
Flamer & Gauss
• May 2012 – Aug 2012
• Highly Sophisticated
Threat
• Targets Middle EastTimeline of Targeted a ttacks 8
Source: Symantec08 Internet Security
Threat Report, April 2012, “Targeted
Attacks,” 16.p. 21
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TaRgETEd a TTaCkS, ha CkTIVISM, aNd da Ta bREa ChES
Web Injection Process Used in Watering h ole a ttacks 9
Source: Symantec09 See http://www.
symantec.com/
content/en/us/
enterprise/media/
security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf .
4. The compromised website is
now “waiting” to infect the profiled
victim with a zero-day exploit, just like a lion waiting at a watering hole.
2. Attacker then tests these websites
for vulnerabilities.2. Attacker then tests these websites
for vulnerabilities.
1. Attacker profiles victims and
the kind of websites they go to.1. Attacker profiles victims and
the kind of websites they go to.
3. When the attacker finds a website
that he can compromise, he injects JavaScript or HTML, redirecting the victim to a separate site that hosts the exploit code for the chosen vulnerability.
Watering Hole AttacksWatering Hole Attackscrafted email aimed at someone in a target company.
In 2012, we saw a big increase in attacks on people in
R&D and sales roles compared to the previous year.
This suggests that attackers are casting a wider net and targeting less senior positions below the executive level in
order to gain access to companies. The increase in attacks
has been particularly high overall in these two areas. Still, attacks in other areas, such as back-office roles, are still a
significant threat.
Attackers continue to use social engineering techniques
in targeted attacks. For example, messages impersonating
EU officials, messages that appear to come from security
agencies in the United States and target other government officials, or messages that piggyback announcements
about new procurement plans from potential government
clients such as the U.S. Air Force. This shows extensive research, a sophisticated understanding of the motivation
of recipients, and makes it much more likely that victims
will open attachments that contain malware.
Watering Hole Attacks
The biggest innovation in targeted attacks was the emergence of watering hole attacks. This involves
compromising a legitimate website that a targeted victim
might visit and using it to install malware on their computer. For example, this year we saw a line of code in a
tracking script
10 on a human rights organization’s website
with the potential to compromise a computer. It exploited a new, zero-day vulnerability in Internet Explorer® to
infect visitors. Our data showed that within 24 hours, people in 500 different large companies and government
organizations visited the site and ran the risk of infection.
The attackers in this case, known as the Elderwood Gang, used sophisticated tools and exploited zero-day
vulnerabilities in their attacks, pointing to a well-
resourced team backed by a large criminal organization or a nation state.
1110 See http://www.symantec.
com/connect/blogs/cve-
2012-1875-exploited-wild-part-1-trojannaid .
11 See http://www.symantec.
com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-
elderwood-project.pdf .
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TaRgETEd a TTaCkS, ha CkTIVISM, aNd da Ta bREa ChES
Assume You’re a Target.
Small size and relative anonymity are not defenses against the
most sophisticated attacks. Targeted attacks threaten small
companies as well as large ones. Attackers could also use your
website as a way to attack other people. If you assume you are a potential target and improve your defenses against the most serious threats, you will automatically improve your
protection against other threats.
Defense in Depth.
Emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive
defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in
any specific technology or protection method. This should
include the deployment of regularly updated firewalls, as well as gateway antivirus, intrusion detection, intrusion protection
systems, and Web security gateway solutions throughout the
network. Endpoints must be secured by more than signature-based antivirus technology. Educate Employees.
Raise employees’ awareness about the risks of social engineering and counter it with staff training. Similarly, good
training and procedures can reduce the risk of accidental data
loss and other insider risks. Train staff about the value of data and how to protect it.
Data Loss Prevention.
Prevent data loss and exfiltration with data loss protection software on your network. Use encryption to protect data in
transit, whether online or via removable storage.Recommendationsp. 23
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Internet Security Threat Report 2013 :: Volume 18
VULNER abILITIES
ExPLOITS
aNd TOOL kITSp. 24
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VULNERabILITIES, ExPLOITS, aNd TOOLkITS
Recent research by the Ponemon Institute suggests that the
cost of cybercrime rose by six percent in 2012 with a 42 percent
increase in the number of cyberattacks. The cost is significant
with businesses incurring an average cost of $591,780.12 Given
the increase availability of vulnerabilities and exploits it comes
as no surprise that the cybercriminals have increased their
ability to make a profit.
Quite a few diverse skills are needed to find vulnerabilities,
create ways to exploit them, and then run attacks using them.
Fortunately for the cybercriminal, a black market exists where these skills can be purchased in the form of toolkits. Hackers
find and exploit and or sell vulnerabilities. Toolkit authors find
or buy exploit code and incorporate it into their “products.” Cybercriminals in turn buy or steal the latest versions of toolkits
which allow them to run massive attacks without the trouble of
learning the skills needed to run the whole operation. 12 See http://www.
symantec.com/
connect/blogs/cost-
cybercrime-2012.at a glance
• Usage of zero-day vulnerabilities is up, from 8 to 14 in 2012.
• There is an increasingly sophisticated black market serving a
multi-billion dollar online crime industry.
• These vulnerabilities are later commercialized and added to Web-attack toolkits, usually after they become published publicly.
• In 2012, drive-by Web attacks increased by one third, possibly driven by malvertising.
• Around 600,000 Macs were infected with Flashback malware this year.
• The Sakura toolkit, which had little impact in 2011, now accounts for approximately 22 percent of Web-based toolkit attacks, overtaking Blackhole during some points of the year.
dataIntroduction
browser Vulnerabilities 2010 – 2012
Source: SymantecPlug-in Vulnerabilities 2010 – 2012
Source: Symantec
5101520253035404550%Apple Safari
Google ChromeMozilla FirefoxMicrosoft Internet Explorer Opera
2012 2011 2010
10
52030
25
1540
354550%
2012 2011 2010Adobe Flash Player
Oracle Sun JavaAdobe Acrobat ReaderApple QuickTime
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VULNERabILITIES, ExPLOITS, aNd TOOLkITS
123
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN• A zero-day vulnerability is
one that is reported to have
been exploited in the wild
before the vulnerability is public knowledge and prior to a patch being publicly
available.
• There were 14 zero-day
vulnerabilities reported in
2012.
• There were up to 3 zero-day
vulnerabilities reported each
month.Total Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
Zero-day Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec• There were 5,291
vulnerabilities reported in
2012, compared with 4,989
in 2011.
• Reported vulnerabilities per
month in 2012 fluctuated
roughly between 300 and
500 per month.
• In 2012, there were 85 public SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition)
vulnerabilities, a massive
decrease over the 129 vulnerabilities in 2011.
• There were 415 mobile vulnerabilities identified in 2012, compared with 315 in
2011.
0100200300400500600
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN100200300400500600
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANp. 26
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analysis
Web-based Attacks on the Rise
We have seen the number of Web-based attacks increase by
almost a third. These attacks silently infect enterprise and
consumer users when they visit a compromised website. In
other words, you can be infected simply by visiting a legitimate website. Typically, attackers infiltrate the website to install their
attack toolkits and malware payloads, unbeknown to the site
owner or the potential victims.
The malware payload that is dropped by Web-attack toolkits
is often server-side polymorphic or dynamically generated,
rendering enterprises that rely on signature-based antivirus protection unable to protect themselves against these silent
attacks. A hidden piece of JavaScript™ or a few lines of code
linking to another website can install malware that is very difficult to detect. It then checks the system of each visitor for
browser or operating system vulnerabilities until it finds one
that is likely to succeed and it uses that to install malware on the visitor’s computer.
These attacks are successful because enterprise and consumer
systems are not up to date with the latest patches for browser plug-ins, such as Adobe’s Flash Player® and Acrobat Reader®,
as well as Oracle’s Java™ platform. While a lack of attentiveness
can be blamed for consumers remaining out of date, often in larger companies, older versions of these plug-ins are required
to run critical business systems, making it harder to upgrade
to the latest versions. Such patch management predicaments, with slow patch deployment rates, make companies especially
vulnerable to Web-based attacks.
It’s important to note that the volume of vulnerabilities doesn’t
correlate to increased levels of risk. One single vulnerability in
an application may present a critical risk to an organization,
if exploited successfully. Analysis of risk from vulnerabilities exploited in Web-based attack toolkits is an area that Symantec
will explore further in 2013.
The key is that it’s not the latest zero-day vulnerability that is
responsible for the widespread success of Web-based attacks.
The rate of attacks from compromised websites has increased
by 30 percent, while the rate of discovery of vulnerabilities has only increased by 6 percent. In a nutshell, it’s older, non-patched
vulnerabilities that cause most systems to get compromised.The Arms Race to Exploit New Vulnerabilities
We have witnessed an increase in zero-day vulnerabilities this
year. There were 14 unreported vulnerabilities first seen being
used in the wild in 2012. This is up from 8 in 2011. Overall,
reported vulnerabilities are up slightly in 2012, from 4,989 in 2011 to 5,291 in 2012. Mobile vulnerabilities are also up, from
315 in 2011 to 415 reported in 2012.
Organized groups, such as the team behind the Elderwood
attacks, have worked to discover new weaknesses in everyday
software such as Web browsers and browser plug-ins. When one
vulnerability becomes public, they are able to quickly deploy a new one, which speaks to the sophistication of the groups
creating vulnerabilities.
There is an arms race between Internet criminals and legitimate
software developers. Criminals’ ability to quickly find and
exploit new vulnerabilities is not matched by software vendors’
ability to fix and release patches. Some software companies only patch once a quarter; others are slow to acknowledge
vulnerabilities. Even if they do a good job with updates,
companies are often slow to deploy them.
While zero-day vulnerabilities present a serious security threat,
known (and even patched) vulnerabilities are dangerous if ignored.
Many companies and consumers fail to apply published updates in a timely way. Toolkits that target well-known vulnerabilities
make it easy for criminals to target millions of PCs and find the
ones that remain open to infection. In fact, the vulnerabilities that are exploited the most often are not the newest.
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VULNERabILITIES, ExPLOITS, aNd TOOLkITS
Malvertising and Website Hacking
How does a hacker add his code to a legitimate website? Toolkits
are available that make it easy. For example, in May 2012, the
LizaMoon toolkit used a SQL injection technique to affect at
least a million websites.13 Other approaches include:
• Exploiting a known vulnerability in the website hosting or
content management software
• Using phishing, spyware, or social engineering to get the
webmaster’s password
• Hacking through the Web server backend infrastructure,
such as control panels or databases
• Paying to host an advertisement that contains the infection
This last technique, known as malvertising, means that legitimate websites can be impacted without even being compromised. This form of attack appears to be very common. Using experimental
scanning software (see “Website Malware Scanning and Website
Vulnerability Assessment” later in this section), Symantec found that half of the tested sites were infected by malvertising.
Malvertising opens an avenue of attack that hackers can use
to compromise a website without having to directly hack the website itself. Using these malicious ads allows them to
silently infect users, often installing dynamically created
malware that antivirus alone is unable to detect.
A sign of the seriousness of the problem is that Google
and other search engines scan for malware and blacklist
sites that contain malware. There have been occasions when prominent advertising networks have fallen prey to
malvertising, impacting some of the biggest names in online
media.
14 Situations like this can have a serious impact on
websites whose bottom line often depends on revenue, even
diminishing their credibility in the eyes of their readers.
With dozens of advertising networks and constantly rotating adverts, tracking malvertising and preventing it is a huge
challenge.
13 See http://www.
symantec.com/
connect/blogs/
lizamoon-mass-sql-
injection-tried-and-tested-formula.
14 See http://www.
symantec.com/connect/blogs/danger-malware-ahead-please-not-my-site.
Online advertisement for a malware toolkit.p. 28
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VULNERabILITIES, ExPLOITS, aNd TOOLkITS
Web a ttack Toolkits Over Time
Source: Symantec
Blackhole
41%Sakura
22%
Others
20%10% Phoenix
7% Redkit
Approximately 41 percent of Web-based toolkit attacks
in 2012 related to the Blackhole toolkit, compared with
44 percent in 2011. The Sakura toolkit was not in the
top 10 for 2011, and now accounts for approximately 22 percent of Web-based toolkit attacks, overtaking
Blackhole at some points in the year.Top Web a ttack Toolkits by Percent
Source: Symantec
Others
Blackhole
Sakura
Nuclear
Redkit
Phoenix
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN102030405060708090%Web Attack Toolkits
It’s one thing to discover new vulnerabilities, but another
matter to implement a way to exploit them. Criminal
entrepreneurs turn them into toolkits that less sophisticated
users can buy and use. Like commercial software, they even include support and warranties. Authors accept payments
using online payment services with anonymous numbered
accounts.
Attack toolkits exist for creating a variety of malware and
for attacking websites. The popular Blackhole toolkit is a
notorious example. This updating strategy suggests that it has a kind of brand loyalty and that the authors are building on
that in the same way that legitimate software vendors do with
their updates and new editions.
Blackhole continued to make its presence felt in 2012,
making up for 41 percent of all Web-based attacks. We also
saw the release of an updated version of the toolkit, dubbed Blackhole 2.0, back in September. However, Blackhole’s overall
dominance may have begun to decline, as another Web attack
toolkit surpassed Blackhole during a few months in the latter half of 2012. Sakura, a new entrant to the market, at its peak
made up as much of 60 percent of all toolkit activity, and 22
percent of overall toolkit usage in 2012. p. 29
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Website Malware Scanning and Website
Vulnerability Assessment
In 2012, Symantec’s Trust Services (formerly VeriSign)
technology scanned over 1.5 million websites as part of its
Website Malware Scanning and Vulnerability Assessment
services. Over 130,000 URLs were scanned for malware each day, with 1 in 532 of websites found to be infected with
malware. The most common form of compromise was for
the use of drive-by downloads.
Furthermore, in assessing potentially exploitable vulnerabilities
on websites, over 1,400 vulnerability scans were performed each
day. Approximately 53 percent of websites scanned were found to have unpatched, potentially exploitable vulnerabilities (36
percent in 2011), of which 24 percent were deemed to be critical
(25 percent in 2011). The most common vulnerability found was for cross-site scripting vulnerabilities.
The Growth of Secured Connections
One of the ways to judge the growth of usage for SSL is to monitor the change in statistics for OCSP (Online Certificate
Status Protocol, which is used for obtaining the revocation
status of a digital certificate) and CRL (Certificate Revocation List) lookups. When an SSL secured connection is initiated, a
revocation check is performed using OCSP or CRL and we track
the number of lookups that go through our systems. This is a growth indicator for the number of SSL secured sessions that
are performed online. This implies that more people are going
online and using secured connections (for example, representing a growth of eCommerce transactions on the Web). It also may
show the impact of the adoption of SSL more widely, in more
places and for more uses, such as the growing use of Extended Validation SSL Certificates, which trigger browsers to indicate
whether a user is on a secured site by turning the address bar
green, and for “Always On SSL” (adopted heavily through 2012 by social networks, search services, and online email providers).
Further, it may be a result of devices other than traditional
desktops and laptops that enable online access; for example, smartphones and tablets.
In 2012, Symantec identified the average number of OCSP
lookups grew by 31 percent year on year between 2011 and 2012, with more than 4.8 billion lookups performed each day in
2012. The high-water-mark of OCSP lookups was 5.8 billion in
a single day in 2012. It is worth noting that OCSP is the modern revocation checking methodology.Additionally, Symantec’s CRL lookups increased by 45 percent year on year between 2011 and 2012, with approximately 1.4 billion per day, and a high-water-mark of 2.1 billion.
CRL is the older lookup technology that OCSP supersedes.
Norton Secured Seal and Trust Marks
In 2012, more consumers were visiting websites with trust
marks (such as the Norton Secured Seal) in 2012. Based on
analysis of the statistics from Symantec’s own trust marks, we
saw an 8 percent increase in 2012. The Symantec trust mark was viewed up to 750 million times a day in 2012 as more online users are necessitating stronger security to safeguard their
online activities.
Stolen Key-signing Certificates
2012 continued to show that organizations large and small were
susceptible to becoming unwitting players in the global malware
distribution network. We’ve seen increased activity of malware
being signed with legitimate code-signing certificates. Since the malware code is signed, it appears to be legitimate, which make
it easier to spread.
Malware developers often use stolen code-signing private
keys. They attack Certificate Authorities and once inside
their networks, they seek out and steal private keys. In other
cases, poor security practices allow them to buy legitimate certificates with fake identities. For example, in May 2012,
Comodo, a large Certificate Authority, authenticated and
issued a legitimate code-signing certificate to a fictitious organization run by cybercriminals.
15 15 See http://www.
securityweek.com/comodo-
certificates-used-sign-banking-trojans-brazil.p. 30
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VULNERabILITIES, ExPLOITS, aNd TOOLkITS
Use a Full Range of Protection Technology.
If the threat landscape was less advanced, then file scanning
technology (commonly called antivirus) would be sufficient
to prevent malware infections. However, with toolkits for
building malware-on-demand, polymorphic malware and zero-day exploits, antivirus is not enough. Network-based
protection and reputation technology must be deployed on
endpoints to help prevent attacks. And behavior blocking and scheduled file scanning must be used to help find malware
that avoid preventative defense.
Protect Your Public-facing Websites.
Consider Always On SSL to encrypt visitors’ interactions
with your site across the whole site, not just on the checkout
or sign-up pages. Make sure you update your content
management system and Web server software just as you would a client PC. Run vulnerability and malware scanning
tools on your websites to detect problems promptly. To protect
these credentials against social engineering and phishing, use strong passwords for admin accounts and other services. Limit
login access to important Web servers to users that need it.
Protect Code-signing Certificates.
Certificate owners should apply rigorous protection and
security policies to safeguard keys. This means effective
physical security, the use of cryptographic hardware security
modules, and effective network and endpoint security, including data loss prevention on servers involved in signing
code, and thorough security for applications used to sign code.
In addition, Certificate Authorities need to ensure that they are using best practices in every step of the authentication
process.Adopting an Always On SSL approach helps to safeguard account information from unencrypted connections and thus
render end users less vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack.
Be Aggressive on Your Software Updating and Review
Your Patching Processes.
The majority of Web-based attacks exploit the top 20 most
common vulnerabilities. Consequently, installing patches for
known vulnerabilities will prevent the most common attacks.
It’s essential to update and patch all your software promptly. In particular, with risks like the Flashback attacks that used
Java, it’s important to run the latest version of that software
or do without it altogether. This is equally true for CIOs managing thousands of users, small business owners with
dozens of users, or individual users at home.
Update, patch, and migrate from outdated and insecure
browsers, applications, and browser plug-ins to the latest
available versions using the vendors’ automatic update
mechanisms, especially for the top software vulnerabilities being exploited. Most software vendors work diligently
to patch exploited software vulnerabilities; however, such
patches can only be effective if adopted in the field. Be wary of deploying standard corporate images containing older versions
of browsers, applications, and browser plug-ins that are
outdated and insecure. Consider removing vulnerable plug-ins from images for employees that have no need for that software.
Wherever possible, automate patch deployments to maintain
protection against vulnerabilities across the organization.Recommendationsp. 31
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SOCIaL NETWOR kINg
MObILE
aNd T hE CLOU dp. 32
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Internet Security Threat Report 2013 :: Volume 18
SOCIaL NETWORkINg, MObILE , aNd ThE CLOUd
Online criminals and spammers are less interested in email as
an infection vector than they were. Why? Because social media
is becoming so popular and it gives them many new ways to
steal people’s identities or personal information and infect their computers with malware.
Social media combines two behaviors that are useful for
criminals: social proof and sharing. Social proofing is the psychological mechanism that convinces people to do things
because their friends are doing it. For example, if you get a
message on your Facebook wall from a trusted friend, you’re more likely to click on it.
Sharing is what people do with social networks: they share
personal information such as their birthday, home address, and other contact details. This type of information is very useful for
identity thieves. For example, your social media profile might
contain clues to security questions a hacker would need to reset your password and take control of your account.
People are spending more time online, and the most popular
activity is for social networking. Furthermore, younger users are more commonly using mobile devices to access the Internet and
social media applications.
16 Moreover, many mobile applications frequently rely on cloud-based storage, and without an Internet connection are often
limited in their functionality. Many more people and businesses are routinely using cloud-based systems, sometimes without
even realising it.
The bank robber Willie Sutton famously explained why he robbed
banks: “Because that’s where the money is.” Online criminals
target social media because that’s where the victims are.
Facebook users can report potential Facebook phishing
scams to the company through the following email address:
[email protected].
16 See http://blog.nielsen.
com/nielsenwire/
social/2012/at a glance
• Scammers continue to use social media as spam and phishing
tools, including newer sites such as Pinterest and Instagram.
• Mobile malware has increased significantly in 2012 with new threats such as mobile botnets.
• Thirty-two percent of all mobile malware steals information from the compromised device.
• Fast-growing trends towards cloud computing, bring your own device, and consumerization create additional risks for businesses.Introduction
data
Top 5 Social Media a ttacks in 2012
Source: Symantec
56%
1 1
2
2
3
3
4
4
5
518%
10%
5%
3%Fake
Offering
Manual Sharing
Likejacking
Fake Plug-in
Copy and Paste
• Fake Offering. These scams invite social network users to join a fake
event or group with incentives such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to share credentials with the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
• Manual Sharing Scams. These rely on victims to actually do the hard work of sharing the scam by presenting them with intriguing
videos, fake offers or messages that they share with their friends.
• Likejacking. Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into
clicking website buttons that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
• Fake Plug-in Scams. Users are tricked into downloading fake browser extensions on their machines. Rogue browser extensions can pose like legitimate extensions but when installed can steal sensitive information from the infected machine.
• Copy and Paste Scams. Users are invited to paste malicious JavaScript code directly into their browser’s address bar in the hope of receiving a gift coupon in return. p. 33
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20406080100120
DEC
NOV
OCT
SEP
AUG
JUL
JUN
MAY
APR
MAR
FEB
JAN
121
MOBILE
VULNERABILITIES
IN MARCH• March was the most active
month of 2012, with 121
vulnerabilities reported.
• There were 415 mobile
vulnerabilities identified
in 2012, compared with
315 in 2011.Mobile Vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
Information stealing tops the list of activities carried out by mobile malware, with 32 percent of all
threats recording some sort of
information in 2012.Mobile Threats in 2012
Source: Symantec
25%
15%32%
Traditional Threats
Track UserSteal Information
Reconfigure DeviceSend Content
8%
Adware/Annoyance8%13%
SHARE
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Mobile Threats by d evice Type in 2012
Source: Symantec
Device Type Number of Threats
Android malware 103
symbian malware 3
Windows Mobile malware 1
iOs malware 1In contrast to vulnerabilities,
Android was by far the most
commonly targeted mobile
platform in 2012, comprising 103 out of 108 unique threats.VARIANTS FAMILIES
020406080100120140160180200
JAN, 2012 JAN, 2011 JAN, 2010
05001,0001,5002,0002,5003,0003,5004,0004,5005,000
JAN 2012
JAN 2011FAMILIES (CUMULATIVE) VARIANTS (CUMULATIVE)Cumulative Mobile a ndroid Malware, Families and Variants 2010 to 2012
Source: Symantec
• 2012 saw a 58 percent increase in mobile malware families compared to 2011. The year’s total
now accounts for 59 percent of all malware to-date.
• At the same time the number of variants within each family has increased dramatically, from an average ratio of variants per family of 5:1 in 2011 to 38:1 in 2012. This indicates that threat authors are spending more time repackaging or making minor changes to their threats, in order
to spread them further and avoid detection.
SHARE
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Spam and Phishing Move to Social Media
In the last few years, we’ve seen a significant increase in spam
and phishing on social media sites. Criminals follow users to
popular sites. As Facebook and Twitter have grown in popularity
for users, they have also attracted more criminal activity. However, in the last year, online criminals have also started
targeting newer, fast-growing sites such as Instagram,
Pinterest, and Tumblr.
Typical threats include fake gift cards and survey scams. These
kinds of fake offer scams account for more than half (56 percent)
of all social media attacks. For example, in one scam the victim
sees a post on somebody’s Facebook wall or on their Pinterest
feeds (where content appears from the people they follow or in specific categories) that says “Click here for a $100 gift card.”
When the user clicks on the link, they go to a website where
they are asked to sign up for any number of offers, turning over personal details in the process. The spammers get a fee for each
registration and, of course, there’s no gift card at the
end of the process.analysis
Typical social media scam.
Fake website with bogus survey.
Platform Documented Vulnerabilities
Apple iO s 387
Android 13
BlackBerry 13
nokia 0
LG electronics 0
Windows Mobile 2The vast majority of vulnerabilities on mobile systems were on the iOS
platform. However, the higher number
of vulnerabilities is not indicative of a higher level of threat, because most
mobile threats have not used software
vulnerabilities.Mobile Vulnerabilities by OS
Source: Symantecp. 36
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We also documented a similar spam campaign on
the popular photo-sharing app Instagram.17 17 See http://www.
symantec.com/
connect/blogs/
instaspam-
instagram-users-receive-gift-card-spam.Another trick is to use a fake website to persuade a victim to reveal their personal details and passwords; for example, their
Facebook or Twitter account information. These phishing
scams are insidious and often exploit people’s fascination with celebrities such as professional athletes, film stars, or singers.
We have seen an increase in phishing scams that target specific
countries and their celebrities.
In 2012, we have seen ever more threats targeted on social
media websites as well as more and more new channels and
platforms opening up, especially those that are available only as
mobile applications. It is likely that these mobile social channels will become more targeted in 2013, especially those that are
aimed specifically at teenagers and young adults, who may not
know how to recognize such attacks and may be a little freer with their personal details.Phishing site spoofing a social networking site promoting soccer star Lionel Messi.
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Mobile Threats
In the last year, we have seen a further increase in mobile
malware. This correlates with increasing numbers of Internet-
connected mobile devices. Android has a 72 percent market
share with Apple® iOS a distant second with 14 percent, according to Gartner.
18 As a result of its market share and more
open development environment, Android is the main target for
mobile threats.
Typically, people use phones to store personal information and
contact information and increasingly they have high-speed
Internet connections. The smartphone has become a powerful
computer in its own right, and this makes these attractive devices to criminals. They also have the added advantage of
being tied to a payment system—the owner’s phone contract—
which means that they offer additional ways for criminals to siphon off money from the victim.
We’ve seen a big rise in all kinds of mobile phone attacks:
•
Android threats were more commonly found in Eastern
Europe and Asia; however, during the last year, the number
of Android threats in the rest of Europe and the United
States has increased.
• Privacy leaks that disclose personal information, including
the release of surveillance software designed to covertly
transmit the owner’s location.19
• Premium number fraud where malicious apps send expensive
text messages. This is the quickest way to make money from mobile malware. One mobile botnet Symantec observed
used fake mobile apps to infect users and by our calculation the botmaster is generating anywhere between $1,600 to
$9,000 per day and $547,500 to $3,285,000 per year.
20
• Mobile botnets. Just as spammers have linked networks of
PCs into botnets to send out unwanted email, now criminals have begun using Android botnets the same way.
21 This
suggests that attackers are adapting techniques used on PCs to work on smartphones.
Historically, malware infected smartphones through rogue app
markets and users sideloading apps directly onto their devices.
However, legitimate app stores are not immune. In 2012, we saw
rogue software masquerading as popular games on the Google® Play market, having bypassed Google’s automated screening
process.
22
Businesses are increasingly allowing staff to “bring your own device” (BYOD) to work, either by allowing them to use
personal computers, tablets, or smartphones for work, even subsidizing their purchase. Even when companies provide their
own equipment, the trend towards consumerization means that companies often turn to consumer technology, such as
file-sharing websites, and devices, such as consumer laptops
or tablets, to reduce costs. These two trends open the door to
a greater risk to businesses from mobile devices because they often lack security features such as encryption, access control,
and manageability.
We have seen far more vulnerabilities for the iOS platform,
which makes up 93 percent of those published, than for Android
in 2012, but yet Android dominates the malware landscape, with
97 percent of new threats.
While seemingly contradictory at first, there is a good reason
for this: jailbreaking iOS devices. In order to install applications
that are not available on the Apple App Store, a user must run an exploit against a vulnerability in the software. While not the
safest approach from a security standpoint, this is the only way
to install applications that are not available through the Apple App Store.
In contrast, the Android platform provides the option to
install apps from unofficial markets by simply changing settings in the operating system. Since no exploit is needed, the same
incentives aren’t present as there are on iOS. Android users are
vulnerable to a whole host of threats; however, very few have utilized vulnerabilities to spread threats.
While Android clocks in with 103 threats in 2012, this number
may appear small compared to other estimates on the scope of the mobile threat landscape. Many estimates are larger because
they provide a count of overall variants, as opposed to new,
unique threats. While many of these variants simply undergone minor changes in an attempt to avoid antivirus scanners
detecting them, Symantec counted at least 3,906 different
mobile variants for the year.
There’s an important distinction between old and new Android
versions regarding security features. Google added a feature in
Android version 4.x to allow users to block any particular app from pushing notifications into the status bar. This came in
response to feedback from users of older versions, annoyed by
ad platforms that push notifications to the status bar.
Also, due to the rise of threats that silently send premium text
messages—Android.Opfake, Android.Premiumtext, Android.
Positmob, and Android.Rufraud, for instance—Google added a feature in Android 4.2 to prompt the user to confirm sending
such premium text messages. This can be very helpful in
protecting most users.
However, at around 10 percent market penetration at the end of
2012,
23 Android 4.2 devices account only for a small percentage 18 See http://www.
gartner.com/it/page.
jsp?id=2237315.
19 See http://en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/FinFisher and
http://www.nytimes.
com/2012/08/31/technology/finspy-software-is-tracking-political-dissidents.html?_r=1.
20 See http://www.symantec.
com/connect/blogs/androidbmaster-million-dollar-mobile-botnet .
21 See http://www.symantec.
com/connect/blogs/
androidbmaster-million-
dollar-mobile-botnet .
22 See http://news.cnet.
com/8301-1009_3-57470729-83/malware-went-undiscovered-for-weeks-on-google-play .
23 See http://developer.android.
com/about/dashboards/
index.html.p. 38
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of the total devices out there. The Android ecosystem makes it
harder to keep everyone up to date. Google released the official
platform that works out of the box only on Nexus devices—
Google’s own branded device. From there each manufacturer modifies and releases its own platform, which is in turn picked
up by mobile network operators who also customize those
platforms.
This makes it impossible for any change coming from Google
to be quickly available to all in-field devices. Any change to the
platform requires thorough testing by each manufacturer and then each operator, all adding to the time needed to reach users.
Having so many device models also multiplies the amount of
resources all these companies have to allocate for each update, leading to infrequently released updates or in some cases no
updates for older devices.
For most exploits in the OS, Google released quick fixes;
however, users still had long waits before they received the
fix from their network operators. Some exploits are not in the
original OS itself but in the custom modifications made by manufacturers, such as the exploit for Samsung models that
appeared in 2012. Samsung was quick to fix it, but the fix still
had to propagate through network operators to reach users.
Tighter control from Google over the platform can solve some of
the “fragmentation” issues, but this could affect the relationship
it has with manufacturers. A cut-off point for older Android users could help to mitigate the risk, but it is usually the
manufacturers that do this.
Cloud Computing Risks
The cloud services market was expected to grow by 20 percent
in 2012, according to Gartner.24 Cloud computing promises
businesses a way to enhance their IT without heavy upfront
capital costs and, for smaller businesses, it offers access to
enterprise-class business software at an affordable price. On a fundamental level, it offers huge and growing economies of
scale as Internet bandwidth and processing power continue to
increase rapidly.
Cloud computing offers some potential security benefits,
especially for smaller companies without dedicated IT security
staff. Well-run cloud applications are more likely to be patched and updated efficiently. They are also more likely to be resilient, secure, and backed up than on-premises systems.
However, cloud computing presents some security concerns, too:
•
Privacy. Well-run cloud companies will have strong
policies about who can access customer data (for example,
for troubleshooting) and under what circumstances.Information should only be entrusted to a third party over the Internet where there is sufficient assurance as to how
that data will be managed and accessed.
•
Data Liberation. Cloud computing businesses make it easy
to get started, and reputable companies make it easy to
extract your data (for example, archived emails or customer
records) if you want to change providers. Before entrusting their data to a cloud provider, potential users should
fully evaluate the terms and conditions of extracting and
recovering that data at a later date.
•
Eggs in One Basket. As we have seen from large-scale data
breaches in the last few years, attackers tend to go where
they can score the most data for the least effort. If a cloud
services provider stores confidential information for a large number of customers, it becomes a bigger target for
attackers. A single breach at a cloud provider could be a
gold mine of personal data for an attacker.
•
Consumerization. Companies face a significant risk of
accidental or deliberate data loss when their employees
use unapproved cloud systems on an ad-hoc basis. For
example, if company policies make it difficult to email large files to third parties, employees may decide to use
free online file sharing applications instead. The risk is
that these systems may fall short of company standards for security. For example, one popular file-sharing site left
all its user accounts unlocked for four hours.
25 In addition,
where employees use unauthorized cloud applications for their work, such as social networking sites for marketing
purposes, they open up the company to attack from Web-based malware.
•
Infrastructure. Although not in the wild, there is a
theoretical risk that in a virtualized, multi-tenant
architecture, a malicious user could rent a virtual machine
and use it to launch an attack against the system by exploiting a vulnerability in the underlying hypervisor and
use this to gain access to other virtual machines running in
the same environment. Consideration should also be given to data encryption within the virtual machine to minimize the
risk from unauthorized access to the physical hard disks.24 See http://www.gartner.com/
it/page.jsp?id=2163616.25 See http://www.wired.
com/threatlevel/2011/06/
dropbox/.p. 39
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Social Media Threats Are a Business Issue.
Companies are often unwilling to block access to social
media sites altogether, but they need to find ways to protect
themselves against Web-based malware on these and other
sites. This means multi-layer security software at the gateway and on client PCs. It also requires aggressive patching and
updating to reduce the risk of drive-by infections. Lastly, user
education and clear policies are essential, especially regarding the amount of personal information users disclose online.
Cloud Security Advice.26
Carry out a full risk assessment before signing up. Secure your own information and identities. Implement a strong
governance framework.Protect Your Mobile Devices.
Consider installing security software on mobile devices.
Also, users need to be educated about the risks of
downloading rogue applications and how to use their privacy
and permission settings. For company-provided devices, consider locking them down and preventing the installation
of unapproved applications altogether.
26 For more advice about cloud
adoption, see https://www4.symantec.com/mktginfo/.Recommendationsp. 40
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SPa M
aNd PhIShINgp. 41
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Malware, spam, and social engineering continue to be massive,
chronic problems. Although they have been around for a long
time, attacks continue to evolve and they still have the potential
to do serious damage to consumers and businesses.
In addition, they hurt everyone by undermining confidence
in the Internet. These chronic threats do not get much news
coverage because they are “background noise” but that doesn’t mean that they are unimportant. A useful comparison is the
difference between plane crashes and car crashes. A single plane
crash makes the national news, but the daily death toll on the roads goes unreported despite killing significantly more people
each year.
27
The popularity of ransomware is an example of all these themes. It permanently locks people out of their computer unless they
pay a swinging “fine” to the perpetrators. It’s corrosive to trust, expensive to remedy, and reveals a new level of ruthlessness and
sophistication.The numbers are telling. In one example, malware called Reveton (aka Trojan.Ransomlock.G), was detected attempting
to infect 500,000 computers over a period of 18 days. According to a recent Symantec survey of 13,000 adults in 24 countries,
average losses per cybercrime incident are $197.
28 In the last 12
months an estimated 556 million adults worldwide experienced some form of cybercrime.
27 In the United States, for
example, the NTSB reports that 472 people died in
aircraft accidents in 2010
compared with 32,885 in highway accidents. See http://www.ntsb.gov/data/
index.html.28 See http://www.
symantec.com/about/
news/release/article.
jsp?prid=20120905_02.
at a glance
• With ransomware, malware has become more vicious and more
profitable.
• Email spam volumes fall again, down 29 percent in 2012, as spammers move to social media.
• Phishing becomes more sophisticated and targets social networking sites. Introduction
Irreversible ransomware locks
people out of their computer
unless they pay a “fine,” which
in most cases does not unlock the computer.p. 42
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Spam
Spam rates declined for a second year in a row, dropping from
75 percent in 2011 to 69 percent of all email in 2012. In 2011
we were reluctant to call this decrease in spam a permanent
trend. Botnets can be rebuilt, new ones created. But several factors appear to be keeping spam rates lower than in previous
years.
The takedowns of spam botnets continued in 2012. In March
2012 a resurrected Kelihos botnet was taken down for a second
time. In July the Grum botnet was taken down. While both were
significant spam botnets and contributed to the reduction in spam, undoubtedly email spammers are still feeling the pain
of botnet takedowns from 2011.
Additionally, pharmaceutical spam continues to decline,
apparently unable to recover from the loss of the major players
in the online pharmaceutical business.
29 Given advancements
in anti-spam technology, plus the migration of many users to social networks as a means of communication, spammers may
be diversifying in order to stay in business.
This is not to say that the problem of spam has been solved.
At 69 percent of all email, it still represents a significant
amount of unwanted messages.
As email spam rates continue to decline, we see the same social
engineering techniques that have been used in email spam
campaigns increasingly being adopted in spam campaigns and being promoted through social networking channels.
29 See http://www.npr.org/blogs/
money/2013/01/15/169424047/
episode-430-black-market-
pharmacies-and-the-spam-
empire-behind-them. data
Top 5 a ctivity for Spam d estination by g eography
Country %
saudi Arabia 79%
Bulgaria 76%
chile 74%
Hungary 74%
china 73%
Top 5 a ctivity for Spam d estination by Industry
Industry %
Marketing/Media 69%
Manufacturing 69%
recreation 69%
Agriculture 69%
chemical/Pharmaceutical 69%
Top 5 a ctivity for Spam d estination by Company Size
Organization Size %
1-250 68%
251-500 68%
501-1,000 68%
1,001-1,500 69%
1,501-2,500 69%
2,501+ 68%SHARE
THISp. 43
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The overall average global spam
rate for 2012 was 69 percent,
compared with 75 percent in
2011.global Spam Rate – 2012 vs 2011
Source: Symantec
102030405060708090%
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN 2011 2012
BILLIONS
0
102030405060
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN• Spam volumes were
highest in August.
• The estimated projection
of global spam volumes decreased by 29 percent,
from 42 billion spam emails
per day in 2011, to 30 billion in 2012.global Spam Volume Per d ay in 2012
Source: Symantecp. 44
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• Pharmaceutical spam makes
up 21 percent of all spam, but
was overtaken by the Adult/
Sex/Dating category, which now makes up 55 percent of
spam.
• Pharmaceutical spam in 2012
declined by approximately 19
percentage points compared
with 2011.Pharmaceutical Spam – 2012 vs 2011
Source: Symantec
2011 201210203040506070%
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANadult/Sex/ dating Spam – 2012 vs 2011
Source: Symantec
2011 2012102030405060708090%
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
• Adult/Dating spam in 2012
increased by approximately
40 percentage points
compared with 2011.
• This suggests an almost direct correlation
between the decline in
pharmaceutical spam and the increase in dating spam.
• The proportion of adult/sex/dating spam was greater in 2012 than for
pharmaceutical spam in
2011, but the actual volume of adult/sex/dating spam
in 2012 was lower than for
pharmaceutical spam in 2011, since overall spam
volumes were lower in 2012
than in the previous year.p. 45
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Phishing
Email phishing rates are also down this year, from one in
299 emails in 2011 to one in 414 in 2012.
The decline in the use of email as a method to spread spam
and carry out phishing attacks does not likely indicate a drop in activity by attackers. Rather, it appears that we
are seeing a shift in activity from email to other forms
of online communication, such as social networks.
• Phishing rates have dropped
drastically in 2012, in many
cases less than half the number for that month in the previous year.
• The overall average phishing rate for 2012 was 1 in 414 emails, compared with
1 in 299 in 2011.Phishing Rate – 2012 vs 2011
Source: Symantec
2011 20121 in 6001 in 5001 in 4001 in 3001 in 2001 in 100
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
Top 5 a ctivity for Phishing d estination by g eography
Country 1 in
netherlands 1 in 123
south Africa 1 in 177
united Kingdom 1 in 191
Denmark 1 in 374
china 1 in 382
Top 5 a ctivity for Phishing d estination by Company Size
Company Size 1 in
1-250 1 in 294
251-500 1 in 501
501-1,000 1 in 671
1,001-1,500 1 in 607
1,501-2,500 1 in 739
2,501+ 1 in 346Top 5 a ctivity for Phishing d estination by Industry
Industry 1 in
Public sector 1 in 95
Finance 1 in 211
education 1 in 223
Accommodation/ catering 1 in 297
Marketing/Media 1 in 355p. 46
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Malware
One in 291 emails contained a virus in 2012, which is down from
one in 239 in 2011. Of that email-borne malware, 23 percent of
it contained URLs that pointed to malicious websites. This is
also down from 2011, where 39 percent of email-borne malware contained a link to a malicious website.
Much like the drop in spam and phishing rates, a drop in emails
that contain viruses does not necessarily mean that attackers have stopped targeting users. Rather, it more likely points to a
shift in tactics, targeting other online activities, such as social
networking.Top 5 a ctivity for Malware d estination by Industry
Industry 1 in
Public sector 1 in 72
education 1 in 163
Finance 1 in 218
Marketing/Media 1 in 235
Accommodation/ catering 1 in 236
Top 5 a ctivity for Malware d estination by Company Size
Company Size 1 in
1-250 1 in 299
251-500 1 in 325
501-1,000 1 in 314
1,001-1,500 1 in 295
1,501-2,500 1 in 42
2,501+ 1 in 252Top 5 a ctivity for Malware d estination by g eography
Country 1 in
netherlands 1 in 108
Luxembourg 1 in 144
united Kingdom 1 in 163
south Africa 1 in 178
Germany 1 in 196
• Overall numbers declined, with one in 291 emails
containing a virus.
• In 2011, the average rate for
email-borne malware was
1 in 239Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was d etected – 2012 vs 2011
Source: Symantec
2011 2012DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN1 in 3501 in 300
1 in 4001 in 2501 in 2001 in 1501 in 1001 in 50p. 47
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2011 201210203040506070%
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
• Emails that contained a
malicious URL dropped
significantly in 2012. In
some months it was more than half the rate as it was
that month in 2011.
• In 2012, approximately 23
percent of email malware
contained a URL rather than
an attachment, compared with 39 percent in 2011.Proportion of Email Traffic Containing URL Malware – 2012 vs 2011
Source: Symantec
• In 2012, approximately
247,350 Web-based attacks were blocked each day.
• In 2011, this figure was approximately 190,370 per day. This represents an
increase of 30 percent.Website Malware b locked Per d ay
Source: Symantec
2011 2012
050100150200250300350400
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JULTHOUSANDSp. 48
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Website Exploits by Type of Website
Based on Norton Safe Web data, the Symantec technology that
scans the Web looking for websites hosting malware, we’ve
determined that 61 percent of malicious sites are actually
regular websites that have been compromised and infected with malicious code.
We see Business, which covers consumer and industrial goods
and service sectors, listed at the forefront this year. This could be due to the contribution of compromised sites from many
SMBs that do not invest in appropriate resources to protect
them. Hacking, which includes sites that promote or provide the means to carry out hacking activities, jumped to second, though
it didn’t appear in the top 15 in 2011.
Although the Technology and Telecommunication category,
which provides information pertaining to computers, the
Internet and telecommunication, ranks third this year, it sees
5.7 percent of the total compromised sites, only a 1.2 percent drop from 2011. Shopping sites that provide the means to
purchase products or services online remain in the top five,
but Shopping sees a drop of 4.1 percent.
It is interesting to note that Hosting, which ranked second
in 2011, has moved down to seventh this year. This covers
services that provide individuals or organizations access to online systems for websites or storage. Due to this increase in
reliable and free cloud-based hosting solutions, provided by
the likes of Google, Dropbox and others, we see usage moving away from unreliable hosting solutions, which could have
contributed towards the drop. Blogging has also experienced a
significant drop in 2012, moving down to fourth position. This could support the theory that people are moving towards social
networking and exchanging information through such networks.
Malware developers find it easy to insert malicious code in such sites and spread them using various means. Website Exploits by Type of Website
Source: Symantec
RankTop Domain Categories that
Got Exploited by # of Sites# of Infected Sites/Total # of Infected Sites
1 Business 7.7%
2 Hacking 7.6%
3 technology and t elecommunication 5.7%
4 Blogging 4.5%
5 shopping 3.6%
6 Known Malware Domain 2.6%
7 Hosting 2.3%
8 Automotive 1.9%
9 Health 1.7%
10 educational 1.7%
Top 10 Malware in 2012
Source: Symantec
Rank Malware Name %
1 W32.sality.Ae 6.9%
2 W32.ramnit.B 5.1%
3 W32.Downadup.B 4.4%
4 W32.Virut. cF 2.2%
5 W32.sillyFDc 1.1%
6 W32.Mabezat.B 1.1%
7 W32.Xpaj.B 0.6%
8 W32. changeup 0.6%
9 W32.Downadup 0.5%
10 W32.imaut 0.4% SHARE
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MaLW aRE , SPaM, aNd PhIShINg
10
MAC THREAT
FAMILIES IN 2012
12345678910
2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007analysis
Macs Under Attack
Historically, Mac users have felt less vulnerable to malware than
PC users. As Apple has gained market share, Macs have become
a more attractive target. In fact, 2012 saw the first significant
Mac malware outbreak. The Flashback attack exploited a vulnerability in Java to create a cross-platform threat.
30 It was
incorporated into the Blackhole attack toolkit and used by
criminals to infect 600,000 Macs,31 which is approximately one
Mac in 100. Like more and more attacks in 2012, as discussed in the “Web Attack Toolkits” section, it spread when users visited
infected websites. Although the Flashback malware was mainly used for advertising click fraud, it had other capabilities, such as
giving hackers remote access to infected computers.
32 Because
most Mac users do not have antivirus software, the chances of detection, once infected, were small. Does this indicate that hackers are going to start paying further attention to Macintosh computers as a platform to target? Not
necessarily. While Mac users may encounter an occasional threat here or there, the vast majority of what they encounter is
malware aimed at Windows computers. In fact, of all the threats
encountered by Symantec customers who used Mac computers in the last quarter of 2012, only 2.5 percent of them were
actually written specifically for Macs.
This isn’t to say that Macs are a safer alternative to PCs; as we’ve
seen, they’re just as susceptible to attacks. There were more
threats created specifically for the Mac in 2012 than in years
past and the trend appears to be rising.30 See http://www.symantec.com/
security_response/writeup.
jsp?docid=2012-041001-0020-99.
31 See http://www.symantec.
com/connect/blogs/flashback-cleanup-still-underway-approximately-
140000-infections.
32 See http://www.symantec.
com/connect/blogs/both-
mac-and-windows-are-targeted-once.
There were more unique threats for OS X in 2012 than any year
previously.Mac-specific Threats by Year
Source: Symantecp. 50
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MaLW aRE , SPaM, aNd PhIShINg
Rise of Ransomware
Ransomware became a bigger challenge in 2012 as its popularity
among malware authors increased. Unlike scareware, which
encouraged you to buy fake antivirus protection, ransomware
just locks your computer and demands a release fee. The malware is often quite sophisticated, difficult to remove, and in
some cases it persists in safe mode, blocking attempts at remote
support.
Victims usually end up with ransomware from drive-by
downloads when they are silently infected visiting websites
that host Web attack toolkits. This ransomware is often from legitimate sites that have been compromised by hackers who
insert the malicious download code. Another source of infection
is malvertisements where criminals buy advertising space on legitimate websites and use it to hide their attack code, as
discussed in the malvertisement section.The perpetrators use social engineering to increase the chances
of payment. The locking screen often contains a fake warning
from local law enforcement and the ransom is presented as a
fine for criminal activity online. In some cases, ransomware also takes a photo of the victim using a webcam and displays this
image in the locking screen, which can be unnerving for victims.
Criminals use anonymous money transfer systems or prepaid
credit cards to receive the payments. The ransom typically
ranges between $50 and $400. In many cases, payment doesn’t
unlock the computer. Symantec monitored a ransomware command and control server and saw 5,300 computers infected.
About three percent of victims paid the ransom, which netted
the criminals about $30,000.
Typical ransomware locking screen showing a fake police warning.
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MaLW aRE , SPaM, aNd PhIShINg
Long-term Stealthy Malware
Internet criminals are also making money from malware that
stays hidden on the victims’ computers. Operating in botnets
with many thousands of computers acting collectively, these
stealthy programs send out spam or generate bogus clicks on website advertisements (which generate referral income for the
site owners). These techniques don’t generate rapid returns like
ransomware; however, they are much less likely to be discovered and, thanks to clever coding, are more difficult to remove.
Consequently, they can generate a constant stream of revenue
over time.
Email Spam Volume Down
After decreases in 2011, this year saw a further reduction in the volume of email spam from 76 percent of all email messages
to 69 percent. There are several reasons for this. First, law
enforcement action has closed down several botnets, reducing the number of messages being sent.
33 Second, spammers are
increasingly redirecting their efforts to social media sites
instead of email. Lastly, spammers are improving the quality and
targeting of their spam messages in an effort to bypass filters and this has led to a reduction in the overall numbers being sent.
Advanced Phishing
While spam has declined slightly in 2012, phishing attacks have increased. Phishers are using very sophisticated fake websites—
in some cases, perfect replicas of real sites—to trick victims into
revealing personal information, passwords, credit card details, and bank credentials. In the past they relied more on fake
emails, but now those emails coupled with similar links posted
on social media sites are used to lure the victim to these more advanced phishing websites.
Typical fake sites include banks and credit card companies, as
you’d expect, but also popular social media sites. The number of phishing sites that spoofed social network sites increased
123 percent in 2012.If criminals can capture your social media login details, they can
use your account to send phishing emails to all your friends. A message that seems to come from a friend appears much more
trustworthy. Another way to use a cracked social media account
is to send out a fake message to someone’s friends about some kind of emergency. For example, “Help! I’m stuck overseas
and my wallet has been stolen. Please send $200 as soon as
possible.”
In an attempt to bypass security and filtering software,
criminals use complex website addresses and nested URL
shortening services. They also use social engineering to motivate victims to click on links. In the last year, they have
focused their messages around celebrities, movies, sports
personalities, and attractive gadgets such as smartphones and tablets. The number of phishing websites that used SSL
certificates in an attempt to lull victims into a false sense of
security increased by 46 percent in 2012 compared with the previous year.
We saw a significant (threefold) rise in non-English phishing in
2012. In particular, we saw a significant increase in South Korea. The non-English languages that had the highest number of
phishing sites were French, Italian, Portuguese, Chinese,
and Spanish.
33 See http://krebsonsecurity.
com/tag/planet-money/.
SHARE
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Internet Security Threat Report 2013 :: Volume 18
MaLW aRE , SPaM, aNd PhIShINg
Protect Yourself Against Social Engineering.
For individuals as well as for businesses, it’s essential that
people learn to spot the telltale signs of social engineering,
which can include undue pressure, titillation or a false sense
of urgency, an offer that is literally too good to be true, bogus “officialese” in an attempt to make something look authentic
(for example, lengthy reference numbers), implausible
pretexts (for example, a Microsoft “representative” calls to tell you that your computer has a virus), and false quid-pro-
quo offers (for example, receive a free gift when you provide
personal or confidential information).
Avoid Ransomware.
Avoid marginal websites and, in particular, pirate software
and adult sites. Do not install unsolicited plug-ins or
executables if prompted to do so, even on legitimate websites.
Consider using advertising blocker software in your browser. Ensure that your computer is up to date with the latest
patches and updates to increase your resistance to drive-by
Web infections. Keep backups and recovery disks so you can unlock your computer in an emergency. And, of course, have
effective, up-to-date security software.
Think Before You Click.
That unsolicited email from a known acquaintance, such as
your mother or coworker, may not be legit. Their account
may have been compromised, if they’ve fallen for a social
engineering trick.Antivirus on Endpoints Is Not Enough.
On endpoints (desktops/laptops), signature-based antivirus alone is not enough to protect against today’s threats and
Web-based attack toolkits. Deploy and use a comprehensive
endpoint security product that includes additional layers of protection, including:
• Endpoint intrusion prevention that protects against
unpatched vulnerabilities from being exploited, protects against social engineering attacks, and stops malware
from ever making it onto endpoints;
• Browser protection for protection against obfuscated Web-
based attacks;
• Heuristic file-based malware prevention to provide more
intelligent protection against unknown threats;
• File and Web-based reputation solutions that provide a
risk-and-reputation rating of any application and website
to prevent rapidly mutating and polymorphic malware;
• Behavioral prevention capabilities that look at the
behavior of applications and malware and prevent
malware;
• Application control settings that can prevent applications
and browser plug-ins from downloading unauthorized malicious content;
• Device control settings that prevent and limit the types of
USB devices to be used.Recommendationsp. 53
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Internet Security Threat Report 2013 :: Volume 18
Looking ahead
More State-sponsored Cyber Attacks
The last few years have seen increasingly sophisticated and
widespread use of cyber attacks. In peacetime, they provide
plausible deniability; in wartime, they could be an essential
tool. Cyber attacks will continue to be an outlet where tensions between countries are played out. Moreover, in addition to
state-sponsored attacks, non-state sponsored attacks, including
attacks by nationalist activists against those whom they perceive to be acting against their country’s interest, will continue.
Security companies and businesses need to be prepared for
blowback and collateral damage from these attacks and, as ever, they need to make strenuous efforts to protect themselves
against targeted attacks of all kinds.
Sophisticated Attack Techniques Trickle Down
Know-how used for industrial espionage or cyberwarfare will be
reverse-engineered by criminal hackers for commercial gain. For
example, the zero-day exploits used by the Elderwood Gang will
be exploited by other malware authors. Similarly the “open-sourcing” of malware toolkits such as Zeus (also known as Zbot),
perhaps in an effort to throw law enforcement off the trail of the
original authors, will make it easier for authors to create new malware.
Websites Will Become More Dangerous
Drive-by infections from websites will become even more common and even harder to block without advanced security
software. Criminals will increasingly attack websites, using
malvertising and website attack kits, as a means of infecting users. Software vendors will come under pressure to increase
their efforts in fixing vulnerabilities promptly. Users and
companies that employ them will need to be more proactive about maintaining their privacy and security in this new social
media world.Social Media Will Be a Major Security Battleground
Social media websites already combine elements of an
operating system, a communications platform, and an
advertising network. As they go mobile and add payment
mechanisms, they will attract even more attention from online criminals with malware, phishing, spam, and scams. Traditional
spam, phishing, and malware will hold steady or decline
somewhat; however, social media attacks will grow enormously. As new social media tools emerge and become popular, criminals
will target them. Further, we think that the intersection of
smartphones and social media will become an important security battleground as criminals target teenagers, young
adults, and other people who may be less guarded about their
personal data and insufficiently security-minded to protect their devices and avoid scams.
Attacks Against Cloud Providers Will Increase
So far, the very big data breaches have occurred in businesses that collect a lot of personal data, such as healthcare providers,
online retailers or games companies. In 2013 we expect to see a
variety of attacks against cloud software providers.
Increasingly Vicious Malware
Malware has advanced from being predominantly about data theft and botnets (although both are still very common) through
fake antivirus scams to increased ransomware attacks in 2012.
We expect to see these attacks become harder to undo, more aggressive, and more professional over time. Once criminals
see that they can get a high conversion rate from this kind of
extortion, we may see other manifestations, such as malware that threatens to and then actually deletes the contents of
your hard disk. This was the case of the Shamoon attacks that
occurred in August and erased data from the infected computer. Essentially, if it is possible, someone will try it; if it is profitable,
many people will do it.“Never make predictions,” said a wise man, “especially about the future.” But we can
extrapolate from this year’s data to speculate on future trends in the hope that this will help
organizations and individuals protect themselves more effectively. Looking ahead, here are
our priorities and concerns for the coming year:p. 55
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Internet Security Threat Report 2013 :: Volume 18
Mobile Malware Comes of Age
Just as social media is becoming the new “operating system” for
computers, mobile phones and tablets are becoming the new
hardware platform. Tablet adoption and smartphone market
penetration will continue and this will attract criminals. What has evolved over a decade on PCs is emerging more rapidly on
smartphones and tablets. We’ll see ransomware and drive-by
website infections on these new platforms in the coming year. For businesses that use these new devices or allow employees
to bring their own to work, this will present a serious security
problem in 2013.Persistent Phishing
Identities are valuable, so criminals will continue to try to steal them. Phishing attacks will continue to get smarter and more
sophisticated. For example, we’ll see more perfect site replicas
and SSL-encryption phishing sites. Phishing will become more regional and it will appear in a wider variety of languages,
making it harder to block and more effective. It will continue
its spread on social media websites where it will exploit the medium’s virality and trusted messaging.p. 56
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Internet Security Threat Report 2013 :: Volume 18
Endnotes
01 See http://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/03/mastercard-visa-warn-of-processor-breach/.
02 See http://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf .
03 Aviation Week & Space Technology, October 22, 2012, 82.
04 See http://www.ic3.gov/media/2012/FraudAlertFinancialInstitutionEmployeeCredentialsTargeted.pdf .
05 The data for the data breaches that could lead to identity theft is procured from the Norton Cybercrime Index (CCI). The Norton CCI
is a statistical model that measures the levels of threats including malicious software, fraud, identity theft, spam, phishing, and social engineering daily. Data for the CCI is primarily derived from Symantec Global Intelligence Network and for certain data from ID Analytics. The majority of the Norton CCI’s data comes from Symantec’s Global Intelligence Network, one of the industry’s most comprehensive sources of intelligence about online threats. The data breach section of the Norton CCI is derived from data breaches that have been reported by legitimate media sources and have exposed personal information, including name, address, Social
Security numbers, credit card numbers, or medical history. Using publicly available data the Norton CCI determines the sectors that
were most often affected by data breaches, as well as the most common causes of data loss.
06 See http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/about/media/pdfs/b-ponemon-2011-cost-of-data-breach-global.en-us.pdf .
07 See http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/shamoon-attacks.
08 Internet Security Threat Report, April 2012, “Targeted Attacks,” 16.
09 See http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf .
10 See http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/cve-2012-1875-exploited-wild-part-1-trojannaid .
11 See http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf .
12 See http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/cost-cybercrime-2012.
13 See http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/lizamoon-mass-sql-injection-tried-and-tested-formula.
14 See http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/danger-malware-ahead-please-not-my-site.
15 See http://www.securityweek.com/comodo-certificates-used-sign-banking-trojans-brazil.
16 See http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/social/2012/.
17 See http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/instaspam-instagram-users-receive-gift-card-spam.
18 See http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=2237315.
19 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/FinFisher and http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/31/technology/finspy-software-is-tracking-
political-dissidents.html?_r=1.
20 See http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/androidbmaster-million-dollar-mobile-botnet .
21 See http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/androidbmaster-million-dollar-mobile-botnet .
22 See http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-57470729-83/malware-went-undiscovered-for-weeks-on-google-play .
23 See http://developer.android.com/about/dashboards/index.html.
24 See http://www.gartner.com/it/page.jsp?id=2163616.
25 See http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/06/dropbox/.
26 For more advice about cloud adoption, see https://www4.symantec.com/mktginfo/.
27 In the United States, for example, the NTSB reports that 472 people died in aircraft accidents in 2010 compared with 32,885 in
highway accidents. See http://www.ntsb.gov/data/index.html.
28 See http://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20120905_02.
29 See http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2013/01/15/169424047/episode-430-black-market-pharmacies-and-the-spam-empire-behind-
them.
30 See http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-041001-0020-99.
31 See http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/flashback-cleanup-still-underway-approximately-140000-infections.
32 See http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/both-mac-and-windows-are-targeted-once.
33 See http://krebsonsecurity.com/tag/planet-money/.p. 57
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2013 :: Volume 18
about Symantec
More Information
• Symantec.cloud Global Threats: http://www.symanteccloud.com/en/gb/globalthreats/.
• Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/.
• Internet Security Threat Report Resource Page: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/.
• Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer/.
• Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex/.Symantec protects the world’s information and is a global leader in security, backup, and
availability solutions. Our innovative products and services protect people and information
in any environment—from the smallest mobile device to the enterprise data center to cloud-
based systems. Our world-renowned expertise in protecting data, identities, and interactions
gives our customers confidence in a connected world. More information is available at
www.symantec.com or by connecting with Symantec at go.symantec.com/socialmedia.
|
2013 T rends, Volume 19, Published April 2014
INTERNET SECURITY THREAT REPORT 2014p. 2
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
CONTENTS
4 Introduction
5 Executive Summary
8 2013 SECURITY TIMELINE
9 2013 Security Timeline
11 2013 IN NUMBERS
12 Breaches
14 Spam
15 Bots, Email
16 Mobile
17 Web
18 Targeted Attacks – Spear Phishing
22 Targeted Attacks – Web-Based
24 TARGETED ATTACKS
+ DATA BREACHES
25 Targeted Attacks
26 Average Number of Spear-Phishing
Attacks Per Day, 2011 – 2013
27 Email Campaigns, 2011 – 2013
28 Targeted Attack Key Stages
29 Top-Ten Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
30 Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization, 2011 – 2013
31 Risk of Job Role Impact by Targeted Attack Sent by Spear-Phishing Email32 Ratio of Organizations in an Industry Impacted by Targeted Attack Sent by Spear-Phishing Email
33 Ratio of Organizations Targeted by Industry Size Sent by Spear-Phishing Email
33 Analysis of Spear-Phishing Emails Used in Targeted Attacks
34 Zero-day Vulnerabilities, Annual Total, 2006 – 2013
35 Top-Five Zero-day Vulnerabilities
38 Point of Sale Breach Stages
39 Data Breaches
39 Top Causes of Data Breach
40 Timeline of Data Breaches
44 E-CRIME
+ MALWARE DELIVERY TACTICS
45 E-crime and Cyber Security
46 Malicious Activity by Source: Bots, 2012–2013
47 Top-Ten Botnets
48 Ransomware Over Time
51 Top-Ten Malware
53 Threat Delivery Tactics
54 Timeline of Web Attack Toolkit Use, Top-Five
54 Top Web Attack Toolkits by Percent
55 Web Attacks Blocked Per Day
56 Most Frequently Exploited Websites
58 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
58 Total Number of Vulnerabilities, 2006 – 2013
60 Plug-in Vulnerabilities Over Time
60 Browser Vulnerabilities, 2011 – 2013p. 3
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Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
61 Proportion of Email Traffic
Containing URL Malware, 2013 vs 2012
61 Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was Detected, 2013 vs 2012
62 Top-Ten Mac OSX Malware Blocked on OSX Endpoints
63 SOCIAL MEDIA
+ MOBILE THREATS
64 Social Media
65 Social Media
69 Mobile
70 Number of Android Variants Per Family, 2013 vs 2012
70 Mobile Malware Families by Month, Android, 2013 vs 2012
72 Mobile Threat Classifications
74 Mobile Vulnerabilities by Percent
75 Top-Five Types of Madware Functionality Percentage of Ad Libraries
77 PHISHING + SPAM
78 Spam and Phishing
78 Phishing Rate, 2013 vs 2012
79 Number of Phishing URLs on Social Media
81 Global Spam Volume Per Day
81 Global Spam Rate, 2013 vs 201283 LOOKING AHEAD
84 Looking Ahead
86 RECOMMENDATIONS
+ BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES
87 Best Practice Guidelines for Businesses
89 Best Practice Guidelines for Consumers
90 SANS Critical Security Controls
94 Footnotes
96 Contributors
97 About Symantec
97 More Informationp. 4
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
Introduction
Symantec has established the most
comprehensive source of Internet threat
data in the world through the Symantec™
Global Intelligence Network, which is made
up of more than 41.5 million attack sensors
and records thousands of events per second. This network monitors threat activity in
over 157 countries and territories through
a combination of Symantec products and
services such as Symantec DeepSight™
Threat Management System, Symantec™ Managed Security Services, Norton™
consumer products, and other third-party
data sources.In addition, Symantec maintains one of the world’s most
comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting of
more than 60,000 recorded vulnerabilities (spanning more than
two decades) from over 19,000 vendors representing over 54,000 products.
Spam, phishing, and malware data is captured through a variety
of sources including the Symantec Probe Network, a system of more than 5 million decoy accounts, Symantec.cloud, and
a number of other Symantec security technologies. Skeptic™,
the Symantec.cloud proprietary heuristic technology, is able to detect new and sophisticated targeted threats before they
reach customers’ networks. Over 8.4 billion email messages
are processed each month and more than 1.7 billion web requests filtered each day across 14 data centers. Symantec also
gathers phishing information through an extensive anti-fraud
community of enterprises, security vendors, and more than 50 million consumers.
Symantec Trust Services provides 100 percent availability and
processes over 6 billion Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) look-ups per day, which are used for obtaining the revocation
status of X.509 digital certificates around the world. These
resources give Symantec analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze, and provide informed commen-
tary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity,
phishing, and spam. The result is the annual Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, which gives enterprises, small business-
es, and consumers essential information to secure their systems
effectively now and into the future.p. 5
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Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
Executive Summary
In 2013 much attention was focused on cyber-espionage, threats to privacy and the acts of
malicious insiders. However the end of 2013 provided a painful reminder that cybercrime
remains prevalent and that damaging threats from cybercriminals continue to loom over
businesses and consumers. Eight breaches in 2013 each exposed greater than 10 million
identities, targeted attacks increased and end-user attitudes towards social media and
mobile devices resulted in wild scams and laid a foundation for major problems for end-users and businesses as these devices come to dominate our lives.
This year’s ISTR once again covers the wide-ranging threat landscape, with data collected
and analyzed by Symantec’s security experts. In this summary, we call out seven areas that
deserve special attention.
The most important trends in 2013 were:
2013 Was The Year of Mega Breach
Our Internet Security Threat Report 17 reported 2011 as the
Year of the Data Breach. The year was extraordinary because in
addition to increased cybercrime-driven breaches, Anonymous
in acts of hactivism breached dozens of companies. With Anonymous less active, breach numbers returned to more
predictable growth in 2012. And then came 2013. If 2011 was
the year of the breach, then 2013 can best be described as the Year of the Mega Breach.
The total number of breaches in 2013 was 62 percent greater
than in 2012 with 253 total breaches. It was also larger than the 208 breaches in 2011. But even a 62 percent increase does
not truly reflect the scale of the breaches in 2013. Eight of the
breaches in 2013 exposed more than 10 million identities each. In 2012 only one breach exposed over 10 million identities. In
2011, only five were of that size.
2011 saw 232 million identities exposed, half of the number
exposed in 2013. In total over 552 million identities were
breached in 2013, putting consumer’s credit card information,
birth dates, government ID numbers, home addresses, medical records, phone numbers, financial information, email addresses,
login, passwords, and other personal information into the
criminal underground. Targeted Attacks Grow and Evolve
While targeted attacks continue to rise, Symantec observed an interesting evolution in these attacks. As first reported in last
year’s Internet Security Threat Report, attackers added water -
ing-hole attacks to their arsenal. But reports of the death of
spear phishing are greatly exaggerated. While the total number
of emails used per campaign has decreased and the number of
those targeted has also decreased, the number of spear-phishing campaigns themselves saw a dramatic 91 percent rise in 2013.
This “low and slow” approach (campaigns also run three times
longer than those in 2012) are a sign that user awareness and protection technologies have driven spear phishers to tighten
their targeting and sharpen their social engineering. We have
also observed the addition of real world social engineering, combining virtual and real world attacks, being employed to
increase the odds of success.
This year’s Internet Security Threat Report also introduces
a new calculation. Using epidemiology concepts commonly
applied to public health issues, we have estimated the risk
industries and users face of being targeted for attack. It sends a warning to some industries that may view the volume of attacks
against them as no cause for concern. For instance, while the
most targeted attacks in 2013 were against Governments and the Services industry, the industries at most risk of attack were
Mining, Governments and then Manufacturing. Their odds of
being attacked are 1 in 2.7, 1 in 3.1 and 1 in 3.2 respectively.p. 6
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
Executive Summary
Zero-day Vulnerabilities and Unpatched Websites
Facilitated Watering-Hole Attacks
More zero-day vulnerabilities were discovered in 2013 than any
other year Symantec has tracked. The 23 zero-day vulnerabili-
ties discovered represent a 61 percent increase over 2012 and
are more than the two previous years combined.
Zero-day vulnerabilities are coveted because they give attackers
the means to silently infect their victim without depending
on social engineering. And by applying these exploits in a
watering-hole attack they avoid the possibility of anti-phishing technology stopping them. Unfortunately legitimate web
sites with poor patch management practices have facilitated
the adoption of watering hole attacks. 77 percent of legiti-mate websites had exploitable vulnerabilities and 1-in-8 of all
websites had a critical vulnerability. This gives attackers plenty
of choices in websites to place their malware and entrap their victims.
Typically cutting-edge attackers stop using a vulnerability once
it is made public. But this does not bring an end to their use. Common cybercriminals rapidly incorporate zero-day vulner -
abilities to threaten all of us. Even though the top five zero-day vulnerabilities were patched on average within four days, Symantec detected a total of 174,651 attacks within 30 days of
these top five becoming known.
Ransomware attacks grew by 500 percent
in 2013 and turned vicious
Scammers continued to leverage profitable ransomware scams
– where the attacker pretends to be local law enforcement,
demanding a fake fine of between $100 to $500. First appearing
in 2012 these threats escalated in 2013, and grew by 500 percent over the course of the year.
These attacks are highly profitable and attackers have adapted
them to ensure they remain profitable. The next step in this evolution was Ransomcrypt, commonly known as Cryptolocker.
This is the most prominent of these threats and turns ransom-
ware vicious by dropping all pretence of being law enforcement and is designed to encrypt a user’s files and request a ransom
for the files to be unencrypted. This threat causes even more
damage to businesses where not only the victims’ files are encrypted but also files on shared or attached network drives. Holding encrypted files for ransom is not entirely new, but
getting the ransom paid has previously proven problematic for
the crooks. With the appearance of online payment methods ransomcrypt is poised for growth in 2014. Small businesses and
consumers are most at risk from losing data, files or memories.
Prevention and backup are critical to protecting users from this type of attack.
Social Media Scams and Malware
Flourish on Mobile
While the prevalence of mobile malware is still comparatively
low, 2013 showed that the environment for an explosive growth
of scams and malware attacks is here. Our Norton Report, a
global survey of end-users, showed that 38 percent of mobile users had already experienced mobile cybercrime. Lost or stolen
devices remain the biggest risk, but mobile users are behaving in
ways that leave themselves open to other problems.
Mobile users are storing sensitive files online (52 percent),
store work and personal information in the same online storage
accounts (24 percent) and sharing logins and passwords with families (21 percent) and friends (18 percent), putting their data
and their employers’ data at risk.
Yet only 50 percent of these users take even basic security
precautions.
The number of brand new malware families created slowed as
malware authors worked to perfect existing malware. In 2012 each mobile malware family had an average of 38 variants.
In 2013 each family had 58. However several events in 2013
showed that mobile users are highly susceptible to scams via mobile apps. It might be said that mobile malware has not yet
exploded because the bad guys have not needed it to get what
they want. p. 7
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
Executive Summary
Prevalence of Scams Fail to Change
User Behaviour on Social Media
Surrounded by their friends, users continue to fall for scams on
social media sites. Fake offers such as free cell phone minutes
accounted for the largest number of attacks of Facebook users
in 2013 – 81 percent in 2013 compared to 56 percent in 2012. And while twelve percent of social media users say someone has hacked into their social network account and pretended to be
them, a quarter continue to shared their social media passwords
with others and a third connect with people they don’t know.
As social media becomes more and more of an activity done on
mobile devices these bad behaviours are likely to have worse
consequences.Attackers are turning to the Internet of Things
Baby monitors, as well as security cameras and routers, were famously hacked in 2013. Furthermore, security researchers
demonstrated attacks against smart televisions, automobiles
and medical equipment. This gives us a preview of the security challenge presented by the rapid adoption of the Internet of
Things (IoT).
The benefit to attackers of compromising these devices may
not yet be clear, and some suspect claims about hacked devices
(refrigerators for instance) are to be expected. But the risk is
real. IoT devices will become access points for targeted attackers and become bots for cybercriminals.
Of immediate concern are attacks against consumer routers.
Computer worms like Linux.Darlloz are making a comeback as attackers target devices without users to social engineer,
but with unpatched vulnerabilities they can remotely exploit.
Control of these devices can prove profitable for attackers, using DNS redirection to push victims to fake websites, usually to steal
financial details.
Today the burden of preventing attacks against IoT devices falls
on the user; however this is not a viable long-term strategy.
Manufacturers are not prioritizing security – they need to
make the right security investments now. The risk gets even higher with the proliferation of data being generated from these
devices. Big data is big money and unless the right security steps
are taken it’s all available for an enterprising cybercriminal.p. 8
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
2013 SECURITY TIMELINE
2013 SECURITY TIMELINEp. 9
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
2013 Security Timeline
01 January
• Elderwood Project found using new
Internet Explorer Zero-Day Vulner -
ability (CVE-2012-4792)
• Java Zero-Day found in Cool Exploit
Kit (CVE-2013-0422)
• Android.Exprespam potentially
infects thousands of devices
• Backdoor.Barkiofork used to target
Aerospace and Defense industries
02 February
• Bamital botnet taken down
• Adobe zero-day used in “LadyBoyle”
attack (CVE-2013-0634)
• Cross-platform toolkit for creating
the remote access tool (RAT)
“Frutas” discovered
• Fake Adobe Flash update discovered
installing ransomware and perform-ing click fraud
• Bit9 suffers security breach, code-
signing SSL certificates stolen
03 March
• Android Malware spams victims’
contacts
• “Facebook Black” scam spreads on
Facebook
• Blackhole Exploit Kit takes
advantage of financial crisis in Cyprus
• Several South Korean banks and
local broadcasting organizations impacted by cyber attack.04 April
• #OpIsrael hacktivism campaign
targets Israeli websites
• NPR, Associated Press, and various
Twitter accounts hacked by Syrian Electronic Army (SEA)
• Distributed Denial of Service attacks
hit Reddit and European banks
• WordPress plugin vulnerability
discovered, allowing PHP injection
• LivingSocial resets passwords for 50
million accounts after data breach
05 May
• A US Department of Labor website
becomes victim of a watering-hole attack
• Cybercriminals steal more than $1
million from a Washington state hospital
• SEA hacks twitter accounts of The
Onion, E! Online, The Financial Times, and Sky
• New Internet Explorer 8 Zero-Day
Vulnerability used in watering-hole attack (CVE-2012-4792)
• #OpUSA hacktivism campaign
launches against US websites
• Seven men were arrested in New
York in connection with their role in international cyber attacks which resulted in theft of $45 million
across 26 different countries. 06 June
• Microsoft and FBI disrupt Citadel
botnets
• A surveillance scandal emerges
in the United States, as a former
Government security contractor releases classified documents
• Zero-day vulnerability found in most
browsers across PC, Mac, mobile, and game consoles
• Anonymous launches #OpPetrol
attack on international oil and gas companies
• 65 websites compromised to host
malicious ads with ZeroAccess Trojan
• FakeAV discovered on Android
phones
07 July
• Ubisoft hacked: user account infor -
mation stolen
• France caught up in PRISM scandal
as data snooping allegations emerge
• New exploit kit targets flaws in
Internet Explorer, Java, and Adobe
Reader
• FBI-style ransomware discovered
targeting OSX computers
• Android Master Key vulnerability
used in the wild
• Viber and Thomson Reuters latest
victims of SEA attacksp. 10
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
2013 SECURITY TIMELINE
2013 Security Timeline
08 August
• Channel 4 blog, New York Post,
SocialFlow, Washington Post, New
York Times, impacted by SEA attacks
• DNS hijack caused thousands of sites
to redirect users to exploit kit
• Two new ransomware scams found:
One that changes Windows login credentials on Chinese systems, another that takes advantage of the
NSA PRISM controversy
• Fake ‘Instagram for PC’ leads to
survey scam
• Attackers targeted banks’ wire
payment switch to steal millions
• Francophoned social engineer -
ing ushers in a new era of targeted
attacks
09 September
• Syrian Electronic Army compro -
mises US Marine Corps’ website, Fox Twitter accounts, supposedly using
Mac Trojan
• ATMs discovered that dispense cash
to criminals
• Ransomware called “Cryptolocker”
surfaces that encrypts victims’ files
and demands payment to decrypt
them
• Symantec lifts lid on professional
hackers-for-hire group Hidden Lynx
• Belgian telecom compromised in
alleged cyber espionage campaign
• Symantec Security Response
sinkholes ZeroAccess botnet 10 October
• The Silk Road marketplace taken
offline, resurfaces by end of month
• SEA attacks GlobalPost and Qatar
websites, US Presidential staff
emails
• Adobe confirms security breach, 150
million identities exposed
• Blackhole and Cool Exploit Kit
author arrested
• WhatsApp, AVG, Avira defaced by
hacker group KDMS
• New ransomware demands Bitcoins
for decryption key
11 November
• Second Android master key vulner -
ability discovered
• Microsoft zero-day vulnerability
being used in targeted attacks and
e-crime scams (CVE-2013-3906)
• SEA hacks VICE.com in retaliation
for article that supposedly names members
• Anonymous claims to have hacked
UK Parliament Wi-Fi during London protest
• Linux worm that targets “Internet of
Things” discovered
• Target confirms data breach leading
to the exposure of 110 million
identities.12 December
• Data of 20 million Chinese hotel
guests leaked
• Cross-site scripting vulnerability
found in wind turbine control appli-cation
• Imitation versions of Cryptolocker
discovered, attempt to capitalize on original’s success
• 105 million South Korean accounts
exposed in credit card security breachp. 11
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
2013 IN NUMBERS
2013 IN NUMBERSp. 12
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
2013 IN NUMBERS
Breaches With More Than 10 Million
Identities Exposed
Top-Ten Types of Information Breached 1
2012 8
2013+700%
01 Real Names
02 Birth Dates
03 Government ID Numbers (Social Security)
04 Home Address
05 Medical Records
06 Phone Numbers
07 Financial Information
08 Email Addresses
09 User Names & Passwords
10 InsuranceBreaches
• Mega Breaches were
data breach incidents
that resulted in the
personal details of at least 10 million
identities being exposed
in an individual incident. There were eight in
2013, compared with
only one in 2012.p. 13
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
2013 IN NUMBERS
Total
Breaches Total IdentitiesExposed
+62% +493%
Average Identities Exposed / Breach
Median Identities Exposed / Breach
-19%+261%
20122013 6,777
8,350
20122013 2,181,891
604,826 156
2012 253
2013 552 Million
2013
93Million
2012• Hacking continued to
be the primary cause
of data breaches in
2013. Hacking can undermine institutional
confidence in a
company, exposing its attitude to security and
the loss of personal data
in a highly public way can result in damage
to an organization’s
reputation. Hacking accounted for 34
percent of data breaches
in 2013.
• In 2013, there were
eight data breaches
that netted hackers 10 million or more
identities, the largest
of which was a massive breach of 150 million
identities. In contrast,
2012 saw only one breach larger than 10
million identities.
• Although overall average
size of a breach has
increased, the median
number of identities stolen has actually fallen
from 8,350 in 2012 to
6,777 in 2013. Using the median can be
helpful in this scenario
since it ignores the extreme values caused
by the notable, but rare
events that resulted in the largest numbers of
identities being exposed.Breachesp. 14
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
2013 IN NUMBERS
-3%
ptsOverall Email Spam Rate
-3%
pts
+15%
pts
66%
2012 2013
Pharmaceutical Email Spam
Adult / Sex / Dating Email Spam
70%69%
2012
18%
201321%
55%
2012 2013
-3%
20122013 29Billion
30Billion Estimated Global Email Spam Volume / Day• Approximately 76
percent of spam email
was distributed by
spam-sending botnets, compared with 79
percent in 2012.
Ongoing actions to disrupt a number of
botnet activities during
the year have helped to contribute to this
gradual decline.
• In 2013, 87 percent
of spam messages
contained at least
one URL hyperlink, compared with 86
percent in 2011, an
increase of 1 percentage point.
• Adult Spam dominated in 2013, with 70 percent of spam related to adult
content. These are often
email messages inviting the recipient to connect
to the scammer through
instant messaging, or a URL hyperlink where
they are then typically
invited to a pay-per-view adult-content web
cam site. Often a bot
responder, or a person working in a low-pay,
offshore call center
would handle any IM conversation.Spamp. 15
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
2013 IN NUMBERS
Number of Bots
20122013 2.3Million
3.4 Million -33%
2012
25%23%
2013Email Malware as URL
+2%
pts
Email Virus Rate Smaller Number = Greater Risk
Email Phishing Rate Smaller Number = Greater Risk
2013 1 IN 392
2012 1 IN 414
2012 1 IN 291
2013 1 IN 196
Bots, Email
• Bot-infected computers,
or bots, are counted if
they are active at least
once during the period. Of the bot-infected
computer activities
that Symantec tracks, they may be classified
as actively-attacking
bots or bots that send out spam, i.e. spam
zombies. During 2013,
Symantec struck a major blow against the
ZeroAccess botnet. With
1.9 million computers under its control, it is
one of the larger botnets
in operation at present. ZeroAccess has been
largely used to engage in
click fraud to generate profits for its controllers.
• In 2013, more email-borne malware comprised hyperlinks
that referenced
malicious code, an indication that
cybercriminals
are attempting to circumvent security
countermeasures by
changing the vector of attacks from purely
email to the web.
• 71 percent of phishing
attacks were related
to spoofed financial
organizations, compared with 67 percent in
2012. Phishing attacks
on organizations in the Information Services
sector accounted for
22 percent of phishing attacks in 2013p. 16
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
2013 IN NUMBERS
Android Mobile
Malware FamiliesAverage Number ofVariants Per Family
-45%
-14%+50%
103
2012 57
201357
2013
38
2012
20122013 3,262
3,783 Total Android Mobile Malware Variants
-69%
20122013 127
416 Mobile VulnerabilitiesMobile
• Currently most
malicious code for
mobile devices consists
of Trojans that pose as legitimate applications.
These applications are
uploaded to mobile application (“app”)
marketplaces in the
hope that users will download and install
them, often trying to
pass themselves off as legitimate apps or
games.
• Attackers have also
taken popular legitimate
applications and added
additional code to them. Symantec has
classified the types of
threats into a variety of categories based on
their functionality
• Symantec tracks the
number of threats
discovered against
mobile platforms by tracking malicious
threats identified by
Symantec’s own security products and confirmed
vulnerabilities
documented by mobile vendors.p. 17
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
2013 IN NUMBERS
New Unique Malicious Web Domains
201120122013 74,001
55,000 56,158
-24%
Web Attacks Blocked Per Day
201120122013 464,100
190,000 568,700
+23%
Web
• Approximately 67
percent of websites used
to distribute malware
were identified as legitimate, compromised
websites.
• 10 percent of malicious
website activity was
classified in the
Technology category, 7 percent were classified
in the Business category
and 5 percent were classified as Hosting.
• 73 percent of browser-based attacks were found on Anonymizer
proxy websites,
similarly, 67 percent of attacks found on
Blogging websites
involved browser-based exploits.p. 18
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
2013 IN NUMBERS
Targeted Attacks – Spear Phishing
• Targeted attacks aimed
at Small Businesses
(1-250) accounted for
30 percent of targeted spear-phishing attacks.
1 in 5 small business
organizations was targeted with at least
one spear-phishing
email in 2013.
• 39 percent of targeted
spear-phishing attacks
were sent to Large Enterprises comprising
over 2,500+ employees.
1 in 2 of which were targeted with at least
one such attack.
• The frontline in these
attacks is moving along
the supply chain and
large enterprises may be targeted though web-
based watering-hole
attacks should email-based spear-phishing
attacks fail to yield the
desired results.
Spear-Phishing Attacks
by Business Size
Risk of BeingTargeted
31%19%50%
2012Small
Business
(SMB)
1 to 250Medium
Business
251 to 2,500 Large
Enterprises
2,501+
Employees
TARGETED ATTACKS
SPEAR PHISHING
1 IN 2.3
1 IN 5.2
30%31%39%
2013p. 19
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
2013 IN NUMBERS
Targeted Attacks – Spear Phishing
Top Industries Attacked by Spear Phishing
Services – Non-TraditionalServices – ProfessionalPublic Administration (Government)
16%
15%
14%
Industries at Greatest Risk
of Being Targeted by Spear Phishing
Mining 1 IN 2.7
Public Administration (Gov.) 1 IN 3.1
Manufacturing 1 IN 3.2• Approximately 1 in
3 organizations in
the Mining, Public
Administration and Manufacturing sectors
were subjected to at
least one targeted spear-phishing attack in 2013.
• The Government and Public Sector (aka. Public Administration)
accounted for 16
percent of all targeted spear-phishing email
attacks blocked in 2013,
compared with 12 percent in 2012.p. 20
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
2013 IN NUMBERS
3x longer
than 2012 Average Time of Campaign Days 8-79%23 Recipients Per Campaign+91%779 Campaigns in 2013
-76%29 Attacks Per CampaignSpear-Phishing Email Campaigns
Spear-Phishing Emails Per Day
116
201283
2013-28%• Attackers may target
both the personal and
professional email
accounts of individuals concerned; a target’s
work-related account
is likely to be targeted more often and is known
as spear phishing.
• Over the past decade,
an increasing number
of users have been
targeted with spear-phishing attacks and
the social engineering
has grown more sophisticated over time.
• In 2013 the volume and intensity of these attacks had
changed considerably
from the previous year, prolonging the
duration over which
a campaign may last, rather than intensifying
the attacks in one or
two days as had been the case previously.
Consequently, the
number of attacks seen each day has fallen and
other characteristics of
these attacks suggest this may help to avoid
drawing attention to an
attack campaign that may be underway.Targeted Attacks – Spear Phishingp. 21
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
2013 IN NUMBERS
Spear-Phishing Email Cloud
Most commonly used words in spear-phishing attacksTargeted Attacks – Spear Phishing
• This word cloud shows the most frequently occurring words
that have been used in targeted spear-phishing email attacks throughout 2013. The larger the size of the font, the more
frequently that word was used.p. 22
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
2013 IN NUMBERS
Scanned Websites With Vulnerabilities ...
... % of Which Were Critical
+28%
20122013 6,787
5,291 New Vulnerabilities
TARGETED ATTACKS
WEB-BASED
SSL and TLS protocol renogotiation
vulnerabilities were most commonly exploited+25%
pts
53%
2012
-8%
pts
24%
2012
77%
2013
16%
20131 IN 8 sites
had critical
unpatched vulnerabilities• Attackers generally
have to find and exploit
a vulnerability in a
legitimate website in order to gain control and
plant their malicious
payload within the site. Compromising
a legitimate website
may seem to be a challenge for many,
but vulnerability scans
of public websites carried out in 2013
by Symantec’s
Website Vulnerability Assessment Services
found that 77 percent
of sites contained vulnerabilities.
• Of this, 16 percent were classified as critical vulnerabilities that
could allow attackers
to access sensitive data, alter the website’s
content, or compromise
visitors’ computers. This means that when
an attacker looks for a
site to compromise, one in eight sites makes it
relatively easy to gain
access.
• The most commonly
exploited vulnerabilities
related to SSL and TLS protocol renegotiation.Targeted Attacks – Web-Basedp. 23
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
2013 IN NUMBERS
Websites Found With Malware
Zero-day Vulnerabilities1 IN 532
20121 IN 566
2013
+64% 14
201223
2013
NUMBER OF DAYS AFTER VULNERABILITY PUBLICATIONNUMBER OF ATTACKS DETECTED THOUSANDS
246810121416
0 90Oracle Java SE CVE-2013-1493 54%
Oracle Java Runtime Environment CVE-2013-2423 27%
Oracle Java Runtime Environment CVE-2013-0422 16%
Microsoft Internet Explorer CVE-2013-1347 1%
Microsoft Internet Explorer CVE-2013-3893 <1%Top-5 zero-day vulnerabilities
4 days
Average time
to patch19 days
Total time of exposure for top 5 zero-days23 software vulnerabilities were zero-day,
5 of which were for Java
97% of attacks using exploits for vulnerabilities
identified as zero-day were Java-basedTargeted Attacks – Web-Based
• Malware was found
on 1 in 566 websites
scanned by Symantec’s
Website Vulnerability Assessment Service in
combination with the
daily malware scanning service.
• 97 percent of attacks using exploits for vulnerabilities initially
identified as zero-days
were Java-based. The total time between a
zero-day vulnerability
being published and the required patch
being published was
19 days for the top-five most-exploited zero-
day vulnerabilities. The
average time between publication and patch
was 4 days.
• Zero-day vulnerabilities
are frequently used
in watering-hole
web-based targeted attacks. Attackers can
quickly switch to using
a new exploit for an unpublished zero-day
vulnerability once an
attack is discovered and the vulnerability
published.p. 24
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
TARGETED ATTACKS + DATA BREACHES
TARGETED ATTACKS
+ DATA BREACHESp. 25
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
TARGETED ATTACKS + DATA BREACHES
At a Glance
• Targeted attacks have
become more focused as attackers have streamlined their attack methods.
• The global average
number of spear-phishing
attacks per day in 2013 was 83.
• Zero-day vulnerabilities, often used in watering-hole attacks, reached their highest levels since Symantec began tracking them.
• Hackers were once again responsible for more
data breaches than any
other source. However, accidental exposure, as well as theft or loss, grew significantly in 2013.
• There were over 552 million identities exposed in data breaches during 2013.Targeted Attacks
The use of malware specifically to steal sensitive or confidential information from organizations
isn’t a new trend; it’s been around for at least the past decade. However the scale of these attacks
has always been relatively low in order to remain below the radar of security technology used to
safeguard against them. A targeted attack uses malware aimed at a specific user or group of users within a targeted organization and may be delivered through a spear-phishing email, or a form of
drive-by download known as a watering-hole attack. No matter how these attacks are delivered they
are designed to be low in volume, often with malicious components used exclusively in one attack. Their ultimate goal is to provide a backdoor for the attacker to breach the targeted organization.
In the past these targeted attacks have relied primarily on the spear-phishing element, an email-
based phishing attack is often aimed at an individual or small group of individuals, because they may have access to sensitive information through their role at a targeted organization. An
important detail with a spear-phishing email is that it often appears to come from someone the
recipient knows, a source they would trust, or contain subject matter the target would be interested in or is relevant to their role. The social engineering is always refined and well-researched, hence
the attack may be very difficult to recognize without the right technology in place to safeguard
against it.
However, targeted attacks no longer rely as heavily on spear-phishing attacks in order to penetrate
an organization’s defenses. More recently the attackers have expanded their tactics to include
watering-hole attacks, which are legitimate websites that have been compromised for the purpose of installing targeted malware onto the victim’s computer. These attacks rely almost exclusively
on client-side exploits for zero-day vulnerabilities that the attackers have in their arsenal. Once
the vulnerability the hackers are using has been published, they will often quickly switch to using another exploit in order to remain undetected.
Changes in 2013
It’s worth looking back at the last few years to see how previous attack trends compare to the ones in 2013. In 2012 we witnessed a 42 percent increase in the targeted-attack rate when compared to
the previous year. This was a measure of the average number of targeted-attack spear-phishing
emails blocked each day. In 2013 the attack rate appears to have dropped 28 percent, returning to similar levels seen in 2011.
What appears to have happened is that attacks have become more focused as the attackers
have solidified and streamlined their attack methods. Looking at email-based attack campaigns in particular,
01 the number of distinct campaigns identified by Symantec is up by 91 percent
compared to 2012, and almost six times higher compared to 2011. However, the average number of
attacks per campaign has dropped, down 76 percent when compared to 2012 and 62 percent from
2011. This indicates that while each attack campaign is smaller, there have been many more of them in 2013.
The number of recipients of spear-phishing emails during a campaign is also lower, at 23 recipients
per campaign, down from 111 in 2012 and 61 in 2011. In contrast, these campaigns are lasting
longer. The average duration of a campaign is 8.2 days, compared to 3 days in 2012 and 4 days in 2011. This could indicate that the attack campaigns are becoming more focused and persistent,
with a reduced number of attempts over a longer period of time in order to better hide the activity.An attack campaign is defined as a
series of emails that: A.) Show clear evidence that the subject and target has been deliberately selected. B.) Contain at least 3 or 4 strong correlations to other emails such as the topic, sender address, recipient domain, source IP address, etc. C.) Are sent on the same day or across multiple days.Their ultimate
goal is to provide a backdoor for the attacker to breach the targeted organization. p. 26
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
TARGETED ATTACKS + DATA BREACHES
• The global average daily
rate of targeted spear-
phishing attacks is 28
percent lower than in 2012, but two percent higher
than 2011. The figure for
2012 was unusually high, and attackers seem to
have adjusted their tactics
in 2013 in an attempt to reduce their footprint. The
average rates for 2013
returned to levels on par with previous years.
• The global average number of spear-phishing attacks per day in 2013 was 83,
compared with 116 in 2012
and 82 in 2011.
• The spear-phishing attack
rate reached a peak of 188
attacks per day in the month of August, compared with
the peak of 227 in June of
the previous year.
Average Number of Spear-Phishing
Attacks Per Day, 2011–2013
Source: Symantec
2012 2013 2011255075100125150175200225250
D N O S A J J M A M F JFig. 1
Spear Phishing
Spear-phishing attacks rely heavily on social engineering to improve their chances of success.
The emails in each case are specially tailored by the attackers to spark the interest of the indi-
vidual being targeted, with the hope that they will open them. For example, an attacker may send
someone working in the financial sector a spear-phishing email that appears to cover some new financial rules and regulations. If they were targeting someone working in human resources, they
might send spear-phishing emails that include malware-laden résumé attachments.
We’ve also seen some fairly aggressive spear-phishing attacks. In these cases the attacker sent an
email and then followed up with a phone call directly to the target, such as the “Francophoned”
attack from April 2013.
02 The attacker impersonated a high-ranking employee, and requested that
the target open an attachment immediately. This assertive method of attack has been reported more often in 2013 than in previous years.
Attackers will often use both the personal and professional accounts of the individual targeted,
although statistically the victim’s work-related account is more likely to be targeted.
Over the past decade, an increasing number of users have been targeted with spear-phishing
attacks, and the social engineering has grown more sophisticated over time. In analyzing the patterns and trends in these attacks it is important to look at the profile of the organizations
concerned, most notably to which industry sector they belong, and how large their workforce is.
The net total number of attacks blocked in 2013 is broken down by industry in figure 4 and organi-zation size in figure 5.http://www.symantec.com/connect/
blogs/francophoned-sophisticated-social-engineering-attackp. 27
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
TARGETED ATTACKS + DATA BREACHES
Spear Phishing
Spear-phishing attacks rely heavily on social engineering to improve their chances of success.
The emails in each case are specially tailored by the attackers to spark the interest of the indi-
vidual being targeted, with the hope that they will open them. For example, an attacker may send
someone working in the financial sector a spear-phishing email that appears to cover some new financial rules and regulations. If they were targeting someone working in human resources, they
might send spear-phishing emails that include malware-laden résumé attachments.
We’ve also seen some fairly aggressive spear-phishing attacks. In these cases the attacker sent an
email and then followed up with a phone call directly to the target, such as the “Francophoned”
attack from April 2013.
02 The attacker impersonated a high-ranking employee, and requested that
the target open an attachment immediately. This assertive method of attack has been reported more often in 2013 than in previous years.
Attackers will often use both the personal and professional accounts of the individual targeted,
although statistically the victim’s work-related account is more likely to be targeted.
Over the past decade, an increasing number of users have been targeted with spear-phishing
attacks, and the social engineering has grown more sophisticated over time. In analyzing the patterns and trends in these attacks it is important to look at the profile of the organizations
concerned, most notably to which industry sector they belong, and how large their workforce is.
The net total number of attacks blocked in 2013 is broken down by industry in figure 4 and organi-zation size in figure 5.http://www.symantec.com/connect/
blogs/francophoned-sophisticated-social-engineering-attack
2013
vs 20122013
vs 2011
2013 2012
2011
-81% -62% 23 111 61Recipients per
Campaign
8.2 3 4Average Durationof a Campaign (in days)+91% +472%
+173% +105%779 408 165 Campaigns
-76% -62% 29 122 78Average Number of Email AttacksPer CampagnEMAIL CAMPAIGNS
2011 – 2013
Source: SymantecFig. 2
• In 2013 the volume and intensity of spear phishing targeted email campaigns changed considerably
from the previous year, extending the duration over which a campaign may last, rather than
intensifying the attacks in one or two days as had been the case previously. Consequently, the number
of attacks seen each day has fallen and other characteristics of these attacks suggest this may help to avoid drawing attention to an attack campaign that may be underway.p. 28
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TARGETED ATTACK
KEY STAGES
Source: Symantec
01 INCURSION The attacker gains entry to the targeted organization. This is often preceded
by reconnaissance activities where the attacker is looking for a suitable social engineering tactic.
02 DISCOVERY Once the attacker has gained entry, they will seek to maintain that access
as well as discover what data and other valuable resources they may wish to access.
03 CAPTURE Once the valuable data has been discovered and identified, the
attacker will find a way to collect and gather that data before trying to exfiltrate it.
04 EXFILTRATION The attacker will find a mechanism to steal the
data from the targeted organization. This may be by uploading it to a remote
server or website the attackers have access to. More covert methods may involve encryption and steganography, to further obfuscate the exfiltration process, such as hiding data inside DNS request packets. Fig.3p. 29
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• Public Administration03
topped the industries
targeted in 2013,
comprising 16 percent of all attacks.
• Services, both professional and non-traditional,
04
came in second and third, respectively, in the overall
number of attacks.In previous years, this category was
labeled as Government.
The Professional category includes
Engineering, Accounting, Legal, and Heath-related services. The Non-Traditional category includes Business, Amusement, and Repair-related services.
Top-Ten Industries Targeted
in Spear-Phishing Attacks, 2013
Source: Symantec
ConstructionMiningRetailWholesaleTransportation, Gas,
Communications, ElectricFinance, Insurance
& Real EstateManufacturingServices – Non-TraditionalServices – ProfessionalPublic Administration (Gov.) 16%
15
14
13
13
6
5
2
1
1Fig. 4However just because an industry or organization of a particular size receives a large number of
attacks doesn’t necessarily mean that it was at an elevated risk, or that someone working in that
industry or organization had a high probability of being targeted. The probability was determined by looking at a group of people who have been targeted and comparing this number against a
control group for that industry or organization size. Furthermore, it was important to look not
only at the attacks themselves, but also to examine the email traffic of other customers in the same sectors and of the same organizational size. In this way, for the first time, Symantec was able to
report on the odds of any particular organization being targeted in such an attack, based on their
industry and size.
Politics and
Targeted Attacks
While correlation doesn’t
always equal causation,
it’s often quite interest-
ing never-the-less. This is especially true in the
amalgamous region of
targeted attacks, where it’s difficult to prove
motive. A good example
of this came this year after negotiations
concerning an energy
partnership between two nation states. Sadly the
negotiations broke down,
but what followed was a significant increase in
the number of targeted
attacks against the Energy sector.p. 30
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• Targeted attacks aimed at small businesses (1-250 employees)
in 2013 accounted for 30 percent of all such attacks, compared
with 31 percent in 2012 and 18 percent in 2011. Despite the
overall average being almost unchanged, the trend shows that the proportion of attacks at organizations of this size was increasing
throughout the year, peaking at 53 percent in November.
• If businesses with 1-250 and 251-500 employees are combined,
the proportion of attacks is 41 percent of all attacks, compared
with 36 percent in 2012.• Large enterprises comprising over 2,500+ employees accounted
for 39 percent of all targeted attacks, compared with 50 percent
in 2012 and 2011. The frontline in these attacks moved along
the supply chain department. Large enterprises were more likely to be targeted though watering-hole attacks than through spear
phishing.
Spear-Phishing Attacks by Size of Targeted Organization, 2011 – 2013
Source: Symantec
1 to 250251 to 500501 to 1,0001,001 to 1,5001,501 to 2,5002,501+
Employees
2013 2012 201150%39%
61%50%
18%31% 30%50% 50%100%
0
Fig. 5p. 31
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For example, in 2013, 1 in 54 Symantec.cloud customers were targeted with at least one spear-
phishing email. The seriousness of attempted spear-phishing attacks is even clearer, using the
same methodology, when comparing these numbers to the annual risk of an office fire.
The odds of a building catching fire are, at worst, around one in 161.05
These odds change depending on the industry, the size of the organization, and an individual’s
role within the organization. This risk can be calculated using epidemiology concepts commonly
applied to public health issues,06 in this case applying them to the industry and job role. Epide -
miology is frequently used in medicine to analyze how often diseases occur in different groups of
people and why. In this way, if targeted attacks are considered to be disease agents, it is possible
to determine which groups are more or less at risk based on exposure to the disease. In this case, Fires in workplace premises: risk data.
Holborn et. al.( 2002) Fire Safety Journal 37 303-327. The full range is from 1:161 and 1:588.
These are frequently referred to as case-control studies, which compare a group of subjects with a disease (cases) to a similar group without the disease (the controls). The resulting ratio shows the risk of contracting the disease. In the case of spear phishing, we simply substitute “afflicted with a disease” for “received at least one spear phishing email in 2013.”
Risk of Job Role Impact by Targeted Attack
Sent by Spear-Phishing Email
Source: Symantec
Risk
Personal Assistant (Executive Assistant)
MediaHigh
Senior Management Medium
Sales
C-Level
Recruitment
R&DLow
• Personal assistants, people working in the media, and senior
managers are currently most at risk of being targeted by a spear-
phishing campaign, based on observations in 2013.
• C-level executives, recruitment, and research and development
are less likely to be targeted in the near future solely because
of their job role.Fig. 6
Theft in the Middle
of the Night
On occasion, evidence of
a cybercrime comes from
an unexpected source.
One company in the financial sector noticed
an unusual early morning
money transfer on a particular day, and from
a particular computer.
The company decided to check the CCTV footage
and discovered that
there was no one sitting at the computer at the
time of the transac -
tion. A back door Trojan
was discovered during
the examination of the
computer. The threat was removed, but not before
the attackers behind
the attack made off with more than €60,000.p. 32
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we were not just focused on the organizations being targeted within a particular sector, but on
other organizations within the same industry which may not be targeted. In this way we were able
to more accurately determine the odds ratio for any one type of organization being targeted. It’s
similar to the way risk is calculated for diseases such as lung cancer, and calculating the probability of developing the disease from exposure to tobacco smoke.
Of course an organization’s risk will either rise or fall depending on their industry and number of
employees (figure 8). For the individual, another factor will be their job role, as shown in figure 6.
Ratio of Organizations in an Industry
Impacted by Targeted Attack
Sent by Spear-Phishing Email
Source: Symantec
1 IN Risk
Mining 2.7
Public Administration (Government) 3.1
Manufacturing 3.2High
Wholesale 3.4
Transportation, Communications,
Electric, Gas & Sanitary Services 3.9
Finance, Insurance & Real Estate 4.8Medium
Services — Non-Traditional 6.6
Construction 11.3
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishing 12.0Low• Mining, Manufacturing, and
Public Administration were
high-risk industries based on
observations made in 2013. For example, approximately
1 in 3 Symantec.cloud
customers in these sectors were subjected to one
or more targeted spear-
phishing attacks in 2013.
• Although only 0.9 percent
(1 in 110) of all spear-
phishing attacks were aimed at the Mining sector in
2013, one-third of Mining
organizations were targeted at least once. This indicates
a high likelihood of being
targeted, but the frequency and volume of attacks is
relatively low compared to
other sectors.
• Similarly Wholesale,
Transportation, and Finance
may be classified as medium-risk industries.
• Non-traditional services, Construction, and Agriculture fell below the
base line, which means
that the organizations in these industry sectors
were unlikely to have been
targeted solely for being in that sector.Fig. 7p. 33
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Ratio of Organizations Targeted by Industry Size
Sent by Spear-Phishing Email
Source: Symantec
1 IN Risk
2,500+ 2.3
1,501–2,500 2.9
1,001–1,500 2.9High
501–1,000 3.8
1–250 5.2Medium 251–500 4.3• The larger the company, the
greater risk of receiving a
spear-phishing email.
• One in 2.3 organizations
with 2500+ employees
were targeted in at least
one or more spear-phishing attacks, while 1 in 5 small
or medium businesses were
targeted in this way.Fig. 8
07 This represents the proportions of
organizations within the same sector that were subjected to one or more targeted attacks within the year.
Fig. 9
Analysis of Spear-Phishing Emails
Used in Targeted Attacks
Source: Symantec
Executable type 2013 2012
.exe 31.3% 39%
.scr 18.4% 2%
.doc 7.9% 34%
.pdf 5.3% 11%
.class 4.7% <1%
.jpg 3.8% <1%
.dmp 2.7% 1%
.dll 1.8% 1%
.au3 1.7% <1%
.xls 1.2% 5%• More than 50 percent of email attachments used in spear-
phishing attacks contained executable files in 2013.
• Microsoft Word and PDF documents were both used regularly, making up 7.9 and 5.3 percent of attachments respectively. However, these percentages are both down from 2012.
• Java .class files also made up 4.7 percent of email attachments used in spear-phishing attacks.p. 34
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Watering Holes
In 2013, the most sophisticated form of targeted attacks made use of “watering holes”. First docu-
mented in 2011,08 this attack technique requires the attackers to infiltrate a legitimate site visited
by their target, plant malicious code, and then lie in wait. As a drive-by download tactic, it can
be incredibly potent. For example, the Hidden Lynx09 attacks infected approximately 4,000 users
in one month alone. In some cases other visitors to a watering-hole site may not be the intended target, and are therefore either served with other forms of malware or no malware at all, rather
than being subjected to the attack reserved for the primary target. This illustrates that while effective, watering holes may be used as a longer-term tactic, requiring a degree of patience on the
part of the attackers as they wait for their intended target to visit the site unprompted.
To set up a watering hole, attackers generally have to find and exploit a vulnerability in a legitimate
website in order to gain control and plant their malicious payload within the site. Compromising a
legitimate website may seem to be a challenge for many, but vulnerability scans of public websites
carried out in 2013 by Symantec’s Website Security Solutions division
10 found that 77 percent of
sites contained vulnerabilities. Of these, 16 percent were classified as critical vulnerabilities that
allow attackers to either access sensitive data, alter website content, or compromise a visitor’s
computers. This means that when an attacker looked for a site to compromise, one in eight sites made it relatively easy to gain access.
When a website is compromised, the attackers are able to monitor the logs of the compromised
site in order to see who is visiting the website. For instance, if they are targeting organizations in the defense industry, they may look for IP addresses of known defense contractors. If these IP
addresses are found in the traffic logs, they may then use the website as a watering hole. http://www.symantec.com/content/
en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/hidden_lynx.pdf
http://www.symantec.com/en/aa/theme.jsp?themeid=ssl-resources
Zero-day Vulnerabilities, Annual Total,
2006 – 2013
Source: Symantec
0
51015202530
2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 20061315
91214
81423
Zero-Fig. 10Attackers
generally have to
find and exploit a vulnerability in a legitimate website in order to gain control and plant their malicious
payload within
the site.p. 35
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Top-Five Zero-day Vulnerabilities
Source: SymantecNUMBER OF ATTACKS DETECTED THOUSANDS
NUMBER OF DAYS AFTER VULNERABILITY PUBLICATION246810121416
0 904 days
Average time
to patch19 days
Total time of exposure for top 5 zero-days
Oracle Java SE CVE-2013-1493
Remote Code Execution Vulnerability: 54%
Oracle Java Runtime Environment CVE-2013-2423
Security Bypass Vulnerability: 27%
Oracle Java Runtime Environment CVE-2013-0422
Multiple Remote Code Execution Vulnerabilities: 16%
Microsoft Internet Explorer CVE-2013-1347 Use-After-Free Remote Code Execution Vulnerability: 1%
Microsoft Internet Ex plorer CVE-2 013-3893
Memory Corruption Vulnerability: <1%Fig. 11
• The chart above shows the malicious activity blocked by Symantec endpoint technology for the most
frequently exploited vulnerabilities that were identified as zero-days in 2013.
• Within the first 5-days after publication, Symantec blocked 20,813 potential attacks, which grew to
37,555 after 10 days. Within 30 days the total for the top five was 174,651.
• For some zero-day vulnerabilities, there was a higher amount of malicious activity very soon after
publication, an indication of exploits being available in the wild before the vulnerability was documented.
For example, with CVE-2013-0422 after five days Symantec had blocked 20,484 malicious actions
against that vulnerability, and 100,013 after just 30 days.p. 36
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Attackers can even send the malicious payloads to particular IP address ranges they wish to
target, in order to minimize the level of collateral damage from other people visiting the site
which potentially draws attention to the existence of the attack.
Watering holes rely heavily on exploiting zero-day vulnerabilities because the chances of the
attack being discovered are low. The number of zero-day vulnerabilities which were used in
attacks during 2013 increased, with 23 new ones discovered during the year. This is an increase
from the 14 that were discovered in 2012, and the highest figure since Symantec began tracking zero-day vulnerabilities in 2006.
In 2013 the majority of attacks that used zero-day vulnerabilities focused on Java. Java held the
top three spots in exploited zero-day vulnerabilities, responsible for 97 percent of attacks that used zero-day vulnerabilities after they were disclosed. When looking at the top five zero-day
vulnerabilities, the average exposure window between disclosure and an official patch was 3.8
days, and comprised a total of 19 days where users were left exposed.
One reason why watering-hole attacks are becoming more popular is that users aren’t instinc-
tively suspicious of legitimate websites that they know and trust. In general such attacks are
set up on legitimate websites that contain specific content of interest to the individual or group being targeted. The use of zero-day vulnerabilities on legitimate websites made watering holes a
very attractive method for attackers with the resources to orchestrate such an attack.
Network Discovery and Data Capture
If attackers successfully compromise an organization they may traverse the network, attempt to
gain access to the domain controller, find documents of interest, and exfiltrate the data. Down-
loaders were popular tools used to gain further control within an organization’s network. Often
referred to as “stage-one back doors”, these highly versatile forms of malicious code allow the download of other different malware, depending on what may be needed to carry out their objec-
tives. The main reason that attackers use downloaders is that they’re lightweight and easy to
propagate. Once a downloader enters a network it will, by definition, download more traditional payloads such as Trojan horses to scan the network, keyloggers to steal information typed into
compromised computers, and back doors that can send stolen data back to the attacker.
Once on the network, an attacker’s goal is generally to traverse it further and gain access to
various systems. Info-stealing Trojans are one of the more common payloads that an attacker
will deliver. These Trojans quietly sit on compromised computers gathering account details.
Password-dumping tools are used as well, especially when encountering an encrypted cache of passwords. These tools allow an attacker to copy encrypted (or “hashed”) passwords and attempt
to “pass the hash,” as it is known, to exploit potentially vulnerable systems on the network.
The goal for the attacker is to gain elevated privileges on systems on the network that appeal to
them, such as FTP access, email servers, domain controllers, and so on. Attackers can use these
details to log into these systems, continue to traverse the network, or use them to exfiltrate data.
It’s Not Just a
Game Anymore
Video game companies
have become the target
of attackers, but for
more than just to steal virtual currencies, as
we’ve seen in previous
years. It appears there has been a concerted
effort by hacking groups
to steal the source code of popular games,
particularly those in the
massively-multiplayer online role-playing game
(MMORPG) genre. The
hackers appear to have gained access through
forged digital certifi-
cates, after which point they stole source code.
The motive for doing so
remains unclear, though it could be to monitor game
users or simply to steal
the intellectual property.p. 37
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TARGETED ATTACKS + DATA BREACHES
Case Study: Point of Sale Attacks
One of the most notable incidents in
2013 was caused by a targeted attack
exploiting a retailer’s point of sale (PoS)
systems. This resulted in a significant
breach of confidential customer records.
These PoS systems handle customer
transactions through cash or credit
cards. When a customer swipes their credit or debit card at a PoS system,
their data is sent through the company’s
networks in order to reach the payment
processor. Depending on how the system
is set up, attackers could take advantage
of a number of flaws within the networks
to ultimately allow them to get to their targeted data.
01 First, the attacker needs to gain access to
the corporation’s network that provides access to the PoS systems.
02 Once the attacker has established a beachhead into the network, they will need to get to their targeted systems. To achieve this, the attacker needs to either attempt to exploit vulnerabilities using brute-force attacks or steal privileged credentials from an employee through an information-stealing Trojan.03 The attacker must then plant malware
that steals sensitive financial data, such
as network-sniffing tools, which steal
credit card numbers as they move through
internal unencrypted networks, or RAM-
scraping malware, which gather credit card
numbers as the computer reads them.
04 Once the malware is planted, the attacker needs to wait until enough financial data is
collected before exfiltrating it. The stolen
data is stored locally and is disguised by
obfuscating file names and encrypting data. The attacker can also use the stolen administrator credentials to delete log files or disable monitoring software to cover their tracks.
05 When the time comes for the attacker to exfiltrate the data, they may use a hijacked internal system to act as their staging
server. The stolen data will be passed to this
server and when the time comes, the details
will be transferred through any number of other internal systems before reaching an external system under the attacker’s
control.p. 38
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POINT OF SALE BREACH
STAGES
Source: Symantec
01 INFILTRATION Attackers break into corporate network □
via spear phishing, vulnerable servers, and other traditional means
02 NETWORK TRAVERSAL Attacker searches for entry point
to the point of sale network
03 DATA STEALING TOOLS Attacker installs malware on PoS
systems to steal credit card data
04 PERSISTENCE & STEALTH Malware steals data after each credit
card transaction, accumulating large amounts of stolen data over time05 STAGING
Attackers hijack
internal system for their “staging server”
– accumulating data from
thousands
of PoS systems 06 EXFILTRATION
Collected data is
exfiltrated to an external server such
as a compromised
3rd party cloudserver for removal
PoSFig. 14p. 39
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TARGETED ATTACKS + DATA BREACHES
Data Breaches
We’ve seen a shift in 2013 in the causes of data breaches. When thinking of a data breach,
what often comes to mind are outside attackers penetrating an organization’s defense. Hacking
continues to lead in terms of the number of breach causes, comprising 35 percent of data breaches
in 2013, but this is down from 2012. At 28 percent, accidental disclosure is up 5 percentage points from 2012 and theft or loss is close behind it, up 4 percentage points to 27 percent.
There are many situations where data is exposed by the information leaving the organization
silently. Sometimes it’s a well-meaning employee simply hoping to work from home by sending a spreadsheet through third-party web-based email, a cloud service, or simply by copying the files to
a USB drive.
Alternatively system glitches may expose data to users who should not be able to see or share such
material. For instance, users may be granted permissions on company storage resources that are
higher than necessary, thus granting them too much access rather than just enough to do what
they need. Privileged users, such as those granted administrative rights on work computers, are
• Hacking was the leading source for reported
identities exposed in
2013: Hackers were also
responsible for the largest
number of identities
exposed, responsible for 35 percent of the incidents and
76 percent of the identities
exposed in data breach incidents during 2013.
• The average number of identities exposed per data breach for hacking incidents
was approximately 4.7
million.
• Theft or loss of a device was
ranked third, and accounted
for 27 percent of data breach incidents.
Top Causes of Data Breach, 2013
Source: Symantec
FraudUnknownInsider TheftTheft or Loss
of Computeror DriveAccidentally
Made PublicHackers 34%
27% 29%
6%
2%
2%Number
of Incidents
87
726915
64
253 TOTALFig. 12p. 40
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20406080100120140160
D N O S A J J M A M F J
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
IDENTITIES EXPOSED (MILLIONS)
INCIDENTS IDENTITIES EXPOSED (Millions)Timeline of Data Breaches, 2013
Source: Symantec
130
113159
.8 .38 62353
3124324
1719
15 15 1537
2226
2026
17
510152025303540
Fig. 13
• There were 253 data breach incidents recorded by the Norton Cybercrime Index for 2013, and a total of
552,018,539 identities exposed as a result
• The average number of identities exposed per incident was 2,181,891, compared with 604,826 in 2012
(an increase of over 2.5 times)
• The median number of identities exposed was 6,777 compared with 8,350 in 2012. The median is a
useful measure as it eliminates extreme values caused by the most notable incidents, which may not necessarily be typical.
• The number of incidents that resulted in 10 million or more identities being exposed in 2013 was eight, compared with only one in 2012.p. 41
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often more responsible for breaches than external hackers. These users try to access data they
shouldn’t have access to or tamper with protections, such as data loss prevention software meant
to keep sensitive data from leaving the organization’s network.
In many of these cases the employee does not believe that they are putting the company at risk.
In fact, according to a survey conducted by Symantec and The Ponemon Institute, 53 percent of
employees believe this practice is acceptable because it doesn’t harm the company.11
That’s not to say that attacks from hackers have suddenly slowed. In 2013 there were three record-breaking data breaches, where the numbers of identities exposed was in the hundreds of millions.
These massive breaches highlight the importance of having defenses in place to keep outside intruders out as well as systems set up to stop sensitive information from leaving the network.
According to the 2013 Cost of a Data Breach study, published by Symantec and the Ponemon
Institute,
12 the cost of the average consolidated data breach incident increased from US$130
to US$136. However, this number can vary depending on the country, where German and US
companies experienced much higher costs at US$199 and US$188, respectively.
Consequences of a Data Breach
Data theft is not a victimless crime. Data breaches pose major consequences for both the corpora-
tions that experience them and the consumers who are victims of them.
Risks for the Corporations
If a company suffers a major data breach, it can face severe repercussions that could impact its business. First, there are the reputational damages that come with a data breach. The incident
could cause consumers to lose trust in the company and move to their competitors’ businesses. If
the company suffered a large data breach it’s likely to receive extensive media coverage, further damaging the corporation’s reputation.
If the customers decide that the company was at fault for failing to protect their information from
theft, they could file a class action lawsuit against the breached firm. For example, a class action lawsuit is being taken against a health insurer over the theft of two unencrypted laptop computers
which held data belonging to 840,000 of its members.
Affected corporations could have other financial concerns beyond legal matters. We believe that
on average, US companies paid US$188 per breached record over a period of two years. The only
country hit with a bigger price tag was Germany, at US$199 per breached record. This price rose
if the data breach was caused by a malicious attack. In these cases, US firms paid US$277 per breached record over two years, while German firms paid US$214 per record. These expenses
covered detection, escalation, notification and after-the-fact response, such as offering data moni-
toring services to affected customers.
One US medical records company was driven to bankruptcy after a break-in which led to the
exposure of addresses, social security numbers, and medical diagnoses of 14,000 people. When
explaining its decision to file for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection, the company said that the cost of dealing with the data breach was “prohibitive.” http://www.symantec.com/
about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20130206_01
http://www.symantec.com/about/
news/resources/press_kits/detail.
jsp?pkid=ponemon-2013Data theft is not a
victimless crime. Data breaches pose major consequences for both the corporations that experience them and the consumers who are victims of them.p. 42
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Risks for the Consumers
Ultimately, consumers are the real victims of data breaches, as they face many serious risks as a
result of this cybercrime.
One unintended risk for consumers whose data was stolen in this way is that their other online
accounts could be compromised. Attackers use a victim’s personal details to try to gain access to other accounts of more value, for example, through password reset features on websites.
Depending on the stolen information, attackers could use the data to authorize bank account
transfers to accounts under their control. They could also use victims’ financial details to create fraudulent credit or debit cards and steal their money.
Consumers’ own lax password habits could also cause several of their accounts to be compromised
as the result of a data breach. If an attacker manages to obtain email addresses and passwords for one service as a result of a data breach, they could use this data to attempt to log in to other online
services.
Medical identity theft could have a huge impact on the consumer, potentially costing victims
thousands of dollars, putting their health coverage at risk, causing legal problems, or leading to the
creation of inaccurate medical records. Attackers can use health insurance information, personal
details, and social security numbers to make false claims on their victims’ health insurance. They could take advantage of this data to get free medical treatment at the victims’ cost, or even to
obtain addictive prescription drugs for themselves or to sell to others. According to our data, the
healthcare sector contained the largest number of disclosed data breaches in 2013 at 37 percent of those disclosed.
Why does it appear that the Healthcare sector is subject to a higher number of data breaches? One
consideration is that few other industries can lay claim to needing to store such a variety of person-ally identifiable information about clients. By targeting a hospital’s records, an attacker can easily
gather a lot of personal information from these sources, especially if their goal is identity theft.
On the other hand, the healthcare industry is one of the most highly regulated industries, and
required to disclose when and where a breach occurs. These sorts of disclosures garner lots of
media attention. In contrast, many industries are less forthcoming when a breach occurs. For
instance, if a company has trade secrets compromised, which doesn’t necessarily impact clients or customers directly, they may not be quite as forthcoming with the information. Whatever the case,
at 44 percent Healthcare continues to top our list of industries most impacted by data breaches.
Digital Privacy Concerns
If there ever was any question that governments are monitoring Internet traffic, a spotlight was
cast on the subject in 2013. A variety of leaks during the year showed that, for better or for worse,
there are agencies in the world who are largely gathering anything and everything they can.
In some cases it’s one nation state monitoring another. In others it’s a nation state monitoring the
communications of its own citizens. While some governments have been thrust into the spotlight
more than others, there’s no question that it is happening in many places. Online monitoring was a
major security and privacy talking point in 2013.
From June 2013, several news reports were released containing new information on the US
National Security Agency’s (NSA) data surveillance programs. More are yet to come, considering the sheer magnitude of documents leaked by Edward Snowden, the former NSA contractor who
released the data. The documents claimed that over the course of several years the NSA collected
metadata from phone calls and major online services, accessed the fiber-optic networks that Medical identity
theft could have a huge impact on the consumer, potentially costing victims thousands of dollars, putting their health coverage at risk, causing legal problems or leading to the creation of inaccurate medical records.p. 43
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TARGETED ATTACKS + DATA BREACHES
connected global data centers, attempted to circumvent widely-used Internet encryption technolo -
gies, and stored vast amounts of metadata gathered as part of these programs.
The US wasn’t the only country engaged in cyber-espionage activities in 2013. The Snowden leaks
also pointed the finger at the United Kingdom’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), and the monitoring activities of other European spying agencies have come to light as
well. In other parts of the globe, Symantec uncovered a professional hackers-for-hire group with
advanced capabilities known as Hidden Lynx. The group may have worked for nation states, as the information that they targeted includes knowledge and technologies that would benefit other
countries. Russia’s intelligence forces were also accused of gaining access to corporate networks in
the US, Asia, and Europe.
What’s important to note is that the released data leading to many of the year’s online monitor -
ing stories was brought to the public from someone who was a contractor rather than a full-time
employee, and considered a trusted member of the organization. These organizations also appeared to lack strong measures in place to prevent such data leaks, such as data loss prevention
systems.
Unlike external attackers, insiders may already possess privileged access to sensitive customer
information, meaning they don’t have to go to the trouble of stealing login credentials from
someone else. They also have knowledge of the inner workings of a company, so if they know that
their organization has lax security practices they may believe that they could get away with data theft unscathed. Our recent research conducted with the Ponemon Institute says that 51 percent of
employees claim that it’s acceptable to transfer corporate data to their personal computers, as their
organizations don’t strictly enforce data security policies. Insiders could earn a lot of money for selling customer details, which may be motivation enough to risk their careers.
There are two big issues with online monitoring today, not just for governments, but also for
organizations and ordinary citizens: Personal digital privacy, and the use of malware or spyware. It’s clear that governments are monitoring communications on the internet, leading more Internet
users to look into encryption to protect their communications and online activities. What’s more
troubling for those concerned about safeguarding their privacy is that nation states have largely adopted the same techniques as traditional attackers, using exploits and delivering malicious
binaries. From a security perspective, there is very little difference between these techniques,
targeted attacks, and cybercrime in general.If there ever was
any question that governments are monitoring Internet traffic, a spotlight has been cast on the subject in 2013p. 44
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E-CRIME + MALWARE DELIVERY TACTICS
E-CRIME
+ MALWARE DELIVERY TACTICSp. 45
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
E-CRIME + MALWARE DELIVERY TACTICS
E-crime and Cyber Security
The use of computers and electronic communications equipment in an attempt to commit criminal
activities, often to generate money, is generally referred to as e-crime and it continues to play a
pivotal role in the threat landscape. The scope of what is covered by e-crime has also changed and
expanded over the years and now includes a variety of other potentially illegal activities that may be conducted online, such as cyber bullying, the hijacking of personal data, and the theft of intel-
lectual property.
The threats used to carry out the more traditional e-crime attacks rely heavily on social engineer -
ing in order to succeed, and may be delivered in one of two ways; through web-based activity,
drive-by downloads, or by email; similar to the way spam campaigns are conducted.
The criminals behind these e-crime attacks are well organized, having a sophisticated malicious
distribution network behind them. This plays out in a format where different attackers carry out
different tasks. One group will focus on compromising computers, another will configure and
administer those computers to carry out various malicious activities, while yet another will broker deals for renting the use of those compromised computers to other cybercriminals.
Botnets and the Rental Market
Cybercriminals involved in e-crime generally start out by working to get malware onto computers, turning them into “zombies” with the aim of adding them to larger networks of similarly compro -
mised computers, called botnets, or “robot networks”. A botnet can be easily controlled from a central location, either through a command and control (C&C) server or a peer to peer (P2P) network. Zombie computers connected to the same C&C channels become part of the same botnet.
Botnets are an extremely potent asset for criminals because they can be used for a wide variety of
purposes, such as sending spam emails, stealing banking information, conducting a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against a website, or a variety of other malicious activities. They
have also become a core tool for administering compromised computers that are rented to yet
another third party for malicious purposes.
Adding a computer to a botnet is generally just the first step. The attackers seek out other cyber -
criminals in the hope that they can lease the botnets for various purposes. This rental style gives
the initial attacker a lot of leverage and flexibility concerning how they monetize and use the computers they’ve compromised and look after. Configurations can vary widely, focused on types of
computers, regions, languages, or other features that the buyer is looking to gain access to. Prices
also vary depending on the length of rental and the job for which the computers are to be used.
For example, infections in some countries are considered more valuable than others. In the case
of click fraud, an infection will create fake user clicks on advertisements to earn affiliate fees.
American and UK computers tend to be preferred because pay-per-click advertisers in these countries will pay more. The same applies to banking Trojans, which are generally more focused on
targeting Western bank accounts.
The good news is that there were a number of takedowns that occurred in 2013. Of particular note
are the efforts to take down the Bamital and ZeroAccess botnets.
Bamital was taken down in February, thanks to a cooperative effort on the part of Symantec,
Microsoft, Spain’s Civil Guardia, and Catalunyan CERT (CESICAT).This botnet had been respon-
sible for a significant amount of click-fraud traffic, generating upwards of three million clicks per day at its peak.
13 To perform click fraud, the botnet would hijack the search results typed into http://www.symantec.com/content/
en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/trojan_bamital.pdf
At a Glance
• The criminals behind
e-crime have set up sophisticated malicious distribution networks.
• The monthly volume of ransomware has
increased by over six
times since the beginning of 2013.
• Web attack toolkits continue to be a primary method for compromis-ing computers, even with the arrest of the alleged creator of the Blackhole exploit kit in 2013.
• The number of vulner-
abilities disclosed has
reached record levels in 2013.
Botnets are
an extremely potent asset for criminals because they can be used for a wide variety of purposesp. 46
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Fig. 1
Malicious Activity by Source: Bots, 2012–2013
Source: Symantec
Country/Region 2013 Bots Rank 2013 Bots % 2012 Bots Rank 2012 Bots %
United States 1 20.0% 1 15.3%
China 2 9.1% 2 15.0%
Italy 3 6.0% 5 7.6%
Taiwan 4 6.0% 3 7.9%
Brazil 5 5.7% 4 7.8%
Japan 6 4.3% 6 4.6%
Hungary 7 4.2% 8 4.2%
Germany 8 4.2% 9 4.0%
Spain 9 3.9% 10 3.2%
Canada 10 3.5% 11 2.0%• Unsurprisingly, the US and
China have the most densely
populated bot populations,
largely owing to their large Internet populations. The US
population are avid users of
the Internet, with 78 percent Internet penetration, but
undoubtedly their keen use
of the Internet contributes to their popularity with malware
authors. China also has the
largest population of Internet users in the Asia region,
with 40 percent Internet
penetration and accounting for approximately 50 percent
of the Internet users in the
Asia region.
14
• Italy has a lower percentage of bots in the country, but is
ranked third highest in 2013,
compared with fifth in 2012.
• The US, Germany, Spain
and Canada all increased
their relative proportions of the world’s bots in 2013,
while the proportions in the
other geographies listed has diminished.http://internetworldstats.com/compromised computers, redirecting the users to predetermined pay-per-click sites, with the goal of making money off those clicks. When a computer is used to perform click fraud, the user will
rarely notice. The fraud consumes few computer resources to run, and at the most takes up extra
bandwidth with the clicks. The attackers make money from pay-per-click advertisers and publish-ers—not from the user. This is in contrast with other forms of malware such as ransomware, where
it is clear that an infection has occurred. A computer may be used in a click-fraud operation for
an extended period of time, performing its activity invisibly during the daily operation of the computer.
The partial takedown during the year made a lasting impact on the operations of the ZeroAccess
botnet. Symantec security researchers looking at the threat discovered a flaw in ZeroAccess that could allow them to sinkhole computers within the botnet. The operation succeeded in liberating approximately half a million ZeroAccess clients from the botnet network.
15
At that time, ZeroAccess was one of the larger botnets in existence, and one that used P2P commu-nications to maintain links between clients. These types of P2P botnets tend to be quite large
overall; Helios and Zbot (a.k.a. GameOver Zeus) are two other examples of large botnets that use
similar communication mechanisms. It isn’t entirely clear if these botnets are big because they utilize P2P , or they utilize P2P because they’re big. However, using P2P for communications does
make it more difficult to take down a botnet, given the lack of a centralized C&C server.
Large botnets like Cutwail and Kelihos have made their presence felt in the threat landscape
this year by sending out malicious attachments. The threats are generally like banking Trojans
or downloaders, such as Downloader.Ponik and Downloader.Dromedan (also called Pony and
Andromeda respectively), which download more malware.
Trojan.Zbot (a.k.a. Zeus) continues to make an impact in the botnet world. Having its malicious
payload based on easy-to-use toolkits has allowed Zbot to maintain its popularity with threat actors. In 2013 we’ve seen Zbot being packed in different ways and at different times in order to
evade detection. These packing techniques appear almost seasonal in their approach to evading
detection, but underneath it all it’s always the same Zeus code base.http://www.symantec.com/connect/
blogs/grappling-zeroaccess-botnetp. 47
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E-CRIME + MALWARE DELIVERY TACTICS
Fig. 2
Top-Ten Botnets, 2013
Source: Symantec
Spam Botnet
NamePercentage of Botnet SpamEstimated Spam Per Day Top Sources of Spam From Botnet
KELIHOS 46.90% 10.41BN Spain 8.4% United States 7.2% India 6.6%
CUTWAIL 36.33% 8.06BN India 7.7% Peru 7.5% Argentina 4.8%
DARKMAILER 7.21% 1.60BN Russia 12.4% Poland 8.3% United States 8.1%
MAAZBEN 2.70% 598.12M China 23.6% United States 8.2% Russia 4.8%
DARKMAILER3 2.58% 573.33M United States 18.2% France 10.4% Poland 7.5%
UNKNAMED 1.17% 259.03M China 35.1% United States 10.0% Russia 7.5%
FESTI 0.81% 178.89M China 21.9% Russia 5.8% Ukraine 4.7%
DARKMAILER2 0.72% 158.73M United States 12.6% Belarus 8.3% Poland 6.6%
GRUM 0.53% 118.00M Russia 14.5% Argentina 6.9% India 6.9%
GHEG 0.35% 76.81M Poland 17.4% Vietnam 12.1% India 11.5%
• 76 percent of spam was sent from spam botnets, down from 79 percent in 2012.
• It is worth noting that while Kelihos is the name of a spam-sending botnet, Waledac is the name of the
malware used to create it. Similarly, Cutwail is another the spam-sending botnet and Pandex is the
name of the malware involved.p. 48
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E-CRIME + MALWARE DELIVERY TACTICS
Ransomware: When Data Becomes a Hostage to Fortune
In October 2013, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation issued a warning about a new type of
malware that had appeared. The threat, known as CryptoLocker, encrypted a victim’s documents
and demanded payment in return for the decryption key. Two weeks later, the UK equivalent of the
FBI, the National Crime Agency, also issued a public warning about CryptoLocker. It isn’t often that one piece of malware mobilizes law enforcement agencies across the world, and it is indicative of the
level of panic created by CryptoLocker during 2013.
Despite the hype, CryptoLocker is not a completely new malware. Instead it is the latest evolution of
a family of threats known as ransomware. Ransomware first came to prominence a decade ago. The
business model usually involves the victim’s computer being locked. Attackers demand a ransom in
order to remove the infection.
However, CryptoLocker has managed to capture the public imagination because it represents the
perfect ransomware threat: It encrypts the user’s data and, unlike most malware infections, no fix
can rescue it. CryptoLocker uses strong encryption, meaning the victim is left with the unpalatable choice of saying goodbye to their valuable personal data or paying the attackers a ransom fee.
Symantec noticed a significant upsurge in the number of ransomware attacks during 2013. During
January we stopped over 100,000 infection attempts. By December that number had risen more than six-fold. There was a noticeable uptick in detection from the month of July onwards, peaking in
November.
CryptoLocker first began to circulate in September, and while CryptoLocker detections grew quickly
(by 30 percent in December alone), the number of definitive CryptoLocker detections is still a very
small proportion of overall ransomware detections. For example, in December only 0.2 per cent
(1 in 500) of all ransomware detections by Symantec was indisputably identified as CryptoLocker.
Ransomware Over Time, 2013
Source: SymantecTHOUSANDS
0
1002003004005006007008009001,000
D N O S A J J M A M F J112 107138 141189286625
419861
660
178
TREND421• Monthly ransomware activity
increased by 500 percent
from 100,000 in January
to 600,000 in December, increasing to six times its
previous level.Fig. 3p. 49
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E-CRIME + MALWARE DELIVERY TACTICS
However, this statistic only tells part of the story, and its prevalence may be higher. CryptoLocker is
often blocked by intrusion prevention systems (IPS) which may simply identify it as generic ransom-
ware rather than a specific variant.
Ransomware, including CryptoLocker, continues to prove lucrative for attackers. Symantec research
indicates that on average, 3 percent of infected users will pay the ransom. These figures tally with work done by other researchers.
16
Analysis by Symantec of the ransoms demanded by CryptoLocker infections indicates that most variants demand US$100 to $400 for a decryption key. This is roughly in line with the ransom
amount demanded by other ransomware variants. Although CryptoLocker is a more effective threat,
attackers have yet to take advantage of this by demanding larger ransoms.
The amount of money being paid in ransom is difficult to assess, however some efforts have been
made to track payments made through Bitcoin. All Bitcoin transactions are logged as public record,
and searching for Bitcoin addresses used to collect ransom can yield some insight. From the small number of Bitcoin addresses analyzed, it is clear that ransomware distributors have without a doubt
earned tens of millions over the last year.
Analysis of ransom amounts is complicated somewhat by the fact that many variants demand
payment in Bitcoin. Our analysis of CryptoLocker ransom demands found that attackers generally
seek between 0.5 and 2 Bitcoin. Lower ransom demands began appearing near the end of 2013. This
reduction had less to do with any newfound altruism on the part of attackers and more to do with the soaring value of Bitcoin. The virtual currency was trading at just over US$100 when CryptoLock-
er first appeared in September. By December its value had increased to over US$1,000. http://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/08/
inside-a-reveton-ransomware-operation/Fig. 4 Browser-based ransomware threat, Browlock.
Ransomware,
including CryptoLocker, continues to prove lucrative for attackers. Symantec research indicates that on average, 3 percent of infected users will pay the ransom.p. 50
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E-CRIME + MALWARE DELIVERY TACTICS
This suggests that attackers have concluded that US$100 to $400 is the optimum ransom amount,
and they will move to adjust their demand to avoid pricing themselves out of the market. Some
attackers have also refined their ransom tactics by introducing a second, larger ransom of 10 Bitcoin
for victims who miss the original 72 hour deadline. The attackers appear to have concluded that some potential opportunities were left unexploited by their original business model, with some
victims willing to pay significant amounts for the return of valuable data. This higher ransom tier
may also have the secondary purpose of exerting additional pressure on victims to pay within the deadline.
Meanwhile, older ransomware attack techniques have started to seep into markets previously
unexploited. More localized content, based on location data, has started to appear in Latin American countries. In many ways, this form of ransomware is similar to what has been seen in English-speak-
ing countries in previous years. The reasons behind this are likely precipitated by the increasing
availability of online payment providers in these regions. With easy options for payment, ransom-ware has begun to appear in these areas, with the Reventon and Urausy versions already having
been discovered with Spanish variants.
In the grand scheme of the threat landscape, ransomware does not make up a huge percentage of
overall threats, but it clearly does serious damage particularly to the victims who may not have
backed-up their data to begin with. In the future, new ransomware schemes may emerge. Since some
groups have had success with it, others may jump on the bandwagon. Toolkits for creating these types of ransomware have been developed. Browser-based ransomware also began to appear near
the end of the year, which uses JavaScript to prevent a user from closing the browser tab,
17 and more
of these ransomware-type scams will likely be seen in the future.
Banking Trojans and Heists
Banking Trojans are a fairly lucrative prospect for attackers. Today’s threats continue to focus
on modifying banking sessions and injecting extra fields in the hope of either stealing sensitive
banking details or hijacking the session. Some of the more common banking Trojans include Trojan.
Tiylon18 and a variant of the Zbot botnet, called Gameover Zeus. Symantec’s State of Financial
Trojans 2013 whitepaper19 concluded that in the first three quarters of 2013, the number of banking
Trojans tripled. More than half of these attacks were aimed at the top 15 financial institutions,
though over 1,400 institutions have been targeted in 88 countries. While browser-based attacks are
still common, mobile threats are also used to circumvent authentication through SMS messages, where the attacker can intercept text messages from the victim’s bank.
The most common form of attack continues to be financial Trojans which perform a Man-In-The-
Browser (MITB) attack on the client’s computer during an online banking session. Symantec analyzed 1,086 configuration files of 8 common financial Trojans. The malware was configured to
scan for URLs belonging to 1,486 different organizations. All of the top 15 targeted financial institu-
tions were present in more than 50 percent of the analyzed configuration files.
In addition to those attacks, Symantec observed an increase in hardware-supported attacks in 2013.
Besides the still popular skimming attacks, a new piece of malware was discovered named Backdoor.
Ploutus which targeted ATMs. Initially discovered in Mexico, the malware soon spread to other countries, with English versions emerging later.
The malware allows for criminals to effectively empty infected ATMs of cash. The malware is
applied to the ATM by physically inserting a malicious CD-ROM and causing the machine to boot from it. While booting, the malware is installed onto the system. The attacker can then use specific
key combinations on the keypad to interact with the malware and initiate the ultimate goal – to http://www.symantec.com/connect/
blogs/massive-malvertising-campaign-leads-browser-locking-ransomware
http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-111612-5925-99
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the_state_of_financial_trojans_2013.pdfIn the grand
scheme of the threat landscape, ransomware does not make up a huge percentage of overall threats, but it clearly does serious damage, particularly to the victims who may not have backed-up their data to begin with.p. 51
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E-CRIME + MALWARE DELIVERY TACTICS
dispense all available cash from the cassettes. Later variants allow cash to be dispensed by sending a
special SMS to an installed GSM modem at the ATM.
Meanwhile in Britain, a gang attempted to steal millions from a bank in London by attaching a KVM
wireless switch to computers at one of the bank’s branches. They infiltrated the branch by posing as computer repair personnel. This allowed them to remotely control these computers over a wireless
link, most likely with intent to leverage this access to defraud the bank. However, the attack was
foiled and the police arrested 12 men involved in this scam. A similar attack on another bank in London resulted in eight arrests. In this case the attackers were successful in transferring funds
of around £1.3 million from the bank through KVM-controlled machines. The wireless transmitter
packages were installed a day earlier by an attacker disguised as an IT technician.
These examples highlight the trend that attackers are increasingly targeting physical systems
directly at financial institutions. This is similar to the trend that what we have observed with
attacks against point of sale (PoS) systems at retailers.
