DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 0 1.71k
It is not clear how we should interpret Schweitzer's position.
The reference to the ice crystal is especially puzzling, for an ice
crystal is not alive at all. Putting this aside, however, the problem
with the defences offered by both Schweitzer and Taylor for
their ethical views is that they use language metaphorically and
then argue as if what they had said was literally true. We may
often talk about plants 'seeking' water or light so that they can
survive, and this way of thinking about plants makes it easier
to accept talk of their 'will to live', or of them 'pursuing' their
own good. But once we stop to reflect on the fact that plants
are not conscious and cannot engage in any intentional behaviour,
it is clear that all this language is metaphorical; one might
just as well say that a river is pursuing its own good and striving
to reach the sea, or Jhat the' good' of a guided missile is to blow
itself up along with its target. It is misleading of Schweitzer to
attempt to sway us towards an ethic of reverence for all life
by referring to 'yearning', 'exaltation', 'pleasure', and 'terror'.
Plants experience none of these.
Moreover, in the case of plants, rivers, and guided missiles,
it is possible to give a purely physical explanation of what is
happening; and in the absence of consciousness, there is no
good reason why we should have greater respect for the physical
processes that govern the growth and decay of living things than
we have for those that govern non-living things. This being so,
279
Practical Ethics
it is at least not obvious why we should have greater reverence
for a tree than for a stalactite, or for a Single-celled organism
than for a mountain.
DEEP ECOLOGY
More than forty years ago the American ecologist AIdo Leopold
wrote that there was a need for a 'new ethic', an 'ethic dealing
with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which
grow upon it'. His proposed 'land ethic' would enlarge 'the
boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants,
and animals, or collectively, the land'. The rise of ecological
concern in the early 1970s led to a revival of interest in this
attitude. The Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess wrote a brief
but influential article distinguishing between 'shallow' and
'deep' strands in the ecological movement. Shallow ecological
thinking was limited to the traditional moral framework; those
who thought in this way were anxious to avoid pollution to
our water supply so that we could have safe water to drink,
and they sought to preserve wilderness so that people could
continue to enjoy walking through it. Deep ecologists, on the
other hand, wanted to preserve the integrity of the biosphere
for its own sake, irrespective of the possible benefits to humans
that might flow from so doing. Subsequently several other writers
have attempted to develop some form of 'deep' environmental
theory.
Where the reverence for life ethic emphasises individual living
organisms, proposals for deep ecology ethics tend to take something
larger as the object of value: species, ecological systems,
even the biosphere as a whole. Leopold summed up the basis
of his new land ethic thus: 'A thing is right when it tends to
preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community.
It is wrong when it tends otherwise: In a paper published
in 1984, Arne Naess and George Sessions, an American
philosopher involved in the deep ecology movement, set out
280
The Environment
several principles for a deep ecological ethic, beginning with the
following:
The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human Life
on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value,
inherent value). These values are independent of the usefulness
of the non-human world for human purposes.
2 Richness and diversity oflife forms contribute to the realisation
of these values and are also values in themselves.
3 Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity
except to satisfy vital needs.
Although these principles refer only to life, in the same paper
Naess and Sessions say that deep ecology uses the term 'biosphere'
in a more comprehensive way, to refer also to nonliving
things such as rivers (watersheds), landscapes, and
ecosystems. Two Australians working at the deep end of environmental
ethics, Richard Sylvan and Val Plumwood, also
extend their ethic beyond living things, including in it an obligation
'not to jeopardise the well-being of natural objects or
systems without good reason'.
In the previous section I quoted Paul Taylor's remark to the
effect that we should be ready not merely to respect every living
thing, but to place the same value on the life of every living
thing as we place on our own. This is a common theme among
deep ecologists, often extended beyond living things. In Deep
Ecology Bill Devall and George Sessions defend a form of 'biocentric
egalitarianism':
The intuition of biocentric equality is that all things in the biosphere
have an equal right to live and blossom and to reach their
own individual forms of unfolding and self-realisation within the
larger Self-realisation. This basic intuition is that all organisms
and entities in the ecosphere, as parts of the interrelated whole,
are equal in intrinsic worth.
If, as this quotation appears to suggest. this biocentric equality
rests on a 'basic intuition', it is up against some strong intuitions
that point in the opposite direction - for example, the intuition
281
Practical Ethics
that the rights to 'live and blossom' of normal adult humans
ought to be preferred over those of yeasts, and the rights of

It is not clear how we should interpret Schweitzer's position.

