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objects, and anything that could possibly happen really does happen in
some world or another. The thought that Lewis ’ argument establishes such
a view has seemed incredible to some philosophers. Peter van Inwagen, for
one, writes, “ [T]o suppose that the existence of a plurality of universes or
cosmoi could be established by so casual an application of Quine ’ s criterion
of ontological commitment has been regarded by most of Lewis ’ s readers
as very exceptionable indeed ” (87).
Others have suggested that Lewis ’ argument is not even an argument,
properly speaking, at all. For example, William Lycan calls it a “ brief paean
to the hominess and familiarity of nonactual worlds ” and goes on to say
that Lewis ’ “ ‘ natural as breathing ’ talk, like Meinong ’ s, thinly masks a
formidable theoretical apparatus which must be evaluated on theoretical
grounds ” (277 n.7).
The argument Lewis later offered in On the Plurality of Worlds was an
argument from utility: the notion of possible worlds is useful, and this is a
reason to think that there are possible worlds. The earlier argument, as
construed below, anticipates the later one in at least two ways. First, the
earlier argument concludes not that there are possible worlds but rather
that there is a presumption in favor of accepting the existence of possible
worlds. Similarly, Lewis ’ argument from utility was not intended as a conclusive
case for the existence of possible worlds (Lewis On the Plurality ,
viii). Second, premise four of the below argument stands in clear need of
further support. Much of On the Plurality of Worlds consists of a defense
of modal realism and a critique of the alternatives and thus attempts to
provide the support that premise four needs. Lewis ’ later argument might
thus been seen as a development of his earlier one.
I believe that there are possible worlds other than the one we happen to
inhabit. If an argument is wanted, it is this. It is uncontroversially true that
things might have been otherwise than they are. I believe, and so do you, that
things could have been different in countless ways. But what does this mean?
Ordinary language permits the paraphrase: there are many ways things could
have been besides the way they actually are. On the face of it, this sentence
is an existential quantifi cation. It says that there exist many entities of a
certain description, to wit ‘ ways things could have been ’ . I believe that things
could have been different in countless ways; I believe permissible paraphrases
78 David Vander Laan
of what I believe; taking the paraphrase at its face value, I therefore believe
in the existence of certain entities that might be called ‘ ways things could have
been ’ . I prefer to call them ‘ possible worlds ’ . (Lewis Counterfactuals , 84)
P1. Things could have been different in many ways.
P2. If things could have been different in many ways, then there are many
ways things could have been besides the way they actually are.
C1. There are many ways things could have been besides the way they
actually are ( modus ponens , P1, P2).
P3. If (C1), then if it is not the case that both (i) taking (C1) at face value
is known to lead to trouble, and (ii) taking (C1) in some other way is
known not to lead to trouble, then there is a presumption in favor of
accepting (C1) at face value.
C2. If it is not the case that both (i) taking (C1) at face value is known
to lead to trouble, and (ii) taking (C1) in some other way is known
not to lead to trouble, then there is a presumption in favor of accepting
(C1) at face value ( modus ponens , C1, P3).
P4. It is not the case that both (i) taking (C1) at face value is known to lead
to trouble, and (ii) taking (C1) in some other way is known not to lead
to trouble.
C3. There is a presumption in favor of accepting (C1) at face value
( modus ponens , C2, P4).
P5. “ There exist many possible worlds ” expresses (C1) taken at face value.
C4. There is a presumption in favor of accepting that there exist many
possible worlds (substitution, C3, P5).
20
A Reductionist Account of
Personal Identity 1
Fauve Lybaert
Descartes , Ren é . Meditations on First Philosophy . New York : Classic Books
America , 2009 .
Locke , John . An Essay concerning Human Understanding . Indianapolis :
Hackett , 1996 .
Nagel , Thomas . The View from Nowhere . Oxford : Oxford University Press ,
1986 .
Parfi t , Derek . “ Experiences, Subjects and Conceptual Schemes , ” Philosophical
Topics 26 , 1/2 ( 1999 ): 217 – 70 .
___. “ Is Personal Identity What Matters ? ” The Ammonius Foundation.
http://www.ammonius.org/assets/pdfs/ammoniusfi nal.pdf
(accessed December 31, 2007 ).
___. Reasons and Persons . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1984 .
___. “ The Unimportance of Identity , ” in Identity , edited by H. Harris ,
13 – 46 . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1995 .
Quine , W. V. “ Identity and Individuation . ” The Journal of Philosophy 69
( 1972 ): 488 – 97 .
Shoemaker , Sydney . “ Persons and Their Pasts . ” American Philosophical
Quarterly 7 ( 1970 ): 269 – 85 .
Williams , Bernard . Problems of the Self . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge
University Press , 1973 .
Wittgenstein , Ludwig . Zettel . Oxford : Blackwell , 1967 .
1 The exposition of this account draws heavily on the work of Derek Parfi t. The exposition
of the different kinds of reductionism is in large part inspired by Parfi t ’ s “ Experiences, Subjects
and Conceptual Schemes ” as well as his “ Is Personal Identity What Matters? ” in which he
slightly revises the argument which he makes about personal identity in Reasons and Persons .
The formalized argument at the end of this chapter is an abbreviated version of the argument
which Parfi t develops in his Reasons and Persons . Both the commentary and the formalized
argument have benefi ted from the comments of Derek Parfi t, Cheryl Chen, Filip Buekens,
Lorenz Demey, and Roger Vergauwen.
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
80 Fauve Lybaert
For ages, philosophers have argued over the nature of persons and what
is involved in the numerical identity of persons over time. To understand
the concept of numerical identity, consider this. The two chairs at my

objects, and anything that could possibly happen really does happen in

some world or another. The thought that Lewis ’ argument establishes such

a view has seemed incredible to some philosophers. Peter van Inwagen, for

one, writes, “ [T]o suppose that the existence of a plurality of universes or

cosmoi could be established by so casual an application of Quine ’ s criterion

of ontological commitment has been regarded by most of Lewis ’ s readers

as very exceptionable indeed ” (87).

Others have suggested that Lewis ’ argument is not even an argument,

properly speaking, at all. For example, William Lycan calls it a “ brief paean

to the hominess and familiarity of nonactual worlds ” and goes on to say

that Lewis ’ “ ‘ natural as breathing ’ talk, like Meinong ’ s, thinly masks a

formidable theoretical apparatus which must be evaluated on theoretical

grounds ” (277 n.7).

The argument Lewis later offered in On the Plurality of Worlds was an

argument from utility: the notion of possible worlds is useful, and this is a

reason to think that there are possible worlds. The earlier argument, as

construed below, anticipates the later one in at least two ways. First, the

earlier argument concludes not that there are possible worlds but rather

that there is a presumption in favor of accepting the existence of possible

worlds. Similarly, Lewis ’ argument from utility was not intended as a conclusive

case for the existence of possible worlds (Lewis On the Plurality ,

viii). Second, premise four of the below argument stands in clear need of

further support. Much of On the Plurality of Worlds consists of a defense

of modal realism and a critique of the alternatives and thus attempts to

provide the support that premise four needs. Lewis ’ later argument might

thus been seen as a development of his earlier one.

I believe that there are possible worlds other than the one we happen to

inhabit. If an argument is wanted, it is this. It is uncontroversially true that

things might have been otherwise than they are. I believe, and so do you, that

things could have been different in countless ways. But what does this mean?

Ordinary language permits the paraphrase: there are many ways things could

have been besides the way they actually are. On the face of it, this sentence

is an existential quantifi cation. It says that there exist many entities of a

certain description, to wit ‘ ways things could have been ’ . I believe that things

could have been different in countless ways; I believe permissible paraphrases

78 David Vander Laan

of what I believe; taking the paraphrase at its face value, I therefore believe

in the existence of certain entities that might be called ‘ ways things could have

been ’ . I prefer to call them ‘ possible worlds ’ . (Lewis Counterfactuals , 84)

P1. Things could have been different in many ways.

P2. If things could have been different in many ways, then there are many

ways things could have been besides the way they actually are.

C1. There are many ways things could have been besides the way they

actually are ( modus ponens , P1, P2).

P3. If (C1), then if it is not the case that both (i) taking (C1) at face value

is known to lead to trouble, and (ii) taking (C1) in some other way is

known not to lead to trouble, then there is a presumption in favor of

accepting (C1) at face value.

C2. If it is not the case that both (i) taking (C1) at face value is known

to lead to trouble, and (ii) taking (C1) in some other way is known

not to lead to trouble, then there is a presumption in favor of accepting

(C1) at face value ( modus ponens , C1, P3).

P4. It is not the case that both (i) taking (C1) at face value is known to lead

to trouble, and (ii) taking (C1) in some other way is known not to lead

to trouble.

C3. There is a presumption in favor of accepting (C1) at face value

( modus ponens , C2, P4).

P5. “ There exist many possible worlds ” expresses (C1) taken at face value.

C4. There is a presumption in favor of accepting that there exist many

possible worlds (substitution, C3, P5).

20

A Reductionist Account of

Personal Identity 1

Fauve Lybaert

Descartes , Ren é . Meditations on First Philosophy . New York : Classic Books

America , 2009 .

Locke , John . An Essay concerning Human Understanding . Indianapolis :

Hackett , 1996 .

Nagel , Thomas . The View from Nowhere . Oxford : Oxford University Press ,

1986 .

Parfi t , Derek . “ Experiences, Subjects and Conceptual Schemes , ” Philosophical

Topics 26 , 1/2 ( 1999 ): 217 – 70 .

___. “ Is Personal Identity What Matters ? ” The Ammonius Foundation.

http://www.ammonius.org/assets/pdfs/ammoniusfi nal.pdf

(accessed December 31, 2007 ).

___. Reasons and Persons . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1984 .

___. “ The Unimportance of Identity , ” in Identity , edited by H. Harris ,

13 – 46 . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 1995 .

Quine , W. V. “ Identity and Individuation . ” The Journal of Philosophy 69

( 1972 ): 488 – 97 .

Shoemaker , Sydney . “ Persons and Their Pasts . ” American Philosophical

Quarterly 7 ( 1970 ): 269 – 85 .

Williams , Bernard . Problems of the Self . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge

University Press , 1973 .

Wittgenstein , Ludwig . Zettel . Oxford : Blackwell , 1967 .

1 The exposition of this account draws heavily on the work of Derek Parfi t. The exposition

of the different kinds of reductionism is in large part inspired by Parfi t ’ s “ Experiences, Subjects

and Conceptual Schemes ” as well as his “ Is Personal Identity What Matters? ” in which he

slightly revises the argument which he makes about personal identity in Reasons and Persons .

The formalized argument at the end of this chapter is an abbreviated version of the argument

which Parfi t develops in his Reasons and Persons . Both the commentary and the formalized

argument have benefi ted from the comments of Derek Parfi t, Cheryl Chen, Filip Buekens,

Lorenz Demey, and Roger Vergauwen.

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

80 Fauve Lybaert

For ages, philosophers have argued over the nature of persons and what

is involved in the numerical identity of persons over time. To understand

the concept of numerical identity, consider this. The two chairs at my