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Multilat is an impact filter for Existential threats.

Lederer 21

Lederer 21 Edith Lederer 9-11-2021 “UN chief: World is at `pivotal moment' and must avert crises” https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/un-chief-world-is-at-pivotal-moment-and-must-avert-crises/2021/09/11/ff58806c-1323-11ec-baca-86b144fc8a2d_story.html //Elmer

Guterres issued a dire warning the world is moving in the wrong direction and faces “a pivotal moment” continuing business as usual could lead to a breakdown of global order and a future of perpetual crisis the world’s nations must choose “the breakthrough scenario.” The world is under “enormous stress this extends beyond COVID to climate crisis and the collapse of biodiversity unchecked inequality undermining cohesion of societies and technology’s advances without guard rails the extreme risk from nuclear war and a climate breakdown and inequality, discrimination and injustice bringing people into the streets breakthrough is driven by working together recognizing that we are bound to each other and that no country can solve challenges alone multilateral institutions have proven to be “too weak What’s needed is more effective multilateral institutions immediate action is needed to protect the planet’s “most precious” assets from oceans to outer space and to deliver peace and good health issues go beyond traditional security threats “to strengthen global governance of tech and space to manage future risks and crises It would consider a New Agenda including measures to reduce risks from nuclear weapons cyber warfare and autonomous weapons humanity’s most destabilizing inventions.

the world faces “a pivotal moment could lead to a breakdown of global order and perpetual crisis beyond COVID to climate biod cohesion and tech without guard rails from nuc war and climate breakdown breakthrough is driven by working together no country can solve alone What’s needed is effective multilat strengthen global governance to manage crises reduce risks from nuc s, cyber and autonomous weapons

UNITED NATIONS — U.N. Secretary-General Antonio Guterres issued a dire warning that the world is moving in the wrong direction and faces “a pivotal moment” where continuing business as usual could lead to a breakdown of global order and a future of perpetual crisis. Changing course could signal a breakthrough to a greener and safer future, he said. The U.N. chief said the world’s nations and people must reverse today’s dangerous trends and choose “the breakthrough scenario.” The world is under “enormous stress” on almost every front, he said, and the COVID-19 pandemic was a wake-up call demonstrating the failure of nations to come together and take joint decisions to help all people in the face of a global life-threatening emergency. Guterres said this “paralysis” extends far beyond COVID-19 to the failures to tackle the climate crisis and “our suicidal war on nature and the collapse of biodiversity,” the “unchecked inequality” undermining the cohesion of societies, and technology’s advances “without guard rails to protect us from its unforeseen consequences.” In other signs of a more chaotic and insecure world, he pointed to rising poverty, hunger and gender inequality after decades of decline, the extreme risk to human life and the planet from nuclear war and a climate breakdown, and the inequality, discrimination and injustice bringing people into the streets to protest “while conspiracy theories and lies fuel deep divisions within societies.” In a horizon-scanning report presented to the General Assembly and at a press conference Friday, Guterres said his vision for the “breakthrough scenario” to a greener and safer world is driven by “the principle of working together, recognizing that we are bound to each other and that no community or country, however powerful, can solve its challenges alone.” The report -- “Our Common Agenda” -- is a response to last year’s declaration by world leaders on the 75th anniversary of the United Nations and the request from the assembly’s 193 member nations for the U.N. chief to make recommendations to address the challenges for global governance. In today’s world, Guterres said, “Global decision-making is fixed on immediate gain, ignoring the long-term consequences of decisions -- or indecision.” He said multilateral institutions have proven to be “too weak and fragmented for today’s global challenges and risks.” What’s needed, Guterres said, is not new multilateral bureaucracies but more effective multilateral institutions including a United Nations “2.0” more relevant to the 21st century. “And we need multilateralism with teeth,” he said. In the report outlining his vision “to fix” the world, Guterres said immediate action is needed to protect the planet’s “most precious” assets from oceans to outer space, to ensure it is livable, and to deliver on the aspirations of people everywhere for peace and good health. He called for an immediate global vaccination plan implemented by an emergency task force, saying “investing $50 billion in vaccinations now could add an estimated $9 trillion to the global economy in the next four years.” The report proposes that a global Summit of the Future take place in 2023 that would not only look at all these issues but go beyond traditional security threats “to strengthen global governance of digital technology and outer space, and to manage future risks and crises,” he said. It would also consider a New Agenda for Peace including measures to reduce strategic risks from nuclear weapons, cyber warfare and lethal autonomous weapons, which Guterres called one of humanity’s most destabilizing inventions.

<h4>Multilat is an <u>impact filter</u> for Existential threats. </h4><p><strong>Lederer 21</strong> Edith Lederer 9-11-2021 “UN chief: World is at `pivotal moment' and must avert crises” https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/un-chief-world-is-at-pivotal-moment-and-must-avert-crises/2021/09/11/ff58806c-1323-11ec-baca-86b144fc8a2d_story.html<u> //Elmer </p><p></u>UNITED NATIONS — U.N. Secretary-General Antonio <u>Guterres issued a dire warning</u> that <u><strong><mark>the world </mark>is moving in the wrong direction</u></strong> <u>and <mark>faces “a <strong>pivotal moment</strong></mark>”</u> where <u>continuing business as usual <mark>could lead to a <strong>breakdown of global order</strong> and </mark>a <strong>future of <mark>perpetual crisis</u></strong></mark>. Changing course could signal a breakthrough to a greener and safer future, he said. The U.N. chief said <u>the world’s nations</u> and people <u>must</u> reverse today’s dangerous trends and <u>choose “the breakthrough scenario.” The world is under “<strong>enormous stress</u></strong>” on almost every front, he said, and the COVID-19 pandemic was a wake-up call demonstrating the failure of nations to come together and take joint decisions to help all people in the face of a global life-threatening emergency. Guterres said <u>this</u> “paralysis” <u>extends</u> far <u><mark>beyond <strong>COVID</u></strong></mark>-19 <u><mark>to</u> </mark>the failures to tackle the <u><strong><mark>climate </mark>crisis</u></strong> and “our suicidal war on nature <u>and the <strong>collapse of <mark>biod</mark>iversity</u></strong>,” the “<u><strong>unchecked inequality</u></strong>” <u>undermining</u> the <u><strong><mark>cohesion</mark> of societies</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>and tech</mark>nology’s advances</u></strong> “<u><mark>without guard rails</u></mark> to protect us from its unforeseen consequences.” In other signs of a more chaotic and insecure world, he pointed to rising poverty, hunger and gender inequality after decades of decline, <u>the extreme risk</u> to human life and the planet <u><strong><mark>from nuc</mark>lear <mark>war and</mark> a <mark>climate breakdown</u></strong></mark>, <u>and</u> the <u>inequality, discrimination and injustice bringing people into the streets</u> to protest “while conspiracy theories and lies fuel deep divisions within societies.” In a horizon-scanning report presented to the General Assembly and at a press conference Friday, Guterres said his vision for the “<u><strong><mark>breakthrough</u></strong> </mark>scenario” to a greener and safer world <u><mark>is driven by</u> </mark>“the principle of <u><strong><mark>working together</u></strong></mark>, <u>recognizing that we are bound to each other and that <strong><mark>no</u></strong> </mark>community or <u><strong><mark>country</u></strong></mark>, however powerful, <u><strong><mark>can solve</u></strong> </mark>its <u><strong>challenges <mark>alone</u></strong></mark>.” The report -- “Our Common Agenda” -- is a response to last year’s declaration by world leaders on the 75th anniversary of the United Nations and the request from the assembly’s 193 member nations for the U.N. chief to make recommendations to address the challenges for global governance. In today’s world, Guterres said, “Global decision-making is fixed on immediate gain, ignoring the long-term consequences of decisions -- or indecision.” He said <u>multilateral institutions have proven to be “too weak</u> and fragmented for today’s global challenges and risks.” <u><mark>What’s needed</u></mark>, Guterres said, <u><mark>is</u> </mark>not new multilateral bureaucracies but <u><strong>more <mark>effective multilat</mark>eral institutions</u></strong> including a United Nations “2.0” more relevant to the 21st century. “And we need multilateralism with teeth,” he said. In the report outlining his vision “to fix” the world, Guterres said <u><strong>immediate action</strong> is needed to protect the planet’s <strong>“most precious</strong>” assets from <strong>oceans</strong> to <strong>outer space</u></strong>, to ensure it is livable, <u>and to deliver</u> on the aspirations of people everywhere for <u><strong>peace and good health</u></strong>. He called for an immediate global vaccination plan implemented by an emergency task force, saying “investing $50 billion in vaccinations now could add an estimated $9 trillion to the global economy in the next four years.” The report proposes that a global Summit of the Future take place in 2023 that would not only look at all these <u>issues</u> but <u>go beyond traditional security threats “to <mark>strengthen <strong>global governance</u></strong></mark> <u>of </u>digital <u><strong>tech</u></strong>nology <u>and</u> outer <u><strong>space</u></strong>, and <u><mark>to manage <strong></mark>future risks and <mark>crises</u></strong></mark>,” he said. <u>It would</u> also <u>consider a New Agenda</u> for Peace <u>including measures to <strong><mark>reduce</u></strong> </mark>strategic <u><strong><mark>risks from nuc</mark>lear weapon<mark>s</u></strong>, <u><strong>cyber </mark>warfare</u></strong> <u><mark>and</u> </mark>lethal <u><strong><mark>autonomous weapons</u></strong></mark>, which Guterres called one of <u>humanity’s most destabilizing inventions.</p></u>

1AC: ASEAN v2

./documents/hsld22/SanMateo/YeRa/SanMateo-YeRa-Aff-CPS-LD-Invitational-Octas.docx

A

CPS LD Invitational

Octas

Westridge TW

Lichtman, Bittner, Kilpatrick

1ac - asean 1nc - wto mfn consult cp, myanmar pic, populism da, t, case 1ar - all 2nr - wto mfn consult 2ar - case, cp

hsld22/SanMateo/YeRa/SanMateo-YeRa-Aff-CPS-LD-Invitational-Octas.docx

2023-01-13 16:17:19

YeRa

San Mateo YeRa

Ye.....

Ra.....

SanMateo

San Mateo

CA

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

ld

hs

Interpretation- Federal is not states

OED 89

OED 89 (Oxford English Dictionary, 2ed. XIX, p. 795)

political unity so constituted distinguished from separate states composing it

political unity distinguished from separate states composing it

b. Of or pertaining to the political unity so constituted, as distinguished from the separate states composing it.

<h4>Interpretation- Federal is not states</h4><p><strong>OED 89</strong> (Oxford English Dictionary, 2ed. XIX, p. 795)</p><p>b. Of or pertaining to the <u><mark>political unity</mark> so constituted</u>, as <u><mark>distinguished from</u></mark> the <u><mark>separate states composing it</u></mark>.</p>

Other Off Case

T - Federal

1NC Shell

./documents/openev/2015/SDI/Welfare Surveillance Negative - SDI 2015.docx

Ban fails – too early to understand, no verification, and states will break it if war starts.

Noyes '19

Noyes '19 [Matthew Freeman; 6/14/19; Masters of Art and Science in the Art of War from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, MPP from the Harvard Kennedy School; "Autonomous Weapons: The Future Behind Us," https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1085435.pdf]

due to the competitive and chaotic nature of the international system. Establishing effective arms control regimes is a significant challenge; national interests and military effectiveness is often the foremost concern in conflict, presenting the risk that agreements may collapse in the event of war absent demonstrated examples of the harms of a particular weapon, as was the case with land mines and chemical weapons, it is unclear whether there is sufficient political motivation to adopt an arms control agreement. Even for existing military capabilities, like offensive cyber operations, twenty years of UN discussions have resulted in only limited progress in establishing constraints on state use Beyond the first order policy question of whether there should be policy or legal constraints on the development or use of autonomous weapons, developing specific technical, verifiable, and enforceable measures to constrain development or adoption of autonomous weapons is a substantial challenge. Such an effort ought to be informed by an ex ante assessment of what is likely to exist absent such a constraint being adopted, to enable subsequent assessment of the effectiveness of a control regime. Therefore, this work limits the scope of the analysis to likely potential military uses of autonomous weapons in the absence of effective ethical, policy, or legal constraints.

due to competitive nature of international system effective arms control is a significant challenge military effectiveness is the foremost concern in conflict, presenting risk agreements collapse in the event of war absent demonstrated examples of the harms it is unclear whether there is political motivation to agree Even for existing capabilities years of discussions resulted in limited progress Beyond whether there should be constraints on autonomous weapons, developing specific technical, verifiable, and enforceable measures is a substantial challenge effort ought to be informed by ex ante assessment of what is likely to exist to enable effectiveness of a control regime

This delimitation is reasonable due to the competitive and chaotic nature of the international system. Establishing effective arms control regimes is a significant challenge; national interests and military effectiveness is often the foremost concern in conflict, presenting the risk that agreements may collapse in the event of war.8 Moreover, absent demonstrated examples of the harms of a particular weapon, as was the case with land mines and chemical weapons, it is unclear whether there is sufficient political motivation to adopt an arms control agreement. Even for existing military capabilities, like offensive cyber operations, twenty years of UN discussions have resulted in only limited progress in establishing constraints on state use.9 Beyond the first order policy question of whether there should be policy or legal constraints on the development or use of autonomous weapons, developing specific technical, verifiable, and enforceable measures to constrain development or adoption of autonomous weapons is a substantial challenge. Such an effort ought to be informed by an ex ante assessment of what is likely to exist absent such a constraint being adopted, to enable subsequent assessment of the effectiveness of a control regime. Therefore, this work limits the scope of the analysis to likely potential military uses of autonomous weapons in the absence of effective ethical, policy, or legal constraints.

<h4>Ban fails – too early to understand, no verification, and states will break it if war starts.</h4><p><strong>Noyes '19 </strong>[Matthew Freeman; 6/14/19; Masters of Art and Science in the Art of War from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, MPP from the Harvard Kennedy School; "Autonomous Weapons: The Future Behind Us," https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1085435.pdf]</p><p>This delimitation is reasonable <u><mark>due to</mark> the <strong><mark>competitive</strong></mark> and <strong>chaotic</strong> <mark>nature of</mark> the <mark>international system</mark>. Establishing <mark>effective <strong>arms control</strong></mark> regimes <mark>is a <strong>significant challenge</strong></mark>; <strong>national interests</strong> and <strong><mark>military effectiveness</strong> is</mark> often <mark>the <strong>foremost concern</strong> in conflict, presenting</mark> the <mark>risk</mark> that <strong><mark>agreements</mark> may <mark>collapse in the event of war</u></strong></mark>.8 Moreover, <u><mark>absent <strong>demonstrated examples</strong> of the harms</mark> of a particular weapon, as was the case with <strong>land mines</strong> and <strong>chemical weapons</strong>, <mark>it is <strong>unclear</strong> whether there is</mark> sufficient <strong><mark>political motivation</strong> to</mark> adopt an arms control <mark>agree</mark>ment. <mark>Even for existing</mark> military <mark>capabilities</mark>, like <strong>o</strong>ffensive <strong>c</strong>yber <strong>o</strong>peration<strong>s</strong>, twenty <mark>years of</mark> UN <mark>discussions</mark> have <mark>resulted in</mark> only <strong><mark>limited progress</strong></mark> in establishing <strong>constraints</strong> on state use</u>.9</p><p><u><mark>Beyond</mark> the first order <strong>policy question</strong> of <mark>whether there <strong>should</strong> be</mark> policy or legal <strong><mark>constraints</strong> on</mark> the development or use of <strong><mark>autonomous weapons</strong>, developing <strong>specific</strong> <strong>technical</strong>, <strong>verifiable</strong>, and <strong>enforceable</strong> measures</mark> to constrain development or adoption of autonomous weapons <mark>is a <strong>substantial challenge</strong></mark>. Such an <mark>effort ought to be informed by</mark> an <strong><mark>ex ante assessment</strong> of what is likely to exist</mark> absent such a constraint being adopted, <mark>to enable</mark> <strong>subsequent assessment</strong> of the <strong><mark>effectiveness</strong> of a <strong>control regime</mark>. Therefore, this work limits the scope of the analysis to likely potential military uses of autonomous weapons in the absence of effective ethical, policy, or legal constraints.</p></u></strong>

Solvency

NC – Ban Fails

./documents/hsld20/Harker/Sh/Harker-Shah-Neg-Peninsula-Round2.docx

N

Peninsula

2

West Ranch KT

Vanessa Nguyen

1AC - Whole Rez 1NC - DA-Dictators DA-Hegemony 2NR - Hegemony

hsld20/Harker/Sh/Harker-Shah-Neg-Peninsula-Round2.docx

DeSh

Harker DeSh

De.....

Sh.....

Harker

Harker

CA

hsld20

HS LD 2020-21

ld

hs

Attacks on LAWs threaten weapon capabilities, accurate info, and national security

Heinl 17

Heinl 17 Caitríona Heinl (Executive Strategist/Lead Strategist for Asia Pacific), 10-9-2017, “Maturing autonomous cyber weapons systems: Implications for international security cyber and autonomous weapons systems regimes,” Oxford Handbook of Cyber Security, Oxford University Press, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3255104, SJBE

The increasing reliance on AI for autonomous decision-making is increasing the number of new vulnerabilities to cyber attacks Moreover, there is a risk that AI systems are susceptible to tactics that are not necessarily easy to predict, and the compromising of automated systems may allow for disruption to critical infrastructure or national security networks. In other words, the purpose of winning ‘cyber supremacy’ over an opponent could be to ensure that these physical platforms or systems could be shut down or controlled.85 Thus, a key question is whether increasing autonomy could drive the development of cyber weapons in order to exploit the vulnerability of AWS.86 Information might even be intercepted, or possibly manipulated The fear is that it will become increasingly difficult to guarantee the accuracy and reliability of data. This might mean that decision-making will be affected, that trust in systems may decline, or that there may even be adverse physical effects Experts note the challenge in ensuring against reliability and vulnerability problems in autonomous weapons software, “cautioning that failure could lead to unintended fatalities” - false or missing software requirements, incorrect algorithms or code, insufficient testing, incorrect or unexpected use of software, and possible vulnerabilities to cyber attacks could expose systems to risk.

compromising of automated systems may allow for disruption to critical infrastructure or national security networks winning ‘cyber supremacy’ could ensure systems could be shut down or controlled Information might be manipulated it will become increasingly difficult to guarantee the reliability of data. decision-making will be affected trust in systems may decline failure could lead to unintended fatalities

The increasing reliance on AI for autonomous decision-making is increasing the number of new vulnerabilities to cyber attacks.80 This is also exacerbating those difficulties already associated with attribution. The 2016 ODNI Worldwide Threat Assessment Report explains that such increased use of AI means “increased vulnerability to cyber attack, difficulty in ascertaining attribution, facilitation of advances in foreign weapon and intelligence systems, the risk of accidents and related liability issues, and unemployment”.81 Moreover, there is a risk that AI systems are susceptible to tactics that are not necessarily easy to predict, and the compromising of automated systems may allow for disruption to critical infrastructure or national security networks.82 In the case of maturing autonomous technologies, in some quarters, these are expected to replace remotely piloted air and ground vehicles in the domains of air, sea, undersea, land and space. 83 As a result, the vulnerability of their underlying systems to cyber attack is particularly significant as it may become more difficult to protect these systems. Such technologies could be taken over so that cyber may become the “high ground”.84 In other words, the purpose of winning ‘cyber supremacy’ over an opponent could be to ensure that these physical platforms or systems could be shut down or controlled.85 Thus, a key question is whether increasing autonomy could drive the development of cyber weapons in order to exploit the vulnerability of AWS.86 Information might even be intercepted, or possibly manipulated. A plethora of information assurance issues may then arise too, such as how to be certain of the integrity of data. In situations where decisions are increasingly informed by advanced computer systems, it is essential that the information presented is accurate. There is a growing concern within the cyber community currently over the danger associated with data manipulation. The fear is that it will become increasingly difficult to guarantee the accuracy and reliability of data. This might mean that decision-making will be affected, that trust in systems may decline, or that there may even be adverse physical effects.87 While AWS (both physical platforms and cyber systems) are vulnerable to cyber operations, at face value this may seem no different to other fields or technologies. However, there is a difference insofar as there could be a case for limits on these technologies if the consequences of AWS and a cyber operation on such a system(s) are not yet fully understood. The ICRC similarly argues that a key concern about the interaction between cyber operations and AWS is how to maintain human control with the possibility of cyber attack – in other words, these systems may be manipulated which is why there may be good cause for limits to autonomy.88 This means that technical safeguards are extremely important. Experts note the challenge in ensuring against reliability and vulnerability problems in autonomous weapons software, “cautioning that failure could lead to unintended fatalities” - false or missing software requirements, incorrect algorithms or code, insufficient testing, incorrect or unexpected use of software, and possible vulnerabilities to cyber attacks could expose systems to risk.89

<h4>Attacks on LAWs threaten weapon capabilities, accurate info, and national security</h4><p><strong>Heinl 17 </strong>Caitríona Heinl (Executive Strategist/Lead Strategist for Asia Pacific), 10-9-2017, “Maturing autonomous cyber weapons systems: Implications for international security cyber and autonomous weapons systems regimes,” Oxford Handbook of Cyber Security, Oxford University Press, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3255104, SJBE</p><p><u>The increasing reliance on AI for autonomous decision-making is increasing the number of new vulnerabilities to cyber attacks</u>.80 This is also exacerbating those difficulties already associated with attribution. The 2016 ODNI Worldwide Threat Assessment Report explains that such increased use of AI means “increased vulnerability to cyber attack, difficulty in ascertaining attribution, facilitation of advances in foreign weapon and intelligence systems, the risk of accidents and related liability issues, and unemployment”.81 <u>Moreover, there is a risk that AI systems are susceptible to tactics that are not necessarily easy to predict, and the <mark>compromising of automated systems may allow for disruption to critical infrastructure or national security networks</mark>.</u>82 In the case of maturing autonomous technologies, in some quarters, these are expected to replace remotely piloted air and ground vehicles in the domains of air, sea, undersea, land and space. 83 As a result, the vulnerability of their underlying systems to cyber attack is particularly significant as it may become more difficult to protect these systems. Such technologies could be taken over so that cyber may become the “high ground”.84 <u>In other words, the purpose of <mark>winning ‘cyber supremacy’ </mark>over an opponent <mark>could</mark> be to <mark>ensure</mark> that these physical platforms or <mark>systems could be shut down or controlled</mark>.85 Thus, a key question is whether increasing autonomy could drive the development of cyber weapons in order to exploit the vulnerability of AWS.86 <mark>Information might</mark> even <mark>be </mark>intercepted, or possibly <mark>manipulated</u></mark>. A plethora of information assurance issues may then arise too, such as how to be certain of the integrity of data. In situations where decisions are increasingly informed by advanced computer systems, it is essential that the information presented is accurate. There is a growing concern within the cyber community currently over the danger associated with data manipulation. <u>The fear is that <mark>it will become increasingly difficult to guarantee the</mark> accuracy and <mark>reliability of data. </mark>This might mean that <mark>decision-making will be affected</mark>, that <mark>trust in systems may decline</mark>, or that there may even be adverse physical effects</u>.87 While AWS (both physical platforms and cyber systems) are vulnerable to cyber operations, at face value this may seem no different to other fields or technologies. However, there is a difference insofar as there could be a case for limits on these technologies if the consequences of AWS and a cyber operation on such a system(s) are not yet fully understood. The ICRC similarly argues that a key concern about the interaction between cyber operations and AWS is how to maintain human control with the possibility of cyber attack – in other words, these systems may be manipulated which is why there may be good cause for limits to autonomy.88 This means that technical safeguards are extremely important. <u>Experts note the challenge in ensuring against reliability and vulnerability problems in autonomous weapons software, “cautioning that <mark>failure could lead to unintended fatalities</mark>” - false or missing software requirements, incorrect algorithms or code, insufficient testing, incorrect or unexpected use of software, and possible vulnerabilities to cyber attacks could expose systems to risk.</u>89</p>

Advantage

./documents/hsld20/StrakeJesuit/At/Strake%20Jesuit-Atkins-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round2.docx

A

Golden Desert

2

Iowa City West JS

William Phong

1AC - stock 1NC - truth testing contracts nc poaching pic case 1AR - case truth testing contracts nc poaching pic 2NR - truth testing contracts nc case 2AR - case truth testing contracts nc

hsld20/StrakeJesuit/At/Strake%20Jesuit-Atkins-Aff-Golden%20Desert-Round2.docx

AiAt

Strake Jesuit AiAt

Ai.....

At.....

StrakeJesuit

Strake Jesuit

TX

hsld20

HS LD 2020-21

ld

hs

We’ll defend normal means as the signatories of the OST adding an optional protocol under Article II.

Tronchetti 7

Tronchetti 7[Fabio Tronchetti is a professor at the International Institute of Air and Space Law, Leiden University, The Netherlands, 2007, https://iislweb.org/docs/Diederiks2007.pdf, 12-15-2021 amrita]

The legal content of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty is one of the most debated and analysed topic in the field of space law ”. The text of Article II represents the final point of a process, formally initiated with Resolution 1721, aimed at conferring to outer space the status of res communis omnium, namely a thing open for the free exploration and use by all States without the possibility of being appropriated , Article II makes clear that the customary procedures of international law allowing subjects to obtain sovereignty rights over un-owed lands, namely discovery, occupatio and effective possession, do not apply to outer space the question of whether both States and private individuals are subjected to the provisions of Article II. Indeed, while Article II forbids expressis verbis the national appropriation by claims of sovereignty, by means of use and occupation or other means of outer space, it does not make any explicit mention to its private appropriation some authors have argued that the private appropriation of outer space and celestial bodies is allowed. The same argument is used today by the enterprises selling extraterrestrial acres. They base their claim to the Moon and other celestial bodies on the consideration that Article II does not explicitly forbid private individuals and enterprises to claim, exploit or appropriate the celestial bodies for profit there is a general consensus on the fact that both national appropriation and private property rights are denied under the Outer Space Treaty Private entities are allowed to carry out space activities but, according to Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, they must be authorized to conduct such activities by the appropriate State of nationality. But if the State is prohibited from engaging in certain conduct, then it lacks the authority to license its nationals or other entities subject to its jurisdiction to engage in that prohibited activity the prohibition of national appropriation implies prohibition of private appropriation because the latter cannot exist independently from the former10. In order to exist, indeed, private property requires a superior authority to enforce it, be in the form of a State or some other recognised entity Moreover, it is possible to use some historical elements to support the argument that both the acquisition of State sovereignty and the creation of private property rights are forbidden by the words of Article II. . Thus, summing up, we may say that prohibition of appropriation of outer space and its parts is a rule which is valid for both private and public entity. The theory that private operators are not subject to this rule represents a myth that is not supported by any valid legal argument. Therefore, the need to protect the non-appropriative nature of outer space emerges in all its relevance.

The text of Article II represents free exploration without the possibility of being appropriated makes clear that i law allowing sovereignty rights over un-owed lands do not apply to space. while Article II forbids appropriation by sovereignty it does not a mention to private both national appropriation and private are denied Private entities are allowed to carry out activities but must be authorized by the State the prohibition of national implies prohibition of private prohibition of appropriation of outer space is valid for both private and public entity the need to protect the non-appropriative nature o space emerges

ARTICLE II OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY: A MATTER OF DEBATE The legal content of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty is one of the most debated and analysed topic in the field of space law. Indeed, several interpretations have been put forward to explain the meaning of its provisions. Article II states that: “Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means”. The text of Article II represents the final point of a process, formally initiated with Resolution 1721, aimed at conferring to outer space the status of res communis omnium, namely a thing open for the free exploration and use by all States without the possibility of being appropriated. By prohibiting the possibility of making territorial claims over outer space or any part thereof based on use or occupation, Article II makes clear that the customary procedures of international law allowing subjects to obtain sovereignty rights over un-owed lands, namely discovery, occupatio and effective possession, do not apply to outer space. This prohibition was considered by the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty the best guarantee for preserving outer space for peaceful activities only and for stimulating the exploration and use of the space environment in the name of all mankind. What has been the object of controversy among legal scholars is the question of whether both States and private individuals are subjected to the provisions of Article II. Indeed, while Article II forbids expressis verbis the national appropriation by claims of sovereignty, by means of use and occupation or other means of outer space, it does not make any explicit mention to its private appropriation. Relying on this consideration, some authors have argued that the private appropriation of outer space and celestial bodies is allowed. For instance, in 1968 Gorove wrote: “Thus, at present an individual acting on his own behalf or on behalf of another individual or private association or an international organisation could lawfully appropriate any parts of outer space…”6 . The same argument is used today by the enterprises selling extraterrestrial acres. They base their claim to the Moon and other celestial bodies on the consideration that Article II does not explicitly forbid private individuals and enterprises to claim, exploit or appropriate the celestial bodies for profit7 . However, it must be said, that nowadays there is a general consensus on the fact that both national appropriation and private property rights are denied under the Outer Space Treaty. Several way of reasoning have been advanced to support this view. Sters and Tennen affirm that the argument that Article II does not apply to private entities since they are not expressly mentioned fails for the reason that they do not need to be explicitly listed in Article II to be fully subject to the non-appropriation principle8 . Private entities are allowed to carry out space activities but, according to Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, they must be authorized to conduct such activities by the appropriate State of nationality. But if the State is prohibited from engaging in certain conduct, then it lacks the authority to license its nationals or other entities subject to its jurisdiction to engage in that prohibited activity. Jenks argues that “States bear international responsibility for national activities in space; it follows that what is forbidden to a State is not permitted to a chartered company created by a State or to one of its nationals acting as a private adventurer”9 . It has been also suggested that the prohibition of national appropriation implies prohibition of private appropriation because the latter cannot exist independently from the former10. In order to exist, indeed, private property requires a superior authority to enforce it, be in the form of a State or some other recognised entity. In outer space, however, this practice of State endorsement is forbidden. Should a State recognise or protect the territorial acquisitions of any of its subjects, this would constitute a form of national appropriation in violation of Article II. Moreover, it is possible to use some historical elements to support the argument that both the acquisition of State sovereignty and the creation of private property rights are forbidden by the words of Article II. During the negotiations of the Outer Space Treaty, the Delegate of Belgium affirmed that his delegation “had taken note of the interpretation of the non-appropriation advanced by several delegations-apparently without contradiction-as covering both the establishment of sovereignty and the creation of titles to property in private law”11. The French Delegate stated that: “…there was reason to be satisfied that three basic principles were affirmed, namely: the prohibition of any claim of sovereignty or property rights in space…”12. The fact that the accessions to the Outer Space Treaty were not accompanied by reservations or interpretations of the meaning of Article II, it is an evidence of the fact that this issue was considered to be settled during the negotiation phase. Thus, summing up, we may say that prohibition of appropriation of outer space and its parts is a rule which is valid for both private and public entity. The theory that private operators are not subject to this rule represents a myth that is not supported by any valid legal argument. Moreover, it can be also added that if any subject was allowed to appropriate parts of outer space, the basic aim of the drafters of the Treaty, namely to prevent a colonial competition in outer space and to create the conditions and premises for an exploration and use of outer space carried out for the benefit of all States, would be betrayed. Therefore, the need to protect the non-appropriative nature of outer space emerges in all its relevance.

<h4>We’ll defend normal means as the signatories of the OST adding an optional protocol under Article II.</h4><p><u><strong>Tronchetti 7</u></strong>[Fabio Tronchetti is a professor at the International Institute of Air and Space Law, Leiden University, The Netherlands, 2007, https://iislweb.org/docs/Diederiks2007.pdf<u>, 12-15-2021 amrita]</p><p></u>ARTICLE II OF THE OUTER SPACE TREATY: A MATTER OF DEBATE <u>The legal content of Article II of the Outer Space Treaty is one of the most debated and analysed topic in the field of space law</u>. Indeed, several interpretations have been put forward to explain the meaning of its provisions. Article II states that: “Outer space, including the Moon and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means<u>”. <strong><mark>The text of Article II represents</strong> </mark>the final point of a process, formally initiated with Resolution 1721, aimed at conferring to outer space the status of res communis omnium, namely a thing open for the <strong><mark>free exploration</strong> </mark>and use by all States <strong><mark>without the possibility of being appropriated</u></strong></mark>. By prohibiting the possibility of making territorial claims over outer space or any part thereof based on use or occupation<u>, Article II <strong><mark>makes clear that</strong> </mark>the customary procedures of <strong><mark>i</strong></mark>nternational <strong><mark>law allowing</strong> </mark>subjects to obtain <strong><mark>sovereignty rights over un-owed lands</strong></mark>, namely discovery, occupatio and effective possession, <strong><mark>do not apply to</strong> </mark>outer <strong><mark>space</u>.</strong> </mark>This prohibition was considered by the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty the best guarantee for preserving outer space for peaceful activities only and for stimulating the exploration and use of the space environment in the name of all mankind. What has been the object of controversy among legal scholars is <u>the question of whether both States and private individuals are subjected to the provisions of Article II. Indeed, <strong><mark>while Article II forbids</strong> </mark>expressis verbis the national <strong><mark>appropriation by</strong></mark> claims of <strong><mark>sovereignty</strong></mark>, by means of use and occupation or other means of outer space, <strong><mark>it does not</strong> </mark>make <strong><mark>a</strong></mark>ny explicit <strong><mark>mention</strong> <strong>to</strong></mark> its <strong><mark>private</strong></mark> appropriation</u>. Relying on this consideration, <u>some authors have argued that the private appropriation of outer space and celestial bodies is allowed.</u> For instance, in 1968 Gorove wrote: “Thus, at present an individual acting on his own behalf or on behalf of another individual or private association or an international organisation could lawfully appropriate any parts of outer space…”6 . <u>The same argument is used today by the enterprises selling extraterrestrial acres. They base their claim to the Moon and other celestial bodies on the consideration that Article II does not explicitly forbid private individuals and enterprises to claim, exploit or appropriate the celestial bodies for profit</u>7 . However, it must be said, that nowadays <u>there is a general consensus on the fact that <strong><mark>both national appropriation and private</strong> </mark>property rights <strong><mark>are denied</strong></mark> under the Outer Space Treaty</u>. Several way of reasoning have been advanced to support this view. Sters and Tennen affirm that the argument that Article II does not apply to private entities since they are not expressly mentioned fails for the reason that they do not need to be explicitly listed in Article II to be fully subject to the non-appropriation principle8 . <u><strong><mark>Private entities are allowed to carry out</strong> </mark>space <strong><mark>activities but</strong></mark>, according to Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, they <strong><mark>must be authorized</strong> </mark>to conduct such activities <strong><mark>by the</strong> </mark>appropriate <strong><mark>State</strong></mark> of nationality. But if the State is prohibited from engaging in certain conduct, then it lacks the authority to license its nationals or other entities subject to its jurisdiction to engage in that prohibited activity</u>. Jenks argues that “States bear international responsibility for national activities in space; it follows that what is forbidden to a State is not permitted to a chartered company created by a State or to one of its nationals acting as a private adventurer”9 . It has been also suggested that <u><strong><mark>the prohibition of national</strong> </mark>appropriation <strong><mark>implies prohibition of private</strong> </mark>appropriation because the latter cannot exist independently from the former10. In order to exist, indeed, private property requires a superior authority to enforce it, be in the form of a State or some other recognised entity</u>. In outer space, however, this practice of State endorsement is forbidden. Should a State recognise or protect the territorial acquisitions of any of its subjects, this would constitute a form of national appropriation in violation of Article II. <u>Moreover, it is possible to use some historical elements to support the argument that both the acquisition of State sovereignty and the creation of private property rights are forbidden by the words of Article II.</u> During the negotiations of the Outer Space Treaty, the Delegate of Belgium affirmed that his delegation “had taken note of the interpretation of the non-appropriation advanced by several delegations-apparently without contradiction-as covering both the establishment of sovereignty and the creation of titles to property in private law”11. The French Delegate stated that: “…there was reason to be satisfied that three basic principles were affirmed, namely: the prohibition of any claim of sovereignty or property rights in space…”12. The fact that the accessions to the Outer Space Treaty were not accompanied by reservations or interpretations of the meaning of Article II, it is an evidence of the fact that this issue was considered to be settled during the negotiation phase<u>. Thus, summing up, we may say that <strong><mark>prohibition of appropriation of outer space</strong> </mark>and its parts is a rule which <strong><mark>is valid for both private and public entity</strong></mark>. The theory that private operators are not subject to this rule represents a myth that is not supported by any valid legal argument.</u> Moreover, it can be also added that if any subject was allowed to appropriate parts of outer space, the basic aim of the drafters of the Treaty, namely to prevent a colonial competition in outer space and to create the conditions and premises for an exploration and use of outer space carried out for the benefit of all States, would be betrayed. <u>Therefore, <strong><mark>the need to protect the non-appropriative nature o</strong></mark>f outer <strong><mark>space emerges</strong> </mark>in all its relevance.</p></u>

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2. Challenges---A federal PTD creates a path to challenge federal, state and private actors increasing emissions as failing to protect water resources. Solves emissions.

Kelly ’19

Kelly ’19 — Carolyn Kelly, Assistant District Counsel at the New York District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, J.D., NYU School of Law, B.A. from the University of Chicago; (2019; “ARTICLE: WHERE THE WATER MEETS THE SKY: HOW AN UNBROKEN LINE OF PRECEDENT FROM JUSTINIAN TO JULIANA SUPPORTS THE POSSIBILITY OF A FEDERAL ATMOSPHERIC PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE”; University of Michigan Libraries, Nexus Uni; New York University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 27; //LFS—JCM)

courts will continue to define the scope and applicability of the public trust doctrine as Juliana and its sister atmospheric public trust cases advance in the federal courts Modern science has shown a clear connection between air and water quality science has shown a connection between increased atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and warmer oceans and navigable waters ocean acidity and lower oxygen levels Elevated levels of greenhouse gases have been directly linked to public resources held in trust by the federal government Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands have been devastated by stronger storms made more probable by a warmer wetter world These territories' navigable waters held in trust by the federal government have been threatened by the risk of flooding traditional public trust uses including navigation and fishing have been compromised by the storm greenhouse gases also raise the temperature of the territorial seas affecting the fish population at every stage of the life cycle This puts stress on deep sea fisheries at a time when stocks are already falling Climate change is threatening the most traditional of public trust uses the federal government is the sovereign and trustee of the territorial seas with a responsibility to preserve the seas in trust for the people When considering air within the public trust the connection between air and navigable waters and other public trust resources and federal authority over trust resources in the U.S. territories and territorial seas points to the existence of a federal atmospheric public trust plaintiffs have fleshed out the nexus between water and sky between aquatic public trust resources and the atmosphere concentration of CO2 and methane in the atmosphere has endangered the water they drink and the fish they eat we cannot safeguard the aquatic public trust without protecting the atmospheric public trust This connection between the aquatic and the atmospheric public trust has also laid the groundwork for other plaintiffs industry might sue federal or state government agencies for failing to restrain the fossil fuel industry They could credibly argue concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere acidify the ocean decimating oysters crabs mussels and any sea creature fishing could argue that warming air leads to warming waters which threatens fish stocks communities hit by hurricanes could sue federal or state governments for failing to rein in the fossil fuel industry can point to science showing that rising atmospheric temperatures lead to high ocean surface temperatures which fuel destructive hurricanes They can trace the damage to waterways as storm surge and inland flooding causes the sewers to overrun and the manure lagoons to overflow fouling surface waters and threatening supply of drinking water and fresh water fish

science has shown a connection between increased g h g s and warmer navigable waters levels of gases have been linked to public resources held in trust by the federal government territories' waters held by the fed been threatened by flooding the connection between air waters and federal authority points to a federal atmospheric trust CO2 and methane endangered water This has laid the groundwork for plaintiffs sue state s for failing to restrain the fossil industry They can trace damage to supply of water

The courts will certainly continue to define the scope and applicability of the public trust doctrine as Juliana and its sister atmospheric public trust cases advance or are dismissed in the federal and state courts. There are no easy answers when it comes [*237] to the public trust doctrine, but history, science, and law point to the possibility of including air within a federal public trust doctrine. Air has been included as a public trust resource since the time of the Institute of Justinian, 410 and U.S. courts have treated it as a public resource. 411 Modern science, which has shaped the evolution of the public trust doctrine in this country, has shown a clear connection between air and water quality. Specifically, science has shown a connection between increased atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases and warmer oceans and navigable waters, greater ocean acidity, and lower oxygen levels. 412 Elevated levels of greenhouse gases have also been directly linked to compromises in public resources held in trust by the federal government. 413 Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands have been devastated by stronger storms made more probable by a warmer, wetter world. 414 These territories' navigable waters, which are held in trust by the federal government for the benefit of the people and potential future states, have been threatened by the risk of flooding of superfund sites. 415 Additionally, traditional public trust uses including navigation and fishing have been compromised by the storm. 416 Elevated levels of greenhouse gases also raise the temperature of the territorial seas, affecting the fish population at every stage of the life cycle. 417 This puts additional stress on deep sea fisheries at a time when fish stocks are already falling. 418 Climate change is threatening one of the most traditional of public trust uses - the right to fish the seas. 419 In this scenario, the federal government is [*238] the sovereign and trustee of the territorial seas, with a concomitant responsibility to preserve the seas in trust for the people. 420 When considering these issues together - the traditional inclusion of air within the public trust, the connection between air and navigable waters and other well-established public trust resources, and federal authority over trust resources in the U.S. territories and territorial seas - points to the existence of a federal atmospheric public trust. With the retirement of Justice Kennedy from the Supreme Court, it is difficult to know whether the plaintiffs will prevail if their case is appealed all the way to the Supreme Court. But they have, in any case, fleshed out the nexus between water and sky, between aquatic public trust resources and the atmosphere. 421 They have shown how the concentration of CO2 and methane in the atmosphere has endangered the water they drink and the fish they eat. 422 They have shown that we cannot safeguard the aquatic public trust without protecting the atmospheric public trust. 423 This connection between the aquatic and the atmospheric public trust has also laid the groundwork for other plaintiffs. For example, the fishing industry might sue federal or state government agencies for failing to restrain the fossil fuel industry. They could credibly argue that high concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere acidify the ocean, decimating oysters, crabs, mussels, and any sea creature that grows a shell. Similarly, the fishing industry could argue that warming air leads to warming waters, which threatens already faltering fish stocks. Furthermore, communities hit by hurricanes could sue federal or state governments for failing to rein in the fossil fuel industry. These communities can now point to emerging science showing [*239] that rising atmospheric temperatures lead to high ocean surface temperatures, which fuel more powerful and destructive hurricanes. 424 They can trace the damage to their waterways, as storm surge and inland flooding causes the sewers to overrun and the manure lagoons to overflow, fouling surface waters and threatening the supply of drinking water and fresh water fish.

<h4>2. <u>Challenges</u>---A <u>federal</u> PTD creates a <u>path</u> to challenge <u>federal</u>, <u>state</u> and <u>private actors</u> increasing emissions as failing to <u>protect water resources</u>. Solves emissions.</h4><p><strong>Kelly ’19</strong> — Carolyn Kelly, Assistant District Counsel at the New York District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, J.D., NYU School of Law, B.A. from the University of Chicago; (2019; “ARTICLE: WHERE THE WATER MEETS THE SKY: HOW AN UNBROKEN LINE OF PRECEDENT FROM JUSTINIAN TO JULIANA SUPPORTS THE POSSIBILITY OF A FEDERAL ATMOSPHERIC PUBLIC TRUST DOCTRINE”; University of Michigan Libraries, Nexus Uni; New York University Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 27; //LFS—JCM)</p><p>The <u>courts will</u> certainly <u>continue to</u> <u>define the scope</u> <u>and applicability</u> <u>of the <strong>public trust doctrine</u></strong> <u>as Juliana</u> <u>and its sister</u> <u>atmospheric public trust</u> <u>cases <strong>advance</u></strong> or are dismissed <u>in the federal</u> and state <u>courts</u>. There are no easy answers when it comes [*237] to the public trust doctrine, but history, science, and law point to the possibility of including air within a federal public trust doctrine. Air has been included as a public trust resource since the time of the Institute of Justinian, 410 and U.S. courts have treated it as a public resource. 411 <u>Modern <mark>science</u></mark>, which has shaped the evolution of the public trust doctrine in this country, <u><mark>has shown a</mark> <strong>clear <mark>connection</strong> between</u></mark> <u><strong>air and water</strong> quality</u>. Specifically, <u>science has shown</u> <u>a connection</u> <u>between</u> <u><mark>increased</u></mark> <u>atmospheric concentrations</u> <u>of <strong><mark>g</mark>reen<mark>h</mark>ouse <mark>g</mark>ase<mark>s</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>and</mark> <strong><mark>warmer</mark> oceans</u></strong> <u>and <mark>navigable waters</u></mark>, greater <u><strong>ocean acidity</u></strong>, <u>and lower <strong>oxygen levels</u></strong>. 412</p><p><u>Elevated <mark>levels</u> <u>of</mark> greenhouse <mark>gases</u> <u>have</u></mark> also <u><mark>been</mark> directly <mark>linked</u> <u>to</u></mark> compromises in <u><strong><mark>public resources</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>held in trust</u></mark> <u><mark>by the</u></mark> <u><mark>federal government</u></mark>. 413 <u><strong>Puerto Rico</strong> and the</u> U.S. <u><strong>Virgin Islands</u></strong> <u>have been</u> <u>devastated by <strong>stronger storms</u></strong> <u>made more probable</u> <u>by a warmer</u>, <u>wetter world</u>. 414 <u>These <mark>territories'</u></mark> <u>navigable <mark>waters</u></mark>, which are <u><mark>held</mark> in trust <mark>by</u> <u>the</mark> <strong><mark>fed</mark>eral government</u></strong> for the benefit of the people and potential future states, <u>have <mark>been threatened</u> <u>by</mark> the <strong>risk of <mark>flooding</u></strong></mark> of superfund sites. 415 Additionally, <u>traditional public trust uses</u> <u>including <strong>navigation and fishing</u></strong> <u>have been</u> <u>compromised by the</u> <u>storm</u>. 416</p><p>Elevated levels of <u><strong>greenhouse gases</u></strong> <u>also raise the</u> <u>temperature of the</u> <u>territorial seas</u>, <u><strong>affecting the fish population</u></strong> <u>at every stage</u> <u>of the life cycle</u>. 417 <u>This puts</u> additional <u>stress on deep sea</u> <u>fisheries at a time when</u> fish <u>stocks are already falling</u>. 418 <u>Climate change</u> <u>is threatening</u> one of <u>the most</u> <u>traditional of</u> <u><strong>public trust uses</u></strong> - the right to fish the seas. 419 In this scenario, <u>the <strong>federal</strong> government is</u> [*238] <u>the sovereign and</u> <u><strong>trustee of the territorial seas</u></strong>, <u>with a</u> concomitant <u>responsibility to preserve</u> <u>the <strong>seas in trust</u></strong> <u>for the people</u>. 420</p><p><u>When considering</u> these issues together - the traditional inclusion of <u>air within</u> <u>the public trust</u>, <u><mark>the connection</u></mark> <u><mark>between <strong>air </mark>and navigable <mark>waters</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>and</mark> other</u> well-established <u><strong>public trust resources</u></strong>, <u>and <mark>federal authority</u></mark> <u>over trust resources</u> <u>in the U.S.</u> <u>territories and</u> <u>territorial seas</u> - <u><mark>points to</mark> the existence</u> <u>of <mark>a <strong>federal</mark> <mark>atmospheric</mark> public <mark>trust</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>With the retirement of Justice Kennedy from the Supreme Court, it is difficult to know whether the <u>plaintiffs</u> will prevail if their case is appealed all the way to the Supreme Court. But they <u>have</u>, in any case, <u>fleshed out the</u> <u><strong>nexus between water and sky</u></strong>, <u>between aquatic</u> <u><strong>public trust resources</u></strong> <u>and the <strong>atmosphere</u></strong>. 421 They have shown how the <u>concentration of</u> <u><strong><mark>CO2 and methane</u></strong></mark> <u>in the atmosphere</u> <u>has <mark>endangered</mark> the <mark>water</u></mark> <u>they drink and</u> <u>the fish they eat</u>. 422 They have shown that <u>we cannot safeguard</u> <u>the aquatic</u> <u>public trust</u> <u>without protecting</u> <u>the <strong>atmospheric public trust</u></strong>. 423</p><p><u><mark>This</u></mark> <u>connection</u> <u>between</u> <u>the aquatic</u> <u>and the</u> <u>atmospheric public trust</u> <u><mark>has</mark> also <strong><mark>laid the groundwork</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>for</mark> other <mark>plaintiffs</u></mark>. For example, the fishing <u>industry might</u> <u><mark>sue</mark> <strong>federal or <mark>state</mark> government</u></strong> <u>agencie<mark>s</mark> <mark>for failing</u> <u>to</mark> <mark>restrain</u></mark> <u><mark>the</mark> <strong><mark>fossil</mark> fuel <mark>industry</u></strong></mark>. <u>They could</u> <u>credibly argue</u> that high <u>concentrations of CO2</u> <u>in the atmosphere</u> <u><strong>acidify the ocean</u></strong>, <u>decimating</u> <u>oysters</u>, <u>crabs</u>, <u>mussels</u>, <u>and <strong>any sea creature</u></strong> that grows a shell. Similarly, the <u>fishing</u> industry <u>could argue that</u> <u><strong>warming air</strong> leads</u> <u>to <strong>warming waters</u></strong>, <u>which threatens</u> already faltering <u>fish stocks</u>.</p><p>Furthermore, <u>communities hit by hurricanes could</u> <u><strong>sue federal or state governments</u></strong> <u>for failing to rein</u> <u>in the <strong>fossil fuel industry</u></strong>. These communities <u>can</u> now <u>point to</u> emerging <u>science showing</u> [*239] <u>that rising atmospheric</u> <u>temperatures lead to</u> <u>high ocean <strong>surface temperatures</u></strong>, <u>which fuel</u> more powerful and <u>destructive hurricanes</u>. 424 <u><mark>They can <strong>trace</mark> the <mark>damage</strong></mark> to</u> their <u>waterways</u>, <u>as storm surge</u> <u>and inland flooding causes</u> <u>the sewers <mark>to</u></mark> <u>overrun and the</u> <u>manure lagoons to overflow</u>, <u>fouling surface waters</u> <u>and threatening</u> the <u><mark>supply of</mark> <strong>drinking <mark>water</u></strong></mark> <u>and <strong>fresh water fish</u></strong>.</p>

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Asia War escalates – outweighs.

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Gady 17 Franz-Stefan Gady 8-3-2017 “The Coming War in Asia: Why It Is Hard to Imagine the Unimaginable” https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/the-coming-war-in-asia-why-it-is-hard-to-imagine-the-unimaginable/ (Research Fellow with the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London)//Elmer

the Asia-Pacific region is the most militarized region in the world the three largest defense budgets in the world (the United States, China, and Russia) are by countries with significant military assets in the region. Six Asia-Pacific powers were under the top ten global military spenders in 2016. The world’s seven largest militaries are all in Asia out of the seven six are nuclear powers. profound neglected dangers lurk behind the increasing militarization of the region with its numerous territorial disputes on both land and sea and frozen conflicts, and which at the same time lacks a regional security structure if you only have a hammer, sooner or later most problems will look like nails Given the growing military arsenals, Asia-Pacific policymakers may be more willing to use military force to achieve political objectives and settle disputes while all Asia-Pacific powers are expanding their militaries, no military force save the United States’ has had any extensive combat experience, nor any nation firsthand knowledge of what it means to fight an interstate conflict in the 21st century lack of understanding of what it means to go to war, combined with a regional arms race, and various territorial disputes, can create a fertile habitat for strategic miscalculations over the use of military power. a risk cycle governs interstate relations in Asia, which consists of uncertainty, insecurity, and instability Asian nations have gone through numerous iterations of this cycle without ever succeeding in reversing it. As a result, the Asia-Pacific region remains stuck in instability, the last stage of the cycle that can cause large-scale military conflict once the risk cycle reaches this last stage, instability, the immediate question is how bad it will become and whether minor flare-ups will turn into serious clashes.” whether a small military clash can lead to large-scale war We have become so used to this perpetual cycle of instability and constant confrontations, whether on the Korean Peninsula, in the East China Sea, or along the Indo-Pakistan border that we have lost sight of the inherent danger that each of these confrontations pose to the general peace in the Asia-Pacific region the next big war in the Asia-Pacific may come as an apparent surprise when we least expect it. the current instability in the Asia-Pacific cannot endure indefinitely.

Asia- is the most militarized region The world’s seven largest militaries are all in Asia out of the seven six are nuclear powers. profound dangers lurk behind increasing militarization territorial disputes lacks a regional security structure Given military arsenals, Asia policymakers more willing to use military force can create a fertile habitat for miscalculations over the use of military power. a small clash can lead to large-scale war

There has not been a large-scale war in Asia since 1945. Interstate conflicts in the region over the past decades included the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Border War, and the 1999 Kargil War. With the exception of the 1971 clash between India and Pakistan (along with the Bangladesh Liberation War), these wars were low in casualties and involved limited military resources. Nevertheless, the Asia-Pacific region is the most militarized region in the world. According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies’ Military Balance 2017, the three largest defense budgets in the world (the United States, China, and Russia) are by countries with significant military assets in the region. Six Asia-Pacific powers were under the top ten global military spenders in 2016. The world’s seven largest militaries including China, the United States, India, North Korea, Russia, Pakistan, and South Korea are all (at least partly) found in Asia. Furthermore, out of the seven six are nuclear powers. While these statistics are nothing new to Diplomat readers, they are worth restating to illustrate the profound and often neglected dangers that lurk behind the increasing militarization of the region with its numerous territorial disputes on both land and sea and frozen conflicts, and which at the same time lacks a regional security structure and political community akin to, for example, NATO and the European Union in Europe. The old maxim that if you only have a hammer, sooner or later most problems will look like nails is in particular pertinent in that respect: Given the growing military arsenals, Asia-Pacific policymakers may be more willing to use military force to achieve political objectives and settle disputes. This is further accentuated by the fact that while all Asia-Pacific powers are expanding their militaries, no military force save the United States’ has had any extensive combat experience, nor any nation firsthand knowledge of what it means to fight an interstate conflict in the 21st century. Based on historical evidence (e.g. European militaries prior to the First World War), this lack of understanding of what it means to go to war, combined with a regional arms race, and various territorial disputes, can create a fertile habitat for strategic miscalculations over the use of military power. In his book The End of the Asian Century, Michael R. Auslin outlines a risk cycle that he thinks governs interstate relations in Asia, which consists of three components: uncertainty, insecurity, and instability. Auslin argues that Asian nations have gone through numerous iterations of this cycle (which begins with uncertainty, followed by insecurity, and ends in instability) over the last decades without, however, ever succeeding in reversing it. As a result, the Asia-Pacific region remains stuck in instability, the last stage of the cycle that can cause large-scale military conflict. “War is not preordained, but once the risk cycle reaches this last stage, instability, the immediate question is how bad it will become and whether minor flare-ups will turn into serious clashes.” The question whether a small military clash can lead to large-scale war has indeed plagued decision-makers throughout history. We have become so used to this perpetual cycle of instability and constant confrontations, whether on the Korean Peninsula, in the East China Sea, or along the Indo-Pakistan border that we have lost sight of the inherent danger that each of these confrontations pose to the general peace in the Asia-Pacific region. As a result, despite our best efforts, the next big war in the Asia-Pacific, like most military conflicts, may come as an apparent surprise when we least expect it. For what is clear is that the current instability in the Asia-Pacific cannot endure indefinitely.

