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Water protection requires government regulation limiting behavior.

Bajcetic 16

Marko Bajcetic 16, regulation member of the International Academy of Management and Technology Novi Sad, Serbia, “Economic Efficiency of Water Protection Within Environmentally Friendly and Integrated Water Resources Management,” International Review, no. 1-2, https://doi.org/10.5937/intrev1602082B

Water protection requires government regulations but clearly defined functions that serve as a basis for establishing administrative processes in economic and financial structures and systems Such implies defining administrative activities and the use based on normative and technological measures Water protection is possible on condition that polluted water is subject to prohibition, different conditions or limitations Water protection consists of the various characteristics of water and technological systems which define the limits of allowed impact on water systems wherever there is water protection management

Water protection requires government regulations as a basis for administrative processes Such implies defining activities and use Water protection is on condition that water is subject to prohibition conditions or limitations which define allowed impact on water systems

A Water Protection System and Ecology in Water Management Water is a natural resource, not a commodity, and services are those that enable achieving its quality targets, or its use-value. Thanks to the services provided, polluted water from a deteriorated natural resource is transformed into good natural resource and new economic resource. Water protection not only requires government regulations but clearly defined functions and elements that serve as a basis for establishing administrative and business processes in economic and financial structures and systems. Transforming the use-value of water from unused natural resource into economic resource occurs because organizations operating in the water sector are oriented towards increasing economic efficiency. Such orientation implies defining administrative activities and the use of buildings, devices and facilities based on normative and technological basis and measures. The existing technology, the production and the attitude of citizens towards water accelerate water pollution which requires well-designed water and environmental protection. Water protection is possible on condition that discharging or receiving polluted water is subject to prohibition, different conditions or limitations. The primary concern is to choose between different preventive, technological, economic, regulatory or other solutions that would enable achieving good quality of water at the side of natural persons and legal entities that pollute it. The second important condition lies in the treatment before the used water is released into a recipient body of water and water facilities. Third is achieving the quality target by physically, chemically, biologically and ecologically treating the water area and the drainage basin. There is another special option which is to leave the water to clean itself in the watercourse or for the water to be released into a larger watercourse. Water protection, as a field, can be grouped according to: (a) pressures and impacts of natural factors and human activities concerning water and environmental protection, protected areas and water usage; (b) changes in the nature of movement and fluctuations in water quality; (c) the methods and procedures for achieving the goals of water protection; (d) types and methods for the implementation of service processes; (e) the ways and methods of providing and performing water protection services; (f) the needs and demand of the public and users, and taxpayers - beneficiaries and (g) the applicable laws on water protection. Water protection system consists of the elements such as various physical, chemical and biological characteristics of water and technological systems and economic factors which define the limits of allowed impact on water systems wherever there is water protection management. The water system can be considered an eco-system given that it includes mutually interconnected factors of different intensity, pressure and effects on water and the environment that require ecological balance. Ecological balance implies sustaining natural diversity, supporting biological production, developing methods to eliminate negative pressures and impacts on water, promoting economic efficiency from the demand for water through services provided by the water sector.

<h4>Water protection <u>requires</u> government regulation <u>limiting behavior</u>. </h4><p>Marko <strong>Bajcetic 16</strong>, regulation member of the International Academy of Management and Technology Novi Sad, Serbia, “Economic Efficiency of Water Protection Within Environmentally Friendly and Integrated Water Resources Management,” International Review, no. 1-2, https://doi.org/10.5937/intrev1602082B</p><p>A Water Protection System and Ecology in Water Management</p><p>Water is a natural resource, not a commodity, and services are those that enable achieving its quality targets, or its use-value. Thanks to the services provided, polluted water from a deteriorated natural resource is transformed into good natural resource and new economic resource. <u><mark>Water protection</u></mark> not only <u><strong><mark>requires</mark> <mark>government</mark> <mark>regulations</strong></mark> but <strong>clearly defined</strong> functions</u> and elements <u>that serve <mark>as a basis for</mark> establishing <strong><mark>administrative</u></strong></mark> and business <u><mark>processes</mark> in economic and financial structures and systems</u>. Transforming the use-value of water from unused natural resource into economic resource occurs because organizations operating in the water sector are oriented towards increasing economic efficiency. <u><mark>Such</u></mark> orientation <u><mark>implies <strong>defining</strong></mark> administrative <strong><mark>activities</strong> and</mark> the <strong><mark>use</u></strong></mark> of buildings, devices and facilities <u>based on normative and technological</u> basis and <u>measures</u>.</p><p>The existing technology, the production and the attitude of citizens towards water accelerate water pollution which requires well-designed water and environmental protection. <u><mark>Water protection is</mark> possible <strong><mark>on condition</strong> that</u></mark> discharging or receiving <u>polluted <mark>water is <strong>subject to prohibition</strong></mark>, different <strong><mark>conditions</strong> or <strong>limitations</u></strong></mark>. The primary concern is to choose between different preventive, technological, economic, regulatory or other solutions that would enable achieving good quality of water at the side of natural persons and legal entities that pollute it. The second important condition lies in the treatment before the used water is released into a recipient body of water and water facilities. Third is achieving the quality target by physically, chemically, biologically and ecologically treating the water area and the drainage basin. There is another special option which is to leave the water to clean itself in the watercourse or for the water to be released into a larger watercourse.</p><p>Water protection, as a field, can be grouped according to: (a) pressures and impacts of natural factors and human activities concerning water and environmental protection, protected areas and water usage; (b) changes in the nature of movement and fluctuations in water quality; (c) the methods and procedures for achieving the goals of water protection; (d) types and methods for the implementation of service processes; (e) the ways and methods of providing and performing water protection services; (f) the needs and demand of the public and users, and taxpayers - beneficiaries and (g) the applicable laws on water protection.</p><p><u>Water protection</u> system <u>consists of the</u> elements such as <u>various</u> physical, chemical and biological <u>characteristics of water and technological systems</u> and economic factors <u><mark>which <strong>define</mark> the limits</strong> of <strong><mark>allowed impact</strong> on water systems</mark> wherever there is <strong>water protection management</u></strong>. The water system can be considered an eco-system given that it includes mutually interconnected factors of different intensity, pressure and effects on water and the environment that require ecological balance. Ecological balance implies sustaining natural diversity, supporting biological production, developing methods to eliminate negative pressures and impacts on water, promoting economic efficiency from the demand for water through services provided by the water sector.</p>

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damien mm

kenny delph

1ac prophecy of the seven 1nc - t-usfg - k-cap - pik-latinx 2nr - t-usfg

hspolicy21/Leland/ShGa/Leland-Shih-Gao-Neg-toc-Round5.docx

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The plan mobilizes support for right-wing populism – independently causes circumvention.

Vorländer PhD 18.

Vorländer PhD 18. [Hans Vorländer is full professor of political science and holds the chair in Political Theory and History of Political Thought at TU Dresden, where he is also the founding director of the Centre for the Study of Constitutionalism and Democracy. He has been a guest professor in Paris, Dubrovnik, Mexico City, Bologna and Turin. Since 2017, he has been the director of the Mercator Forum on Migration and Democracy – MIDEM, which he initiated. He is currently working on various research projects dealing with constitutionalism and democracy, is responsible for a range of international collaboration and exchange programmes and is a member of numerous national and international commissions, committees and bodies. Since 2018, he is member of the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration. Most recently, he has been appointed to the Expert Commission for Integration of the German Federal Government. 2018, MIDEM, “MIGRATION AND POPULISM” https://forum-midem.de/cms/data/fm/download/TUD_MIDEM_Jahresbericht2018_Excerpt_FINAL.pdf] //L. Su

MIGRATION AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM CONNECTED Initially it seems obvious that there is a link between migration and right-wing populism populist parties profited from the ‘refugee crisis’ or made political capital out of it. impact chain which generates an increase in votes for right-wing populist parties (1) The starting point is sudden migratory movements and the associated strong increase in the numbers of refugees or immigrants (2) As a result, media coverage and political discussions about the topic of migration and refugees commence in the receiving country (3) Both ‘activate’ the latent scepticism with regard to migration which is present in parts of the population migration does not create these fears, rather, it triggers and strengthens them The ‘refugee crisis’ ‘woke’ and mobilised anti-immigration attitudes, which were already present particularly amongst people with conservative-authoritarian value systems, but had not previously been openly articulated (4) The ‘activation’ of anti-immigration attitudes, combined with the widespread dissatisfaction with the governments’ and European Union’s management of the migration issue was ultimately reflected in votes for right-wing populist parties, which had made the topics of migration and refugees the focus of their campaigns The issue of migration is thus a prerequisite for the mobilisation of right-wing populist support in the protest against the ‘ruling elite’ and is the subject of polarising controversies in the political discourse (5) The impact chain of migration and right-wing populism generally results in a more restrictive migration policy, one which can not only be traced back to decisions made by right-wing populist governments . A special feature of this impact chain is that it also gets set in motion or persists if there is not in fact strong growth in the number of refugees it is merely ‘imagined’

MIGRATION generates an increase in votes for populist parties starting point is sudden migratory movements media coverage commence anti-immigration attitudes, combined with dissatisfaction with management reflected in votes for right-wing populist migration is a prerequisite populism results in more restrictive migration

HOW ARE MIGRATION AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM CONNECTED? What is the relationship between migration and populism? To what extent and under what circumstances does migration promote populist politics? Initially it seems obvious that there is a link between migration and right-wing populism. After all, right-wing populist parties profited from the ‘refugee crisis’ or made political capital out of it. The AfD in Germany is an example of this, as is the success of the UKIP party in Great Britain. However, a closer look reveals that it is not quite so clear-cut that a rise in the number of refugees or immigrants inevitably triggers right-wing populist reactions. How else can one explain the fact that in immigration countries like Spain or Portugal there are to date no right-wing populist parties with seats in parliament? The link between migration and right-wing populism is thus more complex than it appears at first sight. This study assumes the existence of an impact chain which generates an increase in votes for right-wing populist parties. Its main elements can be summarised as follows: (1) The starting point is sudden migratory movements and the associated strong increase in the numbers of refugees or immigrants (as some European countries have experienced in recent years). (2) As a result, media coverage and political discussions about the topic of migration and refugees commence in the receiving country (see Fig. 3). The immediate impact of the most recent forced migration can be clearly seen in the considerable growth in the number of relevant media reports – in particular at the height of the ‘refugee crisis’. Increased media coverage and intensive political debates are generally linked and reinforce each other.3 (3) Both ‘activate’ the latent scepticism with regard to migration which is present in parts of the population (cf. Dennison/Geddes/Talo 2017). Strictly speaking, migration does not create these fears, rather, it triggers and strengthens them. Evidence for this can be seen in the increased importance of the topic of migration in the eyes of voters while the attitudes to migration remained the same (see Fig. 4). In concrete terms this means that for the most part the ‘refugee crisis’ did not make European populations more sceptical of or opposed to migration (with the exception of the Visegrad countries, where the trend in terms of attitudes towards migration had also been predominantly negative beforehand). The ‘refugee crisis’ ‘woke’ and mobilised anti-immigration attitudes, which were already present particularly amongst people with conservative-authoritarian value systems, but had not previously been openly articulated. (4) The ‘activation’ of anti-immigration attitudes, combined with the widespread dissatisfaction with the governments’ and European Union’s management of the migration issue was ultimately reflected in votes for right-wing populist parties, which had made the topics of migration and refugees the focus of their campaigns (Kaufmann 2018). The issue of migration is thus a prerequisite for the mobilisation of right-wing populist support in the protest against the ‘ruling elite’ and is the subject of polarising controversies in the political discourse. (5) The impact chain of migration and right-wing populism generally results in a more restrictive migration policy, one which can not only be traced back to decisions made by right-wing populist governments (cf. De Haas/Natter/Vezzoli 2016). Non-populist governments (like the grand coalition in Germany for instance) have also taken a more restrictive course with regard to migration policy. A special feature of this impact chain is that it also gets set in motion or persists if there is not in fact strong growth in the number of refugees and (e.g. due to intensive media coverage) it is merely ‘imagined’. This applies in particular to Central and Eastern European countries, which in the past years hardly accepted any asylum seekers, yet in which the topic of migration temporarily led to intensive political debates and media discussions, from which especially right-wing populist parties like Jarosław Kaczyński’s party ‘Law and Justice’ (abbreviation: PiS) attempted to benefit. In these cases the right-wing populist parties gain a good part of their success from the fact that the mere prospect of increased immigration (in particular from nonEU states) becomes the subject of critical media coverage and emotionally charged political discussions. In some cases this can be used as proof for the contact hypothesis according to which the attitude towards immigrants is more negative if the population does not have any everyday contact with foreigners.

<h4>The plan mobilizes support for right-wing populism – independently causes circumvention.</h4><p><strong>Vorländer PhD 18.</strong> [Hans Vorländer is full professor of political science and holds the chair in Political Theory and History of Political Thought at TU Dresden, where he is also the founding director of the Centre for the Study of Constitutionalism and Democracy. He has been a guest professor in Paris, Dubrovnik, Mexico City, Bologna and Turin. Since 2017, he has been the director of the Mercator Forum on Migration and Democracy – MIDEM, which he initiated. He is currently working on various research projects dealing with constitutionalism and democracy, is responsible for a range of international collaboration and exchange programmes and is a member of numerous national and international commissions, committees and bodies. Since 2018, he is member of the Expert Council of German Foundations on Integration and Migration. Most recently, he has been appointed to the Expert Commission for Integration of the German Federal Government. 2018, MIDEM, “MIGRATION AND POPULISM” https://forum-midem.de/cms/data/fm/download/TUD_MIDEM_Jahresbericht2018_Excerpt_FINAL.pdf] //L. Su</p><p>HOW ARE <u><strong><mark>MIGRATION</mark> AND RIGHT-WING POPULISM CONNECTED</u></strong>? What is the relationship between migration and populism? To what extent and under what circumstances does migration promote populist politics? <u>Initially it seems obvious that there is a link between migration and right-wing populism</u>. After all, right-wing <u>populist parties profited from the ‘refugee crisis’ or made political capital out of it.</u> The AfD in Germany is an example of this, as is the success of the UKIP party in Great Britain. However, a closer look reveals that it is not quite so clear-cut that a rise in the number of refugees or immigrants inevitably triggers right-wing populist reactions. How else can one explain the fact that in immigration countries like Spain or Portugal there are to date no right-wing populist parties with seats in parliament? The link between migration and right-wing populism is thus more complex than it appears at first sight. This study assumes the existence of an <u>impact chain which <mark>generates an <strong>increase in votes</strong> for</mark> right-wing <mark>populist parties</u></mark>. Its main elements can be summarised as follows: <u>(1)</u> <u>The <mark>starting point is <strong>sudden migratory movements</strong></mark> and the associated strong increase in the numbers of refugees or immigrants</u> (as some European countries have experienced in recent years). <u>(2)</u> <u>As a result, <strong><mark>media coverage</mark> and political discussions</strong> about the topic of migration and refugees <mark>commence</mark> in the receiving country</u> (see Fig. 3). The immediate impact of the most recent forced migration can be clearly seen in the considerable growth in the number of relevant media reports – in particular at the height of the ‘refugee crisis’. Increased media coverage and intensive political debates are generally linked and reinforce each other.3 <u>(3) Both ‘activate’ the latent scepticism with regard to migration which is present in parts of the population</u> (cf. Dennison/Geddes/Talo 2017). Strictly speaking, <u>migration does not create these fears, rather, <strong>it triggers and strengthens them</u></strong>. Evidence for this can be seen in the increased importance of the topic of migration in the eyes of voters while the attitudes to migration remained the same (see Fig. 4). In concrete terms this means that for the most part the ‘refugee crisis’ did not make European populations more sceptical of or opposed to migration (with the exception of the Visegrad countries, where the trend in terms of attitudes towards migration had also been predominantly negative beforehand). <u>The ‘refugee crisis’ ‘woke’ and mobilised anti-immigration attitudes, which were already present particularly amongst people with conservative-authoritarian value systems, but had not previously been openly articulated</u>. <u>(4) The ‘activation’ of <mark>anti-immigration attitudes, combined with</mark> the widespread <strong><mark>dissatisfaction</mark> <mark>with</mark> the governments’</strong> and European Union’s <strong><mark>management</mark> of the migration issue</strong> was ultimately <mark>reflected in votes for right-wing populist</mark> parties, which had made the topics of migration and refugees the <strong>focus of their campaigns</u></strong> (Kaufmann 2018). <u>The issue of <mark>migration is</mark> thus <mark>a <strong>prerequisite</mark> for the mobilisation of right-wing populist support</strong> in the protest against the ‘ruling elite’ and is the subject of polarising controversies in the political discourse</u>. <u>(5) The impact chain of migration and right-wing <mark>populism</mark> generally <mark>results in</mark> a <strong><mark>more restrictive migration</mark> policy</strong>, one which can not only be traced back to decisions made by right-wing populist governments</u> (cf. De Haas/Natter/Vezzoli 2016). Non-populist governments (like the grand coalition in Germany for instance) have also taken a more restrictive course with regard to migration policy<u>. A special feature of this impact chain is that it also gets set in motion or persists if there is not in fact strong growth in the number of refugees </u>and (e.g. due to intensive media coverage)<u> it is merely ‘imagined’</u>. This applies in particular to Central and Eastern European countries, which in the past years hardly accepted any asylum seekers, yet in which the topic of migration temporarily led to intensive political debates and media discussions, from which especially right-wing populist parties like Jarosław Kaczyński’s party ‘Law and Justice’ (abbreviation: PiS) attempted to benefit. In these cases the right-wing populist parties gain a good part of their success from the fact that the mere prospect of increased immigration (in particular from nonEU states) becomes the subject of critical media coverage and emotionally charged political discussions. In some cases this can be used as proof for the contact hypothesis according to which the attitude towards immigrants is more negative if the population does not have any everyday contact with foreigners. </p>

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./documents/hsld22/Livingston/RaBa/Livingston-RaBa-Neg-California-Invitational-Berkeley-Debate-Round-1.docx

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henderson

ac- rights nc- populism da, human trafficking da, automation da 1ar- first adv, populism da 2nr- human trafficking da, automation da 2ar- first adv

hsld22/Livingston/RaBa/Livingston-RaBa-Neg-California-Invitational-Berkeley-Debate-Round-1.docx

2023-04-05 23:22:50

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Nuclear war

Tønnesson 15

Stein Tønnesson 15, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311

recent works have made contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict Interdependence raises the cost of conflict but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that increase the risk of military conflict decisions for war are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations If leaders begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline they may blame external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and refuse to be deterred by nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly in East Asia The greatest risk is not a territorial dispute but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so Deterrence could lose its credibility great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional war

Interdependence raises cost of conflict but unbalanced dependencies and negative expectations generate trade wars that risk conflict If leaders anticipate their nation’s decline they may blame external dependence, adopt protectionist policies, and refuse to be deterred changes in the world economy alter circumstances in ways that render peace precarious with deterrence the only factor to protect Armageddon, unreliably so. Deterrence could lose credibility great powers might gamble in a war

Several recent works on China and Sino–US relations have made substantial contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances a combination of nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that interdependence may both inhibit and drive conflict are right. Interdependence raises the cost of conflict for all sides but asymmetrical or unbalanced dependencies and negative trade expectations may generate tensions leading to trade wars among inter-dependent states that in turn increase the risk of military conflict (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, decisions for war and peace are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. If leaders on either side of the Atlantic begin to seriously fear or anticipate their own nation’s decline then they may blame this on external dependence, appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain respect or credibility, adopt protectionist policies, and ultimately refuse to be deterred by either nuclear arms or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen abruptly, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions in East Asia are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. The greatest risk is not that a territorial dispute leads to war under present circumstances but that changes in the world economy alter those circumstances in ways that render inter-state peace more precarious. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, with nuclear deterrence remaining the only factor to protect the world from Armageddon, and unreliably so. Deterrence could lose its credibility: one of the two great powers might gamble that the other yield in a cyber-war or conventional limited war, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.

<h4>Nuclear war</h4><p>Stein <strong>Tønnesson 15</strong>, Research Professor, Peace Research Institute Oslo; Leader of East Asia Peace program, Uppsala University, 2015, “Deterrence, interdependence and Sino–US peace,” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, p. 297-311</p><p>Several <u>recent works</u> on China and Sino–US relations <u>have made</u> substantial <u>contributions to the current understanding of how and under what circumstances</u> a combination of <u>nuclear deterrence and economic interdependence may reduce the risk of war between major powers</u>. At least four conclusions can be drawn from the review above: first, those who say that <u>interdependence may <strong>both inhibit and drive conflict</u></strong> are right. <u><mark>Interdependence raises </mark>the <mark>cost of conflict</u></mark> for all sides <u><mark>but</u></mark> <u>asymmetrical or <mark>unbalanced dependencies and <strong>negative </mark>trade <mark>expectations</u></strong></mark> may <u><mark>generate</mark> tensions leading to <mark>trade wars</mark> among inter-dependent states <mark>that</u></mark> in turn <u>increase the <mark>risk </mark>of military <mark>conflict</u></mark> (Copeland, 2015: 1, 14, 437; Roach, 2014). The risk may increase if one of the interdependent countries is governed by an inward-looking socio-economic coalition (Solingen, 2015); second, the risk of war between China and the US should not just be analysed bilaterally but include their allies and partners. Third party countries could drag China or the US into confrontation; third, in this context it is of some comfort that the three main economic powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and South Korea) are all deeply integrated economically through production networks within a global system of trade and finance (Ravenhill, 2014; Yoshimatsu, 2014: 576); and fourth, <u>decisions for war</u> and peace <u>are taken by very few people, who act on the basis of their future expectations</u>. International relations theory must be supplemented by foreign policy analysis in order to assess the value attributed by national decision-makers to economic development and their assessments of risks and opportunities. <u><mark>If leaders</u></mark> on either side of the Atlantic <u>begin to seriously <strong>fear or <mark>anticipate their</mark> own <mark>nation’s decline</u></strong></mark> then <u><mark>they may blame</u></mark> this on <u><mark>external dependence, </mark>appeal to anti-foreign sentiments, contemplate the use of force to gain</u> respect or <u>credibility, <mark>adopt protectionist policies, and</u></mark> ultimately <u><strong><mark>refuse to be deterred </mark>by</u></strong> either <u><strong>nuclear arms</strong> or prospects of socioeconomic calamities. Such a dangerous shift could happen <strong>abruptly</u></strong>, i.e. under the instigation of actions by a third party – or against a third party. Yet as long as there is both nuclear deterrence and interdependence, the tensions <u>in East Asia</u> are unlikely to escalate to war. As Chan (2013) says, all states in the region are aware that they cannot count on support from either China or the US if they make provocative moves. <u>The greatest risk is <strong>not</u></strong> that <u><strong>a territorial dispute</u></strong> leads to war under present circumstances <u>but that <strong><mark>changes in the world economy</strong></mark> <mark>alter</mark> those <mark>circumstances in ways that render</mark> inter-state <mark>peace</mark> more <mark>precarious</u></mark>. If China and the US fail to rebalance their financial and trading relations (Roach, 2014) then a trade war could result, interrupting transnational production networks, provoking social distress, and exacerbating nationalist emotions. <u>This could have unforeseen consequences in the field of security, <mark>with</mark> nuclear <mark>deterrence</mark> remaining <mark>the only factor to <strong>protect</mark> the world from <mark>Armageddon</strong>, </mark>and <strong><mark>unreliably so</u></strong>. <u>Deterrence could <strong>lose</mark> its <mark>credibility</u></strong></mark>: one of the two <u><mark>great powers might gamble</mark> that the other yield <mark>in a </mark>cyber-war or conventional</u> limited <u><mark>war</u></mark>, or third party countries might engage in conflict with each other, with a view to obliging Washington or Beijing to intervene.</p>

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./documents/ndtceda20/UNLV/BoKh/UNLV-Boelkens-Khan-Neg-ADA%20Spring-Quads.docx

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ADA Spring

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Matt Liu

1AC - UK MDA 1NC - T-Defense Pact T-Subsets Deterrence DA Advantage CP Stimulus DA NFU CP Case 2NC - T-Defense Pact Case 1NR - Stimulus DA Impact Turn

ndtceda20/UNLV/BoKh/UNLV-Boelkens-Khan-Neg-ADA%20Spring-Quads.docx

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Space wars go nuclear

Grego 18

Grego 18 – Laura, Senior Scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, PhD in Experimental Physics at the California Institute of Technology, Space and Crisis Stability, Union of Concerned Scientists, 3-19-18, https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/7804-grego-space-and-crisis-stabilitypdf

space is a particular problem for crisis stability and first strike incentives Satellites are inherently fragile and difficult to protect; in the language of strategic planners, space is an “offense-dominant” regime. This can lead to a number of pressures to strike first that don‘t exist for other, better-protected domains. Satellites travel on predictable orbits, and many pass repeatedly over all of the earth‘s nations. Low-earth orbiting satellites are reachable by missiles much less capable than those needed to launch satellites into orbit, as well as by directed energy which can interfere with sensors or with communications channels. Because launch mass is at a premium, satellite armor is impractical. Maneuvers on orbit need costly amounts of an actor with substantial dependence on space has an incentive to strike first if hostilities look probable, to ensure these valuable assets are not lost. Even if both (or all) sides in a conflict prefer not to engage in war, any actor for which satellites or space-based weapons are an important part of its military posture, whether for support missions or on-orbit weapons, will feel “use it or lose it” pressure compressed timelines of crises combine with these “use it or lose it” pressures to shrink timelines. This dynamic couples dangerously with the inherent difficulty of determining the causes of satellite degradation, whether malicious or from natural causes, in a timely way. was a relatively clear sense that these targets were off limits, as attacks could undermine nuclear deterrence. In the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the US and Soviet Union pledged not to interfere with each other‘s ―national technical means‖ of verifying compliance with the agreement, yet another recognition that attacking strategically important satellites could be destabilizing.20 There was also restraint in building the hardware that could hold these assets at risk. However, where the lines between strategic satellite missions and other missions are blurred, these norms can be weakened. For example, the satellites that provide early warning of ballistic missile launch are associated with nuclear deterrent posture, but also are critical sensors for missile defenses. Strategic surveillance and missile warning satellites also support efforts to locate and destroy mobile . Interfering with an early warning sensor satellite might be intended to dissuade an adversary from using nuclear weapons first by degrading their missile defenses and thus hindering their first-strike posture. However, for a state that uses early warning satellites to enable a “hair trigger” or launch-on-attack posture, the interference with such a satellite might instead be interpreted as a precursor to a nuclear attack. It may accelerate the use of nuclear weapons rather than inhibit it. Misperception and dual-use technologies Some space technologies and activities can be used both for relatively benign purposes but also for hostile ones. It may be difficult for an actor to understand the intent behind the development, testing, use, and stockpiling of these technologies, and see threats where there are none. (Or miss a threat until it is too late.) This may start a cycle of action and reaction based on misperception the Pentagon‘s annual wargame warned it was hard to keep the conflict wargame participants emphasized the challenges in containing once space control capabilities are employed States have of implications of military actions on the and ). Because of a lack of experience in hostilities that target space-based capabilities, it is not entirely clear what the proper response to a space activity is and where the escalation thresholds or “red lines” lie.

space is a problem for crisis stability space is “offense-dominant” This can lead to pressures to strike first Even if all) sides prefer not to engage in war any actor will feel “use it or lose it” pressure lines between satellite missions and other missions are blurred interference might be interpreted as a precursor to accelerate the use of nuclear weapons in space it is not clear where the “red lines” lie

Why space is a particular problem for crisis stability For a number of reasons, space poses particular challenges in preventing a crisis from starting or from being managed well. Some of these are to do with the physical nature of space, such as the short timelines and difficulty of attribution inherent in space operations. Some are due to the way space is used, such as the entanglement of strategic and tactical missions and the prevalence of dual-use technologies. Some are due to the history of space, such the absence of a shared understanding of appropriate behaviors and consequences, and a dearth of stabilizing personal and institutional relationships. While some of these have terrestrial equivalents, taken together, they present a special challenge. The vulnerability of satellites and first strike incentives Satellites are inherently fragile and difficult to protect; in the language of strategic planners, space is an “offense-dominant” regime. This can lead to a number of pressures to strike first that don‘t exist for other, better-protected domains. Satellites travel on predictable orbits, and many pass repeatedly over all of the earth‘s nations. Low-earth orbiting satellites are reachable by missiles much less capable than those needed to launch satellites into orbit, as well as by directed energy which can interfere with sensors or with communications channels. Because launch mass is at a premium, satellite armor is impractical. Maneuvers on orbit need costly amounts of fuel, which has to be brought along on launch, limiting satellites‘ ability to move away from threats. And so, these very valuable satellites are also inherently vulnerable and may present as attractive targets. Thus, an actor with substantial dependence on space has an incentive to strike first if hostilities look probable, to ensure these valuable assets are not lost. Even if both (or all) sides in a conflict prefer not to engage in war, this weakness may provide an incentive to approach it closely anyway. A RAND Corporation monograph commissioned by the Air Force15 described the issue this way: First-strike stability is a concept that Glenn Kent and David Thaler developed in 1989 to examine the structural dynamics of mutual deterrence between two or more nuclear states.16 It is similar to crisis stability, which Charles Glaser described as ―a measure of the countries‘ incentives not to preempt in a crisis, that is, not to attack first in order to beat the attack of the enemy,‖17 except that it does not delve into the psychological factors present in specific crises. Rather, first strike stability focuses on each side‘s force posture and the balance of capabilities and vulnerabilities that could make a crisis unstable should a confrontation occur. For example, in the case of the United States, the fact that conventional weapons are so heavily dependent on vulnerable satellites may create incentives for the US to strike first terrestrially in the lead up to a confrontation, before its space-derived advantages are eroded by anti-satellite attacks.18 Indeed, any actor for which satellites or space-based weapons are an important part of its military posture, whether for support missions or on-orbit weapons, will feel “use it or lose it” pressure because of the inherent vulnerability of satellites. Short timelines and difficulty of attribution The compressed timelines characteristic of crises combine with these “use it or lose it” pressures to shrink timelines. This dynamic couples dangerously with the inherent difficulty of determining the causes of satellite degradation, whether malicious or from natural causes, in a timely way. Space is a difficult environment in which to operate. Satellites orbit amidst increasing amounts of debris. A collision with a debris object the size of a marble could be catastrophic for a satellite, but objects of that size cannot be reliably tracked. So a failure due to a collision with a small piece of untracked debris may be left open to other interpretations. Satellite electronics are also subject to high levels of damaging radiation. Because of their remoteness, satellites as a rule cannot be repaired or maintained. While on-board diagnostics and space surveillance can help the user understand what went wrong, it is difficult to have a complete picture on short timescales. Satellite failure on-orbit is a regular occurrence19 (indeed, many satellites are kept in service long past their intended lifetimes). In the past, when fewer actors had access to satellite-disrupting technologies, satellite failures were usually ascribed to “natural” causes. But increasingly, even during times of peace operators may assume malicious intent. More to the point, in a crisis when the costs of inaction may be perceived to be costly, there is an incentive to choose the worst-case interpretation of events even if the information is incomplete or inconclusive. Entanglement of strategic and tactical missions During the Cold War, nuclear and conventional arms were well separated, and escalation pathways were relatively clear. While space-based assets performed critical strategic missions, including early warning of ballistic missile launch and secure communications in a crisis, there was a relatively clear sense that these targets were off limits, as attacks could undermine nuclear deterrence. In the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the US and Soviet Union pledged not to interfere with each other‘s ―national technical means‖ of verifying compliance with the agreement, yet another recognition that attacking strategically important satellites could be destabilizing.20 There was also restraint in building the hardware that could hold these assets at risk. However, where the lines between strategic satellite missions and other missions are blurred, these norms can be weakened. For example, the satellites that provide early warning of ballistic missile launch are associated with nuclear deterrent posture, but also are critical sensors for missile defenses. Strategic surveillance and missile warning satellites also support efforts to locate and destroy mobile conventional missile launchers. Interfering with an early warning sensor satellite might be intended to dissuade an adversary from using nuclear weapons first by degrading their missile defenses and thus hindering their first-strike posture. However, for a state that uses early warning satellites to enable a “hair trigger” or launch-on-attack posture, the interference with such a satellite might instead be interpreted as a precursor to a nuclear attack. It may accelerate the use of nuclear weapons rather than inhibit it. Misperception and dual-use technologies Some space technologies and activities can be used both for relatively benign purposes but also for hostile ones. It may be difficult for an actor to understand the intent behind the development, testing, use, and stockpiling of these technologies, and see threats where there are none. (Or miss a threat until it is too late.) This may start a cycle of action and reaction based on misperception. For example, relatively low-mass satellites can now maneuver autonomously and closely approach other satellites without their cooperation; this may be for peaceful purposes such as satellite maintenance or the building of complex space structures, or for more controversial reasons such as intelligence-gathering or anti-satellite attacks. Ground-based lasers can be used to dazzle the sensors of an adversary‘s remote sensing satellites, and with sufficient power, they may damage those sensors. The power needed to dazzle a satellite is low, achievable with commercially available lasers coupled to a mirror which can track the satellite. Laser ranging networks use low-powered lasers to track satellites and to monitor precisely the Earth‘s shape and gravitational field, and use similar technologies. 21 Higher-powered lasers coupled with satellite-tracking optics have fewer legitimate uses. Because midcourse missile defense systems are intended to destroy long-range ballistic missile warheads, which travel at speeds and altitudes comparable to those of satellites, such defense systems also have inherent ASAT capabilities. In fact, while the technologies being developed for long-range missile defenses might not prove very effective against ballistic missiles—for example, because of the countermeasure problems associated with midcourse missile defense— they could be far more effective against satellites. This capacity is not just theoretical. In 2007, China demonstrated a direct-ascent anti-satellite capability which could be used both in an ASAT and missile defense role, and in 2009, the United States used a ship-based missile defense interceptor to destroy a satellite, as well. US plans indicated a projected inventory of missile defense interceptors with capability to reach all low earth orbiting satellites in the dozens in the 2020s, and in the hundreds by 2030.22 Discrimination The consequences of interfering with a satellite may be vastly different depending on who is affected and how, and whether the satellite represents a legitimate military objective. However, it will not always be clear who the owners and operators of a satellite are, and users of a satellite‘s services may be numerous and not public. Registration of satellites is incomplete23 and current ownership is not necessarily updated in a readily available repository. The identification of a satellite as military or civilian may be deliberately obscured. Or its value as a military asset may change over time; for example, the share of capacity of a commercial satellite used by military customers may wax and wane. A potential adversary‘s satellite may have different or additional missions that are more vital to that adversary than an outsider may perceive. An ASAT attack that creates persistent debris could result in significant collateral damage to a wide range of other actors; unlike terrestrial attacks, these consequences are not limited geographically, and could harm other users unpredictably. In 2015, the Pentagon‘s annual wargame, or simulated conflict, involving space assets focused on a future regional conflict. The official report out24 warned that it was hard to keep the conflict contained geographically when using anti-satellite weapons: As the wargame unfolded, a regional crisis quickly escalated, partly because of the interconnectedness of a multi-domain fight involving a capable adversary. The wargame participants emphasized the challenges in containing horizontal escalation once space control capabilities are employed to achieve limited national objectives. Lack of shared understanding of consequences/proportionality States have fairly similar understandings of the implications of military actions on the ground, in the air, and at sea, built over decades of experience. The United States and the Soviet Union/Russia have built some shared understanding of each other‘s strategic thinking on nuclear weapons, though this is less true for other states with nuclear weapons. But in the context of nuclear weapons, there is an arguable understanding about the crisis escalation based on the type of weapon (strategic or tactical) and the target (counterforce—against other nuclear targets, or countervalue—against civilian targets). Because of a lack of experience in hostilities that target space-based capabilities, it is not entirely clear what the proper response to a space activity is and where the escalation thresholds or “red lines” lie. Exacerbating this is the asymmetry in space investments; not all actors will assign the same value to a given target or same escalatory nature to different weapons.

<h4>Space wars go nuclear</h4><p><strong>Grego 18</strong> – Laura, Senior Scientist in the Global Security Program at the Union of Concerned Scientists, Postdoctoral Researcher at the Harvard-Smithsonian Center for Astrophysics, PhD in Experimental Physics at the California Institute of Technology, Space and Crisis Stability, Union of Concerned Scientists, 3-19-18, https://www.law.upenn.edu/live/files/7804-grego-space-and-crisis-stabilitypdf</p><p>Why <u><strong><mark>space is a </mark>particular <mark>problem for crisis stability</u></strong></mark> For a number of reasons, space poses particular challenges in preventing a crisis from starting or from being managed well. Some of these are to do with the physical nature of space, such as the short timelines and difficulty of attribution inherent in space operations. Some are due to the way space is used, such as the entanglement of strategic and tactical missions and the prevalence of dual-use technologies. Some are due to the history of space, such the absence of a shared understanding of appropriate behaviors and consequences, and a dearth of stabilizing personal and institutional relationships. While some of these have terrestrial equivalents, taken together, they present a special challenge. The vulnerability of satellites <u><strong>and first strike incentives Satellites are inherently fragile and difficult to protect; in the language of strategic planners, <mark>space is</mark> an <mark>“offense-dominant”</mark> regime. <mark>This can lead to</mark> a number of <mark>pressures to strike</mark> <mark>first</mark> that don‘t exist for other, better-protected domains. Satellites travel on predictable orbits, and many pass repeatedly over all of the earth‘s nations. Low-earth orbiting satellites are reachable by missiles much less capable than those needed to launch satellites into orbit, as well as by directed energy which can interfere with sensors or with communications channels. Because launch mass is at a premium, satellite armor is impractical. Maneuvers on orbit need costly amounts of</u></strong> fuel, which has to be brought along on launch, limiting satellites‘ ability to move away from threats. And so, these very valuable satellites are also inherently vulnerable and may present as attractive targets. Thus, <u><strong>an actor with substantial dependence on space has an incentive to strike first if hostilities look probable</strong>, <strong>to ensure</strong> these <strong>valuable assets are not lost</strong>. <strong><mark>Even if</mark> both (or <mark>all) sides</mark> in a conflict <mark>prefer not to engage in war</mark>,</strong> </u>this weakness may provide an incentive to approach it closely anyway. A RAND Corporation monograph commissioned by the Air Force15 described the issue this way: First-strike stability is a concept that Glenn Kent and David Thaler developed in 1989 to examine the structural dynamics of mutual deterrence between two or more nuclear states.16 It is similar to crisis stability, which Charles Glaser described as ―a measure of the countries‘ incentives not to preempt in a crisis, that is, not to attack first in order to beat the attack of the enemy,‖17 except that it does not delve into the psychological factors present in specific crises. Rather, first strike stability focuses on each side‘s force posture and the balance of capabilities and vulnerabilities that could make a crisis unstable should a confrontation occur. For example, in the case of the United States, the fact that conventional weapons are so heavily dependent on vulnerable satellites may create incentives for the US to strike first terrestrially in the lead up to a confrontation, before its space-derived advantages are eroded by anti-satellite attacks.18 Indeed, <u><strong><mark>any actor </mark>for which satellites or space-based weapons are an important part of its military posture, whether for support missions or on-orbit weapons, <mark>will feel “use it or lose it” pressure</strong></mark> </u>because of the inherent vulnerability of satellites. Short timelines and difficulty of attribution The <u><strong>compressed timelines</u></strong> characteristic <u><strong>of crises</strong> <strong>combine with these</strong> <strong>“use it or lose it” pressures to shrink timelines</strong>. This dynamic <strong>couples dangerously with</strong> the <strong>inherent difficulty of determining the causes of satellite degradation</strong>, <strong>whether malicious or from natural causes, in a timely way</strong>.</u> Space is a difficult environment in which to operate. Satellites orbit amidst increasing amounts of debris. A collision with a debris object the size of a marble could be catastrophic for a satellite, but objects of that size cannot be reliably tracked. So a failure due to a collision with a small piece of untracked debris may be left open to other interpretations. Satellite electronics are also subject to high levels of damaging radiation. Because of their remoteness, satellites as a rule cannot be repaired or maintained. While on-board diagnostics and space surveillance can help the user understand what went wrong, it is difficult to have a complete picture on short timescales. Satellite failure on-orbit is a regular occurrence19 (indeed, many satellites are kept in service long past their intended lifetimes). In the past, when fewer actors had access to satellite-disrupting technologies, satellite failures were usually ascribed to “natural” causes. But increasingly, even during times of peace operators may assume malicious intent. More to the point, in a crisis when the costs of inaction may be perceived to be costly, there is an incentive to choose the worst-case interpretation of events even if the information is incomplete or inconclusive. Entanglement of strategic and tactical missions During the Cold War, nuclear and conventional arms were well separated, and escalation pathways were relatively clear. While space-based assets performed critical strategic missions, including early warning of ballistic missile launch and secure communications in a crisis, there <u><strong>was a relatively clear sense that these targets were off limits, as attacks could undermine nuclear deterrence. In the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the US and Soviet Union pledged not to interfere with each other‘s ―national technical means‖ of verifying compliance with the agreement, yet another recognition that attacking strategically important satellites could be destabilizing.20 There was also restraint in building the hardware that could hold these assets at risk. However, where the <mark>lines between</mark> strategic <mark>satellite missions and other missions are blurred</mark>, these norms can be weakened. For example, the satellites that provide early warning of ballistic missile launch are associated with nuclear deterrent posture, but also are critical sensors for missile defenses. Strategic surveillance and missile warning satellites also support efforts to locate and destroy mobile</u></strong> conventional missile launchers<u>. <strong>Interfering with an early warning sensor satellite might be intended to dissuade an adversary from using nuclear weapons first by degrading their missile defenses and thus hindering their first-strike posture</strong>. <strong>However</strong>, <strong>for a state that uses early warning satellites to enable a “hair trigger” or launch-on-attack posture, the <mark>interference</mark> with such a satellite <mark>might</mark> instead <mark>be interpreted as a precursor to </mark>a nuclear attack. It may <mark>accelerate the use of nuclear weapons</mark> rather than inhibit it. Misperception and dual-use technologies Some space technologies and activities can be used both for relatively benign purposes but also for hostile ones. It may be difficult for an actor to understand the intent behind the development, testing, use, and stockpiling of these technologies, and see threats where there are none. (Or miss a threat until it is too late.)</strong> <strong>This may start a cycle of action and reaction based on misperception</u></strong>. For example, relatively low-mass satellites can now maneuver autonomously and closely approach other satellites without their cooperation; this may be for peaceful purposes such as satellite maintenance or the building of complex space structures, or for more controversial reasons such as intelligence-gathering or anti-satellite attacks. Ground-based lasers can be used to dazzle the sensors of an adversary‘s remote sensing satellites, and with sufficient power, they may damage those sensors. The power needed to dazzle a satellite is low, achievable with commercially available lasers coupled to a mirror which can track the satellite. Laser ranging networks use low-powered lasers to track satellites and to monitor precisely the Earth‘s shape and gravitational field, and use similar technologies. 21 Higher-powered lasers coupled with satellite-tracking optics have fewer legitimate uses. Because midcourse missile defense systems are intended to destroy long-range ballistic missile warheads, which travel at speeds and altitudes comparable to those of satellites, such defense systems also have inherent ASAT capabilities. In fact, while the technologies being developed for long-range missile defenses might not prove very effective against ballistic missiles—for example, because of the countermeasure problems associated with midcourse missile defense— they could be far more effective against satellites. This capacity is not just theoretical. In 2007, China demonstrated a direct-ascent anti-satellite capability which could be used both in an ASAT and missile defense role, and in 2009, the United States used a ship-based missile defense interceptor to destroy a satellite, as well. US plans indicated a projected inventory of missile defense interceptors with capability to reach all low earth orbiting satellites in the dozens in the 2020s, and in the hundreds by 2030.22 Discrimination The consequences of interfering with a satellite may be vastly different depending on who is affected and how, and whether the satellite represents a legitimate military objective. However, it will not always be clear who the owners and operators of a satellite are, and users of a satellite‘s services may be numerous and not public. Registration of satellites is incomplete23 and current ownership is not necessarily updated in a readily available repository. The identification of a satellite as military or civilian may be deliberately obscured. Or its value as a military asset may change over time; for example, the share of capacity of a commercial satellite used by military customers may wax and wane. A potential adversary‘s satellite may have different or additional missions that are more vital to that adversary than an outsider may perceive. An ASAT attack that creates persistent debris could result in significant collateral damage to a wide range of other actors; unlike terrestrial attacks, these consequences are not limited geographically, and could harm other users unpredictably. In 2015, <u><strong>the Pentagon‘s annual wargame</u>, </strong>or simulated conflict, involving space assets focused on a future regional conflict. The official report out24<strong> <u>warned</u> </strong>that<strong> <u>it was hard to keep the conflict </u>contained geographically</strong> when using anti-satellite weapons: As the wargame unfolded, a regional crisis quickly escalated, partly because of the interconnectedness of a multi-domain fight involving a capable adversary. The <u><strong>wargame participants emphasized the challenges in containing </u>horizontal escalation<u> once space control capabilities are employed</u> </strong>to achieve limited national objectives. Lack of shared understanding of consequences/proportionality<strong> <u>States have</u> </strong>fairly <strong>similar understandings</strong> <u><strong>of</u></strong> the <u><strong>implications of military actions on the </u>ground</strong>, in the <strong>air</strong>, <u><strong>and</u></strong> at <strong>sea</strong>,<strong> </strong>built over decades of experience. The United States and the Soviet Union/Russia have built some shared understanding of each other‘s strategic thinking on nuclear weapons, though this is less true for other states with nuclear weapons. But in the context of nuclear weapons, there is an arguable understanding about the crisis escalation based on the type of weapon (strategic or tactical) and the target (counterforce—against other nuclear targets, or countervalue—against civilian targets<u>). <strong>Because of a lack of experience <mark>in </mark>hostilities that target <mark>space</mark>-based capabilities, <mark>it is not</mark> entirely <mark>clear</mark> what the proper response to a space activity is and <mark>where the</mark> escalation thresholds or <mark>“red lines” lie</strong></mark>.</u> Exacerbating this is the asymmetry in space investments; not all actors will assign the same value to a given target or same escalatory nature to different weapons. </p>

Advantage- Space War

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48th Annual Harvard National Forensics Tournament

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Warming causes extinction

Sprat & Dunlop 19

Sprat & Dunlop 19 (David Spratt and Ian Dunlop, *Research Director for Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration and co-author of Climate Code Red: The case for emergency action; **member of the Club of Rome AND formerly an international oil, gas and coal industry executive, chairman of the Australian Coal Association, chief executive of the Australian Institute of Company Directors, and chair of the Australian Greenhouse Office Experts Group on Emissions Trading, "Existential climate-related security risk: A scenario approach," Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration, https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/148cb0_90dc2a2637f348edae45943a88da04d4.pdf)//BB

system tipping-points for the West Antarctic Ice Sheet and a sea-ice-free Arctic summer were passed well before 1.5°C of warming, for the Greenland Ice Sheet well before 2°C, and for widespread permafrost loss and large-scale Amazon drought and dieback by 2.5°C. The “hothouse Earth” scenario has been realised, and Earth is headed for another degree or more of warming, since human greenhouse emissions are significant. seas may eventually rise by more than 25 metres. Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and 55 percent of the global population, are subject to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat conditions, beyond the threshold of human survivability. The destabilisation of the Jet Stream has significantly affected the intensity and geographical distribution of the Asian and West African monsoons and, with the further slowing of the Gulf Stream, is impinging on life support systems in Europe. North America suffers from devastating weather extremes including wildfires, heatwaves, drought and inundation. The summer monsoons in China have failed, and water flows into the great rivers of Asia are reduced by more than one-third of the Himalayan ice sheet. Glacial loss reaches 70 percent in the Andes, and rainfall in Mexico and central America falls by half. permanent El Nino conditions prevail. Aridification emerges over more than 30 percent of the world’s land surface. Desertification is severe in southern Africa, the southern Mediterranean, west Asia, the Middle East, inland Australia and across the U S ecosystems collapse, including coral reef systems, the Amazon rainforest and in the Arctic. nations and regions become unviable. Deadly heat conditions persist for more than 100 days per year in West Africa, tropical South America, the Middle East and South-East Asia, which with land degradation and rising sea levels contributes to a billion people being displaced. Water availability decreases sharply ), affecting two billion people worldwide. Ag becomes nonviable in the dry subtropics. the world see a significant drop in food production and increasing extreme weather events, including heat waves, floods and storms. Food production is inadequate to feed the global population and food prices skyrocket, as a consequence of a one-fifth decline in crop yields, a decline in the nutrition content of crops, a catastrophic decline in insect populations, desertification, monsoon failure and chronic water shortages, and conditions too hot for human habitation agriculturally-important river deltas and the world’s most populous cities are abandoned. small islands become uninhabitable. Ten percent of Bangladesh is inundated, displacing 15 million people. even for 2°C of warming, more than a billion people may need to be relocated due to sea-level rise, and the scale of destruction is beyond our capacity to model, with a high likelihood of human civilisation coming to an end

hothouse Earth” scenario has been realised seas may rise 25 metres. beyond human survivability North America suffers devastating weather extremes Desertification is severe ecosystems collapse nations become unviable. Ag becomes nonviable in subtropics. Food production is inadequate prices skyrocket decline in insect and chronic water shortages islands become uninhabitable human civilisation to end

2050: By 2050, there is broad scientific acceptance that system tipping-points for the West Antarctic Ice Sheet and a sea-ice-free Arctic summer were passed well before 1.5°C of warming, for the Greenland Ice Sheet well before 2°C, and for widespread permafrost loss and large-scale Amazon drought and dieback by 2.5°C. The “hothouse Earth” scenario has been realised, and Earth is headed for another degree or more of warming, especially since human greenhouse emissions are still significant. While sea levels have risen 0.5 metres by 2050, the increase may be 2–3 metres by 2100, and it is understood from historical analogues that seas may eventually rise by more than 25 metres. Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and 55 percent of the global population, are subject to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat conditions, beyond the threshold of human survivability. The destabilisation of the Jet Stream has very significantly affected the intensity and geographical distribution of the Asian and West African monsoons and, together with the further slowing of the Gulf Stream, is impinging on life support systems in Europe. North America suffers from devastating weather extremes including wildfires, heatwaves, drought and inundation. The summer monsoons in China have failed, and water flows into the great rivers of Asia are severely reduced by the loss of more than one-third of the Himalayan ice sheet. Glacial loss reaches 70 percent in the Andes, and rainfall in Mexico and central America falls by half. Semi-permanent El Nino conditions prevail. Aridification emerges over more than 30 percent of the world’s land surface. Desertification is severe in southern Africa, the southern Mediterranean, west Asia, the Middle East, inland Australia and across the south-western United States. Impacts: A number of ecosystems collapse, including coral reef systems, the Amazon rainforest and in the Arctic. Some poorer nations and regions, which lack capacity to provide artificially-cooled environments for their populations, become unviable. Deadly heat conditions persist for more than 100 days per year in West Africa, tropical South America, the Middle East and South-East Asia, which together with land degradation and rising sea levels contributes to 21 perhaps a billion people being displaced. Water availability decreases sharply in the most affected regions at lower latitudes (dry tropics and subtropics), affecting about two billion people worldwide. Agriculture becomes nonviable in the dry subtropics. Most regions in the world see a significant drop in food production and increasing numbers of extreme weather events, including heat waves, floods and storms. Food production is inadequate to feed the global population and food prices skyrocket, as a consequence of a one-fifth decline in crop yields, a decline in the nutrition content of food crops, a catastrophic decline in insect populations, desertification, monsoon failure and chronic water shortages, and conditions too hot for human habitation in significant food-growing regions. The lower reaches of the agriculturally-important river deltas such as the Mekong, Ganges and Nile are inundated, and significant sectors of some of the world’s most populous cities — including Chennai, Mumbai, Jakarta, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Hong Kong, Ho Chi Minh City, Shanghai, Lagos, Bangkok and Manila — are abandoned. Some small islands become uninhabitable. Ten percent of Bangladesh is inundated, displacing 15 million people. According to the Global Challenges Foundation’s Global Catastrophic Risks 2018 report, even for 2°C of warming, more than a billion people may need to be relocated due to sea-level rise, and In high-end scenarios “the scale of destruction is beyond our capacity to model, with a high likelihood of human civilisation coming to an end”. 22

<h4>Warming causes <u>extinction</h4><p></u><strong>Sprat & Dunlop 19</strong> (David Spratt and Ian Dunlop, *Research Director for Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration and co-author of Climate Code Red: The case for emergency action; **member of the Club of Rome AND formerly an international oil, gas and coal industry executive, chairman of the Australian Coal Association, chief executive of the Australian Institute of Company Directors, and chair of the Australian Greenhouse Office Experts Group on Emissions Trading, "Existential climate-related security risk: A scenario approach," Breakthrough National Centre for Climate Restoration, https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/148cb0_90dc2a2637f348edae45943a88da04d4.pdf)//BB</p><p>2050: By 2050, there is broad scientific acceptance that <u>system tipping-points for the West Antarctic Ice Sheet and a sea-ice-free Arctic summer were passed well before 1.5°C of warming, for the Greenland Ice Sheet well before 2°C, and for widespread permafrost loss and large-scale Amazon drought and dieback by 2.5°C. <strong>The “<mark>hothouse Earth” scenario has been realised</strong></mark>, and Earth is headed for another degree or more of warming,</u> especially <u>since human greenhouse emissions are</u> still <u>significant.</u> While sea levels have risen 0.5 metres by 2050, the increase may be 2–3 metres by 2100, and it is understood from historical analogues that <u><mark>seas may</mark> eventually <mark>rise</mark> by more than <mark>25 metres.</mark> Thirty-five percent of the global land area, and 55 percent of the global population, are subject to more than 20 days a year of lethal heat conditions, <strong><mark>beyond</mark> the threshold of <mark>human survivability</mark>. </strong>The destabilisation of the Jet Stream has</u> very <u>significantly affected the intensity and geographical distribution of the Asian and West African monsoons and, </u>together <u>with the further slowing of the Gulf Stream, is impinging on life support systems in Europe. <mark>North America suffers</mark> from <strong><mark>devastating weather extremes</mark> including wildfires, heatwaves, drought and inundation.</strong> The summer monsoons in China have failed, and water flows into the great rivers of Asia are </u>severely <u>reduced by</u> the loss of <u>more than one-third of the Himalayan ice sheet. Glacial loss reaches 70 percent in the Andes, and rainfall in Mexico and central America falls by half.</u> Semi-<u>permanent El Nino conditions prevail. Aridification emerges over more than 30 percent of the world’s land surface. <mark>Desertification is severe</mark> in southern Africa, the southern Mediterranean, west Asia, the Middle East, inland Australia and across the </u>south-western <u>U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. Impacts: A number of <u><strong><mark>ecosystems collapse</strong></mark>, including coral reef systems, the Amazon rainforest and in the Arctic. </u>Some poorer <u><mark>nations</mark> and regions</u>, which lack capacity to provide artificially-cooled environments for their populations, <u><mark>become unviable.</mark> Deadly heat conditions persist for more than 100 days per year in West Africa, tropical South America, the Middle East and South-East Asia, which</u> together <u>with land degradation and rising sea levels contributes to</u> 21 perhaps <u>a billion people being displaced. Water availability decreases sharply</u> in the most affected regions at lower latitudes (dry tropics and subtropics<u>), affecting</u> about <u>two billion people worldwide. <strong><mark>Ag</u></strong></mark>riculture <u><strong><mark>becomes nonviable</strong> in</mark> the dry <mark>subtropics.</mark> </u>Most regions in <u>the world see a significant drop in food production and increasing</u> numbers of <u><strong>extreme weather events</strong>, including heat waves, floods and storms. <strong><mark>Food production is inadequate</strong></mark> to feed the global population and food <mark>prices skyrocket</mark>, as a consequence of a one-fifth decline in crop yields, a decline in the nutrition content of</u> food <u>crops, a catastrophic <mark>decline in insect</mark> populations, desertification, monsoon failure <mark>and <strong>chronic water shortages</strong></mark>, and conditions <strong>too hot for human habitation</strong> </u>in significant food-growing regions. The lower reaches of the <u>agriculturally-important river deltas</u> such as the Mekong, Ganges and Nile are inundated, <u>and</u> significant sectors of some of <u>the world’s most populous cities</u> — including Chennai, Mumbai, Jakarta, Guangzhou, Tianjin, Hong Kong, Ho Chi Minh City, Shanghai, Lagos, Bangkok and Manila — <u>are <strong>abandoned</strong>.</u> Some <u>small <mark>islands become <strong>uninhabitable</strong></mark>. Ten percent of Bangladesh is inundated, displacing 15 million people. </u>According to the Global Challenges Foundation’s Global Catastrophic Risks 2018 report, <u>even for 2°C of warming, more than a billion people may need to be relocated due to sea-level rise, and</u> In high-end scenarios “<u>the scale of destruction is beyond our capacity to model, with <strong>a high likelihood of <mark>human civilisation </mark>coming <mark>to</mark> an <mark>end</u></strong></mark>”. 22</p>

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Grid collapse cascades globally AND it’s irreversible — extinction

Rees 18

Martin Rees 18, Astronomer Royal, founded the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, Fellow of Trinity College and Emeritus Professor of Cosmology and Astrophysics at the University of Cambridge, “2. Humanity’s Future on Earth,” in On the Future: Prospects for Humanity, 10/16/2018, Princeton University Press, pp 61-119

Our world increasingly depends on elaborate networks: electricity power grids, air traffic control, international finance, globally dispersed manufacturing, and so forth. Unless these networks are highly resilient, their benefits could be outweighed by catastrophic breakdowns Cities would be [gridlocked] without electricity— the lights would go out, but that would be far from the most serious consequence. Within a few days our cities would be uninhabitable and anarchic The historical record reveals episodes when ‘civilisations’ have crumbled and even been extinguished. Our world is so interconnected it’s unlikely a catastrophe could hit any region without its consequences cascading globally. For the first time, we need to contemplate a collapse that would be a truly global setback to civilisation. The setback could be so devastating (and could have entailed so much degradation) that the survivors could never regenerate

Our world depends on elaborate power grids these could breakdown Cities would be [gridlocked] without electricity uninhabitable and anarchic ‘civilisations’ have been extinguished it’s unlikely a catastrophe could hit any region without cascading globally a collapse would be a global setback so devastating that survivors could never regenerate

2.5. TRULY EXISTENTIAL RISKS? Our world increasingly depends on elaborate networks: electricity power grids, air traffic control, international finance, globally dispersed manufacturing, and so forth. Unless these networks are highly resilient, their benefits could be outweighed by catastrophic (albeit rare) breakdowns— realworld analogues of what happened in the 2008 global financial crisis. Cities would be paralysed [gridlocked] without electricity— the lights would go out, but that would be far from the most serious consequence. Within a few days our cities would be uninhabitable and anarchic. Air travel can spread a pandemic worldwide within days, wreaking havoc on the disorganised megacities of the developing world. And social media can spread panic and rumour, and economic contagion, literally at the speed of light. When we realise the power of biotech, robotics, cybertechnology, and AI— and, still more, their potential in the coming decades— we can’t avoid anxieties about how this empowerment could be misused. The historical record reveals episodes when ‘civilisations’ have crumbled and even been extinguished. Our world is so interconnected it’s unlikely a catastrophe could hit any region without its consequences cascading globally. For the first time, we need to contemplate a collapse— societal or ecological— that would be a truly global setback to civilisation. The setback could be temporary. On the other hand, it could be so devastating (and could have entailed so much environmental or genetic degradation) that the survivors could never regenerate a civilisation at the present level.

