DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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kitchen table, which look exactly alike and are made of the same material,
may be qualitatively identical, but they are not numerically identical.
Contrast this with the one chair in my room. If someone paints that chair
while my eyes are closed, then the chair I see when I open my eyes will
be qualitatively different from but numerically the same as the chair I saw
before.
Apply this to persons. When a relative tells you that you have changed
over the years, he recognizes that you are still numerically the same person.
He does not think that you have passed away. But he sees that you are
qualitatively a bit different now.
There is more debate over whether someone is still numerically the same
person when complete loss of memory and radical change of character
occur. Philosophers disagree over whether the resulting person is only qualitatively
different or also numerically different than the person before having
a brain hemorrhage. Philosophers, such as Derek Parfi t, who hold that we
are only the same as long as there is psychological continuity, say that we
would in such a case be confronted with a numerically different entity.
Philosophers, such as Bernard Williams, who state that someone stays the
same as long as there is bodily continuity, claim the opposite.
How do we decide what determines the numerical identity of someone?
We will fi rst have to agree on how the concept “ person ” gets its meaning.
John Locke ( An Essay , 148 II.xxvii.26) stated that the concept ‘ person ’ is
a forensic concept. “ Forensic ” is often equivocated with “ legal ” , but its
meaning stretches further than this. The term is derived from the Latin term
‘ forum ’ and means “ public ” . Locke refers to “ person ” as a public concept
because he takes its meaning to be determined by how we use it – or, to be
more precise, by how we ought to use it if we want our speaking to be in
accordance with our common beliefs, attitudes, and practices. The meaning
of the word ‘ person ’ in a legal context is one instance of this. It has, for
example, been held that, in this context, someone cannot be found guilty
of committing a crime unless he remembers committing it. One idea behind
this is that it only makes sense to penalize someone for doing something if
he can take responsibility for doing this. Remembering what you did is
supposed to be a precondition for the latter.
However, not all philosophers agree on whether the meaning of the
concept “ person ” is determined by our common use of it. Derek Parfi t, for
instance, contests this assumption. He warns that our use of this term may
be wrongheaded and holds that philosophers are in a position to assess this.
They can unveil inconsistencies in our use of this concept, examine whether
there is a real entity in the world to which it refers, as well as determine
A Reductionist Account of Personal Identity 81
whether this concept names what matters when we are concerned about
our survival – as we usually think it does. 2
This being said, philosophers will mostly start their examination of what
the concept “ person ” refers to with an assessment of how we commonly
use this concept. They will either describe our use of this concept as precisely
as possible and let this description function as a determination of the
meaning of this term, or they will explain why our application of this
concept is not entirely accurate.
This has led to two main philosophical approaches to the questions of
what persons are and what makes a person maintain her numerical identity
over time: the reductionist and the nonreductionist approach.
There are different versions of reductionism. Constitutive reductionism 3
is likely to be the most defensible version of reductionism with regard to
persons. Constitutive reductionists admit that persons exist but argue that
they are fully constituted by their physical and/or psychological continuity,
and nothing over and above these continuities.
To say that persons are fully constituted by their physical and/or psychological
continuity is not to say that persons are nothing but this continuity.
According to Sydney Shoemaker, the case is analogous to the relationship
between a statue and the lump of clay of which it is made. The statue is
constituted by the clay and has no separate existence apart from the clay.
Yet it is not the same as the lump of clay. For, if this lump loses its shape,
it will still be there, but the statue will not be. 4
Constitutive reductionists are metaphysical reductionists, not conceptual
reductionists. 5 They claim that persons are not separately existing entities
over and above their physical and/or psychological continuity, even though
we may not be able to get rid of the term “ person ” when we want to give
a complete description of the world. It is possible that we ascribe experiences
to subjects and that we should call these subjects “ persons ” not
“ physical ” and/or “ psychological continuities. ”
Another way to state what constitutive reductionists hold is this. They
claim that what makes different experiences belong to one person is not the
fact that they belong to a single separately existing entity. Rather, what
makes experiences intrapersonal should be explained in terms of other facts,
such as the fact that they are psychologically continuous with one another
or the fact that they are associated with a single body.
3 For the term ‘ constitutive reductionism, ’ see Parfi t “ Experiences ” and Parfi t “ Is Personal ” .
2 This is why Parfi t calls for a revisionary metaphysics, rather than a descriptive metaphysics:
he claims that we have to revise the use of certain of our concepts (see, e.g., Parfi t
Reasons, ix).
5 For a distinction between these two kinds of reductionism, see Parfi t “ Experiences ” (223).
4 For this reference to Shoemaker, see Parfi t “ Experiences ” (268 n.9).
82 Fauve Lybaert
A metaphysical nonreductionist, on the other hand, claims that persons
are separately existing entities over and above their physical and psychological
continuity. An example of a metaphysical nonreductionist would be
someone who identifi es persons in accordance with their soul and does not
take this soul to be fully constituted by any combination of further entities.
This metaphysical nonreductionist could believe in the transmigration of
the soul: perhaps she believes that she is identical to some past person from
whom her soul has migrated, even though that person ’ s body is not continuous
with her current body, that person ’ s character is radically different, and
she has no memory of that person ’ s experiences.
Let ’ s return to reductionism. Within constitutive reductionism, there is
still one big division to be made. Some reductionists, such as Bernard
Williams and Thomas Nagel, argue that a person stays the same person as
long as there is a certain degree of physical continuity. Other reductionists,
such as Sydney Shoemaker and Parfi t, hold that a person stays the same as
long as there is a certain degree of nonbranched psychological continuity.

kitchen table, which look exactly alike and are made of the same material,

may be qualitatively identical, but they are not numerically identical.