The reference to the ice crystal is especially puzzling, for an ice

crystal is not alive at all. Putting this aside, however, the problem

with the defences offered by both Schweitzer and Taylor for

their ethical views is that they use language metaphorically and

then argue as if what they had said was literally true. We may

often talk about plants 'seeking' water or light so that they can

survive, and this way of thinking about plants makes it easier

to accept talk of their 'will to live', or of them 'pursuing' their

own good. But once we stop to reflect on the fact that plants

are not conscious and cannot engage in any intentional behaviour,

it is clear that all this language is metaphorical; one might

just as well say that a river is pursuing its own good and striving

to reach the sea, or Jhat the' good' of a guided missile is to blow

itself up along with its target. It is misleading of Schweitzer to

attempt to sway us towards an ethic of reverence for all life

by referring to 'yearning', 'exaltation', 'pleasure', and 'terror'.

Plants experience none of these.

Moreover, in the case of plants, rivers, and guided missiles,

it is possible to give a purely physical explanation of what is

happening; and in the absence of consciousness, there is no

good reason why we should have greater respect for the physical

processes that govern the growth and decay of living things than

we have for those that govern non-living things. This being so,

279

Practical Ethics

it is at least not obvious why we should have greater reverence

for a tree than for a stalactite, or for a Single-celled organism

than for a mountain.

DEEP ECOLOGY

More than forty years ago the American ecologist AIdo Leopold

wrote that there was a need for a 'new ethic', an 'ethic dealing

with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which

grow upon it'. His proposed 'land ethic' would enlarge 'the

boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants,

and animals, or collectively, the land'. The rise of ecological

concern in the early 1970s led to a revival of interest in this

attitude. The Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess wrote a brief

but influential article distinguishing between 'shallow' and

'deep' strands in the ecological movement. Shallow ecological

thinking was limited to the traditional moral framework; those

who thought in this way were anxious to avoid pollution to

our water supply so that we could have safe water to drink,

and they sought to preserve wilderness so that people could

continue to enjoy walking through it. Deep ecologists, on the

other hand, wanted to preserve the integrity of the biosphere

for its own sake, irrespective of the possible benefits to humans

that might flow from so doing. Subsequently several other writers

have attempted to develop some form of 'deep' environmental

theory.

Where the reverence for life ethic emphasises individual living

organisms, proposals for deep ecology ethics tend to take something

larger as the object of value: species, ecological systems,

even the biosphere as a whole. Leopold summed up the basis

of his new land ethic thus: 'A thing is right when it tends to

preserve the integrity, stability and beauty of the biotic community.

It is wrong when it tends otherwise: In a paper published

in 1984, Arne Naess and George Sessions, an American

philosopher involved in the deep ecology movement, set out

280

The Environment

several principles for a deep ecological ethic, beginning with the

following:

The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human Life

on Earth have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value,

inherent value). These values are independent of the usefulness

of the non-human world for human purposes.

2 Richness and diversity oflife forms contribute to the realisation

of these values and are also values in themselves.

3 Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity

except to satisfy vital needs.

Although these principles refer only to life, in the same paper

Naess and Sessions say that deep ecology uses the term 'biosphere'

in a more comprehensive way, to refer also to nonliving

things such as rivers (watersheds), landscapes, and

ecosystems. Two Australians working at the deep end of environmental

ethics, Richard Sylvan and Val Plumwood, also

extend their ethic beyond living things, including in it an obligation

'not to jeopardise the well-being of natural objects or

systems without good reason'.

In the previous section I quoted Paul Taylor's remark to the

effect that we should be ready not merely to respect every living

thing, but to place the same value on the life of every living

thing as we place on our own. This is a common theme among

deep ecologists, often extended beyond living things. In Deep

Ecology Bill Devall and George Sessions defend a form of 'biocentric

egalitarianism':

The intuition of biocentric equality is that all things in the biosphere

have an equal right to live and blossom and to reach their

own individual forms of unfolding and self-realisation within the

larger Self-realisation. This basic intuition is that all organisms

and entities in the ecosphere, as parts of the interrelated whole,

are equal in intrinsic worth.

If, as this quotation appears to suggest. this biocentric equality

rests on a 'basic intuition', it is up against some strong intuitions

that point in the opposite direction - for example, the intuition

281

Practical Ethics

that the rights to 'live and blossom' of normal adult humans

ought to be preferred over those of yeasts, and the rights of