Another popular method employed last year was to use DDoS attacks as distractions while the
attackers conducted the fraudulent transactions. A construction company and its bank in California
were attacked using this method: While a classic Zeus Trojan started to transfer US$900,000 out of clients’ accounts, the attackers started a DDoS attack against the bank to obfuscate their actions and
to keep the bank’s Computer Emergency Readiness Team (CERT) busy.
Monetization: Malware as a Commodity
E-crime in 2013 can be summed up as follows: Attackers are trying to extract every last drop of cash
available, using every monetization option at their disposal with the compromised computers they
control. Compromised computers have essentially become just another commodity, where attackers
work to maximize the ways they make money from them.
Fig. 5
Top-Ten Malware, 2013
Source: Symantec
Rank Name Overall Percentage
1 W32.Ramnit 15.4%
2 W32.Sality 7.4%
3 W32.Downadup 4.5%
4 W32.Virut 3.4%
5 W32.Almanahe 3.3%
6 W32.SillyFDC 2.9%
7 W32.Chir 1.4%
8 W32.Mabezat 1.2%
9 W32.Changeup 0.4%
10 W32.Xpaj 0.2%Attackers are
trying to extract every last bit of money possible by utilizing every monetization option at their disposal with the compromised computers they control. p. 52
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E-CRIME + MALWARE DELIVERY TACTICS
The attackers will generally monitor the compromised computers, often through a back door
connection to an administration tool such as a botnet dashboard, to determine what malicious
faucets they can tap. For instance, they may start with a banking Trojan and wait to see if they can
gather any banking details entered into the compromised computer. If nothing is captured by the banking Trojan, they may try ransomware with a pornographic theme, in the hope that they can
extort money from the user through the ransom attempt.
In one such scenario, an attack group may compromise computers and initially install a downloader
followed by a banking Trojan. The attackers monitor to see what financial institutions the user
interacts with, in the hopes they connect to a bank in a specific region. If they don’t see any banking
activity over a period of a week or two, the attack group will change tactics and install ransomware using the original downloader. If the victim pays the ransom, they’ll then install a spam Trojan
and convert the computer into a spam bot, which will run behind the scenes without the user’s
knowledge.
While the payouts from cybercrime can be high, so too can the punishment for getting caught. 2013
saw several cases where arguably harsh punishments were handed out to cybercriminals. While
punishments like the 18-year sentence given to a Ukrainian cybercriminal found guilty of running a website where stolen financial data was bought and sold may seem deserved, others have been more
questionable. For instance a man from the US was given two years federal probation and a hefty fine
of US$183,000 for his part in a DDoS attack against a multinational corporation. The guilty man in this case used the Low Orbit Ion Cannon DDoS tool for approximately 60 seconds as part of a larger
group of hacktivists taking part in an Anonymous campaign. Whether or not people think these
punishments are fitting of the crimes, one thing is clear—Law makers and enforcers now realize the potential and actual impact cybercrime can have.
The attackers will generally monitor
the compromised computers, often through a back door connection to an administration tool such as a botnet dashboard, to determine what malicious faucets they can tap.p. 53
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Threat Delivery Tactics
Toolkits
A major shift in the realm of toolkits happened in early October of 2013 with the arrest of the
Blackhole and Cool Exploit Kit author, nicknamed “Paunch”. The Blackhole exploit kit has
dominated the web attack toolkit charts for the last few years and looked poised to do so again,
based on the numbers leading up to and including October.
It appears that Blackhole has largely fallen off the map, while other toolkits have stepped in to
take its place. For instance, the attackers behind the Cutwail botnet, who used to rely heavily on
Blackhole, appear to have switched to the Magnitude exploit kit (a.k.a. Popads).20 The Styx and
Nuclear kits have been picked up by the attackers distributing Trojan.Shylock.21 The authors of the
ransomware threats such as Revention (Trojan.Ransomlock.G) have moved to the WhiteHole kit.22
It’s possible that in the near future, the source code for the Blackhole toolkit will appear online and new people will pick it up, create their own version, and help to develop it. Releasing source code like
this can help someone mask their trail from investigators.
Eventually, the void left by Blackhole will be filled by another toolkit. Much like the arrest of a drug
kingpin causes lower ranking criminals to scramble to fill the void, so too will the chaos caused by
the arrest of the apparent Blackhole author eventually settle and a new toolkit will take its place.
Business Model
Years ago, web-attack toolkits were sold on underground forums, where one person would sell it for
a set amount to an associate, who would sell it on to another associate, and so on. The distribution
worked in a black market sense, but the developer of the attack toolkit would miss a large percentage
of revenue, where someone who simply possessed the code could profit without doing much work.
In the last few years, the Blackhole toolkit changed all that by introducing a service model that has
grown to become the dominate way toolkits operate. In this service-style model, the web-attack
toolkit developer maintains control of the code and administers the toolkit.
The kit can be locked down to a compromised computer of the attacker’s choice, but the owners of
the toolkit will offer access as a service where they will administer the kit. This way the developer
maintains control of the kit code, rather than releasing it in underground forums.
Web Attacks Blocked per Day
This sort of setup has allowed toolkit owners to experiment with different service offerings.
This ranges from end-to-end coverage where the toolkit administrator sets everything up, to a
less hands-on approach where tech support services are available to help the purchaser if they
encounter configuration issues.
For advanced attacker clientele with some level of technical know-how, there is access to redirect
their traffic from computers they’ve compromised to the web attack toolkit. However, in the case of
setups like Blackhole, the toolkit uses legitimate PHP obfuscators, protecting the toolkit developers “intellectual property.” This means that even if someone has access to a system running Blackhole,
the code is unreadable without the proper keys to decode it.
When the primary work is handled by the toolkit owner, it requires far less administration on the
attacker’s side, or even knowledge of how to set up the attacks. In fact today’s
toolkit clients are usually of limited technical expertise when compared http://www.secureworks.com/
resources/blog/research/cutwail-spam-swapping-blackhole-for-magnitude-exploit-kit/
http://www.threattracksecurity.com/it-
blog/shylock-caphaw-drops-blackhole-
for-styx-and-nuclear/
http://www.scmagazine.com/criminals-move-quickly-to-other-exploit-kits-after-arrest-of-blackhole-author/article/315629/Eventually, the
void left by Blackhole will be filled by another toolkit. Much like the arrest of a drug kingpin causes lower ranking criminals to scramble to fill the void, so too will the chaos caused by the arrest of the Blackhole author eventually settle and a new toolkit will take its place.
Continued on p.57 ...p. 54
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E-CRIME + MALWARE DELIVERY TACTICS
Top Web Attack Toolkits by Percent, 2013
Source: Symantec
51015202530%
COOL
KITSTYX SAKURA BLACK
HOLEG01
PACKOTHERS23%27%
19%
14%
10%8%• The earlier dominance of the
Blackhole toolkit had all but
disappeared by the end of
2013 when the alleged person responsible for it was arrested in
October. Blackhole was ranked
first in 2013 with 44.3 percent of total attacks blocked; however,
The G01Pack Exploit Kit was
ranked first in 2013 with 23 percent of attacks blocked.
• The Sakura toolkit that ranked second in 2012, accounting for 22 percent of attacks is now
ranked third with 14 percent in
2013.
• Many of the more common attack
toolkits were updated in 2013
to include exploits for the Java Runtime Environment, including
CVE-2013-0422, CVE-2013-
2465 and CVE-2013-1493 and the Microsoft Internet Explorer
vulnerability CVE-2013-2551.Fig. 6
Timeline of Web Attack Toolkit Use, Top-Five, 2013
Source: Symantec
102030405060708090100%
OTHERS
COOL EXPLOIT KITSTYXSAKURABLACKHOLEG01 PACK EXPLOIT KIT
D N O S A J J M A M F JFig. 7p. 55
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• The average number of malicious websites blocked each day rose by approximately 22.5 percent from
approximately 464,100 in 2012 to 568,700 in 2013.
• The highest level of activity was in July, with approximately 799,500 blocks per day.
• The lowest rate of malicious activity was 135,450 blocks per day in October 2013; this is likely to have been connected to the arrest in Russia of “Paunch,” the alleged author of the Blackhole and Cool Exploit
web attack toolkits. Blackhole operated as a software-as-a-service toolkit, which was maintained in
the cloud. With no one around to update it, Blackhole quickly became less effective, leaving a space for other operators to move in.
Web Attacks Blocked Per Day, 2013
Source: SymantecTHOUSANDS
2012 2013
0100200300400500600700800
D N O S A J J M A M F JFig. 8p. 56
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Classification of Most Frequently Exploited Websites in 2013
• The malicious URLs identified by the Norton Safe
Web technology were classified by category using
the Symantec Rulespace23 technology, and the most
frequently abused sites for malicious code were listed in the table above.
• Approximately 67 percent of websites used to
distribute malware were identified as legitimate, compromised websites that could be classified,
compared with 61 percent in 2012. This figure excludes URLs that contained just an IP address and
did not include general domain parking and pay-per-
click websites.• The Technology category accounted for 9.9 percent
of malicious Website activity identified
• The Illegal category is for sites that fall into the
following sub-categories: Activist Groups, Cyber -
bullying, Malware Accomplice, Password Cracking, Potentially Malicious Software and Unwanted Programs, Remote Access Programs, and several
other phishing and spam-related content.
• Analysis of websites that were used to deliver
drive-by fake antivirus attacks revealed that four percent of threats found on compromised Art
and Museum sites were related to fake antivirus software. Moreover, 50 percent of fake antivirus
attacks were found on compromised Art and
Museum sites. Additionally, 42 percent of attacks found on compromised Shopping sites were fake
antivirus software.
• Analysis of websites that were used to deliver
attacks using browser exploits revealed that 21 percent of threats found on compromised Anony-
mizer sites were related to browser exploits. Furthermore, 73 percent of browser-exploit attacks
were found on compromised Anonymizer sites
and 67 percent of attacks found on compromised Blogging sites involved browser exploits.
• Finally, 17 percent of attacks used on social
networking sites were related to malware hosted on compromised Blogging sites. This is where a
URL hyperlink for a compromised website is shared
on a social network. Similarly, hosting websites accounted for 4 percent of social networking related
attacks. Hosting covers services that provide indi-
viduals or organizations access to online systems for websites or storage, often using free cloud-based
solutions.For more details about Symantec
Rulespace, please visit http://www.symantec.com/theme.jsp?themeid=rulespace
Fig. 9
Most Frequently Exploited
Websites, 2013
Source: Symantec
RankTop 10 Most Frequently
Exploited Categories
of WebsitesPercent of Total Number of infected
Websites
1 Technology 9.9%
2 Business 6.7%
3 Hosting 5.3%
4 Blogging 5.0%
5 Illegal 3.8%
6 Shopping 3.3%
7 Entertainment 2.9%
8 Automotive 1.8%
9 Educational 1.7%
10 Virtual Community 1.7%p. 57
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to those offering toolkit services. At most they know enough to set up and administer the kit, but
probably don’t have the skills to write the code themselves. They’re simply out to make money
through using the services being provided.
Of course, the Achilles heel for this system is the locked-down software-as-a-service model. This is
exactly what led to the colossal disruption that the Blackhole toolkit experienced when “Paunch”
was arrested. Since the toolkit was run and administered by a small group of developers, the toolkit
collapsed when they were arrested.
Spam, Compromised Sites, and Malvertising
The vast majority of infections that occur through web attack toolkits are spam-relays, compromised websites, and malvertisments. None of these techniques are new, pointing again to the fact that
age-old techniques continue to reap rewards for attackers.
The area of the most growth in 2013 has been in malvertising. Malvertising is the process of serving
up malicious code through advertising programs. When successful, this allows attackers to serve up
specially-crafted ads on legitimate websites, often bypassing security mechanisms that may be set
up on the primary site because the content comes from a third party.
For instance, near the end of the year a large malvertising campaign was used to spread the
Browlock ransomware threat.
24 This form of attack is extremely difficult to block, because attackers
are signing up with advertisers, and initially serve up perfectly legitimate ads on legitimate websites. After a few weeks of apparent legitimate activity, the attackers switch over to serving up
malicious ads. It’s a long-term strategy that pays off due to the large amount of traffic it can gather
very quickly. Lots of hits may come through within a few hours before the website discovers the
malicious ad in question and blocks it from their advertising network.
Advertising companies are aware of this behavior and are taking action to prevent it, including
forming organizations to investigate this behavior such as the Online Trust Alliance.
25 Ad
companies check IP addresses of registered accounts and share suspicious addresses. They also look for activity on registered domain names which domains advertisers direct their ads towards. If the
domain has only recently been registered a week or two, they may deny access to the ad network.
Social Engineering Toolkits: From RATs to Creepware
While web-attack toolkits tend to dominate the discussion in the threat landscape, they are not the only type of toolkits out there. There are also toolkits designed for penetration testing and detecting
vulnerabilities that are open to exploits, often used legitimately by the whitehat community, but are
often also employed by blackhat cybercriminals.
Probably the second most commonly known type of toolkit is the remote administration tool (RAT).
These toolkits have been around for many years, such as the RATs behind the Zeus botnet, and are
often used to create payload Trojans with various features as well as to obfuscate the binaries in an attempt to evade antivirus detection.
Social Engineering toolkits can be used to create phishing sites such as fake Facebook login pages.
These are essentially web-design tools with extra features for hacking. For instance, an attacker can specify the type of information they want to collect on the back end of the website.
Creepware is a type of threat that uses toolkits. These threats are usually installed through social
engineering and allow attackers to spy on the victims.
26 In many cases, the attackers administer
their creepware by using toolkits that allow them to carry out various activities through the toolkit
control panel.http://www.symantec.com/connect/
blogs/massive-malvertising-campaign-leads-browser-locking-ransomware
https://otalliance.org/resources/
malvertising.html
http://www.symantec.com/connect/
blogs/creepware-who-s-watching-youThe vast majority
of infections that occur through web attack toolkits are spam, compromised websites, and malvertisments. None of these techniques are new, pointing again to the fact that age-old techniques continue to reap rewards for attackers.p. 58
Symantec Corporation
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Total Number of Vulnerabilities, 2006 – 2013
Source: Symantec
0
1,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,0007,0008,000
2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 2006
TREND6,787
5,2914,9896,253
5,562
4,8424,6444,814• There were 6,787
vulnerabilities disclosed
in 2013, compared with
5,291in 2012.
• In 2013 there were 32 public
SCADA (Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition) vulnerabilities, compared
with 85 in 2012 and 129 in
2011.
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities, 2013
Source: Symantec
0
12345678
D N O S A J J M A M F J27
012 2
1 1 1 14
1• A zero-day vulnerability is
one that is reported to have
been exploited in the wild
before the vulnerability is public knowledge and prior to a patch being publicly
available.
• The total number of zero-day
vulnerabilities reported in
2013 was 23, compared
with 14 in 2012.
• The peak number reported
in one month for 2013 was 7
(in February), compared with a monthly peak of 3 (June)
in 2012.Fig. 10
Fig. 11p. 59
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Vulnerabilities: The Path to Exploitation
Vulnerabilities continue to be one of the core choices for the delivery of malicious code. Vulnerabili-
ties are being exploited to serve up all sorts of threats such as ransomware, Trojans, backdoors, and
botnets. The total number of vulnerabilities disclosed in 2013 supports this - at 6787 vulnerabilities
disclosed, the number is higher than any year previously reported.
The number of vulnerabilities being exploited in zero-day attacks was up in 2013, often used in
watering-hole attacks. This increase in the number of zero-day vulnerabilities occurred for the most
part in the first half of the year. The reduction in the latter half of the year could have a lot to do with the complexity of exploitation for the zero-days discovered later in the year. This could point to
a future landscape where vulnerability exploitation becomes more difficult.
Once a zero-day is disclosed, further exploits are developed and incorporated into toolkits within
a matter of days, as attackers scramble to take advantage of the window of exploitation between
disclosure, the patch release, and the time it takes organizations and individuals to patch their
computers.
For the top-five zero-day vulnerabilities disclosed in 2013, the top 3 accounted for 97 percent of all
attacks against zero-day vulnerabilities in 2013. Moreover, for the top-five zero-day vulnerabilities,
the average time between publication and the requisite patch being made available by the vendor was approximately 4 days; however, there were a total of 19 days during which time no patch was
available.
Bug bounties are also bringing more researchers out of the underground and allowing them to
participate in the public dialog, where finders can get paid through discovery bounties rather than
be tempted to sell them to malicious actors for use in attacks.
Browser vulnerabilities have declined this year, where four of the top five browsers reported fewer
vulnerabilities than they did in 2012. The exception is Internet Explorer, which saw an increase in
reported vulnerabilities from 60 to 139. While Safari reported the most vulnerabilities in 2012, the
Chrome browser came out on top in 2013, with 212 vulnerabilities.
Oracle’s Java platform had the highest number of reported plug-in vulnerabilities. However, this
may not point to an increased weakness in the Java platform, but rather to the way in which Oracle
has responded to Java security issues, increasing the release of security patches. Security improve -
ments in other popular browser plug-ins have also contributed to this, with attackers continuing
to exploit Java vulnerabilities where users have not upgraded to newer, more secure Java versions.
Adobe added sandboxing technology to its products a few years ago, and has seen the benefits of such a strategy. Sandboxing executes code within a controlled environment, preventing an applica-
tion for making programmatic calls outside its own environment. This has made it increasingly
difficult to run malicious code within environments using the latest versions of the software. On top of that, Google has created mechanisms that actively test the Flash content being served up in
search results to determine if exploits are being used on sites before showing it to users. This effec-
tively limits the use of the platform as an easily-exploitable piece of the threat landscape.Vulnerabilities
continue to be one of the core choices for the delivery of malicious code. Vulnerabilities are being exploited to serve up all sorts of threats, ranging from ransomware, Trojans, backdoors,
and botnets.p. 60
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• In 2013, 375
vulnerabilities affecting
browser plug-ins were
documented by Symantec, an increase compared
to 312 vulnerabilities
affecting browser
plug-ins in 2012.
• ActiveX vulnerabilities decreased in 2013.
• Java vulnerabilities
increased in 2013. This
upward trend was already visible in 2012, and is also
reflected in its usage in
attack toolkits which have focused around Adobe
Flash Player, Adobe PDF
Reader and Java in 2013.
• Although the number
of Java vulnerabilities
was significantly higher in 2013, the number of
new vulnerabilities being
reported against the other plug-ins decreased
throughout the year.
• Java is a cross-platform
application, and as such
any new vulnerability may
potentially be exploited on a variety of different
operating systems and
browsers. This makes Java especially attractive
to cyber-criminals and
exploits against Java are likely to quickly find their
way in the various web-
attack toolkits.
Browser Vulnerabilities, 2011 – 2013
Source: Symantec
100200300400500600700800900
Opera
Mozilla FirefoxMicrosoft Internet
Explorer
Google Chrome
Apple Safari
2013 2012 2011591891
351
Fig. 12
Plug-in Vulnerabilities Over Time, 2013
Source: Symantec
0
1020304050607080%
Java
AppleAdobeActiveX
D N O S A J J M A M F J
Fig. 13p. 61
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• The proportion of email
traffic that contains a
malicious URL has increased
in 2013 from 23 to 25 percent.
• There were two spikes in
2013 where more than 40
pecent of malicious emails contained URL links to
malicious websites, rather
than attachments, resulting in a higher rate for 2013
overall.
Proportion of Email Traffic
Containing URL Malware, 2013 vs 2012
Source: Symantec
51015202530354045%
D N O S A J J M A M F J
2012 2013Fig. 15• Overall email-based
malware numbers
increased in 2013, with 1
in 196 emails containing malware, compared with 1
in 291 in 2012.
1 in 50
1 in 100
1 in 150
1 in 200
1 in 250
1 in 3001 in 350
1 in 400
1 in 450
1 in 500
D N O S A J J M A M F JProportion of Email Traffic
in Which Virus Was Detected, 2013 vs 2012
Source: Symantec
2012 2013 TRENDFig. 14p. 62
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Fig. 16
Top-Ten Mac OSX Malware
Blocked on OSX Endpoints, 2013
Source: Symantec
Malware NamePercent of Mac Threats
Detected on Macs
OSX.RSPlug.A 35.2%
OSX.Flashback.K 10.1%
OSX.Flashback 9.0%
OSX.HellRTS 5.9%
OSX.Crisis 3.3%
OSX.Keylogger 3.0%
OSX.MacControl 2.9%
OSX.FakeCodec 2.3%
OSX.Iservice.B 2.2%
OSX.Inqtana.A 2.1%
• Approximately 1 in 924 (0.11 percent) of malware detected
on Mac OSX endpoints was actually Mac-based malware. The
remainder was mostly Windows based (i.e. Mac computers
encountering Windows-based malware). This figure was 2.5 percent in 2012, largely due to the initial spread of the Flashback malware in 2012, which exploited a vulnerability in Java and
reportedly affected as many as 600,000 Macs at the time.
• Flashback was first identified in 2012 and was still being detected
on Macs in 2013.Email Malware
Windows executable files still dominate the realm of malicious email attachments, and Java attachments have
grown in number. In fact, attackers have found these attach-
ments so successful that they’re no longer trying to mask them within web attack toolkits. In 2013, Symantec identi-
fied executable Java files being sent through email both as
.jar and .class attachments because, assuming a Java runtime environment is installed, both file types are launched by
double-clicking them. It’s possible this shift could be based
on a desire to get past attachment restrictions in large corporations where traditional executables are not allowed
as attachments, or it could simply be taking advantage of the
average user’s lack of awareness of the threat.
Malware sent through email increased in 2013, where 1 in 196
emails contained a malicious attachment. This is up from 1 in
290.7 in 2012. December saw the largest ratio for the year, at 1 in 112.7, generally during a time of year when the virus rate
is in decline.
Apple Macs Under Attack
There has been an increase in Enterprise-level adoption of
Macs as many organizations are allowing their work force to
choose between PCs and Macs.
Although Macs still represent a small proportion of the
overall operating system market, Macs could be considered
more valuable if higher profile targets adopt the operating
system for work purposes. Since the data available on these Macs may be considered more valuable, more resources are
being turned towards attacking the Mac platform.
The challenge for Macs is similar to the challenges surround-
ing BYOD (bring your own device) initiatives within an
organization. How do you manage the risk of another device
type without compromising user performance? Unfortunately many Mac end users may still be under the impression that
they are protected against malware attacks and don’t require
basic protection. As with any Internet-connected device that is used to access sensitive information, security countermea-
sures should always be included for Macs.
Ultimately, Macs are an accepted part of the IT fabric for
an organization, and any strong security architecture plans
must include them. As the demand for Macs in the Enterprise
increases and they are used to access sensitive data, so too will the amount of Mac malware.p. 63
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SOCIAL MEDIA
+ MOBILE THREATSp. 64
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Social Media
Social media continued to work its way deeper into our digital lives in 2013. The importance of
social media has also grown in the past year, and its cultural significance has been reflected in the
financial markets’ acceptance of mobile as an increasingly popular platform for global business.
During 2013 a number of newer, niche platforms garnered enough users to make their way into popular consciousness, while more-established platforms realized the financial success that comes
with IPOs. Popularity and profit appear to be central to the social media world this year.
Many of the recent entrants into social media have grown by narrowing their focus in comparison
with better-established platforms, fulfilling an apparent desire for straightforward, simple-to-use
social media apps, such as time-limited photos, short videos, micro blogging, or free alternatives
to text messaging. The sites are often designed specifically for mobile use and the target audience is generally younger. It is these early adopters—the “cool kids” —who often start new trends,
quickly bringing more users with them. These are the sort of users that scammers identify as their
prime targets. Unfortunately, widespread popularity draws scammers to these social networking platforms, as per the saying, “If you build it, they will come.” If a social network attains a certain
level of popularity, scammers will find a way to exploit it. In 2012 the shift in spam and phishing
towards social media was already underway, although these threats were harder to recognize than their email counterparts. Symantec identified new scams targeting some of these up-and-coming
social networks during 2013.
The central goal of the scammer is profit. A lot of scam activity is carried out through traditional
click-through campaigns that lead to survey scams, in contrast to the more complex setups found
in other areas of the threat landscape. While they aren’t making such large amounts of money as
the hackers behind threats such as ransomware, a scammer in the world of social media can still make thousands of dollars in a month, thereby providing a regular income.
It is easy for a scammer to get started in this field because setting up social media accounts is
largely free. A scammer can set up accounts on the sites, cultivate a group of followers, create and release free apps or browser plug-ins, and even host external pages on free sites. From there all the
scammer has to do is figure out a topic that users might click on and then deploy the campaigns.
Techniques
Phishing and spam is evolving, moving further away from email and into the social media
landscape. These social media campaigns include the same lures that are seen in phishing and
spam email. The types of material being offered remains similar to past years: gift cards, elec-
tronics, concert tickets, and DVD box sets are just a few of the fake offers seen this year. The fake profiles set up by scammers include pictures of attractive people looking to be friends and more. In
other cases, a scam may center around posting a single photo or theme on a series of compromised
accounts.
At a Glance
• Fake offers lead the types
of scams on social media again this year, account-ing for 81 percent of scams identified in 2013.
• Click-through campaigns
that lead to online
surveys are a common tactic used by scammers.
• Mobile attackers are repackaging their threats more often, as the aver-age number of variants per family is up in 2013.
• Tracking users is most common type of activity found in mobile threats.
Phishing and
spam is evolving,
moving further
and further away from email and into the social media landscape.
The campaigns include the same lures that are seen in phishing and spam email.p. 65
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• Fake Offers accounted
for the largest number of
social media based attacks
in 2013, with 81 percent, compared with 56 percent
in 2012.
• Manual sharing scams have
also decreased in 2013,
from 18 percent in 2012 to
2 percent.
• Micro-blogging based scams
accounted for one percent of
total attacks detected for the social media category, for
both 2012 and 2013.
Social Media, 2013
Source: Symantec
102030405060708090%
Manual
SharingFake
AppsFake
Plug-inLike
JackingFake
Offering56%81%
10%7%5% 6%3% 2% 2%18%
2012 2013
Fake Offers These scams invite social network users to join a fake event or group
with incentives such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to share
credentials with the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
Manual Sharing Scams These rely on victims to actually do the work of sharing
the scam by presenting them with intriguing videos, fake offers or messages that they share with their friends.
Likejacking Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into clicking website
buttons that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
Fake Plug-in Scams Users are tricked into downloading fake browser extensions
on their machines. Rogue browser extensions can pose like legitimate extensions, but when installed steal sensitive information from the infected machine.
Fake App Users are invited to subscribe to an application that appears to be
integrated for use with a social network, but is not as described and may be used to steal credentials or harvest other personal data.Fig. 1p. 66
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One example that came to light involved a login- and password-stealing scam that advertised a cool
app for users to check out, or offered a download of a song from a favorite artist. If a user clicked on
it, the scam asked the user to enter their social media credentials. They then stole this and redirect -
ed the user back to the social network without providing the promised app, download, or service.
In addition to stealing credentials, phishing sites encouraged victims to spam information about
supposed phishing apps. This appeared to work well as a propagation technique for the scam,
allowing it to spread from the original victim to their friends. These were often coupled with supposed incentives, like credits or points to be given to the users within the fake app.
For example, phishers offered a bogus app that claimed to deliver free cell phone minutes to
social media users. The offer allegedly was available only if a user entered their login credentials and then forwarded it to at least ten friends. Thus, phishers aimed at multiplying the number Fig. 2 Social media scam offering free cell phone minutes.
A scam could
be advertised as a cool app to check out, or offer a download of a song from a favorite artist. If a user clicks on it, the scam often asks the user to enter his or her social media
login details.p. 67
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of victims exponentially by blending their
phishing attack with spam.
Social media scams are generally delivered
through posts in the social network’s feed, though if the service offers it they may also
spread through private messages. Scammers
don’t limit their messages to the latest posts either, often replying to posts across the
user’s history sometimes months, if not years
earlier. The messages generally linked to resources outside of the social network, such
as compromised websites that the scam is
being promoted upon.
Social media attackers were often seeking
account credentials in the hope of using the
account as a platform to spread their scams. A compromised profile allowed them to send
messages to the victim’s friends which appear
to come from a reliable source. Another area of concern wasn’t just a user’s friends; it’s
who they chose to follow. Celebrities and
other popular accounts or pages became prime targets of scammers who have hacked
into their accounts. A simple word of caution
in these cases: If the material posted seems contrary to the celebrity in question (e.g. A
well-known academic hawking miracle diets)
a user should not click any links presented.
Social media sites with a particular activity focus, like dating, also continued to be a location where
scammers attempted to prey upon users. Fake users will often send messages to those genuinely
attempting to meet a romantic partner. However, a common tell is that they generally come on quite strong. For instance, a scammer may send a user a message saying “Hey you’re cute,” hoping
to strike up a conversation. The scammers send provocative photos, eventually followed by a link
that leads to a webcam site. Only the site requires registration and the user is asked to hand over credit card information on this cam site. They may benefit from a few days of free access, but will
eventually be charged at very high prices.
It’s not just the specific social media sites to be concerned about. The growth in aggregate social
media sites which allow users to quickly publish posts across multiple sites opened new avenues
for attackers to take control of many points in a social profile at once. If these sites are hacked,
as has already happened, they may not have gained direct access to users’ various social media account details, but if they could send messages through the service it worked just as well in
helping them accomplish their mischievous goals.
Another lure we continued to see was enticing users to participate in scams by suggesting they
could gain likes. For example, “Gain 100 followers by clicking this link and filling out a survey” or
“Install this mobile app and gain 100 followers.” In many cases, the app the user is directed to is
legitimate, but the scammer made money from the download through affiliate programs. It’s worth noting that the affiliate may not have been aware of the scam. In the end no followers or likes were
given, but the scammer didn’t care; they’ve achieved their objective.
Fig. 3 Dating scam, where scammers send racy
photos if the user agrees to install apps of their choosing.p. 68
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In some cases, a scam did indeed increase followers. However, the followers
may not have been the types of accounts that the user would have desired.
The scammers generally had a large group of compromised or fake
accounts which they used to like or follow the user’s account. The InstLike app, that was removed from popular app marketplaces near the end of
2013, was one such example. The app allowed a user to purchase likes and
followers and also requested the user’s login details, which was then used to “auto-like” and “auto-follow” other InstLike users.
27
This focus on identity theft increased in scams, though the underlying motive was still financially rooted, albeit more indirectly. Well-established
markets where phishers were able to sell such information on to other
criminals were in abundance. These markets provided an easier and less risky method to make money as they gathered and sold personal details, in
contrast to having attempted to use the information directly.
This highlights why such scams were so popular and prevalent. The chief
risk for a cybercriminal was capitalizing on their ill-gotten gains. This is
often what exposed them to potential detection and capture. Selling infor -
mation and details to others who have established networks for cashing
out (i.e. money laundering) reduced the risk. This is why a credit card had
a value on the black market that seemed lower than its potential value in
real terms: The higher the value, the greater the risk.
In the overall threat landscape, social networking scammers were low on
the food chain. Their margins were much less, but so was their risk. They
made money by doing what they do in large volumes: spam run through compromised accounts, URL comment scams, fake profiles with the same
details, along with other methodologies.http://www.symantec.com/connect/
blogs/instagram-users-compromise-their-own-accounts-likes
Fig. 4 The InstLike application
Well-established markets, where
phishers are able to sell such information on to other criminals, are in abundance. These markets provide an easier and less risky method to making money as they gather and sell personal details, in contrast to attempting to use the information directly. p. 69
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Mobile
Transition from Desktop
Mobile malware has been around for a number of years, and has multiplied with the widespread
adoption of the Android platform. When Android gave smartphone users more freedom to install
software from outside their official marketplace, it also opened the doors to malware authors, who
have spent years honing their techniques. Much of the focus has been around stealing informa-tion from the device, although a variety of threats that have traditionally been found on desktop
systems have begun to appear more regularly in the mobile landscape.
In the middle of 2013 remote access Trojan (RAT) toolkits began to appear for Android.
28 At first,
attackers began to circulate Java-based RAT threats using email attachments, which were traced
back to a toolkit designed to create threats that work across multiple platforms so long as a Java
Runtime Machine is present.29 RAT toolkits began to be developed for the Android operating
system shortly thereafter, such as in a threat called Android.Dandro.30 This toolkit type, called a
“binder,” allowed an attacker to take a Trojan and package it with a legitimate app. The idea was
simple; to take the Trojan and the legitimate app, put them together and attempt to get them onto
as many mobile devices as possible while hoping users do not notice the extended permissions
requested by the Trojanized app.
In 2012, Symantec’s Norton Report31 showed that
44 percent of adults were unaware that security
solutions existed for mobile devices, highlighting
the lack of awareness of the mobile danger. The 2013 Norton Report
32 showed this number rising
to 57 percent. How did this awareness of security
software decline? It seems that a lack of education
among mobile users has contributed at least in part to this, or that people who had previously
had feature phones (and therefore limited need
for security software) were becoming smartphone users – but hadn’t been made aware of the need
to install a security app. The pool of people using
mobile devices grew in 2013 as well, and many of these users were later adopters, who tend to be
less digitally literate and less aware of the risks.
It appears that most mobile device users are just
not aware of mobile threats, and as if to play into
this lack of knowledge, rogue security software has
been discovered on these devices; the first of which was identified in June. Android.Fakedefender did
everything expected from fake security software:
it ran a scan, warned the user of non-existent threats that the software found on the device,
then attempted to coerce the user into paying for
the fake app in order to remove them.
33 Moreover,
while desktop fake security software is annoying,
it generally doesn’t prevent someone from using http://www.symantec.com/connect/
blogs/remote-access-tool-takes-aim-android-apk-binder
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/rise-java-remote-access-tools
http://www.symantec.com/
security_response/writeup.
jsp?docid=2013-012916-2128-99
http://now-static.norton.com/now/en/pu/images/Promotions/2012/cybercrimeReport/2012_Norton_Cybercrime_Report_Master_FINAL_050912.pdf
http://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20131001_01
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/fakeav-holds-android-phones-
ransom
Fig. 5 Android.Fakedefender
showing fake threats.
In 2012,
Symantec’s Norton Report showed that 44 percent of adults were unaware that security solutions existed for mobile devices, highlighting the lack of awareness of the mobile danger.p. 70
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
SOCIAL MEDIA + MOBILE THREATS
Mobile Malware Families by Month,
Android, 2013 vs 2012
Source: Symantec
24681012141618
D N O S A J J M A M F J
2012 2013• The average number of
mobile malware families
discovered per month in
2013 was 5, compared with 9 in 2012.
• June and July were the most active months in 2013, when 9 and 8 families were
identified each month.Fig. 6
Number of Android Variants Per Family ,
2012 vs 2013
Source: Symantec
0
50100150200250
D N O S A J J M A M F J
2012 2013• The average number of
variants within each family
has increased since 2012.
The average number of variants per family in 2012
was 1:38, increasing to 1:57
in 2013.
• March and June were the most active months for
identifying new variants,
with 748 and 504 variants being discovered,
respectively.Fig. 7p. 71
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
SOCIAL MEDIA + MOBILE THREATS
the computer. Fakedefender34 took it one stage further, preventing the user from using the device
altogether. This is reminiscent of the ransomware frequently found on desktops, though it’s
difficult to determine whether this was truly intentional. The code behind Fakedefender was buggy
and caused the device to crash. On the one hand, it might have been a trick to make the user think the phone was infected; on the other it may simply have been shoddy programing on the attacker’s
part. Regardless, it appears there may be more threats like this on the horizon, potentially having
greater impact on mobile users as attackers improve them.
Phishing pages were also developed for mobile devices. These campaigns were hosted on standard
websites, and simply designed in such a manner to lend themselves to mobile devices - smaller
images, less text, and so on.
Mobile users are already very familiar with the idea of downloading applications (or apps) onto
their smartphones for the convenience and added functionality they provide. Consequently,
cybercriminals have sought new ways to hide their malicious code inside mobile apps and make
them attractive to potential users; sometimes they will repackage malicious code within legitimate apps, or simply create new malicious apps that pretend to contain some useful functionality while
carefully masking their malicious purpose.
This highlights a key factor of the mobile landscape: App marketplaces are a quick way to get an
application out to a large audience. Mobile users have become familiar with these marketplaces
and the process of finding, downloading and installing new apps is a fast and painless process,
whilst the cost is often small or even free. During the height of the desktop operating system’s dominance, there was never such a simplified software marketplace quite like the app markets of
today. In the past a developer would have to sign on with a software distributor, or would have to
generate traffic to their own website for their customers to download applications.
This shift to app marketplaces was also helpful for cyber criminals. Attackers were likely to spend
the time trawling through app marketplaces to find out what is popular, and then attempt to
repackage malicious code with such apps. For instance, the release of an instant messaging applica-tion by a well-known smartphone vendor on the Android platform was greeted with much fanfare,
and it quickly climbed to the top of the download charts. Attackers in turn took advantage of the
popularity of the new app and released a variety of counterfeit versions bundled with adware. These apps were quickly removed from the Android marketplace, but not before accumulating a
large number of downloads.
This trend appeared in our stats when we compared new mobile malware families to variants.
The number of new families per month dropped from an average of 8.5 per month in 2012 to 4.8
in 2013. In comparison, while a huge number of variants was discovered in February of 2012, the
median number of variants discovered per month increased 25 percent in 2012, from 170.5 per month to 213.
Also of note in 2013 is that mobile malware seemed almost exclusively focused on the Android
platform. In fact only one new family was discovered outside this operating system—an informa-tion stealing Trojan for the Windows mobile platform.
Regional Landscapes
The type of attacks and the material attackers are pursuing often depends on the geographic region they’re targeting. For example, there was a cluster of malicious mobile activity in Japan, which
could be based on the presence of an advanced mobile infrastructure in the country. There are
mobile services prevalent in Japan that are less common in other countries, as well as leading-edge, mobile-based purchasing methods. http://www.symantec.com/
security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-060301-4418-99The draw of
mobile to attackers is clearly based on the size of the user base today. Yet it’s also based on the amount of personal information that’s easily attainable, once an attacker is on the device. p. 72
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
SOCIAL MEDIA + MOBILE THREATS
Mobile Threat Classifications, 2013
Source: Symantec
5101520253035%
Track
UserSteal
InformationTraditional
ThreatsReconfigure
DeviceAdware
AnnoyanceSend
Content8%13%
9%8% 8%10%25%
20%32%
28%30%
15%
2012 2013
Track User Risks that spy on the individual using the device, collecting SMS
messages or phone call logs, tracking GPS coordinates, recording phone calls,
or gathering pictures and video taken with the device.
Steal Information This includes the collection of both device- and user-specific
data, such as device information, configuration data, or banking details.
Traditional T hreats Threats that carry out traditional malware functions,
such as back doors and downloaders.
Recon/f_igure D evice These t ypes of risks attempt to elevate privileges
or simply modify various settings within the operating system.
Adware/Anno yance Mobile risks that display advertising or generally perform
actions to disrupt the user.
Send Conte nt These risks will send text messages to premium SMS numbers,
ultimately appearing on the bill of the device’s owner. Other risks can be used to send spam messages.
• The number of threats that
track users has increased
in 2013, from 15 to 30
percent, effectively doubling since 2012. This is perhaps
an indication that this
type of data is of more commercial value to the
cybercriminals.
• In contrast, the largest type
of mobile threat in 2012,
those that steal information
off the device, has actually decreased nine percentage
points from 32 percent to 23
percent.Fig. 8p. 73
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
SOCIAL MEDIA + MOBILE THREATS
One popular method for spreading malicious apps was through a mobile email account.36 The
emails provided a link and asked the user to download and install an app. If installed, information
like contact details was gathered from the phone and the invitation messages were spammed out to
other users in the recipient’s address book. Similar attacks were carried out in South Korea as well,
though these used SMS instead.
Another type of attack also surfaced this year in South Korea. A legitimate Korean app developer
was compromised by attackers, which resulted in their app being replaced with a variant of
Android.Fakeguard.37 Users of the app were notified of an update to the app through normal
means, and downloaded the revised, malicious code thinking it was a standard update. China is
also another area where malicious versions of software are prevalent. However, this malicious
activity has been driven due to a less robust version of official app marketplaces being available in the country. As a result, users have become inclined to install apps from unknown sources that have the functionality they desire, putting themselves at risk in less-stringent marketplaces, where
threats may not be identified as readily.
A similar problem was present in Russia, where the presence of counterfeit app marketplaces,
designed to look like official ones, hosting malicious apps was commonplace. Many sites offered a
variety of malware-laden apps, though in some cases they went a simpler route and created an app
install page hosting only one app.In Japan email is often used instead of
SMS, through special email addresses provided by mobile carriers. While primarily accessed and used through mobile devices, these email addresses can send and receive email from standard email addresses.
http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-102908-3526-99Fig. 9 A Japanese mobile spam message, used
to spread Android.Exprespam.35http://www.symantec.com/connect/
blogs/androidexprespam-authors-revamp-gcogle-play-android-express-s-play
Fig. 10 A fake Russian app market, offering
threats masked as popular apps.
p. 74
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Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
SOCIAL MEDIA + MOBILE THREATS
Vulnerabilities
It still appears that the mobile threat landscape is under development. Attackers are researching
what they can do on Android, and their attacks are becoming more sophisticated. For instance,
we’ve seen threats like Android.Obad,38 which used exploits to elevate its privileges, and then once
installed, hid all traces of itself on the device.
The discovery of a vulnerability that allowed attackers to inject malicious code into apps without
invalidating the digital signature is one example. This “Master Key” vulnerability allowed an attacker to modify apps to include malicious code, yet looked identical to legitimate apps in terms of their signature. In essence, the operating system had no way to tell the modified app from the
original.
Disclosed vulnerability numbers are lower in 2013 than the previous year, down almost 68 percent.
September saw the largest number of disclosed vulnerabilities. This increase coincided with the
release of Apple’s iOS7, which included a number of patches for vulnerabilities discovered in iOS6.
Similarly, the Android platform saw the release of version 4.3 in July and 4.4 in November.http://www.symantec.com/
security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-060411-4146-99
Mobile Vulnerabilities by Percentage, 2013
Source: Symantec
Windows
MobilewebOSNokiaBlackberryAndroidApple iOS
iPhone / iPad 82%
127 1% 13%
1%
0%
0%Documented
Vulnerabilities
TOTAL108
17
1
100• As we have seen in previous
years, a high number of
vulnerabilities for a mobile
operating system does not necessarily lead to
malware that exploits those
vulnerabilities. Overall, there were 127 mobile
vulnerabilities published in
2013, compared with 416 in 2012, a decrease of 69
percent.Fig. 11p. 75
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
SOCIAL MEDIA + MOBILE THREATS
Mobile Adware (“Madware”)
There’s another risk to the mobile landscape that grew in
2013. Advertising is a core part of the free app business model;
however, some developers aren’t content with keeping their
advertisements held within the bounds of their application. Some developers have taken to displaying ads in the notifica-
tion bar, or suggest the user install other apps. This type of
risk is called mobile adware – or “madware.”
The problem is that madware is common on app stores and
appears to be growing. In October of 2013, 65 ad libraries were
identified.
39 This number increased to 88 ad libraries by the
end of 2013. That’s not to say the market owners aren’t quick
to pull apps that exhibit some of the more aggressive madware
traits. However, an app like this can rack up a modest number of installs before it’s discovered and removed. http://www.symantec.com/content/
en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/madware_and_malware_analysis.pdf
Fig. 12 Example madware
pop-up advertisement.
Top-Five Types of Madware Functionality
Percentage of Ad Libraries
Source: Symantec
Displays ads
in the appCollects mobile
network infoPuts ads on
notification barCollects location
coordinatesCollects your
device info 72%
43% 44%
43%
41%Fig. 13p. 76
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Hybrid Threats
Another new development we’ve seen is malware threats and campaigns targeted at both Android
and Windows. In the case of the Android.Stels Trojan,40 which was distributed via a malicious email
campaign, the payload varied depending on the device type. If the malicious URL in the email was
opened on a PC, then a PC version of the malware was installed. If it was opened on a mobile device,
a mobile version was served up. Other threats contained payloads for both device types in one package. If an Android device was connected to a compromised PC, it spread to the device.
41
Motivations
The attraction of the mobile environment to attackers is clearly based on the size and growth rate of the user base today. Yet it’s also based on the amount of personal information that’s easily
attainable once an attacker is on the device. With the right permissions the device’s phone number,
GPS coordinates, camera, and other information become readily available.
Access to various features and data on a device is the key here. Mobile devices offer attackers a
much wider attack surface: Cameras, near field communication (NFC), GPS and other location
services, Bluetooth, and wireless are all common features present in most smartphones. All apps have to ask for access permissions to access these features on the device. Fortunately mobile
operating systems are usually quite verbose in detailing which permissions are requested when
installing an app. Still, most users don’t examine these permissions carefully, opting to just accept the request rather than reading through the details, in much the same way many users approach
EULAs. Given this behavior, malicious app developers find it simple to persuade users that they
should grant unnecessary permissions to a malicious app. http://www.symantec.com/
security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-032910-0254-99
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/windows-malware-attempts-infect-android-devices
The attraction of the mobile environment
to attackers is clearly based on the size and growth rate of the user base today. Yet it’s also based on the amount of personal information that’s easily attainable once an attacker is on the device. p. 77
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Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
PHISHING + SPAM
PHISHING + SPAMp. 78
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Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
PHISHING + SPAM
Spam and Phishing
In the mid-to-late 2000s, most phishing attempts were carried out through email for financial gain.
Over time, phishing attacks have expanded in the scope of their targets from not only banks, credit
unions and other financial institutions, to a variety of other organizations. The social engineering
involved has also grown more sophisticated in recent years and recent examples include phishing for online accounts of customers of domestic energy companies and loyalty card programs. More
energy utility companies are encouraging their customers to move to paperless billing, enabling
an attacker to retrieve utility bills. They can potentially use these bills in the money laundering process such as in creating a bank account in someone else’s name and using the online bill as
proof of identity.
The phishing rate for the year has increased, from 1 in 414.3 emails per day, to 1 in 392.4. The
busiest month of the year was February, where the rate rose to 1 in 193.0 emails.
Many of these phishing attempts consist of fake login pages for popular social networks. In
addition to just spoofing login pages of legitimate sites, phishers began introducing baits relevant to current events to add flavor to the phishing pages. Celebrity promotions, popular community
pages, social networking applications, and other related material were introduced into phishing
sites as bait.
Phishing Rate, 2013 vs 2012
Source: Symantec
1 in 100
1 in 200
1 in 300
1 in 4001 in 5001 in 6001 in 7001 in 8001 in 900
D N O S A J J M A M F J
2012 2013 TRENDFig. 1
• The global average phishing
rate has increased from
2012 from 1 in 414 to
1 in 392.
At a Glance
• The phishing rate has
increased in 2013, from 1 in 414 for 2012 to 1 in 392 in 2013.
• Login credentials for various accounts are the
primary type of informa-
tion sought by phishers.
• Spam rates are down 3 percentage points in 2013, making up 66 percent of email traffic.
• Scammers are working to compromise websites in order to help spread their scams.p. 79
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
PHISHING + SPAM
Phishers also began exploring new up-and-coming social networks. During the past five years, the
number of social media sites that phishers have used in their attempts to gather sensitive informa-
tion has increased to roughly three times its earlier figure.
Social networking is bringing down the overall impact of email phishing attempts as scammers
post their messages and campaigns through social media instead. For instance, in October 2013
Symantec noted one such phishing campaign being propagated using social media messages. This
phishing attack in particular used URLs with the .pw top-level domain (TLD), a TLD frequently utilized by scammers in 2013. The number of phishing URLs originating from social media sources increased six-fold in November 2013 as compared to the previous month. Out of these links, 84
percent of URLs had the .pw TLD.
That’s not to say that attackers have abandoned email for spam and phishing attempts; these still
make up a large percentage of email traffic. Spammers still hawk their wares and phishers still try
to steal information.
Login credentials for accounts seem to be the main information phishers are looking for. Email
campaigns often include socially-engineered text and links to web pages that are designed to
impersonate popular social networking sites, while others may look almost identical to a bank’s
website. The email text might hint at a problem with a user’s account or a special limited-time offer, the goal being to convince users that the web page is legitimate so that they will enter their
credentials. Once entered, compromised social media accounts can be used to spread phishing and
spam campaigns, or banking information can be used to access an individual’s finances. In total,
the 2013 Norton Report demonstrated that 12 percent of those surveyed said that someone has
hacked their social media account.
42 http://www.symantec.com/
about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20131001_01
Number of Phishing URLs on Social Media
Source: Symantec
0
102030405060
OCT JUL APR JAN
2013OCT JUL APR JAN
2012OCT JUL APR JAN
2011OCT JUL APR JAN OCT
2009THOUSANDS• This chart represents
number of URLs detected on
social media websites per
month.Fig. 2
Social networking
is bringing down the overall impact of email phishing attempts as scammers post their messages and campaigns through social media instead.p. 80
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
PHISHING + SPAM
Phishers also continued to spoof webmail accounts during 2013. One popular attack method played
off the idea that a mailbox has exceeded its quota. A victim is directed to a site where they are
asked to “confirm” email, user name and password. However, no further information is provided
about the quota issue and the account is compromised, leaving it open to be used to send spam.
One of the latest findings from analysis of phishing activity in 2013 was the emergence of
campaigns targeting information not usually associated with more traditional phishing activities.
These include attempts to steal frequent flyer and loyalty card accounts, online credentials for utility accounts, and cloud-based storage account details. More concerning perhaps was that some
of these may be used in identity fraud. For instance, a utility bill is often a requirement as a proof
of address. Many people today use paperless billing, so if phishers gained access to a utility account they could have feasibly changed the account address and used it to fraudulently obtain goods and
services in the victim’s name.
In other cases, scammers preyed upon people’s dreams of living in another country. Someone
looking to travel or emigrate, particularly to countries with tight visa restrictions may have been
willing to reveal sensitive information if they thought that it would help them to gain entry to the
country in question.
With all the new phishing scams, the more traditional financial phishing has not declined. There
were a number of new angles that became popular in 2013. Bitcoin wallet account details, tax
information, welfare and benefit details, and payday loan accounts were all examples of campaigns targeting a victim’s finances.
In terms of spam campaign strategies, some were quite blatant, clearly selling pills, whilst in other
cases the message entirely unrelated topics - such as subject lines referencing replica watches, while the email body linked to pornographic sites.
Fig. 3 Example quota phishing email and website.
p. 81
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Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
PHISHING + SPAM
Global Spam Volume Per Day, 2013
Source: SymantecBILLIONS
1020304050
D N O S A J J M A M F J
TREND• The estimated projection
of global spam volumes
for spam in business email
traffic decreased marginally by 3 percent, from 30 billion
spam emails per day in
2012, to 29 billion in 2013.
• Spam volumes were highest
in March and April, with
approximately 34.3 billion and 35.3 billion spam emails
per day.Fig. 4
Global Spam Rate, 2013 vs 2012
Source: Symantec
1020304050607080%
D N O S A J J M A M F J
2012 2013• The global average spam
rate for 2013 was 66
percent, compared with 69
percent in 2012; a decrease of 3 percentage points.
• Pharmaceutical spam accounts for 18 percent of all spam, but the Adult/Dating category accounts for
approximately 70 percent
of spam. Pharmaceutical spam in 2013 declined by
approximately 3 percentage
points compared with 2012.
• Adult/Dating spam in 2013
increased by approximately
15 percentage points compared with 2012. Fig. 5p. 82
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
PHISHING + SPAM
The overall spam rate appeared to be down by 3 percentage points for the year, from 69 percent
in 2012 to 66 percent in 2013. There was a period of time during 2013 where the spam rate did
surpass rates for similar time periods during 2012. For approximately six months of the year, the
global spam rate exceeded the equivalent rate for the same month in the previous year, despite the fact that the annual average was actually lower.
Lots of spam and phishing attacks use URL shortening, a method where a longer URL is shortened
to save space, but still resolves to the original page. However, the use of shortened URLs also masks the original URL, allowing attackers to hide malicious links behind them. This technique was still
popular and for much of 2013 its use remained fairly stable.
Compromised Sites
Many ordinary users and small businesses are comfortable managing their own web servers,
whether internally or externally hosted, since it’s now easier to do and relatively inexpensive.
However, while the ease of installation and cost of maintenance may have decreased, many new
administrators are perhaps not familiar with how to secure their servers against attacks from the latest web attack toolkits. Nor are they diligent about keeping their sites secure and patched with
the latest software updates. Updating popular applications such as content management systems
or blogging software on the web server is a necessity. These services have become major targets for abuse by hackers, and a single vulnerability may be used across thousands of sites.
Scammers are also attacking web hosting sites that provide hosting platforms as a service. If an
attacker can figure out a way to successfully breach a company that provides such services, they
can gain access to multiple sites hosted by the compromised company. It’s possible for thousands
of sites to be impacted in such breaches. Hackers can also use popular search engines to quickly discover potentially vulnerable websites that they may be able to compromise. In this way, a
website may be easily hijacked if any software vulnerabilities can be exploited by the attackers.
Beyond hijacking websites in order to spread spam, scammers continue to attack Autonomous
Systems (ASes) using the Border Gateway Protocol (BGP), as first discussed in last year’s ISTR.
In these situations, attackers hijack entire blocks or ranges of IP addresses that may belong to a
business and re-route them to a new destination URL of their choosing. The spammers then use those IP addresses to send spam for a brief period, where the spam appears to come from the legiti-
mate business. This topic is covered in detail in Appendix C of this report, New Spam Tread: BGP
Hijacking.
• For more information on spam and phishing trends, see the Spam and Phishing appendix.The use of
shortened URLs also masks the original URL, allowing attackers to hide malicious links behind them. This technique was still popular and for much of 2013 its use remained fairly stable.p. 83
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
LOOKING AHEAD
LOOKING AHEADp. 84
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
LOOKING AHEAD
Privacy and Trust
Many factors helped to shape the threat landscape during
2013, and some will have an enduring impact by altering our
thinking about how we behave and conduct ourselves online.
For some, the attitude regarding online privacy may be a factor of our age and perhaps to some extent how long we have been
online; however, the general attitudes regarding online trust and
privacy changed more during 2013 than in any other time.
In one sense, anything published online may be there forever;
our proudest moments may sit alongside our most embarrass-
ing mistakes. It is when the personal information we casually share falls into what we call “the wrong hands” that we are
most concerned. We are increasingly sharing more data about
ourselves that we may not even think about; for example, if it will lower our insurance premiums, we are willing to share GPS
tracking information with an insurance provider to prove that
we don’t drive recklessly. So much of what we do is online and linked across many different environments, social media appli-
cations, and devices. What we do in one area is quickly shared
with another.
One of the key drivers for the adoption of cloud-based tech-
nology has been the widespread use of social media; social
networking sites, applications and mobile apps all use the cloud. Without Internet access, a smartphone is just a phone. Wide -
spread cloud adoption has essentially enabled rapid growth to occur on an enormous scale, and as a result of some of the headlines in 2013 some people are already asking questions: “Do
we still trust the cloud?” “Who should we trust to look after our
personal data?” We have seen limited impact, but it remains to be seen whether this will influence the social media and mobile
app revolution in any meaningful way over the coming months.
In 2014 and beyond we can expect social networking organiza-tions and other online service providers to seek to win back the
hearts and minds of their users by making online privacy and
data security core to their offerings. The worst case scenario is that people will become even more lackadaisical about online
privacy to the detriment of their own personal security.
The adoption of encryption technology is expected to grow in
2014 and beyond, not only for securing data on personal devices
but for online transactions including emails. The use of personal
VPNs is also likely to increase as concerned users become wary about the traffic that may be exposed through their Wi-Fi
hotspot, or simply to prevent their ISP from being able to track
their activity. More up-to-date, faster encryption protocols will be in demand to secure these devices, so even if data is exposed or a device falls into the wrong hands, users can be assured that
it cannot be exploited by the criminals.
Targeted Attacks and Data Breaches
The huge scale of breaches dominated the headlines during
2013, and has forced both businesses and home users to
seriously consider how they secure their confidential informa-
tion to keep it both private and secure. The sheer number of data breaches and even larger volume of identities being leaked was
alarming, and the majority of these were caused by hacking. As
the pressure mounts not to become the next victim, businesses are looking more towards trusted security vendors as a one-stop
solution provider to take care of all their data protection needs.
Not only will the focus be on safeguarding against an attack by hardening the perimeter, but also on minimizing the potential
impact of any breach should one occur. The wider adoption of
encryption technology will be at the core of securing personal data, intellectual property, and company secrets. It has often
been considered difficult to implement a robust and compre -
hensive encryption policy within an organization, hence the
growing demand for such technology to become a seamless part
of the underlying infrastructure rather than an add-on only
used by a few.
As more personal information is stored in the cloud and
accessible online, we routinely share more data with each
other. Businesses and governments need to routinely handle massive quantities of personal information securely. Important
questions are now being asked by the owners of this data,
such as whether the caretakers are taking sufficient protective measures to safeguard it, irrespective of whether information is
on their own computers and devices or in the cloud?
E-crime and Malware Delivery
In the short term, e-crime will continue to grow. This will lead
to greater cooperation between law enforcement and industry,
and make it increasingly difficult for cybercriminals to operate.
Rather than disappearing, e-crime is likely to move towards a new, more professional business model.
At the end of 2013 there are still many users on Windows XP
using older, more vulnerable web browsers and plug-ins; in many ways this combination can be the Achilles heel of security. Looking Aheadp. 85
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
LOOKING AHEAD
Microsoft is sun-setting their support for Windows XP in
2014 and it will be interesting to see how this affects people’s
attitudes towards online security. On the one hand, those that
continue to use the retired operating system will no longer get patches directly from Microsoft. On the other, it may precipitate
a large move to newer and more secure operating systems.
The next two or three years may bear witness to a divergence
in the threat landscape; as people move to newer, more secure
operating systems and modern web browsers, it will naturally
become more easy to avoid falling victim to a casual malware attack. The success or failure of these attacks will be increasing-
ly determined by the level of social engineering involved, which
in turn may drastically affect the overall shape of the online security landscape.
Finally, as the “Internet of Things” becomes more an everyday
reality, items like TVs, telephones, security cameras, and baby monitors as well as wearable technology and even motor cars
will become woven into the fabric of the Internet. This in turn
increases the attack surface, presenting new opportunities for researchers and attackers alike. The Internet of Things could
soon become the next battleground in the threat landscape.Social Media and Mobile
So much of what we now do in our daily lives is being tracked
and recorded online. The public has a seemingly insatiable
appetite for personal lifestyle apps that help do things better
than before and help achieve our goals faster than we could imagine. This may open more avenues for cybercriminals to
exploit and allow them to take advantage of potential victims.
While there may still be a number of activities in our lives that aren’t currently shared online, this is likely to diminish in the
near future. Wearable technology such as interactive wrist -
watches and other accessories will make interacting with these
apps less like being online and simply a part of everyday life.
Users who are less aware of the potential risks and dangers may
soon find themselves victims. The importance of online security education and awareness-raising for these users will be greater
than ever.
In the future, expect more traditional malware threats being
“ported” to mobile devices. Fake security software has already
appeared in this environment, and ransomware could soon be
developed for the mobile platform too, given how lucrative it has proved on desktop and laptop computers.
The latest mobile devices also contain a large number of entry
points, including Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and near field communica-tion (NFC), as well as USB. There may be plenty of opportunities
to compromise these devices through new methods not fully
explored at this stage. So far, mobile threats are still mainly aimed at consumers rather than enterprises. Only a few cases
have been discovered where a mobile threat has targeted
corporate users. Targeted attacks can be expected to take advantage of the mobile landscape in the near future, especially
since the potential for surveillance or counter surveillance
measures are even higher on devices that include in-built cameras and microphones that may be switched on
and off with ease. Looking Aheadp. 86
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
RECOMMENDATIONS + BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES
RECOMMENDATIONS
+ BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINESp. 87
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
RECOMMENDATIONS + BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES
Best Practice Guidelines for Businesses
01
Employ defense-in-depth strategies
Emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive
defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protection method. This should include the deployment of regularly updated firewalls as well as gateway antivirus, intrusion detection or protection systems (IPS), website vulnerability with malware protection, and web security gateway solutions throughout the network.
02
Monitor for network incursion attempts, vulnerabilities, and brand abuse
Receive alerts for new vulnerabilities and threats across vendor platforms for proactive remediation. Track brand abuse via domain alerting and fictitious website reporting.
03
Antivirus on endpoints is not enough
On endpoints, it is important to have the latest versions of antivirus software installed. Deploy and use a comprehensive endpoint security product that includes additional layers of protection including:
• Endpoint intrusion prevention that protects unpatched vulnerabilities from being exploited, protects against social engineering attacks, and stops malware from reaching endpoints;
• Browser protection for avoiding obfuscated web-based attacks;
• File and web-based reputation solutions that provide a risk-and-reputation rating of any application and website to prevent rapidly mutating and polymorphic malware;
• Behavioral prevention capabilities that look at the behavior of applications and prevent malware;
• Application control settings that can prevent applications and browser plug-ins from downloading unauthorized malicious content;
• Device control settings that prevent and limit the types of USB
devices to be used.04
Secure your websites against MITM
attacks and malware infection
Avoid compromising your trusted relationship
with your customers by:
• Implementing Always On SSL (SSL protection on your website
from logon to logoff);
• Scanning your website daily for malware;
• Setting the secure flag for all session cookies;
• Regularly assessing your website for any vulnerabilities (in
2013 1 in 8 websites scanned by Symantec was found to have vulnerabilities);
• Choosing SSL Certificates with Extended Validation to display the green browser address bar to website users;
• Displaying recognized trust marks in highly visible locations on your website to show customers your commitment to their security.
05
Protect your private keys
Make sure to get your digital certificates from an established, trustworthy certificate authority that demonstrates excellent security practices. Symantec recommends that organizations:
• Use separate Test Signing and Release Signing infrastructures;
• Secure keys in secure, tamper-proof, cryptographic hardware
devices;
• Implement physical security to protect your assets from theft.
06
Use encryption to protect sensitive data
Implement and enforce a security policy whereby any sensitive data
is encrypted. Access to sensitive information should be restricted. This should include a Data Loss Protection (DLP) solution. Ensure that customer data is encrypted as well. This not only serves to prevent data breaches, but can also help mitigate the damage of potential data leaks from within an organization. Use Data Loss Prevention to help prevent data breaches: Implement a DLP solution that can discover where sensitive data resides, monitor its use, and protect it from loss. Data loss prevention should be implemented to monitor the flow of information as it leaves the organization over the network, and monitor traffic to external devices or websites.
• DLP should be configured to identify and block suspicious copying or downloading of sensitive data;
• DLP should also be used to identify confidential or sensitive data assets on network file systems and computers. p. 88
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
RECOMMENDATIONS + BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES
Best Practice Guidelines for Businesses
07
Ensure all devices allowed on company
networks have adequate security protections
If a bring your own device (BYOD) policy is in place,
ensure a minimal security profile is established for any
devices that are allowed access to the network.
08
Implement a removable media policy
Where practical, restrict unauthorized devices such as external
portable hard-drives and other removable media. Such devices can both introduce malware and facilitate intellectual property breaches, whether intentional or unintentional. If external media devices are permitted, automatically scan them for viruses upon connection to the network and use a DLP solution to monitor and restrict copying confidential data to unencrypted external storage devices.
09
Be aggressive in your updating and patching
Update, patch, and migrate from outdated and insecure browsers, applications, and browser plug-ins. Keep virus and intrusion prevention definitions at the latest available versions using vendors’ automatic update mechanisms. Most software vendors work diligently to patch exploited software vulnerabilities; however, such patches can only be effective if adopted in the field. Wherever possible, automate patch deployments to maintain protection against vulnerabilities across the organization.
10
Enforce an effective password policy
Ensure passwords are strong; at least 8-10 characters long and include a mixture of letters and numbers. Encourage users to avoid re-using the same passwords on multiple websites and sharing of passwords with others should be forbidden. Passwords should be changed regularly, at least every 90 days.
11
Ensure regular backups are available
Create and maintain regular backups of critical systems, as well as endpoints. In the event of a security or data emergency, backups should be easily accessible to minimize downtime of services and employee productivity.12
Restrict email attachments
Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments that are commonly used to spread viruses, such as .VBS, .BAT, .EXE, .PIF, and .SCR files. Enterprises should investigate policies for .PDFs that are allowed to be included as email attachments. Ensure that mail servers are adequately protected by security software and that email is thoroughly scanned.
13
Ensure that you have infection and incident response procedures in place
• Keep your security vendor contact information handy, know who you will call, and what steps you will take if you have one or more infected systems;
• Ensure that a backup-and-restore solution is in place in order to restore lost or compromised data in the event of successful attack or catastrophic data loss;
• Make use of post-infection detection capabilities from web gateway, endpoint security solutions and firewalls to identify infected systems;
• Isolate infected computers to prevent the risk of further infection within the organization, and restore using trusted backup media;
• If network services are exploited by malicious code or some other threat, disable or block access to those services until a patch is applied.
14
Educate users on basic security protocols
• Do not open attachments unless they are expected and come from a known and trusted source, and do not execute software that is downloaded from the Internet (if such actions are permitted) unless the download has been scanned for viruses;
• Be cautious when clicking on URLs in emails or social media programs, even when coming from trusted sources and friends;
• Deploy web browser URL reputation plug-in solutions that display the reputation of websites from searches;
• Only download software (if allowed) from corporate shares or directly from the vendor website;
• If Windows users see a warning indicating that they are “infected” after clicking on a URL or using a search engine (fake antivirus infections), educate users to close or quit the browser
using Alt-F4, CTRL+W or the task manager. p. 89
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
RECOMMENDATIONS + BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES
Best Practice Guidelines for Consumers
01
Protect yourself
Use a modern Internet security solution that includes
the following capabilities for maximum protection against malicious code and other threats:
• Antivirus (file- and heuristic-based) and behavioral malware prevention can prevent unknown malicious threats from executing;
• Bi-directional firewalls will block malware from exploiting potentially vulnerable applications and services running on your computer;
• Browser protection to protect against obfuscated web-based attacks;
• Use reputation-based tools that check the reputation and trust of a file and website before downloading, and that check URL reputations and provide safety ratings for websites found
through search engines;
• Consider options for implementing cross-platform parental
controls, such as Norton Online Family.
43
02
Update regularly
Keep your system, program, and virus definitions up-to-date
– always accept updates requested by the vendor. Running out-of-date versions can put you at risk from being exploited by web-based attacks. Only download updates from vendor sites directly. Select automatic updates wherever possible.
03
Be wary of scareware tactics
Versions of software that claim to be free, cracked or pirated can expose you to malware, or social engineering attacks that attempt to trick you into thinking your computer is infected and getting you to pay money to have it removed.
04
Use an effective password policy
Ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers, and change them often. Passwords should not consist of words from the dictionary. Do not use the same password for multiple applications or websites. Use complex passwords (upper/lowercase and punctuation) or passphrases.05
Think before you click
Never view, open, or copy email attachments to your desktop or execute any email attachment unless you expect it and trust the sender. Even when receiving email attachments from trusted users, be suspicious.
• Be cautious when clicking on URLs in emails or social media communications, even when coming from trusted sources and friends. Do not blindly click on shortened URLs without expanding them first using a preview tool or plug-in.
• Use a web browser plug-in or URL reputation site that shows the reputation and safety rating of websites before visiting. Be
suspicious of search engine results; only click through to trusted
sources when conducting searches, especially on topics that are
hot in the media.
• Be suspicious of warnings that pop up asking you to install media players, document viewers and security updates. Only download software directly from the vendor’s website.
• Be aware of files you make available for sharing on public sites,
including gaming, bitTorrent, and any other peer-to-peer (P2P)
exchanges. Keep Dropbox, Evernote, and other usages to a
minimum for pertinent information only.
06
Guard your personal data
Limit the amount of personal information you make
publicly available on the Internet (in particular via social networks). This includes personal and financial information, such as bank logins or birth dates.
• Review your bank, credit card, and credit information frequently
for irregular activity. Avoid banking or shopping online from
public computers (such as libraries, Internet cafes, and similar
establishments) or from unencrypted Wi-Fi connections.
• Use HTTPS when connecting via Wi-Fi networks to your email, social media and sharing websites. Check the settings and
preferences of the applications and websites you are using.
• Look for the green browser address bar, HTTPS, and recognizable trust marks when you visit websites where you log in or share
any personal information.
• Configure your home Wi-Fi network for strong authentication
and always require a unique password for access to it.For more information about Norton Online Family, please visit https://onlinefamily.norton.com/p. 90
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
RECOMMENDATIONS + BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES
SANS Critical Security Controls:
How to Protect Your Organization from Cyber Attack
Introduction
The goal of the annual Symantec Internet Security
Threat Report (ISTR) is not only to raise awareness of
cyber threats and educate business users and consumers
about the changing nature of the cyber security threat landscape, but also to provide guidance and advice about
how to secure your critical assets, including your personal
data to help reduce the impact of any potentially harmful incidents.
There are a number of good best practice guidelines that,
if followed, can help to reduce the risk from cyber threats – many of these have been outlined in this report. However,
for businesses and organizations especially, the implemen-
tation of a more methodological approach to hardening their security profile can bring additional benefits as well.
There are a variety of frameworks that can help, and each
one may suit different organizations in different ways. Generally a standard framework will need to be continually
maintained, and adapted to new threats and challenges.
Moreover, your business will benefit from the wealth of experience and lessons learned by other organizations
that are also using these standards and frameworks, and
building on them in turn. This approach will help you to prioritize the areas that you need to focus on first, and also
to harden your existing defenses and develop the right security posture to help prevent the most common and
potentially most harmful types of attack from damaging
your business.
In the United States, the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) recently published the “Framework
for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity,” and
Symantec has played a central role in shaping it. The NIST framework is not designed to be a standard or set of
controls, nor is it a checklist; instead, it is a tool to help
organizations assess and improve their cybersecurity programs, or to help develop such a program if they don’t
already have one in place. Symantec also works with the
SANS Institute
44, one of the largest sources for informa-
tion security training and certification, which operates
the SANS Top 20 Critical Security Controls. The SANS
CSC is comprised of a detailed list of controls that any organization can implement and adapt quickly, and each
one is specifically designed to address particular areas of
concern. For more information on the SANS CSC, please visit www.sans.org/critical-security-controls/guidelines.
Additional details about the new NIST framework can also
be found here: www.nist.gov/cyberframework .www.
sans.org
How to Apply the SANS Critical Security Controls
In order to apply the controls effectively, it’s not always necessary to try to implement everything at once. By iden-
tifying some “quick wins,” you should be able to quickly
implement the relevant controls that will have the greatest impact and reduce the exposure of your organization to the
greatest threats more quickly.
For example, in order to tighten the controls that will help
reduce the likelihood of a website being breached; you may wish to consider the following controls: 3, 4 and 5 to begin with and then 6 and 11 when that is fully operational. Addi-
tional controls may then be introduced later, once you have
the basics in place and operating effectively.
Following is a list of potential controls that could be imple -
mented to safeguard against some of the most important
types of threats discussed in the Symantec ISTR.p. 91
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
RECOMMENDATIONS + BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES
BotsSpam + PhishingMobile Threats
Malware ThreatsSafeguarding
Web ServersTargeted AttacksData Breaches
Web-Based AttacksCRITICAL CONTROL
PROTECTION PRIORITIES
Source: Sans.org, Symantec
ENHANCE
DETECTIONREDUCE
IMPACTHARDEN
DEFENSES
02
03
04
05
06
10
11
07
01
14
16
09
18
20
01
14
16
18
20
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14
16
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14
16
18
20
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01
14
16
09
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20
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09
20
01
14
18
08
12
17
13
15
19
12
17
13
15
12
13
15
17
08
12
17
13
08
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08
12
17
13
12
13
17
13
19
02
03
04
05
06
11
02
03
04
05
06
02
03
04
05
06
10
11
02
03
04
05
06
07
02
03
04
05
02
05
02
03
04
05
p. 92
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
RECOMMENDATIONS + BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES
01
Inventory of Authorized and
Unauthorized Devices
Reduce the ability of attackers to find and
exploit unauthorized and unprotected systems: Use active monitoring and configuration management to maintain an up-to-date inventory of devices connected to the enterprise network, including servers, workstations, laptops, and remote devices.
02
Inventory of Authorized and
Unauthorized Software
Identify vulnerable or malicious software
to mitigate or root out attacks: Devise a list of authorized software for each type of system, and deploy tools to track software installed (including type, version, and patches) and monitor for unauthorized or unnecessary software.
03
Secure Configurations for
Hardware & Software on Laptops,
Workstations, and Servers
Prevent attackers from exploiting services
and settings that allow easy access through networks and browsers: Build a secure image that is used for all new systems deployed to the enterprise, host these standard images on secure storage servers, regularly validate and update these configurations, and track system images in a configuration management system.
04
Continuous Vulnerability
Assessment and Remediation
Proactively identify and repair software
vulnerabilities reported by security researchers or vendors: Regularly run automated vulnerability scanning tools against all systems and quickly remediate any vulnerabilities, with critical problems fixed within 48 hours.05
Malware Defense
Block malicious code from tampering with system settings or content, capturing sensitive data, or from spreading:
Use automated antivirus and anti-spyware
software to continuously monitor and protect workstations, servers, and mobile devices. Automatically update such anti-malware tools on all machines on a daily basis.
Prevent network devices from using auto-
run programs to access removable media.
06
Application Software Security
Neutralize vulnerabilities in web-based and other application software: Carefully test internally-developed and third-party application software for security flaws, including coding errors and malware. Deploy web application firewalls that inspect all traffic, and explicitly check for errors in all user input (including by size and data type).
07
Wireless Device Control
Protect the security perimeter against unauthorized wireless access: Allow wireless devices to connect to the network only if they match an authorized configuration and security profile and have a documented owner and defined business need. Ensure that all wireless access points are manageable using enterprise management tools. Configure scanning tools to detect wireless access points.
08
Data Recovery Capability
Minimize the damage from an attack: Implement a trustworthy plan for removing all traces of an attack. Automatically back up all information required to fully restore each system, including the operating system, application software, and data. Back up all systems at least weekly; back up sensitive systems more frequently.
Regularly test the restoration process.09
Security Skills Assessment
and Appropriate Training
to Fill Gaps
Find knowledge gaps, and eradicate them
with exercises and training: Develop a security skills assessment program, map training against the skills required for each job, and use the results to allocate resources effectively to improve security practices.
10
Secure Configurations for
Network Devices such as
Firewalls, Routers, and Switches
Preclude electronic holes from forming
at connection points with the Internet, other organizations, and internal network segments: Compare firewall, router, and switch configurations against standards for each type of network device. Ensure that any deviations from the standard configurations are documented and approved and that any temporary deviations are undone when the business need abates.
11
Limitation and Control of Network
Ports, Protocols, and Services
Allow remote access only to legitimate
users and services: Apply host-based firewalls, port-filtering, and scanning tools to block traffic that is not explicitly allowed. Properly configure web servers, mail servers, file and print services, and domain name system (DNS) servers to limit remote access. Disable automatic installation of unnecessary software components. Move servers inside the firewall unless remote access is required for business purposes.p. 93
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
RECOMMENDATIONS + BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES
12
Controlled Use of
Administrative Privileges
Protect and validate administrative
accounts on desktops, laptops, and servers to prevent two common types of attack: (1) enticing users to open a malicious email, attachment, or file, or to visit a malicious website; and (2) cracking an administrative password and thereby gaining access to a target machine. Use robust passwords that follow Federal Desktop Core Configuration (FDCC) standards.
13
Boundary Defense
Control the flow of traffic through network borders, and police content by looking for attacks and evidence of compromised machines: Establish a multi-layered boundary defense by relying on firewalls, proxies, demilitarized zone (DMZ) perimeter networks, and other network-based tools. Filter inbound and outbound traffic, including through business partner networks (“extranets”).
14
Maintenance, Monitoring, and
Analysis of Security Audit Logs
Use detailed logs to identify and uncover the
details of an attack, including the location, malicious software deployed, and activity on victim machines: Generate standardized logs for each hardware device and the software installed on it, including date, time stamp, source addresses, destination addresses, and other information about each packet and/or transaction. Store logs on dedicated servers, and run bi-weekly reports to identify and document anomalies.15
Controlled Access Based
on the Need to Know
Prevent attackers from gaining access to
highly sensitive data: Carefully identify and separate critical data from information that is readily available to internal network users. Establish a multilevel data classification scheme based on the impact of any data exposure, and ensure that only authenticated users
have access to nonpublic data and files.
16
Account Monitoring and Control
Keep attackers from impersonating
legitimate users: Review all system accounts and disable any that are not associated with a business process and owner. Immediately revoke system access for terminated employees or contractors. Disable dormant accounts and encrypt and isolate any files associated with such accounts. Use robust passwords that conform to FDCC standards.
17
Data Loss Prevention
Stop unauthorized transfer of sensitive data through network attacks and physical theft: Scrutinize the movement of data across network boundaries, both electronically and physically, to minimize exposure to attackers. Monitor people, processes, and systems, using a centralized management framework.18
Incident Response
Management
Protect the organization’s reputation, as
well as its information: Develop an incident response plan with clearly delineated roles and responsibilities for quickly discovering an attack and then effectively containing the damage, eradicating the attacker’s presence, and restoring the integrity of the network and systems.
19
Secure Network Engineering
Keep poor network design from enabling attackers: Use a robust, secure network engineering process to prevent security controls from being circumvented. Deploy a network architecture with at least three tiers: DMZ, middleware, private network. Allow rapid deployment of new access controls to quickly deflect attacks.
20
Penetration Tests and
Red Team Exercises
Use simulated attacks to improve
organizational readiness: Conduct regular internal and external penetration tests that mimic an attack to identify vulnerabilities and gauge the potential damage. Use periodic red team exercises—all-out attempts to gain access to critical data and systems to test existing defense and response capabilities.p. 94
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
Footnotes
Targeted Attacks + Data Breaches
01 An attack campaign is defined as a series of emails that:
A.) Show clear evidence that the subject and target has been deliberately selected. B.) Contain at least 3 or 4 strong correlations to other emails such as the topic, sender address, recipient domain, source IP address, etc. C.) Are sent on the same day or across multiple days.
02 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/francophoned-sophisticated-social-engineering-attack
03 In previous years, this category was labeled as Government.
04 The Professional category includes Engineering, Accounting, Legal, and Heath-related services. The Non-Traditional category includes Business, Amusement, and Repair-related services.
05 Fires in workplace premises: risk data. Holborn et. al.( 2002) Fire Safety Journal 37 303-327. The full range is from 1:161 and 1:588.
06 These are frequently referred to as case-control studies, which compare a group of subjects with a disease (cases) to a similar group without the disease (the controls). The resulting ratio shows the risk of contracting the disease. In the case of spear phishing, we simply substitute “afflicted with a disease” for “received at least one spear-phishing email in 2013.”
07 This represents the proportions of organizations within the same sector that were subjected to one or more targeted attacks within the year.
08 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the-elderwood-project.pdf
09 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/hidden_lynx.pdf
10 http://www.symantec.com/en/aa/theme.jsp?themeid=ssl-resources
11 http://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20130206_01
12 http://www.symantec.com/about/news/resources/press_kits/
detail.jsp?pkid=ponemon-2013Ecrime, Malware + Malware Delivery Tactics
13 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/
security_response/whitepapers/trojan_bamital.pdf
14 http://internetworldstats.com/
15 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/grappling-zeroaccess-botnet
16 http://krebsonsecurity.com/2012/08/inside-a-reveton-ransomware-operation/
17 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/massive-malvertising-campaign-leads-browser-locking-ransomware
18 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-111612-5925-99
19 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/the_state_of_financial_trojans_2013.pdf
20 http://www.secureworks.com/resources/blog/research/cutwail-spam-swapping-blackhole-for-magnitude-exploit-kit/
21 http://www.threattracksecurity.com/it-blog/shylock-caphaw-drops-blackhole-for-styx-and-nuclear/
22 http://www.scmagazine.com/criminals-move-quickly-to-other-exploit-kits-after-arrest-of-blackhole-author/article/315629/
23 For more details about Symantec Rulespace, please visit http://www.symantec.com/theme.jsp?themeid=rulespace
24 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/massive-malvertising-campaign-leads-browser-locking-ransomware
25 https://otalliance.org/resources/malvertising.html
26 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/creepware-who-s-watching-youp. 95
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
Footnotes
Social Media + Mobile Threats
27 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/instagram-users-
compromise-their-own-accounts-likes
28 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/remote-access-tool-takes-aim-android-apk-binder
29 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/rise-java-remote-access-tools
30 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-012916-2128-99
31 http://now-static.norton.com/now/en/pu/images/Promotions/2012/cybercrimeReport/2012_Norton_Cybercrime_Report_Master_FINAL_050912.pdf
32 http://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20131001_01
33 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/fakeav-holds-android-phones-ransom
34 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-060301-4418-99
35 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/androidexprespam-authors-revamp-gcogle-play-android-express-s-play
36 In Japan email is often used instead of SMS, through special email addresses provided by mobile carriers. While primarily accessed and used through mobile devices, these email addresses can send and receive email from standard email addresses.
37 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2012-102908-3526-99
38 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-060411-4146-99
39 http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/madware_and_malware_analysis.pdf
40 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2013-032910-0254-99
41 http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/windows-malware-
attempts-infect-android-devicesPhishing + Spam
42 http://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.
jsp?prid=20131001_01
Best Practice Guidelines
43 For more information about Norton Online Family, please visit https://onlinefamily.norton.com/
SANS Critical Controls
44 www.sans.orgp. 96
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
Contributors
Credits
Paul Wood, Executive Editor
Ben Nahorney, Editorial Content
Kavitha Chandrasekar, Analyst
Scott Wallace, Graphics & DesignKevin Haley, Technical Advisor
Contributors
Anand KashyapAndrew Horbury Arman Catacutan
Bartlomiej Uscilowski
Candid WueestChau Mai Con MallonDick O’Brien
Eric Chien
Eric Park Gavin O’GormanHon LauJohn-Paul Power
Joji Hamada
Kari Ann SewellLaura O’BrienMathew ManiyaraOlivier ThonnardNicholas JohnstonOrla Cox
Peter Coogan
Pierre-Antoine Vervier Quentin Liu Satnam NarangStephen DohertyTim GalloWith Support From
Andrew WatsonChintan TrivediHimanshu DubeyJason Theodorson
Jeffrey Wilhelm
John GunalanJohn SwickKevin ThompsonManish Khorgade
Mat Nisbet
Parveen VashishthaPaul ThomasPhil IversPrasanna N
Rahul Sharma
Rajesh SethumadhavanTony Zhu
Special Thanks To
Alejandro BorgiaCheryl EllimanDarragh CotterElizabeth SoaresJasmin Kohan
Jeannie Warner
Linda Smith MunyanRebecca DonaldsonRichard ClookeSondra MagnessJennifer Duffourgp. 97
Symantec Corporation
Internet Security Threat Report 2014 :: Volume 19
About Symantec
More Information
• Symantec Worldwide: http://www.symantec.com/
• ISTR and Symantec Intelligence Resources: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
• Symantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/
• Norton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer/
• Norton Cybercrime Index: http://us.norton.com/cybercrimeindex/Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC) is an information protection expert that helps
people, businesses and governments seeking the freedom to unlock the opportunities
technology brings – anytime, anywhere. Founded in April 1982, Symantec, a Fortune
500 company, operating one of the largest global data-intelligence networks, has
provided leading security, backup and availability solutions for where vital information
is stored, accessed and shared. The company’s more than 20,000 employees reside in more than 50 countries. Ninety-nine percent of Fortune 500 companies are Symantec
customers. In fiscal 2013, it recorded revenues of $6.9 billion. To learn more go to
www.symantec.com or connect with Symantec at: go.symantec.com/socialmedia.
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Internet Security Threat ReportInternet Security Threat Report
VOLUME 21, APRIL 20162016 Internet Security Threat Report 2
CONTENTS
4 Introduction
5 Executive Summary
8 BIG NUMBERS
10 MOBILE DEVICES & THE
INTERNET OF THINGS
10 Smartphones
and Mobile Devices
10 One Phone Per Person
11 Cross-Over Threats
11 Android Attacks Become More Stealthy
12 How Malicious Video Messages Could
Lead to Stagefright and Stagefright 2.0
13 Android Users under Fire with Phishing
and Ransomware
13 Apple iOS Users Now More at Risk than
Ever
13 Ransomware Goes Mobile
13 iOS App Developers Haunted by
XcodeGhost
14 YiSpecter Shows How Attackers Now
Have iOS Firmly in Their Sights
14 Targeting Non-Jailbroken iOS Devices
and Certificate Abuse
14 Exploiting Apple’s Private APIs
14 Cross-Platform Youmi Madware Pilfers
Personal Data on iOS and Android
14 Distinguishing Madware
15 Protecting Mobile Devices
16 Looking Ahead
16 The Internet of Things
16 Billions and Billions of Things
16 The Insecurity of Things
17 Infographic: Peek into the Future: The Risk
of Things
18 Home Automation to Reach
a Tipping Point by 2020
18 How to Protect Connected Devices
18 Towards a Secure, Connected Future
19 WEB THREATS
19 Web Attacks, Toolkits, and
Exploiting Vulnerabilities Online
20 Problematic Plugins
20 The End Is Nigh for Flash
21 Exploiting Plugins for Web Servers
21 Infection by Injection
21 Web Attack Exploit Toolkits
21 Angling for Malicious Ads21 Tech Support Scams Go Nuclear,
Spreading Ransomware
22 Malvertising
23 Cybersecurity Challenges
For Website Owners
23 Put Your Money Where Your Mouse Is
23 Websites Are Still Vulnerable to Attacks
Leading to Malware and Data Breaches
23 Moving to Stronger Authentication
24 Accelerating to Always-On Encryption
24 Reinforced Reassurance
25 Websites Need to Become Harder to
Attack
25 SSL/TLS and The
Industry’s Response
25 The Evolution of Encryption
25 Strength in Numbers
25 Slipping through the Cracks
26 Checks and Balances
27 SOCIAL MEDIA, SCAMS,
& EMAIL THREATS
27 Social Engineering and
Exploiting The Individual
27 Trust No One
28 Infographic: How The Gmail Scam Works
29 Secrets and Lies
29 Social Engineering
Using Social Media
30 Language and Location Is No Barrier
30 Safeguarding Against Social Engineering
31 Email and Communications Threats
31 Email Abuse
31 Spam Trends
33 Phishing Trends
34 Email Malware Trends
35 Communications Attacks
35 Email Encryption
36 Email Security Advice
36 Looking Ahead
37 TARGETED ATTACKS
37 Targeted Attacks,
Spear Phishing, and Intellectual
Property Theft
37 Persistent Attacks
38 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities and Watering
Holes
38 Diversity in Zero Days39 Infographic: A New Zero-Day Vulnerability
Discovered Every Week in 2015
39 Infographic: A New Zero-Day Vulnerability
Discovered Every Week in 2015
40 Spear Phishing
43 Active Attack Groups in 2015
44 Infographic: Attackers Target Both Large
and Small Businesses
45 Profiting from High-Level Corporate
Attacks and the Butterfly Effect
45 Cybersecurity, Cybersabotage, and Coping
with Black Swan Events
46 Cybersabotage and
the Threat of “Hybrid Warfare”
46 Small Business and the Dirty Linen Attack
47 Industrial Control Systems
Vulnerable to Attacks
47 Obscurity is No Defense
48 DATA BREACHES
& PRIVACY
48 Data Breaches Large
and Small
48 The State of Play
50 Infographic: Facts About the Attack on
Anthem
52 By Any Other Name
53 The Insider Threat
54 Infographic: Over Half a Billion Personal
Information Records Stolen or Lost in 2015
55 Privacy Regulation
and the Value of Personal Data
56 Reducing the Risk
57 The Underground Economy
and Law Enforcement
57 Business in the Cyber Shadows
58 Stand and Deliver
59 Global Issues, Local Attacks
60 Botnets and the Rise of the Zombies
60 The Dyre Consequences and Law
Enforcement
61 Cybercrime and Keeping out of Harm’s
Way
62 CLOUD & INFRASTRUCTURE
62 Computers, Cloud Computing
and IT Infrastructure
62 Protecting the System
63 Nothing Is Automatically Immune
63 Mac OS X
64 Linux in the Firing Line
TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 3
CHARTS & TABLES
8 BIG NUMBERS
10 MOBILE DEVICES & THE INTERNET
OF THINGS
11 Cumulative Android Mobile
Malware Families
11 Cumulative Android Mobile
Malware Variants
11 Mobile Vulnerabilities by
Operating System
12 Android Malware Volume
12 Top Ten Android Malware
15 App Analysis by Symantec’s
Norton Mobile Insight
17 Infographic: Peek into the
Future: The Risk of Things
19 WEB THREATS
20 Scanned Websites with Vulnerabilities
20 Percentage of Vulnerabilities
Which Were Critical
20 Browser Vulnerabilities
20 Annual Plugin Vulnerabilities
20 Web Attacks Blocked per Month
21 Top Five Web Attack Toolkits
22 Blocked Tech Support Scams
22 Classification of Most Frequently
Exploited Websites
26 Top 10 Vulnerabilities Found Unpatched
on Scanned Web Servers27 SOCIAL MEDIA, SCAMS,
& EMAIL THREATS
30 Social Media
30 Number of Phishing URLs on Social Media
32 Overall Email Spam Rate
32 Estimated Global Email
Spam Rate per Day
32 Percentage of Spam in Email by Industry
32 Spam by Company Size
33 Email Phishing Rate (Not Spear Phishing)
33 Phishing Rate
33 Phishing Ratio in Email by Industry
34 Phishing Rate in Email
34 Email Malware Rate (Overall)
34 Proportion of Email Traffic in
Which Virus Was Detected
34 Malicious File Attachments in Email
35 Virus Ratio in Email by Industry
35 Ratio of Malware in Email
Traffic by Company Size
37 TARGETED ATTACKS
38 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
38 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities, Annual Total
39 Infographic: A New Zero-Day Vulnerability
Discovered Every Week in 2015
39 Infographic: A New Zero-Day Vulnerability
Discovered Every Week in 2015
40 Top 5 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities,
Patch and Signature Duration
40 Top 5 Most Frequently Exploited
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
41 Spear-Phishing Email Campaigns
41 Top Industries Targeted in
Spear-Phishing Attacks
42 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing
Attacks by Group — Healthcare
42 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing
Attacks by Group – Energy
42 Industries Targeted in Spear-
Phishing Attacks by Group – Finance,
Insurance, & Real Estate
42 Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing
Attacks by Group – Public Administration
43 Spear-Phishing Attacks
by Size of Targeted Organization
43 Risk Ratio of Spear-Phishing Attacks
by Organization Size
43 Analysis of Spear-Phishing Emails
Used in Targeted Attacks
44 Infographic: Atttakcers Target Both
Large and Small Businesses
45 Timeline of Butterfly Attacks
Against Industry Sectors
47 Vulnerabilities Disclosed in
Industrial Control Systems48 DATA BREACHES
& PRIVACY
49 Timeline of Data Breaches
49 Top 5 High Level Sectors
Breached by Number of Identities
Exposed and Incidents
49 Top Sub Level Sectors Breached
by Number of Identities
Exposed and Incidents
50 Infographic: Facts About the
Attack on Anthem
51 Top 10 Sectors Breached
by Number of Incidents
51 Top 10 Sub-Sectors Breached
by Number of Incidents
51 Top 10 Sectors Breached
by Number of Identities Exposed
51 Top 10 Sub-Sectors Breached
by Number of Identities Exposed
52 Top Sectors Filtered for Incidents,
Caused by Hacking and Insider Theft
52 Top Sectors Filtered for Identities Exposed,
Caused by Hacking and Insider Theft
53 Top 10 Types of Information Exposed
53 Top Causes of Data Breach by Incidents
54 Infographic: Over Half a Billion
Personal Information Records
Stolen or Lost in 2015
55 Top Causes of Data Breach
by Identities Exposed
58 Growing Dominance of
Crypto-Ransomware
58 Crypto-Ransomware Over Time
58 Crypto-Ransomware as Percentage
of All Ransomware
59 Ransomware Discoveries
60 Malicious Activity by Source: Bots
60 Dyre Detections Over Time
62 CLOUD & INFRASTRUCTURE
63 Total Number of Vulnerabilities
63 Mac OS X Malware Volume
64 Top Ten Mac OS X Malware Blocked
on OS X Endpoints
64 Linux Malware Volume
64 Top Ten Linux Malware Blocked
on Linux Endpoints
65 Proportion of Malware Samples
That Are Virtual Machine Aware
67 DDoS Attack Volume Seen by
Symantec’s Global Intelligence Network
67 Top Five DDoS Attack Traffic Seen by
Symantec’s Global Intelligence Network
68 Distribution of Network Layer
DDoS Attacks by Duration (Q3)
68 Distribution of Network Layer
DDoS Attacks by Duration (Q2)65 Cloud and Virtualized Systems
65 Cloud Vulnerabilities
66 Protecting the IT infrastructure
66 Protect Information Wherever It Is
66 DDoS Attacks and Botnets
66 DDoS at Large
67 Simple but Effective
68 What’s in a Botnet?
69 Conclusions
71 Best Practice Guidelines
for Businesses
74 Best Practice Guidelines
for Website Owners
75 20 Critical Security Controls
78 Best Practice Guidelines
for Consumers
79 Credits
80 About Symantec
80 More InformationTABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 4
INTRODUCTION
Symantec has established one of the most
comprehensive sources of Internet threat data in the
world through the Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network,
which is made up of more than 63.8 million attack
sensors and records thousands of events per second.
This network monitors threat activity in over 157 countries
and territories through a combination of Symantec
products and services, such as Symantec DeepSight™
Intelligence, Symantec™ Managed Security Services,
Norton™ consumer products, and other third-party data
sources.
In addition, Symantec maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive vulnerability
databases, currently consisting of more than 74,180 recorded vulnerabilities (spanning more
than two decades) from over 23,980 vendors representing over 71,470 products.
Spam, phishing, and malware data is captured through a variety of sources, including the
Symantec Probe Network, a system of more than five million decoy accounts, Symantec.
cloud, and a number of other Symantec security technologies. Skeptic™, the Symantec.
cloud proprietary heuristic technology, is able to detect new and sophisticated targeted
threats before they reach customers’ networks. Over nine billion email messages are
processed each month and more than 1.8 billion web requests filtered each day across 13
data centers. Symantec also gathers phishing information through an extensive anti-fraud
community of enterprises, security vendors, and more than 52 million consumers and 175
million endpoints.
Symantec Website Security secures more than one million web servers worldwide with
100 percent availability since 2004. The validation infrastructure processes over six billion
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) look-ups per day, which are used for obtaining the
revocation status of X.509 digital certificates around the world. The Norton™ Secured Seal is
displayed almost one billion times per day on websites in 170 countries and in search results
on enabled browsers.
These resources give Symantec analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify,
analyze, and provide informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code
activity, phishing, and spam. The result is the annual Symantec Internet Security Threat
Report, which gives enterprises, small businesses, and consumers essential information to
secure their systems effectively now and into the future.TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 5
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Introduction
Symantec discovered more than 430 million new unique pieces of malware in
2015, up 36 percent from the year before. Perhaps what is most remarkable
is that these numbers no longer surprise us. As real life and online become
indistinguishable from each other, cybercrime has become a part of our daily
lives. Attacks against businesses and nations hit the headlines with such
regularity that we’ve become numb to the sheer volume and acceleration of
cyber threats.
Most threat reports only scratch the surface of the threat landscape, whereas
the breadth of Symantec’s data enables the Internet Security Threat Report
(ISTR) to examine multiple facets, including targeted attacks, smartphone
threats, social media scams, and Internet of Things (IoT) vulnerabilities, as well
as attackers’ tactics, motivations, and behaviors. While there is much to be
learned from this comprehensive view into the threat landscape, the following
are six key findings and trends from 2015.
A New Zero-Day Vulnerability Was Discovered
on Average Each Week in 2015
Advanced attack groups continue to profit from
previously undiscovered flaws in browsers
and website plugins
In 2015, the number of zero-day vulnerabilities discovered
more than doubled to 54, a 125 percent increase from the
year before. Or put another way, a new zero-day vulner -
ability was found every week (on average) in 2015. In
2013, the number of zero-day vulnerabilities (23) doubled
from the year before. In 2014, the number held relatively
steady at 24, leading us to conclude that we had reached a
plateau. That theory was short-lived. The 2015 explosion in
zero-day discoveries reaffirms the critical role they play in
lucrative targeted attacks.
Given the value of these vulnerabilities, it’s not surpris -
ing that a market has evolved to meet demand. In fact,
at the rate that zero-day vulnerabilities are being discov -
ered, they may become a commodity product. Targeted
attack groups exploit the vulnerabilities until they are publicly exposed, then toss them aside for newly discov -
ered vulnerabilities. When The Hacking Team was exposed
in 2015 as having at least six zero-days in its portfolio, it
confirmed our characterization of the hunt for zero days
as being professionalized.
Vulnerabilities can appear in almost any type of software,
but the most attractive to targeted attackers is software
that is widely used. Again and again, the majority of these
vulnerabilities are discovered in software such as Internet
Explorer and Adobe Flash, which are used on a daily
basis by a vast number of consumers and professionals.
Four of the five most exploited zero-day vulnerabilities in
2015 were Adobe Flash. Once discovered, the zero days
are quickly added to cybercriminal toolkits and exploited.
At this point, millions will be attacked and hundreds of
thousands infected if a patch is not available, or if people
have not moved quickly enough to apply the patch.SHARE
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2016 Internet Security Threat Report 6
Over Half a Billion Personal Records
Were Stolen or Lost in 2015
More companies than ever are not reporting
the full extent of their data breaches
At the close of 2015, the world experienced the largest data
breach ever publicly reported. An astounding 191 million
records were exposed. It may have been the largest mega-
breach, but it wasn’t alone. In 2015, a record-setting total
of nine mega-breaches were reported. (A mega-breach is
defined as a breach of more than 10 million records.)
The total reported number of exposed identities jumped
23 percent to 429 million. But this number hides a bigger
story. In 2015, more and more companies chose not to
reveal the full extent of the breaches they experienced.
Companies choosing not to report the number of records
lost increased by 85 percent. A conservative estimate by
Symantec of those unreported breaches pushes the real
number of records lost to more than half a billion.
The fact that companies are increasingly choosing to hold
back critical details after a breach is a disturbing trend.
Transparency is critical to security. While numerous data
sharing initiatives are underway in the security industry,
helping all of us improve our security products and
postures, some of this data is getting harder to collect.
Major Security Vulnerabilities in Three Quarters
of Popular Websites Put Us All at Risk
Web administrators still struggle to stay current
on patches
There were over one million web attacks against people
each and every day in 2015. Many people believe that
keeping to well-known, legitimate websites will keep them
safe from online crime. This is not true. Cybercriminals
continue to take advantage of vulnerabilities in legitimate
websites to infect users, because website administrators
fail to secure their websites. More than 75 percent of all
legitimate websites have unpatched vulnerabilities. Fifteen
percent of legitimate websites have vulnerabilities deemed
‘critical,’ which means it takes trivial effort for cybercrim -
inals to gain access and manipulate these sites for their
own purposes. It’s time for website administrators to step
up and address the risks more aggressively.Spear-Phishing Campaigns Targeting
Employees Increased 55 Percent in 2015
Cyber attackers are playing the long game
against large companies
In 2015, a government organization or a financial company
targeted for attack once was most likely to be targeted
again at least three more times throughout the year.
Overall, large businesses that experienced a cyber attack
saw an average of 3.6 successful attacks each.
In the last five years, we have observed a steady increase
in attacks targeting businesses with less than 250
employees, with 43 percent of all attacks targeted at small
businesses in 2015, proving that companies of all sizes are
at risk.
It’s not just Fortune 500 companies and nation states at
risk of having IP stolen–even the local laundry service is
a target. In one example, an organization of 35 employees
was the victim of a cyber attack by a competitor. The
competitor hid in their network for two years stealing
customer and pricing information, giving them a signif -
icant advantage. This serves as a clear warning that all
businesses are potentially vulnerable to targeted attacks.
In fact, spear-phishing campaigns targeting employees
increased 55 percent in 2015. No business is without risk.
Attackers motivated purely by profit can be just as tech -
nically sophisticated and well-organized as any nation
state-sponsored attackers. Take, for example, the Butterfly
gang, who steal information to use in stock manipulation.
Ransomware Increased
35 Percent in 2015
Cyber criminals are using encryption as a weapon to
hold companies’ and individuals’ critical data hostage
Ransomware continues to evolve. Last year, we saw Cryp -
to-ransomware (encrypting files) push the less damaging
locker-style ransomware (locking the computer screen) out
of the picture. Crypto-style ransomware grew 35 percent
in 2015. An extremely profitable type of attack, ransom -
ware will continue to ensnare PC users and expand to any
network-connected device that can be held hostage for a
profit. In 2015, ransomware found new targets and moved
beyond its focus on PCs to smart phones, Mac, and Linux
systems. Symantec even demonstrated proof-of-concept
attacks against smart watches and televisions in 2015. TABLE OF CONTENTS
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2016 Internet Security Threat Report 7
Symantec Blocked 100 Million Fake Technical
Support Scams in 2015
Cyber scammers now make you call them
to hand over your cash
While ransomware continues to grow as a threat, it is not
the only threat that people face. As people conduct more
of their lives online, attackers are finding new ways to lure
victims. Fake technical support scams, first reported by
Symantec in 2010, have evolved from cold-calling unsus -
pecting victims to the attacker fooling victims into calling
them directly. Attackers trick people with pop-ups that alert
them to a serious error or problem, thus steering the victim
to an 800 number, where a “technical support representa -
tive” attempts to sell the victim worthless services. In 2015,
Symantec blocked 100 million of these types of attacks.
Attackers continue to find ways to profit from what can
be stolen online. Last year, Netflix expanded into new
countries, attracting the attention of attackers. Symantec
researchers discovered logins and passwords to legiti -
mate Netflix accounts being sold on the black market. The
account access information was stolen via phishing or
malware. Of course, reselling account access on the black
market is not a new phenomenon. Symantec continues to
see stolen hotel loyalty, airline frequent flyer, and gaming
accounts advertised for sale on the black market.
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2016 Internet Security Threat Report 8
BIG NUMBERS
Number of Bots
2013
2.3M
–2014
1.9M
-18%2015
1.1M
-42%Email Phishing Rate (Not Spear Phishing)
2013
1 in 3922014
1 in 9652015
1 in 1,846
Email Malware Rate (Overall)
2013
1 in 1962014
1 in 2442015
1 in 220New Malware Variants
(Added in Each Year)
2014
317M
–2015
431M
+36%Overall Email Spam Rate
2013
66%
–2014
60%
-6%pts2015
53%
-7%pts 66 60 53Total Identities Exposed
2013
552M
–2014
348M
-37%2015
429M
+23%
Average Identities
Exposed per Breach
2013
2.2M
–2014
1.1M
-49%2015
1.3M
+21%
Median Identities
Exposed per Breach
2013
6,777
–2014
7,000
+3%2015
4,885
-30%
Crypto-
Ransomware Total
2014
269K
–2015
362K
+35%
Average
Per Day
737Average
Per Day
992Breaches With
More Than 10 Million
Identities Exposed
2013
8
–2014
4
-50%2015
9
+125%BREACHES
EMAIL THREATS, MALWARE AND BOTSTotal Breaches
2013
253
–2014
312
+23%2015
318
+2%TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 9
New Mobile
Vulnerabilities
2013
127
–2014
168
+32%2015
528
+214%
New Android Mobile
Malware Families
2013
57
–2014
46
-19%2015
18
-61%
Spear-Phishing
Emails per Day
2013
83
–2014
73
-12%2015
46
-37%New Android Mobile
Malware Variants
2013
3,262
–2014
2,227
-32%2015
3,944
+77%
Zero-day Vulnerabilities
2013
23
–2014
24
+4%2015
54
+125%New Vulnerabilities
2013
6,787
–2014
6,549
-4%2015
5,585
-15%MOBILE WEB
SPEAR-PHISHING
(EMAIL TARGETED ATTACKS)VULNERABILITIESScanned Websites with Vulnerabilities ...
2013
77%
–2014
76%
-1% pts2015
78%
+2% pts 77 76 78
... Percentage of Which Were Critical
2013
16%
–2014
20%
+4% pts2015
15%
-5% pts 16 20 15
Websites Found with Malware
2013
1 in 5662014
1 in 1,1262015
1 in 3,172Web Attacks Blocked per Day
2013
569K
–2014
493K
-13%2015
1.1M
+117%TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 10
MOBILE DEVICES & THE INTERNET OF THINGS
MOBILE
DEVICES
& THE
INTERNET
OF
THINGS
MOBILE DEVICES &
THE INTERNET OF
THINGS
SMARTPHONES
AND MOBILE DEVICES
Smartphones are an increasingly
attractive target for online criminals.
As a result, they are investing in
more sophisticated attacks that
are effective at stealing valuable
personal data or extorting money
from victims. Although Android users
remain the main target, 2015 saw
effective attacks on Apple devices as
well, and iOS devices did not need to
be jail-broken to be compromised.One Phone Per Person
The world bought more than 1.4 billion smartphones in 2015, up
10 percent from the 1.3 billion units sold in the previous year,
according to IDC’s Worldwide Quarterly Mobile Phone Tracker
(January 27, 2016). Five out of six new phones were running
Android , with one in seven running Apple’s iOS operating
system ( Smartphone OS Market Share , 2015, Q2). One mobile
manufacturer, Ericsson, predicts there could be as many as 6.4
billion smartphone subscriptions by the end of 2020, almost one
per person .
At the same time, high-end phones and tablets have powerful
processors and with 4G network, they have high-bandwidth
connectivity. They also contain valuable personal information.
In 2015, Apple Pay launched in more countries around the
world. With Samsung Pay and Android Pay also competing to
manage the cards in your wallet, other mobile payment systems
are likely to follow. All of this makes smartphones very attrac -
tive to criminals.TABLE OF CONTENTS
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2016 Internet Security Threat Report 11
MOBILE DEVICES & THE INTERNET OF THINGS
Cross-Over Threats
With many app stores, users are able to browse, purchase, and
remotely install apps from their desktop, providing a unique
opportunity for a cross-over of threats. In one example with
Google Play, customers can browse the Play Store from their
computer using a normal web browser, installing apps directly
onto their phone. Recent examples of some Windows malware
have exploited this by stealing browser cookies for Google Play
sessions from the infected desktop computer and using these
stolen cookies (essentially the users’ credentials), impersonat -
ing the user to remotely install apps onto the victims’ phones
and tablets without their knowledge or consent.
Cumulative Android Mobile Malware Families
TThe number of Android malware families added in 2015 grew by 6 percent,
compared with the 20 percent growth in 2014.
50100150200250300350
2015 2014 2013 2012 201171174231277295
Cumulative Android Mobile Malware Variants
TThe volume of Android variants increased by 40 percent in 2015, compared
with 29 percent growth in the previous year.
246810121416
2015 2014 2013 2012 20115674,3507,6129,83913,783THOUSANDThe number of mobile vulnerabilities has increased every year
over the past three years. Unlike Android devices, iOS vulner -
abilities have been a critical part of gaining access to an iOS
device, especially for jail-breaking. Jail-breaking enables a user
to install apps that are not authorized on the Apple Store and
bypasses the integral security of iOS. It is much more difficult to
compromise a non-jailbroken device, as this typically requires
an app to be installed by downloading it from the Apple Store.
Apple is well-known for its stringent screening processes, which
is why the number of malicious iOS apps is so much smaller
than for Android.
In 2012, IOS.Finfish had been the first example of a malicious
iOS app to be discovered in the Apple Store. Finfish was able to
steal information from a compromised device. OSX.Wirelurker
emerged in 2014, which used an attack involving USB connec -
tions to a Mac or PC, potentially enabling apps to be installed on
non-jailbroken iOS devices.
However, in 2015, attacks using XcodeGhost and YiSpecter were
revealed not to require vulnerabilities, or to be jail-broken, in
order to compromise an iOS device. We will be taking a closer
look at these and other mobile threats later in this section.
Mobile Vulnerabilities by Operating System
TVulnerabilities on the iOS platform have accounted for the greatest number
of mobile vulnerabilities in recent years, with research often fueled by the
interest to jail-break devices or gain unauthorized access to install malware.
102030405060708090100%
Windows
PhoneBlackberry OS Android iOS2013 2014 2015
8284 84
131116
14<1% <1% <1%1
Android Attacks Become More Stealthy
Android malware is becoming stealthier. For example, malware
authors started to obfuscate code to bypass signature-based
security software. Additionally, before they begin their attacks,
some malware can now check to see if it is running on real
phones or the kind of emulators or sandboxes that security
researchers use.TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 12
MOBILE DEVICES & THE INTERNET OF THINGS
The number of malware attacks against Android fluctuat -
ed during 2015. In Q1, Symantec blocked approximately 550
attacks each day, the highest period of the year. This fell to
approximately 272 per day by Q3, rising again to 495 by the end
of Q4.
Android Malware Volume
TThere were more than three times as many Android apps classified as
containing malware in 2015 than in 2014, an increase of 230 percent.
5,00010,00015,00020,00025,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
2015
Top Ten Android Malware
TThirty-seven percent of Android malware blocked by Symantec in 2015
related to variants of Android.Lotoor, which is generic detection for hacking
tools that can exploit vulnerabilities in Android in order to gain root privilege
access on compromised Android devices.
Rank Malware Percentage
1 Android.Lotoor 36.8%
2 Android.RevMob 10.0%
3 Android.Malapp 6.1%
4 Android.Fakebank.B 5.4%
5 Android.Generisk 5.2%
6 Android.AdMob 3.3%
7 Android.Iconosis 3.1%
8 Android.Opfake 2.7%
9 Android.Premiumtext 2.0%
10 Android.Basebridge 1.7%How Malicious Video Messages Could
Lead to Stagefright and Stagefright 2.0
No matter how quickly Google patches critical vulnerabilities in
the Android OS, the speed at which end-users receive updates is
dependent on their device manufacturers, and sometimes this can
take longer. This was highlighted when on July 2015, seven vulner -
abilities were patched that could allow attackers to compromise
affected devices by simply sending them a malicious multimedia
message (MMS); all the intended victim had to do was to look at the
malicious message, triggering an exploit.
The seven vulnerabilities involved were collectively known as
the “Google Stagefright Media Playback Engine Multiple Remote
Code Execution Vulnerabilities,” (CVE-2015-1538, CVE-2015-1539,
CVE-2015-3824, CVE-2015-3826, CVE-2015-3827, CVE-2015-3828
and CVE-2015-3829), and all were related to an Android component
known as libStageFright, which handled media playback. Joshua
Drake, from Zimperium zLabs, reported the vulnerabilities to
Google in April and May 2015, raising further concerns that while
Google had provided patches to its partners, many manufacturers
took much longer providing patches to protect their customers. The
severity of these vulnerabilities was compounded by the fact that
despite the availability of a patch from Google, users remained at
risk until carriers and manufacturers rolled out their own patches.
This can often take weeks or months, and many older devices may
never have a patch pushed out to them at all.
However, Google was keen to point out that devices with Android
4.0 and higher (approximately 95% of active Android devices),
have protection against a buffer overflow attack built-in, using a
technology called Address Space Layout Randomization, (ASLR).
Additionally, Android users were able to turn-off the automatic
retrieval of multimedia messages through the built-in Messaging
application, as well as through Google Hangouts.
Whilst this afforded partial mitigation, it could not prevent the
vulnerabilities from being exploited if a malformed or malicious
multimedia message was downloaded and opened.
In October 2015, two more Android vulnerabilities (CVE-2015-
6602 and CVE-2015-3876), similar to the original Stagefright bug,
were disclosed. Again, if exploited they could allow an attacker to
gain control of a compromised device, this time when the intended
victim viewed a preview of an .mp3 or .mp4 file. By creating
malicious audio or video files, attackers could entice a user to
preview a song or video on an unpatched Android device.
Google had previously patched the libStageFright library so it
no longer automatically processed such messages; however, it
remained possible for attackers to exploit libStageFright through
the mobile browser. Dubbed Stagefright 2.0, these new vulnerabil -
ities could also be exploited through man-in-the-middle attacks
and through third-party applications that still used Stagefright.
Discovered and reported in August, the patches for these new
vulnerabilities were included in Google’s October Monthly Security
Update.TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 13
MOBILE DEVICES & THE INTERNET OF THINGS
Android Users under Fire with Phishing
and Ransomware
Besides familiar tricks such as hiding malicious code inside
ostensibly legitimate apps, or being disguised as something
more useful, attackers are using more sophisticated techniques
to make money from their victims. For example, Symantec
researchers uncovered a new Android phishing Trojan that tricks
users into entering their banking credentials by popping up a
fake login page on top of legitimate banking apps. Similarly, the
latest Android ransomware copies Google’s design style to make
it appear more legitimate and intimidating when it displays fake
FBI warnings on users’ lockscreens. We have also seen phone
ransomware start to encrypt files, such as pictures, rather than
simply change the phone’s access PIN.
Apple iOS Users Now More at Risk than Ever
Thanks to Apple’s tight control over its app store and operating
system, threats to iPhones and iPads have been infrequent and
limited in scale. This changed in 2015.
TIn 2015, we identified nine new iOS threat families,
compared to four in total previously.
TBootlegged developer software, known as XcodeGhost ,
infected as many as 4,000 apps.
TThe YiSpecter malware bypassed the app store altogether by
using the enterprise app provisioning framework.
TResearchers found Youmi embedded in 256 iOS apps. This
software is used in apps to display advertising, but also
sends personal information to a remote location without
users’ consent.
TVulnerabilities in Apple’s AirDrop wireless file transfer
system could allow an attacker to install malware on an
Apple device.Ransomware Goes Mobile
TImagine the frustration of a user who downloads a cool new app to their
phone only to find the device locked with an FBI warning on the home
screen when they try to log in.
TThey have two options: pay a ‘fine’ and hope that the attackers unlock the
phone or give up access to precious photos, contacts, and memories.
iOS App Developers Haunted by XcodeGhost
As Apple sells more and more iPads and iPhones, we believe that
criminals will increasingly target them, drawn in part by the
higher disposable income (on average) of their owners. However,
owners and Apple users should no longer assume that Apple
devices are immune from attack. In September 2015, malware
was discovered in a number of iOS applications in China and was
discovered in a number of legitimate Apple Store apps, including
WeChat , a popular IM application. The problem was that these
apps were not specifically designed to be malicious, but rather
their developers had been compromised with malware that was
embedded into the apps they were developing.
The malicious code, known as XcodeGhost (detected as
OSX.Codgost ), had been discovered in certain unofficial versions
of Apple’s integrated development environment, Xcode. Develop -
ers of iOS applications that used these infected versions of Xcode
were unknowingly allowing malicious code to be inserted into
their own official iOS applications, putting their own users at risk.
If a user downloads and installs an infected app, XcodeGhost
uploads information about the device to its command and
control (C&C) server. The attacker would then be able to issue
commands through the C&C server to perform actions including:TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 14
MOBILE DEVICES & THE INTERNET OF THINGS
TCreating fake phishing alerts to steal the victim’s username
and password
TReading and writing data on the device’s clipboard, which
could be used to uncover passwords copied from a password
management tool
THijacking the browser to open specific URLs, which could
lead to further exploits
It has been estimated that hundreds of iOS apps on the Apple
App Store were infected, potentially affecting hundreds of
thousands of users, particularly in China, where the WeChat app
is particularly popular.
This threat did not require a jailbroken iOS device, as with other
iOS threats previously, making it a new and rather worrying
development in the mobile threat landscape. Symantec blocked
33 attacks in 2015, between September and December. Moreover,
it wasn’t just Apple’s iOS that came under fire in 2015. Mac OS X,
the company’s popular desktop operating system, also saw a rise
in vulnerabilities, exploits, and threats during the year.
YiSpecter Shows How Attackers Now Have iOS
Firmly in Their Sights
In 2015, we saw an escalation in threats targeting the iOS
platform, including YiSpecter (detected as IOS.Specter ), which
was also discovered in October 2015. YiSpecter was specifical -
ly designed to target Chinese speakers and has affected mainly
users in East Asia, including China and Taiwan.
YiSpecter is a Trojan horse that is able to exploit both jailbro -
ken and non-jailbroken iOS devices; it essentially provides a
back door onto the compromised device and installs adware.
The Trojan allows an attacker to accomplish a range of tasks,
including uninstalling apps, downloading new fraudulent apps,
and forcing other apps to display adverts.
Targeting Non-Jailbroken iOS Devices
and Certificate Abuse
YiSpecter was the first iOS threat that took advantage of Apple’s
enterprise app provisioning framework to compromise non-jail -
broken devices. The framework is used by many businesses to
legitimately deploy private apps to their workforce without
having to make them publicly available on the official App Store.
Apps are built and signed with enterprise certificates, and do
not need to be vetted by Apple before being distributed outside
of the App Store. This also affords more scope for businesses
to develop apps with features that would otherwise be rejected
by Apple, but could still be signed and deployed legitimately
through the framework.
However, as demonstrated with YiSpecter, iOS enterprise certifi -
cates can also be used to package and sign their malware. It’s not
known exactly how the attackers gained access to certificates,
but it’s possible that they registered with Apple as an enterprise, paying the necessary fees and following the vetting procedure.
Alternatively, they may have been able to steal legitimate certif -
icates from an already-registered developer or by partnering
with one.
Once the attackers had access to a valid enterprise certificate,
they were able to create, sign, and distribute their malicious
apps, potentially to any iOS device, without any further inter -
vention from Apple. Of course, when Apple learns of the
misuse of any enterprise certificate, it can be instantly revoked,
rendering any apps signed by it useless. Enterprise-signed apps
can generally only be installed once the user accepts the request
to trust the app or developer. From experience, we know that
asking the user whether they trust an app or developer is rarely
an effective security measure, but it is one last line of defense
that needs to be crossed before the malware can be installed.
Exploiting Apple’s Private APIs
One of the reasons that YiSpecter included more advanced func -
tionality was because it also used Apple’s own private APIs to
perform activities that standard iOS apps cannot. These “private
APIs” are reserved for Apple’s own apps to be able to perform
a range of system-level actions. Other iOS developers are not
supposed to use these APIs in their apps, and any third-par -
ty apps that do so are rejected from the Apple App Store. Of
course, YiSpecter is able to circumvent the official App Store,
instead relying on unofficial distribution channels to spread the
malware. As a result, the threat is able to take advantage of the
private APIs for its own purposes.
Cross-Platform Youmi Madware Pilfers
Personal Data on iOS and Android
In October 2015, Apple pulled as many as 256 apps from its App
Store for apparently violating the company’s privacy guidelines.
The apps had used third-party advertising technology from a
company called Youmi (detected as Android.Youmi ), which was
secretly being used to access private information, including
Apple ID email addresses and International Mobile Station
Equipment Identity (IMEI) numbers.
Soon after this, the same advertising library was discovered in a
number of Android apps, where it was being used to perform a
range of actions that could also compromise the user’s privacy,
including harvesting their GPS location and phone number, as
well as downloading additional, potentially unwanted applica -
tions.
Distinguishing Madware
Adware and its mobile counterpart, mobile Adware (or madware),
has been around for many years and is a popular way of financing
free apps, where the app developer is paid a fee for each of the
adverts presented to their users. Many people are happy relin -
quish a small area of the screen for advertising in exchange for a
free app; however, this may sometimes happen without consent TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 15
MOBILE DEVICES & THE INTERNET OF THINGS
or be particularly aggressive. Symantec recorded a 77 percent
rise in apps containing unwanted madware.
Ad-blocking tools have grown in popularity as a way to avoid
this, and by blocking mobile ads, they also help to reduce mobile
data costs incurred with madware traffic and minimize the
number of on-screen ads. Furthermore, such software can also
help to improve the security posture of a device by blocking
potentially unwanted madware that may be installed without
the user’s permission or knowledge.
App Analysis by Symantec’s Norton Mobile Insight
TSymantec analyzed 71 percent more apps in 2015 and more than three
times as many (230 percent) more were classified as malicious. A 30
percent rise in grayware was owing in large part to a 77 percent rise in
apps containing unwanted madware.
2013 2014 2015
Total Apps Analyzed6.1
Million 6.3
Million10.8
Million
Total Apps Classified
as Malware0.7
Million1.1
Million3.3
Million
Total Apps Classified
as Grayware2.2
Million2.3
Million3.0
Million
Total Grayware
Further Classified as
Madware1.2
Million1.3
Million2.3
Million
Malware DefinitionPrograms and files that are created to do
harm. Malware includes computer viruses,
worms, and Trojan horses.
Grayware DefinitionPrograms that do not contain viruses
and that are not obviously malicious, but
that can be annoying or even harmful
to the user, (for example, hacking tools,
accessware, spyware, adware, dialers, and
joke programs).
Madware DefinitionAggressive techniques to place advertising
in your mobile device’s photo albums and
calendar entries and to push messages to
your notification bar. Madware can even go
so far as to replace a ringtone with an ad.Protecting Mobile Devices
We recommend that people and employers treat mobile devices
like the small, powerful computers that they are and protect
them accordingly, including:
TAccess control, including biometrics where possible.
TData loss prevention, such as on-device encryption.
TAutomated device backup.
TRemote find and wipe tools, in the event of a lost device.
TRegular updating. For example, the latest version of
Android , codenamed Marshmallow (version 6.0), was
launched in October and includes a number of features
designed specifically to thwart attackers. According to
Statista , in October 2015, KitKat (version 4.4) was still the
most widely used version of Android at 38.9 percent, and
Lollipop (version 5.0) accounted for 15.6 percent.
TRefrain from downloading apps from unfamiliar sites and
only install apps from trusted sources.
TDon’t jailbreak devices. Jailbroken devices are often more
susceptible to security issues.
TPay particular attention to permissions requested by an app.
TUpdate apps as often as possible, or if a suspicious app is
identified, delete it and wait for a new version to be made
available.
TChange your Apple ID password, or your Google Play
password, if you suspect your account has been compro -
mised. This advice extends to safeguarding account
credentials on any third-party app store.
TWatch out for any suspicious emails or push notifications
to your device asking for your credentials, or any other
personally identifying information.
TUntil a patch is applied, proceed cautiously when using your
mobile browser to preview unsolicited audio and video files.
TAndroid users are advised to apply any security updates
issued by their carrier or device manufacturer as they
become available.
TAdditional mobile security solutions can also help safeguard
against malicious software, and enterprises should consider
mobility management tools that can help secure and
control mobile devices within an organization.TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 16
MOBILE DEVICES & THE INTERNET OF THINGS
Looking Ahead
We predict that mobile threats will continue to proliferate in
2016. We may soon see PC-like exploit kits for phones commer -
cialized on the black market.
At the same time, Apple and Google are working hard to secure
their operating systems and wider ecosystems. In particular,
we anticipate improvements in the techniques used to validate
and sign applications, as well as in application delivery. Phone
users will become accustomed to frequent on-by-default appli -
cation and operating system updates, and the need for security
software on their mobile devices.
This is perhaps an indicator of progress, rather than a cause for
despair. It suggests that security researchers, operating system,
developers, and app writers are, in fact, paying more attention
to mobile security by identifying and fixing more problems.
Although we expect mobile devices to come under growing
attack over the next year, there is also hope that with the right
preventative measures and continuing investment in security,
users can achieve a high level of protection against them.
THE INTERNET OF THINGS
Internet-connected things are
multiplying rapidly. We saw many
proof-of-concept and real-world
attacks in 2015, identifying serious
vulnerabilities in cars, medical
devices, and more. Manufacturers
need to prioritize security to
reduce the risk of serious personal,
economic, and social consequences.
Billions and Billions of Things
The Internet of Things has already arrived. We only have to look
around at our own environment to see the impact it is having on our
everyday lives. The average smart phone now has more computing
power than the Space Shuttle ; a smartwatch now downloads
updates from the Internet; the point-of-sale terminals at a coffee
shop are all connected to the company’s central financial system;
many cars now have satellite navigation and Bluetooth connections;
an Internet-connected thermostat can control the temperature in
our homes.
In the USA, for example, there are 25 online devices per 100 inhab -
itants , and that is just the beginning. Gartner forecasts that 6.4
billion connected things will be in use worldwide in 2016, and will reach 20.8 billion by 2020 (Gartner, Inc., press release , November
10, 2015).
If the Internet of Things is to deliver the promised $2 trillion
economic benefit, designers and manufacturers have to address
fundamental security challenges. The prospects, however, are not
good.
The Insecurity of Things
Over the last year, Symantec has seen an increase in proof-
of-concept attacks and growing numbers of IoT attacks in the
wild. In numerous cases, the vulnerabilities were obvious and
all too easy to exploit. IoT devices often lack stringent security
measures , and some attacks are able to exploit vulnerabilities in
the underlying Linux-based operating systems found in several
IoT devices and routers. Many issues stem from how securely
vendors implemented mechanisms for authentication and
encryption (or not). Here are some examples:
TCars. Fiat Chrysler recalled 1.4 million vehicles after
researchers demonstrated a proof-of-concept attack where
they managed to take control of the vehicle remotely. In the
UK, thieves hacked keyless entry systems to steal cars.
TSmart home devices. Millions of homes are vulnerable to
cyberattacks. Symantec research found multiple vulnerabili -
ties in 50 commercially available devices, including a ‘smart’
door lock that could be opened remotely online without a
password.
TMedical devices. Researchers have found potentially deadly
vulnerabilities in dozens of devices such as insulin pumps,
x-ray systems, CT-scanners, medical refrigerators, and
implantable defibrillators.
TSmart TVs. Hundreds of millions of Internet-connected TVs
are potentially vulnerable to click fraud, botnets, data theft,
and even ransomware, according to Symantec research.
TEmbedded devices. Thousands of everyday devices,
including routers, webcams, and Internet phones, share the
same hard-coded SSH and HTTPS server certificates , leaving
more than 4 million devices vulnerable to interception and
unauthorised access.
We expect to see more stories like this in the coming year. If a
device can be hacked, it likely will be. In addition, where there
are proof-of-concept attacks, real attacks invariably follow. We
may even expect to see IoT devices as the preferred route for
attacking an organization, and potentially the most difficult for
incident response staff to recognize and remove.
Given the present poor state of security on connected devices,
they will present an increasingly attractive target to criminals
who look for easy targets in the same way that burglars prefer
houses without alarms or resident dogs.TABLE OF CONTENTS
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MOBILE DEVICES & THE INTERNET OF THINGS
Peek into the Future:
The Risk of Things
Internet-connected things
Numbers in billions(predicted)
2014 2015 2016 20201234567891011121314151617181920
20.8 billion1
The insecurity of things
6.4 billion
3.9 billion 4.9 billion
1 Source: gartner.com/newsroom/id/3165317Today in the USA, there are
25 connected
devices per
100 inhabitants1 Cars. Fiat Chrysler recalled 1.4 million vehicles after researchers
demonstrated a proof-of-concept attack where they managed to take control of the vehicle remotely. In the UK, thieves hacked keyless entry systems to steal cars.Smart TVs. Hundreds of millions of Internet-connected TVs are potentially
vulnerable to click fraud, botnets, data theft and even ransomware,
according to Symantec research. Medical devices. Researchers have found potentially deadly vulnerabilities in
dozens of devices such as insulin pumps and implantable defibrillators.
Infographic: Peek into the Future: The Risk of Things
Infographic: Peek into the Future: The Risk of ThingsTABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 18
MOBILE DEVICES & THE INTERNET OF THINGS
Home Automation to Reach
a Tipping Point by 2020
Despite the increased attention and rapid development, the
Internet of Things has not reached a critical mass when it comes
to home automation. Perhaps one of the final hurdles holding
IoT dominance back has to do with standardized communi -
cation protocols. So far, we have seen plenty of growth with
interconnected IoT devices using well-established protocols,
such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth®. Devices that utilize 802.11b/g/n/
ac wireless protocols, including Smart TVs, intelligent thermo -
stats, IP cameras, and other devices, are cropping up everywhere.
Devices that employ Bluetooth 4.0, such as fitness trackers,
smart watches, and other wearables, have also helped IoT gain
significant traction in that market.
However, these communication protocols fall flat in many home
automation cases. The latest Wi-Fi technologies work great
for quick and efficient wireless connections, but have power
requirements that can put a strain on smaller devices. Bluetooth
does operate better in this scenario, but its short range does
not make it ideal for communication from more than a few feet
away. That’s not to say that it cannot be done. It just has not
been possible to do it cheaply enough to bring the technology
to ubiquity.
A number of vendors have stepped in to address these communi -
cations challenges, though none has yet to dominate the market.
This has resulted in a fragmented market of competing wireless
communication specifications tied to specific vendors or vendor
groups. What may finally open the gates for small, low powered
IoT devices is Wi-Fi HaLow™ (IEEE 802.11ah), a new communica -
tions protocol for IoT and wearable devices, slated to be finalized
and certified between 2016 and 2018. Once released, router
manufacturers could quickly incorporate the protocol to their
products, as with other communications protocols like 802.11ac,
and in so doing, open the doors for consumers to automate their
homes more easily and cheaply.
Of course, when introducing any new technology, the attack
surface expands, which presents a variety of new problems from
a security standpoint. Proprietary IoT networks have already
been found with multiple security vulnerabilities, some trivial
and some serious. The fundamental question regarding IoT and
home automation is not, “How do we do this?” It is, “How do we
do this securely?”
With the adoption of common standards, it is likely that older
proprietary protocols will fall by the wayside, paving the way
for potentially greater consolidation in the marketplace. While
larger, well-known brand names will continue to release their
own products, smaller, innovative IoT companies will become
attractive targets for organizations seeking to quickly expand
their portfolios into those areas. However, cybersecurity must
be at the core for the adoption of this new breed of IoT tech -
nology to succeed. As more homes become connected, it will be difficult for consumers to ignore the benefits that this new tech -
nology will promise.
It is always important to weigh the convenience of remote
control, automation, ease of use, and the benefits they can bring,
against the potential risks introduced that could lead to hackers
opening IoT locks , disabling IoT burglar alarm s, or generally
wreaking havoc with IoT devices .
How to Protect Connected Devices
Protecting the Internet of things requires the same holistic
approach as other areas of IT security. Unfortunately, both
Industrial IoT ecosystems, like the Industrial Internet Consor -
tium (IIC) , and consumer IoT ecosystems, such as the AllSeen
Alliance , are still very early in defining standards for this
rapidly evolving area. To address this, Symantec published its
Security Reference Architecture , and contributed to the IIC and
AllSeen efforts, along with the Online Trust Alliance (OTA) IoT
Trust Framework , and the US Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) Security Tenets for Life Critical Embedded Systems .
Effective security requires layers of security built into devices
and the infrastructure that manages them, including authenti -
cation, code signing, and on-device security (such as Embedded
Critical System Protection technology). Analytics, auditing, and
alerting are also key to understanding the nature of threats
emerging in this area. Finally, strong SSL/TLS encryption tech -
nology plays a crucial role in authentication and data protection.
Towards a Secure, Connected Future
As with other aspects of Internet security, some threats are
more dangerous than others are, and while a hacked fitness
monitor may be an inconvenience, a vulnerability in millions of
cars may present a more serious danger. Similarly, a backdoor
in a medical device may give thieves access to medical records,
albeit on a relatively small-scale, or it may lead to serious injury
or potentially even death.
The remedies are well-understood, but manufacturers need to
prioritize security and find the right balance between innovation,
ease-of-use, and time-to-market constraints. Fundamentally,
companies and consumers need to be assured that suppliers are
building security into the IoT devices they are buying.
TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 19
WEB THREATS
WEB
THREATS
WEB THREATS
WEB ATTACKS, TOOLKITS, AND
EXPLOITING VULNERABILITIES
ONLINE
If web servers are vulnerable, then
so are the websites they host and
the people who visit them. Attackers
are exploiting any vulnerability they
can to compromise websites and
commandeer their host servers. The
ease of use and wide availability
of web attack toolkits is feeding
the number of web attacks, which
doubled in 2015.Website owners still aren’t patching and updating their websites
and servers as often as perhaps they should. This is like leaving
a window open through which cybercriminals can climb through
and take advantage of whatever they find.
Over the past three years, more than three quarters of websites
scanned contained unpatched vulnerabilities, one in seven (15
percent) of which were deemed critical in 2015.TABLE OF CONTENTS
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WEB THREATS
Scanned Websites with Vulnerabilities
TA critical vulnerability is one which, if exploited, may allow malicious code
to be run without user interaction, potentially resulting in a data breach and
further compromise of visitors to the affected websites.
2013 2014 2015
77+23 76+24 78+22
77% 76%
-1% pts78%
+2% pts
Percentage of Vulnerabilities Which Were Critical
2013 2014 2015
16+84 20+80 15+85
16% 20%
+4% pts15%
-5% pts
Problematic Plugins
It’s not just the operating systems making web servers vulner -
able. While many of the major content management system
providers have improved security and implemented automatic
updates in recent years, the security of plugins for these systems
is still a big problem.
Browser Vulnerabilities
2004006008001,000
2015 2014 2013 2012 2011876
639591891
351Opera
Mozilla Firefox
Microsoft Internet
Explorer
Google Chrome
Apple SafariAnnual Plugin Vulnerabilities
TThe number of vulnerabilities in Adobe plugins has grown in 2015, an
indication that attackers are seeking to exploit plugins that are not only
cross-platform, but also ubiquitous. Most Adobe vulnerabilities are related to
Adobe Flash Player (also known as Shockwave Flash).
100200300400500600700
2015 2014 2013Adobe Plug-ins
Apple Plug-ins
Chrome Plug-ins
ActiveX Plug-ins
375
336679
The End Is Nigh for Flash
Adobe Flash Player has continually been the subject of malicious
exploitation over the years and accounted for 10 vulnerabilities
that were classified as zero days in 2015 (17 percent) compared
with 12 in 2014 (50 percent), and five in 2013 (22 percent). With
such rich pickings, it’s clear to see why attackers are partial to
exploiting Flash. Apple, Google, and Mozilla have all expressed
their concerns with the Flash plugin, and Google recently
announced that Flash will no longer be supported natively in
Chrome. Mozilla continues to support Flash within Firefox as an
exception to the general plugin policy.
From a security perspective, we expect Adobe Flash will
gradually fall out of common usage over the next year.
Web Attacks Blocked per Month
TThe chart shows the number of web attacks blocked each day on average
since 2013. An average of one million web attacks was blocked each day in
2015, an increase of 117 percent (more than double) compared with 2014. THOUSAND
30060090012001,500
2015 2014 2013TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 21
WEB THREATS
Exploiting Plugins for Web Servers
It’s not only plugins for web browsers that are vulnerable and
exploited. Take WordPress, which now powers a quarter of the
world’s websites , for example. Anyone can write a WordPress
plugin―and they often do. Plugins range from the useful to the
completely ridiculous, such as Logout Roulette : “on every admin
page load, there’s a 1 in 10 chance you’ll be logged out.”
The problem is, some plugins are shockingly insecure. Windows
attracts many exploits because of its large user base, and the
same applies to WordPress plugins. Vulnerable plugins found on
WordPress sites can and will be exploited.
Plugins, whether for browsers or servers, need to be updated
regularly as they are vulnerable to security flaws, and out-of-
date versions should be avoided where possible.
Minimize Risk from Plugins
TUpdate plugins regularly.
TWatch the media and security lists for warnings.
TBe very selective about the plugins used to reduce your attack
surface.
Infection by Injection
In 2015, Symantec also saw the return of Team GhostShell ,
which claims to have hacked a significant number of websites.
Earlier this year, the Symantec Security Response team reported:
“From first appearances, the recently released list of hacked
websites seems to be random and there is no indication that any
particular country or sector is being targeted. The group is more
than likely hacking websites based on their vulnerability.
In keeping with its previous modus operandi, it is likely that
the group compromised the databases by way of SQL injection
attacks and poorly configured PHP scripts.”
Again, these are hacks that most likely could have been
prevented with better website and server management. SQL
injection is a long-established attack method, which continues
to work because of an unnecessary weakness in the parameters
administrators establish for search queries.
Web Attack Exploit Toolkits
It is difficult to defend against new and unknown vulnerabili -
ties, particularly zero-day vulnerabilities for which there may
be no patch, and attackers are trying hard to exploit them faster
than vendors can roll out patches.
In 2015, following the breach of Hacking Team , an Italy-based
company, previously unknown zero-day exploits were made
public by the attackers. Exploits for zero-day vulnerabilities
were shared, and within hours, integrated into exploit toolkits. Angling for Malicious Ads
The Angler exploit kit, first seen in 2013, is arguably among
the most sophisticated exploit kits available today, and has
pioneered many technical advances that other exploit kits have
often followed, including the use of anti-cybersecurity counter -
measures. For example, Angler is able to download and execute
malware from memory, without needing to write any files to disk,
in an attempt to evade detection by traditional security technol -
ogy. Additionally, one significant factor in Angler’s incredible
growth in 2015 is that it has been very fast at integrating the
growing number of new zero-day exploits into its arsenal.
Top Five Web Attack Toolkits
TThe Angler exploit kit was the most common exploit kit in use during 2015,
and accounted for 23 percent of all exploit-kit web attacks. It has grown
considerably in the last year and was not featured in the top five for 2014.
Magnitude 2%RIG
0 100%AnglerNuclear
Neutrino 1%
23% 6%4% 14% 10% 8%Other 64%0 100%SakuraNuclear
Styx
OrangeKit
Blackhole
23% 10% 7%5%5% Other 50%
20152014
Angler was the most active exploit kit in 2015, and hundreds
of thousands of attacks by this kit were blocked by Symantec
on a daily basis. In total, the number of Angler-based attacks
blocked numbered over 19.5 million. Angler’s favorite delivery
mechanism was malvertisments, favoring exploited Adobe Flash
vulnerabilities. Windows was the preferred target for Angler
in 2015. Windows 7 in particular accounted for 64 percent of
Angler attacks, and Windows 8.1 accounted for 24 percent.
Moreover, Mac OS X did not appear to be in the firing line for
attackers using the Angler toolkit in 2015, but this is expected
to change as cybercriminals seek to exploit the Apple ecosystem.
Tech Support Scams Go Nuclear, Spreading
Ransomware
In 2015, Symantec recorded an increase in tech support scams ,
equivalent to a 200 percent rise compared to the previous year.
Tech support scams are not a new tactic, and hundreds of
thousands of people worldwide are targeted on a daily basis.
The earliest types of tech support scams involved call center
workers cold-calling users, trying to sell them technical support
packages to resolve non-existent problems on their intended
victims’ computers. TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 22
WEB THREATS
These scams have evolved over time, and more recent examples
may display seemingly endless fake warning messages, urging
the intended victims to call a toll-free number for help. On
calling the number, seemingly professional-sounding call center
staff try to convince their intended victims to install malware
and other unwanted applications onto their computers, while
claiming it will fix their problems.
In the latest twist, tech support scammers were found using
the Nuclear exploit kit to drop ransomware onto its intended
victims’ computers. The scammers could distract the user while
the ransomware encrypts files on their computer, perhaps
increasing their chances of earning money from the victim.
While this wasn’t the first time tech support scammers have been
discovered installing ransomware, the most recent examples
include a malicious HTML iframe on their website, redirecting
visitors to a server hosting the Nuclear exploit kit . The exploit
kit was found to be taking advantage of the recent Adobe Flash
Player Unspecified Remote Code Execution Vulnerability (CVE-
2015-7645), among other vulnerabilities. On success, it either
dropped Trojan.Cryptowall (ransomware) or Trojan.Miuref.B (an
information-stealing Trojan).
This was the first time Symantec has seen tech support scams
used in parallel with the Nuclear exploit kit to deliver ransom -
ware, and if this proves to be an effective combination, this
trend is set to continue. While it may be quite plausible that
tech support scammers and exploit kit attackers have joined
forces, it is possible that the tech support scammers’ own web
servers were compromised by a separate group who are using
the Nuclear exploit kit.
Blocked Tech Support Scams
TIn total, Symantec blocked more than 100 million malware or exploit-kit
attacks relating to tech support scams in 2015.
TThe countries targeted the most by tech support scams were the US, UK,
France, Australia, and Germany. MILLION
2
JAN
2015FEB MAR APR MAY JUN JUL AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC4681012141618Malvertising
The middle of 2015 was filled with accounts of malvertising
affecting almost every segment of the ad-supported Internet.