<h4>Asia War <u>escalates</u> – outweighs. </h4><p><strong>Gady 17</strong> Franz-Stefan Gady 8-3-2017 “The Coming War in Asia: Why It Is Hard to Imagine the Unimaginable” https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/the-coming-war-in-asia-why-it-is-hard-to-imagine-the-unimaginable/<u> (Research Fellow with the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London)//Elmer </p><p></u> There has not been a large-scale war in Asia since 1945. Interstate conflicts in the region over the past decades included the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese Border War, and the 1999 Kargil War. With the exception of the 1971 clash between India and Pakistan (along with the Bangladesh Liberation War), these wars were low in casualties and involved limited military resources. Nevertheless, <u>the <mark>Asia-</mark>Pacific region <mark>is the <strong>most militarized region</strong> </mark>in the world</u>. According to the International Institute of Strategic Studies’ Military Balance 2017, <u>the three largest defense budgets in the world (the United States, China, and Russia) are by countries with significant military assets in the region. <strong>Six</strong> Asia-Pacific powers were under the <strong>top ten</strong> global military <strong>spenders</strong> in 2016. <mark>The world’s <strong>seven largest militaries</strong></mark> </u>including China, the United States, India, North Korea, Russia, Pakistan, and South Korea <u><mark>are all</u></mark> (at least partly) found <u><mark>in Asia</u></mark>. Furthermore, <u><strong><mark>out of the seven six are nuclear powers</strong>.</mark> </u>While these statistics are nothing new to Diplomat readers, they are worth restating to illustrate the <u><mark>profound</u></mark> and often <u>neglected <mark>dangers</u></mark> that <u><mark>lurk behind</mark> the <strong><mark>increasing militarization</strong></mark> of the region with its numerous <strong><mark>territorial disputes</strong></mark> on both land and sea and frozen conflicts, and which at the same time <mark>lacks a <strong>regional security structure</u></strong></mark> and political community akin to, for example, NATO and the European Union in Europe. The old maxim that <u>if you only have a hammer, sooner or later most problems will look like nails</u> is in particular pertinent in that respect: <u><strong><mark>Given</strong> </mark>the growing <strong><mark>military arsenals, Asia</strong></mark>-Pacific <mark>policymakers </mark>may be <strong><mark>more willing</strong> to use military <strong>force</strong></mark> to achieve political objectives and settle disputes</u>. This is further accentuated by the fact that <u>while all Asia-Pacific powers are expanding their militaries, <strong>no</strong> military force save the United States’ has had any extensive <strong>combat experience</strong>, nor any nation firsthand knowledge of what it means to fight an interstate conflict in the 21st century</u>. Based on historical evidence (e.g. European militaries prior to the First World War), this <u>lack of understanding of what it means to go to war, combined with a regional arms race, and various territorial disputes, <mark>can create a <strong>fertile habitat</strong> for </mark>strategic <strong><mark>miscalculations over the use of military power</strong>. </u></mark>In his book The End of the Asian Century, Michael R. Auslin outlines <u>a risk cycle</u> that he thinks <u>governs interstate relations in Asia, which consists of</u> three components: <u>uncertainty, insecurity, and instability</u>. Auslin argues that <u>Asian nations have gone through numerous iterations of this cycle</u> (which begins with uncertainty, followed by insecurity, and ends in instability) over the last decades <u>without</u>, however, <u>ever succeeding in reversing it. As a result, the Asia-Pacific region remains stuck in <strong>instability</strong>, the last stage of the cycle that can cause <strong>large-scale military conflict</u></strong>. “War is not preordained, but <u>once the risk cycle reaches this last stage, instability, the immediate question is how bad it will become and whether minor flare-ups will turn into serious clashes.” </u>The question <u>whether <mark>a <strong>small </mark>military <mark>clash</strong> can lead to <strong>large-scale war</u></strong></mark> has indeed plagued decision-makers throughout history. <u>We have become so used to this perpetual cycle of instability and constant confrontations, <strong>whether on the Korean Peninsula, in the East China Sea, or along the Indo-Pakistan border that we have lost sight of the inherent danger that each of these confrontations pose to the general peace in the Asia-Pacific region</u></strong>. As a result, despite our best efforts, <u>the next big war in the Asia-Pacific</u>, like most military conflicts, <u>may come as an apparent surprise when we least expect it.</u> For what is clear is that <u>the current instability in the Asia-Pacific cannot endure indefinitely.</p></u>

TOC R5 AC v BASIS Silicon Valley SK

1AC: ASEAN

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Jack Quisenberry

1ac- asean v4 1nc- t-conditional, csa, util bad, tt, zombies, t-resolved, cap, idk, reid-brinkley, case 1ar-th all 2nr- th tt 2ar- comp worlds tt

hsld22/MercerIsland/KaSh/MercerIsland-KaSh-Aff-TOC-Round-5.docx

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Outweighs on magnitude---populism undermines response to every large impact

Leigh 21

Dr. Andrew Leigh 21, PhD from Harvard, Member of the Australian House of Representatives, former Professor in the Economics Program of the Research School of Social Sciences at Australian National University, “What's the Worst That Could Happen: Existential Risk and Extreme Politics”, MIT University Press, ebook

humanity could become extinct with out-of-control superintelligence, bioterrorism, and totalitarianism among the largest risks we are playing a game of Russian roulette with humanity’s future imagine our species becoming extinct due to a catastrophe such as nuclear war, asteroids, or a pandemic the danger surpasses plenty of perils we already worry about Extinction risk outstrips other dangers we have another one billion years before the increasing heat of our sun brings most plant life to an end That’s plenty of time to figure out how to become an interstellar species and move to a more suitable solar system humans aren’t good at understanding extinction risk Our thinking about dangers is skewed by an “availability bias”: a tendency to focus on familiar risks we are lousy at judging the probability of rare but catastrophic events our instincts fail us as the magnitudes grow larger In this environment, a special style of politics has thrived: populism Populists see politics as a conflict between crooked elites and the pure mass of people populists make a stronger attack on elites, claiming that they are dishonest or corrupt. Populists then claim that they—and only they—represent the “real people The political strategy of populists involves critiquing intellectuals, institutions, and internationalism. The political style of populists tends to be fierce They have little respect for experts and the systems of government electoral success of populists has served to sideline work on long-term dangers such as climate change and nuclear war Trump lost but transformed the Republican Party while the strength of populism threatened to sideline issues of catastrophic risk, coronavirus did the opposite COVID-19 never threatened to extinguish humanity, but it highlighted our vulnerability to infectious diseases But it’s still an open question as to how COVID-19 will affect humanity’s ability to think about the long term accentuating the long term requires taking risk more seriously and placing greater emphasis on saving our species the biggest risks facing humanity such as the next virus might combine the infectiousness of COVID-19 with the deadliness of Ebola bioterrorism, and danger of extremists developing their own versions of smallpox or the bubonic plague climate change could be catastrophic rendering large sections of the planet uninhabitable threat from new nuclear powers has made the problem less predictable what we used to call an arms race now looks more like a bar fight, with hazards coming from unexpected directions, including terrorist groups sensible strategies can reduce the odds of nuclear catastrophe superintelligence has been dubbed the “last invention” we’ll ever make a i whose abilities exceed our own could spell disaster Once a superintelligence can improve itself, it is unstoppable we need to build the guardrails before the highway also consider unknown unknowns other doomsday scenarios could be lurking around the corner tackling existential risks is a political problem preventing nuclear war, averting bioterrorism, and curbing greenhouse emissions are problems of government the values of those who run the country will determine how much of a priority the nation places on averting catastrophe. That’s why the rise of populists is crucial to humanity’s long- term survival populists tend to be uninterested in dealing with long-term threats. Populists’ focus on the short term means we’re in danger of missing the threats that could kill us Most critics of populism have concentrated on the present day. They’re missing the bigger picture. Populists are primarily endangering the unborn Bad politics doesn’t just exacerbate other dangers; it represents a risk factor in itself through the possibility of a totalitarian turn in which democracy is replaced by an enduring autocracy For each of the existential risks we face, there are sensible approaches that could curtail the dangers Because of its focus on the urgent over the important, populist politics should bear the label, “Warning: populism can harm your children what is the alternative? A stoic approach to politics isn’t about favoring one side of the ideological fence over another. Instead, it’s about the temperament of good political leadership Decisions are based on empirical evidence, not emotion. Anger has no place in effective leadership

humanity could become extinct with superintelligence, totalitarianism nuclear war, asteroids a pandemic Extinction risk outstrips other dangers populists critiq institutions, and internationalism sideline work on climate change and nuclear war the biggest risks such as next virus combine infectiousness with deadliness extremists developing versions of plague climate change rendering the planet uninhabitable nuclear catastrophe superintelligence could spell disaster unknown unknowns could be lurking tackling ex risks is a political problem rise of populists is crucial to humanity’s survival populists tend to be uninterested in long-term threats Bad politics doesn’t just exacerbate other dangers a risk factor in itself

How likely is it that humanity could end? Experts working on catastrophic risk have estimated the chances of disaster for a wide range of the hazards that our species faces. Adding up the threats, philosopher Toby Ord estimates the odds that humanity could become extinct over the next century at one in six, with an out-of-control superintelligence, bioterrorism, and totalitarianism among the largest risks. He argues that most of the risks have arisen because technology has advanced more rapidly than safeguards to keep it in check. To encapsulate the situation facing humanity, Ord titled his book The Precipice. A one in six chance of going the way of dodos and dinosaurs effectively means we are playing a game of Russian roulette with humanity’s future. Six chambers. One bullet. Even the most foolhardy soldier usually finds an excuse not to play Russian roulette. And that’s when just their own life is at stake. In considering extinction risk, we’re contemplating not one fatality but the death of billions or possibly trillions of people—not to mention countless animals. It can seem impossible to imagine our species becoming extinct due to a catastrophe such as nuclear war, asteroids, or a pandemic. But in reality, the danger surpasses plenty of perils we already worry about. One way to put catastrophic risk into perspective is to compare it with more familiar risks. If extinction risk poses a one in six risk to our species over the next century, then it means that it is far more hazardous than many everyday risks. Specifically, it suggests that the typical US resident is fifteen times more likely to die from a catastrophic risk—such as nuclear war or bioterrorism—than in car crash.2 Extinction risk outstrips other dangers too. Ask people about their greatest fears, and you’ll get answers like “street violence,” “snakes,” “heights,” and “terrorism."4 But in reality, these are much less hazardous than catastrophic risks. People in the United States are 31 times more likely to die from a catastrophic risk than from homicide. Catastrophic risk is 3,519 times likelier to kill than falls from a height, and 6,194 times more likely to kill than venomous plants and animals. If you have ever worried about any of these threats, you should be more fearful about cata- strophic risk. Extinction risks aren’t just more dangerous than any of them; they are more hazardous than all of them put together. Catastrophic risk poses a greater danger to the life of the typical US resident than car accidents, murder, drowning, high falls, electrocution, and rattlesnakes put together. A one in six risk is just the danger in a single century. Suppose that the risk of extinction remains at one in six for each century. That means there’s a five in six chance humanity makes it to the end of the twenty-first century, but less than an even chance we survive to the end of the twenty-fourth century. The odds that we survive all the way to the year 3000 are just one in six. In other words, if we continue playing Russian roulette once a century, it’s probable that we blow our brains out before the millennium is halfway through, and there’s only a small chance that we make it to the end of the millennium. Part of the reason humans undervalue the future is that it’s hard to get our heads around the idea that our genetic code could live on for millions of years. At present, the best estimates are that our species, Homo sapiens, evolved around three hundred thousand years ago.1 That means we have existed for about ten thousand generations. But we have another one billion years before the increasing heat of our sun brings most plant life to an end.1 That’s plenty of time to figure out how to become an interstellar species and move to a more suitable solar system. Humans could live to enjoy another thirty million generations on earth. Thinking about the mind-boggling scale of these numbers, I’m reminded of the Total Perspective Vortex machine, created by Douglas Adams in The Restaurant at the End of the Universe. Anyone brave enough to enter sees a scale model of the entire universe, with an arrow indicating their current position. As a result, their brain explodes. As Adams reflects, the machine proves that “if life is going to exist in a universe of this size, then the one thing it cannot afford to have is a sense of proportion.” Still, let’s try. Imagine your ancestors a hundred generations ago. They are your great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-grandparents. These people lived around 1000 BCE, at the start of the Iron Age. They might have been part of Homeric Greece, ancient Egypt, Vedic age India, the preclassic Maya, or Zhou Dynasty China. Contemplate for a moment about what the hundred genera- tions between our Iron Age ancestors and today have achieved. They built the Taj Mahal and Sistine Chapel, the Angkor Wat and Empire State Building. Thanks to them, we can relish the poetry of Maya Angelou, novels of Leo Tolstoy, and music of Ludwig van Beethoven. An abundance of inventions has delivered us deli- cious food, homes that are comfortable year-round, and technol- ogy that provides online access to a bottomless well of entertain- ment. If time machines existed, we might pop in to visit our great100 grandparents, but few would volunteer to stay in the Iron Age. Yet humanity is really just getting started. If things go well, it’s ten thousand generations down, thirty million to go. Imagine what those future generations could do, and how much time they have to enjoy. Here’s one way to think about what it means to have thirty million generations ahead. Suppose humanity’s potential time on the planet was shrunk down to a single eighty- year life span. In that event, we would now be a newborn baby— just nine days old. Homo sapiens is a mere 0.03 percent through all we could experience on earth. We won’t meet most of those who follow us on the planet, but we should cherish future generations all the same. If you value humanity’s past achievements—the Aztec and Roman civiliza- tions, art of the Renaissance, and breakthroughs of the Industrial Revolution—then the generations to come are just as worthy. This is what political philosopher Edmund Burke meant when he described society as “a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.’- To appreciate the past is akin to admiring the achievements of distant places. Like geography, his- tory helps us better understand the way of the world. Politicians like me like to speak fondly about looking after "our children and our grandchildren.” But it usually stops after a generation or two. Policy pays little heed to the many generations that will follow. For my own part, it took a coronavirus-induced shutdown to have the time to spend reflecting deeply about the long term. This book had been rattling around in my head for years, but it was only when all my meetings, events, and travel were canceled that I had the time to write it. Pandemics are one of the threats to humanity that I’ll discuss in this book, but in this instance, it provided a chance to reflect on the long term. It’s tempting to ignore the distant future. It’s easier to love the grandchildren whom we hug than the great-great-great-grand- children whom we’ll never get to smile on. But that doesn’t make those far-flung generations any less important. Via my wife, our children can trace their lineage to Benjamin Franklin, but I’m more excited about the potential achievements of the generations yet to be born. For companies and governments, a major impediment to long- term thinking is the idea of discounting the future. When investing money, this is a reasonable approach. A dollar in a decade’s time is less valuable than a dollar today for the simple reason that a dollar today could be invested and earn a real return. Share markets have good and bad years, but based on returns from the past 120 years, someone who put $1,000 into the US stock market for an average year could expect it to be worth $1,065 after twelve months (accounting for dividends and inflation).2 Approximating these returns, when governments contemplate making investments, they often apply a discount rate of around 5 percent, while companies use rates that are higher still.2 When it comes to growing your greenbacks, this makes perfect sense. If Kanesha offered you $ 1,000 today, and Jane offered you $ 1,000 in a year’s time, most of us would think that Kanesha was making the more generous offer. Kanesha’s cash can be put to productive use and would be worth more than Jane’s when the year is out. But what if we’re talking about Kanesha and Jane themselves? Suppose Kanesha is alive today, and Jane is yet to be born. When discounting is applied to lives, it suggests that Kanesha’s life to- day is worth twice as much as Jane’s life in fifteen years’ time. It implies that Kanesha today is worth 132 times as much as Jane in a century’s time. So if we’re spending money to keep them safe, a 5 percent discount rate indicates that we should spend more than a hundred times as much to protect Kanesha today than to pro- tect Jane in a century’s time. The further we stretch the time period, the more ridiculous the results become. Discounting at a rate of 5 percent implies that Christopher Columbus is worth more than all eight billion people on the planet today.— Naturally, it also implies that your life is worth more than eight billion lives in five hundred years’ time. Even if you value the hug of a loved one over the unseen successes of next century’s generations, is it fair to ruthlessly dis- miss the distant future? Discounting is the enemy of the long term. As philosopher Will MacAskill points out, there is something morally repugnant about concluding that the happiness of those who will be alive in the 2100s is inconsequential simply because they live in the future. MacAskill coined the term “presentism” to refer to prejudice against people who are yet unborn.” Just like racism, sexism, or other forms of bigotry, he argues that mis- treating those who live a long way in the future is unfair. To dis- criminate in favor of Kanesha against unborn Jane is a form of presentism. If you traveled back in time to the 1500s and met someone who claimed that they were worth more than everyone alive in the 2000s, you’d rightly regard them as an egomaniac. Isn’t it equally narcissistic to ignore the happiness of people in the 2500s? Some have contended that we should favor the living over the unborn for the same reason that philanthropy favors the down- trodden over the wealthy. If incomes rise over time, the argument goes, then asking today’s citizens to help those in the future is like taking from the poor to give to the rich.— But this reasoning ignores the fact that we are talking about the survival of future generations. Theoretical riches won’t do them any good if they are practically dead—or if planetary apocalypse snuffs out their chance to be born. Similarly, it misses the possibility that future pandemics, wars, or climate disasters could make coming genera- tions significantly poorer.— Insights from behavioral science help explain why humans aren’t good at understanding extinction risk.— Our thinking about dangers is skewed by an “availability bias”: a tendency to focus on familiar risks. Like the traders who failed to forecast the collapse of the securitized housing debt market, we are lousy at judging the probability of rare but catastrophic events. Most important, our instincts fail us as the magnitudes grow larger. In research titled "The More Who Die, the Less We Care,” psychologists Paul Slovic and Daniel Vastfjall argue that we become numb to suffering as the body count grows.— Humans’ compassionate instincts are aroused by stories, not statistics. Indeed, one study found that people were more likely to donate to help a single victim than they were to assist eight victims. This may help explain why the international community has been so slow to respond to genocide, including recent incidents in Rwanda, Darfur, and Myanmar. As artificial intelligence researcher Eliezer Yudkowsky notes, human neurotransmitters are unable to feel sorrow that is thousands of times stronger than a single funeral.— The problem is starker still when it comes to extinction risk. Our emotional brains cannot multiply by billions. Add to this a media cycle that has become a media cyclone, in which stories explode in a matter of minutes, and “outrage porn” seems to drive the news choices of many outlets. In the 2016 US election, researchers found that for every piece of professional news shared on Twitter, there was one piece of “junk news.’’— Conflict fueled by social media keeps us in a primal state of rage and retaliation. And this isn’t the only force that makes politics myopic. Campaign contributions tend to come from donors who have an immediate interest in a “today” issue rather than from people aiming to solve long-term problems. This kind of “instant noodle” politics prioritizes quick results and sidelines fundamental challenges. In this environment, a special style of politics has thrived: populism. The term “populist" gets thrown around a lot—typically as an insult—so it’s worth taking a moment to define it precisely.— Populists see politics as a conflict between crooked elites and the pure mass of people. Many candidates trying to defeat an incumbent will criticize “insiders,” but populists make a stronger attack on elites, claiming that they are dishonest or corrupt. Populists then claim that they—and only they—represent the “real people.” Populists combine a fierce critique of elites and personal appeal to the “silent majority.” The political strategy of populists involves critiquing intellectuals, institutions, and internationalism. The political style of populists tends to be fierce. They do not strive for unity and calm consensus. Populists share with revolutionaries a desire for sudden and dramatic change. They have little respect for experts and the systems of government. Populists’ priorities tend to be immediate issues such as crime, migration, jobs, and taxes. Consequently, the electoral success of populists has served to sideline work on long-term dangers such as climate change and nuclear war. Donald Trump may have lost his presidential reelection bid, but he has transformed the Republican Party, which has jettisoned its longstanding commitment to free trade, immigration, and global alliances. Many moderate Republicans, who might have served comfortably under Ronald Reagan or George H. W. Bush, have quit the party or been defeated by Trump-supporting populists. The Republican Party, which holds nearly half the seats in Congress and controls a majority of state legislatures, has embraced populism to a degree that was unimaginable when it was led by George W. Bush, John McCain, or Mitt Romney. After four years under President Trump, the Republican Party is now more cynical and isolationist, focused on immediate grievances rather than long-term challenges. Yet while the strength of populism threatened to sideline issues of catastrophic risk, coronavirus did the opposite. The worst pandemic in a century led to the most severe economic crisis since the Great Depression. Churches and concert halls fell silent. International travel collapsed. The Summer Olympics were postponed. Stocks plunged, and for a brief moment, the price of a barrel of oil went negative. Globally, millions lost their jobs, and millions more faced famine. COVID-19 never threatened to extinguish humanity, but it highlighted our vulnerability to infectious diseases. More than at any time in living memory, people focused on the dangers of pandemics. The popularity of Geraldine Brooks’s Year of Wonders, Stephen King’s The Stand, Emily St. John Mandel’s Station Eleven, and Albert Camus’s The Plague vividly illustrates the way in which fear of pandemics has become more acute. We know that disasters can remake society. The black death helped usher in the Renaissance.— The Great Depression made a generation of investors more risk averse.— World War II spawned the United Nations and formed the modern welfare state. In autocracies, droughts and floods can topple dictators.— Coronavirus is reshaping the world in numerous ways.— Handwashing is in. Cheek kissing is out. The rise of big cities is slowing as people consider the downsides of density. Firms that automated their production systems to deal with physical dis- tancing requirements and stay-at-home orders are discovering that they can get by permanently with fewer staff. More tele- working and less business travel is leading to a drop in demand for receptionists, bus drivers, office cleaners, and security guards. When it comes to our use of technology, coronavirus suddenly accelerated the world to 2030. When it comes to globalization, the pandemic took us back to 2010. But it’s still an open question as to how COVID-19 will affect humanity’s ability to think about the long term. Most of the examples I’ve listed are instances in which crises affected societies organically: the shock came, and it changed our behavior. But accentuating the long term requires taking risk more seriously and placing greater emphasis on saving our species. Linebackers are swift to respond when an offensive player suddenly takes a step to the right. But it takes longer to recognize that a team’s offensive plays are skewed to the right and modify the defensive formation accordingly. Like a football team that adapts its tactics, this book argues that we should lengthen our thinking. At minimal cost, society can massively reduce the odds of catastrophe. By ensuring that the big threats get the attention and resources they need, we can safeguard the future of our species. As insurance policies go, this one is a bargain. In the chapters that follow, I’ll outline the biggest risks facing humanity. I’ll begin in chapter 2 with pandemics, such as the possibility that the next virus might combine the infectiousness of COVID-19 with the deadliness of Ebola. What can we do to shut down exotic animal markets, speed up vaccine develop- ment, and create surge capacity in hospitals? I’ll then delve into bioterrorism, and the danger of extremists developing their own versions of smallpox or the bubonic plague. How difficult is it for them to create these devilish diseases, and what can we do to prevent it? In chapter 3, I’ll then explore climate change—perhaps the in- tergenerational issue that has received the most public attention in recent years. While much of the modeling looks at how global warming could be bad, my focus is on the chances that it’s catastrophic. This isn’t about climate change shortening the ski season; it’s about the possibility of temperatures rising by 18°F (10°C), rendering large sections of the planet uninhabitable. What does the risk of cataclysmic climate change mean for energy policy? Next, I’ll turn to nukes. As a child in the 1980s, I vividly re- member watching The Day After. My classmates and I agreed that a nuclear war was inevitable. When the Cold War ended, the world seemed safer, but in the three decades since, the threat from new nuclear powers has made the problem less predictable. As I discuss in chapter 4, what we used to call an arms race now looks more like a bar fight, with hazards coming from unexpected directions, including terrorist groups. Yet just as there are practical ways to avoid pub brawls (don’t drink past midnight, avoid the stairs, look out for the glass), so too are there sensible strategies that can reduce the odds of nuclear catastrophe (adopt a “no first use" policy, reduce the stockpiles, control loose nukes). A superintelligence has been dubbed the “last invention” we’ll ever make. An artificial intelligence machine whose abilities exceed our own could turbocharge productivity and living stan- dards. But it could also spell disaster. If we program our artificial intelligence to maximize human happiness, it could fulfill our wishes literally by immobilizing everyone and attaching electrodes to the pleasure centers of our brains. As chapter 5 notes, what makes artificial intelligence different from every other risky technology is its runaway potential. Once a superintelligence can improve itself, it is unstoppable. So we need to build the guardrails before the highway. What are the odds? In chapter 6,1 complete the discussion of catastrophic danger by examining less risky risks, including asteroids and supervolcanoes. I also consider the prospect of “unknown unknowns.” For example, prior to the first atomic bomb test, some scientists thought there was a chance it could set the atmosphere on fire, destroying the planet. When the Large Hadron Collider was being built, critics warned that the particle collisions inside it could create micro black holes. Although neither situation eventuated, they raise the question of what other doomsday scenarios could be lurking around the corner. How should the prospect of these unexpected risks change our approach to cutting-edge science? Drawing together these dangers with the major hazards, I report the likely probability of each, benchmarking existential risks such as nuclear war and pandemics against individual risks such as being struck by lightning or dying on the battlefield. Ultimately, tackling existential risks is a political problem. Private citizens can achieve many things, but preventing nuclear war, averting bioterrorism, and curbing greenhouse emissions are fundamentally problems of government. Governments control the military, levy taxes, and provide public goods. So the values of those who run the country will determine how much of a priority the nation places on averting catastrophe. That’s why the rise of populists is crucial to humanity’s long- term survival. In chapter 7,1 discuss the factors that have led to the electoral success of populists during recent decades, and why populists tend to be uninterested in dealing with long-term threats. Populists’ focus on the short term means that—like a driver distracted by a back seat squabble—we’re in danger of missing the threats that could kill us. I’ll explore why populists around the world struggled to respond to COVID-19, and what this says about the dangers that populism poses to our species. Most critics of populism have concentrated on the present day. They’re missing the bigger picture. Populists are primarily endangering the unborn. Bad politics doesn’t just exacerbate other dangers; it represents a risk factor in itself through the possibility of a totalitarian turn —in which democracy is replaced by an enduring autocracy. The road to democracy is not a one-way street. Over the centuries, dozens of countries have backslid from democracy into autocracy —abandoning the institutions of fair elections, protection for minorities, and free expression. Such an outcome could be deadly for dissenters and miserable for the multitudes. Chapter 8 explores why democracy dies and identifies the signs that institutions are being undermined. Chapter 9 suggests how we might strengthen democracies to allow citizens to have a greater say, and lower the chances of the few taking over from the many. Chapter 10 concludes the book. When COVID-19 hit, many rushed out to buy life insurance.— In our personal lives, we know that spending a small amount on insurance can guard against financial ruin. Societies can take a similar approach: implementing modest measures today to safe- guard the immense future of our species. For each of the existential risks we face, there are sensible approaches that could curtail the dangers. For all the risks we face, a better politics will lead to a safer world. Because of its focus on the urgent over the important, populist politics should perhaps bear the label, “Warning: populism can harm your children." But what is the alternative? In the conclusion, I argue that the answer lies in the ancient philosophy of stoicism. A stoic approach to politics isn’t about favoring one side of the ideological fence over another. Instead, it’s about the temperament of good political leadership. Stoicism emphasizes that character matters and holds that virtue is the only good. Decisions are based on empirical evidence, not emotion. Anger has no place in effective leadership. Strength comes from civility, courage, and endurance. Stoics make a sharp distinction between the things they can change and those they cannot.

<h4>Outweighs on <u>magnitude</u>---populism undermines <u>response</u> to <u>every large impact</h4><p></u>Dr. Andrew <strong>Leigh 21</strong>, PhD from Harvard, Member of the Australian House of Representatives, former Professor in the Economics Program of the Research School of Social Sciences at Australian National University, “What's the Worst That Could Happen: Existential Risk and Extreme Politics”, MIT University Press, ebook</p><p>How likely is it that humanity could end? Experts working on catastrophic risk have estimated the chances of disaster for a wide range of the hazards that our species faces. Adding up the threats, philosopher Toby Ord estimates the odds that <u><mark>humanity could <strong>become extinct</u></strong></mark> over the next century at one in six, <u><mark>with</u></mark> an <u>out-of-control <mark>superintelligence, <strong></mark>bioterror</strong>ism, and <strong><mark>totalitarianism</strong></mark> among the largest risks</u>. He argues that most of the risks have arisen because technology has advanced more rapidly than safeguards to keep it in check. To encapsulate the situation facing humanity, Ord titled his book The Precipice.</p><p>A one in six chance of going the way of dodos and dinosaurs effectively means <u>we are playing a game of Russian roulette with humanity’s future</u>. Six chambers. One bullet. Even the most foolhardy soldier usually finds an excuse not to play Russian roulette. And that’s when just their own life is at stake. In considering extinction risk, we’re contemplating not one fatality but the death of billions or possibly trillions of people—not to mention countless animals.</p><p>It can seem impossible to <u>imagine our species becoming extinct due to a <strong>catastrophe</strong> such as <strong><mark>nuclear war</strong>, <strong>asteroids</strong></mark>, or <mark>a <strong>pandemic</u></strong></mark>. But in reality, <u>the danger surpasses plenty of perils we already worry about</u>. One way to put catastrophic risk into perspective is to compare it with more familiar risks. If extinction risk poses a one in six risk to our species over the next century, then it means that it is far more hazardous than many everyday risks. Specifically, it suggests that the typical US resident is fifteen times more likely to die from a catastrophic risk—such as nuclear war or bioterrorism—than in car crash.2</p><p><u><strong><mark>Extinction risk</strong> outstrips <strong>other dangers</u></strong></mark> too. Ask people about their greatest fears, and you’ll get answers like “street violence,” “snakes,” “heights,” and “terrorism."4 But in reality, these are much less hazardous than catastrophic risks. People in the United States are 31 times more likely to die from a catastrophic risk than from homicide. Catastrophic risk is 3,519 times likelier to kill than falls from a height, and 6,194 times more likely to kill than venomous plants and animals. If you have ever worried about any of these threats, you should be more fearful about cata- strophic risk. Extinction risks aren’t just more dangerous than any of them; they are more hazardous than all of them put together. Catastrophic risk poses a greater danger to the life of the typical US resident than car accidents, murder, drowning, high falls, electrocution, and rattlesnakes put together.</p><p>A one in six risk is just the danger in a single century. Suppose that the risk of extinction remains at one in six for each century. That means there’s a five in six chance humanity makes it to the end of the twenty-first century, but less than an even chance we survive to the end of the twenty-fourth century. The odds that we survive all the way to the year 3000 are just one in six. In other words, if we continue playing Russian roulette once a century, it’s probable that we blow our brains out before the millennium is halfway through, and there’s only a small chance that we make it to the end of the millennium.</p><p>Part of the reason humans undervalue the future is that it’s hard to get our heads around the idea that our genetic code could live on for millions of years. At present, the best estimates are that our species, Homo sapiens, evolved around three hundred thousand years ago.1 That means we have existed for about ten thousand generations. But <u>we have another one billion years before the increasing heat of our sun brings most plant life to an end</u>.1 <u>That’s plenty of time to figure out how to become an interstellar species and move to a more suitable solar system</u>. Humans could live to enjoy another thirty million generations on earth.</p><p>Thinking about the mind-boggling scale of these numbers, I’m reminded of the Total Perspective Vortex machine, created by Douglas Adams in The Restaurant at the End of the Universe. Anyone brave enough to enter sees a scale model of the entire universe, with an arrow indicating their current position. As a result, their brain explodes. As Adams reflects, the machine proves that “if life is going to exist in a universe of this size, then the one thing it cannot afford to have is a sense of proportion.”</p><p>Still, let’s try. Imagine your ancestors a hundred generations ago. They are your great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great-great- great-great-great-grandparents. These people lived around 1000 BCE, at the start of the Iron Age. They might have been part of Homeric Greece, ancient Egypt, Vedic age India, the preclassic Maya, or Zhou Dynasty China.</p><p>Contemplate for a moment about what the hundred genera- tions between our Iron Age ancestors and today have achieved. They built the Taj Mahal and Sistine Chapel, the Angkor Wat and Empire State Building. Thanks to them, we can relish the poetry of Maya Angelou, novels of Leo Tolstoy, and music of Ludwig van Beethoven. An abundance of inventions has delivered us deli- cious food, homes that are comfortable year-round, and technol- ogy that provides online access to a bottomless well of entertain- ment. If time machines existed, we might pop in to visit our great100 grandparents, but few would volunteer to stay in the Iron Age.</p><p>Yet humanity is really just getting started. If things go well, it’s ten thousand generations down, thirty million to go. Imagine what those future generations could do, and how much time they have to enjoy. Here’s one way to think about what it means to have thirty million generations ahead. Suppose humanity’s potential time on the planet was shrunk down to a single eighty- year life span. In that event, we would now be a newborn baby— just nine days old. Homo sapiens is a mere 0.03 percent through all we could experience on earth.</p><p>We won’t meet most of those who follow us on the planet, but we should cherish future generations all the same. If you value humanity’s past achievements—the Aztec and Roman civiliza- tions, art of the Renaissance, and breakthroughs of the Industrial Revolution—then the generations to come are just as worthy. This is what political philosopher Edmund Burke meant when he described society as “a partnership not only between those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, and those who are to be born.’- To appreciate the past is akin to admiring the achievements of distant places. Like geography, his- tory helps us better understand the way of the world.</p><p>Politicians like me like to speak fondly about looking after "our children and our grandchildren.” But it usually stops after a generation or two. Policy pays little heed to the many generations that will follow. For my own part, it took a coronavirus-induced shutdown to have the time to spend reflecting deeply about the long term. This book had been rattling around in my head for years, but it was only when all my meetings, events, and travel were canceled that I had the time to write it. Pandemics are one of the threats to humanity that I’ll discuss in this book, but in this instance, it provided a chance to reflect on the long term. It’s tempting to ignore the distant future. It’s easier to love the grandchildren whom we hug than the great-great-great-grand- children whom we’ll never get to smile on. But that doesn’t make those far-flung generations any less important. Via my wife, our children can trace their lineage to Benjamin Franklin, but I’m more excited about the potential achievements of the generations yet to be born.</p><p>For companies and governments, a major impediment to long- term thinking is the idea of discounting the future. When investing money, this is a reasonable approach. A dollar in a decade’s time is less valuable than a dollar today for the simple reason that a dollar today could be invested and earn a real return. Share markets have good and bad years, but based on returns from the past 120 years, someone who put $1,000 into the US stock market for an average year could expect it to be worth $1,065 after twelve months (accounting for dividends and inflation).2 Approximating these returns, when governments contemplate making investments, they often apply a discount rate of around 5 percent, while companies use rates that are higher still.2</p><p>When it comes to growing your greenbacks, this makes perfect sense. If Kanesha offered you $ 1,000 today, and Jane offered you $ 1,000 in a year’s time, most of us would think that Kanesha was making the more generous offer. Kanesha’s cash can be put to productive use and would be worth more than Jane’s when the year is out.</p><p>But what if we’re talking about Kanesha and Jane themselves? Suppose Kanesha is alive today, and Jane is yet to be born. When discounting is applied to lives, it suggests that Kanesha’s life to- day is worth twice as much as Jane’s life in fifteen years’ time. It implies that Kanesha today is worth 132 times as much as Jane in a century’s time. So if we’re spending money to keep them safe, a 5 percent discount rate indicates that we should spend more than a hundred times as much to protect Kanesha today than to pro- tect Jane in a century’s time.</p><p>The further we stretch the time period, the more ridiculous the results become. Discounting at a rate of 5 percent implies that Christopher Columbus is worth more than all eight billion people on the planet today.— Naturally, it also implies that your life is worth more than eight billion lives in five hundred years’ time. Even if you value the hug of a loved one over the unseen successes of next century’s generations, is it fair to ruthlessly dis- miss the distant future? Discounting is the enemy of the long term.</p><p>As philosopher Will MacAskill points out, there is something morally repugnant about concluding that the happiness of those who will be alive in the 2100s is inconsequential simply because they live in the future. MacAskill coined the term “presentism” to refer to prejudice against people who are yet unborn.” Just like racism, sexism, or other forms of bigotry, he argues that mis- treating those who live a long way in the future is unfair. To dis- criminate in favor of Kanesha against unborn Jane is a form of presentism. If you traveled back in time to the 1500s and met someone who claimed that they were worth more than everyone alive in the 2000s, you’d rightly regard them as an egomaniac. Isn’t it equally narcissistic to ignore the happiness of people in the 2500s?</p><p>Some have contended that we should favor the living over the unborn for the same reason that philanthropy favors the down- trodden over the wealthy. If incomes rise over time, the argument goes, then asking today’s citizens to help those in the future is like taking from the poor to give to the rich.— But this reasoning ignores the fact that we are talking about the survival of future generations. Theoretical riches won’t do them any good if they are practically dead—or if planetary apocalypse snuffs out their chance to be born. Similarly, it misses the possibility that future pandemics, wars, or climate disasters could make coming genera- tions significantly poorer.—</p><p>Insights from behavioral science help explain why <u>humans aren’t good at understanding extinction risk</u>.— <u>Our thinking about dangers is skewed by an “availability bias”: a tendency to focus on <strong>familiar risks</u></strong>. Like the traders who failed to forecast the collapse of the securitized housing debt market, <u>we are lousy at judging the probability of rare but catastrophic events</u>. Most important, <u>our instincts fail us as the magnitudes grow larger</u>. In research titled "The More Who Die, the Less We Care,” psychologists Paul Slovic and Daniel Vastfjall argue that we become numb to suffering as the body count grows.— Humans’ compassionate instincts are aroused by stories, not statistics. Indeed, one study found that people were more likely to donate to help a single victim than they were to assist eight victims. This may help explain why the international community has been so slow to respond to genocide, including recent incidents in Rwanda, Darfur, and Myanmar. As artificial intelligence researcher Eliezer Yudkowsky notes, human neurotransmitters are unable to feel sorrow that is thousands of times stronger than a single funeral.— The problem is starker still when it comes to extinction risk. Our emotional brains cannot multiply by billions.</p><p>Add to this a media cycle that has become a media cyclone, in which stories explode in a matter of minutes, and “outrage porn” seems to drive the news choices of many outlets. In the 2016 US election, researchers found that for every piece of professional news shared on Twitter, there was one piece of “junk news.’’— Conflict fueled by social media keeps us in a primal state of rage and retaliation. And this isn’t the only force that makes politics myopic. Campaign contributions tend to come from donors who have an immediate interest in a “today” issue rather than from people aiming to solve long-term problems. This kind of “instant noodle” politics prioritizes quick results and sidelines fundamental challenges.</p><p><u>In this environment, a <strong>special style of politics has thrived: populism</u></strong>. The term “populist" gets thrown around a lot—typically as an insult—so it’s worth taking a moment to define it precisely.— <u>Populists see politics as a conflict between <strong>crooked elites and the pure mass of people</u></strong>. Many candidates trying to defeat an incumbent will criticize “insiders,” but <u>populists make a stronger attack on elites, claiming that they are dishonest or corrupt. Populists then claim that they—and only they—represent the “real people</u>.” Populists combine a fierce critique of elites and personal appeal to the “silent majority.”</p><p><u>The political strategy of <mark>populists</mark> involves <strong><mark>critiq</mark>uing intellectuals, <mark>institutions, and internationalism</strong></mark>. The political style of populists tends to be fierce</u>. They do not strive for unity and calm consensus. Populists share with revolutionaries a desire for sudden and dramatic change. <u>They have little respect for experts and the systems of government</u>. Populists’ priorities tend to be immediate issues such as crime, migration, jobs, and taxes. Consequently, the <u>electoral success of populists has served to <strong><mark>sideline work on</mark> long-term dangers such as <mark>climate change and nuclear war</u></strong></mark>.</p><p>Donald <u>Trump</u> may have <u><strong>lost</u></strong> his presidential reelection bid, <u><strong>but</u></strong> he has <u><strong>transformed the Republican Party</u></strong>, which has jettisoned its longstanding commitment to free trade, immigration, and global alliances. Many moderate Republicans, who might have served comfortably under Ronald Reagan or George H. W. Bush, have quit the party or been defeated by Trump-supporting populists. The Republican Party, which holds nearly half the seats in Congress and controls a majority of state legislatures, has embraced populism to a degree that was unimaginable when it was led by George W. Bush, John McCain, or Mitt Romney. After four years under President Trump, the Republican Party is now more cynical and isolationist, focused on immediate grievances rather than long-term challenges.</p><p>Yet <u>while the strength of populism threatened to sideline issues of catastrophic risk, coronavirus did the opposite</u>. The worst pandemic in a century led to the most severe economic crisis since the Great Depression. Churches and concert halls fell silent. International travel collapsed. The Summer Olympics were postponed. Stocks plunged, and for a brief moment, the price of a barrel of oil went negative. Globally, millions lost their jobs, and millions more faced famine.</p><p><u>COVID-19 never threatened to extinguish humanity, but it highlighted our vulnerability to infectious diseases</u>. More than at any time in living memory, people focused on the dangers of pandemics. The popularity of Geraldine Brooks’s Year of Wonders, Stephen King’s The Stand, Emily St. John Mandel’s Station Eleven, and Albert Camus’s The Plague vividly illustrates the way in which fear of pandemics has become more acute.</p><p>We know that disasters can remake society. The black death helped usher in the Renaissance.— The Great Depression made a generation of investors more risk averse.— World War II spawned the United Nations and formed the modern welfare state. In autocracies, droughts and floods can topple dictators.—</p><p>Coronavirus is reshaping the world in numerous ways.— Handwashing is in. Cheek kissing is out. The rise of big cities is slowing as people consider the downsides of density. Firms that automated their production systems to deal with physical dis- tancing requirements and stay-at-home orders are discovering that they can get by permanently with fewer staff. More tele- working and less business travel is leading to a drop in demand for receptionists, bus drivers, office cleaners, and security guards. When it comes to our use of technology, coronavirus suddenly accelerated the world to 2030. When it comes to globalization, the pandemic took us back to 2010.</p><p><u>But it’s still an open question as to how COVID-19 will affect humanity’s ability to think about the long term</u>. Most of the examples I’ve listed are instances in which crises affected societies organically: the shock came, and it changed our behavior. But <u>accentuating the long term requires taking risk more seriously and placing greater emphasis on <strong>saving our species</u></strong>. Linebackers are swift to respond when an offensive player suddenly takes a step to the right. But it takes longer to recognize that a team’s offensive plays are skewed to the right and modify the defensive formation accordingly.</p><p>Like a football team that adapts its tactics, this book argues that we should lengthen our thinking. At minimal cost, society can massively reduce the odds of catastrophe. By ensuring that the big threats get the attention and resources they need, we can safeguard the future of our species. As insurance policies go, this one is a bargain.</p><p>In the chapters that follow, I’ll outline <u><mark>the <strong>biggest risks</mark> facing humanity</u></strong>. I’ll begin in chapter 2 with pandemics, <u><mark>such as</u></mark> the possibility that <u>the <strong><mark>next virus</strong></mark> might <mark>combine</mark> the <mark>infectiousness</mark> of COVID-19 <mark>with</mark> the <mark>deadliness</mark> of Ebola</u>. What can we do to shut down exotic animal markets, speed up vaccine develop- ment, and create surge capacity in hospitals? I’ll then delve into <u><strong>bioterrorism</strong>, and</u> the <u>danger of <mark>extremists developing</mark> their own <mark>versions of</mark> smallpox or the bubonic <mark>plague</u></mark>. How difficult is it for them to create these devilish diseases, and what can we do to prevent it?</p><p>In chapter 3, I’ll then explore <u><strong><mark>climate change</u></strong></mark>—perhaps the in- tergenerational issue that has received the most public attention in recent years. While much of the modeling looks at how global warming <u>could be</u> bad, my focus is on the chances that it’s <u><strong>catastrophic</u></strong>. This isn’t about climate change shortening the ski season; it’s about the possibility of temperatures rising by 18°F (10°C), <u><mark>rendering</mark> large sections of <mark>the planet uninhabitable</u></mark>. What does the risk of cataclysmic climate change mean for energy policy?</p><p>Next, I’ll turn to nukes. As a child in the 1980s, I vividly re- member watching The Day After. My classmates and I agreed that a nuclear war was inevitable. When the Cold War ended, the world seemed safer, but in the three decades since, the <u>threat from <strong>new nuclear powers</strong> has made the problem less predictable</u>. As I discuss in chapter 4, <u>what we used to call an arms race now looks more like a bar fight, with hazards coming from <strong>unexpected directions</strong>, including <strong>terrorist groups</u></strong>. Yet just as there are practical ways to avoid pub brawls (don’t drink past midnight, avoid the stairs, look out for the glass), so too are there <u>sensible strategies</u> that <u>can <strong>reduce the odds of <mark>nuclear catastrophe</u></strong></mark> (adopt a “no first use" policy, reduce the stockpiles, control loose nukes).</p><p>A <u><strong><mark>superintelligence</strong></mark> has been dubbed the “last invention” we’ll ever make</u>. An <u><strong>a</u></strong>rtificial <u><strong>i</u></strong>ntelligence machine <u>whose abilities exceed our own <mark>could</u></mark> turbocharge productivity and living stan- dards. But it could also <u><strong><mark>spell disaster</u></strong></mark>. If we program our artificial intelligence to maximize human happiness, it could fulfill our wishes literally by immobilizing everyone and attaching electrodes to the pleasure centers of our brains. As chapter 5 notes, what makes artificial intelligence different from every other risky technology is its runaway potential. <u>Once a superintelligence can improve itself, it is <strong>unstoppable</u></strong>. So <u>we need to build the guardrails before the highway</u>.</p><p>What are the odds? In chapter 6,1 complete the discussion of catastrophic danger by examining less risky risks, including asteroids and supervolcanoes. I <u>also consider</u> the prospect of “<u><strong><mark>unknown unknowns</u></strong></mark>.” For example, prior to the first atomic bomb test, some scientists thought there was a chance it could set the atmosphere on fire, destroying the planet. When the Large Hadron Collider was being built, critics warned that the particle collisions inside it could create micro black holes. Although neither situation eventuated, they raise the question of what <u><strong>other doomsday scenarios</strong> <mark>could be <strong>lurking</mark> around the corner</u></strong>. How should the prospect of these unexpected risks change our approach to cutting-edge science? Drawing together these dangers with the major hazards, I report the likely probability of each, benchmarking existential risks such as nuclear war and pandemics against individual risks such as being struck by lightning or dying on the battlefield.</p><p>Ultimately, <u><mark>tackling <strong>ex</strong></mark>istential <mark>risks is a <strong>political problem</u></strong></mark>. Private citizens can achieve many things, but <u>preventing nuclear war, averting bioterrorism, and curbing greenhouse emissions are</u> fundamentally <u>problems of government</u>. Governments control the military, levy taxes, and provide public goods. So <u>the <strong>values</strong> of those who run the country will determine how much of a priority the nation places on averting catastrophe<strong>.</p><p></strong>That’s why the <strong><mark>rise of populists is crucial to humanity’s</mark> long- term <mark>survival</u></strong></mark>. In chapter 7,1 discuss the factors that have led to the electoral success of populists during recent decades, and why <u><mark>populists tend to be <strong>uninterested in</mark> dealing with <mark>long-term threats</strong></mark>. Populists’ focus on the short term means</u> that—like a driver distracted by a back seat squabble—<u>we’re in danger of <strong>missing the threats that could kill us</u></strong>. I’ll explore why populists around the world struggled to respond to COVID-19, and what this says about the dangers that populism poses to our species. <u>Most critics of populism have concentrated on the present day. They’re missing the bigger picture. Populists are primarily <strong>endangering the unborn</u></strong>.</p><p><u><mark>Bad politics <strong>doesn’t just exacerbate other dangers</strong></mark>; it represents <mark>a <strong>risk factor in itself</strong> </mark>through the possibility of a totalitarian turn</u> —<u>in which democracy is replaced by an enduring autocracy</u>. The road to democracy is not a one-way street. Over the centuries, dozens of countries have backslid from democracy into autocracy —abandoning the institutions of fair elections, protection for minorities, and free expression. Such an outcome could be deadly for dissenters and miserable for the multitudes. Chapter 8 explores why democracy dies and identifies the signs that institutions are being undermined. Chapter 9 suggests how we might strengthen democracies to allow citizens to have a greater say, and lower the chances of the few taking over from the many. Chapter 10 concludes the book.</p><p>When COVID-19 hit, many rushed out to buy life insurance.— In our personal lives, we know that spending a small amount on insurance can guard against financial ruin. Societies can take a similar approach: implementing modest measures today to safe- guard the immense future of our species. <u>For each of the existential risks we face, there are sensible approaches that could curtail the dangers</u>. For all the risks we face, a better politics will lead to a safer world.</p><p><u>Because of its focus on the urgent over the important, populist politics should</u> perhaps <u>bear the label, “Warning: populism can harm your children</u>." But <u>what is the alternative?</u> In the conclusion, I argue that the answer lies in the ancient philosophy of stoicism. <u>A stoic approach to politics isn’t about favoring one side of the ideological fence over another. Instead, it’s about the temperament of good political leadership</u>. Stoicism emphasizes that character matters and holds that virtue is the only good. <u><strong>Decisions are based on empirical evidence</strong>, not emotion. Anger has no place in effective leadership</u>. Strength comes from civility, courage, and endurance. Stoics make a sharp distinction between the things they can change and those they cannot.</p>

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1ac - baudy borders 1nc - tfw populism da util nc security good case 1ar - all 2nr - security good util nc populism da 1ar - all

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Antiblackness isn’t historically calcified and their reading runs counter to the Black radical tradition

Kelley, 17

Kelley, 17—Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA (Robin D.G., “Robin D.G. Kelley & Fred Moten In Conversation,” transcribed from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fP-2F9MXjRE, 1:57:36-2:02:56, dml)

I don't always recognize that black politics have been structured or defined by white supremacy not everything is about, or in response to, white supremacy it's simply not true because much of what people do in terms of social formation, community building may be structured in dominance in some ways, but not defined by it Cedric talks about the ontological totality structured by enslavement and dispossession but one in which western hegemony didn't work part of the Black radical tradition is a refusal to be property, to even admit that human beings could be property we sometimes give white supremacy way too much credit The way we have tended to more recently treat slavery, Jim Crow and mass incarceration as the reinstantiation of the same thing, the continuation, that denies the fact that these systems are actually distinct, that they are historically specific, and in fact they’re responses to the weakness of this as a racial regime Jim Crow was not the continuation of slavery Jim Crow was a response to the Black Democratic upsurge after slavery It was a way to try to suppress that That's why there's a huge gap between 1877 at the official end of Reconstruction and the rise of Jim Crow the 1890s, disfranchisement, lynching you've had 13, 14, 15, 20, 25 years of a democratic possibility and struggle. The same thing with mass incarceration—yes, we've had incarceration, but that upward swing has a lot to do with, again, responses to the struggles in the 1960s if we don't acknowledge that what we end up doing is thinking that somehow there's a structure of white supremacy that's unchanging, fixed, and so powerful we can't do anything about it when in fact it's the opposite. White supremacy is fragile. White supremacy is weak. Racial regimes actually are always having to shore themselves up precisely because they're unstable We can't see it because the whole system is to give us the impression that it is so powerful, there's no space out. And yet it’s working overtime to respond to our opposition

not everything is about, or in response to, white supremacy social formation may be structured in dominance but not defined by part of Black radical tradition is refusal to be property, to even admit human beings could be property give white supremacy too much credit treat slavery, Jim Crow and mass incarceration as the same thing denies that these systems are distinct historically specific, and responses to the weakness of a racial regime Jim Crow was not the continuation of slavery Jim Crow was a response to the Black Democratic upsurge after slavery a huge gap between the end of Reconstruction and rise of Jim Crow 25 years of democratic possibility and struggle same with mass incarceration upward swing with responses to the 60s if we don't acknowledge that we end up thinking white supremacy that's unchanging, fixed, and so powerful we can't do anything White supremacy is fragile weak Racial regimes always shore themselves up because they're unstable system give the impression it is so powerful yet it’s working overtime to respond to our opposition

KELLEY: Um, Fred—Fred will take most of these questions. So that's why I'm going to begin first because he's gonna, he's gonna—he's gonna end it because he, he, he has the answer to all these questions ‘cause I turn to him for these questions. On the specific, on the first question, I just want to make sure I understand it because I'm, you know, I don't always recognize, uh, it may be because I'm just old, but I don't always recognize, uh, that black politics, black [unclear—maybe “guys”] work politics have been structured or defined by white supremacy. I mean, white supremacy is there. And I guess maybe because I'm such a student of Cedric Robinson, you know, not everything is about, or in response to, white supremacy. And in fact, one of the critiques coming out of doing Southern history was this idea that race relations framework, that race relations defines, uh, African-American history or Black history. And it's simply not true because much of what people do in terms of, of social formation, community building, um, is, is, is what Raymond Williams might call alternative cultures. In other words, it may be structured in dominance in some ways, but not defined by it. And Cedric's Black Marxism, you know, really made this point. He talks about the ontological totality, you know, the, this sense of being and making ourselves whole, in that we come out of an experience, again, structured by white supremacy, structured by violence, structured by enslavement and dispossession, but, but one in which western hegemony didn't work, you know, that modes of thinking wasn't defined by Enlightenment modes of thinking. In other words, that, that part of the Black radical tradition is a refusal to be property, to even admit that human beings could be property. You know, so we sometimes give white supremacy way too much credit, and maybe I misunderstood the question. And so I think that there's lots of things that happen outside of joy and survival, and survival is important, but survival is not the end all, you know. So I think, and I'll give you one very, very specific example, and now I'm not gonna say anything else after this. The way we have tended to more recently treat slavery, Jim Crow and mass incarceration as a piece, as the reinstantiation of the same thing, the continuation, that denies the fact that these systems are actually distinct, that they are historically specific, and in fact they’re responses to, in many ways, to the weakness of this as a racial regime. So if you think of like the whole idea of the new Jim Crow to me is very, very problematic. Um, although that book by Michelle Alexander is very, very powerful and very useful in terms of educating people about prisons. Jim Crow was not the continuation of slavery. It was not. Jim Crow was a response to the Black Democratic, uh, upsurge after slavery. It was a revolution of Reconstruction. It was a way to try to suppress that. The fact that, that, you know, there was this incredible response. That's why there's a, there's a huge gap between 1877 at the official end of Reconstruction and the rise of Jim Crow, which is the 1890s, disfranchisement, lynching. That's because you've had 13, 14, 15, 20, 25 years of a democratic possibility and struggle. The same thing with mass incarceration—yes, we've had incarceration, but it's, but that, that, that, that upward swing has a lot to do with, again, responses to the struggles in the 1960s, the assault on the Keynesian welfare-warfare state, the fact that you know the, the war on political, the formation of political prisoners, those struggles in fact was the state's response to opposition. And so if we don't acknowledge that, then what we end up doing is thinking that somehow there's a structure of white supremacy that's unchanging, fixed, and so powerful we can't do anything about it when in fact it's the opposite. White supremacy is fragile. White supremacy is weak. Racial regimes actually are always having to shore themselves up precisely because they're unstable. We can see that. We can't see it because the whole system of hegemony is to give us the impression that it is so powerful, there's no space out. And yet it’s working overtime to, to respond to our opposition. Right. That may not answer your question, but that's sort of a way I think about it. Maybe it’s not satisfactory, but yeah.

