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Pleasure and pain are intrinsic value and disvalue – everything else regresses – robust neuroscience.

Blum et al. 18

Blum et al. 18 Kenneth Blum, 1Department of Psychiatry, Boonshoft School of Medicine, Dayton VA Medical Center, Wright State University, Dayton, OH, USA 2Department of Psychiatry, McKnight Brain Institute, University of Florida College of Medicine, Gainesville, FL, USA 3Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Keck Medicine University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA 4Division of Applied Clinical Research & Education, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC, North Kingstown, RI, USA 5Department of Precision Medicine, Geneus Health LLC, San Antonio, TX, USA 6Department of Addiction Research & Therapy, Nupathways Inc., Innsbrook, MO, USA 7Department of Clinical Neurology, Path Foundation, New York, NY, USA 8Division of Neuroscience-Based Addiction Therapy, The Shores Treatment & Recovery Center, Port Saint Lucie, FL, USA 9Institute of Psychology, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary 10Division of Addiction Research, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC. North Kingston, RI, USA 11Victory Nutrition International, Lederach, PA., USA 12National Human Genome Center at Howard University, Washington, DC., USA, Marjorie Gondré-Lewis, 12National Human Genome Center at Howard University, Washington, DC., USA 13Departments of Anatomy and Psychiatry, Howard University College of Medicine, Washington, DC US, Bruce Steinberg, 4Division of Applied Clinical Research & Education, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC, North Kingstown, RI, USA, Igor Elman, 15Department Psychiatry, Cooper University School of Medicine, Camden, NJ, USA, David Baron, 3Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Keck Medicine University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA, Edward J Modestino, 14Department of Psychology, Curry College, Milton, MA, USA, Rajendra D Badgaiyan, 15Department Psychiatry, Cooper University School of Medicine, Camden, NJ, USA, Mark S Gold 16Department of Psychiatry, Washington University, St. Louis, MO, USA, “Our evolved unique pleasure circuit makes humans different from apes: Reconsideration of data derived from animal studies”, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 28 February 2018, accessed: 19 August 2020, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6446569/, R.S.

Pleasure is not only primary reward functions it also defines reward. functions of rewards, the reason why particular stimuli, objects, events, situations, and activities are rewarding due to pleasure. Pleasure, as the primary effect of rewards provides the basis for hedonic theories of reward function. We are attracted by rewards and exert intense efforts to obtain them because they are enjoyable using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure Pleasure as a hallmark of reward is sufficient for defining a reward A reward may generate positive behavior because it contains substances that are essential for body function. evolution and its basic principles found mechanisms that steer behavior and biological development. organisms are the result of evolutionary competition. Dawkins stresses gene survival and propagation as the basic mechanism of life the fittest phenotype will make it. the ultimate, distal function of rewards is to increase evolutionary fitness Behavioral reward functions have evolved to help individuals to survive and propagate their genes people need to live well and long enough to reproduce. any small edge will ultimately result in evolutionary advantage Thus the distal reward function in gene propagation and evolutionary fitness defines the proximal reward functions that we see That is why foods, drinks, mates, and offspring are rewarding. pleasure is described as a state or feeling of happiness and satisfaction resulting from an experience that one enjoys. pathways for ordinary liking and pleasure are limited in scope there are many brain regions that significantly modulate our pleasure or even produce the opposite disgust and fear One region is organized like a computer keyboard, with particular stimulus triggers in rows the cortex has unique roles in the cognitive evaluation of our feelings of pleasure “liking” of something, or pure pleasure, is represented by regions in the limbic system part of larger neural circuits. researchers examined 247 specimens of neural tissue from six humans, five chimpanzees, and five macaque monkeys. investigators analyzed which genes were turned on or off in 16 regions of the brain. the differences among species were subtle, there was a remarkable contrast in the neocortices in an area of the brain that is much more developed in humans than in chimpanzees. ability to pursue various rewards that are perhaps months or even years away This may explain what often motivates people to work for things that have no apparent short-term benefit

Pleasure defines reward. the reason why particular stimuli are rewarding due to pleasure. Pleasure provides the basis for hedonic theories of reward organisms are the result of evolutionary competition. rewards increase fitness foods, drinks, mates, and offspring are rewarding. brain regions modulate pleasure or the opposite liking something is represented by regions in the limbic system researchers examined neural tissue neocortices in the brain much more developed in humans ability to pursue rewards that are years away

Pleasure is not only one of the three primary reward functions but it also defines reward. As homeostasis explains the functions of only a limited number of rewards, the principal reason why particular stimuli, objects, events, situations, and activities are rewarding may be due to pleasure. This applies first of all to sex and to the primary homeostatic rewards of food and liquid and extends to money, taste, beauty, social encounters and nonmaterial, internally set, and intrinsic rewards. Pleasure, as the primary effect of rewards, drives the prime reward functions of learning, approach behavior, and decision making and provides the basis for hedonic theories of reward function. We are attracted by most rewards and exert intense efforts to obtain them, just because they are enjoyable [10]. Pleasure is a passive reaction that derives from the experience or prediction of reward and may lead to a long-lasting state of happiness. The word happiness is difficult to define. In fact, just obtaining physical pleasure may not be enough. One key to happiness involves a network of good friends. However, it is not obvious how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to an ice cream cone, or to your team winning a sporting event. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure [14]. Pleasure as a hallmark of reward is sufficient for defining a reward, but it may not be necessary. A reward may generate positive learning and approach behavior simply because it contains substances that are essential for body function. When we are hungry, we may eat bad and unpleasant meals. A monkey who receives hundreds of small drops of water every morning in the laboratory is unlikely to feel a rush of pleasure every time it gets the 0.1 ml. Nevertheless, with these precautions in mind, we may define any stimulus, object, event, activity, or situation that has the potential to produce pleasure as a reward. In the context of reward deficiency or for disorders of addiction, homeostasis pursues pharmacological treatments: drugs to treat drug addiction, obesity, and other compulsive behaviors. The theory of allostasis suggests broader approaches - such as re-expanding the range of possible pleasures and providing opportunities to expend effort in their pursuit. [15]. It is noteworthy, the first animal studies eliciting approach behavior by electrical brain stimulation interpreted their findings as a discovery of the brain’s pleasure centers [16] which were later partly associated with midbrain dopamine neurons [17–19] despite the notorious difficulties of identifying emotions in animals. Evolutionary theories of pleasure: The love connection BO:D Charles Darwin and other biological scientists that have examined the biological evolution and its basic principles found various mechanisms that steer behavior and biological development. Besides their theory on natural selection, it was particularly the sexual selection process that gained significance in the latter context over the last century, especially when it comes to the question of what makes us “what we are,” i.e., human. However, the capacity to sexually select and evolve is not at all a human accomplishment alone or a sign of our uniqueness; yet, we humans, as it seems, are ingenious in fooling ourselves and others–when we are in love or desperately search for it. It is well established that modern biological theory conjectures that organisms are the result of evolutionary competition. In fact, Richard Dawkins stresses gene survival and propagation as the basic mechanism of life [20]. Only genes that lead to the fittest phenotype will make it. It is noteworthy that the phenotype is selected based on behavior that maximizes gene propagation. To do so, the phenotype must survive and generate offspring, and be better at it than its competitors. Thus, the ultimate, distal function of rewards is to increase evolutionary fitness by ensuring the survival of the organism and reproduction. It is agreed that learning, approach, economic decisions, and positive emotions are the proximal functions through which phenotypes obtain other necessary nutrients for survival, mating, and care for offspring. Behavioral reward functions have evolved to help individuals to survive and propagate their genes. Apparently, people need to live well and long enough to reproduce. Most would agree that homo-sapiens do so by ingesting the substances that make their bodies function properly. For this reason, foods and drinks are rewards. Additional rewards, including those used for economic exchanges, ensure sufficient palatable food and drink supply. Mating and gene propagation is supported by powerful sexual attraction. Additional properties, like body form, augment the chance to mate and nourish and defend offspring and are therefore also rewards. Care for offspring until they can reproduce themselves helps gene propagation and is rewarding; otherwise, many believe mating is useless. According to David E Comings, as any small edge will ultimately result in evolutionary advantage [21], additional reward mechanisms like novelty seeking and exploration widen the spectrum of available rewards and thus enhance the chance for survival, reproduction, and ultimate gene propagation. These functions may help us to obtain the benefits of distant rewards that are determined by our own interests and not immediately available in the environment. Thus the distal reward function in gene propagation and evolutionary fitness defines the proximal reward functions that we see in everyday behavior. That is why foods, drinks, mates, and offspring are rewarding. There have been theories linking pleasure as a required component of health benefits salutogenesis, (salugenesis). In essence, under these terms, pleasure is described as a state or feeling of happiness and satisfaction resulting from an experience that one enjoys. Regarding pleasure, it is a double-edged sword, on the one hand, it promotes positive feelings (like mindfulness) and even better cognition, possibly through the release of dopamine [22]. But on the other hand, pleasure simultaneously encourages addiction and other negative behaviors, i.e., motivational toxicity. It is a complex neurobiological phenomenon, relying on reward circuitry or limbic activity. It is important to realize that through the “Brain Reward Cascade” (BRC) endorphin and endogenous morphinergic mechanisms may play a role [23]. While natural rewards are essential for survival and appetitive motivation leading to beneficial biological behaviors like eating, sex, and reproduction, crucial social interactions seem to further facilitate the positive effects exerted by pleasurable experiences. Indeed, experimentation with addictive drugs is capable of directly acting on reward pathways and causing deterioration of these systems promoting hypodopaminergia [24]. Most would agree that pleasurable activities can stimulate personal growth and may help to induce healthy behavioral changes, including stress management [25]. The work of Esch and Stefano [26] concerning the link between compassion and love implicate the brain reward system, and pleasure induction suggests that social contact in general, i.e., love, attachment, and compassion, can be highly effective in stress reduction, survival, and overall health. Understanding the role of neurotransmission and pleasurable states both positive and negative have been adequately studied over many decades [26–37], but comparative anatomical and neurobiological function between animals and homo sapiens appear to be required and seem to be in an infancy stage. Finding happiness is different between apes and humans As stated earlier in this expert opinion one key to happiness involves a network of good friends [38]. However, it is not entirely clear exactly how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to a sugar rush, winning a sports event or even sky diving, all of which augment dopamine release at the reward brain site. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure. Remarkably, there are pathways for ordinary liking and pleasure, which are limited in scope as described above in this commentary. However, there are many brain regions, often termed hot and cold spots, that significantly modulate (increase or decrease) our pleasure or even produce the opposite of pleasure— that is disgust and fear [39]. One specific region of the nucleus accumbens is organized like a computer keyboard, with particular stimulus triggers in rows— producing an increase and decrease of pleasure and disgust. Moreover, the cortex has unique roles in the cognitive evaluation of our feelings of pleasure [40]. Importantly, the interplay of these multiple triggers and the higher brain centers in the prefrontal cortex are very intricate and are just being uncovered. Desire and reward centers It is surprising that many different sources of pleasure activate the same circuits between the mesocorticolimbic regions (Figure 1). Reward and desire are two aspects pleasure induction and have a very widespread, large circuit. Some part of this circuit distinguishes between desire and dread. The so-called pleasure circuitry called “REWARD” involves a well-known dopamine pathway in the mesolimbic system that can influence both pleasure and motivation. In simplest terms, the well-established mesolimbic system is a dopamine circuit for reward. It starts in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain and travels to the nucleus accumbens (Figure 2). It is the cornerstone target to all addictions. The VTA is encompassed with neurons using glutamate, GABA, and dopamine. The nucleus accumbens (NAc) is located within the ventral striatum and is divided into two sub-regions—the motor and limbic regions associated with its core and shell, respectively. The NAc has spiny neurons that receive dopamine from the VTA and glutamate (a dopamine driver) from the hippocampus, amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex. Subsequently, the NAc projects GABA signals to an area termed the ventral pallidum (VP). The region is a relay station in the limbic loop of the basal ganglia, critical for motivation, behavior, emotions and the “Feel Good” response. This defined system of the brain is involved in all addictions –substance, and non –substance related. In 1995, our laboratory coined the term “Reward Deficiency Syndrome” (RDS) to describe genetic and epigenetic induced hypodopaminergia in the “Brain Reward Cascade” that contribute to addiction and compulsive behaviors [3,6,41]. Furthermore, ordinary “liking” of something, or pure pleasure, is represented by small regions mainly in the limbic system (old reptilian part of the brain). These may be part of larger neural circuits. In Latin, hedus is the term for “sweet”; and in Greek, hodone is the term for “pleasure.” Thus, the word Hedonic is now referring to various subcomponents of pleasure: some associated with purely sensory and others with more complex emotions involving morals, aesthetics, and social interactions. The capacity to have pleasure is part of being healthy and may even extend life, especially if linked to optimism as a dopaminergic response [42]. Psychiatric illness often includes symptoms of an abnormal inability to experience pleasure, referred to as anhedonia. A negative feeling state is called dysphoria, which can consist of many emotions such as pain, depression, anxiety, fear, and disgust. Previously many scientists used animal research to uncover the complex mechanisms of pleasure, liking, motivation and even emotions like panic and fear, as discussed above [43]. However, as a significant amount of related research about the specific brain regions of pleasure/reward circuitry has been derived from invasive studies of animals, these cannot be directly compared with subjective states experienced by humans. In an attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the causal contributions of mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward, we have previously evaluated the three-main competing explanatory categories: “liking,” “learning,” and “wanting” [3]. That is, dopamine may mediate (a) liking: the hedonic impact of reward, (b) learning: learned predictions about rewarding effects, or (c) wanting: the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli [44]. We have evaluated these hypotheses, especially as they relate to the RDS, and we find that the incentive salience or “wanting” hypothesis of dopaminergic functioning is supported by a majority of the scientific evidence. Various neuroimaging studies have shown that anticipated behaviors such as sex and gaming, delicious foods and drugs of abuse all affect brain regions associated with reward networks, and may not be unidirectional. Drugs of abuse enhance dopamine signaling which sensitizes mesolimbic brain mechanisms that apparently evolved explicitly to attribute incentive salience to various rewards [45]. Addictive substances are voluntarily self-administered, and they enhance (directly or indirectly) dopaminergic synaptic function in the NAc. This activation of the brain reward networks (producing the ecstatic “high” that users seek). Although these circuits were initially thought to encode a set point of hedonic tone, it is now being considered to be far more complicated in function, also encoding attention, reward expectancy, disconfirmation of reward expectancy, and incentive motivation [46]. The argument about addiction as a disease may be confused with a predisposition to substance and nonsubstance rewards relative to the extreme effect of drugs of abuse on brain neurochemistry. The former sets up an individual to be at high risk through both genetic polymorphisms in reward genes as well as harmful epigenetic insult. Some Psychologists, even with all the data, still infer that addiction is not a disease [47]. Elevated stress levels, together with polymorphisms (genetic variations) of various dopaminergic genes and the genes related to other neurotransmitters (and their genetic variants), and may have an additive effect on vulnerability to various addictions [48]. In this regard, Vanyukov, et al. [48] suggested based on review that whereas the gateway hypothesis does not specify mechanistic connections between “stages,” and does not extend to the risks for addictions the concept of common liability to addictions may be more parsimonious. The latter theory is grounded in genetic theory and supported by data identifying common sources of variation in the risk for specific addictions (e.g., RDS). This commonality has identifiable neurobiological substrate and plausible evolutionary explanations. Over many years the controversy of dopamine involvement in especially “pleasure” has led to confusion concerning separating motivation from actual pleasure (wanting versus liking) [49]. We take the position that animal studies cannot provide real clinical information as described by self-reports in humans. As mentioned earlier and in the abstract, on November 23rd, 2017, evidence for our concerns was discovered [50] In essence, although nonhuman primate brains are similar to our own, the disparity between other primates and those of human cognitive abilities tells us that surface similarity is not the whole story. Sousa et al. [50] small case found various differentially expressed genes, to associate with pleasure related systems. Furthermore, the dopaminergic interneurons located in the human neocortex were absent from the neocortex of nonhuman African apes. Such differences in neuronal transcriptional programs may underlie a variety of neurodevelopmental disorders. In simpler terms, the system controls the production of dopamine, a chemical messenger that plays a significant role in pleasure and rewards. The senior author, Dr. Nenad Sestan from Yale, stated: “Humans have evolved a dopamine system that is different than the one in chimpanzees.” This may explain why the behavior of humans is so unique from that of non-human primates, even though our brains are so surprisingly similar, Sestan said: “It might also shed light on why people are vulnerable to mental disorders such as autism (possibly even addiction).” Remarkably, this research finding emerged from an extensive, multicenter collaboration to compare the brains across several species. These researchers examined 247 specimens of neural tissue from six humans, five chimpanzees, and five macaque monkeys. Moreover, these investigators analyzed which genes were turned on or off in 16 regions of the brain. While the differences among species were subtle, there was a remarkable contrast in the neocortices, specifically in an area of the brain that is much more developed in humans than in chimpanzees. In fact, these researchers found that a gene called ability to pursue various rewards that are perhaps months or even years away in the future. This same idea has been suggested by Dr. Robert Sapolsky, a professor of biology and neurology at Stanford University. Dr. Sapolsky cited evidence that dopamine levels rise dramatically in humans when we anticipate potential rewards that are uncertain and even far off in our futures, such as retirement or even the possible alterlife. This may explain what often motivates people to work for things that have no apparent short-term benefit [51]. In similar work, Volkow and Bale [52] proposed a model in which dopamine can favor NOW processes through phasic signaling in reward circuits or LATER processes through tonic signaling in control circuits. Specifically, they suggest that through its modulation of the orbitofrontal cortex, which processes salience attribution, dopamine also enables shilting from NOW to LATER, while its modulation of the insula, which processes interoceptive information, influences the probability of selecting NOW versus LATER actions based on an individual’s physiological state. This hypothesis further supports the concept that disruptions along these circuits contribute to diverse pathologies, including obesity and addiction or RDS.

<h4><strong>Pleasure and pain are intrinsic value and disvalue – everything else regresses – robust neuroscience. </h4><p>Blum et al. 18 </strong>Kenneth Blum, 1Department of Psychiatry, Boonshoft School of Medicine, Dayton VA Medical Center, Wright State University, Dayton, OH, USA 2Department of Psychiatry, McKnight Brain Institute, University of Florida College of Medicine, Gainesville, FL, USA 3Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Keck Medicine University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA 4Division of Applied Clinical Research & Education, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC, North Kingstown, RI, USA 5Department of Precision Medicine, Geneus Health LLC, San Antonio, TX, USA 6Department of Addiction Research & Therapy, Nupathways Inc., Innsbrook, MO, USA 7Department of Clinical Neurology, Path Foundation, New York, NY, USA 8Division of Neuroscience-Based Addiction Therapy, The Shores Treatment & Recovery Center, Port Saint Lucie, FL, USA 9Institute of Psychology, Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary 10Division of Addiction Research, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC. North Kingston, RI, USA 11Victory Nutrition International, Lederach, PA., USA 12National Human Genome Center at Howard University, Washington, DC., USA, Marjorie Gondré-Lewis, 12National Human Genome Center at Howard University, Washington, DC., USA 13Departments of Anatomy and Psychiatry, Howard University College of Medicine, Washington, DC US, Bruce Steinberg, 4Division of Applied Clinical Research & Education, Dominion Diagnostics, LLC, North Kingstown, RI, USA, Igor Elman, 15Department Psychiatry, Cooper University School of Medicine, Camden, NJ, USA, David Baron, 3Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, Keck Medicine University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA, Edward J Modestino, 14Department of Psychology, Curry College, Milton, MA, USA, Rajendra D Badgaiyan, 15Department Psychiatry, Cooper University School of Medicine, Camden, NJ, USA, Mark S Gold 16Department of Psychiatry, Washington University, St. Louis, MO, USA, “Our evolved unique pleasure circuit makes humans different from apes: Reconsideration of data derived from animal studies”, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, 28 February 2018, accessed: 19 August 2020, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6446569/, R.S.</p><p><u><strong><mark>Pleasure</strong></mark> is not only</u> one of the three <u>primary reward functions</u> but <u>it also <strong><mark>defines reward.</u></strong></mark> As homeostasis explains the <u>functions of</u> only a limited number of <u>rewards, <strong><mark>the</u></strong></mark> principal <u><strong><mark>reason why particular stimuli</strong></mark>, objects, events, situations, and activities <strong><mark>are rewarding</u></strong></mark> may be <u><strong><mark>due to pleasure</strong>.</u></mark> This applies first of all to sex and to the primary homeostatic rewards of food and liquid and extends to money, taste, beauty, social encounters and nonmaterial, internally set, and intrinsic rewards. <u><strong><mark>Pleasure</strong></mark>, as the primary effect of rewards</u>, drives the prime reward functions of learning, approach behavior, and decision making and <u><strong><mark>provides the basis for hedonic theories of reward</strong></mark> function. We are attracted by</u> most <u>rewards and exert intense efforts to obtain them</u>, just <u>because they are enjoyable</u> [10]. Pleasure is a passive reaction that derives from the experience or prediction of reward and may lead to a long-lasting state of happiness. The word happiness is difficult to define. In fact, just obtaining physical pleasure may not be enough. One key to happiness involves a network of good friends. However, it is not obvious how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to an ice cream cone, or to your team winning a sporting event. Recent multidisciplinary research, <u>using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure</u> [14]. <u>Pleasure as a hallmark of reward is sufficient for defining a reward</u>, but it may not be necessary. <u>A reward may generate positive</u> learning and approach <u>behavior</u> simply <u>because it contains substances that are essential for body function.</u> When we are hungry, we may eat bad and unpleasant meals. A monkey who receives hundreds of small drops of water every morning in the laboratory is unlikely to feel a rush of pleasure every time it gets the 0.1 ml. Nevertheless, with these precautions in mind, we may define any stimulus, object, event, activity, or situation that has the potential to produce pleasure as a reward. In the context of reward deficiency or for disorders of addiction, homeostasis pursues pharmacological treatments: drugs to treat drug addiction, obesity, and other compulsive behaviors. The theory of allostasis suggests broader approaches - such as re-expanding the range of possible pleasures and providing opportunities to expend effort in their pursuit. [15]. It is noteworthy, the first animal studies eliciting approach behavior by electrical brain stimulation interpreted their findings as a discovery of the brain’s pleasure centers [16] which were later partly associated with midbrain dopamine neurons [17–19] despite the notorious difficulties of identifying emotions in animals. Evolutionary theories of pleasure: The love connection BO:D Charles Darwin and other biological scientists that have examined the biological <u>evolution and its basic principles found</u> various <u>mechanisms that steer behavior and biological development.</u> Besides their theory on natural selection, it was particularly the sexual selection process that gained significance in the latter context over the last century, especially when it comes to the question of what makes us “what we are,” i.e., human. However, the capacity to sexually select and evolve is not at all a human accomplishment alone or a sign of our uniqueness; yet, we humans, as it seems, are ingenious in fooling ourselves and others–when we are in love or desperately search for it. It is well established that modern biological theory conjectures that <u><strong><mark>organisms are</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>result of evolutionary competition.</u></strong></mark> In fact, Richard <u>Dawkins stresses gene survival and propagation as the basic mechanism of life</u> [20]. Only genes that lead to <u>the fittest phenotype will make it.</u> It is noteworthy that the phenotype is selected based on behavior that maximizes gene propagation. To do so, the phenotype must survive and generate offspring, and be better at it than its competitors. Thus, <u>the ultimate, distal function of <strong><mark>rewards</strong></mark> is to <strong><mark>increase</strong></mark> evolutionary <strong><mark>fitness</u></strong></mark> by ensuring the survival of the organism and reproduction. It is agreed that learning, approach, economic decisions, and positive emotions are the proximal functions through which phenotypes obtain other necessary nutrients for survival, mating, and care for offspring. <u>Behavioral reward functions have evolved to help individuals to survive and propagate their genes</u>. Apparently, <u>people need to live well and long enough to reproduce.</u> Most would agree that homo-sapiens do so by ingesting the substances that make their bodies function properly. For this reason, foods and drinks are rewards. Additional rewards, including those used for economic exchanges, ensure sufficient palatable food and drink supply. Mating and gene propagation is supported by powerful sexual attraction. Additional properties, like body form, augment the chance to mate and nourish and defend offspring and are therefore also rewards. Care for offspring until they can reproduce themselves helps gene propagation and is rewarding; otherwise, many believe mating is useless. According to David E Comings, as <u>any small edge will ultimately result in evolutionary advantage</u> [21], additional reward mechanisms like novelty seeking and exploration widen the spectrum of available rewards and thus enhance the chance for survival, reproduction, and ultimate gene propagation. These functions may help us to obtain the benefits of distant rewards that are determined by our own interests and not immediately available in the environment. <u>Thus the distal reward function in gene propagation and evolutionary fitness defines the proximal reward functions that we see</u> in everyday behavior. <u><strong>That is why <mark>foods, drinks, mates, and offspring are rewarding</strong>.</mark> </u>There have been theories linking pleasure as a required component of health benefits salutogenesis, (salugenesis). In essence, under these terms, <u>pleasure is described as a state or feeling of happiness and satisfaction resulting from an experience that one enjoys.</u> Regarding pleasure, it is a double-edged sword, on the one hand, it promotes positive feelings (like mindfulness) and even better cognition, possibly through the release of dopamine [22]. But on the other hand, pleasure simultaneously encourages addiction and other negative behaviors, i.e., motivational toxicity. It is a complex neurobiological phenomenon, relying on reward circuitry or limbic activity. It is important to realize that through the “Brain Reward Cascade” (BRC) endorphin and endogenous morphinergic mechanisms may play a role [23]. While natural rewards are essential for survival and appetitive motivation leading to beneficial biological behaviors like eating, sex, and reproduction, crucial social interactions seem to further facilitate the positive effects exerted by pleasurable experiences. Indeed, experimentation with addictive drugs is capable of directly acting on reward pathways and causing deterioration of these systems promoting hypodopaminergia [24]. Most would agree that pleasurable activities can stimulate personal growth and may help to induce healthy behavioral changes, including stress management [25]. The work of Esch and Stefano [26] concerning the link between compassion and love implicate the brain reward system, and pleasure induction suggests that social contact in general, i.e., love, attachment, and compassion, can be highly effective in stress reduction, survival, and overall health. Understanding the role of neurotransmission and pleasurable states both positive and negative have been adequately studied over many decades [26–37], but comparative anatomical and neurobiological function between animals and homo sapiens appear to be required and seem to be in an infancy stage. Finding happiness is different between apes and humans As stated earlier in this expert opinion one key to happiness involves a network of good friends [38]. However, it is not entirely clear exactly how the higher forms of satisfaction and pleasure are related to a sugar rush, winning a sports event or even sky diving, all of which augment dopamine release at the reward brain site. Recent multidisciplinary research, using both humans and detailed invasive brain analysis of animals has discovered some critical ways that the brain processes pleasure. Remarkably, there are <u>pathways for ordinary liking and pleasure</u>, which <u>are limited in scope</u> as described above in this commentary. However, <u>there are <strong>many <mark>brain regions</u></strong></mark>, often termed hot and cold spots, <u>that significantly <strong><mark>modulate</u></strong></mark> (increase or decrease) <u>our <strong><mark>pleasure or</strong></mark> even <strong>produce <mark>the opposite</u></strong></mark> of pleasure— that is <u>disgust and fear</u> [39]. <u>One</u> specific <u>region</u> of the nucleus accumbens <u>is organized like a computer keyboard, with particular stimulus triggers in rows</u>— producing an increase and decrease of pleasure and disgust. Moreover, <u>the cortex has unique roles in the cognitive evaluation of our feelings of pleasure</u> [40]. Importantly, the interplay of these multiple triggers and the higher brain centers in the prefrontal cortex are very intricate and are just being uncovered. Desire and reward centers It is surprising that many different sources of pleasure activate the same circuits between the mesocorticolimbic regions (Figure 1). Reward and desire are two aspects pleasure induction and have a very widespread, large circuit. Some part of this circuit distinguishes between desire and dread. The so-called pleasure circuitry called “REWARD” involves a well-known dopamine pathway in the mesolimbic system that can influence both pleasure and motivation. In simplest terms, the well-established mesolimbic system is a dopamine circuit for reward. It starts in the ventral tegmental area (VTA) of the midbrain and travels to the nucleus accumbens (Figure 2). It is the cornerstone target to all addictions. The VTA is encompassed with neurons using glutamate, GABA, and dopamine. The nucleus accumbens (NAc) is located within the ventral striatum and is divided into two sub-regions—the motor and limbic regions associated with its core and shell, respectively. The NAc has spiny neurons that receive dopamine from the VTA and glutamate (a dopamine driver) from the hippocampus, amygdala and medial prefrontal cortex. Subsequently, the NAc projects GABA signals to an area termed the ventral pallidum (VP). The region is a relay station in the limbic loop of the basal ganglia, critical for motivation, behavior, emotions and the “Feel Good” response. This defined system of the brain is involved in all addictions –substance, and non –substance related. In 1995, our laboratory coined the term “Reward Deficiency Syndrome” (RDS) to describe genetic and epigenetic induced hypodopaminergia in the “Brain Reward Cascade” that contribute to addiction and compulsive behaviors [3,6,41]. Furthermore, ordinary <u>“<strong><mark>liking</strong></mark>” of <strong><mark>something</strong></mark>, or pure pleasure, <strong><mark>is represented by</u></strong></mark> small <u><strong><mark>regions</u></strong></mark> mainly <u><strong><mark>in the limbic system</u></strong></mark> (old reptilian part of the brain). These may be <u>part of larger neural circuits.</u> In Latin, hedus is the term for “sweet”; and in Greek, hodone is the term for “pleasure.” Thus, the word Hedonic is now referring to various subcomponents of pleasure: some associated with purely sensory and others with more complex emotions involving morals, aesthetics, and social interactions. The capacity to have pleasure is part of being healthy and may even extend life, especially if linked to optimism as a dopaminergic response [42]. Psychiatric illness often includes symptoms of an abnormal inability to experience pleasure, referred to as anhedonia. A negative feeling state is called dysphoria, which can consist of many emotions such as pain, depression, anxiety, fear, and disgust. Previously many scientists used animal research to uncover the complex mechanisms of pleasure, liking, motivation and even emotions like panic and fear, as discussed above [43]. However, as a significant amount of related research about the specific brain regions of pleasure/reward circuitry has been derived from invasive studies of animals, these cannot be directly compared with subjective states experienced by humans. In an attempt to resolve the controversy regarding the causal contributions of mesolimbic dopamine systems to reward, we have previously evaluated the three-main competing explanatory categories: “liking,” “learning,” and “wanting” [3]. That is, dopamine may mediate (a) liking: the hedonic impact of reward, (b) learning: learned predictions about rewarding effects, or (c) wanting: the pursuit of rewards by attributing incentive salience to reward-related stimuli [44]. We have evaluated these hypotheses, especially as they relate to the RDS, and we find that the incentive salience or “wanting” hypothesis of dopaminergic functioning is supported by a majority of the scientific evidence. Various neuroimaging studies have shown that anticipated behaviors such as sex and gaming, delicious foods and drugs of abuse all affect brain regions associated with reward networks, and may not be unidirectional. Drugs of abuse enhance dopamine signaling which sensitizes mesolimbic brain mechanisms that apparently evolved explicitly to attribute incentive salience to various rewards [45]. Addictive substances are voluntarily self-administered, and they enhance (directly or indirectly) dopaminergic synaptic function in the NAc. This activation of the brain reward networks (producing the ecstatic “high” that users seek). Although these circuits were initially thought to encode a set point of hedonic tone, it is now being considered to be far more complicated in function, also encoding attention, reward expectancy, disconfirmation of reward expectancy, and incentive motivation [46]. The argument about addiction as a disease may be confused with a predisposition to substance and nonsubstance rewards relative to the extreme effect of drugs of abuse on brain neurochemistry. The former sets up an individual to be at high risk through both genetic polymorphisms in reward genes as well as harmful epigenetic insult. Some Psychologists, even with all the data, still infer that addiction is not a disease [47]. Elevated stress levels, together with polymorphisms (genetic variations) of various dopaminergic genes and the genes related to other neurotransmitters (and their genetic variants), and may have an additive effect on vulnerability to various addictions [48]. In this regard, Vanyukov, et al. [48] suggested based on review that whereas the gateway hypothesis does not specify mechanistic connections between “stages,” and does not extend to the risks for addictions the concept of common liability to addictions may be more parsimonious. The latter theory is grounded in genetic theory and supported by data identifying common sources of variation in the risk for specific addictions (e.g., RDS). This commonality has identifiable neurobiological substrate and plausible evolutionary explanations. Over many years the controversy of dopamine involvement in especially “pleasure” has led to confusion concerning separating motivation from actual pleasure (wanting versus liking) [49]. We take the position that animal studies cannot provide real clinical information as described by self-reports in humans. As mentioned earlier and in the abstract, on November 23rd, 2017, evidence for our concerns was discovered [50] In essence, although nonhuman primate brains are similar to our own, the disparity between other primates and those of human cognitive abilities tells us that surface similarity is not the whole story. Sousa et al. [50] small case found various differentially expressed genes, to associate with pleasure related systems. Furthermore, the dopaminergic interneurons located in the human neocortex were absent from the neocortex of nonhuman African apes. Such differences in neuronal transcriptional programs may underlie a variety of neurodevelopmental disorders. In simpler terms, the system controls the production of dopamine, a chemical messenger that plays a significant role in pleasure and rewards. The senior author, Dr. Nenad Sestan from Yale, stated: “Humans have evolved a dopamine system that is different than the one in chimpanzees.” This may explain why the behavior of humans is so unique from that of non-human primates, even though our brains are so surprisingly similar, Sestan said: “It might also shed light on why people are vulnerable to mental disorders such as autism (possibly even addiction).” Remarkably, this research finding emerged from an extensive, multicenter collaboration to compare the brains across several species. These <u><strong><mark>researchers examined</strong></mark> 247 specimens of <strong><mark>neural tissue</strong></mark> from six humans, five chimpanzees, and five macaque monkeys.</u> Moreover, these <u>investigators analyzed which genes were turned on or off in 16 regions of the brain.</u> While <u>the differences among species were subtle, <strong>there was</strong> a <strong>remarkable contrast in</strong> the<strong> <mark>neocortices</u></strong></mark>, specifically <u><strong><mark>in</strong></mark> an area of <strong><mark>the brain</strong></mark> that <strong>is <mark>much more developed in humans</mark> </strong>than in chimpanzees.</u> In fact, these researchers found that a gene called <u><strong><mark>ability to pursue</strong></mark> various <strong><mark>rewards that are</strong></mark> perhaps months or even <strong><mark>years away </u></strong></mark>in the future. This same idea has been suggested by Dr. Robert Sapolsky, a professor of biology and neurology at Stanford University. Dr. Sapolsky cited evidence that dopamine levels rise dramatically in humans when we anticipate potential rewards that are uncertain and even far off in our futures, such as retirement or even the possible alterlife. <u>This may explain what often motivates people to work for things that have no apparent short-term benefit</u><strong> [51]. In similar work, Volkow and Bale [52] proposed a model in which dopamine can favor NOW processes through phasic signaling in reward circuits or LATER processes through tonic signaling in control circuits. Specifically, they suggest that through its modulation of the orbitofrontal cortex, which processes salience attribution, dopamine also enables shilting from NOW to LATER, while its modulation of the insula, which processes interoceptive information, influences the probability of selecting NOW versus LATER actions based on an individual’s physiological state. This hypothesis further supports the concept that disruptions along these circuits contribute to diverse pathologies, including obesity and addiction or RDS.</p></strong>

