Datasets:

Hellisotherpeople

/

OpenCaseList-Deduplicated

like 0

Adaptation and intervening actors check warming.

FARQUHAR ET AL. 17

Sebastian FARQUHAR ET AL. 17, Project Manager at FHI responsible for external relations, M.A in Physics and Philosophy from the University of Oxford; John Halstead, Global Priorities Project; Owen Cotton-Barratt, Research Associate in the FHI at the University of Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at St. Hugh’s College, Oxford; Stefan Schubert, PhD in philosophy, Researcher at the Centre for Effective Altruism; Haydn Belfield, Academic Project Manager, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, University of Cambridge; Andrew Snyder-Beattie, Director of Research at FHI [“Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, Global Priorities Project 2017, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf]

The most likely levels of global warming are very unlikely to cause human extinction existential risks stem from tail risk climate change – the low probability of extreme warming Research has suggested that warming of 11-12°C would render the planet uninhabitable the timescales over which such changes might happen could mean that humanity is able to adapt enough to avoid extinction in even very extreme scenarios unless action is taken it is likely that we will pursue a medium-high emissions pathway It is likely that the world will take action against climate change once it begins to impose large costs on human society, long before there is warming of 10°C If the world does start to face costly warming, the international community will face strong incentives to find ways to reduce global temperatures

The most likely levels of warming are very unlikely to cause extinction existential risks stem from tail risk low probability extreme warming the timescales over which such changes happen mean humanity is able to adapt to avoid extinction in even very extreme scenarios the international community will face strong incentives to find ways to reduce temperatures

The most likely levels of global warming are very unlikely to cause human extinction.15 The existential risks of climate change instead stem from tail risk climate change – the low probability of extreme levels of warming – and interaction with other sources of risk. It is impossible to say with confidence at what point global warming would become severe enough to pose an existential threat. Research has suggested that warming of 11-12°C would render most of the planet uninhabitable,16 and would completely devastate agriculture.17 This would pose an extreme threat to human civilisation as we know it.18 Warming of around 7°C or more could potentially produce conflict and instability on such a scale that the indirect effects could be an existential risk, although it is extremely uncertain how likely such scenarios are.19 Moreover, the timescales over which such changes might happen could mean that humanity is able to adapt enough to avoid extinction in even very extreme scenarios. The probability of these levels of warming depends on eventual greenhouse gas concentrations. According to some experts, unless strong action is taken soon by major emitters, it is likely that we will pursue a medium-high emissions pathway.20 If we do, the chance of extreme warming is highly uncertain but appears non-negligible. Current concentrations of greenhouse gases are higher than they have been for hundreds of thousands of years,21 which means that there are significant unknown unknowns about how the climate system will respond. Particularly concerning is the risk of positive feedback loops, such as the release of vast amounts of methane from melting of the arctic permafrost, which would cause rapid and disastrous warming.22 The economists Gernot Wagner and Martin Weitzman have used IPCC figures (which do not include modelling of feedback loops such as those from melting permafrost) to estimate that if we continue to pursue a medium-high emissions pathway, the probability of eventual warming of 6°C is around 10%,23 and of 10°C is around 3%.24 These estimates are of course highly uncertain. It is likely that the world will take action against climate change once it begins to impose large costs on human society, long before there is warming of 10°C. Unfortunately, there is significant inertia in the climate system: there is a 25 to 50 year lag between CO2 emissions and eventual warming,25 and it is expected that 40% of the peak concentration of CO2 will remain in the atmosphere 1,000 years after the peak is reached.26 Consequently, it is impossible to reduce temperatures quickly by reducing CO2 emissions. If the world does start to face costly warming, the international community will therefore face strong incentives to find other ways to reduce global temperatures.

<h4><u>Adaptation</u> and <u>intervening actors</u> check warming.</h4><p>Sebastian <strong>FARQUHAR ET AL. 17</strong>, Project Manager at FHI responsible for external relations, M.A in Physics and Philosophy from the University of Oxford; John Halstead, Global Priorities Project; Owen Cotton-Barratt, Research Associate in the FHI at the University of Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at St. Hugh’s College, Oxford; Stefan Schubert, PhD in philosophy, Researcher at the Centre for Effective Altruism; Haydn Belfield, Academic Project Manager, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, University of Cambridge; Andrew Snyder-Beattie, Director of Research at FHI [“Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, Global Priorities Project 2017, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf]</p><p><u><mark>The <strong>most likely</strong> levels of</mark> global <mark>warming are <strong>very unlikely</strong> to cause</mark> human <mark>extinction</u></mark>.15 The <u><mark>existential risks</u></mark> of climate change instead <u><mark>stem from tail risk</mark> climate change – the <mark>low probability</mark> of <mark>extreme</u></mark> levels of <u><mark>warming</u></mark> – and interaction with other sources of risk. It is impossible to say with confidence at what point global warming would become severe enough to pose an existential threat. <u>Research has suggested that warming of 11-12°C would render</u> most of <u>the planet uninhabitable</u>,16 and would completely devastate agriculture.17 This would pose an extreme threat to human civilisation as we know it.18 Warming of around 7°C or more could potentially produce conflict and instability on such a scale that the indirect effects could be an existential risk, although it is extremely uncertain how likely such scenarios are.19 Moreover, <u><mark>the <strong>timescales</strong> over which such changes</mark> might <mark>happen</mark> could <mark>mean</mark> that <mark>humanity is able to <strong>adapt</strong></mark> enough <mark>to <strong>avoid extinction</strong> in even very extreme scenarios</u></mark>.</p><p>The probability of these levels of warming depends on eventual greenhouse gas concentrations. According to some experts, <u>unless</u> strong <u>action is taken</u> soon by major emitters, <u>it is likely that we will pursue a medium-high emissions pathway</u>.20 If we do, the chance of extreme warming is highly uncertain but appears non-negligible. Current concentrations of greenhouse gases are higher than they have been for hundreds of thousands of years,21 which means that there are significant unknown unknowns about how the climate system will respond. Particularly concerning is the risk of positive feedback loops, such as the release of vast amounts of methane from melting of the arctic permafrost, which would cause rapid and disastrous warming.22 The economists Gernot Wagner and Martin Weitzman have used IPCC figures (which do not include modelling of feedback loops such as those from melting permafrost) to estimate that if we continue to pursue a medium-high emissions pathway, the probability of eventual warming of 6°C is around 10%,23 and of 10°C is around 3%.24 These estimates are of course highly uncertain.</p><p><u>It is likely that the world will take action against climate change once it begins to impose large costs on human society, long before there is warming of 10°C</u>. Unfortunately, there is significant inertia in the climate system: there is a 25 to 50 year lag between CO2 emissions and eventual warming,25 and it is expected that 40% of the peak concentration of CO2 will remain in the atmosphere 1,000 years after the peak is reached.26 Consequently, it is impossible to reduce temperatures quickly by reducing CO2 emissions. <u>If the world does start to face costly warming, <mark>the international community will</u></mark> therefore <u><mark>face strong incentives to find</u></mark> other <u><mark>ways to reduce</mark> global <mark>temperatures</u></mark>.</p>

1ar

Growth

AT: Warming

./documents/ndtceda18/Emory/JaAl/Emory-Jablonski-Allums-Aff-Northwestern-Round4.docx

A

Northwestern

4

Trinity DK

Yonter

1ac Auer 2nr Dedev

ndtceda18/Emory/JaAl/Emory-Jablonski-Allums-Aff-Northwestern-Round4.docx

JaAl

Emory JaAl

Be.....

Ja.....

Ka.....

Al.....

Emory

Emory

ndtceda18

NDT/CEDA 2018-19

cx

college

The problem is that we don’t fear enough. Debate around existential risks is key to civic engagement and academic research to develop risk mitigation strategies.

Javorsky 18

Javorsky 18 [Emilia, a Boston-based physician-scientist focused on the invention, development and commercialization of new medical therapies. She also leads an Artificial Intelligence in Medicine initiative with The Future Society at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. Why Human Extinction Needs a Marketing Department. January 15, 2018. https://www.xconomy.com/boston/2018/01/15/why-human-extinction-needs-a-marketing-department/]

Experts at Oxford and elsewhere have estimated that the risk of a global human extinction event is around 1 in 10 The most probable culprits are anthropogenic risks These include climate change, nuclear disaster, and more emerging risks such as artificial intelligence gone wrong (by accident or nefarious intent) and bioterrorism. A big part of the problem is a lack of awareness about the real threats we face When asked to estimate the chance of an extinction event in the next 50 years, U.S. adults in surveys reported 1 in 10 million The awareness and engagement issues extend to the academic community as well, where a key bottleneck is a lack of talented people studying existential risks Developing viable risk mitigation strategies will require widespread civic engagement and concerted research efforts there is an urgent need to improve the communication of the magnitude and importance of existential risks

Experts at Oxford estimated the risk of extinction is 1 in 10. The most probable culprits include nuclear disaster artificial intelligence gone wrong and bioterrorism A big problem is lack of awareness about real threats we face When asked to estimate the chance of extinction adults reported 1 in 10 million awareness and engagement issues extend to the academic community where a key bottleneck is a lack of talented people studying existential risks. Developing risk mitigation strategies will require civic engagement and concerted research there is an urgent need to improve communication of the magnitude of existential risks

Experts at Oxford University and elsewhere have estimated that the risk of a global human extinction event this century—or at least of an event that wipes out 10 percent or more of the world’s population— is around 1 in 10. The most probable culprits sending us the way of the dinosaur are mostly anthropogenic risks, meaning those created by humans. These include climate change, nuclear disaster, and more emerging risks such as artificial intelligence gone wrong (by accident or nefarious intent) and bioterrorism. A recent search of the scientific literature through ScienceDirect for “human extinction” returned a demoralizing 157 results, compared to the 1,627 for “dung beetle.” I don’t know about you, but this concerns me. Why is there so little research and action on existential risks (risks capable of rendering humanity extinct)? A big part of the problem is a lack of awareness about the real threats we face and what can be done about them. When asked to estimate the chance of an extinction event in the next 50 years, U.S. adults in surveys reported chances ranging from 1 in 10 million to 1 in 100, certainly not 10 percent. The awareness and engagement issues extend to the academic community as well, where a key bottleneck is a lack of talented people studying existential risks. Developing viable risk mitigation strategies will require widespread civic engagement and concerted research efforts. Consequently, there is an urgent need to improve the communication of the magnitude and importance of existential risks. The first step is getting an audience to pay attention to this issue.

<h4>The problem is that we don’t fear enough. Debate around existential risks is key to <u>civic engagement</u> and <u>academic research</u> to develop risk mitigation strategies.</h4><p><strong>Javorsky 18 </strong>[Emilia, a Boston-based physician-scientist focused on the invention, development and commercialization of new medical therapies. She also leads an Artificial Intelligence in Medicine initiative with The Future Society at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. Why Human <mark>Extinction Needs a Marketing Department</mark>. January 15, 2018. https://www.xconomy.com/boston/2018/01/15/why-human-extinction-needs-a-marketing-department/]</p><p><u><strong><mark>Experts at Oxford</u></strong></mark> University <u><strong>and elsewhere have <mark>estimated</mark> that <mark>the risk of</mark> a global human <mark>extinction</mark> event</u></strong> this century—or at least of an event that wipes out 10 percent or more of the world’s population— <u><strong><mark>is</mark> around <mark>1 in 10</u></strong>. <u><strong>The most probable culprits</u></strong></mark> sending us the way of the dinosaur <u><strong>are</u></strong> mostly <u><strong>anthropogenic risks</u></strong>, meaning those created by humans. <u>These <mark>include</mark> climate change, <mark>nuclear disaster</mark>, and more emerging risks such as <mark>artificial intelligence gone wrong</mark> (by accident or nefarious intent) <mark>and bioterrorism</mark>.</u> A recent search of the scientific literature through ScienceDirect for “human extinction” returned a demoralizing 157 results, compared to the 1,627 for “dung beetle.” I don’t know about you, but this concerns me. Why is there so little research and action on existential risks (risks capable of rendering humanity extinct)?</p><p><u><strong><mark>A big</mark> part of the <mark>problem is</mark> a <mark>lack of awareness about </mark>the <mark>real threats we face</u></strong></mark> and what can be done about them. <u><strong><mark>When asked to estimate the chance of</mark> an <mark>extinction</mark> event in the next 50 years, U.S. <mark>adults</mark> in surveys <mark>reported</u></strong></mark> chances ranging from <u><strong><mark>1 in 10 million</u></strong></mark> to 1 in 100, certainly not 10 percent. <u><strong>The <mark>awareness and engagement issues extend to the academic community</mark> as well, <mark>where a key bottleneck is a lack of talented people studying existential risks</u></strong>. <u><strong>Developing</mark> viable <mark>risk mitigation strategies will require</mark> widespread <mark>civic engagement and concerted research</mark> efforts</u></strong>. Consequently, <u><strong><mark>there is an urgent need to improve</mark> the <mark>communication of the magnitude</mark> and importance <mark>of existential risks</u></strong></mark>. The first step is getting an audience to pay attention to this issue.</p>

Resilience Aff: Security K Ans

Security Good

2AC AT Fear

./documents/hspolicy22/Bandera/MeSa/Bandera-MeSa-Aff-All-Tournaments-All-Rounds.docx

A

All Tournaments

All

hspolicy22/Bandera/MeSa/Bandera-MeSa-Aff-All-Tournaments-All-Rounds.docx

2023-03-09 16:12:53

MeSa

Bandera MeSa

Ka.....

Me.....

El.....

Sa.....

Bandera

Bandera

TX

hspolicy22

HS Policy 2022-23

cx

hs

1 – Clash. A limited topic preserving competitive incentives encourages research and argument refinement over the season. External benefits are logically secondary to procedural ones, but maximizing clash using competitive incentives increases all of them.

Iverson ’9

Iverson ’9 [Joel; 2009; Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Montana, Ph.D in Communication from Arizona State University Relations at the University of Sydney; Debate Central, “Can Cutting Cards Carve into Our Personal Lives: An Analysis of Debate Research on Personal Advocacy,” https://debate.uvm.edu/dybvigiverson1000.html]

debate provides preparation for participation in democracy argumentative agency which] involves the capacity to contextualize employ skills and strategies in social action debate can research conducted for competition is a catalyst and provide a greater depth of understanding Without the guidance of a debate topic, how many students would do in-depth research on female genital mutilation in Africa, or United Nations sanctions on Iraq? The competitive nature of policy debate provides an impetus for students to research beyond their front doors makes us good public advocates The debaters who protesting sanctions were not actively engaged in the issue until their research drew them to the topic exposure to debate research as the person finding the evidence acts as a spark of awareness on an issue Even if not compelled to take action, research still changes opinions the topic U S F G should spurred activism college was used to rally people in support of movements ). The focus of research is breadth, not depth. In fact, in-depth research into one topic for parliamentary debate would seem to be counterproductive. Every round has a different resolution and for APDA, at least, those resolutions are generally written so they are open to a wide array of case examples, So, developing too narrow of a focus could be competitively fatal. However, research is apparently increasing for parliamentary teams as reports of "stock cases" used by teams for numerous rounds have recently appeared. One coach did state that a perceived "stock case" by one team pushed his debaters to research the topic of AIDS in Africa in order to be equally knowledgeable in that case. Interestingly, the coach also stated that some of their research in preparation for parliamentary debate was affecting the opinions and attitudes of the debaters on the team. supporting and researching both sides of argument created stronger advocates debaters learn both sides so they could defend their positions against attack Learning the intricate nature of policy proposals helps debaters to strengthen their own stance on issues

debate provides preparation for argumentative agency the capacity to employ strategies in action research for competition is a catalyst and provide a depth of understanding Without topic, how many students would research mutilation in Africa, or U N sanctions on Iraq? competitive debate provides an impetus for to research beyond their front doors makes us good advocates debaters who protest sanctions were not engaged until research drew them to the topic Even if not compelled to take action, research changes opinions the topic U S F G should spurred activism college was used to rally people in support of movements researching both sides of argument created advocates debaters learn both sides so they could defend their positions against attack Learning the nature of proposals helps debaters strengthen their stance

Mitchell (1998) provides a thorough examination of the pedagogical implication for academic debate. Although Mitchell acknowledges that debate provides preparation for participation in democracy, limiting debate to a laboratory where students practice their skill for future participation is criticized. Mitchell contends: For students and teachers of argumentation, the heightened salience of this question should signal the danger that critical thinking and oral advocacy skills alone may not be sufficient for citizens to assert their voices in public deliberation. (p. 45) Mitchell contends that the laboratory style setting creates barriers to other spheres, creates a "sense of detachment" and causes debaters to see research from the role of spectators. Mitchell further calls for "argumentative agency [which] involves the capacity to contextualize and employ the skills and strategies of argumentative discourse in fields of social action, especially wider spheres of public deliberation" (p. 45). Although we agree with Mitchell that debate can be an even greater instrument of empowerment for students, we are more interested in examining the impact of the intermediary step of research. In each of Mitchell's examples of debaters finding creative avenues for agency, there had to be a motivation to act. It is our contention that the research conducted for competition is a major catalyst to propel their action, change their opinions, and to provide a greater depth of understanding of the issues involved. The level of research involved in debate creates an in-depth understanding of issues. The level of research conducted during a year of debate is quite extensive. Goodman (1993) references a Chronicle of Higher Education article that estimated "the level and extent of research required of the average college debater for each topic is equivalent to the amount of research required for a Master's Thesis (cited in Mitchell, 1998, p. 55). With this extensive quantity of research, debaters attain a high level of investigation and (presumably) understanding of a topic. As a result of this level of understanding, debaters become knowledgeable citizens who are further empowered to make informed opinions and energized to take action. Research helps to educate students (and coaches) about the state of the world. Without the guidance of a debate topic, how many students would do in-depth research on female genital mutilation in Africa, or United Nations sanctions on Iraq? The competitive nature of policy debate provides an impetus for students to research the topics that they are going to debate. This in turn fuels students’ awareness of issues that go beyond their front doors. Advocacy flows from this increased awareness. Reading books and articles about the suffering of people thousands of miles away or right in our own communities drives people to become involved in the community at large. Research has also focused on how debate prepares us for life in the public sphere. Issues that we discuss in debate have found their way onto the national policy stage, and training in intercollegiate debate makes us good public advocates. The public sphere is the arena in which we all must participate to be active citizens. Even after we leave debate, the skills that we have gained should help us to be better advocates and citizens. Research has looked at how debate impacts education (Matlon and Keele 1984), legal training (Parkinson, Gisler and Pelias 1983, Nobles 19850 and behavioral traits (McGlone 1974, Colbert 1994). These works illustrate the impact that public debate has on students as they prepare to enter the public sphere. The debaters who take active roles such as protesting sanctions were probably not actively engaged in the issue until their research drew them into the topic. Furthermore, the process of intense research for debate may actually change the positions debaters hold. Since debaters typically enter into a topic with only cursory (if any) knowledge of the issue, the research process provides exposure to issues that were previously unknown. Exposure to the literature on a topic can create, reinforce or alter an individual's opinions. Before learning of the School for the America's, having an opinion of the place is impossible. After hearing about the systematic training of torturers and oppressors in a debate round and reading the research, an opinion of the "school" was developed. In this manner, exposure to debate research as the person finding the evidence, hearing it as the opponent in a debate round (or as judge) acts as an initial spark of awareness on an issue. This process of discovery seems to have a similar impact to watching an investigative news report. Mitchell claimed that debate could be more than it was traditionally seen as, that it could be a catalyst to empower people to act in the social arena. We surmise that there is a step in between the debate and the action. The intermediary step where people are inspired to agency is based on the research that they do. If students are compelled to act, research is a main factor in compelling them to do so. Even if students are not compelled to take direct action, research still changes opinions and attitudes. Research often compels students to take action in the social arena. Debate topics guide students in a direction that allows them to explore what is going on in the world. Last year the college policy debate topic was, Resolved: That the United States Federal Government should adopt a policy of constructive engagement, including the immediate removal of all or nearly all economic sanctions, with the government(s) of one or more of the following nation-states: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Syria, North Korea. This topic spurred quite a bit of activism on the college debate circuit. Many students become actively involved in protesting for the removal of sanctions from at least one of the topic countries. The college listserve was used to rally people in support of various movements to remove sanctions on both Iraq and Cuba. These messages were posted after the research on the topic began. While this topic did not lend itself to activism beyond rallying the government, other topics have allowed students to take their beliefs outside of the laboratory and into action. In addition to creating awareness, the research process can also reinforce or alter opinions. By discovering new information in the research process, people can question their current assumptions and perhaps formulate a more informed opinion. One example comes from a summer debate class for children of Migrant workers in North Dakota (Iverson, 1999). The Junior High aged students chose to debate the adoption of Spanish as an official language in the U.S. Many students expressed their concern that they could not argue effectively against the proposed change because it was a "truism." They were wholly in favor of Spanish as an official language. After researching the topic throughout their six week course, many realized much more was involved in adopting an official language and that they did not "speak 'pure' Spanish or English, but speak a unique dialect and hybrid" (Iverson, p. 3). At the end of the class many students became opposed to adopting Spanish as an official language, but found other ways Spanish should be integrated into American culture. Without research, these students would have maintained their opinions and not enhanced their knowledge of the issue. The students who maintained support of Spanish as an official language were better informed and thus also more capable of articulating support for their beliefs. The examples of debate and research impacting the opinions and actions of debaters indicate the strong potential for a direct relationship between debate research and personal advocacy. However, the debate community has not created a new sea of activists immersing this planet in waves of protest and political action. The level of influence debater search has on people needs further exploration. Also, the process of research needs to be more fully explored in order to understand if and why researching for the competitive activity of debate generates more interest than research for other purposes such as classroom projects. Since parliamentary debate does not involve research into a single topic, it can provide an important reference point for examining the impact of research in other forms of debate. Based upon limited conversations with competitors and coaches as well as some direct coaching and judging experience in parliamentary debate, parliamentary forms of debate has not seen an increase in activism on the part of debaters in the United States. Although some coaches require research in order to find examples and to stay updated on current events, the basic principle of this research is to have a commonsense level of understanding(Venette, 1998). As the NPDA website explains, "the reader is encouraged to be well-read in current events, as well as history, philosophy, etc. Remember: the realm of knowledge is that of a 'well-read college student'" (NPDA Homepage,http://www.bethel.edu/Majors/Communication/npda/faq2.html). The focus of research is breadth, not depth. In fact, in-depth research into one topic for parliamentary debate would seem to be counterproductive. Every round has a different resolution and for APDA, at least, those resolutions are generally written so they are open to a wide array of case examples, So, developing too narrow of a focus could be competitively fatal. However, research is apparently increasing for parliamentary teams as reports of "stock cases" used by teams for numerous rounds have recently appeared. One coach did state that a perceived "stock case" by one team pushed his debaters to research the topic of AIDS in Africa in order to be equally knowledgeable in that case. Interestingly, the coach also stated that some of their research in preparation for parliamentary debate was affecting the opinions and attitudes of the debaters on the team. Not all debate research appears to generate personal advocacy and challenge peoples' assumptions. Debaters must switch sides, so they must inevitably debate against various cases. While this may seem to be inconsistent with advocacy, supporting and researching both sides of an argument actually created stronger advocates. Not only did debaters learn both sides of an argument, so that they could defend their positions against attack, they also learned the nuances of each position. Learning and the intricate nature of various policy proposals helps debaters to strengthen their own stance on issues

<h4><strong>1 – Clash. A <u>limited topic</u> preserving <u>competitive incentives</u> encourages research and argument refinement over the <u>season</u>. External benefits are logically <u>secondary</u> to procedural ones, but <u>maximizing clash</u> using <u>competitive incentives</u> <u>increases</u> all of them. </h4><p>Iverson ’9</strong> [Joel; 2009; Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Montana, Ph.D in Communication from Arizona State University Relations at the University of Sydney; Debate Central, “Can Cutting Cards Carve into Our Personal Lives: An Analysis of Debate Research on Personal Advocacy,” https://debate.uvm.edu/dybvigiverson1000.html]</p><p>Mitchell (1998) provides a thorough examination of the pedagogical implication for academic debate. Although Mitchell acknowledges that <u><strong><mark>debate</strong> provides <strong>preparation</strong> for</mark> participation in democracy</u>, limiting debate to a laboratory where students practice their skill for future participation is criticized. Mitchell contends: </p><p>For students and teachers of argumentation, the heightened salience of this question should signal the danger that critical thinking and oral advocacy skills alone may not be sufficient for citizens to assert their voices in public deliberation. (p. 45) </p><p>Mitchell contends that the laboratory style setting creates barriers to other spheres, creates a "sense of detachment" and causes debaters to see research from the role of spectators. Mitchell further calls for "<u><strong><mark>argumentative agency</u></strong></mark> [<u>which] involves <mark>the <strong>capacity</strong> to</mark> contextualize</u> and <u><mark>employ</u></mark> the <u><strong>skills and <mark>strategies</u></strong></mark> of argumentative discourse <u><mark>in</u></mark> fields of <u><strong>social <mark>action</u></strong></mark>, especially wider spheres of public deliberation" (p. 45). Although we agree with Mitchell that <u>debate can</u> be an even greater instrument of empowerment for students, we are more interested in examining the impact of the intermediary step of research. In each of Mitchell's examples of debaters finding creative avenues for agency, there had to be a motivation to act. It is our contention that the <u><strong><mark>research</strong></mark> conducted <mark>for <strong>competition</strong> is a</u></mark> major <u><strong><mark>catalyst</u></strong></mark> to propel their action, change their opinions, <u><mark>and</u></mark> to <u><mark>provide a <strong></mark>greater <mark>depth</strong> of <strong>understanding</u></strong></mark> of the issues involved. </p><p>The level of research involved in debate creates an in-depth understanding of issues. The level of research conducted during a year of debate is quite extensive. Goodman (1993) references a Chronicle of Higher Education article that estimated "the level and extent of research required of the average college debater for each topic is equivalent to the amount of research required for a Master's Thesis (cited in Mitchell, 1998, p. 55). With this extensive quantity of research, debaters attain a high level of investigation and (presumably) understanding of a topic. As a result of this level of understanding, debaters become knowledgeable citizens who are further empowered to make informed opinions and energized to take action. Research helps to educate students (and coaches) about the state of the world. </p><p><u><mark>Without </mark>the guidance of a <strong>debate <mark>topic</strong>, how many students would </mark>do <strong>in-depth <mark>research</strong> </mark>on <strong>female genital <mark>mutilation</strong> in Africa, or <strong>U</strong></mark>nited <strong><mark>N</strong></mark>ations <mark>sanctions on Iraq<strong>?</strong></mark> The <strong><mark>competitive</strong></mark> nature of <strong>policy <mark>debate</u></strong> <u>provides an impetus for</mark> <strong>students <mark>to research</u></strong></mark> the topics that they are going to debate. This in turn fuels students’ awareness of issues that go <u><mark>beyond their <strong>front doors</u></strong></mark>. Advocacy flows from this increased awareness. Reading books and articles about the suffering of people thousands of miles away or right in our own communities drives people to become involved in the community at large.</p><p>Research has also focused on how debate prepares us for life in the public sphere. Issues that we discuss in debate have found their way onto the national policy stage, and training in intercollegiate debate <u><mark>makes us good <strong></mark>public <mark>advocates</u></strong></mark>. The public sphere is the arena in which we all must participate to be active citizens. Even after we leave debate, the skills that we have gained should help us to be better advocates and citizens. Research has looked at how debate impacts education (Matlon and Keele 1984), legal training (Parkinson, Gisler and Pelias 1983, Nobles 19850 and behavioral traits (McGlone 1974, Colbert 1994). These works illustrate the impact that public debate has on students as they prepare to enter the public sphere. </p><p><u>The <mark>debaters who</u></mark> take active roles such as <u><mark>protest</mark>ing</u> <u><mark>sanctions were</u></mark> probably <u><mark>not <strong></mark>actively <mark>engaged</strong></mark> in the issue <mark>until</mark> their <mark>research drew them</u></mark> in<u><mark>to the topic</u></mark>. Furthermore, the process of intense research for debate may actually change the positions debaters hold. Since debaters typically enter into a topic with only cursory (if any) knowledge of the issue, the research process provides exposure to issues that were previously unknown. Exposure to the literature on a topic can create, reinforce or alter an individual's opinions. Before learning of the School for the America's, having an opinion of the place is impossible. After hearing about the systematic training of torturers and oppressors in a debate round and reading the research, an opinion of the "school" was developed. In this manner, <u>exposure to debate research as the person finding the evidence</u>, hearing it as the opponent in a debate round (or as judge) <u>acts as a</u>n initial <u>spark of awareness on an issue</u>. This process of discovery seems to have a similar impact to watching an investigative news report.</p><p>Mitchell claimed that debate could be more than it was traditionally seen as, that it could be a catalyst to empower people to act in the social arena. We surmise that there is a step in between the debate and the action. The intermediary step where people are inspired to agency is based on the research that they do. If students are compelled to act, research is a main factor in compelling them to do so. <u><mark>Even if</u></mark> students are <u><strong><mark>not compelled</strong> to take</u></mark> direct <u><mark>action, research <strong></mark>still <mark>changes</strong> opinions</u></mark> and attitudes.</p><p>Research often compels students to take action in the social arena. Debate topics guide students in a direction that allows them to explore what is going on in the world. Last year <u><mark>the</u></mark> college policy debate <u><mark>topic</u></mark> was, </p><p>Resolved: That the <u><strong><mark>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><strong><mark>F</u></strong></mark>ederal <u><strong><mark>G</u></strong></mark>overnment <u><mark>should</u></mark> adopt a policy of constructive engagement, including the immediate removal of all or nearly all economic sanctions, with the government(s) of one or more of the following nation-states: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Syria, North Korea. </p><p>This topic <u><mark>spurred</u></mark> quite a bit of <u><mark>activism</u></mark> on the college debate circuit. Many students become actively involved in protesting for the removal of sanctions from at least one of the topic countries. The <u><mark>college</u></mark> listserve <u><mark>was used to <strong>rally people</strong> in support of</u><strong></mark> </strong>various <u><strong><mark>movements</u></strong></mark> to remove sanctions on both Iraq and Cuba. These messages were posted after the research on the topic began. While this topic did not lend itself to activism beyond rallying the government, other topics have allowed students to take their beliefs outside of the laboratory and into action.</p><p>In addition to creating awareness, the research process can also reinforce or alter opinions. By discovering new information in the research process, people can question their current assumptions and perhaps formulate a more informed opinion. One example comes from a summer debate class for children of Migrant workers in North Dakota (Iverson, 1999). The Junior High aged students chose to debate the adoption of Spanish as an official language in the U.S. Many students expressed their concern that they could not argue effectively against the proposed change because it was a "truism." They were wholly in favor of Spanish as an official language. After researching the topic throughout their six week course, many realized much more was involved in adopting an official language and that they did not "speak 'pure' Spanish or English, but speak a unique dialect and hybrid" (Iverson, p. 3). At the end of the class many students became opposed to adopting Spanish as an official language, but found other ways Spanish should be integrated into American culture. Without research, these students would have maintained their opinions and not enhanced their knowledge of the issue. The students who maintained support of Spanish as an official language were better informed and thus also more capable of articulating support for their beliefs. </p><p>The examples of debate and research impacting the opinions and actions of debaters indicate the strong potential for a direct relationship between debate research and personal advocacy. However, the debate community has not created a new sea of activists immersing this planet in waves of protest and political action. The level of influence debater search has on people needs further exploration. Also, the process of research needs to be more fully explored in order to understand if and why researching for the competitive activity of debate generates more interest than research for other purposes such as classroom projects.</p><p>Since parliamentary debate does not involve research into a single topic, it can provide an important reference point for examining the impact of research in other forms of debate. Based upon limited conversations with competitors and coaches as well as some direct coaching and judging experience in parliamentary debate, parliamentary forms of debate has not seen an increase in activism on the part of debaters in the United States. Although some coaches require research in order to find examples and to stay updated on current events, the basic principle of this research is to have a commonsense level of understanding(Venette, 1998). As the NPDA website explains, "the reader is encouraged to be well-read in current events, as well as history, philosophy, etc. Remember: the realm of knowledge is that of a 'well-read college student'" (NPDA Homepage,http://www.bethel.edu/Majors/Communication/npda/faq2.html<u>). The focus of research is breadth, not depth. In fact, in-depth research into one topic for parliamentary debate would seem to be counterproductive. Every round has a different resolution and for APDA, at least, those resolutions are generally written so they are open to a wide array of case examples, So, developing too narrow of a focus could be competitively fatal. However, research is apparently increasing for parliamentary teams as reports of "stock cases" used by teams for numerous rounds have recently appeared. One coach did state that a perceived "stock case" by one team pushed his debaters to research the topic of AIDS in Africa in order to be equally knowledgeable in that case. Interestingly, the coach also stated that some of their research in preparation for parliamentary debate was affecting the opinions and attitudes of the debaters on the team.</p><p></u>Not all debate research appears to generate personal advocacy and challenge peoples' assumptions. Debaters must switch sides, so they must inevitably debate against various cases. While this may seem to be inconsistent with advocacy, <u><strong>supporting and <mark>researching</strong> both sides of</u></mark> an <u><mark>argument</u></mark> actually <u><mark>created <strong></mark>stronger <mark>advocates</u></strong></mark>. Not only did <u><mark>debaters learn both sides</u></mark> of an argument, <u><mark>so</u></mark> that <u><mark>they could <strong>defend</strong> their positions <strong>against attack</u></strong></mark>, they also learned the nuances of each position. <u><mark>Learning</u></mark> and <u><mark>the <strong></mark>intricate <mark>nature</strong> of</u></mark> various <u><strong>policy <mark>proposals</strong> helps debaters</mark> to <mark>strengthen their <strong></mark>own <mark>stance</mark> on issues</p></u></strong>

1NC

OFF

1

./documents/hspolicy21/Lowell/SaTs/Lowell-Satovsky-Tsan-Neg-1%20-%20Greenhill%20RR-Round5.docx

N

1 - Greenhill RR

5

BPS KZ

Allie Chase Jada Stinnett

1AC - Snake 1NC - T-USFG - Util K - Counter-Poem - Privatization - Bizcon - Newtonian Metaphysics K - Value Procedural - River Rights CP 2NR - T-USFG

hspolicy21/Lowell/SaTs/Lowell-Satovsky-Tsan-Neg-1%20-%20Greenhill%20RR-Round5.docx

SaTs

Lowell SaTs

Je.....

Sa.....

Ta.....

Ts.....

Lowell

Lowell

CA

hspolicy21

HS Policy 2021-22

cx

hs

Withdrawal from Paris will be decided in 2020---staying prevents extinction-level warming

Schlanger 17 –

Schlanger 17 – Zoë Schlanger, Environment Reporter for Quartz and Akshat Rathi, Science Journalist with Quartz, “It’s Official: Trump is Forcing the US to Turn its Back on the Paris Climate Agreement”, Quartz, https://qz.com/996376/trump-has-decided-to-pull-the-us-from-the-paris-climate-agreement/

Trump announced he’s decided to withdraw from Paris The US emits about one-sixth of the planet’s total greenhouse gas emissions, making it the second-largest emitter in the world. The decision removes the US from its commitments to international efforts to reduce fossil-fuel emissions and thereby avoid levels of global temperature rise that imperil the future viability of human life on Earth Trump will abide by the structure laid out in the agreement, which means it could take the US up to four years to actually leave. So the real question of whether the country stays in the Paris climate agreement may be decided by voters in 2020 the presidential election The pledge is symbolically important. It offers offered an assurance to other nations that the country would take responsibility for its own share of global emissions without US participation during what scientists agree are critical years, the hope of avoiding dangerous levels of climate change slips farther away

US emits one-sixth of emissions The decision removes US commitments to reduce and avoid levels of temperature rise that imperil viability of life on Earth Trump will abide by the agreement, the real question of whether the country stays in Paris may be decided in 2020 the election The pledge is symbolically important an assurance that the country would take responsibility for its emissions without US participation during critical years hope of avoiding dangerous climate change slips away

Since Trump reportedly waffled up to the last moment on the Paris agreement decision, we decided to show you what almost could have been. Here’s our story, written both ways. US president Donald Trump announced today (June 1) he’s decided to withdraw the country from the Paris climate agreement. The US emits about one-sixth of the planet’s total greenhouse gas emissions, making it the second-largest emitter in the world. The decision removes the US from its commitments to international efforts to reduce fossil-fuel emissions and thereby avoid levels of global temperature rise that imperil the future viability of human life on Earth. The US joins Nicaragua and Syria as the only countries to reject the Paris agreement. Notably, Nicaragua refused to join because its leadership felt the agreement did not go far enough. Syria, meanwhile, has since 2011 been mired in one of the globe’s most violent civil conflicts. Not leaving means Trump will have to respect the US’s commitments to reduce emissions. Trump will abide by the structure laid out in the agreement, which means it could take the US up to four years to actually leave. So the real question of whether the country stays in the Paris climate agreement may be decided by voters in 2020 the presidential election. Trump, who reportedly was undecided as recently as last evening, ultimately listened to ignored the voices of energy industry giants like ExxonMobil and Shell, coal company Cloud Peak, and Rex Tillerson, his own secretary of state, not to mention some of his most trusted advisors, daughter Ivanka Trump and son-in-law Jared Kushner. He thus ignored instead listened to the climate-denying faction of his inner-circle, including Environmental Protection Agency administrator Scott Pruitt, chief strategist Steve Bannon, and a coterie of 22 Republican senators who sent a letter to the president urging him to back out. (Those senators have collectively received $10 million in campaign contributions from the oil and gas industry since 2012.) The pledge made by the Obama administration to the Paris agreement is was not legally binding, but symbolically important. It offers offered an assurance to other nations that the country would take responsibility for its own share of global emissions. Within weeks of Trump taking office, however, his administration began the process of rolling back key federal emissions standards, making clear that it had no intention of working towards meeting the US’s commitment to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 2025 to about a third of the country’s 2005 emission levels. Without the US, the total number of countries that have formally pledged emissions reductions remains 147 drops to 146, in total accounting for roughly 80% 65% of the planet’s emissions. As the US vacates its seat at the bargaining table, it has partners in it cedes climate leadership to India, China, and the EU, all of which have publicly pledged to strengthen their commitments to mutually reduce emissions. Still, without US participation during what scientists agree are critical years, the hope of avoiding dangerous levels of climate change slips farther away.

