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to not being (uninstantiated) (or vice versa). So any change involves
something that both is and is not, which is an apparent contradiction. He
anticipates the obvious proposed resolution to this claim: there is no contradiction
in an item or property both being and not being, since it can,
say, “ be ” in the present while “ not be ” in the future or past. He replies that
this just relocates the contradiction inherent in change to the level of change
Palmer , John . Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy . Oxford : Oxford
University Press , 2009 .
Hoy , Ronald . “ Parmenides ’ Complete Rejection of Time . ” Journal of
Philosophy 91 ( 1994 ): 573 – 98 .
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
62 Adrian Bardon
over time. Taking change seriously requires us to think in terms of past and
future times as real; but the past and future are distinguished from the
present in that the present “ is ” while the past and future “ are not. ” The
only way to think of the past and future as real (Parmenides would claim)
is to think of them as real now, which would make them present. So thinking
about change requires us to think about the past and future as both
present and not present, real and not real.
Parmenides ’ resolution of the contradiction is to deny the reality both of
change and of the passage of time. (Note this line of reasoning is a very
close precursor to J. M. E. McTaggart ’ s (#15) early - twentieth - century argument
to the same conclusion. Sense - perception is characterized by change,
so sensation is fundamentally deceptive. The only way to know the truth
about the world is by disregarding sensation and using reason and logic
alone.
Note that Parmenides does not consider rejecting P2 or P4 instead of P1;
he does not, in other words, consider any defi nition of change that would
be consistent with a static theory of time. The static theory denies dynamic
nonrelational temporal properties (such as past/present/future) but allows
static relational temporal properties (such as earlier/simultaneous/later).
This is the same omission later made by McTaggart. This omission does
not affect the validity of this argument when considered as an attack specifi -
cally on the dynamic theory of time.
As yet a single tale of a way
remains, that it is; and along this path markers are there
very many, that What Is is ungenerated and deathless,
whole and uniform, and still and perfect;
but not ever was it, nor yet will it be, since it is now together entire,
single, continuous; for what birth will you seek of it?
How, whence increased? From not being I shall not allow
you to say or to think: for not to be said and not to be thought
is it that it is not. And indeed what need could have aroused it
later rather than before, beginning from nothing, to grow?
Thus it must either be altogether or not at all.
Nor ever from not being will the force of conviction allow
something to come to be beyond it: on account of this neither to be born
nor to die has Justice allowed it, having loosed its bonds,
but she holds it fast. And the decision about these matters lies in this:
it is or it is not; but it has in fact been decided, just as is necessary,
to leave the one unthought and nameless (for no true
way is it), and [it has been decided] that the one that it is indeed is genuine.
And how could What Is be hereafter? And how might it have been?
For if it was, it is not, nor if ever it is going to be:
thus generation is extinguished and destruction unheard of.
(Parmenides, qtd. in Palmer, 143)
Parmenides’ Refutation of Change 63
P1. Change is real (assumption for reductio ).
P2. If change is real, then it involves either (a) an object ’ s coming into existence
or beginning to have some property or (b) an object ’ s becoming
nonexistent or ceasing to have some property.
P3. If (P2), then there are different times, that is, past/present/future.
C1. There are different times, that is, past/present/future (hypothetical
syllogism, P1,P2, P3).
P4. There are not different times – only the present exists.
C2. There are different times and there are not different times (conjunction
C1, P4).
C3. Change is not real ( reductio , P1 – C2).
15
McTaggart ’ s Argument against the
Reality of Time
M. Joshua Mozersky
McTaggart ’ s argument begins with the rather simple observation that there
are two ways in which moments and events in time may be characterized.
First, they may be past, present, or future, in which case they form what
McTaggart calls the “ A - series ” (this is a series because these properties
order events with respect to each other). Second, times or events may be
earlier than, simultaneous with, or later than other times/events; McTaggart
calls this ordering the “ B - series. ” These two series differ. A - series properties
are transitory; an event might be future, but soon it will be present, then
past. B - series relations are permanent. If, for example, it is true that X
follows Y, then it is always true that X follows Y; there is never a time at
which X precedes Y or at which X and Y are simultaneous. On the B - series,
McTaggart concludes, there is no genuine change – no temporal variation
in facts – since whatever is true is always true. McTaggart also claims,
however, that time can only exist if change exists; hence, if time is real, then
McTaggart , J. M. E. The Nature of Existence , vol. II . Cambridge, UK :
Cambridge University Press , 1927 .
Broad , C. D. An Examination of McTaggart ’ s Philosophy , vol. II . Cambridge,
UK : Cambridge University Press , 1938 .
Le Poidevin , Robin , and Murray MacBeath (eds.). The Philosophy of Time .
Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1993 .
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
McTaggart’s Argument against the Reality of Time 65
moments and events in time must be characterized by A - series properties.
In short, any series that is ordered solely by B - series relations could not be

to not being (uninstantiated) (or vice versa). So any change involves

something that both is and is not, which is an apparent contradiction. He

anticipates the obvious proposed resolution to this claim: there is no contradiction

in an item or property both being and not being, since it can,

say, “ be ” in the present while “ not be ” in the future or past. He replies that

this just relocates the contradiction inherent in change to the level of change

Palmer , John . Parmenides and Presocratic Philosophy . Oxford : Oxford

University Press , 2009 .