CPS R1 v Harker MK

1AC—Schengenlargement

1AC—Framing—Util

./documents/hsld22/MountainHouse/ElSu/MountainHouse-ElSu-Aff-CPS-LD-Invitational-Round-4.docx

A

CPS LD Invitational

4

Harker MK

Lukas Krause

1AC - Schengenlargement 1NC - T-cohen, EU CP, case 1AR - all 2NR - case 2AR - T case

hsld22/MountainHouse/ElSu/MountainHouse-ElSu-Aff-CPS-LD-Invitational-Round-4.docx

2023-01-02 23:45:29

ElSu

Mountain House ElSu

See 0 - Contact Info in cites for disclosure, etc.

El.....

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Mountain House

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HS LD 2022-23

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[6] Extinction comes first!

Pummer 15

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now : that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy. Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness seem to be fairly implausible views. even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.

reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the whole world. so many people could exist in the future trillions upon trillions reducing existential risk is the most important even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight We should also take into account moral uncertainty. even if we are only 1% sure that well-being

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

<h4>[6] Extinction comes first!</h4><p><u><strong>Pummer 15</u></strong> [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015] AT</p><p><u><strong>There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now</u></strong>, whatever general moral view we adopt<u><strong>: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war.</u></strong> How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that <u><strong>we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. </u></strong>According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. <u><strong>Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here.</u></strong> If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how<u><strong> <mark>reducing existential risk is </mark>easily <mark>the most important thing in the whole world.</mark> This is for the familiar reason that there are <mark>so many people </mark>who <mark>could exist in the future</mark> – there are <mark>trillions upon trillions</mark>… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that <mark>reducing existential risk is</mark> arguably <mark>the most important</mark> thing in the world, <mark>even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight </mark>as that of existing people.</u></strong> Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, <u><strong>this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake.</u></strong> <u><strong>Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter.</u></strong> Even John Rawls wrote, “<u><strong>All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.</u></strong>” <u><strong>Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view.</u></strong> <u><strong>They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk</u></strong>, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. <u><strong>Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk.</u></strong> It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). <u><strong>To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being.</u></strong> To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – <u><strong>suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being</u></strong>, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But <u><strong>once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk.</u></strong> Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. <u><strong><mark>We should also take into account moral uncertainty.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts?</u></strong> I’ve just argued that <u><strong>there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree.</u></strong> But <u><strong>even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one </u></strong>(and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), <u><strong>they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk.</u></strong> Perhaps most disturbingly still, <u><strong><mark>even if we are only 1% sure that </mark>the <mark>well-being </mark>of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world.</u></strong> Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. <u><strong>It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if</u></strong>, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, <u><strong>all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world.</u></strong> While there are some non-crazy <u><strong>views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness</u></strong>, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless <u><strong>seem to be fairly implausible views.</u></strong> And <u><strong>even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve.</u></strong> Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. <u><strong>Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. </u></strong>We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. <u><strong>If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. </u></strong>Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. <u><strong>Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.</u></strong>” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)</p>

Harvard Round 7

Framework

./documents/hsld20/Oxford/Me/Oxford-Mehta-Aff-Harvard-Round7.docx

A

Harvard

7

North Allegheny RR

Daniel Herrera

1AC - China v7 1NC - LogCon Must Spec LAWs Must have Solvency Advocate Must Not Read Epistemic Modesty and Extinction ow Case 1AR - All 2NR - Eval after 1NC Must Not Read Epistemic Modesty and Extinction ow 2AR - Case Lying Voter Skep RVI Must Not Read Epistemic Modesty and Extinction ow

hsld20/Oxford/Me/Oxford-Mehta-Aff-Harvard-Round7.docx

ViMe

Oxford ViMe

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Oxford

Oxford

CA

hsld20

HS LD 2020-21

ld

hs

Only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable – all other frameworks collapse.

Moen 16

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281]

a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good. : “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself. pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value

pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable there is something undeniably good about pleasure and something undeniably bad about pain value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat experiences pleasure is not good for anything further pleasure and pain both reach the end of the line in matters of value

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value

<h4>Only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable – all other frameworks collapse.</h4><p><strong>Moen 16</strong> [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281]</p><p>Let us start by observing, empirically, that <u>a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that <mark>pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable</mark>.</u> <u>On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues.</u> This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for <u><mark>there is something undeniably good about</mark> the way <mark>pleasure</mark> feels <mark>and something undeniably bad about</mark> the way <mark>pain</mark> feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have.</u> “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative.2 <u>The special <mark>value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat</mark> these <mark>experiences </mark>in our everyday reasoning about values.</u> If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, <u>I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so</u>, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but <u>for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable.</u> You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” <u>If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the <mark>pleasure is not good for anything further</mark>; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good.</u>3 As Aristotle observes<u>: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.</u>”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that <u><mark>pleasure and pain</mark> are <mark>both</mark> places where we <mark>reach the end of the line in matters of value</p></u></mark>

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Warming causes extinction.

Ng 19

Ng 19 [Yew-Kwang; May 2019; Professor of Economics at Nanyang Technology University, Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia and Member of the Advisory Board at the Global Priorities Institute at Oxford University, Ph.D. in Economics from Sydney University; Global Policy, “Keynote: Global Extinction and Animal Welfare: Two Priorities for Effective Altruism,” vol. 10, no. 2, p. 258-266; RP]

climate change causing global extinction is possible due to interrelated factors of non‐linearity, cascading effects, positive feedbacks, multiplicative factors, critical thresholds and tipping points A imminent tipping point could be ‘an abrupt ice sheet collapse [that] could cause rapid sea level rise’ There are many avenues for positive feedback replacement of an ice sea by a liquid surface from melting increases absorption of sunlight, leading to faster warming drying of forests increases forest fires and release of more carbon ocean temperatures lead to release of methane producing runaway global warming ‘The world is completely unprepared to envisage, and deal with CCC’ The threat of sea‐level rising from warming is well known, but there likely and imminent threats to the survivability of mankind the adaptability limit to climate change due to heat stress from high temperature ‘even modest warming could expose large fractions of the [world] to unprecedented heat stress’ and with substantial warming, ‘the area of land rendered uninhabitable would dwarf sea level’ making extinction likely and the moderate assessment models unreliably low we cannot rule it out probabilities of 5 per cent, 0.5 per cent or even 0.005 per cent of excessive warming and resulting extinction probabilities cannot be ruled out and are unacceptable. Even if there is only a 1 per cent probability that there is a bomb in the airplane, you want to change your flight. Extinction of the whole world is more important to avoid by a trillion times

climate causing extinction is due to non‐linearity, cascading feedbacks and tipping points ice sheet collapse cause rapid sea rise’ faster warming forest fires and release of methane producing runaway warming adaptability limit to mak extinction likely and moderate models unreliabl Even if there is 1 per cent probability Extinction is more important by a trillion

Catastrophic climate change Though by no means certain, CCC causing global extinction is possible due to interrelated factors of non‐linearity, cascading effects, positive feedbacks, multiplicative factors, critical thresholds and tipping points (e.g. Barnosky and Hadly, 2016; Belaia et al., 2017; Buldyrev et al., 2010; Grainger, 2017; Hansen and Sato, 2012; IPCC 2014; Kareiva and Carranza, 2018; Osmond and Klausmeier, 2017; Rothman, 2017; Schuur et al., 2015; Sims and Finnoff, 2016; Van Aalst, 2006).7 A possibly imminent tipping point could be in the form of ‘an abrupt ice sheet collapse [that] could cause a rapid sea level rise’ (Baum et al., 2011, p. 399). There are many avenues for positive feedback in global warming, including: the replacement of an ice sea by a liquid ocean surface from melting reduces the reflection and increases the absorption of sunlight, leading to faster warming; the drying of forests from warming increases forest fires and the release of more carbon; and higher ocean temperatures may lead to the release of methane trapped under the ocean floor, producing runaway global warming. Though there are also avenues for negative feedback, the scientific consensus is for an overall net positive feedback (Roe and Baker, 2007). Thus, the Global Challenges Foundation (2017, p. 25) concludes, ‘The world is currently completely unprepared to envisage, and even less deal with, the consequences of CCC’. The threat of sea‐level rising from global warming is well known, but there are also other likely and more imminent threats to the survivability of mankind and other living things. For example, Sherwood and Huber (2010) emphasize the adaptability limit to climate change due to heat stress from high environmental wet‐bulb temperature. They show that ‘even modest global warming could … expose large fractions of the [world] population to unprecedented heat stress’ p. 9552 and that with substantial global warming, ‘the area of land rendered uninhabitable by heat stress would dwarf that affected by rising sea level’ p. 9555, making extinction much more likely and the relatively moderate damages estimated by most integrated assessment models unreliably low. While imminent extinction is very unlikely and may not come for a long time even under business as usual, the main point is that we cannot rule it out. Annan and Hargreaves (2011, pp. 434–435) may be right that there is ‘an upper 95 per cent probability limit for S [temperature increase] … to lie close to 4°C, and certainly well below 6°C’. However, probabilities of 5 per cent, 0.5 per cent, 0.05 per cent or even 0.005 per cent of excessive warming and the resulting extinction probabilities cannot be ruled out and are unacceptable. Even if there is only a 1 per cent probability that there is a time bomb in the airplane, you probably want to change your flight. Extinction of the whole world is more important to avoid by literally a trillion times.

<h4>Warming causes extinction.</h4><p><strong>Ng 19 </strong>[Yew-Kwang; May 2019; Professor of Economics at Nanyang Technology University, Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences in Australia and Member of the Advisory Board at the Global Priorities Institute at Oxford University, Ph.D. in Economics from Sydney University; Global Policy, “Keynote: Global Extinction and Animal Welfare: Two Priorities for Effective Altruism,” vol. 10, no. 2, p. 258-266; RP]</p><p>Catastrophic <u><mark>climate</mark> change</u> Though by no means certain, CCC <u><mark>causing</mark> <strong>global <mark>extinction</strong> is</mark> possible <mark>due to</mark> <strong>interrelated factors</strong> of <strong><mark>non‐linearity</strong>, <strong>cascading</mark> effects</strong>, <strong>positive <mark>feedbacks</strong></mark>, <strong>multiplicative factors</strong>, <strong>critical thresholds</strong> <mark>and <strong>tipping points</u></strong></mark> (e.g. Barnosky and Hadly, 2016; Belaia et al., 2017; Buldyrev et al., 2010; Grainger, 2017; Hansen and Sato, 2012; IPCC 2014; Kareiva and Carranza, 2018; Osmond and Klausmeier, 2017; Rothman, 2017; Schuur et al., 2015; Sims and Finnoff, 2016; Van Aalst, 2006).7 <u>A</u> possibly <u><strong>imminent</strong> tipping point could be</u> in the form of <u>‘an abrupt <strong><mark>ice sheet collapse</strong></mark> [that] could <mark>cause</u></mark> a <u><strong><mark>rapid</strong> sea</mark> level <mark>rise’</u></mark> (Baum et al., 2011, p. 399). <u>There are many avenues for <strong>positive feedback</u></strong> in global warming, including: the <u>replacement of an ice sea by a liquid</u> ocean <u>surface from melting</u> reduces the reflection and <u><strong>increases</u></strong> the <u><strong>absorption</strong> of sunlight, leading to <strong><mark>faster warming</u></strong></mark>; the <u>drying of <strong>forests</u></strong> from warming <u>increases <mark>forest fires and</u></mark> the <u>release of <strong>more carbon</u></strong>; and higher <u>ocean temperatures</u> may <u>lead to</u> the <u><mark>release of <strong>methane</u></strong></mark> trapped under the ocean floor, <u><mark>producing</mark> <strong><mark>runaway</strong></mark> global <mark>warming</u></mark>. Though there are also avenues for negative feedback, the scientific consensus is for an overall net positive feedback (Roe and Baker, 2007). Thus, the Global Challenges Foundation (2017, p. 25) concludes, <u>‘The world is</u> currently <u><strong>completely unprepared</strong> to envisage, and</u> even less <u>deal with</u>, the consequences of <u>CCC’</u>. <u>The threat of <strong>sea‐level rising</strong> from</u> global <u>warming is well known, but there</u> are also other <u><strong>likely</strong> and</u> more <u><strong>imminent</strong> threats to the <strong>survivability of mankind</u></strong> and other living things. For example, Sherwood and Huber (2010) emphasize <u>the <strong><mark>adaptability limit</strong> to</mark> climate change due to <strong>heat stress</strong> from high</u> environmental wet‐bulb <u>temperature</u>. They show that <u>‘even <strong>modest</strong> </u>global <u>warming could</u> … <u>expose <strong>large fractions</strong> of the [world]</u> population <u>to <strong>unprecedented</strong> heat stress’</u> p. 9552 <u>and</u> that <u>with substantial</u> global <u>warming, ‘the area of land rendered <strong>uninhabitable</u></strong> by heat stress <u>would dwarf</u> that affected by rising <u>sea level’</u> p. 9555, <u><mark>mak</mark>ing <strong><mark>extinction</u></strong></mark> much more <u><strong><mark>likely</strong> and</mark> the</u> relatively <u><mark>moderate</u></mark> damages estimated by most integrated <u>assessment <mark>models <strong>unreliabl</mark>y low</u></strong>. While imminent extinction is very unlikely and may not come for a long time even under business as usual, the main point is that <u>we cannot rule it out</u>. Annan and Hargreaves (2011, pp. 434–435) may be right that there is ‘an upper 95 per cent probability limit for S [temperature increase] … to lie close to 4°C, and certainly well below 6°C’. However, <u>probabilities of 5 per cent, 0.5 per cent</u>, 0.05 per cent <u>or even <strong>0.005 per cent</strong> of excessive warming and</u> the <u>resulting <strong>extinction probabilities</strong> cannot be ruled out and are <strong>unacceptable</strong>. <mark>Even if there is</mark> only a <strong><mark>1 per cent probability</strong></mark> that there is a</u> time <u>bomb in the airplane, you</u> probably <u>want to change your flight. <mark>Extinction</mark> of the <strong>whole world</strong> <mark>is <strong>more important</strong></mark> to avoid <mark>by</mark> </u>literally <u><mark>a <strong>trillion</mark> times</u></strong>.</p>

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Decline cascades – nuclear war

Maavak 21

Maavak 21 – Mathew Maavak, PhD in Risk Foresight from the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, External Researcher (PLATBIDAFO) at the Kazimieras Simonavicius University, Expert and Regular Commentator on Risk-Related Geostrategic Issues at the Russian International Affairs Council, “Horizon 2030: Will Emerging Risks Unravel Our Global Systems?”, Salus Journal – The Australian Journal for Law Enforcement, Security and Intelligence Professionals, Volume 9, Number 1, p. 2-8

scholars regard global social instability as the greatest threat The catalyst has been postulated to be a Second Great Depression which, in turn, will have profound implications for global security and national integrity emerging risks are intertwined Tight couplings in global systems have enabled risks accrued in one area to snowball into a full-blown crisis elsewhere banking, utility, farming, healthcare and retail sectors etc. are increasingly entwined. Risks accrued in one system may cascade into an unforeseen crisis the behaviour of intersecting systems is determined by complex and largely invisible interactions at the substratum a global financial crash will lead to a trickle-down meltdown, impacting all areas of human activity and lead to a Second Great Depression Economic stressors may induce radical geopolitical realignments. Bullions now carry more weight than NATO’s security guarantees in Eastern Europe this erosion in regional trust was based on historical precedents with two global Titanics – the U S and China on a collision course the seismic ripples will be felt far, wide and for a considerable period What happens to the environment when our economies implode? Think of a debt-laden workforce at sensitive nuclear and chemical plants, along with a concomitant surge in industrial accidents? Economic stressors pose the biggest threats to the environment global risks can no longer be boxed into a taxonomical silo Our JIT world aggravates the cascading potential of risks Production and delivery delays will eventually require industrial overcompensation Interlinked ecosystems may be hijacked The environmental fallouts loom like a Sword of Damocles over this decade The primary catalyst behind WWII was the Great Depression history often repeats itself, expect familiar bogeymen to reappear in societies roiling with impoverishment Anti-Semitism may reach alarming proportions possibly forcing Israel to undertake reprisal operations how will affected nations react? Balloon effects present a classic problematic Contemporary geopolitical risks include a possible Iran-Israel war; US-China military confrontation over Taiwan or the South China Sea; North Korean proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies; an India-Pakistan nuclear war; an Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz; fundamentalist-driven implosion in the Islamic world; or a nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia

a Second Depression will have implications for global security couplings in global systems enabled risks in one area to snowball into full-blown crisis elsewhere banking farming, health and retail are entwined Economic stressors induce geopolitical realignments with U S and China ripples will be felt Think of a debt-laden workforce at nuclear and chemical plants with a surge in accidents The catalyst behind WWII was the Depression history repeats itself Balloon effects include Iran war; US-China confrontation over Taiwan India-Paki nuclear war NATO and Russia

