Datasets:

JennyGub

/

PrivTest

like 0

https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/11275

Prevent tagsinput select element to be submitted without a value when they are required

Fixes #11274 Additionally, we now perform the same validity check when sending a private message than we do when compiling the list of valid recipients for display in the new message page.

Prevent tagsinput select element to be submitted without a value when they are required Fixes #11274 Additionally, we now perform the same validity check when sending a private message than we do when compiling the list of valid recipients for display in the new message page.

No

Discusses a bug fix

https://api.github.com/repos/twilio/twilio-video-ios/issues/225

Smart cover on iPad running iOS 15 may cause audio issue by audio interruptions

### Description On iPads running iOS 15, while in a live video call, if you use smart cover, the remote participant may observe no audio. This is an iOS behavior where it interrupts audio capture from the microphone for VoIP calls when smart cover is used. ### Steps to Reproduce 1. iPad running iOS 15 having smart cover 2. Connect to a Room and observe the bi-direction audio 3. Use smart cover and close the screen. 4. No audio is observed on the remote side. ### Over writing the audio interruption behavior Use [overrideMutedMicrophoneInterruption](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/avfaudio/avaudiosession/categoryoptions/3727255-overridemutedmicrophoneinterrupt/) AVAudioSession Category Option. Here is an example code snippet on how to set the category options using DefaultAudioDevice. ``` try if #available(iOS 14.5, *) { let audioDevice = DefaultAudioDevice() TwilioVideoSDK.audioDevice = audioDevice audioDevice.block = { do { DefaultAudioDevice.DefaultAVAudioSessionConfigurationBlock() let audioSession = AVAudioSession.sharedInstance() audioSession.setCategory(AVAudioSession.Category.playAndRecord, mode: AVAudioSession.Mode.videoChat, options: [AVAudioSession.CategoryOptions.allowBluetooth, AVAudioSession.CategoryOptions.overrideMutedMicrophoneInterruption] ) } catch let error as NSError { print("Fail: \(error.localizedDescription)") } } audioDevice.block(); } ``` #### iOS Version iOS 15 #### iOS Device iPad

Smart cover on iPad running iOS 15 may cause audio issue by audio interruptions ### Description On iPads running iOS 15, while in a live video call, if you use smart cover, the remote participant may observe no audio. This is an iOS behavior where it interrupts audio capture from the microphone for VoIP calls when smart cover is used. ### Steps to Reproduce 1. iPad running iOS 15 having smart cover 2. Connect to a Room and observe the bi-direction audio 3. Use smart cover and close the screen. 4. No audio is observed on the remote side. ### Over writing the audio interruption behavior Use [overrideMutedMicrophoneInterruption](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/avfaudio/avaudiosession/categoryoptions/3727255-overridemutedmicrophoneinterrupt/) AVAudioSession Category Option. Here is an example code snippet on how to set the category options using DefaultAudioDevice. ``` try if #available(iOS 14.5, *) { let audioDevice = DefaultAudioDevice() TwilioVideoSDK.audioDevice = audioDevice audioDevice.block = { do { DefaultAudioDevice.DefaultAVAudioSessionConfigurationBlock() let audioSession = AVAudioSession.sharedInstance() audioSession.setCategory(AVAudioSession.Category.playAndRecord, mode: AVAudioSession.Mode.videoChat, options: [AVAudioSession.CategoryOptions.allowBluetooth, AVAudioSession.CategoryOptions.overrideMutedMicrophoneInterruption] ) } catch let error as NSError { print("Fail: \(error.localizedDescription)") } } audioDevice.block(); } ``` #### iOS Version iOS 15 #### iOS Device iPad

No

HW fix

https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/21025

Right panel widgets can remain alive unexpectedly

_Originally noticed by @HarHarLinks in https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/20929#issuecomment-1030632554_ Right panel widgets are no longer tearing down the widget frame when unmounted, and so can remain running in the background. This is unrelated to the widget permission to remain on screen: it happens for all widgets viewed in the right panel. Likely regressed by https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-react-sdk/pull/7575

Right panel widgets can remain alive unexpectedly _Originally noticed by @HarHarLinks in https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/20929#issuecomment-1030632554_ Right panel widgets are no longer tearing down the widget frame when unmounted, and so can remain running in the background. This is unrelated to the widget permission to remain on screen: it happens for all widgets viewed in the right panel. Likely regressed by https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-react-sdk/pull/7575

No

Discusses a bug fix

https://api.github.com/repos/commons-app/apps-android-commons/issues/4779

Send in-app feedback to wiki page instead of email

Currently, the `Feedback` button (in the app's main menu) opens an email editor. For privacy reasons, let's switch to a form that posts the same information to the top of https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Commons:Mobile_app/Feedback For logged-in users: 1. Show a form: - 4-lines high text area where the user must write a custom message. - Checkboxes for each line of debug information (for instance `API level: 30`, `Android version: 11`, etc). The user can unselect the debug information that will be sent. For instance, if the user does not want others to know that they are using a SM-G986B phone (for privacy reasons), they can uncheck the checkbox at the `Device model: SM-G986B` line. 2. Post the content as a new section at the top of https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Commons:Mobile_app/Feedback . Adding a new section to a wiki article is already implemented by the app in other places, such as peer review, so it should be rather easy to implement. The probability of two users sending feedback at the exact same time is very low, but please just try to minimize the time between reading the content of the page and posting the updated content. If the user is not logged in, just open the user's browser at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Commons:Mobile_app/Feedback (rationale: _once there the user will be able to add a new section, and will receive the WMF's official disclaimers regarding their confidentiality_)

Send in-app feedback to wiki page instead of email Currently, the `Feedback` button (in the app's main menu) opens an email editor. For privacy reasons, let's switch to a form that posts the same information to the top of https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Commons:Mobile_app/Feedback For logged-in users: 1. Show a form: - 4-lines high text area where the user must write a custom message. - Checkboxes for each line of debug information (for instance `API level: 30`, `Android version: 11`, etc). The user can unselect the debug information that will be sent. For instance, if the user does not want others to know that they are using a SM-G986B phone (for privacy reasons), they can uncheck the checkbox at the `Device model: SM-G986B` line. 2. Post the content as a new section at the top of https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Commons:Mobile_app/Feedback . Adding a new section to a wiki article is already implemented by the app in other places, such as peer review, so it should be rather easy to implement. The probability of two users sending feedback at the exact same time is very low, but please just try to minimize the time between reading the content of the page and posting the updated content. If the user is not logged in, just open the user's browser at https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Commons:Mobile_app/Feedback (rationale: _once there the user will be able to add a new section, and will receive the WMF's official disclaimers regarding their confidentiality_)

Yes

The user can select what debug information will be sent

https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/20806

Extend widget privacy information before accepting it

### Your use case #### What would you like to do? With https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/11262#issuecomment-554131235 we got the information about what data might get transmitted to a widget.  I would like to see this extended for privacy concerns: 1. It would be good if this warning could determine in advance not what data could, but actually will be transmitted to the widget. 2. The warning says "might transmit data to XY", and store cookies. In above screenshot I tried adding several different widgets using a self hosted dimension integration manager. It will always say dimension, even if you embed a totally different page. With dev tools we can see that e.g. `"data.url": "https://framadate.org/somehashhere"`. I would like to be able to preview what actually is embedded based on the actual content that's loaded. (I'm not sure however, some of this might be specific to how dimension works.) #### Why would you like to do it? 1. More fine grained control/expectation about what data you're willing to expose 2. Can decide if I want to share above info to that specific site. This is important because I might trust things hosted by my homeserver or reputable organizations, but not others. Further, this doesn't depend on the widget title being set and trusted to tell me what this is. #### How would you like to achieve it? 1. Think similar to installing an app on android: This widget requires the following: mxid, roomid, etc. This might eventually need some spec about how to define those requirements. 2. Maybe just display said url field? ### Have you considered any alternatives? _No response_ ### Additional context _No response_

Extend widget privacy information before accepting it ### Your use case #### What would you like to do? With https://github.com/vector-im/element-web/issues/11262#issuecomment-554131235 we got the information about what data might get transmitted to a widget.  I would like to see this extended for privacy concerns: 1. It would be good if this warning could determine in advance not what data could, but actually will be transmitted to the widget. 2. The warning says "might transmit data to XY", and store cookies. In above screenshot I tried adding several different widgets using a self hosted dimension integration manager. It will always say dimension, even if you embed a totally different page. With dev tools we can see that e.g. `"data.url": "https://framadate.org/somehashhere"`. I would like to be able to preview what actually is embedded based on the actual content that's loaded. (I'm not sure however, some of this might be specific to how dimension works.) #### Why would you like to do it? 1. More fine grained control/expectation about what data you're willing to expose 2. Can decide if I want to share above info to that specific site. This is important because I might trust things hosted by my homeserver or reputable organizations, but not others. Further, this doesn't depend on the widget title being set and trusted to tell me what this is. #### How would you like to achieve it? 1. Think similar to installing an app on android: This widget requires the following: mxid, roomid, etc. This might eventually need some spec about how to define those requirements. 2. Maybe just display said url field? ### Have you considered any alternatives? _No response_ ### Additional context _No response_

Yes

Select what data will be transmitted to the widget

https://api.github.com/repos/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/1506

Impossible to disable the Privacy Statement / End-user Agreement

**Describe the bug** On DSpace 7, a new feature has been added to include a privacy statement and a end-user agreement: https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/736 Some institutions do not want to use these (especially as the users are forced to accept the end-user agreement at their first login), but there is no configurable way to disable them. Note that there is another ongoing issue about privacy statement / end-user agreement, but it is more about providing a better default text: https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/1080 **To Reproduce** Login for the first time with a user and get to the end-user agreement. OR Click the privacy policy or end-user agreement links in the footer. **Expected behavior** 2 new configurations should be added in order to allow repository administrators to : - Enable / Disable the end-user agreement - Enable / Disable the privacy statement **Related work** https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/736 https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/1080 **Estimate** 5 hours

Impossible to disable the Privacy Statement / End-user Agreement **Describe the bug** On DSpace 7, a new feature has been added to include a privacy statement and a end-user agreement: https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/736 Some institutions do not want to use these (especially as the users are forced to accept the end-user agreement at their first login), but there is no configurable way to disable them. Note that there is another ongoing issue about privacy statement / end-user agreement, but it is more about providing a better default text: https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/1080 **To Reproduce** Login for the first time with a user and get to the end-user agreement. OR Click the privacy policy or end-user agreement links in the footer. **Expected behavior** 2 new configurations should be added in order to allow repository administrators to : - Enable / Disable the end-user agreement - Enable / Disable the privacy statement **Related work** https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/736 https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/1080 **Estimate** 5 hours

