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are extrinsic. |
C4. Intrinsic properties are not disguised relations to times ( modus |
tollens , P9, P2). |
P10. If intrinsic properties are those properties which ordinary things have |
in the present, then there is no other time than the present; that is, presentism |
is true. |
P11. If presentism is true, then ordinary things do not persist. |
C5. Presentism is false ( modus tollens , P11, C1). |
C6. Ordinary things do not endure ( modus tollens , P9, C4, C5). |
C7. Ordinary things perdure (disjunctive syllogism, C2, C6). |
C8. The incompatible properties of ordinary things belong to their different |
temporal parts ( modus ponens , P8, C8). |
24 |
A Modern Modal Argument |
for the Soul |
Rafal Urbaniak and Agnieszka Rostalska |
Alston , W. P. , and T. W. Smythe . β Swinburne β s Argument for Dualism . β Faith |
and Philosophy 11 ( 1994 ): 127 β 33 . |
Hasker , W. β Swinburne β s Modal Argument for Dualism: Epistemically |
Circular . β Faith and Philosophy 15 ( 1998 ): 366 β 70 . |
Nagasawa , Y. 2005 . β Critical Notice of Richard Swinburne β s β The Evolution |
of the Soul (Revised Version) β . β Available at www.infi dels.org/library/ |
modern/yujin_nagasawa/soul.html (accessed 27 July, 2010). |
Reames , K. β A Response to Swinburne β s Latest Defense of the Argument for |
Dualism . β Faith and Philosophy 16 ( 1999 ): 90 β 7 . |
Stump , E. , and N. Kretzmann . β An Objection to Swinburne β s Argument for |
Dualism . β Faith and Philosophy 13 ( 1996 ): 405 β 12 . |
Swinburne , Richard . The Evolution of the Soul . Oxford : Clarendon Press , |
1986 . |
___. β Dualism Intact . β Faith and Philosophy 13 ( 1996 ): 968 β 77 . |
Swinburne , Richard , and Sydney Shoemaker . Personal Identity . Oxford : |
Blackwell , 1984 . |
Urbaniak , R. , and A. Rostalska . β Swinburne β s Modal Argument for the |
Existence of a Soul: Formalization and Criticism . β Philo 12 ( 2009 ): |
73 β 87 . |
Zimmerman , D. W. β Two Cartesian Arguments for the Simplicity of the |
Soul . β American Philosophical Quarterly 3 ( 1991 ): 217 β 26 . |
Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy, |
First Edition. Edited by Michael Bruce and Steven Barbone. |
Β© 2011 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. Published 2011 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd. |
94 Rafal Urbaniak and Agnieszka Rostalska |
Richard Swinburne, one of the most prominent representatives of dualism |
in the twentieth century, formulated his modal argument for the existence |
of the soul as an improvement of Descartes β (#76) analogous argument. |
Roughly speaking, Swinburne argues that human beings currently alive |
have nonbodily immaterial parts called souls, using the assumption that it |
is logically possible that a human being survives the destruction of the body |
(and a few additional supposedly quite innocent premises). The modern |
twist to the argument that makes it technically interesting is that it employs |
a quantifi ed propositional modal logic. The argument raises also a general |
philosophical interest, like all seemingly simple and correct philosophical |
arguments for strong conclusions. |
The argument employs quantifi ed propositional modal logic T, a rather |
straightforward extension of classical propositional logic. We extend the |
language with two modal operators: β β β read as β it is possible that, β and |
β β‘ β read as β it is necessary that β and quantifiers binding propositional variables. |
On top of the classical rules of inference, one needs to add two axiom |
schemata (called traditionally K and T): |
(K) β‘ ( A β B ) β ( β‘ A β β‘ B ) |
(T) β‘ A β A |
We also add two rules of inference: necessitation, which tells us that if |
something is a thesis of the system, it is necessary, and propositional universal |
quantifi er elimination, which works like universal quantifi er elimination |
in classical predicate logic, except that it applies to propositional |
variables and formulae. We β ll start with a brief presentation of the argument |
in its original formulation. Then, we β ll reconstruct the argument in more |
detail. Next, we β ll describe main known objections to the argument, describe |
how one of the objections (usually considered to be lethal) can be avoided, |
and fi nally, provide our own brief assessment of what we think the main |
weakness of the argument is. |
The argument was originally designed to prove that I [Swinburne] have a |
soul in 1984, and I leave it in that form. Updating is always possible for any |
year in which Premiss one is manifestly true. Likewise any name or other |
referring expression can be substituted for β I β , so long as Premiss 1 remains |
manifestly true. [ β¦ ] I defi ne: |
p = β I am a conscious person and I exist in 1984 β |
q = β my body is destroyed in the last instant of 1984 β |
r = β I have a soul in 1984 β |
s = β I exist in 1985 β |
x ranges over all consistent propositions compatible with ( p & q ) and |
describing 1984 states of affairs. |
A Modern Modal Argument for the Soul 95 |
β ( x ) β is to be read in the normal way as β for all x β . |
The argument is then as follows: |
p (Premiss 1) |
( x ) β ( p & q & x & s ) (Premiss 2) |
βΌ β ( p & q & βΌ r & s ) (Premiss 3) |
Premiss 2 says that it is possible that I survive into 1985, given that I am |
conscious in 1984, even if my body is totally destroyed and whatever else |
might be the case in 1984, compatible with these last two suppositions. |
Premiss 3 says that it is not possible that I who am conscious in 1984 survive |
into 1985 if my body is totally destroyed, unless there is a non - bodily part |
of me in 1984, namely, a soul. It follows from Premiss 2 and Premiss 3 that |
βΌ r is not within the range of x . But since βΌ r describes a 1984 state of affairs |
it follows that it is not compatible with ( p & q ). Hence ( p & q ) entails r . But |
the addition to p of q , which describes what happens to my body at the end |
of 1984 can hardly affect whether or not p entails r . So I conclude that p by |
itself entails r . Hence, from Premiss 1, r . (Swinburne Evolution , 322 β 3) |
Once we point out tacit assumptions, the argument comes out valid in |
a rather modest modal logic T with universal propositional quantifi er elimination. |
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