<h4>Withdrawal from Paris will be <u>decided in 2020</u>---staying prevents <u>extinction-level</u> warming</h4><p><strong>Schlanger 17 –</strong> Zoë Schlanger, Environment Reporter for Quartz and Akshat Rathi, Science Journalist with Quartz, “It’s Official: Trump is Forcing the US to Turn its Back on the Paris Climate Agreement”, Quartz, https://qz.com/996376/trump-has-decided-to-pull-the-us-from-the-paris-climate-agreement/</p><p>Since Trump reportedly waffled up to the last moment on the Paris agreement decision, we decided to show you what almost could have been. Here’s our story, written both ways. US president Donald <u>Trump announced</u> today (June 1) <u>he’s decided to withdraw</u> the country <u>from</u> the <u>Paris</u> climate agreement. <u>The <mark>US emits</mark> about <mark>one-sixth of</mark> the planet’s total greenhouse gas <mark>emissions</mark>, making it the second-largest emitter in the world. <mark>The decision removes</mark> the <mark>US</mark> from its <mark>commitments to</mark> international efforts to <mark>reduce</mark> fossil-fuel emissions <mark>and</mark> thereby <mark>avoid levels of</mark> global <mark>temperature rise that <strong>imperil</mark> the future <mark>viability of</mark> human <mark>life on Earth</u></strong></mark>. The US joins Nicaragua and Syria as the only countries to reject the Paris agreement. Notably, Nicaragua refused to join because its leadership felt the agreement did not go far enough. Syria, meanwhile, has since 2011 been mired in one of the globe’s most violent civil conflicts. Not leaving means Trump will have to respect the US’s commitments to reduce emissions. <u><mark>Trump will abide by the</mark> structure laid out in the <mark>agreement, </mark>which means it could <strong>take the US up to four years to actually leave</strong>. So <mark>the <strong>real question</strong> of whether the country stays in</mark> the <mark>Paris</mark> climate agreement <mark>may be <strong>decided</mark> by voters <mark>in 2020 the</mark> presidential <mark>election</u></strong></mark>. Trump, who reportedly was undecided as recently as last evening, ultimately listened to ignored the voices of energy industry giants like ExxonMobil and Shell, coal company Cloud Peak, and Rex Tillerson, his own secretary of state, not to mention some of his most trusted advisors, daughter Ivanka Trump and son-in-law Jared Kushner. He thus ignored instead listened to the climate-denying faction of his inner-circle, including Environmental Protection Agency administrator Scott Pruitt, chief strategist Steve Bannon, and a coterie of 22 Republican senators who sent a letter to the president urging him to back out. (Those senators have collectively received $10 million in campaign contributions from the oil and gas industry since 2012.) <u><mark>The pledge</u></mark> made by the Obama administration to the Paris agreement <u><mark>is</u></mark> was not legally binding, but <u><strong><mark>symbolically important</strong></mark>. It offers offered <mark>an <strong>assurance</strong></mark> to other nations <mark>that the country would take responsibility for its</mark> own share of global <mark>emissions</u></mark>. Within weeks of Trump taking office, however, his administration began the process of rolling back key federal emissions standards, making clear that it had no intention of working towards meeting the US’s commitment to cut greenhouse gas emissions by 2025 to about a third of the country’s 2005 emission levels. Without the US, the total number of countries that have formally pledged emissions reductions remains 147 drops to 146, in total accounting for roughly 80% 65% of the planet’s emissions. As the US vacates its seat at the bargaining table, it has partners in it cedes climate leadership to India, China, and the EU, all of which have publicly pledged to strengthen their commitments to mutually reduce emissions. Still, <u><strong><mark>without US participation</strong> during</mark> what scientists agree are <strong><mark>critical years</strong></mark>, the <mark>hope of avoiding <strong>dangerous</mark> levels of <mark>climate change</strong> slips</mark> farther <mark>away</u></mark>.</p>

1NC -- Harvard CM

Off

1NC---2020 DA

./documents/ndtceda18/GeorgeMason/AhHo/George%20Mason-Ahmed-Howley-Neg-Georgetown-Octas.docx

N

Georgetown

Octas

Harvard CM

Buntin, Knez, Klarman

1AC- NFU Ambguity Noko IndoPak 1NC- ESR 2020 TNWs CP Prolif 2NR- TNWs Ambguity Good

ndtceda18/GeorgeMason/AhHo/George%20Mason-Ahmed-Howley-Neg-Georgetown-Octas.docx

AhHo

George Mason AhHo

Ha.....

Ah.....

Sh.....

Ho.....

GeorgeMason

George Mason

ndtceda18

NDT/CEDA 2018-19

cx

college

Only Russia war causes extinction – regional nuclear wars don’t

Cotton-Barratt 17

Cotton-Barratt 17 [Owen Cotton-Barratt, et al, PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute, 2/3/2017, Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf]

even in an all-out nuclear war between the U S and Russia neither country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast The aftermath could be much worse burning flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere a nuclear winter an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 5 years. This could leave some survivors but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great. An exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would put two billion at risk though this might be pessimistic Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to human extinction It is difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war the most likely nuclear war is between India and Pakistan However, given the relatively modest size of their arsenals, the risk of human extinction is plausibly greater from a conflict between the U S and Russia

nuclear war between the U S and Russia aftermath could be much worse burning send smoke into the atmosphere 4,000 weapons making it impossible to grow food threat of extinction would be great exchange is only possible between the US and Russia who have 90% of the world’s weapons regional nuclear war are unlikely to lead to extinction extinction is plausibly greater from conflict between the U S and Russia

The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, even in an all-out nuclear war between the United States and Russia, despite horrific casualties, neither country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed by the direct effects of the blast, fire, and radiation.8 The aftermath could be much worse: the burning of flammable materials could send massive amounts of smoke into the atmosphere, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – a nuclear winter. According to one model 9 , an all-out exchange of 4,000 weapons10 could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, making it impossible to grow food for 4 to 5 years. This could leave some survivors in parts of Australia and New Zealand, but they would be in a very precarious situation and the threat of extinction from other sources would be great. An exchange on this scale is only possible between the US and Russia who have more than 90% of the world’s nuclear weapons, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models suggest that even a small regional nuclear war involving 100 nuclear weapons would produce a nuclear winter serious enough to put two billion people at risk of starvation,12 though this estimate might be pessimistic.13 Wars on this scale are unlikely to lead to outright human extinction, but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns. It is very difficult to precisely estimate the probability of existential risk from nuclear war over the next century, and existing attempts leave very large confidence intervals. According to many experts, the most likely nuclear war at present is between India and Pakistan.14 However, given the relatively modest size of their arsenals, the risk of human extinction is plausibly greater from a conflict between the United States and Russia. Tensions between these countries have increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future.

<h4>Only Russia war causes <u>extinction</u> – <u>regional</u> nuclear wars <u>don’t</h4><p></u><strong>Cotton-Barratt 17</strong> [Owen Cotton-Barratt, et al, PhD in Pure Mathematics, Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at Oxford, Research Associate at the Future of Humanity Institute, 2/3/2017, Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf]</p><p>The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki demonstrated the unprecedented destructive power of nuclear weapons. However, <u>even in an all-out <mark>nuclear war between the <strong>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><mark>and <strong>Russia</u></strong></mark>, despite horrific casualties, <u>neither country’s population is likely to be completely destroyed <strong>by the direct effects of the blast</u></strong>, fire, and radiation.8 <u>The <mark>aftermath could be <strong>much worse</u></strong></mark>: the <u><mark>burning</u></mark> of <u>flammable materials could <mark>send</mark> massive amounts of <mark>smoke into the atmosphere</u></mark>, which would absorb sunlight and cause sustained global cooling, severe ozone loss, and agricultural disruption – <u><strong>a nuclear winter</u></strong>.</p><p>According to one model 9 , <u>an all-out exchange of <mark>4,000 weapons</u></mark>10 <u>could lead to a drop in global temperatures of around 8°C, <mark>making it <strong>impossible to grow food</mark> for</u></strong> 4 to <u><strong>5 years</strong>. This could leave some survivors</u> in parts of Australia and New Zealand, <u>but they would be in a very precarious situation and the <strong><mark>threat of extinction </mark>from other sources <mark>would be great</strong></mark>. An <mark>exchange </mark>on this scale <mark>is <strong>only possible between the US and Russia</strong> who have</mark> more than <mark>90% of the world’s </mark>nuclear <mark>weapons</u></mark>, with stockpiles of around 4,500 warheads each, although many are not operationally deployed.11 Some models suggest that even <u>a small <mark>regional nuclear war</mark> involving 100 nuclear weapons would</u> produce a nuclear winter serious enough to <u>put two billion</u> people <u>at risk</u> of starvation,12 <u>though this</u> estimate <u><strong>might be pessimistic</u></strong>.13 <u>Wars on this scale <mark>are <strong>unlikely to lead to</u></strong></mark> outright <u><strong>human <mark>extinction</u></strong></mark>, but this does suggest that conflicts which are around an order of magnitude larger may be likely to threaten civilisation. It should be emphasised that there is very large uncertainty about the effects of a large nuclear war on global climate. This remains an area where increased academic research work, including more detailed climate modelling and a better understanding of how survivors might be able to cope and adapt, would have high returns.</p><p><u>It is</u> very <u>difficult to precisely estimate the probability of <strong>existential risk from nuclear war</u></strong> over the next century, and existing attempts leave very large confidence intervals. According to many experts, <u>the most likely nuclear war</u> at present <u>is between India and Pakistan</u>.14 <u>However, given the relatively modest size of their arsenals, the risk of human <mark>extinction is <strong>plausibly greater</strong> from</mark> a <mark>conflict between the <strong>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><mark>and <strong>Russia</u></strong></mark>. Tensions between these countries have increased in recent years and it seems unreasonable to rule out the possibility of them rising further in the future. </p>

Advantage

./documents/hsld19/Loyola/Pr/Loyola-Pribe-Aff-Strake%20Online-Round1.docx

A

Strake Online

1

Wakanda AP

Elijah Pitt

1AC - ICBM VRussia V2 NC - Antiblackness K 1AR - Covered 2NR - Antiblackness K 2AR - Covered

hsld19/Loyola/Pr/Loyola-Pribe-Aff-Strake%20Online-Round1.docx

AnPr

Loyola AnPr

An.....

Pr.....

Loyola

Loyola

CA

hsld19

HS LD 2019-20

ld

hs

Spoilers will ruin the process.

Basu ’5-18

Basu ’5-18 — Zachary; national security reporter at Axios. "Strongmen spoilers in Turkey and Hungary threaten Western unity"; Axios; https://www.axios.com/2022/05/18/turkey- NATO-finland-sweden-hungary-russia; //CYang

Erdoğan employing hostage-taking also practiced by Hungary which singlehandedly blocking European from imposing embargo on Russian oil outsized influence of single-member states in NATO undermining the united front leaders have touted as key to effectively responding Erdoğan believes he's free to do whatever he wants hard to stand up to Erdogan on this issue given high stakes and the unique role Turkey is playing stunt set a precedent other NATO leaders to essentially seek bribes in moments of crisis Hungary's a spoiler Hungary's far-right Orbán the most pro-Russian leader for weeks used his veto to prevent banning imports of Russian oil leverage to pressure Hungary a financial compensation package effectively neutralizing landmark decision to withhold pandemic recovery funds from Hungary

Erdoğan employing hostage-taking influence of single states undermin united front Erdoğan do whatever he wants hard to stand up given role Turkey is playing stunt set precedent other NATO leaders seek bribes in crisis Hungary's spoiler used veto to prevent banning Russian oil neutralizing landmark decision

Why it matters: Critics have accused Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of employing a "hostage-taking" tactic also practiced by Hungary, which for weeks has been singlehandedly blocking the European Union from imposing an embargo on Russian oil. The outsized influence of single-member states in the EU and NATO has drawn increased scrutiny in recent years, especially as both Hungary and Turkey have drifted toward authoritarianism and strengthened their ties with Russia. Their resistance to two critical Western priorities risks undermining the united front that leaders like President Biden have touted as key to effectively responding to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Driving the news: U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who has said he is "very confident" all NATO allies will ultimately approve Sweden and Finland's applications, will meet on Wednesday with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. Çavuşoğlu said Sunday that in exchange for Turkey lifting its opposition, Sweden and Finland must end their alleged support for Kurdish groups that Turkey views as terrorists and a top national security threat. Turkey is also expected to use its leverage to seek bilateral concessions from the U.S., including speeding up the potential sale of F-16 fighter jets. Between the liens: Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı, director of the German Marshall Fund's office in Ankara, told Axios that Erdoğan "saw an opportunity to extract some benefits both for Turkey and for his own political standing" ahead of a crucial election next year. Erdoğan believes he's "more or less free to do whatever he wants," Ünlühisarcıklı said. He argued it's hard to stand up to Erdogan on this issue, given the high stakes of Sweden and Finland's NATO applications, and the unique role Turkey is playing in Ukraine as both a mediator in peace talks and supplier of highly effective drones. Critics, meanwhile, say the stunt could set a precedent for other NATO leaders to essentially seek bribes in moments of crisis — with some going as far as to call Turkey a "Trojan horse" within the Western alliance. Zoom out: That label has long been used to describe Hungary's role as a spoiler within the EU. Hungary's far-right prime minister Viktor Orbán is viewed as the most pro-Russian leader in the EU, and for weeks has used his veto to prevent the bloc from banning imports of Russian oil. In the meantime, Orbán has used his leverage to pressure the EU to send Hungary a financial compensation package — effectively neutralizing Brussels' landmark decision this year to withhold pandemic recovery funds from Hungary over its democratic backsliding.

<h4>Spoilers will <u>ruin</u> the process.</h4><p><strong>Basu ’5-18</strong> — Zachary; national security reporter at Axios. "Strongmen spoilers in Turkey and Hungary threaten Western unity"; Axios; https://www.axios.com/2022/05/18/turkey- NATO-finland-sweden-hungary-russia; //CYang</p><p>Why it matters: Critics have accused Turkish President Recep Tayyip <u><mark>Erdoğan</u></mark> of <u><mark>employing</u></mark> a "<u><strong><mark>hostage-taking</u></strong></mark>" tactic <u>also practiced by Hungary</u>, <u>which</u> for weeks has been <u>singlehandedly blocking</u> the <u>European</u> Union <u>from imposing</u> an <u>embargo on Russian oil</u>. The <u><strong>outsized <mark>influence</strong> of single</mark>-member <mark>states</mark> in</u> the EU and <u>NATO</u> has drawn increased scrutiny in recent years, especially as both Hungary and Turkey have drifted toward authoritarianism and strengthened their ties with Russia. Their resistance to two critical Western priorities risks <u><mark>undermin</mark>ing the <strong><mark>united front</u></strong></mark> that <u>leaders</u> like President Biden <u>have <strong>touted</strong> as key to <strong>effectively responding</u></strong> to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Driving the news: U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken, who has said he is "very confident" all NATO allies will ultimately approve Sweden and Finland's applications, will meet on Wednesday with Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. Çavuşoğlu said Sunday that in exchange for Turkey lifting its opposition, Sweden and Finland must end their alleged support for Kurdish groups that Turkey views as terrorists and a top national security threat. Turkey is also expected to use its leverage to seek bilateral concessions from the U.S., including speeding up the potential sale of F-16 fighter jets. Between the liens: Özgür Ünlühisarcıklı, director of the German Marshall Fund's office in Ankara, told Axios that Erdoğan "saw an opportunity to extract some benefits both for Turkey and for his own political standing" ahead of a crucial election next year. <u><mark>Erdoğan</mark> believes he's</u> "more or less <u>free to <mark>do <strong>whatever he wants</u></strong></mark>," Ünlühisarcıklı said. He argued it's <u><mark>hard to stand up</mark> to Erdogan on this issue</u>, <u><mark>given</u></mark> the <u>high stakes</u> of Sweden and Finland's NATO applications, <u>and the <strong>unique <mark>role</strong> Turkey is playing</u></mark> in Ukraine as both a mediator in peace talks and supplier of highly effective drones. Critics, meanwhile, say the <u><mark>stunt</u></mark> could <u><mark>set</mark> a <strong><mark>precedent</u></strong></mark> for <u><mark>other NATO leaders</mark> to <strong>essentially <mark>seek</strong> bribes in</mark> moments of <mark>crisis</u></mark> — with some going as far as to call Turkey a "Trojan horse" within the Western alliance. Zoom out: That label has long been used to describe <u><mark>Hungary's</u></mark> role as <u>a <strong><mark>spoiler</u></strong></mark> within the EU. <u>Hungary's far-right</u> prime minister Viktor <u>Orbán</u> is viewed as <u>the <strong>most pro-Russian leader</u></strong> in the EU, and <u>for weeks</u> has <u><mark>used</mark> his <strong><mark>veto</strong> to prevent</u></mark> the bloc from <u><mark>banning</mark> imports of <mark>Russian oil</u></mark>. In the meantime, Orbán has used his <u>leverage to pressure</u> the EU to send <u>Hungary a <strong>financial compensation</strong> package</u> — <u><strong>effectively <mark>neutralizing</u></strong></mark> Brussels' <u><strong><mark>landmark decision</u></strong></mark> this year <u>to withhold pandemic recovery funds from Hungary</u> over its democratic backsliding.</p>

1NC

Solvency

1NC---Solvency---Always

./documents/hspolicy22/NilesNorth/BuSi/NilesNorth-BuSi-Neg-University-of-Michigan-HS-Debate-Tournament-Round-2.docx

N

University of Michigan HS Debate Tournament

2

Glenbrook South JY

Cameron

1AC---Space Assets 1NC---DOS CP, EU CP, DOD DA

hspolicy22/NilesNorth/BuSi/NilesNorth-BuSi-Neg-University-of-Michigan-HS-Debate-Tournament-Round-2.docx

2022-11-16 03:09:17

BuSi

Niles North BuSi

alex 1A/2N- she/they mustafa 2A/1N - he/him email chain: [email protected] AND [email protected]

Al.....

Bu.....

Mu.....

Si.....

NilesNorth

Niles North

IL

hspolicy22

HS Policy 2022-23

cx

hs

Empirics prove – opening borders is the strongest driver of a global movement towards populism

Dion 19

Stéphane Dion 19 {Special Envoy of Canada’s Prime Minister to the European Union and Europe, and Ambassador of Canada to Germany} - ("“Cultural insecurity as the main root cause of populism”," GAC, published 11-8-2019, accessed 12-15-2022, https://www.international.gc.ca/country_news-pays_nouvelles/2019-10-08-germany-allemagne.aspx?lang=eng)//marlborough-wr/

the most prevalent variant of populism is the right-wing one, and its main driver is ethno cultural anxiety linked to the fear of uncontrolled migration. Cultural backlash against immigration is, by far, the main predictor of right-wing populist vote. Much more than economic anxiety or distress, populism’s appeal is correlated with a growing sense of cultural insecurity. Populism’s supporters are hostile towards immigration, and give a high premium to authoritarian values such as stability, order and tradition. so many voters are inclined to let their voting preferences be guided by their cultural and identity concerns over economic interests.  For them, “it’s the migration, stupid.” Populists speak about migration as an existential threat to national culture Everywhere, populism has influenced mainstream political parties’ platforms and discourse. This creates an especially difficult political arena for center-left parties, who are struggling to campaign and build their credibility with voters on issues like “identity” and cultural security. With the political spectrum polarizing, it becomes harder to build consensus, and to build the coalitions systems require for effective, stable governance. Central, Eastern and Balkan European post-communist countries have had little recent experience with immigration, especially with non-Christian immigration, and consider it with much apprehension it is in the racially homogeneous community zones with the lowest percentage of foreign born people that the vote for anti-immigration parties is the highest. These towns and rural areas like their homogeneous societies and fear the cosmopolitanism that they see in large metropolitan cities Everywhere, one will find aging ethnically homogeneous towns and rural areas in demographic decline, economically stagnant and unable to retain their young people.   As a result, they are losing confidence in the future of their way of life. Campaigns to restrict immigration provide strong appeal to them, offering hope to protect the world they know countries feel threatened by the prospect of immigration, especially when it is juxtaposed with the economic emigration of their own populations, which is resulting in a massive brain drain and a collective societal loss. The existential fear of disappearing continues to be part of their collective memory. Now that they are finally able to enjoy their own sovereignty, large parts of their population desire an ethnically homogeneous state, as a safety net.

populism main driver is fear of uncontrolled migration Cultural backlash is by far, the main predictor Much more than economic distress supporters are hostile towards immigration Populists speak about migration as an existential threat to national culture Everywhere populism creates difficult arena for center-left struggling to build credibility With the political spectrum polarizing it becomes harder to build consensus and coalitions racially homogeneous community fear cosmopolitanism Everywhere rural areas in demographic decline, economically stagnant and unable to retain people they are losing confidence in the future countries feel threatened by immigration especially juxtaposed with economic emigration resulting in brain drain

However, the most prevalent variant of populism is the right-wing one, and its main driver is ethno cultural anxiety linked to the fear of uncontrolled migration. Cultural backlash against immigration is, by far, the main predictor of right-wing populist vote. Much more than economic anxiety or distress, populism’s appeal is correlated with a growing sense of cultural insecurity. Populism’s supporters are hostile towards immigration, and give a high premium to authoritarian values such as stability, order and tradition. One might almost say “it’s NOT the economy, stupid”, being that so many voters are inclined to let their voting preferences be guided by their cultural and identity concerns over economic interests.  For them, “it’s the migration, stupid.” Populists speak about migration – and Islam in particular – as an existential threat to national culture and to Western civilization. Everywhere, populism has influenced mainstream political parties’ platforms and discourse. This creates an especially difficult political arena for center-left parties, who are struggling to campaign and build their credibility with voters on issues like “identity” and cultural security. With the political spectrum polarizing, it becomes harder to build consensus, and to build the coalitions that so many European electoral systems require for effective, stable governance. Central, Eastern and Balkan European post-communist countries are the only region where populists routinely beat mainstream parties in elections.  These countries are new democracies and have had little recent experience with immigration, especially with non-Christian immigration, and consider it with much apprehension.2 We should not be surprised by the fact that the countries having little experience of immigration - especially non-white and non-Christian immigration - register an exceptionally strong cultural backlash against it. Similarly, everywhere in Europe, it is in the racially homogeneous community zones with the lowest percentage of foreign born people that the vote for anti-immigration parties is the highest. These towns and rural areas like their homogeneous societies and fear the cosmopolitanism that they see in large metropolitan cities like London, Paris or Vienna. Similarly, in the United States, “the racial and ethnic isolation of whites at the zip code level is one of the strongest predictors of Trump support.”3 Everywhere, one will find aging ethnically homogeneous towns and rural areas in demographic decline, economically stagnant and unable to retain their young people.   As a result, they are losing confidence in the future of their way of life. Campaigns to restrict immigration provide strong appeal to them, offering hope to protect the world they know.4 A sense of demographic displacement is also at play. Many countries feel threatened by the prospect of immigration, especially when it is juxtaposed with the economic emigration of their own populations, which is resulting in a massive brain drain and a collective societal loss. In post-communist European countries, some of which have almost disappeared over the two last centuries, or at minimum have been dominated by various imperial powers, an aging non-renewing population is all the more vulnerable to nativist populist rhetoric.  The existential fear of disappearing continues to be part of their collective memory. Now that they are finally able to enjoy their own sovereignty, large parts of their population desire an ethnically homogeneous state, as a safety net.

<h4>Empirics prove – opening borders is the <u>strongest driver</u> of a <u>global</u> movement towards populism</h4><p>Stéphane <strong>Dion 19<u></strong> {Special Envoy of Canada’s Prime Minister to the European Union and Europe, and Ambassador of Canada to Germany} - ("“Cultural insecurity as the main root cause of populism”," GAC, published 11-8-2019, accessed 12-15-2022, https://www.international.gc.ca/country_news-pays_nouvelles/2019-10-08-germany-allemagne.aspx?lang=eng)//marlborough-wr/</p><p></u>However, <u>the most prevalent variant of <mark>populism</mark> is the right-wing one, and its <strong><mark>main driver</strong> is</mark> ethno cultural anxiety linked to the <strong><mark>fear of uncontrolled migration</strong></mark>.</u> <u><mark>Cultural</mark> <mark>backlash</mark> against immigration <mark>is</mark>, <strong><mark>by far, the main predictor</strong></mark> of right-wing populist vote.</u> <u><strong><mark>Much more than economic</mark> anxiety or <mark>distress</strong></mark>, populism’s appeal is correlated with a growing sense of cultural insecurity. Populism’s <mark>supporters</mark> <mark>are <strong>hostile towards immigration</strong></mark>, and give a high premium to authoritarian values such as stability, order and tradition. </p><p></u>One might almost say “it’s NOT the economy, stupid”, being that <u>so many voters are inclined to let their voting preferences be guided by their cultural and identity concerns over economic interests.  For them, “<strong>it’s the migration, stupid</strong>.”</p><p><mark>Populists</mark> <mark>speak about migration</u></mark> – and Islam in particular – <u><mark>as</mark> <mark>an <strong>existential threat to national culture</u></strong></mark> and to Western civilization. <u><strong><mark>Everywhere</strong></mark>, <mark>populism</mark> has influenced mainstream political parties’ platforms and discourse. This <mark>creates</mark> an especially <strong><mark>difficult</mark> political <mark>arena</mark> <mark>for center-left</mark> parties</strong>, who are <mark>struggling</mark> <mark>to</mark> campaign and <mark>build</mark> their <mark>credibility</mark> with voters on issues like “identity” and cultural security. <mark>With</mark> <mark>the</mark> <strong><mark>political spectrum polarizing</strong></mark>, <mark>it becomes <strong>harder to build consensus</strong></mark>, <mark>and</mark> to build the <mark>coalitions</u></mark> that so many European electoral <u>systems require for effective, stable governance.</p><p>Central, Eastern and Balkan European post-communist countries</u> are the only region where populists routinely beat mainstream parties in elections.  These countries are new democracies and <u>have had little recent experience with immigration, especially with non-Christian immigration, and consider it with much apprehension</u>.2</p><p>We should not be surprised by the fact that the countries having little experience of immigration - especially non-white and non-Christian immigration - register an exceptionally strong cultural backlash against it. Similarly, everywhere in Europe, <u>it is in the <mark>racially</mark> <mark>homogeneous</mark> <mark>community</mark> zones with the lowest percentage of foreign born people that the vote for anti-immigration parties is the highest. These towns and rural areas like their homogeneous societies and <strong><mark>fear</mark> the <mark>cosmopolitanism</strong></mark> that they see in large metropolitan cities</u> like London, Paris or Vienna. Similarly, in the United States, “the racial and ethnic isolation of whites at the zip code level is one of the strongest predictors of Trump support.”3</p><p><u><strong><mark>Everywhere</strong></mark>, one will find aging ethnically homogeneous towns and <mark>rural areas <strong>in demographic decline, economically stagnant and unable to retain</mark> their young <mark>people</strong></mark>.   As a result, <mark>they</mark> <mark>are</mark> <strong><mark>losing confidence in the future</strong></mark> of their way of life. Campaigns to restrict immigration provide strong appeal to them, offering hope to protect the world they know</u>.4</p><p>A sense of demographic displacement is also at play. Many <u><mark>countries</mark> <mark>feel</mark> <strong><mark>threatened</mark> <mark>by</mark> the prospect of <mark>immigration</strong></mark>, <mark>especially</mark> when it is <strong><mark>juxtaposed</mark> <mark>with</mark> the <mark>economic</mark> <mark>emigration</strong></mark> of their own populations, which is <mark>resulting</mark> <mark>in</mark> a massive <strong><mark>brain drain</strong></mark> and a collective societal loss.</p><p></u>In post-communist European countries, some of which have almost disappeared over the two last centuries, or at minimum have been dominated by various imperial powers, an aging non-renewing population is all the more vulnerable to nativist populist rhetoric.  <u>The existential fear of disappearing continues to be part of their collective memory. Now that they are finally able to enjoy their own sovereignty, large parts of their population desire an ethnically homogeneous state, as a safety net.</p></u>

USC R5 NC

2

./documents/hsld22/Marlborough/KaMe/Marlborough-KaMe-Neg-USC-Trojan-Invitational-Round-5.docx

N

USC Trojan Invitational

5

Harvard-Westlake AW

Dosch

ac- rights and econ nc- cap k, populism da, case 1ar-all nr- k 2ar-k

hsld22/Marlborough/KaMe/Marlborough-KaMe-Neg-USC-Trojan-Invitational-Round-5.docx

2023-02-26 16:49:12

KaMe

Marlborough KaMe

Ka.....

Me.....

Marlborough

Marlborough

CA

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

ld

hs

3 — Social Psychology: Neurological, racial bias is flexible and determined by coalitional habit forming in the brain – orienting groups around institutional change best breaks down bias. This is offense because their theory rejects these solutions.

Cikara and Van Bavel 15

Cikara and Van Bavel 15. (Mina Cikara is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Intergroup Neuroscience Lab at Harvard University. Her research examines the conditions under which groups and individuals are denied social value, agency, and empathy. Jay Van Bavel is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Social Perception and Evaluation Laboratory at New York University. The Flexibility of Racial Bias: Research suggests that racism is not hard wired, offering hope on one of America’s enduring problems. June 2, 2015. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-flexibility-of-racial-bias/)

Institutional and systemic racism reinforce discrimination in countless situations, including hiring, sentencing, housing, and even mortgage lending It would be easy to see in all this powerful evidence that racism is a permanent fixture in America’s social fabric and an inevitable aspect of human nature Extensive research has found that these implicit racial biases—negative thoughts and feelings about people from other races—are automatic, pervasive, and difficult to suppress Early studies found that when people viewed faces of another race, the amount of activity in the amygdala—a small brain structure associated with experiencing emotions, including fear—was associated with individual differences on implicit measures of racial bias There is little question that race play a major role in shaping the biases and stereotypes that people bring to bear in their judgments of others However research has shown that how people categorize themselves may be just as fundamental to understanding prejudice as how they categorize others findings highlight the remarkable ease with which humans form coalitions Recent research confirms that coalition-based preferences trump race-based preferences both Democrats and Republicans favor the resumes of those affiliated with their political party much more than they favor those who share their race coalition-based preferences remain powerful even in the absence of the animosity present in electoral politics research has shown that the simple act of placing people on a mixed-race team can diminish their automatic racial bias. White participants who were randomly placed on a mixed-race team—the Tigers or Lions—showed little evidence of implicit racial bias Merely belonging to a mixed-race team trigged positive automatic associations with all of the members of their own group, irrespective of race Being a part of one of these seemingly trivial mixed-race groups produced similar effects on brain activity—the amygdala responded to team membership rather than race these studies indicate that momentary changes in group membership can override the influence of race on the way we see, think about, and feel toward people who are different from ourselves Just as a particular person’s group membership can be flexible, so too are the relations between groups. Groups that have previously had cordial relations may become rivals (and vice versa) psychological and biological responses to out-group members can change all out-groups are treated the same: some elicit indifference whereas others become targets of antipathy. Stereotypically threatening groups are especially likely to be targeted with violence, but those stereotypes can be tempered with other information. If perceptions of intergroup relations can be changed, individuals may overcome hostility toward perceived foes and become more responsive to one another’s grievances. The flexible nature of both group membership and intergroup relations offers reason to be optimistic about the potential for greater cooperation among groups in conflict One strategy is to bring multiple groups together around a common goal creating a sense of cohesion between two competitive groups can increase empathy for the suffering of our rivals These strategies reduce aggression toward hostile out-groups, which is critical for creating more opportunities for constructive dialogue addressing greater social injustices. Even in cases where it isn’t possible to create a common identity among groups in conflict, it may be possible to blur the boundaries between groups we have a responsibility to reduce prejudice and discrimination findings from psychology and neuroscience indicate that we, as individuals, possess this capacity Ultimately, only collective action and institutional evolution can address systemic racism The science is clear on one thing, though: individual bias and discrimination are changeable. Race-based prejudice and discrimination, in particular, are created and reinforced by many social factors, but they are not inevitable consequences of our biology

It would be easy to see evidence that racism is permanent and inevitable how people categorize themselves may be fundamental to prejudice coalition preferences trump race both Democrats and Republicans favor their party more than their race placing people on a mixed-race team can diminish automatic bias. belonging to a mixed-race team trigged positive automatic associations the amygdala responded to team rather than race responses to out-group members can change stereotypes can be tempered with other info If individuals overcome hostility and become more responsive The flexible nature offers reason to be optimistic about coop among groups in conflict One strategy is to bring groups together around a common goal creating cohesion can increase empathy These reduce aggression toward out-groups, which is critical for constructive dialogue addressing injustices. only collective action and institutional evolution can address systemic racism The science is clear individual bias and discrimination are changeable Race-based prejudice are created and reinforced by social factors, not inevitable consequences of biology

The city of Baltimore was rocked by protests and riots over the death of Freddie Gray, a 25-year-old African American man who died in police custody. Tragically, Gray’s death was only one of a recent in a series of racially-charged, often violent, incidents. On April 4th, Walter Scott was fatally shot by a police officer after fleeing from a routine traffic stop. On March 8th, Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity members were caught on camera gleefully chanting, “There Will Never Be A N***** In SAE.” On March 1st, a homeless Black man was shot in broad daylight by a Los Angeles police officer. And these are not isolated incidents, of course. Institutional and systemic racism reinforce discrimination in countless situations, including hiring, sentencing, housing, and even mortgage lending. It would be easy to see in all this powerful evidence that racism is a permanent fixture in America’s social fabric and even, perhaps, an inevitable aspect of human nature. Indeed, the mere act of labeling others according to their age, gender, or race is a reflexive habit of the human mind. Social categories, like race, impact our thinking quickly, often outside of our awareness. Extensive research has found that these implicit racial biases—negative thoughts and feelings about people from other races—are automatic, pervasive, and difficult to suppress. Neuroscientists have also explored racial prejudice by exposing people to images of faces while scanning their brains in fMRI machines. Early studies found that when people viewed faces of another race, the amount of activity in the amygdala—a small brain structure associated with experiencing emotions, including fear—was associated with individual differences on implicit measures of racial bias. This work has led many to conclude that racial biases might be part of a primitive—and possibly hard-wired—neural fear response to racial out-groups. There is little question that categories such as race, gender, and age play a major role in shaping the biases and stereotypes that people bring to bear in their judgments of others. However, research has shown that how people categorize themselves may be just as fundamental to understanding prejudice as how they categorize others. When people categorize themselves as part of a group, their self-concept shifts from the individual (“I”) to the collective level (“us”). People form groups rapidly and favor members of their own group even when groups are formed on arbitrary grounds, such as the simple flip of a coin. These findings highlight the remarkable ease with which humans form coalitions. Recent research confirms that coalition-based preferences trump race-based preferences. For example, both Democrats and Republicans favor the resumes of those affiliated with their political party much more than they favor those who share their race. These coalition-based preferences remain powerful even in the absence of the animosity present in electoral politics. Our research has shown that the simple act of placing people on a mixed-race team can diminish their automatic racial bias. In a series of experiments, White participants who were randomly placed on a mixed-race team—the Tigers or Lions—showed little evidence of implicit racial bias. Merely belonging to a mixed-race team trigged positive automatic associations with all of the members of their own group, irrespective of race. Being a part of one of these seemingly trivial mixed-race groups produced similar effects on brain activity—the amygdala responded to team membership rather than race. Taken together, these studies indicate that momentary changes in group membership can override the influence of race on the way we see, think about, and feel toward people who are different from ourselves. Although these coalition-based distinctions might be the most basic building block of bias, they say little about the other factors that cause group conflict. Why do some groups get ignored while others get attacked? Whenever we encounter a new person or group we are motivated to answer two questions as quickly as possible: “is this person a friend or foe?” and “are they capable of enacting their intentions toward me?” In other words, once we have determined that someone is a member of an out-group, we need to determine what kind? The nature of the relations between groups—are we cooperative, competitive, or neither?—and their relative status—do you have access to resources?—largely determine the course of intergroup interactions. Groups that are seen as competitive with one’s interests, and capable of enacting their nasty intentions, are much more likely to be targets of hostility than more benevolent (e.g., elderly) or powerless (e.g., homeless) groups. This is one reason why sports rivalries have such psychological potency. For instance, fans of the Boston Red Sox are more likely to feel pleasure, and exhibit reward-related neural responses, at the misfortunes of the archrival New York Yankees than other baseball teams (and vice versa)—especially in the midst of a tight playoff race. (How much fans take pleasure in the misfortunes of their rivals is also linked to how likely they would be to harm fans from the other team.) Just as a particular person’s group membership can be flexible, so too are the relations between groups. Groups that have previously had cordial relations may become rivals (and vice versa). Indeed, psychological and biological responses to out-group members can change, depending on whether or not that out-group is perceived as threatening. For example, people exhibit greater pleasure—they smile—in response to the misfortunes of stereotypically competitive groups (e.g., investment bankers); however, this malicious pleasure is reduced when you provide participants with counter-stereotypic information (e.g., “investment bankers are working with small companies to help them weather the economic downturn). Competition between “us” and “them” can even distort our judgments of distance, making threatening out-groups seem much closer than they really are. These distorted perceptions can serve to amplify intergroup discrimination: the more different and distant “they” are, the easier it is to disrespect and harm them. Thus, not all out-groups are treated the same: some elicit indifference whereas others become targets of antipathy. Stereotypically threatening groups are especially likely to be targeted with violence, but those stereotypes can be tempered with other information. If perceptions of intergroup relations can be changed, individuals may overcome hostility toward perceived foes and become more responsive to one another’s grievances. The flexible nature of both group membership and intergroup relations offers reason to be cautiously optimistic about the potential for greater cooperation among groups in conflict (be they black versus white or citizens versus police). One strategy is to bring multiple groups together around a common goal. For example, during the fiercely contested 2008 Democratic presidential primary process, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama supporters gave more money to strangers who supported the same primary candidate (compared to the rival candidate). Two months later, after the Democratic National Convention, the supporters of both candidates coalesced around the party nominee—Barack Obama—and this bias disappeared. In fact, merely creating a sense of cohesion between two competitive groups can increase empathy for the suffering of our rivals. These sorts of strategies can help reduce aggression toward hostile out-groups, which is critical for creating more opportunities for constructive dialogue addressing greater social injustices. Of course, instilling a sense of common identity and cooperation is extremely difficult in entrenched intergroup conflicts, but when it happens, the benefits are obvious. Consider how the community leaders in New York City and Ferguson responded differently to protests against police brutality—in NYC political leaders expressed grief and concern over police brutality and moved quickly to make policy changes in policing, whereas the leaders and police in Ferguson responded with high-tech military vehicles and riot gear. In the first case, multiple groups came together with a common goal—to increase the safety of everyone in the community; in the latter case, the actions of the police likely reinforced the “us” and “them” distinctions. Tragically, these types of conflicts continue to roil the country. Understanding the psychology and neuroscience of social identity and intergroup relations cannot undo the effects of systemic racism and discriminatory practices; however, it can offer insights into the psychological processes responsible for escalating the tension between, for example, civilians and police officers. Even in cases where it isn’t possible to create a common identity among groups in conflict, it may be possible to blur the boundaries between groups. In one recent experiment, we sorted participants into groups—red versus blue team—competing for a cash prize. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to see a picture of a segregated social network of all the players, in which red dots clustered together, blue dots clustered together, and the two clusters were separated by white space. The other half of the participants saw an integrated social network in which the red and blue dots were mixed together in one large cluster. Participants who thought the two teams were interconnected with one another reported greater empathy for the out-group players compared to those who had seen the segregated network. Thus, reminding people that individuals could be connected to one another despite being from different groups may be another way to build trust and understanding among them. A mere month before Freddie Gray died in police custody, President Obama addressed the nation on the 50th anniversary of Bloody Sunday in Selma: “We do a disservice to the cause of justice by intimating that bias and discrimination are immutable, or that racial division is inherent to America. To deny…progress – our progress – would be to rob us of our own agency; our responsibility to do what we can to make America better." The president was saying that we, as a society, have a responsibility to reduce prejudice and discrimination. These recent findings from psychology and neuroscience indicate that we, as individuals, possess this capacity. Of course this capacity is not sufficient to usher in racial equality or peace. Even when the level of prejudice against particular out-groups decreases, it does not imply that the level of institutional discrimination against these or other groups will necessarily improve. Ultimately, only collective action and institutional evolution can address systemic racism. The science is clear on one thing, though: individual bias and discrimination are changeable. Race-based prejudice and discrimination, in particular, are created and reinforced by many social factors, but they are not inevitable consequences of our biology. Perhaps understanding how coalitional thinking impacts intergroup relations will make it easier for us to affect real social change going forward.