One possible explanation is that malvertising is simply an
easier way to infect site visitors than spamming out links to
infected websites. It’s much easier for an attacker to try and
compromise a popular site or seek to host malicious ads on
popular, high-traffic websites because it means they don’t need
to consider the complex nuancing of social engineering, elimi -
nating one more step in the bad guys’ “pipeline.”
Ad companies often don’t request a lot of information from
people submitting ads, making it easy for criminals to masquer -
ade as legitimate businesses and upload malicious ads, which
can appear on any number of sites.
Thanks to the use of cookies, malware authors can also tailor
their malicious code or redirects to target almost any subset of
users, by geography, time of day, company, interests, or recent
Internet activity.
Classification of Most Frequently Exploited Websites
TTechnology and business related websites were the most popular for
hosting malicious content and malvertising in 2015.
2015 Top 10 Most
Frequently Exploited
Categories
of Websites2015
Percentage
of Total
Number
of infected
Websites2014
Top 102014
%
1Technology 23.2% Technology 21.5%
2 Business 8.1% Hosting 7.3%
3 Search 7.5% Blogging 7.1%
4 Blogging 7.0% Business 6.0%
5 Dynamic 6.4% Anonymizer 5.0%
6 Educational 4.0% Entertainment 2.6%
7 Domain Parking 3.2% Shopping 2.5%
8 Entertainment 2.6% Illegal 2.4%
9 Shopping 2.4% Domain Parking 2.2%
10 Illegal 2.1%Virtual
Community1.8%TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 23
WEB THREATS
Unfortunately, malvertising is notoriously difficult to track
and criminals have become increasingly clever, removing the
malicious code from their ads after an hour or two, making it
almost invisible. Since it is powerful, effective, and hard to
analyze, we expect the use of malvertising to continue to grow.
Consequently, an increased demand for ad-blockers may in turn
help to reduce the negative impact of malvertising.
CYBERSECURITY CHALLENGES
FOR WEBSITE OWNERS
Whether it’s the way we shop,
work, or pay our tax bill, trust and
confidence in online services has
become critical to our way of life.
Thankfully, changes are coming to
the way we use and secure the
Internet to reinforce trust in online
privacy, security, and transactions.
Website security encompasses more than the information in
transit between a server and visitors to a website. Organiza -
tions need to think about their websites as parts of an entire
ecosystem that needs constant care and attention if they want
to retain people’s trust and confidence.
The consequences of failing to bolster website security are likely
to extend beyond the costs to an individual company: it will
damage consumer confidence and the wider economic fallout
could be huge.
Put Your Money Where Your Mouse Is
The scales finally tipped during the 2015 Thanksgiving holiday
weekend in the US, as the number of consumers shopping online
exceeded those shopping in store, according to the National
Retail Foundation .
E-commerce is big business, and Ecommerce Europe reported
that global business-to-consumer ecommerce turnover grew
by 24 percent, reaching $1.9 billion in 2014. However, that may
seem small compared to the $6.7 trillion that Frost & Sullivan
estimates the business-to-business e-commerce market will be
worth by 2020. Frost & Sullivan’s forecast includes all forms of
electronic commerce including using Internet and electronic
data interchange systems.
Even governments are becoming increasingly dependent on
digital services to keep their books balanced. The British govern -ment, for example, recently revealed that it had saved £1.7
billion through digital and technology transformation in 2014.
While SSL/TLS certificates, trust marks, and good website
security all help maintain the online economy, all this economic
activity could be at risk if people lose trust and confidence in the
security foundations of the online economy.
Websites Are Still Vulnerable to Attacks
Leading to Malware and Data Breaches
Websites are a critical element in major attacks: they are a way
into the network, they are a way into sensitive data, and they are
a way to reach customers and partners.
For example, the rise in malware aimed at Linux web servers―
including website hosts―proves that criminals have realized
that the infrastructure behind websites is as valuable, if not
more so, than the information encrypted by SSL/TLS certifi -
cates.
Many attacks against website infrastructure could be prevented
with regular maintenance and patching, but the numbers
suggest that website owners just aren’t managing to keep up.
Three quarters of the websites Symantec scanned in 2015 had
vulnerabilities―a number that hasn’t shifted in years.
Cybercriminals continued to find vulnerabilities in the underly -
ing infrastructure of website security in 2015, including FREAK ,
which allowed attackers intercepting a secure connection to
force the server to downgrade to encryption an easier-to-crack
protocol.
Distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks have also
continued to prove disruptive to businesses 2015. While large-
scale attacks such as the one that hit the BBC at the end of 2015
tend to grab headlines, businesses of every size are a target for
attack and often smaller sites can suffer as part of the collateral
damage when a host has to shut down a server, taking multiple
sites offline, because of an attack on just one of its clients.
Mitigation tactics and tools exist to defend against DDoS attacks,
but website managers need to take the time to understand and
deploy them if they are to keep their websites safe.
Moving to Stronger Authentication
It’s not all bad news. There have been several advances in both
the strength and adoption of SSL/TLS certificates in 2015
as well as initiatives by Certificate Authorities (CAs) to make
issuing SSL/TLS certificates more transparent.
Crucially, nearly 40 percent of all downstream Internet traffic in
the US is now encrypted, according to research from Sandvine ,
and this is expected to grow to more than 70 percent of the
world’s Internet traffic over the coming year.
Unfortunately, in a world where everything is encrypted,
consumers have a false sense of security that whenever they see
HTTPS in the browser, the website that they are on has been SHARE
THIS
TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 24
WEB THREATS
validated and authenticated and must therefore be genuine.
In reality, online fraud has historically occurred on Domain
Validated (DV) sites , which offer no validation of the organiza -
tion behind the site.
With DV certificates, the CA will verify that a contact at the
domain in question approves the certificate request, usually via
email or telephone, and this is often automated. Consequent -
ly, DV certificates are usually cheaper than the more rigorous
Extended Validation (EV) SSL certificates, which require more
vetting and validation.
While DV certificates verify the consent of a domain owner,
they make no attempt to verify who the domain owner really is,
making it ideal for both phishing and MITM (man-in-the-mid -
dle) attacks. Symantec expects to see a move by organisations,
particularly those driven by PCI compliance, to strengthen the
requirements for stronger authentication, and the adoption of
EV SSL certificates providing greater levels of assurance.
Encryption of SSL/TLS will also become stronger with the shift
from SHA-1 to SHA-2. Historically, SHA1 is a very popular
one-way hashing function, where each hash generated from a
source is intended to be unique. There should be no “collision”
where two different sources will generate the same hash;
however, the first weaknesses were identified as early as 2005.
This came to a head in 2014 when Google announced it would
soon no longer support sites using SHA1 and will display
security warnings to visitors trying to access sites with SHA-1
certificates expiring after 1st January 2017. Several other
browser vendors followed suit, spelling the inevitable end for
SHA-1.
The security community is making great progress, and there is a
real opportunity to significantly reduce the number of success -
ful website attacks, but it will only happen if website owners
step up and take action too.
Accelerating to Always-On Encryption
Nearly 40 percent of all downstream Internet traffic in the US is
now encrypted, according to research from Sandvine , and this is
expected to grow to more than 70 percent of the world’s Internet
traffic over the year. This sudden upsurge is down to a number
of factors:
TBig company commitment. Some of the biggest names
on the Internet have already adopted HTTPS, including
Facebook, Twitter and, more recently, Netflix .
TSearch engine preference. Google announced in 2014 that
the adoption of ‘HTTPS everywhere’ would have a positive
impact on search rankings, encouraging site owners to adopt
it to get an edge in search engine rankings. THTTP upgrade. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
the organization in charge of creating standards for the
Internet, published a new version of the Hypertext Transfer
Protocol in 2015. Dubbed HTTP/2, it will likely be adopted as
standard in the near future and, as the draft states , HTTP/2
enables a “more efficient use of network resources,” meaning
HTTP/2 is designed to deliver better, faster responsive
performance for websites out of the box. And every major
browser has said its support for HTTP/2 is only going to be
over SSL/TLS. In effect, this makes encryption mandatory
for sites using this new standard.
The hope is that within the next few years, every page on the
Internet will have an SSL/TLS certificate. Symantec is already
working with web hosting providers to help them provide
encryption as part of their service to website owners.
Reinforced Reassurance
Several major browsers are also changing their security indi -
cators―the colours and symbols used in the address bar to
indicate to visitors how safe a site is―to make it clear when an
SSL/TLS-secured web page includes unsecured content that is
vulnerable to man-in-the-middle tampering. In other words,
this will make it clearer when a site fails to achieve always-on
encryption and the danger this poses.
This is just one example of the drive to offer added reassurance
to websites visitors and online shoppers, which also includes
trust marks and shopping guarantees , which help to allay the
fears many shoppers have when they shop online and can’t see
the store owner in person or hold the goods they’re buying in
their hands.
TTaken from Mozilla’s Security Blog
TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 25
WEB THREATS
Websites Need to Become Harder to Attack
Organizations need to be more proactive around SSL/TLS imple -
mentation. It’s not a one-and-done task. Tools that automate
and streamline the process are essential.
Updates are released regularly for SSL/TLS protocol libraries,
such as OpenSSL, to protect against such vulnerabilities, but
website owners still have to install them. The move from SHA-1
certificates to the much stronger SHA-2 is also accelerating, but
again organizations have to deploy the new certificates properly
for the change to be effective.
Rather than thinking solely about protection, website managers
need to think about protection, detection, and response. They
need to use automation tools to monitor their websites continu -
ally for signs of vulnerability or attack, block those attacks, and
then report, update, and patch accordingly.
SSL/TLS AND THE
INDUSTRY’S RESPONSE
SSL/TLS remains at the heart of
online privacy, authentication, and
encryption, but around them is an
infrastructure of trust that requires
maintenance and vigilance if it is to
remain effective. The industry must
learn and adapt.
The Evolution of Encryption
On August 11, 1994 , Daniel Kohn sold a CD to a friend in Phil -
adelphia. His friend used his credit card to spend $12.48, plus
shipping costs, in a transaction that, for the first time ever,
was protected by encryption technology. The site Daniel ran at
the time required customers to download a special browser to
conduct secure transactions, which employed the PGP encryp -
tion standard that his website relied on.
Reporting the next day, the New York Times commented:
“Alarmed by increasing reports of security breaches on the
Internet, many people and businesses are reluctant to transmit
sensitive information, including credit cards numbers, sales
information, or private electronic mail messages, on the
network.”
Twenty years later, people’s concerns remain the same, although
their behaviour suggests they’re willing to take the risk of
relying on their bank for help if something goes wrong. Without a consistent and secure SSL/TLS infrastructure, however, this
fragile state of trust will crumble and ecommerce simply won’t
be able to function.
Strength in Numbers
The strength of SSL/TLS has come a long way since 1994, and
this year saw the switch from SHA-1 to SHA-2 as the industry
standard moving forward.
As computing power has increased, so has a hacker’s ability
to break hashing algorithms through sheer brute force. Many
experts predict that SHA-1 will become vulnerable in the very
near future. That’s why the major browsers have agreed to stop
supporting SHA-1 certificates during the next two years so that
any visitors trying to access a site continuing to use them will
see a security warning.
“The current plan is to [stop accepting SHA-1 certificates] on
January 1, 2017. However, in light of recent attacks on SHA-1,
we are also considering the feasibility of having a cut-off date as
early as July 1, 2016,” says Mozilla , and there has been discus -
sion of bringing those dates even further forward to accelerate
the change.
Symantec offers a free upgrade service, but large organizations
need to ensure they have a full migration plan in place to update
any devices and applications that may not currently recognize
SHA-2.
Time to freak out?
TThe vulnerability known as FREAK was discovered back in
March 2015. Attackers who intercepted the setting up of a secure
connection between an affected server and client could force them to use ‘export-grade’ encryption, a much weaker form of encryption than is usually used today, therefore making the transacted message easy to break with the computing resources available today.
TIt’s estimated that servers supporting 9.6 percent of the top one
million website domains were initially vulnerable to attack and nine months later, 8.5 percent remain so.
Slipping through the Cracks
Despite encryption getting stronger, many of the attacks aimed
at SSL/TLS this year have focused on weaknesses in the wider
SSL/TLS ecosystem.
Symantec has seen a much greater focus in the last year on the
code libraries related to SSL/TLS implementations, and as a
result, we have seen a regular stream of vulnerability updates
and fixes.
That’s the good news. But the most common unpatched vulner -
abilities on web servers in the last year reveal that website
owners aren’t keeping up with the releases. It’s vital that website
managers maintain the integrity of their SSL/TLS implementa -
tions. It’s not a fit-and-forget task.SHARE
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TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 26
WEB THREATS
Top 10 Vulnerabilities Found Unpatched on Scanned
Web Servers
TPOODLE (Padding Oracle On Downgraded Legacy Encryption) exploited an
outdated form of encryption (SSL 3.0) instead of TLS.
Name
1 SSL/TLS POODLE Vulnerability
2 Missing X-Content-Type-Options Header
3 Missing X-Frame-Options Header
4 SSL Certificate Signed using Weak Hashing Algorithm
5 Cross Site Scripting Vulnerability
6 Missing Strict-Transport-Security Header
7 SSL v2 support detected
8 Missing Secure Attribute in an Encrypted Session (SSL) Cookie
9 SSL Weak Cipher Suites Supported
10 SSL and TLS protocols renegotiation vulnerability
Although we didn’t see any vulnerabilities as potentially
dangerous as 2014’s Heartbleed, OpenSSL released several
updates and patches throughout 2015. OpenSSL is one of the
most widely-used implementations of the SSL and TLS cryp -
tographic protocols and is used on two-thirds of all web servers.
The updates it released were for vulnerabilities that ranged
from low risk to high severity and which could allow attackers
to carry out man-in-the-middle attacks to eavesdrop on secure
communications or to launch denial-of-service attacks .Checks and Balances
In order to strengthen the SSL/TLS ecosystem, Symantec
has pushed for the widespread adoption of DNS Certification
Authority Authorization (CAA). This allows an organization, or
DNS owner, to specify which certificate authority (CA) it will buy
SSL/TLS certificates from. If a malicious actor, or an employee
who doesn’t know company policy, tries to purchase a certificate
from a CA not on the approved list, that CA can check the CAA
and alert the DNS owner of the request.
This reduces the risk of rogue certificates being issued in a legit -
imate organization’s name without its knowledge, which in turn
would reduce the risk of criminals being able to set up certified
phishing sites.
In an effort to better spot rogue certificates, Symantec is also
complying with Google’s request to log all EV certificates we
issue on its Certificate Transparency log . As of March 2016,
Symantec is also logging OV and DV certificates. Along with
software that can monitor and audit certificates and their use,
this creates, as its authors say , “an open framework that lets
anyone observe and verify newly issued and existing SSL certif -
icates in nearly real time."
Trust Services, Electronic Identification (eID),
and Electronic Trust Services (eTS)
In September 2015, the European Commission completed the
adoption of all the implementing acts required for adoption
of the new eIDAS Regulation. This regulation marks a major
change in the regulatory environment to enable secure and
seamless electronic interactions between businesses, citizens,
and public authorities across Europe.
Moreover, it is also an important step forward in promoting
greater security requirements for Certificate Authorities (CAs)
with the implementation of an EU Trust Mark for Qualified
Trust Services. The new trust mark will help in clearly differ -
entiating qualified trust services from others in the market,
fostering greater transparency and confidence in such essential
online services. TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 27
SOCIAL MEDIA & SCAMS
SOCIAL ENGINEERING AND
EXPLOITING THE INDIVIDUAL
The sophistication and ruthlessness
of some of the attacks and tactics
used by cybercriminals in 2015
have demonstrated how vulnerable
individuals are online and chipped
away at public confidence in online
security. Data breaches, government
surveillance, and good old-fashioned
scams came together to further
encroach on personal privacy,
whether it is personal photos, login
credential or medical histories.
Personal data is anything but private.Trust No One
In 2015, Symantec saw plenty of traditional scams and
malware attacks intended to gather personal information. For
example, one scam promised large numbers of followers for
free on Instagram , while seeking to fool people into revealing
their passwords. Some attacks impersonated tax officials in
an attempt to trick people into downloading malicious email
attachments.
In their simplest form, many scams still rely on the poor security
habits of the general public to succeed. However, we have also
seen how poor website security can expose customer data. In the
latter example, it doesn’t matter how strong a password may be
if the website is vulnerable to a data breach.
More concerning are attacks in 2015 that made use of sophisti -
cated social engineering to bypass the two-factor authentication
systems designed to safeguard users.
By going through a legitimate password-reset process and
posing as Google via SMS, however, one scam was able exploit
the public’s trust in a reputable brand to gain access to email
accounts without raising the victims’ suspicions. SOCIAL
MEDIA,
SCAMS,
& EMAIL
THREATS
SOCIAL
MEDIA,
SCAMS,
& EMAIL
THREATS
SHARE
THIS
TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 28
SOCIAL MEDIA & SCAMS
555-283-4 972
...@gmail .com
[email protected] omJohn Doe
Get a v erifica tion c ode on my phone: ****555
Receive via:Account Help
a text mess age (SMS)
an aut oma ted phone call
Continue1
An a ttacker obtains a
victim’ s email a ddress
and phone number—both
of which ar e usually
publicly a vailable.2
The attacker poses as the victim and requests a password reset from Google.
Google sends the code to the victim.
3
The attacker then texts the victim with a message similar to:4
The attacker can then reset the password and once they have what they want or have set up forwarding, can inform the victim—again posing as Google—of their new temporary password, leaving the victim none the wiser. 6
“Google has detected unusual activity
on your account. Please respond with the code sent to your mobile device to stop unauthorized activity.”5
The victim ther efore expects the
password-reset verifica tion c ode
that Goo gle sends out and
passes i t on t o the a ttacker. 483829
new password483829
How the Gmail Scam Works
Source: Symantec
Infographic: How The Gmail Scam WorksTABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 29
SOCIAL MEDIA & SCAMS
Secrets and Lies
While traditional scams continued, 2015 also saw more salacious
scams and threats to privacy.
Online ‘ sextortion ’ has been around for years , and more
recent examples, particularly prevalent in Asia, have turned
to malicious Android apps. These scammers, using an attrac -
tive avatar or profile picture, encourage the intended victim to
share sexually-explicit videos. The criminals then encourage
the victim to “continue the liaison” using an Android app, which
also gathers the victim’s phone number, account details, and all
of their contacts.
Now with an incriminating video, and a list of the victim’s
friends and family, the gang threatens to send the sexually
explicit content to the victim’s entire contact list unless they
pay up. Because of the sensitive nature of the threat, victims
often find it difficult to go to the authorities and end up sending
hundreds, if not thousands, of dollars to the attacker.
In the wake of the Ashley Madison attack , a spike in spam
messages with subject lines like “How to Check if You Were
Exposed in Ashley Madison Hack” or “Ashley Madison hacked,
is your spouse cheating?” were reported. The hack was perhaps
more unusual in that its ramifications went well beyond the
financial sphere to affect people’s personal relationships and
reputations.
Social Engineering
Using Social Media
Social media remains a favored target
of scammers, as criminals seek to
leverage the trust people have in their
own social circles to spread scams,
fake links, and phishing. To succeed,
the social engineering involved must
be convincing, and so we see more
progressive and ingenious tactics to
dupe potential victims.
One scam in particular went to great
lengths to create an entire family
tree of hundreds of thousands of fake
Twitter accounts, each branch boosting
the credibility of the one above, to gain
followers, and retweets from genuine
Twitter users. At the top of the family
tree were accounts impersonating news
outlets and celebrities, even curating
real tweets from the genuine accounts
to make them seem more credible.
Through the discovery of these
imposter accounts, we identified three
account types that were being used: T‘Mockingbird’ accounts: use brand and celebrity imagery for
impersonation
T‘Parrot’ accounts: fake accounts using stolen tweets and
photographs of real women
T‘Egg’ accounts: act like new users with no tweets and use the
default “egg” avatar
Each tweet from a Mockingbird account received nearly 1,000
retweets and 500 favorites, which were not genuine, as they orig -
inated from a secondary account, which we called the Parrot. In
turn, Parrot accounts, follow anyone and everyone in the hope
that genuine Twitter users will follow them back, a remarkably
effective tactic.
If these Parrot accounts only retweeted spam from the Mock -
ingbird accounts, they would quickly be spotted, which is why
they also posted other tweets too, typically copying tweets and
retweeting memes from genuine Twitter users.
On the other hand, the majority of Egg accounts never composed
a single tweet. Instead, they would simply be used to bolster the
number of followers of the Parrot accounts in the hundreds.
This complex operation centered on weight-loss spam. The
operators went to great lengths to avoid anti-spam measures
and were able to operate for a long time.
TGraphic showing how the spam operation works. Taken from white paper .TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 30
SOCIAL MEDIA & SCAMS
Social networking scams require some form of interaction,
and manual sharing remained the main route for social media
attacks in 2015, expanding on the technique that had snow -
balled in the previous year.
Social Media
102030405060708090100%
Fake
PluginFake
AppsLikejacking Fake
OfferingManual
Sharing70
57512 20<1 07681
217232014 2015 2013
TManual Sharing – These rely on victims to actually do the work of
sharing the scam by presenting them with intriguing videos, fake
offers, or messages that they share with their friends.
TFake Offering – These scams invite social network users to join a
fake event or group with incentives, such as free gift cards. Joining often requires the user to share credentials with the attacker or send a text to a premium rate number.
TLikejacking – Using fake “Like” buttons, attackers trick users into
clicking website buttons that install malware and may post updates on a user’s newsfeed, spreading the attack.
TFake Apps – Users are invited to subscribe to an application that
appears to be integrated for use with a social network, but is not as described, and may be used to steal credentials or harvest other personal data.
TFake Plugin – Users are invited to install a plugin to view a video, but
the plugin is malicious and may spread by re-posting the fake video message to a victim’s profile page without permission. Examples include installing a fake YouTube premium browser extension to view the video, or noticing that a DivX plugin is required, and the fake plugin masquerades as such. For more information visit:
http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/fake-browser-plug-new-vehicle-scammers
Language and Location Is No Barrier
Other forms of attack seen in 2015 also prove just how sophis -
ticated and ruthless criminals are willing to be to make a profit.
Wherever you live or whatever language you speak, you could
still be under threat from cyber attackers. Take Boleto, a payment
system used in Brazil for example. Boleto may be considered a niche, very local system, and yet in 2015, three malware families
emerged specifically targeting it.
Similar localized attacks around the world show that cyber -
criminals are putting in the effort to manipulate victims no
matter the location or the language. Adapting phishing scams
using phishing toolkits makes it extremely easy to conduct a
campaign against a target in one country, change the templates,
and quickly target another elsewhere. Often the language used
in such localized attacks has been automatically translated
through the templates and may appear convincing to a non-na -
tive speaker.
Number of Phishing URLs on Social Media
TThe chart shows how social media has played a crucial role in the social
engineering of attacks in the past. In recent years, these sites have
clamped-down on such abuses, and made it much harder for the attackers
to exploit them.
5,00010,00015,00020,00025,00030,000
2015 2014 2013
Safeguarding Against Social Engineering
Cybercrime costs the global economy up to US$575 billion
annually according to BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research,
whose report goes on to say that in a potential worst-case 2020
‘Cybergeddon’ scenario, cybercrime could extract up to a fifth of
the value created by the Internet.
It is everyone’s responsibility to do all they can to prevent that
from happening.
For consumers, it’s time kick bad habits. Many people know
the basics of good cybersecurity, yet people continue to share
their passwords. In fact more than a third of people who share
passwords in the United States have shared the password to
their online banking account. People need to start taking more
responsibility for shoring up their online security.
Users should more wary of who they follow on social media. Bots
can appear more and more like a real person, and are sometimes
difficult to spot. When choosing who to trust on social media,
consider the following advice:TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 31
SOCIAL MEDIA & SCAMS
TBe skeptical of new followers. If a random person follows
you, do not automatically follow them back. Look at their
tweets. Are they retweeting content that looks like spam? If
they are, they are most likely a bot.
TNumbers can lie. Even if these random followers have tens
of thousands of followers, those numbers can easily be faked.
Do not base your decision to follow them back based on how
many people follow them.
TLook for the “verified” badge. Twitter users should always
check to see if a well-known brand or famous celebrity has
been verified by Twitter before following. The blue verified
badge denotes that Twitter has authenticated the true owner
of an account.
Taking risks with cybersecurity is not acceptable, and we should
reject the misconception that privacy no longer exists. Privacy is
something precious, and should be protected carefully.
For businesses, this means approaching security in terms of
education, cybersecurity awareness training, and good digital
hygiene. Every employee should be part of the effort to stay
digitally healthy. CIOs and IT managers need to be aware of
just how many risks they face and start proactively monitoring
for symptoms so that they can diagnose digital diseases before
putting customer data and customer confidence at risk.
EMAIL AND COMMUNICATIONS
THREATS
IT systems continue to come
under attack from rapidly evolving
malware. Email remains the medium
of choice for cybercriminals and
email volumes continue to grow, as
phishing and spam decline—the latter
of which accounted for more than
half of inbound email traffic. Phishing
attacks were more targeted and
malicious emails grew in number
and complexity, highlighting how
email remains an effective medium
for cybercriminals.Email Abuse
Email continues to dominate digital communications, regard -
less of the rising popularity of instant messaging technology
for both business and consumer use. Symantec estimates there
were approximately 190 billion emails in circulation each day in
2015, a number that we predict to grow by as much as 4 percent
by the end of 2016. On average, each business user sent and
received 42 emails each day, and a growing number of individ -
uals were reading email on mobile devices. For cybercriminals
who want to reach the largest number of people electronically,
email is still the favored way to do it.
No wonder it is still widely used by Internet criminals for spam,
phishing, and email malware. In 2015, Symantec saw email
threats decline. Email-based attacks from phishing and malware
are categorized as spam, and accounted for approximately one
percent of all spam email. Symantec provides further analysis of
spam classified as malware and phishing, as these threats have
potentially significant, harmful consequences.
Symantec scans a significant proportion of the global business
email traffic, giving us a unique insight into this medium and
the security threats it poses. Many business emails will never
be sent outside of an organization, with approximately three
quarters of external business email traffic being inbound, more
than half of which was spam.
Spam Trends
More than half of inbound business email traffic was spam in
2015, despite a gradual decline over recent years. In 2015, spam
reached its lowest level since 2003. However, the spam problem
is not going away. Spammers are finding other ways to reach
their audiences, including the use of social networking and
instant messaging, two of the most popular types of applica -
tions found on mobile devices. In exploiting them in addition to
email, spammers continually seek to evolve their tactics.
In addition, Symantec has observed an increase in what
is commonly known as “snowshoe spam.” As an analogy,
snowshoes are designed to spread the wearer’s weight across a
wide area, and snowshoe spamming distributes large volumes of
spam across a wide range of IP addresses. As the name implies,
this technique seeks to circumvent anti-spam technology, such
as propagation latency and IP address reputation, by sending
large volumes of spam messages in very short bursts. By also
quickly rotating domains and recirculating IP addresses, this
can make them more difficult to block quickly.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 32
SOCIAL MEDIA & SCAMS
Overall Email Spam Rate
2013 2014 2015
66+34 60+40 53+47
66% 60%
-6% pts53%
-7% pts
Estimated Global Email Spam Rate per Day
TIn June, spam fell below 50 percent for the first time since 2003.
102030405060708090100%
2015 2014 2013Percentage of Spam in Email by Industry
TSome industry sectors receive more spam than others, but the range is
only approximately 5 percent.
Industry Detail Percentage of Email as Spam
Mining 56.3%
Manufacturing 54.2%
Construction 53.7%
Services 53.0%
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 52.9%
Retail Trade 52.7%
Nonclassifiable Establishments 52.6%
Wholesale Trade 52.5%
Public Administration 52.2%
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 52.1%
Transportation & Public Utilities 51.8%
Non SIC Related Industries
Healthcare 54.1%
Energy 53.0%
Spam by Company Size
TNo particular company size received significantly more spam than any
other did, with a range of only 1.5 percent.
Company Size Spam % in Email
1-250 52.9%
251-500 53.3%
501-1000 53.3%
1001-1500 51.9%
1501-2500 52.6%
2501+ 52.5%TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 33
SOCIAL MEDIA & SCAMS
Phishing Trends
Over the years, phishing campaigns have become much easier
to operate, thanks to the evolving cybercriminal marketplace.
Attackers will cooperate, with some specializing in phishing
kits, and others selling them on to other scammers who want to
conduct phishing campaigns.
These kits often trade for between US$2 and $10, and their users
do not require much in the way of technical skills to operate them
or customize their webpages to suit their needs. Scammers may
use the data stolen from these attacks for their own purposes, or
sell it on underground marketplaces for a profit.
Symantec has reported a concerning increase in the number and
sophistication of phishing attempts, targeting specific depart -
ments within organizations. While some phishing attempts may
seem obvious, such as a fake delivery tracking emails, the Legal
and Finance departments at some company were targeted with
well-crafted phishing attacks.
Some of these included wire transfer attempts, and while it may
seem surprising, some companies have lost millions of dollars
because employees were fooled into believing wire transfer
requests and other phishing attacks were genuine. The social
engineering involved in these phishing attacks is more sophis -
ticated and targeted. They not only send generic scams to large
numbers of people, but seek to develop ongoing relationships,
validate access to company information, and build trust.
Social engineering requires research and reconnaissance,
reviewing social media profiles, and the online activity of
potential targets to learn about their job, their co-workers, and
the organizational structure. With this information so easily
obtained online, phishing emails are more personalized, and
convincing―displaying an understanding of the business and
knowledge of key executives and work processes.
Many businesses are a prime target, and an assumption that
technology can provide automatic protection is a false one. While
leveraging sophisticated controls and technology for protection,
organizations still rely on the capability of its employees to
detect advanced and targeted phishing campaigns.
One successful attempt can do serious harm to a company’s
reputation and credibility.
Email Phishing Rate (Not Spear Phishing)
2013 2014 2015
1 in 392 1 in 965 1 in 1,846Phishing Rate
TPhishing numbers in 2015 continued to fluctuate, but remained in gradual
decline throughout the year. 1 IN300
600
900
1, 200
1,500
1,800
2,100
2,400
2,700
3,0002015 2014 2013
Phishing Ratio in Email by Industry
TRetail was the industry sector most heavily exposed to phishing attacks in
2015.
Industry Detail Phish Email Ratio
Retail Trade 1 in 690
Public Administration 1 in 1,198
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 1 in 1,229
Nonclassifiable Establishments 1 in 1,708
Services 1 in 1,717
Manufacturing 1 in 1,999
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 1 in 2,200
Mining 1 in 2,225
Wholesale Trade 1 in 2,226
Construction 1 in 2,349
Transportation & Public Utilities 1 in 2,948
Non SIC Related Industries
Energy 1 in 2,525
Healthcare 1 in 2,711TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 34
SOCIAL MEDIA & SCAMS
Phishing Rate in Email
TNo particular company size received significantly more spam than any
other did, with a range of only 1.5 percent.
Company Size Phishing Rate in Email
1-250 1 in 1,548
251-500 1 in 758
501-1000 1 in 1,734
1001-1500 1 in 2,212
1501-2500 1 in 1,601
2501+ 1 in 2,862
Email Malware Trends
As with phishing fraud, malware distributed in emails requires
social engineering to convince its recipient to open the attach -
ment or to click on a link. Attachments can be disguised as fake
invoices , office documents, or other files, and often exploits an
unpatched vulnerability in the software application used to open
that type of file. Malicious links may direct the user to a compro -
mised website using a web attack toolkit to drop something
malicious onto their computer.
Threats like Dridex exclusively use spam email campaigns, and
incorporate real company names in the sender address and in
the email body. The vast majority of Dridex spam masquerades
as financial emails, such as invoices, receipts, and orders. The
emails include malicious Word or Excel attachments with a
payload that drops the actual malware designed to target online
banking information.
The cybercriminal group behind this particular attack has used
many different techniques for sending spam and malware: from
simple malware attachments, hyperlinks in the message body
that point to an exploit kit landing page, malicious PDF attach -
ments, and document macros.
Email malware has not been in decline in the same way as
general spam, and because of its relatively low volume in
comparison, it is more subject to fluctuation. Spikes occur when
large campaigns are undertaken.
Email Malware Rate (Overall)
2013 2014 2015
1 in 196 1 in 244 1 in 220Proportion of Email Traffic in Which Virus Was
Detected
TThe overall email malware rate for 2015 increased since 2014. Email
remains an effective medium for cybercriminals.
40
80
120
160
200
240
280
320
360
2015 2014 20131 IN
Malicious File Attachments in Email
TIn 2015, Office documents were the most popular attachment type, with
executable files becoming less popular. Overall 1.3 percent of attachment
types were executable, including .exe, .com, .pif, .bat and others.
Rank File Extension Blocked in Emails
1 .doc 55.8%
2 .xls 15.0%
3 .zip 8.7%
4 .htm 7.9%
5 .docm 2.4%
6 .js 2.2%
7 .mso 1.9%
8 .html 1.6%
9 .exe 0.9%
10 .png 0.8%TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 35
SOCIAL MEDIA & SCAMS
Virus Ratio in Email by Industry
TThe retail sector had the highest rate of malware-borne malware in 2015,
with more than one percent of email classified as malicious.
Industry Detail Ratio of Malware in Email
Retail Trade 1 in 74
Public Administration 1 in 151
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 1 in 187
Services 1 in 199
Wholesale Trade 1 in 234
Construction 1 in 240
Manufacturing 1 in 243
Nonclassifiable Establishments 1 in 277
Mining 1 in 304
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 1 in 310
Transportation & Public Utilities 1 in 338
Non SIC Related Industries
Energy 1 in 319
Healthcare 1 in 396
Ratio of Malware in Email Traffic by Company Size
TThe highest rate of malware in email traffic was in the 251-1000 company
size grouping. The range was 0.4 percent.
Company Size Malware Rate in Email
1-250 1 in 184
251-500 1 in 82
501-1000 1 in 189
1001-1500 1 in 312
1501-2500 1 in 168
2501+ 1 in 352Communications Attacks
We saw a succession of attacks and vulnerabilities in the under -
lying encryption used to secure email transmissions. For
example, the Logjam attack exploits a weakness in the key
exchange mechanism that begins any encrypted exchange.
TCustomers can check their domains for Logjam, and other major
vulnerabilities, using Symantec’s SSL Toolbox.
TUse this free tool to check for major issues, such as POODLE
or Heartbleed, as well as potential errors in your SSL/TLS
certificate(s) installation.
Email Encryption
Email encryption is valuable because it protects the privacy
of messages and can help to authenticate senders. It is under
threat because of vulnerabilities in the underlying technology
(see above) but also because it is not widely used.
Although webmail systems such as Microsoft’s Outlook.com
and Google Mail use encryption on the clients, and almost all
email systems prioritize encrypted transmission, a surpris -
ing proportion of email is sent in the clear using unencrypted
SMTP transfers. Google reports that in 2015, around 57 percent
of inbound emails were encrypted compared with 51 percent
the year before. The number of outbound encrypted emails
rose from 65 percent to 80 percent in the same period. It isn’t
unusual for some spam to be sent using encryption. As long ago
as 2010, the Rustock botnet used TLS encryption as a means to
disguise the spam it was sending.
Good desktop and gateway email encryption tools do exist,
including Symantec’s own, but companies need to make better
use of the technology available to them to protect email in
transit and at rest.TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 36
SOCIAL MEDIA & SCAMS
Email Security Advice
Organizations and individuals need to realize that even if they
do not think they are an obvious target for cybercriminals, it
does not mean they are immune.
On a personal level, this means remaining vigilant by:
TNot opening emails from unknown senders
TLooking for the padlock and checking the encryption certifi -
cate on any sites where you enter sensitive data
TNot using unsecure networks when accessing sensitive data
For organizations to remain vigilant by:
TDeploying email encryption where possible
TEnsuring that email is scanned for malware, spam, and
phishing
TUsing web security systems to block access to known
phishing sitesLooking Ahead
With a continual three-year decline, we expect phishing attacks
to remain at least at current levels, if not decline further.
Phishing attacks have become more targeted, and less scatter -
gun. Many attacks have shifted towards social media, adding to
the decline in email numbers. Some parts of the world suffer
more from email phishing attacks than others―with the greatest
decline in many English-speaking countries, North America and
parts of Western Europe.
People will continue to do more and more online, and because
Internet access and online transactions are growing in popu -
larity among developing countries, we may even see growth
in phishing attacks in these areas. For example, paying utility
bills, booking doctors’ appointments, applying to a university,
managing frequent flyer accounts, and taking out insurance all
provide fruitful inspiration for phishing attacks.
As organizations deliver more services online they need to be
mindful of the need for security, and they have to work with
customers to educate them further and build trust. In addition,
they may need to consider two-factor authentication to ensure
customer confidence and reduce the cost of phishing fraud.
As we have noted, cybercriminals are increasingly moving
towards more complex email threats, where malware authors,
ransomware creators, phishers, and scammers will seek to
exploit what they perceive to be the weakest link in the chain―
humans. Social engineering, or “head hacking,” is a vital
ingredient to any would-be attacker that is trying to gain access
to systems that hold potentially valuable information. TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 37
TARGETED ATTACKS
TARGETED ATTACKS,
SPEAR PHISHING, AND
INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY THEFT
Widespread, persistent, and
sophisticated attacks against
government organizations and
businesses of all sizes pose greater
risks to national security and the
economy. The number of zero-day
vulnerabilities grew, and evidence
of them being weaponized for
use in cyberattacks was revealed.
Spear-phishing campaigns became
stealthier, targeting fewer individuals
within a smaller number of select
organizations.Persistent Attacks
In February 2015, 78 million patient records were exposed in
a major data breach at Anthem, the second largest healthcare
provider in the US. Symantec traced the attack to a well-fund -
ed attack group, named Black Vine, that has associations with
a China-based IT security organization, called Topsec. Black
Vine is responsible for carrying out cyberespionage campaigns
against multiple industries, including energy and aerospace,
using advanced, custom-developed malware.
Other high-profile targets of cyberespionage in 2015 included
the White House , the Pentagon , the German Bundestag , and the
US Government’s Office of Personnel Management , which lost
21.5 million personnel files, including sensitive information
such as health and financial history, arrest records, and even
fingerprint data.
These attacks are part of a rising tide of sophisticated, well-re -
sourced, and persistent cyberespionage attacks around the
world. Targets include state secrets, intellectual property such
as designs, patents, and plans, and as evidenced by recent data
breaches, personal information.
Symantec’s continuing investigation into the Regin Trojan
gives us a further glimpse into the technical capabilities of
state-sponsored attackers. It revealed 49 new modules, each
of which adds new capabilities, such keylogging, email and file TARGETED ATTACKS
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TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 38
TARGETED ATTACKS
access, and an extensive command-and-control infrastructure.
Symantec analysts commented that the level of sophistication
and complexity of Regin suggests that the development of this
threat could have taken well-resourced teams of developers
many months or years to develop.
Currently, spear-phishing and watering-hole attacks that
exploit compromised websites are the favored avenues for
targeted attacks. However, as additional layers of technology
are introduced to an organization, its attack surface expands.
With businesses turning more to cloud technology and the prev -
alence of IoT devices, we expect to see targeted attacks seeking
to exploit vulnerabilities in these systems within the next year
or two. Cloud services particularly vulnerable to exploits, such
as SQL injection flaws, will likely be targeted first. Spear-phish -
ing campaigns exploiting misconfiguration and poor security by
users, rather than cloud service providers, will bear low-hanging
fruit for the attackers.
In order to remain below the radar, spear-phishing campaigns
have increased in number, but have become smaller with fewer
individuals targeted in each campaign. We expect spear-phish -
ing campaigns will soon consist of just a single target, or a few
select individuals at the same organization. Moreover, the larger
spear-phishing campaigns will likely all be conducted using
web-based watering hole attacks, with compromised websites
exploiting highly-coveted zero-day vulnerabilities.
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities and Watering Holes
Zero-day vulnerabilities are particularly valuable to attackers.
Indeed, because zero-day vulnerabilities are such a seemingly
rare commodity, attackers will closely guard their exploits so
that they may be used for longer and remain undetected.
Sophisticated watering-hole attacks, using compromised
websites, activate only when a visitor to that website originates
from a particular IP address. Reducing collateral damage in this
way makes it less likely that the covert attack is discovered.
Moreover, this approach also makes it more difficult for security
researchers who may visit the website from a different location.
Once an exploit is disclosed publically by the relevant vendor,
these watering-hole sites will often switch to using another
unpublished exploit for a different zero-day vulnerability in
order to remain hidden.
The breach of Hacking Team in 2015 stood out because the
attackers weren’t after money or identities; they were after
cyberweapons, such as zero-day exploits. Hacking Team is
an Italian outfit that specializes in covert surveillance and
espionage software marketed at government users. Previously
unknown zero-day exploits were uncovered in the attack and
made public by the attackers. Details of weaponized zero-day
vulnerabilities and numerous Trojans used by the group were
shared within days on public forums, and within hours, exploit
kit authors had integrated them into their exploit toolkits.Diversity in Zero Days
There was an unprecedented 54 zero-day vulnerabilities found
throughout 2015, more than doubling the number found in the
previous year. Discovering unknown vulnerabilities and figuring
out how to exploit them has clearly become a go-to technique for
advanced attackers, and there is no sign of this trend changing.
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
TZero-day vulnerabilities command high prices on the black market.
Because of this, and because of their very nature we believe that the
number of zero-day vulnerabilities yet to be discovered is much higher.
2013 Change 2014 Change 2015
23 +4% 24 +125% 54
Most of the zero days seen in 2015 target old, “faithful” tech -
nologies that have been targeted for years. Attackers racked up
10 individual zero-day vulnerabilities against Adobe’s Flash
Player during the year. Microsoft received equal attention from
malicious zero-day developers, though the 10 zero day vulner -
abilities found targeting their software was distributed across
Microsoft Windows (6x), Internet Explorer (2x), and Microsoft
Office (2x). The Android operating system was also targeted
through four zero-day vulnerabilities during 2015.
Zero-Day Vulnerabilities, Annual Total
TThe highest number of zero-day vulnerabilities was disclosed in 2015,
evidence of the maturing market for research in this area.
10203040506070
2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 20061315
91214
81423 245454TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 39
TARGETED ATTACKS
Infographic: A New Zero-Day Vulnerability Discovered Every Week in 2015
Infographic: A New Zero-Day Vulnerability Discovered Every Week in 2015
Infographic: A New Zero-Day Vulnerability Discovered Every Week in 2015
Infographic: A New Zero-Day Vulnerability Discovered Every Week in 2015 TABLE OF CONTENTS
Hacker discovers
vulnerabilityExploit created
to leverage
vulnerabilityAttack is
launched
Public and vendor
become aware
Vendor builds patch
Window of Opportunity
Patch isdistributedZero-Day Timeline
from discovery to patch
Advanced attack groups continue to profit
from previously undiscovered flaws in browsers and website plugins.
In 2015, 54 zero-day vulnerabilities were
discovered.A New Zero-Day
Vulnerability DiscoveredEvery Week in 2015
1
2symantec.com/connect/blogs/third-adobe-flash
-zero-day-exploit-cve-2015-5123-leaked-hacking-team-cache
3Total time of exposure for the top five zero-day vulnerabilities1 on average, based on 54 vulnerabilities2015 Zero-Day
Not-So-Fun Facts
0
23
24
2013 2014
542015
(+4%)
(+125%)
19%
attacked
Flash
Player
zero-days found in 2015
4 of the top 5
exploited zero-days
10
Mozilla Firefox and Google Chrome
Are Phasing
Out SupportEnd Is Nigh for Adobe Flash Player
DAYIT admin
installs patch
new vulnerabilities
used to exploit
open source
software
11
ICS vulnerabilities
targeted a variety
of manufacturers
and devices
7
62
zero-day
vulnerabilities
discovered in the
Hacking Team
breach
Total Zero-Day
Vulnerabilities
7 Days Total Time of Exposure3
1 Day Average Time to Patch
in 2015
Source: Symantec2016 Internet Security Threat Report 40
TARGETED ATTACKS
What is concerning, though not surprising, is that there were
11 zero-day vulnerabilities that were used to exploit open
source software. Some exploits targeted common libraries and
packages, while others went after open source web develop -
ment tools, like content management systems and e-commerce
platforms. Networking protocols were also highly targeted, with
continued attacks against OpenSSL, as well as Samba.
However, what should give most people cause for concern is
that attackers appear to be discovering and exploiting zero-day
vulnerabilities in industrial control systems (ICSs)—devices
used to control things ranging from industrial manufacturing to
power plants. There were seven known zero-day vulnerabilities
during 2015 targeting a variety of different manufacturers and
different devices.
Top 5 Zero-Day Vulnerabilities, Patch and Signature
Duration
TWhile there were more zero-day vulnerabilities disclosed in 2015, some
were proof-of-concept, but vendors were generally quicker to provide fixes
in 2015 than in 2014..
25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 275 300 325201320142015
295
597
1
19
4Average Days to PatchTotal Time of ExposureTotal Time of Exposure
DAYS
The motivations behind such attacks are not clear, and could
range from geopolitical disputes to ransom-related attacks.
Regardless, if not monitored carefully, such attacks could have
serious consequences in the future, and it doesn’t look likely to
go away anytime soon.Top 5 Most Frequently Exploited Zero-Day
Vulnerabilities
TWith the exception of CVE-2015-0235, the most frequently targeted zero-
day exploits were related to vulnerabilities in Adobe’s Flash Player.
TThis data is based on exploitation after the vulnerability has become public.
2015 Exploit 2015 2014 Exploit 2014
1Adobe Flash Player
CVE-2015-031381%Microsoft
ActiveX Control
CVE-2013-733181%
2Adobe Flash Player
CVE-2015-511914%Microsoft
Internet Explorer
CVE-2014-032210%
3Adobe Flash Player
CVE-2015-51225%Adobe
Flash Player
CVE-2014-05157%
4Heap-Based Buffer
Overflow aka
‘Ghost’
CVE-2015-0235<1%Adobe
Flash Player
CVE-2014-04972%
5Adobe Flash Player
CVE-2015-3113<1%Microsoft Windows
CVE-2014-4114 OLE<1%
In the case of CVE-2015-5119, Symantec already had signatures
that were able to detect exploits four days before the vulnerabil -
ity was publically disclosed. Sometimes, existing signatures can
be successful in blocking attacks exploiting new vulnerabilities,
and signatures are frequently updated to block more attacks
even where protection exists beforehand. Additionally, this
vulnerability was among those exposed in the breach against
Hacking Team .
Spear Phishing
It’s not only websites that may contain hidden exploits. A previ -
ously-unknown vulnerability may be exploited to attack an
organization using an infected document attached in an email.
Such an attack is known as spear phishing, and relies heavily on
very good social engineering in order to dress-up the email to
appear convincing.
Spear-phishing emails are sent in waves, or campaigns, to a
very small group of people, often not all at once, but individu -
ally or where more than one person in an organization may be
targeted. Over time, different exploits may be used against the
same people, should these attacks prove ineffective. However, in
recent years attackers quickly switch tactics after a few failed
attempts in order to remain undetected. In previous years,
they were more likely to continue with different exploits or by
targeting different individuals within the organization.TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 41
TARGETED ATTACKS
Spear-Phishing Email Campaigns
TIn 2015, the number of campaigns increased, while the number of attacks
and the number of recipients within each campaign continued to fall. With
the length of time shortening, it’s clear that these types of attacks are
becoming stealthier.
306090120150
2015 2014 2013 20123006009001,2001,500Average Number of
Email Attacks Per CampaignCampaigns
Recipients Per Campaign
CAMPAIGNS EMAIL ATTACKS & RECIPIENTS PER CAMPAIGN
2013 2014 2015
Campaigns779
+91%841
+8%1,305
+55%
Recipients per
Campaign23
-81%18
-20%11
-39%
Average Number
of Email Attacks
per Campaign29
-76%25
-14%12
-52%
Average Duration
of a Campaign8 Days
+173%9 Days
+13%6 Days
-33%
Spear-phishing attacks are less likely to arouse suspicion with
campaigns that are smaller, shorter, and target fewer recipi -
ents. A few years ago, a targeted attack campaign may have been
directed to a hundred or more individuals, any one of whom may
become suspicious and raise the alarm. With fewer people, this
probability is greatly reduced.
In 2015, the Finance sector was the most targeted, with 34.9
percent of all spear-phishing email directed at an organization
in that industry, 15 percentage points higher than the previous
year. The likelihood of an organization in this sector being
targeted at least once in the year was 8.7 percent (approximate -
ly 1 in 11). With so many attacks destined for this sector, some businesses were being targeted more aggressively than others.
Typically, such an organization may expect to be targeted at least
four times during the year. The attackers only have to succeed
once, whereas the businesses must thwart each and every attack
to remain secure. Businesses should already be thinking about
what to do when (not if) such a breach occurs.
Top Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
TIn 2015, we combined the Services groups (previously, “Services,
Professional” and “Services, Non-Traditional”) into one group. We have also
identified some of the most frequently targeted sub-sectors, including the
Energy sector, which includes some mining industries, and Healthcare,
which is part of the Services category.
T*The Risk in Group figure is a measure of the likelihood of an organization
in that industry being attacked at least once during the year. For example,
if there are 100 customers in a group and 10 of them were targeted, that
would indicate a risk of 10 percent.
Industry Detail DistributionAttacks
per Org% Risk in
Group*
Finance, Insurance,
& Real Estate35% 4.1 8.7%
Services 22% 2.1 2.5%
Manufacturing 14% 1.8 8.0%
Transportation
& Public Utilities13% 2.7 10.7%
Wholesale Trade 9% 1.9 6.9%
Retail Trade 3% 2.1 2.4%
Public Administration 2% 4.7 3.2%
Non-Classifiable
Establishments2% 1.7 3.4%
Mining 1% 3.0 10.3%
Construction <1% 1.7 1.1%
Agriculture, Forestry,
& Fishing<1% 1.4 2.0%
Non SIC Related Industries
Energy 2% 2.0 8.4%
Healthcare <1% 2.0 1.1%TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 42
TARGETED ATTACKS
Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
by Group — Healthcare
THealthcare falls under the Services SIC group, but we have called it out here
for clarity.
Industry Detail DistributionAttacks
per Org% Risk in
Group*
Health Services <1% 2.0 1%
Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
by Group – Energy
TEnergy companies are classified in the Mining category or the
Transportation and Utilities category, depending on the nature of their
business. We have called these out here for clarity.
Industry Detail DistributionAttacks
per Org% Risk in
Group*
Energy 1.8% 2.0 8.4%
Oil & Gas Extraction 1.4% 3.4 12.3%
Electric, Gas, &
Sanitary Services<1% 1.6 5.7%
Coal Mining <1% 1.0 8.1%Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
by Group – Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate
TDepository Institutions include organizations in the retail banking sector.
Industry Detail DistributionAttacks
per Org% Risk in
Group*
Finance, Insurance,
& Real Estate34.9% 4.1 8.7%
Depository
Institutions18.9% 5.9 31.3%
Holding & Other
Investment Offices8.3% 2.9 11.0%
Nondepository
Institutions3.7% 6.7 5.3%
Real Estate 1.4% 2.4 2.2%
Insurance Agents,
Brokers, & Service<1% 2.1 4.0%
Insurance Carriers <1% 1.6 10.1%
Security &
Commodity Brokers<1% 2.2 3.7%
Industries Targeted in Spear-Phishing Attacks
by Group – Public Administration
TThe Public Administration sector includes both national, central government
agencies as well as local government.
Industry Detail DistributionAttacks
per Org% Risk in
Group*
Public Administration 2.0% 4.7 3.2%
Executive,
Legislative, &
General1.8% 5.7 3.6%
Justice, Public Order,
& Safety<1% 4.3 1.1%
Administration of
Economic Programs<1% 1.1 7.3%
National Security &
International Affairs<1% 2.5 3.5%
Administration of
Human Resources<1% 1.0 2.0%TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 43
TARGETED ATTACKS
Spear-Phishing Attacks
by Size of Targeted Organization
TAttacks against small businesses continued to grow in 2015, although
many of these attacks were directed to fewer organizations, increasing by
9 percentage points.
Small
Businesses
(SMBs)
1 to 250
EmployeesMedium-Size
Businesses
251 to 2,500
EmployeesLarge
Enterprises
2,500+
Employees
0100%
2015 2014 2013 2012 201150%
32%
18%50%
19%
31%39%
31%
30%41% 35%
22%
43%25%
34%
Risk Ratio of Spear-Phishing Attacks
by Organization Size
TSmall businesses had a 1 in 40 (3 percent) chance of being targeted,
indicating a convergence of attacks on fewer organizations. Large
enterprises had a 1 in 2.7 (38 percent) chance, suggesting a much broader
focus in attacks, with a higher frequency.
Industry Detail2015 Risk
Ratio2015 Risk
Ratio as %Attacks
per Org
Large Enterprises
2,500+ Employees1 in 2.7 38% 3.6
Medium Business
251–2,5001 in 6.8 15% 2.2
Small Business
(SMB) 1–2501 in 40.5 3% 2.1Analysis of Spear-Phishing Emails
Used in Targeted Attacks
TOffice documents, such as Word and Excel, remain popular as a delivery
mechanism for exploits that drop malware onto a targeted computer.
Perhaps surprisingly, executable file types are still popular, however,
accounting for at least 36 percent of the spear-phishing attachments in
2015. In non-targeted email malware, executable file attachment accounted
for approximately 1.3 percent of malicious attachments.
RankAttachment
Type2015 Overall
PercentageAttachment
Type2014
Overall
Percentage
1 .doc 40.4% .doc 38.7%
2 .exe 16.9% .exe 22.6%
3 .scr 13.7% .scr 9.2%
4 .xls 6.2% .au3 8.2%
5 .bin 5.4% .jpg 4.6%
6 .js 4.2% .class 3.4%
7 .class 2.6% .pdf 3.1%
8 .ace 1.7% .bin 1.9%
9 .xml 1.6% .txt 1.4%
10 .rtf 1.4% .dmp 1.0%
Active Attack Groups in 2015
Some of the more notable targeted attack groups that were
active in 2015 included the following:
TBlack Vine – Attacks associated with an IT security
organization Topsec, primarily targeting aerospace and
healthcare, including Anthem, in search of intellectual
property and identities
TAdvanced Threat Group 9 (ATG9, a.k.a. Rocket Kitten) – Iran
based state-sponsored espionage attacks on journalists,
human rights activists, and scientists
TCadelle and Chafer – Iran-based and attacking mainly
airlines, energy, and telcos in the Middle East, and one
company in the US
TDuke and Seaduke – State-sponsored attacks against mainly
European government agencies, high-profile individuals,
and international policy and private research organizations;
believed to have been around since 2010TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 44
TARGETED ATTACKS
Attackers Target
Both Large andSmall Businesses
Like thrown paint on a blank
canvas, attacks against businesses, both large and small, appear indiscriminate.If there is profit to be made, attackers strike at will.
Spear-Phishing Attacks
by Size of Targeted Organization
The last five years have shown asteady increase in attacks targetingbusinesses with less than 250 employees.
Medium-Size Businesses 251 to 2 ,500Large Enterprises 2,500+
Small Businesses (SMBs) 1 to 2 50Number of Em ployees
0100%2011 2012 2013
20152014 2015
2014 201350%
32%
18%50%
19%
31%39%
31%
30%41%
25%
34%35%
22%
43%
Risk Ratioas %2.2 2.1
Risk R atio of Spear-Phishing Attacks
by Organization Size
1 in 2.7 1 in 6.8 1 in 40 .5Risk Ra tioAttacks
per Org
15%3%2015
3.6
38%
1,305
+55%841Cyber attackers are playing the long game against large companies, but all businesses of all sizes are vulnerable to targeted attacks. In fact, the number of spear-phishing campaigns targeting employees increased 55% in 2015.
779
+91% +8%50%
32%
18%50%
19%
31%39%
31%
30%41%
25%
34%35%
22%
43%
Source: Symantec
Infographic: Attackers Target Both Large and Small Businesses
Infographic: Atttakcers Target Both Large and Small BusinessesTABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 45
TARGETED ATTACKS
TAdvanced Threat Group 8 (ATG9, a.k.a. Emissary Panda)
– Attacks against financial, aerospace, intelligence, telecom -
munications, energy, and nuclear engineering industries
in search of intellectual property; notable for exploiting
CVE-2015-5119, a zero-day exploit revealed in the Hacking
Team breach
TWaterbug and Turla – Russia-based espionage spear-phish -
ing and watering-hole attacks against government
institutions and embassies; believed to have been active
since 2005
TButterfly – Attacks against multi-billion dollar corporations
in IT, pharmaceuticals, commodities, including Facebook
and Apple for insider trading
Profiting from High-Level Corporate Attacks
and the Butterfly Effect
Butterfly is a group of extremely well-organized, highly-capable
hackers who are spying on companies with a view to profiting on
the stock market by selling market-sensitive information to the
highest-bidder. The types of information the attackers poten -
tially had access to included emails, legal documents, policy
documents, training materials, product descriptions, and data
harvested from specialist security systems. Stolen materials
such as these could also be valuable for insider-trading purposes.
Symantec first saw these attacks in 2012 and 2013 when they
compromised some well-known companies including Apple,
Microsoft, and Facebook. However, they also employ sophisticat -
ed counter-measures to cover their tracks, including encrypted
virtual command and control servers.
Timeline of Butterfly Attacks Against Industry Sectors
TThe Butterfly group has been active for a number of years, targeting
a variety of organizations, including those linked to extracting natural
resources.
TTheir use of zero-day vulnerabilities in attacks reveals a level of
sophistication that we have not seen before in commercially-motivated
attacks.
TThe graphic shows a timeline of when Butterfly attacks began against
different industry sectors.
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016Legal
Technology
Pharmaceutical
CommoditiesCybersecurity, Cybersabotage, and Coping
with Black Swan Events
A Black Swan event is an event that was unprecedented and
unexpected at the time it occurred; however, after further
analysis, experts sometimes conclude that it could have been
predicted. The term originates from the belief that all swans were
white, until in 1697, black swans were discovered in Australia.
If advanced cyberespionage is so common, it is perhaps curious
that cybersabotage is not. The capabilities required to inflict
physical damage are similar to those needed for cyberespionage,
and the target set is growing thanks to the proliferation of Inter -
net-connected devices, including industrial control systems.
The British Government’s 2015 security and defense review
sums up the challenges neatly:
“The range of cyber actors threatening the UK has
grown. The threat is increasingly asymmetric and global.
Reliable, consistent cyber defense typically requires
advanced skills and substantial investment. But growing
numbers of states, with state-level resources, are devel -
oping advanced capabilities which are potentially
deployable in conflicts, including against CNI [Critical
National Infrastructure], and government institutions.
And non-state actors, including terrorists and cyber
criminals can use easily available cyber tools and tech -
nology for destructive purposes.”
The Stuxnet cyberattack on the Iranian nuclear program is the
best-known example of an Internet attack on physical infra -
structure. It may be that other successful attacks have occurred
in the shadows or that infections are in place, but haven’t been
activated yet. It seems unlikely that the world’s critical infra -
structure is immune. An attack at the end of 2014 on a German
steel mill is a warning of potentially more serious attacks to
come.
Speculations about possible cybersabotage continued into 2015
with the discovery of an information-stealing threat named
Trojan.Laziok . This particular threat appears to have been
designed for reconnaissance style attacks aimed at the energy
sector, particularly in the Middle East. Laziok wasn’t implicitly
designed to attack and bring down critical infrastructure, but
rather to gather information about the systems it compromised.
As we discussed in ISTR 20, these attacks can be just as potent as
direct attacks against critical systems, improving an attacker’s
ability to press further into an environment simply by learning
more about the types of systems they are traversing. Simply
put, if an attacker knows what types of computers he or she has
or can compromise, they can decide how to proceed in order to
carry out their malicious goals.TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 46
TARGETED ATTACKS
Cybersabotage and
the Threat of “Hybrid Warfare”
The notion of hybrid threats has been around for a long time in
cybersecurity, traditionally referring to malware that has many
different attack vectors―such as dropping malicious Trojan code
onto an infected device and infecting other code on the system,
while spreading itself through email or some other means. The
term “hybrid warfare,” however refers to a type of warfare that
is a combination of conventional and unconventional informa -
tion and cyber warfare. According to NATO, “the term appeared
at least as early as 2005 and was subsequently used to describe
the strategy used by the Hezbollah in the 2006 Lebanon War.”
It wasn’t until the end of 2015 where speculations about cybers -
abotage turned into real indications of one such attack. On
December 23, a power failure hit the Ivano-Frankivisk region
in western Ukraine. Details emerged over the coming days and
weeks of a multi-pronged cyber attack that not only disabled
power in eight provinces in the region, but also masked the
activity of the attackers and made it difficult to assess the extent
of the outage.
The malware behind the attack appears to be a potent combi -
nation of the BlackEnergy Trojan ( Backdoor.Lancafdo ) and
Trojan.Disakil . In order to carry out the attack, the BlackEnergy
Trojan was most likely used to traverse the network, allowing
the attackers to gather information about the computers they
compromised until they reached the critical systems that
allowed them to disconnect breakers, resulting in the loss of
electricity in the region. However, it doesn’t appear as though
the Trojan itself disconnected the power. Rather, it allowed the
attackers to discover the critical systems and then gain full
control of them, after which they could use the original software
on these systems to take down the power grid.
While noteworthy to this point, the attackers responsible appear
to have planned the attack to such an extent that they were able
to prolong the outage beyond the point it was pinpointed as an
actual cyberattack. One way they were able to do this was by
performing a telephone denial-of-service (TDoS) attack against
the power supplier’s call center, preventing customers from
calling in, and leaving operators in the dark as to the extent of
the outage.
However, the one-two punch in the attack appears to be tied
to the use of Trojan.Disakil in the attack. A highly destructive
Trojan, Disakil was likely used to overwrite system files and wipe
master boot records on computers that operators would turn to
in order to bring the power back online. So not only was the
power taken down, so too were the systems used to restore it,
forcing operators to manually restore power in circumstances
they normally would be able to do so through available software.
As with any cyber attack, attribution can be difficult to determine.
Based on circumstantial evidence and current geopolitical
disputes, it is fairly easy to draw conclusions; however, there is no smoking gun in this case. What is known is that the group
behind the BlackEnergy Trojan has been active for many years
and has targeted multiple organizations in the Ukraine, as well
as Western European countries, NATO, and others . Around the
time of these attacks, this group was also discovered attacking
media organizations in the Ukraine . It is likely this won’t be the
last we hear of them.
The cybersabotage attacks in Ukraine generated much debate
about the use and effectiveness of hybrid warfare, and it is likely
this won’t be the last we hear of these types of attacks, particu -
larly as international tensions remain high in some parts of the
world, and managing the risks from cyberterrorism moves up
the agenda for many national governments.
Small Business and the Dirty Linen Attack
Of course, small businesses have smaller IT budgets, and conse -
quently spend less on cybersecurity than their large enterprise
counterparts. However, this trend has continued for years,
in spite evidence that shows a greater proportion of targeted
spear-phishing attacks each year are intended for small busi -
nesses.
In 2015, 43 percent of targeted spear-phishing blocked by
Symantec were destined for small businesses, compared with
34 percent in 2014. Additionally, the attackers focus narrowed,
concentrating on fewer companies, and approximately 3 percent
of small businesses were targeted in 2015, compared with 45
percent in the previous year. On average, these organizations
were targeted at least twice during the year. This shift from a
scattergun approach of more widely dispersed attacks in 2014,
to a more sniper-style line of attack converging on fewer targets
in 2015 also helps to keep these attacks below the radar.
One of the most difficult challenges is knowing when your orga -
nization is in the sights of cyber attackers, particularly when
most cybersecurity headlines focus on nation states vying for
company secrets, and the tens of millions of credit card details
and other personal data exposed in breaches. It’s all too easy to
believe that a targeted attack only happens to other companies.
However, no business is too small or too obscure to become a
target and one good example that shows this is the Dirty Linen
Attack.
Perhaps an unlikely target, General Linens Service, Inc. is a
very small company, with only one location and 35 employees.
They provide a linen service to restaurants and the hospitality
industry, including uniforms and carpet cleaning. As unlikely a
targeted as it would seem for a nation state, it was a competi -
tor, General Linen Services, LLC. that had been hidden in their
network for two years. Perhaps the similar choice of company
name was deliberate, because for two years they were able to
steal customers by accessing the targeted company’s invoices,
allowing them to see how much they were charging, giving them
a significant advantage. The question was how they achieved
this; a small business conducting cyberattacks on a rival seemed TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 47
TARGETED ATTACKS
extreme. However, it transpired that the attackers noticed that
both companies used the same software for their web portal,
and the targeted company had not changed the default admin -
istration password. This enabled the attackers to access their
data 157 times. The good news is that General Linen Services,
LLC was caught and convicted, and General Linens Service, Inc.
discovered the importance of following security best practices.
Industrial Control Systems
Vulnerable to Attacks
Industrial control systems (ICSs) are found in many areas of
industrial production and utility services worldwide, and are
routinely connected to the Internet for remote monitoring and
control. Uncovering vulnerabilities in these systems is a major
area of research, emphasized by the growth in the numbers of
these vulnerabilities in 2015.
The actual number of vulnerabilities affecting ICSs is estimated
to be much higher, since many organizations standardize their
platforms by using commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) products,
such as Windows or Linux that are also subject to vulnerabilities,
but which are not counted here. Furthermore, ICS management
systems connected with enterprise networks can increase the
potential exposure to threats more typically associated with
these operating systems.
Vulnerabilities Disclosed in Industrial Control Systems
TAt least seven zero-day vulnerabilities directly related to a variety of
different ICS manufacturers and devices in 2015.
20406080100120140160
2015 2014 2013 2012102030405060708074
9 71375
3935135Unique VendorsVulnerabilitiesObscurity is No Defense
The most valuable form of protection against cyberespionage is
simply to be aware that it is possible. All businesses are poten -
tially vulnerable to targeted attacks using techniques such
as watering hole attacks and spear phishing . Small size and
obscurity are no protection.
Indeed, in 2015 small businesses accounted for a greater propor -
tion (43 percent) of spear-phishing attacks, but the likelihood
of being targeted diminished. While more attacks were destined
for that group, they were focused on a smaller, more discreet
number of businesses (3 percent).
Contrast this with large enterprises, which accounted for 35
percent of the spear-phishing attacks, and 1 in 2.7 (38 percent)
were targeted at least once. This suggests a much more extensive
scale where campaigns were more scattergun in their approach.
Having acknowledged the risk, organizations can take steps
to protect themselves by reviewing their security and incident
response plans, getting advice and help if required, updating the
technical defenses, putting good personnel policies and training
in place, and staying up to date with the latest information. TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 48
DATA BREACHES & PRIVACY
DATA BREACHES
& PRIVACY
DATA BREACHES LARGE
AND SMALL
Whether an insider attack, or
criminal fraud focused on websites
and point-of-sale devices, data
breaches continued in 2015, costing
victims more than ever. The number
of mega-breaches climbed to
the highest level since 2013. The
number of breaches where the full
extent of a breach was not revealed,
increased; fewer companies declined
to publish the numbers, unless
required to do so by law.The State of Play
Symantec figures show the total number of breaches has
risen slightly by 2 percent in 2015. The year also saw nine
mega-breaches, surpassing 2013’s record of eight breaches
containing more than 10 million identities each. Another new
record was set near the end of the year when 191 million identi -
ties were exposed , surpassing the previous record for the largest
single data beach.
Helped in no small part by this massive breach, the overall total
number of identities exposed has jumped 23 percent to 429
million. What’s more concerning is that this number is likely
much higher due to the increasing tendency of organizations to
limit the information released about the extent of the breaches
they suffer. In 2015, the number of breaches reported that
did not include a figure for identities exposed increased by 85
percent, from 61 to 113. Symantec estimates the total number
of identities exposed, had these breaches been fully reported, is
likely to be at least half a billion.
It’s a staggering number, but also one full of speculation based
on incomplete data. The median number of identities exposed
per breach has decreased by around a third to 4,885 identities
per breach. However, this does not lessen the cause for concern,
but rather suggests the data stolen across breaches is more
valuable and the impact to the business greater than in previous
years.SHARE
THIS
TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 49
DATA BREACHES & PRIVACY
Timeline of Data Breaches
TA massive breach in December 2015 helped to set a new record for
identities exposed in a year. At 41, the month of July also saw the highest-
ever number of breaches in a month.
255075100125150175200225
D N O S A J J M A M F J
201551015202530354045
195
11171342
2222
.22 .49333
18262830
2641
34
2322
13
11
11
INCIDENTSIDENTITIES EXPOSED (MILLIONS)Number of IncidentsIdentities Exposed
(Millions)Identities Exposed
(Millions)
As a result, cyber insurance claims are becoming more common.
This year’s NetDiligence Cyber Claims study saw claims
ranging up to US$15 million, while typical claims ranged from
US$30,000 to US$263,000. But the cost of insuring digital assets
is on the rise, contributing further to the rising overall cost of
data breaches.
Average premiums for retailers surged 32 percent in the first
half of 2015, and the healthcare sector saw some premiums
triple. Reuters also reports that higher deductibles are now
common and even the biggest insurers will not write policies for
more than $100 million for risky customers.
Looking at industries across the broadest of categories, the
Services sector was impacted by more data breaches than any
other industry, both in terms of the number of incidents and the
number of identities exposed. However, the reasons in each case
differs when looking at the sub-sectors contained within these
high-level classifications.
The largest number of breaches took place within the Health
Services sub-sector, which actually comprised 39 percent of all
breaches in the year. This comes as no surprise, given the strict
rules within the healthcare industry regarding reporting of data
breaches. However, the number of identities exposed is relative -
ly small in this industry. Such a high number of breaches with
low numbers of identities tends to show that the data itself is
quite valuable to warrant so many small breaches.
The sub-sector responsible for the most identities exposed was
Social Services. However, this is largely due to the record-break -
ing data breach responsible for 191 million identities exposed.
Removing this one breach drops Social Services to the bottom
of the list. (Coincidentally, this is where it falls within the list of
sectors for number of breaches.)Top 5 High Level Sectors Breached by Number of
Identities Exposed and Incidents
50100150200250300
50100150200250300
Retail
TradeWholesale
TradePublic
Admin.Finance,
Insurance,
& Real EstateServices260
200
120
28
12630
11 1733MILLIONS OF IDENTITIES EXPOSED
NUMBER OF INCIDENTSNumber of IncidentsIdentities Exposed
(Millions)Identities Exposed
(Millions)
Top Sub Level Sectors Breached by Number of
Identities Exposed and Incidents
255075100125150175200
Health Services
Educational Services
Executive, Legislative, & GeneralWholesale Trade - Durable GoodsBusiness Services
Insurance Agents, Brokers, & Service Administration of Human ResourcesPersonal Services Insurance CarriersSocial Services191
100
40
21 19 19126 5 4120
20 20
3 2 617
510 9MILLIONS OF IDENTITIES EXPOSED
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS
255075100125150175200
Number of IncidentsIdentities Exposed
(Millions)Identities Exposed
(Millions)TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 50
DATA BREACHES & PRIVACY
The breach is believed to be the work of a
well-resourced cyberespionage group, which Symantec calls Black Vine. They appear to have access to a wide variety of resources to let it conduct multiple, simultaneous attacks over a sustained period of time. They used:
attacker-owned infrastructure
zero-day exploits
custom-developed malware
Three variants are named:
detected as Trojan.Sakurel Backdoor.Mivast1) Hurix, 2) Sakurel, and 3) Mivast
Open a back doorAll variants have the following capabilities:
Execute files
& commands
Delete, modify, andcreate registry keys
Gather and transmitinformation about thecompromised computerFacts about the
Attack on Anthem
On January 26, 2015
78 Million
patient records were exposed.
Top 10 Sub-Sectors Breached by Number of Incidents
Healthcare
BusinessEducationInsuranceHotels120
20
20
17
14
10
9
9
8
6Wholesale Trade
Eating and Drinking PlacesExecutive, Legislative, & GeneralDepository InstitutionsSocial Services
Source: Symantec
Infographic: Facts About the Attack on Anthem
Infographic: Facts About the Attack on AnthemTABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 51
DATA BREACHES & PRIVACY
Top 10 Sectors Breached
by Number of Incidents
THealth Services is denoted as a sub-sector within the Services industry,
and 120 of the 200 breaches that occurred within the Services sector were
attributed to Healthcare.
SectorNumber of
Incidents% of
Incidents
1 Services 200 65.6%
2Finance, Insurance,
& Real Estate33 10.8%
3 Retail Trade 30 9.8%
4 Public Administration 17 5.6%
5 Wholesale Trade 11 3.6%
6 Manufacturing 7 2.3%
7Transportation
& Public Utilities6 2.0%
8 Construction 1 <1%
Top 10 Sub-Sectors Breached
by Number of Incidents
SectorNumber of
Incidents% of
Incidents
1 Health Services 120 39.3%
2 Business Services 20 6.6%
3 Educational Services 20 6.6%
4 Insurance Carriers 17 5.6%
5Hotels & Other Lodging
Places14 4.6%
6Wholesale Trade - Durable
Goods10 3.3%
7 Eating & Drinking Places 9 3.0%
8Executive, Legislative, &
General9 3.0%
9 Depository Institutions 8 2.6%
10 Social Services 6 2.0%Top 10 Sectors Breached
by Number of Identities Exposed
TThe Services sector accounted for 60 percent of identities exposed, the
majority of which were within the Social Services sub-sector.
SectorNumber of
Incidents% of
Incidents
1 Services 259,893,565 60.6%
2Finance, Insurance, & Real
Estate 120,124,214 28.0%
3 Public Administration 27,857,169 6.5%
4 Wholesale Trade 11,787,795 2.7%
5 Retail Trade 5,823,654 1.4%
6 Manufacturing 3,169,627 <1%
7Transportation & Public
Utilities 156,959 <1%
8 Construction 3,700 <1%
Top 10 Sub-Sectors Breached
by Number of Identities Exposed
SectorNumber of
Incidents% of
Incidents
1 Social Services 191,035,533 44.5%
2 Insurance Carriers 100,436,696 23.4%
3 Personal Services 40,500,000 9.4%
4Administration of Human
Resources 21,501,622 5.0%
5Insurance Agents, Brokers,
& Service 19,600,000 4.6%
6 Business Services 18,519,941 4.3%
7Wholesale Trade - Durable
Goods 11,787,795 2.7%
8Executive, Legislative, &
General 6,017,518 1.4%
9 Educational Services 5,012,300 1.2%
10 Health Services 4,154,226 1.0%TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 52
DATA BREACHES & PRIVACY
This calls into question how risk factors into a data breach. An
industry may suffer a large number of data breaches or expose
a large number of identities, but does this mean that the data
itself is being used for nefarious purposes?
For instance, 48 percent of data breaches were caused by data
accidentally being exposed. Personal data in these cases were
indeed exposed, be it by a company sharing data with the wrong
people or a misconfigured website that inadvertently made
private records public. But was this data obtained by people with
malicious intentions? In many cases, it’s likely that it was not.
A retired grandmother who accidentally receives someone else’s
healthcare record by email is unlikely to flip this information
for identity theft. That’s not to say it never happens―just that a
large majority of such data breaches are of a lower risk.
What is a much higher risk are cases where either hackers or
insider theft was the cause of a breach. These are instances
where the motive was very likely to steal data. To that end, here
are some examples of high risk industries.
Top Sectors Filtered for Incidents,
Caused by Hacking and Insider Theft
Industry SectorNumber of
Incidents
1 Health Services 53
2 Hotels & Other Lodging Places 14
3 Business Services 14
4 Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 9
5 Educational Services 9
The Health Services sub-sector still tops the list for number of
incidences, but it is now followed by the Hotels & Other Lodging
Places sub-sector. Interestingly, 100 percent of breaches in this
particular sub-sector included credit card information, but only
seven percent actually reported the number of identities stolen.
The Business Services sector dropped from second to third place
when looking at high-risk causes. The companies breached in
this sector are primarily dominated by online businesses and
software manufacturers.Top Sectors Filtered for Identities Exposed,
Caused by Hacking and Insider Theft
Industry SectorIdentities
Exposed
1 Insurance Carriers 100,301,173
2 Personal Services 40,500,000
3 Administration of Human Resources 21,500,000
4Insurance Agents, Brokers,
& Service19,600,000
5 Business Services 18,405,914
In terms of identities exposed in high-risk breaches, the
Insurance Carriers and the Insurance Agents, Brokers, & Service
sub-sectors both appear in the top five. Between these two
sub-sectors lie almost half the mega-breaches seen in 2015.
This presents one other interesting item: of the insurance-re -
lated breaches, almost 40 percent of them also contained
healthcare records. Given the overlap between healthcare costs
and insurance companies that cover such costs, this isn’t too
surprising. What is concerning here is that attackers may have
figured out that this highly prized data is available in insur -
ance-related sectors, and in much bigger numbers than found in
small hospitals or private practices.
By Any Other Name
The more details someone has about an individual, the easier it
is to commit identity fraud. Criminals are targeting insurance,
government, and healthcare organizations to get more complete
profiles of individuals.
The types of information that thieves are persuing has not
changed in 2015, save some minor changes in ranking. Real
names are still the most common type of information exposed,
present in over 78 percent of all data breaches. Home addresses,
birth dates, Government IDs (like SSN), medical records, and
financial information all appear in the 40 to 30 percent range, as
in 2014, though their order of appearance has changes slightly.
Rounding out the top 10, email addresses, phone numbers,
insurance information, and user names/passwords again appear
in 10 to 20 percent range.
This isn’t to say credit card data isn’t still a common target. Its
black market value isn’t especially high on a per-card basis, since
credit card companies are quick to spot anomalous spending
patterns (as are credit card owners) and stolen card data and
other financial information has a limited shelf life. However,
there is still an evergreen market for stolen credit card data.TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 53
DATA BREACHES & PRIVACY
Top 10 Types of Information Exposed
TFinancial information includes stolen credit card details and other financial
credentials.
2015 Type2015
%2014 Ty pe2014
%
1 Real Names 78% Real Names 69%
2 Home Addresses 44%Gov. ID Numbers
(e.g., SSN)45%
3 Birth Dates 41% Home Addresses 43%
4Gov. ID Numbers
(e.g., SSN)38% Financial Information 36%
5 Medical Records 36% Birth Dates 35%
6Financial
Information33% Medical Records 34%
7 Email Addresses 21% Phone Numbers 21%
8 Phone Numbers 19% Email Addresses 20%
9 Insurance 13%User Names &
Passwords13%
10User Names &
Passwords11% Insurance 11%
Retail remains a lucrative sector for criminals, although the
introduction of the EMV standard, or ‘chip-and-PIN’ payment
technology, in the US means the information criminals will
be able to scrape from point-of-sale (POS) devices will be
less valuable. EMV is a global standard for cards equipped
with microchips, and the technology has been in use in some
countries since 1990s and early 2000s. EMV is used to authen -
ticate chip-and-PIN transactions, and following numerous
large-scale data breaches in recent years, and increasing rates
of credit card fraud, credit card issuers in the US are migrating
to this technology in a bid to reduce the impact of such fraud.
Previously, criminals could get hold of ‘ Track 2 ’ data, which
is shorthand for some of the data stored on a card’s magnetic
strip. This made it easier to clone credit cards and use them in
stores, or even in ATMs, if they had the PIN. Track 1 stores more
information than Track 2, and contains the cardholder’s name,
as well as account number and other discretionary data. Track 1
is sometimes used by airlines when securing reservations with a
credit card. The value of this data is reflected in the online black
market sale prices, with Track 2 data costing up to US$100 per
card.
As of October 2015, 40 percent of US consumers have EMV
cards , and 25 percent of merchants are estimated to be EMV
compliant. With the move to the EMV standard, credit cards are
much more difficult to clone, as they necessitate the use of a PIN in order to use them. And while the transition might take a few
years to fully implement, alongside other improvements in POS
security, it should make large-scale POS thefts more difficult
and certainly less profitable for criminals.
The Insider Threat
While insider theft only accounted for around 10 percent of data
breaches in 2015, the NetDiligence Cyber Claims study reported
that there was insider involvement in 32 percent of the claims
submitted in 2015. According to its CEO, a disgruntled insider
was alleged to have been responsible for one of the most publi -
cized data breaches of the year, at Ashley Madison. Although
this has not been confirmed, if true, it highlights the potential
damage a malicious insider can inflict.
Top Causes of Data Breach by Incidents
TThe proportion of incidents involving insider theft grew from less than one
percent in 2014 to 10 percent in 2015.
49%
22% 22% 21% 21%
10%102030405060708090100%
Insider Theft Theft or Loss
of Computer
or DriveAccidentally
Made PublicAttackers46%
8%
2015 % of Incidents2014 % of Incidents2014 % of IncidentsTABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 54
DATA BREACHES & PRIVACY
These numbers
are likely higher, as many companies are choosing not to reveal the full extent of their data breaches.Total Reported
Identities Exposed
+85%2014
2015
Incidents
that did notreport identitiesexposed in 201561
113
Million*500
*estimated
201320142015429+23%
-37% 348
552numbers in millions
REPORTED IDENTITIES EXPOSED
78 million
patient records
were exposed
at Anthem22 million
personal records
were exposed at
Office of Personnel
Management
UNREPORTED IDENTITIES EXPOSED
Despite companies’ choice
not to report the truenumber of records exposed,hundreds of millions more peoplemay have been compromised.
?
Identities
Exposed4 120Incidents
of breaches
included medical
records
36%
39%The largest number of breaches
took place within the Health Services sub-sector, which actually comprised 39 percentof all breaches in the year.This comes as no surprise, given the strict rules within the healthcare industry regarding reporting of databreaches.
Million
Most of an iceberg is submerged underwater, hiding a great ice mass.
The number of reported identities exposed in data breaches are justthe tip of the iceberg. What remains hidden?Over Half a Billion Personal
Information Records Stolen or Lost in 2015
and more companies than ever not reporting
the full extent of their data breaches
Given the facts,
it is possible that
identities were
exposed2015 Stats
Source: Symantec
Infographic: Over Half a Billion Personal Information Records Stolen or Lost in
2015
Infographic: Over Half a Billion Personal Information Records Stolen or Lost in 2015TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 55
DATA BREACHES & PRIVACY
Top Causes of Data Breach by Identities Exposed
TThe proportion of identities exposed that was accidentally made public
increased to 48 percent from 22 percent in 2014.
82%
<1% <1% <1% <1%102030405060708090100%
Insider Theft Theft or Loss
of Computer
or DriveAccidentally
Made PublicAttackers52%2015 % of Identities2014 % of Identities2014 % of Identities
17%48%
The proportion of identities exposed that was accidentally made
public increased to 48 percent from 22 percent in 2014.
Insider threats have always been a hot topic in cybersecurity,
but in 2015, government bodies not only started to take notice―
and take action.
TMore than three-quarters of US government agencies
surveyed in the MeriTalk Federal Insider Threat Report say
their agency is more focused on combating insider threats
today than one year ago.
TThe UK’s Centre for Defence Enterprise sponsored several
projects in 2015 aimed at monitoring employee digital
behaviour to predict and identify insider threats in real
time, as well as learning simulators to help people spot risk.
Privacy Regulation
and the Value of Personal Data
Cybercriminals are not only interested in ‘who can hack,’ but
also ‘who can leak.’ Whether data may be stolen in a data
breach, accidentally leaked, or even posted online legitimate -
ly in the past, personal data has a value in the underground
shadow economy. Until relatively recently, many people did not
recognize the potential value in personally identifiable infor -
mation, and often were very lackadaisical in safeguarding it.
The advent of social media in the last decade has enabled more
people to share more personal data than at any time in history,
and privacy controls were not at the forefront of many social
networking applications.
Personal data can and will be used to commit crimes, whether
to conduct identity fraud, or to enhance the social engineering
in phishing scams, or even as part of the reconnaissance in the
prelude to a targeted attack. The recognition of the potential
value of this data in the wrong hands has resulted in social networking services enhancing and tightening their privacy
controls, and more people regarding their personal data with
greater respect. For example, the European Court of Justice’s
“right to be forgotten” ruling rippled through the data-gather -
ing community in May 2014 and by the end of 2015, Google had
received 348,085 requests to delist specific search results.
While many thought this would only be of benefit to those
wanting to hide scandal or avoid incrimination, according to
Google’s FAQ, some of the most common cases for removal
are sites that contain personal contact or address information
or “content that relates solely to information about someone’s
health, sexual orientation, race, ethnicity, religion, political
affiliation and trade-union status”.
And the European Court of Justice sharpened the public’s focus
on privacy again this year when it ruled the 2000 “Safe Harbor”
agreement to be invalid. As Monique Goyens, director general
of the European Consumer Organisation explained, the ruling
confirms that “an agreement which allows US companies to
merely declare that they adhere to EU data protection rules
without any authority screening this claim is clearly not
worth the paper it is written on.” As The Guardian newspaper
commented at the time, it may “help stop the US government
from being able to gain access to user data from the EU” and
“may open the door to further probes, complaints, and lawsuits
from users and data regulators.”
However, in February 2016, The European Commission and the
US agreed on a new framework for transatlantic data flows:
the EU-US Privacy Shield. The new framework was designed
to address the requirements set out by the European Court of
Justice after ruling the old Safe Harbor framework invalid. The
press release states, “The new arrangement will provide stronger
obligations on companies in the US to protect the personal data
of Europeans and stronger monitoring and enforcement by the
US Department of Commerce and Federal Trade Commission
(FTC), including through increased cooperation with European
Data Protection Authorities.”
Surveying seven thousand people across Europe, Symantec’s
2015 State of Privacy Report shows that in the UK alone, 49
percent of consumers are worried their data is not safe. And
across the EU, technology companies (22 percent), retailers (20
percent) and social media companies (10 percent), were the least
trusted. Symantec sees the lack of trust in these companies as a
reputational issue, possibly stemming from recent high-profile
data breach incidents.
We expect that reluctance to share personal information will
grow and begin to change online behavior among consumers.
One of the major reasons data privacy is becoming such a
concern is because there is now a clear understanding amongst
consumers that their data holds value. Providers of technology
services should take heed when it comes to data privacy, because
until the technology sector can be trusted to do the right thing
by its consumers to safeguard that data, more work will need TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 56
DATA BREACHES & PRIVACY
to be done in the coming years to build and sustain the level of
trust needed.
As data breaches proliferate and people’s lives increasingly
move online, we expect to see more regulation and more judicial
interest in the protection of individual privacy in 2016 and
beyond. Businesses need to be more transparent with customers
on how they are keeping data secure. Security needs to be
embedded into a company’s value chain, but it should also be
viewed internally as a customer-winning requirement, and not
just a cost.
Ilias Chantzos, senior director in government affairs at
Symantec commented, “There is a real consistency emerging
that privacy is a competitive advantage for businesses and that
privacy concerns also determine consumers’ behaviour. It is
critical to ensure consumers are empowered to understand what
their data is being used for and how it is protected.”Reducing the Risk
While these are important steps, a large number of data
breaches could also have been prevented with basic common
sense, including:
TPatching vulnerabilities
TMaintaining good software hygiene
TDeploying effective email filters
TUsing intrusion prevention and detection software
TRestricting third-party access to company data
TEmploying encryption where appropriate to secure confi -
dential data
TImplementing data loss prevention (DLP) technology
Of course, all of these relate to preventing outsider attacks.
When it comes to mitigating the risk of malicious or acciden -
tal insider threats, organizations need to focus on employee
education and data loss prevention.
Basic security hygiene should be drilled into employees the
same way the public are told to cover our mouths when we
cough or sanitize our hands in hospitals. Organizations should
also be making use of data loss prevention technology to locate,
monitor, and protect their data―wherever it is within the orga -
nization―so that they know who is doing what, with what data,
in real time. DLP can block certain types of data from leaving an
organization, such as credit card numbers and other confiden -
tial documentation.
Security should be an essential part of operations and employee
behavior, rather than an add-on or something to appease
auditors. Data breaches are unlikely to stop any time soon, but
the scale and impact of them could certainly be reduced if orga -
nizations recognized that security goes well beyond the bounds
of the CIO or the IT manager. Security is in every employee’s
hands. TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 57
E-CRIME & MALWARE
E-CRIME & MALWARE
THE UNDERGROUND ECONOMY
AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
The underground economy is
booming and cybercrime is
growing fast, but as we have seen
with the growing number of high-
profile arrests and takedowns in
2015, wherever the cybercriminals
may be, law enforcement is now
catching-up with them much more
quickly. Ransomware attacks have
diversified, including targeting Linux
web servers, and a growth in crypto-
ransomware.Business in the Cyber Shadows
Cybercriminals are more professional and are much bolder, not
only in the targets they go after, but also the sums of money they
seek. These criminal enterprises see themselves as a fully-func -
tioning business, covering a multitude of areas, each with their
own speciality. Just as legitimate businesses have partners, asso -
ciates, resellers, and vendors, so do those enterprises operating
in the shadows.
While prices for email addresses on the black market have
dropped in recent years, credit card prices have remained
relatively low but stable. However, if they come with ‘luxury’
data—verification that the seller’s accounts are still active or
that a credit card has not yet been blocked—they now fetch a
premium price.
At the other end of the market, a drive-by download web toolkit,
which includes updates and 24x7 support, can be rented for
between US$100 and US$700 per week, while distributed
denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks can be ordered from US$10
to US$1,000 per day. And at the top of the market, a zero-day
vulnerability can sell for hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Moreover, these figures have changes very little since 2014. SHARE
THIS
TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 58
E-CRIME & MALWARE
Stand and Deliver
Ransomware has become increasingly dominant in recent years
and in 2014 many expected to see this trend continue. However,
while we have seen ransomware attacks diversify, the growth in
volume has not been seen. Attacks have moved to mobile devices,
encrypting files, and anything else an owner will pay to recover.
Growing Dominance of Crypto-Ransomware
TPercentage of new families of misleading apps, fake security software
(Fake AV), locker ransomware and crypto ransomware identified between
2005 and 2015.
102030405060708090100%
’15 ’14 ’13 ’12 ’11 ’10 ’09 ’08 ’07 ’06 ’05FakeAV
Crypto-Ransomware LockersMisleading Apps
In 2015, one Symantec researcher demonstrated that smart TVs
were potentially vulnerable to ransomware, although this has
not yet been observed in the wild.
Some ransomware now also threatens to publish the victim’s
files online unless they pay―an interesting and sinister twist,
which is likely to increase since the traditional advice of keeping
effective backups, does not help in this scenario.
Never before in the history of human kind have people across
the world been subjected to extortion on a massive scale as they
are today. But why are criminals favoring ransomware, especial -
ly crypto-ransomware? With the glut of stolen information on
the black market and the introduction of the more secure EMV
standard (chip-and-PIN) payment cards for card payments in
the US, the potential profit criminals can gain by exploiting
stolen credit card details had reduced.
Credit card fraud involves several people to conduct, and
consumer legislation ensures the victim’s financial loss is
minimized. In contrast, an attacker can obtain a ransomware
toolkit from an underground source, and target their intended
victims, who may have few alternatives but to pay-up. There are no middlemen for the criminal to pay and nothing to mitigate
the losses to the victim, thus maximizing the profits.
One crypto-ransomware tactic that seeks to increase the
pressure on victims to pay-up, threatens to destroy the only
copy of the secret key after a certain time, with the encrypted
data potentially lost forever.
Crypto-Ransomware Over Time
TWhile more traditional locker-style ransomware is showing a rapid decline,
crypto-ransomware continues to grow. Crypto-ransomware employs very
strong, ostensibly unbreakable key-based cryptography to hold a victim’s
personal files to ransom by encrypting them with a key that only the
criminals have access to.
10,00020,00030,00040,00050,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
2015
Crypto-Ransomware as Percentage
of All Ransomware
TAlthough the chart indicates a steady decline in traditional ransomware in
2015, crypto-ransomware now accounts for the majority of all ransomware.
100200300400500600
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
2015102030405060708090100%THOUSANDRansomware Crypto-Ransomware
Crypto-Ransomware
as % of All RansomwareTABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 59
E-CRIME & MALWARE
Ransomware also targeted Linux web servers in 2015, encrypting
files associated with web applications, archives, and back-ups.
The evolution of Linux ransomware has also mirrored that of
Windows ransomware: initial versions were basic, and often
used poor encryption, making it relatively simple to recover
encrypted files. However, just like with Windows ransomware,
we can expect the criminals behind this new trend to quickly
learn from their mistakes, and become more sophisticated in the
future.
Global Issues, Local Attacks
With the build up to the presidential elections in the US, spam
that leads to malware has been circulating that uses the US
presidential primaries as bait. Spammers know how to play into
visceral, emotive themes, like global events, the refugee crisis
in the Middle East, immigration, and foreign policy issues, the
economy, and even terrorism.
In January 2015, the Twitter and YouTube accounts of the US
military command were hacked by self-styled supporters of the
jihadist terrorist group, ISIS (a.k.a. IS, ISIL or Daesh). US Central
Command commented that it was, “cyber-vandalism” rather
than a serious data breach.
However, in April 2015, French television network TV5 Monde
reported that it had been hacked by a group claiming to belong
to the terrorist group, ISIS. According to reports, its TV station
was brought to a standstill, and its website and social media
pages were also disrupted in the attack. The hackers posted documents that purported to be the identity cards, and CVs of
relatives of French soldiers involved in anti-ISIS operations in
Iraq and Syria.
Both examples highlight a clear-cut case of terrorists using
cyberthreats as an instrument to amplify their messages. The
Internet has become not only tool only for online radicalization,
but also for communication between terrorist groups, and for
financing their operations. As a consequence, the calls for law
enforcement to break encryption protocols are likely to have a
wider and long-lasting impact on the technological integrity of
Internet communications as a whole.
In a refereence to terrorism, one recent email campaign imper -
sonated local law enforcement officials in the Middle East and
Canada, tricking people into downloading malware by posing
as security tips that would keep the intended victim safe from
potential terror attacks in their location. The email spoofed the
addresses of law enforcement agencies and included the names
of officials who were all still in office at the time of the campaign.
The subject lines in the emails often reflected the name of an
employee who worked within the targeted company.
To make this type of attack convincing requires some degree of
research, and here we have seen that this group did so before
sending these phishing emails. Furthermore, without any
employee information, they would email other people in the
company as an entry point, such as customer services or IT
personnel. Ransomware Discoveries
Hidden Tear
ORX-LockerKeRanger
GinxBrowlockKovterNymaim RevetonCryptowall
Q1 Q1 Q1 Q2 Q2 Q2 Q3 Q3 Q3 Q4 Q4 Q42013Gpcoder
Linkup
SynolockerCTB-Locker/Citron VirLockSlockerOnionCoinvault
TorrentLockerZerolocker
2014PayCrypt
Job Cryptor
Power Worm
Magic
Chimera-LockerDumbVaultCrypt
RadamantXRTN
Hi Buddy
Vipasana
HydracryptCryptoAppLockDroid
Cryptolocker2015
PclockPacmanSimplockerTeslaCryptToxTroldeshEncryptor RaaS
BandarChorCryptvault
2015
Q12016 2012 2005
DMA-LockerUnix.Ransomcrypt
LowLevel404 Umbrecrypt
Urausy
Mabouia OSX POCRansom32
Gomasom73v3n
Nanolocker
LeChiffreCryptoJockerLocky
Threat FinderCryptInfinite
Source: Symantec
Ransomware
Discoveries TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 60
E-CRIME & MALWARE
This level of research and localisation indicates a growing profes -
sionalism, and is becoming increasingly common in botnet
scams. The underground economy isn’t just about selling stolen
goods: it’s an entire industry with the talented professionals and
organisations you would expect in a legitimate business sector.
Botnets and the Rise of the Zombies
As with many other industries, up and coming economies,
such as China in particular, has become a favoured as target for
cybercrime in 2015. One significant factor has been a growth
in broadband adoption in the last year. In 2013, the Chinese
Government announced plans to expand broadband coverage
for both rural and urban areas by 2020. One of the milestones
for the multi-pronged strategy aimed to bring fixed broadband
connections to 400 million Chinese households by 2015. In
addition, prices have been kept low as broadband speeds have
increased. All of this make the country an attractive target for
cybercriminals seeking to compromise a fresh source of high-
speed, internet-connected computers.
Malicious Activity by Source: Bots
TChina was the origin of much more bot activity in 2015, seeing a sharp
rise of 84 percent in bot-related activity in that country. Bot activity in the
US by contrast, fell by 67%. Successful law enforcement activity against
cybercriminals, and heightened cybersecurity awareness are both
contributing factors in the decline of bots in general.
2015
Country/
Region2015
Bots %
of GlobalPercent
Change Bots
in Country/
Region2014
Country/
Region2014 Bots
Percentage
of Global
1 China 46.1% +84.0% China 16.5%
2United
States8.0% -67.4%United
States16.1%
3 Taiwan 5.8% -54.8% Taiwan 8.5%
4 Turkey 4.5% +29.2% Italy 5.5%
5 Italy 2.4% -71.2% Hungary 4.9%
6 Hungary 2.2% -69.7% Brazil 4.3%
7 Germany 2.0% -58.0% Japan 3.4%
8 Brazil 2.0% -70.1% Germany 3.1%
9 France 1.7% -57.9% Canada 3.0%
10 Spain 1.7% -44.5% Poland 2.8%The Dyre Consequences and Law Enforcement
After police shut down several major financial botnets in 2014,
Dyre stepped up to take their place. Not only could Dyre hijack
common web browsers and intercept Internet banking sessions
to steal information, it could also download additional malware
to the victim’s computer, binding it to the perpetrator’s network
of botnet computers.
Dyre Detections Over Time
TThe chart shows a decline in Dyre malware activity long before the botnet
was disrupted in November 2015. This may be an indication of an already
weakened business model.
5,00010,00015,00020,00025,00030,00035,000
DNOSAJJMAMFJ
2015DNOSAJJ
2014
Dyre had initially emerged as one of the most dangerous
financial fraud operations, configured to defraud the customers
of more than 1,000 banks and other companies worldwide.
However, the cybercrime group controlling the Dyre financial
fraud Trojan suffered a major blow following a Russian law
enforcement operation in November. As outlined in a Security
Response blog , Symantec telemetry has confirmed a virtual
cessation of the group’s activities. Dyre (detected by Symantec
as Infostealer.Dyre ) was spread through email campaigns and
no Dyre-related email campaigns have been observed since
November 18, 2015. Detections of the Dyre Trojan and associ -
ated malware dropped dramatically soon after. Previously, the
number of infections was estimated to be above 9,000 per month
in early 2015. In November it fell to below 600 per month.
Law enforcement has become more effective at catching cyber -
criminals like these, and high-profile successes at disrupting
them shows how coordinated, international efforts can pay
dividends. Rarely is an attack group confined to one country, and
with major groups spanning multiple jurisdictions, cross-bor -
der cooperation with law enforcement is an important factor
to ensure that these successes continue to strike a blow against
cybercriminals. We expect to see still more successful law
enforcement operations against cybercriminals in the next year. TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 61
E-CRIME & MALWARE
As the risks for the cybercriminals intensify, the potential
rewards will diminish, raising the barrier to entry for any
would-be cybercriminals. Other notable successes in 2015
included:
TDridex takedown. The Dridex botnet specialized in stealing
bank credentials. In October, an international law enforce -
ment operation coordinated efforts to sinkhole thousands of
compromised computers, cutting them off from the botnet’s
control, and saw one man charged. However, this may have
been a partial success as Dridex continues to propagate ,
indicating that many key elements of the operation are still
functioning. As such, we expect the group to continue to
pose a serious threat during 2016.
TSimda takedown. In April, infrastructure owned by the Simda
botnet’s controllers, including a number of command-and-
control servers, was seized by law enforcement. According to
Interpol , “Simda was used by cyber criminals to gain remote
access to computers enabling the theft of personal details,
including banking passwords, as well as to install and spread
other malware.”
TRamnit seizure. In February, a law enforcement operation
led by Europol and assisted by, among others, Symantec and
Microsoft , seized servers and other infrastructure owned by
the cybercrime group behind the Ramnit botnet.
TMulti-national banking and financial services fraud-related
indictments. Federal authorities indicted at least four men in
connection with hacking incidents that resulted in the theft
of over 100 million customer records. They were charged
with hacking into multiple financial institutions and for
operating a stock pump-and-dump scheme. One of the
attacks occurred in 2014, and netted more than 80 million
customer records, a breach that the US Justice Depart -
ment dubbed the “largest theft of customer data from a US
financial institution in history.”Cybercrime and Keeping out of Harm’s Way
Organizations and individuals need to realise that even if they
don’t think they’re an obvious target for cybercriminals, it
doesn’t mean they’re not one.
The key is to remain vigilant both on a personal level by:
TNot opening emails from unknown senders.
TLooking for the padlock and checking the SSL certificate on
any sites where you enter sensitive data.
TNot using unsecured networks when accessing sensitive
data.
Remain vigilant at an organizational level by:
TDeploying intrusion prevention and detection software.
TKnowing what valuable data you have and harnessing data
loss prevention technology.
TMonitoring where data is, and who has access to it.
TEnsuring you have a good incident response plan for when
an attack is detected. It’s not a question of what to do if an
attack occurs, but when. TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 62
CLOUD & INFRASTRUCTURE
CLOUD &
INFRASTRUCTURE
COMPUTERS, CLOUD COMPUTING
AND IT INFRASTRUCTURE
IT systems continue to come
under attack from rapidly evolving
malware. No operating system is
automatically immune, and malware
threats against Linux and Mac
OS X are increasing. Even cloud-
hosted and virtualized systems are
vulnerable. Malware is able to seek-
out virtualized environments and
infect them. Protecting the System
The days of an operating system avoiding attacks simply by not
being Windows is long behind us. Attacks against Mac OS X and
Linux have both increased considerably in 2015 and cybersecu -
rity is a necessity across the board for all operating systems―not
just for Windows―to avoid the consequences of attack.
Cybersecurity affects everyone. Businesses need to protect their
computers and IT infrastructure to stop data theft, fraud, and
malware attacks. Likewise, businesses and consumers should
be concerned about ransomware holding their data hostage,
identity theft, and attackers using their computers as a spring -
board to attack others.
At a fundamental level, cybersecurity is about protecting the
sinews of IT everywhere: computers, servers, and networks. The
problem is that malware is ubiquitous. In 2015, we have seen
many more systems come under attack, including Linux, Macs,
virtualized computers, and cloud systems. Each year, the cloud
handles more of our data, whether it is for customer relation -
ship management, invoicing services, social networking, mobile
email, and a whole gamut of other applications
One route for attacks is through exploiting vulnerabilities, and
most systems have vulnerabilities. These exist in the operating
systems and applications used on them, and are an important
aspect of cybersecurity. If left unpatched, a vulnerability may SHARE
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CLOUD & INFRASTRUCTURE
leave the path clear for would-be attackers to exploit them
and use them for malicious purposes. Each year, researchers
uncover new vulnerabilities, and the most coveted of these are
zero-days, a special type of vulnerability for which a patch is not
yet available.
Total Number of Vulnerabilities
TThe chart suggests an inflection towards a downward trend since 2013,
markedly accentuated in 2015.
1,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,0007,000
2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 2007 20064,8424,6445,562
4,8146,253
4,9895,2916,4366,204
5,585
Germophobes may not like it, but bacteria and viruses cover
every surface. They live on our skin and in the air, and they
are not going away. Likewise, vulnerabilities are a part of the
computing environment. They are not going away either, and a
slipshod approach to patching―whether through carelessness,
misconfiguration, human error, or negligence―is a major cause
of malware infections. Well-managed, well-patched systems are
much less likely to become infected.Nothing Is Automatically Immune
In the last year, Symantec has seen threats to almost every kind
of computer, operating system, and other essential IT services,
including:
TMac OS X. In addition to more vulnerabilities being
uncovered in 2015, proof-of-concept ransomware and
several methods for Trojans to gain unauthorised access to
affected computers were also discovered.
TMySQL. Symantec researchers discovered malware that
attacks MySQL ―a very popular database system―and uses it
to launch denial-of-service attacks on other systems.
TLinux. There was a rapid growth in Linux malware in 2015,
including attack kits that hackers can use to infect unpatched
Linux web servers.
TVirtualised systems. Even virtualised systems are not
immune. Sixteen percent of malware is routinely able to
recognize and exploit a virtual machine environment, and
vulnerabilities such as VENOM could allow an attacker to
escape an infected virtual machine and attack others on the
same system, or even attack the host hypervisor.
Mac OS X
Apple’s Mac OS X operating system was targeted for a variety
of attacks in 2015, including a proof-of-concept ransomware
threat called Mabouia (detected as OSX.Ransomcrypt ), the first
effective file-based ransomware threat against OS X. Previously,
browser-based threats against Macs have been found, including
ransomware targeting Safari through a malicious website.
Moreover, the volume of OS X malware has doubled (100%
growth) since the start of 2015. In Q1, Symantec blocked approx -
imately 3,650 attacks each day, rising to 7,255 by the end of Q4.
Mac OS X Malware Volume
30,00060,00090,000120,000150,000180,000210,000240,000270,000300,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
2015TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 64
CLOUD & INFRASTRUCTURE
Top Ten Mac OS X Malware Blocked
on OS X Endpoints
TMany OS X malware variants were additionally blocked using generic
detection for which specific definitions are not created. Generic detection
protects against many Trojans that share similar characteristics.
RankMalware
NamePercent of
Mac Threats
2015Malware
NamePercent
of Mac
Threats
2014
1 OSX.Sudoprint 42.0% OSX.RSPlug.A 21.2%
2 OSX.RSPlug.A 16.8% OSX.Okaz 12.1%
3 OSX.Klog.A 6.6%OSX.
Flashback.K8.6%
4 OSX.Keylogger 5.6% OSX.Keylogger 7.7%
5OSX.
Wirelurker5.0% OSX.Stealbit.B 6.0%
6 OSX.Luaddit 3.2% OSX.Klog.A 4.4%
7OSX.
Flashback.K3.1% OSX.Crisis 4.3%
8 OSX.Crisis 2.1% OSX.Sabpab 3.2%
9 OSX.Okaz 1.7% OSX.Netweird 3.1%
10 OSX.Stealbit.B 1.6% OSX.Flashback 3.0%
Linux in the Firing Line
Although the overall volume is lower by comparison, the number
of malware attacks against Linux has risen has risen almost
fourfold (286 percent increase) since the start of the year. In Q1,
Symantec blocked approximately 1.3 attacks each day, rising to
5.2 by the end of Q4.Linux Malware Volume
TIn 2015, Symantec saw a surge in malware targeting Linux—the most
common operating system on website servers, among other essential
Internet services.
50100150200250300
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MARFEB JAN
2015
Top Ten Linux Malware Blocked
on Linux Endpoints
TFifty-five percent of Linux malware in 2015 related to variants of Linux.
Xorddos, a Trojan horse that opens a back door on the compromised
computer and includes a rootkit device that can hide network traffic and
other files. It may also download other potentially malicious files.
Rank Malware NamePercent of Linux
Threats 2015
1 Linux.Xorddos 54.9%
2 Linux.Dofloo 13.9%
3 Linux.Wifatch 12.7%
4 Linux.Shelock 4.2%
5 Linux.Spalooki 3.9%
6 Linux.Kaiten.B 3.8%
7 Linux.Mumblehard 2.4%
8 Linux.Moose 1.6%
9 Linux.Raubdo 1.0%
10 Linux.Xnote 0.5%
Linux is ubiquitous, and one server may accommodate thousands
of websites within the datacenter of any hosting provider. Linux
has become an attractive target for hackers because with access TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 65
CLOUD & INFRASTRUCTURE
to one server, an attacker can potentially infect all of the websites
hosted on it, and in turn all of their visitors and customers.
Attackers will often contaminate compromised web servers with
code that links to exploit toolkits, or they to send spam emails
and steal usernames and passwords . Additionally, compromised
web servers are often a springboard from which an attacker will
conduct a wide variety of other attacks, including very powerful
DDoS attacks, where the bandwidth of a hosting provider is
considerably greater than that of a home-user with a broadband
connection.
A proliferation of specialized, automated attack toolkits have
emerged, making it easier for cyber criminals to carry attacks
against Linux systems. These toolkits help attackers to sniff-out
potentially vulnerable servers, scanning for insecure content
management systems and other exposed web applications.
Ransomware targeting Linux was also uncovered in 2015,
targeted in particular files with extensions associated with web
applications. The program also encrypted archives and direc -
tories that contained the word ‘backup,’ making it particularly
difficult for anyone without offsite backups.
Cloud and Virtualized Systems
The term “cloud computing” covers a wide variety of technical
solutions and environments, including software-as-a-service
(SaaS), platform-as-a-service (PaaS), or infrastructure-as-a-ser -
vice (IaaS) models. IaaS is growing in popularity among
businesses, and as more data and services move to the cloud,
it is attracting more attention from security researchers and
cybercriminals. As with any system, each time a new layer
is introduced to a service stack, the attack surface increases.
While cloud environments may suffer from common vulnera -
bilities, such as SQL injection flaws, they may also be impacted
by other issues. For example, in 2015, Symantec found that
misconfiguration and poor management (by users, not cloud
service providers) left cloud-hosted systems vulnerable to
unauthorized access. Additionally, 11,000 publicly accessible
files―some containing sensitive personal information―were
also unearthed. Stolen credentials for cloud-based systems are
regularly traded on underground markets, typically for less than
US$10.
Cloud Vulnerabilities
It is not necessarily the case that cloud systems are inherently
less-secure than traditional IT services. Nevertheless, admin -
istrators need to ensure that the cloud services they use are
properly configured and all data is adequately protected. They
should take care to control access to their cloud systems, prefer -
ably with two-factor authentication.Vulnerabilities, like VENOM , could allow an attacker to escape
from a guest virtual machine (VM) and access the native host
operating system, along with other VMs running on the same
platform. Attackers exploiting the VENOM bug could poten -
tially steal sensitive data on any of the virtual machines on the
affected system, and gain elevated access to the host’s local
network and its systems. The VENOM bug (CVE-2015-3456)
existed since 2004 in the open-source hypervisor QEMU, which
is often installed by default in a number of virtualized infra -
structures using Xen, QEMU, and KVM. However, it is important
to note that VENOM does not affect VMware, Microsoft Hyper-V,
and Bochs hypervisors.
To date, the VENOM bug has not known to have been exploited
in the wild, and QEMU’s developers and other affected vendors
have since created and distributed patches for VENOM.
One in six (16 percent) malware variants is able to detect the
presence of a virtualized environment, compared with one in
five (20 percent) in 2014. This ability can help the malware to
better evade detection, particularly on security sandboxing
systems using virtualization. More concerning is that an attack
may detect when it is able to exploit and infect other virtual
machines on the same system.
Proportion of Malware Samples
That Are Virtual Machine Aware
TApproximately 16 percent of malware is routinely able to detect and identify
the presence of a virtual machine environment, peaking at around 22
percent in Q4.
510152025%
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
2015161516
817 17
12201922 22
16
Having a robust security profile for virtual systems is now more
important than ever. Virtual machines and cloud services need
securing in the same way as other services and devices. Policies
should cover the virtual infrastructure as well as the physical
one, and the use of integrated security tools across all platforms
will help to mitigate such problems in the future.TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 66
CLOUD & INFRASTRUCTURE
Protecting the IT infrastructure
In the face of these threats, and many others like them, the old
advice holds good for any infrastructure services, including file
servers, web servers, and other Internet-connected devices:
TStay informed about emerging threats.
TKeep systems up to date with patches and updates.
TUse integrated security software, including anti-malware
technology.
TUse a strong firewall that only permits known traffic, and
review access logs regularly to detect potentially suspicious
activity.
TEmploy multi-layer protection, so if one layer is compro -
mised, there are other layers to protect different areas the
system.
TApply good policies and train staff well.
TControl access on a least-privilege basis.
TDeploy network intrusion prevention and detection and
monitor email services running on the server.
TAlways keep backups offsite.
Be concerned about cloud systems too. Here are some additional
considerations:
TSafeguard all credentials used to access the cloud-based
administration functions and ensure access is controlled on
a need-to-know basis.
TEnsure that you understand the settings of your cloud
resources and configure them accordingly.
TEnable event logging to keep track of who is accessing data
in the cloud.
TRead the cloud providers’ service-level agreements to learn
how data in the cloud is secured.
TInclude cloud IP addresses in vulnerability management
processes and perform audits on any services that are
provided through the cloud.
Protect Information Wherever It Is
As companies move their IT systems to virtual and cloud-host -
ed environments, they face new security challenges. In addition,
as ever, human nature itself is a threat, with poorly-managed
security leading to shadow IT systems. Shadow IT refers to
solutions used inside organizations without explicit organiza -
tional approval, and solutions used by departments other than
the IT department. It can sometimes be all too easy for a group
of employees to turn to external products to fulfil an immediate
need. IT decision makers should understand what is influenc -
ing their employees to turn to these solutions, and when the IT
department should be involved to help shape those decisions.It is important for the CIO to understand what the organization
is doing, and whether certain teams are looking for services or
applications that are not provided for, then determine how to
address that need and offer that service in a secure fashion.
Having the right processes is key to protecting information and
data, even when it is not housed inside the enterprise.
DDOS ATTACKS AND BOTNETS
Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS)
attacks are growing in number
and intensity, but most last for 30
minutes or less. The availability of
botnets-for-hire has fueled this
increase and we are likely to see
the Internet of Things provide more
fodder for these botnet armies.
DDoS at Large
Some DDoS attacks can still afford criminals many opportu -
nities for financial reward through extortion and blackmail by
disrupting an organization’s website. Following the money trail
made this more difficult and DDoS mitigation technologies
meant the attackers needed greater and greater bandwidth in
order to make an impact. More recently, however, it is hacktivist
groups and sometimes state actors that are complicit in some of
the biggest attacks.
The recent attack on the BBC , which saw its website and asso -
ciated services including iPlayer (the BBC’s Internet catch-up
TV and radio service in the UK) taken down for several hours
on New Year’s Eve, is a prime example. It is thought to be the
biggest ever DDoS attack, according to New World Hacking, the
anti-Islamic State organisation that claimed responsibility. The
attackers claimed that the BBC’s scale offered a chance for them
to test their capabilities and claim the attack reached a peak of
602 Gbps .
There are rewards to be gained through a DDoS attack, the
most obvious being blackmail. Victims are threated to pay or
have their sites remain under attack. DDoS has also been used
as a “distraction” tool in conjunction with some high-profile
targeted attacks in 2015, where attackers flooded the website of
the targeted organisation, leaving the IT team believing it was
the prelude to a ransom demand. In reality, another, stealthier
attack was quietly taking place at the same time. SHARE
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CLOUD & INFRASTRUCTURE
DDoS Attack Volume Seen by Symantec’s Global
Intelligence Network
TThe chart shows the number of DDoS attacks per month, and this number
has grown in the second half of 2015, before tailing-off at the end of
the year. There were more notable spikes of activity, as attack durations
become shorter and more discreet.
2571012151720
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
2015MILLION
Top Five DDoS Attack Traffic Seen by Symantec’s
Global Intelligence Network
TThe majority of DDoS attacks were ICMP flood attacks, where a large
volume of (typically) ‘ping’ requests eventually overload the target until it can
no longer handle legitimate traffic.
2015 Attacks2015
Attack
Rate2014 Attacks2014
Attack
Rate
1Generic ICMP
Flood Attack85.7%DNS
Amplification
Attack29.4%
2Generic TCP
Syn Flood
Denial of
Service Attack6.4%Generic ICMP
Flood Attack17.2%
3Generic Ping
Broadcast
(Smurf) Denial
of Service
Attack2.1%Generic Ping
Broadcast
(Smurf) Denial of
Service Attack16.8%
4Generic
Teardrop/
Land Denial of
Service Attack2.0%Generic
Teardrop/Land
Denial of Service
Attack7.2%
5RFProwl Denial
of Service
Attack0.6%Generic ICMP
Unreachable
Denial of Service
Attack5.7%Different attack groups have different preferences for their
DDoS campaigns, and ICMP flood attacks were one of the main
methods used by the Darkness/Optima botnet. Some methods,
particularly amplification attacks, may no longer work that
well over time. For example, when the media extensively covers
a high-profile attack, more people will patch their servers. In
addition, botnets that were used to perform previous attacks
may be taken down or upgraded to newer versions that provide
new functionality.
Simple but Effective
So why are DDoS attacks so popular? The answer is the same
now as it was when we first wrote about them in December 200 2:
they are simple to set up, difficult to stop, and very effective.
This is truer than ever with the rise of botnets-for-hire.
Botnets-for-hire were implicated in roughly 40 percent of all
DDoS network layer attacks in the second quarter of 2015,
according to Incapsula , a Symantec partner. While criminals
can go to the effort of infecting multiple vulnerable devices and
creating their own botnet to carry out DDoS attacks, it’s often
much easier to hire pre-made botnets for a set amount of time.
Prices remained fairly steady in the black market in 2015, where
DDoS attacks can be ordered from just US$10 to US$1,000 per
day. The cost to a business will be significantly higher, perhaps
as much as a thousand times greater, depending on the nature
of the business and the importance of the company’s website.
In 2015, Incapsula reported a DDoS attack can cost an organiza -
tion as much as US$40,000 per hour. Consequently the potential
rewards for an attacker successfully holding a company to
ransom in this way will more than compensate for their costs.
For example, one Australian email provider was attacked and
attackers demanded a payment of 20 Bitcoins, worth about
US$6,600. Another company that paid the demand was soon
subjected to another assault shortly afterwards.TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 68
CLOUD & INFRASTRUCTURE
Distribution of Network Layer DDoS Attacks
by Duration (Q3)
TThe chart shows how by the end of Q2 2015, there were still a significant
proportion of DDoS attacks that could last for several hours, days, weeks, or
months even. Chart courtesy of Incapsula .
10203040506070%
720+
480-720 240-480120-24096-12072-9648-72 24-4812-246-123-61-3 .5-1<.51658%
76
11<1 22<1134410
HOURS
These shorter hit-and-run style attacks are indicative of a shift
towards the greater use of DDoS being offered as a service,
where subscribers are allotted limited access to the overall
botnet resources, which are shared with other subscribers.
This will usually be sufficient for them to conduct a few short -
er-duration, mid-sized attacks. This can also help the attackers
determine how effective the target infrastructure is at miti -
gating such attacks, and whether they need to increase the
volume. Incapsula also reported that 100+ Gbps attacks became
commonplace and a 100+ Gbps attack was mitigated once every
other day.
The rise in popularity of DDoS-as-a-service corresponds with
the significant drop in network layer attack duration in the third
quarter of 2015 compared with the second quarter. Some of
these DDoS-for-hire services refer to themselves as “stressers,”
because conducting a DDoS attack is illegal, they hide behind a
veil, inferring they can be used for “stress testing” server resil -
ience.Distribution of Network Layer DDoS Attacks
by Duration (Q2)
TThe chart shows that by the end of Q3, the number of DDoS attacks that
lasted for more than a day had almost disappeared completely, accounting
for less than half of one percent of all DDoS attacks.
Chart courtesy of Incapsula .
102030405060708090100%
24+ 12-24 6-12 3-6 1-3 .5-1 <.516
HOURS77%
118
1 1 <1 <1
What’s in a Botnet?
Botnets are key to DDoS attacks, whether they’re hired or
created by the criminals carrying out the attack. The bigger
the botnet, the more simultaneous requests it can send and the
more disruptive the attack will be.
But it’s not just infected PCs that are providing criminals with
their robot army. In October, we saw malware target MySQL
servers , which often offer a much larger bandwidth capacity for
an attack than traditional consumer PCs. This method isn’t new,
but it shows criminals are continuing to create bigger and better
botnets.
In 2015, we also saw criminals making increasing use of the
Internet of Things (IoT) to strengthen their botnet ranks. CCTV
cameras proved particularly popular , likely because they are one
of the most common IoT devices, with 245 million profession -
ally installed video surveillance cameras active and operational
globally in 2014.
Looking ahead, it’s likely that criminals will make increasing use
of vulnerable IoT devices to execute large-scale DDoS attacks.
While solutions exist to mitigate against DDoS attack, organiza -
tions will also face new challenges in implementing appropriate
security on non-traditional devices to ensure they don’t become
part of the problem. Perhaps more concerning, without the right
security in place, it will be even more difficult to know when
your printer, or refrigerator, thermostat, or toaster is actually
part of a toxic global botnet. TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 69
Why is Cybersecurity so Important?
This is the 21st edition of the Symantec Internet Security Threat
Report and much has changed since the first one. Each year we
take a fresh look at the structure and contents of the report. As
well as focusing on the threats and reporting the findings from
our research, Symantec also tracks industry trends, and in the
report, we try to highlight the important developments and
look to future trends. This goes beyond just looking at computer
systems, smartphones, and other products, and extends into
broad concepts like national security, the economy, data protec -
tion, and privacy.
Cybersecurity Matters
This report takes a high-level view of cybersecurity and Internet
threats, underlining the notable changes and developments.
However, we must not forget that cybercrime is not victimless.
For example, ransomware locks people out of their computers,
holding treasured family photos to ransom, hijacking unfin -
ished manuscripts for novels, and blocking access to tax returns,
banking records, and other valuable documents. Moreover,
there are no guarantees that paying the ransom will release
those padlocks. Businesses, as well as home users, have become
victims, and relying on backups is often the last line of defense
when cybersecurity should really be the first.
Targeted attacks steal invaluable intellectual property from
businesses, and a data breach can shred an organization’s repu -
tation―even threatening its survival. Cyber insurance claims
are growing in number and cost, pushing premiums even higher.
In the broadest sense, cybersecurity problems threaten national
security and economic growth, which ultimately affects us all.
Web Security and the Industry’s Responsibility
Updates to protect against such vulnerabilities are released
regularly, including for SSL/TLS protocol libraries, such as
OpenSSL, but website owners still have to install them. We
have seen in this report and over the past few years that this
is still not happening quickly enough. The number of vulnera -
ble websites continues to persist year after year, with very little
improvement to show. While the move from SHA-1 certificates
to the much stronger SHA-2 is gaining momentum, organiza -
tions must deploy the new certificates properly in order for the
changes to be effective.
Criminals continued to find vulnerabilities in the underlying
infrastructure of website security in 2015, exploiting weakness -
es in the underlying encryption systems, allowing attackers
to intercept and control secure connections. The wider debate
around security, privacy, and strong encryption will ultimately
affect all of us.Nothing Is Automatically Immune
No system is automatically immune from cyber threats, and
in this report, the consequences of ignoring the risks from
complacency, negligence, and incompetence are clear. In 2015,
an unprecedented number of vulnerabilities were identified as
zero-day exploits that have been weaponized, and web attack
exploit kits are adapting and evolving them more quickly than
ever. As more devices are connected, vulnerabilities will be
exploited. Safeguarding Internet-connected devices will become
critically important to ensuring the safety of industrial control
systems (ICS) and medical devices in the community.
Alongside the rising number of software vulnerabilities, and
the parade of attacks on different systems, the future will bring
with it a greater range of diversity as threats against Windows
systems will extend to other operating systems, mobile, and
other IoT devices.
Digital Hygiene and a Cleaner Future
In cybersecurity, we often talk about infections and viruses.
But the state of ubiquitous attacks, epic data breaches, and
advanced threats we have seen this year suggest that there are
better medical analogies. Instead of infection, we might think of
disease both chronic and acute, serious, and benign.
Instead of thinking in binary terms of infection-free and compro -
mised, we should move to a wellness model that considers
susceptibility, resilience , wellness, vulnerability to infection,
and recoverability. As IT security professionals, we should
emphasize prevention, detection, and mitigation, as well as a
complete cure. Concepts borrowed from epidemiology, incident
response planning , and tools such as security simulation are
becoming more important and useful.
For individuals and companies, Internet security is going to
be much more like ‘wellness’ and ‘hygiene’ than ‘medicine,’
and focused on the routine of prevention rather than looking
for a panacea or cure. We all need to stay digitally healthy and
digitally clean, and habits of security will need to be relearned,
over and over again.
Similarly, IT departments need to be proactive in reducing
the risk from persistent intrusions and malware, and identify
breaches quickly. Unfortunately, discovering attacks quickly
requires constant, active vigilance. Information security can’t
wait for support tickets to open or for a favored security tool to
identify an issue conclusively. Security needs to start digging
through the data proactively during non-breach response time. CONCLUSIONSTABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 70
As an industry, we need to start moving into a more investiga -
tive, clinical-study mindset where we are constantly researching
the habits or artifacts that cause the “digital diseases.” Taking
risks with cybersecurity will be seen as unacceptable, perhaps
anathema akin to driving a car while under the influence of
alcohol.
Cybersecurity is not just about employing the right kind of
technology, it also requires good digital hygiene on the part of
everyone; both at home, and in the office. Education and greater
awareness of cybersecurity issues will help everyone to become
more digitally healthy. By being aware of just how many risks
you face, you can reduce them, and learn how to recognize
symptoms, and diagnose “digital diseases” before they put your
data, and your customers’ data at risk. We should reject the
misconception that privacy no longer exists. Privacy is precious,
and should be protected carefully.
For the latest updated figures, please visit:
Symantec’s Monthly Threat ReportTABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 71
Employ Defense-in-Depth Strategies
Emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive
defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any
specific technology or protection method. This should include
the deployment of regularly updated firewalls as well as gateway
antivirus, intrusion detection or protection systems (IPS),
website vulnerability with malware protection, and web security
gateway solutions throughout the network.
Monitor for Network Incursion Attempts,
Vulnerabilities, and Brand Abuse
Receive alerts for new vulnerabilities and threats across vendor
platforms for proactive remediation. Track brand abuse via
domain alerting and fictitious website reporting.
Antivirus on Endpoints Is Not Enough
On endpoints, it is important to have the latest versions of
antivirus software installed. Deploy and use a comprehensive
endpoint security product that includes additional layers of
protection, including:
TEndpoint intrusion prevention that protects unpatched
vulnerabilities from being exploited, protects against social
engineering attacks, and stops malware from reaching
endpoints.
TBrowser protection for avoiding obfuscated web-based
attacks.
TFile and web-based reputation solutions that provide a
risk-and-reputation rating of any application and website to
prevent rapidly mutating and polymorphic malware.
TBehavioral prevention capabilities that look at the behavior
of applications and prevent malware.
TApplication control settings that can prevent applications
and browser plugins from downloading unauthorized
malicious content.
TDevice control settings that prevent and limit the types of
USB devices to be used.Secure Websites Against Attacks and Malware
Infection
Avoid compromising your trusted relationship with customers
by regularly assessing your website for vulnerabilities and
malware. Additionally, consider:
TChoosing SSL Certificates with Extended Validation to
display the green browser address bar to website users.
TDisplaying recognized trust marks in highly visible
locations on your website to show customers your commit -
ment to their security.
Protect Private Keys
Make sure to get your digital certificates from an established,
trustworthy certificate authority that demonstrates excellent
security practices. Symantec recommends that organizations:
TUse separate Test Signing and Release Signing infrastruc -
tures.
TSecure keys in secure, tamper-proof, cryptographic
hardware devices.
TImplement physical security to protect your assets from
theft.
Use Encryption and DLP to Protect Sensitive
Data
Implement and enforce a security policy whereby any sensitive
data is encrypted. Ensure that customer data is encrypted as
well. This not only serves to prevent data breaches, but can also
help mitigate the damage of potential data leaks from within an
organization.
Access to sensitive information should be restricted. This
should include a Data Loss Protection (DLP) solution that can
help prevent data breaches and minimize their impact.
TImplement a DLP solution that can discover where sensitive
data resides, monitor its use, and protect it from loss.
TMonitor the flow of information as it leaves the organi -
zation over the network, and monitor traffic to external
devices or websites.
TDLP should be configured to identify and block suspicious
copying or downloading of sensitive data.
TDLP should also be used to identify confidential or sensitive
data assets on network file systems and computers.BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR BUSINESSESTABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 72
Ensure All Devices Allowed on Company
Networks Have Adequate Security Protections
If a bring-your-own-device (BYOD) policy is in place, ensure a
minimal security profile is established for any devices that are
allowed access to the network.
Implement a Removable Media Policy
Where practical, restrict unauthorized devices, such as external
portable hard-drives and other removable media. Such devices
can both introduce malware and facilitate intellectual property
breaches, whether intentional or unintentional. If external
media devices are permitted, automatically scan them for
viruses upon connection to the network and use a DLP solution
to monitor and restrict copying confidential data to unencrypt -
ed external storage devices.
Be Aggressive in Updating and Patching
Update, patch, and migrate from outdated and insecure
browsers, applications, and browser plugins. This also applies
to operating systems, not just across computers, but mobile,
ICS, and IoT devices as well. Keep virus and intrusion preven -
tion definitions at the latest available versions using vendors’
automatic updates.
Most software vendors work diligently to patch exploited
software vulnerabilities; however, such patches can only be
effective if adopted in the field. Wherever possible, automate
patch deployments to maintain protection against vulnerabili -
ties across the organization.
Enforce an Effective Password Policy
Ensure passwords are strong. Passwords should be at least 8-10
characters long and include a mixture of letters and numbers.
Encourage users to avoid re-using the same passwords on
multiple websites and sharing passwords with others should be
forbidden. Passwords should be changed regularly, at least every
90 days.
Ensure Regular Backups Are Available
Create and maintain regular backups of critical systems, as
well as endpoints. In the event of a security or data emergency,
backups should be easily accessible to minimize downtime of
services and employee productivity.Restrict Email Attachments
Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains
file attachments that are commonly used to spread viruses, such
as .VBS, .BAT, .EXE, .PIF, and .SCR files. Enterprises should inves -
tigate policies for .PDFs that are allowed to be included as email
attachments. Ensure that mail servers are adequately protected
by security software and that email is thoroughly scanned.
Ensure Infection and Incident Response
Procedures Are in Place
TKeep your security vendor contact information handy; know
who you will call, and what steps you will take if you have
one or more infected systems.
TEnsure that a backup-and-restore solution is in place in
order to restore lost or compromised data in the event of
successful attack or catastrophic data loss.
TMake use of post-infection detection capabilities from
web gateway, endpoint security solutions and firewalls to
identify infected systems.
TIsolate infected computers to prevent the risk of further
infection within the organization, and restore using trusted
backup media.
TIf network services are exploited by malicious code or some
other threat, disable or block access to those services until a
patch is applied.
Educate Employees
As ever, basic common sense and the introduction of good
security habits can go a long way to keeping sites and servers
safe this year.
TDo not open attachments unless they are expected and
come from a known and trusted source, and do not execute
software that is downloaded from the Internet (if such
actions are permitted) unless from a trusted source or the
download has been scanned for malware.
TBe cautious when clicking on URLs in emails or social media
programs, even when coming from trusted sources and
friends.
TDeploy web browser URL reputation plugin solutions that
display the reputation of websites from searches.
TRestrict software to corporate-approved applications, if
possible, and avoid downloading software from file sharing
sites. Only download packages directly from trusted
vendors’ websites.BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR BUSINESSESTABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 73
TEducate users on safe social media conduct. Offers that
look too good usually are, and hot topics are prime bait for
scams. Not all links lead to real login pages.
TEncourage them to adopt two-step authentication on any
website or app that offers it.
TEnsure they have different passwords for every email
account, applications and login―especially for work-related
sites and services.
TRemind then to use common sense. Having antivirus and
security software doesn’t mean it is ok to visit malicious or
questionable websites.
TEncourage employees to raise the alarm if they see anything
suspicious. For example, if Windows users see a warning
indicating that they are “infected” after clicking on a
URL or using a search engine (indicative of fake antivirus
infections), educate users to close or quit the browser using
Alt-F4, CTRL+W or to use the task manager, and then notify
the helpdesk.
Protect Mobile Devices
We recommend that people and employers treat mobile
devices like the small, powerful computers that they are and
protect them accordingly using:
TAccess control, including biometrics where possible.
TData loss prevention, such as on-device encryption.
TAutomated device backup.
TRemote find and wipe.
TRegular updating. For example, the latest version of
Android , codenamed ‘Honeycomb’, includes a number of
features designed specifically to thwart attackers.
TCommon sense. Don’t jailbreak devices and only use trusted
app markets.
TTraining, particularly around paying attention to permis -
sions requested by an app.
TSecurity solutions such as Symantec Mobility or Norton
Mobile Security
We have seen the number of mobile vulnerabilities increase
every year over the past three years―although this is perhaps
an indicator of progress rather than a cause for despair. It
is an indication that security researchers, operating system
developers and app writers are, in fact, paying more attention
to mobile security by identifying and fixing more problems.
Although we expect mobile devices to come under growing
attack over the next year, there is also hope that with the right preventative measures and continuing investment in security,
users can achieve a high level of protection against them.
Building Security into Devices
The diverse nature of ICS and IoT platforms make host-based
intrusion detection systems (IDS) and intrusion prevention
systems (IPS), with customizable rulesets and policies that are
unique to a platform and application, suitable solutions.
However, manufacturers of ICS and IoT devices are largely
responsible for ensuring that security is built into the devices
before shipping.
Building security directly into the software and applications
that run on the ICS and IoT devices should prevent many
attacks that manage to side-step defenses at the upper layers.
Manufacturers should adopt and integrate such principles
into their software development processes.
Business users and consumers need to be assured that
suppliers are fundamentally building security into the IoT
devices that they are buying, rather than it being considered
as a bolt-on option.
It’s a Team Effort
Consumer confidence is built up over multiple interactions
across numerous websites owned by countless different orga -
nizations. But it only takes one bad experience of stolen data
or a drive-by download to tarnish the reputation of every
website in the consumer’s mind.
As we said at the start of the report, there is a real opportu -
nity in the coming year to reduce the number of successful
web attacks and limit the risks websites potentially pose to
consumers, but it will take commitment and action from
website owners for it to become a reality.
Adopt Complete Website Security in 2016, and together with
Symantec, make it a good year for cybersecurity and a very
bad one for cybercriminals. BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR BUSINESSESTABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 74
For website security to be effective, it has to be implemented with
care and attention and it has to be monitored and maintained
continually.
While there are tools to help you keep your website ecosystem
secure, it all starts with education. You’ve read about the risks―
now find out what you can do about them.
Get in line with industry standards
TImplement always-on SSL. Implement SSL/TLS on every
page of your website so that every interaction a visitor has
with your site is encrypted. Switching to ‘HTTPS everywhere’,
as it’s also called, with OV or EV SSL/TLS certificates demon -
strates your credibility and can also improve your search
rankings and paves the way for an upgrade to HTTP/2, deliv -
ering better performance.
TMigrate to SHA-2. As discussed in the report, certificate
authorities should have stopped issuing SHA-1 certificates as
of 1 January 2016, but you need to ensure any legacy certifi -
cates are also upgraded and that any devices and applications
that may not currently recognize SHA-2 are upgraded too.
TConsider adopting ECC. Symantec also offers the use of the
ECC encryption algorithm. All major browsers, even mobile,
support ECC certificates on all the latest platforms, and
compared to an industry-standard 2048-bit RSA key, 256-bit
ECC keys are 64,000 times harder to crack .
Use SSL/TLS Correctly
SSL/TLS is only as good as its implementation and maintenance.
So be sure to:
TKeep protocol libraries up to date. SSL/TLS implementation
is an on-going task and it’s vital that any patches or updates
to the software you use are implemented as soon as possible.
TDon’t let your certificates expire. Keep track of what certif -
icates you have, from which certificate authority, and when
they are due to expire. Symantec offers a range of automation
tools to help you do this, giving you more time for proactive
security tasks.
TDisplay recognized trust marks. Display trust marks (such as
the Norton Secured Seal) in highly visible locations on your
website to show customers your commitment to their security.
Manage your SSL/TLS keys properly. Limit the number of people
with access to them; have separate administrators for managing
the passwords for the server where they’re kept and for managing
the systems they’re actually stored in; and use automated certifi -
cate and key management systems to reduce human involvement.
Any breach affecting SSL keys should be notified to the CA
quickly, so that corresponding certificates can be revoked.Adopt Comprehensive Website Security
TScan regularly. Keep an eye on your web servers and watch
for vulnerabilities or malware. Automation tools can help
with this.
TUse antivirus. Antivirus software isn’t just for PCs and smart -
phones―it’s for servers too and could help prevent a serious
malware attack against your entire website infrastructure.
TBe picky about your plugins. The software you use to manage
your website comes with vulnerabilities too. The more
third-party software you use, the greater your attack surface;
so only deploy what’s absolutely necessary.
TConsider the whole ecosystem. Have you deployed a Web
Application Firewall to defend against injection attacks? Is
your code signing secure for your web apps? Do you have
automated tools to detect and defend against the increasingly
common problem of DDoS attacks?
Symantec offers a range of tools that makes maintaining complete
website security a straightforward and efficient task.
Avoid Compromising Trusted Relationships with
Customers by:
TRegularly assessing your website for any vulnerabilities.
TScanning your website daily for malware.
TSetting the secure flag for all session cookies.
TSecuring your websites against man-in-the-middle (MITM)
attacks and malware infection.
TChoosing SSL Certificates with Extended Validation to
display the green browser address bar to website users.
TDisplaying recognized trust marks in highly visible locations
on your website to show customers your commitment to
their security.
There Is No ‘I’ in Team
Consumer confidence is built up over multiple interactions across
numerous websites owned by countless different organizations. It
only takes one bad experience to tarnish the reputation of every
single one in the consumer’s mind.
As we said in the report, there exists a real opportunity in the
coming year to reduce the number of successful web attacks and
limit the risks your website potentially poses to consumers, but
it will take commitment and action from website owners for it to
become a reality.
Adopt comprehensive website security in 2016 and, together with
Symantec, make it a good year for cyber security and a very bad
one for cybercriminals.BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR WEBSITE OWNERSTABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 75
Overview
The Council on Cybersecurity 20 Critical Security Controls is a
prioritized list designed to provide maximum benefits toward
improving risk posture against real-world threats. This list of 20
control areas grew out of an international consortium of U.S. and
international agencies and experts, sharing from actual incidents
and helping to keep it current against evolving global cybersecu -
rity threats. Led by the Center for Internet Security (CIS), the CIS
Critical Security Controls (“the Controls”) have been matured by
an international community of individuals and institutions, and
were updated in 2015 to version six. For more information please
refer to the documentation found at http://www.cisecurity.org/
critical-controls .
Many organizations face the challenges and increasing threats
to their cybersecurity by strategically choosing a security
controls framework as a reference for initiating, implementing,
measuring and evaluating their security posture, and managing risk. Over the years, many security control frameworks have been
developed (for example, NIST), with the common goal of offering
combined knowledge and proven guidance for protecting critical
assets, infrastructure, and information. Based on the informa-
tion we have today about attacks and threats, what are the most
important steps that enterprises should take now to secure
systems and data?
The Critical Security Controls are designed to provide organi-
zations the information necessary to increase their security
posture in a consistent and ongoing fashion. The Controls are a
relatively small number of prioritized, well-vetted, and supported
set of security actions that organizations can take to assess and
improve their current security state.
To implement the Controls you must understand what is critical
to your business, data, systems, networks, and infrastructures,
and you must consider the adversary actions that could impact
your ability to be successful in the business or operations.
TOP 5 PRIORITIES
We emphasize the use of the first five
Controls for every organization. This
helps establish a foundation of security
and has the most immediate impact on
preventing attacks. From this foundation
organizations can apply other Controls
as they meet the business need of the
organization.
In the following pages you will see a table
that outlines the areas identified in the
ISTR and ties them to Critical Security
Controls:
01
Inventory of Authorized
and Unauthorized Devices
Actively manage (inventory, track, and
correct) all hardware devices on the
network so that only authorized devices
are given access, and unauthorized
and unmanaged devices are found and
prevented from gaining access.02
Inventory of Authorized and
Unauthorized Software
Actively manage (inventory, track, and
correct) all software on the network so
that only authorized software is installed
and can execute, and that unauthorized
and unmanaged software is found and
prevented from installation or execution.
03
Secure Configurations for
Hardware and Software on
Mobile Devices, Laptops,
Workstations, and Servers
Establish, implement, and actively manage
(track, report on, correct) the security
configuration of laptops, servers, and
workstations using a rigorous configuration
management and change control process in
order to prevent attackers from exploiting
vulnerable services and settings.04
Continuous Vulnerability
Assessment and Remediation
Continuously acquire, assess, and take action
on new information in order to identify
vulnerabilities, remediate, and minimize
the window of opportunity for attackers.
