DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 1.71k
which allows atheists to use deontic language meaningfully without believing
in God. God would, moreover, retain moral prerogatives that human
beings wouldn ’ t, so God ’ s behavior, though ultimately recognizable as
moral, need not be exactly like human morality (contrary to John Stuart
Mill ’ s claim to the contrary). Although God ’ s issuing irremediably evil commands
is vaguely conceivable, it wouldn ’ t be genuinely possible; reconciling
God ’ s commands with ineliminable moral intuitions may be diffi cult but
The Euthyphro Dilemma 51
can ’ t be impossible if it ’ s rational to believe in God ’ s moral perfection; and
our grasp of necessary moral facts is an epistemic issue that would underdetermine
the metaphysical foundations of morality. And fi nally, the dependence
of morality on God does not entail God ’ s volitional control over the
contents of morality to make it just anything at all; divine impeccability
would rule some things out. Armed with such distinctions, the theistic ethicist
and divine command theorist has not been shown to be irrational in
light of the Euthyphro Dilemma.
Is what is holy holy because the gods approve it, or do they approve it
because it is holy? (Plato, 10a)
P1. What is moral is either moral because God commands it or it is not.
P2. If what is moral is moral because God commands it, then morality is
arbitrary and vacuous.
P3. If what is moral is moral for reasons other than that God commands
it, then God is superfl uous from the standpoint of morality.
C1. Either morality is arbitrary and vacuous or God is superfl uous to
morality (constructive dilemma, P1, P2, P3).
12
Nietzsche ’ s Death of God
Tom Grimwood
While Nietzsche resists easy logical formulation, the signifi cance of his
critique of the ideas of truth and morality in Western philosophy makes
him one of the most important thinkers in modern times. Perhaps no other
philosopher has been defi ned through his legacy as has been Nietzsche: the
assault on the metaphysical nature of truth in this argument not only lays
foundations for existentialism, poststructuralism, and postmodernism, but
it also provides moral philosophy with an emblematic fi gure of moral skepticism
(in the work of MacIntyre or Williams, for example).
For Nietzsche, the contemporary age (Northern Europe at the end of the
nineteenth century) was witnessing a radical undermining of its philosophical
foundations. On the one hand, the traditional beliefs in God were
rendered unbelievable by developments in science. But on the other hand,
the gap this left in existence had merely being fi lled by a substitute, science
itself, which for Nietzsche maintained the same illusory suppositions over
the sacred nature of “ truth. ” On the one hand, the rise of the middle classes
in the industrial age was undermining traditional structures of society,
revealing the importance and malleability of power to the development of
humanity. On the other hand, Nietzsche saw that this great shift had produced
not radical change but only apathy. The real problem, Nietzsche
argued, was not that God had ceased to be believable, but – given the way
Nietzsche , Friedrich . The Gay Science , translated by Josefi ne Nauckhoff.
Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 2001 .
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Nietzsche’s Death of God 53
in which science seamlessly slotted into the same foundational space –
nobody had really noticed the signifi cance of the event. Nietzsche is not a
nihilist: for him, the death of God is the greatest event of recent times,
enabling “ Free Spirits ” to throw off their metaphysical shackles and embrace
a genuinely open future (although Nietzsche ’ s – necessary – ambiguity over
the precise nature of this future has undeniably led to such diverse readings
of his work).
Hence, despite its subject matter, Nietzsche does not argue for the Death
of God itself in his work in a way that would engage traditionally with the
philosophy of religion – it is, rather, a proclamation of an event which is
witnessed or reported (for example, in The Gay Science, § 125, § 343, and
in the prologue to Thus Spoke Zarathustra ). He is more interested in how
we, as humans, react to the event: whether we embrace its full signifi cance
or continue to place a similar “ faith ” in concepts that remain dependent
upon the same metaphysical assumptions, such as science and/or morality.
Central to these assumptions is the affi rmation of “ another world, ” that of
“ truth, ” which lies behind our immediate world of experience (for
Christianity, this is “ heaven ” ; for morality, the abstract “ good ” ; for science,
atomic structures; and so on). This “ beyond ” removes us from our own
sensibilities and retains us in a quasi - religious state in reverence to the
scientifi c and/or the moral. Given that such an ordering of the world infects
both our language and practice, Nietzsche consequently views the importance
of truth as metaphorical rather than rational: the sense we make of
the world is always limited by our perspective (indeed, in his early work he
argues that truth is itself a mixed metaphorical construction, a point much
elaborated on by later poststructuralists), and as such images, fi gures, and
motifs authorize this sense long before we construct a justifi catory logic for
it. Nietzsche ’ s style of arguing is at once rigorously philological, tracing
the historical development of concepts with intense academic skill, and
at the same time almost hopelessly generalizing, aiming broad shots across
the bows of our expectations of what a philosophical argument should be.
This style must be borne in mind when approaching the logic of Nietzsche ’ s
argument: his argument over the Death of God is far more a polemic than
it is an exercise in close reasoning, and at least one of its aims is to open
our eyes to a world without fi xed parameters of meaning and truth, and in
its place, a raw fl ux of energy and power.
The greatest recent event – that “ God is dead ” ; that the belief in the
Christian God has become unbelievable – is already starting to cast its fi rst
shadow over Europe. [ … ] But in the main one might say: for many people ’ s
power of comprehension, the event is itself far too great, distant, and out of
the way even for its tidings to be thought of as having arrived yet. Even less
may one suppose many to know at all what this even really means – and,
54 Tom Grimwood
now that this faith has been undermined, how much must collapse because
it was built on this faith, leaned on it, had grown on it – for example, our
entire European morality. ( § 343)