<h4>Grid collapse <u>cascades globally</u> AND it’s <u>irreversible</u> — <u>extinction</h4><p></u>Martin <strong>Rees 18</strong>, Astronomer Royal, founded the Centre for the Study of Existential Risk, Fellow of Trinity College and Emeritus Professor of Cosmology and Astrophysics at the University of Cambridge, “2. Humanity’s Future on Earth,” in On the Future: Prospects for Humanity, 10/16/2018, Princeton University Press, pp 61-119</p><p>2.5. TRULY EXISTENTIAL RISKS? </p><p><u><mark>Our world</mark> increasingly <mark>depends on elaborate</mark> networks: electricity <strong><mark>power grids</strong></mark>, <strong>air traffic control</strong>, <strong>international finance</strong>, globally dispersed</u> <u><strong>manufacturing</strong>, and so forth. Unless <mark>these</mark> networks are <strong>highly resilient</strong>, their benefits <mark>could</mark> be outweighed by catastrophic</u> (albeit rare) <u><strong><mark>breakdown</strong></mark>s</u>— realworld analogues of what happened in the 2008 global financial crisis. <u><mark>Cities would be</u></mark> paralysed <u><strong><mark>[gridlocked] without electricity</strong></mark>— the lights would go out, but that would be far from the most serious consequence. Within a few days our cities would be</u> <u><strong><mark>uninhabitable</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong>anarchic</u></strong></mark>. Air travel can spread a pandemic worldwide within days, wreaking havoc on the disorganised megacities of the developing world. And social media can spread panic and rumour, and economic contagion, literally at the speed of light. </p><p>When we realise the power of biotech, robotics, cybertechnology, and AI— and, still more, their potential in the coming decades— we can’t avoid anxieties about how this empowerment could be misused. <u>The historical record reveals episodes when <mark>‘civilisations’ have</mark> crumbled and even <mark>been <strong>extinguished</strong></mark>. Our world is so interconnected <mark>it’s unlikely a catastrophe could hit</u> <u><strong>any region</u></strong> <u>without</mark> its consequences</u> <u><strong><mark>cascading globally</strong></mark>. For the first time, we need to contemplate <mark>a collapse</u></mark>— societal or ecological— <u>that <mark>would be a</mark> truly</u> <u><strong><mark>global setback</mark> to civilisation</strong>. The setback</u> could be temporary. On the other hand, it <u>could be</u> <u><strong><mark>so devastating</u></strong></mark> <u>(and could have entailed so much</u> environmental or genetic <u><strong>degradation</strong>) <mark>that</mark> the <mark>survivors could</u> <u><strong>never regenerate</u></strong></mark> a civilisation at the present level.</p>

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NATO’s inevitable – only a question of US leadership making it effective

Savage 17

Savage 17 – Pat Savage is a Master’s Student in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. His concentration is in U.S. National Security Policy, and his research focuses primarily on Russia, Eastern and Central Europe, and the former-Soviet Union. (Gssr, "NATO Without America: A Grim Prognosis," Georgetown Security Studies Review, 3-14-2017, https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2017/03/14/nato-without-america-a-grim-prognosis/, Accessed 7-24-2022, LASA-SC)

consternation throughout the alliance over the past year suggested US support for NATO should be conditional on nations paying their fair share NATO has weathered its share of crises over its nearly 70 years of existence While unlikely it is worth considering whether the alliance could survive without the U S NATO viable without the United States Remove the U S and NATO retains 27 states and a GDP of 20 trillion more than adequate to build a self-sufficient military infrastructure However these facts belie a more troublingly reality in NATO’s immediate future short-term viability picture is far less positive without the U S concern in the short term would be sheer manpower Without the U S that immediately drops by nearly half thousands of pieces of military equipment would no longer support NATO, armored vehicles, aircraft, and ships number of reservists Russia has at its disposal could be from 2 to 20 million quantity surpasses quality Russia increasing efforts update its military arsenal question who would assume leadership for the alliance in the absence of the U S no obvious candidate to take the lead if the United States were to step aside U K relationship strained after its vote to leave the EU Germany’s broken with a more conciliatory tone towards Russia criticized NATO France constant state of high alert following terrorist attacks over the past several years—a threat it is not alone in facing—with new plots being uncovered and thwarted in February and troops remaining deployed on the streets.[xii] questionable if Britain France or Germany would be able to do the same if the mantle of leadership fell upon them. If the U S were to leave NATO even the alliance were not to collapse immediately vacuum call into question short-term survivability the longer the doubt over continued US participation the greater damage uncertainty creates. It encourages political forces within member states not consistent with NATO’s values encourage adversaries to undertake provocative and aggressive actions It is critical that more consistent and clear in voicing his desire to remain in the alliance, and

NATO has weathered crises Remove the U S NATO retains 27 states GDP of 20 trillion more troublingly immediate future. sheer manpower drops by half military equipment no longer support reservists Russia has 2 to 20 million no obvious candidate to take lead U K leave EU Germany criticized France high alert alliance not collapse question short-term survivability doubt encourage adversaries to undertake aggressive actions

Statements made by candidate and now-President Donald Trump on the US commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have caused much consternation throughout the alliance over the past year. President Trump has previously suggested that US support for NATO should be conditional on nations paying their fair share, with former-President Obama assuring the world after the election that Mr. Trump would be fully committed to the alliance.[i] Since taking office, President Trump has vacillated on support for NATO. He contradicted Defense Secretary James Mattis by stating NATO is obsolete, but then made an about-face to declare support for the alliance.[ii] NATO has weathered its share of crises over its nearly 70 years of existence. While unlikely in the short term, it is worth considering whether the alliance could survive without the unconditional backing of the United States given President Trump’s unclear intentions. On paper, NATO has the potential to be viable as a collective security organization without the United States. Remove the United States from the equation and NATO retains 27 member states with nearly 600 million people[iii] and a combined nominal GDP of almost $20 trillion.[iv] This should be more than adequate to build a self-sufficient military infrastructure. A majority of NATO’s members are also deeply connected both politically and economically through the European Union.[v] In the long term, a NATO without the United States may not only be feasible, but desirable. However, these rosy structural facts belie a more troublingly reality in NATO’s immediate future. When looking at NATO’s short-term viability, the picture is far less positive without the substantial commitment of the United States. The most obvious item of concern if the US were to leave or moderate its commitment to NATO in the short term would be sheer manpower. In 2016, the alliance had a combined troop strength of around 3.1 million active duty personnel. Without the United States, that immediately drops by nearly half to somewhere below 1.9 million personnel.[vi] This ignores thousands of pieces of military equipment that would no longer support NATO, including armored vehicles, aircraft, and ships. Granted, Russia—the most prominent threat to NATO—has significantly cut down its active duty forces in recent years, estimated at just over 900,000 active duty personnel in 2016.[vii] However, the exact number of reservists Russia has at its disposal is unknown, and could be anywhere from 2 to 20 million personnel depending on the scale of a call up.[viii] While NATO forces may have an advantage in training, equipment, and organization, past a certain point quantity surpasses quality. Russia has also been increasing efforts to update its military arsenal, purchasing new weapons and equipment to close that gap as well.[ix] The more important question, however, may be who would assume the burden of leadership for the alliance in the absence of the United States. Among the most influential of NATO’s members, there is no obvious candidate to take the lead if the United States were to step aside, and all the obvious candidates face their own significant political issues at home and abroad. The United Kingdom’s relationship with continental Europe has been strained in the aftermath of its vote to leave the EU. Its relationship will be further tested in the months and years to come as that process plays out.[x] Germany’s President-elect, former Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, has broken with Chancellor Angela Merkel’s governing coalition with a more conciliatory tone towards Russia. He has criticized NATO policies on sanctions and military exercises.[xi] Meanwhile, France remains in a constant state of high alert following a string of terrorist attacks over the past several years—a threat it is not alone in facing—with new plots being uncovered and thwarted in February and troops remaining deployed on the streets.[xii] These existing political issues are aggravated by the fact that the UK, Germany, and France all face populist or nationalist surges in their domestic politics, a trend seen across Europe. The UK Independence Party played an instrumental role in Britain’s decision to leave the EU. National Front candidate Marine Le Pen is highly likely to make it to the second round of the French presidential election this year. The Alternative for Germany party of Frauke Petry and Jorg Meuthen seems poised to gain its first seats in the Bundestag following elections this fall. Among a laundry list of controversial policy positions, these parties have tended to either have highly critical views of NATO, close ties to Russia, or both.[xiii] While the United States is obviously not without its own domestic political issues, the relative size, power, and strength of its institutions all put it in a better position to simultaneously deal with such issues and wrangle NATO at the same time. It is questionable if Britain, France, or Germany would be able to do the same if the mantle of leadership fell upon them. If the United States were to leave NATO in the next four years, even if the alliance were not to collapse immediately, the ensuring vacuum would call into question its short-term survivability. But even if President Trump does not truly plan to leave NATO, the longer the doubt over continued US participation, the greater damage this uncertainty creates. It encourages political forces within member states not consistent with NATO’s values and it may encourage potential adversaries to undertake provocative and aggressive actions. It is critical that President Trump be more consistent and clear in voicing his desire to remain in the alliance, and frame whatever criticisms he has of NATO—which are not baseless—in the context of improving the alliance. It is also critically important that the President strive to set a better domestic political example for NATO allies as they face increasing levels of political instability and uncertainty of their own. More than his own approval ratings may be riding on his ability to be a unifying political figure.

<h4>NATO’s inevitable – only a question of US leadership making it <u>effective</h4><p></u><strong>Savage 17</strong> – Pat Savage is a Master’s Student in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University’s Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service. His concentration is in U.S. National Security Policy, and his research focuses primarily on Russia, Eastern and Central Europe, and the former-Soviet Union. (Gssr, "NATO Without America: A Grim Prognosis," Georgetown Security Studies Review, 3-14-2017, https://georgetownsecuritystudiesreview.org/2017/03/14/nato-without-america-a-grim-prognosis/, Accessed 7-24-2022, LASA-SC)</p><p>Statements made by candidate and now-President Donald Trump on the US commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) have caused much <u>consternation</u> <u><strong>throughout</u></strong> <u>the alliance over the past year</u>. President Trump has previously <u>suggested</u> that <u>US support for NATO</u> <u>should be</u> <u><strong>conditional</u></strong> <u>on nations paying their fair share</u>, with former-President Obama assuring the world after the election that Mr. Trump would be fully committed to the alliance.[i] Since taking office, President Trump has vacillated on support for NATO. He contradicted Defense Secretary James Mattis by stating NATO is obsolete, but then made an about-face to declare support for the alliance.[ii] <u><mark>NATO</u></mark> <u><mark>has</mark> <mark>weathered</mark> its</u> <u><strong>share of <mark>crises</u></strong></mark> <u>over its nearly 70 years of existence</u>. <u>While</u> <u><strong>unlikely</u></strong> in the short term, <u>it is worth considering whether the alliance could survive</u> <u><strong>without</u></strong> <u>the</u> unconditional backing of the <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates given President Trump’s unclear intentions.</p><p>On paper, <u>NATO</u> has the potential to be <u><strong>viable</u></strong> as a collective security organization <u>without the United States</u>. <u><mark>Remove</u> <u>the</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates from the equation <u>and <mark>NATO retains</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>27</u></strong></mark> member <u><mark>states</u></mark> with nearly 600 million people[iii] <u>and a</u> combined nominal <u><mark>GDP of</u></mark> almost $<u><strong><mark>20 trillion</u></strong></mark>.[iv] This should be <u>more than adequate to build a self-sufficient military infrastructure</u>. A majority of NATO’s members are also deeply connected both politically and economically through the European Union.[v] In the long term, a NATO without the United States may not only be feasible, but desirable. <u><strong>However</u></strong>, <u>these</u> rosy structural <u>facts belie a <mark>more</u> <u><strong>troublingly</u></strong></mark> <u>reality in NATO’s <mark>immediate future</u>.</p><p></mark>When looking at NATO’s <u>short-term viability</u>, the <u>picture</u> <u>is</u> <u><strong>far less</u></strong> <u>positive</u> <u>without</u> <u>the</u> substantial commitment of the <u>U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates. The most obvious item of <u>concern</u> if the US were to leave or moderate its commitment to NATO <u>in the</u> <u>short term</u> <u>would be</u> <u><strong><mark>sheer manpower</u></strong></mark>. In 2016, the alliance had a combined troop strength of around 3.1 million active duty personnel. <u>Without the</u> <u>U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates, <u>that immediately</u> <u><strong><mark>drops by</mark> nearly <mark>half</u></strong></mark> to somewhere below 1.9 million personnel.[vi] This ignores <u>thousands of pieces of <mark>military equipment</u></mark> that <u>would</u> <u><strong><mark>no longer</u></strong> <u>support</mark> NATO,</u> including <u>armored vehicles, aircraft, and ships</u>. Granted, Russia—the most prominent threat to NATO—has significantly cut down its active duty forces in recent years, estimated at just over 900,000 active duty personnel in 2016.[vii] However, the exact <u>number of</u> <u><strong><mark>reservists</u></strong> <u>Russia</mark> <mark>has</mark> at its disposal</u> is unknown, and <u>could be</u> anywhere <u>from</u> <u><strong><mark>2 to 20 million</u></strong></mark> personnel depending on the scale of a call up.[viii] While NATO forces may have an advantage in training, equipment, and organization, past a certain point <u>quantity surpasses quality</u>. <u>Russia</u> has also been <u><strong>increasing efforts</u></strong> to <u>update its military arsenal</u>, purchasing new weapons and equipment to close that gap as well.[ix]</p><p>The more important <u>question</u>, however, may be <u>who would assume</u> the burden of <u><strong>leadership</u></strong> <u>for the alliance in the absence of the</u> <u>U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates.<u> </u>Among the most influential of NATO’s members, there is <u><strong><mark>no obvious candidate</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>to take</mark> the <mark>lead</mark> if the United States were to step aside</u>, and all the obvious candidates face their own significant political issues at home and abroad. The <u><mark>U</u></mark>nited <u><mark>K</u></mark>ingdom’s <u>relationship</u> with continental Europe has been <u><strong>strained</u></strong> in the <u>after</u>math of <u>its vote to <mark>leave</mark> the <mark>EU</u></mark>. Its relationship will be further tested in the months and years to come as that process plays out.[x] <u><mark>Germany</mark>’s</u> President-elect, former Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier, has <u><strong>broken</u></strong> <u>with</u> Chancellor Angela Merkel’s governing coalition with <u>a more conciliatory tone towards Russia</u>. He has <u><strong><mark>criticized</mark> NATO</u></strong> policies on sanctions and military exercises.[xi] Meanwhile, <u><mark>France</u></mark> remains in a <u>constant state of</u> <u><strong><mark>high alert</u></strong></mark> <u>following</u> a string of <u>terrorist attacks over the past several years—a threat it is not alone in facing—with new plots being uncovered and thwarted in February and troops remaining deployed on the streets.[xii]</p><p></u>These existing political issues are aggravated by the fact that the UK, Germany, and France all face populist or nationalist surges in their domestic politics, a trend seen across Europe. The UK Independence Party played an instrumental role in Britain’s decision to leave the EU. National Front candidate Marine Le Pen is highly likely to make it to the second round of the French presidential election this year. The Alternative for Germany party of Frauke Petry and Jorg Meuthen seems poised to gain its first seats in the Bundestag following elections this fall. Among a laundry list of controversial policy positions, these parties have tended to either have highly critical views of NATO, close ties to Russia, or both.[xiii] While the United States is obviously not without its own domestic political issues, the relative size, power, and strength of its institutions all put it in a better position to simultaneously deal with such issues and wrangle NATO at the same time. It is <u>questionable if</u> <u><strong>Britain</u></strong>, <u><strong>France</u></strong>, <u>or</u> <u><strong>Germany</u></strong> <u>would be able to do the same if the mantle of leadership fell upon them.</p><p>If the</u> <u>U</u>nited <u>S</u>tates <u>were to</u> <u><strong>leave NATO</u></strong> in the next four years, <u><strong>even</u></strong> if <u>the <mark>alliance</u></mark> <u><strong>were <mark>not</u></strong></mark> <u>to <mark>collapse</mark> immediately</u>, the ensuring <u>vacuum</u> would <u>call into <mark>question</u></mark> its <u><strong><mark>short-term survivability</u></strong></mark>. But even if President Trump does not truly plan to leave NATO, <u>the longer the</u> <u><strong><mark>doubt</u></strong></mark> <u>over continued US participation</u>, <u>the</u> <u><strong>greater damage</u></strong> this <u>uncertainty creates. It</u> <u>encourages</u> <u><strong>political forces</u></strong> <u>within member states</u> <u><strong>not consistent</u></strong> <u>with NATO’s values</u> and it may <u><mark>encourage</u></mark> potential <u><strong><mark>adversaries</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>to undertake</u></mark> <u><strong>provocative</u></strong> <u>and</u> <u><strong><mark>aggressive</u></strong></mark> <u><mark>actions</u></mark>. <u>It is critical that</u> President Trump be <u>more consistent and clear in voicing his desire to remain in the alliance, and</u> frame whatever criticisms he has of NATO—which are not baseless—in the context of improving the alliance. It is also critically important that the President strive to set a better domestic political example for NATO allies as they face increasing levels of political instability and uncertainty of their own. More than his own approval ratings may be riding on his ability to be a unifying political figure.</p>

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1AC – Russian Cyber v1.3.6 1NC – Imperialism Security K Block – Imperialism Security K 2NR – Imperialism Security K

hspolicy22/LiberalArtsAndScienceAcademy/WiDo/LiberalArtsAndScienceAcademy-WiDo-Aff-Glenbrooks-Speech-and-Debate-Tournament-Round-6.docx

2022-11-20 18:38:59

WiDo

Liberal Arts And Science Academy WiDo

For docs, contact only: [email protected] For chains, put both: [email protected] [email protected] Gideon Witchel (he/him) - 2A Jack Dollinger (he/him) - 2N

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Capitalism causes environmental destruction and wars – turns the aff

Parr 13 , p. 145-147]

Parr 13—Associate Professor of Philosophy and Environmental Studies at the University of Cincinnati [Adrian, THE WRATH OF CAPITAL: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics, p. 145-147]

an economic meltdown; a frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business a prolonged, costly, and unjustified war in Iraq Greek economy in ruins escalation of global food prices bee colonies in global extinction 925 million hungry in 2010 the world's five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million people a planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather conditions; and the list goes on and on Sounds like a ticking time bomb it is. massive die-outs will put to pale comparison the 6 million murdered during the Holocaust; the millions killed in two world wars; the genocides in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur; the 1 million left homeless and the 316,000 killed by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The time has come to wake up to the warning signs.3 we do not enjoy the luxury of incremental change anymore. We are in the last decade where we can do something Gilding explains that "two degrees of warming is an inadequate goal and a plan for failure Once we move higher than 2°C of warming, projected to occur by 2050, positive feedback mechanisms will kick in, and then we will be at the point of no return. We therefore need to start thinking very differently right now. We do not see the crisis for what it is; we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with. the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of the capital and its model: capitalism.

economic meltdown sell-off of public land to the energy business war in Iraq escalation of global food prices bee colonies in global extinction melting ice caps extreme weather a ticking time bomb massive die-outs We are in the last decade where we can do something Once we move higher than 2°C of warming positive feedback mechanisms will kick in, we will be at the point of no return We need to start thinking differently right now the cause of this is the capitalism

A quick snapshot of the twenty-first century so far: an economic meltdown; a frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business as President George W Bush exited the White House; a prolonged, costly, and unjustified war in Iraq; the Greek economy in ruins; an escalation of global food prices; bee colonies in global extinction; 925 million hungry reported in 2010; as of 2005, the world's five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million people, the richest 10 percent accounting for 54 percent of global income; a planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather conditions; and the list goes on and on and on.2 Sounds like a ticking time bomb, doesn't it? Well it is. It is shameful to think that massive die-outs of future generations will put to pale comparison the 6 million murdered during the Holocaust; the millions killed in two world wars; the genocides in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur; the 1 million left homeless and the 316,000 killed by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The time has come to wake up to the warning signs.3 The real issue climate change poses is that we do not enjoy the luxury of incremental change anymore. We are in the last decade where we can do something about the situation. Paul Gilding, the former head of Greenpeace International and a core faculty member of Cambridge University's Programme for Sustainability, explains that "two degrees of warming is an inadequate goal and a plan for failure;' adding that "returning to below one degree of warming . . . is the solution to the problem:'4 Once we move higher than 2°C of warming, which is what is projected to occur by 2050, positive feedback mechanisms will begin to kick in, and then we will be at the point of no return. We therefore need to start thinking very differently right now. We do not see the crisis for what it is; we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with. This was the message that Venezuela's president Hugo Chavez delivered at the COP15 United Nations Climate Summit in Copenhagen on December 16, 2009, when he declared: "Let's talk about the cause. We should not avoid responsibilities, we should not avoid the depth of this problem. And I'll bring it up again, the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of the capital and its model: capitalism.”5

<h4>Capitalism causes environmental destruction and wars – turns the aff</h4><p><strong>Parr 13</strong>—Associate Professor of Philosophy and Environmental Studies at the University of Cincinnati [Adrian, THE WRATH OF CAPITAL: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics<u><strong>, p. 145-147]</p><p></u></strong>A quick snapshot of the twenty-first century so far: <u><strong>an <mark>economic meltdown</mark>; a frantic <mark>sell-off of public land to the energy business</u></strong></mark> as President George W Bush exited the White House; <u><strong>a prolonged, costly, and unjustified <mark>war in Iraq</u></strong></mark>; the <u><strong>Greek economy in ruins</u></strong>; an <u><strong><mark>escalation of global food prices</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong><mark>bee colonies in global extinction</u></strong></mark>; <u><strong>925 million hungry</u></strong> reported <u><strong>in 2010</u></strong>; as of 2005, <u><strong>the world's five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million people</u></strong>, the richest 10 percent accounting for 54 percent of global income; <u><strong>a planet on the verge of boiling point; <mark>melting ice caps</mark>; increases in <mark>extreme weather</mark> conditions; and the list goes on and on</u></strong> and on.2 <u><strong>Sounds like <mark>a ticking time bomb</u></strong></mark>, doesn't it? Well <u><strong>it is.</p><p></u></strong>It is shameful to think that <u><strong><mark>massive die-outs</u></strong></mark> of future generations <u><strong>will put to pale comparison the 6 million murdered during the Holocaust; the millions killed in two world wars; the genocides in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur; the 1 million left homeless and the 316,000 killed by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The time has come to wake up to the warning signs.3</p><p></u></strong>The real issue climate change poses is that <u><strong>we do not enjoy the luxury of incremental change anymore.</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>We are in the last decade where we can do something</u></strong></mark> about the situation. Paul <u><strong>Gilding</u></strong>, the former head of Greenpeace International and a core faculty member of Cambridge University's Programme for Sustainability, <u><strong>explains that "two degrees of warming is an inadequate goal and a plan for failure</u></strong>;' adding that "returning to below one degree of warming . . . is the solution to the problem:'4 <u><strong><mark>Once we move higher than 2°C of warming</mark>,</u></strong> which is what is <u><strong>projected to occur by 2050, <mark>positive feedback mechanisms will</u></strong></mark> begin to <u><strong><mark>kick in,</mark> and then <mark>we will be at the point of no return</mark>. <mark>We</mark> therefore <mark>need to start thinking</mark> very <mark>differently right now</mark>.</p><p>We do not see the crisis for what it is; we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with.</u></strong> This was the message that Venezuela's president Hugo Chavez delivered at the COP15 United Nations Climate Summit in Copenhagen on December 16, 2009, when he declared: "Let's talk about the cause. We should not avoid responsibilities, we should not avoid the depth of this problem. And I'll bring it up again, <u><strong><mark>the cause of this</mark> disastrous panorama <mark>is the</mark> metabolic, destructive system of the capital and its model: <mark>capitalism</mark>.</u></strong>”5</p>

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And, diseases cause extinction.

Dhillon 17,

Ranu Dhillon 17, instructor at Harvard Medical School and a physician at Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston. He works on building health systems in developing countries and served as an advisor to the president of Guinea during the Ebola epidemic instructor at Harvard Medical School and a physician at Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston. He works on building health systems in developing countries and served as an advisor to the president of Guinea during the Ebola epidemic, Harvard Business Review, 3-15-17, “The World Is Completely Unprepared for a Global Pandemic”, https://hbr.org/2017/03/the-world-is-completely-unprepared-for-a-global-pandemic

it is only a matter of time before we face a deadlier and more contagious pathogen, yet the threat of a deadly pandemic remains dangerously overlooked Pandemics occur with greater frequency due to climate change urbanization and international travel a weak W H O and potentially massive cuts to funding for U.S. research stand to deepen our vulnerability We also face the specter of novel and mutated pathogens that could spread and kill faster than diseases we have seen before rival nuclear weapons in deadliness Our experiences tell us that the world is unprepared for these threats We need stronger global coordination responsibility for controlling pandemics is fragmented, spread across too many players with no unifying authority In Ebola’s aftermath, there have been calls for a mechanism for responding to pandemics similar to the advance planning and training that NATO has in place for its numerous members to respond to military threats in a quick, coordinated fashion WHO, which should anchor global action, continues to suffer from a lack of credibility International actors are essential but cannot parachute into countries and navigate local dynamics quickly enough to contain outbreaks Access to routine care is also essential With Ebola and Zika, we lacked global coordination, and local health systems — which are still urgently needed the United States has played a key role in combatting pandemics around the world Investing in our ability to prevent and contain pandemics through revitalized national institutions should be our goal Pandemics are an existential threat on par with climate change and nuclear conflict

it is only a matter of time Pandemics occur with great frequency a weak W H O deepen our vulnerability We also face novel and mutated pathogens that could spread and kill faster than before rival nuclear weapons in deadliness responsibility is fragmented, with no unifying authority WHO suffer from a lack of credibility International actors cannot navigate local dynamics quickly enough the U S played a key role in combatting pandemics an existential threat on par with climate change and nuclear conflict

We fear it is only a matter of time before we face a deadlier and more contagious pathogen, yet the threat of a deadly pandemic remains dangerously overlooked. Pandemics now occur with greater frequency, due to factors such as climate change, urbanization, and international travel. Other factors, such as a weak World Health Organization and potentially massive cuts to funding for U.S. scientific research and foreign aid, including funding for the United Nations, stand to deepen our vulnerability. We also face the specter of novel and mutated pathogens that could spread and kill faster than diseases we have seen before. With the advent of genome-editing technologies, bioterrorists could artificially engineer new plagues, a threat that Ashton Carter, the former U.S. secretary of defense, thinks could rival nuclear weapons in deadliness. The two of us have advised the president of Guinea on stopping Ebola. In addition, we have worked on ways to contain the spread of Zika and have informally advised U.S. and international organizations on the matter. Our experiences tell us that the world is unprepared for these threats. We urgently need to change this trajectory. We can start by learning four lessons from the gaps exposed by the Ebola and Zika pandemics. Faster Vaccine Development The most effective way to stop pandemics is with vaccines. However, with Ebola there was no vaccine, and only now, years later, has one proven effective. This has been the case with Zika, too. Though there has been rapid progress in developing and getting a vaccine to market, it is not fast enough, and Zika has already spread worldwide. Many other diseases do not have vaccines, and developing them takes too long when a pandemic is already under way. We need faster pipelines, such as the one that the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations is trying to create, to preemptively develop vaccines for diseases predicted to cause outbreaks in the near future. Poinkt-of-Care Diagnostics Even with such efforts, vaccines will not be ready for many diseases and would not even be an option for novel or artificially engineered pathogens. With no vaccine for Ebola, our next best strategy was to identify who was infected as quickly as possible and isolate them before they infected others. Because Ebola’s symptoms were identical to common illnesses like malaria, diagnosis required laboratory testing that could not be easily scaled. As a result, many patients were only tested after several days of being contagious and infecting others. Some were never tested at all, and about 40% of patients in Ebola treatment centers did not actually have Ebola. Many dangerous pathogens similarly require laboratory testing that is difficult to scale. Florida, for example, has not been able to expand testing for Zika, so pregnant women wait weeks to know if their babies might be affected. What’s needed are point-of-care diagnostics that, like pregnancy tests, can be used by frontline responders or patients themselves to detect infection right away, where they live. These tests already exist for many diseases, and the technology behind them is well-established. However, the process for their validation is slow and messy. Point-of-care diagnostics for Ebola, for example, were available but never used because of such bottlenecks. Greater Global Coordination We need stronger global coordination. The responsibility for controlling pandemics is fragmented, spread across too many players with no unifying authority. In Guinea we forged a response out of an amalgam of over 30 organizations, each of which had its own priorities. In Ebola’s aftermath, there have been calls for a mechanism for responding to pandemics similar to the advance planning and training that NATO has in place for its numerous members to respond to military threats in a quick, coordinated fashion. This is the right thinking, but we are far from seeing it happen. The errors that allowed Ebola to become a crisis replayed with Zika, and the WHO, which should anchor global action, continues to suffer from a lack of credibility. Stronger Local Health Systems International actors are essential but cannot parachute into countries and navigate local dynamics quickly enough to contain outbreaks. In Guinea it took months to establish the ground game needed to stop the pandemic, with Ebola continuing to spread in the meantime. We need to help developing countries establish health systems that can provide routine care and, when needed, coordinate with international responders to contain new outbreaks. Local health systems could be established for about half of the $3.6 billion ultimately spent on creating an Ebola response from scratch. Access to routine care is also essential for knowing when an outbreak is taking root and establishing trust. For months, Ebola spread before anyone knew it was happening, and then lingered because communities who had never had basic health care doubted the intentions of foreigners flooding into their villages. The turning point in the pandemic came when they began to trust what they were hearing about Ebola and understood what they needed to do to halt its spread: identify those exposed and safely bury the dead. With Ebola and Zika, we lacked these four things — vaccines, diagnostics, global coordination, and local health systems — which are still urgently needed. However, prevailing political headwinds in the United States, which has played a key role in combatting pandemics around the world, threaten to make things worse. The Trump administration is seeking drastic budget cuts in funding for foreign aid and scientific research. The U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development may lose over one-third of their budgets, including half of the funding the U.S. usually provides to the UN. The National Institutes of Health, which has been on the vanguard of vaccines and diagnostics research, may also face cuts. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which has been at the forefront of responding to outbreaks, remains without a director, and, if the Affordable Care Act is repealed, would lose $891 million, 12% of its overall budget, provided to it for immunization programs, monitoring and responding to outbreaks, and other public health initiatives. Investing in our ability to prevent and contain pandemics through revitalized national and international institutions should be our shared goal. However, if U.S. agencies become less able to respond to pandemics, leading institutions from other nations, such as Institut Pasteur and the National Institute of Health and Medical Research in France, the Wellcome Trust and London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine in the UK, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs have done instrumental research and response work in previous pandemics), would need to step in to fill the void. There is no border wall against disease. Pandemics are an existential threat on par with climate change and nuclear conflict. We are at a critical crossroads, where we must either take the steps needed to prepare for this threat or become even more vulnerable. It is only a matter of time before we are hit by a deadlier, more contagious pandemic. Will we be ready?

<h4>And, diseases cause extinction. </h4><p>Ranu <strong>Dhillon 17, </strong>instructor at Harvard Medical School and a physician at Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston. He works on building health systems in developing countries and served as an advisor to the president of Guinea during the Ebola epidemic instructor at Harvard Medical School and a physician at Brigham and Women’s Hospital in Boston. He works on building health systems in developing countries and served as an advisor to the president of Guinea during the Ebola epidemic, Harvard Business Review, 3-15-17, “The World Is Completely Unprepared for a Global Pandemic”, https://hbr.org/2017/03/the-world-is-completely-unprepared-for-a-global-pandemic</p><p>We fear <u><mark>it is only a matter of time </mark>before</u> <u>we face a <strong>deadlier and more contagious pathogen</strong>, yet the threat of a deadly pandemic remains dangerously overlooked</u>. <u><mark>Pandemics</u></mark> now <u><mark>occur with <strong>great</mark>er <mark>frequency</u></strong></mark>, <u>due to</u> factors such as <u><strong>climate change</u></strong>, <u><strong>urbanization</u></strong>, <u>and</u> <u><strong>international travel</u></strong>. Other factors, such as <u><mark>a weak W</u></mark>orld <u><mark>H</u></mark>ealth <u><mark>O</u></mark>rganization <u>and potentially massive cuts to funding for U.S.</u> scientific <u>research</u> and foreign aid, including funding for the United Nations, <u>stand to <mark>deepen our vulnerability</u></mark>. <u><mark>We also</u></mark> <u><strong><mark>face</mark> the specter of <mark>novel and mutated pathogens that could spread and kill faster than</mark> diseases we have seen <mark>before</u></strong></mark>. With the advent of genome-editing technologies, bioterrorists could artificially engineer new plagues, a threat that Ashton Carter, the former U.S. secretary of defense, thinks could <u><strong><mark>rival nuclear weapons in deadliness</u></strong></mark>. The two of us have advised the president of Guinea on stopping Ebola. In addition, we have worked on ways to contain the spread of Zika and have informally advised U.S. and international organizations on the matter. <u>Our experiences tell us that the world is unprepared for these threats</u>. We urgently need to change this trajectory. We can start by learning four lessons from the gaps exposed by the Ebola and Zika pandemics. Faster Vaccine Development The most effective way to stop pandemics is with vaccines. However, with Ebola there was no vaccine, and only now, years later, has one proven effective. This has been the case with Zika, too. Though there has been rapid progress in developing and getting a vaccine to market, it is not fast enough, and Zika has already spread worldwide. Many other diseases do not have vaccines, and developing them takes too long when a pandemic is already under way. We need faster pipelines, such as the one that the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations is trying to create, to preemptively develop vaccines for diseases predicted to cause outbreaks in the near future. Poinkt-of-Care Diagnostics Even with such efforts, vaccines will not be ready for many diseases and would not even be an option for novel or artificially engineered pathogens. With no vaccine for Ebola, our next best strategy was to identify who was infected as quickly as possible and isolate them before they infected others. Because Ebola’s symptoms were identical to common illnesses like malaria, diagnosis required laboratory testing that could not be easily scaled. As a result, many patients were only tested after several days of being contagious and infecting others. Some were never tested at all, and about 40% of patients in Ebola treatment centers did not actually have Ebola. Many dangerous pathogens similarly require laboratory testing that is difficult to scale. Florida, for example, has not been able to expand testing for Zika, so pregnant women wait weeks to know if their babies might be affected. What’s needed are point-of-care diagnostics that, like pregnancy tests, can be used by frontline responders or patients themselves to detect infection right away, where they live. These tests already exist for many diseases, and the technology behind them is well-established. However, the process for their validation is slow and messy. Point-of-care diagnostics for Ebola, for example, were available but never used because of such bottlenecks. Greater Global Coordination <u><strong>We need stronger global coordination</u></strong>. The <u><mark>responsibility</mark> for controlling pandemics <mark>is <strong>fragmented, </mark>spread across too many players <mark>with no unifying authority</u></strong></mark>. In Guinea we forged a response out of an amalgam of over 30 organizations, each of which had its own priorities. <u>In Ebola’s aftermath, there have been calls for a mechanism for responding to pandemics similar to the advance planning and training that NATO has in place for its numerous members to respond to military threats in a quick, coordinated fashion</u>. This is the right thinking, but we are far from seeing it happen. The errors that allowed Ebola to become a crisis replayed with Zika, and the <u><mark>WHO</mark>, which should anchor global action, continues to <mark>suffer from a lack of credibility</u></mark>. Stronger Local Health Systems <u><mark>International actors</mark> are essential but <strong><mark>cannot</mark> parachute into countries and <mark>navigate local dynamics quickly enough </mark>to contain outbreaks</u></strong>. In Guinea it took months to establish the ground game needed to stop the pandemic, with Ebola continuing to spread in the meantime. We need to help developing countries establish health systems that can provide routine care and, when needed, coordinate with international responders to contain new outbreaks. Local health systems could be established for about half of the $3.6 billion ultimately spent on creating an Ebola response from scratch. <u>Access to <strong>routine care</strong> is also <strong>essential</u></strong> for knowing when an outbreak is taking root and establishing trust. For months, Ebola spread before anyone knew it was happening, and then lingered because communities who had never had basic health care doubted the intentions of foreigners flooding into their villages. The turning point in the pandemic came when they began to trust what they were hearing about Ebola and understood what they needed to do to halt its spread: identify those exposed and safely bury the dead. <u>With Ebola and Zika, we lacked</u> these four things — vaccines, diagnostics, <u>global coordination, and local health systems — which are still urgently needed</u>. However, prevailing political headwinds in <u><mark>the U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u>, which <u>has <mark>played a <strong>key role in combatting pandemics</mark> around the world</u></strong>, threaten to make things worse. The Trump administration is seeking drastic budget cuts in funding for foreign aid and scientific research. The U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development may lose over one-third of their budgets, including half of the funding the U.S. usually provides to the UN. The National Institutes of Health, which has been on the vanguard of vaccines and diagnostics research, may also face cuts. The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, which has been at the forefront of responding to outbreaks, remains without a director, and, if the Affordable Care Act is repealed, would lose $891 million, 12% of its overall budget, provided to it for immunization programs, monitoring and responding to outbreaks, and other public health initiatives. <u>Investing in our ability to prevent and contain pandemics through <strong>revitalized national</u></strong> and international <u><strong>institutions</u></strong> <u>should be our</u> shared <u>goal</u>. However, if U.S. agencies become less able to respond to pandemics, leading institutions from other nations, such as Institut Pasteur and the National Institute of Health and Medical Research in France, the Wellcome Trust and London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine in the UK, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs have done instrumental research and response work in previous pandemics), would need to step in to fill the void. There is no border wall against disease. <u><strong>Pandemics are <mark>an existential threat on par with climate change and nuclear conflict</u></strong></mark>. We are at a critical crossroads, where we must either take the steps needed to prepare for this threat or become even more vulnerable. It is only a matter of time before we are hit by a deadlier, more contagious pandemic. Will we be ready?</p>

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Primary Care

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DPT is a statistical artifact---empirical analysis

Mousseau 18

Mousseau 18 – Professor @ UCF, PhD PoliSci @ Binghamton [Michael, Conflict Management and Peace Science, “Grasping the scientific evidence: The contractualist peace supersedes the democratic peace”, Vol 35(2) 175-192, SagePub, accessed 8/21/18]

This study investigates all five of these factual claims. I begin by addressing the issue of missing data by constructing two entirely new measures for contractualist economy. I then take up possible measurement error in the dependent variable by reporting tests using both my own (Mousseau, 2013) and DOR’s measures for conflict. Next, I disaggregate the data to investigate a causal interaction of democracy with contractualist economy. I then examine the evidence for reverse causality, and scrutinize the competing test models to pinpoint the exact factors that can account for differences in test outcomes. results are consistent across all tests: there is no credible evidence supporting democracy as a cause of peace the impact of democracy is zero regardless of how interstate conflict is measured evidence for reverse causality from democracy to contractualist economy is shown to be based on an erroneous research design marginal peace is a statistical artifact since it does not exist among neighbors where everyone has an equal opportunity to fight. results merely corroborate the present state of knowledge implications of this study are far from trivial the observation of democratic peace is a statistical artifact, seemingly explained by economic conditions. we must stop describing democracy as a ‘‘known’’ cause or correlate of peace, and stop tossing in a variable for democracy, willy-nilly, in quantitative analyses of international conflict; If nations want to advance peace promotion of democracy will not achieve it

results are consistent across all tests: there is no credible evidence supporting democracy as a cause of peace the impact is zero regardless of how interstate conflict is measured evidence for reverse causality is shown to be based on erroneous research design democratic peace is a statistical artifact we must stop describing democracy as a ‘‘known’’ cause of peace, If nations want peace democracy will not achieve it

A weighty controversy has enveloped the study of international conflict: whether the democratic peace, the observed dearth of militarized conflict between democratic nations, may be spurious and accounted for by institutionalized market ‘‘contractualist’’ economy. I have offered theory and evidence that economic norms, specifically contractualist economy, appear to account for both the explanans (democracy) and the explanandum (peace) in the democratic peace research program (Mousseau, 2009, 2012a, 2013; see also Mousseau et al., 2013a, b). Five studies have responded with several arguments for why we should continue to believe that democracy causes peace (Dafoe, 2011; Dafoe and Russett, 2013; Dafoe et al., 2013; Ray, 2013; Russett, 2010). Resolution of this controversy is fundamental to the study and practice of international relations. The observation of democratic peace is ‘‘the closest thing we have to an empirical law’’ in the study of global politics (Levy, 1988: 662), and carries the profound implication that the spread of democracy will end war. New economic norms theory, on the other hand, yields the contrary implication that universal democracy will not end war. Instead, it is market-oriented development that creates a culture of contracting, and this culture legitimates democracy within nations and causes peace among them. The policy implications could hardly be more divergent: to end war (and support democracy), the contractualist democracies should promote the economies of nations at risk (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2015; Meierrieks, 2012; Mousseau, 2000, 2009, 2012a, 2013; Nieman, 2015). In the literature are five factual claims for why we should continue to believe that democracy causes peace: (1) an assertion that in three of the five studies that overturned the democratic peace (Mousseau, 2013; Mousseau et al., 2013a, b), the insignificance of democracy controlling for contractualist economy is due to the treatment of missing data for contractualist economy (Dafoe et al., 2013, henceforth DOR); (2) a claim of error in the measure for conflict (DOR) that appears in one of the five studies that overturned the democratic peace (Mousseau, 2013); (3) an alleged misinterpretation of an interaction term that appears in one of the five studies (Mousseau, 2009) that overturned the democratic peace, along with in inference of democratic causality from an interaction of democracy with contractualist economy (Dafoe and Russett, 2013; DOR); (4) a claim of reverse causality, of democracy causing contractualist economy (Ray, 2013); and (5) a report of multiple regressions with most said to show democratic significance after controlling for contractualist economy (DOR). This study investigates all five of these factual claims. I begin by addressing the issue of missing data by constructing two entirely new measures for contractualist economy. I then take up possible measurement error in the dependent variable by reporting tests using both my own (Mousseau, 2013) and DOR’s measures for conflict. Next, I disaggregate the data to investigate a causal interaction of democracy with contractualist economy. I then examine the evidence for reverse causality, and scrutinize the competing test models to pinpoint the exact factors that can account for differences in test outcomes. The results are consistent across all tests: there is no credible evidence supporting democracy as a cause of peace. Using DOR’s base model, the impact of democracy is zero regardless of how contractualist economy or interstate conflict is measured. There is no misinterpreted interaction term in any study that has overturned the democratic peace, and the disaggregation of the data yields no support for a causal interaction of democracy with contractualist economy. Ray’s (2013) evidence for reverse causality from democracy to contractualist economy is shown to be based on an erroneous research design. And of DOR’s 120 separate regressions that consider contractualist economy, 116 contain controversial measurement and specification practices; the remaining four are analyses of all (fatal and non-fatal) disputes, where the correlation of democracy with peace is limited to mixedeconomic dyads, those where one state has a contractualist economy and the other does not, a subset that includes only 27% of dyads from 1951 to 2001, including only 50% of democratic dyads. It is further shown that this marginal peace is a statistical artifact since it does not exist among neighbors where everyone has an equal opportunity to fight. The results of this study should not be surprising, as they merely corroborate the present state of knowledge. This is because, while DOR ardently assert that four alleged errors, when corrected, each independently save the democratic peace proposition—multiple imputation, the exclusion of ongoing dispute years, an interaction term, and their alternative measure for contractualist economy—they never actually report any clear-cut evidence in support of their claims. One issue not addressed is Dafoe and Russett’s (2013) challenge to Mousseau et al. (2013a) on the grounds that our reported insignificance of democracy is not significant. Like the four claims of error made by DOR addressed here, Dafoe and Russett (2013) made this charge without supporting it. Mousseau et al. (2013b) then investigated it and showed that it too has no support. This issue appears resolved, as Russett and colleagues (DOR) did not raise it again. Nor have DOR or anyone else disputed the overturning of the democratic peace as reported in Mousseau (2012a), which has not been contested with any assertion, supported or unsupported. The implications of this study are far from trivial: the observation of democratic peace is a statistical artifact, seemingly explained by economic conditions. If scientific knowledge progresses and the field of interstate conflict processes is to abide by the scientific rules of evidence, then we must stop describing democracy as a ‘‘known’’ cause or correlate of peace, and stop tossing in a variable for democracy, willy-nilly, in quantitative analyses of international conflict; the variable to replace it is contractualist economy. If nations want to advance peace abroad, the promotion of democracy will not achieve it: the policy to replace it is the promotion of economic opportunity The economic norms account for how contractualist economy can cause both democracy and peace has been explicated in numerous prior studies and need not be repeated here (Mousseau, 2000, 2009, 2012a, 2013). An abundance of prior studies have also corroborated various novel predictions of the theory in wider domains (Ungerer, 2012), and no one has disputed the multiple reports that contractualist economy is the strongest non-trivial predictor of peace both within (Mousseau, 2012b) and between nations (Mousseau, 2013; see also Nieman, 2015). The only matter in controversy is whether democracy has any observable impact on peace between nations after consideration of contractualist economy. My investigation begins below with the allegation of measurement error.