05
Controlled Use of
Administrative Privileges
The processes and tools used to track/
control/prevent/correct the use,
assignment, and configuration of
administrative privileges on computers,
networks, and applications.20 CRITICAL SECURITY CONTROLSTABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 76
06
Maintenance, Monitoring,
and Analysis of Audit Logs
Collect, manage, and analyze audit
logs of events that could help detect,
understand, or recover from an attack.
07
Email and Web Browser
Protections
Minimize the attack surface and the
opportunities for attackers to manipulate
human behavior though their interaction
with web browsers and email systems.
08
Malware Defenses
Control the installation, spread,
and execution of malicious code at
multiple points in the enterprise, while
optimizing the use of automation to
enable rapid updating of defense, data
gathering, and corrective action.
09
Limitation and Control of Network
Ports, Protocols, and Services
Manage (track/control/correct) the
ongoing operational use of ports,
protocols, and services on networked
devices in order to minimize windows
of vulnerability available to attackers.
10
Data Recovery Capability
The processes and tools used to properly
back up critical information with a proven
methodology for timely recovery of it.11
Secure Configurations for
Network Devices such as
Firewalls, Routers, and Switches
Establish, implement, and actively manage
(track, report on, correct) the security
configuration of network infrastructure
devices using a rigorous configuration
management and change control process in
order to prevent attackers from exploiting
vulnerable services and settings.
12
Boundary Defense
Detect/prevent/correct the flow of
information transferring networks
of different trust levels with a focus
on security-damaging data.
13
Data Protection
The processes and tools used to prevent
data exfiltration, mitigate the effects of
exfiltrated data, and ensure the privacy
and integrity of sensitive information.
14
Controlled Access Based
on the Need to Know
The processes and tools used to track/
control/prevent/correct secure access
to critical assets (e.g., information,
resources, and systems) according to the
formal determination of which persons,
computers, and applications have a need
and right to access these critical assets
based on an approved classification.
15
Wireless Access Control
The processes and tools used to track/
control/prevent/correct the security use
of wireless local area networks (LANS),
access points, and wireless client systems.16
Account Monitoring and Control
Keep attackers from impersonating
lActively manage the life cycle of
system and application accounts – their
creation, use, dormancy, and deletion
- in order to minimize opportunities
for attackers to leverage them.
17
Security Skills Assessment and
Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps
For all functional roles in the organization
(prioritizing those mission – critical to
the business and its security), identify the
specific knowledge, skills, and abilities
needed to support defense of the enterprise;
develop and execute an integrated plan
to assess, identify gaps, and remediate
through policy, organizational planning,
training, and awareness programs.
18
Application Software Security
Manage the security life cycle of
all in-house developed and acquired
software in order to prevent, detect,
and correct security weaknesses.
19
Incident Response
and Management
Protect the organization’s information,
as well as its reputation, by developing
and implementing an incident response
infrastructure (e.g., plans, defined roles,
training, communications, management
oversight) for quickly discovering an
attack and then effectively containing
the damage, eradicating the attacker’s
presence, and restoring the integrity
of the network and systems.
20
Penetration Tests
and Red Team Exercises
Test the overall strength of an organization’s
defenses (the technology, the processes,
and the people) by simulating the
objectives and actions of an attacker.CRITICAL CONTROLSTABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 77
CRITICAL CONTROL PROTECTION PRIORITIES
ENHANCE
DETECTIONHARDEN
DEFENSESREDUCE
IMPACT
INTERNET OF THINGSMOBILE DEVICES
CLOUD &
INFRASTRUCTURE
WEB SERVERS
DDOS & BOTNETSE-CRIME & MALWARETARGETED ATTACKS
& SPEAR PHISHINGWEB-BASED THREATS
SOCIAL MEDIA
& EMAIL THREATS
DATA BREACHES0304111418 0102060815 050912170304071118 0102060815 05101317
0304111418 01
1602
20060815 05
1709
19101213
0304111418 01
2002060816 05
1709
19101213
03041118 0102060820 050912171903
1804071114 01
2002060816 05
1709
1910121303
1804071114 01
2002060816 05
1709
1910121303040718 0102060816 0509101217
030407 01020820 05101217
03
1804071114 01
2002061516 05
1709
19101213TABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 78
Protect Yourself
Use a modern Internet security solution that includes the
following capabilities for maximum protection against malicious
code and other threats:
TAntivirus (file- and heuristic-based) and behavioral malware
prevention can prevent unknown malicious threats from
executing.
TBi-directional firewalls will block malware from exploiting
potentially vulnerable applications and services running on
your computer.
TBrowser protection will protect against obfuscated
web-based attacks.
TUse reputation-based tools that check the reputation and
trust of a file and website before downloading, and that
check URL reputations and provide safety ratings for
websites found through search engines.
TConsider options for implementing cross-platform parental
controls, such as Norton Online Family.
Update Regularly
Keep your system, program, and virus definitions up-to-date;
always accept updates requested by the vendor.
Running out-of-date versions can put you at risk from being
exploited by web-based attacks. Only download updates from
vendor sites directly. Select automatic updates wherever
possible.
Be Wary of Scareware Tactics
Versions of software that claim to be free, cracked, or pirated
can expose you to malware or social engineering attacks that
attempt to trick you into thinking your computer is infected and
getting you to pay money to have it removed.
Use an Effective Password Policy
Ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers, and
change them often. Passwords should not consist of words from
the dictionary. Do not use the same password for multiple appli -
cations or websites.
Use complex passwords (upper/lowercase and punctuation).
Passphrases and password management apps can help too.
Think Before You Click
Never view, open, or copy email attachments to your desktop or
execute any email attachment unless you expect it and trust the
sender. Even when receiving email attachments from trusted
users, be suspicious. TBe cautious when clicking on URLs in emails or social media
communications, even when coming from trusted sources
and friends. Do not blindly click on shortened URLs without
expanding them first using a preview tool or plugin.
TUse a web browser plugin or URL reputation site that shows
the reputation and safety rating of websites before visiting.
TBe suspicious of search engine results; only click through
to trusted sources when conducting searches, especially on
topics that are hot in the media.
TBe suspicious of warnings that pop up asking you to install
media players, document viewers, and security updates.
Only download software directly from the vendor’s website.
TBe aware of files you make available for sharing on public
sites, including gaming, BitTorrent, and any other peer-to-
peer (P2P) exchanges. Keep Dropbox, Evernote, and other
usages to a minimum for pertinent information only, and
only use when approved for corporate use.
Safeguard Your Personal Data
Limit the amount of personal information you make publicly
available on the Internet (in particular via social networks).
This includes personal and financial information, such as bank
logins or birth dates. Additionally:
TRegularly review your bank, credit card, and credit informa -
tion frequently for irregular activity.
TAvoid banking or shopping online from public computers
(such as libraries, Internet cafes, and similar establish -
ments) or from unencrypted.
Wi-Fi Connections
When using public wireless hotspots consider the following:
TUse HTTPS when connecting via Wi-Fi networks to your
email, social media, and sharing websites. Check the
settings and preferences of the applications and websites
you are using.
TLook for the green browser address bar, HTTPS, and recog -
nizable trust marks when you visit websites where you log
in or share any personal information.
T Configure your home Wi-Fi network for strong authentica -
tion and always require a unique password for access to it
TLook for the green browser address bar, HTTPS, and recog -
nizable trust marks when you visit websites where you log
in or share any personal information.
TConfigure your home Wi-Fi network for strong authentica -
tion and always require a unique password for access to it. BEST PRACTICE GUIDELINES FOR CONSUMERSTABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 79
CREDITS
Paul Wood, Editor-in-Chief
Ben Nahorney, Managing Editor
Kavitha Chandrasekar, Data Analyst
Scott Wallace, Art Director
Kevin Haley, Technical Advisor
Contributors
Marianne Davis, Copy Editor
Steven Rankin, Infographics
With Support From
Axel Wirth
Bartlomiej Uscilowski
Brian Witten
Candid Wueest
Dermot Harnett
Dick O’Brien
Dipesh Shah
Dylan Morss
Efrain Ortiz
Gaurang Bhatt
Gavin O’Gorman
Himanshu Mehta
Kent McMullen
Laura O’Brien
Mario Ballano Barcena
Michael Klieman
Nicholas Johnston
Peter Coogan
Pierre-Antoine Vervier
Preeti Agarwal
Rauf Ridzuan
Roberto Sponchioni
Roger Park
Sara Groves
Satnam Narang
Shankar Somasundaram
Stephen Doherty
Vaughn Eisler
William WrightSpecial Thanks To
Alejandro Borgia
Anna Sampson
Cheryl Elliman
Jennifer Duffourg
Linda Smith Munyan
Mara MortTABLE OF CONTENTS2016 Internet Security Threat Report 80
ABOUT SYMANTEC
MORE INFORMATION
TSymantec Worldwide: http://www.symantec.com/
TISTR and Symantec Intelligence Resources: http://www.symantec.com/threatreport/
TSymantec Security Response: http://www.symantec.com/security_response/
TNorton Threat Explorer: http://us.norton.com/security_response/threatexplorer/Symantec Corporation is the global leader in cybersecurity. Operating
one of the world’s largest cyber intelligence networks, we see more
threats, and protect more customers from the next generation of attacks.
We help companies, governments and individuals secure their most
important data wherever it lives.TABLE OF CONTENTS
|
Internet Security Threat ReportISTR
April 2017
Contents
IntroductionExecutive summary
Big numbers
Targeted attacks:
Espionage, subversion,
& sabotageEmail: Malware, spam,
& phishingWeb attacks, toolkits, &
exploiting vulnerabilities
online
Cyber crime & the
underground economy
Ransomware: Extorting
businesses & consumers
New frontiers: IoT,
mobile, & cloud threatsVolume
22Internet Security Threat Report
Contents
4 Introduction
6 Executive summary
9 Big numbers
13 Targeted attacks:
Espionage, subversion, & sabotage
14 Introduction
14 Key findings
16 The targeted attack
landscape in 2016
17 Trends and analysis
17 Subversion emerges as a new motive
for targeted attacks
18 Sabotage attacks make a comeback
18 Living off the land
19 How Shamoon attackers used “living off the land” tactics
20 Economic espionage
21 New threats emerge
21
Further reading
22 Best practices
23 Email: Malware, spam,
& phishing
24 Introduction
24 Key findings
24 Trends and analysis
24 Malware menace
25 Phishing
26 BEC scams
27 Spam stays steady
28 Case studies/investigations
28 Changing tactics
28 Ice-cold: Snowshoe and
hailstorm techniques
29 Tried and tested social engineering
30 Social engineering and new
messaging platforms
30 Further reading
31 Best practices
32 Web attacks, toolkits, &
exploiting vulnerabilities online
33 Introduction
33 Key findings
33 Trends and analysis
33 Vulnerability assessment34 Exploit kits
35 Web attacks
35 Browser vulnerabilities
36 Case study
36 Angler: The rise and fall of an exploit kit
36 Further reading
36 Best practices
37 Cyber crime & the underground economy
38 Introduction
38 Key findings
38 Malware
39 Living off the land: PowerShell, macros,
and social engineering
41 Botnet case study: Necurs
42 It’s all about the money: Financial malware
43 Up to the Mac
44
Odinaff and Banswift:
The year of the targeted financial heist
44 Banswift
45 Odinaff45
Data breaches and the
underground economy
45 Data breaches
45 Year in review
47 Data breach causes
48 Industries exposed
50 Country data
51 Underground Economy
53 Disruptions and takedowns
53 Avalanche
53 Bayrob53 Lurk/Angler53 Dyre54
Further reading
54 Best practices
55 Ransomware:
Extorting businesses
& consumers
56 Introduction
56 Key findings
56 Trends & analysis
58 Case studies/investigations
58 How ransomware can affect consumers
58 How ransomware can affect businesses59 Ransom demands soar
59 Infection vectors
61 Arrival of Ransomware-as-a-Service
61 New techniques: Targeted attacks and
“living off the land”
62 Other platforms now vulnerable
62 Law enforcement takedowns
62 Further reading
62 Best practices
63 New frontiers:
Internet of Things, mobile, & cloud threats
64 Internet of Things
64 Key findings
64 Trends and analysis
65 Country data
66 Passwords
66 The Mirai botnet
67 An evolving story
67 Looking forward
67 Best practices
68 Mobile
68 Key findings
68 Mobile malware trends
69 Motives and techniques
70 Malware and grayware rates
70 Increase in runtime packers
70 Mobile vulnerabilities
70 Improvements in Android
architecture
72 Sour taste for Apple
72 Best practices
72 Cloud
72 Key findings
72 Trends and analysis
73 Risky business
73 Ransomware danger
74 IoT and cloud: Potential partners in cyber crime
74 Living off the land
74 Further reading
74 Best practices
75 Credits
76 About Symantec
76 More InformationInternet Security Threat Report
Graphics, tables,
and charts
9 Big numbers
13 Targeted attacks: Espionage, subversion, & sabotage
14 Timeline of notable targeted
attack incidents during 2016
15 Notable targeted attack groups
16 Zero-day vulnerabilities, annual total
16 US presidential election: Timeline of attacks during 2016
17 Vulnerabilities disclosed in
industrial control systems
19 Most commonly seen tools that can be misused by attackers
20 Spear-phishing email used in DNC attacks
23 Email: Malware, spam,
& phishing
24 Overall email malware rate
25 Monthly email malware rate
25 Email malware rate by industry
25 Email malware rate by company size
25 Overall phishing rate
26 Monthly phishing rate
26 Phishing rate by industry
26 Phishing rate by company size
27 BEC scams: Common subject lines
27 Overall spam rate
27 Monthly spam rate
28 Spam rate by company size
28 Spam rate by industry
28 Downloader detections by month
29 Blocked emails with WSF attachments
29 Typical emailed malware
infection process
30 Keywords used in malware spam campaigns
30 Preferred languages used in spam campaigns
32 Web attacks, toolkits, &
exploiting vulnerabilities online
33 Scanned websites with vulnerabilities
33 Percentage of vulnerabilities
which were critical
34 Top 10 exploit kits35 Web attacks blocked per month
35 Classification of most frequently
exploited websites
36 Browser vulnerabilities
37 Cyber crime & the
underground economy
38 Unique malware variants
detected for the first time
38 Monthly count of unique malware variants first seen in 2016
39 Unique malware variants detected
39 Monthly count of unique malware variants in 2016
40 Malware prevalence and trends
40
Typical attack scenario in 2016
took the following steps
41 JavaScript downloader detections per month
41 Office macro downloader
detections per month
41 Bot activity numbers
42 Downloaders delivered by
Necurs spam botnet
42 Top 10 financial Trojans
43 Financial Trojan activity by month
43 Mac malware distribution per
month, 2014-2016
44 Top 10 malware blocked on OS X endpoints as percentage of total infections
45 Data breaches, 2014-2016
46 Data breaches per month, 2014-2016
46 Identities stolen by month, 2014-2016
46 Types of data lost in breaches in 2016
47 Top 10 causes of data breaches in 2016
47 Top 10 causes of data breaches
by identities stolen in 2016
48 Top 10 sectors breached by number of incidents
48 Top 10 sub-sectors breached by number of incidents
49 Top 10 sectors breached by number of identities stolen
49 Top 10 sub-sectors breached by number of identities stolen
50 Top 10 countries by number of data breaches
50 Top 10 countries by number
of identities stolen
51 Underground marketplace price list
52
The underground marketplace55 Ransomware:
Extorting businesses
& consumers
56 Average global ransomware
detections per day
57 Global ransomware detections by month
57 Ransomware detections by country
57 New ransomware families
57 New ransomware variants
58 Ransomware variants by month
58 Consumer vs enterprise infections
58 Consumer vs enterprise infections by month
59 Average ransom demand
60 Major ransomware threats
63 New frontiers:
Internet of Things, mobile, & cloud threats
65 Hourly attacks on the IoT honeypot per month
65 Top 10 countries where
attacks on the Symantec IoT honeypot were initiated
66 Top 10 passwords used to attempt to
log in to the Symantec IoT honeypot
67 Mirai’s trail of disruption in 2016
68 Number of overall mobile malware detections per year
68 Cumulative number of mobile malware families per year
69 Mobile variants per family
69 Mobile malware variants by year
69 Top mobile threats in 2016
70 Malware and grayware rates, 2014-2016
70 Percentage of in-field mobile malware that is packed
71 Market share of different versions of Android, January 2017
71
Mobile vulnerabilities reported,
by operating system
73 Most commonly used cloud
apps in enterprisesInternet Security Threat Report
Introduction
00SectionIntroductionBack to Table of ContentsPage 5
ISTR April 2017 00
Symantec has established the largest civilian threat
collection network in the world, and one of the most
comprehensive collections of cyber security threat
intelligence through the Symantec Global Intelligence Network™. The Symantec Global Intelligence Network tracks over 700,000 global adversaries and records
events from 98 million attack sensors worldwide.
This network monitors threat activities in over 157 countries and territories through a combination of Symantec products, technologies, and services,
including Symantec Endpoint Protection™, Symantec
DeepSight™ Intelligence, Symantec Managed Security Services™, Norton™ consumer products,
and other third-party data sources, generating
more than nine trillion rows of security data. In addition, Symantec maintains one of the world’s most
comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting of
more than 88,900 recorded vulnerabilities (spanning more than
two decades) from 24,560 vendors representing over 78,900 products.
Analysis of spam, phishing, and email malware trends is
gathered from a variety of Symantec security technologies
processing more than 2 billion emails each day, including:
Skeptic™, Symantec Messaging Gateway for Service Providers, Symantec CloudSOC, and the Symantec Probe Network.
Skeptic™ is the Symantec Email and Web Security.cloud™
proprietary heuristic technology, filtering more than 336 million emails, and over 2.4 billion web requests each day. Symantec
also gathers phishing information through an extensive anti-
fraud community of enterprises, security vendors, and partners.
Symantec Cloud Threat Labs provides the detailed analysis
of cloud-based threats and risks, and is developed using data
from Symantec CloudSOC security technology, which in 2016 safeguarded more than 20,000 cloud apps, 176 million cloud
documents, and 1.3 billion emails. Symantec CloudSOC is the
company’s Cloud Access Security Broker (CASB) solution, and is designed to provide visibility, control, and protection for cloud-
based apps and data.
Symantec Web Application Firewall & Reverse Proxy scans one
billion previously unseen web requests daily.
Symantec Website Security secures 1.4 million web servers
worldwide with 100 percent availability since 2004. The
validation infrastructure processes over 15.7 billion Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) look-ups per day, which
are used for obtaining the revocation status of X.509 digital
certificates around the world.
These resources give Symantec analysts unparalleled sources
of data with which to identify, analyze, and provide informed
commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and spam. The result is the annual Symantec
Internet Security Threat Report™, which gives enterprises, small
businesses, and consumers essential information to secure their systems effectively now and into the future.Internet Security Threat Report
Executive
summary
01SectionExecutive summaryBack to Table of ContentsPage 7
ISTR April 2017 01
Cyber attackers revealed new levels of ambition
in 2016, a year marked by extraordinary
attacks, including multi-million dollar virtual
bank heists, overt attempts to disrupt the US electoral process by state-sponsored groups, and some of the biggest distributed denial of
service (DDoS) attacks on record powered by
a botnet of Internet of Things (IoT) devices.
While cyber attacks managed to cause
unprecedented levels of disruption, attackers
frequently used very simple tools and tactics
to make a big impact. Zero-day vulnerabilities and sophisticated malware now tend to be used sparingly and attackers are increasingly attempting
to hide in plain sight. They rely on straightforward
approaches, such as spear-phishing emails and “living off the land” by using whatever tools are on
hand, such as legitimate network administration
software and operating system features.
Mirai, the botnet behind a wave of major DDoS
attacks, was primarily composed of infected
routers and security cameras, low-powered
and poorly secured devices. In the wrong hands, even relatively benign devices and software can be used to devastating effect.Targeted attacks: Subversion and sabotage
come to the fore
The world of cyber espionage experienced a notable shift
towards more overt activity, designed to destabilize and
disrupt targeted organizations and countries. Cyber attacks
against the US Democratic Party and the subsequent leak of stolen information were one of the major talking points of the
US presidential election. With the US Intelligence Community
attributing the attacks to Russia and concluding the campaign would have been judged a success, it is likely these tactics will
be reused in efforts to influence politics and sow discord in
other countries.
Cyber attacks involving sabotage have traditionally been quite
rare, but 2016 saw two separate waves of attacks involving destructive malware. Disk-wiping malware was used against targets in Ukraine in January and again in December, attacks
which also resulted in power outages. Meanwhile the disk-
wiping Trojan Shamoon reappeared after a four-year absence and was used against multiple organizations in Saudi Arabia.
The upsurge in disruptive attacks coincided with a decline in
some covert activity, specifically economic espionage, the theft of intellectual property, and trade secrets. Following a 2015
agreement between the US and China, which saw both countries
promise not to conduct economic espionage in cyber space, detections of malware linked to suspected Chinese espionage
groups dropped considerably. However, this does not mean
economic espionage has disappeared entirely and comes at a time when other forms of targeted attack, such as subversion or
high-level financial attacks, have increased.
Financial heists: Cyber attackers chase the big scores
Until recently, cyber criminals mainly focused on bank
customers, raiding accounts or stealing credit cards. However,
a new breed of attacker has bigger ambitions and is targeting
the banks themselves, sometimes attempting to steal millions of dollars in a single attack. Gangs such as Carbanak have led the
way, demonstrating the potential of this approach by pulling off
a string of attacks against US banks.
During 2016, two other outfits upped the ante by launching even
more ambitious attacks. The Banswift group managed to steal US$81 million from Bangladesh’s central bank by exploiting
weaknesses in the bank’s security to infiltrate its network
and steal its SWIFT credentials, allowing them to make the
fraudulent transactions.
Another group, known as Odinaff, was also found to be
mounting sophisticated attacks against banks and other
financial institutions. It too appeared to be using malware to
hide customers’ own records of SWIFT messages relating to fraudulent transactions carried out by the group. Executive summaryBack to Table of ContentsPage 8
ISTR April 2017 01
While Banswift and Odinaff demonstrated some technical
expertise and employed tactics associated with advanced
groups, much less sophisticated groups also stole massive sums
of money. Business email compromise (BEC) scams, which rely on little more than carefully composed spear-phishing emails,
continue to cause major losses; more than $3 billion has been
stolen in the past three years.
Living off the land
Attackers ranging from cyber criminals to state-sponsored groups have begun to change their tactics, making more use
of operating system features, off-the-shelf tools, and cloud
services to compromise their victims. The most high-profile case of a living off the land attack took place during the US
elections. A simple spear-phishing email provided access to
Hillary Clinton’s campaign chairman John Podesta’s Gmail account without the use of any malware or vulnerabilities.
“Living off the land”—making use of the resources at hand
rather than malware and exploits—provides many advantages
to attackers. Identifying and exploiting zero days has become
harder as improvements in secure development and bounty programs take hold. Web attack toolkits have fallen out of favor,
likely due to the effort required in maintaining fresh exploits
and a backend infrastructure.
Powerful scripting tools, such as PowerShell and macros, are
default features of Windows and Microsoft Office that can
facilitate remote access and malware downloads without the use of vulnerabilities or malicious tools. Despite existing for
almost 20 years, Office macros have reemerged on the threat
landscape as attackers use social engineering techniques to easily defeat security measures that were put in place to tackle
the erstwhile problem of macro viruses.
When executed well, living off the land approaches can result
in almost symptomless infections, allowing attackers to hide in
plain sight.
Resurgence of email as favored attack channel
Malicious emails were the weapon of choice for a wide range of cyber attacks during 2016, used by everyone from state-
sponsored cyber espionage groups to mass-mailing ransomware
gangs. One in 131 emails sent were malicious, the highest rate in five years.
Email’s renewed popularity has been driven by several factors.
It is a proven attack channel. It doesn’t rely on vulnerabilities,
but instead uses simple deception to lure victims into opening
attachments, following links, or disclosing their credentials. Spear-phishing emails, such as spoofed emails instructing
targets to reset their Gmail password, were used in the US
election attacks. Malicious emails disguised as routine correspondence, such as
invoices or delivery notifications, were meanwhile the favored
means of spreading ransomware. The availability of spam botnets-for-hire, such as Necurs, allowed ransomware groups
to mount massive email campaigns during 2016, pumping out
hundreds of thousands of malicious emails daily.
Ransomware squeezing victims with escalating
demands
Ransomware continues to plague businesses and consumers,
with indiscriminate campaigns pushing out massive volumes
of malicious emails. In some cases, organizations can be
overwhelmed by the sheer volume of ransomware-laden emails they receive. Attackers are demanding more and more from
victims with the average ransom demand in 2016 rising to
$1,077, up from $294 a year earlier.
Attackers have honed a business model that usually involves
malware hidden in innocuous emails, unbreakable encryption, and anonymous ransom payment involving cryptocurrencies.
The success of this business model has seen a growing number
of attackers jump on the bandwagon. The number of new ransomware families uncovered during 2016 more than tripled
to 98 and Symantec logged a 36 percent increase in ransomware
infections.
New frontiers: IoT and cloud move into the spotlight
While ransomware and financial fraud groups continue to pose the biggest threat to end users, other threats are beginning
to emerge. It was only a matter of time before attacks on IoT
devices began to gain momentum, and 2016 saw the first major incident with the emergence of Mirai, a botnet composed
of IoT devices such as routers and security cameras. Weak
security made these devices easy pickings for attackers, who constructed a botnet big enough to carry out the largest DDoS
attack ever seen. Symantec witnessed a twofold increase
in attempted attacks against IoT devices over the course of 2016 and, at times of peak activity, the average IoT device was
attacked once every two minutes.
Several of Mirai’s targets were cloud-related services, such as
DNS provider Dyn. This, coupled with the hacking of millions
of MongoDB databases hosted in the cloud, shows how cloud attacks have become a reality and are likely to increase in
2017. A growing reliance on cloud services should be an area of
concern for enterprises as they present a security blind spot. Symantec found that the average organization was using 928
cloud apps, up from 841 earlier in the year. However, most CIOs
think their organizations only use around 30 or 40 cloud apps, meaning the level of risk could be underestimated, leaving them
open to attack from newly emergent threats.Internet Security Threat Report
Big numbers
02SectionBreaches
Email threats, malware, and botsIn the last 8 years more than 7.1 billion identities have been exposed in data breachesTotal breaches
Breaches with
more than 10 million identities exposed
Spam rate %
Number of botsAverage identities
exposed per breachTotal identities exposed
Phishing rate
Email malware rate
New malware variants1,5232014
2014
1 in
965
1in
2441,2112015
2015
1 in
1,846
1in
2201,2092016
2016
1 in
2,596
1in
131927K
98.6M 91.9M805K 466K11
1.2B
60%13
564M
53%15
1.1B
53%
357M 355M275MRansomware
Number of detections
Ransomware families
Average ransom amount463,841
982016
340,665
302015
302014Mobile New Android mobile
malware families
New Android mobile
malware variants2016 2015 2014
41846
Web Average number of web
attacks blocked per day
Percentage
of scanned
websites with
vulnerabilities
Percentage
of which were
critical2016 2014 20153.6K 3.9K2.2KNew mobile vulnerabilities
2015 89 4632016 290 316
2014 178
12 10 BlackBerryiOS AndroidTOTAL
606
552
200
$1,077 $294 $37376% 78%76%
9%15%20%2015 2016
229K340KCloud
Internet of ThingsAverage number
of cloud apps used
per organization
Speed of attack
Number of attacks against Symantec
honeypot
per hour
JAN|2016 DEC|20162 minutes:
time it takes for
an IoT device to
be attackedJAN-JUN
2016JUL-DEC
2015JUL-DEC
2016
Percentage of data
broadly shared23%25%25%841 774928
9
5Internet Security Threat Report
Targeted attacks:
Espionage, subversion,
& sabotage
03SectionTargeted attacks: Espionage,
subversion, & sabotageBack to Table of ContentsPage 14
ISTR April 2017 03
Key findings
|Attacks for subversive purposes, in particular those
during the US elections, have come to the fore and
represent a new form of high-profile targeted attack.
|Targeted attacks involving destructive malware have
increased in some regions, such as the reemergence of disk-wiping malware Shamoon in the Middle East and
attacks against targets in Ukraine involving the KillDisk Trojan.
|Economic espionage such as stealing trade or commercial
secrets, one of the traditional forms of targeted attack,
has dropped off in some cases. Detections of Chinese
espionage malware dropped considerably following a mutual agreement with the US to not target intellectual
property. However, economic espionage hasn’t
disappeared by any means and the drop comes at a time when other types of targeted attack, such as sabotage and
subversion, have been on the increase.
|Zero-day vulnerabilities have become less important and
some adversaries are no longer as reliant on malware, increasingly “living off the land”—making use of the
resources to hand including legitimate administrative and penetration testing tools to carry out attacks.Introduction
The targeted attack landscape shifted considerably
during 2016, with several groups emerging from the shadows and engaging in more public, politically
subversive activities. The ongoing conflict in
Ukraine, the US election, and the Olympics were all affected by campaigns designed to steal and leak data in order to influence public opinion, create
an atmosphere of distrust, and possibly influence
political outcomes. Due to these recent successes and, with key elections approaching in a number of countries in 2017, it is likely these kinds of activities
will continue. Groups have meanwhile continually
refined their tactics, with several moving away from customized malware and relying more on legitimate
software tools to compromise targeted networks.
JAN MAR MAY JUL SEP NOV FEB JUN OCT APR AUG DECDestructive malware
used in cyber attacks
against power
stations in Ukraine
Buckeye begins campaign against targets in Hong KongMicrosoft patches IE zero day which was
being used in targeted
attacks in South Korea Equation Breach—exploits and malware
dumped online
Symantec
uncovers Strider cyber espionage groupDisk-wiping malware Shamoon reappears after
four years
Seven Iranians charged in
relation to cyber attacks
against US targetsData stolen from
Democratic National
Committee (DNC)
intrusion released onlineData stolen from World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) intrusion releasedPower outages in Ukraine suspected to be linked to cyber attackTimeline of notable targeted attack incidents during
7
Timeline of notable targeted attack incidents during 2016Targeted attacks: Espionage,
subversion, & sabotageBack to Table of ContentsPage 15
ISTR April 2017 03
Notable targeted attack groups
Tools, tactics, & procedures (TTP)
Watering holes, infected CD-ROMs,
infected USB keys, vulnerabilities, zero-
days, custom back door and information-
stealing programs, worm programs Motives
Espionage
Target categories & regions
Targets of interest to nation-state attackersRecent activities
Breached in 2016, with tools and exploits leaked
Tools, tactics, & procedures (TTP)
Custom back door programsMotives
Espionage
Target categories & regions
Airlines, telecommunications, Iranian citizens, governments, NGOsRecent activities
Surveillance on domestic targets in Iran and orgs
in the Middle EastTools, tactics, & procedures (TTP)
Spear phishing, watering holes, infected
storage devices, vulnerabilities, zero-
days, custom back door and information-
stealing programsMotives
Espionage, subversion
Target categories & regions
Governments, Europe, USRecent activities
Associated with WADA and DNC hacksTools, tactics, & procedures (TTP)
Custom back door programs signed using stolen certificates
Motives
Espionage
Target categories & regions
E-commerce, governments, technology,
healthcare, financial, shippingRecent activities
Targeted attacks using multiple stolen
code-signing certificatesNotable targeted attack groups
Tools, tactics, & procedures (TTP)
Advanced surveillance toolMotives
Espionage
Target categories & regions
Embassies, airlines, Russia, China,
Sweden, BelgiumRecent activities
Uncovered by Symantec in 2016Tools, tactics, & procedures (TTP)
Spear phishing, vulnerabilities, zero-days, custom back door programs,
destructive payloadsMotives
Espionage, sabotage
Target categories & regions
Governments, international
organizations, energy, Europe, USRecent activities
Linked to destructive attacks against Ukrainian
media and energy targets Sandworm est. 2014Possible region of origin:
Russia
Aliases / Quedagh, BE2 APTHousefly
Strider
Suckfly est. 2001
est. 2011
est. 2014Possible region of origin:
US
Possible region of origin:
Western
Possible region of origin:
ChinaAliases / Remsec
Aliases / None
Tools, tactics, & procedures (TTP)
Spear phishing, zero-days, custom back
door programs
Motives
Espionage
Target categories & regions
Military, defense industry, media,
education, US, UK, Hong KongRecent activities
Shifted focus from Western targets to Hong KongBuckeye est. 2009Possible region of origin:
China
Aliases / APT3, UPS, Gothic Panda, TG-0110
Tools, tactics, & procedures (TTP)
Spear phishing, watering holes, custom back door programs
Motives
Espionage
Target categories & regions
Technology, broadcasting, aquatic
engineering, JapanRecent activities
Long-standing campaigns against targets in JapanTick est. 2006Possible region of origin:
China
Aliases / NoneTools, tactics, & procedures (TTP)
Spear phishing, custom back door programsMotives
Espionage, subversion
Target categories & regions
Governments, think tanks, media, Europe, USRecent activities
Associated with Democratic National
Committee (DNC) attacks Fritillary est. 2010Possible region of origin:
Russia
Aliases / Cozy Bear, Office Monkeys, EuroAPT, Cozyduke, APT29
Swallowtail est. 2007Possible region of origin:
Russia
Aliases / Fancy Bear, APT28, Tsar Team, Sednit
Cadelle est. 2012Possible region of origin:
Iran
Aliases / None
Tools, tactics, & procedures (TTP)
Spear phishing, DDoS attacks, disk
wiping, zero-days, custom back door
and information-stealing programs,
destructive payloadsMotives
Espionage, sabotage, subversion
Target categories & regions
Financial, military, governments, entertainment, electronicsRecent activities
Subject to disruption operations in early 2016.
Links with Bangladesh
Bank attackersAppleworm est. 2012Possible region of origin:
North Korea
Aliases / LazarusAliases / EquationTargeted attacks: Espionage,
subversion, & sabotageBack to Table of ContentsPage 16
ISTR April 2017 03
MAR MAY JUL SEP NOV JUN OCT APR AUG DECSpear-phishing email
sent to John Podesta,
the chairman of the
2016 Clinton presidential
campaignAdditional
spear-phishing emails sent to
personal accounts
of DNC personnelTwitter posts used to claim intrusions were work of a lone attacker called Guccifer 2.0 and steer
public attention away from Russian groups
Democratic Congressional
Campaign Committee (DCCC) hacked by same
adversariesDay after US election, election-themed
spear-phishing emails sent to high-level
targets in US federal
governmentTwo spear-phishing campaigns
conducted against
political think tanks and strategy NGOs
by same adversaries
US intelligence agencies
released statement they
were confident that
Russia directed attacks against US political groupsWikiLeaks released nearly 20,000 DNC emails
Democratic National Committee (DNC) notified by the FBI that its infrastructure had been breachedFirst dump of stolen DNC data posted online using BitTorrentDNC identified intruders’ access and claimed to have closed and secured its network
DNC identified files and malware which led it to identify two Russian groups alleged to have accessed its networkUS presidential election: Timeline of attacks during
US presidential election: Timeline of attacks during 2016The targeted attack landscape in 2016
2016 was an exceptionally active year for targeted attack
groups, with notable incidents occurring in Europe, the US,
Asia, and the Middle East. As the year progressed, the level
of high-profile activity appeared to escalate, with politically subversive incidents directed at the United States and destruc-
tive malware targeting Saudi Arabia and Ukraine.
A wide range of targeted attack groups is in operation today.
While the global powers all have a long-standing ability to
conduct a variety of cyber operations, regional powers have
also moved into cyber space with their own cyber espionage operations directed at rival countries and internal opposition
groups. The Notable targeted attack groups graphic lists 10 of
the most significant groups that were active in 2016 and that have been publicly connected to nation states.Zero-day vulnerabilities, annual total
Zero-day vulnerabilities (vulnerabilities not discovered by the software’s
vendor) declined marginally from 4,066 in 2015 to 3,986 in 2016.
0
1,0002,0003,0004,0005,0006,000
2016 2015 20144,958
4,066 3,986
Previous editions of the Internet Security Threat Report
focused on the number of exploits of zero-day vulnerabili-
ties. This year, we have opted to analyze the total number of
zero days, i.e. vulnerabilities not discovered by the software’s vendor. Under this metric, zero days found during 2016 fell
once again, declining marginally from 4,066 to 3,986. This stag-
nation suggests that the growing popularity of “bug bounty” programs and a greater focus on security as part of the product
development process may mean that zero-day vulnerabil-
ities are becoming harder to find for attackers, forcing them to move away from using them and broadening their range of
tactics (see Living off the land below). Targeted attacks: Espionage,
subversion, & sabotageBack to Table of ContentsPage 17
ISTR April 2017 03
The decline in zero-day discovery comes after the underground
market for vulnerabilities came under the spotlight in 2015,
following the Hacking Team breach. Multiple zero-day exploits
were leaked as part of the breach, in addition to information on how much money these exploits were changing hands for .
Nevertheless, there were a number of instances of zero-day vulnerabilities being exploited in targeted attacks during 2016. For example, in October, Adobe issued a patch for Flash
Player following discovery of a zero day that was being actively
exploited in the wild. Three vulnerabilities in Apple iOS, collec-
tively known as Trident, were disclosed and patched in August
after they were found to have been used in a cyber attack
against a UAE-based human rights activist. In May, Microsoft patched an Internet Explorer zero-day which was exploited in
targeted attacks in South Korea.
Vulnerabilities disclosed in industrial control systems
The number of industrial control system (ICS) vulnerabilities discovered fell
compared to 2015.
0
50100150200250
2016 2015 2014176200
165
Similarly, the number of industrial control system (ICS)
vulnerabilities discovered during 2016 fell compared to 2015,
providing further evidence to suggest vulnerabilities are
becoming harder to find for attackers.
Trends and analysis
Subversion emerges as a new motive for targeted attacksOne of the most eye-catching developments in 2016 was the
prominence of operations attempting to influence political
events in targeted countries. Traditionally, targeted attack
groups have focused on espionage and maintained a low profile
in order to avoid detection, but a number of groups added more overt operations to their repertoire during 2016.
In August 2016, a trove of data linked to the Equation cyber
espionage group was leaked online by a group calling itself
“Shadow Brokers.” The leak contained tools and exploits used
by Equation, and Shadow Brokers claimed it was a fraction of what it had obtained, offering to auction off the rest to the highest bidder.
Most of the leaked files appear to be several years old, dating
back to between 2010 and 2013. How they came into the hands
of the leakers remains unknown. The Shadow Brokers group
was unknown prior to this incident, but it could also have been a cover name for another group.
Given that the Shadow Brokers’ attempts to sell the stolen data
appeared half-hearted, it seems likely that discrediting the Equation group rather than monetary gain was the primary
motive behind the leak.
The most high-profile, subversive incident of the year was
a series of intrusions against the Democratic Party, which
occurred in the run-up to the 2016 US presidential election.
A joint investigation by the US Intelligence Community concluded that two groups linked to Russia’s intelligence
services were responsible for the campaign.
Both groups were previously known to Symantec and have been
active for a number of years, engaging in espionage against a
range of targets in the US and Europe. Fritillary (aka APT29
and Cozy Bear) has been active since at least 2010 and was known for using the Duke family of Trojans against its targets,
e.g. Cozyduke (Trojan.Cozer ) and Seaduke (Trojan.Seaduke ).
Swallowtail (aka APT28 and Fancy Bear) has been active for at
least 10 years and usually uses the Sofacy Trojan (Infostealer.
Sofacy ) as one of its main malware tools. Fritillary is known
to target very high-profile individuals and organizations in
government, international policy, and research institutes in
the European Union and the United States while Swallowtail
primarily targets military, government, embassy, and defense contractor personnel in Eastern European countries.
In September, Swallowtail was also implicated in the leak of
medical records stolen from the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA). Data relating to American Olympic athletes, British
cyclists, and athletes from a number of other countries was
released following an intrusion.
According to WADA , Swallowtail was responsible for the
intrusion. The group took the unusual step of creating its own
website (using the Fancy Bear moniker) to publish the stolen data along with claims it contained proof the athletes had
broken anti-doping rules.
The DNC and WADA intrusions were a major change in tactics
by both groups, both of whom hadn’t previously engaged in
this kind of subversive activity. The US intelligence commu-
nity’s report into the DNC data thefts and subsequent public
disclosures assessed that they were part of an influence
campaign conducted by the Russian Government aimed at Targeted attacks: Espionage,
subversion, & sabotageBack to Table of ContentsPage 18
ISTR April 2017 03
the 2016 US presidential election. It also concluded that the
campaign would have been seen as a success in Russia and that
these activities will likely be used to inform future influence
operations.
Given the proven potential for sowing discord and confusion,
there is a strong likelihood that these tactics may be used again
in a bid to destabilize other countries. France and Germany are both holding elections this year and already Bruno Kahl, the
head of Germany’s foreign intelligence service, has said the
same kind of attacks have already begun against Germany .
“We have evidence of cyber attacks that have no other purpose
than triggering political uncertainty,” he said. “The perpetra-
tors are interested in delegitimizing the democratic process as such, no matter who that subsequently helps.”
Sabotage attacks make a comeback
There was a resurgence in sabotage attacks during 2016,
beginning with a number of attacks against Ukraine involving
the use of disk-wiping malware. The attacks were linked to another possibly Russian cyber espionage group known as
Sandworm and involved a highly destructive Trojan (Trojan.
Disakil ). Attacks in late 2015 and early 2016 hit media organi-
zations and the energy sector in Ukraine, with the latter being
linked to power outages in the country.
Disakil returned at the end of 2016, when a new version
was circulated disguised as ransomware. The malware was
reportedly used in a number of attempted attacks against the
financial sector in Ukraine.
The variant was designed to run on Linux computers and, if
run, rendered them unusable by encrypting key operating
system files. Once the encryption has finished, it displayed a message demanding a ransom of 222 Bitcoin (approximately
US$210,000 at the time of the attacks). Paying the ransom
would not decrypt the affected files, with the encryption keys generated on the infected computer not saved locally nor to
a command and control (C&C) server. The malware was likely
disguised as ransomware in order to trick victims into not investigating attacks thoroughly.
Sabotage attacks also occurred in other regions, one of the
most notable of which was the reemergence of the Shamoon disk-wiping malware (W32.Disttrack ) after an absence of five
years. First used in attacks against the Saudi Arabian energy sector in 2012, a new variant (W32.Disttrack.B) was used against targets in Saudi Arabia in November 2016 and January
2017.In the first wave of new attacks, the malware was configured
to launch its disk-wiping payload at 8:45 p.m. local time on
Thursday, November 17. The Saudi Arabian working week runs
from Sunday to Thursday. Thus, the attack was timed to occur after most staff had gone home for the weekend in the hope
of reducing the chance of discovery before maximum damage
could be caused.
The Shamoon malware was configured with passwords that
appeared to have been stolen from the targeted organizations.
These passwords were likely used to allow the malware to spread across an organization’s network.
The attacks were likely politically motivated. In the 2012
attacks, infected computers had their master boot records wiped and replaced with an image of a burning US flag. The
latest attacks instead used a photo of the body of Alan Kurdi,
the three-year-old Syrian refugee who drowned in the Mediter -
ranean in 2015.
The November attacks were linked to a group known as
“Greenbug,” which was discovered by Symantec during
its investigation into the Shamoon attacks. Greenbug has
targeted a range of organizations in the Middle East including
companies in the aviation, energy, government, investment, and education sectors. Symantec found that Greenbug infected
at least one administrator computer belonging to an organiza-
tion that was subsequently hit by Shamoon.
The January attacks were carried out by a group known as
“Timberworm” (see panel How Shamoon attackers used
“living off the land” tactics ). Although Greenbug and Timber -
worm appear to be distinct groups, if they are both spreading
Shamoon, it is likely at the direction of a single entity.
Living off the land
Attackers have begun to change their tactics, expanding their
range of tools and many groups are no longer as reliant on the traditional attack toolkit of malware and zero-day vulnerabili-
ties. While not a new technique, groups are increasingly “living
off the land,” using operating system features, legitimate tools, and cloud services to compromise networks. This tactic can
make attacks more difficult to detect, since it’s harder to spot
the malicious use of legitimate tools compared to the presence of malware. Targeted attacks: Espionage,
subversion, & sabotageBack to Table of ContentsPage 19
ISTR April 2017 03
Most commonly seen tools that can be misused by
attackers
According to Symantec file reputation telemetry, the most widely seen legitimate tools that can be misused by attackers during 2016 were Mimikatz, PsExec, and WCE.
12345
WCE PsExec MimikatzMILLION4.6m
3.2m
2.0m
According to Symantec file reputation telemetry, the most
widely seen legitimate tool that can be misused by attackers
during 2016 was Mimikatz (Hacktool.Mimikatz )—a tool capable
of changing privileges, exporting security certificates, and
recovering Windows passwords in plaintext—followed by the
Microsoft Sysinternals tool PsExec and Windows Credential
Editor. Given the sheer number of instances and the fact that all three tools have legitimate uses (even Mimikatz can be used
for penetration testing), it is easy to see the appeal of these
tools to attackers, since their use may go unnoticed.
Malicious PowerShell scripts have also been widely used in
targeted attacks, with attackers exploiting the framework’s flex-
ibility to download payloads, traverse compromised networks, and carry out reconnaissance. Recent research by Symantec
demonstrated PowerShell’s popularity as an attack tool. Of all
of the PowerShell scripts analyzed through Symantec’s Blue Coat Malware Analysis sandbox, 95.4 percent were malicious.
This practice has been used extensively by a range of groups
in recent times. A prominent case in point was the afore -
mentioned intrusions on the DNC in the run-up to the US
presidential election. One of the initial points of compro -
mise according to the FBI was a spear-phishing email sent to
campaign chairman John Podesta’s email account on March 19,
2016. The email was crafted to appear as though it originated
from an official Gmail administrative account and suggested that his email had been compromised and directed him to
reset his password. It included a shortened URL which obfus-
cated a malicious URL. Once clicked, the victim was directed
to a fake password reset page masquerading as a legitimate
Gmail account reset page. No malware or exploits were needed to perform the attack. Instead, simple social engineering was
used to obtain a password.How Shamoon attackers used “living off the land” tactics
One prominent exponent of living off the land during 2016 was
Timberworm, a cyber espionage group linked to the resumption
of attacks involving the destructive malware Shamoon ( W32.
Disttrack.B). Shamoon reappeared in November 2016 following
a four-year absence, with a series of attacks against targets
in Saudi Arabia. Two more waves of attack occurred later in
November 2016 and again in January 2017.
While the November attacks were linked to a group known as
“Greenbug,” the January attacks were launched by Timberworm,
a cyber espionage group responsible for a string of attacks across the Middle East.
To spread Shamoon, Timberworm first sent spear-phishing
emails to individuals at targeted organizations. In some cases, the emails contained Microsoft Word or Excel files as attach-
ments. In others, the emails contained malicious links, which if
clicked, downloaded similar Word or Excel files.
If the file was opened, a macro ran a PowerShell script that
provided remote access and performed basic reconnaissance of
the compromised computer. If a computer was of interest, they then installed malware (Backdoor.Mhretriev).
From there, the attackers used a cornucopia of legitimate admin-
istrative and penetration testing tools to traverse the target’s
network and identify computers for infection. These included:
|PsExec, a tool for executing processes on other systems from Microsoft Sysinternals
|PAExec, a free reimplementation of PsExec from Poweradmin
|Netscan, a multipurpose IPv4/IPv6 network scanner
|Samdump, a hacking tool that dumps Windows password hashes
|Mimikatz (Hacktool.Mimikatz), a hacking tool used to harvest credentials
|TightVNC, an open-source remote desktop access application
|Plink, a command line network connection tool supporting encrypted communications
|Rar, archiving utility for compressing files before exfiltration
Once the reconnaissance operation was complete, Shamoon
(W32.Disttrack.B) was installed on pre-selected computers. The
malware was configured to trigger its disk-wiping payload at a set time on all compromised computers, maximizing the impact
of the attacks. Targeted attacks: Espionage,
subversion, & sabotageBack to Table of ContentsPage 20
ISTR April 2017 03
Spear-phishing email used in DNC attacks
Text of spear-phishing email sent to John Podesta, the chairman of the 2016
Clinton presidential campaign.
Another example of living off the land is provided by the
Chafer cyber espionage group , which appears to be based in
Iran. One of its attack vectors is to compromise web servers, exploiting vulnerabilities identified through web scanning tools. In a recent intrusion against a target in Turkey, Symantec
discovered that Chafer had used a software tool called JexBoss
to identify an older, unpatched, community version of JBoss Application Server belonging to the target. The group then
deployed a web shell to the server, a script which permits
remote administration, in addition to a copy of the software tool Mimikatz.
From there, they were able to use native operating system tools
such as Qwinsta and Whoami to extract information about the compromised server. Within 20 minutes of the initial
compromise, the group had used the Microsoft Sysinternals
tool PsExec to spread to two other computers on the target’s network. Another actor which has made use of this tactic in recent times is the China-based group Tick, which has targeted mainly
Japanese organizations for at least 10 years. Recent campaigns
have seen it use spear-phishing emails and compromise
Japanese websites in order to infect targets.
One of Tick’s main tools is its own custom-developed malware
(Backdoor.Daserf ), but it also uses a range of tools such as the
aforementioned Mimikatz, Windows Credential Editor, and
GSecdump ( Gsecdump ), a hacking tool that may be used to
steal hashes from Security Accounts Manager (SAM), Active
Directory, and active logon sessions.
There are also instances of attackers using basic cloud services
rather than command and control servers for data exfiltration. For example, Fritillary, one of the groups which attacked the
DNC, was found to have used approximately 200 Microsoft
OneDrive accounts to exfiltrate stolen data. The goal here appeared to be to hide in plain sight and the attackers may
have decided that data being moved to OneDrive may have
been mistaken for legitimate activity.
Economic espionage
In September 2015, the US and China reached an agreement that neither country would conduct economic espionage
in cyber space. Under the terms of the agreement, the two
countries agreed that neither government would “conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property,
including trade secrets or other confidential business informa-
tion, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.”
Given the nature of such espionage operations, establishing
whether this agreement is working can be difficult. However, analysis by Symantec has found strong evidence that there has
been a marked decline in activity by groups probably associat -
ed with China since the agreement was signed.
Reviewing detections of malware families used by cyber
espionage groups, which Symantec believes are China-based,
provided an insight into activity levels over time. Almost immediately after the agreement was signed, the number of
infections dropped considerably. Infection rates continued to
fall in the following months and remained low at year-end.
In tandem with this trend, some individual Chinese groups
have also exhibited changing patterns of activity. For example,
the Buckeye group (aka APT3 or Gothic Panda) had conducted cyber espionage operations against organizations in the US,
UK, and other countries for at least half a decade. However,
the group’s focus began to shift in the run-up to the US-China agreement . Targeted attacks: Espionage,
subversion, & sabotageBack to Table of ContentsPage 21
ISTR April 2017 03
From June 2015 onwards the group began compromising
political entities in Hong Kong. By March 2016 Buckeye had
almost fully migrated its focus to organizations in Hong Kong.
While there is no definitive proof that the shift in focus was motivated by the agreement, it was consistent with the overall
trend of a reduction in cyber espionage activity against targets
in other countries. While the US-China agreement has caused a shift in focus for some cyber attack groups, it does not neces-
sarily mean a wholesale cessation of operations.
New threats emerge
In addition to ongoing activity from known targeted attack
groups, other threats emerged from the shadows during 2016. In August, Symantec shone the spotlight on a previous-
ly unknown group called Strider, which has been mounting
attacks against selected targets in Russia, China, Sweden, and Belgium.
Strider’s main tool is a stealthy Trojan known as Remsec
(Backdoor.Remsec ), which appears to be of such high sophisti-
cation that we assess it was primarily designed for espionage
purposes. Active since at least 2011, Strider maintained a low
profile, partly because it was highly selective in its choice of targets, with Symantec finding evidence of infections on 36
computers across seven separate organizations.
Remsec exhibited a high degree of technical competence,
containing a number of advanced features designed to help
it evade detection. Several components were in the form
of executable blobs (Binary Large Objects), which are more difficult for traditional, signature-based antivirus software to
detect. In addition to this, much of the malware’s functional-
ity is deployed over the network, meaning it resides only in a computer’s memory and is never stored on disk—again making
it more difficult to detect.
Remsec illustrates the levels of skill and resources that nation-
state groups can now bring to bear on targets. As vendors
become more effective at uncovering targeted attack groups,
which has led some groups to move away from sophisticated tools, there are still some operations that are in a league of
their own. Further reading
|Buckeye cyber espionage group shifts gaze from US to
Hong Kong
|Equation: Has secretive cyber espionage group been
breached?
|Strider: Cyber espionage group turns eye of Sauron on
targets
|Patchwork cyber espionage group expands targets from
governments to wide range of industries
|Tick cyber espionage group zeros in on Japan
|Taiwan targeted with new cyber espionage back door
Trojan
|Suckfly: Revealing the secret life of your code signing
certificates
|Collaborative Operation Blockbuster aims to send Lazarus
back to the dead
|Destructive Disakil malware linked to Ukraine power
outages also used against media organizations
|Shamoon: Back from the dead and destructive as ever
|Greenbug cyber espionage group targeting Middle East,
possible links to Shamoon
|Shamoon: Multi-staged destructive attacks limited to
specific targetsTargeted attacks: Espionage,
subversion, & sabotageBack to Table of ContentsPage 22
ISTR April 2017 03
Best practices
|Emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually
supportive defensive systems to guard against single-
point failures in any specific technology or protection
method. This should include the deployment of regularly updated firewalls as well as gateway antivirus,
intrusion detection or protection systems (IPS), website
vulnerability with malware protection, and web security gateway solutions throughout the network.
|Exploitation of vulnerabilities is a commonly used
tactic by targeted attack groups. Receive alerts for new
vulnerabilities and threats across vendor platforms and
patch known vulnerabilities as soon as possible.
|Implement and enforce a security policy whereby any
sensitive data is encrypted at rest and in transit. Ensure
that customer data is encrypted as well. This can help
mitigate the damage of potential data leaks from within an organization.
|Attackers frequently use stolen or default credentials
to traverse a network. Ensure passwords are strong.
Important passwords, such as those with high privileges,
should be at least 8-10 characters long (and preferably longer) and include a mixture of letters and numbers.
Encourage users to avoid reusing the same passwords
on multiple websites and sharing passwords with others should be forbidden. Delete unused credentials and
profiles and limit the number of administrative-level
profiles created.
|Educate employees on the dangers posed by spear-
phishing emails, including exercising caution around
emails from unfamiliar sources and opening attachments
that haven’t been solicited. A full protection stack helps to defend against emailed threats, including Symantec
Email Security.cloud which can block email-borne threats
and Symantec Endpoint Protection, which can block malware on the endpoint. Symantec Messaging Gateway’s
Disarm technology can also protect computers from
threats by removing malicious content from attached documents before they even reach the user.Internet Security Threat Report
Email: Malware, spam,
& phishing
04SectionEmail: Malware, spam, & phishingBack to Table of ContentsPage 24
ISTR April 2017 04
Introduction
Although a vital communication tool, email is also
one of the prime sources of disruption for end users and organizations. This disruption can range
from unwanted emails in the form of spam to more
dangerous threats, such as the propagation of ransomware or targeted spear-phishing campaigns.
While just over half of all emails (53 percent) are
spam, a growing proportion of that spam contains
malware. This increase in email-borne malware is driven largely by a professionalization of malware-spamming operations. Malware authors can
outsource their spam campaigns to specialized
groups who conduct major spam campaigns. The sheer scale of email malware operations indicates that attackers are making considerable profits from
these kinds of attacks and email is likely to continue
to be one of the main avenues of attack in 2017.
Key findings
|The email malware rate increased significantly during
2016, from 1 in 220 emails sent containing malware
in 2015, to 1 in 131 emails in 2016. This increase was
driven primarily by botnets, which are used to deliver massive spam campaigns related to threats such as Locky
(Ransom.Locky ), Dridex (W32.Cridex ), and TeslaCrypt
(Ransom.TeslaCrypt ).
|Targeted spear-phishing campaigns, especially in the
form of Business Email Compromise (BEC) scams, rather than the mass-mailing phishing campaigns of old, are
now favored by attackers. This is reflected in the drop in phishing rates, which fell from 1 in 1,846 emails to 1 in
2,596 emails.
|Major email threat groups are relying primarily on the
use of first-stage downloaders to install their final payload, typically ransomware. At the beginning of 2016,
Office documents containing malicious macros were the most common form of downloader being used in spam
campaigns. However, a shift occurred in March and, since
then, JavaScript downloaders have dominated. Trends and analysis
Email data gathered throughout 2016 demonstrates that email has become the main vector for malware propagation.
Malware menace
The most noteworthy trend observed through 2016 was the
uptick in email malware rates. The rate jumped from 1 in 220
emails in 2015 to 1 in 131 emails in 2016.
Overall email malware rate
2014 2015 2016
1 in 244 1 in 220 1 in 131
This increase in email malware can probably be linked to ongoing activity during 2016 by mass-mailing malware
groups, primarily spreading Locky, Dridex, and TeslaCrypt.
One of the major distributors of malware is a botnet known as Necurs (Backdoor.Necurs ). Necurs is responsible for massive
campaigns that spread malware through JavaScript and Office macro attachments. These downloaders subsequently install the final payload, which in 2016 was typically ransomware
threats such as Locky.
Necurs was inactive between December 24, 2016 and March
20, 2017, meaning there was a significant decline in the email
malware rate in January and February 2017. While it is not
unusual for malware groups to take a break during Christmas, these breaks usually only last around a week. The reason for
Necurs ceasing operations remains unknown, but the group
was able to immediately resume mass-mailing campaigns on
its return. Symantec blocked almost two million malicious
emails on March 20 alone, the day of its return.
Dridex is a financial Trojan used to steal end users’ banking
credentials. The attackers behind Dridex are professionals who
put a lot of effort into continually refining the malware and
making the emails used to distribute it appear as legitimate as possible. TeslaCrypt and Locky are both ransomware, with
Locky having appeared in February 2016. Ransomware was
one of the major themes of cyber security in 2016.
Monthly telemetry collected by Symantec showed a strong
start to the year for email malware, with sharp drops in April
and June, times when decreases in activities by the groups
behind Locky, Dridex, and others were reported .Email: Malware, spam, & phishingBack to Table of ContentsPage 25
ISTR April 2017 04
With the exception of Retail Trade, which saw a drop in its email
malware rate (from 1 in 74 emails in 2015 to 1 in 135 emails in
2016), every industry saw an increase in email malware in 2016.
The biggest increases were in the industries of Transport (from 1 in 338 emails to 1 in 176), Finance (from 1 in 310 to 1 in 182),
and Mining (from 1 in 304 to 1 in 139). Healthcare Services saw
a jump from 1 in 396 emails to 1 in 204.
Email malware hit businesses of all sizes in 2016. However,
small- to medium-sized businesses (with 251 to 500 employees)
were the most impacted, according to our figures.
Email malware rate by company size
The highest rate of malware in email traffic was in the 251-500 company size
grouping, with 1 in 95 emails received containing malware.
Company Size Email Malware Rate (1 in)
1-250 127
251-500 95
501-1000 139
1001-1500 224
1501-2500 104
2501+ 170
Phishing
Phishing rates have been in decline for the last several years,
and they dropped again in 2016, falling from 1 in 1,846 emails
to 1 in 2,596 emails.
Overall phishing rate
2014 2015 2016
1 in 965 1 in 1846 1 in 2596
There was a noticeable drop in October, which had a phishing rate of just 1 in 5,313 emails, before the rate returned to a more
“average” figure of 1 in 2,621 emails for November.
There was a lot happening in the information security world in
October, including the Mirai botnet coming to increased prom-
inence following a distributed denial of service attack (DDoS)
on DNS provider Dyn, which affected a number of high-profile websites, including Spotify, Netflix, and PayPal. There were
also reports of an increase in activity surrounding the Kovter
(Trojan.Kotver ) family of threats. However, there is no single
clear reason why the phishing rate dropped so sharply that month.Monthly email malware rate
The monthly email malware rate shows sharp drops in April and June, which
may be linked to law enforcement activity against several cyber crime groups.
1 IN
50
100
150
200
250
300
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
Symantec believes that this drop in activity may have been
linked to law enforcement activity, with the drop in activity
in June coming in the aftermath of the arrest of 50 people in
Russia allegedly connected to the Lurk banking fraud group .
However, this drop in activity was only temporary and
malware spam campaigns quickly scaled up again. Campaigns
involving Dridex and Locky resumed, while incidents of the Kovter family of threats (Trojan.Kovter ) started increasing in
August and maintained this growth for the rest of the year. For
more details on mass-mailing ransomware campaigns, see our
Ransomware chapter.
Email malware rate by industry
Wholesale Trade and Agriculture were the classified industry sectors most
affected by email-borne threats in 2016.
Industry Email Malware Rate (1 in)
Nonclassifiable Establishments 103
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 111
Wholesale Trade 111
Services 121
Manufacturing 130
Retail Trade 135
Mining 139
Public Administration 141
Transportation & Public Utilities 176
Construction 179
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 182Email: Malware, spam, & phishingBack to Table of ContentsPage 26
ISTR April 2017 04
Phishing rate by company size
The highest rate of phishing occurred in the 251-500 company size grouping,
with 1 in 2,554 emails received classed as phishing attempts.
Company Size Phishing Rate (1 in)
1-250 2897
251-500 2554
501-1000 4023
1001-1500 6640
1501-2500 2610
2501+ 3323
However, spear phishing continues to grow. There were many
high-profile cases over the course of 2016, such as the hacking
of the emails of Hillary Clinton campaign chairman John
Podesta and former US Secretary of State Colin Powell, where spear-phishing emails were used.
BEC scams
BEC scams, which rely on spear-phishing emails, came to
increased prominence in 2016. Also known as CEO fraud or
“whaling,” BEC scams are a form of low-tech financial fraud where spoofed emails are sent to financial staff by scammers
pretending to be the CEO or senior management. The
scammers then request a large money transfer. These scams can be damaging as they require little technical expertise but
can reap huge financial rewards for the criminals and signifi-
cant losses for the companies involved. For example, early in 2016, an Austrian aerospace company fired its CEO after it lost
almost US$50 million to BEC scammers.
Symantec research in the first half of 2016 found that more
than 400 businesses are targeted by BEC scams every day,
with small- and medium-sized businesses the most targeted.
Estimates from the FBI indicate that more than $3 billion may have been lost to BEC scams in the past three years, with more
than 22,000 victims worldwide.
Symantec research found these scams to be an evolution of the
famous Nigerian 419 scams; almost half of the email addresses
analyzed by Symantec had Nigerian IP addresses. Emails are
sent Monday to Friday, following a standard working week,
and generally contain innocuous subject lines, featuring words
such as “Request,” “Payment,” “Urgent,” etc.Monthly phishing rate
The monthly phishing rate figures show a noticeable drop in October, but there
was no single clear reason for such a significant drop that month.
1 IN
1,000
2,000
3,000
4,000
5,000
6,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
It’s likely there are myriad reasons behind the decrease in
phishing activity. Consumers are increasingly aware of the
dangers of clicking unknown links or downloading suspicious
attachments, meaning that it’s possible the “standard,” indis-criminate, mass-mailing phishing campaigns are becoming
less effective for scammers.
Phishing rate by industry
Agriculture was the industry sector most affected by phishing in 2016, with 1 in
1,815 emails classed as phishing attempts.
Industry Phishing Rate (1 in)
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 1815
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 1918
Mining 2254
Public Administration 2329
Retail Trade 2419
Nonclassifiable Establishments 2498
Services 3091
Manufacturing 3171
Wholesale Trade 4742
Construction 4917
Transportation & Public Utilities 6176Email: Malware, spam, & phishingBack to Table of ContentsPage 27
ISTR April 2017 04
Spam fell to its lowest level since 2003 in 2015, and it main-
tained this low figure in 2016. This is likely influenced by
the previously mentioned growth in ransomware and more
targeted spear-phishing campaigns such as BEC scams. The profitability of these campaigns may be turning attackers away
from the old-school spam campaigns to these new methods.
Monthly spam rate
The spam rate increased slightly towards the end of 2016. In November, the
spam rate hit 54.3 percent, the highest rate seen since March 2015.
51.051.552.052.553.053.554.054.555.0%
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
While the overall spam rate remained stagnant for the year,
there was a spike in spam being sent in the last quarter of
2016. In November, the spam rate hit 54.3 percent, the highest
rate seen since March 2015.
A couple of factors influenced this jump. The US presiden-
tial election, which took place at the beginning of November,
caused a spike in election-related spam. Symantec blocked almost 8 million emails related to the presidential election in
the period from mid-September to mid-October.
Also in October, two significant campaigns impacted Symantec
customers. An adult-themed spam attack that started in Spain
impacted users in EMEA as it quickly spread into several
different European languages. The second campaign, a signifi-cant snowshoe attack ( see Ice-cold panel ) sent emails related to
spam products and services. The attackers sent a low volume of email to probe detections and aborted the spam run within minutes if the messages were blocked.
Spam related to Black Friday and Cyber Monday was also
behind the high volumes of spam in November, with one campaign being used to spread the Locky ransomware. In
December there were reports of the hailstorm spam technique
being used to spread Dridex and Locky, but the spam rate held steady.
Spammers appear to be non-discriminatory when it comes to
the size of the companies they target. The difference between the most-targeted small businesses and least-targeted larger
businesses was just over a percentage point.BEC scams: Common subject lines
“Request” was the most popular keyword used in subject lines for BEC scam
emails. It was followed by “Payment” (15 percent) and “Urgent” (10 percent).
10% Urgent 15% Payment
Transfer Request 9%URGENT 8%Tranfer Inquiry 8%REQUEST 6%Urgent Request 6%Transfer Payment 6%Transfer Request 6%
Request
25%
BEC scammers’ techniques continue to evolve in order
to ensure the success of the scam. Symantec research in
November found that, rather than asking for a money transfer straight away, scammers used informal language to check if a victim was at their desk or to find out more information before
requesting the cash.
A new technique recently observed by our researchers is the
“hijacking” of legitimate invoices sent by companies so that
the account number is changed to that of the scammer. Some
cases we have seen involved scammers attacking the email server to change the details on the invoice. Others were just
fake invoice emails sent without the need to hack the email
server, but which were effective provided they went out before the legitimate invoices.
With BEC scams proving hugely lucrative, they are likely to
continue to be a strong trend in 2017.
Spam stays steady
Spam rates remained steady at 53 percent in 2016 after declining in recent years.
However, this figure does still mean that the majority of
inbound business emails sent in 2016 were spam. Spam is generally considered to be any unsolicited email that is sent
in bulk and in some cases may not contain malicious threats.
Spam emails can just be annoying or unwanted or they may lead to sites that carry out click fraud.
Overall spam rate
The spam rate between 2015 and 2016 has remained fairly steady.
2014 2015 2016
60% 53% 53%Email: Malware, spam, & phishingBack to Table of ContentsPage 28
ISTR April 2017 04
Downloader detections by month
Office macro downloaders (W97M.Downloader and variants) and JavaScript
downloaders (JS.Downloader and variants) are the most commonly used downloaders that spread malware via email. JavaScript downloader activity increased during 2016, while Office macros experienced a resurgence in December 2016.
100,000200,000300,000400,000500,000600,000700,000800,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANJS.Downloader W97M.Downloader
Symantec believes that spamming operations using JavaScript
and Office macro downloaders are operated by different cyber
criminal groups. Malware groups can hire either (or both)
channels to deliver their threats. If this is the case, the trend is down to malware groups that favor spamming operations
using JavaScript downloaders in the latter end of 2016.
While the propagation of Office macro downloaders has been
lower throughout the year, Symantec doesn’t believe that this
vector will disappear. In fact, we can see that W97M.Down-
loader detections spiked in December, although JS.Downloader
continues to dominate. This spike could possibly be attributed
to the previously mentioned hailstorm campaign ( see Ice-cold
panel ) that was being used to spread Locky and Dridex, which
can be spread through malicious macros in Word documents.
Ice-cold: Snowshoe and hailstorm techniques
Snowshoe spamming distributes a broad load of spam across an
array of IP addresses in order to increase the chances of some
getting through. Snowshoe spammers anticipate that some
emails will be trapped by spam filters. However, this technique of
sending emails from a large number of IP addresses increases the
chances of them avoiding spam filters and reaching a computer
user’s inbox. Snowshoe spammers send a low amount of spam
from each IP address in order to stay under the radar.
The hailstorm spam technique is an evolution of the snowshoe
spam technique, and both have been around for many years.
Hailstorm spam is also sent using a large number of sender IP
addresses, but hailstorm campaigns are sent out in very high
volume over a very short period of time. Hailstorm spammers
can send thousands of emails very quickly, and then suddenly
stop. Some hailstorm spam attacks take place over such a short
period of time that they often end before the fastest traditional
anti-spam defenses can update in response to them.Spam rate by company size
There was little difference between the most targeted and least targeted
company sizes, with the spam rate varying between 52.6 percent and 54.2 percent.
Company Size Spam Rate (%)
1-250 54.2
251-500 53.1
501-1000 53.4
1001-1500 53.2
1501-2500 52.6
2501+ 52.8
Spam rate by industry
Some industry sectors receive more spam than others, but the range is only approximately 8 percent.
Industry Spam Rate (%)
Construction 59.5
Mining 57.1
Retail Trade 54.9
Manufacturing 54.4
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 54.0
Nonclassifiable Establishments 53.0
Services 53.0
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 52.9
Transportation & Public Utilities 52.9
Wholesale Trade 52.6
Public Administration 51.6
Case studies/investigations
The groups involved in mass-mailing campaigns continually refine
their tactics in a bid to stay one step ahead of email security systems.
Changing tactics
A notable trend during 2016 was a shift in the type of downloader used to deliver some of the most prolific threats. At the beginning of
the year, Office documents with malicious macros ( W97M.Download-
er and variants) were the most popular form of downloader and were used in campaigns delivering threats such as Dridex ( W32.Cridex).
During March 2016, a shift occurred and the use of JavaScript down-loaders (JS.Downloader and variants) increased significantly. Email: Malware, spam, & phishingBack to Table of ContentsPage 29
ISTR April 2017 04
Within the shift to JavaScript downloaders, Symantec saw a
significant increase in the use of malicious Windows Script
File (WSF) attachments (detected as JS.Downloader ) from July
onwards. WSF files are designed to allow a mix of scripting
languages within a single file. They are opened and run by the
Windows Script Host (WSH). Their use as malicious attach-
ments may be due to the fact that files with the .wsf extension are not automatically blocked by some email clients and can be
launched like an executable file.
Ransomware, in particular, has been distributed employing
this new tactic. In the second half of 2016, Symantec blocked a
range of major campaigns distributing Locky (Ransom.Locky )
that involved malicious WSF files.
Blocked emails with WSF attachments
The number of blocked emails containing malicious WSF attachments jumped
significantly between June and September 2016.
500,0001,000,0001,500,0002,000,0002,500,000
SEP AUG JUL JUN
Tried and tested social engineering
While spam campaigns spreading malware rely on a range of
tactics, the largest malware spamming operations tend to rely
on social engineering tricks. Threats such as Locky ransom-ware or the Dridex financial Trojan may be spread through
emails disguised as financial transaction confirmations.
Analysis of 623 major malware spam campaigns logged by
Symantec during 2016 found that “Invoice” was the most
commonly used keyword in subject lines. Other financial
terms such as “Order,” “Payment,” and “Bill” also figured in the top 10.
The use of financial keywords has been an unchanging feature
of malware spam campaigns throughout the year, indicating that attackers are having a high degree of success with this
tactic. Since most businesses receive a high volume of routine
legitimate emails from customers and suppliers, malicious emails could be inadvertently opened if they aren’t blocked
by email security software. Consumers, meanwhile, may also
be tricked into opening these emails, fearing they have been charged for goods they didn’t order. Malware downloaded
is typically ransomwareIncludes attachment, typically JavaScript (JS) file or Office file containing malicious macro02Email received disguised as routine notification, most commonly an
INVOICE or RECEIPT01
Opened attachment executes PowerShell script to download malware 03
04Typical emailed malware
infection process
Typical emailed malware infection processEmail: Malware, spam, & phishingBack to Table of ContentsPage 30
ISTR April 2017 04
Social engineering and new messaging platforms
As businesses and consumers move to newer messaging
platforms beyond traditional email, attackers will likely seek
to leverage these platforms for malicious purposes.
Businesses are increasingly using collaborative tools such as
Slack for both internal communication and interactions with
customers. In China, WeChat has dominated the messaging
space, where it offers extensive features, including a payment system. Where financial transactions go, cyber criminals are
likely to follow. WeChat will likely serve as a model for other
messaging applications. Facebook Messenger has already increased its focus on the use of automated bots to allow
brands to insert themselves into users’ conversations.
While some of the techniques used in typical malicious
emails are not transferable to other messaging platforms,
at the root of email campaigns is the use of social engi-
neering. The lessons learned from the success of email scams and campaigns will likely be applied to messaging
platforms as they become more widely adopted by
businesses and consumers.
Further reading
|Dridex: Financial Trojan aggressively spread in millions of
spam emails each day
|Locky ransomware on aggressive hunt for victims
|Locky, Dridex, and Angler among cyber crime groups to
experience fall in activity
|Surge of email attacks using malicious WSF attachments
|Necurs: Mass-mailing botnet returns with new wave of
spam campaignsKeywords used in malware spam campaigns
The top 10 subject line keywords seen in major malware spam campaigns
during 2016.
12% Scan13% DocumentEmailing 6%
Doc 5%
Bill 6%
Fax 6%
Payment 7%
Order 9%
Mail Delivery
Failure 10% Invoice
26%
Another common tactic is to disguise emails as coming from
a scanner, printer, or multifunction device (MFD). Emails
containing the keywords “Scan,” “Document,” and “Fax” were
usually disguised as coming from such devices.
A third tactic seen during 2016 was to disguise malicious spam
campaigns as some kind of email delivery failure message. Ten
percent of the major spam campaigns analyzed had some form of delivery failure message in the subject line.
Preferred languages used in spam campaigns
The language used in subject lines in major malware spam campaigns, 2016
No subject line 6%
German 3%French 1%Norwegian 1%Spanish .3%Portuguese .2%
English
89%
The vast majority (89 percent) of the major malware spam
campaigns analyzed had English-language subject lines.
German was a distant second, accounting for three percent,
with small proportions of French, Norwegian, Portuguese, and Spanish emails. Interestingly, attackers adopted similar tactics
regardless of language, with many non-English campaigns
also employing a financial theme. For example, the most
popular keyword used in German campaigns was “Rechnung,”
the German word for invoice.Email: Malware, spam, & phishingBack to Table of ContentsPage 31
ISTR April 2017 04
Best practices
|A full protection stack helps to defend against emailed
threats. Symantec Email Security.cloud can block email-
borne threats and Symantec Endpoint Protection can
block malware on the endpoint.
|Delete any suspicious-looking emails you receive,
especially if they contain links or attachments.
|Be extremely wary of any Microsoft Office email
attachment that advises you to enable macros to view
its content. Unless you are absolutely sure that this is
a genuine email from a trusted source, do not enable macros and instead immediately delete the email.
|Always keep your security software up to date to protect
yourself against any new malware variants.
|Keep your operating system and other software updated.
Software updates will frequently include patches for
newly discovered security vulnerabilities that could be
exploited by attackers.
|Be suspicious of emails that demand some action without
following usual procedures.
|Draft a reply with the supposed sender’s email obtained
directly from the corporate address book, instead of
simply hitting the Reply button, to ensure that a scammer
is pushed out of the reply thread.
|Do not reply to suspicious emails and do not give out
sensitive information.
|Report suspicious or obviously bogus emails to the proper
authorities.
|Enforce an effective password policy on all your employees
to ensure passwords are strong and changed regularly.
|Never use links in an email to connect to a website unless
you are sure they are genuine. Type URLs directly into the
address bar to ensure you are connecting to a legitimate
site and not one with an address that simply looks similar.Internet Security Threat Report
Web attacks,
toolkits, & exploiting vulnerabilities online
05SectionWeb attacks, toolkits, &
exploiting vulnerabilities onlineBack to Table of ContentsPage 33
ISTR April 2017 05
Introduction
A distinct shift in the cyber security landscape
occurred in 2016, as web attacks fell by almost a third year-on-year. The shift involved a move
away from exploit kits being used as the primary
infection vector, to email being the favored threat delivery method of attackers. This is a distinct contrast with 2015, when the number of
web attacks doubled from the previous year.
However, this shift from exploit kits to email
may not be permanent. Attackers have regularly switched between email and exploit
kits and are likely to continue to do so.
Key findings
|Web attacks have dropped by a third (32 percent) year-on-
year. However, web attacks are still a big problem, with an
average of more than 229,000 being detected every single
day in 2016. More than three-quarters (76 percent) of scanned websites in 2016 contained vulnerabilities, nine
percent of which were deemed critical.
|Malicious activity from exploit kits dropped by 60 percent
in 2016, with our research indicating that attackers are now favoring email as a primary infection vector.
The drop in exploit kits is significant, but it does not necessarily mean the threat from attackers is decreasing,
rather they are using different methods to spread threats.
|The RIG exploit kit was the most active exploit kit at the
end of 2016. It was responsible for 35 percent of all web attacks in December, distributing mainly Ransom.Cerber .
|On average there were 2.4 browser vulnerabilities
discovered per day in 2016, a slight drop from 2015, when approximately three browser vulnerabilities were
discovered every day.Trends and analysis
While the web attack and exploit kit figures have fallen, the percentage of websites scanned that contained vulnerabili-
ties remained at the same high level it has been at for the last
number of years.
Vulnerability assessment
Our data found that 76 percent of websites scanned contained vulnerabilities—the same percentage as 2014 and just two
percent less than the 2015 figure.
Scanned websites with vulnerabilities
Seventy-six percent of scanned websites were found to have vulnerabilities in
2016, down two percent from 2015.
20406080100%
2016 2015 2014-2% pts +2% pts -1% pts
76% 78%76%
Critical vulnerabilities were down by six percent year-on-year.
Nine percent of the websites scanned were found to contain
critical vulnerabilities. This compares to 20 percent in 2014,
and 15 percent in 2015, appearing to show a trend of steady decline in the number of websites with critical vulnerabilities.
A critical vulnerability is one which, if exploited by attackers,
may allow malicious code to be run without user interaction, potentially resulting in a data breach and further compromise
of visitors to the affected websites.
Percentage of vulnerabilities which were critical
The percentage of vulnerabilities found to be critical has fallen steadily in the
last three years and now stands at nine percent.
0
510152025%
2016 2015 2014-6% pts -5% pts +4% pts
9%15%20%Web attacks, toolkits, &
exploiting vulnerabilities onlineBack to Table of ContentsPage 34
ISTR April 2017 05
Exploit kits
Undoubtedly, the biggest takeaway for web threats in 2016 was
the phenomenal drop in exploit kit activity. Exploit kit detec-
tions dropped by 60 percent, with some of the most prominent exploit kit families disappearing during the course of the year.
There are a few reasons behind this fall in exploit kit detection
numbers. As previously mentioned, and as discussed in depth in the Email: malware, spam, & phishing chapter, our
data indicates that over the course of 2016 email became the
preferred infection vector for attackers. The email malware rate increased in 2016, from 1 in 220 emails to 1 in 131 emails.
The disappearance of many exploit kit families over the course
of the year can also be observed, as analysis of our month-on-month data shows.
The largest percentage of exploit kits detected in 2016, as in
2015, were unclassified. This category is comprised of lots of different, small, unrelated exploit kits that don’t fall under the
definition of a known exploit kit family.
The Angler exploit kit continued to be the most detected
exploit kit family in 2016, dominating for the first half of the
year and accounting for more than 50 percent of all exploit kit
activity in May. However, Angler activity dropped by nearly 30 percentage points in June and continued to fall to almost
non-existent levels by year-end.
This sharp drop in Angler activity coincided with the arrest
of 50 people in Russia accused of involvement with the Lurk
banking fraud group , and it is widely speculated that this
takedown was the reason for the disappearance of this previ-
ously dominant exploit kit. For more details, see the case study
later in this chapter .
The disappearance of Angler led to a spike in activity for the
Neutrino exploit kit in the following months, with its activity
jumping by 10 percentage points in June immediately following
the drop in activity from Angler. However, by year-end Neutri-no’s activity levels were largely the same as they were at the
start of the year.
Nuclear and Spartan are two other toolkits that largely disap -
peared in 2016. An exposé on the Nuclear exploit kit that
revealed a lot about how it worked is believed to be the reason
behind its disappearance. In contrast, the disappearance of Spartan seems to simply be a case of the criminal or criminals
behind it deciding to “retire” the exploit kit. Symantec
telemetry shows Spartan being extremely active up to the end of March 2016, which is why it appears in the top 10 for the
year, but it then disappears.The disappearance of so many high-profile exploit kits may
mean that they are no longer seen as a reliable option. Cyber
criminals may not want to purchase an “exploit kit as a service”
for fear the exploit kit could simply disappear from circulation in a month’s time.
There was an uptick in RIG exploit kit activity in the last
quarter of the year, which is probably related to the disappear -
ance of so many other high-profile exploit kit families. The RIG
exploit kit was the most active exploit kit at the end of 2016,
and was responsible for 35 percent of all attacks in December. These attacks were mainly distributing the Ransom.Cerber
ransomware.
Top 10 exploit kits
The Angler exploit kit was the most common exploit kit in use during 2016, and
accounted for 22 percent of all exploit kit web attacks. However, Angler activity dropped by nearly 30 percentage points in June and continued to fall to almost non-existent levels by year-end. The RIG exploit kit was the most active exploit kit at the end of 2016, and was responsible for 35 percent of all attacks in December.
Rank Exploit Kit 2015 (%) 2016 (%)Percentage
Point
Difference
1 Unclassified 38.9 37.9 -1.0
2 Angler 13.3 22.2 8.9
3 Spartan 7.3 11.9 4.6
4 RIG 2.0 7.9 5.9
5 Magnitude 1.1 5.8 4.7
6 Neutrino 1.3 5.8 4.5
7 VIP 24.8 3.2 -21.6
8 Nuclear 4.0 1.6 -2.4
9 Fiesta 2.5 1.0 -1.5
10 G01 Pack 2.2 0.8 -1.4Web attacks, toolkits, &
exploiting vulnerabilities onlineBack to Table of ContentsPage 35
ISTR April 2017 05
Web attacks
Overall, web attacks dropped more than 30 percent year-on-
year between 2015 and 2016. This drop can be explained by
attackers moving to email as the primary infection vector. As
previously mentioned, email is an easier way for attackers to distribute malware and, in the current climate, is also more
reliable. Exploit kits require maintenance of a backend infra-
structure and are simply more work for attackers than sending an email.
The important takeaway from this, though, is not that the
threats have lessened, rather that attackers are simply using different tactics to spread threats.
Symantec telemetry shows that the drop in web threats was
almost continuous for the 12 months of 2016. They reached their lowest point in September, increasing slightly in October
and November, before falling back again in December.
Web attacks blocked per month
The number of web attacks per unique system fell steadily throughout 2016.
MILLION
024681012
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
Despite this general drop in web threat activity, it is still a
major threat, with Symantec blocking an average of more than
229,000 unique web attacks on endpoint computers every
day in 2016. Data from Blue Coat web gateway products that
operate at the network level shows that, by the end of 2016,
the number of web threats blocked at the gateway grew by 24
percent compared with the same period in 2015. However, the rate of increase is down, when compared to a growth of 124
percent from 2014 to 2015.
Technology- and business-related websites were the most
frequently exploited website categories in 2016. Technology websites were exploited nearly twice as much as business-re -
lated websites. Search, which was the third-most frequently exploited category in 2015, dropped out of the top 10 in 2016.Classification of most frequently exploited websites
Technology- and business-related websites were the most popular for hosting
malicious content and malvertising in 2016.
Rank Domain Categories 2015 (%) 2016 (%)Percentage
Point
Difference
1 Technology 23.2 20.7 -2.5
2 Business 8.1 11.3 3.2
3 Blogging 7.0 8.6 1.6
4 Hosting 0.6 7.2 6.6
5 Health 1.9 5.7 3.8
6 Shopping 2.4 4.2 1.8
7 Educational 4.0 4.1 < 0.1
8 Entertainment 2.6 4.0 1.4
9 Travel 1.5 3.6 2.1
10 Gambling 0.6 2.8 2.2
Browser vulnerabilities
On average, there were 2.4 browser vulnerabilities discovered
per day in 2016. The number of publicly announced browser
vulnerabilities dropped during the year, with Microsoft Internet
Explorer/Edge experiencing the biggest drop in vulnerabili-ties. This may be explained by the fact that there was no new
version of Explorer released in 2016, with Microsoft essential-
ly ending its development. Usage of the Explorer browser also plummeted during the year. Microsoft’s new browser, Edge, is
only available to people using Windows 10, and its new security
architecture makes it more difficult to successfully exploit.
The number of vulnerabilities in Firefox and Safari also
dropped, while Symantec measured a slight increase in
the number of Google Chrome vulnerabilities. However, an unusually high number of browser vulnerabilities were discov-
ered in 2015, partially due to the high number of zero-day
vulnerabilities discovered that year. In 2016, the figures for browser vulnerabilities really just returned closer to “normal”
levels, but are still quite high.Web attacks, toolkits, &
exploiting vulnerabilities onlineBack to Table of ContentsPage 36
ISTR April 2017 05
Browser vulnerabilities
The number of browser vulnerabilities discovered dropped from 1,093 in 2015
to 888 in 2016.
6161,093
888
0
2004006008001,0001,200
2016 2015 2014Opera
Mozilla FirefoxMicrosoft Internet
Explorer/EdgeGoogle Chrome
Apple Safari
Another possible reason behind the fall in browser vulner -
abilities is that, due to an increased number of bug bounty
programs, and the increased participation of security
researchers in them, many browser vulnerabilities have been discovered and patched in previous years and the “low-hang-
ing fruit” that may once have been exploited by malicious
actors is no longer there.
Further reading
Locky, Dridex and Angler among cyber crime groups to experi-ence fall in activity
Best practices
|Regularly assess your website for any vulnerabilities.
|Scan your website daily for malware.
|Set the secure flag for all session cookies.
|Secure your websites against man-in-the-middle (MITM)
attacks and malware infection.
|Choose SSL Certificates with Extended Validation to
verify protection and display the green browser address
bar to website users.
|Display recognized trust marks in highly visible locations
on your website.
|Be picky about your plugins. The software you use to
manage your website may come with vulnerabilities too. The more third-party software you use, the greater
your attack surface, so only deploy what’s absolutely necessary.Case study
Angler: The rise and fall of an exploit kit
The Angler exploit kit first appeared on the threat landscape
in late 2013, following the demise of the Blackhole exploit kit
in October that year. It became fairly popular straight away,
but it really took off in 2015, when it dominated the exploit kit
landscape.
Angler was a sophisticated exploit kit that pioneered many
technical advances that other exploit kits subsequently followed, such as including the use of anti-cyber security countermeasures.
Angler was able to download and execute malware from memory,
without needing to write any files to disk, in an attempt to evade
detection by traditional security technology. It was also very fast
at integrating new zero-day exploits into its arsenal, which would
account for its growth in popularity in 2015. There were a lot of
zero-day vulnerabilities discovered in 2015, including a number
in Adobe Flash Player, which was commonly targeted by Angler.
One of Angler’s big advantages over other exploit kits was that it
could bypass many traditional security countermeasures. It used
a number of techniques to evade detection, including switching
host names and IP numbers rapidly, and it also used domain
shadowing—registering domain names that look like they belong
to legitimate websites—to piggyback on legitimate domains.
Angler was one of the most active exploit kits throughout 2015.
Symantec’s intrusion protection system blocked hundreds
of thousands of attacks by it on a daily basis. Total blocks on
Angler-based attacks numbered more than 19.5 million in
2015 alone. Angler’s primary delivery mechanism was malver-
tisements, and it mostly exploited Adobe Flash vulnerabilities.
Computers running Windows, particularly Windows 7, were its
favored targets.
Angler was primarily used to spread ransomware. Its demise in
June 2016 coincided with a decline in detections of CryptXXX
ransomware (Ransom.CryptXXX), which was primarily spread
using Angler.
Angler suffered a decline in activity at the beginning of 2016
but quickly ramped up again before disappearing completely in
June. Its demise followed the arrest of 50 people by authorities
in Russia who were allegedly associated with the Lurk banking
fraud group. It’s widely believed these arrests are the reason
behind Angler’s demise.
The demise of such a previously dominant exploit kit has left
something of a gap in the market, which was temporarily filled
by a rise in activity by the Neutrino exploit kit. Cyber criminals
are sure to find a way to fill that gap before long.Internet Security Threat Report
Cyber crime & the
underground economy
06SectionCyber crime and
the underground economyBack to Table of ContentsPage 38
ISTR April 2017 06
Introduction
Two distinct sides to cyber crime emerged in 2016.
Traditional mass-market cyber crime groups carried out large-scale email campaigns to distribute
“commodity” malware such as ransomware and
online banking threats. While their motivations and payloads remained largely the same, their distribution methods have shifted away from web-
based exploit kits to more traditional methods,
in particular the use of email attachments.
The other side of cyber crime is made up of
organized criminal groups, responsible for
a number of sophisticated financial heists.
However, it wasn’t just professional criminals conducting these campaigns—there has been evidence of nation-state involvement as well.
Both mass-market and targeted cyber crime groups
have adopted tactics referred to as “living off the land.” This trend, as discussed in the Targeted attacks chapter , shows attackers leveraging
operating system and application features coupled with publicly available tools in lieu of exploiting vulnerabilities and developing custom tools.
Key findings
|Cyber crime hit the big time in 2016, with high-profile
victims and bigger-than-ever financial rewards. The
Banswift (Trojan.Banswift ) attacks that took place in 2016
were also the first time there were strong indications of state involvement in financial cyber crime.
|Mass-market cyber crime remains strong despite
disruption efforts. Attackers adapted their methods for distributing traditional cyber crime malware. In
particular the use of JavaScript downloaders and
malicious macro downloaders in Office files was widespread and accounted for just over 7 million attempted infections in 2016.
|While the number of data breaches in 2016 remained steady
compared to 2015, the number of identities stolen increased significantly. Almost 1.1 billion identities were stolen in
2016, a big jump from the 563.8 million stolen in 2015.
|Nearly 100 million bots were observed in 2016, an increase
of seven percent from 2015.Malware
Malware continues to be a blight on the threat landscape with
more than 357 million new variants observed in 2016. However,
for the first time, the rate of new malware seen on the endpoint
has remained largely stagnant in 2016 – increasing by half a percent.
Unique malware variants detected for the first time
There was a slight (0.5 percent) increase between 2015 and 2016 in unique
malware variants detected for the first time.
50100150200250300350400
2016 2015 2014357m 355m
274mMILLION
Monthly count of unique malware variants first seen in
2016
In this month-by-month measure of unique malware variants first seen in 2016, a clear spike can be seen in October.
20406080100
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN2015 2016MILLION
While the rate of new malware variants was stable for the early
part of 2016, the latter half of the year saw an explosion in
new variants. This was driven mainly by the high volume of
ransomware downloaders propagated over email by the Necurs (Backdoor.Necurs ) botnet, which is discussed in further detail
later in this chapter.
In previous reports, Symantec took a slightly different
approach to counting malware variants, focusing on variants
unique for that year only, rather than malware first seen in that year. Using this legacy methodology on 2016 data shows a
slightly higher volume of variants but a seven percent decline
in new variants year on year.Cyber crime and
the underground economyBack to Table of ContentsPage 39
ISTR April 2017 06
Unique malware variants detected
There was a slight drop between 2015 and 2016 in the number of unique
malware variants detected.
100200300400500
2016 2015401m431mMILLION
Breaking the data down month by month shows an almost
identical trend with a notable uptick in variants towards the
end of the year.
Monthly count of unique malware variants in 2016
The count of unique malware variants also shows a spike in October.
20406080100
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN2015 2016MILLION
Looking at this data in isolation, it may appear that the malware
problem is stabilizing or even improving; however, looking at
the bigger picture, it is clear this isn’t the case. Many attacks
are blocked earlier in the attack chain and aren’t represented in malware volume numbers, which focus primarily on the final
or close-to-final payloads. As discussed in the Email chapter ,
email accounted for a large volume of malware distributed in
2016. Symantec has also continued to block a large number of
web attacks. This leads to fewer final payloads being delivered
and, therefore, a lower total number of variants seen.
There are other explanations too: a lower incidence of poly-
morphic threats and attackers relying less on malware to carry
out their deeds. This is a phenomenon referred to as “living off the land.”Living off the land: PowerShell, macros, and social
engineering
A trend emerged in 2016 that saw attackers use legitimate Windows programs to download and execute payloads. This
tactic of “living off the land” is discussed in greater detail in
the Targeted Attacks chapter ; however, the techniques used
by advanced attackers have also been seen in the cyber crime
world.
PowerShell, a powerful scripting language and shell framework,
has become a mainstay of the infection chain and appeals to
attackers for a number of reasons. It is installed by default on
most Windows computers, and most organizations do not have extended logging enabled for it, making malicious PowerShell
activities largely invisible. Scripts can also easily be obfuscat -
ed, which hides their malicious intent. It allows for payloads
to be executed directly from memory, meaning that attackers
leave fewer traces behind.
An analysis by Symantec in late 2016 showed that 95.4 percent
of inspected PowerShell scripts were found to be malicious.
Malicious PowerShell scripts are primarily used as download-
ers during the initial infection phase, but can also be used for lateral movement across a network. This lateral movement is
typically seen in targeted attacks to enable a threat to execute
code on a remote computer when spreading inside the network. When it comes to cyber crime attacks, PowerShell is used to
facilitate the download and execution of the final payload.
The use of PowerShell increased sharply during 2016.
Blue Coat’s Malware Analysis sandbox received 22 times
as many samples using PowerShell in the third quarter of
2016 compared to the second quarter. This was likely due to increased activity associated with JavaScript downloaders and
Trojan.Kotver in this time period. Overall, our analysis found
PowerShell was used most frequently with W97M.Downloader (9.4 percent of samples), followed by Kovter (Trojan.Kotver ) at
4.5 percent, and JS.Downloader (4 percent). Kovter is notable for its use of PowerShell to create a fileless infection complete -
ly contained in the registry.
More advanced targeted cyber crime groups also leveraged
PowerShell in 2016. The Odinaff group used malicious Power -
Shell scripts to attack financial organizations. These attacks
are discussed later in this chapter.
Malicious Office macros continue to be popular with attackers
as evidenced by the prevalence of detections (discussed below).
Office macros don’t run by default, so these attacks rely on
social engineering to convince users to launch the macro when opening an Office attachment. By using features like
PowerShell and macros, attackers don’t need to rely on software exploits or custom tools that are more likely to arouse suspicion while requiring more time and skill to use. Cyber crime and
the underground economyBack to Table of ContentsPage 40
ISTR April 2017 06
There are also attacks which don’t rely on any malicious code
or system features. Business Email Compromise (BEC) attacks,
discussed in-depth in the chapter on email, rely solely on
social engineering to trick victims into giving up large sums
of money.
While this trend shows a movement away from exploits and
custom tools, it’s important to note that there is a malware component to almost every attack. This means that malware
will continue to persist as a problem. Additionally, this shift
doesn’t mean that attackers are becoming less sophisticated. In fact, it demonstrates an increase in efficiency and an ability
to hide in plain sight.
Malware prevalence and trends
Generic detections dominated the most prevalent malware detected on the
endpoint in 2016.
Rank Detection Number of Infections
1 Heur.AdvML.B 5,648,434
2 JS.Downloader 3,487,119
3 Packed.Dromedan!lnk 2,615,857
4 W97M.Downloader 2,199,083
5 Heur.AdvML.C 2,039,212
6 SMG.Heur!cg1 1,291,550
7 W32.SillyFDC 1,019,644
8 Trojan.Startpage 908,429
9 W32.Downadup.B 814,687
10 Infostealer 753,783
Looking at the most prevalent malware highlights, the impact
of generic or heuristic malware detections is notable. They
account for nine out of the top 10 types of malware detected
on the endpoint in 2016. However, it’s important to note the prominence of JS.Downloader and W97M.Downloader, which
are new entries in 2016’s prevalence list.
In 2016, Symantec observed a large number of email campaigns
distributing ransomware and online banking threats via
malicious Office macro (W97M.Downloader and variants) and
JavaScript downloader files ( JS.Downloader and variants).
Between them they have accounted for 7 million detections on the endpoint in 2016 and have dominated the cyber crime threat landscape, particularly in the latter half of the year.The final payload is typically
ransomware but may also be an online banking threat such as DridexThe email contains an
attachment, usually an office file, JavaScript (JS), or another scripting type02An attacker sends an email, typically masquerading as an
INVOICE or BILL01
When the file is launched, it will either prompt users to execute a macro or will launch PowerShell to download and execute the final payload03
04Typical attack scenario in
2016 took the following steps:
OR
Typical attack scenario in 2016 took the following stepsCyber crime and
the underground economyBack to Table of ContentsPage 41
ISTR April 2017 06
JavaScript downloader detections per month
JavaScript downloader detections (JS.Downloader and variants) increased in
the second half of 2016.
100,000200,000300,000400,000500,000600,000700,000800,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
Office macro downloader detections per month
There was a spike in Office macro detections (W97M.Downlader and variants)
in December 2016.
50,000100,000150,000200,000250,000300,000350,000400,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
These downloaders are favored by attackers for a variety
of reasons. Businesses are unlikely to block all Office files
at the email gateway as it could affect legitimate emails,
which accounts for the popularity of Office macro download-ers. Meanwhile, ease of obfuscation in an attempt to evade
detection has contributed to the increase of JavaScript down-
loaders. As previously discussed, JS.Downloader will typically use PowerShell or a Visual Basic Script (VBS) to execute the
final payload in an attempt to fly below the radar.
Symantec research indicates that some groups favor W97M.
Downloader, while others prefer JS.Downloader. Activity
around W97M.Downloader dropped in the second half of 2016,
but Symantec believes the groups using it are likely to increase activity again. In fact, an increase in W97M.Downloader detec-tions was observed in the final month of 2016.
Many of these threats are being primarily propagated by spam
botnets. Symantec observed an uptick in bot numbers in 2016. The figure jumped from 91.9 million to 98.6 million bots making
up various botnets.
Bot activity numbers
Symantec observed 6.7 million more bots in 2016 than 2015.
20406080100
2016 201598.6m91.9mMILLION
Some malware took further precautions in order to be even
stealthier. Twenty percent of malware is now routinely able to
detect and identify the presence of a virtual machine environ-
ment, an increase from 16 percent in 2015.
Blue Coat’s Malware Analysis sandbox tracked an increased
use of the SSL protocol for communication with command
and control (C&C) servers, making it more difficult to inspect network traffic. Such behavior increased by 79 percent, resting
at 3.1 percent at the end of 2016. This was probably due to
SSL certificates becoming more easily available in 2016, and attackers realizing that they had an improved chance of passing
through the gateway undetected if they used SSL encryption.
Furthermore, the communication to cloud services doubled to more than four percent in 2016.
One percent of all threats used the Tor network. In those
cases, it was primarily used by ransomware to deliver payment instructions.
Botnet case study: Necurs
The Necurs botnet was one of the main distributors of malware
in 2016 and was responsible for massive email campaigns
distributing JavaScript, VBS, and Office macro downloaders. Necurs’ primary payload in 2016 was Ransom.Locky . Other
major botnets observed by Symantec were used to spread threats such as Dridex (W32.Cridex ), Cerber (Ransom.Cerber ),
and Kotver (Trojan.Kotver ), as well as Locky.
Necurs was one of the most active botnets distributing malware in 2016. The operators behind Necurs stuck to the average
working week. Threats were distributed Monday through
Friday and there was little activity on weekends. Cyber crime and
the underground economyBack to Table of ContentsPage 42
ISTR April 2017 06
Looking at just one day of Necurs activity, the scale of it is clear.
On November 24, 2016, Necurs sent five spam campaigns—two
delivering JavaScript downloaders, two delivering .wsf attach-
ments, and one delivering a VBS attachment. These five spam runs sent out more than 2.3 million spam emails—more than
1.8 million used JS downloaders, while just under 465,000 used
VBS.
Research by Symantec into 146 email runs carried out by
Necurs in the last quarter of the year found that it was respon-
sible for sending out an average of 525 unique malware samples in every email run.
Looking at spam runs primarily involving JS, VBS, and WSF
downloaders, our research found that JavaScript downloaders were by far the most popular type of downloader distributed
by Necurs.
Downloaders delivered by Necurs spam botnet
In the period observed by Symantec, Necurs predominantly sent spam
campaigns involving JS.Downloader.
WSF 15%
VBS 14%JSE 2%DOCX 1%XLSX .3%
JS
67%
When this study of Necurs began at the end of October, threats
were primarily being spread using VBS, but in November and
December JavaScript downloaders dominated.
This use of different downloaders indicates that Necurs was
a “botnet for hire” that was being used by different attack
groups.
Interestingly, Symantec observed Necurs’ activity ceasing for
almost three months from the end of December. Its last spam
run started on December 22 and ended on December 24. While
it was first thought that this was just a case of the group behind Necurs taking a break for the holidays, the botnet remained
quiet until March 20, 2017.Necurs’ disappearance led to a big drop in the volume of
malicious email being sent in late 2016 and early 2017. The reason behind its disappearance remains a mystery. Symantec
blocked almost two million malicious emails on March 20,
the day of its return. The fact that Necurs was able to resume massive spam campaigns on its return indicates that, whatever
the reason for its absence, it appears to have lost none of its
capabilities.
It’s all about the money: Financial malware
Financial malware, specifically threats targeting online banking, has historically been a large driver of cyber crime.
However, a number of arrests and takedowns, coupled with the
continued success of ransomware, means that it has become less dominant.
Infection data shows that this area is dominated by five
families, while activity outside of this top five is negligible.
Top 10 financial Trojans
The list of top 10 financial Trojans shows that a handful of financial Trojans
dominated the landscape in 2016.
Rank Financial threats Impacted machines
1 Ramnit 460,673
2 Bebloh 310,086
3 Zbot 292,160
4 Snifula 121,624
5 Cridex 23,127
6 Dyre 4,675
7 Shylock 4,512
8 Pandemiya 3,330
9 Shifu 2,177
10 Spyeye 1,480
Ramnit (W32.Ramnit ) made a triumphant return to the world
of financial fraud in 2016. Ramnit has been in operation
since 2010 but a takedown of the cyber crime gang behind it
in February 2015, which Symantec assisted in, was believed
to have shut down the botnet’s operations. It is believed that
the botnet was made up of 350,000 computers at the time of the takedown. Ramnit disappeared for some time, but a new
variant was observed in December 2015.Cyber crime and
the underground economyBack to Table of ContentsPage 43
ISTR April 2017 06
Ramnit went on to dominate financial Trojans in 2016 and was
detected at a high rate consistently for the whole year. Inter -
estingly, as Ramnit was often distributed via the Angler exploit kit in the past, it did not show any drop in activity following the disappearance of Angler in the middle of the year. This
indicates the actors behind it may have adjusted their infection
techniques, and there were reports of Ramnit being spread
through email in the UK. The fact that some Ramnit variants
self-replicate contributed to its prevalence.
There were reports in 2016 of Bebloh (Trojan.Bebloh ), which
occupies the second spot in the financial Trojans list, under -
taking aggressive campaigns in Japan, targeting small banks
and credit unions. Bebloh also drove a big spike in financial
Trojan activity in September and October. Bebloh was part
of the Avalanche malware-hosting network, which was taken
down in 2016, and saw a sharp drop in activity in November
and December.
Financial Trojan activity by month
The downturn in activity after October 2016 reflects the impact of a number of
high-profile takedowns.
50,000100,000150,000200,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
The alleged hacker behind the Neverquest banking malware,
which Symantec detects as Trojan.Snifula, was also arrested
in January 2017. All these factors could mean the financial Trojans top five could look very different at the end of 2017.
The impact of takedowns, covered in more detail later in this
chapter, is reflected in the downturn in infection numbers
after October 2016. Significant drops in activity from Dridex (which dominated the threat landscape in 2015), Dyre, and
Shylock (Trojan.Shylock ) can all be attributed to takedowns.
Up to the MacApple’s operating system, which was once seen as being
almost impregnable, saw an increasing amount of malware being detected on it over the course of 2016.A steady increase in malware being detected on Macs began in September and continued through the last quarter of the year;
almost three times as many malware detections occurred in
November 2016 compared to the start of the year.
Mac malware distribution per month, 2014-2016
The growth in Mac malware in the second half of 2016 can clearly be seen.
50,000100,000150,000200,000250,000300,000350,000400,000
DEC 16 JUL 16 JAN 16 JUL 15 JAN 15 JUL 14 JAN 14
However, these figures do not necessarily mean that attackers
are increasingly targeting the Mac ecosystem.
Looking more closely at the malware blocked on OS X endpoints,
JavaScript downloaders (JS.Downloader) and Office macro downloaders (W97M.Downloader) are two of the main infection
vectors, accounting for three of the top five. JS.Nemucod, which
delivers Locky ransomware, also features in the top 10.
It’s more likely that Mac users are being caught up in
email campaigns spreading threats using JS.Downloader,
W97M.Downloader, and JS.Nemucod rather than that threat actors are increasingly targeting Mac users.
This is also evident in an uptick in malware detected on Mac in
November and December, a time when an increase in incidents of JS.Downloader and W97M.Downloader also took place.
The other detections that make up the top five, OSX.Malcol and
OSX.Malcol.2, are generic detections that protect against many
individual but varied OS X Trojans.Cyber crime and
the underground economyBack to Table of ContentsPage 44
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Top 10 malware blocked on OS X endpoints as percentage
of total infections
JS.Downloader and W97M.Downloader both feature in the top five for malware blocked on OS X endpoints in 2016.
Rank Detection Total Infections(%)
1 OSX.Malcol 6.88
2 JS.Downloader 5.76
3 OSX.Malcol.2 5.73
4 W97M.Downloader 5.11
5 JS.Downloader.D 1.87
6 JS.Nemucod 1.09
7 VBS.Downloader.B 1.04
8 VBS.Downloader.Trojan 0.83
9 Trojan.Malscript 0.59
10 SMG.Heur!cg1 0.57
Odinaff and Banswift: The year of the targeted financial heist
While the cyber crime threat landscape is typically dominated
by indiscriminate, mass attacks, 2016 saw the emergence
or reemergence of more sophisticated and elite cyber crime
groups. While traditional cyber crime takes a more “smash and grab” approach, the elite criminals leverage techniques
typically seen in advanced targeted attacks. The resources,
patience, and sheer bravado needed to execute these attacks demonstrates how cyber crime is potentially entering a new
era.
The emergence of two groups targeting the inner workings of
the international financial system, while traditional online
banking threats declined, shows how financial institutions are
facing a much different kind of threat in 2017.
Banswift
A cyber heist on Bangladesh’s central bank in early 2016 was one of the most audacious bank heists ever. The criminals
successfully got away with US$81 million and, but for a typo
and the suspicions of eagle-eyed bank officials being raised,
could have made off with $1 billion.
The criminals exploited weaknesses in the Bangladesh Bank’s
security to infiltrate its system and steal the bank’s SWIFT credentials, which allowed them to make the fraudulent trans-
actions. The criminals then used malware to cover their tracks. The
malware was able to doctor the Bangladesh Bank’s printed transaction confirmation messages in order to delay discovery
of the fraud. The attackers also carried out the attack at the
start of a long weekend in Bangladesh, to further reduce the chance of the thefts being discovered.
Using the stolen SWIFT credentials from the Bangladesh Bank,
the criminals made several transfer requests to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for it to transfer the Bangladesh
bank’s money, primarily to locations in the Philippines and
Sri Lanka. Four requests to transfer a total of $81 million to entities in the Philippines successfully went through, but a
request to transfer $20 million to a non-profit “foundation”
in Sri Lanka raised suspicions because foundation was spelled incorrectly. This led to the transfers being suspended and
clarification being sought from Bangladesh, which uncovered
the fraud. However, by then the $81 million had disappeared, primarily into accounts related to casinos in the Philippines.
Most of that $81 million remains unrecovered, however, $15
million was returned by a casino in the Philippines to the Bangladesh Central Bank in November.
The methods used in this attack, in particular the in-depth
knowledge of the SWIFT systems and the steps taken to cover tracks, are indicative of highly proficient actors. This was an
incredibly audacious hack, and was also the first time strong
indications of nation-state involvement in financial cyber crime had been observed. The attack was linked to nation-state
actors in North Korea.
Symantec’s analysis of the malware (Trojan.Banswift ) used
in the attack on the Bangladesh bank found evidence of code
sharing between this malware and tools used by Lazarus—which
the FBI claims has links to the North Korean government. The Lazarus group was associated with the infamous Sony hack in
2014, and has been linked to a string of attacks against the US
and South Korea since 2009.
This same group was also linked to two other bank heists
targeting banks that make transfers using the SWIFT network,
though the SWIFT network itself was not compromised in any of these attacks.
Vietnam’s Tien Phong Bank revealed that it had intercepted
a fraudulent transfer of more than $1 million in the fourth quarter of 2015. Research by Symantec also uncovered
evidence that another bank was targeted by the same group in
October 2015. Cyber crime and
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ISTR April 2017 06
A third bank, Banco del Austro in Ecuador, was also reported
to have lost $12 million to attackers using fraudulent SWIFT
transactions, although no definitive link could be made
between that fraud and the attacks in Asia.
Symantec believes the Lazarus group may have reappeared in
2017 with further attacks against financial institutions.
Odinaff
A campaign involving Trojan.Odinaff was discovered to be
targeting financial organizations worldwide in 2016. The attacks leveraging Odinaff were sophisticated and clearly
carried out by a professional cyber criminal gang. While also
targeting users of SWIFT, there is no evidence linking these attacks with the Banswift attacks.
Symantec research indicates that campaigns using Odinaff
began in January 2016 and were focused on organizations in the banking, securities, trading, and payroll sectors. The
Odinaff Trojan was typically deployed in the first stage of an
attack to gain a foothold on the network.
Attacks involving Odinaff were highly sophisticated, requiring
a large amount of hands-on involvement, with methodical
deployment of a range of lightweight back doors and purpose-built tools onto computers of specific interest.
The Trojan was most commonly deployed in documents
containing malicious macros, while botnets were also used to deploy it. The attacks were carefully managed, with the threat
actors maintaining a low profile on the targeted organization’s
network, only downloading and installing new tools when necessary.
Tools used in the Odinaff attacks bear the hallmarks of the
infamous Carbanak group , which has been targeting the
financial sector since 2013.
Carbanak’s activities were discovered in late 2014 and the
group is believed to have targeted hundreds of banks in multiple countries. Some members of the cyber security community
estimate that they may have stolen up to $1 billion. Symantec
discovered multiple links between Carbanak and the Odinaff attackers, however, the infrastructure crossover is atypical,
meaning Odinaff could be operating in loose cooperation with
Carbanak if it is not part of the wider Carbanak organization.
The Odinaff and Banswift attacks demonstrated that, while
in 2016 many attackers moved back to utilizing existing tools
and techniques, there are still cohorts of extremely sophisti-cated cyber criminals deploying advanced campaigns for big
financial reward. Data breaches and the underground economy
Data breaches
In the last eight years, more than seven billion online identities
have been stolen in data breaches, which is almost the equiva-
lent of one for every person on the planet.
In 2016, more than 1.1 billion identities were stolen in data
breaches, almost double the number stolen in 2015, when just
over 563 million identities were stolen. This is the despite the fact that the number of data breaches actually fell between
2015 and 2016—dropping from 1,211 to 1,209.
The average number of identities stolen per breach in 2016
jumped to almost 1 million—the highest average of the last
three years.
In 2016, there were 15 mega breaches—breaches in which more
than 10 million identities were stolen—an increase from 11 in
2014 and 13 in 2015.
Data breaches, 2014-2016
While the number of data breaches in 2016 remained fairly steady, the number
of identities stolen increased significantly.
Year Breaches Identities stolenAverage per
breachMega
breaches
2014 1523 1,226,138,929 805,081 11
2015 1211 563,807,647 465,572 13
2016 1209 1,120,172,821 926,528 15
Data breaches also hit the headlines in 2016—primarily due
to Yahoo. In September, the company revealed that a breach
in 2014 led to 500 million of its user accounts being compro -
mised. Then, in December, it revealed that in August 2013,
more than 1 billion user accounts were compromised—making
it the largest data breach that has ever been reported.
The company said it believes the two breaches are connected
and that the attacks are state-sponsored. The revelations have
had serious implications for the company, which is in the midst
of being sold to Verizon, and it has seen its value plummet as a result of these revelations.
Year in review
While news of the Yahoo data breaches broke in 2016, they are not included in Symantec’s telemetry for the year, as Symantec
records a data breach when it takes place, rather than when it
is reported.Cyber crime and
the underground economyBack to Table of ContentsPage 46
ISTR April 2017 06
The number of breaches per month in 2016 was highest at the
start of the year and then tapered off towards the end of the
year. This is fairly typical for data breaches as often there is a
gap between a data breach occurring and it being reported, as can clearly be seen in the case of the Yahoo breaches, so data
breaches that took place towards the end of 2016 may not have
been reported yet.
Data breaches per month, 2014-2016
The number of data breaches per month tapered off at the end of 2016. It is
likely that data breaches that occurred in November and December have not yet been reported.
50100150200
DEC 16 JUL 16 JAN 16 JUL 15 JAN 15 JUL 14 JAN 14
Identities stolen by month, 2014-2016
There was a spike in identities stolen in October 2016, which was largely
caused by a breach of Friend Finder Networks.
100200300400500600
DEC 16 JUL 16 JAN 16 JUL 15 JAN 15 JUL 14 JAN 14MILLION
While the number of data breaches tapered off towards the end
of the year, the number of identities stolen peaked in October,
rising to almost 600 million. This surge can be largely attribut -
ed to a data breach of Friend Finder Networks, which exposed the private details of 412 million user accounts.Friend Finder Networks is an adult dating and pornography
site company that operates sites including Adult Friend Finder
and Cams.com, as well as some other smaller websites. It also
ran Penthouse.com, which it sold in February 2016. Despite this, Adult Friend Finder still had Penthouse.com user details
stored and, as a result, these were also exposed in the breach.
The breach saw email addresses, passwords (which were stored
in either plain visible format or SHA1 hashed), dates of last
visits, browser information, IP addresses, and site membership
status exposed. It was the second hack on the organization in just over a year.
Types of data lost in breaches in 2016
Personally Identifiable Information was still the most common form of data to
be lost in 2016, but Personal Financial Information was not far behind.
Type 2015 (%) 2016 (%)Percentage point
difference
Personally Identifiable
Information (PII)54.5 42.9 -11.6
Personal Financial
Information (PFI)32.9 39.2 6.3
Other information 1.6 11.1 9.5
Personal Health
Information (PHI)11.0 6.8 -4.2
Almost 40 percent of information lost in data breaches in 2016
was Personal Financial Information, which could include credit
or debit card details or banking financial records. This figure
increased by more than six percentage points from 2015. Cyber crime and
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ISTR April 2017 06
The exposure of financial data in data breaches is serious as
those affected have a direct risk of financial loss if this data is
exploited.
Data breach causes
Theft of Data was the cause behind the highest percentage
(36 percent) of data breaches in 2016, as it was in 2015. It was followed by Improper Use of Data, Unclassified or Other Cause
(where the cause could not be determined), and Phishing,
Spoofing, or Social Engineering.
Top 10 causes of data breaches in 2016
Theft of Data led the way as the main cause of data breaches in 2016,
accounting for more than a third of breaches.
Rank Cause 2015 (%) 2016 (%)Percentage
point
difference
1 Theft of Data 42.4 36.2 -6.2
2 Improper Use of Data 20.4 19.3 -1.1
3Unclassified or Other
Cause11.9 19.2 7.3
4Phishing, Spoofing, or
Social Engineering21.8 15.8 -6.0
5 Accidental Data Loss 1.7 3.2 1.5
6 Loss or Theft of Device 0.6 3.1 2.5
7IT Errors Leading to
Data Loss0.5 1.6 1.1
8Network Disruption or
DDoS0.3 1.6 1.3
9Extortion, Blackmail, or
Disruption0.1 0.2 0.1
10 Identity Theft or Fraud 0.1 0 -0.1
While Theft of Data is the cause of just over a third of
data breaches when looking at number of breaches, when
measuring by the number of identities stolen, more than 91
percent of breaches fall into this category.Top 10 causes of data breaches by identities stolen in 2016
Theft of Data was responsible for the vast majority of identities stolen in 2016.
Rank Cause 2015 (%) 2016 (%)Percentage
point
difference
1 Theft of Data 85.3 91.6 6.3
2Phishing, Spoofing, or
Social Engineering9.8 6.4 -3.4
3 Accidental Data Loss 1.1 1.0 -0.1
4IT Errors Leading to
Data Loss< 0.1 0.9 0.9
5Network Disruption or
DDoS< 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
6 Improper Use of Data 3.3 < 0.1 -3.3
7 Loss or Theft of Device < 0.1 < 0.1 < -0.1
8Unclassified or Other
Cause0.4 < 0.1 -0.4
9Extortion, Blackmail, or
Disruption< 0.1 < 0.1 < 0.1
10 Identity Theft or Fraud < 0.1 0 < -0.1Cyber crime and
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Industries exposed
Services was the industry most affected by data breaches
during 2016, with almost 45 percent of breaches occurring in
that sector, followed by the Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate sector at 22 percent. This is the same top two as 2015. Looking
at a more detailed breakdown into sub-sectors, the Business
Services industry had the highest percentage of data breaches (24 percent), followed by Health Services (11 percent).
Due to the sensitivity of the information that could be revealed,
there are strict rules about reporting data breaches in the Health Services industry, which would account for it appearing
so high on the list.
Top 10 sectors breached by number of incidents
Services was the industry most affected by data breaches in 2016.
Rank Industry Breaches Percent
1 Services 452 44.2
2 Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 226 22.1
3 Manufacturing 116 11.3
4 Retail Trade 84 8.2
5 Transportation & Public Utilities 75 7.3
6 Wholesale Trade 32 3.1
7 Construction 20 2.0
8 Mining 8 0.8
9 Public Administration 6 0.6
10 Nonclassifiable Establishments 3 0.3Top 10 sub-sectors breached by number of incidents
Business Services was the most affected sub-sector,
followed by Health Services.
Rank Industry Breaches Percent
1 Business Services 248 24.2
2 Health Services 115 11.2
3 Depository Institutions 71 6.9
4 Nondepository Institutions 62 6.1
5 Communications 42 4.1
6 Insurance Carriers 41 4.0
7 Engineering & Management Services 38 3.7
8 Miscellaneous Retail 34 3.3
9 Wholesale Trade - Durable Goods 25 2.4
10 Holding & Other Investment Offices 23 2.2Cyber crime and
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The top 10 sectors and sub-sectors breached by number
of identities stolen largely reflects the above figures, with
Services (90 percent) at the top of the sectors list, and Business
Services (78 percent) top in sub-sectors.
Health Services represents a much smaller percentage when
looking at data breaches by number of identities stolen—it is
ninth on the list of sub-sectors, accounting for less than one percent of identities stolen.
Top 10 sectors breached by number of identities stolen
The Services sector accounted for more than 90 percent of the
identities stolen in 2016
Rank Industry Identities Percent
1 Services 914,382,512 90.1
2 Manufacturing 56,782,089 5.6
3 Retail Trade 13,173,167 1.3
4 Mining 9,758,832 1.0
5 Construction 7,963,470 0.8
6 Transportation & Public Utilities 6,243,712 0.6
7Finance, Insurance, & Real
Estate3,554,225 0.4
8 Wholesale Trade 2,051,635 0.2
9 Public Administration 1,198,971 0.1
10 Nonclassifiable Establishments 685 < 0.1Top 10 sub-sectors breached by number of identities stolen
Business Services was the sub-sector most affected in terms of identities
stolen, accounting for nearly 78 percent.
Rank Industry Identities Percent
1 Business Services 786,918,569 77.5
2 Motion Pictures 85,200,000 8.4
3 Printing & Publishing 49,299,205 4.9
4 Personal Services 27,001,398 2.7
5 Miscellaneous Retail 10,694,512 1.1
6 Coal Mining 9,746,241 1.0
7Engineering & Management
Services8,216,181 0.8
8 Special Trade Contractors 7,932,817 0.8
9 Health Services 6,838,017 0.7
10 Communications 5,304,054 0.5
One interesting feature in the sub-sectors list is the presence
of Motion Pictures in second place with 85.2 million identities
(8 percent) stolen. This figure can be attributed to a single data
breach, the hack of French online video-sharing website Daily-
motion, which falls under the Motion Pictures classification.
The data breach of Dailymotion took place in October, but was
not made public until December. The breach led to the exposure of 85.2 million unique email addresses and user names from the
company’s systems. However, roughly one-fifth of the accounts
exposed had associated passwords that were scrambled with the strong bcrypt hashing function, making them difficult to crack.Cyber crime and
the underground economyBack to Table of ContentsPage 50
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Country data
The United States was at the top of the list for both the number
of breaches by country and the number of identities stolen by
country. This is an unsurprising finding for several reasons. The US has a large population, high adoption of technology,
and a large number of companies based there. There are also
strict legal requirements in the US around reporting data breaches. Data breaches are often underreported in territories
where there are no legal requirements in place.
Top 10 countries by number of data breaches
The United States was the country most heavily affected
by data breaches in 2016
Rank Country Breaches
1 United States 1023
2 United Kingdom 38
3 Canada 19
4 Australia 15
5 India 8
6 Ireland 8
7 Japan 7
8 Israel 6
9 Germany 5
10 Thailand 5Top 10 countries by number of identities stolen
Once again, the United States leads the way in terms of
identities stolen in 2016.
Rank Country Identities
1 United States 791,820,040
2 France 85,312,000
3 Russia 83,500,000
4 Canada 72,016,746
5 Taiwan 30,000,051
6 China 11,344,346
7 South Korea 10,394,341
8 Japan 8,301,658
9 Netherlands 6,595,756
10 Sweden 6,084,276
Looking at identities stolen in the US, one interesting finding
is that the identities were mainly exposed in mega breaches.
Ninety percent of identities stolen in the US were exposed in
just eight mega breaches.
There were only four data breaches in France in 2016, but it
appears in the second spot on the list for identities stolen due
to the previously discussed Dailymotion breach that saw more than 85 million identities stolen.
Similarly, in Russia, two data breaches were responsible for
the bulk of exposed identities. Both breaches occurred at Mail.Ru. One breach revealed 57 million email addresses, while the
second saw 25 million user accounts from an online forum
compromised.Cyber crime and
the underground economyBack to Table of ContentsPage 51
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Underground Economy
While the underground economy is typically associated with
credit card details and stolen personal information, Symantec
researchers observed cyber criminals showing an increasing interest in selling media accounts such as Netflix and Spotify,
with prices ranging from 10 cents to US$10 per account. While
the prices they can charge for these accounts are low, if an attacker has compromised a device it is likely they will have
this account information anyway, so they attempt to sell it on
in an effort to maximize their profits.
The 2016 underground economy has something for everybody:
from accounts for ride-hailing apps such as Uber for $1, to
distributed denial of service (DDoS) services that could cost up to $1,000.
Restaurant gift cards, hotel bookings, and airline frequent flyer
miles were also among the services for sale. Online banking accounts were also for sale, alongside PayPal accounts, and
retail shopping accounts for Amazon and Walmart.
When it came to malware, ransomware toolkits could command
up to $1,800, and were often sold as Crimeware-as-a-Service
(CaaS), while Android banking Trojans were being sold for $200.
Symantec observed an increase in offers for money transfer
services, which were being sold for around 10 percent of their
value, e.g. pay $100 in bitcoins for a money transfer of $1,000.
This indicates that the process of cashing out the stolen money is still the most difficult step in the chain for cyber criminals.
The prices observed, on publicly accessible underground
forums and dark web Tor sites, have remained somewhat stable since 2015. Credit cards are still the most sold digital
good on underground forums.
The prices for credit cards varied greatly depending on the
country they were from (credit cards from the EU being more
expensive than those from the US), the company, the level
(Gold, Platinum, etc), and the extra information provided. Credit cards with full details commanded a higher price than
those without, while if a personal identification number (PIN)
was included, the price could be 10 times higher.Underground marketplace price list
Payment cards Price
Single credit card $0.5 - $30
Single credit card with full details (Fullz) $20 - $60
Dump of magnetic strip track 1&2 & PIN $60 - $100
Malware
Basic banking Trojan kit with support $100
Password stealing Trojan $25 - $100
Android banking Trojan $200
Office macro downloader generator $5
Malware crypter service (make hard to detect) $20 - $40
Ransomware kit $10 - $1800
Services
Media streaming services $0.10 - $10
Hotel reward program accounts (100K points) $10 - $20
Airline frequent flyer miles account (10K miles) $5 - $35
Taxi app accounts with credit $0.5 - $1
Online retail gift cards20% - 65% of face
value
Restaurant gift cards20% - 40% of face
value
Airline ticket and hotel bookings 10% of face value
DDoS service, < 1hr duration, medium target $5 - $20
DDoS service, > 24hr duration, medium &
strong target$10 - $1000
Dedicated bulletproof hosting (per month) $100 - $200
Money transfer services
Cash-out service 10% - 20%
Accounts
Online bank accounts0.5% - 10% of
account balance
Retailer accounts $20 - $50
Cloud service provider accounts $6 - $10
Identities
Identity (Name, SSN & DOB) $0.1 - $1.5
Scanned passports and other documents (e.g. utility bill)$1 - $3Cyber crime and
the underground economyBack to Table of ContentsPage 52
ISTR April 2017 06
The underground marketplace
GIFTGIFT8475 0594 5688 4856
Jane DoeBANKRansomware
toolkit
Gift card Cash-out serviceDDoS short duration
(< 1 hr)Documents
(Passports, utility bills)
Where
everything
has a priceCredit cards Cloud service account Android banking Trojan
$6 – $10 $0.5 – $30 $200$10 –
$1,800$5 – $20 $1 – $3
20%– 40%
(of face value)10%– 20%
(of acct. value)The underground marketplaceCyber crime and
the underground economyBack to Table of ContentsPage 53
ISTR April 2017 06
Disruptions and takedowns
While cyber crime continues to be profitable, there were a
number of significant disruptions, including several high-pro -
file takedowns, which helped put a dent in activity and send out a warning signal.
Avalanche
The Avalanche takedown dealt a severe blow to the cyber
criminal community following the takedown of infrastruc-
ture used by at least 17 malware families. The takedown was
a combined effort by multiple international law enforcement agencies, public prosecutors, and security and IT organizations,
including Symantec. It resulted in the seizure of 39 servers
and several hundred thousand domains that were being used by the criminal organization behind the Avalanche network.
Symantec’s research into the Avalanche network began in 2012
when it published research on ransomware that was predom-inantly targeting German speakers in Germany, Austria, and
parts of Switzerland. At the same time, German police were
carrying out an investigation into the Bebloh malware (Trojan.Bebloh), which featured in Symantec research. Symantec
researchers provided technical assistance to the police inves-
tigation, and these combined efforts eventually led to the discovery of the Avalanche botnet. Avalanche was a massive
operation responsible for controlling a large number of
compromised computers across the world.
The investigation culminated on November 30, 2016, and
resulted in the takedown of infrastructure providing support for
at least 17 different malware families, as well as the arrests of multiple individuals suspected of participating in the operation.
Bayrob
The Bayrob takedown was the culmination of an eight-year
FBI investigation that was assisted by Symantec. It saw the arrest and extradition to the US of three Romanian men who may have stolen up to US$35 million from victims over several
years.
The career cyber criminals behind Bayrob (Trojan.Bayrob )
started out by creating fake online vehicle auctions to con
victims out of tens of thousands of dollars, before diversify-
ing into other fraudulent and malware operations, including credit card theft and cryptocurrency mining.
During its investigation, Symantec discovered multiple
versions of the Bayrob malware, collected intelligence data, and witnessed Bayrob as it morphed from online fraud to a
botnet of over 300,000 computers used for cryptocurrency
mining. Symantec succeeded in exposing the gang’s opera-tions, gaining insight into its key players, tactics, malware, and
the potential impact and criminal activity undertaken.Symantec first wrote about the Bayrob gang in 2007, when
it exposed its highly sophisticated fake motor sales eBay scam. This public attention did not deter the cyber criminals,
however, and the gang continued its criminal activities, carrying out more online auction fraud, as well as diversify-
ing into credit card fraud. It also recruited a network of money
mules in the US and Europe in order to move the proceeds of its scams back to Romania.
In recent years, the group had turned its attention to building
a botnet for cryptocurrency mining, and by 2016 its botnet had grown to more than 300,000 computers.
Over the years, Symantec continuously monitored the
group’s activities, allowing it to keep improving protection for customers, as well as assisting with the FBI’s investigation.
This cooperation eventually led to the arrests in late 2016.
Lurk/Angler
Russian security forces cracked down on the Lurk banking
group in June 2016, arresting 50 people in Moscow.
The Lurk banking Trojan targeted Russian financial institu-
tions and the group behind it is believed to have stolen more
than US$25 million from the accounts of various Russian financial institutions.
These arrests coincided with a drop in activity from a number
of threat groups—including Locky, Dridex, and the Angler
exploit kit. However, while Locky and Dridex experienced a
surge in activity again in the second half of 2016, Angler did
not. This led to speculation that the same people were behind both the Lurk banking Trojan and the Angler exploit kit.
Since the Lurk arrests, Angler has disappeared from the threat
landscape, a development covered in depth in the Web Attacks chapter .
DyreOne of the major takedown stories to break in early 2016
surrounded the Dyre financial fraud Trojan.
Reports emerged in February that a Russian law enforcement
operation in November 2015 coincided with a virtual cessation
in activity around the financial Trojan. Symantec telemetry
confirmed this drop in activity. Dyre (Infostealer.Dyre ) was
spread through email spam campaigns, and no Dyre-relat -
ed spam campaigns have been observed by Symantec since November 18, 2015.
The Dyre takedown was significant because it had grown
to become one of the most active financial fraud tools in
operation. Dyre targeted Windows computers to steal banking and other credentials; it could also be used to infect victims
with other types of malware and add them to spam botnets.Cyber crime and
the underground economyBack to Table of ContentsPage 54
ISTR April 2017 06
Dyre spam campaigns contained a malicious attachment that,
if opened, would install the Upatre downloader (Downloader.
Upatre ) on a victim’s computer. Detections of Upatre hit a high
of more than a quarter of a million in July 2015. Detections of
both Upatre and Dyre dropped sharply after November 2015.
The circumstances surrounding the Dyre takedown are unclear,
with no definitive evidence emerging relating to who or how many people were arrested. Reports in late 2016 claimed that
new banking Trojan Trickbot (Trojan.Trickybot ) was a rewrite
of Dyre. Fidelis researchers said they believed “with moderate
confidence” that one or more of Dyre’s original developers was
involved with Trickbot.
Further reading
|SWIFT attackers’ malware linked to more financial attacks
|Odinaff: New Trojan used in high level financial attacks
|Avalanche malware network hit with law enforcement
takedown
|Bayrob: Three suspects extradited to face charges in US
|PowerShell threats surge: 95.4 percent of analyzed scripts
were malicious
|Necurs: Mass mailing botnet returns with new wave of
spam campaignsBest practices
|Regularly back up any files stored on your computer or any
other devices.
|Always keep your security software up to date, on all your
devices, including mobile, to protect yourself against any new variants of malware.
|Keep your operating system and other software updated.
Software updates will frequently include patches for newly discovered security vulnerabilities that could be
exploited by attackers.
|Delete any suspicious-looking emails you receive,
especially if they contain links or attachments.
|Be extremely wary of any Microsoft Office email
attachment that advises you to enable macros to view
its content. Unless you are absolutely sure that this is
a genuine email from a trusted source, do not enable macros and instead immediately delete the email.
|On mobile devices, refrain from downloading apps from
unfamiliar sites and only install apps from trusted
sources. Also, pay close attention to the permissions
requested by apps.
|Make sure passwords you use for your online accounts
are unique and strong. Do not reuse passwords across
multiple accounts, and enable two-factor authentication
if available.
|Sign up to alerts from your bank so that you will be alerted
if any suspicious transactions are made on your account.Internet Security Threat Report
Ransomware:
Extorting businesses
& consumers
07SectionRansomware: Extorting
businesses and consumersBack to Table of ContentsPage 56
ISTR April 2017 07
Introduction
During 2016, ransomware was one of the most
significant threats facing both individuals and organizations. Attackers have honed and perfected
the ransomware business model, using strong
encryption, anonymous Bitcoin payments, and vast spam campaigns to create dangerous and wide-ranging malware. The increasing number of new
ransomware families signals that more and more
attackers are jumping on the bandwagon. While consumers in particular (69 percent of all infections) are at risk from ransomware, this year saw evidence
that ransomware attackers may be branching out
and developing even more sophisticated attacks, such as targeted ransomware attacks on businesses
that involved initial compromise and network
traversal leading to the encryption of multiple machines. Ransomware looks set to continue to be a major source of concern globally in 2017.
Key findings
|Due to its prevalence and destructiveness, ransomware
remained the most dangerous cyber crime threat facing
consumers and businesses in 2016.
|The average ransom amount has shot upwards, jumping
266 percent from US$294 in 2015 to $1,077. Attackers clearly think that there’s more to be squeezed from
victims.
|Detections of ransomware increased by 36 percent in
2016.
Trends & analysis
The number of detections of ransomware increased by 36 percent during 2016, from 340,000 in 2015 to 463,000 during
2016. The daily rate of antivirus detections for ransomware
also increased during 2016, averaging at approximately 846 per day at the beginning of the year and rising to more than
1,539 a day at year end.
It is important to note that these detection figures represent
a small fraction of the total amount of ransomware being
blocked by Symantec, with the majority of attacks being
blocked earlier in the infection process. Ransomware is spread in a number of different ways and,
generally speaking, the infection process involves a number
of different stages at which the attack can be blocked. For example, in the case of ransomware distributed via email,
most attacks (hundreds of thousands per day) are blocked by
anti-spam defenses. Most ransomware emails come with a downloader hidden in a malicious attachment. The downloader
is used to download and install the ransomware on the victim’s
computer and a significant number of attacks are blocked at this stage, before the ransomware can be downloaded to the
target’s computer.
In the case of web attacks, a significant number of ransomware
attacks are performed using exploit kits, malicious web pages
designed to exploit vulnerabilities on the victim’s computer
to install malware. A large number of ransomware attacks are blocked at exploit kit stage, before the ransomware can be
installed on the victim’s computer.
In addition to attacks which are blocked early in the infection
process, ransomware is often detected and blocked by generic
detection technologies, which identify malicious behavior
common to malware.
While antivirus detections of ransomware amount to a small
percentage of the overall number of attacks, the notable
uptick in detections during the year suggests that ransomware activity increased during 2016.
Average global ransomware detections per day
Ransomware antivirus detections increased by 36 percent compared to 2015,
rising from an average of 933 per day in 2015 to 1,270 per day in 2016.
0
3006009001,2001,500
2016 20159331,271Ransomware: Extorting
businesses and consumersBack to Table of ContentsPage 57
ISTR April 2017 07
Global ransomware detections by month
Ransomware antivirus detections by month increased over the course of 2016
averaging at approximately 35,000 per month at the beginning of the year and rising to more than 40,000 per month by the end of the year.
0
10,00020,00030,00040,00050,00060,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
With more than a third of all infections logged in 2016, the US
continues to be the region most affected by ransomware. Japan
(nine percent), Italy (seven percent), Canada (four percent),
and India (four percent) are also heavily affected. European nations such as the Netherlands (three percent), Russia (three
percent), Germany (three percent), and the UK (three percent)
figure highly in infection statistics. The other country to figure in the top 10 is Australia (three percent).
The statistics indicate that attackers are largely concentrating
their efforts on developed, stable economies.
Ransomware detections by country
Ransomware antivirus detections by country, 2016. The US continues to be the
region where ransomware is most prevalent.
United Kingdom 3%
Australia 3%Germany 3%Russia 3%Netherlands 3%India 4%Canada 4%Italy 7%Japan 9%
United
States
34%
Other
Countries
27%
The number of new ransomware families emerging shot up
during 2016. With 30 new families appearing each year for
2014 and 2015, the number more than tripled to 98 in 2016. The trend suggests that more and more attackers are now
jumping on the ransomware bandwagon and creating new
ransomware families or modifying existing ones.New ransomware families
New ransomware families discovered by year. The number more than tripled
to 98 in 2016, suggesting more and more attackers are now jumping on the ransomware bandwagon.
20406080100
2016 2015 201430 3098
The number of ransomware variants (i.e. distinct variants
of ransomware families) was down year-on-year, falling by
29 percent from 342,000 in 2015 to 241,000 in 2016. That
downward trend was reflected in monthly numbers of new ransomware variants, where the average number fell from
more than 20,000 in January to below 20,000 by year-end.
The number of new variants is another indicator of overall
ransomware activity, where attackers will create new variants
of their threats in the hope of evading detection. The fall in the
number of variants could be explained when put alongside the major increase in new ransomware families in 2016. It suggests
that more attackers are opting to start with a clean slate by
creating a new family of ransomware rather than tweaking existing families by creating new variants.
New ransomware variants
New ransomware variants (number of unique, individual examples) by year. The
number of new variants fell by 29 percent from 342,000 in 2015 to 241,000 in 2016.
0
50100150200250300350400
2016 2015 201468,000342,000
241,000THOUSANDRansomware: Extorting
businesses and consumersBack to Table of ContentsPage 58
ISTR April 2017 07
Ransomware variants by month
New ransomware variants by month. The average number fell from more than
20,000 in January 2016 to below 20,000 by year-end.
0
5,00010,00015,00020,00025,00030,00035,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
The majority of ransomware infections during 2016 occurred
on consumer computers (69 percent). This is marginally up
from 2015, when the proportion of ransomware infections
occurring on consumer computers was 67 percent.
The proportion of consumer infections vs infections in enter -
prises and other organizations remained relatively stable for
much of 2016, with consumer infections accounting for between 59 percent and 79 percent each month. The sole exception was
December 2016, when there was near parity, with the propor -
tion of consumer infections falling to 51 percent.
Consumer vs enterprise infections
Enterprise versus consumer ransomware infections. The majority of
ransomware infections during 2016 occurred on consumer computers. The proportion of consumer infections (69 percent) was only marginally up from 2015, when it was 67 percent.
0
102030405060708090100%
2016 201567%
33%31%69%Consumer EnterpriseConsumer vs enterprise infections by month
The proportion of consumer infections vs infections in enterprises and other
organizations remained relatively stable for much of 2016.
10,00020,00030,00040,00050,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANConsumer Enterprise
Case studies/investigations
How ransomware can affect consumers
There are now hundreds of different ransomware families,
which are spread through a variety of methods, but the most
active ransomware threats seen in 2016 were usually spread
via email. In many cases, the victim would receive a spam email
designed to appear like an invoice or receipt from a company. The email would be written in a way to lure the recipient into
opening a malicious attachment, e.g. “Here is the details for
you recent purchase, for more details see the attached receipt.”
Opening the attachment can set in train the process of
infection. It can run a small piece of malware, known as a
downloader, which will download the ransomware and install it on the victim’s computer. Once installed, the ransomware
will then begin encrypting a pre-programmed range of files on
the computer (either files in certain folders or files with certain extensions or both). Most newer ransomware families employ
strong encryption, meaning the victim has no hope of opening
encrypted files without an encryption key.
Often the victim will be unaware of anything untoward until
a ransom message is displayed on their screen. The message
will usually explain what has happened to the victim’s files and how the ransom can be paid, which is often done via websites
on the anonymous Tor network.