<h4>3 — Social Psychology: Neurological, racial bias is <u>flexible</u> and determined by <u>coalitional habit forming</u> in the brain – orienting groups around <u>institutional change</u> best <u>breaks down bias</u>. This is <u>offense</u> because their theory <u>rejects these solutions</u>.</h4><p><strong>Cikara and Van Bavel 15</strong>. (Mina Cikara is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Intergroup Neuroscience Lab at Harvard University. Her research examines the conditions under which groups and individuals are denied social value, agency, and empathy. Jay Van Bavel is an Assistant Professor of Psychology and Director of the Social Perception and Evaluation Laboratory at New York University. The Flexibility of Racial Bias: Research suggests that racism is not hard wired, offering hope on one of America’s enduring problems. June 2, 2015. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-flexibility-of-racial-bias/)</p><p>The city of Baltimore was rocked by protests and riots over the death of Freddie Gray, a 25-year-old African American man who died in police custody. Tragically, Gray’s death was only one of a recent in a series of racially-charged, often violent, incidents. On April 4th, Walter Scott was fatally shot by a police officer after fleeing from a routine traffic stop. On March 8th, Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity members were caught on camera gleefully chanting, “There Will Never Be A N***** In SAE.” On March 1st, a homeless Black man was shot in broad daylight by a Los Angeles police officer. And these are not isolated incidents, of course. <u>Institutional and systemic racism reinforce discrimination in countless situations, including hiring, sentencing, housing, and even mortgage lending</u>. <u><strong><mark>It would be easy</strong> to see</mark> in all this powerful <mark>evidence that racism is</mark> a <mark>permanent</mark> fixture in America’s social fabric <mark>and</u></mark> even, perhaps, <u>an <strong><mark>inevitable</mark> aspect of human nature</u></strong>. Indeed, the mere act of labeling others according to their age, gender, or race is a reflexive habit of the human mind. Social categories, like race, impact our thinking quickly, often outside of our awareness. <u>Extensive research has found that these implicit racial biases—negative thoughts and feelings about people from other races—are automatic, pervasive, and difficult to suppress</u>. Neuroscientists have also explored racial prejudice by exposing people to images of faces while scanning their brains in fMRI machines. <u>Early studies found that when people viewed faces of another race, the amount of activity in the amygdala—a small brain structure associated with experiencing emotions, including fear—was associated with individual differences on implicit measures of racial bias</u>. This work has led many to conclude that racial biases might be part of a primitive—and possibly hard-wired—neural fear response to racial out-groups. <u>There is little question that</u> categories such as <u>race</u>, gender, and age <u>play a major role in shaping the biases and stereotypes that people bring to bear in their judgments of others</u>. <u><strong>However</u></strong>, <u>research has shown that <mark>how people categorize <strong>themselves</strong> may be</mark> just as <mark>fundamental to</mark> understanding <mark>prejudice</mark> as how they categorize others</u>. When people categorize themselves as part of a group, their self-concept shifts from the individual (“I”) to the collective level (“us”). People form groups rapidly and favor members of their own group even when groups are formed on arbitrary grounds, such as the simple flip of a coin. These <u>findings highlight the remarkable ease with which humans form coalitions</u>. <u><strong>Recent research confirms</strong> that <strong><mark>coalition</strong></mark>-based <strong><mark>preferences trump race</strong></mark>-based <strong>preferences</u></strong>. For example, <u><mark>both Democrats and Republicans favor</mark> the resumes of those affiliated with <mark>their</mark> political <strong><mark>party</strong></mark> much <strong><mark>more than</strong></mark> they favor those who share <strong><mark>their race</u></strong></mark>. These <u>coalition-based preferences remain powerful even in the absence of the animosity present in electoral politics</u>. Our <u>research has shown that the simple act of <mark>placing people on a <strong>mixed-race team</strong> can <strong>diminish</strong></mark> their <strong><mark>automatic </mark>racial <mark>bias.</u></strong></mark> In a series of experiments, <u>White participants who were randomly placed on a mixed-race team—the Tigers or Lions—showed little evidence of implicit racial bias</u>. <u>Merely <mark>belonging to a mixed-race team trigged positive automatic associations</mark> with all of the members of their own group, irrespective of race</u>. <u>Being a part of one of these seemingly trivial mixed-race groups produced similar effects on brain activity—<mark>the <strong>amygdala responded</strong> to <strong>team</strong></mark> membership <strong><mark>rather than race</u></strong></mark>. Taken together, <u>these studies indicate that momentary changes in group membership can override the influence of race on the way we see, think about, and feel toward people who are different from ourselves</u>. Although these coalition-based distinctions might be the most basic building block of bias, they say little about the other factors that cause group conflict. Why do some groups get ignored while others get attacked? Whenever we encounter a new person or group we are motivated to answer two questions as quickly as possible: “is this person a friend or foe?” and “are they capable of enacting their intentions toward me?” In other words, once we have determined that someone is a member of an out-group, we need to determine what kind? The nature of the relations between groups—are we cooperative, competitive, or neither?—and their relative status—do you have access to resources?—largely determine the course of intergroup interactions. Groups that are seen as competitive with one’s interests, and capable of enacting their nasty intentions, are much more likely to be targets of hostility than more benevolent (e.g., elderly) or powerless (e.g., homeless) groups. This is one reason why sports rivalries have such psychological potency. For instance, fans of the Boston Red Sox are more likely to feel pleasure, and exhibit reward-related neural responses, at the misfortunes of the archrival New York Yankees than other baseball teams (and vice versa)—especially in the midst of a tight playoff race. (How much fans take pleasure in the misfortunes of their rivals is also linked to how likely they would be to harm fans from the other team.) <u>Just as a particular person’s group membership can be flexible, so too are the relations between groups. Groups that have previously had cordial relations may become rivals (and vice versa)</u>. Indeed, <u><strong>psychological and biological <mark>responses</strong> to out-group members <strong>can change</u></strong></mark>, depending on whether or not that out-group is perceived as threatening. For example, people exhibit greater pleasure—they smile—in response to the misfortunes of stereotypically competitive groups (e.g., investment bankers); however, this malicious pleasure is reduced when you provide participants with counter-stereotypic information (e.g., “investment bankers are working with small companies to help them weather the economic downturn). Competition between “us” and “them” can even distort our judgments of distance, making threatening out-groups seem much closer than they really are. These distorted perceptions can serve to amplify intergroup discrimination: the more different and distant “they” are, the easier it is to disrespect and harm them. Thus, not <u>all out-groups are treated the same: some elicit indifference whereas others become targets of antipathy. Stereotypically threatening groups are especially likely to be targeted with violence, but those <strong><mark>stereotypes can be tempered</strong> with <strong>other info</strong></mark>rmation.</u> <u><mark>If</mark> perceptions of intergroup relations can be changed, <mark>individuals</mark> may <mark>overcome hostility</mark> toward perceived foes <mark>and become more responsive </mark>to one another’s grievances.</u> <u><mark>The <strong>flexible nature</strong></mark> of both group membership and intergroup relations <mark>offers reason to be</u></mark> cautiously <u><strong><mark>optimistic</strong> about</mark> the potential for greater <mark>coop</mark>eration <mark>among groups in conflict</u></mark> (be they black versus white or citizens versus police). <u><strong><mark>One strategy is to bring </mark>multiple <mark>groups together around a common goal</u></strong></mark>. For example, during the fiercely contested 2008 Democratic presidential primary process, Hillary Clinton and Barack Obama supporters gave more money to strangers who supported the same primary candidate (compared to the rival candidate). Two months later, after the Democratic National Convention, the supporters of both candidates coalesced around the party nominee—Barack Obama—and this bias disappeared. In fact, merely <u><mark>creating </mark>a sense of <strong><mark>cohesion</strong></mark> between two competitive groups <mark>can increase empathy</mark> for the suffering of our rivals</u>. <u><mark>These</u></mark> sorts of <u>strategies</u> can help <u><mark>reduce aggression toward</mark> hostile <mark>out-groups, which is <strong>critical for</mark> creating more opportunities for <mark>constructive dialogue addressing</mark> greater social <mark>injustices.</mark> </u></strong>Of course, instilling a sense of common identity and cooperation is extremely difficult in entrenched intergroup conflicts, but when it happens, the benefits are obvious. Consider how the community leaders in New York City and Ferguson responded differently to protests against police brutality—in NYC political leaders expressed grief and concern over police brutality and moved quickly to make policy changes in policing, whereas the leaders and police in Ferguson responded with high-tech military vehicles and riot gear. In the first case, multiple groups came together with a common goal—to increase the safety of everyone in the community; in the latter case, the actions of the police likely reinforced the “us” and “them” distinctions. Tragically, these types of conflicts continue to roil the country. Understanding the psychology and neuroscience of social identity and intergroup relations cannot undo the effects of systemic racism and discriminatory practices; however, it can offer insights into the psychological processes responsible for escalating the tension between, for example, civilians and police officers. <u>Even in cases where it isn’t possible to create a common identity among groups in conflict, it may be possible to blur the boundaries between groups</u>. In one recent experiment, we sorted participants into groups—red versus blue team—competing for a cash prize. Half of the participants were randomly assigned to see a picture of a segregated social network of all the players, in which red dots clustered together, blue dots clustered together, and the two clusters were separated by white space. The other half of the participants saw an integrated social network in which the red and blue dots were mixed together in one large cluster. Participants who thought the two teams were interconnected with one another reported greater empathy for the out-group players compared to those who had seen the segregated network. Thus, reminding people that individuals could be connected to one another despite being from different groups may be another way to build trust and understanding among them. A mere month before Freddie Gray died in police custody, President Obama addressed the nation on the 50th anniversary of Bloody Sunday in Selma: “We do a disservice to the cause of justice by intimating that bias and discrimination are immutable, or that racial division is inherent to America. To deny…progress – our progress – would be to rob us of our own agency; our responsibility to do what we can to make America better." The president was saying that <u>we</u>, as a society, <u>have a responsibility to reduce prejudice and discrimination</u>. These recent <u><strong>findings from psychology and neuroscience indicate that we, as individuals, possess this capacity</u></strong>. Of course this capacity is not sufficient to usher in racial equality or peace. Even when the level of prejudice against particular out-groups decreases, it does not imply that the level of institutional discrimination against these or other groups will necessarily improve. <u>Ultimately, <mark>only <strong>collective action</strong> and <strong>institutional evolution</strong> can address systemic racism</u></mark>. <u><mark>The science is clear</mark> on one thing, though: <strong><mark>individual bias and discrimination are changeable</strong></mark>.</u> <u><mark>Race-based prejudice</mark> and discrimination, in particular, <mark>are <strong>created and reinforced by</strong></mark> many <strong><mark>social factors,</strong></mark> but they are <strong><mark>not inevitable consequences of</strong></mark> our <strong><mark>biology</u></mark>.</strong> Perhaps understanding how coalitional thinking impacts intergroup relations will make it easier for us to affect real social change going forward.</p>

2AC

K — Antiblackness

1AC — Governance

./documents/hspolicy22/Peninsula/QiYa/Peninsula-QiYa-Aff-National-Speech-and-Debate-Season-Opener-Round-4.docx

A

National Speech and Debate Season Opener

4

Calvert Hall BS

Lawrence

1ac ssas 1nc t - article v k - antiblackness 2nr k - antiblackness

hspolicy22/Peninsula/QiYa/Peninsula-QiYa-Aff-National-Speech-and-Debate-Season-Opener-Round-4.docx

2022-10-15 23:52:44

QiYa

Peninsula QiYa

Arthur (he/him) Coralynn (she/her) [email protected] Please add [email protected] to chains

Ar.....

Qi.....

Co.....

Ya.....

Peninsula

Peninsula

CA

hspolicy22

HS Policy 2022-23

cx

hs

“In” means “throughout”

Words and Phrases 8

Words and Phrases 8 (Permanent Edition, vol. 20a, p. 207)

the word “in” should be construed to mean “throughout” such counties. Reynolds v. Larkin, 14, p. 114, 117, 10 Colo. 126.

“in” should be construed to mean “throughout”

Colo. 1887. In the Act of 1861 providing that justices of the peace shall have jurisdiction “in” their respective counties to hear and determine all complaints, the word “in” should be construed to mean “throughout” such counties. Reynolds v. Larkin, 14, p. 114, 117, 10 Colo. 126.

<h4>“In” means “throughout”</h4><p><strong>Words and Phrases 8</strong> (Permanent Edition, vol. 20a, p. 207)</p><p>Colo. 1887. In the Act of 1861 providing that justices of the peace shall have jurisdiction “in” their respective counties to hear and determine all complaints, <u><strong>the word <mark>“in” should be construed to mean “throughout”</strong></mark> such counties. Reynolds v. Larkin, 14, p. 114, 117, 10 Colo. 126.</p></u>

1NC

OFF

1NC Off Case Shell

./documents/ndtceda19/Georgia/AdWe/Georgia-Adam-Weintraub-Neg-Navy-Round6.docx

N

Navy

6

Emory PZ

Hall

1AC Debris 1NC T Subsets T ADR Unilat CP Hardening CP Politics Appeasement Turn 2NR T Subsets

ndtceda19/Georgia/AdWe/Georgia-Adam-Weintraub-Neg-Navy-Round6.docx

AdWe

Georgia AdWe

Za.....

Ad.....

Jo.....

We.....

Georgia

Georgia

ndtceda19

NDT/CEDA 2019-20

cx

college

No pandemic extinction—burnout

FARQUHAR ET AL. 17

Sebastian FARQUHAR ET AL. 17, Project Manager at FHI responsible for external relations, M.A in Physics and Philosophy from the University of Oxford; John Halstead, Global Priorities Project; Owen Cotton-Barratt, Research Associate in the FHI at the University of Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at St. Hugh’s College, Oxford; Stefan Schubert, PhD in philosophy, Researcher at the Centre for Effective Altruism; Haydn Belfield, Academic Project Manager, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, University of Cambridge; Andrew Snyder-Beattie, Director of Research at FHI [“Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, Global Priorities Project 2017, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf]

there are reasons to believe natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause extinction. Analysis of the IUCN database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% were ascribed to infectious disease None on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors contributed It seems our own species, which is numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of response is unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts

pandemics are very unlikely to cause extinction of the 833 recorded extinctions less than 4% were ascribed to disease None were globally dispersed, and other factors contributed our own species, which is numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of response is unlikely to be killed off lethal pathogens kill their hosts before they spread

For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, there are some reasons to believe that natural pandemics are very unlikely to cause human extinction. Analysis of the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) red list database has shown that of the 833 recorded plant and animal species extinctions known to have occurred since 1500, less than 4% (31 species) were ascribed to infectious disease.38 None of the mammals and amphibians on this list were globally dispersed, and other factors aside from infectious disease also contributed to their extinction. It therefore seems that our own species, which is very numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of a rational response to problems, is very unlikely to be killed off by a natural pandemic. One underlying explanation for this is that highly lethal pathogens can kill their hosts before they have a chance to spread, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal. Therefore, pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts.39

<h4>No pandemic extinction—burnout</h4><p>Sebastian <strong>FARQUHAR ET AL. 17</strong>, Project Manager at FHI responsible for external relations, M.A in Physics and Philosophy from the University of Oxford; John Halstead, Global Priorities Project; Owen Cotton-Barratt, Research Associate in the FHI at the University of Oxford, Lecturer in Mathematics at St. Hugh’s College, Oxford; Stefan Schubert, PhD in philosophy, Researcher at the Centre for Effective Altruism; Haydn Belfield, Academic Project Manager, Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, University of Cambridge; Andrew Snyder-Beattie, Director of Research at FHI [“Existential Risk: Diplomacy and Governance,” Future of Humanity Institute, University of Oxford, Global Priorities Project 2017, https://www.fhi.ox.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/Existential-Risks-2017-01-23.pdf]</p><p>For most of human history, natural pandemics have posed the greatest risk of mass global fatalities.37 However, <u>there are</u> some <u>reasons to believe</u> that <u>natural <mark>pandemics are very unlikely to cause</u></mark> human <u><mark>extinction</mark>. Analysis of the</u> International Union for Conservation of Nature (<u>IUCN</u>) red list <u>database has shown that <mark>of the 833 recorded</mark> plant and animal species <mark>extinctions</mark> known to have occurred since 1500, <mark>less than 4%</u></mark> (31 species) <u><mark>were ascribed to</mark> infectious <mark>disease</u></mark>.38 <u><mark>None</u></mark> of the mammals and amphibians <u>on this list <mark>were globally dispersed, and other factors</u></mark> aside from infectious disease also <u><mark>contributed</u></mark> to their extinction. <u>It</u> therefore <u>seems</u> that <u><mark>our own species, which is</u></mark> very <u><mark>numerous, globally dispersed, and capable of</u></mark> a rational <u><mark>response</u></mark> to problems, <u><mark>is</u></mark> very <u><mark>unlikely to be killed off</mark> by a natural pandemic</u>.</p><p>One underlying explanation for this is that <u>highly <mark>lethal pathogens</mark> can <mark>kill their hosts before they</mark> have a chance to <mark>spread</mark>, so there is a selective pressure for pathogens not to be highly lethal</u>. Therefore, <u>pathogens are likely to co-evolve with their hosts rather than kill all possible hosts</u>.39</p>

OFF

ACA---Disease

./documents/ndtceda18/Emory/GaSh/Emory-Gazmararian-Shaikh-Aff-Gonzaga-Semis.docx

A

Gonzaga

Semis

Georgia AR

DML, Amar Adam, Maggie Solice

1AC - Tariffs 2NR - ESR and Midterms

ndtceda18/Emory/GaSh/Emory-Gazmararian-Shaikh-Aff-Gonzaga-Semis.docx

GaSh

Emory GaSh

Al.....

Ga.....

Za.....

Sh.....

Emory

Emory

ndtceda18

NDT/CEDA 2018-19

cx

college

No global sprint or arms race – aff claims overexaggerate normal military behavior and ignore actual spending.

Perry and Scharre '20

Perry and Scharre '20 [Lucas and Paul; 3/16/20; Project Coordinator at the Future of Life Institute; Senior Fellow and Director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security; "AI Alignment Podcast: On Lethal Autonomous Weapons with Paul Scharre," https://futureoflife.org/2020/03/16/on-lethal-autonomous-weapons-with-paul-scharre/?cn-reloaded=1]//GJ Paul Scharre: If there’s an arms race, it’s a very strange one because no one is building the weapons. We see militaries advancing in robotics and autonomy, but we don’t really see sort of this rush to build autonomous weapons. I struggle to point to any programs that I’m aware of in militaries around the globe that are clearly oriented to build fully autonomous weapons. I think there are lots of places where much like these incremental advancements of autonomy in cars, you can see more autonomous features in military vehicles and drones and robotic systems and missiles. They’re adding more autonomy. And one might be violently concerned about where that’s going. But it’s just simply not the case that militaries have declared their intention. We’re going to build autonomous weapons, and here they are, and here’s our program to build them. I would struggle to use the term arms race. It could happen, maybe worth a starting line of an arms race. But I don’t think we’re in one today by any means.

It’s worth asking, when we say arms race, what do we mean and why do we care? This is again, one of these terms, it’s often thrown around. You’ll hear about this, the concept of autonomous weapons or AI, people say we shouldn’t have an arms race. Okay. Why is an arms race a bad thing? Militaries normally invest in new technologies to improve their national defense. That’s a normal activity concern whether in terms of violence and destructiveness of war, if a war breakout or the likelihood of war and the stability of war This is an area where certainly we’re not in any way from a spending standpoint, in an arms race for autonomous weapons or AI today, when you look at actual expenditures, they’re a small fraction of what militaries are spending on

when we say arms race, what do we mean why do we care it’s thrown around. You’ll hear the concept of autonomous weapons or AI Why is an arms race a bad thing? Militaries normally invest in new tech to improve their defense This is an area where certainly we’re not in an arms race look at actual expenditures, they’re a small fraction of spending

It’s worth also asking, when we say arms race, what do we mean and why do we care? This is again, one of these terms, it’s often thrown around. You’ll hear about this, the concept of autonomous weapons or AI, people say we shouldn’t have an arms race. Okay. Why? Why is an arms race a bad thing? Militaries normally invest in new technologies to improve their national defense. That’s a normal activity. So if you say arms race, what do you mean by that? Is it beyond normal activity? And why would that be problematic? In the political science world, the specific definitions vary, but generally, an arms race is viewed as an increase in defense spending overall, or in a particular technology area above normal levels of modernizing militaries. Now, usually, this is problematic for a couple of reasons. One could be that it ends up just in a massive national expenditure, like during the case of the Cold War, nuclear weapons, that doesn’t really yield any military value or increase anyone’s defense or security, it just ends up net flushing a lot of money down the drain. That’s money that could be spent elsewhere for pre K education or healthcare or something else that might be societally beneficial instead of building all of these weapons. So that’s one concern. Another one might be that we end up in a world that the large number of these weapons or the type of their weapons makes it worse off. Are we really better off in a world where there are 10s of thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger versus a few thousand weapons or a few hundred weapons? Well, if we ever have zero, all things being equal, probably fewer nuclear weapons is better than more of them. So that’s another kind of concern whether in terms of violence and destructiveness of war, if a war breakout or the likelihood of war and the stability of war. This is an A in an area where certainly we’re not in any way from a spending standpoint, in an arms race for autonomous weapons or AI today, when you look at actual expenditures, they’re a small fraction of what militaries are spending on, if you look at, say AI or autonomous features at large.

<h4>No global sprint or arms race – aff claims overexaggerate normal military behavior and ignore actual spending. </h4><p><strong>Perry and Scharre '20 </strong>[Lucas and Paul; 3/16/20; Project Coordinator at the Future of Life Institute; Senior Fellow and Director of the Technology and National Security Program at the Center for a New American Security; "AI Alignment Podcast: On Lethal Autonomous Weapons with Paul Scharre," https://futureoflife.org/2020/03/16/on-lethal-autonomous-weapons-with-paul-scharre/?cn-reloaded=1]//GJ</p><p>Paul Scharre: <u><mark>If there’s a</mark>n <strong>arms <mark>race</strong>, it’s</mark> a <strong>very <mark>strange</strong></mark> one because <mark>no one is building the weapons. We see militaries <strong>advancing</strong> in <strong>robotics</strong> and <strong>autonomy</strong>, but we don’t really see</mark> sort of this rush to build autonomous weapons. I struggle to point to any programs</u> that I’m aware of in militaries <u>around the globe that are <strong><mark>clearly oriented</strong></mark> to build <strong><mark>fully autonomous</mark> weapons</u></strong>. I think there are lots of places where much like these incremental advancements of autonomy in cars, you can see more autonomous features in military vehicles and drones and robotic systems and missiles. <u>They’re adding more autonomy. And one might be violently concerned about</u> where that’s going. <u>But it’s just simply not the case that militaries have declared their intention</u>. We’re going to build autonomous weapons, and here they are, and here’s our program to build them. <u>I would struggle to use the term <strong>arms race</u></strong>. It could happen, maybe worth a starting line of an arms race. But I don’t think we’re in one today by any means.</p><p><u>It’s worth</u> also <u>asking, <mark>when we say arms race, what do we mean</mark> and <mark>why do we care</mark>? This is again, one of these terms, <mark>it’s</mark> often <strong><mark>thrown around</strong>. You’ll hear</mark> about this, <mark>the concept of <strong>autonomous weapons</strong> or <strong>AI</strong></mark>, people say we shouldn’t have an arms race. Okay.</u> Why? <u><mark>Why is an arms race a bad thing? Militaries <strong>normally invest</strong> in new tech</mark>nologies <mark>to <strong>improve</strong> their</mark> <strong>national <mark>defense</strong></mark>. That’s a <strong>normal activity</u></strong>. So if you say arms race, what do you mean by that? Is it beyond normal activity? And why would that be problematic? In the political science world, the specific definitions vary, but generally, an arms race is viewed as an increase in defense spending overall, or in a particular technology area above normal levels of modernizing militaries. Now, usually, this is problematic for a couple of reasons. One could be that it ends up just in a massive national expenditure, like during the case of the Cold War, nuclear weapons, that doesn’t really yield any military value or increase anyone’s defense or security, it just ends up net flushing a lot of money down the drain. That’s money that could be spent elsewhere for pre K education or healthcare or something else that might be societally beneficial instead of building all of these weapons. So that’s one concern.</p><p>Another one might be that we end up in a world that the large number of these weapons or the type of their weapons makes it worse off. Are we really better off in a world where there are 10s of thousands of nuclear weapons on hair-trigger versus a few thousand weapons or a few hundred weapons? Well, if we ever have zero, all things being equal, probably fewer nuclear weapons is better than more of them. So that’s another kind of <u>concern whether in terms of violence and destructiveness of war, if a war breakout or the likelihood of war and the stability of war</u>. <u><mark>This is</u></mark> an A in <u><mark>an area where certainly we’re <strong>not</strong> in</mark> any way from a <strong>spending standpoint</strong>, in <mark>an arms race</mark> for autonomous weapons or AI today, when you <mark>look at <strong>actual expenditures</strong>, they’re a <strong>small fraction</strong> of</mark> what militaries are <mark>spending</mark> on</u>, if you look at, say AI or autonomous features at large.</p>

Case

NC – AT: Arms Race

./documents/hsld20/Harker/Sh/Harker-Shah-Neg-Harvard%20Westlake%20RR-Round3.docx

N

Harvard Westlake RR

3

Rancho Bernardo JJ

Jacob Nails, Joshua Michael

1AC - China 1NC - CP-Tort T-Nebel 2NR - Tort

hsld20/Harker/Sh/Harker-Shah-Neg-Harvard%20Westlake%20RR-Round3.docx

DeSh

Harker DeSh

De.....

Sh.....

Harker

Harker

CA

hsld20

HS LD 2020-21

ld

hs

No food wars ― no causal evidence and government responses solve the impact

Rosegrant 13

Mark W. Rosegrant 13, Director of the Environment and Production Technology Division at the International Food Policy Research Institute, et al., 2013, “The Future of the Global Food Economy: Scenarios for Supply, Demand, and Prices,” in Food Security and Sociopolitical Stability, p. 39-40

food price spikes in the late 2000s coincided with street demonstrations and riots Violent protests occurred in 21 countries many factors could be causing or contributing to these protests, such as government response tactics, rather than the initial food price spike higher food prices lead to income declines and an increase in political instability, but only for poor countries data from 61 countries found a direct connection between food price shocks and an increased likelihood of civil conflict, including riots and demonstrations Other researchers have broadened the analysis by considering government responses that influence outcomes and the linkage between food price shocks and conflict. Carter and Bates evaluated data from 30 developing countries concluding when governments mitigate the impact of food price shocks on urban consumers, the apparent relationship between food price shocks and civil war disappears when urban consumers expect a favorable response, protests only serve as a motivation for a policy response rather than as a prelude to something more serious, such as violent demonstrations or civil war Brinkman and Hendrix ask if it could be food insecurity causing conflict. Their answer is "a highly qualified yes especially for intrastate conflict The linkage connecting food insecurity to conflict is contingent on levels of economic development (a stronger linkage for poorer countries and other factors establishing causation directly is elusive, considering a lack of evidence

food spikes coincided with riots higher prices lead to instability only for poor countries when governments mitigate the impact the apparent relationship between food and war disappears protests serve as a motivation for policy rather than a prelude to violent demonstrations or war linkage connecting food to conflict is contingent on other factors establishing causation is elusive considering lack of evidence

The food price spikes in the late 2000s caught the world’s attention, particularly when sharp increases in food and fuel prices in 2008 coincided with street demonstrations and riots in many countries. For 2008 and the two preceding years, researchers identified a significant number of countries (totaling 54) with protests during what was called the global food crisis (Benson et al. 2008). Violent protests occurred in 21 countries, and nonviolent protests occurred in 44 countries. Both types of protest took place in 11 countries. In a separate analysis, developing countries with low government effectiveness experienced more food price protests between 2007 and 2008 than countries with high government effectiveness (World Bank 201la). Although the incidence of violent protests was much higher in countries with less capable governance, many factors could be causing or contributing to these protests, such as government response tactics, rather than the initial food price spike. Data on food riots and food prices have tracked together in recent years. Agricultural commodity prices started strengthening in international markets in 2006. In the latter half of 2007, as prices continued to rise, two or fewer food price riots per month were recorded (based on World Food Programme data, as reported in Brinkman and Hendrix 2011). As prices peaked and remained high during mid-2008, the number of riots increased dramatically, with a cumulative total of 84 by August 2008. Subsequently, both prices and the monthly number of protests declined. Several researchers have studied the connection between food price shocks and conflict, finding at least some relationship between food prices and conflict. According to Dell et al. (2008), higher food prices lead to income declines and an increase in political instability, but only for poor countries. Researchers also found a positive and significant relationship between weather shocks (affecting food availability, prices, and real income) and the probability of suffering government repression or a civil war (Besley and Persson 2009). Arezki and Bruckner (2011) evaluated a constructed food price index and political variables, including data on riots and anti-government demonstrations and measures of civil unrest. Using data from 61 countries over the period 1970 to 2007, they found a direct connection between food price shocks and an increased likelihood of civil conflict, including riots and demonstrations. Other researchers have broadened the analysis by considering government responses or underlying policies that affect local prices, and consequently influence outcomes and the linkage between food price shocks and conflict. Carter and Bates (2012) evaluated data from 30 developing countries for the time period 1961 to 2001, concluding that when governments mitigate the impact of food price shocks on urban consumers, the apparent relationship between food price shocks and civil war disappears. Moreover, when the urban consumers can expect a favorable response, the protests only serve as a motivation for a policy response rather than as a prelude to something more serious, such as violent demonstrations or even civil war. Many in the international development community see war and conflict as a development issue, with a war or conflict severely damaging the local economy, which in turn leads to forced migration and dislocation, and ultimately acute food insecurity. Brinkman and Hendrix (2011) ask if it could be the other way around, with food insecurity causing conflict. Their answer, based on a review of the literature, is "a highly qualified yes," especially for intrastate conflict. The primary reason is that insecurity itself heightens the risk of democratic breakdown and civil conflict. The linkage connecting food insecurity to conflict is contingent on levels of economic development (a stronger linkage for poorer countries), existing political institutions, and other factors. The researchers say establishing causation directly is elusive, considering a lack of evidence for explaining individual behavior. The debate over cause and effect is ongoing.

<h4>No food wars ― no causal evidence and government responses solve the impact </h4><p>Mark W. <strong>Rosegrant 13</strong>, Director of the Environment and Production Technology Division at the International Food Policy Research Institute, et al., 2013, “The Future of the Global Food Economy: Scenarios for Supply, Demand, and Prices,” in Food Security and Sociopolitical Stability, p. 39-40 </p><p>The <u><mark>food</mark> price <mark>spikes</mark> in the late 2000s</u> caught the world’s attention, particularly when sharp increases in food and fuel prices in 2008 <u><mark>coincided with</mark> <strong>street demonstrations and <mark>riots</u></strong></mark> in many countries. For 2008 and the two preceding years, researchers identified a significant number of countries (totaling 54) with protests during what was called the global food crisis (Benson et al. 2008). <u>Violent protests occurred in 21 countries</u>, and nonviolent protests occurred in 44 countries. Both types of protest took place in 11 countries. In a separate analysis, developing countries with low government effectiveness experienced more food price protests between 2007 and 2008 than countries with high government effectiveness (World Bank 201la). Although the incidence of violent protests was much higher in countries with less capable governance, <u><strong>many factors</strong> could be causing or contributing to these protests, such as government response tactics, <strong>rather than the initial food price spike</u></strong>.</p><p>Data on food riots and food prices have tracked together in recent years. Agricultural commodity prices started strengthening in international markets in 2006. In the latter half of 2007, as prices continued to rise, two or fewer food price riots per month were recorded (based on World Food Programme data, as reported in Brinkman and Hendrix 2011). As prices peaked and remained high during mid-2008, the number of riots increased dramatically, with a cumulative total of 84 by August 2008. Subsequently, both prices and the monthly number of protests declined.</p><p>Several researchers have studied the connection between food price shocks and conflict, finding at least some relationship between food prices and conflict. According to Dell et al. (2008), <u><mark>higher</mark> food <mark>prices lead to</mark> income declines and an increase in political <mark>instability</mark>, but <strong><mark>only for poor countries</u></strong></mark>. Researchers also found a positive and significant relationship between weather shocks (affecting food availability, prices, and real income) and the probability of suffering government repression or a civil war (Besley and Persson 2009). Arezki and Bruckner (2011) evaluated a constructed food price index and political variables, including data on riots and anti-government demonstrations and measures of civil unrest. Using <u>data from 61 countries</u> over the period 1970 to 2007, they <u>found a direct connection between food price shocks and an increased likelihood of civil conflict, including riots and demonstrations</u>.</p><p><u>Other researchers have broadened the analysis by <strong>considering government responses</u></strong> or underlying policies <u>that</u> affect local prices, and consequently <u>influence outcomes and the linkage between food price shocks and conflict. Carter and Bates</u> (2012) <u>evaluated data from 30 developing countries</u> for the time period 1961 to 2001, <u>concluding</u> that <u><mark>when governments mitigate the impact</mark> of food price shocks on urban consumers, <mark>the <strong>apparent relationship between food</mark> price shocks <mark>and</mark> civil <mark>war disappears</u></strong></mark>. Moreover, <u>when</u> the <u>urban consumers</u> can <u>expect a favorable response,</u> the <u><mark>protests</mark> only <mark>serve as a <strong>motivation for</mark> a <mark>policy</mark> response</strong> <mark>rather than</mark> as <mark>a prelude to</mark> something more serious, such as <strong><mark>violent demonstrations or</u></strong></mark> even <u><strong>civil <mark>war</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Many in the international development community see war and conflict as a development issue, with a war or conflict severely damaging the local economy, which in turn leads to forced migration and dislocation, and ultimately acute food insecurity. <u>Brinkman and Hendrix</u> (2011) <u>ask if it could be</u> the other way around, with <u>food insecurity causing conflict. Their answer</u>, based on a review of the literature, <u>is "a <strong>highly qualified yes</u></strong>," <u><strong>especially</strong> for intrastate conflict</u>. The primary reason is that insecurity itself heightens the risk of democratic breakdown and civil conflict. <u>The <mark>linkage connecting food</mark> insecurity <mark>to conflict is contingent on</mark> levels of economic development (a stronger linkage for poorer countries</u>), existing political institutions, <u>and <mark>other factors</u></mark>. The researchers say <u><strong><mark>establishing causation</mark> directly <mark>is elusive</strong></mark>, <mark>considering</mark> a <strong><mark>lack of evidence</u></strong></mark> for explaining individual behavior. The debate over cause and effect is ongoing.</p>

1NC

1NC ― Economy

./documents/ndtceda18/Georgia/HoHa/Georgia-Hoover-Haskins-Neg-Georgetown-Round3.docx

N

Georgetown

3

Harvard BS

Hannah Call

1AC - China Tariffs 1NC - Cap K ESR CP T - Prohibit Lashout DA Politics DA 2NC - T ESR 1NR - Politics DA 2NR - T

ndtceda18/Georgia/HoHa/Georgia-Hoover-Haskins-Neg-Georgetown-Round3.docx

HoHa

Georgia HoHa

Al.....

Ho.....

Tr.....

Ha.....

Georgia

Georgia

ndtceda18

NDT/CEDA 2018-19

cx

college

1 – Environmental effects and global dead hand – either is triggered by one weapon and guarantees extinction

Webber 5/28

Webber 5/28/19 [Dr Philip Webber has written widely on nuclear issues and is Chair of Scientists for Global Responsibility (SGR) – a membership organisation promoting responsible science and technology. We will all end up killing each other and one nuclear blast could do it. May 18, 2019. https://metro.co.uk/2019/05/18/we-will-all-end-up-killing-each-other-and-one-nuclear-blast-could-do-it-9370115/]

The nuclear armed nations have inadvertently created a global Doomsday machine with 15,000 nuclear weapons Pre-programmed targets include main cities as well as military targets One nuclear blast could trigger it What just one nuclear warhead can do is unimaginable huge city-wide firestorms combined with high-altitude debris clouds would severely reduce sunlight and disrupt the world’s climate for a decade causing drought a prolonged winter global famine and catastrophic impacts for all life on earth and in the seas due to intense levels of UV with the destruction of the ozone layer a terrorist organisation with a nuclear weapon cannot be deterred there are several ways in which a nuclear war can start by mistake risk of mistake is very high because the USA and Russia each keep 900 warheads ready to fire in a few minutes should a warning of nuclear attack come in With only a few minutes to evaluate a warning one mistake can trigger disaster

nuclear nations inadvertently created a Doomsday machine with 15,000 nuc weapons Pre-programmed targets include main cities One nuclear blast could trigger it What just one warhead can do is unimaginable firestorms combined with high-altitude debris would reduce sunlight for a decade causing drought winter global famine and catastrophic impacts for all life due to intense UV with destruction of ozone a terrorist org with a nuclear weapon cannot be deterred nuclear war can start by mistake risk of mistake is very high because the US and Russia each keep 900 warheads ready to fire in minutes With only minutes to evaluate a warning one mistake can trigger disaster

The nuclear armed nations have inadvertently created a global Doomsday machine, built with 15,000 nuclear weapons. Most (93%) have been built by Russia and in the US, 3,100 of them are ready to fire within hours. Pre-programmed targets include main cities as well as a range of military and civilian targets across the world primarily in the UK, Europe, US, Russia and China but also in Japan, Australia and South America. One nuclear blast, one mistake, one cyber attack could trigger it. But first a reminder about the incredible destructive power of a nuclear weapon. Modern nuclear warheads are typically 20 times larger than either of the two bombs that obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the Second World War. What just one nuclear warhead can do is unimaginable. We’ve drawn some of the key features to scale against cityscapes in the UK for a Russian SS-18 RS 20V (NATO designation ‘Satan’) 500kT warhead. US submarines deploy a similar weapon - the Trident II Mk5, 475kT warhead. A deafening, terrifying noise will be created, like an intense thunder that lasts for 10 seconds or longer. After a blinding flash of light bright destroying the retina of anyone looking, and a violent electromagnetic pulse (EMP) knocking out electrical equipment several miles away, a bomb of this size quickly forms an incandescent fireball 850 metres across. This is about the same height as the world’s tallest building, the Burj Khalifa. Drawn against the London Canary Wharf financial district or the Manchester skyline, the huge fireball dwarfs one Canary Sq. (240m), the South Tower Deansgate (201m) and the Beetham Tower Hilton, (170m). The fireball engulfs both city centres completely, melting glass and steel and forms an intensely radioactive 60m deep crater zone of molten earth and debris. A devastating supersonic blast wave flattens everything within a radius of two to three km, the entire Manchester centre, an area larger than the City of London, with lighter damage out to eight km. Most people in these areas would be killed or very seriously injured. The fireball quickly rises forming an enormous characteristic mushroom shaped cloud raining highly radioactive particles (fallout). It rises to 60,000 ft (18,000m) - twice the altitude of Everest - and is 15 miles, 24km across. This is one warhead. There are 10 such warheads on each of Russia’s 46 missiles (460 in total) and 48 on each of eight US Trident submarines (384 in total). In reality, in a nuclear conflict all of these warheads and a further 956 ready-to-fire are likely to be launched. Whilst this scale of destruction is horrific and hundreds of millions of people would be killed in a few hours from a combination of blast, radiation and huge fires, there are also terrible longer-term effects. Scientists predict that huge city-wide firestorms combined with very the high-altitude debris clouds would severely reduce sunlight levels and disrupt the world’s climate for a decade causing drought, a prolonged winter, global famine and catastrophic impacts for all life on earth and in the seas due to intense levels of UV with the destruction of the ozone layer. But even at the level of a few hundred nuclear warheads, the consequences of a nuclear war would be extremely severe across the world far beyond the areas hit directly. A nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan with ‘only’ 100 small warheads would kill hundreds of millions and cause climate damage leading to a global famine. The sheer destructive nature of nuclear explosions combined with long lasting radiation, means that nuclear weapons are of no military use. ‘Enemy’ territory would be unusable for years because of intense radiation -especially when nuclear power stations and reprocessing plants are hit. Even if your own country is not hit, radiation and climate damage will spread across the globe. No one escapes the consequences. But the nuclear nations argue that they build and keep nuclear weapons to make sure that they are never used. After all no one would be stupid enough to actually launch a nuclear weapon facing such terrible retaliation? It sounds obvious. If you threaten any attacker with terrible nuclear devastation of course they won’t attack you. That might be true most of the time. It is very unlikely that any country would launch a nuclear attack deliberately. But there are two very major problems. First, a terrorist organisation with a nuclear weapon cannot be deterred in this way. Secondly, there are several ways in which a nuclear war can start by mistake. A report by the prestigious Chatham House in 2014 documents 30 instances between 1962 and 2002 when nuclear weapons came within minutes of being launched due to miscalculation, miscommunication, or technical errors. What prevented their use on many of these occasions was the intervention of individuals who, against military orders, either refused to authorise a nuclear strike or relay information that would have led to launch. Examples include a weather rocket launch mistaken for an attack on Russia, a US satellite misinterpreting sunlight reflecting off clouds as multiple missiles firings, a 42c chip fault creating a false warning of 220 missiles launched at the United States. Such risks are heightened during political crises. The risk of mistake is very high because, in a hangover from the Cold War, the USA and Russia each keep 900 warheads ready to fire in a few minutes, in a ‘launch on warning’ status, should a warning of nuclear attack come in. These nuclear weapons form a dangerous nuclear stand-off - rather like two people holding guns to each other’s heads. With only a few minutes to evaluate a warning of nuclear attack before warheads would strike, one mistake can trigger disaster. A similar nuclear stand-off exists between India and Pakistan.