<h4>Antiblackness isn’t historically calcified and their reading runs <u>counter</u> to the Black radical tradition</h4><p><strong>Kelley, 17</strong>—Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA (Robin D.G., “Robin D.G. Kelley & Fred Moten In Conversation,” transcribed from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fP-2F9MXjRE, 1:57:36-2:02:56, dml)</p><p>KELLEY: Um, Fred—Fred will take most of these questions. So that's why I'm going to begin first because he's gonna, he's gonna—he's gonna end it because he, he, he has the answer to all these questions ‘cause I turn to him for these questions. On the specific, on the first question, I just want to make sure I understand it because I'm, you know, I don't always recognize, uh, it may be because I'm just old, but <u>I don't always recognize</u>, uh, <u>that black politics</u>, black [unclear—maybe “guys”] work politics <u>have been <strong>structured</strong> or <strong>defined</strong> by white supremacy</u>. I mean, white supremacy is there. And I guess maybe because I'm such a student of Cedric Robinson, you know, <u><strong><mark>not everything is about</strong>, or <strong>in response to</strong>, white supremacy</u></mark>. And in fact, one of the critiques coming out of doing Southern history was this idea that race relations framework, that race relations defines, uh, African-American history or Black history. And <u>it's <strong>simply not true</strong> because much of what people do in terms of</u>, of <u><strong><mark>social formation</strong></mark>, <strong>community building</u></strong>, um, is, is, is what Raymond Williams might call alternative cultures. In other words, it <u><mark>may be <strong>structured in dominance</strong></mark> in some ways, <mark>but <strong>not defined by</mark> it</u></strong>. And <u>Cedric</u>'s Black Marxism, you know, really made this point. He <u>talks about the <strong>ontological totality</u></strong>, you know, the, this sense of being and making ourselves whole, in that we come out of an experience, again, structured by white supremacy, structured by violence, <u><strong>structured by enslavement</strong> and <strong>dispossession</u></strong>, but, <u>but one in which <strong>western hegemony didn't work</u></strong>, you know, that modes of thinking wasn't defined by Enlightenment modes of thinking. In other words, that, that <u><mark>part of</mark> the <mark>Black radical tradition is</mark> a <strong><mark>refusal to be property</strong>, to <strong>even</mark> <mark>admit</mark> that <mark>human beings could be property</u></strong></mark>. You know, so <u>we sometimes <mark>give white</mark> <mark>supremacy</mark> <strong>way <mark>too much credit</u></strong></mark>, and maybe I misunderstood the question. And so I think that there's lots of things that happen outside of joy and survival, and survival is important, but survival is not the end all, you know. So I think, and I'll give you one very, very specific example, and now I'm not gonna say anything else after this. <u>The way we have tended to more recently <mark>treat <strong>slavery</strong>, <strong>Jim Crow</strong> and <strong>mass incarceration</u></strong></mark> as a piece, <u><mark>as</mark> the <strong>reinstantiation of <mark>the same thing</strong></mark>, the <strong>continuation</strong>, that <strong><mark>denies </mark>the fact</strong> <mark>that these systems are</mark> <strong>actually <mark>distinct</strong></mark>, that they are <strong><mark>historically specific</strong>, and</mark> in fact they’re <strong><mark>responses</u></strong></mark> to, in many ways, <u><mark>to</mark> <mark>the <strong>weakness</strong> of</mark> this as <mark>a racial regime</u></mark>. So if you think of like the whole idea of the new Jim Crow to me is very, very problematic. Um, although that book by Michelle Alexander is very, very powerful and very useful in terms of educating people about prisons. <u><mark>Jim Crow was <strong>not the continuation of slavery</u></strong></mark>. It was not. <u><mark>Jim Crow was a <strong>response to</mark> <mark>the Black Democratic</u></strong></mark>, uh, <u><strong><mark>upsurge</strong> after slavery</u></mark>. It was a revolution of Reconstruction. <u>It was a way to try to suppress that</u>. The fact that, that, you know, there was this incredible response. <u>That's why</u> there's a, <u>there's <mark>a <strong>huge gap</strong> between </mark>1877 at <mark>the</mark> official <mark>end of Reconstruction and</mark> the <mark>rise of Jim Crow</u></mark>, which is <u>the 1890s, disfranchisement, lynching</u>. That's because <u>you've had <strong>13</strong>, <strong>14</strong>, <strong>15</strong>, <strong>20</strong>, <strong><mark>25 years</strong> of</mark> a <strong><mark>democratic possibility</strong> and <strong>struggle</strong></mark>. The <strong><mark>same</mark> thing <mark>with mass incarceration</strong></mark>—yes, we've had incarceration, but</u> it's, but that, that, that, <u>that <strong><mark>upward swing</strong></mark> has a lot to do <mark>with</mark>, again, <strong><mark>responses</strong> to</mark> the struggles in <mark>the</mark> 19<mark>60s</u></mark>, the assault on the Keynesian welfare-warfare state, the fact that you know the, the war on political, the formation of political prisoners, those struggles in fact was the state's response to opposition. And so <u><mark>if we <strong>don't acknowledge that</u></strong></mark>, then <u>what <mark>we end up</mark> doing is <mark>thinking</mark> that somehow there's a structure of <mark>white supremacy that's <strong>unchanging</strong>, <strong>fixed</strong>, and <strong>so powerful we can't do anything</mark> about it</strong> when in fact it's the <strong>opposite</strong>. <mark>White supremacy is <strong>fragile</strong></mark>. White supremacy is <strong><mark>weak</strong></mark>. <mark>Racial regimes</mark> actually are <strong><mark>always</mark> having to <mark>shore themselves up</strong></mark> precisely <mark>because they're <strong>unstable</u></strong></mark>. We can see that. <u>We <strong>can't see it</strong> because the whole <mark>system</u></mark> of hegemony <u>is to <mark>give</mark> us <mark>the impression</mark> that <mark>it is <strong>so powerful</strong></mark>, there's <strong>no space out</strong>. And <mark>yet it’s <strong>working overtime</u></strong></mark> to, <u><mark>to <strong>respond to our opposition</u></strong></mark>. Right. That may not answer your question, but that's sort of a way I think about it. Maybe it’s not satisfactory, but yeah. </p>

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Warren K

2AC---Social Death

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USMC MC

Cerja

1AC - NFU Crisis adv 1NC - Framing Consult CP Wake Work K Warren K 2NR - Framing Wake Work

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Bio-d loss isn’t existential

Kareiva and Carranza, 18

Kareiva and Carranza, 18—Institute of the Environment and Sustainability, University of California, Los Angeles (Peter and Valerie, “Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back,” Futures, available online January 5, 2018, ScienceDirect, dml)

One boundary often mentioned as a concern for the fate of global civilization is biodiversity There is little evidence that this is a threshold—and it is hard to imagine any data that would allow one to identify where the threshold was A better question is whether one can imagine any scenario by which the loss of too many species leads to the collapse of societies and environmental disasters, even though one cannot know the absolute number of extinctions While there are data that relate local reductions to altered ecosystem function, these results do not point to substantial existential risks. The data are small-scale experiments in which plant productivity, or nutrient retention is reduced or are local observations Those are not existential risks. To make the link even more tenuous, there is little evidence that biodiversity is even declining at local scales Total planetary biodiversity may be in decline, but local and regional biodiversity is often staying the same because species from elsewhere replace local losses there is growing skepticism regarding the strength of evidence linking trends in biodiversity loss to an existential risk for humans Obviously if all biodiversity disappeared civilization would end—but no one is forecasting the loss of all species. It seems plausible that the loss of 90% of the world’s species could also be apocalyptic, but not one is predicting that degree of biodiversity loss either If global biodiversity were halved, but at the same time locally the number of species stayed relatively stable, what would be the mechanism for an end-of-civilization or even end of human prosperity scenario? biodiversity loss are ethical and spiritual losses, but perhaps not an existential risk

little ev and hard to imagine any data would identify the threshold results do not point to existential risks data are small-scale experiments or local observations Those are not existential there is little ev biod is even declining at local scales local and regional biod is staying the same species from elsewhere replace local losses no one is forecasting loss of 90% species If global biod were halved what would be the mechanism for end-of-civilization

The interesting question is whether any of the planetary thresholds other than CO2 could also portend existential risks. Here the answer is not clear. One boundary often mentioned as a concern for the fate of global civilization is biodiversity (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2012), with the proposed safety threshold being a loss of greater than 0.001% per year (Rockström et al., 2009). There is little evidence that this particular 0.001% annual loss is a threshold—and it is hard to imagine any data that would allow one to identify where the threshold was (Brook, Ellis, Perring, Mackay, & Blomqvist, 2013; Lenton & Williams, 2013). A better question is whether one can imagine any scenario by which the loss of too many species leads to the collapse of societies and environmental disasters, even though one cannot know the absolute number of extinctions that would be required to create this dystopia. While there are data that relate local reductions in species richness to altered ecosystem function, these results do not point to substantial existential risks. The data are small-scale experiments in which plant productivity, or nutrient retention is reduced as species numbers decline locally (Vellend, 2017), or are local observations of increased variability in fisheries yield when stock diversity is lost (Schindler et al., 2010). Those are not existential risks. To make the link even more tenuous, there is little evidence that biodiversity is even declining at local scales (Vellend et al., 2013, 2017). Total planetary biodiversity may be in decline, but local and regional biodiversity is often staying the same because species from elsewhere replace local losses, albeit homogenizing the world in the process. Although the majority of conservation scientists are likely to flinch at this conclusion, there is growing skepticism regarding the strength of evidence linking trends in biodiversity loss to an existential risk for humans (Maier, 2012; Vellend, 2014). Obviously if all biodiversity disappeared civilization would end—but no one is forecasting the loss of all species. It seems plausible that the loss of 90% of the world’s species could also be apocalyptic, but not one is predicting that degree of biodiversity loss either. Tragic, but plausible is the possibility of our planet suffering a loss of as many as half of its species. If global biodiversity were halved, but at the same time locally the number of species stayed relatively stable, what would be the mechanism for an end-of-civilization or even end of human prosperity scenario? Extinctions and biodiversity loss are ethical and spiritual losses, but perhaps not an existential risk.

<h4>Bio-d loss isn’t existential</h4><p><strong>Kareiva and Carranza, 18</strong>—Institute of the Environment and Sustainability, University of California, Los Angeles (Peter and Valerie, “Existential risk due to ecosystem collapse: Nature strikes back,” Futures, available online January 5, 2018, ScienceDirect, dml)</p><p>The interesting question is whether any of the planetary thresholds other than CO2 could also portend existential risks. Here the answer is not clear. <u>One boundary often mentioned as a concern for the fate of global civilization is <strong>biodiversity</u></strong> (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 2012), with the proposed safety threshold being a loss of greater than 0.001% per year (Rockström et al., 2009). <u>There is <strong><mark>little ev</mark>idence</strong> that this</u> particular 0.001% annual loss <u>is a threshold—<mark>and</mark> it is <strong><mark>hard to imagine any data</strong></mark> that <mark>would</mark> allow one to <strong><mark>identify</mark> where <mark>the threshold</mark> was</u></strong> (Brook, Ellis, Perring, Mackay, & Blomqvist, 2013; Lenton & Williams, 2013). <u>A better question is whether one can imagine <strong>any scenario</strong> by which the loss of too many species leads to the <strong>collapse of societies</strong> and <strong>environmental disasters</strong>, even though one <strong>cannot know the absolute number of extinctions</u></strong> that would be required to create this dystopia. <u>While there are data that relate local reductions</u> in species richness <u>to altered ecosystem function, these <mark>results <strong>do not point to</mark> substantial <mark>existential risks</strong></mark>. The <mark>data are <strong>small-scale experiments</strong></mark> in which plant productivity, or nutrient retention is reduced</u> as species numbers decline locally (Vellend, 2017), <u><mark>or</mark> are <strong><mark>local observations</u></strong></mark> of increased variability in fisheries yield when stock diversity is lost (Schindler et al., 2010). <u><mark>Those are <strong>not existential</mark> risks</strong>. To make the link <strong>even more tenuous</strong>, <mark>there is <strong>little ev</mark>idence</strong> that <mark>biod</mark>iversity <mark>is <strong>even declining at local scales</u></strong></mark> (Vellend et al., 2013, 2017). <u><strong>Total</strong> planetary biodiversity may be in decline, but <mark>local and regional biod</mark>iversity <mark>is <strong></mark>often <mark>staying the same</strong></mark> because <mark>species from elsewhere <strong>replace local losses</u></strong></mark>, albeit homogenizing the world in the process. Although the majority of conservation scientists are likely to flinch at this conclusion, <u>there is <strong>growing skepticism</strong> regarding the <strong>strength of evidence</strong> linking trends in biodiversity loss to an <strong>existential risk for humans</u></strong> (Maier, 2012; Vellend, 2014). <u><strong>Obviously</strong> if all biodiversity disappeared civilization would end—but <strong><mark>no one is forecasting</mark> the loss of all species</strong>. It seems plausible that the <mark>loss of <strong>90%</strong></mark> of the world’s <mark>species</mark> could also be apocalyptic, but <strong>not one is predicting that degree of biodiversity loss either</u></strong>. Tragic, but plausible is the possibility of our planet suffering a loss of as many as half of its species. <u><mark>If global biod</mark>iversity <mark>were halved</mark>, but at the same time locally the number of species stayed relatively stable, <strong><mark>what would be the mechanism</strong> for</mark> an <mark>end-of-civilization</mark> or even end of human prosperity scenario?</u> Extinctions and <u>biodiversity loss are <strong>ethical</strong> and <strong>spiritual losses</strong>, but perhaps <strong>not an existential risk</u></strong>.</p>

LASA DW - BASIS Semis COMPILED

1NC

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1AC - River Rights 1NC - T Protection - States CP - EPA Tradeoff - Con Con CP - Oil DA 2NC - T Protection - Oil DA - Con Con CP 1NR - Growth Turn - 2 NR - T Protection

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[4] Working within the state functions to expose hidden oppression and to fully understand the state – we’re a prerequisite to the kritik.

Zanotti 14

Zanotti 14 Dr. Laura Zanotti, Associate Professor of PoliSci, Virginia Tech. “Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology: Re-thinking Political Agency in the Global World.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 38, p. 288-304. A little unclear if this is late 2013 or early 2014 – the stated “Version of Record” is Feb 20, 2014, but was originally published online on December 30th, 2013.

Options for resistance are not limited to rejection It is found in contingent struggles that are constituted within the scripts of governmental rationalities and transform them. This approach questions oversimplifications power interacts in complex ways with diverse political spaces Governmentality as a heuristic invites situated explorations and careful differentiations rather than overarching demonizations of power alternative formulations foster an ethics of political engagement that demand continuous attention to what happens instead of fixations on what ought to be

Options for resistance are not limited to rejection It is found in contingent struggles that are constituted within the scripts of governmental rationalities and transform them. This approach questions oversimplifications power interacts in complex ways with diverse political spaces Governmentality as a heuristic invites situated explorations and careful differentiations rather than overarching demonizations of power alternative formulations foster an ethics of political engagement that demand continuous attention to what happens’’ instead of fixations on what ought to be

By questioning substantialist representations of power and subjects, inquiries on the possibilities of political agency are reframed in a way that focuses on power and subjects’ relational character and the contingent processes of their (trans)formation in the context of agonic relations. Options for resistance to governmental scripts are not limited to ‘‘rejection,’’ ‘‘revolution,’’ or ‘‘dispossession’’ to regain a pristine ‘‘freedom from all constraints’’ or an immanent ideal social order. It is found instead in multifarious and contingent struggles that are constituted within the scripts of governmental rationalities and at the same time exceed and transform them. This approach questions oversimplifications of the complexities of liberal political rationalities and of their interactions with non-liberal political players and nurtures a radical skepticism about identifying universally good or bad actors or abstract solutions to political problems. International power interacts in complex ways with diverse political spaces and within these spaces it is appropriated, hybridized, redescribed, hijacked, and tinkered with. Governmentality as a heuristic focuses on performing complex diagnostics of events. It invites historically situated explorations and careful differentiations rather than overarching demonizations of ‘‘power,’’ romanticizations of the ‘‘rebel’’ or the ‘‘the local.’’ More broadly, theoretical formulations that conceive the subject in non-substantialist terms and focus on processes of subjectification, on the ambiguity of power discourses, and on hybridization as the terrain for political transformation, open ways for reconsidering political agency beyond the dichotomy of oppression/rebellion. These alternative formulations also foster an ethics of political engagement, to be continuously taken up through plural and uncertain practices, that demand continuous attention to ‘‘what happens’’ instead of fixations on ‘‘what ought to be.’’83

<h4>[4] Working within the state functions to expose hidden oppression and to fully understand the state – we’re a prerequisite to the kritik.</h4><p><strong>Zanotti 14 </strong>Dr. Laura Zanotti, Associate Professor of PoliSci, Virginia Tech. “Governmentality, Ontology, Methodology: Re-thinking Political Agency in the Global World.” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, Vol. 38, p. 288-304. A little unclear if this is late 2013 or early 2014 – the stated “Version of Record” is Feb 20, 2014, but was originally published online on December 30th, 2013.</p><p>By questioning substantialist representations of power and subjects, inquiries on the possibilities of political agency are reframed in a way that focuses on power and subjects’ relational character and the contingent processes of their (trans)formation in the context of agonic relations. <u><strong><mark>Options for resistance</u></strong></mark> to governmental scripts <u><strong><mark>are not limited to </u></strong></mark>‘‘<u><strong><mark>rejection</u></strong></mark>,’’ ‘‘revolution,’’ or ‘‘dispossession’’ to regain a pristine ‘‘freedom from all constraints’’ or an immanent ideal social order. <u><strong><mark>It is found</u></strong></mark> instead <u><strong><mark>in</u></strong></mark> multifarious and <u><strong><mark>contingent struggles that are constituted within the scripts of governmental rationalities and</u></strong></mark> at the same time exceed and <u><strong><mark>transform them. This approach questions oversimplifications</u></strong></mark> of the complexities of liberal political rationalities and of their interactions with non-liberal political players and nurtures a radical skepticism about identifying universally good or bad actors or abstract solutions to political problems. International <u><strong><mark>power interacts in complex ways with diverse political spaces</u></strong></mark> and within these spaces it is appropriated, hybridized, redescribed, hijacked, and tinkered with. <u><strong><mark>Governmentality as a heuristic</u></strong></mark> focuses on performing complex diagnostics of events. It <u><strong><mark>invites</u></strong></mark> historically <u><strong><mark>situated explorations and careful differentiations rather than overarching demonizations of </u></strong></mark>‘‘<u><strong><mark>power</u></strong></mark>,’’ romanticizations of the ‘‘rebel’’ or the ‘‘the local.’’ More broadly, theoretical formulations that conceive the subject in non-substantialist terms and focus on processes of subjectification, on the ambiguity of power discourses, and on hybridization as the terrain for political transformation, open ways for reconsidering political agency beyond the dichotomy of oppression/rebellion. These <u><strong><mark>alternative formulations</u></strong></mark> also <u><strong><mark>foster an ethics of political engagement</u></strong></mark>, to be continuously taken up through plural and uncertain practices, <u><strong><mark>that demand continuous attention to</u></strong></mark> ‘‘<u><strong><mark>what happens</u></strong>’’</mark> <u><strong><mark>instead of fixations on</u></strong></mark> ‘‘<u><strong><mark>what ought to be</u></strong></mark>.’’83 </p>

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Mining solves extinction from scarcity.

Pelton 17

Pelton 17—(Director Emeritus of the Space and Advanced Communications Research Institute at George Washington University, PHD in IR from Georgetown).. Pelton, Joseph N. 2017. The New Gold Rush: The Riches of Space Beckon! Springer. Accessed 8/30/19.

Are Humans Doomed to Extinction? What will we do when Earth’s resources are used up ? The world is over populated, with billions crammed into our overcrowded cities. These will be more vulnerable to terrorist attack, natural disaster, and other plights that come with overcrowding . We are rapidly running out of water and minerals. Climate change is threatening our very existence. All humanity is at tremendous risk. we envision a new space economy that recognizes there is more water in the skies that all our oceans. The new space frontier can literally open up a “gold rush in the skies.” there is new hope for humanity. we have overlooked the great abundance available to us in the skies above. there is already the beginning of a new gold rush in space—a pathway to astral abundance. new pathways to the stars could prove vital to human survival. entrepreneurial New Space initiatives are changing everything . entrepreneurs are taking over. developing new tech and establishing space enterprises that can bring the wealth of outer space down to Earth. This is not a pipe dream, but will increasingly be the economic reality of the 2020s. Some will say this is sci-fi hogwash this is what people said about planes and nuclear devices. The skeptics laughed at Columbus and his plan to sail across the oceans . When Seward bought Alaska, there were plenty of naysayers . Info technology, robotics, artificial intelligence and commercial space have set us on course to harvest riches in the skies—new natural resources, new energy, and new ways of looking at the purpose of human existence. if we don’t seek to realize our ultimate destiny Homo sapiens can end up in the dustbin of history like millions of already failed species the way of the T. Rex, the woolly mammoth, and the Dodo bird along with extinct ferns, grasses and cacti. space materials, energy and wealth save us from excesses of the past. bold leaders such as Paul Allen Richard Branson Jeff Bezos of Amazon Blue Origin Robert Bigelow not only dream of the space industry but also have billions in assets. are the bright stars of an entirely new industry . space billionaires are proponents of astral abundance. Each of them is launching new commercial space industries. These New Space enterprises give new promise of transforming our world . Near-Earth asteroids composed of platinum and rare earth metals have an incredible value. Helium-3 isotopes space could provide clean and abundant energy. There is more water in space than in our oceans. These can take place by the end of this century. if these changes do not take place we will be in trouble. the struggle between “haves” and “have nots” will grow increasingly ugly. A lack of affordable and readily available water, natural resources, food, health care and medical supplies, plus systematic threats to urban security and systemic warfare are the alternatives to astral abundance. Within the next few decades these problems will be increasingly real. the world may almost be begging for new, out of- the-box thinking.

over populated crowded cities will be vulnerable to terrorist attack, natural disaster, running out of water and Climate change . All humanity is at risk. new tech can bring the wealth to Earth. the reality of the 2020s. robotics, a i and commercial space have set us on course . Allen Branson Bezos Bigelow have billions . Each of them is launching space industries. asteroids rare earth metals have value. Helium-3 provide clean energy. There is more water in space than oceans. lack of food, health care and systemic warfare are the alternatives Within the next few decades .

Are We Humans Doomed to Extinction? What will we do when Earth’s resources are used up by humanity? The world is now hugely over populated, with billions and billions crammed into our overcrowded cities. By 2050, we may be 9 billion strong, and by 2100 well over 11 billion people on Planet Earth. Some at the United Nations say we might even be an amazing 12 billion crawling around this small globe. And over 80 % of us will be living in congested cities. These cities will be ever more vulnerable to terrorist attack, natural disaster, and other plights that come with overcrowding and a dearth of jobs that will be fueled by rapid automation and the rise of artifi cial intelligence across the global economy. We are already rapidly running out of water and minerals. Climate change is threatening our very existence. Political leaders and even the Pope have cautioned us against inaction. Perhaps the naysayers are right. All humanity is at tremendous risk. Is there no hope for the future? This book is about hope. We think that there is literally heavenly hope for humanity. But we are not talking here about divine intervention. We are envisioning a new space economy that recognizes that there is more water in the skies that all our oceans. Th ere is a new wealth of natural resources and clean energy in the reaches of outer space—more than most of us could ever dream possible. There are those that say why waste money on outer space when we have severe problems here at home? Going into space is not a waste of money. It is our future. It is our hope for new jobs and resources. The great challenge of our times is to reverse public thinking to see space not as a resource drain but as the doorway to opportunity. The new space frontier can literally open up a “gold rush in the skies.” In brief, we think there is new hope for humanity. We see a new a pathway to the future via new ventures in space. For too long, space programs have been seen as a money pit. In the process, we have overlooked the great abundance available to us in the skies above. It is important to recognize there is already the beginning of a new gold rush in space—a pathway to astral abundance. “New Space” is a term increasingly used to describe radical new commercial space initiatives—many of which have come from Silicon Valley and often with backing from the group of entrepreneurs known popularly as the “space billionaires.” New space is revolutionizing the space industry with lower cost space transportation and space systems that represent significant cost savings and new technological breakthroughs. “New Commercial Space” and the “New Space Economy” represent more than a new way of looking at outer space. These new pathways to the stars could prove vital to human survival. If one does not believe in spending money to probe the mysteries of the universe then perhaps we can try what might be called “calibrated greed” on for size. One only needs to go to a cubesat workshop, or to Silicon Valley or one of many conferences like the “Disrupt Space” event in Bremen, Germany, held in April 2016 to recognize that entrepreneurial New Space initiatives are changing everything [ 1 ]. In fact, the very nature and dimensions of what outer space activities are today have changed forever. It is no longer your grandfather’s concept of outer space that was once dominated by the big national space agencies. The entrepreneurs are taking over. The hopeful statements in this book and the hard economic and technical data that backs them up are more than a minority opinion. It is a topic of growing interest at the World Economic Forum, where business and political heavyweights meet in Davos, Switzerland, to discuss how to stimulate new patterns of global economic growth. It is even the growing view of a group that call themselves “space ethicists.” Here is how Christopher J. Newman, at the University of Sunderland in the United Kingdom has put it: Space ethicists have offered the view that space exploration is not only desirable; it is a duty that we, as a species, must undertake in order to secure the survival of humanity over the longer term. Expanding both the resource base and, eventually, the habitats available for humanity means that any expenditure on space exploration, far from being viewed as frivolous, can legitimately be rationalized as an ethical investment choice. (Newman) On the other hand there are space ethicists and space exobiologists who argue that humans have created ecological ruin on the planet—and now space debris is starting to pollute space. Th ese countervailing thoughts by the “no growth” camp of space ethicists say we have no right to colonize other planets or to mine the Moon and asteroids—or at least no right to do so until we can prove we can sustain life here on Earth for the longer term. However, for most who are planning for the new space economy the opinion of space philosophers doesn’t really fl oat their boat. Legislators, bankers, and aspiring space entrepreneurs are far more interested in the views of the super-rich capitalists called the space billionaires. A number of these billionaires and space executives have already put some very serious money into enterprises intent on creating a new pathway to the stars. No less than five billionaires with established space ventures—Elon Musk, Paul Allen, Jeff Bezos, Sir Richard Branson, and Robert Bigelow—have invested millions if not billions of dollars into commercializing space. They are developing new technologies and establishing space enterprises that can bring the wealth of outer space down to Earth. This is not a pipe dream, but will increasingly be the economic reality of the 2020s. These wealthy space entrepreneurs see major new economic opportunities. To them space represents the last great frontier for enterprising pioneers. Th us they see an ever-expanding space frontier that offers opportunities in low-cost space transportation, satellite solar power satellites to produce clean energy 24h a day, space mining, space manufacturing and production, and eventually space habitats and colonies as a trajectory to a better human future. Some even more visionary thinkers envision the possibility of terraforming Mars, or creating new structures in space to protect our planet from cosmic hazards and even raising Earth’s orbit to escape the rising heat levels of the Sun in millennia to come. Some, of course, will say this is sci-fi hogwash. It can’t be done. We say that this is what people would have said in 1900 about airplanes, rocket ships, cell phones and nuclear devices. The skeptics laughed at Columbus and his plan to sail across the oceans to discover new worlds. When Thomas Jefferson bought the Louisiana Purchase from France or Seward bought Alaska, there were plenty of naysayers that said such investment in the unknown was an extravagant waste of money. A healthy skepticism is useful and can play a role in economic and business success. Before one dismisses the idea of an impending major new space economy and a new gold rush, it might useful to see what has already transpired in space development in just the past five decades. The world’s first geosynchronous communications satellite had a throughput capability of about 500 kb / s. In contrast, today’s state of the art Viasat 2 —a half century later— has an impressive throughput of some 140 Gb/s. Th is means that the relative throughput is nearly 300,000 greater, while its lifetime is some ten times longer (Figs. 1.1 and 1.2 ). Each new generation of communications satellite has had more power, better antenna systems, improved pointing and stabilization, and an extended lifetime. And the capabilities represented by remote sensing satellites , meteorological satellites , and navigation and timing satellites have also expanded their capabilities and performance in an impressive manner. When satellite applications first started, the market was measured in millions of dollars. Today commercial satellite services exceed a quarter of a billion dollars. Vital services such as the Internet, aircraft traffi c control and management, international banking, search and rescue and much, much more depend on application satellites. Th ose that would doubt the importance of satellites to the global economy might wish to view on You Tube the video “If Th ere Were a Day Without Satellites?” [ 2 ]. Let’s check in on what some of those very rich and smart guys think about the new space economy and its potential. (We are sorry to say that so far there are no female space billionaires, but surely this, too, will come someday soon.) Of course this twenty-fi rst century breakthrough that we call the New Space economy will not come just from new space commerce. It will also come from the amazing new technologies here on Earth. Vital new terrestrial technologies will accompany this cosmic journey into tomorrow. Information technology, robotics, artificial intelligence and commercial space travel systems have now set us on a course to allow us humans to harvest the amazing riches in the skies—new natural resources, new energy, and even totally new ways of looking at the purpose of human existence. If we pursue this course steadfastly, it can be the beginning of a New Space renaissance. But if we don’t seek to realize our ultimate destiny in space, Homo sapiens can end up in the dustbin of history—just like literally millions of already failed species. In each and every one of the five mass extinction events that have occurred over the last 1.5 billion years on Earth, some 50–80 % of all species have gone the way of the T. Rex, the woolly mammoth, and the Dodo bird along with extinct ferns, grasses and cacti. On the other hand, the best days of the human race could be just beginning. If we are smart about how we go about discovering and using these riches in the skies and applying the best of our new technologies, it could be the start of a new beginning for humanity. Konstantin Tsiokovsky, the Russian astronautics pioneer, who fi rst conceived of practical designs for spaceships, famously said: “A planet is the cradle of mankind, but one cannot live in a cradle forever.” Well before Tsiokovsky another genius, Leonardo da Vinci, said, quite poetically: “Once you have tasted flight, you will forever walk the earth with your eyes turned skyward, for there you have been, and there you will always long to return.” The founder of the X-Prize and of Planetary Resources, Inc., Dr. Peter Diamandis, has much more brashly said much the same thing in quite diff erent words when he said: “The meek shall inherit the Earth. The rest of us will go to Mars.” The New Space Billionaires Peter Diamandis is not alone in his thinking. From the list of “visionaries” quoted earlier, Elon Musk, the founder of SpaceX; Sir Richard Branson, the founder of Virgin Galactic; and Paul Allen, the co-founder of Microsoft and the man who financed SpaceShipOne, the world’s first successful spaceplane have all said the future will include a vibrant new space economy. Th ey, and others, have said that we can, we should and we soon shall go into space and realize the bounty that it can offer to us. Th e New Space enterprise is today indeed being led by those so-called space billionaires , who have an exciting vision of the future. They and others in the commercial space economy believe that the exploitation of outer space may open up a new golden age of astral abundance. They see outer space as a new frontier that can be a great source of new materials, energy and various forms of new wealth that might even save us from excesses of the past. Th is gold rush in the skies represents a new beginning. We are not talking about expensive new space ventures funded by NASA or other space agencies in Europe, Japan, China or India. No, these eff orts which we and others call New Space are today being forged by imaginative and resourceful commercial entrepreneurs. Th ese twenty-fi rst century visionaries have the fortitude and zeal to look to the abundance above. New breakthroughs in technology and New Space enterprises may be able to create an “astral life raft” for humanity. Just as Columbus and the Vikings had the imaginative drive that led them to discover the riches of a new world, we now have a cadre of space billionaires that are now leading us into this New Space era of tomorrow. These bold leaders, such as Paul Allen and Sir Richard Branson, plus other space entrepreneurs including Jeff Bezos of Amazon and Blue Origin, and Robert Bigelow, Chairman of Budget Suites and Bigelow Aerospace, not only dream of their future in the space industry but also have billions of dollars in assets. These are the bright stars of an entirely new industry that are leading us into the age of New Space commerce. These space billionaires, each in their own way, are proponents of a new age of astral abundance. Each of them is launching new commercial space industries. They are literally transforming our vision of tomorrow. These new types of entrepreneurial aerospace companies—the New Space enterprises—give new hope and new promise of transforming our world as we know it today. The New Space Frontier What happens in space in the next few decades, plus corresponding new information technologies and advanced robotics, will change our world forever. These changes will redefi ne wealth, change our views of work and employment and upend almost everything we think we know about economics, wealth, jobs, and politics. Th ese changes are about truly disruptive technologies of the most fundamental kinds. If you thought the Internet, smart phones, and spandex were disruptive technologies, just hang on. You have not seen anything yet. In short, if you want to understand a transition more fundamental than the changes brought to the twentieth century world by computers, communications and the Internet, then read this book. There are truly riches in the skies. Near-Earth asteroids largely composed of platinum and rare earth metals have an incredible value. Helium-3 isotopes accessible in outer space could provide clean and abundant energy. There is far more water in outer space than is in our oceans. In the pages that follow we will explain the potential for a cosmic shift in our global economy, our ecology, and our commercial and legal systems. These can take place by the end of this century. And if these changes do not take place we will be in trouble. Our conventional petro-chemical energy systems will fail us economically and eventually blanket us with a hydrocarbon haze of smog that will threaten our health and our very survival. Our rare precious metals that we need for modern electronic appliances will skyrocket in price, and the struggle between “haves” and “have nots” will grow increasingly ugly. A lack of affordable and readily available water, natural resources, food, health care and medical supplies, plus systematic threats to urban security and systemic warfare are the alternatives to astral abundance. The choices between astral abundance and a downward spiral in global standards of living are stark. Within the next few decades these problems will be increasingly real. By then the world may almost be begging for new, out of- the-box thinking. International peace and security will be an indispensable prerequisite for exploitation of astral abundance, as will good government for all. No one nation can be rich and secure when everyone else is poor and insecure. In short, global space security and strategic space defense, mediated by global space agreements, are part of this new pathway to the future.

<h4>Mining solves extinction from <u>scarcity</u>.</h4><p><strong>Pelton 17</strong>—(Director Emeritus of the Space and Advanced Communications Research Institute at George Washington University, PHD in IR from Georgetown).. Pelton, Joseph N. 2017. The New Gold Rush: The Riches of Space Beckon! Springer. Accessed 8/30/19.</p><p><u>Are </u>We<u> Humans Doomed to <strong>Extinction</strong>? What will we do when Earth’s resources are used up </u>by humanity<u>? The world is</u> now hugely <u><strong><mark>over populated</strong></mark>, with billions</u> and billions <u>crammed into our over<strong><mark>crowded</strong> cities</mark>. </u>By 2050, we may be 9 billion strong, and by 2100 well over 11 billion people on Planet Earth. Some at the United Nations say we might even be an amazing 12 billion crawling around this small globe. And over 80 % of us will be living in congested cities. <u>These</u> cities <u><mark>will be</u></mark> ever <u>more <mark>vulnerable to <strong>terrorist attack</strong>, <strong>natural disaster</strong>,</mark> and other plights that come with overcrowding </u>and a dearth of jobs that will be fueled by rapid automation and the rise of artifi cial intelligence across the global economy<u>.</u> <u>We are </u>already <u>rapidly <strong><mark>running out of water</strong> and <strong></mark>minerals</strong>. <strong><mark>Climate change</strong> </mark>is threatening our very <strong>existence</strong><mark>.</u></mark> Political leaders and even the Pope have cautioned us against inaction. Perhaps the naysayers are right. <u><strong><mark>All humanity is at </mark>tremendous <mark>risk.</u></strong></mark> Is there no hope for the future? This book is about hope. We think that there is literally heavenly hope for humanity. But <u>we</u> are not talking here about divine intervention. We are <u>envision</u>ing <u>a new space economy that recognizes</u> that <u>there is more water in the skies that all our oceans. </u>Th ere is a new wealth of natural resources and clean energy in the reaches of outer space—more than most of us could ever dream possible. There are those that say why waste money on outer space when we have severe problems here at home? Going into space is not a waste of money. It is our future. It is our hope for new jobs and resources. The great challenge of our times is to reverse public thinking to see space not as a resource drain but as the doorway to opportunity. <u>The new space frontier can literally open up a “gold rush in the skies.” </u>In brief, we think <u>there is new hope for humanity.</u> We see a new a pathway to the future via new ventures in space. For too long, space programs have been seen as a money pit. In the process, <u>we have overlooked the great abundance available to us in the skies above.</u> It is important to recognize <u>there is already the beginning of a new gold rush in space—a pathway to astral abundance.</u> “New Space” is a term increasingly used to describe radical new commercial space initiatives—many of which have come from Silicon Valley and often with backing from the group of entrepreneurs known popularly as the “space billionaires.” New space is revolutionizing the space industry with lower cost space transportation and space systems that represent significant cost savings and new technological breakthroughs. “New Commercial Space” and the “New Space Economy” represent more than a new way of looking at outer space. These <u>new pathways to the stars could prove vital to <strong>human survival</strong>. </u>If one does not believe in spending money to probe the mysteries of the universe then perhaps we can try what might be called “calibrated greed” on for size. One only needs to go to a cubesat workshop, or to Silicon Valley or one of many conferences like the “Disrupt Space” event in Bremen, Germany, held in April 2016 to recognize that <u>entrepreneurial New Space initiatives are changing everything</u> [ 1 ]<u>.</u> In fact, the very nature and dimensions of what outer space activities are today have changed forever. It is no longer your grandfather’s concept of outer space that was once dominated by the big national space agencies. The <u>entrepreneurs are taking over.</u> The hopeful statements in this book and the hard economic and technical data that backs them up are more than a minority opinion. It is a topic of growing interest at the World Economic Forum, where business and political heavyweights meet in Davos, Switzerland, to discuss how to stimulate new patterns of global economic growth. It is even the growing view of a group that call themselves “space ethicists.” Here is how Christopher J. Newman, at the University of Sunderland in the United Kingdom has put it: Space ethicists have offered the view that space exploration is not only desirable; it is a duty that we, as a species, must undertake in order to secure the survival of humanity over the longer term. Expanding both the resource base and, eventually, the habitats available for humanity means that any expenditure on space exploration, far from being viewed as frivolous, can legitimately be rationalized as an ethical investment choice. (Newman) On the other hand there are space ethicists and space exobiologists who argue that humans have created ecological ruin on the planet—and now space debris is starting to pollute space. Th ese countervailing thoughts by the “no growth” camp of space ethicists say we have no right to colonize other planets or to mine the Moon and asteroids—or at least no right to do so until we can prove we can sustain life here on Earth for the longer term. However, for most who are planning for the new space economy the opinion of space philosophers doesn’t really fl oat their boat. Legislators, bankers, and aspiring space entrepreneurs are far more interested in the views of the super-rich capitalists called the space billionaires. A number of these billionaires and space executives have already put some very serious money into enterprises intent on creating a new pathway to the stars. No less than five billionaires with established space ventures—Elon Musk, Paul Allen, Jeff Bezos, Sir Richard Branson, and Robert Bigelow—have invested millions if not billions of dollars into commercializing space. They are <u>developing <strong><mark>new tech</u></strong></mark>nologies<u> and establishing space enterprises that <mark>can bring the wealth</mark> of outer space down <mark>to Earth. </mark>This is not a pipe dream, but will increasingly be <mark>the</mark> <strong>economic <mark>reality</strong> of the 2020s.</mark> </u>These wealthy space entrepreneurs see major new economic opportunities. To them space represents the last great frontier for enterprising pioneers. Th us they see an ever-expanding space frontier that offers opportunities in low-cost space transportation, satellite solar power satellites to produce clean energy 24h a day, space mining, space manufacturing and production, and eventually space habitats and colonies as a trajectory to a better human future. Some even more visionary thinkers envision the possibility of terraforming Mars, or creating new structures in space to protect our planet from cosmic hazards and even raising Earth’s orbit to escape the rising heat levels of the Sun in millennia to come. <u><strong>Some</u></strong>, of course, <u>will say this is <strong>sci-fi hogwash</u></strong>.<u> </u>It can’t be done. We say that <u>this is what people</u> would have <u>said</u> in 1900 <u>about </u>air<u><strong>planes</u></strong>, rocket ships, cell phones <u>and nuclear devices.</u> <u>The skeptics <strong>laughed</strong> at</u> <u><strong>Columbus</u></strong> <u>and his plan to sail across the oceans</u> to discover new worlds<u>. When</u> Thomas Jefferson bought the Louisiana Purchase from France or <u>Seward bought Alaska, there were plenty of naysayers</u> that said such investment in the unknown was an extravagant waste of money<u>. </u>A healthy skepticism is useful and can play a role in economic and business success. Before one dismisses the idea of an impending major new space economy and a new gold rush, it might useful to see what has already transpired in space development in just the past five decades. The world’s first geosynchronous communications satellite had a throughput capability of about 500 kb / s. In contrast, today’s state of the art Viasat 2 —a half century later— has an impressive throughput of some 140 Gb/s. Th is means that the relative throughput is nearly 300,000 greater, while its lifetime is some ten times longer (Figs. 1.1 and 1.2 ). Each new generation of communications satellite has had more power, better antenna systems, improved pointing and stabilization, and an extended lifetime. And the capabilities represented by remote sensing satellites , meteorological satellites , and navigation and timing satellites have also expanded their capabilities and performance in an impressive manner. When satellite applications first started, the market was measured in millions of dollars. Today commercial satellite services exceed a quarter of a billion dollars. Vital services such as the Internet, aircraft traffi c control and management, international banking, search and rescue and much, much more depend on application satellites. Th ose that would doubt the importance of satellites to the global economy might wish to view on You Tube the video “If Th ere Were a Day Without Satellites?” [ 2 ]. Let’s check in on what some of those very rich and smart guys think about the new space economy and its potential. (We are sorry to say that so far there are no female space billionaires, but surely this, too, will come someday soon.) Of course this twenty-fi rst century breakthrough that we call the New Space economy will not come just from new space commerce. It will also come from the amazing new technologies here on Earth. Vital new terrestrial technologies will accompany this cosmic journey into tomorrow. <u>Info</u>rmation<u> technology, <mark>robotics, <strong>a</strong></mark>rtificial <strong><mark>i</strong></mark>ntelligence <mark>and commercial space</mark> </u>travel systems<u> <mark>have</mark> </u>now<u> <mark>set us on</mark> </u>a <u><mark>course</mark> to </u>allow us humans to<u> harvest </u>the amazing<u> riches in the skies—new natural resources, new energy, and</u> even totally <u>new ways of looking at the <strong>purpose of human existence</strong><mark>.</u></mark> If we pursue this course steadfastly, it can be the beginning of a New Space renaissance. But <u>if we don’t seek to realize our <strong>ultimate destiny</u></strong> in space, <u>Homo sapiens can end up in the <strong>dustbin of history</u></strong>—just <u>like </u>literally<u> <strong>millions of already failed species</u></strong>. In each and every one of the five mass extinction events that have occurred over the last 1.5 billion years on Earth, some 50–80 % of all species have gone <u>the way of the <strong>T. Rex</strong>, the <strong>woolly mammoth</strong>, and the <strong>Dodo bird</u></strong> <u>along with extinct <strong>ferns</strong>, <strong>grasses</strong> and <strong>cacti</strong>.</u> On the other hand, the best days of the human race could be just beginning. If we are smart about how we go about discovering and using these riches in the skies and applying the best of our new technologies, it could be the start of a new beginning for humanity. Konstantin Tsiokovsky, the Russian astronautics pioneer, who fi rst conceived of practical designs for spaceships, famously said: “A planet is the cradle of mankind, but one cannot live in a cradle forever.” Well before Tsiokovsky another genius, Leonardo da Vinci, said, quite poetically: “Once you have tasted flight, you will forever walk the earth with your eyes turned skyward, for there you have been, and there you will always long to return.” The founder of the X-Prize and of Planetary Resources, Inc., Dr. Peter Diamandis, has much more brashly said much the same thing in quite diff erent words when he said: “The meek shall inherit the Earth. The rest of us will go to Mars.” The New Space Billionaires Peter Diamandis is not alone in his thinking. From the list of “visionaries” quoted earlier, Elon Musk, the founder of SpaceX; Sir Richard Branson, the founder of Virgin Galactic; and Paul Allen, the co-founder of Microsoft and the man who financed SpaceShipOne, the world’s first successful spaceplane have all said the future will include a vibrant new space economy. Th ey, and others, have said that we can, we should and we soon shall go into space and realize the bounty that it can offer to us. Th e New Space enterprise is today indeed being led by those so-called space billionaires , who have an exciting vision of the future. They and others in the commercial space economy believe that the exploitation of outer space may open up a new golden age of astral abundance. They see outer <u>space</u> as a new frontier that can be a great source of new <u>materials, energy and</u> various forms of new <u>wealth</u> that might even <u>save us from excesses of the past.</u> Th is gold rush in the skies represents a new beginning. We are not talking about expensive new space ventures funded by NASA or other space agencies in Europe, Japan, China or India. No, these eff orts which we and others call New Space are today being forged by imaginative and resourceful commercial entrepreneurs. Th ese twenty-fi rst century visionaries have the fortitude and zeal to look to the abundance above. New breakthroughs in technology and New Space enterprises may be able to create an “astral life raft” for humanity. Just as Columbus and the Vikings had the imaginative drive that led them to discover the riches of a new world, we now have a cadre of space billionaires that are now leading us into this New Space era of tomorrow. These <u><strong>bold leaders</u></strong>, <u>such as <strong>Paul <mark>Allen</u></strong></mark> and Sir <u><strong>Richard <mark>Branson</u></strong></mark>, plus other space entrepreneurs including <u><strong>Jeff <mark>Bezos</mark> of Amazon</u></strong> and <u><strong>Blue Origin</u></strong>, and <u><strong>Robert <mark>Bigelow</u></strong></mark>, Chairman of Budget Suites and Bigelow Aerospace, <u>not only dream of</u> their future in <u>the space industry but also <mark>have billions</u></mark> of dollars <u>in assets<mark>.</u></mark> These <u>are the</u> <u><strong>bright stars of an entirely new industry</u></strong> that are leading us into the age of New Space commerce<u>.</u> These <u>space billionaires</u>, each in their own way, <u>are proponents of </u>a new age of <u>astral abundance. <mark>Each of them is launching</mark> new commercial <mark>space industries.</mark> </u>They are literally transforming our vision of tomorrow. <u>These</u> new types of entrepreneurial aerospace companies—the <u>New Space enterprises</u>—<u>give</u> new hope and <u>new promise of transforming our world</u> as we know it today<u>.</u> The New Space Frontier What happens in space in the next few decades, plus corresponding new information technologies and advanced robotics, will change our world forever. These changes will redefi ne wealth, change our views of work and employment and upend almost everything we think we know about economics, wealth, jobs, and politics. Th ese changes are about truly disruptive technologies of the most fundamental kinds. If you thought the Internet, smart phones, and spandex were disruptive technologies, just hang on. You have not seen anything yet. In short, if you want to understand a transition more fundamental than the changes brought to the twentieth century world by computers, communications and the Internet, then read this book. There are truly riches in the skies.<u> Near-Earth <mark>asteroids</mark> </u>largely<u> composed of platinum and <strong><mark>rare earth metals</strong> have</mark> an incredible <mark>value. Helium-3</mark> isotopes </u>accessible in outer<u> space could <mark>provide <strong>clean</mark> and abundant <mark>energy</strong>. There is</mark> </u>far<u> <mark>more water in</mark> </u>outer<u> <mark>space than</mark> </u>is<u> in our <mark>oceans.</mark> </u>In the pages that follow we will explain the potential for a cosmic shift in our global economy, our ecology, and our commercial and legal systems.<u> These can take place by the end of this century. </u>And <u>if these changes do not take place we will be in trouble.</u> Our conventional petro-chemical energy systems will fail us economically and eventually blanket us with a hydrocarbon haze of smog that will threaten our health and our very survival. Our rare precious metals that we need for modern electronic appliances will skyrocket in price, and <u>the struggle between “haves” and “have nots” will grow increasingly <strong>ugly</strong>. A <mark>lack of</mark> affordable and readily available <strong>water</strong>, natural <strong>resources</strong>, <strong><mark>food</strong>, <strong>health care</strong> and</mark> medical supplies, plus systematic threats to <strong>urban security</strong> and <strong><mark>systemic warfare</strong> are the alternatives</mark> to astral abundance. </u>The choices between astral abundance and a downward spiral in global standards of living are stark. <u><mark>Within the next few decades</mark> these problems will be increasingly real<mark>.</u></mark> By then <u>the world may almost be <strong>begging</strong> for new, out of- the-box thinking. </u>International peace and security will be an indispensable prerequisite for exploitation of astral abundance, as will good government for all. No one nation can be rich and secure when everyone else is poor and insecure. In short, global space security and strategic space defense, mediated by global space agreements, are part of this new pathway to the future. </p>

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The aff is ineffective in face of the aff. Mere theorization cannot alone solve material impacts and because violence is material not rhetorical, violence must be theorized on that plane

Zack 16

Naomi Zack 16. professor of philosophy at the University of Oregon. She is author and editor of a dozen books, including White Privilege and Black Rights: The Injustice of U.S. Police Racial Profiling and Homicide (2015); The Ethics and Mores of Race: Equality after the History of Philosophy (2011); Ethics for Disaster (2009). Applicative Justice: A Pragmatic Empirical Approach to Racial Injustice. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Incorporated. Pages 125-134.

Just law can coexist with unjust practice and both are parts of “empirical law” or what Bendey called “the process of government Empirical law is constantly changing theorists hope that someday public political discourse on behalf of those who are treated unjustly will have the power to interrupt a cycle of just written law accompanied by continued unjust practice That is, the “right” discourse perennially holds the promise of changing the beliefs, values, and goals of everyone in the public auditorium so that the same kind of unjust practices do not perpetually chase the same kinds of just laws This search for “magic words” is futile for academics who are professionally confined to dry and abstract prose Our verbiage does not have the power to move the multitudes who do not read or listen to it anyway. even when multitudes are inspired and emotionally stirred by great orators, action that follows is unlikely to result in lasting change, without the support of powerful interests Academic political discourse has been swimming upstream against a more rarefied tradition In the United States, everything now points to both the existence of real academic freedom and its real ineffectiveness Progressive academic writers ply a craft of formal speech that deals with contemporary injustice through complex theoretical frameworks with requisite scholarly apparatuses and without translation into more simple views of the world there is often also a lack of translation from one discipline to The audience is other academics and students there is a problem with the delusional nature of so much of this work The delusion consists of a naive view of the power of academic speech to directly change reality The rhetorical mode of address used by academics writing cultural criticism often proceeds as though its authors are making grand entries in a planetary cabala where words have the immediate power to become their intended referents Those subscribe to the Trickle-Down Good Ideas Theory that is immediately self-flattering but it lacks reliable empirical support even very good academic political discourse about justice cannot be relied upon to attract implementation or application in real life This may be because there has not been sufficient time for the development of training programs for a new profession of “bridgers,” who could translate good ideas in the academy for those who govern and make policy Public media, as a democratic analogue to disagreement within academic discourse, supports the idea that views have immediate practical results It is not evident how there could be such results when opposing views and opinions are treated with the same respect and have equal access to the same mass auditorium that lacks rules for evidence or valid argument As with academic discourse, there is no structured connection to official decision processes. The only reliable result of participation in such unbinding referenda is that those who participate are able to express themselves The shared judgment throughout the American atmosphere of race in the early twenty-first century is that racism is morally bad This judgment is a general principle that leaves the nature of racism undefined The overriding shared judgment is a bitter and ineffective refuge The “racial climate” has a history of meaning “micro-aggressions” based on race In using the term “racial atmosphere,” reference may be made to other issues of harm to people of color, such as ignorance and discrimination The implication of these meanings is that the micro-aggressions add up to what is perceived as a general predisposition of white people to treat people of color in unjust ways. But, at this time, ideas of racial atmosphere and climate also work as metaphors Except for what academics write and say and how important they think their discourse is American discourse of racial liberation is at a standstill And insofar as academic discourse is uttered and received in a closed system, with a semicaptive audience and no reliable means for it to affect the real world that standstill remains at the disposal of unpredictable contingent events

law is constantly changing theorists hope political discourse on behalf of those who are treated unjustly will interrupt unjust practice That is, the “right” discourse holds the promise of changing beliefs of everyone in the public This search for “magic words” is futile verbiage does not have the power to move the multitudes who do not read or listen to it even when multitudes are inspired action that follows is unlikely to result in lasting change, without the support of powerful interests there is often a lack of translation to reality Trickle-Down Good Ideas Theory is self-flattering, but lacks empirical support even very good discourse about justice cannot be relied on to attract implementation in real life because there has not been sufficient bridgers who translate ideas in the academy for those who make policy The only reliable result is that participate express themselves The judgment is a bitter and ineffective refuge American discourse is at a standstill. And in a closed system, with a semicaptive audience that standstill remains at the disposal of contingent events

ACADEMIC INJUSTICE DISCOURSE Just law can coexist with unjust practice and both are parts of “empirical law” or what Bendey called “the process of government.” Empirical law is constantly changing and some theorists are optimistic that verbal discourse has the ability to make written law more just, even though the same unjust practices recur or new ones emerge. These theorists, some of whom are or may aspire to become public intellectuals, hope that someday public political discourse on behalf of those who are treated unjustly will have the power to interrupt a cycle of just written law accompanied by continued unjust practice. That is, the “right” discourse perennially holds the promise of changing the beliefs, values, and goals of everyone in the public auditorium, so that the same kind of unjust practices do not perpetually chase the same kinds of just laws.11 This search for “magic words” is futile for academics who are professionally confined to dry and abstract prose. Our verbiage does not have the power to move the multitudes who do not read or listen to it anyway. But even when multitudes are inspired and emotionally stirred by great orators, action that follows is unlikely to result in lasting change, without the support of powerful interests. After the 1960s, academics began a robust practice of liberatory discourse about injustice that seems to grow more impassioned and intense each year. The quest for demographic diversity among students and faculty in higher education has weathered judicial defeat of explicit affirmative action policies, but only partly for the sake of justice. There are pragmatic prizes if the academy can justify itself by producing a racially integrated leadership and managerial class for business, politics, and the military. Top leaders throughout society realize that they need such racial diversity for broad consumption, voter support, and boots on the ground, and the expression of that need is evident in amicus curiae briefs submitted to the US Supreme Court as it has been torturously dismantling affirmative action, piece by piece, since Bakke in 1978.12 Academic political discourse has been deeper than polemics and debate, exactly because of its disciplined intellectual origins in different fields of study (i.e., discipline imposed by distinct “disciplines”). But it has been swimming upstream against a more rarefied and older academic tradition, particularly among many philosophers and their gate keepers outside of the profession. Even Hannah Arendt (see chapter 2) spoke approvingly of the life of the mind as cut off from real political activity that occurred in the realm of “opinion.” In her 1970 interview with Adelbert Reif, Arendt addressed the phenomenon of college-stu-dent protestors, noting that they had brought social change through optimistic belief in their ability to make a better world, while at the same time discovering joy in civic participation. Arendt credited such protests with the success of the civil rights movement and progress toward ending the Vietnam War.13 As discussed in chapter 4, it is doubtful that Arendt was correct that student protests caused the success of the civil rights movement. A historical analysis of the end to the Vietnam War is beyond the present scope, but what we already know about empirical Bentleyan analyses would warrant skepticism about Arendt’s causal thesis there as well. In the same interview, Arendt warned that demonstrations by student activists could be self-defeating in democratic Euro-American contexts, because in attacking their universities, they were attacking the very entities that made their protests possible, American universities, especially large state schools that were the sites of the protests Arendt had in mind, have perforce developed very different financial structures since 1970. These schools have become increasingly dependent on private corporate and philanthropic funding, with state government funds now a much reduced part of their budget. While this structural change is not generally viewed as an incursion on academic freedom, it has been coincident with a very flat era of student protest and activism. Still, Arendt's notion of the "life of the mind” remains useful if we consider that the progressive/change-seeking output of professional academics since 1970 has been professionally accepted in the institutions that employ its participants. Also, much of today’s liberatory academic discourse can be viewed as the legacy of earlier student protest, furthering a tradition that may have been founded when some of the 1960s student radicals became professors. This indicates that the connection between academic radicals and the hands that feed them is not as simple as Arendt thought. In the United States, everything now points to both the existence of real academic freedom and its real ineffectiveness. Progressive academic writers ply a craft of formal speech that deals with contemporary injustice through complex theoretical frameworks, with requisite scholarly apparatuses and without translation into more simple views of the world; there is often also a lack of translation from one discipline to another or between subdisciplines in the same field. The audience is other academics and students. Neither specialization nor the limited and partly captive audience should be viewed as problematic because that is the nature of academic work, given broad social divisions of labor. But there is a problem with the delusional nature of so much of this work. The delusion consists of a naive view of the power of academic speech to directly change reality. The rhetorical mode of address used by academics writing cultural criticism, political philosophy, social philosophy, or what is now called social-political philosophy (which combines the other subfield approaches), often proceeds as though its authors are making grand entries in a planetary cabala, where words have the immediate power to become their intended referents. Those who do not write and speak cabalistically may subscribe to the Trickle-Down Good Ideas Theory that can be traced from Plato to John Stuart Mill to John Rawls. Subscription to that theory is immediately self-flattering, but it lacks reliable empirical support.16 Although, after the US civil rights movement, there has been an uncanny coincidence of race-blind formal racial equality with the hegemony in political philosophy of Rawls’s requirement that those who plan fundamental social institutions do so in ignorance of their own societal environments. As we saw in chapter 1, Rawls was quite explicit about this: I assume that the parties do not know the particular circumstances of their own society. That is, they do not know its economic or political situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has been able to achieve. The persons in the original position have no information as to which generation they belong.17 Both race-blind racial equality and Rawlsian ideals are compatible with race-based real inequality. There are, of course, counter-examples, such as Katherine MacKinnon’s work on sexual harassment in the workplace as expressed in current law and institutional policy.18 Nevertheless even very good academic political discourse about justice and injustice cannot be relied upon to attract implementation or application in real life. This may be because there has not been sufficient time for the development of training programs for a new profession of “bridgers,” who could translate good ideas in the academy for those who govern and make policy. An internal problem for such translators would be to decide where to anchor their bridges in fields—every humanistic field—where experts disagree. However, the current tradition of progressive academic writing and speech is less than half a century old and if and when such translators emerge, they will develop their own professional criteria for choosing among contending experts. Public media, as a democratic analogue to disagreement within academic discourse, supports the idea that expressing and airing views in day-to-day practices or special “national conversations” also have immediate practical results. It is not evident how there could be such results, when opposing views and opinions are treated with the same respect and have equal access to the same mass auditorium that lacks rules for evidence or valid argument. As with academic discourse, there is no structured connection to official decision processes. The only reliable result of participation in such unbinding referenda is that those who participate are able to express themselves and get attention that may benefit them in the marketplace of their related endeavors. Public expression also serves to, represent and create collective atmospheres of belief, attitude, and opinion. These atmospheres are implicitly known by a majority of people in the culture, even though such knowledge is difficult to validate. Ambiguities cannot be resolved by recourse to public opinion polls, because understanding the results of those polls requires creative interpretive skills that draw on what is already known about relevant atmospheres. For example, suppose that more blacks than whites believe that white privilege is real and that O.J. Simpson was innocent, or that more whites than blacks believe that white American police officers are not, in general, racially biased. Are the views of whites evidence of racial bias or racial oblivion? Are the views of blacks evidence of racial preference or paranoia? Moreover, such polls almost always have a large racial overlap of opinion: If 29 percent of blacks compared to 71 percent of whites believe X, then 71 percent of blacks and 29 percent of whites do not believe X. Does this mean that the percentages of each group that does not contribute to the discrepancy in belief recorded in the polls are in some degree of agreement? Experiments in social psychology could be designed to answer such questions and others like them, but it is important to decide beforehand why the data is important and what it does and does not indicate. For instance, testing the claim that white privilege is a reality of contemporary life requires some prior definition of what is meant by “white privilege,” which can range from injustice to social courtesies. In a widely discussed 2013 experiment conducted in Queensland, Australia, economists Redzo Mujcic and Paul Frijters found that the majority of free bus rides, based on conductor generosity, were dispensed to whites, with blacks least likely to receive this courtesy, compared to all other racial groups among commuters. Journalist Britni Danielle, writing for a general audience on Yahoo News, touted this study as evidence that “white privilege is real,” without distinguishing between an amenity such as a free bus ride and recognition of one’s rights by not being subject to arbitrary stops and frisks by police officers.19 Conservatives reading Mujcic and Frijter’s study might say that the bus driver may have been acting rationally based on past experience with unruly black passengers. From a progressive perspective, more specifics would need to be introduced to defend the claim that this study revealed white privilege, such as controls for the apparent social class and gender of passengers, as well as the preexisting racial climate among bus commuters in Queensland, as well as the broader racial atmosphere throughout Australia in 2013. The 2015 Academy Awards What is racial atmosphere and climate? A US example that is also global could help clarify these vague ideas, provided that it is understood beforehand that in this context, as in most public references to "race," ‘racial” means “pertaining to racism.” From beginning to end, the 2015 Academy Awards ceremony hit racist notes that slid by unchecked, because it was an occasion of celebration. Neil Patrick Harris, the host, began with what might have been a critical remark about the lack of racial diversity among audience members and award winners: “Tonight we honor Hollywood’s best and whitest, sorry, bright est.” For those who were uncomfortable with the lack of robust racial diversity among audience members and award winners, his remark might have validated their unease. But those who would have been uncomfortable with more racial diversity may have been heard “best and whitest” as support for their social values. (The discourse of white privilege as a critique of contemporary anti-nonwhite racism is, as indicated, that kind of double-edged sword.) Midway through the ceremony, Patricia Arquette called for people of color and members of the lesbian, bisexual, gay, and transgender (LBGT) community to support legislation for equal pay for women and to commit themselves to supporting women, thereby overlooking the women who were either or both people of color and members of the LGВТ community. This kind of oversight may perhaps be excused by Arquette’s ignorance of what academics have been for decades analyzing as “intersectionality.” But Sean Penn’s remark at the grand finale awarding for Best Picture to Alejandro Gonzalez Inarritu, the Mexican director of Birdman, was simply, explicitly, racist: "Who gave this son of a bitch a green card?” Inarritu later brushed off the insult by saying he found it "hilarious,” because “Sean and I have that kind of brutal relationship. I think it was very funny.”20 Inarritu attempt at a “save” for Penn does not address the impact of Penn’s insult on other Mexicans and Mexican Americans, including those without green cards who struggle to remain employed in the face of anti-immigrant prejudice and discrimination. (That such a moment of maximum recognition was brought so low by a racist crack is not unusual in US culture, where the nastiest forms of racist insult are often let loose on people of color who have succeeded.) As a spectacle watched by almost thirty-four million, the 2015 Oscars, despite ratings lower than recent years, was a global public event.21 Symbolically, it has no peer for the display of beauty, talent, and artistic creativity. Its subtext inevitably has implications about current American race relations, which influence their future. The racial implications of the Oscars replays in millions of minds at countless other public celebrations and entertainment venues, as well as in private interactions (for a year at least). Such spectacles are forms of public discourse and what they represent or fail to represent about US racial demographics and the attitude of the dominant white group creates or augments a specific racial climate that in 2015 is part of a more general racial atmosphere of ambiguity and indeterminacy. At the 2015 Academy Awards, for many critical observers, the issue or subject pertaining to race (insofar as it is understood that subjects of race are subjects of racism), was recognition.22 The beauty, talent, and artistic creativity of people of color was not fully recognized. Some people of color did get awards and some audience members were people of color, so recognition, along with diversity, was not completely absent. But there appeared to be insufficient racial diversity for audience and award winners to be considered racially integrated. And that appearance was symbolic. However, the symbolic meaning is ambiguous: Were there people of color who were deserving of awards but did not get them because they were people of color? Is race a factor in who I becomes a member of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences? In the future, will the racial makeup of award winners become more or less representative of their proportions in the motion picture industry? If the proportion of people of color in the motion picture industry is not proportional to their presence in the population at large, why is that? The answers to these questions are undetermined in the symbolic spectacle of the 2015 Academy Awards. The observer does not know if recognition of the achievements of people of color in the movie industry will improve, stay the same, or get worse, and she does not know how to find out. The racial (i.e., in regards to racism) climate of the Academy Awards is cloudy, subject to many different interpretations, some of them conflicting. It is an epistemologically unstable racial climate, because people of color do not know what the weather is in that climate, as a basis for prediction, and neither do they know how to find out. The shared judgment throughout the American atmosphere of race in the early twenty-first century is that racism is morally bad. This judgment is a general principle that leaves the nature of racism undefined throughout the atmosphere and most of the climates and subclimates of race. The overriding shared judgment is a bitter and ineffective refuge for nonwhites, because it does not protect them from either First Amendment-protected racist expressions or actions that turn out to be indirectly racist. Energetic self-aware racist whites can try to evade the judgment that they are racist through coded language for racial difference, and the use of intermediate activities and traits as subjects of direct action. That is, something other than race, which nonetheless does a good job of picking out members of a specific racial group, can be used instead of the race of that group to maintain prejudice and legitimize discrimination. The term “racial climate” has a history of meaning “micro-aggressions” based on race, small cuts, insults, and slights that can have a cumulative effect of individual harm.24 In using the term “racial atmosphere,” reference may be made to other issues of harm to people of color, such as ignorance of black history and contemporary racism or discrimination in career advancement.25 The implication of these meanings is that the micro-aggressions add up to what is perceived as a general predisposition of white people to treat people of color in unjust ways. But, at this time, ideas of racial atmosphere and climate also work as metaphors for what is unknown about race relations and attitudes; they capture the vagueness and unpredictability of racial prejudice and discrimination that occur in a society where nonwhites remain disadvantaged, even though there is formal equality. This “vague weather” aspect of atmosphere and climate is an epistemological condition of indecision that may or may not constitute a lasting crisis, although some syndromes of political injustice should be viewed as crises. A crisis is a period of indecision and uncertainty that requires a resolution before life can go on. Will blacks and other people of color achieve more equality with whites, or is the United States—and with it the world, because US racism is exported with business practices, tour-ism, and entertainment products—on the brink of a new era of explicitlу direct oppression of people of color? Are most white Americans, whose race-neutral economic and social activities have racist effects on nonwhites, genuinely ignorant of how the system in which they operate works, or are they secretly but knowingly hearts-and-minds not clear that this indeterminate aspect of present racial atmosphere and climates must be resolved now. We do not know if life can go on if it is not resolved or what it means for life to go on, or not. We do not even know if the putative crisis can be resolved at this time, because there is as yet no systematic and sustained, impassioned, liberatory dis- course for our condition of ambiguity, a time with a black president and police killing with impunity of unarmed black youth, a time of voting rights for everyone but new restrictions and requirements that disproportionately affect African Americans.26 Except for what academics write and say and how important they think their discourse is (among themselves), American discourse of racial liberation is at a standstill. And insofar as academic discourse is uttered and received in a closed system, with a semicaptive audience and no reliable means for it to affect the real world, that standstill remains at the disposal of history, where history is understood to be the unpredictable result of contingent events. However, if academic oppositional political discourse can be related to a longer historical trend, a more coherent and optimistic picture might emerge. Cornel West's ideas about the American black prophetic tradition appears to be a relation to such a trend.