Yes

Configurability of privacy statement

https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/11185

Issue 10906: prevent personal notes from being altered

Fixes #10906

Issue 10906: prevent personal notes from being altered Fixes #10906

No

Cannot relate to privacy

https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/20589

Enhance user-informed-ness about data collection

 Element Web recently revamped its "learn more" panel (under Security & Privacy -> Privacy -> Analytics) to the above, it's very good, however, compared to the old panel, it loses all of the "positive" acknowledgements of data collection ("We will connect X"), while introducing "negative" ones ("We will not collect Y") <details> <summary>Old Panel</summary>  </details> I think that this is not adequate enough, as only people who are familiar with data collection in general will be able to draw conclusions from these negative acknowlegements. Thus, I'm asking for more detailed *positive* acknowledgements as to what data is collected in above panel. Suggestions for this include; 1. grabbing those definitions from [matrix-analytics-events](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-analytics-events), and displaying these in this panel in a fashion (such as under a expansion dropdown) 2. prefixing "negative" acknowledgements with red/cross icons. 3. describing intentions, "We will use data about the number of rooms you've joined to prioritise room performance optimisation, and provide the best average experience". 4. providing a visual readout of the current live data, so that the user can double-check for themselves what data the local client is actually sending out. 5. in patch notes, include new types of data to be collected through analytics 6. provide toggles on a data-type basis for users to opt-in/out of specific analytics data. Above is in decreasing order of suggested urgency, the main thing i want to get across is that the user is informed at any time as to what data is being collected from them, that they're able to keep up-to-date with this information, and that they have complete agency over this fact, plus their participation. --- (Copied verbatim from https://github.com/vector-im/element-meta/issues/110)

Enhance user-informed-ness about data collection  Element Web recently revamped its "learn more" panel (under Security & Privacy -> Privacy -> Analytics) to the above, it's very good, however, compared to the old panel, it loses all of the "positive" acknowledgements of data collection ("We will connect X"), while introducing "negative" ones ("We will not collect Y") <details> <summary>Old Panel</summary>  </details> I think that this is not adequate enough, as only people who are familiar with data collection in general will be able to draw conclusions from these negative acknowlegements. Thus, I'm asking for more detailed *positive* acknowledgements as to what data is collected in above panel. Suggestions for this include; 1. grabbing those definitions from [matrix-analytics-events](https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-analytics-events), and displaying these in this panel in a fashion (such as under a expansion dropdown) 2. prefixing "negative" acknowledgements with red/cross icons. 3. describing intentions, "We will use data about the number of rooms you've joined to prioritise room performance optimisation, and provide the best average experience". 4. providing a visual readout of the current live data, so that the user can double-check for themselves what data the local client is actually sending out. 5. in patch notes, include new types of data to be collected through analytics 6. provide toggles on a data-type basis for users to opt-in/out of specific analytics data. Above is in decreasing order of suggested urgency, the main thing i want to get across is that the user is informed at any time as to what data is being collected from them, that they're able to keep up-to-date with this information, and that they have complete agency over this fact, plus their participation. --- (Copied verbatim from https://github.com/vector-im/element-meta/issues/110)

Yes

The title is informative

https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/11125

Potential directory registration consent violation

We've received [a report on the Friendica Directory repository](https://git.friendi.ca/friendica/friendica-directory/issues/83) that a node meant to be private ended up registered in the official directory and as a result got overwhelmed by tens of thousands of requests from remote nodes suddenly aware of its existence. I'm not sure how this could happen but I'd like us to make sure that this can't happen again.

Potential directory registration consent violation We've received [a report on the Friendica Directory repository](https://git.friendi.ca/friendica/friendica-directory/issues/83) that a node meant to be private ended up registered in the official directory and as a result got overwhelmed by tens of thousands of requests from remote nodes suddenly aware of its existence. I'm not sure how this could happen but I'd like us to make sure that this can't happen again.

Yes

Content was disclosed

https://api.github.com/repos/covidpass-org/covidpass/issues/143

Data Protection/Security: Document details on new ג€žEnlarge QR codeג€œ feature

https://github.com/covidpass-org/covidpass/releases/tag/v0.5.0 made it possible to click on "Enlarge QR-Code" on the back of the Wallet card. When clicking on this link, one is transferred to an page like https://covidpass.marvinsextro.de/pass#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 (this is **not** my QR code but just a test one) With this feature, some questions come to my mind: - Has the data privacy note been updated? - How safe is the storage on the server? How is the link generated? What if the server is attacked, is it possible that the attackers steals all the data? - How long is the QR code stored on the page - Is it possible to remove the QR code from the page when the user wants this? - Would it make sense to ask the user whether this is wanted during the generation of the pass? - Is there a solution which works offline?

Data Protection/Security: Document details on new ג€žEnlarge QR codeג€œ feature https://github.com/covidpass-org/covidpass/releases/tag/v0.5.0 made it possible to click on "Enlarge QR-Code" on the back of the Wallet card. When clicking on this link, one is transferred to an page like https://covidpass.marvinsextro.de/pass#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 (this is **not** my QR code but just a test one) With this feature, some questions come to my mind: - Has the data privacy note been updated? - How safe is the storage on the server? How is the link generated? What if the server is attacked, is it possible that the attackers steals all the data? - How long is the QR code stored on the page - Is it possible to remove the QR code from the page when the user wants this? - Would it make sense to ask the user whether this is wanted during the generation of the pass? - Is there a solution which works offline?

Yes

Questions regrading the privacy protection of the app

https://api.github.com/repos/simonsdave/cloudfeaster/issues/61

need process to ensure using current rev of Alpine for runtime-lite docker image

- Alpine releases are listed [here](https://alpinelinux.org/releases/) - runtime-lite docker file is [here](https://github.com/simonsdave/cloudfeaster/blob/master/dockerfiles/runtime-lite/Dockerfile) - docker image versions are [here](https://hub.docker.com/_/alpine?tab=tags) although not sure these are needed

need process to ensure using current rev of Alpine for runtime-lite docker image - Alpine releases are listed [here](https://alpinelinux.org/releases/) - runtime-lite docker file is [here](https://github.com/simonsdave/cloudfeaster/blob/master/dockerfiles/runtime-lite/Dockerfile) - docker image versions are [here](https://hub.docker.com/_/alpine?tab=tags) although not sure these are needed

No

Discusses a bug fix

https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/20212

Calling turns on video without participant consent.

### Steps to reproduce 1. In a group chat, start or join a jitsi call (even when clicking the "voice call" button). 2. Your camera is now on, without consent or warning, and visible to anyone connecting to your call. ### Outcome #### What did you expect? I expected that there would at least be a warning if it were to turn on, and if anything, hitting "voice call" wouldn't have turned on my camera. #### What happened instead? My camera was immediately turned on. ### Operating system _No response_ ### Application version Element version: 1.9.7 Olm version: 3.2.8 ### How did you install the app? https://community.chocolatey.org/packages/element-desktop ### Homeserver yiff.social ### Will you send logs? No

Calling turns on video without participant consent. ### Steps to reproduce 1. In a group chat, start or join a jitsi call (even when clicking the "voice call" button). 2. Your camera is now on, without consent or warning, and visible to anyone connecting to your call. ### Outcome #### What did you expect? I expected that there would at least be a warning if it were to turn on, and if anything, hitting "voice call" wouldn't have turned on my camera. #### What happened instead? My camera was immediately turned on. ### Operating system _No response_ ### Application version Element version: 1.9.7 Olm version: 3.2.8 ### How did you install the app? https://community.chocolatey.org/packages/element-desktop ### Homeserver yiff.social ### Will you send logs? No

Yes

Turns on camera without consent

https://api.github.com/repos/RickBarretto/PreviewGram/issues/4

Block non preview links

### Block non preview links The app must not open telegram.org or t.me without /s/...

Block non preview links ### Block non preview links The app must not open telegram.org or t.me without /s/...

No

Not specifically related to privacy

https://api.github.com/repos/RickBarretto/PreviewGram/issues/3

Block Fav Icon Request

### נŸƒ Run away from favicon trackers: Why block it? > Because it can track you! Look: נŸ‘€ **נŸ” Sources:** - [Browser Tracking using Fav-Icon - Shneie](https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/02/browser-tracking-using-favicons.html) - [Favicons may be used to track users - G Hacks](https://www.ghacks.net/2021/01/22/favicons-may-be-used-to-track-users/) - [Super Cookie on Github](https://github.com/jonasstrehle/supercookie)

Block Fav Icon Request ### נŸƒ Run away from favicon trackers: Why block it? > Because it can track you! Look: נŸ‘€ **נŸ” Sources:** - [Browser Tracking using Fav-Icon - Shneie](https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2021/02/browser-tracking-using-favicons.html) - [Favicons may be used to track users - G Hacks](https://www.ghacks.net/2021/01/22/favicons-may-be-used-to-track-users/) - [Super Cookie on Github](https://github.com/jonasstrehle/supercookie)

Yes

Blocks tracking attempts

https://api.github.com/repos/nextcloud/server/issues/29877

[stable23] Hide user status on profile from public

backport of #29869

[stable23] Hide user status on profile from public backport of #29869

Yes

Hide private data

https://api.github.com/repos/nextcloud/server/issues/29869

Hide user status on profile from public

See title נŸ‘†

Hide user status on profile from public See title נŸ‘†

Yes

Hide private data

https://api.github.com/repos/microsoftgraph/microsoft-graph-explorer-v4/issues/1216

Sovereign Clouds Privacy review

**Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.** Privacy Assessment for Graph Explorer - Privacy of Graph Explorer Production Service and App Assessment required so that work done to support soverign clouds can be released Tasks to be done are listed under: [353431 ](https://o365trustcompliance.visualstudio.com/Trust/_workitems/edit/353431)

Sovereign Clouds Privacy review **Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.** Privacy Assessment for Graph Explorer - Privacy of Graph Explorer Production Service and App Assessment required so that work done to support soverign clouds can be released Tasks to be done are listed under: [353431 ](https://o365trustcompliance.visualstudio.com/Trust/_workitems/edit/353431)

Yes

Privacy in the cloud

https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/19745

Element contacts Posthog before user has agreed

### Steps to reproduce 1. Sign in to Element Nightly desktop app ### Outcome #### What did you expect? Element shouldn't attempt to connect to telemetry until it has been enabled by the user #### What happened instead POST request to https://posthog.hss.element.io/decide/?ip=X&_=XXXXXXXXXX is sent before user has made a decision on this dialog: <img width="311" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/5855073/141660701-61be1c42-a8f8-42a7-93c9-9f98d03fc1b1.png"> ### Operating system macOS ### Browser information _No response_ ### URL for webapp _No response_ ### Application version Element Nightly version: 2021111301 ### Homeserver _No response_ ### Will you send logs? No

Element contacts Posthog before user has agreed ### Steps to reproduce 1. Sign in to Element Nightly desktop app ### Outcome #### What did you expect? Element shouldn't attempt to connect to telemetry until it has been enabled by the user #### What happened instead POST request to https://posthog.hss.element.io/decide/?ip=X&_=XXXXXXXXXX is sent before user has made a decision on this dialog: <img width="311" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/5855073/141660701-61be1c42-a8f8-42a7-93c9-9f98d03fc1b1.png"> ### Operating system macOS ### Browser information _No response_ ### URL for webapp _No response_ ### Application version Element Nightly version: 2021111301 ### Homeserver _No response_ ### Will you send logs? No

Yes

Performing actions without consent

https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/3036

[MINOR] updated comment and added link to generateId code in Tessera

Signed-off-by: Sally MacFarlane <[email protected]> Added link to relevant Tessera code for generating privacy group ID ## Changelog - [x] I thought about the changelog and included a [changelog update if required](https://wiki.hyperledger.org/display/BESU/Changelog).