Contrast this with the one chair in my room. If someone paints that chair

while my eyes are closed, then the chair I see when I open my eyes will

be qualitatively different from but numerically the same as the chair I saw

before.

Apply this to persons. When a relative tells you that you have changed

over the years, he recognizes that you are still numerically the same person.

He does not think that you have passed away. But he sees that you are

qualitatively a bit different now.

There is more debate over whether someone is still numerically the same

person when complete loss of memory and radical change of character

occur. Philosophers disagree over whether the resulting person is only qualitatively

different or also numerically different than the person before having

a brain hemorrhage. Philosophers, such as Derek Parfi t, who hold that we

are only the same as long as there is psychological continuity, say that we

would in such a case be confronted with a numerically different entity.

Philosophers, such as Bernard Williams, who state that someone stays the

same as long as there is bodily continuity, claim the opposite.

How do we decide what determines the numerical identity of someone?

We will fi rst have to agree on how the concept “ person ” gets its meaning.

John Locke ( An Essay , 148 II.xxvii.26) stated that the concept ‘ person ’ is

a forensic concept. “ Forensic ” is often equivocated with “ legal ” , but its

meaning stretches further than this. The term is derived from the Latin term

‘ forum ’ and means “ public ” . Locke refers to “ person ” as a public concept

because he takes its meaning to be determined by how we use it – or, to be

more precise, by how we ought to use it if we want our speaking to be in

accordance with our common beliefs, attitudes, and practices. The meaning

of the word ‘ person ’ in a legal context is one instance of this. It has, for

example, been held that, in this context, someone cannot be found guilty

of committing a crime unless he remembers committing it. One idea behind

this is that it only makes sense to penalize someone for doing something if

he can take responsibility for doing this. Remembering what you did is

supposed to be a precondition for the latter.

However, not all philosophers agree on whether the meaning of the

concept “ person ” is determined by our common use of it. Derek Parfi t, for

instance, contests this assumption. He warns that our use of this term may

be wrongheaded and holds that philosophers are in a position to assess this.

They can unveil inconsistencies in our use of this concept, examine whether

there is a real entity in the world to which it refers, as well as determine

A Reductionist Account of Personal Identity 81

whether this concept names what matters when we are concerned about

our survival – as we usually think it does. 2

This being said, philosophers will mostly start their examination of what

the concept “ person ” refers to with an assessment of how we commonly

use this concept. They will either describe our use of this concept as precisely

as possible and let this description function as a determination of the

meaning of this term, or they will explain why our application of this

concept is not entirely accurate.

This has led to two main philosophical approaches to the questions of

what persons are and what makes a person maintain her numerical identity

over time: the reductionist and the nonreductionist approach.

There are different versions of reductionism. Constitutive reductionism 3

is likely to be the most defensible version of reductionism with regard to

persons. Constitutive reductionists admit that persons exist but argue that

they are fully constituted by their physical and/or psychological continuity,

and nothing over and above these continuities.

To say that persons are fully constituted by their physical and/or psychological

continuity is not to say that persons are nothing but this continuity.

According to Sydney Shoemaker, the case is analogous to the relationship

between a statue and the lump of clay of which it is made. The statue is

constituted by the clay and has no separate existence apart from the clay.

Yet it is not the same as the lump of clay. For, if this lump loses its shape,

it will still be there, but the statue will not be. 4

Constitutive reductionists are metaphysical reductionists, not conceptual

reductionists. 5 They claim that persons are not separately existing entities

over and above their physical and/or psychological continuity, even though

we may not be able to get rid of the term “ person ” when we want to give

a complete description of the world. It is possible that we ascribe experiences

to subjects and that we should call these subjects “ persons ” not

“ physical ” and/or “ psychological continuities. ”

Another way to state what constitutive reductionists hold is this. They

claim that what makes different experiences belong to one person is not the

fact that they belong to a single separately existing entity. Rather, what

makes experiences intrapersonal should be explained in terms of other facts,

such as the fact that they are psychologically continuous with one another

or the fact that they are associated with a single body.

3 For the term ‘ constitutive reductionism, ’ see Parfi t “ Experiences ” and Parfi t “ Is Personal ” .

2 This is why Parfi t calls for a revisionary metaphysics, rather than a descriptive metaphysics:

he claims that we have to revise the use of certain of our concepts (see, e.g., Parfi t

Reasons, ix).

5 For a distinction between these two kinds of reductionism, see Parfi t “ Experiences ” (223).

4 For this reference to Shoemaker, see Parfi t “ Experiences ” (268 n.9).

82 Fauve Lybaert

A metaphysical nonreductionist, on the other hand, claims that persons

are separately existing entities over and above their physical and psychological

continuity. An example of a metaphysical nonreductionist would be

someone who identifi es persons in accordance with their soul and does not

take this soul to be fully constituted by any combination of further entities.

This metaphysical nonreductionist could believe in the transmigration of

the soul: perhaps she believes that she is identical to some past person from

whom her soul has migrated, even though that person ’ s body is not continuous

with her current body, that person ’ s character is radically different, and

she has no memory of that person ’ s experiences.

Let ’ s return to reductionism. Within constitutive reductionism, there is

still one big division to be made. Some reductionists, such as Bernard

Williams and Thomas Nagel, argue that a person stays the same person as

long as there is a certain degree of physical continuity. Other reductionists,

such as Sydney Shoemaker and Parfi t, hold that a person stays the same as

long as there is a certain degree of nonbranched psychological continuity.