DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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C4. If time is real, then it is not the case that moments and events are
characterized only by B - series relations (transposition, C3).
P4. If it is not the case that moments and events are characterized only by
B - series relations, then moments and events have A - series properties.
C5. If time is real, then moments and events have A - series properties
(hypothetical syllogism, C4, P4).
P5. A - series properties are mutually incompatible.
P6. If A - series properties are mutually incompatible, then the attribution of
A - series properties to moments and events entails a contradiction.
C6. The attribution of A - series properties to moments and events entails
a contradiction ( modus ponens , P5, P6).
P7. If the attribution of A - series properties to moments and events entails
a contradiction, then it is not the case that moments and events have
A - series properties.
C7. It is not the case that moments and events have A - series properties
( modus ponens , C6, P7).
C8. It is not the case that time is real ( modus tollens , C5, C7).
16
Berkeley ’ s Master Argument for
Idealism
John M. DePoe
Much of the philosophical writings of George Berkeley (1685 – 1753) is
dedicated to arguing for metaphysical idealism, the position that everything
that exists is composed of thought, mind, or God. As Berkeley understood
it, being composed of thought is contrary to being composed of matter, and
therefore he aimed to show that believing in the existence of matter is
unreasonable, if not unintelligible. Matter, according to Berkeley, exists
independently of thought. He described matter as inert, senseless, and
having what the British empiricists called “ primary qualities, ” roughly
defi ned as properties that exist independently of a mind ’ s perception of them
(e.g., mass, extension, motion, etc.).
One of Berkeley ’ s most famous arguments against the existence of matter
is commonly called “ the master argument ” because if it is successful, it
refutes the existence of matter with a single masterstroke. The argument
can be summed up with a challenge: can you imagine or conceive of a tree ’ s
(or any material object ’ s) existing without its being perceived (or thought
about)? While you might think you have succeeded in conceiving of a tree
that is not being perceived, a little refl ection will reveal that you haven ’ t
done so, because in the process of conceiving of the tree, you are perceiving
Berkeley , George . Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues ,
edited by R. S. Woolhouse . London : Penguin , 1988 .
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Berkeley’s Master Argument for Idealism 69
it. So, it seems that it is impossible to conceive of something ’ s existing truly
unperceived. But if it isn ’ t even possible to conceive of something existing
unperceived, why should we think that matter can and does exist this way?
Since it is impossible to conceive of matter ’ s unperceived existence, Berkeley
concluded that the existence of matter is unreasonable.
But say you, surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees, for
instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and no body by to perceive
them. I answer, you may so, there is no diffi culty in it: but what is all this, I
beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call
books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one
that may perceive them? But do not you your self perceive or think of them
all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shows you have
the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but it doth not shew
that you can conceive it possible, the objects of your thought may exist
without the mind: to make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them
existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When
we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the
while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of
itself, is deluded to think it can and doth conceive bodies existing unthought
of or without the mind; though at the same time they are apprehended by or
exist in it self. (Berkeley, 60)
P1. If material objects exist, then material objects exist independently of
any mind ’ s thinking of them.
P2. If material objects exist independently of any mind ’ s thinking of them,
then it is conceivable for material objects to exist without any mind
thinking of them.
P3. It is not the case that it is conceivable for material objects to exist
without any mind thinking of them.
C1. It is not the case that material objects exist independently of any
mind ’ s thinking of them ( modus tollens , P2, P3).
C2. It is not the case that material objects exist ( modus tollens , P1, C1).
17
Kant ’ s Refutation of Idealism
Adrian Bardon
In the second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason , Kant offers a refutation
of Cartesian epistemological skepticism that draws (albeit somewhat
cryptically) on his insights regarding the necessary conditions of time -
consciousness. While the details remain under dispute, the key claim seems
to be that we would be unable to order all or some of our subjective experiences
in time unless we were relating their sequence in some way to changes
in objects external to the mind. The contents of our perceptual states do
not come marked with the time of their occurrence; further, all experience
is successive in form regardless of whether it represents sequences of events
or static states of affairs. Thus we need some guide to reconstructing past
events beyond the mere subjective contents of perception and memory. Only
objective states of affairs and events – conceived of as part of a law -
governed system – could function as a guide to this reconstruction by dictating
one interpretation over another. Consequently, the fact that we are
Kant , Immanuel . Critique of Pure Reason , translated by Paul Guyer and
Allen Wood. Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 1998 .
Dicker , Georges . “ Kant ’ s Refutation of Idealism , ” No û s 42 , 1 ( 2008 ):
80 – 108 .
Guyer , Paul . Kant . New York : Routledge , 2006 .
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

C4. If time is real, then it is not the case that moments and events are

characterized only by B - series relations (transposition, C3).

P4. If it is not the case that moments and events are characterized only by

B - series relations, then moments and events have A - series properties.