How ransomware can affect businesses
Most ransomware threats are indiscriminate and the infection
experience is similar for businesses and consumers. However, a
small number of groups have begun to specifically target busi-nesses with ransomware attacks designed to infect multiple
computers on a single network and encrypt valuable data.Ransomware: Extorting
businesses and consumersBack to Table of ContentsPage 59
ISTR April 2017 07
In the case of SamSam (Ransom.SamSam ) the attackers’ initial
point of entry was a public-facing web server. They exploited
an unpatched vulnerability to compromise the server and get
a foothold on the victim’s network. From there, the attackers used multipurpose tools such as Microsoft Sysinternals to
traverse the victim’s network. This enabled them to map
every accessible computer on the organization’s network and identify the most valuable assets.
The attackers then used a batch script called f.bat to deploy
SamSam and a public encryption key on each computer. The script also deleted volume shadow copies from the computers,
which prevented any files from being restored from them
following infection. They next distributed a tool called sqlsrvtmg1.exe. This executable searched for any running
backup processes and stopped them. It also deleted any back-
up-related files it found.
The last stage was the distribution of another batch script
called reg.bat. This initiated the encryption process on each
infected computer. SamSam is configured to encrypt hundreds of different file types. Once the encryption finished, the
ransomware deleted itself, leaving the encrypted files and a
ransom note on the desktop. The note instructed the victim to visit a website and pay a ransom of 1.5 Bitcoin (US$1,587 at
the time of writing) for each compromised computer.
Ransom demands soar
The mean average ransom demanded by attackers increased
dramatically during 2016. After declining slightly during 2015, the average ransom demand seen in new families discov-
ered in 2016 rose from $294 to $1,077.
The increase in the average ransom demand was, in part,
affected by the highest ransom seen during 2016, an unusually
high $28,730, which was demanded by the MIRCOP ransom-
ware (Ransom.Mircop ). However, even if MIRCOP were
excluded, the mean average ransom would still have more than
doubled to $678. Attackers clearly think there is more to be
squeezed from victims.
According to research carried out by the Norton Cyber Security
Insight team, 34 percent of victims will pay the ransom. This
proportion rises to 64 percent of victims in the US, providing some indication as to why the country is so heavily targeted.
Willingness to pay the ransom has to be a major reason for the
increase in ransom demands.
Ransom payment has also become easier to manage. To
encourage victims to pay, attackers often now offer support
on how to pay the fee—and the wider availability of payment broker services makes it even easier to use Bitcoin—especially
now that Bitcoin is not as obscure as it used to be.However, paying the ransom doesn’t guarantee decryption
of the victim’s files. According to the Norton Cyber Security
Insight team, only 47 percent of victims who paid the ransom
reported getting their files back.
Average ransom demand
The average mean ransom demand seen in new families discovered in 2016
rose from $294 to $1,077.
0
$200$400$600$800$1,000$1,200
2016 2015 2014$1,077
$373$294
Attackers have also become more creative in their attempts
to extract more from victims, with several newer ransomware
families featuring variable ransom demands. For example,
Cerber (Ransom.Cerber ) will double its ransom demand from
1.25 bitcoin (US$1,255) to 2.5 bitcoin after five days if the
ransom remains unpaid.
There is also some evidence that ransomware attackers have
begun tailoring their ransom demands on the basis of the type
and volume of data they have encrypted. The attackers behind
HDDCryptor (Ransom.HDDCryptor ) reportedly demanded
$70,000 following an attack on San Francisco’s Municipal
Transportation Agency , which resulted in disruption of the
city’s light rail service (these “custom” ransom demands aren’t
factored into our calculations for average ransom amounts).
Infection vectors
Ransomware is spread using multiple infection vectors. One of
the most common vectors used is spam emails, with some of
the most widespread threats of 2016, such as Locky (Ransom.Locky ), being distributed in this fashion.
Widescale spam runs, some consisting of millions of emails, occur almost daily and are powered by botnets—networks of compromised computers, ranging from hundreds to millions
of computers. Most campaigns use social engineering tricks to
lure recipients into opening emails and attachments, such as disguising the email as an invoice or a shipping notification. Ransomware: Extorting
businesses and consumersBack to Table of ContentsPage 60
ISTR April 2017 07
Major ransomware threats
Locky Cerber CryptXXX
$965 $1,200 $500
Discovery:
One of the most widely
spread ransomware threats in 2016
Spread via massive email
campaigns powered by Necurs botnet
Significant drop in Locky
prevalence in early 2017 due to reduction in Necurs activity since late December 2016 Very widespread in late 2016 as a result of extensive email and RIG exploit kit campaigns
Email campaigns primarily
use JavaScript and Office macro downloaders but may also be attached as a zip file Disappearance of Angler in early June 2016 prompted a drop in activity
Reemerged in early 2017
delivered via Neutrino exploit kit
Early variants used weak
encryption which could be broken. Newer versions employ stronger encryption, making decryption impossible Email campaigns
Neutrino exploit kit Nuclear exploit kit RIG exploit kit Email campaigns RIG exploit kit Magnitude exploit kit Angler exploit kit Neutrino exploit kit
Spread through:February 2016 March 2016 April 2016Approx. Ransom:
Major ransomware threatsRansomware: Extorting
businesses and consumersBack to Table of ContentsPage 61
ISTR April 2017 07
The most common infection method involves a malicious
attachment that contains a downloader—usually a
JavaScript downloader ( JS.Downloader ) or Word Macro down-
loader (W97M.Downloader )—which subsequently downloads
and installs the ransomware. In some cases, no download-er is used and the malicious attachment directly installs the
ransomware. In others, the spam email will contain a link that points to an exploit kit which will lead to the ransomware
being installed on the recipient’s computer. Some links do not
lead to an exploit kit and instead lead directly to a downloader or ransomware payload.
Exploit kits by themselves are another major infection vector
and have been utilized to spread major ransomware threats such as Cerber (Ransom.Cerber ) and CryptXXX (Ransom.
CryptXXX). Exploit kit attackers usually compromise third-party web servers and insert malicious code into the web pages hosted on them. This enables them to direct browsers to
the exploit kit servers.
Aside from links distributed via spam campaigns or social
media posts, attackers can use a number of other methods
for redirecting traffic to exploit kit servers, such as malicious
advertisements (known as malvertising) or redirecting traffic from traffic distribution services.
Exploit kits rely on exploiting vulnerabilities. Users running
outdated or unpatched software are at most risk. Users with up-to-date software will only be exposed in cases where a
zero-day vulnerability is used by an exploit kit. At the end of
2016, Symantec was blocking around 388,000 attacks per day from exploit kits.
While spam campaigns and exploit kits are the main infection
vectors, a number of other tactics have also been used to spread ransomware, including:
| Secondary infections: In some cases malware that has
already infected a computer can be used to download
more malware, including ransomware. A case in point was
the original CryptoLocker ransomware, with some victims reportedly infected following earlier infection from one of
several botnets.
| Brute-forcing passwords: Some families of ransomware
are spread through brute-forcing login credentials for software used on servers. One example is Bucbi (Ransom.
Bucbi), which uses this method to gain a foothold on remote desktop protocol (RDP) servers. | Exploiting server vulnerabilities: A number of
ransomware groups have targeted vulnerable software
running on servers to gain access to an organization’s
network. The group behind the SamSam ransomware (Ransom.SamSam ) finds and exploits vulnerabilities to
spread their malware through a network.
| Self-propagation: While a few Android ransomware
display worm-like behavior by spreading to all contacts
via SMS, 2016 saw the first Windows ransomware to
use self-propagation. ZCryptor (W32.ZCrypt ) infects all
removable drives with a copy of itself before it begins
encrypting, increasing its chances of spreading to other
computers.
| Third-party app stores: Some mobile ransomware may be
spread via untrusted third-party app stores. One example
is Android.Lockdroid.E, which poses as a pornographic
video player on third-party app stores.
Arrival of Ransomware-as-a-ServiceOne factor that may have influenced the increase in ransomware activity during 2016 was the advent of Ransom-
ware-as-a-Service (RaaS). This involves malware developers
creating ransomware kits, which can be used to easily create and customize their new ransomware variants. The developers
usually provide the kits to attackers in exchange for a percent -
age of the proceeds.
One example of RaaS is Shark (Ransom.SharkRaaS), which
emerged during 2016. Shark is distributed through its own
website and allows users to customize the ransom amount and which files it encrypts. Payment is automated and sent
directly to Shark’s creators, who retain 20 percent and send
the remainder on to the attackers.
New techniques: Targeted attacks and “living off the land”
While ransomware attacks to date have been largely indiscrim-inate, there is evidence that attackers have a growing interest
in hitting organizations with targeted attacks. Although rela-
tively small in number compared to the mass-mailed threats, these can be devastating for organizations affected, with
potentially hundreds of computers encrypted.
One of the most dangerous examples of this new breed of
targeted attacks is SamSam (Ransom.SamSam ). SamSam
targets servers running older, unpatched community versions of JBoss Application Server , with the attackers using freely
available tools, such as the open-source testing tool JexBoss, to
identify vulnerable servers. Ransomware: Extorting
businesses and consumersBack to Table of ContentsPage 62
ISTR April 2017 07
Once they have compromised one server, the attackers may
steal credentials and use a number of publicly available tools,
such as Microsoft Sysinternals utilities, to traverse the victim’s
network. When computers suitable for infection are identified, the attackers use a batch script to deploy SamSam and a public
encryption key on each computer. The script also deletes
Volume Shadow Copies from the computers, which prevents any files from being restored following infection. They also
search for any running backup processes and stop them, in
addition to deleting any backup related files they find.
The techniques used in the SamSam attacks are more
commonly seen in cyber espionage campaigns and indicate
the level of expertise available to some ransomware groups. Although more difficult to perform, these kinds of targeted
attacks could potentially infect thousands of computers in an
affected organization, causing massive disruption.
Other platforms now vulnerable
To date, ransomware attackers have largely focused on Windows users, however the breadth of platforms under threat has begun
to grow. A number of Android threats have emerged including
one crypto-ransomware for Android—the Russian-language Simplocker ( Android.Simplocker ) and its English-language
variant ( Android.Simplocker.B). Mobile devices are not the only
Android devices that are potentially vulnerable to ransomware. Research by Symantec found that SmartTVs running Android
could potentially be affected as well.
During 2016, a threat known as KeRanger ( OSX.Keranger )
became the first widespread ransomware to target Mac users.
KeRanger was briefly distributed in a compromised version of
the installer for the Transmission BitTorrent client.
Aside from threats designed specifically for one operating
system, a number of ransomware variants are created in
JavaScript, meaning they can infect multiple platforms, such as Ransom.Nemucod and Ransom.Ransom32.
Law enforcement takedowns
There were a number of law enforcement operations affecting
some of the smaller ransomware groups during 2016. In
August, Dutch police seized command and control (C&C) infra-structure belonging to the WildFire group (Ransom.Zyklon ).
In December, Symantec assisted in a takedown operation against the Avalanche malware-hosting network . The
operation resulted in the seizure of 39 servers and several
hundred thousand domains that were being used by the
criminal organization to spread at least 17 malware families, including the Trojan.Ransomlock.P ransomware. Further reading
|Ransomware and Business 2016
|Locky ransomware on aggressive hunt for victims
|KeRanger: First Mac OS X ransomware emerges
|SamSam may signal a new trend of targeted ransomware
Best practices
|New ransomware variants appear on a regular basis.
Always keep your security software up to date to protect
yourself against ransomware.
|Keep your operating system and other software updated.
Software updates will frequently include patches for newly discovered security vulnerabilities that could be
exploited by ransomware attackers.
|Email is one of the main infection methods. Delete any
suspicious-looking email you receive, especially if they
contain links and/or attachments.
|Be extremely wary of any Microsoft Office email
attachment that advises you to enable macros to view its content. Unless you are absolutely sure that this is
a genuine email from a trusted source, do not enable macros and instead immediately delete the email.
|Backing up important data is the single most effective
way of combating ransomware infection. Attackers have
leverage over their victims by encrypting valuable files
and leaving them inaccessible. If the victim has backup copies, they can restore their files once the infection has
been cleaned up.
|Using cloud services could help mitigate ransomware
infection, since many retain previous versions of files, allowing you to “roll back” to the unencrypted form.Internet Security Threat Report
New frontiers:
Internet of Things,
mobile, & cloud threats
08SectionNew Frontiers: IoT,
mobile, & cloud threatsBack to Table of ContentsPage 64
ISTR April 2017 08
While attacks against traditional desktops
and servers have dominated the threat
landscape in terms of numbers, there are
other platforms being actively targeted or that are ripe for targeting by threat actors.
The widespread use of mobile devices and the
mainstream adoption of cloud and Internet
of Things (IoT) technologies has opened up whole new platforms and users for attackers
to target, and in 2016 a number of emerging
threats against these three increasingly
high-profile areas could be observed.
Internet of Things
The rapid increase in profile of the security of IoT devices in 2016 didn’t come as a total bolt from the
blue. Symantec warned about the “insecurity of the Internet of Things” in the 2015 ISTR. However,
it would have been hard to predict the level of
attention IoT and its security, or lack thereof, would receive in the last quarter of 2016.
The reason for such attention comes down to
one word: Mirai. The Mirai botnet, which is
made up of IoT devices, was used in a number of high-profile distributed denial of service
(DDoS) attacks towards the end of 2016.
It is difficult to definitively state how many
Mirai-infected devices are out there, but many figures quoted are quite staggering. Incapsula
research uncovered almost 50,000 unique IPs
hosting Mirai-infected devices attempting to launch attacks on its network. Level 3 said it had
identified approximately 493,000 Mirai bots:
213,000 before the source code was released, and 280,000 in the last few months of 2016.
Symantec established an IoT honeypot in late
2015 to track attack attempts against IoT devices.
Data gathered from this honeypot shows how IoT attacks are gathering steam and how IoT devices are firmly in the sights of attackers. Key findings
|Attacks on Symantec’s Internet of Things honeypot
almost doubled from January to December 2016. An
average of almost 4.6 unique IP addresses were hitting
the honeypot every hour in January, but this increased to an average of just over 8.8 in December. At times of peak
activity, when Mirai was expanding rapidly, attacks on the
honeypot were taking place every two minutes.
|In 2016, IoT devices were responsible for the biggest
DDoS attack ever seen. The attack on the French hosting
company OVH, which peaked at 1 Tbps, was the largest
DDoS attack ever recorded. It was primarily driven by the Mirai botnet.
|Default passwords are still the biggest security weakness
for IoT devices. The password most commonly tried by
attackers is “admin.”
Trends and analysis
What is the IoT? Many people picture smart thermostats and
virtual assistants that will respond to voice commands, but the
IoT is primarily composed of commonly used devices. Home
routers, DVRs, and internet-connected cameras—which all make up part of the IoT—were the devices most targeted by the
Mirai botnet.
A botnet is a “zombie army” of internet-connected devices,
infected with malicious software and controlled as a group
without their owners’ knowledge. The attacker can use the
controlled devices to carry out malicious activities such as DDoS attacks or spam campaigns. IoT devices are an attractive
target for botnets for three reasons:
01 Security is often not a priority for the device manufactur -
er. This leads to poor practices such as the use of default passwords and open ports, which the users do not, or can-
not, change.
02 They typically don’t have built-in mechanisms to receive automatic firmware updates, resulting in vulnerabilities
being left unpatched.
03 They are often forgotten about once installed. This means
that their owners are unaware when devices are being used
for malicious purposes and have little incentive to apply
firmware updates.
While Mirai’s sole purpose appears to be DDoS attacks,
malware on a wireless router could conceivably lead to
personal information—including user names, passwords, and financial data—being stolen. Infected IoT devices could also be New Frontiers: IoT,
mobile, & cloud threatsBack to Table of ContentsPage 65
ISTR April 2017 08
used as a stepping-stone to attack other devices in a private
network. It could also mean that a device belonging to you
could participate in a global botnet that plays a role in taking
down websites or services.
Symantec established an IoT honeypot in 2015 to observe
attacks against IoT devices. The honeypot appears as an open
router and attempts to connect to the system are logged for analysis. Between January and December 2016, the number of
unique IP addresses targeting the honeypot almost doubled.
In January, the average number of unique IPs scanning the
honeypot every hour stood at almost 4.6. In December, that
figure had grown to an average of just over 8.8. Most of the IPs
hitting the honeypot are other IoT devices.
Hourly attacks on the IoT honeypot per month
The growth in hourly attacks on the Symantec honeypot from January to
December can be clearly observed, almost doubling over the course of the year.
12345678910
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANWhile there was a slight downward trend from July to October,
incidents of attacks swung sharply upwards in November and
December. The source code for the Mirai botnet was made
public on the last day of September, which was likely to have had some influence on this increase.
The source code for Mirai was revealed on a hacking forum
by an individual with the user name Anna-senpai. It is not possible to definitively say who is behind Mirai, but security
journalist Brian Krebs, one of the first victims of the botnet,
wrote a lengthy article about his investigation into the identity
of Anna-senpai.
A large-scale attack on DNS provider Dyn, which took place
on October 21, received extensive media attention and raised Mirai’s profile. It demonstrated how easy it was to create a large
botnet and disrupt major websites. The perpetrators of the
Dyn attack have not been identified, but it is widely believed they were “script kiddies” (wannabe hackers with few skills)
rather than a sophisticated hacking group. The Dyn attack also
revealed the existence of Mirai to the world at large, and there were subsequent media reports of so-called “skids” asking for
tutorials on hacking forums so they could learn how to use the
Mirai source code.
Country data
Analysis of honeypot data also meant it was possible to determine the countries from which attacks on the honeypot
were initiated.
Top 10 countries where attacks on the Symantec IoT honeypot were initiated
United
States
17.7%Russian
Federation
5.8%China
26.5%
Japan
2.3%Netherlands
3.0%Ukraine
2.5%
United
Kingdom
2.1%France
2.5%Vietnam
3.8%Germany
4.9%
Others
28.8%
Top 10 countries where attacks on the Symantec IoT honeypot were initiatedNew Frontiers: IoT,
mobile, & cloud threatsBack to Table of ContentsPage 66
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China (26.5 percent) and the US (17.7 percent) dominated when
it came to attacks, with Russia (5.8 percent), Germany (4.9
percent), and Vietnam (3.8 percent) rounding out the top five.
These metrics measure the countries in which the IP address
of the attacking device was based, but this doesn’t necessarily
mean the attackers themselves were based in these countries.
Passwords
Analysis of the passwords used by IoT malware to attempt to
log into devices yielded unsurprising results, revealing that
the default user names and passwords of IoT devices are often
never changed.
There are many reasons for this. A number of IoT devices
have hardcoded user names and passwords that can’t easily
be changed. Many users are likely unaware of the dangers of
default credentials and are therefore unlikely to change them.
Traditional best practice dictates that users should have a
unique user name and password combination for all their
IoT devices, as is recommended for online accounts. However, unless manufacturers and providers implement changes that
force users to select a unique password, then passwords are
likely to continue to be a security weak point.
Top 10 passwords used to attempt to log in to the
Symantec IoT honeypot
Default passwords dominated the list of top 10 passwords used to log into the Symantec honeypot.
abc123 1.8%
test 2.0%admin123 2.3%1234 5.6%password 7.2%ubnt 7.5%
12345 10.1%admin
36.5%
123456 10.7% root
16.3%
“Admin” (37 percent) and “root” (16 percent) dominate the
list of passwords used to attempt to log in to the Symantec
honeypot, with the usual suspects of “123456,” “12345,”
“1234,” and “password” also featuring. The default password for the Ubiquiti brand of routers, “ubnt,” also features in
the top 10. It is likely Ubiquiti routers were targeted because it was revealed in May 2016 that an old vulnerability in the routers allowed worms targeting embedded devices to spread
across thousands of Ubiquiti Networks routers running
outdated firmware.
While Ubiquiti released a firmware update in mid-2016 that
patched this vulnerability, the worm was still able to exploit the weakness in cases where the firmware update had not been
downloaded.
The Mirai botnet
Mirai first came to public attention in September when, as
mentioned above, the botnet was used for a huge DDoS attack
on Brian Krebs’ website. That attack peaked at 620 Gbps,
making it the biggest DDoS attack ever reported at that time. However, a few days later, reports emerged about an earlier attack on French hosting company OVH that was reported to
have peaked at 1 Tbps.
However, it was a DDoS attack on DNS company Dyn in October
that put Mirai on the front page. The attack on Dyn disrupted
many of the world’s leading websites, including Netflix,
Twitter, and PayPal.
The attack showed how powerful a DDoS attack using IoT
devices could be and raised questions about what it might
mean if attackers decided to target industrial control systems or critical national infrastructure.
Mirai works by continuously scanning for IoT devices that are
accessible over the internet and protected by factory default or hardcoded user names and passwords. It then infects them
with malware that forces them to report to a central control
server, turning them into a bot that can be used in DDoS attacks. There are also at least 17 other IoT malware families
that are actively compromising devices.
With Gartner predicting that there will be more than 20 billion
IoT devices in the world by 2020, it’s important that security
problems be addressed or campaigns like Mirai could be seen
on an even larger scale. Additionally, the profile of IoT devices is likely to change. As connected cars and connected medical
devices become more commonplace, attacker motives are also
likely to change.
Attacks using IoT devices also lower the barriers to entry for
cyber criminals. There is much less security for attackers to
overcome when trying to take over an IoT device. Unlike a
desktop computer or laptop, which will typically have security
software installed and receive automatic security updates, an IoT device’s only protection may be an easily guessed default
user name and password. Currently, the poor security on IoT
devices is just making life easier for cyber criminals.New Frontiers: IoT,
mobile, & cloud threatsBack to Table of ContentsPage 67
ISTR April 2017 08
An evolving story
The source code for Mirai was made publicly available at the
end of September. As mentioned, it was posted to HackForums
by a user with the handle Anna-senpai on September 30. As expected, the revelation of the source code resulted in the
creation of other Mirai variants.
In late November, a variant of Mirai crippled internet access for
nearly 1 million home internet users in Germany. This variant
attacked a number of routers where TCP port 7547 was acces-
sible remotely on the device, while also exploiting a weakness in the CPE WAN Management Protocol. Similar routers used
by Irish company Eir were also believed to have been vulnera-
ble to the same attack.
With this first variant appearing less than two months after
the source code was made public, it would be reasonable to
assume that it is just the tip of what could be a very large iceberg.
Looking forward
The number of IoT devices will continue to grow and this may lead to increased calls for regulation of the IoT industry as
the only way to deal with the security problem. If regulation
becomes a possibility, the next question will be whether it would be best applied at the industry level or the government
level.
The DDoS attack on US-headquartered Dyn, which was carried
out primarily using webcams produced by Chinese electron-
ics firm XiongMai Technologies, emphasizes the difficulty of
regulating IoT devices.
Though there is no one way to fix a complex problem like this,
risk-based baseline security standards are part of the solution.
Individual nation states should consider minimum security regulation, in particular for critical uses, to ensure that
security is a core consideration in the design and manufacture
of IoT devices. Of course, manufacturers should take the lead role in the security of the products that they are sending to market. They should provide consumers a level of transparency in
the security of IoT devices so that consumers can make an
informed decision on purchases. This also allows security to become an inherent feature of a device, which would allow
premium manufacturers to differentiate their products based
on security.
Whatever happens, IoT security is likely to continue to be
much discussed in 2017.
Best practices
|Research the capabilities and security features of an IoT
device before purchase.
|Perform an audit of IoT devices used on your network.
|Change the default credentials on devices. Use strong and
unique passwords for device accounts and Wi-Fi networks.
Don’t use common or easily guessable passwords such as
“123456” or “password.”
|Use a strong encryption method when setting up Wi-Fi
network access (WPA2).
|Many devices come with a variety of services enabled
by default. Disable features and services that are not
required.
|Disable Telnet login and use SSH where possible.
|Modify the default privacy and security settings of IoT
devices according to your requirements.
|Disable or protect remote access to IoT devices when not
needed.
|Use wired connections instead of wireless where possible.
|Regularly check the manufacturer’s website for firmware
updates.
|Ensure that a hardware outage does not result in an
unsecure state of the device.19 Mirai botnet
launches DDoS attack
against hosting
provider OVH that
peaks at 1 Tbps.30 Mirai source code is
released on online hacking community
HackForums. 27 Mirai botnet exploits
vulnerability in home routers used
by Deutsche Telekom customers that results in almost one million
home users being taken of/uniFB02ine. 21 Attack against DNS
provider Dyn blocks access to
several popular websites such
as Net/uniFB02ix, Twitter, and PayPal.
24 Hangzhou Xiongmai Technology Co recalls a number of
devices believed to have been used as part of the Mirai botnet. 20 Mirai botnet launches DDoS attack against
krebsonsecurity.com that peaks at 620 Gbps.SEPTEMBER OCTOBER NOVEMBERMirai’s trail of disruption in 2016
Mirai’s trail of disruption in 2016New Frontiers: IoT,
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ISTR April 2017 08
Mobile
Symantec has continued to observe an increase in
malicious activity related to mobile devices, driven
by cyber criminals using tried and trusted methods
to monetize attacks. Android continues to be the most targeted mobile platform. However, following an explosive year in 2015, the rate of growth in
attacks against Android has slowed for the first time
in 2016 as attackers consolidate their activities and contend with improved security architectures.
Key findings
|The Android operating system remains the main focus for
mobile threat actors. However, security improvements in
Android’s architecture have made it increasingly difficult
to infect mobile phones or to capitalize on successful infections.
|Attacks on the iOS operating system are still relatively
rare. However, three zero-day vulnerabilities in iOS were exploited in targeted attacks to infect phones with the Pegasus malware in 2016.
|The overall volume of malicious Android apps increased
significantly in 2016, growing by 105 percent. However,
this rate of growth has slowed when compared with
the previous year, when the number of malicious apps increased by 152 percent.
|Symantec blocked 18.4 million mobile malware infections
in total in 2016. Data from Symantec-protected mobile
devices shows that 1 in 20 devices will have experienced
an attempted infection in 2016. Similar levels were observed in 2015.
Mobile malware trends
Overall threat detections on mobile devices, including data from Symantec cloud technologies, doubled in 2016, resulting
in 18.4 million mobile malware detections in 2016. However, the
increase of 105 percent in 2016 was significantly smaller than the 152 percent increase in the previous year, despite the growth in
smartphone adoption. This is an indication that there is a transition occurring from a period of explosive growth in the mobile threat landscape, to a phase where attackers are consol-
idating their activities while coming to grips with the security
measures implemented on Android. Number of overall mobile malware detections per year
Symantec observed 18.4 million mobile malware detections in total in 2016, an
increase of 105 percent on 2015.
5101520
2016 2015 20143.6m9.0m18.4mMILLION
Further evidence of the consolidation taking place emerges
when looking at families of threats. Threat families are a
grouping of threats from the same or similar attack groups.
Symantec recorded four new mobile families in 2016, which was a steep drop from 2015, when 18 new families were
identified. However, it should be noted that newer detection
technologies, such as heuristics, machine learning, and cloud detections, detect threats in a more generic manner, potential-
ly masking the presence of newer families. When analyzing
mobile threat characteristics more closely, clusters of 61 distinct new threats that emerged in 2016 can be seen. When
compared to the 75 clusters identified in 2015, it shows a drop
of almost 19 percent, again pointing to a slowdown in growth or
innovation in the mobile threat landscape.
Cumulative number of mobile malware families per year
Four new mobile malware families were recorded by Symantec in 2016, a steep
drop from 2015, when 18 new families were identified.
260270280290300
2016 2015 2014277295299
Looking more closely at individual threat variants within
each family, the number of malicious mobile app variants per
family increased by more than a quarter in 2016, just slightly
less than the increase in 2015, when the number of malicious mobile variants per family increased by 30 percent.New Frontiers: IoT,
mobile, & cloud threatsBack to Table of ContentsPage 69
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Mobile variants per family
Mobile variants per family increased by more than a quarter in 2016, slightly
less than the 30 percent increase in 2015.
102030405060
2016 2015 2014364759
Taking a more holistic view, there was a slight decrease in the
overall number of malicious mobile app variants detected,
with a drop of eight percent between 2015 and 2016. This
small decrease followed a huge spike in malicious mobile app variants detected between 2014 and 2015, when it increased
by more than three quarters. The figures this year show that
activity began to stabilize.
Mobile malware variants by year
The decrease in mobile variants detected in 2016 indicates that activity in the
area is beginning to stabilize.
5001,0001,5002,0002,5003,0003,5004,000
2016 2015 20142,2273,9443,634
Overall, it can be deduced that attackers are opting to refine
and modify existing malware families and types rather than
develop new and unique threat types.
Motives and techniques
Mobile malware continues to be financially motivated, using
tried and trusted monetization methods, such as sending
premium text messages, advertisement click fraud, and
ransomware.
When analyzing the malware types detected, the top two detec-
tions—Android.Malapp and Android.MalDownloader—account
for more than half of total detections for the year. These are generic detections used to detect a wide variety of individual
but unclassified threats.
The first interesting detection in the top 10 is Android.Opfake
in third place. Opfake detects malware that sends premium text
messages, which continue to be a big earner for mobile threat
attackers. A second premium text message detection, Android.Premiumtext , appears in fifth place. The Android operating
system has added warnings when premium text messages are sent, making it increasingly difficult for threat actors to hide their activities. Some of the other malware in the top 10
(Android.HiddenAds and Android.Fakeapp ) use click fraud
methods in order to make money and get around the warnings.
Malware that is used to spread ransomware and malware used
in attempts to steal victims’ banking information also featured
in the top 20 detections for 2016.
Top mobile threats in 2016
The two most commonly seen mobile malware detections are generic detection
names, used to block a wide range of unclassified Android threats.
Mobile Threat Percentage
Android.Malapp 39.2
Android.MalDownloader 16.1
Android.Opfake 5.2
Android.HiddenAds 4.8
Android.Premiumtext 4.1
Android.Maldropper 2.1
Android.Mobilespy 1.9
Android.Downloader 1.7
Android.Dropper 1.7
Android.Fakeapp 1.7
Android.Smsstealer 1.7
Android.Rootnik 1.6
Android.Lotoor 1.4
Android.SmsBlocker 1.4
Android.MobileSpy 1.3
Android.RegSMS 1.2
Android.FakeInst 1.2
Android.SMSblocker 0.9
Android.HiddenApp 0.8
Android.Lockdroid.E 0.8New Frontiers: IoT,
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Malware and grayware rates
Symantec proactively collates mobile apps that are found to
contain grayware or malware.
Grayware is made up of programs that do not contain malware
and are not obviously malicious, but can be annoying or harmful for users. Examples include hack tools, accessware,
spyware, adware, dialers, and joke programs.
There were significant spikes in both malware and grayware
apps between 2014 and 2015, but in 2016 both areas leveled
off. Grayware increased by just less than four percent in 2016,
while malware increased by around 29 percent, compared to an increase of more than 300 percent in 2015. The levels
of grayware and malware identified in 2016 are now almost
comparative.
Malware and grayware rates, 2014-2016
There was a levelling off in malware and grayware apps in 2016 following
growth between 2014 and 2015.
246810
2016 2015 20141.3m4.3m5.6m7.8m7.2m8.1mMalware GraywareMILLION
Increase in runtime packers
While mobile attackers may not be demonstrating significant
innovations in the types of threat activity they conduct, they
are adopting techniques that will increase infection success
rates and longevity. Mobile attackers have increasingly adopted the use of runtime packers in an attempt to obfuscate
malware, a practice that nearly doubled from the beginning of
2016 to the end of the year.
Runtime packers make it more difficult for malware to be
detected and have been used by traditional malware for a
number of years. They can allow a malicious app to be repack-aged many times so it isn’t detected as malicious, but then at runtime it will deploy its malware load.Percentage of in-field mobile malware that is packed
A rise in the use of runtime packers can be seen in 2016, with the rate more
than doubling between January and December.
51015202530
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
Mobile vulnerabilities
A noteworthy change in 2016 was that Android surpassed iOS
in terms of the number of mobile vulnerabilities reported, a
stark contrast with previous years, when iOS far outstripped
Android in this area. This change may be partially attributed to continuing improvements in the security of the Android
architecture and an ongoing interest by researchers in mobile
platforms.
Improvements in Android architecture
Android has continually modified its architecture to help improve security. This has impacted cyber criminals by making
it more difficult for them to successfully install malware on
phones. Even if they do succeed in installing malware on a victim’s phone, various developments and improvements in
Android have made it increasingly difficult to monetize it.
Symantec data shows that premium text messages are still one
of the most effective ways for cyber attackers to make money
from mobile malware. However, Android 4.2 (Jelly Bean) incor -
porated an update in 2012 that undermined the operation of
premium SMS Trojans, which were rampant at the time. The
update meant the phone would display an alert if there was
an attempt to send a message to a premium phone number, greatly reducing the effectiveness of these scams.
Autostart restrictions introduced in Android 3.1 (Honeycomb)
in 2011 also presented a challenge to attackers as it blocked silent autostart capabilities, preventing Trojans from silently
launching without any front-end activity. While this has been
effective, attackers have also devised ways to get around this restriction. New Frontiers: IoT,
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ISTR April 2017 08
Elsewhere, updates released as part of Android 5.0 (Lollipop)
and Android 6.0 (Marshmallow) made life more difficult for
attackers attempting to deploy mobile banking malware.
Mobile banking malware works by creating overlay injections to phish the current running application, but these updates
thwarted malware’s ability to find the current running task by
deprecating the getRunningTasks() API. Since then, attackers have been engaged in finding workarounds to overcome these
additional security measures.
Updates on Marshmallow also attempted to tackle the
problem of mobile ransomware. A new permissions model
on the updates made it very difficult for ransomware authors
targeting Marshmallow to successfully launch their malware on a device by requiring the user to give explicit permission for
the ransomware to lock the device.
While these updates and security improvements are
welcomed, continuing improvements are only useful if people can download the latest version of Android onto their device,
which isn’t always the case.
Some manufacturers never roll out the latest version of
Android onto their smartphones, or there is a major lag
between the latest version being released and it becoming available for all. Figures from Android itself show that, at the
start of 2017, the most up-to-date version of its OS, Nougat,
had only a tiny market share, as it was not yet available for most phones outside of Google’s ecosystem. The next most
up-to-date version, Marshmallow, did not have the operating system’s biggest market share either, with it around four
percentage points behind the previous version, Lollipop. A lack
of updates can provide ample opportunities for cyber attackers
to target outdated mobile operating systems.
Market share of different versions of Android, January 2017
The most up-to-date version of Android, Nougat, only has a tiny percentage of
the operating system’s market share.
Nougat 0.7%1.0% Gingerbread
1.1% Ice Cream
Sandwich
Lollipop
33.4%Marshmallow
29.6% KitKat
22.6%Jelly
Bean
11.6%
The prevalence of older operating system versions means
attackers can continue using old techniques, which may be unusable on the most up-to-date OS, to carry out attacks
without a need for innovation on their parts.
This may go some way to explain the lack of innovation or
expansion on the part of mobile attackers—they have a model
that works. Mobile vulnerabilities reported, by operating system
Android surpassed iOS in terms of the number of mobile vulnerabilities reported in 2016.
0 100 200 300 400 500 600201620152014 178
463 8912
290 316iOS10 BlackberryAndroid
Mobile vulnerabilities reported, by operating systemNew Frontiers: IoT,
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Sour taste for Apple
Malware on iOS is still a relatively rare occurrence. However,
in August 2016 it was discovered that three zero-day vulner -
abilities on iOS, known as Trident, were being exploited in targeted attacks to inject the Pegasus malware onto victims’ phones. Pegasus is spyware that can access messages, calls,
and emails. It can also gather information from apps including
Gmail, Facebook, Skype, and WhatsApp.
The attack worked by sending a link to the victim through a
text message. If the victim clicked on the link then the phone
was jailbroken and Pegasus could be injected onto it and start its spy work.
The vulnerabilities that allowed this attack to take place
included one in the Safari WebKit that allowed the attacker to compromise the device if a user clicked on a link, an infor -
mation leak in the kernel, and an issue where kernel memory corruption could lead to a jailbreak.
The attack was discovered when a human rights activist
handed over his phone to Citizen Lab after he received a suspi-
cious text message. The vulnerabilities only appear to have been exploited in a limited number of targeted attacks.
Pegasus is a spyware developed by the NSO Group, an Israeli
firm that reportedly only sells its software to governments. The three vulnerabilities were patched by Apple in iOS version 9.3.5.
This attack showed that while attacks on iOS are rare, the
system is not infallible.
Best practices
|Keep your software up to date.
|Refrain from downloading apps from unfamiliar sites and
only install apps from trusted sources.
|Pay close attention to the permissions requested by apps.
|Install a suitable mobile security app, such as Norton, to
protect your device and data.
|Make frequent backups of important data.Cloud
As cloud usage by both enterprises and consumers
has become mainstream, its appeal to attackers
has naturally increased. While cloud attacks are
still in their infancy, 2016 saw the first widespread outage of cloud services as a result of a denial of service (DoS) campaign, serving as a warning for how
susceptible cloud services are to malicious attack.
Key findings
|Widespread adoption of cloud applications in
corporations, coupled with risky user behavior that the
corporation may not even be aware of, is widening the
scope for cloud-based attacks. At the end of 2016, the average enterprise organization was using 928 cloud apps,
up from 841 earlier in the year. However, most CIOs think
their organizations only use around 30 or 40 cloud apps.
|Symantec CloudSOC analysis found that 25 percent of all
shadow data (business data stored in the cloud without IT’s consent or knowledge) is “broadly shared,” increasing its risk of exposure. Three percent of this “broadly
shared” data is compliance related.
|Several high-profile attacks and campaigns in 2016 took
aim against cloud-related services, including the Mirai botnet’s distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks
against DNS provider Dyn, and attacks on Mongo DB databases hosted on cloud services.
Trends and analysis
Data gathered by Symantec CloudSOC over the last six months of 2016 showed that the use and abuse of cloud apps and
services, as well as the data shared and stored in them, is
increasing.
The analysis looked at more than 20,000 cloud apps, 176
million cloud documents, and 1.3 billion emails. It found that
the average enterprise has 928 cloud apps in use, an increase of 87 from 841 in the first half of 2016.
While these numbers may seem big, bear in mind that a
multitude of commonly used services such as Office 365, Google, Dropbox, and Salesforce are all cloud apps. In fact,
Office 365, Google, and Dropbox were found to be the top three
most commonly adopted and used collaborative apps in enter -
prises in both the first and second half of 2016. New Frontiers: IoT,
mobile, & cloud threatsBack to Table of ContentsPage 73
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Most commonly used cloud apps in enterprises
The average enterprise has 928 cloud apps in use on its systems, but most CIOs
think their organizations only use around 30 or 40 cloud apps.
Collaboration
1H 2016 2H 2016
Office 365 Office 365
Google Google
Dropbox Dropbox
Box Evernote
Evernote Box
Business enablement
1H 2016 2H 2016
Salesforce GitHub
GitHub Salesforce
Zendesk Zendesk
ServiceNow ServiceNow
Amazon Web Services Amazon Web Services
Consumer
1H 2016 2H 2016
Facebook Facebook
Twitter LinkedIn
LinkedIn YouTube
YouTube Twitter
Pinterest Pinterest
A lack of policies and procedures around how users in an orga-
nization use cloud services increases the risk of cloud app use.
This analysis found that most CIOs think their organizations
only use around 30 or 40 cloud apps, despite most enterprises having adopted an average of 928, a difference of more than
2,000 percent.
Symantec CloudSOC analysis found that 25 percent of all
shadow data (business data stored in the cloud without IT’s
consent or knowledge) is “broadly shared,” meaning it is
shared internally, externally, and/or with the public.
Even more concerning is that of the 25 percent of files broadly
shared, three percent contained compliance-related data such
as Personally Identifiable Information (PII), Payment Card Information (PCI), or Protected Health Information (PHI).
If this sensitive data leaks, it can lead to substantial compli-ance penalties and mitigation costs for the affected company.
Limiting employees to using secure, popular file-sharing apps
like Office 365 and Box cannot fully mitigate risks to this data
from employee misuse or account compromise by hackers. Enforcing smart cloud data governance practices, such as iden-
tifying, categorizing, and monitoring the use of all cloud data,
is critical to prevent data loss.
Alarmingly, Symantec CloudSOC found that 66 percent of risky
user activity in the cloud indicated attempts to exfiltrate data.
Attempts to exfiltrate data are indicated by frequent sharing of accounts, frequent or excessive downloads, and frequent
previewing of documents. Previewing of documents is indic-
ative of exfiltration activity because it can allow attackers to screenshot data. User Behavior Analysis (UBA) is critical to
identifying risky users and identifying and preventing exploits
such as data exfiltration, data destruction, and account compromise.
Risky business
Increased use of cloud services by organizations and their
employees means that companies’ data governance is being
eroded and they are susceptible to weaknesses that exist outside of their organization.
This could be very serious. Symantec analysis found that 76
percent of websites contain vulnerabilities, nine percent of which are critical. This statistic is explored in more detail in
the chapter on Web Attacks .
The Dyn attack, previously covered in the IoT section of this
chapter, is an example of attackers targeting one organiza-
tion, but affecting services provided by numerous enterprises,
including Amazon Web Services, SoundCloud, Spotify, and GitHub. It underlined the risks businesses take when using
cloud services.
Ransomware danger
A number of ransomware attacks against cloud-based services
demonstrated the susceptibility of cloud-based data to
cyber crime attacks. A recent high-profile case was when
tens of thousands of MongoDB open source databases were
hijacked and held for ransom. The incident occurred after older MongoDB databases were left open by users in a default
configuration setting.
While there was no inherent security vulnerability in
MongoDB itself, and the company alerted users about this
issue, numerous older implementations that hadn’t applied
security best practices remained online, with more than 27,000 databases reportedly being hijacked. These attacks underlined
the need for users to remain vigilant and ensure any open
source software they are using is secure. New Frontiers: IoT,
mobile, & cloud threatsBack to Table of ContentsPage 74
ISTR April 2017 08
There was also a report in early 2016 from a California firm
that ran its entire operation through a managed cloud solutions
firm. After one of its employees opened a spam email, it found
that no one in the company could access the more than 4,000 files it had stored in the cloud.
The company had fallen victim to ransomware, specifical-
ly TeslaCrypt (Ransom.TeslaCrypt ). Fortunately, the cloud
provider kept daily backups, but it still took a week for the
company’s files to be restored. This is just one example of the
amount of disruption ransomware can cause to businesses.
IoT and cloud: Potential partners in cyber crime
The rush to bring any and all devices online has meant that security is often an afterthought. This was patently evident in the case of CloudPets, internet-connected teddy bears. Spiral
Toys’ CloudPets are soft toys that allow children and their
parents to exchange recorded messages over the internet. However, researcher Troy Hunt found that the company stored
customer data in an unprotected MongoDB that was easy to discover online. This exposed more than 800,000 customer credentials, including emails and passwords, and more than
2 million recorded messages. Hunt said that even though the
credentials were secured using secure hashing function bcrypt, a large number of the passwords were weak enough to make it
possible to decrypt them.
This case illustrates how the combination of IoT and cloud can
put customer data at risk. Many IoT devices gather personal
data and rely on cloud services to store that data in online
databases. If those databases are not adequately secured then customer privacy and security is being placed at risk.
Living off the land
Increased use of cloud services also helps facilitate a trend discussed elsewhere in this report of attackers opting to “live off
the land” instead of developing their own attack infrastructure.
Two of the most high-profile cases of 2016—the hacking of the
Gmail account of Hillary Clinton’s campaign chief John Podesta,
and the hacking of the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA)—
were facilitated through the use of cloud services. Attackers
used social engineering to acquire the password for John Podesta’s Gmail. Additionally, the attackers reportedly used
cloud services to exfiltrate the stolen data rather than build
custom infrastructure for this purpose. Both of these high-pro -
file cases are covered in depth in the Targeted Attacks chapter .Cloud is attractive to attackers as, depending on how it is used
and configured, it allows them to bypass local security; data
stored on the cloud can be more easily accessible to attackers than data stored on local servers. Targeting cloud services also
allows attackers to cause maximum disruption with relatively
little effort—as seen with the Dyn DNS DDoS attack.
As the usage of cloud services becomes increasingly common,
it stands to reason that attacks on such services will also
become more commonplace in the future.
Further reading
2H 2016 Shadow Data Report: Companies More Collaborative, More Secure and More in the Cloud than Ever Before
Best practices
|Delete any suspicious-looking emails you receive,
especially if they contain links or attachments.
|Be extremely wary of any Microsoft Office email
attachment that advises you to enable macros to view
its content. Unless you are absolutely sure that this is
a genuine email from a trusted source, do not enable
macros and instead immediately delete the email.
|Watch out for any updates or patches issued for any
open source software you use. Software updates will frequently include patches for newly discovered security
vulnerabilities that could be exploited by attackers.
|Ensure that the cloud service you use regularly backs
up your files to ensure you can replace them should you
become a victim of ransomware.
|Implement smart data governance practices in your
business so that you know what business data is being stored on cloud services.CreditsBack to Table of ContentsPage 75
ISTR April 2017 00
Credits
Team
Kavitha Chandrasekar
Gillian ClearyOrla CoxHon LauBenjamin NahorneyBrigid O GormanDick O’BrienScott Wallace
Paul Wood
Candid WueestContributors
Shaun AimotoTareq AlKhatibPeter CooganMayee CorpinJon DiMaggioStephen DohertyTommy DongJames Duff
Brian Fletcher
Kevin GossettSara GrovesKevin HaleyDermot Harnett
Martin Johnson
Sean KiernanBhavani Satish KonijetiGary KrallRichard KrivoYogesh Kulkarni
Matt Nagel
Gavin O’GormanJohn-Paul PowerNirmal RamadassRajesh Sethumadhavan
Ankit Singh
Tor SkaarDennis TanSuyog UpadhyeParveen Vashishtha
William Wright
Tony ZhuAbout Symantec
Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC), the world’s leading
cyber security company, helps businesses, governments and
people secure their most important data wherever it lives.
Organizations across the world look to Symantec for strategic, integrated solutions to defend against sophisticated attacks
across endpoints, cloud and infrastructure.
Likewise, a global community of more than 50 million people
and families rely on Symantec’s Norton suite of products for
protection at home and across all of their devices. Symantec operates one of the world’s largest civilian cyber intelligence
networks, allowing it to see and protect against the most
advanced threats.
More Information
Symantec Worldwide: http://www.symantec.com
ISTR and Symantec Intelligence Resources: https://www.symantec.com/security-center/threat-reportSymantec Security Center: https://www.symantec.com/security-center
Norton Security Center: https://us.norton.com/security-center
|
ISTR
Internet Security
Threat Report
Volume
23IntroductionBack to Table of ContentsPage 2
ISTR April 2017 01
THE DOCUMENT IS PROVIDED “AS IS” AND ALL EXPRESS OR IMPLIED CONDITIONS, REPRESENTATIONS AND WARRANTIES, INCLUDING ANY IMPLIED
WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR NON-INFRINGEMENT, ARE DISCLAIMED, EXCEPT TO THE EXTENT THAT SUCH DISCLAIMERS ARE HELD TO BE LEGALLY INVALID.
SYMANTEC CORPORATION SHALL NOT BE LIABLE FOR INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES IN CONNECTION WITH THE FURNISHING,
PERFORMANCE, OR USE OF THIS DOCUMENT. THE INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THIS DOCUMENT IS SUBJECT TO CHANGE WITHOUT NOTICE. INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THIRD PARTY SOURCES IS BELIEVED TO BE RELIABLE, BUT IS IN NO WAY GUARANTEED.
SECURITY PRODUCTS, TECHNICAL SERVICES, AND ANY OTHER TECHNICAL DATA REFERENCED IN THIS DOCUMENT (“CONTROLLED ITEMS”) ARE
SUBJECT TO U.S. EXPORT CONTROL AND SANCTIONS LAWS, REGULATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS, AND MAY BE SUBJECT TO EXPORT OR IMPORT REGULATIONS IN OTHER COUNTRIES.
YOU AGREE TO COMPLY STRICTLY WITH THESE LAWS, REGULATIONS AND REQUIREMENTS, AND ACKNOWLEDGE THAT YOU HAVE THE
RESPONSIBILITY TO OBTAIN ANY LICENSES, PERMITS OR OTHER APPROVALS THAT MAY BE REQUIRED IN ORDER FOR YOU TO EXPORT, RE-EXPORT, TRANSFER IN COUNTRY OR IMPORT SUCH CONTROLLED ITEMS.TABLE OF
CONTENTS01
02 03
04 The Cyber Crime Threat Landscape
Targeted Attacks by Numbers
Ransomware:
More than Just Cyber Crime
Infecting the Software Supply Chain
The Mobile Threat LandscapeExecutive SummaryBig Numbers
MethodologyMalware
Web Threats
EmailVulnerabilities
Targeted Attacks
Mobile ThreatsInternet of Things
Fraud and the Underground
EconomyIntroduction
Year in ReviewFacts and Figures
Predictions01SectionIntroIntroductionBack to Table of ContentsPage 5
ISTR March 2018 01
Executive Summary
From the sudden spread of WannaCry and
Petya/NotPetya, to the swift growth in coinminers, 2017 provided us with another reminder that digital security threats can come from new and unexpected sources. With each
passing year, not only has the sheer volume of
threats increased, but the threat landscape has become more diverse, with attackers working harder to discover new avenues of attack and cover their tracks while doing so.
Coin-mining attacks explode
Cyber criminals who have been firmly focused on
ransomware for revenue generation are now starting to explore other opportunities. During the past year, the astronomical rise in cryptocurrency values inspired many cyber criminals to shift to coin mining as an alternative revenue source. This coin mining gold rush resulted in an 8,500 percent increase in detections of coinminers on endpoint computers in 2017.
With a low barrier of entry—only requiring a couple lines
of code to operate—cyber criminals are using coinminers to steal computer processing power and cloud CPU usage from consumers and enterprises to mine cryptocurrency. While the immediate impact of coin mining is typically performance related—slowing down devices, overheating batteries and in some cases, rendering devices unusable—there are broader implications, particularly for organizations. Corporate networks are at risk of shutdown from coinminers aggressively propagated across their environment. There may also be financial implications for organizations who find themselves billed for cloud CPU usage by coinminers.
As malicious coin mining evolves, IoT devices will continue
to be ripe targets for exploitation. Symantec™ already found a 600 percent increase in overall IoT attacks in 2017, which means that cyber criminals could exploit the connected nature of these devices to mine en masse. Spike in software
supply chain attacks
Despite the EternalBlue exploit wreaking havoc in 2017,
the reality is that vulnerabilities are becoming increasingly difficult for attackers to identify and exploit. In response to this, Symantec is now seeing an increase in attackers injecting malware implants into the supply chain to infiltrate unsuspecting organizations, with a 200 percent increase in these attacks—one every month of 2017 as compared to four attacks annually in years prior.
Hijacking software updates provides attackers with an
entry point for compromising well-protected targets, or to target a specific region or sector. The Petya/NotPetya (Ransom.Petya ) outbreak was the most notable example:
after using Ukrainian accounting software as the point of entry, Petya/NotPetya used a variety of methods to spread across corporate networks to deploy the attackers’ malicious payload.
Ransomware business
experiences market correction
When viewed as a business, it’s clear that ransomware
profitability in 2016 led to a crowded market with overpriced ransom demands. In 2017, the ransomware “market” made a correction with fewer ransomware families and lower ransom demands—signaling that ransomware has become a commodity. Many cyber criminals may have shifted their focus to coin mining as an alternative to cash in while cryptocurrency values are high. Some online banking threats have also experienced a renaissance as established ransomware groups have attempted to diversify.
Last year, the average ransom demand dropped to $522,
less than half the average of the year prior. And while the number of ransomware variants increased by 46 percent, indicating the established criminal groups are still quite productive, the number of ransomware families dropped, suggesting they are innovating less and may have shifted their focus to new, higher value targets.IntroductionBack to Table of ContentsPage 6
ISTR March 2018 01
Drop in zero days can’t halt
the rise in targeted attacks
Symantec has found that overall targeted attack activity is
up by 10 percent in 2017, motivated primarily (90 percent) by intelligence gathering. However, a not-so-insignificant 10 percent of attack groups engage in some form of disruptive activity.
The “Living off the Land” trend continues with attack
groups opting for tried-and-trusted means to infiltrate target organizations. Spear phishing is the number one infection vector employed by 71 percent of organized groups in 2017. The use of zero days continues to fall out of favor. In fact, only 27 percent of the 140 targeted attack groups that Symantec tracks have been known to use zero-day vulnerabilities at any point in the past.
Mobile malware continues to surge
Threats in the mobile space continue to grow year-over-year. The number of new mobile malware variants increased by 54 percent in 2017, as compared to 2016. And last year, there were an average of 24,000 malicious mobile applications blocked each day.
While threats are on the increase, the problem is
exacerbated by the continued use of older operating systems. In particular, on Android™, only 20 percent of devices are running the newest major version and only
2.3 percent are on the latest minor release.
Mobile users also face privacy risks from grayware, apps
that aren’t completely malicious but can be troublesome. Symantec found that 63 percent of grayware apps leak the device’s phone number. With grayware increasing by 20 percent in 2017, this isn’t a problem that’s going away.Big Numbers
8,500%
Increase i n
coinminer
detections80%
Increase
in new malware on Macs92%
Increase in new
downloader variantsMore than
1 Billion
Web requests analyzed each day
Up 5% from 2016
1 in 13
Web requests lead to malware
Up 3% from 2016Web Threats
MalwarePercentage
spam rate
5.4B
WannaCry
attacks blocked5.4B
WannaCry attacks blocked
46%
Increase in new ransomware variants46%
Increase in new ransomware variants
2016
53%2015
53%2017
55%
RansomwareEmail
United States
11%
China
21%India
5%Brazil
7%Russian Federation
6%
Japan
4%IoT
Attack Origin2017
2016600%
Increase
in attacks against IoT devicesNumber of
new variants
2017
27K2016
17K
24,000Average number of malicious mobile apps blocked each dayMobile
Increase in mobile
malware variants
54%
App categories that have the most malicious mobile apps are: 27%Lifestyle
Music & Audio20%
Leaky apps – what sensitive information do they most often leak? 63%
Phone Number
Device Location37%
29%
Increase in
industrial control system (ICS) related vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities
13%
Overall increase in reported vulnerabilitiesIntroductionBack to Table of ContentsPage 12
ISTR March 2018 01
Methodology
Symantec has established the largest civilian threat collection
network in the world, and one of the most comprehensive
collections of cyber security threat intelligence through the
Symantec™ Global Intelligence Network. The Symantec Global Intelligence Network comprises more than 126.5 million attack
sensors, recording thousands of threat events every second,
and contains over five petabytes of security threat data. This network also monitors the threat activities for over 175 million
endpoints located in 157 countries and territories through a
combination of Symantec products, technologies, and services, including Symantec Endpoint Protection™ software, the
Symantec DeepSight™ Intelligence service, Symantec Managed
Security Services™ offering, Norton™ consumer products, and other third-party data sources.
In addition, Symantec maintains one of the world’s most
comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting of more than 95,800 recorded vulnerabilities (gathered over more
than two decades) from 25,000 vendors representing
over 78,700 products.
Analysis of spam, phishing, and email malware trends is
gathered from a variety of Symantec email security tech -
nologies processing more than 2.4 billion emails each day,
including: Symantec Messaging Gateway for Service Providers,
Symantec Email Security.cloud, Symantec Advanced Threat
Protection for Email, Symantec’s CloudSOC™ Service, and the Symantec Probe Network.
Filtering more than 338 million emails, and over 1.8 billion web
requests each day, Symantec’s proprietary Skeptic™ technol -
ogy underlies the Symantec Email and Web Security.cloud™
services, utilizing advanced machine learning, network traffic
analysis, and behavior analysis to detect even the most stealthy and persistent threats. Additionally, Symantec’s Advanced
Threat Protection for Email uncovers advanced email attacks
by adding cloud-based sandboxing, additional spear-phishing protection, and unique targeted attack identification capa -
bilities. Symantec also gathers phishing information through an extensive anti-fraud community of enterprises, security vendors, and partners.
Over 1 billion URLs are processed and analyzed each day by
Symantec’s Secure Web Gateway solutions, including ProxySG™, Advanced Secure Gateway (ASG), and Web Security Solution
(WSS), all powered by our real-time WebPulse Collaborative
Defense technology and Content Analysis System, identifying and protecting against malicious payloads and controlling
sensitive web-based content. This is out of a total of 6 billion
web analysis requests. The technology is supported by our Global Intelligence Network, featuring web and threat intelli -gence gained through our partnership with more than 15,000 of
the largest global enterprises.
ID Analytics™, and ID:A Labs (our dedicated identity research
group), provides comprehensive insights into credit and fraud
risks, and is powered by the ID Network™. The ID Network is a
unique cross-industry repository of up-to-the-minute consumer information providing a unique perspective on identity and
fraud-related risks. The ID Network also receives outcome
behavior data from third-party enterprises that confirm when an applicant has been identified as fraudulent within their
portfolio. This continuously updated database of cross-industry
consumer behavior data allows Symantec to identify the riskiest one percent of all applications, for example, including applica -
tions for credit cards, auto loans, and wireless phone service.
Symantec Endpoint Protection Mobile (SEP Mobile) offers
unparalleled depth of mobile threat intelligence which is used
to predict, detect, and protect against the broadest range of
existing and unknown threats. SEP Mobile’s predictive tech -
nology uses a layered approach that leverages massive crowd-
sourced threat intelligence, in addition to both device-based
and server-based analysis, to proactively protect mobile devices from malware, network threats, and app and OS vulnerability
exploits.
The ISTR also includes analysis by industry sector, for which the
Standard Industry Classification (SIC) system for identifying
the industry sectors for businesses is used. The data relating
to Symantec’s customers and clients is anonymized prior to analysis and grouped according to key attributes such as
industry, company size, and geographical location.
Symantec takes every care and precaution to ensure that all
of the data presented in this report is produced to the highest
standards and to present an unbiased and objective view of the
threat landscape. Occasionally it has been necessary to filter or adjust the data to avoid bias or skewing, and this is stated
in the report where required. For further information on the
products, services and technologies mentioned, please refer to the Further Information section and Contacts at the back of
this report.
These resources give Symantec analysts unrivalled sources
of data with which to identify, analyze, and provide informed
commentary on emerging trends in cyber attacks, malicious
code activity, phishing, and spam. The result is the annual Symantec Internet Security Threat Report™, which gives enter -
prises, small businesses, and consumers essential information to help secure their systems effectively now and into the future.02SectionY ear in
ReviewThe Cyber Crime
Threat Landscape
The Cyber Crime Threat LandscapeBack to Table of ContentsPage 15
ISTR March 2018
2017 was an interesting year on the cyber crime
threat landscape. The WannaCry and Petya/NotPetya attacks made headlines, but they were exceptions and masked the first indications of a shift, in the ransomware landscape in particular. While ransomware remains a major threat, it seems some ransomware criminals have been busy adding more strings to their bow: in some cases distributing financial Trojans and in other cases turning to cryptocurrency coin mining.
Some online banking threats felt the impact of major take-
downs that took place in late 2016 , but others managed
to make a breakthrough. In particular, the Emotet ( Trojan.
Emotet ) banking Trojan reemerged after a long hiatus.
Emotet’s activity ramped up in the last few months of 2017, with detections increasing by 2,000 percent in this period. At the same time, the growth of coinminers, and their use by cyber criminals, grabbed headlines.
“The growth in coin
mining in the final months
of 2017 was immense. Overall coin-mining activity increased by 34,000 percent over
the course of the year; while file-based detections of coinminers on endpoint machines increased by 8,500 percent.
”The growth in coin mining in the final months of 2017 was
immense. Overall coin-mining activity increased by 34,000 percent over the course of the year, while file-based detec
-
tions of coinminers on endpoint machines increased by 8,500 percent. There were more than 8 million coin-mining events blocked by Symantec in December 2017 alone. These numbers
are quite mind-boggling, but this explosion in activity may
be short lived. Coin-mining activity is strongly linked to the increase in value of many cryptocurrencies; a sustained drop in their value may lead to this activity going down just as quickly
as it went up.
Ransomware
The ransomware landscape in 2017 was dominated by the
stories of the WannaCry ( Ransom.Wannacry ) and Petya/
NotPetya ( Ransom.Petya ) attacks, but they were not “typical”
ransomware attacks, and don’t represent the overall trend for ransomware in 2017. In fact, Petya/NotPetya was not a real ransomware, it was a destructive wiper that masqueraded as ransomware. For these reasons, we have omitted detections
of these threats from our ransomware detection counts in
this chapter. The impact and significance of these attacks is covered elsewhere in this report, in the article on Ransom
-
ware: More Than Just Cyber Crime .
Ransomware infections had steadily increased year-over-year since 2013, and reached a record high of 1,271 detections
per day in 2016. Ransomware detections failed to break that
record in 2017, but remained at those elevated levels. With WannaCry and Petya/NotPetya excluded from detection numbers, there were approximately 1,242 average ransom
-
ware detections every day in 2017, roughly the same as 2016’s record-breaking number.
Ransomware detections per day 2015-2017
If we exclude WannaCry and Petya/NotPetya, ransomware detections were
stable between 2016 and 2017.
3006009001,2001,500
2017* 2016 20159331,271 1,242
*Numbers exclude WannaCry and Petya/NotPetyaThe Cyber Crime Threat LandscapeBack to Table of ContentsPage 16
ISTR March 2018
A stabilizing of ransomware detections on the endpoint may
not necessarily be an indication of drops in activity, but could also be indicative of the impact of improved upstream protec
-
tion. Effective email filtering, Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) detection, and machine learning technology mean that ransomware activity is being blocked earlier in the infection
chain. For example, in 2017 we saw a 92 percent increase in
blocks of script and macro downloaders, a major source of ransomware infections. Improved detections earlier in the attack chain by Symantec mean these downloaders are being
detected and blocked before they drop their final payload.
Viewing ransomware as a business, it’s clear that the profit
-
ability of ransomware in 2016 led to a crowded market and
clear overpricing of ransom demands from greedy criminals.
In 2017, the market made a correction, with fewer new ransomware families and lower ransom demands. Ransom
-
ware authors honed their business model in 2017, seeming “Improved detections
earlier in the attack chain
by Symantec mean these downloaders are being detected and blocked before they drop their
final payload.
”
There was a
92%
increase in blocks of downloaders in 20173.0
1.6
0.4
2015 2016 2017
Million
The Cyber Crime Threat LandscapeBack to Table of ContentsPage 17
ISTR March 2018
New ransomware variants 2015-2017
The number of new ransomware variants seen increased by 46 percent in 2017
50,000100,000150,000200,000250,000300,000350,000400,000
2017 2016 2015241342 350
There were also declines in activity from some of the big
ransomware families in 2017. Cerber ( Ransom.Cerber ), Locky
(Ransom.Locky ), and TorrentLocker ( Ransom.TorrentLocker ) all
but disappeared from the scene over the course of the year.
Despite this, the Necurs ( Backdoor.Necurs ) botnet, one of
the main distributors of Locky, had a big impact on the cyber
crime threat landscape in 2017. Necurs disappeared for much of the first three months of 2017—reappearing just as
suddenly on March 20 when it started sending out stock spam.
Its absence was immediately felt, with a major drop in email malware and spam rates for those three months. The rates steadily increased for the rest of the year, though they never
quite reached 2016 levels.
Email malware rate 2016-2017 (1 in)
The impact made by Necurs’ absence at the start of 2017 is clearly visible
1 IN
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
DNOSAJJMAMFJ
2017DNOSAJJMAMFJ
2016
Despite its absence at the beginning of the year, Necurs was
still one of the biggest hitters in cyber crime in 2017. If we look at telemetry for the number of email malware campaigns
executed by Necurs in 2017 we can see an increase in activity
from June, with a notable surge in September and October, and some peaks visible right through to the end of the year.to find the sweet spot victims are willing to pay. The average ransom demand for 2017 was $522, which is less than half
of 2016’s figure of $1,070, and is also a decrease from the
mid-year average, which was $544.
In 2017, 28 new ransomware families appeared, which is on
par with 2014 and 2015, but a drop on 2016, when an unprec
-
edented 98 new families were discovered.
“There were also declines
in activity from some
of the big ransomware families in 2017. Cerber, Locky, and TorrentLocker all but disappeared from the scene over the course
of the year.
”
New ransomware families 2015-2017
The number of new families observed stabilized in 2017 after a surge in 2016
0102030405060708090100
2017 2016 201530 2898
However, the number of overall ransomware variants
increased by 46 percent, indicating that established ransom -
ware groups continue to develop and propagate their wares. The stable number of new families emerging likely indicates a lack of new attack groups, or less innovation on the part of
established groups. The Cyber Crime Threat LandscapeBack to Table of ContentsPage 18
ISTR March 2018
were detected on hundreds of thousands of machines in 2016,
so their absence had a big impact on financial Trojan numbers overall. A decline in financial Trojan numbers year-over-year
is a trend that we have seen in the last couple of years. As
well as the takedowns, some of this decline can be explained by better detections being in place further upstream, similar to the situation with ransomware, which means that the
final payload of the financial Trojan may never end up on the
victim’s machine.
Financial Trojans: Month by month counts 2017
Overall, financial Trojan figures in 2017 were down compared to 2016
40,00043,00046,00049,00052,00055,00058,00061,00064,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
Despite the overall drop, we can see that activity is trending
up in the second half of the year. This is primarily due to the Emotet banking Trojan, which had a surge of activity in the last
quarter of 2017.
Emotet: Making an impact
Emotet is a financial Trojan that first emerged in 2014 and,
after a quiet period, reappeared to make waves in the second half of 2017. Its activity has steadily increased, particularly in
the last few months of the year, with its activity increasing by
2,000 percent in the final quarter of 2017. Primarily delivered through large email campaigns, the group behind Emotet appears to be a “professional” cyber crime group, with most
campaigns being deployed Monday to Friday, with the group
appearing to take the weekend off. The threat is primarily deployed via spam campaigns sent out by the Emotet botnet; as well as stealing information from infected devices, the malware is also capable of adding infected devices to the botnet.Necurs sent out almost 15 million malicious emails in 2017, with 80 percent of these sent in the second half of the year. More than 67,000 malicious emails were sent by the Necurs
botnet every day in the last six months of 2017.
Necurs email malware campaigns 2017
The vast majority of activity occurred in the second half of the year
50,000100,000150,000200,000250,000300,000350,000400,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
While the main groups behind ransomware distribution are
still very much active, we observed a greater number of email campaigns distributing online banking threats and, in some cases, replacing ransomware campaigns. If we look at Necurs
activity for the final six months of the year, we can see that its
final payloads alternated between ransomware and financial malware.
Necurs payloads H2 2017
Necurs primarily distributed ransomware, but it also sent out some financial
Trojan campaigns
25,00050,00075,000100,000125,000150,000175,000200,000225,000250,000
JUL SEP OCT NOV DEC AUGRansomware Financial
Online banking threats
Despite attention from Necurs, overall financial Trojan activity
fell in 2017 compared to 2016, primarily due to law enforce -
ment action. Two financial Trojans that were major players in 2016— Trojan.Bebloh and Trojan.Snifula —largely disappeared
in 2017 as the criminal gangs operating them were both hit
by takedowns towards the end of 2016. Both of these Trojans The Cyber Crime Threat LandscapeBack to Table of ContentsPage 19
ISTR March 2018
it will enable remote access and attempt to carry out larger
fraud, rather than just stealing online banking credentials. In another example of a threat evolving in 2017, Trickybot
(Trojan.Trickybot ) integrated the EternalBlue exploit to allow
it to spread across networks. EternalBlue, of course, was most
famously used in the WannaCry and Petya/NotPetya attacks, with Trickybot apparently incorporating it following the Petya/
NotPetya outbreak.
Top 10 financial Trojans 2017
Ramnit and Zbot dominated, but Emotet, the fifth most detected, made a big
impact towards the end of the year
102030405060%
Retefe Pandex Snifula Bebloh Shylock EmotetTrickybotCridexZbotRamnit
While some ransomware groups switched to distributing
financial Trojans, we also observed many cyber criminals turning to coinminers in 2017, with the growth in coin mining
in the last quarter of 2017 undoubtedly one of the stories of
the year.
Coin mining: A modern gold rush
Before we examine this growth in coinminers, let us first explain what a coinminer is.
Coinminers are used to mine cryptocurrencies. Cryptocurren
-
cies are digital currencies: they are created using computer
programs and computing power, and recorded on the block -
chain. Bitcoin was the first cryptocurrency developed on the blockchain, and is still the best known and most highly valued cryptocurrency in existence. However, Bitcoin requires a lot
of processing power to mine and so is not a viable option for
mining on regular computers. However, other cryptocurrencies have been developed that can more easily be mined using the computing power of regular home computers. Monero is the
primary example of this. Monero, unlike Bitcoin, also provides
full anonymity.
File-based coin mining involves downloading and running an
executable file on your computer. Browser-based coin mining, which saw the biggest jump in prevalence in 2017, takes place
inside a web browser and is implemented using scripting
languages.Emotet detections
Emotet detections rose sharply in the final months of 2017
2,0004,0006,0008,00010,00012,00014,00016,000
December November October September August
“Emotet is a financial
Trojan that first emerged
in 2014 and, after a quiet period, reappeared to
make waves in the
second half of 2017.
”
Emotet saw a particular uptick in activity in November and
December. While, overall, it’s only fifth in our list of top 10 financial Trojans in 2017—and is dwarfed by Ramnit ( W32.
Ramnit ) and Zbot ( Trojan.Zbot ), which both dominated the
financial Trojans list in 2016 too—its reemergence and increasing activity is interesting, and will be significant if it continues into 2018. Emotet’s activity did decrease during the
December holiday period, but it appears its operators may
just have been taking a break, as it returned to its year-end activity levels at the start of 2018. If it maintains those levels of activity for the year it’s likely to be higher up our list of top financial Trojans next year.
While the reemergence of Emotet was the most interesting
development in this space in 2017, other online banking threats also evolved. Some financial Trojans began stealing
not just online banking credentials but cryptocurrency wallet
logins and any other account details that may help maximize profits.
Dridex ( Trojan.Cridex ), which is third in our top 10 list of
financial Trojans for 2017, now checks the software installed
on the devices it has infected. If it detects accounting software 20K
$1229K 31K1.7M
JAN
2017AUG
2017SEP
2017DEC
2017
Avg. Monero price
Mining detections
$321$104 $81
The Cyber Crime Threat LandscapeBack to Table of ContentsPage 21
ISTR March 2018
mining events were blocked in December—an increase of
34,000 percent since the beginning of the year. File-based detections on the endpoint by Symantec products for these
miners jumped by 8,500 percent in 2017. Much of this growth
is driven by JS.Webcoinminer which detects activity associated
with browser-based coinminers.
“Coinminers made up 24
percent of all web attacks
blocked in December 2017, and 16 percent of web attacks blocked in the last three months of 2017, demonstrating the big impact of these browser-based coinminers.
”
Coin-mining events 2017
Total coin-mining activity blocked by Symantec increased by more than 34,000 percent during 2017
123456789
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANMillion
Coinminers made up 24 percent of all web attacks blocked in
December 2017, and 16 percent of web attacks blocked in the last three months of 2017, demonstrating the big impact of
these browser-based coinminers.
There were twice as many detections of coinminers on
consumer machines than enterprise in December, when brows
-
er-based coinminers surged, indicating that coinminers are Coin mining is not illegal, and many people are now choosing
to run files or scripts on their computers to carry out coin
mining. And, indeed, many people may not object to some of their computing power being used to mine cryptocurrency when they visit a particular website. It could be a welcome alternative to watching ads, or paying for the content in other
ways. For example, media website Salon.com asked visitors
who use an ad blocker to either turn it off or allow their computer to be used to carry out coin mining while they are on the website. The problems arise when people aren’t aware their computers are being used to mine cryptocurrency, or
if cyber criminals surreptitiously install miners on victims’
computers or Internet of Things (IoT) devices without their knowledge.
A few factors can help explain the rise in the popularity of
coinminers among cyber criminals in the latter part of 2017:
|The main driving force was almost certainly the steep rise
in value of many cryptocurrencies in the final months of 2017.
|The launch of a new browser-based mining service in
September by Coinhive also led to renewed interest in the area of browser-based mining. We detailed this in a blog published in December 2017. Coinhive is marketed
as an alternative to ads for websites seeking to generate revenue. It recommends that its users are transparent with site visitors about its presence, but it is somewhat powerless to prevent unscrupulous operators from using it to carry out secret mining with the hope that users won’t
notice.
|Carrying out browser-based coin mining does not require
the same level of skill as developing an exploit and install -
ing it on victims’ computers, and it also means that even
people whose machines are fully patched are potential victims.
|It is a less disruptive way to make money. Victims won’t
necessarily immediately realize they are infected, if they ever do. They may notice that their computer is perform
-
ing more slowly or that their electricity bill has increased due to their computer using more power, but if the impact is only minor victims may not make the connection to
coin mining. This allows cyber criminals to make money
without victims even realizing they have something unwanted on their machine or on the website they are
visiting. Ransomware does not allow cyber criminals to fly
under the radar in this way.
The growth in coin-mining events blocked by Symantec in the last few months of 2017 is stark, with a steep rise in detec
-
tions in the last quarter of the year. More than 8 million coin The Cyber Crime Threat LandscapeBack to Table of ContentsPage 22
ISTR March 2018
Coinminer detections per month on Mac
A sharp increase in detections in the last three months of the year is visible
10,00020,00030,00040,00050,00060,00070,00080,00090,000100,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
Just as they are not limited to one operating system, cyber
criminals distributing coinminers do not seem to be limited to using just one distribution vector. In the latter part of 2017, there were multiple reports of campaigns spreading coinminers.
|The attack group behind the VenusLocker ransom -
ware switched from distributing that malware via email campaigns to distributing a Monero miner.
|The attackers behind the Zealot campaign sought to
exploit vulnerabilities in order to install a Monero miner on
unpatched machines.
|A massive brute-forcing campaign focused on WordPress
sites was used in an attempt to install a Monero miner
on compromised sites. This attack had generated at least
$100,000 by the time it was discovered.
|There were also examples of coinminers trying to spread
via Facebook Messenger.
The increased prevalence of coinminers has correlated with the increasing value of many cryptocurrencies. The longevity
of this activity very much depends on the future value of these currencies.affecting consumers more than enterprise users. In a way this make sense as these miners work best on sites where people spend a long time—such as video streaming sites—which is more likely to occur on consumer rather than enterprise
machines.
It’s not just Windows® computers that are being impacted
either: there was also a sharp increase in miner detections on Mac® computers since October, also driven by
JS.Webcoinminer.
“Just as they are not
limited to one operating
system, cyber criminals distributing coinminers do not seem to be limited to using just one distribution vector. In the latter part of 2017, there were multiple reports of campaigns spreading coinminers.
”Targeted
Attacks
by Numbers
Targeted Attacks by NumbersBack to Table of ContentsPage 24
ISTR March 2018
How likely is it that your organization will be
attacked? And if you are attacked, what are the attackers’ likely motives and means?
We spend a lot of time investigating targeted attacks and, over
the past number of years, we’ve regularly shone the spotlight on previously unknown groups. Often we’re asked to give an
overview of the targeted attack landscape. People want to
know what the overall activity level is like, whether it’s up or down, who is being targeted and where they are located. It’s something we often do with other threat types, such as
ransomware or financial Trojans.
However, presenting a macro picture of targeted attacks is a
fairly difficult thing to do. Why? For a start, targeted attacks are just that, targeted. Relatively speaking, they’re very low in number, which makes it more difficult to crunch the numbers.
Even a very small number of attacks can cause big variations
in percentage terms.
When we began to think about it a little more, we realized
there was an alternative approach. We keep a lot of data on targeted attack groups themselves. By aggregating that data,
we could paint a picture of the average targeted attack group.
And from that, we could tell people how these groups are most likely to attack an organization and what their primary motivations are.
What do we classify as a targeted attack?
Before we go any further, it’s probably worth clarifying what we mean by “targeted attack.” While the term does appear to be self-explanatory—an attack directed at a specific target or
targets as opposed to widescale indiscriminate campaigns—
there are some distinctions to make. The work of individuals usually isn’t classed as a targeted attack. For example, if someone decides to hack into the computer of someone they
know, this isn’t a targeted attack as we’d know it.
Instead, targeted attacks are the work of organized groups.
The majority of these groups are state sponsored (although there is a small number of private operators) and they’re usually driven by a small number of motivations: intelligence
gathering, disruption, sabotage, or financial. Broadly speaking
“targeted attacks” corresponds to espionage, although the lines are starting to blur and, in recent times, we’ve seen a
number of groups branch out beyond espionage.
Even within this definition, there are some attacks that don’t
fit the mold. For example, the Petya/NotPetya ( Ransom.Petya )
attacks were the work of a state sponsored attacker, but were indiscriminate (although mainly targeted at Ukraine).Groups
The first thing we looked at was how many groups are operating at present and if that number is growing over time. Currently, there are 140 targeted attack groups known to
Symantec. Even that number may require some explanation.
What is a targeted attack group? They rarely leave calling cards, meaning it can take some time to piece together the evidence to suggest that certain tools and techniques are all
the work of one particular group.
In a world where few things are certain, the lines can be
blurred. For example, groups affiliated to a single state are sometimes known to share infrastructure and tools, which can lead to some questions on whether two or more groups are
distinct entities or part of the same operation. Vendors will
often make different assessments based on the information they have, which means the running total of known groups kept by any two vendors is likely to be different.
“Unlike the world of
cyber crime, where gangs
regularly disappear only to be replaced by new threats, the world of cyber espionage is becoming an increasingly crowded marketplace.
”
Over the past three years, we’ve become aware of an average
of 29 new groups every year, although the pace of new groups emerging slowed somewhat during 2017, when we logged
a total of 19 new groups. Nevertheless, it gives a good idea
of the pace of expansion in this sector. When you compare it to the total of known groups, the number of new players appearing on the scene every year is quite significant. What’s
more, most of the older groups show no sign of going away.
What the attackers do once they’ve compromised an organi
-
zation, such as what computers they target, and what (if any) information they steal can provide you with further insights. Targeted Attacks by NumbersBack to Table of ContentsPage 25
ISTR March 2018
Targeted attack groups known to Symantec
Running total of targeted attack groups known to Symantec. Over the past
three years, we’ve become aware of an average of 29 new groups every year.
255075100125150
2017 2016 201587121140
One of the most interesting but intensive jobs we do is discov -
ering and investigating new targeted attack groups, in order
to protect our customers from them and warn the wider world. Once we have enough data to build up a useful profile, we’ll
usually publish our research and, of those 140 groups we know
about, 28 were first exposed by Symantec. We’ve exposed an average of three new groups every year.
Motives
While we rarely get an insight into the minds of the attackers, over time we’re usually able to come to some conclusions about the motivations behind targeted attack groups. We have
a few ways of doing this. Looking at the type of organization
targeted by these groups can often tell you a lot about what they’re interested in. Analyzing the capabilities and features of the tools will provide further insights. What the attackers
do once they’ve compromised an organization, such as what
computers they target, and what (if any) information they steal can provide you with further insights.
Symantec
hasexposedan average of 3 new
targeted attack groupsevery year. 2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
20171
1
3
4
2
6
4
3
4Targeted Attacks by NumbersBack to Table of ContentsPage 26
ISTR March 2018
ANALYST STORIES
We talked to some of our threat researchers and asked
them to tell us about the groups they’ve worked on.
What’s the most interesting group you’ve
encountered?
Gavin O’Gorman
“Butterfly is probably the most interesting group I’ve
worked on. They were one of the few targeted attack groups who didn’t appear to be affiliated to any country
and were instead involved in corporate espionage,
presumably for financial gain. Over the course of a few years, they compromised a range of major corporations, such as Twitter™, Facebook™, Apple®, and Microsoft®.
Every time I go to a conference, people ask me about
them, wanting to know if we’ve seen any more attacks.
The answer is that they’ve disappeared completely. Their operational security was some of the best we’ve seen. For example, they ran command and control servers on
encrypted virtual machines on compromised servers.
That’s something we don’t see every day.
Have they retired? I doubt it. The zero-day vulnerabilities
they were using would have required a lot of time and skill to acquire on their own and they were most likely bought
instead. Zero days like those cost a lot of money, which
means they must have been earning a lot.
If I had to guess, they shut down temporarily and
developed a completely new set of tools. They were making too much money to just walk away.”
Alan Neville
“Turla was one of the first big investigations I worked on, and it’s still one of the most interesting. They used a lot of tools and tricks that I hadn’t seen before and really
demonstrated the level of sophistication at which these
groups operate. Even tracing the development of their tool kit indicated this was a large, well organized group that had money to back their operations. There was obviously a
lot of skilled work involved by different people to develop
each component. For example, their Venom watering hole framework is a step above what we usually see. They were one of the first groups to use system fingerprinting techniques, whereby they analyzed visitors to watering holes and collected enough information to determine if the potential
victim was of interest to the group, and if so, were able
to determine the best exploit to deliver in order to gain a foothold within their target’s organization. But alongside that, there was also their ability to compromise multiple
servers to host their exploit kit framework as a means of
compromising victims. They obviously had such a range of skills available to them and this was demonstrated by the varying level of sophistication of the tools they used, their ability to operate within multiple environments, and the
fact they had been active for such a long period of time,
compromising multiple governments. To this day, Turla continue their operations and remain one of the most interesting groups to track.”
Stephen Doherty
“Dragonfly is definitely the most interesting group I’ve worked on recently, mainly because they’ve been targeting critical infrastructure. There was a time when
these kinds of attacks were unthinkable, at least until
Stuxnet surfaced. But now there’s several groups doing it. Dragonfly has been compromising energy companies since at least 2011.
As time goes on, they’ve begun to use more off-the-shelf
tools and Living off the Land tactics, meaning it’s become
harder to attribute attacks to them. You need to be very precise because, given their targets, if you get it wrong, you’re going to create unnecessary alarm.
What are they doing? As far as we can tell, they’re focused
on getting and maintaining access to energy networks and
gathering information on how they operate.
We know they have the ability to cause serious disrup
-
tion to energy networks, but so far they’ve never opted
to go that far. The danger is that they could, at a time of their choosing. Of all the groups we’ve looked at, they’re
probably the ones that have come closest to crossing the
line between intelligence gathering and something more hostile, like sabotage.”Targeted Attacks by NumbersBack to Table of ContentsPage 27
ISTR March 2018
In most cases, we’ve been able to establish at least one
motive for each of the groups we investigate. By far the most prevalent motive is intelligence gathering, with 90 percent
of groups being wholly or partly involved in it. Intelligence
gathering can include information stealing, spying, and surveillance.
“Disruptive attacks
are also regarded as
being far more hostile and aggressive than intelligence gathering
and anyone mounting them will risk reprisals.
”
While disruptive attacks have come to prominence in the past
two years, as a motive, disruption is still a distant second to intelligence gathering, with 11 percent of groups engaged
in it. This isn’t surprising. While there have been a number
of high-profile disruptive attacks, they are still a risky prop
-
osition. By their very nature, they draw a lot of attention. The exposure makes it more difficult for groups to carry out further attacks, since their tools and techniques will have
been thoroughly investigated and as a result organizations
are likely to bolster their defenses. Disruptive attacks are also regarded as being far more hostile and aggressive than intelli
-
gence gathering and anyone mounting them will risk reprisals. In most cases, particularly when sabotage is involved, they are used sparingly and usually appear calibrated to send a
message to the intended target. Destructive malware
Percentage of groups known to use destructive malware.
Yes 6%
No
94%
While only a small percentage of groups are involved in
disruptive attacks, an even smaller percentage are involved in activities that could be classed as destructive, such as disk wiping. Of the groups we’ve encountered, only six percent have
been known to use destructive malware at any point.
The third category of motive we’ve seen is financial, seen in
just over nine percent of groups. Again, this isn’t too surpris
-
ing. Most targeted attack groups are state sponsored, meaning they have the resources of an entire country behind them. They don’t need money. Or, to be precise, they don’t need any
more money.
There are exceptions. The most notable in recent years is
probably the Lazarus group, a large and very active outfit, which made a name for itself from widescale espionage operations and a number of very public disruptive attacks,
most notably the 2014 Sony Pictures™ attack which saw large
amounts of information, including unreleased films, being stolen and computers wiped by malware.
More recently, Lazarus has also moved into financially
motivated operations. The group was linked to the US$81
million theft from the Bangladesh central bank in 2016 , along
with a string of other virtual heists. Why was Lazarus robbing
banks? The FBI has said the North Korean government was responsible for the aforementioned Sony Pictures attack .
Subject to ongoing sanctions relating to its nuclear weapons program, North Korea is known to be short of foreign currency and cyber crime may be one way of raising more. Lazarus was also linked to the WannaCry ransomware outbreak in May 2017 (for more about that, see “ Ransomware: More Than Just
Cyber Crime .”)Targeted Attacks by NumbersBack to Table of ContentsPage 28
ISTR March 2018
Targeted attack motives
Known motives of targeted attack groups. The majority of groups are focused
on intelligence gathering.
102030405060708090100%
Intelligence Gathering Disruption Financial9% 11%90%
While Lazarus has its fingers in many pies, it is an exception
to the rule. Most of the targeted attack groups we’ve encoun -
tered are much more tightly focused, with 85 percent having only one clear motive. Just 12 percent of groups have two or more known motives. For a small number of groups (three
percent) we’ve yet to establish a motive.
Number of motives
Number of motives per group. Most (85 percent) have just one known motive.
102030405060708090100%
Three Motives Two Motives One Motive No Known Motive3%1%85%
11%
Vectors:
How do groups compromise their victims?
One of the key pieces of information we look for when inves -
tigating targeted attacks is the infection vector, namely how
the attackers managed to get on the victim’s network in the first place. It goes without saying, but blocking attacks at the point of entry is the most effective way of combatting targeted
attacks.
Discovering the infection vector can often be quite difficult.
Attackers usually attempt to compromise organizations by infecting any available computer in a targeted organiza
-
tion and, once inside, then move on to specific computers of interest by mapping and traversing the organization’s network. Groups with good operational security will often clean up as they go along, removing their tools from any computers they no longer need. That means that traces of the initial infection have often been removed by attackers by the
time an attack is uncovered.
Spear-phishing emails emerged as by far the most widely used
infection vector, employed by 71 percent of groups.
Spear phishing relies on duping the recipient into opening an
attachment or following a malicious link and its popularity
illustrates how often the person sitting behind a computer can
be the weakest link in an organization’s security. Alongside a robust email security solution, educating staff about the dangers of spear-phishing emails and how to spot them will go a long way towards minimizing risk of compromise.
“Spear-phishing emails
emerged as by far
the most widely used infection vector, employed by 71 percent of groups.
”
The next most popular infection vector is watering holes,
websites which have been compromised by the attacker, usually without the knowledge of the website’s owner.
Attackers will often compromise a website that is likely to be
visited by intended targets. For example, if their target is in the aviation sector, they may compromise an aviation forum.
Watering hole attacks tend to be a blunter form of infection
method. Attackers can’t be guaranteed that the intended
target will visit the compromised website. There is also the risk
of collateral damage, in the form of unintended infections of victims outside the targeted organization. Attackers will often attempt to reduce the risk of this happening by employing an
exploit kit which will only infect users coming from a pre-se
-
lected IP range.
Alongside spear phishing and watering holes there are a few,
more niche infection vectors. Six percent of groups have been
known to use software updates, where legitimate software
packages are compromised, usually by uploading a Trojanized version of the software to the unwitting developer’s website. Targeted Attacks by NumbersBack to Table of ContentsPage 29
ISTR March 2018
ANALYST STORIES
What groups have the best/worst
operational security?
“The groups with the best operational security are
probably the ones we don’t know about,” said Gavin O’Gorman. “If you can identify a distinct group, by
tying multiple incidents together, that means that the
attackers have made a mistake and done something that allows us to identify them. We see lots of individual incidents. Attribution, tying multiple incidents to the
same group is getting increasingly hard because they’re
getting better at covering their tracks. The increasing use of off-the-shelf tools means attackers leave less distinctive fingerprints behind.”
“One of the poorest examples of operational security
I’ve seen was this guy Bachosens,” said Stephen
Doherty, referring to a lone wolf attacker who was discovered carrying out targeted attacks on organiza
-
tions for cyber crime purposes. “He made some really fundamental mistakes, such as registering domains using his own name. You could see that he was learning
over time and he’d begun to tighten up, but he didn’t
seem to realize that all of the clues he’d left earlier don’t just disappear.”
“If you think that’s bad, there’s one group some
Symantec colleagues were working on recently where
the researcher found the attacker’s CV!” said O’Gorman.
“The attacker used some malicious infrastructure for their own personal use, and left a link to their CV on it, publicly accessible.”
“Of course, some people don’t care as much about oper
-
ational security as others,” said Doherty. “Take Swallow -
tail [aka APT 28 and Fancy Bear]. Those guys just use the
same tools over and over. They don’t seem to care too much about people knowing it was them.”A small number of groups (three percent) have been known to use web server exploits to compromise victims, which involves exploiting vulnerabilities in SQL-based applications to send
malicious commands to an SQL database.
Targeted attack infection vectors
Known infection vectors used by targeted attack groups. Spear phishing is by
far the most popular.
102030405060708090100%
Spear-Phishing
EmailsWatering Hole
WebsitesTrojanized
Software UpdatesWeb Server
Exploits6%3%24%71%
The majority of groups we’ve encountered (60 percent) rely on
just one known infection vector. Of the remainder, 20 percent have been known to use two or more infection vectors. For 20 percent of groups, we’ve yet to discover an infection vector
they use.
Number of infection vectors
Number of known infection vectors per group.
102030405060708090100%
Three Vectors Two Vectors One Vector Unknown Vector(s)60%
20%16%
4%
One tactic we’ve frequently seen used over the years to infect
the victims of targeted attacks is the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities, software vulnerabilities which were previously
unknown and unpatched. However, in the past few years,
usage of zero days seems to have declined and this appears to be borne out by our analysis. Only 27 percent of the groups we’ve investigated have been known to use zero-day vulnera
-
bilities at any point in the past. Targeted Attacks by NumbersBack to Table of ContentsPage 30
ISTR March 2018
There was a time when zero days were a valuable and powerful
tool for targeted attack groups. But attackers have begun to eschew them in favor of less conspicuous tactics, namely
“living off the land” by using whatever tools are on hand, such
as legitimate network administration software and operating system features.
Zero-day vulnerability use
Nearly three quarters of all groups have never been observed exploiting zero-
day vulnerabilities.
No
73%Yes
27%
“One of the key phases
in most targeted attacks is what’s known as lateral movement. Attackers rarely luck out and manage to immediately compromise the computers they are interested in.
”
Lateral movement
One of the key phases in most targeted attacks is what’s
known as lateral movement. Attackers rarely luck out and manage to immediately compromise the computers they
are interested in. Instead they’ll usually find a way on to a
target’s network by infecting any available computer and use these computers as a beachhead. From there, they’ll explore the network, identify targets of interest and move across the
network to infect those computers.
There are many techniques used to perform lateral movement
and, in most cases, they leave few traces. There are a few common lateral movement techniques we log.
Of those, stolen credentials were the most commonly seen
lateral movement technique employed. Attackers often use
hacking software tools to obtain credentials from a compro
-
mised computer and then use them to attempt to log into other computers on the network. “Pass the hash”—where attackers steal and reuse the underlying hashed version of a password
and, without cracking it, can use it to authentic themselves
on other computers or servers—was used by just under six percent of groups.
Another commonly used technique we’ve seen is exploiting
open network shares, which was used by just over four
percent of groups.
Lateral movement techniques
Stolen credentials is the most common lateral movement technique we’ve
observed, used by seven percent of groups.
12345678%
Stolen Credentials Pass the Hash Open Share4%6%7%
Tools of the trade:
The malware behind targeted attacks
Malware continues to be one of the most important tools used
by targeted attack groups. Although many groups rely on it less than before (using hacking tools and legitimate software
for network traversal for example), malware is still generally
used at the “pointy end” of any attack, to achieve the ultimate goal of the attack, whether it’s information stealing, spying, sabotage, or any other kind of compromise.
In order to get a picture of how these malicious tools are being
used, we picked a selection of 20 of the most active targeted
attack groups over the past number of years and drilled down into the numbers (performing this exercise for every group would involve far too much data, so we picked a
representative sample). *Based on a selection of the 20 most active groups in recent years42
Average number
of organizations
compromised
per groupOver the
past 3 years:
65
Average number
of individuals
compromised
per group
4
Average number
of malicious tools used per group18
Highest number of
tools used by a group
1
Lowest number
of tools used by
a group
& Tools* Targets Targeted Attacks by NumbersBack to Table of ContentsPage 32
ISTR March 2018
What we found was, among these 20 groups, the average
number of tools used by each group was 4. The highest number was 18 and this related to the aforementioned
Lazarus group. The number reflects the fact that it’s
something of a sprawling operation with a lot of interests.
How are these tools being used? Over the past three years, an
average of 42 organizations were compromised per group. In the same time period, the same groups each compromised an
average of 65 individuals. If our sample of 20 groups is repre
-
sentative, the average targeted attack group will therefore
compromise an average of 14 organizations and 22
individuals a year.
Where are the victims?
How common are targeted attacks? And how widespread are they? We took a look at our infection data for malware solely associated with targeted attack groups and found that
hundreds of organizations annually, across a fairly broad
range of countries, are affected by targeted attacks.
Organizations hit by targeted attacks
Number of organizations affected by targeted attacks per year, 2015 to 2017.
100200300400500600
2017 2016 2015532
479528
Following a dip in 2016, the number of organizations affected
by targeted attacks rebounded in 2017 back to the same levels seen in 2015.
When broken down by geography, it wasn’t too surprising to
find out that the United States was the country most affected by targeted attacks over the past three years. It’s populous, prosperous, and powerful, meaning it’s going to be an obvious
region of interest for targeted attack groups.
Similarly, large countries such as India, Japan, and Russia are
expected inclusions on the list. Another evident trend is that countries that are the focus of regional tensions are often
frequently attacked, such as Taiwan, Ukraine,
and South Korea. Top 10 countries affected by targeted attacks
Between 2015 and 2017, the U.S. was the country most affected by targeted
attacks.
50 100 150 200 250 300 350
PakistanVietnamRussiaBruneiSouth KoreaUkraineTaiwanJapanIndiaU.S. 303
133
87
59
49
45
34
32
29
22
Analyst stories
What are the biggest/longest running groups?
“It can be hard to say when a group got started, but on
the evidence we have, Turla is probably one of the longest running groups out there,” said Alan Neville. “They’ve
definitely been around since at least 2005 and there’s
been some research linking them to attacks as early as the 1990s, which would definitely make them among the first.”
“Lazarus is probably the biggest group at the moment,”
said Gavin O’Gorman. “It’s hard to say though whether
it’s one large team or a cluster of groups with access to the same tools. They probably have so many people working there that it’s hard to maintain operational
security. You know what it’s like with huge teams. People
will just go and do their own thing and it’s harder to keep control over them.”Targeted Attacks by NumbersBack to Table of ContentsPage 33
ISTR March 2018
What can we learn?
Based on the data we’ve gathered together here, what can we
say about targeted attacks? Are you at risk? And, if you are, how are you at risk?
The first thing to say is that while the overall number of orga
-
nizations affected by targeted attacks is quite low, the risk
posed by an attack is quite high. These attackers are skilled, well-resourced, and capable of stealing valuable information
or causing serious disruption.
Countries that are politically and economically powerful tend
to attract more attacks than most, for obvious reasons. But if you’re based in a country that is the focus of regional political tensions, you may be more at risk of attack.
The most likely reason for an attack is intelligence gathering.
That could mean theft of documents and intellectual property, or it could involve snooping on your staff and customers. With this in mind, attackers will do everything they can to avoid discovery and can sometimes succeed in staying on a victim’s
network for months at a time.
If you’re going to be attacked, the chances are that initial
compromise, the gap in the fence the attackers sneak through, is going to be created by social engineering rather
than anything technically sophisticated such as exploit of a
zero-day vulnerability. Spear-phishing emails are the number one means of attack we’ve seen used, meaning a well-crafted email, sent to an unsuspecting staff member is the most likely source of compromise and can be the trigger to a potentially
serious security breach.Further Reading
Greenbug cyberespionage group targeting Middle East,
possible links to Shamoon (Blog)
Shamoon: Multi-staged destructive attacks limited to specific
targets (Blog)
Longhorn: Tools used by cyberespionage group linked to Vault
7 (Blog)
WannaCry: Ransomware attacks show strong links to Lazarus
group (Blog)
Bachosens: Highly-skilled petty cyber criminal with lofty ambitions targeting large organizations (Blog)
Attackers are increasingly living off the land (Blog)
Dragonfly: Western energy sector targeted by sophisticated
attack group (Blog)
Sowbug: Cyber espionage group targets South American and
Southeast Asian governments (Blog)
Triton: New Malware Threatens Industrial Safety Systems
(Blog)Ransomware:
More Than Just
Cyber Crime
Ransomware: More Than Just Cyber CrimeBack to Table of ContentsPage 35
ISTR March 2018
Ransomware is no longer just the preserve of
the cyber criminal. For a variety of reasons, targeted attack groups are taking an interest too; whether it’s to raise foreign currency or use fake ransomware as a cover for other types of attacks.
In late 2015, we came across something which, at the time,
was very unusual. A major company in South East Asia asked us to investigate a widescale ransomware attack
on its network. Hundreds of computers had been hit, all
infected with what appeared to be a variant of the CryptoW
-
all (Ransom.Cryptowall ) ransomware. Almost immediately
though, we realized that there was something very odd about this attack.
When we analyzed samples of the malware, we found that it
didn’t actually encrypt any files as you would expect ransom
-
ware to do. Instead, it just overwrote files on the hard disk with meaningless data. The malware was in fact a disk wiper, disguised as ransomware. Why did the attackers go to the
trouble of trying to cover their tracks in this fashion?
When we dug a little deeper we began to piece together what
had happened. The organization had been the victim of long running and sophisticated targeted attack. Five months prior to the “ransomware” incident, a number of computers at the
organization had been compromised through a combination of
spear-phishing emails and watering hole websites.
From this initial compromise, the attackers used a combina
-
tion of malware and penetration testing tools to steal creden -
tials, map the organization’s network, and compromise many
more computers, including file, application, and email servers.
The true purpose of the attack was data theft and, over the
course of the intervening five months, the attackers managed
to steal thousands of files from the organization. When they were finished, the intruders attempted to cover their tracks, deploying the fake ransomware to wipe the disks of infected computers.
Disguising the disk wiper as ransomware was a clever move.
At the time, ransomware was beginning to reach epidemic proportions. On cursory examination, the wiper (which we named Trojan.Phonywall ) looked a lot like CryptoWall,
displaying a ransom note identical to the real CryptoWall
message. The only difference was the payment URL. CryptoW
-
all payment URLs were usually unique to each infection but
Phonywall’s was hardcoded and just copied from a CryptoWall ransom note posted online. If the attack hadn’t been investi
-
gated properly, the company may have simply assumed that it had been hit with a ransomware attack, accepted its losses, and not investigated any further. We had seen plenty of cases in the past where attackers have employed DDoS attacks to cover up intrusions. However, in 2015 the use of ransomware as a decoy by a targeted attack
group was something completely new. All of that quickly
changed and by 2017 it was no longer an outlier. Several targeted attack groups had discovered ransomware. They put it to a range of uses but, in almost every case, it was used to devastating effect.
“... the intruders
attempted to cover their
tracks, deploying the fake ransomware to wipe the disks of infected computers.
”
Revenue-generating attacks
Targeted attack groups don’t usually get involved in financially
motivated attacks. That’s because, in most cases, they have the resources of a nation state behind them and can afford to
pay for personnel and pricey tools (such as zero days).
When WannaCry ( Ransom.Wannacry ) first struck, it seemed
unlikely that a targeted attack group was behind it. The attack
had the hallmarks of a cyber crime operation, something most targeted attack groups wouldn’t stoop to. However, we subse
-
quently uncovered strong evidence that the Lazarus group was behind the threat.
Although it is also possible the attack had a disruptive motive;
if the motive was financial, it wouldn’t be the first time Lazarus
had gotten involved in cyber crime activities, having been linked to the Bangladesh Bank heist and a number of other major bank attacks. The group has been linked by the FBI to North Korea, which is subject to sanctions and known to be short on foreign currency reserves.
WannaCry had a massive impact and, had the potential to be
hugely profitable. The main reason for this was that it incor
-
porated the leaked EternalBlue exploit that used two known
vulnerabilities in Windows ( CVE-2017-0144 and CVE-2017-
0145 ) to turn the ransomware into a worm, capable of
spreading itself to any unpatched computers on the victim’s Gathering pace
of attacks
JUN
2017Petya/NotPetya outbreak,
mainly affecting Ukraine Ukraine
OCT
2017BadRabbit outbreak,mainly affecting RussiaRussia
MAY
2017WannaCry uses leaked EternalBlue exploit to spread globally in hours
Disk-wiping malware disguised asransomware in attacks on Ukraine
“Phonywall” fake ransomware used tocover-up targeted attack in SE Asia NOV
2015
DEC
2016Ransomware: More Than Just Cyber CrimeBack to Table of ContentsPage 37
ISTR March 2018
network and also to other vulnerable computers connected
to the internet. Within hours of its release, WannaCry had infected hundreds of thousands of computers worldwide.
While WannaCry caught the world’s attention and caused a
significant amount of disruption, from a financial perspective it was a flop. Its authors botched their implementation of the payment mechanism. WannaCry was meant to generate a unique Bitcoin wallet address for each infected computer
but, due to a bug, it failed to do so and instead defaulted to
three hardcoded Bitcoin addresses for payment. The attackers had no way of knowing which victims had paid using the hardcoded addresses, meaning once this became public
knowledge, victims had little incentive to pay the ransom.
Secondly, the authors included a “killswitch” in the malware.
This was the address of a non-existent domain. WannaCry checked if the domain was live and, if it was, would cease installing. The feature was obviously intended to allow the
attackers to call a halt to the attack. However, it was quickly
found by a security researcher who registered the domain themselves, thus limiting the damage of WannaCry on the same day it was released.
Had it been configured correctly, WannaCry could have
earned its creators tens of millions of dollars.
“DDoS attacks can knock
an organization offline,
meaning that its systems admins will be busy trying to stem the DDoS attack and may be too distracted to notice suspicious activity on their network indicating that a targeted attack is underway.
”Ransomware as a decoy
Decoy attacks aren’t new, but previously targeted attack
groups relied on other forms of decoy, usually distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. DDoS attacks can knock an
organization offline, meaning that its systems admins will be
busy trying to stem the DDoS attack and may be too distracted to notice suspicious activity on their network indicating that a targeted attack is underway.
As mentioned earlier, we saw the first case of ransomware
being used as a decoy in late 2015. However, by the end of
2016, more targeted attack groups had adopted the tactic.
One of the most high-profile examples was the Sandworm cyber espionage group which created a new version of its destructive Disakil Trojan ( Trojan.Disakil ) which was disguised
as ransomware.
Designed to run on Linux computers, it essentially rendered
them unusable by encrypting key operating system files. Once the encryption finished, it displayed a message demanding a ransom of 222 Bitcoin (approximately $250,000 at the time).
Paying the ransom would not decrypt the affected files, since
the encryption keys generated on the infected computer are not saved locally nor to a command and control (C&C) server.
This version of Disakil was used in a number of attacks against
the Ukrainian electricity grid and was also reportedly used in
attempted attacks against the financial sector and shipping
targets in Ukraine. As with DDoS attacks, using ransomware as a decoy had a similar effect, sowing confusion among the victims and delaying an effective response.
Over the past number of years, the amount of ransomware
being distributed has expanded rapidly, making it one of the most common cyber crime threats. Its ubiquity has made it a perfect cover for attacks. It’s now so widespread that admins may not be surprised by a ransomware attack or question an
apparent ransomware infection.Major destructive
malware attacks
JUL
2010Discovery of Stuxnet worm,
targeting Iranian nuclear program
MAR
2013
Disk-wiping attacks launched against South Korean banks and television broadcasters
Disk-wiping malware used in attacks on Ukraine energy sector DEC
2016
Disk-wiping attacks launched against SouthKorean banks and television broadcasters
UkraineSaudi
ArabiaSaudi
ArabiaAUG
2012Shamoon disk-wiping Trojan usedagainst targets in Saudi Arabia
DEC
2014Disk-wiping malware used in attack on Sony Pictures (U.S.)
NOV
2016
Petya/NotPetya hits multiple organizations, mainly in Ukraine JUN
2017Fresh wave of Shamoon attacks against Saudi ArabiaRansomware: More Than Just Cyber CrimeBack to Table of ContentsPage 39
ISTR March 2018
Destructive malware infection attempts
Infection attempts by month involving destructive malware associated with
targeted attack groups.
50100150200250
JUL
2017JAN
2017JUL
2016JAN
2016JUL
2015JAN
2015
Ransomware as a disruption tool
The advent of ransomware as a decoy, followed by the
appearance of WannaCry has led to the arrival of a third type
of attack, namely ransomware as a form of disruption.
The first and most notable case of this was Petya/NotPetya
(Ransom.Petya ). When it emerged, it initially appeared to
be a WannaCry copycat.
“As with DDoS attacks,
using ransomware as a
decoy had a similar effect, sowing confusion among the victims and delaying an effective response.
”
Like WannaCry, Petya/NotPetya also used the EternalBlue
exploit to spread itself, but also incorporated other Server Message Block (SMB) network spreading techniques, which
meant it could spread across organizations to computers
that had been patched against EternalBlue.
However, Petya/NotPetya contained some key differences
to WannaCry which revealed the motive of the attackers. For a start, disks encrypted by Petya/NotPetya could never be recovered. When it ran, it scanned the hard drive for 65
different file types and encrypted any it found. The key was
encrypted with an embedded public key and appended to a README.TXT file. When the computer rebooted, it encrypted
the entire hard disk and displayed a ransom note to the user.
This ransom note displays an “installation key” which was a randomly generated string. A randomly generated Salsa20 key was then used for disk encryption. The problem was that there was no relationship between the “installation key” and Salsa20
key. Since the disk couldn’t be decrypted, Petya/NotPetya
wasn’t really ransomware. It was a disk wiper.
Secondly, unlike WannaCry, Petya/NotPetya wasn’t designed
to spread indiscriminately. Instead, the attack was designed to mainly affect organizations in Ukraine. The initial infections
were spread through a Trojanized version of M.E.doc, a tax and
accounting software package that is widely used in Ukraine. The attackers managed to compromise the M.E.doc website and upload a Trojanized version of a software update.
Disruptive attacks are an evolution of decoy attacks. The
inclusion of a self-propagation mechanism means that the
attack is more widespread. While ransomware still acts as decoy, the end-goal of the attack is not a cover-up, but to disrupt and sow confusion in affected organizations.
Once installed on one computer within an organization, Petya/
NotPetya would begin attempting to spread itself to other
computers on the network, building a list of IP addresses and
using EternalBlue and other SMB spreading techniques to infect them. It did spread to external IP addresses, but only those that were in some way connected to the infected orga
-
nization. While some organizations outside Ukraine were hit, these were essentially collateral damage, rather than inten
-
tional.
The net effect was that Petya/NotPetya was highly targeted
against Ukraine and deeply disruptive, because it wiped all
infected computers. The timing of the attack also appeared
designed to cause maximum disruption, coming on June 27, the day before Ukraine’s Constitution Day, a national holiday.
Copycat or retaliation?
Several months after the Petya/NotPetya outbreak, a very similar threat began spreading. BadRabbit ( Ransom.
BadRabbit ) appeared on October 24, 2017 and was highly
targeted against Russia (which accounted for 86 percent of infection attempts in the first 24 hours ). The initial infection
method was via drive-by downloads on compromised websites, with the malware disguised as a fake update for Adobe Flash
Player™. By compromising Russian websites, the attackers
ensured that victims were mainly concentrated in that country.
Just like Petya/NotPetya, BadRabbit was capable of self-prop
-
agation, and tried to spread itself across a victim’s network Why have targeted
attack groups started using ransomware?
Disakil
Perfect cover for a targeted attack.
Ransomware attacks are quite
common and may not arouse suspicion.
Encrypting or wiping computers
can cover evidence of an intrusion.
WannaCry
Possible source of foreign currency
for cash-strapped regimes.
Using EternalBlue exploit turned
ransomware into a worm and hit hundreds of thousands of potential victims.Petya/
NotPetya
Making the ransomware impossible
to decrypt effectively turned it into
a disk wiper.
Using ransomware disguised true
disruptive motive of the attack.
Disruption
DecoyRevenueRansomware: More Than Just Cyber CrimeBack to Table of ContentsPage 41
ISTR March 2018
via SMB and Mimikatz ( Hacktool.Mimikatz ), a hacking tool
capable of stealing passwords. The malware also uses a
hardcoded list of commonly used default credentials to
attempt to guess passwords, along with the EternalRomance
exploit, a similar exploit to EternalBlue.
Unlike Petya/NotPetya, BadRabbit was genuine ransomware
and decryption was possible. After the system is restarted, a ransom note is displayed, demanding a ransom of 0.05 bitcoin
(approximately $280 at the time of the attack).
That fact that it was functional ransomware may mean that
the attackers had seen the impact of Petya/NotPetya and opportunistically created a copycat version in the hope of making some money. However, if that was the case, why was
BadRabbit largely targeted at Russia? Did a group of attackers
in Ukraine think Russia was responsible for Petya/NotPetya? If so, was BadRabbit their retaliation? A lot of unanswered questions remain.
“Targeted attack groups
using ransomware is a
very recent development and it remains to be seen whether it will continue into 2018.
”Short-term phenomenon or long-term trend?
Targeted attack groups using ransomware is a very recent
development and it remains to be seen whether it will
continue into 2018.
WannaCry was the sole confirmed case of a targeted attack
group who dabbled in ransomware for financial purposes.
However, from a revenue raising perspective, it was a fiasco.
Its botched configuration meant the attackers earned rela -
tively little. Lazarus, the group behind WannaCry, has had much more success with virtual bank heists, meaning it is possible the group will abandon ransomware as a failed
experiment.
On the one hand, ransomware is a cheap and easy form of
decoy or disruption. Not a lot of development work is required
and, in many cases, variants aren’t written from scratch and
instead adapted from pre-existing threats. Even the incor -
poration of the EternalBlue exploit into WannaCry was fairly unsophisticated, largely a case of copying and pasting code. By contrast, performing a DDoS attack, the traditional form of
decoy, requires a lot more time, effort, and infrastructure.
Ransomware continues to be one of the main online threats
faced by organizations and consumers. Our own telemetry suggests that ransomware infections continued to grow during 2017. Its sheer ubiquity means that it may continue to be a
perfect cover for other forms of attack.
Further Reading
Destructive Disakil malware linked to Ukraine power outages
also used against media organizations (Blog)
What you need to know about the WannaCry Ransomware
(Blog)
WannaCry: Ransomware attacks show strong links to Lazarus
group (Blog)
Petya/NotPetya ransomware outbreak: Here’s what you need to know (Blog)
BadRabbit: New strain of ransomware hits Russia and Ukraine
(Blog)
Ransomware 2017: An ISTR special report (white paper)Infecting the
Software
Supply Chain
Infecting the Software Supply ChainBack to Table of ContentsPage 43
ISTR March 2018
There was at least one large software update
supply chain attack reported every month in 2017 .
This is a clear sign of an increasing trend considering an
average of three similar cases were reported per year between 2013 and 2016. The actual number may even be higher
considering some smaller cases may not have been publicly
reported. An extension of the recent living-off-the-land trend, this type of attack occurs when sophisticated attackers manipulate software supply chains to infiltrate even the most
well-guarded networks. One of the reasons why attackers have
chosen to hijack software updates is that it is getting increas
-
ingly difficult to find exploitable zero-day vulnerabilities that they can use. Therefore supply chain attacks are an efficient alternative to reach their goals and will most likely
continue to grow.
A software update supply chain attack in IT security can be
defined as follows:
Implanting a piece of malware into an otherwise legitimate software package at its usual distribution location; this can occur during production at the software vendor, at a third-party storage location, or through redirection.
The typical attack scenario involves the attacker replacing a
legitimate software update with a malicious version in order
to distribute it quickly and surreptitiously to intended targets. Any user applying the software update will automatically have their computer infected and will give the attacker a foothold on their network. It is not only desktop computers, the same
applies to IoT devices and industrial controller components.
Motivations for attackers
There are six main reasons why the software update supply
chain is attractive for attackers:
01 Infiltration of well-protected organizations by leveraging a
trusted channel
02 Fast distribution: number of infections can grow quickly as users update automatically
03 Targeting of specific regions or sectors
04 Infiltration of isolated targets, such as those in industrial
environments
05 Difficult for victims to identify attacks as trusted processes
are misused
06 May provide attacker with elevated privileges during installationAttackers typically use software update supply chain attacks
to infiltrate well-protected organizations where traditional infection vectors are unsuccessful. It is especially common for
targeted attack groups to search for the weakest link in
the chain.
By spreading malware through an already established distri -
bution channel, attackers can compromise a large volume of
computers in a short period of time, especially if the compro -
mised software has an automated update mechanism.
All this, without the need for an exploit that can be used for
network propagation.
“Attackers typically
use software update
supply chain attacks to infiltrate well-protected organizations where traditional infection vectors are unsuccessful.
”
Depending on the software package chosen, supply chain
attacks may allow for semi-targeted infections. For example,
attackers may target a specific sector by leveraging software
that is primarily used in that sector. Trojanized software updates may also allow attackers to penetrate air-gapped networks, as sysadmins will often copy the software update
to the separated network or install it from a USB stick.
The Petya/NotPetya incident in June 2017 was an example of
how the supply chain can be abused to rapidly deploy malware
to a targeted region.
In the Petya/NotPetya ( Ransom.Petya ) case, Ukrainian
accounting software was misused to distribute the payload.
It’s therefore not surprising that more than 96 percent of the companies that downloaded the malicious update were
located in Ukraine. This figure only includes organizations that
got infected directly by downloading the infected software; it does not count companies that were subsequently infected via the EternalBlue exploit or due to the use of stolen credentials. Infecting the Software Supply ChainBack to Table of ContentsPage 44
ISTR March 2018
While attackers cannot fully control who gets infected in a
software update supply chain attack, they can still use the first-phase malware to analyze the target and then only deploy
the second-phase payload to victims of interest. This was the
case during the CCleaner incident .
Well-orchestrated supply chain attacks are difficult to spot for the average user. The Trojanized update is downloaded
from a legitimate, trusted domain that might even have
been whitelisted in the victim’s organization. In addition, the download is started from a trusted application that has the required permission to perform network connections and execute downloaded binaries. In some cases, even the down
-
loaded binary has a valid digital certificate. This can make these types of attacks particularly difficult to stop.“The most straight-
forwar d attack path is
when an attacker is able
to compromise the vendor of a software package directly.
”
Software update supply
chain attack methods
Compromising the software
supplier directly
Hijacking
third-party
hosting servicesHijacking DNS,
domains, IP routing
or network trafficInfecting the Software Supply ChainBack to Table of ContentsPage 45
ISTR March 2018
Compromising the software supplier directly
The most straightforward attack path is when an attacker is
able to compromise the vendor of a software package directly. This method was leveraged with great effect in the Petya/
NotPetya attack campaign in June 2017.
In a direct compromise scenario, the attacker switches the
update package with a modified malicious version. The simplest way to achieve this is by compromising the web server where the update packages are hosted—for example,
through a vulnerability in the content management tool. The
attacker hits the jackpot if they manage to get full access to the development environment. This may be achieved through a successful spear-phishing attack against a developer, or
by using any of the other common vectors, such as infected
websites or credential theft.
Depending on the access obtained, the attacker may also
acquire digital certificates allowing them to code-sign the Trojanized update. This results in the malicious update
having a legitimate and trusted digital signature that cannot
be distinguished by the user. Of course, attackers with such deep access can also modify any information posted on the download website, such as file size, version number, or hash value of the modified update. These attributes are therefore
not a guarantee of a legitimate update.
This is very often the most difficult type of attack to conduct,
but also the most difficult for the user to detect. It’s therefore highly effective.
Hijacking DNS, domains, IP routing or network traffic
Sometimes, even the supply chain target is attacked indi -
rectly—a supply chain attack against the supply chain, so to speak. In today’s interconnected IT world there are many interdependencies between companies that can be misused.
For example, attackers can try to attack the domain registrar
in order to change the registered name servers for a given domain, or even transfer the whole domain. Another method involves compromising a DNS server in order to change
the domain resolution to a different IP address under the
attacker’s control. Both attacks will result in visitors to the domain being redirected to the attacker’s server. We have seen a bank’s whole online presence being taken over in this manner. While in that case the main goal seems to have been
to redirect visitors to phishing websites, it’s a technique that
could easily be used to push Trojanized updates.
Sometimes, no hacking is involved at all, if the timing is right.
Surprisingly, it is not uncommon for organizations to forget to renew domains they acquired some time ago to use for
various purposes, such as limited promotions for example. An
attacker could then register one of these lapsed domains and potentially use it to control all data sent back to the domain’s visitors. There are hundreds of cases of hijacked subdomains of larger companies that pointed to expired domains.
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) manages how packets are
routed on the internet and is therefore responsible for defining the path through which a resource, such as an IP address, can be reached. Through BGP routing modification, it is possible to redirect IP addresses belonging to other entities to a new
destination. A case of BGP hijacking in December 2017 saw
some of the IP addresses belonging to Microsoft and Apple, among others, rerouted through Russia. This allows attackers to intercept requests for updates from these IP addresses, and instead send down a Trojanized update. Of course, it is not
always that easy. For example, Windows updates have to be
signed by Microsoft to get executed, but as we saw in the past with the Flamer threat , vulnerabilities may exist that allow
attackers to bypass this security measure.
If the attacker has control over a targeted network, perhaps
because they created a rogue Wi-Fi access point or because
they have access to the ISP used by the target, then they can attempt to swap any requested file update using a man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack. In September 2017, some variants of the FinFisher malware appear to have used this attack vector to compromise target computers.
Hijacking third-party hosting services
Not all software vendors host software on their own infra -
structure. Some use cloud storage distributed around the globe and others, especially open source projects, are often hosted on service providers such as GitHub. Attackers could
potentially make subtle changes to the source code that they
could exploit in future campaigns. With many projects, such changes are reviewed and may be discovered. A more common method is to steal the credentials of someone that has the
permission to upload new binaries. Therefore, it is not surpris
-
ing that we see many phishing attacks against developer
accounts, which could facilitate future software update supply chain attacks.
Other supply chain attack methods
There are other software supply chain attack methods that do not implant a backdoor in a software update, but instead misuse the connection and relationships between companies.
The following are examples of how the supply chain can be
abused beyond hijacking updates. Supply chain attacks
MAYJapanese word processor
tool used to install malwareAPREvLog update compromised with malware
JUNXcodeGhost: Malware found in Apple dev environment
DECBackdoor found in Juniper Networks firewall2015
SEPS. Korean security software used to install malware
OCTAttackers hijack BrazilianBank’s entire DNS
NOVAsk Network Toolbarused to install malware
DECAsk Partner Network updater used to install malware2016
MAY HandBrake video tool used to install malware
Operation WilySupply compromises editing tool updates
JUN M.E.Doc updater used to distribute Petya/NotPetya
JUL ePrica pharmacy software installs backdoor Trojan
AUG CCleaner tool injected with malware
Backdoor found in NetSarang server mgmt. software
SEP Modified Python modules found on official repository
"ExpensiveWall" malware found in Android SDK
OCTElmedia Player for Mac OS X bundled with malware
NOVBitcoin Gold wallet replacedwith malware
DECWordPress plugins used to install backdoorsFEB Trojanized version of Yeecall Pro for Android used as a RAT
Kingslayer campaign hijacks sysadmin software updates2017Infecting the Software Supply ChainBack to Table of ContentsPage 47
ISTR March 2018
Account misuse
These attacks misuse the access permission of service
providers or suppliers. Although they are often referred to as supply chain attacks, they are not quite the same thing.
One of the most discussed cases is a reported attack against
Target™ in 2013 that led to a large data breach. The attackers were allegedly able to misuse stolen credentials from a HVAC systems supplier to gain initial access to the victim’s
network. There have been numerous similar incidents where
attackers stole VPN and SSH credentials of service employees that had remote access to computers of interest in the final target organizations. There have even been cases where a password reset email provider has been compromised in order
to take over accounts. Controlling the reset service allowed
the attacker to set new passwords for any given account without requiring access to the actual email account.
“No need to compromise
the software vendor if you
own the software.”
Watering hole attacks
Software update supply chain attacks differ from classic
watering hole attacks, where an attacker compromises a website of interest to the victim group and implants an exploit
that will compromise the targets’ computers. These watering
hole attacks, which are often observed during targeted attacks, attempt to exploit a vulnerability rather than hijack the trusted update process.
Process attacks
A similar attack avenue also exists for disruption attacks and hardware attacks. Attackers can block suppliers from providing the right parts for just-in-time manufacturing lines,
or worse, switch the order of some parts, resulting in the
production process coming to a halt. There is also the chance that newly bought hardware is infected or manipulated by the attacker, before it arrives at the target destination. We have also observed attackers stealing customer data from a supplier as that was easier to compromise than the main
target. For large enterprises it is often hard to control what
happens with confidential data once it has left their own network.Deliberate malicious applications
There have even been some attacks where rather than compromising the software vendor, the attacker simply bought the rights to the software package and then sent a malicious
update to the existing user base. No need to compromise the
software vendor if you own the software. In other cases it was a malicious insider or a former employee that still had access and that deliberately changed the software update.
A similar scenario is when links are sent in spam emails
that point to fake websites with cloned software packages.
Similarly, opportunistic attacks can occur if a user is searching for a tool, for example for video editing, but lands on a fake site providing an infected version. Such cases can be detected
by well-known protection measures and software should only
be downloaded from trusted sources. Similar due diligence applies when buying hardware equipment.
Collateral infections
Of course, there are also collateral damage infections that can happen at a software vendor. For example, it is possible for the computer of a developer to get infected with file-infecting
malware that then infects the public software package before
distribution. Another example is USB drives that get infected at the manufacturing site, because one of the machines was infected with a worm that copied itself to all attached USB
drives. Such infections can also spread quickly, but are usually
neither intentional nor targeted.
Case studies
CCleaner
In August 2017, a popular system clean-up tool called CCleaner was targeted by supply chain attackers. An unknown group of attackers gained access to the company’s development
environment, which allowed them to create and distribute
a malicious version of the tool through the update process. The success of the campaign was aided by the fact that the attackers were able to sign the Trojanized update with the
manufacturer’s official digital signature.
Between August 15 and September 12, the compromised
version, CCleaner v5.33.6162, and the cloud version were distributed to customers. According to figures from Avast,
the modified version was downloaded 2.27 million times . Our
telemetry shows that most downloads happened in the U.S.,
followed by Germany. Infecting the Software Supply ChainBack to Table of ContentsPage 48
ISTR March 2018
CCleaner infections by country
The U.S. was hit most, followed by Germany
Netherlands 4%
France 5%
United Kingdom 7%
U.S.
57%Germany
27%
This first-phase backdoor, detected as Trojan.Sibakdi, is a
typical reconnaissance tool and gathers system informa -
tion such as the name of the computer, installed software packages, list of running processes, and other information, and sends it back to the attacker with an HTTPS POST request.
The malware uses classic tricks to avoid automated detection.
For example, the malware pings a local multicast IP address using a timeout set to 601 seconds. Consequently, the malware sleeps for 10 minutes in an attempt to evade automated sandbox detection.
The information gathered from the first payload was then
used to narrow down the list of interesting targets to a handful of technology companies. These compromised computers then received a second payload ( Trojan.Famberp ). Analysis of the
log files on the command and control (C&C) server revealed
that around 20 selected victims around the globe did receive
a second payload delivered through the dropped backdoor.
The attacker misused DLLs from older versions of software
and modified them with malicious code. On 32-bit systems
the VirtCDRDrv32.dll, which was part of an older version of
WinZip, and on 64-bit systems the EFACli64.dll, which was part of an older Symantec Endpoint Protection package, was used as a template. These DLLs were modified, Trojanized, and no longer digitally signed. Malicious code was simply injected
into them.
Petya/NotPetya and M.E.doc
In June 2017, the Petya/NotPetya wiper Trojan spread rapidly
and compromised thousands of computers. Analysis showed
that M.E.Doc, a tax and accounting software package, was
used for the initial insertion of Petya/NotPetya into corporate
networks. After gaining an initial foothold, Petya/NotPetya then used a variety of methods to spread across corporate networks.Onsite analysis indicates that the attackers used stolen
credentials to modify the configuration of the M.E.doc web server. This allowed the attackers to redirect any request for the update server to a malicious server under their control.
The analysis further showed that the update process had
already been compromised in April 2017. Until June, at least three malicious updates were pushed down. The backdoor then periodically checked back with the same update server
for any additional commands to be executed and sent back
some system information inside an HTTP cookie, including local proxy settings with passwords, in order to evade detection.
This backdoor mechanism was then finally used to download
and execute the Petya/NotPetya wiper malware.
Conclusion
Given the increase in supply chain attacks in 2017 and the
success of a number of campaigns, it’s likely that attackers will continue to leverage this attack method. Already in 2018
we have seen some attacks where this method was used: one
targeting forum software , and another aimed at Mac users .
While supply chain attacks are difficult to protect against, there are some steps that can be taken including testing new updates, even seemingly legitimate ones, in small test envi
-
ronments or sandboxes first, in order to detect any suspicious behavior. However, bear in mind that attackers can apply well-known tricks to delay malicious behavior in order to not attract
attention during this kind of analysis.
Behavior monitoring of all activity on a system can also help
identify any unwanted patterns and allow you to block a suspicious application before any damage can be done. This is possible as the behavior of a malicious update will be different
to that of the expected clean software.
Finally, the producers of software packages should ensure
that they are able to detect unwanted changes in the software update process and on their website.Mobile
Threat Landscape
Mobile Threat LandscapeBack to Table of ContentsPage 50
ISTR March 2018
Threats in the mobile space continue to grow
year on year. In 2017, there was a 54 percent increase in the number of new malware variants alone and it’s not just the volume that’s increasing. Attackers have developed new methods of infection and tricks to remain on compromised devices as long as possible. They’ve also come up with a variety of means of generating revenue from devices, from ransomware to cryptocurrency mining.
But while the attacks continue to evolve and mature, the same
can’t always be said of the device user. Many users continue to make life easy for attackers by continuing to use older operating systems. In particular, on Android, only 20
percent of devices are running the newest major version.
Mobile threats continue to rise
The number of new mobile malware variants grew
by 54 percent in 2017, compared to 2016.
Mobile malware variants by year
The number of new mobile malware variants grew by 54 percent in 2017,
compared to 2016.
2016 2017 Change
Mobile Malware Variants 17,214 26,579 54%
Number of malware blocked per day on mobile devices
An average of 23,795 malicious mobile applications blocked on mobile devices each day.
2016 2017
Total Mobile Malware Blocked 7,193,927 8,684,993
Average per Day 19,709 23,795
Average number of ransomware blocked per month.
An average of 3,510 mobile ransomware were blocked per month in 2017.
2017
Mobile Ransomware Blocked 42,118
Average per Month 3,510 Number of new mobile malware families identified
The number of new mobile malware families grew by 12 percent in 2017, compared to 2016.
2016 2017 Change
New Mobile Malware Families361 405 12%
“Many users continue
to make life easy for attackers by continuing to use older operating systems. In particular, on Android, only 20 percent of devices are running the newest major version.
”
Top 10 app categories for malware
In 2017, 27 percent of malicious apps were found in the Lifestyle category, followed by Music & Audio with 20 percent.
Category % Malware
Lifestyle 27%
Music & Audio 20%
Books & Reference 10%
Entertainment 6%
Tools 6%
House & Home 5%
Education 4%
Art & Design 4%
Photography 3%
Casual Games 2%2017 Notable events in the
mobile threat landscape
JAN
Ransomware adopted banking malware’s social
engineering tactics to circumvent new permission
model introduced in Android Marshmallow (6.0). Ransomware using voice recognition, forcing victims
to speak the unlock code instead of typing the key.
Ransomware using social messenger apps with integrated
payment SDKs to facilitate barcoded payments.
FEB
JUL AUG
Rootnik family begins using open-source
VirtualApp engine to create a virtual space within the Android device that is used to install and run APKs without any contstraints. Devices infected with Adclicker were turned
into distributed denial of service (DDoS) bots that were commanded to repeatedly visit specific target URLs.
MobileSpy family of threats using reactive tools to
hook into events, such as SMS text received, to trigger other actions and commands remotely.
Wide availability of mobile malware toolkits help to
automate the creation of new variants of malicious
mobile apps in large volumes. Rise of WAP billing Trojans spawn the next generation in
Premium Service Subscription scams by silently visiting
WAP service subscription pages and automating the sign-up process, subscribing the victim to the paid-for services without consent.
MAR APR
WAP
Android.Fakeapp variant stealing credentials of online aggregate service providers, covering
up the trail by launching legitimate apps using mobile deep-linking URIs.OCT
Banking malware variants found to be using
StackTraceElements API to derive decryption keys at runtime. Rise of fake mobile apps with embedded
JavaScript-based cryptocurrency miners.
SEP
NOV
Mobile Threat LandscapeBack to Table of ContentsPage 52
ISTR March 2018
Notably, with 99.9 percent, the clear majority of discovered
mobile malware was hosted on third-party app stores.
Grayware is made up of programs that do not contain malware
and are not obviously malicious, but can be annoying or
harmful for users. Examples include hack tools, accessware, spyware, adware, dialers, and joke programs. Like malware, grayware has also continued to increase in volume in 2017.
Number of mobile grayware variants identified
2016 2017 Change
New Mobile Grayware
Variants3,055 3,655 20%
Number of mobile grayware families identified
The number of new mobile grayware families grew by 5 percent from 188 in 2016 to 198 in 2017.
2016 2017 Change
New Mobile Grayware Families188 198 5%
Percentage of apps that leak sensitive information
While not considered malicious, grayware nevertheless presents potential privacy issues for users. We found that 63 percent of the grayware apps in 2017 leaked the phone number and 37 percent revealed the phone’s physical location.
Type of Information Leaked Percentage
Phone Number 63%
Location Info 37%
Installed App Info 35%
Cryptocurrencies and other new vectors for monetization
The goal of the vast majority of mobile malware is revenue
generation. Traditional means of revenue generation have included premium rate SMS attacks , where attackers co-opt
victims’ mobile devices to send paid text messages and collect the revenue, or adware, where attackers collect attribution for ad impressions and app downloads, either by forcing the user to view web pages or download content. Infostealers allowed attackers to harvest personal data from mobile phones which
could then be traded in underground markets.
In recent years, attackers have turned to ransomware on
mobile phones where profits are made by locking devices or by encrypting personal data and extorting a ransom payment from the victim to allow them to regain access. In 2017,
a number of mobile apps emerged that allowed attackers to generate their own ransomware in an automated fashion, lowering the barrier to entry for cyber criminals. Another
innovation was the use of voice-enabled ransomware. Rather
than having the user key in an unlock code, this ransomware contains a speech recognition module which allows the victim to say the unlock code. The payment methods have also
evolved, with some ransomware variants accepting payment
from barcodes from social media apps.
“Notably, with 99.9
percent, the clear majority
of discovered mobile malware was hosted on third-party app stores.
”
Mobile devices also weren’t immune from the cryptocurrency
coin-mining explosion of 2017. While mining Bitcoin isn’t prof -
itable on mobile devices, Monero provides a lighter alternative means of coin mining and we identified a number of fake apps in 2017 packaged with functionality for mining Monero.
User behavior and security profiling
Keeping up-to-date
Analysis of Android mobile devices that are on the latest major version, e.g. 7.x or 8.x for 2017, reveals that 20 percent of devices are on the latest major release, and only 2.3 percent
are on the latest minor release. Although only 1 in 5 Android
mobile devices are kept up-to-date with the latest major release, this is an increase compared with only 15 percent (1 in 7) for 2016. It is a difficult gap to close however, since many older devices will never be powerful enough to run the latest version and currently 80 percent of Android devices are
lagging the latest major release. Mobile Threat LandscapeBack to Table of ContentsPage 53
ISTR March 2018
Percentage of Android devices running
newest version of OS
2016 2017
Android Devices on Newest Major Version 15.0% 20.0%
Android Devices on Newest Minor Version 11.8% 2.3%
The story is a little different for iOS™, as we see approxi -
mately 77.3 percent of iOS devices using the latest version,
and 26.5 percent using the latest minor version. iOS updates are rolled out much more quickly as they are not dependent
on a carrier making the updates available for their devices on
their network, often with bespoke changes required before doing so. Interestingly, although this figure is higher on iOS than for Android, the number is in decline since 2016, when
79.4 percent of iOS devices were patched to the latest major
version, and 24 percent were at the latest minor release.Percentage of iOS devices running
newest version of OS
2016 2017
iOS Devices on Newest Major Version 79.4% 77.3%
iOS Devices on Newest Minor Version 24.0% 26.5%
Cumulative exposure to network threats over time
We analyzed the scale of the potential threat from devices being exposed to insecure networks over a longer period. As can be seen, the effect becomes cumulative over a longer
period. For example, typically 21.2 percent of new devices
were exposed to network threats in their first month of use. This figure rises to 43.7 percent after four months. In this model, a network threat may be something such as a
malicious man-in-the-middle (MitM) style attack.
21%31%38%44%
+1 Months +2 +3 +4Cumulative exposure
to network threats Mobile Threat LandscapeBack to Table of ContentsPage 54
ISTR March 2018
Such an attack may be used to intercept and decrypt SSL
traffic, or to manipulate content in transit to or from the device. Sometimes this can be down to a misconfigured router
that can expose certain data. Regardless of intent, individuals
and organizations would be wise to avoid any network that does not accurately and securely perform the connection services originally requested by the user and the device.
Jailbroken and rooted devices
The act of “rooting” an Android device, or “jailbreaking” an iOS device, is a means by which the user can gain greater control over the device and bypass certain security controls enabling
access to more personalization options and functions which
are otherwise blocked by the operating system. This activity has decreased in recent years as newer versions of operating systems now provide increased functionality. However,
because of the power it can offer an attacker, jailbreaking or
rooting a compromised device is still a goal, and monitoring for such activity can often reveal it as an indicator
of compromise.
Ratio of devices that are jailbroken or rooted, by year and by
operating system
2016 2017
iOS Android iOS Android
Enterprise1 in
10,8391 in 2541 in
14,3511 in 1,589
Individual or Consumer1 in 694 1 in 92 1 in 1,658 1 in 281
Additionally, in 2017, 1 in 107 devices were identified as
high-risk, including rooted or jailbroken devices and devices considered to have high certainty of malware apps installed,
compared with 1 in 65 for 2016.
Percentage of devices that have passcode protection enabled
by operating system
In 2017, approximately 1 in 20 enterprise devices were not protected
with a passcode, and this number rises to 1 in 10 for consumers.
2016 2017
Enterprise 84.1% 95.2%
Individual or Consumer 70.0% 90.5%“Regardless of
intent, individuals and organizations would be wise to avoid any network that does not accurately and securely perform the connection services originally requested by the user and the device.
”
Percentage of devices that have encryption enabled by operating system
In relation to encryption, we can see the proportion of Android devices not being encrypted is falling, but it is still at a considerably high level.
Android Only 2016 2017
Enterprise 57.8% 43.1%
Individual or Consumer 57.7% 45.5%
iOS provides encryption by default, as has Android in recent
years. However, it is still a potential risk for older versions of operating systems, if they are still in use and remain unen
-
crypted. Encryption is key to ensuring data on a device is not exposed if it becomes lost or stolen.
Recommendations
Since user behavior is such a huge factor in mobile security, user education is one of the most important things an organi
-
zation can do to minimize the threat posed by mobile devices. Users should know to only install apps from the primary app stores, and don’t click on untrusted links or approve device permissions and accesses without good reason.Facts
and
Figures03SectionBack to Table of ContentsFACTS AND
FIGURES
CONTENTS03
Malware
Web Threats
Email
VulnerabilitiesTargeted Attacks
Mobile Threats
Internet of ThingsFraud and the Underground EconomyFacts and FiguresFacts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 57
ISTR March 2018 03
Malware
Key findings
|Coin mining was the biggest growth area in cyber crime in
2017, with antivirus detections up 8,500 percent.
|Ransomware infections are up 40 percent in 2017, driven
primarily by WannaCry ( Ransom.Wannacry ).
|The number of ransomware variants is up 46 percent,
despite fewer new families emerging, indicating intensify -
ing activity by established groups.
|Emotet ( Trojan.Emotet ), a new player in banking threats,
remerged in late 2017; detections increased 2,000 percent
in the final quarter.
|Script and macro downloaders increased by 92 percent,
as they continue to be aggressively propagated in order to install ransomware and banking threats.
|Overall malware variants are up by 88 percent; however,
these numbers are inflated by a single threat type.
New malware variants
The growth in malware variants was largely owing to the Kotver Trojan ( Trojan.
Kotver), which accounted for 78 percent of the new variants in 2017.
Year New Variants Percent Change
2015 355,419,881 -
2016 357,019,453 0.5
2017 669,947,865 87.7
New malware variants on Mac
The number of Mac malware variants was dominated by JS.Webcoinminer
variants, which accounted for 60 percent of this number in 2017.
Year New Variants Percent Change
2016 772,018 -
2017 1,390,261 80.1New malware variants per month
Early 2017 was dominated by a large number of new variants
related to the Kotver Trojan.
20406080100
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANMillion
Top new malware variants per month
Variants of the Kotver Trojan accounted for the majority of new malware
variants in 2017.
20406080100
XM.Mailcab@mm
WS.Reputation.1W32.Sality.AEW32.Ramnit!htmlW32.Almanahe.B!inf
VBS.Dunihi!lnkTrojan.Kotver!gm2JS.WebcoinminerHeur.AdvML.CHeur.AdvML.BDEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANMillionFacts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 58
ISTR March 2018 03
Top 10 malware detections
Advanced machine learning heuristics and JavaScript downloaders accounted
for the top three in this list, and are often used to drop other forms of malicious code, malware, and ransomware.
Rank Malware Attacks Blocked Percent
1 Heur.AdvML.C 23,335,068 27.5
2 Heur.AdvML.B 10,408,782 12.3
3 JS.Downloader 2,645,965 3.1
4 Hacktool.Kms 2,318,729 2.7
5 Packed.Dromedan!lnk 1,995,429 2.4
6 W97M.Downloader 1,763,143 2.1
7 Hacktool 1,615,555 1.9
8 ER.Heur!gen1 799,479 0.9
9 VBS.Downloader.B 772,080 0.9
10 Trojan.Mdropper 763,328 0.9
Top 10 malware detections by month
The top 10 list was dominated by advanced machine learning heuristics used to detect new forms of generic malware.
123456
W97M.Downloader
VBS.Downloader.BTrojan.MdropperPacked.Dromedan!lnkJS.Downloader
Heur.AdvML.CHeur.AdvML.BHacktool.KmsHacktoolER.Heur!gen1DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANMillionMalware detections by month
The increase in April and May was related to a growth in generic malware
and downloaders.
101520
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANMillion
Downloader detections
The number of downloaders increased by 91.7 percent in 2017.
Year Attacks Blocked
2015 399,386
2016 1,602,335
2017 3,072,126
Office® macro downloader detections per month
W97M.Downloader - A sharp increase was observed in April and May, stabilizing
at higher levels than previously seen.
50,000100,000150,000200,000250,000300,000350,000400,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANFacts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 59
ISTR March 2018 03
JavaScript downloader detections per month
JS.Downloader - A notable spike was observed in August. The frequency of
JS.Downloader detections is higher than for W97M.Downloader.
100,000200,000300,000400,000500,000600,000700,000800,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
VBScript downloader detections per month
VBS.Downloader - A significant increase began in September and continued
through October and for the duration of the year, peaking in December.
50,000100,000150,000200,000250,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
Malware distribution by operating system
Mac malware attacks rose by 64 percent in 2017, driven by JS.Webcoinminer.
Windows malware attacks grew by 2.5 percent.
Year Mac Windows
2015 1,824,685 300,966,231
2016 2,445,414 161,707,491
2017 4,011,252 165,638,707Mac malware distribution per month
There was a notable increase in attacks against Macs that began at the end of 2016 and accelerated during 2017.