[MINOR] updated comment and added link to generateId code in Tessera Signed-off-by: Sally MacFarlane <[email protected]> Added link to relevant Tessera code for generating privacy group ID ## Changelog - [x] I thought about the changelog and included a [changelog update if required](https://wiki.hyperledger.org/display/BESU/Changelog).

Yes

A general privacy feature request

https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/3030

remove Orion acceptance tests

Orion will be deprecated at the end of Nov. We can then stop running the Acceptance tests. See `ParameterizedEnclaveTestBase` Would be interesting to observe if this reduces the time for ATs to run, and if so, how much.

remove Orion acceptance tests Orion will be deprecated at the end of Nov. We can then stop running the Acceptance tests. See `ParameterizedEnclaveTestBase` Would be interesting to observe if this reduces the time for ATs to run, and if so, how much.

No

Discusses a bug fix

https://api.github.com/repos/nextcloud/server/issues/29559

Respect user enumeration settings on profile

The `shareapi_*` user enumeration settings are already respected and hide profile entrypoints (if needed) in the contacts menu, Avatar menu, and other areas which pass through `filterContacts` https://github.com/nextcloud/server/blob/e1c2c13585d5417db2ed490b2986c1ea04cd808d/lib/private/Contacts/ContactsMenu/ContactsStore.php#L150 This PR is for when users navigate to a user's profile page directly by the `/u/{userId}` URL and respects the user enumeration settings listed below. - `shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration` - `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_full_match` - `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` - `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_phone` The user's profile will not be displayed and instead show the "Profile not found" error page if restricted by any of these settings. Contributes to https://github.com/nextcloud/server/issues/28139

Respect user enumeration settings on profile The `shareapi_*` user enumeration settings are already respected and hide profile entrypoints (if needed) in the contacts menu, Avatar menu, and other areas which pass through `filterContacts` https://github.com/nextcloud/server/blob/e1c2c13585d5417db2ed490b2986c1ea04cd808d/lib/private/Contacts/ContactsMenu/ContactsStore.php#L150 This PR is for when users navigate to a user's profile page directly by the `/u/{userId}` URL and respects the user enumeration settings listed below. - `shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration` - `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_full_match` - `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` - `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_phone` The user's profile will not be displayed and instead show the "Profile not found" error page if restricted by any of these settings. Contributes to https://github.com/nextcloud/server/issues/28139

Yes

Hiding user profile

https://api.github.com/repos/brave/brave-talk/issues/13

For talk.brave.com, make the "Remember My Decision" dialog very prominent

This issue overtakes brave/brave-together#185 ... it originally suggested we maintain a "allowed" list of sites that included talk.brave.com, so the user wouldn't have the friction of having to allow A/C for confabs, nor the confusion if they "fat-fingered" the response. rather than make a precedent for the "allowed" list, it is suggested that the permissions dialog be very prominent. i'm not sure what such a design would entail, but that's the current thinking.

For talk.brave.com, make the "Remember My Decision" dialog very prominent This issue overtakes brave/brave-together#185 ... it originally suggested we maintain a "allowed" list of sites that included talk.brave.com, so the user wouldn't have the friction of having to allow A/C for confabs, nor the confusion if they "fat-fingered" the response. rather than make a precedent for the "allowed" list, it is suggested that the permissions dialog be very prominent. i'm not sure what such a design would entail, but that's the current thinking.

No

Discusses permissions and not privacy

https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2987

change "privacyGroupId" from being a base64 encoded String to a proper class

Using a PrivacyGroupId class has many benefits, one being that as a developer I don't have to remember that the Id is base64 encoded.

change "privacyGroupId" from being a base64 encoded String to a proper class Using a PrivacyGroupId class has many benefits, one being that as a developer I don't have to remember that the Id is base64 encoded.

No

Bug fix for a PrivacyGroupID class

https://api.github.com/repos/brave/brave-ios/issues/4436

Persist private tabs

mini spec TBA Intent review https://github.com/brave/security/issues/641

Persist private tabs mini spec TBA Intent review https://github.com/brave/security/issues/641

No

From the title + body - not related to privacy, the link to GitHub is broken

https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2961

Remove code duplication TODO in OnchainPrivacyPrecompiledContract

Remove code duplication TODO in OnchainPrivacyPrecompiledContract Search for any others and remove.

Remove code duplication TODO in OnchainPrivacyPrecompiledContract Remove code duplication TODO in OnchainPrivacyPrecompiledContract Search for any others and remove.

No

Bug fix of code duplication

https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2960

Clean up naming of flexible privacy groups

`flexible` and `onchain` both used. Where possible, standardise on `flexible` Do we want to change / add alternate names for: - [ ] Besu CLI option --privacy-onchain-groups-enabled - [ ] RPC methods PRIVX_FIND_PRIVACY_GROUP("privx_findOnChainPrivacyGroup"), - [ ] web3js-quorum https://consensys.github.io/web3js-quorum/latest/module-flexiblePrivacyGroup.html#~findOnChainPrivacyGroup

Clean up naming of flexible privacy groups `flexible` and `onchain` both used. Where possible, standardise on `flexible` Do we want to change / add alternate names for: - [ ] Besu CLI option --privacy-onchain-groups-enabled - [ ] RPC methods PRIVX_FIND_PRIVACY_GROUP("privx_findOnChainPrivacyGroup"), - [ ] web3js-quorum https://consensys.github.io/web3js-quorum/latest/module-flexiblePrivacyGroup.html#~findOnChainPrivacyGroup

No

Not sure

https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2959

Performance testing for onchain privacy groups

Use current quorum-performance (artillery) results as a baseline. Less interested in specific TPS number, more interested in if any particular parameters affect performance (eg does adding a new group member slow things down considerably). - [ ] Sending a simple contract to a single user (self) Performance test scenario: - [x] Recommend sending to multiple users - create a group with 2,3,5 members - [ ] Sending a sequence of transactions (includes check group membership) - [x] Adding a user to the group after eg 10, 100, 1000 tx Caliper is not the right tool for this.

Performance testing for onchain privacy groups Use current quorum-performance (artillery) results as a baseline. Less interested in specific TPS number, more interested in if any particular parameters affect performance (eg does adding a new group member slow things down considerably). - [ ] Sending a simple contract to a single user (self) Performance test scenario: - [x] Recommend sending to multiple users - create a group with 2,3,5 members - [ ] Sending a sequence of transactions (includes check group membership) - [x] Adding a user to the group after eg 10, 100, 1000 tx Caliper is not the right tool for this.

No

Addresses performance issues

https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2958

Move onchain privacy groups to production

Complete work required to move onchain privacy groups to production.

Move onchain privacy groups to production Complete work required to move onchain privacy groups to production.

No

Moving from dev to prod

https://api.github.com/repos/nextcloud/server/issues/29429

Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists

Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists So far, the functions to find user statuses listed didn't respect user enumeration settings (shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration and shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group core app settings). Fix this privacy issue by returning an empty list in case shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. In the long run, we might want to return users from common groups if shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. It's complicated to implement this in a way that scales, though. See the discussion at #27879 (review) for details. Also, don't register the user_status dashboard widget at all if shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. Fixes: #27122 Signed-off-by: Jonas Meurer [email protected]

Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists So far, the functions to find user statuses listed didn't respect user enumeration settings (shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration and shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group core app settings). Fix this privacy issue by returning an empty list in case shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. In the long run, we might want to return users from common groups if shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. It's complicated to implement this in a way that scales, though. See the discussion at #27879 (review) for details. Also, don't register the user_status dashboard widget at all if shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. Fixes: #27122 Signed-off-by: Jonas Meurer [email protected]

Yes

Handling user enumeration issues

https://api.github.com/repos/nextcloud/server/issues/29428

Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists

Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists So far, the functions to find user statuses listed didn't respect user enumeration settings (shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration and shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group core app settings). Fix this privacy issue by returning an empty list in case shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. In the long run, we might want to return users from common groups if shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. It's complicated to implement this in a way that scales, though. See the discussion at #27879 (review) for details. Also, don't register the user_status dashboard widget at all if shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. Fixes: #27122 Signed-off-by: Jonas Meurer [email protected]

Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists So far, the functions to find user statuses listed didn't respect user enumeration settings (shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration and shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group core app settings). Fix this privacy issue by returning an empty list in case shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. In the long run, we might want to return users from common groups if shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. It's complicated to implement this in a way that scales, though. See the discussion at #27879 (review) for details. Also, don't register the user_status dashboard widget at all if shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. Fixes: #27122 Signed-off-by: Jonas Meurer [email protected]

Yes

Handling user enumeration issues

https://api.github.com/repos/nextcloud/server/issues/29427

Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists

Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists So far, the functions to find user statuses listed didn't respect user enumeration settings (shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration and shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group core app settings). Fix this privacy issue by returning an empty list in case shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. In the long run, we might want to return users from common groups if shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. It's complicated to implement this in a way that scales, though. See the discussion at #27879 (review) for details. Also, don't register the user_status dashboard widget at all if shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. Fixes: #27122 Signed-off-by: Jonas Meurer [email protected]

Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists Backport #29260: Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists So far, the functions to find user statuses listed didn't respect user enumeration settings (shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration and shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group core app settings). Fix this privacy issue by returning an empty list in case shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. In the long run, we might want to return users from common groups if shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. It's complicated to implement this in a way that scales, though. See the discussion at #27879 (review) for details. Also, don't register the user_status dashboard widget at all if shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration is unset or shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group is set. Fixes: #27122 Signed-off-by: Jonas Meurer [email protected]

Yes

Handling user enumeration issues

https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2937

remove deprecated field: privateTransaction.hash

This field has been deprecated for some time: // Caches the hash used to uniquely identify the transaction. // This field will be removed in 1.5.0 @Deprecated(since = "1.4.3") protected volatile Hash hash; - [ ] confirm it can safely be removed - [ ] changelog entry

remove deprecated field: privateTransaction.hash This field has been deprecated for some time: // Caches the hash used to uniquely identify the transaction. // This field will be removed in 1.5.0 @Deprecated(since = "1.4.3") protected volatile Hash hash; - [ ] confirm it can safely be removed - [ ] changelog entry

Yes

Removes identification data

https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/10906

Personal Notes Shared to Forum

<!-- Please fill out this template with all the information you have. The more info you can provide the easier it will be to help you out or fix the problem you are seeing. For trouble with the UI donג€™t forget to add a screenshot or two. Please do your best! Please note that this template is only for bugs. Please use other templates in case of feature requests or support requests Lastly, be sure to preview your issue before saving. Thanks! --> - [X ] I have searched open and closed issues for duplicates <!-- You can search all issues here https://github.com/friendica/friendica/issues?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=is%3Aissue Replace [ ] with [X] once you've searched --> ### Bug Description <!-- Give an overall summary of the issue. --> Personal notes are shared when using `!` address. ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- Using bullet points, list the steps that reproduce the bug. --> 1. Draft a personal note 2. Include `[email protected]` 3. Save Actual Result: Personal note is shared with the public. <!-- Describe the details of the buggy behaviour. --> Expected Result: That personal notes are NOT shared with anyone. Use case: saving a draft of a post that is intended to be shared in the future. <!-- Describe in detail what the correct behavior should be. --> ### Screenshots https://friendica.hubup.pro/display/f3ad7b1c-1261-701b-a168-070845120860 <!-- How to take screenshots on all OSes: https://www.take-a-screenshot.org/ You can drag and drop images into this text box. --> ### Platform Info Friendica Version: 2021.09

Personal Notes Shared to Forum <!-- Please fill out this template with all the information you have. The more info you can provide the easier it will be to help you out or fix the problem you are seeing. For trouble with the UI donג€™t forget to add a screenshot or two. Please do your best! Please note that this template is only for bugs. Please use other templates in case of feature requests or support requests Lastly, be sure to preview your issue before saving. Thanks! --> - [X ] I have searched open and closed issues for duplicates <!-- You can search all issues here https://github.com/friendica/friendica/issues?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=is%3Aissue Replace [ ] with [X] once you've searched --> ### Bug Description <!-- Give an overall summary of the issue. --> Personal notes are shared when using `!` address. ### Steps to Reproduce <!-- Using bullet points, list the steps that reproduce the bug. --> 1. Draft a personal note 2. Include `[email protected]` 3. Save Actual Result: Personal note is shared with the public. <!-- Describe the details of the buggy behaviour. --> Expected Result: That personal notes are NOT shared with anyone. Use case: saving a draft of a post that is intended to be shared in the future. <!-- Describe in detail what the correct behavior should be. --> ### Screenshots https://friendica.hubup.pro/display/f3ad7b1c-1261-701b-a168-070845120860 <!-- How to take screenshots on all OSes: https://www.take-a-screenshot.org/ You can drag and drop images into this text box. --> ### Platform Info Friendica Version: 2021.09

Yes

Personal note is shared to public

https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/10881

Switch available contact selection to private-supporting networks in ACL

Fixes #10872 This switch also prevents users to send private message to OStatus contacts even though there's no support for private conversations.

Switch available contact selection to private-supporting networks in ACL Fixes #10872 This switch also prevents users to send private message to OStatus contacts even though there's no support for private conversations.

Yes

Selecting private contact, restriction on private messages

https://api.github.com/repos/nextcloud/server/issues/29260

Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists

So far, the functions to find user statuses listed didn't respect user enumeration settings (`shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration` and `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` core app settings). Fix this privacy issue by returning an empty list in case `shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration` is unset or `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` is set. In the long run, we might want to return users from common groups if `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` is set. It's complicated to implement this in a way that scales, though. See the discussion at https://github.com/nextcloud/server/pull/27879#pullrequestreview-753655308 for details. Also, don't register the user_status dashboard widget at all if `shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration` is unset or `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` is set. Fixes: #27122 Signed-off-by: Jonas Meurer <[email protected]>

Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists So far, the functions to find user statuses listed didn't respect user enumeration settings (`shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration` and `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` core app settings). Fix this privacy issue by returning an empty list in case `shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration` is unset or `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` is set. In the long run, we might want to return users from common groups if `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` is set. It's complicated to implement this in a way that scales, though. See the discussion at https://github.com/nextcloud/server/pull/27879#pullrequestreview-753655308 for details. Also, don't register the user_status dashboard widget at all if `shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration` is unset or `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` is set. Fixes: #27122 Signed-off-by: Jonas Meurer <[email protected]>

Yes

Handling user enumeration issues

https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/19294

Multiple Audio tracks (old ones are not closing) in web and client

### Steps to reproduce Running Arch Linux kernel 5.14.9 DE: KDE Plasma Sound: pipewire. 1. Launch Element in web or in native client. 2. Take a call. -> in Sound Manager applications new Chromium pipes appear. 3. Close the call -> The Tracks are still here. 4. Take a call again and even more tracks open. ### Outcome #### What did you expect? A call opens 1 or 2 tracks maybe an option for selection channel count. After call closes the tracks disconnect/close #### What happened instead? Element opens multiple tracks and dont close them afterwards ### Operating system Linux ### Browser information Chromium: 94.0.4606.61 ### URL for webapp 1.8.5-1 ### Homeserver matrix.archgang.xyz ### Will you send logs? Yes

Multiple Audio tracks (old ones are not closing) in web and client ### Steps to reproduce Running Arch Linux kernel 5.14.9 DE: KDE Plasma Sound: pipewire. 1. Launch Element in web or in native client. 2. Take a call. -> in Sound Manager applications new Chromium pipes appear. 3. Close the call -> The Tracks are still here. 4. Take a call again and even more tracks open. ### Outcome #### What did you expect? A call opens 1 or 2 tracks maybe an option for selection channel count. After call closes the tracks disconnect/close #### What happened instead? Element opens multiple tracks and dont close them afterwards ### Operating system Linux ### Browser information Chromium: 94.0.4606.61 ### URL for webapp 1.8.5-1 ### Homeserver matrix.archgang.xyz ### Will you send logs? Yes

No

Bug fix - call tracks don’t close after call close

https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/10805

Switch uid with nickname in user picture URLs

Closes #10725

Switch uid with nickname in user picture URLs Closes #10725

Yes

Hiding UID

https://api.github.com/repos/amareensaleh/basic-java-instant-messenger/issues/4

NFR2: Protecting Personal Information

|NFR2: Protecting Personal Information | |----------------------| | **Estimate:** 3 | | **Priority:** Should have | |**Story**: As a User, I want that the application does not use any of my personal chats for any purposes without my concern so that I can feel comfortable that my privacy is respected. | | **Acceptance criteria:** | |1. a user uses the chat application | |2. a user can chat with other users.| |3. the application must not misuse personal chats for any purposes without usersג€™ consent nor should it give access to any other users except the sender and the receiver.|

NFR2: Protecting Personal Information |NFR2: Protecting Personal Information | |----------------------| | **Estimate:** 3 | | **Priority:** Should have | |**Story**: As a User, I want that the application does not use any of my personal chats for any purposes without my concern so that I can feel comfortable that my privacy is respected. | | **Acceptance criteria:** | |1. a user uses the chat application | |2. a user can chat with other users.| |3. the application must not misuse personal chats for any purposes without usersג€™ consent nor should it give access to any other users except the sender and the receiver.|

Yes

Protection of personal info

https://api.github.com/repos/vladimiry/ElectronMail/issues/446

Add tor browser fingerprints to browser identity

Hi i think its great this app adds ability to disguise itself as a different browser. It's worth noting that on the Tor network it is highly irregular for a user to be using anything other than a tor browser user agent. they are pretty standardized for purpose of not letting anyone stand out. i think it should be an option to use tor browser fingerprints only especially when setting up an account that accesses protonmail over its tor hidden service. as i said in opening statement using other browser identities is highly irregular, attracts attention and makes a user more unique all things that mute the value of using tor in the first place.

Add tor browser fingerprints to browser identity Hi i think its great this app adds ability to disguise itself as a different browser. It's worth noting that on the Tor network it is highly irregular for a user to be using anything other than a tor browser user agent. they are pretty standardized for purpose of not letting anyone stand out. i think it should be an option to use tor browser fingerprints only especially when setting up an account that accesses protonmail over its tor hidden service. as i said in opening statement using other browser identities is highly irregular, attracts attention and makes a user more unique all things that mute the value of using tor in the first place.

