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if one didn ’ t have a soul! The key question here is whether the modalities
underlying those intuitions are the same. It seems that the modality that
motivates us to accept P3 is a rather strong metaphysical modality with
quite a few metaphysical assumptions built in, whereas the one that compels
98 Rafal Urbaniak and Agnieszka Rostalska
us to buy into P2 * looks defi nitely weaker (would a modality that makes
it impossible to survive into 1985 if you didn ’ t have a soul in 1984 make
you think that no true sentence about 1984 excludes your survival into
1985?)
Swinburne ( Evolution , 314) himself admits only one type of possibility
and explicitly identifi es the metaphysical and the logical. The mere fact,
however, that Swinburne didn ’ t want to accept such a distinction doesn ’ t
mean that we ourselves should make no distinction between the kinds of
modalities involved in the intuitive assessment of P2 * and P3. And in fact,
if this distinction is made, we not only have an explanation of why the
argument initially might seem compelling (we don ’ t notice that our intuitions
employ two different modalities), but also the argument itself cannot
be interpreted as a sound argument.
25
Two Arguments for the
Harmlessness of Death
Epicurus . “ Letter to Menoeceus , ” in Greek and Roman Philosophy after
Aristotle , edited by Jason Saunders , 49 – 52 . New York : The Free Press ,
1966 .
Epicurus ’ Death is Nothing to Us Argument
Steven Luper
Epicurus (341 – 270 bce ) is most famous for arguing that death is nothing
to us. His position is still discussed today, partly because it is not immediately
clear where his argument fails and partly because the implications of
his conclusion would be important. For example, it seems to follow that
we have no reason to avoid death and also that if we save people from
death, we are not doing them any good. If death is not bad for us, it seems,
living is not good for us.
Epicurus makes his argument in the course of defending a more substantial
thesis, namely that anyone can achieve, and then maintain, ataraxia , or
perfect equanimity. The achievement of complete equanimity requires so
situating ourselves that nothing will harm us, so that we have nothing to
dread. Since death appears to be harmful indeed, and hence something that
a reasonable person will dread, Epicurus needed to explain why it is not.
His argument can be found in the following passage, taken from his
“ Letter to Menoeceus ” :
Death [ … ], the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we
are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not. (50)
Unfortunately, it is not clear that this argument accomplishes what
Epicurus wanted it to do. The problem is that the term ‘ death ’ might mean
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.
© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
100 Steven Luper and Nicolas Bommarito
at least two different things. First, it might signify an event: our ceasing to
live. Call this “ dying. ” Second, it might signify a state of affairs: the state
of affairs we are in as a result of our ceasing to live. Call this “ death. ” Both
dying and death appear to harm us, and hence both threaten our equanimity.
But Epicurus ’ argument shows, at best, that death is nothing to us.
This argument is directed at death rather than dying, but it is possible
to substitute ‘ dying ’ for ‘ death ’ .
P1. We are not affected by an event or state of affairs before it happens.
P2. Death is an event or state of affairs.
C1. Death does not affect us before it happens (instantiation, P1, P2).
P3. If death affects us while we are alive, it affects us before it happens.
C2. Death does not affect us while we are alive ( modus tollens , P3, C1).
P4. If death affects us while we are dead, it affects us when we do not exist.
P5. We are not affected by anything when we do not exist.
C3. We are not affected by death when we do not exist (instantiation,
P5).
C4. Death does not affect us while we are dead ( modus tollens , P4, C3).
C5. It is not the case that death affects us while we are alive or while
we are dead (conjunction, C2, C4).
P6. If death affects us, it affects us while we are alive or while we are dead.
C6. Death does not affect us ( modus tollens , P6, C5).
P7. What does not affect us is nothing to us.
C7. Death is nothing to us ( modus ponens , P7, C6).
It is possible to substitute ‘ dying ’ for ‘ death ’ in this argument, but the
resulting argument will clearly be unsound. The problem, of course, is P6,
which can easily be challenged on the grounds that dying can affect us while
we are dying.
Lucretius ’ Symmetry Argument
Luctretius . On the Nature of Things , translated by Martin Ferguson Smith.
Indianapolis : Hackett , 2001 .
Kaufman , Frederick . “ Death and Deprivation; or, Why Lucretius ’ Symmetry
Argument Fails . ” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 , 2 ( 1996 ):
305 – 12 .
Nagel , Thomas . “ Death ” in Mortal Questions . Cambridge : Cambridge
University Press , 1997 .
Warren , James . Facing Death . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2004 .
Nicolas Bommarito
Two Arguments for the Harmlessness of Death 101
Symmetry arguments attempt to show the fear of death to be irrational by
appeal to similarities between time before our birth and the time after our
death. This type of argument has its origin in the philosophy of Epicurus
(341 – 270 bce ), but its most famous statement is in Lucretius ’ ( c .99 bce –
c .55 bce ) philosophical epic De Rerum Natura ( On the Nature of Things ).
The scope of the poem is wide, dealing with physics, metaphysics, psychology,
and other fi elds. The clearest statement of the symmetry argument
comes near the end of book III:
Look back now and consider how the bygone ages of eternity that elapsed
before our birth were nothing to us. Here, then, is a mirror in which nature
shows us the time to come after our death. Do you see anything fearful in it?
Do you perceive anything grim? Does it not appear more peaceful than the
deepest sleep? (Lucretius III, 972 – 75)

if one didn ’ t have a soul! The key question here is whether the modalities

underlying those intuitions are the same. It seems that the modality that

motivates us to accept P3 is a rather strong metaphysical modality with

quite a few metaphysical assumptions built in, whereas the one that compels

98 Rafal Urbaniak and Agnieszka Rostalska

us to buy into P2 * looks defi nitely weaker (would a modality that makes

it impossible to survive into 1985 if you didn ’ t have a soul in 1984 make

you think that no true sentence about 1984 excludes your survival into

1985?)

