DebateLabKIT/deepa2-corpus · Datasets at Hugging Face

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to anything more long-term or far-reaching. More normal lives
have meaning because they are lived to some larger purpose.
All this is speculative. You may accept or reject it to the extent
that it agrees with your own observation and introspection. My
next - and final - suggestion is more speculative still. It is that
to find an enduring meaning in our lives it is not enough to go
beyond psychopaths who have no long-term commitments or
life plans; we must also go beyond more prudent egoists who
have long term plans concerned only with their own interests.
The prudent egoists may find meaning in their lives for a time,
for they have the purpose of furthering their own interests; but
what, in the end, does that amount to? When everything in
our interests has been achieved, do we just sit back and be
332
Why Act Morally?
happy? Could we be happy in this way? Or would we decide
that we had still not quite reached our target, that there was
something else we needed before we could sit back and enjoy
it all? Most materially successful egoists take the latter route,
thus escaping the necessity of admitting that they cannot find
happiness in permanent holidaying. People who slaved to establish
small businesses, telling themselves they would do it
only until they had made enough to live comfortably, keep
working long after they have passed their original target. Their
material 'needs' expand just fast enough to keep ahead of their
income.
The 1980s, the' decade of greed', provided plenty of examples
of the insatiable nature of the desire for wealth. In 1985 Dennis
Levine was a highly successful Wall Street banker with the
fastest-growing and most talked-about Wall Street firm, Drexel
Burnham Lambert. But Levine was not satisfied:
When I was earning $20,000 a year, I thought, I can make
$100,000. When I was eaming $100,000 a year, I thought, I can
make $200,000. When I was making $1 million, I thought, I can
make $3 million. There was always somebody one rung higher
on the ladder, and I could never stop wondering: Is he really
twice as good as I am.
Levine decided to take matters into his own hands and arranged
with friends at other Wall Street firms to exchange confidential
information that would allow them to profit by buying shares
in companies that were about to become takeover targets. By
this method Levine made an additional $11 million, on top of
what he earned in salary and bonuses. He also ended up bringing
about his own ruin, and spending time in prison. That, however,
is not the relevant point here. No doubt some who use inside
information to make millions of dollars do not get caught. What
is less certain, however, is that they really find satisfaction and
fulfilment in having more money.
Now we begin to see where ethics comes into the problem
of living a meaningful life. If we are looking for a purpose
333
Practical Ethics
broader than our own interests, something that will allow us
to see our lives as possessing significance beyond the narrow
confines of our own conscious states, one obvious solution is
to take up the ethical point of view. The ethical point of view
does, as we have seen, require us to go beyond a personal point
of view to the standpoint of an impartial spectator. Thus looking
at things ethically is a way of transcending our inward-looking
concerns and identifying ourselves with the most objective point
of view possible - with, as Sidgwick put it, 'the point of view
of the universe'.
The point of view of the universe is a lofty standpoint. In the
rarefied air that surrounds it we may get carried away into
talking, as Kant does, of the moral point of view, 'inevitably'
humbling all who compare their own limited nature with it. I
do not want to suggest anything as sweeping as this. Earlier in
this chapter, in rejecting Thomas Nagel's argument for the rationality
of altruism, I said that there is nothing irrational about
being concerned with the quality of one's own existence in a
way that one is not concerned with the quality of existence of
other individuals. Without going back on this, I am now suggesting
that rationality, in the broad sense that includes selfawareness
and reflection on the nature and point of our own
existence, may push us towards concerns broader than the quality
of our own existence; but the process is not a necessary one
and those who do not take part in it - or, who in taking part,
do not follow it all the way to the ethical point of view - are
neither irrational nor in error. Psychopaths, for all I know, may
simply be unable to obtain as much happiness through caring
about others as they obtain by antisocial acts. Other people find
collecting stamps an entirely adequate way of giving purpose
to their lives. There is nothing irrational about that; but others
again grow out of stamp collecting as they become more aware
of their situation in the world and more reflective about their
purposes. To this third group the ethical point of view offers a
meaning and purpose in life that one does not grow out of.
334
Why Act Morally?
(At least, one cannot grow out of the ethical point of view
until all ethical tasks have been accomplished. If that utopia
were ever achieved, our purposive nature might well leave us
dissatisfied, much as egoists might be dissatisfied when they
have everything they need to be happy. There is nothing paradoxical
about this, for we should not expect evolution to have
equipped us, in advance, with the ability to enjoy a situation
that has never previously occurred. Nor is this going to be a
practical problem in the near future.)
'Why act morally?' cannot be given an answer that will provide
everyone with overwhelming reasons for acting morally.

to anything more long-term or far-reaching. More normal lives

have meaning because they are lived to some larger purpose.