<h4>DPT is a statistical artifact---empirical analysis </h4><p><u><strong>Mousseau 18</u></strong> – Professor @ UCF, PhD PoliSci @ Binghamton [Michael, Conflict Management and Peace Science, “Grasping the scientific evidence: The contractualist peace supersedes the democratic peace”, Vol 35(2) 175-192, SagePub, accessed 8/21/18]</p><p>A weighty controversy has enveloped the study of international conflict: whether the democratic peace, the observed dearth of militarized conflict between democratic nations, may be spurious and accounted for by institutionalized market ‘‘contractualist’’ economy. I have offered theory and evidence that economic norms, specifically contractualist economy, appear to account for both the explanans (democracy) and the explanandum (peace) in the democratic peace research program (Mousseau, 2009, 2012a, 2013; see also Mousseau et al., 2013a, b). Five studies have responded with several arguments for why we should continue to believe that democracy causes peace (Dafoe, 2011; Dafoe and Russett, 2013; Dafoe et al., 2013; Ray, 2013; Russett, 2010).</p><p>Resolution of this controversy is fundamental to the study and practice of international relations. The observation of democratic peace is ‘‘the closest thing we have to an empirical law’’ in the study of global politics (Levy, 1988: 662), and carries the profound implication that the spread of democracy will end war. New economic norms theory, on the other hand, yields the contrary implication that universal democracy will not end war. Instead, it is market-oriented development that creates a culture of contracting, and this culture legitimates democracy within nations and causes peace among them. The policy implications could hardly be more divergent: to end war (and support democracy), the contractualist democracies should promote the economies of nations at risk (Krieger and Meierrieks, 2015; Meierrieks, 2012; Mousseau, 2000, 2009, 2012a, 2013; Nieman, 2015).</p><p>In the literature are five factual claims for why we should continue to believe that democracy causes peace: (1) an assertion that in three of the five studies that overturned the democratic peace (Mousseau, 2013; Mousseau et al., 2013a, b), the insignificance of democracy controlling for contractualist economy is due to the treatment of missing data for contractualist economy (Dafoe et al., 2013, henceforth DOR); (2) a claim of error in the measure for conflict (DOR) that appears in one of the five studies that overturned the democratic peace (Mousseau, 2013); (3) an alleged misinterpretation of an interaction term that appears in one of the five studies (Mousseau, 2009) that overturned the democratic peace, along with in inference of democratic causality from an interaction of democracy with contractualist economy (Dafoe and Russett, 2013; DOR); (4) a claim of reverse causality, of democracy causing contractualist economy (Ray, 2013); and (5) a report of multiple regressions with most said to show democratic significance after controlling for contractualist economy (DOR).</p><p><u><strong>This study investigates all five of these factual claims. I begin by addressing the issue of missing data by constructing two entirely new measures for contractualist economy. I then take up possible measurement error in the dependent variable by reporting tests using both my own (Mousseau, 2013) and DOR’s measures for conflict. Next, I disaggregate the data to investigate a causal interaction of democracy with contractualist economy. I then examine the evidence for reverse causality, and scrutinize the competing test models to pinpoint the exact factors that can account for differences in test outcomes.</p><p></u></strong>The <u><strong><mark>results are consistent across all tests:</u></strong> <u><strong>there is no credible evidence</mark> <mark>supporting democracy as a cause of peace</u></strong></mark>. Using DOR’s base model, <u><strong><mark>the impact</mark> of democracy <mark>is zero</u></strong> <u><strong>regardless of how</mark> </u></strong>contractualist economy or<u><strong> <mark>interstate conflict is measured</u></strong></mark>. There is no misinterpreted interaction term in any study that has overturned the democratic peace, and the disaggregation of the data yields no support for a causal interaction of democracy with contractualist economy. Ray’s (2013) <u><strong><mark>evidence for reverse causality</mark> from democracy to contractualist economy <mark>is shown to be based on</mark> an <mark>erroneous research design</u></strong></mark>. And of DOR’s 120 separate regressions that consider contractualist economy, 116 contain controversial measurement and specification practices; the remaining four are analyses of all (fatal and non-fatal) disputes, where the correlation of democracy with peace is limited to mixedeconomic dyads, those where one state has a contractualist economy and the other does not, a subset that includes only 27% of dyads from 1951 to 2001, including only 50% of democratic dyads. It is further shown that this <u><strong>marginal peace is a statistical artifact since it does not exist among neighbors where everyone has an equal opportunity to fight.</p><p></u></strong>The <u><strong>results</u></strong> of this study should not be surprising, as they <u><strong>merely corroborate the present state of knowledge</u></strong>. This is because, while DOR ardently assert that four alleged errors, when corrected, each independently save the democratic peace proposition—multiple imputation, the exclusion of ongoing dispute years, an interaction term, and their alternative measure for contractualist economy—they never actually report any clear-cut evidence in support of their claims. One issue not addressed is Dafoe and Russett’s (2013) challenge to Mousseau et al. (2013a) on the grounds that our reported insignificance of democracy is not significant. Like the four claims of error made by DOR addressed here, Dafoe and Russett (2013) made this charge without supporting it. Mousseau et al. (2013b) then investigated it and showed that it too has no support. This issue appears resolved, as Russett and colleagues (DOR) did not raise it again. Nor have DOR or anyone else disputed the overturning of the democratic peace as reported in Mousseau (2012a), which has not been contested with any assertion, supported or unsupported.</p><p>The <u><strong>implications of this study are far from trivial</u></strong>: <u><strong>the observation of <mark>democratic peace is a statistical artifact</mark>, seemingly explained by economic conditions. </u></strong>If scientific knowledge progresses and the field of interstate conflict processes is to abide by the scientific rules of evidence, then <u><strong><mark>we must stop describing democracy as a ‘‘known’’ cause</mark> or correlate <mark>of peace, </mark>and stop tossing in a variable for democracy, willy-nilly, in quantitative analyses of international conflict;</u></strong> the variable to replace it is contractualist economy. <u><strong><mark>If nations want</mark> to advance <mark>peace</u></strong></mark> abroad, the <u><strong>promotion of <mark>democracy will not achieve it</u></strong></mark>: the policy to replace it is the promotion of economic opportunity</p><p>The economic norms account for how contractualist economy can cause both democracy and peace has been explicated in numerous prior studies and need not be repeated here (Mousseau, 2000, 2009, 2012a, 2013). An abundance of prior studies have also corroborated various novel predictions of the theory in wider domains (Ungerer, 2012), and no one has disputed the multiple reports that contractualist economy is the strongest non-trivial predictor of peace both within (Mousseau, 2012b) and between nations (Mousseau, 2013; see also Nieman, 2015). The only matter in controversy is whether democracy has any observable impact on peace between nations after consideration of contractualist economy. My investigation begins below with the allegation of measurement error.</p>

1NR

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Democracy D: 2NC

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Probability – 0.1% chance of a collision.

Salter Economics Professor at Texas Tech ’16

Alexander William Salter, Economics Professor at Texas Tech, ’16, “SPACE DEBRIS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE ORBITAL COMMONS” 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 221 *numbers replaced with English words

The probability of a collision is low the maximum probability of a collision over the lifetime of a spacecraft remains below one in one thousand

The probability of a collision is low. the maximum probability of a collision over the lifetime of a spacecraft remains below one in one thousand

The probability of a collision is currently low. Bradley and Wein estimate that the maximum probability in LEO of a collision over the lifetime of a spacecraft remains below one in one thousand, conditional on continued compliance with NASA’s deorbiting guidelines.3 However, the possibility of a future “snowballing” effect, whereby debris collides with other objects, further congesting orbit space, remains a significant concern.4 Levin and Carroll estimate the average immediate destruction of wealth created by a collision to be approximately $30 million, with an additional $200 million in damages to all currently existing space assets from the debris created by the initial collision.5 The expected value of destroyed wealth because of collisions, currently small because of the low probability of a collision, can quickly become significant if future collisions result in runaway debris growth.

<h4>Probability – 0.1% chance of a collision. </h4><p>Alexander William <strong>Salter</strong>, <strong>Economics Professor at Texas Tech</strong>, <strong>’16</strong>, “SPACE DEBRIS: A LAW AND ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF THE ORBITAL COMMONS” 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 221 *numbers replaced with English words </p><p><u><mark>The probability of a collision is</u></mark> currently <u><strong><mark>low</u></strong>.</mark> Bradley and Wein estimate that <u><mark>the</u> <u><strong>maximum probability</u></strong></mark> in LEO <u><mark>of a collision over the lifetime of a spacecraft remains <strong>below one in one thousand</u></strong></mark>, conditional on continued compliance with NASA’s deorbiting guidelines.3 However, the possibility of a future “snowballing” effect, whereby debris collides with other objects, further congesting orbit space, remains a significant concern.4 Levin and Carroll estimate the average immediate destruction of wealth created by a collision to be approximately $30 million, with an additional $200 million in damages to all currently existing space assets from the debris created by the initial collision.5 The expected value of destroyed wealth because of collisions, currently small because of the low probability of a collision, can quickly become significant if future collisions result in runaway debris growth.</p>

Harker Mining Case Hit

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Their cessation of revolutionary institution building abdicates the potential for true communual power, reducing revolution to reactive bursts of energy. This debate must be a question of the speed, scope, and scale of revolutionary strategy. Only dual power organizing can build institutions that meet the material needs of community and construct a revolutionary base in the face of compounding crises of climate change, imperialism, and fascism.

Escalante, 19

Escalante, 19 [Alyson, you should totally read her work for non-debate reasons, Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist, "Communism and Climate Change: A Dual Power Approach," Failing That, Invent, https://failingthatinvent.home.blog/2019/02/15/communism-and-climate-change-a-dual-power-approach/]// recut ahsBC

dual power strategy gives the masses an infrastructure of socialist institutions which can directly provide for material needs in times of capitalist crisis. Socialist agricultural and food distribution programs can take ground that the capitalist state cedes by simultaneously meeting the needs of the masses while proving that socialist self-management and political institutions can function independently of capitalism not only capable of literally saving lives in crisis, but demonstrating the possibility of a revolutionary project which seeks to destroy rather than reform capitalism. One of the most pressing crises is climate change The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts that we have 12 years to limit not prevent catastrophic climate change. The horrific, fact that we all must face is that climate change has reached a point where many effects are inevitable, and we are in a post-brink world where damage control is the primary concern. The question is not whether we can escape climate change, but whether we can survive it. Socialist strategy must adapt accordingly democratic socialists largely settled on market reforms. The Green New Deal, does nothing to challenge capitalism but seeks to subsidize market solutions to reorient US energy infrastructure towards renewable energy and development of public investment towards these ends. The plan does nothing to call into question the profit incentives and endless resource consumption of capitalism which led us to this point seeks to reorient relentless market forces of capitalism towards slightly less destructive technological developments. While the plan would lead to a massive investment in the manufacturing and deployment of solar energy infrastructure Fabricating [solar] panels requires caustic chemicals such as sodium hydroxide and hydrofluoric acid, and the process uses water as well as electricity, the production of which emits greenhouse gases Technology alone cannot sufficiently combat this crisis, as the production through capitalist manufacturing infrastructure only perpetuates environmental harm. subsidizing and incentivizing renewable energy stops far short of actually combating the fossil fuel industry development of high-tech energy infrastructure and low emission transportation requires raw material and rare earth minerals which the United States can only access because of the imperial division of the Global South. requires constant militarism from imperial core nations facilitates constant warfare as imperial states compete for spheres of influence in order to facilitate cheap resource extraction The US military is the single largest user of petroleum one of its main functions is to ensure oil access for the United States. capitalists are not going to save us, and if we don’t find a way to save ourselves, the collapse of human civilization is a real possibility. how are we going to save ourselves? we must find a way to organize outside the confines of capitalist institutions, towards the end of overthrowing capitalism The DSA is far larger and well funded than any other socialist organizations and failed to produce anything more revolutionary than the Green New Deal We have to abandon the idea that electoral strategy will be sufficient to resolve the underlying causes of this crisis within 12 years. reformists raise the same response what are you going to do in the mean time? we have much work to be done before a revolutionary strategy can be enacted. the left has sought to ignore this truth by embracing adventurism and violent protest theatrics, in the hope of sparking momentum If this is the core strategy of the socialist left, we will accomplish nothing in the next 12 years We must build a movement with infrastructure which can survive revolution and provide a framework for socialist development Dual power is tooled towards this project best. The Marxist Center network has done an impressive amount of work developing socialist institutions across the US through tenants organizing and serve the people programs left wing factions within the DSA develop mutual aid programs that could be useful for dual power strategy At the same time, mutual aid is not enough. We cannot simply build these institutions as a reform to make capitalism more survivable. we must make these institutions part of a broader revolutionary movement and they ought to function as a material prefiguration to a socialist society and economy dual power outside the capitalist state today ought to be structured towards revolutionary ends, such that they will someday function as the early institutions of a revolutionary socialist society. we cannot simply declare these institutions to be revolutionary they have to be linked together through an actual revolutionary movement working towards revolutionary ends This means that dual power institutions cannot exist as ends in and of themselves, nor can abstract notions of mutual aid cannot be conceptualized as an end in itself The explicit purpose of these institutions has to be to radicalize the masses through meeting their needs, and providing an infrastructure for a socialist movement to meet the needs of its members and the communities in which it operates. Revolutionary institutions that can provide food, housing, and other needs for a revolutionary movement will be crucial for building a base and constructing beginnings of a socialist infrastructure for when we engage in revolutionary struggle.

dual power gives the masses institutions which can directly provide for material needs in times of capitalist crisis Socialist agricultural and food distribution programs can take ground that the capitalist state cedes by meeting the needs of the masses while proving that socialist self-management and political institutions can function independently of capitalism is not only literally saving lives but demonstrating the possibility of a revolutionary project we have 12 years to limit catastrophic climate change we are in a post-brink world The question is not whether we can escape but whether we can survive Technology cannot sufficiently combat this crisis high-tech infrastructure requires constant militarism from warfare as imperial states compete for spheres of influence in order to facilitate cheap resource extraction if we don’t find a way to save ourselves, the collapse of human civilization is a real possibility. We must build a movement with infrastructure which can survive revolution The Marxist Center has done work developing socialist institutions through tenants organizing and serve the people programs. mutual aid is not enough We cannot simply make capitalism more survivable we must make these institutions part of a broader revolutionary movement we cannot simply declare institutions to be revolutionary they have to be linked together through an revolutionary movement working towards revolutionary ends The purpose has to be to radicalize the masses through meeting the needs of the communities in which it operates Revolutionary institutions can provide food, housing and build a base

I have previously argued that a crucial advantage to dual power strategy is that it gives the masses an infrastructure of socialist institutions which can directly provide for material needs in times of capitalist crisis. Socialist agricultural and food distribution programs can take ground that the capitalist state cedes by simultaneously meeting the needs of the masses while proving that socialist self-management and political institutions can function independently of capitalism. This approach is not only capable of literally saving lives in the case of crisis, but of demonstrating the possibility of a revolutionary project which seeks to destroy rather than reform capitalism. One of the most pressing of the various crises which humanity faces today is climate change. Capitalist production has devastated the planet, and everyday we discover that the small window of time for avoiding its most disastrous effects is shorter than previously understood. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts that we have 12 years to limit (not even prevent) the more catastrophic effects of climate change. The simple, and horrific, fact that we all must face is that climate change has reached a point where many of its effects are inevitable, and we are now in a post-brink world, where damage control is the primary concern. The question is not whether we can escape a future of climate change, but whether we can survive it. Socialist strategy must adapt accordingly. In the face of this crisis, the democratic socialists and social democrats in the United States have largely settled on market based reforms. The Green New Deal, championed by Alexandria Ocasio Cortez and the left wing of the Democratic Party, remains a thoroughly capitalist solution to a capitalist problem. The proposal does nothing to challenge capitalism itself, but rather seeks to subsidize market solutions to reorient the US energy infrastructure towards renewable energy production, to develop less energy consuming transportation, and the development of public investment towards these ends. The plan does nothing to call into question the profit incentives and endless resource consumption of capitalism which led us to this point. Rather, it seeks to reorient the relentless market forces of capitalism towards slightly less destructive technological developments. While the plan would lead to a massive investment in the manufacturing and deployment of solar energy infrastructure, National Geographic reports that, “Fabricating [solar] panels requires caustic chemicals such as sodium hydroxide and hydrofluoric acid, and the process uses water as well as electricity, the production of which emits greenhouse gases.” Technology alone cannot sufficiently combat this crisis, as the production of such technology through capitalist manufacturing infrastructure only perpetuates environmental harm. Furthermore, subsidizing and incentivizing renewable energy stops far short of actually combating the fossil fuel industry driving the current climate crisis. The technocratic market solutions offered in the Green New Deal fail to adequately combat the driving factors of climate change. What is worse, they rely on a violent imperialist global system in order to produce their technological solutions. The development of high-tech energy infrastructure and the development of low or zero emission transportation requires the import of raw material and rare earth minerals which the United States can only access because of the imperial division of the Global South. This imperial division of the world requires constant militarism from the imperial core nations, and as Lenin demonstrates in Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, facilitates constant warfare as imperial states compete for spheres of influence in order to facilitate cheap resource extraction. The US military, one of many imperialist forces, is the single largest user of petroleum, and one of its main functions is to ensure oil access for the United States. Without challenging this imperialist division of the world and the role of the United States military in upholding it, the Green New Deal fails even further to challenge the underlying causes of climate change. Even with the failed promises of the Green New Deal itself, it is unlikely that this tepid market proposal will pass at all. Nancy Pelosi and other lead Democrats have largely condemned it and consider it “impractical” and “unfeasible.” This dismissal is crucial because it reveals the total inability of capitalism to resolve this crisis. If the center-left party in the heart of the imperial core sees even milquetoast capitalist reforms as a step too far, we ought to have very little hope that a reformist solution will present itself within the ever shrinking 12 year time frame. There are times for delicacy and there are times for bluntness, and we are in the latter. To put things bluntly: the capitalists are not going to save us, and if we don’t find a way to save ourselves, the collapse of human civilization is a real possibility. The pressing question we now face is: how are we going to save ourselves? Revolution and Dual Power If capitalism will not be able to resolve the current encroaching climate crisis, we must find a way to organize outside the confines of capitalist institutions, towards the end of overthrowing capitalism. If the Democratic Socialists of America backed candidates cannot offer real anti-capitalist solutions through the capitalist state, we should be skeptical of the possibility for any socialist organization doing so. The DSA is far larger and far more well funded than any of the other socialist organizations in the United States, and they have failed to produce anything more revolutionary than the Green New Deal. We have to abandon the idea that electoral strategy will be sufficient to resolve the underlying causes of this crisis within 12 years. While many radicals call for revolution instead of reform, the reformists often raise the same response: revolution is well and good, but what are you going to do in the mean time? In many ways this question is fair. The socialist left in the United States today is not ready for revolutionary action, and a mass base does not exist to back the various organizations which might undertake such a struggle. Revolutionaries must concede that we have much work to be done before a revolutionary strategy can be enacted. This is a hard truth, but it is true. Much of the left has sought to ignore this truth by embracing adventurism and violent protest theatrics, in the vain hope of sparking revolutionary momentum which does not currently exist. If this is the core strategy of the socialist left, we will accomplish nothing in the next 12 years. Such approaches are as useless as the opportunist reforms pushed by the social democrats. Our task in these 12 years is not simply to arm ourselves and hope that magically the masses will wake up prepared for revolution and willing to put their trust in our small ideological cadres. We must instead, build a movement, and with it we must build infrastructure which can survive revolution and provide a framework for socialist development. Dual power is tooled towards this project best. The Marxist Center network has done an impressive amount of work developing socialist institutions across the US, largely through tenants organizing and serve the people programs. The left wing factions within the DSA itself have also begun to develop mutual aid programs that could be useful for dual power strategy. At the same time, mutual aid is not enough. We cannot simply build these institutions as a reform to make capitalism more survivable. Rather, we must make these institutions part of a broader revolutionary movement and they ought to function as a material prefiguration to a socialist society and economy. The institutions we build as dual power outside the capitalist state today ought to be structured towards revolutionary ends, such that they will someday function as the early institutions of a revolutionary socialist society. To accomplish this goal, we cannot simply declare these institutions to be revolutionary. Rather they have to be linked together through an actual revolutionary movement working towards revolutionary ends. This means that dual power institutions cannot exist as ends in and of themselves, nor can abstract notions of mutual aid cannot be conceptualized as an end in itself. The explicit purpose of these institutions has to be to radicalize the masses through meeting their needs, and providing an infrastructure for a socialist movement to meet the needs of its members and the communities in which it operates. Revolutionary institutions that can provide food, housing, and other needs for a revolutionary movement will be crucial for building a base among the masses and for constructing the beginnings of a socialist infrastructure for when we eventually engage in revolutionary struggle.

<h4><strong>Their cessation of revolutionary institution building <u>abdicates</u> the potential for true communual power, reducing revolution to <u>reactive bursts of energy.</u> This debate must be a question of the <u>speed,</u> <u>scope,</u> and <u>scale</u> of revolutionary strategy. Only dual power organizing can <u>build institutions</u> that meet the <u>material needs</u> of community and construct a <u>revolutionary base</u> in the face of <u>compounding crises</u> of climate change, imperialism, and fascism.</h4><p>Escalante, 19 </strong>[Alyson, you should totally read her work for non-debate reasons, Marxist-Leninist, Materialist Feminist and Anti-Imperialist activist, "Communism and Climate Change: A Dual Power Approach," Failing That, Invent, https://failingthatinvent.home.blog/2019/02/15/communism-and-climate-change-a-dual-power-approach/]// recut ahsBC</p><p>I have previously argued that a crucial advantage to <u><strong><mark>dual power</strong> <strong></mark>strategy</u></strong> is that it <u><mark>gives the masses </mark>an infrastructure of socialist<strong> <mark>institutions</strong></mark> <mark>which can directly provide for <strong>material needs</strong> in times of <strong>capitalist crisis</mark>.</strong> <strong><mark>Socialist agricultural</strong> and <strong>food distribution programs</strong> can take ground that the <strong>capitalist state</strong> cedes</mark> <mark>by</mark> simultaneously <mark>meeting the needs of the masses</mark> <mark>while proving that socialist <strong>self-management</strong> and<strong> political</strong> <strong>institutions</strong> can function <strong>independently</strong> of capitalism</u></mark>. This approach <mark>is <u>not only</mark> capable of <strong><mark>literally saving lives</strong></mark> in</u> the case of <u>crisis, <mark>but</u></mark> of <u><mark>demonstrating the <strong>possibility of a revolutionary project</strong></mark> which seeks to <strong>destroy rather than reform</strong> capitalism. One of the most pressing</u> of the various <u>crises</u> which humanity faces today <u>is climate change</u>. Capitalist production has devastated the planet, and everyday we discover that the small window of time for avoiding its most disastrous effects is shorter than previously understood. <u>The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change predicts that <mark>we have <strong>12 years</strong> to limit</mark> </u>(<u>not</u> even <u>prevent</u>) the more <u><mark>catastrophic</u></mark> effects of <u><mark>climate change</mark>. The</u> simple, and <u>horrific, fact that we all must face is that climate change has reached a point where many</u> of its <u>effects are <strong>inevitable</strong>, and <mark>we are</u></mark> now <u><mark>in a <strong>post-brink world</u></strong></mark>, <u>where damage control is the primary concern. <strong><mark>The question is not whether we can escape</u></strong></mark> a future of <u><strong>climate change, <mark>but whether we can survive </mark>it</strong>. Socialist strategy must adapt accordingly</u>. In the face of this crisis, the <u>democratic socialists</u> and social democrats in the United States have <u>largely settled on market</u> based <u>reforms. The Green New Deal,</u> championed by Alexandria Ocasio Cortez and the left wing of the Democratic Party, remains a thoroughly capitalist solution to a capitalist problem. The proposal <u>does nothing to challenge capitalism</u> itself, <u>but</u> rather <u>seeks to subsidize market solutions to reorient</u> the <u>US energy infrastructure towards renewable energy</u> production, to develop less energy consuming transportation, <u>and</u> the <u>development of public investment towards these ends.</u> <u><strong>The plan does nothing to call into question the profit incentives and endless resource consumption of capitalism which led us to this point</u></strong>. Rather, it <u>seeks to reorient</u> the <u>relentless market forces of capitalism towards slightly less destructive technological developments. While the plan would lead to a massive investment in the manufacturing and deployment of solar energy infrastructure</u>, National Geographic reports that, “<u>Fabricating [solar] panels <strong>requires caustic chemicals</strong> such as sodium hydroxide and hydrofluoric acid, and <strong>the process uses water as well as electricity</strong>, the production of which <strong>emits greenhouse gases</u></strong>.” <u><mark>Technology</mark> alone <mark>cannot</mark> <mark>sufficiently combat this crisis</mark>, as the production</u> of such technology <u>through capitalist manufacturing infrastructure <strong>only perpetuates environmental harm</strong>.</u> Furthermore, <u>subsidizing and incentivizing renewable energy stops far short of actually combating the fossil fuel industry</u> driving the current climate crisis. The technocratic market solutions offered in the Green New Deal fail to adequately combat the driving factors of climate change. What is worse, they rely on a violent imperialist global system in order to produce their technological solutions. The <u>development of <mark>high-tech</mark> energy <mark>infrastructure</mark> and </u>the development of <u>low</u> or zero <u>emission transportation <mark>requires</u></mark> the import of <u>raw material and rare earth minerals which the United States can only access because of the imperial division of the Global South.</u> This imperial division of the world <u>requires <mark>constant <strong>militarism</strong> from</u></mark> the <u>imperial core nations</u>, and as Lenin demonstrates in Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism, <u>facilitates <strong>constant <mark>warfare</strong> as imperial states compete for <strong>spheres of influence</strong> in order to facilitate cheap resource extraction</u></mark>. <u>The US military</u>, one of many imperialist forces, <u>is the single largest user of petroleum</u>, and <u>one of its main functions is to ensure oil access for the United States.</u> Without challenging this imperialist division of the world and the role of the United States military in upholding it, the Green New Deal fails even further to challenge the underlying causes of climate change. Even with the failed promises of the Green New Deal itself, it is unlikely that this tepid market proposal will pass at all. Nancy Pelosi and other lead Democrats have largely condemned it and consider it “impractical” and “unfeasible.” This dismissal is crucial because it reveals the total inability of capitalism to resolve this crisis. If the center-left party in the heart of the imperial core sees even milquetoast capitalist reforms as a step too far, we ought to have very little hope that a reformist solution will present itself within the ever shrinking 12 year time frame. There are times for delicacy and there are times for bluntness, and we are in the latter. To put things bluntly: the <u>capitalists are not going to save us, and <strong><mark>if we don’t find a way to save ourselves, the collapse of human civilization is a real possibility.</u></strong></mark> The pressing question we now face is: <u><strong>how are we going to save ourselves? </u></strong>Revolution and Dual Power If capitalism will not be able to resolve the current encroaching climate crisis, <u>we must find a way to organize outside the confines of capitalist institutions, towards the end of overthrowing capitalism</u>. If the Democratic Socialists of America backed candidates cannot offer real anti-capitalist solutions through the capitalist state, we should be skeptical of the possibility for any socialist organization doing so. <u>The DSA is far larger and</u> far more <u>well funded than any</u> of the <u>other socialist organizations </u>in the United States, <u>and</u> they have <u>failed to produce anything more revolutionary than the Green New Deal</u>. <u>We have to abandon the idea that electoral strategy will be sufficient to resolve the underlying causes of this crisis within 12 years. </u>While many radicals call for revolution instead of reform, the <u>reformists</u> often <u>raise the same response</u>: revolution is well and good, but <u>what are you going to do in the mean time?</u> In many ways this question is fair. The socialist left in the United States today is not ready for revolutionary action, and a mass base does not exist to back the various organizations which might undertake such a struggle. Revolutionaries must concede that <u>we have much work to be done before a revolutionary strategy can be enacted.</u> This is a hard truth, but it is true. Much of <u>the left has sought to ignore this truth by embracing adventurism and violent protest theatrics, in the</u> vain <u>hope of sparking</u> revolutionary <u>momentum</u> which does not currently exist. <u>If this is the core strategy of the socialist left, <strong>we will accomplish nothing in the next 12 years</u></strong>. Such approaches are as useless as the opportunist reforms pushed by the social democrats. Our task in these 12 years is not simply to arm ourselves and hope that magically the masses will wake up prepared for revolution and willing to put their trust in our small ideological cadres. <u><mark>We must</u></mark> instead, <u><mark>build a movement</u></mark>, and <u><mark>with</u></mark> it we must build <u><mark>infrastructure which can survive revolution</mark> and provide a framework for socialist development</u>. <u>Dual power is tooled towards this project best. <strong><mark>The Marxist Center</strong></mark> network <mark>has done</mark> an impressive amount of <mark>work developing socialist institutions</mark> across the US</u>, largely <u><mark>through <strong>tenants organizing</strong></mark> <mark>and <strong>serve the people programs</u></strong>.</mark> The <u>left wing factions within the DSA</u> itself have also begun to <u>develop <strong>mutual aid programs</strong> that could be useful for dual power strategy</u>. <u>At the same time, <strong><mark>mutual aid is not enough</strong></mark>. <mark>We cannot</mark> <mark>simply</mark> build these institutions as a reform to <mark>make capitalism more survivable</mark>.</u> Rather, <u><mark>we must make these institutions part of a <strong>broader revolutionary movement</strong></mark> and</u> <u>they ought to function as a material prefiguration to a socialist society and economy</u>. The institutions we build as <u>dual power outside the capitalist state today ought to be structured towards revolutionary ends, such that they will someday function as the early institutions of a revolutionary socialist society. </u>To accomplish this goal, <u><mark>we</mark> <mark>cannot simply declare</mark> these <mark>institutions to be revolutionary</u></mark>. Rather <u><strong><mark>they have to be linked together through an</mark> actual <mark>revolutionary movement working towards revolutionary ends</u></strong></mark>. <u>This means that dual power institutions cannot exist as ends in and of themselves, nor can abstract notions of mutual aid cannot be conceptualized as an end in itself</u>. <u><mark>The</mark> explicit <mark>purpose</mark> of these institutions <mark>has to be to <strong>radicalize</strong> the masses through meeting </mark>their needs, and providing an infrastructure for a socialist movement to meet <strong><mark>the needs of</strong></mark> its members and <mark>the <strong>communities</strong> in which it operates</mark>. <strong><mark>Revolutionary institutions</strong></mark> that <strong><mark>can provide food, housing</strong></mark>, <mark>and</mark> other needs for a revolutionary movement will be crucial for <strong><mark>build</strong></mark>ing <strong><mark>a base</u></strong></mark> among the masses <u>and</u> for <u>constructing</u> the <u>beginnings of a socialist infrastructure for when we </u>eventually <u>engage in revolutionary struggle.</u> </p>

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Xi’s regime is stable now, but its success depends on strong growth and private sector development.

Mitter and Johnson 21

Mitter and Johnson 21 [Rana Mitter and Elsbeth Johnson, Rana Mitter is a professor of the history and politics of modern China at Oxford. Elsbeth Johnson, formerly the strategy director for Prudential PLC’s Asian business, is a senior lecturer at MIT’s Sloan School of Management and the founder of SystemShift, a consulting firm. May-June 2021, "What the West Gets Wrong About China," Harvard Business Review, https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china accessed 12/14/21] Adam

In China, however, growth has come in the context of stable communist rule, democracy and growth are not inevitably mutually dependent many Chinese believe that the country’s recent economic achievements large-scale poverty reduction, huge infrastructure investment, and development as a world-class tech innovator aggressive handling of Covid-19—in sharp contrast to that of many Western countries with higher death rates and later, less-stringent lockdowns—has, if anything, reinforced that view. China has also defied predictions that its authoritarianism would inhibit its capacity to innovate. It is a global leader in AI, biotech, and space exploration. much of the technological progress has come from a highly innovative and well-funded military that has invested heavily in China’s burgeoning new industries. But in China the consumer applications have come faster, making more obvious the link between government investment and products and services that benefit individuals. ordinary Chinese people see Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Huawei, and TikTok as sources of national pride—international vanguards of Chinese success—rather than simply sources of jobs or GDP, as they might be viewed in the West. 95% satisfaction with the Beijing government among Chinese citizens. Most ordinary people we meet don’t feel that the authoritarian state is solely oppressive,

In China growth has come in the context of stable rule poverty reduction infrastructure investment world-class tech innovator global leader in space exploration technological progress consumer applications come faster link between government investment and products Chinese people see companies as sources of national pride vanguards of Chinese success

In China, however, growth has come in the context of stable communist rule, suggesting that democracy and growth are not inevitably mutually dependent. In fact, many Chinese believe that the country’s recent economic achievements—large-scale poverty reduction, huge infrastructure investment, and development as a world-class tech innovator—have come about because of, not despite, China’s authoritarian form of government. Its aggressive handling of Covid-19—in sharp contrast to that of many Western countries with higher death rates and later, less-stringent lockdowns—has, if anything, reinforced that view. China has also defied predictions that its authoritarianism would inhibit its capacity to innovate. It is a global leader in AI, biotech, and space exploration. Some of its technological successes have been driven by market forces: People wanted to buy goods or communicate more easily, and the likes of Alibaba and Tencent have helped them do just that. But much of the technological progress has come from a highly innovative and well-funded military that has invested heavily in China’s burgeoning new industries. This, of course, mirrors the role of U.S. defense and intelligence spending in the development of Silicon Valley. But in China the consumer applications have come faster, making more obvious the link between government investment and products and services that benefit individuals. That’s why ordinary Chinese people see Chinese companies such as Alibaba, Huawei, and TikTok as sources of national pride—international vanguards of Chinese success—rather than simply sources of jobs or GDP, as they might be viewed in the West. Thus July 2020 polling data from the Ash Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government revealed 95% satisfaction with the Beijing government among Chinese citizens. Our own experiences on the ground in China confirm this. Most ordinary people we meet don’t feel that the authoritarian state is solely oppressive, although it can be that; for them it also provides opportunity. A cleaner in Chongqing now owns several apartments because the CCP reformed property laws. A Shanghai journalist is paid by her state-controlled magazine to fly around the world for stories on global lifestyle trends. A young student in Nanjing can study propulsion physics at Beijing’s Tsinghua University thanks to social mobility and the party’s significant investment in scientific research.

<h4>Xi’s regime is stable now, but its success depends on strong growth and private sector development.</h4><p><strong>Mitter and Johnson 21</strong> [Rana Mitter and Elsbeth Johnson, Rana Mitter is a professor of the history and politics of modern China at Oxford. Elsbeth Johnson, formerly the strategy director for Prudential PLC’s Asian business, is a senior lecturer at MIT’s Sloan School of Management and the founder of SystemShift, a consulting firm. May-June 2021, "What the West Gets Wrong About China," Harvard Business Review, https://hbr.org/2021/05/what-the-west-gets-wrong-about-china accessed 12/14/21<u>] Adam</p><p><mark>In China</mark>, however, <mark>growth</mark> <mark>has come in the context of</mark> <mark>stable</mark> communist <mark>rule</mark>,</u> suggesting that <u>democracy and growth are not inevitably mutually dependent</u>. In fact, <u>many Chinese believe that the country’s recent economic achievements</u>—<u>large-scale <mark>poverty reduction</mark>, huge <mark>infrastructure investment</mark>, and development as a <mark>world-class</mark> <mark>tech innovator</u></mark>—have come about because of, not despite, China’s authoritarian form of government. Its <u>aggressive handling of Covid-19—in sharp contrast to that of many Western countries with higher death rates and later, less-stringent lockdowns—has, if anything, reinforced that view.</p><p>China has also defied predictions that its authoritarianism would inhibit its capacity to innovate.</u> <u>It is a <mark>global leader in</mark> AI, biotech, and <mark>space exploration</mark>. </u>Some of its technological successes have been driven by market forces: People wanted to buy goods or communicate more easily, and the likes of Alibaba and Tencent have helped them do just that. But <u>much of the <mark>technological progress</mark> has come from a highly innovative and well-funded military that has invested heavily in China’s burgeoning new industries.</u> This, of course, mirrors the role of U.S. defense and intelligence spending in the development of Silicon Valley. <u>But in China the <mark>consumer applications</mark> have <mark>come faster</mark>, making more obvious the <mark>link between government investment and</mark> <mark>products</mark> and services that benefit individuals.</u> That’s why <u>ordinary <mark>Chinese people see</mark> Chinese <mark>companies</mark> such as Alibaba, Huawei, and TikTok <mark>as sources of national pride</mark>—international <mark>vanguards of Chinese success</mark>—rather than simply sources of jobs or GDP, as they might be viewed in the West.</p><p></u>Thus July 2020 polling data from the Ash Center at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government revealed <u>95% satisfaction with the Beijing government among Chinese citizens.</u> Our own experiences on the ground in China confirm this. <u>Most ordinary people we meet don’t feel that the authoritarian state is solely oppressive, </u>although it can be that; for them it also provides opportunity. A cleaner in Chongqing now owns several apartments because the CCP reformed property laws. A Shanghai journalist is paid by her state-controlled magazine to fly around the world for stories on global lifestyle trends. A young student in Nanjing can study propulsion physics at Beijing’s Tsinghua University thanks to social mobility and the party’s significant investment in scientific research.</p>

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A] Debate resource inequities---stealing cards is the only way to level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs who can’t bypass paywalled articles.

Louden 10, [Allan D. Louden, professor of Communication at Wake Forest (“Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century” Wake Forest National Debate Conference. IDEA, 2010)]

Louden 10, [Allan D. Louden, professor of Communication at Wake Forest (“Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century” Wake Forest National Debate Conference. IDEA, 2010)]

digital resources are making research and networking increasingly accessible New initiatives in the field of open-source debate make evidence sharing, such as the Open Caselist, a powerful tool for new programs to engage and compete against established teams the winners of the NDT tend to be the schools with the largest coaching staffs, but the increased distribution and free sharing of evidence and resources have made smaller debate programs increasingly capable of competing against larger institutions increased resource sharing is one example of dramatic changes occurring in the community that are capable of opening the doors for new participation in debate

New initiatives in open-source make evidence sharing a powerful tool for new programs to engage and compete against established teams increased resource sharing is capable of opening the doors for new participation in debate

Groups interested in engaging in competitive National Debate Tournament (NDT)-Cross Examination Debate Association (CEDA)-style policy debate are entering an exciting time in the debate community where digital resources are making research and networking increasingly accessible. Those developing programs should be encouraged to choose their own topics and resolutions, but they should also make use of the massive resources available by focusing on the official NDT-CEDA resolution. New initiatives in the field of open-source debate make evidence sharing, such as the Open Caselist, a powerful tool for new programs to engage and compete against established teams. It is no coincidence that the winners of the NDT tend to be the schools with the largest coaching staffs, but the increased distribution and free sharing of evidence and resources have made smaller debate programs increasingly capable of competing against larger institutions. We are now seeing the beginnings of increased resource sharing, with multiple initiatives focusing on regional evidence sharing for groups of developing debate programs. This is one example of dramatic changes occurring in the community that are capable of opening the doors for new participation in debate. Regardless of outside influence, such as an organized campaign by preexisting debate organizations to increase resource distribution, students are independently capable of establishing the foundations for a larger competitive program. The following suggestions are a nonlinear set of options available to students who wish to establish a struc-tured and coached debate program, and eventually developing the capability to maintain multiple professional teaching positions, such as those discussed earlier in the chapter.

<h4>A] <u>Debate resource inequities</u>---stealing cards is the only way to level the playing field for students such as novices in under-privileged programs who can’t bypass paywalled articles. </h4><p><strong>Louden 10, [Allan D. Louden, professor of Communication at Wake Forest (“Navigating Opportunity: Policy Debate in the 21st Century” Wake Forest National Debate Conference. IDEA, 2010)]</p><p></strong>Groups interested in engaging in competitive National Debate Tournament (NDT)-Cross Examination Debate Association (CEDA)-style policy debate are entering an exciting time in the debate community where <u><strong>digital resources are making research and networking increasingly accessible</u></strong>. Those developing programs should be encouraged to choose their own topics and resolutions, but they should also make use of the massive resources available by focusing on the official NDT-CEDA resolution. <u><strong><mark>New initiatives in</mark> the field of <mark>open-source</mark> debate <mark>make evidence sharing</mark>, such as the Open Caselist, <mark>a powerful tool for new programs to engage and compete against established teams</u></strong></mark>. It is no coincidence that <u><strong>the winners of the NDT tend to be the schools with the largest coaching staffs, but the increased distribution and free sharing of evidence and resources have made smaller debate programs increasingly capable of competing against larger institutions</u></strong>. We are now seeing the beginnings of <u><strong><mark>increased resource sharing</u></strong></mark>, with multiple initiatives focusing on regional evidence sharing for groups of developing debate programs. This <u><strong><mark>is</mark> one example of dramatic changes occurring in the community that are <mark>capable of opening the doors for new participation in debate</u></strong></mark>. Regardless of outside influence, such as an organized campaign by preexisting debate organizations to increase resource distribution, students are independently capable of establishing the foundations for a larger competitive program. The following suggestions are a nonlinear set of options available to students who wish to establish a struc-tured and coached debate program, and eventually developing the capability to maintain multiple professional teaching positions, such as those discussed earlier in the chapter.<strong> </p></strong>

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The Golden State Academy JaPa

[email protected] fb is Jayden Park (i need friends) Also just text me for my email ig

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Physicalism is true and is side constraint on ethics.

Papineau 08 [David, "Naturalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism/>.

Papineau 08 [David, "Naturalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism/>.

conservation of energy imply deterministic laws: research, in nerve cells, gave no indication of effects that cannot be explained physical forces that occur outside This led to ‘causal closure’ all effects can be accounted for by physical causes mental must be physical , if they are to produce effects. naturalism integrate[s] the mental with causal unfolding of the spatiotemporal If moral facts cannot influence the physical world, then hard we can have knowledge of them.

conservation of energy imply deterministic laws research in nerve cells gave no indication of effects that cannot be explained physical forces This causal closure’ mental must be physical if they are to produce effects If moral facts cannot influence the physical world hard knowledge of them.

In the middle of the nineteenth century the conservation of kinetic plus potential energy came to be accepted as a basic principle of physics (Elkana 1974). In itself this does not rule out distinct mental or vital forces, for there is no reason why such forces should not be ‘conservative’, operating in such a way as to compensate losses of kinetic energy by gains in potential energy and vice versa. (The term ‘nervous energy’ is a relic of the widespread late nineteenth-century assumption that mental processes store up a species of potential energy that is then released in action.) However, the conservation of energy does imply that any such special forces must be governed by strict deterministic laws: if mental or vital forces arose spontaneously, then there would be nothing to ensure that they never led to energy increases. During the course of the twentieth century received scientific opinion became even more restrictive about possible causes of physical effects, and came to reject sui generis mental or vital causes, even of a law-governed and predictable kind. Detailed physiological research, especially into nerve cells, gave no indication of any physical effects that cannot be explained in terms of basic physical forces that also occur outside living bodies. By the middle of the twentieth century, belief in sui generis mental or vital forces had become a minority view. This led to the widespread acceptance of the doctrine now known as the ‘causal closure’ or the ‘causal completeness’ of the physical realm, according to which all physical effects can be accounted for by basic physical causes (where ‘physical’ can be understood as referring to some list of fundamental forces) non-physical causes of physical effects. As a result, the default philosophical view was a non-naturalist interactive pluralism which recognized a wide range of such non-physical influences, including spontaneous mental influences (or ‘determinations of the soul’ as they would then have been called). The nineteenth-century discovery of the conservation of energy continued to allow that sui generis non-physical forces can interact with the physical world, but required that they be governed by strict force laws. This gave rise to an initial wave of naturalist doctrines around the beginning of the twentieth century. Sui generis mental forces were still widely accepted, but an extensive philosophical debate about the significance of the conservation of energy led to a widespread recognition that any such mental forces would need to be law-governed and thus amenable to scientific investigation along with more familiar physical forces.[5] By the middle of the twentieth century, the acceptance of the casual closure of the physical realm led to even stronger naturalist views. The causal closure thesis implies that any mental and biological causes must themselves be physically constituted, if they are to produce physical effects. It thus gives rise to a particularly strong form of ontological naturalism, namely the physicalist doctrine that any state that has physical effects must itself be physical. From the 1950s onwards, philosophers began to formulate arguments for ontological physicalism. Some of these arguments appealed explicitly to the causal closure of the physical realm (Feigl 1958, Oppenheim and Putnam 1958). In other cases, the reliance on causal closure lay below the surface. However, it is not hard to see that even in these latter cases the causal closure thesis played a crucial role. Thus, for example, consider J.J.C. Smart's (1958) thought that we should identify mental states with brain states, for otherwise those mental states would be "nomological danglers" which play no role in the explanation of behaviour. Or take David Lewis's (1966) and David Armstrong's (1968) argument that, since mental states are picked out by their causal roles, and since we know that physical states play these roles, mental states must be identical with those physical states. Again, consider Donald Davidson's (1970) argument that, since the only laws governing behaviour are those connecting behaviour with physical antecedents, mental events can only be causes of behaviour if they are identical with those physical antecedents. At first sight, it may not be obvious that these arguments require the causal closure thesis. But a moment's thought will show that none of these arguments would remain cogent if the closure thesis were not true, and that some physical effects (the movement of matter in arms, perhaps, or the firings of the motor neurones which instigate those movements) were not determined by prior physical causes at all, but by sui generis mental causes. Sometimes it is suggested that the indeterminism of modern quantum mechanics creates room for sui generis non-physical causes to influence the physical world. However, even if quantum mechanics implies that some physical effects are themselves undetermined, it provides no reason to doubt a quantum version of the causal closure thesis, to the effect that the chances of those effects are fully fixed by prior physical circumstances. And this alone is enough to rule out sui generis non-physical causes. For such sui generis causes, if they are to be genuinely efficiacious, must presumably make an independent difference to the chances of physical effects, and this in itself would be inconsistent with the quantum causal closure claim that such chances are already fixed by prior physical circumstances. Once more, it seems that anything that makes a difference to the physical realm must itself be physical. Even if it is agreed that anything with physical effects must in some sense be physical, there is plenty of room to debate exactly what ontologically naturalist doctrines follow. The causal closure thesis says that (the chance of) every physical effect is fixed by a fully physical prior history. So, to avoid an unacceptable proliferation of causes, any prima facie non-physical cause of a physical effect will need to be included in that physical history. But what exactly does this require? The contemporary literature offers a wide range of answers to this question. In part the issue hinges on the ontological status of causes. Some philosophers think of causes as particular events, considered in abstraction from any properties they may possess (Davidson 1980). Given this view of causation, a mental or other apparently non-physical cause will be the same as some physical cause as long as it is constituted by the same particular (or ‘token’) event. For example, a given feeling and a given brain event will count as the same cause as long as they are constituted by the same token event. However, it is widely agreed that this kind of ‘token identity’ on its own fails to ensure that prima facie non-physical causes can make any real difference to physical effects. To see why, note that token identity is a very weak doctrine: it does not imply any relationship at all between the properties involved in the physical and non-physical cause; it is enough that the same particular entity should possess both these properties. Compare the way in which an apple's shape and colour are both possessed by the same particular thing, namely that apple. It seems wrong to conclude on this account that the apple's colour causes what its shape causes. Similarly, it seems unwarranted to conclude that someone's feelings cause what that person's neuronal discharges cause, simply on the grounds that these are both aspects of the same particular event. This could be true, and yet the mental property of the event could be entirely irrelevant to any subsequent physical effects. Token identity on its own thus seems to leave it open that the mental and other prima facie non-physical properties are ‘epiphenomenal’, exerting no real influence on effects that are already fixed by physical processes (Honderich 1982, Yalowitz 2006 Section 6, Robb and Heil 2005 Section 5). These considerations argue that causation depends on properties as well as particulars. There are various accounts of causation that respect this requirement, the differences between which do not matter for present purposes. The important point is that, if mental and other prima facie non-physical causes are to be equated with physical causes, [any] non-physical properties must somehow be constituted by physical properties. If your anger is to cause what your brain state causes, the property of being angry cannot be ontologically independent of the relevant brain properties. So much is agreed by nearly all contemporary naturalists. At this point, however, consensus ends. One school holds that epiphenomenalism can only be avoided by type-identity, the strict identity of the relevant prima facie non-physical properties with physical properties. On the other side stand ‘non-reductive’ physicalists, who hold that the causal efficacy of non-physical properties will be respected as long as they are ‘realized by’ physical properties, even if they are not reductively identified with them. Type-identity is the most obvious way to ensure that non-physical and physical causes coincide: if exactly the same particulars and properties comprise a non-physical and a physical cause, the two causes will certainly themselves be fully identical. Still, type-identity is a very strong doctrine. Type identity about thoughts, for example, would imply that the property of thinking about the square root of two is identical with some physical property. And this seems highly implausible. Even if all human beings with this thought must be distinguished by some common physical property of their brains—which itself seems highly unlikely—there remains the argument that other life-forms, or intelligent androids, will also be able to think about the square root of two, even though their brains may share no significant physical properties with ours (cf. Bickle 2006). This ‘variable realization’ argument has led many philosophers to seek an alternative way of reconciling the efficacy of non-physical causes with the causal closure thesis, one which does not require the strict identity of non-physical and physical properties. The general idea of this ‘non-reductive physicalism’ is to allow that a given non-physical property can be ‘realized’ by different physical properties in different cases. There are various ways of filling out this idea. A common feature is the requirement that non-physical properties should metaphysically supervene on physical properties, in the sense that any two beings who share all physical properties will necessarily share the same non-physical properties, even though the physical properties which so realize the non-physical ones can be different in different beings. This arguably ensures that nothing more is required for any specific instantiation of a non-physical property than its physical realization—even God could not have created your brain states without thereby creating your feelings—yet avoids any reductive identification of non-physical properties with physical ones. (This is a rough sketch of the supervenience formulation of physicalism. For more see Stoljar 2001 Sections 2 and 3.) Some philosophers object that non-reductive physicalism does not in fact satisfy the original motivation for physicalism, since it fails to reconcile the efficacy of non-physical causes with the causal closure thesis (Kim 1993. Robb and Heil 2005 Section 6). According to non-reductive physicalism, prima facie non-physical properties are not type-identical with any strictly physical properties, even though they supervene on them. However, if causes are in some way property-involving, this then seems to imply that any prima facie non-physical cause will be distinct from any physical cause. Opponents of non-reductive physicalism object that this gives us an unacceptable proliferation of causes for the physical effects of non-physical causes—both the physical cause implied by the causal closure thesis and the distinct non-physical cause. In response, advocates of non-reductive physicalism respond that there is nothing wrong with such an apparent duplication of causes if it is also specified that the latter metaphysically supervene on the former. The issue here hinges on the acceptability of different kinds of overdetermination (Bennett 2003). All can agree that it would be absurd if the physical effects of non-physical causes always had two completely independent causes. This much was assumed by the original causal argument for physicalism, which reasoned that no sui generis non-physical state of affairs can cause some effect that already has a full physical cause. However, even if ‘strong overdetermination’ by two ontologically independent causes is so ruled out, this does not necessarily preclude ‘weak overdetermination’ by both a physical cause and a metaphysically supervenient non-physical cause. Advocates of non-reductive physicalism argue that this kind of overdetermination is benign, on the grounds that the two causes are not ontologically distinct—the non-physical cause isn't genuinely additional to the physical cause (nothing more is needed for your feelings than your brain states). There is room to query whether non-reductive physicalism amounts to a substantial form of naturalism. After all, the requirement that some category of properties metaphysically supervenes on physical properties is not a strong one. A very wide range of properties would seem intuitively to satisfy this requirement, including moral and aesthetic properties, along with any mental, biological, and social properties. (Can two physically identical things be different with respect to wickedness or beauty?) Supervenience on the physical realm is thus a far weaker requirement than that some property should enter into natural laws, say, or be analysable by the methods of the natural sciences. Indeed some philosophers are explicitly anti-naturalist about categories that they allow to supervene on the physical—we need only think of G.E. Moore on moral properties, or Donald Davidson and his followers on mental properties (Moore 1903, Davidson 1980). In response, those of naturalist sympathies are likely to point out that any viable response to the argument from causal closure will require more than metaphysical supervenience alone (Horgan 1993, Wilson 1999). Supervenience is at least necessary, if non-reductive physicalists are to avoid the absurdity of strong overdetermination. But something more than mere supervenience is arguably needed if non-reductive physicalists are to make good their claim that non-physical states cause the physical effects that their realizers cause. Metaphysical supervenience alone does not ensure this. (Suppose ricketiness, in a car, is defined as the property of having some loose part. Then ricketiness will supervene on physical properties. In a given car, it may be realized by a disconnected wire between ignition and starter motor. This disconnected wire will cause this car not to start. But it doesn't follow that this car's then not starting will be caused by its property of ricketiness. Most rickety cars start perfectly well.) So it looks as if the causal closure argument requires not only that non-physical properties metaphysically supervene on physical properties, but that they be natural in some stronger sense, so as to qualify as causes of those properties' effects. It is a much-discussed issue how this demand can be satisfied. Some philosophers seek to meet it by offering a further account of the nature of the relevant non-physical properties, for example, that they are second-order role properties whose presence is constituted by some first-order property with a specified causal role (Levin 2004). Others suggest that the crucial feature is how these properties feature in certain laws (Fodor 1974) or alternatively the degree of their explanatory relevance to physical effects (Yablo 1992). And reductive physicalists will insist that the demand can only be met by type-identifying prima-facie non-physical properties with physical properties after all.[6] There is no agreed view on the requirements for prima facie non-physical properties to have physical effects. This difficult issue hinges, inter alia, on the nature of the causal relation itself, and it would take us too far afield to pursue it further here. For the purpose of this entry, we need only note that the causal closure argument seems to require that properties with physical effects must be ‘natural’ in some sense that is stronger than metaphysical supervenience on physical properties. Beyond that, we can leave it open exactly what this extra strength requires. Some philosophers hold that mental states escape the causal argument, on the grounds that mental states cause actions rather than any physical effects. Actions are not part of the subject matter of the physical sciences, and so a fortiori not the kinds of effects guaranteed to have physical causes by any casual closure thesis. So there is no reason, according to this line of thought, to suppose that the status of mental states as causes of actions is threatened by physics, nor therefore any reason to think that mental states must in some sense be realized by physical states (Hornsby 1997, Sturgeon 1998). The obvious problem with this line of argument is that actions aren't the only effects of mental states. On occasion mental states also cause unequivocally physical effects. Fast Eddie Felsen's desire to move a pool ball in a certain direction will characteristically have just that effect. And now the causal closure argument bites once more. The snooker ball's motion has a purely physical cause, by the causal closure thesis. This will pre-empt Fast Eddie's desire as a cause of that motion, unless that desire is in some sense physically realized (Balog 1999, Witmer 2000). Other philosophers have a different reason for saying that mental states, or more particularly conscious mental states, don't have physical effects. They think that there are strong independent arguments to show that conscious states can't possibly supervene metaphysically on physical states. Putting this together with the closure claim that physical effects always have physical causes, and abjuring the idea that the physical effects of conscious causes are strongly overdetermined by both a physical cause and an ontologically independent conscious cause, they conclude that conscious states must be ‘epiphenomenal’, lacking any power to causally influence the physical realm (Jackson 1981; 1985. See also Chalmers 1995).[7] The rejection of physicalism about conscious properties certainly has the backing of intuition. (Don't zombies—beings who are physically exactly like humans but have no conscious life—seem intuitively possible?) However, whether this intuition can be parlayed into a sound argument is a highly controversial issue, and one that lies beyond the scope of this entry. A majority of contemporary philosophers probably hold that physicalism can resist these arguments. But a significant minority take the other side.[8] If the majority are right, and physicalism about conscious states is not ruled out by independent arguments, then physicalism seems clearly preferable to epiphenomenalism. In itself, epiphenomenalism is not an attractive position. It requires us to suppose that conscious states, even though they are caused by processes in the physical world, have no effects on that world. This is a very odd kind of causal structure. Nature displays no other examples of such one-way causal intercourse between realms. By contrast, a physicalist naturalism about conscious states will integrate[s] the mental realm with the causal unfolding of the spatiotemporal world in an entirely familiar way. Given this, general principles of theory choice would seem to argue strongly for physicalism over epiphenomenalism.[9] If we focus on this last point, we may start wondering why the causal closure thesis is so important. If general principles of theory choice can justify physicalism, why bring in all the complications associated with causal closure? The answer is that causal closure is needed to rule out interactionist dualism. General principles of theory choice may dismiss epiphenomenalism in favour of physicalism, but they do not similarly discredit interactionist dualism. As the brief historical sketch earlier will have made clear, interactionist dualism offers a perfectly straightforward theoretical option requiring no commitment to any bizarre causal structures. Certainly the historical norm has been to regard it as the default account of the causal role of the mental realm.[10] Given this, arguments from theoretical simplicity cut no ice against interactionist dualism. Rather, the case against interactionist dualism hinges crucially on the empirical thesis that all physical effects already have physical causes. It is specifically this claim that makes it difficult to see how dualist states can make a causal difference to the physical world. It is sometimes suggested that physicalism about the mind can be vindicated by an ‘inference to the best explanation’. The thought here is that there are many well-established synchronic correlations between mental states and brain states, and that physicalism is a ‘better explanation’ of these correlations than epiphenomenalism (Hill 1991, Hill and McLaughlin 1999). From the perspective outlined here, this starts the argument in the middle rather than the beginning, by simply assuming the relevant mind-brain correlations. This assumption of pervasive synchronic mind-brain correlations is only plausible if interactionist dualism has already been ruled out. After all, if we believed interactionist dualism, then we wouldn't think dualist mental states needed any help from synchronic neural correlates to produce physical effects. And it is implausible to suppose that we have direct empirical evidence, prior to the rejection of interactive dualism, for pervasive mind-brain correlations, given the paucity of any explicit examples of well-established neural correlates for specific mental states. Rather our rationale for believing in such correlations must be that the causal closure of the physical realm eliminates interactive dualism, whence we infer that mental states can only systematically precede physical effects if they are correlated with the physical causes of those effects. G.E. Moore's famous ‘open question’ argument is designed to show that moral facts cannot possibly be identical to natural facts. Suppose the natural properties of some situation are completely specified. It will always remain an open question, argued Moore, whether that situation is morally good or bad. (Moore 1903.) Moore took this argument to show that moral facts comprise a distinct species of non-natural fact. However, any such non-naturalist view of morality faces immediate difficulties, deriving ultimately from the kind of causal closure thesis discussed above. If all physical effects are due to a limited range of natural causes, and if moral facts lie outside this range, then it follow that moral facts can never make any difference to what happens in the physical world (Harman, 1986). At first sight this may seem tolerable (perhaps moral facts indeed don't have any physical effects). But it has very awkward epistemological consequences. For beings like us, knowledge of the spatiotemporal world is mediated by physical processes involving our sense organs and cognitive systems. If moral facts cannot influence the physical world, then it is hard to see how we can have any knowledge of them.