<h4>The aff is ineffective in face of the aff. Mere theorization cannot alone solve material impacts and because violence is material not rhetorical, violence must be theorized on that plane </h4><p>Naomi <strong>Zack 16</strong>. professor of philosophy at the University of Oregon. She is author and editor of a dozen books, including White Privilege and Black Rights: The Injustice of U.S. Police Racial Profiling and Homicide (2015); The Ethics and Mores of Race: Equality after the History of Philosophy (2011); Ethics for Disaster (2009). Applicative Justice: A Pragmatic Empirical Approach to Racial Injustice. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Incorporated. Pages 125-134. </p><p>ACADEMIC INJUSTICE DISCOURSE <u>Just law can <strong>coexist with unjust practice</u></strong> <u>and both are parts of “<strong>empirical law</strong>”</u> <u>or what Bendey called “the</u> <u><strong>process of government</u></strong>.” <u>Empirical <mark>law is <strong>constantly changing</u></strong></mark> and some theorists are optimistic that verbal discourse has the ability to make written law more just, even though the same unjust practices recur or new ones emerge. These <u><mark>theorists</u></mark>, some of whom are or may aspire to become public intellectuals, <u><mark>hope</mark> that someday <strong>public <mark>political discourse on behalf of those who are treated unjustly</u></strong> <u>will</mark> have the power to <strong><mark>interrupt</mark> a cycle of just written law</u></strong> <u>accompanied by continued <strong><mark>unjust practice</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>That is, the “right” discourse</mark> perennially <mark>holds the promise of <strong>changing</mark> the <mark>beliefs</mark>, values, and goals <mark>of everyone in the public</mark> auditorium</u></strong>, <u>so that the same kind of unjust practices do not perpetually chase the same kinds of just laws</u>.11 <u><mark>This search for “<strong>magic words</strong>”</u> <u>is <strong>futile</mark> for academics</u></strong> <u>who are professionally confined to dry and abstract prose</u>. <u>Our <mark>verbiage <strong>does not have the power to move the multitudes who do not read or listen to it</mark> anyway</strong>.</u> But <u><mark>even when multitudes are inspired</mark> and emotionally stirred by great orators, <mark>action that follows is <strong>unlikely to result in lasting change, without the support of powerful interests</u></strong></mark>. After the 1960s, academics began a robust practice of liberatory discourse about injustice that seems to grow more impassioned and intense each year. The quest for demographic diversity among students and faculty in higher education has weathered judicial defeat of explicit affirmative action policies, but only partly for the sake of justice. There are pragmatic prizes if the academy can justify itself by producing a racially integrated leadership and managerial class for business, politics, and the military. Top leaders throughout society realize that they need such racial diversity for broad consumption, voter support, and boots on the ground, and the expression of that need is evident in amicus curiae briefs submitted to the US Supreme Court as it has been torturously dismantling affirmative action, piece by piece, since Bakke in 1978.12 <u>Academic political discourse</u> has been deeper than polemics and debate, exactly because of its disciplined intellectual origins in different fields of study (i.e., discipline imposed by distinct “disciplines”). But it <u>has been <strong>swimming upstream</u></strong> <u>against a more</u> <u><strong>rarefied</u></strong> and older academic <u><strong>tradition</u></strong>, particularly among many philosophers and their gate keepers outside of the profession. Even Hannah Arendt (see chapter 2) spoke approvingly of the life of the mind as cut off from real political activity that occurred in the realm of “opinion.” In her 1970 interview with Adelbert Reif, Arendt addressed the phenomenon of college-stu-dent protestors, noting that they had brought social change through optimistic belief in their ability to make a better world, while at the same time discovering joy in civic participation. Arendt credited such protests with the success of the civil rights movement and progress toward ending the Vietnam War.13 As discussed in chapter 4, it is doubtful that Arendt was correct that student protests caused the success of the civil rights movement. A historical analysis of the end to the Vietnam War is beyond the present scope, but what we already know about empirical Bentleyan analyses would warrant skepticism about Arendt’s causal thesis there as well. In the same interview, Arendt warned that demonstrations by student activists could be self-defeating in democratic Euro-American contexts, because in attacking their universities, they were attacking the very entities that made their protests possible, American universities, especially large state schools that were the sites of the protests Arendt had in mind, have perforce developed very different financial structures since 1970. These schools have become increasingly dependent on private corporate and philanthropic funding, with state government funds now a much reduced part of their budget. While this structural change is not generally viewed as an incursion on academic freedom, it has been coincident with a very flat era of student protest and activism. Still, Arendt's notion of the "life of the mind” remains useful if we consider that the progressive/change-seeking output of professional academics since 1970 has been professionally accepted in the institutions that employ its participants. Also, much of today’s liberatory academic discourse can be viewed as the legacy of earlier student protest, furthering a tradition that may have been founded when some of the 1960s student radicals became professors. This indicates that the connection between academic radicals and the hands that feed them is not as simple as Arendt thought. <u>In the United States, everything now points to both the existence of <strong>real academic freedom</strong> and its <strong>real ineffectiveness</u></strong>. <u>Progressive academic writers ply a craft of formal speech that deals with contemporary injustice through complex theoretical frameworks</u>, <u>with requisite <strong>scholarly apparatuses</strong> and <strong>without translation into more simple views of the world</u></strong>; <u><mark>there is often</mark> also <mark>a <strong>lack of translation</u></strong></mark> <u>from one discipline</u> <u><mark>to</u></mark> another or between subdisciplines in the same field. <u>The audience is other <strong>academics</strong> and <strong>students</u></strong>. Neither specialization nor the limited and partly captive audience should be viewed as problematic because that is the nature of academic work, given broad social divisions of labor. But <u>there is a problem with the <strong>delusional nature</strong> of so much of this work</u>. <u>The delusion consists of a naive view of the power of academic speech to <strong>directly change <mark>reality</u></strong></mark>. <u>The <strong>rhetorical mode of address</u></strong> <u>used by academics writing cultural criticism</u>, political philosophy, social philosophy, or what is now called social-political philosophy (which combines the other subfield approaches), <u>often proceeds as though its authors are making <strong>grand entries in a planetary cabala</u></strong>, <u>where words have the <strong>immediate power to become their intended referents</u></strong>. <u>Those</u> who do not write and speak cabalistically may <u>subscribe to the <strong><mark>Trickle-Down Good Ideas Theory</u></strong></mark> that can be traced from Plato to John Stuart Mill to John Rawls. Subscription to <u>that</u> theory <u><mark>is</mark> <strong>immediately <mark>self-flattering</u></strong>, <u>but</mark> it <strong><mark>lacks</mark> reliable <mark>empirical support</u></strong></mark>.16 Although, after the US civil rights movement, there has been an uncanny coincidence of race-blind formal racial equality with the hegemony in political philosophy of Rawls’s requirement that those who plan fundamental social institutions do so in ignorance of their own societal environments. As we saw in chapter 1, Rawls was quite explicit about this: I assume that the parties do not know the particular circumstances of their own society. That is, they do not know its economic or political situation, or the level of civilization and culture it has been able to achieve. The persons in the original position have no information as to which generation they belong.17 Both race-blind racial equality and Rawlsian ideals are compatible with race-based real inequality. There are, of course, counter-examples, such as Katherine MacKinnon’s work on sexual harassment in the workplace as expressed in current law and institutional policy.18 Nevertheless <u><mark>even <strong>very good</mark> academic political <mark>discourse about justice</u></strong></mark> and injustice <u><mark>cannot be relied</mark> up<mark>on to attract <strong>implementation</mark> or application <mark>in real life</u></strong></mark>. <u>This may be <mark>because there has not been sufficient</mark> time for the development of training programs for a new profession of <strong>“<mark>bridgers</mark>,” <mark>who</mark> could <mark>translate</mark> good <mark>ideas in the academy for those who</mark> govern and <mark>make policy</u></strong></mark>. An internal problem for such translators would be to decide where to anchor their bridges in fields—every humanistic field—where experts disagree. However, the current tradition of progressive academic writing and speech is less than half a century old and if and when such translators emerge, they will develop their own professional criteria for choosing among contending experts. <u>Public media, as a democratic analogue to disagreement within academic discourse, supports the idea that</u> expressing and airing <u>views</u> in day-to-day practices or special “national conversations” also <u>have immediate practical results</u>. <u>It is <strong>not evident how there could be such results</u></strong>, <u>when opposing views and opinions are treated with the same respect and have equal access to the same mass auditorium that <strong>lacks rules for evidence or valid argument</u></strong>. <u>As with academic discourse, there is no structured connection to official decision processes. <mark>The only reliable result</mark> of participation in such <strong>unbinding referenda</u></strong> <u><mark>is that</mark> those who <mark>participate</mark> are able to <strong><mark>express themselves</u></strong></mark> and get attention that may benefit them in the marketplace of their related endeavors. Public expression also serves to, represent and create collective atmospheres of belief, attitude, and opinion. These atmospheres are implicitly known by a majority of people in the culture, even though such knowledge is difficult to validate. Ambiguities cannot be resolved by recourse to public opinion polls, because understanding the results of those polls requires creative interpretive skills that draw on what is already known about relevant atmospheres. For example, suppose that more blacks than whites believe that white privilege is real and that O.J. Simpson was innocent, or that more whites than blacks believe that white American police officers are not, in general, racially biased. Are the views of whites evidence of racial bias or racial oblivion? Are the views of blacks evidence of racial preference or paranoia? Moreover, such polls almost always have a large racial overlap of opinion: If 29 percent of blacks compared to 71 percent of whites believe X, then 71 percent of blacks and 29 percent of whites do not believe X. Does this mean that the percentages of each group that does not contribute to the discrepancy in belief recorded in the polls are in some degree of agreement? Experiments in social psychology could be designed to answer such questions and others like them, but it is important to decide beforehand why the data is important and what it does and does not indicate. For instance, testing the claim that white privilege is a reality of contemporary life requires some prior definition of what is meant by “white privilege,” which can range from injustice to social courtesies. In a widely discussed 2013 experiment conducted in Queensland, Australia, economists Redzo Mujcic and Paul Frijters found that the majority of free bus rides, based on conductor generosity, were dispensed to whites, with blacks least likely to receive this courtesy, compared to all other racial groups among commuters. Journalist Britni Danielle, writing for a general audience on Yahoo News, touted this study as evidence that “white privilege is real,” without distinguishing between an amenity such as a free bus ride and recognition of one’s rights by not being subject to arbitrary stops and frisks by police officers.19 Conservatives reading Mujcic and Frijter’s study might say that the bus driver may have been acting rationally based on past experience with unruly black passengers. From a progressive perspective, more specifics would need to be introduced to defend the claim that this study revealed white privilege, such as controls for the apparent social class and gender of passengers, as well as the preexisting racial climate among bus commuters in Queensland, as well as the broader racial atmosphere throughout Australia in 2013. The 2015 Academy Awards What is racial atmosphere and climate? A US example that is also global could help clarify these vague ideas, provided that it is understood beforehand that in this context, as in most public references to "race," ‘racial” means “pertaining to racism.” From beginning to end, the 2015 Academy Awards ceremony hit racist notes that slid by unchecked, because it was an occasion of celebration. Neil Patrick Harris, the host, began with what might have been a critical remark about the lack of racial diversity among audience members and award winners: “Tonight we honor Hollywood’s best and whitest, sorry, bright est.” For those who were uncomfortable with the lack of robust racial diversity among audience members and award winners, his remark might have validated their unease. But those who would have been uncomfortable with more racial diversity may have been heard “best and whitest” as support for their social values. (The discourse of white privilege as a critique of contemporary anti-nonwhite racism is, as indicated, that kind of double-edged sword.) Midway through the ceremony, Patricia Arquette called for people of color and members of the lesbian, bisexual, gay, and transgender (LBGT) community to support legislation for equal pay for women and to commit themselves to supporting women, thereby overlooking the women who were either or both people of color and members of the LGВТ community. This kind of oversight may perhaps be excused by Arquette’s ignorance of what academics have been for decades analyzing as “intersectionality.” But Sean Penn’s remark at the grand finale awarding for Best Picture to Alejandro Gonzalez Inarritu, the Mexican director of Birdman, was simply, explicitly, racist: "Who gave this son of a bitch a green card?” Inarritu later brushed off the insult by saying he found it "hilarious,” because “Sean and I have that kind of brutal relationship. I think it was very funny.”20 Inarritu attempt at a “save” for Penn does not address the impact of Penn’s insult on other Mexicans and Mexican Americans, including those without green cards who struggle to remain employed in the face of anti-immigrant prejudice and discrimination. (That such a moment of maximum recognition was brought so low by a racist crack is not unusual in US culture, where the nastiest forms of racist insult are often let loose on people of color who have succeeded.) As a spectacle watched by almost thirty-four million, the 2015 Oscars, despite ratings lower than recent years, was a global public event.21 Symbolically, it has no peer for the display of beauty, talent, and artistic creativity. Its subtext inevitably has implications about current American race relations, which influence their future. The racial implications of the Oscars replays in millions of minds at countless other public celebrations and entertainment venues, as well as in private interactions (for a year at least). Such spectacles are forms of public discourse and what they represent or fail to represent about US racial demographics and the attitude of the dominant white group creates or augments a specific racial climate that in 2015 is part of a more general racial atmosphere of ambiguity and indeterminacy. At the 2015 Academy Awards, for many critical observers, the issue or subject pertaining to race (insofar as it is understood that subjects of race are subjects of racism), was recognition.22 The beauty, talent, and artistic creativity of people of color was not fully recognized. Some people of color did get awards and some audience members were people of color, so recognition, along with diversity, was not completely absent. But there appeared to be insufficient racial diversity for audience and award winners to be considered racially integrated. And that appearance was symbolic. However, the symbolic meaning is ambiguous: Were there people of color who were deserving of awards but did not get them because they were people of color? Is race a factor in who I becomes a member of the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and Sciences? In the future, will the racial makeup of award winners become more or less representative of their proportions in the motion picture industry? If the proportion of people of color in the motion picture industry is not proportional to their presence in the population at large, why is that? The answers to these questions are undetermined in the symbolic spectacle of the 2015 Academy Awards. The observer does not know if recognition of the achievements of people of color in the movie industry will improve, stay the same, or get worse, and she does not know how to find out. The racial (i.e., in regards to racism) climate of the Academy Awards is cloudy, subject to many different interpretations, some of them conflicting. It is an epistemologically unstable racial climate, because people of color do not know what the weather is in that climate, as a basis for prediction, and neither do they know how to find out. <u>The shared judgment throughout the American atmosphere of race in the early twenty-first century is that racism is morally bad</u>. <u>This judgment is a <strong>general principle</u></strong> <u>that leaves the <strong>nature of racism undefined</u></strong> throughout the atmosphere and most of the climates and subclimates of race. <u><mark>The</mark> overriding shared <mark>judgment is a <strong>bitter and ineffective refuge</u></strong></mark> for nonwhites, because it does not protect them from either First Amendment-protected racist expressions or actions that turn out to be indirectly racist. Energetic self-aware racist whites can try to evade the judgment that they are racist through coded language for racial difference, and the use of intermediate activities and traits as subjects of direct action. That is, something other than race, which nonetheless does a good job of picking out members of a specific racial group, can be used instead of the race of that group to maintain prejudice and legitimize discrimination. <u>The</u> term <u><strong>“racial climate”</u></strong> <u>has a history of meaning “micro-aggressions” based on race</u>, small cuts, insults, and slights that can have a cumulative effect of individual harm.24 <u>In using the term “racial atmosphere,” reference may be made to other issues of harm to people of color, such as <strong>ignorance</u></strong> of black history <u>and</u> contemporary racism or <u><strong>discrimination</u></strong> in career advancement.25 <u>The implication of these meanings is that the micro-aggressions add up to what is perceived as a <strong>general predisposition of white people</u></strong> <u>to treat people of color in unjust ways. But, at this time, ideas of racial atmosphere and climate also work as metaphors</u> for what is unknown about race relations and attitudes; they capture the vagueness and unpredictability of racial prejudice and discrimination that occur in a society where nonwhites remain disadvantaged, even though there is formal equality. This “vague weather” aspect of atmosphere and climate is an epistemological condition of indecision that may or may not constitute a lasting crisis, although some syndromes of political injustice should be viewed as crises. A crisis is a period of indecision and uncertainty that requires a resolution before life can go on. Will blacks and other people of color achieve more equality with whites, or is the United States—and with it the world, because US racism is exported with business practices, tour-ism, and entertainment products—on the brink of a new era of explicitlу direct oppression of people of color? Are most white Americans, whose race-neutral economic and social activities have racist effects on nonwhites, genuinely ignorant of how the system in which they operate works, or are they secretly but knowingly hearts-and-minds not clear that this indeterminate aspect of present racial atmosphere and climates must be resolved now. We do not know if life can go on if it is not resolved or what it means for life to go on, or not. We do not even know if the putative crisis can be resolved at this time, because there is as yet no systematic and sustained, impassioned, liberatory dis- course for our condition of ambiguity, a time with a black president and police killing with impunity of unarmed black youth, a time of voting rights for everyone but new restrictions and requirements that disproportionately affect African Americans.26 <u>Except for what academics <strong>write and say</strong> and <strong>how important they think their discourse is</u></strong> (among themselves), <u><mark>American discourse</mark> of racial liberation <mark>is at a <strong>standstill</u></strong>. <u>And</mark> insofar as academic discourse is uttered and received <mark>in a <strong>closed system</strong>,</u> <u>with a <strong>semicaptive audience</u></strong></mark> <u>and <strong>no reliable means for it to affect the real world</u></strong>, <u><mark>that standstill remains <strong>at the disposal of</u></strong></mark> history, where history is understood to be the <u><strong>unpredictable</u></strong> result of <u><strong><mark>contingent events</u></strong></mark>. However, if academic oppositional political discourse can be related to a longer historical trend, a more coherent and optimistic picture might emerge. Cornel West's ideas about the American black prophetic tradition appears to be a relation to such a trend. </p>

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Root cause explanations of international politics don’t exist – methodological pluralism is necessary to reclaim IR as emancipatory praxis and avoid endless political violence.

Bleiker 14

Bleiker 14 – (6/17, Roland, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique,” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2, pages 325–327)

the key challenge in IR is “unchecked reification” the widespread and dangerous process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe The dangers are real because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues, from genocides to war Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can have far-reaching consequences Levine detects self-reflective and critical moments in straightforward positivist positions outlines why while explicitly post-positivist IR scholarship, often lacked critical self-awareness respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that reification is a consequence of all thinking sustainable critique not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself” He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked. Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand But each should recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when or, rather, precisely when they are deemed incompatible They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences The benefit of such methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them reification may be “checked at the source” and a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable” Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another”

the key challenge in is “unchecked reification” dangerous because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues, from genocides to war Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can have far-reaching consequences Levine detects self-reflective moments in positivist positions outlines why explicitly post-positivist IR often lacked critical self-awareness reification is a consequence of all thinking . The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked. Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of sustainable critique multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms trying to understand from multiple perspectives No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand But each should recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot In practical terms, this means combining methods precisely when they are deemed incompatible They can range from poststructual deconstruction to positivist social sciences The benefit of methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives reification may be “checked at the source”

This book is part of an increasing trend of scholarly works that have embraced poststructural critique but want to ground it in more positive political foundations, while retaining a reluctance to return to the positivist tendencies that implicitly underpin much of constructivist research. The path that Daniel Levine has carved out is innovative, sophisticated, and convincing. A superb scholarly achievement. For Levine, the key challenge in international relations (IR) scholarship is what he calls “unchecked reification”: the widespread and dangerous process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe or to which they refer” (p. 15). The dangers are real, Levine stresses, because IR deals with some of the most difficult issues, from genocides to war. Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can thus have far-reaching consequences. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. His ultimate goal is to overcome reification, or, to be more precise, to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated. Levine proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship, for he detects self-reflective and critical moments in scholars that are usually associated with straightforward positivist positions (such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Graham Allison). But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge. The second stage of Levine's inquiry outlines why IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Here, he points to a range of factors and phenomena, from peer review processes to the speed at which academics are meant to publish. And here too, he eschews conventional wisdom, showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate, while explicitly post-positivist and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing IR scholarship, often lacked critical self-awareness. As a result, Levine believes that many of the respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that “reification is a consequence of all thinking—including itself” (p. 68). The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one. Here, he outlines the path toward what he calls “sustainable critique”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. Critique, for him, is not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists. It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself” (p. 12). The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Two stand out: First, if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are, then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second, if one constantly questions one's own perspective, does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has, of course, been critiqued as relentlessly negative, even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters, such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth). The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are, in my view, both convincing and useful at a practical level. He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked. Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of Levine's sustainable critique. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena. He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing” (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms, trying to understand the event in question from multiple perspectives. No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand . But each should, in a way, recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot (p. 102). In practical terms, this means combining a range of methods even when—or, rather, precisely when—they are deemed incompatible. They can range from poststructual deconstruction to the tools pioneered and championed by positivist social sciences. The benefit of such a methodological polyphony is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives. Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them. For Levine, this is how reification may be “checked at the source” and this is how a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable” (p. 103). It is in this sense that Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but, rather, an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another” (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments advanced by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.

<h4><strong>Root cause explanations of international politics don’t exist – methodological pluralism is necessary to reclaim IR as emancipatory praxis and avoid endless political violence.</h4><p>Bleiker 14</strong> – (6/17, Roland, Professor of International Relations at the University of Queensland, “International Theory Between Reification and Self-Reflective Critique,” International Studies Review, Volume 16, Issue 2, pages 325–327)</p><p>This book is part of an increasing trend of scholarly works that have embraced poststructural critique but want to ground it in more positive political foundations, while retaining a reluctance to return to the positivist tendencies that implicitly underpin much of constructivist research. The path that Daniel Levine has carved out is innovative, sophisticated, and convincing. A superb scholarly achievement.</p><p>For Levine, <u><mark>the key challenge in</u></mark> international relations (<u><strong>IR</u></strong>) scholarship <u><mark>is</u></mark> what he calls <u><strong><mark>“unchecked reification”</u></strong></mark>: <u>the widespread and <mark>dangerous</mark> process of forgetting “the distinction between theoretical concepts and the real-world things they mean to describe</u> or to which they refer” (p. 15). <u>The dangers are real</u>, Levine stresses, <u><mark>because <strong>IR deals with</strong> some of the most difficult issues, from <strong>genocides to war</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Upholding one subjective position without critical scrutiny can</u></mark> thus <u><mark>have <strong>far-reaching consequences</u></strong></mark>. Following Theodor Adorno—who is the key theoretical influence on this book—Levine takes a post-positive position and assumes that the world cannot be known outside of our human perceptions and the values that are inevitably intertwined with them. His ultimate goal is to overcome reification, or, to be more precise, to recognize it as an inevitable aspect of thought so that its dangerous consequences can be mitigated.</p><p><u><mark>Levine</u></mark> proceeds in three stages: First he reviews several decades of IR theories to resurrect critical moments when scholars displayed an acute awareness of the dangers of reification. He refreshingly breaks down distinctions between conventional and progressive scholarship, for he <u><mark>detects self-reflective</mark> and critical <mark>moments in</u></mark> scholars that are usually associated with <u>straightforward <mark>positivist positions</u></mark> (such as E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, or Graham Allison). But Levine also shows how these moments of self-reflexivity never lasted long and were driven out by the compulsion to offer systematic and scientific knowledge.</p><p>The second stage of Levine's inquiry <u><mark>outlines why</u></mark> IR scholars regularly closed down critique. Here, he points to a range of factors and phenomena, from peer review processes to the speed at which academics are meant to publish. And here too, he eschews conventional wisdom, showing that work conducted in the wake of the third debate, <u>while <mark>explicitly post-positivist</u></mark> and critiquing the reifying tendencies of existing <u><mark>IR</u></mark> <u>scholarship, <mark>often lacked critical self-awareness</u></mark>. As a result, Levine believes that many of the <u>respective authors failed to appreciate sufficiently that</u> “<u><strong><mark>reification is a consequence of all thinking</u></strong></mark>—including itself” (p. 68).</p><p>The third objective of Levine's book is also the most interesting one. Here, he outlines the path toward what he calls “<u>sustainable critique</u>”: a form of self-reflection that can counter the dangers of reification. Critique, for him, is <u>not just something that is directed outwards, against particular theories or theorists</u>. <u>It is also inward-oriented, ongoing, and sensitive to the “limitations of thought itself”</u> (p. 12).</p><p>The challenges that such a sustainable critique faces are formidable. Two stand out: First, if the natural tendency to forget the origins and values of our concepts are as strong as Levine and other Adorno-inspired theorists believe they are, then how can we actually recognize our own reifying tendencies? Are we not all inevitably and subconsciously caught in a web of meanings from which we cannot escape? Second, if one constantly questions one's own perspective, does one not fall into a relativism that loses the ability to establish the kind of stable foundations that are necessary for political action? Adorno has, of course, been critiqued as relentlessly negative, even by his second-generation Frankfurt School successors (from Jürgen Habermas to his IR interpreters, such as Andrew Linklater and Ken Booth).</p><p>The response that Levine has to these two sets of legitimate criticisms are, in my view, both convincing and useful at a practical level. <u>He starts off with depicting reification not as a flaw that is meant to be expunged, but as an a priori condition for scholarship<strong><mark>. The challenge then is not to let it go unchecked.</p><p>Methodological pluralism lies at the heart of</mark> Levine's <mark>sustainable critique</u></strong></mark>. He borrows from what Adorno calls a “constellation”: an attempt to juxtapose, rather than integrate, different perspectives. It is in this spirit that Levine advocates <u><strong><mark>multiple methods to understand the same event or phenomena</u></strong></mark>. <u>He writes of the need to validate “multiple and mutually incompatible ways of seeing”</u> (p. 63, see also pp. 101–102). In this model, <u><mark>a scholar oscillates back and forth between different methods and paradigms</u></mark>, <u><mark>trying to understand</mark> the event in question <mark>from multiple perspectives</u></mark>. <u><strong><mark>No single method can ever adequately represent the event or should gain the upper hand</p><p></u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>But each should</u></mark>, in a way, <u><strong><mark>recognize and capture details or perspectives that the others cannot</u></strong></mark> (p. 102). <u><mark>In practical terms, this means <strong>combining</mark> a range of <mark>methods</strong></mark> even when</u>—<u><strong>or, rather, <mark>precisely when</u></strong></mark>—<u><mark>they are deemed incompatible</u></mark>. <u><mark>They can <strong>range from poststructual deconstruction</strong> to</mark> the tools pioneered and championed by</u> <u><strong><mark>positivist social sciences</u></strong></mark>.</p><p><u><mark>The benefit of</mark> such</u> a <u><strong><mark>methodological polyphony</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>is not just the opportunity to bring out nuances and new perspectives</u></mark>. <u>Once the false hope of a smooth synthesis has been abandoned, the very incompatibility of the respective perspectives can then be used to identify the reifying tendencies in each of them</u>. For Levine, this is how <u><strong><mark>reification may be “checked at the source”</u></strong></mark> <u>and</u> this is how <u>a “critically reflexive moment might thus be rendered sustainable”</u> (p. 103). It is in this sense that <u>Levine's approach is not really post-foundational but</u>, rather, <u>an attempt to “balance foundationalisms against one another”</u> (p. 14). There are strong parallels here with arguments advanced by assemblage thinking and complexity theory—links that could have been explored in more detail.</p>

1AC

1AC – Yemen

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1AC - Saudi Arabia 1NC - Gerard K Assurances DA Disclosure Theory 2NR - Gerard K

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Fifth, root cause claims and focus on overarching structures ignore application to material injustice.

Pappas 2.

Pappas 2. The Pragmatists Approach to Injustice, by Gregory Fernando Pappas. The Pluralist, Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016, pp. 58-77. Published by University of Illinois Press.

The pragmatists’ approach should be distinguished from nonideal theories whose starting point seems to be the injustices of society at large that have a history and persist through time this approach assumes that¶ a philosophical critique of specific social situations can be accomplished only under the assumption of a broader and full blown critique of soci- ety in its entirety: as a critique of capitalism, of modernity, of western civilization, of rationality itself Pragmatism does not deny the importance of power structures and seeing the connections be- tween injustices through time To capture the legacy of the past on present injustices, we must study history but also seek present evidence of the weight of the past on the present injustice.¶ pragmatists’ approach takes as its main focus diagnosing and treating the particular present illness, that is, the particular situation-bound injustice and not a global “social pathology” or some single transhistorical source of injustice concepts and categories “white supremacy” and “colonialism are nothing more than tools to make reference to and ameliorate particular injustices experienced (suffered) in the midst of a particular and unique re- lationship in a situation complexity of a problem of injustice does not always stop at the level of being a member of a historical group or even a member of many groups, as insisted on by intersectional analysis. There may be unique cir- cumstances to particular countries, towns, neighborhoods, institutions, and ultimately situations that we must be open to in a context-sensitive inquiry the forces that cause and sustain domination vary tremendously context by context, and there isn’t necessarily a single causal explanation theories fail to focus on the concrete problems which arise in experience, allowing such problems to be buried under their sweeping generalizations principles are nothing more than historically grounded tools to use in present problematic situations that call for our analysis principles are falsifiable and open to revision

pragmatists’ approach should be distinguished from theories whose starting point seems injustices at large this assumes philosophical critique can be accomplished under critique of capitalism modernity Pragmatism does not deny the importance of power structures we must study history bu seek present evidence of the weight of the past pragmatists’ approach takes treating the particular situation and not a global “social pathology concepts white supremacy” and “colonialism are tools to ameliorate particular injustices complexity of injustice insist on intersectional analysis the forces that cause and sustain domination vary there isn’t a single causal explanation principles are falsifiable and open to revision

The pragmatists’ approach should be distinguished from nonideal theories whose starting point seems to be the injustices of society at large that have a history and persist through time, where the task of political philosophy is to detect and diagnose the presence of these historical injustices in particular situations of injustice. For example, critical theory today has inherited an approach to social philosophy characteristic of the European tradition that goes back to Rousseau, Marx, Weber, Freud, Marcuse, and others. Accord- ing to Roberto Frega, this tradition takes society to be “intrinsically sick” with a malaise that requires adopting a critical historical stance in order to understand how the systematic sickness affects present social situations. In other words, this approach assumes that¶ a philosophical critique of specific social situations can be accomplished only under the assumption of a broader and full blown critique of soci- ety in its entirety: as a critique of capitalism, of modernity, of western civilization, of rationality itself. The idea of social pathology becomes intelligible only against the background of a philosophy of history or of an anthropology of decline, according to which the distortions of actual social life are but the inevitable consequence of longstanding historical processes. (“Between Pragmatism and Critical Theory” 63)¶ However, this particular approach to injustice is not limited to critical theory. It is present in those Latin American and African American political philosophies that have used and transformed the critical intellectual tools of ¶ critical theory to deal with the problems of injustice in the Americas. For instance, Charles W. Mills claims that the starting point and alternative to the abstractions of ideal theory that masked injustices is to diagnose and rectify a history of an illness—the legacy of white supremacy in our actual society.11 The critical task of revealing this illness is achieved by adopting a historical perspective where the injustices of today are part of a larger historical narrative about the development of modern societies that goes back to how Europeans have progressively dehumanized or subordinated others. Similary, radical feminists as well as Third World scholars, as reaction to the hege- monic Eurocentric paradigms that disguise injustices under the assumption of a universal or objective point of view, have stressed how our knowledge is always situated. This may seem congenial with pragmatism except the locus of the knower and of injustices is often described as power structures located in “global hierarchies” and a “world-system” and not situations.12¶ Pragmatism only questions that we live in History or a “World-System” (as a totality or abstract context) but not that we are in history (lowercase): in a present situation continuous with others where the past weighs heavily in our memories, bodies, habits, structures, and communities. It also does not deny the importance of power structures and seeing the connections be- tween injustices through time, but there is a difference between (a) inquiring into present situations of injustice in order to detect, diagnose, and cure an injustice (a social pathology) across history, and (b) inquiring into the his- tory of a systematic injustice in order to facilitate inquiry into the present unique, context-bound injustice. To capture the legacy of the past on present injustices, we must study history but also seek present evidence of the weight of the past on the present injustice.¶ If injustice is an illness, then the pragmatists’ approach takes as its main focus diagnosing and treating the particular present illness, that is, the particular situation-bound injustice and not a global “social pathology” or some single transhistorical source of injustice. The diagnosis of a particular injustice is not always dependent on adopting a broader critical standpoint of society in its entirety, but even when it is, we must be careful to not forget that such standpoints are useful only for understanding the present evil. The concepts and categories “white supremacy” and “colonialism” can be great tools that can be of planetary significance. One could even argue that they pick out much larger areas of people’s lives and injustices than the categories of class and gender, but in spite of their reach and explanatory theoretical value, they are nothing more than tools to make reference to and ameliorate particular injustices experienced (suffered) in the midst of a particular and unique re- lationship in a situation. No doubt many, but not all, problems of injustice are a consequence of being a member of a group in history, but even in these cases, we cannot a priori assume that injustices are homogeneously equal for all members of that group. Why is this important? The possible pluralism and therefore complexity of a problem of injustice does not always stop at the level of being a member of a historical group or even a member of many groups, as insisted on by intersectional analysis. There may be unique cir- cumstances to particular countries, towns, neighborhoods, institutions, and ultimately situations that we must be open to in a context-sensitive inquiry. If an empirical inquiry is committed to capturing and ameliorating all of the harms in situations of injustice in their raw pretheoretical complexity, then this requires that we try to begin with and return to the concrete, particular, and unique experiences of injustice.¶ Pragmatism agrees with Sally Haslanger’s concern about Charles Mills’s view. She writes: “The goal is not just a theory that is historical (v. ahistori- cal), but is sensitive to historical particularity, i.e., that resists grand causal narratives purporting to give an account of how domination has come about and is perpetuated everywhere and at all times” (1). For “the forces that cause and sustain domination vary tremendously context by context, and there isn’t necessarily a single causal explanation; a theoretical framework that is useful as a basis for political intervention must be highly sensitive to the details of the particular social context” (1).13¶ Although each situation is unique, there are commonalities among the cases that permit inquiry about common causes. We can “formulate tentative general principles from investigation of similar individual cases, and then . . . check the generalizations by applying them to still further cases” (Dewey, Lectures in China 53). But Dewey insists that the focus should be on the indi- vidual case, and was critical of how so many sociopolitical theories are prone to starting and remaining at the level of “sweeping generalizations.” He states that they “fail to focus on the concrete problems which arise in experience, allowing such problems to be buried under their sweeping generalizations” (Lectures in China 53).¶ The lesson pragmatism provides for nonideal theory today is that it must be careful to not reify any injustice as some single historical force for which particular injustice problems are its manifestation or evidence for its exis- tence. Pragmatism welcomes the wisdom and resources of nonideal theories that are historically grounded on actual injustices, but it issues a warning about how they should be understood and implemented. It is, for example, sympathetic to the critical resources found in critical race theory, but with an important qualification. It understands Derrick Bell’s valuable criticism as context-specific to patterns in the practice of American law. Through his inquiry into particular cases and civil rights policies at a particular time and place, Bell learned and proposed certain general principles such as the one of “interest convergence,” that is, “whites will promote racial advantages for blacks only when they also promote white self-interest.”14 But, for pragma- tism, these principles are nothing more than historically grounded tools to use in present problematic situations that call for our analysis, such as deliberation in establishing public policies or making sense of some concrete injustice. The principles are falsifiable and open to revision as we face situation-specific injustices. In testing their adequacy, we need to consider their function in making us see aspects of injustices we would not otherwise appreciate.15

<h4>Fifth, root cause claims and focus on overarching structures ignore application to material injustice.</h4><p><strong>Pappas 2.</strong> The Pragmatists Approach to Injustice, by Gregory Fernando Pappas. The Pluralist, Volume 11, Number 1, Spring 2016, pp. 58-77. Published by University of Illinois Press. </p><p><u>The <mark>pragmatists’ approach should be distinguished from</mark> nonideal <mark>theories whose starting point seems</mark> to be the <mark>injustices</mark> of society <mark>at large</mark> that have a history and persist through time</u>, where the task of political philosophy is to detect and diagnose the presence of these historical injustices in particular situations of injustice. For example, critical theory today has inherited an approach to social philosophy characteristic of the European tradition that goes back to Rousseau, Marx, Weber, Freud, Marcuse, and others. Accord- ing to Roberto Frega, this tradition takes society to be “intrinsically sick” with a malaise that requires adopting a critical historical stance in order to understand how the systematic sickness affects present social situations. In other words, <u><mark>this</mark> approach <mark>assumes</mark> that<strong>¶</strong> a <mark>philosophical critique</mark> of specific social situations <mark>can be accomplished</mark> only <mark>under</mark> the assumption of a broader and full blown <mark>critique of</mark> soci- ety in its entirety: as a critique of <mark>capitalism</mark>, of <mark>modernity</mark>, of western civilization, of rationality itself</u>. The idea of social pathology becomes intelligible only against the background of a philosophy of history or of an anthropology of decline, according to which the distortions of actual social life are but the inevitable consequence of longstanding historical processes. (“Between Pragmatism and Critical Theory” 63)¶ However, this particular approach to injustice is not limited to critical theory. It is present in those Latin American and African American political philosophies that have used and transformed the critical intellectual tools of ¶ critical theory to deal with the problems of injustice in the Americas. For instance, Charles W. Mills claims that the starting point and alternative to the abstractions of ideal theory that masked injustices is to diagnose and rectify a history of an illness—the legacy of white supremacy in our actual society.11 The critical task of revealing this illness is achieved by adopting a historical perspective where the injustices of today are part of a larger historical narrative about the development of modern societies that goes back to how Europeans have progressively dehumanized or subordinated others. Similary, radical feminists as well as Third World scholars, as reaction to the hege- monic Eurocentric paradigms that disguise injustices under the assumption of a universal or objective point of view, have stressed how our knowledge is always situated. This may seem congenial with pragmatism except the locus of the knower and of injustices is often described as power structures located in “global hierarchies” and a “world-system” and not situations.12¶ <u><mark>Pragmatism</u></mark> only questions that we live in History or a “World-System” (as a totality or abstract context) but not that we are in history (lowercase): in a present situation continuous with others where the past weighs heavily in our memories, bodies, habits, structures, and communities. It also <u><mark>does not deny the importance of power structures</mark> and seeing the connections be- tween injustices through time</u>, but there is a difference between (a) inquiring into present situations of injustice in order to detect, diagnose, and cure an injustice (a social pathology) across history, and (b) inquiring into the his- tory of a systematic injustice in order to facilitate inquiry into the present unique, context-bound injustice. <u>To capture the legacy of the past on present injustices, <mark>we must study history bu</mark>t also <strong><mark>seek present evidence of the weight of the past</u></strong></mark> <u>on the present injustice.<strong>¶</strong> </u>If injustice is an illness, then the <u><mark>pragmatists’ approach takes</mark> as its main focus diagnosing and <mark>treating</mark> the particular present illness, that is, <mark>the particular situation</mark>-bound injustice <mark>and not a global “social pathology</mark>” or some single transhistorical source of injustice</u>. The diagnosis of a particular injustice is not always dependent on adopting a broader critical standpoint of society in its entirety, but even when it is, we must be careful to not forget that such standpoints are useful only for understanding the present evil. The <u><mark>concepts</mark> and categories “<mark>white supremacy” and “colonialism</u></mark>” can be great tools that can be of planetary significance. One could even argue that they pick out much larger areas of people’s lives and injustices than the categories of class and gender, but in spite of their reach and explanatory theoretical value, they <u><mark>are</mark> nothing more than <mark>tools to</mark> make reference to and <mark>ameliorate particular injustices</mark> experienced (suffered) in the midst of a particular and unique re- lationship in a situation</u>. No doubt many, but not all, problems of injustice are a consequence of being a member of a group in history, but even in these cases, we cannot a priori assume that injustices are homogeneously equal for all members of that group. Why is this important? The possible pluralism and therefore <u><mark>complexity of</mark> a problem of <mark>injustice</mark> does not always stop at the level of being a member of a historical group or even a member of many groups, as <mark>insist</mark>ed <mark>on</mark> by <mark>intersectional analysis</mark>. There may be unique cir- cumstances to particular countries, towns, neighborhoods, institutions, and ultimately situations that we must be open to in a context-sensitive inquiry</u>. If an empirical inquiry is committed to capturing and ameliorating all of the harms in situations of injustice in their raw pretheoretical complexity, then this requires that we try to begin with and return to the concrete, particular, and unique experiences of injustice.¶ Pragmatism agrees with Sally Haslanger’s concern about Charles Mills’s view. She writes: “The goal is not just a theory that is historical (v. ahistori- cal), but is sensitive to historical particularity, i.e., that resists grand causal narratives purporting to give an account of how domination has come about and is perpetuated everywhere and at all times” (1). For “<u><mark>the forces that cause and sustain domination vary</mark> tremendously context by context, and <mark>there isn’t</mark> necessarily <mark>a single causal explanation</u></mark>; a theoretical framework that is useful as a basis for political intervention must be highly sensitive to the details of the particular social context” (1).13¶ Although each situation is unique, there are commonalities among the cases that permit inquiry about common causes. We can “formulate tentative general principles from investigation of similar individual cases, and then . . . check the generalizations by applying them to still further cases” (Dewey, Lectures in China 53). But Dewey insists that the focus should be on the indi- vidual case, and was critical of how so many sociopolitical <u>theories</u> are prone to starting and remaining at the level of “sweeping generalizations.” He states that they “<u>fail to focus on the concrete problems which arise in experience, allowing such problems to be buried under their sweeping generalizations</u>” (Lectures in China 53).¶ The lesson pragmatism provides for nonideal theory today is that it must be careful to not reify any injustice as some single historical force for which particular injustice problems are its manifestation or evidence for its exis- tence. Pragmatism welcomes the wisdom and resources of nonideal theories that are historically grounded on actual injustices, but it issues a warning about how they should be understood and implemented. It is, for example, sympathetic to the critical resources found in critical race theory, but with an important qualification. It understands Derrick Bell’s valuable criticism as context-specific to patterns in the practice of American law. Through his inquiry into particular cases and civil rights policies at a particular time and place, Bell learned and proposed certain general principles such as the one of “interest convergence,” that is, “whites will promote racial advantages for blacks only when they also promote white self-interest.”14 But, for pragma- tism, these <u>principles are nothing more than historically grounded tools to use in present problematic situations that call for our analysis</u>, such as deliberation in establishing public policies or making sense of some concrete injustice. The <u><mark>principles are falsifiable and open to revision</u></mark> as we face situation-specific injustices. In testing their adequacy, we need to consider their function in making us see aspects of injustices we would not otherwise appreciate.15</p>

SO Prag AC [4:50]

Underview

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This is a change in the world order. Decolonization is the creation of alternative political realities outside of the settler state that seeks to destroy indigenous communities. This opens the possibilities for new forms of life and relationships with the people and the land this directly disrupts settler attempts at reconciliation by destabilizing the settler psyche. The 1AC unsettles the innocence of the settler by making an “impossible” demand that accepts nothing but the physical return of indigenous land, the abolition of slavery and property and the dismantlement of the imperial metropole.

Tuck & Yang 12

Tuck & Yang 12 [Eve Tuck is Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto. She is Canada Research Chair of Indigenous Methodologies with Youth and Communities. K. Wayne Yang writes about decolonization and everyday epic organizing, particularly from underneath ghetto colonialism, often with his frequent collaborator, Eve Tuck. Currently, they are convening The Land Relationships Super Collective, editing the book series, Indigenous and Decolonizing Studies in Education, and editing the journal, Critical Ethnic Studies. He is interested in the complex role of cities in global affairs: cities as sites of settler colonialism, as stages for empire, as places of resettlement and gentrification, and as always-already on Indigenous lands. *Sometimes he writes as la paperson, an avatar that irregularly calls.“Decolonization is not a metaphor,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol 1 No 1 (2012) //tjb]

Having elaborated on settler moves to innocence, we give a synopsis of the imbrication of settler colonialism with transnationalist, abolitionist, and critical pedagogy movements - efforts that are often thought of as exempt from Indigenous decolonizing analyses - as a synthesis of how decolonization as material, not metaphor, unsettles the innocence of these movements. These are interruptions which destabilize, un-balance, and repatriate the very terms and assumptions of some of the most radical efforts to reimagine human power relations. We argue that the opportunities for solidarity lie in what is incommensurable rather than what is common across these efforts. We offer these perspectives on unsettling innocence because they are examples of what we might call an ethic of incommensurability, which recognizes what is distinct, what is sovereign for project(s) of decolonization in relation to human and civil rights based social justice projects. We make these notations to highlight opportunities for what can only ever be strategic and contingent collaborations, and to indicate the reasons that lasting solidarities may be elusive, even undesirable. The anti-colonial turn towards the transnational can sometimes involve ignoring the settler colonial context where one resides and how that inhabitation is implicated in settler colonialism, in order to establish “global” solidarities that presumably suffer fewer complicities and complications. For people writing on Third World decolonizations, but who do so upon Native land, we invite you to consider the permanent settler war as the theater for all imperial wars The abolition of slavery often presumes the expansion of settlers who own Native land and life via inclusion of emancipated slaves and prisoners into the settler nation-state. Communal ownership of land has figured centrally in various movements for autonomous, self-determined communities. “The land belongs to those who work it,” disturbingly parrots Lockean justifications for seizing Native land as property, ‘earned’ through one’s labor in clearing and cultivating ‘virgin’ land. Thus, abolition is likewise twofold, requiring the repatriation of land and the abolition of property (land and bodies). Incommensurability is an acknowledgement that decolonization will require a change in the order of the world This is not to say that Indigenous peoples or Black and brown peoples take positions of dominance over white settlers; the goal is not for everyone to merely swap spots on the settler-colonial triad, to take another turn on the merry-go-round. The goal is to break the relentless structuring of the triad - a break and not a compromise Breaking the settler colonial triad, in direct terms, means repatriating land to sovereign Native tribes and nations, abolition of slavery in its contemporary forms, and the dismantling of the imperial metropole. Decolonization “here” is intimately connected to anti-imperialism elsewhere. However, decolonial struggles here/there are not parallel, not shared equally, nor do they bring neat closure to the concerns of all involved - particularly not for settlers. There is so much that is incommensurable, so many overlaps that can’t be figured, that cannot be resolved. Settler colonialism fuels imperialism all around the globe. “Indian Country” was/is the term used in Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iraq by the U.S. military for ‘enemy territory’. The technologies of the permanent settler war are reserviced for foreign wars, including boarding schools, colonial schools, urban schools run by military personnel.

transnationalist, abolitionist, and critical pedagogy efforts are often thought of as exempt from Indigenous decolonizing analyses - decolonization unsettles the innocence of these movements. These are interruptions which destabilize the terms of radical efforts to reimagine power relations. opportunities for solidarity lie in what is incommensurable rather than what is common . an ethic of incommensurability recognizes what is distinct for decolonization . lasting solidarities may be elusive, even undesirable. Incommensurability is an acknowledgement that decolonization will require a change in the order of the world This is not to say that Indigenous peoples or Black and brown peoples take positions of dominance over white settlers; the goal is not for everyone to merely swap spots on the settler-colonial triad . e goal is to break the relentless structuring of the triad - a break and not a compromise . Breaking the settler colonial triad, means repatriating land to sovereign Native tribes and nations, abolition of slavery in its contemporary forms, and the dismantling of the imperial metropole. Decolonization “here” is intimately connected to anti-imperialism elsewhere. decolonial struggles are not parallel, not shared equally, nor do they bring neat closure to the concerns of all involved - particularly not for settlers. There is so much that is incommensurable, so many overlaps that can’t be figured, that cannot be resolved.