which allows atheists to use deontic language meaningfully without believing

in God. God would, moreover, retain moral prerogatives that human

beings wouldn ’ t, so God ’ s behavior, though ultimately recognizable as

moral, need not be exactly like human morality (contrary to John Stuart

Mill ’ s claim to the contrary). Although God ’ s issuing irremediably evil commands

is vaguely conceivable, it wouldn ’ t be genuinely possible; reconciling

God ’ s commands with ineliminable moral intuitions may be diffi cult but

The Euthyphro Dilemma 51

can ’ t be impossible if it ’ s rational to believe in God ’ s moral perfection; and

our grasp of necessary moral facts is an epistemic issue that would underdetermine

the metaphysical foundations of morality. And fi nally, the dependence

of morality on God does not entail God ’ s volitional control over the

contents of morality to make it just anything at all; divine impeccability

would rule some things out. Armed with such distinctions, the theistic ethicist

and divine command theorist has not been shown to be irrational in

light of the Euthyphro Dilemma.

Is what is holy holy because the gods approve it, or do they approve it

because it is holy? (Plato, 10a)

P1. What is moral is either moral because God commands it or it is not.

P2. If what is moral is moral because God commands it, then morality is

arbitrary and vacuous.

P3. If what is moral is moral for reasons other than that God commands

it, then God is superfl uous from the standpoint of morality.

C1. Either morality is arbitrary and vacuous or God is superfl uous to

morality (constructive dilemma, P1, P2, P3).

12

Nietzsche ’ s Death of God

Tom Grimwood

While Nietzsche resists easy logical formulation, the signifi cance of his

critique of the ideas of truth and morality in Western philosophy makes

him one of the most important thinkers in modern times. Perhaps no other

philosopher has been defi ned through his legacy as has been Nietzsche: the

assault on the metaphysical nature of truth in this argument not only lays

foundations for existentialism, poststructuralism, and postmodernism, but

it also provides moral philosophy with an emblematic fi gure of moral skepticism

(in the work of MacIntyre or Williams, for example).

For Nietzsche, the contemporary age (Northern Europe at the end of the

nineteenth century) was witnessing a radical undermining of its philosophical

foundations. On the one hand, the traditional beliefs in God were

rendered unbelievable by developments in science. But on the other hand,

the gap this left in existence had merely being fi lled by a substitute, science

itself, which for Nietzsche maintained the same illusory suppositions over

the sacred nature of “ truth. ” On the one hand, the rise of the middle classes

in the industrial age was undermining traditional structures of society,

revealing the importance and malleability of power to the development of

humanity. On the other hand, Nietzsche saw that this great shift had produced

not radical change but only apathy. The real problem, Nietzsche

argued, was not that God had ceased to be believable, but – given the way

Nietzsche , Friedrich . The Gay Science , translated by Josefi ne Nauckhoff.

Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 2001 .

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

Nietzsche’s Death of God 53

in which science seamlessly slotted into the same foundational space –

nobody had really noticed the signifi cance of the event. Nietzsche is not a

nihilist: for him, the death of God is the greatest event of recent times,

enabling “ Free Spirits ” to throw off their metaphysical shackles and embrace

a genuinely open future (although Nietzsche ’ s – necessary – ambiguity over

the precise nature of this future has undeniably led to such diverse readings

of his work).

Hence, despite its subject matter, Nietzsche does not argue for the Death

of God itself in his work in a way that would engage traditionally with the

philosophy of religion – it is, rather, a proclamation of an event which is

witnessed or reported (for example, in The Gay Science, § 125, § 343, and

in the prologue to Thus Spoke Zarathustra ). He is more interested in how

we, as humans, react to the event: whether we embrace its full signifi cance

or continue to place a similar “ faith ” in concepts that remain dependent

upon the same metaphysical assumptions, such as science and/or morality.

Central to these assumptions is the affi rmation of “ another world, ” that of

“ truth, ” which lies behind our immediate world of experience (for

Christianity, this is “ heaven ” ; for morality, the abstract “ good ” ; for science,

atomic structures; and so on). This “ beyond ” removes us from our own

sensibilities and retains us in a quasi - religious state in reverence to the

scientifi c and/or the moral. Given that such an ordering of the world infects

both our language and practice, Nietzsche consequently views the importance

of truth as metaphorical rather than rational: the sense we make of

the world is always limited by our perspective (indeed, in his early work he

argues that truth is itself a mixed metaphorical construction, a point much

elaborated on by later poststructuralists), and as such images, fi gures, and

motifs authorize this sense long before we construct a justifi catory logic for

it. Nietzsche ’ s style of arguing is at once rigorously philological, tracing

the historical development of concepts with intense academic skill, and

at the same time almost hopelessly generalizing, aiming broad shots across

the bows of our expectations of what a philosophical argument should be.

This style must be borne in mind when approaching the logic of Nietzsche ’ s

argument: his argument over the Death of God is far more a polemic than

it is an exercise in close reasoning, and at least one of its aims is to open

our eyes to a world without fi xed parameters of meaning and truth, and in

its place, a raw fl ux of energy and power.

The greatest recent event – that “ God is dead ” ; that the belief in the

Christian God has become unbelievable – is already starting to cast its fi rst

shadow over Europe. [ … ] But in the main one might say: for many people ’ s

power of comprehension, the event is itself far too great, distant, and out of

the way even for its tidings to be thought of as having arrived yet. Even less

may one suppose many to know at all what this even really means – and,

54 Tom Grimwood

now that this faith has been undermined, how much must collapse because

it was built on this faith, leaned on it, had grown on it – for example, our

entire European morality. ( § 343)