DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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The argument draws a similarity between pre - natal nonexistence and
post - mortem nonexistence; they both are simply states in which we fail to
exist. It then notes that we do not fear the time before our birth in which
we did not exist, so the time after our death warrants a similar attitude. It
is important to remember that the argument is about the fear of death (the
state of nonexistence), not the fear of dying (the process of going out of
existence).
There are several criticisms of this kind of argument. Thomas Nagel
suggests that post - mortem nonexistence is a deprivation in a way that pre -
natal nonexistence is not; one who dies is robbed of life in a way that those
yet to be conceived are not. Someone whose watch has just been stolen is
not in the same state as someone who never owned a watch; they are both
watch - less, but one of them has lost something. One might also think that
fear itself has a temporal aspect and is essentially future - directed in the way
it is natural to fear being fi red next week but not to fear having been fi red
last week.
Another response to the argument is to grant the symmetry, but use our
fear of death as a premise rather than our lack of fear of the time before
we existed. Another way to have similar attitudes toward both states is to
fear both the time before we existed and the time after our death.
P1. The pre - natal state is a kind of nonexistence.
P2. The post - mortem state is a kind of nonexistence.
C1. Pre - natal and post - mortem states are relevantly similar; both are
states of nonexistence (conjunction, P1, P2).
P3. If states are relevantly similar, then they warrant similar attitudes.
C2. The pre - natal and post - mortem states warrant similar attitudes
( modus ponens , C1, P3).
P4. The pre - natal state does not warrant fear.
C3. Post - mortem nonexistence does not warrant fear (instantiation, C2,
P4).
26
The Existence of Forms: Plato ’ s
Argument from the Possibility
of Knowledge
Jurgis (George) Brakas
Plato . The Collected Dialogues of Plato , edited by Edith Hamilton and
Huntington Cairns . New York : Bollington Foundation , 1963 .
Cornford , F. M. The Republic of Plato . Oxford : Oxford University Press ,
1941 .
Ross , William David . Plato ’ s Theory of Ideas . Oxford : Clarendon Press ,
1951 .
The existence of Forms is at the heart of Plato ’ s philosophy. Take them
away, and no philosophy that could reasonably be called Plato ’ s would
remain. To the layman (not to mention many philosophers), they are strange
creatures indeed. This demands that any discussion of them attempt not
only to make clear what these Forms are supposed to be like but also why
we should believe they exist at all. Plato gives us several arguments for their
existence, but the most important one is arguably what may be called his
“ argument from the possibility of knowledge. ” Its premises can be found
in several of his dialogues. The argument, naturally enough, is the product
of his own passionate convictions and the infl uence of his predecessors upon
his thinking.
Deeply infl uenced by Socrates, he took from him the love of wisdom,
the love of genuine knowledge, with its corresponding withering contempt
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
The Existence of Forms 103
for pretensions to it – including the relativism and subjectivism of many of
his contemporary thinkers, the Sophists. He also realized that he had to
come to grips with the views of two other major thinkers, Heraclitus and
Parmenides – Heraclitus claiming that nothing is, only becoming, Parmenides
(#14) claiming that change does not exist, only what does not change (a
certain One). If – as Plato believed with Heraclitus – everything in this world
is constantly changing in every way, constantly “ morphing, ” never, ever
remaining what it is, how could it ever be possible for us to “ grasp ” anything,
to know what any thing is? By the time you think you have grasped
it, it has already slipped out of your hands.
To know something must therefore be to know something that does not
change, something that always remains what it is (something Parmenidean).
Only such a thing can be known, and only such a thing – Plato agrees with
Parmenides – is really real. Since such things do not exist in this world, they
must exist in, and constitute, a nonspatial, nontemporal dimension. These
are what Plato calls “ Forms. ” (Note that the structure of Plato ’ s argument
is not that Forms exist because knowledge exists; it is, rather, that knowledge
exists because Forms exist. Knowledge is not the source of the existence
of Forms; the reverse is true: the existence of Forms makes the existence
of knowledge possible. Plato ’ s argument, therefore, is not epistemic; it is
ontological.) They are also perfect, eternal, the source of the existence of
this world, and many other things as well, but Plato gives other reasons for
their possession of these attributes.
[Socrates asks Cratylus] Tell me whether there is or is not any absolute
beauty or good, or any other absolute existence? Certainly, Socrates, I think
there is. Then let us seek the true beauty, not asking whether a face is fair, or
anything of that sort, for all such things appear to be in fl ux, but let us ask
whether the true beauty is not always beautiful. Certainly [ . . . ]. Then how
can that be a real thing which is never in the same state? [ . . . ]. They cannot.
Nor yet, can they be known by anyone; for at the moment that the observer
approaches, then they become other and of another nature, so that you can
no longer know their nature or state. [ . . . ]. Nor can we reasonably say [ . . . ]
that there is knowledge at all, if everything is in a state of transition and there
is nothing abiding. For knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge
unless continuing always to abide and to exist. But if the very nature
of knowledge changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be
no knowledge, and if the transition is always going on, there will always
be no knowledge. ( Cratylus , qtd. in Ross, 439C – 440C; Ross ’ s trans., slightly
modifi ed using Jowett ’ s in The Collected Dialogues )
In the Republic , Plato gives us the same argument in more explicit form
– or, if you like, a different version of the same argument in more explicit
form.

