DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 1.71k
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Kant’s Refutation of Idealism 71
able to assign a determinate order to our experiences shows that they are
the result of contact with states of affairs and events independent of the
mind.
Kant ’ s refutation of idealism is a classic example of an argument form
known as a “ transcendental argument. ” Transcendental arguments are
usually aimed at some form of epistemological skepticism. They begin with
some uncontroversial fact about our mental life – such as our having some
knowledge, belief, or cognitive capacity – and add the claim that some fact
about the extra - mental world questioned by the skeptic is a necessary condition
of that indisputable fact about our subjective mental life.
Many contemporary commentators think that transcendental arguments
are not likely to be successful as proofs of any extra - mental fact since they
characteristically involve an implausible leap from knowing how we must
represent the world to knowing how the world must really be. However,
some also think that more modest versions of similar arguments may hold
promise. A “ modest ” transcendental argument attempts to show only that
some conceptual framework is indispensable to experience as we know it,
not that the world must actually conform to that framework. The most
common contemporary objection to Kant ’ s reasoning in the refutation of
idealism is that it establishes, at best, that we must conceive of our experiences
as being related to external objects and events, not that those experiences
are actually caused by external objects and events. Kant ’ s apparent
lack of concern over the difference between these conclusions may be due
to his “ transcendental idealism, ” according to which the distinction between
how things are and how we must, constitutionally, represent them to be is
intelligible on a certain level but inoperative from any experiential or practical
standpoint.
I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All determination
of time presupposes something persistent in perception. This persistent
thing, however, cannot be an intuition in me. For all grounds of determination
of my existence that can be encountered in me are representations, and as
such require something persistent that is distinct even from them, in relation
to which their change, thus my existence in the time in which they change,
can be determined. Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible
only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of
a thing outside me. Consequently, the determination of my existence in time
is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive
outside myself. Now consciousness in time is necessarily combined with the
consciousness of the possibility of this time - determination. Therefore it is also
necessarily combined with the existence of the things outside me, as the condition
of time - determination; i.e., the consciousness of my own existence is at
the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things
outside me. (Kant, B276)
72 Adrian Bardon
P1. I am aware of myself as a subject of experiences with a determinate
temporal order that represent a world of objects and events distinct from
my mental states; that is, I have self - consciousness.
P2. If (P1), then I make judgments about the temporal order of my own
mental states.
C1. I make judgments about the temporal order of my own mental states
( modus ponens , P1, P2).
P3. There are no grounds for ordering my own mental states to be found
either in the form or content of those states.
P4. If (P3), then if I have self - consciousness, then there is something distinct
from my mental states to which their changes can be referred and their
order thereby determined.
C2. If I have self - consciousness, then there is something distinct from my
mental states to which their changes can be referred and their order
thereby determined ( modus ponens , P3, P4).
C3. There is something distinct from my mental states to which their
changes can be referred and their order thereby determined ( modus
ponens , C2, P1).
P5. If (C3), then objects of experience exist outside me.
C4. Objects of experience exist outside me ( modus ponens , C3, P5).
P6. If objects of experience exist outside me, they must exist in space.
C5. Objects of experience exist in space ( modus ponens , P6, C4).
18
The Master Argument of Diodorus
Cronus
Ludger Jansen
Aristotle . The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation ,
edited by Jonathan Barnes , 2 vols. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University
Press , 1984 .
Boethius . Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias , vols. I – II , edited
by C. Meiser . Leipzig : Teubner , 1877 – 80 .
Cicero . De Fato , translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA : Harvard
University Press , 1982 .
Epictetus . Discourses , in The Hellenistic Philosophers , edited and translated
by A. Long and D. Sedley , vol. 1 . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University
Press , 1987 .
Gaskin , Richard . The Sea Battle and the Master Argument: Aristotle and
Diodorus Cronus on the Metaphysics of the Future . Berlin : de Gruyter ,
1995 .
Psellos , Michael . Theologica , Vol. I., edited by P. Gautier. Leipzig: Teubner,
1989 .
Sedley , David . “ Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic Philosophy . ” Proceedings
of the Cambridge Philological Society 203 ( 1977 ) 74 – 120 .
Vuillemin , Jules . Necessity or Contingency: The Master Argument . Stanford,
CA : CSLI , 1996 .
Weidemann , Hermann . “ Aristotle, the Megarics, and Diodorus Cronus on
the Notion of Possibility . ” American Philosophical Quarterly 45 ( 2008 )
131 – 48 .
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
74 Ludger Jansen
The “ Master argument ” ( ho kurieu ô n logos ) is usually credited to Diodorus
Cronus, a philosopher of the Dialectical school in the fourth century bce .

Kant’s Refutation of Idealism 71

able to assign a determinate order to our experiences shows that they are

the result of contact with states of affairs and events independent of the

mind.