Yes

Browser disguise

https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/19141

clear or delete chat history feature request

### Your use case #### What would you like to do? > I would like to be able to delete the chat history #### Why would you like to do it? > Since this is a pretty private chatting app, I believe that history deletion is a fair request. #### How would you like to achieve it? > there are three ways come to my mind, one is a button or something that delete all chat history, second is to let user choose the time period that they want to delete or user can choose certain messages that they want to delete. ### Have you considered any alternatives? _No response_ ### Additional context _No response_

clear or delete chat history feature request ### Your use case #### What would you like to do? > I would like to be able to delete the chat history #### Why would you like to do it? > Since this is a pretty private chatting app, I believe that history deletion is a fair request. #### How would you like to achieve it? > there are three ways come to my mind, one is a button or something that delete all chat history, second is to let user choose the time period that they want to delete or user can choose certain messages that they want to delete. ### Have you considered any alternatives? _No response_ ### Additional context _No response_

Yes

Deleting the history of private chats

https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/10687

Joseph Hogan please read this

Here's the private message I received this morning from Joseph Hogan (`[email protected]`): > Hello Hypolitel, > > This is Joseph, the person from Montreal, Canada. I've been a little silent since I've been super busy. I tried upgrading my friendica with no success. > > I have decided to reinstall Friendica with the latest version. and, a friend of mine showed me how git works, so I will be using GIT to install and upgrade. > > But, I have a couple of questions, and when posting on the friendica support forum, I have gotten no replies. No sure if no one sees my messages, or they just are not showing up. > > I am hoping to get some help and get active again. > > Can yo let me know that yo get this email and if you see my message on the support forum? > > Thanks! > > Joseph I tried to reply to them with the following answer: > Hi Joseph, I received your private message loud and clear. However I can't see any recent message from you in the Friendica Support forum. Did you reinstall Friendica from scratch on the same domain by wiping the database out by any chance? > > In this case you could have federation problems as your node's cryptographic keys have changed so its indistinguishable from an impersonation attempt. But the message sending didn't work, I assume because Joseph Hogan's account on their new node with the same username on the same domain is failing the security check. I'm getting the following error pop-ups: - "Unable to locate contact information" - "Message not available." Unfortunately I have no other way to contact Joseph, hence the title. Beyond this inconvenience, it seems like we're accepting private messages from anyone without checking their cryptographic keys which isn't great. I understand I can't reply to them, but I shouldn't have received the message in the first place, or with a privacy warning about the potential impersonation.

Joseph Hogan please read this Here's the private message I received this morning from Joseph Hogan (`[email protected]`): > Hello Hypolitel, > > This is Joseph, the person from Montreal, Canada. I've been a little silent since I've been super busy. I tried upgrading my friendica with no success. > > I have decided to reinstall Friendica with the latest version. and, a friend of mine showed me how git works, so I will be using GIT to install and upgrade. > > But, I have a couple of questions, and when posting on the friendica support forum, I have gotten no replies. No sure if no one sees my messages, or they just are not showing up. > > I am hoping to get some help and get active again. > > Can yo let me know that yo get this email and if you see my message on the support forum? > > Thanks! > > Joseph I tried to reply to them with the following answer: > Hi Joseph, I received your private message loud and clear. However I can't see any recent message from you in the Friendica Support forum. Did you reinstall Friendica from scratch on the same domain by wiping the database out by any chance? > > In this case you could have federation problems as your node's cryptographic keys have changed so its indistinguishable from an impersonation attempt. But the message sending didn't work, I assume because Joseph Hogan's account on their new node with the same username on the same domain is failing the security check. I'm getting the following error pop-ups: - "Unable to locate contact information" - "Message not available." Unfortunately I have no other way to contact Joseph, hence the title. Beyond this inconvenience, it seems like we're accepting private messages from anyone without checking their cryptographic keys which isn't great. I understand I can't reply to them, but I shouldn't have received the message in the first place, or with a privacy warning about the potential impersonation.

No

Installation issues

https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2750

Unify onchain and onChain to onchain

<!-- Have you done the following? --> <!-- * read the Code of Conduct? By filing an Issue, you are expected to --> <!-- comply with it, including treating everyone with respect: --> <!-- https://github.com/hyperledger/besu/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md --> <!-- * Reproduced the issue in the latest version of the software --> <!-- * Read the debugging docs: https://besu.hyperledger.org/en/stable/HowTo/Monitor/Logging/ --> <!-- * Duplicate Issue check: https://github.com/search?q=+is%3Aissue+repo%3Ahyperledger/Besu --> <!-- Note: Not all sections will apply to all issue types. --> ### Description We decided to treat onchain as a single word. In the codebase we use both onchain/Onchain and onChain/OnChain. To make names more predictable, all instance of onChain/OnChain should be renamed to onchain/Onchain.

Unify onchain and onChain to onchain <!-- Have you done the following? --> <!-- * read the Code of Conduct? By filing an Issue, you are expected to --> <!-- comply with it, including treating everyone with respect: --> <!-- https://github.com/hyperledger/besu/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md --> <!-- * Reproduced the issue in the latest version of the software --> <!-- * Read the debugging docs: https://besu.hyperledger.org/en/stable/HowTo/Monitor/Logging/ --> <!-- * Duplicate Issue check: https://github.com/search?q=+is%3Aissue+repo%3Ahyperledger/Besu --> <!-- Note: Not all sections will apply to all issue types. --> ### Description We decided to treat onchain as a single word. In the codebase we use both onchain/Onchain and onChain/OnChain. To make names more predictable, all instance of onChain/OnChain should be renamed to onchain/Onchain.

No

Bug fix

https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2722

Unexpected FROM value in private transaction receipt when transaction gas is not zero.

### Description An unexpected `from` value is present on the *private* transaction receipt when the `gas` value in the transaction is not zero. When `gas` is omitted the expected `from` value is present on the private transaction receipt. ### Acceptance Criteria `from` value on the private transaction receipt should match the `from` on the private transaction. This value is not expected to change with the `gasLimit`. ### Steps to Reproduce (Bug) 1. Run Besu (v20.10.4) with the following config: ``` /opt/besu/bin/besu public-key export --to=/tmp/bootnode_pubkey; /opt/besu/bin/besu \ --config-file=/config/config.toml \ --p2p-host=$$(hostname -i) \ --genesis-file=/config/genesis.json \ --node-private-key-file=/opt/besu/keys/key \ --min-gas-price=0 \ --privacy-enabled \ --privacy-url=$${ORION_CLIENTURL} \ --privacy-public-key-file=/config/orion/orion.pub \ --privacy-onchain-groups-enabled=false \ --rpc-http-api=EEA,WEB3,ETH,NET,PRIV,PERM,IBFT \ --rpc-ws-api=EEA,WEB3,ETH,NET,PRIV,PERM,IBFT ; ``` 2. Send a transaction with `gas` set to a value (eg. 900000). 3. Retrieve the private transaction receipt. 4. Send a transaction with `gas` omitted. 5. Retrieve the private transaction receipt. **Expected behavior:** [What you expect to happen] The `from` value on both receipts should be the same. **Actual behavior:** [What actually happens] The `from` value on the transaction without gas has the expected value, the `from` value on the transaction with gas has an unexpected value.

Unexpected FROM value in private transaction receipt when transaction gas is not zero. ### Description An unexpected `from` value is present on the *private* transaction receipt when the `gas` value in the transaction is not zero. When `gas` is omitted the expected `from` value is present on the private transaction receipt. ### Acceptance Criteria `from` value on the private transaction receipt should match the `from` on the private transaction. This value is not expected to change with the `gasLimit`. ### Steps to Reproduce (Bug) 1. Run Besu (v20.10.4) with the following config: ``` /opt/besu/bin/besu public-key export --to=/tmp/bootnode_pubkey; /opt/besu/bin/besu \ --config-file=/config/config.toml \ --p2p-host=$$(hostname -i) \ --genesis-file=/config/genesis.json \ --node-private-key-file=/opt/besu/keys/key \ --min-gas-price=0 \ --privacy-enabled \ --privacy-url=$${ORION_CLIENTURL} \ --privacy-public-key-file=/config/orion/orion.pub \ --privacy-onchain-groups-enabled=false \ --rpc-http-api=EEA,WEB3,ETH,NET,PRIV,PERM,IBFT \ --rpc-ws-api=EEA,WEB3,ETH,NET,PRIV,PERM,IBFT ; ``` 2. Send a transaction with `gas` set to a value (eg. 900000). 3. Retrieve the private transaction receipt. 4. Send a transaction with `gas` omitted. 5. Retrieve the private transaction receipt. **Expected behavior:** [What you expect to happen] The `from` value on both receipts should be the same. **Actual behavior:** [What actually happens] The `from` value on the transaction without gas has the expected value, the `from` value on the transaction with gas has an unexpected value.

Yes

Unexpected valus is presented

https://api.github.com/repos/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/issues/685

[Requirements] Data Retention Requirements

### Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe. With MDS 1.2 and the Requirements API, it is possible for the first time for Agencies to specify which data they need,ֲ and which data should not be shared. This is a major step forward for Data Minimization by allowing for the creation of best practices and example Requirements files that describe how to make minimal data requests for common use cases. A related step I'd love to see MDS take is to describe data retention practices. This could cover some or all of the following capabilities: - Allowing Agencies to specify a minimum duration for data retained on operators' systems - Allowing Agencies to specify a maximum duration for data retained on their own (or a chosen aggregators') systems - Allowing operators to specify a maximum duration that they retain data _and/or_ - Allowing Agencies to specify a maximum duration for data retained on operators' systems These requirements could be expressed at the API, endpoint and perhaps even the field level. Here are some example use cases: - An agency specifies that they require status events to be retained by operators (ie queryable) for at least 6 months - An agency specifies that they will hold onto metrics data for up to five years, but will only hold onto disaggregate trip data for 1 month. - An agency interested in trying [Geography Driven Events](https://github.com/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/blob/main/general-information.md#geography-driven-events) specifies that they will hold onto GDE event data for up to one year, and they will hold onto full event data for one month (to allow for the verification and evaluation of GDE data). _A note on aggregate data_ My intention with this issue is to allow for explicit requirements around the retention of _raw_ (particularly sensitive) data being delivered via MDS. This seemed like a good place to draw the line for now, but aggregate data can also sometimes be sensitive. It's an open, related question whether and how MDS might someday attempt to describe the retention of data that has been aggregated, analyzed etc. ### Describe the solution you'd like I'm imagining this as an extension to the Requirements API. ### Is this a breaking change Probably, insofar as it might allow for the creation of breaking requirements on operator implementations. Possibly this could be avoided with a conditional period, as we allowed for with Requirements in 1.2. ### Impacted Spec For which spec is this feature being requested? * `requirements` ### Additional context See also the #608 and #646.