Various scholars and institutions regard global social instability as the greatest threat facing this decade. The catalyst has been postulated to be a Second Great Depression which, in turn, will have profound implications for global security and national integrity. This paper, written from a broad systems perspective, illustrates how emerging risks are getting more complex and intertwined; blurring boundaries between the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological taxonomy used by the World Economic Forum for its annual global risk forecasts. Tight couplings in our global systems have also enabled risks accrued in one area to snowball into a full-blown crisis elsewhere. The COVID-19 pandemic and its socioeconomic fallouts exemplify this systemic chain-reaction. Onceinexorable forces of globalization are rupturing as the current global system can no longer be sustained due to poor governance and runaway wealth fractionation. The coronavirus pandemic is also enabling Big Tech to expropriate the levers of governments and mass communications worldwide. This paper concludes by highlighting how this development poses a dilemma for security professionals. Key Words: Global Systems, Emergence, VUCA, COVID-9, Social Instability, Big Tech, Great Reset INTRODUCTION The new decade is witnessing rising volatility across global systems. Pick any random “system” today and chart out its trajectory: Are our education systems becoming more robust and affordable? What about food security? Are our healthcare systems improving? Are our pension systems sound? Wherever one looks, there are dark clouds gathering on a global horizon marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA). But what exactly is a global system? Our planet itself is an autonomous and selfsustaining mega-system, marked by periodic cycles and elemental vagaries. Human activities within however are not system isolates as our banking, utility, farming, healthcare and retail sectors etc. are increasingly entwined. Risks accrued in one system may cascade into an unforeseen crisis within and/or without (Choo, Smith & McCusker, 2007). Scholars call this phenomenon “emergence”; one where the behaviour of intersecting systems is determined by complex and largely invisible interactions at the substratum (Goldstein, 1999; Holland, 1998). The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a case in point. While experts remain divided over the source and morphology of the virus, the contagion has ramified into a global health crisis and supply chain nightmare. It is also tilting the geopolitical balance. China is the largest exporter of intermediate products, and had generated nearly 20% of global imports in 2015 alone (Cousin, 2020). The pharmaceutical sector is particularly vulnerable. Nearly “85% of medicines in the U.S. strategic national stockpile” sources components from China (Owens, 2020). An initial run on respiratory masks has now been eclipsed by rowdy queues at supermarkets and the bankruptcy of small businesses. The entire global population – save for major pockets such as Sweden, Belarus, Taiwan and Japan – have been subjected to cyclical lockdowns and quarantines. Never before in history have humans faced such a systemic, borderless calamity. COVID-19 represents a classic emergent crisis that necessitates real-time response and adaptivity in a real-time world, particularly since the global Just-in-Time (JIT) production and delivery system serves as both an enabler and vector for transboundary risks. From a systems thinking perspective, emerging risk management should therefore address a whole spectrum of activity across the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological (EEGST) taxonomy. Every emerging threat can be slotted into this taxonomy – a reason why it is used by the World Economic Forum (WEF) for its annual global risk exercises (Maavak, 2019a). As traditional forces of globalization unravel, security professionals should take cognizance of emerging threats through a systems thinking approach. METHODOLOGY An EEGST sectional breakdown was adopted to illustrate a sampling of extreme risks facing the world for the 2020-2030 decade. The transcendental quality of emerging risks, as outlined on Figure 1, below, was primarily informed by the following pillars of systems thinking (Rickards, 2020): • Diminishing diversity (or increasing homogeneity) of actors in the global system (Boli & Thomas, 1997; Meyer, 2000; Young et al, 2006); • Interconnections in the global system (Homer-Dixon et al, 2015; Lee & Preston, 2012); • Interactions of actors, events and components in the global system (Buldyrev et al, 2010; Bashan et al, 2013; Homer-Dixon et al, 2015); and • Adaptive qualities in particular systems (Bodin & Norberg, 2005; Scheffer et al, 2012) Since scholastic material on this topic remains somewhat inchoate, this paper buttresses many of its contentions through secondary (i.e. news/institutional) sources. ECONOMY According to Professor Stanislaw Drozdz (2018) of the Polish Academy of Sciences, “a global financial crash of a previously unprecedented scale is highly probable” by the mid- 2020s. This will lead to a trickle-down meltdown, impacting all areas of human activity. The economist John Mauldin (2018) similarly warns that the “2020s might be the worst decade in US history” and may lead to a Second Great Depression. Other forecasts are equally alarming. According to the International Institute of Finance, global debt may have surpassed $255 trillion by 2020 (IIF, 2019). Yet another study revealed that global debts and liabilities amounted to a staggering $2.5 quadrillion (Ausman, 2018). The reader should note that these figures were tabulated before the COVID-19 outbreak. The IMF singles out widening income inequality as the trigger for the next Great Depression (Georgieva, 2020). The wealthiest 1% now own more than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people (Coffey et al, 2020) and this chasm is widening with each passing month. COVID-19 had, in fact, boosted global billionaire wealth to an unprecedented $10.2 trillion by July 2020 (UBS-PWC, 2020). Global GDP, worth $88 trillion in 2019, may have contracted by 5.2% in 2020 (World Bank, 2020). As the Greek historian Plutarch warned in the 1st century AD: “An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics” (Mauldin, 2014). The stability of a society, as Aristotle argued even earlier, depends on a robust middle element or middle class. At the rate the global middle class is facing catastrophic debt and unemployment levels, widespread social disaffection may morph into outright anarchy (Maavak, 2012; DCDC, 2007). Economic stressors, in transcendent VUCA fashion, may also induce radical geopolitical realignments. Bullions now carry more weight than NATO’s security guarantees in Eastern Europe. After Poland repatriated 100 tons of gold from the Bank of England in 2019, Slovakia, Serbia and Hungary quickly followed suit. According to former Slovak Premier Robert Fico, this erosion in regional trust was based on historical precedents – in particular the 1938 Munich Agreement which ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As Fico reiterated (Dudik & Tomek, 2019): “You can hardly trust even the closest allies after the Munich Agreement… I guarantee that if something happens, we won’t see a single gram of this (offshore-held) gold. Let’s do it (repatriation) as quickly as possible.” (Parenthesis added by author). President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia (a non-NATO nation) justified his central bank’s gold-repatriation program by hinting at economic headwinds ahead: “We see in which direction the crisis in the world is moving” (Dudik & Tomek, 2019). Indeed, with two global Titanics – the United States and China – set on a collision course with a quadrillions-denominated iceberg in the middle, and a viral outbreak on its tip, the seismic ripples will be felt far, wide and for a considerable period. A reality check is nonetheless needed here: Can additional bullions realistically circumvallate the economies of 80 million plus peoples in these Eastern European nations, worth a collective $1.8 trillion by purchasing power parity? Gold however is a potent psychological symbol as it represents national sovereignty and economic reassurance in a potentially hyperinflationary world. The portents are clear: The current global economic system will be weakened by rising nationalism and autarkic demands. Much uncertainty remains ahead. Mauldin (2018) proposes the introduction of Old Testament-style debt jubilees to facilitate gradual national recoveries. The World Economic Forum, on the other hand, has long proposed a “Great Reset” by 2030; a socialist utopia where “you’ll own nothing and you’ll be happy” (WEF, 2016). In the final analysis, COVID-19 is not the root cause of the current global economic turmoil; it is merely an accelerant to a burning house of cards that was left smouldering since the 2008 Great Recession (Maavak, 2020a). We also see how the four main pillars of systems thinking (diversity, interconnectivity, interactivity and “adaptivity”) form the mise en scene in a VUCA decade. ENVIRONMENTAL What happens to the environment when our economies implode? Think of a debt-laden workforce at sensitive nuclear and chemical plants, along with a concomitant surge in industrial accidents? Economic stressors, workforce demoralization and rampant profiteering – rather than manmade climate change – arguably pose the biggest threats to the environment. In a WEF report, Buehler et al (2017) made the following pre-COVID-19 observation: The ILO estimates that the annual cost to the global economy from accidents and work-related diseases alone is a staggering $3 trillion. Moreover, a recent report suggests the world’s 3.2 billion workers are increasingly unwell, with the vast majority facing significant economic insecurity: 77% work in part-time, temporary, “vulnerable” or unpaid jobs. Shouldn’t this phenomenon be better categorized as a societal or economic risk rather than an environmental one? In line with the systems thinking approach, however, global risks can no longer be boxed into a taxonomical silo. Frazzled workforces may precipitate another Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986), Deepwater Horizon (2010) or Flint water crisis (2014). These disasters were notably not the result of manmade climate change. Neither was the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) nor the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004). Indeed, the combustion of a long-overlooked cargo of 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate had nearly levelled the city of Beirut, Lebanon, on Aug 4 2020. The explosion left 204 dead; 7,500 injured; US$15 billion in property damages; and an estimated 300,000 people homeless (Urbina, 2020). The environmental costs have yet to be adequately tabulated. Environmental disasters are more attributable to Black Swan events, systems breakdowns and corporate greed rather than to mundane human activity. Our JIT world aggravates the cascading potential of risks (Korowicz, 2012). Production and delivery delays, caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, will eventually require industrial overcompensation. This will further stress senior executives, workers, machines and a variety of computerized systems. The trickle-down effects will likely include substandard products, contaminated food and a general lowering in health and safety standards (Maavak, 2019a). Unpaid or demoralized sanitation workers may also resort to indiscriminate waste dumping. Many cities across the United States (and elsewhere in the world) are no longer recycling wastes due to prohibitive costs in the global corona-economy (Liacko, 2021). Even in good times, strict protocols on waste disposals were routinely ignored. While Sweden championed the global climate change narrative, its clothing flagship H&M was busy covering up toxic effluences disgorged by vendors along the Citarum River in Java, Indonesia. As a result, countless children among 14 million Indonesians straddling the “world’s most polluted river” began to suffer from dermatitis, intestinal problems, developmental disorders, renal failure, chronic bronchitis and cancer (DW, 2020). It is also in cauldrons like the Citarum River where pathogens may mutate with emergent ramifications. On an equally alarming note, depressed economic conditions have traditionally provided a waste disposal boon for organized crime elements. Throughout 1980s, the Calabriabased ‘Ndrangheta mafia – in collusion with governments in Europe and North America – began to dump radioactive wastes along the coast of Somalia. Reeling from pollution and revenue loss, Somali fisherman eventually resorted to mass piracy (Knaup, 2008). The coast of Somalia is now a maritime hotspot, and exemplifies an entwined form of economic-environmental-geopolitical-societal emergence. In a VUCA world, indiscriminate waste dumping can unexpectedly morph into a Black Hawk Down incident. The laws of unintended consequences are governed by actors, interconnections, interactions and adaptations in a system under study – as outlined in the methodology section. Environmentally-devastating industrial sabotages – whether by disgruntled workers, industrial competitors, ideological maniacs or terrorist groups – cannot be discounted in a VUCA world. Immiserated societies, in stark defiance of climate change diktats, may resort to dirty coal plants and wood stoves for survival. Interlinked ecosystems, particularly water resources, may be hijacked by nationalist sentiments. The environmental fallouts of critical infrastructure (CI) breakdowns loom like a Sword of Damocles over this decade. GEOPOLITICAL The primary catalyst behind WWII was the Great Depression. Since history often repeats itself, expect familiar bogeymen to reappear in societies roiling with impoverishment and ideological clefts. Anti-Semitism – a societal risk on its own – may reach alarming proportions in the West (Reuters, 2019), possibly forcing Israel to undertake reprisal operations inside allied nations. If that happens, how will affected nations react? Will security resources be reallocated to protect certain minorities (or the Top 1%) while larger segments of society are exposed to restive forces? Balloon effects like these present a classic VUCA problematic. Contemporary geopolitical risks include a possible Iran-Israel war; US-China military confrontation over Taiwan or the South China Sea; North Korean proliferation of nuclear and missile technologies; an India-Pakistan nuclear war; an Iranian closure of the Straits of Hormuz; fundamentalist-driven implosion in the Islamic world; or a nuclear confrontation between NATO and Russia. Fears that the Jan 3 2020 assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani might lead to WWIII were grossly overblown. From a systems perspective, the killing of Soleimani did not fundamentally change the actor-interconnection-interaction adaptivity equation in the Middle East. Soleimani was simply a cog who got replaced.

<h4>Decline <u>cascades</u> – nuclear war</h4><p><strong>Maavak 21</strong> – Mathew Maavak, PhD in Risk Foresight from the Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, External Researcher (PLATBIDAFO) at the Kazimieras Simonavicius University, Expert and Regular Commentator on Risk-Related Geostrategic Issues at the Russian International Affairs Council, “Horizon 2030: Will Emerging Risks Unravel Our Global Systems?”, Salus Journal – The Australian Journal for Law Enforcement, Security and Intelligence Professionals, Volume 9, Number 1, p. 2-8</p><p>Various <u>scholars</u> and institutions <u>regard <strong>global social instability</strong> as the <strong>greatest threat</u></strong> facing this decade. <u>The catalyst has been postulated to be <mark>a <strong>Second</mark> Great <mark>Depression</strong></mark> which, in turn, <mark>will have</mark> <strong>profound <mark>implications</strong> for <strong>global security</strong></mark> and national integrity</u>. This paper, written from a broad systems perspective, illustrates how <u>emerging risks are</u> getting more complex and <u><strong>intertwined</u></strong>; blurring boundaries between the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological taxonomy used by the World Economic Forum for its annual global risk forecasts. <u><strong>Tight <mark>couplings</strong> in</u></mark> our <u><strong><mark>global systems</strong></mark> have</u> also <u><mark>enabled risks</mark> accrued <mark>in <strong>one area</strong> to <strong>snowball</strong> into </mark>a <strong><mark>full-blown crisis</strong> <strong>elsewhere</u></strong></mark>. The COVID-19 pandemic and its socioeconomic fallouts exemplify this systemic chain-reaction. Onceinexorable forces of globalization are rupturing as the current global system can no longer be sustained due to poor governance and runaway wealth fractionation. The coronavirus pandemic is also enabling Big Tech to expropriate the levers of governments and mass communications worldwide. This paper concludes by highlighting how this development poses a dilemma for security professionals. Key Words: Global Systems, Emergence, VUCA, COVID-9, Social Instability, Big Tech, Great Reset INTRODUCTION The new decade is witnessing rising volatility across global systems. Pick any random “system” today and chart out its trajectory: Are our education systems becoming more robust and affordable? What about food security? Are our healthcare systems improving? Are our pension systems sound? Wherever one looks, there are dark clouds gathering on a global horizon marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity (VUCA). But what exactly is a global system? Our planet itself is an autonomous and selfsustaining mega-system, marked by periodic cycles and elemental vagaries. Human activities within however are not system isolates as our <u><mark>banking</mark>, utility, <mark>farming, <strong>health</strong></mark>care <mark>and retail</mark> sectors etc. <mark>are</mark> increasingly <strong><mark>entwined</strong></mark>. Risks accrued in <strong>one system</strong> may <strong>cascade</strong> into an <strong>unforeseen crisis</u></strong> within and/or without (Choo, Smith & McCusker, 2007). Scholars call this phenomenon “emergence”; one where <u>the behaviour of <strong>intersecting systems</strong> is determined by <strong>complex</strong> and largely <strong>invisible interactions</strong> at the <strong>substratum</u></strong> (Goldstein, 1999; Holland, 1998). The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic is a case in point. While experts remain divided over the source and morphology of the virus, the contagion has ramified into a global health crisis and supply chain nightmare. It is also tilting the geopolitical balance. China is the largest exporter of intermediate products, and had generated nearly 20% of global imports in 2015 alone (Cousin, 2020). The pharmaceutical sector is particularly vulnerable. Nearly “85% of medicines in the U.S. strategic national stockpile” sources components from China (Owens, 2020). An initial run on respiratory masks has now been eclipsed by rowdy queues at supermarkets and the bankruptcy of small businesses. The entire global population – save for major pockets such as Sweden, Belarus, Taiwan and Japan – have been subjected to cyclical lockdowns and quarantines. Never before in history have humans faced such a systemic, borderless calamity. COVID-19 represents a classic emergent crisis that necessitates real-time response and adaptivity in a real-time world, particularly since the global Just-in-Time (JIT) production and delivery system serves as both an enabler and vector for transboundary risks. From a systems thinking perspective, emerging risk management should therefore address a whole spectrum of activity across the economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal and technological (EEGST) taxonomy. Every emerging threat can be slotted into this taxonomy – a reason why it is used by the World Economic Forum (WEF) for its annual global risk exercises (Maavak, 2019a). As traditional forces of globalization unravel, security professionals should take cognizance of emerging threats through a systems thinking approach. METHODOLOGY An EEGST sectional breakdown was adopted to illustrate a sampling of extreme risks facing the world for the 2020-2030 decade. The transcendental quality of emerging risks, as outlined on Figure 1, below, was primarily informed by the following pillars of systems thinking (Rickards, 2020): • Diminishing diversity (or increasing homogeneity) of actors in the global system (Boli & Thomas, 1997; Meyer, 2000; Young et al, 2006); • Interconnections in the global system (Homer-Dixon et al, 2015; Lee & Preston, 2012); • Interactions of actors, events and components in the global system (Buldyrev et al, 2010; Bashan et al, 2013; Homer-Dixon et al, 2015); and • Adaptive qualities in particular systems (Bodin & Norberg, 2005; Scheffer et al, 2012) Since scholastic material on this topic remains somewhat inchoate, this paper buttresses many of its contentions through secondary (i.e. news/institutional) sources. ECONOMY According to Professor Stanislaw Drozdz (2018) of the Polish Academy of Sciences, “<u>a global financial crash</u> of a previously unprecedented scale is highly probable” by the mid- 2020s. This <u>will lead to a <strong>trickle-down meltdown</strong>, impacting <strong>all areas</strong> of human activity</u>. The economist John Mauldin (2018) similarly warns that the “2020s might be the worst decade in US history” <u>and</u> may <u>lead to a <strong>Second Great Depression</u></strong>. Other forecasts are equally alarming. According to the International Institute of Finance, global debt may have surpassed $255 trillion by 2020 (IIF, 2019). Yet another study revealed that global debts and liabilities amounted to a staggering $2.5 quadrillion (Ausman, 2018). The reader should note that these figures were tabulated before the COVID-19 outbreak. The IMF singles out widening income inequality as the trigger for the next Great Depression (Georgieva, 2020). The wealthiest 1% now own more than twice as much wealth as 6.9 billion people (Coffey et al, 2020) and this chasm is widening with each passing month. COVID-19 had, in fact, boosted global billionaire wealth to an unprecedented $10.2 trillion by July 2020 (UBS-PWC, 2020). Global GDP, worth $88 trillion in 2019, may have contracted by 5.2% in 2020 (World Bank, 2020). As the Greek historian Plutarch warned in the 1st century AD: “An imbalance between rich and poor is the oldest and most fatal ailment of all republics” (Mauldin, 2014). The stability of a society, as Aristotle argued even earlier, depends on a robust middle element or middle class. At the rate the global middle class is facing catastrophic debt and unemployment levels, widespread social disaffection may morph into outright anarchy (Maavak, 2012; DCDC, 2007). <u><mark>Economic stressors</u></mark>, in transcendent VUCA fashion, <u>may</u> also <u><mark>induce</mark> <strong>radical <mark>geopolitical realignments</strong></mark>. Bullions now carry more weight than NATO’s <strong>security guarantees</strong> in <strong>Eastern Europe</u></strong>. After Poland repatriated 100 tons of gold from the Bank of England in 2019, Slovakia, Serbia and Hungary quickly followed suit. According to former Slovak Premier Robert Fico, <u>this <strong>erosion</strong> in <strong>regional trust</strong> was based on historical precedents</u> – in particular the 1938 Munich Agreement which ceded Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland to Nazi Germany. As Fico reiterated (Dudik & Tomek, 2019): “You can hardly trust even the closest allies after the Munich Agreement… I guarantee that if something happens, we won’t see a single gram of this (offshore-held) gold. Let’s do it (repatriation) as quickly as possible.” (Parenthesis added by author). President Aleksandar Vucic of Serbia (a non-NATO nation) justified his central bank’s gold-repatriation program by hinting at economic headwinds ahead: “We see in which direction the crisis in the world is moving” (Dudik & Tomek, 2019). Indeed, <u><mark>with</mark> two global Titanics – the <strong><mark>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><mark>and China</u></mark> – set <u>on a <strong>collision course</u></strong> with a quadrillions-denominated iceberg in the middle, and a viral outbreak on its tip, <u>the <strong>seismic <mark>ripples</strong> will be felt</mark> <strong>far</strong>, <strong>wide</strong> and for a <strong>considerable period</u></strong>. A reality check is nonetheless needed here: Can additional bullions realistically circumvallate the economies of 80 million plus peoples in these Eastern European nations, worth a collective $1.8 trillion by purchasing power parity? Gold however is a potent psychological symbol as it represents national sovereignty and economic reassurance in a potentially hyperinflationary world. The portents are clear: The current global economic system will be weakened by rising nationalism and autarkic demands. Much uncertainty remains ahead. Mauldin (2018) proposes the introduction of Old Testament-style debt jubilees to facilitate gradual national recoveries. The World Economic Forum, on the other hand, has long proposed a “Great Reset” by 2030; a socialist utopia where “you’ll own nothing and you’ll be happy” (WEF, 2016). In the final analysis, COVID-19 is not the root cause of the current global economic turmoil; it is merely an accelerant to a burning house of cards that was left smouldering since the 2008 Great Recession (Maavak, 2020a). We also see how the four main pillars of systems thinking (diversity, interconnectivity, interactivity and “adaptivity”) form the mise en scene in a VUCA decade. ENVIRONMENTAL <u>What happens to the <strong>environment</strong> when our <strong>economies implode</strong>? <mark>Think of a <strong>debt-laden</strong> workforce at</mark> sensitive <strong><mark>nuclear</strong> and <strong>chemical plants</strong></mark>, along <mark>with a</mark> concomitant <strong><mark>surge</strong> in</mark> <strong>industrial <mark>accidents</strong></mark>? <strong>Economic stressors</u></strong>, workforce demoralization and rampant profiteering – rather than manmade climate change – arguably <u>pose the <strong>biggest threats</strong> to the environment</u>. In a WEF report, Buehler et al (2017) made the following pre-COVID-19 observation: The ILO estimates that the annual cost to the global economy from accidents and work-related diseases alone is a staggering $3 trillion. Moreover, a recent report suggests the world’s 3.2 billion workers are increasingly unwell, with the vast majority facing significant economic insecurity: 77% work in part-time, temporary, “vulnerable” or unpaid jobs. Shouldn’t this phenomenon be better categorized as a societal or economic risk rather than an environmental one? In line with the systems thinking approach, however, <u>global risks can no longer be boxed into a <strong>taxonomical silo</u></strong>. Frazzled workforces may precipitate another Bhopal (1984), Chernobyl (1986), Deepwater Horizon (2010) or Flint water crisis (2014). These disasters were notably not the result of manmade climate change. Neither was the Fukushima nuclear disaster (2011) nor the Indian Ocean tsunami (2004). Indeed, the combustion of a long-overlooked cargo of 2,750 tonnes of ammonium nitrate had nearly levelled the city of Beirut, Lebanon, on Aug 4 2020. The explosion left 204 dead; 7,500 injured; US$15 billion in property damages; and an estimated 300,000 people homeless (Urbina, 2020). The environmental costs have yet to be adequately tabulated. Environmental disasters are more attributable to Black Swan events, systems breakdowns and corporate greed rather than to mundane human activity. <u>Our JIT world aggravates the <strong>cascading potential</strong> of risks</u> (Korowicz, 2012). <u>Production and delivery delays</u>, caused by the COVID-19 outbreak, <u>will eventually require industrial <strong>overcompensation</u></strong>. This will further stress senior executives, workers, machines and a variety of computerized systems. The trickle-down effects will likely include substandard products, contaminated food and a general lowering in health and safety standards (Maavak, 2019a). Unpaid or demoralized sanitation workers may also resort to indiscriminate waste dumping. Many cities across the United States (and elsewhere in the world) are no longer recycling wastes due to prohibitive costs in the global corona-economy (Liacko, 2021). Even in good times, strict protocols on waste disposals were routinely ignored. While Sweden championed the global climate change narrative, its clothing flagship H&M was busy covering up toxic effluences disgorged by vendors along the Citarum River in Java, Indonesia. As a result, countless children among 14 million Indonesians straddling the “world’s most polluted river” began to suffer from dermatitis, intestinal problems, developmental disorders, renal failure, chronic bronchitis and cancer (DW, 2020). It is also in cauldrons like the Citarum River where pathogens may mutate with emergent ramifications. On an equally alarming note, depressed economic conditions have traditionally provided a waste disposal boon for organized crime elements. Throughout 1980s, the Calabriabased ‘Ndrangheta mafia – in collusion with governments in Europe and North America – began to dump radioactive wastes along the coast of Somalia. Reeling from pollution and revenue loss, Somali fisherman eventually resorted to mass piracy (Knaup, 2008). The coast of Somalia is now a maritime hotspot, and exemplifies an entwined form of economic-environmental-geopolitical-societal emergence. In a VUCA world, indiscriminate waste dumping can unexpectedly morph into a Black Hawk Down incident. The laws of unintended consequences are governed by actors, interconnections, interactions and adaptations in a system under study – as outlined in the methodology section. Environmentally-devastating industrial sabotages – whether by disgruntled workers, industrial competitors, ideological maniacs or terrorist groups – cannot be discounted in a VUCA world. Immiserated societies, in stark defiance of climate change diktats, may resort to dirty coal plants and wood stoves for survival. <u>Interlinked ecosystems</u>, particularly water resources, <u>may be <strong>hijacked</u></strong> by nationalist sentiments. <u>The <strong>environmental fallouts</u></strong> of critical infrastructure (CI) breakdowns <u>loom like a <strong>Sword of Damocles</strong> over this decade</u>. GEOPOLITICAL <u><mark>The</mark> <strong>primary <mark>catalyst</strong> behind <strong>WWII</strong> was the</mark> <strong>Great <mark>Depression</u></strong></mark>. Since <u><mark>history</mark> often <strong><mark>repeats itself</strong></mark>, expect <strong>familiar bogeymen</strong> to <strong>reappear</u></strong> <u>in societies roiling with <strong>impoverishment</u></strong> and ideological clefts. <u>Anti-Semitism</u> – a societal risk on its own – <u>may reach alarming proportions</u> in the West (Reuters, 2019), <u>possibly <strong>forc</strong>ing Israel to undertake <strong>reprisal operations</u></strong> inside allied nations. If that happens, <u>how will <strong>affected nations</strong> react?</u> Will security resources be reallocated to protect certain minorities (or the Top 1%) while larger segments of society are exposed to restive forces? <u><strong><mark>Balloon effects</u></strong></mark> like these <u>present a classic</u> VUCA <u>problematic</u>. <u>Contemporary geopolitical risks <mark>include</mark> a possible <strong><mark>Iran</mark>-Israel <mark>war</strong>; <strong>US-China</mark> military <mark>confrontation</strong> over <strong>Taiwan</strong> </mark>or the <strong>S</strong>outh <strong>C</strong>hina <strong>S</strong>ea; <strong>North Korean proliferation</strong> of <strong>nuclear</strong> and <strong>missile technologies</strong>; an <strong><mark>India-Paki</mark>stan <mark>nuclear war</strong></mark>; an <strong>Iranian closure</strong> of the Straits of <strong>Hormuz</strong>; <strong>fundamentalist-driven implosion in the Islamic world</strong>; or a <strong>nuclear confrontation</strong> between <strong><mark>NATO</strong> and <strong>Russia</u></strong></mark>. Fears that the Jan 3 2020 assassination of Iranian Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani might lead to WWIII were grossly overblown. From a systems perspective, the killing of Soleimani did not fundamentally change the actor-interconnection-interaction adaptivity equation in the Middle East. Soleimani was simply a cog who got replaced.</p>

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hsld22/ArchbishopMitty/JoYu/ArchbishopMitty-JoYu-Neg-Mid-America-Cup-Round-3.docx

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1 – Extinction o/ws under any framework, even under moral uncertainty – infinite future generations

Pummer 15

Pummer 15 — (Theron Pummer, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford, “Moral Agreement on Saving the World“, Practical Ethics University of Oxford, 5-18-2015, Available Online at http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/, accessed 7-2-2018, HKR-AM) **we do not endorse ableist language=

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. . If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree . Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly

reducing existential risk is the most important there are trillions upon trillions future people even if the well-being were given 0.001% weight Non-consequentialism is not that the latter don’t matter Minimally plausible versions of deont and virtue ethics must be concerned with promoting the good imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk Even if they were 90% sure they would have reason, from moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters) Afc paragraph theory

<h4>1 – Extinction o/ws under any framework, even under moral uncertainty – infinite future generations </h4><p><strong>Pummer 15</strong> — (Theron Pummer, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford, “Moral Agreement on Saving the World“, Practical Ethics University of Oxford, 5-18-2015, Available Online at http://blog.practicalethics.ox.ac.uk/2015/05/moral-agreement-on-saving-the-world/, accessed 7-2-2018, HKR-AM) **we do not endorse ableist language=</p><p><u>There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy.</u> Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe <u>there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war.</u> How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here<u>. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how <mark>reducing existential risk is</mark> easily <mark>the most important</mark> thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – <mark>there are</mark> <mark>trillions upon trillions</mark>… upon trillions.</u> <u>There are so many possible <mark>future people</mark> that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world,</u> <u><mark>even if the well-being</mark> of these possible people <mark>were</mark> <mark>given</mark> only <mark>0.001% </mark>as much <mark>weight</mark> as that of existing people</u>. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that <u>there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists</u>. But that is a huge mistake. <u><mark>Non-consequentialism </mark>is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it <mark>is not</mark> the view <mark>that the latter don’t matter</mark>. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” <mark>Minimally plausible versions of deont</mark>ology <mark>and virtue ethics must be concerned</mark> in part <mark>with promoting the good</mark>, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus <mark>imply</mark> very <mark>strong reasons to reduce existential risk</mark>, </u>at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. <u>We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree</u>. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct<u>. <mark>Even if they were 90% sure </mark>that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), <mark>they would have </mark>pretty strong <mark>reason, from </mark>the standpoint of <mark>moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk</mark>. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world</u>. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. <u>Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately:</u> “We live during the hinge of history. <u>Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period.</u> <u>Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly</u>.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)</p><p>Afc paragraph theory</p>

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Util- You should vote AFF if the 1AC’s contingently true---even if they’re right about everything else.

Baum & Barrett 18

Seth D. Baum & Anthony M. Barrett 18. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. 2018. “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174–184.

Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe This suggests a rather low threshold However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization that human civilization does not recover from that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements Bostrom using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. society should be willing to spend $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held People often value some people more than others Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others This debate is crucial While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” or a “veil of ignorance” in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

some catastrophes are vastly more important than others humanity could go extinct loss of all future generations. 500 trillion lives may be an underestimate risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent global catastrophe than to save a person’s life While everyone has the right to their own views the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally Philosophers speak of a a “veil of ignorance” in which each considers what is best for society irrespective of which member they happen to be valuing everyone equally suggests a very high value for reducing GCR

2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? Taken literally, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe. This suggests a rather low threshold for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be catastrophic for a significant portion of the globe. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization (Beckstead 2013), that human civilization does not recover from (Maher and Baum 2013), that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements (Bostrom 2002, using the term “existential risk”), or that result in human extinction (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that some catastrophes are vastly more important than others. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with nuclear winter, per Sagan, humanity could go extinct. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the loss of all future generations. To paraphrase Sagan, the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even more. Sagan estimated 500 trillion lives, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number may even be an underestimate. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an infinite length of time or instead merely an astronomically large but finite length of time (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way, the stakes with global catastrophes could be much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), but they have limited practical significance. This can be seen when evaluating GCRs from a standard risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude framework. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, society should try 500 trillion times harder to prevent a global catastrophe than it should to save a person’s life. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, society should be willing to spend at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least $1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. Thus while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest vast resource allocations should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only strengthened when considering the astronomical size of the stakes, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then even tiny GCR reductions merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause permanent harm to global human civilization. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is not universally held. People often value some people more than others, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. This debate is crucial for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. While everyone has the right to their own views and feelings, we find that the strongest arguments are for the widely held position that all human lives should be valued equally. This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. Philosophers speak of an agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) or a “veil of ignorance” (Rawls 1971) in which each person considers what is best for society irrespective of which member of society they happen to be. Such a perspective suggests valuing everyone equally, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn suggests a very high value for reducing GCR, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts.

