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Anselm then defi nes justice as “ rectitude of will preserved for its own
sake ” (S I: 194; Dialogues , 24). Given that in the second dialogue freedom
of choice is defi ned as “ the power to preserve rectitude of will for the sake
of rectitude itself, ” freedom of choice turns out to be identical with a capacity
for justice. This illuminates why the ability to sin, when added to the
will, diminishes its freedom. Also, we can now see clearly that, like his
42 Julia Hermann
understanding of truth, Anselm ’ s understanding of freedom is teleological.
This distinguishes him from most contemporary philosophers.
In the way in which Anselm presents his argument, it is incomplete. To
be formally and semantically valid, it has to be supplemented by a number
of premises that are merely implicit in the text. The original argument is
contained in the following passage from “ On Free Will ” :
T: Which will do you think is freer: one whose willing and whose ability
not to sin are such that it cannot be turned away from the rectitude of
not sinning, or one that in some way can be turned to sin?
S: I don ’ t see why a will isn ’ t freer when it is capable of both.
T: Do you not see that someone who has what is fi tting and expedient in
such a way that he cannot lose it is freer than someone who has it in
such a way that he can lose it and be seduced into what is unfi tting
and inexpedient?
S: I don ’ t think anyone would doubt that.
T: And you will say that it is no less indubitable that sinning is always unfi tting
and harmful.
S: No one in his right mind thinks otherwise.
T: Then a will that cannot fall away from the rectitude of not sinning is
freer than a will that can abandon that rectitude.
S: I don ’ t think anything could be more reasonably asserted.
T: Now if something diminishes freedom if it is added and increases freedom
if taken away, do you think that it is either freedom or a part of
freedom?
S: I cannot think so.
T: Then the power to sin, which if added to the will diminishes its freedom
and if taken away increases it, is neither freedom nor a part of freedom.
S: Nothing could be more logical. (S I: 208f; Dialogues , 32f)
P1. If someone has what is fi tting and expedient in such a way that he
cannot lose it, he is freer than someone who has it in such a way that
he can lose it and be seduced into what is unfi tting and harmful.
P2. Rectitude is fi tting and expedient.
C1. If someone has rectitude in such a way that he cannot lose it, then he is
freer than someone who has it in such a way that he can lose it and be
seduced into what is unfi tting and harmful (substitution, P1, P2).
P3. Sinning is always unfi tting and harmful.
C2. If someone has rectitude in such a way that he cannot lose it, then
he is freer than someone who has it in such a way that he can lose it
and be seduced into sinning (substitution, C1, P3).
P4. Someone who has rectitude in such a way that he cannot lose it is
someone who has a will that cannot fall away from the rectitude of not
sinning.
St. Anselm on Free Choice and the Power to Sin 43
P5. If someone has a will that cannot fall away from the rectitude of not
sinning, then he is freer than someone who has it in such a way that he
can lose it and be seduced into sinning (substitution, C2, P4).
C3. Someone who has a will that cannot fall away from the rectitude of
not sinning is freer than a will that has rectitude in such a way that
he can lose it and be seduced into sinning ( modus ponens , P5, P4).
P6. A will that can abandon rectitude is a will that has rectitude in such a
way that it can lose it and be seduced into sinning.
C4. A will that cannot fall away from the rectitude of not sinning is freer
than a will that can abandon rectitude (substitution, C3, P6).
P7. The power to sin diminishes freedom if it is added to the will and
increases freedom if it is taken away from it (implied by C2).
P8. If something diminishes freedom if it is added and increases freedom if
taken away, then it is neither freedom nor a part of freedom.
C5. The power to sin is neither freedom nor a part of freedom ( modus
ponens , P7, P8).
10
Hume ’ s Argument against
Miracles
Tommaso Piazza
Originally planned to appear in the earlier Treatise of Human Nature
(1739 – 40), Hume ’ s argument against miracles fi rst went to press as Chapter
X of An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding in 1748. Since then,
mainly as a separate text, it has been granted continued attention. The
argument is part of Hume ’ s philosophy of religion. In particular, it is
inserted within a discussion about whether some religious belief could be
Hume , David. An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding . Indianapolis :
Hackett , 1997 .
Buckle , Stephen. Hume ’ s Enlightenment Tract: The Unity and Purpose of An
Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding . Oxford : Oxford University
Press , 2001 .
Fogelin , Robert J. A Defense of Hume on Miracles . Princeton, NJ : Princeton
University Press , 2003 .
Levine , Michael P. Hume and the Problem of Miracles: A Solution . Dordrecht :
Kluwer , 1989 .
___. “ Miracles . ” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2005
edn.), edited by Edward N. Zalta, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/
entries/miracles/#Hum
Swinburne , Richard. The Existence of God . Oxford : Oxford University
Press , 2004 .
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Hume’s Argument against Miracles 45
established by revelation; the argument purports to vindicate a negative
answer to this question, by showing that miracles – the very foundation of
revealed religion – are not (could not be) credible. Importantly, it is independent
of any metaphysical claim about whether a miracle is or is not
possible, and it is just premised on Hume ’ s empiricist views in epistemology.
Here is how Hume summarizes the argument:

Anselm then defi nes justice as “ rectitude of will preserved for its own

sake ” (S I: 194; Dialogues , 24). Given that in the second dialogue freedom

of choice is defi ned as “ the power to preserve rectitude of will for the sake

of rectitude itself, ” freedom of choice turns out to be identical with a capacity

for justice. This illuminates why the ability to sin, when added to the

will, diminishes its freedom. Also, we can now see clearly that, like his

42 Julia Hermann

understanding of truth, Anselm ’ s understanding of freedom is teleological.

