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temporal in nature.
The problem, according to McTaggart, is that the assumption that anything
exhibits A - series properties leads to a contradiction. On the one hand,
these properties are mutually incompatible: if something is present, for
example, it is neither past nor future. On the other hand, each event in time
must possess all three A - series properties: anything present, for instance,
was future and will be past. McTaggart notes that one may object that there
is no diffi culty here, for surely it is not really a contradiction to suppose
that an event is present, was future, and will be past. He responds as
follows. Suppose that an event, M, is present, was future, and will be past.
To say that M will be past is to say that at some future time, T, M is past.
Nonetheless, since M is present, there is no moment of past time at which
M is past. However, T itself will eventually be past, and when it is, M will
then be past at a moment of past time. So it turns out that M is not past
at a moment of past time but is past at a moment of past time, namely T,
and this is a contradiction. Now, of course, one will want to reply that
when T is fi nally past, then it is possible for M to be past at a moment of
past time, so there is no contradiction even if now M cannot be past at any
moment of past time. This move, replies McTaggart, simply reintroduces
the contradiction, because if T itself will be past, then T must be past,
present, and future, and to make that coherent we must suppose that it is
past, present, and future at different times. But each of those times will be
past, present, and future, which is a contradiction unless we suppose that
they are past, present, and future at different times; and so on. Every
attempt to eliminate the contradiction leads back to it.
Accordingly, the A - series does not escape contradiction and, therefore,
cannot characterize anything. But time is real only if moments and events
are characterized by A - series properties. Hence, concludes McTaggart, time
itself is unreal.
McTaggart ’ s argument is valid, but there are three main sources of
concern over its soundness. First, McTaggart presents the fi rst premise
without substantial support. In fact, his defense is simply the following: “ It
would, I suppose, be universally admitted that time involves change [ … ]
there could be no time if nothing changed ” (11). But even if this were universally
admitted, perhaps universal opinion is wrong. It is, moreover, not
universally admitted. Some philosophers have argued that it is possible for
time to exist without change (see Le Poidevin and MacBeath 63 – 79).
Additionally, the second premise has been questioned. McTaggart argues
that if it is always true that, say, a fi replace poker is hot on Monday and
cold on Tuesday, then nothing has changed because the sum total of truths
remains unchanged. But it is beliefs, sentences, or propositions that are true;
66 M. Joshua Mozersky
in other words, truth, whatever it is, is a property of entities that represent
something else. But couldn ’ t something have a property that our representation
of it lacks? After all, we can represent a red fl ower with black and
white words, so perhaps we can represent a changing world with a set of
nonchanging, eternal truths. In other words, it seems that McTaggart is
wrong to assume that the B - series is incompatible with real change, and as
a result many philosophers have rejected the A - series without rejecting the
existence of time. Such philosophers are typically called “ B - theorists. ”
Finally, premise six is controversial. Many philosophers have wondered
why we should follow McTaggart and analyze “ M will be past ” as “ M is
past at a moment of future time, T ” (see Broad). Perhaps tense modifi ers
such as ‘ was ’ and ‘ will be ’ have no need of further analysis and are easily
understood as they are. In other words, if we allow for tensed descriptions
of time such as ‘ M is present ’ , ‘ M was future ’ , and ‘ M will be past ’ to stand
as basic and fundamental, then no contradiction arises that needs to be
eliminated by McTaggart ’ s suggested analysis, because all such descriptions
are mutually compatible. “ A - theorists ” agree with McTaggart that the
B - series is inadequate as a description of time but reject his claim that there
is a contradiction in the A - series.
To this day, most philosophers who think about time are either A - theorists
or B - theorists. Though few agree with the whole of McTaggart ’ s reasoning,
almost every subsequent philosopher of time has been infl uenced by it.
It truly stands as one of the most important arguments in Western
philosophy.
Past, present and future are incompatible determinations. Every event must
be one or the other, but no event can be more than one. If I say that any event
is past, that implies that it is neither present nor future, and so with the others.
And this exclusiveness is essential to change, and therefore to time. For the
only change we can get is from future to present, and from present to past.
The characteristics are, therefore, incompatible. But every event has them all.
If M is past, it has been present and future. If it is future, it will be present
and past. If it is present, it has been future and will be past. Thus all the three
characteristics belong to each event [ … ]. The attribution of the characteristics
past, present and future to the terms of any series leads to a contradiction,
unless it is specifi ed that they have them successively. This means, as we have
seen, that they have them in relation to terms specifi ed as past, present and
future. These again, to avoid a like contradiction, must in turn be specifi ed
as past, present and future. And, since this continues infi nitely, the fi rst set of
terms never escapes from contradiction at all [ … ]. The reality of the A series,
then, leads to a contradiction, and must be rejected. And, since we have seen
that change and time require the A series, the reality of change and time must
be rejected. And so must the reality of the B series, since that requires time.
(McTaggart, 20 – 2)
McTaggart’s Argument against the Reality of Time 67
P1. If time is real, then change is real.
P2. If change is real, then what is true at one time differs from what is true
at other times.
C1. If time is real, then what is true at one time differs from what is true
at other times (hypothetical syllogism, P1, P2).
P3. If moments and events are characterized only by B - series relations, then
it is not the case that what is true at one time differs from what is true
at other times.
C2. If it is not the case that what is true at one time differs from what
is true at other times, then it is not the case that time is real (transposition,
C1).
C3. If moments and events are characterized only by B - series relations,
then it is not the case that time is real (hypothetical syllogism, P3,
C2).

temporal in nature.

