DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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compatible with a human-centred ethic to see economic growth
based on the exploitation of irreplaceable resources as something
that brings gains to the present generation, and possibly
the next generation or two, but at a price that will be paid by
273
Practical Ethics
every generation to come. But in the light of our discussion of
speciesism in Chapter 3, it should also be clear that it is wrong
to limit ourselves to a human-centred ethic. We now need to
consider more fundamental challenges to this traditional Western
appro~.s;h to environmental issues.
IS THERE VALUE BEYOND SENTIENT BEINGS?
Although some debates about significant environmental issues
can be conducted by appealing only to the long-term interests
of our own species, in any serious exploration of environmental
values a central issue will be the question of intrinsic value. We
have already seen that it is arbitrary to hold that only human
beings are of intrinsic value. If we find value in human conscious
experiences, we cannot deny that there is value in at least some
experiences of non-human beings. How far does intrinsic value
extend? To all, but only, sentient beings? Or beyond the boundary
of sentience?
To explore this question a few remarks on the notion of'intrinsic
value' will be helpful. Something is of intrinsic value if
it is good or desirable in itself; the contrast is with 'instrumental
value', that is, value as a means to some other end or purpose.
Our own happiness, for example, is of intrinsic value, at least
to most of us, in that we desire it for its own sake. Money, on
the other hand, is only of instrumental value to us. We want it
because of the things we can buy with it, but if we were marooned
on a desert island, we would not want it. (Whereas
happiness would be just as important to us on a desert island
as anywhere else.)
Now consider again for a moment the issue of damming the
river described at the beginning of this chapter. If the decision
were to be made on the basis of human interests alone, we
would balance the economic benefits of the dam for the citizens
of the state against the loss for bushwalkers, scientists, and
others, now and in the future, who value the preservation of
274
The Environment
the river in its natural state. We have already seen that because
this calculation includes an indefinite number of future generations,
the loss of the wild river is a much greater cost than
we might at first imagine. Even so, once we broaden the basis
of our decision beyond the interests of human beings, we have
much more to set against the economic benefits of building the
dam. Into the calculations must now go the interests of all the
non-human animals who live in the area that will be flooded.
A few may be able to move to a neighboring area that is suitable,
but wilderness is not full of vacant niches awaiting an occupant;
if there is territory that can sustain a native animaL it is most
likely already occupied. Thus most of the animals living in the
flooded area will die: either they will be drowned, or they will
starve. Neither drowning nor starvation are easy ways to die,
and the suffering involved in these deaths should, as we have
seen, be given no less weight than we would give to an equivalent
amount of suffering experienced by human beings. This
will significantly increase the weight of considerations against
building the dam.
What of the fact that the animals will die, apart from the
suffering that will occur in the course of dying? As we have
seen, one can, without being guilty of arbitrary discrimination
on the basis of species, regard the death of a non-human animal
who is not a person as less significant than the death of a person,
since humans are capable of foresight and forward planning in
ways that non-human animals are not. This difference between
causing death to a person and to a being who is not a person
does not mean that the death of an animal who is not a person
should be treated as being of no account. On the contrary,
utilitarians will take into account the loss that death inflicts on
the animals - the loss of all their future existence, and the
experiences that their future lives would have contained. When
a proposed dam would flood a valley and kill thousands, perhaps
millions, of sentient creatures, these deaths should be given
great importance in any assessment of the costs and benefits of
275
Practical Ethics
building the dam. For those utilitarians who accept the total
view discussed in Chapter 4, moreover, if the dam destroys the
habitat in which the animals lived, then it is relevant that this
loss is a continuing one. If the dam is not built, animals will
presumably continue to live in the valley for thousands of years,
experiencing their own distinctive pleasures and pains. One
might question whether life for animals in a natural environment
yields a surplus of pleasure over pain, or of satisfaction
over frustration of preferences. At this point the idea of calculating
benefits becomes almost absurd; but that does not mean
that the loss of future animal lives should be dismissed from
our decision making.
That, however, may not be all. Should we also give weight,
not only to the suffering and death of individual animals, but
to the fact that an entire species may disappear? What of the
loss of trees that have stood for thousands of years? How much
- if any - weight should we give to the preservation of the
animals, the species, the trees and the valley's ecosystem, independently
of the interests of human beings - whether economic,
recreational, or scientific - in their preservation?
Here we have a fundamental moral disagreement: a disagreement
about what kinds of beings ought to be considered in

compatible with a human-centred ethic to see economic growth

based on the exploitation of irreplaceable resources as something

that brings gains to the present generation, and possibly

the next generation or two, but at a price that will be paid by

273

Practical Ethics

every generation to come. But in the light of our discussion of

speciesism in Chapter 3, it should also be clear that it is wrong

to limit ourselves to a human-centred ethic. We now need to

consider more fundamental challenges to this traditional Western

appro~.s;h to environmental issues.