All this is speculative. You may accept or reject it to the extent

that it agrees with your own observation and introspection. My

next - and final - suggestion is more speculative still. It is that

to find an enduring meaning in our lives it is not enough to go

beyond psychopaths who have no long-term commitments or

life plans; we must also go beyond more prudent egoists who

have long term plans concerned only with their own interests.

The prudent egoists may find meaning in their lives for a time,

for they have the purpose of furthering their own interests; but

what, in the end, does that amount to? When everything in

our interests has been achieved, do we just sit back and be

332

Why Act Morally?

happy? Could we be happy in this way? Or would we decide

that we had still not quite reached our target, that there was

something else we needed before we could sit back and enjoy

it all? Most materially successful egoists take the latter route,

thus escaping the necessity of admitting that they cannot find

happiness in permanent holidaying. People who slaved to establish

small businesses, telling themselves they would do it

only until they had made enough to live comfortably, keep

working long after they have passed their original target. Their

material 'needs' expand just fast enough to keep ahead of their

income.

The 1980s, the' decade of greed', provided plenty of examples

of the insatiable nature of the desire for wealth. In 1985 Dennis

Levine was a highly successful Wall Street banker with the

fastest-growing and most talked-about Wall Street firm, Drexel

Burnham Lambert. But Levine was not satisfied:

When I was earning $20,000 a year, I thought, I can make

$100,000. When I was eaming $100,000 a year, I thought, I can

make $200,000. When I was making $1 million, I thought, I can

make $3 million. There was always somebody one rung higher

on the ladder, and I could never stop wondering: Is he really

twice as good as I am.

Levine decided to take matters into his own hands and arranged

with friends at other Wall Street firms to exchange confidential

information that would allow them to profit by buying shares

in companies that were about to become takeover targets. By

this method Levine made an additional $11 million, on top of

what he earned in salary and bonuses. He also ended up bringing

about his own ruin, and spending time in prison. That, however,

is not the relevant point here. No doubt some who use inside

information to make millions of dollars do not get caught. What

is less certain, however, is that they really find satisfaction and

fulfilment in having more money.

Now we begin to see where ethics comes into the problem

of living a meaningful life. If we are looking for a purpose

333

Practical Ethics

broader than our own interests, something that will allow us

to see our lives as possessing significance beyond the narrow

confines of our own conscious states, one obvious solution is

to take up the ethical point of view. The ethical point of view

does, as we have seen, require us to go beyond a personal point

of view to the standpoint of an impartial spectator. Thus looking

at things ethically is a way of transcending our inward-looking

concerns and identifying ourselves with the most objective point

of view possible - with, as Sidgwick put it, 'the point of view

of the universe'.

The point of view of the universe is a lofty standpoint. In the

rarefied air that surrounds it we may get carried away into

talking, as Kant does, of the moral point of view, 'inevitably'

humbling all who compare their own limited nature with it. I

do not want to suggest anything as sweeping as this. Earlier in

this chapter, in rejecting Thomas Nagel's argument for the rationality

of altruism, I said that there is nothing irrational about

being concerned with the quality of one's own existence in a

way that one is not concerned with the quality of existence of

other individuals. Without going back on this, I am now suggesting

that rationality, in the broad sense that includes selfawareness

and reflection on the nature and point of our own

existence, may push us towards concerns broader than the quality

of our own existence; but the process is not a necessary one

and those who do not take part in it - or, who in taking part,

do not follow it all the way to the ethical point of view - are

neither irrational nor in error. Psychopaths, for all I know, may

simply be unable to obtain as much happiness through caring

about others as they obtain by antisocial acts. Other people find

collecting stamps an entirely adequate way of giving purpose

to their lives. There is nothing irrational about that; but others

again grow out of stamp collecting as they become more aware

of their situation in the world and more reflective about their

purposes. To this third group the ethical point of view offers a

meaning and purpose in life that one does not grow out of.

334

Why Act Morally?

(At least, one cannot grow out of the ethical point of view

until all ethical tasks have been accomplished. If that utopia

were ever achieved, our purposive nature might well leave us

dissatisfied, much as egoists might be dissatisfied when they

have everything they need to be happy. There is nothing paradoxical

about this, for we should not expect evolution to have

equipped us, in advance, with the ability to enjoy a situation

that has never previously occurred. Nor is this going to be a

practical problem in the near future.)

'Why act morally?' cannot be given an answer that will provide

everyone with overwhelming reasons for acting morally.