DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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Wouldn ’ t the cultivation of the scientifi c spirit begin when one permitted
oneself no more convictions? That is probably the case; only we need still
ask: in order that this cultivation begin , must there not be some prior conviction
– and indeed one so authoritative and unconditional that it sacrifi ces all
other convictions to itself? We see that science, too, rests on a faith; there is
simply no “ presuppositionless ” science. The question whether truth is necessary
must get an answer in advance, the answer “ yes ” , and moreover this
answer must be so fi rm that it takes the form of the statement, the belief, the
conviction: “ Nothing is more necessary than truth; and in relation to it, everything
else has only secondary value. ” [ … ] But why not deceive? But why
not allow oneself to be deceived? Note that the reasons for the former lie in
a completely different area from those for the latter: one does not want to let
oneself be deceived because one assumes it is harmful, dangerous, disastrous
to be deceived; in this sense science would be a long - range prudence, caution,
utility, and to this one could justifi ably object: How so? Is it really less
harmful, dangerous, disastrous not to want to let oneself be deceived? [ … ]
Precisely this conviction could never have originated if truth and untruth had
constantly made it clear that they were both useful, as they are. So, the faith
in science, which after all undeniably exists, cannot owe its origin to such a
calculus of utility; rather it must have originated in spite of the fact that the
disutility and dangerousness of the “ will to truth ” or “ truth at any price ” is
proved to it constantly. [ … ] Consequently, “ will to truth ” does not mean “ I
do not want to let myself be deceived ” but – there is no alternative – “ I will
not deceive, not even myself ” ; and with that we stand on moral ground .
( § 344)
Thus the question “ Why science? ” leads back to the moral problem: Why
morality at all , if life, nature, and history are “ immoral ” ? No doubt, those
who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense which faith in science
presupposes thereby affi rm another world than that of life, nature, and
history; [ … ] it is still a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science
rests – that even we knowers of today, we godless anti - metaphysicians, still
take our fi re, too, from the fl ame lit by the thousand - year old faith, the
Christian faith which was also Plato ’ s faith, that God is truth; that truth is
divine [ … ] But what if this were to become more and more diffi cult to believe,
if nothing more were to turn out to be divine except error, blindness, the lie
– if God himself were to turn out to be our longest lie? ( § 344)
The opening part of this reconstructed argument is not Nietzsche ’ s but
rather a standard motif of modernity, which Nietzsche takes to task:
P1. If we accept or commit to something as an organizing principle of our
lives, then it should be rational, true, or believable.
Nietzsche’s Death of God 55
P2. God ’ s existence is not rational, true, or believable ( “ The belief in the
Christian God has become unbelievable, ” § 343).
C1. We should not accept and commit to God as an organizing principle
of our lives ( modus tollens , P1, P2).
The majority of people are happy with this, Nietzsche thinks, because they
substitute other, more believable principles – science, morality, and so on – in
the place of ‘ God ’ s existence ’ . P2 then becomes an affi rmation rather than a
negation – ‘ science is rational ’ , for example – albeit creating a fallacy of
affi rming the consequent. It is these substitutions that Nietzsche sees as remnants
of belief that are really challenged by the idea of the Death of God.
Thus, Nietzsche is not interested in discussing the existence or nature of God
(P2 or C1). His issue is rather with the claim made in P1: our desire to seek a
“ truth ” in the world beyond our immediate sensations, or, as Nietzsche terms
it, the Will to Truth, and why this conditions our lives in the way it does.
P3. If science, morality, or religion contains assumptions, then these will
affect the outcome of its inquiry.
Again, here Nietzsche is using the principles of the Enlightenment (the
“ scientifi c spirit ” ) that knowledge should be objective and without assumptions
(or, in Nietzsche ’ s words, “ convictions ” ). “ Wouldn ’ t the cultivation
of the scientifi c spirit begin when one permitted oneself no more convictions?
” But Nietzsche probes this premise, “ we need still ask: in order that
this cultivation begin , must there not be some prior conviction – and indeed
one so authoritative and unconditional that it sacrifi ces all other convictions
to itself? ” ( § 344).
P4. Science, morality, and religion contain the same assumption: the Will
to Truth (the unspoken assumption of science, for example, is that truth
is worth discovering: the “ yes ” in advance); “ There is simply no ‘ presuppositionless
’ science. ”
C2. The Will to Truth affects the outcome of (moral, scientifi c, religious)
inquiry ( modus ponens , P3, P4).
Nietzsche is noting here that our understanding is conditioned by the
need to discover a “ truth ” beyond our immediate perception, which he
considers most moral, scientifi c, and religious understanding to do (he
writes more on this in the section of Beyond Good and Evil entitled “ On
the prejudices of philosophers ” ).
P5. If the Will to Truth is essential to our understanding (i.e., we can have
no knowledge without it), then we will have a reason for following it.
P6. But we do not have a moral or utilitarian reason for following it.
56 Tom Grimwood
When Nietzsche asks whether it is “ really less harmful, dangerous, disastrous
not to want to let oneself be deceived? ” we can see that lying and
deception can, in fact, be very useful (e.g., when raising children, absolute
truth is unnecessary and sometimes unhelpful).
C3. The Will to Truth is not essential to our understanding ( modus
tollens , P5, P6).
As Nietzsche refl ects, “ you only have to ask yourself carefully, ‘ Why do
you not want to deceive? ’ especially if it should seem – and it does seem!
– as if [ … ] life on the largest scale has actually always shown itself to be
on the side of the most unscrupulous polytropoi . ” (201) “ Polytropoi ”
means devious, cunning, deceptive. It comes from The Odyssey , where it is
used to describe the hero who uses these traits to survive the wrath of the
gods. In other words, Nietzsche is suggesting that “ life ” in general does not
favor truth in the way that scientifi c or moral knowledge seems to.
The argument then makes two interrelated points surrounding the status
of “ truth ” itself:
P7. If we do not have moral or utilitarian reasons for following the Will to
Truth, our reasons must be other than these.
“ Should both be necessary – a lot of trust as well as a lot of mistrust –
then where might science get the unconditional belief or conviction one