This distinguishes him from most contemporary philosophers.

In the way in which Anselm presents his argument, it is incomplete. To

be formally and semantically valid, it has to be supplemented by a number

of premises that are merely implicit in the text. The original argument is

contained in the following passage from “ On Free Will ” :

T: Which will do you think is freer: one whose willing and whose ability

not to sin are such that it cannot be turned away from the rectitude of

not sinning, or one that in some way can be turned to sin?

S: I don ’ t see why a will isn ’ t freer when it is capable of both.

T: Do you not see that someone who has what is fi tting and expedient in

such a way that he cannot lose it is freer than someone who has it in

such a way that he can lose it and be seduced into what is unfi tting

and inexpedient?

S: I don ’ t think anyone would doubt that.

T: And you will say that it is no less indubitable that sinning is always unfi tting

and harmful.

S: No one in his right mind thinks otherwise.

T: Then a will that cannot fall away from the rectitude of not sinning is

freer than a will that can abandon that rectitude.

S: I don ’ t think anything could be more reasonably asserted.

T: Now if something diminishes freedom if it is added and increases freedom

if taken away, do you think that it is either freedom or a part of

freedom?

S: I cannot think so.

T: Then the power to sin, which if added to the will diminishes its freedom

and if taken away increases it, is neither freedom nor a part of freedom.

S: Nothing could be more logical. (S I: 208f; Dialogues , 32f)

P1. If someone has what is fi tting and expedient in such a way that he

cannot lose it, he is freer than someone who has it in such a way that

he can lose it and be seduced into what is unfi tting and harmful.

P2. Rectitude is fi tting and expedient.

C1. If someone has rectitude in such a way that he cannot lose it, then he is

freer than someone who has it in such a way that he can lose it and be

seduced into what is unfi tting and harmful (substitution, P1, P2).

P3. Sinning is always unfi tting and harmful.

C2. If someone has rectitude in such a way that he cannot lose it, then

he is freer than someone who has it in such a way that he can lose it

and be seduced into sinning (substitution, C1, P3).

P4. Someone who has rectitude in such a way that he cannot lose it is

someone who has a will that cannot fall away from the rectitude of not

sinning.

St. Anselm on Free Choice and the Power to Sin 43

P5. If someone has a will that cannot fall away from the rectitude of not

sinning, then he is freer than someone who has it in such a way that he

can lose it and be seduced into sinning (substitution, C2, P4).

C3. Someone who has a will that cannot fall away from the rectitude of

not sinning is freer than a will that has rectitude in such a way that

he can lose it and be seduced into sinning ( modus ponens , P5, P4).

P6. A will that can abandon rectitude is a will that has rectitude in such a

way that it can lose it and be seduced into sinning.

C4. A will that cannot fall away from the rectitude of not sinning is freer

than a will that can abandon rectitude (substitution, C3, P6).

P7. The power to sin diminishes freedom if it is added to the will and

increases freedom if it is taken away from it (implied by C2).

P8. If something diminishes freedom if it is added and increases freedom if

taken away, then it is neither freedom nor a part of freedom.

C5. The power to sin is neither freedom nor a part of freedom ( modus

ponens , P7, P8).

10

Hume ’ s Argument against

Miracles

Tommaso Piazza

Originally planned to appear in the earlier Treatise of Human Nature

(1739 – 40), Hume ’ s argument against miracles fi rst went to press as Chapter

X of An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding in 1748. Since then,

mainly as a separate text, it has been granted continued attention. The

argument is part of Hume ’ s philosophy of religion. In particular, it is

inserted within a discussion about whether some religious belief could be

Hume , David. An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding . Indianapolis :

Hackett , 1997 .

Buckle , Stephen. Hume ’ s Enlightenment Tract: The Unity and Purpose of An

Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding . Oxford : Oxford University

Press , 2001 .

Fogelin , Robert J. A Defense of Hume on Miracles . Princeton, NJ : Princeton

University Press , 2003 .

Levine , Michael P. Hume and the Problem of Miracles: A Solution . Dordrecht :

Kluwer , 1989 .

___. “ Miracles . ” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2005

edn.), edited by Edward N. Zalta, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/

entries/miracles/#Hum

Swinburne , Richard. The Existence of God . Oxford : Oxford University

Press , 2004 .

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

Hume’s Argument against Miracles 45

established by revelation; the argument purports to vindicate a negative

answer to this question, by showing that miracles – the very foundation of

revealed religion – are not (could not be) credible. Importantly, it is independent

of any metaphysical claim about whether a miracle is or is not

possible, and it is just premised on Hume ’ s empiricist views in epistemology.

Here is how Hume summarizes the argument: