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Below, we will look at Parfi t ’ s argument for his position. Parfi t argues
for his view by stating that we should be either nonreductionists or reductionists,
by advancing that there is no evidence for the nonreductionist view,
and by demonstrating how we can describe psychological continuity in a
way that does not presuppose personal identity.
Even when Parfi t ’ s argument is considered formally valid, discussion
about the truth of his premises and his method is possible.
Two of the premises that could be questioned are premise 6 and premise
7. Can quasi - memories really be called ‘ memories ’ , or are they only bits of
information? If the latter is the case, could quasi - memory then still be said
to be an instance of psychological continuity?
As far as Parfi t ’ s method is concerned, one could question his appeal to a
thought experiment. Parfi t imagines a world in which we could have memories
of experiencing an event at which we were in fact not present. Philosophers
develop thought experiments like these to become clear on our intuitions
about a certain concept. They ask something like “ If x were the case, what
would we then think about A? ” There is controversy over whether it is
legitimate to appeal to thought experiments in philosophical arguments.
Some philosophers, such as Quine ( “ Identity, ” 490) and Wittgenstein ( Zettel ,
proposition 350), claim that doing so would mean that we attribute a power
to words which they in fact do not have. They argue that, being in this world,
we cannot really predict what our attitudes in another world would be. They
also question what our attitudes in a world unlike ours could possibly say
about our attitudes in the world in which we actually live.
We are not separately existing entities, apart from our brains and bodies,
and various interrelated physical and mental events. Our existence just
A Reductionist Account of Personal Identity 83
involves the existence of our brains and bodies, and the doing of our deeds,
and the thinking of our thoughts, and the occurrence of certain other physical
and mental events. Our identity over time just involves (a) Relation R – psychological
connectedness and/or psychological continuity – with the right
kind of cause, provided (b) that this relation does not take a ‘ branching ’
form, holding between one person and two different future people. (Parfi t
Reasons , 216)
Defi ning Premises
P1. When we ask what persons are, and how they continue to exist, the
fundamental choice is between two views: the nonreductionist view and
the reductionist view (Parfi t Reasons , 273).
P2. “ On the non - reductionist view, persons are separately existing entities,
distinct from their brain and bodies and their experiences ” (ibid., 275).
On this view, persons are entities whose existence must be all - or - nothing
(cf., ibid., 273).
P3. On the reductionist view, “ persons exist. And a person is distinct from
his brain and body, and his experiences. But persons are not separately
existing entities. The existence of a person, during any period, just consists
in the existence of his brain and body, the thinking of his thoughts,
the doing of his deeds, and the occurrence of many other physical and
mental events ” (cf., ibid.).
Arguments in Defense of the Reductionist View
P4. The reductionist view is true (A) if the occurrence of psychological
continuity does not presuppose that a person holds these psychological
events together and (B) if we should reject the belief that persons are
separately existing entities.
A. The occurrence of psychological continuity does not presuppose that
a person holds these psychological events together.
P5. We could think of memories as instantiations of quasi - memories.
P6. I would have an “ accurate quasi - memory of past experience if I seem
to remember having an experience; someone did have this experience;
and my apparent memory is causally dependent on that past experience ”
(ibid., 220). An example of my quasi - memory of another person ’ s past
experience could be this: this person experiences something; a memory
of this experience is formed; this memory gets stored on some device and
is then downloaded to my brain.
84 Fauve Lybaert
P7. The continuity of quasi - memory is an instantiation of psychological
continuity. Or, in other words: if there is continuity of quasi - memory
(P( x )), then there is an instantiation of psychological continuity (Q( x )).
Formalized, this gives: ( ∀ x (P( x ) → Q( x )).
P8. If we were aware that our quasi - memories may be of other people ’ s
past experiences, as well as of ours, these quasi - memories would and
should not be automatically combined with the belief that these memories
are about our own experiences. In logical language, this means that
the continuity of quasi - memory (P) is consistent with the idea that this
continuity can be shared by different persons (R). This relationship of
consistency can be formalized as: ∃ x (P( x ) & R( x )).
C1. A certain continuity of quasi - memory can be shared by different
persons. Or: P( a ) & R( a ) (elimination of the existential quantifi er, P8).
C2. There is continuity of quasi - memory (P( a )) (simplifi cation, C1).
C3. The occurrence of a certain continuity of quasi - memory implies the
occurrence of a certain psychological continuity: P( a ) → Q( a ) (elimination
of the universal quantifi er, P7).
C4. There is an instantiation of psychological continuity (Q( a )) ( modus
ponens , C2, C3).
C5. Something has the property of being shared by different persons
(R( a )) (simplifi cation, C1).
C6. The property of being psychologically continuous is consistent with
the property of being shared: Q( a ) & R( a ) (conjunction,C4, C5).
C7. Psychological continuity is consistent with this continuity not being
shared by different persons: ∃ x (Q( x ) & R( x )). Or, in other words: the
occurrence of psychological continuity does not presuppose that one
person holds these psychological events together) (introduction of the
existential quantifi er, C6).
B. We should reject the belief that persons are separately existing
entities.
P9. If we do not have evidence for the claim that persons exist as separately
existing entities, then we should reject this belief (ibid., 224).
P10. We do not have any awareness of the continued existence of a separately
existing subject.
P11. We do not have “ evidence for the fact that psychological continuity
depends chiefl y, not on the continuity of the brain, but on the continuity

Below, we will look at Parfi t ’ s argument for his position. Parfi t argues

for his view by stating that we should be either nonreductionists or reductionists,

by advancing that there is no evidence for the nonreductionist view,

and by demonstrating how we can describe psychological continuity in a

way that does not presuppose personal identity.

Even when Parfi t ’ s argument is considered formally valid, discussion

about the truth of his premises and his method is possible.

Two of the premises that could be questioned are premise 6 and premise

7. Can quasi - memories really be called ‘ memories ’ , or are they only bits of

information? If the latter is the case, could quasi - memory then still be said

to be an instance of psychological continuity?

As far as Parfi t ’ s method is concerned, one could question his appeal to a

thought experiment. Parfi t imagines a world in which we could have memories

of experiencing an event at which we were in fact not present. Philosophers

develop thought experiments like these to become clear on our intuitions

about a certain concept. They ask something like “ If x were the case, what

would we then think about A? ” There is controversy over whether it is

legitimate to appeal to thought experiments in philosophical arguments.

Some philosophers, such as Quine ( “ Identity, ” 490) and Wittgenstein ( Zettel ,

proposition 350), claim that doing so would mean that we attribute a power

to words which they in fact do not have. They argue that, being in this world,

we cannot really predict what our attitudes in another world would be. They

also question what our attitudes in a world unlike ours could possibly say

about our attitudes in the world in which we actually live.

We are not separately existing entities, apart from our brains and bodies,

and various interrelated physical and mental events. Our existence just

A Reductionist Account of Personal Identity 83

involves the existence of our brains and bodies, and the doing of our deeds,

and the thinking of our thoughts, and the occurrence of certain other physical

and mental events. Our identity over time just involves (a) Relation R – psychological

connectedness and/or psychological continuity – with the right

kind of cause, provided (b) that this relation does not take a ‘ branching ’

form, holding between one person and two different future people. (Parfi t

Reasons , 216)

Defi ning Premises

P1. When we ask what persons are, and how they continue to exist, the

fundamental choice is between two views: the nonreductionist view and

the reductionist view (Parfi t Reasons , 273).

P2. “ On the non - reductionist view, persons are separately existing entities,

distinct from their brain and bodies and their experiences ” (ibid., 275).

On this view, persons are entities whose existence must be all - or - nothing

(cf., ibid., 273).

P3. On the reductionist view, “ persons exist. And a person is distinct from

his brain and body, and his experiences. But persons are not separately

existing entities. The existence of a person, during any period, just consists

in the existence of his brain and body, the thinking of his thoughts,

the doing of his deeds, and the occurrence of many other physical and

mental events ” (cf., ibid.).

Arguments in Defense of the Reductionist View

P4. The reductionist view is true (A) if the occurrence of psychological

continuity does not presuppose that a person holds these psychological

events together and (B) if we should reject the belief that persons are

separately existing entities.

A. The occurrence of psychological continuity does not presuppose that

a person holds these psychological events together.

P5. We could think of memories as instantiations of quasi - memories.

P6. I would have an “ accurate quasi - memory of past experience if I seem

to remember having an experience; someone did have this experience;

and my apparent memory is causally dependent on that past experience ”

(ibid., 220). An example of my quasi - memory of another person ’ s past

experience could be this: this person experiences something; a memory

of this experience is formed; this memory gets stored on some device and

is then downloaded to my brain.

84 Fauve Lybaert

P7. The continuity of quasi - memory is an instantiation of psychological

continuity. Or, in other words: if there is continuity of quasi - memory

(P( x )), then there is an instantiation of psychological continuity (Q( x )).

Formalized, this gives: ( ∀ x (P( x ) → Q( x )).

P8. If we were aware that our quasi - memories may be of other people ’ s

past experiences, as well as of ours, these quasi - memories would and

should not be automatically combined with the belief that these memories

are about our own experiences. In logical language, this means that

the continuity of quasi - memory (P) is consistent with the idea that this

continuity can be shared by different persons (R). This relationship of

consistency can be formalized as: ∃ x (P( x ) & R( x )).

C1. A certain continuity of quasi - memory can be shared by different

persons. Or: P( a ) & R( a ) (elimination of the existential quantifi er, P8).

C2. There is continuity of quasi - memory (P( a )) (simplifi cation, C1).

C3. The occurrence of a certain continuity of quasi - memory implies the

occurrence of a certain psychological continuity: P( a ) → Q( a ) (elimination

of the universal quantifi er, P7).

C4. There is an instantiation of psychological continuity (Q( a )) ( modus

ponens , C2, C3).

C5. Something has the property of being shared by different persons

(R( a )) (simplifi cation, C1).

C6. The property of being psychologically continuous is consistent with

the property of being shared: Q( a ) & R( a ) (conjunction,C4, C5).

C7. Psychological continuity is consistent with this continuity not being

shared by different persons: ∃ x (Q( x ) & R( x )). Or, in other words: the

occurrence of psychological continuity does not presuppose that one

person holds these psychological events together) (introduction of the

existential quantifi er, C6).

B. We should reject the belief that persons are separately existing

entities.

P9. If we do not have evidence for the claim that persons exist as separately

existing entities, then we should reject this belief (ibid., 224).

P10. We do not have any awareness of the continued existence of a separately

existing subject.

P11. We do not have “ evidence for the fact that psychological continuity

depends chiefl y, not on the continuity of the brain, but on the continuity