<h4><strong>Util- You should vote AFF if the 1AC’s contingently true---even if they’re right about everything else. </h4><p></strong>Seth D. <strong>Baum &</strong> Anthony M. <strong>Barrett 18<u></strong>. Global Catastrophic Risk Institute. 2018. “Global Catastrophes: The Most Extreme Risks.” Risk in Extreme Environments: Preparing, Avoiding, Mitigating, and Managing, edited by Vicki Bier, Routledge, pp. 174–184.</p><p></u>2. What Is GCR And Why Is It Important? <u>Taken <strong>literally</strong>, a global catastrophe can be any event that is in some way catastrophic across the globe</u>. <u>This suggests a rather low threshold</u> for what counts as a global catastrophe. An event causing just one death on each continent (say, from a jet-setting assassin) could rate as a global catastrophe, because surely these deaths would be catastrophic for the deceased and their loved ones. <u>However, in common usage, a global catastrophe would be <strong>catastrophic</strong> for a significant portion of the globe</u>. Minimum thresholds have variously been set around ten thousand to ten million deaths or $10 billion to $10 trillion in damages (Bostrom and Ćirković 2008), or death of one quarter of the human population (Atkinson 1999; Hempsell 2004). <u>Others have emphasized catastrophes that cause <strong>long-term declines in the trajectory of human civilization</u></strong> (Beckstead 2013), <u>that human civilization <strong>does not recover from</u></strong> (Maher and Baum 2013), <u>that drastically reduce humanity’s potential for future achievements</u> (<u>Bostrom</u> 2002, <u>using the term “<strong>existential risk</strong>”), or that result in <strong>human extinction</u></strong> (Matheny 2007; Posner 2004). <u>A common theme across all these treatments of GCR is that <strong><mark>some</mark> <mark>catastrophes</mark> <mark>are vastly more important than others</u></strong></mark>. Carl Sagan was perhaps the first to recognize this, in his commentary on nuclear winter (Sagan 1983). <u>Without nuclear winter, a global nuclear war might kill several hundred million people. This is obviously a major catastrophe, but humanity would presumably carry on. However, with <strong>nuclear winter</u></strong>, per Sagan, <u><strong><mark>humanity</mark> <mark>could go extinct</strong></mark>. The loss would be not just an additional four billion or so deaths, but the <mark>loss of <strong>all future generations</u></strong>.</mark> To paraphrase Sagan, <u>the loss would be billions and billions of lives, or even <strong>more</u></strong>. <u>Sagan estimated <strong><mark>500 trillion lives</strong></mark>, assuming humanity would continue for ten million more years, which he cited as typical for a successful species. Sagan’s 500 trillion number <mark>may</mark> even <mark>be an <strong>underestimate</u></strong></mark>. The analysis here takes an adventurous turn, hinging on the evolution of the human species and the long-term fate of the universe. On these long time scales, the descendants of contemporary humans may no longer be recognizably “human”. The issue then is whether the descendants are still worth caring about, whatever they are. If they are, then it begs the question of how many of them there will be. Barring major global catastrophe, Earth will remain habitable for about one billion more years 2 until the Sun gets too warm and large. The rest of the Solar System, Milky Way galaxy, universe, and (if it exists) the multiverse will remain habitable for a lot longer than that (Adams and Laughlin 1997), should our descendants gain the capacity to migrate there. <u>An open question in astronomy is whether it is possible for the descendants of humanity to continue living for an <strong>infinite length of time</strong> or instead merely an <strong>astronomically large but finite</strong> length of time</u> (see e.g. Ćirković 2002; Kaku 2005). Either way,<u> the stakes with global catastrophes <strong>could</strong> be <strong>much larger than the loss of 500 trillion lives. </strong>Debates about the infinite vs. the merely astronomical are of theoretical interest</u> (Ng 1991; Bossert et al. 2007), <u>but they have <strong>limited practical significance</strong>. This can be seen when <strong>evaluating GCRs from a standard <mark>risk-equals-probability-times-magnitude</mark> framework</strong>. Using Sagan’s 500 trillion lives estimate, it follows that reducing the probability of global catastrophe by a mere one-in-500-trillion chance is of the same significance as saving one human life. Phrased differently, <mark>society should <strong>try 500 trillion times harder to prevent</mark> a <mark>global catastrophe</mark> <mark>than</mark> it should <mark>to save a person’s life</strong></mark>. Or, preventing one million deaths is equivalent to a one-in500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe. This suggests society should <strong>make extremely large investment in GCR reduction, at the expense of virtually all other objectives. </u></strong>Judge and legal scholar Richard Posner made a similar point in monetary terms (Posner 2004). Posner used $50,000 as the value of a statistical human life (VSL) and 12 billion humans as the total loss of life (double the 2004 world population); he describes both figures as significant underestimates. Multiplying them gives $600 trillion as an underestimate of the value of preventing global catastrophe. For comparison, the United States government typically uses a VSL of around one to ten million dollars (Robinson 2007). Multiplying a $10 million VSL with 500 trillion lives gives $5x1021 as the value of preventing global catastrophe. But even using “just" $600 trillion, <u>society should be willing to spend</u> at least that much to prevent a global catastrophe, which converts to being willing to spend at least <u>$1 million for a one-in-500-million reduction in the probability of global catastrophe</u>. Thus <u>while reasonable disagreement exists on how large of a VSL to use and how much to count future generations, even low-end positions suggest <strong>vast resource allocations</strong> should be redirected to reducing GCR. This conclusion is only <strong>strengthened</strong> when considering the <strong>astronomical size of the stakes</u></strong>, but the same point holds either way. The bottom line is that, <u>as long as something along the lines of the standard riskequals-probability-times-magnitude framework is being used, then <strong>even tiny GCR reductions</strong> merit significant effort. This point holds especially strongly for risks of catastrophes that would cause <strong>permanent harm to global human civilization</strong>. The discussion thus far has assumed that all human lives are valued equally. This assumption is <strong>not universally held</u></strong>. <u>People often value some people more than others</u>, favoring themselves, their family and friends, their compatriots, their generation, or others whom they identify with. <u>Great debates rage on across moral philosophy, economics, and other fields about how much people should value others</u> who are distant in space, time, or social relation, as well as the unborn members of future generations. <u>This debate is crucial</u> for all valuations of risk, including GCR. Indeed, if each of us only cares about our immediate selves, then global catastrophes may not be especially important, and we probably have better things to do with our time than worry about them. <u><mark>While everyone has the right to their <strong>own views</mark> and feelings</u></strong>, we find that <u><mark>the strongest arguments are for the <strong>widely held position</strong> that <strong>all human lives should be valued equally</strong></mark>.</u> This position is succinctly stated in the United States Declaration of Independence, updated in the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments: “We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men and 3 women are created equal”. <u><mark>Philosophers speak of a</mark>n agent-neutral, objective “view from nowhere”</u> (Nagel 1986) <u>or <mark>a “veil of ignorance”</u></mark> (Rawls 1971) <u><mark>in which each</mark> person <mark>considers what is best for society <strong>irrespective of which member</mark> of society <mark>they happen to be</u></strong></mark>. <u>Such a perspective <strong>suggests <mark>valuing everyone equally</strong></mark>, regardless of who they are or where or when they live. This in turn <mark>suggests a <strong>very high value for reducing GCR</mark>, or a high degree of priority for GCR reduction efforts. </p></u></strong>

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The “United States federal government” means the three branches of the central government

OECD, 87

OECD, 87

Political and organisational structure of government The United States of America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch

The U S is a federal republic The Federal Government is composed of three branches: legislative executive and judicial

(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Council, 1987, “United States,” The Control and Management of Government Expenditure, p. 179) JD 1. Political and organisational structure of government The United States of America is a federal republic consisting of 50 states. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information). The Federal Government is composed of three branches: the legislative branch, the executive branch, and the judicial branch. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.

<h4>The “United States federal government” means the <u>three branches</u> of the central government</h4><p><strong>OECD, 87</strong> </p><p>(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Council, 1987, “United States,” The Control and Management of Government Expenditure, p. 179) JD</p><p>1. <u>Political and organisational structure of government</u> <u><mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates of America <mark>is a federal republic</mark> consisting of 50 states</u>. States have their own constitutions and within each State there are at least two additional levels of government, generally designated as counties and cities, towns or villages. The relationships between different levels of government are complex and varied (see Section B for more information). <u><mark>The Federal Government is composed of three branches<strong>:</strong></mark> the <mark>legislative</mark> branch, the <mark>executive</mark> branch, <mark>and</mark> the <mark>judicial</mark> branch</u>. Budgetary decisionmaking is shared primarily by the legislative and executive branches. The general structure of these two branches relative to budget formulation and execution is as follows.</p>

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“In the area” means all of the activities within the area

UN 13

UN 13, United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part1.htm PART I¶ INTRODUCTION¶ Article 1

activities in the Area" means all activities of the Area

activities in the Area" means all activities of the Area

Use of terms and scope¶ 1. For the purposes of this Convention: (1) "Area" means the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; (2) "Authority" means the International Seabed Authority; (3) "activities in the Area" means all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources of the Area;t

<h4>“In the area” means all of the activities within the area</h4><p><strong>UN 13</strong>, United Nations Law of the Sea Treaty, http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/part1.htm PART I¶ INTRODUCTION¶ Article 1</p><p>Use of terms and scope¶ 1. For the purposes of this Convention: (1) "Area" means the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction; (2) "Authority" means the International Seabed Authority; (3) "<u><mark>activities in the Area" means all activities</u></mark> of exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources <u><mark>of the Area</u></mark>;t</p>

x

./documents/ndtceda18/WichitaState/HiPh/Wichita%20State-Hinecker-Phillips-Neg-kentucky-Round3.docx

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kentucky

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Missouri state

Allison Harper

1ac - trade 1nc - t-restrict wto cp oil cp esr cp executive powers midterms dollar heg da on case 2nr - midterms

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college

Economic decline leads to nuclear war.

Tonnesson 15

Tonnesson 15 [Stein Tonnesson, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311] JS

recent works have made contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict Interdependence raises the cost of conflict but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that increase the risk of military conflict decisions for war are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations If leaders begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline they may blame external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and refuse to be deterred by nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly in East Asia The greatest risk is not a territorial dispute but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional war

Interdependence raises the cost of conflict If leaders seriously anticipate their nation’s decline they may blame external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate force and refuse to be deterred by nuclear arms a shift could happen abruptly The greatest risk is changes in the world economy alter circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace precarious This could have consequences with nuclear deterrence the only factor to protect from Armageddon, Deterrence could lose credibility great powers might gamble in a cyber or conventional war

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

<h4><strong>Economic decline leads to nuclear war.</h4><p><u>Tonnesson 15</u></strong> [Stein Tonnesson, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311] JS</p><p>Several <u><strong>recent works</u></strong> on China and Sino–US relations <u><strong>have made</u></strong> substantial <u><strong>contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances</u></strong> a combination of <u><strong>nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers</u></strong>. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that <u><strong>interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict</u></strong> are right. <u><strong><mark>Interdependence raises the cost of conflict</u></strong></mark> for all sides <u><strong>but</u></strong> <u><strong>asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations</u></strong> may <u><strong>generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that</u></strong> in turn <u><strong>increase the risk of military conflict</u></strong> (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, <u><strong>decisions for war</u></strong> and peace <u><strong>are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations</u></strong>. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. <u><strong><mark>If leaders</u></strong></mark> on either side of the Atlantic <u><strong>begin to <mark>seriously</mark> fear or <mark>anticipate their</mark> own <mark>nation’s decline</u></strong></mark> then <u><strong><mark>they may blame</u></strong></mark> this on <u><strong><mark>external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate</mark> the use of <mark>force</mark> to gain</u></strong> respect or <u><strong>credibility, adopt protectionist policies, <mark>and</u></strong></mark> ultimately <u><strong><mark>refuse to be deterred by</u></strong></mark> either <u><strong><mark>nuclear arms</mark> or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such <mark>a</mark> dangerous <mark>shift could happen abruptly</u></strong></mark>, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions <u><strong>in East Asia</u></strong> are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. <u><strong><mark>The greatest risk is</mark> not</u></strong> that <u><strong>a territorial dispute</u></strong> leads to war under present circumstances <u><strong>but that <mark>changes in the world economy alter</mark> those <mark>circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace</mark> more <mark>precarious</u></strong></mark>. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. <u><strong><mark>This could have</mark> unforeseen <mark>consequences</mark> in the field of security, <mark>with nuclear deterrence</mark> remaining <mark>the only factor to protect</mark> the world <mark>from Armageddon, </mark>and </strong>unreliably so. <mark>Deterrence<strong> could lose</mark> its <mark>credibility</u></strong></mark>: one of the two <u><strong><mark>great powers might gamble</mark> that the other yield <mark>in a cyber</mark>-war <mark>or conventional</u></strong></mark> limited <u><strong><mark>war</u></strong></mark>, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.</p>

Advantage 1 is Econ

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Berkeley

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Harvard Westlake JN

John Overing

1AC Corporations 1NC Abolish T Mueller DA Case 1AR Must check T interps All 2NR 1AR shell Mueller DA Case 2AR Case DA Impact Turns

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That is the only egalitarian metric – anything else collapses cooperation on collective action crises and makes extinction inevitable

Khan 18. /

Risalat Khan 18. Risalat, activist and entrepreneur from Bangladesh passionate about addressing climate change, biodiversity loss, and other existential challenges. He was featured by The Guardian as one of the “young climate campaigners to watch” (2015). As a campaigner with the global civic movement Avaaz (2014-17), Risalat was part of a small core team that spearheaded the largest climate marches in history with a turnout of over 800,000 across 2,000 cities. After fighting for the Paris Agreement, Risalat led a campaign joined by over a million people to stop the Rampal coal plant in Bangladesh to protect the Sundarbans World Heritage forest, and elicited criticism of the plant from Crédit Agricolé through targeted advocacy. Currently, Risalat is pursuing an MPA in Environmental Science and Policy at Columbia University as a SIPA Environmental Fellow, “5 reasons why we need to start talking about existential risks,” https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/5-reasons-start-talking-existential-risks-extinction-moriori/

Infinite possibilities human culture is far from immutable we can master them and rise to unprecedented challenges even this does not make us masters of our own destiny. We can make visionary choices, but the future can still surprise us. faced with an uncertain future, the only wise thing we can do is prepare the possibilities seem endless. They range from abundance to the end of humanity Among the infinite future possibilities, only one outcome is truly irreversible: extinction Concerns are dismissed as apocalyptic alarmism repeating that mankind is still here after 70 years of existential warning about nuclear warfare is a straw man argument. The fact that a 1000-year flood has not happened does not negate its possibility there have been far too many nuclear near-misses to rest easy. Davos discusses five reasons why the possibility of existential risks should raise the stakes of conversation: Extinction is the rule, not the exception 99.9% of all the species that ever existed are gone Deep time is unfathomable if one cares to take a tour of the billions of years of life’s history, we find a litany of forgotten species. 99.9% of all human cultures that have ever existed are extinct. It is only in the very recent past that we became a truly global civilization 15,000 scientists just issued a ‘warning to humanity’ Diamond charts the history of past societies overpopulation and resource use beyond the carrying capacity have often been important, of collapse. we must achieve tremendous changes in our response to several major environmental crises. Bostrom cites a survey of industry experts that projected a 50% chance of the development of artificial superintelligence by 2050 and a 90% chance by 2075 Visionaries warned of the existential risks from artificial superintelligence. Throughout history, we have rallied against the ‘other’ Tribes overpowered tribes, empires have conquered rivals our fiercest displays of unity typically happen at wartime. We we 21st-century citizens find ourselves on an increasingly unstable island. We may have a violent past, but we have no more dangerous enemy than ourselves Our task is to find Our own shared contract, based on equity, would help us navigate safely. would ensure a future that unleashes the full potential of our still-budding human civilization, in all its diversity. We cannot do this unless we are humbly grounded in the possibility of our own destruction Survival is life’s primal instinct In the absence of a common enemy, we must find common cause in survival. Our future may depend on whether we realize this.

human culture is far from immutable. we can rise to challenges faced with an uncertain future, the only wise thing we can do is prepare only one outcome is truly irreversible: extinction. Concerns are dismissed there have been far too many nuclear near-misses to rest easy. Extinction is the rule 99.9% of all the species that ever existed are gone. Deep time is unfathomable billions of years of life’s history find litany of forgotten species displays of unity typically happen at wartime. We may have a violent past, but no more dangerous enemy than ourselves equity, would help us navigate safely. a future that unleashes the full potential of our civilization We cannot do this unless we are humbly grounded in the possibility of our own destruction. Survival is life’s primal instinct. In the absence of a common enemy, we must find common cause in survival.

Infinite future possibilities I find the story of the Moriori profound. It teaches me two lessons. Firstly, that human culture is far from immutable. That we can struggle against our baser instincts. That we can master them and rise to unprecedented challenges. Secondly, that even this does not make us masters of our own destiny. We can make visionary choices, but the future can still surprise us. This is a humbling realization. Because faced with an uncertain future, the only wise thing we can do is prepare for possibilities. Standing at the launch pad of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, the possibilities seem endless. They range from an era of abundance to the end of humanity, and everything in between. How do we navigate such a wide and divergent spectrum? I am an optimist. From my bubble of privilege, life feels like a rollercoaster ride full of ever more impressive wonders, even as I try to fight the many social injustices that still blight us. However, the accelerating pace of change amid uncertainty elicits one fundamental observation. Among the infinite future possibilities, only one outcome is truly irreversible: extinction. Concerns about extinction are often dismissed as apocalyptic alarmism. Sometimes, they are. But repeating that mankind is still here after 70 years of existential warning about nuclear warfare is a straw man argument. The fact that a 1000-year flood has not happened does not negate its possibility. And there have been far too many nuclear near-misses to rest easy. As the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting in Davos discusses how to create a shared future in a fractured world, here are five reasons why the possibility of existential risks should raise the stakes of conversation: 1. Extinction is the rule, not the exception More than 99.9% of all the species that ever existed are gone. Deep time is unfathomable to the human brain. But if one cares to take a tour of the billions of years of life’s history, we find a litany of forgotten species. And we have only discovered a mere fraction of the extinct species that once roamed the planet. In the speck of time since the first humans evolved, more than 99.9% of all the distinct human cultures that have ever existed are extinct. Each hunter-gatherer tribe had its own mythologies, traditions and norms. They wiped each other out, or coalesced into larger formations following the agricultural revolution. However, as major civilizations emerged, even those that reached incredible heights, such as the Egyptians and the Romans, eventually collapsed. It is only in the very recent past that we became a truly global civilization. Our interconnectedness continues to grow rapidly. “Stand or fall, we are the last civilization”, as Ricken Patel, the founder of the global civic movement Avaaz, put it. 2. Environmental pressures can drive extinction More than 15,000 scientists just issued a ‘warning to humanity’. They called on us to reduce our impact on the biosphere, 25 years after their first such appeal. The warning notes that we are far outstripping the capacity of our planet in all but one measure of ozone depletion, including emissions, biodiversity, freshwater availability and more. The scientists, not a crowd known to overstate facts, conclude: “soon it will be too late to shift course away from our failing trajectory, and time is running out”. In his 2005 book Collapse, Jared Diamond charts the history of past societies. He makes the case that overpopulation and resource use beyond the carrying capacity have often been important, if not the only, drivers of collapse. Even though we are making important incremental progress in battles such as climate change, we must still achieve tremendous step changes in our response to several major environmental crises. We must do this even while the world’s population continues to grow. These pressures are bound to exert great stress on our global civilization. 3. Superintelligence: unplanned obsolescence? Imagine a monkey society that foresaw the ascendance of humans. Fearing a loss of status and power, it decided to kill the proverbial Adam and Eve. It crafted the most ingenious plan it could: starve the humans by taking away all their bananas. Foolproof plan, right? This story describes the fundamental difficulty with superintelligence. A superintelligent being may always do something entirely different from what we, with our mere mortal intelligence, can foresee. In his 2014 book Superintelligence, Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom presents the challenge in thought-provoking detail, and advises caution. Bostrom cites a survey of industry experts that projected a 50% chance of the development of artificial superintelligence by 2050, and a 90% chance by 2075. The latter date is within the life expectancy of many alive today. Visionaries like Stephen Hawking and Elon Musk have warned of the existential risks from artificial superintelligence. Their opposite camp includes Larry Page and Mark Zuckerberg. But on an issue that concerns the future of humanity, is it really wise to ignore the guy who explained the nature of space to us and another guy who just put a reusable rocket in it? 4. Technology: known knowns and unknown unknowns Many fundamentally disruptive technologies are coming of age, from bioengineering to quantum computing, 3-D printing, robotics, nanotechnology and more. Lord Martin Rees describes potential existential challenges from some of these technologies, such as a bioengineered pandemic, in his book Our Final Century. Imagine if North Korea, feeling secure in its isolation, could release a virulent strain of Ebola, engineered to be airborne. Would it do it? Would ISIS? Projecting decades forward, we will likely develop capabilities that are unthinkable even now. The unknown unknowns of our technological path are profoundly humbling. 5. 'The Trump Factor' Despite our scientific ingenuity, we are still a confused and confusing species. Think back to two years ago, and how you thought the world worked then. Has that not been upended by the election of Donald Trump as US President, and everything that has happened since? The mix of billions of messy humans will forever be unpredictable. When the combustible forces described above are added to this melee, we find ourselves on a tightrope. What choices must we now make now to create a shared future, in which we are not at perpetual risk of destroying ourselves? Common enemy to common cause Throughout history, we have rallied against the ‘other’. Tribes have overpowered tribes, empires have conquered rivals. Even today, our fiercest displays of unity typically happen at wartime. We give our lives for our motherland and defend nationalistic pride like a wounded lion. But like the early Morioris, we 21st-century citizens find ourselves on an increasingly unstable island. We may have a violent past, but we have no more dangerous enemy than ourselves Our task is to find our own Nunuku’s Law. Our own shared contract, based on equity, would help us navigate safely. It would ensure a future that unleashes the full potential of our still-budding human civilization, in all its diversity. We cannot do this unless we are humbly grounded in the possibility of our own destruction. Survival is life’s primal instinct. In the absence of a common enemy, we must find common cause in survival. Our future may depend on whether we realize this.

<h4>That is the only <u>egalitarian metric</u> – anything else collapses cooperation on <u>collective action</u> crises and makes extinction inevitable </h4><p>Risalat<strong> Khan 18. </strong>Risalat, activist and entrepreneur from Bangladesh passionate about addressing climate change, biodiversity loss, and other existential challenges. He was featured by The Guardian as one of the “young climate campaigners to watch” (2015). As a campaigner with the global civic movement Avaaz (2014-17), Risalat was part of a small core team that spearheaded the largest climate marches in history with a turnout of over 800,000 across 2,000 cities. After fighting for the Paris Agreement, Risalat led a campaign joined by over a million people to stop the Rampal coal plant in Bangladesh to protect the Sundarbans World Heritage forest, and elicited criticism of the plant from Crédit Agricolé through targeted advocacy. Currently, Risalat is pursuing an MPA in Environmental Science and Policy at Columbia University as a SIPA Environmental Fellow, “5 reasons why we need to start talking about existential risks,” https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2018/01/5-reasons-start-talking-existential-risks-extinction-moriori<u><strong><mark>/</p><p></mark>Infinite</u></strong> future <u><strong>possibilities</u></strong> I find the story of the Moriori profound. It teaches me two lessons. Firstly, that <u><mark>human culture is <strong>far from immutable</u></strong>.</mark> That we can struggle against our baser instincts. That <u><strong><mark>we can</mark> master them and <mark>rise to</mark> unprecedented <mark>challenges</u></strong></mark>. Secondly, that <u>even this does not make us masters of our own destiny. We can make visionary choices, but the future can still surprise us. </u>This is a humbling realization. Because <u><strong><mark>faced with an uncertain future, the only wise thing we can do is prepare</u></strong></mark> for possibilities. Standing at the launch pad of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, <u>the possibilities seem endless. They range from</u> an era of <u>abundance to the end of humanity</u>, and everything in between. How do we navigate such a wide and divergent spectrum? I am an optimist. From my bubble of privilege, life feels like a rollercoaster ride full of ever more impressive wonders, even as I try to fight the many social injustices that still blight us. However, the accelerating pace of change amid uncertainty elicits one fundamental observation. <u>Among the infinite future possibilities<strong>, <mark>only one outcome is truly irreversible: extinction</u></strong>. <u>Concerns</u></mark> about extinction <u><mark>are</u></mark> often <u><mark>dismissed</mark> as <strong>apocalyptic alarmism</u></strong>. Sometimes, they are. But <u>repeating that mankind is still here after 70 years of existential warning about nuclear warfare is a <strong>straw man argument</strong>.</u> <u><strong>The fact that a 1000-year flood has not happened does not negate its possibility</u></strong>. And <u><mark>there have been <strong>far too many nuclear near-misses to rest easy.</mark> </u></strong>As the World Economic Forum’s Annual Meeting in <u>Davos discusses</u> how to create a shared future in a fractured world, here are <u>five reasons why the possibility of existential risks should raise the stakes of conversation: </u>1. <u><strong><mark>Extinction is the rule</mark>, not the exception</u></strong> More than <u><mark>99.9% of all the species that ever existed are gone</u>. <u><strong>Deep time is unfathomable</u></strong></mark> to the human brain. But <u>if one cares to take a tour of the <mark>billions of years of life’s history</mark>, we <mark>find</mark> a <mark>litany of forgotten species</mark>. </u>And we have only discovered a mere fraction of the extinct species that once roamed the planet. In the speck of time since the first humans evolved, more than <u>99.9% of all</u> the distinct <u>human cultures that have ever existed are extinct.</u> Each hunter-gatherer tribe had its own mythologies, traditions and norms. They wiped each other out, or coalesced into larger formations following the agricultural revolution. However, as major civilizations emerged, even those that reached incredible heights, such as the Egyptians and the Romans, eventually collapsed. <u>It is only in the very recent past that we became a truly global civilization</u>. Our interconnectedness continues to grow rapidly. “Stand or fall, we are the last civilization”, as Ricken Patel, the founder of the global civic movement Avaaz, put it. 2. Environmental pressures can drive extinction More than <u>15,000 scientists just issued a ‘warning to humanity’</u>. They called on us to reduce our impact on the biosphere, 25 years after their first such appeal. The warning notes that we are far outstripping the capacity of our planet in all but one measure of ozone depletion, including emissions, biodiversity, freshwater availability and more. The scientists, not a crowd known to overstate facts, conclude: “soon it will be too late to shift course away from our failing trajectory, and time is running out”. In his 2005 book Collapse, Jared <u>Diamond charts the history of past societies</u>. He makes the case that <u>overpopulation and resource use beyond the carrying capacity have often been important, </u>if not the only, drivers <u>of collapse. </u>Even though we are making important incremental progress in battles such as climate change, <u>we must</u> still <u>achieve tremendous </u>step <u>changes in our response to several major environmental crises.</u> We must do this even while the world’s population continues to grow. These pressures are bound to exert great stress on our global civilization. 3. Superintelligence: unplanned obsolescence? Imagine a monkey society that foresaw the ascendance of humans. Fearing a loss of status and power, it decided to kill the proverbial Adam and Eve. It crafted the most ingenious plan it could: starve the humans by taking away all their bananas. Foolproof plan, right? This story describes the fundamental difficulty with superintelligence. A superintelligent being may always do something entirely different from what we, with our mere mortal intelligence, can foresee. In his 2014 book Superintelligence, Swedish philosopher Nick Bostrom presents the challenge in thought-provoking detail, and advises caution. <u><strong>Bostrom cites a survey of industry experts that projected a 50% chance of the development of artificial superintelligence by 2050</u></strong>, <u><strong>and a 90% chance by 2075</u></strong>. The latter date is within the life expectancy of many alive today. <u>Visionaries</u> like Stephen Hawking and Elon Musk have <u>warned of the existential risks from artificial superintelligence. </u>Their opposite camp includes Larry Page and Mark Zuckerberg. But on an issue that concerns the future of humanity, is it really wise to ignore the guy who explained the nature of space to us and another guy who just put a reusable rocket in it? 4. Technology: known knowns and unknown unknowns Many fundamentally disruptive technologies are coming of age, from bioengineering to quantum computing, 3-D printing, robotics, nanotechnology and more. Lord Martin Rees describes potential existential challenges from some of these technologies, such as a bioengineered pandemic, in his book Our Final Century. Imagine if North Korea, feeling secure in its isolation, could release a virulent strain of Ebola, engineered to be airborne. Would it do it? Would ISIS? Projecting decades forward, we will likely develop capabilities that are unthinkable even now. The unknown unknowns of our technological path are profoundly humbling. 5. 'The Trump Factor' Despite our scientific ingenuity, we are still a confused and confusing species. Think back to two years ago, and how you thought the world worked then. Has that not been upended by the election of Donald Trump as US President, and everything that has happened since? The mix of billions of messy humans will forever be unpredictable. When the combustible forces described above are added to this melee, we find ourselves on a tightrope. What choices must we now make now to create a shared future, in which we are not at perpetual risk of destroying ourselves? Common enemy to common cause <u>Throughout history, we have rallied against the ‘other’</u>. <u>Tribes</u> have <u>overpowered tribes,</u> <u>empires have conquered rivals</u>. Even today, <u>our fiercest <mark>displays of unity typically happen at wartime.</mark> We</u> give our lives for our motherland and defend nationalistic pride like a wounded lion. But like the early Morioris, <u>we 21st-century citizens find ourselves on an <strong>increasingly unstable island</strong>.</u> <u><mark>We may have a violent past, but</mark> <strong>we have <mark>no more dangerous enemy than ourselves</u></strong></mark> <u>Our task is to find</u> our own Nunuku’s Law. <u>Our own shared contract, based on <mark>equity, would help us navigate safely.</u></mark> It <u>would ensure <mark>a future that unleashes the full potential of our</mark> still-budding human <mark>civilization</mark>, in all its diversity. <mark>We cannot do this unless we are <strong>humbly grounded in the possibility of our own destruction</u></strong>. <u><strong>Survival is life’s primal instinct</u></strong>. <u>In the absence of a common enemy, we must find common cause in survival.</mark> Our future may depend on whether we realize this.</p></u>

Russia Debris

Debris---1AC

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Kentucky

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Kentucky KL

Adam Lipton

1AC - Heg Russia Debris 1NC - K 2NR - K

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college

A] Extinction outweighs---it’s the upmost moral evil and disavowal of the risk makes it more likely.