The argument draws a similarity between pre - natal nonexistence and

post - mortem nonexistence; they both are simply states in which we fail to

exist. It then notes that we do not fear the time before our birth in which

we did not exist, so the time after our death warrants a similar attitude. It

is important to remember that the argument is about the fear of death (the

state of nonexistence), not the fear of dying (the process of going out of

existence).

There are several criticisms of this kind of argument. Thomas Nagel

suggests that post - mortem nonexistence is a deprivation in a way that pre -

natal nonexistence is not; one who dies is robbed of life in a way that those

yet to be conceived are not. Someone whose watch has just been stolen is

not in the same state as someone who never owned a watch; they are both

watch - less, but one of them has lost something. One might also think that

fear itself has a temporal aspect and is essentially future - directed in the way

it is natural to fear being fi red next week but not to fear having been fi red

last week.

Another response to the argument is to grant the symmetry, but use our

fear of death as a premise rather than our lack of fear of the time before

we existed. Another way to have similar attitudes toward both states is to

fear both the time before we existed and the time after our death.

P1. The pre - natal state is a kind of nonexistence.

P2. The post - mortem state is a kind of nonexistence.

C1. Pre - natal and post - mortem states are relevantly similar; both are

states of nonexistence (conjunction, P1, P2).

P3. If states are relevantly similar, then they warrant similar attitudes.

C2. The pre - natal and post - mortem states warrant similar attitudes

( modus ponens , C1, P3).

P4. The pre - natal state does not warrant fear.

C3. Post - mortem nonexistence does not warrant fear (instantiation, C2,

P4).

26

The Existence of Forms: Plato ’ s

Argument from the Possibility

of Knowledge

Jurgis (George) Brakas

Plato . The Collected Dialogues of Plato , edited by Edith Hamilton and

Huntington Cairns . New York : Bollington Foundation , 1963 .

Cornford , F. M. The Republic of Plato . Oxford : Oxford University Press ,

1941 .

Ross , William David . Plato ’ s Theory of Ideas . Oxford : Clarendon Press ,

1951 .

The existence of Forms is at the heart of Plato ’ s philosophy. Take them

away, and no philosophy that could reasonably be called Plato ’ s would

remain. To the layman (not to mention many philosophers), they are strange

creatures indeed. This demands that any discussion of them attempt not

only to make clear what these Forms are supposed to be like but also why

we should believe they exist at all. Plato gives us several arguments for their

existence, but the most important one is arguably what may be called his

“ argument from the possibility of knowledge. ” Its premises can be found

in several of his dialogues. The argument, naturally enough, is the product

of his own passionate convictions and the infl uence of his predecessors upon

his thinking.

Deeply infl uenced by Socrates, he took from him the love of wisdom,

the love of genuine knowledge, with its corresponding withering contempt

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

The Existence of Forms 103

for pretensions to it – including the relativism and subjectivism of many of

his contemporary thinkers, the Sophists. He also realized that he had to

come to grips with the views of two other major thinkers, Heraclitus and

Parmenides – Heraclitus claiming that nothing is, only becoming, Parmenides

(#14) claiming that change does not exist, only what does not change (a

certain One). If – as Plato believed with Heraclitus – everything in this world

is constantly changing in every way, constantly “ morphing, ” never, ever

remaining what it is, how could it ever be possible for us to “ grasp ” anything,

to know what any thing is? By the time you think you have grasped

it, it has already slipped out of your hands.

To know something must therefore be to know something that does not

change, something that always remains what it is (something Parmenidean).

Only such a thing can be known, and only such a thing – Plato agrees with

Parmenides – is really real. Since such things do not exist in this world, they

must exist in, and constitute, a nonspatial, nontemporal dimension. These

are what Plato calls “ Forms. ” (Note that the structure of Plato ’ s argument

is not that Forms exist because knowledge exists; it is, rather, that knowledge

exists because Forms exist. Knowledge is not the source of the existence

of Forms; the reverse is true: the existence of Forms makes the existence

of knowledge possible. Plato ’ s argument, therefore, is not epistemic; it is

ontological.) They are also perfect, eternal, the source of the existence of

this world, and many other things as well, but Plato gives other reasons for

their possession of these attributes.

[Socrates asks Cratylus] Tell me whether there is or is not any absolute

beauty or good, or any other absolute existence? Certainly, Socrates, I think

there is. Then let us seek the true beauty, not asking whether a face is fair, or

anything of that sort, for all such things appear to be in fl ux, but let us ask

whether the true beauty is not always beautiful. Certainly [ . . . ]. Then how

can that be a real thing which is never in the same state? [ . . . ]. They cannot.

Nor yet, can they be known by anyone; for at the moment that the observer

approaches, then they become other and of another nature, so that you can

no longer know their nature or state. [ . . . ]. Nor can we reasonably say [ . . . ]

that there is knowledge at all, if everything is in a state of transition and there

is nothing abiding. For knowledge too cannot continue to be knowledge

unless continuing always to abide and to exist. But if the very nature

of knowledge changes, at the time when the change occurs there will be

no knowledge, and if the transition is always going on, there will always

be no knowledge. ( Cratylus , qtd. in Ross, 439C – 440C; Ross ’ s trans., slightly

modifi ed using Jowett ’ s in The Collected Dialogues )

In the Republic , Plato gives us the same argument in more explicit form

– or, if you like, a different version of the same argument in more explicit

form.