The problem, according to McTaggart, is that the assumption that anything

exhibits A - series properties leads to a contradiction. On the one hand,

these properties are mutually incompatible: if something is present, for

example, it is neither past nor future. On the other hand, each event in time

must possess all three A - series properties: anything present, for instance,

was future and will be past. McTaggart notes that one may object that there

is no diffi culty here, for surely it is not really a contradiction to suppose

that an event is present, was future, and will be past. He responds as

follows. Suppose that an event, M, is present, was future, and will be past.

To say that M will be past is to say that at some future time, T, M is past.

Nonetheless, since M is present, there is no moment of past time at which

M is past. However, T itself will eventually be past, and when it is, M will

then be past at a moment of past time. So it turns out that M is not past

at a moment of past time but is past at a moment of past time, namely T,

and this is a contradiction. Now, of course, one will want to reply that

when T is fi nally past, then it is possible for M to be past at a moment of

past time, so there is no contradiction even if now M cannot be past at any

moment of past time. This move, replies McTaggart, simply reintroduces

the contradiction, because if T itself will be past, then T must be past,

present, and future, and to make that coherent we must suppose that it is

past, present, and future at different times. But each of those times will be

past, present, and future, which is a contradiction unless we suppose that

they are past, present, and future at different times; and so on. Every

attempt to eliminate the contradiction leads back to it.

Accordingly, the A - series does not escape contradiction and, therefore,

cannot characterize anything. But time is real only if moments and events

are characterized by A - series properties. Hence, concludes McTaggart, time

itself is unreal.

McTaggart ’ s argument is valid, but there are three main sources of

concern over its soundness. First, McTaggart presents the fi rst premise

without substantial support. In fact, his defense is simply the following: “ It

would, I suppose, be universally admitted that time involves change [ … ]

there could be no time if nothing changed ” (11). But even if this were universally

admitted, perhaps universal opinion is wrong. It is, moreover, not

universally admitted. Some philosophers have argued that it is possible for

time to exist without change (see Le Poidevin and MacBeath 63 – 79).

Additionally, the second premise has been questioned. McTaggart argues

that if it is always true that, say, a fi replace poker is hot on Monday and

cold on Tuesday, then nothing has changed because the sum total of truths

remains unchanged. But it is beliefs, sentences, or propositions that are true;

66 M. Joshua Mozersky

in other words, truth, whatever it is, is a property of entities that represent

something else. But couldn ’ t something have a property that our representation

of it lacks? After all, we can represent a red fl ower with black and

white words, so perhaps we can represent a changing world with a set of

nonchanging, eternal truths. In other words, it seems that McTaggart is

wrong to assume that the B - series is incompatible with real change, and as

a result many philosophers have rejected the A - series without rejecting the

existence of time. Such philosophers are typically called “ B - theorists. ”

Finally, premise six is controversial. Many philosophers have wondered

why we should follow McTaggart and analyze “ M will be past ” as “ M is

past at a moment of future time, T ” (see Broad). Perhaps tense modifi ers

such as ‘ was ’ and ‘ will be ’ have no need of further analysis and are easily

understood as they are. In other words, if we allow for tensed descriptions

of time such as ‘ M is present ’ , ‘ M was future ’ , and ‘ M will be past ’ to stand

as basic and fundamental, then no contradiction arises that needs to be

eliminated by McTaggart ’ s suggested analysis, because all such descriptions

are mutually compatible. “ A - theorists ” agree with McTaggart that the

B - series is inadequate as a description of time but reject his claim that there

is a contradiction in the A - series.

To this day, most philosophers who think about time are either A - theorists

or B - theorists. Though few agree with the whole of McTaggart ’ s reasoning,

almost every subsequent philosopher of time has been infl uenced by it.

It truly stands as one of the most important arguments in Western

philosophy.

Past, present and future are incompatible determinations. Every event must

be one or the other, but no event can be more than one. If I say that any event

is past, that implies that it is neither present nor future, and so with the others.

And this exclusiveness is essential to change, and therefore to time. For the

only change we can get is from future to present, and from present to past.

The characteristics are, therefore, incompatible. But every event has them all.

If M is past, it has been present and future. If it is future, it will be present

and past. If it is present, it has been future and will be past. Thus all the three

characteristics belong to each event [ … ]. The attribution of the characteristics

past, present and future to the terms of any series leads to a contradiction,

unless it is specifi ed that they have them successively. This means, as we have

seen, that they have them in relation to terms specifi ed as past, present and

future. These again, to avoid a like contradiction, must in turn be specifi ed

as past, present and future. And, since this continues infi nitely, the fi rst set of

terms never escapes from contradiction at all [ … ]. The reality of the A series,

then, leads to a contradiction, and must be rejected. And, since we have seen

that change and time require the A series, the reality of change and time must

be rejected. And so must the reality of the B series, since that requires time.

(McTaggart, 20 – 2)

McTaggart’s Argument against the Reality of Time 67

P1. If time is real, then change is real.

P2. If change is real, then what is true at one time differs from what is true

at other times.

C1. If time is real, then what is true at one time differs from what is true

at other times (hypothetical syllogism, P1, P2).

P3. If moments and events are characterized only by B - series relations, then

it is not the case that what is true at one time differs from what is true

at other times.

C2. If it is not the case that what is true at one time differs from what

is true at other times, then it is not the case that time is real (transposition,

C1).

C3. If moments and events are characterized only by B - series relations,

then it is not the case that time is real (hypothetical syllogism, P3,

C2).