Burns 2017 (

Burns 2017 (Elizabeth Finneron-Burns is a Teaching Fellow at the University of Warwick and an Affiliated Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, What’s wrong with human extinction?, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00455091.2016.1278150?needAccess=true, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017)

extinction would prevent the existence of very many people it is a good thing for people to exist and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this The ‘good could be understood in two ways. first it is good for that person that they come to exist if humans were to go extinct the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity billions of people would likely die painful deaths The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation there is value in human life and something valuable about creating future people When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible set of people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost humans’ capacity for rationality is valuable in itself we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Each scenario would involve significant physical and/ non-physical harms extinction could cause premature death A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as to be respected taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury Existing people could endure non-physical harms the fact there would not be any future people could give rise to a personal reason there could be various deleterious psychological effects There are two main sources of this trauma The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children this is by no means universa it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction The second is a higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled without the hope of posterity for our race all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction

it is good for people to exist and extinction would deprive people of this billions of people would die painful deaths there would be no future generations the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life humans’ capacity for rationality is valuable in itself Existing people would endure physical pain and painful premature deaths there could be various psychological effects sense of hopelessness there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you.

Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the extinction of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It would prevent the existence of very many happy people One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that it is a good thing for people to exist and enjoy happy lives and extinction would deprive more people of enjoying this good. The ‘good’ in this case could be understood in at least two ways. According to the first, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that it is good for that person that they come to exist. The second view might hold that if humans were to go extinct, the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that billions of people would likely die painful deaths. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. The worst thing about human extinction is that there would be no future generations. Since there could be so many generations in our future, the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that there is value in human life and also something valuable about creating future people which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that a possible person or a set of possible people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about humans’ capacity for rationality which is valuable in itself. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. Existing people would endure physical pain and/or painful and/or premature deaths Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. Each of these scenarios would involve significant physical and/or non-physical harms to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of extinction could cause premature death. A nuclear winter that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘appreciating the value of human life is primarily a matter of seeing human lives as something to be respected, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. Existing people could endure non-physical harms I said earlier than the fact in itself that there would not be any future people is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason could give rise to a personal reason that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that there could be various deleterious psychological effects that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. There are two main sources of this trauma, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children. Whilst this is by no means universal, it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. The second is a more general, higher level sense of hopelessness or despair that there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you. Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘without the hope of posterity for our race if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’ (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction.

<h4>A] Extinction outweighs---it’s the upmost moral evil and disavowal of the risk makes it more likely.</h4><p><strong>Burns 2017 (</strong>Elizabeth Finneron-Burns is a Teaching Fellow at the University of Warwick and an Affiliated Researcher at the Institute for Futures Studies in Stockholm, What’s wrong with human extinction?, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00455091.2016.1278150?needAccess=true, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2017)</p><p>Many, though certainly not all, people might believe that it would be wrong to bring about the end of the human species, and the reasons given for this belief are various. I begin by considering four reasons that could be given against the moral permissibility of human extinction. I will argue that only those reasons that impact the people who exist at the time that the extinction or the knowledge of the upcoming extinction occurs, can explain its wrongness. I use this conclusion to then consider in which cases human extinction would be morally permissible or impermissible, arguing that there is only a small class of cases in which it would not be wrong to cause the <u>extinction</u> of the human race or allow it to happen. 2.1. It <u>would prevent the existence of very many</u> happy <u>people</u> One reason of human extinction might be considered to be wrong lies in the value of human life itself. The thought here might be that <u><mark>it is </mark>a <mark>good </mark>thing <mark>for people to exist</u> </mark>and enjoy happy lives <u><mark>and extinction would deprive </mark>more <mark>people of </mark>enjoying <mark>this</u> </mark>good. <u>The ‘good</u>’ in this case <u>could be understood in</u> at least <u>two ways.</u> According to the <u>first</u>, one might believe that you benefit a person by bringing them into existence, or at least, that <u>it is good for that person that they come to exist</u>. The second view might hold that <u>if humans were to go extinct</u>, <u>the utility foregone by the billions (or more) of people who could have lived but will now never get that opportunity</u>, renders allowing human extinction to take place an incidence of wrongdoing. An example of this view can be found in two quotes from an Effective Altruism blog post by Peter Singer, Nick Beckstead and Matt Wage: One very bad thing about human extinction would be that <u><strong><mark>billions of people would </mark>likely <mark>die painful deaths</u></strong></mark>. But in our view, this is by far not the worst thing about human extinction. <u>The worst thing about human extinction is that <mark>there would be no future generations</u></mark>. Since there could be so many generations in our future, <u><strong><mark>the value of all those generations together greatly exceeds the value of the current generation</u></strong></mark>. (Beckstead, Singer, and Wage 2013) The authors are making two claims. The first is that <u>there is value in human life and</u> also <u>something valuable about creating future people</u> which gives us a reason to do so; furthermore, it would be a very bad thing if we did not do so. The second is that, not only would it be a bad thing for there to be no future people, but it would actually be the worst thing about extinction. Since happy human lives have value, and the number of potential people who could ever exist is far greater than the number of people who exist at any one time, even if the extinction were brought about through the painful deaths of currently existing people, the former’s loss would be greater than the latter’s. Both claims are assuming that there is an intrinsic value in the existence of potential human life. The second claim makes the further assumption that the forgone value of the potential lives that could be lived is greater than the disvalue that would be accrued by people existing at the time of the extinction through suffering from painful and/or premature deaths. The best-known author of the post, Peter Singer is a prominent utilitarian, so it is not surprising that he would lament the potential lack of future human lives per se. However, it is not just utilitarians who share this view, even if implicitly. Indeed, other philosophers also seem to imply that they share the intuition that there is just something wrong with causing or failing to prevent the extinction of the human species such that we prevent more ‘people’ from having the ‘opportunity to exist’. Stephen Gardiner (2009) and Martin O’Neill (personal correspondence), both sympathetic to contract theory, for example, also find it intuitive that we should want more generations to have the opportunity to exist, assuming that they have worth-living lives, and I find it plausible to think that many other people (philosophers and non-philosophers alike) probably share this intuition. <u>When we talk about future lives being ‘prevented’, we are saying that</u> <u>a possible</u> person or a <u>set</u> <u>of</u> possible <u>people who could potentially have existed will now never actually come to exist</u>. To say that it is wrong to prevent people from existing could either mean that a possible person could reasonably reject a principle that permitted us not to create them, or that the foregone value of their lives provides a reason for rejecting any principle that permits extinction. To make the first claim we would have to argue that a possible person could reasonably reject any principle that prevented their existence on the grounds that it prevented them in particular from existing. However, this is implausible for two reasons. First, we can only wrong someone who did, does or will actually exist because wronging involves failing to take a person’s interests into account. When considering the permissibility of a principle allowing us not to create Person X, we cannot take X’s interest in being created into account because X will not exist if we follow the principle. By considering the standpoint of a person in our deliberations we consider the burdens they will have to bear as a result of the principle. In this case, there is no one who will bear any burdens since if the principle is followed (that is, if we do not create X), X will not exist to bear any burdens. So, only people who do/will actually exist can bear the brunt of a principle, and therefore occupy a standpoint that is owed justification. Second, existence is not an interest at all and a possible person is not disadvantaged by not being caused to exist. Rather than being an interest, it is a necessary requirement in order to have interests. Rivka Weinberg describes it as ‘neutral’ because causing a person to exist is to create a subject who can have interests; existence is not an interest itself.3 In order to be disadvantaged, there must be some detrimental effect on your interests. However, without existence, a person does not have any interests so they cannot be disadvantaged by being kept out of existence. But, as Weinberg points out, ‘never having interests itself could not be contrary to people’s interests since without interest bearers, there can be no ‘they’ for it to be bad for’ (Weinberg 2008, 13). So, a principle that results in some possible people never becoming actual does not impose any costs on those ‘people’ because nobody is disadvantaged by not coming into existence.4 It therefore seems that it cannot be wrong to fail to bring particular people into existence. This would mean that no one acts wrongly when they fail to create another person. Writ large, it would also not be wrong if everybody decided to exercise their prerogative not to create new people and potentially, by consequence, allow human extinction. One might respond here by saying that although it may be permissible for one person to fail to create a new person, it is not permissible if everyone chooses to do so because human lives have value and allowing human extinction would be to forgo a huge amount of value in the world. This takes us to the second way of understanding the potential wrongness of preventing people from existing — the foregone value of a life provides a reason for rejecting any principle that prevents it. One possible reply to this claim turns on the fact that many philosophers acknowledge that the only, or at least the best, way to think about the value of (individual or groups of) possible people’s lives is in impersonal terms (Parfit 1984; Reiman 2007; McMahan 2009). Jeff McMahan, for example, writes ‘at the time of one’s choice there is no one who exists or will exist independently of that choice for whose sake one could be acting in causing him or her to exist … it seems therefore that any reason to cause or not to cause an individual to exist … is best considered an impersonal rather than individual-affecting reason’ (McMahan 2009, 52). Another reply along similar lines would be to appeal to the value that is lost or at least foregone when we fail to bring into existence a next (or several next) generations of people with worth-living lives. Since ex hypothesi worth-living lives have positive value, it is better to create more such lives and worse to create fewer. Human extinction by definition is the creation of no future lives and would ‘deprive’ billions of ‘people’ of the opportunity to live worth-living lives. This might reduce the amount of value in the world at the time of the extinction (by killing already existing people), but it would also prevent a much vaster amount of value in the future (by failing to create more people). Both replies depend on the impersonal value of human life. However, recall that in contractualism impersonal values are not on their own grounds for reasonably rejecting principles. Scanlon himself says that although we have a strong reason not to destroy existing human lives, this reason ‘does not flow from the thought that it is a good thing for there to be more human life rather than less’ (104). In contractualism, something cannot be wrong unless there is an impact on a person. Thus, neither the impersonal value of creating a particular person nor the impersonal value of human life writ large could on its own provide a reason for rejecting a principle permitting human extinction. It seems therefore that the fact that extinction would deprive future people of the opportunity to live worth-living lives (either by failing to create either particular future people or future people in general) cannot provide us with a reason to consider human extinction to be wrong. Although the lost value of these ‘lives’ itself cannot be the reason explaining the wrongness of extinction, it is possible the knowledge of this loss might create a personal reason for some existing people. I will consider this possibility later on in section (d). But first I move to the second reason human extinction might be wrong per se. 2.2. <u><strong><mark>It would mean the loss of the only known form of intelligent life </mark>and all civilization and intellectual progress would be lost</u></strong> A second reason we might think it would be wrong to cause human extinction is the loss that would occur of the only (known) form of rational life and the knowledge and civilization that that form of life has created. One thought here could be that just as some might consider it wrong to destroy an individual human heritage monument like the Sphinx, it would also be wrong if the advances made by humans over the past few millennia were lost or prevented from progressing. A related argument is made by those who feel that there is something special about <u><mark>humans’ capacity for rationality</u> </mark>which <u><mark>is valuable in itself</u></mark>. Since humans are the only intelligent life that we know of, it would be a loss, in itself, to the world for that to end. I admit that I struggle to fully appreciate this thought. It seems to me that Henry Sidgwick was correct in thinking that these things are only important insofar as they are important to humans (Sidgwick 1874, I.IX.4).5 If there is no form of intelligent life in the future, who would there be to lament its loss since intelligent life is the only form of life capable of appreciating intelligence? Similarly, if there is no one with the rational capacity to appreciate historic monuments and civil progress, who would there be to be negatively affected or even notice the loss?6 However, even if there is nothing special about human rationality, just as some people try to prevent the extinction of nonhuman animal species, we might think that <u>we ought also to prevent human extinction for the sake of biodiversity</u>. The thought in this, as well as the earlier examples, must be that it would somehow be bad for the world if there were no more humans even though there would be no one for whom it is bad. This may be so but the only way to understand this reason is impersonally. Since we are concerned with wrongness rather than badness, we must ask whether something that impacts no one’s well-being, status or claims can be wrong. As we saw earlier, in the contractualist framework reasons must be personal rather than impersonal in order to provide grounds for reasonable rejection (Scanlon 1998, 218–223). Since the loss of civilization, intelligent life or biodiversity are per se impersonal reasons, there is no standpoint from which these reasons could be used to reasonably reject a principle that permitted extinction. Therefore, causing human extinction on the grounds of the loss of civilization, rational life or biodiversity would not be wrong. 2.3. <u><strong><mark>Existing people would endure physical pain and</mark>/or <mark>painful </mark>and/or <mark>premature deaths</u></strong> </mark>Thinking about the ways in which human extinction might come about brings to the fore two more reasons it might be wrong. It could, for example, occur if all humans (or at least the critical number needed to be unable to replenish the population, leading to eventual extinction) underwent a sterilization procedure. Or perhaps it could come about due to anthropogenic climate change or a massive asteroid hitting the Earth and wiping out the species in the same way it did the dinosaurs millions of years ago. <u>Each</u> of these <u>scenario</u>s <u>would involve significant physical</u> <u>and/</u>or <u>non-physical harms</u> to existing people and their interests. Physically, people might suffer premature and possibly also painful deaths, for example. It is not hard to imagine examples in which the process of <u>extinction could cause</u> <u>premature death</u>. <u>A nuclear winter</u> <u>that killed everyone or even just every woman under the age of 50 is a clear example of such a case</u>. Obviously, some types of premature death themselves cannot be reasons to reject a principle. Every person dies eventually, sometimes earlier than the standard expected lifespan due to accidents or causes like spontaneously occurring incurable cancers. A cause such as disease is not a moral agent and therefore it cannot be wrong if it unavoidably kills a person prematurely. Scanlon says that the fact that a principle would reduce a person’s well-being gives that person a reason to reject the principle: ‘components of well-being figure prominently as grounds for reasonable rejection’ (Scanlon 1998, 214). However, it is not settled yet whether premature death is a setback to well-being. Some philosophers hold that death is a harm to the person who dies, whilst others argue that it is not.7 I will argue, however, that regardless of who is correct in that debate, <u>being caused to die prematurely can be reason to reject a principle when it fails to show respect to the person as a rational agent</u>. Scanlon says that recognizing others as rational beings with interests involves seeing reason to preserve life and prevent death: ‘<u>appreciating</u> <u>the value of human life is primarily a matter of</u> <u>seeing human lives as</u> something <u>to be respected</u>, where this involves seeing reasons not to destroy them, reasons to protect them, and reasons to want them to go well’ (Scanlon 1998, 104). The ‘respect for life’ in this case is a respect for the person living, not respect for human life in the abstract. This means that we can sometimes fail to protect human life without acting wrongfully if we still respect the person living. Scanlon gives the example of a person who faces a life of unending and extreme pain such that she wishes to end it by committing suicide. Scanlon does not think that the suicidal person shows a lack of respect for her own life by seeking to end it because the person whose life it is has no reason to want it to go on. This is important to note because it emphasizes the fact that the respect for human life is person-affecting. It is not wrong to murder because of the impersonal disvalue of death in general, but because <u>taking someone’s life without their permission shows disrespect to that person</u>. This supports its inclusion as a reason in the contractualist formula, regardless of what side ends up winning the ‘is death a harm?’ debate because even if death turns out not to harm the person who died, ending their life without their consent shows disrespect to that person. A person who could reject a principle permitting another to cause his or her premature death presumably does not wish to die at that time, or in that manner. Thus, <u><strong>if they are killed without their consent, their interests have not been taken into account</u></strong>, and they have a reason to reject the principle that allowed their premature death.8 This is as true in the case of death due to extinction as it is for death due to murder. However, physical pain may also be caused to existing people without killing them, but still resulting in human extinction. Imagine, for example, surgically removing everyone’s reproductive organs in order to prevent the creation of any future people. Another example could be <u>a nuclear bomb that did not kill anyone, but did painfully render them infertile through illness or injury</u>. These would be cases in which physical pain (through surgery or bombs) was inflicted on existing people and the extinction came about as a result of the painful incident rather than through death. Furthermore, one could imagine a situation in which a bomb (for example) killed enough people to cause extinction, but some people remained alive, but in terrible pain from injuries. It seems uncontroversial that the infliction of physical pain could be a reason to reject a principle. Although Scanlon says that an impact on well-being is not the only reason to reject principles, it plays a significant role, and indeed, most principles are likely to be rejected due to a negative impact on a person’s well-being, physical or otherwise. It may be queried here whether it is actually the involuntariness of the pain that is grounds for reasonable rejection rather than the physical pain itself because not all pain that a person suffers is involuntary. One can imagine acts that can cause physical pain that are not rejectable — base jumping or life-saving or improving surgery, for example. On the other hand, pushing someone off a cliff or cutting him with a scalpel against his will are clearly rejectable acts. The difference between the two cases is that in the former, the person having the pain inflicted has consented to that pain or risk of pain. My view is that they cannot be separated in these cases and it is involuntary physical pain that is the grounds for reasonable rejection. Thus, the fact that a principle would allow unwanted physical harm gives a person who would be subjected to that harm a reason to reject the principle. Of course the mere fact that a principle causes involuntary physical harm or premature death is not sufficient to declare that the principle is rejectable — there might be countervailing reasons. In the case of extinction, what countervailing reasons might be offered in favour of the involuntary physical pain/ death-inducing harm? One such reason that might be offered is that humans are a harm to the natural environment and that the world might be a better place if there were no humans in it. It could be that humans might rightfully be considered an all-things-considered hindrance to the world rather than a benefit to it given the fact that we have been largely responsible for the extinction of many species, pollution and, most recently, climate change which have all negatively affected the natural environment in ways we are only just beginning to understand. Thus, the fact that human extinction would improve the natural environment (or at least prevent it from degrading further), is a countervailing reason in favour of extinction to be weighed against the reasons held by humans who would experience physical pain or premature death. However, the good of the environment as described above is by definition not a personal reason. Just like the loss of rational life and civilization, therefore, it cannot be a reason on its own when determining what is wrong and countervail the strong personal reasons to avoid pain/death that is held by the people who would suffer from it.9 Every person existing at the time of the extinction would have a reason to reject that principle on the grounds of the physical pain they are being forced to endure against their will that could not be countervailed by impersonal considerations such as the negative impact humans may have on the earth. Therefore, a principle that permitted extinction to be accomplished in a way that caused involuntary physical pain or premature death could quite clearly be rejectable by existing people with no relevant countervailing reasons. This means that human extinction that came about in this way would be wrong. There are of course also additional reasons they could reject a similar principle which I now turn to address in the next section. 2.4. <u><strong>Existing people could endure non-physical harms</u></strong> I said earlier than <u>the fact</u> in itself that <u>there would not be any future people</u> is an impersonal reason and can therefore not be a reason to reject a principle permitting extinction. However, this impersonal reason <u>could give rise to a personal reason</u> that is admissible. So, the final important reason people might think that human extinction would be wrong is that <u><mark>there could be various </mark>deleterious <mark>psychological effects</u> </mark>that would be endured by existing people having the knowledge that there would be no future generations. <u>There are two main sources of this trauma</u>, both arising from the knowledge that there will be no more people. <u>The first relates to individual people and the undesired negative effect on well-being</u> <u>that would be experienced by those who would have wanted to have children</u>. Whilst <u><strong>this is by no means universa</u></strong>l, <u><strong>it is fair to say that a good proportion of people feel a strong pull towards reproduction</u></strong> and having their lineage continue in some way. Samuel Scheffler describes the pull towards reproduction as a ‘desire for a personalized relationship with the future’ (Scheffler 2012, 31). Reproducing is a widely held desire and the joys of parenthood are ones that many people wish to experience. For these people knowing that they would not have descendants (or that their descendants will endure painful and/or premature deaths) could create a sense of despair and pointlessness of life. Furthermore, the inability to reproduce and have your own children because of a principle/policy that prevents you (either through bans or physical interventions) would be a significant infringement of what we consider to be a basic right to control what happens to your body. For these reasons, knowing that you will have no descendants could cause significant psychological traumas or harms even if there were no associated physical harm. <u>The second is a</u> more general, <u>higher level <mark>sense of hopelessness </mark>or despair that <mark>there will be no more humans and that your projects will end with you</u>.</mark> <u>Even those who did not feel a strong desire to procreate themselves might feel a sense of hopelessness that any projects or goals they have for the future would not be fulfilled</u>. Many of the projects and goals we work towards during our lifetime are also at least partly future-oriented. Why bother continuing the search for a cure for cancer if either it will not be found within humans’ lifetime, and/or there will be no future people to benefit from it once it is found? Similar projects and goals that might lose their meaning when confronted with extinction include politics, artistic pursuits and even the type of philosophical work with which this paper is concerned. Even more extreme, through the words of the character Theo Faron, P.D. James says in his novel The Children of Men that ‘<u>without the hope of posterity for our race</u> if not for ourselves, without the assurance that we being dead yet live, <u>all pleasures of the mind and senses sometimes seem to me no more than pathetic and crumbling defences shored up against our ruins’</u> (James 2006, 9). Even if James’ claim is a bit hyperbolic and all pleasures would not actually be lost, I agree with Scheffler in finding it not implausible that the knowledge that extinction was coming and that there would be no more people would have at least a general depressive effect on people’s motivation and confidence in the value of and joy in their activities (Scheffler 2012, 43). <u>Both sources of psychological harm are personal reasons to reject a principle that permitted human extinction</u>. Existing people could therefore reasonably reject the principle for either of these reasons. Psychological pain and the inability to pursue your personal projects, goals, and aims, are all acceptable reasons for rejecting principles in the contractualist framework. So too are infringements of rights and entitlements that we accept as important for people’s lives. These psychological reasons, then, are also valid reasons to reject principles that permitted or required human extinction. </p>

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Pandemics risk extinction - simulations, empirics, and surging connectivity prove.

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Kim 21, Kiseong, et al. "Network Analysis to Identify the Risk of Epidemic Spreading." Applied Sciences 11.7 (2021): 2997. (Department of Bio and Brain Engineering, KAIST; R&D Center)//Re-cut by Elmer

epidemics, such as the Black Death and the Spanish flu, have threatened human life throughout history; however, it is unclear if humans will remain safe from the sudden and fast spread of epidemic diseases the transmission characteristics of epidemics remain undiscovered we present an epidemic simulation experiment revealing the relationship between epidemic parameters and pandemic risk certain diseases can infect all nodes in the human social networks these cause a pandemic when the average degree is larger than the threshold value. These results indicated certain diseases lead to human extinction The emergence of a pandemic is a human extinction event one of the global catastrophic risks in studies regarding the future several such as the Black Death Spanish flu smallpox SARS and Ebola have affected a large population throughout history. The risk of pandemics increases with an increase in population mobility threatening humankind It is essential to analyze the epidemic spread in society to minimize damage when the epidemic spreads to all nodes it can increase the pandemic risk We designed an epidemic simulation process We adapted the Monte Carlo method to determine the status of the transition Diseases causing extinctive spread are potential candidates of high pandemic risk extinctive spreading indicates disease will infect every person in the society Many previous studies have made stochastic SIR models to analyze the dynamics or stability of epidemic diseases However, they did not conduct a quantitative assessment of pandemic risk taking into account physical contact between people we consider various connectivity and disease characteristics The results revealed that certain infectious diseases can lead to extinction human extinction is possible Based on the simulation results we confirmed certain infectious diseases can lead to extinction identifying candidate diseases is crucial in addressing epidemic prevention activities

epidemics have threatened human life it is unclear if humans will remain safe from sudden and fast spread a epidemic simulation experiment certain diseases can infect all nodes in human social networks These results indicated certain diseases lead to human extinction the Black Death smallpox SARS and Ebola affected a large population risk increases with mobility threatening humankind previous studies did not conduct quantitative assessment of risk taking into account physical contact human extinction is possible simulation results confirmed certain infectious diseases can lead to extinction