Wouldn ’ t the cultivation of the scientifi c spirit begin when one permitted

oneself no more convictions? That is probably the case; only we need still

ask: in order that this cultivation begin , must there not be some prior conviction

– and indeed one so authoritative and unconditional that it sacrifi ces all

other convictions to itself? We see that science, too, rests on a faith; there is

simply no “ presuppositionless ” science. The question whether truth is necessary

must get an answer in advance, the answer “ yes ” , and moreover this

answer must be so fi rm that it takes the form of the statement, the belief, the

conviction: “ Nothing is more necessary than truth; and in relation to it, everything

else has only secondary value. ” [ … ] But why not deceive? But why

not allow oneself to be deceived? Note that the reasons for the former lie in

a completely different area from those for the latter: one does not want to let

oneself be deceived because one assumes it is harmful, dangerous, disastrous

to be deceived; in this sense science would be a long - range prudence, caution,

utility, and to this one could justifi ably object: How so? Is it really less

harmful, dangerous, disastrous not to want to let oneself be deceived? [ … ]

Precisely this conviction could never have originated if truth and untruth had

constantly made it clear that they were both useful, as they are. So, the faith

in science, which after all undeniably exists, cannot owe its origin to such a

calculus of utility; rather it must have originated in spite of the fact that the

disutility and dangerousness of the “ will to truth ” or “ truth at any price ” is

proved to it constantly. [ … ] Consequently, “ will to truth ” does not mean “ I

do not want to let myself be deceived ” but – there is no alternative – “ I will

not deceive, not even myself ” ; and with that we stand on moral ground .

( § 344)

Thus the question “ Why science? ” leads back to the moral problem: Why

morality at all , if life, nature, and history are “ immoral ” ? No doubt, those

who are truthful in that audacious and ultimate sense which faith in science

presupposes thereby affi rm another world than that of life, nature, and

history; [ … ] it is still a metaphysical faith upon which our faith in science

rests – that even we knowers of today, we godless anti - metaphysicians, still

take our fi re, too, from the fl ame lit by the thousand - year old faith, the

Christian faith which was also Plato ’ s faith, that God is truth; that truth is

divine [ … ] But what if this were to become more and more diffi cult to believe,

if nothing more were to turn out to be divine except error, blindness, the lie

– if God himself were to turn out to be our longest lie? ( § 344)

The opening part of this reconstructed argument is not Nietzsche ’ s but

rather a standard motif of modernity, which Nietzsche takes to task:

P1. If we accept or commit to something as an organizing principle of our

lives, then it should be rational, true, or believable.