C5. If time is real, then moments and events have A - series properties

(hypothetical syllogism, C4, P4).

P5. A - series properties are mutually incompatible.

P6. If A - series properties are mutually incompatible, then the attribution of

A - series properties to moments and events entails a contradiction.

C6. The attribution of A - series properties to moments and events entails

a contradiction ( modus ponens , P5, P6).

P7. If the attribution of A - series properties to moments and events entails

a contradiction, then it is not the case that moments and events have

A - series properties.

C7. It is not the case that moments and events have A - series properties

( modus ponens , C6, P7).

C8. It is not the case that time is real ( modus tollens , C5, C7).

16

Berkeley ’ s Master Argument for

Idealism

John M. DePoe

Much of the philosophical writings of George Berkeley (1685 – 1753) is

dedicated to arguing for metaphysical idealism, the position that everything

that exists is composed of thought, mind, or God. As Berkeley understood

it, being composed of thought is contrary to being composed of matter, and

therefore he aimed to show that believing in the existence of matter is

unreasonable, if not unintelligible. Matter, according to Berkeley, exists

independently of thought. He described matter as inert, senseless, and

having what the British empiricists called “ primary qualities, ” roughly

defi ned as properties that exist independently of a mind ’ s perception of them

(e.g., mass, extension, motion, etc.).

One of Berkeley ’ s most famous arguments against the existence of matter

is commonly called “ the master argument ” because if it is successful, it

refutes the existence of matter with a single masterstroke. The argument

can be summed up with a challenge: can you imagine or conceive of a tree ’ s

(or any material object ’ s) existing without its being perceived (or thought

about)? While you might think you have succeeded in conceiving of a tree

that is not being perceived, a little refl ection will reveal that you haven ’ t

done so, because in the process of conceiving of the tree, you are perceiving

Berkeley , George . Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues ,

edited by R. S. Woolhouse . London : Penguin , 1988 .

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

Berkeley’s Master Argument for Idealism 69

it. So, it seems that it is impossible to conceive of something ’ s existing truly

unperceived. But if it isn ’ t even possible to conceive of something existing

unperceived, why should we think that matter can and does exist this way?

Since it is impossible to conceive of matter ’ s unperceived existence, Berkeley

concluded that the existence of matter is unreasonable.

But say you, surely there is nothing easier than to imagine trees, for

instance, in a park, or books existing in a closet, and no body by to perceive

them. I answer, you may so, there is no diffi culty in it: but what is all this, I

beseech you, more than framing in your mind certain ideas which you call

books and trees, and at the same time omitting to frame the idea of any one

that may perceive them? But do not you your self perceive or think of them

all the while? This therefore is nothing to the purpose: it only shows you have

the power of imagining or forming ideas in your mind; but it doth not shew

that you can conceive it possible, the objects of your thought may exist

without the mind: to make out this, it is necessary that you conceive them

existing unconceived or unthought of, which is a manifest repugnancy. When

we do our utmost to conceive the existence of external bodies, we are all the

while only contemplating our own ideas. But the mind taking no notice of

itself, is deluded to think it can and doth conceive bodies existing unthought

of or without the mind; though at the same time they are apprehended by or

exist in it self. (Berkeley, 60)

P1. If material objects exist, then material objects exist independently of

any mind ’ s thinking of them.

P2. If material objects exist independently of any mind ’ s thinking of them,

then it is conceivable for material objects to exist without any mind

thinking of them.

P3. It is not the case that it is conceivable for material objects to exist

without any mind thinking of them.

C1. It is not the case that material objects exist independently of any

mind ’ s thinking of them ( modus tollens , P2, P3).

C2. It is not the case that material objects exist ( modus tollens , P1, C1).

17

Kant ’ s Refutation of Idealism

Adrian Bardon

In the second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason , Kant offers a refutation

of Cartesian epistemological skepticism that draws (albeit somewhat

cryptically) on his insights regarding the necessary conditions of time -

consciousness. While the details remain under dispute, the key claim seems

to be that we would be unable to order all or some of our subjective experiences

in time unless we were relating their sequence in some way to changes

in objects external to the mind. The contents of our perceptual states do

not come marked with the time of their occurrence; further, all experience

is successive in form regardless of whether it represents sequences of events

or static states of affairs. Thus we need some guide to reconstructing past

events beyond the mere subjective contents of perception and memory. Only

objective states of affairs and events – conceived of as part of a law -

governed system – could function as a guide to this reconstruction by dictating

one interpretation over another. Consequently, the fact that we are

Kant , Immanuel . Critique of Pure Reason , translated by Paul Guyer and

Allen Wood. Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press , 1998 .

Dicker , Georges . “ Kant ’ s Refutation of Idealism , ” No û s 42 , 1 ( 2008 ):

80 – 108 .

Guyer , Paul . Kant . New York : Routledge , 2006 .

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.