DioLiu/Test1 · Datasets at Hugging Face

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and thou wilt go, and it will never return.

Every moment think steadily as a Roman and a man to do what thou hast
in hand with perfect and simple dignity, and feeling of affection,
and freedom, and justice; and to give thyself relief from all other
thoughts. And thou wilt give thyself relief, if thou doest every act
of thy life as if it were the last, laying aside all carelessness
and passionate aversion from the commands of reason, and all hypocrisy,
and self-love, and discontent with the portion which has been given
to thee. Thou seest how few the things are, the which if a man lays
hold of, he is able to live a life which flows in quiet, and is like
the existence of the gods; for the gods on their part will require
nothing more from him who observes these things.

Do wrong to thyself, do wrong to thyself, my soul; but thou wilt no
longer have the opportunity of honouring thyself. Every man's life
is sufficient. But thine is nearly finished, though thy soul reverences
not itself but places thy felicity in the souls of others.

Do the things external which fall upon thee distract thee? Give thyself
time to learn something new and good, and cease to be whirled around.
But then thou must also avoid being carried about the other way. For
those too are triflers who have wearied themselves in life by their
activity, and yet have no object to which to direct every movement,
and, in a word, all their thoughts.

Through not observing what is in the mind of another a man has seldom
been seen to be unhappy; but those who do not observe the movements
of their own minds must of necessity be unhappy.

This thou must always bear in mind, what is the nature of the whole,
and what is my nature, and how this is related to that, and what kind
of a part it is of what kind of a whole; and that there is no one
who hinders thee from always doing and saying the things which are
according to the nature of which thou art a part.

Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts- such a comparison as
one would make in accordance with the common notions of mankind- says,
like a true philosopher, that the offences which are committed through
desire are more blameable than those which are committed through anger.
For he who is excited by anger seems to turn away from reason with
a certain pain and unconscious contraction; but he who offends through
desire, being overpowered by pleasure, seems to be in a manner more
intemperate and more womanish in his offences. Rightly then, and in
a way worthy of philosophy, he said that the offence which is committed
with pleasure is more blameable than that which is committed with
pain; and on the whole the one is more like a person who has been
first wronged and through pain is compelled to be angry; but the other
is moved by his own impulse to do wrong, being carried towards doing
something by desire.

Since it is possible that thou mayest depart from life this very moment,
regulate every act and thought accordingly. But to go away from among
men, if there are gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for the gods
will not involve thee in evil; but if indeed they do not exist, or
if they have no concern about human affairs, what is it to me to live
in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of Providence? But in truth
they do exist, and they do care for human things, and they have put
all the means in man's power to enable him not to fall into real evils.
And as to the rest, if there was anything evil, they would have provided
for this also, that it should be altogether in a man's power not to
fall into it. Now that which does not make a man worse, how can it
make a man's life worse? But neither through ignorance, nor having
the knowledge, but not the power to guard against or correct these
things, is it possible that the nature of the universe has overlooked
them; nor is it possible that it has made so great a mistake, either
through want of power or want of skill, that good and evil should
happen indiscriminately to the good and the bad. But death certainly,
and life, honour and dishonour, pain and pleasure, all these things
equally happen to good men and bad, being things which make us neither
better nor worse. Therefore they are neither good nor evil.

How quickly all things disappear, in the universe the bodies themselves,
but in time the remembrance of them; what is the nature of all sensible
things, and particularly those which attract with the bait of pleasure
or terrify by pain, or are noised abroad by vapoury fame; how worthless,
and contemptible, and sordid, and perishable, and dead they are- all
this it is the part of the intellectual faculty to observe. To observe
too who these are whose opinions and voices give reputation; what
death is, and the fact that, if a man looks at it in itself, and by
the abstractive power of reflection resolves into their parts all
the things which present themselves to the imagination in it, he will
then consider it to be nothing else than an operation of nature; and
if any one is afraid of an operation of nature, he is a child. This,
however, is not only an operation of nature, but it is also a thing
which conduces to the purposes of nature. To observe too how man comes
near to the deity, and by what part of him, and when this part of
man is so disposed.

Nothing is more wretched than a man who traverses everything in a
round, and pries into the things beneath the earth, as the poet says,
and seeks by conjecture what is in the minds of his neighbours, without
perceiving that it is sufficient to attend to the daemon within him,
and to reverence it sincerely. And reverence of the daemon consists
in keeping it pure from passion and thoughtlessness, and dissatisfaction
with what comes from gods and men. For the things from the gods merit
veneration for their excellence; and the things from men should be
dear to us by reason of kinship; and sometimes even, in a manner,
they move our pity by reason of men's ignorance of good and bad; this
defect being not less than that which deprives us of the power of

and thou wilt go, and it will never return.