<h4>1 – <u>Environmental effects</u> and <u>global dead hand</u> – either is triggered by <u>one weapon</u> and <u>guarantees extinction</h4><p></u><strong>Webber 5/28</strong>/19 [Dr Philip Webber has written widely on nuclear issues and is Chair of Scientists for Global Responsibility (SGR) – a membership organisation promoting responsible science and technology. We will all end up killing each other and one nuclear blast could do it. May 18, 2019. https://metro.co.uk/2019/05/18/we-will-all-end-up-killing-each-other-and-one-nuclear-blast-could-do-it-9370115/]</p><p><u>The <mark>nuclear</mark> armed <mark>nations</mark> have <strong><mark>inadvertently</strong> created a</mark> global <strong><mark>Doomsday machine</u></strong></mark>, built <u><mark>with <strong>15,000 nuc</mark>lear <mark>weapons</u></strong></mark>. Most (93%) have been built by Russia and in the US, 3,100 of them are ready to fire within hours. <u><strong><mark>Pre-programmed targets</u></strong> <u>include <strong>main cities</strong></mark> as well as</u> a range of <u>military</u> and civilian <u>targets</u> across the world primarily in the UK, Europe, US, Russia and China but also in Japan, Australia and South America. <u><strong><mark>One nuclear blast</u></strong></mark>, one mistake, one cyber attack <u><mark>could trigger it</u></mark>. But first a reminder about the incredible destructive power of a nuclear weapon. Modern nuclear warheads are typically 20 times larger than either of the two bombs that obliterated Hiroshima and Nagasaki at the end of the Second World War. <u><mark>What just <strong>one </mark>nuclear <mark>warhead</strong> can do is unimaginable</u></mark>. We’ve drawn some of the key features to scale against cityscapes in the UK for a Russian SS-18 RS 20V (NATO designation ‘Satan’) 500kT warhead. US submarines deploy a similar weapon - the Trident II Mk5, 475kT warhead. A deafening, terrifying noise will be created, like an intense thunder that lasts for 10 seconds or longer. After a blinding flash of light bright destroying the retina of anyone looking, and a violent electromagnetic pulse (EMP) knocking out electrical equipment several miles away, a bomb of this size quickly forms an incandescent fireball 850 metres across. This is about the same height as the world’s tallest building, the Burj Khalifa. Drawn against the London Canary Wharf financial district or the Manchester skyline, the huge fireball dwarfs one Canary Sq. (240m), the South Tower Deansgate (201m) and the Beetham Tower Hilton, (170m). The fireball engulfs both city centres completely, melting glass and steel and forms an intensely radioactive 60m deep crater zone of molten earth and debris. A devastating supersonic blast wave flattens everything within a radius of two to three km, the entire Manchester centre, an area larger than the City of London, with lighter damage out to eight km. Most people in these areas would be killed or very seriously injured. The fireball quickly rises forming an enormous characteristic mushroom shaped cloud raining highly radioactive particles (fallout). It rises to 60,000 ft (18,000m) - twice the altitude of Everest - and is 15 miles, 24km across. This is one warhead. There are 10 such warheads on each of Russia’s 46 missiles (460 in total) and 48 on each of eight US Trident submarines (384 in total). In reality, in a nuclear conflict all of these warheads and a further 956 ready-to-fire are likely to be launched. Whilst this scale of destruction is horrific and hundreds of millions of people would be killed in a few hours from a combination of blast, radiation and huge fires, there are also terrible longer-term effects. Scientists predict that <u>huge city-wide <strong><mark>firestorms</strong> combined with</u></mark> very the <u><strong><mark>high-altitude debris</strong></mark> clouds <mark>would</mark> severely <mark>reduce</mark> <strong><mark>sunlight</u></strong></mark> levels <u>and disrupt the world’s climate <mark>for a decade causing <strong>drought</u></strong></mark>, <u>a prolonged <strong><mark>winter</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>global famine</strong> and <strong>catastrophic impacts</strong> for <strong>all life</mark> on earth</strong> and in the seas <mark>due to <strong>intense</strong></mark> levels of <strong><mark>UV</strong> with</mark> the <strong><mark>destruction of </mark>the <mark>ozone</strong></mark> layer</u>. But even at the level of a few hundred nuclear warheads, the consequences of a nuclear war would be extremely severe across the world far beyond the areas hit directly. A nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan with ‘only’ 100 small warheads would kill hundreds of millions and cause climate damage leading to a global famine. The sheer destructive nature of nuclear explosions combined with long lasting radiation, means that nuclear weapons are of no military use. ‘Enemy’ territory would be unusable for years because of intense radiation -especially when nuclear power stations and reprocessing plants are hit. Even if your own country is not hit, radiation and climate damage will spread across the globe. No one escapes the consequences. But the nuclear nations argue that they build and keep nuclear weapons to make sure that they are never used. After all no one would be stupid enough to actually launch a nuclear weapon facing such terrible retaliation? It sounds obvious. If you threaten any attacker with terrible nuclear devastation of course they won’t attack you. That might be true most of the time. It is very unlikely that any country would launch a nuclear attack deliberately. But there are two very major problems. First, <u><mark>a <strong>terrorist org</mark>anisation</strong> <mark>with a <strong>nuclear weapon</strong> <strong>cannot be deterred</u></strong></mark> in this way. Secondly, <u>there are several ways in which a <strong><mark>nuclear war</strong> can <strong>start by mistake</u></strong></mark>. A report by the prestigious Chatham House in 2014 documents 30 instances between 1962 and 2002 when nuclear weapons came within minutes of being launched due to miscalculation, miscommunication, or technical errors. What prevented their use on many of these occasions was the intervention of individuals who, against military orders, either refused to authorise a nuclear strike or relay information that would have led to launch. Examples include a weather rocket launch mistaken for an attack on Russia, a US satellite misinterpreting sunlight reflecting off clouds as multiple missiles firings, a 42c chip fault creating a false warning of 220 missiles launched at the United States. Such risks are heightened during political crises. The <u><mark>risk</mark> <mark>of mistake is very high because</u></mark>, in a hangover from the Cold War, <u><mark>the US</mark>A <mark>and Russia each keep <strong>900 warheads</strong> ready to fire in</mark> a <strong>few <mark>minutes</u></strong></mark>, in a ‘launch on warning’ status, <u>should a <strong>warning</strong> of nuclear attack come in</u>. These nuclear weapons form a dangerous nuclear stand-off - rather like two people holding guns to each other’s heads. <u><mark>With only</mark> a few <mark>minutes to evaluate a warning</u></mark> of nuclear attack before warheads would strike, <u><strong><mark>one mistake can trigger disaster</u></strong></mark>. A similar nuclear stand-off exists between India and Pakistan.</p>

1AC – Cal – Harker MH

1AC – Miscalc

Contention 1 – Advantage

./documents/hsld19/Harker/Hu/Harker-Huynh-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx

A

Berkeley

2

Northland Christian AB

Amanda Yang

AC - Miscalculation NC - Reform CP Exascale DA Indo Pak PIC NR - Exascale DA

hsld19/Harker/Hu/Harker-Huynh-Aff-Berkeley-Round2.docx

MaHu

Harker MaHu

Ma.....

Hu.....

Harker

Harker

CA

hsld19

HS LD 2019-20

ld

hs

That causes global nuclear war

Henricksen 17

Thomas H. Henricksen 17, emeritus senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, 3/23/17, “Post-American World Order,” http://www.hoover.org/research/post-american-world-order

tensions stoked by assertive regimes could spark a political or military incident that might set off a chain reaction leading to a large-scale war The anomalous Cold War era spared nuclear exchange destroying the world. Such a repetition might reoccur in the unfolding geopolitical world by staying militarily and economically strong, the U S will have the resources to deter its peers’ hawkish behavior that might otherwise trigger major conflict the coming strategic chess match with Russia and China will prove tense and demanding since all the countries boast nuclear arms the U S should widen and sustain willing coalitions of partners There can be little room for error in crises among nuclear-weaponized hostile powers the playbook involves a waiting game in which each power looks to its rivals to suffer internal problems

tensions stoked by assertive regimes could spark large-scale war Cold War spared nuclear exchange destroying the world repetition might reoccur by staying militarily and economically strong, the U S will deter major conflict the strategic chess match will prove tense since all countries boast nuclear arms

The tensions stoked by the assertive regimes in the Kremlin or Tiananmen Square could spark a political or military incident that might set off a chain reaction leading to a large-scale war. Historically, powerful rivalries nearly always lead to at least skirmishes, if not a full-blown war. The anomalous Cold War era spared the United States and Soviet Russia a direct conflict, largely from concerns that one would trigger a nuclear exchange destroying both states and much of the world. Such a repetition might reoccur in the unfolding three-cornered geopolitical world. It seems safe to acknowledge that an ascendant China and a resurgent Russia will persist in their geo-strategic ambitions. What Is To Be Done? The first marching order is to dodge any kind of perpetual war of the sort that George Orwell outlined in “1984,” which engulfed the three super states of Eastasia, Eurasia, and Oceania, and made possible the totalitarian Big Brother regime. A long-running Cold War-type confrontation would almost certainly take another form than the one that ran from 1945 until the downfall of the Soviet Union. What prescriptions can be offered in the face of the escalating competition among the three global powers? First, by staying militarily and economically strong, the United States will have the resources to deter its peers’ hawkish behavior that might otherwise trigger a major conflict. Judging by the history of the Cold War, the coming strategic chess match with Russia and China will prove tense and demanding—since all the countries boast nuclear arms and long-range ballistic missiles. Next, the United States should widen and sustain willing coalitions of partners, something at which America excels, and at which China and Russia fail conspicuously. There can be little room for error in fraught crises among nuclear-weaponized and hostile powers. Short- and long-term standoffs are likely, as they were during the Cold War. Thus, the playbook, in part, involves a waiting game in which each power looks to its rivals to suffer grievous internal problems which could entail a collapse, as happened to the Soviet Union.

<h4>That causes global nuclear war </h4><p>Thomas H. <strong>Henricksen 17</strong>, emeritus senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, 3/23/17, “Post-American World Order,” http://www.hoover.org/research/post-american-world-order</p><p>The <u><mark>tensions stoked by</u></mark> the <u><mark>assertive regimes</u></mark> in the Kremlin or Tiananmen Square <u><mark>could <strong>spark</mark> a political or military incident</strong> that might set off a chain reaction leading to a</u> <u><strong><mark>large-scale war</u></strong></mark>. Historically, powerful rivalries nearly always lead to at least skirmishes, if not a full-blown war. <u>The anomalous <mark>Cold War</mark> era</u> <u><strong><mark>spared</u></strong></mark> the United States and Soviet Russia a direct conflict, largely from concerns that one would trigger a <u><strong><mark>nuclear exchange destroying</u></strong></mark> both states and much of <u><strong><mark>the world</strong></mark>. Such a <mark>repetition <strong>might</strong> reoccur</mark> in the unfolding</u> three-cornered <u>geopolitical world</u>. It seems safe to acknowledge that an ascendant China and a resurgent Russia will persist in their geo-strategic ambitions. What Is To Be Done? The first marching order is to dodge any kind of perpetual war of the sort that George Orwell outlined in “1984,” which engulfed the three super states of Eastasia, Eurasia, and Oceania, and made possible the totalitarian Big Brother regime. A long-running Cold War-type confrontation would almost certainly take another form than the one that ran from 1945 until the downfall of the Soviet Union. What prescriptions can be offered in the face of the escalating competition among the three global powers? First, <u><mark>by <strong>staying militarily and economically strong</strong>, the U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>S</u></mark>tates <u><mark>will</mark> have the resources to <mark>deter</mark> its peers’ hawkish behavior that might otherwise trigger</u> a <u><strong><mark>major conflict</u></strong></mark>. Judging by the history of the Cold War, <u><mark>the</mark> coming <mark>strategic chess match</mark> with Russia and China <mark>will prove tense</mark> and demanding</u>—<u><mark>since</u> <u><strong>all</mark> the <mark>countries boast nuclear arms</u></strong></mark> and long-range ballistic missiles. Next, <u>the U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>should widen and sustain willing coalitions of partners</u>, something at which America excels, and at which China and Russia fail conspicuously. <u>There can be <strong>little room for error</strong> in</u> fraught <u><strong>crises among nuclear-weaponized</u></strong> and <u><strong>hostile powers</u></strong>. Short- and long-term standoffs are likely, as they were during the Cold War. Thus, <u>the playbook</u>, in part, <u>involves a <strong>waiting game</strong> in which each power looks to its rivals to suffer</u> grievous <u>internal problems</u> which could entail a collapse, as happened to the Soviet Union. </p>

1-

./documents/ndtceda18/GeorgeMason/PeRu/George%20Mason-Pedersen-Ruiz-Neg-ADA%20Fall%20Championships-Round1.docx

N

ADA Fall Championships

1

Liberty CS

Jacob Bosley

1AC- NFU 1NC- ESR Lashout Farm Bill Prolif 2NR- Case Assurances

ndtceda18/GeorgeMason/PeRu/George%20Mason-Pedersen-Ruiz-Neg-ADA%20Fall%20Championships-Round1.docx

PeRu

George Mason PeRu

Sh.....

Pe.....

Se.....

Ru.....

GeorgeMason

George Mason

ndtceda18

NDT/CEDA 2018-19

cx

college

Reduce refers to sweeping measures that establish qualitative or quantitative limits on weapon exports – that’s distinct from restrictions on specific states or types of weapons.

Pearson 88

Pearson 88 (Frederic S. Pearson, Prof. of Political Science and Fellow at the Center of International Studies @ University of Missouri-St Louis, Arms Transfer Limitations and Third World Security, ed. Thomas Ohlson, SIPRI publication, pgs. 129-130)

suppliers have formulated positions on the management, restriction or reduction of arms transfers Arms trade management implies rules for reporting or licensing sales in specific circumstances Restriction of sales entails disapproval, banning or embargoes to specific states or classes of states or of specific types of weapon. Reduction of transfers includes more sweeping measures, such as qualitative or quantitative limits or ceilings, and deliberate government policies designed to curtail weapon exports

Restriction of sales entails disapproval, banning or embargoes to specific states or classes of states or of specific types of weapon. Reduction of transfers includes more sweeping measures, such as qualitative or quantitative limits or ceilings

Based on these general perspectives, second-tier suppliers have formulated both unilateral and multilateral positions on the management, restriction or reduction of Third World arms transfers. These are examined separately in order to assess the restraints most likely to be adopted in the future. Arms trade management, whether unilateral or multilateral, implies rules for reporting or licensing sales in specific circumstances, as well as potential market sharing arrangements. Restriction of sales entails disapproval, banning or embargoes to specific states or classes of states or of specific types of weapon. Reduction of transfers includes more sweeping measures, such as qualitative or quantitative limits or ceilings, and deliberate government policies or international agreements designed to curtail weapon exports. In the process of devising restraints, there can be trade-offs, such as restraints on transferring arms versus the technology or equipment to make or use them, on naval versus air versus land systems, or on weapon deliveries versus new sales agreements.

<h4>Reduce refers to sweeping measures that establish qualitative or quantitative limits on weapon exports – that’s distinct from <u>restrictions</u> on specific states or types of weapons.</h4><p><strong>Pearson 88</strong> (Frederic S. Pearson, Prof. of Political Science and Fellow at the Center of International Studies @ University of Missouri-St Louis, Arms Transfer Limitations and Third World Security, ed. Thomas Ohlson, SIPRI publication, pgs. 129-130)</p><p>Based on these general perspectives, second-tier <u>suppliers have formulated</u> both unilateral and multilateral <u>positions on the management, restriction or reduction of</u> Third World <u>arms transfers</u>. These are examined separately in order to assess the restraints most likely to be adopted in the future. <u><strong>Arms trade management</u></strong>, whether unilateral or multilateral, <u>implies rules for reporting or licensing sales in specific circumstances</u>, as well as potential market sharing arrangements. <u><strong><mark>Restriction of sales</u></strong> <u>entails disapproval, banning or embargoes to <strong>specific states</strong> or <strong>classes of states</strong> or of <strong>specific types of weapon. Reduction of transfers</u></strong> <u>includes more sweeping measures, such as qualitative or quantitative limits or ceilings</mark>, and deliberate government policies</u> or international agreements <u>designed to curtail weapon exports</u>. In the process of devising restraints, there can be trade-offs, such as restraints on transferring arms versus the technology or equipment to make or use them, on naval versus air versus land systems, or on weapon deliveries versus new sales agreements.</p>

Open source – Damus Round 2 Neg

1NC

1NC – T

./documents/hspolicy19/Peninsula/RhSr/Peninsula-Rhoades-Sridevan-Neg-Damus-Round2.docx

N

Damus

2

Stockdale IP

Kalyani Allums

1AC Saudi 1NC T Pearson ASPEC T Future Offsets CP Defense Industrial Base DA 2NC ASPEC Defense Industrial Base DA 1NR Case 2NR ASPEC Defense Industrial base DA Defense

hspolicy19/Peninsula/RhSr/Peninsula-Rhoades-Sridevan-Neg-Damus-Round2.docx

RhSr

Peninsula RhSr

Lu.....

Rh.....

Sa.....

Sr.....

Peninsula

Peninsula

CA

hspolicy19

HS Policy 2019-20

cx

hs

Democratic collapse is an existential threat --- controls every impact

Kasparov 17

Kasparov 17 (Garry Kasparov, Chairman of the Human Rights Foundation, former World Chess Champion, “Democracy and Human Rights: The Case for U.S. Leadership,” Testimony Before The Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 16th, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/021617_Kasparov_%20Testimony.pdf)

As countless millions were protected from totalitarianism by the United States it is easy for me to talk about the past That a nation founded on freedom was bound to defend freedom everywhere America led by example and set a high standard, a standard that exposed the hypocrisy and cruelty of dictatorships around the world. But there is no time for nostalgia Americans have retreated from those principles, and the world has become much worse off as a result People living under dictatorships want the opportunity for freedom The United States must not abandon them. The United States and the rest of the free world has an unprecedented advantage in economic and military strength today. What is lacking is the will. the will to take risks and invest in the long-term security of the country, and the world terror , war, refugees, and military intervention results when America leaves a vacuum of power. existential threat today is not found on a map, but it is very real. forces of the past are making steady progress against the modern world order. Terrorist movements in the Middle East, extremist parties across Europe, a paranoid tyrant in North Korea threatening nuclear blackmail, and an aggressive KGB dictator in Russia. They all want to turn the world back to a dark past because their survival is threatened by values of the free world, epitomized by the United States. And they are thriving as the U.S. has retreated. this is what happens when there is no cop on the beat. American leadership begins at home, right here. America cannot lead the world on democracy and human rights if there is no unity on meaning and importance of these things. Leadership is required to make that case clearly and powerfully. Right now, Americans are engaged in politics at a level not seen in decades. It is an opportunity for them to rediscover that making America great begins with believing America can be great. stability is the great strength of democracies. Strong institutions that outlast politicians allow for long-range planning The spread of democracy is the only proven remedy for nearly every crisis that plagues the world today. War, famine, poverty y, terrorism–all are generated and exacerbated by authoritarian regimes America First inevitably puts American security last. American leadership is required because there is no one else There is no weapon or wall that is more powerful for security than America being envied, imitated, and admired around the world. Admired not for being perfect, but for having the exceptional courage to always try to be better

America led by example and exposed dictatorships Americans have retreated the world has become much worse off terror , war and ntervention results when America leaves a vacuum existential threat is very real Terrorist extremist parties North Korea nuclear blackmail, and aggressive Russia. are thriving as the U.S. has retreated American leadership begins at home democracy is the only remedy for every crisis that plagues the world today. War, famine, poverty y, terrorism–all are generated by authoritarian regimes American leadership is required because there is no one else

As one of the countless millions of people who were freed or protected from totalitarianism by the United States of America, it is easy for me to talk about the past. To talk about the belief of the American people and their leaders that this country was exceptional, and had special responsibilities to match its tremendous power. That a nation founded on freedom was bound to defend freedom everywhere. I could talk about the bipartisan legacy of this most American principle, from the Founding Fathers, to Democrats like Harry Truman, to Republicans like Ronald Reagan. I could talk about how the American people used to care deeply about human rights and dissidents in far-off places, and how this is what made America a beacon of hope, a shining city on a hill. America led by example and set a high standard, a standard that exposed the hypocrisy and cruelty of dictatorships around the world. But there is no time for nostalgia. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War, Americans, and America, have retreated from those principles, and the world has become much worse off as a result. American skepticism about America’s role in the world deepened in the long, painful wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their aftermaths. Instead of applying the lessons learned about how to do better, lessons about faulty intelligence and working with native populations, the main outcome was to stop trying. This result has been a tragedy for the billions of people still living under authoritarian regimes around the world, and it is based on faulty analysis. You can never guarantee a positive outcome— not in chess, not in war, and certainly not in politics. The best you can do is to do what you know is right and to try your best. I speak from experience when I say that the citizens of unfree states do not expect guarantees. They want a reason to hope and a fighting chance. People living under dictatorships want the opportunity for freedom, the opportunity to live in peace and to follow their dreams. From the Iraq War to the Arab Spring to the current battles for liberty from Venezuela to Eastern Ukraine, people are fighting for that opportunity, giving up their lives for freedom. The United States must not abandon them. The United States and the rest of the free world has an unprecedented advantage in economic and military strength today. What is lacking is the will. The will to make the case to the American people, the will to take risks and invest in the long-term security of the country, and the world. This will require investments in aid, in education, in security that allow countries to attain the stability their people so badly need. Such investment is far more moral and far cheaper than the cycle of terror , war, refugees, and military intervention that results when America leaves a vacuum of power. The best way to help refugees is to prevent them from becoming refugees in the first place. The Soviet Union was an existential threat, and this focused the attention of the world, and the American people. There existential threat today is not found on a map, but it is very real. The forces of the past are making steady progress against the modern world order. Terrorist movements in the Middle East, extremist parties across Europe, a paranoid tyrant in North Korea threatening nuclear blackmail, and, at the center of the web, an aggressive KGB dictator in Russia. They all want to turn the world back to a dark past because their survival is threatened by the values of the free world, epitomized by the United States. And they are thriving as the U.S. has retreated. The global freedom index has declined for ten consecutive years. No one like to talk about the United States as a global policeman, but this is what happens when there is no cop on the beat. American leadership begins at home, right here. America cannot lead the world on democracy and human rights if there is no unity on the meaning and importance of these things. Leadership is required to make that case clearly and powerfully. Right now, Americans are engaged in politics at a level not seen in decades. It is an opportunity for them to rediscover that making America great begins with believing America can be great. The Cold War was won on American values that were shared by both parties and nearly every American. Institutions that were created by a Democrat, Truman, were triumphant forty years later thanks to the courage of a Republican, Reagan. This bipartisan consistency created the decades of strategic stability that is the great strength of democracies. Strong institutions that outlast politicians allow for long-range planning. In contrast, dictators can operate only tactically, not strategically, because they are not constrained by the balance of powers, but cannot afford to think beyond their own survival. This is why a dictator like Putin has an advantage in chaos, the ability to move quickly. This can only be met by strategy, by long-term goals that are based on shared values, not on polls and cable news. The fear of making things worse has paralyzed the United States from trying to make things better. There will always be setbacks, but the United States cannot quit. The spread of democracy is the only proven remedy for nearly every crisis that plagues the world today. War, famine, poverty y, terrorism–all are generated and exacerbated by authoritarian regimes. A policy of America First inevitably puts American security last. American leadership is required because there is no one else, and because it is good for America. There is no weapon or wall that is more powerful for security than America being envied, imitated, and admired around the world. Admired not for being perfect, but for having the exceptional courage to always try to be better. Thank you.

<h4>Democratic collapse is an existential threat --- controls every impact</h4><p><strong>Kasparov 17</strong> (Garry Kasparov, Chairman of the Human Rights Foundation, former World Chess Champion, “Democracy and Human Rights: The Case for U.S. Leadership,” Testimony Before The Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere, Transnational Crime, Civilian Security, Democracy, Human Rights, and Global Women's Issues of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 16th, https://www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/021617_Kasparov_%20Testimony.pdf)</p><p><u>As</u> one of the <u>countless millions</u> of people who <u>were</u> freed or <u>protected from totalitarianism by the United States</u> of America, <u>it is easy for me to talk about the past</u>. To talk about the belief of the American people and their leaders that this country was exceptional, and had special responsibilities to match its tremendous power. <u>That a nation founded on freedom was bound to defend freedom everywhere</u>. I could talk about the bipartisan legacy of this most American principle, from the Founding Fathers, to Democrats like Harry Truman, to Republicans like Ronald Reagan. I could talk about how the American people used to care deeply about human rights and dissidents in far-off places, and how this is what made America a beacon of hope, a shining city on a hill. <u><mark>America led by example and </mark>set a high standard, a standard that <mark>exposed</mark> the hypocrisy and cruelty of <mark>dictatorships</mark> around the world. But there is no time for nostalgia</u>. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War, <u><mark>Americans</u></mark>, and America, <u><mark>have retreated</mark> from those principles, and <strong><mark>the world has become much worse off </mark>as a result</u></strong>. American skepticism about America’s role in the world deepened in the long, painful wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and their aftermaths. Instead of applying the lessons learned about how to do better, lessons about faulty intelligence and working with native populations, the main outcome was to stop trying. This result has been a tragedy for the billions of people still living under authoritarian regimes around the world, and it is based on faulty analysis. You can never guarantee a positive outcome— not in chess, not in war, and certainly not in politics. The best you can do is to do what you know is right and to try your best. I speak from experience when I say that the citizens of unfree states do not expect guarantees. They want a reason to hope and a fighting chance. <u>People living under dictatorships want the opportunity for freedom</u>, the opportunity to live in peace and to follow their dreams. From the Iraq War to the Arab Spring to the current battles for liberty from Venezuela to Eastern Ukraine, people are fighting for that opportunity, giving up their lives for freedom. <u>The United States must not abandon them. The United States and the rest of the free world has an unprecedented advantage in economic and military strength today. What is lacking is the will. </u>The will to make the case to the American people, <u>the will to take risks and invest in the long-term security of the country, and the world</u>. This will require investments in aid, in education, in security that allow countries to attain the stability their people so badly need. Such investment is far more moral and far cheaper than the cycle of <u><strong><mark>terror , war</strong></mark>, refugees, <mark>and</mark> <strong>military i<mark>ntervention</u></strong></mark> that <u><mark>results when America leaves a vacuum </mark>of power. </u>The best way to help refugees is to prevent them from becoming refugees in the first place. The Soviet Union was an existential threat, and this focused the attention of the world, and the American people. There <u><strong><mark>existential threat</strong></mark> today is not found on a map, but it <strong><mark>is very real</strong></mark>. </u>The <u>forces of the past are making steady progress against the modern world order. <strong><mark>Terrorist</strong></mark> movements in the Middle East, <mark>extremist parties</mark> across Europe, a paranoid tyrant in <strong><mark>North Korea </mark>threatening <mark>nuclear blackmail,</strong> and</u></mark>, at the center of the web, <u>an <strong><mark>aggressive </mark>KGB dictator in <mark>Russia</strong>.</mark> They all want to turn the world back to a dark past because their survival is threatened by</u> the <u>values of the free world, epitomized by the United States. And <strong>they <mark>are thriving as the U.S. has retreated</strong></mark>.</u> The global freedom index has declined for ten consecutive years. No one like to talk about the United States as a global policeman, but <u><strong>this is what happens when there is no cop on the beat. <mark>American leadership begins at home</strong></mark>, right here. America cannot lead the world on democracy and human rights if there is no unity on</u> the <u>meaning and importance of these things.<mark> <strong></mark>Leadership is required to make that case clearly and powerfully</strong>. Right now, Americans are engaged in politics at a level not seen in decades. It is an opportunity for them to rediscover that making America great begins with believing America can be great. </u>The Cold War was won on American values that were shared by both parties and nearly every American. Institutions that were created by a Democrat, Truman, were triumphant forty years later thanks to the courage of a Republican, Reagan. This bipartisan consistency created the decades of strategic <u>stability</u> that <u>is the great strength of democracies. Strong institutions that outlast politicians allow for long-range planning</u>. In contrast, dictators can operate only tactically, not strategically, because they are not constrained by the balance of powers, but cannot afford to think beyond their own survival. This is why a dictator like Putin has an advantage in chaos, the ability to move quickly. This can only be met by strategy, by long-term goals that are based on shared values, not on polls and cable news. The fear of making things worse has paralyzed the United States from trying to make things better. There will always be setbacks, but the United States cannot quit. <u>The spread of <strong><mark>democracy is the only</strong></mark> proven <strong><mark>remedy for</strong></mark> nearly <strong><mark>every crisis that plagues the world today. War, famine, poverty y, terrorism</strong>–all are generated</mark> and exacerbated <mark>by authoritarian regimes</u></mark>. A policy of <u>America First inevitably puts American security last. <strong><mark>American leadership is required because there is no one else</u></strong></mark>, and because it is good for America. <u>There is no weapon or wall that is more powerful for security than America being envied, imitated, and admired around the world. Admired not for being perfect, but for having the exceptional courage to always try to be better</u>. Thank you.</p>

Advantage 2 – War Powers

./documents/hspolicy19/TulsaUnion/WaMa/Tulsa%20Union-Watson-Martin-Aff-Jenks%20Classic-Finals.docx

A

Jenks Classic

Finals

Union MC

Kourti Cain, Micheal Haskins, Rylee Buchert

1AC- Saudi Arabia 1NC- Oil DA

hspolicy19/TulsaUnion/WaMa/Tulsa%20Union-Watson-Martin-Aff-Jenks%20Classic-Finals.docx

WaMa

Tulsa Union WaMa

Ja.....

Wa.....

Za.....

Ma.....

TulsaUnion

Tulsa Union

OK

hspolicy19

HS Policy 2019-20

cx

hs

Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning—they’re our most baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions

Moen 16

Moen 16, Ole Martin (PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo). "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267. SM

a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels are understood inclusively , I might ask: “What for The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good We never ask what end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue

a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable there is something undeniably good about pleasure I might ask: “What for The reason is that pleasure is not good for anything further We never ask what end is in being pleased, because we assume pleasure is worthy in itself if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad pleasure reach the end of the line in matters of value for intrinsic value

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good. 3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value. Although pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail. Though it is, of course, an open question whether other objections to P1 might be more successful, I shall assume that if (1)–(4) fail, we are justified in believing that P1 is true itself a paragon of freedom—there will always be some agents able to interfere substantially with one’s choices. The effective level of protection one enjoys, and hence one’s actual degree of freedom, will vary according to multiple factors: how powerful one is, how powerful individuals in one’s vicinity are, how frequent police patrols are, and so on. Now, we saw above that what makes a slave unfree on Pettit’s view is the fact that his master has the power to interfere arbitrarily with his choices; in other words, what makes the slave unfree is the power relation that obtains between his master and him. The difficulty is that, in light of the facts I just mentioned, there is no reason to think that this power relation will be unique. A similar relation could obtain between the master and someone other than the slave: absent perfect state control, the master may very well have enough power to interfere in the lives of countless individuals. Yet it would be wrong to infer that these individuals lack freedom in the way the slave does; if they lack anything, it seems to be security. A problematic power relation can also obtain between the slave and someone other than the master, since there may be citizens who are more powerful than the master and who can therefore interfere with the slave’s choices at their discretion. Once again, it would be wrong to infer that these individuals make the slave unfree in the same way that the master does. Something appears to be missing from Pettit’s view. If I live in a particularly nasty part of town, then it may turn out that, when all the relevant factors are taken into account, I am just as vulnerable to outside interference as are the slaves in the royal palace, yet it does not follow that our conditions are equivalent from the point of view of freedom. As a matter of fact, we may be equally vulnerable to outside interference, but as a matter of right, our standings could not be more different. I have legal recourse against anyone who interferes with my freedom; the recourse may not be very effective—presumably it is not, if my overall vulnerability to outside interference is comparable to that of a slave— but I still have full legal standing.68 By contrast, the slave lacks legal recourse against the interventions of one specific individual: his master. It is that fact, on a Kantian view—a fact about the legal relation in which a slave stands to his master—that sets slaves apart from freemen. The point may appear trivial, but it does get something right: whereas one cannot identify a power relation that obtains uniquely between a slave and his master, the legal relation between them is undeniably unique. A master’s right to interfere with respect to his slave does not extend to freemen, regardless of how vulnerable they might be as a matter of fact, and citizens other than the master do not have the right to order the slave around, regardless of how powerful they might be. This suggests that Kant is correct in thinking that the ideal of freedom is essentially linked to a person’s having full legal standing. More specifically, he is correct in holding that the importance of rights is not exhausted by their contribution to the level of protection that an individual enjoys, as it must be on an instrumental view like Pettit’s. Although it does matter that rights be enforced with reasonable effectiveness, the sheer fact that one has adequate legal rights is essential to one’s standing as a free citizen. In this respect, Kant stays faithful to the idea that freedom is primarily a matter of standing—a standing that the freeman has and that the slave lacks. Pettit himself frequently insists on the idea, but he fails to do it justice when he claims that freedom is simply a matter of being adequately (and reliably) shielded against the strength of others. As Kant recognizes, the standing of a free citizen is a more complex matter than that. One could perhaps worry that the idea of legal standing is something of a red herring here—that it must ultimately be reducible to a complex network of power relations and, hence, that the position I attribute to Kant differs only nominally from Pettit’s. That seems to me doubtful. Viewing legal standing as essential to freedom makes sense only if our conception of the former includes conceptions of what constitutes a fully adequate scheme of legal rights, appropriate legal recourse, justified punishment, and so on. Only if one believes that these notions all boil down to power relations will Kant’s position appear similar to Pettit’s. On any other view—and certainly that includes most views recently defended by philosophers—the notion of legal standing will outstrip the power relations that ground Pettit’s theory.