IS THERE VALUE BEYOND SENTIENT BEINGS?

Although some debates about significant environmental issues

can be conducted by appealing only to the long-term interests

of our own species, in any serious exploration of environmental

values a central issue will be the question of intrinsic value. We

have already seen that it is arbitrary to hold that only human

beings are of intrinsic value. If we find value in human conscious

experiences, we cannot deny that there is value in at least some

experiences of non-human beings. How far does intrinsic value

extend? To all, but only, sentient beings? Or beyond the boundary

of sentience?

To explore this question a few remarks on the notion of'intrinsic

value' will be helpful. Something is of intrinsic value if

it is good or desirable in itself; the contrast is with 'instrumental

value', that is, value as a means to some other end or purpose.

Our own happiness, for example, is of intrinsic value, at least

to most of us, in that we desire it for its own sake. Money, on

the other hand, is only of instrumental value to us. We want it

because of the things we can buy with it, but if we were marooned

on a desert island, we would not want it. (Whereas

happiness would be just as important to us on a desert island

as anywhere else.)

Now consider again for a moment the issue of damming the

river described at the beginning of this chapter. If the decision

were to be made on the basis of human interests alone, we

would balance the economic benefits of the dam for the citizens

of the state against the loss for bushwalkers, scientists, and

others, now and in the future, who value the preservation of

274

The Environment

the river in its natural state. We have already seen that because

this calculation includes an indefinite number of future generations,

the loss of the wild river is a much greater cost than

we might at first imagine. Even so, once we broaden the basis

of our decision beyond the interests of human beings, we have

much more to set against the economic benefits of building the

dam. Into the calculations must now go the interests of all the

non-human animals who live in the area that will be flooded.

A few may be able to move to a neighboring area that is suitable,

but wilderness is not full of vacant niches awaiting an occupant;

if there is territory that can sustain a native animaL it is most

likely already occupied. Thus most of the animals living in the

flooded area will die: either they will be drowned, or they will

starve. Neither drowning nor starvation are easy ways to die,

and the suffering involved in these deaths should, as we have

seen, be given no less weight than we would give to an equivalent

amount of suffering experienced by human beings. This

will significantly increase the weight of considerations against

building the dam.

What of the fact that the animals will die, apart from the

suffering that will occur in the course of dying? As we have

seen, one can, without being guilty of arbitrary discrimination

on the basis of species, regard the death of a non-human animal

who is not a person as less significant than the death of a person,

since humans are capable of foresight and forward planning in

ways that non-human animals are not. This difference between

causing death to a person and to a being who is not a person

does not mean that the death of an animal who is not a person

should be treated as being of no account. On the contrary,

utilitarians will take into account the loss that death inflicts on

the animals - the loss of all their future existence, and the

experiences that their future lives would have contained. When

a proposed dam would flood a valley and kill thousands, perhaps

millions, of sentient creatures, these deaths should be given

great importance in any assessment of the costs and benefits of

275

Practical Ethics

building the dam. For those utilitarians who accept the total

view discussed in Chapter 4, moreover, if the dam destroys the

habitat in which the animals lived, then it is relevant that this

loss is a continuing one. If the dam is not built, animals will

presumably continue to live in the valley for thousands of years,

experiencing their own distinctive pleasures and pains. One

might question whether life for animals in a natural environment

yields a surplus of pleasure over pain, or of satisfaction

over frustration of preferences. At this point the idea of calculating

benefits becomes almost absurd; but that does not mean

that the loss of future animal lives should be dismissed from

our decision making.

That, however, may not be all. Should we also give weight,

not only to the suffering and death of individual animals, but

to the fact that an entire species may disappear? What of the

loss of trees that have stood for thousands of years? How much

- if any - weight should we give to the preservation of the

animals, the species, the trees and the valley's ecosystem, independently

of the interests of human beings - whether economic,

recreational, or scientific - in their preservation?

Here we have a fundamental moral disagreement: a disagreement

about what kinds of beings ought to be considered in