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In the philosophy of religion, the “ problem of evil ” (sometimes referred to
as “ theodicy ” ) is one of the oldest and most interesting areas of study. There
have been numerous reformulations and solutions proposed, most of which
try to reconcile the existence of evil in the world with the concept of God
as omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent (all powerful, all knowing,
and all loving). Epicurus (341 – 270 bce ) is usually cited as the fi rst author
to articulate this tension. Following Epicurus, we present a generic argument
that more explicitly shows the inferences. Starting with the premise
of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God, the argument
shows only that the defi nition is incoherent by confl ict with the existence
of evil and the relevant collective attributes of God. A common mistake in
interpreting this argument is to suppose that it shows that “ God ” does not
exist tout court ; what this argument in fact shows is that “ God ” as defi ned
in a certain way is contradictory and therefore cannot exist as such.
Inwood , Brad , and L. P. Gerson . Hellenistic Philosophy . Indianapolis :
Hackett , 1988 .
Hume , David. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion . Indianapolis : Hackett ,
1980 .
Mackie , J. L. “ Evil and Omnipotence . ” Mind 64 ( 1955 ): 200 – 12 .
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
36 Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone
God either wants to eliminate bad things and cannot, or can but does not
want to, or neither wishes to nor can, or both wants to and can. If he wants
to and cannot, he is weak – and this does not apply to god. If he can, but
does not want to, then he is spiteful – which is equally foreign to god ’ s nature.
If he neither wants to nor can, he is both weak and spiteful and so not a god.
If he wants to and can, which is the only thing fi tting for a god, where then
do bad things come from? Or why does he not eliminate them? (Epicurus as
recounted by Lactantius, qtd. in Inwood and Gerson, 94)
P1. God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
P2. If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.
C1. God has the power to eliminate all evil ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
P3. If God is omniscient, then God knows evil exists.
C2. God knows evil exists ( modus ponens , P1, P3).
P4. If God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to eliminate all evil.
C3. God has the desire to eliminate all evil ( modus ponens , P1, P4).
P5. Evil exists.
P6. If evil exists, then either God doesn ’ t have the power to eliminate all
evil or doesn ’ t know evil exists or doesn ’ t have the desire to eliminate
all evil.
C4. God doesn ’ t have the power to eliminate all evil or doesn ’ t know
evil exists or doesn ’ t have the desire to eliminate all evil ( modus
ponens , P5, P6).
P7. If God doesn ’ t have the power to eliminate all evil or doesn ’ t know evil
exists or doesn ’ t have the desire to eliminate all evil, then God does not
exist.
C5. God does not exist ( modus ponens , P7, C4).
8
The Free Will Defense to the
Problem of Evil
Grant Sterling
The free will defense is a response to the problem of evil (#7). This defense
is designed to show that there is no contradiction in supposing that God
would allow evil to exist (even if God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly
good), because even a perfectly good being might have reason to
permit an evil to exist if there is some greater good that cannot be achieved
without allowing it. The proponent of the free will defense thinks that free
will is such a good – it is logically impossible for even God to give a creature
free will and at the same time guarantee that it will always choose rightly,
and yet free will is a very great good (or is necessary for the existence of
great goods).
Note that for many advocates of this argument, it is only necessary to
show that such a story is coherent, not that it is true. That is, since the
problem of evil claims that it is impossible for God and evil both to exist,
to refute the argument, it is only necessary to show that the existence of
both God and evil is a coherent possibility. On this understanding, a
“ defense ” claims to lay out a coherent possibility, whereas a philosopher
who undertakes a “ theodicy ” aims to show that this possibility is the actual
reason God allows evil.
van Inwagen , Peter. The Problem of Evil . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 2006 .
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
38 Grant Sterling
I grant that, in some sense of the word, the non - existence of evil must
be what a perfectly good being wants. But we often don ’ t bring about states
of affairs we can bring about and want to bring about. Suppose, for example,
that Alice ’ s mother is dying in great pain and that Alice yearns desperately
for her mother to die today and not next week or next month. And suppose
it would be easy for Alice to arrange this – she is perhaps a doctor or a
nurse and has easy access to pharmaceutical resources that would enable
her to achieve this end. Does it follow that she will act on this ability that
she has? It is obvious that it does not, for Alice might have reasons for not
doing what she can do. Two obvious candidates for such reasons are: she
thinks it would be morally wrong; she is afraid that her act would be discovered,
and that she would be prosecuted for murder. And either of these
reasons might be suffi cient, in her mind, to outweigh her desire for an
immediate end to her mother ’ s sufferings. So it may be that someone has a
very strong desire for something and is able to obtain this thing, but does
not act on this desire – because he has reasons for not doing so that seem
to him to outweigh the desirability of the thing. The conclusion that evil
does not exist does not, therefore, follow logically from the premises that
the non - existence of evil is what God wants and that he is able to bring
about the object of his desire – since, for all logic can tell us, God might
have reasons for allowing evil to exist that, in his mind, outweigh the desirability
of the non - existence of evil. (van Inwagen, 64 – 5)
God made the world and it was very good. An indispensable part of the
goodness he chose was the existence of rational beings: self - aware beings