Several epidemics, such as the Black Death and the Spanish flu, have threatened human life throughout history; however, it is unclear if humans will remain safe from the sudden and fast spread of epidemic diseases. Moreover, the transmission characteristics of epidemics remain undiscovered. In this study, we present the results of an epidemic simulation experiment revealing the relationship between epidemic parameters and pandemic risk. To analyze the time-dependent risk and impact of epidemics, we considered two parameters for infectious diseases: the recovery time from infection and the transmission rate of the disease. Based on the epidemic simulation, we identified two important aspects of human safety with regard to the threat of a pandemic. First, humans should be safe if the fatality rate is below 100%. Second, even when the fatality rate is 100%, humans would be safe if the average degree of human social networks is below a threshold value. Nevertheless, certain diseases can potentially infect all nodes in the human social networks, and these diseases cause a pandemic when the average degree is larger than the threshold value. These results indicated that certain infectious diseases lead to human extinction and can be prevented by minimizing human contact. 1. Introduction The emergence of a pandemic is one of the various scenarios frequently discussed as a human extinction event, and it is listed as one of the global catastrophic risks in studies regarding the future [1,2,3]. In particular, several pandemics, such as the Black Death [4,5], Spanish flu [6], and those caused by smallpox [7], severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) [8], and Ebola [9], have affected a large population throughout history. The risk of pandemics increases with an increase in population mobility between cities, nations, and continents, thereby threatening humankind [10,11,12]. It is essential to analyze the epidemic spread in society to minimize the damage from epidemic disasters; however, extinctive epidemic spreading experiments have limitations in real-world situations, as they predict stochastic effects on the spread without considering the structure of human society. Network-based approaches have been proposed to overcome these limitations and perform epidemic spreading simulations by considering the network structure of numerous real-world connections [13,14,15]. These methods use various models of epidemic spreading, such as the susceptible–infectious–susceptible (SIS) [16,17,18], susceptible–infectious–recovered (SIR) [19,20,21], and Watts threshold models [22]. While these methods are mathematically convenient, they are epidemiologically unrealistic for various infections because they require exponentially distributed incubation and infectious periods [23,24,25]. Moreover, previous epidemic studies did not perform quantitative assessment of the pandemic risk depending on the network connectivity in individuals and fatality rate of various diseases [26]. In the present study, we applied an SIR epidemic model to a scale-free network with Monte Carlo simulation to identify the quantitative relationship between infectious diseases and human existence. Our fundamental hypothesis states that when the epidemic spreads to all nodes of the network and the fatality rate is 100%, it can increase the pandemic risk. To address this, we initially constructed a scale-free network to simulate a society. Moreover, for the epidemic spreading simulation, an SIR model was applied to the network to describe the immune state of an individual after infection. From the simulation study, we found that the mean degree of a scale-free network was an essential factor in determining whether epidemics threaten humans. This approach provides important insights into epidemic spreading analysis by investigating the relationship between epidemic and scale-free network parameters. Furthermore, it highlights the necessity of determining information flow during an epidemic. 2. Materials and Methods We designed an epidemic simulation process to identify the relationship between pandemic risk and network parameters. This study was performed in four steps (Figure 1): (i) generating a scale-free network model to reflect real-world conditions; (ii) applying an SIR model to the scale-free network for epidemic spreading simulations; (iii) adapting the Monte Carlo method to reflect the stochastic process in the node status of the SIR model; and (iv) iteratively performing simulation for every parameter set and analyzing the results. We have provided the source code and sample results of epidemic simulation in Supplementary Materials. Figure 1. Overview of epidemic simulation process based on the Monte Carlo method. (A) We generated scale-free networks for a fixed population (N = 1,000,000) and various node degrees (k = 2, 5, 7, and 10). (B) Epidemic spreading was simulated by applying a susceptible–infectious–recovered (SIR) model to the scale-free network. We set the epidemic parameters, β and γd. β represents the spreading rate of epidemics, and γd is the reciprocal of γ and reflects the time interval between infection and recovery. Randomly, 0.05% of nodes were initially infected. (C) We adapted the Monte Carlo method to determine the status of the transition from the infection node to immunization node. Repeated simulations were performed until a steady state was achieved. (D) For every parameter set, 10,000 simulations were performed. 2.1. Network Generation Based on a Scale-Free Model We constructed a network model for the epidemic spreading simulation (Figure 1). The nodes and edges of the network represent people in the society and their physical contacts, respectively. We used a scale-free network model, which follows the preferential attachment property observed in numerous real-world networks, such as social networks, physical systems, and economic networks [27,28,29]. In the scale-free network, when a node is added to the network, its likelihood of connecting to existing nodes increases with an increase in the node’s degree. Hub nodes, which lead to fast and vast spreading of epidemics, exist. Two characteristic parameters, including N and k, affect the form of scale-free networks. The parameter N denotes all nodes in the network. In the real world, N indicates the whole population size. The parameter k is the average degree of the network, which determines the degree of the newly attached node for each step during network generation. Following the characteristics of the network model, we generated scale-free networks representing human contacts for epidemic spread. The scale-free network was generated by the Barabasi–Albert graph distribution, in which the network is constructed from a cycle graph with three vertices, followed by the addition of k edges at each construction step [30]. The k edges are randomly attached to the vertex based on the degree distribution of the vertex. After network generation, we investigated the degree distribution properties of the network (Figure 2). The results indicate that the degree distributions have similar tendency for networks with varying number of nodes and edges. This study constructed scale-free networks with the largest number of nodes considering computational complexity (N = 1,000,000). Figure 2. Degree distribution of the scale-free network. We analyzed the degree distribution of the network based on the number of nodes (N) and mean degree (k). 2.2. Epidemic Spreading Based on the SIR Model For the epidemic spreading simulations, we applied an SIR model to the generated scale-free network. The classical SIR model can be expressed by the following nonlinear differential equations [21]: where S, I, and R represent susceptible, infected, and recovered compartments, respectively, in the whole population. S represents people who have not been infected yet but can be infected in future. I represents infected people who can spread the epidemic to susceptible people through physical contact. R denotes people who have recovered or died from the epidemic and who no longer participate in the epidemic spreading process. The sum of the S, I, and R values represents the whole population size N. Epidemics have two parameters in the SIR model, transmission rate (β) and recovery rate (γ), which arise from the basic reproduction number R0 (Figure 1B). The basic reproduction number is the number of infections caused by one infective node [31,32,33]. If the R0 is more than 1, the infection can spread in a population, whereas if R0 is less than 1, the infection cannot spread. We express the basic reproduction number as R0 = β/γ, where β represents the spreading rate of epidemics between infective nodes and adjacent susceptible nodes and γ represents the probability of recovery from infection [34]. We mainly used γd, which is the reciprocal of γ and reflects the time interval between infection and recovery. 2.3. Investigation of Epidemic Status Based on the Monte Carlo Method The epidemic simulation was performed for a time series event by constructing epidemic status matrix (z) to represent the status of the nth node at time step t. For each node, the value of epidemic status matrix at time step t can be 0, 1, or 2, indicating that a node is susceptible, infective, or recovered, respectively. We initially (t = 0) set every value of epidemic status matrix to 0 because all nodes are susceptible before the epidemic spreads. At the initial infection stage, randomly selected 0.05% of nodes were infected. At every time period, we performed immunization and observed the infection stages (Figure 3). At the immunization stage, we identified infective nodes and determined whether these nodes would be recovered in the next time step. To calculate the transition probability of infected and recovered phenomena, the Monte Carlo method was applied [35,36]. When infection and recovery parameters are provided, it is possible to investigate whether a node transitions from an epidemic state to another state. To accomplish this, we compared the method revealing the change in each population in every compartment over time (Figure 4). The final steady state of the epidemic spreading simulation model indicates the total number of casualties of the epidemic who either are dead or have recovered from the disease. Infective nodes at time t (zn [t] = 1) are transformed to recovered nodes at time t + 1 (zn [t + 1] = 2) when 1/γd is larger than a random real number between 0 and 1. We determined whether the neighbor nodes of the infection node would be infected by identifying susceptible nodes adjacent to the infective nodes at time t (zn [t] = 0, with the adjacent infective node) (Figure 5). When β is larger than a random real number between 0 and 1, a susceptible node becomes an infective node at time t + 1 (zn [t + 1] = 1); this scenario represents epidemic spread. For each time step, we recorded the number of susceptible, infective, and recovered nodes during epidemic spread. 2.4. Simulation Parameters We carried out simulation trials for various mean degrees of networks (k = 2, 5, 7, and 10). Each network considered the following epidemic parameters: β ranges from 0.05 to 0.95 and γd ranges from 1 to 10. The Monte Carlo model was repeatedly simulated to observe saturation of the recovery process. Considering that the simulation pipeline contains random processes such as initial infection and Monte Carlo trials, we performed the simulation iteratively until the status of nodes remained unchanged. After simulation, time series data from every simulation were interpolated in the time domain. The fatality rate determines the ratio of deceased and recovered individuals in the final population [37,38,39]. If the fatality rate is below 100%, the recovered population contains both dead and recovered individuals. Such a situation does not always cause a pandemic. In this simulation, we assumed a 100% fatality rate. To accomplish this, we enumerated the recovered nodes as dead for considering the pandemic risk. 3. Results Through our method, we obtained epidemic spreading data with various network and epidemic parameter sets. In the present study, we focused on the case where the epidemic infects all nodes and defined this phenomenon as “extinctive spread”. Diseases causing extinctive spread are potential candidates of high pandemic risk. In the real world, extinctive spreading indicates that the disease will infect every person in the society. From the simulation data, we calculated the extinctive spread score by dividing the total number of simulation trials by the number of extinctive spread cases. Thereafter, we identified that the number of extinctive spread cases is mainly influenced by spreading speed, which is determined by β, γd, and k (Figure 6). The extinctive spread region (brown area in Figure 6) is expanded as the value of mean degree of network (k) is increased, thereby indicating that the area of extinctive spread becomes noticeably wider in a dense network than in a sparse network. Thus, the more contact between people, the higher the risk of epidemics. Moreover, high γd and high β cause extinctive spread across a large region, indicating that the high spreading rate and short time interval between infection and recovery are risk factors of epidemic diseases. In contrast, the infective nodes recover before they transmit the disease to their neighbors in low β and low γd scenarios, thus disconnecting the network and preventing extinctive spread. This occurs because the infective nodes need more time to transmit the disease in low β and high γd scenarios. Therefore, the disease begins to subside due to a lack of new infective nodes. Furthermore, we investigated the range of β and γd for existing epidemics of the common cold [40,41] and fatal diseases, namely, cholera [42,43], Marburg [44,45], Ebola (Congo and Uganda) [46,47,48,49], SARS [50], and MERS [51] (Table 1). We selected diseases with relatively well-known epidemic parameters, such as average duration of infection and basic number of reproductions from previous studies. Transmission rates were calculated using the mean duration of infectious periods and basic reproduction numbers of the epidemics. Different studies reveal multiple values of infectious period and transmission rate for some of these diseases; we considered these values separately [40,41,42,43,46,47,48,49]. For example, the infectious period of a common cold is from 3 to 7 days and that of Ebola is 6.5 days. Next, we placed the possible regions of these epidemics as a disease band for various k values (colored lines in Figure 6). When k > 5, fatal diseases have an opportunity to cause a pandemic. Even when k = 5, diseases such as cholera and Ebola (Congo) can be threatening in regions of low γd and high, thus demonstrating that the knowledge of network parameters of the society and the characteristics of epidemic diseases can aid in quantifying the risk of epidemics. 4. Discussion Many previous studies have made stochastic SIR models to analyze the dynamics or stability of epidemic diseases. They investigated the distribution of susceptible, infected, and removed populations for specific epidemic disease spreading, such as cholera, SARS, Marburg, and MERS, based on mathematical modelling [52,53,54,55]. However, they did not conduct a quantitative assessment of pandemic risk taking into account physical contact between people. To solve this limitation, we performed epidemic spreading simulations by applying an SIR model to scale-free networks with Monte Carlo simulation. In the simulation, we consider various connectivity and disease characteristics on scale-free networks. For each network and epidemic parameter set, the probability of extinctive spread was calculated. The results revealed that certain infectious diseases can lead to extinction. Moreover, even if the disease band extends over the extinctive spread regions, it does not indicate that human extinction results from the disease, as the fatality rate is below 100%; however, in the case of 100% fatality, the disease can cause a human extinction event. The risk of infectious disease is influenced by the network structure. A dense network has a higher risk of spreading infectious disease than a sparse network, as we observed in the extinctive spreading maps. According to our results, when the average degree of human social networks is below the risk threshold, i.e., less than 4 in this study, human society is safe from an extinctive outbreak based on our knowledge regarding the epidemic parameters of the infectious disease. Nevertheless, in other cases, human extinction is possible. For example, if the population is 1,000,000 and there are 4 or more instances of physical contact between people, human extinction events may occur, depending on the fatality rate of the epidemics. Hence, physical contact between people is closely related to an extinction event of infectious diseases. Eventually, from a public health perspective, lowering the average contact level of society is an appropriate way to increase the robustness of strategies against the occurrence of extinction. In the real world, reducing network density can be accomplished by epidemic prevention activity, such as isolation and quarantine treatment. This action prevents epidemic risk to the society, thereby avoiding human extinction. Additional considerations may improve our analysis. First, large population size and various proportions of initial infective nodes were not considered in the experiments. We have confirmed that the result was consistent when the proportion of initial infective nodes was 0.05% of the total population; however, this can vary depending on the distinct proportion of initial infective nodes in a different population. To achieve robust results, we need to perform additional experiments for various parameters; however, we could not address this issue due to computational complexity. Second, we did not consider numerous known epidemic diseases. We calculated the transmission rates of epidemic diseases using the known infectious periods and reproduction numbers of the epidemics from evidence in the literature. In the present study, we only considered five epidemic diseases, since the information on infectious periods and reproduction numbers of diseases was mostly unavailable for other epidemic diseases. Third, this study only considers the SIR model on scale-free networks in epidemic simulation. Since the dynamics of epidemic diseases can be varied in different models or networks, it is important to experiment in various simulation environments to confirm the robustness of the results. Nevertheless, these limitations can be considered in future experiments or using improved computational methods. With these further improvements, our approach can be used as a computational tool to analyze the risk of epidemic diseases. 5. Conclusions In this study, we analyzed the risk of epidemic diseases by creating an epidemic simulation on a scale-free network. Based on the simulation results for various epidemic parameters, we confirmed that certain infectious diseases can lead to extinction and can be prevented by minimizing human contact. We believe that identifying potential candidate diseases that may lead to human extinction is crucial in addressing epidemic prevention activities such as quarantine.

<h4>Pandemics risk extinction - <u>simulations</u>, <u>empirics</u>, and <u>surging connectivity</u> prove.</h4><p><strong>Kim 21</strong>, Kiseong, et al. "Network Analysis to Identify the Risk of Epidemic Spreading." Applied Sciences 11.7 (2021): 2997. (Department of Bio and Brain Engineering, KAIST; R&D Center)//Re-cut by Elmer</p><p>Several <u><strong><mark>epidemics</strong></mark>, such as the Black Death and the Spanish flu, <strong><mark>have</strong> <strong>threatened</strong> <strong>human life</mark> throughout history</strong>; however, <strong><mark>it is unclear if humans</u></strong> <u><strong>will remain safe</strong> <strong>from</strong> </mark>the <strong><mark>sudden and fast spread </mark>of epidemic diseases</u></strong>. Moreover, <u>the transmission <strong>characteristics</strong> of epidemics remain <strong>undiscovered</u></strong>. In this study, <u>we present</u> the results of <u><strong><mark>a</strong></mark>n <strong><mark>epidemic</strong> <strong>simulation experiment</u></strong></mark> <u>revealing the relationship between epidemic parameters and pandemic risk</u>. To analyze the time-dependent risk and impact of epidemics, we considered two parameters for infectious diseases: the recovery time from infection and the transmission rate of the disease. Based on the epidemic simulation, we identified two important aspects of human safety with regard to the threat of a pandemic. First, humans should be safe if the fatality rate is below 100%. Second, even when the fatality rate is 100%, humans would be safe if the average degree of human social networks is below a threshold value. Nevertheless, <u><strong><mark>certain</u></strong> <u>diseases</mark> <strong><mark>can</u></strong></mark> potentially <u><strong><mark>infect all nodes in</mark> the <mark>human</mark> <mark>social networks</u></strong></mark>, and <u>these</u> diseases <u>cause a pandemic when the average degree is <strong>larger than the threshold</strong> value. <mark>These</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>results indicated</u></strong> </mark>that <u><strong><mark>certain</u></strong> </mark>infectious <u><strong><mark>diseases</strong> <strong>lead to human extinction</u></strong></mark> and can be prevented by minimizing human contact. 1. Introduction <u>The emergence of a <strong>pandemic</u></strong> <u>is</u> one of the various scenarios frequently discussed as <u>a</u> <u><strong>human extinction event</u></strong>, and it is listed as <u>one of the global</u> <u><strong>catastrophic</u></strong> <u>risks in studies regarding the future</u> [1,2,3]. In particular, <u>several</u> pandemics, <u>such as <mark>the <strong>Black Death</u></strong></mark> [4,5], <u>Spanish flu</u> [6], and those caused by <u><strong><mark>smallpox</u></strong></mark> [7], severe acute respiratory syndrome (<u><strong><mark>SARS</u></strong></mark>) [8], <u><mark>and <strong>Ebola</u></strong></mark> [9], <u>have <mark>affected a <strong>large population</strong></mark> throughout history. The <mark>risk</mark> of pandemics <strong><mark>increases</u></strong> <u>with</mark> an increase in population <strong><mark>mobility</u></strong></mark> between cities, nations, and continents, thereby <u><mark>threatening <strong>humankind</u></strong></mark> [10,11,12]. <u>It is essential to analyze the epidemic spread in <strong>society</u></strong> <u>to</u> <u><strong>minimize</u></strong> the <u><strong>damage</u></strong> from epidemic disasters; however, extinctive epidemic spreading experiments have limitations in real-world situations, as they predict stochastic effects on the spread without considering the structure of human society. Network-based approaches have been proposed to overcome these limitations and perform epidemic spreading simulations by considering the network structure of numerous real-world connections [13,14,15]. These methods use various models of epidemic spreading, such as the susceptible–infectious–susceptible (SIS) [16,17,18], susceptible–infectious–recovered (SIR) [19,20,21], and Watts threshold models [22]. While these methods are mathematically convenient, they are epidemiologically unrealistic for various infections because they require exponentially distributed incubation and infectious periods [23,24,25]. Moreover, previous epidemic studies did not perform quantitative assessment of the pandemic risk depending on the network connectivity in individuals and fatality rate of various diseases [26]. In the present study, we applied an SIR epidemic model to a scale-free network with Monte Carlo simulation to identify the quantitative relationship between infectious diseases and human existence. Our fundamental hypothesis states that <u>when the epidemic spreads to all <strong>nodes</u></strong> of the network and the fatality rate is 100%, <u>it can increase the <strong>pandemic</strong> risk</u>. To address this, we initially constructed a scale-free network to simulate a society. Moreover, for the epidemic spreading simulation, an SIR model was applied to the network to describe the immune state of an individual after infection. From the simulation study, we found that the mean degree of a scale-free network was an essential factor in determining whether epidemics threaten humans. This approach provides important insights into epidemic spreading analysis by investigating the relationship between epidemic and scale-free network parameters. Furthermore, it highlights the necessity of determining information flow during an epidemic. 2. Materials and Methods <u>We designed an epidemic <strong>simulation process</u></strong> to identify the relationship between pandemic risk and network parameters. This study was performed in four steps (Figure 1): (i) generating a scale-free network model to reflect real-world conditions; (ii) applying an SIR model to the scale-free network for epidemic spreading simulations; (iii) adapting the Monte Carlo method to reflect the stochastic process in the node status of the SIR model; and (iv) iteratively performing simulation for every parameter set and analyzing the results. We have provided the source code and sample results of epidemic simulation in Supplementary Materials. Figure 1. Overview of epidemic simulation process based on the Monte Carlo method. (A) We generated scale-free networks for a fixed population (N = 1,000,000) and various node degrees (k = 2, 5, 7, and 10). (B) Epidemic spreading was simulated by applying a susceptible–infectious–recovered (SIR) model to the scale-free network. We set the epidemic parameters, β and γd. β represents the spreading rate of epidemics, and γd is the reciprocal of γ and reflects the time interval between infection and recovery. Randomly, 0.05% of nodes were initially infected. (C) <u>We adapted the <strong>Monte Carlo method</u></strong> <u>to determine the status of the transition</u> from the infection node to immunization node. Repeated simulations were performed until a steady state was achieved. (D) For every parameter set, 10,000 simulations were performed. 2.1. Network Generation Based on a Scale-Free Model We constructed a network model for the epidemic spreading simulation (Figure 1). The nodes and edges of the network represent people in the society and their physical contacts, respectively. We used a scale-free network model, which follows the preferential attachment property observed in numerous real-world networks, such as social networks, physical systems, and economic networks [27,28,29]. In the scale-free network, when a node is added to the network, its likelihood of connecting to existing nodes increases with an increase in the node’s degree. Hub nodes, which lead to fast and vast spreading of epidemics, exist. Two characteristic parameters, including N and k, affect the form of scale-free networks. The parameter N denotes all nodes in the network. In the real world, N indicates the whole population size. The parameter k is the average degree of the network, which determines the degree of the newly attached node for each step during network generation. Following the characteristics of the network model, we generated scale-free networks representing human contacts for epidemic spread. The scale-free network was generated by the Barabasi–Albert graph distribution, in which the network is constructed from a cycle graph with three vertices, followed by the addition of k edges at each construction step [30]. The k edges are randomly attached to the vertex based on the degree distribution of the vertex. After network generation, we investigated the degree distribution properties of the network (Figure 2). The results indicate that the degree distributions have similar tendency for networks with varying number of nodes and edges. This study constructed scale-free networks with the largest number of nodes considering computational complexity (N = 1,000,000). Figure 2. Degree distribution of the scale-free network. We analyzed the degree distribution of the network based on the number of nodes (N) and mean degree (k). 2.2. Epidemic Spreading Based on the SIR Model For the epidemic spreading simulations, we applied an SIR model to the generated scale-free network. The classical SIR model can be expressed by the following nonlinear differential equations [21]: where S, I, and R represent susceptible, infected, and recovered compartments, respectively, in the whole population. S represents people who have not been infected yet but can be infected in future. I represents infected people who can spread the epidemic to susceptible people through physical contact. R denotes people who have recovered or died from the epidemic and who no longer participate in the epidemic spreading process. The sum of the S, I, and R values represents the whole population size N. Epidemics have two parameters in the SIR model, transmission rate (β) and recovery rate (γ), which arise from the basic reproduction number R0 (Figure 1B). The basic reproduction number is the number of infections caused by one infective node [31,32,33]. If the R0 is more than 1, the infection can spread in a population, whereas if R0 is less than 1, the infection cannot spread. We express the basic reproduction number as R0 = β/γ, where β represents the spreading rate of epidemics between infective nodes and adjacent susceptible nodes and γ represents the probability of recovery from infection [34]. We mainly used γd, which is the reciprocal of γ and reflects the time interval between infection and recovery. 2.3. Investigation of Epidemic Status Based on the Monte Carlo Method The epidemic simulation was performed for a time series event by constructing epidemic status matrix (z) to represent the status of the nth node at time step t. For each node, the value of epidemic status matrix at time step t can be 0, 1, or 2, indicating that a node is susceptible, infective, or recovered, respectively. We initially (t = 0) set every value of epidemic status matrix to 0 because all nodes are susceptible before the epidemic spreads. At the initial infection stage, randomly selected 0.05% of nodes were infected. At every time period, we performed immunization and observed the infection stages (Figure 3). At the immunization stage, we identified infective nodes and determined whether these nodes would be recovered in the next time step. To calculate the transition probability of infected and recovered phenomena, the Monte Carlo method was applied [35,36]. When infection and recovery parameters are provided, it is possible to investigate whether a node transitions from an epidemic state to another state. To accomplish this, we compared the method revealing the change in each population in every compartment over time (Figure 4). The final steady state of the epidemic spreading simulation model indicates the total number of casualties of the epidemic who either are dead or have recovered from the disease. Infective nodes at time t (zn [t] = 1) are transformed to recovered nodes at time t + 1 (zn [t + 1] = 2) when 1/γd is larger than a random real number between 0 and 1. We determined whether the neighbor nodes of the infection node would be infected by identifying susceptible nodes adjacent to the infective nodes at time t (zn [t] = 0, with the adjacent infective node) (Figure 5). When β is larger than a random real number between 0 and 1, a susceptible node becomes an infective node at time t + 1 (zn [t + 1] = 1); this scenario represents epidemic spread. For each time step, we recorded the number of susceptible, infective, and recovered nodes during epidemic spread. 2.4. Simulation Parameters We carried out simulation trials for various mean degrees of networks (k = 2, 5, 7, and 10). Each network considered the following epidemic parameters: β ranges from 0.05 to 0.95 and γd ranges from 1 to 10. The Monte Carlo model was repeatedly simulated to observe saturation of the recovery process. Considering that the simulation pipeline contains random processes such as initial infection and Monte Carlo trials, we performed the simulation iteratively until the status of nodes remained unchanged. After simulation, time series data from every simulation were interpolated in the time domain. The fatality rate determines the ratio of deceased and recovered individuals in the final population [37,38,39]. If the fatality rate is below 100%, the recovered population contains both dead and recovered individuals. Such a situation does not always cause a pandemic. In this simulation, we assumed a 100% fatality rate. To accomplish this, we enumerated the recovered nodes as dead for considering the pandemic risk. 3. Results Through our method, we obtained epidemic spreading data with various network and epidemic parameter sets. In the present study, we focused on the case where the epidemic infects all nodes and defined this phenomenon as “extinctive spread”. <u>Diseases causing extinctive spread are potential candidates of <strong>high pandemic risk</u></strong>. In the real world, <u>extinctive spreading indicates</u> that the <u>disease will <strong>infect every person in the society</u></strong>. From the simulation data, we calculated the extinctive spread score by dividing the total number of simulation trials by the number of extinctive spread cases. Thereafter, we identified that the number of extinctive spread cases is mainly influenced by spreading speed, which is determined by β, γd, and k (Figure 6). The extinctive spread region (brown area in Figure 6) is expanded as the value of mean degree of network (k) is increased, thereby indicating that the area of extinctive spread becomes noticeably wider in a dense network than in a sparse network. Thus, the more contact between people, the higher the risk of epidemics. Moreover, high γd and high β cause extinctive spread across a large region, indicating that the high spreading rate and short time interval between infection and recovery are risk factors of epidemic diseases. In contrast, the infective nodes recover before they transmit the disease to their neighbors in low β and low γd scenarios, thus disconnecting the network and preventing extinctive spread. This occurs because the infective nodes need more time to transmit the disease in low β and high γd scenarios. Therefore, the disease begins to subside due to a lack of new infective nodes. Furthermore, we investigated the range of β and γd for existing epidemics of the common cold [40,41] and fatal diseases, namely, cholera [42,43], Marburg [44,45], Ebola (Congo and Uganda) [46,47,48,49], SARS [50], and MERS [51] (Table 1). We selected diseases with relatively well-known epidemic parameters, such as average duration of infection and basic number of reproductions from previous studies. Transmission rates were calculated using the mean duration of infectious periods and basic reproduction numbers of the epidemics. Different studies reveal multiple values of infectious period and transmission rate for some of these diseases; we considered these values separately [40,41,42,43,46,47,48,49]. For example, the infectious period of a common cold is from 3 to 7 days and that of Ebola is 6.5 days. Next, we placed the possible regions of these epidemics as a disease band for various k values (colored lines in Figure 6). When k > 5, fatal diseases have an opportunity to cause a pandemic. Even when k = 5, diseases such as cholera and Ebola (Congo) can be threatening in regions of low γd and high, thus demonstrating that the knowledge of network parameters of the society and the characteristics of epidemic diseases can aid in quantifying the risk of epidemics. 4. Discussion <u>Many <strong><mark>previous</strong> studies</mark> have made <strong>stochastic</u></strong> <u>SIR models to analyze the dynamics or stability of epidemic diseases</u>. They investigated the distribution of susceptible, infected, and removed populations for specific epidemic disease spreading, such as cholera, SARS, Marburg, and MERS, based on mathematical modelling [52,53,54,55]. <u>However, they <mark>did not conduct</mark> a</u> <u><strong><mark>quantitative</u></strong> <u>assessment</mark> <strong><mark>of</strong> </mark>pandemic <strong><mark>risk taking into account physical contact </mark>between people</u></strong>. To solve this limitation, we performed epidemic spreading simulations by applying an SIR model to scale-free networks with Monte Carlo simulation. In the simulation, <u>we consider <strong>various</strong> connectivity and <strong>disease</strong> characteristics</u> on scale-free networks. For each network and epidemic parameter set, the probability of extinctive spread was calculated. <u>The results <strong>reveal</strong>ed that <strong>certain infectious diseases can lead to extinction</u></strong>. Moreover, even if the disease band extends over the extinctive spread regions, it does not indicate that human extinction results from the disease, as the fatality rate is below 100%; however, in the case of 100% fatality, the disease can cause a human extinction event. The risk of infectious disease is influenced by the network structure. A dense network has a higher risk of spreading infectious disease than a sparse network, as we observed in the extinctive spreading maps. According to our results, when the average degree of human social networks is below the risk threshold, i.e., less than 4 in this study, human society is safe from an extinctive outbreak based on our knowledge regarding the epidemic parameters of the infectious disease. Nevertheless, in other cases, <u><strong><mark>human extinction is possible</u></strong></mark>. For example, if the population is 1,000,000 and there are 4 or more instances of physical contact between people, human extinction events may occur, depending on the fatality rate of the epidemics. Hence, physical contact between people is closely related to an extinction event of infectious diseases. Eventually, from a public health perspective, lowering the average contact level of society is an appropriate way to increase the robustness of strategies against the occurrence of extinction. In the real world, reducing network density can be accomplished by epidemic prevention activity, such as isolation and quarantine treatment. This action prevents epidemic risk to the society, thereby avoiding human extinction. Additional considerations may improve our analysis. First, large population size and various proportions of initial infective nodes were not considered in the experiments. We have confirmed that the result was consistent when the proportion of initial infective nodes was 0.05% of the total population; however, this can vary depending on the distinct proportion of initial infective nodes in a different population. To achieve robust results, we need to perform additional experiments for various parameters; however, we could not address this issue due to computational complexity. Second, we did not consider numerous known epidemic diseases. We calculated the transmission rates of epidemic diseases using the known infectious periods and reproduction numbers of the epidemics from evidence in the literature. In the present study, we only considered five epidemic diseases, since the information on infectious periods and reproduction numbers of diseases was mostly unavailable for other epidemic diseases. Third, this study only considers the SIR model on scale-free networks in epidemic simulation. Since the dynamics of epidemic diseases can be varied in different models or networks, it is important to experiment in various simulation environments to confirm the robustness of the results. Nevertheless, these limitations can be considered in future experiments or using improved computational methods. With these further improvements, our approach can be used as a computational tool to analyze the risk of epidemic diseases. 5. Conclusions In this study, we analyzed the risk of epidemic diseases by creating an epidemic simulation on a scale-free network. <u>Based on the <strong><mark>simulation results</u></strong></mark> for various epidemic parameters, <u>we</u> <u><strong><mark>confirmed</u></strong></mark> that <u><strong><mark>certain</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>infectious diseases <strong>can lead to extinction</u></strong></mark> and can be prevented by minimizing human contact. We believe that <u>identifying</u> potential <u><strong>candidate</u></strong> <u>diseases</u> that may lead to human extinction <u>is</u> <u><strong>crucial</u></strong> <u>in addressing epidemic prevention activities</u> such as quarantine.</p>

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“USFG should” means the debate is about a policy established by governmental means

ERICSON 3

Jon M. ERICSON, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., 3 [The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4]

each topic contains An agent doing the acting The U S should adopt The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action should means to put a policy into action though governmental means The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose

each topic contains An agent doing the acting The U S should The verb should urges action should means to put a policy into action though governmental means The debate is about whether something ought to occur

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action though governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

<h4>“USFG should” means the debate is about a policy established by governmental means</h4><p>Jon M. <strong>ERICSON</strong>, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., <strong>3</strong> [The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4]</p><p>The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action</p><p>In policy propositions, <u><mark>each topic contains</u></mark> certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. <u><mark>An agent doing the acting</u></mark> ---“The United States” in “<u><mark>The U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>should</mark> adopt</u> a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. <u><mark>The verb should</mark>—the first part of a verb phrase that <mark>urges action</u></mark>. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, <u><mark>should</u></mark> adopt here <u><mark>means to put a</u></mark> program or <u><mark>policy into action though governmental means</u></mark>. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. <u><mark>The</mark> entire <mark>debate is about whether something ought to occur</mark>. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose</u>. </p>

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“USfg should” means that the agent and verb indicate a debate about hypothetical government action

Ericson 3

Jon M Ericson 3, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4

each topic contains certain key elements An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy the agent is the subject of the sentence The verb should urges action should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action through governmental means A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur

each topic contains An agent doing the acting The U S in “The U S should adopt a policy the agent is the subject The verb should urges action should adopt means to put a policy into action through governmental means A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, each topic contains certain key elements, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should—the first part of a verb phrase that urges action. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, should adopt here means to put a program or policy into action through governmental means. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

<h4>“USfg should” means that the <u>agent and verb</u> indicate a debate about <u>hypothetical government action</h4><p></u>Jon M <strong>Ericson 3</strong>, Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4</p><p>The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, <u><strong><mark>each topic contains</mark> certain key elements</u></strong>, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. <u><strong><mark>An agent</mark> <mark>doing the acting</mark> ---“<mark>The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates” <mark>in “The U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>should</mark> <mark>adopt a policy</u></strong></mark> of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, <u><strong><mark>the agent is the subject </mark>of the sentence</u></strong>. 2. <u><strong><mark>The verb should</u></strong></mark>—the first part of a verb phrase that <u><strong><mark>urges action</u></strong></mark>. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. For example, <u><strong><mark>should adopt</mark> here <mark>means to put a</mark> program or <mark>policy into action through governmental means</u></strong></mark>. 4. <u><strong><mark>A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired</u></strong></mark>. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. <u><strong><mark>The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur</u></strong></mark>. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose. </p>

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“Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School ‘04

Army Officer School ‘04

(5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm) The colon introduces A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

The colon introduces A formal resolution, after the word "resolved Resolved: (colon) this council petition the mayor.