[Requirements] Data Retention Requirements ### Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe. With MDS 1.2 and the Requirements API, it is possible for the first time for Agencies to specify which data they need,ֲ and which data should not be shared. This is a major step forward for Data Minimization by allowing for the creation of best practices and example Requirements files that describe how to make minimal data requests for common use cases. A related step I'd love to see MDS take is to describe data retention practices. This could cover some or all of the following capabilities: - Allowing Agencies to specify a minimum duration for data retained on operators' systems - Allowing Agencies to specify a maximum duration for data retained on their own (or a chosen aggregators') systems - Allowing operators to specify a maximum duration that they retain data _and/or_ - Allowing Agencies to specify a maximum duration for data retained on operators' systems These requirements could be expressed at the API, endpoint and perhaps even the field level. Here are some example use cases: - An agency specifies that they require status events to be retained by operators (ie queryable) for at least 6 months - An agency specifies that they will hold onto metrics data for up to five years, but will only hold onto disaggregate trip data for 1 month. - An agency interested in trying [Geography Driven Events](https://github.com/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/blob/main/general-information.md#geography-driven-events) specifies that they will hold onto GDE event data for up to one year, and they will hold onto full event data for one month (to allow for the verification and evaluation of GDE data). _A note on aggregate data_ My intention with this issue is to allow for explicit requirements around the retention of _raw_ (particularly sensitive) data being delivered via MDS. This seemed like a good place to draw the line for now, but aggregate data can also sometimes be sensitive. It's an open, related question whether and how MDS might someday attempt to describe the retention of data that has been aggregated, analyzed etc. ### Describe the solution you'd like I'm imagining this as an extension to the Requirements API. ### Is this a breaking change Probably, insofar as it might allow for the creation of breaking requirements on operator implementations. Possibly this could be avoided with a conditional period, as we allowed for with Requirements in 1.2. ### Impacted Spec For which spec is this feature being requested? * `requirements` ### Additional context See also the #608 and #646.

Yes

Data retention policies

https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2693

Flexible Privacy Group can not unlock.

# summary - This occurs when flexiblePrivacyGroup is used. - If the lock is acquired with setLockState, it cannot be unlocked. # Steps to Reproduce - Launches the besu container, which is available in flexible privacy group mode. - create a privacy group. - get the lock with lock function. - release the lock with unlock function, but it can't release the lock. ## sample script ``` const Web3 = require("web3"); const EEAClient = require("web3js-quorum"); const { tessera, besu } = require("../config/keys.js"); const node1 = new EEAClient(new Web3(besu.node1.url)); const privacyProxyAbi = require("./PrivacyProxy.json").output.abi // https://github.com/ConsenSys/web3js-quorum/blob/master/solidity/PrivacyProxy.json module.exports = async () => { const onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult = await node1.eth.flexiblePrivacyGroup.create( { participants: [tessera.node1.publicKey, tessera.node2.publicKey], enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey } ); console.log("Created new on-chain privacy group:"); console.log(onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId); console.log("-- canExecute before lock--") await canExecute(node1, { enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privacyGroupId: onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey } ) console.log("-- get lock --") await setLockState(node1, { enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privacyGroupId: onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey, lock: true } ) console.log("-- canExecute after lock--") await canExecute(node1, { enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privacyGroupId: onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey } ) console.log("-- get unlock --") await setLockState(node1, { enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privacyGroupId: onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey, lock: false } ) console.log("-- canExecute after unlock--") await canExecute(node1, { enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privacyGroupId: onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey } ) } async function setLockState(web3, options) { const contract = new web3.eth.Contract(privacyProxyAbi); const functionAbi = contract._jsonInterface.find((e) => { return e.name === (options.lock ? "lock" : "unlock"); }); const functionCall = { to: "0x000000000000000000000000000000000000007c", data: functionAbi.signature, privateFrom: options.enclaveKey, privacyGroupId: options.privacyGroupId, privateKey: options.privateKey, }; let transactionHash = await web3.priv.generateAndSendRawTransaction(functionCall) let transactionReceipt = await web3.priv.waitForTransactionReceipt(transactionHash); console.log("TransactionReceipt.status: ", transactionReceipt.status) console.log("TransactionReceipt.output: ", transactionReceipt.output) } async function canExecute(web3, options) { const contract = new web3.eth.Contract(privacyProxyAbi); const functionAbi = contract._jsonInterface.find((e) => { return e.name === ("canExecute"); }); const functionCall = { to: "0x000000000000000000000000000000000000007c", data: functionAbi.signature, privateFrom: options.enclaveKey, privacyGroupId: options.privacyGroupId, privateKey: options.privateKey, }; let transactionHash = await web3.priv.generateAndSendRawTransaction(functionCall) let transactionReceipt = await web3.priv.waitForTransactionReceipt(transactionHash); console.log("TransactionReceipt.status: ", transactionReceipt.status) console.log("TransactionReceipt.output: ", transactionReceipt.output) } if (require.main === module) { module.exports(); } ``` ## console log ``` Waiting for transaction to be mined ... Created new on-chain privacy group: bHPtl5dGLKn/hOUv5Uq7h7VRSJNPe8IT07Kk1H9kcEI= -- canExecute before lock-- Waiting for transaction to be mined ... TransactionReceipt.status: 0x1 TransactionReceipt.output: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 -- get lock -- Waiting for transaction to be mined ... TransactionReceipt.status: 0x1 TransactionReceipt.output: 0x -- canExecute after lock-- Waiting for transaction to be mined ... TransactionReceipt.status: 0x0 TransactionReceipt.output: 0x -- get unlock -- Waiting for transaction to be mined ... TransactionReceipt.status: 0x0 TransactionReceipt.output: 0x -- canExecute after unlock-- Waiting for transaction to be mined ... TransactionReceipt.status: 0x0 TransactionReceipt.output: 0x ``` # Versions - BESU: besu/v21.7.2/linux-x86_64/adoptopenjdk-java-11 - web3js-quorum: 21.7.0-rc1

Flexible Privacy Group can not unlock. # summary - This occurs when flexiblePrivacyGroup is used. - If the lock is acquired with setLockState, it cannot be unlocked. # Steps to Reproduce - Launches the besu container, which is available in flexible privacy group mode. - create a privacy group. - get the lock with lock function. - release the lock with unlock function, but it can't release the lock. ## sample script ``` const Web3 = require("web3"); const EEAClient = require("web3js-quorum"); const { tessera, besu } = require("../config/keys.js"); const node1 = new EEAClient(new Web3(besu.node1.url)); const privacyProxyAbi = require("./PrivacyProxy.json").output.abi // https://github.com/ConsenSys/web3js-quorum/blob/master/solidity/PrivacyProxy.json module.exports = async () => { const onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult = await node1.eth.flexiblePrivacyGroup.create( { participants: [tessera.node1.publicKey, tessera.node2.publicKey], enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey } ); console.log("Created new on-chain privacy group:"); console.log(onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId); console.log("-- canExecute before lock--") await canExecute(node1, { enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privacyGroupId: onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey } ) console.log("-- get lock --") await setLockState(node1, { enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privacyGroupId: onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey, lock: true } ) console.log("-- canExecute after lock--") await canExecute(node1, { enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privacyGroupId: onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey } ) console.log("-- get unlock --") await setLockState(node1, { enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privacyGroupId: onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey, lock: false } ) console.log("-- canExecute after unlock--") await canExecute(node1, { enclaveKey: tessera.node1.publicKey, privacyGroupId: onChainPrivacyGroupCreationResult.privacyGroupId, privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey } ) } async function setLockState(web3, options) { const contract = new web3.eth.Contract(privacyProxyAbi); const functionAbi = contract._jsonInterface.find((e) => { return e.name === (options.lock ? "lock" : "unlock"); }); const functionCall = { to: "0x000000000000000000000000000000000000007c", data: functionAbi.signature, privateFrom: options.enclaveKey, privacyGroupId: options.privacyGroupId, privateKey: options.privateKey, }; let transactionHash = await web3.priv.generateAndSendRawTransaction(functionCall) let transactionReceipt = await web3.priv.waitForTransactionReceipt(transactionHash); console.log("TransactionReceipt.status: ", transactionReceipt.status) console.log("TransactionReceipt.output: ", transactionReceipt.output) } async function canExecute(web3, options) { const contract = new web3.eth.Contract(privacyProxyAbi); const functionAbi = contract._jsonInterface.find((e) => { return e.name === ("canExecute"); }); const functionCall = { to: "0x000000000000000000000000000000000000007c", data: functionAbi.signature, privateFrom: options.enclaveKey, privacyGroupId: options.privacyGroupId, privateKey: options.privateKey, }; let transactionHash = await web3.priv.generateAndSendRawTransaction(functionCall) let transactionReceipt = await web3.priv.waitForTransactionReceipt(transactionHash); console.log("TransactionReceipt.status: ", transactionReceipt.status) console.log("TransactionReceipt.output: ", transactionReceipt.output) } if (require.main === module) { module.exports(); } ``` ## console log ``` Waiting for transaction to be mined ... Created new on-chain privacy group: bHPtl5dGLKn/hOUv5Uq7h7VRSJNPe8IT07Kk1H9kcEI= -- canExecute before lock-- Waiting for transaction to be mined ... TransactionReceipt.status: 0x1 TransactionReceipt.output: 0x0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 -- get lock -- Waiting for transaction to be mined ... TransactionReceipt.status: 0x1 TransactionReceipt.output: 0x -- canExecute after lock-- Waiting for transaction to be mined ... TransactionReceipt.status: 0x0 TransactionReceipt.output: 0x -- get unlock -- Waiting for transaction to be mined ... TransactionReceipt.status: 0x0 TransactionReceipt.output: 0x -- canExecute after unlock-- Waiting for transaction to be mined ... TransactionReceipt.status: 0x0 TransactionReceipt.output: 0x ``` # Versions - BESU: besu/v21.7.2/linux-x86_64/adoptopenjdk-java-11 - web3js-quorum: 21.7.0-rc1

No

Bug Fix

https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/18776

Guest option in private spaces is alarming

### Your use case <img width="1107" alt="Screenshot 2021-08-25 at 17 03 52" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/4626865/130825494-db764834-40d9-4dff-9d79-4ab4afc8bc3f.png"> 1. Create a private space. 2. Go to space settings. 3. Observe that guest access is enabled in Settings. This is scary and alarming. ### Suggested quick fix Default this to 'off' when creating a private space.

Guest option in private spaces is alarming ### Your use case <img width="1107" alt="Screenshot 2021-08-25 at 17 03 52" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/4626865/130825494-db764834-40d9-4dff-9d79-4ab4afc8bc3f.png"> 1. Create a private space. 2. Go to space settings. 3. Observe that guest access is enabled in Settings. This is scary and alarming. ### Suggested quick fix Default this to 'off' when creating a private space.