<h4><strong>Physicalism is true and is side constraint on ethics. </h4><p>Papineau 08 <u><mark>[David, "Naturalism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/naturalism/>.</p><p></u></strong></mark>In the middle of the nineteenth century the conservation of kinetic plus potential energy came to be accepted as a basic principle of physics (Elkana 1974). In itself this does not rule out distinct mental or vital forces, for there is no reason why such forces should not be ‘conservative’, operating in such a way as to compensate losses of kinetic energy by gains in potential energy and vice versa. (The term ‘nervous energy’ is a relic of the widespread late nineteenth-century assumption that mental processes store up a species of potential energy that is then released in action.) However, the<u><strong> <mark>conservation of energy</mark> </u></strong>does<u><strong> <mark>imply</u></strong></mark> that any such special forces must be governed by strict <u><strong><mark>deterministic laws</mark>: </u></strong>if mental or vital forces arose spontaneously, then there would be nothing to ensure that they never led to energy increases. During the course of the twentieth century received scientific opinion became even more restrictive about possible causes of physical effects, and came to reject sui generis mental or vital causes, even of a law-governed and predictable kind. Detailed physiological <u><strong><mark>research</mark>, </u></strong>especially <u><strong><mark>in</u></strong></mark>to<u><strong> <mark>nerve cells</mark>, <mark>gave no indication of</mark> </u></strong>any<u><strong> </u></strong>physical<u><strong> <mark>effects that cannot be explained </mark> </u></strong>in terms of basic<u><strong> <mark>physical forces </mark>that </u></strong>also <u><strong>occur outside </u></strong>living bodies. By the middle of the twentieth century, belief in sui generis mental or vital forces had become a minority view.<u><strong> <mark>This </mark>led to </u></strong>the widespread acceptance of the doctrine now known as the<u><strong> ‘<mark>causal closure’</mark> </u></strong>or the ‘causal completeness’ of the physical realm, according to which<u><strong> all</u></strong> physical <u><strong>effects</u></strong> <u><strong>can be accounted for by</u></strong> basic<u><strong> physical causes</u></strong> (where ‘physical’ can be understood as referring to some list of fundamental forces) non-physical causes of physical effects. As a result, the default philosophical view was a non-naturalist interactive pluralism which recognized a wide range of such non-physical influences, including spontaneous mental influences (or ‘determinations of the soul’ as they would then have been called). The nineteenth-century discovery of the conservation of energy continued to allow that sui generis non-physical forces can interact with the physical world, but required that they be governed by strict force laws. This gave rise to an initial wave of naturalist doctrines around the beginning of the twentieth century. Sui generis mental forces were still widely accepted, but an extensive philosophical debate about the significance of the conservation of energy led to a widespread recognition that any such mental forces would need to be law-governed and thus amenable to scientific investigation along with more familiar physical forces.[5] By the middle of the twentieth century, the acceptance of the casual closure of the physical realm led to even stronger naturalist views. The causal closure thesis implies that any<u><strong> <mark>mental</mark> </u></strong>and biological causes<u><strong> <mark>must</mark> </u></strong>themselves<u><strong> <mark>be physical</u></strong></mark>ly constituted<u><strong>, <mark>if they are to produce</mark> </u></strong>physical<u><strong> <mark>effects</mark>. </u></strong>It thus gives rise to a particularly strong form of<u><strong> </u></strong>ontological naturalism, namely the physicalist doctrine that any state that has physical effects must itself be physical. From the 1950s onwards, philosophers began to formulate arguments for ontological physicalism. Some of these arguments appealed explicitly to the causal closure of the physical realm (Feigl 1958, Oppenheim and Putnam 1958). In other cases, the reliance on causal closure lay below the surface. However, it is not hard to see that even in these latter cases the causal closure thesis played a crucial role. Thus, for example, consider J.J.C. Smart's (1958) thought that we should identify mental states with brain states, for otherwise those mental states would be "nomological danglers" which play no role in the explanation of behaviour. Or take David Lewis's (1966) and David Armstrong's (1968) argument that, since mental states are picked out by their causal roles, and since we know that physical states play these roles, mental states must be identical with those physical states. Again, consider Donald Davidson's (1970) argument that, since the only laws governing behaviour are those connecting behaviour with physical antecedents, mental events can only be causes of behaviour if they are identical with those physical antecedents. At first sight, it may not be obvious that these arguments require the causal closure thesis. But a moment's thought will show that none of these arguments would remain cogent if the closure thesis were not true, and that some physical effects (the movement of matter in arms, perhaps, or the firings of the motor neurones which instigate those movements) were not determined by prior physical causes at all, but by sui generis mental causes. Sometimes it is suggested that the indeterminism of modern quantum mechanics creates room for sui generis non-physical causes to influence the physical world. However, even if quantum mechanics implies that some physical effects are themselves undetermined, it provides no reason to doubt a quantum version of the causal closure thesis, to the effect that the chances of those effects are fully fixed by prior physical circumstances. And this alone is enough to rule out sui generis non-physical causes. For such sui generis causes, if they are to be genuinely efficiacious, must presumably make an independent difference to the chances of physical effects, and this in itself would be inconsistent with the quantum causal closure claim that such chances are already fixed by prior physical circumstances. Once more, it seems that anything that makes a difference to the physical realm must itself be physical. Even if it is agreed that anything with physical effects must in some sense be physical, there is plenty of room to debate exactly what ontologically naturalist doctrines follow. The causal closure thesis says that (the chance of) every physical effect is fixed by a fully physical prior history. So, to avoid an unacceptable proliferation of causes, any prima facie non-physical cause of a physical effect will need to be included in that physical history. But what exactly does this require? The contemporary literature offers a wide range of answers to this question. In part the issue hinges on the ontological status of causes. Some philosophers think of causes as particular events, considered in abstraction from any properties they may possess (Davidson 1980). Given this view of causation, a mental or other apparently non-physical cause will be the same as some physical cause as long as it is constituted by the same particular (or ‘token’) event. For example, a given feeling and a given brain event will count as the same cause as long as they are constituted by the same token event. However, it is widely agreed that this kind of ‘token identity’ on its own fails to ensure that prima facie non-physical causes can make any real difference to physical effects. To see why, note that token identity is a very weak doctrine: it does not imply any relationship at all between the properties involved in the physical and non-physical cause; it is enough that the same particular entity should possess both these properties. Compare the way in which an apple's shape and colour are both possessed by the same particular thing, namely that apple. It seems wrong to conclude on this account that the apple's colour causes what its shape causes. Similarly, it seems unwarranted to conclude that someone's feelings cause what that person's neuronal discharges cause, simply on the grounds that these are both aspects of the same particular event. This could be true, and yet the mental property of the event could be entirely irrelevant to any subsequent physical effects. Token identity on its own thus seems to leave it open that the mental and other prima facie non-physical properties are ‘epiphenomenal’, exerting no real influence on effects that are already fixed by physical processes (Honderich 1982, Yalowitz 2006 Section 6, Robb and Heil 2005 Section 5). These considerations argue that causation depends on properties as well as particulars. There are various accounts of causation that respect this requirement, the differences between which do not matter for present purposes. The important point is that, if mental and other prima facie non-physical causes are to be equated with physical causes, [any] non-physical properties must somehow be constituted by physical properties. If your anger is to cause what your brain state causes, the property of being angry cannot be ontologically independent of the relevant brain properties. So much is agreed by nearly all contemporary naturalists. At this point, however, consensus ends. One school holds that epiphenomenalism can only be avoided by type-identity, the strict identity of the relevant prima facie non-physical properties with physical properties. On the other side stand ‘non-reductive’ physicalists, who hold that the causal efficacy of non-physical properties will be respected as long as they are ‘realized by’ physical properties, even if they are not reductively identified with them. Type-identity is the most obvious way to ensure that non-physical and physical causes coincide: if exactly the same particulars and properties comprise a non-physical and a physical cause, the two causes will certainly themselves be fully identical. Still, type-identity is a very strong doctrine. Type identity about thoughts, for example, would imply that the property of thinking about the square root of two is identical with some physical property. And this seems highly implausible. Even if all human beings with this thought must be distinguished by some common physical property of their brains—which itself seems highly unlikely—there remains the argument that other life-forms, or intelligent androids, will also be able to think about the square root of two, even though their brains may share no significant physical properties with ours (cf. Bickle 2006). This ‘variable realization’ argument has led many philosophers to seek an alternative way of reconciling the efficacy of non-physical causes with the causal closure thesis, one which does not require the strict identity of non-physical and physical properties. The general idea of this ‘non-reductive physicalism’ is to allow that a given non-physical property can be ‘realized’ by different physical properties in different cases. There are various ways of filling out this idea. A common feature is the requirement that non-physical properties should metaphysically supervene on physical properties, in the sense that any two beings who share all physical properties will necessarily share the same non-physical properties, even though the physical properties which so realize the non-physical ones can be different in different beings. This arguably ensures that nothing more is required for any specific instantiation of a non-physical property than its physical realization—even God could not have created your brain states without thereby creating your feelings—yet avoids any reductive identification of non-physical properties with physical ones. (This is a rough sketch of the supervenience formulation of physicalism. For more see Stoljar 2001 Sections 2 and 3.) Some philosophers object that non-reductive physicalism does not in fact satisfy the original motivation for physicalism, since it fails to reconcile the efficacy of non-physical causes with the causal closure thesis (Kim 1993. Robb and Heil 2005 Section 6). According to non-reductive physicalism, prima facie non-physical properties are not type-identical with any strictly physical properties, even though they supervene on them. However, if causes are in some way property-involving, this then seems to imply that any prima facie non-physical cause will be distinct from any physical cause. Opponents of non-reductive physicalism object that this gives us an unacceptable proliferation of causes for the physical effects of non-physical causes—both the physical cause implied by the causal closure thesis and the distinct non-physical cause. In response, advocates of non-reductive physicalism respond that there is nothing wrong with such an apparent duplication of causes if it is also specified that the latter metaphysically supervene on the former. The issue here hinges on the acceptability of different kinds of overdetermination (Bennett 2003). All can agree that it would be absurd if the physical effects of non-physical causes always had two completely independent causes. This much was assumed by the original causal argument for physicalism, which reasoned that no sui generis non-physical state of affairs can cause some effect that already has a full physical cause. However, even if ‘strong overdetermination’ by two ontologically independent causes is so ruled out, this does not necessarily preclude ‘weak overdetermination’ by both a physical cause and a metaphysically supervenient non-physical cause. Advocates of non-reductive physicalism argue that this kind of overdetermination is benign, on the grounds that the two causes are not ontologically distinct—the non-physical cause isn't genuinely additional to the physical cause (nothing more is needed for your feelings than your brain states). There is room to query whether non-reductive physicalism amounts to a substantial form of naturalism. After all, the requirement that some category of properties metaphysically supervenes on physical properties is not a strong one. A very wide range of properties would seem intuitively to satisfy this requirement, including moral and aesthetic properties, along with any mental, biological, and social properties. (Can two physically identical things be different with respect to wickedness or beauty?) Supervenience on the physical realm is thus a far weaker requirement than that some property should enter into natural laws, say, or be analysable by the methods of the natural sciences. Indeed some philosophers are explicitly anti-naturalist about categories that they allow to supervene on the physical—we need only think of G.E. Moore on moral properties, or Donald Davidson and his followers on mental properties (Moore 1903, Davidson 1980). In response, those of naturalist sympathies are likely to point out that any viable response to the argument from causal closure will require more than metaphysical supervenience alone (Horgan 1993, Wilson 1999). Supervenience is at least necessary, if non-reductive physicalists are to avoid the absurdity of strong overdetermination. But something more than mere supervenience is arguably needed if non-reductive physicalists are to make good their claim that non-physical states cause the physical effects that their realizers cause. Metaphysical supervenience alone does not ensure this. (Suppose ricketiness, in a car, is defined as the property of having some loose part. Then ricketiness will supervene on physical properties. In a given car, it may be realized by a disconnected wire between ignition and starter motor.<u><strong> </u></strong>This disconnected wire will cause this car not to start. But it doesn't follow that this car's then not starting will be caused by its property of ricketiness. Most rickety cars start perfectly well.) So it looks as if the causal closure argument requires not only that non-physical properties metaphysically supervene on physical properties, but that they be natural in some stronger sense, so as to qualify as causes of those properties' effects. It is a much-discussed issue how this demand can be satisfied. Some philosophers seek to meet it by offering a further account of the nature of the relevant non-physical properties, for example, that they are second-order role properties whose presence is constituted by some first-order property with a specified causal role (Levin 2004). Others suggest that the crucial feature is how these properties feature in certain laws (Fodor 1974) or alternatively the degree of their explanatory relevance to physical effects (Yablo 1992). And reductive physicalists will insist that the demand can only be met by type-identifying prima-facie non-physical properties with physical properties after all.[6] There is no agreed view on the requirements for prima facie non-physical properties to have physical effects. This difficult issue hinges, inter alia, on the nature of the causal relation itself, and it would take us too far afield to pursue it further here. For the purpose of this entry, we need only note that the causal closure argument seems to require that properties with physical effects must be ‘natural’ in some sense that is stronger than metaphysical supervenience on physical properties. Beyond that, we can leave it open exactly what this extra strength requires. Some philosophers hold that mental states escape the causal argument, on the grounds that mental states cause actions rather than any physical effects. Actions are not part of the subject matter of the physical sciences, and so a fortiori not the kinds of effects guaranteed to have physical causes by any casual closure thesis. So there is no reason, according to this line of thought, to suppose that the status of mental states as causes of actions is threatened by physics, nor therefore any reason to think that mental states must in some sense be realized by physical states (Hornsby 1997, Sturgeon 1998). The obvious problem with this line of argument is that actions aren't the only effects of mental states. On occasion mental states also cause unequivocally physical effects. Fast Eddie Felsen's desire to move a pool ball in a certain direction will characteristically have just that effect. And now the causal closure argument bites once more. The snooker ball's motion has a purely physical cause, by the causal closure thesis. This will pre-empt Fast Eddie's desire as a cause of that motion, unless that desire is in some sense physically realized (Balog 1999, Witmer 2000). Other philosophers have a different reason for saying that mental states, or more particularly conscious mental states, don't have physical effects. They think that there are strong independent arguments to show that conscious states can't possibly supervene metaphysically on physical states. Putting this together with the closure claim that physical effects always have physical causes, and abjuring the idea that the physical effects of conscious causes are strongly overdetermined by both a physical cause and an ontologically independent conscious cause, they conclude that conscious states must be ‘epiphenomenal’, lacking any power to causally influence the physical realm (Jackson 1981; 1985. See also Chalmers 1995).[7] The rejection of physicalism about conscious properties certainly has the backing of intuition. (Don't zombies—beings who are physically exactly like humans but have no conscious life—seem intuitively possible?) However, whether this intuition can be parlayed into a sound argument is a highly controversial issue, and one that lies beyond the scope of this entry. A majority of contemporary philosophers probably hold that physicalism can resist these arguments. But a significant minority take the other side.[8] If the majority are right, and physicalism about conscious states is not ruled out by independent arguments, then physicalism seems clearly preferable to epiphenomenalism. In itself, epiphenomenalism is not an attractive position. It requires us to suppose that conscious states, even though they are caused by processes in the physical world, have no effects on that world. This is a very odd kind of causal structure. Nature displays no other examples of such one-way causal intercourse between realms. By contrast, a physicalist<u><strong> naturalism </u></strong>about conscious states will<u><strong> integrate[s] the mental </u></strong>realm <u><strong>with </u></strong>the <u><strong>causal unfolding of the spatiotemporal </u></strong>world in an entirely familiar way. Given this, general principles of theory choice would seem to argue strongly for physicalism over epiphenomenalism.[9] If we focus on this last point, we may start wondering why the causal closure thesis is so important. If general principles of theory choice can justify physicalism, why bring in all the complications associated with causal closure? The answer is that causal closure is needed to rule out interactionist dualism. General principles of theory choice may dismiss epiphenomenalism in favour of physicalism, but they do not similarly discredit interactionist dualism. As the brief historical sketch earlier will have made clear, interactionist dualism offers a perfectly straightforward theoretical option requiring no commitment to any bizarre causal structures. Certainly the historical norm has been to regard it as the default account of the causal role of the mental realm.[10] Given this, arguments from theoretical simplicity cut no ice against interactionist dualism. Rather, the case against interactionist dualism hinges crucially on the empirical thesis that all physical effects already have physical causes. It is specifically this claim that makes it difficult to see how dualist states can make a causal difference to the physical world. It is sometimes suggested that physicalism about the mind can be vindicated by an ‘inference to the best explanation’. The thought here is that there are many well-established synchronic correlations between mental states and brain states, and that physicalism is a ‘better explanation’ of these correlations than epiphenomenalism (Hill 1991, Hill and McLaughlin 1999). From the perspective outlined here, this starts the argument in the middle rather than the beginning, by simply assuming the relevant mind-brain correlations. This assumption of pervasive synchronic mind-brain correlations is only plausible if interactionist dualism has already been ruled out. After all, if we believed interactionist dualism, then we wouldn't think dualist mental states needed any help from synchronic neural correlates to produce physical effects. And it is implausible to suppose that we have direct empirical evidence, prior to the rejection of interactive dualism, for pervasive mind-brain correlations, given the paucity of any explicit examples of well-established neural correlates for specific mental states. Rather our rationale for believing in such correlations must be that the causal closure of the physical realm eliminates interactive dualism, whence we infer that mental states can only systematically precede physical effects if they are correlated with the physical causes of those effects. G.E. Moore's famous ‘open question’ argument is designed to show that moral facts cannot possibly be identical to natural facts. Suppose the natural properties of some situation are completely specified. It will always remain an open question, argued Moore, whether that situation is morally good or bad. (Moore 1903.) Moore took this argument to show that moral facts comprise a distinct species of non-natural fact. However, any such non-naturalist view of morality faces immediate difficulties, deriving ultimately from the kind of causal closure thesis discussed above. If all physical effects are due to a limited range of natural causes, and if moral facts lie outside this range, then it follow that moral facts can never make any difference to what happens in the physical world (Harman, 1986). At first sight this may seem tolerable (perhaps moral facts indeed don't have any physical effects). But it has very awkward epistemological consequences. For beings like us, knowledge of the spatiotemporal world is mediated by physical processes involving our sense organs and cognitive systems.<u><strong> <mark>If moral facts cannot influence the physical world</mark>, then </u></strong>it is <u><strong><mark>hard</u></strong></mark> to see how<u><strong> we can have </u></strong>any<u><strong> <mark>knowledge of them.</p></u></strong></mark>

Saudi Arabia v2

Framing

./documents/hsld18/Lexington/Ga/Lexington-Gandhi-Aff-Blake-Doubles.docx

A

Blake

Doubles

Newark Science OS

Panel

hsld18/Lexington/Ga/Lexington-Gandhi-Aff-Blake-Doubles.docx

SiGa

Lexington SiGa

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Ga.....

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hsld18

HS LD 2018-19

ld

hs

Restricting Trump’s military authority ruins agenda focus and spills over

PV 8

PV 8, [Posner Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago, Vermuele - Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Constitutional Showdowns, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2745&context=journal_articles]

Often the struggle to establish authority overshadows the decision itself. If both agents take an aggressive stance, then a showdown occurs, and rather than establishing policy each agent finds itself in a costly protracted battle to assert authority. delay and crisis result can seriously harm the public interest showdown interrupts governance. Uncertainty is bad it creates unnecessary transaction costs. debates are interminable and socially fruitless. The only way for the government to act when officials disagree about authority is constant negotiation and renegotiation, so officials trade off favored areas of authority or find common ground cost of a showdown is government does not act-or energy of government officials is diverted from the problem at hand to asserting authority ascertaining lines of authority showdown over one issue might metastasize as each side refuses to cooperate in other policy dimensions areas of substantive legislation) until the other side backs down with respect to the original source of dispute.

the struggle to establish authority overshadows the decision itself both agents take an aggressive stance showdown occurs, each finds itself in a costly battle delay and crisis can interrupt governance. Uncertainty creates transaction costs debates are interminable and fruitless. The only way to act is constant negotiation government does not act energy of officials is diverted to authority showdown over one issue might metastasize, as side refuses to cooperate in other areas of legislation

Often the struggle to establish constitutional authority overshadows the decision itself. Showdowns are played for high stakes, and if the benefits are great, the risks are great as well. If both agents take an aggressive stance, then a showdown occurs, and rather than establishing policy and seeing its choice vindicated, each agent finds itself in a costly and protracted battle to assert its authority. The delay and crisis that result can seriously harm the public interest. In Part III, we will discuss how agents' incentives to make these tradeoffs might cause a deviation from the socially optimal outcome. In this Part, we want to establish what that socially optimal outcome is. A. Social Costs and Benefits In the framework on which we have been relying, what are the social costs and benefits of showdowns? The benefit is that a showdown clarifies constitutional authority, reducing decision costs for the government and public in the future. The cost is that a showdown interrupts governance. The social desirability of a particular showdown depends on the balance of this benefit and cost. Clarification of constitutional authority provides major benefits to the public. When public officials do not know who has the authority to perform some action, they make inconsistent decisions or fail to decide, leaving subordinates uncertain how to proceed and the public confused about law and policy. The public, unable to predict how the government will act, is likely to be excessively cautious. Future generations and current actors-officials, citizens, and litigants-benefit from clarification of the rules of the constitutional game, all else equal. Obviously an actor might prefer uncertainty to clearly bad rules, but only if the uncertainty creates a chance that the rules will eventually be clarified in the actor's favor. At any given level of (expected) goodness or badness of the rules, clarity is better than lack of clarity. Furthermore, a risk-averse actor might prefer a clear rule that is somewhat unfavorable, if an ambiguous rule with a more favorable expected outcome carries with it a risk of severe downside loss. And two risk-averse parties may both prefer a compromise that clearly gives them only half a loaf, if there is a chance that uncertainty will eventually be resolved by giving the other party the whole loaf. Uncertainty is bad to the extent that actors do not like to bear risk, but another problem with uncertainty is that it creates unnecessary transaction costs. In area after area of constitutional law, the precedents, judicial and nonjudicial, created by earlier showdowns are picked over by commentators and the actors involved; but there are relatively few precedents, so they leave open most of the fighting issues, and the resulting debates are interminable and socially fruitless. The only way for the government to act when officials disagree about their authority is through constant negotiation and renegotiation, so officials can trade off favored areas of authority or find common ground where one can act without undermining the goals of the other. An early showdown can reduce this costly wheel-spinning in future generations. The cost of a showdown is simply that the government does not act-or, more precisely, that the energy of government officials is diverted from the problem at hand to the problem of asserting authority (in the case of top officials) or the problem of ascertaining the lines of authority (in the case of subordinate officials). Top officials stop arguing about whether the war should be terminated-a question involving difficult judgments about troop strength, home-front morale, and so forth-and start arguing about who should have the authority to terminate the war-a question involving difficult judgments about relative institutional advantage in conducting wars. Subordinate officials, like generals and soldiers, must make predictions about how the argument between top officials will be resolved. If they guess wrong, they could find themselves in trouble for disobeying the institution that ends up winning the showdown, or, if they temporize, failing to be prepared when the decision is made. Subordinate officials might end up acting excessively cautiously, so as to avoid offending the different authorities, or allowing policy and military judgments to be influenced by their implications for the resolution of the conflict about authority, to the extent that subordinate officials have preferences regarding such resolution. And a showdown over one issue, like executive privilege, might metastasize, as each side refuses to cooperate in other policy dimensions (appointments, budgets, and other areas of substantive legislation) until the other side backs down with respect to the original source of dispute.

<h4><strong>Restricting Trump’s military authority ruins agenda <u>focus</u> and <u>spills over</h4><p></u>PV 8</strong>, [<u>Posner</u> Kirkland & Ellis Professor of Law, University of Chicago, <u>Vermuele</u> - Professor of Law, Harvard Law School, Constitutional Showdowns, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2745&context=journal_articles]</p><p><u><strong>Often</u></strong> <u><mark>the <strong>struggle</strong> to <strong>establish</u></strong></mark> constitutional <u><strong><mark>authority</u></strong> <u><strong>overshadows</u></strong> <u>the <strong>decision itself</strong></mark>.</u> Showdowns are played for high stakes, and if the benefits are great, the risks are great as well. <u>If <mark>both agents take an aggressive stance</mark>, then a <mark>showdown occurs,</mark> and rather than establishing policy </u>and seeing its choice vindicated, <u><mark>each </mark>agent <mark>finds itself in a costly</u></mark> and <u>protracted <mark>battle </mark>to assert</u> its <u>authority.</u> The <u><strong><mark>delay</u></strong> <u>and <strong>crisis</u></strong></mark> that <u>result <mark>can</u></mark> <u>seriously harm the public interest</u>. In Part III, we will discuss how agents' incentives to make these tradeoffs might cause a deviation from the socially optimal outcome. In this Part, we want to establish what that socially optimal outcome is.</p><p>A. Social Costs and Benefits</p><p>In the framework on which we have been relying, what are the social costs and benefits of showdowns? The benefit is that a showdown clarifies constitutional authority, reducing decision costs for the government and public in the future. The cost is that a <u>showdown <mark>interrupt</mark>s<mark> governance.</u></mark> The social desirability of a particular showdown depends on the balance of this benefit and cost.</p><p>Clarification of constitutional authority provides major benefits to the public. When public officials do not know who has the authority to perform some action, they make inconsistent decisions or fail to decide, leaving subordinates uncertain how to proceed and the public confused about law and policy. The public, unable to predict how the government will act, is likely to be excessively cautious. Future generations and current actors-officials, citizens, and litigants-benefit from clarification of the rules of the constitutional game, all else equal. Obviously an actor might prefer uncertainty to clearly bad rules, but only if the uncertainty creates a chance that the rules will eventually be clarified in the actor's favor. At any given level of (expected) goodness or badness of the rules, clarity is better than lack of clarity. Furthermore, a risk-averse actor might prefer a clear rule that is somewhat unfavorable, if an ambiguous rule with a more favorable expected outcome carries with it a risk of severe downside loss. And two risk-averse parties may both prefer a compromise that clearly gives them only half a loaf, if there is a chance that uncertainty will eventually be resolved by giving the other party the whole loaf.</p><p><u><mark>Uncertainty</mark> is bad</u> to the extent that actors do not like to bear risk, but another problem with uncertainty is that <u>it <mark>creates <strong></mark>unnecessary <mark>transaction costs</strong></mark>.</u> In area after area of constitutional law, the precedents, judicial and nonjudicial, created by earlier showdowns are picked over by commentators and the actors involved; but there are relatively few precedents, so they leave open most of the fighting issues, and the resulting <u><strong><mark>debates</strong> are <strong>interminable</strong> and</mark> socially <mark>fruitless. The only way</mark> for the government <mark>to act </mark>when officials disagree about</u> their <u>authority <mark>is</u></mark> through <u><strong><mark>constant negotiation</strong> </mark>and <strong>renegotiation</strong>, so officials </u>can <u><strong>trade off</strong> favored</u> <u>areas of authority or find common ground</u> where one can act without undermining the goals of the other. An early showdown can reduce this costly wheel-spinning in future generations.</p><p>The <u>cost of a showdown is</u> simply that the <u><mark>government <strong>does not act</strong></mark>-or</u>, more precisely, that the <u><mark>energy of</u></mark> <u>government <mark>officials is <strong>diverted</strong></mark> from the problem at hand <mark>to</u></mark> the problem of <u>asserting <mark>authority</u></mark> (in the case of top officials) or the problem of <u>ascertaining</u> the <u>lines of authority</u> (in the case of subordinate officials). Top officials stop arguing about whether the war should be terminated-a question involving difficult judgments about troop strength, home-front morale, and so forth-and start arguing about who should have the authority to terminate the war-a question involving difficult judgments about relative institutional advantage in conducting wars. Subordinate officials, like generals and soldiers, must make predictions about how the argument between top officials will be resolved. If they guess wrong, they could find themselves in trouble for disobeying the institution that ends up winning the showdown, or, if they temporize, failing to be prepared when the decision is made. Subordinate officials might end up acting excessively cautiously, so as to avoid offending the different authorities, or allowing policy and military judgments to be influenced by their implications for the resolution of the conflict about authority, to the extent that subordinate officials have preferences regarding such resolution. And a <u><mark>showdown over <strong>one issue</u></strong></mark>, like executive privilege, <u><mark>might <strong>metastasize</u></strong>, <u>as </mark>each <mark>side <strong>refuses to cooperate</strong> in <strong>other</mark> policy dimensions</u></strong> (appointments, budgets, and other <u><mark>areas of</mark> <strong>substantive <mark>legislation</strong></mark>) until the other side backs down<strong> with respect to the original source of dispute.</p></u></strong>

USMCA DA

./documents/hsld18/Harker/Th/Harker-Thakur-Neg-Harvard%20Westlake-Round6.docx

N

Harvard Westlake

6

Harvard-Westlake TD

Gersh, Annie

1AC - Saudi 1NC - Saudi Aid DA Iran Oil DA USMCA DA 2NR - Iran Oil DA

hsld18/Harker/Th/Harker-Thakur-Neg-Harvard%20Westlake-Round6.docx

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HS LD 2018-19

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It goes nuclear.

Gallagher 15

Gallagher 15 (Nancy, interim director of the Center for International and Security Studies in Maryland, previous Executive Director of the Clinton Administration’s CTBT Treaty Committee, an arms control specialist at the State Dept., and a faculty member at Wesleyan, “Antisatellite warfare without nuclear risk: A mirage,” May 29, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, http://thebulletin.org/space-weapons-and-risk-nuclear-exchanges8346)

as space-based recon communication, and targeting capabilities have become integral elements of modern military operations policy makers have explored whether a sat attacks could confer military advantages without increasing the risk of nuclear war. In theory, the answer might be yes. In practice certainly no. If any nation launched an attack on a second nation's satellites, nuclear retaliation against terrestrial targets would be an irrational response. But powerful countries do sometimes respond irrationally when attacked. disproportionate retaliation is not even the likeliest way. crisis management would become more difficult, and the risk of inadvertent deterrence failure would increase, if satellites used for reconnaissance and communication were destroyed. If US military leaders became seriously concerned that China or Russia were preparing an antisatellite attack, pressure could build for a pre-emptive attack against Chinese or Russian strategic forces.

space-based targeting capabilities have become integral elements of modern military op s, a sat attacks risk nuclear war nuclear retal would be irrational But powerful countries respond irrationally when attacked crisis management would become more difficult the risk of inadvertent deterrence failure would increase If, leaders became concerned China or Russia were preparing an antisatellite attack pressure could build for a pre-emptive attack

In recent decades, however, as space-based reconnaissance, communication, and targeting capabilities have become integral elements of modern military operations, strategists and policy makers have explored whether carrying out antisatellite attacks could confer major military advantages without increasing the risk of nuclear war. In theory, the answer might be yes. In practice, it is almost certainly no. Hyping threats. No country has ever deliberately and destructively attacked a satellite belonging to another country (though nations have sometimes interfered with satellites' radio transmissions). But the United States, Russia, and China have all tested advanced kinetic antisatellite weapons, and the United States has demonstrated that it can modify a missile-defense interceptor for use in antisatellite mode. Any nation that can launch nuclear weapons on medium-range ballistic missiles has the latent capability to attack satellites in low Earth orbit. Because the United States depends heavily on space for its terrestrial military superiority, some US strategists have predicted that potential adversaries will try to neutralize US advantages by attacking satellites. They have also recommended that the US military do everything it can to protect its own space assets while maintaining a capability to disable or destroy satellites that adversaries use for intelligence, communication, navigation, or targeting. Analysis of this sort often exaggerates both potential adversaries’ ability to destroy US space assets and the military advantages that either side would gain from antisatellite attacks. Nonetheless, some observers are once again advancing worst-case scenarios to support arguments for offensive counterspace capabilities. In some other countries, interest in space warfare may be increasing because of these arguments. If any nation, for whatever reason, launched an attack on a second nation's satellites, nuclear retaliation against terrestrial targets would be an irrational response. But powerful countries do sometimes respond irrationally when attacked. Moreover, disproportionate retaliation following a deliberate antisatellite attack is not the only way in which antisatellite weapons could contribute to nuclear war. It is not even the likeliest way. As was clearly understood by the countries that negotiated the Outer Space Treaty, crisis management would become more difficult, and the risk of inadvertent deterrence failure would increase, if satellites used for reconnaissance and communication were disabled or destroyed. But even if the norm against attacking another country’s satellites is never broken, developing and testing antisatellite weapons still increase the risk of nuclear war. If, for instance, US military leaders became seriously concerned that China or Russia were preparing an antisatellite attack, pressure could build for a pre-emptive attack against Chinese or Russian strategic forces. Should a satellite be struck by a piece of space debris during a crisis or a low-level terrestrial conflict, leaders might mistakenly assume that a space war had begun and retaliate before they knew what had actually happened. Such scenarios may seem improbable, but they are no more implausible than the scenarios that are used to justify the development and use of antisatellite weapons.

<h4>It <u>goes nuclear</u>.</h4><p><strong>Gallagher 15</strong> (Nancy, interim director of the Center for International and Security Studies in Maryland, previous Executive Director of the Clinton Administration’s CTBT Treaty Committee, an arms control specialist at the State Dept., and a faculty member at Wesleyan, “Antisatellite warfare without nuclear risk: A mirage,” May 29, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, http://thebulletin.org/space-weapons-and-risk-nuclear-exchanges8346)</p><p>In recent decades, however, <u>as <mark>space-based</mark> recon</u>naissance, <u>communication, and <mark>targeting</u> <u><strong>capabilities have become integral</strong> elements of modern military</mark> <strong><mark>op</strong></mark>eration<strong><mark>s</u></strong>,</mark> strategists and <u>policy makers have explored whether</u> carrying out <u><strong><mark>a</u></strong></mark>nti<u><strong><mark>sat</u></strong></mark>ellite <u><mark>attacks</mark> could confer</u> major <u>military advantages without increasing the <strong><mark>risk</mark> of <mark>nuclear war</strong></mark>. In theory, the answer might be yes. In practice</u>, it is almost <u><strong>certainly no. </u></strong>Hyping threats. No country has ever deliberately and destructively attacked a satellite belonging to another country (though nations have sometimes interfered with satellites' radio transmissions). But the United States, Russia, and China have all tested advanced kinetic antisatellite weapons, and the United States has demonstrated that it can modify a missile-defense interceptor for use in antisatellite mode. Any nation that can launch nuclear weapons on medium-range ballistic missiles has the latent capability to attack satellites in low Earth orbit. Because the United States depends heavily on space for its terrestrial military superiority, some US strategists have predicted that potential adversaries will try to neutralize US advantages by attacking satellites. They have also recommended that the US military do everything it can to protect its own space assets while maintaining a capability to disable or destroy satellites that adversaries use for intelligence, communication, navigation, or targeting. Analysis of this sort often exaggerates both potential adversaries’ ability to destroy US space assets and the military advantages that either side would gain from antisatellite attacks. Nonetheless, some observers are once again advancing worst-case scenarios to support arguments for offensive counterspace capabilities. In some other countries, interest in space warfare may be increasing because of these arguments. <u>If any nation</u>, for whatever reason, <u>launched an attack on a second nation's satellites, <mark>nuclear retal</mark>iation against terrestrial targets <mark>would be</mark> an <mark>irrational</mark> response. <strong><mark>But</mark> <mark>powerful countries</mark> do sometimes <mark>respond irrationally when attacked</mark>.</u></strong> Moreover, <u>disproportionate retaliation</u> following a deliberate antisatellite attack is not the only way in which antisatellite weapons could contribute to nuclear war. It <u>is not even the likeliest way.</u> As was clearly understood by the countries that negotiated the Outer Space Treaty, <u><mark>crisis management would become more difficult</mark>, and <mark>the risk of <strong>inadvertent deterrence failure</strong> would increase</mark>, if satellites used for reconnaissance and communication were </u>disabled or<u> destroyed. </u>But even if the norm against attacking another country’s satellites is never broken, developing and testing antisatellite weapons still increase the risk of nuclear war. <u><mark>If</u>,</mark> for instance, <u>US military <mark>leaders became </mark>seriously <mark>concerned</mark> that <mark>China or Russia were preparing an antisatellite attack</mark>, <mark>pressure could build for a <strong>pre-emptive attack</strong> </mark>against Chinese or Russian strategic forces.</u> Should a satellite be struck by a piece of space debris during a crisis or a low-level terrestrial conflict, leaders might mistakenly assume that a space war had begun and retaliate before they knew what had actually happened. Such scenarios may seem improbable, but they are no more implausible than the scenarios that are used to justify the development and use of antisatellite weapons.</p>

1AC

Russia Unilat

./documents/ndtceda19/MissouriState/EnHo/Missouri%20State-Engelby-Hopkins-Aff-ADA-Round3.docx

A

ADA

3

Miami HL

Dallas Perkins

1AC- Russia PD (Unilat Asteroids) 1NC- Detection DA T in the area Japan Islands DA Skyfall DA Non-Nuke CP 2NR- Non-Nuke CP

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NDT/CEDA 2019-20

cx

college

Sustained usable power key to the structural foundations of the liberal world order that constrains catastrophic transition wars with revisionist Russia and China – multiplicity of factors explains their historical grievances and strategic motivations, but ONLY hard power can check their revisionist rise

Kagan ’17

Kagan ’17 – Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings Robert Kagan, “The Twilight of the Liberal World Order,” Brookings Big Ideas for America edited by Michael O’Hanlon, Brookings Institution Press (2017): https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1kk66tr.31

The liberal world order may be coming to an end external challenges come from ambition of dissatisfied powers to overturn the existing strategic order to gain hegemony in their regions China and Russia pose the greatest challenges because of military, economic, and political power and willingness to use it, and because regions where they seek hegemony have been critical to global peace and stability. Iran seeks regional hegemony North Korea seeks control of the Korean peninsula China and Russia pose the greatest challenge to the relatively peaceful and prosperous international order . If they were to accomplish their aims of establishing hegemony in their spheres of influence the world would return to competing great powers clashing over inevitably intersecting and overlapping spheres of interest unsettled, disordered conditions produced two destructive world wars collapse of the British-dominated world order contributed to a highly competitive international environment The result was an unprecedented global calamity the U.S.-led world order has held in check great power conflicts The role of the United States has been critical Until recently, the dissatisfied powers have faced insuperable obstacles in achieving their objectives chief has been the power and coherence of the order itself The American-led system of alliances has presented China and Russia with situations of strength that required them to pursue ambitions cautiously The system has served as a check on their ambitions in both positive and negative ways. They have been participants in the open international economic system The continual threat posed by the U.S has made them hostile However it has also been a source of weakness and vulnerability. Chinese rulers worry about what an unsuccessful confrontation might do to their sources of legitimacy at home. Putin has taken a more cautious approach when met with determined U.S. opposition and pushed forward only when invited to do so by U.S. The greatest check on Chinese and Russian ambitions has come from military power of the U S and its allies China has had to contemplate facing the combined military strength of the world’s superpower and some very formidable regional powers Russia has had to face the United States and NATO When united military powers present a daunting challenge to a revisionist power Faced with these obstacles, the two great powers have had to hope for or if possible engineer a weakening of the U.S.-supported world order from within. This could come about either by separating the United States from its allies, raising doubts about the U.S. commitment to or by wooing American allies out from within the liberal world order’s strategic structure. the system has worked What Wohlforth described as the inherent stability of the unipolar order reflected this dynamic as dissatisfied powers sought to challenge the status quo neighbors turned to the distant American superpower The system has depended on will, capacity, and coherence The United States had to be willing and able to play its part in the military and strategic realm the liberal order has begun to weaken and fracture at the core As a result of many related factors there has emerged a crisis of confidence in the liberal enlightenment project We have been witnessing something like the opposite of the “end of history” but have returned to history with a vengeance, rediscovering all the darker aspects of the human soul. That includes, for many, the perennial human yearning for a strong leader to provide firm guidance in a time of seeming breakdown and incoherence. This crisis of the enlightenment project may have been inevitable this crisis of confidence in liberalism coincides with a breakdown of the strategic order it is the United States’ own willingness to continue upholding the order that it created and which depends entirely on American power. With the election of Donald Trump, a majority of Americans have sig naled their unwillingness to continue upholding the world order. Trump was not the only candidate in 2016 to run on a platform suggesting a much narrower definition of American interests and a lessening of the burdens of American global leadership. “America First” is not just an empty phrase but a fairly coherent philosophy with a long lineage and many adherents in the American academy. It calls for viewing American interests through a narrow lens. It suggests no longer supporting an international alliance structure, no longer seeking to deny great powers their spheres of influence and regional hegemony, no longer attempting to uphold liberal norms in the international system, and no longer sacrificing short-term interests—in trade for instance—in the longer-term interest of preserving an open economic order. this new approach in American foreign policy is likely to hasten a return to the instability and clashes of previous eras. These external challenges to the liberal world order and the continuing weakness and fracturing of the liberal world from within are likely to feed on each other. abdication by the United States will encourage more aggressive revisionism which may exacerbate weakness and helplessness and loss of confidence which will increase the sense the great power autocracies that this is their opportunity to reorder the world to conform to their interests. this is a downward spiral from which it will be difficult to recover absent a major conflict it was the American decision to remove itself from a position of global responsibility to preserve the peace in Europe, and neglect its naval strength essentially selfish policies pursued by the world’s strongest power helped set the stage for the calamities of the 1930s revisionist great powers are not easy to satisfy short of complete capitulation rising great powers always express some historical grievance. Every people, except perhaps Americans, have reason for resentment at ancient injustices, nurse grudges seek to return to a glorious past grievances are rarely solved by minor border changes Russia’s historical sphere of influence does not end in Ukraine It extends to the Baltics, to the Balkans, and to heart of Central Europe The best way to avoid great power clashes is to make the U.S. position clear the United States welcomes competition of a certain kind. Great powers compete across multiple planes—economic, ideological, and political, as well as military. Competition in most spheres is necessary and even healthy. Within the liberal order, China can compete economically and successfully with the United States; Russia can thrive in the international economic order upheld by the liberal powers, even if it is not itself liberal. But security competition is different only the United States has the capacity and the unique geographical advantages to provide global security There is no stable balance of power without the United States soft power and smart power have been and always will be of limited value when confronting raw military power it is in the military realm where U.S. advantages remain clearest. without a U.S. willingness to use military power system will buckle under the unrestrained military competition of regional powers. If history is any guide, the next four years are the critical inflection point. The rest of the world will take its cue from the early actions of the new administration. If the next president governs as he ran, which is to say if he pursues a course designed to secure only America’s narrow interests; focuses chiefly on international terrorism—the least of the challenges to the present world order; accommodates the ambitions of the great powers; ceases to regard international economic policy in terms of global order but only in terms of America’s bottom line narrowly construed; and generally ceases to place a high priority on reassuring allies and partners in the world’s principal strategic theaters—then the collapse of the world order, with all that entails, may not be far off.