<h4>Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning—they’re our most baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions</h4><p><strong>Moen 16</strong>, Ole Martin (PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo). "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267. SM</p><p>Let us start by observing, empirically, that <u><strong><mark>a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value</u></strong></mark> and disvalue <u><strong><mark>is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable</u></strong></mark>. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for <u><strong><mark>there is something undeniably good about</strong></mark> the way <strong><mark>pleasure</strong></mark> feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels</u>, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” <u>are</u> here <u>understood inclusively</u>, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store<u>, <strong><mark>I might ask: “What for</u></strong></mark>?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. <u><strong><mark>The reason is that</mark> </strong>the <strong><mark>pleasure is not good for anything further</strong></mark>; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good</u>. 3 As Aristotle observes: “<u><strong><mark>We never ask</u></strong></mark> [a man] <u><strong><mark>what</u></strong></mark> his <u><strong><mark>end is in being pleased, because we assume</strong></mark> that <strong><mark>pleasure is</strong></mark> choice <strong><mark>worthy in itself</u></strong></mark>.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that <u><strong><mark>if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad</u></strong></mark>. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that <u><strong><mark>pleasure</strong></mark> and pain are both places where we <strong><mark>reach the end of the line in matters of value</u></strong></mark>. Although <u>pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates <strong><mark>for intrinsic value</strong></mark> and disvalue</u>, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail. Though it is, of course, an open question whether other objections to P1 might be more successful, I shall assume that if (1)–(4) fail, we are justified in believing that P1 is true itself a paragon of freedom—there will always be some agents able to interfere substantially with one’s choices. The effective level of protection one enjoys, and hence one’s actual degree of freedom, will vary according to multiple factors: how powerful one is, how powerful individuals in one’s vicinity are, how frequent police patrols are, and so on. Now, we saw above that what makes a slave unfree on Pettit’s view is the fact that his master has the power to interfere arbitrarily with his choices; in other words, what makes the slave unfree is the power relation that obtains between his master and him. The difficulty is that, in light of the facts I just mentioned, there is no reason to think that this power relation will be unique. A similar relation could obtain between the master and someone other than the slave: absent perfect state control, the master may very well have enough power to interfere in the lives of countless individuals. Yet it would be wrong to infer that these individuals lack freedom in the way the slave does; if they lack anything, it seems to be security. A problematic power relation can also obtain between the slave and someone other than the master, since there may be citizens who are more powerful than the master and who can therefore interfere with the slave’s choices at their discretion. Once again, it would be wrong to infer that these individuals make the slave unfree in the same way that the master does. Something appears to be missing from Pettit’s view. If I live in a particularly nasty part of town, then it may turn out that, when all the relevant factors are taken into account, I am just as vulnerable to outside interference as are the slaves in the royal palace, yet it does not follow that our conditions are equivalent from the point of view of freedom. As a matter of fact, we may be equally vulnerable to outside interference, but as a matter of right, our standings could not be more different. I have legal recourse against anyone who interferes with my freedom; the recourse may not be very effective—presumably it is not, if my overall vulnerability to outside interference is comparable to that of a slave— but I still have full legal standing.68 By contrast, the slave lacks legal recourse against the interventions of one specific individual: his master. It is that fact, on a Kantian view—a fact about the legal relation in which a slave stands to his master—that sets slaves apart from freemen. The point may appear trivial, but it does get something right: whereas one cannot identify a power relation that obtains uniquely between a slave and his master, the legal relation between them is undeniably unique. A master’s right to interfere with respect to his slave does not extend to freemen, regardless of how vulnerable they might be as a matter of fact, and citizens other than the master do not have the right to order the slave around, regardless of how powerful they might be. This suggests that Kant is correct in thinking that the ideal of freedom is essentially linked to a person’s having full legal standing. More specifically, he is correct in holding that the importance of rights is not exhausted by their contribution to the level of protection that an individual enjoys, as it must be on an instrumental view like Pettit’s. Although it does matter that rights be enforced with reasonable effectiveness, the sheer fact that one has adequate legal rights is essential to one’s standing as a free citizen. In this respect, Kant stays faithful to the idea that freedom is primarily a matter of standing—a standing that the freeman has and that the slave lacks. Pettit himself frequently insists on the idea, but he fails to do it justice when he claims that freedom is simply a matter of being adequately (and reliably) shielded against the strength of others. As Kant recognizes, the standing of a free citizen is a more complex matter than that. One could perhaps worry that the idea of legal standing is something of a red herring here—that it must ultimately be reducible to a complex network of power relations and, hence, that the position I attribute to Kant differs only nominally from Pettit’s. That seems to me doubtful. Viewing legal standing as essential to freedom makes sense only if our conception of the former includes conceptions of what constitutes a fully adequate scheme of legal rights, appropriate legal recourse, justified punishment, and so on. Only if one believes that these notions all boil down to power relations will Kant’s position appear similar to Pettit’s. On any other view—and certainly that includes most views recently defended by philosophers—the notion of legal standing will outstrip the power relations that ground Pettit’s theory.</p>

AC – Aegis Ashore

1AC – Framing

./documents/hsld20/Elkins/Ma/Elkins-Manoj-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round3.docx

A

Golden Desert

3

Harker DS

Lydia Dimsu

1AC - Aegis Ashore 1NC - T-Lethal Realism K Moscow PIC Prolif DA North Korea DA 1AR - All 2NR - Moscow PIC Prolif DA 2AR - All

hsld20/Elkins/Ma/Elkins-Manoj-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round3.docx

AyMa

Elkins AyMa

Ay.....

Ma.....

Elkins

Elkins

TX

hsld20

HS LD 2020-21

ld

hs

No impact to bioterror

Lentzos 14

Filippa Lentzos 14, PhD from London School of Economics and Social Science, Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine at King’s College London, Catherine Jefferson, researcher in the Department of Social Science, Health, and Medicine at King’s College London, DPhil from the University of Sussex, former senior policy advisor for international security at the Royal Society, and Dr. Claire Marris, Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine at King's College London, “The myths (and realities) of synthetic bioweapons,” 9/18/2014, http://thebulletin.org/myths-and-realities-synthetic-bioweapons7626

Those who have overemphasized bioterror portray it as an imminent concern, with emphasis on high-consequence, mass-casualty attacks This is a myth assumption is that terrorists would seek mass-casualty weapons leading biological disarmament and non-proliferation experts believe the risk of large-scale bioterrorism attacks to be quite small. This is backed by historical evidence attempts in the past were small-scale assumption is that producing a pathogenic organism equates to producing a weapon It does not. Considerable knowledge and resources are necessary for scaling up, storage, and dissemination. These present significant barriers Even if a weapon were disseminated successfully medical countermeasures, such as antibodies and vaccination, can significantly blunt the impact of an attack.

bioterror as an imminent concern is a myth leading experts believe risk of large-scale bioterror to be quite small. This is backed by historical evidence attempts were small-scale assumption is that a pathogen equates to a weapon It does not knowledge and resources necessary for scaling storage, and dissemination. present significant barriers medical countermeasures significantly blunt the impact

The bioterror WMD myth. Those who have overemphasized the bioterrorism threat typically portray it as an imminent concern, with emphasis placed on high-consequence, mass-casualty attacks, performed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This is a myth with two dimensions.¶ The first involves the identities of terrorists and what their intentions are. The assumption is that terrorists would seek to produce mass-casualty weapons and pursue capabilities on the scale of 20th century, state-level bioweapons programs. Most leading biological disarmament and non-proliferation experts believe that the risk of a small-scale bioterrorism attack is very real and present. But they consider the risk of sophisticated large-scale bioterrorism attacks to be quite small. This judgment is backed up by historical evidence. The three confirmed attempts to use biological agents against humans in terrorist attacks in the past were small-scale, low-casualty events aimed at causing panic and disruption rather than excessive death tolls. ¶ The second dimension involves capabilities and the level of skills and resources available to terrorists. The implicit assumption is that producing a pathogenic organism equates to producing a weapon of mass destruction. It does not. Considerable knowledge and resources are necessary for the processes of scaling up, storage, and dissemination. These processes present significant technical and logistical barriers.¶ Even if a biological weapon were disseminated successfully, the outcome of an attack would be affected by factors like the health of the people who are exposed and the speed and manner with which public health authorities and medical professionals detect and respond to the resulting outbreak. A prompt response with effective medical countermeasures, such as antibodies and vaccination, can significantly blunt the impact of an attack.

<h4>No impact to bioterror</h4><p>Filippa <strong>Lentzos 14<u></strong>, PhD from London School of Economics and Social Science, Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine at King’s College London, Catherine Jefferson, researcher in the Department of Social Science, Health, and Medicine at King’s College London, DPhil from the University of Sussex, former senior policy advisor for international security at the Royal Society, and Dr. Claire Marris, Senior Research Fellow in the Department of Social Science, Health and Medicine at King's College London, “The myths (and realities) of synthetic bioweapons,” 9/18/2014, http://thebulletin.org/myths-and-realities-synthetic-bioweapons7626</p><p></u>The bioterror WMD myth. <u>Those who have <strong>overemphasized</u></strong> the <u><mark>bioterror</u></mark>ism threat typically <u>portray it <mark>as an <strong>imminent concern</strong></mark>, with emphasis</u> placed <u>on <strong>high-consequence, mass-casualty attacks</u></strong>, performed with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). <u>This <mark>is a myth</u></mark> with two dimensions.¶ The first involves the identities of terrorists and what their intentions are. The <u>assumption is that terrorists would seek</u> to produce <u><strong>mass-casualty weapons</u></strong> and pursue capabilities on the scale of 20th century, state-level bioweapons programs. Most <u><strong><mark>leading</mark> biological disarmament and non-proliferation <mark>experts</u></strong> <u>believe</u></mark> that the risk of a small-scale bioterrorism attack is very real and present. But they consider <u>the <mark>risk of</u></mark> sophisticated <u><strong><mark>large-scale</mark> <mark>bioterror</mark>ism attacks <mark>to be quite small.</u></strong> <u>This</u></mark> judgment <u><mark>is</u> <u>backed</u></mark> up <u><mark>by <strong>historical evidence</u></strong></mark>. The three confirmed <u><mark>attempts</u></mark> to use biological agents against humans in terrorist attacks <u>in the past <mark>were <strong>small-scale</u></strong></mark>, low-casualty events aimed at causing panic and disruption rather than excessive death tolls. ¶ The second dimension involves capabilities and the level of skills and resources available to terrorists. The implicit <u><mark>assumption is that</mark> producing <mark>a pathogen</mark>ic organism <mark>equates to</mark> producing <mark>a weapon</u></mark> of mass destruction. <u><strong><mark>It does not</mark>.</u></strong> <u>Considerable <mark>knowledge and resources </mark>are <mark>necessary for</u></mark> the processes of <u><strong><mark>scaling </mark>up, <mark>storage, and dissemination.</u></strong> <u></mark>These</u> processes <u><mark>present</u> <u><strong>significant</u></strong></mark> technical and logistical <u><strong><mark>barriers</u></strong></mark>.¶ <u><strong>Even if</u></strong> <u>a</u> biological <u>weapon were disseminated successfully</u>, the outcome of an attack would be affected by factors like the health of the people who are exposed and the speed and manner with which public health authorities and medical professionals detect and respond to the resulting outbreak. A prompt response with effective <u><strong><mark>medical countermeasures</mark>,</u></strong> <u>such as antibodies and vaccination, can <strong><mark>significantly blunt the impact</mark> of an attack</strong>.</p></u>

Case

Adv 2

./documents/hspolicy20/Mamaroneck/BlOw/Mamaroneck-Blechman-Owen-Neg-Pennsbury-Round4.docx

N

Pennsbury

4

Calvert Hall CS

Emily Chan

1ac -- tax crimes 2nr -- civil cp 2ar -- condo

hspolicy20/Mamaroneck/BlOw/Mamaroneck-Blechman-Owen-Neg-Pennsbury-Round4.docx

BlOw

Mamaroneck BlOw

Ja.....

Bl.....

Ja.....

Ow.....

Mamaroneck

Mamaroneck

NY

hspolicy20

HS Policy 2020-21

cx

hs

no warming impact---adaptation and resilience

Hart 15

Hart 15 (Michael, he’s the Simon Reisman chair at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa, former Fulbright-Woodrow Wilson Center Visiting Research, he was also a Scholar-in-Residence in the School of International Service and a Senior Fellow in the Center for North American Studies at American University in Washington, a former official in Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, where he specialized in trade policy and trade negotiations, MA from the University of Toronto and is the author, editor, or co-editor of more than a dozen books, “Hubris: The Troubling Science, Economics, and Politics of Climate Change”, google books)

the IPCC scenarios are wildly alarmist on the underlying assumptions The result cannot withstand critical analysis Each scare scenario is based on linear projections without any reference to technological developments or adaptation Why should the rest of humanity not be able to do likewise in the face of a trivial rise in temperature over the course of more than a century The work on physical impacts is equally over the top All the scenarios assume only negative impacts ignore the reality of adaptation and attribute any and all things bad to global warming Assuming the GHG theory to be correct means that its impact would be most evident at night and during the winter studies ignore this facet The IPCC believes that a warmer world will harm human health due to increased disease, malnutrition, heat-waves, floods, storms, and cardiovascular incidents there is no basis for the claim about severe-weather-related threats or malnutrition spread of malaria is largely unrelated to climate Malaria’s worst recorded outbreak was in Siberia long before there was any discussion of AGW Catastrophic species loss similarly has little foundation in past experience Even if the GHG hypothesis were to be correct its impact would be slow providing significant scope and opportunity for adaptation including by flora and fauna modelers fed wildly improbable scenarios and data into their computers and produced the much-touted claim of massive species loss There are literally thousands of websites devoted to spreading alarm about species loss Global warming is but one of many claimed human threats to the planet’s biodiversity The claims, are largely hype scientists have no idea of the extent of the world's flora and fauna there are no reliable data about the rate of loss 95 per cent of the species that ever existed have been lost over the eons species loss is slowing reaching its lowest level in 500 years a species of plant or animal has responded to adverse conditions by moving to more hospitable circumstances species have shown the ability to adapt rapidly to changes in climate Claims that global warming threatens extinction typically rest on speculation rather than real-world evidence The world’s species have proven very resilient having survived past natural climate cycles that involved much greater warming and higher C02 concentrations than exist today or are likely to exist in the coming centuries?“

IPCC scenarios are wildly alarmist cannot withstand critical analysis Each scenario is without reference to adaptation work on physical impacts is over the top there is no basis for the claim about severe-weather- species loss similarly has little foundation its impact would be slow, providing opportunity for adaptation modelers fed improbable scenarios claims are hype species have shown the ability to adapt rapidly Claims that warming threatens extinction rest on speculation rather than real evidence

As already noted, the IPCC scenarios themselves are wildly alarmist, not only on the basic science but also on the underlying economic assumptions, which in turn drive the alarmist impacts. The result cannot withstand critical analysis. Economists Ian Castles and David Henderson, for example, show the extent to which the analysis is driven by the desire to reach predetermined outcomes.50 Other economists have similarly wondered what purpose was served by pursuing such unrealistic scenarios. It is hard to credit the defense put forward by Mike Hulme, one of the creators of the scenarios, that the IPCC is not engaged in forecasting the future but in creating “plausible” story lines of what might happen under various scenarios.51 Each scare scenario is based on linear projections without any reference to technological developments or adaptation. If, on a similar linear basis, our Victorian ancestors in the UK, worried about rapid urbanization and population growth in London, had made similar projections, they would have pointed to the looming crisis arising from reliance on horse-drawn carriages and omnibuses; they would have concluded that by the middle of the 20th century, London would be knee-deep in horse manure, and all of the southern counties would be required to grow the oats and hay to feed and bed the required number of horses. Technology progressed and London adapted. Why should the rest of humanity not be able to do likewise in the face of a trivial rise in temperature over the course of more than a century? The work on physical impacts is equally over the top. All the scenarios assume only negative impacts, ignore the reality of adaptation, and attribute any and all things bad to global warming. Assuming the GHG theory to be correct means that its impact would be most evident at night and during the winter in reducing atmospheric heat loss to outer space.52 It would have greater impact in increasing minimum temperatures than in increasing maximum temperatures. Secondary studies, however, generally ignore this facet of the hypothesis. The IPCC believes that a warmer world will harm human health due, for example, to increased disease, malnutrition, heat-waves, floods, storms, and cardiovascular incidents. As already noted there is no basis for the claim about severe-weather-related threats or malnutrition. The claim about heat-related deaths gained a boost during the summer of 2003 because of the tragedy of some 15,000 alleged heat-related deaths in France as elderly people stayed behind in city apartments without air conditioning while their children enjoyed the heat at the sea shore during the August vacation. Epidemiological studies of so-called "excess" deaths resulting from heat waves are abused to get the desired results. Similar studies of the impact of cold spells show that they are far more lethal than heat waves and that it is much easier to adapt to heat than to cold.53 More fundamentally, this, like most of the alarmist literature, ignores the basics of the AGW hypothesis: the world will not see an exponential increase in summer, daytime heat (and thus more heat waves), but a decrease in night-time and winter cooling, particularly at higher latitudes and altitudes. Based on the AGW hypothesis, Canada, China, Korea, Northern Europe, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Chile, and Argentina will see warmer winters and warmer nights. There are clear benefits to such a development, even if there may also be problems, but the AGW industry tends to ignore the positive aspects of their alarmist scenarios. The feared spread of malaria, a much repeated claim, is largely unrelated to climate. Malaria’s worst recorded outbreak was in Siberia long before there was any discussion of AGW. Similarly, the building of the Rideau Canal in Ottawa in the 1820s was severely hampered by outbreaks of malaria due to the proximity of mosquito-infested wetlands in the area. Malaria remains widespread in tropical countries today in part because of the UN’s lengthy embargo on the use of DDT, the legacy of an earlier alarmist disaster. Temperature is but one factor, and a minor one at that, in the multiple factors that affect the rise or decline in the presence of disease-spreading mosquitoes. Wealthier western countries have pursued public health strategies that have reduced the incidence of the dis- ease in their countries. Entomologist Paul Reiter, widely recognized as the leading specialist on malaria vectors and a contributor to some of the early work of the IPCC, was aghast to learn how his careful and systematic analysis of the potential impacts had been twisted in ways that he could not endorse. In a recent paper, he concludes: “Simplistic reasoning on the future prevalence of malaria is ill-founded; malaria is not limited by climate in most temperate regions, nor in the tropics, and in nearly all cases, ’new' malaria at high altitudes is well below the maximum altitudinal limits for transmission. Future changes in climate may alter the prevalence and incidence of the disease, but obsessive emphasis on ’global warming' as a dominant parameter is indefensible; the principal determinants are linked to ecological and societal change, politics and economics.”54 Catastrophic species loss similarly has little foundation in past experience.55 Even if the GHG hypothesis were to be correct, its impact would be slow, providing significant scope and opportunity for adaptation, including by flora and fauna. One of the more irresponsible claims was made by a group of UK modelers who fed wildly improbable scenarios and data into their computers and produced the much-touted claim of massive species loss by the end of the century. There are literally thousands of websites devoted to spreading alarm about species loss and biodiversity. Global warming is but one of many claimed human threats to the planet’s biodiversity. The claims, fortunately, are largely hype, based on computer models and the estimate by Harvard naturalist Edward O. Wilson that 27,000 to 100,000 species are lost annually - a figure he advanced purely hypothetically but which has become one of the most persistent of environmental urban myths. The fact is that scientists have no idea of the extent of the world's flora and fauna, with estimates ranging from five million to 100 million species, and that there are no reliable data about the rate of loss. By some estimates, 95 per cent of the species that ever existed have been lost over the eons, most before humans became major players in altering their environment. A much more credible estimate of recent species loss comes from a surprising source, the UN Environmental Program. It reports that known species loss is slowing reaching its lowest level in 500 years in the last three decades of the 20th century, with some 20 reported extinctions despite increasing pressure on the biosphere from growing human population and industrialization.57 The alarmist community has also introduced the scientifically unknown concept of "locally extinct,” often meaning little more than that a species of plant or animal has responded to adverse conditions by moving to more hospitable circumstances, e.g., birds or butterflies becoming more numerous north of their range and disappearing at its extreme southern extent. Idso et al. conclude: “Many species have shown the ability to adapt rapidly to changes in climate. Claims that global warming threatens large numbers of species with extinction typically rest on a false definition of extinction (the loss of a particular population rather than en- tire species) and speculation rather than real-world evidence. The world’s species have proven very resilient, having survived past natural climate cycles that involved much greater warming and higher C02 concentrations than exist today or are likely to exist in the coming centuries?“

<h4>no warming impact---adaptation and resilience</h4><p><strong>Hart 15</strong> (Michael, he’s the Simon Reisman<u> chair at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa, former Fulbright-Woodrow Wilson Center Visiting Research, he was also a Scholar-in-Residence in the School of International Service and a Senior Fellow in the Center for North American Studies at American University in Washington, a former official in Canada’s Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, where he specialized in trade policy and trade negotiations, MA from the University of Toronto and is the author, editor, or co-editor of more than a dozen books, “Hubris: The Troubling Science, Economics, and Politics of Climate Change”, google books)</p><p></u>As already noted, <u>the <mark>IPCC scenarios</u></mark> themselves <u><strong><mark>are wildly alarmist</u></strong></mark>, not only on the basic science but also <u>on the</u> <u><strong>underlying</u></strong> economic <u><strong>assumptions</u></strong>, which in turn drive the alarmist impacts. <u>The result</u><mark> <u><strong>cannot withstand critical analysis</u></strong></mark>. Economists Ian Castles and David Henderson, for example, show the extent to which the analysis is driven by the desire to reach predetermined outcomes.50 Other economists have similarly wondered what purpose was served by pursuing such unrealistic scenarios. It is hard to credit the defense put forward by Mike Hulme, one of the creators of the scenarios, that the IPCC is not engaged in forecasting the future but in creating “plausible” story lines of what might happen under various scenarios.51 <u><mark>Each</u></mark> <u><strong>scare <mark>scenario</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>is </mark>based on linear projections <mark>without</u> <u><strong></mark>any <mark>reference to</mark> technological developments or <mark>adaptation</u></strong></mark>. If, on a similar linear basis, our Victorian ancestors in the UK, worried about rapid urbanization and population growth in London, had made similar projections, they would have pointed to the looming crisis arising from reliance on horse-drawn carriages and omnibuses; they would have concluded that by the middle of the 20th century, London would be knee-deep in horse manure, and all of the southern counties would be required to grow the oats and hay to feed and bed the required number of horses. Technology progressed and London adapted. <u><strong>Why should the rest of humanity not be able to do likewise</u></strong> <u>in the face of a trivial rise in temperature over the course of <strong>more than a century</u></strong>? <u>The <mark>work on physical impacts is</u> <u><strong></mark>equally <mark>over the top</u></strong></mark>. <u>All the scenarios assume</u> <u><strong>only negative impacts</u></strong>, <u>ignore the reality of</u> <u><strong>adaptation</u></strong>, <u>and attribute <strong>any and all things bad</strong> to global warming</u>. <u>Assuming the GHG theory to be correct means that its impact would be most evident at night and during the winter</u> in reducing atmospheric heat loss to outer space.52 It would have greater impact in increasing minimum temperatures than in increasing maximum temperatures. Secondary <u>studies</u>, however, generally <u><strong>ignore this facet</u></strong> of the hypothesis. <u>The IPCC believes that a warmer world will harm human health</u> <u>due</u>, for example, <u>to increased disease, malnutrition, heat-waves, floods, storms, and cardiovascular incidents</u>. As already noted <u><strong><mark>there is no basis for the claim about severe-weather-</mark>related threats or malnutrition</u></strong>. The claim about heat-related deaths gained a boost during the summer of 2003 because of the tragedy of some 15,000 alleged heat-related deaths in France as elderly people stayed behind in city apartments without air conditioning while their children enjoyed the heat at the sea shore during the August vacation. Epidemiological studies of so-called "excess" deaths resulting from heat waves are abused to get the desired results. Similar studies of the impact of cold spells show that they are far more lethal than heat waves and that it is much easier to adapt to heat than to cold.53 More fundamentally, this, like most of the alarmist literature, ignores the basics of the AGW hypothesis: the world will not see an exponential increase in summer, daytime heat (and thus more heat waves), but a decrease in night-time and winter cooling, particularly at higher latitudes and altitudes. Based on the AGW hypothesis, Canada, China, Korea, Northern Europe, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Chile, and Argentina will see warmer winters and warmer nights. There are clear benefits to such a development, even if there may also be problems, but the AGW industry tends to ignore the positive aspects of their alarmist scenarios. The feared <u>spread of malaria</u>, a much repeated claim, <u>is largely unrelated to climate</u>. <u>Malaria’s worst recorded outbreak</u> <u><strong>was in Siberia long before there was any discussion of AGW</u></strong>. Similarly, the building of the Rideau Canal in Ottawa in the 1820s was severely hampered by outbreaks of malaria due to the proximity of mosquito-infested wetlands in the area. Malaria remains widespread in tropical countries today in part because of the UN’s lengthy embargo on the use of DDT, the legacy of an earlier alarmist disaster. Temperature is but one factor, and a minor one at that, in the multiple factors that affect the rise or decline in the presence of disease-spreading mosquitoes. Wealthier western countries have pursued public health strategies that have reduced the incidence of the dis- ease in their countries. Entomologist Paul Reiter, widely recognized as the leading specialist on malaria vectors and a contributor to some of the early work of the IPCC, was aghast to learn how his careful and systematic analysis of the potential impacts had been twisted in ways that he could not endorse. In a recent paper, he concludes: “Simplistic reasoning on the future prevalence of malaria is ill-founded; malaria is not limited by climate in most temperate regions, nor in the tropics, and in nearly all cases, ’new' malaria at high altitudes is well below the maximum altitudinal limits for transmission. Future changes in climate may alter the prevalence and incidence of the disease, but obsessive emphasis on ’global warming' as a dominant parameter is indefensible; the principal determinants are linked to ecological and societal change, politics and economics.”54 <u><strong>Catastrophic <mark>species loss</u></strong> <u>similarly has</u> <u><strong>little foundation </mark>in past experience</u></strong>.55 <u>Even if the GHG hypothesis were to be correct</u>, <u><strong><mark>its impact would be slow</u></strong>, <u><strong>providing </mark>significant scope and <mark>opportunity for adaptation</u></strong></mark>, <u>including by flora and fauna</u>. One of the more irresponsible claims was made by a group of UK <u><mark>modelers</u></mark> who <u><mark>fed</mark> wildly <mark>improbable scenarios</mark> and data into their computers and produced the much-touted claim of massive species loss</u> by the end of the century. <u>There are literally</u> <u><strong>thousands of websites</u></strong> <u><strong>devoted to spreading alarm about species loss</u></strong> and biodiversity. <u>Global warming is</u> <u><strong>but one of many claimed human threats to the planet’s biodiversity</u></strong>. <u>The <mark>claims</mark>,</u> fortunately, <u><mark>are </mark>largely <mark>hype</u></mark>, based on computer models and the estimate by Harvard naturalist Edward O. Wilson that 27,000 to 100,000 species are lost annually - a figure he advanced purely hypothetically but which has become one of the most persistent of environmental urban myths. The fact is that <u>scientists</u> <u><strong>have no idea of the extent of the world's flora and fauna</u></strong>, with estimates ranging from five million to 100 million species, and that <u>there are no reliable data about the rate of loss</u>. By some estimates, <u>95 per cent of the species that ever existed have been lost over the eons</u>, most before humans became major players in altering their environment. A much more credible estimate of recent species loss comes from a surprising source, the UN Environmental Program. It reports that known <u><strong>species loss is slowing reaching its lowest level in 500 years</u></strong> in the last three decades of the 20th century, with some 20 reported extinctions despite increasing pressure on the biosphere from growing human population and industrialization.57 The alarmist community has also introduced the scientifically unknown concept of "locally extinct,” often meaning little more than that <u>a species of plant or animal has responded to adverse conditions by moving to more hospitable circumstances</u>, e.g., birds or butterflies becoming more numerous north of their range and disappearing at its extreme southern extent. Idso et al. conclude: “Many <u><mark>species have shown the ability to</u> <u><strong>adapt rapidly </mark>to changes in climate</u></strong>. <u><mark>Claims that </mark>global <mark>warming threatens</u></mark> large numbers of species with <u><strong><mark>extinction</u></strong> <u></mark>typically <mark>rest on</u></mark> a false definition of extinction (the loss of a particular population rather than en- tire species) and <u><strong><mark>speculation rather than real</mark>-world <mark>evidence</u></strong></mark>. <u>The world’s species have proven</u> <u><strong>very resilient</u></strong>, <u>having survived past natural climate cycles that involved much greater warming and higher C02 concentrations than exist today or are likely to exist in the coming centuries?“</p></u>

warming

warm

./documents/ndtceda16/Kentucky/TrBa/Kentucky-Trufanov-Bannister-Neg-Northwestern-Round4.docx

N

Northwestern

4

Kansas BC

Tom Gliniecki

aff was carbon tax with warming and a new china advantage 1nc was states CP CAT assistance CP incentives CP tax reform politics DA federalism DA lng DA t cap 2nr was lng DA

ndtceda16/Kentucky/TrBa/Kentucky-Trufanov-Bannister-Neg-Northwestern-Round4.docx

TrBa

Kentucky TrBa

An.....

Tr.....

Da.....

Ba.....

Kentucky

Kentucky

ndtceda16

NDT/CEDA 2016-17

cx

college

‘Core antitrust’ is all three.

Rataj ’21

Rataj ’21 [Michael; May 12; PC, Law Degree from the Detroit College of Law; Michael Rataj Blog, “Consequences for Breaking Antitrust Laws,” https://www.michaelrataj.com/blog/2021/05/consequences-for-breaking-antitrust-laws/]

The three core antitrust laws are the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act

The three core antitrust laws are Sherman F T C and Clayton Act

The core antitrust laws are… The three core antitrust laws are the Sherman Act, the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act. The Sherman Act primarily prohibits unreasonable restraint of trade and monopolization. Those who are in violation of the Sherman Act may face hefty fines, up to $100 million, and up to 10 years behind bars. The FTC Act prohibits unfair practices or acts and unfair approaches to harming competition. Only the FTC can file cases under this act. The Clayton Act is a catch-all that covers every practice not covered by the Sherman and FTC Acts. Then consequences for violations of both of these acts are usually civil in nature.

<h4>‘Core antitrust’ is all three. </h4><p><strong>Rataj ’21</strong> [Michael; May 12; PC, Law Degree from the Detroit College of Law; Michael Rataj Blog, “Consequences for Breaking Antitrust Laws,” https://www.michaelrataj.com/blog/2021/05/consequences-for-breaking-antitrust-laws/]</p><p>The core antitrust laws are…</p><p><u><mark>The three <strong>core antitrust laws</strong> are</mark> the <strong><mark>Sherman</mark> Act</strong>, the <strong><mark>F</strong></mark>ederal <strong><mark>T</strong></mark>rade <strong><mark>C</strong></mark>ommission <strong>Act</strong> <mark>and</mark> the <strong><mark>Clayton Act</u></strong></mark>. The Sherman Act primarily prohibits unreasonable restraint of trade and monopolization. Those who are in violation of the Sherman Act may face hefty fines, up to $100 million, and up to 10 years behind bars.</p><p>The FTC Act prohibits unfair practices or acts and unfair approaches to harming competition. Only the FTC can file cases under this act. The Clayton Act is a catch-all that covers every practice not covered by the Sherman and FTC Acts. Then consequences for violations of both of these acts are usually civil in nature.</p>

2AC---Round Four---NDT

T---Scope

T---Scope Exemptions---2AC

./documents/ndtceda21/Michigan/PiRa/Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Aff-NDT-Round4.docx

A

00 NDT

4

Georgetown WW

Pavan Reddy, Matthew Granstrom, Ian Morris

1AC Religious Exercise 2NR Antitrust PIC Judicial Economics DA

ndtceda21/Michigan/PiRa/Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Aff-NDT-Round4.docx

PiRa

Michigan PiRa

Ra.....

Pi.....

Gi.....

Ra.....

Michigan

Michigan

ndtceda21

NDT/CEDA 2021-22

cx

college

Plan solves labor migration flows boosting economic integration.

Koyanagi 16

Koyanagi 16 Ken Koyanagi 5-2-2016 "ASEAN needs Schengen-like system: top Thai business school head" https://archive.vn/N5Sbq#selection-2535.0-2542.0 (Jain is an internationally renowned marketing and business management scholar and has served as the Sasin director since 2014. Prior to the current position, he served as dean of such top business schools as INSEAD and Kellogg School for Management at Northwestern University. He also sits on the board of directors at such publicly traded companies as Northern Trust of the U.S. and Reliance Industries of India.)//Elmer

If Southeast Asian countries want to make their common market more effectively function as a pan-regional economy they should accelerate the free movement of people install its own version of Schengen rules" to let people move freely within the region Jain was referring to the European Union's arrangement that allows member states' nationals to cross each other's borders without passport checks. rules on human travel and relocation across borders have changed very little, keeping it difficult for companies in the region to utilize human resources of multiple nationalities in integrated and dynamic ways For example, if a company wants to relocate some of its employees in one country to another frequently, the destination country's rules on visas, immigration and labor often stand in the way. Connecting people to people is the key to success for the AEC," You can fly or drive directly to every part of the region from Bangkok," he said. He also noted that a lower cost of living compared to Singapore is another advantage for the kingdom. To leverage those factors and attract business investment, he said, development of both physical and soft infrastructure will be crucial

If Southeast Asian countries want to make their common market more effectively function as a pan-regional economy they should accelerate the free movement of people install its own Schengen rules" to let people move freely cross borders without passport checks rules on relocation across borders changed very little, keeping difficult for companies in the region to utilize human resources of multiple nationalities in integrated and dynamic ways if a company wants to relocate to another frequently the destination country's rules on visas, immigration and labor often stand in the way Connecting people is the key to success for the AEC

BANGKOK -- If Southeast Asian countries want to make their common market more effectively function as a pan-regional economy, they should accelerate the free movement of people, according to the head of the region's top business school. In an interview with the Nikkei Asian Review in late April, Dipak Jain, director of Sasin Graduate School of Business Administration at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, said, "ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) should install its own version of Schengen rules" to let people move freely within the region. Jain was referring to the European Union's arrangement that allows member states' nationals to cross each other's borders without passport checks. ASEAN officially launched a region-wide common market, dubbed the ASEAN Economic Community, at the end of 2015, where the 10 member states have agreed to advance the free movement of goods, money and people over the coming years. While tariffs on over 95% of goods traded inside the region have been abolished, rules on human travel and relocation across borders have changed very little, keeping it difficult for companies in the region to utilize human resources of multiple nationalities in integrated and dynamic ways. For example, if a company wants to relocate some of its employees in one country to another frequently, the destination country's rules on visas, immigration and labor often stand in the way. "Connecting people to people is the key to success for the AEC," said Jain, claiming that the current situation is not very supportive. Jain also pointed out that Thailand is geographically better positioned than other ASEAN countries to benefit from the AEC by becoming a regional hub. "You can fly or drive directly to every part of the region from Bangkok," he said. He also noted that a lower cost of living compared to Singapore is another advantage for the kingdom. To leverage those factors and attract business investment, he said, development of both physical and soft infrastructure will be crucial.

<h4>Plan <u>solves</u> labor migration flows boosting <u>economic integration</u>. </h4><p><strong>Koyanagi 16</strong> Ken Koyanagi 5-2-2016 "ASEAN needs Schengen-like system: top Thai business school head" https://archive.vn/N5Sbq#selection-2535.0-2542.0 (Jain is an internationally renowned marketing and business management scholar and has served as the Sasin director since 2014. Prior to the current position, he served as dean of such top business schools as INSEAD and Kellogg School for Management at Northwestern University. He also sits on the board of directors at such publicly traded companies as Northern Trust of the U.S. and Reliance Industries of India.)//Elmer </p><p>BANGKOK -- <u><strong><mark>If Southeast Asian countries want to make their common market more effectively function as a pan-regional economy</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong><mark>they should accelerate the free movement of people</u></strong></mark>, according to the head of the region's top business school. In an interview with the Nikkei Asian Review in late April, Dipak Jain, director of Sasin Graduate School of Business Administration at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, said, "ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) should <u><strong><mark>install</u></strong> <u><strong>its own</u></strong></mark> <u>version of</u> <u><strong><mark>Schengen rules" to</u></strong> <u><strong>let</u></strong> <u><strong>people move freely</u></strong> <u></mark>within the region</u>. <u>Jain was referring to the European Union's arrangement that allows member states' nationals to <strong><mark>cross</strong> </mark>each other's <strong><mark>borders</strong> <strong>without</strong> <strong>passport checks</strong></mark>.</u> ASEAN officially launched a region-wide common market, dubbed the ASEAN Economic Community, at the end of 2015, where the 10 member states have agreed to advance the free movement of goods, money and people over the coming years. While tariffs on over 95% of goods traded inside the region have been abolished, <u><strong><mark>rules on</u></strong></mark> <u>human travel and</u> <u><strong><mark>relocation</u></strong> <u><strong>across borders</u></strong> <u></mark>have</u> <u><strong><mark>changed very little, </p><p>keeping</u></strong> <u></mark>it</u> <u><strong><mark>difficult</u></strong> <u><strong>for companies in the region to utilize human resources of multiple nationalities in integrated and dynamic ways</u></strong></mark>. <u>For example, <strong><mark>if a company wants to relocate</strong> </mark>some of its employees in one country <strong><mark>to another</strong> <strong>frequently</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>the destination country's rules on visas, immigration and labor often stand in the way</strong></mark>.</u> "<u><strong><mark>Connecting people</strong> </mark>to people <strong><mark>is the key to success for the AEC</strong></mark>,"</u> said Jain, claiming that the current situation is not very supportive. Jain also pointed out that Thailand is geographically better positioned than other ASEAN countries to benefit from the AEC by becoming a regional hub. "<u>You can fly or drive directly to every part of the region from Bangkok," he said. He also noted that a lower cost of living compared to Singapore is another advantage for the kingdom. To leverage those factors and attract business investment, he said, development of both physical and soft infrastructure will be crucial</u>.</p>

1AC: ASEAN

1AC: Plan [New Plan]

./documents/hsld22/MillardNorth/SwDa/MillardNorth-SwDa-Aff-The-NaviGator-at-Northstar-Round-5.docx

A

The NaviGator at Northstar

5

Lincoln East BH

Baker

1ac- ASEAN 1nc- topicality, peace poem, war k, case 1ar- all 2nr- war k, topicality 2ar- all

hsld22/MillardNorth/SwDa/MillardNorth-SwDa-Aff-The-NaviGator-at-Northstar-Round-5.docx

2023-01-26 19:51:15

SwDa

Millard North SwDa

Sw.....

Da.....

MillardNorth

Millard North

NE

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

ld

hs

It goes nuclear.

Johnson 14

Les Johnson 14. Baen science fiction author, popular science writer, and NASA technologist. “Living without satellites”. https://www.baen.com/living_without_satellites.

Satellite imagery is used by the military and political leaders to maintain the peace When potential adversaries can’t hide what they’re doing, where their armies are moving and what they are doing with their civilian and military infrastructure, then the danger of surprise attack is diminished In nuclear age with instant death only minutes away by missile attack (MAD) only works if both sides know whether or not they are being attacked. can easily be seen from space far in advance of either reaching their potential targets halfway around the globe danger of surprise attack is therefore small, making an accidental war far less likely. security of countries are now dependent on space satellites Should we lose these fragile assets in space, economy would experience a disruption like no other: ship, air and train travel would stop and only restart/operate in a much-reduced capacity for years (GPS loss) Lives would be put at risk and the productivity of our farming would dramatically decrease (weather satellite loss). The risk of war, including nuclear war, would increase (loss of spy satellites) and our military’s ability to react to crises would be significantly reduced (loss of military logistics and intelligence gathering satellites).

Satellite used by military to maintain peace adversaries can’t hide what they’re doing and military infrastructure danger of attack is diminished (MAD) only works if both sides know whether they are being attacked making accidental war far less likely security of countries dependent on space satellites Should we lose assets in space Lives would be at risk risk of nuclear war, would increase and military’s ability to react would be reduced

Satellite imagery is used by the military and our political leaders to maintain the peace. When your potential adversaries can’t hide what they’re doing, where their armies are moving and what they are doing with their civilian and military infrastructure, then the danger of surprise attack is diminished. In our nuclear age with instant death only minutes away by missile attack, the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) only works if both sides know whether or not they are being attacked. The launch of missiles or a bomber fleet can easily be seen from space far in advance of either reaching their potential targets halfway around the globe. The danger of surprise attack is therefore small, making an accidental war far less likely. So what does all this mean? And what do we do about it? First of all, it means that the advocates of space development, exploration and commercialization have succeeded far beyond their initial expectations and dreams. The economies and security of countries in the developed world are now dependent on space satellites. We space advocates should celebrate our success and be terrified of it at the same time. Should we lose these fragile assets in space, our economy would experience a disruption like no other: ship, air and train travel would stop and only restart/operate in a much-reduced capacity for years (GPS loss). Many banking and retail transactions would cease (VSAT loss). Distribution of news and vital national information would be crippled (communications satellite loss). Lives would be put at risk and the productivity of our farming would dramatically decrease (weather satellite loss). The risk of war, including nuclear war, would increase (loss of spy satellites) and our military’s ability to react to crises would be significantly reduced (loss of military logistics and intelligence gathering satellites).