100,000200,000300,000400,000500,000600,000
DNOSAJJMAMFJ
2017DNOSAJJMAMFJ
2016DNOSAJJMAMFJ
2015
New malware variants on Mac endpoints by month
Attacks on Macs were dominated by the growth in JS.Webcoinminer variants
during the final quarter of the year.
50,000100,000150,000200,000250,000300,000350,000
DNOSAJJMAMFJ
2017DNOSAJJMAMFJ
2016
Top new malware variants on Mac endpoints by month
JS.Webcoinminer variants on Mac surged in September and continued to grow.
50,000100,000150,000200,000250,000300,000
W97M.Downloader
W32.Ramnit!htmlTrojan.MalscriptSMG.Heur!genPUA.WASMcoinminer
JS.WebcoinminerJS.NemucodJS.DownloaderHeur.AdvML.BBloodhound.Exploit.33DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANFacts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 60
ISTR March 2018 03
Top malware blocked on Mac endpoints
Although JS.Webcoinminer activity was only significant during the final quarter
of the year, it was still enough to secure third place in the top 10 ranking for the entire year.
Rank Malware Attacks Blocked Percent
1 W97M.Downloader 268,497 6.7
2 Heur.AdvML.B 241,832 6.0
3 JS.Webcoinminer 184,944 4.6
4 OSX.Malcol.2 148,872 3.7
5 OSX.Malcol 145,886 3.6
6 JS.Downloader 130,854 3.3
7 Trojan.Mdropper 79,438 2.0
8 VBS.Downloader.B 82,216 2.0
9 JS.Downloader.D 61,149 1.5
10 W97M.Downloader.M 51,432 1.3
Top malware blocked on Mac endpoints by month
W97M.Downloader and JS.Webcoinminer activity overshadowed the Mac threat landscape in 2017.
50,000100,000150,000200,000250,000
W97M.Downloader.M
W97M.DownloaderVBS.Downloader.BTrojan.MdropperOSX.Malcol.2
OSX.MalcolJS.WebcoinminerJS.Downloader.DJS.DownloaderHeur.AdvML.BDEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANPercentage of malware that uses SSL
Malware that used SSL to encrypt its communications increased
from 2.8 percent to 4.5 percent in 2017.
Year Percent
2016 2.8
2017 4.5
Ransomware
New ransomware variants
The number of new ransomware variants increased by 45 percent in 2017.
Year New Variants
2016 241,021
2017 350,496
Ransomware detections by year
The number of ransomware attacks blocked in 2017 grew by 41 percent.
Year Attacks Blocked
2016 482,833
2017 678,497
Enterprise vs. consumer ransomware detections
59 percent of ransomware attacks were against businesses in 2017. This was
largely because the WannaCry (Ransom.Wannacry) attacks affected mainly enterprises than consumers.
Year Consumer Enterprise
2017 281,325 396,764Facts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 61
ISTR March 2018 03
Ransomware detections by country
Typically, ransomware has been more dominant in countries with higher
numbers of internet-connected populations.
Rank Country Percent
1 United States 18.2
2 China 12.2
3 Japan 10.7
4 India 8.9
5 Italy 4.1
6 Germany 3.4
7 Brazil 3.1
8 Mexico 2.5
9 United Kingdom 2.3
10 Canada 2.1
Ransomware detections by country per month
Ransomware attacks against Japan spiked between May and June, while attacks in China grew during the same period, but remained higher for the remainder of the year.
10,00020,00030,00040,00050,000
United States
United KingdomMexicoJapanItaly
IndiaGermanyChinaCanadaBrazilDEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANRansomware detections by month
Following the spike in May, ransomware attacks continued to increase
at a steady rate during the remainder of the year.
20,00040,00060,00080,000100,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
New ransomware variants by month
The general trend for the number of ransomware variants discovered
each month indicates an overall increase as the year progressed.
10,00020,00030,00040,00050,000
DNOSAJJMAMF JAN
2017DNOSAJJMAMF JAN
2016
Enterprise vs. consumer ransomware detections by month
Although ransomware attacks against consumers dominated in the early part of
2017, attacks against enterprises dominated following the WannaCry
outbreak in May.
10,00020,00030,00040,00050,00060,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANEnterprise ConsumerFacts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 62
ISTR March 2018 03
New ransomware families
The number of new ransomware families returned to previous levels,
following a very active year in 2016.
102030405060708090100
2017 2016 2015 201430 3098
28
Average ransom demand
The average value of a ransomware demand fell to $522 in 2017, following
a peak of $1,071 in 2016. In part this may be affected by the volatility in cryptocurrency values towards the end of 2017. Ransomware demands were often advertised in U.S. dollars, with payment requested in the equivalent
value in Bitcoin or Monero, for example.
2004006008001,000$1,200
2017 2016 2015 2014$372$294$1,071
$522Coinminers
New coinminer variants
JS.Webcoinminer produced the greatest number of coin-mining malware
variants in this list, towards the end of the year.
123456
Trojan.Coinliteminer
Trojan.CoinbitminerSONAR.Coinbitminer!g1PUA.WASMcoinminer
PUA.GyplyraminerPUA.BitcoinminerOSX.CoinbitminerJS.WebcoinminerDEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANMillion
Coinminer detections by month
Before the surge that began in September, cryptocurrency mining malware was
not particularly notable, with detections numbering in the tens of thousands, quickly rising to hundreds of thousands, and peaking at 1.6 million in December.
500,0001,000,0001,500,0002,000,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANFacts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 63
ISTR March 2018 03
Top coin miner detections by month
JS.Webcoinminer accounted for the greatest number of coin-mining
malware detections in 2017, particularly after September.
500,0001,000,0001,500,0002,000,000
Trojan.Coinliteminer
Trojan.Coinbitminer
Trojan.Badminer
SONAR.Coinbitminer!g1PUA.Zcashminer
PUA.WASMcoinminerPUA.GyplyraminerPUA.Bitcoinminer
OSX.Coinbitminer
JS.WebcoinminerDEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
Top coinminer detections
JS.Webcoinminer was the most frequently blocked coin-mining
malware in 2017.
Rank Coin mining Malware Percent
1 JS.Webcoinminer 82.6
2 PUA.Bitcoinminer 6.9
3 Trojan.Coinbitminer 5.7
4 PUA.WASMcoinminer 4.6
5 PUA.Gyplyraminer 0.2
Top coinminer detections on Mac by month
JS.Webcoinminer also dominated on the Mac platform, after September.
20,00040,00060,00080,000100,000120,000
Trojan.Coinbitminer
Trojan.BadminerPUA.ZcashminerPUA.WASMcoinminerPUA.BitcoinminerOSX.CoinbitminerJS.WebcoinminerDEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANCoinminer variants on Mac by month
The rapid growth in the number of variants of JS.Webcoinminer was
also observed on Mac, most notably towards the end of the year.
50,000100,000150,000200,000250,000300,000
Trojan.Coinbitminer
PUA.WASMcoinminerPUA.Bitcoinminer
OSX.CoinbitminerJS.WebcoinminerDEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
Enterprise vs. consumer coinminer detections by month
Coin-mining malware attacks on Mac were more frequently identified on
consumer hardware, especially related to JS.Webcoinminer.
200,000400,000600,000800,0001,000,0001,200,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANEnterprise Consumer
Financial Trojans
Financial Trojans by month
A new Emotet variant emerged in November, making use of certain Windows
API features seeking to evade detection and anti-sandboxing techniques.
40,00050,00060,00070,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANFacts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 64
ISTR March 2018 03
Top financial Trojans by month
Ramnit ( W32.Ramnit) and Zbot ( Trojan.Zbot) were the most prevalent
financial malware in 2017.
10,00020,00030,00040,00050,00060,00070,00080,000
Zbot
Trickybot
Snifula
ShylockRetefe
Ramnit
PandexEmotetCridexBeblohDEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN
Top financial Trojans
Although it only appeared in November, Emotet was quick to secure
fifth place in the top malware list for all of 2017.
Rank Threat Names Percent
1 Ramnit 53.0
2 Zbot 25.8
3 Cridex 4.6
4 Trickybot 4.3
5 Emotet 4.0
6 Shylock 2.1
7 Bebloh 1.7
8 Snifula 1.3
9 Pandex 1.2
10 Retefe 0.7
Virtual-machine-aware malware
The percentage of new malware that are virtual-machine-aware by year.
Year Percentage
2014 20.1
2015 16.4
2016 19.8
2017 18.0Web threats
Key findings
|1 in 13 URLs analyzed at the gateway were found to be
malicious. In 2016 this number was 1 in 20.
|There was a 62 percent increase in overall botnet activity
identified at the gateway.
|As the year progressed, web attacks blocked at the
endpoint trended upwards driven by coin-mining activity.
|There was a 448 percent increase in exploit kit activity
blocked at the endpoint.
Web attacks blocked
This shows the total number of web attacks blocked in 2017,
and corresponding average number per day.
Year Total Web Attacks BlockedAverage Web Attacks
Blocked per Day
2017 223,066,372 611,141
Web attacks blocked per day
As the year ended, the number of web attacks blocked each day
was more than double the number at the start of the year.
200,000400,000600,000800,0001,000,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANFacts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 65
ISTR March 2018 03
Web attacks blocked per month
The peak level of malicious activity took place in October,
when more than 27.7 million web attacks were blocked.
51015202530
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANMillion
Classification of most frequently exploited websites
The “Malware” classification identifies websites that are known for harboring
malware, and accounted for 15.9 percent of web-based malware blocked. The “Dynamic” classification relates to domains that use dynamic DNS services, and accounted for 13.2 percent of malicious websites in 2017.
RankDomain
Categories2016 (%) 2017 (%)Percentage
Point
Difference
1 Malware 1.4 15.9 14.5
2 Dynamic < 0.1 13.2 13.2
3 Technology 20.7 11.5 -9.2
4 Business 11.3 7.5 -3.7
5 Hosting 7.2 6.9 -0.3
6 Gambling 2.8 6.7 3.9
7 Health 5.7 4.8 -0.9
8 Shopping 4.2 3.8 -0.3
9 Educational 4.1 3.1 -1.0
10 Travel 3.6 2.8 -0.8URLs analyzed per day
Symantec WebPulse URL classification and reputation analysis service scanned 1.07 billion URLs per day in 2017.
Year Total Percent Change
2016 1,020,000,000 -
2017 1,076,000,000 5.5
* Out of a total 6 billion web analysis requests. The number used for analysis is sourced
from the WebPulse URL Reputation Service and does not include requests from Symantec
Web Security Service and other sources
Percentage of malicious traffic in web traffic
In 2017 the number of malicious URLs grew by 2.8 percent,
with 7.8 percent (1 in 13) of all URLs identified as malicious.
Year TotalPercent of
TotalRatioPercentage
Point
Change
2016 50,675,406 5 1 in 20 -
2017 83,351,181 7.8 1 in 13 2.8Facts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 66
ISTR March 2018 03
Percentage of botnet traffic in web traffic
The number of URLs resulting from bot-related traffic, such as that used for
command and control, grew by 62.3 percent, accounting for 14.7 percent
(1 in 88) of all malicious URLs in 2017.
Year Per DayPercent of All
URLs/DayRatioPercent of
Malicious URLsRatio Percent ChangePercentage
Point
Change
2016 7,567,271 0.7 1 in 135 14.9 1 in 7 - -
2017 12,281,279 1.1 1 in 88 14.7 1 in 7 62.3 -0.2
Percentage of phishing URL traffic in web traffic
The number of URLs related to phishing activity rose by 182.6 percent,
which accounted for 5.8 percent (1 in 224) of all malicious URLs in 2017.
Year Per DayPercent of All
URLs/DayRatioPercent of
Malicious URLsRatio Percent ChangePercentage
Point
Change
2016 1,699,214 0.2 1 in 600 3.4 1 in 30 - -
2017 4,802,409 0.5 1 in 224 5.8 1 in 17 182.6 2.4
Email threats
Key findings
|The disappearance of Necurs ( Backdoor.Necurs ) in the
first quarter of the year led to a decline in email malware
from 1 in 131 in 2016 to 1 in 412 in 2017.
|The Necurs botnet sent out almost 15 million malicious
emails in 2017, 82.5 percent of which were sent in the second half of the year.
|7,710 organizations are hit by a BEC scam every month.
Email malware
Overall email malware rate
In 2017, the rate for email-borne malware fell to 1 in 412 (0.2 percent),
from 1 in 131 (0.8 percent) in 2016.
Year 1 in
2015 220
2016 131
2017 412URL malware rate
In 2017, the proportion of email-borne malware that comprised a malicious URL,
rather than an attachment, grew by 10.7 percentage points to 12.3 percent.
Year Percent of Email Malware
2016 1.6
2017 12.3
Monthly email malware rate
This chart shows the gradual decline in email-borne malware through 2017.
800700600500400300200
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN1 inFacts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 67
ISTR March 2018 03
Monthly URL malware rate
This chart shows the proportion of email-borne malware using a malicious link
rather than an attachment.
5101520
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN% of Email Malware
Malicious emails per user
Although the overall rate fell slightly in 2017, the number of malicious emails
sent to the average user each month increased from 9 in January, to 16 by the end of the year.
51015202530
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANMalicious Emails per UserEmail malware rate by industry
The highest rate of email-borne malware was for the organizations in the Public
Administration sector. Many organizations potentially suffered much higher rates than the global annual average.
Rank Industry 1 in
1 Public Administration 120
2 Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 211
3 Mining 273
4 Wholesale Trade 364
5 Manufacturing 384
6 Services 400
7 Nonclassifiable Establishments 437
8 Construction 472
9 Transportation & Public Utilities 486
10 Retail Trade 489
11 Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 612
URL malware rate by industry
Malware destined for organizations in the Construction industry had the highest rate of malware in links vs. attachments, with 27.2 percent of
malware comprising a link instead of an attachment.
Rank IndustryPercent of Email
Malware
1 Construction 27.2
2 Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 21.5
3 Retail Trade 19.4
4 Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 16.6
5 Mining 13.3
6 Public Administration 11.6
7 Transportation & Public Utilities 11.5
8 Services 10.6
9 Manufacturing 9.5
10 Nonclassifiable Establishments 9.5
11 Wholesale Trade 9.1Facts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 68
ISTR March 2018 03
Email malware per user by industry
During 2017, approximately 53 email viruses were sent to the average
user in the Public Administration sector.
Rank IndustryEmail Malware
per User
1 Public Administration 53.1
2 Wholesale Trade 34.4
3 Mining 30.0
4 Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 26.5
5 Manufacturing 25.5
6 Nonclassifiable Establishments 21.8
7 Retail Trade 19.9
8 Construction 18.1
9 Services 12.1
10 Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 9.1
11 Transportation & Public Utilities 8.7
Email malware rate by company size
Some of the lowest email malware rates were for organizations
in the large enterprise category (2,500+ employees).
Company Size 1 in
1-250 376
251-500 306
501-1000 425
1001-1500 244
1501-2500 355
2501+ 512URL malware rate by company size
Large enterprises and small businesses were affected equally by the proportion
of email-borne malware that comprised a malicious link.
Company Size Percent of Email Malware
1-250 12.8
251-500 8.1
501-1000 15.0
1001-1500 11.4
1501-2500 10.9
2501+ 12.9
Email malware per user by company size
The average user both in large enterprises and small businesses was targeted by a similar number of viruses during 2017 (10 and 9 respectively).
Company Size 1 in
1-250 9
251-500 6
501-1000 5
1001-1500 3
1501-2500 4
2501+ 10Facts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 69
ISTR March 2018 03
Email malware rate by country
Austria was the country that had the highest email malware rate in 2017,
with 1 in 102 emails received in the country blocked as malicious.
Rank Country 1 in
1 Austria 102
2 Hungary 108
3 Indonesia 140
4 Oman 156
5 Saudi Arabia 175
6 Netherlands Antilles 184
7 Malaysia 216
8 Kuwait 217
9 South Africa 233
10 Taiwan 234
URL malware rate by country
Ireland, Australia, and New Zealand had the highest proportion of malicious
email-borne links in 2017.
Rank CountryPercent of Email
Malware
1 Ireland 32.4
2 Australia 26.7
3 New Zealand 26.3
4 Brazil 23.1
5 Norway 18.0
6 United Kingdom 16.8
7 Mexico 16.4
8 Sweden 16.1
9 Finland 11.5
10 Canada 11.4Top malicious email themes
This table shows the most common themes used in email malware subject lines.
Rank Subject Topic Percent
1 Bill 15.9
2 Email Delivery Failure 15.3
3 Legal/Law Enforcement 13.2
4 Scanned Document 11.5
5 Package Delivery 3.9
Keywords used in malware spam campaigns
The most frequently used words in malicious emails included, “delivery,”
“mail,” “message,” and “sender.”
Rank Words Percent
1 delivery 12.1
2 mail 11.8
3 message 11.3
4 sender 11.2
5 your 11.2
6 returning 7.6
7 failed: 7.6
8 invoice 6.9
9 images 6.6
10 scanned 6.5Facts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 70
ISTR March 2018 03
Payloads used in malware spam campaigns
Visual Basic Script and JavaScript were among the most common type of
malicious attachments in 2017.
Rank File Type Percent
1 .vbs 27.7
2 .js 21.4
3 .exe 18.6
4 .jar 9.8
5 .docx, .doc, .dot 3.9
6 .html, htm 3.5
7 .wsf 3.4
8 .pdf 3.3
9 .xml 1.7
10 .rtf 1.5
Payloads used in malware spam campaigns by month
This chart shows the growth of different malware attachment types over time, and the increased use of VBS-based attacks in the latter half of 2017.
246810
.xml
.wsf.vbs.rtf.pdf
.js.jar.html, .htm.exe.docx, .doc, .dotDEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANMillionPayload types used in malware spam campaigns
Malicious scripts accounted for 61.4 percent of malicious attachments.
Executables are typically easier to block and are often disabled by default
for many email applications.
Rank File Type Percent
1 Scripts 61.4
2 Executables 29.6
3 Other 7.6
Phishing
Average number of companies targeted by BEC scams
Business email compromise (BEC) scams could have potentially
affected 7,700 organizations in 2017 were these attacks not blocked.
Year Average
2017 7,710
BEC emails received per organization
Each of these targeted organizations was attacked
an average of 4.9 times during 2017.
Year Average
2017 4.9Facts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 71
ISTR March 2018 03
Top subject lines in BEC scam emails
Analysis of the BEC emails shows that the most frequently occurring words
included, “payment,” “urgent,” “request,” and “attention.”
Rank Subject Percent
1 payment 13.8
2 urgent 9.1
3 request 6.7
4 attention 6.1
5 important 4.8
6 confidential 2.0
7 immediate response 1.9
8 transfer 1.8
9 important update 1.7
10 attn 1.5
Overall phishing rate
The phishing rate declined from 1 in 2,596 in 2016 to 1 in 2,995 in 2017.
Year 1 in
2015 1,846
2016 2,596
2017 2,995
Monthly phishing rate
The phishing rate increased during 2017, recovering from an early dip
at the start of the year.
10,0008,0006,0004,0002,000
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN1 inEmail users sent phishing attempts per month
As the year progressed, the average number of users per phishing attack
increased, following a dip around March. In January, 1 in 53 users were sent
a phishing attack, compared with 1 in 33 by the end of the year.
150120906030
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN1 in
Phishing rate by industry
Many types of industry had phishing rates that were much higher than the
global average, with the highest rate for organizations in the Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing sector.
Rank Industry 1 in
1 Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 2,212
2 Nonclassifiable Establishments 2,240
3 Public Administration 2,418
4 Mining 2,453
5 Services 2,737
6 Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 3,013
7 Manufacturing 3,998
8 Retail Trade 4,353
9 Wholesale Trade 4,406
10 Construction 4,667
11 Transportation & Public Utilities 5,567Facts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 72
ISTR March 2018 03
Email users sent phishing attempts by industry
Nonclassifiable Establishments, Mining, and Wholesale Trade had the highest
ratio of users per phishing attack in 2017.
Rank Industry 1 in
1 Nonclassifiable Establishments 24
2 Mining 30
3 Wholesale Trade 35
4 Public Administration 38
5 Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 39
6 Manufacturing 41
7 Retail Trade 45
8 Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 54
9 Construction 55
10 Services 57
11 Transportation & Public Utilities 131
Phishing rate by company size
For organizations that could be classified by size, the phishing rate
appeared to be much lower than the global average.
Company Size 1 in
1-250 3,111
251-500 3,539
501-1000 3,844
1001-1500 7,173
1501-2500 3,854
2501+ 3,019Email users sent phishing attempts by company size
The ratio of users per phishing attack was highest in 501-1,000, and 1,500-2,500 sized organizations, where 1 in 41 and 1 in 42 email users was targeted, respectively.
Company Size 1 in
1-250 72
251-500 64
501-1000 41
1001-1500 75
1501-2500 42
2501+ 58
Phishing rate by country
The phishing rate in South Africa was the highest in world ranking for 2017, where 1 in 785 emails was a phishing attack.
Rank Country 1 in
1 South Africa 785
2 Netherlands 1,298
3 Malaysia 1,359
4 Hungary 1,569
5 Portugal 1,671
6 Austria 1,675
7 Taiwan 1,906
8 Brazil 2,117
9 Indonesia 2,380
10 Singapore 2,422Facts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 73
ISTR March 2018 03
Spam
Overall spam rate
The percentage of email determined to be spam increased by 1.2 percentage
points in 2017.
Year Percent
2015 52.7
2016 53.4
2017 54.6
Monthly spam rate
Spam levels were much higher in the latter half of 2017, peaking at 55.5 percent in November.
52.052.553.053.554.054.555.055.556.0
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANPercent
Amount of spam per user
In 2017, the average number of spam emails per user each month increased
from 63 in January to 67 in December.
50607080
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANSpam per UserSpam rate by industry
The Mining industry had the highest spam rate for 2017, with 58.8 percent
of emails identified as spam.
Rank Industry Percent
1 Mining 58.8
2 Construction 56.9
3 Manufacturing 55.9
4 Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 55.2
5 Nonclassifiable Establishments 54.6
6 Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 54.5
7 Transportation & Public Utilities 53.9
8 Services 53.7
9 Public Administration 53.4
10 Retail Trade 53.3
11 Wholesale Trade 53.1
Amount of spam per user by industry
In contrast, recipients in the Wholesale Trade sector had the highest average
number of spam emails per user per month. Similarly, for Manufacturing and Retail, the number of employees that have an active email account in these sectors is comparatively low, with higher numbers of blue-collar workers.
Rank Industry Spam per User
1 Wholesale Trade 125.8
2 Manufacturing 103.5
3 Nonclassifiable Establishments 98.2
4 Retail Trade 98.1
5 Construction 91.8
6 Mining 91.0
7 Public Administration 64.2
8 Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 58.5
9 Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 57.9
10 Services 49.1
11 Transportation & Public Utilities 43.3Facts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 74
ISTR March 2018 03
Spam rate by company size
Many larger organizations had higher spam rates in 2017.
Company Size Percent
1-250 54.9
251-500 52.8
501-1000 53.9
1001-1500 56.4
1501-2500 52.9
2501+ 54.7
Amount of spam per user by company size
Email recipients within small businesses potentially received fewer spam
emails than their counterparts working at larger organizations.
Company Size Spam per User
1-250 45.2
251-500 55.4
501-1000 95.2
1001-1500 101.8
1501-2500 92.2
2501+ 54.0
Spam rate by country
This list shows the countries with the highest spam rates in 2017.
Rank Country Percent
1 Saudi Arabia 69.9
2 China 68.6
3 Brazil 64.7
4 Sri Lanka 64.6
5 Hungary 60.4
6 Kuwait 59.8
7 Oman 58.9
8 South Africa 57.1
9 Norway 56.9
10 United Arab Emirates 56.3Vulnerabilities
Key findings
|While major vulnerabilities such as EternalBlue, Meltdown,
and Spectre made headlines, vulnerability disclosures
across the board were up in 2017. This doesn’t necessarily
translate to a rise in exploits, and may be indicative of the
popularity of bug bounty programs.
Total number of vulnerabilities
This shows a 13 percent increase in the number of reported vulnerabilities
recorded in 2017.
2,0004,0006,0008,00010,000
2017 2016 20158,0777,6928,718
Zero-day vulnerabilities
There was an increase of 7 percent in the number of zero-day vulnerabilities
recorded in 2017.
1,0002,0003,0004,0005,000
2017 2016 20154,066 3,9864,262Facts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 75
ISTR March 2018 03
Vulnerabilities disclosed in industrial control systems
There was an increase of 29 percent in the number of recorded vulnerabilities
affecting industrial control system (ICS) technology in 2017.
50100150200250
2017 2016 2015200
165212
Browser vulnerabilities
The number of recorded vulnerabilities affecting Safari rose by 14 percent
in 2017. The number related to Firefox fell by 29 percent. Edge and Internet Explorer vulnerabilities were down by 23 percent, and those affecting Chrome were down by 9 percent.
2004006008001,0001,200
Opera
Google ChromeMicrosoft Internet Explorer/EdgeMozilla FirefoxApple Safari2017 2016 2015Targeted attacks
Key findings
|90 percent of targeted attack groups are motivated by
intelligence gathering.
|Over the past three years, the most active groups compro -
mised an average of 42 organizations.
|71 percent of groups use spear-phishing emails as the
primary infection vector.
|The U.S. was the most targeted country in the past three
years, accounting for 27 percent of all targeted attack
activity.
|The number of organizations affected by targeted attacks
increase by 10 percent in 2017.
Number of new targeted attack groups discovered by year
140 distinct groups were known to be conducting targeted attacks in 2017,
a 15.7 percent increase since 2016.
306090120150
2017 2016 201587121140
Targeted attack groups exposed by Symantec
Since 2009, a total of 28 different targeted attack groups have been
identified by Symantec.
123456
2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009Facts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 76
ISTR March 2018 03
Motives of targeted attack groups
The vast majority of attacks (90 percent) appeared to have been designed to
gather intelligence from targeted organizations.
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100%
FinancialDisruptionIntelligence
Gathering 90.0%
11.4%
9.3%
Number of motives per group
Further analysis revealed that for 85 percent of attacks,
only one motive was involved.
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100%
Three MotivesTwo MotivesOne MotiveNo Known
Motive 2.9%
85.0%
10.7%
1.4%
Infection vectors
In 2017, 71.4 percent of targeted attacks involved the use
of spear-phishing emails.
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100%
Web Server
ExploitsTrojanized
Software
UpdatesWatering Hole
WebsitesSpear-Phishing
Emails 71.4%
23.6%
5.7%
2.9%Infection vectors used per group
Only one infection vector was used in 60 percent of targeted attacks in 2017.
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100%
Three VectorsTwo VectorsOne VectorUnknown
Vector(s) 20.0%
60.0%
16.4%
3.6%
Countries most affected by targeted attack groups
This table shows the geographic locations that were the most frequent
focus of targeted attacks in 2017.
Rank Country Total
1 U.S. 303
2 India 133
3 Japan 87
4 Taiwan 59
5 Ukraine 49
6 South Korea 45
7 Brunei 34
8 Russia 32
9 Vietnam 29
10 Pakistan 22Facts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 77
ISTR March 2018 03
Lateral movement techniques
In 2017, 7.1 percent of targeted attacks used stolen credentials as a lateral
movement technique. Lateral movement concerns the techniques used to traverse a compromised network, searching for other exploits and valuable data that can be utilized and stolen.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10%
Stolen
CredentialsPass the HashOpen Share 4.3%
5.7%
7.1%
Lateral movement techniques per group
Referring to lateral movement, 12.9 percent of attacks used only one lateral movement technique in 2017.
2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16%
Two Lateral
MovementsOne Lateral
Movement
2.1%12.9%
Number of organizations affected
by targeted attacks per year
The number of organizations targeted increased by 11.1 percent
in 2017, to 532.
450 460 470 480 490 500 510 520 530 540
201720162015532
479
528Other attack group numbers
The lowest number of tools used by attack groups was one, in contrast
to the highest number, 18, used by the Lazarus group.
Average number of tools used by groups 3.6
Average number of organizations targeted per group (over three years)42
Average number of individuals targeted per group (over three years)65
Percentage of groups known to use zero-day vulnerabilities27%
Percentage of groups known to use destructive malware 6%
Mobile threats
Key findings
|The number of new discovered mobile malware variants
grew by 54 percent from 2016 to 2017
|In 2017 an average of 24,000 malicious mobile applica -
tions were blocked on devices per day.
|27 percent of malicious apps were found in the Lifestyle
category, followed by Music & Audio with 20 percent.
|63 percent of the grayware apps in 2017 leaked the
phone number and 37 percent reveal the phones physical
location.
|77.3 percent of the iOS devices had the newest major
version installed in 2017, a drop of 2.1 percent from 2016. With Android only 20 percent of the devices were running
the newest major version, but there was an increase of 5
percent from 2016.
New mobile malware variants
In 2017, the number of new mobile malware variants increased by 54 percent.
Year New Variants
2016 17,214
2017 26,579Facts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 78
ISTR March 2018 03
Number of blocked apps
Approximately 23,795 malicious app were blocked each day in 2017.
Year Blocked Malware per Day
2017 23,795
Most common app categories for malware
27.3 percent of malicious apps were categorized as Lifestyle apps,
followed by 19.7 percent categorized as Music & Audio apps.
Rank Category Percent Malware
1 Lifestyle 27.3
2 Music & Audio 19.7
3 Books & Reference 9.9
4 Entertainment 6.2
5 Tools 5.5
6 House & Home 4.5
7 Education 3.9
8 Art & Design 3.7
9 Photography 2.7
10 Casual Games 2.2
Sensitive information leaked by apps
63 percent of mobile apps leaked users’ phone numbers,
and 37 percent revealed devices’ physical locations.
Type of Information Leaked Percent
Phone Number 63.0
Location Info 37.0
Installed App Info 35.0Keeping devices up to date
77.3 percent of iOS devices had the newest major version installed in 2017, a
drop of 2.1 percent. With Android, only 20 percent of the devices were running the newest major version, with an increase of 5 percent from 2016.
YeariOS Devices Using
Newest Major Version
(Percent)Android Devices Using
Newest Major Version
(Percent)
2016 79.4 15.0
2017 77.3 20.0
New mobile malware families
The number of new mobile malware families increased by 12.2 percent
between 2016 and 2017.
330340350360370380390400410
2017 2016361405
New mobile grayware families
The number of new mobile grayware families grew by 5.3 percent in 2017.
182184186188190192194196198200
2017 2016188198Facts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 79
ISTR March 2018 03
New mobile grayware variants
The number of new mobile grayware variants increased by 19.6 percent 2017.
2,7002,8002,9003,0003,1003,2003,3003,4003,5003,6003,700
2017 20163,0553,655
Mobile ransomware
The number of ransomware apps blocked each month in 2017.
Year Average Number of Ransomware Blocked per Month
2017 3,510
Biggest source of mobile malware
The vast majority of mobile malware was found in third-party app stores.
Year Malware Found in Third-Party App Stores (Percent)
2017 99.9
Top Android threats
Top 10 list of most frequently blocked Android malware in 2017.
Rank Threat Name Percent
1 Malapp 20.2
2 FakeInst 16.4
3 Premiumtext 11.2
4 MalDownloader 10.0
5 Simplocker 8.8
6 Fakeapp 8.5
7 SmsBlocker 7.1
8 Mobilespy 4.8
9 Smsstealer 2.0
10 Opfake 1.9Top countries for mobile malware
Top 10 list of countries where mobile malware was most frequently
blocked in 2017.
Ukraine 2%
China 2%
Indonesia 3%
Russia 3%
Canada 3%
Japan 5%
Austria 6%
Germany 9%
India 11%U.S.
57%
Jailbroken or rooted devices
This shows the proportion of devices that are jailbroken or rooted is gradually
diminishing, but remains a key indicator of compromise.
Year OS Enterprise Consumer
2016 iOS 1 in 10,839 1 in 694
Android 1 in 254 1 in 92
2017 iOS 1 in 14,351 1 in 1,658
Android 1 in 1,589 1 in 281
Devices protected by passwords
Approximately 5 percent of enterprise devices were not password protected, compared with almost 10 percent of consumer devices.
Year Enterprise (Percent) Consumer (Percent)
2016 84.1 70.0
2017 95.2 90.5
Exposure to network threats
This shows the cumulative exposure to network threats over time. In 2017, 1 in 5 devices were exposed to attacks in their first month of use, rising to 3 in 7 after four months.
Devices exposed to
network attacks after1 month 2 months 3 months 4 months
2016 21.6 31.2 38.6 44.3
2017 21.2 30.7 37.7 43.7Facts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 80
ISTR March 2018 03
Internet of things
Key findings
|There was a 600 percent increase in IoT attacks from 2016
to 2017.
|More than half of the attempted attacks against IoT
devices targeted the Telnet service.
IoT attacks by source country
This table shows the country of origin, based on IP address,
of the attacking devices.
Rank Country2017
PercentCountry2016
Percent
1 China 21 China 22.2
2 United States 10.6 United States 18.7
3 Brazil 6.9 Vietnam 6
4Russian
Federation6.4Russian
Federation5.5
5 India 5.4 Germany 4.2
6 Japan 4.1 Netherlands 3
7 Turkey 4.1 United Kingdom 2.7
8 Argentina 3.7 France 2.6
9 South Korea 3.6 Ukraine 2.6
10 Mexico 3.5 Argentina 2.5IoT attacks’ most used user names
This table shows the most frequently attempted login names for attacks
against IoT devices.
Rank 2017 User Name2017
Percent2016 User Name2016
Percent
1 root 40 root 33.5
2 admin 17.3 admin 14.1
3 enable 10.3 DUP root 6
4 shell 10.2 DUP admin 2.1
5 guest 1.5 ubnt 1.3
6 support 1.3 test 1.1
7 user 1.1 oracle 1.1
8 ubnt 0.9 postgres 0.7
9 DUP root 0.6 0.7
10 supervisor 0.5 123321 0.6
IoT attacks’ most used passwords
This table shows the most frequently attempted passwords for attacks
against IoT devices.
Rank 2017 Password2017
Percent 2016 Password 2016
Percent
1 system 10.3 admin 9.5
2 sh 10.2 root 5.8
3 123456 9.1 12345 5
4 admin 3.7 123456 3.7
5 1234 3.1 password 3.2
6 password 2.5 1234 2.4
7 12345 2.5 ubnt 1.7
8 2.3 admin123 1
9 root 2.1 abc123 0.9
10 support 1.2 pass 0.7Facts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 81
ISTR March 2018 03
Top threats detected by IoT honeypot in 2017
This shows the most frequently blocked malware aimed at IoT devices in 2017.
Rank Threat Name Percent
1 Linux.Lightaidra 57.5
2 Trojan.Gen.NPE 10.2
3 Linux.Mirai 8.7
4 Trojan.Gen.NPE.2 4
5 Linux.Kaiten 3.6
6 Downloader.Trojan 3
7 Linux.Gafgyt 2.7
8 Trojan.Gen.8!cloud 2.2
9 SecurityRisk.gen1 1.9
10 Trojan.Gen.6 1.7
Top 10 attacked services for IoT honeypot in Q4 2017
Telnet and HTTP were the most frequently targeted IoT services.
Rank Service Percent
1 Telnet 50.5
2 HTTP 32.4
3 HTTPS 7.7
4 SMB 5.8
5 SSH 2.1
6 UPnP 0.9
7 FTP 0.2
8 CWMP 0.1
9 SNMP 0.1
10 Modbus 0.1Top 10 attacked ports for IoT honeypot in Q4 2017
The most frequently targeted IoT ports in network-based attacks
in the last quarter of 2017.
Rank Port Percent
1 23/tcp (Telnet) 43.1
2 80/tcp (HTTP) 31.6
3 443/tcp (HTTPS) 7.7
4 2323/tcp (Telnet) 7.2
5 445/tcp (SMB) 5.8
6 22/tcp (SSH) 1.9
7 1900/udp (UPnP) 0.9
8 8080/tcp (HTTP) 0.8
9 2222/tcp (SSH) 0.2
10 21/tcp (FTP) 0.2
Top device type performing attacks against IoT honeypot
This table identifies the types of devices involved in the IoT attacks against the
Symantec honeypot in 2017, with routers being the most frequently exploited type of device.
Rank Device Type Percent
1 Router 33.6
2 DVR (Digital Video Recorder) 23.2
3 Network 9.3
4 Satellite Dish 7.3
5 DSL/Cable Modem 7
6 SOHO Router 4.7
7 NAS (Network Attached Storage) 3.6
8 Camera 3.5
9 PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) 3.4
10 Alarm System 1.9Facts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 82
ISTR March 2018 03
Top reputation of device attacking IoT honeypot
Further analysis of the attacking IP addresses reveals that almost half were
not previously blacklisted, or involved with other malicious activity.
Rank Category Percent
1 Not Blacklisted 48.9
2 Bot 17
3 Spam 16.1
4 Attacks 9.8
5 Malware 8.1
Fraud and the underground economy
Key findings
|Bankcard, retail card, and wireless fraud rates are
1.8 times higher than they were in 2014.
|The price of a premium ransomware toolkit ($450) is
currently less than one average ransom ($522).
|Coin-mining toolkits are available on the dark web
for as little as $30.
Confirmed fraud rate
The confirmed fraud rates in the bank card, retail card, and wireless industries
are 1.8 times higher than they were in 2014.
0.10.20.30.40.50.60.70.8%
2017 2016 2015 2014Percent0.4%0.6%0.7%0.7%Fraud attempts
1.2 percent of U.S. credit applications made during 2017 were considered
fraudulent.
1.01.11.2%
2017 2016 2015 2014Percent 1.1%1.1%1.2%1.2%
Pricelist for goods
Although priced in U.S. dollars, payments are often made using cryptocurrencies, such as Bitcoin or Monero, at the daily exchange rate equivalent values.
These prices are taken from publicly accessible underground forums and dark web TOR sites. Closed, private forums tend to have even lower prices. We cannot verify if the goods are genuinely sold for the asked price, some of them might be fake offers.
Credit Cards
The credit card data prices vary heavily depending on the country they are from (U.S. cards are cheaper as there are more available, EU cards are more expensive), the company (Visa®, Mastercard®, American Express®), the level (gold, platinum, business), and the extra information provided, such as date of birth (DoB), Verified by Visa®, Mastercard SecureCode™, etc. Often, the more you take the cheaper it gets (bulk prices).
Single credit card $0.50-25
Single credit card with full details (Fullz) $1-40
Dump of magnetic strip track1/2 data (e.g.
from skimming)$20-60
500 credit cards already used for fraud in the
last week$1
Malware
Common banking Trojan toolkit with support $40-1500
Spyware $15-50
Android banking Trojan $2-500
Office macro downloader generator $5
Cryptocurrency miner & stealer (Monero) $30-300
Ransomware toolkit $5-450
DDoS bot software $1-15Facts and FiguresBack to Table of ContentsPage 83
ISTR March 2018 03
Services
DDoS service, short duration <1 hour, medium
protected targets$5-20
DDoS service, duration >24 hours, medium and
strong protected targets$10-1000
Hacker for hire $100+
Credit score repair $50
Messing up peoples online presence $500
Airplane ticket and hotel bookings 10% of value
Money Transfer Services
Cash redirector service for online money
platforms (Pay $100 in Bitcoin and get a
transfer of $1,000 to your account)1-20% of value
Cash redirector service for bank accounts 2.5-15% of value
Accounts (User Name and Password)
Video and sound streaming accounts $0.10-10
Various services, more than 120+ available
(gaming, food, shopping, etc.)$0.5-10
Online banking accounts 0.5-10% of value
Online money accounts (depending on value
and verification)$10-100
Retail shopping account $5-50
Cloud accounts $5-10
Hacked Gmail accounts $0.1-5
500,000 email accounts with passwords from
data breaches$90
Hotel loyalty/reward program accounts with
100,000 points$10-20
Shopping loyalty accounts with cash points $2-7
VPN services $1-10
Online retailer gift cards15-50% of face
value
Restaurant gift cards15-40% of face
valueIdentities
Identity: Name, SSN, and DOB $0.1-$1.5
Scanned documents (utility bill etc.) $1-3
Fake ID, driver license, passport $10-600
ID/passport scans $1-25
Anonymous IBAN bank account $7 Predictions
04SectionMobile Threat LandscapeBack to Table of ContentsPage 85
ISTR March 2018
Predictions for 2018
Mid-tier mature cloud providers will likely
see the impact of the Meltdown and Spectre vulnerabilities
At the beginning of January 2018, two serious vulnerabilities
were discovered which affected nearly all modern processor chips. Known as Meltdown and Spectre the vulnerabilities
could permit attackers to gain unauthorized access to a computer’s memory.
Meltdown and Spectre can affect all kinds of computers, but
the most worrying possible impact is in the cloud, because
an attack on a single server could lead to the compromise of
multiple virtual machines running on that server.
Chip manufacturers, software vendors, and cloud providers
have all been working hard, both before and after the vulnera
-
bilities were disclosed, to ensure patches were in place. While major cloud providers possess the resources to ensure mitiga
-
tions are in place, smaller and less-prepared cloud companies, such as smaller hosting providers, may struggle to respond, leaving their customers exposed.
WannaCry and Petya/NotPetya may inspire
new generation of self-propagating threats
Worms—self-spreading malware—enjoyed their heyday
around the turn of the century. For example, in 2003, the Slammer worm managed to infect most of its victims within
one hour. Until May 2017, it seemed unlikely that another
threat could cause global disruption in the same way.
That all changed with the arrival of WannaCry and Petya/
NotPetya. Both threats were capable of self-propagation largely because they used the EternalBlue exploit. Although
the vulnerability had been patched several months previ
-
ously, there was enough unpatched computers online for both
threats to cause serious disruption.
Attackers will no doubt have noticed how effective both
threats were. EternalBlue’s usefulness may be exhausted at
this stage since most organizations will have patched, but there are other techniques that can be used. Petya/NotPetya employed other SMB spreading techniques using legitimate tools, such as PsExec and Windows Management Instrumen
-
tation Command-line (WMIC), to spread to network shares using stolen credentials. The use of these “living off the land” techniques allow attacks to fly under the radar making them
more appealing to attackers. It’s likely we’ll see an increase in
threats self-propagating using these techniques. IoT attacks will likely diversify as attackers
seek new types of devices to add to botnets
During 2016, we heard a lot about IoT attacks as the Mirai
botnet appeared and caused serious disruption with large DDoS attacks. While IoT attacks weren’t in the headlines
as much in 2017, they certainly haven’t gone away. In fact,
attacks against IoT devices were up by 600 percent last year.
Our current research shows that attackers are still primarily
focused on routers and modems, and are using infected devices to power botnets. Attacks are now so frequent that
botnet operators are fighting over the same pool of devices
and have to configure their malware to identify and remove malware belonging to other botnets.
IoT continues to be plagued by poor security, with default
passwords and unpatched vulnerabilities all too common. Some IoT attackers have already started looking beyond
routers and have begun to target other connected devices
in a serious way.
Coinminer activity will likely continue to grow
but will increase focus on organizations
2017 was the year that cyber criminals cashed in on crypto -
currency mining. Detections of coinminers grew by an aston -
ishing 8,500 percent. This is not surprising considering Bitcoin
prices began the year at just below $1,000 and finished at over $14,000 towards the end of 2017.
Coin-mining attacks are likely to continue into 2018 and
attackers will spend a lot of time and energy discovering more creative and effective forms of attack. Broadly speaking, their strategies will likely follow three directions:
01 Distributed mining, either through conventional botnets
of malware-infected computers and IoT devices or brows-
er-based coinminers, hosted on websites.
02 The second avenue of attack is likely targeting corporate or
organizational networks in order to harness the power of
servers or supercomputers.
03 Finally, cloud services offer the possibility of high-powered
mining. This has a possible financial impact on cloud cus-
tomers where they pay based on CPU usage.
Although the immediate rewards may ostensibly seem lower,
coin mining offers a long-term, passive revenue stream if the miners can remain undiscovered for longer. We believe that
coin-mining activity will increase in the mobile space into 2018
and beyond. We saw an uptick at the end of 2017 and if this proves lucrative, it may grow.Mobile Threat LandscapeBack to Table of ContentsPage 86
ISTR March 2018
All of this is likely dependent on one thing: cryptocurrency
values remaining high. Bitcoin prices have begun to slip backwards in recent months. However, this is perhaps seen as
more of a market adjustment. Bitcoin is not the only crypto
-
currency, and it also depends on how other cryptocurrencies
fare, especially Monero. We believe we will see a shift away from Bitcoin as the lingua franca for cyber crime, perhaps with
alternatives such as Ethereum, Monero, and Zcash gaining
in popularity due to their stronger anonymity. Continued volatility in the Bitcoin market will become a major hindrance, particularly for smaller transactions.
However, if the value of all cryptocurrencies falls back,
attackers will likely quickly lose interest in coin mining. At the
moment, coin mining is more profitable than ransomware, but if cryptocurrencies lose their value, attackers are likely to move on to something more lucrative.
Attacks on critical infrastructure
likely to step up in 2018
Attackers have been exhibiting a growing interest in critical infrastructure in recent years and the scale and persistence of these attacks is now reaching worrying proportions. Our latest
research on the Dragonfly group found that it has continued
to target the energy sector in Europe and North America. For now, Dragonfly appears to be focusing on gaining access to operational systems and gathering as much intelligence as
possible about how these plants operate.
These attacks would likely give Dragonfly the ability to
sabotage or gain control of these systems should it decide to do so. However, it seems unlikely that any group would go to these lengths unless it was prepared to launch disruptive
attacks. Nonetheless, there is a real risk that at some stage
soon, Dragonfly’s masters may decide to play this card. CreditsBack to Table of ContentsPage 87
ISTR March 2018 00
Credits
Team
Gillian Cleary
Mayee Corpin
Orla Cox
Hon LauBenjamin NahorneyDick O’BrienBrigid O’Gorman
John-Paul Power
Scott Wallace
Paul WoodCandid WueestContributors
Shaun AimotoPravin Bange
Albert Cooley
Stephen DohertyBrian DuckeringJames DuffDaniel Grady
Sara Groves
Kevin Haley
Dermot HarnettRobert KeithSean KiernanAnudeep Kumar
Chris Larsen
Carmel MaherMatt NagelAlan NevilleGavin O’Gorman
Hitesh Patel
Yun ShenDennis TanTor SkaarParveen Vashishtha
Pierre-Antoine Vervier
William WrightAbout Symantec
Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC), the world’s leading
cyber security company, helps businesses, governments and
people secure their most important data wherever it lives.
Organizations across the world look to Symantec for strategic, integrated solutions to defend against sophisticated attacks
across endpoints, cloud and infrastructure.
Likewise, a global community of more than 50 million people
and families rely on Symantec’s Norton suite of products for
protection at home and across all of their devices. Symantec operates one of the world’s largest civilian cyber intelligence
networks, allowing it to see and protect against the most
advanced threats.
Further Information
Symantec Managed Security Services: https://www.symantec.com/services/cyber-security-services
DeepSight Intelligence Service: https://www.symantec.com/services/cyber-security-services/deepsight-intelligenceSymantec Messaging Gateway: https://www.symantec.com/products/messaging-gateway
Symantec Email.cloud: https://www.symantec.com/products/email-security-cloud
Symantec’s Advanced Threat Protection for Email: https://www.symantec.com/products/advanced-threat-protection-for-emailSymantec Web Security.cloud: https://www.symantec.com/products/cloud-delivered-web-security-servicesSymantec On-Premise Secure Web Gateway: https://www.symantec.com/products/secure-web-gateway-proxy-sg-and-asg
Symantec CloudSOC: https://www.symantec.com/products/cloud-application-security-cloudsoc
Symantec Endpoint Protection (SEP): https://www.symantec.com/products/endpoint-protectionSEP Mobile: https://www.symantec.com/products/endpoint-protection-mobileNorton: https://www.norton.com
ID Analytics: https://www.idanalytics.com/
|
ISTR
Internet Security Threat Report
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FACTS AND FIGURES METHODOLOGY1
BIG NUMBERS2
YEAR-IN-REVIEW
TABLE OF
CONTENTS
Formjacking
Cryptojacking
Ransomware
Living off the land
and supply chain attacks
Targeted attacks
Cloud
IoT
Election interferenceMessaging
Malware
Mobile
Web attacks
Targeted attacks
IoT
Underground economyMALICIOUS URLS
ONE IN TEN
URLS ARE MALICIOUSWEB ATTACKS
56%4,800AVERAGE NUMBER OF WEBSITES COMPROMISED
WITH FORMJACKING CODE EACH MONTHFORMJACKING ATTACKS
3.7M BLOCKED
FORMJACKING ATTACKS
ON ENDPOINTSCRYPTOJACKING
$362
JAN DEC8M
MORE CRYPTOJACKING EVENTS
BLOCKED IN 2018 VS 2017,
BUT TRENDING DOWN 4X
90%
DROP IN CRYPTOCURRENCY
VALUE (MONERO)$484M52%
DROP IN CRYPTOJACKING EVENTS
BETWEEN JAN AND DEC 2018 33%ENTERPRISE
RANSOMWARE MOBILE
RANSOMWARE
OVERALL
RANSOMWARE12%
20%UP
DOWNSUPPLY CHAIN
ATTACKS
%POWERSHELL
INCREASE IN
MALICIOUS
POWERSHELL
SCRIPTS1000%MALICIOUS EMAIL
OF MALICIOUS EMAIL ATTACHMENTS
ARE OFFICE FILES, UP FROM 5% IN 201748%NUMBER OF
ATTACK GROUPS
USING DESTRUCTIVE
MALWARE AVERAGE NUMBER
OF ORGANIZATIONS
TARGETED BY EACH
ATTACK GROUP
55%2ISTR 24 | February 2019Year-in-Review 14 Back to ToC
Incidents of formjacking —the use of malicious JavaScript
code to steal credit card details and other information
from payment forms on the checkout web pages of
eCommerce sites—trended upwards in 2018.
Symantec data shows that 4,818 unique websites were
compromised with formjacking code every month in 2018.
With data from a single credit card being sold for up to
$45 on underground markets, just 10 credit cards stolen
from compromised websites could result in a yield of up to
$2.2 million for cyber criminals each month. The appeal of
formjacking for cyber criminals is clear.
Symantec blocked more than 3.7 million formjacking
attempts in 2018, with more than 1 million of those
blocks occurring in the last two months of the year alone.
Formjacking activity occurred throughout 2018, with an
anomalous spike in activity in May (556,000 attempts in
that month alone), followed by a general upward trend in
activity in the latter half of the year.
Much of this formjacking activity has been blamed on
actors dubbed Magecart, which is believed to be several
groups, with some, at least, operating in competition with one another . Magecart is believed to be behind several
high-profile attacks, including those on British Airways and
Ticketmaster , as well as attacks against British electronics
retailer Kitronik and contact lens seller VisionDirect .
This increase in formjacking reflects the general growth
in supply chain attacks that we discussed in ISTR 23, with
Magecart in many cases targeting third-party services in order
to get its code onto targeted websites. In the high-profile
breach of Ticketmaster, for example, Magecart compromised a
third-party chatbot, which loaded malicious code into the web
browsers of visitors to Ticketmaster’s website, with the aim of
harvesting customers’ payment data.
While attacks on household names make headlines,
Symantec’s telemetry shows that it is often small and
medium sized retailers, selling goods ranging from clothing
to gardening equipment to medical supplies, that have had
formjacking code injected onto their websites. This is a global
problem with the potential to affect any business that accepts
payments from customers online.
The growth in formjacking in 2018 may be partially explained
by the drop in the value of cryptocurrencies during the year:
cyber criminals who may have used websites for cryptojacking
may now be opting for formjacking. The value of stolen credit
card details on the cyber underground is probably more
assured than the value of cryptocurrencies in the current
climate.CYBER CRIMINALS TARGET
PAYMENT CARD DATA.ISTR 24 | February 2019Year-in-Review 15 Back to ToC
Cryptojacking—where cyber criminals surreptitiously run
coinminers on victims’ devices without their knowledge
and use their central processing unit (CPU) power to mine
cryptocurrencies—was the story of the final quarter of 2017
and continued to be one of the dominant features in the
cyber security landscape in 2018.
Cryptojacking activity peaked between December 2017 and
February 2018, with Symantec blocking around 8 million
cryptojacking events per month in that period. During 2018,
we blocked more than four times as many cryptojacking
events as in 2017—almost 69 million cryptojacking events
in the 12-month period, compared to just over 16 million in
2017. However, cryptojacking activity did fall during the year,
dropping by 52 percent between January and December
2018. Despite this downward trend, we still blocked more
than 3.5 million cryptojacking events in December 2018.
This is still significant activity, despite the fact that
cryptocurrency values—which were at record-breaking
highs at the end of 2017 and played a major role in driving
the initial growth of cryptojacking—dropped significantly in
2018. While this may have led some of the initial adopters of
cryptojacking to turn to other ways to make money, such as
formjacking, it’s clear a significant cohort of cyber criminals still think cryptojacking is worth their time. We also saw some
cryptojacking criminals targeting enterprises in 2018, with
the WannaMine ( MSH.Bluwimps ) cryptojacking script, which
uses the Eternal Blue exploit made famous by WannaCry to
spread through enterprise networks, rendering some devices
unusable due to high CPU usage.
The majority of cryptojacking activity continued to originate
from browser-based coinminers in 2018. Browser-based coin
mining takes place inside a web browser and is implemented
using scripting languages. If a web page contains a coin-
mining script, the web page visitors’ computing power will be
used to mine for cryptocurrency for as long as the web page
is open. Browser-based miners allow cyber criminals to target
even fully patched devices and can also allow them to operate
stealthily without the activity being noticed by victims.
We predicted that cryptojacking activity by cyber criminals
would be largely dependent on cryptocurrency values
remaining high. As cryptocurrency values have fallen, we
have also observed a decline in the volume of cryptojacking
events. However, they haven’t fallen at the same rate as
cryptocurrency values—in 2018, the value of Monero
dropped by almost 90 percent while cryptojacking dropped
by around 52 percent. This means some cyber criminals must
still find it profitable or are biding their time until another
surge in cryptocurrency values. It also shows that there are
other elements of cryptojacking that make it attractive to
cyber criminals, such as the anonymity it offers and the low
barriers to entry. It looks like cryptojacking is an area that will
continue to have a role in the cyber crime landscape.TRENDING DOWN, BUT
CERTAINLY NOT OUT.ISTR 24 | February 2019Year-in-Review 16 Back to ToC
For the first time since 2013, we observed a decrease in
ransomware activity during 2018, with the overall number of
ransomware infections on endpoints dropping by 20 percent.
WannaCry, copycat versions, and Petya, continued to inflate
infection figures. When these worms are stripped out from
the statistics, the drop in infection numbers is steeper: a 52
percent fall.
However, within these overall figures there was one dramatic
change. Up until 2017, consumers were the hardest hit by
ransomware, accounting for the majority of infections. In 2017,
the balance tipped towards enterprises, with the majority
of infections occurring in businesses. In 2018, that shift
accelerated and enterprises accounted for 81 percent of all
ransomware infections. While overall ransomware infections
were down, enterprise infections were up by 12 percent in
2018.
This shift in victim profile was likely due to a decline in exploit
kit activity, which was previously an important channel for
ransomware delivery. During 2018, the chief ransomware
distribution method was email campaigns. Enterprises tend to
be more affected by email-based attacks since email remains
the primary communication tool for organizations.
Alongside this, a growing number of consumers are exclusively
using mobile devices, and their essential data is often backed
up in the cloud. Since most major ransomware families still
target Windows-based computers, the chances of consumers
being exposed to ransomware is declining. ACTIVITY BEGINS TO DROP,
BUT REMAINS A CHALLENGE
FOR ORGANIZATIONS.
Another factor behind the drop in overall ransomware
activity is Symantec’s increased efficiency at blocking
ransomware earlier in the infection process, either via email
protection or using technologies such as behavioral analysis
or machine learning. Also contributing to the decline is
the fact that some cyber crime gangs are losing interest in
ransomware. Symantec saw a number of groups previously
involved in spreading ransomware move to delivering other
malware such as banking Trojans and information stealers.
However, some groups are continuing to pose a severe
threat. In further bad news for organizations, a notable
number of highly damaging targeted ransomware attacks hit
organizations in 2018, many of which were conducted by the
SamSam group. During 2018, Symantec found evidence of
67 SamSam attacks , mostly against organizations in the U.S.
In tandem with SamSam, other targeted ransomware groups
have become more active. Additional targeted threats have also emerged. Activity
involving Ryuk ( Ransom.Hermes ) increased significantly in
late 2018. This ransomware was responsible for an attack in
December where the printing and distribution of several well-
known U.S. newspapers was disrupted.
Dharma/Crysis (Ransom.Crysis ) is also often used in a
targeted fashion against organizations. The number of
Dharma/Crysis infection attempts seen by Symantec
more than tripled during 2018, from an average of
1,473 per month in 2017 to 4,900 per month in 2018.
In November, two Iranian nationals were indicted in the U.S.
for their alleged involvement with SamSam. It remains to
be seen whether the indictment will have any impact on the
group’s activity.ISTR 24 | February 2019Year-in-Review 17 Back to ToC
In previous reports, we highlighted the trend of attackers
opting for off-the-shelf tools and operating system features
to conduct attacks. This trend of “living off the land” shows
no sign of abating—in fact, there was a significant increase
in certain activity in 2018. PowerShell usage is now a staple
of both cyber crime and targeted attacks—reflected by a
massive 1,000 percent increase in malicious PowerShell
scripts blocked in 2018 on the endpoint.
In 2018, Microsoft Office files accounted for almost half (48
percent) of all malicious email attachments, jumping up from
just 5 percent in 2017. Cyber crime groups, such as Mealybug
and Necurs, continued to use macros in Office files as their
preferred method to propagate malicious payloads in 2018,
but also experimented with malicious XML files and Office
files with DDE payloads.
Zero-day exploit usage by targeted attack groups
continued to decline in 2018. Only 23 percent of attack
groups were known to use zero days, down from 27 percent in
2017. We also began seeing attacks which rely solely on living
off the land techniques and don’t use any malicious code. The
targeted attack group Gallmaker is an example of this shift,
with the group exclusively using generally available tools to
carry out its malicious activities.REMAIN A STAPLE OF THE
NEW THREAT LANDSCAPE.Self-propagating threats continued to create headaches for
organizations but, unlike worms of old, modern worms don’t
use remotely exploitable vulnerabilities to spread. Instead,
worms such as Emotet ( Trojan.Emotet ) and Qakbot ( W32.
Qakbot ) use simple techniques including dumping passwords
from memory or brute-forcing access to network shares to
laterally move across a network.
Supply chain attacks continued to be a feature of the threat
landscape, with attacks increasing by 78 percent in 2018.
Supply chain attacks, which exploit third-party services and
software to compromise a final target, take many forms,
including hijacking software updates and injecting malicious
code into legitimate software. Developers continued to be
exploited as a source of supply chain attacks, either through
attackers stealing credentials for version control tools, or
by attackers compromising third-party libraries that are
integrated into larger software projects.
The surge in formjacking attacks in 2018 reinforced how the
supply chain can be a weak point for online retailers and
eCommerce sites. Many of these formjacking attacks were
the result of the attackers compromising third-party services
commonly used by online retailers, such as chatbots or
customer review widgets.
Both supply chain and living off the land attacks highlight the
challenges facing organizations and individuals, with attacks
increasingly arriving through trusted channels, using fileless
attack methods or legitimate tools for malicious purposes.
While we block on average 115,000 malicious PowerShell
scripts each month, this only accounts for less than 1
percent of overall PowerShell usage. Effectively identifying
and blocking these attacks requires the use of advanced
detection methods such as analytics and machine learning. ISTR 24 | February 2019Year-in-Review 18 Back to ToC
Targeted attack actors continued to pose a significant
threat to organizations during 2018, with new groups
emerging and existing groups continuing to refine their
tools and tactics. The larger, more active attack groups
appeared to step up their activity during 2018. The 20
most active groups tracked by Symantec targeted an
average of 55 organizations over the past three years,
up from 42 between 2015 and 2017.
One notable trend was the diversification in targets,
with a growing number of groups displaying an interest
in compromising operational computers, which could
potentially permit them to mount disruptive operations
if they chose to do so.
This tactic was pioneered by the Dragonfly espionage
group, which is known for its attacks on energy companies.
During 2018, we observed the Thrip group compromise a
satellite communications operator and infect computers
running software that monitors and controls satellites.
The attack could have given Thrip the ability to seriously
disrupt the company’s operations.
We also saw the Chafer group compromise a telecoms
services provider in the Middle East . The company sells
solutions to multiple telecoms operators in the region and
the attack may have been intended to facilitate surveillance
of end-user customers of those operators.
This interest in potentially disruptive attacks is also
reflected in the number of groups known to use destructive
malware, up by 25 percent in 2018.
During 2018, Symantec exposed four previously unknown
targeted attack groups, bringing the number of targeted
attack groups first exposed by Symantec since 2009 to 32.
While Symantec exposed four new groups in both 2017 and 2018, there was a big shift in the way these groups were
uncovered. Two out of the four new groups exposed during
2018 were uncovered through their use of living off the land
tools. Indeed, one of those two groups ( Gallmaker ) doesn’t use
any malware in its attacks, relying exclusively on living off the
land and publicly available hacking tools.
Living off the land has been increasingly used by targeted
attack groups in recent years because it can help attackers
maintain a low profile by hiding their activity in a mass
of legitimate processes. This trend was one of the main
motivations for Symantec to create its Targeted Attack
Analytics (TAA) solution in 2018, which leverages advanced
artificial intelligence to spot patterns of malicious activity
associated with targeted attacks. Twice during 2018 we
discovered previously unknown targeted attack groups in
investigations that began with TAA triggered by living off the
land tools. The rise in the use of living off the land tools has
been mirrored by the decline of other, older attack techniques.
The number of targeted attack groups known to use zero-day
vulnerabilities was 23 percent, down from 27 percent at the
end of 2017.
One of the most dramatic developments during 2018 was
the significant increase in indictments in the United States
against people alleged to be involved in state-sponsored
espionage. Forty-nine individuals or organizations were
indicted during 2018, up from four in 2017 and five in 2016.
While most of the headlines were devoted to the indictment
of 18 alleged Russian agents, most of whom were charged
with involvement in attacks relating to the 2016 presidential
election, the indictments were far more wide ranging.
Alongside Russian nationals, 19 Chinese individuals or
organizations were charged, along with 11 Iranians, and
one North Korean.
This sudden glare of publicity may disrupt some of the
organizations named in these indictments. It will severely
limit the ability of indicted individuals to travel internationally,
potentially hampering their ability to mount operations
against targets in other countries. ISTR 24 | February 2019Year-in-Review 19 Back to ToC
From simple misconfiguration issues to vulnerabilities in
hardware chips, in 2018 we saw the wide range of security
challenges that the cloud presents.
Poorly secured cloud databases continued to be a weak point
for organizations. In 2018, S3 buckets emerged as an Achilles
heel for organizations, with more than 70 million records
stolen or leaked as a result of poor configuration. This was
on the heels of a spate of ransomware attacks against open
databases such as MongoDB in 2017, which saw attackers
wipe their contents and seek payment in order to restore
them. Attackers didn’t stop there—also targeting container
deployment systems such Kubernetes, serverless applications
and other publicly exposed API services. There’s a common
theme across these incidents—poor configuration. SECURITY CHALLENGES
EMERGE ON MULTIPLE FRONTS.
There are numerous tools widely available which allow
potential attackers to identify misconfigured cloud
resources on the internet. Unless organizations take
action to properly secure their cloud resources, such as
following the advice provided by Amazon for securing S3
buckets, they are leaving themselves open to attack.
A more insidious threat to the cloud emerged in 2018 with
the revelation of several vulnerabilities in hardware chips.
Meltdown and Spectre exploit vulnerabilities in a process
known as speculative execution. Successful exploitation
provides access to memory locations that are normally
forbidden. This is particularly problematic for cloud
services because while cloud instances have their own virtual processors, they share pools of memory—meaning
that a successful attack on a single physical system could
result in data being leaked from several cloud instances.
Meltdown and Spectre weren’t isolated cases—several
variants of these attacks were subsequently released into the
public domain throughout the year. They were also followed
up by similar chip-level vulnerabilities such as Speculative
Store Bypass and Foreshadow, or L1 Terminal Fault. This is
likely just the start, as researchers and attackers home in on
vulnerabilities at the chip level, and indicates that there are
challenging times ahead for the cloud. ME LTDOWN
STORAGE
SPECTREISTR 24 | February 2019Year-in-Review 20 Back to ToC
While worms and bots continued to account for the vast
majority of Internet of Things (IoT) attacks, in 2018 we saw
a new breed of threat emerge as targeted attack actors
displayed an interest in IoT as an infection vector.
The overall volume of IoT attacks remained high in 2018
and consistent (-0.2 percent) compared to 2017. Routers
and connected cameras were the most infected devices and
accounted for 75 and 15 percent of the attacks respectively.
It’s unsurprising that routers were the most targeted devices
given their accessibility from the internet. They’re also
attractive as they provide an effective jumping-off point
for attackers.
The notorious Mirai distributed denial of service (DDoS)
worm remained an active threat and, with 16 percent
of the attacks, was the third most common IoT threat in
2018. Mirai is constantly evolving and variants use up to
16 different exploits, persistently adding new exploits to
increase the success rate for infection, as devices often
remain unpatched. The worm also expanded its target scope by going after unpatched Linux servers . Another
noticeable trend was the increase in attacks against industrial
control systems (ICS). The Thrip group went after satellites ,
and Triton attacked industrial safety systems, leaving them
vulnerable to sabotage or extortion attacks. Any computing
device is a potential target.
The emergence of VPNFilter in 2018 represented an evolution
of IoT threats. VPNFilter was the first widespread persistent
IoT threat, with its ability to survive a reboot making it very
difficult to remove. With an array of potent payloads at its
disposal, such as man in the middle (MitM) attacks, data
exfiltration, credential theft, and interception of SCADA
communications, VPNFilter was a departure from traditional
IoT threat activity such as DDoS and coin mining. It also
includes a destructive capability which can “brick,” or wipe a
device at the attackers’ command, should they wish to destroy
evidence. VPNFilter is the work of a skilled and well-resourced
threat actor and demonstrates how IoT devices are now facing
attack from many fronts.IN THE CROSSHAIRS
OF CYBER CRIMINALS AND
TARGETED ATTACK GROUPS.ISTR 24 | February 2019Year-in-Review 21 Back to ToC
With the 2016 U.S. presidential election impacted by several
cyber attacks, such as the attack on the Democratic National
Committee (DNC), all eyes were on the 2018 midterms. And,
just one month after Election Day had passed, the National
Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) confirmed its
email system was hacked by an unknown third party in the
run-up to the midterms. The hackers reportedly gained access
to the email accounts of four senior NRCC aides and may
have collected thousands of emails over the course of several
months.
Then, in January 2019, the DNC revealed it was targeted by an
unsuccessful spear-phishing attack shortly after the midterms
had ended. The cyber espionage group APT29, which has
been attributed by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) and the FBI to Russia , is thought to be responsible for
the campaign. In July and August 2018, multiple malicious domains
mimicking websites belonging to political organizations
were discovered and shut down by Microsoft. The cyber
espionage group APT28 (which has also been attributed
by Homeland Security and the FBI to Russia ) is thought to
have set-up some of these sites as part of a spear-phishing
campaign targeting candidates in the 2018 midterms.
To combat website spoofing attacks like this, Symantec
launched Project Dolphin , a free security tool for website
owners.
Adversaries continued to focus on using social media
platforms to influence voters in 2018. While this is nothing
new, the tactics used have become more sophisticated.
Some Russia-linked accounts, for example, used third
parties to purchase social media ads for them and avoided
using Russian IP addresses or Russian currency. Fake
accounts also began to focus more on promoting events
and rallies, which are not monitored as closely as politically
targeted ads.
Social media companies and government agencies took
a more proactive role in combatting election interference
in 2018. Facebook set up a “war room” to tackle election
interference and blocked numerous accounts and pages
suspected of being linked to foreign entities engaged in
attempts to influence politics in the U.S., U.K., Middle East,
and Latin America .
Twitter removed over 10,000 bots posting messages
encouraging people not to vote and updated its rules for
identifying fake accounts and protecting the integrity
of elections. Twitter also released an archive of tweets
associated with two state-sponsored propaganda operations
that abused the platform to spread disinformation intended
to sway public opinion.Other efforts to combat election interference in
2018 included the United States Cyber Command
contacting Russian hackers directly to tell them they
had been identified by U.S. operatives and were being
tracked; the DHS offering free security assessments
of state election machines and processes; and the
widespread adoption of so-called Albert sensors ,
hardware that helps the federal government monitor
for evidence of interference with computers used to
run elections.MESSAGING
EMAIL DISGUISED AS
NOTIFICATION, SUCH AS
INVOICE OR RECEIPTATTACHED OFFICE
FILE CONTAINS
MALICIOUS SCRIPTOPENING ATTACHMENT
EXECUTES SCRIPT
DOWNLOADS MALWARE
2 348%
OF MALICIOUS EMAIL
ATTACHMENTS ARE
OFFICE FILES
UP FROM 5% IN 2017
1In 2018, employees of small organizations were more likely to be hit by email threats—including
spam, phishing, and email malware—than those in large organizations. We also found that spam
levels continued to increase in 2018, as they have done every year since 2015, with 55 percent of
emails received in 2018 being categorized as spam. Meanwhile, the email malware rate remained
stable, while phishing levels declined, dropping from 1 in 2,995 emails in 2017, to 1 in 3,207 emails
in 2018. The phishing rate has declined every year for the last four years.
We also saw fewer URLs used in malicious emails as attackers refocused on using malicious email
attachments as a primary infection vector. The use of malicious URLs in emails had jumped to
12.3 percent in 2017, but it dropped back to 7.8 percent in 2018. Symantec telemetry shows that
Microsoft Office users are the most at risk of falling victim to email-based malware, with Office
files accounting for 48 percent of malicious email attachments, jumping from 5 percent in 2017.MALICIOUS EMAIL RATE (YEAR)
2018
1 in 412
MALICIOUS EMAIL URL RATE (YEAR)
2018
7.8%
MALICIOUS EMAIL RATE (MONTH)
Malicious email rate (1 in)200
300
400
500
600
700
800
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb JanMALICIOUS EMAIL URL RATE (MONTH)
% of malicious email02%4%6%8%10%12%14%
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb JanMALICIOUS EMAIL PER USER (MONTH)
Users targeted (%)05%10%15%20%25%30%
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan
MALICIOUS EMAIL RATE BY INDUSTRY (YEAR)
INDUSTRY MALICIOUS EMAIL RATE (1 IN)
Mining 258
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 302
Public Administration 302
Manufacturing 369
Wholesale Trade 372
Construction 382
Nonclassifiable Establishments 450
Transportation & Public Utilities 452
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 491
Services 493
Retail Trade 516The pecentage of users hit with
malicious email trended up
during 2018
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 24 Back to ToC
MALICIOUS EMAIL URL RATE BY INDUSTRY (YEAR)
INDUSTRY EMAIL MALWARE (%)
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 11.2
Retail Trade 10.9
Mining 8.9
Services 8.2
Construction 7.9
Public Administration 7.8
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 7.7
Manufacturing 7.2
Nonclassifiable Establishments 7.2
Wholesale Trade 6.5
Transportation & Public Utilities 6.3MALICIOUS EMAIL PER USER BY INDUSTRY (YEAR)
INDUSTRY USERS TARGETED (%)
Mining 38.4
Wholesale Trade 36.6
Construction 26.6
Nonclassifiable Establishments 21.2
Retail Trade 21.2
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 21.1
Manufacturing 20.6
Public Administration 20.2
Transportation & Public Utilities 20.0
Services 11.7
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 11.6
MALICIOUS EMAIL RATE BY ORGANIZATION SIZE (YEAR)
ORGANIZATION SIZE MALICIOUS EMAIL RATE (1 IN)
1-250 323
251-500 356
501-1000 391
1001-1500 823
1501-2500 440
2501+ 556MALICIOUS EMAIL URL RATE BY ORGANIZATION SIZE (YEAR)
ORGANIZATION SIZE MALICIOUS EMAIL (%)
1-250 6.6
251-500 8.3
501-1000 6.6
1001-1500 8.3
1501-2500 7.3
2501+ 8.6
MALICIOUS EMAIL PER USER BY ORGANIZATION SIZE (YEAR)
ORGANIZATION SIZE USERS TARGETED (1 IN)
1-250 6
251-500 6
501-1000 4
1001-1500 7
1501-2500 4
2501+ 11Employees of smaller organizations
were more likely to be hit by email
threats—including spam, phishing,
and email malware—than those in
large organizations.
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 25 Back to ToC
MALICIOUS EMAIL RATE BY COUNTRY (YEAR)
COUNTRY MALICIOUS EMAIL RATE (1 IN)
Saudi Arabia 118
Israel 122
Austria 128
South Africa 131
Serbia 137
Greece 142
Oman 160
Taiwan 163
Sri Lanka 169
UAE 183
Thailand 183
Poland 185
Norway 190
Hungary 213
Qatar 226
Singapore 228
Italy 232
Netherlands 241
UK 255
Ireland 263
Luxembourg 272
Hong Kong 294
China 309
Denmark 311
Malaysia 311
Colombia 328
Switzerland 334
Papua New Guinea 350
Germany 352
Philippines 406
Belgium 406COUNTRY MALICIOUS EMAIL RATE (1 IN)
Brazil 415
South Korea 418
Portugal 447
Spain 510
Finland 525
Canada 525
Sweden 570
New Zealand 660
USA 674
France 725
Australia 728
India 772
Mexico 850
Japan 905
MALICIOUS EMAIL URL RATE BY COUNTRY (YEAR)
COUNTRY MALICIOUS EMAIL (%)
Brazil 35.7
Mexico 29.7
Norway 12.8
Sweden 12.4
Canada 11.5
New Zealand 11.3
Colombia 11.0
Australia 10.9
France 10.5
Finland 9.7
Switzerland 9.5
Spain 9.4Qatar 8.9
USA 8.9
Portugal 8.4
India 8.3
Philippines 8.1
Singapore 7.7
Luxembourg 7.3
Italy 7.1
Austria 6.7
South Africa 6.7
Papua New Guinea 6.5
South Korea 6.5
Germany 6.3
Japan 6.3
Belgium 6.1
UK 6.1
Hungary 5.9
Saudi Arabia 5.2
Denmark 5.1
Hong Kong 5.1
Malaysia 5.1
China 4.9
Netherlands 4.9
Serbia 4.4
Taiwan 4.4
UAE 4.2
Sri Lanka 4.1
Ireland 3.9
Oman 3.6
Thailand 3.4
Greece 3.3
Poland 2.8
Israel 1.9
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 26 Back to ToC
TOP EMAIL THEMES (YEAR)
SUBJECT TOPIC PERCENT
Bill 15.7
Email delivery failure 13.3
Package delivery 2.4
Legal/law enforcement 1.1
Scanned document 0.3
TOP EMAIL KEYWORDS (YEAR)
WORDS PERCENT
invoice 13.2
mail 10.2
sender 9.2
payment 8.9
important 8.5
message 7.7
new 7.2
returned 6.9
: 6.9
delivery 6.6TOP MALICIOUS EMAIL ATTACHMENT TYPES (YEAR)
FILE TYPE PERCENT
.doc, .dot 37.0
.exe 19.5
.rtf 14.0
.xls, .xlt, .xla 7.2
.jar 5.6
.html, htm 5.5
.docx 2.3
.vbs 1.8
.xlsx 1.5
.pdf 0.8
TOP MALICIOUS EMAIL ATTACHMENT CATEGORIES (YEAR)
FILE TYPE PERCENT
Scripts 47.5
Executables 25.7
Other 25.1
MONTHLY AVERAGE NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONS TARGETED
BY BEC SCAMS (YEAR)
AVERAGE
5,803
AVERAGE BEC EMAILS PER ORGANIZATION (YEAR)
AVERAGE
4.5TOP BEC EMAIL KEYWORDS (YEAR)
SUBJECT PERCENT
urgent 8.0
request 5.8
important 5.4
payment 5.2
attention 4.4
outstanding payment 4.1
info 3.6
important update 3.1
attn 2.3
transaction 2.3
EMAIL PHISHING RATE (YEAR)
PHISHING RATE (1 IN)
3,207
Phishing levels declined, dropping
from 1 in 2,995 emails in 2017,
to 1 in 3,207 emails in 2018.
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 27 Back to ToC
EMAIL PHISHING RATE (MONTH)
Phishing rate (1 in)2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
4,000
4,500
5,000
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan
EMAIL PHISHING RATE PER USER (MONTH)
Users targeted (1 in)30
40
50
60
70
80
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb JanEMAIL PHISHING RATE BY INDUSTRY (YEAR)
INDUSTRY PHISHING RATE (1 IN)
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 1,769
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 2,628
Mining 2,973
Wholesale Trade 3,042
Public Administration 3,473
Services 3,679
Construction 3,960
Retail Trade 3,971
Manufacturing 3,986
Nonclassifiable Establishments 5,047
Transportation & Public Utilities 5,590
EMAIL PHISHING RATE PER USER BY INDUSTRY (YEAR)
INDUSTRY USERS TARGETED (1 IN)
Wholesale Trade 22
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 28
Mining 30
Retail Trade 36
Construction 39
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 46
Manufacturing 52
Nonclassifiable Establishments 53
Public Administration 57
Transportation & Public Utilities 62
Services 64EMAIL PHISHING RATE BY ORGANIZATION SIZE (YEAR)
ORGANIZATION SIZE PHISHING RATE (1 IN)
1-250 2,696
251-500 3,193
501-1000 3,203
1001-1500 6,543
1501-2500 3,835
2501+ 4,286
EMAIL PHISHING RATE PER USER BY ORGANIZATION SIZE
(YEAR)
ORGANIZATION SIZE USERS TARGETED (1 IN)
1-250 52
251-500 57
501-1000 30
1001-1500 56
1501-2500 36
2501+ 82
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 28 Back to ToC
EMAIL PHISHING RATE BY COUNTRY (YEAR)
COUNTRY PHISHING RATE (1 IN)
Saudi Arabia 675
Norway 860
Netherlands 877
Austria 1,306
South Africa 1,318
Hungary 1,339
Thailand 1,381
Taiwan 1,712
Brazil 1,873
UAE 2,312
New Zealand 2,446
Hong Kong 2,549
Singapore 2,857
Luxembourg 2,860
Italy 3,048
Qatar 3,170
China 3,208
USA 3,231
Ireland 3,321
Belgium 3,322
Sweden 3,417
Australia 3,471
Switzerland 3,627
Spain 3,680
UK 3,722
Oman 3,963
Papua New Guinea 4,011
Sri Lanka 4,062
Portugal 4,091
Philippines 4,241
Canada 4,308COUNTRY PHISHING RATE (1 IN)
Greece 4,311
Israel 4,472
Colombia 4,619
Malaysia 4,687
Germany 5,223
Denmark 5,312
Mexico 5,389
France 5,598
India 5,707
Serbia 6,376
Finland 6,617
Japan 7,652
South Korea 8,523
Poland 9,653
EMAIL SPAM RATE (YEAR)
EMAIL SPAM RATE (%)
55EMAIL SPAM RATE (MONTH)
Email spam rate (%)54.0%54.5%55.0%55.5%56.0%
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan
EMAIL SPAM PER USER (MONTH)
Spam per user606570758085
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 29 Back to ToC
EMAIL SPAM RATE BY INDUSTRY (YEAR)
INDUSTRY EMAIL SPAM RATE (%)
Mining 58.3
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 56.7
Manufacturing 55.1
Public Administration 54.9
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 54.6
Transportation & Public Utilities 54.6
Nonclassifiable Establishments 54.2
Services 54.1
Retail Trade 53.7
Construction 53.6
Wholesale Trade 52.6
EMAIL SPAM PER USER BY INDUSTRY (YEAR)
INDUSTRY SPAM PER USER
Wholesale Trade 135
Retail Trade 111
Mining 109
Construction 103
Nonclassifiable Establishments 97
Transportation & Public Utilities 93
Manufacturing 79
Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 66
Public Administration 63
Finance, Insurance, & Real Estate 61
Services 59EMAIL SPAM RATE BY ORGANIZATION SIZE (YEAR)
ORGANIZATION SIZE EMAIL SPAM RATE (%)
1-250 55.9
251-500 53.6
501-1000 54.5
1001-1500 56.9
1501-2500 53.7
2501+ 54.9
EMAIL SPAM PER USER BY ORGANIZATION SIZE (YEAR)
ORGANIZATION SIZE SPAM PER USER
1-250 55
251-500 57
501-1000 109
1001-1500 125
1501-2500 107
2501+ 55
EMAIL SPAM RATE BY COUNTRY (YEAR)
COUNTRY EMAIL SPAM RATE (%)
Saudi Arabia 66.8
China 62.2
Brazil 60.8
Sri Lanka 60.6
Norway 59.1
Oman 58.6
Sweden 58.3
Mexico 58.1
UAE 58.1
USA 57.5
Colombia 56.8Belgium 56.2
Serbia 55.8
Singapore 55.4
UK 54.8
Germany 54.8
Taiwan 54.5
Austria 54.4
Finland 54.4
Hungary 54.4
Greece 54.2
Israel 54.1
Denmark 54.1
France 54
Netherlands 53.9
Australia 53.9
New Zealand 53.4
Canada 53.4
Italy 53.4
Poland 53.2
Spain 52.9
Qatar 52.6
South Korea 52.4
Portugal 52.1
Luxembourg 51.4
Malaysia 51.4
Thailand 51.1
Ireland 51
India 50.9
South Africa 50.8
Switzerland 50.8
Hong Kong 50.5
Papua New Guinea 50
Philippines 49.5
Japan 48.7
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 30 Back to ToC
MALWARE8,000,000
7,000,000
6,000,000
5,000,000
4,000,000
3,000,0000$50$100$150$200$250$300$350$400$450
TOTAL CRYPTOJACKING EVENTS BY MONTH
VALUE OF MONEROSELF-PROPAGATING
EMOTET JUMPS UP TO
FROM 4% in 2017Emotet continued to aggressively expand its market share in 2018, accounting
for 16 percent of financial Trojans, up from 4 percent in 2017. Emotet was also
being used to spread Qakbot, which was in 7th place in the financial Trojans
list, accounting for 1.8 percent of detections. Both of these threats present
further serious challenges for organizations due to their self-propagating
functionality.
Use of malicious PowerShell scripts increased by 1,000 percent in 2018, as
attackers continued the movement towards living off the land techniques. A
common attack scenario uses Office macros to call a PowerShell script, which
in turn downloads the malicious payload. Office macro downloaders accounted
for the majority of downloader detections, while VBS.Downloader and
JS.Downloader threats declined.
In 2018, we also blocked 69 million cryptojacking events—four times as many
events as we blocked in 2017. However, cryptojacking activity declined by 52
percent between January and December 2018. This mirrored the decline in
cryptocurrency values, albeit at a slower rate. For the first time since 2013,
the overall number of ransomware infections fell, dropping by more than
20 percent year-on-year. However, enterprise detections bucked the trend,
increasing by 12 percent, demonstrating that ransomware continues to be a
problem for enterprises. Fewer new ransomware families emerged in 2018,
indicating that ransomware may hold less appeal for cyber criminals than it
previously did.NEW MALWARE VARIANTS (YEAR)
YEAR NEW VARIANTS PERCENT CHANGE
2016 357,019,453 0.5
2017 669,947,865 87.7
2018 246,002,762 -63.3TOP NEW MALWARE VARIANTS (MONTH)
W32.Almanahe.B!inf WS.Reputation.1
W32.Sality.AETrojan.Kotver!gm2 Heur.AdvML.C XM.Mailcab@mm W32.Ramnit!html
JS.WebcoinminerPUA.WASMcoinminer Heur.AdvML.B05M10M15M20M25M30M35M
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANEmotet continued to aggressively
expand its market share in
2018, accounting for 16 percent
of financial Trojans, up from 4
percent in 2017.
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 32 Back to ToC
TOP MALWARE (YEAR)
THREAT NAME ATTACKS BLOCKED PERCENT
Heur.AdvML.C 43,999,373 52.1
Heur.AdvML.B 8,373,445 9.9
BloodHound.SymVT.FP 3,193,779 3.8
JS.Webcoinminer 2,380,725 2.8
Heur.AdvML.S.N 2,300,919 2.7
W97M.Downloader 1,233,551 1.5
Packed.Dromedan!lnk 1,215,196 1.4
Hacktool 846,292 1.0
Hacktool.Kms 763,557 0.9
Trojan.Mdropper 679,248 0.8TOP MALWARE (MONTH)
Heur.AdvML.S.N Trojan.Mdropper
Hacktool.Kms Packed.Dromedan!lnkHeur.AdvML.C Hacktool W97M.Downloader JS.Webcoinminer
Heur.AdvML.B BloodHound.SymVT.FP03M6M9M12M15M
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb JanCyber crime groups, such as
Mealybug and Necurs, continued to
use macros in Office files as their
preferred method to propagate
malicious payloads in 2018.
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 33 Back to ToC
TOTAL MALWARE (MONTH)
Attacks blocked05M10M15M20M25M
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan
TOTAL DOWNLOADERS (MONTH)
Downloaders blocked050K100K150K200K250K300K350K
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb JanOFFICE MACRO DOWNLOADERS (MONTH)
Downloaders blocked050K100K150K200K250K300K
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb JanJAVASCRIPT DOWNLOADERS (MONTH)
Downloaders blocked030K60K90K120K150K
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan
VBSCRIPT DOWNLOADERS (MONTH)
Downloaders blocked020K40K60K80K100K
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb JanWhile VBS.Downloader and
JS.Downloader threats trended
downwards in 2018, Office macro
downloaders trended upwards
towards the end of the year.
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 34 Back to ToC
TOTAL MALWARE BY OPERATING SYSTEM (YEAR)
YEAR OPERATING SYSTEM ATTACKS BLOCKED PERCENT
2016 Windows 161,708,289 98.5
Mac 2,445,414 1.5
2017 Windows 165,639,264 97.6
Mac 4,011,252 2.4
2018 Windows 144,338,341 97.2
Mac 4,206,986 2.8
TOTAL MAC MALWARE (MONTH)
Attacks blocked0100K200K300K400K500K
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan
NEW MAC MALWARE VARIANTS (YEAR)
YEAR VARIANTS PERCENT CHANGE
2016 772,018
2017 1,390,261 80.1
2018 1,398,419 0.6TOP NEW MAC MALWARE VARIANTS (MONTH)
OSX.Shlayer W97M.Downloader
SMG.Heur!genMiner.Jswebcoin Heur.AdvML.B Wasm.Webcoinminer PUA.WASMcoinminer
JS.NemucodJS.Webcoinminer Bloodhound.Unknown0100K200K300K400K500K
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 35 Back to ToC
TOP MAC MALWARE (YEAR)
THREAT NAME ATTACKS BLOCKED PERCENT
OSX.Malcol 338,806 18.3
W97M.Downloader 262,704 14.2
OSX.Malcol.2 205,378 11.1
Heur.AdvML.B 166,572 9.0
JS.Webcoinminer 122,870 6.6
Trojan.Mdropper 77,800 4.2
OSX.Shlayer 59,197 3.2
OSX.AMCleaner!g1 49,517 2.7
JS.Downloader 40,543 2.2
Wasm.Webcoinminer 40,166 2.2TOP MAC MALWARE (MONTH)
OSX.Malcol.2 W97M.Downloader
Trojan.MdropperOSX.Malcol JS.Downloader Wasm.Webcoinminer OSX.Shlayer
JS.WebcoinminerOSX.AMCleaner!g1 Heur.AdvML.B050K100K150K200K
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JANIn 2018, Symantec blocked 69
million cryptojacking events—four
times as many events as 2017.
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 36 Back to ToC
PERCENTAGE SSL-ENABLED MALWARE (YEAR)
YEAR PERCENTAGE OF MALWARE THAT USES SSL
2017 4.5
2018 3.9
TOTAL RANSOMWARE (YEAR)
YEAR TOTAL
2018 545,231
RANSOMWARE BY MARKET (YEAR)
MARKET TOTAL
Consumer 100,907
Enterprise 444,259
TOP RANSOMWARE BY COUNTRY (YEAR)
COUNTRY PERCENT
China 16.9
India 14.3
USA 13.0
Brazil 5.0
Portugal 3.9
Mexico 3.5
Indonesia 2.6
Japan 2.1
South Africa 2.1
Chile 1.8RANSOMWARE BY COUNTRY (MONTH)
Japan South Africa
PortugalIndonesia Chile USA Mexico
ChinaIndia Brazil05K10K15K20K25K30K35K40K
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 37 Back to ToC
TOTAL RANSOMWARE (MONTH)
Ransomware010K20K30K40K50K60K
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan
NEW RANSOMWARE VARIANTS (MONTH)
New variants05K10K15K20K25K
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan
NEW RANSOMWARE VARIANTS (YEAR)
YEAR TOTAL
2018 186,972RANSOMWARE BY MARKET (MONTH)
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun may Apr Mar Feb Jan010K20K30K40K50K
ConsumerEnterprise
NEW RANSOMWARE FAMILIES (YEAR)
2018 2017 2016 2015020406080100120
Ransomware families3098
28
10MALWARE: TOP COINMINER VARIANTS (MONTH)
Shminer Xiaobaminer
XMRigminerLinux.Coinminer CPUMiner Zcashminer WASM.Webcoinminer
CoinminerJS.Webcoinminer Bitcoinminer01M2M3M4M5M6M7M8M
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan
The overall number of ransomware
infections fell, dropping by more
than 20 percent year-on-year.
However, enterprise detections
bucked the trend, increasing by
12 percent, demonstrating that
ransomware continues to be a
problem for enterprises.
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 38 Back to ToC
TOTAL CRYPTOJACKING (MONTH)
Cryptojacking01M2M3M4M5M6M7M8M
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan
TOP COINMINERS (MONTH)
JS.Webcoinminer XMRigminer
WASM.WebcoinminerGyplyraminer Bluwimps Zcashminer Linux.Coinminer
CPUMinerCoinminer Bitcoinminer00.5M1.0M1.5M2.0M2.5M
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb JanTOP COINMINERS (YEAR)
THREAT NAME ATTACKS BLOCKED PERCENT
JS.Webcoinminer 2,768,721 49.7
WASM.Webcoinminer 2,201,789 39.5
Bitcoinminer 414,297 7.4
Bluwimps 58,601 1.1
XMRigminer 58,301 1.0
Coinminer 38,655 0.7
Zcashminer 13,389 0.2
Gyplyraminer 5,221 0.1
CPUMiner 3,807 0.1
Linux.Coinminer 3,324 0.1
TOP MAC COINMINERS (MONTH)
Neoscryptminer XMRigminer
WASM.WebcoinminerLinux.Coinminer CPUMiner Zcashminer OSX.Coinminer
CoinminerJS.Webcoinminer Bitcoinminer030K60K90K120K150K
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb JanCOINMINER BY MARKET (MONTH)
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan0300K600K900K1.2M1.5M
ConsumerEnterprise
TOTAL FINANCIAL TROJANS (MONTH)
Attacks blocked01K2K3K4K5K6K7K
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 39 Back to ToC
TOP FINANCIAL TROJANS (MONTH)
Qakbot Trickybot
ShylockEmotet Carberp Zbot Ramnit
Cidox/RovnixCridex Bebloh010K20K30K40K50K60K70K80K
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan
TOP FINANCIAL TROJANS (YEAR)
FINANCIAL TROJAN ATTACKS BLOCKED PERCENT
Ramnit 271,930 47.4
Zbot 100,821 17.6
Emotet 92,039 16.0
Cridex 31,539 5.5
Carberp 22,690 4.0
Trickybot 14,887 2.6
Qakbot 10,592 1.8
Shylock 7,354 1.3
Bebloh 5,592 1.0
Cidox/Rovnix 3,889 0.7VIRTUAL-MACHINE-AWARE MALWARE (YEAR)
2018 2017 2016 201505%10%15%20%25%
15%18%
16%20%
Virtual-machine-aware malwarePOWERSHELL DETECTIONS (MONTH)
DATE PERCENTAGE MALICIOUS POWERSHELL SCRIPTS RATIO
Jan 0.1 1 in 1,000
Feb 0.5 1 in 200
Mar 2.5 1 in 40
Apr 0.4 1 in 250
May 1.3 1 in 77
Jun 0.9 1 in 111
Jul 1.4 1 in 71
Aug 0.8 1 in 125
Sep 1.0 1 in 100
Oct 1.0 1 in 100
Nov 0.7 1 in 143
Dec 0.7 1 in 143
POWERSHELL DETECTIONS (YEAR)
YEARPERCENT OF TOTAL
WHICH IS MALICIOUS RATIOPERCENT INCREASE
OF MALICIOUS
SCRIPTS
2017 0.9 1 in 111
2018 0.9 1 in 111 998.9Use of malicious PowerShell
scripts increased by 1,000 percent
in 2018, as attackers continued the
movement towards living off the
land techniques.
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 40 Back to ToC
MOBILE
ONE INMOBILE
DEVICES
HAD HIGH
RISK APPS
INSTALLED33%
MOBILE
RANSOMWARE
INFECTIONS
INCREASED
FROM 2017While the overall number of mobile malware infections fell during
2018, there was a rapid increase in the number of ransomware
infections on mobile devices, up by a third when compared to 2017.
The U.S. was the worst affected by mobile ransomware, accounting
for 63 percent of infections. It was followed by China (13 percent)
and Germany (10 percent).
Managing mobile device security continues to present a challenge
for organizations. During 2018, one in 36 devices used in
organizations were classed as high risk. This included devices
that were rooted or jailbroken, along with devices that had a high
degree of certainty that malware had been installed.NEW MOBILE MALWARE VARIANTS (YEAR)
2018 2017 201601K2K3K4K5K6K7K8K
New variants added6,705
5,932
2,328
NUMBER OF BLOCKED MOBILE APPS (YEAR)
PER DAY
10,573
TOP MALICIOUS MOBILE APP CATEGORIES (YEAR)
CATEGORY PERCENT
Tools 39.1
LifeStyle 14.9
Entertainment 7.3
Social & Communication 6.2
Music & Audio 4.3
Brain & Puzzle Games 4.2
Photo & Video 4.2
Arcade & Action Games 4.1
Books & Reference 3.2
Education 2.6NEW MOBILE MALWARE FAMILIES (YEAR)
2018 2017 201601020304050607080
New families added68
50
23
MONTHLY AVERAGE NUMBER OF MOBILE RANSOMWARE
(YEAR)
PER MONTH
4,675
TOP MOBILE MALWARE (YEAR)
THREAT NAME PERCENT
Malapp 29.7
Fakeapp 9.1
MalDownloader 8.9
FakeInst 6.6
Mobilespy 6.3
HiddenAds 4.7
Premiumtext 4.4
MobileSpy 2.8
HiddenApp 2.5
Opfake 2.0During 2018, Symantec blocked an
average of 10,573 malicious mobile
apps per day. Tools (39%), Lifestyle
(15%), and Entertainment (7%)
were the most frequently seen
categories of malicious apps.
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 42 Back to ToC
TOP COUNTRIES FOR MOBILE MALWARE (YEAR)
Percent of malwareGermany 3.9%
China 3%
Japan 2.8%
Russia 2.6%
Brazil 2.3%
Netherlands 2.1%
Australia 1.9%
Indonesia 1.8%USA 24.7%
India 23.6%Other 31.3%
JAILBROKEN OR ROOTED MOBILE DEVICE RATE (YEAR)
SEGMENT RATIO
Android Consumer 1 in 23
Android Enterprise 1 in 3,890
iOS Consumer 1 in 828
iOS Enterprise 1 in 4,951
PASSWORD PROTECTED MOBILE DEVICES BY MARKET
(YEAR)
SEGMENT PERCENT
Consumer 97.9
Enterprise 98.4LENGTH OF EXPOSURE TO NETWORK THREATS FOR MOBILE
DEVICES (YEAR)
DEVICES EXPOSED TO NETWORK ATTACKS PERCENT
After 1 month
(out of devices created 1-4 months ago)15.1
After 2 months
(out of devices created 2-5 months ago)21.8
After 3 months
(out of devices created 3-6 months ago)27.4
After 4 months
(out of devices created 4-7 months ago)32.2
DEVICES THAT DO NOT HAVE ENCRYPTION ENABLED (YEAR)
SEGMENT PERCENT
Consumer 13.4
Enterprise 10.5
DEVICES RISK LEVELS (YEAR)
DEVICE RISK LEVEL RATIO
Minimal 1 in 2
Low 1 in 4
Medium 1 in 4
High (including rooted/jailbroken/have
high-certainty-malware apps installed) 1 in 36DEVICES RUNNING NEWEST ANDROID VERSION (YEAR)
Other 76.3%Newest
major version
18.6%
Newest
minor version
5.1%All new
Android versions
23.7%
DEVICES RUNNING NEWEST IOS VERSION (YEAR)
Newest major
version 48.6%
All new iOS versions 78.3%Other
21.7%
Newest minor
version 29.7%
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 43 Back to ToC
RATIO OF APPS THAT ACCESS HIGH RISK DATA (YEAR)
YEARAPPS ACCESSING HIGH-
RISK DATA (%) RATIO CHANGE (PP)
2016 7.2 1 in 13.9
2017 8.9 1 in 11.3 1.7
2018 6.9 1 in 14.5 -2
RATIO OF APPS THAT CONTAIN HARD CODED CREDENTIALS
(YEAR)
YEARAPPS CONTAINING HARD-CODED
CREDENTIALS (%) RATIO CHANGE (PP)
2016 0.8 1 in 124.5
2017 1.1 1 in 91.0 0.3
2018 1.0 1 in 99.1 -0.1
RATIO OF APPS THAT USE HOT PATCHING (YEAR)
YEARAPPS USING HOT-
PATCHING RISK (%) RATIO CHANGE (PP)
2016 0.7 1 in 142.1
2017 0.35 1 in 285.1 -0.35
2018 0.01 1 in 7,146.0 -0.34RATIO OF APPS THAT ACCESS HEAL TH DATA (YEAR)
YEARAPPS ACCESSING
HEALTH DATA (%) RATIO CHANGE (PP)
2016 0.2 1 in 427.3
2017 1.7 1 in 57.6 1.5
2018 2.2 1 in 46.3 0.5
RATIO OF APPS THAT USE INVASIVE ADVERTISING (YEAR)
YEARPERCENTAGE OF
APPS USING INVASIVE
ADVERTISING RATIO CHANGE (PP)
2016 19.4 1 in 5.2
2017 30.5 1 in 3.3 11.1
2018 26.4 1 in 3.8 -4.1
PERCENTAGE OF ORGANIZATIONS AFFECTED BY APPS THAT
ACCESS HEAL TH DATA (YEAR)
YEARORGANIZATIONS WITH
1+ APPS: HEALTH DATA
(%) RATIO CHANGE (PP)
2016 27.6 1 in 3.6
2017 44.9 1 in 2.2 17.3
2018 39.0 1 in 2.6 -5.9The percentage of mobile apps
that employ invasive advertising
techniques dropped. Having stood
at 30% in 2017, it fell to 26%
in 2018.
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 44 Back to ToC
PERCENTAGE OF ORGANIZATIONS AFFECTED BY APPS THAT
ACCESS HIGH RISK DATA (YEAR)
YEARPERCENTAGE OF
ORGANIZATIONS FOUND
WITH APPS THAT ACCESS
HIGH-RISK DATA RATIO CHANGE (PP)
2016 63 1 in 1.6
2017 54.6 1 in 1.8 -8.4
2018 46 1 in 2.2 -8.6
PERCENTAGE OF ORGANIZATIONS AFFECTED BY APPS THAT
CONTAIN HARD CODED CREDENTIALS (YEAR)
YEARPERCENTAGE OF
ORGANIZATIONS FOUND
WITH APPS THAT
HAVE HARD-CODED
CREDENTIALS RATIO CHANGE (PP)
2016 47.3 1 in 2.1
2017 42.9 1 in 2.3 -4.4
2018 34.3 1 in 2.9 -8.6
PERCENTAGE OF ORGANIZATIONS AFFECTED BY APPS THAT
USE HOT PATCHING (YEAR)
YEARPERCENTAGE OF
ORGANIZATIONS FOUND
WITH APPS THAT USE
HOT-PATCHING RATIO CHANGE (PP)
2016 31.3 1 in 3.2
2017 11.7 1 in 8.5 -19.6
2018 6.8 1 in 14.7 -4.9PERCENTAGE OF ORGANIZATIONS AFFECTED BY APPS THAT
USE INVASIVE ADVERTISING (YEAR)
YEARPERCENTAGE OF
ORGANIZATIONS
FOUND WITH APPS
THAT USE INVASIVE
ADVERTISING RATIO CHANGE (PP)
2016 19.4 1 in 5.2
2017 30.5 1 in 3.3 11.1
2018 26.4 1 in 3.8 -4.1
TOP COUNTRIES FOR MOBILE RANSOMWARE (YEAR)
USA 63.2%
China 13.4%Germany
10.4%Japan 3.4%
India 2.4%
Canada 1.5%
UK 0.8%
Norway 0.6%
Netherlands 0.6%
Austria 0.6%
Other 3.1%TOP MOBILE RANSOMWARE (YEAR)
THREAT NAME PERCENT
Simplocker 59.3
Lockdroid.E 26.2
LockScreen 7.1
Simplocker.B 2.8
Ransomware 2.7
Ransomeware 1.0
Lockdroid.F 0.7
Android.WannaLocker <0.1
WannaLocker <0.1
Lockdroid.G <0.1There was a marked increase in the
number of ransomware infections
on mobile devices during 2018, up
by a third when compared to 2017.
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 45 Back to ToC
NUMBER OF MOBILE MALWARE BLOCKED (MONTH)
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan02K4K6K8K10K12K
Malware per monthNUMBER OF MOBILE RANSOMWARE BLOCKED (MONTH)
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan050100150200250300350400
Ransomware per day
While the annual total of mobile malware infections
fell in 2018, infection numbers began to climb upwards
again during the fourth quarter of the year.
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 46 Back to ToC
DEC NOV OCT SEP AUG JUL JUN MAY APR MAR FEB JAN200,000400,000600,000800,0001,000,0001,200,0001,400,000WEB ATTACKS
1,362,990
4th QTR
1,122,229
2nd QTR
551,117
3rd QTR697,187
1st QTRIn 2018, 1 in 10 URLs analyzed were identified as being malicious, up from 1 in 16 in
2017. Additionally, despite a drop off in exploit kit activity, overall web attacks on
endpoints increased by 56 percent in 2018. By December, Symantec was blocking
more than 1.3 million unique web attacks on endpoint machines every day.
Formjacking was one of the biggest cyber security trends of the year, with an
average of 4,800 websites compromised with formjacking code every month in 2018.
Formjacking is the use of malicious JavaScript code to steal payment card details
and other information from payment
forms on the checkout web pages of
eCommerce sites, and in total Symantec
blocked 3.7 million formjacking attempts
on endpoint devices in 2018. More than
a third of formjacking activity took place
in the last quarter of 2018, with 1.36
million formjacking attempts blocked in
that period alone.
FORMJACKING BY QTRFORMJACKING ACTIVITY
More than a third of the formjacking activity
took place in the last quarter of 2018.
FORMJACKING BY MONTHWEB ATTACKS (YEAR)
TOTAL WEB ATTACKS BLOCKED AVERAGE WEB ATTACKS BLOCKED PER DAY
348,136,985 953,800
WEB ATTACKS (MONTH)
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan010M20M30M40M50M
Web attacks per month
WEB ATTACKS (DAY)
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan0300K600K900K1.2M1.5M
Web attacks per dayTOP COMPROMISED WEBSITE CATEGORIES (YEAR)
DOMAIN CATEGORIES 2017 (%) 2018 (%)PERCENTAGE POINT
DIFFERENCE
Dynamic DNS 15.7 16.6 0.8
Gambling 7.9 16.3 8.4
Hosting 8.2 8.7 0.5
Technology 13.6 8.1 -5.5
Shopping 4.6 8.1 3.6
Business 9.0 7.2 -1.7
Pornography 3.2 5.2 2.1
Health 5.7 4.5 -1.2
Educational 3.7 3.9 0.2
Content Delivery
Network2.1 2.6 0.6
MALICIOUS URLS (YEAR)
YEAR PERCENT OF TOTAL RATIOPERCENTAGE POINT
CHANGE
2017 6.4 1 in 16
2018 9.9 1 in 10 3.4
BOTNET URLS (YEAR)
YEARPERCENT OF
ALL URLS RATIOPERCENT OF
MALICIOUS
URLS RATIO PERCENTAGE
CHANGEPERCENTAGE
POINT CHANGE
2017 1.2 1 in 85 18.2 1 in 5
2018 1.8 1 in 54 18.7 1 in 5 57.6 0.7PHISHING URLS (YEAR)
YEARPERCENT OF
ALL URLS RATIOPERCENT OF
MALICIOUS
URLS RATIO PERCENTAGE
CHANGEPERCENTAGE
POINT CHANGE
2017 0.4 1 in 235 6.6 1 in 15
2018 0.6 1 in 170 5.9 1 in 17 38.1 0.2
FORMJACKING ATTACKS (YEAR)
YEAR FORMJACKING ATTACKS
2018 3,733,523
FORMJACKING ATTACKS (MONTH)
Dec Nov Oct Sep Aug Jul Jun May Apr Mar Feb Jan0100K200K300K400K500K600K
Formjacking attacks
AVERAGE FORMJACKING WEBSITES (MONTH)
YEAR AVERAGE WEBSITES EACH MONTH
2018 4,818
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 48 Back to ToC
49
2016 201754TARGETED ATTACKS
2015-2017: AVG 42 ORGS TARGETED PER GROUP
(20 MOST ACTIVE GROUPS)ESPIONAGE INDICTMENTS BY U.S. AUTHORITIES
SPEAR PHISHING INTELLIGENCE GATHERING2016-2018: AVG 55 ORGS TARGETED PER GROUP
(20 MOST ACTIVE GROUPS)
8%
Groups using
destructive
malware23%
Groups using
zero-day
vulnerabilities
2018CHINA
RUSSIA
IRAN
NORTH KOREAWhile the overall number of targeted attacks was down somewhat last year, the most
active groups stepped up their activity, attacking an average of 55 organizations
over the past three years, up from 42 between 2015 and 2017. Spear-phishing emails
remained the most popular avenue for attack and were used by 65 percent of all
known groups. The most likely reason for an organization to experience a targeted
attack was intelligence gathering, which is the motive for 96 percent of groups.
Alongside the rise in popularity of living off the land tactics, the use of zero-day
vulnerabilities declined in 2018, with only 23 percent of groups known to have
exploited zero days, down from 27 percent in 2017. While still a niche area, the use
of destructive malware continued to grow. Eight percent of groups were known to
use destructive tools, a 25 percent increase over 2017.
65%
of groups used spear
phishing as the primary
infection vector 96%
of groups’ primary
motivation continues to be
intelligence gathering19
18
11
1TARGETED ATTACK GROUPS KNOWN (YEAR)
2018 2017 2016050100150200
Total known groups116137155
TARGETED ATTACK GROUPS EXPOSED BY SYMANTEC (YEAR)
2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 2011 2010 2009012345678
Number of groupsTARGETED ATTACK GROUP MOTIVES (ALL TIME)
Intelligence Disruption Financial020%40%60%80%100%
Percentage of groups96%
10%6%
MOTIVES PER TARGETED ATTACK GROUP (ALL TIME)
1 2 3020%40%60%80%100%
Motives per group89%
10%
1%The most likely reason for an
organization to experience a
targeted attack was intelligence
gathering, which is the motive for
96 percent of groups.
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 50 Back to ToC
TARGETED ATTACK GROUP INFECTION VECTORS (ALL TIME)
Spear phishing
emailsWatering hole
websitesTrojanized software
updatesWeb server
exploitsData storage
devices010%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%
65%
23%
5%
1% 2%
Percentage of groups
INFECTION VECTORS PER TARGETED ATTACK GROUP
(ALL TIME)
Three vectors Two vectors One vector No known vector(s)010%20%30%40%50%60%
4%15%27%54%
Percentage of groupsTOP COUNTRIES AFFECTED BY TARGETED ATTACK GROUPS
(2016-2018)
COUNTRY ATTACKS
USA 255
India 128
Japan 69
China 44
Turkey 43
Saudi Arabia 42
South Korea 40
Taiwan 37
UAE 30
Pakistan 28
NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONS AFFECTED BY TARGETED
ATTACKS (YEAR)
2018 2017 20160100200300400500600
455
388582
OrganizationsSpear-phishing emails remained
the most popular avenue for attack
and were used by 65 percent of all
known groups.
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 51 Back to ToC
NUMBER OF TOOLS USED BY THE 20 MOST ACTIVE GROUPS
(2016-2018)
MINIMUM MAXIMUM AVERAGE
1 18 5
AVERAGE NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONS TARGETED BY THE 20
MOST ACTIVE GROUPS (2016-2018)
2016-2018
55PERCENTAGE OF GROUPS KNOWN TO USE ZERO-DAY
VULNERABILITIES (ALL TIME)
YesNo77% 23%
PERCENTAGE OF GROUPS KNOWN TO USE DESTRUCTIVE
MALWARE (ALL TIME)
YesNo92% 8%TOTAL INDICTMENTS BY U.S. AUTHORITIES (YEAR)
2018 2017 20160102030405060
49
5 4
Number Indicted
INDICTMENTS BY U.S. AUTHORITIES BY COUNTRY (YEAR)
North Korea Syria
IranRussia China01020304050
2018 2017 2016While still a niche area, the use of
destructive malware continued to
grow. Eight percent of groups were
known to use destructive tools, up
from 6 percent at the end of 2017.
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 52 Back to ToC
IOT
ACCOUNTING FOR OVER
90 PERCENT
OF ACTIVITY.WERE THE MAIN SOURCE OF IOT ATTACKSROUTERS AND CONNECTED CAMERAS
IOT DEVICES EXPERIENCE AN AVERAGE OF 5,200 ATTACKS PER MONTHATTACKS INVOLVING CONNECTED CAMERAS UP FROM 3.5% IN 2017 TO 15% IN 2018
After a massive increase in Internet of Things (IoT)
attacks in 2017, attack numbers stabilized in 2018,
when the number of attacks averaged 5,200 per
month against Symantec’s IoT honeypot. Routers
and connected cameras were by far the main source
of IoT attacks, accounting for over 90 percent of all
attacks on the honeypot. The proportion of infected
cameras used in attacks increased considerably
during 2018. Connected cameras accounted for 15
percent of attacks, up from 3.5 percent in 2017.
Attackers were also increasingly focused on Telnet
as an avenue for attack. Telnet accounted for over 90
percent of attempted attacks in 2018, a jump from
50 percent in 2017.TOP SOURCE COUNTRIES FOR IOT ATTACKS (YEAR)
COUNTRY PERCENT
China 24.0
USA 10.1
Brazil 9.8
Russia 5.7
Mexico 4.0
Japan 3.7
Vietnam 3.5
South Korea 3.2
Turkey 2.6
Italy 1.9
TOP USER NAMES USED IN IOT ATTACKS (YEAR)
USER NAME PERCENT
root 38.1
admin 22.8
enable 4.5
shell 4.2
sh 1.9
[BLANK] 1.7
system 1.1
enable 0.9
>/var/tmp/.ptmx && cd /var/tmp/ 0.9
>/var/.ptmx && cd /var/ 0.9TOP PASSWORDS USED IN IOT ATTACKS (YEAR)
PASSWORDS PERCENT
123456 24.6
[BLANK] 17.0
system 4.3
sh 4.0
shell 1.9
admin 1.3
1234 1.0
password 1.0
enable 1.0
12345 0.9
TOP IOT THREATS (YEAR)
THREAT NAME PERCENT
Linux.Lightaidra 31.3
Linux.Kaiten 31.0
Linux.Mirai 15.9
Trojan.Gen.2 8.5
Downloader.Trojan 3.2
Trojan.Gen.NPE 2.8
Linux.Mirai!g1 1.9
Linux.Gafgyt 1.7
Linux.Amnesiark 1.1
Trojan.Gen.NPE.2 0.8The notorious Mirai distributed
denial of service (DDoS) worm
remained an active threat and,
with 16 percent of the attacks, was
the third most common IoT threat
in 2018.
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 54 Back to ToC
TOP PROTOCOLS ATTACKED BY IOT THREATS (YEAR)
TARGETED SERVICE PERCENT
telnet 90.9
http 6.6
https 1.0
smb 0.8
ssh 0.6
ftp <0.1
snmp <0.1
cwmp <0.1
upnp <0.1
modbus <0.1
TOP PORTS ATTACKED BY IOT THREATS (YEAR)
TCP PORT NUMBER DESCRIPTION PERCENT
23 Telnet 85.0
80 World Wide Web HTTP 6.5
2323 Telnet (alternate) 5.8
443 HTTP over TLS/SSL 1.0
445 Microsoft Directory Services 0.8
22 Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol 0.6
8080 HTTP (alternate) 0.1
2223 Rockwell CSP2 <0.1
2222 Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol (alternate) <0.1
21 File Transfer Protocol [Control] <0.1TOP DEVICE TYPES PERFORMING IOT ATTACKS (YEAR)
DEVICE TYPE PERCENT
Router 75.2
Connected Camera 15.2
Multi Media Device 5.4
Firewall 2.1
PBX Phone System 0.6
NAS (Network Attached Storage) 0.6
VoIP phone 0.2
Printer 0.2
Alarm System 0.2
VoIP Adapter 0.1
ATTACKS AGAINST IOT DEVICES (YEAR)
YEAR TOTAL ATTACKS PERCENT CHANGE
2017 57,691
2018 57,553 -0.2
AVERAGE ATTACKS AGAINST IOT DEVICES (MONTH)
PER MONTH
5,233Routers and connected cameras
were the most infected devices and
accounted for 75 and 15 percent of
the attacks respectively.
ISTR 24 | February 2019
Facts and Figures 55 Back to ToC
$0.50–45$1–35$0.10–35$15–25$0.50–99
$1–100$0.50–25$1–20$0.50–12$0.10–10$0.10–2UNDERGROUND ECONOMY
ACCOUNTS
Restaurant gift cards
Online retailer gift cards
Online banking accounts (depending on value & verification)
Socks proxy account
Video and music streaming accounts
Cloud service account
Gaming platform account
Hacked email accounts (2,500)
VPN services
Hotel loyalty (reward program accounts with 100,000 points)
Various services (more than 120+ different accounts)
RDP login credentials
Retail shopping account
Online payment accounts (depending on value & verification)
IDENTITIES
Stolen or fake identity (name, SSN, and DOB)
Medical notes and prescriptions
Mobile phone online account
Stolen medical records
ID/passport scans or templates
Scanned documents (utility bill, etc.)
Full ID packages (name, address, phone, SSN, email, bank account, etc.)15–40% of value
15–50% of value
0.5%–10% of value
$1–15$5–10
$10–20
$15–20$3–30
$30–100
10 0 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100 110 120$0.10–1.50$0–250$10–200$4–60$70–240UNDERGROUND ECONOMY
IDENTITIES (CONT .)
Fake health care ID cards
Parcel drop off box for deliveries
Fake ID, driver license, passport, etc.
MONEY TRANSFER SERVICES
Cash redirector service for bank accounts
Cash redirector service for online payment system
Pay $100 in Bitcoin and get a money transfer of $1000
Cash redirector service
MALWARE
Office macro downloader generator
DDoS bot software
Spyware
Cryptocurrency stealer malware
Cryptocurrency miner (e.g. Monero)
Ransomware toolkit
Common banking Trojans toolkit with support.1–15% of value
1–5% of value
$100
5–20% of value
$1–15$5–10
$10–1,500$3–50$25–5,000
10
1000
020
20030
30040
100050
150060
200070
250080
300090
3500100 110 120
4000 4500 5000$50–220$2–6$0.10–3$5–60$0.50–20$10–1,000$3–12UNDERGROUND ECONOMY
$200–250SERVICES
Airline ticket and hotel bookings
Money laundering service (into cash or cryptocurrencies)
Cash out service (bank account, ATM card, and fake ID)
Hacker for hire
Custom phishing page service
DDoS service, short duration <1 hour (medium protected targets)
DDoS service, duration >24h (medium and strong protected targets)
PAYMENT CARDS
Single credit card
Single credit card with full details (fullz)
Dump of magnetic strip track 1/2 data (e.g. from skimming)
SOCIAL MEDIA
100 likes on social media platforms
500 social media followers
100,000 social media video views10% of value
4–40%
$350
$100+
$5–20
10
1000
020
20030
30040
100050
150060
200070
250080
300090
3500100 110 120
4000 4500 5000$1–45
These prices are taken from publicly accessible underground forums
and dark web TOR sites. Closed, private forums tend to have even
lower prices. We cannot verify if the goods are genuinely sold for the
asked price, some of them might be fake offers.ISTR 24 | February 2019Mehodology 59 Back to ToC
Symantec has established the largest civilian threat collection
network in the world, and one of the most comprehensive
collections of cyber security threat intelligence, through the
Symantec Global Intelligence Network (GIN).
The Symantec GIN comprises more than 123 million attack
sensors, recording thousands of threat events per second,
and contains over 9 petabytes of security threat data. This
network also monitors threat activities for over 300,000
businesses and organizations worldwide that depend on
Symantec for protection. Telemetry from across Symantec’s
threat protection portfolio helps our 3,800 cyber security
researchers and engineers identify the top trends shaping the
threat landscape.
Analyses of spam, phishing, and email malware trends
are gathered from a variety of Symantec email security
technologies processing more than 2.4 billion emails each day,
including: Symantec Messaging Gateway for Service Providers,
Symantec Email Security.cloud, Symantec Advanced Threat
Protection for Email, Symantec’s CloudSOC™ Service, and the
Symantec Probe Network. Symantec also gathers phishing
information through an extensive anti-fraud community of
enterprises, security vendors, and partners.Filtering more than 322 million emails, and over 1.5 billion
web requests each day, Symantec’s proprietary Skeptic™
technology underlies the Symantec Email and Web Security.
cloud™ services, utilizing advanced machine learning,
network traffic analysis, and behavior analysis to detect
even the most stealthy and persistent threats. Additionally,
Symantec’s Advanced Threat Protection for Email uncovers
advanced email attacks by adding cloud-based sandboxing,
additional spear-phishing protection, and unique targeted
attack identification capabilities.
Billions of URLs are processed and analyzed each month
by Symantec’s Secure Web Gateway solutions, including
ProxySG™, Advanced Secure Gateway (ASG), and Web
Security Solution (WSS), all powered by our real-time
WebPulse Collaborative Defense technology and Content
Analysis System, identifying and protecting against malicious
payloads and controlling sensitive web-based content. Mobile threat intelligence, provided by Symantec Endpoint
Protection Mobile (SEPM), is used to predict, detect, and
protect against the broadest range of existing and unknown
threats. SEPM’s predictive technology uses a layered
approach that leverages massive crowdsourced threat
intelligence, in addition to both device-based and server-
based analysis, to proactively protect mobile devices from
malware, network threats, and app and OS vulnerability
exploits. Additionally, mobile technology from Appthority,
coupled with SEPM, offers the ability to analyze mobile apps
for both malicious capabilities and unsafe and unwanted
behaviors, such as vulnerabilities, risk of sensitive data loss,
and privacy-invasive actions.These resources give Symantec analysts unrivaled sources
of data with which to identify, analyze, and provide informed
commentary on emerging trends in cyber attacks, malicious
code activity, phishing, and spam. The result is the annual
Symantec Internet Security Threat Report™, which gives
enterprises, small businesses, and consumers essential
information to help secure their systems effectively now
and into the future. CREDITS
Contributors
Alan Neville
Alex Shehk
Brian Duckering
Chris Larsen
Christian Tripputi
Dennis Tan
Gavin O’Gorman
Parveen Vashishtha
Pierre-Antoine Vervier
Pravin Bange
Robert Keith
Sean Kiernan
Sebastian Zatorski
Seth Hardy
Shashank Srivastava
Shaun Aimoto
Siddhesh Chandrayan
Tor Skaar
Tyler Anderson
Yun ShenTeam
Brigid O’Gorman
Candid Wueest
Dick O’Brien
Gillian Cleary
Hon Lau
John-Paul Power
Mayee Corpin
Orla Cox
Paul Wood
Scott Wallace
|
ISTR
Volume 24
Executive
Summary
2019 Internet Security Threat Report01 Executive Summary | Internet Security Threat Report February 2019
Formjacking. Targeted attacks. Living off the
land. Coming for your business.
Like flies to honey, miscreants swarm to the latest exploits that
promise quick bucks with minimal effort. Ransomware and
cryptojacking had their day; now it’s formjacking’s turn.
In the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, Volume 24,
we share the latest insights into global threat activity, cyber
criminal trends, and attacker motivations.
The report analyzes data from Symantec’s Global Intelligence
Network, the largest civilian threat intelligence network in the
world, which records events from 123 million attack sensors
worldwide, blocks 142 million threats daily, and monitors threat
activities in more than 157 countries.
Cyber criminals get rich quick with formjacking
Formjacking attacks are simple and lucrative: cyber criminals
load malicious code onto retailers’ websites to steal shoppers’
credit card details, with 4,800+ unique websites compromised
on average every month.
Both well-known (Ticketmaster and British Airways) and small-
medium businesses were attacked, conservatively yielding tens
of millions of dollars to bad actors last year.
All it takes is 10 stolen credit cards per compromised website to
result in a yield of up to $2.2M per month, as each card fetches
up to $45 in underground selling forums. With more than
380,000 credit cards stolen, the British Airways attack alone
may have netted criminals more than $17 million.Down, but not out
Ransomware and cryptojacking were go-to moneymakers
for cyber criminals. But 2018 brought diminishing returns,
resulting in lower activity.
For the first time since 2013, ransomware declined, down 20
percent overall, but up 12 percent for enterprises.
With a 90 percent plunge in the value of cryptocurrencies,
cryptojacking fell 52 percent in 2018. Still, cryptojacking
remains popular due to a low barrier of entry and minimal
overhead; Symantec blocked four times as many cryptojacking
attacks in 2018 compared to the previous year.
Targeted attackers have an appetite for
destruction
Supply chain and Living-off-the-Land (LotL) attacks are now
a cyber crime mainstay: supply chain attacks ballooned by 78
percent in 2018.
Living-off-the-land techniques allow attackers to hide inside
legitimate processes. For example, the use of malicious
PowerShell scripts increased by 1,000 percent last year.
Symantec blocks 115,000 malicious PowerShell scripts each
month, but this number accounts for less than one percent of
overall PowerShell usage. A sledgehammer approach toward
blocking all PowerShell activity would disrupt business, further
illustrating why LotL techniques have become the preferred
tactic for many targeted attack groups, allowing them to fly
under the radar.Executive Summary
TARGETED ATTACKS02
Executive Summary | Internet Security Threat Report February 2019
Attackers also increased their use of tried-and-true methods
like spear phishing to infiltrate organizations. While intelligence
gathering remains their primary motive, some groups also focus
on destruction. Nearly one in ten targeted attack groups now
use malware to destroy and disrupt business operations, a 25
percent increase from the previous year.
One stark example is Shamoon , which notably re-emerged after
a two-year absence, deploying wiping malware to delete files on
computers of targeted organizations in the Middle East.
Cloud challenges: If it’s in the cloud,
security’s on you
A single misconfigured cloud workload or storage instance
could cost an organization millions or cause a compliance
nightmare. In 2018, more than 70 million records were stolen or
leaked from poorly configured S3 buckets. Off-the-shelf tools on
the web allow attackers to identify misconfigured cloud resources.
Hardware chip vulnerabilities, including Meltdown, Spectre,
and Foreshadow allow intruders to access companies’ protected
memory spaces on cloud services hosted on the same physical
server. Successful exploitation provides access to memory
locations that are normally forbidden.
This is particularly problematic for cloud services because while
cloud instances have their own virtual processors, they share
pools of memory—meaning that a successful attack on a single
physical system could result in data being leaked from several
cloud instances.03
Executive Summary | Internet Security Threat Report February 2019
Get the details. Download the Symantec 2019
Internet Security Threat Report (ISTR)
https://go.symantec.com/ISTR
Election Securit y
Democracy is impossible without cyber security
LEARN MOREYour favorite IoT device is an attacker’s
best friend
Although routers and connected cameras make up 90 percent
of infected devices, almost every IoT device is vulnerable, from
smart light bulbs to voice assistants .
Targeted attack groups increasingly focus on IoT as a soft entry
point, where they can destroy or wipe a device, steal credentials
and data, and intercept SCADA communications.
And industrial IT shaped up as a potential cyber warfare
battleground, with threat groups such as Thrip and Triton vested
in compromising operational and industrial control systems.Did your social media feed sway an election?
With all eyes on the 2018 US Midterms, thankfully, no major
disruptions landed. But social media continued as a
hyperactive battlefield.
Malicious domains mimicking legitimate political websites were
discovered and shut down , while Russia-linked accounts used
third parties to purchase social media ads for them.
Social media companies took a more active role in combatting
election interference. Facebook set up a war room to tackle
election interference; Twitter removed over 10,000 bots posting
messages encouraging people not to vote.
|
SymAnte C enterpriSe SeCUritySymantec Global Internet
Security Threat Report
trends for 2008
Volume XiV, published April 2009Marc Fossi
executive editor
manager, DevelopmentSecurity technology and response
Eric Johnsoneditor
Security technology and response
Trevor Mack
Associate editor
Security technology and response
Dean Turner
Director, Global intelligence network
Security technology and response
Joseph Blackbird
threat Analyst
Symantec Security response
Mo King Lowthreat AnalystSecurity technology and response
Teo Adamsthreat Analyst
Security technology and response
David McKinney
threat AnalystSecurity technology and response
Stephen Entwislethreat Analyst
Security technology and response
Marika Pauls Laucht
threat AnalystSecurity technology and response
Candid Wueestthreat AnalystSecurity technology and response
Paul WoodSenior AnalystmessageLabs intelligence, Symantec
Dan Bleakenthreat AnalystmessageLabs intelligence, Symantec
Greg Ahmadthreat AnalystSecurity technology and response
Darren Kempthreat AnalystSecurity technology and response
Ashif Samnanithreat AnalystSecurity technology and responseIntroduction ............................................................................... 4
Executive Summary ........................................................................ 5
Highlights ............................................................................... 13
Threat Activity Trends .................................................................... 17
Vulnerability Trends ...................................................................... 35
Malicious Code Trends .................................................................... 55
Phishing, Underground Economy Servers, and Spam Trends ................................... 73
Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices ...................................................... 93
Appendix B—Threat Activity Trends Methodology ............................................ 95
Appendix C—Vulnerability Trends Methodology .............................................. 97
Appendix D—Malicious Code Trends Methodology .......................................... 104
Appendix E—Phishing, Underground Economy Servers, and Spam Trends Methodology .......... 105ContentsVolume XiV, published April 2009
Symantec Global Internet Security
Threat ReportSymantec Global internet Security threat report
4Introduction
the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report provides an annual overview and analysis of
worldwide internet threat activity, a review of known vulnerabilities, and highlights of malicious code.
trends in phishing and spam are also assessed, as are observed activities on underground economy
servers. previously presented every six months, this volume of the Symantec Global Internet Security
Threat Report will alert readers to trends and impending threats that Symantec has observed for 2008.
Symantec has established some of the most comprehensive sources of internet threat data in the world
through the Symantec™ Global intelligence network. more than 240,000 sensors in over 200 countries
monitor attack activity through a combination of Symantec products and services such as Symantec
DeepSight™ threat management System, Symantec managed Security Services and norton™ consumer
products, as well as additional third-party data sources.
Symantec also gathers malicious code intelligence from more than 130 million client, server, and gateway
systems that have deployed its antivirus products. Additionally, Symantec’s distributed honeypot network
collects data from around the globe, capturing previously unseen threats and attacks and providing
valuable insight into attacker methods.
Symantec maintains one of the world’s most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting
of more than 32,000 recorded vulnerabilities (spanning more than two decades) affecting more than
72,000 technologies from more than 11,000 vendors. Symantec also facilitates the Bugt raq™ mailing list,
one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion of vulnerabilities on the internet, which
has approximately 50,000 subscribers who contribute, receive, and discuss vulnerability research on a
daily basis.
Spam and phishing data is captured through a variety of sources including: the Symantec probe network,
a system of more than 2.5 million decoy accounts; messageLabs intelligence, a respected source of data
and analysis for messaging security issues, trends and statistics; and other Symantec technologies. Data
is collected in more than 86 countries from around the globe. Over eight billion email messages, as well
as over one billion Web requests are processed per day across 16 data centers. Symantec also gathers
phishing information through an extensive antifraud community of enterprises, security vendors and
more than 50 million consumers.
these resources give Symantec’s analysts unparalleled sources of data with which to identify, analyze, and
provide informed commentary on emerging trends in attacks, malicious code activity, phishing, and spam.
the result is the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report, which gives enterprises and consumers
the essential information to effectively secure their systems now and into the future. Symantec Global internet Security threat report
5Executive Summary
the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report consists primarily of four reports: the Global Internet Security
Threat Report; the EMEA Internet Security Threat Report, for the europe, the middle east, and Africa
(emeA) region; the APJ Internet Security Threat Report, for the Asia-p acific/Japan (Ap J) region; and the
Government Internet Security Threat Report, which focuses on threats of specific interest to governments
and critical infrastructure sectors. together, these reports provide a detailed overview and analysis of
internet threat activity, malicious code, and known vulnerabilities. trends in phishing and spam are also
assessed, as are observed activities on underground economy servers.
this summary will discuss current trends, impending threats, and the continuing evolution of the internet
threat landscape based on data for 2008 discussed within the four reports. this summary will also discuss
how regional differences can affect malicious activity globally.
there are a number of trends noted in previous volumes of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report
that continued in 2008: malicious activity has increasingly become Web-based; attackers are targeting end
users instead of computers; the online underground economy has consolidated and matured; and attackers
are able to rapidly adapt their attack activities.1
Symantec recently examined these trends along with the continued consolidation of malicious activities in the online underground economy in the Symantec Report on the Underground Economy.
2 that report found
that the underground economy is geographically diverse and able to generate millions of dollars in revenue
for (often) well-organized groups. the underground economy is also increasingly becoming a self-
sustaining system where tools specifically developed to facilitate fraud and theft are freely bought and sold. these tools are then used for information theft that may then be converted into profit to fund the
development of additional tools.
Based on the data and discussions presented in the current Symantec Internet Security Threat Report, this
summary will examine the primary methods being used to compromise end users and organizations, who is
generating these attacks, and what these attackers are after. Finally, this summary will look at emerging
trends that Symantec believes will become prevalent in the immediate future.
How users are being compromised
Web-based attacks are now the primary vector for malicious activity over the internet. the continued
growth of the internet and the number of people increasingly using it for an extensive array of activities
presents attackers with a growing range of targets as well as various means to launch malicious activity.3
Within this activity, Symantec has noted that most Web-based attacks are launched against users who visit
legitimate websites that have been compromised by attackers in order to serve malicious content.
Some of the common techniques used by attackers to compromise a website include exploiting a
vulnerable Web application running on the server (by attacking through improperly secured input fields), or exploiting some vulnerability present in the underlying host operating system. in 2008 alone, there were
12,885 site-specific vulnerabilities identified (figure 1) and 63 percent of vulnerabilities documented by Symantec affected Web applications. Attackers can exploit these vulnerabilities in a website or underlying
application to modify the pages served to users visiting the site. this can include directly serving malicious
1 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_exec_summary_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf
2 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_underground_economy_report_11-2008-14525717.en-us.pdf
3 http://www.verisign.com/static/043939.pdfSymantec Global internet Security threat report
6content from the site itself, or embedding a malicious iframe on pages that can redirect a user’s browser to
another Web server that is under the attacker’s control.4 in this way, the compromise of a single website
can cause attacks to be launched against every visitor to that site.
Period2007 200812,88517,697
Figure 1. Site-specific vulnerabilities
Source: Based on data provided by the XSSed Project5
in the case of a popular, trusted site with a large number of visitors, this can yield thousands of
compromises from a single attack. For example, one attack that targeted the websites of both the United
nations and the UK government, among others, injected malicious code that was designed to load content
from an attacker-controlled location into visitors’ browsers.6 Another separate attack successfully defaced
the national Albanian postal service website.7 these types of attacks provide an optimal beachhead for
distributing malicious code because they target high-traffic websites of reputable organizations.
in order to compromise the largest possible number of websites with a single mechanism, attackers will
attempt to compromise an entire class of vulnerability by searching for commonalities within them and
generically automating their discovery and exploitation. this allows attackers to compromise websites
with the efficiency commonly found in network worms.
the lengthy and complicated steps being pursued to launch successful Web-based attacks also demonstrate
the increasing complexity of the methods used by attackers. While a single high-severity flaw can be
exploited to fully compromise a user, attackers are now frequently stringing together multiple exploits for
medium-severity vulnerabilities to achieve the same goal. An indication of this is that eight of the top 10
vulnerabilities exploited in 2008 were rated as medium severity.
4 An iframe is an HtmL element that can include Web content from other pages or Web servers to be rendered when the user visits the original page. this tag can be
constructed so that it is effectively invisible and the user will not see any of the embedded content when viewing the original page.
5 Data was provided by the XSSed project, a site devoted to tracking and verifying reports of site-specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities: http://www.xssed.com.
6 http://news.cnet.com/8301-10789_3-9925637-57.html
7 http://albmasters.com/?p=3Symantec Global internet Security threat report
7many enterprises and end users will often make patching high-severity vulnerabilities a top priority,
while medium- and low-severity vulnerabilities may be ignored. this could result in the possibility of more
computers remaining exposed for longer periods to these vulnerabilities. For example, of the 12,885 site-
specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities identified by Symantec in 2008, only 394 (3 percent) are known
by Symantec to have been fixed.8
these developments and trends indicate that Web-based threats have not only become widespread, but
that they have also increased in sophistication. in particular, Symantec has noticed that some botnets
(such as Asprox,9 which was initially used for phishing scams) are being redesigned to specifically exploit
cross-site scripting vulnerabilities in order to inject malicious code into compromised websites.10
in many cases, medium-severity vulnerabilities are sufficient to mount successful attacks if attackers
are able to execute arbitrary code and perform actions such as accessing confidential information or
making network connections. this is made possible because many end users do not require administrative
privileges to run or modify the targeted applications. While the danger of client-side vulnerabilities may
be limited by best practices, such as restricting Web applications at the administrative level, this is often
unrealistic given how integral Web applications are to the delivery of content for many businesses. medium-
severity vulnerabilities affecting client or desktop applications are often sufficient for an attacker to mount successful malicious attacks on individual end users as well as at the enterprise level.
that said, however, a single high-severity vulnerability was the top attacked flaw in 2008. previous editions
of the Symantec Internet Security Threat Report noted that there has been a decrease in the volume of
network worms, partly due to a lack of easily exploitable remote vulnerabilities in default operating system
components. many network worms exploited such vulnerabilities in order to propagate. Highly successful
worms—such as Codered,
11 nimda,12 and Slammer13—all exploited high-severity vulnerabilities in remotely
accessible services to spread. these worms prompted changes in security measures, such as the inclusion
of personal firewall applications in operating systems that are turned on by default. this helped protect
users from most network worms, even if the vulnerability being exploited was not immediately patched.
the high-severity vulnerability in question was a zero-day vulnerability that was discovered in late 2008 in
the microsoft® Windows® Server® Service rpC Handling component that allowed remote code execution.14
Because remote communication with this service is allowed through the Windows firewall when file and
print sharing is turned on, many users would have to apply the patch to be protected from exploitation
attempts. Soon after, a new worm called Downadup (also known as Conficker) emerged that exploited
this vulnerability.15 Downadup was able to spread rapidly, partially due to its advanced propagation
mechanisms and its ability to spread through removable media devices.16 By the end of 2008 there were
well over a million individual computers infected by Downadup. Once Downadup has infected a computer,
it uses a Web or peer-to-peer (p2p) update mechanism to download updated versions of itself, or to install other malicious code onto the compromised computer.
8 For the purpose of this report, the term cross-site scripting encapsulates two broad classes of vulnerability; this includes traditional cross-site scripting and a category
known as HtmL injection (or persistent cross-site scripting).
9 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-060812-4603-99
10 http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/mLireport_Annual_2008_FinAL.pdf : p. 33
11 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2001-071911-5755-99
12 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2001-091816-3508-99
13 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2003-012502-3306-99
14 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/31874
15 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-112203-2408-99
16 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/malicious-Code/Downadup-Attempts-at-Smart-network-Scanning/ba-p/382114 - A233Symantec Global internet Security threat report
8Downadup has been particularly prolific in the Ap J and Latin America (LAm) regions.17 these regions are
also where some of the highest software piracy rates are recorded.18 Because pirated versions of software
are frequently unable to use automated update mechanisms for security patches (in case they are detected
and disabled), it is likely many computers in these two regions have not been patched against Downadup.
Software piracy rates are often high in many emerging markets with rapidly growing internet and
broadband infrastructures.19
From the data gathered for this reporting period, Symantec has also noted other significant malicious activities occurring in countries with rapidly emerging internet infrastructures. For example, while the
United States is still home to a large amount of threat activity and continues to be the top ranked country for malicious activity—mainly due to its extensive broadband penetration and significantly developed
internet infrastructure—Symantec has noted a steady increase in malicious activity in countries not
previously associated with such activities. One result of this trend is that these countries can appeal to
attackers as potential bases for hosting phishing websites, spam relays, and other malicious content,
possibly because rapidly growing iSps in these areas may have difficulty monitoring and filtering the
growing volume of traffic across their networks.
Attackers are also organized enough to implement contingency plans in case their activities are detected.
By relocating their activities to a variety of countries, attackers can minimize the chances of being partially
or completely shut down. this is demonstrated by events after the shutdown of a U.S.-based iSp toward
the end of 2008.
20 it seems that the bot controllers generating much of the attack activity from this iSp
had alternative hosting plans.21 As a result, although Symantec noted a significant drop in malicious
activity after the shutdown, particularly in spam, the numbers returned to previous levels soon afterward.
it became apparent that the botnet controllers had been able to successfully relocate enough of their bot
command-and-control (C&C) servers to other hosts, and were thus able to rebuild their botnets back up to
previous numbers. Given that the affected botnets were three of the world’s largest, it is not surprising that
new locations were quickly found to host these servers due to the significant profits such botnets are able
to generate.
What attackers want
more than ever before, attackers are concentrating on compromising end users for financial gain. in 2008,
78 percent of confidential information threats exported user data, and 76 percent used a keystroke-logging component to steal information such as online banking account credentials. Additionally, 76 percent of phishing lures targeted brands in the financial services sector (figure 2) and this sector also had the most
identities exposed due to data breaches. Similarly, 12 percent of all data breaches that occurred in 2008 exposed credit card information. in 2008 the average cost per incident of a data breach in the United
States was $6.7 million
22—which is an increase of 5 percent from 2007—and lost business amounted to
an average of $4.6 million.23
17 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/malicious-Code/Downadup-Geo-location-Fingerprinting-and-piracy/ba-p/380993 - A228
18 http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/01/bsa-piracy-economic-impact-is-tens-of-billions-of-dollars.ars
19 http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0ein/is_2008_may_14/ai_n25411795
20 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/other_resources/b-state_of_spam_report_12-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 7
21 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/11/18/short_mccolo_resurrection/
22 All figures are in U.S. dollars unless otherwise noted.
23 http://www.encryptionreports.com/download/p onemon_COB_2008_US_090201.pdf Symantec Global internet Security threat report
94%
1%
<1%
<1%
<1%
<1%<1%11%
76%
RetailFinancial
ISP
Internet community
Government8%
Computer hardwareOnline gaming
Insurance
Computer softwareTelecom
Figure 2. Phished sectors by volume of phishing lures
Source: Symantec Corporation
Once attackers have obtained financial information or other personal details—such as names, addresses,
and government identification numbers—they frequently sell that data on the underground economy.24
the most popular item for sale on underground economy servers in 2008 was credit card information,
accounting for 32 percent of the total (table 1). this is likely due to the fact that there are numerous
ways for credit card information to be stolen, and that stolen card data can be easily cashed out. this is
because the underground economy has a well-established infrastructure for monetizing such information,
again indicating the increased sophistication of the underground economy. Also, because of the large
quantity of credit card numbers available, the price for each card can be as low as 6 cents when they
are purchased in bulk. Some groups in the underground economy also specialize in manufacturing blank plastic cards with magnetic stripes destined to be encoded with stolen credit card and bankcard data.
the manufacture and distribution of these cards requires a well-organized level of sophistication since
the cards are often produced in one country, imprinted, and then shipped to the countries from where
the stolen data originated.