China and Russia pose the greatest challenges because of power and willingness to use it the world would return to competing great powers clashing destructive world wars unprecedented global calamity The U S has been critical alliances check ambitions The greatest check has come from military power When united the system has worked Wohlforth described the inherent stability of the unipolar order As a result of many related factors there has emerged a crisis of confidence abdication by the U S will encourage more revisionism which it will be difficult to recover absent a major conflict revisionist powers are not easy to satisfy grievances are rarely solved soft r will be of limited value in the military realm .S. advantages remain clearest

The liberal world order established in the aftermath of World War II may be coming to an end, challenged by forces both without and within. The external challenges come from the ambition of dissatisfied large and medium-size powers to overturn the existing strategic order dominated by the United States and its allies and partners. Their aim is to gain hegemony in their respective regions. China and Russia pose the greatest challenges to the world order because of their relative military, economic, and political power and their evident willingness to use it, which makes them significant players in world politics and, just as important, because the regions where they seek strategic hegemony—Asia and Europe—historically have been critical to global peace and stability. At a lesser but still significant level, Iran seeks regional hegemony in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, which if accomplished would have a strategic, economic, and political impact on the international system. North Korea seeks control of the Korean peninsula, which if accomplished would affect the stability and security of northeast Asia. Finally, at a much lower level of concern, there is the effort by ISIS and other radical Islamist groups to establish a new Islamic caliphate in the Middle East. If accomplished, that, too, would have effects on the global order. However, it is the two great powers, China and Russia, that pose the greatest challenge to the relatively peaceful and prosperous international order created and sustained by the United States. If they were to accomplish their aims of establishing hegemony in their desired spheres of influence, the world would return to the condition it was in at the end of the 19th century, with competing great powers clashing over inevitably intersecting and overlapping spheres of interest. These were the unsettled, disordered conditions that produced the fertile ground for the two destructive world wars of the first half of the 20th century. The collapse of the British-dominated world order on the oceans, the disruption of the uneasy balance of power on the European continent due to the rise of a powerful unified Germany, combined with the rise of Japanese power in East Asia all contributed to a highly competitive international environment in which dissatisfied great powers took the opportunity to pursue their ambitions in the absence of any power or group of powers to unite in checking them. The result was an unprecedented global calamity. It has been the great accomplishment of the U.S.-led world order in the 70 years since the end of the Second World War that this kind of competition has been held in check and great power conflicts have been avoided. The role of the United States, however, has been critical. Until recently, the dissatisfied great and medium-size powers have faced considerable and indeed almost insuperable obstacles in achieving their objectives. The chief obstacle has been the power and coherence of the order itself and of its principal promoter and defender. The American-led system of political and military alliances, especially in the two critical regions of Europe and East Asia, has presented China and Russia with what Dean Acheson once referred to as “situations of strength” in their regions that have required them to pursue their ambitions cautiously and in most respects to defer serious efforts to disrupt the international system. The system has served as a check on their ambitions in both positive and negative ways. They have been participants in and for the most part beneficiaries of the open international economic system the United States created and helped sustain and, so long as that system was functioning, have had more to gain by playing in it than by challenging and overturning it. The same cannot be said of the political and strategic aspects of the order, both of which have worked to their detriment. The growth and vibrancy of democratic government in the two decades following the collapse of Soviet communism has posed a continual threat to the ability of rulers in Beijing and Moscow to maintain control, and since the end of the Cold War they have regarded every advance of democratic institutions, including especially the geographical advance close to their borders, as an existential threat—and with reason. The continual threat to the basis of their rule posed by the U.S.-supported order has made them hostile both to the order and to the United States. However, it has also been a source of weakness and vulnerability. Chinese rulers in particular have had to worry about what an unsuccessful confrontation with the United States might do to their sources of legitimacy at home. And although Vladimir Putin has to some extent used a calculated foreign adventurism to maintain his hold on domestic power, he has taken a more cautious approach when met with determined U.S. and European opposition, as in the case of Ukraine, and pushed forward, as in Syria, only when invited to do so by U.S. and Western passivity. Autocratic rulers in a liberal democratic world have had to be careful. The greatest check on Chinese and Russian ambitions, however, has come from the combined military power of the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia. China, although increasingly powerful itself, has had to contemplate facing the combined military strength of the world’s superpower and some very formidable regional powers linked by alliance or common strategic interest, including Japan, India, and South Korea, as well as smaller but still potent nations like Vietnam and Australia. Russia has had to face the United States and its NATO allies. When united, these military powers present a daunting challenge to a revisionist power that can call on no allies of its own for assistance. Even were the Chinese to score an early victory in a conflict, they would have to contend over time with the combined industrial productive capacities of some of the world’s richest and most technologically advanced nations. A weaker Russia would face an even greater challenge. Faced with these obstacles, the two great powers, as well as the lesser dissatisfied powers, have had to hope for or if possible engineer a weakening of the U.S.-supported world order from within. This could come about either by separating the United States from its allies, raising doubts about the U.S. commitment to defend its allies militarily in the event of a conflict, or by various means wooing American allies out from within the liberal world order’s strategic structure. For most of the past decade, the reaction of American allies to greater aggressiveness on the part of China and Russia in their respective regions, and to Iran in the Middle East, has been to seek more reassurance from the United States. Russian actions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria; Chinese actions in the East and South China seas; Iranian actions in Syria, Iraq, and along the littoral of the Persian Gulf—all have led to calls by American allies and partners for a greater commitment. In this respect, the system has worked as it was supposed to. What the political scientist William Wohlforth once described as the inherent stability of the unipolar order reflected this dynamic—as dissatisfied regional powers sought to challenge the status quo, their alarmed neighbors turned to the distant American superpower to contain their ambitions. The system has depended, however, on will, capacity, and coherence at the heart of the liberal world order. The United States had to be willing and able to play its part as the principal guarantor of the order, especially in the military and strategic realm. The order’s ideological and economic core order—the democracies of Europe and East Asia and the Pacific—had to remain relatively healthy and relatively confident. In such circumstances, the combined political, economic, and military power of the liberal world would be too great to be seriously challenged by the great powers, much less by the smaller dissatisfied powers. In recent years, however, the liberal order has begun to weaken and fracture at the core. As a result of many related factors—difficult economic conditions, the recrudescence of nationalism and tribalism, weak and uncertain political leadership and unresponsive mainstream political parties, a new era of communications that seems to strengthen rather than weaken tribalism—there has emerged a crisis of confidence in what might be called the liberal enlightenment project. That project tended to elevate universal principles of individual rights and common humanity over ethnic, racial, religious, national, or tribal differences. It looked to a growing economic interdependence to create common interests across boundaries and the establishment of international institutions to smooth differences and fa cilitate cooperation among nations. Instead, the past decade has seen the rise of tribalism and nationalism; an increasing focus on the “other” in all societies; and a loss of confidence in government, in the capitalist system, and in democracy. We have been witnessing something like the opposite of the “end of history” but have returned to history with a vengeance, rediscovering all the darker aspects of the human soul. That includes, for many, the perennial human yearning for a strong leader to provide firm guidance in a time of seeming breakdown and incoherence. This crisis of the enlightenment project may have been inevitable. It may indeed have been cyclical, due to inherent flaws in both capitalism and democracy, which periodically have been exposed and have raised doubts about both—as happened, for instance, throughout the West in the 1930s. Now, as then, moreover, this crisis of confidence in liberalism coincides with a breakdown of the strategic order. In this case, however, the key variable has not been the United States as the outside power and its willingness, or not, to step in and save or remake an order lost by other powers. Rather it is the United States’ own willingness to continue upholding the order that it created and which depends entirely on American power. That willingness has been in doubt for some time. Increasingly in the quarter-century after the end of the Cold War, Americans have been wondering why they bear such an unusual and outsized responsibility for preserving global order when their own interests are not always apparently served and when, indeed, the United States seems to be making sacrifices while others benefit. The reasons why the United States took on this abnormal role after the calamitous two world wars of the 20th century have been largely forgotten. As a consequence, the American public’s patience with the difficulties and costs inherent in playing such a role has worn thin. Thus, whereas previous unsuccessful wars, in Korea in 1950 and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and previous economic downturns, such as in the mid- to late 1970s, did not have the effect of turning Americans against global involvement, the unsuccessful wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the financial crisis of 2007–09 have had that effect. President Obama pursued an ambivalent approach to global involvement, but the main thrust of his approach was retrenchment. His actions and statements were a critique of previous American strategy and reinforced a national mood favoring a much less active role in the world and much narrower definition of American interests. With the election of Donald Trump, a majority of Americans have sig naled their unwillingness to continue upholding the world order. Trump was not the only candidate in 2016 to run on a platform suggesting a much narrower definition of American interests and a lessening of the burdens of American global leadership. “America First” is not just an empty phrase but a fairly coherent philosophy with a long lineage and many adherents in the American academy. It calls for viewing American interests through a narrow lens. It suggests no longer supporting an international alliance structure, no longer seeking to deny great powers their spheres of influence and regional hegemony, no longer attempting to uphold liberal norms in the international system, and no longer sacrificing short-term interests—in trade for instance—in the longer-term interest of preserving an open economic order. Coming as it does at a time of growing great power competition, this new approach in American foreign policy is likely to hasten a return to the instability and clashes of previous eras. These external challenges to the liberal world order and the continuing weakness and fracturing of the liberal world from within are likely to feed on each other. The weakness of the liberal core and the abdication by the United States of its global responsibilities will encourage more aggressive revisionism by the dissatisfied powers, which may in turn exacerbate the sense of weakness and helplessness and the loss of confidence of the liberal world, which will in turn increase the sense on the part of the great power autocracies that this is their opportunity to reorder the world to conform to their interests. History suggests that this is a downward spiral from which it will be difficult to recover absent a major conflict. It was in the 1920s, not the 1930s, that the most important and ultimately fatal decisions were made by the liberal powers. Above all, it was the American decision to remove itself from a position of global responsibility, to reject strategic involvement to preserve the peace in Europe, and neglect its naval strength in the Pacific to check the rise of Japan. The “return to normalcy” of the 1920 U.S. election seemed safe and innocent at the time, but the essentially selfish policies pursued by the world’s strongest power in the following decade helped set the stage for the calamities of the 1930s. By the time the crises began to erupt in that decade, it was already too late to avoid paying the high price of global conflict. One thing for the new administration to keep in mind: History tells us that revisionist great powers are not easy to satisfy short of complete capitulation. Their sphere of influence is never quite large enough to satisfy their pride or their expanding need for security. The “satiated” power that Bismarck spoke of is rare—even his Germany, in the end, could not be satiated. And of course, rising great powers always express some historical grievance. Every people, except perhaps for the fortunate Americans, have reason for resentment at ancient injustices, nurse grudges against old adversaries, seek to return to a glorious past that was stolen from them by military or political defeat. The world’s supply of grievances is inexhaustible. These grievances, however, are rarely solved by minor border changes. Japan, the aggrieved “have-not” nation of the 1930s, did not satisfy itself by swallowing Manchuria in 1931. Germany, the aggrieved victim of Versailles, did not satisfy itself by bringing the Germans of the Sudetenland back into the fold. And, of course, Russia’s historical sphere of influence does not end in Ukraine. It begins in Ukraine. It extends to the Baltics, to the Balkans, and to heart of Central Europe. The tragic irony is that, in the process of carving out these spheres of influence, the ambitious rising powers invariably create the very threats they use to justify their actions. The cycle only ends if and when the great powers that make up the existing power structure, in today’s case, the United States, decide they have had enough. We know those moments as major power wars. The new administration seems to be fixated almost entirely on the threat of radical Islam and may not believe its main problem is going to be great power confrontation. In fact, it is going to have to confront both sets of challenges. The first, addressing the threat of terrorism, is comparatively manageable. It is the second, managing great power competition and confrontation, that has historically proved the most difficult and also the most costly when handled badly. The best way to avoid great power clashes is to make the U.S. position clear from the outset. That position should be that the United States welcomes competition of a certain kind. Great powers compete across multiple planes—economic, ideological, and political, as well as military. Competition in most spheres is necessary and even healthy. Within the liberal order, China can compete economically and successfully with the United States; Russia can thrive in the international economic order upheld by the liberal powers, even if it is not itself liberal. But security competition is different. The security situation undergirds everything else. It remains true today as it has since the Second World War that only the United States has the capacity and the unique geographical advantages to provide global security. There is no stable balance of power in Europe or Asia without the United States. And while we can talk about soft power and smart power, they have been and always will be of limited value when confronting raw military power. Despite all of the loose talk of American decline, it is in the military realm where U.S. advantages remain clearest. Even in other great powers’ backyards, the United States retains the capacity, along with its powerful allies, to deter challenges to the security order. But without a U.S. willingness to use military power to establish balance in far-flung regions of the world, the system will buckle under the unrestrained military competition of regional powers. If history is any guide, the next four years are the critical inflection point. The rest of the world will take its cue from the early actions of the new administration. If the next president governs as he ran, which is to say if he pursues a course designed to secure only America’s narrow interests; focuses chiefly on international terrorism—the least of the challenges to the present world order; accommodates the ambitions of the great powers; ceases to regard international economic policy in terms of global order but only in terms of America’s bottom line narrowly construed; and generally ceases to place a high priority on reassuring allies and partners in the world’s principal strategic theaters—then the collapse of the world order, with all that entails, may not be far off.

<h4>Sustained usable power key to the structural foundations of the liberal world order that constrains catastrophic transition wars with revisionist Russia and China – multiplicity of factors explains their historical grievances and strategic motivations, but ONLY hard power can check their revisionist rise </h4><p><strong>Kagan ’17 </strong>– Stephen & Barbara Friedman Senior Fellow with the Project on International Order and Strategy in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings</p><p>Robert Kagan, “The Twilight of the Liberal World Order,” Brookings Big Ideas for America edited by Michael O’Hanlon, Brookings Institution Press (2017): <strong>https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7864/j.ctt1kk66tr.31</p><p><u></strong>The liberal world order</u> established in the aftermath of World War II <u>may be coming to an end</u>, challenged by forces both without and within. The <u>external challenges</u> <u>come from</u> the <u>ambition of dissatisfied</u> large and medium-size <u>powers</u> <u>to overturn the existing strategic order</u> dominated by the United States and its allies and partners. Their aim is <u>to gain hegemony</u> <u>in their</u> respective <u>regions</u>. <u><strong><mark>China and Russia pose the greatest challenges</u></strong></mark> to the world order <u><mark>because of</u></mark> their relative <u>military, economic, and political <mark>power</u> <u>and</u></mark> their evident <u><mark>willingness to use it</mark>,</u> which makes them significant players in world politics <u>and</u>, just as important, <u>because</u> the <u>regions</u> <u>where they seek</u> strategic <u>hegemony</u>—Asia and Europe—historically <u>have been critical to global peace and stability.</u> At a lesser but still significant level, <u>Iran seeks regional hegemony</u> in the Middle East and Persian Gulf, which if accomplished would have a strategic, economic, and political impact on the international system. <u>North Korea seeks control of the Korean peninsula</u>, which if accomplished would affect the stability and security of northeast Asia. Finally, at a much lower level of concern, there is the effort by ISIS and other radical Islamist groups to establish a new Islamic caliphate in the Middle East. If accomplished, that, too, would have effects on the global order.</p><p>However, it is the two great powers, <u>China and Russia</u>, that <u>pose the greatest challenge to the relatively peaceful and prosperous international order</u> created and sustained by the United States<u><strong>. If they</strong> were to accomplish their aims of <strong>establish</strong>ing <strong>heg</strong>emony</u> <u><strong>in</u></strong> <u><strong>their</u></strong> desired <u><strong>spheres of influence</u></strong>, <u><strong><mark>the world would return to</u></strong></mark> the condition it was in at the end of the 19th century, with <u><strong><mark>competing great powers clashing</u></strong></mark> <u>over inevitably intersecting and overlapping spheres of interest</u>. These were the <u>unsettled, disordered conditions</u> that <u>produced</u> the fertile ground for the <u>two</u> <u><strong><mark>destructive world wars</u></strong></mark> of the first half of the 20th century. The <u>collapse of the British-dominated world order</u> on the oceans, the disruption of the uneasy balance of power on the European continent due to the rise of a powerful unified Germany, combined with the rise of Japanese power in East Asia all <u>contributed to <strong>a highly competitive international environment</u></strong> in which dissatisfied great powers took the opportunity to pursue their ambitions in the absence of any power or group of powers to unite in checking them. <u>The result was an</u> <u><strong><mark>unprecedented global calamity</u></strong></mark>. It has been the great accomplishment of <u>the U.S.-led world order</u> in the 70 years since the end of the Second World War that this kind of competition <u>has</u> been <u>held in check</u> and <u>great power conflicts</u> have been avoided.</p><p><u><strong><mark>The</mark> role of the <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u></strong>, however, <u><strong><mark>has been critical</u></strong></mark>. <u>Until recently, the dissatisfied</u> great and medium-size <u>powers</u> <u>have faced</u> considerable and indeed almost <u>insuperable obstacles in achieving their objectives</u>. The <u>chief</u> obstacle <u>has been the power and coherence of the order itself</u> and of its principal promoter and defender. <u>The American-led system of</u> political and military <u><mark>alliances</u></mark>, especially in the two critical regions of Europe and East Asia, <u>has presented China and Russia with</u> what Dean Acheson once referred to as “<u>situations of strength</u>” in their regions <u>that</u> have <u>required them to pursue</u> their <u>ambitions cautiously</u> and in most respects to defer serious efforts to disrupt the international system. <u>The system has served as a <mark>check </mark>on their <mark>ambitions</mark> in both positive and negative ways. They have been participants in</u> and for the most part beneficiaries of <u>the open international economic system</u> the United States created and helped sustain and, so long as that system was functioning, have had more to gain by playing in it than by challenging and overturning it. The same cannot be said of the political and strategic aspects of the order, both of which have worked to their detriment. The growth and vibrancy of democratic government in the two decades following the collapse of Soviet communism has posed a continual threat to the ability of rulers in Beijing and Moscow to maintain control, and since the end of the Cold War they have regarded every advance of democratic institutions, including especially the geographical advance close to their borders, as an existential threat—and with reason. <u>The continual threat</u> to the basis of their rule <u>posed by the U.S</u>.-supported order <u>has made them hostile</u> both to the order and to the United States. <u>However</u>, <u>it has also been a source of weakness and vulnerability. <strong>Chinese rulers</u></strong> in particular have had to <u><strong>worry about</u></strong> <u>what</u> <u><strong>an unsuccessful confrontation</u></strong> with the United States <u>might do to their sources of legitimacy at home.</u> And although Vladimir <u><strong>Putin</u></strong> has to some extent used a calculated foreign adventurism to maintain his hold on domestic power, he <u><strong>has taken a more cautious approach when met with determined U.S.</strong> </u>and European<u> <strong>opposition</u></strong>, as in the case of Ukraine, <u>and pushed forward</u>, as in Syria, <u>only when invited to do so by U.S.</u> and Western passivity. Autocratic rulers in a liberal democratic world have had to be careful.</p><p><u><strong><mark>The greatest check </mark>on Chinese and Russian ambitions</u></strong>, however, <u><strong><mark>has come from</u></strong></mark> the combined <u><strong><mark>military power</mark> of the</u></strong> <u><strong>U</u></strong>nited <u><strong>S</u></strong>tates <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>its allies</u></strong> in Europe and Asia. <u>China</u>, although increasingly powerful itself, <u>has had to contemplate facing the combined military strength of the world’s superpower and some very formidable regional powers</u> linked by alliance or common strategic interest, including Japan, India, and South Korea, as well as smaller but still potent nations like Vietnam and Australia. <u>Russia has had to face the United States and</u> its <u>NATO</u> allies. <u><strong><mark>When united</u></strong></mark>, these <u><strong>military powers present a daunting challenge to a revisionist power</u></strong> that can call on no allies of its own for assistance. Even were the Chinese to score an early victory in a conflict, they would have to contend over time with the combined industrial productive capacities of some of the world’s richest and most technologically advanced nations. A weaker Russia would face an even greater challenge.</p><p><u>Faced with these obstacles, the two great powers</u>, as well as the lesser dissatisfied powers, <u>have had to hope for or if possible engineer a weakening of the U.S.-supported world order from within. This could come about either by separating the United States from its allies, raising doubts about the U.S. commitment to</u> defend its allies militarily in the event of a conflict, <u>or by </u>various means <u>wooing American allies out from within the liberal world order’s strategic structure.</u> For most of the past decade, the reaction of American allies to greater aggressiveness on the part of China and Russia in their respective regions, and to Iran in the Middle East, has been to seek more reassurance from the United States. Russian actions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria; Chinese actions in the East and South China seas; Iranian actions in Syria, Iraq, and along the littoral of the Persian Gulf—all have led to calls by American allies and partners for a greater commitment. In this respect, <u><strong><mark>the system has worked</u></strong></mark> as it was supposed to. <u>What</u> the political scientist William <u><mark>Wohlforth</u></mark> once <u><mark>described</u></mark> <u>as <mark>the <strong>inherent stability of the unipolar order</strong></mark> reflected this dynamic</u>—<u>as dissatisfied</u> regional <u>powers sought to challenge the status quo</u>, their alarmed <u>neighbors turned to the distant American superpower</u> to contain their ambitions.</p><p><u>The system has depended</u>, however, <u>on will, capacity, and coherence</u> at the heart of the liberal world order. <u>The United States had to be willing and able to play its part</u> as the principal guarantor of the order, especially <u>in the military and strategic realm</u>. The order’s ideological and economic core order—the democracies of Europe and East Asia and the Pacific—had to remain relatively healthy and relatively confident. In such circumstances, the combined political, economic, and military power of the liberal world would be too great to be seriously challenged by the great powers, much less by the smaller dissatisfied powers.</p><p>In recent years, however, <u>the liberal order has begun to weaken and fracture at the core</u>. <u><strong><mark>As a result of many related factors</u></strong></mark>—difficult economic conditions, the recrudescence of nationalism and tribalism, weak and uncertain political leadership and unresponsive mainstream political parties, a new era of communications that seems to strengthen rather than weaken tribalism—<u><strong><mark>there has emerged a crisis of confidence</u></strong></mark> <u>in</u> what might be called <u>the liberal enlightenment project</u>. That project tended to elevate universal principles of individual rights and common humanity over ethnic, racial, religious, national, or tribal differences. It looked to a growing economic interdependence to create common interests across boundaries and the establishment of international institutions to smooth differences and fa cilitate cooperation among nations. Instead, the past decade has seen the rise of tribalism and nationalism; an increasing focus on the “other” in all societies; and a loss of confidence in government, in the capitalist system, and in democracy. <u>We have been witnessing something like the opposite of the “end of history” but have returned to history with a vengeance, rediscovering all the darker aspects of the human soul. That includes, for many, the perennial human yearning for a strong leader to provide firm guidance in a time of seeming breakdown and incoherence.</p><p>This crisis of the enlightenment project may have been inevitable</u>. It may indeed have been cyclical, due to inherent flaws in both capitalism and democracy, which periodically have been exposed and have raised doubts about both—as happened, for instance, throughout the West in the 1930s. Now, as then, moreover, <u>this crisis of confidence in liberalism coincides with a breakdown of the strategic order</u>. In this case, however, the key variable has not been the United States as the outside power and its willingness, or not, to step in and save or remake an order lost by other powers. Rather <u>it is the United States’ own willingness to continue upholding the order that it created and which depends entirely on American power.</p><p></u>That willingness has been in doubt for some time. Increasingly in the quarter-century after the end of the Cold War, Americans have been wondering why they bear such an unusual and outsized responsibility for preserving global order when their own interests are not always apparently served and when, indeed, the United States seems to be making sacrifices while others benefit. The reasons why the United States took on this abnormal role after the calamitous two world wars of the 20th century have been largely forgotten. As a consequence, the American public’s patience with the difficulties and costs inherent in playing such a role has worn thin. Thus, whereas previous unsuccessful wars, in Korea in 1950 and Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, and previous economic downturns, such as in the mid- to late 1970s, did not have the effect of turning Americans against global involvement, the unsuccessful wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the financial crisis of 2007–09 have had that effect. President Obama pursued an ambivalent approach to global involvement, but the main thrust of his approach was retrenchment. His actions and statements were a critique of previous American strategy and reinforced a national mood favoring a much less active role in the world and much narrower definition of American interests.</p><p><u>With the election of Donald Trump, a majority of Americans have sig naled their unwillingness to continue upholding the world order. Trump was not the only candidate in 2016 to run on a platform suggesting a much narrower definition of American interests and a lessening of the burdens of American global leadership. “America First” is not just an empty phrase but a fairly coherent philosophy with a long lineage and many adherents in the American academy. It calls for viewing American interests through a narrow lens. It suggests no longer supporting an international alliance structure, no longer seeking to deny great powers their spheres of influence and regional hegemony, no longer attempting to uphold liberal norms in the international system, and no longer sacrificing short-term interests—in trade for instance—in the longer-term interest of preserving an open economic order.</p><p></u>Coming as it does at a time of growing great power competition, <u>this new approach in American foreign policy is likely to hasten a return to the instability and clashes of previous eras. These external challenges to the liberal world order and the continuing weakness and fracturing of the liberal world from within are likely to feed on each other.</u> The weakness of the liberal core and the <u><strong><mark>abdication by the</mark> <mark>U</mark>nited <mark>S</mark>tates</u></strong> of its global responsibilities <u><strong><mark>will encourage more</mark> aggressive <mark>revisionism</u></strong></mark> by the dissatisfied powers, <u>which may</u> in turn <u>exacerbate</u> the sense of <u>weakness</u> <u>and helplessness</u> <u>and</u> the <u>loss of confidence</u> of the liberal world, <u>which will</u> in turn <u>increase</u> <u>the sense</u> on the part of <u>the great power autocracies</u> <u>that this is their opportunity to reorder the world to conform to their interests.</p><p></u>History suggests that <u><strong>this is a downward spiral from <mark>which it will be difficult to recover absent a major conflict</u></strong></mark>. It was in the 1920s, not the 1930s, that the most important and ultimately fatal decisions were made by the liberal powers. Above all, <u>it was <strong>the American decision to remove itself</strong> from a position of global responsibility</u>, to reject strategic involvement <u>to preserve the peace in Europe, and neglect its naval strength</u> in the Pacific to check the rise of Japan. The “return to normalcy” of the 1920 U.S. election seemed safe and innocent at the time, but the <u>essentially selfish policies pursued by the world’s strongest power</u> in the following decade <u><strong>helped set the stage for the calamities of the 1930s</u></strong>. By the time the crises began to erupt in that decade, it was already too late to avoid paying the high price of global conflict.</p><p>One thing for the new administration to keep in mind: History tells us that <u><strong><mark>revisionist </mark>great <mark>powers are not easy to satisfy </mark>short of complete capitulation</u></strong>. Their sphere of influence is never quite large enough to satisfy their pride or their expanding need for security. The “satiated” power that Bismarck spoke of is rare—even his Germany, in the end, could not be satiated. And of course, <u>rising great powers always express some historical grievance.</u> <u>Every people, except perhaps</u> for the fortunate <u>Americans, have reason for resentment at ancient injustices, nurse grudges</u> against old adversaries, <u>seek to return to a glorious past</u> that was stolen from them by military or political defeat. The world’s supply of grievances is inexhaustible.</p><p>These <u><strong><mark>grievances</u></strong></mark>, however, <u><strong><mark>are rarely solved </mark>by minor border changes</u></strong>. Japan, the aggrieved “have-not” nation of the 1930s, did not satisfy itself by swallowing Manchuria in 1931. Germany, the aggrieved victim of Versailles, did not satisfy itself by bringing the Germans of the Sudetenland back into the fold. And, of course, <u>Russia’s historical sphere of influence does not end in Ukraine</u>. It begins in Ukraine. <u>It extends to the Baltics, to the Balkans, and to heart of Central Europe</u>. The tragic irony is that, in the process of carving out these spheres of influence, the ambitious rising powers invariably create the very threats they use to justify their actions. The cycle only ends if and when the great powers that make up the existing power structure, in today’s case, the United States, decide they have had enough. We know those moments as major power wars.</p><p>The new administration seems to be fixated almost entirely on the threat of radical Islam and may not believe its main problem is going to be great power confrontation. In fact, it is going to have to confront both sets of challenges. The first, addressing the threat of terrorism, is comparatively manageable. It is the second, managing great power competition and confrontation, that has historically proved the most difficult and also the most costly when handled badly.</p><p><u><strong>The best way to avoid great power clashes is to make the U.S. position clear</u></strong> from the outset. That position should be that <u><strong>the United States welcomes competition</strong> of a certain kind. Great powers compete across multiple planes—economic, ideological, and political, as well as military. Competition in most spheres is necessary and even healthy. Within the liberal order, China can compete economically and successfully with the United States; Russia can thrive in the international economic order upheld by the liberal powers, even if it is not itself liberal.</p><p><strong>But security competition is different</u></strong>. The security situation undergirds everything else. It remains true today as it has since the Second World War that <u>only the United States has the capacity and the unique geographical advantages to provide global security</u>. <u>There is no stable balance of power</u> in Europe or Asia <u>without the United States</u>. And while we can talk about <u><strong><mark>soft </mark>power and smart powe<mark>r</u></strong></mark>, they <u><strong>have been and always <mark>will be of limited value </mark>when confronting raw military power</u></strong>. Despite all of the loose talk of American decline, <u><strong>it is <mark>in the military realm</mark> where U<mark>.S. advantages remain clearest</mark>.</u></strong> Even in other great powers’ backyards, the United States retains the capacity, along with its powerful allies, to deter challenges to the security order. But <u>without a U.S. willingness to use military power</u> to establish balance in far-flung regions of the world, the <u>system will buckle under the unrestrained military competition of regional powers.</p><p><strong>If history is any guide, the next four years are the critical inflection point. The rest of the world will take its cue from the early actions of the new administration. If the next president governs as he ran, which is to say if he pursues a course designed to secure only America’s narrow interests; focuses chiefly on international terrorism—the least of the challenges to the present world order; accommodates the ambitions of the great powers; ceases to regard international economic policy in terms of global order but only in terms of America’s bottom line narrowly construed; and generally ceases to place a high priority on reassuring allies and partners in the world’s principal strategic theaters—then the collapse of the world order, with all that entails, may not be far off.</p></u></strong>

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./documents/hsld20/SanMarino/Ma/San%20Marino-MacDermott-Aff-Jack%20Howe-Round3.docx

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Jack Howe

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Marlborough WR

Kabir Dubey

1ac - us aff v4 1ar - all 2ar - all

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San Marino MaMa

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The Aff is key:First, Unity. Borders fragment Africa, liberalization ensures unity through trade, economic formalization, and uniform governance.

Maunganidze 22

Maunganidze 22 [OTTILIA ANNA MAUNGANIDZE, Ottilia Anna Maunganidze joined the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in 2009, and is currently head of special projects in the office of the executive director, where she explores new areas of work for ISS and informs institutional strategy, worked as a legal advisor in Makhanda and human rights education officer for Amnesty International South Africa, 12 December 2022, ISS Africa, ”Africa’s prosperity depends on free trade and mobility,” https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/africas-prosperity-depends-on-free-trade-and-mobility HKR-MK]

Regional integration is key for Africa’s prosperity. To achieve it, policies, systems and practices must be adopted to reduce barriers to access, facilitate people’s freedom of movement ) aimed at a single African market for goods and services supported by the free movement of people are instrumental. Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment (Free Movement Protocol). Establishing a continental economic community in which goods, services and people move freely is regarded as important in addressing Africa’s developmental challenges and realising the aspirations of Agenda 2063. Mobility is thus intimately intertwined with trade. that, by 2023, people will be able to move freely among member countries, by, among others, eliminating visa requirements for intra-African travel. A 2023 target is also set for completing the first two phases of the AfCFTA. The continent is well on track to achieve the free trade milestone, but free movement of people is lagging. Despite understanding that these elements go hand in hand, the pace of ratification and implementation of the two instruments remains asymmetrical. States show more political will for trade. The AfCFTA is anticipated to transform Africa and be a significant driver of economic growth and industrialisation estimates that intra-African exports by the end of 2021 were only 14.4%. UNECA predicts that the AfCFTA could increase exports by 3%, Informal trade is not included in these statistics. informal cross-border trade is significant and widespread. The value of informal commerce may equal or surpass the value of formal trade for specific goods and countries. African borders are frequently crossed by unregistered companies and informal traders who buy and sell goods throughout the continent. However, accurate data is still lacking. informal cross-border trade ranges from 30% to 72% of formal trade this has important implications for Africa and collecting data on informal cross-border trade will be key to accurately tracing intracontinental trade flows. For fragile and conflict-affected states, informal cross-border trade is particularly significant as formal trade channels may be adversely affected. The former provides traders with a market outside the fragmented and potentially failing domestic market. However, even as most states are on board for the free trade area, a few major regional players continue to dominate intra-African trade. This has led to concerns about the uneven distribution of gains between middle-income countries and smaller economies, particularly the least-developed countries Mobility and free trade Migration also plays a crucial role in Africa’s regional integration agenda, by contributing to socio-economic development in countries of both origin and destination. Some studies definitively show increased bilateral trade between recipient and origin countries due to the presence of migrants in a country. It is clear that establishing linkages through capital investment, philanthropy, knowledge transfer and entrepreneurship is crucial. The diaspora is, thus, a key resource. Studies show increased bilateral trade between countries due to the presence of migrants regular migration could significantly contribute to the development of host countries by providing them with the experience, knowledge and services they require from both skilled and unskilled labour. While the positive impact of migration and trade tends to tilt towards recipient countries, the resultant trade imbalance for origin countries could be rectified through remittances and direct investment. African countries must give each other progressively better access to services within their markets Why free movement? The AU’s Migration Policy Framework and the African Common Position on Migration and Development articulate clearly that Africa can advance economic development through better migration management and governance member states and regional economic communities need to formulate policies that use migration for development. While the Free Movement Protocol is a continental agreement, its effective governance and implementation are national and regional. Already many African countries have participated through RECs in freedom of movement declarations and, thus, are aware of the responsibility that comes with freedom of mobility. For the protocol to be successful, the agreement must be translated and contextualised to take into account domestic realities and the long-term strategy of the continent This includes ways in which its implementation can help to build resilience in Africa for unanticipated mobility and support the transition to a borderless continent. It also extends to providing a framework for policy coherence on the digitalisation of civil registers and helping to meet the long-term aspirations of ‘making Africa a home’. Still, progress on ratifying and implementing the protocol is slow

integration is key policies must facilitate freedom of movement continent on track to free trade but movement lagging these go hand in hand could increase exports Informal trade is 72% trade collecting data key to tracing trade Migration crucial in integration by development in origin and destination bilateral trade due to migrants linkages significantly development of host countries with labour countries give better access to their markets the Common Position and a continental agreement effective governance and implementation build resilience and transition to a borderless continent providing policy coherence

Regional integration is key for Africa’s prosperity. To achieve it, policies, systems and practices must be adopted to reduce barriers to access, facilitate people’s freedom of movement, encourage intraregional trade and develop joint strategies. Processes brokered by the African Union (AU) aimed at a single African market for goods and services supported by the free movement of people are instrumental. In 2018, AU heads of state adopted two complementary instruments. The first was the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement. The second was the Protocol to the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment (Free Movement Protocol). Establishing a continental economic community in which goods, services and people move freely is regarded as important in addressing Africa’s developmental challenges and realising the aspirations of Agenda 2063. Mobility is thus intimately intertwined with trade. Several progressive continental policies strengthen the aims of the AfCFTA and the Free Movement Protocol. These include the Migration Policy Framework for Africa, the Single African Air Transport Market and the AU Strategy for a Better Integrated Border Governance. The AU hopes that, by 2023, people will be able to move freely among member countries, by, among others, eliminating visa requirements for intra-African travel. A 2023 target is also set for completing the first two phases of the AfCFTA. The continent is well on track to achieve the free trade milestone, but free movement of people is lagging. Despite understanding that these elements go hand in hand, the pace of ratification and implementation of the two instruments remains asymmetrical. States show more political will for trade. Unlocking Africa’s potential through trade The AfCFTA is anticipated to transform Africa and be a significant driver of economic growth and industrialisation. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) estimates that intra-African exports by the end of 2021 were only 14.4%. Both UNCTAD and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) believe that the AfCFTA could change this dramatically. Africa is well on track to achieve the free trade milestone, but free movement is lagging UNECA predicts that the AfCFTA could increase exports by 3%, augmenting the value of intra-African trade by between 15% and 25% (US$50 billion and US$70 billion) by 2040. Informal trade is not included in these statistics. In Africa, informal cross-border trade is significant and widespread. The value of informal commerce may equal or surpass the value of formal trade for specific goods and countries. African borders are frequently crossed by unregistered companies and informal traders, especially women, who buy and sell goods throughout the continent. However, accurate data is still lacking. In 2021, UNECA estimates found that informal cross-border trade constituted 7% to 16% of all formal intra-African trade flows. Significantly, between neighbouring countries, informal cross-border trade ranges from 30% to 72% of formal trade. According to UNECA, this has important implications for Africa and collecting data on informal cross-border trade will be key to accurately tracing intracontinental trade flows. For fragile and conflict-affected states, informal cross-border trade is particularly significant as formal trade channels may be adversely affected. The former provides traders with a market outside the fragmented and potentially failing domestic market. However, even as most states are on board for the free trade area, a few major regional players continue to dominate intra-African trade. This has led to concerns about the uneven distribution of gains between middle-income countries and smaller economies, particularly the least-developed countries. Mobility and free trade Migration also plays a crucial role in Africa’s regional integration agenda, by contributing to socio-economic development in countries of both origin and destination. Some studies definitively show increased bilateral trade between recipient and origin countries due to the presence of migrants in a country. It is clear that establishing linkages through capital investment, philanthropy, knowledge transfer and entrepreneurship is crucial. The diaspora is, thus, a key resource. Studies show increased bilateral trade between countries due to the presence of migrants In addition, regular migration could significantly contribute to the development of host countries by providing them with the experience, knowledge and services they require from both skilled and unskilled labour. While the positive impact of migration and trade tends to tilt towards recipient countries, the resultant trade imbalance for origin countries could be rectified through remittances and direct investment. A further dimension is that under the AfCFTA, African countries must give each other progressively better access to services within their markets. In 2018, African member states agreed on five priority services as the starting point for engagement. These are financial services, communication, transport, tourism and business services. By September 2022, initial offers on the trade in services had been received from 43 countries. This means that the continent is on course to finalising this essential element of the process. Why free movement? The AU’s Migration Policy Framework and the African Common Position on Migration and Development articulate clearly that Africa can advance economic development through better migration management and governance. For the AU, member states and regional economic communities (RECs) need to formulate policies that use migration for development. While the Free Movement Protocol is a continental agreement, its effective governance and implementation are national and regional. Already many African countries have participated through RECs in freedom of movement declarations and, thus, are aware of the responsibility that comes with freedom of mobility. For the protocol to be successful, the agreement must be translated and contextualised to take into account domestic realities and the long-term strategy of the continent (and its member states). This includes ways in which its implementation can help to build resilience in Africa for unanticipated mobility and support the transition to a borderless continent. It also extends to providing a framework for policy coherence on the digitalisation of civil registers and helping to meet the long-term aspirations of ‘making Africa a home’. Still, progress on ratifying and implementing the protocol is slow – slower than that for the AfCFTA.

<h4>The Aff is key:First, <u>Unity</u>. Borders fragment Africa, liberalization ensures unity through trade, economic formalization, and uniform governance.</h4><p><strong>Maunganidze 22</strong> [OTTILIA ANNA MAUNGANIDZE, Ottilia Anna Maunganidze joined the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) in 2009, and is currently head of special projects in the office of the executive director, where she explores new areas of work for ISS and informs institutional strategy, worked as a legal advisor in Makhanda and human rights education officer for Amnesty International South Africa, 12 December 2022, ISS Africa, ”Africa’s prosperity depends on free trade and mobility,” https://issafrica.org/pscreport/psc-insights/africas-prosperity-depends-on-free-trade-and-mobility HKR-MK]</p><p><u>Regional <strong><mark>integration</strong> is <strong>key</strong></mark> for Africa’s <strong>prosperity</strong>. To achieve it, <strong><mark>policies</strong></mark>, systems and practices <strong><mark>must</strong></mark> be <strong>adopted</strong> to <strong>reduce barriers</strong> to access, <strong><mark>facilitate</strong></mark> people’s <strong><mark>freedom</strong> of <strong>movement</u></strong></mark>, encourage intraregional trade and develop joint strategies. Processes brokered by the African Union (AU<u>) aimed at a <strong>single</strong> African <strong>market</strong> for goods and services supported by the free movement of people are <strong>instrumental</strong>.</p><p></u>In 2018, AU heads of state adopted two complementary instruments. The first was the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) agreement. The second was the Protocol to the Treaty <u>Establishing the African Economic Community Relating to Free Movement of Persons, Right of Residence and Right of Establishment (Free Movement Protocol).</p><p>Establishing a <strong>continental economic community</strong> in which <strong>goods</strong>, <strong>services</strong> and <strong>people</strong> move freely is regarded as <strong>important</strong> in <strong>addressing</strong> <strong>Africa’s developmental</strong> <strong>challenges</strong> and <strong>realising</strong> the <strong>aspirations</strong> of <strong>Agenda 2063.</strong> <strong>Mobility</strong> is thus <strong>intimately intertwined</strong> with <strong>trade</strong>.</u> Several progressive continental policies strengthen the aims of the AfCFTA and the Free Movement Protocol. These include the Migration Policy Framework for Africa, the Single African Air Transport Market and the AU Strategy for a Better Integrated Border Governance. </p><p>The AU hopes <u>that, by 2023, people will be able to move freely among member countries, by, among others, <strong>eliminating visa requirements</strong> for intra-African travel. A 2023 target is also set for completing the first two phases of the AfCFTA.</p><p>The <mark>continent</mark> is well <strong><mark>on track</strong> to </mark>achieve the <strong><mark>free trade</strong></mark> milestone, <mark>but </mark>free <mark>movement</mark> of people is <strong><mark>lagging</strong></mark>. Despite understanding that <mark>these</mark> elements <mark>go <strong>hand in hand</strong></mark>, the <strong>pace</strong> of <strong>ratification</strong> and <strong>implementation</strong> of the two instruments remains <strong>asymmetrical</strong>. States show more political will for trade.</p><p></u>Unlocking Africa’s potential through trade</p><p><u>The AfCFTA is anticipated to <strong>transform Africa</strong> and be a <strong>significant driver</strong> of economic <strong>growth</strong> and <strong>industrialisation</u></strong>. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) <u>estimates that intra-African exports by the end of 2021 were only 14.4%.</u> Both UNCTAD and the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) believe that the AfCFTA could change this dramatically.</p><p>Africa is well on track to achieve the free trade milestone, but free movement is lagging</p><p><u>UNECA predicts that the AfCFTA <mark>could <strong>increase exports</strong></mark> by 3%,</u> augmenting the value of intra-African trade by between 15% and 25% (US$50 billion and US$70 billion) by 2040. <u><strong><mark>Informal trade</strong></mark> is not included in these statistics.</p><p></u>In Africa, <u>informal cross-border trade <mark>is <strong></mark>significant</strong> and <strong>widespread</strong>. The value of informal commerce may equal or <strong>surpass</strong> the value of <strong>formal trade</strong> for specific goods and countries. African borders are <strong>frequently crossed</strong> by <strong>unregistered</strong> companies and informal traders</u>, especially women, <u>who buy and sell goods throughout the continent. However, accurate data is still lacking.</p><p></u>In 2021, UNECA estimates found that informal cross-border trade constituted 7% to 16% of all formal intra-African trade flows. Significantly, between neighbouring countries, <u>informal cross-border trade ranges from 30% to <strong><mark>72%</strong> </mark>of formal <mark>trade</u></mark>. According to UNECA, <u>this has <strong>important implicati</strong>ons for Africa and <mark>collecting data</mark> on informal cross-border trade will be <mark>key to</mark> <strong>accurately <mark>tracing</strong></mark> intracontinental <strong><mark>trade</strong></mark> flows.</p><p>For fragile and conflict-affected states, informal cross-border trade is particularly significant as <strong>formal trade</strong> channels may be <strong>adversely affected</strong>. The former provides traders with a market <strong>outside</strong> the <strong>fragmented</strong> and <strong>potentially failing</strong> <strong>domestic market</strong>. However, even as most states are on board for the free trade area, a few major <strong>regional players</strong> continue to <strong>dominate</strong> intra-African trade. This has <strong>led to</strong> concerns about the <strong>uneven distribution</strong> of <strong>gains</strong> between middle-income countries and smaller economies, particularly the least-developed countries</u>.</p><p><u>Mobility and free trade</p><p><mark>Migration</mark> also plays a <strong><mark>crucial</strong></mark> role <mark>in</mark> Africa’s <strong>regional <mark>integration</strong></mark> agenda, <mark>by</mark> contributing to socio-economic <strong><mark>development</strong> in</mark> countries of <strong>both</strong> <strong><mark>origin</strong> and <strong>destination</strong></mark>. Some studies <strong>definitively show</strong> increased <strong><mark>bilateral trade</strong></mark> <strong>between</strong> <strong>recipient</strong> and <strong>origin</strong> countries <strong><mark>due to</strong></mark> the presence of <mark>migrants</mark> in a country. It is <strong>clear</strong> that <strong>establishing <mark>linkages</strong></mark> through capital investment, philanthropy, knowledge transfer and entrepreneurship <strong>is crucial</strong>. The diaspora is, thus, a key resource.</p><p>Studies show increased bilateral trade between countries due to the presence of migrants</p><p></u>In addition, <u><strong>regular migration</strong> could <mark>significantly</mark> contribute to the <strong><mark>development</strong> of <strong>host countries</strong></mark> by <strong>providing</strong> them <mark>with</mark> the <strong>experience</strong>, <strong>knowledge</strong> and <strong>services</strong> they <strong>require</strong> from both <strong>skilled</strong> and <strong>unskilled</strong> <strong><mark>labour</strong></mark>. While the positive impact of migration and trade tends to tilt towards recipient countries, the resultant trade <strong>imbalance</strong> for origin countries could be <strong>rectified</strong> through remittances and direct investment.</p><p></u>A further dimension is that under the AfCFTA, <u>African <mark>countries</mark> must <mark>give </mark>each other progressively <strong><mark>better access</strong> to</mark> services within <mark>their <strong>markets</u></strong></mark>. In 2018, African member states agreed on five priority services as the starting point for engagement. These are financial services, communication, transport, tourism and business services. By September 2022, initial offers on the trade in services had been received from 43 countries. This means that the continent is on course to finalising this essential element of the process.</p><p><u>Why free movement?</p><p>The AU’s Migration Policy Framework and <mark>the</mark> African <strong><mark>Common Position</strong></mark> on Migration <mark>and</mark> Development articulate clearly that Africa <strong>can</strong> <strong>advance economic</strong> <strong>development</strong> through better migration management and governance</u>. For the AU, <u>member states and regional economic communities</u> (RECs) <u>need to formulate policies that use migration for development.</p><p>While the Free Movement Protocol is <mark>a <strong>continental agreement</strong></mark>, its <strong><mark>effective governance</strong> and <strong>implementation</strong></mark> are <strong>national</strong> and <strong>regional</strong>. Already many African countries have participated through RECs in freedom of movement declarations and, thus, are aware of the responsibility that comes with freedom of mobility. For the protocol to be successful, the agreement must be translated and contextualised to take into account domestic realities and the long-term strategy of the continent</u> (and its member states).</p><p><u>This includes ways in which its implementation can help to <strong><mark>build resilience</strong></mark> in Africa for <strong>unanticipated mobility</strong> <mark>and <strong></mark>support</strong> the <strong><mark>transition</strong> to a <strong>borderless continent</strong></mark>. It also extends to <strong><mark>providing</strong></mark> a <strong>framework</strong> for<strong> <mark>policy coherence</strong></mark> on the digitalisation of civil registers and helping to <strong>meet</strong> the <strong>long-term</strong> <strong>aspirations</strong> of ‘<strong>making Africa a home’.</strong> Still, <strong>progress on ratifying</strong> and implementing the protocol <strong>is slow</u></strong> – slower than that for the AfCFTA.</p>

r4 westerns vs. marl ms

1AC – Africa v2

1AC---Food

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westerns

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marlborough ms

wang

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2023-03-12 01:06:27

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2] Iterative improvements to movements and politics optimizes advocacy.

Williams 15

Douglas Williams 15, Third-Generation Organizer, BA in Political Science from the University of Minnesota at Morris, MPA from the University of Missouri Columbia, Doctoral Student in Political Science at Wayne State University, internally quoting Freddie DeBoer, Lecturer at Purdue University and PhD in Rhetoric and Composition from Purdue University and MA in English with a Concentration in Writing and Rhetoric from The University of Rhode Island, The South Lawn, https://thesouthlawn.org/2015/03/10/the-dead-end-of-identity-politics/ [language modified]

Freddie DeBoer makes a great point in his piece on what he calls “critique drift“: many in the left have a norm where being an ally means that you never critique people who are speaking from your side especially if speaking from a position of greater oppression. I understand the need for solidarity the problem of undermining and people who have traditionally been silenced should be given a position of privilege But critique drift demonstrates why a [effective] functioning political movement can’t forbid tactical criticism of those with whom you largely agree. Because critical vocabulary and political arguments are common intellectual property which gain or lose power based on their communal use, never criticizing those who misuse them ultimately [undermines] the left. Refusing to say ‘this is a real thing, but you are not being fair or helpful in making that accusation right now’ alienates potential allies, contributes to the burgeoning backlash against social justice politics, and prevents us from making the most accurate, cogent critique possible.” yet we have gotten to a point where any critique of tactics used by oppressed communities can result in being deemed “sexist/racist/insert oppression here-ist” as a world where left-wing activism is made potent and transformative will be one where they cannot simply take comfort in their cocoon

many have a norm where being an ally means you never critique people from your side especially if speaking from a position of oppression But a [effective] movement can’t forbid tactical criticism of those with whom you largely agree never criticizing [undermines] the left. Refusing to say ‘this is real but you are not helpful in making that accusation now’ alienates allies, contributes to backlash against social justice and prevents accurate, cogent critique we have gotten to a point where any critique of tactics can be deemed oppression activism made potent and transformative cannot take comfort in their cocoon

Freddie DeBoer makes a great point in his piece on what he calls “critique drift“: “This all largely descends from a related condition: many in the broad online left have adopted a norm where being an ally means that you never critique people who are presumed to be speaking from your side, and especially if they are seen as speaking from a position of greater oppression. I understand the need for solidarity, I understand the problem of undermining and derailing, and I recognize why people feel strongly that those who have traditionally been silenced should be given a position of privilege in our conversations. But critique drift demonstrates why a [effective] healthy, functioning political movement can’t forbid tactical criticism of those with whom you largely agree. Because critical vocabulary and political arguments are common intellectual property which gain or lose power based on their communal use, never criticizing those who misuse them ultimately disarms [undermines] the left. Refusing to say ‘this is a real thing, but you are not being fair or helpful in making that accusation right now’ alienates potential allies, contributes to the burgeoning backlash against social justice politics, and prevents us from making the most accurate, cogent critique possible.” Look, I am Black. Also, sometimes, I can be wrong. Those two things are not mutually exclusive, and yet we have gotten to a point where any critique of tactics used by oppressed communities can result in being deemed “sexist/racist/insert oppression here-ist” and cast out of the Social Justice Magic Circle. And listen, maybe that is cool with some folks. Maybe the revolution that so many of these types speak about will simply consist of everyone spontaneously coming to consciousness and there will be no need for coalitions, give-and-take, or contact with people who do not know every word or phrase that these groups use as some sort of litmus test for the unwashed. But for the rest of us who reside in a reality-based world, where every social interaction is not tailored for your idiosyncratic indignations, we know that casting folks out for the tiniest of offenses will lead to a Left that will forever be marginalized and ineffective. I have stated before that the kind of people who put out these lists and engage in the kind of identitarian caterwauling that has become rote copy on the Internet might actually want that, as a world where left-wing activism is made potent and transformative will be one where they cannot simply take comfort in their cocoon of self-righteousness. But damn them when I can turn on my computer and see one Black person after another being gunned down by police. Damn them when we have a president that can sit there with a straight face and speak the words of freedom and liberation while using the power at his disposal to deny those very concepts to others. And damn them when we can get thousands of words on Patricia Arquette drunk at a party or how it is privileged to not like the same musicians that they do, but we cannot seem to get any thoughts on how the biggest moment for communities of color since the 1960s is being squandered in a hail of intergenerational squabbling. And do not even get me started on people writing articles that malign long-standing activist organizations without a whiff of evidence that there has been any wrongdoing on their part.