Nietzsche’s Death of God 55

P2. God ’ s existence is not rational, true, or believable ( “ The belief in the

Christian God has become unbelievable, ” § 343).

C1. We should not accept and commit to God as an organizing principle

of our lives ( modus tollens , P1, P2).

The majority of people are happy with this, Nietzsche thinks, because they

substitute other, more believable principles – science, morality, and so on – in

the place of ‘ God ’ s existence ’ . P2 then becomes an affi rmation rather than a

negation – ‘ science is rational ’ , for example – albeit creating a fallacy of

affi rming the consequent. It is these substitutions that Nietzsche sees as remnants

of belief that are really challenged by the idea of the Death of God.

Thus, Nietzsche is not interested in discussing the existence or nature of God

(P2 or C1). His issue is rather with the claim made in P1: our desire to seek a

“ truth ” in the world beyond our immediate sensations, or, as Nietzsche terms

it, the Will to Truth, and why this conditions our lives in the way it does.

P3. If science, morality, or religion contains assumptions, then these will

affect the outcome of its inquiry.

Again, here Nietzsche is using the principles of the Enlightenment (the

“ scientifi c spirit ” ) that knowledge should be objective and without assumptions

(or, in Nietzsche ’ s words, “ convictions ” ). “ Wouldn ’ t the cultivation

of the scientifi c spirit begin when one permitted oneself no more convictions?

” But Nietzsche probes this premise, “ we need still ask: in order that

this cultivation begin , must there not be some prior conviction – and indeed

one so authoritative and unconditional that it sacrifi ces all other convictions

to itself? ” ( § 344).

P4. Science, morality, and religion contain the same assumption: the Will

to Truth (the unspoken assumption of science, for example, is that truth

is worth discovering: the “ yes ” in advance); “ There is simply no ‘ presuppositionless

’ science. ”

C2. The Will to Truth affects the outcome of (moral, scientifi c, religious)

inquiry ( modus ponens , P3, P4).

Nietzsche is noting here that our understanding is conditioned by the

need to discover a “ truth ” beyond our immediate perception, which he

considers most moral, scientifi c, and religious understanding to do (he

writes more on this in the section of Beyond Good and Evil entitled “ On

the prejudices of philosophers ” ).

P5. If the Will to Truth is essential to our understanding (i.e., we can have

no knowledge without it), then we will have a reason for following it.

P6. But we do not have a moral or utilitarian reason for following it.

56 Tom Grimwood

When Nietzsche asks whether it is “ really less harmful, dangerous, disastrous

not to want to let oneself be deceived? ” we can see that lying and

deception can, in fact, be very useful (e.g., when raising children, absolute

truth is unnecessary and sometimes unhelpful).

C3. The Will to Truth is not essential to our understanding ( modus

tollens , P5, P6).

As Nietzsche refl ects, “ you only have to ask yourself carefully, ‘ Why do

you not want to deceive? ’ especially if it should seem – and it does seem!

– as if [ … ] life on the largest scale has actually always shown itself to be

on the side of the most unscrupulous polytropoi . ” (201) “ Polytropoi ”

means devious, cunning, deceptive. It comes from The Odyssey , where it is

used to describe the hero who uses these traits to survive the wrath of the

gods. In other words, Nietzsche is suggesting that “ life ” in general does not

favor truth in the way that scientifi c or moral knowledge seems to.

The argument then makes two interrelated points surrounding the status

of “ truth ” itself:

P7. If we do not have moral or utilitarian reasons for following the Will to

Truth, our reasons must be other than these.

“ Should both be necessary – a lot of trust as well as a lot of mistrust –

then where might science get the unconditional belief or conviction one