Swinburne ( Evolution , 314) himself admits only one type of possibility

and explicitly identifi es the metaphysical and the logical. The mere fact,

however, that Swinburne didn ’ t want to accept such a distinction doesn ’ t

mean that we ourselves should make no distinction between the kinds of

modalities involved in the intuitive assessment of P2 * and P3. And in fact,

if this distinction is made, we not only have an explanation of why the

argument initially might seem compelling (we don ’ t notice that our intuitions

employ two different modalities), but also the argument itself cannot

be interpreted as a sound argument.

25

Two Arguments for the

Harmlessness of Death

Epicurus . “ Letter to Menoeceus , ” in Greek and Roman Philosophy after

Aristotle , edited by Jason Saunders , 49 – 52 . New York : The Free Press ,

1966 .

Epicurus ’ Death is Nothing to Us Argument

Steven Luper

Epicurus (341 – 270 bce ) is most famous for arguing that death is nothing

to us. His position is still discussed today, partly because it is not immediately

clear where his argument fails and partly because the implications of

his conclusion would be important. For example, it seems to follow that

we have no reason to avoid death and also that if we save people from

death, we are not doing them any good. If death is not bad for us, it seems,

living is not good for us.

Epicurus makes his argument in the course of defending a more substantial

thesis, namely that anyone can achieve, and then maintain, ataraxia , or

perfect equanimity. The achievement of complete equanimity requires so

situating ourselves that nothing will harm us, so that we have nothing to

dread. Since death appears to be harmful indeed, and hence something that

a reasonable person will dread, Epicurus needed to explain why it is not.

His argument can be found in the following passage, taken from his

“ Letter to Menoeceus ” :

Death [ … ], the most awful of evils, is nothing to us, seeing that, when we

are, death is not come, and, when death is come, we are not. (50)

Unfortunately, it is not clear that this argument accomplishes what

Epicurus wanted it to do. The problem is that the term ‘ death ’ might mean

Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy,

First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone.

100 Steven Luper and Nicolas Bommarito

at least two different things. First, it might signify an event: our ceasing to

live. Call this “ dying. ” Second, it might signify a state of affairs: the state

of affairs we are in as a result of our ceasing to live. Call this “ death. ” Both

dying and death appear to harm us, and hence both threaten our equanimity.

But Epicurus ’ argument shows, at best, that death is nothing to us.

This argument is directed at death rather than dying, but it is possible

to substitute ‘ dying ’ for ‘ death ’ .

P1. We are not affected by an event or state of affairs before it happens.

P2. Death is an event or state of affairs.

C1. Death does not affect us before it happens (instantiation, P1, P2).

P3. If death affects us while we are alive, it affects us before it happens.

C2. Death does not affect us while we are alive ( modus tollens , P3, C1).

P4. If death affects us while we are dead, it affects us when we do not exist.

P5. We are not affected by anything when we do not exist.

C3. We are not affected by death when we do not exist (instantiation,

P5).

C4. Death does not affect us while we are dead ( modus tollens , P4, C3).

C5. It is not the case that death affects us while we are alive or while

we are dead (conjunction, C2, C4).

P6. If death affects us, it affects us while we are alive or while we are dead.

C6. Death does not affect us ( modus tollens , P6, C5).

P7. What does not affect us is nothing to us.

C7. Death is nothing to us ( modus ponens , P7, C6).

It is possible to substitute ‘ dying ’ for ‘ death ’ in this argument, but the

resulting argument will clearly be unsound. The problem, of course, is P6,

which can easily be challenged on the grounds that dying can affect us while

we are dying.

Lucretius ’ Symmetry Argument

Luctretius . On the Nature of Things , translated by Martin Ferguson Smith.

Indianapolis : Hackett , 2001 .

Kaufman , Frederick . “ Death and Deprivation; or, Why Lucretius ’ Symmetry

Argument Fails . ” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 , 2 ( 1996 ):

305 – 12 .

Nagel , Thomas . “ Death ” in Mortal Questions . Cambridge : Cambridge

University Press , 1997 .

Warren , James . Facing Death . Oxford : Oxford University Press , 2004 .

Nicolas Bommarito

Two Arguments for the Harmlessness of Death 101

Symmetry arguments attempt to show the fear of death to be irrational by

appeal to similarities between time before our birth and the time after our

death. This type of argument has its origin in the philosophy of Epicurus

(341 – 270 bce ), but its most famous statement is in Lucretius ’ ( c .99 bce –

c .55 bce ) philosophical epic De Rerum Natura ( On the Nature of Things ).

The scope of the poem is wide, dealing with physics, metaphysics, psychology,

and other fi elds. The clearest statement of the symmetry argument

comes near the end of book III:

Look back now and consider how the bygone ages of eternity that elapsed

before our birth were nothing to us. Here, then, is a mirror in which nature

shows us the time to come after our death. Do you see anything fearful in it?

Do you perceive anything grim? Does it not appear more peaceful than the

deepest sleep? (Lucretius III, 972 – 75)