<h4>2] Iterative improvements to movements and politics optimizes advocacy. </h4><p>Douglas <strong>Williams 15</strong>, Third-Generation Organizer, BA in Political Science from the University of Minnesota at Morris, MPA from the University of Missouri Columbia, Doctoral Student in Political Science at Wayne State University, internally quoting Freddie DeBoer, Lecturer at Purdue University and PhD in Rhetoric and Composition from Purdue University and MA in English with a Concentration in Writing and Rhetoric from The University of Rhode Island, The South Lawn, https://thesouthlawn.org/2015/03/10/the-dead-end-of-identity-politics/ [language modified]</p><p><u>Freddie DeBoer makes a great point in his piece on what he calls “critique drift“:</p><p></u>“This all largely descends from a related condition: <u><mark>many</mark> in the</u> broad online <u>left <mark>have</u></mark> adopted <u><mark>a norm where being an ally means</mark> that <mark>you never critique people</mark> who are</u> presumed to be <u>speaking <mark>from your side</u></mark>, and <u><mark>especially if</u></mark> they are seen as <u><mark>speaking from a position of</mark> greater <mark>oppression</mark>. I understand the need for solidarity</u>, I understand <u>the problem of undermining</u> and derailing, <u>and</u> I recognize why <u>people</u> feel strongly that those <u>who have traditionally been silenced should be given a position of privilege</u> in our conversations. <u><mark>But</mark> critique drift demonstrates why <mark>a [effective]</u></mark> healthy, <u>functioning political <mark>movement <strong>can’t forbid</strong> <strong>tactical criticism</strong> of those with whom you largely agree</mark>. Because critical vocabulary and political arguments are common intellectual property which gain or lose power based on their communal use, <mark>never criticizing</mark> those who misuse them ultimately </u>disarms <u><mark>[undermines] the left. Refusing to say ‘<strong>this</strong> is</mark> a <mark>real</mark> thing, <mark>but you are not</mark> being fair or <mark>helpful in making <strong>that</strong> accusation</mark> right <mark>now’ alienates</mark> potential <mark>allies, contributes to</mark> the burgeoning <mark>backlash against social justice</mark> politics, <mark>and prevents</mark> us from making the most <strong><mark>accurate, cogent critique</strong></mark> possible.”</p><p></u>Look, I am Black. Also, sometimes, I can be wrong. Those two things are not mutually exclusive, and <u>yet <mark>we have gotten to a point where any critique of tactics</mark> used by oppressed communities <mark>can</mark> result in <mark>be</mark>ing <mark>deemed</mark> “sexist/racist/insert <mark>oppression</mark> here-ist”</u> and cast out of the Social Justice Magic Circle. And listen, maybe that is cool with some folks. Maybe the revolution that so many of these types speak about will simply consist of everyone spontaneously coming to consciousness and there will be no need for coalitions, give-and-take, or contact with people who do not know every word or phrase that these groups use as some sort of litmus test for the unwashed.</p><p>But for the rest of us who reside in a reality-based world, where every social interaction is not tailored for your idiosyncratic indignations, we know that casting folks out for the tiniest of offenses will lead to a Left that will forever be marginalized and ineffective. I have stated before that the kind of people who put out these lists and engage in the kind of identitarian caterwauling that has become rote copy on the Internet might actually want that, <u>as a world where left-wing <mark>activism</mark> is <mark>made <strong>potent</strong> and <strong>transformative</strong></mark> will be one where they <mark>cannot</mark> simply <mark>take comfort in their cocoon</u></mark> of self-righteousness. But damn them when I can turn on my computer and see one Black person after another being gunned down by police. Damn them when we have a president that can sit there with a straight face and speak the words of freedom and liberation while using the power at his disposal to deny those very concepts to others. And damn them when we can get thousands of words on Patricia Arquette drunk at a party or how it is privileged to not like the same musicians that they do, but we cannot seem to get any thoughts on how the biggest moment for communities of color since the 1960s is being squandered in a hail of intergenerational squabbling. And do not even get me started on people writing articles that malign long-standing activist organizations without a whiff of evidence that there has been any wrongdoing on their part.</p>

1NC – Quarters

1NC---OFF

1NC – CP

./documents/hsld22/DurhamAcademy/SaAg/DurhamAcademy-SaAg-Neg-Isidore-Newman-School-Invitational-Quarters.docx

N

Isidore Newman School Invitational

Quarters

Coppell HA

Harun Vemulapalli, Ashish Wadhwani, Angela Zhong

1AC – QME 1NC – T Framework Frame Subtraction CP Case 1AR – All 2NR – T Framework Case 2AR – Case T Framework

hsld22/DurhamAcademy/SaAg/DurhamAcademy-SaAg-Neg-Isidore-Newman-School-Invitational-Quarters.docx

2022-12-11 17:58:19

SaAg

Durham Academy SaAg

Phone: 919-797-8192 FB: Sachin Aggarwal Email: [email protected] circuitdebater.org

Sa.....

Ag.....

DurhamAcademy

Durham Academy

NC

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

ld

hs

2] Extinction outweighs

Pummer 15

Pummer 15 [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015, Moral Agreement on Saving the World | Practical Ethics (ox.ac.uk)] brett

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now : that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations goodness of outcomes it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists that is a huge mistake Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than consequences it is not the view that the latter don’t matter All ethical doctrines take consequences into account in judging rightness Minimally plausible versions of deontology must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. even if we are only 1% sure well-being of future people matters from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness seem to be fairly implausible views. even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.

in philosophy disagreements are deep and irresolvable one thing to agree on is reducing existential risk there are trillions possible future people to assume it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists is a huge mistake Non-consequentialism is the view there’s more that determines rightness than consequences not that the latter don’t matter We should take into account moral uncertainty when one is uncertain about moral facts even if we are only 1% sure well-being matters reducing existential risk is most important

There appears to be lot of disagreement in moral philosophy. Whether these many apparent disagreements are deep and irresolvable, I believe there is at least one thing it is reasonable to agree on right now, whatever general moral view we adopt: that it is very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war. How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that we – whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists – should all agree that we should try to save the world. According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here. If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how reducing existential risk is easily the most important thing in the whole world. This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many possible future people that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world, even if the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people. Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. There is a tendency to assume that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations (the goodness of outcomes), it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists. But that is a huge mistake. Non-consequentialism is the view that there’s more that determines rightness than the goodness of consequences or outcomes; it is not the view that the latter don’t matter. Even John Rawls wrote, “All ethical doctrines worth our attention take consequences into account in judging rightness. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” Minimally plausible versions of deontology and virtue ethics must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being. To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk. Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. We should also take into account moral uncertainty. What is it reasonable for one to do, when one is uncertain not (only) about the empirical facts, but also about the moral facts? I’ve just argued that there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree. But even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one (and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk. Perhaps most disturbingly still, even if we are only 1% sure that the well-being of possible future people matters, it is at least arguable that, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, reducing existential risk is the most important thing in the world. Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world. While there are some non-crazy views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless seem to be fairly implausible views. And even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve. Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)

<h4>2] Extinction outweighs</h4><p><strong>Pummer 15</strong> [Theron, Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Anne's College, University of Oxford. “Moral Agreement on Saving the World” Practical Ethics, University of Oxford. May 18, 2015, Moral Agreement on Saving the World | Practical Ethics (ox.ac.uk)] brett</p><p><u>There appears to be lot of disagreement <mark>in</mark> moral <mark>philosophy</mark>. Whether these many apparent <mark>disagreements are</mark> <strong><mark>deep and irresolvable</strong></mark>, I believe there is at least <mark>one thing</mark> it is reasonable <mark>to agree on</mark> right now</u>, whatever general moral view we adopt<u>: that it <mark>is</mark> very important to reduce the risk that all intelligent beings on this planet are eliminated by an enormous catastrophe, such as a nuclear war.</u> How we might in fact try to reduce such existential risks is discussed elsewhere. My claim here is only that <u>we – <strong>whether we’re consequentialists, deontologists, or virtue ethicists</strong> – should all agree that <strong>we should try to save the world</strong>. </u>According to consequentialism, we should maximize the good, where this is taken to be the goodness, from an impartial perspective, of outcomes. <u>Clearly one thing that makes an outcome good is that the people in it are doing well. There is little disagreement here.</u><strong> </strong>If the happiness or well-being of possible future people is just as important as that of people who already exist, and if they would have good lives, it is not hard to see how<strong> <u></strong><mark>reducing existential risk</mark> is easily the most important thing in the whole world.</u><strong> </strong>This is for the familiar reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – <u><mark>there are trillions </mark>upon trillions… upon trillions. There are so many <mark>possible future people</u><strong></mark> </strong>that reducing existential risk is arguably the most important thing in the world,<strong> <u></strong>even if</u><strong> <u></strong>the well-being of these possible people were given only 0.001% as much weight as that of existing people</u><strong>.</strong> Even on a wholly person-affecting view – according to which there’s nothing (apart from effects on existing people) to be said in favor of creating happy people – the case for reducing existential risk is very strong. As noted in this seminal paper, this case is strengthened by the fact that there’s a good chance that many existing people will, with the aid of life-extension technology, live very long and very high quality lives. You might think what I have just argued applies to consequentialists only. <u>There is a tendency <mark>to assume</mark> that, if an argument appeals to consequentialist considerations</u> (the <u>goodness of outcomes</u>), <u><mark>it is irrelevant to non-consequentialists</u></mark>. But <u><strong>that <mark>is a huge mistake</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Non-consequentialism is the view</mark> that <mark>there’s more that determines rightness than</u></mark> the goodness of <u><mark>consequences</u></mark> or outcomes; <u>it is <mark>not</mark> the view <mark>that the latter don’t matter</u></mark>. Even John Rawls wrote, “<u>All ethical doctrines</u> worth our attention <u>take consequences into account in judging rightness</u>. One which did not would simply be irrational, crazy.” <u>Minimally plausible versions of deontology</u> and virtue ethics <u>must be concerned in part with promoting the good, from an impartial point of view</u>. They’d thus imply very strong reasons to reduce existential risk, at least when this doesn’t significantly involve doing harm to others or damaging one’s character. What’s even more surprising, perhaps, is that even if our own good (or that of those near and dear to us) has much greater weight than goodness from the impartial “point of view of the universe,” indeed even if the latter is entirely morally irrelevant, we may nonetheless have very strong reasons to reduce existential risk. <u>Even egoism, the view that each agent should maximize her own good, might imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk.</u> It will depend, among other things, on what one’s own good consists in. If well-being consisted in pleasure only, it is somewhat harder to argue that egoism would imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk – perhaps we could argue that one would maximize her expected hedonic well-being by funding life extension technology or by having herself cryogenically frozen at the time of her bodily death as well as giving money to reduce existential risk (so that there is a world for her to live in!). I am not sure, however, how strong the reasons to do this would be. But views which imply that, if I don’t care about other people, I have no or very little reason to help them are not even minimally plausible views (in addition to hedonistic egoism, I here have in mind views that imply that one has no reason to perform an act unless one actually desires to do that act). <u>To be minimally plausible, egoism will need to be paired with a more sophisticated account of well-being.</u> To see this, it is enough to consider, as Plato did, the possibility of a ring of invisibility – <u>suppose that, while wearing it, Ayn could derive some pleasure by helping the poor, but instead could derive just a bit more by severely harming them. Hedonistic egoism would absurdly imply she should do the latter. To avoid this implication, egoists would need to build something like the meaningfulness of a life into well-being</u>, in some robust way, where this would to a significant extent be a function of other-regarding concerns (see chapter 12 of this classic intro to ethics). But <u>once these elements are included, we can (roughly, as above) argue that this sort of egoism will imply strong reasons to reduce existential risk.</u> Add to all of this Samuel Scheffler’s recent intriguing arguments (quick podcast version available here) that most of what makes our lives go well would be undermined if there were no future generations of intelligent persons. On his view, my life would contain vastly less well-being if (say) a year after my death the world came to an end. So obviously if Scheffler were right I’d have very strong reason to reduce existential risk. <u><strong><mark>We should </mark>also<mark> take into account moral uncertainty</mark>.</u></strong> <u>What is it reasonable for one to do, <mark>when one is uncertain</mark> not (only) about the empirical facts, but also <mark>about</mark> the <mark>moral facts</mark>?</u> I’ve just argued that <u>there’s agreement among minimally plausible ethical views that we have strong reason to reduce existential risk – not only consequentialists, but also deontologists, virtue ethicists, and sophisticated egoists should agree.</u> But <u>even those (hedonistic egoists) who disagree should have a significant level of confidence that they are mistaken, and that one of the above views is correct. Even if they were 90% sure that their view is the correct one </u>(and 10% sure that one of these other ones is correct), <u>they would have pretty strong reason, from the standpoint of moral uncertainty, to reduce existential risk.</u><strong> </strong>Perhaps most disturbingly still, <u><mark>even if we are only 1% sure</u></mark> that the <u><mark>well-being</mark> of</u> possible <u>future people <mark>matters</u></mark>, it is at least arguable that, <u>from the standpoint of <strong>moral uncertainty</strong>, <mark>reducing existential risk is</mark> the <mark>most important</mark> thing in the world</u>.<strong> </strong>Again, this is largely for the reason that there are so many people who could exist in the future – there are trillions upon trillions… upon trillions. (For more on this and other related issues, see this excellent dissertation). Of course, it is uncertain whether these untold trillions would, in general, have good lives. It’s possible they’ll be miserable. <u>It is enough for my claim that there is moral agreement in the relevant sense if</u>, at least given certain empirical claims about what future lives would most likely be like, <u><strong>all minimally plausible moral views would converge on the conclusion that we should try to save the world</strong>.</u> While there are some non-crazy <u>views that place significantly greater moral weight on avoiding suffering than on promoting happiness</u>, for reasons others have offered (and for independent reasons I won’t get into here unless requested to), they nonetheless <u>seem to be fairly implausible views.</u> And <u>even if things did not go well for our ancestors, I am optimistic that they will overall go fantastically well for our descendants, if we allow them to. I suspect that most of us alive today – at least those of us not suffering from extreme illness or poverty – have lives that are well worth living, and that things will continue to improve.</u> Derek Parfit, whose work has emphasized future generations as well as agreement in ethics, described our situation clearly and accurately: “We live during the hinge of history. <u>Given the scientific and technological discoveries of the last two centuries, the world has never changed as fast. </u>We shall soon have even greater powers to transform, not only our surroundings, but ourselves and our successors. <u>If we act wisely in the next few centuries, humanity will survive its most dangerous and decisive period. </u>Our descendants could, if necessary, go elsewhere, spreading through this galaxy…. <u>Our descendants might, I believe, make the further future very good. But that good future may also depend in part on us. If our selfish recklessness ends human history, we would be acting very wrongly.</u><strong>” (From chapter 36 of On What Matters)</p></strong>

I affirm the resolution Resolved: The justices of the Supreme Court of the United States ought to be term-limited.

./documents/hsld22/ClearLake/GeRi/ClearLake-GeRi-Aff-TFA-State-Round-1.docx

A

TFA State

1

StAgn Ella Huang

Quisenberry

1AC: fem, public trust, polarization 1NC/NR: T, cap k, case 1AR: T, response to k, extend fem and public trust 2NR: T, cap K 2AR: T, cap K, fem/public trust

hsld22/ClearLake/GeRi/ClearLake-GeRi-Aff-TFA-State-Round-1.docx

2023-03-10 01:20:12

GeRi

Clear Lake GeRi

Genevieve (I go by Gigi) Rishikof --- she/her Contact: (832) 857-6044 (preferred) [email protected] --- email (or text) me for disclosure, I will not send unless contacted

Ge.....

Ri.....

ClearLake

Clear Lake

TX

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

ld

hs

Making impactful contributions demands causal policy relevance AND methodological pluralism---that is the only way to draw accurate contextual conclusions and prevent violent, imprecise reification.

Desch 19 J. Dee Professor of International Relations at Notre Dame and founding director of the Notre Dame International Security Center, former Professor and Director of the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, #gocats. 2019. “Conclusions, Responses to Objections, and Scholarly Recommendations.” Cult of the Irrelevant: The Waning Influence of Social Science on National Security, Princeton University Press.

Michael C. Desch 19. Packey J. Dee Professor of International Relations at Notre Dame and founding director of the Notre Dame International Security Center, former Professor and Director of the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, #gocats. 2019. “Conclusions, Responses to Objections, and Scholarly Recommendations.” Cult of the Irrelevant: The Waning Influence of Social Science on National Security, Princeton University Press.

I am not arguing that scholarship that is formal or quantitative is by definition irrelevant When applied to economic issues, the discipline of economics has managed to be both highly “scientific” and, at times, quite relevant, though for both good and ill. Likewise, there are examples of highly quantitative political science that policymakers have found useful. Nor is this in any way a brief against theory everyone uses theory “it seems obvious that all thinking involves notions of how and why things happen. Instead I offer simply a critique of the increasing tendency to embrace methods for their own sake rather than because they can help us answer questions This inclination is reinforced by intellectual culture. As a result political scientists have committed themselves to particular methods not so much because they believe they will illuminate real-world policy problems but because they dovetail with a particular image This imposes costs on society when it excludes a more balanced approach to rigor and relevance of the sort that characterized the subfield of security studies in the past policymakers need academic expertise because they have to make decisions about issues and areas of the world “about which they cannot be expert and learned.” They depend on the academy for the raw data—whether quantitative or historical—that they use in decision making. They also rely on the social sciences for the theories they use to analyze and make sense of this data. The problem with relying exclusively on in-house government research to make up for the lack of policy-relevant academic research is that it is often of low quality. The role of the “independent policy analyst” is essential for three reasons: can challenge basic policy assumptions undertake “research which does not necessarily take the mission of the military for granted and admits the possibility U.S. may be wrong” And academic social scientists are particularly well suited to this role by virtue of the fact that they both conduct research and also teach future policymakers. They have the time to develop greater depth of knowledge The institution of tenure also gives them the freedom to explore controversial issues and take unpopular stands And while peer review can homogenize and narrow scholarship, it also plays an indisputably positive role in advancing it. Finally, university-based scholars have less of a vested interest in certain policies and programs I am not suggesting, of course, that scholars would make better policy than bureaucrats and elected officials. They lack inside knowledge, have little actual power, and are often politically out of step with the rest of American society. Rather our democratic political system depends on groups with various strengths and weaknesses offsetting each other’s limitations We run into trouble when we lack one of these perspectives in policy debates. Indeed in Vietnam and Iraq had the majority consensus of scholars influenced policy national interest would have been better served the flawed Iraq War debate bankrupt in national security affairs our political problems run much deeper than just the Beltway/Ivory Tower gap, but closing it would represent an important step in the country’s intellectual recapitalization No arrangement for the perpetuation of thought is secure if that thought does not make contact with the problems that it is presumed to solve the hyperspecialization of knowledge today makes it difficult for even scholars in related disciplines to understand each other, much less the general public Such intellectual fragmentation makes the application of scholarly knowledge to policymaking extremely difficult Therefore, a deeper and more regular engagement between the Ivory Tower and the Beltway will be mutually beneficial even the most sophisticated social science will be judged by what it tells us about things that affect the lives of large numbers of people and which policymakers seek to influence The recurrent congressional debates about National Science Foundation funding for political science highlight the direct costs to the discipline of not being able to justify itself in terms of broader impact on the rest of society When the academy fails it can undermine support Political science’s subfield of international security studies can plausibly claim to save large amounts of money and even lives and so its increasing marginalization is a self-inflicted wound on the discipline. There are nuts-and-bolts issues that scholars should be mindful of if they want to participate in the broader policy debate policymakers find much current scholarly work inaccessible scholars should cut jargon political science needs to rethink how it balances rigor with practical application. There is a middle ground between policy analysis and journalism and scholastic irrelevance The best approach is methodological pluralism, which includes a commitment to using not any particular method or all of them but rather just the approach most appropriate for the question at hand reinforcing methodological pluralism must also be a commitment to problem-, rather than method-, driven research agendas. It is only the combination of these principles that will ensure that policy-relevant security studies can survive While there is no doubt that theory is important to policymakers, scholars need to be aware that as with many other things, too much can be bad In particular, the effort to cram the rich complexity of the social world into universal models can do intellectual violence to the phenomenon under study as well as produce suboptimal policy [theoretical] oversimplification presents great dangers Theory is a powerful tool but when scholars embrace universal models they also risk irrelevance or worse While nonacademic transmission belts can mediate between the Ivory Tower and the Beltway, they are no substitute for the scholars who produce knowledge to themselves serve as their own translators of it into policy. To be sure, scholars should not stop writing scholarly books and monographs In addition to doing these things, scholars should address real world problems, not just chase after disciplinary fads. No one is in a better position to highlight the policy implications of a given piece of research than the individual who conducted it Drawing on DPT, some officials in the George W. Bush administration justified the invasion of Iraq as part of a larger strategy to bring peace to the region by spreading democracy.82 Democratic Peace proponent Bruce Russett objected to this conclusion after the fact though his voice had been largely mute in the run up to the war.83 Had he and other democracy scholars participated more actively in the prewar debate, this rationale may have been less credible. Academics also need to develop a more nuanced appreciation of the various influences on policy. Many, even in democratic political systems, tend to have an unrealistically “technocratic” attitude toward policymaking. 84 They often underestimate the role of politics in government decision making. Scholars must therefore understand that the policymaking process is inherently political and that without such an appreciation of the political considerations associated with any policy choice, even a good one may not be implemented.85

I critique the tendency to embrace methods for their own sake rather than because they help answer questions intellectual culture have committed to methods not believe they illuminate policy problems but because they dovetail with a particular image This costs society academic expertise to make decisions the “independent policy analyst” is essential can challenge basic policy assumptions undertake “research which does not take the military for granted and admits the U.S. may be wrong” academic social scientists are particularly well suited They have time to develop greater depth tenure gives freedom to explore controversial issues our political system depends on groups offsetting each other’s limitations in Vietnam and Iraq had scholars influenced policy national interest would have been better served No arrangement for thought is secure if thought does not contact the problems it is presumed to solve political science needs to rethink how it balances rigor with practical application The best approach is methodological pluralism, which using not any particular method but the approach most appropriate for the question reinforcing pluralism must be a commitment to problem-, rather than method-, driven research While theory is important too much can be bad effort to cram the rich complexity of the social world into universal models can do intellectual violence to the phenomenon under study as well as produce suboptimal policy oversimplification presents dangers universal models risk irrelevance or worse nonacademic transmission are no substitute for the scholars who produce knowledge to themselves serve as translators into policy Academics need to develop nuanced appreciation of the influences on policy

I want to reiterate that I am not arguing that scholarship that is formal or quantitative is by definition irrelevant. Indeed, one can point to examples of both that are. When applied to economic issues, the discipline of economics has managed to be both highly “scientific” and, at times, quite relevant, though for both good and ill. Likewise, there are examples of highly quantitative political science that policymakers have found useful.1 Finally, there is much nonquantitative scholarship, particularly but not exclusively in the humanities that, is jargon laden and otherwise inaccessible to a wider audience, including government policymakers.2 This is by no means an anti-social science methods screed, just a reminder of the tensions between rigor and relevance that need to managed rather than assumed away. Nor is this in any way a brief against theory. Former State Department official Roger Hilsman reminded us that everyone, including policymakers, uses theory. Paraphrasing John Maynard Keynes, he concluded that “it seems obvious that all thinking involves notions of how and why things happen. Even the ‘practical’ man who despises theory has a number of assumptions and expectations which lead him to believe that when certain things are done, certain results follow.. . .It is this ‘theory’ that helps a problem solver select from the mass of facts surrounding him those which he hopes are relevant.”3 Given that, I fully associate myself with Hans Morgenthau’s balanced view that “theory without verification is metaphysics, but empiricism without theory is aimless.”4 Since policymakers implicitly use theory in analyzing situations and assessing their alternatives, such theories should be stated explicitly and analyzed systematically, which is a comparative advantage of the scholars. Instead, what I offer is simply a critique of the increasing tendency of many social scientists to embrace methods and models for their own sake rather than because they can help us answer substantively important questions. This inclination is in part the result of the otherwise normal and productive workings of science, but is also reinforced by less positive factors such as organizational self-interest and intellectual culture. As a result of the latter, many political scientists have committed themselves to particular social science methods not so much because they believe they will illuminate real-world policy problems but because they serve a vested interest in disciplinary autonomy and dovetail with a particular image (mathematized and model-based) of what a “science” of politics should look like. In other words, the professionalization of social science is the root of the enduring relevance question. This tendency to equate rigor with technique imposes costs on the rest of society as well as the discipline, especially when it excludes a more balanced approach to rigor and relevance of the sort that characterized the subfield of security studies in the past. On the former, as diplomat George Kennan rightly observed, policymakers need academic expertise because they have to make decisions about issues and areas of the world “about which they cannot be expert and learned.”5 They depend on the academy for the raw data—whether quantitative or historical—that they use in decision making. They also rely on the social sciences for the theories they use to analyze and make sense of this data. The problem with relying exclusively on in-house government research to make up for the lack of policy-relevant academic research is that it is often of low quality. The role of the “independent policy analyst” is essential for three reasons: 6 He or she can challenge basic policy assumptions. As RAND’s Hans Spier put it, they can undertake “research which does not necessarily take the mission of the military for granted and admits the possibility U.S. may be wrong”7 And academic social scientists are particularly well suited to this role by virtue of the fact that they both conduct research and also teach future policymakers. Academics have some other advantages over policymakers. They have the time to develop greater depth of knowledge on issues and regions than most policymakers can. The institution of tenure also gives them, at least in theory, the freedom to explore controversial issues and take unpopular stands. And while peer review can homogenize and narrow scholarship, it also plays an indisputably positive role in advancing it. Finally, university-based scholars have less of a vested interest in certain policies and programs than do policymakers, though of course that is not to deny that they have their own institutional interests and biases.9 I am not suggesting, of course, that scholars would make better policy than bureaucrats and elected officials. They lack inside knowledge, have little actual power, and are often politically out of step with the rest of American society.10 They also come to policy issues with a markedly different intellectual orientation than policymakers.11 Rather, my point is simply that our democratic political system depends on the successful functioning of the marketplace of ideas and checks and balances in which individuals and groups with various strengths and weaknesses and offsetting biases participate in the larger policy debate, thereby compensating for each other’s limitations.12 We run into trouble when we lack one of these perspectives in policy debates. Indeed, there are instances—the war in Vietnam and the recent Iraq War—in which had the majority consensus of scholars in academia influenced policy, the country’s national interest would have been better served. As the flawed Iraq War debate demonstrates, our nation’s marketplace of ideas is bankrupt, particularly in national security affairs.13 Of course, our political problems run much deeper than just the Beltway/Ivory Tower gap, but closing it would represent an important step in the country’s intellectual recapitalization. This nation’s universities need to reclaim their place as one of society’s main sources of independent ideas about the problems that it faces.14 Less widely recognized, and perhaps more controversial given the prevailing sentiments in the Academy for a sharp distinction between “science” and “policy,” is my contention that the growing gap is ultimately bad for the generation of new knowledge. There are at least two reasons why greater attention to policy relevance produces better scholarship. First, it leads to more realistic theorizing. As John Kenneth Galbraith warned his economics colleagues nearly forty years ago, “No arrangement for the perpetuation of thought is secure if that thought does not make contact with the problems that it is presumed to solve.”15 Second, a focus on manipulatable variables makes it more likely that they are testable because the analyst can ensure variation on them. Also, the hyperspecialization of knowledge today makes it difficult for even scholars in related disciplines to understand each other, much less the general public. Such intellectual fragmentation makes the application of scholarly knowledge to policymaking extremely difficult. Therefore, a deeper and more regular engagement between the Ivory Tower and the Beltway will be mutually beneficial for both sides.16 Ultimately, even the most sophisticated social science will be judged by what it tells us about things that affect the lives of large numbers of people and which policymakers therefore seek to influence and control.17 The recurrent congressional debates about National Science Foundation funding for political science highlight the direct costs to the discipline of not being able to justify itself in terms of broader impact on the rest of society. Harkening back to the debate about the Mansfield Amendment, an article in Science cautioned that “to the extent that the research community disdains work on major national missions or behaves self-servingly in mission-oriented work, anti-intellectualism will increase its influence on the fate of American science.”18 Also, public and philanthropic community support for investment in academia generally reflects the belief that it will produce work that will speak to problems of broader importance. When the academy fails on that score, it can undermine that support.19 Political science’s subfield of international security studies can plausibly claim to save large amounts of money and even lives and so its increasing marginalization is a self-inflicted wound on the discipline. Response to Objections There are at least eight reasonable, though ultimately unpersuasive, objections to my argument that we should consider. First, some point to the influence of the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) on the Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama administrations as evidence that one of the most scientific of social science theories in international relations was both useful and influential among policymakers.20 The argument that democracies are unlikely to go to war with each other gained currency among social scientists based on statistical analysis of every major interstate war since 1815. In the words of Rutgers political scientist Jack Levy, the Democratic Peace Theory is “as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations.”21 Two scholars argued that the theory became relevant outside of the academy precisely “because of the law-like status of a particular empirical finding.”22 Others hold it up as a model of how basic research in political science can contribute to policymakers.23 It is not clear, though, that the influence of the DPT on recent U.S. foreign policy was due to its unassailable social scientific standing. While former Defense Department official and Ohio State political scientist Joseph Kruzel conceded that DPT “had substantial impact on public policy,” he attributed its attractiveness to policymakers to its simplicity rather than its social scientific rigor.24 It clearly identifies America’s enemies (nondemocratic states) and prescribed a simple response to them (make them democratic). It is also likely that the much less methodologically sophisticated articulation of the theory in the work of Michael Doyle was far more influential.25 And the process by which DPT entered the Clinton White House did not involve sophisticated social science. Rather, the key administration proponent of the democratic peace was National Security Advisor (and former college professor) Anthony Lake.26 It is clear, however, that to the extent that Lake was drawing support for the democratic peace from academic sources, it was not from statistically based research, but rather from the qualitative work of scholars like Harvard’s Samuel Huntington.27 The results of a survey of senior national security policymakers found that more than half of those familiar with the methodologically sophisticated democratic peace theory reported not being influenced by it in their government work.28 Finally, one could argue that U.S. policymakers have embraced the democratic peace because of its compatibility with our political culture rather than its scientific standing.29 A second, and in some ways, flip side of the first critique, is that the relevance problem with contemporary security studies is the result of the subfield’s domination by realism, and particularly its most abstruse and theoretical manifestation, neorealism.30 Critics point particularly to neorealist arguments that tout the virtues of nuclear proliferation as examples of theoretically elegant but politically unacceptable social science.31 Despite its respectability among scholars, neorealist proliferation optimism has reportedly had little influence on actual policy.32 While that particular policy issue may not have been influenced by realist thinking, as this book has shown realists have remained committed to policy relevance at times when the rest of the discipline has eschewed it. And they have more often been on the right side of policy debates as well.33 A third potential challenge to my argument is that many social scientists believe that they should avoid offering policy recommendations in favoring of focusing on basic research tasks such as identifying empirical regularities and offering generalizations to explain them.34 As Dartmouth political scientist Kalman Silvert warned, “It is not the legitimate role of the social scientist as scholar to advocate specific courses of governmental action or to act as implementer of government decisions.”35 Another rationale is that doing so is unnecessary given that the applied implications of basic research tend to trickle down by themselves.36 Policy engagement—particularly offering explicit policy recommendations—is both unwise and unnecessary in the view of many social scientists. Neither of these views, however, are shared by policymakers. Most believe that in addition to providing basic research findings, “scientists must explicitly define the linkage, whether immediate or remote, of the knowledge acquired or being acquired, to specific operational problems and continually assess the import of such knowledge to solution of the problems.”37 Nor are current and former policymakers sanguine about the trickle-down (or bubble-up in which senior policymakers get the results of scholarly work through their methodologically savvy staffs) process. As John K. Plank of the Brookings Institution, a former DoD official, recollected, “There is presumably a process whereby the research product is filtered up to [senior policymakers], but in point of fact very little of operational usefulness is transmitted.”38 Fourth, some political scientists believe that there are now so many new outlets for scholars to engage in the policy debate, it is both easier for them to do so and also unnecessary for them to concern themselves with doing so in their scholarship.39 Academics can now publish basic research in scholarly venues and then disseminate its applied implications through the new media. George Washington political scientist and blogger Marc Lynch effused that with the rise of the new media “this is in most ways a golden age for policy-relevant public spheres.”40 Indeed, many see the proliferation of new media outlets as the answer to political science’s perennial problem: its diminished public profile.41 The assumption here is that political scientists are simply not communicating their results effectively. There are three problems with these arguments: Until recently, we had no idea whether blogs and other new media reached policymakers. As one optimist conceded, we have “no solid statistics” on our impact.42 But we do now and it suggests that blogs and other new media are in fact not an important source of information for policymakers and therefore are unlikely to effectively convey the implications of basic research to policymakers, the media, or the general public.43 Moreover, even if a few blogs get some attention, many others do not, simply making more noise in an already cacophonous marketplace of ideas.44 And suggesting that the failure of communication argument misses the mark, Social Science Research Council president Craig Calhoun noted that scholarly “engagement with public constituencies must move beyond a dissemination model” that assumes that “pure research” will naturally triclde down, even with better communication.45 In other words, it is not the medium that matters as much as the message. And the message must be made more intelligible and useful to policymakers and the general public. Finally, there is systematic evidence that academic bloggers and scholars who utilize other new media venues receive little professional credit for them in the critical areas of promotion and tenure.46 In short, despite the explosive growth of new media outlets, professional incentives still do not encourage scholars to use them. A fifth conceivable objection is that advanced social science techniques and basic research will eventually become more useful to policymakers as they (or at least their staffs) become more sophisticated in their understanding of them. One optimist, for example, noted that most graduate public policy schools now include one or two required courses in economics and social science methods in their curricula. As these increasingly methodologically savvy young bureaucrats become senior policymakers, so this argument goes, they will be more adept at using them and more appreciative of their policy relevance.47 However, this argument assumes that training in advanced research techniques is a recent development. Policy schools, however, have long had methods courses as part of their required curriculum. Even prior to this, many national security policymakers came out of academic Ph.D. programs in which they were exposed to the latest innovations in social science methodology. It also ignores that the security studies subfield played a leading role in developing many of these sophisticated social science techniques, particularly at RAND in the 1950s.48 An example of the reverse flow of ideas from the policy world to the Academy was the “unquestionably” leading role that RAND mathematicians and other social scientists played in the development of game theory, a mathematical framework for strategizing under uncertainty.49 Despite early enthusiasm, many at RAND concluded that game theory had an Achilles Heel in its application to national security policy: how to assign the numerical values that were to be plugged into its formulas. That was not a trivial limitation, which led Hitch to confess that “for our purposes, Game Theory has been quite disappointing.”50 It also assumes that today’s aspiring policymakers come away from these methods courses with an unqualified appreciation of their usefulness. My experience after ten years in teaching in such schools, and familiarity with the evaluations students give these courses, leaves me skeptical. They often do not see the usefulness of such courses and suspect they are being forced to take them for academic, not professional, reasons.51 Other colleagues at professional schools share this impression.52 Finally, an earlier survey of current and former national security policymakers reveals that the more highly educated the policymaker, the greater the skepticism about their utility.53 This is consistent with the argument that familiarity with advanced techniques instills greater appreciation not only for their promise but also their limits. Even proponents of modern social science methods in international relations concede that “the emerging science of international relations has a long way to go before it can be of direct use to policy makers.”54 It is hard to find much evidence that the most sophisticated approaches to international relations are of much direct use to policymakers, and there are ample reasons for caution about how much of the discipline’s “basic” research is really trickling down to indirectly influence policymakers. Sixth, some point to the post-9 /11 resurgence of interest among younger social scientists as a harbinger of another renaissance of interest in policy relevance. Others suggest that changes in the nature of the “new paradigm of knowledge production,” which is “socially distributed, application-oriented, trans-disciplinary, and subject to multiple accountabilities” constitute grounds for optimism about a broader return to relevance among the social sciences.55 To be sure, there are reasons for optimism on this score but also for continuing caution. As we have seen, previous periods of optimism about answering the relevance question have given way to disappointment. Moreover, many scholars have claimed to be policy relevant even though policymakers did not find them so.56 As one CIA analyst warned, “Social scientists commonly define policy-relevant research far more broadly than the foreign policy community does.”57 A seventh potential criticism of my argument is there are other forms of “relevance” beyond just influencing government policymakers by offering policy recommendations to which scholars should aspire.58 Especially in a democratic political system, a scholar’s vocation for politics can also involve educating students and informing the wider public about pressing issues of policy. Moreover, an engaged scholar could serve with nongovernmental and private organizations rather than just through government service. While there is no doubt that policy influence is broader than just affecting government policy, that is ultimately the goal of the enterprise, either directly through policymakers or indirectly through the media or the public. Moreover, it is the clearest and most demanding standard of relevance available. So if we want to understand when and how social science matters to policymakers that is the most important, if not the only, aspect of it to consider.59 Finally, many political scientists share Daniel Drezner’s view that economics has solved the relevance question in being both rigorous and relevant. 60 The logical implication of such a belief is that the rest of social sciences should follow that discipline’s lead in terms of its approach and methodology. This economics envy is based on a misapprehension that academic trends in economics have not also created a relevance problem. For example, a recent review of research at the World Bank by leading academic economists raised questions about how much of the scholarship of bank analysts that was written for publication in academic journals was of any use to the bank.61 Their answer was not much. They blamed intellectual trends in the discipline because it encouraged research that was “too academic, too focused toward the previously existing academic agenda, and too directed towards technical rather than pressing policy issues.”62 Behind this economics envy lies an even deeper inferiority complex visa- vis the natural sciences. Many social scientists believe that the physical sciences have two advantages over the “softer” social sciences: more reliable data and a consensus on how to analyze it. Quantifiable data, in this view, is more persuasive, because it is clearer and less subject to dispute.63 This view of the superiority of the physical over the social sciences is widespread, with many of the former reveling in their preeminence and some of the latter manifesting two classic symptoms of an inferiority complex: resentment or reflexive emulation. Neither of these responses is healthy. It is simply not true that expressing propositions mathematically ensures that they are clearer and more transparent than conveying them in English. Economist Paul Romer admitted that “with enough math, an author can be confident that most readers will never figure out where FWUTV [facts with unknown truth values] is buried. A discussant or referee cannot say that an identification assumption is not credible if they cannot figure out what it is and are too embarrassed to ask.”64 On the latter, one would think that the 2008 Great Recession, in which the misguided belief that quantitative models of the economy could be used to guide investment decisions on the grounds they could reveal “the truth” about what drives the market, would temper confidence that such scientific approaches could ensure effective policy.65 In a much discussed essay in the New York Times Magazine, Princeton economist Paul Krugman concluded that “the economics profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth.. . . The central cause of the profession’s failure was the desire for an all-encompassing, intellectually elegant approach that also gave economists a chance to show off their mathematical prowess.”66 It is not even clear that natural scientists have been most influential when they have employed their most rigorous and mathematically sophisticated approaches, at least in the national security realm. Indeed, there is more evidence that they have been most influential when they have offered practical solutions to real-world problems. These solutions have often come from scientifically uncertain and incomplete data.67 These are the hallmarks of much of the best of qualitative social science. Social scientists also ought to take heart that they not only can make an important contribution using their own distinct approaches, but also that in some instances they might even be superior to those of the physical scientists. For example, many of the nuclear scientists involved in the Manhattan Project soon came to regret their role in the escalating nuclear arms race of the Cold War. Reflecting a collective sense of guilt, chemist and peace activist Linus Pauling got almost nine thousand scientists to sign a January 1958 petition to end nuclear testing as first step toward universal disarmament.68 Talcing an equally impractical tack, Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard wrote to Franldin Delano Roosevelt’s science adviser Vannevar Bush in January 1944, “This weapon is so powerful that there can be no peace if it is simultaneously in the possession of any two powers unless these two powers are bound by an indissoluble political union.”69 While not all of the atomic scientists harbored doubts—recall the famous debates between Robert Oppenheimer and Edward Teller—the majority became advocates of international control of nuclear weapons, a policy that in retrospect was politically unrealistic. In comparing the assessments and policy recommendations of the physical scientists in the Golden Age, with those of social scientists like Jacob Viner, Bernard Brodie, and William T. R Fox, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the latter’s views of the nuclear problem (that the genie of nuclear weapons could not be stuffed back in the bottle), and their recommendations for dealing with that situation (nuclear deterrence), were far more “realistic” than those of the nuclear “one world” physical scientists. What Is to Be Done? There are, of course, some nuts-and-bolts issues that scholars should be mindful of if they want to participate in the broader policy debate. Since policymakers have short attention spans given the number and breadth of issues they have to deal with, scholarly efforts to engage them need to be brief in conveying their ideas.70 This explains why Op/Eds are particularly influential and why so many are optimistic that blogs could play a similar role. Moreover, policymakers find much current scholarly work—from across the methodological spectrum—inaccessible. The common sentiment animating their views is that scholars should cut the jargon. Policymakers don’t want scholars to write in Greek or French, but rather just plain English.71 There are also some much bigger issues undergirding the relevance question.72 To begin with, political science needs to rethink how it balances scholarly rigor with practical application. There is a middle ground between policy analysis and journalism, on one side, and scholastic irrelevance on the other.73 The best approach to balancing scholarly rigor with continuing policy relevance is methodological pluralism, which includes a commitment to using not any particular method (or all of them) but rather just the approach most appropriate for the question at hand. But methodological pluralism, by itself, is not sufficient. The latest trend in political science requiring the simultaneous use of multiple methods could, ironically, prove to be even more limiting of policy relevance. Indeed, given the need to employ all of these methods simultaneously, it is potentially even more constraining in terms of the problems it can address because it has to be limited to those which can be quantified, modeled, and studied in depth at the same time.74 Therefore, reinforcing methodological pluralism must also be a commitment to problem-, rather than method-, driven research agendas. It is only the combination of these two principles that will ensure that policy-relevant security studies can not only survive, but thrive, in political science.75 Scholars also need to think carefully about the role of theory in policyrelevant security studies scholarship. While there is no doubt that theory is important to policymakers, scholars need to be aware that as with many other things, too much of it can be a bad thing. In particular, the effort to cram the rich complexity of the social world into universal models can do intellectual violence to the phenomenon under study as well as produce suboptimal policy. Paul Nitze, then the director of the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff, readily conceded policymakers’ need for theory but also noted that “there is the opposing consideration .. . that [theoretical] oversimplification presents great dangers.”76 Albert Wohlstetter advocated a balanced approach to theory, noting that the key to his success throughout his career “was the practical experience I had in working with engineers. I worked with them from two sides, so to speak, as someone who had been concerned with very abstract theory more basic than that familiar to design engineers, but on the other hand, I was also concerned with production, and therefore generally trying to get them to do things more practical than they wanted to do.”77 Theory is a powerful tool of statecraft, but when scholars embrace universal models they also risk irrelevance or worse. Likewise, the transmission belts conveying scholarly findings to the policy world must be repaired. Kennan envisioned the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff in the late 1940s serving this function, and in some respects it continues to do so to this day.78 However, there are limits to how effectively a part of the bureaucracy can serve as an honest research broker. A plethora of think tanks in Washington are also supposed to translate knowledge into action, though the trend in recent years has been toward the establishment of overtly political and advocacy organizations, rather than nonpartisan, translational research centers.79 Reinventing the role of think tanks as bridges between the Ivory Tower and the beltway is long overdue. While nonacademic transmission belts can mediate between the Ivory Tower and the Beltway, they are no substitute for the scholars who produce knowledge to themselves serve as their own translators of it into policy. To be sure, scholars should not stop writing scholarly books and monographs utilizing the most sophisticated techniques of their discipline, if appropriate. In addition to doing these things, scholars should address pressing real world problems, not just chase after disciplinary fads. No one is in a better position to highlight the policy implications of a given piece of research than the individual who conducted it. Academic social scientists, if they want to be heard by senior policymakers, and heard correctly, need to be their own policy “transmission belts.”80 The role of the Democratic Peace Theory in the recent Iraq war demonstrates the problems with scholars not specifying the concrete policy implications of their research.81 Drawing on DPT, some officials in the George W. Bush administration justified the invasion of Iraq as part of a larger strategy to bring peace to the region by spreading democracy.82 Democratic Peace proponent Bruce Russett objected to this conclusion after the fact though his voice had been largely mute in the run up to the war.83 Had he and other democracy scholars participated more actively in the prewar debate, this rationale may have been less credible. Academics also need to develop a more nuanced appreciation of the various influences on policy. Many, even in democratic political systems, tend to have an unrealistically “technocratic” attitude toward policymaking. 84 They often underestimate the role of politics in government decision making. Scholars must therefore understand that the policymaking process is inherently political and that without such an appreciation of the political considerations associated with any policy choice, even a good one may not be implemented.85