In the philosophy of religion, the “ problem of evil ” (sometimes referred to

as “ theodicy ” ) is one of the oldest and most interesting areas of study. There

have been numerous reformulations and solutions proposed, most of which

try to reconcile the existence of evil in the world with the concept of God

as omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent (all powerful, all knowing,

and all loving). Epicurus (341 – 270 bce ) is usually cited as the fi rst author

to articulate this tension. Following Epicurus, we present a generic argument

that more explicitly shows the inferences. Starting with the premise

of an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God, the argument

shows only that the defi nition is incoherent by confl ict with the existence

of evil and the relevant collective attributes of God. A common mistake in

interpreting this argument is to suppose that it shows that “ God ” does not

exist tout court ; what this argument in fact shows is that “ God ” as defi ned

in a certain way is contradictory and therefore cannot exist as such.

Inwood , Brad , and L. P. Gerson . Hellenistic Philosophy . Indianapolis :

Hackett , 1988 .

Hume , David. Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion . Indianapolis : Hackett ,

1980 .

Mackie , J. L. “ Evil and Omnipotence . ” Mind 64 ( 1955 ): 200 – 12 .

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

36 Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone

God either wants to eliminate bad things and cannot, or can but does not

want to, or neither wishes to nor can, or both wants to and can. If he wants

to and cannot, he is weak – and this does not apply to god. If he can, but

does not want to, then he is spiteful – which is equally foreign to god ’ s nature.

If he neither wants to nor can, he is both weak and spiteful and so not a god.

If he wants to and can, which is the only thing fi tting for a god, where then

do bad things come from? Or why does he not eliminate them? (Epicurus as

recounted by Lactantius, qtd. in Inwood and Gerson, 94)

P1. God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.

P2. If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.

C1. God has the power to eliminate all evil ( modus ponens , P1, P2).

P3. If God is omniscient, then God knows evil exists.

C2. God knows evil exists ( modus ponens , P1, P3).

P4. If God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to eliminate all evil.

C3. God has the desire to eliminate all evil ( modus ponens , P1, P4).

P5. Evil exists.

P6. If evil exists, then either God doesn ’ t have the power to eliminate all

evil or doesn ’ t know evil exists or doesn ’ t have the desire to eliminate

all evil.

C4. God doesn ’ t have the power to eliminate all evil or doesn ’ t know

evil exists or doesn ’ t have the desire to eliminate all evil ( modus

ponens , P5, P6).

P7. If God doesn ’ t have the power to eliminate all evil or doesn ’ t know evil

exists or doesn ’ t have the desire to eliminate all evil, then God does not

exist.

C5. God does not exist ( modus ponens , P7, C4).

8

The Free Will Defense to the

Problem of Evil

Grant Sterling

The free will defense is a response to the problem of evil (#7). This defense

is designed to show that there is no contradiction in supposing that God

would allow evil to exist (even if God is omnipotent, omniscient, and perfectly

good), because even a perfectly good being might have reason to

permit an evil to exist if there is some greater good that cannot be achieved

without allowing it. The proponent of the free will defense thinks that free

will is such a good – it is logically impossible for even God to give a creature

free will and at the same time guarantee that it will always choose rightly,

and yet free will is a very great good (or is necessary for the existence of

great goods).

Note that for many advocates of this argument, it is only necessary to

show that such a story is coherent, not that it is true. That is, since the

problem of evil claims that it is impossible for God and evil both to exist,

to refute the argument, it is only necessary to show that the existence of

both God and evil is a coherent possibility. On this understanding, a

“ defense ” claims to lay out a coherent possibility, whereas a philosopher

who undertakes a “ theodicy ” aims to show that this possibility is the actual

reason God allows evil.

van Inwagen , Peter. The Problem of Evil . Oxford : Clarendon Press , 2006 .

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

38 Grant Sterling

I grant that, in some sense of the word, the non - existence of evil must

be what a perfectly good being wants. But we often don ’ t bring about states

of affairs we can bring about and want to bring about. Suppose, for example,

that Alice ’ s mother is dying in great pain and that Alice yearns desperately

for her mother to die today and not next week or next month. And suppose

it would be easy for Alice to arrange this – she is perhaps a doctor or a

nurse and has easy access to pharmaceutical resources that would enable

her to achieve this end. Does it follow that she will act on this ability that

she has? It is obvious that it does not, for Alice might have reasons for not

doing what she can do. Two obvious candidates for such reasons are: she

thinks it would be morally wrong; she is afraid that her act would be discovered,

and that she would be prosecuted for murder. And either of these

reasons might be suffi cient, in her mind, to outweigh her desire for an

immediate end to her mother ’ s sufferings. So it may be that someone has a

very strong desire for something and is able to obtain this thing, but does

not act on this desire – because he has reasons for not doing so that seem

to him to outweigh the desirability of the thing. The conclusion that evil

does not exist does not, therefore, follow logically from the premises that

the non - existence of evil is what God wants and that he is able to bring

about the object of his desire – since, for all logic can tell us, God might

have reasons for allowing evil to exist that, in his mind, outweigh the desirability

of the non - existence of evil. (van Inwagen, 64 – 5)

God made the world and it was very good. An indispensable part of the

goodness he chose was the existence of rational beings: self - aware beings