24 the underground economy comprises various forums, such as websites and internet relay Chat (irC) channels,
which allow criminals to buy, sell, and trade illicit goods and services. For more information see:
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_underground_economy_report_11-2008-14525717.en-us.pdfSymantec Global internet Security threat report
102008
Rank
1
2
3
4
56
78
9
102007
Rank
1
2
9
3
12
4
65
17
8Item
Credit card information
Bank account credentials
Email accounts
Email addresses
Proxies Full identities
Mailers Cash out services
Shell scripts Scams 2008
Percentage
32%
19%
5%
5%
4%4%
3%3%
3%
3%2007
Percentage
21%
17%
4%
6%
3%
6%
5%
5%
2%
5%Range of Prices
$0.06–$30
$10–$1000$0.10–$100
$0.33/MB–$100/MB
$0.16–$20
$0.70–$60
$2–$40
8%–50% or flat rate of
$200–$2000 per item
$2–$20
$3–$40/week for hosting,
$2–$20 design
Table 1. Goods and services available for sale on underground economy servers
Source: Symantec
One result that Symantec has drawn from the observance of increased professionalization in the
underground economy is that the coordination of specialized and, in some cases, competitive groups for
the production and distribution of items such as customized malicious code and phishing kits has led to a
dramatic increase in the general proliferation of malicious code. in 2008, Symantec detected 1,656,227
malicious code threats (figure 3). this represents over 60 percent of the approximately 2.6 million
malicious code threats that Symantec has detected in total over time.
Number of new threats
0200,0001,000,000
800,0001,800,000
1,600,000
Period600,000
400,0001,400,000
1,200,000
200220,547
200318,827
200469,107
2005113,025
2006140,690
2007624,267
20081,656,227
Figure 3. New malicious code threats
Source: SymantecSymantec Global internet Security threat report
11A prime example of this type of underground professional organization is the russian Business network
(rBn). the rBn reputedly specializes in the distribution of malicious code, hosting malicious websites,
and other malicious activity. the rBn has been credited with creating approximately half of the phishing
incidents that occurred worldwide last year. it is also thought to be associated with a significant amount
of the malicious activities on the internet in 2007.
Since that time there have been two significant cases of iSps that were shut down because of malicious
activity. these iSps were hosting malicious code, phishing websites, bot C&C servers, and spam relays.
this includes the instance noted above, when Symantec saw a 65 percent drop in spam and a 30 percent
decrease in bot activity within 24 hours of one particular iSp being taken offline.25 While it may seem
remarkable that the shutdown of a single iSp can result in such drastic decreases in malicious activity
within a short time period, as noted, malicious activity is increasingly organized and attackers are now
readily prepared for contingencies that might affect their operations. much of the malicious activity was
simply shifted to other locations. in this instance, the iSp even resurfaced briefly to afford the group an
opportunity to update the botnets under their control.26
in this increasingly sophisticated internet threat landscape, there is a growing impetus for greater
cooperation to address the high degree of organization of groups creating threats on the internet. this
was demonstrated by the aggressive spread of the Downadup worm in the latter months of 2008 and into 2009. Due to its multiple propagation mechanisms, the worm was able to spread rapidly. more worrisome
is the fact that the worm contains an update mechanism that could allow new versions of the worm or
other threats, such as a bot, to be installed on compromised computers. to combat its rapid spread and
aggressive profile, a coalition was formed by stakeholders involved in internet security.
27 the success of
this coalition of identifying how the worm operates, slowing its growth, and limiting its potential danger
demonstrates the benefits of increased cooperation among internet security stakeholders.
Conclusion
Changes in the current threat landscape—such as the increasing complexity and sophistication of
attacks, the evolution of attackers and attack patterns, and malicious activities being pushed to emerging countries—show not just the benefits of, but also the need for increased cooperation among security
companies, governments, academics, and other organizations and individuals to combat these changes.
Symantec expects malicious activity to continue to be pushed to regions with emerging infrastructures
that may still lack the resources to combat the growing involvement of organized crime in the online underground economy. the onus will be on organizations, institutions, and other knowledgeable groups
to come together for the benefit of the affected regions. internet threat activity is truly global, and
malicious activity allowed to flourish in one area could quickly spread worldwide.
With the increasing adaptability of malicious code developers and their ability to evade detection,
Symantec also expects that overt attack activities will either be abandoned or pushed further underground.
For example, if the effort to set up malicious iSps outweighs the return for attackers before being taken
offline, it is likely that attackers will abandon this approach for other attack vectors in order to continue to evade detection and potential apprehension or prosecution. this has already been seen with the use of
25 Cf. http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/other_resources/b-state_of_spam_report_12-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 7
and http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/mLireport_Annual_2008_FinAL.pdf : p. 26
26 http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/154554/spammers_regaining_control_over_srizbi_botnet.html
27 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/malicious-Code/Coalition-Formed-in-response-to-W32-Downadup/ba-p/388129 - A241Symantec Global internet Security threat report
12Http and p2p communication channels in threats such as Downadup. Because of the distributed nature of
these control channels, it is much more difficult to disable an entire network and locate the individual or
group behind the attacks.
the large increase in the number of new malicious code threats, coupled with the use of the Web as a
distribution mechanism, also demonstrates the growing need for more responsive and cooperative security
measures. While antivirus signature scanning, heuristic detection, and intrusion prevention continue to be
vital for the security of organizations as well as end users, newer technologies, such as reputation-based
security, will become increasingly important.
the focus of threats in 2008 continued to be aimed at exploiting end users for profit, and attackers
have continued to evolve and refine their abilities for online fraud. While some criminal groups have come
and gone, other large organizations persist and continue to consolidate their activities. these pseudo-
corporations and their up-and-coming competitors will likely remain at the forefront of malicious activity
in the coming year.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
13Highlights
this section provides highlights of the security trends that Symantec observed in 2008 based on the data
gathered from the sources listed in the introduction to this report. Selected metrics will be discussed in
greater depth in the sections that follow.
Threat Activity Trends Highlights
During this reporting period, 23 percent of all malicious activity measured by Symantec in 2008 was •
located in the United States; this is a decrease from 26 percent in 2007.
the United States was the top country of attack origin in 2008, accounting for 25 percent of worldwide •
activity; this is a decrease from 29 percent in 2007.the education sector accounted for 27 percent of data breaches that could lead to identity theft during •
this period, more than any other sector and a slight increase from 26 percent in 2007.
the financial sector was the top sector for identities exposed in 2008, accounting for 29 percent of the •
total and an increase from 10 percent in 2007.in 2008, the theft or loss of a computer or other data-storage devices accounted for 48 percent of data •
breaches that could lead to identity theft and for 66 percent of the identities exposed.Symantec observed an average of 75,158 active bot-infected computers per day in 2008, an increase of •
31 percent from the previous period.China had the most bot-infected computers in 2008, accounting for 13 percent of the worldwide total; •
this is a decrease from 19 percent in 2007.Buenos Aires was the city with the most bot-infected computers in 2008, accounting for 4 percent of the •
worldwide total.in 2008, Symantec identified 15,197 distinct new bot command-and-control servers; of these, •
43 percent operated through irC channels and 57 percent used Http .
the United States was the location for the most bot command-and-control servers in 2008, with •
33 percent of the total, more than any other country.
the top Web-based attack in 2008 was associated with the microsoft internet explorer® ADODB.Stream •
Object File installation Weakness vulnerability, which accounted for 30 percent of the total.
the United States was the top country of origin for Web-based attacks in 2008, accounting for •
38 percent of the worldwide total.
the United States was the country most frequently targeted by denial-of-service attacks in 2008, •
accounting for 51 percent of the worldwide total.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
14Vulnerability Trends Highlights
Symantec documented 5,491 vulnerabilities in 2008; this is a 19 percent increase over the •
4,625 vulnerabilities documented in 2007.
two percent of vulnerabilities in 2008 were classified as high severity, 67 percent as medium severity, •
and 30 percent as low severity.28 in 2007, 4 percent of vulnerabilities were classified as high severity,
61 percent as medium severity, and 35 percent as low severity.
eighty percent of documented vulnerabilities were classified as easily exploitable in 2008; this is an •
increase from 2007, when 74 percent of documented vulnerabilities were classified as easily exploitable.
Of any browser analyzed in 2008, Apple® Safari® had the longest window of exposure (the time between •
the release of exploit code for a vulnerability and a vendor releasing a patch), with a nine-day average;
mozilla® browsers had the shortest window of exposure in 2008, averaging less than one day.
mozilla browsers were affected by 99 new vulnerabilities in 2008, more than any other browser; there •
were 47 new vulnerabilities identified in internet explorer, 40 in Apple Safari, 35 in Opera™, and 11 in
Google® Chrome.29
there were 415 browser plug-in vulnerabilities identified in 2008, fewer than the 475 identified in 2007. •
ActiveX® technologies still constituted the majority of new browser plug-in vulnerabilities, with a total of
287; however, this is substantially down from the 399 ActiveX vulnerabilities identified in 2007.
memory corruption vulnerabilities again made up the majority of the type of vulnerabilities in browser •
plug-in technologies for 2008, with 271 vulnerabilities classified as such. in 2008, 63 percent of vulnerabilities affected Web applications, an increase from 59 percent in 2007.•
During 2008, there were 12,885 site-specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities identified, compared to •
17,697 in 2007; of the vulnerabilities identified in 2008, only 3 percent (394 vulnerabilities) had been
fixed at the time of writing.
in 2008, Symantec documented nine zero-day vulnerabilities, compared to 15 in 2007. •
the top attacked vulnerability for 2008 was the microsoft Windows Server Service rpC Handling •
remote Code execution Vulnerability.
in 2008, 95 percent of attacked vulnerabilities were client-side vulnerabilities and 5 percent were •
server-side vulnerabilities, compared to 93 percent and 7 percent, respectively, in 2007.
28 percentages are rounded off to the closest whole number and percentages may not equal 100 percent in some instances.
29 Google Chrome was released in September 2008.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
15Malicious Code Trends Highlights
in 2008, the number of new malicious code signatures increased by 265 percent over 2007; over •
60 percent of all currently detected malicious code threats were detected in 2008.
Of the top 10 new malicious code families detected in 2008, three were trojans, three were trojans •
with a back door component, two were worms, one was a worm with a back door component, and
one was a worm with back door and virus components.
trojans made up 68 percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code samples reported in 2008, a •
minor decrease from 69 percent in 2007.Five of the top 10 staged downloaders in 2008 were trojans, two were trojans that incorporated a back •
door component, one was a worm, one of was a worm that incorporated a back door, and one was a
worm that incorporated a virus component.
in 2008, the proportional increase of potential malicious code infections was greatest in the europe, •
the middle east and Africa region.
the percentage of threats to confidential information that incorporate remote access capabilities •
declined to 83 percent in 2008; this is a decrease from 91 percent in 2007, although such threats
remained the most prevalent exposure type.
in 2008, 78 percent of threats to confidential information exported user data and 76 percent had •
a keystroke-logging component; these are increases from 74 percent and 72 percent, respectively,
in 2007.
propagation through executable file sharing continued to increase in 2008, accounting for 66 percent •
of malicious code that propagates—up from 44 percent in 2007.One percent of the volume of the top 50 malicious code samples modified Web pages in 2008, down •
from 2 percent in 2007. the percentage of documented malicious code samples that exploit vulnerabilities declined substantially, •
from 13 percent in 2007 to 3 percent in 2008.in 2008, eight of the top 10 downloaded components were trojans, one was a trojan with a back door •
component, and one was a back door.
malicious code that targets online games accounted for 10 percent of the volume of the top 50 potential •
malicious code infections, up from 7 percent in 2007.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
16Phishing, Underground Economy Servers, and Spam Trends Highlights
the majority of brands used in phishing attacks in 2008 were in the financial services sector, accounting •
for 79 percent, down slightly from 83 percent identified in 2007.
the financial services sector accounted for the highest volume of phishing lures during this period, with •
76 percent of the total; this is considerably higher than 2007, when the volume for financial services was
52 percent.
in 2008, Symantec detected 55,389 phishing website hosts, an increase of 66 percent over 2007, when •
Symantec detected 33,428 phishing hosts.in 2008, 43 percent of all phishing websites identified by Symantec were located in the United States, •
considerably less than 2007, when 69 percent of such sites were based there.the most common top-level domain used in phishing lures detected in 2008 was .com, accounting for •
39 percent of the total; it was also the highest ranking top-level domain in 2007, when it accounted for
46 percent of the total.
One particular automated phishing toolkit identified by Symantec was responsible for an average of •
14 percent of all phishing attacks during 2008.Credit card information was the most commonly advertised item for sale on underground economy •
servers known to Symantec, accounting for 32 percent of all goods and services; this is an increase
from 2007 when credit card information accounted for 21 percent of the total.
the United States was the top country for credit cards advertised on underground economy servers, •
accounting for 67 percent of the total; this is a decrease from 2007 when it accounted for 83 percent
of the total.
the most common type of spam detected in 2008 was related to internet- or computer-related goods and •
services, which made up 24 percent of all detected spam; in 2007, this was the second most common
type of spam, accounting for 19 percent of the total.
Symantec observed a 192 percent increase in spam detected across the internet, from 119.6 billion •
messages in 2007 to 349.6 billion in 2008.
in 2008, 29 percent of all spam recorded by Symantec originated in the United States, a substantial •
decrease from 45 percent in 2007, when the United States was also the top ranked country of origin.in 2008, bot networks were responsible for the distribution of approximately 90 percent of all •
spam email.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
17Threat Activity Trends
this section of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report will provide an analysis of threat
activity, as well as other malicious activity, data breaches, and Web-based attacks that Symantec observed
in 2008. the malicious activity discussed in this section not only includes threat activity, but also phishing,
malicious code, spam zombies, bot-infected computers, and bot C&C server activity. Attacks are defined as any malicious activity carried out over a network that has been detected by an intrusion detection system
(iDS) or firewall. Definitions for the other types of malicious activities can be found in their respective
sections within this report.
this section will discuss the following metrics, providing analysis and discussion of the trends indicated by
the data:
malicious activity by country•
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by sector•
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by cause•
Bot-infected computers•
Bot command-and-control servers•
top Web-based attacks•
top countries of origin for Web-based attacks•
threat activity—protection and mitigation•
Malicious activity by country
this metric will assess the countries in which the largest amount of malicious activity takes place or
originates. to determine this, Symantec has compiled geographical data on numerous malicious activities,
including: bot-infected computers, phishing website hosts, malicious code reports, spam zombies, and attack origin. the rankings are determined by calculating the mean average of the proportion of these
malicious activities that originated in each country.
malicious activity usually affects computers that are connected to high-speed broadband internet because
these connections are attractive targets for attackers. Broadband connections provide larger bandwidth
capacities than other connection types, faster speeds, the potential of constantly connected systems, and
typically more stable connections. the top three countries in this metric—the United States, China, and
Germany—all have extensively developed and growing broadband infrastructures.
30 China, which passed
the United States for the largest number of broadband subscribers for the first time in 2008, has 21 percent
of the worldwide broadband subscriber total with 83.3 million subscribers. the United States is second
with 20 percent, while Germany is fourth with 6 percent. each country also experienced a growth of
over 20 percent in broadband subscribers from 2007.
in 2008, the United States was the top country for overall malicious activity, making up 23 percent of the
total (table 2). this is a decrease from 2007 when the United States was also first, with 26 percent. Within
specific category measurements, the United States ranked first in malicious code, phishing website hosts, and attack origin.
30 http://www.point-topic.comSymantec Global internet Security threat report
182008
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
102007
Rank
1
2
3
4
8
6
7
5
15
12Country
United States
China
Germany
United Kingdom
Brazil
Spain
Italy
France
Turkey
Poland2008
Overall
Percentage
23%
9%
6%
5%
4%
4%
3%
3%
3%
3%2007
Overall
Percentage
26%
11%
7%
4%
3%
3%
3%
4%
2%
2%Malicious
Code
Rank
1
2
12
4
16
10
11
8
15
23Spam
Zombies
Rank
3
42
10
1
8
6
14
5
9Phishing
Websites
Host Rank
1
62
5
16
13
14
9
24
8Bot
Rank
2
14
9
5
3
6
10
8
7Attack
Origin
Rank
1
24
3
9
6
85
12
17
Table 2. Malicious activity by country
Source: Symantec
the slight decrease in overall malicious activity for the United States can be attributed to the drop in
spam zombies there. this is likely due to the shutdown of two U.S.-based Web hosting companies that
were allegedly hosting a large number of bot C&C servers associated with spam distribution bot networks
(botnets).31 Spam activity decreased worldwide after both shutdowns. in one case, Symantec observed a
65 percent decrease in spam traffic in the 24 hours that followed.32 Both companies allegedly hosted a
large number of bot C&C servers for several large spam botnets: Srizbi,33 rustock,34 and Ozdok (mega-D).35
Spam zombies that lack a critical command system are unable to send out spam.
China had the second highest amount of overall worldwide malicious activity in 2008, accounting for
9 percent; this is a decrease from 11 percent in the previous reporting period. Along with the fact that
China has the most broadband subscribers in the world, the amount of time spent online by users there could contribute to the high percentage of malicious activity in China. the longer a user is online, the
longer the computer is exposed to malicious attack or compromise, and internet users in China spend
more of their leisure time online than users in any other country.
36 Online leisure activities are also
typically more likely to include activities on sites that may be vulnerable to attacks. this includes social
networking websites, online gaming sites, forums, blogs, and online shopping sites. Dynamic sites, such as forums, for example, are prime targets for attackers using bot-infected computers to propagate and host
malicious content since Web application and site-specific vulnerabilities can put these types of site at risk.
the slight drop in China’s percentage of malicious activity in 2008 was mainly due to the drop in phishing
website hosts and bot-infected computers. China dropped from third for phishing website hosts in 2007
to sixth in 2008, with just under 3 percent of the global total; and, although China maintained its top ranking for bot-infected computers, its global share in this regard decreased from 19 percent in 2007 to
13 percent in 2008.
One possible cause for the decreases may be national initiatives to block websites potentially most
susceptible to fraud in an effort to increase online security for users ahead of the 2008 Beijing Olympic
Games. thousands of websites were either shut down or blacklisted as part of this effort, including a
31 http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/10/spam_volumes_plummet_after_atr.html
32 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/other_resources/b-state_of_spam_report_12-2008.en-us.pdf
33 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-062007-0946-99
34 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-011309-5412-99
35 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-021215-0628-99
36 http://www.tnsglobal.com/_assets/files/ tnS_market_research_Digital_World_Digital_Life.pdfSymantec Global internet Security threat report
19substantial number of message forums,37 which, as noted previously, are popular targets of attack from
Web application and site-specific vulnerabilities. thus, any reduction in the number of bot-infected
computers should result in a corresponding drop in other attack activity categories, such as spam zombies,
because these are often associated with bot-infected computers. China dropped from third in spam zombies
in 2007, with 7 percent of the worldwide total, to fourth and 6 percent in 2008.
Another factor that may have contributed to the lower percentage of bot-infected computers in China in
2008 was that many unlicensed internet cafés there were also shut down and supervision was tightened
on the remaining cafés to help address online security risks associated with the casual use of public computers.
38 public computers tend to be more susceptible to attacks because of the significant amount
of varied traffic on such computer terminals. public computers are frequently used by a great variety of
people for many different activities such as email, online shopping, and gaming. the variety of usage and
likelihood that transient users are less aware of—or concerned with—security makes such computers attractive to attackers.
in 2008, Germany again ranked third with 6 percent of all internet-wide malicious activity, down slightly
from 7 percent in 2007. in both years, Germany ranked highly in spam zombies and hosting phishing
websites—activities that are often associated with bot networks. in 2008, Germany ranked fourth for bot
C&C servers, with 5 percent of the total. this high number of bot C&C servers likely indicates that botnets
are prominent in Germany, which would contribute to the high amount of overall malicious activity
originating there. Also, spam zombies are often focused in regions with high broadband penetration and
bandwidth capacity because these conditions facilitate sending out large amounts of spam quickly.
it is reasonable to expect that the United States, China and Germany will continue to outrank other
countries in this measurement as they have done so for the past several reports. Beyond these three,
however, countries such as Brazil, turkey, poland, india, and russia are expected to continue to increase
their share of overall malicious activity because they all have rapidly growing internet infrastructures and
growing broadband populations.
39 Countries that have a relatively new and growing internet infrastructure
tend to experience increasing levels of malicious activity until security protocols and measures are improved to counter these activities.
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft, by sector
identity theft continues to be a high-profile security issue, particularly for organizations that store and
manage large amounts of personal information. Based on the most recent information available from 2007,
roughly 8.4 million U.S. residents were victims of identity theft, which represents approximately 3 percent
of the adult population.40 not only can compromises that result in the loss of personal data undermine
customer and institutional confidence, result in costly damage to an organization’s reputation, and be
costly for individuals to recover from the resulting identity theft, they can also be financially costly to
organizations. in 2008, the average cost per incident of a data breach in the United States was $6.7 million,
an increase of 5 percent from 2007, and lost business amounted to an average of $4.6 million.41 Also,
organizations can be held liable for breaches and losses, which may result in fines or litigation.42
37 See http://www.vnunet.com/vnunet/news/2207878/china-cracks-web-porn and http://english.gov.cn/2008-03/29/content_931872.htm
38 http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/rt GAm.20080212.wgtchina0212/BnStory/ technology/home
39 http://www.point-topic.com
40 http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/idtheftsurveys.htm#Jav2007
41 http://www.encryptionreports.com/download/p onemon_COB_2008_US_090201.pdf.
42 http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communication/pr/2007/021.shtmlSymantec Global internet Security threat report
20Using publicly available data, Symantec has determined the sectors that were most often affected by
these breaches and the most common causes of data loss.43 this discussion will also explore the severity
of the breach by measuring the total number of identities exposed to attackers, using the same publicly
available data.44
it should be noted that some sectors may need to comply with more stringent reporting requirements for
data breaches than others. For instance, government organizations are more likely to report data breaches,
either due to regulatory obligations or in conjunction with publicly accessible audits and performance
reports.45 Conversely, organizations that rely on consumer confidence may be less inclined to report such
breaches for fear of negative consumer, industry, or market reaction. As a result, sectors that are not
required or encouraged to report data breaches may be under-represented in this data set.
in 2008, the education sector represented the highest number of known data breaches that could lead to
identity theft, accounting for 27 percent of the total (figure 4). this is a slight increase from 2007 when the
education sector also ranked first with 26 percent of the total.
4% 5%
29%
20%13%6%
Data breaches Identities exposed2%10%
Health careEducation
Government
Financial 2%2%2%2%
20%5%
14%
15%
Retail/ wholesale
Arts/media
Manufacturing 27%
TelecomBusiness consulting
Insurance
Other
Biotech /pharmaceutical4%
17%2%
Utilities/ ener gy
Figure 4. Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by sector and identities exposed by sector46
Source: Based on data provided by OSF DataLoss DB
43 Open Security Foundation (OSF) Dataloss DB, see http://datalossdb.org
44 An identity is considered to be exposed if personal or financial data related to the identity is made available through the data breach.
45 Cf. http://www.privacyrights.org/fs/fs6a-facta.htm and http://www.cms.hhs.gov/HealthplansGeninfo/12_Hip AA.asp
46 Due to rounding, percentages might not equal 100 percent. Symantec Global internet Security threat report
21educational institutions store a large amount of personal information on students, faculty, and staff that
could be used for the purposes of identity theft, including government-issued identification numbers,
names, and addresses. Finance departments in these institutions also store bank account information for
payroll and may also hold credit card information for people who use this method to pay for tuition and
fees. these institutions—particularly larger universities—often consist of many autonomous departments
within which sensitive personal identification information may be stored in separate locations and be accessible to many people. this may increase the opportunities for attackers to gain unauthorized access
to this data since it may be more difficult to standardize the security, educate everyone with access to the
data on the policies, and control access to these dispersed databases.
Despite the high number of data breaches that occurred in the education sector during 2008, it only
accounted for 4 percent of all identities exposed during the period and ranked seventh (figure 4). this
may be because the educational institutions have relatively smaller databases than those of financial or
government institutions and, hence, fewer identities would be exposed in a data breach. One of the largest
universities in the United States accounted for less than 80,000 students and employees, while financial
and government institutions may store information on millions of people.
47
Also, one-third of the data breaches in the education sector this period were caused by the theft or loss
of computers or data-storage devices. As such, data breaches that occurred in the education sector in
this reporting period were not as likely to result in wide-scale identity theft because they resulted in the exposure of fewer identities. these types of breaches only expose the limited amount of data that is
stored on the devices.
in 2008, the government sector ranked second and accounted for 20 percent of data breaches that could
lead to identity theft. this is a decrease from the previous year, when the government sector represented
23 percent of the total, though still ranking second. this trend is reinforced by the annual Federal Computer
Security report card, where the number of government agencies with a failing grade decreased by almost
half.
48 the health care sector ranked third in 2008, accounting for 15 percent of data breaches that could
lead to identity theft. it also ranked third in 2007, accounting for 14 percent.
Government and health care organizations, like educational institutions, store large amounts of information
that could be used for identity theft. Similar to the education sector, these organizations often consist of
numerous autonomous departments that store sensitive personal information in separate locations and
are accessible to numerous people. As a consequence, these organizations face the same security and
control issues as educational institutions. Furthermore, health care organizations store sensitive medical information in addition to personal information, which could result in even more damaging breaches
of privacy.
the government sector ranked third for identities exposed during 2008, accounting for 17 percent of
the total while the health care sector ranked sixth, accounting for 5 percent of the total. As with the
education sector, data breaches within the health care sector resulted in a relatively low number of
identities exposed.
47 http://www.osu.edu/osutoday/stuinfo.php
48 http://republicans.oversight.house.gov/media/pDFs/reports/F y2007FiSmAreportCard.pdfSymantec Global internet Security threat report
22Data breaches that could lead to identity theft, by cause
in 2008, the primary cause of data breaches that could facilitate identity theft was the theft or loss of
a computer or other medium on which data is stored or transmitted, such as a USB key or a back-up
medium.49 theft or loss made up 48 percent of all data breaches in 2008, a decrease from the
previous reporting period when it accounted for 52 percent of all reported breaches (figure 5).
Data breaches Identities exposedInsider 4%
Unknown <1%Insecure policy 8%
Hacking 22%
Theft /loss 66%Insecure policy 21%Insider 7%
Hacking 17%
Unknown 7%
Fraud 1%
Theft /loss 48%Fraud <1%
Figure 5. Data breaches that could lead to identity theft by cause and identities exposed50
Source: Based on data provided by OSF DataLoss DB
theft or loss accounted for 66 percent of all identities exposed in 2008, more than any other cause
(figure 5). this was a large increase from 2007, when the number of identities exposed from theft or loss
accounted for 24 percent of the total. the main reason for this dramatic increase is that theft or loss was
the cause for the three largest breaches that exposed the highest number of identities reported in 2008.
these breaches were due to lost or missing disks and exposed personal information relating to an
estimated 41 million people.
Although laptops and other storage devices, such as USB memory keys, portable hard drives, and disks,
have become smaller, less expensive, and easier to use, their compact size and larger storage capability has
increased the opportunity for theft, loss, or misplacement, as well as the potential amount of information
breached; a single DVD disk can contain personal information on millions of people. in a recent survey, one
in 10 people have lost a laptop, smart phone, or USB flash drive with corporate information stored on it.51 it
may be that the theft of a computer or data-storage device is opportunistic and motivated by the hardware
itself and not necessarily its contents, and as such, may not lead to wide-scale identity theft, although there
have been cases where information obtained from on a lost disk was discovered in advertisements in the
underground economy.
49 this cause will be referred to as theft or loss for the remainder of the report.
50 Due to rounding, percentages might not equal 100 percent.
51 http://www.rsa.com/press_release.aspx?id=9703Symantec Global internet Security threat report
23to protect against data theft or loss, organizations should restrict the use of outside personal storage
devices within their network, monitor the usage of such hardware when permitted, and educate employees
on proper usage. Organizations should also include reviews and audits of electronic documents used by
employees upon leaving the company. in a recent study, 59 percent of employees admitted to taking
company information, such as email addresses, contact information of customers, employee records,
and financial records, when leaving the organization.52 Of these former employees, 79 percent took the
information without consent from the company. in 92 percent of the instances, the information was taken
on disk, while 73 percent was on removable drives. it is worth noting that only 15 percent of the companies
polled had conducted a review or audit of electronic documents taken by employees. Also, sensitive data
should be strongly encrypted on any laptop or storage device that may be used outside of the enterprise.
the second most common cause of data breaches that could lead to identity theft during 2008 was
insecure policy, which represented 21 percent of all incidents. A data breach is considered to be caused
by insecure policy if it can be attributed to a failure to develop, implement, and/or comply with adequate
security policy. in 2007, insecure policy also ranked second, accounting for 28 percent of such data
breaches. this decrease in the number of data breaches may be due to organizations becoming more
diligent and producing stronger security policies such as limiting access to sensitive information to required
personnel and the documentation of document transfers. insecure policy accounted for only 8 percent of
exposed identities in 2008 and, thus, each breach exposed only a relatively small number of identities. Although breaches caused by insecure policy in 2008 were not likely to result in wide-scale identity theft, the breaches still exposed approximately 6.5 million identities.
53
in 2008, hacking was the third leading cause of data breaches that could lead to identity theft, accounting for 17 percent of the total. A data breach is considered to be caused by hacking if data related to identity
theft was exposed by attackers external to an organization gaining unauthorized access to computers or
networks. Hacking also ranked third in 2007, accounting for 14 percent of breaches that could facilitate
identity theft. Hacking is more purpose-driven than insecure policy, theft, or loss: in 2008, over half of the
breaches that exposed credit card information were due to hacking. Attackers can take advantage of site-
specific and Web-application vulnerabilities to gain access to networks and steal personal information. For
this discussion, Symantec considers hacking to be an intentional act with a defined purpose to steal data
that can be used for purposes of identity theft or other fraud.
Hacking ranked second for identities exposed in 2008, with 22 percent; this is a large decrease from 2007,
when hacking accounted for 62 percent of total identities exposed. the contributing factor for its high
ranking in 2007 was a significant data breach in which data on over 94 million credit cards was stolen by attackers hacking into a company’s database through unencrypted wireless transmissions and installing
programs to capture credit card information.
54 it is estimated that between $63 million and $83 million
in credit card fraud across 13 countries can be attributed to this single data breach.55
in 2008, two breaches contributed significantly to the high ranking of hacking in this metric: in the
first, confidential information on six million Chileans was illegally obtained from government databases
by a hacker who publicly posted the information afterward; in the second, credit card information from
4.2 million customers was stolen from a U.S.-based grocery chain by hackers monitoring the credit
52 http://www.symantec.com/about/news/release/article.jsp?prid=20090223_01
53 http://datalossdb.org
54 http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21454847/
55 http://www.securityfocus.com/news/11493Symantec Global internet Security threat report
24authorization process.56 Because of the motivation of attackers who use hacking to steal personal financial
information, the impact of data breaches due to hacking are severe because they are likely to result in
large-scale fraud and high financial cost to affected organizations, credit card issuers, and consumers.
even though they constitute one of the most challenging issues faced by organizations, data breaches
that could lead to identity theft are mostly preventable. For any department that manages or requires
access to sensitive information, organizations should develop strong security policies such as strongly
encrypting all data, ensuring there are controls in place that restricts access to such information to required
personnel, and providing education and resources for all employees on proper security procedures. network
administrators should be closely monitoring network traffic and tracking all activity to ensure that there is no illegal access to databases, as well as testing security processes and systems regularly to ensure their
integrity. Organizations should include these steps as part of a broader security policy, and ensure that any
security policy is implemented and enforced to protect all sensitive data from unauthorized access.
Bot-infected computers
Bots are programs that are covertly installed on a user’s machine in order to allow an attacker to remotely control the targeted system through a communication channel, such as internet relay chat (irC), p2p, or
Http . these channels allow the remote attacker to control a large number of compromised computers over
a single, reliable channel in a botnet, which can then be used to launch coordinated attacks.
Bots allow for a wide range of functionality and most can be updated to assume new functionality by
downloading new code and features. Attackers can use bots to perform a variety of tasks, such as setting up
denial-of-service (DoS) attacks against an organization’s website, distributing spam and phishing attacks,
distributing spyware and adware, propagating malicious code, and harvesting confidential information from
compromised computers that may be used in identity theft, all of which can have serious financial and legal
consequences. Bots are also inexpensive and relatively easy to propagate. in 2008, Symantec observed
underground economy advertisements for as little as $0.04 per bot. this is much cheaper than in 2007,
when $1 was the cheapest price advertised for bots. Bot-infected computers with a decentralized bot C&C
model are favored by attackers because they are difficult to disable, and most importantly, can be lucrative
for their controllers. in one example, a botnet owner arrested in new Zealand admitted to earning $21,500
over a two-year span from his activities.
57
A bot-infected computer is considered active on a given day if it carries out at least one attack on that day. this does not have to be continuous; rather, a single such computer can be active on a number of different
days. A distinct bot-infected computer is a distinct computer that was active at least once during the period.
in 2008, Symantec observed an average of 75,158 active bot-infected computers per day (figure 6), a
31 percent increase from 2007. Symantec also observed 9,437,536 distinct bot-infected computers
during this period, a 1 percent increase from 2007.
56 Cf. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/7395295.stm or http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23678909/
57 http://www.itworld.com/security/58670/botnet-master-sees-himself-next-bill-gatesSymantec Global internet Security threat report
25DateActive bot-infected computers
Apr 4, 2007 Jul 4, 2007 Oct 3, 2007 Jan 2, 2008020,00040,00060,00080,000100,000120,000
Apr 2, 2008 Jul 2, 2008 Oct 1, 2008 Jan 3, 20074 per . moving averageMedian daily
active bots
Dec 31, 2008
Figure 6. Active bot-infected computers, by day
Source: Symantec
the decrease in active bot-infected computers at the beginning of 2008 may be due to the reduction in
size of the botnet associated with the peacomm trojan.58 the number of bot-infected computers in the
botnet was reduced to 5 percent of its previous estimated size, from 2 million bot-infected computers
to 100,000.59 in addition, as stated in “Malicious activity by country,” the shutdown of two U.S.-based
hosting companies responsible for hosting bot C&C servers for a number of major botnets likely contributed
to the decrease in active bot-infected computers in September and november 2008. After the shutdown
in September, major botnets, including Srizbi and pandex,60 were able to find alternate hosting, which
resulted in an increase in bot-infected computers back to pre-shutdown levels. However, the shutdown
in november severely crippled Srizbi and Ozdok, and as a consequence, competing botnets, including
pandex, were able to fill the void.61
Although the number of active bot-infected computers decreased at the end of the year, it is assumed that
botnet owners will seek out new hosts to get their botnets back online, and it is expected that bot numbers
will rise again in 2009.62 One result of all the activity in 2008 is that this shows that botnets can be crippled
by identifying and shutting down their bot C&C server hosts, but that this strategy is difficult to implement given the various global hosting options that botnet controllers have at their disposal.
58 Also known as the Storm botnet.
59 http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/mLireport_Annual_2008_FinAL.pdf : p. 32
60 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-042001-1448-99
61 http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/mLireport_Annual_2008_FinAL.pdf : p. 25–26
62 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/other_resources/b-state_of_spam_report_12-2008.en-us.pdfSymantec Global internet Security threat report
26Bot command-and-control servers
Symantec tracks the number of bot C&C servers globally because these are what botnet owners use to
relay commands to bot-infected computers on their networks. For the first time, in this volume of the
Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report, bot C&C servers controlled over Http are included in this
analysis alongside irC bot C&C servers.63 this change in measurement was made due to the trend of
botnet owners shifting away from traditional irC bot C&C communication frameworks and toward
managing their botnets through Http bot C&C servers. in 2008, Symantec identified 15,197 distinct new
bot C&C servers (figure 7), of which 43 percent were over irC channels and 57 percent over Http .
IRC 43%HTTP 57%
Figure 7. Bot command-and-control servers, by type
Source: Symantec
Botnet owners are moving away from traditional irC-based botnets since they are easier to detect,
track, filter, and block than botnets based on Http traffic. Http communications can be used to disguise
botnet traffic among other Web traffic in order to make it difficult to distinguish malicious traffic from
legitimate Http traffic. (most Http bot transmissions are encrypted to avoid detection.) to filter the
traffic, organizations would have to inspect the encrypted Http traffic and identify and remove bot-related traffic while still allowing legitimate traffic to pass through. Because of this, it is very difficult to pinpoint and disable a bot C&C structure. it is also unreasonable to block Http traffic since organizations depend
on legitimate Http traffic to conduct day-to-day business. Botnet owners have also been switching away from using p2p for bot C&C server communications because such traffic is more easily detected due to the
“noise” it creates in transmission. moreover, many enterprises and other organizations also block p2p
ports to prevent such high-bandwidth traffic from entering their networks.
63 not included in this measurement are bot C&C servers over p2p protocols; also, as this is the first report in which Http bot C&C servers are included in this analysis,
2007 comparisons are unavailable. Symantec Global internet Security threat report
27Symantec also observed an average of 42 new active bot C&C servers per day in 2008, of which 18 were
irC-based and 24 were Http (figure 8). the three largest botnets identified by Symantec in 2008—Srizbi,
rustock, and pandex—are all Http -based.
DateBot comand-and-control servers
0103050
204060
HTTP
IRC
3 per . moving average (H TTP)
3 per . moving average (IRC )
Apr 2, 2008 Jul 2, 2008 Oct 1, 2008 Jan 2, 2008 Dec 31, 2008
Figure 8. Bot command-and-control servers, by day
Source: Symantec
the drop in new and active Http bot C&C servers in February 2008 is likely due to bot C&C servers for
a major Http -based botnet, Ozdok, going offline for 10 days during that month.64 Also, the significant
reductions that occurred in September and november 2008 are likely due to the shutdown of two U.S.-
based iSps, as was noted previously in this discussion. the September shutdown resulted in an immediate
decrease in activity associated with the Srizbi and pandex botnets.65 As mentioned, it is assumed that
these botnets found alternate hosting, which would explain the subsequent rise in activity.
the second shutdown in november resulted in a 30 percent decrease in overall botnet traffic and is
thought to have severely weakened two of the largest botnets, Srizbi and rustock.66 the significant drop in
new and active Http bot C&C servers in november may be because one of these iSps was allegedly hosting
a large number of bot C&C servers for Srizbi and rustock, and bots were hard-coded to connect to these
servers.67 it was estimated that the Srizbi botnet had 300,000 bots prior to the shutdown68 and the
rustock botnet had included over 150,000 bots.69
64 http://www.scmagazineus.com/ trACe-Six-botnets-generate-85-percent-of-spam/article/107603/
65 http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/mLireport_Annual_2008_FinAL.pdf : p. 25
66 http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/mLireport_Annual_2008_FinAL.pdf : p. 26
67 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/other_resources/b-state_of_spam_report_12-2008.en-us.pdf
68 http://itknowledgeexchange.techtarget.com/security-bytes/srizbi-botnet-is-the-biggest-but-does-size-matter/
69 http://www.scmagazineus.com/ the-rustock-botnet-spams-again/article/112940/Symantec Global internet Security threat report
28Top Web-based attacks
the widespread deployment of Web applications along with the ubiquity of easy-to-exploit Web application
security vulnerabilities have resulted in the prevalence of Web-based threats. Attackers wanting to take
advantage of client-side vulnerabilities no longer need to actively compromise specific networks to gain
access to those computers. instead, they are now focused on attacking and compromising websites in
order to mount additional, client-side attacks.
these attack types can be found globally and Symantec identifies each by an associated distinct detection
signature. most attack types target specific vulnerabilities or weaknesses in Web browsers or other client-
side applications that process content originating from the Web. this metric will assess the top distinct
Web-based attacks originating from compromised legitimate sites and malicious sites that have been
created to intentionally target Web users.
the attacks discussed can involve social engineering to entice a victim to view a malicious website, but
most attacks exploit trusted high-traffic websites. When the user visits a compromised website, a number
of attack methods are used. malicious content from the website can directly exploit a vulnerability in
the browser, a browser plug-in, or a desktop application. An attack such as this may require very little
interaction apart from the user visiting the site from where the attack originates. in the case of a drive-by
download, the attack will occur without any interaction required from the user.70
Attackers also use malicious websites for compromises, such as misleading the user to indirectly authorize
a specific technology that then downloads malicious code, or prompting the user to click on a pop-up or banner ad. Attackers can also redirect all traffic from a legitimate website to a malicious website from
which the user’s computer will then be attacked. in all of these types of Web-based attacks, the user is
unaware of the compromise. Once an attacker has compromised a website and injected malicious content, he or she can passively attack visitors of the compromised site. this type of attack is very efficient for
attackers because they only have to compromise one Web page in order to affect multiple users. When a user visits a compromised Web page, the attack is carried out through the user’s browser.
71 the attack will
either target vulnerabilities in the browser itself or it will target third-party applications that are activated
by the browser.
All Web-based attack traffic goes through the Http or HttpS protocols. the benefit of this for attackers
is that it is unreasonable to block these protocols because legitimate organizations depend on them for
their day-to-day business. in addition, filtering a large volume of Http traffic would significantly slow
throughput traffic. Http traffic is also difficult to filter with intrusion detection/intrusion prevention systems (iDS/ipS) because it is difficult to distinguish malicious traffic from legitimate traffic, and Http
traffic can be encrypted, thus enabling attacks to be obfuscated within legitimate traffic.
Attackers are not only employing manual methods to exploit these issues, but they are also using
automated tools, such as neosploit,
72 to exploit client-side vulnerabilities on a massive scale. Such toolkits
are widely available and prepackaged so that people with minimal technical knowledge are able to use them effectively.
70 A drive-by download is any download that occurs without a user’s prior knowledge or authorization and does not require user interaction. typically this is
an executable file.
71 Cf. “Vulnerability trends” section for discussion on compromises to websites with Web-based vulnerabilities.
72 http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&taxonomyname=Security&articleid=9115599&taxonomyid=17&pagenumber=1Symantec Global internet Security threat report
29Another attraction of the Web for exploitation is the profusion of dynamic sites that use Web-based
applications, such as forums, photo-sharing galleries, blogs, and online shopping applications. Dynamic
sites are prime targets for attackers using bot-infected computers to propagate and host malicious
content since Web application and site-specific vulnerabilities can put these types of site at risk.
Attackers are also especially attracted to large, popular websites with trusted reputations. this is not only
because a successful compromise can reach a greater number of people (who tend to have an inherent
trust for legitimate websites and are thus more susceptible to attack), but, as mentioned, it may be difficult
to block attacks to these sites using security tools without disrupting legitimate traffic.
these developments and trends indicate that Web-based threats have not only become widespread, but
that they also have increased in sophistication and severity. in particular, Symantec has noticed that
botnets (such as Asprox, which was initially used for phishing scams) are being redesigned to specifically exploit cross-site scripting vulnerabilities and inject malicious code into compromised websites.
73
many Web-based attacks exploit vulnerabilities that are considered medium severity. this means that
they can compromise the account of the currently logged in user because the user does not require
administrative privileges to run the affected applications. While the danger of client-side vulnerabilities
may be limited by best practices, such as restricting Web applications to the administrative level, this is often unreasonable given how integral Web applications are to the delivery of content for many businesses.
medium-severity vulnerabilities affecting client or desktop applications are often sufficient for an attacker
to mount successful malicious attacks on single clients, as well as at the enterprise level.
in 2008, the top Web-based attack was associated with the microsoft internet explorer ADODB.Stream
Object File installation Weakness,
74 which accounted for 29 percent of the total globally (table 3).
the weakness allows attackers to install malicious files on a vulnerable computer when a user visits
a website hosting an exploit. to carry out this attack, an attacker must exploit another vulnerability that
bypasses internet explorer security settings to allow the attacker to execute malicious files installed by
the initial security weakness. this issue was published on August 23, 2003, and fixes have been available
since July 2, 2004. Since this was the top Web-based attack in 2008, this may indicate that many
computers running internet explorer have not been patched or updated and are running with this
exposed vulnerability.
Rank
1
2
3
4
56
789
10Web-based Attack
Microsoft Internet Explorer ADODB.Stream Object File Installation Weakness
Acrobat PDF Suspicious File Download
ANI File Header Size Buffer Overflow
Adobe SWF Remote Code Executable
Microsoft Internet Explorer DHTML CreateControlRange Code ExecutableSnapShot Viewer ActiveX File Download
Microsoft Internet Explorer XML Core Services XMLHTTP Buffer OverloadQuicktime RTSP URI Buffer OverloadAOL SuperBuddy ActiveX Code ExecutableMicrosoft Internet Explorer WebViewFolderIcon ActiveX Control Buffer OverflowPercentage
30%
11%
7%
7%
6%5%
4%3%3%2%
Table 3. Top Web-based attacks
Source: Symantec
73 http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/mLireport_Annual_2008_FinAL.pdf : p. 33
74 Cf. http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid=50031 or http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/10514Symantec Global internet Security threat report
30A large number of exploits and malicious applications may depend on this vulnerability as a common
way of compromising computers, in tandem with other known vulnerabilities. therefore, the amount of
attack activity is related to the cumulative number of exploits, attack toolkits, and worms targeting this
vulnerability as one possible means of compromising computers. it is also likely that the large market
share of microsoft internet explorer plays a role in the popularity of this attack.75 While the vulnerability
was patched in 2004, there are likely still enough unpatched computers that are affected by this
vulnerability for attackers to continue to benefit from its exploitation.
the second most common Web-based attack in 2008 was related to malicious Adobe® Acrobat® pDF
activity,76 which accounted for 11 percent of Web-based attacks. Specifically, attempts to download
suspicious pDF documents were observed. this may indicate attempts by attackers to distribute malicious
pDF content to victims via the Web. the attack is not directly related to any specific vulnerability, although
the contents of the malicious file would be designed to exploit an arbitrary vulnerability in an application
that processes it, such as Adobe Acrobat reader®. A successful attack could ultimately result in the
compromise of the integrity and security of an affected computer. this attack is assumed to be popular
to due the common use and distribution of pDF documents on the Web. Also, browsers can be set up to
automatically render a pDF document by default. Specific exploit activity related to malicious pDF files
was observed in 2008.77
the “Vulnerability Trends ” section of this report notes that the percentage of plug-in vulnerabilities
affecting Adobe Acrobat reader in comparison to the total number of browser plug-in vulnerabilities
increased to 4 percent in 2008 from 1 percent in 2007. this demonstrates that Adobe Acrobat reader is
increasingly targeted by attackers. in addition, the reappearance of the neosploit toolkit in 2008 may have
contributed to the popularity of this type of attack as that toolkit is designed to exploit vulnerabilities in pDF documents.
78
in 2008, the third most common Web-based attack exploited the microsoft Windows User32.DLL Ani File
Header Handling Stack-Based Buffer Overflow Vulnerability,79 accounting for 7 percent of Web-based
attacks in 2008. the Ani (animated cursor file) handler is a default component of the microsoft Windows
operating system and is used by a significant number of widely used microsoft applications as well as the
Windows shell. if successfully exploited, the vulnerability allows an attacker to execute arbitrary code
embedded in a malformed Ani file originating from the Web or other sources. this vulnerability was
published on January 11, 2005, and fixes have also been available since that time. exploit code was
publicly available the following day. As with the microsoft internet explorer ADODB.Stream Object File
installation Weakness, the prominence of this type of attack indicates that computers in the region are likely not being sufficiently patched and updated.
Vulnerabilities such as those discussed here continue to generate a large amount of observed attack
activity because they can be reliably exploited. this makes these vulnerabilities prime candidates for
automation. Despite the fact that fixes are available, as mentioned, it is likely that there are still enough unpatched systems in existence that these attacks continue to enjoy success. When attacks prove
successful, they are often adopted by a large number malicious code variants and attack toolkits. this can
cumulatively create a large amount of observed attack activity. it is also likely that older malicious code
variants continue to attempt to automatically exploit these vulnerabilities as a means of propagation.
75 http://marketshare.hitslink.com/browser-market-share.aspx?qprid=0&qpmr=100&qpdt=1&qpct=3&qptimeframe=y &qpsp=2008&qpnp=2
76 http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid=23153
77 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/Vulnerabilities-exploits/pidief-the-Word-for-exploits/ba-p/305564#A141
78 http://www.computerworld.com/action/article.do?command=viewArticleBasic&taxonomyname=Security&articleid=9115599&taxonomyid=17&pagenumber=2
79 Cf. http://www.symantec.com/business/security_response/attacksignatures/detail.jsp?asid=21719 or http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/12233Symantec Global internet Security threat report
31Top countries of origin for Web-based attacks
this metric will assess the top countries of origin for Web-based attacks against users in 2008 by
determining the location of computers from which the attacks occurred. note that attackers, in order to
hide their tracks, often redirect users through one or more servers that may be located anywhere globally.
Once an attacker has compromised a legitimate website, users who visit the website will be attacked by
several additional means. One way is through a drive-by download, which results in the installation of malicious code without the user’s knowledge or consent. Another way is to redirect the user to another
website that is used to host malicious code. Sites and servers hosting a variety of malicious exploits can
be found worldwide. multiple domains can be associated with one compromised site, which is used to
exploit one or more security vulnerabilities in affected client browsers.
in 2008, computers from the United States were the leading source of Web-based attacks against users,
accounting for 38 percent of the total (table 4). there are a number of factors that make the United States
the top country of origin for Web-based attacks. this ranking may be due to the more than half a million
websites that were compromised in may 2008 with malicious code that was hosted in russia and the
United States. Web forums hosted by pHp -based bulletin board applications were exploited to inject
malicious JavaScript™ into forum content. these forums would then infect visitors with variants of the Zlob
trojan
80 disguised as a video codec installer. the exploit changes browser and DnS settings on the infected
computer and enables additional attacks, including turning the infected computer into a zombie.81 this
attack follows the trend of attackers inserting malicious code into legitimate high-traffic websites where users are likely to be more trusting of the content, rather than attempting to lure users to visit specially
designed malicious sites.
Rank
1
23
4
5
6
78
9
10Country
United States
ChinaUkraine
Netherlands
Russia
United Kingdom
CanadaJapan
Latvia
FrancePercentage
38%13%12%
8%5%
5%
3%2%
1%
1%
Table 4. Top countries of origin for Web-based attacks
Source: Symantec
80 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-042316-2917-99
81 http://www.channelregister.co.uk/2008/05/13/zlob_trojan_forum_compromise_attack/Symantec Global internet Security threat report
32in 2008, China ranked as the second country of origin for Web-based attacks, with 13 percent of the
worldwide total. the main reason for the high rank of China in 2008 is due to compromised websites
relating to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. the games were one of the largest events of 2008 and
attackers exploited the popularity of the event in their attempts to lure and compromise users, as has
been seen previously with other major sporting and entertainment events.82 One example is the rustock
botnet, which sent out emails with links to a news report about the games. Users were prompted to click
a link in the email and visit a site, which then prompted them to download a missing codec in order to launch a video. Clicking to obtain the codec actually resulted in the installation of a trojan.
Attackers may have also used social engineering to lure users to compromised websites under the guise
of being associated with the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games, as attacks against Chinese-language websites
increased significantly during the games.
83 the extent of these attacks was mitigated, however, by
initiatives to increase online security for users ahead of the Games by shutting down or blacklisting thousands of websites potentially most susceptible to fraud, which are popular targets of attack from Web
application and site-specific vulnerabilities. Also, thousands of websites in China were compromised when
certain Web applications were infected with malicious JavaScript that was planted through the use of SQL-
injection attacks.
84 Visitors to these compromised sites had their computers attacked and, if the attacks
were successful, trojans were downloaded onto the computers.85
Ukraine ranked third in 2008 for top country of origin for Web-based attacks, accounting for 12 percent
of such attacks worldwide. the prominence of Ukraine in this metric is likely due to the compromise of the
website of a U.S.-based electronic bill payment processing company.86 the attackers were able to obtain
account credentials to the company’s domain using a phishing attack, and were then able to gain access
to the company’s website. Customers, thinking they were visiting the legitimate website, were redirected to a malicious website hosted on servers in the Ukraine where they were attacked with a trojan.
87 in addition
to the compromise of the bill payment company’s website, there were at least 71 domains that were
redirected to the malicious Ukrainian server during this time.88
Of note, six of the top 10 countries for Web-based attacks in the emeA region were also in the top 10
countries of origin for Web-based attacks globally, and countries in the emeA region accounted for
41 percent of the worldwide total, more than any other region. exploit packs may be one of reasons
behind the prominence of the emeA region in this measurement. many exploit packs, including mpack,89
icep ack,90 and neosploit,91 originated in russia and it is likely that the russians who developed these
attack kits are responsible for much of their continued propagation. these attackers could possibly be
compromising websites around the world and redirecting visitors to computers in emeA that host the
exploit code being used to target client-side vulnerabilities in Web browsers.
Also contributing to the prominence of the emeA region this period were a number of high-profile Web-
based attacks that occurred there. One example was in January 2008, when the embassy website of the
netherlands in russia was compromised and visitors to the site were misled into installing malicious
code.92 Another example occurred in August 2008 when several hundred domains in the netherlands were
compromised and defaced.93 A third case was when more than a thousand UK websites were compromised
82 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/technology/7548870.stm
83 http://www.networkworld.com/newsletters/gwm/2008/090808msg1.html
84 http://www.h-online.com/security/Chinese-websites-under-mass-attack--/news/110764
85 ibid.
86 http://www.networkworld.com/news/2008/120508-network-solutions-phishing-came-before.html
87 http://www.csoonline.com/article/474365/CheckFree_Warns_million_Customers_After_Hack
88 http://blog.kievukraine.info/2008/12/digging-deeper-into-checkfree-attack.html
89 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/blogs/blogarticlepage/blog-id/vulnerabilities_exploits/article-id/93#m93
90 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/Vulnerabilities-exploits/Honor-Among- thieves/ba-p/306084#A193
91 http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1593
92 http://www.theregister.co.uk/2008/01/23/embassy_sites_serve_malware/
93 http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1788Symantec Global internet Security threat report
33and users visiting these sites risked being infected with the Asprox trojan.94 the success of these attacks
on government sites can be attributed, in part, to the inherent trust that visitors to such sites will have,
making these visitors more liable to accept prompts to download files if requested.
Web-based attacks are a major threat to computer networks for both enterprises and end users. Attacks
such as drive-by downloads are covert and very difficult to mitigate because most users are unaware that they are being attacked. Organizations are thus confronted with the complicated task of having to detect
and filter attack traffic from legitimate traffic. Since many organizations rely on Web-based tools and
applications to conduct business, it is likely that the Web will continue to be the primary conduit for
attack activity favored by malicious code developers.
Threat activity—protection and mitigation
there are a number of measures that enterprises, administrators, and end users can employ to protect against malicious activity. Organizations should monitor all network-connected computers for signs of
malicious activity, including bot activity and potential security breaches, ensuring that any infected
computers are removed from the network and disinfected as soon as possible. Organizations should
employ defense-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software and a firewall.
95
Administrators should update antivirus definitions regularly and ensure that all desktop, laptop, and
server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their operating system vendor.
As compromised computers can be a threat to other systems, Symantec also recommends that
enterprises notify their iSps of any potentially malicious activity.
Symantec recommends that organizations perform both ingress and egress filtering on all network traffic
to ensure that malicious activity and unauthorized communications are not taking place. Organizations should also filter out potentially malicious email attachments to reduce exposure to enterprises and end
users. in addition, egress filtering is one of the best ways to mitigate a DoS attack. DoS victims frequently
need to engage their upstream iSp to help filter the traffic to mitigate the effects of attacks.
Symantec also advises that users never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment
is expected and comes from a known and trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is
known. By creating and enforcing policies that identify and restrict applications that can access the
network, organizations can minimize the effect of malicious activity, and hence, minimize the effect on
day-to-day operations. Also, administrators should limit privileges on systems for users that do not require
such access and they should also restrict unauthorized devices, such as external portable hard-drives and
other removable media.
94 http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/the_web/article4381034.ece
95 Defense-in-depth emphasizes multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or
protection methodology. Defense-in-depth should include the deployment of antivirus, firewalls, and intrusion detection systems, among other security measures.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
34to reduce the likelihood of identity theft, organizations that store personal information should take the
necessary steps to protect data transmitted over the internet or stored on their computers. this should
include the development, implementation, and enforcement of a secure policy requiring that all sensitive
data is encrypted. Organizations should implement a data loss protection (DLp) solution that not only
prevents data breaches, but also mitigates potential data leaks from within an organization. Access to
sensitive information should be restricted and organizations should also enforce compliance to information
storage and transmission standards such as the pCi standard.96 policies that ensure that computers
containing sensitive information are kept in secure locations and are accessed only by authorized individuals should be put in place and enforced. Sensitive data should not be stored on mobile devices that
could be easily misplaced or stolen. this step should be part of a broader security policy that organizations
should develop and implement in order to ensure that any sensitive data is protected from unauthorized access. this would ensure that even if the computer or medium on which the data were lost or stolen, the
data would not be accessible. this step should be part of a broader security policy that organizations should
develop and implement in order to ensure that any sensitive data is protected from unauthorized access.
96 https://www.pcisecuritystandards.org/Symantec Global internet Security threat report
35Vulnerability Trends
this section will discuss selected vulnerability trends in greater depth, providing analysis and discussion
of the trends indicated by the data. the following metrics will be discussed:
Window of exposure for Web browsers •
Web browser vulnerabilities •
Web browser plug-in vulnerabilities•
Web browser plug-in vulnerabilities, by type•
Web application vulnerabilities•
Site-specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities•
Zero-day vulnerabilities •
top attacked vulnerabilities•
Attacked vulnerabilities by attack vector (client versus server)•
Vulnerabilities—protection and mitigation•
Window of exposure for Web browsers
the window of exposure for Web browsers is the difference in days between the time when exploit code
affecting a vulnerability is made public and the time when the affected vendor makes a patch publicly
available for that vulnerability. During this time, the computer or system on which the affected application
is deployed may be susceptible to attack. the metric is derived from the average amount of time it took to
release a patch in comparison to the average amount of time it took for exploit code to be made publicly available. this metric also includes maximum patch times, which is the maximum amount of time required
to release a patch for all of the patched vulnerabilities in the data set.
By measuring the amount of time it takes for vendors to release patches for vulnerabilities, it is possible to
gain some insight into their overall security responsiveness. Some of the vulnerabilities examined in this
metric were patched by the vendor at the time they were announced. this may be reflective of an internal
security audit by the vendor, which may have revealed the vulnerability. it may also indicate that security
researchers discovered the vulnerability and responsibly disclosed it to the vendor. Other vulnerabilities
are independently reported by security researchers prior to the release of a patch. this indicates that
security researchers did not coordinate with the vendor to disclose the vulnerability. in some cases, this
may mean that the researcher did not responsibly disclose the vulnerability, and in other cases it is possible that the researcher attempted to responsibly report the vulnerability but the vendor was
unresponsive. the patch release time is compared against the average time it takes for vulnerability
exploits to become publicly available to determine the window of exposure.
the window of exposure takes all of these factors into account to calculate the average time during which
end users and organizations are exposed to exploits. During the window of exposure, administrators and
end users need to mitigate the possibility of exploitation by employing current best practices and the best
available mitigation technologies. For high priority vulnerabilities, organizations must devote resources to
mitigation until the vulnerability is adequately addressed and eliminated as a risk.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
36this metric will examine the window of exposure for the following Web browsers:97
Apple Safari•
Google Chrome•
microsoft internet explorer •
mozilla browsers •
Opera•
in 2008, the average window of exposure for Safari was nine days, based on a sample set of 31 patched
vulnerabilities (figure 9). the window of exposure for 2007 was one day, based on a sample set of 31
patched vulnerabilities. the eight-day increase in the window of exposure for Safari is due to a number
of independently discovered vulnerabilities. the maximum time for Apple to patch a Safari vulnerability in
2008 was 156 days, which negatively affected the average and is significantly longer than the maximum patch time of eight days in 2007
19
Opera
MozillaInternet Explorer
Chrome
Average time in days0 2468Period
102200782008 Safari
33
17
<1
Figure 9. Window of exposure for Web browsers
Source: Symantec
internet explorer had an average window of exposure of seven days in 2008, based on a sample set
of 31 patched vulnerabilities. the maximum amount of time to release a patch in 2008 was 147 days.
in 2007, the average window of exposure was eight days, based on a sample set of 28 vulnerabilities,
and the maximum time to release a patch was 90 days.
in 2008, a zero-day vulnerability affecting internet explorer was found to be exploited in the wild.
microsoft addressed this vulnerability within eight days of its discovery. in this case, the response time
of eight days to release a patch is less than the average time it took to develop a patch for internet
explorer in 2008, which was 11 days.
97 it should be noted that this metric examines all versions of each browser; vulnerabilities affecting multiple versions are counted as a single vulnerability.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
37For the first time, in this report, Chrome is included in the browsers being assessed by Symantec. Because
it was released only recently (September 2008), it is being included here mainly to provide insight into its
performance against other browsers thus far and to set a baseline for future reports. in 2008, Symantec
documented an average window of exposure of three days for Chrome based on a sample set of six patched vulnerabilities. the maximum patch time for a vulnerability was 11 days.
the window of exposure for Opera in 2008 was one day, based on a sample set of 33 patched vulnerabilities. in 2008, the maximum time to patch a vulnerability was 29 days. in 2007, the window of
exposure for Opera was two days, based on a sample set of 14 patched vulnerabilities, and the maximum patch time was 23 days.
mozilla browsers had a window of exposure of less than one day in 2008, based on a sample set of
83 patched vulnerabilities, and the maximum patch time was 30 days. in 2007, mozilla browsers had
a window of exposure of three days, from a sample set of 103 vulnerabilities, and the maximum patch
time was 109 days.Of all the browser vendors examined, mozilla browsers maintained the shortest window of exposure while
patching more vulnerabilities than other vendors. this may be indicative of their efforts to marshal the
security community to responsibly report vulnerabilities through initiatives such as their Bug Bounty
program.
98 the result of this effort is that more vulnerabilities are announced by the vendor at the time
they are fixed, instead of being publicly reported by security researchers independently of the vendor.
it is also worth noting that independent browser vendors, such as Opera and the mozilla Foundation,
had a shorter window of exposure in 2008 than the major operating system vendors, such as Apple and
microsoft. this may be due to the possibility that vendors whose main product is a Web browser do not
have to spread their security response efforts across multiple, disparate products, and can instead focus
on the browser. Comparably, major operating system vendors typically have to coordinate security
response efforts across a larger number of unpatched vulnerabilities affecting a more diverse product
portfolio and organization. Vulnerabilities in other products may take priority based on a number of factors
such as the severity of the vulnerability, attack activity in the wild, or the relative ease of developing a
patch. Because Chrome is a new addition for this volume, it remains to be seen how Google will fare in the
long term as a large vendor whose Web browser technology represents only a small portion of the products
and services it offers.
Web browser vulnerabilities
Web browser vulnerabilities are a serious security concern due to their role in online fraud and in the
propagation of malicious code, spyware, and adware. they are particularly prone to security concerns
because they are exposed to a greater amount of potentially untrusted or hostile content than most other applications. this is a concern because attacks can originate from malicious websites as well as legitimate
websites that have been compromised to serve malicious content. Browsers can also facilitate client-side attacks because of their use of plug-ins and other applications in handling potentially malicious content served from the Web such as documents and media files.
98 http://www.mozilla.org/security/bug-bounty-faq.htmlSymantec Global internet Security threat report
38this metric will examine the total number of vulnerabilities affecting the following Web browsers:
Apple Safari•
Google Chrome•
microsoft internet explorer •
mozilla browsers •
Opera•
During 2008, 99 vulnerabilities affected mozilla browsers (figure 10). Forty of these vulnerabilities were
considered low severity and 59 were considered medium severity. this is fewer than the 122 vulnerabilities
that were documented in 2007 for mozilla browsers, of which 91 were considered low severity and 31 were
considered medium severity.
SafariMozilla
4712299
OperaInternet Explorer
Chrome
Documented vulnerabilities02 06 0 100 120Period
140192007572008 40
3547
11
40 80
Figure 10. Web browser vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
internet explorer was subject to 47 new vulnerabilities in 2008. Sixteen of these vulnerabilities were
considered low severity and 31 were considered medium severity. this is fewer than the 57 new
vulnerabilities documented in internet explorer in 2007, of which 28 were considered low severity,
28 were considered medium severity, and one was considered high severity.
Safari was affected by 40 new vulnerabilities in 2008, of which 16 were considered low severity and
24 were considered medium severity. this is less than the 47 vulnerabilities identified in Safari in 2007,
of which 27 were considered low severity, 19 were considered medium severity, and one was considered
high severity.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
39in 2008, Symantec documented 35 new vulnerabilities in Opera, of which 12 were considered low severity
and 23 were considered medium severity. this is more than the 19 vulnerabilities discovered in Opera in
2007, of which eight were considered low severity and 11 were considered medium severity.
Chrome was affected by 11 vulnerabilities in 2008, of which seven were considered low severity and four
were considered medium severity. Chrome was released in September 2008 and no comparison with
previous years is possible.
With the exception of Opera (and, as noted, Chrome), there were fewer browser vulnerabilities identified in
2008 than those in 2007. the entrance of Chrome into the browser market and increasing browser market
share of Opera may have influenced security research into these browsers and shifted attention away from other browsers. the trend toward fewer total vulnerabilities in browsers may also indicate a shift by the
vendors to improve the security of browsers.
However, it is also worth noting that the trend in 2008 was toward more medium-severity vulnerabilities
in browsers. this may correlate with the overall trend toward a higher proportion of medium-severity
vulnerabilities in relation to all vulnerabilities documented in 2008. this may also be indicative of evolving
skills among security researchers and attackers, who are identifying fewer lower-severity vulnerabilities
as a result. it should be noted that, in many cases, medium-severity vulnerabilities are sufficient to mount
successful attacks if attackers are able to execute arbitrary code and perform actions such as accessing
confidential information or making network connections.
it is important for browser vendors to continue to improve browser security given the continuous
competition among vendors to develop and include more feature-rich products in their products. in
2008, a number of browser vendors made concerted efforts to demonstrate their commitment to
security. in particular, Google released the Browser Security Handbook, which outlines common browser
security issues.
99 the goal of this project is to aid browser developers and security researchers in their
understanding of these vulnerabilities to help identify and fix these issues. mozilla has also started the
mozilla Security metrics project as an attempt to quantify the relative security of their browser products.100
Web browsers continue to be an attractive target for attackers. in 2008, internet explorer was the target of
a zero-day vulnerability in its XmL-handling code.101 this vulnerability was linked with SQL-injection attacks
that compromised trusted websites for the purpose of hosting exploit code for the vulnerability.102 this
technique was detailed in the previous volume of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report.103 it
is a continuing trend in 2008 for attackers to use Web-application vulnerabilities to compromise legitimate websites from which further attacks can then be launched. this exploit is also noteworthy because it
attempts to obfuscate signs of an attack by closing the browser cleanly without any errors once exploitation has occurred. this is a measure undertaken by attackers to extend the survivability of zero-day exploits. A
zero-day browser vulnerability is a highly valued asset that attackers work to protect against discovery by
victims and security vendors. prolonging the discovery of a zero-day vulnerability delays the development
of vendor patches and security content, such as intrusion prevent signatures that help with mitigation.
99 http://code.google.com/p/browsersec/wiki/main
100 http://blog.mozilla.com/security/2008/07/02/mozilla-security-metrics-project/
101 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/Vulnerabilities-exploits/ yes-there-s-a-Zero-Day-exploit-for-internet-explorer-Out- there/ba-p/371628#A180
102 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/Vulnerabilities-exploits/rise-of-ie-Zero-Day- through-SQL-injection/ba-p/372832#A182
103 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 34Symantec Global internet Security threat report
40Another noteworthy browser security issue in 2008 was the “carpet bombing” flaw discovered in Safari.104
the vulnerability would cause the browser to download arbitrary files to the victim’s desktop. it was later
discovered that this could further be exploited to execute code. this issue was actually a combination of
security weaknesses in Safari for Windows, internet explorer, and microsoft Windows that, when exploited
in tandem, could result in the deployment of a malicious executable. this is interesting because the
deployed environment of the browser was a factor that elevated a relatively minor vulnerability into a
major one. this presents a risk for browser vendors when they release products for new platforms, as
Apple did with its first non-beta release of Safari 3.1 for Windows in march 2008. this concern may be
relevant for Chrome, as Google is expected to release versions of the browser for Linux® and mac OS® X
in 2009.105
Administrators should maintain a restrictive policy regarding which applications are allowed within the
organization. the security of applications should be evaluated on a platform-by-platform basis to ensure
that platform-specific security issues do not arise when the application is installed.
Web browser plug-in vulnerabilities
this metric will examine the number of vulnerabilities affecting plug-ins for Web browsers. Browser
plug-ins are technologies that run inside the Web browser and extend its features. Often these plug-ins
allow additional multimedia content from Web pages to be rendered in the browser. they can also
enable execution environments that allow applications to be run inside the browser. Browser plug-in vulnerabilities are also used in a range of client-side attacks. many browsers include various plug-ins
in their default installation and provide a framework to ease the installation of additional plug-ins.
plug-ins now provide much of the expected or desired functionality of Web browsers and some may
even be required to effectively use the internal sites of enterprises.
the following plug-in technologies will be examined:
Adobe Acrobat •
Adobe Flash®•
Apple Quickt ime® •
microsoft ActiveX•
microsoft Windows media® player •
mozilla browser extensions •
Sun® Java™ • in 2008, Symantec documented a total of 419 vulnerabilities in plug-in technologies for Web browsers.
this is fewer than the 475 vulnerabilities affecting browser plug-ins identified in 2007. Of the total
for 2008, 287 vulnerabilities affected ActiveX, which is significantly more than any other plug-in technology (figure 11). Of the remaining plug-ins for which vulnerabilities were documented, there
were 45 vulnerabilities identified in Java, 40 in Quickt ime, 17 in Acrobat reader, 16 in Flash player,
five affected mozilla extensions, and five that affected Windows media player.
104 http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/746
105 http://news.cnet.com/chrome-gets-mac-deadline-extensions-foundation/?tag=rtcol;newsnowSymantec Global internet Security threat report
412008 2007QuickTime 8%
Acrobat 1%Mozilla extensions 1%
Java 4%
ActiveX 83%Flash 2%Windows Media Player 1%QuickTime 10%Acrobat 4%
Mozilla extensions 1%
Java 11%
ActiveX 69%Flash 4%
Windows Media Player 1%
Figure 11. Web browser plug-in vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
ActiveX was also affected by the most vulnerabilities in 2007, with a total of 399 out of the 475
vulnerabilities identified. After that, Quickt ime ranked second with 37 vulnerabilities, Java was affected
by 17, Flash player had 11, four affected mozilla extensions, three affected Windows media player, and
three affected Adobe Acrobat reader.
ActiveX vulnerabilities are still a popular mode of attack for developers of attack toolkits such as neoSploit.
in 2008, a number of additional exploits for ActiveX added to the neoSploit toolkit were identified. this
includes a vulnerability in the Snapshot Viewer for microsoft Access®,106 and another in the Computer
Associates BrightStor® application.107 in fact, to exploit the microsoft Access Snapshot Viewer vulnerability,
attackers went to the length of silently installing the vulnerable control on client computers not previously
affected by the vulnerability.108 this highlights underlying security issues in the ActiveX security model
through which attackers are able to silently install vulnerable ActiveX components that are cryptographically signed by a vendor within the trusted certificate store of internet explorer.
the prevalence of ActiveX vulnerabilities poses a particular concern to end users and organizations that
use internet explorer. While the market share of internet explorer 7 surpassed that of internet explorer 6
in 2008, the fact that ActiveX vulnerabilities are still a popular avenue of attack suggests that the security
features of internet explorer 7 have not eliminated the ActiveX threat.
109 it appears that end users are
overriding these security features and continue to allow insecure ActiveX controls to be installed and executed. microsoft internet explorer 8 is slated to include additional security features to manage the
threat of insecure ActiveX controls.
110 it is uncertain whether better ActiveX security in internet explorer 8
will have an effect on the number of vulnerabilities in the short term, since there are still many insecure
106 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/Vulnerabilities-exploits/microsoft-Access-Snapshot-Viewer-exploited-in-neosploit-Wrapper/ba-p/335199#A164
107 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/Vulnerabilities-exploits/neosploit-Updated-with-exploit/ba-p/314840#A151
108 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/Vulnerabilities-exploits/ActiveX-Vulnerabilities-e ven-When- you-Aren-t-Vulnerable- you-may/ba-p/341705#A165
109 http://www.w3schools.com/browsers/browsers_stats.asp
110 http://blogs.msdn.com/ie/archive/2008/05/07/ie8-security-part-ii-activex-improvements.aspxSymantec Global internet Security threat report
42ActiveX controls available for download on the internet. However, there may be fewer incidents and
examples of these vulnerabilities being incorporated into attack toolkits if the security measures being
implemented by microsoft are effective.
Other plug-in technologies such as Acrobat were also subject to exploitation in the wild.111 For instance,
the number of plug-in vulnerabilities in Java rose due to increased interest from the security research community. Java is an attractive target because it runs in most Web browser versions on most operating
systems. this means that many of the vulnerabilities in the Java plug-in facilitate the development of
cross-platform exploit code. this represents an ideal scenario for attackers because it exposes a large
number of targets to simple and reliable exploitation. Attackers seek vulnerabilities that affect widely
deployed applications that can be attacked through the Web browser.
Web browser plug-in vulnerabilities, by type
this discussion will examine some specific vulnerabilities that affect browser plug-ins. to do so, the
vulnerabilities covered in the previous metric are classified into various categories based on their security impact. the impact of a vulnerability helps to determine the means by which an attack accomplishes its
goal by exploiting the vulnerability. it also helps administrators prioritize the risks posed by a specific
vulnerability and develop mitigations that are in proportion to the threat.
the categories below are meant to highlight the primary impact on end users. it should be noted that
some vulnerabilities defy categorization due to inadequate public information about the nature of
the vulnerability and its potential impact. Vulnerabilities that could not be categorized are noted
in the discussion.Vulnerabilities affecting browser plug-in technologies are classified into the following distinct categories:
112
Memory corruption:• these vulnerabilities allow attackers to corrupt the memory of an application
process with malicious input and can allow attackers to execute arbitrary code.
Denial-of-service (DoS):• DoS vulnerabilities typically result in an application crash when exploited.
Although this could be due to a memory corruption issue, these vulnerabilities are classified as DoS
when no potential of arbitrary code execution is apparent.
Information disclosure:• these vulnerabilities most often expose sensitive information to an
unauthorized party, either as a result of active exploitation or as an inadvertent side effect of an
erroneous condition in the application.
Content injection:• these vulnerabilities allow the injection of malicious content or allow attackers to
bypass third-party input validation filters; they can also enable cross-site scripting attacks.
Spoofing:• these vulnerabilities allow an attack to spoof elements of the browser-user interface.
Unauthorized file system access:• these vulnerabilities allow attackers to view, modify, or delete files on
the computer hosting the affected browser plug-in.
111 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/Vulnerabilities-exploits/Acrobat-util-printf-exploit-Detected-with-existing-ipS/ba-p/364088#A176
112 For a more complete description of these categories, please see Appendix C—Vulnerability trends methodologiesSymantec Global internet Security threat report
43Command execution:• these vulnerabilities allow a remote attacker to execute operating system
commands through an affected browser plug-in.
Origin validation:• these vulnerabilities can occur when content from an invalid or unauthorized
originating source is treated as valid by a plug-in.Elevated security context:• these vulnerabilities violate a security policy intended to prevent remote
content from accessing system properties and capabilities. it should be noted that some vulnerabilities
may present an opportunity for elevated security bypass but are more accurately described by
another category.
in 2008, of the 415 vulnerabilities identified in browser plug-ins, 271 were classified as memory corruption
vulnerabilities (figure 12). this is followed by 61 unauthorized file system access vulnerabilities, 27 elevated
security context vulnerabilities, 14 DoS attack vulnerabilities, 13 information disclosure vulnerabilities,
nine command execution vulnerabilities, eight origin validation vulnerabilities, four content injection vulnerabilities, and one vulnerability that facilitated spoofing attacks. the remaining seven vulnerabilities
could not be classified due to insufficient information about their causes and effects.
11%
<1%
2%2%
16%1%
2008 2007
Information disclosureMemory corruption
DoS
Content injection Unauthorized file system access
Command executio n
Elevated security context
Spoofing Unknown<1%2%
5%
Origin validation 61%3%7%
1%15% 2%
2%
65%3%<1%
2%
Figure 12. Web browser plug-in vulnerabilities, by type
Source: Symantec Symantec Global internet Security threat report
44memory corruption vulnerabilities also made up the majority of plug-in vulnerabilities in 2007, with 288
being classified as such out of 475 total vulnerabilities identified (table 5). Of the remaining, 76 were
considered DoS issues, 54 allowed unauthorized file system access, 24 allowed elevated security context,
nine allowed command execution, eight allowed content injection, five vulnerabilities allowed information
disclosure, and two were related to origin validation. there were no spoofing vulnerabilities in browser plug-
in technologies in 2007 and nine vulnerabilities could not be classified due to a lack of information about the causes and effects of the vulnerabilities.
memory corruption vulnerabilities constituted the majority of browser plug-in vulnerabilities in both 2007
and 2008. However, the data indicates that DoS vulnerabilities were less prevalent in 2008 than they were
in 2007. in 2008, they were displaced by unauthorized file system access vulnerabilities as the second
highest proportion of plug-in technology vulnerabilities. in October of 2008, Symantec noted the rise in
unauthorized file system access vulnerabilities affecting ActiveX controls.
113 At that time, attackers had
integrated a number of exploits for these issues into attack toolkits, proving their effectiveness and
popularity among attackers. in the same month, Symantec also observed new attack patterns for
unauthorized file system access vulnerabilities that affected ActiveX controls.114 these attack patterns
can allow attackers to exploit unauthorized file system access vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code.
the decrease of DoS vulnerabilities and increase in vulnerabilities such as unauthorized file system access
and elevated security context indicate an evolving skill set among security researchers and attackers. in
particular, researchers and attackers are developing their skills to pinpoint higher-severity vulnerabilities
that allow remote code execution and other serious consequences. this also explains the prevalence of
memory corruption vulnerabilities in browser plug-ins because, if successfully exploited, they will let an attacker run arbitrary code on the affected computer. DoS vulnerabilities in plug-in technologies are often
the result of unskilled security research efforts because their effect on client applications is minimal in
comparison to DoS vulnerabilities affecting servers. As a result, it is not as worthwhile to discover lower-
severity vulnerabilities such as DoS. Security researchers and attackers with an advanced skill set usually
prefer to devote their efforts to finding more significant vulnerabilities that will ideally allow the underlying
computer to be compromised in some way as a result of exploitation.
Adobe Acrobat Reader
Adobe Flash Player
ActiveX
Java
Mozilla Extensions
QuickTime
Windows Media PlayerMemory corruption
Memory corruption/origin validation/
elevated security context
Memory corruption
Elevated security context
Content injection
Memory corruption
Memory corruptionMemory corruption/content injection/
command execution
Elevated security context
Memory corruption
Elevated security context
Content injection
Memory corruption
Memory corruption/DoSPlug-in 2008 Top Category 2007 Top Category
Table 5. Top categories for Web browser plug-in vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
113 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/Vulnerabilities-exploits/ActiveX-File-Overwrite-Delete-Vulnerabilities-Continued/ba-p/361308#A175
114 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/Vulnerabilities-exploits/Web-Attacks-Using-microsoft-Help-and-Support-Center-Viewer/ba-p/360270#A172Symantec Global internet Security threat report
45For ActiveX, memory corruption vulnerabilities were the top category in 2008, as well as 2007. this is
due to efforts among the security community to automate the discovery of these types of vulnerabilities
by employing fuzzing tools. there are a number of publicly available fuzzing tools for ActiveX such as
Axman115 and COmraider.116 tools such as these were highlighted in previous volumes of the Symantec
Global Internet Security Threat Report, and appear to still be widely used. there were numerous instances
of in-the-wild exploitation of memory corruption vulnerabilities in ActiveX controls during 2008. Among the
examples observed by Symantec were a vulnerability in the realplayer® ActiveX control,117 a vulnerability in
the Cisco Webex™ control,118 and a vulnerability in the CA™ BrightStor ActiveX component.119 Symantec
also observed that a new version of the neoSploit attack toolkit included exploits for a number of
vulnerabilities related to ActiveX memory corruption.120
For Java, the top category for plug-in vulnerabilities was elevated security context for both 2007 and
2008. this is due to vulnerability discoveries in the sandbox-based Java virtual machine security model.
For Quickt ime, the top category for plug-in vulnerabilities in both 2007 and 2008 was memory corruption.
Vulnerabilities that arise from handling malicious and malformed media content are common in Quickt ime.
in 2008, the top category for plug-in vulnerabilities in the Acrobat reader plug-in was memory corruption.
this is a change from 2007, when memory corruption, content injection, and command execution were
all in the top category. Symantec observed a number of exploits in the wild that targeted Acrobat. these
include a vulnerability initially discovered in 2007,121 trojan attacks related to malicious pDF files,122 and
a buffer overflow in the implementation of a JavaScript function in Adobe reader.123 these vulnerabilities
were all due to memory corruption conditions that were exposed when the application handled content
inside of maliciously crafted pDF files.
For Flash player, the top categories for vulnerabilities were memory corruption, origin validation, and
elevated security content in 2008. in 2007, the top category was elevated security context.
mozilla extensions had a top plug-in vulnerability category of content injection in 2007 and 2008. this is
due to issues in third-party extensions that have allowed hostile HtmL and script content to be injected.
For Windows media player, memory corruption was the top category for plug-in vulnerabilities in 2008.
in 2007, the top categories were memory corruption and DoS. this is due to vulnerabilities in handling
malicious and malformed multimedia content, as well as a number of vulnerabilities related to handling
of malicious skin packages.124
Security research is often focused on areas where an application is perceived to be the weakest from
a code quality or security design standpoint. When a particular avenue of attack has proven successful,
security researchers and attackers attempt to search for similar vulnerabilities. plug-in technologies
such as ActiveX, Java, mozilla extensions, and Quickt ime have been prone to the same category of
vulnerability in consecutive years. in some cases, this indicates that weak points have been identified in
these technologies, resulting in repeated discoveries of similar vulnerabilities. Administrators should consider the track record of particular plug-in technologies for common types of vulnerabilities. this
115 http://www.metasploit.com/users/hdm/tools/axman/
116 http://labs.idefense.com/software/fuzzing.php#more_comraider
117 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/Vulnerabilities-exploits/Unpatched-realplayer-Vulnerability-Being-exploited-in-the-Wild/ba-p/314841#A152
118 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30578/exploit
119 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/28268/exploit
120 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/Vulnerabilities-exploits/neosploit-Updated-with-exploit/ba-p/314840#A151
121 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/27641/exploit
122 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/Vulnerabilities-exploits/pidief-the-Word-for-exploits/ba-p/305564#A141
123 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/30035/exploit
124 Skins are a feature of many applications that allow users to customize the application interface.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
46can provide guidance into vectors of attack that are likely to target these specific plug-in technologies.
Security policies should be adjusted to anticipate these attack vectors, such as using a Web proxy to filter
incoming multimedia content and applets and restricting the use of particular plug-ins.
Web application vulnerabilities
this discussion focuses on the number of vulnerabilities disclosed during this reporting period that affect
Web applications compared to the overall volume of vulnerabilities disclosed during the same period. this
comparison provides insight into Web application security, which is especially important given the recent trend of attackers compromising trusted websites as a means of exploiting visitors to those sites.
in 2008, 63 percent of identified vulnerabilities affected Web applications (figure 13). this is an increase
over 2007, when 59 percent of identified vulnerabilities affected Web applications. the previous volume
of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report noted a decrease in the proportion of Web
application vulnerabilities in 2007.
125 this trend has not continued in 2008.
PeriodPercentage of vulnerabilities
0%20%40%60%80%100%
Non-W eb application vulnerabilities
Web-application vulnerabilities10%30%50%70%90%
20072,7501,875
20083,4622,029
Figure 13. Web application vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
in the previous volume of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report, it was noted that there was
a correlation between the rise in site-specific vulnerabilities and the drop in Web application vulnerabilities.
in 2008, there may be a similar correlation as the number of site-specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities
was lower than 2007, while the proportion of Web applications was greater. this indicates that security
researchers are dividing their attention between auditing specific websites and Web applications. Security researchers appeared to focus more effort toward Web applications in 2008; however, the number of Web
application vulnerabilities discovered in 2008 is still small in comparison to the number of site-specific
cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. this may mean that the incentives for discovering site-specific
125 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 35Symantec Global internet Security threat report
47vulnerabilities are still greater for security researchers and attackers. For security researchers, the
incentive is often the prestige associated with discovering a vulnerability in a high-profile website.
Whereas for attackers, the incentives include finding a broader set of victims for attacks, which may increase the revenue-generating potential of their malicious activities.
in 2008 there were a number of high-profile incidents involving SQL injection vulnerabilities. early in
the year, there was a rise in SQL-injection vulnerabilities targeting Web applications implemented in
classic ASp
126 with a microsoft SQL Server database back-end.127 the purpose of these attacks was to
inject malicious content into compromised sites that would then attempt to exploit subsequent site
visitors. Attackers used a technique that allowed them to dynamically inject malicious content into
strings throughout the database without detection.128 this provided a means of generically exploiting
vulnerable applications rather than having to develop application-specific payloads.
many classic ASp applications were prone to SQL-injection vulnerabilities in common variable names
that could be easily identified. As a result, attackers developed tools that used search engines to identify
vulnerable sites running vulnerable Web applications and exploit them.129 this functionality was
subsequently employed by botnets as a means of propagation.130 this is noteworthy because it shows
that attackers are advancing beyond trying to discover and exploit application-specific or site-specific
vulnerabilities. instead, this incident demonstrates that attackers are looking for the commonalities across
an entire class of vulnerabilities to generically automate the discovery and exploitation of vulnerabilities. At this point, such discoveries are rare. However, this incident demonstrates a need for a defense-in-depth
strategy that employs security countermeasures at the network, Web application, and database layers.
Late in 2008, SQL injection attacks were also used as a means to propagate exploit code for a zero-day
vulnerability in internet explorer.
131 While SQL injection vulnerabilities have the potential to compromise
sensitive information within the organization hosting a vulnerable website, it is interesting that attackers
prefer to inject malicious content to attack other users instead. in the case of these attacks, the actual
information assets of the organization have little value to the attackers, whose main objective is to exploit the trust placed in the organization as a means of attacking legitimate users of the website. this diverges
from the premise of targeted attacks that are tailored toward a specific enterprise or organization.
instead, the compromised assets are only valuable to the attacker in that they provide a vehicle for
indiscriminately attacking site visitors. the nature of the compromised site is less of a concern than
the fact that users trust it and do not expect attacks to originate from a site they use on a regular basis. even the characteristics of the users of a particular site are of little concern, except in that they may be
vulnerable to the malicious content injected into the compromised site. this further perpetuates the trend
observed in previous volumes of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report of attackers shifting
their attention toward exploiting trusted websites.
126 microsoft maintains classic ASp and the newer ASp .net implementation. Classic ASp is an interpreted server-side scripting language for developing Web
applications. ASp .net is a server-side Web application development framework that depends on .net and runs within the Common Language runtime (CLr).
many sites are still implemented in classic ASp .
127 http://blogs.technet.com/swi/archive/2008/05/29/sql-injection-attack.aspx
128 http://blogs.technet.com/neilcar/archive/2008/03/15/anatomy-of-a-sql-injection-incident-part-2-meat.aspx
129 http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=4294
130 http://www.secureworks.com/research/threats/danmecasprox/
131 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/Vulnerabilities-exploits/rise-of-ie-Zero-Day- through-SQL-injection/ba-p/372832Symantec Global internet Security threat report
48Site-specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities
this metric examines vulnerabilities reported in specific websites. Site-specific vulnerabilities are a
concern for enterprises because they are often used in multistage attacks that involve a compromise of
a trusted website, which can then be used to attack subsequent targets. this means that a legitimate
website that was previously considered safe by the organization may become the source of attacks against
users within the organization. As a result, some security policies designed to limit the potential for attacks
by permitting access to a small group of trusted websites are ineffective because those trusted websites
could now become a source of malicious content.
this section will discuss a sub-category of Web-application vulnerabilities known as cross-site scripting
vulnerabilities.132 Cross-site scripting represents a sub-set of possible vulnerabilities that may affect
specific websites; therefore, the data presented in this report is only a sample of the possible vulnerabilities that may be present in specific websites. it should also be noted that the data included in
this metric does not cover all known public reports of site-specific vulnerabilities, but is limited to user-submitted data gathered by the XSSed project.
133
During 2008, there were 12,885 site-specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities reported, compared to
17,697 in 2007.134 Of the vulnerabilities reported in 2008, only 394 had been fixed by the website
maintainer at the time of writing. this amounts to 3 percent of all site-specific cross-site scripting
vulnerabilities reported in 2008. in 2007, 1,240 site-specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities had been
fixed at the time of writing.135 this equates to 7 percent of the vulnerabilities reported in 2007 that affect
specific websites.
the average amount of time it took for a website maintainer to fix a vulnerability in 2008 was 60 days.
this is lower than the average of 76 days in 2007. this is a significant amount of time for users of the
websites to be exposed to attacks that result from vulnerabilities.While there were fewer site-specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities in 2008, this may be indicative of
different patterns of security research for the year rather than a quantitative improvement in the security
of websites. in particular, there was a rise in the percentage of Web application vulnerabilities in 2008,
which may indicate that security researchers have shifted some of their focus toward general Web
applications as opposed to specific sites. the reason for the conclusion that site-specific security has not
improved is that a small percentage of vulnerabilities are being fixed. Additionally, the amount of time taken to fix vulnerabilities in specific websites is significant. Website maintainers face different challenges
in fixing vulnerabilities than do traditional software vendors, such as the potential for downtime or a
disruption of services when a fix is rolled out. However, this does not explain the low rate of vulnerability
remediation among website maintainers. there may be other factors such as a lack of concern by website
maintainers because they do not perceive these issues as a threat. in some cases, the website maintainers
may not be aware of the vulnerabilities.
Site-specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities remain a serious issue for website maintainers and the
users of affected sites. they may pose a threat to an enterprise because they can compromise website
accounts of users within the organization. Additionally, these vulnerabilities may be used as a means of launching attacks against other computers within an organization. Administrators should monitor public
132 For the purpose of this report, the term cross-site scripting encapsulates two broad classes of vulnerability; this includes traditional cross-site scripting and a
category known as HtmL injection (or persistent cross-site scripting).
133 Data was provided by the XSSed project, a site devoted to tracking and verifying reports of site-specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities:
http://www.xssed.com.
134 At the time of writing, not all of the reported vulnerabilities have been processed; this means that the data used in this report does not reflect
all of 2008; plus, the XSSed project started in February 2007 and, as a result, data for all of 2007 was unavailable.
135 it should be noted that these vulnerabilities were published in 2007, meaning the remainder remain unpatched at the time this report was written.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
49security intelligence sources for information about vulnerabilities affecting specific websites. if a website
is known to be affected by an unpatched vulnerability, the administrator in the enterprise should consider
blocking access to the affected site by users within the organization until the vulnerability is addressed.
this mitigation should be used in combination with a white-list policy that permits access to approved
websites only.
Zero-day vulnerabilities
A zero-day vulnerability is one that appears to have been exploited in the wild prior to being publicly
known. it may not have been known to the affected vendor prior to exploitation and at the time of the
exploit activity the vendor had not released a patch. in the absence of available patches, zero-day
vulnerabilities represent a serious threat since, in many cases, they likely will be able to evade purely
signature-based detection. it is the unexpected nature of zero-day threats that causes concern, especially
because they may be used in targeted attacks and in the propagation of malicious code.
in 2008, Symantec documented nine zero-day vulnerabilities, a decrease from the 15 documented in
2007. the decrease in the number of zero-day vulnerabilities is accounted for by a drop in vulnerabilities
targeting region-specific applications. in the previous volume of the Symantec Global Internet Security
Threat Report, it was noted that a number of Chinese- and Japanese-language applications were being
targeted by attackers in zero-day attacks during 2007.136 in 2008, there was only one such zero-day
attack, early in the year, targeting two vulnerabilities in the GlobalLink ActiveX control.137
During both 2007 and 2008, the majority of vulnerabilities were present in ActiveX controls and the
microsoft Office® suite. the two primary attack vectors for zero-day vulnerabilities in both years were
microsoft Office and internet explorer. in 2008, six of the nine zero-day vulnerabilities could be exploited
via internet explorer and microsoft Office applications. in 2007, 13 of the 15 zero-day vulnerabilities could
be exploited via these two applications.
in 2008, there was a significant event related to a non-client-side vulnerability. in particular, a zero-day
vulnerability affecting the microsoft Server Service was detected based on exploit activity in the wild.138
Symantec observed multistage attacks on the vulnerability. in particular, trojan.Gimmiv.A, once installed
on a computer, will attempt to download an exploit for the vulnerability as a means to propagate itself on
a local network on the compromised computer.139 this mode of attack has advantages over a widespread
worm-based attack across the internet because it relies on the trojan to penetrate into the protected
internal network of an organization. From there, it can then exploit the vulnerability to compromise
potentially less secure computers behind the network perimeter.
While this method of attack is not new in terms of a zero-day attack, it provides a less noisy alternative
than developing a self-replicating worm that randomly attacks hosts on the internet. it is also worth noting,
however, that attack activity for this vulnerability subsequently became quite widespread due to public exploits and as propagation method for the Downadup worm (also known as Conficker, the worm is
discussed in “Top attacked vulnerabilities ”). this demonstrates that attacker motivations are diverse:
while some attackers prefer to conduct targeted attacks with limited collateral damage, other attackers
will take advantage of vulnerabilities such as this to compromise computers en masse. Worms remain a
popular attack method when they present a viable means for attackers.
136 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 39
137 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/27626
138 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/31874
139 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-102320-3122-99&tabid=1Symantec Global internet Security threat report
50Top attacked vulnerabilities
this metric will examine the top 10 attacked vulnerabilities. this data is based on events collected from
Symantec intrusion prevention systems (ipS). the events are triggered by ipS signatures that are designed
specifically to detect the specific vulnerabilities. When an event is triggered, it does not necessarily
indicate that the exploit was successful, but merely that activity identified by the signature has been
detected. this normally indicates an attempted attack.
For the purpose of this discussion, the attacked vulnerabilities are divided into their year of publication. this provides insight into which vulnerabilities published in 2007 and 2008 are being attacked in the wild.
the discussion will cover the top 10 attacked vulnerabilities from each year, which are ranked according to
the amount of activity associated with each vulnerability. this will help to pinpoint trends such as the types
of vulnerabilities that are associated with the most attack activity, and the degree to which exploitation for these vulnerabilities has been automated by attackers. enterprises may benefit from this information
because it provides an indication of the types of vulnerabilities that attackers are most likely to employ in attacks and how to best protect against them.
the top attacked vulnerability for 2008 was the microsoft Windows Server Service rpC Handling remote
Code execution Vulnerability (table 6). this was a zero-day vulnerability for which microsoft released an
emergency security bulletin in response to limited targeted attacks in the wild.
140 Attack activity for this
vulnerability eventually became widespread, even after it was patched by microsoft, due to various factors
such as malicious code and the release of public exploits.141 in particular, the Downadup worm uses this
vulnerability as a means to propagate.142 the automated nature of worm propagation is a driving factor
behind the amount of attack activity associated with this vulnerability. this vulnerability has a server-side
attack vector, meaning that attackers can exploit the vulnerability by sending malicious network traffic to
an affected computer, as opposed to enticing a user into performing actions such as visiting a malicious
website. As a result, the vulnerability facilitated the development of reliable exploit code that could be
easily automated to attack arbitrary computers on the internet.
Ranking
1
2
3
4
56
7
8
9
10BID
31874
30114
32721
31065
2730530674
28157
27578
28570
27756Title
Microsoft Windows Server Service RPC Handling Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
Snapshot Viewer for Microsoft Access ActiveX Control Arbitrary File Download Vulnerability
Microsoft Internet Explorer XML Handling Remote Code Execution Vulnerability
Microsoft Windows Media Encoder 9 ‘wmex.dll’ ActiveX Control Remote Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
Microsoft Excel Macro Validation Uninitialized Variable Manipulation VulnerabilityMicrosoft Visual Studio ‘Msmask32.ocx’ ActiveX Control Remote Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
RealNetworks RealPlayer ‘rmoc3260.dll’ ActiveX Control Memory Corruption Vulnerability
Yahoo! Music Jukebox ‘mediagrid.dll’ ActiveX Control Remote Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
Microsoft Windows GDI ‘EMR_COLORMATCHTOTARGETW’ Stack Overflow Vulnerability
Aurigma Imaging Technology 'ImageUploader4.1.ocx' FileMask Method ActiveX Buffer
Overflow Vulnerability
Table 6. Top attacked vulnerabilities, 2008
Source: Symantec
140 http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/Bulletin/mS08-067.mspx
141 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/Vulnerabilities-exploits/increase-in-exploit-Attempts-Against-mS08-067/ba-p/367483#A178
142 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-112203-2408-99&tabid=2Symantec Global internet Security threat report
51in contrast to the top attacked vulnerability for 2008, the remainder of vulnerabilities affected client and
desktop software. in particular, the vulnerabilities targeted ActiveX controls and file handling routines in
microsoft desktop applications. this correlates with the conclusion drawn in the “Zero-day vulnerabilities ”
discussion that microsoft internet explorer and microsoft Office are primary targets for attackers. this also
demonstrates that client-side vulnerabilities make up a large proportion of the vulnerabilities that attackers are exploiting in the wild. these vulnerabilities are likely to be incorporated into attack toolkits, which often
employ the shotgun attack methodology, as described in the previous volume of the Symantec Global
Internet Security Threat Report.
143 Server-side vulnerabilities constitute a smaller proportion but may
result in widespread attack activity if it is possible to develop reliable automated exploit code that
can be incorporated into worm attacks.
in 2007, Symantec observed a different pattern. the applications targeted by attacks were more diverse,
including Adobe photoshop®, realplayer, Apple Quickt ime, and Adobe Acrobat reader (table 7). the
majority of top attacked vulnerabilities still targeted desktop applications; however, there were fewer
that specifically targeted ActiveX controls. Another difference between the top attacked vulnerabilities
in 2007 and 2008 was that none in the latter year targeted microsoft Office.
Ranking
1
2
3
4
56
7
8
9
10BID
23621
21829
21930
26130
2654924426
27246
26341
25748
22196Title
Adobe Photoshop Multiple File Format Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
Apple QuickTime RTSP URI Remote Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
Microsoft Windows Vector Markup Language Buffer Overrun Vulnerability
RealPlayer ‘ierpplug.dll’ ActiveX Control Import Playlist Name Stack Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
Apple QuickTime RTSP Response Header Content-Type Remote Stack Based Buffer Overflow VulnerabilityMicrosoft Internet Explorer Speech API 4 COM Object Instantiation Buffer Overflow Vulnerabilities
2Wire Routers Cross-Site Request Forgery Vulnerability
Apple QuickTime STSD Atom Remote Heap Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
Adobe Acrobat Mailto PDF File Command Execution Vulnerability
NCTsoft NCTAudioFile2 ActiveX Control Remote Buffer Overflow Vulnerability
Table 7. Top attacked vulnerabilities, 2007
Source: Symantec
Attacked vulnerabilities by attack vector (client versus server)
this metric will examine the proportion of attacked vulnerabilities that have client-side and server-side
attack vectors. the data covers the vulnerabilities that were published in 2008 that have had associated
attack activity in the wild. Client-side vulnerabilities are those that affect client software such as Web browsers. they also include desktop application vulnerabilities that require interaction on the part of the
user to successfully exploit. An example would be a vulnerability in a desktop application that required the user to visit a malicious website or download a malicious file to exploit. these vulnerabilities in desktop
applications are frequently exploited through the Web browser, email client, or other network clients such as instant messaging and p2p.
143 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 34Symantec Global internet Security threat report
52A server-side vulnerability is one that usually affects a networked service that is hosted on a computer.
the service is often always running and awaits incoming connections from clients. in this case, exploitation
typically occurs when the attack sends directly to the service malicious communications that are designed
to exploit a particular vulnerability. the vulnerabilities typically do not require user interaction and typically
affect a server-related component of the application. By examining the proportion of client-side and server-
side vulnerabilities, it is possible to determine which attack vectors are most common for vulnerabilities
that are attacked in the wild. this provides insight into the effectiveness of client-side and server-side
security measures.
in 2008, 95 percent of attacked vulnerabilities were client-side vulnerabilities (figure 14). Five percent
of the attacked vulnerabilities from 2008 were server-side vulnerabilities. in 2007, 93 percent of
attacked vulnerabilities were client-side vulnerabilities. the remaining 7 percent in 2007 were
server-side vulnerabilities.
2008 20075%
95%
Client-side vulnerabilitie s
Server-side vulnerabilitie s7%
93%
Figure 14. Attacked vulnerabilities by attack vector, client versus server
Source: Symantec
the differences between 2007 and 2008 are not significant, indicating a continuing trend toward attacking
client-side vulnerabilities. this means that among the many vulnerabilities published within the year,
attackers are more likely to choose client-side as a basis for their malicious activities. this is due to a
number of factors such as network security perimeters, which make it difficult to execute server-side attacks
because many networked services are concealed within an organization’s internal network. Attackers employ
client-side attacks as a means of circumventing these security measures since, instead of trying to penetrate a network’s perimeter, the attacker relies on the client to download malicious content or visit a website that
includes malicious content that will exploit the victim’s client software and desktop applications. From this
point, an attacker can install malicious software such as trojans and bots, steal confidential information,
and attack other computers on the network.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
53As noted in the “Top attacked vulnerabilities ” discussion, the top vulnerability of 2008 affected the
microsoft Windows Server Service. this is an example of a vulnerability with a server-side attack vector
that possessed a particular combination of traits that made it a successful and lucrative means of attack.
these traits include the possibility for reliable and automated exploitation, and a large base of computers
running the affected component by default.
it is also worth noting that the trojan.Gimmiv.A attacks exploiting this vulnerability attempted to bypass
the network perimeter by compromising a host and then launching attacks on the host’s internal network.
to combat such threats, many organizations have erected network perimeter security measures, which
have been largely successful in preventing server-side attacks. in many cases, server applications are
deployed within the network perimeter and are not exposed to attacks originating from the internet. Very
few services remain exposed to the internet. the data demonstrates that it is only in rare cases that server-
side vulnerabilities are subject to widespread attacks. By and large, attackers have shifted toward client-
side attacks. this trend will likely continue until client-side security improves or other more successful
and lucrative attack vectors present themselves.
Vulnerabilities—protection and mitigation
in addition to the specific steps required to protect against the vulnerabilities discussed in this section,
there are general steps that should be taken to protect against the exploitation of vulnerabilities.
Administrators should employ a good asset management system to track the assets that are deployed
on the network and to determine which ones may be affected by the discovery of new vulnerabilities. Administrators should monitor vulnerability mailing lists and security websites to keep abreast of new
vulnerabilities affecting their assets. Where possible, patch deployments should be automated to ensure
that vulnerabilities are addressed across the organization in a timely manner.
Symantec recommends that administrators employ vulnerability assessment services, a vulnerability
management solution, and vulnerability assessment tools to evaluate the security posture of the
enterprise. these measures should be incorporated into infrastructure change-management processes.
Organizations should employ third-party consulting and penetration testing services to identify security exposures. For any products or applications developed by the organization, code-auditing software and
services may help to identify and address vulnerabilities at various stages of development.
Unpatched vulnerabilities should be identified by administrators, and assessed and mitigated according
to the risk they present. Where possible, problematic applications with many unpatched vulnerabilities
should be removed or isolated. ipS systems can aid in detecting known attacks against such applications
and provide generic protection against vulnerabilities. Security information and event management
should be deployed to assist in data management within the enterprise infrastructure and aid in
policy compliance.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
54in order to protect against successful exploitation of Web browser vulnerabilities, Symantec advises users
and administrators to upgrade all browsers to the latest, patched versions. Symantec recommends that
organizations educate users to be extremely cautious about visiting unknown or untrusted websites and
viewing or following links in unsolicited emails. Administrators should also deploy Web proxies in order to
block potentially malicious script code. Administrators and end users should actively maintain a whitelist
of trusted sites and disable individual plug-ins and scripting capabilities for all other sites. this will not
prevent exploitation attempts from whitelisted sites, but may aid in preventing exploits from all other sites.
Organizations can also implement an egress filtering policy at the network perimeter to regulate outgoing access by end users. Antivirus and host-based iDS and ipS solutions at the desktop level also provide a
layer of protection against attacks that originate from the Web.
enterprises should subscribe to a vulnerability alerting service in order to be notified of new vulnerabilities.
they should also manage their Web-based assets carefully. if they are developing Web applications in-house,
developers should be educated about secure development practices, such as the Security Development
Lifecycle and threat modeling.
144 if possible, all Web applications should be audited for security prior to
deployment and only those applications that have been certified should be deployed. Web application security solutions and a number of products and services are available to detect and prevent attacks
against these applications.
When deploying applications, administrators should ensure that secure, up-to-date versions are used,
and that applications are properly configured to avoid the exploitation of latent vulnerabilities. Symantec
recommends the use of secure shared components that have been audited for common Web application
vulnerabilities. As much as possible, enterprises are advised to avoid deploying products that are not
regularly maintained or that are not supported by the vendor.
144 the Security Development Lifecycle is a development paradigm that incorporates security at every stage from the initial architecture to programming, and in the quality
assurance/testing phases; threat modeling is a security auditing methodology to identify and map out all possible attack vectors for an application.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
55Malicious Code Trends
Symantec gathers malicious code intelligence from more than 130 million client, server, and gateway
systems that have deployed its antivirus products. Underpinning these products are the Symantec Digital
immune System and Symantec Scan and Deliver technologies, as well as norton Community Watch, which
allow customers to automate the process of reporting viruses and other malicious code threats.
this discussion is based on malicious code samples reported in 2008, with the following trends
being analyzed:
new malicious code threats•
top 10 new malicious code families•
malicious code types•
Staged downloaders—multiple infections by type•
Geolocation by type of malicious code•
threats to confidential information•
propagation mechanisms•
malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities•
malicious code—protection and mitigation•
New malicious code threats
Symantec monitors the proliferation of malicious code by examining the number of new malicious code
signatures created to detect threats from period to period. Comparing new signatures against signatures
created previously indicates how quickly new malicious code threats are being developed. periods in
which a significant number of new malicious code threats are created indicates how critical it is for both enterprises and home users to maintain updated antivirus signatures, and to implement and maintain
robust security measures such as software patches.
in 2008, Symantec created 1,656,227 new malicious code signatures (figure 15). this is a 265 percent
increase over 2007, when 624,267 new malicious code signatures were added. Although the percentage
increase in signatures added is less than the fairly staggering 445 percent increase from 2006 to 2007,
the overall number of malicious code signatures by the end of 2008 grew to 2,674,171. this means that
of all the malicious code signatures created by Symantec, more than 60 percent of that total was created
in 2008. Furthermore, Symantec blocked an average of more than 245 million attempted malicious code
attacks worldwide each month in 2008.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
56
Number of new threats
0200,0001,000,000
800,0001,800,000
1,600,000
Period600,000
400,0001,400,000
1,200,000
200220,547
200318,827
200469,107
2005113,025
2006140,690
2007624,267
20081,656,227
Figure 15. New malicious code signatures
Source: Symantec
previous volumes of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report have discussed the increasing
professionalization of malicious code development.145 the result is an increase in the speed and efficiency
with which malicious code is “brought to market,” which would enable an increased number of threats to
be developed. A driving force behind the growing speed and efficiency of these developments is the
demand for goods and services that facilitate online fraud. this is exemplified by the flourishing
profitability of confidential information sales, as was discussed in the recently published Symantec Report
on the Underground Economy.146 For example, Symantec estimated the value of total advertised goods on
underground economy servers between July 2007 and June 2008 to be $276 million.
Of particular value in the underground economy is malicious code that exposes confidential information.
this is because confidential information is critical to several illegal practices, such as identity theft
and credit card fraud. Symantec has determined that, in many instances, this code is being developed
on a large scale by well-organized programmers, much as applications are developed in a legitimate software enterprise. the demand for malicious code in the underground economy is further illustrated by
advertisements specific to such goods, with some advertisers selling the malicious code itself and others
requesting the services of malicious code authors. Advertisements for malicious code authors are often looking for the one-time development of specific code to create new variants of existing threats, rather than
developing entirely new threats. this is likely because variants of existing malicious code can be developed
more easily, and can therefore be brought to market in the underground economy much more quickly.
145 Cf. http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 9 and
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_09_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 12
146 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_underground_economy_report_11-2008-14525717.en-us.pdf : p. 6Symantec Global internet Security threat report
57Top 10 new malicious code families
Symantec analyzes new malicious code families detected during each reporting period to determine what
threat types and attack vectors are being employed in the most prevalent new threats. this information
allows administrators and users to gain familiarity with threats that may gain future notoriety. insight into
emerging threat development trends can help bolster security measures and mitigate future attacks.
in 2008, there were six trojans in the top 10 new malicious code families detected (table 8). three of
the six trojans include a back door component and one includes a virus component.147 the remaining
four families consist of worms, one of which has a back door component and one of which has a
virus component.the previous edition of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report noted that the prevalence of
trojans is indicative of multistage attacks.
148 A multistage attack typically involves an initial compromise,
followed by the installation of an additional piece of malicious code, such as a trojan that downloads and
installs adware. As was the case in 2007, during this reporting period, five of the top 10 new malicious code
families that were identified download additional threats. these multistage attacks are examined in greater
detail in the “Staged downloaders—multiple infections by type ” discussion that follows.
During this reporting period, the Brisv trojan149 was the most widely reported new malicious code
family. Unsurprisingly, this trojan continues to garner interest beyond 2008, having possibly affected as
many as 1.6 million computers during a surge of activity in February 2009.150 Brisv scans computers for
multimedia files, including .asf, .mp2, .mp3, .wma and .wmv. the trojan then modifies a data marker in the
files with a malicious UrL. the marker is a part of the Windows media Audio (WmA) format. Although other
applications appear to be unaffected, when the files are opened using Windows media player, the marker is
automatically processed, causing the application to open a Web browser window and access the malicious UrL. Accessing the malicious UrL may expose the user to additional threats.
the effectiveness of Brisv is heightened by the possibility that unknowing victims may share the
compromised multimedia files with others, through p2p or email, etc. As a result, the compromised files
can potentially affect users whose computers were not exposed to the trojan itself.
moreover, when Brisv scans for multimedia files, it converts all .mp2 and .mp3 files it encounters into the
.wma format prior to injecting the malicious code, even while preserving the original file extensions of the (now) converted files. the reason for converting files into the .wma format is so that Windows media player
will process the injected marker data properly. this is an example of increased sophistication in malicious
code development.
147 Back door components allow attackers to remotely connect to a compromised computer, typically using a specialized application. Once connected, the attacker can
perform numerous actions such as taking screenshots, changing configuration settings, and uploading, downloading, or deleting files.
148 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 46
149 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-071823-1655-99&tabid=1
150 http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2009/02/consider_the_source_not_just_t.htmlSymantec Global internet Security threat report
58Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Sample
Brisv
Tidserv
Auraax
Blusod
Ircbrute
Spakrab
Wowinzi
Mandaph
Brojack
MebrootType
Trojan
Trojan/back
door
Worm
Trojan
Worm/back
door
Trojan/back
door
Worm/virus/
back door
Worm
Trojan
Trojan/back
doorVectors
N/A
N/A
CIFS
N/A
Removable
drives
N/A
Mapped and
removable drives,
CIFS
Mapped drives
N/A
N/AImpact
Modifies multimedia files, causing Windows Media Player to
open malicious URLs
Allows remote access, installs additional threats, and
displays advertisements
Downloads additional threats
Downloads additional threats and displays fake error and
alert messages
Allows remote access and performs DoS attacks
Allows remote access and sends system data as well as
email addresses to the attacker
Steals confidential information, downloads additional threats,
and allows remote access
Downloads additional threats
Modifies Internet settings and removes Web browser plug-ins
Overwrites the Master Boot Record (MBR) and allows
remote access
Table 8. Top 10 new malicious code families
Source: Symantec
the second ranked new malicious code family in 2008 was the tidserv trojan.151 tidserv is delivered
primarily as a spammed email attachment titled “e-card,” although other methods are also used. tidserv
works by installing a rootkit to obfuscate its presence on the computer and then opening a back door for
the delivery of additional threats. tidserv also displays advertisements for various goods, indicating that
there may be financial motivation behind the distribution of the trojan. these ads are hosted remotely
and, much like legitimate internet advertising, the attacker can rotate the ads as desired.
the Auraax worm152 was the third ranked new malicious code family in 2008. this worm propagates by
copying itself to all removable drives and network shares that it can locate. An autorun instruction file is
also created in these drives or shares that automatically executes Auraax whenever the drives or shares
are accessed.153 the worm obfuscates itself by overwriting certain kernel drivers with a rootkit.154 it also
downloads additional threats, including misleading applications, onto affected computers.
Once installed, Auraax protects itself by modifying the “hosts” file to prevent users from accessing a list of
computer security websites.155 the UrLs of these sites are added to the hosts file and configured so that
access to the UrLs is redirected to the local address. interestingly, Auraax also does the same with the
UrLs of some advertising websites, adding them to the hosts file and making them inaccessible. this is
somewhat peculiar behavior because malicious code is more typically used to distribute advertisements
and increase hits to advertising Web pages, rather than to hide them. this could be because some of the
additional threats downloaded by Auraax attempt to target and replace advertisements by legitimate organizations. By making the websites of those organizations inaccessible, the worm may be attempting
151 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-091809-0911-99&tabid=1
152 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-092409-4704-99&tabid=2
153 Autorun is a function of the Windows operating system that launches newly detected processes or applications (e.g., the insertion of a CD-rOm or USB drive).
Windows searches the root directory of the drive for an autorun information file that contains instructions for what process or application to launch.
154 A collection of tools (programs) that enable administrator-level access to a computer or network.
155 the “hosts” file contains a lists of hostnames mapped to ip addresses. this information is used by computers, in conjunction with or in lieu of DnS
(domain name system), to locate nodes on the network.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
59to increase the chances that UrLs in the illegitimate advertisements are accessed instead of those in
the legitimate ones. this could be particularly deceiving for users because the maliciously placed
advertisements may appear in the same locations and styles as those of the legitimate advertisements.
Worth noting here is that the Downadup worm ranked eleventh among the new malicious code families.
this is a significantly high ranking considering the worm did not emerge on the threat landscape until
november 2008. Had Downadup emerged earlier, it would likely have ranked much higher. the worm
did, however, rank seventh among the top 10 new malicious code families in the Ap J region, where it
initially spread. Although its spread is slowing, Symantec expects Downadup to continue to have a
significant impact on the threat landscape in 2009.
Malicious code types
Analyzing the prevalence of malicious code types provides insight into the general diversity in the threat
landscape and, combined with the data of other metrics, helps Symantec more accurately determine
emerging trends in malicious code. it should be noted that the volume of top 50 potential malicious code
infections in 2008 was more than twice the volume of 2007. therefore, decreases in percentages may not
indicate a year-over-year decline in potential infections.
the percentages of malicious code types in the top 50 potential malicious code infections for 2008
remained largely similar to those in 2007. As in previous reporting periods, trojans made up the highest
percentage of the volume of the top 50 potential malicious code infections (figure 16), although there was 1 percent decrease down to 68 percent in 2008.
156
01 02 03 0 40 50 70 6020072008
80
Percentage of top 50 by potential infection sType
18%19%Virus
21%15%Back doorTrojan69%68%
Worm26%29%
Figure 16. Malicious code types by volume of potential infections
Source: Symantec
156 it should also be noted that malicious code samples may be comprised of multiple components that are each classified as different types; as a result, cumulative
percentages discussed in this metric may exceed 100 percent.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
60the previous volume of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report discussed the possibility that
attackers are gravitating toward the use of a smaller number of more successful trojans.157 this means
that once a trojan has had a moderate degree of success, minor variations of it are continuously created
and used in new attacks. Using this approach, malicious code developers in the underground economy can
increase productivity and bolster the supply of goods for sale in the underground economy. the rapid
deployment of variant threats also serves malicious code developers by increasing the pressure on the resources of security organizations and enterprises to respond to these challenges.
the top malicious code sample causing potential infections in 2008 (as well as 2007) was the Vundo
trojan.
158 the main goal of Vundo is to download and install adware on a victim’s computer. this attack
should be popular with attackers since the adware component is designed to generate revenue from every
compromised computer. in some cases, malicious code authors may be contracted by adware developers to
install a negotiated number of applications, with no questions asked as to their methods. By implementing the adware installation process into their malicious code, the malicious code authors are becoming more
efficient and, thus, increasing productivity. the continued prevalence of this threat into 2008 and its
potential for revenue generation is indicative of the increasing commercialization and professionalization of malicious code.
the Gampass trojan
159 was the second ranked sample causing potential infection in 2008, and also the
most downloaded component in multistage attacks in 2008. this is another example of malicious code
that is clearly meant to generate revenue. Gampass uses keystroke-logging functionality160 in order to
steal authentication credentials for online gaming accounts. the accounts are then usually sold in the
underground economy. For example, Symantec observed advertisements for these accounts ranging
from $8 to $50 each in 2008.the second highest percentage of the top 50 potential malicious code infections for 2008 belonged to
worms, which increased to 29 percent from 26 percent in 2007. At that time, there were indications that
the decline in worms was leveling off, which is supported by the relatively static percentage of potential
worm infections between 2007 and 2008.
161 two prominent mass-mailing worms that bolstered worm
numbers in the previous reporting period were netsky162 and rontokbro.163 Both of these worms and
others from 2007 also accounted for a significant number of potential infections in 2008. this may
indicate that attackers are making increased use of lingering threats to take advantage of previously successful attacks.
the third highest percentage of the top 50 potential malicious code infections in 2008 was potential
virus infections, which increased to 19 percent in 2008 from 18 percent previously. the slight increase is
primarily due to a rise in new worms with a viral infection component. For example, the Wowinzi worm,
164
which ranked eighth in the top new malicious code families for 2008, incorporates a viral infection
component and spreads by copying itself to mapped, fixed, and removable drives. Furthermore, many
of the prominent worms from 2007 that contain viruses continued to be prevailing threats in 2008,
and the number of potential infections increased. By incorporating viral components into worms, malicious
code authors can increase infection rates by adding multiple propagation techniques. At the same time,
the threat will be more entrenched on compromised computers due to the nature of viral infection.165
157 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 49
158 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-112111-3912-99
159 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-111201-3853-99
160 Keystroke logging applications record keystrokes on compromised computers and return the data to the attacker. the data can be filtered to extract fraud-worthy
information such as user account credentials for online banking websites, stock trading websites, or online game accounts.
161 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 50
162 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-021615-4827-99
163 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-021916-0751-99
164 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2008-050714-5642-99
165 http://service1.symantec.com/SUppOrt /nav.nsf/aab56492973adccd8825694500552355/024c927836400f528825675100593eb2?OpenDocument&src=symsug_usSymantec Global internet Security threat report
61the previous volume of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report discussed the increasing
use of removable drives as a means for worms and viruses to propagate.166 this was a popular means of
infection when floppy disks were a primary medium for data transfer. However, the use of the propagation
mechanism dropped significantly when transfer options over the internet (such as email, F tp, etc.) became
more widespread. the recent popularity of removable storage devices (such as portable media players,
USB drives, etc.) has led to a resurgence in use of the propagation mechanism by malicious code authors.
Furthermore, the relatively massive storage capacity of some of these devices can facilitate larger threats,
as well as potentially allowing malicious code to go unnoticed among other data stored within. Some
malicious code is designed to automatically create copies of itself on removable devices that are connected
to an infected computer. When an unknowing user removes the infected device and connects it to another
computer, the worm then automatically copies itself to the newly attached computer. this could be
especially dangerous to enterprises if the infected device is connected to a network. this trend continued
in 2008, and is a contributing factor to the increase in potential virus infections.167
the only proportional decline in potential infections was primarily due to a drop in back doors. in 2008,
back doors made up 15 percent of the volume of top 50 potential malicious code infections, down from
21 percent in 2007. this drop is mainly attributed to the modest increases in other types of malicious
code. this may also be an indication that, due to the trend toward multistage attacks, back doors are not
being incorporated into new frontline threats, but instead are being used in the later stages of attacks. Furthermore, one tactic that is employed in first-stage attacks is to disable or reduce the software
capabilities on affected computers so that threats that are installed during later-stage attacks may have
a better chance of going undetected. this would reduce the need for new unique back doors or trojans.
Staged downloaders—multiple infections by type
Staged downloaders are threats that download and install other malicious code onto a compromised
computer. these threats allow attackers to change the downloadable component to any type of threat that
suits their objectives, or to match the profile of the computer being targeted. For example, if the targeted computer contains no data of interest, attackers can install a trojan that relays spam, rather than one that
steals confidential information. As the attackers’ objectives change, they can change any later components that will be downloaded to perform the requisite tasks.
Of the top 50 potential malicious code infections, 79 percent downloaded additional threats. in 2008,
the Wimad trojan
168 was the most prevalent downloader component (table 9). this trojan arrives on
computers as a license-protected multimedia file. When the file is opened, Wimad exploits the intended
functionality of digital rights management (Drm) technology in order to open a window and access an
attacker-controlled UrL. When an attacker’s Web page is processed, a deceptive message is displayed,
enticing the user to click a button. if it is clicked, the trojan will download other threats, including
adware and spyware.
166 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 51
167 Cf. https://forums2.symantec.com/syment/blog/article?blog.id=malicious_code&thread.id=220 or
http://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/prg/em/ccirc/2008/in08-007-eng.aspx
168 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-011213-2709-99Symantec Global internet Security threat report
62Rank
1
2
3
45
6
7
8
9
10Sample
Wimad
Vundo
Zlob
SpybotMetajuan
Imaut
Pandex
Vundo.B
Sality
VirantixType
Trojan
Trojan
Trojan
Worm/back doorTrojan/back door
Worm
Trojan
Trojan/back door
Worm/virus
TrojanImpact
Uses Microsoft Windows Media Digital Rights Manager
to trick user into downloading files
Redirects browser to malicious Web page
Downloads files from remote addresses
Downloads files from remote addressesDownloads files from remote addresses
Downloads files from remote addresses
Downloads files from remote addresses
Redirects browser to malicious Web page
Downloads files from remote addresses
Downloads files from remote addresses
Table 9. Top 10 staged downloaders
Source: Symantec
Adware programs are components that are commonly downloaded by malicious code or sometimes even
integrated into the malicious code itself, as is the case with the Adclicker trojan, which is discussed below.
Adware programs can also operate as stand-alone applications. Adware applications are popular because they are effective at generating revenue for malicious code authors; this is because adware generates
traffic for advertising services that typically pay on a per-visit or per-view basis. thus, their popularity
as a commonly downloaded component is not surprising; five of the top 10 staged downloaders for
2008 download and install adware programs along with other components and threats.
the second most prevalent downloader component was the Vundo trojan.
169 Once this trojan is
installed on a computer, it attempts to contact certain ip addresses to download and install its secondary
components. One of the files it attempts to install is an adware program that will periodically display pop-
up advertisements. if clicked, these ads will generate income for the malicious code author (and possibly
the adware developer, if they are not the same person).
the Zlob trojan170 was the third most common staged downloader component in 2008. A successful
implementation of this trojan sets the home page, search, and “page not found” pages in the user’s
browser to other pages hosting malicious code. Zlob also periodically displays fake security alerts that
claim that the compromised computer is infected. if clicked, these error messages will redirect the browser
to an attacker-controlled Web page promoting the download of an anti-spyware application that is actually additional malicious code.
the most prevalent downloaded component in 2008 was the Gampass trojan (table 10). As mentioned
previously, Gampass uses keystroke-logging functionality to steal authentication credentials for online
gaming accounts. popular targets include Lineage, rexue, Jianghu, and rohan, which are all popular
games in the Ap J region. Gampass is commonly downloaded by the mummawow,
171 Wowinzi and
Fubalca172 worms, as well as others.
169 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2004-112111-3912-99
170 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2005-042316-2917-99
171 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-032015-4300-99
172 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-062214-3636-99Symantec Global internet Security threat report
63 Rank
1
2
3
4
56
7
8
9
10Sample
Gampass
Adclicker
Graybird
Lineage
HorstLowZones
Onlinegame
KillAV
Bancos
BankerType
Trojan
Trojan
Back door
Trojan
Trojan/back doorTrojan
Trojan
Trojan
Trojan
TrojanImpact
Steals online gaming account informationGenerates traffic to websites and banner ads
Allows remote access, logs keystrokes, and steals passwords
Steals online gaming account information
Allows remote access and ends antivirus and firewall servicesLowers Internet Explorer security settings
Steals online gaming account information
Disables security applications
Steals online banking account information
Logs keystrokes, steals passwords, redirects and intercepts
network traffic
Table 10. Top 10 downloaded components
Source: Symantec
the second most downloaded component in 2008 was the Adclicker trojan.173 this simple trojan is
intended to drive traffic to particular Web pages and click the banner advertisements. Banner
advertisements compensate the owner of the website they are hosted on for each view or click-through.174
Generating traffic to these advertisements by fraudulent means is commonly referred to as click fraud. the
significant presence of other threats that are linked to financial gain, along with the flourishing vitality of
the underground economy and the related success of Adclicker, may indicate a growing trend toward
malicious code developed specifically to facilitate advertisement distribution.
Graybird175 was the third most frequently downloaded component in 2008. this back door gives an attacker
full remote access to a compromised computer. it also captures cached passwords, logs keystrokes, and
then sends all of this information to the remote attacker. Furthermore, Graybird allows the attacker to
download and install additional threats onto the compromised computer.
many of the top downloaded components in 2008 ranked similarly to 2007, indicating that these families
continue to be prevalent and effective threats. it is also noteworthy that six out of the 10 most downloaded
components involve password stealing, keystroke logging, or advertisement promotion—all of which are further indications that profit continues to be the driving motivation for malicious code authors.
173 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2002-091214-5754-99
174 A click-through is a link that contains uniquely identifiable information about its originator that a user clicks on. typically, the originator receives financial
compensation for each click-through.
175 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2003-040217-2506-99Symantec Global internet Security threat report
64Geolocation by type of malicious code
Symantec examines the top regions reporting potential malicious code infections as well as the types of
malicious code causing potential infections in each region. the increasing regionalization of threats can
cause differences between the types of malicious code being observed from one area to the next, such as when threats employ certain languages or localized events as part of their social engineering techniques.
threats that steal confidential information can also be tailored to steal information that is more commonly
available in some countries than in others. For instance, trojans that attempt to steal account information
for Brazilian banks are quite common in the LAm region, while malicious code that steals online gaming account information is most frequently observed in the Ap J region.
176 Because of the different propagation
mechanisms used by different malicious code types, and the different effects that each malicious code type
may have, information about the geographic distribution of malicious code can help network administrators
improve their security efforts.
it should be noted that the numbers presented in this discussion represent proportional geographic
percentages. therefore, proportional percentage fluctuation from the previous period to the current period
does not indicate a change in the absolute number of reports from a specific region.
in 2008, the regional proportion of potential infections from malicious code remained largely unchanged;
however, in all cases, the actual number of reports for each malicious code type from each region increased.
177 While there were small variances in some regions, the changes were not representative
of significant shifts in the threat landscape. the proportion of reports from the emeA region increased,
which may indicate that the concentration of threats targeting countries in emeA is growing faster than
the concentration in other regions. this may also be a sign that the concentration of malicious code
authors, or organizations employing those authors, is greater in emeA than in other regions. One possible
reason for a higher concentration in this region may be due to recent reports of politically motivated attacks
during this period.178 this sort of activity may have increased the demand for capable authors in emeA.
Trojans
in 2008, 35 percent of trojans were reported from the north America (nAm) region, 34 percent from emeA,
24 percent from Ap J, and 6 percent from LAm (table 11). Although the number of trojans reported from
nAm appears to have dropped significantly, this is mainly attributable to the proportional increase in
trojans reported from emeA, indicating that a similar amount of trojan activity was reported in both
nAm and emeA in 2008.
Region
NAM
EMEA
APJ
LAM2007 Percentage
46%
28%
22%
4%2008 Percentage
35%
34%
24%
6%
Table 11. Geolocation of Trojans
Source: Symantec
176 Cf. http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=2504 or
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/ent-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xii_09_2007.en-us.pdf : p. 81
177 Cumulative totals might not equal 100 percent due to rounding.
178 See http://blogs.zdnet.com/security/?p=1670 and http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/10/report_russian_hacker_forums_f.htmlSymantec Global internet Security threat report
65the previous edition of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report discussed the continued
concentration of trojans in north America, and posited that attackers may consciously be moving toward
trojan attacks there because of successful efforts by north American-based enterprises and iSps to thwart
worm attacks.179 in 2008, the number of trojans reported in emeA was similar to the number reported in
nAm. While the increase in emeA could be attributed to similar reasons as those given in the previous
paragraph, the proportional increase in reports of other malicious code types in emeA suggests that the
increased activity is not a reaction to any specific mitigation efforts.
One possible explanation for the increase in emeA is that there were a number of attacks against
prominent government and corporate websites in the region during 2008.180 For example, one attack that
targeted the websites of both the United nations and the UK government, among others, injected malicious
code that was designed to load content from an attacker-controlled location into visitors’ browsers.181
Another separate attack successfully defaced the national Albanian postal service website.182 Such attacks
are a perfect beachhead for distributing malicious code because they target high-traffic websites of
reputable organizations. Successful distribution of malicious code using this method of delivery may have
contributed to the increased proportion of trojans in emeA in 2008.
Worms
Forty percent of the potential infections caused by worms in 2008 were reported from the Ap J region,
followed by emeA with 36 percent, nAm with 13 percent, and LAm with 11 percent (table 12). the drop
in proportion of worms in Ap J is mainly attributed to the increase in emeA and may indicate that worm
activity in emeA will eventually surpass that of Ap J. the emergence of the Downadup worm may offset this,
however, and cause the percentage of potential worm infections in Ap J to rise in 2009 since that is where it
has been initially concentrated.
Region
APJ
EMEA
NAM
LAM2007 Percentage
44%
32%
16%
9%2008 Percentage
40%
36%
13%
11%
Table 12. Geolocation of worms
Source: Symantec
Back door infections
emeA accounted for the largest proportion of potential back door infections reported worldwide in 2008,
with 39 percent of the total. Ap J accounted for the second largest percentage, with 29 percent, followed by
nAm at 23 percent, and LAm at 9 percent (table 13). As with the previously discussed types of potential malicious code infection, the proportional increase in reports from emeA is the primary contributor to
decreases in other regions. As is discussed elsewhere in this report, there are indications that back doors are increasingly being incorporated as secondary stages of multistage attacks. Because of this, the
proportional increase of back doors in emeA may be closely related to the observed increase of trojans
reported there.
179 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 52
180 http://news.cnet.com/8301-10789_3-9983940-57.html
181 http://news.cnet.com/8301-10789_3-9925637-57.html
182 http://albmasters.com/?p=3Symantec Global internet Security threat report
66Region
EMEA
APJNAM
LAM2007 Percentage
36%
30%28%
5%2008 Percentage
39%
29%23%
9%
Table 13. Geolocation of back door infections
Source: Symantec
While the regional percentages of potential back door infections can show fairly wide variances, it is
important to note that the worldwide volume of back door threats was significantly lower than trojans
and worms. therefore, the percentage variance between regions actually represents a much smaller
difference in raw numbers than the percentage differences between worms and trojans.
Viruses
the Ap J region continued to hold the highest concentration of reported potential infections caused by
viruses in 2008, with 41 percent of the worldwide total, although this is a decrease from its 53 percent
share in 2007 (table 14). the emeA region again ranked second, with its share growing to 38 percent in
2008 from 27 percent in 2007. the proportion of potential virus infections concentrated in nAm dropped
to 15 percent in 2008 from 17 percent previously, while LAm increased to 6 percent this period from
4 percent previously.
Region
APJ
EMEA
NAM
LAM2007 Percentage
53%
27%
17%
4%2008 Percentage
41%
38%
15%
6%
Table 14. Geolocation of viruses
Source: Symantec
As was the case with the previous reporting period, the increased proportion of viruses in emeA was linked
to the greater proportion of worms reported from the region, which is because viral infection functionality is
a common component incorporated into worms.183 For example, the mabezat worm includes a viral
infection component and was heavily concentrated in the emeA region in 2008 (it was one of the top 10
potential infections reported from the region).
183 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 53Symantec Global internet Security threat report
67Threats to confidential information
Some malicious code programs are designed specifically to expose confidential information that is stored
on an infected computer. these threats may expose sensitive data such as system information, confidential
files and documents, or logon credentials. Some malicious code threats, such as back doors, can give a remote attacker complete control over a compromised computer. threats to confidential information are
a particular concern because of their potential for use in criminal activities. With the widespread use of online shopping and internet banking, compromises of this nature can result in significant financial loss,
particularly if credit card information or banking details are exposed.
Within the enterprise, the exposure of confidential information can lead to significant data leakage. if it
involves customer-related data such as credit card information, customer confidence in the enterprise can
be severely undermined. moreover, it can also violate local laws. Sensitive corporate information, including
financial details, business plans, and proprietary technologies, could also be leaked from compromised computers.
in 2008, 83 percent of confidential information threats had a remote access component (figure 17). this
was a decrease from 91 percent in 2007. this decrease is mainly attributable to an increase in malicious
code that exports user data or logs keystrokes, along with the decrease in the percentage of potential
infections from back doors. Another reason may be that attackers are less interested in administering
individual compromised computers than they are in simply gathering the available information, which
can be accomplished without installing a back door.
Exports system dataExports email addresses Keystroke loggerAllows remote access
83%
78%91%
74%
PeriodPercentage of exposure threats
Exports user data
2008 200765%76%
61%68% 72%
67%
Figure 17. Threats to confidential information, by type
Source: SymantecSymantec Global internet Security threat report
68malicious code that could export user data accounted for 78 percent of threats to confidential information
in 2008, up from 74 percent in 2007. Such threats are useful because leaked data can be used to steal a
user’s identity or aid in further attacks. increases in this type of exposure are not surprising considering
the potential value of harvested information. the third highest exposure type, keystroke logging, further
supports this.
Confidential information threats with a keystroke-logging capability made up 76 percent of threats to
confidential information, up from 72 percent in 2007. malicious code incorporating keystroke loggers that
target online gaming account credentials continues to be popular. the Wowinzi worm is one such threat and
was one of the top 10 new malicious code samples in 2008. Several trojans and worms such as Gampass,
Gammima,184 and mumawow185 have been around for some time and are specifically designed to steal
online gaming credentials, and they continue to account for a significant number of potential infections.
Organizations can take several steps to limit the exposure of confidential information by successful
intrusions. Data leakage prevention solutions can prevent sensitive data from being stored on endpoint
computers. encrypting sensitive data that is stored in databases will limit an attacker’s ability to view and/or
use the data. However, this step may require sufficient resources to be made available, as adequately
managing encryption keys and ensuring that archived data is actually encrypted can be costly. Furthermore,
encrypting stored data will not protect against man-in-the-middle attacks that intercept data before it is
encrypted.186 As a result, data should always be transmitted through secure channels such as SSH, SSL,
and ipSec.
Propagation mechanisms
Worms and viruses use various means to transfer themselves, or propagate, from one computer to another.
these means are collectively referred to as propagation mechanisms. propagation mechanisms can include
a number of different vectors, such as instant messaging (im), Simple mail transfer protocol (Smtp),
Common internet File System (CiFS), p2p, and remotely exploitable vulnerabilities. Some malicious code
may even use other malicious code as a propagation vector by locating a computer that has been compromised via a back door server and using it to upload and install itself. the samples discussed here
are assessed according to the percentage of potential infections.
in 2008, 66 percent of potential malicious code infections propagated as shared executable files, up
significantly from 44 percent in 2007 (table 15).
187 Shared executable files are the propagation mechanisms
employed by viruses and some worms to copy themselves onto removable media. the resurgence in this
vector over the past few years coincides with the increased use of removable drives and other portable
devices. it is also an easy vector to exploit because old malicious code exploits developed for floppy disks
can be easily modified for current removable media devices.
to limit the propagation of threats through removable drives, administrators should ensure that all such
devices are scanned for viruses when they are connected to a computer. if removable drives are not needed
within the enterprise, endpoint security and policy can prevent computers from recognizing these drives
when they are attached. Additionally, best practices policies should be implemented to mitigate the dangers
of attaching unauthorized devices to computers within the enterprise.
184 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-032206-2043-99
185 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-032015-4300-99
186 A “man-in-the-middle attack” is an attack in which a third party intercepts communications between two computers. the “man in the middle” captures the data,
but still relays it to the intended destination to avoid detection.
187 Because malicious code samples often use more than one mechanism to propagate, cumulative percentages may exceed 100 percent.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
692008 Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
102007 Percentage
44%
32%26%
15%
17%
3%
3%
3%
3%
1%66%
31%30%
12%
10%
4%
3%
3%
3%
2%2008 Percentage
File-sharing executables
File transfer/email attachment
File transfer/CIFS
Remotely exploitable vulnerability
File sharing/P2P
File transfer/embedded HTTP URI/instant messenger
SQL
Back door/Kuang2Back door/SubSeven
File transfer/instant messengerPropagation Mechanism
Table 15. Propagation mechanisms
Source: Symantec
in 2008, 31 percent of malicious code that propagated did so in email attachments, a slight decrease
from 32 percent in 2007. the previous volume of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report
stated that, despite a small increase for the reporting period, propagation through email attachments
was surpassed by propagation through file sharing executables.188 this was noted to likely be the result
of diversification by malicious code authors. Although there was an increase again in 2008, the gap
between the first and second ranked propagation mechanisms has widened substantially.
One possible reason for the diversification of propagation methods, as well as the resulting gap, is that
malicious code authors may not be experiencing as much success with attacks using email attachments
as in past years. increased user awareness and prevention against email-based attacks may be a factor.
However, the number of potential infections that use email-based propagation appears to be stable, which may be a result of attackers experiencing increased success with other propagation vectors and opting to
use those instead. Despite such factors, email attachments continue to be a common and attractive
propagation mechanism for malicious code.
to limit the propagation of email-borne threats, administrators should ensure that all email attachments
are scanned at the gateway. Additionally, all executable files originating from external sources such as
email attachments or those downloaded from websites should be treated as suspicious. All executable
files should be checked by antivirus scanners using the most current definitions.malicious code that propagated by the CiFS protocol made up 30 percent of malicious code that propagated
in 2008, up from 26 percent in 2007.
189 this indicates that this protocol continues to be a common and
effective means for the propagation of malicious threats. the increase may be linked to the diversification of
mechanisms discussed above. two of the top 10 malicious code threats for 2008 employed this propagation
mechanism. this includes the Fujacks worm,190 a long-standing malicious code family in top 10 lists, and the
Almanahe worm,191 a modular threat that includes a viral component that has steadily increased in potential
infections since its discovery early in 2007.
188 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 57
189 CiFS is a file sharing protocol that allows files and other resources on a computer to be shared with other computers across the internet. One or more directories on a
computer can be shared to allow other computers to access the files within.