Yes

Guest access is enabled by default in private spaces

https://api.github.com/repos/microsoftgraph/microsoft-graph-explorer-v4/issues/1068

Deliver support for soverign clouds

[AB#10824](https://microsoftgraph.visualstudio.com/0985d294-5762-4bc2-a565-161ef349ca3e/_workitems/edit/10824)

Deliver support for soverign clouds [AB#10824](https://microsoftgraph.visualstudio.com/0985d294-5762-4bc2-a565-161ef349ca3e/_workitems/edit/10824)

No

Bug fix

https://api.github.com/repos/microsoftgraph/microsoft-graph-explorer-v4/issues/1052

Extend OCV feedback button & NPS feedback pop to be compliant

**Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.** Extending the existing OCV button feedback & NPS pop up to be privacy compliant **Describe the solution you'd like** For AAD users, GE to check the set tenant admin policy to determine if the CES feedback button is displayed to users. For MSA users, GE to check age-group information **Scenarios** - Unauthenticated on main and GE - Unauthenticated on Main and Authenticated AAD user on GE - Unauthenticated on Main and Authenticated MSA user on GE - Authenticated AAD user on main and Unauthenticated GE - Authenticated AAD user on main and GE - Authenticated AAD user on main and Authenticated MSA user on GE - Authenticated MSA user on main and Unauthenticated on GE - Authenticated MSA user on main and Authenticated AAD user on GE - Authenticated MSA user on main and Authenticated MSA user on GE [AB#10613](https://microsoftgraph.visualstudio.com/0985d294-5762-4bc2-a565-161ef349ca3e/_workitems/edit/10613)

Extend OCV feedback button & NPS feedback pop to be compliant **Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.** Extending the existing OCV button feedback & NPS pop up to be privacy compliant **Describe the solution you'd like** For AAD users, GE to check the set tenant admin policy to determine if the CES feedback button is displayed to users. For MSA users, GE to check age-group information **Scenarios** - Unauthenticated on main and GE - Unauthenticated on Main and Authenticated AAD user on GE - Unauthenticated on Main and Authenticated MSA user on GE - Authenticated AAD user on main and Unauthenticated GE - Authenticated AAD user on main and GE - Authenticated AAD user on main and Authenticated MSA user on GE - Authenticated MSA user on main and Unauthenticated on GE - Authenticated MSA user on main and Authenticated AAD user on GE - Authenticated MSA user on main and Authenticated MSA user on GE [AB#10613](https://microsoftgraph.visualstudio.com/0985d294-5762-4bc2-a565-161ef349ca3e/_workitems/edit/10613)

Yes

Privacy compliance

https://api.github.com/repos/brave/brave-ios/issues/4019

iPhone closed tab stuck as a tab navigation background

### Description: - After closing the tab, it flashes for a while during the tab switches or creating a new tab. ### Steps to Reproduce - Not sure how to reproduce each time. But faced this issue whenever following settings are made. 1. Disabled Brave rewards 2. Search engine suggestions-> On. 3. Appearance-> Automatic 4. Show background Images, Default Images only. 5. Show tabs bar in landscape only. 6. Show bookmarks shortcut 7. Hide rewards ico - Left other settings to default **Actual result:** [Link to video](https://imgur.com/kHOnn7O) **Device Information** - iPhone XR running iOS 14.7.1 - Brave browser version : Version 1.29 (21.8.3.10)

iPhone closed tab stuck as a tab navigation background ### Description: - After closing the tab, it flashes for a while during the tab switches or creating a new tab. ### Steps to Reproduce - Not sure how to reproduce each time. But faced this issue whenever following settings are made. 1. Disabled Brave rewards 2. Search engine suggestions-> On. 3. Appearance-> Automatic 4. Show background Images, Default Images only. 5. Show tabs bar in landscape only. 6. Show bookmarks shortcut 7. Hide rewards ico - Left other settings to default **Actual result:** [Link to video](https://imgur.com/kHOnn7O) **Device Information** - iPhone XR running iOS 14.7.1 - Brave browser version : Version 1.29 (21.8.3.10)

No

Bug fix

https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/18464

Option to disable voice messages

#### Is your suggestion related to a problem? Please describe. I don't use voice messages so I consider the possibility of accidentally sending an audio recording of my environment to a room where it's impossible for me to delete it a security risk. #### Describe the solution you'd like. A setting somewhere that completely disables voice messages for me. Preferably (but possibly optionally?) saved to my account data and respected by all my sessions in all Element clients across all platforms. #### Describe alternatives you've considered. - Deny microphone access to the Element clients and apps. Though this is not an ideal solution as I would have to explicitly enable mic access before and disable again after a call. - Disable the feature on the Synapse or reverse proxy level. Tho I can't immediately think of a way to do this. But if this is possible, it is also not a good solution in case I do need voice messages some day and this is not available to people that are not running their own server.

Option to disable voice messages #### Is your suggestion related to a problem? Please describe. I don't use voice messages so I consider the possibility of accidentally sending an audio recording of my environment to a room where it's impossible for me to delete it a security risk. #### Describe the solution you'd like. A setting somewhere that completely disables voice messages for me. Preferably (but possibly optionally?) saved to my account data and respected by all my sessions in all Element clients across all platforms. #### Describe alternatives you've considered. - Deny microphone access to the Element clients and apps. Though this is not an ideal solution as I would have to explicitly enable mic access before and disable again after a call. - Disable the feature on the Synapse or reverse proxy level. Tho I can't immediately think of a way to do this. But if this is possible, it is also not a good solution in case I do need voice messages some day and this is not available to people that are not running their own server.

Yes

A privacy feature of disabling voice messaging

https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/18456

Stopping the camera whilst screensharing does not turn the webcam LED off on my mac

### Steps to reproduce 1. Start a VoIP call with camera on 2. Start screensharing 3. Stop camera ### What happened? Camera has stopped, but the "green" LED that indicate that the webcam is active is still on ### What did you expect? I would expect that LED to switch off and the camera to stop recording ### Operating system macOs ### Browser information Chromium Version 92.0.4515.131 ### URL for webapp app.element.io / Element Desktop

Stopping the camera whilst screensharing does not turn the webcam LED off on my mac ### Steps to reproduce 1. Start a VoIP call with camera on 2. Start screensharing 3. Stop camera ### What happened? Camera has stopped, but the "green" LED that indicate that the webcam is active is still on ### What did you expect? I would expect that LED to switch off and the camera to stop recording ### Operating system macOs ### Browser information Chromium Version 92.0.4515.131 ### URL for webapp app.element.io / Element Desktop

No

Bug fix, not specifically related to privacy

https://api.github.com/repos/revoltchat/revite/issues/36

Add DuckDuckGo-style privacy warnings for special embeds.

Don't automatically load external embeds, ask the user first and allow them to permanently allow a website to be embedded.  

Add DuckDuckGo-style privacy warnings for special embeds. Don't automatically load external embeds, ask the user first and allow them to permanently allow a website to be embedded.  

No

Bug fix

https://api.github.com/repos/revoltchat/revite/issues/5

External link warning.

Add a modal which warns a user that the link they just clicked on does not match what the URL says. Similarly, also open the warning if a user opens an external image link.

External link warning. Add a modal which warns a user that the link they just clicked on does not match what the URL says. Similarly, also open the warning if a user opens an external image link.

No

Bug fix

https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2613

[Spike] Investigate better separation of private tx processing logic from public

Review the branching of execution of public vs private transactions in an effort to better isolate their differences. The ideal scenario would be that, when running on public networks, none of the private tx logic would be ever in the code execution path. See https://github.com/hyperledger/besu/issues/2606 for context - [ ] add more tests that utilise chainId of 1 (mainnet) - need to make sure tests are totally isolated from Mainnet - [ ] maybe we need a GoQuorumTransactionValidator - similar idea to GoQuorumBlockProcessor - instead of having code in MainnetTransactionValidator - [ ] ensure sufficient testing - acceptance tests Problem The scope of this problem is limited to: Value transfer public transactions received via JSON-RPC Value transfer public transactions received via DevP2P When receiving a value transfer tx via JSON-RPC, Besu was considering it a private tx and enforcing a validity check that prevents private transactions from transferring value. That's why it was returning the error message ether value is not supported for private transactions. When receiving value transfer tx via DevP2P, Besu was considering those transactions invalid, not propagating them further. Luckily, the logic for block validation and import wasn't using the same code path. This means that Besu would still successfully synchronise with Mainnet and be up-to-date. This bug won't cause a fork. It is worth mentioning that this bug was caused by a specific combination of factors, related to the chainId value being 1. Unfortunately, our tests do not cover scenarios with specific chainIds.

[Spike] Investigate better separation of private tx processing logic from public Review the branching of execution of public vs private transactions in an effort to better isolate their differences. The ideal scenario would be that, when running on public networks, none of the private tx logic would be ever in the code execution path. See https://github.com/hyperledger/besu/issues/2606 for context - [ ] add more tests that utilise chainId of 1 (mainnet) - need to make sure tests are totally isolated from Mainnet - [ ] maybe we need a GoQuorumTransactionValidator - similar idea to GoQuorumBlockProcessor - instead of having code in MainnetTransactionValidator - [ ] ensure sufficient testing - acceptance tests Problem The scope of this problem is limited to: Value transfer public transactions received via JSON-RPC Value transfer public transactions received via DevP2P When receiving a value transfer tx via JSON-RPC, Besu was considering it a private tx and enforcing a validity check that prevents private transactions from transferring value. That's why it was returning the error message ether value is not supported for private transactions. When receiving value transfer tx via DevP2P, Besu was considering those transactions invalid, not propagating them further. Luckily, the logic for block validation and import wasn't using the same code path. This means that Besu would still successfully synchronise with Mainnet and be up-to-date. This bug won't cause a fork. It is worth mentioning that this bug was caused by a specific combination of factors, related to the chainId value being 1. Unfortunately, our tests do not cover scenarios with specific chainIds.

Yes

Differentiate private and public transactions

https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2587

Smart Contracts for Validator Selection: Create github repo

### Description Create a github repository for the smart contracts used for validator selection ### Acceptance Criteria Repository has been created

Smart Contracts for Validator Selection: Create github repo ### Description Create a github repository for the smart contracts used for validator selection ### Acceptance Criteria Repository has been created

No

smart contracts

https://api.github.com/repos/twilio/twilio-video-ios/issues/195

Microphone indicator is flashing, when someone else starts talking.