Having elaborated on settler moves to innocence, we give a synopsis of the imbrication of settler colonialism with transnationalist, abolitionist, and critical pedagogy movements - efforts that are often thought of as exempt from Indigenous decolonizing analyses - as a synthesis of how decolonization as material, not metaphor, unsettles the innocence of these movements. These are interruptions which destabilize, un-balance, and repatriate the very terms and assumptions of some of the most radical efforts to reimagine human power relations. We argue that the opportunities for solidarity lie in what is incommensurable rather than what is common across these efforts. We offer these perspectives on unsettling innocence because they are examples of what we might call an ethic of incommensurability, which recognizes what is distinct, what is sovereign for project(s) of decolonization in relation to human and civil rights based social justice projects. There are portions of these projects that simply cannot speak to one another, cannot be aligned or allied. We make these notations to highlight opportunities for what can only ever be strategic and contingent collaborations, and to indicate the reasons that lasting solidarities may be elusive, even undesirable. Below we point to unsettling themes that challenge the coalescence of social justice endeavors broadly assembled into three areas: Transnational or Third World decolonizations, Abolition, and Critical Space-Place Pedagogies. For each of these areas, we offer entry points into the literature - beginning a sort of bibliography of incommensurability. Third world decolonizations The anti-colonial turn towards the transnational can sometimes involve ignoring the settler colonial context where one resides and how that inhabitation is implicated in settler colonialism, in order to establish “global” solidarities that presumably suffer fewer complicities and complications. This deliberate not-seeing is morally convenient but avoids an important feature of the aforementioned selective collapsibility of settler colonial-nations states. Expressions such as “the Global South within the Global North” and “the Third World in the First World” neglect the Four Directions via a Flat Earth perspective and ambiguate First Nations with Third World migrants. For people writing on Third World decolonizations, but who do so upon Native land, we invite you to consider the permanent settler war as the theater for all imperial wars: ● the Orientalism of Indigenous Americans (Berger, 2004; Marez, 2007) ● discovery, invasion, occupation, and Commons as the claims of settler sovereignty (Ford, 2010) ● heteropatriarchy as the imposition of settler sexuality (Morgensen, 2011) ● citizenship as coercive and forced assimilation into the white settler normative (Bruyneel, 2004; Somerville, 2010) ● religion as covenant for settler nation-state (A.J. Barker, 2009; Maldonado-Torres, 2008) ● the frontier as the first and always the site of invasion and war (Byrd, 2011), ● U.S. imperialism as the expansion of settler colonialism (ibid) ● Asian settler colonialism (Fujikane, 2012; Fujikane, & Okamura, 2008, Saranillio, 2010a, 2010b) ● the frontier as the language of ‘progress’ and discovery (Maldonado-Torres, 2008) ● rape as settler colonial structure (Deer, 2009; 2010) ● the discourse of terrorism as the terror of Native retribution (Tuck & Ree, forthcoming) ● Native Feminisms as incommensurable with other feminisms (Arvin, Tuck, Morrill, forthcoming; Goeman & Denetdale, 2009). Abolition The abolition of slavery often presumes the expansion of settlers who own Native land and life via inclusion of emancipated slaves and prisoners into the settler nation-state. As we have noted, it is no accident that the U.S. government promised 40 acres of Indian land as reparations for plantation slavery. Likewise, indentured European laborers were often awarded tracts of ‘unsettled’ Indigenous land as payment at the end of their service (McCoy, forthcoming). Communal ownership of land has figured centrally in various movements for autonomous, self-determined communities. “The land belongs to those who work it,” disturbingly parrots Lockean justifications for seizing Native land as property, ‘earned’ through one’s labor in clearing and cultivating ‘virgin’ land. For writers on the prison industrial complex, il/legality, and other forms of slavery, we urge you to consider how enslavement is a twofold procedure: removal from land and the creation of property (land and bodies). Thus, abolition is likewise twofold, requiring the repatriation of land and the abolition of property (land and bodies). Abolition means self-possession but not object-possession, repatriation but not reparation: ● “The animals of the world exist for their own reasons. They were not made for humans any more than black people were made for white, or women created for men” (Alice Walker, describing the work of Marjorie Spiegel, in the in the preface to Spigel’s 1988 book, The Dreaded Comparison). ● Enslavement/removal of Native Americans (Gallay, 2009) ● Slaves who become slave-owners, savagery as enslavability, chattel slavery as a sign of civilization (Gallay, 2009) ● Black fugitivity, undercommons, and radical dispossession (Moten, 2008; Moten & Harney, 2004; Moten & Harney, 2010) ● Incarceration as a settler colonialism strategy of land dispossession (Ross, 1998; Watson, 2007) ● Native land and Native people as co-constituitive (Meyer, 2008; Kawagley, 2010) Critical pedagogies The many critical pedagogies that engage emancipatory education, place based education, environmental education, critical multiculturalism, and urban education often position land as public Commons or seek commonalities between struggles. Although we believe that “we must be fluent” in each other’s stories and struggles (paraphrasing Alexander, 2002, p.91), we detect precisely this lack of fluency in land and Indigenous sovereignty. Yupiaq scholar, Oscar Kawagley’s assertion, “We know that Mother Nature has a culture, and it is a Native culture” (2010, p. xiii), directs us to think through land as “more than a site upon which humans make history or as a location that accumulates history” (Goeman, 2008, p.24). The forthcoming special issue in Environmental Education Research, “Land Education: Indigenous, postcolonial, and decolonizing perspectives on place and environmental education research” might be a good starting point to consider the incommensurability of place-based, environmentalist, urban pedagogies with land education. ● The urban as Indigenous (Bang, 2009; Belin, 1999; Friedel, 2011; Goeman, 2008; Intertribal Friendship House & Lobo, 2002) ● Indigenous storied land as disrupting settler maps (Goeman, 2008) ● Novels, poetry, and essays by Greg Sarris, Craig Womack, Joy Harjo, Gerald Vizenor ● To Remain an Indian (Lomawaima & McCarty, 2006) ● Shadow Curriculum (Richardson, 2011) ● Red Pedagogy (Grande, 2004) ● Land Education (McCoy, Tuck, McKenzie, forthcoming) More on incommensurability Incommensurability is an acknowledgement that decolonization will require a change in the order of the world (Fanon, 1963). This is not to say that Indigenous peoples or Black and brown peoples take positions of dominance over white settlers; the goal is not for everyone to merely swap spots on the settler-colonial triad, to take another turn on the merry-go-round. The goal is to break the relentless structuring of the triad - a break and not a compromise (Memmi, 1991). Breaking the settler colonial triad, in direct terms, means repatriating land to sovereign Native tribes and nations, abolition of slavery in its contemporary forms, and the dismantling of the imperial metropole. Decolonization “here” is intimately connected to anti-imperialism elsewhere. However, decolonial struggles here/there are not parallel, not shared equally, nor do they bring neat closure to the concerns of all involved - particularly not for settlers. Decolonization is not equivocal to other anti-colonial struggles. It is incommensurable. There is so much that is incommensurable, so many overlaps that can’t be figured, that cannot be resolved. Settler colonialism fuels imperialism all around the globe. Oil is the motor and motive for war and so was salt, so will be water. Settler sovereignty over these very pieces of earth, air, and water is what makes possible these imperialisms. The same yellow pollen in the water of the Laguna Pueblo reservation in New Mexico, Leslie Marmon Silko reminds us, is the same uranium that annihilated over 200,000 strangers in 2 flashes. The same yellow pollen that poisons the land from where it came. Used in the same war that took a generation of young Pueblo men. Through the voice of her character Betonie, Silko writes, “Thirty thousand years ago they were not strangers. You saw what the evil had done; you saw the witchery ranging as wide as the world" (Silko, 1982, p. 174). In Tucson, Arizona, where Silko lives, her books are now banned in schools. Only curricular materials affirming the settler innocence, ingenuity, and right to America may be taught. In “No”, her response to the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq, Mvskoke/Creek poet Joy Harjo (2004) writes, “Yes, that was me you saw shaking with bravery, with a government issued rifle on my back. I’m sorry I could not greet you, as you deserved, my relative.” Don’t Native Americans participate in greater rates in the military? asks the young-ish man from Viet Nam. “Indian Country” was/is the term used in Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iraq by the U.S. military for ‘enemy territory’. The first Black American President said without blinking, “There was a point before folks had left, before we had gotten everybody back on the helicopter and were flying back to base, where they said Geronimo has been killed, and Geronimo was the code name for bin Laden.” Elmer Pratt, Black Panther leader, falsely imprisoned for 27 years, was a Vietnam Veteran, was nicknamed ‘Geronimo’. Geronimo is settler nickname for the Bedonkohe Apache warrior who fought Mexican and then U.S. expansion into Apache tribal lands. The Colt .45 was perfected to kill Indigenous people during the ‘liberation’ of what became the Philippines, but it was first invented for the ‘Indian Wars’ in North America alongside The Hotchkiss Canon- a gattling gun that shot canonballs. The technologies of the permanent settler war are reserviced for foreign wars, including boarding schools, colonial schools, urban schools run by military personnel. It is properly called Indian Country. Ideologies of US settler colonialism directly informed Australian settler colonialism. South African apartheid townships, the kill-zones in what became the Philippine colony, then nation-state, the checkerboarding of Palestinian land with checkpoints, were modeled after U.S. seizures of land and containments of Indian bodies to reservations. The racial science developed in the U.S. (a settler colonial racial science) informed Hitler’s designs on racial purity (“This book is my bible” he said of Madison Grant’s The Passing of the Great Race). The admiration is sometimes mutual, the doctors and administrators of forced sterilizations of black, Native, disabled, poor, and mostly female people - The Sterilization Act accompanied the Racial Integrity Act and the Pocohontas Exception - praised the Nazi eugenics program. Forced sterilizations became illegal in California in 1964.

<h4>This is a change in the world order. Decolonization is the creation of alternative political realities outside of the settler state that seeks to destroy indigenous communities. This opens the possibilities for new forms of life and relationships with the people and the land this directly disrupts settler attempts at reconciliation by destabilizing the settler psyche. The 1AC unsettles the innocence of the settler by making an “impossible” demand that accepts nothing but the physical return of indigenous land, the abolition of slavery and property and the dismantlement of the imperial metropole. </h4><p><strong>Tuck & Yang 12</strong> [Eve Tuck is Associate Professor of Critical Race and Indigenous Studies at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education (OISE), University of Toronto. She is Canada Research Chair of Indigenous Methodologies with Youth and Communities. K. Wayne Yang writes about decolonization and everyday epic organizing, particularly from underneath ghetto colonialism, often with his frequent collaborator, Eve Tuck. Currently, they are convening The Land Relationships Super Collective, editing the book series, Indigenous and Decolonizing Studies in Education, and editing the journal, Critical Ethnic Studies. He is interested in the complex role of cities in global affairs: cities as sites of settler colonialism, as stages for empire, as places of resettlement and gentrification, and as always-already on Indigenous lands. *Sometimes he writes as la paperson, an avatar that irregularly calls.“Decolonization is not a metaphor,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol 1 No 1 (2012) //tjb]</p><p><u><strong>Having elaborated on settler moves to innocence, we give a synopsis of the imbrication of settler colonialism with <mark>transnationalist, abolitionist, and critical pedagogy </mark>movements - <mark>efforts</mark> that <mark>are often thought of as exempt from Indigenous decolonizing analyses</mark> <mark>-</mark> as a synthesis of how <mark>decolonization</mark> as material, not metaphor, <mark>unsettles the innocence of these movements.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>These are interruptions which destabilize</mark>, un-balance, and repatriate <mark>the</mark> very <mark>terms</mark> and assumptions <mark>of</mark> some of the most <mark>radical efforts to reimagine</mark> human <mark>power relations.</mark> We argue that the <mark>opportunities for solidarity lie in what is incommensurable rather than what is common</mark> across these efforts<mark>.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>We offer these perspectives on unsettling innocence because they are examples of what we might call <mark>an ethic of incommensurability</mark>, which <mark>recognizes what is distinct</mark>, what is sovereign <mark>for</mark> project(s) of <mark>decolonization</mark> in relation to human and civil rights based social justice projects<mark>.</u></strong></mark> There are portions of these projects that simply cannot speak to one another, cannot be aligned or allied. <u><strong>We make these notations to highlight opportunities for what can only ever be strategic and contingent collaborations, and to indicate the reasons that <mark>lasting solidarities may be elusive, even undesirable.</u></strong></mark> Below we point to unsettling themes that challenge the coalescence of social justice endeavors broadly assembled into three areas: Transnational or Third World decolonizations, Abolition, and Critical Space-Place Pedagogies. For each of these areas, we offer entry points into the literature - beginning a sort of bibliography of incommensurability. Third world decolonizations <u><strong>The anti-colonial turn towards the transnational can sometimes involve ignoring the settler colonial context where one resides and how that inhabitation is implicated in settler colonialism, in order to establish “global” solidarities that presumably suffer fewer complicities and complications.</u></strong> This deliberate not-seeing is morally convenient but avoids an important feature of the aforementioned selective collapsibility of settler colonial-nations states. Expressions such as “the Global South within the Global North” and “the Third World in the First World” neglect the Four Directions via a Flat Earth perspective and ambiguate First Nations with Third World migrants. <u><strong>For people writing on Third World decolonizations, but who do so upon Native land, we invite you to consider the permanent settler war as the theater for all imperial wars</u></strong>: ● the Orientalism of Indigenous Americans (Berger, 2004; Marez, 2007) ● discovery, invasion, occupation, and Commons as the claims of settler sovereignty (Ford, 2010) ● heteropatriarchy as the imposition of settler sexuality (Morgensen, 2011) ● citizenship as coercive and forced assimilation into the white settler normative (Bruyneel, 2004; Somerville, 2010) ● religion as covenant for settler nation-state (A.J. Barker, 2009; Maldonado-Torres, 2008) ● the frontier as the first and always the site of invasion and war (Byrd, 2011), ● U.S. imperialism as the expansion of settler colonialism (ibid) ● Asian settler colonialism (Fujikane, 2012; Fujikane, & Okamura, 2008, Saranillio, 2010a, 2010b) ● the frontier as the language of ‘progress’ and discovery (Maldonado-Torres, 2008) ● rape as settler colonial structure (Deer, 2009; 2010) ● the discourse of terrorism as the terror of Native retribution (Tuck & Ree, forthcoming) ● Native Feminisms as incommensurable with other feminisms (Arvin, Tuck, Morrill, forthcoming; Goeman & Denetdale, 2009). Abolition <u><strong>The abolition of slavery often presumes the expansion of settlers who own Native land and life via inclusion of emancipated slaves and prisoners into the settler nation-state. </u></strong>As we have noted, it is no accident that the U.S. government promised 40 acres of Indian land as reparations for plantation slavery. Likewise, indentured European laborers were often awarded tracts of ‘unsettled’ Indigenous land as payment at the end of their service (McCoy, forthcoming). <u><strong>Communal ownership of land has figured centrally in various movements for autonomous, self-determined communities. “The land belongs to those who work it,” disturbingly parrots Lockean justifications for seizing Native land as property, ‘earned’ through one’s labor in clearing and cultivating ‘virgin’ land.</u></strong> For writers on the prison industrial complex, il/legality, and other forms of slavery, we urge you to consider how enslavement is a twofold procedure: removal from land and the creation of property (land and bodies). <u><strong>Thus, abolition is likewise twofold, requiring the repatriation of land and the abolition of property (land and bodies).</u></strong> Abolition means self-possession but not object-possession, repatriation but not reparation: ● “The animals of the world exist for their own reasons. They were not made for humans any more than black people were made for white, or women created for men” (Alice Walker, describing the work of Marjorie Spiegel, in the in the preface to Spigel’s 1988 book, The Dreaded Comparison). ● Enslavement/removal of Native Americans (Gallay, 2009) ● Slaves who become slave-owners, savagery as enslavability, chattel slavery as a sign of civilization (Gallay, 2009) ● Black fugitivity, undercommons, and radical dispossession (Moten, 2008; Moten & Harney, 2004; Moten & Harney, 2010) ● Incarceration as a settler colonialism strategy of land dispossession (Ross, 1998; Watson, 2007) ● Native land and Native people as co-constituitive (Meyer, 2008; Kawagley, 2010) Critical pedagogies The many critical pedagogies that engage emancipatory education, place based education, environmental education, critical multiculturalism, and urban education often position land as public Commons or seek commonalities between struggles. Although we believe that “we must be fluent” in each other’s stories and struggles (paraphrasing Alexander, 2002, p.91), we detect precisely this lack of fluency in land and Indigenous sovereignty. Yupiaq scholar, Oscar Kawagley’s assertion, “We know that Mother Nature has a culture, and it is a Native culture” (2010, p. xiii), directs us to think through land as “more than a site upon which humans make history or as a location that accumulates history” (Goeman, 2008, p.24). The forthcoming special issue in Environmental Education Research, “Land Education: Indigenous, postcolonial, and decolonizing perspectives on place and environmental education research” might be a good starting point to consider the incommensurability of place-based, environmentalist, urban pedagogies with land education. ● The urban as Indigenous (Bang, 2009; Belin, 1999; Friedel, 2011; Goeman, 2008; Intertribal Friendship House & Lobo, 2002) ● Indigenous storied land as disrupting settler maps (Goeman, 2008) ● Novels, poetry, and essays by Greg Sarris, Craig Womack, Joy Harjo, Gerald Vizenor ● To Remain an Indian (Lomawaima & McCarty, 2006) ● Shadow Curriculum (Richardson, 2011) ● Red Pedagogy (Grande, 2004) ● Land Education (McCoy, Tuck, McKenzie, forthcoming) More on incommensurability <u><strong><mark>Incommensurability is an acknowledgement that decolonization will require a change in the order of the world</u></strong></mark> (Fanon, 1963). <u><strong><mark>This is not to say that Indigenous peoples or Black and brown peoples take positions of dominance over white settlers; the goal is not for everyone to merely swap spots on the settler-colonial triad</mark>, to take another turn on the merry-go-round<mark>.</mark> Th<mark>e goal is to break the relentless structuring of the triad - a break and not a compromise</u></strong></mark> (Memmi, 1991)<mark>.</mark> <u><strong><mark>Breaking the settler colonial triad,</mark> in direct terms, <mark>means repatriating land to sovereign Native tribes and nations, abolition of slavery in its contemporary forms, and the dismantling of the imperial metropole.</mark> <mark>Decolonization “here” is intimately connected to anti-imperialism elsewhere.</mark> However, <mark>decolonial struggles</mark> here/there <mark>are not parallel, not shared equally, nor do they bring neat closure to the concerns of all involved - particularly not for settlers.</u></strong></mark> Decolonization is not equivocal to other anti-colonial struggles. It is incommensurable. <u><strong><mark>There is so much that is incommensurable, so many overlaps that can’t be figured, that cannot be resolved.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>Settler colonialism fuels imperialism all around the globe.</u></strong> Oil is the motor and motive for war and so was salt, so will be water. Settler sovereignty over these very pieces of earth, air, and water is what makes possible these imperialisms. The same yellow pollen in the water of the Laguna Pueblo reservation in New Mexico, Leslie Marmon Silko reminds us, is the same uranium that annihilated over 200,000 strangers in 2 flashes. The same yellow pollen that poisons the land from where it came. Used in the same war that took a generation of young Pueblo men. Through the voice of her character Betonie, Silko writes, “Thirty thousand years ago they were not strangers. You saw what the evil had done; you saw the witchery ranging as wide as the world" (Silko, 1982, p. 174). In Tucson, Arizona, where Silko lives, her books are now banned in schools. Only curricular materials affirming the settler innocence, ingenuity, and right to America may be taught. In “No”, her response to the 2003 United States invasion of Iraq, Mvskoke/Creek poet Joy Harjo (2004) writes, “Yes, that was me you saw shaking with bravery, with a government issued rifle on my back. I’m sorry I could not greet you, as you deserved, my relative.” Don’t Native Americans participate in greater rates in the military? asks the young-ish man from Viet Nam. <u><strong>“Indian Country” was/is the term used in Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Iraq by the U.S. military for ‘enemy territory’. </u></strong>The first Black American President said without blinking, “There was a point before folks had left, before we had gotten everybody back on the helicopter and were flying back to base, where they said Geronimo has been killed, and Geronimo was the code name for bin Laden.” Elmer Pratt, Black Panther leader, falsely imprisoned for 27 years, was a Vietnam Veteran, was nicknamed ‘Geronimo’. Geronimo is settler nickname for the Bedonkohe Apache warrior who fought Mexican and then U.S. expansion into Apache tribal lands. The Colt .45 was perfected to kill Indigenous people during the ‘liberation’ of what became the Philippines, but it was first invented for the ‘Indian Wars’ in North America alongside The Hotchkiss Canon- a gattling gun that shot canonballs. <u><strong>The technologies of the permanent settler war are reserviced for foreign wars, including boarding schools, colonial schools, urban schools run by military personnel.</u></strong> It is properly called Indian Country. Ideologies of US settler colonialism directly informed Australian settler colonialism. South African apartheid townships, the kill-zones in what became the Philippine colony, then nation-state, the checkerboarding of Palestinian land with checkpoints, were modeled after U.S. seizures of land and containments of Indian bodies to reservations. The racial science developed in the U.S. (a settler colonial racial science) informed Hitler’s designs on racial purity (“This book is my bible” he said of Madison Grant’s The Passing of the Great Race). The admiration is sometimes mutual, the doctors and administrators of forced sterilizations of black, Native, disabled, poor, and mostly female people - The Sterilization Act accompanied the Racial Integrity Act and the Pocohontas Exception - praised the Nazi eugenics program. Forced sterilizations became illegal in California in 1964. </p>

1AC

./documents/hspolicy20/SiouxFallsRoosevelt/LuTo/Sioux%20Falls%20Roosevelt-Luckett-Torguson-Aff-Grapevine-Doubles.docx

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hspolicy20/SiouxFallsRoosevelt/LuTo/Sioux%20Falls%20Roosevelt-Luckett-Torguson-Aff-Grapevine-Doubles.docx

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Heg decline causes prolif and unstable nuclear alliances -- that leads to war.

Hayes 18

Peter Hayes, 6-16-2018, [Peter Hayes is Honorary Professor, Center for International Security Studies, Sydney University, Australia and Director, Nautilus Institute in Berkeley, California. His main research interests are nuclear weapons, climate change and energy security, particularly in Northeast Asia.]"Trump and the Interregnum of American Nuclear Hegemony," Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2018.1532525//CHS PK

During a post-hegemonic era nuclear alliances are likely to be replaced by ad hoc nuclear coalitions, aligning and realigning around different congeries of threat and even actual nuclear wars with much higher levels of uncertainty and unpredictability these dynamics are likely to be inconsistent and contradictory the potency of political, military service and corporate interests, may ensure that residual aspects of the formerly hegemonic postures are adhered these states may be forced to adjust and retrench strategically, or start to take their own nuclear risks by making increasingly explicit nuclear threats and deployments against nuclear-armed adversaries Under full-blown American nuclear hegemony, fewer states had nuclear weapons In a nuclear duel, it was clear that only one of two sides could fire first; with nine nuclear weapons states, and conflicts conceivably involving three, four or more of them it will not be evident . In a highly proliferated world states may feel driven to obtain larger nuclear forces configured to fight more than one protracted nuclear war at a time especially in nuclear states torn apart by civil war and post-nuclear attack reconstruction nuclear weapons will be the new normal

nuclear alliances are replaced by ad hoc coalitions, aligning around threat and nuclear wars, with higher unpredictability interests ensure formerly hegemonic postures are adhered these states may or start to take nuclear risks Under American hegemony, fewer states had nuclear weapons states feel driven to obtain larger forces configured to fight more than one war at a time nuclear weapons will be the new normal

During a post-hegemonic era, long-standing nuclear alliances are likely to be replaced by ad hoc nuclear coalitions, aligning and realigning around different congeries of threat and even actual nuclear wars, with much higher levels of uncertainty and unpredictability than was the case in the nuclear hegemonic system. There are a number of ways that this dynamic could play out during the interregnum, and these dynamics are likely to be inconsistent and contradictory. In some instances, the sheer momentum of past policy combined with bureaucratic inertia and the potency of political, military service and corporate interests, may ensure that residual aspects of the formerly hegemonic postures are adhered to even as formal nuclear alliances rupture. Even as they reach for the old anchors, these states may be forced to adjust and retrench strategically, or start to take their own nuclear risks by making increasingly explicit nuclear threats and deployments against nuclear-armed adversaries – as Japan has begun to do with reference to its “technological deterrent” since about 2012.9 This period could last for many years until and when nuclear war breaks out and leads to a post-nuclear war disorder; or a new, post-hegemonic strategic framework is established to manage and/or abolish nuclear threat. Under full-blown American nuclear hegemony, fewer states had nuclear weapons, the major nuclear weapons states entered into legally binding restraints on force levels and they learned from nuclear near-misses to promulgate rules of the road and tacit understandings. The lines drawn during full-blown collisions involving nuclear weapons were stark and concentrated the minds of leaders greatly. In a nuclear duel, it was clear that only one of two sides could fire first; the only question was which one. Now, with nine nuclear weapons states, and conflicts conceivably involving three, four or more of them, no matter how much leaders concentrate, it will not be evident who is aiming at who, who may fire first, and during a volley, who fired first and even who hit whom. In a highly proliferated world, nuclear-armed states may feel driven to obtain larger nuclear forces able to deter multiple adversaries at the same time, sufficient to conduct not only a few nuclear attacks but configured to fight more than one protracted nuclear war at a time, especially in nuclear states torn apart by civil war and post-nuclear attack reconstruction. The first time nuclear weapons are used since 1945 will be shocking, the second time, less so, the third time, the new normal.

<h4>Heg decline causes prolif and unstable nuclear alliances -- that leads to war.</h4><p>Peter <u><strong>Hayes</u></strong>, 6-16-20<u><strong>18</u></strong>, [Peter Hayes is Honorary Professor, Center for International Security Studies, Sydney University, Australia and Director, Nautilus Institute in Berkeley, California. His main research interests are nuclear weapons, climate change and energy security, particularly in Northeast Asia.]"Trump and the Interregnum of American Nuclear Hegemony," Taylor & Francis, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/25751654.2018.1532525//CHS PK</p><p><u><strong>During a post-hegemonic era</u></strong>, long-standing <u><strong><mark>nuclear alliances are</mark> likely to be <mark>replaced by ad hoc</mark> nuclear <mark>coalitions, aligning</mark> and realigning <mark>around</mark> different congeries of <mark>threat and</mark> even actual <mark>nuclear wars</u></strong>, <u><strong>with </mark>much <mark>higher</mark> levels of uncertainty and <mark>unpredictability</u></strong></mark> than was the case in the nuclear hegemonic system. There are a number of ways that this dynamic could play out during the interregnum, and <u><strong>these dynamics are likely to be inconsistent and contradictory</u></strong>. In some instances, the sheer momentum of past policy combined with bureaucratic inertia and <u><strong>the potency of political, military service and corporate <mark>interests</mark>, may <mark>ensure </mark>that residual aspects of the <mark>formerly hegemonic postures are adhered</mark> </u></strong>to even as formal nuclear alliances rupture. Even as they reach for the old anchors, <u><strong><mark>these states may</mark> be forced to adjust and retrench strategically, <mark>or start to take</mark> their own <mark>nuclear risks</mark> by making increasingly explicit nuclear threats and deployments against nuclear-armed adversaries</u></strong> – as Japan has begun to do with reference to its “technological deterrent” since about 2012.9 This period could last for many years until and when nuclear war breaks out and leads to a post-nuclear war disorder; or a new, post-hegemonic strategic framework is established to manage and/or abolish nuclear threat. <u><strong><mark>Under</mark> full-blown <mark>American</mark> nuclear <mark>hegemony, fewer states had nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark>, the major nuclear weapons states entered into legally binding restraints on force levels and they learned from nuclear near-misses to promulgate rules of the road and tacit understandings. The lines drawn during full-blown collisions involving nuclear weapons were stark and concentrated the minds of leaders greatly. <u><strong>In a nuclear duel, it was clear that only one of two sides could fire first;</u></strong> the only question was which one. Now, <u><strong>with nine nuclear weapons states, and conflicts conceivably involving three, four or more of them</u></strong>, no matter how much leaders concentrate, <u><strong>it will not be evident</u></strong> who is aiming at who, who may fire first, and during a volley, who fired first and even who hit whom<u><strong>. In a highly proliferated world</u></strong>, nuclear-armed <u><strong><mark>states</mark> may <mark>feel driven to obtain larger</mark> nuclear <mark>forces</u></strong></mark> able to deter multiple adversaries at the same time, sufficient to conduct not only a few nuclear attacks but <u><strong><mark>configured to fight more than one</mark> protracted nuclear <mark>war at a time</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>especially in nuclear states torn apart by civil war and post-nuclear attack reconstruction</u></strong>. The first time <u><strong><mark>nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark> are used since 1945 <u><strong><mark>will be</u></strong></mark> shocking, the second time, less so, the third time, <u><strong><mark>the new normal</u></strong></mark>.</p>

1AC—Advantage: Partisanship

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1AC US aff V2 1NC Pyscho K T A Dementia pic Trump Diversionary War DA 1AR T Case The offs 2NR Diversionary War Da 2AR Case

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New lethal autonomous systems will target nuclear second-strike systems – that causes accidental escalation and preemptive strikes from the US, Russia, and China

Klare 19

Klare 19 [Michael T. Klare is a professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association. This is the second in the “Arms Control Tomorrow” series, in which he considers disruptive emerging technologies and their implications for war-fighting and arms control. This installment provides an assessment of autonomous weapons systems development and prospects, the dangers they pose, and possible strategies for their control. "Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Laws of War." https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-03/features/autonomous-weapons-systems-laws-war]

Arms racing behavior is a perennial concern for the great powers, because efforts by competing states to gain a technological advantage over their rivals, or to avoid falling behind, often lead to excessive and destabilizing arms buildups. A race in autonomy poses a particular danger because the consequences of investing machines with increased intelligence and decision-making authority are largely unknown and could prove catastrophic. In their haste to match the presumed progress of likely adversaries states might field robotic weapons with considerable autonomy well before their abilities and limitations have been fully determined, resulting in unintended fatalities or uncontrolled escalation. China, Russia, the U S will deploy increasingly autonomous robotic weapons in the years ahead, policymakers must identify and weigh the potential risks of such deployments. These include not only the potential for accident and unintended escalation, as would be the case with any new weapons that are unleashed on the battlefield, but also a wide array of moral, ethical, and legal concerns arising from the diminishing role of humans in life-and-death decision-making. In war, accidents and mishaps, some potentially catastrophic, are almost inevitable. Another danger arises from the speed with which automated systems operate, along with plans for deploying autonomous weapons systems in coordinated groups, or swarms. The Pentagon envisions a time when large numbers of drone ships and aircraft are released to search for enemy missile-launching submarines and other critical assets, including mobile ballistic missile launchers adversaries rely on those missile systems to serve as an invulnerable second-strike deterrent to a U.S. disarming first strike Should Russia or China ever perceive that swarming U.S. drones threaten the survival of their second-strike systems, those countries could feel pressured to launch their missiles when such swarms are detected, lest they lose their missiles to a feared U.S. first strike Strategies for Control analysts in the arms control and human rights communities, joined by sympathetic diplomats and others, have sought to devise strategies for regulating such systems or banning them entirely. The first and most unequivocal would be the adoption under the CCW of a legally binding international ban on the development, deployment, or use of fully autonomous weapons systems Today, very few truly autonomous robotic weapons are in active combat use Nations are determined to field these weapons quickly lest their competitors outpace them in an arms race in autonomy. Diplomats and policymakers must seize this moment before fully autonomous weapons systems become widely deployed to weigh the advantages of a total ban and consider other measures to ensure they will never be used to commit unlawful acts or trigger catastrophic escalation

Arms racing is perennial for the great powers efforts lead to excessive destabilizing arms buildups. A race in autonomy poses a particular danger investing machines with authority could prove catastrophic. In their haste states field weapons with autonomy well before abilities have been determined, resulting in uncontrolled escalation China, Russia, the U S will deploy autonomous weapons accidents and mishaps are inevitable Another danger arises from the speed along with coordinated groups The Pentagon envisions drone ships released to search for submarines and ballistic missile launchers adversaries rely on those as second-strike deterrent Should Russia or China perceive that swarming U.S. drones threaten second-strike systems, those countries could launch their missiles analysts in the arms control joined diplomats and others to devise strategies for banning them entirely unequivocal would be a legally binding international ban of fully autonomous weapons systems Nations are determined to field weapons quickly policymakers must seize this moment to weigh the advantages of a total ban

Arms racing behavior is a perennial concern for the great powers, because efforts by competing states to gain a technological advantage over their rivals, or to avoid falling behind, often lead to excessive and destabilizing arms buildups. A race in autonomy poses a particular danger because the consequences of investing machines with increased intelligence and decision-making authority are largely unknown and could prove catastrophic. In their haste to match the presumed progress of likely adversaries, states might field robotic weapons with considerable autonomy well before their abilities and limitations have been fully determined, resulting in unintended fatalities or uncontrolled escalation. Supposedly, those risks would be minimized by maintaining some degree of human control over all such machines, but the race to field increasingly capable robotic weapons could result in ever-diminishing oversight. “Despite [the Defense Department’s] insistence that a ‘man in the loop’ capability will always be part of RAS systems,” the CRS noted in 2018, “it is possible if not likely, that the U.S. military could feel compelled to develop…fully autonomous weapon systems in response to comparable enemy ground systems or other advanced threat systems that make any sort of ‘man in the loop’ role impractical.”8 Assessing the Risks Given the likelihood that China, Russia, the United States, and other nations will deploy increasingly autonomous robotic weapons in the years ahead, policymakers must identify and weigh the potential risks of such deployments. These include not only the potential for accident and unintended escalation, as would be the case with any new weapons that are unleashed on the battlefield, but also a wide array of moral, ethical, and legal concerns arising from the diminishing role of humans in life-and-death decision-making. The potential dangers associated with the deployment of AI-empowered robotic weapons begin with the fact that much of the technology involved is new and untested under the conditions of actual combat, where unpredictable outcomes are the norm. For example, it is one thing to test self-driving cars under controlled conditions with human oversight; it is another to let such vehicles loose on busy highways. If that self-driving vehicle is covered with armor, equipped with a gun, and released on a modern battlefield, algorithms can never anticipate all the hazards and mutations of combat, no matter how well “trained” the algorithms governing the vehicle’s actions may be. In war, accidents and mishaps, some potentially catastrophic, are almost inevitable. Extensive testing of AI image-classification algorithms has shown that such systems can easily be fooled by slight deviations from standardized representations—in one experiment, a turtle was repeatedly identified as a rifle9—and are vulnerable to trickery, or “spoofing,” as well as hacking by adversaries. Former Navy Secretary Richard Danzig, who has studied the dangers of employing untested technologies on the battlefield, has been particularly outspoken in cautioning against the premature deployment of AI-empowered weaponry. “Unfortunately, the uncertainties surrounding the use and interaction of new military technologies are not subject to confident calculation or control,” he wrote in 2018.10 This poses obvious challenges because virtually all human ethical and religious systems view the taking of a human life, whether in warfare or not, as a supremely moral act requiring some valid justification. Humans, however imperfect, are expected to abide by this principle, and most societies punish those who fail to do so. Faced with the horrors of war, humans have sought to limit the conduct of belligerents in wartime, aiming to prevent cruel and excessive violence. Beginning with the Hague Convention of 1898 and in subsequent agreements forged in Geneva after World War I, international jurists have devised a range of rules, collectively, the laws of war, proscribing certain behaviors in armed conflict, such as the use of poisonous gas. Following World War II and revelations of the Holocaust, diplomats adopted additional protocols to the Hague and Geneva conventions intended to better define the obligations of belligerents in sparing civilians from the ravages of war, measures generally known as international humanitarian law. So long as humans remain in control of weapons, in theory they can be held accountable under the laws of war and international humanitarian law for any violations committed when using those devices. What happens when a machine makes the decision to take a life and questions arise over the legitimacy of that action? Who is accountable for any crimes found to occur, and how can a chain of responsibility be determined? These questions arise with particular significance regarding two key aspects of international humanitarian law, the requirement for distinction and proportionality in the use of force against hostile groups interspersed with civilian communities. Distinction requires warring parties to discriminate between military and civilian objects and personnel during the course of combat and spare the latter from harm to the greatest extent possible. Proportionality requires militaries to apply no more force than needed to achieve the intended objective, while sparing civilian personnel and property from unnecessary collateral damage.11 These principles pose a particular challenge to fully autonomous weapons systems because they require a capacity to make fine distinctions in the heat of battle. It may be relatively easy in a large tank-on-tank battle, for example, to distinguish military from civilian vehicles; but in many recent conflicts, enemy combatants have armed ordinary pickup trucks and covered them with a tarpaulins, making them almost indistinguishable from civilian vehicles. Perhaps a hardened veteran could spot the difference, but an intelligent robot? Unlikely. Similarly, how does one gauge proportionality when attempting to attack enemy snipers firing from civilian-occupied tenement buildings? For robots, this could prove an insurmountable challenge. Advocates and critics of autonomous weaponry disagree over whether such systems can be equipped with algorithms sufficiently adept to distinguish between targets to satisfy the laws of war. “Humans possess the unique capacity to identify with other human beings and are thus equipped to understand the nuances of unforeseen behavior in ways that machines, which must be programmed in advance, simply cannot,” analysts from Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the International Human Rights Clinic of Harvard Law School wrote in 2016.12 Another danger arises from the speed with which automated systems operate, along with plans for deploying autonomous weapons systems in coordinated groups, or swarms. The Pentagon envisions a time when large numbers of drone ships and aircraft are released to search for enemy missile-launching submarines and other critical assets, including mobile ballistic missile launchers. At present, U.S. adversaries rely on those missile systems to serve as an invulnerable second-strike deterrent to a U.S. disarming first strike. Should Russia or China ever perceive that swarming U.S. drones threaten the survival of their second-strike systems, those countries could feel pressured to launch their missiles when such swarms are detected, lest they lose their missiles to a feared U.S. first strike. Strategies for Control Since it first became evident that strides in AI would permit the deployment of increasingly autonomous weapons systems and that the major powers were seeking to exploit those breakthroughs for military advantage, analysts in the arms control and human rights communities, joined by sympathetic diplomats and others, have sought to devise strategies for regulating such systems or banning them entirely. As part of that effort, parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), a 1980 treaty that restricts or prohibits the use of particular types of weapons that are deemed to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants or to harm civilians indiscriminately, established a group of governmental experts to assess the dangers posed by fully autonomous weapons systems and to consider possible control mechanisms. Some governments also have sought to address these questions independently, while elements of civil society have entered the fray. Out of this process, some clear strategies for limiting these systems have emerged. The first and most unequivocal would be the adoption under the CCW of a legally binding international ban on the development, deployment, or use of fully autonomous weapons systems. Such a ban could come in the form a new CCW protocol, a tool used to address weapon types not envisioned in the original treaty, as has happened with a 1995 ban on blinding laser weapons and a 1996 measure restricting the use of mines, booby traps, and other such devices.13 Two dozen states, backed by civil society groups such as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, have called for negotiating an additional CCW protocol banning fully autonomous weapons systems altogether. Autonomous weapons systems and would allow some states to field weapons with dangerous and unpredictable capabilities. Others say a total ban may not be achievable and argue that a nonbinding measure of this sort is the best option available. Yet another approach gaining attention is a concentrated focus on the ethical dimensions of fielding fully autonomous weapons systems. This outlook holds that international law and common standards of ethical practice ordain that only humans possess the moral capacity to justify taking another human’s life and that machines can never be vested with that power. Proponents of this approach point to the Martens clause of the Hague Convention of 1899, also inscribed in Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, stating that even when not covered by other laws and treaties, civilians and combatants “remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of human conscience.” Opponents of fully autonomous weapons systems claim that such weapons, by removing humans from life-and-death decision-making, are inherently contradicting principles of humanity and dictates of human conscience and so should be banned. Reflecting awareness of this issue, the Defense Department has reportedly begun to develop a set of guiding principles for the “safe, ethical, and responsible use” of AI and autonomous weapons systems by the military services. Today, very few truly autonomous robotic weapons are in active combat use, but many countries are developing and testing a wide range of machines possessing high degrees of autonomy. Nations are determined to field these weapons quickly, lest their competitors outpace them in an arms race in autonomy. Diplomats and policymakers must seize this moment before fully autonomous weapons systems become widely deployed to weigh the advantages of a total ban and consider other measures to ensure they will never be used to commit unlawful acts or trigger catastrophic escalation.

<h4>New <u>lethal autonomous systems</u> will target <u>nuclear second-strike</u> systems – that causes <u>accidental escalation</u> and <u>preemptive strikes</u> from the US, Russia, and China </h4><p><strong>Klare 19</strong> [Michael T. Klare<u> is a professor emeritus of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association. This is the second in the “Arms Control Tomorrow” series, in which he considers disruptive emerging technologies and their implications for war-fighting and arms control. This installment provides an assessment of autonomous weapons systems development and prospects, the dangers they pose, and possible strategies for their control. "Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Laws of War." https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2019-03/features/autonomous-weapons-systems-laws-war]</p><p><strong><mark>Arms racing</strong></mark> behavior <mark>is</mark> a <mark>perennial</mark> concern <mark>for the <strong>great powers</strong></mark>, because <mark>efforts</mark> by competing states to gain a technological advantage over their <strong>rivals</strong>, or to avoid falling behind, often <mark>lead to excessive</mark> and <strong><mark>destabilizing arms buildups</strong>. A race in <strong>autonomy</strong> poses a <strong>particular danger</strong></mark> because the consequences of <mark>investing machines with</mark> increased <strong>intelligence</strong> and <strong>decision-making <mark>authority</u></strong></mark> <u>are largely unknown and <mark>could prove <strong>catastrophic</strong>. In their <strong>haste</strong></mark> to match the presumed progress of likely <strong>adversaries</u></strong>, <u><mark>states</mark> might <mark>field</mark> robotic <mark>weapons with</mark> considerable <strong><mark>autonomy</strong> well before</mark> their <strong><mark>abilities</strong></mark> and <strong>limitations</strong> <mark>have been</mark> fully <strong><mark>determined</strong>, resulting in</mark> <strong>unintended fatalities or <mark>uncontrolled escalation</strong></mark>.</p><p></u>Supposedly, those risks would be minimized by maintaining some degree of human control over all such machines, but the race to field increasingly capable robotic weapons could result in ever-diminishing oversight. “Despite [the Defense Department’s] insistence that a ‘man in the loop’ capability will always be part of RAS systems,” the CRS noted in 2018, “it is possible if not likely, that the U.S. military could feel compelled to develop…fully autonomous weapon systems in response to comparable enemy ground systems or other advanced threat systems that make any sort of ‘man in the loop’ role impractical.”8</p><p>Assessing the Risks</p><p>Given the likelihood that <u><strong><mark>China</strong>, <strong>Russia</strong>, the</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates, and other nations <u><mark>will deploy</mark> increasingly <mark>autonomous</mark> robotic <mark>weapons</mark> in the years ahead, policymakers must identify and weigh the potential risks of such deployments. These include not only the potential for accident and unintended escalation, as would be the case with any new weapons that are unleashed on the battlefield, but also a wide array of moral, ethical, and legal concerns arising from the diminishing role of humans in life-and-death decision-making.</p><p></u>The potential dangers associated with the deployment of AI-empowered robotic weapons begin with the fact that much of the technology involved is new and untested under the conditions of actual combat, where unpredictable outcomes are the norm. For example, it is one thing to test self-driving cars under controlled conditions with human oversight; it is another to let such vehicles loose on busy highways. If that self-driving vehicle is covered with armor, equipped with a gun, and released on a modern battlefield, algorithms can never anticipate all the hazards and mutations of combat, no matter how well “trained” the algorithms governing the vehicle’s actions may be. <u>In war, <strong><mark>accidents and mishaps</strong></mark>, some potentially catastrophic, <mark>are </mark>almost <strong><mark>inevitable</strong></mark>.</p><p></u>Extensive testing of AI image-classification algorithms has shown that such systems can easily be fooled by slight deviations from standardized representations—in one experiment, a turtle was repeatedly identified as</p><p>a rifle9—and are vulnerable to trickery, or “spoofing,” as well as hacking by adversaries.</p><p>Former Navy Secretary Richard Danzig, who has studied the dangers of employing untested technologies on the battlefield, has been particularly outspoken in cautioning against the premature deployment of AI-empowered weaponry. “Unfortunately, the uncertainties surrounding the use and interaction of new military technologies are not subject to confident calculation or control,” he wrote in 2018.10</p><p>This poses obvious challenges because virtually all human ethical and religious systems view the taking of a human life, whether in warfare or not, as a supremely moral act requiring some valid justification. Humans, however imperfect, are expected to abide by this principle, and most societies punish those who fail to do so. Faced with the horrors of war, humans have sought to limit the conduct of belligerents in wartime, aiming to prevent cruel and excessive violence. Beginning with the Hague Convention of 1898 and in subsequent agreements forged in Geneva after World War I, international jurists have devised a range of rules, collectively, the laws of war, proscribing certain behaviors in armed conflict, such as the use of poisonous gas. Following World War II and revelations of the Holocaust, diplomats adopted additional protocols to the Hague and Geneva conventions intended to better define the obligations of belligerents in sparing civilians from the ravages of war, measures generally known as international humanitarian law. So long as humans remain in control of weapons, in theory they can be held accountable under the laws of war and international humanitarian law for any violations committed when using those devices. What happens when a machine makes the decision to take a life and questions arise over the legitimacy of that action? Who is accountable for any crimes found to occur, and how can a chain of responsibility be determined?</p><p>These questions arise with particular significance regarding two key aspects of international humanitarian law, the requirement for distinction and proportionality in the use of force against hostile groups interspersed with civilian communities. Distinction requires warring parties to discriminate between military and civilian objects and personnel during the course of combat and spare the latter from harm to the greatest extent possible. Proportionality requires militaries to apply no more force than needed to achieve the intended objective, while sparing civilian personnel and property from unnecessary collateral damage.11</p><p>These principles pose a particular challenge to fully autonomous weapons systems because they require a capacity to make fine distinctions in the heat of battle. It may be relatively easy in a large tank-on-tank battle, for example, to distinguish military from civilian vehicles; but in many recent conflicts, enemy combatants have armed ordinary pickup trucks and covered them with a tarpaulins, making them almost indistinguishable from civilian vehicles. Perhaps a hardened veteran could spot the difference, but an intelligent robot? Unlikely. Similarly, how does one gauge proportionality when attempting to attack enemy snipers firing from civilian-occupied tenement buildings? For robots, this could prove an insurmountable challenge.</p><p>Advocates and critics of autonomous weaponry disagree over whether such systems can be equipped with algorithms sufficiently adept to distinguish between targets to satisfy the laws of war. “Humans possess the unique capacity to identify with other human beings and are thus equipped to understand the nuances of unforeseen behavior in ways that machines, which must be programmed in advance, simply cannot,” analysts from Human Rights Watch (HRW) and the International Human Rights Clinic of Harvard Law School wrote in 2016.12</p><p><u><mark>Another danger arises from the <strong>speed</strong></mark> with which automated systems <strong>operate</strong>, <mark>along with</mark> plans for deploying autonomous weapons systems in <strong><mark>coordinated groups</strong></mark>, or swarms. <mark>The <strong>Pentagon</strong> envisions</mark> a time when large numbers of <mark>drone ships </mark>and aircraft are <mark>released to search for</mark> enemy missile-launching <strong><mark>submarines</strong> and</mark> other critical assets, including <strong>mobile <mark>ballistic missile launchers</u></strong></mark>. At present, U.S. <u><mark>adversaries rely on those</mark> missile systems to serve <mark>as</mark> an invulnerable <strong><mark>second-strike deterrent</strong></mark> to a U.S. disarming first strike</u>. <u><mark>Should <strong>Russia</strong> or <strong>China</strong></mark> ever <mark>perceive that <strong>swarming U.S. drones</u></strong> <u>threaten</mark> the survival of their <mark>second-strike systems, those countries could</mark> feel pressured to <strong><mark>launch their missiles</strong></mark> when such swarms are detected, lest they lose their missiles to a feared <strong>U.S. first strike</u></strong>.</p><p><u><strong>Strategies for Control</p><p></u></strong>Since it first became evident that strides in AI would permit the deployment of increasingly autonomous weapons systems and that the major powers were seeking to exploit those breakthroughs for military advantage, <u><mark>analysts in the arms control</mark> and human rights communities, <mark>joined</mark> by sympathetic <mark>diplomats and others</mark>, have sought <mark>to devise strategies for</mark> regulating such systems or <strong><mark>banning them entirely</mark>.</p><p></u></strong>As part of that effort, parties to the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW), a 1980 treaty that restricts or prohibits the use of particular types of weapons that are deemed to cause unnecessary suffering to combatants or to harm civilians indiscriminately, established a group of governmental experts to assess the dangers posed by fully autonomous weapons systems and to consider possible control mechanisms. Some governments also have sought to address these questions independently, while elements of civil society have entered the fray.</p><p>Out of this process, some clear strategies for limiting these systems have emerged. <u>The first and most <strong><mark>unequivocal</strong> would be</u></mark> <u>the adoption under the CCW of <mark>a legally binding <strong>international ban</u></strong></mark> <u>on the development, deployment, or use <mark>of <strong>fully autonomous weapons systems</u></strong></mark>. Such a ban could come in the form a new CCW protocol, a tool used to address weapon types not envisioned in the original treaty, as has happened with a 1995 ban on blinding laser weapons and a 1996 measure restricting the use of mines, booby traps, and other such devices.13 Two dozen states, backed by civil society groups such as the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots, have called for negotiating an additional CCW protocol banning fully autonomous weapons systems altogether.</p><p>Autonomous weapons systems and would allow some states to field weapons with dangerous and unpredictable capabilities. Others say a total ban may not be achievable and argue that a nonbinding measure of this sort is the best option available.</p><p>Yet another approach gaining attention is a concentrated focus on the ethical dimensions of fielding fully autonomous weapons systems. This outlook holds that international law and common standards of ethical practice ordain that only humans possess the moral capacity to justify taking another human’s life and that machines can never be vested with that power. Proponents of this approach point to the Martens clause of the Hague Convention of 1899, also inscribed in Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, stating that even when not covered by other laws and treaties, civilians and combatants “remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates of human conscience.” Opponents of fully autonomous weapons systems claim that such weapons, by removing humans from life-and-death decision-making, are inherently contradicting principles of humanity and dictates of human conscience and so should be banned. Reflecting awareness of this issue, the Defense Department has reportedly begun to develop a set of guiding principles for the “safe, ethical, and responsible use” of AI and autonomous weapons systems by the military services.</p><p><u>Today, very few truly autonomous robotic weapons are in active combat use</u>, but many countries are developing and testing a wide range of machines possessing high degrees of autonomy. <u><mark>Nations are determined to field</mark> these <mark>weapons <strong>quickly</u></strong></mark>, <u>lest their competitors outpace them in an arms race in autonomy. Diplomats and <mark>policymakers must</mark> <strong><mark>seize this moment</strong></mark> before fully autonomous weapons systems become widely deployed <mark>to weigh the advantages of a <strong>total ban</strong></mark> and consider other measures to ensure they will never be used to commit unlawful acts or trigger <strong>catastrophic escalation</u></strong>.</p>

AC – Cyberwar

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A

Cougar Classic

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Michael Stuckert

ZAC DAVIS

AC- cyberwar NC- CP T DA 1ar- all 2nr-cp da 2ar- aff cp da

hsld20/Princeton/Ko/Princeton-Kothari-Aff-Cougar%20Classic-Round1.docx

TaKo

Princeton TaKo

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Ko.....

Princeton

Princeton

NJ

hsld20

HS LD 2020-21

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Free movement can save intra-African trade – ratification of the FMP is key

PSC Report 22

PSC Report 22 {The PSC Report is an initiative of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS)} - ("Africa’s prosperity depends on free trade and mobility," ISS Africa, published 10-28-2022, accessed 12-13-2022, https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/africas-prosperity-depends-on-free-trade-and-mobility)//marlborough-wr/

Regional integration is key for Africa’s prosperity. To achieve it, policies, systems and practices must reduce barriers to access, facilitate people’s freedom of movement encourage intraregional trade and develop joint strategies. Processes brokered by the African Union supported by the free movement of people are instrumental. AU heads of state adopted two complementary instruments AfCFTA Free Movement Protocol Establishing a continental economic community in which goods, services and people move freely is regarded as important in addressing Africa’s developmental challenges Mobility is thus intimately intertwined with trade. The continent is well on track to achieve the free trade milestone, but free movement of people is lagging. these elements go hand in hand, the pace of ratification and implementation of the two instruments remains asymmetrical. States show more political will for trade.¶ Unlocking Africa’s potential through trade¶ The AfCFTA is anticipated to transform Africa and be a significant driver of economic growth and industrialisation. intra-African exports by the end of 2021 were only 14.4%. the AfCFTA could change this dramatically. AfCFTA could increase exports by 3%, augmenting the value of intra-African trade by between 15% and 25% (US$50 billion and US$70 billion) by 2040. informal cross-border trade is significant and widespread. The value of informal commerce may equal or surpass the value of formal trade for specific goods and countries. informal cross-border trade constituted 7% to 16% of all formal intra-African trade flows. , informal cross-border trade ranges from 30% to 72% of formal trade. a few major regional players continue to dominate intra-African trade. This has led to concerns about the uneven distribution of gains between middle-income countries and smaller economies, particularly the least-developed countries.¶ Migration also plays a crucial role in Africa’s regional integration agenda, by contributing to socio-economic development in countries of both origin and destination. studies definitively show increased bilateral trade between recipient and origin countries due to the presence of migrants in a country. establishing linkages through capital investment, philanthropy, knowledge transfer and entrepreneurship is crucial. The diaspora is, thus, a key resource. regular migration could significantly contribute to the development of host countries by providing them with the experience, knowledge and services they require from both skilled and unskilled labour. the resultant trade imbalance for origin countries could be rectified through remittances and direct investment.¶ Why free movement?¶ Africa can advance economic development through better migration management and governance. For the AU, member states and regional economic communities (RECs) need to formulate policies that use migration for development.¶ While the Free Movement Protocol is a continental agreement, its effective governance and implementation are national and regional. its implementation can help to build resilience in Africa for unanticipated mobility and support the transition to a borderless continent progress on ratifying and implementing the protocol is slow – slower than that for the AfCFTA.

Regional integration is key Processes brokered by the A U supported by free movement are instrumental. Mobility is intertwined with trade. The continent is to achieve free trade but free movement is lagging these elements go hand in hand ratification and implementation remains asymmetrical AfCFTA is to transform Africa and be a driver of growth intra-African exports were only 14.4%. AfCFTA could increase the value by 25% informal trade is widespread Migration plays a crucial role studies definitively show increased bilateral trade investment knowledge transfer and entrepreneurship regular migration significantly contribute to development from labour trade imbalance could be rectified through remittances and investment

Regional integration is key for Africa’s prosperity. To achieve it, policies, systems and practices must be adopted to reduce barriers to access, facilitate people’s freedom of movement, encourage intraregional trade and develop joint strategies. Processes brokered by the African Union (AU) aimed at a single African market for goods and services supported by the free movement of people are instrumental.¶ In 2018, AU heads of state adopted two complementary instruments. The first was the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement. The second was the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment (Free Movement Protocol).¶ Establishing a continental economic community in which goods, services and people move freely is regarded as important in addressing Africa’s developmental challenges and realising the aspirations of Agenda 2063. Mobility is thus intimately intertwined with trade. Several progressive continental policies strengthen the aims of the AfCFTA and the Free Movement Protocol. These include the Migration Policy Framework for Africa, the Single African Air Transport Market and the AU Strategy for a Better Integrated Border Governance. ¶ The AU hopes that, by 2023, people will be able to move freely among member countries, by, among others, eliminating visa requirements for intra-African travel. A 2023 target is also set for completing the first two phases of the AfCFTA.¶ The continent is well on track to achieve the free trade milestone, but free movement of people is lagging. Despite understanding that these elements go hand in hand, the pace of ratification and implementation of the two instruments remains asymmetrical. States show more political will for trade.¶ Unlocking Africa’s potential through trade¶ The AfCFTA is anticipated to transform Africa and be a significant driver of economic growth and industrialisation. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates that intra-African exports by the end of 2021 were only 14.4%. Both UNCTAD and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) believe that the AfCFTA could change this dramatically.¶ UNECA predicts that the AfCFTA could increase exports by 3%, augmenting the value of intra-African trade by between 15% and 25% (US$50 billion and US$70 billion) by 2040. Informal trade is not included in these statistics.¶ In Africa, informal cross-border trade is significant and widespread. The value of informal commerce may equal or surpass the value of formal trade for specific goods and countries. African borders are frequently crossed by unregistered companies and informal traders, especially women, who buy and sell goods throughout the continent. However, accurate data is still lacking.¶ In 2021, UNECA estimates found that informal cross-border trade constituted 7% to 16% of all formal intra-African trade flows. Significantly, between neighbouring countries, informal cross-border trade ranges from 30% to 72% of formal trade. According to UNECA, this has important implications for Africa and collecting data on informal cross-border trade will be key to accurately tracing intracontinental trade flows.¶ For fragile and conflict-affected states, informal cross-border trade is particularly significant as formal trade channels may be adversely affected. The former provides traders with a market outside the fragmented and potentially failing domestic market. However, even as most states are on board for the free trade area, a few major regional players continue to dominate intra-African trade. This has led to concerns about the uneven distribution of gains between middle-income countries and smaller economies, particularly the least-developed countries.¶ Mobility and free trade¶ Migration also plays a crucial role in Africa’s regional integration agenda, by contributing to socio-economic development in countries of both origin and destination. Some studies definitively show increased bilateral trade between recipient and origin countries due to the presence of migrants in a country. It is clear that establishing linkages through capital investment, philanthropy, knowledge transfer and entrepreneurship is crucial. The diaspora is, thus, a key resource.¶ In addition, regular migration could significantly contribute to the development of host countries by providing them with the experience, knowledge and services they require from both skilled and unskilled labour. While the positive impact of migration and trade tends to tilt towards recipient countries, the resultant trade imbalance for origin countries could be rectified through remittances and direct investment.¶ A further dimension is that under the AfCFTA, African countries must give each other progressively better access to services within their markets. In 2018, African member states agreed on five priority services as the starting point for engagement. These are financial services, communication, transport, tourism and business services. By September 2022, initial offers on the trade in services had been received from 43 countries. This means that the continent is on course to finalising this essential element of the process.¶ Why free movement?¶ The AU’s Migration Policy Framework and the African Common Position on Migration and Development articulate clearly that Africa can advance economic development through better migration management and governance. For the AU, member states and regional economic communities (RECs) need to formulate policies that use migration for development.¶ While the Free Movement Protocol is a continental agreement, its effective governance and implementation are national and regional. Already many African countries have participated through RECs in freedom of movement declarations and, thus, are aware of the responsibility that comes with freedom of mobility. For the protocol to be successful, the agreement must be translated and contextualised to take into account domestic realities and the long-term strategy of the continent (and its member states).¶ This includes ways in which its implementation can help to build resilience in Africa for unanticipated mobility and support the transition to a borderless continent. It also extends to providing a framework for policy coherence on the digitalisation of civil registers and helping to meet the long-term aspirations of ‘making Africa a home’. Still, progress on ratifying and implementing the protocol is slow – slower than that for the AfCFTA.