(5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm) The colon introduces the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

<h4><strong> “Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum</h4><p>Army Officer School ‘04</p><p><u></strong>(5-12, “# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)</p><p><mark>The colon introduces</u></mark> the following: a.  A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b.  A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c.  A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d.  A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e.  After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f.  The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g.  <u><mark>A <strong>formal resolution</strong>, after the word "<strong>resolved</strong></mark>:"</p><p><mark>Resolved: (colon)</mark> That <mark>this council petition the mayor.</p></u></mark>

2NC

T

Science

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Nuke war causes extinction – Ice Age, famines, and war won’t stay limited.

Edwards 17

Edwards 17 – Paul N. Edwards, CISAC’s William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Being interviewed by EarthSky. How nuclear war would affect Earth’s climate. September 8, 2017. earthsky.org/human-world/how-nuclear-war-would-affect-earths-climate

In the nuclear conversation, what are we not talking about that we should be? We are not talking enough about the climatic effects of nuclear war this aspect of nuclear war has faded from view. That’s not good. In the mid-2000s, climate scientists took another look at nuclear winter theory. This time around, they used much-improved and much more detailed climate models than those available 20 years earlier U.S.-Russia war currently seems unlikely, but if it were to occur, hundreds or even thousands of nuclear weapons might be launched. The climatic consequences would be catastrophic: global average temperatures would drop as much as 12 degrees Fahrenheit (7 degrees Celsius) for up to several years — temperatures last seen during the great ice ages. Meanwhile, smoke and dust circulating in the stratosphere would darken the atmosphere enough to inhibit photosynthesis, causing disastrous crop failures, widespread famine and massive ecological disruption. The effect would be similar to that of the giant meteor believed to be responsible for the extinction of the dinosaurs. This time, we would be the dinosaurs. we are closer to a nuclear war than we have been since the early 1960s it’s quite unlikely that any exchange between two nuclear powers would stay limited to these smaller, less destructive bombs.

climate scientists used improved models hundreds or thousands of weapons might be launched temperatures would drop 12 degrees last seen during the ice ages smoke would inhibit photosynthesis, causing crop failures famine and ecological disruption effect would be similar to giant meteor responsible for the extinction of the dinosaurs we would be the dinosaurs. it’s unlikely any exchange would stay limited

In the nuclear conversation, what are we not talking about that we should be? We are not talking enough about the climatic effects of nuclear war. The “nuclear winter” theory of the mid-1980s played a significant role in the arms reductions of that period. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reduction of U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, this aspect of nuclear war has faded from view. That’s not good. In the mid-2000s, climate scientists such as Alan Robock (Rutgers) took another look at nuclear winter theory. This time around, they used much-improved and much more detailed climate models than those available 20 years earlier. They also tested the potential effects of smaller nuclear exchanges. The result: an exchange involving just 50 nuclear weapons — the kind of thing we might see in an India-Pakistan war, for example — could loft 5 billion kilograms of smoke, soot and dust high into the stratosphere. That’s enough to cool the entire planet by about 2 degrees Fahrenheit (1.25 degrees Celsius) — about where we were during the Little Ice Age of the 17th century. Growing seasons could be shortened enough to create really significant food shortages. So the climatic effects of even a relatively small nuclear war would be planet-wide. What about a larger-scale conflict? A U.S.-Russia war currently seems unlikely, but if it were to occur, hundreds or even thousands of nuclear weapons might be launched. The climatic consequences would be catastrophic: global average temperatures would drop as much as 12 degrees Fahrenheit (7 degrees Celsius) for up to several years — temperatures last seen during the great ice ages. Meanwhile, smoke and dust circulating in the stratosphere would darken the atmosphere enough to inhibit photosynthesis, causing disastrous crop failures, widespread famine and massive ecological disruption. The effect would be similar to that of the giant meteor believed to be responsible for the extinction of the dinosaurs. This time, we would be the dinosaurs. Many people are concerned about North Korea’s advancing missile capabilities. Is nuclear war likely in your opinion? At this writing, I think we are closer to a nuclear war than we have been since the early 1960s. In the North Korea case, both Kim Jong-un and President Trump are bullies inclined to escalate confrontations. President Trump lacks impulse control, and there are precious few checks on his ability to initiate a nuclear strike. We have to hope that our generals, both inside and outside the White House, can rein him in. North Korea would most certainly “lose” a nuclear war with the United States. But many millions would die, including hundreds of thousands of Americans currently living in South Korea and Japan (probable North Korean targets). Such vast damage would be wrought in Korea, Japan and Pacific island territories (such as Guam) that any “victory” wouldn’t deserve the name. Not only would that region be left with horrible suffering amongst the survivors; it would also immediately face famine and rampant disease. Radioactive fallout from such a war would spread around the world, including to the U.S. It has been more than 70 years since the last time a nuclear bomb was used in warfare. What would be the effects on the environment and on human health today? To my knowledge, most of the changes in nuclear weapons technology since the 1950s have focused on making them smaller and lighter, and making delivery systems more accurate, rather than on changing their effects on the environment or on human health. So-called “battlefield” weapons with lower explosive yields are part of some arsenals now — but it’s quite unlikely that any exchange between two nuclear powers would stay limited to these smaller, less destructive bombs.

<h4>Nuke war causes <u>extinction</u> – <u>Ice Age</u>, <u>famines</u>, and <u>war</u> won’t stay limited.</h4><p><strong>Edwards 17 </strong>– Paul N. Edwards, CISAC’s William J. Perry Fellow in International Security at Stanford’s Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. Being interviewed by EarthSky. How nuclear war would affect Earth’s climate. September 8, 2017. earthsky.org/human-world/how-nuclear-war-would-affect-earths-climate</p><p><u>In the nuclear conversation, what are we not talking about that we should be?</p><p>We are not talking enough about the climatic effects of nuclear<strong> war</u></strong>. The “nuclear winter” theory of the mid-1980s played a significant role in the arms reductions of that period. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the reduction of U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals, <u>this aspect of nuclear war has faded from view. That’s not good. In the mid-2000s, <mark>climate scientists</u></mark> such as Alan Robock (Rutgers) <u>took another look at nuclear winter theory. This time around, they <mark>used </mark>much-<mark>improved</mark> and much more detailed climate <mark>models</mark> than those available 20 years earlier</u>. They also tested the potential effects of smaller nuclear exchanges. The result: an exchange involving just 50 nuclear weapons — the kind of thing we might see in an India-Pakistan war, for example — could loft 5 billion kilograms of smoke, soot and dust high into the stratosphere. That’s enough to cool the entire planet by about 2 degrees Fahrenheit (1.25 degrees Celsius) — about where we were during the Little Ice Age of the 17th century. Growing seasons could be shortened enough to create really significant food shortages. So the climatic effects of even a relatively small nuclear war would be planet-wide. What about a larger-scale conflict? A <u>U.S.-Russia war currently seems unlikely, but if it were to occur, <mark>hundreds or</mark> even <mark>thousands of</mark> nuclear <mark>weapons might be launched</mark>. The climatic consequences would be catastrophic: global average <mark>temperatures would drop</mark> as much as <mark>12 degrees</mark> Fahrenheit (7 degrees Celsius) for up to several years — temperatures <mark>last seen during the </mark>great <mark>ice ages</mark>. Meanwhile, <mark>smoke</mark> and dust circulating in the stratosphere <mark>would </mark>darken the atmosphere enough to <mark>inhibit photosynthesis, causing </mark>disastrous <mark>crop failures</mark>, widespread <mark>famine and </mark>massive <mark>ecological disruption</mark>. The <mark>effect would be similar to</mark> that of the <mark>giant meteor</mark> believed to be <mark>responsible for the extinction of the dinosaurs</mark>. This time, <mark>we would be the dinosaurs.</u></mark> Many people are concerned about North Korea’s advancing missile capabilities. Is nuclear war likely in your opinion? At this writing, I think <u>we are closer to a nuclear war than we have been since the early 1960s</u>. In the North Korea case, both Kim Jong-un and President Trump are bullies inclined to escalate confrontations. President Trump lacks impulse control, and there are precious few checks on his ability to initiate a nuclear strike. We have to hope that our generals, both inside and outside the White House, can rein him in. North Korea would most certainly “lose” a nuclear war with the United States. But many millions would die, including hundreds of thousands of Americans currently living in South Korea and Japan (probable North Korean targets). Such vast damage would be wrought in Korea, Japan and Pacific island territories (such as Guam) that any “victory” wouldn’t deserve the name. Not only would that region be left with horrible suffering amongst the survivors; it would also immediately face famine and rampant disease. Radioactive fallout from such a war would spread around the world, including to the U.S. It has been more than 70 years since the last time a nuclear bomb was used in warfare. What would be the effects on the environment and on human health today? To my knowledge, most of the changes in nuclear weapons technology since the 1950s have focused on making them smaller and lighter, and making delivery systems more accurate, rather than on changing their effects on the environment or on human health. So-called “battlefield” weapons with lower explosive yields are part of some arsenals now — but <u><mark>it’s</mark> quite <mark>unlikely</mark> that <mark>any exchange</mark> between two nuclear powers <mark>would stay limited </mark>to these smaller, less destructive bombs.</p></u>

1AC

1AC – Be Like Mike

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2 - Duke Invitational

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Byram Hills EW

Survance, Anthony

1AC - Be Like Mike v1 1NC - Prizes CP - Innovation DA - Climate Patents DA - Case 1AR - Case - Prizes CP - Innovation DA - Climate Patents DA 2NR - Prizes CP - Innovation DA 2AR - Case - Prizes CP - Innovation DA Survance votes for Scripps Ranch AS (W)

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No impact to economic decline – new data

Drezner 2014

Drezner 2014 Daniel, IR prof at Tufts, The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession, World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014, pp. 123-164

a dog hasn't barked During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force whether through repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict The aggregate data suggest otherwise, however the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007 Interstate violence has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict The decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed the crisis has not generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected

analysts asserted the crisis would lead states to use of force through diversionary wars, arms races, or great power conflict The aggregate data suggest otherwise the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is the same as 2007 Interstate violence declined as have military expenditures studies confirm the Recession has not triggered violent conflict the crisis has not generated protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion

The final significant outcome addresses a dog that hasn't barked: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple analysts asserted that the financial crisis would lead states to increase their use of force as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—whether through greater internal repression, diversionary wars, arms races, or a ratcheting up of great power conflict. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. The aggregate data suggest otherwise, however. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is approximately the same as it was in 2007."43 Interstate violence in particular has declined since the start of the financial crisis, as have military expenditures in most sampled countries. Other studies confirm that the Great Recession has not triggered any increase in violent conflict, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 The secular decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed. Rogers Brubaker observes that "the crisis has not to date generated the surge in protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion that might have been expected."43

<h4>No impact to economic decline – new data</h4><p><u><strong><mark>Drezner 2014</u></strong></mark> Daniel, IR prof at Tufts, The System Worked: Global Economic Governance during the Great Recession, World Politics, Volume 66. Number 1, January 2014, pp. 123-164</p><p>The final significant outcome addresses <u><strong>a dog</u></strong> that <u><strong>hasn't barked</u></strong>: the effect of the Great Recession on cross-border conflict and violence. <u><strong>During the initial stages of the crisis, multiple <mark>analysts asserted</mark> that <mark>the</mark> financial <mark>crisis would lead states to</mark> increase their <mark>use of force</u></strong></mark> as a tool for staying in power.42 They voiced genuine concern that the global economic downturn would lead to an increase in conflict—<u><strong>whether <mark>through</u></strong></mark> greater internal <u><strong>repression, <mark>diversionary wars, arms races, or</mark> a ratcheting up of <mark>great power conflict</u></strong></mark>. Violence in the Middle East, border disputes in the South China Sea, and even the disruptions of the Occupy movement fueled impressions of a surge in global public disorder. <u><strong><mark>The aggregate data suggest otherwise</mark>, however</u></strong>. The Institute for Economics and Peace has concluded that "<u><strong><mark>the average level of peacefulness in 2012 is</mark> approximately <mark>the same as</mark> it was in <mark>2007</u></strong></mark>."43 <u><strong><mark>Interstate violence</u></strong></mark> in particular <u><strong>has <mark>declined</mark> since the start of the financial crisis, <mark>as have military expenditures</u></strong></mark> in most sampled countries. Other <u><strong><mark>studies confirm</mark> that</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>the</mark> Great <mark>Recession has not triggered</mark> any increase in <mark>violent conflict</u></strong></mark>, as Lotta Themner and Peter Wallensteen conclude: "[T]he pattern is one of relative stability when we consider the trend for the past five years."44 <u><strong>The</u></strong> secular <u><strong>decline in violence that started with the end of the Cold War has not been reversed</u></strong>. Rogers Brubaker observes that "<u><strong><mark>the crisis has not</u></strong></mark> to date <u><strong><mark>generated</mark> the surge in <mark>protectionist nationalism or ethnic exclusion</mark> that might have been expected</u></strong>."43</p>

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FDA

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Casady CP

Justin Reinking

1AC - Insider Threats 1NC - T-bulk data TPP Politics Multiplank CP dedev prez powers DA on case 2NC - T prez powers DA case defense 1NR - Politics 2NR - T W

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Moreover, only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure; Occam’s razor requires us to treat these as instrumentally valuable.

Moen 16

Moen 16 [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI

I do not think the burden of proof lies on hedonists to explain why the additional values are not intrinsic values. If someone claims that X is intrinsically valuable, this is a substantive, positive claim, and it lies on him or her to explain why we should believe that X is in fact intrinsically valuable. there is something peculiar about the list of additional intrinsic values : the listed values have a strong tendency to be well explained as things that help promote pleasure and avert pain. wisdom, freedom, peace, and security, although they are perhaps not themselves pleasurable, are important means to achieve a happy life, and as such, they are things that hedonists would value highly. Morally good dispositions and virtues, cooperation, and just distribution of goods and evils, moreover, are things that, on a collective level, contribute a happy society, and thus the traits that would be promoted and cultivated if this were something sought after. the suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values are potentially explainable by appeal to just pleasure and pain then—by appeal to Occam’s razor—we have at least a pro tanto reason to resist the introduction of any further intrinsic values and disvalues. It is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality of intrinsic values and disvalues, so in case all values admit of explanation by reference to a single intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue, we have reason to reject more complicated accounts. The fact that suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values tend to be hedonistic instrumental values does not, however, count in favor of hedonism solely in virtue of being most elegantly explained by hedonism; it also does so in virtue of creating an explanatory challenge for pluralists. If the non-hedonic values suggested by pluralists are truly intrinsic values in their own right, then why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?27

additional values have a tendency to be explained as that help promote pleasure and avert pain wisdom, freedom and securit are important means to achieve a happy life we have reason to resist any further intrinsic values

I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists. First, I do not think the burden of proof lies on hedonists to explain why the additional values are not intrinsic values. If someone claims that X is intrinsically valuable, this is a substantive, positive claim, and it lies on him or her to explain why we should believe that X is in fact intrinsically valuable. Possibly, this could be done through thought experiments analogous to those employed in the previous section. Second, there is something peculiar about the list of additional intrinsic values that counts in hedonism’s favor: the listed values have a strong tendency to be well explained as things that help promote pleasure and avert pain. To go through Frankena’s list, life and consciousness are necessary presuppositions for pleasure; activity, health, and strength bring about pleasure; and happiness, beatitude, and contentment are regarded by Frankena himself as “pleasures and satisfactions.” The same is arguably true of beauty, harmony, and “proportion in objects contemplated,” and also of affection, friendship, harmony, and proportion in life, experiences of achievement, adventure and novelty, self-expression, good reputation, honor and esteem. Other things on Frankena’s list, such as understanding, wisdom, freedom, peace, and security, although they are perhaps not themselves pleasurable, are important means to achieve a happy life, and as such, they are things that hedonists would value highly. Morally good dispositions and virtues, cooperation, and just distribution of goods and evils, moreover, are things that, on a collective level, contribute a happy society, and thus the traits that would be promoted and cultivated if this were something sought after. To a very large extent, the intrinsic values suggested by pluralists tend to be hedonic instrumental values. Indeed, pluralists’ suggested intrinsic values all point toward pleasure, for while the other values are reasonably explainable as a means toward pleasure, pleasure itself is not reasonably explainable as a means toward the other values. Some have noticed this. Moore himself, for example, writes that though his pluralistic theory of intrinsic value is opposed to hedonism, its application would, in practice, look very much like hedonism’s: “Hedonists,” he writes “do, in general, recommend a course of conduct which is very similar to that which I should recommend.”24 Ross writes that “[i]t is quite certain that by promoting virtue and knowledge we shall inevitably produce much more pleasant consciousness. These are, by general agreement, among the surest sources of happiness for their possessors.”25 Roger Crisp observes that “those goods cited by non-hedonists are goods we often, indeed usually, enjoy.”26 What Moore and Ross do not seem to notice is that their observations give rise to two reasons to reject pluralism and endorse hedonism. The first reason is that if the suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values are potentially explainable by appeal to just pleasure and pain (which, following my argument in the previous chapter, we should accept as intrinsically valuable and disvaluable), then—by appeal to Occam’s razor—we have at least a pro tanto reason to resist the introduction of any further intrinsic values and disvalues. It is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality of intrinsic values and disvalues, so in case all values admit of explanation by reference to a single intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue, we have reason to reject more complicated accounts. The fact that suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values tend to be hedonistic instrumental values does not, however, count in favor of hedonism solely in virtue of being most elegantly explained by hedonism; it also does so in virtue of creating an explanatory challenge for pluralists. The challenge can be phrased as the following question: If the non-hedonic values suggested by pluralists are truly intrinsic values in their own right, then why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?27

<h4><strong>Moreover, only pleasure and pain are intrinsically valuable. All other values can be explained with reference to pleasure; Occam’s razor requires us to treat these as instrumentally valuable. </h4><p>Moen 16</strong> [Ole Martin Moen, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo “An Argument for Hedonism” Journal of Value Inquiry (Springer), 50 (2) 2016: 267–281] SJDI</p><p>I think several things should be said in response to Moore’s challenge to hedonists. First, <u><strong>I do not think the burden of proof lies on hedonists to explain why the additional values are not intrinsic values. If someone claims that X is intrinsically valuable, this is a substantive, positive claim, and it lies on him or her to explain why we should believe that X is in fact intrinsically valuable.</u></strong> Possibly, this could be done through thought experiments analogous to those employed in the previous section. Second, <u><strong>there is something peculiar about the list of <mark>additional </mark>intrinsic <mark>values</u></strong></mark> that counts in hedonism’s favor<u><strong>: the listed values <mark>have a </mark>strong <mark>tendency to be</mark> well <mark>explained as</mark> things <mark>that help promote pleasure and avert pain</mark>.</u></strong> To go through Frankena’s list, life and consciousness are necessary presuppositions for pleasure; activity, health, and strength bring about pleasure; and happiness, beatitude, and contentment are regarded by Frankena himself as “pleasures and satisfactions.” The same is arguably true of beauty, harmony, and “proportion in objects contemplated,” and also of affection, friendship, harmony, and proportion in life, experiences of achievement, adventure and novelty, self-expression, good reputation, honor and esteem. Other things on Frankena’s list, such as understanding, <u><strong><mark>wisdom, freedom</mark>, peace, <mark>and securit</mark>y, although they are perhaps not themselves pleasurable, <mark>are important means to achieve a happy life</mark>, and as such, they are things that hedonists would value highly.</u></strong> <u><strong>Morally good dispositions and virtues, cooperation, and just distribution of goods and evils, moreover, are things that, on a collective level, contribute a happy society, and thus the traits that would be promoted and cultivated if this were something sought after.</u></strong> To a very large extent, the intrinsic values suggested by pluralists tend to be hedonic instrumental values. Indeed, pluralists’ suggested intrinsic values all point toward pleasure, for while the other values are reasonably explainable as a means toward pleasure, pleasure itself is not reasonably explainable as a means toward the other values. Some have noticed this. Moore himself, for example, writes that though his pluralistic theory of intrinsic value is opposed to hedonism, its application would, in practice, look very much like hedonism’s: “Hedonists,” he writes “do, in general, recommend a course of conduct which is very similar to that which I should recommend.”24 Ross writes that “[i]t is quite certain that by promoting virtue and knowledge we shall inevitably produce much more pleasant consciousness. These are, by general agreement, among the surest sources of happiness for their possessors.”25 Roger Crisp observes that “those goods cited by non-hedonists are goods we often, indeed usually, enjoy.”26 What Moore and Ross do not seem to notice is that their observations give rise to two reasons to reject pluralism and endorse hedonism. The first reason is that if <u><strong>the suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values are potentially explainable by appeal to just pleasure and pain</u></strong> (which, following my argument in the previous chapter, we should accept as intrinsically valuable and disvaluable), <u><strong>then—by appeal to Occam’s razor—<mark>we have</mark> at least a pro tanto <mark>reason to resist</mark> the introduction of <mark>any further intrinsic values</mark> and disvalues. It is ontologically more costly to posit a plurality of intrinsic values and disvalues, so in case all values admit of explanation by reference to a single intrinsic value and a single intrinsic disvalue, we have reason to reject more complicated accounts.</u></strong> <u><strong>The fact that suggested non-hedonic intrinsic values tend to be hedonistic instrumental values does not, however, count in favor of hedonism solely in virtue of being most elegantly explained by hedonism; it also does so in virtue of creating an explanatory challenge for pluralists.</u></strong> The challenge can be phrased as the following question: <u><strong>If the non-hedonic values suggested by pluralists are truly intrinsic values in their own right, then why do they tend to point toward pleasure and away from pain?27</p></u></strong>

1AC

Framing

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isidore newman

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Carleigh West

1ac- japan 1nc- ballot cp tech da 2nr- tech da

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Resolved means a legislative policy

Words and Phrases 64

Words and Phrases 64 Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964.

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature to establish by law

resolve is determination by legislature to establish by law

Definition of the word “resolve,” given by Webster is “to express an opinion or determination by resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the legislature;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “to establish by law”.

<h4><u>Resolved means a legislative policy</h4><p><strong>Words and Phrases 64</u></strong> Words and Phrases Permanent Edition. “Resolved”. 1964.</p><p><u><strong>Definition of the word “<mark>resolve</mark>,” given by Webster <mark>is</mark> “to express an opinion or <mark>determination by</mark> resolution or vote; as ‘it was resolved by the <mark>legislature</u></strong></mark>;” It is of similar force to the word “enact,” which is defined by Bouvier as meaning “<u><strong><mark>to establish by law</u></strong></mark>”. </p>

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Emory

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Chris Castillo, Tom Evnen, Charles Karcher

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Extinction outweighs

MacAskill 14

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a bad thing However, even if we believe in a moral view which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term extinction First extinction is extremely high stakes the number of humans in existence given that we don’t go extinct would be 2×10^14 So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent extinction. Second extinction is irreversible Third, we should expect to progress, morally as we have in the past. in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate extinction Suppose that we have 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people if we did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive value there’s a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). in expected value terms, the cost of waiting is vanishingly small compared with keeping one’s options open

we have strong reason to prevent near-term extinction extremely high stakes extinction is irreversible expect to progress, morally as in the past in time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate extinction if we did research we would know for certain whether or not people positive the cost of waiting is small compared with keeping options open

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

<h4>Extinction outweighs</h4><p><strong>MacAskill 14</strong> [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]</p><p><u><strong>The human race might go extinct </u></strong>from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And <u><strong>different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a </u></strong>good<u><strong> </u></strong>or a <u><strong>bad thing</u></strong>. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 <u><strong>However, even if we believe in a moral view </u></strong>according to <u><strong>which human extinction would be a good thing, <mark>we </mark>still <mark>have strong reason to prevent near-term</mark> </u></strong>human<u><strong> <mark>extinction</u></strong></mark>. To see this, we must note three points. <u><strong>First</u></strong>, we should note that the <u><strong>extinction</u></strong> of the human race <u><strong>is </u></strong>an <u><strong><mark>extremely high stakes</u></strong></mark> moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, <u><strong>the number of humans in existence </u></strong>in the<u><strong> </u></strong>The future, <u><strong>given that we don’t go extinct</u></strong> any time soon, <u><strong>would be 2×10^14</u></strong>. <u><strong>So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent </u></strong>human<u><strong> extinction. Second</u></strong>, human <u><strong><mark>extinction is</mark> </u></strong>by its nature an <u><strong><mark>irreversible</u></strong></mark> scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. <u><strong>Third, we should <mark>expect</u></strong></mark> ourselves <u><strong><mark>to progress, morally</u></strong></mark>, over the next few centuries, <u><strong><mark>as </mark>we have</u></strong> progressed <u><strong><mark>in the past</mark>.</u></strong> So we should expect that <u><strong><mark>in </mark>a few centuries’ <mark>time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate</u></strong></mark> human <u><strong><mark>extinction</u></strong></mark> than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. <u><strong>Suppose that we have</u></strong> 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and <u><strong>0.2</u></strong> <u><strong>certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people</u></strong>; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that,<u><strong> <mark>if we</mark> </u></strong>let the human race continue and<u><strong> <mark>did research</mark> for 300 years, <mark>we would know for certain whether or not </mark>additional <mark>people</mark> are of <mark>positive</u></strong></mark> or negative <u><strong>value</u></strong>. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But <u><strong>there’s</u></strong> also <u><strong>a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14),</u></strong> <u><strong>the expected value of which is 4×(10^13).</u></strong> That is, <u><strong>in expected value terms, <mark>the cost of waiting</mark> </u></strong>for a few hundred years<u><strong> <mark>is </mark>vanishingly <mark>small compared with</mark> </u></strong>the benefit of<u><strong> <mark>keeping </mark>one’s <mark>options open</mark> </u></strong>while one gains new information.</p>

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ac - stock with changes in osource nc - carbon tax cp - reform cp - politics da - foucault k - case 1ar - all 2nr - k - carbon tax - politics - case 2ar - case - cp - da

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Resolved means a Policy.