<h4><strong>It goes nuclear.</h4><p></strong>Les <strong>Johnson 14</strong>. Baen science fiction author, popular science writer, and NASA technologist. “Living without satellites”. https://www.baen.com/living_without_satellites<u>. </p><p><mark>Satellite</mark> imagery is <mark>used by</mark> the <mark>military</mark> and</u> our <u>political leaders <mark>to maintain</mark> the <mark>peace</u></mark>. <u>When</u> your <u>potential <mark>adversaries</mark> <mark>can’t hide what they’re doing</mark>, where their armies are moving <mark>and</mark> what they are doing with their civilian and <mark>military infrastructure</mark>, then the <mark>danger of</mark> surprise <mark>attack is diminished</u></mark>. <u>In</u> our <u>nuclear age with instant death only minutes away by missile attack</u>, the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction <u><strong><mark>(MAD)</mark> <mark>only works if</mark> <mark>both sides</mark> <mark>know</mark> <mark>whether</mark> or not <mark>they are being attacked</mark>.</u></strong> The launch of missiles or a bomber fleet <u>can easily be seen from space far in advance of either reaching their potential targets halfway around the globe</u>. The <u>danger of surprise attack is therefore small, <mark>making</mark> an <strong><mark>accidental war</strong> far less likely</mark>.</u> So what does all this mean? And what do we do about it? First of all, it means that the advocates of space development, exploration and commercialization have succeeded far beyond their initial expectations and dreams. The economies and <u><strong><mark>security of countries</mark> </u></strong>in the developed world<u><strong> are now <mark>dependent on space</mark> <mark>satellites</u></strong></mark>. We space advocates should celebrate our success and be terrified of it at the same time. <u><mark>Should we lose</mark> these fragile <mark>assets in space</mark>,</u> our <u>economy would experience a disruption like no other: ship, air and train travel would stop and only restart/operate in a much-reduced capacity for years (GPS loss)</u>. Many banking and retail transactions would cease (VSAT loss). Distribution of news and vital national information would be crippled (communications satellite loss). <u><strong><mark>Lives would be</mark> put <mark>at risk</strong></mark> and the productivity of our farming would dramatically decrease (weather satellite loss). The <mark>risk of</mark> war, including <strong><mark>nuclear war, would increase</strong></mark> (loss of spy satellites) <mark>and</mark> our <mark>military’s ability to react</mark> to crises <mark>would be</mark> significantly <mark>reduced</mark> (loss of military logistics and intelligence gathering satellites).</p></u>

1ac

Russia Debris

Debris---1AC

./documents/ndtceda19/Emory/ChJa/Emory-Chaudhry-Jablonski-Aff-GSU-Round7.docx

A

GSU

7

Kansas HO

Val

1ac Russia Debris 2nr Unilat Cp Sanction CP Containment DA

ndtceda19/Emory/ChJa/Emory-Chaudhry-Jablonski-Aff-GSU-Round7.docx

ChJa

Emory ChJa

Ni.....

Ch.....

Be.....

Ja.....

Emory

Emory

ndtceda19

NDT/CEDA 2019-20

cx

college

Warming is linear—every decrease in rising temperatures radically mitigates the risk of existential climate change.

Xu and Ramanathan 17,

Xu and Ramanathan 17, Yangyang Xu, Assistant Professor of Atmospheric Sciences at Texas A&M University; and Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric and Climate Sciences at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California, San Diego, 9/26/17, “Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 114, No. 39, p. 10315-10323//recut CHS PK

changes of this magnitude, not experienced in the last 20+ million years, pose existential threats to a majority of the population catastrophe can strike at even lower warming levels. Several studies have concluded that 3 to 5 °C global warming is likely to be the threshold for tipping points such as the collapse of the western Antarctic ice sheet, shutdown of deep water circulation in the North Atlantic, dieback of Amazon rainforests as well as boreal forests, and collapse of the West African monsoon, among others. natural scientists refer to these as abrupt and irreversible climate changes catastrophic events Warming of such magnitudes has catastrophic human health effects Human beings are extremely sensitive to heat stress a 2 °C warming would double the land area subject to deadly heat and expose 48% of the population. A 4 °C warming by 2100 would subject 74% of the world population to deadly heat, which could pose existential risks to humans and mammals several hundred million people would be subject to famine with warming in excess of 4 °C there has essentially been no discussion on warming beyond 5 °C can act as a major force multiplier and expose as much as 90% of species to the dangers of extinction The bodily harms combined with climate change-forced species destruction, biodiversity loss, and threats to water and food security motivated us to categorize warming beyond 5 °C as existential

changes pose existential threats catastrophe can strike at lower levels 3 to 5 ° is the threshold for tipping points as irreversible climate changes Human beings are extremely sensitive to heat 2 ° would double deadly heat 4 ° would subject 74% of the population which could pose existential risks 5 ° can act as a major force multiplier and expose 90% of species The harms combined with species destruction, biod loss, and threats to water and food security categorize warming as existential

We are proposing the following extension to the DAI risk categorization: warming greater than 1.5 °C as “dangerous”; warming greater than 3 °C as “catastrophic?”; and warming in excess of 5 °C as “unknown??,” with the understanding that changes of this magnitude, not experienced in the last 20+ million years, pose existential threats to a majority of the population. The question mark denotes the subjective nature of our deduction and the fact that catastrophe can strike at even lower warming levels. The justifications for the proposed extension to risk categorization are given below. From the IPCC burning embers diagram and from the language of the Paris Agreement, we infer that the DAI begins at warming greater than 1.5 °C. Our criteria for extending the risk category beyond DAI include the potential risks of climate change to the physical climate system, the ecosystem, human health, and species extinction. Let us first consider the category of catastrophic (3 to 5 °C warming). The first major concern is the issue of tipping points. Several studies (48, 49) have concluded that 3 to 5 °C global warming is likely to be the threshold for tipping points such as the collapse of the western Antarctic ice sheet, shutdown of deep water circulation in the North Atlantic, dieback of Amazon rainforests as well as boreal forests, and collapse of the West African monsoon, among others. While natural scientists refer to these as abrupt and irreversible climate changes, economists refer to them as catastrophic events (49). Warming of such magnitudes also has catastrophic human health effects. Many recent studies (50, 51) have focused on the direct influence of extreme events such as heat waves on public health by evaluating exposure to heat stress and hyperthermia. It has been estimated that the likelihood of extreme events (defined as 3-sigma events), including heat waves, has increased 10-fold in the recent decades (52). Human beings are extremely sensitive to heat stress. For example, the 2013 European heat wave led to about 70,000 premature mortalities (53). The major finding of a recent study (51) is that, currently, about 13.6% of land area with a population of 30.6% is exposed to deadly heat. The authors of that study defined deadly heat as exceeding a threshold of temperature as well as humidity. The thresholds were determined from numerous heat wave events and data for mortalities attributed to heat waves. According to this study, a 2 °C warming would double the land area subject to deadly heat and expose 48% of the population. A 4 °C warming by 2100 would subject 47% of the land area and almost 74% of the world population to deadly heat, which could pose existential risks to humans and mammals alike unless massive adaptation measures are implemented, such as providing air conditioning to the entire population or a massive relocation of most of the population to safer climates. Climate risks can vary markedly depending on the socioeconomic status and culture of the population, and so we must take up the question of “dangerous to whom?” (54). Our discussion in this study is focused more on people and not on the ecosystem, and even with this limited scope, there are multitudes of categories of people. We will focus on the poorest 3 billion people living mostly in tropical rural areas, who are still relying on 18th-century technologies for meeting basic needs such as cooking and heating. Their contribution to CO2 pollution is roughly 5% compared with the 50% contribution by the wealthiest 1 billion (55). This bottom 3 billion population comprises mostly subsistent farmers, whose livelihood will be severely impacted, if not destroyed, with a one- to five-year megadrought, heat waves, or heavy floods; for those among the bottom 3 billion of the world’s population who are living in coastal areas, a 1- to 2-m rise in sea level (likely with a warming in excess of 3 °C) poses existential threat if they do not relocate or migrate. It has been estimated that several hundred million people would be subject to famine with warming in excess of 4 °C (54). However, there has essentially been no discussion on warming beyond 5 °C. Climate change-induced species extinction is one major concern with warming of such large magnitudes (>5 °C). The current rate of loss of species is ∼1,000-fold the historical rate, due largely to habitat destruction. At this rate, about 25% of species are in danger of extinction in the coming decades (56). Global warming of 6 °C or more (accompanied by increase in ocean acidity due to increased CO2) can act as a major force multiplier and expose as much as 90% of species to the dangers of extinction (57). The bodily harms combined with climate change-forced species destruction, biodiversity loss, and threats to water and food security, as summarized recently (58), motivated us to categorize warming beyond 5 °C as unknown??, implying the possibility of existential threats. Fig. 2 displays these three risk categorizations (vertical dashed lines).

<h4><strong>Warming is linear—every decrease in rising temperatures radically mitigates the risk of existential climate change. </h4><p><u>Xu and Ramanathan 17, </u></strong>Yangyang Xu, Assistant Professor of Atmospheric Sciences at Texas A&M University; and Veerabhadran Ramanathan, Distinguished Professor of Atmospheric and Climate Sciences at the Scripps Institution of Oceanography, University of California, San Diego, 9/26/17, “Well below 2 °C: Mitigation strategies for avoiding dangerous to catastrophic climate changes,” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Vol. 114, No. 39, p. 10315-10323//recut CHS PK</p><p>We are proposing the following extension to the DAI risk categorization: warming greater than 1.5 °C as “dangerous”; warming greater than 3 °C as “catastrophic?”; and warming in excess of 5 °C as “unknown??,” with the understanding that <u><strong><mark>changes</mark> of this magnitude, not experienced in the last 20+ million years, <mark>pose existential threats</mark> to a majority of the population</u></strong>. The question mark denotes the subjective nature of our deduction and the fact that <u><strong><mark>catastrophe can strike at</mark> even <mark>lower</mark> warming <mark>levels</mark>.</u></strong> The justifications for the proposed extension to risk categorization are given below. From the IPCC burning embers diagram and from the language of the Paris Agreement, we infer that the DAI begins at warming greater than 1.5 °C. Our criteria for extending the risk category beyond DAI include the potential risks of climate change to the physical climate system, the ecosystem, human health, and species extinction. Let us first consider the category of catastrophic (3 to 5 °C warming). The first major concern is the issue of tipping points. <u><strong>Several studies</u></strong> (48, 49) <u><strong>have concluded that <mark>3 to 5 °</mark>C global warming <mark>is</mark> likely to be <mark>the threshold for tipping points</mark> such as the collapse of the western Antarctic ice sheet, shutdown of deep water circulation in the North Atlantic, dieback of Amazon rainforests as well as boreal forests, and collapse of the West African monsoon, among others.</u></strong> While <u><strong>natural scientists refer to these <mark>as </mark>abrupt and <mark>irreversible climate changes</u></strong></mark>, economists refer to them as <u><strong>catastrophic events</u></strong> (49). <u><strong>Warming of such magnitudes </u></strong>also<u><strong> has catastrophic human health effects</u></strong>. Many recent studies (50, 51) have focused on the direct influence of extreme events such as heat waves on public health by evaluating exposure to heat stress and hyperthermia. It has been estimated that the likelihood of extreme events (defined as 3-sigma events), including heat waves, has increased 10-fold in the recent decades (52). <u><strong><mark>Human beings are extremely sensitive to heat</mark> stress</u></strong>. For example, the 2013 European heat wave led to about 70,000 premature mortalities (53). The major finding of a recent study (51) is that, currently, about 13.6% of land area with a population of 30.6% is exposed to deadly heat. The authors of that study defined deadly heat as exceeding a threshold of temperature as well as humidity. The thresholds were determined from numerous heat wave events and data for mortalities attributed to heat waves. According to this study, <u><strong>a <mark>2 °</mark>C warming <mark>would double</mark> the land area subject to <mark>deadly heat</mark> and expose 48% of the population. A <mark>4 °</mark>C warming by 2100 <mark>would subject</mark> </u></strong>47% of the land area and almost <u><strong><mark>74% of the</mark> world <mark>population</mark> to deadly heat, <mark>which could pose existential risks</mark> to humans and mammals</u></strong> alike unless massive adaptation measures are implemented, such as providing air conditioning to the entire population or a massive relocation of most of the population to safer climates. Climate risks can vary markedly depending on the socioeconomic status and culture of the population, and so we must take up the question of “dangerous to whom?” (54). Our discussion in this study is focused more on people and not on the ecosystem, and even with this limited scope, there are multitudes of categories of people. We will focus on the poorest 3 billion people living mostly in tropical rural areas, who are still relying on 18th-century technologies for meeting basic needs such as cooking and heating. Their contribution to CO2 pollution is roughly 5% compared with the 50% contribution by the wealthiest 1 billion (55). This bottom 3 billion population comprises mostly subsistent farmers, whose livelihood will be severely impacted, if not destroyed, with a one- to five-year megadrought, heat waves, or heavy floods; for those among the bottom 3 billion of the world’s population who are living in coastal areas, a 1- to 2-m rise in sea level (likely with a warming in excess of 3 °C) poses existential threat if they do not relocate or migrate. It has been estimated that <u><strong>several hundred million people would be subject to famine with warming in excess of 4 °C</u></strong> (54). However, <u><strong>there has essentially been no discussion on warming beyond <mark>5 °</mark>C</u></strong>. Climate change-induced species extinction is one major concern with warming of such large magnitudes (>5 °C). The current rate of loss of species is ∼1,000-fold the historical rate, due largely to habitat destruction. At this rate, about 25% of species are in danger of extinction in the coming decades (56). Global warming of 6 °C or more (accompanied by increase in ocean acidity due to increased CO2) <u><strong><mark>can act as a major force multiplier and expose</mark> as much as <mark>90% of species</mark> to the dangers of extinction</u></strong> (57). <u><strong><mark>The</mark> bodily <mark>harms combined with</mark> climate change-forced <mark>species destruction, biod</mark>iversity <mark>loss, and threats to water and food security</u></strong></mark>, as summarized recently (58), <u><strong>motivated us to <mark>categorize warming</mark> beyond 5 °C <mark>as</u></strong></mark> unknown??, implying the possibility of <u><strong><mark>existential</u></strong></mark> threats. Fig. 2 displays these three risk categorizations (vertical dashed lines).</p>

1AC

1AC — Advantages

Advantage 1 — Wages

./documents/hsld21/MontaVista/Ra/Monta%20Vista-Rastogi-Aff-Blue%20Key-Round6.docx

A

Blue Key

6

Lake Highland Prep AB

Samantha McLoughlin

1AC - ag workers 1NC - t just cap k case 1AR - all 2NR - util k t just 2AR - all

hsld21/MontaVista/Ra/Monta%20Vista-Rastogi-Aff-Blue%20Key-Round6.docx

KeRa

Monta Vista KeRa

Ke.....

Ra.....

MontaVista

Monta Vista

CA

hsld21

HS LD 2021-22

ld

hs

No cyber impact – attribution, restraint, and capabilities.

Lewis ’20

Lewis ’20 [James Andrew; 8/17/20; senior vice president and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; "Dismissing Cyber Catastrophe," https://www.csis.org/analysis/dismissing-cyber-catastrophe]

there are powerful strategic constraints on those who have ability to launch catastrophe attacks. We have more decades of experience with the use of cyber techniques and have a clear understanding of motives, capabilities, and intentions Nonstate actors and most states lack the capability to launch attacks that cause physical damage at any level, much less a catastrophe There have been regular predictions every year that nonstate actors will acquire these in two or three years The monetary return is negligible, which dissuades the skilled cybercriminals who might have the necessary skills There is enough uncertainty among potential attackers about the United States’ ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk massive retaliation in response No one has ever died from a cyberattack, and only a handful produced physical damage. A cyberattack is not a nuclear weapon, and it is intellectually lazy to equate them to nuclear weapons The shadow of nuclear war distorts discussion of cyber warfare State use of cyber operations is consistent with their broad national strategies and interests. Their primary emphasis is on espionage and political coercion. The United States has opponents and is in conflict with them, but they have no interest in launching a catastrophic cyberattack since it would certainly produce an equally catastrophic retaliation. Their goal is to stay below the “use-of-force” threshold not start a war This has implications inadvertent escalation, something that has also never occurred there are both technological and strategic constraints that shape and limit risk in cyber operations, and the absence of inadvertent escalation suggests a high degree of control for cyber capabilities by advanced states. Attackers, particularly among the United States’ major opponents for whom cyber is just one of the tools for confrontation, seek to avoid actions that could trigger escalation. The United States has two opponents (China and Russia) who are capable of damaging cyberattacks. but neither Russia nor China would be well served by a attack on the United States. Iran may reach the point where it could use cyberattacks but it would only do so when it has decided to engage in a major armed conflict with the United States North Korea has not developed this kind of capability

Nonstate actors and states lack capability to cause damage much less catastrophe There is enough uncertainty about ability to attribute they are unwilling to risk retaliation No one has died from cyber it is lazy to equate them to nuc s opponents have no interest in catastrophic attack it would produce equal retaliation inadvertent escalation never occurred constraints limit risk absence suggests control by advanced states neither Russia China would attack U S Iran could but only when in North Korea has no capability

More importantly, there are powerful strategic constraints on those who have the ability to launch catastrophe attacks. We have more than two decades of experience with the use of cyber techniques and operations for coercive and criminal purposes and have a clear understanding of motives, capabilities, and intentions. We can be guided by the methods of the Strategic Bombing Survey, which used interviews and observation (rather than hypotheses) to determine effect. These methods apply equally to cyberattacks. The conclusions we can draw from this are: Nonstate actors and most states lack the capability to launch attacks that cause physical damage at any level, much less a catastrophe. There have been regular predictions every year for over a decade that nonstate actors will acquire these high-end cyber capabilities in two or three years in what has become a cycle of repetition. The monetary return is negligible, which dissuades the skilled cybercriminals (mostly Russian speaking) who might have the necessary skills. One mystery is why these groups have not been used as mercenaries, and this may reflect either a degree of control by the Russian state (if it has forbidden mercenary acts) or a degree of caution by criminals. There is enough uncertainty among potential attackers about the United States’ ability to attribute that they are unwilling to risk massive retaliation in response to a catastrophic attack. (They are perfectly willing to take the risk of attribution for espionage and coercive cyber actions.) No one has ever died from a cyberattack, and only a handful of these attacks have produced physical damage. A cyberattack is not a nuclear weapon, and it is intellectually lazy to equate them to nuclear weapons. Using a tactical nuclear weapon against an urban center would produce several hundred thousand casualties, while a strategic nuclear exchange would cause tens of millions of casualties and immense physical destruction. These are catastrophes that some hack cannot duplicate. The shadow of nuclear war distorts discussion of cyber warfare. State use of cyber operations is consistent with their broad national strategies and interests. Their primary emphasis is on espionage and political coercion. The United States has opponents and is in conflict with them, but they have no interest in launching a catastrophic cyberattack since it would certainly produce an equally catastrophic retaliation. Their goal is to stay below the “use-of-force” threshold and undertake damaging cyber actions against the United States, not start a war. This has implications for the discussion of inadvertent escalation, something that has also never occurred. The concern over escalation deserves a longer discussion, as there are both technological and strategic constraints that shape and limit risk in cyber operations, and the absence of inadvertent escalation suggests a high degree of control for cyber capabilities by advanced states. Attackers, particularly among the United States’ major opponents for whom cyber is just one of the tools for confrontation, seek to avoid actions that could trigger escalation. The United States has two opponents (China and Russia) who are capable of damaging cyberattacks. Russia has demonstrated its attack skills on the Ukrainian power grid, but neither Russia nor China would be well served by a similar attack on the United States. Iran is improving and may reach the point where it could use cyberattacks to cause major damage, but it would only do so when it has decided to engage in a major armed conflict with the United States. Iran might attack targets outside the United States and its allies with less risk and continues to experiment with cyberattacks against Israeli critical infrastructure. North Korea has not yet developed this kind of capability.

<h4>No cyber impact – <u>attribution</u>, <u>restraint</u>, and <u>capabilities</u>.</h4><p><strong>Lewis ’20 </strong>[James Andrew; 8/17/20; senior vice president and director of the Strategic Technologies Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies; "Dismissing Cyber Catastrophe," https://www.csis.org/analysis/dismissing-cyber-catastrophe]</p><p>More importantly, <u>there are powerful</u> <u><strong>strategic constraints</u></strong> <u>on those who have</u> the <u>ability to launch <strong>catastrophe attacks</strong>. We have more</u> than two <u>decades of experience with the use of</u> <u><strong>cyber techniques</u></strong> and operations for coercive and criminal purposes <u>and have a</u> <u><strong>clear understanding</u></strong> <u>of</u> <u><strong>motives</strong>, <strong>capabilities</strong>, and <strong>intentions</u></strong>. We can be guided by the methods of the Strategic Bombing Survey, which used interviews and observation (rather than hypotheses) to determine effect. These methods apply equally to cyberattacks. The conclusions we can draw from this are:</p><p><u><strong><mark>Nonstate actors</strong> and</mark> <strong>most <mark>states</strong> lack</mark> the <mark>capability to</mark> launch attacks that <mark>cause</mark> <strong>physical <mark>damage</mark> at any level, <mark>much less</mark> a <mark>catastrophe</u></strong></mark>. <u>There have been regular predictions every year</u> for over a decade <u>that nonstate actors will acquire these</u> high-end cyber capabilities <u>in two or three years</u> in what has become a cycle of repetition. <u>The monetary</u> <u><strong>return is negligible</strong>, which <strong>dissuades</strong> the skilled cybercriminals</u> (mostly Russian speaking) <u>who might have the necessary skills</u>. One mystery is why these groups have not been used as mercenaries, and this may reflect either a degree of control by the Russian state (if it has forbidden mercenary acts) or a degree of caution by criminals.</p><p><u><mark>There is <strong>enough uncertainty</strong></mark> among potential attackers <mark>about</mark> the <strong>U</strong>nited <strong>S</strong>tates’ <mark>ability to <strong>attribute</u></strong></mark> <u>that <mark>they are</u> <u><strong>unwilling to risk</mark> massive <mark>retaliation</strong></mark> in response</u> to a catastrophic attack. (They are perfectly willing to take the risk of attribution for espionage and coercive cyber actions.)</p><p><u><mark>No one has</mark> ever <mark>died from</mark> a <mark>cyber</mark>attack, and only a handful</u> of these attacks have <u>produced physical damage. A cyberattack is not a nuclear weapon, and <mark>it is</mark> <strong>intellectually <mark>lazy</strong> to equate them to nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s</u></mark>. Using a tactical nuclear weapon against an urban center would produce several hundred thousand casualties, while a strategic nuclear exchange would cause tens of millions of casualties and immense physical destruction. These are catastrophes that some hack cannot duplicate. <u>The shadow of <strong>nuclear war distorts discussion</strong> of cyber warfare</u>.</p><p><u>State use of cyber operations is consistent with their broad national strategies and interests. Their <strong>primary emphasis</strong> is on</u> <u><strong>espionage</u></strong> <u>and political</u> <u><strong>coercion</strong>. The <strong>U</strong>nited <strong>S</strong>tates has <strong><mark>opponents</strong></mark> and is in <strong>conflict</strong> with them, but they <mark>have <strong>no interest</strong> in</mark> launching <strong>a <mark>catastrophic</mark> cyber<mark>attack</strong></mark> since <mark>it would</mark> <strong>certainly</strong> <mark>produce</mark> <strong>an <mark>equal</mark>ly catastrophic <mark>retaliation</strong></mark>. Their goal is to stay below the “use-of-force” threshold</u> and undertake damaging cyber actions against the United States, <u>not start a war</u>.</p><p><u>This has implications</u> for the discussion of <u><strong><mark>inadvertent escalation</strong></mark>, something that has also</u> <u><strong><mark>never occurred</u></strong></mark>. The concern over escalation deserves a longer discussion, as <u>there are both <strong>technological</strong> and <strong>strategic</strong> <strong><mark>constraints</strong></mark> that shape and <strong><mark>limit risk</mark> in cyber operations</strong>, and <strong>the <mark>absence</mark> of inadvertent escalation</strong> <mark>suggests</mark> <strong>a high degree of <mark>control</strong></mark> for cyber capabilities <mark>by <strong>advanced states</strong></mark>. Attackers, particularly among the <strong>U</strong>nited <strong>S</strong>tates’ major <strong>opponents</u></strong> <u>for whom cyber is just one of the tools for confrontation, seek to <strong>avoid actions</strong> that could <strong>trigger escalation.</p><p></strong>The <strong>U</strong>nited <strong>S</strong>tates has two opponents (<strong>China</strong> and <strong>Russia</strong>) who are capable of damaging cyberattacks.</u> Russia has demonstrated its attack skills on the Ukrainian power grid, <u>but <mark>neither <strong>Russia</mark> nor <mark>China</strong> would</mark> be <strong>well served</strong> by a</u> similar <u><mark>attack</mark> on the <strong><mark>U</strong></mark>nited <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>tates. <strong><mark>Iran</u></strong></mark> is improving and <u>may reach the point where it <mark>could</mark> use cyberattacks</u> to cause major damage, <u><mark>but</mark> it would <strong><mark>only</strong></mark> do so <mark>when</mark> it has <strong>decided</strong> to <strong>engage</strong> <mark>in</mark> a</u> <u><strong>major armed conflict</p><p></strong> with the <strong>U</strong>nited <strong>S</strong>tates</u>. Iran might attack targets outside the United States and its allies with less risk and continues to experiment with cyberattacks against Israeli critical infrastructure. <u><strong><mark>North Korea</strong> has <strong>no</mark>t</u></strong> yet <u>developed this kind of <mark>capability</u></mark>.</p>

1NC

Adv---ASEAN

AT: ASEAN---1NC

./documents/ndtceda20/Michigan/PiRa/Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx

N

NDT

1

Liberty WW

Casey Harrigan, Johnnie Stupek, Hannah Call,

1AC Philippines SCS 2NR Article 5 PIC Assurance DA

ndtceda20/Michigan/PiRa/Michigan-Pierry-Rabbini-Neg-NDT-Round1.docx

PiRa

Michigan PiRa

Ra.....

Pi.....

Gi.....

Ra.....

Michigan

Michigan

ndtceda20

NDT/CEDA 2020-21

cx

college

1] Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning—they’re our most baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions

Moen 16

Moen 16, Ole Martin (PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo). "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267.

a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels are understood inclusively , I might ask: “What for The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good We never ask what end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value. Although pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue

pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable there is something undeniably good about pleasure bad about pain pleasure is not good for anything further We never ask what end is in being pleased, we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value

Let us start by observing, empirically, that a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value and disvalue is that pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for there is something undeniably good about the way pleasure feels and something undeniably bad about the way pain feels, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” are here understood inclusively, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store, I might ask: “What for?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. The reason is that the pleasure is not good for anything further; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good. 3 As Aristotle observes: “We never ask [a man] what his end is in being pleased, because we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value. Although pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail. Though it is, of course, an open question whether other objections to P1 might be more successful, I shall assume that if (1)–(4) fail, we are justified in believing that P1 is true itself a paragon of freedom—there will always be some agents able to interfere substantially with one’s choices. The effective level of protection one enjoys, and hence one’s actual degree of freedom, will vary according to multiple factors: how powerful one is, how powerful individuals in one’s vicinity are, how frequent police patrols are, and so on. Now, we saw above that what makes a slave unfree on Pettit’s view is the fact that his master has the power to interfere arbitrarily with his choices; in other words, what makes the slave unfree is the power relation that obtains between his master and him. The difficulty is that, in light of the facts I just mentioned, there is no reason to think that this power relation will be unique. A similar relation could obtain between the master and someone other than the slave: absent perfect state control, the master may very well have enough power to interfere in the lives of countless individuals. Yet it would be wrong to infer that these individuals lack freedom in the way the slave does; if they lack anything, it seems to be security. A problematic power relation can also obtain between the slave and someone other than the master, since there may be citizens who are more powerful than the master and who can therefore interfere with the slave’s choices at their discretion. Once again, it would be wrong to infer that these individuals make the slave unfree in the same way that the master does. Something appears to be missing from Pettit’s view. If I live in a particularly nasty part of town, then it may turn out that, when all the relevant factors are taken into account, I am just as vulnerable to outside interference as are the slaves in the royal palace, yet it does not follow that our conditions are equivalent from the point of view of freedom. As a matter of fact, we may be equally vulnerable to outside interference, but as a matter of right, our standings could not be more different. I have legal recourse against anyone who interferes with my freedom; the recourse may not be very effective—presumably it is not, if my overall vulnerability to outside interference is comparable to that of a slave— but I still have full legal standing.68 By contrast, the slave lacks legal recourse against the interventions of one specific individual: his master. It is that fact, on a Kantian view—a fact about the legal relation in which a slave stands to his master—that sets slaves apart from freemen. The point may appear trivial, but it does get something right: whereas one cannot identify a power relation that obtains uniquely between a slave and his master, the legal relation between them is undeniably unique. A master’s right to interfere with respect to his slave does not extend to freemen, regardless of how vulnerable they might be as a matter of fact, and citizens other than the master do not have the right to order the slave around, regardless of how powerful they might be. This suggests that Kant is correct in thinking that the ideal of freedom is essentially linked to a person’s having full legal standing. More specifically, he is correct in holding that the importance of rights is not exhausted by their contribution to the level of protection that an individual enjoys, as it must be on an instrumental view like Pettit’s. Although it does matter that rights be enforced with reasonable effectiveness, the sheer fact that one has adequate legal rights is essential to one’s standing as a free citizen. In this respect, Kant stays faithful to the idea that freedom is primarily a matter of standing—a standing that the freeman has and that the slave lacks. Pettit himself frequently insists on the idea, but he fails to do it justice when he claims that freedom is simply a matter of being adequately (and reliably) shielded against the strength of others. As Kant recognizes, the standing of a free citizen is a more complex matter than that. One could perhaps worry that the idea of legal standing is something of a red herring here—that it must ultimately be reducible to a complex network of power relations and, hence, that the position I attribute to Kant differs only nominally from Pettit’s. That seems to me doubtful. Viewing legal standing as essential to freedom makes sense only if our conception of the former includes conceptions of what constitutes a fully adequate scheme of legal rights, appropriate legal recourse, justified punishment, and so on. Only if one believes that these notions all boil down to power relations will Kant’s position appear similar to Pettit’s. On any other view—and certainly that includes most views recently defended by philosophers—the notion of legal standing will outstrip the power relations that ground Pettit’s theory.

<h4>1] Pleasure and pain are the starting point for moral reasoning—they’re our most baseline desires and the only things that explain the intrinsic value of objects or actions</h4><p><strong>Moen 16</strong>, Ole Martin (PhD, Research Fellow in Philosophy at University of Oslo). "An Argument for Hedonism." Journal of Value Inquiry 50.2 (2016): 267. </p><p>Let us start by observing, empirically, that <u><strong>a widely shared judgment about intrinsic value</u></strong> and disvalue <u><strong>is that <mark>pleasure is intrinsically valuable and pain is intrinsically disvaluable</u></strong></mark>. On virtually any proposed list of intrinsic values and disvalues (we will look at some of them below), pleasure is included among the intrinsic values and pain among the intrinsic disvalues. This inclusion makes intuitive sense, moreover, for <u><strong><mark>there is something undeniably good about </mark>the way <mark>pleasure </mark>feels and something undeniably <mark>bad about </mark>the way <mark>pain </mark>feels</u></strong>, and neither the goodness of pleasure nor the badness of pain seems to be exhausted by the further effects that these experiences might have. “Pleasure” and “pain” <u><strong>are</u></strong> here <u><strong>understood inclusively</u></strong>, as encompassing anything hedonically positive and anything hedonically negative. 2 The special value statuses of pleasure and pain are manifested in how we treat these experiences in our everyday reasoning about values. If you tell me that you are heading for the convenience store<u><strong>, I might ask: “What for</u></strong>?” This is a reasonable question, for when you go to the convenience store you usually do so, not merely for the sake of going to the convenience store, but for the sake of achieving something further that you deem to be valuable. You might answer, for example: “To buy soda.” This answer makes sense, for soda is a nice thing and you can get it at the convenience store. I might further inquire, however: “What is buying the soda good for?” This further question can also be a reasonable one, for it need not be obvious why you want the soda. You might answer: “Well, I want it for the pleasure of drinking it.” If I then proceed by asking “But what is the pleasure of drinking the soda good for?” the discussion is likely to reach an awkward end. <u><strong>The reason is that the<mark> pleasure is not good for anything further</mark>; it is simply that for which going to the convenience store and buying the soda is good</u></strong>. 3 As Aristotle observes: “<u><strong><mark>We never ask</u></strong></mark> [a man] <u><strong><mark>what</u></strong></mark> his <u><strong><mark>end is in being pleased, </mark>because <mark>we assume that pleasure is choice worthy in itself</u></strong></mark>.”4 Presumably, a similar story can be told in the case of pains, for if someone says “This is painful!” we never respond by asking: “And why is that a problem?” We take for granted that <u><strong><mark>if something is painful, we have a sufficient explanation of why it is bad</u></strong></mark>. If we are onto something in our everyday reasoning about values, it seems that <u><strong><mark>pleasure and pain are both places where we reach the end of the line in matters of value</mark>. Although pleasure and pain thus seem to be good candidates for intrinsic value and disvalue</u></strong>, several objections have been raised against this suggestion: (1) that pleasure and pain have instrumental but not intrinsic value/disvalue; (2) that pleasure and pain gain their value/disvalue derivatively, in virtue of satisfying/frustrating our desires; (3) that there is a subset of pleasures that are not intrinsically valuable (so-called “evil pleasures”) and a subset of pains that are not intrinsically disvaluable (so-called “noble pains”), and (4) that pain asymbolia, masochism, and practices such as wiggling a loose tooth render it implausible that pain is intrinsically disvaluable. I shall argue that these objections fail. Though it is, of course, an open question whether other objections to P1 might be more successful, I shall assume that if (1)–(4) fail, we are justified in believing that P1 is true itself a paragon of freedom—there will always be some agents able to interfere substantially with one’s choices. The effective level of protection one enjoys, and hence one’s actual degree of freedom, will vary according to multiple factors: how powerful one is, how powerful individuals in one’s vicinity are, how frequent police patrols are, and so on. Now, we saw above that what makes a slave unfree on Pettit’s view is the fact that his master has the power to interfere arbitrarily with his choices; in other words, what makes the slave unfree is the power relation that obtains between his master and him. The difficulty is that, in light of the facts I just mentioned, there is no reason to think that this power relation will be unique. A similar relation could obtain between the master and someone other than the slave: absent perfect state control, the master may very well have enough power to interfere in the lives of countless individuals. Yet it would be wrong to infer that these individuals lack freedom in the way the slave does; if they lack anything, it seems to be security. A problematic power relation can also obtain between the slave and someone other than the master, since there may be citizens who are more powerful than the master and who can therefore interfere with the slave’s choices at their discretion. Once again, it would be wrong to infer that these individuals make the slave unfree in the same way that the master does. Something appears to be missing from Pettit’s view. If I live in a particularly nasty part of town, then it may turn out that, when all the relevant factors are taken into account, I am just as vulnerable to outside interference as are the slaves in the royal palace, yet it does not follow that our conditions are equivalent from the point of view of freedom. As a matter of fact, we may be equally vulnerable to outside interference, but as a matter of right, our standings could not be more different. I have legal recourse against anyone who interferes with my freedom; the recourse may not be very effective—presumably it is not, if my overall vulnerability to outside interference is comparable to that of a slave— but I still have full legal standing.68 By contrast, the slave lacks legal recourse against the interventions of one specific individual: his master. It is that fact, on a Kantian view—a fact about the legal relation in which a slave stands to his master—that sets slaves apart from freemen. The point may appear trivial, but it does get something right: whereas one cannot identify a power relation that obtains uniquely between a slave and his master, the legal relation between them is undeniably unique. A master’s right to interfere with respect to his slave does not extend to freemen, regardless of how vulnerable they might be as a matter of fact, and citizens other than the master do not have the right to order the slave around, regardless of how powerful they might be. This suggests that Kant is correct in thinking that the ideal of freedom is essentially linked to a person’s having full legal standing. More specifically, he is correct in holding that the importance of rights is not exhausted by their contribution to the level of protection that an individual enjoys, as it must be on an instrumental view like Pettit’s. Although it does matter that rights be enforced with reasonable effectiveness, the sheer fact that one has adequate legal rights is essential to one’s standing as a free citizen. In this respect, Kant stays faithful to the idea that freedom is primarily a matter of standing—a standing that the freeman has and that the slave lacks. Pettit himself frequently insists on the idea, but he fails to do it justice when he claims that freedom is simply a matter of being adequately (and reliably) shielded against the strength of others. As Kant recognizes, the standing of a free citizen is a more complex matter than that. One could perhaps worry that the idea of legal standing is something of a red herring here—that it must ultimately be reducible to a complex network of power relations and, hence, that the position I attribute to Kant differs only nominally from Pettit’s. That seems to me doubtful. Viewing legal standing as essential to freedom makes sense only if our conception of the former includes conceptions of what constitutes a fully adequate scheme of legal rights, appropriate legal recourse, justified punishment, and so on. Only if one believes that these notions all boil down to power relations will Kant’s position appear similar to Pettit’s. On any other view—and certainly that includes most views recently defended by philosophers—the notion of legal standing will outstrip the power relations that ground Pettit’s theory.</p>

1ac

Framing

./documents/hsld20/Dulles/Su/Dulles-Subramanian-Aff-UT-Round4.docx

A

UT

4

Northview SD

Chris Wang

1ac- whole res 1nc- spec rate hikes da ethanol pic case 1ar- condopics bad all 2nr- spec condopics bad 2ar- spec case

hsld20/Dulles/Su/Dulles-Subramanian-Aff-UT-Round4.docx

SrSu

Dulles SrSu

Sr.....

Su.....

Dulles

Dulles

TX

hsld20

HS LD 2020-21

ld

hs

4] Extinction isn’t tied to util – it’s a distinct phenomena which is offense under ANY fw

Burke et al 16

Burke et al 16 Associate Professor of International and Political Studies @ UNSW, Australia, 2016 (Anthony, Stefanie Fishel is Assistant Professor, Department of Gender and Race Studies at the University of Alabama, Audra Mitchell is CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Simon Dalby is CIGI Chair in the Political Economy of Climate Change at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, and, Daniel J. Levine is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Alabama, “Planet Politics: Manifesto from the End of IR,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 1–25) 8. Global ethics must respond to mass extinction. In late 2014, the Worldwide Fund for Nature reported a startling statistic: according to their global study, 52% of species had gone extinct between 1970 and 2010.60 This is not news: for three decades, conservation biologists have been warning of a ‘sixth mass extinction’, which, by definition, could eliminate more than three quarters of currently existing life forms in just a few centuries.61 In other words, it could threaten the practical possibility of the survival of earthly life. Mass extinction is not simply extinction (or death) writ large: it is a qualitatively different phenomena that demands its own ethical categories. It cannot be grasped by aggregating species extinctions, let alone the deaths of individual organisms. Not only does it erase diverse, irreplaceable life forms, their unique histories and open-ended possibilities, but it threatens the ontological conditions of Earthly life.