<h4>Free movement can save intra-African trade – ratification of the FMP is key</h4><p><strong>PSC Report 22<u></strong> {The PSC Report is an initiative of the Institute for Security Studies (ISS)} - ("Africa’s prosperity depends on free trade and mobility," ISS Africa, published 10-28-2022, accessed 12-13-2022, https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/africas-prosperity-depends-on-free-trade-and-mobility)//marlborough-wr/</p><p><strong><mark>Regional</mark> <mark>integration</strong></mark> <mark>is</mark> <mark>key</mark> for Africa’s prosperity. To achieve it, policies, systems and practices must</u> be adopted to <u>reduce barriers to access, <strong>facilitate people’s freedom of movement</u></strong>, <u>encourage intraregional trade and develop joint strategies. <mark>Processes brokered by the A</mark>frican <mark>U</mark>nion</u> (AU) aimed at a single African market for goods and services <u><strong><mark>supported</mark> <mark>by</mark> the <mark>free</mark> <mark>movement</mark> of people</strong> <mark>are <strong>instrumental</strong>.</u></mark>¶ In 2018, <u>AU heads of state adopted</u> <u>two complementary instruments</u>. The first was the African Continental Free Trade Area (<u>AfCFTA</u>) agreement. The second was the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment (<u>Free Movement Protocol</u>).¶ <u>Establishing a <strong>continental economic community</strong> in which goods, services and people move freely is regarded as important in addressing Africa’s developmental challenges</u> and realising the aspirations of Agenda 2063. <u><strong><mark>Mobility</mark> <mark>is</mark> thus intimately <mark>intertwined</mark> <mark>with</mark> <mark>trade</strong>.</u></mark> Several progressive continental policies strengthen the aims of the AfCFTA and the Free Movement Protocol. These include the Migration Policy Framework for Africa, the Single African Air Transport Market and the AU Strategy for a Better Integrated Border Governance. ¶ The AU hopes that, by 2023, people will be able to move freely among member countries, by, among others, eliminating visa requirements for intra-African travel. A 2023 target is also set for completing the first two phases of the AfCFTA.¶ <u><mark>The</mark> <mark>continent</mark> <mark>is</mark> well on track <mark>to</mark> <mark>achieve</mark> the <mark>free trade</mark> milestone, <mark>but <strong>free movement</mark> of people <mark>is lagging</strong></mark>.</u> Despite understanding that <u><strong><mark>these</mark> <mark>elements</mark> <mark>go hand in hand</strong></mark>, the pace of <mark>ratification</mark> <mark>and</mark> <mark>implementation</mark> of the two instruments <mark>remains</mark> <strong><mark>asymmetrical</strong></mark>. States show more political will for trade.¶ <strong>Unlocking Africa’s potential through trade¶ </strong>The <mark>AfCFTA</mark> <mark>is</mark> anticipated <mark>to transform Africa</mark> <mark>and</mark> <mark>be</mark> <mark>a</mark> significant <mark>driver</mark> <mark>of</mark> economic <mark>growth</mark> and industrialisation.</u> The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates that <u><mark>intra-African exports</mark> by the end of 2021 <mark>were only 14.4%.</u></mark> Both UNCTAD and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) believe that <u>the AfCFTA could change this dramatically.</u>¶ UNECA predicts that the <u><mark>AfCFTA</mark> <mark>could</mark> <mark>increase</mark> exports by 3%, augmenting <mark>the</mark> <mark>value</mark> of intra-African trade <mark>by</mark> between 15% and <mark>25%</mark> (US$50 billion and US$70 billion) by 2040.</u> Informal trade is not included in these statistics.¶ In Africa, <u><mark>informal</mark> cross-border <mark>trade</mark> <mark>is</mark> <strong>significant and <mark>widespread</strong></mark>. The value of informal commerce may equal or surpass the value of formal trade for specific goods and countries.</u> African borders are frequently crossed by unregistered companies and informal traders, especially women, who buy and sell goods throughout the continent. However, accurate data is still lacking.¶ In 2021, UNECA estimates found that <u>informal cross-border trade constituted 7% to 16% of all formal intra-African trade flows.</u> Significantly, between neighbouring countries<u>, informal cross-border trade ranges from 30% to 72% of formal trade.</u> According to UNECA, this has important implications for Africa and collecting data on informal cross-border trade will be key to accurately tracing intracontinental trade flows.¶ For fragile and conflict-affected states, informal cross-border trade is particularly significant as formal trade channels may be adversely affected. The former provides traders with a market outside the fragmented and potentially failing domestic market. However, even as most states are on board for the free trade area, <u>a few major regional players continue to dominate intra-African trade. This has led to concerns about the <strong>uneven distribution of gains</strong> between middle-income countries and smaller economies, particularly the least-developed countries.¶ </u>Mobility and free trade¶ <u><strong><mark>Migration</mark> also <mark>plays a crucial role</strong></mark> in Africa’s regional integration agenda, by contributing to <strong>socio-economic development</strong> in countries of both origin and destination.</u> Some <u><mark>studies</mark> <mark>definitively</mark> <mark>show</mark> <strong><mark>increased bilateral trade</strong></mark> between recipient and origin countries due to the presence of migrants in a country.</u> It is clear that <u>establishing <strong>linkages through capital <mark>investment</mark>, philanthropy, <mark>knowledge transfer and entrepreneurship</strong></mark> is crucial. The diaspora is, thus, a key resource.</u>¶ In addition, <u><mark>regular</mark> <mark>migration</mark> could <strong><mark>significantly</mark> <mark>contribute</mark> <mark>to</mark> the <mark>development</mark> of host countries</strong> by providing them with the experience, knowledge and services they require <mark>from</mark> both skilled and unskilled <mark>labour</mark>. </u>While the positive impact of migration and trade tends to tilt towards recipient countries, <u>the resultant <mark>trade</mark> <mark>imbalance</mark> for origin countries <mark>could be <strong>rectified through remittances and </mark>direct <mark>investment</mark>.¶ </u></strong>A further dimension is that under the AfCFTA, African countries must give each other progressively better access to services within their markets. In 2018, African member states agreed on five priority services as the starting point for engagement. These are financial services, communication, transport, tourism and business services. By September 2022, initial offers on the trade in services had been received from 43 countries. This means that the continent is on course to finalising this essential element of the process.¶ <u>Why free movement?¶ </u>The AU’s Migration Policy Framework and the African Common Position on Migration and Development articulate clearly that <u>Africa can advance economic development through better migration management and governance. For the AU, member states and regional economic communities (RECs) need to <strong>formulate policies that use migration for development.</strong>¶ While the Free Movement Protocol is a continental agreement, its <strong>effective governance and implementation are national and regional</strong>.</u> Already many African countries have participated through RECs in freedom of movement declarations and, thus, are aware of the responsibility that comes with freedom of mobility. For the protocol to be successful, the agreement must be translated and contextualised to take into account domestic realities and the long-term strategy of the continent (and its member states).¶ This includes ways in which <u>its implementation can help to build resilience in Africa for unanticipated mobility and support the transition to a borderless continent</u>. It also extends to providing a framework for policy coherence on the digitalisation of civil registers and helping to meet the long-term aspirations of ‘making Africa a home’. Still, <u>progress on ratifying and implementing the protocol is slow – slower than that for the AfCFTA.</p></u>

Middle School AC

Advantage 1: FMP Boosts the Economy

./documents/hsld22/Marlborough/ElPi/Marlborough-ElPi-Aff-Marlborough-MSNovice-Invitational-Round-2.docx

A

Marlborough MS/Novice Invitational

2

Modern Brain CZ

Phumchun, Kitiny

AC: boosts econ Nc: meat consumption rise, terrorism

hsld22/Marlborough/ElPi/Marlborough-ElPi-Aff-Marlborough-MSNovice-Invitational-Round-2.docx

2023-03-04 20:41:03

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No risk of Russia war---neither side will escalate

Tsygankov 16

Andrei Tsygankov 16, Professor at the Departments of Political Science and International Relations at San Francisco State University, PhD from USC, “5 reasons why the threat of a global war involving Russia is overstated,” Feb 19 2016, http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/5-reasons-why-threat-great-power-war-involving-russia-overstated

Experts and politicians are warning of high likelihood of a military conflict – possibly a nuclear one – between Russia and the U.S. or NATO In the West, many argue the dangers associated with a “resurgent” Russia and tensions have been growing since the Ukraine crisis possible military conflict with Istanbul and alleged preparations to invade the Baltic States alarmist views and arguments are misplaced because they underestimate the dangers of the Cold War and overestimate those of today’s world whatever the rhetoric, major powers are not inclined towards risky behavior when their core interests are at stake. This concerns not only the nuclear superpowers, but also Turkey. The prospect of confronting Russia's military should give pause even to Erdogan NATO has been careful to not be drawn into highly provocative actions, whether responding to Russia seizing the Pristina Airport in June 1999, getting involved on Georgia’s side or providing support for Ukraine. Unless Russia is the clear and proven aggressor, NATO is unlikely to begin World War III. Russia remains a defensive power aware of its responsibility for maintaining international stability. Moscow wants to work with major powers, not against them the U S has important interests to prevent regional conflicts from escalating U.S. military and diplomatic resources are sufficient to restrain key regional players proxy wars are happening, but they are unlikely to escalate Despite the dangers the world contains a number of important underappreciated, checks threat talk may be a way to pressure the opponent into concessions rather than to signal real intentions. When such pressures do not bring expected results rhetoric of war subsides Then a dialogue begins. increasing frequency of exchanges between Obama and Putin including phone conversation following the Munich conference - suggest recognition that the record of pressuring has been mixed at best.

alarmist views are misplaced because the dangers overestimate those of today’s world NATO has been careful to not be drawn in Russia remains a defensive power aware of responsibility for stability U S has interests to restrain regional players the world contains underappreciated, checks threat talk may be a way to pressure the opponent dialogue begins exchanges between Obama and Putin suggest recognition

The contemporary discussion of security interactions among major powers is depressing to participants and observers alike. Experts and politicians are warning us of an increasingly high likelihood of a military conflict – possibly a nuclear one – between Russia, on the one hand, and the U.S. or NATO, on the other.¶ In the West, many argue the dangers associated with a “resurgent” Russia and vow to defend themselves from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “aggressive” actions in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Last month, U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter accused Russia of threatening the world order and starkly warned: “Make no mistake, the United States will defend our interests, our allies, the principled international order, and the positive future it affords us all.”¶ The tensions have been growing and have become especially high since the 2014 Ukraine crisis. Russian military flights over the Baltic and Black Sea in response to NATO’s active buildup on Russia’s European borders has done little to calm these fears. The Turkish decision to shoot down a Russian warplane by claiming violation of its airspace in November 2015 revived the discussion of Moscow’s possible military conflict with Istanbul and NATO, of which Turkey is a member. More recently, the hype has been over the Kremlin’s alleged preparations to invade the Baltic States and the West’s need to respond.¶ In Russia, these threats and discussions are taken seriously, and the responsibility for these security tensions has been squarely placed on the Western powers. The frequently repeated charges are that the West and NATO have encircled Russia with military bases and refused to recognize Moscow’s global interests. Russian media have actively discussed the U.S. National Security Archive’s Cold War documents on a nuclear attack against Russia and China declassified on Dec. 22, 2015.¶ Last week, while attending the Munich Security Conference, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev compared the contemporary security environment with the one that led to the Cuban Missile Crisis and reminded the audience of U.S. President John F. Kennedy’s words that “foreign policy can kill us."¶ In the meantime, contradicting Medvedev, Russian experts often bemoan the fact that the Cold War was far more predictable and less dangerous than today’s multipolar world. What many have initially viewed as a generally positive transition from the U.S. “diktat” is now presented as leading toward a great power war.¶ This increasingly apocalyptic mood on both sides reflects a growing international instability and breakdown of important communication channels between Russia and the West. Since the beginning of Ukraine crisis and up until the G20 meeting in Antalya in December 2015, the two sides have barely interacted. Appalled by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for Ukrainian separatists, Western leaders pursued policies of sanctions and isolation, whereas the indignant Kremlin has sought to demonstrate its indifference toward such policies.¶ Only since Antalya have Putin and U.S. President Barack Obama resumed their attempts to regularly discuss issues of importance. Western and Russia military, too, severed their contacts although the two sides have recently begun to coordinate their actions in the Syrian airspace. The aforementioned alarmist views and arguments are misplaced because they underestimate the dangers of the Cold War and overestimate those of today’s world.¶ Despite some attempts to present the Cold War as generally stable, predictable, and peaceful, this is not the time to feel nostalgic about it. Multiple crises from Berlin to Cuba and Afghanistan extended across much of the Cold War era. State propaganda on both sides was reinforced by an intense ideological confrontation accompanied by drills and necessary preparations for a nuclear war.¶ The Oscar-nominated film “Bridge of Spies” directed by Steven Spielberg reproduces some of that hysterical atmosphere in the United States where the public was mobilized for any actions in support of the government. In the Soviet Union it was no different. For the world outside the West and the U.S.S.R., this was not a peaceful, but rather an increasingly chaotic and violent time – the conclusion well documented by scholars of the Third World.¶ Why today's world is less dangerous than the Cold War¶ Today’s world, while threatening and uncertain, is hardly more dangerous than the Cold War, for the following reasons.¶ First, whatever the rhetoric, major powers are not inclined towards risky behavior when their core interests are at stake. This concerns not only the nuclear superpowers, but also countries such as Turkey. The prospect of confronting Russia's overwhelmingly superior military should give pause even to someone as hot-tempered as Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan. Even if Erdogan wanted to pit Russia against NATO, it wouldn’t work.¶ So far, NATO has been careful to not be drawn into highly provocative actions, whether it is by responding to Russia seizing the Pristina International Airport in June 1999, getting involved on Georgia’s side during the military conflict in August 2008 or by providing lethal military assistance and support for Ukraine. Unless Russia is the clear and proven aggressor, NATO is unlikely to support Turkey and begin World War III.¶ Second, Russia remains a defensive power aware of its responsibility for maintaining international stability. Moscow wants to work with major powers, not against them. Its insistence on Western recognition of Russia’s interests must not be construed as a drive to destroy the foundations of the international order, such as sovereignty, multilateralism, and arms control.¶ Third, the United States has important interests to prevent regional conflicts from escalating or becoming trans-regional. Although its relative military capabilities are not where they were ten years ago, the U.S. military and diplomatic resources are sufficient to restrain key regional players in any part of the world. Given the power rivalry across several regions, proxy wars are possible and indeed are happening, but they are unlikely to escalate.¶ Fourth, unlike the Cold War era, the contemporary world has no rigid alliance structure. The so-called Russia-China-Iran axis is hardly more than a figment of the imagination by American neoconservatives and some Russia conspiracy-minded thinkers. The world remains a space in which international coalitions overlap and are mostly formed on an ad hoc basis.¶ Fifth, with the exception of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS), there is no fundamental conflict of values and ideologies. Despite the efforts to present as incompatible the so-called “traditional” and “Western” values by Russia or “democracy” to “autocracy” by the United States and Europe, the world majority does not think that this cultural divide is worth fighting for.¶ Despite the dangers of the world we live in, it contains a number of important, even underappreciated, checks on great powers’ militarism. The threat talk coming from politicians is often deceiving. Such talk may be a way to pressure the opponent into various political and military concessions rather than to signal real intentions. When such pressures do not bring expected results, the rhetoric of war and isolation subsides.¶ Then a dialogue begins. Perhaps, the increasing frequency of exchanges between Obama and Putin since December 2015 - including their recent phone conversation following the Munich conference - suggest a growing recognition that the record of pressuring Russia has been mixed at best.

<h4>No risk of Russia war---neither side will escalate</h4><p>Andrei <strong>Tsygankov 16<u></strong>, Professor at the Departments of Political Science and International Relations at San Francisco State University, PhD from USC, “5 reasons why the threat of a global war involving Russia is overstated,” Feb 19 2016, http://www.russia-direct.org/opinion/5-reasons-why-threat-great-power-war-involving-russia-overstated</p><p></u>The contemporary discussion of security interactions among major powers is depressing to participants and observers alike. <u>Experts and politicians are warning</u> us <u>of</u> an increasingly <u><strong>high likelihood of a military conflict – possibly</strong> a <strong>nuclear</strong> one – between Russia</u>, on the one hand, <u>and the U.S. or NATO</u>, on the other.¶ <u>In the West, many argue the dangers associated with a “resurgent” Russia and</u> vow to defend themselves from Russian President Vladimir Putin’s “aggressive” actions in Eastern Europe and the Middle East. Last month, U.S. Defense Secretary Ash Carter accused Russia of threatening the world order and starkly warned: “Make no mistake, the United States will defend our interests, our allies, the principled international order, and the positive future it affords us all.”¶ The <u>tensions have been growing</u> and have become especially high <u>since the</u> 2014 <u>Ukraine crisis</u>. Russian military flights over the Baltic and Black Sea in response to NATO’s active buildup on Russia’s European borders has done little to calm these fears. The Turkish decision to shoot down a Russian warplane by claiming violation of its airspace in November 2015 revived the discussion of Moscow’s <u>possible military conflict with Istanbul and</u> NATO, of which Turkey is a member. More recently, the hype has been over the Kremlin’s <u><strong>alleged preparations to invade</strong> the Baltic States</u> and the West’s need to respond.¶ In Russia, these threats and discussions are taken seriously, and the responsibility for these security tensions has been squarely placed on the Western powers. The frequently repeated charges are that the West and NATO have encircled Russia with military bases and refused to recognize Moscow’s global interests. Russian media have actively discussed the U.S. National Security Archive’s Cold War documents on a nuclear attack against Russia and China declassified on Dec. 22, 2015.¶ Last week, while attending the Munich Security Conference, Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev compared the contemporary security environment with the one that led to the Cuban Missile Crisis and reminded the audience of U.S. President John F. Kennedy’s words that “foreign policy can kill us."¶ In the meantime, contradicting Medvedev, Russian experts often bemoan the fact that the Cold War was far more predictable and less dangerous than today’s multipolar world. What many have initially viewed as a generally positive transition from the U.S. “diktat” is now presented as leading toward a great power war.¶ This increasingly apocalyptic mood on both sides reflects a growing international instability and breakdown of important communication channels between Russia and the West. Since the beginning of Ukraine crisis and up until the G20 meeting in Antalya in December 2015, the two sides have barely interacted. Appalled by Russia’s annexation of Crimea and support for Ukrainian separatists, Western leaders pursued policies of sanctions and isolation, whereas the indignant Kremlin has sought to demonstrate its indifference toward such policies.¶ Only since Antalya have Putin and U.S. President Barack Obama resumed their attempts to regularly discuss issues of importance. Western and Russia military, too, severed their contacts although the two sides have recently begun to coordinate their actions in the Syrian airspace. The aforementioned <u><mark>alarmist views</mark> and arguments <mark>are <strong>misplaced</u></strong> <u>because </mark>they underestimate <mark>the dangers</mark> of the Cold War and <strong><mark>overestimate those of today’s world</u></strong></mark>.¶ Despite some attempts to present the Cold War as generally stable, predictable, and peaceful, this is not the time to feel nostalgic about it. Multiple crises from Berlin to Cuba and Afghanistan extended across much of the Cold War era. State propaganda on both sides was reinforced by an intense ideological confrontation accompanied by drills and necessary preparations for a nuclear war.¶ The Oscar-nominated film “Bridge of Spies” directed by Steven Spielberg reproduces some of that hysterical atmosphere in the United States where the public was mobilized for any actions in support of the government. In the Soviet Union it was no different. For the world outside the West and the U.S.S.R., this was not a peaceful, but rather an increasingly chaotic and violent time – the conclusion well documented by scholars of the Third World.¶ Why today's world is less dangerous than the Cold War¶ Today’s world, while threatening and uncertain, is hardly more dangerous than the Cold War, for the following reasons.¶ First, <u>whatever the rhetoric, major powers are not inclined towards risky behavior when their core interests are at stake. This concerns not only the nuclear superpowers, but also</u> countries such as <u>Turkey. The prospect of confronting Russia's</u> overwhelmingly superior <u>military should give pause even to</u> someone as hot-tempered as Turkish President Tayyip <u>Erdogan</u>. Even if Erdogan wanted to pit Russia against NATO, it wouldn’t work.¶ So far, <u><mark>NATO has been <strong>careful to not be drawn in</mark>to highly provocative actions</strong>, whether</u> it is by <u>responding to Russia seizing the Pristina</u> International <u>Airport in June 1999, getting involved on Georgia’s side</u> during the military conflict in August 2008 <u>or</u> by <u>providing</u> lethal military assistance and <u>support for Ukraine. Unless Russia is the clear and proven aggressor, NATO is unlikely to</u> support Turkey and <u><strong>begin World War III</strong>.</u>¶ Second, <u><mark>Russia <strong>remains a defensive power</u></strong> <u>aware of </mark>its <mark>responsibility for</mark> maintaining international <mark>stability</mark>. Moscow wants to work with major powers, not against them</u>. Its insistence on Western recognition of Russia’s interests must not be construed as a drive to destroy the foundations of the international order, such as sovereignty, multilateralism, and arms control.¶ Third, <u>the</u> <u><strong><mark>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><mark>has</mark> important <mark>interests to</u> <u></mark>prevent regional conflicts from escalating</u> or becoming trans-regional. Although its relative military capabilities are not where they were ten years ago, the <u>U.S. military and diplomatic resources are sufficient to</u> <u><strong><mark>restrain</mark> key <mark>regional players</u></strong> </mark>in any part of the world. Given the power rivalry across several regions, <u>proxy wars are</u> possible and indeed are <u>happening, but they are <strong>unlikely to escalate</u></strong>.¶ Fourth, unlike the Cold War era, the contemporary world has no rigid alliance structure. The so-called Russia-China-Iran axis is hardly more than a figment of the imagination by American neoconservatives and some Russia conspiracy-minded thinkers. The world remains a space in which international coalitions overlap and are mostly formed on an ad hoc basis.¶ Fifth, with the exception of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Greater Syria (ISIS), there is no fundamental conflict of values and ideologies. Despite the efforts to present as incompatible the so-called “traditional” and “Western” values by Russia or “democracy” to “autocracy” by the United States and Europe, the world majority does not think that this cultural divide is worth fighting for.¶ <u>Despite the dangers</u> of <u><mark>the world</u></mark> we live in, it <u><mark>contains</mark> a number of important</u>, even <u><strong><mark>underappreciated</strong>, checks</u></mark> on great powers’ militarism. The <u><mark>threat talk</u></mark> coming from politicians is often deceiving. Such talk <u><mark>may be a way to <strong>pressure the opponent</strong></mark> into</u> various political and military <u>concessions rather than to signal real intentions. When such pressures do not bring expected results</u>, the <u>rhetoric of war</u> and isolation <u>subsides</u>.¶ <u><strong>Then a <mark>dialogue begins</mark>.</u></strong> Perhaps, the <u><strong>increasing</strong> frequency of <strong><mark>exchanges between Obama and Putin</u></strong></mark> since December 2015 - <u>including</u> their recent <u>phone conversation following the Munich conference -</u> <u><mark>suggest</u></mark> a growing <u><mark>recognition </mark>that the record of pressuring</u> Russia <u>has been mixed at best.</p></u>

1NC Doubles vs. Northwestern GY

PGS Deterrence

1NC—AT: Russia

./documents/ndtceda18/Georgia/RaAg/Georgia-Ramanan-Agrawal-Neg-Kentucky-Quarters.docx

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Kentucky

Quarters

Northwestern JW

T Leburu, T Rebrovik, T Glinecki

1AC Operational NFU Ambiguity PGS Deterrence Good 1NC T Vagueness CP ESR CP Middle East PIC DA War Powers DA Japan Prolif DA Midterms TURN TNW Good TURN PGS Bad 2NR DA Midterms CP ESR

ndtceda18/Georgia/RaAg/Georgia-Ramanan-Agrawal-Neg-Kentucky-Quarters.docx

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college

The best studies confirm our impact – err on the side of a consensus of empirical research – our evidence assumes every skeptic.

Brooks & Wohlforth 16

Stephen Brooks & William Wohlforth 16. William, Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. Stephen Brooks, Ph. D in Political Science from Yale, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. Page 103-108

Consistency with influential relevant theories lends credence to the expectation that US security commitments actually can shape the strategic environment as deep engagement presupposes to model the strategy’s expected effects we had to simplify things by selecting two mechanisms assurance and deterrence and examining their effects independently, thus missing potentially powerful positive interactions between them. major bodies of evidence are most important empirical findings and regionally focused research General Patterns of Evidence Three key questions about US security provision have received the most extensive analysis. First, do alliances such as those sustained by the United States actually deter war and increase security? Second, does such security provision actually hinder nuclear proliferation? And third, does limiting proliferation actually increase security? The determinants of deterrence success and failure have attracted case study tests deterrence is much harder in practice than in theory Many quantitative findings are mutually contradictory or are clearly not relevant to extended deterrence. But some relevant results receive broad support: Alliances have a deterrent effect In a study spanning two centuries Johnson and Leeds found “support for the hypothesis that defensive alliances deter the initiation of disputes defensive alliances lower the probability of international conflict and are thus a good policy option for states seeking to maintain peace Fuhrmann similarly find that formal defense pacts with nuclear states The overall balance of military forces does not appear to influence deterrence; the local balance of military forces in the specific theater in which deterrence is actually practiced, however, is key Forward- deployed troops enhance the deterrent effect Strong mutual interests and ties enhance deterrence Case studies strongly ratify the theoretical expectation that it is easier to defend a given status quo than to challenge it forcefully compellence is extremely hard. The most important finding is that alliances with nuclear- armed allies like the United States actually work in deterring conflict selection bias works against it The United States is more inclined to offer alliance rela- tionships in settings where the probability of military conflicts is higher than average The fact that alliances work to deter conflict in precisely the situations where deterrence is likely to be especially hard is noteworthy. the United States is interested in deterring military challenges , relying only on latent military capabilities in the US homeland is likely to be far less effective than having an overseas military posture forward deterrence posture is strongly appealing because defending a given status quo is far cheaper than overturning it, and, once a favorable status quo is successfully overturned, restoring the status quo ante can be expected to be fearsomely costly Recognizing the significance of these findings clearly casts doubt on the wait on the sidelines and decide whether to intervene later” approach favored by retrenchment proponents Fear that nuclear proliferation might deter [US leaders] from using military intervention to pursue their interests, reduce the effectiveness of their coercive diplomacy, trigger regional instability, undermine their alliance structures, dissipate their strategic attention, and set off further nuclear proliferation within their sphere of influence also notable are the enhanced prospects of nuclear accidents and the greater risk of leakage of nuclear material to terrorists Do security ties serve to contain t nuclear weapons findings are decidedly mixed. Alliance relationships are just one piece of this complex puzzle empirical studies face the same selection bias problem just discussed alliance guarantees might be offered to states actively considering the nuclear option precisely in order to try to forestall that decision the most relevant findings that emerge from this literature are The most recent statistical analysis concludes that “security guarantees significantly reduce proliferation proclivity states with such guarantees are less likely to export sensitive nuclear material and technology Case study research underscores that the complexity of motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons cannot be reduced to security Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case studies nonetheless reveal that security alliances help explain numerous allied decisions not to proliferate even when security is not always the main driver of leaders’ interest States whose security goals are subsumed by their sponsors’ own aims have never acquired the bomb This finding highlights the role of U.S. security commitments in stymieing nuclear proliferation .S. protégés will only seek the bomb if they doubt U.S. protection Multiple independently case research projects further unpack the conditions that decrease the likelihood of allied proliferation, centering on the credibility of the alliance commitment. in cases of prevention failure, the alliances allow the patron to influence the ally’s nuclear program subsequently, decreasing further proliferation risks Security alliances lower the likelihood of proliferation cascades many predicted cascades did not occur. security provision, mainly by the United States, is a key reason why The most comprehensive statistical analysis finds that states are more likely to proliferate in response to neighbors when three conditions are met there is an intense security rivalry between the two countries the proliferating state does not have a security guarantee from a nuclear- armed patron and the potential proliferator has the industrial and technical capacity to launch an indigenous program the spread of nuclear weapons decelerated with the end of the Cold War Their research, as well as that of scores of scholars using multiple methods and representing many contrasting theoretical perspectives shows that US security guarantees and the counter- proliferation policy deep engagement allows are a big part of the reason why some of the same realist precepts that generate the theoretical prediction that retrenchment would increase demand for nuclear weapons also suggest that proliferation might increase security nuclear optimists like Waltz contend that deterrence essentially solves the security problem for all nuclear- armed states largely eliminating the direct use of force US retrenchment might generate an initial decrease in security followed by an increase as insecure states acquire nuclear capabilities ultimately leaving no net effect on international security This perspective is countered by nuclear pessimists they see major security downsides from new nuclear states. Copious research casts doubt on the expectation that governments can be relied upon to create secure and controlled nuclear forces. The more nuclear states there are, the higher the probability that the organizational, psychological, and civil- military pathologies Sagan identifies will turn an episode like one of the numerous “near misses” he uncovers One day a warning system will fail an official will panic or a terrorist attack will be misconstrued, and the missiles will fly. powerful reasons to question the assessment of proliferation optimists also emerge even if one assumes, as they do, that states are rational and seek only to maximize their security nuclear deterrence can only work by raising the risk of nuclear war. For deterrence to be credible there has to be a nonzero chance of nuclear use If nuclear use is impossible, deterrence cannot be credible every nuclear deterrence relationship depends on some probability The more such relationships there are the greater the risk of nuclear war Nuclear crisis bargaining is about a “competition in risk taking Kroenig counts some twenty cases in which states ran real risks of nuclear war in order to prevail in crises , “By asking whether states can be deterred or not … proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis The more nuclear- armed states there are, the more the opportunities for such risk- taking and the greater the probability of nuclear use

to model effects we simplify assurance and deterrence examining effects independently miss powerful interactions deterrence attracted tests findings are contradictory some results receive broad support Alliances have a deterrent In a study spanning two centuries Leeds found “support for defensive alliances lower conflict military forces in the theater which deterrence is practiced is key Forward- deployed troops enhance the effect studies ratify the expectation it is easier to defend than challenge alliances with nuclear allies work selection bias” works against it. The U S is inclined to offer in settings where probability of conflict is higher relying on latent capabilities in the homeland is far less effective forward deterrence is appealing because defending is cheaper than overturning Recognizing these findings casts doubt on the wait on the sidelines and decide to intervene later” approach Do security ties contain nuclear weapons findings are mixed the most relevant are statistical analysis concludes security guarantees reduce proliferation states with guarantees are less likely to export material and tech Multiple independent studies reveal security alliances explain decisions not to proliferate protégés only seek the bomb if they doubt U.S. protection research center on credibility of the alliance commitment alliances lower proliferation cascades provision by the U S , is a key reason The most comprehensive analysis finds states proliferate when there is an intense rivalry the state does not have a security guarantee and capacity spread decelerated with the end of the Cold War scores of scholars using multiple methods representing contrasting perspectives, shows US guarantees and deep engagement are why pessimists see major downsides research casts doubt governments can be relied upon warning system fail an official will panic attack will be misconstrued missiles will fly deterrence only work by raising the risk of nuclear war If use is impossible, deterrence cannot be credible The more the greater the risk crisis is a “competition in risk taking The more armed states the greater the probability

Consistency with influential relevant theories lends credence to the expectation that US security commitments actually can shape the strategic environment as deep engagement presupposes. But it is far from conclusive. Not all analysts endorse the theories we discussed in chapter 5. These theories make strong assumptions that states generally act rationally and focus primarily on security. Allowing misperceptions, emotions, domestic politics, desire for status, or concern for honor into the picture might alter the verdict on the strategy’s net expected effects. And to model the strategy’s expected effects we had to simplify things by selecting two mechanisms— assurance and deterrence— and examining their effects independently, thus missing potentially powerful positive interactions between them. This chapter moves beyond theory to examine patterns of evidence. If the theoretical arguments about the security effects of deep engagement are right, what sort of evidence should we see? Two major bodies of evidence are most important: general empirical findings concerning the strategy’s key mechanisms and regionally focused research. General Patterns of Evidence Three key questions about US security provision have received the most extensive analysis. First, do alliances such as those sustained by the United States actually deter war and increase security? Second, does such security provision actually hinder nuclear proliferation? And third, does limiting proliferation actually increase security? Deterrence Effectiveness The determinants of deterrence success and failure have attracted scores of quantitative and case study tests. Much of the case study work yields a cautionary finding: that deterrence is much harder in practice than in theory, because standard models assume away the complexities of human psychology and domestic politics that tend to make some states hard to deter and might cause deterrence policies to backfire. 1 Many quantitative findings, mean- while, are mutually contradictory or are clearly not relevant to extended deterrence. But some relevant results receive broad support: Alliances generally do have a deterrent effect. In a study spanning nearly two centuries, Johnson and Leeds found “support for the hypothesis that defensive alliances deter the initiation of disputes.” They conclude that “defensive alliances lower the probability of international conflict and are thus a good policy option for states seeking to maintain peace in the world.” Sechser and Fuhrmann similarly find that formal defense pacts with nuclear states have significant deterrence benefits. 2 3 The overall balance of military forces (including nuclear) between states does not appear to influence deterrence; the local balance of military forces in the specific theater in which deterrence is actually practiced, however, is key. 4 Forward- deployed troops enhance the deterrent effect of alliances with overseas allies. 5 Strong mutual interests and ties enhance deterrence. 6 Case studies strongly ratify the theoretical expectation that it is easier to defend a given status quo than to challenge it forcefully: compellence (sometimes termed “coercion” or “coercive diplomacy”) is extremely hard. The most important finding to emerge from this voluminous research is that alliances— especially with nuclear- armed allies like the United States— actually work in deterring conflict. This is all the more striking in view of the fact that what scholars call “selection bias” probably works against it. The United States is more inclined to offer— and protégés to seek— alliance rela- tionships in settings where the probability of military conflicts is higher than average. The fact that alliances work to deter conflict in precisely the situations where deterrence is likely to be especially hard is noteworthy. More specifically, these findings buttress the key theoretical implication that if the United States is interested in deterring military challenges to the status quo in key regions, relying only on latent military capabilities in the US homeland is likely to be far less effective than having an overseas military posture. Similarly, they lend support to the general proposition that a forward deterrence posture is strongly appealing to a status quo power, because defending a given status quo is far cheaper than overturning it, and, once a favorable status quo is successfully overturned, restoring the status quo ante can be expected to be fearsomely costly. Recognizing the significance of these findings clearly casts doubt on the “wait on the sidelines and decide whether to intervene later” approach that is so strongly favored by retrenchment proponents. The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation Matthew Kroenig highlights a number of reasons why US policymakers seek to limit the spread of nuclear weapons: “Fear that nuclear proliferation might deter [US leaders] from using military intervention to pursue their interests, reduce the effectiveness of their coercive diplomacy, trigger regional instability, undermine their alliance structures, dissipate their strategic attention, and set off further nuclear proliferation within their sphere of influence.” These are not the only reasons for concern about nuclear proliferation; also notable are the enhanced prospects of nuclear accidents and the greater risk of leakage of nuclear material to terrorists. 9 8 Do deep engagement’s security ties serve to contain the spread of nuclear weapons? The literature on the causes of proliferation is massive and faces challenges as great as any in international relations. With few cases to study, severe challenges in gathering evidence about inevitably secretive nuclear programs, and a large number of factors in play on both the demand and the supply sides, findings are decidedly mixed. Alliance relationships are just one piece of this complex puzzle, one that is hard to isolate from all the other factors in play. And empirical studies face the same selection bias problem just discussed: Nuclear powers are more likely to offer security guarantees to states confronting a serious threat and thus facing above- average incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, alliance guarantees might be offered to states actively considering the nuclear option precisely in order to try to forestall that decision. Like a strong drug given only to very sick patients, alliances thus may have a powerful effect even if they sometimes fail to work as hoped. 10 Bearing these challenges in mind, the most relevant findings that emerge from this literature are: The most recent statistical analysis of the precise question at issue concludes that “security guarantees significantly reduce proliferation proclivity among their recipients.” In addition, states with such guarantees are less likely to export sensitive nuclear material and technology to other nonnuclear states. 12 11 Case study research underscores that the complexity of motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons cannot be reduced to security: domestic politics, economic interests, and prestige all matter. 13 Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case studies nonetheless reveal that security alliances help explain numerous allied decisions not to proliferate even when security is not always the main driver of leaders’ interest in a nuclear program. As Nuno Monteiro and Alexandre Debs stress, “States whose security goals are subsumed by their sponsors’ own aims have never acquired the bomb. … This finding highlights the role of U.S. security commitments in stymieing nuclear proliferation: U.S. protégés will only seek the bomb if they doubt U.S. protection of their core security goals.” 15 14 Multiple independently conceived and executed recent case research projects further unpack the conditions that decrease the likelihood of allied proliferation, centering on the credibility of the alliance commitment. In addition, in some cases of prevention failure, the alliances allow the patron to influence the ally’s nuclear program subsequently, decreasing further proliferation risks. 17 Security alliances lower the likelihood of proliferation cascades. To be sure, many predicted cascades did not occur. But security provision, mainly by the United States, is a key reason why. The most comprehensive statistical analysis finds that states are more likely to proliferate in response to neighbors when three conditions are met: (1) there is an intense security rivalry between the two countries; (2) the prospective proliferating state does not have a security guarantee from a nuclear- armed patron; and (3) the potential proliferator has the industrial and technical capacity to launch an indigenous nuclear program. 18 19 16 In sum, as Monteiro and Debs note, “Despite grave concerns that more states would seek a nuclear deterrent to counter U.S. power preponderance,” in fact “the spread of nuclear weapons decelerated with the end of the Cold War in 1989.” Their research, as well as that of scores of scholars using multiple methods and representing many contrasting theoretical perspectives, shows that US security guarantees and the counter- proliferation policy deep engagement allows are a big part of the reason why. 20 The Costs of Nuclear Proliferation General empirical findings thus lend support to the proposition that security alliances impede nuclear proliferation. But is this a net contributor to global security? Most practitioners and policy analysts would probably not even bring this up as a question and would automatically answer yes if it were raised. Yet a small but very prominent group of theorists within the academy reach a different answer: some of the same realist precepts that generate the theoretical prediction that retrenchment would increase demand for nuclear weapons also suggest that proliferation might increase security such that the net effect of retrenchment could be neutral. Most notably, “nuclear optimists” like Kenneth Waltz contend that deterrence essentially solves the security problem for all nuclear- armed states, largely eliminating the direct use of force among them. It follows that US retrenchment might generate an initial decrease in security followed by an increase as insecure states acquire nuclear capabilities, ultimately leaving no net effect on international security. 21 This perspective is countered by “nuclear pessimists” such as Scott Sagan. Reaching outside realism to organization theory and other bodies of social science research, they see major security downsides from new nuclear states. Copious research produced by Sagan and others casts doubt on the expectation that governments can be relied upon to create secure and controlled nuclear forces. The more nuclear states there are, the higher the probability that the organizational, psychological, and civil- military pathologies Sagan identifies will turn an episode like one of the numerous “near misses” he uncovers into actual nuclear use. As Campbell Craig warns, “One day a warning system will fail, or an official will panic, or a terrorist attack will be misconstrued, and the missiles will fly.” 22 23 Looking beyond these kinds of factors, it is notable that powerful reasons to question the assessment of proliferation optimists also emerge even if one assumes, as they do, that states are rational and seek only to maximize their security. First, nuclear deterrence can only work by raising the risk of nuclear war. For deterrence to be credible, there has to be a nonzero chance of nuclear use. If nuclear use is impossible, deterrence cannot be credible. It follows that every nuclear deterrence relationship depends on some probability of 24 nuclear use. The more such relationships there are, the greater the risk of nuclear war. Proliferation therefore increases the chances of nuclear war even in a perfectly rationalist world. Proliferation optimists cannot logically deny that nuclear spread increases the risk of nuclear war. Their argument must be that the security gains of nuclear spread outweigh this enhanced risk. Estimating that risk is not simply a matter of pondering the conditions under which leaders will choose to unleash nuclear war. Rather, as Schelling established, the question is whether states will run the risk of using nuclear weapons. Nuclear crisis bargaining is about a “competition in risk taking.” Kroenig counts some twenty cases in which states—including prominently the United States—ran real risks of nuclear war in order to prevail in crises. As Kroenig notes, “By asking whether states can be deterred or not … proliferation optimists are asking the wrong question. The right question to ask is: what risk of nuclear war is a specific state willing to run against a particular opponent in a given crisis?” The more nuclear- armed states there are, the more the opportunities for such risk- taking and the greater the probability of nuclear use. 27 26 25

<h4>The <u>best</u> studies confirm our <u>impact</u> – err on the side of a <u>consensus</u> of <u>empirical</u> research – our evidence assumes <u>every skeptic</u>.</h4><p>Stephen<strong> Brooks & </strong>William<strong> Wohlforth 16<u></strong>. William, Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College. Stephen Brooks, Ph. D in Political Science from Yale, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Senior Fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University. Page 103-108</p><p>Consistency with influential relevant theories lends <strong>credence</u></strong> <u>to the expectation that <strong>US security commitments</u></strong> <u>actually can shape the strategic environment as deep engagement presupposes</u>. But it is far from conclusive. Not all analysts endorse the theories we discussed in chapter 5. These theories make strong assumptions that states generally act rationally and focus primarily on security. Allowing misperceptions, emotions, domestic politics, desire for status, or concern for honor into the picture might alter the verdict on the strategy’s net expected effects. And <u><mark>to model</mark> the strategy’s expected <mark>effects we</mark> had to <mark>simplify</mark> things by selecting two mechanisms</u>— <u><strong><mark>assurance</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>deterrence</u></strong></mark>— <u>and <mark>examining </mark>their <mark>effects independently</mark>, thus <mark>miss</mark>ing potentially <strong><mark>powerful</mark> positive <mark>interactions</strong></mark> between them.</p><p></u>This chapter moves beyond theory to examine patterns of evidence. If the theoretical arguments about the security effects of deep engagement are right, what sort of evidence should we see? Two <u>major bodies of evidence are most important</u>: general <u><strong>empirical findings</u></strong> concerning the strategy’s key mechanisms <u>and</u> <u><strong>regionally focused research</u></strong>.</p><p><u>General Patterns of Evidence Three key questions about US security provision have received the most extensive analysis. First, do alliances such as those sustained by the United States actually deter war and increase security? Second, does such security provision actually hinder nuclear proliferation? And third, does limiting proliferation actually increase security?</p><p></u>Deterrence Effectiveness <u>The determinants of <mark>deterrence </mark>success and failure have <mark>attracted</u></mark> scores of quantitative and <u>case study <mark>tests</u></mark>. Much of the case study work yields a cautionary finding: that <u>deterrence is much harder in practice than in theory</u>, because standard models assume away the complexities of human psychology and domestic politics that tend to make some states hard to deter and might cause deterrence policies to backfire. 1 <u>Many quantitative <mark>findings</u></mark>, mean- while, <u><mark>are</mark> mutually <mark>contradictory</mark> or are clearly not relevant to extended deterrence. But <strong><mark>some</mark> relevant <mark>results receive broad support</mark>:</strong> </p><p><strong><mark>Alliances</u></strong></mark> generally do <u><strong><mark>have a deterrent </mark>effect</u></strong>. <u><mark>In a study spanning</u></mark> nearly <u><strong><mark>two centuries</u></strong></mark>, <u><strong>Johnson</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong><mark>Leeds</u></strong> <u>found “support for</mark> the hypothesis that defensive alliances deter the <strong>initiation of disputes</u></strong>.” They conclude that “<u><mark>defensive alliances lower </mark>the <strong>probability of international <mark>conflict</strong></mark> and are thus a good policy option for states seeking to maintain peace </u>in the world.” Sechser and <u>Fuhrmann similarly find that formal defense pacts with nuclear states</u> have significant deterrence benefits. 2 3 </p><p><u>The overall balance of military forces</u> (including nuclear) between states <u>does not appear to influence deterrence; the <strong>local balance of <mark>military forces </strong>in the <strong></mark>specific <mark>theater</strong></mark> in <mark>which <strong>deterrence</strong> is</mark> actually <strong><mark>practiced</strong></mark>, however, <strong><mark>is key</u></strong></mark>. 4 </p><p><u><strong><mark>Forward- deployed troops enhance the </mark>deterrent <mark>effect</u></strong></mark> of alliances with overseas allies. 5 </p><p><u>Strong mutual interests and ties enhance deterrence</u>. 6 </p><p><u>Case <mark>studies <strong></mark>strongly <mark>ratify</mark> </strong><mark>the</mark> theoretical <mark>expectation</mark> that <mark>it is easier to <strong>defend</strong></mark> a given status</u> <u>quo <mark>than</mark> to <strong><mark>challenge</mark> it forcefully</u></strong>: <u>compellence</u> (sometimes termed “coercion” or “coercive diplomacy”) <u>is extremely hard.</p><p>The most important finding</u> to emerge from this voluminous research <u>is that <mark>alliances</u></mark>— especially <u><mark>with</u> <u><strong>nuclear</mark>- armed <mark>allies</u></strong></mark> <u>like the United States</u>— <u><strong>actually <mark>work</u></strong></mark> <u>in deterring conflict</u>. This is all the more striking in view of the fact that what scholars call “<u><mark>selection bias</u>”</mark> probably <u><strong><mark>works against it</u></strong>.</mark> <u><mark>The</mark> <strong><mark>U</strong></mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates <mark>is</mark> more <mark>inclined to offer</u></mark>— and protégés to seek— <u>alliance rela- tionships <mark>in settings where</mark> the <strong><mark>probability</strong> of</mark> military <strong><mark>conflict</mark>s</strong> <mark>is <strong>higher </mark>than average</u></strong>. <u>The fact that alliances work to deter conflict in precisely the situations where <strong>deterrence</strong> is likely to be <strong>especially hard</strong> is noteworthy.</p><p></u>More specifically, these findings buttress the key theoretical implication that if <u>the United States is interested in deterring military challenges</u> to the status quo in key regions<u>, <mark>relying</mark> only <mark>on</mark> <strong><mark>latent</mark> military <mark>capabilities</strong> in the</mark> US <strong><mark>homeland</strong></mark> <mark>is</mark> likely to be <strong><mark>far less effective</u></strong> <u></mark>than having an <strong>overseas military posture</u></strong>. Similarly, they lend support to the general proposition that a <u><mark>forward deterrence</mark> posture <mark>is</u> <u><strong></mark>strongly <mark>appealing</u></strong></mark> to a status quo power, <u><mark>because defending</mark> a given status quo <mark>is <strong></mark>far <mark>cheaper than overturning</mark> it</strong>, and, once a favorable status quo is successfully overturned, <strong>restoring</strong> the status quo ante can be expected to be <strong>fearsomely costly</u></strong>. <u><mark>Recognizing</mark> the significance of <mark>these <strong>findings</mark> clearly <mark>casts doubt</strong> on the</u></mark> “<u><strong><mark>wait on the sidelines and decide</mark> whether <mark>to intervene later” approach</u></strong></mark> that is so strongly <u>favored by <strong>retrenchment proponents</u></strong>.</p><p>The Causes of Nuclear Proliferation Matthew Kroenig highlights a number of reasons why US policymakers seek to limit the spread of nuclear weapons: “<u>Fear that nuclear proliferation might deter [US leaders] from using military <strong>intervention</strong> to pursue their interests, reduce the effectiveness of their <strong>coercive diplomacy</strong>, trigger <strong>regional instability</strong>, undermine their <strong>alliance structures</strong>, dissipate their strategic attention, and set off <strong>further nuclear proliferation</strong> within their sphere of influence</u>.” These are not the only reasons for concern about nuclear proliferation; <u>also notable are the enhanced prospects of</u> <u><strong>nuclear accidents</u></strong> <u>and the greater risk of <strong>leakage</strong> of</u> <u><strong>nuclear material to terrorists</u></strong>. 9 8</p><p><u><mark>Do</u></mark> deep engagement’s <u><mark>security ties</u></mark> <u>serve to <mark>contain</mark> t</u>he spread of <u><strong><mark>nuclear weapons</u></strong></mark>? The literature on the causes of proliferation is massive and faces challenges as great as any in international relations. With few cases to study, severe challenges in gathering evidence about inevitably secretive nuclear programs, and a large number of factors in play on both the demand and the supply sides, <u><strong><mark>findings are </mark>decidedly <mark>mixed</strong></mark>. Alliance relationships are just one piece of this complex puzzle</u>, one that is hard to isolate from all the other factors in play. And <u>empirical studies face the same selection bias problem just discussed</u>: Nuclear powers are more likely to offer security guarantees to states confronting a serious threat and thus facing above- average incentives to acquire nuclear weapons. Indeed, <u>alliance guarantees might be offered to states actively considering the nuclear option precisely in order to try to forestall that decision</u>. Like a strong drug given only to very sick patients, alliances thus may have a powerful effect even if they sometimes fail to work as hoped. 10</p><p>Bearing these challenges in mind, <u><mark>the <strong>most relevant</strong></mark> findings that emerge <strong>from this literature <mark>are</u></strong></mark>:</p><p><u>The</u> <u><strong>most recent <mark>statistical analysis</u></strong></mark> of the precise question at issue <u><mark>concludes</mark> that “<mark>security guarantees <strong></mark>significantly <mark>reduce proliferation</u></strong></mark> <u>proclivity</u> among their recipients.” In addition, <u><mark>states</mark> <mark>with</mark> such <mark>guarantees are less likely to <strong>export</strong></mark> sensitive</u> <u><strong>nuclear <mark>material and tech</mark>nology</u></strong> to other nonnuclear states. 12 11 </p><p><u><strong>Case study research</u></strong> <u>underscores that the complexity of motivations for acquiring nuclear weapons cannot be reduced to security</u>: domestic politics, economic interests, and prestige all matter. 13 </p><p><u><mark>Multiple <strong>independent</mark>ly conceived</strong> and</u> <u><strong>executed</u></strong> <u>recent case <mark>studies</mark> nonetheless <mark>reveal</mark> that <strong><mark>security alliances</u></strong></mark> <u>help <mark>explain</mark> numerous allied <mark>decisions not to proliferate</mark> even when security is not always the main driver of leaders’ interest</u> in a nuclear program. As Nuno Monteiro and Alexandre Debs stress, “<u>States whose security goals are subsumed by their sponsors’ own aims have <strong>never acquired the bomb</u></strong>. … <u>This finding highlights the role of U.S. security commitments in <strong>stymieing nuclear proliferation</u></strong>: U<u>.S. <mark>protégés</mark> will <mark>only <strong>seek the bomb</strong> if they <strong>doubt U.S. protection</u></strong></mark> of their core security goals.” 15 14 </p><p><u><strong>Multiple independently</u></strong> conceived and executed recent <u><strong>case <mark>research</u></strong></mark> <u>projects further unpack the conditions that decrease the likelihood of allied proliferation, <mark>center</mark>ing<mark> on</mark> the <strong><mark>credibility</strong> of the <strong>alliance commitment</mark>. </u></strong>In addition, <u>in</u> some <u>cases of prevention failure, the alliances allow the patron to influence the ally’s nuclear program subsequently, decreasing further proliferation risks</u>. 17 </p><p><u>Security <mark>alliances lower</mark> the likelihood of <strong><mark>proliferation cascades</u></strong></mark>. To be sure, <u>many predicted cascades did not occur.</u> But <u>security <strong><mark>provision</strong></mark>, mainly <mark>by the <strong>U</mark>nited<mark> S</mark>tates</strong><mark>, is a <strong>key</strong> reason </mark>why</u>. <u><mark>The <strong>most comprehensive</mark> statistical <mark>analysis</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>finds</mark> that <mark>states</mark> are more likely to <mark>proliferate</mark> in response to neighbors <mark>when</mark> <strong>three conditions are met</u></strong>: (1) <u><mark>there is an <strong>intense</mark> security <mark>rivalry</mark> </strong>between the two countries</u>; (2) <u><mark>the</u></mark> prospective <u>proliferating <mark>state <strong>does not have a security guarantee</strong></mark> from a <strong>nuclear</strong>- armed <strong>patron</u></strong>; <u><mark>and</u></mark> (3) <u>the potential proliferator has the industrial and technical <mark>capacity</mark> to launch an indigenous</u> nuclear <u>program</u>. 18 19 16</p><p>In sum, as Monteiro and Debs note, “Despite grave concerns that more states would seek a nuclear deterrent to counter U.S. power preponderance,” in fact “<u>the <mark>spread</mark> of nuclear weapons <strong><mark>decelerated</strong> with the <strong>end of the Cold War</u></strong></mark> in 1989.” <u>Their research, as well as that of <strong><mark>scores of scholars</u></strong> <u>using</u> <u><strong>multiple methods</u></strong></mark> <u>and <mark>representing </mark>many <strong><mark>contrasting</mark> theoretical <mark>perspectives</u></strong>, <u>shows</mark> that <mark>US</mark> <strong>security <mark>guarantees</strong> and</mark> the counter- proliferation policy <strong><mark>deep engagement</u></strong></mark> <u>allows <mark>are</mark> a <strong>big part</strong> of the <strong>reason <mark>why</u></strong></mark>. 20</p><p>The Costs of Nuclear Proliferation General empirical findings thus lend support to the proposition that security alliances impede nuclear proliferation. But is this a net contributor to global security? Most practitioners and policy analysts would probably not even bring this up as a question and would automatically answer yes if it were raised. Yet a small but very prominent group of theorists within the academy reach a different answer: <u>some of the same realist precepts that generate the theoretical prediction that retrenchment would increase demand for nuclear weapons also suggest that proliferation might <strong>increase security</u></strong> such that the net effect of retrenchment could be neutral. Most notably, “<u><strong>nuclear optimists</u></strong>” <u>like</u> Kenneth <u><strong>Waltz</u></strong> <u>contend that <strong>deterrence</strong> essentially solves the security problem for all <strong>nuclear- armed states</u></strong>, <u>largely eliminating the direct use of force </u>among them. It follows that <u>US retrenchment might generate an initial decrease in security followed by an <strong>increase as insecure states acquire nuclear capabilities</u></strong>, <u>ultimately leaving no net effect on international security</u>. 21</p><p><u>This perspective is countered by </u>“<u><strong>nuclear <mark>pessimists</u></strong></mark>” such as Scott Sagan. Reaching outside realism to organization theory and other bodies of social science research, <u>they <mark>see major</mark> security <mark>downsides </mark>from <strong>new nuclear states</strong>. <strong>Copious <mark>research</u></strong></mark> produced by Sagan and others <u><mark>casts doubt</mark> on the expectation that <strong><mark>governments</strong> can be <strong>relied upon</strong></mark> to create <strong>secure</strong> and <strong>controlled</strong> <strong>nuclear forces</strong>. The more nuclear states there are, the higher the probability that the organizational, psychological, and civil- military pathologies Sagan identifies will turn an episode like one of the numerous “<strong>near misses” he uncovers</u></strong> into actual nuclear use. As Campbell Craig warns, “<u>One day a <strong><mark>warning system</mark> will <mark>fail</u></strong></mark>, or <u><strong><mark>an</mark> <mark>official will panic</u></strong></mark>, <u>or a terrorist <strong><mark>attack will be misconstrued</strong></mark>, and <strong>the <mark>missiles will fly</strong></mark>.</u>” 22 23</p><p>Looking beyond these kinds of factors, it is notable that <u>powerful reasons to question the assessment of proliferation optimists also emerge even if one assumes, as they do, that states are rational and seek only to maximize their security</u>. First, <u>nuclear <mark>deterrence </mark>can <mark>only work by <strong>raising the risk of nuclear</mark> <mark>war</strong></mark>. For deterrence to be <strong>credible</u></strong>, <u>there has to be a</u> <u><strong>nonzero chance </strong>of nuclear use</u>. <u><mark>If </mark>nuclear <mark>use is <strong>impossible</strong>, <strong>deterrence cannot be credible</u></strong></mark>. It follows that <u>every nuclear deterrence relationship depends on some probability</u> of 24 nuclear use. <u><mark>The more </mark>such relationships there are</u>, <u><strong><mark>the greater the risk</mark> of nuclear war</u></strong>. Proliferation therefore increases the chances of nuclear war even in a perfectly rationalist world. Proliferation optimists cannot logically deny that nuclear spread increases the risk of nuclear war. Their argument must be that the security gains of nuclear spread outweigh this enhanced risk. </p><p>Estimating that risk is not simply a matter of pondering the conditions under which leaders will choose to unleash nuclear war. Rather, as Schelling established, the question is whether states will run the risk of using nuclear weapons. <u>Nuclear <mark>crisis </mark>bargaining <mark>is </mark>about <mark>a “<strong>competition in risk taking</u></strong></mark>.” <u>Kroenig counts some twenty cases in which states</u>—including prominently the United States—<u>ran real risks of nuclear war in order to prevail in crises</u>. As Kroenig notes<u>, “By asking whether states can be deterred or not … proliferation optimists are <strong>asking the wrong question</strong>.</u> <u>The right question to ask is: <strong>what risk of nuclear war</u></strong> <u>is a specific state willing to run against a <strong>particular opponent</strong> in a</u> <u><strong>given crisis</u></strong>?” <u><mark>The more</mark> nuclear- <mark>armed states </mark>there are, the more the opportunities for such risk- taking and <mark>the <strong>greater the probability</mark> of nuclear use</u></strong>. 27 26 25</p>