Every moment think steadily as a Roman and a man to do what thou hast

in hand with perfect and simple dignity, and feeling of affection,

and freedom, and justice; and to give thyself relief from all other

thoughts. And thou wilt give thyself relief, if thou doest every act

of thy life as if it were the last, laying aside all carelessness

and passionate aversion from the commands of reason, and all hypocrisy,

and self-love, and discontent with the portion which has been given

to thee. Thou seest how few the things are, the which if a man lays

hold of, he is able to live a life which flows in quiet, and is like

the existence of the gods; for the gods on their part will require

nothing more from him who observes these things.

Do wrong to thyself, do wrong to thyself, my soul; but thou wilt no

longer have the opportunity of honouring thyself. Every man's life

is sufficient. But thine is nearly finished, though thy soul reverences

not itself but places thy felicity in the souls of others.

Do the things external which fall upon thee distract thee? Give thyself

time to learn something new and good, and cease to be whirled around.

But then thou must also avoid being carried about the other way. For

those too are triflers who have wearied themselves in life by their

activity, and yet have no object to which to direct every movement,

and, in a word, all their thoughts.

Through not observing what is in the mind of another a man has seldom

been seen to be unhappy; but those who do not observe the movements

of their own minds must of necessity be unhappy.

This thou must always bear in mind, what is the nature of the whole,

and what is my nature, and how this is related to that, and what kind

of a part it is of what kind of a whole; and that there is no one

who hinders thee from always doing and saying the things which are

according to the nature of which thou art a part.

Theophrastus, in his comparison of bad acts- such a comparison as

one would make in accordance with the common notions of mankind- says,

like a true philosopher, that the offences which are committed through

desire are more blameable than those which are committed through anger.

For he who is excited by anger seems to turn away from reason with

a certain pain and unconscious contraction; but he who offends through

desire, being overpowered by pleasure, seems to be in a manner more

intemperate and more womanish in his offences. Rightly then, and in

a way worthy of philosophy, he said that the offence which is committed

with pleasure is more blameable than that which is committed with

pain; and on the whole the one is more like a person who has been

first wronged and through pain is compelled to be angry; but the other

is moved by his own impulse to do wrong, being carried towards doing

something by desire.

Since it is possible that thou mayest depart from life this very moment,

regulate every act and thought accordingly. But to go away from among

men, if there are gods, is not a thing to be afraid of, for the gods

will not involve thee in evil; but if indeed they do not exist, or

if they have no concern about human affairs, what is it to me to live

in a universe devoid of gods or devoid of Providence? But in truth

they do exist, and they do care for human things, and they have put

all the means in man's power to enable him not to fall into real evils.

And as to the rest, if there was anything evil, they would have provided

for this also, that it should be altogether in a man's power not to

fall into it. Now that which does not make a man worse, how can it

make a man's life worse? But neither through ignorance, nor having

the knowledge, but not the power to guard against or correct these

things, is it possible that the nature of the universe has overlooked

them; nor is it possible that it has made so great a mistake, either

through want of power or want of skill, that good and evil should

happen indiscriminately to the good and the bad. But death certainly,

and life, honour and dishonour, pain and pleasure, all these things

equally happen to good men and bad, being things which make us neither

better nor worse. Therefore they are neither good nor evil.

How quickly all things disappear, in the universe the bodies themselves,

but in time the remembrance of them; what is the nature of all sensible

things, and particularly those which attract with the bait of pleasure

or terrify by pain, or are noised abroad by vapoury fame; how worthless,

and contemptible, and sordid, and perishable, and dead they are- all

this it is the part of the intellectual faculty to observe. To observe

too who these are whose opinions and voices give reputation; what

death is, and the fact that, if a man looks at it in itself, and by

the abstractive power of reflection resolves into their parts all

the things which present themselves to the imagination in it, he will

then consider it to be nothing else than an operation of nature; and

if any one is afraid of an operation of nature, he is a child. This,

however, is not only an operation of nature, but it is also a thing

which conduces to the purposes of nature. To observe too how man comes

near to the deity, and by what part of him, and when this part of

man is so disposed.

Nothing is more wretched than a man who traverses everything in a

round, and pries into the things beneath the earth, as the poet says,

and seeks by conjecture what is in the minds of his neighbours, without

perceiving that it is sufficient to attend to the daemon within him,

and to reverence it sincerely. And reverence of the daemon consists

in keeping it pure from passion and thoughtlessness, and dissatisfaction

with what comes from gods and men. For the things from the gods merit

veneration for their excellence; and the things from men should be

dear to us by reason of kinship; and sometimes even, in a manner,

they move our pity by reason of men's ignorance of good and bad; this

defect being not less than that which deprives us of the power of