<h4>Making impactful contributions demands <u>causal policy relevance</u> AND <u>methodological pluralism</u>---that is the only way to draw accurate contextual conclusions and prevent violent, imprecise reification. </h4><p>Michael C. <strong>Desch 19</strong>. Packey<u><strong> J. Dee Professor of International Relations at Notre Dame and founding director of the Notre Dame International Security Center, former Professor and Director of the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce at the University of Kentucky, #gocats. 2019. “Conclusions, Responses to Objections, and Scholarly Recommendations.” Cult of the Irrelevant: The Waning Influence of Social Science on National Security, Princeton University Press.</p><p></u></strong>I want to reiterate that <u><strong>I am not arguing that scholarship that is formal or quantitative is by definition irrelevant</u></strong>. Indeed, one can point to examples of both that are. <u><strong>When applied to economic issues, the discipline of economics has managed to be both highly “scientific” and, at times, quite relevant, though for both good and ill. Likewise, there are examples of highly quantitative political science that policymakers have found useful.</u></strong>1 Finally, there is much nonquantitative scholarship, particularly but not exclusively in the humanities that, is jargon laden and otherwise inaccessible to a wider audience, including government policymakers.2 This is by no means an anti-social science methods screed, just a reminder of the tensions between rigor and relevance that need to managed rather than assumed away. <u><strong>Nor is this in any way a brief against theory</u></strong>. Former State Department official Roger Hilsman reminded us that <u><strong>everyone</u></strong>, including policymakers, <u><strong>uses theory</u></strong>. Paraphrasing John Maynard Keynes, he concluded that <u><strong>“it seems obvious that all thinking involves notions of how and why things happen. </u></strong>Even the ‘practical’ man who despises theory has a number of assumptions and expectations which lead him to believe that when certain things are done, certain results follow.. . .It is this ‘theory’ that helps a problem solver select from the mass of facts surrounding him those which he hopes are relevant.”3 Given that, I fully associate myself with Hans Morgenthau’s balanced view that “theory without verification is metaphysics, but empiricism without theory is aimless.”4 Since policymakers implicitly use theory in analyzing situations and assessing their alternatives, such theories should be stated explicitly and analyzed systematically, which is a comparative advantage of the scholars. <u><strong>Instead</u></strong>, what <u><strong><mark>I</mark> offer</u></strong> is <u><strong>simply a <mark>critique</mark> of <mark>the</mark> increasing <mark>tendency</u></strong></mark> of many social scientists <u><strong><mark>to embrace</u></strong> <u><strong>methods</u></strong></mark> and models <u><strong><mark>for their own sake rather than because they</mark> can <mark>help</mark> us <mark>answer</u></strong></mark> substantively important <u><strong><mark>questions</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>This inclination is</u></strong> in part the result of the otherwise normal and productive workings of science, but is also <u><strong>reinforced</u></strong> <u><strong>by</u></strong> less positive factors such as organizational self-interest and <u><strong><mark>intellectual culture</mark>. As a result</u></strong> of the latter, many <u><strong>political scientists <mark>have committed</mark> themselves <mark>to</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>particular</u></strong> social science <u><strong><mark>methods</u></strong> <u><strong>not</mark> so much because they <mark>believe they</mark> will</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>illuminate</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>real-world <mark>policy problems</u></strong> <u><strong>but because they</u></strong></mark> serve a vested interest in disciplinary autonomy and <u><strong><mark>dovetail</u></strong> <u><strong>with a</u></strong> <u><strong>particular image</u></strong></mark> (mathematized and model-based) of what a “science” of politics should look like. In other words, the professionalization of social science is the root of the enduring relevance question. <u><strong><mark>This</u></strong></mark> tendency to equate rigor with technique <u><strong>imposes <mark>costs</mark> on</u></strong> the rest of <u><strong><mark>society</u></strong></mark> as well as the discipline, especially <u><strong>when it excludes a more balanced approach to rigor and relevance of the sort that characterized the subfield of security studies in the past</u></strong>. On the former, as diplomat George Kennan rightly observed, <u><strong>policymakers</u></strong> <u><strong>need <mark>academic expertise</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>because they have <mark>to make decisions</mark> about issues and areas of the world “about which they cannot be expert and learned.”</u></strong>5 <u><strong>They</u></strong> <u><strong>depend on the academy</u></strong> <u><strong>for the raw data—whether quantitative or historical—that they use in decision making. They also rely on the social sciences for the theories they use to analyze and make sense of this data. The problem with relying exclusively</u></strong> <u><strong>on in-house government research to make up for the lack of policy-relevant academic research is that it is often of low quality. The role of <mark>the “independent policy analyst” is essential</mark> for three reasons: </u></strong>6 He or she <u><strong><mark>can challenge basic policy assumptions</u></strong></mark>. As RAND’s Hans Spier put it, they can <u><strong><mark>undertake “research which does not</mark> necessarily <mark>take</mark> the mission of <mark>the military for granted</u></strong> <u><strong>and admits the</mark> possibility <mark>U.S. may be wrong”</u></strong></mark>7 <u><strong>And <mark>academic social scientists are particularly well suited</mark> to this role by virtue of the fact that they both conduct research and also teach future policymakers. </u></strong>Academics have some other advantages over policymakers. <u><strong><mark>They have</mark> the <mark>time to develop greater</u></strong> <u><strong>depth</mark> of knowledge</u></strong> on issues and regions than most policymakers can. <u><strong>The institution of <mark>tenure</mark> also <mark>gives</mark> them</u></strong>, at least in theory, <u><strong>the <mark>freedom to explore controversial issues</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>and take unpopular stands</u></strong>. <u><strong>And while peer review can homogenize and narrow scholarship, it also plays an indisputably positive role in advancing it. Finally, university-based scholars have less of a vested interest in certain policies and programs</u></strong> than do policymakers, though of course that is not to deny that they have their own institutional interests and biases.9 <u><strong>I am not suggesting, of course, that scholars would make better policy than bureaucrats and elected officials. They lack inside knowledge, have little actual power, and are often politically out of step with the rest of American society.</u></strong>10 They also come to policy issues with a markedly different intellectual orientation than policymakers.11 <u><strong>Rather</u></strong>, my point is simply that <u><strong><mark>our</mark> democratic <mark>political system depends on</u></strong></mark> the successful functioning of the marketplace of ideas and checks and balances in which individuals and <u><strong><mark>groups</mark> with various strengths and weaknesses</u></strong> and <u><strong><mark>offsetting</u></strong></mark> biases participate in the larger policy debate, thereby compensating for <u><strong><mark>each other’s limitations</u></strong></mark>.12 <u><strong>We run into trouble when we lack one of these perspectives in policy debates. Indeed</u></strong>, there are instances—the war <u><strong><mark>in</u></strong> <u><strong>Vietnam</u></strong> <u><strong>and</u></strong></mark> the recent <u><strong><mark>Iraq</u></strong></mark> War—in which <u><strong><mark>had</mark> the majority consensus of <mark>scholars</u></strong></mark> in academia <u><strong><mark>influenced policy</u></strong></mark>, the country’s <u><strong><mark>national interest would have been better served</u></strong></mark>. As <u><strong>the flawed Iraq War debate</u></strong> demonstrates, our nation’s marketplace of ideas is <u><strong>bankrupt</u></strong>, particularly <u><strong>in national security affairs</u></strong>.13 Of course, <u><strong>our political problems run much deeper than just the Beltway/Ivory Tower gap, but closing it would represent an important step in the country’s intellectual recapitalization</u></strong>. This nation’s universities need to reclaim their place as one of society’s main sources of independent ideas about the problems that it faces.14 Less widely recognized, and perhaps more controversial given the prevailing sentiments in the Academy for a sharp distinction between “science” and “policy,” is my contention that the growing gap is ultimately bad for the generation of new knowledge. There are at least two reasons why greater attention to policy relevance produces better scholarship. First, it leads to more realistic theorizing. As John Kenneth Galbraith warned his economics colleagues nearly forty years ago, “<u><strong><mark>No arrangement for</mark> the perpetuation of <mark>thought is secure if</mark> that <mark>thought does not</mark> make <mark>contact</mark> with <mark>the problems</mark> that <mark>it is presumed to solve</u></strong></mark>.”15 Second, a focus on manipulatable variables makes it more likely that they are testable because the analyst can ensure variation on them. Also, <u><strong>the</u></strong> <u><strong>hyperspecialization</u></strong> <u><strong>of knowledge today makes it difficult for even scholars in related disciplines to understand each other, much less the general public</u></strong>. <u><strong>Such</u></strong> <u><strong>intellectual fragmentation</u></strong> <u><strong>makes the application of scholarly knowledge to policymaking extremely difficult</u></strong>. <u><strong>Therefore, a deeper and more regular engagement</u></strong> <u><strong>between the Ivory Tower and the Beltway will be mutually beneficial </u></strong>for both sides.16 Ultimately, <u><strong>even the most sophisticated social science will be judged by what it tells us about things that affect the lives of large numbers of people and which policymakers</u></strong> therefore <u><strong>seek to influence</u></strong> and control.17 <u><strong>The recurrent congressional debates about National Science Foundation funding for political science highlight the direct costs to the discipline</u></strong> <u><strong>of not being able to justify itself in terms of broader impact on the rest of society</u></strong>. Harkening back to the debate about the Mansfield Amendment, an article in Science cautioned that “to the extent that the research community disdains work on major national missions or behaves self-servingly in mission-oriented work, anti-intellectualism will increase its influence on the fate of American science.”18 Also, public and philanthropic community support for investment in academia generally reflects the belief that it will produce work that will speak to problems of broader importance. <u><strong>When the academy fails</u></strong> on that score, <u><strong>it can undermine</u></strong> that <u><strong>support</u></strong>.19 <u><strong>Political science’s subfield of international security studies can plausibly claim to save large amounts of money and even lives and so its increasing marginalization is a self-inflicted wound on the discipline. </u></strong>Response to Objections There are at least eight reasonable, though ultimately unpersuasive, objections to my argument that we should consider. First, some point to the influence of the Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) on the Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama administrations as evidence that one of the most scientific of social science theories in international relations was both useful and influential among policymakers.20 The argument that democracies are unlikely to go to war with each other gained currency among social scientists based on statistical analysis of every major interstate war since 1815. In the words of Rutgers political scientist Jack Levy, the Democratic Peace Theory is “as close as anything we have to an empirical law in international relations.”21 Two scholars argued that the theory became relevant outside of the academy precisely “because of the law-like status of a particular empirical finding.”22 Others hold it up as a model of how basic research in political science can contribute to policymakers.23 It is not clear, though, that the influence of the DPT on recent U.S. foreign policy was due to its unassailable social scientific standing. While former Defense Department official and Ohio State political scientist Joseph Kruzel conceded that DPT “had substantial impact on public policy,” he attributed its attractiveness to policymakers to its simplicity rather than its social scientific rigor.24 It clearly identifies America’s enemies (nondemocratic states) and prescribed a simple response to them (make them democratic). It is also likely that the much less methodologically sophisticated articulation of the theory in the work of Michael Doyle was far more influential.25 And the process by which DPT entered the Clinton White House did not involve sophisticated social science. Rather, the key administration proponent of the democratic peace was National Security Advisor (and former college professor) Anthony Lake.26 It is clear, however, that to the extent that Lake was drawing support for the democratic peace from academic sources, it was not from statistically based research, but rather from the qualitative work of scholars like Harvard’s Samuel Huntington.27 The results of a survey of senior national security policymakers found that more than half of those familiar with the methodologically sophisticated democratic peace theory reported not being influenced by it in their government work.28 Finally, one could argue that U.S. policymakers have embraced the democratic peace because of its compatibility with our political culture rather than its scientific standing.29 A second, and in some ways, flip side of the first critique, is that the relevance problem with contemporary security studies is the result of the subfield’s domination by realism, and particularly its most abstruse and theoretical manifestation, neorealism.30 Critics point particularly to neorealist arguments that tout the virtues of nuclear proliferation as examples of theoretically elegant but politically unacceptable social science.31 Despite its respectability among scholars, neorealist proliferation optimism has reportedly had little influence on actual policy.32 While that particular policy issue may not have been influenced by realist thinking, as this book has shown realists have remained committed to policy relevance at times when the rest of the discipline has eschewed it. And they have more often been on the right side of policy debates as well.33 A third potential challenge to my argument is that many social scientists believe that they should avoid offering policy recommendations in favoring of focusing on basic research tasks such as identifying empirical regularities and offering generalizations to explain them.34 As Dartmouth political scientist Kalman Silvert warned, “It is not the legitimate role of the social scientist as scholar to advocate specific courses of governmental action or to act as implementer of government decisions.”35 Another rationale is that doing so is unnecessary given that the applied implications of basic research tend to trickle down by themselves.36 Policy engagement—particularly offering explicit policy recommendations—is both unwise and unnecessary in the view of many social scientists. Neither of these views, however, are shared by policymakers. Most believe that in addition to providing basic research findings, “scientists must explicitly define the linkage, whether immediate or remote, of the knowledge acquired or being acquired, to specific operational problems and continually assess the import of such knowledge to solution of the problems.”37 Nor are current and former policymakers sanguine about the trickle-down (or bubble-up in which senior policymakers get the results of scholarly work through their methodologically savvy staffs) process. As John K. Plank of the Brookings Institution, a former DoD official, recollected, “There is presumably a process whereby the research product is filtered up to [senior policymakers], but in point of fact very little of operational usefulness is transmitted.”38 Fourth, some political scientists believe that there are now so many new outlets for scholars to engage in the policy debate, it is both easier for them to do so and also unnecessary for them to concern themselves with doing so in their scholarship.39 Academics can now publish basic research in scholarly venues and then disseminate its applied implications through the new media. George Washington political scientist and blogger Marc Lynch effused that with the rise of the new media “this is in most ways a golden age for policy-relevant public spheres.”40 Indeed, many see the proliferation of new media outlets as the answer to political science’s perennial problem: its diminished public profile.41 The assumption here is that political scientists are simply not communicating their results effectively. There are three problems with these arguments: Until recently, we had no idea whether blogs and other new media reached policymakers. As one optimist conceded, we have “no solid statistics” on our impact.42 But we do now and it suggests that blogs and other new media are in fact not an important source of information for policymakers and therefore are unlikely to effectively convey the implications of basic research to policymakers, the media, or the general public.43 Moreover, even if a few blogs get some attention, many others do not, simply making more noise in an already cacophonous marketplace of ideas.44 And suggesting that the failure of communication argument misses the mark, Social Science Research Council president Craig Calhoun noted that scholarly “engagement with public constituencies must move beyond a dissemination model” that assumes that “pure research” will naturally triclde down, even with better communication.45 In other words, it is not the medium that matters as much as the message. And the message must be made more intelligible and useful to policymakers and the general public. Finally, there is systematic evidence that academic bloggers and scholars who utilize other new media venues receive little professional credit for them in the critical areas of promotion and tenure.46 In short, despite the explosive growth of new media outlets, professional incentives still do not encourage scholars to use them. A fifth conceivable objection is that advanced social science techniques and basic research will eventually become more useful to policymakers as they (or at least their staffs) become more sophisticated in their understanding of them. One optimist, for example, noted that most graduate public policy schools now include one or two required courses in economics and social science methods in their curricula. As these increasingly methodologically savvy young bureaucrats become senior policymakers, so this argument goes, they will be more adept at using them and more appreciative of their policy relevance.47 However, this argument assumes that training in advanced research techniques is a recent development. Policy schools, however, have long had methods courses as part of their required curriculum. Even prior to this, many national security policymakers came out of academic Ph.D. programs in which they were exposed to the latest innovations in social science methodology. It also ignores that the security studies subfield played a leading role in developing many of these sophisticated social science techniques, particularly at RAND in the 1950s.48 An example of the reverse flow of ideas from the policy world to the Academy was the “unquestionably” leading role that RAND mathematicians and other social scientists played in the development of game theory, a mathematical framework for strategizing under uncertainty.49 Despite early enthusiasm, many at RAND concluded that game theory had an Achilles Heel in its application to national security policy: how to assign the numerical values that were to be plugged into its formulas. That was not a trivial limitation, which led Hitch to confess that “for our purposes, Game Theory has been quite disappointing.”50 It also assumes that today’s aspiring policymakers come away from these methods courses with an unqualified appreciation of their usefulness. My experience after ten years in teaching in such schools, and familiarity with the evaluations students give these courses, leaves me skeptical. They often do not see the usefulness of such courses and suspect they are being forced to take them for academic, not professional, reasons.51 Other colleagues at professional schools share this impression.52 Finally, an earlier survey of current and former national security policymakers reveals that the more highly educated the policymaker, the greater the skepticism about their utility.53 This is consistent with the argument that familiarity with advanced techniques instills greater appreciation not only for their promise but also their limits. Even proponents of modern social science methods in international relations concede that “the emerging science of international relations has a long way to go before it can be of direct use to policy makers.”54 It is hard to find much evidence that the most sophisticated approaches to international relations are of much direct use to policymakers, and there are ample reasons for caution about how much of the discipline’s “basic” research is really trickling down to indirectly influence policymakers. Sixth, some point to the post-9 /11 resurgence of interest among younger social scientists as a harbinger of another renaissance of interest in policy relevance. Others suggest that changes in the nature of the “new paradigm of knowledge production,” which is “socially distributed, application-oriented, trans-disciplinary, and subject to multiple accountabilities” constitute grounds for optimism about a broader return to relevance among the social sciences.55 To be sure, there are reasons for optimism on this score but also for continuing caution. As we have seen, previous periods of optimism about answering the relevance question have given way to disappointment. Moreover, many scholars have claimed to be policy relevant even though policymakers did not find them so.56 As one CIA analyst warned, “Social scientists commonly define policy-relevant research far more broadly than the foreign policy community does.”57 A seventh potential criticism of my argument is there are other forms of “relevance” beyond just influencing government policymakers by offering policy recommendations to which scholars should aspire.58 Especially in a democratic political system, a scholar’s vocation for politics can also involve educating students and informing the wider public about pressing issues of policy. Moreover, an engaged scholar could serve with nongovernmental and private organizations rather than just through government service. While there is no doubt that policy influence is broader than just affecting government policy, that is ultimately the goal of the enterprise, either directly through policymakers or indirectly through the media or the public. Moreover, it is the clearest and most demanding standard of relevance available. So if we want to understand when and how social science matters to policymakers that is the most important, if not the only, aspect of it to consider.59 Finally, many political scientists share Daniel Drezner’s view that economics has solved the relevance question in being both rigorous and relevant. 60 The logical implication of such a belief is that the rest of social sciences should follow that discipline’s lead in terms of its approach and methodology. This economics envy is based on a misapprehension that academic trends in economics have not also created a relevance problem. For example, a recent review of research at the World Bank by leading academic economists raised questions about how much of the scholarship of bank analysts that was written for publication in academic journals was of any use to the bank.61 Their answer was not much. They blamed intellectual trends in the discipline because it encouraged research that was “too academic, too focused toward the previously existing academic agenda, and too directed towards technical rather than pressing policy issues.”62 Behind this economics envy lies an even deeper inferiority complex visa- vis the natural sciences. Many social scientists believe that the physical sciences have two advantages over the “softer” social sciences: more reliable data and a consensus on how to analyze it. Quantifiable data, in this view, is more persuasive, because it is clearer and less subject to dispute.63 This view of the superiority of the physical over the social sciences is widespread, with many of the former reveling in their preeminence and some of the latter manifesting two classic symptoms of an inferiority complex: resentment or reflexive emulation. Neither of these responses is healthy. It is simply not true that expressing propositions mathematically ensures that they are clearer and more transparent than conveying them in English. Economist Paul Romer admitted that “with enough math, an author can be confident that most readers will never figure out where FWUTV [facts with unknown truth values] is buried. A discussant or referee cannot say that an identification assumption is not credible if they cannot figure out what it is and are too embarrassed to ask.”64 On the latter, one would think that the 2008 Great Recession, in which the misguided belief that quantitative models of the economy could be used to guide investment decisions on the grounds they could reveal “the truth” about what drives the market, would temper confidence that such scientific approaches could ensure effective policy.65 In a much discussed essay in the New York Times Magazine, Princeton economist Paul Krugman concluded that “the economics profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in impressive-looking mathematics, for truth.. . . The central cause of the profession’s failure was the desire for an all-encompassing, intellectually elegant approach that also gave economists a chance to show off their mathematical prowess.”66 It is not even clear that natural scientists have been most influential when they have employed their most rigorous and mathematically sophisticated approaches, at least in the national security realm. Indeed, there is more evidence that they have been most influential when they have offered practical solutions to real-world problems. These solutions have often come from scientifically uncertain and incomplete data.67 These are the hallmarks of much of the best of qualitative social science. Social scientists also ought to take heart that they not only can make an important contribution using their own distinct approaches, but also that in some instances they might even be superior to those of the physical scientists. For example, many of the nuclear scientists involved in the Manhattan Project soon came to regret their role in the escalating nuclear arms race of the Cold War. Reflecting a collective sense of guilt, chemist and peace activist Linus Pauling got almost nine thousand scientists to sign a January 1958 petition to end nuclear testing as first step toward universal disarmament.68 Talcing an equally impractical tack, Hungarian physicist Leo Szilard wrote to Franldin Delano Roosevelt’s science adviser Vannevar Bush in January 1944, “This weapon is so powerful that there can be no peace if it is simultaneously in the possession of any two powers unless these two powers are bound by an indissoluble political union.”69 While not all of the atomic scientists harbored doubts—recall the famous debates between Robert Oppenheimer and Edward Teller—the majority became advocates of international control of nuclear weapons, a policy that in retrospect was politically unrealistic. In comparing the assessments and policy recommendations of the physical scientists in the Golden Age, with those of social scientists like Jacob Viner, Bernard Brodie, and William T. R Fox, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the latter’s views of the nuclear problem (that the genie of nuclear weapons could not be stuffed back in the bottle), and their recommendations for dealing with that situation (nuclear deterrence), were far more “realistic” than those of the nuclear “one world” physical scientists. What Is to Be Done? <u><strong>There are</u></strong>, of course, some <u><strong>nuts-and-bolts</u></strong> <u><strong>issues that scholars should be mindful of if they want to participate in the broader policy debate</u></strong>. Since policymakers have short attention spans given the number and breadth of issues they have to deal with, scholarly efforts to engage them need to be brief in conveying their ideas.70 This explains why Op/Eds are particularly influential and why so many are optimistic that blogs could play a similar role. Moreover, <u><strong>policymakers find much current scholarly work</u></strong>—from across the methodological spectrum—<u><strong>inaccessible</u></strong>. The common sentiment animating their views is that <u><strong>scholars should cut</u></strong> the <u><strong>jargon</u></strong>. Policymakers don’t want scholars to write in Greek or French, but rather just plain English.71 There are also some much bigger issues undergirding the relevance question.72 To begin with, <u><strong><mark>political science needs to rethink how it balances</u></strong></mark> scholarly <u><strong><mark>rigor with practical application</mark>. There is a</u></strong> <u><strong>middle ground</u></strong> <u><strong>between policy analysis and journalism</u></strong>, on one side, <u><strong>and</u></strong> <u><strong>scholastic irrelevance</u></strong> on the other.73 <u><strong><mark>The</u></strong> <u><strong>best approach</u></strong></mark> to balancing scholarly rigor with continuing policy relevance <u><strong><mark>is</u></strong> <u><strong>methodological pluralism, which</mark> includes a commitment to <mark>using not any particular method</u></strong></mark> (<u><strong>or</u></strong> <u><strong>all of them</u></strong>) <u><strong><mark>but</mark> rather just <mark>the approach most appropriate for the question</mark> at hand</u></strong>. But methodological pluralism, by itself, is not sufficient. The latest trend in political science requiring the simultaneous use of multiple methods could, ironically, prove to be even more limiting of policy relevance. Indeed, given the need to employ all of these methods simultaneously, it is potentially even more constraining in terms of the problems it can address because it has to be limited to those which can be quantified, modeled, and studied in depth at the same time.74 Therefore, <u><strong><mark>reinforcing</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>methodological <mark>pluralism must</mark> also <mark>be a</u></strong> <u><strong>commitment to problem-, rather than method-, driven research</mark> agendas. It is only the combination</u></strong> <u><strong>of these</u></strong> two <u><strong>principles that will ensure that policy-relevant security studies can</u></strong> not only <u><strong>survive</u></strong>, but thrive, in political science.75 Scholars also need to think carefully about the role of theory in policyrelevant security studies scholarship. <u><strong><mark>While</mark> there is no doubt that <mark>theory is important</mark> to policymakers, scholars need to be aware that as with many other things, <mark>too much</u></strong></mark> of it <u><strong><mark>can be</u></strong></mark> a <u><strong><mark>bad</u></strong></mark> thing. <u><strong>In particular, the <mark>effort to cram the</u></strong> <u><strong>rich complexity of the social world into universal models</u></strong> <u><strong>can do intellectual violence to the phenomenon under study</u></strong> <u><strong>as well as produce suboptimal policy</u></strong></mark>. Paul Nitze, then the director of the Secretary of State’s Policy Planning Staff, readily conceded policymakers’ need for theory but also noted that “there is the opposing consideration .. . that <u><strong>[theoretical] <mark>oversimplification presents</mark> great <mark>dangers</u></strong></mark>.”76 Albert Wohlstetter advocated a balanced approach to theory, noting that the key to his success throughout his career “was the practical experience I had in working with engineers. I worked with them from two sides, so to speak, as someone who had been concerned with very abstract theory more basic than that familiar to design engineers, but on the other hand, I was also concerned with production, and therefore generally trying to get them to do things more practical than they wanted to do.”77 <u><strong>Theory is a powerful</u></strong> <u><strong>tool</u></strong> of statecraft, <u><strong>but when scholars embrace <mark>universal models</mark> they also</u></strong> <u><strong><mark>risk irrelevance or worse</u></strong></mark>. Likewise, the transmission belts conveying scholarly findings to the policy world must be repaired. Kennan envisioned the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff in the late 1940s serving this function, and in some respects it continues to do so to this day.78 However, there are limits to how effectively a part of the bureaucracy can serve as an honest research broker. A plethora of think tanks in Washington are also supposed to translate knowledge into action, though the trend in recent years has been toward the establishment of overtly political and advocacy organizations, rather than nonpartisan, translational research centers.79 Reinventing the role of think tanks as bridges between the Ivory Tower and the beltway is long overdue. <u><strong>While <mark>nonacademic transmission</mark> belts can mediate between the Ivory Tower and the Beltway, they <mark>are</u></strong> <u><strong>no substitute</u></strong> <u><strong>for the</u></strong> <u><strong>scholars who produce knowledge to themselves serve as</mark> their own <mark>translators</u></strong></mark> <u><strong>of it <mark>into</u></strong> <u><strong>policy</mark>. To be sure, scholars should not</u></strong> <u><strong>stop</u></strong> <u><strong>writing scholarly books and monographs</u></strong> utilizing the most sophisticated techniques of their discipline, if appropriate. <u><strong>In addition</u></strong> <u><strong>to doing these things, scholars should</u></strong> <u><strong>address</u></strong> pressing <u><strong>real world problems, not just chase after disciplinary fads.</u></strong> <u><strong>No one</u></strong> <u><strong>is in a better position to highlight the policy implications of a given piece of research than the individual who conducted it</u></strong>. Academic social scientists, if they want to be heard by senior policymakers, and heard correctly, need to be their own policy “transmission belts.”80 The role of the Democratic Peace Theory in the recent Iraq war demonstrates the problems with scholars not specifying the concrete policy implications of their research.81 <u><strong>Drawing on DPT, some officials in the George W. Bush administration justified the invasion of Iraq as part of a larger strategy to bring peace to the region by spreading democracy.82 Democratic Peace proponent Bruce Russett objected to this conclusion after the fact though his voice had been largely mute in the run up to the war.83 Had he and other democracy scholars participated more actively in the prewar debate, this rationale may have been less credible. <mark>Academics</mark> also <mark>need to develop</mark> a more <mark>nuanced appreciation of the</mark> various <mark>influences on policy</mark>. Many, even in democratic political systems, tend to have an unrealistically “technocratic” attitude toward policymaking. 84 They often underestimate the role of politics in government decision making. Scholars must therefore understand that the policymaking process is inherently political and that without such an appreciation of the political considerations associated with any policy choice, even a good one may not be implemented.85</p></u></strong>

1 AC

Adv – bases

./documents/ndtceda20/Cornell/AbLi/Cornell-Abrams-Li-Aff-Navy-Round5.docx

A

Navy

5

UT San Antonio UW

Keenan, V

1 AC- Japan AFF 1 NC- Security

ndtceda20/Cornell/AbLi/Cornell-Abrams-Li-Aff-Navy-Round5.docx

AbLi

Cornell AbLi

Zi.....

Ab.....

Ri.....

Li.....

Cornell

Cornell

ndtceda20

NDT/CEDA 2020-21

cx

college

[1] LAWs cause crisis instability and escalation – 4 examples

Laird 20

Laird 20 Burgess Laird (senior international researcher at RAND, M.B.A. in business management, Pepperdine University; A.B.D. in comparative politics and East Asian security, University of Denver; B.A. in politics, University of Dallas; Seminar XXI in international relations, MIT), 6-3-2020, "The Risks of Autonomous Weapons Systems for Crisis Stability and Conflict Escalation in Future U.S.-Russia Confrontations," RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/06/the-risks-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-for-crisis.html, SJBE

Thus, the military capabilities developed by nuclear-armed states like the United States and Russia and how they posture them are key determinants of whether crises between them will remain stable or devolve into conventional armed conflict, as well as the extent to which such conflict might escalate in intensity and scope, including to the level of nuclear use First, a state facing an adversary with AWS capable of making decisions at machine speeds is likely to fear the threat of sudden and potent attack, a threat that would compress the amount of time for strategic decisionmaking. The posturing of AWS during a crisis would likely create fears that one's forces could suffer significant, if not decisive, strikes. These fears in turn could translate into pressures to strike first—to preempt—for fear of having to strike second from a greatly weakened position. Similarly, within conflict, the fear of losing at machine speeds would be likely to cause a state to escalate the intensity of the conflict possibly even to the level of nuclear use. Second, as the speed of military action in a conflict involving the use of AWS as well as hypersonic weapons and other advanced military capabilities begins to surpass the speed of political decisionmaking, leaders could lose the ability to manage the crisis and with it the ability to control escalation Third, and perhaps of greatest concern to policymakers should be the likelihood that, from the vantage point of Russia's leaders, in U.S. hands the operational advantages of AWS are likely to be understood as an increased U.S. capability for what Georgetown professor Caitlin Talmadge refers to as “conventional counterforce” operations What to NATO is a logical part of a conventional campaign could well appear to Moscow as initial moves of a larger plan designed to degrade the integrated air defense and command and control networks upon which Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal relies. In turn, such fears could feed pressures for Moscow to escalate to nuclear use while it still has the ability to do so. Finally, even if the employment of AWS does not drive an increase in the speed and momentum of action that forecloses the time for exchanging signals, a future conflict in which AWS are ubiquitous will likely prove to be a poor venue both for signaling and interpreting signals Such AWS could also misunderstand adversary attempts to signal resolve solely as adversary preparations for imminent attack By contrast, much less attention has been paid to the risks AWS potentially raise. There are times in which the fundamental tensions between the search for military effectiveness and the requirements of ensuring that crises between major nuclear weapons states remain stable and escalation does not ensue are pronounced and too consequential to ignore

First machine speeds compress the time for strategic decisionmaking fears that forces could suffer decisive, strikes could translate into pressures to strike first even nuclear Second as the speed of AWS and other advanced capabilities surpass decisionmaking leaders lose the ability to control escalation Third advantages of AWS are understood as an increased conventional counterforce a conventional campaign could appear as initial moves to degrade command and control could feed pressures to escalate to nuclear use while it still has the ability Finally AWS could misunderstand adversary resolve as imminent attack

While holding out the promise of significant operational advantages, AWS simultaneously could increase the potential for undermining crisis stability and fueling conflict escalation in contests between the United States and Russia. Defined as “the degree to which mutual deterrence between dangerous adversaries can hold in a confrontation,” as my RAND colleague Forrest Morgan explains, crisis stability and the ways to achieve it are not about warfighting, but about “building and posturing forces in ways that allow a state, if confronted, to avoid war without backing down” on important political or military interests. Thus, the military capabilities developed by nuclear-armed states like the United States and Russia and how they posture them are key determinants of whether crises between them will remain stable or devolve into conventional armed conflict, as well as the extent to which such conflict might escalate in intensity and scope, including to the level of nuclear use. AWS could foster crisis instability and conflict escalation in contests between the United States and Russia in a number of ways; in this short essay I will highlight only four. First, a state facing an adversary with AWS capable of making decisions at machine speeds is likely to fear the threat of sudden and potent attack, a threat that would compress the amount of time for strategic decisionmaking. The posturing of AWS during a crisis would likely create fears that one's forces could suffer significant, if not decisive, strikes. These fears in turn could translate into pressures to strike first—to preempt—for fear of having to strike second from a greatly weakened position. Similarly, within conflict, the fear of losing at machine speeds would be likely to cause a state to escalate the intensity of the conflict possibly even to the level of nuclear use. Second, as the speed of military action in a conflict involving the use of AWS as well as hypersonic weapons and other advanced military capabilities begins to surpass the speed of political decisionmaking, leaders could lose the ability to manage the crisis and with it the ability to control escalation. With tactical and operational action taking place at speeds driven by machines, the time for exchanging signals and communications and for assessing diplomatic options and offramps will be significantly foreclosed. However, the advantages of operating inside the OODA loop of a state adversary like Iraq or Serbia is one thing, while operating inside the OODA loop of a nuclear-armed adversary is another. As the renowned scholar Alexander George emphasized (PDF), especially in contests between nuclear armed competitors, there is a fundamental tension between the operational effectiveness sought by military commanders and the requirements for political leaders to retain control of events before major escalation takes place. Third, and perhaps of greatest concern to policymakers should be the likelihood that, from the vantage point of Russia's leaders, in U.S. hands the operational advantages of AWS are likely to be understood as an increased U.S. capability for what Georgetown professor Caitlin Talmadge refers to as “conventional counterforce” operations. In brief, in crises and conflicts, Moscow is likely to see the United States as confronting it with an array of advanced conventional capabilities backstopped by an interconnected shield of theater and homeland missile defenses. Russia will perceive such capabilities as posing both a conventional war-winning threat and a conventional counterforce threat (PDF) poised to degrade the use of its strategic nuclear forces. The likelihood that Russia will see them this way is reinforced by the fact that it currently sees U.S. conventional precision capabilities precisely in this manner. As a qualitatively new capability that promises new operational advantages, the addition of AWS to U.S. conventional capabilities could further cement Moscow's view and in doing so increase the potential for crisis instability and escalation in confrontations with U.S. forces. In other words, the fielding of U.S. AWS could augment what Moscow already sees as a formidable U.S. ability to threaten a range of important targets including its command and control networks, air defenses, and early warning radars, all of which are unquestionably critical components of Russian conventional forces. In many cases, however, they also serve as critical components of Russia's nuclear force operations. As Talmadge argues, attacks on such targets, even if intended solely to weaken Russian conventional capabilities, will likely raise Russian fears that the U.S. conventional campaign is in fact a counterforce campaign aimed at neutering Russia's nuclear capabilities. Take for example, a hypothetical scenario set in the Baltics in the 2030 timeframe which finds NATO forces employing swarming AWS to suppress Russian air defense networks and key command and control nodes in Kaliningrad as part of a larger strategy of expelling a Russian invasion force. What to NATO is a logical part of a conventional campaign could well appear to Moscow as initial moves of a larger plan designed to degrade the integrated air defense and command and control networks upon which Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal relies. In turn, such fears could feed pressures for Moscow to escalate to nuclear use while it still has the ability to do so. Finally, even if the employment of AWS does not drive an increase in the speed and momentum of action that forecloses the time for exchanging signals, a future conflict in which AWS are ubiquitous will likely prove to be a poor venue both for signaling and interpreting signals. In such a conflict, instead of interpreting a downward modulation in an adversary's operations as a possible signal of restraint or perhaps as signaling a willingness to pause in an effort to open up space for diplomatic negotiations, AWS programmed to exploit every tactical opportunity might read the modulation as an opportunity to escalate offensive operations and thus gain tactical advantage. Such AWS could also misunderstand adversary attempts to signal resolve solely as adversary preparations for imminent attack. Of course, correctly interpreting signals sent in crisis and conflict is vexing enough when humans are making all the decisions, but in future confrontations in which decisionmaking has willingly or unwillingly been ceded to machines, the problem is likely only to be magnified. Concluding Thoughts Much attention has been paid to the operational advantages to be gained from the development of AWS. By contrast, much less attention has been paid to the risks AWS potentially raise. There are times in which the fundamental tensions between the search for military effectiveness and the requirements of ensuring that crises between major nuclear weapons states remain stable and escalation does not ensue are pronounced and too consequential to ignore. The development of AWS may well be increasing the likelihood that one day the United States and Russia could find themselves in just such a time. Now, while AWS are still in their early development stages, it is worth the time of policymakers to carefully consider whether the putative operational advantages from AWS are worth the potential risks of instability and escalation they may raise.

<h4>[1] LAWs cause crisis instability and escalation – 4 examples</h4><p><strong>Laird 20</strong> Burgess Laird (senior international researcher at RAND, M.B.A. in business management, Pepperdine University; A.B.D. in comparative politics and East Asian security, University of Denver; B.A. in politics, University of Dallas; Seminar XXI in international relations, MIT), 6-3-2020, "The Risks of Autonomous Weapons Systems for Crisis Stability and Conflict Escalation in Future U.S.-Russia Confrontations," RAND Corporation, https://www.rand.org/blog/2020/06/the-risks-of-autonomous-weapons-systems-for-crisis.html, SJBE</p><p>While holding out the promise of significant operational advantages, AWS simultaneously could increase the potential for undermining crisis stability and fueling conflict escalation in contests between the United States and Russia. Defined as “the degree to which mutual deterrence between dangerous adversaries can hold in a confrontation,” as my RAND colleague Forrest Morgan explains, crisis stability and the ways to achieve it are not about warfighting, but about “building and posturing forces in ways that allow a state, if confronted, to avoid war without backing down” on important political or military interests. <u><strong>Thus, the military capabilities developed by nuclear-armed states like the United States and Russia and how they posture them are key determinants of whether crises between them will remain stable or devolve into conventional armed conflict, as well as the extent to which such conflict might escalate in intensity and scope, including to the level of nuclear use</u></strong>. AWS could foster crisis instability and conflict escalation in contests between the United States and Russia in a number of ways; in this short essay I will highlight only four. <u><strong><mark>First</mark>, a state facing an adversary with AWS capable of making decisions at <mark>machine speeds</mark> is likely to fear the threat of sudden and potent attack, a threat that would <mark>compress the</mark> amount of <mark>time for strategic decisionmaking</mark>. The posturing of AWS during a crisis would likely create <mark>fears that</mark> one's <mark>forces could suffer</mark> significant, if not <mark>decisive, strikes</mark>. These fears in turn <mark>could translate into pressures to strike first</mark>—to preempt—for fear of having to strike second from a greatly weakened position. Similarly, within conflict, the fear of losing at machine speeds would be likely to cause a state to escalate the intensity of the conflict possibly <mark>even</mark> to the level of <mark>nuclear</mark> use. <mark>Second</mark>, <mark>as the speed</mark> of military action in a conflict involving the use <mark>of AWS</mark> as well as hypersonic weapons <mark>and other advanced</mark> military <mark>capabilities</mark> begins to <mark>surpass</mark> the speed of political <mark>decisionmaking</mark>, <mark>leaders</mark> could <mark>lose the ability to</mark> manage the crisis and with it the ability to <mark>control escalation</u></strong></mark>. With tactical and operational action taking place at speeds driven by machines, the time for exchanging signals and communications and for assessing diplomatic options and offramps will be significantly foreclosed. However, the advantages of operating inside the OODA loop of a state adversary like Iraq or Serbia is one thing, while operating inside the OODA loop of a nuclear-armed adversary is another. As the renowned scholar Alexander George emphasized (PDF), especially in contests between nuclear armed competitors, there is a fundamental tension between the operational effectiveness sought by military commanders and the requirements for political leaders to retain control of events before major escalation takes place. <u><strong><mark>Third</mark>, and perhaps of greatest concern to policymakers should be the likelihood that, from the vantage point of Russia's leaders, in U.S. hands the operational <mark>advantages of AWS</mark> <mark>are</mark> likely to be <mark>understood as an increased</mark> U.S. capability for what Georgetown professor Caitlin Talmadge refers to as “<mark>conventional counterforce</mark>” operations</u></strong>. In brief, in crises and conflicts, Moscow is likely to see the United States as confronting it with an array of advanced conventional capabilities backstopped by an interconnected shield of theater and homeland missile defenses. Russia will perceive such capabilities as posing both a conventional war-winning threat and a conventional counterforce threat (PDF) poised to degrade the use of its strategic nuclear forces. The likelihood that Russia will see them this way is reinforced by the fact that it currently sees U.S. conventional precision capabilities precisely in this manner. As a qualitatively new capability that promises new operational advantages, the addition of AWS to U.S. conventional capabilities could further cement Moscow's view and in doing so increase the potential for crisis instability and escalation in confrontations with U.S. forces.<u><strong> </u></strong>In other words, the fielding of U.S. AWS could augment what Moscow already sees as a formidable U.S. ability to threaten a range of important targets including its command and control networks, air defenses, and early warning radars, all of which are unquestionably critical components of Russian conventional forces. In many cases, however, they also serve as critical components of Russia's nuclear force operations. As Talmadge argues, attacks on such targets, even if intended solely to weaken Russian conventional capabilities, will likely raise Russian fears that the U.S. conventional campaign is in fact a counterforce campaign aimed at neutering Russia's nuclear capabilities. Take for example, a hypothetical scenario set in the Baltics in the 2030 timeframe which finds NATO forces employing swarming AWS to suppress Russian air defense networks and key command and control nodes in Kaliningrad as part of a larger strategy of expelling a Russian invasion force. <u><strong>What to NATO is a logical part of <mark>a conventional campaign could</mark> well <mark>appear</mark> to Moscow <mark>as initial moves</mark> of a larger plan designed <mark>to degrade</mark> the integrated air defense and <mark>command and control</mark> networks upon which Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal relies. In turn, such fears <mark>could feed pressures</mark> for Moscow <mark>to escalate to nuclear use while it still has the ability</mark> to do so. <mark>Finally</mark>, even if the employment of AWS does not drive an increase in the speed and momentum of action that forecloses the time for exchanging signals, a future conflict in which AWS are ubiquitous will likely prove to be a poor venue both for signaling and interpreting signals</u></strong>. In such a conflict, instead of interpreting a downward modulation in an adversary's operations as a possible signal of restraint or perhaps as signaling a willingness to pause in an effort to open up space for diplomatic negotiations, AWS programmed to exploit every tactical opportunity might read the modulation as an opportunity to escalate offensive operations and thus gain tactical advantage. <u><strong>Such <mark>AWS</mark> <mark>could</mark> also <mark>misunderstand adversary </mark>attempts to signal <mark>resolve</mark> solely <mark>as</mark> adversary preparations for <mark>imminent attack</u></strong></mark>. Of course, correctly interpreting signals sent in crisis and conflict is vexing enough when humans are making all the decisions, but in future confrontations in which decisionmaking has willingly or unwillingly been ceded to machines, the problem is likely only to be magnified. Concluding Thoughts Much attention has been paid to the operational advantages to be gained from the development of AWS. <u><strong>By contrast, much less attention has been paid to the risks AWS potentially raise. There are times in which the fundamental tensions between the search for military effectiveness and the requirements of ensuring that crises between major nuclear weapons states remain stable and escalation does not ensue are pronounced and too consequential to ignore</u></strong>. The development of AWS may well be increasing the likelihood that one day the United States and Russia could find themselves in just such a time. Now, while AWS are still in their early development stages, it is worth the time of policymakers to carefully consider whether the putative operational advantages from AWS are worth the potential risks of instability and escalation they may raise.</p>

Churchill Semis – 1AC v Legacy BP

Advantage

./documents/hsld20/StrakeJesuit/Xi/Strake%20Jesuit-Xie-Aff-Winston%20Churchill%20Classic%20TOC%20and%20NIETOC%20Qualifier-Semis.docx

A

Winston Churchill Classic TOC and NIETOC Qualifier

Semis

Legacy Christian BP

Davina Le, Truman Le, Kartikeya Kotamraju

1ac - stock 1nc - baudrillard iron dome pic aff 1ar - aff k pic 2nr - pic 2ar - perfcon

hsld20/StrakeJesuit/Xi/Strake%20Jesuit-Xie-Aff-Winston%20Churchill%20Classic%20TOC%20and%20NIETOC%20Qualifier-Semis.docx

JaXi

Strake Jesuit JaXi

Ja.....

Xi.....

StrakeJesuit

Strake Jesuit

TX

hsld20

HS LD 2020-21

ld

hs

But, rights claims are not enforceable in the state of nature because of the problem of assurance—without the state, there is nothing that can ensure rights will be enforced. Exempting yourself from the state is impossible since any disagreement would be willing coercion.

Ripstein 04

Ripstein 04 [Arthur Ripstein, (University Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Toronto) "Authority and Coercion" Philosophy & Public Affairs, 32: 2–35, 2004, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2004.00003.x/abstract, DOA:12-16-2017 // WWBW]

the “general will.” manages to capture the way in which the specificity of the law and the monopoly on [the law’s] its enforcement do not thereby make it the unilateral imposition of one person’s will upon another. it is an “omnilateral” will, since all must agree to set up procedures that will make right possible. All must agree, because without such procedures, equal freedom is impossible, and so the external freedom of each is impossible. they must agree is not just that they should agree; it is that they cannot object to being forced to accept those procedures, because any objection would be nothing more than an assertion of the right to use force against others unilaterally. the General Will provides further constraints on the possibility of a rightful condition, and even explains the ways in which a state can legitimately coerce its citizens

the monopoly on [the law’s] enforcement is an “omnilateral” will, since all must agree to set up procedures that will make right possible without such procedures, equal freedom is impossible, and so the external freedom of each is impossible. they cannot object to being forced to accept those procedures, because any objection would be nothing more than an assertion of the right to use force against others unilaterally.

Kant explains the need for the three branches of government in Rousseau’s vocabulary of the “general will.” Kant finds this concept helpful, since it manages to capture the way in which the specificity of the law and the monopoly on [the law’s] its enforcement do not thereby make it the unilateral imposition of one person’s will upon another. Instead, it is what Kant calls an “omnilateral” will, since all must agree to set up procedures that will make right possible. All must agree, because without such procedures, equal freedom is impossible, and so the external freedom of each is impossible. But the sense in which they must agree is not just that they should agree; it is that they cannot object to being forced to accept those procedures, because any objection would be nothing more than an assertion of the right to use force against others unilaterally. Once the concept of the General Will is introduced, it provides further constraints on the possibility of a rightful condition, and even explains the ways in which a state can legitimately coerce its citizens for reasons other than the redress of private wrongs. Kant’s treatment of these issues of “Public Right” has struck many readers as somewhat perfunctory, especially after his meticulously detailed, if not always transparent, treatment of private right. He treats these issues as he does because he takes them to follow directly from the institution of a social contract. The details of his arguments need not concern us here, because he does not claim that these exhaust the further powers of the state. Instead, he puts them forward as additional powers a state must have if it is to create a rightful condition, and it is the structure of that argument that is of concern here.

<h4>But,<strong> rights claims are not enforceable in the state of nature because of the problem of assurance—without the state, there is nothing that can ensure rights will be enforced. Exempting yourself from the state is impossible since any disagreement would be willing coercion.</h4><p>Ripstein 04 </strong>[Arthur Ripstein, (University Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Toronto) "Authority and Coercion" Philosophy & Public Affairs, 32: 2–35, 2004, http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6486.2004.00003.x/abstract, DOA:12-16-2017 // WWBW]</p><p>Kant explains the need for the three branches of government in Rousseau’s vocabulary of <u><strong>the “general will.”</u></strong> Kant finds this concept helpful, since it <u><strong>manages to capture the way in which the specificity of the law and <mark>the monopoly on [the law’s]</mark> its <mark>enforcement</mark> do not thereby make it the unilateral imposition of one person’s will upon another.</u></strong> Instead, <u><strong>it <mark>is</u></strong></mark> what Kant calls <u><strong><mark>an “omnilateral” will, since all must agree to set up procedures that will make right possible</mark>. All must agree, because<mark> without such procedures, equal freedom is impossible, and so the external freedom of each is impossible.</u></strong></mark> But the sense in which <u><strong>they must agree is not just that they should agree; it is that <mark>they cannot object to being forced to accept those procedures, because any objection would be nothing more than an assertion of the right to use force against others unilaterally.</u></strong></mark> Once the concept of <u><strong>the General Will</u></strong> is introduced, it <u><strong>provides further constraints on the possibility of a rightful condition, and even explains the ways in which a state can legitimately coerce its citizens</u></strong> for reasons other than the redress of private wrongs. Kant’s treatment of these issues of “Public Right” has struck many readers as somewhat perfunctory, especially after his meticulously detailed, if not always transparent, treatment of private right. He treats these issues as he does because he takes them to follow directly from the institution of a social contract. The details of his arguments need not concern us here, because he does not claim that these exhaust the further powers of the state. Instead, he puts them forward as additional powers a state must have if it is to create a rightful condition, and it is the structure of that argument that is of concern here.</p>

1AC – Framework

./documents/hsld22/Dulles/ViNa/Dulles-ViNa-Aff-Greenhill-Fall-Classic-Round-4.docx

A

Greenhill Fall Classic

4

Lexington JB

Isaac Chao

1ac - Kant v5 1nc - Indexicals Bad, Affirming hard bad, Straight ref 1ar - all, rvi 2n - straight ref, rvi 2ar - rvis on i meets

hsld22/Dulles/ViNa/Dulles-ViNa-Aff-Greenhill-Fall-Classic-Round-4.docx

2022-09-18 00:14:03

ViNa

Dulles ViNa

Hi. For diclosure, dm me on facebook. It's just my name (friend req me first). email: [email protected] phone: 3468181945 he/him SO - September October ND - November December JF - January February G - Generic 0 - basic info

Vi.....

Na.....

Dulles

Dulles

TX

hsld22

HS LD 2022-23

ld

hs

No space war – it’s hype and systems are redundant

Johnson-Freese 16

Johnson-Freese and Hitchens 16 [Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese is a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College and author of Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens. Views expressed are those of the author alone. Theresa Hitchens is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), and the former Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva, Switzerland. Stop The Fearmongering Over War In Space: The Sky’s Not Falling, Part 1. December 27, 2016. https://breakingdefense.com/2016/12/stop-the-fearmongering-over-war-in-space-the-skys-not-falling-part-1/]

we’ve seen hysteria over a future war in space Fanning the flames are dire assessments from the US military, but also breathless coverage from a and credulous press This reporting muddy public debate over the slim possibility of war in space CNN’s recent special, War in Space latter might as well have been called Sharknado in Space CNN needs to hire some fact checkers no country in the world has yet weaponized space stock market transactions are not synchronized through GPS, but a closed system Cruise missiles can find their targets without GPS because they have precision inertial measurement units onboard and IMUs don’t rely on satellite data the United States is not unable to protect its sat s sat s have capabilities to maneuver Many are hardened against electro-magnetic pulse sport “shutters” to protect optical “eyes” from solar flares and lasers, and use radio frequency hopping to resist jamming No adversary has capabilities nor will they ever likely do so There is just too much redundancy in the system

we’ve seen hysteria over war in space from the military and press This muddy debate over the slim possibility of war in space no country has weaponized space stock transactions are not synchronized through GPS missiles find their targets without GPS IMUs don’t rely on sat data U S sat s have capabilities to maneuver Many are hardened against e m p sport “shutters” to protect from flares and lasers, and frequency hop to resist jamming No adversary has capabilities, nor will they ever There is too much redundancy

In the last two years, we’ve seen rising hysteria over a future war in space. Fanning the flames are not only dire assessments from the US military, but also breathless coverage from a cooperative and credulous press. This reporting doesn’t only muddy public debate over whether we really need expensive systems. It could also become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The irony is that nothing makes the currently slim possibility of war in space more likely than fearmongering over the threat of war in space. Two television programs in the past two years show how egregious this fearmongering can get. In April 2015, the CBS show 60 Minutes ran a segment called “The Battle Above.” In an interview with General John Hyten, the then-chief of U.S. Air Force Space Command, it came across loud and clear that the United States was being forced to prepare for a battle in space — specifically against China — that it really didn’t want. It was explained by Hyten and other guests that China is building a considerable amount of hardware and accumulating significant know-how regarding space, all threatening to space assets Americans depend on every day. If viewers weren’t frightened after watching the segment, it wasn’t for lack of trying on the part of CBS. Using terms like “offensive counterspace” as a 1984 NewSpeak euphemism for “weapons,” it was made clear that the United States had no choice but to spend billions of dollars on offensive counterspace technology to not just thwart the Chinese threat, but control and dominate space. While it didn’t actually distort facts — just omit facts about current U.S. space capabilities — the segment was basically a cost-free commercial for the military-industrial complex. In retrospect though, “The Battle Above” was pretty good compared to CNN’s recent special, War in Space: The Next Battlefield. The latter might as well have been called Sharknado in Space – because the only far-out weapons technology our potential adversaries don’t have, according to the broadcast, seems to be “sharks with frickin’ laser beams attached to their heads!” First, CNN needs to hire some fact checkers. Saying “unlike its adversaries, the U.S. has not yet weaponized space” is deeply misleading, like saying “unlike his political opponents, President-Elect Donald Trump has not sprouted wings and flown away”: A few (admittedly alarming) weapons tests aside, no country in the world has yet weaponized space. Contrary to CNN, stock market transactions are not timed nor synchronized through GPS, but a closed system. Cruise missiles can find their targets even without GPS, because they have both GPS and precision inertial measurement units onboard, and IMUs don’t rely on satellite data. Oh, and the British rock group Pink Floyd holds the only claim to the Dark Side of the Moon: There is a “far side” of the Moon — the side always turned away from the Earth — but not a “dark side” — which would be a side always turned away from the Sun. More nefariously, the segment sensationalized nuggets of truth within a barrage of half-truths, backed by a heavy bass, dramatic soundtrack (and gravelly-voiced reporter Jim Sciutto) and accompanied by sexy and scary visuals. Make no mistake there are dangers in space, and the United States has the most to lose if space assets are lost. The question is how best to protect them. Here are a few facts CNN omitted. The Reality The U.S. has all of the technologies described on the CNN segment and deemed potentially offensive: maneuverable satellites, nano-satellites, lasers, jamming capabilities, robotic arms, ballistic missiles that can be used as anti-satellite weapons, etc. In fact, the United States is more technologically advanced than other countries in both military and commercial space. That technological superiority scares other countries; just as the U.S. military space community is scared of other countries obtaining those technologies in the future. The U.S. military space budget is more than 10 times greater than that of all the countries in the world combined. That also causes other countries concern. More unsettling still, the United States has long been leery of treaty-based efforts to constrain a potential arms race in outer space, as supported by nearly every other country in the world for decades. Indeed, under the administration of George W. Bush, the U.S. talking points centered on the mantra “there is no arms race in outer space,” so there is no need for diplomat instruments to constrain one. Now, a decade later, the U.S. military – backed by the Intelligence Community which operates the nation’s spy satellites – seems to be shouting to the rooftops that the United States is in danger of losing the space arms race already begun by its potential adversaries. The underlying assumption — a convenient one for advocates of more military spending — is that now there is nothing that diplomacy can do. However, it must be remembered that most space-related technologies – with the exception of ballistic missiles and dedicated jammers – have both military and civil/commercial uses; both benign — indeed, helpful — and nefarious uses. For example, giving satellites the ability to maneuver on orbit can allow useful inspections of ailing satellites and possibly even repairs. Further, the United States is not unable to protect its satellites, as repeated during the CNN broadcast by various interviewees and the host. Many U.S. government-owned satellites, including precious spy satellites, have capabilities to maneuver. Many are hardened against electro-magnetic pulse, sport “shutters” to protect optical “eyes” from solar flares and lasers, and use radio frequency hopping to resist jamming. Offensive weapons, deployed on the ground to attack satellites, or in space, are not a silver bullet. To the contrary, U.S. deployment of such weapons may actually be detrimental to U.S. and international security in space (as we argued in a recent Atlantic Council publication, Towards a New National Security Space Strategy). Further, there are benefits to efforts started by the Obama Administration to find diplomatic tools to restrain and constrain dangerous military activities in space. These diplomatic efforts, however, would be undercut by a full-out U.S. pursuit of “space dominance.” This includes dialogue with China, the lack of which Gen. William Shelton, retired commander of Air Force Space Command, lamented in the CNN report. Given CNN’s “cast,” the spin was not surprising. Starting with Ghost Fleet author Peter Singer set the sensationalist tone, which never altered. The apocalyptic opening, inspired by Ghost Fleet, posited a scenario where all U.S. satellites are taken off-line in nearly one fell swoop. Unless we are talking about an alien invasion, that scenario is nigh on impossible. No potential adversary has such capabilities, nor will they ever likely do so. There is just too much redundancy in the system.