Louisiana House 5

Louisiana House 5 “Glossary” https://web.archive.org/web/20050211153132/http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm //Elmer

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved

Resolution A legislative instrument used for stating policies uses the term "resolved

Resolution A legislative instrument that generally is used for making declarations, stating policies, and making decisions where some other form is not required. A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution uses the term "resolved". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)

<h4>Resolved means a Policy. </h4><p><strong>Louisiana House 5</strong> “Glossary” https://web.archive.org/web/20050211153132/http://house.louisiana.gov/house-glossary.htm //Elmer</p><p><u><strong><mark>Resolution</u></strong> <u><strong>A legislative instrument</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>that generally is</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>used for</u></strong> <u><strong></mark>making declarations,</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>stating policies</u></strong></mark>, and making decisions where some other form is not required. <u><strong>A bill includes the constitutionally required enacting clause; a resolution</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>uses the term "resolved</u></strong></mark>". Not subject to a time limit for introduction nor to governor's veto. ( Const. Art. III, §17(B) and House Rules 8.11 , 13.1 , 6.8 , and 7.4)</p>

1NC

1NC – OFF

./documents/hsld22/DiamondBar/NaCh/DiamondBar-NaCh-Neg-Harvard-Round-2.docx

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Jarvis Xie

1AC - Disability Pess 1NC - T-FW - Disclosure Theory - TT - Silence PIK - Coma K - Incoherency NC - Case 1AR - All 2NR - TT - Case 2AR - Case - TT

hsld22/DiamondBar/NaCh/DiamondBar-NaCh-Neg-Harvard-Round-2.docx

2023-02-18 17:55:46

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States don’t have the ability to look to individual experiences—can only evaluate averages and aggregates.

Goodin 90.

Goodin 90. Robert Goodin 90, [professor of philosophy at the Australian National University college of arts and social sciences], “The Utilitarian Response,” pgs 141-142 //RS

there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus

Public officials make choices under uncertainty Public officials are poorly informed as to the effects their choices will have on individuals they typically know averages and aggregates That is enough to use utilitarian calculus

My larger argument turns on the proposition that there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals. Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. Public officials are obliged to make their choices under uncertainty, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. Public officials, in contrast, are relatively poorly informed as to the effects that their choices will have on individuals, one by one. What they typically do know are generalities: averages and aggregates. They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all. That is enough to allow public policy-makers to use the utilitarian calculus – assuming they want to use it at all – to choose general rules or conduct.

<h4>States don’t have the ability to look to individual experiences—can only evaluate averages and aggregates. </h4><p><strong>Goodin 90.</strong> Robert Goodin 90, [professor of philosophy at the Australian National University college of arts and social sciences], “The Utilitarian Response,” pgs 141-142 //RS </p><p>My larger argument turns on the proposition that <u>there is something special about the situation of public officials that makes utilitarianism more probable for them than private individuals.</u> Before proceeding with the large argument, I must therefore say what it is that makes it so special about public officials and their situations that make it both more necessary and more desirable for them to adopt a more credible form of utilitarianism. Consider, first, the argument from necessity. <u><mark>Public officials</mark> are obliged to <mark>make</mark> their <mark>choices under uncertainty</mark>, and uncertainty of a very special sort at that. </u>All choices – public and private alike – are made under some degree of uncertainty, of course. But in the nature of things, <u>private individuals will usually have more complete information on the peculiarities of their own circumstances and on the ramifications that alternative possible choices might have for them. <mark>Public officials</u></mark>, in contrast, <u><mark>are</mark> relatively <mark>poorly informed as to the effects</mark> that <mark>their choices will have on individuals</mark>, one by one. What <mark>they typically</mark> do <mark>know</mark> are generalities: <mark>averages and aggregates</mark>.</u> They know what will happen most often to most people as a result of their various possible choices, but that is all. <u><mark>That is enough to</mark> allow public policy-makers to <mark>use</mark> the <mark>utilitarian calculus</u></mark> – assuming they want to use it at all – to choose general rules or conduct. </p>

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No food wars.

Vestby et al. 18

Jonas Vestby et al. 18, Doctoral Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo; Ida Rudolfsen, doctoral researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and PRIO; and Halvard Buhaug, Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Professor of Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), and Associate Editor of the Journal of Peace Research and Political Geography, 5/18/2018, “Does hunger cause conflict?” https://blogs.prio.org/ClimateAndConflict/2018/05/does-hunger-cause-conflict/

little scholarly merit in the notion that food increases the probability that conflict will break out violent conflict requires people to have both the means and the will. Most people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence In reality, the sources of discontent are considerably more complex---linked to political structures, land ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems Research has shown while the international media tend to seek simple resource-related explanations debates are more complex

little merit that food increases conflict conflict requires means and will. Most on starvation are not resort to violence discontent linked to land corruption democratic reforms and econ while the media seek resource explanations debates are complex

It is perhaps surprising, then, that there is little scholarly merit in the notion that a short-term reduction in access to food increases the probability that conflict will break out. This is because to start or participate in violent conflict requires people to have both the means and the will. Most people on the brink of starvation are not in the position to resort to violence, whether against the government or other social groups. In fact, the urban middle classes tend to be the most likely to protest against rises in food prices, since they often have the best opportunities, the most energy, and the best skills to coordinate and participate in protests. Accordingly, there is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages. In reality, the sources of discontent are considerably more complex---linked to political structures, land ownership, corruption, the desire for democratic reforms and general economic problems---where the price of food is seen in the context of general increases in the cost of living. Research has shown that while the international media have a tendency to seek simple resource-related explanations---such as drought or famine---for conflicts in the Global South, debates in the local media are permeated by more complex political relationships.

<h4>No food wars.</h4><p>Jonas <strong>Vestby et al. 18</strong>, Doctoral Researcher at the Peace Research Institute Oslo; Ida Rudolfsen, doctoral researcher at the Department of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University and PRIO; and Halvard Buhaug, Research Professor at the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), Professor of Political Science at the Norwegian University of Science and Technology (NTNU), and Associate Editor of the Journal of Peace Research and Political Geography, 5/18/2018, “Does hunger cause conflict?” https://blogs.prio.org/ClimateAndConflict/2018/05/does-hunger-cause-conflict/</p><p>It is perhaps surprising, then, that there is <u><strong><mark>little</mark> scholarly <mark>merit</strong></mark> in the notion <mark>that</u></mark> a short-term reduction in access to <u><strong><mark>food</strong> increases</mark> the probability that <mark>conflict</mark> will break out</u>. This is because to start or participate in <u><strong>violent <mark>conflict</strong> requires</mark> people to have <strong>both the <mark>means and</mark> the <mark>will</strong>. Most</mark> people <mark>on</mark> the brink of <mark>starvation are not</mark> in the position to <mark>resort to violence</u></mark>, whether against the government or other social groups. In fact, the urban middle classes tend to be the most likely to protest against rises in food prices, since they often have the best opportunities, the most energy, and the best skills to coordinate and participate in protests.</p><p>Accordingly, there is a widespread misapprehension that social unrest in periods of high food prices relates primarily to food shortages. <u><strong>In reality</strong>, <strong>the sources of <mark>discontent</strong></mark> are <strong>considerably more complex</strong>---<mark>linked to</mark> <strong>political structures</strong>, <strong><mark>land</mark> ownership</strong>, <strong><mark>corruption</strong></mark>, the desire for <strong><mark>democratic reforms</strong> and</mark> <strong>general <mark>econ</mark>omic problems</u></strong>---where the price of food is seen in the context of general increases in the cost of living. <u>Research has shown</u> that <u><mark>while <strong>the</mark> international <mark>media</u></strong></mark> have a <u>tend</u>ency <u>to <mark>seek</u></mark> <u><strong>simple <mark>resource</mark>-related <mark>explanations</u></strong></mark>---such as drought or famine---for conflicts in the Global South, <u><mark>debates</u></mark> in the local media <u><mark>are</u></mark> permeated by <u><strong>more <mark>complex</u></strong></mark> political relationships.</p>

1nc---crossings Christian---mich r4

Adv 2

1nc---!---food

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Brown

1ac---Like space AI or something 2nr---condo is good

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2022-11-28 19:21:50

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Gilman GaMa

chains: [email protected] [email protected] questions: [email protected]

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Nuclear war fallout between India and Pakistan results in nuclear winter, mass starvation, and an uninhabitable world that converge in extinction.

Starr 15

Starr 15, Steven. “Nuclear War: An Unrecognized Mass Extinction Event Waiting To Happen.” Ratical. March 2015. https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StevenStarr022815.html / MU

A war fought with 21st century nuclear weapons would be more than just a great catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war would be a mass extinction event that ends human history. There is a profound difference between extinction and “an unprecedented disaster,” or even “the end of civilization,” because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on. extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality, and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act The world’s leading climatologists now tell us that nuclear war threatens our continued existence as a species studies predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, would create a post-war environment in which for many years it would be too cold and dark to even grow food not only humans, but most large animals and many other forms of complex life would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness The environmental consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. Radioactive fallout produced not only by nuclear bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, would poison the biosphere. Millions of tons of smoke would act to destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer and block most sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface, creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last for decades. research predicts virtually any nuclear war, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed nuclear arsenals, will leave the Earth essentially uninhabitable.

A war with nuclear weapons would be a mass extinction event an event of utter finality for many years it would be too cold and dark to grow food Radioactive fallout would poison the biosphere. Millions of tons of smoke would destroy ozone and block sunlight from reaching Earth creating Ice Age for decades virtually any nuclear war will leave the Earth essentially uninhabitable

A war fought with 21st century strategic nuclear weapons would be more than just a great catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war would be a mass extinction event that ends human history. There is a profound difference between extinction and “an unprecedented disaster,” or even “the end of civilization,” because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on. But extinction, by definition, is an event of utter finality, and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act. It certainly would be the crime to end all crimes. The world’s leading climatologists now tell us that nuclear war threatens our continued existence as a species. Their studies predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, would create a post-war environment in which for many years it would be too cold and dark to even grow food. Their findings make it clear that not only humans, but most large animals and many other forms of complex life would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness of our own making. The environmental consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. Radioactive fallout produced not only by nuclear bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, would poison the biosphere. Millions of tons of smoke would act to destroy Earth’s protective ozone layer and block most sunlight from reaching Earth’s surface, creating Ice Age weather conditions that would last for decades. Yet the political and military leaders who control nuclear weapons strictly avoid any direct public discussion of the consequences of nuclear war. They do so by arguing that nuclear weapons are not intended to be used, but only to deter. Remarkably, the leaders of the Nuclear Weapon States have chosen to ignore the authoritative, long-standing scientific research done by the climatologists, research that predicts virtually any nuclear war, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed nuclear arsenals, will leave the Earth essentially uninhabitable.

<h4>Nuclear war fallout between India and Pakistan results in nuclear winter, mass starvation, and an uninhabitable world that converge in extinction. </h4><p><strong>Starr 15<u></strong>, Steven</u>. “Nuclear War: An Unrecognized Mass Extinction Event Waiting To Happen.” Ratical. March 2015. https://ratical.org/radiation/NuclearExtinction/StevenStarr022815.html /<u> MU</p><p><strong><mark>A war</strong> </mark>fought <strong><mark>with</strong></mark> 21st century</u> strategic <u><strong><mark>nuclear weapons</strong></mark> would be more than just a great catastrophe in human history. If we allow it to happen, such a war <strong><mark>would be a mass extinction event</strong></mark> that ends human history. There is a profound difference between extinction and “an unprecedented disaster,” or even “the end of civilization,” because even after such an immense catastrophe, human life would go on. </u>But <u>extinction, by definition, is <strong><mark>an event of utter finality</strong></mark>, and a nuclear war that could cause human extinction should really be considered as the ultimate criminal act</u>. It certainly would be the crime to end all crimes. <u>The world’s leading climatologists now tell us that nuclear war threatens our continued existence as a species</u>. Their <u>studies predict that a large nuclear war, especially one fought with strategic nuclear weapons, would create a post-war environment in which <strong><mark>for many years it would be too cold and dark to</strong></mark> even <strong><mark>grow food</u></strong></mark>. Their findings make it clear that <u>not only humans, but most large animals and many other forms of complex life would likely vanish forever in a nuclear darkness </u>of our own making. <u>The environmental consequences of nuclear war would attack the ecological support systems of life at every level. <strong><mark>Radioactive fallout</strong></mark> produced not only by nuclear bombs, but also by the destruction of nuclear power plants and their spent fuel pools, <strong><mark>would poison the biosphere. Millions of tons of smoke would</strong></mark> act to <strong><mark>destroy</strong></mark> Earth’s protective <strong><mark>ozone</strong></mark> layer <strong><mark>and block</strong></mark> most <strong><mark>sunlight from reaching Earth</strong></mark>’s surface, <strong><mark>creating Ice Age</strong></mark> weather conditions that would last <strong><mark>for decades</strong></mark>. </u>Yet the political and military leaders who control nuclear weapons strictly avoid any direct public discussion of the consequences of nuclear war. They do so by arguing that nuclear weapons are not intended to be used, but only to deter. Remarkably, the leaders of the Nuclear Weapon States have chosen to ignore the authoritative, long-standing scientific research done by the climatologists, <u>research</u> that <u>predicts <strong><mark>virtually any nuclear war</strong></mark>, fought with even a fraction of the operational and deployed nuclear arsenals, <strong><mark>will leave the Earth essentially uninhabitable</strong></mark>.</p></u>

Kashmir AC

1AC – Plan

./documents/hsld19/AppletonNorth/Ub/Appleton%20North-Uberoi-Aff-State-Round1.docx

A

State

1

Neenah WR

Jaya Sims

1AC - IndoPak 1NC - deterrence terror 1AR - IndoPak 2NC - all 2AR - IndoPak

hsld19/AppletonNorth/Ub/Appleton%20North-Uberoi-Aff-State-Round1.docx

MiUb

Appleton North MiUb

Mi.....

Ub.....

AppletonNorth

Appleton North

WI

hsld19

HS LD 2019-20

ld

hs

“Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum

Army Officer School 2005

Army Officer School 2005 (“# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, 5-12, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)

The colon introduces A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

The colon introduces A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon)

The colon introduces the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) That this council petition the mayor.

<h4>“Resolved” before a colon reflects a legislative forum</h4><p><strong>Army Officer School 2005 </strong>(“# 12, Punctuation – The Colon and Semicolon”, 5-12, http://usawocc.army.mil/IMI/wg12.htm)</p><p><u><mark>The colon introduces</u></mark> the following: a. A list, but only after "as follows," "the following," or a noun for which the list is an appositive: Each scout will carry the following: (colon) meals for three days, a survival knife, and his sleeping bag. The company had four new officers: (colon) Bill Smith, Frank Tucker, Peter Fillmore, and Oliver Lewis. b. A long quotation (one or more paragraphs): In The Killer Angels Michael Shaara wrote: (colon) You may find it a different story from the one you learned in school. There have been many versions of that battle [Gettysburg] and that war [the Civil War]. (The quote continues for two more paragraphs.) c. A formal quotation or question: The President declared: (colon) "The only thing we have to fear is fear itself." The question is: (colon) what can we do about it? d. A second independent clause which explains the first: Potter's motive is clear: (colon) he wants the assignment. e. After the introduction of a business letter: Dear Sirs: (colon) Dear Madam: (colon) f. The details following an announcement For sale: (colon) large lakeside cabin with dock g. <u><mark>A formal resolution, after the word "resolved:" Resolved: (colon) </mark>That this council petition the mayor.</p></u>

3

./documents/hsld20/DoughertyValley/Ko/Dougherty%20Valley-Kotapati-Neg-Berkeley%20Invitational-Round1.docx

N

Berkeley Invitational

1

Albuquerque LN

Beth Zhao

1AC - NonT 1NC - TFW Disc New Affs Bad Case 1AR - All 2NR - NAB Movements Case 2AR - idk i wasn't paying attention

hsld20/DoughertyValley/Ko/Dougherty%20Valley-Kotapati-Neg-Berkeley%20Invitational-Round1.docx

SaKo

Dougherty Valley SaKo

Sa.....

Ko.....

DoughertyValley

Dougherty Valley

CA

hsld20

HS LD 2020-21

ld

hs

Should requires immediate, certain legal effect

Summers 94

Summers 94 (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)

The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should" may be deemed a ruling in praesenti Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability ) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" In praesenti means literally "at the present time." the phrase denotes law is immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future

contexts mandate construction of "should" as more than desirability "should" would mean "must" law is immediately effective as opposed to in the future

4 The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"13 in the May 18 order connotes futurity or may be deemed a ruling in praesenti.14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16 [CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE] 13 "Should" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. Certain contexts mandate a construction of the term "should" as more than merely indicating preference or desirability. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958) ("should" would mean the same as "shall" or "must" when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). 14 In praesenti means literally "at the present time." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance the phrase denotes that which in law is presently or immediately effective, as opposed to something that will or would become effective in the future [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).

<h4><strong>Should requires immediate, certain legal effect</h4><p>Summers 94</strong> (Justice – Oklahoma Supreme Court, “Kelsey v. Dollarsaver Food Warehouse of Durant”, 1994 OK 123, 11-8, http://www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/DeliverDocument.asp?CiteID=20287#marker3fn13)</p><p> 4 <u><strong>The legal question to be resolved by the court is whether the word "should"</u></strong>13 in the May 18 order connotes futurity or <u><strong>may be deemed a ruling in praesenti</u></strong>.14 The answer to this query is not to be divined from rules of grammar;15 it must be governed by the age-old practice culture of legal professionals and its immemorial language usage. To determine if the omission (from the critical May 18 entry) of the turgid phrase, "and the same hereby is", (1) makes it an in futuro ruling - i.e., an expression of what the judge will or would do at a later stage - or (2) constitutes an in in praesenti resolution of a disputed law issue, the trial judge's intent must be garnered from the four corners of the entire record.16 </p><p>[CONTINUES – TO FOOTNOTE]</p><p>13 "Should" not only is used as a "present indicative" synonymous with ought but also is the past tense of "shall" with various shades of meaning not always easy to analyze. See 57 C.J. Shall § 9, Judgments § 121 (1932). O. JESPERSEN, GROWTH AND STRUCTURE OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1984); St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Brown, 45 Okl. 143, 144 P. 1075, 1080-81 (1914). For a more detailed explanation, see the Partridge quotation infra note 15. <u><strong>Certain <mark>contexts mandate</mark> a <mark>construction of</mark> the term <mark>"should" as more than</mark> merely indicating preference or <mark>desirability</u></strong></mark>. Brown, supra at 1080-81 (jury instructions stating that jurors "should" reduce the amount of damages in proportion to the amount of contributory negligence of the plaintiff was held to imply an obligation and to be more than advisory); Carrigan v. California Horse Racing Board, 60 Wash. App. 79, 802 P.2d 813 (1990) (one of the Rules of Appellate Procedure requiring that a party "should devote a section of the brief to the request for the fee or expenses" was interpreted to mean that a party is under an obligation to include the requested segment); State v. Rack, 318 S.W.2d 211, 215 (Mo. 1958<u><strong>) (<mark>"should" would mean</mark> the same as "shall" or <mark>"must"</strong></mark> </u>when used in an instruction to the jury which tells the triers they "should disregard false testimony"). 14 <u><strong>In praesenti means literally "at the present time."</u></strong> BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 792 (6th Ed. 1990). In legal parlance <u><strong>the phrase denotes</u></strong> that which in <u><strong><mark>law is</u></strong></mark> presently or <u><strong><mark>immediately effective</mark>, <mark>as opposed to</mark> something that will or would become effective <mark>in the future</u></strong></mark> [in futurol]. See Van Wyck v. Knevals, 106 U.S. 360, 365, 1 S.Ct. 336, 337, 27 L.Ed. 201 (1882).</p>

1nr

Harmonization

./documents/ndtceda16/JamesMadison/LeWa/James%20Madison-Lepp-Wardak-Neg-Liberty-Round4.docx

N

Liberty

4

Georgia YM

John Katsulas

1AC Carbon Tax Warming Harmonization 1NC T Restrictions Spec Econ DA Elections DA TPP DA 2NC Case 1NR Econ Elex 2NR Econ Case

ndtceda16/JamesMadison/LeWa/James%20Madison-Lepp-Wardak-Neg-Liberty-Round4.docx

LeWa

James Madison LeWa

Ni.....

Le.....

Ry.....

Wa.....

JamesMadison

James Madison

ndtceda16

NDT/CEDA 2016-17

cx

college

D] Mathematically outweighs.

MacAskill 14

MacAskill 14 [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]

The human race might go extinct different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a bad thing However, even if we believe in a moral view which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction First extinction is extremely high stakes the number of humans in existence given that we don’t go extinct would be 2×10^14 So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent extinction. Second extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario Third, we should expect to progress, morally as we have in the past. in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction Suppose that we have 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people if we did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value there’s a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). in expected value terms, the cost of waiting is vanishingly small compared with benefit of keeping one’s options open

we have reason to prevent extinction extremely high stakes 2×10^14 extinction is irreversible in time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate extinction if we did research we would know for certain whether people positive the cost of waiting is small compared with keeping options open

The human race might go extinct from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a good or a bad thing. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 However, even if we believe in a moral view according to which human extinction would be a good thing, we still have strong reason to prevent near-term human extinction. To see this, we must note three points. First, we should note that the extinction of the human race is an extremely high stakes moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, the number of humans in existence in the The future, given that we don’t go extinct any time soon, would be 2×10^14. So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent human extinction. Second, human extinction is by its nature an irreversible scenario. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. Third, we should expect ourselves to progress, morally, over the next few centuries, as we have progressed in the past. So we should expect that in a few centuries’ time we will have better evidence about how to evaluate human extinction than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. Suppose that we have 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 0.2 certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that, if we let the human race continue and did research for 300 years, we would know for certain whether or not additional people are of positive or negative value. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But there’s also a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14), the expected value of which is 4×(10^13). That is, in expected value terms, the cost of waiting for a few hundred years is vanishingly small compared with the benefit of keeping one’s options open while one gains new information.

<h4>D] Mathematically <u>outweighs</u>.</h4><p><strong>MacAskill 14</strong> [William, Oxford Philosopher and youngest tenured philosopher in the world, Normative Uncertainty, 2014]</p><p><u>The human race might go extinct </u>from a number of causes: asteroids, supervolcanoes, runaway climate change, pandemics, nuclear war, and the development and use of dangerous new technologies such as synthetic biology, all pose risks (even if very small) to the continued survival of the human race.184 And <u>different moral views give opposing answers to question of whether this would be a </u>good<u> </u>or a <u>bad thing</u>. It might seem obvious that human extinction would be a very bad thing, both because of the loss of potential future lives, and because of the loss of the scientific and artistic progress that we would make in the future. But the issue is at least unclear. The continuation of the human race would be a mixed bag: inevitably, it would involve both upsides and downsides. And if one regards it as much more important to avoid bad things happening than to promote good things happening then one could plausibly regard human extinction as a good thing.For example, one might regard the prevention of bads as being in general more important that the promotion of goods, as defended historically by G. E. Moore,185 and more recently by Thomas Hurka.186 One could weight the prevention of suffering as being much more important that the promotion of happiness. Or one could weight the prevention of objective bads, such as war and genocide, as being much more important than the promotion of objective goods, such as scientific and artistic progress. If the human race continues its future will inevitably involve suffering as well as happiness, and objective bads as well as objective goods. So, if one weights the bads sufficiently heavily against the goods, or if one is sufficiently pessimistic about humanity’s ability to achieve good outcomes, then one will regard human extinction as a good thing.187 <u>However, even if we believe in a moral view </u>according to <u>which human extinction would be a good thing, <mark>we </mark>still <mark>have <strong></mark>strong <mark>reason to prevent </mark>near-term human <mark>extinction</u></strong></mark>. To see this, we must note three points. <u>First</u>, we should note that the <u>extinction</u> of the human race <u>is </u>an <u><mark>extremely <strong>high stakes</u></strong></mark> moral issue. Humanity could be around for a very long time: if humans survive as long as the median mammal species, we will last another two million years. On this estimate, <u>the number of humans in existence </u>in the<u> </u>The future, <u>given that we don’t go extinct</u> any time soon, <u>would be <strong><mark>2×10^14</u></strong></mark>. <u>So if it is good to bring new people into existence, then it’s very good to prevent </u>human<u> extinction. Second</u>, human <u><strong><mark>extinction is</mark> by its nature an <mark>irreversible</mark> scenario</u></strong>. If we continue to exist, then we always have the option of letting ourselves go extinct in the future (or, perhaps more realistically, of considerably reducing population size). But if we go extinct, then we can’t magically bring ourselves back into existence at a later date. <u>Third, we should expect</u> ourselves <u>to progress, morally</u>, over the next few centuries, <u>as we have</u> progressed <u>in the past.</u> So we should expect that <u><mark>in </mark>a few centuries’ <mark>time we will have <strong>better evidence about how to evaluate</mark> human <mark>extinction</u></strong></mark> than we currently have. Given these three factors, it would be better to prevent the near-term extinction of the human race, even if we thought that the extinction of the human race would actually be a very good thing. To make this concrete, I’ll give the following simple but illustrative model. <u>Suppose that we have</u> 0.8 credence that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and <u>0.2</u> <u>certain that it’s a good thing to produce new people</u>; and the degree to which it is good to produce new people, if it is good, is the same as the degree to which it is bad to produce new people, if it is bad. That is, I’m supposing, for simplicity, that we know that one new life has one unit of value; we just don’t know whether that unit is positive or negative. And let’s use our estimate of 2×10^14 people who would exist in the future, if we avoid near-term human extinction. Given our stipulated credences, the expected benefit of letting the human race go extinct now would be (.8-.2)×(2×10^14) = 1.2×(10^14). Suppose that,<u> <mark>if we</mark> </u>let the human race continue and<u> <mark>did research</mark> for 300 years, <mark>we would know <strong>for certain</strong> whether </mark>or not additional <mark>people</mark> are of <strong><mark>positive</mark> or negative value</u></strong>. If so, then with the credences above we should think it 80% likely that we will find out that it is a bad thing to produce new people, and 20% likely that we will find out that it’s a good thing to produce new people. So there’s an 80% chance of a loss of 3×(10^10) (because of the delay of letting the human race go extinct), the expected value of which is 2.4×(10^10). But <u>there’s</u> also <u>a 20% chance of a gain of 2×(10^14),</u> <u>the expected value of which is 4×(10^13).</u> That is, <u>in expected value terms, <mark>the cost of waiting</mark> </u>for a few hundred years<u> <mark>is <strong></mark>vanishingly <mark>small</strong> compared with</mark> </u>the <u><strong>benefit of <mark>keeping </mark>one’s <mark>options open</strong></mark> </u>while one gains new information.</p>

1AC R4 Churchill

1AC – Framing

./documents/hsld21/StrakeJesuit/Sh/Strake%20Jesuit-Shah-Aff-Churchill-Round4.docx

A

Churchill

4

StMar WK

Brody, Ben

1AC- Debris 1NC- Space Innovation (Lay) Case 1AR- All 2NR- All 2AR- All

hsld21/StrakeJesuit/Sh/Strake%20Jesuit-Shah-Aff-Churchill-Round4.docx

KaSh

Strake Jesuit KaSh

Ka.....

Sh.....

StrakeJesuit

Strake Jesuit

TX

hsld21

HS LD 2021-22

ld

hs

3. No disease extinction

Barratt 17

Owen Cotton-Barratt 17, et al, PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute, 2/3/2017, Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf

natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic. that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal

pandemics are unlikely to cause extinction. of 833 plant and animal extinctions since 1500, less than 4% were ascribed to infectious disease. None were globally dispersed, other factors also contributed our species is numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response very unlikely to be killed by a highly lethal pathogens can kill hosts before they there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be lethal

For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic. One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread , so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39

<h4>3. No disease extinction</h4><p>Owen Cotton-<strong>Barratt 17</strong>, et al, PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute, 2/3/2017, Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf</p><p>For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that<u> natural <mark>pandemics are</mark> <strong>very <mark>unlikely to cause </mark>human <mark>extinction</strong>.</u></mark> Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that<u> <mark>of</mark> the <mark>833</mark> recorded <mark>plant and animal</mark> species <mark>extinctions</mark> known to have occurred <mark>since 1500, <strong>less than 4%</strong></mark> (31 species) <mark>were ascribed to infectious disease</u>.</mark>38 <u><mark>None</mark> of the mammals and amphibians on this list <mark>were globally dispersed,</mark> and <mark>other factors</mark> aside from infectious disease <mark>also contributed</mark> to their extinction.</u> <u>It </u>therefore <u>seems that <mark>our</mark> own <mark>species</mark>, which <mark>is <strong></mark>very <mark>numerous</strong>, <strong>globally dispersed</strong>, and capable of a <strong>rational response</mark> to problems</strong>, is <mark>very unlikely to be killed</mark> off <mark>by a</mark> natural pandemic.</p><p></u>One underlying explanation for this is <u>that <mark>highly lethal pathogens can kill</mark> their <mark>hosts before they</mark> have a chance to spread</p><p></u>, so <u><mark>there is a <strong>selective pressure for pathogens not to be</mark> highly <mark>lethal</u></strong></mark>. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39</p>

Deterrence