Hoy , Ronald . “ Parmenides ’ Complete Rejection of Time . ” Journal of

Philosophy 91 ( 1994 ): 573 – 98 .

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

62 Adrian Bardon

over time. Taking change seriously requires us to think in terms of past and

future times as real; but the past and future are distinguished from the

present in that the present “ is ” while the past and future “ are not. ” The

only way to think of the past and future as real (Parmenides would claim)

is to think of them as real now, which would make them present. So thinking

about change requires us to think about the past and future as both

present and not present, real and not real.

Parmenides ’ resolution of the contradiction is to deny the reality both of

change and of the passage of time. (Note this line of reasoning is a very

close precursor to J. M. E. McTaggart ’ s (#15) early - twentieth - century argument

to the same conclusion. Sense - perception is characterized by change,

so sensation is fundamentally deceptive. The only way to know the truth

about the world is by disregarding sensation and using reason and logic

alone.

Note that Parmenides does not consider rejecting P2 or P4 instead of P1;

he does not, in other words, consider any defi nition of change that would

be consistent with a static theory of time. The static theory denies dynamic

nonrelational temporal properties (such as past/present/future) but allows

static relational temporal properties (such as earlier/simultaneous/later).

This is the same omission later made by McTaggart. This omission does

not affect the validity of this argument when considered as an attack specifi -

cally on the dynamic theory of time.

As yet a single tale of a way

remains, that it is; and along this path markers are there

very many, that What Is is ungenerated and deathless,

whole and uniform, and still and perfect;

but not ever was it, nor yet will it be, since it is now together entire,

single, continuous; for what birth will you seek of it?

How, whence increased? From not being I shall not allow

you to say or to think: for not to be said and not to be thought

is it that it is not. And indeed what need could have aroused it

later rather than before, beginning from nothing, to grow?

Thus it must either be altogether or not at all.

Nor ever from not being will the force of conviction allow

something to come to be beyond it: on account of this neither to be born

nor to die has Justice allowed it, having loosed its bonds,

but she holds it fast. And the decision about these matters lies in this:

it is or it is not; but it has in fact been decided, just as is necessary,

to leave the one unthought and nameless (for no true

way is it), and [it has been decided] that the one that it is indeed is genuine.

And how could What Is be hereafter? And how might it have been?

For if it was, it is not, nor if ever it is going to be:

thus generation is extinguished and destruction unheard of.

(Parmenides, qtd. in Palmer, 143)

Parmenides’ Refutation of Change 63

P1. Change is real (assumption for reductio ).

P2. If change is real, then it involves either (a) an object ’ s coming into existence

or beginning to have some property or (b) an object ’ s becoming

nonexistent or ceasing to have some property.

P3. If (P2), then there are different times, that is, past/present/future.

C1. There are different times, that is, past/present/future (hypothetical

syllogism, P1,P2, P3).

P4. There are not different times – only the present exists.

C2. There are different times and there are not different times (conjunction

C1, P4).

C3. Change is not real ( reductio , P1 – C2).

15

McTaggart ’ s Argument against the

Reality of Time

M. Joshua Mozersky

McTaggart ’ s argument begins with the rather simple observation that there

are two ways in which moments and events in time may be characterized.

First, they may be past, present, or future, in which case they form what

McTaggart calls the “ A - series ” (this is a series because these properties

order events with respect to each other). Second, times or events may be

earlier than, simultaneous with, or later than other times/events; McTaggart

calls this ordering the “ B - series. ” These two series differ. A - series properties

are transitory; an event might be future, but soon it will be present, then

past. B - series relations are permanent. If, for example, it is true that X

follows Y, then it is always true that X follows Y; there is never a time at

which X precedes Y or at which X and Y are simultaneous. On the B - series,

McTaggart concludes, there is no genuine change – no temporal variation

in facts – since whatever is true is always true. McTaggart also claims,

however, that time can only exist if change exists; hence, if time is real, then

McTaggart , J. M. E. The Nature of Existence , vol. II . Cambridge, UK :

Cambridge University Press , 1927 .

Broad , C. D. An Examination of McTaggart ’ s Philosophy , vol. II . Cambridge,

UK : Cambridge University Press , 1938 .

Le Poidevin , Robin , and Murray MacBeath (eds.). The Philosophy of Time .

Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1993 .

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

McTaggart’s Argument against the Reality of Time 65

moments and events in time must be characterized by A - series properties.

In short, any series that is ordered solely by B - series relations could not be