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Global populism upsurge is bad—laundry list of impacts

Leigh 21

Leigh 21 Andrew Leigh 2021 “What's the Worst that Could Happen?: Existential Risk and Extreme Politics” (Ph.D. in Public Policy from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University)//Elmer

populists pose a threat to long-termism Because long-term threats requires science institutions, global engagement, and cooperation populists are anti-intellectual Because populists view politics as a contest This led to clashes between populist leaders and scientists called climate change nonexistent virtually all climate deniers are populists anti-vaccination movement has been bolstered rise of populist parties has been accompanied by an increase in anti-vaxxer sentiment sidelined technocrats and touted unproven health measures skepticism manifests in support for debunked conspiracy theories Populist leaders build political support by pushing conspiracy theories populists are anti-institution suspicious of institutions bureaucracy, judiciary, and media populists are anti-international hostile toward global bodies During COVID populists undermined international cooperation Trump fomented conflict with Chin Trump and Bolsonaro worked together to drive out 10,000 Cuban doctors and nurses from Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia and El Salvador, increasing the death toll of the virus in impoverished communities When populists turn from international trade, they make it harder to address future pandemics nations built comparative advantages in medical supplies over eighty countries implemented export controls leading to cascading closure of the global medical trade rhetoric of self-reliance misleads Populists create scapegoats out of minority communities and deploy racism to win votes By fostering a suspicion of foreigners separating the world into “us” and “them,” populists make it harder to solve problems that cross international boundaries. existential threats are global problems International tensions increase the chances of nuclear war and make it more difficult to control bioterrorism Anti-internationalism raises the risks of artificial intelligence dismissed concerns a machine that can “perform at the level of, or better than a human We need to move from international values statements on artificial intelligence to treaties such agreements founder on the tendency of populist governments to oppose international pacts If populists prevent global artificial intelligence safety standards, the world risks a race to the bottom. populists are anti-irenic. they benefit from division and disagreement Populists thrive off chaos But when external crises hit, populist leaders struggle Populist politics risks exacerbating the catastrophic risks of nuclear war, pandemics, dangerous superintelligence, and climate change

populists pose a threat to long-termism Because long-term threats requires science institutions engagement and cooperation populists are anti-intellectual climate deniers anti-vaccination conspiracy theories populists are suspicious of institutions During COVID populists undermined international cooperation make it harder to address pandemics closure of global trade scapegoats of minorit ies suspicion of foreigners make it harder to solve existential threats tensions increase nuclear war make it difficult to control bioterrorism Anti-internationalism risks a i Populist politics exacerbating catastrophic risks of nuclear war, pandemics, dangerous superintelligence, and climate change

Why do populists pose a threat to long-termism? Because tackling long-term threats requires four things: strong science, effective institutions, global engagement, and a sense of cooperation and order. Populists are anti-intellectual, anti-institutional, anti-international, and anti-irenic (“irenic” means to strive for peace and consensus). This is not an accident. Each of the four antis forms part of the electoral appeal of populism, just as each makes it impossible for populists to effectively address challenges to humanity’s future. First, populists are anti-intellectual. Because populists view politics as a contest between a pure mass of people and vile elite, their characterization of the elite often includes experts. This has led to a spate of clashes between populist leaders and scientists. According to the Union of Concerned Scientists, Trump attacked science more than 150 times.75 Research on child health and pollution, the environmental impacts of coal mining, and species extinction was ignored or criticized. In the 2017 “Sharpiegate” affair, the White House redrew a meteorologic map to make it consistent with an erroneous presidential tweet. Trump called climate change “mythical” and “nonexistent.” In a similar fashion, Bolsonaro has questioned his own government’s data on deforestation in the Amazon, while Dutch far-right leader Thierry Baudet rails against “climate change hysteria.” Not every populist is a climate denier, but virtually all climate deniers are populists.76 One analysis of the twenty-one largest right-wing populist parties in Europe found that one-third were outright climate deniers, while many others were hostile to climate action.77 Right-wing populists make up 15 percent of the European Parliament, but account for around half of the votes against climate and energy resolutions. One study in the United Kingdom identified voters who held populist beliefs about politics, such as agreeing that people rather than politicians should make policy decisions, or that elected officials talk too much and take too little action.78 These populist voters were significantly less likely to agree that global warming is caused by human action and less likely to support measures to protect the environment. Importantly, this pattern held across the political spectrum; populism explains climate denial among both left- and right-wing voters. The anti-vaccination movement, with its conspiracy theories about large pharmaceutical companies, has been bolstered by populists. In Italy, the populist Five Star Movement criticized a 2017 law making it compulsory for children to be vaccinated against measles, mumps, and rubella, sometimes repeating falsehoods about the vaccine. In France, the populist National Rally party (formerly the National Front) condemned an increase in the number of mandatory childhood vaccines. Across Europe, the rise of populist parties has been accompanied by an increase in anti-vaxxer sentiment. One in seven Europeans say that they do not believe vaccines are important, while half wrongly believe that vaccines can often cause serious side effects.79 As vaccination rates fell, the number of European measles cases more than doubled between 2011 and 2019.80 Confirming the role of politics, a study that analyzed data across fourteen European countries found a strong relationship between the share of people who vote for populist parties and the proportion who believe that vaccination is not important.81 Before becoming president, Trump expressed support for a prominent anti-vaxxer conspiracy theory: the debunked claim that vaccines cause autism. As president, Trump tweeted about the dangers of vaccines more than thirty times.82 It was much the same with COVID-19. Trump’s overconfidence led him initially to dismiss the coronavirus threat. In January 2020, he said, “We have it totally under control. It’s one person coming in from China, and we have it under control. It’s going to be just fine.” In February, he referred to coronavirus as a “new hoax” being peddled by the Democrats. Gainsaying the experts, Trump was dismissive of mask wearing, slowed down testing, and touted the ineffective drug hydroxychloroquine. It soon became clear that Trump saw the disease primarily in terms of politics rather than public health.83 As a satirical headline in the Onion put it, “Trump: ‘Even One Death That Makes Me Look Bad Is a Tragedy.’”84 Bolsonaro was similarly dismissive of medical expertise. He initially described coronavirus as a media “trick,” arguing that Brazilians were naturally immune to the disease. “The Brazilian needs to be studied,” said Bolsonaro. “He doesn’t catch anything. You see a guy jumping into sewage, diving in, right? Nothing happens to him. I think a lot of people were already infected in Brazil, weeks or months ago, and they already have the antibodies that help it not proliferate.” Bolsonaro urged the premature relaxation of physical distancing measures, supported street protests against quarantines, and fired two health ministers.85 Relative to population, Brazil has one of the highest COVID-19 death rates in the world.86 Like populist leaders Johnson and Trump, Bolsonaro contracted coronavirus himself. Three of Brazil’s 81 senators have died from the disease. Similarly, in Indonesia and the Philippines, populist leaders sidelined technocrats and touted unproven health measures. Widodo was slow to implement lockdowns in Indonesia, saying that he did not want to cause “panic” and claiming that lockdowns were ineffective. His ministers variously promoted prayer and a necklace made of eucalyptus as protections against COVID-19.87 In the Philippines, President Duterte advocated gasoline as a disinfectant and created a coronavirus task force led by retired generals rather than epidemiologists.88 Indonesia and the Philippines have among the highest rates of coronavirus deaths in the Asia-Pacific region.89 Hostility toward scientists and intellectuals shows up among supporters too. In a 2019 survey, 62 percent of Democrats—but only 44 percent of Republicans—agreed that scientists’ judgments are based solely on the facts.90 Populists’ skepticism of intellectuals also manifests in support for debunked conspiracy theories.91 A global survey of twenty-two thousand voters across nineteen democracies found that populist voters were far more likely to be conspiracy minded. Populists are more than twice as likely to think that global warming is a hoax. They are almost twice as likely to believe that AIDS was invented by the US Central Intelligence Agency, that supposedly harmful effects of vaccines are being hidden from the public, and that the US government knowingly helped the September 11 attackers. Populists are more likely to believe that alien contact is being hidden from the public. Populist leaders frequently build political support by pushing conspiracy theories. Among the falsehoods peddled by populist actors are that the Holocaust is a hoax, former German chancellor Angela Merkel is the secret daughter of Adolf Hitler, the European Union is resurrecting the Roman Empire as a communist superstate, and there is a worldwide cabal of Satan-worshipping pedophiles who rule the world (the QAnon theory).92 In November 2020, Georgia Republican Marjorie Taylor Greene was the first QAnon supporter to be elected to the US Congress.93 Half of all Republican voters believe one of QAnon’s key tenets: that top Democrats are involved in child sex trafficking.94 A majority of Republicans believe that the January 2021 assault on the United States Capitol was “mostly an antifa-inspired attack.”95 Second, populists are anti-institution. Campaigning as outsiders, populist leaders tend to be suspicious of institutions such as the bureaucracy, judiciary, and media. Journalist Michael Lewis highlights the plethora of programs run by the two million people employed by the federal government, including child nutrition, veterans’ health, air traffic control, and national security. Yet the day after the 2016 election, Lewis writes, The hundreds of people who had prepared to brief the incoming Trump administration sat waiting. A day became a week and a week became a month . . . and no one showed up. The parking spots that had been set aside for Trump’s people remained empty, and the briefing books were never opened. You could walk into almost any department of the US government and hear people asking the same question: where were these people who were meant to be running the place?96 This approach to the federal bureaucracy characterized the Trump administration. By the time coronavirus struck, ten cabinet members had departed, and four-fifths of senior White House positions had turned over.97 Trump was on his fifth secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, his fourth national security adviser, and his third chief of staff. As journalists Jennifer Steinhauer and Zolan Kanno-Youngs note, “Between Mr. Trump’s history of firing people and the choice by many career officials and political appointees to leave, he now finds himself with a government riddled with vacancies, acting department chiefs and, in some cases, leaders whose professional backgrounds do not easily match up to the task of managing a pandemic.”98 Populists regard regulatory bodies and oversight mechanisms not as an appropriate check on power but rather as a creation of self-serving insiders. In Poland and Hungary, populist governments have changed the rules on the appointment of judges and imposed age limits to remove unwanted ones.99 Elsewhere, populists have encouraged lawbreaking. In Brazil and the Philippines, populist leaders advocate the extrajudicial murder of suspected criminals. Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, fears that populism “threatens to reverse the accomplishments of the modern human rights movement” created in the aftermath of the atrocities of World War II.100 Universities—the institutional home of many intellectuals—are a particular focus of populist ire. Populists claim that university research is irrelevant to real-world problems. and teaching amounts to indoctrination. Colleges are accused of lacking legitimacy and being out of touch with popular opinion. Amid the populist takeover of the Republican Party, the share of Republicans who thought that universities had a negative effect on the country jumped by 22 percentage points between 2015 and 2019.101 Another trademark of populists are their attacks on the mainstream media—or what Palin dubbed the “lamestream media.” Describing journalists as “human scum,” “low life reporters,” “corrupt,” “dishonest,” and “the enemy of the people,” Trump sought to undercut the credibility of the press. As Chris Wallace of Fox News summed it up, “He has done everything he can to undercut the media, to try and delegitimize us, and I think his purpose is clear: to raise doubts, when we report critically about him and his administration, that we can be trusted.”102 Ethical journalism—with its adherence to accuracy, independence, impartiality, and public accountability—is an important check on the abuse of power. Without an ethical media, it becomes more difficult to have a conversation about the long term. The overall importance of institutions is reinforced by a four-country study that found people who were less trusting of national institutions were also less supportive of policies to protect the well-being of future generations.103 COVID-19 also reflected Trump’s undermining of institutions. Experts had long warned about the need for the United States to work with China on potential disease hot spots. As early as 2007, microbiologists warned that “coronaviruses are well known to undergo genetic recombination, which may lead to new genotypes and outbreaks.” They went on to note that “the presence of a large reservoir of SARS-CoV-like viruses in horseshoe bats, together with the culture of eating exotic mammals in southern China, is a time bomb.”104 Despite this, Trump reduced the number of China-based staff from the CDC by two-thirds during his first two years in office.105 In his proposed budgets prior to the pandemic, Trump sought to cut CDC funding by 10 to 20 percent, with a particular emphasis on reducing CDC funding for emerging diseases, global health, and public health preparedness.106 The Trump administration also shut down the entire global health security unit of the National Security Council.107 As a report from the Environmental Data and Governance Initiative put it, “[Trump’s] efforts to reduce spending have dramatically and consistently taken aim at programs most likely to reveal and tackle potential pandemic origin points around the world.”108 The problem wasn’t just underinvestment in global health. The United States is the only advanced nation without universal health coverage, despite spending more on health care as a share of the economy than any other nation in the world. The lack of universal health care is one reason the United States has experienced so many COVID deaths and suffered difficulties in rolling out the vaccine. Minorities were both more likely to contract COVID in 2020 and less likely to be vaccinated in 2021. Populist opposition to the institutional framework of universal health care made the impact of COVID more severe and more inequitable. Third, populists are anti-international. Populist political slogans include “I Want My Country Back,” “Law and Border,” “Patriotism, Protection, and Prosperity,” “Finland for the Finns,” “Courage to Stand Up for Germany,” and “America First.” Populists typically distrust immigration, trade, and foreign investment. They tend to be hostile toward global bodies such as the World Bank, International Criminal Court, World Trade Organization, and United Nations. Many European populists advocate dissolving the European Union. Had he won a second term, experts anticipated that Trump would have tried to withdraw the United States from NATO, destabilizing the power balance in Europe.109 During the COVID-19 crisis, populists also undermined international cooperation. President Trump deliberately fomented conflict with China, calling COVID-19 “the China Virus” and “Kung Flu.” The Trump administration withdrew from the World Health Organization and cut funding to the Pan-American Health Organization, Latin America’s leading health agency. President Bolsonaro bizarrely claimed that the World Health Organization was encouraging same-sex relationships in four-year-olds, sexual experiences for nine-year-olds, and masturbation in children from birth.110 Trump and Bolsonaro worked together to drive out 10,000 Cuban doctors and nurses from Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia and El Salvador, increasing the death toll of the virus in impoverished communities.111 When populists turn their countries away from international trade, they make it harder to address the impact of future pandemics. Over time, nations have built up comparative advantages in producing certain kinds of medical supplies. Switzerland is a major manufacturer of pharmaceuticals. Malaysia is a substantial exporter of surgical gloves. The United States is the world’s largest exporter of medical instruments. China is the world’s biggest producer of face masks. South Korea mass-produces in vitro diagnostics products. Nine-tenths of the personal protective equipment sold in the European Union is imported.112 Unfortunately, during the COVID-19 crisis, over eighty countries implemented export controls on medical supplies and medicines, leading to concerns about a cascading closure of the global medical trade.113 Such a slide into autarky would be especially damaging for developing nations. The rhetoric of self-reliance misleads; rather than banning trade, countries should build stockpiles. By allowing nations to specialize in what they do best, we end up with more production of higher-quality goods at cheaper prices—and a world that is better able to respond to disease threats. At its best, patriotism fosters a sense of pride in what our ancestors have built and a love of local communities. But the antiglobal movement frequently stokes unfounded fears. Populists often create scapegoats out of minority communities and deploy racism to win votes. By fostering a suspicion of foreigners, and separating the world into “us” and “them,” populists make it harder to solve problems that cross international boundaries. By definition, existential threats to humanity are global problems, and are much harder to solve when countries are unwilling to work together. International tensions increase the chances of nuclear war and make it more difficult to control bioterrorism. Anti-internationalism also raises the risks of artificial intelligence. In 2020, President Trump issued an executive order on artificial intelligence, which touched briefly on safety issues. But in implementing it, his administration dismissed concerns about a machine that can “perform at the level of, or better than a human agent,” saying that such issues were “beyond the scope” of the executive order.114 Trump’s chief technology officer, Michael Kratsios, stated the goal simply: for the United States to “win the race for artificial intelligence.”115 This is dangerously narrow-minded. We need to move from international values statements on artificial intelligence to binding treaties. But such global agreements could founder on the tendency of populist governments to oppose international pacts. If populists prevent the development of global artificial intelligence safety standards, the world risks a race to the bottom. Fourth, populists are anti-irenic. Rather than striving for an irenic calm consensus, they benefit from division and disagreement. The politics of division requires that the temperature be at boiling point, the volume at full blast, the gas pedal flat to the floor. To persuade voters that politics is broken, there must be a villain. Populists thrive on bombast and blame—not compromise and community building. Throughout his four years as president, Trump averaged a false or misleading statement every ninety minutes, according to analysis by the Washington Post.116 Many of his lies were deliberately designed to provoke outrage. Describing the effect of his most incendiary statements, Trump said, “I used to watch it like a rocket ship when I put out a beauty.”117 A perpetual culture war not only served to mobilize the Republican base; it also engendered a sense of stress and anxiety that has been shown by psychologists to foster hostility toward outsiders.118 Two-fifths of Republicans think their political opponents are evil. One-fifth regard Democrats as animals.119 When stressed, people can develop tunnel vision—overvaluing short-term priorities at the expense of future needs. Scarcity, argue researchers Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar Shafir, “makes us dumber. It makes us more impulsive. We must get by with less mind available, with less fluid intelligence.”120 Stressful politics and a perpetual state of fear can act as a “cognitive tax” on voters, promoting a politics of short-termism. If every day is a crisis, long-term planning is a luxury. In a battle, soldiers aren’t thinking about whether they’ve put enough money into their retirement accounts. Populists may not be bonkers, but they revel in being agitators and stirrers, fighting against a system that they regard as having served the elites for too long. If populism was a computer program, its volatility and unpredictability would be regarded as a feature, not a bug. To attack the establishment is to attack the institutions and rules that have sustained the status quo. If we could rank the world’s leaders on a spectrum, starting with the most calm and cerebral, and ending with the crankiest and craziest, populists would be at the end of the line. Remember from chapter 4 the nuclear war study “War with Crazy Types”? Populists are more likely to be “crazy types.” If anyone collapses the nuclear deterrence house of cards, it’s likely to be a populist. Divisive politics also acts as a counterweight against the sort of cooperation that is essential to long-run planning. Where politicians have taken significant actions to reduce long-term threats, it has often involved a measure of bipartisanship. A program to contain “loose nukes” after the breakup of the Soviet Union was driven by Democratic senator Nunn and Republican senator Richard Lugar. California’s 2006 cap-and-trade emissions reduction program was passed by a Democratic legislature and signed into law by Republican governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. But voters who believe their political opponents are “evil” or “animals” are less likely to support bipartisan collaboration on long-term issues. Populists thrive off chaos of their own making. But when external crises hit, populist leaders struggle. According to one study on crisis leadership, effective disaster response requires providing clear direction, putting public safety first, being compassionate toward victims, and learning lessons afterward.121 As COVID-19 showed, many populist leaders were erratic, put politics first, were unsympathetic toward the most vulnerable, and covered up their policy failings. The qualities that make populists electorally successful also make them abysmal crisis managers. We should no more expect populists to be good crisis leaders than we should expect jockeys to succeed at basketball. The characteristics of populists that threaten long-termism—anti-intellectual, anti-institutional, anti-international, and anti-irenic—are frequently celebrated by populists themselves. Populist talk show host Rush Limbaugh used to call government, academia, science, and media “the four corners of deceit.”122 For Limbaugh, hostility to intellectualism and institutions wasn’t a mark of shame, it was a badge of honor. For much of the postwar era, a centrist consensus in many advanced nations held that decisions should be guided by experts, globalization is fundamentally a force for good, established institutions deserve respect, and the media is an essential check on power. The rise of populism—driven primarily by jobs, snobs, race, pace, and luck—has upended these views. The greatest consequence of this transformation could be on the future. Populist politics risks exacerbating the catastrophic risks of nuclear war, pandemics, dangerous superintelligence, and climate change. But there is another risk too: that populist democrats become authoritarian demagogues—quashing democracy and ushering in a frightening future. It is to that danger that I now turn.

<h4>Global populism upsurge is bad—laundry list of impacts</h4><p><strong>Leigh 21</strong> Andrew Leigh 2021 “What's the Worst that Could Happen?: Existential Risk and Extreme Politics” (Ph.D. in Public Policy from the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University)//Elmer </p><p>Why do <u><strong><mark>populists</strong> <strong>pose a threat to long-termism</u></strong></mark>? <u><strong><mark>Because</u></strong> </mark>tackling <u><strong><mark>long-term threats requires</u></strong> </mark>four things: strong <u><strong><mark>science</u></strong></mark>, effective <u><strong><mark>institutions</strong></mark>, global <strong><mark>engagement</strong></mark>, <strong><mark>and</u></strong> </mark>a sense of <u><strong><mark>cooperation</u></strong> </mark>and order. Populists are anti-intellectual, anti-institutional, anti-international, and anti-irenic (“irenic” means to strive for peace and consensus). This is not an accident. Each of the four antis forms part of the electoral appeal of populism, just as each makes it impossible for populists to effectively address challenges to humanity’s future. First, <u><strong><mark>populists are anti-intellectual</u></strong></mark>. <u>Because populists view politics as a contest </u>between a pure mass of people and vile elite, their characterization of the elite often includes experts. <u>This</u> has <u>led to</u> a spate of <u>clashes between populist leaders and scientists</u>. According to the Union of Concerned Scientists, Trump attacked science more than 150 times.75 Research on child health and pollution, the environmental impacts of coal mining, and species extinction was ignored or criticized. In the 2017 “Sharpiegate” affair, the White House redrew a meteorologic map to make it consistent with an erroneous presidential tweet. Trump <u>called climate change</u> “mythical” and “<u>nonexistent</u>.” In a similar fashion, Bolsonaro has questioned his own government’s data on deforestation in the Amazon, while Dutch far-right leader Thierry Baudet rails against “climate change hysteria.” Not every populist is a climate denier, but <u>virtually all <strong><mark>climate deniers</strong> </mark>are populists</u>.76 One analysis of the twenty-one largest right-wing populist parties in Europe found that one-third were outright climate deniers, while many others were hostile to climate action.77 Right-wing populists make up 15 percent of the European Parliament, but account for around half of the votes against climate and energy resolutions. One study in the United Kingdom identified voters who held populist beliefs about politics, such as agreeing that people rather than politicians should make policy decisions, or that elected officials talk too much and take too little action.78 These populist voters were significantly less likely to agree that global warming is caused by human action and less likely to support measures to protect the environment. Importantly, this pattern held across the political spectrum; populism explains climate denial among both left- and right-wing voters. The <u><strong><mark>anti-vaccination</strong> </mark>movement</u>, with its conspiracy theories about large pharmaceutical companies, <u>has been bolstered</u> by populists. In Italy, the populist Five Star Movement criticized a 2017 law making it compulsory for children to be vaccinated against measles, mumps, and rubella, sometimes repeating falsehoods about the vaccine. In France, the populist National Rally party (formerly the National Front) condemned an increase in the number of mandatory childhood vaccines. Across Europe, the <u>rise of populist parties has been accompanied by an increase in <strong>anti-vaxxer sentiment</u></strong>. One in seven Europeans say that they do not believe vaccines are important, while half wrongly believe that vaccines can often cause serious side effects.79 As vaccination rates fell, the number of European measles cases more than doubled between 2011 and 2019.80 Confirming the role of politics, a study that analyzed data across fourteen European countries found a strong relationship between the share of people who vote for populist parties and the proportion who believe that vaccination is not important.81 Before becoming president, Trump expressed support for a prominent anti-vaxxer conspiracy theory: the debunked claim that vaccines cause autism. As president, Trump tweeted about the dangers of vaccines more than thirty times.82 It was much the same with COVID-19. Trump’s overconfidence led him initially to dismiss the coronavirus threat. In January 2020, he said, “We have it totally under control. It’s one person coming in from China, and we have it under control. It’s going to be just fine.” In February, he referred to coronavirus as a “new hoax” being peddled by the Democrats. Gainsaying the experts, Trump was dismissive of mask wearing, slowed down testing, and touted the ineffective drug hydroxychloroquine. It soon became clear that Trump saw the disease primarily in terms of politics rather than public health.83 As a satirical headline in the Onion put it, “Trump: ‘Even One Death That Makes Me Look Bad Is a Tragedy.’”84 Bolsonaro was similarly dismissive of medical expertise. He initially described coronavirus as a media “trick,” arguing that Brazilians were naturally immune to the disease. “The Brazilian needs to be studied,” said Bolsonaro. “He doesn’t catch anything. You see a guy jumping into sewage, diving in, right? Nothing happens to him. I think a lot of people were already infected in Brazil, weeks or months ago, and they already have the antibodies that help it not proliferate.” Bolsonaro urged the premature relaxation of physical distancing measures, supported street protests against quarantines, and fired two health ministers.85 Relative to population, Brazil has one of the highest COVID-19 death rates in the world.86 Like populist leaders Johnson and Trump, Bolsonaro contracted coronavirus himself. Three of Brazil’s 81 senators have died from the disease. Similarly, in Indonesia and the Philippines, populist leaders <u>sidelined technocrats and touted unproven health measures</u>. Widodo was slow to implement lockdowns in Indonesia, saying that he did not want to cause “panic” and claiming that lockdowns were ineffective. His ministers variously promoted prayer and a necklace made of eucalyptus as protections against COVID-19.87 In the Philippines, President Duterte advocated gasoline as a disinfectant and created a coronavirus task force led by retired generals rather than epidemiologists.88 Indonesia and the Philippines have among the highest rates of coronavirus deaths in the Asia-Pacific region.89 Hostility toward scientists and intellectuals shows up among supporters too. In a 2019 survey, 62 percent of Democrats—but only 44 percent of Republicans—agreed that scientists’ judgments are based solely on the facts.90 Populists’ <u>skepticism</u> of intellectuals also <u>manifests in support for <strong>debunked <mark>conspiracy theories</u></strong></mark>.91 A global survey of twenty-two thousand voters across nineteen democracies found that populist voters were far more likely to be conspiracy minded. Populists are more than twice as likely to think that global warming is a hoax. They are almost twice as likely to believe that AIDS was invented by the US Central Intelligence Agency, that supposedly harmful effects of vaccines are being hidden from the public, and that the US government knowingly helped the September 11 attackers. Populists are more likely to believe that alien contact is being hidden from the public. <u>Populist leaders</u> frequently <u>build political support by pushing conspiracy theories</u>. Among the falsehoods peddled by populist actors are that the Holocaust is a hoax, former German chancellor Angela Merkel is the secret daughter of Adolf Hitler, the European Union is resurrecting the Roman Empire as a communist superstate, and there is a worldwide cabal of Satan-worshipping pedophiles who rule the world (the QAnon theory).92 In November 2020, Georgia Republican Marjorie Taylor Greene was the first QAnon supporter to be elected to the US Congress.93 Half of all Republican voters believe one of QAnon’s key tenets: that top Democrats are involved in child sex trafficking.94 A majority of Republicans believe that the January 2021 assault on the United States Capitol was “mostly an antifa-inspired attack.”95 Second, <u><strong><mark>populists are</strong> <strong></mark>anti-institution</u></strong>. Campaigning as outsiders, populist leaders tend to be <u><strong><mark>suspicious of institutions</u></strong> </mark>such as the <u>bureaucracy, judiciary, and media</u>. Journalist Michael Lewis highlights the plethora of programs run by the two million people employed by the federal government, including child nutrition, veterans’ health, air traffic control, and national security. Yet the day after the 2016 election, Lewis writes, The hundreds of people who had prepared to brief the incoming Trump administration sat waiting. A day became a week and a week became a month . . . and no one showed up. The parking spots that had been set aside for Trump’s people remained empty, and the briefing books were never opened. You could walk into almost any department of the US government and hear people asking the same question: where were these people who were meant to be running the place?96 This approach to the federal bureaucracy characterized the Trump administration. By the time coronavirus struck, ten cabinet members had departed, and four-fifths of senior White House positions had turned over.97 Trump was on his fifth secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, his fourth national security adviser, and his third chief of staff. As journalists Jennifer Steinhauer and Zolan Kanno-Youngs note, “Between Mr. Trump’s history of firing people and the choice by many career officials and political appointees to leave, he now finds himself with a government riddled with vacancies, acting department chiefs and, in some cases, leaders whose professional backgrounds do not easily match up to the task of managing a pandemic.”98 Populists regard regulatory bodies and oversight mechanisms not as an appropriate check on power but rather as a creation of self-serving insiders. In Poland and Hungary, populist governments have changed the rules on the appointment of judges and imposed age limits to remove unwanted ones.99 Elsewhere, populists have encouraged lawbreaking. In Brazil and the Philippines, populist leaders advocate the extrajudicial murder of suspected criminals. Kenneth Roth, executive director of Human Rights Watch, fears that populism “threatens to reverse the accomplishments of the modern human rights movement” created in the aftermath of the atrocities of World War II.100 Universities—the institutional home of many intellectuals—are a particular focus of populist ire. Populists claim that university research is irrelevant to real-world problems. and teaching amounts to indoctrination. Colleges are accused of lacking legitimacy and being out of touch with popular opinion. Amid the populist takeover of the Republican Party, the share of Republicans who thought that universities had a negative effect on the country jumped by 22 percentage points between 2015 and 2019.101 Another trademark of populists are their attacks on the mainstream media—or what Palin dubbed the “lamestream media.” Describing journalists as “human scum,” “low life reporters,” “corrupt,” “dishonest,” and “the enemy of the people,” Trump sought to undercut the credibility of the press. As Chris Wallace of Fox News summed it up, “He has done everything he can to undercut the media, to try and delegitimize us, and I think his purpose is clear: to raise doubts, when we report critically about him and his administration, that we can be trusted.”102 Ethical journalism—with its adherence to accuracy, independence, impartiality, and public accountability—is an important check on the abuse of power. Without an ethical media, it becomes more difficult to have a conversation about the long term. The overall importance of institutions is reinforced by a four-country study that found people who were less trusting of national institutions were also less supportive of policies to protect the well-being of future generations.103 COVID-19 also reflected Trump’s undermining of institutions. Experts had long warned about the need for the United States to work with China on potential disease hot spots. As early as 2007, microbiologists warned that “coronaviruses are well known to undergo genetic recombination, which may lead to new genotypes and outbreaks.” They went on to note that “the presence of a large reservoir of SARS-CoV-like viruses in horseshoe bats, together with the culture of eating exotic mammals in southern China, is a time bomb.”104 Despite this, Trump reduced the number of China-based staff from the CDC by two-thirds during his first two years in office.105 In his proposed budgets prior to the pandemic, Trump sought to cut CDC funding by 10 to 20 percent, with a particular emphasis on reducing CDC funding for emerging diseases, global health, and public health preparedness.106 The Trump administration also shut down the entire global health security unit of the National Security Council.107 As a report from the Environmental Data and Governance Initiative put it, “[Trump’s] efforts to reduce spending have dramatically and consistently taken aim at programs most likely to reveal and tackle potential pandemic origin points around the world.”108 The problem wasn’t just underinvestment in global health. The United States is the only advanced nation without universal health coverage, despite spending more on health care as a share of the economy than any other nation in the world. The lack of universal health care is one reason the United States has experienced so many COVID deaths and suffered difficulties in rolling out the vaccine. Minorities were both more likely to contract COVID in 2020 and less likely to be vaccinated in 2021. Populist opposition to the institutional framework of universal health care made the impact of COVID more severe and more inequitable. Third, <u>populists are <strong>anti-international</u></strong>. Populist political slogans include “I Want My Country Back,” “Law and Border,” “Patriotism, Protection, and Prosperity,” “Finland for the Finns,” “Courage to Stand Up for Germany,” and “America First.” Populists typically distrust immigration, trade, and foreign investment. They tend to be <u>hostile toward global bodies</u> such as the World Bank, International Criminal Court, World Trade Organization, and United Nations. Many European populists advocate dissolving the European Union. Had he won a second term, experts anticipated that Trump would have tried to withdraw the United States from NATO, destabilizing the power balance in Europe.109 <u><strong><mark>During</u></strong> </mark>the <u><strong><mark>COVID</u></strong></mark>-19 crisis, <u><strong><mark>populists</u></strong> </mark>also <u><strong><mark>undermined international cooperation</u></strong></mark>. President <u>Trump</u> deliberately <u>fomented conflict with Chin</u>a, calling COVID-19 “the China Virus” and “Kung Flu.” The Trump administration withdrew from the World Health Organization and cut funding to the Pan-American Health Organization, Latin America’s leading health agency. President Bolsonaro bizarrely claimed that the World Health Organization was encouraging same-sex relationships in four-year-olds, sexual experiences for nine-year-olds, and masturbation in children from birth.110 <u><strong>Trump and Bolsonaro worked together to drive out 10,000 Cuban doctors and nurses from Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia and El Salvador, increasing the death toll of the virus in impoverished communities</u></strong>.111 <u>When populists turn</u> their countries away <u>from international trade, they <strong><mark>make it harder to address</u></strong> </mark>the impact of <u><strong>future <mark>pandemics</u></strong></mark>. Over time, <u>nations</u> have <u>built</u> up <u>comparative advantages in</u> producing certain kinds of <u>medical supplies</u>. Switzerland is a major manufacturer of pharmaceuticals. Malaysia is a substantial exporter of surgical gloves. The United States is the world’s largest exporter of medical instruments. China is the world’s biggest producer of face masks. South Korea mass-produces in vitro diagnostics products. Nine-tenths of the personal protective equipment sold in the European Union is imported.112 Unfortunately, during the COVID-19 crisis, <u>over eighty countries implemented export controls</u> on medical supplies and medicines, <u>leading to </u>concerns about a <u>cascading <strong><mark>closure of</strong> </mark>the <strong><mark>global</strong> </mark>medical <strong><mark>trade</u></strong></mark>.113 Such a slide into autarky would be especially damaging for developing nations. The <u>rhetoric of self-reliance <strong>misleads</u></strong>; rather than banning trade, countries should build stockpiles. By allowing nations to specialize in what they do best, we end up with more production of higher-quality goods at cheaper prices—and a world that is better able to respond to disease threats. At its best, patriotism fosters a sense of pride in what our ancestors have built and a love of local communities. But the antiglobal movement frequently stokes unfounded fears. <u>Populists</u> often <u>create <mark>scapegoats</mark> out <mark>of minorit</mark>y communit<mark>ies</mark> and deploy racism to win votes</u>. <u>By</u> <u><strong>fostering a <mark>suspicion of foreigners</u></strong></mark>, and <u>separating the world into “us” and “them,” populists <strong><mark>make it harder to solve </mark>problems that cross international boundaries.</u></strong> By definition, <u><strong><mark>existential threats</u></strong> </mark>to humanity <u>are global problems</u>, and are much harder to solve when countries are unwilling to work together. <u>International <strong><mark>tensions</strong> <strong>increase</strong> </mark>the chances of <strong><mark>nuclear war </strong></mark>and <strong><mark>make it</strong> <strong></mark>more <mark>difficult to control bioterrorism</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong><mark>Anti-internationalism</u></strong> </mark>also <u><strong>raises the <mark>risks </mark>of <mark>a</strong></mark>rtificial <strong><mark>i</strong></mark>ntelligence</u>. In 2020, President Trump issued an executive order on artificial intelligence, which touched briefly on safety issues. But in implementing it, his administration <u>dismissed concerns</u> about <u>a machine that can “perform at the level of, or better than a human</u> agent,” saying that such issues were “beyond the scope” of the executive order.114 Trump’s chief technology officer, Michael Kratsios, stated the goal simply: for the United States to “win the race for artificial intelligence.”115 This is dangerously narrow-minded. <u>We need to move from international values statements on <strong>a</strong>rtificial <strong>i</strong>ntelligence to </u>binding<u> treaties</u>. But <u>such</u> global <u>agreements</u> could <u>founder on the tendency of populist governments to oppose international pacts</u>. <u>If populists prevent</u> the development of <u>global <strong>a</strong>rtificial <strong>i</strong>ntelligence safety standards, the world risks a <strong>race to the bottom.</u></strong> Fourth, <u>populists are <strong>anti-irenic</strong>.</u> Rather than striving for an irenic calm consensus, <u>they benefit from division and disagreement</u>. The politics of division requires that the temperature be at boiling point, the volume at full blast, the gas pedal flat to the floor. To persuade voters that politics is broken, there must be a villain. Populists thrive on bombast and blame—not compromise and community building. Throughout his four years as president, Trump averaged a false or misleading statement every ninety minutes, according to analysis by the Washington Post.116 Many of his lies were deliberately designed to provoke outrage. Describing the effect of his most incendiary statements, Trump said, “I used to watch it like a rocket ship when I put out a beauty.”117 A perpetual culture war not only served to mobilize the Republican base; it also engendered a sense of stress and anxiety that has been shown by psychologists to foster hostility toward outsiders.118 Two-fifths of Republicans think their political opponents are evil. One-fifth regard Democrats as animals.119 When stressed, people can develop tunnel vision—overvaluing short-term priorities at the expense of future needs. Scarcity, argue researchers Sendhil Mullainathan and Eldar Shafir, “makes us dumber. It makes us more impulsive. We must get by with less mind available, with less fluid intelligence.”120 Stressful politics and a perpetual state of fear can act as a “cognitive tax” on voters, promoting a politics of short-termism. If every day is a crisis, long-term planning is a luxury. In a battle, soldiers aren’t thinking about whether they’ve put enough money into their retirement accounts. Populists may not be bonkers, but they revel in being agitators and stirrers, fighting against a system that they regard as having served the elites for too long. If populism was a computer program, its volatility and unpredictability would be regarded as a feature, not a bug. To attack the establishment is to attack the institutions and rules that have sustained the status quo. If we could rank the world’s leaders on a spectrum, starting with the most calm and cerebral, and ending with the crankiest and craziest, populists would be at the end of the line. Remember from chapter 4 the nuclear war study “War with Crazy Types”? Populists are more likely to be “crazy types.” If anyone collapses the nuclear deterrence house of cards, it’s likely to be a populist. Divisive politics also acts as a counterweight against the sort of cooperation that is essential to long-run planning. Where politicians have taken significant actions to reduce long-term threats, it has often involved a measure of bipartisanship. A program to contain “loose nukes” after the breakup of the Soviet Union was driven by Democratic senator Nunn and Republican senator Richard Lugar. California’s 2006 cap-and-trade emissions reduction program was passed by a Democratic legislature and signed into law by Republican governor Arnold Schwarzenegger. But voters who believe their political opponents are “evil” or “animals” are less likely to support bipartisan collaboration on long-term issues. <u>Populists thrive off chaos</u> of their own making. <u>But when external crises hit, populist leaders struggle</u>. According to one study on crisis leadership, effective disaster response requires providing clear direction, putting public safety first, being compassionate toward victims, and learning lessons afterward.121 As COVID-19 showed, many populist leaders were erratic, put politics first, were unsympathetic toward the most vulnerable, and covered up their policy failings. The qualities that make populists electorally successful also make them abysmal crisis managers. We should no more expect populists to be good crisis leaders than we should expect jockeys to succeed at basketball. The characteristics of populists that threaten long-termism—anti-intellectual, anti-institutional, anti-international, and anti-irenic—are frequently celebrated by populists themselves. Populist talk show host Rush Limbaugh used to call government, academia, science, and media “the four corners of deceit.”122 For Limbaugh, hostility to intellectualism and institutions wasn’t a mark of shame, it was a badge of honor. For much of the postwar era, a centrist consensus in many advanced nations held that decisions should be guided by experts, globalization is fundamentally a force for good, established institutions deserve respect, and the media is an essential check on power. The rise of populism—driven primarily by jobs, snobs, race, pace, and luck—has upended these views. The greatest consequence of this transformation could be on the future. <u><strong><mark>Populist politics</strong> </mark>risks <strong><mark>exacerbating</strong> </mark>the <strong><mark>catastrophic risks of nuclear war, pandemics, dangerous superintelligence, and climate change</u></strong></mark>. But there is another risk too: that populist democrats become authoritarian demagogues—quashing democracy and ushering in a frightening future. It is to that danger that I now turn.</p>

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Futurist imaginaries to prevent extinction are valuable.

Stevens ’18

Stevens ’18 [Tim; 2018; Senior Lecturer in Global Security at Kings College London; Millennium: Journal of International Studies, “Exeunt Omnes? Survival, Pessimism and Time in the Work of John H. Herz,” p. 283-302]

implicit recognition of an open yet linear temporality allowed him to imagine possible futures aligned with the survival ethic, whilst at the same time imagining futures in which humans become extinct pessimism about the latter did not preclude working towards the former. it was one thing to develop an ethics of survival but quite another to translate theory into practice. What was required was a collective, transnational and inherently interdisciplinary effort to address nuclear and environmental issues and to problematize notions of security in the context of nuclear geopolitics The principal responsibilities of researchers were two-fold. One, to raise awareness of survival issues in the minds of policy-makers and the public, and to demonstrate the link between political inaction now and its effect on subsequent human survival ‘In our age of global survival concerns, it should be the primary responsibility of scholars to engage in survival issues’ IR should not be afraid to think the worst, if the worst is at all possible, and to establish the various requirements of ‘a livable world’. Of significance here is not the appeal to futurism per se but the suggestion this is ‘the first time’ futurism is necessary to ensuring human survival This ‘promise for the future’ was not, however, a simple liberal view of a better future consonant with human progress experiences of Nazism and the Holocaust destroyed all remnants of any original belief in ‘inevitable progress 78 ditions to draw fir of international politics both cyclical and linear-progressive ways of perceiving historical time each marginalizes and diminishes the contingency of the social world in and through time, and the agency of political actors in effecting change the possibility of agency is a product of a temporality ‘neither temporally closed nor deterministic, neither cyclical nor linear-progressive; it is rooted in contingency’

imagine futures with ethic, whilst at the same time imagining futures in which humans become extinct pessimism did not preclude a collective effort to address nuclear issues and problematize geopolitics The responsibilities of researchers were two to raise awareness of survival in the minds of policy-makers inaction now and subsequent survival scholars should not be afraid to think the worst and establish the requirements of ‘a livable world’ futurism is necessary to survival This future’ was not a liberal view of progress cyclical ways of perceiving time marginalizes and diminishes contingency and the agency of actors in change

Herz explicitly combined, therefore, a political realism with an ethical idealism, resulting in what he termed a ‘survival ethic’.65 This was applicable to all humankind and its propagation relied on the generation of what he termed ‘world-consciousness’.66 Herz’s implicit recognition of an open yet linear temporality allowed him to imagine possible futures aligned with the survival ethic, whilst at the same time imagining futures in which humans become extinct. His pessimism about the latter did not preclude working towards the former. As Herz recognized, it was one thing to develop an ethics of survival but quite another to translate theory into practice. What was required was a collective, transnational and inherently interdisciplinary effort to address nuclear and environmental issues and to problematize notions of security, sustainability and survival in the context of nuclear geopolitics and the technological transformation of society. Herz proposed various practical ways in which young people in particular could become involved in this project. One idea floated in the 1980s, which would alarm many in today’s more cosmopolitan and culturally-sensitive IR, was for a Peace Corps-style ‘peace and development service’, which would ‘crusade’ to provide ‘something beneficial for people living under unspeakably sordid conditions’ in the ‘Third World’.67 He expended most of his energy, however, from the 1980s onwards, in thinking about and formulating ‘a new subdiscipline of the social sciences’, which he called ‘Survival Research’. 68 Informed by the survival ethic outlined above, and within the overarching framework of his realist liberal internationalism, Survival Research emerged as Herz’s solution to the shortcomings of academic research, public education and policy development in the face of global catastrophe.69 It was also Herz’s plea to scholars to venture beyond the ivory tower and become – excusing the gendered language of the time – ‘homme engagé, if not homme révolté’.70 His proposals for Survival Research were far from systematic but they reiterated his life-long concerns with nuclear and environmental issues, and with the necessity to act in the face of threats to human survival. The principal responsibilities of survival researchers were two-fold. One, to raise awareness of survival issues in the minds of policy-makers and the public, and to demonstrate the link between political inaction now and its effect on subsequent human survival. Two, to suggest and shape new attitudes more ‘appropriate to the solution of new and unfamiliar survival problems’, rather than relying on ingrained modes of thought and practice.71 The primary initial purpose, therefore, of Survival Research would be to identify scientific, sociocultural and political problems bearing on the possibilities of survival, and to begin to develop ways of overcoming these. This was, admittedly, non-specific and somewhat vague, but the central thrust of his proposal was clear: ‘In our age of global survival concerns, it should be the primary responsibility of scholars to engage in survival issues’.72 Herz considered IR an essential disciplinary contributor to this endeavour, one that should be promiscuous across the social and natural sciences. It should not be afraid to think the worst, if the worst is at all possible, and to establish the various requirements – social, economic, political – of ‘a livable world’.73 How this long-term project would translate into global policy is not specified but, consistent with his previous work, Herz identified the need for shifts in attitudes to and awareness of global problems and solutions. Only then would it be possible for ‘a turn round that demands leadership to persuade millions to change lifestyles and make the sacrifices needed for survival’. 74 Productive pessimism and temporality In 1976, shortly before he began compiling the ideas that would become Survival Research, Herz wrote: For the first time, we are compelled to take the futuristic view if we want to make sure that there will be future generations at all. Acceleration of developments in the decisive areas (demographic, ecological, strategic) has become so strong that even the egotism of après nous le déluge might not work because the déluge may well overtake ourselves, the living. Of significance here is not the appeal to futurism per se, although this is important, but the suggestion this is ‘the first time’ futurism is necessary to ensuring human survival. This is Herz the realist declaring a break with conventional realism: Herz is not bound to a cyclical vision of political or historical time in which events and processes reoccur over and again. His identification of nuclear weapons as an ‘absolute novum’ in international politics demonstrates this belief in the non-cyclical nature of humankind’s unfolding temporality.76 As Sylvest observes of Herz’s attitude to the nuclear revolution, ‘the horizons of meaning it produced installed a temporal break with the past, and simultaneously carried a promise for the future’. This ‘promise for the future’ was not, however, a simple liberal view of a better future consonant with human progress. His autobiography is clear that his experiences of Nazism and the Holocaust destroyed all remnants of any original belief in ‘inevitable progress’.78 His frustration at scientism, technocratic deception, and the brutal rationality of twentieth-century killing, all but demanded a rejection of the liberal dream and the inevitability of its consummation. If the ‘new age’ ushered in by nuclear weapons, he wrote, is characterized by anything, it is by its ‘indefiniteness of the age and the uncertainties of the future’; it was impossible under these conditions to draw firm conclusions about the future course of international politics.79 Instead, he recognised the contingency, precarity and fragility of international politics, and the ghastly tensions inherent to the structural core of international politics, the security dilemma. 80 Herz was uneasy with both cyclical and linear-progressive ways of perceiving historical time. The former ‘closed’ temporalities are endemic to versions of realist IR, the latter to post-Enlightenment narratives feeding liberal-utopian visions of international relations and those of Marxism.81 In their own ways, each marginalizes and diminishes the contingency of the social world in and through time, and the agency of political actors in effecting change. Simultaneously, each shapes the futures that may be imagined and brought into being. Herz recognised this danger. Whilst drawing attention to his own gloomy disposition, he warns that without care and attention, ‘the assumption may determine the event’.82 As a pessimist, Herz was alert to the hazard of succumbing to negativity, cynicism or resignation. E.H. Carr recognised this also, in the difference between the ‘deterministic pessimism’ of ‘pure’ realism and those realists ‘who have made their mark on history’; the latter may be pessimists but they still believe ‘human affairs can be directed and modified by human action and human thought’.83 Herz would share this anti-deterministic perspective with Carr. Moreover, the possibility of agency is a product of a temporality ‘neither temporally closed nor deterministic, neither cyclical nor linear-progressive; it is rooted in contingency’.

<h4>Futurist imaginaries to prevent extinction are <u>valuable</u>.</h4><p><strong>Stevens ’18</strong> [Tim; 2018; Senior Lecturer in Global Security at Kings College London; Millennium: Journal of International Studies, “Exeunt Omnes? Survival, Pessimism and Time in the Work of John H. Herz<u>,” p. 283-302]</p><p></u>Herz explicitly combined, therefore, a political realism with an ethical idealism, resulting in what he termed a ‘survival ethic’.65 This was applicable to all humankind and its propagation relied on the generation of what he termed ‘world-consciousness’.66 Herz’s <u>implicit recognition of an open yet linear temporality allowed him to <strong><mark>imagine</mark> possible <mark>futures</strong></mark> aligned <mark>with</mark> the <strong>survival <mark>ethic</strong>, whilst at the <strong>same time</strong> imagining futures in which <strong>humans become extinct</u></strong></mark>. His <u><strong><mark>pessimism</strong></mark> about the latter <strong><mark>did not preclude</strong></mark> working towards the former.</p><p></u>As Herz recognized, <u>it was one thing to develop an ethics of survival but quite another to translate theory into practice. What was required was <mark>a <strong>collective</strong></mark>, transnational and inherently<strong> interdisciplinary <mark>effort</strong> to address <strong>nuclear</mark> and environmental <mark>issues</strong> and</mark> to <mark>problematize</mark> notions of security</u>, sustainability and survival <u>in the context of <strong>nuclear <mark>geopolitics</u></strong></mark> and the technological transformation of society. Herz proposed various practical ways in which young people in particular could become involved in this project. One idea floated in the 1980s, which would alarm many in today’s more cosmopolitan and culturally-sensitive IR, was for a Peace Corps-style ‘peace and development service’, which would ‘crusade’ to provide ‘something beneficial for people living under unspeakably sordid conditions’ in the ‘Third World’.67 He expended most of his energy, however, from the 1980s onwards, in thinking about and formulating ‘a new subdiscipline of the social sciences’, which he called ‘Survival Research’.</p><p>68 Informed by the survival ethic outlined above, and within the overarching framework of his realist liberal internationalism, Survival Research emerged as Herz’s solution to the shortcomings of academic research, public education and policy development in the face of global catastrophe.69 It was also Herz’s plea to scholars to venture beyond the ivory tower and become – excusing the gendered language of the time – ‘homme engagé, if not homme révolté’.70 His proposals for Survival Research were far from systematic but they reiterated his life-long concerns with nuclear and environmental issues, and with the necessity to act in the face of threats to human survival. <u><mark>The</mark> <strong>principal <mark>responsibilities</strong> of</u></mark> survival <u><strong><mark>researchers</strong> were two</mark>-fold. One, <mark>to <strong>raise awareness</strong> of survival</mark> issues <mark>in the minds of <strong>policy-makers</strong> </mark>and the <strong>public</strong>, and to demonstrate the link between <strong>political <mark>inaction now</strong> and</mark> its effect on <strong><mark>subsequent</mark> human <mark>survival</u></strong></mark>. Two, to suggest and shape new attitudes more ‘appropriate to the solution of new and unfamiliar survival problems’, rather than relying on ingrained modes of thought and practice.71 The primary initial purpose, therefore, of Survival Research would be to identify scientific, sociocultural and political problems bearing on the possibilities of survival, and to begin to develop ways of overcoming these. This was, admittedly, non-specific and somewhat vague, but the central thrust of his proposal was clear: <u>‘In our age of global survival concerns, it should be the <strong>primary responsibility of <mark>scholars</strong></mark> to engage in survival issues’</u>.72 Herz considered <u>IR</u> an essential disciplinary contributor to this endeavour, one that should be promiscuous across the social and natural sciences. It <u><mark>should not be afraid to <strong>think the worst</strong></mark>, if the worst is at all possible, <mark>and</mark> to <strong><mark>establish the</mark> various <mark>requirements</u></strong></mark> – social, economic, political – <u><mark>of ‘a <strong>livable world</strong>’</mark>.</u>73 How this long-term project would translate into global policy is not specified but, consistent with his previous work, Herz identified the need for shifts in attitudes to and awareness of global problems and solutions. Only then would it be possible for ‘a turn round that demands leadership to persuade millions to change lifestyles and make the sacrifices needed for survival’.</p><p>74 Productive pessimism and temporality</p><p>In 1976, shortly before he began compiling the ideas that would become Survival Research, Herz wrote: </p><p>For the first time, we are compelled to take the futuristic view if we want to make sure that there will be future generations at all. Acceleration of developments in the decisive areas (demographic, ecological, strategic) has become so strong that even the egotism of après nous le déluge might not work because the déluge may well overtake ourselves, the living.</p><p> <u>Of significance here is not the appeal to futurism per se</u>, although this is important, <u>but the suggestion this is ‘the first time’ <mark>futurism is <strong>necessary to</mark> ensuring human <mark>survival</u></strong></mark>. This is Herz the realist declaring a break with conventional realism: Herz is not bound to a cyclical vision of political or historical time in which events and processes reoccur over and again. His identification of nuclear weapons as an ‘absolute novum’ in international politics demonstrates this belief in the non-cyclical nature of humankind’s unfolding temporality.76 As Sylvest observes of Herz’s attitude to the nuclear revolution, ‘the horizons of meaning it produced installed a temporal break with the past, and simultaneously carried a promise for the future’.</p><p> <u><mark>This</mark> ‘promise for the <mark>future’ was <strong>not</strong></mark>, however, <mark>a</mark> <strong>simple <mark>liberal view</strong> of</mark> a better future consonant with human progress</u>. His autobiography is clear that his <u>experiences of Nazism and the Holocaust destroyed all remnants of any original belief in ‘<strong>inevitable <mark>progress</u></strong></mark>’.<u>78 </u>His frustration at scientism, technocratic deception, and the brutal rationality of twentieth-century killing, all but demanded a rejection of the liberal dream and the inevitability of its consummation. If<u> </u>the ‘new age’ ushered in by nuclear weapons, he wrote, is characterized by anything, it is by its ‘indefiniteness of the age and the uncertainties of the future’; it was impossible under these con<u>ditions to draw fir</u>m conclusions about the future course<u> of international politics</u>.79 Instead, he recognised the contingency, precarity and fragility of international politics, and the ghastly tensions inherent to the structural core of international politics, the security dilemma.</p><p>80 Herz was uneasy with <u>both <strong><mark>cyclical</strong></mark> and <strong>linear-progressive <mark>ways</strong> of perceiving</mark> historical <mark>time</u></mark>. The former ‘closed’ temporalities are endemic to versions of realist IR, the latter to post-Enlightenment narratives feeding liberal-utopian visions of international relations and those of Marxism.81 In their own ways, <u>each <strong><mark>marginalizes</strong> and <strong>diminishes</strong></mark> the <mark>contingency</mark> of the social world in and through time, <mark>and the <strong>agency of</mark> political <mark>actors</strong> in <strong></mark>effecting <mark>change</u></strong></mark>. Simultaneously, each shapes the futures that may be imagined and brought into being. Herz recognised this danger. Whilst drawing attention to his own gloomy disposition, he warns that without care and attention, ‘the assumption may determine the event’.82 As a pessimist, Herz was alert to the hazard of succumbing to negativity, cynicism or resignation. E.H. Carr recognised this also, in the difference between the ‘deterministic pessimism’ of ‘pure’ realism and those realists ‘who have made their mark on history’; the latter may be pessimists but they still believe ‘human affairs can be directed and modified by human action and human thought’.83 Herz would share this anti-deterministic perspective with Carr. Moreover, <u>the <strong>possibility of agency</strong> is a product of a temporality ‘neither <strong>temporally closed</strong> nor <strong>deterministic</strong>, neither cyclical nor linear-progressive; it is <strong>rooted in contingency</strong>’</u>.</p>

1NC TOC Round 3

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Advantage

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Charlotte Latin EL

Zachary Siegel

1ac - undocuqueer 1nc - t framework, adv cp, da, standard text 1ar - all 2nr - standard text, da, case 2ar - case, t framework

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Warming is real, anthropogenic, and threatens extinction --- prefer new evidence that represents consensus

Griffin 15 )

Griffin 15 (David, Claremont philosophy professor, “The climate is ruined. So can civilization even survive?”, 4-14, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/14/opinion/co2-crisis-griffin/)

climate scientists have become increasingly worried about the survival of civilization. For virtually all climatologists "are now convinced that global warming poses a clear and present danger to civilization." The climate crisis "threatens the survival of our civilization," said Pulitzer Prize-winner Ross Gelbspan. Mark Hertsgaard agrees saying that the continuation of global warming "would create planetary conditions all but certain to end civilization as we know it." The threat to civilization comes primarily from the increase of the level of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere Because of the CO2 increase, the planet's average temperature has increased 0.85 degrees Celsius (1.5 degrees Fahrenheit). Although this increase may not seem much, it has already brought about serious changes. The burning of coal, oil, and natural gas has made the planet warmer than it had been since the rise of civilization 10,000 years ago. Civilization was made possible by the emergence about 12,000 years ago of the "Holocene" epoch, which turned out to be the Goldilocks zone - not too hot, not too cold. This catapult is dangerous, because we have no evidence civilization can long survive with significantly higher temperatures What would "a 4C world" be like? According to Kevin Anderson of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research (at the University of East Anglia), "during New York's summer heat waves the warmest days would be around 10-12C (18-21.6F) hotter [than today's]." Moreover, he has said, above an increase of 4C only about 10% of the human population will survive. some scientists consider Anderson overly optimistic The main reason for pessimism is the fear that the planet's temperature may be close to a tipping point that would initiate a "low-end runaway greenhouse," involving "out-of-control amplifying feedbacks." This This result "would make most of the planet uninhabitable by humans." Moreover, many scientists believe that runaway global warming could occur much more quickly, because the rising temperature caused by CO2 could release massive amounts of methane (CH4), which is, during its first 20 years, 86 times more powerful than CO2 The resulting threat of runaway global warming may not be merely theoretical. Scientists have long been convinced that methane was central to the fastest period of global warming in geological history, which occurred 55 million years ago. Now a group of scientists have accumulated evidence that methane was also central to the greatest extinction of life thus far: the end-Permian extinction about 252 million years ago. What can be done then? Given the failure of political leaders to deal with the CO2 problem, it is now too late to prevent terrible developments. But it may -- just may -- be possible to keep global warming from bringing about the destruction of civilization. To have a chance, we must, as Hansen says, do everything possible to "keep climate close to the Holocene range" -- which means, mobilize the whole world to replace dirty energy with clean as soon as possible.

virtually all climatologists "are convinced warming poses a clear and present danger continuation "would create planetary conditions all but certain to end civilization This catapult is dangerous above an increase of 4C only about 10% of the human population will survive. some scientists consider Anderson overly optimistic "out-of-control amplifying feedbacks." make the planet uninhabitable rising temperature caused by CO2 could release methane which is, 86 times more powerful But it may be possible to keep warming from bringing about destruction we must do everything to "keep climate close to the Holocene range"

Although most of us worry about other things, climate scientists have become increasingly worried about the survival of civilization. For example, Lonnie Thompson, who received the U.S. National Medal of Science in 2010, said that virtually all climatologists "are now convinced that global warming poses a clear and present danger to civilization." Informed journalists share this concern. The climate crisis "threatens the survival of our civilization," said Pulitzer Prize-winner Ross Gelbspan. Mark Hertsgaard agrees, saying that the continuation of global warming "would create planetary conditions all but certain to end civilization as we know it." These scientists and journalists, moreover, are worried not only about the distant future but about the condition of the planet for their own children and grandchildren. James Hansen, often considered the world's leading climate scientist, entitled his book "Storms of My Grandchildren." The threat to civilization comes primarily from the increase of the level of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere, due largely to the burning of fossil fuels. Before the rise of the industrial age, CO2 constituted only 275 ppm (parts per million) of the atmosphere. But it is now above 400 and rising about 2.5 ppm per year. Because of the CO2 increase, the planet's average temperature has increased 0.85 degrees Celsius (1.5 degrees Fahrenheit). Although this increase may not seem much, it has already brought about serious changes. The idea that we will be safe from "dangerous climate change" if we do not exceed a temperature rise of 2C (3.6F) has been widely accepted. But many informed people have rejected this assumption. In the opinion of journalist-turned-activist Bill McKibben, "the one degree we've raised the temperature already has melted the Arctic, so we're fools to find out what two will do." His warning is supported by James Hansen, who declared that "a target of two degrees (Celsius) is actually a prescription for long-term disaster." The burning of coal, oil, and natural gas has made the planet warmer than it had been since the rise of civilization 10,000 years ago. Civilization was made possible by the emergence about 12,000 years ago of the "Holocene" epoch, which turned out to be the Goldilocks zone - not too hot, not too cold. But now, says physicist Stefan Rahmstorf, "We are catapulting ourselves way out of the Holocene." This catapult is dangerous, because we have no evidence civilization can long survive with significantly higher temperatures. And yet, the world is on a trajectory that would lead to an increase of 4C (7F) in this century. In the opinion of many scientists and the World Bank, this could happen as early as the 2060s. What would "a 4C world" be like? According to Kevin Anderson of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research (at the University of East Anglia), "during New York's summer heat waves the warmest days would be around 10-12C (18-21.6F) hotter [than today's]." Moreover, he has said, above an increase of 4C only about 10% of the human population will survive. Believe it or not, some scientists consider Anderson overly optimistic. The main reason for pessimism is the fear that the planet's temperature may be close to a tipping point that would initiate a "low-end runaway greenhouse," involving "out-of-control amplifying feedbacks." This condition would result, says Hansen, if all fossil fuels are burned (which is the intention of all fossil-fuel corporations and many governments). This result "would make most of the planet uninhabitable by humans." Moreover, many scientists believe that runaway global warming could occur much more quickly, because the rising temperature caused by CO2 could release massive amounts of methane (CH4), which is, during its first 20 years, 86 times more powerful than CO2. Warmer weather induces this release from carbon that has been stored in methane hydrates, in which enormous amounts of carbon -- four times as much as that emitted from fossil fuels since 1850 -- has been frozen in the Arctic's permafrost. And yet now the Arctic's temperature is warmer than it had been for 120,000 years -- in other words, more than 10 times longer than civilization has existed. According to Joe Romm, a physicist who created the Climate Progress website, methane release from thawing permafrost in the Arctic "is the most dangerous amplifying feedback in the entire carbon cycle." The amplifying feedback works like this: The warmer temperature releases millions of tons of methane, which then further raise the temperature, which in turn releases more methane. The resulting threat of runaway global warming may not be merely theoretical. Scientists have long been convinced that methane was central to the fastest period of global warming in geological history, which occurred 55 million years ago. Now a group of scientists have accumulated evidence that methane was also central to the greatest extinction of life thus far: the end-Permian extinction about 252 million years ago. Worse yet, whereas it was previously thought that significant amounts of permafrost would not melt, releasing its methane, until the planet's temperature has risen several degrees Celsius, recent studies indicate that a rise of 1.5 degrees would be enough to start the melting. What can be done then? Given the failure of political leaders to deal with the CO2 problem, it is now too late to prevent terrible developments. But it may -- just may -- be possible to keep global warming from bringing about the destruction of civilization. To have a chance, we must, as Hansen says, do everything possible to "keep climate close to the Holocene range" -- which means, mobilize the whole world to replace dirty energy with clean as soon as possible.