Cold-War era concepts such as ‘nuclear winter’ and ‘omnicide’ gesture towards harms massive in their scale and moral horror they are asymptotic: they imagine nightmares of a severely denuded planet, yet they do not contemplate the comprehensive negation that a mass extinction event entails. this approach fails to recognise the reality of extinction, which is a matter of being and nonbeing, not one of life and death processes. Confronting the enormity of a possible mass extinction event requires a total overhaul of human perceptions of what is at stake in the disruption of the conditions of Earthly life. The question of what is ‘lost’ in extinction has been addressed in terms of financial cost Yet the enormity, complexity, and scale of mass extinction is so huge that humans need to draw on every possible resource in order to find ways of responding. it is crucial and urgent to realise that extinction is a matter of global ethics It is not simply an issue of management or security, or even of particular visions of the good life Instead, it is about staking a claim as to the goodness of life itself. If it does not fit within the existing parameters of global ethics, then it is these boundaries that need to change 9. An Earth-worldly politics. Humans are worldly – that is, we are fundamentally worldforming and embedded in multiple worlds that traverse the Earth. However, the Earth is not ‘our’ world, as the grand theories of IR, and some accounts of the Anthropocene have it – an object and possession to be appropriated, circumnavigated, instrumentalised and englobed.65 Rather, it is a complex of worlds that we share, co-constitute, create, destroy and inhabit with countless other life forms and beings. we can and should reframe it as authors like Karen Barad ‘entanglement’ is a radical, indeed fundamental condition of being-with, This means that no being is truly autonomous or separate, whether at the scale of international politics or of quantum physics. World emerges from the poetics of existence, the collision of energy and matter, the tumult of agencies, the fusion and diffusion of bonds. Worlds erupt from, and consist in, the intersection of diverse forms of being Because of the tumultuousness of the Earth with which they are entangled, worlds’ are not static, rigid or permanent. They are permeable and fluid They can be created, modified – and, of course, destroyed. Concepts of violence, harm and (in)security that focus only on humans ignore at their peril the destruction and severance of worlds, which undermines the conditions of plurality that enables life on Earth to thrive.

they imagine a denuded planet not the comprehensive negation mass extinction entails this fails to recognise the reality which is a matter of being and nonbeing, not one of life and death Worlds erupt from the intersection of diverse forms of being Concepts of violence that focus only on humans ignore the destruction which undermines the conditions of plurality that enables life to thrive

IR is one of few disciplines that is explicitly devoted to the pursuit of survival, yet it has almost nothing to say in the face of a possible mass extinction event.62 It utterly lacks the conceptual and ethical frameworks necessary to foster diverse, meaningful responses to this phenomenon. As mentioned above, Cold-War era concepts such as ‘nuclear winter’ and ‘omnicide’ gesture towards harms massive in their scale and moral horror. However, they are asymptotic: they imagine nightmares of a severely denuded planet, yet they do not contemplate the comprehensive negation that a mass extinction event entails. In contemporary IR discourses, where it appears at all, extinction is treated as a problem of scientific management and biopolitical control aimed at securing existing human lifestyles.63 Once again, this approach fails to recognise the reality of extinction, which is a matter of being and nonbeing, not one of life and death processes. Confronting the enormity of a possible mass extinction event requires a total overhaul of human perceptions of what is at stake in the disruption of the conditions of Earthly life. The question of what is ‘lost’ in extinction has, since the inception of the concept of ‘conservation’, been addressed in terms of financial cost and economic liabilities.64 Beyond reducing life to forms to capital, currencies and financial instruments, the dominant neoliberal political economy of conservation imposes a homogenising, Western secular worldview on a planetary phenomenon. Yet the enormity, complexity, and scale of mass extinction is so huge that humans need to draw on every possible resource in order to find ways of responding. This means that they need to mobilise multiple worldviews and lifeways – including those emerging from indigenous and marginalised cosmologies. Above all, it is crucial and urgent to realise that extinction is a matter of global ethics. It is not simply an issue of management or security, or even of particular visions of the good life. Instead, it is about staking a claim as to the goodness of life itself. If it does not fit within the existing parameters of global ethics, then it is these boundaries that need to change. 9. An Earth-worldly politics. Humans are worldly – that is, we are fundamentally worldforming and embedded in multiple worlds that traverse the Earth. However, the Earth is not ‘our’ world, as the grand theories of IR, and some accounts of the Anthropocene have it – an object and possession to be appropriated, circumnavigated, instrumentalised and englobed.65 Rather, it is a complex of worlds that we share, co-constitute, create, destroy and inhabit with countless other life forms and beings. The formation of the Anthropocene reflects a particular type of worlding, one in which the Earth is treated as raw material for the creation of a world tailored to human needs. Heidegger famously framed ‘earth’ and ‘world’ as two countervailing, conflicting forces that constrain and shape one another. We contend that existing political, economic and social conditions have pushed human worlding so far to one extreme that it has become almost entirely detached from the conditions of the Earth. Planet Politics calls, instead, for a mode of worlding that is responsive to, and grounded in, the Earth. One of these ways of being Earth-worldly is to embrace the condition of being entangled. We can interpret this term in the way that Heidegger66 did, as the condition of being mired in everyday human concerns, worries, and anxiety, to prolong existence. But, in contrast, we can and should reframe it as authors like Karen Barad67 and Donna Haraway68 have done. To them and many others, ‘entanglement’ is a radical, indeed fundamental condition of being-with, or, as Jean-Luc Nancy puts it, ‘being singular plural’.69 This means that no being is truly autonomous or separate, whether at the scale of international politics or of quantum physics. World itself is singular plural: what humans tend to refer to as ‘the’ world is actually a multiplicity of worlds at various scales that intersect, overlap, conflict, emerge as they surge across the Earth. World emerges from the poetics of existence, the collision of energy and matter, the tumult of agencies, the fusion and diffusion of bonds. Worlds erupt from, and consist in, the intersection of diverse forms of being – material and intangible, organic and inorganic, ‘living’ and ‘nonliving’. Because of the tumultuousness of the Earth with which they are entangled, ‘worlds’ are not static, rigid or permanent. They are permeable and fluid. They can be created, modified – and, of course, destroyed. Concepts of violence, harm and (in)security that focus only on humans ignore at their peril the destruction and severance of worlds,70 which undermines the conditions of plurality that enables life on Earth to thrive.

<h4>4] Extinction isn’t tied to util – it’s a distinct phenomena which is offense under ANY fw</h4><p><u><strong>Burke et al 16</strong> Associate Professor of International and Political Studies @ UNSW, Australia, 2016 (Anthony, Stefanie Fishel is Assistant Professor, Department of Gender and Race Studies at the University of Alabama, Audra Mitchell is CIGI Chair in Global Governance and Ethics at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, Simon Dalby is CIGI Chair in the Political Economy of Climate Change at the Balsillie School of International Affairs, and, Daniel J. Levine is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Alabama, “Planet Politics: Manifesto from the End of IR,” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 1–25) </p><p></u>8. <u>Global ethics must respond to mass extinction</u>. In late 2014, the Worldwide Fund for Nature reported a startling statistic: according to their global study, 52% of species had gone extinct between 1970 and 2010.60 This is not news: <u>for three decades, conservation biologists have been warning of a ‘sixth mass extinction’, which, by definition, could eliminate more than three quarters of currently existing life forms in just a few centuries</u>.61 In other words, <u>it could threaten the practical possibility of the survival of earthly life. <mark>Mass extinction</mark> is not simply extinction (or death) writ large</u>: <u><strong>it <mark>is a qualitatively different</mark> <mark>phenomena that demands its own ethical categories</mark>.</u></strong> <u>It cannot be grasped by aggregating species extinctions,</u> let alone the deaths of individual organisms. <u><mark>Not only does it erase</mark> diverse, irreplaceable <mark>life</mark> forms</u>, <u><mark>their</mark> <strong>unique <mark>histories</strong> and</mark> <strong>open-ended <mark>possibilities</strong>, but it <strong>threatens the ontological conditions of</mark> Earthly <mark>life</strong></mark>.</p><p></u>IR is one of few disciplines that is explicitly devoted to the pursuit of survival, yet it has almost nothing to say in the face of a possible mass extinction event.62 It utterly lacks the conceptual and ethical frameworks necessary to foster diverse, meaningful responses to this phenomenon. As mentioned above, <u>Cold-War era concepts such as ‘nuclear winter’ and ‘omnicide’ gesture towards harms massive in their scale and moral horror</u>. However, <u>they are asymptotic: <mark>they imagine</mark> nightmares of <mark>a</mark> severely <mark>denuded planet</mark>, yet they do <mark>not</mark> contemplate <mark>the <strong>comprehensive negation</strong></mark> that a <mark>mass extinction</mark> event <mark>entails</mark>.</u> In contemporary IR discourses, where it appears at all, extinction is treated as a problem of scientific management and biopolitical control aimed at securing existing human lifestyles.63 Once again, <u><mark>this</mark> approach <mark>fails to recognise the reality</mark> of extinction, <mark>which is a <strong>matter of being and nonbeing</strong>, not one of life and death</p><p></mark> processes.</p><p>Confronting the enormity of a possible mass extinction event requires a total overhaul of human perceptions of what is at stake in the disruption of the conditions of Earthly life. The question of what is ‘lost’ in extinction has</u>, since the inception of the concept of ‘conservation’, <u>been addressed in terms of financial cost</u> and economic liabilities.64 Beyond reducing life to forms to capital, currencies and financial instruments, the dominant neoliberal political economy of conservation imposes a homogenising, Western secular worldview on a planetary phenomenon. <u>Yet the <strong>enormity, complexity, and scale</strong> of mass extinction is so huge that humans need to <strong>draw on every possible resource in order to find ways of responding</strong>.</u> This means that they need to mobilise multiple worldviews and lifeways – including those emerging from indigenous and marginalised cosmologies. Above all, <u>it is crucial and urgent to realise that extinction is a <strong>matter of global ethics</u></strong>. <u>It is not simply an issue of management or security, or even of particular visions of the good life</u>. <u>Instead, it is about staking a claim as to the goodness of life itself. If it does not fit within the existing parameters of global ethics, then it is these boundaries that need to change</u>.</p><p><u>9. An Earth-worldly politics. Humans are worldly – that is, we are fundamentally worldforming and embedded in multiple worlds that traverse the Earth. However, the Earth is not ‘our’ world, as the grand theories of IR, and some accounts of the Anthropocene have it – an object and possession to be appropriated, circumnavigated, instrumentalised and englobed.65 Rather, it is a complex of worlds that we share, co-constitute, create, destroy and inhabit with countless other life forms and beings.</p><p></u>The formation of the Anthropocene reflects a particular type of worlding, one in which the Earth is treated as raw material for the creation of a world tailored to human needs. Heidegger famously framed ‘earth’ and ‘world’ as two countervailing, conflicting forces that constrain and shape one another. We contend that existing political, economic and social conditions have pushed human worlding so far to one extreme that it has become almost entirely detached from the conditions of the Earth. Planet Politics calls, instead, for a mode of worlding that is responsive to, and grounded in, the Earth. One of these ways of being Earth-worldly is to embrace the condition of being entangled. We can interpret this term in the way that Heidegger66 did, as the condition of being mired in everyday human concerns, worries, and anxiety, to prolong existence. But, in contrast, <u>we can and should reframe it as authors like Karen Barad</u>67 and Donna Haraway68 have done. To them and many others, <u>‘entanglement’ is a radical, indeed fundamental condition of being-with,</u> or, as Jean-Luc Nancy puts it, ‘being singular plural’.69 <u>This means that no being is truly autonomous or separate, whether at the scale of international politics or of quantum physics. </u>World itself is singular plural: what humans tend to refer to as ‘the’ world is actually a multiplicity of worlds at various scales that intersect, overlap, conflict, emerge as they surge across the Earth. <u><strong>World emerges from the poetics of existence, the collision of energy and matter, the tumult of agencies, the fusion and diffusion of bonds.</p><p></strong><mark>Worlds erupt from</mark>, and consist in, <mark>the intersection of <strong>diverse forms of being</u></strong></mark> – material and intangible, organic and inorganic, ‘living’ and ‘nonliving’. <u>Because of the tumultuousness of the Earth with which they are entangled,</u> ‘<u><strong>worlds’ are not static, rigid or permanent. They are permeable and fluid</u></strong>. <u>They can be <strong>created</strong>, <strong>modified</u></strong> <u>– and, of course, destroyed. <mark>Concepts of violence</mark>, harm and (in)security <mark>that focus only on humans ignore</mark> at their peril <mark>the destruction</mark> and severance of worlds,</u>70 <u><strong><mark>which undermines the conditions of plurality that enables life</mark> on Earth <mark>to thrive</mark>.</p></u></strong>

1AC

FW

./documents/hsld22/MontaVista/KeRa/MontaVista-KeRa-Aff-California-Round-Robin-Round-5.docx

A

California Round Robin

5

Silver Creek KZ

Giordano,Theiding

1AC - hukou 1NC - t-spec, queerpess k, case 1AR - all rest - k, case

hsld22/MontaVista/KeRa/MontaVista-KeRa-Aff-California-Round-Robin-Round-5.docx

2023-02-18 02:34:19

KeRa

Monta Vista KeRa

hola.

Ke.....

Ra.....

MontaVista

Monta Vista

CA

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

ld

hs

Realism is true and inevitable.

de Araujo 14 (2): 29-43)

de Araujo 14 De Aruajo, professor for Ethics at Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 14 (Marcelo, “Moral Enhancement and Political Realism,” Journal of Evolution and Technology 24(2): 29-43)

moral enhancement theorists argue a society of morally enhanced individuals would be in a better position to cope with important problems that humankind is likely to face in climate change terrorist attacks catastrophic wars. The assumption here is our inability to cope successfully with these problems stems mainly from a sort of deficit in human beings’ moral motivation If human beings were morally better there would be fewer wars, less terrorism, and more willingness to save our environment. this assumption is false At the root of threats to the survival of humankind in the future is not a deficit in our moral dispositions but the endurance of an old political arrangement that prevents the pursuit of shared goals on a collective basis. in the international sphere there is not a supranational institution with the real power to prevent states from pursuing means of self-defense. The acquisition of means of self-defense, however, is frequently perceived by other states as a threat to their own security. This leads to the security dilemma and the possibility of war. The actions of states are determined not by moral principles and legal commitments but by considerations of interest and power “structural issues,” rather than human nature, constitute the main factor underlying political conflicts “Structural realism,” does not seek to derive a theory about conflicts and violence in the context of international relations from a theory of human nature. states are the only, relevant actors and states compete for power Moral considerations are secondary when set against the state’s primary goal, namely its own security and survival conflicts in the international arena do not stem from human nature, but from the very “structure” of the international system of states it is this structure that compels individuals to act as they do in the domain of international affairs. its “anarchical structure,” i.e. the lack of a central government analogous to the central governments that exist in the context of domestic politics. It means that each individual state is responsible for its own integrity and survival. In the absence of a superior authority, political leaders often feel compelled to favor security over morality even if human beings turn out to become morally enhanced humankind may still have to face the same scary scenarios moral enhancement will not motivate political leaders to dismantle their nuclear weapons. Neither will it deter other political leaders from pursuing nuclear capability at any rate not as long as the structure of international politics compels them to see prospective cooperators in the present as possible enemies in the future. in the absence of the kind of security that law-enforcing institutions have the force to create, political leaders will fail to cooperate, and engage in wars, in those areas that are critical to their security and survival this is likely to continue to happen, even if, leaders become less egoistic and power-seeking

At the root of threats to humankind is not a deficit in moral disposition but a political arrangement actions of states are determined by considerations of interest and power states are the only relevant actors and compete for power Moral considerations are secondary the lack of a central government means each state is responsible for its own survival. even if morally enhanced humankind may still face the same moral enhancement will not motivate leaders to dismantle their nuclear weapons. the structure of international politics compels them to see cooperators as possible enemies leaders fail to cooperate

Some moral enhancement theorists argue that a society of morally enhanced individuals would be in a better position to cope with important problems that humankind is likely to face in the future such as, for instance, the threats posed by climate change, grand scale terrorist attacks, or the risk of catastrophic wars. The assumption here is quite simple: our inability to cope successfully with these problems stems mainly from a sort of deficit in human beings’ moral motivation. If human beings were morally better – if we had enhanced moral dispositions – there would be fewer wars, less terrorism, and more willingness to save our environment. Although simple and attractive, this assumption is, as I intend to show, false. At the root of threats to the survival of humankind in the future is not a deficit in our moral dispositions, but the endurance of an old political arrangement that prevents the pursuit of shared goals on a collective basis. The political arrangement I have in mind here is the international system of states. In my analysis of the political implications of moral enhancement, I intend to concentrate my attention only on the supposition that we could avoid major wars in the future by making individuals morally better. I do not intend to discuss the threats posed by climate change, or by terrorism, although some human enhancement theorists also seek to cover these topics. I will explain, in the course of my analysis, a conceptual distinction between “human nature realism” and “structural realism,” well-known in the field of international relations theory. Thomas Douglas seems to have been among the first to explore the idea of “moral enhancement” as a new form of human enhancement. He certainly helped to kick off the current phase of the debate. In a paper published in 2008, Douglas suggests that in the “future people might use biomedical technology to morally enhance themselves.” Douglas characterizes moral enhancement in terms of the acquisition of “morally better motives” (Douglas 2008, 229). Mark Walker, in a paper published in 2009, suggests a similar idea. He characterizes moral enhancement in terms of improved moral dispositions or “genetic virtues”: The Genetic Virtue Program (GVP) is a proposal for influencing our moral nature through biology, that is, it is an alternate yet complementary means by which ethics and ethicists might contribute to the task of making our lives and world a better place. The basic idea is simple enough: genes influence human behavior, so altering the genes of individuals may alter the influence genes exert on behavior. (Walker 2009, 27–28) Walker does not argue in favor of any specific moral theory, such as, for instance, virtue ethics. Whether one endorses a deontological or a utilitarian approach to ethics, he argues, the concept of virtue is relevant to the extent that virtues motivate us either to do the right thing or to maximize the good (Walker 2009, 35). Moral enhancement theory, however, does not reduce the ethical debate to the problem of moral dispositions. Morality also concerns, to a large extent, questions about reasons for action. And moral enhancement, most certainly, will not improve our moral beliefs; neither could it be used to settle moral disagreements. This seems to have led some authors to criticize the moral enhancement idea on the ground that it neglects the cognitive side of our moral behavior. Robert Sparrow, for instance, argues that, from a Kantian point of view, moral enhancement would have to provide us with better moral beliefs rather than enhanced moral motivation (Sparrow 2014, 25; see also Agar 2010, 74). Yet, it seems to me that this objection misses the point of the moral enhancement idea. Many people, across different countries, already share moral beliefs relating, for instance, to the wrongness of harming or killing other people arbitrarily, or to the moral requirement to help people in need. They may share moral beliefs while not sharing the same reasons for these beliefs, or perhaps even not being able to articulate the beliefs in the conceptual framework of a moral theory (Blackford 2010, 83). But although they share some moral beliefs, in some circumstances they may lack the appropriate motivation to act accordingly. Moral enhancement, thus, aims at improving moral motivation, and leaves open the question as to how to improve our moral judgments. In a recent paper, published in The Journal of Medical Ethics, neuroscientist Molly Crockett reports the state of the art in the still very embryonic field of moral enhancement. She points out, for example, that the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) citalopram seems to increase harm aversion. There is, moreover, some evidence that this substance may be effective in the treatment of specific types of aggressive behavior. Like Douglas, Crockett emphasizes that moral enhancement should aim at individuals’ moral motives (Crockett 2014; see also Spence 2008; Terbeck et al. 2013). Another substance that is frequently mentioned in the moral enhancement literature is oxytocin. Some studies suggest that willingness to cooperate with other people, and to trust unknown prospective cooperators, may be enhanced by an increase in the levels of oxytocin in the organism (Zak 2008, 2011; Zak and Kugler 2011; Persson and Savulescu 2012, 118–119). Oxytocin has also been reported to be “associated with the subjective experience of empathy” (Zak 2011, 55; Zak and Kugler 2011, 144). The question I would like to examine now concerns the supposition that moral enhancement – comprehended in these terms and assuming for the sake of argument that, some day, it might become effective and safe – may also help us in coping with the threat of devastating wars in the future. The assumption that there is a relationship between, on the one hand, threats to the survival of humankind and, on the other, a sort of “deficit” in our moral dispositions is clearly made by some moral enhancements theorists. Douglas, for instance, argues that “according to many plausible theories, some of the world’s most important problems — such as developing world poverty, climate change and war — can be attributed to these moral deficits” (2008, 230). Walker, in a similar vein, writes about the possibility of “using biotechnology to alter our biological natures in an effort to reduce evil in the world” (2009, 29). And Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson go as far as to defend the “the need for moral enhancement” of humankind in a series of articles, and in a book published in 2012. One of the reasons Savulescu and Persson advance for the moral enhancement of humankind is that our moral dispositions seem to have remained basically unchanged over the last millennia (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 2). These dispositions have proved thus far quite useful for the survival of human beings as a species. They have enabled us to cooperate with each other in the collective production of things such as food, shelter, tools, and farming. They have also played a crucial role in the creation and refinement of a variety of human institutions such as settlements, villages, and laws. Although the possibility of free-riding has never been fully eradicated, the benefits provided by cooperation have largely exceeded the disadvantages of our having to deal with occasional uncooperative or untrustworthy individuals (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 39). The problem, however, is that the same dispositions that have enabled human beings in the past to engage in the collective production of so many artifacts and institutions now seem powerless in the face of the human capacity to destroy other human beings on a grand scale, or perhaps even to annihilate the entire human species. There is, according to Savulescu and Persson, a “mismatch” between our cognitive faculties and our evolved moral attitudes: “[…] as we have repeatedly stressed, owing to the progress of science, the range of our powers of action has widely outgrown the range of our spontaneous moral attitudes, and created a dangerous mismatch” (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 103; see also Persson and Savulescu 2010, 660; Persson and Savulescu 2011b; DeGrazie 2012, 2; Rakić 2014, 2). This worry about the mismatch between, on the one hand, the modern technological capacity to destroy and, on the other, our limited moral commitments is not new. The political philosopher Hans Morgenthau, best known for his defense of political realism, called attention to the same problem nearly fifty years ago. In the wake of the first successful tests with thermonuclear bombs, conducted by the USA and the former Soviet Union, Morgenthau referred to the “contrast” between the technological progress of our age and our feeble moral attitudes as one of the most disturbing dilemmas of our time: The first dilemma consists in the contrast between the technological unification of the world and the parochial moral commitments and political institutions of the age. Moral commitments and political institutions, dating from an age which modern technology has left behind, have not kept pace with technological achievements and, hence, are incapable of controlling their destructive potentialities. (Morgenthau 1962, 174) Moral enhancement theorists and political realists like Morgenthau, therefore, share the thesis that our natural moral dispositions are not strong enough to prevent human beings from endangering their own existence as a species. But they differ as to the best way out of this quandary: moral enhancement theorists argue for the re-engineering of our moral dispositions, whereas Morgenthau accepted the immutability of human nature and argued, instead, for the re-engineering of world politics. Both positions, as I intend to show, are wrong in assuming that the “dilemma” results from the weakness of our spontaneous moral dispositions in the face of the unprecedented technological achievements of our time. On the other hand, both positions are correct in recognizing the real possibility of global catastrophes resulting from the malevolent use of, for instance, biotechnology or nuclear capabilities. The supposition that individuals’ unwillingness to cooperate with each other, even when they would be better-off by choosing to cooperate, results from a sort of deficit of dispositions such as altruism, empathy, and benevolence has been at the core of some important political theories. This idea is an important assumption in the works of early modern political realists such as Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. It was also later endorsed by some well-known authors writing about the origins of war in the first half of the twentieth century. It was then believed, as Sigmund Freud suggested in a text from 1932, that the main cause of wars is a human tendency to “hatred and destruction” (in German: ein Trieb zum Hassen und Vernichtung). Freud went as far as to suggest that human beings have an ingrained “inclination” to “aggression” and “destruction” (Aggressionstrieb, Aggressionsneigung, and Destruktionstrieb), and that this inclination has a “good biological basis” (biologisch wohl begründet) (Freud 1999, 20–24; see also Freud 1950; Forbes 1984; Pick 1993, 211–227; Medoff 2009). The attempt to employ Freud’s conception of human nature in understanding international relations has recently been resumed, for instance by Kurt Jacobsen in a paper entitled “Why Freud Matters: Psychoanalysis and International Relations Revisited,” published in 2013. Morgenthau himself was deeply influenced by Freud’s speculations on the origins of war.1 Early in the 1930s, Morgenthau wrote an essay called “On the Origin of the Political from the Nature of Human Beings” (Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen), which contains several references to Freud’s theory about the human propensity to aggression.2 Morgenthau’s most influential book, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, first published in 1948 and then successively revised and edited, is still considered a landmark work in the tradition of political realism. According to Morgenthau, politics is governed by laws that have their origin in human nature: “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). Just like human enhancement theorists, Morgenthau also takes for granted that human nature has not changed over recent millennia: “Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). And since, for Morgenthau, human nature prompts human beings to act selfishly, rather than cooperatively, political leaders will sometimes favor conflict over cooperation, unless some superior power compels them to act otherwise. Now, this is exactly what happens in the domain of international relations. For in the international sphere there is not a supranational institution with the real power to prevent states from pursuing means of self-defense. The acquisition of means of self-defense, however, is frequently perceived by other states as a threat to their own security. This leads to the security dilemma and the possibility of war. As Morgenthau put the problem in an article published in 1967: “The actions of states are determined not by moral principles and legal commitments but by considerations of interest and power” (1967, 3). Because Morgenthau and early modern political philosophers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes defended political realism on the grounds provided by a specific conception human nature, their version of political realism has been frequently called “human nature realism.” The literature on human nature realism has become quite extensive (Speer 1968; Booth 1991; Freyberg-Inan 2003; Kaufman 2006; Molloy 2006, 82–85; Craig 2007; Scheuerman 2007, 2010, 2012; Schuett 2007; Neascu 2009; Behr 2010, 210–225; Brown 2011; Jütersonke 2012). It is not my intention here to present a fully-fledged account of the tradition of human nature realism, but rather to emphasize the extent to which some moral enhancement theorists, in their description of some of the gloomy scenarios humankind is likely to face in the future, implicitly endorse this kind of political realism. Indeed, like human nature realists, moral enhancement theorists assume that human nature has not changed over the last millennia, and that violence and lack of cooperation in the international sphere result chiefly from human nature’s limited inclination to pursue morally desirable goals. One may, of course, criticize the human enhancement project by rejecting the assumption that conflict and violence in the international domain should be explained by means of a theory about human nature. In a reply to Savulescu and Persson, Sparrow correctly argues that “structural issues,” rather than human nature, constitute the main factor underlying political conflicts (Sparrow 2014, 29). But he does not explain what exactly these “structural issues” are, as I intend to do later. Sparrow is right in rejecting the human nature theory underlying the human enhancement project. But this underlying assumption, in my view, is not trivially false or simply “ludicrous,” as he suggests. Human nature realism has been implicitly or explicitly endorsed by leading political philosophers ever since Thucydides speculated on the origins of war in antiquity (Freyberg-Inan 2003, 23–36). True, it might be objected that “human nature realism,” as it was defended by Morgenthau and earlier political philosophers, relied upon a metaphysical or psychoanalytical conception of human nature, a conception that, actually, did not have the support of any serious scientific investigation (Smith 1983, 167). Yet, over the last few years there has been much empirical research in fields such as developmental psychology and evolutionary biology that apparently gives some support to the realist claim. Some of these studies suggest that an inclination to aggression and conflict has its origins in our evolutionary history. This idea, then, has recently led some authors to resume “human nature realism” on new foundations, devoid of the metaphysical assumptions of the early realists, and entirely grounded in empirical research. Indeed, some recent works in the field of international relations theory already seek to call attention to evolutionary biology as a possible new start for political realism. This point is clearly made, for instance, by Bradley Thayer, who published in 2004 a book called Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict. And in a paper published in 2000, he affirms the following: Evolutionary theory provides a stronger foundation for realism because it is based on science, not on theology or metaphysics. I use the theory to explain two human traits: egoism and domination. I submit that the egoistic and dominating behavior of individuals, which is commonly described as “realist,” is a product of the evolutionary process. I focus on these two traits because they are critical components of any realist argument in explaining international politics. (Thayer 2000, 125; see also Thayer 2004) Thayer basically argues that a tendency to egoism and domination stems from human evolutionary history. The predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics, he argues, is a reflex of dispositions that can now be proved to be part of our evolved human nature in a way that Morgenthau and other earlier political philosophers could not have established in their own time. Now, what some moral enhancement theorists propose is a direct intervention in our “evolved limited moral psychology” as a means to make us “fit” to cope with some possible devastating consequences from the predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics (Persson and Savulescu 2010, 664). Moral enhancement theorists comprehend the nature of war and conflicts, especially those conflicts that humankind is likely to face in the future, as the result of human beings’ limited moral motivations. Compared to supporters of human nature realism, however, moral enhancement theorists are less skeptical about the prospect of our taming human beings’ proclivity to do evil. For our knowledge in fields such as neurology and pharmacology does already enable us to enhance people’s performance in a variety of activities, and there seems to be no reason to assume it will not enable us to enhance people morally in the future. But the question, of course, is whether moral enhancement will also improve the prospect of our coping successfully with some major threats to the survival of humankind, as Savulescu and Persson propose, or to reduce evil in the world, as proposed by Walker. V. The point to which I would next like to call attention is that “human nature realism” – which is implicitly presupposed by some moral enhancement theorists – has been much criticized over the last decades within the tradition of political realism itself. “Structural realism,” unlike “human nature realism,” does not seek to derive a theory about conflicts and violence in the context of international relations from a theory of the moral shortcomings of human nature. Structural realism was originally proposed by Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State and War, published in 1959, and then later in another book called Theory of International Politics, published in 1979. In both works, Waltz seeks to avoid committing himself to any specific conception of human nature (Waltz 2001, x–xi). Waltz’s thesis is that the thrust of the political realism doctrine can be retained without our having to commit ourselves to any theory about the shortcomings of human nature. What is relevant for our understanding of international politics is, instead, our understanding of the “structure” of the international system of states (Waltz 1986). John Mearsheimer, too, is an important contemporary advocate of political realism. Although he seeks to distance himself from some ideas defended by Waltz, he also rejects human nature realism and, like Waltz, refers to himself as a supporter of “structural realism” (Mearsheimer 2001, 20). One of the basic tenets of political realism (whether “human nature realism” or “structural realism”) is, first, that the states are the main, if not the only, relevant actors in the context of international relations; and second, that states compete for power in the international arena. Moral considerations in international affairs, according to realists, are secondary when set against the state’s primary goal, namely its own security and survival. But while human nature realists such as Morgenthau explain the struggle for power as a result of human beings’ natural inclinations, structural realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that conflicts in the international arena do not stem from human nature, but from the very “structure” of the international system of states (Mearsheimer 2001, 18). According to Waltz and Mearsheimer, it is this structure that compels individuals to act as they do in the domain of international affairs. And one distinguishing feature of the international system of states is its “anarchical structure,” i.e. the lack of a central government analogous to the central governments that exist in the context of domestic politics. It means that each individual state is responsible for its own integrity and survival. In the absence of a superior authority, over and above the power of each sovereign state, political leaders often feel compelled to favor security over morality, even if, all other things being considered, they would naturally be more inclined to trust and to cooperate with political leaders of other states. On the other hand, when political leaders do trust and cooperate with other states, it is not necessarily their benevolent nature that motivates them to be cooperative and trustworthy, but, again, it is the structure of the system of states that compels them. The concept of human nature, as we can see, does not play a decisive role here. Because Waltz and Mearsheimer depart from “human nature realism,” their version of political realism has also sometimes been called “neo-realism” (Booth 1991, 533). Thus, even if human beings turn out to become morally enhanced in the future, humankind may still have to face the same scary scenarios described by some moral enhancement theorists. This is likely to happen if, indeed, human beings remain compelled to cooperate within the present structure of the system of states. Consider, for instance, the incident with a Norwegian weather rocket in January 1995. Russian radars detected a missile that was initially suspected of being on its way to reach Moscow in five minutes. All levels of Russian military defense were immediately put on alert for a possible imminent attack and massive retaliation. It is reported that for the first time in history a Russian president had before him, ready to be used, the “nuclear briefcase” from which the permission to launch nuclear weapons is issued. And that happened when the Cold War was already supposed to be over! In the event, it was realized that the rocket was leaving Russian territory and Boris Yeltsin did not have to enter the history books as the man who started the third world war by mistake (Cirincione 2008, 382).3 But under the crushing pressure of having to decide in such a short time, and on the basis of unreliable information, whether or not to retaliate, even a morally enhanced Yeltsin might have given orders to launch a devastating nuclear response – and that in spite of strong moral dispositions to the contrary. Writing for The Guardian on the basis of recently declassified documents, Rupert Myers reports further incidents similar to the one of 1995. He suggests that as more states strive to acquire nuclear capability, the danger of a major nuclear accident is likely to increase (Myers 2014). What has to be changed, therefore, is not human moral dispositions, but the very structure of the political international system of states within which we currently live. As far as major threats to the survival of humankind are concerned, moral enhancement might play an important role in the future only to the extent that it will help humankind to change the structure of the system of states. While moral enhancement may possibly have desirable results in some areas of human cooperation that do not badly threaten our security – such as donating food, medicine, and money to poorer countries – it will not motivate political leaders to dismantle their nuclear weapons. Neither will it deter other political leaders from pursuing nuclear capability, at any rate not as long as the structure of international politics compels them to see prospective cooperators in the present as possible enemies in the future. The idea of a “structure” should not be understood here in metaphysical terms, as though it mysteriously existed in a transcendent world and had the magical power of determining leaders’ decisions in this world. The word “structure” denotes merely a political arrangement in which there are no powerful law-enforcing institutions. And in the absence of the kind of security that law-enforcing institutions have the force to create, political leaders will often fail to cooperate, and occasionally engage in conflicts and wars, in those areas that are critical to their security and survival. Given the structure of international politics and the basic goal of survival, this is likely to continue to happen, even if, in the future, political leaders become less egoistic and power-seeking through moral enhancement. On the other hand, since the structure of the international system of states is itself another human institution, there is no reason to suppose that it cannot ever be changed. If people become morally enhanced in the future they may possibly feel more strongly motivated to change the structure of the system of states, or perhaps even feel inclined to abolish it altogether. In my view, however, addressing major threats to the survival of humankind in the future by means of bioengineering is unlikely to yield the expected results, so long as moral enhancement is pursued within the present framework of the international system of states.