190 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2006-111415-0546-99
191 http://www.symantec.com/security_response/writeup.jsp?docid=2007-041317-4330-99Symantec Global internet Security threat report
70the CiFS propagation mechanism can be a threat to organizations because file servers use CiFS to give
users access to their shared files. if a computer with access to a file server becomes infected by a threat
that propagates through CiFS, the infection could spread to the file server. Since multiple computers within an organization likely access the same file server, this could facilitate the rapid propagation of the threat
within the enterprise. this is increasingly becoming a threat to home environments as well, because home
networks with multiple devices are becoming more commonplace.
to protect against threats that use the CiFS protocol to propagate, all shares should be protected with
strong passwords, and only users who require the resources should be given access to them. if other users
do not need to write to a share, they should only be given “read” permissions. this will prevent malicious
code from copying itself to the shared directory or modifying shared files. Finally, CiFS shares should not be
exposed to the internet. Blocking tCp port 445 at the network boundary will help to protect against threats
that propagate using CiFS.
192
An interesting decrease of note during 2008 was in the percentage of threats that propagate by exploiting
remote vulnerabilities. While there was relatively stable activity in this type of threat through the majority
of the year, that changed when the Downadup worm was discovered late in 2008. Downadup propagates by exploiting the microsoft Windows Server Service rpC Handling remote Code execution Vulnerability.
193 this
worm has attracted a lot of attention because of its sophistication and aggressive infection routine. the first
variant of Downadup is estimated to have infected over half a million computers, primarily in the Ap J and
LAm regions.194 Symantec is monitoring its evolution to how Downadup affects the percentage of threats
that propagate by exploiting remote vulnerabilities into 2009.195
Malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities
Assessing the proportion of malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities helps to show how popular this technique is for developing new variants of malicious code. the exploitation of vulnerabilities as a means
of malicious code propagation is an ongoing concern for enterprises because it illustrates the need for administrators to apply patches in a timely manner.
in 2008, only 3 percent of the 2,476 documented malicious code instances exploited vulnerabilities
(figure 18).
196 this is a significant decline from the 13 percent proportion of the 2,538 malicious code
instances documented for 2007. While the number of new malicious code samples exploiting vulnerabilities
has been declining in recent years, the effectiveness of this method of propagation remains strong, as is illustrated by it being the fourth-ranked propagation mechanism in 2008.
192 tCp port 445 is the default port used to run CiFS on tCp.
193 http://www.securityfocus.com/bid/31874
194 https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/malicious-Code/W32-Downadup-A-and-W32-Downadup-B-Statistics/ba-p/379940#A226
195 please see https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/blogs/blogarticlepage/blog-id/malicious_code/article-id/225,
https://forums2.symantec.com/t5/blogs/blogarticlepage/blog-id/malicious_code/article-id/227, and
https://forums.symantec.com/t5/malicious-Code/Downadup-Small-improvements- yield-Big-returns/ba-p/381717
196 the number of documented malicious code instances differs from the number of malicious code submissions. Documented malicious code instances are those that
have been analyzed and documented within the Symantec malicious code database.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
71PeriodDocumented malicious code
0%20%40%60%80%100%
Remainder of malicious code
Malicious code that
exploits vulnerabilities10%30%50%70%90%
200713%87%
20083%97%
Figure 18. Malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities
Source: Symantec
As well, while the number of malicious code samples exploiting vulnerabilities has dropped, it is important
to note that there are still prevalent examples of successful malicious code families that do so. For example,
a threat such as the Downadup worm can be particularly effective against medium and large enterprises
because these businesses often need to test patches prior to their deployment due to the use of custom applications and software configurations. the resulting delay in patch implementation widens the window
in which infections can occur.
the success of Downadup illustrates that, even though there are fewer new malicious code samples that
exploit vulnerabilities, they can still have great success in compromising unpatched computers. As well, while fewer new malicious code samples were identified that exploit vulnerabilities in operating systems,
popular third-party client-side applications are still a viable target for malicious code. end users and
enterprises should ensure that vulnerabilities in affected software are patched as soon as fixes are available. intrusion prevention systems and antivirus software can help protect against malicious code
that exploits vulnerabilities for which no patch is available.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
72Malicious code—protection and mitigation
it is critical that end users and enterprises maintain the most current antivirus definitions to protect
against the high quantity of new malicious code threats. iDS, ipS, and other behavior-blocking technologies
should also be employed to prevent compromise by new threats. Using a firewall can also prevent threats that send information back to the attacker from opening a communication channel.
Symantec recommends that certain best security practices always be followed to protect against malicious
code infection. Administrators should keep patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host
public services and applications—such as Http , Ftp, Smtp , and DnS servers—and that are accessible
through a firewall or placed in a DmZ. email servers should be configured to only allow file attachment
types that are required for business needs and to block email that appears to come from within the
company, but that actually originates from external sources. Additionally, Symantec recommends that
ingress and egress filtering be put in place on perimeter devices to prevent unwanted activity.
to protect against malicious code that installs itself through a Web browser, additional measures should be
taken. the use of ipS technologies can prevent exploitation of browser and plug-in vulnerabilities through
signatures and behavior-based detection in addition to address space layout randomization (ASLr).
197 end
users should employ defense-in-depth strategies, including the deployment of antivirus software and a
personal firewall. Users should update antivirus definitions regularly. they should also ensure that all
desktop, laptop, and server computers are updated with all necessary security patches from their software vendors. they should never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless it is expected and comes
from a trusted source, and unless the purpose of the attachment is known.
197 ASLr is a security mechanism that randomizes data in memory to prevent the success of attacks that leverage memory corruption vulnerabilities,
such as buffer overflows.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
73Phishing, Underground Economy Servers, and Spam Trends
phishing is an attempt by a third party to solicit confidential information from an individual, group, or
organization by mimicking (or spoofing) a specific brand, usually one that is well known, often for financial
gain. phishers attempt to trick users into disclosing personal data, such as credit card numbers, online
banking credentials, and other sensitive information, which they may then use to commit fraudulent acts.
phishing generally requires an end user to enter their credentials into an online data entry field. this is one
of the characteristics that distinguishes phishing from spam-based scams (such as the widely disseminated
419 scam and other social engineering scams).198 the data that end users enter can then be used for
fraudulent purposes.
Spam is usually defined as junk or unsolicited email sent by a third party. While it is certainly an annoyance
to users and administrators, spam is also a serious security concern because it can be used to deliver
trojans, viruses, and phishing attempts.199 Spam can also be used to deliver drive-by downloaders, which
require no other end user interaction than navigation to the UrLs contained in the spam messages. Large
volumes of spam could also cause a loss of service or degradation in the performance of network resources
and email gateways.
this section will assess phishing and spam trends that Symantec observed in 2008; it will also discuss
items that were offered for sale on underground economy servers during this time period, as this is where
much of the profit is made from phishing and spam attacks. Underground economy servers are black
market forums for advertising and trading stolen information and services. this discussion will assess
underground economy servers according to the different types of goods and services advertised. it should
be noted that this discussion may not necessarily be representative of internet-wide activity; rather, it is
intended as a snapshot of the activity that Symantec monitored during this period.
the results used in this analysis are based on data returned from the Symantec probe network, as well as
the Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam™ customer base. Specifically, statistics are gathered from enterprise
customers’ Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam servers that receive more than 1,000 email messages per day.
this removes the smaller data samples (that is, smaller customers and test servers), thereby allowing for
a more accurate representation of data.
the Symantec probe network consists of millions of decoy email addresses that are configured to attract
a large stream of spam attacks. An attack can consist of one or more messages. the goal of the Symantec
probe network is to simulate a wide variety of internet email users, thereby attracting a stream of traffic
that is representative of spam activity across the internet as a whole. For this reason, this network is
continuously optimized in order to attract new varieties of spam attacks.
in addition to the Symantec probe network, phishing information is also gathered through the Symantec
phish report network, an extensive antifraud community of organizations and end users.200 members of
the Symantec phish report network contribute and receive fraudulent website addresses for alerting and
filtering across a broad range of solutions.
198 http://nortontoday.symantec.com/features/security_at_30.php
199 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6676819.stm
200 http://www.phishreport.net/Symantec Global internet Security threat report
74this section will address the following metrics:
phishing activity by sector•
phishing website hosts•
top countries hosting phishing websites and top targeted sectors•
Automated phishing toolkits •
Underground economy servers—goods and services available for sale•
Spam by category•
top countries of spam origin•
percentage of spam from botnets •
phishing, underground economy servers, and spam—protection and mitigation•
Phishing activity by sector
this section will explore phishing activity in two ways. First, it will analyze the unique brands being spoofed
in phishing attacks according to the sector to which they belong. Second, it will explore the sectors whose
brands were most frequently spoofed by phishing lures. these considerations are important for an
enterprise because the use of its brand in phishing activity can significantly undermine consumer confidence in its reputation.
previous volumes of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report assessed phishing data based
on the number of phishing websites that were targeted by the highest volume of phishing attacks.
201
However, in this volume, phishing activity will be assessed by sector according to the number of so-called
phishing lures that are detected spoofing a company’s brand. phishing lures are UrLs that lead end users
to phishing websites and are usually delivered by spam email (also known as phishing email). multiple
lures can lead to the same phishing website.
phishers are becoming increasingly adept at adapting their lures in order to direct end users to their
phishing sites. For instance, in economically constrained circumstances, phishers may adopt lures that
spoof well-known financial institutions and promise users access to low-interest loans. As a result, tracking
phishing lures may give security analysts insight into what new tactics phishers are using.
the majority of brands used in phishing attacks in 2008 were in the financial services sector, accounting
for 79 percent of the total, down slightly from the 83 percent reported in 2007 (table 16). the financial
services sector also accounted for the highest volume of phishing lures during this period, at 76 percent,
considerably higher than 2007 when the volume for financial services was 52 percent (figure 19).
it is likely that the increase in the percentage of phishing lures spoofing financial services is not so much
due to an increase in the number of these lures, but to a drop in the number of lures spoofing internet
community-related brands, particularly social networking sites, as will be discussed later in this section. the rise in phishing lures that spoof financial services is reflected in the significant amount of credit card information that was offered on underground economy servers in 2008, as is discussed in the
“Underground economy servers ” discussion.
201 A phishing website is a site that is designed to mimic the legitimate website of the organization whose brand is being spoofed. in many cases, it is set up by the
attacker to capture authentication information or other personal identification information from victims; any information gathered is then typically used in identity
theft or other fraudulent activity.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
75Sector
Financial
ISPRetail
Insurance
Internet communityTelecom
Computer hardware
Government
Computer software
Transportation2008 Percentage
79%
8%
4%
2%
2%2%
1%
1%
<1%
<1%2007 Percentage
83%
7%
4%
2%
2%
<1%
1%
1%
1%
1%
Table 16. Unique brands phished, by sector
Source: Symantec
phishing is often carried out for the purpose of financial gain. Brands and activities associated with the
financial sector are most likely to yield data that could be used in financially motivated attacks, such as
bank account credentials. As a result, it is not surprising that the majority of phishing activity detected in
2008 targeted brands in the financial sector.
4%
1%
<1%
<1%
<1%<1%<1%11%
76%
RetailFinancial
ISP
Internet community
Government8%
Computer hardwareOnline gaming
Insurance
Computer softwareTelecom
Figure 19. Phished sectors by volume of phishing lures
Source: SymantecSymantec Global internet Security threat report
76there are several items in the “Underground economy servers” discussion that illustrate the preponderance
of financial services in phishing activity. the top two most frequently advertised items observed on
underground economy servers during 2008 were credit card information and bank account credentials,
in that order. together, these two categories accounted for more than half of the goods and services
advertised in 2008.
many phishing attacks that spoof financial services brands will prompt users to enter credit card
information or banking credentials into fraudulent sites. if this is done, the phishers can then capture and
sell such information in the underground economy. this has been made easier for phishers because of the
increasingly widespread acceptance of online banking. For example, 44 percent of internet users in the
United States perform some degree of online banking, as do 64 percent of users in Canada and 46 percent of those in France.
202 Because of this, end users may be more easily fooled into entering their information
into fraudulent websites that mimic the brand of their financial services provider.
the 4 percent reduction in the number of financial sector brands being spoofed by phishing lures during
2008 may indicate increased awareness of phishing schemes and how to avoid falling victim to them.
information campaigns driven by specific financial institutions, as well as a heightened awareness of phishing schemes targeting financial services, have likely made it more difficult for phishers to carry out
successful phishing attacks against companies offering those services. By the same token, it may also be
a reflection of the fact that a number of financial institutions either ceased operations or changed their business offerings during 2008, thereby reducing the number of financial service brands available for
phishers to spoof.
203
iSps were the second ranked sector for brands spoofed by phishing lures in 2007, making up 8 percent
of the total. this is a 1 percentage point increase from 2007, when it also ranked second. the iSp sector
also ranked second in the volume of phishing lures for 2008, accounting for 11 percent of the total, up
from 4 percent in 2007. Again, the percentage increase in the volume of lures spoofing iSps was likely
due to a drop in the number of lures spoofing brands associated with internet communities, as will be
discussed shortly.
iSp accounts, which often include email accounts, can be valuable targets for phishers because people
frequently use the same authentication credentials (such as usernames and passwords) for multiple
accounts, including email accounts. With a little effort on the part of the attacker, this information could
provide access to other accounts, such as online banking accounts.
Attackers also sometimes use the free Web-hosting space that is often included in iSp accounts to put
up phishing websites, or use the accompanying email accounts to send spam or launch further phishing
attacks. Compromised iSp Web-hosting accounts can also be used to host Web-based exploits, which
would give an attacker a greater number of potential targets. Compromised Web space can also be used
to plant links to other websites that an attacker controls in order to boost the search engine rankings of those sites.
in addition, having access to an email account could allow the attacker to spam the victim’s contact list—
and likely enjoy greater success with this ploy because people tend to trust email from people they know.
this assertion is enforced by email accounts/passwords and addresses being the third and fourth most
common goods available on underground economy servers in 2008, respectively.
202 http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=2524
203 http://www.economist.com/finance/displayStory.cfm?story_id=12294688&source=features_box_mainSymantec Global internet Security threat report
77the third most spoofed sector for 2008 was retail services, which accounted for 4 percent of organizations
whose brands were spoofed by phishing attacks in 2008, the same percentage as 2007. the retail sector
also ranked third in volume of phishing lures, accounting for 8 percent of the total for 2008, down from
12 percent recorded in 2007.
the retail sector is a logical target of phishers for several reasons. First, online retailers regularly conduct
transactions that require the input of financial information, which could be fraudulently obtained and
used for financial gain. By successfully mimicking a retailer’s website, phishers will try to persuade users to attempt a purchase and enter their credit card information. they may also be able to persuade users
to enter account information (such as usernames and passwords) that can then be used to access the account on the retailer’s legitimate website. this can in turn be used to fraudulently order goods that
are charged to the user’s account. many online stores give customers the option of storing credit card
and billing information to facilitate the checkout process. Access to this information also gives phishers access to the victim’s billing address, which is used by merchants as a security feature.
As has been mentioned previously, the volume of phishing lures spoofing brands associated with internet
communities, such as social networking sites, dropped significantly over the past year, from 31 percent in
2007 to only 4 percent in 2008. the previous two volumes of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat
Report discussed the rapid rise in lures targeting this sector and postulated that it was likely due to the
increase in usage of these sites, as well as the fact that users associated with these communities generally
tend to be trusted by other users.
Given the rapid rise of phishing activity targeting this sector in previous years, and the notable drop in
volume in 2008, it is likely that companies in this sector have taken steps to either bolster security against
phishing activity or limit its effectiveness. this could include increased network security measures and
increased user awareness and education.
it is also likely that many of these communities have improved their ability to quickly identify phishing
websites and have them taken down, reducing the window of exposure of end users to such websites. it
may also be the case that phishers have concluded that there are more direct ways to obtain information that can be used for financial gain, such as spoofing brands associated with financial services
organizations.
Phishing website hosts
this metric will assess the volume of distinct phishing website hosts observed by Symantec. A phishing
website host is a computer that has been identified to be hosting one or more phishing websites during
the period. Some phishing hosts may host numerous different phishing websites; however, these hosts
are counted only once for the purpose of this discussion. the number of phishing hosts is an important
consideration because it may give security analysts an indication of the number of different people or groups involved in phishing activity at any one time. By the same token, it may also provide a good
sense of the number and type of automated phishing toolkits in use at any one time.
it should be noted that, in an effort to create a more accurate overview of the extent of phishing sites,
Symantec has made minor methodological changes for this metric. As a result, data reported in the
previous volume has been revised and updated for this volume. Symantec Global internet Security threat report
78in 2008, Symantec detected 55,389 phishing website hosts. this is an increase of 66 percent over 2007
when Symantec detected 33,428 phishing hosts. the increase in phishing website hosts is likely tied to
the continued use of automated phishing toolkits. phishing toolkits allow phishers to carry out phishing
attacks much more easily by automatically creating phishing websites that spoof the websites of legitimate
brands. Attackers can therefore concentrate on identifying and procuring phishing website hosts instead
of the time-consuming job of coding phishing websites themselves.
As noted in the previous two volumes of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report, the adoption
of phishing website toolkits has made phishing attacks much easier and more time efficient. As will be
discussed in “Automated phishing toolkits ” below, one prevalent phishing kit was responsible for an
average of 14 percent of all phishing attacks during 2008, with spikes up to 26 percent. the fact that this
level of phishing activity can be generated with minimal effort on the part of phishers illustrates how easy
it is for phishers to generate high volumes of phishing activity. Symantec believes that this is likely to continue in the foreseeable future.
As noted elsewhere, phishing is generally conducted for financial gain. this is illustrated by the fact that
the financial sector was targeted by 76 percent of phishing lures in 2008 and that brands associated with
financial services organizations made up 79 percent of all spoofed brands for the year. Furthermore, as has
been discussed in previous volumes of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report, phishing has
been adopted as a revenue-generating activity by some organized crime groups.
204 those discussions
focused on the online criminal activities of the rBn, who specialized in the distribution of malicious code,
hosting malicious websites, and other malicious activity (as discussed further in “t op countries hosting
phishing websites and top targeted sectors,” which follows). Symantec believes that phishing activity will likely continue to increase as long as it continues to be a profitable and lucrative enterprise.
Top countries hosting phishing websites and top targeted sectors
this metric will assess the countries in which the most phishing websites were hosted in 2008. this data
is a snapshot in time, and does not offer insight into changes in the locations of certain phishing sites over the course of the reporting period. it should also be noted that the fact that a phishing website is hosted in
a certain country does not necessarily mean that the attacker is located in that country.
in 2008, 43 percent of all phishing websites detected by Symantec were located in the United States
(table 17). this is considerably less than 2007, when 69 percent of phishing websites originated there. Of
the phishing websites situated in the United States, 82 percent spoofed brands associated with financial
services. this is in keeping with the internet-wide average, since 76 percent of phishing websites detected
across the internet as a whole were associated with financial service organizations.
it is worth noting that of the top 10 countries for phishing websites in 2008, only the United States
experienced a drop in activity. All other countries in the top 10 experienced growth (albeit relatively minor
in most cases) or stayed relatively the same. Because the United States hosted such a vast majority of
phishing websites in 2008, it is reasonable to conclude that the changes in percentage were due to a drop in the absolute number of these websites being hosted in the United States, rather than a rise in those
situated in other countries. this could be related to the shutdown of iSps that were being used for large
volumes of spam activity, as is discussed in “Top countries of spam origin,” further below in this report.
204 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 11 Symantec Global internet Security threat report
79Rank
1
2
3
4
56
7
8
9
10Country
United States
Poland
China
France
South KoreaRussia
Germany
United Kingdom
Canada
Italy2008
Percentage
43%
6%
4%
4%
4%3%
3%
3%
3%
2%2007
Percentage
69%
1%
3%
2%
4%2%
3%
3%
2%
<1%2008 Top Sector
Targeted in Country
Financial services
Financial services
ISP
Financial services
Financial services
Financial services
Financial services
Financial services
Financial services
Financial services2008 Percentage of Lures
Targeting Top Sector
82%
94%50%
87%
88%60%79%
86%
77%
67%
Table 17. Top countries hosting phishing websites and top targeted sectors
Source: Symantec
Of the phishing websites hosted in the United States in 2008, 82 percent targeted the financial services
sector. As noted in “phishing activity by sector,” attacks that spoof financial companies give phishers the
best opportunity to attain information that can be used for financially rewarding attacks. in 2007, the
internet community sector was the sector most commonly spoofed by phishing websites based in
the United States, accounting for 55 percent of the total, while financial services ranked second
with 41 percent.
it is likely that phishers based in the United States have moved away from internet community-based
phishing websites due to countermeasures undertaken by companies in this sector to guard against
phishing attacks—most likely through user-education campaigns. it may also be that phishers have
moved toward financial services because this sector provides more opportunities for profit. With the current economic downturn, end users may be more susceptible to phishing attacks that advertise low
interest rates for mortgages and credit cards or that claim to be associated with the administration of
financial institutions that are undergoing some sort of restructuring or cessation.
poland hosted the second highest percentage of phishing websites in 2008, with 6 percent of the total. this
is a significant change from 2007, when poland hosted just 1 percent of phishing websites and was only the
fourteenth-ranked country in this category. poland’s increased rank in 2008 may also be due to remotely
situated attackers compromising computers in poland to use them to host phishing websites, possibly due
to recent crackdowns on fraudulent activity in other countries. For instance, in november 2007, the russia-
based operations of the russian Business network (rBn) were reportedly shut down.
205 the rBn reputedly
specializes in the distribution of malicious code, hosting malicious websites, and other malicious activity,
including the development and sale of the mpack toolkit. the rBn has been credited for creating
approximately half of the phishing incidents that occurred worldwide last year, and reputedly associated with a significant amount of malicious internet and computer activities in 2007. it is possible that when its
operations in russia were shut down, it relocated some of its operations to poland, therefore contributing
to the high number of phishing websites detected there in 2008.
205 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 11Symantec Global internet Security threat report
80China hosted the third highest percentage of phishing websites in 2008, with 4 percent of the total. this
is up from fourth rank and 3 percent in 2007. the sector most commonly targeted by phishing websites
hosted in China in 2008 was the iSp sector, which was spoofed by 50 percent of all known sites there. in
2007, the financial services sector was the sector most commonly spoofed by phishing websites based
in China, with 44 percent of the total.
Of the top 10 countries for phishing websites, China was the only one in which the top targeted sector was
iSps. Financial services was the most commonly targeted sector for all of the other top 10 countries. As
discussed previously in “Phishing activity by sector,” iSps make valuable targets for phishers because of
the potential wealth of personal information from the iSp accounts of end users that is often fairly easily
accessed by skilled attackers and which provides many avenues for further malicious exploits.
Automated phishing toolkits
A phishing toolkit is a set of scripts that allows an attacker to automatically create websites that spoof the legitimate websites of different brands, including the images and logos associated with those brands. the
scripts also help to generate corresponding phishing email messages. As each script generates pseudo-random phishing UrLs with a distinctive pattern,
206 the particular script used to generate a particular
phishing UrL can be identified from that pattern. All phishing UrLs reported to Symantec can be sorted
and grouped according to those specific patterns.
phishing toolkits are developed by groups or individuals who, along with using the kits themselves, sell
the kits in the underground economy. toolkits sold in the underground economy often go unnamed. Unlike
legitimate software, for which naming plays an important marketing role, phishing toolkits often become
popular based on who has produced them. As a consequence, phishing toolkits discussed here cannot be
named specifically and will instead be referred to by number.
Kit 1 was responsible for an average of 14 percent of all phishing attacks during 2008, with spikes
up to 26 percent during the summer months (figure 20). this kit is a domain-based phishing toolkit.
Domain-based phishing toolkits require the phisher to own and register a unique domain, such as
“aphishingsite.com” and host it somewhere like a bot network or on an iSp. the phisher can then
create phishing links with random subdomains, such as “mybank.aphishingsite.com,”
“anotherbank.aphishingsite.com,” and so on.
On the other hand, defacement-based phishing toolkits do not require the registration of domains or DnS
servers so they are easier to setup. Defacement-based phishing toolkits require a phisher to compromise
existing Web pages, after which the phisher can simply upload the page of the spoofed brand. Defacement-based toolkits are often favored by phishers because of their ease of use and light setup requirements. For
example, in 2008, Symantec detected many image-hosting sites and guestbooks that were compromised
and used for phishing attacks.
206 For example, http://www.loginhere.id-123456.spoofed-brand.tld/r1/abcd/login.php and http://www.loginhere.id-456789.spoofed-brand.tld/r1/wxyz/login.phpSymantec Global internet Security threat report
81Kit 1 only targets a popular Webmail service and uses domain names that are often related to images or
pictures, such as “pzychaos.xmas-party-pics.com” or “racz.ani.cool-crazy-pics.com.” they are often sent via
the Webmail service itself to other users, with text such as “Hey see the new images from me.”
Kit 1 activity dropped sharply through August and then rose sharply again in December. this indicates that
security administrators may have implemented measures to defend against these attacks, thereby reducing
their effectiveness. it is likely that the phishers modified the kit in response to this drop-off, leading to the
resurgence in activity in December. this may indicate that attackers were hoping to use it for the
approaching Christmas season to disseminate Christmas-related phishing lures.
MonthApr JunA ug Oct0%10%20%30%
5%15%25%35%40%
DecA verage FebPhishing toolkit 1
Phishing toolkit 2
Phishing toolkit 3PercentagePhishing toolkit 5Phishing toolkit 4
Mar MayJ uly Sep Nov Jan
Figure 20. Activity of most common automated phishing toolkits
Source: Symantec
phishing Kit 5 appeared in September 2008. it was responsible for 26 percent of that month’s phishing
attacks, followed by 36 percent in October 2008. After this spike, its usage dropped to less than 2 percent.
this attack targeted a single non-financial brand, which responded by adopting new security features for
its online services, causing the sudden drop-off. Over the course of the entire year, Kit 5 was responsible
for slightly less than 6 percent of all phishing activity. Symantec Global internet Security threat report
82Underground economy servers—goods and services available for sale
this discussion focuses on the most frequently advertised items for sale observed on underground
economy servers. Underground economy servers are black market forums for the promotion and trade
of stolen information and services. this information can include government-issued identification
numbers, credit cards, credit verification values, debit cards, personal identification numbers (pins),
user accounts, email address lists, and bank accounts. Services include cashiers, scam page hosting,
and job advertisements such as for scam developers or phishing partners. much of this commerce occurs
within channels on internet relay Chat (irC) servers. For an in-depth analysis of how the underground
internet economy functions, please see the Symantec Report on the Underground Economy, published
november 2008.207
the measure of goods and services available for sale is by distinct messages, which are considered to be single advertisements for a good or service, though the same advertisement may appear thousands of
times. to qualify as a new message there must be variations, such as price changes or other alterations in
the message.
in 2008, the most frequently advertised item observed on underground economy servers was credit card
information, accounting for 32 percent of all goods (table 18). this was an increase from 21 percent in
2007. Credit card information advertised on the underground economy consists of the credit card number and expiry date, and may also include the name on the card (or business name for corporate cards), billing address, phone number, CVV2 number, and pin.
208 One reason for this ranking may be because there are
many ways credit card information can be obtained for fraud. this includes phishing schemes, monitoring
merchant card authorizations, the use of magnetic stripe skimmers, or breaking into databases and other data breaches that expose sensitive information.
209
2008
Rank
1
2
3
4
56
78
9
102007
Rank
1
2
9
3
12
4
65
17
8Item
Credit card information
Bank account credentials
Email accounts
Email addresses
Proxies Full identities
Mailers Cash out services
Shell scripts Scams 2008
Percentage
32%
19%
5%
5%
4%4%
3%3%
3%
3%2007
Percentage
21%
17%
4%
6%
3%6%
5%5%
2%
5%Range of Prices
$0.06–$30
$10–$1000$0.10–$100
$0.33/MB–$100/MB
$0.16–$20$0.70–$60
$2–$408%–50% or flat rate of
$200–$2000 per item
$2–$20$3–$40/week for hosting,
$2–$20 design
Table 18. Goods and services available for sale on underground economy servers210
Source: Symantec
207 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-whitepaper_underground_economy_report_11-2008-14525717.en-us.pdf
208 Card Verification Value 2 (CVV2) is a three- or four-digit number on the credit card that is used for card-not-present transactions, such as purchases over the
internet or telephone. this is meant to improve security for credit cards and to verify that the person completing the transaction is in fact, in possession of the card.
209 magnetic stripe skimming devices are small machines designed to scan and retain data contained in the magnetic stripes on credit and debit cards.
210 Descriptions and definitions for the goods and services discussed in this section can be found in Appendix e—phishing, Underground economy Servers,
and Spam trends methodologySymantec Global internet Security threat report
83the frequent use of credit cards also influenced their high rank in 2008. For example, the 23.6 billion
credit card transactions in the United States in 2007 represent a growth of 6 percent over the previous
year.211 High frequency use and the range of available methods for capturing credit card data would
generate more opportunities for theft and compromise and, thus, lead to an increased supply on underground economy servers. Despite the economic slowdown of the last half of 2008, both the number
of online purchases by credit card and the amount of purchases increased. Online spending for 2008 has
been growing since the previous year with sales increasing 6 percent for the third quarter.
212 Also, there
was a 15 percent increase in sales for so-called Cyber monday from the previous year in the United
States.213 many online stores were offering financing options, no payments for 90 days, and heavy
discounts to attract customers.
Credit cards may also be popular on underground economy servers because using fraudulent credit card
information for activities such as making online purchases is relatively easy. Online shopping can be easy
and fast, and a final sale often requires only basic credit card information. Someone knowledgeable enough could potentially make many transactions with a stolen card before the suspicious activity is
detected and the card is suspended. Once the purchases have been completed and the merchandise
delivered, it can then be fenced for a profit. Also, online merchants who have yet to implement multi-level
security features are likely attractive to criminals who wish to conduct fraudulent transactions without
hassle.
Another factor that contributes to the popularity of credit cards is that they are typically sold in bulk
packages on underground economy servers. not only do advertisers offer discounts for bulk purchases or
include free numbers with larger purchases, but having an extensive list of cards enables individuals to quickly try a new number if a card number does not work or is suspended. Also, having a larger number of
credit cards numbers included should theoretically increase the likelihood of having active/valid cards in
the bulk package.
the price range of credit cards in 2008 remained consistent with the prices from the previous year, ranging
from $0.06 to $30 per card number. there were three main factors that influenced the price of credit
cards: the amount of information included with the card, rarity of the card type, and bulk purchase sizes. Credit cards that bundled in personal information—such as government-issued identification numbers,
addresses, phone numbers, and email addresses—were offered at higher prices. Cards that included
security features such as CVV2 numbers, pins, and online verification service passwords were also offered
at higher prices.
the rarity of the credit card information is often associated with the location of the issuing bank and the
type of card. information from regions such as europe, Asia, and the middle east is typically offered at
higher prices than elsewhere because the supply of credit card information for these regions is rarer. For example, cards from countries such as Sweden or Belgium were the most costly, at an average of $20 each,
while cards issued from the United States were the least expensive.
the lower price range for credit cards was also due to bulk purchase discounts offered by sellers. Credit
cards are typically sold in bulk, with lot sizes from as few as 10 credit cards to as many as 5,000. Common bulk amounts and rates observed by Symantec during this reporting period were 100 credit cards for $150
($1.50 each), 140 credit cards for $120 ($0.86 each), and 5,000 credit cards for $300 ($0.06 each).
211 http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss85p2.pdf : table 7
212 http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=2560
213 http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122831827531375837.html. Cyber monday is the first monday after U.S. thanksgiving, which has come to mark the beginning
of the online shopping season. this is typically the busiest online shopping day of the year.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
84As with other areas of the underground economy, the availability of the item seems to determine its price:
an increase in supply will decrease the price of the goods. there are more credit cards in circulation in the
United States than in any other country in the world—1.3 billion cards by the end of 2007, which is an
average of over four credit cards per person.214 in comparison, there were only 67 million credit cards in
circulation in the United Kingdom, which is an average of one per inhabitant and only 5 percent of the U.S.
total. this correlates with the originating location percentages of credit cards advertised on underground
economy servers for this reporting period: cards issued by U.S.-based institutions accounted for 67 percent of the total, while cards from UK-based institutions accounted for 11 percent. this ratio also corresponds
to advertised bulk package prices: UK cards were typically advertised at rates three to four times higher
than U.S. cards.
the second most commonly advertised good on underground economy servers during 2008 was bank
account credentials, accounting for 19 percent of all advertised goods. this was a slight increase from
17 percent observed in 2007. Bank account credentials may consist of account numbers, bank transit numbers, account holder names and/or company names, and may include online banking passwords. Also,
most sellers advertised the type of account and the balances for the stolen bank accounts. Attackers can
steal bank account credentials using the same methods as were outlined in the discussion of credit cards
previously in this section.
the popularity of bank account credentials may be due to a shift toward online banking. As mentioned
earlier, in the United States, 44 percent of internet users perform some degree of online banking.
215 that
number is even higher in Canada and France, where 64 percent and 46 percent of internet users bank
online, respectively.216 the potential increased availability of such sensitive information would likely also
result in
an increase in attempts to steal banking credentials through phishing attempts or the use of malicious
code such as banking trojans. For example, Symantec observed an 86 percent increase in potential
banking trojan infections in the second half of 2007.
Bank account credentials are attractive to attackers because they offer the opportunity to withdraw
currency directly. Withdrawing currency from a bank account has the advantage of a more immediate
payout than with online purchases, which would need to be sold to realize a purely financial reward. Also,
attackers have access to the full balances in the bank accounts, unlike credit cards where the credit limits
imposed will not allow access to the maximum potential balances. Bank account balances advertised were
also considerably higher than credit card limits; in 2008, the average advertised bank account balance was
just over $176,000, while the average credit card limit was just over $3,400. it is likely that advertisers are
skewing the average by promoting bank accounts with high balances, specifically from corporate accounts, to attract customers. Symantec observed advertisements with balances ranging from $3,000 to one with
over $2.4 million. Beyond straightforward account cash outs, bank accounts can also be used as
intermediary channels to launder money or to fund other online currency accounts that only accept bank
transfers for payments.
the advertised price for bank account credentials varied as widely as it did in 2007, with prices ranging
from $10 to $1,000, depending on the amount of funds available, the location of the account, and the
type of account. Corporate and business accounts were advertised for considerably higher prices than
those of personal bank accounts as they typically had higher balances on average. Symantec observed one
eU business bank account—purportedly holding a balance of $400,000—being advertised for sale for $600.
214 http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss85p2.pdf : tables 10 and 10b
215 http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=2318
216 http://www.comscore.com/press/release.asp?press=2524Symantec Global internet Security threat report
85in addition, eU accounts were advertised at a considerably higher average price than their U.S.
counterparts, which may be because eU accounts are rarer than U.S. accounts on underground economy
servers. Furthermore, bank account credentials that bundled in additional information such as names,
addresses, dates of birth, and mothers’ maiden names were advertised at higher prices, presumably
because this added information could potentially be used for further identity fraud.
email accounts were the third most common item advertised for sale on underground economy servers
in 2008, making up 5 percent of all advertised goods, an increase from 4 percent in 2007. Gaining
possession of email passwords can allow access to email accounts, which can be used for sending out
spam and/or for harvesting additional email addresses from contact lists. recipients of the spam emails
may be more trusting of emails coming from a known email address. moreover, along with email, many
iSps include free Web space in their account packages, which many people rarely access. Once the iSp
accounts are compromised, these free spaces can be used to host phishing sites or malicious code
without the knowledge of the victims.
in addition, compromised email accounts will often provide access to additional sensitive personal
information such as bank account data, student identification numbers, mailing address and phone
numbers, or access to other online accounts (such as social networking pages, online stock accounts, etc.) that is stored in saved personal emails. From there, it is often simple for someone to use the password
recovery option offered on most online registration sites and have a new password sent via email to gain
complete access to these accounts. this danger is compounded by the fact that many people have of using
the same password for multiple accounts. the fraudulently gained personal information can then be used
to conduct identity theft and fraud.
the advertised prices of email accounts depended on the iSp of the account; larger iSps that offered large
amounts of Web space were advertised at higher prices than ones with smaller space. Web-based email
accounts from various iSps around the world were advertised, although the location used to register the
account did not factor into the advertised price since users could obtain the same type of access worldwide. Accounts registered in europe, the United States, and the middle east were advertised at the
same prices for this reporting period, ranging from $1 to $100 for each account.
the distribution of goods and services advertised on underground economy servers continues to be
focused on financial information, such as credit card information and bank account credentials. this
seems to suggest that criminals are more focused on purchasing goods that allow them to make large quantities of money quickly on underground economy servers rather than on exploits that require more
time and resources, such as scam pages and email lists for spamming. this trend is likely to continue until
steps are taken to make it more difficult to obtain and use this financial information.
As part of their best practices to help prevent fraud, credit card companies, credit card issuers, and
banks have been taking more secure measures to verify and authenticate users, such as multi-factor
authorization or using technologies such as chip and pin on the credit cards they issue.
217 By instituting
effective multi-factor authentication and multi-level security systems, banks and credit card companies can make it more difficult for criminals to exploit stolen financial information. Also, security features such
as Smart Card-based credit cards using the emV standard for security verification,
218 or credit cards with
chip & pin technology for card-present transactions can make it more difficult for criminals to obtain
and use financial information.
217 http://www.chipandpin.co.uk/reflib/Consumer_digi-guide_p ost_14_Feb_FinAL.pDF
218 emV is a standard for authenticating credit and debit card payments. the name originates from the initial letters of europay, masterCard, and Visa, who together
developed the standard. Cf. http://www.emvco.com/about_emvco.aspxSymantec Global internet Security threat report
86Another technology currently being tested in the United Kingdom for card-not-present transactions, such
as online shopping, are credit cards with one-time codes. to complete the transaction, credit card holders
enter their pin into the built-in keypad on the back of the card. Once the correct pin is entered, the card
will display a six-digit one-time code to be used to authenticate the transaction.219 this code would be
unique for each specific transaction. even if the card is stolen or lost, a criminal would need the pin to
use the card.
moreover, consumers who fear identity theft and payment fraud may be moving toward internet-based
payment services and other non-credit card electronic payment services. these types of services have
become more popular because they do not expose the credit or debit card information that is used to set
up the accounts and, as with some credit card issuers, often offer full protection from unauthorized
transactions. in addition, they allow people without credit cards to make online purchases.
nonetheless, even though consumers seem to be moving toward other non-credit card electronic payment services for online payments, credit cards are still the most popular payment method. people may prefer
to use credit cards over other payment options because of the added bonuses sometimes associated with using them, such as zero liability, flight points, cash-back options, travel options, or dividend bonuses. in
the United States, the value of credit card transactions for 2006 was estimated at just over $2.1 trillion—the equivalent of nearly $7,000 for each person in the United States.
220
Spam by category
Spam categories are assigned based on spam activity that is detected by the Symantec probe network.
While some of the categories may overlap, this data provides a general overview of the types of spam that
are most commonly seen on the internet today. it is important to note that this data is restricted to spam
attacks that are detected and processed by the Symantec probe network. internal upstream processing
may weed out particular spam attacks, such as those that are determined to be potential fraud attacks.
the most common type of spam detected in 2008 was related to internet- or computer-related goods and
services, which made up 24 percent of all detected spam (figure 21). in 2007, this was the second most
common type of spam, accounting for 19 percent of the total. this type of spam is typically used to
promote Web hosting and design, as well as other online commodities such as phishing and spam toolkits.
Since phishing and spam toolkits cannot typically be advertised by legitimate means, such as through
banner ads on websites, spam may be the most effective way to promote them.
the increase in spam associated with internet- or computer-related goods and services is reflected in
the items that were most commonly available on underground economy servers in 2008, as discussed in
“Underground economy servers” previously. email addresses, which are usually purchased for the sake of
spamming, were the fourth most commonly advertised good.
Furthermore, scams ranked tenth in items for sale on underground economy servers in 2008. Scams
advertised on these servers consist of creating scam Web pages, creating and disseminating scams, or hosting scam pages. Fraudsters promote these items, and buyers can often find them advertised on
underground economy servers. this spamming activity in turn adds to the growth of the underground
economy servers. Some of the phishing scams result in the harvesting of credit card and bank account credentials, which are then sold on underground economy servers.
219 http://www.visaeurope.com/pressandmedia/newsreleases/press377_pressreleases.jsp
220 http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss85p2.pdf : tables 9 and 9dSymantec Global internet Security threat report
872007
FinancialInternet
Commercial products
HealthLeisure
Scams
Fraud
PoliticalAdult15%<1%9%
6%6%5%
25%17%19%
15%1%
8%7%5% 5%
19% 16%24%
2008
Figure 21. Top spam categories
Source: Symantec
the second most common type of spam detected in 2008 was related to commercial products, which made
up 19 percent of all spam detected by Symantec sensors. in 2007, commercial spam was the most common
type of spam, accounting for 25 percent of the total. Commercial products spam usually consists of advertisements for commercial goods and services. Such spam is frequently used to sell designer goods
such as watches, handbags, and sunglasses. the profits from the sale of these products can be substantial
given that the goods sold are often cheaply made counterfeits.
For 2008, internet-related spam and commercial-products spam not only switched places from the
previous year, but also percentages. Symantec believes this may be the result of the economic downturn.
it is possible that, with the drop in consumer confidence, people are less inclined to buy the types of
goods and services advertised by commercial-product spam. Symantec Global internet Security threat report
88Spam related to financial services made up 16 percent of all spam detected in 2008, making it the third
most common type of spam during this period. Financial services spam contains references or offers related
to money, the stock market, or other financial “opportunities.” this is almost unchanged from 2007, when
financial services spam was also the third most common type of spam, with 17 percent of the total. While
it might be expected that spam offering stock market tips or other financial opportunities would drop off
during a period of market uncertainty, it is likely that such a drop-off would be negated by an increase in
spam offering such recession-related enticements as low-interest loans and easy access to credit.
Top countries of spam origin
this section will discuss the top 10 countries of spam origin. this discussion is based on data gathered
by customer installations of Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam. this data includes the originating server’s ip
address, against which frequency statistics are compared. each ip address is mapped to a specific country
and charted over time. the nature of spam and its distribution on the internet presents challenges in
identifying the location of people who are sending it because many spammers try to redirect attention away
from their actual geographic location. in an attempt to bypass DnS block lists, they use trojans that relay
email, which allow them to send spam from sites distinct from their physical location. in doing so, they tend
to focus on compromised computers in those regions with the largest bandwidth capabilities. As such, the
region in which the spam originates may not correspond with the region in which the spammers are located.
Over the past year, Symantec observed a 192 percent increase in spam detected across the internet, from
119.6 billion messages in 2007 to 349.6 billion in 2008. this is despite the shutdown of two major botnets
in november, which is discussed in greater depth in the following paragraphs. After the shutdowns,
Symantec saw a 65 percent decrease in spam activity. this lasted for a period of several weeks before
returning to normal levels when the botnets were reestablished elsewhere.
During 2008, 29 percent of all spam originated in the United States (table 19), a decrease from 45 percent
in 2007, when it was also the top country of spam origin. the prominence of the United States is not
surprising, given that it has the second highest number of broadband internet users in the world.221 this is
important because broadband connections are usually high-speed connections that are often constantly
connected to the internet. this allows spammers to send out high volumes of spam at any time of the day.
2008 Rank
1
23
4
5
6
7
8
9
10Country
United States
RussiaTurkey
China
Brazil
United Kingdom
Germany
Italy
Poland
Spain2008 Percentage
29%
6%
5%
4%
4%
3%
3%
3%
2%
2%2007 Rank
1
8
15
2
12
7
6
9
5
102007 Percentage
45%
3%
1%
4%
2%
5%
3%
2%
3%
2%
Table 19. Top 10 countries of spam origin
Source: Symantec
221 http://www.point-topic.comSymantec Global internet Security threat report
89Despite this, the rate of growth of spam originating in the United States was slower than the rate of growth
across the internet in general. in 2008, spam messages increased by 89 percent in the United States, from
approximately 54 billion to roughly 102 billion messages. While this increase may seem significant, it is well behind the 192 percent increase in spam activity across the internet as a whole.
the slower increase in spam originating in the United States is likely due to the november 2008 shutdown
of the mcColo iSp, which was believed to be responsible for a considerable amount of spam activity. this
shutdown is thought to have affected the percentage of email identified as spam because mcColo was
allegedly hosting a significant number of bot C&C systems (as detailed in the bot discussions of the
“Threat Activity Trends ” section of this report). the volume change was measured directly in the
Symantec probe network, which saw a 65 percent drop in traffic in the 24 hours after the shutdown.
222
Symantec believes that the iSp was being used to host bot C&C servers for a number of botnets that were
responsible for propagating spam.223 While the shutdown of mcColo resulted in a temporary slowdown of
spam originating in the United States, by mid-December spam volumes had slowly crept back up to within 80 percent of their levels before the shutdown, as old botnets were brought back online, and new botnets
were created.
224
russia was the second ranked country for originating spam in 2008, with 6 percent. this is a significant
increase from 2007, when 3 percent of spam originated in russia and it ranked eighth. While it accounted
for a relatively small percentage of worldwide spam, russia was the site of a very large increase, with the
amount of spam originating there increasing by 445 percent over the course of 2008.
this increase is likely due to two factors. First, russia is one of the four largest emerging broadband
markets worldwide.225 Second, there is a considerable amount of organized crime activity based in
russia, much of which focuses on fraudulent online activity.226 messageLabs intelligence reported that
12 percent of all malicious websites blocked in 2008 were registered with .ru, the tLD for websites
registered in russia.227
turkey had the third highest volume of spam in 2008, with 5 percent of all detected spam. this is a
significant increase from 2007 when turkey had the fifteenth highest volume of spam, with only 1 percent.
not only is this a considerable jump in rankings, but the volume of spam originating in turkey increased by
nearly 1,200 percent.the volume of spam originating in turkey in 2008 was not steady, but increased from August until the
end of the year. During this time, turkey was the second ranked country of origin, with the volume of spam
varying from 6 to 8 percent of the global total.
228 this may be related to the migration of bot C&C servers
following the shutdown of mcColo and other iSps linked to malicious activities during the same period.
Analysts believe that those iSps were being used by spammers to distribute their attacks.229 Once the iSps
were shut down, spammers were forced to relocate. it appears from the increase in spam activity
originating in turkey during that period that they may have relocated some of their servers there.
222 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/other_resources/b-state_of_spam_report_12-2008.en-us.pdf : p. 7
223 http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/mLireport_2008.09_Sep_Final.pdf
224 http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/other_resources/b-state_of_spam_report_01-2009.en-us.pdf : p. 7
225 http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/mLireport_Annual_2008_FinAL.pdf : p. 29
226 http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2007/nov/15/news.crime
227 http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/mLireport_2008.09_Sep_Final.pdf : p. 50
228 http://www.symantec.com/business/theme.jsp?themeid=state_of_spam#
229 Cf. http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2008/10/spam_volumes_plummet_after_atr.html , http://www.crn.com/security/212002220,
or http://www.messagelabs.com/mlireport/mLireport_2008.09_Sep_Final.pdfSymantec Global internet Security threat report
90Percentage of spam from botnets
in 2007, botnets became the dominant force in terms of distributing not only spam, but also malicious
code and phishing scams. the processing power of large botnets allows them to generate high volumes of
spam. the distributed processing power of botnets makes them an ideal platform for launching large-scale
spam campaigns. Because of their distributed nature, even taking down a large number of individual bots
and entire botnets has little effect on the percentage of spam for which they are responsible.
in 2008, botnets were responsible for approximately 90 percent of all spam email (figure 22). in August
2008, spam volumes rose more than twofold as a result of the continued, aggressive approaches taken to
expand botnet capacity, especially with the Srizbi and Cutwail botnets, which both grew in size by 20 to
25 percent by mid-2008.
As noted in “Bot-infected computers,” Symantec observed over 9 million distinct bot-infected computers
during 2008. With such a large number of bots available to attackers, it is likely that many would be used
to generate profit. it was discussed in the recent Symantec Report on the Underground Economy that many
botnets are available to be rented or purchased on underground economy channels. A spammer could purchase one of these botnets and earn income by using it to send large volumes of spam.
Percentage of spam
from botnet s
DatePercentage of spam
020%40%60%80%100%
Aug 2008 Oct 2008 Jun 2008 Dec 200810%30%50%70%90%
Jul 2008 Sep 2008 Nov 2008
Figure 22. Percentage of spam from botnets
Source: Symantec Symantec Global internet Security threat report
91Spam activities were disrupted somewhat with the previously discussed shutdowns of two iSps in late
2008.230 While these shutdowns reduced spam levels temporarily, they returned to previous levels shortly
thereafter. this is likely due in large part to the ability of spammers to create new botnets and to rework
existing botnets. Further, while it is likely that a large number of bots and other spam relays were taken
offline, the bot owners may have simply increased the output from their remaining botnets.
Additionally, the shift toward Http bot C&C structures, discussed in “Bot command-and-control servers,”
means that many botnets will be more difficult to disable since there is no longer a need for a centralized
controller. removing large numbers of bots—such as by the shutdown of iSps—will cause temporary
reductions in spam volumes, but attackers have shown the ability to relocate and resume their operations
in relatively short periods of time.
Phishing, underground economy servers, and spam—protection and mitigation
Symantec recommends that enterprise users protect themselves against phishing threats by filtering email
at the server level through the mail transfer agent (mt A). Although this will likely remain the primary point
of filtering for phishing, organizations can also use ip-based filtering upstream, as well as Http filtering.
DnS block lists also offer protection against potential phishing emails.231 Organizations could also consider
using domain-level or email authentication in order to verify the actual origin of an email message. this can
protect against phishers who are spoofing email domains.232
to protect against potential phishing activity, administrators should always follow Symantec best practices,
as outlined in Appendix A of this report. Symantec also recommends that organizations educate their end
users about phishing.233 they should also keep their employees notified of the latest phishing attacks and
how to avoid falling victim to them, and provide a means to report suspected phishing sites.234
Organizations can also employ Web-server log monitoring to track if and when complete downloads of their
websites, logos, and images are occurring. Such activity may indicate that someone is attempting to use the
legitimate website to create an illegitimate website for phishing.
Organizations can detect phishing attacks that use spoofing by monitoring non-deliverable email addresses
or bounced email that is returned to non-existent users. they should also monitor the purchasing of cousin
domain names by other entities to identify purchases that could be used to spoof their corporate domains.235
So-called typo domains and homographic domains should also be monitored.236 this can be done with the
help of companies that specialize in domain monitoring; some registrars also provide this service.
the use of antiphishing toolbars and components in Web browsers can also help protect users from phishing
attacks. these measures notify the user if a Web page being visited does not appear to be legitimate. this
way, even if a phishing email reaches a user’s inbox, the user can still be alerted to the potential threat.
230 http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/855
231 A DnS block list (sometimes referred to as a black list) is simply a list of ip addresses that are known to send unwanted email traffic. it is used by email software to
either allow or reject email coming from ip addresses on the list.
232 Spoofing refers to instances where phishers forge the “From:” line of an email message using the domain of the entity they are targeting with the phishing attempt.
233 Cf., basic guidelines on how to avoid phishing at the United States Federal trade Commission: http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/consumer/alerts/alt127.htm
234 Cf. http://www.antiphishing.org for information on the latest phishing threats.
235 “Cousin domains” refers to domain names that include some of the key words of an organization’s domain or brand name; for example, for the corporate domain
“bigbank.com”, cousin domains could include “bigbank-alerts.com”, ”big-bank-security.com”, and so on.
236 typo domains are domain names that use common misspellings of a legitimate domain name, for example the domain “symatnec.com” would be a typo domain for
“symantec.com”. A homographic domain name uses numbers that look similar to letters in the domain name, for example the character for the number “1” can look like the letter “l”.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
92end users should follow best security practices, as outlined in Appendix A of this report. they should use
an antiphishing solution. As some phishing attacks may use spyware and/or keystroke-logging applications,
Symantec advises end users to use antivirus software, antispam software, firewalls, toolbar blockers, and
other software-detection methods. Symantec also advises end users to never disclose any confidential
personal or financial information unless and until they can confirm that any request for such information
is legitimate.
Users should review bank, credit card, and credit information frequently. this can provide information
on any irregular activities. For further information, the internet Fraud Complaint Center (iFCC) has also
released a set of guidelines on how to avoid internet-related scams.237 Additionally, network administrators
can review Web proxy logs to determine if any users have visited known phishing sites. Consumers could also take more security precautions to ensure that their information will not be
compromised. When conducting higher-risk internet activities, such as online banking or purchases,
consumers should do so only on their own computers and not public ones. Further, they should not store
passwords or bank card numbers. they should also avoid following links from within messages (whether
in email, instant messages, online forums, etc.) as these may be links to spoofed websites; instead, they should manually type in the UrL of the website. Also, consumers should be aware of the amount of
personal information that they post on the internet, as criminals may take advantage of this public
information in malicious activities such as phishing scams.
237 http://www.fbi.gov/majcases/fraud/internetschemes.htmSymantec Global internet Security threat report
93Appendix A—Symantec Best Practices
Enterprise best practices
employ defense-in-depth strategies, which emphasize multiple, overlapping, and mutually supportive •
defensive systems to guard against single-point failures in any specific technology or protection method.
this should include the deployment of regularly updated antivirus, firewalls, intrusion detection, and
intrusion protection systems on client systems.
turn off and remove services that are not needed.•
if malicious code or some other threat exploits one or more network services, disable or block access to •
those services until a patch is applied.Always keep patch levels up to date, especially on computers that host public services and are accessible •
through the firewall, such as Http , Ftp, email, and DnS services.
Consider implementing network compliance solutions that will help keep infected mobile users out of •
the network (and disinfect them before rejoining the network).enforce an effective password policy.•
Configure mail servers to block or remove email that contains file attachments that are commonly used •
to spread viruses, such as .VBS, .BA t, .eXe , .piF, and .SCr files.
isolate infected computers quickly to prevent the risk of further infection within the organization.•
perform a forensic analysis and restore the computers using trusted media.•
train employees to not open attachments unless they are expected and come from a known and trusted •
source, and to not execute software that is downloaded from the internet unless it has been scanned
for viruses.ensure that emergency response procedures are in place. this includes having a backup-and-restore •
solution in place in order to restore lost or compromised data in the event of successful attack or
catastrophic data loss.
educate management on security budgeting needs.•
test security to ensure that adequate controls are in place.•
Be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file-•
sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software.
Clicking on links and/or attachments in email messages (or im messages) may also expose computers •
to unnecessary risks. ensure that only applications approved by the organization are deployed on
desktop computers.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
94Consumer best practices
Use an internet security solution that combines antivirus, firewall, intrusion detection, and vulnerability •
management for maximum protection against malicious code and other threats.
ensure that security patches are up to date and that they are applied to all vulnerable applications in a •
timely manner.
ensure that passwords are a mix of letters and numbers, and change them often. passwords should not •
consist of words from the dictionary.never view, open, or execute any email attachment unless the attachment is expected and the purpose •
of the attachment is known.Keep virus definitions updated regularly. By deploying the latest virus definitions, you can protect your •
computer against the latest viruses known to be spreading in the wild.
routinely check to see if your operating system is vulnerable to threats by using Symantec Security •
Check at www.symantec.com/securitycheck.Deploy an antiphishing solution. Also, never disclose any confidential personal or financial information •
unless and until you can confirm that any request for such information is legitimate.Get involved by tracking and reporting attack attempts. With Symantec Security Check’s tracing service, •
users can quickly identify the location of potential hackers and forward the information to the attacker’s
iSp or local police.
Be aware that security risks may be automatically installed on computers with the installation of file-•
sharing programs, free downloads, and freeware and shareware versions of software.Avoid clicking on links and/or attachments in email or im messages, as these may also expose computers •
to unnecessary risks.
read end-user license agreements (eULAs) carefully and understand all terms before agreeing to them •
as some security risks can be installed after an end user has accepted the eULA or as a consequence of
that acceptance. Be aware of programs that flash ads in the user interface. many spyware programs track how users •
respond to these ads, and their presence is a red flag. these ads may be spyware.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
95Appendix B—Threat Activity Trends Methodology
threat activity trends in this report are based on the analysis of data derived from the Symantec Global
intelligence network, which includes the Symantec DeepSight™ threat management System, Symantec
managed Security Services, the Symantec Honeypot network, and proprietary Symantec technologies. Symantec combines data derived from these sources for analysis.
Malicious activity by country
to determine the top countries for the “malicious activity by country” metric, Symantec compiles
geographical data on each type of malicious activity to be considered, namely: bot-infected computers,
phishing website hosts, malicious code reports, spam zombies, and attack origin. the proportion of
each activity originating in each country is then determined. the mean of the percentages of each
malicious activity that originates in each country is calculated. this average determines the proportion
of overall malicious activity that originates from the country in question and the rankings are determined by calculating the mean average of the proportion of these malicious activities that originated in
each country.
Data breaches that could lead to identity theft
Symantec identifies the proportional distribution of cause and sector for data breaches that may facilitate
identity theft based on data provided by the Open Security Foundation (OSF) Dataloss DB.238 OSF reports
data breaches that have been reported by legitimate media sources and have exposed personal information
including name, address, Social Security number, credit card number, or medical history. the sector that
experienced the loss along with the cause of loss that occurred is determined through analysis of the organization reporting the loss and the method that facilitated the loss.
Bot-infected computers
Symantec identifies bot-infected computers based on coordinated scanning and attack behavior that is
observed in global network traffic. An active bot-infected computer is one that carries out at least one
attack per day. this does not have to be continuous; rather, a single computer can be active on a number
of different days. Attacks are defined as any malicious activity carried out over a network that has been detected by an intrusion detection system (iDS) or firewall.
For an attacking computer to be considered to be participating in coordinated scanning and attacking,
it must fit into that pattern to the exclusion of any other activity. this behavioral matching will not catch
every bot-infected computer, and may identify other malicious code or individual attackers behaving in a
coordinated way as a botnet. this behavioral matching will, however, identify many of the most coordinated
and aggressive bot-infected computers. it will also give insight into the population trends of bot-infected
computers, including those that are considered to be actively working in a well-coordinated and aggressive
fashion at some point in time during the reporting period.
238 http://datalossdb.orgSymantec Global internet Security threat report
96Bot command-and-control servers
Symantec tracks the number of new bot C&C servers detected worldwide. Only irC and Http bot C&C
server trends will be evaluated in the methods botnet owners are using to communicate with their
bot-infected computers.
Top Web-based attacks
to evaluate this metric, Symantec identifies each distinct attack delivered via the Web, hereafter referred to
as Web-based attack, hosted on malicious websites that are detected by intrusion prevention technology. A
Web-based attack is any attack that is carried out against a client-side application originating from the Web.
Symantec determines the top Web-based attacks based by determining the most common attacks carried
out against users. Due to the nature of Web-based attacks, the total number of attacks carried out is a
good measure of the success and popularity of the attack.
each attack discussed targets a specific vulnerability or weakness in Web browsers or other client-side
applications that process content originating from the Web. these attacks can vary in their delivery
methods; some rely on misleading a user into downloading a malicious file, while others occur without
any knowledge or interaction by the user.
Top countries of origin for Web-based attacks
Symantec identifies the Web-based attacks by country by determining the geographic origin that conducts the attack on computers upon visiting a website. note that the server hosting the exploit may not necessarily
be the same server that the user has visited due to redirection. A user could visit a website that redirects their Web browser to a malicious server in another country.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
97Appendix C—Vulnerability Trends Methodology
Symantec operates one of the most popular forums for the disclosure and discussion of vulnerabilities
on the internet, the Bugt raq™ mailing list,239 which has approximately 50,000 direct subscribers who
contribute, receive, and discuss vulnerability research on a daily basis. Symantec also maintains one of
the most comprehensive vulnerability databases, currently consisting of over 32,000 vulnerabilities
(spanning more than two decades) affecting more than 72,000 technologies from over 11,000 vendors.
Vulnerability classifications
Following the discovery and/or disclosure of a new vulnerability, Symantec analysts gather all relevant characteristics of the new vulnerability and create an alert. this alert describes important traits of the
vulnerability, such as the severity, ease of exploitation, and a list of affected products. these traits are
subsequently used both directly and indirectly for this analysis.
Vulnerability types
After discovering a new vulnerability, Symantec threat analysts classify the vulnerability into one of
12 possible categories based on the available information. these categories focus on defining the core
cause of the vulnerability, as opposed to classifying the vulnerability merely by its effect.
the classification system is derived from the academic taxonomy presented by taimur Aslam, et al
(1996),240 which provides a full description of the possible values below:
Boundary condition error •
Access validation error •
Origin validation error •
input validation error •
Failure to handle exceptional conditions •
race condition error •
Serialization error •
Atomicity error •
environment error •
Configuration error •
Design error •
Window of exposure for Web browsers
the window of exposure is calculated for vulnerabilities associated with the following Web browsers:
Google Chrome•
Apple Safari •
microsoft internet explorer •
mozilla browsers •
Opera •
239 the Bugtraq mailing list is hosted by SecurityFocus (http://www.securityfocus.com). Archives are available at http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1
240 “Use of a taxonomy of Security Faults”: http://ftp.cerias.purdue.edu/pub/papers/taimur-aslam/aslam-krsul-spaf-taxonomy.pdfSymantec Global internet Security threat report
98Symantec records the window of time between the publication of an initial vulnerability report and the
appearance of third-party exploit code; this is known as the exploit code development time. the time period
between the disclosure date of a vulnerability and the release date of an associated patch is known as the patch development time. the time lapse between the public release of exploit code and the time that the
affected vendor releases a patch for the affected vulnerability is known as the window of exposure. the
average window of exposure is calculated as the difference in days between the average patch development
time and the average exploit code development time. During this time, the computer or system on which
the affected application is deployed may be susceptible to attack, as administrators may have no official
recourse against a vulnerability and must resort to best practices and workarounds to reduce the risk of
attacks. explanations of the average exploit development time and the average patch development time
are included below.
Exploit code development time for Web browsers
the cumulative exploit code development time for each vulnerability affecting a Web browser is calculated.
each cumulative time is then divided by the number of vulnerabilities affecting that browser to determine
the average exploit code development time for that browser. the exploit development time average for each
browser is then compared. this metric is used to compute the window of exposure, which amounts to the
difference between the average patch development time and the average exploit code development time.
Patch development time for Web browsers
the cumulative patch development time for vulnerabilities affecting each browser is calculated. each
cumulative time is then divided by the number of vulnerabilities affecting that browser to determine the
average patch development time for that browser. the patch development time average for each browser
is then compared. this metric is used to compute the window of exposure for Web browsers, which
amounts to the difference between the average patch development time and the average exploit code
development time.
Web browser vulnerabilities
this metric compares vulnerability data for major Web browsers, namely: Google Chrome, microsoft
internet explorer, mozilla browsers (including Firefox), Opera, and Apple Safari. However, in assessing the
comparative data, it should be noted that for this report the total number of vulnerabilities in these Web
browsers is computed, including both vendor confirmed and non-vendor confirmed vulnerabilities.
previous versions of the Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report have discussed vulnerabilities
according to whether they were vendor confirmed or non-vendor confirmed, because vulnerabilities that
were not confirmed were also included in the data. this differentiation was important, especially given
the disparity in patch times between vendors. However, starting with Volume X of the Symantec Internet
Security Threat Report, this convention is no longer followed and no differentiation is made between
vendor-confirmed vulnerabilities and non-vendor-confirmed vulnerabilities when calculating the total
number of vulnerabilities. Symantec Global internet Security threat report
99individual browser vulnerabilities are difficult to precisely identify. A reported attack may be a combination
of several conditions, each of which could be considered a vulnerability in its own right, which may distort
the total vulnerability count. Some browser issues have also been improperly identified as operating
system vulnerabilities or vice versa. this is partly due to increased operating system integration that
makes it difficult to correctly identify the affected component in many cases. Additionally, some browsers are available for mobile and desktop platforms. therefore, the following caveats exist for this metric:
many vulnerabilities in shared operating system components can be exposed to attacks through the •
browser. this report enumerates only those vulnerabilities that are known to affect the browser itself
where sufficient information is available to make the distinction.
Vulnerabilities in mobile versions of a browser are only counted if they also affect the desktop version of •
the browser application. this metric is mainly concerned with evaluating vulnerabilities in desktop Web
browsers and not their mobile equivalents.
Web browser plug-in vulnerabilities
Browser plug-ins are technologies that extend the functionality of the Web browser. they may be
developed by the vendor or by a third-party. Some plug-ins provide support for additional application
programming languages or environments, such as Java or Flash player. Others are applications in their
own right that run in the browser. examples of these include ActiveX objects for internet explorer, and
mozilla extensions and add-ons.
this metric enumerates publicly documented vulnerabilities that affect browser plug-ins. these
vulnerabilities are further classified, when applicable, into general groups of browser plug-in technologies.
Symantec makes an effort to identify all vulnerabilities affecting the various classes of browser plug-in.
Vulnerabilities that affect the browser itself are not included in the data for this metric when it is possible
to make this distinction. in cases where a Web browser ships with a particular plug-in, vulnerabilities
affecting that plug-in will be counted. Although in this case, the plug-in may be included in the default browser installation, it is still considered a separate technology and not a native feature of the browser.
native features are considered to be features intrinsic to the primary function of the browser such as
support for Http /HttpS, HtmL rendering, JavaScript, and other standards that are commonly
implemented in most Web browsers. technologies such as Java and Flash player may be common to
many Web browsers but they are intended to extend their functionality to support additional types
of content and are typically optional components.
the definition of browser plug-ins for this report is limited to technologies that are hosted on the same
computer as the browser, and whose installation and configuration is managed through the browser or
operating system. this distinguishes them from content that is intended to run inside the browser but
is typically external to the browser such as Java applets or Flash movies. this content is rendered or
executed by a browser plug-in but is not considered to be a plug-in in its own right.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
100Web browser plug-in vulnerabilities, by type
this metric will examine some specific vulnerabilities that affect browser plug-ins. to do so, the
vulnerabilities covered in the previous metric are classified into various categories based on their
security impact.
the categories below are meant to highlight the primary impact on end-users. it should be noted that
some vulnerabilities defy categorization due to inadequate public information about the nature of the
vulnerability and its potential impact. For example, a number of vulnerabilities reportedly allow remote
code execution, but the information available at the time of writing is inadequate to determine the effect
of such techniques. therefore, these vulnerabilities cannot be classified into the categories listed below.
the number of vulnerabilities for each period that cannot be categorized is noted in the discussion.
Vulnerabilities affecting browser plug-in technologies will be classified into the following categories:
Memory corruption:• this is a class of vulnerabilities that allows attackers to corrupt the memory of
an application process with malicious input. this category consists of stack- and heap-based buffer
overflow conditions, and a number of other erroneous conditions that could let an attacker influence
the execution of a application process by altering the contents of its memory. these vulnerabilities
have a potential to let attackers execute arbitrary code.
Denial-of-service:• Denial-of-service vulnerabilities are vulnerabilities that typically result in an
application crash when exploited. this may be due to a failure to handle exceptional conditions. Some
of these vulnerabilities may be due to an underlying memory corruption issue. However, for this report,
such vulnerabilities are classified as denial-of-service when there is believed to be no potential of
arbitrary code execution.
Information disclosure:• these vulnerabilities are issues whose main effect is to expose sensitive
information to an unauthorized party. this may occur as a result of active exploitation or may be an
inadvertent side effect of an erroneous condition in the application. For the purpose of this report,
this category does not include vulnerabilities that potentially disclose the contents of files on the
affected computer.
Content injection:• these vulnerabilities directly facilitate injection of malicious content such as HtmL
and script code or they allow attackers to bypass input validation filters on third-party websites that are
designed to prevent content injection. these vulnerabilities could allow cross-site scripting attacks.
Spoofing:• these are vulnerabilities that allow an attack to spoof elements of the browser user interface.
Such attacks may facilitate spoofing of content to make a phishing site appear more authentic to victims
of the attack.
Unauthorized file system access:• this category includes vulnerabilities that allow attackers to view,
modify, or delete files on the computer hosting the affected browser plug-in. Such vulnerabilities have
collateral effects such as the ability to gain unauthorized access to sensitive information, delete critical
system files, or execute arbitrary code. this would include vulnerabilities that force a victim into silently
downloading and executing a malicious executable.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
101Command execution:• Command execution vulnerabilities are those that allow a remote attacker to
execute operating system commands through an affected browser plug-in. this would include a
vulnerability that directly allows an attacker to submit commands to an operating system command
such as a shell. this would also include vulnerabilities that let an attacker execute specific programs
on the affected computer with attacker-specified arguments.
Origin validation:• these are vulnerabilities that occur when content from an invalid or unauthorized
originating source is treated as valid by the browser plug-in technology. Vulnerabilities that bypass the
“same origin policy” are an example, because they allow content from an external domain to access
properties of a site that the user is browsing.
Elevated security context:• these vulnerabilities specifically violate a security policy that is intended to
prevent remote content (such as from a Web page) from accessing system properties and capabilities.
Vulnerabilities that bypass the Java plug-in virtual machine sandbox are an example of elevated security
context. Another example is vulnerabilities that allow an attacker to execute malicious content in the
context of a different security zone in internet explorer. it should be noted that for the purpose of this
report, some vulnerabilities may present an opportunity for elevated security bypass but are more accurately described by another category such as unauthorized file system access.
Site-specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities
Data for this metric is provided by the XSSed project,241 an online archive of publicly known cross-site
scripting vulnerabilities that affect specific websites. the XSSed project gathers its data from security
researchers who report specific instances of vulnerabilities in websites. each submission is verified before
it is published in the XSSed archive. the archive stores additional information such as the publication date,
affected domain, proof-of-concept examples, and the fix status of the vulnerability. this information allows
for the following statistics to be gathered:
the number of vulnerabilities reported over a specific period of time; •
the number of vulnerabilities patched by the maintainers of the affected sites; •
the average time that it took for site maintainers to patch vulnerabilities. •
the data in this metric is limited to the vulnerabilities that security researchers report to the XSSed
project, which is not intended to be a complete database of all publicly known site-specific cross-site scripting vulnerabilities. therefore, the metric is intended to provide insight into site-specific
vulnerabilities, but does not provide a complete picture of all publicly known activity.
Zero-day vulnerabilities
For the purpose of this metric, a zero-day vulnerability is one for which there is sufficient public evidence
to indicate that the vulnerability has been exploited in the wild prior to being publicly known. it may not
have been known to the vendor prior to exploitation, and the vendor had not released a patch at the time of the exploit activity. this metric is derived from public sources and the Symantec vulnerability database.
this metric is meant to calculate the number of high-profile, publicly documented zero-day vulnerability instances during the relevant reporting periods.
241 http://www.xssed.com/Symantec Global internet Security threat report
102Top attacked vulnerabilities
Symantec ipS systems monitor attack activity in the wild. Symantec has 24 million sensors deployed
throughout the world, which have recorded over 360 million events. this metric examines the top attacked
vulnerabilities detected by Symantec ipS systems. Whether or not an event is associated with a vulnerability
is determined by the signature that was triggered for the event. each event in the data set used for metric
is indicative of possible attack activity for a specific vulnerability, but does not necessarily mean that the
attack was successful or that the attacked computer was compromised.
the top attacked vulnerabilities are determined on a yearly basis. For each year, Symantec examines the
vulnerabilities published during the year with the most associated attack activity. the vulnerabilities
are then ranked from one to ten from the highest amount of attack activity to the lowest amount of
attack activity.
Attacked vulnerabilities by attack vector (client versus server)
this metric examines attack activity targeting vulnerabilities. the attacked vulnerabilities are examined on
a yearly basis. For each year, the vulnerabilities published during the year that are associated with attack
events are categorized into the following attack vectors:
Client:• these are attacks that attempt to exploit client-side vulnerabilities . Client-side vulnerabilities
affect client software such as Web browsers. they also include desktop application vulnerabilities that
require user-interaction on the part of the user to successfully exploit.
Server:• these are attacks that attempt to exploit server-side vulnerabilities. A server-side vulnerability is
one that usually affects a networked service that is hosted on a computer. the service is often always
running and awaits incoming connections from clients.
After the attacked vulnerabilities have been categorized, Symantec determines that percentage of the total
with client attack vectors in relation to the percentage of the total with server attack vectors.
Severity of vulnerabilities
this metric also employs the CVSS, using its base score field criteria to determine the inherent properties of a vulnerability, such as:
the degree of confidentiality, integrity, or availability of data that may be affected by the vulnerability; •
Local versus remote exploitability; •
Whether or not authentication is required for exploitation; •
And/or if there are additional factors that may complicate exploitation of the vulnerability. •
these values are not adjusted for temporal factors such as the availability of exploit code. the base score is
intended to be a static value that should only change if additional information is made available that
changes the inherent characteristics of the vulnerability. the base score can have a value of zero to 10. Symantec Global internet Security threat report
103For the sake of categorizing vulnerabilities by their respective severities, the following standard is used:
Low severity (base score of 0–3):• Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities will have a minimal
impact on the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data stored upon or transmitted over systems
on which the vulnerability may be found. these vulnerabilities also tend to be local in nature, have a
high degree of access complexity, and may require authentication to be exploited successfully.
Medium severity (base score of 4–7):• Successful exploitation of these vulnerabilities could allow a
partial compromise of the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data stored upon or transmitted
over systems on which the vulnerability may be found, although this may not always be the case. these
vulnerabilities can be exploited remotely over a network and may have a lower access complexity or may or may not require authentication to successfully exploit.
High severity (base score of 8–10):• these vulnerabilities have innate characteristics that present the
highest threat profile. Successful exploitation often allows a complete compromise of the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of data stored upon or transmitted over systems on which the vulnerability may
be found. these vulnerabilities are exploited remotely across a network, have a low degree of access
complexity, and usually do not require authentication prior to successful exploitation.
Base scores are computed from related fields in the Symantec Vulnerability Database. they are then
categorized into low, medium, and high and broken out by reporting period. Symantec Global internet Security threat report
104Appendix D—Malicious Code Trends Methodology
malicious code trends are based on statistics from malicious code samples reported to Symantec for
analysis. the data is gathered from over 130 million client, server, and gateway systems that have
deployed Symantec’s antivirus products in both consumer and corporate environments. the Symantec
Digital immune System and Scan and Deliver technologies allow customers to automate this reporting
process. Observations in this section are based on empirical data and expert analysis of this data. the
data and analysis draw primarily from the two databases described below.
Infection database
Symantec developed the Symantec AntiVirus research Automation (SArA) technology to help detect and
eradicate computer viruses. this technology is used to analyze, replicate, and define a large subset of the
most common computer viruses that are quarantined by Symantec Antivirus customers.
On average, SArA receives hundreds of thousands of suspect files daily from both enterprise and
individual consumers located throughout the world. Symantec then analyzes these suspect files, matching them with virus definitions. An analysis of this aggregate data set provides statistics on infection rates for
different types of malicious code.
Malicious code database
in addition to infection data, Symantec Security response analyzes and documents attributes for each new
form of malicious code that emerges both in the wild and in a “zoo” (or controlled laboratory) environment.
Descriptive records of new forms of malicious code are then entered into a database for future reference.
For this report, a historical trend analysis was performed on this database to identify, assess, and discuss
any possible trends, such as the use of different infection vectors and the frequency of various types of
payloads. in some cases, Symantec antivirus products may initially detect new malicious code heuristically
or by generic signatures. these may later be reclassified and given unique detections. Because of this,
there may be slight variance in the presentation of the same data set from one volume of the Symantec
Global Internet Security Threat Report to the next.
Geographic location of malicious code instances
Several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic locations of systems to ip
addresses are used along with proprietary Symantec technology to determine the location of computers reporting malicious code instances. While these databases are generally reliable, there is a small margin of
error. the data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of malicious code instances.
Percentage of malicious code that exploits vulnerabilities
Symantec maintains a malicious code database to analyze and document individual instances of malicious code dating back to 1998. the database includes metadata for classifying malicious code by type,
discovery date, and by threat profile, in addition to providing mitigating factors and manual removal steps. Where applicable, this database includes correlations between malicious code instances and vulnerabilities
from the Symantec vulnerability database. this capability was used as a basis for the data in this metric.
Symantec examined the means by which the malicious code propagated, and counted those that propagate by exploiting vulnerabilities. Symantec Global internet Security threat report
105Appendix E—Phishing, Underground Economy Servers,
and Spam Trends Methodology
phishing and spam attack trends in this report are based on the analysis of data captured through the
Symantec probe network, a system of more than 2.5 million decoy accounts, messageLabs intelligence,
and other Symantec technologies in more than 86 countries from around the globe. Over eight billion email messages, as well as over one billion Web requests, are scanned per day across 16 data centers. Symantec
also gathers phishing information through an extensive antifraud community of enterprises, security
vendors and more than 50 million consumers.
the Symantec probe network data is used to track the growth in new phishing activity. it should be noted
that different monitoring organizations use different methods to track phishing attempts. Some groups
may identify and count unique phishing messages based solely on specific content items such as subject
headers or UrLs. these varied methods can often lead to differences in the number of phishing attempts
reported by different organizations.
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam data is also used to gauge the growth in phishing attempts as well as the
percentage of internet mail determined to be phishing attempts. Data returned includes messages
processed, messages filtered, and filter-specific data.
Symantec has classified different filters so that spam statistics and phishing statistics can be determined
separately. Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data includes data reported back from customer
installations providing feedback from antispam filters as well as overall mail volume being processed.
Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam only gathers data at the Smtp layer and not the network layer, where
DnS block lists typically operate because Smtp -layer spam filtering is more accurate than network-layer
filtering and is able to block spam missed at the network layer. network layer-filtering takes place before
email reaches the enterprise mail server. As a result, data from the Smtp layer is a more accurate
reflection of the impact of spam on the mail server itself.
Due to the numerous variables influencing a company’s spam activity, Symantec focuses on identifying
spam activity and growth projections with Symantec Brightmail AntiSpam field data from enterprise
customer installations having more than 1,000 total messages per day. this normalization yields a more
accurate summary of internet spam trends by ruling out problematic and laboratory test servers that
produce smaller sample sets.
this section will provide more detail on specific methodologies used to produce the data and statistics in
this report. While most methodologies are adequately explained in the analysis section of the report, the
following investigations warrant additional detail.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
106Phishing activity by sector
the Symantec phish report network (prn) is an extensive antifraud community whose members
contribute and receive fraudulent website addresses for alerting and filtering across a broad range of
solutions. these sites are categorized according to the brand being phished and its sector. prn members
and contributors send in phishing attacks from many different sources. this includes a client detection
network that detects phishing websites as the clients visit various websites on the internet. it also includes
server detection from spam emails. the sender confirms all spoofed websites before sending the address
of the website into the prn. After it is received by the prn, Symantec spoof detection technology is used to
verify that the website is a spoof site. research analysts manage the prn console 24 hours a day, 365 days
of the year, and manually review all spoof sites sent into the prn to eliminate false positives.
Top countries hosting phishing websites and top targeted sectors
the data for this section is determined by gathering links in phishing email messages and cross-
referencing the addresses with several third-party subscription-based databases that link the geographic
locations of systems to ip addresses. in this case, Symantec counts phishing websites as the number of
unique ip addresses hosting Web pages used for phishing. While these databases are generally reliable,
there is a small margin of error. the data produced is then used to determine the global distribution of
phishing websites.
Phishing site top-level domains
the data for this section is determined by deriving the top-level domains of each distinct phishing website
UrL. the resulting top-level domains are tabulated and compared proportionately.
Automated phishing toolkits
the data in this section is derived from UrLs gathered by the Symantec prn. the UrLs are sorted and
grouped according to specific patterns indicating they were generated by an automated script or phishing
kit. each phishing kit generates UrLs with a distinct signature and can be grouped according to these
distinguishing characteristics. the monthly total of each group of UrLs indicates the level of use of each
automated phishing kit.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
107Underground economy servers—goods and services available for sale
this metric is based on data that is gathered by proprietary Symantec technologies that observe activity
on underground economy servers and collect data. Underground economy servers are typically chat servers
on which stolen data, such as identities, credit card numbers, access to compromised computers, and
email accounts are bought and sold. each server is monitored by recording communications that take
place on them, which typically includes advertisements for stolen data. this data is used to derive the data
presented in this metric. it should be noted that this discussion might not necessarily be representative of
internet-wide activity; rather, it is intended as a snapshot of the activity that Symantec observed during this period.
Description of goods and services advertised on underground economy servers may vary from vendor to
vendor. the following list shows typical goods and services that are found on these servers and general
descriptions of each:
Bank account credentials:• may consist of name, bank account number (including transit and branch
number), address, and phone number. Online banking logins and passwords are often sold as a
separate item.
Cash out:• a withdrawal service where purchases are converted into true currency. this could be in the
form of online currency accounts or through money transfer systems and typically, the requester is
charged a percentage of the cashout value as a fee.
Credit card information:• includes credit card number and expiry date. it may also contain the
cardholder name, Credit Verification Value 2 (CVV2) number, pin, billing address, phone number, and
company name (for a corporate card). CVV2 is a three or four-digit number on the credit card and used
for card-not-present transactions such as internet or phone purchases. this was created to add an extra
layer of security for credit cards and to verify that the person completing the transaction was in fact, in possession of the card.
Email accounts:• includes user iD, email address, password. in addition, the account may contain
personal information such as addresses, other account information, and email addresses in the
contact list.
Email addresses:• consists of lists of email addresses used for spam or phishing activities. the email
addresses can be harvested from hacking databases, public sites on the internet, or from stolen email
accounts. the sizes of lists sold can range from 1 mB to 150 mB.
Full identities:• may consist of name, address, date of birth, phone number, and government-issued
number. it may also include extras such as driver’s license number, mother’s maiden name, email
address, or “secret” questions/answers for password recovery.Mailers:• an application that is used to send out mass emails (spam) for phishing attacks. examples of
this are worms and viruses.Symantec Global internet Security threat report
108Proxies:• proxy services provide access to a software agent, often a firewall mechanism, which performs
a function or operation on behalf of another application or system while hiding the details involved,
allowing attackers to obscure their path and make tracing back to the source difficult or impossible. this
can involve sending email from the proxy, or connecting to the proxy and then out to an underground irC server to sell credit cards or other stolen goods.
Shell scripts:• used to perform operations such as file manipulation and program execution. they can
also be used as a command line interface for various operating systems.
Top countries of spam origin
the data for this section is determined by calculating the frequency of originating server ip addresses in
email messages that trigger antispam filters in the field. the ip addresses are mapped to their host country
of origin and the data is summarized by country based on monthly totals. the percentage of spam per
country is calculated from the total spam detected in the field.
it should be noted that the location of the computer from which spam is detected being sent is not
necessarily the location of the spammer. Spammers can build networks of compromised computers
globally and thereby use computers that are geographically separate from their location.
Percentage of spam from botnets
the data for this section is determined by analysis of emails triggering antispam filters, what proportion
are detected as originating from a known botnet. the identity and location of spam-sending botnets are
tracked by messageLabs intelligence knowledgebase, and is based on the profile of the spam and its
headers as it is being transmitted. each botnet exhibits a unique profile and the information is tracked
accordingly, including its location.Any technical information that is made available by Symantec Corporation is the copyrighted work of Symantec Corporation and is owned by Symantec
Corporation.
nO WArrAnty . the technical information is being delivered to you as is and Symantec Corporation makes no warranty as to its accuracy or use. Any use of the
technical documentation or the information contained herein is at the risk of the user. Documentation may include technical or other inaccuracies or typographical
errors. Symantec reserves the right to make changes without prior notice.
|
November 2017
Contents
Executive summary, key
findings, and introduction
Voice assistants and smart
speakers: What you need to know
What are the risks?ConclusionProtectionA guide to the security
of voice-activated
smart speakers
An ISTR Special Report
Analyst: Candid WueestA guide to the security of voice-activated smart speakers
Contents
3 Executive summary, key findings,
and introduction
5 Voice assistants and smart speakers: What you need to know
6 What do they do?
6 Other “smart” assistants
7 Actions, skills, and Easter eggs
8 Amazon Echo Dot
8 20 Alexa Easter eggs to try
8 20 Google Assistant Easter eggs to try
10 Google Home
11 What are the risks?
12 Security – Who can interfere with your device?
12 Get by with a little help from your friends (and family)
12 The curious child attack
13 The mischievous man next door attack
14 Television troubles
15 Stranger danger
15 Smart speakers could go loopy
15 Wi-Fi worries
17 Privacy
18 Deleting recordings
19 Conclusion
21 Protection
22 Configuration tips
23 About Symantec
23 More InformationA guide to the security of voice-activated smart speakers
Executive summary,
key findings, and
introduction
00SectionExecutive summary, key findings
and introductionBack to Table of ContentsPage 4
00A guide to the security
of voice-activated smart speakers
Executive Summary
Voice-activated smart speakers are very popular
and are now integrated in many everyday objects. After smartphones, they are the next big step for
voice assistants. The market is currently dominated
by Amazon Alexa’s Echo range, which holds 73 percent of market share, with more than 20 million devices in the U.S. alone, followed by Google Home,
which holds nearly all the rest of the market.
In the course of our investigation, we found that voice-
activated speakers can be triggered unintentionally through
voice commands embedded in websites or TV advertisements.
We also discovered that the wake-up word does not always have to be accurate to trigger the device, for example, the
Google Assistant woke up for “Ok Bobo”, demonstrating that
unintentional triggering does happen, even during normal conversations. Fortunately, most of the commands that could
be triggered inadvertently are more likely to be a nuisance
than a serious security threat, and could lead to things like alarms going off during the night. The fact that smart
speakers are always listening also brings up a lot of privacy
concerns, however, it’s important to note that the encrypted recordings are only sent to the backend once the wake-up
word has been heard. So far, there is no evidence to suggest
that the recordings are sold to external companies, but they are of course processed and archived by the service provider.
The major providers have already started to offer free calling
features, so smart speakers might soon take the place of landline phones in homes.
Also of note is that many smart speakers blindly trust the local
network, meaning any compromised device in the same network
could change the settings of the smart speaker or perform
a factory reset without the user’s agreement. Therefore, having a secure local network and a strong account password
is important. A strong password is particularly important
considering anyone with access to the account can listen to old recordings or change the settings of the device over the
internet.
With some devices capable of conducting voice purchases, it is
important to secure the settings and monitor notifications. An
important security feature of smart speakers is the ability to
distinguish between voices, but this is not foolproof yet.Key findings
|The biggest threat to the security of your voice-activated
smart speaker is the other people who can access it
|It’s not just other people: the TV, radio, websites, and
even other smart speakers can all mess with your device—
causing it to play pranks or malfunction
|Privacy concerns are still one of the biggest issues when it
comes to smart speakers
|Wake-up keywords can be misheard, e.g. “Ok Bobo”
triggers the Google Assistant to wake up
|Voice identification is an important feature, but current
versions can still be fooled
|Attackers that gain access to the local network can change
the settings of Google Home devices or perform a factory reset
|When the linked email account gets compromised, then
the device could be used to spy on people
|The most likely attack vector is through vulnerabilities in
streaming services, but so far we haven’t seen this vector
being used in the wild
Introduction
Smart speakers with built-in voice-activated
assistants arrived on the scene in the last few years, with the aim of making people’s lives easier, allowing
us to access the perfect recipe with ease, and change
our music selection without leaving our chairs.
An array of companies have announced or already sell smart
speakers that integrate with Google Assistant (Google), Siri
(Apple), Cortana (Microsoft), and Alexa (Amazon). Amazon
Echo, Google Home, and the Apple’s HomePod are probably the best known examples. But, while they make life easier in
some ways, could they also be endangering people’s privacy
and online security?
As well as reading out recipes and playing music, some of these
devices also come equipped with cameras that can be operated
remotely, while others allow you to order goods online using just your voice. The range of activities that can be carried
out by these speakers means that a hacker or even just a
mischief-minded friend or neighbor could cause havoc if they access these devices.
In this paper, we detail a range of issues we found with these
devices, including software weaknesses, configuration issues, and badly designed processes. We will go through these issues
and provide recommendations on how to connect and configure
these devices as securely as possible.A guide to the security of voice-activated smart speakers
Voice assistants and
smart speakers:
What you need to know
01SectionWhat are voice assistants
and smart speakers?Back to Table of ContentsPage 6
01A guide to the security
of voice-activated smart speakers
What are voice assistants and smart speakers?
Siri, Cortana, Alexa, and Google Assistant
are just some of the numerous voice assistants that exist today, with the smart
speakers that have them integrated set to
become a staple of modern-day living.
Smart speakers, also known as “smart home voice-activat -
ed assistants”, come in many different shapes and sizes. Put
simply, they are music speakers combined with a voice recog-
nition system that the user can interact with. Users use a wake-up word to activate the voice assistant, such as “Alexa”
or “Ok Google”, and they can then interact with the smart
speaker using just their voice: they can ask it questions or request that it start playing music.
There are many different types of smart speakers and voice
assistants on the market at the moment [see panel], with varying levels of capabilities. Some are open for third parties
to use and allow integration into cars or fridges. For example,
BMW announced some of its cars would come with a built-in Alexa voice assistant in 2018, and Sonos, which manufac-
tures speakers, has made a similar announcement. Some hotel
chains have already added voice-activated smart speakers to all rooms. There are also services such as Houndify that allow
users to add a voice assistant to other devices, and there is
even a Kickstarter project for a flying voice assistant. As can be seen, the market for smart speakers is growing rapidly at
the moment.
Other “smart” assistants
|Apple’s HomePod, based on Siri
|Third-party speakers with integrated Cortana from
Microsoft
|MyCroft , an open source AI that can run on a
Raspberry Pi
|Samsung Bixby
|Djingo
|AI Buddy
|Eufy Genie, based on Alexa
|Nestlé XiaoAI, which focuses on nutrition
knowledgeAccording to research by Consumer Intelligence Research
Partners (CIRP), the current market in the U.S. for voice-acti-
vated smart speakers is dominated by Amazon Echo (with a
share of 73 percent) and Google Home (with 27 percent). There are 20 million Amazon Alexa-powered Echo units in the U.S.
alone, and this is trending upwards. With these statistics in
mind, for the purposes of this investigation, we focused on two of the most widely used devices:
|Amazon Echo Dot, based on Alexa
|Google Home, based on Google Assistant
What do they do?
The main usefulness of smart speakers is that the voice-acti-vated assistant can access all the intelligence in the backend: once activated through the keyword, it sends a recording to
the backend for analysis. In the background, it makes use of
speech recognition (SR) and natural language understanding (NLU) to understand the commands. The context of this is then
analyzed in the cloud and a reply is sent back. The device is
always listening for the trigger keyword (“Alexa” is the default in the case of the Echo Dot, and “OK Google” in the case of
Google Home). The word or phrase is detected locally on the
device, and only once it is matched is a recording made and sent back to the Amazon or Google servers, although a tiny
fraction of sound from just before when the matched keyword
is said is also sent back. The device is always listening, with no need for activation by pressing buttons or doing anything else.
This reality might disconcert some people, and if it does, all
the popular devices have a hardware button that allows you to mute the microphone. However, this does mean that when you
want to use the voice assistant again you will have to physical-
ly unmute the device, which somewhat defeats the purpose of voice activation. Studies indicate that the voice interface could
become popular among elderly people who might not want to
walk to the device all the time.
The main usefulness of smart
speakers is that the voice-activated assistant can access all the intelligence in the backendWhat are voice assistants
and smart speakers?Back to Table of ContentsPage 7
01A guide to the security
of voice-activated smart speakers
Most users use these devices to switch on music, ask questions
about the weather or the traffic, set alarms and reminders,
or walk through a cooking recipe in hands-free mode. Smart
speakers can also be used to connect to other smart home devices, allowing them to interact with the smart TV, the
lights, the thermostat, or even the smart door locks. A popular
option is the If This Then That (IFTTT) service, which allows different smart systems to interact. For example, using this, a
user could define that items on their reminder list are auto -
matically synced to the To Do list on their smartphone, or that
the surround system is switched on when the TV is turned on.
Both Google Home and Amazon Echo smart speakers have
announced that they will allow users to create “shortcuts” to condense multiple commands into a single keyword. These
shortcuts are called routines and will help to automate complex
processes.
Actions, skills, and Easter eggs
The capabilities of voice activated assistants can also be extended by additional add-on services: for Amazon Alexa
they are called skills and, in October 2017, there were more
than 25,000 different skills available. These skills allow the voice-activated assistant to do things like order a pizza, call a
taxi, access specific news portals, or interact with other smart
home devices in specific ways. With so many skills, there is already a fight for popular invocation keywords. An Alexa
user can trigger a skill by saying keywords like “open”, “ask”,
“launch”, “tell”, “play” or “start”, followed by the name of the app. For example, saying “Alexa, play 20 questions” will start a
guessing game. This will automatically enable the skill for the
given profile and list it in the smartphone app. Of course, there is the slight chance that some people may not realize they are
triggering an app as the invocation word could be a common
word. The Google Assistant has similar capabilities called actions, with a few hundred different ones currently available.
Anyone can create a free skill and publish it on the Amazon
list. Skills are web services that will receive the transcription of the spoken command from the Amazon backend through an
HTTPS request. The service then sends back the correspond-
ing answer, which is sent to the device where it gets translated into speech. Hence, the backend service has control over what
information is revealed to the app developer.
If a provider of a skill wants to access the user’s To Do or
shopping list, then a special permission has to be granted in
the skills section of the Alexa app on the smartphone. Once a customer grants permissions, the skill will have access to the
user’s Alexa lists until permissions are explicitly revoked. At
any time, the user can change the allowed access for that skill in Manage Settings on the skill’s page in the Alexa app.The capabilities of voice activated
assistants can also be extended by additional add-on services: for Amazon Alexa they are called skills and, in October 2017, there were more than 25,000 different skills available.
Alexa skills permission dialog
The purpose of this report is not to examine how useful voice
assistants are, it is to determine how secure they are, but if
you are interested in examining their usefulness, there have
been various tests on how good and useful the answers of voice
assistants really are. What can be said for sure is that all of
them are improving rapidly. Voice assistants are also getting
better at learning the context of a question: if you ask for a steak restaurant nearby and then ask if they are open, it will
know that you mean that specific restaurant.
As well as add-ons and shortcuts, most voice assistants have
so-called Easter egg phrases [see panel]. This means that if you
ask them a specific question or say a specific phrase they will answer with a funny response. They have no real purpose and are just for amusement. For example, when you tell Alexa to What are voice assistants
and smart speakers?Back to Table of ContentsPage 8
01A guide to the security
of voice-activated smart speakers
“beam me up” it will play the beam sound from Star Trek. Try
out some of the examples in the box above to see what your voice assistant says back.
Amazon Echo Dot
The Alexa voice assistant powers the Amazon Echo Dot. The Dot is part of a range of Echo speakers offered by Amazon, all
of which are powered by Alexa. As well as the Dot, this range
includes: Echo, Echo Tap, Echo Plus, Echo Look, Echo Show, and Echo Spot. These devices range from small ones with just
a tiny speaker to larger ones with a camera and display. The
newly announced Echo Plus has a new design, and comes with features such as a ZigBee hub for smart devices like lightbulbs,
while the Echo Spot, which looks like a smart alarm clock,
has its own display. Another new device is the Echo Buttons, which allows users to interact with the Amazon Echo through
Bluetooth, during trivia games, for example. The Echo range
was first launched at the end of 2014, and it has seen signifi-cant growth in that time.
The Dot that we tested has a small built-in speaker that can be
connected to a higher-end speaker through Bluetooth or with
a cable, if required. The device wakes up when you say “Alexa”, although you can configure it such that the wake-up word is
“Amazon”, “computer”, or “Echo” instead.
The settings for the device can be configured through a smart -
phone app or through the Alexa.com website. This is also
where you can listen to all previous recordings and delete them
if you want. However, deleting all recordings may degrade the learning factor for your specific voice pattern and mean you 20 Alexa Easter eggs to try
|Alexa, self-destruct.
|Alexa, what is the Prime Directive?
|Alexa, use the Force.
|Alexa, open the pod bay doors.
|Alexa, what does the fox say?
|Alexa, sing “Happy Birthday.”
|Alexa, execute Order 66.
|Alexa, who shot first?
|Alexa, what is a day without sunshine?
|Alexa, what is the Third Law?
|Alexa, is Santa Claus real?
|Alexa, rap for me.
|Alexa, tell me a random fact.
|Alexa, what comes with great power?
|Alexa, it’s a trap!
|Alexa, where is Chuck Norris?
|Alexa, are you Skynet?
|Alexa, beam me up.
|Alexa, never gonna give you up.
|Alexa, when is the end of the world?20 Google Assistant Easter eggs to try
|OK Google, meow like a cat.
|OK Google, clean my room.
|OK Google, tell me about Alexa.
|OK Google, what did my cat say?
|OK Google, aren’t you a little short for a
Stormtrooper?
|OK Google, is the cake a lie?
|OK Google, surprise me.
|OK Google, do you speak Morse code?
|OK Google, where’s Waldo?
|OK Google, is your refrigerator running?
|OK Google, flip a coin.
|OK Google, how do you like your coffee?
|OK Google, spin the wheel.
|OK Google, what is your quest?
|OK Google, crystal ball.
|OK Google, who you gonna call?
|OK Google, show me the money.
|Ok Google, beatbox.
|OK Google, what am I thinking right now?
|OK Google, serenade me.What are voice assistants
and smart speakers?Back to Table of ContentsPage 9
01A guide to the security
of voice-activated smart speakers
have to start again from scratch. The Dot automatically checks
for updates and downloads and installs them.
There is cooperation between Microsoft’s Cortana and Alexa,
allowing each voice assistant to use the power of the other service, for example, by saying “Alexa, open Cortana”, or vice
versa.
The voice purchasing option is enabled on the Alexa assistant
by default, which means that anyone can use the assistant
to order goods if the linked account is a Prime account with
one-click ordering enabled. An order can be issued by saying something like “Alexa, order batteries”. Items can also be
added to the shopping list for later by saying “Alexa, add
paper towels to my cart”. However, Alexa will describe the item and tell you the price before it is ordered. Any order has
to be verbally confirmed and a notification is sent by Amazon
allowing for cancellation within 30 minutes. Optionally, a four-digit PIN code can be enabled for security. This is defi-
nitely a recommended option if you want to use the purchasing
feature. The Voice ID feature that should be able to distin-guish between different voices was not available at the time of
testing. According to the description, if Alexa recognizes your
voice, it will not ask you for the purchasing PIN code anymore, if one is enabled.
Alexa voice purchasing settings
Amazon Echo devices also offer a feature called drop-in and voice calls in some countries. At the time of writing, it is
available in the U.S., the U.K., Germany, and Austria. This
feature is not on by default; a user needs to enable Alexa Calling and Messaging first and then enable the “drop” function. The
owner of a device can then authorize other people from their address book to call in and use the device as an intercom. When
a remote user drops in, the receiving user at home will hear a
beep and see a green glow, but does not have to do anything
to accept the drop-in call. This might sound a bit scary, espe -
cially in connection with the Echo Show device, which has an
integrated camera and screen. However, a user can disable the
drop-in feature in the settings or limit it to authorized contacts.
The voice purchasing option is enabled
on the Alexa assistant by default, which means that anyone can use the assistant to order goods if the linked account is a Prime account with one-click ordering enabled.
Besides the drop-in feature, Alexa is also capable of making
calls, and sending voice messages or text messages to Echo
devices, and to the Alexa app on smartphones. However, if you
want to enjoy some quiet time, Alexa offers a Do Not Disturb mode. In order to enable it, simply say “do not disturb me”.
It can be disabled again by the user saying “turn off, do not
disturb me”. Amazon also recommends that users periodically update their contacts book so the device can better match who
can be called.
Alexa drop-in settingsWhat are voice assistants
and smart speakers?Back to Table of ContentsPage 10
01A guide to the security
of voice-activated smart speakers
Google Home
In October 2017, Google announced two new smart speaker
models: the Google Home Mini and the Google Home Maxi,
increasing the total number of speaker variants in its range to
three. The voice assistant service used in the backend by the Google Home smart speaker is called Google Assistant. The
trigger keywords used are “OK Google” and “Hey Google”. In
testing we also found that it worked with slightly modified words like “Hey Bobo” or “OK Hodor”.
Google Home app settings
Already there have been some controversies with these new products, with a journalist who was given a Google Home Mini
in advance of its general release discovering that the device
was making recordings even if he hadn’t said the wake-up word or phrase. Google said this was a hardware problem
that has to do with the activation button on the device that
was registering “phantom touches” and activating. Google said it has since patched this flaw. Google Home automatical-
ly checks for updates and downloads and installs them. The
updates are downloaded over cleartext HTTP but the content is cryptographically signed.
In August 2017, Google announced a partnership with
Walmart for its online shopping. This could mean that in the
near future the Google Assistant will be integrated closely
with Google Express shopping, providing the ability to order
various products by voice, similar to how Alexa is used on the Amazon products.
The Google Assistant can also help you find your phone
if you’ve misplaced it. If you say, “OK Google, where is my phone?” it will make the phone ring on full volume. Google also has a “voice match” feature that it claims is capable of distinguishing different voices, which can be associ-
ated with different profiles. This is one of the most important
features as it can prevent other people from gaining access to your personal information. Once it is set up, access to Calendar
and To Do lists is restricted to the profile that created them.
However, it does not totally ignore unrecognized voices as long as they are accessing non-personal functions, although this
may change in the future. Google Assistant allows up to six
different profiles to be linked with their corresponding voice patterns. During setup, Google warns that the distinguishing
does not work in 100 percent of cases and, indeed, a quick test
showed that my brother’s voice was confused as my own.
Google Home settings
Google Home also has a broadcast feature that allows it to send messages to all connected smart speakers in the home.
In addition, Google Home currently offers a calling feature in
the U.S., which at the moment allows users to call any landline or mobile number in the U.S. and Canada for free. There is no
setup required and you can simply say “Hey Google, call mom”,
for example. Through the voice recognition it will know who speaks and will search the contact list for a matching entry.
There is a big push to offer calling functionality on smart
speakers and they might soon rival conventional telephones in the home.A guide to the security
of voice-activated smart speakersA guide to the security of voice-activated smart speakers
What are the risks?
02SectionWhat are the risks?Back to Table of ContentsPage 12
02A guide to the security
of voice-activated smart speakers
What are the risks?
Now that you understand how these devices
work, the real question is: What are the risks they could pose to your cyber security?
Security – Who can interfere with your device?
Get by with a little help from your friends (and family)
Anyone who has access to your device could potentially
interfere with it. If you have friends or family over for dinner,
it is possible that they might interact with your smart speaker to play a prank on you, which would be a fairly harmless way
to exploit their access. For example, they could add an early
alarm for Sunday morning.
Someone with unsupervised physical access to your smart
speaker could also potentially modify the device or its settings.
For example, there is a known attack with older Echo devices that allows anyone to replace the firmware, add their own code
to the device, and turn it into a listening device. Of course, if
you’re concerned your friends may carry out such a hack, you may have bigger things to worry about, but it serves as a good
warning to be careful when buying second-hand IoT devices
that might have been tampered with. Also, if you’re a bit retro and still have a dedicated home phone answering machine,
complete with a speakerphone so you can listen in real time to who is calling, then there is the chance that someone could
leave you a message that triggers your smart speaker. The same applies to people sending you messages or calendar
entries that will be read out loud.
Of course, speech recognition on computers is not something
new. We demonstrated 10 years ago how speech recognition
on Windows Vista could be misused to unwillingly delete files.
As, currently, most smart speakers do not have a screen with a browser, it is not very realistic for an attacker to simply shout,
for example, “open website myBadSite.tld” with the intent
to run an exploit on the site to infect the smart speaker. But newer models like the Amazon Echo Show do have a screen and
a browser. Although the browser is not accessible by default,
with the help of a trick , the user can still open any website
they want. Opening up the Privacy Policy allows you to jump
to Amazon.com and from there you can move to Google.com,
in the end allowing you to search for any website and open it. Hence, if a vulnerability in the mobile browser used by the
smart speaker is discovered, an unattended guest could direct
the browser to a malicious site and compromise the device.
The curious child attack
Probably one of the biggest worries of smart speaker owners is that someone could use the device to make a purchase without
them realizing, and this is indeed a danger.
The attack of the curious child
Unexpected item in the shopping cart? Take care
to configure devices to avoid unwanted purchases, even from your nearest and dearest.
“Alexa, order me
a Mega Bear
please”“MEGA BEAR ONLY $290
GET YOURS NOW!”What are the risks?Back to Table of ContentsPage 13
02A guide to the security
of voice-activated smart speakers
There have been various reports of children ordering toys
through Alexa without the knowledge of their parents. The
voice assistant will ask to confirm the purchase, to prevent
accidental shopping, but if the child really wants it they might do this as well. Unfortunately, in this scenario, an extra
passcode for orders doesn’t help much either, as children
have a good memory and learn quickly, with some children far better at operating gadgets than their parents. So when
they hear you say the password even just once, they might
easily use it as well. You can disable all purchase options in the account, but unfortunately this would also limit you from
using the order feature. Another option, of course, is to talk
to your child, explain how things work, and trust they won’t exploit it, though monitoring for accidental purchase confir -
mation messages is probably still advisable. As mentioned
above, with the newer versions of voice assistants, the device
is capable of differentiating between voices, which can help prevent anyone else from ordering from your device. However,
you have to enable this feature and “train” the voice assistant
and, as mentioned above, it does not yet appear to be complete -
ly foolproof.
Pets, too, could cause you problems: in September 2017, a
parrot in London apparently managed to order gift boxes
through Alexa without its owners noticing. If the bird had
ordered food for itself, I would have been really impressed, but the order was for golden gift boxes. The mischievous man next door attackIf you live in an apartment block with multiple neighbors, it is
possible that some of them may know you have a smart speaker.
A neighbor who wanted to cause mischief could potentially send commands to the smart speaker in ultrasonic frequen-
cies that are too high for the human ear to hear, but which can
be detected by smart speakers. In August 2017, a researcher demonstrated that it is possible to transmit voice commands
that are not audible to the human ear to smart speakers. This is
not surprising as, for example, the Google Home smart speaker uses ultrasonic frequencies to send the PIN code to nearby
devices when guest mode is enabled. A similar attack was
carried out against voice-activated assistants on smartphones in 2015, where electromagnetic waves were picked up by the cable of plugged-in earphones and triggered the commands.
In the ultrasonic attack scenario, the attacker needs an extra
speaker and amplifier and needs to be close to the device. However, an attacker could also simply shout commands
through a closed door when you are not at home to trigger the
speaker, therefore, it is very important that any automated purchase options are switched off or secured.
Unfortunately, there is currently no easy way to prevent anyone
from, for example, setting an alarm on the smart speaker for
2:00 in the morning once they are in range of audibility. It goes
without saying that it is not a smart idea to link your smart door lock to your voice-activated assistant, as this could allow
someone to let themselves into your house by simply shouting
loudly at your smart speaker.“OK Google, set
alarm for 3:00 AM!”
“As you wish”Voice assistants can be commanded
from outside your home, even by others. Attackers can even use ultrasound frequencies to avoid human detection.Tale of the mischievous neighborWhat are the risks?Back to Table of ContentsPage 14
02A guide to the security
of voice-activated smart speakers
Television troubles
Simply watching television or listening to the radio can also
trigger interaction with smart speakers. This has been noticed
by various marketing people too, and they have attempted to use it to their advantage. For example, in April 2017, Burger
King launched a TV advertisement that would trigger any
nearby Google home devices by mentioning in a calm voice, “OK Google, what is the Whopper burger?” This triggered
the smart speaker to read out the Wikipedia page about the
Whopper burger. However, the aforesaid page was then edited multiple times by different parties, leading to mixed results for
the advertising company. Three hours after the ad first aired,
Google changed the processing on the backend system, so that the ad would no longer trigger a response from the smart speaker. It looks like the specific sound clip has been blacklist -
ed inside Google’s voice recognition system and therefore no longer triggers any response.
This highlights the power that the provider of the backend
system has. If there was some self-replicating malware
spreading from one smart speaker to another over voice, then it would be quickly stopped at the central backend system.
Burger King got around the filter fix by slightly modifying the
ad and replacing the original voice with a different person’s, to
get the same effect. The modified ad was also quickly blacklist -
ed by Google and no longer works. Many people were unhappy
with this invasion on their smart home device, but it doesn’t
constitute hacking—it is just using the features provided on
the device. At least the ad didn’t say, “OK Google, turn off the TV”. Google’s own Super Bowl ad in February triggered the
devices in people’s homes as well, although without a proper
command request, nothing happened.
There have also been instances where Google added a promo
snippet suggestion of an upcoming movie that sounded like
an advertisement into its device’s summary-of-the-day report. After multiple users complained about the sneaked-in message,
the promo was removed from the daily summary.
Another example of external influences interfering with smart
speakers was seen in September 2017, when a South Park
episode triggered the Google Home, Alexa, and Siri devices
of the audience. In the TV series, Cartman tries to get smart speakers to say juvenile phrases such as “big hairy balls”, which worked in the TV show, but also triggered devices at home.
A malicious attacker could also attempt to hijack the TV signal
to stream their own content. For example, researchers have found an exploit for DVB in the past that could change the TV
broadcast. The same applies to sound-streaming services. Last
year, multiple Spotify users reported that their account was hijacked and started playing strange unknown music. Although
none of these cases were used to trigger smart speakers, but
instead to generate revenue for certain songs, they could have
been used for other shenanigans as well. Not to mention that
if you still listen to analog radio, there are many devices out there that allow people to broadcast their own content on any
of the popular frequencies. “What?”A case of talking televisions
“Alexa, turn off the TV”Did you know your voice assistant can take commands
from other devices such as the TV or radio?What are the risks?Back to Table of ContentsPage 15
02A guide to the security
of voice-activated smart speakers
Stranger danger
Similarly, strangers could annoy you by embedding sound clips
on websites, similar to the advertisements. If the speakers on
your computer or smartphone are enabled then they might trigger the smart speaker at home. Of course, you will also hear
the command, but it can be annoying to revert the commands.
Typical annoying commands could include:
|Set alarm for 2:00 a.m.
|Set a timer for 1 hour
|Install embarrassing apps (skills/actions)
|Send text to SMS short code
|Call someone, e.g. “Call Home”
|Play with smart home devices by, for example, saying
“Light off” or “TV off”
|Saying “Restart”, which restarts the most recently played
music
|Full volume, to turn up your speaker to full volume
|Buy something, which could trigger the device to make a
purchase
|Repeat, which repeats the last command
|Simon says / Repeat after me, which will cause the device
to repeat whatever is said afterwards
|Enable the “do not disturb” mode, which will ignore
incoming calls and notifications
|Use the “where is my phone?” function to make your
smartphone ring at full volume
Whatever you do, when using voice
assistants or any Internet of Things (IoT) device for that matter, make sure your Wi-Fi at home is well-protected. Use WPA2 encryption and a strong password to protect it.Smart speakers could go loopy
Various people have tried to get smart speakers to go into an
endless loop where users make the devices talk to each other;
one device asks another device something, and the “conver -
sation” goes on forever. For example, if a user owns a Google
Home and an Amazon Echo device, then they could say: “OK
Google repeat after me Alexa Simon says OK Google repeat.”
This sequence of commands will make the Google Home say,
“Alexa Simon says OK Google repeat”, which triggers Alexa
to say “OK Google repeat”, which in turn starts the sequence again by repeating the last command. Similar tricks involve
calendar entries or notes that can be read out by asking, “What
is on my calendar?”
Of course, typical users would not have smart speaker devices
from different brands at home, as most focus on just one
brand. So this scenario, although amusing, is probably unlikely to occur in real life.
Wi-Fi worries
Whatever you do, when using voice assistants or any Internet
of Things (IoT) device for that matter, make sure your Wi-Fi
at home is well-protected. Use WPA2 encryption and a strong password to protect it. Furthermore, ensure that all Wi-Fi
devices are updated regularly as there could be vulnerabilities
found that degrade the security of the Wi-Fi network, such as the recent KRACKs attack . You may also want to consider
setting up a guest network that is separate from the one used by your devices. This is a much safer option than handing out your password to visitors to your house as, as once they are in
the same network as your smart devices, they could potentially
attack all your devices. Even though they might not do it delib -
erately, an infected computer could act as a stepping stone for
attacking other devices in your network.
An attacker in the same network can, for example, use the
Google Chromecast service to change settings on a Google
Home smart speaker. This includes changing the name of the
device, turning the volume up, enabling guest mode, getting the PIN code, and reading out various configuration settings.
An attacker could also remove the device from the network
or perform a remote factory reset, which would definitely be annoying.
Most smart speakers utilize different music steaming services
such as Spotify. These service clients run on the speakers and could contain potential weaknesses that could allow attackers
to execute their own commands. However, so far, we have not
seen any of these services being misused with a remote code execution vulnerability on smart speakers.What are the risks?Back to Table of ContentsPage 16
02A guide to the security
of voice-activated smart speakers
The following API calls can be made to interact with Google Home devices through Chromecast.
Method URI Description
POST /setup/set_eureka_info Change different settings, e.g. device name, family mode
POST /setup/assistant/a11y_mode Change the beep before and after the keyword/hotword
POST /setup/forget_wifi Remove specific Wi-Fi settings the device will go offline
POST /setup/reboot Reboot or factory-reset the device
POST /setup/assistant/alarms/volume Set or mute the alarm volume
GET /ssdp/device-desc.xml Disclose the personal device name
GET/setup/eureka_
info?options=detail¶ms=version,name,build_info,device_info,net,wifi,setup,settings,opt_in,opencast,multizone,audio,detailDisclose various details including device name, proxy settings, Wi-Fi name, PIN code of family mode, and location
GET /setup/assistant/alarms Disclose set alarms and timers
POST /setup/assistant/check_ready_status Play welcome sound again
POST /setup/assistant/notifications Enable the Do Not Disturb mode
POST /setup/assistant/set_night_mode_params Change the night mode setting for LED and volume
POST
GET/setup/bluetooth/discovery
/setup/bluetooth/get_bondedEnable Bluetooth discovery
GET /setup/configured_networks Disclose any saved Wi-Fi network name
POST
GET/setup/scan_wifi/setup/scan_results Disclose nearby Wi-Fi network names
The following simple request reveals the name of all configured
Wi-Fi networks from a Google Home device.
Request: http://192.168.0.XX:8008/setup/configured_networks
Response: [{“ssid”:”NotYourWIFI”,”wpa_auth”:1,”wpa_cipher”:1,”wpa_id”:0},{“ssid”:”MyWifi”,”wpa_
auth”:7,”wpa_cipher”:4,”wpa_id”:1}]
Meanwhile, the following command line will reboot the device:
curl -H ‘Origin:https://www.google.com’ -H ‘User-Agent:com.google.android.apps.chromecast.app/1.24.37.7 (Linux; U; Android 6.0.1; SM-J510FN Build/MMB29M)’ -H ‘Content-Type:application/json’ -H ‘Content-Length:16’ -H ‘Host:192.168.0.XX:8008’ -H ‘Connection:Keep-Alive’ -H ‘Accept-Encoding:gzip’ -X POST ‘http://192.168.0.XX:8008/setup/reboot’ --data-binary ‘{“params”:”now”}’What are the risks?Back to Table of ContentsPage 17
02A guide to the security
of voice-activated smart speakers
The devices may have other vulnerabilities too, for example
it has been demonstrated with the Bluetooth issues collec-
tively known as BlueBorne that it’s possible for an attacker to
take over a smart speaker if they are in range. Fortunately, the BlueBorne vulnerabilities have since been patched by Google
and Amazon.
Privacy
One of the main concerns for many people when it comes to
voice-activated speakers is privacy. This is understandable,
as these smart speaker devices are in your home and always
on, with the capability to be always listening to what you are saying and doing. There have been incidents in the past of smart TVs and smart toys sending back recordings to their
servers when users were unaware they were recording, which
is another reason why smart speaker vendors try to make the process as transparent as possible.
However, voice-activated assistants are meant to work in
such a way that the smart speaker is permanently listening for the keyword to be said, with the processing done on the
device offline. Once the wake-up word like “OK Google” is
detected, the device will start recording and only then send the captured, encrypted audio back to the cloud service of the
vendor for processing. A LED light comes on on the device to
indicate that it is recording. The data is stored on the backend server and associated with your account. This data is also used
to “train” the voice assistant to understand your pronuncia-
tion better in the future.
One has to hope that none of these data centers suffers a
breach in the future. Having said that, all modern smartphones
have the same recording capabilities and risks, and for them we actually already have seen malware on smartphones in
the wild, but people still use voice assistants on smartphones
without giving it a second thought.
Of course, incidents like the one mentioned earlier in this
whitepaper—where a flaw meant the new Google Home Mini
was literally always listening to its owner —can occur, and
are likely to only increase people’s anxiety when it comes to
concerns around smart speakers and privacy. The bug has
been fixed in October through a software update, but it shows that the devices could technically be used to always listen in
and record everything.
For many areas, the user can decide for themselves if they want
to grant the smart speaker access to their private calendar or
emails. For some, it might even be an option to create a new, unrelated account just for the smart speaker, if they are not
using any of the personalized features. All the major device manufacturers do provide the required
privacy policies that explain what is recorded and how it is processed:
Google’s privacy policy:
“Google Home listens in short (a few seconds) snippets for
the hotword. Those snippets are deleted if the hotword is not
detected, and none of that information leaves your device until
the hotword is heard. When Google Home detects that you’ve said ‘OK Google,’ the LEDs on top of the device light up to tell
you that recording is happening, Google Home records what
you say, and sends that recording (including the few-second hotword recording) to Google in order to fulfill your request.
Y ou can delete those recordings through My Activity anytime.”
Amazon Alexa’s privacy policy:
“Y ou control Alexa with your voice. Alexa streams audio to the cloud when you interact with Alexa. Alexa processes and
retains your Alexa Interactions, such as your voice inputs, music playlists, and your Alexa to-do and shopping lists, in
the cloud to provide and improve our services.”
During a murder investigation in Bentonville in November
2016, the police confiscated an Amazon Echo from the suspect’s
house and requested the voice recordings from Amazon. The
police did not specify what data they expected to find in the recordings—given that only recordings made after the keyword
is said are saved, it is unlikely that much relevant information
would be present. To our knowledge, Amazon did not release any of the recordings in this case. But the case does serve to
highlight the privacy issues around voice-activated assistants.
Formal complaints have already been filed with the authorities
to investigate how far always-on listening devices are allowed
to go in regards to privacy. With all the different laws and
various countries, it is unclear at the moment if, for example, you have to inform your visiting friends that you have a smart
speaker at home that might record them. Furthermore, many
liability questions regarding processing errors are still open. For example, who pays if your voice assistant thinks it heard
“heating on” and your electricity bill goes through the roof?
There is also the issue of storing recordings of minors. According
to the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) in the
U.S., service providers must have the verifiable consent of the
parents when collecting data from children under 13 years old. There has been an ongoing debate as to whether a checkbox
in the app is enough to be considered consent. Because many
attorneys doubt that this is enough, vendors have started to comply with extra verification steps. As an example, Amazon
announced in August 2017 that, in order to enable so-called
kid skills using the Amazon Echo, parents will have to verify a one-time password (OTP) code by text message or authenticate
with their credit card. What are the risks?Back to Table of ContentsPage 18
02A guide to the security
of voice-activated smart speakers
Users of these devices must also
remember that someone who has your Google or Amazon account credentials can listen to your recording history.
Deleting recordings
Users of these devices must also remember that someone who
has your Google or Amazon account credentials can listen to
your recording history. This means it is even more important to protect these accounts from attackers, and strong passwords and
two-factor authentication (2FA) should be used where possible.
All major voice assistants allow you to review the recorded
command history and also let you delete any recordings.
With Amazon Echo, to delete specific recordings:
|Open the Alexa app on your phone
|Go to “Settings”
|Select “History”
|Choose which individual recordings you’d like to delete
To delete entire history:
|Open Amazon.com
|Select “Manage My Content”
|Click on “Alexa”
|Delete entire history
Deleting specific Alexa recording
Google Home users can go to https://myactivity.google.com/
and find a listing of old recordings there, among other data, such as search history etc.
Deleting specific Google Assistant recordingA guide to the security of voice-activated smart speakers
Conclusion
03SectionConclusionBack to Table of ContentsPage 20
03A guide to the security
of voice-activated smart speakers
Conclusion
Voice-activated smart speakers are increasing in popularity.
Voice-activated interfaces are greatly improving and will
become integrated into many everyday objects. It is not just a
replacement for a keyboard, but an actual virtual intelligence that can help in normal, everyday activities.
There are some perils associated with these newfangled smart
speakers. The most prominent scenario is TV advertisements or websites playing sound commands that trigger the smart
speakers. If the user is in the room they will of course hear
the command and can reverse it. Making unnoticed purchases this way is possible but easily avoided as users can and should
configure a passcode for purchases. Until the voice recognition
has become more accurate and can be applied to all commands, we will see more undesired triggering of voice assistants
through TV or radio shows. Given the popularity of Amazon
Alexa, you are not doing your children a favor if you name them Alexa.
The biggest concern is around privacy, as these devices are
always listening and sending encrypted recordings to the cloud backend once an assumed keyword is heard. As recent
issues with Google Home Mini have shown, it is possible for
these devices to go haywire and send a lot more recordings to the backend than intended. As a basic guideline, it should be clear that you should not connect security functions like door locks to the voice-enabled
smart speakers. If you do, a burglar could simply shout “open
the front door” or “disable recordings now”, which would be bad for not only your digital security but also physical security.
The same applies to sensitive information, and these devices
should not be used to remember passwords or credit card data.
So far, we haven’t seen any mass infection of smart speakers
with malware and it is unlikely to happen anytime soon as these
devices are not directly reachable from the internet, and are usually protected against Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
attacks. Nearly all possible attacks rely on the misuse of official
commands and not on modifying the actual code running on the devices. Since all command interpretation will go through
the backend server, the provider has the capability to filter
out any malicious trigger sequence, as has been demonstrat -
ed by Google after the Burger King advertisement. As always
with software, there is a risk that some of the services, such as
commonly used music streaming services, may have a vulner -
ability and that the device could be compromised through it.
The devices may have other vulnerabilities too, for example it
has been demonstrated with the Bluetooth issues collectively known as BlueBorne that it’s possible for an attacker to take
over a smart speaker if they are within range. Fortunately, the
BlueBorne vulnerabilities have since been patched by Google and Amazon. Therefore, all devices should use the auto-update
function to stay up to date.
Most of the bigger issues can be avoided by proper configura-
tion and deciding how much information should be linked to
the device, but preventing a mischief-maker from setting an
alarm for 2 a.m. on the smart speaker can prove very difficult. A guide to the security of voice-activated smart speakers
Protection
04SectionProtectionBack to Table of ContentsPage 22
04A guide to the security
of voice-activated smart speakers
Protection
After setting up a smart speaker device at home, it is important
to configure it securely. Below you can find a few tips that help
you focus on the security and privacy settings. The configu-
ration is done through the mobile app or the website. If you are worried about the security of your smart devices at home,
then you might consider the Norton Core secure router, which
can help secure your home network, and all the devices on it, from attacks. Configuration tips
|Be selective in what accounts you connect to your voice
assistant. Maybe even create a new account if you do not
need to use the calendar or address book.
|For Google Home you can disable “personal results” from
showing up.
|Erase sensitive recordings from time to time, although
this may degrade the quality of the service (as regards the device “learning” how you speak, etc.).
|If you are not using the voice assistant, mute it.
Unfortunately, this can be inconvenient as most likely it will be switched off when you actually need it.
|Turn off purchasing if not needed or set a purchase
password.
|Protect the service account linked to the device with a
strong password and 2FA where possible.
|Use a WPA2 encrypted Wi-Fi network and not an open
hotspot at home.
|Create a guest Wi-Fi network for guests and unsecure IoT
devices.
|Lock the voice assistant down to your personal voice
pattern, when available.
|Don’t use the voice assistant to remember private
information such as passwords or credit card numbers.
|Pay attention to notification emails, especially ones about
new orders for goods or services.
|Consider enabling a beep sound at the beginning and end
of command recognition.
|Disable unused services, such as music streaming
services.
|Do not turn off automatic update functions on the device.About Symantec
Symantec Corporation (NASDAQ: SYMC), the world’s leading
cyber security company, helps businesses, governments and
people secure their most important data wherever it lives.
Organizations across the world look to Symantec for strategic, integrated solutions to defend against sophisticated attacks
across endpoints, cloud and infrastructure.
Likewise, a global community of more than 50 million people
and families rely on Symantec’s Norton suite of products for
protection at home and across all of their devices. Symantec operates one of the world’s largest civilian cyber intelligence
networks, allowing it to see and protect against the most
advanced threats.
More Information
Symantec Worldwide: http://www.symantec.com
ISTR and Symantec Intelligence Resources: https://www.symantec.com/security-center/threat-reportSymantec Security Center: https://www.symantec.com/security-center
Norton Security Center: https://us.norton.com/security-center
|
'RATDispenser' the JavaScript loader
Malware actors are putting a new spin on their old techniques to deliver stealthy malware, most recently with the help of an evasive JavaScript loader called 'RATDispenser'. Reports show that eight malware families were distributed with the objectives of stealing user information and gaining access to compromised devices.
The attack starts with a malicious email carrying a JS file in text form. A simple double-click on this file and the initial infection stage will commence, running the secondary malware that will establish control over the victim's machine. Following this, the obfuscated JavaScript file decodes itself and writes a VBScript file. The VBscript will then attempt to download the external payload and if successful, will subsequently delete itself.
Symantec protects you from this threat, identified by the following:
File-based
CL.Downloader!gen10
Infostealer!im
ISB.Downloader!gen52
ISB.Downloader!gen54
ISB.Downloader!gen68
ISB.Downloader!gen69
ISB.Downloader!gen81
ISB.Downloader!gen223
ISB.Downloader!gen341
ISB.Dropper!gen1
ISB.Dropper!gen35
ISB.Houdini!gen7
Packed.Generic.575
Packed.Generic.603
Trojan Horse
Trojan.Maljava
WS.Malware.1
W32.Spyrat
Machine Learning-based
Heur.AdvML.B
Heur.AdvML.C
|
.cfd TLD becomes a new favorite to spread phish emails
In recent phish runs, .cfd vanity TLD has been heavily abused by various threat actors. CFD TLD (top-level domain) stands for 'clothing and fashion design', and can be used by fashion designers, clothing brands, retailers and e-commerce stores, among others. Symantec has observed persistent phishing waves with .cfd vanity TLD domains used within the FROM email address field. These phish runs are typically masqueraded as notification messages with subjects that contain common keywords such as :
account renewal
account suspension
account shutdown
account authentication
Leave Compliance
Interestingly, phish runs in Japanese language also have similar characteristics and are observed masquerading as popular services. As the keywords in the subjects showcase urgency, users are lured to open such emails and click on the phishing URLs. These URLs direct the victims to credential harvesting webpages. The domains associated with those particular TLDs are mostly shady and registered for at least 1 or 2 years.
Symantec protects you from this threat, identified by the following:
Email-based
Coverage is in place for Symantec's email security products and Email Threat Isolation (ETI) technology provides an extra layer of protection for our customers.
Web-based
Observed domains/IPs are covered under security categories in all WebPulse enabled products
|
.NET DNS Backdoor used by the Lyceum APT
A new customized .NET-based DNS backdoor has been recently used in malicious campaigns carried out by the Lyceum APT group. The backdoor uses code from an open-source DNS Resolver tool known as dig.net. The malware leverages DNS Hijacking techniques and employs DNS protocol for communication to the attackers’ C2 servers. The backdoor has additional functionalities to upload/download files as well as execute remote commands on the compromised systems.
Symantec protects you from this threat, identified by the following:
File-based
Trojan Horse
Trojan.Gen.NPE
WS.Malware.1
Machine Learning-based
Heur.AdvML.B
Heur.AdvML.C
Web-based
Observed domains are covered under security categories
|
2023 holiday season starts off with fake year end leave emails
It's the time of holiday season and the threat actors have added a new theme to their arsenal. In a recent phishing run, emails containing phishing URLs and masqueraded as year end or annual leave notifications are sent to recipients. The email subjects contain the recipient's domain name along with a timestamp. This is done to add a personal touch and lure the user into opening the email. The email body content is kept short and the "from" field shows recipient's domain name + HR Department.
Email Headers:
Subject: [Recipient's_domain_name] 2023 Year End Annual Leave
From: "[Recipient's_domain_name] HR Department" <redacted_email_address>
Symantec protects you from this threat, identified by the following:
Email-based
Coverage is in place for Symantec's email security products and Email Threat Isolation (ETI) technology provides an extra layer of protection for our customers.
Web-based
Observed domains/IPs are covered under security categories in all WebPulse enabled products
|
2023Lock Ransomware
2023Lock is a ransomware actor who has recently targeted companies and encrypted multiple machines. At this time, they do not appear to exfiltrate data or extort users with threats of leaking, focusing solely on the encryption extortion. Upon successful encryption, files will see themselves appended with a .2023Lock extension. The ransom note (README.html and README.txt) is simple, providing users with the run-of-the-mill wording used by most ransomware. Victims are advised to connect and chat with the actor via a provided Onion website.
Symantec protects you from this threat, identified by the following:
Behavior-based
SONAR.RansomPlay!gen1
File-based
Ransom.Gen
|
2nd-COVID Outbreak Warning email brings QasarRAT
Symantec Security Response has observed QasarRAT being distributed through spam emails that ride the ongoing COVID wave. The malicious email was constructed with Covid-related traits such as subject "2nd-COVID Outbreak Warning Alerts For Business Owners/Workers Globally !!!" and attachment name "CDC GUIDES COVID-19 Second Outbreak Warning release.ppt.img". With countries around the globe still enduring waves of COVID infections, concerned recipients will be more likely to open the emails and attached files.
Symantec provides the following coverage against this spam attack:
File-based
Backdoor.Trojan
Email-based
Coverage is in place for Symantec's email security products and Email Threat Isolation (ETI) technology provides an extra layer of protection for our customers.
|
3CX Supply Chain Attack
Attackers believed to be linked to North Korea have Trojanized 3CX DesktopApp, a widely-used voice and video calling desktop client. In an attack reminiscent of SolarWinds, installers for several recent Windows and Mac versions of the software were compromised and modified by the attackers in order to deliver additional information stealing malware to the user’s computer. The information gathered by this malware presumably allowed the attackers to gauge if the victim was a candidate for further compromise.
Read more in our blog: 3CX: Supply Chain Attack Affects Thousands of Users Worldwide
Symantec protects you from this threat, identified by the following:
File-based
Infostealer
OSX.Samsis
OSX.Trojan.Gen
OSX.Trojan.Gen.2
Trojan Horse
Trojan.Dropper
Trojan.Malfilter
Trojan.Samsis
WS.Malware.2
Machine Learning-based
Heur.AdvML.A
Heur.AdvML.B
Network-based
Malicious Site: Malicious Domains Request
Malicious Site: Malicious Domain Request 59
Web Attack: Webpulse Bad Reputation Domain Request
Web-based
Observed domains/IPs are covered under security categories
|
8220's ongoing operations targeting Linux
An ongoing campaign targeting Linux platforms and associated with a threat group known as 8220 has been seen distributing an updated version of the pwnRig cryptomining malware and an IRC bot. The attackers exploit CVE-2022-26134 (Atlassian Confluence) and CVE-2019-2725 (Oracle WebLogic) RCE vulnerabilities for initial access. Upon exploiting the mentioned vulnerabilities, a loader malware is deployed which in turn downloads payloads to the compromised systems.
Symantec protects you from this threat, identified by the following:
File-based
Linux.Backdoor.Kaiten
Linux.Kaiten
Trojan Horse
Trojan.Gen.NPE
WS.Malware.1
WS.Malware.2
Network-based
Attack: Oracle Weblogic RCE CVE-2019-2725
Web Attack: Atlassian OGNL Injection CVE-2022-26134
Policy-based
DCS customers with Confluence Server instances are protected using default hardening rules.
Web-based
Observed IPs/domains are covered under security categories
|
8Base Ransomware
There has been a reported increase of malicious activities associated with the 8Base ransomware group since May 2023. 8Base ransomware is a possible offshoot of the well known Phobos ransomware as there are many similarities between both malware variants. The group behind the 8Base is also possibly related to a less known RansomHouse threat actor - as again also here there are some similarities for example in the ransom notes dropped by both groups. 8Base ransomware encrypts user's files and appends .8base extension to them. The attackers responsible for the threat have also launched a public leak website detailing the victim companies compromised by this ransomware variant.
Symantec protects you from this threat, identified by the following:
Behavior-based
AGR.Terminate!g2
SONAR.SuspDataRun
File-based
Trojan.Gen.2
Trojan.Gen.MBT
WS.Malware.1
Machine Learning-based
Heur.AdvML.B
Heur.AdvML.B!100
Heur.AdvML.B!200
Web-based
Observed domains/IPs are covered under security categories in all WebPulse enabled products
|
Abcbot botnet implements new functions for DDoS attacks
Abcbot is a malware variant first discovered back in July 2021. The botnet targets databases and web servers among others, and is exploiting vulnerabilities and weak passwords for propagation. According to a recent report, Abcbot has been continuously updated by its creators in the last few months and currently incorporates several different DDoS attack methods along with self-updating features.
Symantec protects you from this threat, identified by the following:
File-based
Downloader
Trojan Horse
Trojan.Gen.NPE
WS.Malware.2
Network-based
Web Attack: Webpulse Bad Reputation Domain Request
Web-based
Observed domains/IPs are covered under security categories
|
Aberebot hits Indian mobile users
Back in November 2021, a new variant of Aberebot was seen in the mobile threat landscape. This Android banking malware continues to be observed and was recently seen targeting Indian users. An actor has been purporting to be DHL in the hope of luring victims into installing Aberebot, itself disguised as a DHL mobile application. While there's a focus in India, reports indicate the campaign has also been observed in other countries.
Aberebot is able to steal user credentials of multiple banks, social media accounts and cryptocurrency services by overlaying phishing pages when it notices a user's activity and interaction with certain apps and websites (leveraging the Accessibility Service). It's also able to perform classic actions such as collecting sensitive device information, stored files, contacts and SMS.
Symantec protects you from this threat, identified by the following:
Mobile-based
AppRisk:Generisk
|
A budding ransomware: Underground Team
Named based on the ransomware note, Underground Team is a new strain of this type of malware. The ransom note seems specific to the target, including specific details about the victim, and the group even offers in the note to provide details or recommendations about network and information security. Of course, anything coming from such an actor should be taken with extreme caution in the best of cases. The ransomware does not change the file names or extensions once encrypted, but drops the ransomware note on several places in the system.
Symantec protects you from this threat, identified by the following:
File-based
Trojan Horse
Machine Learning-based
Heur.AdvML.C
|
Abuse of appspot.com services in phishing
Symantec has observed a new wave of attacks leveraging legitimate services and platforms to host phishing and malicious content. In one such recent phishing run, appspot.com domains were used to spread credential phishing web pages through emails. As shown in Figure 1, a phishing email masquerading as a business communication is sent to the user. The email content is kept short with a subject conveying urgency. The email displays a .pdf document with a Microsoft Excel icon on it. The user is enticed to click on the hyperlinked text marked in blue in order to download the document.
Figure 1: Phishing email masqueraded as a business email with an appspot.com URL embedded in content.
Once clicked, the embedded appspot.com URL opens a credential stealing phish web page ready to trick the user into entering credentials. As shown in Figure 2, the credential stealing webpage is masqueraded as a Microsoft Excel online login page.
Figure 2: The embedded appspot.com URL redirects the user to a fake Microsoft Excel online credentials stealing webpage.
Protection
Protection is in place for Symantec's email security products.
|
Abuse of CAPTCHA functionality aims to phish bank customers
In a recent phishing run, CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) functionality was abused to trick various financial institution customers in order to steal their login credentials. Figure 1 shows a phishing email masquerading as an account verification notification being sent to the user.
Figure 1: Phishing email masqueraded as a notification with a phishing URL embedded in the content.
When the user clicks on the embedded phishing URL present in the email, it will open an additional webpage containing CAPTCHA verification as shown in Figure 2. CAPTCHA functionality is introduced here in order to gain the trust of the end user as this bogus additional security step aims at ensuring the visitor of the website's legitimacy.
Figure 2: CAPTCHA verification page
After entering the random five CAPTCHA characters, the user is redirected to a credential stealing webpage imitated as that of a legit bank’s login webpage as shown in Figure 3.
Figure 3: Credential stealing webpage imitating a legit login webpage of a financial institution.
Protection
Protection is in place for Symantec's email security products.
|
Abuse of Google's Firebase services in phishing
Symantec has observed a new wave of phishing attacks abusing Google Firebase URLs. These phishing emails masquerade as notification messages prompting to upgrade existing mailbox storage. The content is kept short, but it does contain some grammatical and punctuation errors. As shown in Figure 1, the words used in the body of the email convey urgency and entice the recipient to click on the hyperlinked text with firebaseapp.com URL embedded within it.
Figure 1: Phishing email masqueraded as a mailbox upgrade notification email with a firebaseapp.com URL embedded in the content.
Once clicked, the embedded firebaseapp.com URL opens a credential stealing web page that tricks the user into entering credentials as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: The embedded firebaseapp.com URL redirects the user to a fake credentials stealing webpage.
Protection
Coverage is in place for Symantec's email security products and Email Threat Isolation (ETI) technology provides an extra layer of protection for our customers.
|
Abuse of Object storage services in Phishing
Legitimate file sharing platforms have long been abused by Threat actors, but now the trend has changed to include object storage services. In a recent phishing run, DigitalOcean Spaces, an object storage service, was abused to host credential stealing web pages. Figure 1 shows a phishing email masquerading as a voicemail notification being sent to the user. In order to listen to the voicemail, the user needs to click on the phishing URL embedded within the colorful text. Once clicked, a credential stealing web page opens which asks the user for credentials.
Figure 1: Phishing email masqueraded as a voicemail notification with a DigitalOcean spaces URL embedded in content.
Protection
Protection is in place for Symantec's email security products.
|
Abuse of SendGrid services in Phishing
Threat actors have started leveraging legitimate services and platforms to host phishing and malicious content. In a recent phishing run, Symantec observed SendGrid services being abused to spread phishing web pages through emails. As shown in Figure 1, a phishing email masquerading as a notification is sent to the user. The email content is kept short with a title conveying urgency. The user is enticed to click on the hyperlinked text marked in blue. Once clicked, the embedded SendGrid URL opens a credential stealing phish web page ready to trick the user into entering credentials. Credential stealing web pages can typically open as an O365 or an Outlook Web App (OWA) login page.
Figure 1: Phishing email masqueraded as a notification email with a SendGrid URL embedded in content.
Protection
Protection is in place for Symantec's email security products.
|
Abuse of YAMM email tracking in Business Email Compromise (BEC) phishing spam
YAMM email tracking tools were abused in a BEC run observed in the second week of July. YAMM tracking tools helps users to know what actions the recipient has performed on the email. When tracking is enabled, random YAMM IDs are generated to identify the recipients. Abuse of email tracking tools is not unusual in the case of promotional unsolicited emails but it’s certainly unusual for BEC spam. These can help the threat actors to identify whether the recipient has opened, replied, unsubscribed, or even whether the email has reached the recipient’s inbox or bounced. In this run, tracking URLs were embedded within the <img src > HTML tag as shown below.
Figure 1: BEC phish email masqueraded as a business communication email.
Figure 2: YAMM email tracking URL embedded within the <img src> HTML tag of the email.
Protection
Protection is in place for Symantec's email security products.
|
Abyss Ransomware
Abyss is another ransomware variant recently active on the threat landscape. The malware encrypts user files and appends .abyss extension to them. Upon completed encryption a ransom note text file called "WhatHappened.txt" is dropped with instructions on how to download a Tor browser and contact the threat actors. Additionally the desktop wallpaper on the infected machine is also changed to display the ransom note text. The malware has the functionality to delete volume shadow copies and system backups on the infected machine.
Symantec protects you from this threat, identified by the following:
Behavior-based
ACM.Untrst-RunSys!g1
ACM.Wmic-DlShcp!g1
SONAR.SuspLaunch!g18
SONAR.SuspLaunch!g193
SONAR.SuspLaunch!g250
SONAR.SuspLaunch!g340
SONAR.TCP!gen1
File-based
Trojan Horse
Trojan.Gen.MBT
WS.Malware.2
Machine Learning-based
Heur.AdvML.A
Heur.AdvML.C
|
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