<h4>Warming is real, anthropogenic, and threatens extinction --- prefer <u>new evidence</u> that represents <u><strong>consensus</h4><p></u>Griffin 15 </strong>(David, Claremont philosophy professor, “The climate is ruined. So can civilization even survive?”, 4-14, http://www.cnn.com/2015/01/14/opinion/co2-crisis-griffin/<u><strong>)</p><p></u></strong>Although most of us worry about other things, <u>climate scientists have become increasingly worried about the survival of civilization. For</u> example, Lonnie Thompson, who received the U.S. National Medal of Science in 2010, said that <u><strong><mark>virtually all climatologists "are</mark> now <mark>convinced</mark> that global <mark>warming poses a clear and present danger </mark>to civilization." </u></strong>Informed journalists share this concern. <u>The climate crisis "threatens the survival of our civilization," said Pulitzer Prize-winner Ross Gelbspan. Mark Hertsgaard agrees</u>, <u><strong>saying that the <mark>continuation</mark> of global warming <mark>"would create planetary conditions all but certain to end civilization</mark> as we know it." </u></strong>These scientists and journalists, moreover, are worried not only about the distant future but about the condition of the planet for their own children and grandchildren. James Hansen, often considered the world's leading climate scientist, entitled his book "Storms of My Grandchildren." <u>The threat to civilization comes primarily from the increase of the level of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere</u>, due largely to the burning of fossil fuels. Before the rise of the industrial age, CO2 constituted only 275 ppm (parts per million) of the atmosphere. But it is now above 400 and rising about 2.5 ppm per year. <u>Because of the CO2 increase, the planet's average temperature has increased 0.85 degrees Celsius (1.5 degrees Fahrenheit). Although this increase may not seem much, it has already brought about serious changes. </u>The idea that we will be safe from "dangerous climate change" if we do not exceed a temperature rise of 2C (3.6F) has been widely accepted. But many informed people have rejected this assumption. In the opinion of journalist-turned-activist Bill McKibben, "the one degree we've raised the temperature already has melted the Arctic, so we're fools to find out what two will do." His warning is supported by James Hansen, who declared that "a target of two degrees (Celsius) is actually a prescription for long-term disaster." <u>The burning of coal, oil, and natural gas has made the planet warmer than it had been since the rise of civilization 10,000 years ago. Civilization was made possible by the emergence about 12,000 years ago of the "Holocene" epoch, which turned out to be the Goldilocks zone - not too hot, not too cold. </u>But now, says physicist Stefan Rahmstorf, "We are catapulting ourselves way out of the Holocene." <u><strong><mark>This catapult is dangerous</mark>, because we have no evidence civilization can long survive with significantly higher temperatures</u></strong>. And yet, the world is on a trajectory that would lead to an increase of 4C (7F) in this century. In the opinion of many scientists and the World Bank, this could happen as early as the 2060s. <u>What would "a 4C world" be like? According to Kevin Anderson of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research (at the University of East Anglia), "during New York's summer heat waves the warmest days would be around 10-12C (18-21.6F) hotter [than today's]." Moreover, he has said, <mark>above an increase of 4C only <strong>about 10% of the human population will survive.</mark> </u></strong>Believe it or not, <u><mark>some scientists consider Anderson overly optimistic</u></mark>. <u>The main reason for pessimism is the fear that the planet's temperature may be close to a tipping point that would initiate a "low-end runaway greenhouse," involving <mark>"out-of-control amplifying feedbacks." </mark>This</u> condition would result, says Hansen, if all fossil fuels are burned (which is the intention of all fossil-fuel corporations and many governments). <u><strong>This result "would <mark>make </mark>most of <mark>the planet uninhabitable </mark>by humans."</u></strong> <u>Moreover, many scientists believe that runaway global warming could occur much more quickly, because the <mark>rising temperature caused by CO2 could release </mark>massive amounts of <mark>methane </mark>(CH4), <mark>which is, </mark>during its first 20 years, <mark>86 times more powerful </mark>than CO2</u>. Warmer weather induces this release from carbon that has been stored in methane hydrates, in which enormous amounts of carbon -- four times as much as that emitted from fossil fuels since 1850 -- has been frozen in the Arctic's permafrost. And yet now the Arctic's temperature is warmer than it had been for 120,000 years -- in other words, more than 10 times longer than civilization has existed. According to Joe Romm, a physicist who created the Climate Progress website, methane release from thawing permafrost in the Arctic "is the most dangerous amplifying feedback in the entire carbon cycle." The amplifying feedback works like this: The warmer temperature releases millions of tons of methane, which then further raise the temperature, which in turn releases more methane. <u>The resulting threat of runaway global warming may not be merely theoretical. Scientists have long been convinced that methane was central to the fastest period of global warming in geological history, which occurred 55 million years ago. Now a group of scientists have accumulated evidence that methane was also central to the greatest extinction of life thus far: the end-Permian extinction about 252 million years ago. </u>Worse yet, whereas it was previously thought that significant amounts of permafrost would not melt, releasing its methane, until the planet's temperature has risen several degrees Celsius, recent studies indicate that a rise of 1.5 degrees would be enough to start the melting. <u>What can be done then? Given the failure of political leaders to deal with the CO2 problem, it is now too late to prevent terrible developments. <strong><mark>But it may</mark> -- just may -- <mark>be possible to keep</mark> global <mark>warming from bringing about</mark> the <mark>destruction</mark> of civilization. To have a chance, <mark>we must</mark>, as Hansen says, <mark>do everything</mark> possible <mark>to "keep climate close to the Holocene range"</mark> -- which means, mobilize the whole world to replace dirty energy with clean as soon as possible.</p></u></strong>

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Trump’s blurred the offense-defense line, which is historically unprecedented.

Lee 19, Hudson Institute senior fellow, 4-3-2019, “Why a US Sale of Fighter Jets to Taiwan Matters,” Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/why-a-us-sale-of-fighter-jets-to-taiwan-matters/

John Lee 19, Hudson Institute senior fellow, 4-3-2019, “Why a US Sale of Fighter Jets to Taiwan Matters,” Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/why-a-us-sale-of-fighter-jets-to-taiwan-matters/

In late March, Bloomberg reported that U.S. President Donald Trump’s advisers had encouraged Taiwan to submit a formal request to buy up to 60 advanced F-16V fighter planes Even if the F-16V sale goes ahead, Taiwan’s new planes will not alter the military balance between China and Taiwan, nor dissuade the mainland from further provocations such as the median line flyover Since the Bill Clinton era, administrations have denied Taiwan’s request to purchase new fighter planes on the basis that the grey line from “defense” to “offense” might be crossed Under the Barack Obama administration, the decision to only offer Taipei upgrades to its aging F-16 A/B planes suggested to Beijing that de-escalating tensions arising from differences over Taiwan was the predominant mindset. the Trump administration has shown unprecedented willingness to escalate tensions with China over political, strategic, and economic differences If the sale of F-16V planes goes through, then, it is evidence that the mindset in Washington with respect to Taiwan has also changed and is less accepting of mainland sensibilities and demands. Such a sale would be an indication that preserving de facto Taiwanese independence is once more considered critical to U.S. and allied strategy when it comes to keeping the PLA confined to inside the so-called First Island Chain. That would be a significant blow to Xi Jinping’s plans Xi implied that “reunification” with Taiwan was a “historic task” he wanted to achieve during his tenure U.S. sale of F-16Vs to Taiwan — and all it implies — makes fulfillment of that task less likely took a great risk in abandoning the rhetoric and diplomacy of China’s “peaceful rise Xi is now being criticized domestically for overreach and miscalculation. It is speculated that the legitimacy of the Communist Party would not survive the “loss” of Taiwan. If the United States goes ahead with the sale of F-16Vs to Taiwan, then the pressure on a president will be immense.

Taiwan’s new planes will not alter the military balance the grey line from “defense” to “offense” might be crossed Trump has shown unprecedented willingness to escalate tensions with China the sale of F-16V planes would be an indication that Taiwanese independence is critical to U.S. strategy keeping the PLA confined to inside the First Island Chain. That would be a significant blow to Xi ’s plans Xi implied that “reunification” was a “historic task” Xi is being criticized the legitimacy of the Party would not survive the “loss” of Taiwan. the pressure will be immense.

In late March, Bloomberg reported that U.S. President Donald Trump’s advisers had encouraged Taiwan to submit a formal request to buy up to 60 advanced F-16V fighter planes. Any sale must still be approved by Congress and would be the first major aircraft purchase from the United States by Taiwan since 1992. During her visit to Hawaii last week, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen confirmed that Taiwan had requested a purchase of new fighter jets from the United States. Days later, two Chinese fighter planes crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait that divides China and Taiwan – the first time this has occurred for 20 years. Even if the F-16V sale goes ahead, Taiwan’s new planes will not alter the military balance between China and Taiwan, nor dissuade the mainland from further provocations such as the median line flyover. That is not Beijing’s primary concern, however. The most important calculation China must make is not the relative capabilities of the Taiwanese armed forces but how the United States will respond in the event of a crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Every clue with respect to uncovering U.S. intention is vital because U.S. intervention could tip the military balance against China in any such conflict. In any event, it guarantees the end of any “acceptable cost” outcome in the event of conflict for China. Under the United States’ 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, any attempt to forcibly determine Taiwan’s future is considered “a threat to peace and security of the Western Pacific and of grave concern to the United States.” To prevent that, Washington is obligated to sell “arms of a defensive character” to Taipei to allow the latter to defend itself and dissuade China from launching any military action. Since the Bill Clinton era, administrations have denied Taiwan’s request to purchase new fighter planes on the basis that the grey line from “defense” to “offense” might be crossed. Speaking from Hawaii, Tsai let the cat out of the bag when she said the purchase of advanced fourth generation fighters would “greatly enhance our land and air capabilities, strengthen military moral and show to the world the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense.” It is the last line which sends shivers down the spine of mainland leaders. Since the Taiwan Relations Act came into force, the United States has deliberately embarked on a policy of “strategic ambiguity” with respect to its military commitments to Taiwan in the event the latter is attacked. Whether the United States intervenes is a matter of political judgment and strategic assessment. Under the Barack Obama administration, the decision to only offer Taipei upgrades to its aging F-16 A/B planes suggested to Beijing that de-escalating tensions arising from differences over Taiwan was the predominant mindset. In contrast, the Trump administration has shown unprecedented willingness to escalate tensions with China over political, strategic, and economic differences. The speech by Vice President Mike Pence last October at the Hudson Institute and the 2017 National Security Strategy pulled no punches in identifying China as a comprehensive rival to the United States. If the sale of F-16V planes goes through, then, it is evidence that the mindset in Washington with respect to Taiwan has also changed and is less accepting of mainland sensibilities and demands. Such a sale would be an indication that preserving de facto Taiwanese independence is once more considered critical to U.S. and allied strategy when it comes to keeping the PLA confined to inside the so-called First Island Chain. That would be a significant blow to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s plans. In a wide-ranging speech on Taiwan in January to mark the 40th anniversary of the “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” delivered to the 1978 National People’s Congress, Xi implied that “reunification” with Taiwan was a “historic task” he wanted to achieve during his tenure. A U.S. sale of F-16Vs to Taiwan — and all it implies — makes fulfillment of that task less likely. Finally, the strength of American support for Taiwan will influence how other nations respond to persistent Chinese attempts to reduce international space within which Taiwan can act as a de facto sovereign entity. The most important regional relationship for Taiwan is with Japan, which has emerged under Shinzo Abe as the political, strategic, and economic leader among democratic Asian nations. On issues such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Tokyo has shown initiative when Washington has been found wanting. The Japanese leader has emerged as one of the few regional countries to have established a strong personal relationship with Taiwan’s Tsai and is widely seen as the most pro-Taiwan leaders amongst U.S. allies in the region. Even then, Abe’s room to move is dependent on the extent to which the United States is willing to defend Taipei’s desire to behave as a de facto sovereign entity. If it is confirmed that Washington is moving to a more robust approach with respect to cross-strait relations, Japan, Australia and others will follow. Xi is already under internal pressure from the global pushback against his flagship policies such as the Belt and Road Initiative and “Made in China 2025.” China has lost goodwill with neighboring states over its actions in the East and South China Seas and along the disputed border with India. It is in the middle of an economic war with the United States while the European Union and Japan are openly criticizing China for violations of economic rules and norms, including the systematic theft of intellectual property by Chinese state-owned firms and “national champions.” Xi took a great risk in abandoning the rhetoric and diplomacy of China’s “peaceful rise,” which was promulgated by his predecessor Hu Jintao. Previously admired for his iron determination to achieve China’s great “rejuvenation,” Xi is now being criticized domestically for overreach and miscalculation. It is speculated that the legitimacy of the Communist Party would not survive the “loss” of Taiwan. If the United States goes ahead with the sale of F-16Vs to Taiwan, then the pressure on a president who has embarked on an unprecedented “anti-corruption campaign” to silence political enemies and doubters will be immense.

<h4>Trump’s blurred the offense-defense line, which is historically unprecedented.</h4><p>John <strong>Lee 19<u>, Hudson Institute senior fellow, 4-3-2019, “Why a US Sale of Fighter Jets to Taiwan Matters,” Diplomat, https://thediplomat.com/2019/04/why-a-us-sale-of-fighter-jets-to-taiwan-matters/</p><p></strong>In late March, Bloomberg reported that U.S. President Donald Trump’s advisers had encouraged Taiwan to submit a formal request to buy up to 60 advanced F-16V fighter planes</u>. Any sale must still be approved by Congress and would be the first major aircraft purchase from the United States by Taiwan since 1992. During her visit to Hawaii last week, Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen confirmed that Taiwan had requested a purchase of new fighter jets from the United States. Days later, two Chinese fighter planes crossed the median line in the Taiwan Strait that divides China and Taiwan – the first time this has occurred for 20 years. <u>Even if the F-16V sale goes ahead, <mark>Taiwan’s new planes will not alter the military balance</mark> between China and Taiwan, nor dissuade the mainland from further provocations such as the median line flyover</u>. That is not Beijing’s primary concern, however. The most important calculation China must make is not the relative capabilities of the Taiwanese armed forces but how the United States will respond in the event of a crisis or conflict in the Taiwan Strait. Every clue with respect to uncovering U.S. intention is vital because U.S. intervention could tip the military balance against China in any such conflict. In any event, it guarantees the end of any “acceptable cost” outcome in the event of conflict for China. Under the United States’ 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, any attempt to forcibly determine Taiwan’s future is considered “a threat to peace and security of the Western Pacific and of grave concern to the United States.” To prevent that, Washington is obligated to sell “arms of a defensive character” to Taipei to allow the latter to defend itself and dissuade China from launching any military action. <u>Since the Bill Clinton era, administrations have denied Taiwan’s request to purchase new fighter planes on the basis that <mark>the grey line from “defense” to “offense” might be crossed</u></mark>. Speaking from Hawaii, Tsai let the cat out of the bag when she said the purchase of advanced fourth generation fighters would “greatly enhance our land and air capabilities, strengthen military moral and show to the world the U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s defense.” It is the last line which sends shivers down the spine of mainland leaders. Since the Taiwan Relations Act came into force, the United States has deliberately embarked on a policy of “strategic ambiguity” with respect to its military commitments to Taiwan in the event the latter is attacked. Whether the United States intervenes is a matter of political judgment and strategic assessment. <u>Under the Barack Obama administration, the decision to only offer Taipei upgrades to its aging F-16 A/B planes suggested to Beijing <strong>that de-escalating tensions</strong> arising from differences over Taiwan was the predominant mindset. </u>In contrast, <u>the <mark>Trump</mark> administration <mark>has shown <strong>unprecedented willingness</strong> <strong>to escalate tensions</strong> with China</mark> over political, strategic, and economic</u> <u>differences</u>. The speech by Vice President Mike Pence last October at the Hudson Institute and the 2017 National Security Strategy pulled no punches in identifying China as a comprehensive rival to the United States. <u>If <mark>the sale of F-16V planes</mark> goes through, then, it is evidence that the mindset in Washington with respect to Taiwan has also changed and is</u> <u>less accepting of mainland sensibilities and demands.</u> <u><strong>Such a sale <mark>would be an indication that</mark> preserving de facto <mark>Taiwanese independence is</mark> once more considered <mark>critical to U.S.</mark> and allied <mark>strategy</u></strong></mark> <u>when it comes to <mark>keeping the PLA <strong>confined to inside the</mark> so-called <mark>First Island Chain</strong>. <strong>That would be a significant blow to</mark> </u></strong>Chinese President <u><strong><mark>Xi</mark> Jinping<mark>’s plans</u></strong></mark>. In a wide-ranging speech on Taiwan in January to mark the 40th anniversary of the “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan” delivered to the 1978 National People’s Congress, <u><mark>Xi implied that “reunification”</mark> with Taiwan <mark>was a “historic task”</mark> he wanted to achieve during his tenure</u>. A <u>U.S. sale of F-16Vs to Taiwan — and all it implies — makes fulfillment <strong>of that task less likely</u></strong>. Finally, the strength of American support for Taiwan will influence how other nations respond to persistent Chinese attempts to reduce international space within which Taiwan can act as a de facto sovereign entity. The most important regional relationship for Taiwan is with Japan, which has emerged under Shinzo Abe as the political, strategic, and economic leader among democratic Asian nations. On issues such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, Tokyo has shown initiative when Washington has been found wanting. The Japanese leader has emerged as one of the few regional countries to have established a strong personal relationship with Taiwan’s Tsai and is widely seen as the most pro-Taiwan leaders amongst U.S. allies in the region. Even then, Abe’s room to move is dependent on the extent to which the United States is willing to defend Taipei’s desire to behave as a de facto sovereign entity. If it is confirmed that Washington is moving to a more robust approach with respect to cross-strait relations, Japan, Australia and others will follow. Xi is already under internal pressure from the global pushback against his flagship policies such as the Belt and Road Initiative and “Made in China 2025.” China has lost goodwill with neighboring states over its actions in the East and South China Seas and along the disputed border with India. It is in the middle of an economic war with the United States while the European Union and Japan are openly criticizing China for violations of economic rules and norms, including the systematic theft of intellectual property by Chinese state-owned firms and “national champions.” Xi <u>took a great risk in abandoning the rhetoric and diplomacy of China’s “peaceful rise</u>,” which was promulgated by his predecessor Hu Jintao. Previously admired for his iron determination to achieve China’s great “rejuvenation,” <u><mark>Xi is </mark>now <mark>being criticized</mark> domestically for overreach and miscalculation. It is speculated that <mark>the legitimacy of the</mark> Communist <mark>Party would not survive the “loss” of Taiwan.</mark> If the<strong> United States goes ahead with the sale of F-16Vs to Taiwan, then <mark>the pressure</mark> on a president </u></strong>who has embarked on an unprecedented “anti-corruption campaign” to silence political enemies and doubters <u><strong><mark>will be immense.</p></u></strong></mark>

1AC – Taiwan

1AC – Taiwan War

./documents/hspolicy19/RowlandHall/DoGu/Rowland%20Hall-Doctorman-Gushin-Aff-7%20-%20Copper%20Classic-Round6.docx

A

7 - Copper Classic

6

Meadows NY

Michael, Joshua

1AC - Taiwan 1NC - - Cap K 2NR - - Cap K

hspolicy19/RowlandHall/DoGu/Rowland%20Hall-Doctorman-Gushin-Aff-7%20-%20Copper%20Classic-Round6.docx

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hspolicy19

HS Policy 2019-20

cx

hs

Absent accommodation, spirals escalate into military conflict.

Swaine 19

Michael D. Swaine 19, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies., 2-21-2019, "The Deepening U.S.-China Crisis: Origins and Solutions," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/21/deepening-u.s.-china-crisis-origins-and-solutions-pub-78429

The ugly dynamic of growing suspicion and worst-case assumptions is increasing the likelihood of future U.S.-China political or military crises in Asia The deepening suspicion and hostility in the relationship is occurring during, and (in part) as a result of, a shifting balance of This negative turn also reflects a general failure to resolve several contentious issues in the region, including Taiwan I believe that China’s continued growth in military and economic power and resulting relative decline in U.S. maritime predominance will eventually create an unstable rough parity This could cause China to overestimate its leverage on contentious issues such as Taiwan it could cause the United States to overreact partly to disabuse China and others of the notion that the United States is losing its dominant position. Without adequate communication and a clear sense of each other’s red lines, and without reassuring understandings on limits and intentions, such miscalculations could easily escalate into tests of relative resolve Although Beijing and Washington could perhaps avoid letting such a crisis devolve into actual military conflict, even a major nonviolent confrontation could severely, and perhaps irreparably, damage U.S.-China relations well beyond anything seen thus far, producing untold shocks to the global economy and both regional and global security Needless to say, if such views became policy, the U.S. One China policy would collapse, along with the original basis for normalized relations with Beijing. The result could be a military conflict this should lead the two countries to accept the need for a stable (and real) balance in Asia and a defusing of the most likely sources of conflict through mutual accommodation Such a mentality should take the place of what currently appear to be U.S. efforts to deepen strategic competition through a largely futile attempt to stay well ahead of China in the region while isolating Beijing economically.

suspicion is increasing the likelihood of U.S.-China crises as a result of failure to resolve Taiwan China’s continued growth in military and economic power and decline in U.S. maritime predominance, will eventually create an unstable rough parity This could cause China to overestimate its leverage on Taiwan it could cause the U S to overreact without reassuring understandings on intentions miscalc escalate to tests of relative resolve result could be a military conflict this should lead to stable balance in Asia and a defusing of conflict through mutual accommodation

The ugly dynamic of growing suspicion and worst-case assumptions is increasing the likelihood of future U.S.-China political or military crises in Asia, crises that could in turn eventually propel the two sides into a Cold War or worse. The deepening suspicion and hostility in the relationship is occurring during, and (in part) as a result of, a shifting balance of power in Asia within the First Island Chain. This negative turn also reflects a general failure to resolve several contentious issues in the region, including the Korean Peninsula; Taiwan; maritime disputes; and military-related intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities. I believe that China’s continued growth in military and economic power and influence in Asia, and the resulting relative decline in U.S. maritime predominance, will eventually create an unstable rough parity between China and U.S./allied states within the First Island Chain along China’s maritime periphery (within approximately 1,500 kilometers of the country’s coast). This could cause China to overestimate its leverage and ability to advance its interests on contentious and provocative issues such as Taiwan and maritime sovereignty disputes. At the same time, it could also cause the United States and Japan to overreact to such behavior, partly to disabuse China and others of the notion that the United States is losing its dominant position. Without adequate communication and a clear sense of each other’s red lines, and without reassuring understandings on limits and intentions, such miscalculations could easily escalate into tests of relative resolve, with neither side willing to make accommodations to reach a middle ground. Although Beijing and Washington could perhaps avoid letting such a crisis devolve into actual military conflict, even a major nonviolent confrontation could severely, and perhaps irreparably, damage U.S.-China relations well beyond anything seen thus far, producing untold shocks to the global economy and both regional and global security. Under present conditions, the issue of Taiwan is particularly concerning. Given the current and worsening U.S. trend toward a zero-sum strategic competition with Beijing in virtually all areas, it is quite possible that anti-China zealots in or around the U.S. government could successfully argue that Washington should start regarding Taiwan as a strategic asset that it should deny China. These sentiments are already found among defense analysts in the United States and Japan. Needless to say, if such views became policy, the U.S. One China policy would collapse, along with the original basis for normalized relations with Beijing. The result could be a military conflict. I am certainly not predicting such an outcome. But I am less confident today than I was a few years ago that it can be avoided. HOW TO SALVAGE CONSTRUCTIVE U.S.-CHINA TIES What should policymakers do about this troubling state of affairs? First, serious, influential individuals in both countries (and not just experts on U.S.-China relations) need to speak out more forcefully. They need to call for an end to reckless rhetoric, soothing propagandistic utterances about win-win outcomes, and mild, half measures for dealing with the serious sources of discontent and suspicion in the relationship. For its part, in the near term, China needs to focus like a laser on dealing with the sources of Western businesses’ discontent and cyber espionage, while indicating a clear willingness, through actions and not just words, to involve Western capitals and business interests in Chinese economic enterprises such as the Belt and Road Initiative. Such actions, along with the efforts of U.S. state and local officials to strengthen close economic ties with China, could contribute greatly to reestablishing the U.S. business community as a major pillar of the U.S.-China relationship. Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress should hold hearings on the future strategic balance in Asia and its implications for U.S. policy. This exercise should involve a full assessment of how medium- and long-term changes in the military, economic, political/diplomatic, and soft-power resources that the United States, China, and other Asian states possess will likely affect regional stability, especially in terms of changing levels of risk tolerance and regional threat perceptions. The point of this assessment would be to confirm and define more clearly the power shift occurring in Asia and to determine the most feasible and effective policy options. In my view, this should lead the two countries to accept the need for a stable (and real) balance in Asia and a defusing of the most likely sources of conflict through mutual accommodation, alongside genuine efforts to integrate the region economically. Such a mentality should take the place of what currently appear to be U.S. efforts to deepen strategic competition through a largely futile attempt to stay well ahead of China in the region while isolating Beijing economically.

<h4>Absent accommodation, spirals escalate into military conflict. </h4><p>Michael D. <strong>Swaine 19<u></strong>, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies., 2-21-2019, "The Deepening U.S.-China Crisis: Origins and Solutions," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/02/21/deepening-u.s.-china-crisis-origins-and-solutions-pub-78429</p><p>The ugly dynamic of growing <mark>suspicion</mark> and worst-case assumptions <mark>is increasing the likelihood of</mark> future <mark>U.S.-China</mark> political or military <mark>crises</mark> in Asia</u>, crises that could in turn eventually propel the two sides into a Cold War or worse. <u>The deepening suspicion and hostility in the relationship is occurring during, and (in part) <mark>as a result of</mark>, a shifting balance of</u> power in Asia within the First Island Chain. <u>This negative turn also reflects a general <mark>failure to resolve</mark> several contentious issues in the region, including </u>the Korean Peninsula; <u><mark>Taiwan</u></mark>; maritime disputes; and military-related intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities. <u>I believe that <mark>China’s continued growth in military and economic power</u></mark> and influence in Asia, <u><mark>and</u></mark> the <u>resulting relative <mark>decline in U.S. maritime predominance</u>, <u><strong>will eventually create an unstable rough parity</mark> </u></strong>between China and U.S./allied states within the First Island Chain along China’s maritime periphery (within approximately 1,500 kilometers of the country’s coast). <u><mark>This could cause China to overestimate its leverage</u></mark> and ability to advance its interests <u><mark>on</mark> contentious</u> and provocative <u>issues</u> <u>such as <mark>Taiwan</u></mark> and maritime sovereignty disputes. At the same time, <u><mark>it could</u></mark> also <u><mark>cause the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u> and Japan <u><strong><mark>to overreact</u></strong></mark> to such behavior, <u>partly to disabuse China and others of the notion that the United States is losing its dominant position. Without adequate communication and a clear sense of each other’s red lines, <strong>and <mark>without reassuring understandings on</mark> limits and <mark>intentions</mark>, such <mark>miscalc</mark>ulations could easily <mark>escalate </mark>in<mark>to tests of relative resolve</u></strong></mark>, with neither side willing to make accommodations to reach a middle ground. <u>Although Beijing and Washington could perhaps avoid letting such a crisis devolve into <strong>actual military conflict</strong>, even a major nonviolent confrontation could severely, and perhaps irreparably, <strong>damage U.S.-China relations well beyond anything seen thus far, producing untold shocks to the global economy and both regional and global security</u></strong>. Under present conditions, the issue of Taiwan is particularly concerning. Given the current and worsening U.S. trend toward a zero-sum strategic competition with Beijing in virtually all areas, it is quite possible that anti-China zealots in or around the U.S. government could successfully argue that Washington should start regarding Taiwan as a strategic asset that it should deny China. These sentiments are already found among defense analysts in the United States and Japan. <u>Needless to say, if such views became policy, the U.S. One China policy would collapse, along with the original basis for normalized relations with Beijing. <strong>The <mark>result could be a military conflict</u></strong></mark>. I am certainly not predicting such an outcome. But I am less confident today than I was a few years ago that it can be avoided. HOW TO SALVAGE CONSTRUCTIVE U.S.-CHINA TIES What should policymakers do about this troubling state of affairs? First, serious, influential individuals in both countries (and not just experts on U.S.-China relations) need to speak out more forcefully. They need to call for an end to reckless rhetoric, soothing propagandistic utterances about win-win outcomes, and mild, half measures for dealing with the serious sources of discontent and suspicion in the relationship. For its part, in the near term, China needs to focus like a laser on dealing with the sources of Western businesses’ discontent and cyber espionage, while indicating a clear willingness, through actions and not just words, to involve Western capitals and business interests in Chinese economic enterprises such as the Belt and Road Initiative. Such actions, along with the efforts of U.S. state and local officials to strengthen close economic ties with China, could contribute greatly to reestablishing the U.S. business community as a major pillar of the U.S.-China relationship. Meanwhile, the U.S. Congress should hold hearings on the future strategic balance in Asia and its implications for U.S. policy. This exercise should involve a full assessment of how medium- and long-term changes in the military, economic, political/diplomatic, and soft-power resources that the United States, China, and other Asian states possess will likely affect regional stability, especially in terms of changing levels of risk tolerance and regional threat perceptions. The point of this assessment would be to confirm and define more clearly the power shift occurring in Asia and to determine the most feasible and effective policy options. In my view, <u><mark>this should lead</mark> the two countries <mark>to</mark> accept the need for a <mark>stable</mark> (and real) <mark>balance in Asia and a defusing of</mark> the most likely sources of <mark>conflict through <strong>mutual accommodation</u></strong></mark>, alongside genuine efforts to integrate the region economically. <u>Such a mentality should take the place of what currently appear to be U.S. efforts to deepen strategic competition through a largely futile attempt to stay well ahead of China in the region while isolating Beijing economically.</p></u>

1ac – Samford – Flash

Taiwan War

./documents/hspolicy19/MontgomeryBell/BoYo/Montgomery%20Bell-Bozza-Young-Aff-Samford-Round3.docx

A

Samford

3

Riverwood JP

Pandey

1ac - taiwan v3 1nc - psychoanalysis mba cannons r racist k 2nr - psychoanalysis

hspolicy19/MontgomeryBell/BoYo/Montgomery%20Bell-Bozza-Young-Aff-Samford-Round3.docx

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HS Policy 2019-20

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hs

Psychoanalysis is both falsifiable and accurate – studies prove.

Grant & Harari 5

Grant & Harari 5 (Don and Edwin, psychiatrists, “Psychoanalysis, science and the seductive theory of Karl Popper,” Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry)

Attacks on psychoanalysis and the long-term therapies derived from it, have enjoyed a long history and much publicity [1-4]. Yet, the justification for such attacks has been challenged on many grounds, including their methodology [5] and the empirically demonstrable validity of core psychoanalytic concepts neuroscience research indicates likely neurological correlates for many key clinically derived psychoanalytic concepts such as self-coherence [8], repression [9] and projective identification [10]. the effectiveness of psychoanalysis and its derivative therapies has been supported by empirical research for DSM axis II pathology what exactly is being attacked is often unclear

Attacks on psychoanalysis has been challenged on methodology and empirical validity of psychoanalytic concepts neuroscience research indicates psychoanalytic concepts self-coherence repression and projective identification psychoanalysis has been supported by empirical research for DSM axis II pathology

Attacks on psychoanalysis and the long-term therapies derived from it, have enjoyed a long history and much publicity [1-4]. Yet, the justification for such attacks has been challenged on many grounds, including their methodology [5] and the empirically demonstrable validity of core psychoanalytic concepts [6,7]. Also, burgeoning neuroscience research, some of which is summarized below, indicates likely neurological correlates for many key clinically derived psychoanalytic concepts such as self-coherence [8], repression [9] and projective identification [10]. Furthermore, the effectiveness of psychoanalysis and its derivative therapies has been supported by empirical research [11,12], particularly for patients with DSM axis II pathology. Despite this evidence, the attacks on psychoanalysis continue unabated, not only from some psychiatrists [13,14] but also from the highest levels of politics and health bureaucrats [15], although what exactly is being attacked is often unclear.

<h4>Psychoanalysis is both falsifiable and accurate – studies prove.</h4><p><strong>Grant & Harari 5</strong> (Don and Edwin, psychiatrists, “Psychoanalysis, science and the seductive theory of Karl Popper,” Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry)</p><p><u><strong><mark>Attacks on psychoanalysis</mark> and the long-term therapies derived from it, have enjoyed a long history and much publicity [1-4]. Yet, the justification for such attacks <mark>has been challenged on</mark> many grounds, including their <mark>methodology</mark> [5] <mark>and</mark> the <mark>empirical</mark>ly demonstrable <mark>validity of</mark> core <mark>psychoanalytic concepts</u></strong></mark> [6,7]. Also, burgeoning <u><strong><mark>neuroscience</u></strong> <u><strong>research</u></strong></mark>, some of which is summarized below, <u><strong><mark>indicates</mark> likely neurological correlates for many key clinically derived <mark>psychoanalytic concepts </mark>such as <mark>self-coherence</mark> [8], <mark>repression</mark> [9] <mark>and projective identification</mark> [10].</u></strong> Furthermore, <u><strong>the effectiveness of <mark>psychoanalysis</mark> and its derivative therapies <mark>has been supported by empirical research</u></strong></mark> [11,12], particularly <u><strong><mark>for</u></strong></mark> patients with <u><strong><mark>DSM axis II pathology</u></strong></mark>. Despite this evidence, the attacks on psychoanalysis continue unabated, not only from some psychiatrists [13,14] but also from the highest levels of politics and health bureaucrats [15], although <u><strong>what exactly is being attacked is often unclear</u></strong>.</p>

1NC R1 St. Mark’s 2021

1

./documents/hsld20/StrakeJesuit/Ge/Strake%20Jesuit-Georges-Neg-Heart%20of%20Texas-Round1.docx

N

Heart of Texas

1

Greenhill RM

Claudia Ribera

1AC - LAWs v2 1NC - Disability K AC 1AR - AC K 2NR - AC 2AR - AC

hsld20/StrakeJesuit/Ge/Strake%20Jesuit-Georges-Neg-Heart%20of%20Texas-Round1.docx

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HS LD 2020-21

ld

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Only a universal prohibition solves – stigma would independently solve circumvention

Goose 15 Stephen Goose (Executive Director, Arms Division, Human Rights Watch) The Case for Banning Killer Robots, 11/24/2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/24/case-banning-killer-robots#

Goose 15 Stephen Goose (Executive Director, Arms Division, Human Rights Watch) The Case for Banning Killer Robots, 11/24/2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/24/case-banning-killer-robots#

Some oppose a preemptive and comprehensive prohibition, saying it is too early and we should "wait and see" where the technology takes us The point of a preemptive treaty is to prevent future harm and with all the dangers and concerns associated with fully autonomous weapons, it would be irresponsible to take a "wait and see" approach and only try to deal with the issue after the harm has already occurred. Once developed, they will be irreversible; it will not be possible to put the genie back in the bottle as the weapons spread rapidly around the world. While some rightly point out that there is no "proof" there cannot be a technological fix to the problems of fully autonomous weapons, it is equally true there is no proof there can be. The principle suggests the international community need not wait for scientific certainty, but could and should take action now. A specific treaty banning a weapon is also the best way to stigmatize the weapon. Experience has shown that stigmatization has a powerful effect even on those who have not yet formally joined the treaty, inducing them to comply with the key provisions, lest they risk international condemnation. A regulatory approach restricting use to certain locations or to specific purposes would be prone to longer-term failure as countries would likely be tempted to use them in other, possibly inappropriate, ways during the heat of battle or in dire circumstances. Once legitimized, the weapons would no doubt be mass produced and proliferate worldwide; only a preemptive international treaty will prevent that. Research and development activities should be banned if they are directed at technology that can only be used for fully autonomous weapons or that is explicitly intended for use in such weapons.

fully autonomous weapons Once developed it will not be possible to put the genie back in the bottle A specific treaty banning a weapon stigmatize the weapon has a powerful effect even on those who have joined the treaty lest they risk international condemnation. A regulatory approach would fail as countries would use them in inappropriate, ways during the heat of battle or in dire circumstances Once legitimized, the weapons would proliferate only a preemptive treaty will prevent that.

Some oppose a preemptive and comprehensive prohibition, saying it is too early and we should "wait and see" where the technology takes us. Others believe restrictions would be more appropriate than a ban, limiting their use to specific situations and missions. Some say existing international humanitarian law will be sufficient to address the challenges posed. The point of a preemptive treaty is to prevent future harm and with all the dangers and concerns associated with fully autonomous weapons, it would be irresponsible to take a "wait and see" approach and only try to deal with the issue after the harm has already occurred. Once developed, they will be irreversible; it will not be possible to put the genie back in the bottle as the weapons spread rapidly around the world. The notion of a preemptive treaty has been done before. The best example is the 1995 CCW protocol that bans blinding laser weapons. After initial opposition from the U.S. and others, states came to agree the weapons would pose unacceptable dangers to soldiers and civilians. The weapons were seen as counter to the dictates of public conscience and nations came to recognize their militaries would be better off if no one had the weapons than if everyone had them. These same rationales apply to fully autonomous weapons. While some rightly point out that there is no "proof" there cannot be a technological fix to the problems of fully autonomous weapons, it is equally true there is no proof there can be. Given the scientific uncertainty that exists, and given the potential benefits of a new legally binding instrument, the precautionary principle in international law is directly applicable. The principle suggests the international community need not wait for scientific certainty, but could and should take action now. Fully autonomous weapons represent a new category of weapons that could change the way wars are fought and pose serious risks to civilians. As such, they demand new, specific law that clarifies and strengthens existing international humanitarian law. A specific treaty banning a weapon is also the best way to stigmatize the weapon. Experience has shown that stigmatization has a powerful effect even on those who have not yet formally joined the treaty, inducing them to comply with the key provisions, lest they risk international condemnation. A regulatory approach restricting use to certain locations or to specific purposes would be prone to longer-term failure as countries would likely be tempted to use them in other, possibly inappropriate, ways during the heat of battle or in dire circumstances. Once legitimized, the weapons would no doubt be mass produced and proliferate worldwide; only a preemptive international treaty will prevent that. The call for a ban on development of fully autonomous weapons is not aimed at impeding broader research into military robotics or weapons autonomy or full autonomy in the civilian sphere. It is not intended to curtail basic AI research in any way. Research and development activities should be banned if they are directed at technology that can only be used for fully autonomous weapons or that is explicitly intended for use in such weapons.

<h4>Only a universal prohibition solves – stigma would independently solve circumvention</h4><p><strong>Goose 15</strong> <u><strong>Stephen Goose (Executive Director, Arms Division, Human Rights Watch) The Case for Banning Killer Robots, 11/24/2015, https://www.hrw.org/news/2015/11/24/case-banning-killer-robots#</p><p>Some oppose a preemptive and comprehensive prohibition, saying it is too early and we should "wait and see" where the technology takes us</u></strong>. Others believe restrictions would be more appropriate than a ban, limiting their use to specific situations and missions. Some say existing international humanitarian law will be sufficient to address the challenges posed. <u><strong>The point of a preemptive treaty is to prevent future harm and with all the dangers and concerns associated with <mark>fully autonomous weapons</mark>, it would be irresponsible to take a "wait and see" approach and only try to deal with the issue after the harm has already occurred. <mark>Once developed</mark>, they will be irreversible; <mark>it will not be possible to put the genie back in the bottle </mark>as the weapons spread rapidly around the world. </u></strong>The notion of a preemptive treaty has been done before. The best example is the 1995 CCW protocol that bans blinding laser weapons. After initial opposition from the U.S. and others, states came to agree the weapons would pose unacceptable dangers to soldiers and civilians. The weapons were seen as counter to the dictates of public conscience and nations came to recognize their militaries would be better off if no one had the weapons than if everyone had them. These same rationales apply to fully autonomous weapons. <u><strong>While some rightly point out that there is no "proof" there cannot be a technological fix to the problems of fully autonomous weapons, it is equally true there is no proof there can be. </u></strong>Given the scientific uncertainty that exists, and given the potential benefits of a new legally binding instrument, the precautionary principle in international law is directly applicable. <u><strong>The principle suggests the international community need not wait for scientific certainty, but could and should take action now. </u></strong>Fully autonomous weapons represent a new category of weapons that could change the way wars are fought and pose serious risks to civilians. As such, they demand new, specific law that clarifies and strengthens existing international humanitarian law. <u><strong><mark>A specific treaty banning a weapon </mark>is also the best way to <mark>stigmatize the weapon</mark>. Experience has shown that stigmatization <mark>has a powerful effect even on those who have</mark> not yet formally <mark>joined the treaty</mark>, inducing them to comply with the key provisions, <mark>lest they risk international condemnation. A regulatory approach</mark> restricting use to certain locations or to specific purposes <mark>would </mark>be prone to longer-term <mark>fail</mark>ure <mark>as countries would</mark> likely be tempted to <mark>use them in</mark> other, possibly <mark>inappropriate, ways</mark> <mark>during the heat of battle or in dire circumstances</mark>. <mark>Once legitimized, the weapons would</mark> no doubt be mass produced and <mark>proliferate </mark>worldwide; <mark>only a preemptive</mark> international <mark>treaty will prevent that.</u></strong></mark> The call for a ban on development of fully autonomous weapons is not aimed at impeding broader research into military robotics or weapons autonomy or full autonomy in the civilian sphere. It is not intended to curtail basic AI research in any way. <u><strong>Research and development activities should be banned if they are directed at technology that can only be used for fully autonomous weapons or that is explicitly intended for use in such weapons. </p></u></strong>

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Pain and pleasure are intrinsically valuable – they are reasons for actions in and of themselves

Nagel 86

Nagel 86 - Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere, HUP, 1986: 156-168.

Physical pleasure and pain are just sensory experiences toward which we feel involuntary desire or aversion. Almost everyone takes the avoidance of his own pain as subjective reasons for action there is no plausibility in th position that pleasure and pain have no value you couldn't say that someone had a reason not to put [her] hand on a hot stove, just because of the pain. see whether you can withhold that judgment. If the idea of reason makes any sense at all, it does not seem possible. someone who was never motivated to do anything would still have involuntary avoidance reactions, And he would be motivated to reduce pain because interfered with some activity that was important to him. even an irrational hatred makes its object very unpleasant we cannot from an objective standpoint withhold endorsement of the most direct subjective value judgments we make We regard ourselves as too close to those things to be mistaken in our immediate, nonideological evaluative impressions. No objective view we can attain could possibly overrule our subjective authority in such cases.

everyone takes the avoidance of pain as reasons for action pleasure and pain have no value you couldn't say that someone had a reason not to put [her] hand on a hot stove If reason makes any sense it does not seem possible. someone who was never motivated would be motivated to reduce pain we cannot from an objective standpoint withhold endorsement of the most direct subjective value judgments No objective view could overrule our subjective authority

I shall defend the unsurprising claim that sensory [P]leasure is good and pain bad, no matter whose they are. The point of the exercise is to see how the pressures of objectification operate in a simple case. Physical pleasure and pain do not usually depend on activities or desires which themselves raise questions of justification and value. They are just sensory experiences in relation to which we are fairly passive, but toward which we feel involuntary desire or aversion. Almost everyone takes the avoidance of his own pain and the promotion of his own pleasure as subjective reasons for action in a fairly simple way; they are not back[ed] up by any further reasons. On the other hand if someone pursues pain or avoids pleasure [it is a means to their end], either it as a means to some end or it is backed up by dark reasons like guilt or sexual masochism. What sort of general value, if any, ought to be assigned to pleasure and pain when we consider these facts from an objective standpoint? What kind of judgment can we reasonably make about these things when we view them in abstraction from who we are? We can begin by asking why there is no plausibility in the zero position, that pleasure and pain have no value of any kind that can be objectively recognized. That would mean that I have no reason to take aspirin for a severe headache, however I may in fact be motivated; and that looking at it from outside, you couldn't even say that someone had a reason not to put his [her] hand on a hot stove, just because of the pain. Try looking at it from the outside and see whether you can manage to withhold that judgment. If the idea of objective practical reason makes any sense at all, so that there is some judgment to withhold, it does not seem possible. If the general arguments against the reality of objective reasons are no good, then it is at least possible that I have a reason, and not just an inclination, to refrain from putting my hand on a hot stove. But given the possibility, it seems meaningless to deny that this is so. Oddly enough, however, we can think of a story that would go with such a denial. It might be suggested that the aversion to pain is a useful phobia—having nothing to do with the intrinsic undesirability of pain itself—which helps us avoid or escape the injuries that are signaled by pain. (The same type of purely instrumental value might be ascribed to sensory pleasure: the pleasures of food, drink, and sex might be regarded as having no value in themselves, though our natural attraction to them assists survival and reproduction.) There would then be nothing wrong with pain in itself, and someone who was never motivated deliberately to do anything just because he knew it would reduce or avoid pain would have nothing the matter with him. He would still have involuntary avoidance reactions, otherwise it would be hard to say that he felt pain at all. And he would be motivated to reduce pain for other reasons—because it was an effective way to avoid the danger being signaled, or because interfered with some physical or mental activity that was important to him. He just wouldn't regard the pain as itself something he had any reason to avoid, even though he hated the feeling just as much as the rest of us. (And of course he wouldn't be able to justify the avoidance of pain in the way that we customarily justify avoiding what we hate without reason—that is, on the ground that even an irrational hatred makes its object very unpleasant!) There is nothing self-contradictory in this proposal, but it seems nevertheless insane. Without some positive reason to think there is nothing in itself good or bad about having an experience you intensely like or dislike, we can't seriously regard the common impression to the contrary as a collective illusion. Such things are at least good or bad for us, if anything is. What seems to be going on here is that we cannot from an objective standpoint withhold a certain kind of endorsement of the most direct and immediate subjective value judgments we make concerning the contents of our own consciousness. We regard ourselves as too close to those things to be mistaken in our immediate, nonideological evaluative impressions. No objective view we can attain could possibly overrule our subjective authority in such cases. There can be no reason to reject the appearances here.

<h4>Pain and pleasure are intrinsically valuable – they are reasons for actions in and of themselves </h4><p><strong>Nagel 86 </strong>- Thomas Nagel, The View From Nowhere, HUP, 1986: 156-168.</p><p>I shall defend the unsurprising claim that sensory [P]leasure is good and pain bad, no matter whose they are. The point of the exercise is to see how the pressures of objectification operate in a simple case.<u><strong> Physical pleasure and pain </u></strong>do not usually depend on activities or desires which themselves raise questions of justification and value. They <u><strong>are just sensory experiences </u></strong>in relation to which we are fairly passive, but<u><strong> toward which we feel involuntary desire or aversion. Almost <mark>everyone takes the avoidance of </mark>his own <mark>pain </u></strong></mark>and the promotion of his own pleasure<u><strong> <mark>as </mark>subjective <mark>reasons for action </u></strong></mark>in a fairly simple way; they are not back[ed] up by any further reasons.<u><strong> </u></strong>On the other hand if someone pursues pain or avoids pleasure [it is a means to their end], either it as a means to some end or it is backed up by dark reasons like guilt or sexual masochism.<u><strong> </u></strong>What sort of general value, if any, ought to be assigned to pleasure and pain when we consider these facts from an objective standpoint? What kind of judgment can we reasonably make about these things when we view them in abstraction from who we are? We can begin by asking why <u><strong>there is no plausibility in th</u></strong>e zero <u><strong>position</u></strong>, <u><strong>that <mark>pleasure and pain have no value </u></strong></mark>of any kind that can be objectively recognized. That would mean that I have no reason to take aspirin for a severe headache, however I may in fact be motivated; and that looking at it from outside, <u><strong><mark>you couldn't </u></strong></mark>even <u><strong><mark>say that someone had a reason not to put </u></strong></mark>his<u><strong><mark> [her] hand on a hot stove</mark>, just because of the pain. </u></strong>Try looking at it from the outside and <u><strong>see whether you can </u></strong>manage to <u><strong>withhold that judgment. <mark>If </mark>the idea of</u></strong> objective practical <u><strong><mark>reason makes any sense </mark>at all,</u></strong> so that there is some judgment to withhold, <u><strong><mark>it does not seem possible.</u></strong> </mark>If the general arguments against the reality of objective reasons are no good, then it is at least possible that I have a reason, and not just an inclination, to refrain from putting my hand on a hot stove. But given the possibility, it seems meaningless to deny that this is so. Oddly enough, however, we can think of a story that would go with such a denial. It might be suggested that the aversion to pain is a useful phobia—having nothing to do with the intrinsic undesirability of pain itself—which helps us avoid or escape the injuries that are signaled by pain. (The same type of purely instrumental value might be ascribed to sensory pleasure: the pleasures of food, drink, and sex might be regarded as having no value in themselves, though our natural attraction to them assists survival and reproduction.) There would then be nothing wrong with pain in itself, and<u><strong> <mark>someone who was never motivated </u></strong></mark>deliberately<u><strong> to do anything </u></strong>just because<u><strong> </u></strong>he knew it would reduce or avoid pain would have nothing the matter with him. He<u><strong> would still have involuntary avoidance reactions, </u></strong>otherwise it would be hard to say that he felt pain at all.<u><strong> And he <mark>would be motivated to reduce pain </u></strong></mark>for other reasons—because it was an effective way to avoid the danger being signaled, or<u><strong> because interfered with some </u></strong>physical or mental<u><strong> activity that was important to him. </u></strong>He just wouldn't regard the pain as itself something he had any reason to avoid, even though he hated the feeling just as much as the rest of us. (And of course he wouldn't be able to justify the avoidance of pain in the way that we customarily justify avoiding what we hate without reason—that is, on the ground that <u><strong>even an irrational hatred makes its object very unpleasant</u></strong>!) There is nothing self-contradictory in this proposal, but it seems nevertheless insane. Without some positive reason to think there is nothing in itself good or bad about having an experience you intensely like or dislike, we can't seriously regard the common impression to the contrary as a collective illusion. Such things are at least good or bad for us, if anything is. What seems to be going on here is that <u><strong><mark>we cannot from an objective standpoint withhold </u></strong></mark>a certain kind of <u><strong><mark>endorsement of the most direct </u></strong></mark>and immediate<u><strong> <mark>subjective value judgments </mark>we make </u></strong>concerning the contents of our own consciousness.<u><strong> We regard ourselves as too close to those things to be mistaken in our immediate, nonideological evaluative impressions. <mark>No objective view </mark>we can attain <mark>could </mark>possibly <mark>overrule our subjective authority </mark>in such cases. </u></strong>There can be no reason to reject the appearances here.</p>