<h4>Realism is <u>true</u> and <u>inevitable</u>.</h4><p><strong>de Araujo 14 </strong>De Aruajo, professor for Ethics at Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, 14 (Marcelo, “Moral Enhancement and Political Realism,” Journal of Evolution and Technology 24<u><strong>(2): 29-43)</p><p></u></strong>Some <u>moral enhancement theorists argue </u>that <u>a society of <strong>morally enhanced individuals</u></strong> <u>would be in a better position to cope with important problems that humankind is likely to face in</u> the future such as, for instance, the threats posed by <u><strong>climate change</u></strong>, grand scale <u><strong>terrorist attacks</u></strong>, or the risk of <u><strong>catastrophic wars.</u></strong> <u>The assumption here is</u> quite simple: <u>our inability to cope successfully with these problems stems mainly from a sort of deficit in human beings’ <strong>moral motivation</u></strong>. <u>If human beings were morally better</u> – if we had enhanced moral dispositions – <u>there would be <strong>fewer wars, less terrorism</strong>, and more <strong>willingness to save our environment</strong>. </u>Although simple and attractive, <u><strong>this assumption is</u></strong>, as I intend to show, <u><strong>false</u></strong>. <u><mark>At the root of threats to</mark> the survival of <mark>humankind</mark> in the future <mark>is not a deficit in</mark> our <mark>moral</mark> <mark>disposition</mark>s</u>, <u><mark>but</mark> the endurance of <mark>a</mark>n <strong>old <mark>political arrangement</strong></mark> that prevents the pursuit of shared goals on a collective basis.</u> The political arrangement I have in mind here is the international system of states. In my analysis of the political implications of moral enhancement, I intend to concentrate my attention only on the supposition that we could avoid major wars in the future by making individuals morally better. I do not intend to discuss the threats posed by climate change, or by terrorism, although some human enhancement theorists also seek to cover these topics. I will explain, in the course of my analysis, a conceptual distinction between “human nature realism” and “structural realism,” well-known in the field of international relations theory. Thomas Douglas seems to have been among the first to explore the idea of “moral enhancement” as a new form of human enhancement. He certainly helped to kick off the current phase of the debate. In a paper published in 2008, Douglas suggests that in the “future people might use biomedical technology to morally enhance themselves.” Douglas characterizes moral enhancement in terms of the acquisition of “morally better motives” (Douglas 2008, 229). Mark Walker, in a paper published in 2009, suggests a similar idea. He characterizes moral enhancement in terms of improved moral dispositions or “genetic virtues”: The Genetic Virtue Program (GVP) is a proposal for influencing our moral nature through biology, that is, it is an alternate yet complementary means by which ethics and ethicists might contribute to the task of making our lives and world a better place. The basic idea is simple enough: genes influence human behavior, so altering the genes of individuals may alter the influence genes exert on behavior. (Walker 2009, 27–28) Walker does not argue in favor of any specific moral theory, such as, for instance, virtue ethics. Whether one endorses a deontological or a utilitarian approach to ethics, he argues, the concept of virtue is relevant to the extent that virtues motivate us either to do the right thing or to maximize the good (Walker 2009, 35). Moral enhancement theory, however, does not reduce the ethical debate to the problem of moral dispositions. Morality also concerns, to a large extent, questions about reasons for action. And moral enhancement, most certainly, will not improve our moral beliefs; neither could it be used to settle moral disagreements. This seems to have led some authors to criticize the moral enhancement idea on the ground that it neglects the cognitive side of our moral behavior. Robert Sparrow, for instance, argues that, from a Kantian point of view, moral enhancement would have to provide us with better moral beliefs rather than enhanced moral motivation (Sparrow 2014, 25; see also Agar 2010, 74). Yet, it seems to me that this objection misses the point of the moral enhancement idea. Many people, across different countries, already share moral beliefs relating, for instance, to the wrongness of harming or killing other people arbitrarily, or to the moral requirement to help people in need. They may share moral beliefs while not sharing the same reasons for these beliefs, or perhaps even not being able to articulate the beliefs in the conceptual framework of a moral theory (Blackford 2010, 83). But although they share some moral beliefs, in some circumstances they may lack the appropriate motivation to act accordingly. Moral enhancement, thus, aims at improving moral motivation, and leaves open the question as to how to improve our moral judgments. In a recent paper, published in The Journal of Medical Ethics, neuroscientist Molly Crockett reports the state of the art in the still very embryonic field of moral enhancement. She points out, for example, that the selective serotonin reuptake inhibitor (SSRI) citalopram seems to increase harm aversion. There is, moreover, some evidence that this substance may be effective in the treatment of specific types of aggressive behavior. Like Douglas, Crockett emphasizes that moral enhancement should aim at individuals’ moral motives (Crockett 2014; see also Spence 2008; Terbeck et al. 2013). Another substance that is frequently mentioned in the moral enhancement literature is oxytocin. Some studies suggest that willingness to cooperate with other people, and to trust unknown prospective cooperators, may be enhanced by an increase in the levels of oxytocin in the organism (Zak 2008, 2011; Zak and Kugler 2011; Persson and Savulescu 2012, 118–119). Oxytocin has also been reported to be “associated with the subjective experience of empathy” (Zak 2011, 55; Zak and Kugler 2011, 144). The question I would like to examine now concerns the supposition that moral enhancement – comprehended in these terms and assuming for the sake of argument that, some day, it might become effective and safe – may also help us in coping with the threat of devastating wars in the future. The assumption that there is a relationship between, on the one hand, threats to the survival of humankind and, on the other, a sort of “deficit” in our moral dispositions is clearly made by some moral enhancements theorists. Douglas, for instance, argues that “according to many plausible theories, some of the world’s most important problems — such as developing world poverty, climate change and war — can be attributed to these moral deficits” (2008, 230). Walker, in a similar vein, writes about the possibility of “using biotechnology to alter our biological natures in an effort to reduce evil in the world” (2009, 29). And Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson go as far as to defend the “the need for moral enhancement” of humankind in a series of articles, and in a book published in 2012. One of the reasons Savulescu and Persson advance for the moral enhancement of humankind is that our moral dispositions seem to have remained basically unchanged over the last millennia (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 2). These dispositions have proved thus far quite useful for the survival of human beings as a species. They have enabled us to cooperate with each other in the collective production of things such as food, shelter, tools, and farming. They have also played a crucial role in the creation and refinement of a variety of human institutions such as settlements, villages, and laws. Although the possibility of free-riding has never been fully eradicated, the benefits provided by cooperation have largely exceeded the disadvantages of our having to deal with occasional uncooperative or untrustworthy individuals (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 39). The problem, however, is that the same dispositions that have enabled human beings in the past to engage in the collective production of so many artifacts and institutions now seem powerless in the face of the human capacity to destroy other human beings on a grand scale, or perhaps even to annihilate the entire human species. There is, according to Savulescu and Persson, a “mismatch” between our cognitive faculties and our evolved moral attitudes: “[…] as we have repeatedly stressed, owing to the progress of science, the range of our powers of action has widely outgrown the range of our spontaneous moral attitudes, and created a dangerous mismatch” (Persson and Savulescu 2012, 103; see also Persson and Savulescu 2010, 660; Persson and Savulescu 2011b; DeGrazie 2012, 2; Rakić 2014, 2). This worry about the mismatch between, on the one hand, the modern technological capacity to destroy and, on the other, our limited moral commitments is not new. The political philosopher Hans Morgenthau, best known for his defense of political realism, called attention to the same problem nearly fifty years ago. In the wake of the first successful tests with thermonuclear bombs, conducted by the USA and the former Soviet Union, Morgenthau referred to the “contrast” between the technological progress of our age and our feeble moral attitudes as one of the most disturbing dilemmas of our time: The first dilemma consists in the contrast between the technological unification of the world and the parochial moral commitments and political institutions of the age. Moral commitments and political institutions, dating from an age which modern technology has left behind, have not kept pace with technological achievements and, hence, are incapable of controlling their destructive potentialities. (Morgenthau 1962, 174) Moral enhancement theorists and political realists like Morgenthau, therefore, share the thesis that our natural moral dispositions are not strong enough to prevent human beings from endangering their own existence as a species. But they differ as to the best way out of this quandary: moral enhancement theorists argue for the re-engineering of our moral dispositions, whereas Morgenthau accepted the immutability of human nature and argued, instead, for the re-engineering of world politics. Both positions, as I intend to show, are wrong in assuming that the “dilemma” results from the weakness of our spontaneous moral dispositions in the face of the unprecedented technological achievements of our time. On the other hand, both positions are correct in recognizing the real possibility of global catastrophes resulting from the malevolent use of, for instance, biotechnology or nuclear capabilities. The supposition that individuals’ unwillingness to cooperate with each other, even when they would be better-off by choosing to cooperate, results from a sort of deficit of dispositions such as altruism, empathy, and benevolence has been at the core of some important political theories. This idea is an important assumption in the works of early modern political realists such as Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes. It was also later endorsed by some well-known authors writing about the origins of war in the first half of the twentieth century. It was then believed, as Sigmund Freud suggested in a text from 1932, that the main cause of wars is a human tendency to “hatred and destruction” (in German: ein Trieb zum Hassen und Vernichtung). Freud went as far as to suggest that human beings have an ingrained “inclination” to “aggression” and “destruction” (Aggressionstrieb, Aggressionsneigung, and Destruktionstrieb), and that this inclination has a “good biological basis” (biologisch wohl begründet) (Freud 1999, 20–24; see also Freud 1950; Forbes 1984; Pick 1993, 211–227; Medoff 2009). The attempt to employ Freud’s conception of human nature in understanding international relations has recently been resumed, for instance by Kurt Jacobsen in a paper entitled “Why Freud Matters: Psychoanalysis and International Relations Revisited,” published in 2013. Morgenthau himself was deeply influenced by Freud’s speculations on the origins of war.1 Early in the 1930s, Morgenthau wrote an essay called “On the Origin of the Political from the Nature of Human Beings” (Über die Herkunft des Politischen aus dem Wesen des Menschen), which contains several references to Freud’s theory about the human propensity to aggression.2 Morgenthau’s most influential book, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, first published in 1948 and then successively revised and edited, is still considered a landmark work in the tradition of political realism. According to Morgenthau, politics is governed by laws that have their origin in human nature: “Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). Just like human enhancement theorists, Morgenthau also takes for granted that human nature has not changed over recent millennia: “Human nature, in which the laws of politics have their roots, has not changed since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws” (Morgenthau 2006, 4). And since, for Morgenthau, human nature prompts human beings to act selfishly, rather than cooperatively, political leaders will sometimes favor conflict over cooperation, unless some superior power compels them to act otherwise. Now, this is exactly what happens in the domain of international relations. For <u>in the international sphere there is not a supranational institution with the real power to prevent states from pursuing means of self-defense. The acquisition of means of self-defense, however, is frequently perceived by other states as a threat to their own security. This leads to the security dilemma and the possibility of war.</u> As Morgenthau put the problem in an article published in 1967: “<u>The <mark>actions of states are</mark> <mark>determined</mark> not by moral principles and legal commitments but <mark>by considerations of interest and power</u></mark>” (1967, 3). Because Morgenthau and early modern political philosophers such as Machiavelli and Hobbes defended political realism on the grounds provided by a specific conception human nature, their version of political realism has been frequently called “human nature realism.” The literature on human nature realism has become quite extensive (Speer 1968; Booth 1991; Freyberg-Inan 2003; Kaufman 2006; Molloy 2006, 82–85; Craig 2007; Scheuerman 2007, 2010, 2012; Schuett 2007; Neascu 2009; Behr 2010, 210–225; Brown 2011; Jütersonke 2012). It is not my intention here to present a fully-fledged account of the tradition of human nature realism, but rather to emphasize the extent to which some moral enhancement theorists, in their description of some of the gloomy scenarios humankind is likely to face in the future, implicitly endorse this kind of political realism. Indeed, like human nature realists, moral enhancement theorists assume that human nature has not changed over the last millennia, and that violence and lack of cooperation in the international sphere result chiefly from human nature’s limited inclination to pursue morally desirable goals. One may, of course, criticize the human enhancement project by rejecting the assumption that conflict and violence in the international domain should be explained by means of a theory about human nature. In a reply to Savulescu and Persson, Sparrow correctly argues that<u> <strong>“structural issues,”</strong> rather than <strong>human nature</strong>, constitute the main factor underlying political conflicts</u> (Sparrow 2014, 29). But he does not explain what exactly these “structural issues” are, as I intend to do later. Sparrow is right in rejecting the human nature theory underlying the human enhancement project. But this underlying assumption, in my view, is not trivially false or simply “ludicrous,” as he suggests. Human nature realism has been implicitly or explicitly endorsed by leading political philosophers ever since Thucydides speculated on the origins of war in antiquity (Freyberg-Inan 2003, 23–36). True, it might be objected that “human nature realism,” as it was defended by Morgenthau and earlier political philosophers, relied upon a metaphysical or psychoanalytical conception of human nature, a conception that, actually, did not have the support of any serious scientific investigation (Smith 1983, 167). Yet, over the last few years there has been much empirical research in fields such as developmental psychology and evolutionary biology that apparently gives some support to the realist claim. Some of these studies suggest that an inclination to aggression and conflict has its origins in our evolutionary history. This idea, then, has recently led some authors to resume “human nature realism” on new foundations, devoid of the metaphysical assumptions of the early realists, and entirely grounded in empirical research. Indeed, some recent works in the field of international relations theory already seek to call attention to evolutionary biology as a possible new start for political realism. This point is clearly made, for instance, by Bradley Thayer, who published in 2004 a book called Darwin and International Relations: On the Evolutionary Origins of War and Ethnic Conflict. And in a paper published in 2000, he affirms the following: Evolutionary theory provides a stronger foundation for realism because it is based on science, not on theology or metaphysics. I use the theory to explain two human traits: egoism and domination. I submit that the egoistic and dominating behavior of individuals, which is commonly described as “realist,” is a product of the evolutionary process. I focus on these two traits because they are critical components of any realist argument in explaining international politics. (Thayer 2000, 125; see also Thayer 2004) Thayer basically argues that a tendency to egoism and domination stems from human evolutionary history. The predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics, he argues, is a reflex of dispositions that can now be proved to be part of our evolved human nature in a way that Morgenthau and other earlier political philosophers could not have established in their own time. Now, what some moral enhancement theorists propose is a direct intervention in our “evolved limited moral psychology” as a means to make us “fit” to cope with some possible devastating consequences from the predominance of conflict and competition in the domain of international politics (Persson and Savulescu 2010, 664). Moral enhancement theorists comprehend the nature of war and conflicts, especially those conflicts that humankind is likely to face in the future, as the result of human beings’ limited moral motivations. Compared to supporters of human nature realism, however, moral enhancement theorists are less skeptical about the prospect of our taming human beings’ proclivity to do evil. For our knowledge in fields such as neurology and pharmacology does already enable us to enhance people’s performance in a variety of activities, and there seems to be no reason to assume it will not enable us to enhance people morally in the future. But the question, of course, is whether moral enhancement will also improve the prospect of our coping successfully with some major threats to the survival of humankind, as Savulescu and Persson propose, or to reduce evil in the world, as proposed by Walker. V. The point to which I would next like to call attention is that “human nature realism” – which is implicitly presupposed by some moral enhancement theorists – has been much criticized over the last decades within the tradition of political realism itself. <u>“Structural realism,”</u> unlike “human nature realism,” <u>does not seek to derive a theory about conflicts and violence in the context of international relations from a theory of</u> the moral shortcomings of <u>human nature.</u> Structural realism was originally proposed by Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State and War, published in 1959, and then later in another book called Theory of International Politics, published in 1979. In both works, Waltz seeks to avoid committing himself to any specific conception of human nature (Waltz 2001, x–xi). Waltz’s thesis is that the thrust of the political realism doctrine can be retained without our having to commit ourselves to any theory about the shortcomings of human nature. What is relevant for our understanding of international politics is, instead, our understanding of the “structure” of the international system of states (Waltz 1986). John Mearsheimer, too, is an important contemporary advocate of political realism. Although he seeks to distance himself from some ideas defended by Waltz, he also rejects human nature realism and, like Waltz, refers to himself as a supporter of “structural realism” (Mearsheimer 2001, 20). One of the basic tenets of political realism (whether “human nature realism” or “structural realism”) is, first, that the <u><mark>states are the</u></mark> main, if not the <u><strong><mark>only</mark>, <mark>relevant actors</mark> </u></strong>in the context of international relations; <u><mark>and</u></mark> second, that <u><strong>states <mark>compete for power</mark> </u></strong>in the international arena. <u><strong><mark>Moral considerations</u></strong></mark> in international affairs, according to realists, <u><mark>are <strong>secondary</strong></mark> when set against the state’s primary goal<strong>,</strong> <strong>namely its own security and survival</u></strong>. But while human nature realists such as Morgenthau explain the struggle for power as a result of human beings’ natural inclinations, structural realists like Waltz and Mearsheimer argue that <u><strong>conflicts in the international arena</strong> <strong>do not stem from human nature, but from the very “structure” of the international system of states</strong> </u>(Mearsheimer 2001, 18). According to Waltz and Mearsheimer, <u>it is this <strong>structure</strong> that compels individuals to act as they do in the domain of international affairs. </u>And one distinguishing feature of the international system of states is <u>its “anarchical structure,” i.e. <mark>the lack of a central government</mark> analogous to the central governments that exist in the context of domestic politics. It <mark>means</mark> that <mark>each</mark> individual <mark>state is responsible for its own</mark> integrity and <mark>survival.</mark> In the absence of a superior authority<strong>,</u></strong> over and above the power of each sovereign state, <u>political leaders <strong>often </strong>feel compelled to favor <strong>security over morality</u></strong>, even if, all other things being considered, they would naturally be more inclined to trust and to cooperate with political leaders of other states. On the other hand, when political leaders do trust and cooperate with other states, it is not necessarily their benevolent nature that motivates them to be cooperative and trustworthy, but, again, it is the structure of the system of states that compels them. The concept of human nature, as we can see, does not play a decisive role here. Because Waltz and Mearsheimer depart from “human nature realism,” their version of political realism has also sometimes been called “neo-realism” (Booth 1991, 533). Thus, <u><strong><mark>even if</strong></mark> human beings turn out to become <strong><mark>morally enhanced</strong></mark> </u>in the future, <u><mark>humankind may still</mark> have to <mark>face the same <strong></mark>scary scenarios</p><p></strong> </u>described by some moral enhancement theorists. This is likely to happen if, indeed, human beings remain compelled to cooperate within the present structure of the system of states. Consider, for instance, the incident with a Norwegian weather rocket in January 1995. Russian radars detected a missile that was initially suspected of being on its way to reach Moscow in five minutes. All levels of Russian military defense were immediately put on alert for a possible imminent attack and massive retaliation. It is reported that for the first time in history a Russian president had before him, ready to be used, the “nuclear briefcase” from which the permission to launch nuclear weapons is issued. And that happened when the Cold War was already supposed to be over! In the event, it was realized that the rocket was leaving Russian territory and Boris Yeltsin did not have to enter the history books as the man who started the third world war by mistake (Cirincione 2008, 382).3 But under the crushing pressure of having to decide in such a short time, and on the basis of unreliable information, whether or not to retaliate, even a morally enhanced Yeltsin might have given orders to launch a devastating nuclear response – and that in spite of strong moral dispositions to the contrary. Writing for The Guardian on the basis of recently declassified documents, Rupert Myers reports further incidents similar to the one of 1995. He suggests that as more states strive to acquire nuclear capability, the danger of a major nuclear accident is likely to increase (Myers 2014). What has to be changed, therefore, is not human moral dispositions, but the very structure of the political international system of states within which we currently live. As far as major threats to the survival of humankind are concerned, moral enhancement might play an important role in the future only to the extent that it will help humankind to change the structure of the system of states. While <u><mark>moral enhancement</u></mark> may possibly have desirable results in some areas of human cooperation that do not badly threaten our security – such as donating food, medicine, and money to poorer countries – it <u><mark>will not motivate</mark> political <mark>leaders to</mark> <strong><mark>dismantle their nuclear weapons</strong>.</mark> Neither will it deter other political leaders from pursuing nuclear capability</u>, <u>at any rate not as long as <mark>the structure of international politics compels them to see</mark> prospective <mark>cooperators</mark> <strong>in the present <mark>as possible enemies</mark> in the future. </u></strong>The idea of a “structure” should not be understood here in metaphysical terms, as though it mysteriously existed in a transcendent world and had the magical power of determining leaders’ decisions in this world. The word “structure” denotes merely a political arrangement in which there are no powerful law-enforcing institutions. And <u>in the absence of the kind of security that law-enforcing institutions have the force to create, political <mark>leaders</mark> will</u> often <u><strong><mark>fail to</mark> <mark>cooperate</mark>,</strong> and</u> occasionally <u>engage in</u> conflicts and <u>wars, in those areas that are critical to their security and survival</u>. Given the structure of international politics and the basic goal of survival, <u>this is likely to continue to happen, <strong>even if,</u></strong> in the future, political <u>leaders become <strong>less egoistic and power-seeking</strong> </u>through moral enhancement. On the other hand, since the structure of the international system of states is itself another human institution, there is no reason to suppose that it cannot ever be changed. If people become morally enhanced in the future they may possibly feel more strongly motivated to change the structure of the system of states, or perhaps even feel inclined to abolish it altogether. In my view, however, addressing major threats to the survival of humankind in the future by means of bioengineering is unlikely to yield the expected results, so long as moral enhancement is pursued within the present framework of the international system of states. </p>

2AC

K

A3

./documents/hspolicy20/Mamaroneck/MiRa/Mamaroneck-Miller-Rahman-Aff-Blake-Round4.docx

A

Blake

4

Kent Denver HA

Colin Waldron

1AC - Antitrust 2NR - ESR PTX

hspolicy20/Mamaroneck/MiRa/Mamaroneck-Miller-Rahman-Aff-Blake-Round4.docx

MiRa

Mamaroneck MiRa

Ja.....

Mi.....

Ra.....

Ra.....

Mamaroneck

Mamaroneck

NY

hspolicy20

HS Policy 2020-21

cx

hs

The Roll of the Ballot is to evaluate the plan vs a competitive alternative as a strategy for developing more effective explanatory critiques of violence.

Understanding the intrincacies of politics, the state, and the military is a PREREQUISITE to addressing oppression – means our ACADEMIC theorizing is methodologically valuable and a PREREQUISITE to the alternative.

Understanding the intrincacies of politics, the state, and the military is a PREREQUISITE to addressing oppression – means our ACADEMIC theorizing is methodologically valuable and a PREREQUISITE to the alternative. Bryant 12 – (9/15, Levi, professor of Philosophy at Collin College and Chair of the Critical Philosophy program at the New Centre for Research and Practice, “War Machines and Military Logistics: Some Cards on the Table,” https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/09/15/war-machines-and-military-logistics-some-cards-on-the-table/)

We need answers to questions of “military logistics” Military logistics asks first what things the opposing war machine captured by the state relies on in order to deploy supply lines, communications networks, people propaganda or ideology Military logistics maps all of these things Second how to best deploy its own resources in fighting that state war machine to defeat racism, sexism, capitalism, neoliberalism what are the privileged nodes within these state war machines that allow them to function? What I’ve heard in discussions is a complete indifference to military logistics people like to wave their hands and say “this is horrible and unjust!” and believe that hand waving is a politically efficacious act Yeah it is horrible but saying so doesn’t go very far and changing it Confronted with an analysis why the social functions in the horrible way, the next response is to say “you’re justifying that system and saying it’s a-okay!” This misses the point that the entire point is to map the “supply lines” of the opposing war machine so you can strategically intervene in them to destroy them and create alternative forms of life we already took for granted your analysis of how horrible things are You’re preaching to the choir your sole strategy seems to be ideological critique or debunking Your idea seems to be that if you just prove that other people’s beliefs are incoherent, they’ll change and things will be different. But we’ve noticed a couple things 1) there have been a number of bang-on critiques of state war machines, without things changing too much and 2) we’ve noticed that we might even persuade others that their position is incoherent, yet they still adhere to it there are two reasons that an ideological critique can be successful and still fail to produce change a) The critique is right but fails to reach the people who need to hear it and they couldn’t receive it because it’s expressed in the foreign language of academics Or b) there are other causal factors that are not discursive, propositional, or semiotic it is a combination I don’t deny that ideology is one component I merely deny that this is the only causal factor I don’t reject your political aims, but merely wonder how to get there you drop pamphlets out of an airplane debunking the ideological reasons that persuade the opposing force’s soldiers forgetting supply lines that there are other soldiers behind them with guns to their back that they have obligations families to feed debt to pay off I’m objecting to your tendency to use a hammer to solve all problems and to see all things as a nail discursive problems It is not simply beliefs, signs, and ideologies that cause oppressive social orders to endure or persist, but also material arrangements upon which people depend to live as they do Part of changing a social order thus necessarily involves intervening in those material networks the hardest thing of all requires the activist to be something more than a critic more than someone who simply denounces how bad things are producing instead other material and semiotic arrangements rendering new forms of life and social relation possible None of this, however, is possible without good mapping of the terrain so as to know what to deconstruct and what resources are available for building new worlds rather than waving my hands and cursing because of how unjust and horrible it is playing the part of the beautiful soul who refuses to get his hands dirty I think we need good maps so we can blow up the right bridges, power lines, and communications networks

We need answers to questions of “military logistics”. what things the opposing war machine captured by the state relies on supply lines, communications networks, people What I’ve heard in discussions is a complete indifference to military logistics people like to wave their hands and say “this is horrible and unjust!” and believe that hand waving is a politically efficacious act Yeah but saying so doesn’t go very far and changing it. the next response is to say “you’re justifying that system and saying it’s a-okay!” the entire point is to map the “supply lines” of the opposing war machine You’re preaching to the choir your sole strategy seems to be ideological critique or debunking we’ve noticed there have been a number of bang-on critiques of state war machines, without things changing too much, and The critique fails to reach the people they couldn’t receive it because it’s expressed in the foreign language of academics there are other causal factors that are not discursive, propositional, or semiotic it is a combination I don’t reject your political aims, but merely wonder how to get there Part of changing a social order thus necessarily involves intervening in material networks the hardest thing requires the activist to be something more than a critic we need good maps so we can blow up the right bridges, power lines, and communications networks

We need answers to these questions to intervene effectively. We can call them questions of “military logistics”. We are, after all, constructing war machines to combat these intolerable conditions. Military logistics asks two questions: first, it asks what things the opposing force, the opposing war machine captured by the state apparatus, relies on in order to deploy its war machine: supply lines, communications networks, people willing to fight, propaganda or ideology, people believing in the cause, etc. Military logistics maps all of these things. Second, military logistics asks how to best deploy its own resources in fighting that state war machine. In what way should we deploy our war machine to defeat war machines like racism, sexism, capitalism, neoliberalism, etc? What are the things upon which these state based war machines are based, what are the privileged nodes within these state based war machines that allows them to function? These nodes are the things upon which we want our nomadic war machines to intervene. If we are to be effective in producing change we better know what the supply lines are so that we might make them our target. What I’ve heard in these discussions is a complete indifference to military logistics. It’s as if people like to wave their hands and say “this is horrible and unjust!” and believe that hand waving is a politically efficacious act. Yeah, you’re right, it is horrible but saying so doesn’t go very far and changing it. It’s also as if people are horrified when anyone discusses anything besides how horribly unjust everything is. Confronted with an analysis why the social functions in the horrible way, the next response is to say “you’re justifying that system and saying it’s a-okay!” This misses the point that the entire point is to map the “supply lines” of the opposing war machine so you can strategically intervene in them to destroy them and create alternative forms of life. You see, we already took for granted your analysis of how horrible things are. You’re preaching to the choir. We wanted to get to work determining how to change that and believed for that we needed good maps of the opposing state based war machine so we can decide how to intervene. We then look at your actual practices and see that your sole strategy seems to be ideological critique or debunking. Your idea seems to be that if you just prove that other people’s beliefs are incoherent, they’ll change and things will be different. But we’ve noticed a couple things about your strategy: 1) there have been a number of bang-on critiques of state based war machines, without things changing too much, and 2) we’ve noticed that we might even persuade others that labor under these ideologies that their position is incoherent, yet they still adhere to it as if the grounds of their ideology didn’t matter much. This leads us to suspect that there are other causal factors that undergird these social assemblages and cause them to endure is they do. We thought to ourselves, there are two reasons that an ideological critique can be successful and still fail to produce change: a) the problem can be one of “distribution”. The critique is right but fails to reach the people who need to hear it and even if they did receive the message they couldn’t receive it because it’s expressed in the foreign language of “academese” which they’ve never been substantially exposed to (academics seem to enjoy only speaking to other academics even as they say their aim is to change the world). Or b) there are other causal factors involved in why social worlds take the form they do that are not of the discursive, propositional, or semiotic order. My view is that it is a combination of both. I don’t deny that ideology is one component of why societies take the form they do and why people tolerate intolerable conditions. I merely deny that this is the only causal factor. I don’t reject your political aims, but merely wonder how to get there. Meanwhile, you guys behave like a war machine that believes it’s sufficient to drop pamphlets out of an airplane debunking the ideological reasons that persuade the opposing force’s soldiers to fight this war on behalf of the state apparatus, forgetting supply lines, that there are other soldiers behind them with guns to their back, that they have obligations to their fellows, that they have families to feed or debt to pay off, etc. When I point out these other things it’s not to reject your political aims, but to say that perhaps these are also good things to intervene in if we wish to change the world. In other words, I’m objecting to your tendency to use a hammer to solve all problems and to see all things as a nail (discursive problems), ignoring the role that material nonhuman entities play in the form that social assemblages take. This is the basic idea behind what I’ve called “terraism”. Terraism has three components: 1) “Cartography” or the mapping of assemblages to understand why they take the form they take and why they endure. This includes the mapping of both semiotic and material components of social assemblages. 2) “Deconstruction” Deconstruction is a practice. It includes both traditional modes of discursive deconstruction (Derridean deconstruction, post-structuralist feminist critique, Foucaultian genealogy, Cultural Marxist critique, etc), but also far more literal deconstruction in the sense of intervening in material or thingly orders upon which social assemblages are reliant. It is not simply beliefs, signs, and ideologies that cause oppressive social orders to endure or persist, but also material arrangements upon which people depend to live as they do. Part of changing a social order thus necessarily involves intervening in those material networks to undermine their ability to maintain their relations or feedback mechanisms that allow them to perpetuate certain dependencies for people. Finally, 3) there is “Terraformation”. Terraformation is the hardest thing of all, as it requires the activist to be something more than a critic, something more than someone who simply denounces how bad things are, someone more than someone who simply sneers, producing instead other material and semiotic arrangements rendering new forms of life and social relation possible. Terraformation consists in building alternative forms of life. None of this, however, is possible without good mapping of the terrain so as to know what to deconstruct and what resources are available for building new worlds. Sure, I care about ontology for political reasons because I believe this world sucks and is profoundly unjust. But rather than waving my hands and cursing because of how unjust and horrible it is so as to feel superior to all those about me who don’t agree, rather than playing the part of the beautiful soul who refuses to get his hands dirty, I think we need good maps so we can blow up the right bridges, power lines, and communications networks, and so we can engage in effective terraformation.

<h4><strong>The Roll of the Ballot is to evaluate the plan vs a competitive alternative as a strategy for developing more effective explanatory critiques of violence.</h4><p>Understanding the intrincacies of politics, the state, and the military is a PREREQUISITE to addressing oppression – means our ACADEMIC theorizing is methodologically valuable and a PREREQUISITE to the alternative.</p><p>Bryant 12</strong> – (9/15, Levi, professor of Philosophy at Collin College and Chair of the Critical Philosophy program at the New Centre for Research and Practice, “War Machines and Military Logistics: Some Cards on the Table,” https://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/09/15/war-machines-and-military-logistics-some-cards-on-the-table/)</p><p><u><mark>We need answers to</u></mark> these <u><mark>questions</u></mark> to intervene effectively. We can call them questions <u><mark>of “military logistics”</u>.</mark> We are, after all, constructing war machines to combat these intolerable conditions. <u>Military logistics asks</u> two questions: <u>first</u>, it asks <u><mark>what things the opposing</u></mark> force, the opposing <u><mark>war machine captured by the</u> <u>state</u></mark> apparatus, <u><mark>relies on</mark> in order to deploy</u> its war machine: <u><mark>supply lines, communications networks, people</u></mark> willing to fight, <u>propaganda or ideology</u>, people believing in the cause, etc. <u>Military logistics maps all of these things</u>. <u>Second</u>, military logistics asks <u>how to best deploy its own resources in fighting that state war machine</u>. In what way should we deploy our war machine <u>to defeat</u> war machines like <u><strong>racism, sexism, capitalism, neoliberalism</u></strong>, etc? What are the things upon which these state based war machines are based, <u>what are the privileged nodes within these state</u> based <u>war machines that allow</u>s <u>them to function?</u> These nodes are the things upon which we want our nomadic war machines to intervene. If we are to be effective in producing change we better know what the supply lines are so that we might make them our target.</p><p><u><mark>What I’ve heard in</u></mark> these <u><mark>discussions is a <strong>complete indifference to military logistics</u></strong></mark>. It’s as if <u><mark>people like to wave their hands and say</u> <u><strong>“this is horrible and unjust!”</u></strong> <u>and <strong>believe that hand waving is a politically efficacious act</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Yeah</u></mark>, you’re right, <u>it is horrible <mark>but saying so doesn’t go very far and changing it</u>.</mark> It’s also as if people are horrified when anyone discusses anything besides how horribly unjust everything is. <u>Confronted with an analysis why the social functions in the horrible way, <mark>the next response is to say <strong>“you’re justifying that system and saying it’s a-okay!”</u></strong></mark> <u>This misses the point that <strong><mark>the entire point is to map the “supply lines” of the opposing war machine</strong></mark> so you can strategically <strong>intervene in them to destroy them</strong> and create alternative forms of life</u>. You see, <u>we already took for granted your analysis of how horrible things are</u>. <u><strong><mark>You’re preaching to the choir</u></strong></mark>. We wanted to get to work determining how to change that and believed for that we needed good maps of the opposing state based war machine so we can decide how to intervene.</p><p>We then look at your actual practices and see that <u><strong><mark>your sole strategy seems to be ideological critique or debunking</u></strong></mark>. <u>Your idea seems to be that if you just prove that other people’s beliefs are incoherent, they’ll change and things will be different. But <mark>we’ve noticed</mark> a couple things</u> about your strategy: <u>1) <mark>there have been a number of bang-on critiques of state</u></mark> based <u><mark>war machines, without things changing too much</u>, <u>and</mark> 2) we’ve noticed that we might even persuade others that</u> labor under these ideologies that <u>their position is incoherent, yet they still adhere to it</u> as if the grounds of their ideology didn’t matter much. This leads us to suspect that there are other causal factors that undergird these social assemblages and cause them to endure is they do. We thought to ourselves, <u>there are two reasons that an ideological critique can be successful and still fail to produce change</u>: <u>a)</u> the problem can be one of “distribution”. <u><mark>The critique</mark> is right but <strong><mark>fails to reach the people</strong></mark> who need to hear it and</u> even if they did receive the message <u><mark>they couldn’t receive it because it’s expressed in the foreign language of</u></mark> “academese” which they’ve never been substantially exposed to (<u><mark>academics</u></mark> seem to enjoy only speaking to other academics even as they say their aim is to change the world). <u>Or b)</u> <u><strong><mark>there are other causal factors</u></strong></mark> involved in why social worlds take the form they do <u><mark>that are not</u></mark> of the <u><strong><mark>discursive, propositional, or semiotic</u></strong></mark> order. My view is that <u><strong><mark>it is a combination</u></strong></mark> of both.</p><p><u>I don’t deny that ideology is one component</u> of why societies take the form they do and why people tolerate intolerable conditions. <u>I merely deny that this is the only causal factor</u>. <u><mark>I don’t reject your political aims, but merely <strong>wonder how to get there</u></strong></mark>. Meanwhile, <u>you</u> guys behave like a war machine that believes it’s sufficient to <u>drop pamphlets out of an airplane debunking the ideological reasons that persuade the opposing force’s soldiers</u> to fight this war on behalf of the state apparatus, <u>forgetting supply lines</u>, <u>that there are other soldiers behind them with guns to their back</u>, <u>that they have obligations</u> to their fellows, that they have <u>families to feed</u> or <u>debt to pay off</u>, etc. When I point out these other things it’s not to reject your political aims, but to say that perhaps these are also good things to intervene in if we wish to change the world. In other words, <u>I’m objecting to your tendency to use a hammer to solve all problems and to see all things as a nail</u> (<u><strong>discursive problems</u></strong>), ignoring the role that material nonhuman entities play in the form that social assemblages take.</p><p>This is the basic idea behind what I’ve called “terraism”. Terraism has three components: 1) “Cartography” or the mapping of assemblages to understand why they take the form they take and why they endure. This includes the mapping of both semiotic and material components of social assemblages. 2) “Deconstruction” Deconstruction is a practice. It includes both traditional modes of discursive deconstruction (Derridean deconstruction, post-structuralist feminist critique, Foucaultian genealogy, Cultural Marxist critique, etc), but also far more literal deconstruction in the sense of intervening in material or thingly orders upon which social assemblages are reliant. <u>It is not simply beliefs, signs, and ideologies that cause oppressive social orders to endure or persist, but also material arrangements upon which people depend to live as they do</u>. <u><strong><mark>Part of changing a social order thus necessarily involves intervening in</mark> those <mark>material networks</u></strong></mark> to undermine their ability to maintain their relations or feedback mechanisms that allow them to perpetuate certain dependencies for people. Finally, 3) there is “Terraformation”. Terraformation is <u><mark>the hardest thing</mark> of all</u>, as it <u><mark>requires the <strong>activist to be something more than a critic</u></strong></mark>, something <u>more than someone who <strong>simply denounces how bad things are</u></strong>, someone more than someone who simply sneers, <u>producing instead other material and semiotic arrangements rendering new forms of life and social relation possible</u>. Terraformation consists in building alternative forms of life. <u><strong>None of this, however, is possible without good mapping of the terrain</strong> so as to know what to deconstruct and what resources are available for building new worlds</u>. Sure, I care about ontology for political reasons because I believe this world sucks and is profoundly unjust. But <u>rather than waving my hands and cursing because of how unjust and horrible it is</u> so as to feel superior to all those about me who don’t agree, rather than <u>playing the part of the beautiful soul who refuses to get his hands dirty</u>, <u>I think</u> <u><strong><mark>we need good maps so we can blow up the right bridges, power lines, and communications networks</u></mark>, and so we can engage in effective terraformation.</p></strong>

2AC

K

1AC Inequality

./documents/ndtceda17/Harvard/BaCo/Harvard-Bates-Cooper-Aff-Texas-Round4.docx

A

Texas

4

Kansas BW

Buntin

1AC-single payer w health care inequality and cell therapy 1NC-pic out of "redistributive"

ndtceda17/Harvard/BaCo/Harvard-Bates-Cooper-Aff-Texas-Round4.docx

BaCo

Harvard BaCo

Cl.....

Ba.....

Jo.....

Co.....

Harvard

Harvard

ndtceda17

NDT/CEDA 2017-18

cx

college

Won’t happen.

Zarybnisky 18

Dr. Eric J. Zarybnisky 18, MA in National Security Studies from the Naval War College, PhD in Operations Research from the MIT Sloan School of Management, Lt Col, USAF, “Celestial Deterrence: Deterring Aggression in the Global Commons of Space”, 3/28/2018, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1062004.pdf

Aggression in space was successfully avoided during the Cold War because both sides viewed an attack on military satellites as highly escalatory, and such an action would likely result in general nuclear war In today’s more nuanced world, attacking satellites, including military satellites, does not necessarily result in nuclear war. For instance, foreign countries have used high-powered lasers against American intelligence-gathering satellites and the U S has been reluctant to respond, let alone retaliate with nuclear weapons. This shift in policy is a result of the broader use of gray zone operations, to which countries struggle to respond while limiting escalation

during the Cold War both sides viewed an attack on sat s as escalatory In today’s nuanced world, attacking sat s, does not result in nuclear war countries used lasers against American intel sat s and U S has been reluctant let alone retaliate with nuc s shift in policy is a result of gray zone op s limiting escalation

PREVENTING AGGRESSION IN SPACE While deterrence and the Cold War are strongly linked in the public’s mind through the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, the fundamentals of deterrence date back millennia and deterrence remains relevant. Thucydides alludes to the concept of deterrence in his telling of the Peloponnesian War when he describes rivals seeking advantages, such as recruiting allies, to dissuade an adversary from starting or expanding a conflict.6F6 Aggression in space was successfully avoided during the Cold War because both sides viewed an attack on military satellites as highly escalatory, and such an action would likely result in general nuclear war.7F7 In today’s more nuanced world, attacking satellites, including military satellites, does not necessarily result in nuclear war. For instance, foreign countries have used high-powered lasers against American intelligence-gathering satellites8F8 and the United States has been reluctant to respond, let alone retaliate with nuclear weapons. This shift in policy is a result of the broader use of gray zone operations, to which countries struggle to respond while limiting escalation. Beginning with the fundamentals of deterrence illuminates how it applies to prevention of aggression in space.

<h4>Won’t happen. </h4><p>Dr. Eric J. <strong>Zarybnisky 18</strong>, MA in National Security Studies from the Naval War College, PhD in Operations Research from the MIT Sloan School of Management, Lt Col, USAF, “Celestial Deterrence: Deterring Aggression in the Global Commons of Space”, 3/28/2018, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/1062004.pdf</p><p>PREVENTING AGGRESSION IN SPACE</p><p>While deterrence and the Cold War are strongly linked in the public’s mind through the nuclear standoff between the United States and the Soviet Union, the fundamentals of deterrence date back millennia and deterrence remains relevant. Thucydides alludes to the concept of deterrence in his telling of the Peloponnesian War when he describes rivals seeking advantages, such as recruiting allies, to dissuade an adversary from starting or expanding a conflict.6F6 <u>Aggression in space was successfully avoided <mark>during the Cold War</mark> because <mark>both sides viewed an attack on</mark> military <strong><mark>sat</strong></mark>ellite<strong><mark>s</strong> as</mark> highly <mark>escalatory</mark>, and such an action would likely result in general nuclear war</u>.7F7 <u><mark>In today’s</mark> <strong>more <mark>nuanced</strong> world, attacking</mark> satellites, including military <strong><mark>sat</strong></mark>ellite<strong><mark>s</strong>, does <strong>not</strong></mark> necessarily <mark>result in nuclear war</mark>. For instance, foreign <mark>countries</mark> have <mark>used</mark> high-powered <mark>lasers against American intel</mark>ligence-gathering <strong><mark>sat</strong></mark>ellite<strong><mark>s</u></strong></mark>8F8 <u><mark>and</mark> the <strong><mark>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><mark>has been <strong>reluctant</mark> to respond, <mark>let alone retaliate</strong> with <strong>nuc</strong></mark>lear weapon<strong><mark>s</strong></mark>. This <strong><mark>shift in policy</strong> is a result of</mark> the broader use of <mark>gray zone <strong>op</strong></mark>eration<strong><mark>s</strong></mark>, to which countries struggle to respond while <strong><mark>limiting escalation</u></strong></mark>. Beginning with the fundamentals of deterrence illuminates how it applies to prevention of aggression in space.</p>

Case

2NC – AT: CP = Russia Freakout

./documents/ndtceda19/Michigan/SmVa/Michigan-Smith-Vance-Neg-Indiana-Round7.docx

N

Indiana

7

Dartmouth VL

Harrigan

1AC - Russia ADR 2NR - Lawfare DA