Kant ’ s refutation of idealism is a classic example of an argument form

known as a “ transcendental argument. ” Transcendental arguments are

usually aimed at some form of epistemological skepticism. They begin with

some uncontroversial fact about our mental life – such as our having some

knowledge, belief, or cognitive capacity – and add the claim that some fact

about the extra - mental world questioned by the skeptic is a necessary condition

of that indisputable fact about our subjective mental life.

Many contemporary commentators think that transcendental arguments

are not likely to be successful as proofs of any extra - mental fact since they

characteristically involve an implausible leap from knowing how we must

represent the world to knowing how the world must really be. However,

some also think that more modest versions of similar arguments may hold

promise. A “ modest ” transcendental argument attempts to show only that

some conceptual framework is indispensable to experience as we know it,

not that the world must actually conform to that framework. The most

common contemporary objection to Kant ’ s reasoning in the refutation of

idealism is that it establishes, at best, that we must conceive of our experiences

as being related to external objects and events, not that those experiences

are actually caused by external objects and events. Kant ’ s apparent

lack of concern over the difference between these conclusions may be due

to his “ transcendental idealism, ” according to which the distinction between

how things are and how we must, constitutionally, represent them to be is

intelligible on a certain level but inoperative from any experiential or practical

standpoint.

I am conscious of my own existence as determined in time. All determination

of time presupposes something persistent in perception. This persistent

thing, however, cannot be an intuition in me. For all grounds of determination

of my existence that can be encountered in me are representations, and as

such require something persistent that is distinct even from them, in relation

to which their change, thus my existence in the time in which they change,

can be determined. Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible

only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of

a thing outside me. Consequently, the determination of my existence in time

is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive

outside myself. Now consciousness in time is necessarily combined with the

consciousness of the possibility of this time - determination. Therefore it is also

necessarily combined with the existence of the things outside me, as the condition

of time - determination; i.e., the consciousness of my own existence is at

the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things

outside me. (Kant, B276)

72 Adrian Bardon

P1. I am aware of myself as a subject of experiences with a determinate

temporal order that represent a world of objects and events distinct from

my mental states; that is, I have self - consciousness.

P2. If (P1), then I make judgments about the temporal order of my own

mental states.

C1. I make judgments about the temporal order of my own mental states

( modus ponens , P1, P2).

P3. There are no grounds for ordering my own mental states to be found

either in the form or content of those states.

P4. If (P3), then if I have self - consciousness, then there is something distinct

from my mental states to which their changes can be referred and their

order thereby determined.

C2. If I have self - consciousness, then there is something distinct from my

mental states to which their changes can be referred and their order

thereby determined ( modus ponens , P3, P4).

C3. There is something distinct from my mental states to which their

changes can be referred and their order thereby determined ( modus

ponens , C2, P1).

P5. If (C3), then objects of experience exist outside me.

C4. Objects of experience exist outside me ( modus ponens , C3, P5).

P6. If objects of experience exist outside me, they must exist in space.

C5. Objects of experience exist in space ( modus ponens , P6, C4).

18

The Master Argument of Diodorus

Cronus

Ludger Jansen

Aristotle . The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation ,

edited by Jonathan Barnes , 2 vols. Princeton, NJ : Princeton University

Press , 1984 .

Boethius . Commentarii in librum Aristotelis Perihermeneias , vols. I – II , edited

by C. Meiser . Leipzig : Teubner , 1877 – 80 .

Cicero . De Fato , translated by H. Rackham. Cambridge, MA : Harvard

University Press , 1982 .

Epictetus . Discourses , in The Hellenistic Philosophers , edited and translated

by A. Long and D. Sedley , vol. 1 . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University

Press , 1987 .

Gaskin , Richard . The Sea Battle and the Master Argument: Aristotle and

Diodorus Cronus on the Metaphysics of the Future . Berlin : de Gruyter ,

1995 .

Psellos , Michael . Theologica , Vol. I., edited by P. Gautier. Leipzig: Teubner,

1989 .

Sedley , David . “ Diodorus Cronus and Hellenistic Philosophy . ” Proceedings

of the Cambridge Philological Society 203 ( 1977 ) 74 – 120 .

Vuillemin , Jules . Necessity or Contingency: The Master Argument . Stanford,

CA : CSLI , 1996 .

Weidemann , Hermann . “ Aristotle, the Megarics, and Diodorus Cronus on

the Notion of Possibility . ” American Philosophical Quarterly 45 ( 2008 )

131 – 48 .

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

74 Ludger Jansen

The “ Master argument ” ( ho kurieu ô n logos ) is usually credited to Diodorus

Cronus, a philosopher of the Dialectical school in the fourth century bce .