<h4>No space war – it’s <u>hype</u> and <u>systems are redundant</h4><p></u><strong>Johnson-Freese</strong> and Hitchens <strong>16</strong> [Dr. Joan Johnson-Freese is a member of the Breaking Defense Board of Contributors, a Professor of National Security Affairs at the Naval War College and author of Space Warfare in the 21st Century: Arming the Heavens. Views expressed are those of the author alone. Theresa Hitchens is a Senior Research Scholar at the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), and the former Director of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) in Geneva, Switzerland. Stop The Fearmongering Over War In Space: The Sky’s Not Falling, Part 1. December 27, 2016. https://breakingdefense.com/2016/12/stop-the-fearmongering-over-war-in-space-the-skys-not-falling-part-1/]</p><p>In the last two years, <u><mark>we’ve seen</u></mark> rising <u><strong><mark>hysteria</u></strong> <u>over</mark> a future <strong><mark>war in space</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Fanning the flames</u></strong> <u>are</u> not only <u>dire assessments <mark>from the</mark> US <mark>military</mark>, but also <strong>breathless coverage</strong> from a</u> cooperative <u><mark>and</u></mark> <u><strong>credulous <mark>press</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>This</mark> reporting</u> doesn’t only <u><strong><mark>muddy</mark> public <mark>debate</u></strong> <u>over</u></mark> whether we really need expensive systems. It could also become a self-fulfilling prophecy. The irony is that nothing makes <u><mark>the</u></mark> currently <u><strong><mark>slim possibility</strong> of <strong>war in space</u></strong></mark> more likely than fearmongering over the threat of war in space. Two television programs in the past two years show how egregious this fearmongering can get. In April 2015, the CBS show 60 Minutes ran a segment called “The Battle Above.” In an interview with General John Hyten, the then-chief of U.S. Air Force Space Command, it came across loud and clear that the United States was being forced to prepare for a battle in space — specifically against China — that it really didn’t want. It was explained by Hyten and other guests that China is building a considerable amount of hardware and accumulating significant know-how regarding space, all threatening to space assets Americans depend on every day. If viewers weren’t frightened after watching the segment, it wasn’t for lack of trying on the part of CBS. Using terms like “offensive counterspace” as a 1984 NewSpeak euphemism for “weapons,” it was made clear that the United States had no choice but to spend billions of dollars on offensive counterspace technology to not just thwart the Chinese threat, but control and dominate space. While it didn’t actually distort facts — just omit facts about current U.S. space capabilities — the segment was basically a cost-free commercial for the military-industrial complex. In retrospect though, “The Battle Above” was pretty good compared to <u>CNN’s recent special, War in Space</u>: The Next Battlefield. The <u>latter might as well have been called <strong>Sharknado in Space</u></strong> – because the only far-out weapons technology our potential adversaries don’t have, according to the broadcast, seems to be “sharks with frickin’ laser beams attached to their heads!” First, <u>CNN needs to hire some <strong>fact checkers</u></strong>. Saying “unlike its adversaries, the U.S. has not yet weaponized space” is deeply misleading, like saying “unlike his political opponents, President-Elect Donald Trump has not sprouted wings and flown away”: A few (admittedly alarming) weapons tests aside, <u><strong><mark>no country</strong></mark> in the world <mark>has</mark> yet <strong><mark>weaponized space</u></strong></mark>. Contrary to CNN, <u><strong><mark>stock</strong></mark> market <strong><mark>transactions</strong> are <strong>not</strong></mark> </u>timed nor <u><mark>synchronized through <strong>GPS</strong></mark>, but a <strong>closed system</u></strong>. <u>Cruise <strong><mark>missiles</strong></mark> can <mark>find their targets</u></mark> even <u><strong><mark>without GPS</u></strong></mark>, <u>because they have</u> both GPS and <u>precision inertial measurement units onboard</u>, <u>and <strong><mark>IMUs don’t rely</strong> on <strong>sat</strong></mark>ellite <strong><mark>data</u></strong></mark>. Oh, and the British rock group Pink Floyd holds the only claim to the Dark Side of the Moon: There is a “far side” of the Moon — the side always turned away from the Earth — but not a “dark side” — which would be a side always turned away from the Sun. More nefariously, the segment sensationalized nuggets of truth within a barrage of half-truths, backed by a heavy bass, dramatic soundtrack (and gravelly-voiced reporter Jim Sciutto) and accompanied by sexy and scary visuals. Make no mistake there are dangers in space, and the United States has the most to lose if space assets are lost. The question is how best to protect them. Here are a few facts CNN omitted. The Reality The U.S. has all of the technologies described on the CNN segment and deemed potentially offensive: maneuverable satellites, nano-satellites, lasers, jamming capabilities, robotic arms, ballistic missiles that can be used as anti-satellite weapons, etc. In fact, the United States is more technologically advanced than other countries in both military and commercial space. That technological superiority scares other countries; just as the U.S. military space community is scared of other countries obtaining those technologies in the future. The U.S. military space budget is more than 10 times greater than that of all the countries in the world combined. That also causes other countries concern. More unsettling still, the United States has long been leery of treaty-based efforts to constrain a potential arms race in outer space, as supported by nearly every other country in the world for decades. Indeed, under the administration of George W. Bush, the U.S. talking points centered on the mantra “there is no arms race in outer space,” so there is no need for diplomat instruments to constrain one. Now, a decade later, the U.S. military – backed by the Intelligence Community which operates the nation’s spy satellites – seems to be shouting to the rooftops that the United States is in danger of losing the space arms race already begun by its potential adversaries. The underlying assumption — a convenient one for advocates of more military spending — is that now there is nothing that diplomacy can do. However, it must be remembered that most space-related technologies – with the exception of ballistic missiles and dedicated jammers – have both military and civil/commercial uses; both benign — indeed, helpful — and nefarious uses. For example, giving satellites the ability to maneuver on orbit can allow useful inspections of ailing satellites and possibly even repairs. Further, <u>the <strong><mark>U</strong></mark>nited <strong><mark>S</strong></mark>tates is <strong>not unable</strong> to <strong>protect</strong> its <strong>sat</u></strong>ellite<u><strong>s</u></strong>, as repeated during the CNN broadcast by various interviewees and the host. Many U.S. government-owned satellites, including precious spy <u><strong><mark>sat</u></strong></mark>ellite<u><strong><mark>s</u></strong></mark>, <u><mark>have <strong>capabilities to maneuver</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>Many are <strong>hardened</u></strong> <u>against <strong>e</strong></mark>lectro-<strong><mark>m</strong></mark>agnetic <strong><mark>p</strong></mark>ulse</u>, <u><mark>sport <strong>“shutters”</strong> to protect</mark> optical “eyes” <mark>from</mark> solar <strong><mark>flares and lasers</strong>, and</mark> use radio <strong><mark>frequency hop</strong></mark>ping <mark>to <strong>resist jamming</u></strong></mark>. Offensive weapons, deployed on the ground to attack satellites, or in space, are not a silver bullet. To the contrary, U.S. deployment of such weapons may actually be detrimental to U.S. and international security in space (as we argued in a recent Atlantic Council publication, Towards a New National Security Space Strategy). Further, there are benefits to efforts started by the Obama Administration to find diplomatic tools to restrain and constrain dangerous military activities in space. These diplomatic efforts, however, would be undercut by a full-out U.S. pursuit of “space dominance.” This includes dialogue with China, the lack of which Gen. William Shelton, retired commander of Air Force Space Command, lamented in the CNN report. Given CNN’s “cast,” the spin was not surprising. Starting with Ghost Fleet author Peter Singer set the sensationalist tone, which never altered. The apocalyptic opening, inspired by Ghost Fleet, posited a scenario where all U.S. satellites are taken off-line in nearly one fell swoop. Unless we are talking about an alien invasion, that scenario is nigh on impossible. <u><strong><mark>No</u></strong></mark> potential <u><strong><mark>adversary</u></strong> <u>has</u></mark> such <u><mark>capabilities</u>, <u>nor will they <strong>ever</strong></mark> likely do so</u>. <u><mark>There is</mark> just <strong><mark>too much redundancy</strong></mark> in the system</u>.</p>

1NC – Round 4 – ADA

Advantage 1

1NC – AT: Space War

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That’s dangerous – military AI arms racing leads to rapid unregulated AI and arms development

Conn 18 Weapons," Future of Life Institute, https://futureoflife.org/2018/09/04/the-risks-posed-by-lethal-autonomous-weapons/?cn-reloaded=1, SJBE

Conn 18 Ariel Conn, 9-4-2018, "The Risks Posed By Lethal Autonomous Weapons," Future of Life Institute, https://futureoflife.org/2018/09/04/the-risks-posed-by-lethal-autonomous-weapons/?cn-reloaded=1, SJBE

More specifically, nearly 4,000 AI and robotics researchers called for a ban on LAWS in 2015; in 2017, 137 CEOs of AI companies asked the UN to ban LAWS; and in 2018, 240 AI-related organizations and nearly 3,100 individuals took that call a step further and pledged not to be involved in LAWS development. Principle among these is that AI experts tend to recognize how dangerous and destabilizing these weapons could be. The weapons could be hacked. The weapons could fall into the hands of “bad actors.” The weapons may not be as “smart” as we think and could unwittingly target innocent civilians. Because the materials necessary to build the weapons are cheap and easy to obtain, military powers could mass-produce these weapons, increasing the likelihood of proliferation and mass killings. The weapons could enable assassinations or, alternatively, they could become weapons of oppression, allowing dictators and warlords to subdue their people. But perhaps the greatest risk posed by LAWS, is the potential to ignite a global AI arms race. advanced AI capabilities in weapons are increasing rapidly. If one country were to begin substantial development of a LAWS program — or even if the program is simply perceived as substantial by other countries — an AI arms race would likely be imminent. During an arms race, countries and AI labs will feel increasing pressure to find shortcuts around safety precautions. Once that happens, every threat mentioned above becomes even more likely, if not inevitable. If any major military power pushes ahead with AI weapon development, a global arms race is virtually inevitable, and the endpoint of this technological trajectory is obvious: autonomous weapons will become the Kalashnikovs of tomorrow. Unlike nuclear weapons, they require no costly or hard-to-obtain raw materials, so they will become ubiquitous and cheap for all significant military powers to mass-produce Autonomous weapons are ideal for tasks such as assassinations, destabilizing nations, subduing populations and selectively killing a particular ethnic group.

LAWS could be hacked. could fall into the hands of “bad actors.” may target innocent civilians But the greatest risk is the potential to ignite a global AI arms race advanced AI capabilities in weapons are increasing rapidly. If a LAWS program is perceived as substantial countries and AI labs will feel increasing pressure to find shortcuts around safety precautions Once that happens, every threat becomes even more likely, if not inevitable

Meanwhile, those who would actually be responsible for designing LAWS — the AI and robotics researchers and developers — have spent these years calling on the UN to negotiate a treaty banning LAWS. More specifically, nearly 4,000 AI and robotics researchers called for a ban on LAWS in 2015; in 2017, 137 CEOs of AI companies asked the UN to ban LAWS; and in 2018, 240 AI-related organizations and nearly 3,100 individuals took that call a step further and pledged not to be involved in LAWS development. And AI researchers have plenty of reasons for their consensus that the world should seek a ban on lethal autonomous weapons. Principle among these is that AI experts tend to recognize how dangerous and destabilizing these weapons could be. The weapons could be hacked. The weapons could fall into the hands of “bad actors.” The weapons may not be as “smart” as we think and could unwittingly target innocent civilians. Because the materials necessary to build the weapons are cheap and easy to obtain, military powers could mass-produce these weapons, increasing the likelihood of proliferation and mass killings. The weapons could enable assassinations or, alternatively, they could become weapons of oppression, allowing dictators and warlords to subdue their people. But perhaps the greatest risk posed by LAWS, is the potential to ignite a global AI arms race. For now, governments insist they will ensure that testing, validation, and verification of these weapons is mandatory. However, these weapons are not only technologically novel, but also transformative; they have been described as the third revolution in warfare, following gun powder and nuclear weapons. LAWS have the potential to become the most powerful types of weapons the world has seen. Varying degrees of autonomy already exist in weapon systems around the world, and levels of autonomy and advanced AI capabilities in weapons are increasing rapidly. If one country were to begin substantial development of a LAWS program — or even if the program is simply perceived as substantial by other countries — an AI arms race would likely be imminent. During an arms race, countries and AI labs will feel increasing pressure to find shortcuts around safety precautions. Once that happens, every threat mentioned above becomes even more likely, if not inevitable. As stated in the Open Letter Against Lethal Autonomous Weapons: The key question for humanity today is whether to start a global AI arms race or to prevent it from starting. If any major military power pushes ahead with AI weapon development, a global arms race is virtually inevitable, and the endpoint of this technological trajectory is obvious: autonomous weapons will become the Kalashnikovs of tomorrow. Unlike nuclear weapons, they require no costly or hard-to-obtain raw materials, so they will become ubiquitous and cheap for all significant military powers to mass-produce. It will only be a matter of time until they appear on the black market and in the hands of terrorists, dictators wishing to better control their populace, warlords wishing to perpetrate ethnic cleansing, etc. Autonomous weapons are ideal for tasks such as assassinations, destabilizing nations, subduing populations and selectively killing a particular ethnic group.

<h4>That’s dangerous – military AI arms racing leads to rapid unregulated AI and arms development</h4><p><strong>Conn 18</strong> Ariel Conn, 9-4-2018, "The Risks Posed By Lethal Autonomous <u><strong>Weapons," Future of Life Institute, https://futureoflife.org/2018/09/04/the-risks-posed-by-lethal-autonomous-weapons/?cn-reloaded=1, SJBE</p><p></u></strong>Meanwhile, those who would actually be responsible for designing LAWS — the AI and robotics researchers and developers — have spent these years calling on the UN to negotiate a treaty banning LAWS. <u><strong>More specifically, nearly 4,000 AI and robotics researchers called for a ban on LAWS in 2015; in 2017, 137 CEOs of AI companies asked the UN to ban LAWS; and in 2018, 240 AI-related organizations and nearly 3,100 individuals took that call a step further and pledged not to be involved in <mark>LAWS</mark> development.</u></strong> And AI researchers have plenty of reasons for their consensus that the world should seek a ban on lethal autonomous weapons. <u><strong>Principle among these is that AI experts tend to recognize how dangerous and destabilizing these weapons could be. The weapons <mark>could be hacked.</mark> The weapons <mark>could fall into the hands of “bad actors.”</mark> The weapons <mark>may</mark> not be as “smart” as we think and could unwittingly <mark>target innocent civilians</mark>. Because the materials necessary to build the weapons are cheap and easy to obtain, military powers could mass-produce these weapons, increasing the likelihood of proliferation and mass killings. The weapons could enable assassinations or, alternatively, they could become weapons of oppression, allowing dictators and warlords to subdue their people. <mark>But</mark> perhaps <mark>the greatest risk</mark> posed by LAWS, <mark>is the potential to ignite a global AI arms race</mark>.</u></strong> For now, governments insist they will ensure that testing, validation, and verification of these weapons is mandatory. However, these weapons are not only technologically novel, but also transformative; they have been described as the third revolution in warfare, following gun powder and nuclear weapons. LAWS have the potential to become the most powerful types of weapons the world has seen. Varying degrees of autonomy already exist in weapon systems around the world, and levels of autonomy and <u><strong><mark>advanced AI capabilities in weapons are increasing rapidly.</u></strong></mark> <u><strong><mark>If</mark> one country were to begin substantial development of <mark>a LAWS program</mark> — or even if the program <mark>is</mark> simply <mark>perceived as substantial</mark> by other countries — an AI arms race would likely be imminent. During an arms race, <mark>countries and AI labs will feel increasing pressure to find shortcuts around safety precautions</mark>. <mark>Once that happens, every threat</mark> mentioned above <mark>becomes even more likely, if not inevitable</mark>.</u></strong> As stated in the Open Letter Against Lethal Autonomous Weapons: The key question for humanity today is whether to start a global AI arms race or to prevent it from starting. <u><strong>If any major military power pushes ahead with AI weapon development, a global arms race is virtually inevitable, and the endpoint of this technological trajectory is obvious: autonomous weapons will become the Kalashnikovs of tomorrow. Unlike nuclear weapons, they require no costly or hard-to-obtain raw materials, so they will become ubiquitous and cheap for all significant military powers to mass-produce</u></strong>. It will only be a matter of time until they appear on the black market and in the hands of terrorists, dictators wishing to better control their populace, warlords wishing to perpetrate ethnic cleansing, etc. <u><strong>Autonomous weapons are ideal for tasks such as assassinations, destabilizing nations, subduing populations and selectively killing a particular ethnic group. </p></u></strong>

1AC

Advantage 1 – AI

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1] This evidence non-unique the whole aff – even if AI is removed from nuclear decision making, humans will prefer AI suggestions over human counterparts.

Klare, PhD, 20

Klare, PhD, 20

, April) There are many reasons to be wary of increasing automation of nuclear command and control, these technologies are still in their infancy and prone to malfunctions Algorithms can become very good at certain tasks but often contain built-in biases conveyed through the training data These systems also are prone to unexplainable malfunctions and can be fooled, or “spoofed,” by skilled professionals No matter how much is spent on cybersecurity NC3 systems will always be vulnerable to hacking by sophisticated adversaries AI systems lack an ability to assess intent or context does a sudden enemy troop redeployment indicate an imminent enemy attack or just the normal rotation Human analysts can use their sense of the current political moment to help shape their assessment of such a situation, but machines lack that ability and may tend to assume the worst. In 1983 Petrov, received an electronic warning of a U.S. missile attack on Soviet territory. Unsure of the accuracy he waited before informing his superiors thus averting a possible nuclear exchange. Machines are not capable of such doubts or hesitations Another problem is the lack of real world data for use in training NC3 algorithms. Other than World War II, there has never been an actual nuclear war and therefore no genuine combat examples for use in devising reality-based attack responses. War games can be substituted but none of these can accurately predict how leaders will actually behave Therefore, decision-support programs devised by these algorithms can never be fully trusted Building an automated decision-support tool to provide early warning of a preemptive nuclear attack is an inherently challenging problem because there is zero actual data of what would constitute reliable indicators of an imminent preemptive nuclear attack.” An equal danger is automation bias the tendency for stressed-out decision-makers to trust information supplied by advanced computers rather than their own considered judgment a U.S. president, informed of sensor data might choose to accept the computer’s advice to initiate a retaliatory strike rather than consider possible alternatives it is likely that humans making command decisions will treat the AI system’s suggestions as on a par with or better than those of human advisers,” a 2018 RAND study noted. “This potentially unjustified trust presents new risks that must be considered.” Compounding all these risks is the likelihood that China, Russia, and the United States will all install automated NC3 systems but without informing each other of the nature and status of these systems it is possible to imagine a “flash war,” triggered by the interaction of competing corporate investment algorithms data assessment systems of each country could misinterpret signs of adversary moves and conclude an attack is imminent, leading other computers to order preparatory moves for a retaliatory strike, in turn prompting the similar moves on the other side, until both commence a rapid escalatory cycle ending in nuclear catastrophe.20

automation of nuclear command and control re still in their infancy and prone to malfunctions Algorithms contain built-in biases through the training data. These systems also are prone to malfunctions and can be spoofed NC3 systems will always be vulnerable to hacking AI systems lack an ability to assess intent or context Human analysts use their sense of the current political moment to shape their assessment machines assume the worst. Machines are not capable of doubts or hesitations lack of real world data for NC3 algorithms there has never been combat examples for devising responses. War games can be substituted but none accurately predict decision-support programs can never be trusted there is zero data of what would constitute indicators of an imminent attack stressed-out decision-makers to trust computers rather than their alternatives that humans making command decisions will treat the AI system’s suggestions as on a par with or better than those of human advisers This unjustified trust presents new risk China, Russia, and the United States will install automated NC3 system without informing each other of the nature a “flash war triggered by competing corporate investment algorithms data assessment systems could misinterpret signs prompting a rapid escalatory cycle ending in nuclear catastrophe.

(Michael T., Ph.D. from the Graduate School of the Union Institute, professor emeritus of peace and world-security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association in Washington, DC, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-04/features/skynet-revisited-dangerous-allure-nuclear-command-automation, April) There are many reasons to be wary of increasing the automation of nuclear command and control, especially when it comes to computer-assisted decision-making. Many of these technologies are still in their infancy and prone to malfunctions that cannot easily be anticipated. Algorithms that have developed through machine learning, a technique whereby computers are fed vast amounts of raw data and are “trained” to detect certain patterns, can become very good at certain tasks, such as facial recognition, but often contain built-in biases conveyed through the training data. These systems also are prone to unexplainable malfunctions and can be fooled, or “spoofed,” by skilled professionals. No matter how much is spent on cybersecurity, moreover, NC3 systems will always be vulnerable to hacking by sophisticated adversaries.16 AI-enabled systems also lack an ability to assess intent or context. For example, does a sudden enemy troop redeployment indicate an imminent enemy attack or just the normal rotation of forces? Human analysts can use their sense of the current political moment to help shape their assessment of such a situation, but machines lack that ability and may tend to assume the worst. This aspect of human judgment arose in a famous Cold War incident. In September 1983, at a time of heightened tensions between the superpowers, a Soviet nuclear watch officer, Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Petrov, received an electronic warning of a U.S. missile attack on Soviet territory. Unsure of the accuracy of the warning, he waited before informing his superiors of the strike and eventually told them he believed it was a computer error, as proved to be the case, thus averting a possible nuclear exchange. Machines are not capable of such doubts or hesitations.17 Another problem is the lack of real world data for use in training NC3 algorithms. Other than the two bombs dropped on Japan at the end of World War II, there has never been an actual nuclear war and therefore no genuine combat examples for use in devising reality-based attack responses. War games and simulations can be substituted for this purpose, but none of these can accurately predict how leaders will actually behave in a future nuclear showdown. Therefore, decision-support programs devised by these algorithms can never be fully trusted. “Automated decision-support systems … are only as good as the data they rely on. Building an automated decision-support tool to provide early warning of a preemptive nuclear attack is an inherently challenging problem because there is zero actual data of what would constitute reliable indicators of an imminent preemptive nuclear attack.”18 An equal danger is what analysts call “automation bias,” or the tendency for stressed-out decision-makers to trust the information and advice supplied by advanced computers rather than their own considered judgment. For example, a U.S. president, when informed of sensor data indicating an enemy nuclear attack and under pressure to make an immediate decision, might choose to accept the computer’s advice to initiate a retaliatory strike rather than consider possible alternatives, such as with Petrov’s courageous Cold War action. Given that AI data systems can be expected to gain ever more analytical capacity over the coming decades, “it is likely that humans making command decisions will treat the AI system’s suggestions as on a par with or better than those of human advisers,” a 2018 RAND study noted. “This potentially unjustified trust presents new risks that must be considered.”19 Compounding all these risks is the likelihood that China, Russia, and the United States will all install automated NC3 systems but without informing each other of the nature and status of these systems. Under these circumstances, it is possible to imagine a “flash war,” roughly akin to a “flash crash” on Wall Street, that is triggered by the interaction of competing corporate investment algorithms. In such a scenario, the data assessment systems of each country could misinterpret signs of adversary moves and conclude an attack is imminent, leading other computers to order preparatory moves for a retaliatory strike, in turn prompting the similar moves on the other side, until both commence a rapid escalatory cycle ending in nuclear catastrophe.20

<h4>1<strong>] This evidence non-unique the whole aff – even if AI is removed from nuclear decision making, humans will prefer AI suggestions over human counterparts.</h4><p>Klare, PhD, 20</p><p></strong>(Michael T., Ph.D. from the Graduate School of the Union Institute, professor emeritus of peace and world-security studies at Hampshire College and senior visiting fellow at the Arms Control Association in Washington, DC, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2020-04/features/skynet-revisited-dangerous-allure-nuclear-command-automation<u><strong>, April) </p><p></strong>There are many reasons to be wary of increasing</u> the <u><mark>automation of nuclear command and control</mark>,</u> especially when it comes to computer-assisted decision-making. Many of <u>these technologies a<mark>re still in their <strong>infancy</strong> and prone to <strong>malfunctions</u></strong></mark> that cannot easily be anticipated. <u><mark>Algorithms</u></mark> that have developed through machine learning, a technique whereby computers are fed vast amounts of raw data and are “trained” to detect certain patterns, <u>can become very good at certain tasks</u>, such as facial recognition, <u>but often <mark>contain <strong>built-in biases</strong></mark> conveyed <mark>through the training data</u>. <u>These systems also are prone to</mark> unexplainable <mark>malfunctions and can be</mark> fooled, or <strong>“<mark>spoofed</strong></mark>,” by skilled professionals</u>. <u>No matter how much is spent on cybersecurity</u>, moreover, <u><mark>NC3 systems will always be <strong>vulnerable to hacking</strong></mark> by sophisticated adversaries</u>.16 <u><mark>AI</u></mark>-enabled <u><mark>systems</u></mark> also <u><mark>lack an ability to assess <strong>intent or context</u></strong></mark>. For example, <u>does a sudden enemy troop redeployment indicate an imminent enemy attack or just the normal rotation</u> of forces? <u><mark>Human analysts </mark>can <mark>use</u> <u>their sense of the current political moment to</mark> help <mark>shape their assessment</mark> of such a situation, but <mark>machines</mark> lack that ability and may <strong>tend to <mark>assume the worst.</strong></mark> </u>This aspect of human judgment arose in a famous Cold War incident. <u>In</u> September <u>1983</u>, at a time of heightened tensions between the superpowers, a Soviet nuclear watch officer, Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav <u>Petrov, received an electronic warning of a U.S. missile attack on Soviet territory. Unsure of the accuracy</u> of the warning, <u>he waited before informing his superiors</u> of the strike and eventually told them he believed it was a computer error, as proved to be the case, <u>thus averting a possible nuclear exchange. <mark>Machines are not capable of</mark> such <strong><mark>doubts or hesitations</u></strong></mark>.17 <u>Another problem is the <strong><mark>lack of real world data</strong> for</mark> use in training <mark>NC3 algorithms</mark>.</u> <u>Other than</u> the two bombs dropped on Japan at the end of <u>World War II, <mark>there has never been</mark> an actual nuclear war and therefore no <strong>genuine <mark>combat examples</strong> for</mark> use in <mark>devising</mark> reality-based attack <mark>responses.</u> <u>War games</u></mark> and simulations <u><mark>can be substituted</u></mark> for this purpose, <u><mark>but none</mark> of these can <strong><mark>accurately predict</strong></mark> how leaders will actually behave </u>in a future nuclear showdown. <u>Therefore, <mark>decision-support programs</mark> devised by these algorithms <mark>can <strong>never be </mark>fully <mark>trusted</u></strong></mark>. “Automated decision-support systems … are only as good as the data they rely on. <u>Building an automated decision-support tool to provide early warning of a preemptive nuclear attack is an inherently challenging problem because <mark>there is zero </mark>actual <mark>data of what would constitute</mark> reliable <mark>indicators of an imminent</mark> preemptive nuclear <mark>attack</mark>.”</u>18 <u>An equal danger is</u> what analysts call “<u>automation bias</u>,” or <u>the tendency for <mark>stressed-out decision-makers to trust</u></mark> the <u>information</u> and advice <u>supplied by advanced <mark>computers rather than their </mark>own considered judgment</u>. For example, <u>a U.S. president,</u> when <u>informed of sensor data</u> indicating an enemy nuclear attack and under pressure to make an immediate decision, <u>might choose to accept the computer’s advice to initiate a retaliatory strike <strong>rather than consider possible <mark>alternatives</u></strong></mark>, such as with Petrov’s courageous Cold War action. Given that AI data systems can be expected to gain ever more analytical capacity over the coming decades, “<u>it is likely <mark>that humans making command decisions will treat the AI system’s suggestions as on a par with or better than those of human advisers</mark>,” a 2018 RAND study noted. “<mark>This</mark> potentially <strong><mark>unjustified trust</strong> presents new risk</mark>s that must be considered.”</u>19 <u>Compounding all these risks is the likelihood that <mark>China, Russia, and the United States will</mark> all <mark>install automated NC3 system</mark>s but <strong><mark>without informing each other</strong> of the nature</mark> and status of these systems</u>. Under these circumstances, <u>it is possible to imagine <mark>a “flash war</mark>,”</u> roughly akin to a “flash crash” on Wall Street, that is <u><mark>triggered by</mark> the interaction of <strong><mark>competing corporate investment algorithms</u></strong></mark>. In such a scenario, the <u><mark>data assessment systems</mark> of each country <mark>could misinterpret signs</mark> of adversary moves and conclude an attack is imminent, leading other computers to order preparatory moves for a retaliatory strike, in turn <mark>prompting</mark> the similar moves on the other side, until both commence <mark>a <strong>rapid escalatory cycle ending in nuclear catastrophe.</mark>20</p></u></strong>

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Independently, states will automate nuclear response – AI integration causes extinction

Murray 18

Murray 18 [Lori Esposito Murray is an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. "Pairing AI and nukes will lead to our autonomous Doomsday." https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2018/11/13/pairing-ai-and-nukes-will-lead-to-our-autonomous-doomsday/]

the world again stands on the precipice of a dramatic revolution in warfare driven by a i the one area where AI holds perhaps the most peril is its potential role in how and when to use nuclear weapons. Advances in AI are on a fast track, and the U S is indisputably in an AI arms race with two of our most formidable competitors both nuclear powers China and Russia Early and determined U.S. leadership is essential to ensure that we are not just competing but also jointly cooperating with our nuclear-capable adversaries to ensure that AI does not destabilize nuclear command and control. The stakes are high; the consequences potentially existential. autonomous nuclear command-and-control might be easily dismissed as not realistic, the past is prologue The history of the Cold War is riddled with near misses when accident, mistake or miscalculation due to computer errors in both the Soviet Union and the United States almost triggered nuclear war. In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union actually considered deploying a fully automated retaliation to a U.S. nuclear strike, a Doomsday machine While concerns have been raised in Congress about having the decision to use nuclear weapons solely in the hands of the commander in chief, an even more ominous, impending threat is having that command and control in the hands of AI. The potential application for this developing, powerful technology in increasing stability and the effectiveness of arms control in areas such as early warning, predictive decision-making by bad actors, tracking and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, and empowering verification for further reductions is as yet unknown. But the destabilizing potential needs to be addressed early and jointly among the nuclear powers — and here, U.S. leadership is indispensable. AI is projected to rapidly and disruptively change the world within a very short time frame AI experts agree machine learning should enhance — not replace human decision-making. This must be a central tenet of nuclear command and control. One of the heroes of the Cold War, who later became known and honored as the man who saved the world from nuclear war, Soviet Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov, overrode repeated and sequential computer warnings in 1983 of a U.S. nuclear missile attack and did not pass on the warning to his superiors. In a 2010 interview with Der Spiegel, Petrov explained that the reason he did not pass the warning on, and correctly determined in the few minutes he had to make a decision that they were a false alarm, was because he factored that: “We are wiser than the computers. We created them.” We are entering this disruptive period of rapid technological change knowing the consequences of nuclear war and the need for U.S. leadership to guide the use of technology so that it taps that wisdom and enhances the control and reduction of these very dangerous weapons The most immediate priority for the U.S. must be to lead the process to ensure that these rapid advancements in AI strengthen the command and control of nuclear weapons not repeat the past and relinquish it to an automatic or nearly automatic Doomsday machine.

AI holds the most peril in how to use nuclear weapons Advances are on a fast track U S is in an arms race with China and Russia leadership is essential to ensure AI does not destabilize nuclear command and control ; the consequences existential autonomous nuclear command-and-control might be easily dismissed as not realistic past is prologue The Cold War is riddled with near misses when accident miscalculation computer errors almost triggered nuclear war. the Soviet Union considered deploying a fully automated retaliation Doomsday machine AI is projected to change the world within a very short time frame experts agree machine learning should enhance — not replace human decision-making. This must be a central tenet of nuclear command and control.

As we commemorate the 100th anniversary of the end of World War I, which transformed how wars are fought and won, the world again stands on the precipice of a dramatic revolution in warfare, this one driven by artificial intelligence. While both AI and the debate about the implications of autonomous decision capabilities in warfare are only in their early stages, the one area where AI holds perhaps the most peril is its potential role in how and when to use nuclear weapons. Advances in AI are on a fast track, and the United States is indisputably in an AI arms race with two of our most formidable competitors, both nuclear powers, China and Russia — the former with a smaller but growing nuclear arsenal in size and sophistication, and the latter, which along with the U.S., possesses 90 percent of the global nuclear weapons stockpile. Early and determined U.S. leadership is essential to ensure that we are not just competing but also jointly cooperating with our nuclear-capable adversaries to ensure that AI does not destabilize nuclear command and control. The stakes are high; the consequences potentially existential. While an autonomous nuclear command-and-control program might be easily dismissed as not realistic, the past is prologue. The history of the Cold War is riddled with near misses when accident, mistake or miscalculation due to computer errors in both the Soviet Union and the United States almost triggered nuclear war. But perhaps one of the most stunning revelations of the post-Cold War period relevant to today’s AI revolution is detailed by David Hoffman in his revelatory 2009 book “The Dead Hand.” In the early 1980s, the Soviet Union actually considered deploying a fully automated retaliation to a U.S. nuclear strike, a Doomsday machine, where a computer alone would issue the command for a retaliatory nuclear strike if the Kremlin leadership had been killed in a first-strike nuclear attack from the U.S. Eventually the Soviets deployed a modified, nearly automatic system where a small group of lower-ranking duty officers deep underground would make that decision, relying on data that the Kremlin leadership had been wiped out in a U.S. nuclear strike. The plan was not meant to deter a U.S. strike by assuring the U.S. that if they attacked first, even with a limited strike against the Soviet leadership, that there would be a guaranteed nuclear response. The Soviets kept the plan secret from the United States. It was meant to ensure an all out, nearly automatic nuclear response, which would have existential consequences. As AI develops and confidence in machine learning increases, the U.S. needs to be leading the effort diplomatically by reinvigorating strategic stability talks with both China and Russia, which should include this issue and ensure that this type of nuclear planning does not make its way back into the thinking of our nuclear adversaries or our own, whether secretly or as a form of deterrence. While concerns have been raised in Congress about having the decision to use nuclear weapons solely in the hands of the commander in chief, an even more ominous, impending threat is having that command and control in the hands of AI. The potential application for this developing, powerful technology in increasing stability and the effectiveness of arms control in areas such as early warning, predictive decision-making by bad actors, tracking and stopping the spread of nuclear weapons, and empowering verification for further reductions is as yet unknown. Potential stabilizing applications need to be a defense-funding priority and also a private sector/university funding priority, similar to the public-private efforts that underpinned and propelled the nuclear arms control and strategic stability process during the Cold War. But the destabilizing potential needs to be addressed early and jointly among the nuclear powers — and here, U.S. leadership is indispensable. AI is projected to rapidly and disruptively change the world within a very short time frame — on the economic side perhaps even eliminating 40 percent of U.S. jobs in as short as 10-15 years. Yet, leading AI experts agree that machine learning should enhance — not replace — human decision-making. This must be a central tenet of nuclear command and control. One of the heroes of the Cold War, who later became known and honored as the man who saved the world from nuclear war, Soviet Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov, overrode repeated and sequential computer warnings in 1983 of a U.S. nuclear missile attack and did not pass on the warning to his superiors. In a 2010 interview with Der Spiegel, Petrov explained that the reason he did not pass the warning on, and correctly determined in the few minutes he had to make a decision that they were a false alarm, was because he factored that: “We are wiser than the computers. We created them.” We are entering this disruptive period of rapid technological change, knowing the consequences of nuclear war and the need for U.S. leadership to guide the use of technology so that it taps that wisdom and enhances the control and reduction of these very dangerous weapons. The most immediate priority for the U.S. must be to lead the process to ensure that these rapid advancements in AI strengthen the command and control of nuclear weapons — not repeat the past and relinquish it to an automatic or nearly automatic Doomsday machine.

<h4>Independently, states will <u>automate nuclear response</u> – AI integration causes <u>extinction</u> </h4><p><strong>Murray 18<u></strong> [Lori Esposito Murray is an adjunct senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. "Pairing AI and nukes will lead to our autonomous Doomsday." https://www.defensenews.com/opinion/commentary/2018/11/13/pairing-ai-and-nukes-will-lead-to-our-autonomous-doomsday/]</p><p></u>As we commemorate the 100th anniversary of the end of World War I, which transformed how wars are fought and won, <u>the world again stands on the precipice of a dramatic <strong>revolution in warfare</u></strong>, this one <u>driven by <strong>a</u></strong>rtificial <u><strong>i</u></strong>ntelligence. While both AI and the debate about the implications of autonomous decision capabilities in warfare are only in their early stages, <u>the one area where <mark>AI</mark> <mark>holds</mark> perhaps <mark>the <strong>most peril</strong></mark> is its potential role <mark>in how</mark> and when <mark>to use <strong>nuclear weapons</strong></mark>.</p><p><mark>Advances</mark> in AI <mark>are on a fast track</mark>, and the <strong><mark>U</u></strong></mark>nited <u><strong><mark>S</u></strong></mark>tates <u><mark>is</mark> indisputably <mark>in an</mark> <strong>AI <mark>arms race</u></strong> <u>with</mark> two of our most formidable competitors</u>, <u>both nuclear powers</u>, <u><strong><mark>China and Russia</u></strong></mark> — the former with a smaller but growing nuclear arsenal in size and sophistication, and the latter, which along with the U.S., possesses 90 percent of the global nuclear weapons stockpile.</p><p><u>Early and determined U.S. <strong><mark>leadership is essential</u></strong> <u>to ensure</mark> that we are not just competing but also jointly <strong>cooperating</strong> with our nuclear-capable adversaries</u> <u>to ensure that <mark>AI does not <strong>destabilize</strong> nuclear</u> <u><strong>command and control</strong></mark>. The stakes are high<mark>; the <strong>consequences</strong></mark> potentially <strong><mark>existential</strong></mark>.</p><p></u>While an <u><strong><mark>autonomous nuclear command-and-control</u></strong></mark> program <u><mark>might be easily dismissed as not realistic</mark>, the <mark>past is</u> <u><strong>prologue</u></strong></mark>. <u><mark>The</mark> history of the <mark>Cold War is riddled with <strong>near misses</strong></mark> <mark>when <strong>accident</strong></mark>, mistake or <strong><mark>miscalculation</strong> </mark>due to <strong><mark>computer errors</strong></mark> in both the Soviet Union and the United States <mark>almost <strong>triggered nuclear war</strong>.</p><p></u></mark>But perhaps one of the most stunning revelations of the post-Cold War period relevant to today’s AI revolution is detailed by David Hoffman in his revelatory 2009 book “The Dead Hand.” <u>In the early 1980s, <mark>the Soviet Union</mark> actually <mark>considered deploying a <strong>fully automated retaliation</strong></mark> to a U.S. nuclear strike, a <strong><mark>Doomsday machine</u></strong></mark>, where a computer alone would issue the command for a retaliatory nuclear strike if the Kremlin leadership had been killed in a first-strike nuclear attack from the U.S.</p><p>Eventually the Soviets deployed a modified, nearly automatic system where a small group of lower-ranking duty officers deep underground would make that decision, relying on data that the Kremlin leadership had been wiped out in a U.S. nuclear strike.</p><p>The plan was not meant to deter a U.S. strike by assuring the U.S. that if they attacked first, even with a limited strike against the Soviet leadership, that there would be a guaranteed nuclear response. The Soviets kept the plan secret from the United States. It was meant to ensure an all out, nearly automatic nuclear response, which would have existential consequences. As AI develops and confidence in machine learning increases, the U.S. needs to be leading the effort diplomatically by reinvigorating strategic stability talks with both China and Russia, which should include this issue and ensure that this type of nuclear planning does not make its way back into the thinking of our nuclear adversaries or our own, whether secretly or as a form of deterrence.</p><p><u>While concerns have been raised in Congress about having the decision to use nuclear weapons solely in the hands of the commander in chief, an even more ominous, impending threat is having that command and control in the hands of AI.</p><p>The potential application for this developing, powerful technology in <strong>increasing stability</strong> and the effectiveness of arms control in areas such as <strong>early warning</strong>, predictive decision-making by bad actors, <strong>tracking and stopping</strong> the spread of <strong>nuclear weapons</strong>, and empowering <strong>verification</strong> for further reductions is as yet unknown.</p><p></u>Potential stabilizing applications need to be a defense-funding priority and also a private sector/university funding priority, similar to the public-private efforts that underpinned and propelled the nuclear arms control and strategic stability process during the Cold War.</p><p><u><strong>But the destabilizing potential needs to be addressed early and jointly among the nuclear powers — and here, U.S. leadership is indispensable.</p><p></strong><mark>AI is projected to</mark> rapidly and disruptively <mark>change the world within a <strong>very short time frame</u></strong></mark> — on the economic side perhaps even eliminating 40 percent of U.S. jobs in as short as 10-15 years. Yet, leading <u><strong>AI <mark>experts agree</u></strong></mark> that <u><mark>machine learning should enhance — not <strong>replace</u></strong></mark> — <u><mark>human decision-making. This must be a <strong>central tenet</strong> of <strong>nuclear command and control.</p><p></mark>One of the heroes of the Cold War, who later became known and honored as the man who saved the world from nuclear war, Soviet Lt. Col. Stanislav Petrov, overrode repeated and sequential computer warnings in 1983 of a U.S. nuclear missile attack and did not pass on the warning to his superiors. In a 2010 interview with Der Spiegel, Petrov explained that the reason he did not pass the warning on, and correctly determined in the few minutes he had to make a decision that they were a false alarm, was because he factored that: “We are wiser than the computers. We created them.”</p><p></strong>We are entering this disruptive period of rapid technological change</u>, <u>knowing the consequences of <strong>nuclear war</strong> and the need</u> <u>for U.S. leadership to guide the use of technology so that it taps that wisdom and enhances the control and <strong>reduction</strong> of these very dangerous weapons</u>. <u>The most <strong>immediate priority</strong> for the U.S. must be to lead the process to ensure that these rapid advancements in AI strengthen the <strong>command and control of nuclear weapons</u></strong> — <u>not repeat the past and relinquish it to an <strong>automatic</strong> or nearly automatic <strong>Doomsday machine.</p></u></strong>

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Only innovation now solves AMR super-bugs -- timeframe’s key.

Sobti 19

Sobti 19 [Dr. Navjot Kaur Sobti is an internal medicine resident physician at Dartmouth-Hitchcock-Medical Center/Dartmouth School of Medicine and a member of the ABC News Medical Unit. May 1, 2019. “Amid superbug crisis, scientists urge innovation”. https://abcnews.go.com/Health/amidst-superbug-crisis-scientists-urge-innovation/story?id=62763415] Dhruv

The United Nations called antimicrobial resistance a “global crisis With the rise in superbugs across the globe infections are becoming harder to treat and lifesaving procedures riskier Drug-resistant infections result in 700,000 deaths per year according to the World Health Organization (WHO). antimicrobial resistance represents a global health crisis With the rising rates of AMR estimates from the WHO show that AMR may cause 10 million deaths every year and lead to a financial crisis as severe as 2008 Antimicrobial resistance develops when germs defeat drugs designed to kill them germs not killed by antimicrobials and continue to grow which can lead to “superbugs. superbugs are far and wide the WHO has urged for coordinated action...to minimize the emergence and spread of antimicrobial resistance with a focus on the development of new antimicrobial medications, vaccines, and careful antimicrobial use Redfield emphasized vaccination during the global superbug crisis stating the only way we have to eliminate an infection is vaccination investing in innovation is key to solving the crisis. AMR has reversed “a century of progress in health.” the challenges of antimicrobial resistance are not insurmountable coordinated action will save millions preserve antimicrobials for generations and secure the future from drug-resistant diseases

the rise in superbugs represents a global health crisis rising AMR may cause 10 million deaths every year resistance develops when germs defeat drugs the WHO has urged development of new medications vaccines and antimicrobial use innovation is key to solving the crisis challenges are not insurmountable action will secure the future from drug-resistant diseases

The United Nations has called antimicrobial resistance a “global crisis.” With the rise in superbugs across the globe, common infections are becoming harder to treat, and lifesaving procedures riskier to perform. Drug-resistant infections result in about 700,000 deaths per year, with at least 230,000 of those deaths due to multidrug resistant tuberculosis, according to a groundbreaking report from the World Health Organization (WHO). Given that antibiotic resistance is present in every country, antimicrobial resistance (AMR) now represents a global health crisis, according to the UN, which has urged immediate, coordinated and global action to prevent a potentially devastating health and financial crisis. With the rising rates of AMR -- including antivirals, antibiotics, and antifungals -- estimates from the WHO show that AMR may cause 10 million deaths every year by 2050, send 24 million people into extreme poverty by 2030, and lead to a financial crisis as severe as the on the U.S. experienced in 2008. Antimicrobial resistance develops when germs like bacteria and fungi are able to “defeat the drugs designed to kill them,” according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Through a biologic “survival of the fittest,” germs that are not killed by antimicrobials and continue to grow. WHO explains that “poor infection control, inadequate sanitary conditions and inappropriate food handling encourage the spread” of AMR, which can lead to “superbugs.” Those superbugs require powerful and oftentimes more expensive antimicrobials to treat. Examples of superbugs are far and wide, and can range from drug-resistant bacteria like Pseudomonas aeruginosa and Staphylococcus aureus to fungi like Candida. These bugs can cause illnesses that range from pneumonia to urinary tract and sexually transmitted infections. According to the WHO, AMR has caused complications for nearly 500,000 people with tuberculosis, and a number of people with HIV and malaria. The people at the highest risk for AMR are those with chronic diseases, people living in nursing homes, hospitalized in the ICU or undergoing life-saving treatments such as organ transplantation and cancer therapy. These people often develop infections, which can become antimicrobial-resistant, rendering them difficult, if not impossible, to treat. (MORE: Melissa Rivers talks about her father's suicide with Dr. Jennifer Ashton) The CDC notes that “antibiotic resistance has the potential to affect people at any stage of life,” including the “healthcare, veterinary, and agriculture industries, making it one of the world’s most urgent public health problems." AMR can cause prolonged hospital stays, billions of dollars in healthcare costs, disability, and potentially, death. “The most important thing is to understand and embrace the interconnectedness of all of this,” said Dr. Robert Redfield, director of the CDC, in a recent interview with ABC News’ Dr. Jennifer Ashton. It’s not just our countries that are connected.” Research has shown that superbugs like Candida auris “came from multiple places, at the same time. It wasn’t just one organism that [evolved]” in a single location, Redfield added. Given longstanding concerns about antimicrobial misuse leading to AMR, physicians have embraced a medical approach called antibiotic stewardship. This encourages physicians to carefully evaluate which antibiotic is most appropriate for their patient, and discontinue it once it is no longer medically needed. WHO has also highlighted that the inappropriate use of antimicrobials in agriculture -- such as on farms and in animals -- may be an underappreciated cause of AMR. Noting these trends, the WHO has urged for “coordinated action...to minimize the emergence and spread of antimicrobial resistance.” It urges all countries to make national action plans, with a focus on the development of new antimicrobial medications, vaccines, and careful antimicrobial use. Redfield emphasized the importance of vaccination during the global superbug crisis, stating that “the only way we have to eliminate an infection is vaccination.” He added that investing in innovation is key to solving the crisis. While WHO continues to advocate for superbug awareness, they warn that AMR has reversed “a century of progress in health.” The WHO added that “the challenges of antimicrobial resistance” are “not insurmountable,” and that coordinated action will “help to save millions of lives, preserve antimicrobials for generations to come and secure the future from drug-resistant diseases.”

<h4>Only innovation now solves <u>AMR super-bugs</u> -- <u>timeframe’s key</u>. </h4><p><u><strong>Sobti 19</u></strong> [Dr. Navjot Kaur Sobti is an internal medicine resident physician at Dartmouth-Hitchcock-Medical Center/Dartmouth School of Medicine and a member of the ABC News Medical Unit. May 1, 2019. “Amid superbug crisis, scientists urge innovation”. https://abcnews.go.com/Health/amidst-superbug-crisis-scientists-urge-innovation/story?id=62763415] Dhruv </p><p><u><strong>The United Nations</u></strong> has <u><strong>called antimicrobial resistance a “global crisis</u></strong>.” <u><strong>With <mark>the rise in superbugs</mark> across the globe</u></strong>, common <u><strong>infections are becoming harder to treat</u></strong>, <u><strong>and lifesaving procedures riskier</u></strong> to perform. <u><strong>Drug-resistant infections result in</u></strong> about <u><strong>700,000 deaths per year</u></strong>, with at least 230,000 of those deaths due to multidrug resistant tuberculosis, <u><strong>according to</u></strong> a groundbreaking report from <u><strong>the World Health Organization (WHO).</u></strong> Given that antibiotic resistance is present in every country, <u><strong>antimicrobial resistance</u></strong> (AMR) now <u><strong><mark>represents a global health crisis</u></strong></mark>, according to the UN, which has urged immediate, coordinated and global action to prevent a potentially devastating health and financial crisis. <u><strong>With the <mark>rising</mark> rates of <mark>AMR</u></strong></mark> -- including antivirals, antibiotics, and antifungals -- <u><strong>estimates from the WHO show that AMR <mark>may cause 10 million deaths every year</u></strong></mark> by 2050, send 24 million people into extreme poverty by 2030, <u><strong>and lead to a financial crisis as severe as</u></strong> the on the U.S. experienced in <u><strong>2008</u></strong>. <u><strong>Antimicrobial <mark>resistance develops when germs</u></strong></mark> like bacteria and fungi are able to “<u><strong><mark>defeat</u></strong></mark> the <u><strong><mark>drugs</mark> designed to kill them</u></strong>,” according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Through a biologic “survival of the fittest,” <u><strong>germs</u></strong> that are <u><strong>not killed by antimicrobials and continue to grow</u></strong>. WHO explains that “poor infection control, inadequate sanitary conditions and inappropriate food handling encourage the spread” of AMR, <u><strong>which can lead to “superbugs.</u></strong>” Those superbugs require powerful and oftentimes more expensive antimicrobials to treat. Examples of <u><strong>superbugs are far and</u></strong> <u><strong>wide</u></strong>, and can range from drug-resistant bacteria like Pseudomonas aeruginosa and Staphylococcus aureus to fungi like Candida. These bugs can cause illnesses that range from pneumonia to urinary tract and sexually transmitted infections. According to the WHO, AMR has caused complications for nearly 500,000 people with tuberculosis, and a number of people with HIV and malaria. The people at the highest risk for AMR are those with chronic diseases, people living in nursing homes, hospitalized in the ICU or undergoing life-saving treatments such as organ transplantation and cancer therapy. These people often develop infections, which can become antimicrobial-resistant, rendering them difficult, if not impossible, to treat. (MORE: Melissa Rivers talks about her father's suicide with Dr. Jennifer Ashton) The CDC notes that “antibiotic resistance has the potential to affect people at any stage of life,” including the “healthcare, veterinary, and agriculture industries, making it one of the world’s most urgent public health problems." AMR can cause prolonged hospital stays, billions of dollars in healthcare costs, disability, and potentially, death. “The most important thing is to understand and embrace the interconnectedness of all of this,” said Dr. Robert Redfield, director of the CDC, in a recent interview with ABC News’ Dr. Jennifer Ashton. It’s not just our countries that are connected.” Research has shown that superbugs like Candida auris “came from multiple places, at the same time. It wasn’t just one organism that [evolved]” in a single location, Redfield added. Given longstanding concerns about antimicrobial misuse leading to AMR, physicians have embraced a medical approach called antibiotic stewardship. This encourages physicians to carefully evaluate which antibiotic is most appropriate for their patient, and discontinue it once it is no longer medically needed. WHO has also highlighted that the inappropriate use of antimicrobials in agriculture -- such as on farms and in animals -- may be an underappreciated cause of AMR. Noting these trends, <u><strong><mark>the WHO has urged</mark> for</u></strong> “<u><strong>coordinated action...to minimize the emergence and spread of antimicrobial resistance</u></strong>.” It urges all countries to make national action plans, <u><strong>with a focus on the <mark>development of new</mark> antimicrobial <mark>medications</mark>, <mark>vaccines</mark>, <mark>and</mark> careful <mark>antimicrobial use</u></strong></mark>. <u><strong>Redfield emphasized</u></strong> the importance of <u><strong>vaccination during the global superbug crisis</u></strong>, <u><strong>stating</u></strong> that “<u><strong>the only way we have to eliminate an infection is vaccination</u></strong>.” He added that <u><strong>investing in <mark>innovation is key to solving the crisis</mark>.</u></strong> While WHO continues to advocate for superbug awareness, they warn that <u><strong>AMR has reversed “a century of progress in health.” </u></strong>The WHO added that “<u><strong>the <mark>challenges</mark> of antimicrobial resistance</u></strong>” <u><strong><mark>are</u></strong></mark> “<u><strong><mark>not insurmountable</u></strong></mark>,” and that <u><strong>coordinated <mark>action will</u></strong></mark> “help to <u><strong>save millions</u></strong> of lives, <u><strong>preserve antimicrobials for generations</u></strong> to come <u><strong>and <mark>secure the future from drug-resistant diseases</u></strong></mark>.”</p>

1AC: Innovation

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