### Description We see an issue, where participant is muted and someone else start talking, system microphone indicator flashes for a brief moment. It could be similar to this issue: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/58194401/status-bar-shows-mic-icon-for-a-moment-when-pausing-stopping-avaudioengine-in-io But hard to guess ### Steps to Reproduce 1. create a room 2. Connect at least two participant 3. Mute one and the other one starts producing audio 4. Muted participant can see a microphone icon #### Expected Behavior Muted participant don't see a microphone icon at all #### Actual Behavior Muted user can see system microphone indicator in a status bar for a brief moment. #### Reproduces How Often Always #### Logs I don't have logs but there is nothing visible either. But I can try to provide them if needed. ### Versions All relevant version information for the issue. #### Video iOS SDK 4.4 #### Xcode 12.5.1 #### iOS Version 14.7 #### iOS Device iPhone 12

Microphone indicator is flashing, when someone else starts talking. ### Description We see an issue, where participant is muted and someone else start talking, system microphone indicator flashes for a brief moment. It could be similar to this issue: https://stackoverflow.com/questions/58194401/status-bar-shows-mic-icon-for-a-moment-when-pausing-stopping-avaudioengine-in-io But hard to guess ### Steps to Reproduce 1. create a room 2. Connect at least two participant 3. Mute one and the other one starts producing audio 4. Muted participant can see a microphone icon #### Expected Behavior Muted participant don't see a microphone icon at all #### Actual Behavior Muted user can see system microphone indicator in a status bar for a brief moment. #### Reproduces How Often Always #### Logs I don't have logs but there is nothing visible either. But I can try to provide them if needed. ### Versions All relevant version information for the issue. #### Video iOS SDK 4.4 #### Xcode 12.5.1 #### iOS Version 14.7 #### iOS Device iPhone 12

No

Bug fix

https://api.github.com/repos/vladimiry/ElectronMail/issues/422

[Question] Some kind of new mail notification cross-platform

What I mean: Right now, on macOS I see a Notification like "Protonmail[x] has received a new mail" for every new mail. - If there will be a title for every added account, it will be more readable like "Shopping account has new mails" - If this app will have an option to specify for example a shell script, and execute it with the message from first option as argument, there will appear a possibility to send this arguments where you want, to other email or chat.

[Question] Some kind of new mail notification cross-platform What I mean: Right now, on macOS I see a Notification like "Protonmail[x] has received a new mail" for every new mail. - If there will be a title for every added account, it will be more readable like "Shopping account has new mails" - If this app will have an option to specify for example a shell script, and execute it with the message from first option as argument, there will appear a possibility to send this arguments where you want, to other email or chat.

No

a feature request

https://api.github.com/repos/nextcloud/server/issues/27879

Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists

The functions to find user statuses listed didn't respect user enumeration settings (`shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration` and `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` core app settings). Fixes: #27122

Respect user enumeration settings in user status lists The functions to find user statuses listed didn't respect user enumeration settings (`shareapi_allow_share_dialog_user_enumeration` and `shareapi_restrict_user_enumeration_to_group` core app settings). Fixes: #27122

Yes

Handling user enumeration issues

https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2509

[Privacy] Allow users to provide a private genesis

Add an option to allow the provision of a private genesis using a plugin-able interface. [](https://mermaid-js.github.io/mermaid-live-editor/edit##eyJjb2RlIjoiZ3JhcGggVERcbiAgICBBW0FsaWNlXSAtLT58ZWVhX3NlbmRSYXdUcmFuc2FjdGlvbnwgQntyZXNvbHZlTGFzdFN0YXRlUm9vdH1cbiAgICBCIC0tPnxlbXB0eXwgRFthcHBseVByaXZhdGVHZW5lc2lzXVxuICAgIEIgLS0-fGhhc1N0YXR8IFBbcmV0dXJuIHN0YXRlXVxuICAgIEQgLS0-IEV7T25DaGFpblByaXZhY3l9XG4gICAgRSAtLT4gfHllc3wgRlthcHBseU1hbmFnZW1lbnRDb250cmFjdHNdXG4gICAgRSAtLT4gfG5vfCBHW3JldHVybiBzdGF0ZV1cbiAgICBGIC0tPiBIW3JldHVybiBzdGF0ZV0iLCJtZXJtYWlkIjoie1xuICBcInRoZW1lXCI6IFwiZGVmYXVsdFwiXG59IiwidXBkYXRlRWRpdG9yIjpmYWxzZSwiYXV0b1N5bmMiOnRydWUsInVwZGF0ZURpYWdyYW0iOmZhbHNlfQ) ### Problems There is no way to prevent nodes from having a different private genesis file. Currently, there is no private consensus to prevent this from happening. As such, there is the possibility for nodes to have inconsistent states. ### Implementation On the `PrivacyPluginService` a method has been added to allow registration of a `PrivacyGroupGenesisProvider`. The provider must return a `PrivacyGenesis`. This currently only allows you to define genesis accounts/allocs.

[Privacy] Allow users to provide a private genesis Add an option to allow the provision of a private genesis using a plugin-able interface. [](https://mermaid-js.github.io/mermaid-live-editor/edit##eyJjb2RlIjoiZ3JhcGggVERcbiAgICBBW0FsaWNlXSAtLT58ZWVhX3NlbmRSYXdUcmFuc2FjdGlvbnwgQntyZXNvbHZlTGFzdFN0YXRlUm9vdH1cbiAgICBCIC0tPnxlbXB0eXwgRFthcHBseVByaXZhdGVHZW5lc2lzXVxuICAgIEIgLS0-fGhhc1N0YXR8IFBbcmV0dXJuIHN0YXRlXVxuICAgIEQgLS0-IEV7T25DaGFpblByaXZhY3l9XG4gICAgRSAtLT4gfHllc3wgRlthcHBseU1hbmFnZW1lbnRDb250cmFjdHNdXG4gICAgRSAtLT4gfG5vfCBHW3JldHVybiBzdGF0ZV1cbiAgICBGIC0tPiBIW3JldHVybiBzdGF0ZV0iLCJtZXJtYWlkIjoie1xuICBcInRoZW1lXCI6IFwiZGVmYXVsdFwiXG59IiwidXBkYXRlRWRpdG9yIjpmYWxzZSwiYXV0b1N5bmMiOnRydWUsInVwZGF0ZURpYWdyYW0iOmZhbHNlfQ) ### Problems There is no way to prevent nodes from having a different private genesis file. Currently, there is no private consensus to prevent this from happening. As such, there is the possibility for nodes to have inconsistent states. ### Implementation On the `PrivacyPluginService` a method has been added to allow registration of a `PrivacyGroupGenesisProvider`. The provider must return a `PrivacyGenesis`. This currently only allows you to define genesis accounts/allocs.

Yes

Privacy feature

https://api.github.com/repos/commons-app/apps-android-commons/issues/4495

Remove EXIF coordinates per-picture

I am happy to share EXIF coordinates of 90% of the pictures I take (landscapes, mountains, landmarks). Without EXIF coordinates these pictures would lose most of their encyclopedic/usability value. On the other hand, I often don't want to share EXIF coordinates of the remaining 10%: Picture of a rare fruit at my friend's house, pictures of tools at a relative's workplace, pictures of super-old out-of-copyright documents at my grandmother's place, etc. I think many contributors share the same problem. While #181 addresses "at my home", I think we need a more **case-by-case** way to remove coordinates. This could be a dedicated button on the newly-implemented coordinates modification screen.

Remove EXIF coordinates per-picture I am happy to share EXIF coordinates of 90% of the pictures I take (landscapes, mountains, landmarks). Without EXIF coordinates these pictures would lose most of their encyclopedic/usability value. On the other hand, I often don't want to share EXIF coordinates of the remaining 10%: Picture of a rare fruit at my friend's house, pictures of tools at a relative's workplace, pictures of super-old out-of-copyright documents at my grandmother's place, etc. I think many contributors share the same problem. While #181 addresses "at my home", I think we need a more **case-by-case** way to remove coordinates. This could be a dedicated button on the newly-implemented coordinates modification screen.

Yes

Location privacy

https://api.github.com/repos/covidpass-org/covidpass/issues/17

Add random data into the pass payload

Hi, I'm not an Apple Wallet expert (and not even an Apple user at all), so please correct me if any of my assumptions are incorrect. This app sends to the back-end a SHA-1 hash of a payload built from the DGC data. I think the use of SHA-1 is acceptable here (and probably a requirement of Apple Wallet anyways נŸ˜’). Still, if I'm not mistaken, the payload is deterministic for a given DGC: https://github.com/covidpass-org/covidpass/blob/888c40c9894b803d40c4eef5b3869691465bd6c4/src/pass.js#L98. So this hash could be used by a modified back-end as a unique identifier for a DGC and could be used for instance to determine how many times a given DGC was scanned or if a DGC you had by another mean has already been processed in the past by the back-end. While I don't think it's very bad, I don't think it is intended and IIUC could easily be avoided at minimum cost by adding some randomly generated bits to the pass payload. As a result, it would leak even less info from the DGC to the back-end and provide even more guarantees to the users. WDYT?

Add random data into the pass payload Hi, I'm not an Apple Wallet expert (and not even an Apple user at all), so please correct me if any of my assumptions are incorrect. This app sends to the back-end a SHA-1 hash of a payload built from the DGC data. I think the use of SHA-1 is acceptable here (and probably a requirement of Apple Wallet anyways נŸ˜’). Still, if I'm not mistaken, the payload is deterministic for a given DGC: https://github.com/covidpass-org/covidpass/blob/888c40c9894b803d40c4eef5b3869691465bd6c4/src/pass.js#L98. So this hash could be used by a modified back-end as a unique identifier for a DGC and could be used for instance to determine how many times a given DGC was scanned or if a DGC you had by another mean has already been processed in the past by the back-end. While I don't think it's very bad, I don't think it is intended and IIUC could easily be avoided at minimum cost by adding some randomly generated bits to the pass payload. As a result, it would leak even less info from the DGC to the back-end and provide even more guarantees to the users. WDYT?

Yes

Privacy in Apple wallet

https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2387

Besu + Private transaction manager Performance problems

HI At @iobuilders we are working with several clients, including Allfunds (on their custom transaction manager). On out latest smart contract set, we are using structs as params, return value, arrays etc. with the new abiencoderv2 We use pragma solidity ^0.7.5; pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2; We use a standard hyperledger besu network, with maxContractSize to 48k, because our main contract are around 38kb. (4gb 2vcpus, 4 validators, 2 regular nodes) Deploying smart contracts at the public state works perfectly fine. Once we deploy de same smart contract, and do the same transactions on the privacy group, and private state level, performance bottlenecks appears, increasing the heap consumption for one single rpc call ( not tx ) to 3GB. Added to rocks db thread blocked traces Having similar issues in the past with public state, and having reported rocks db performance issues in the past(https://pegasys1.atlassian.net/browse/PAN-3245?atlOrigin=eyJpIjoiYTUxYTI2MDQ3MTZkNDY2NGIwZTNjZTU4MjcxNmFlMWEiLCJwIjoiaiJ9), having known that private state has no log bloom cache, our guess and feeling, is that: - Private state performance for complex SC and transactions needs to be tuned - Root cause could be state read at rocks db level, and no cache existence Can you help us, give support on this? Does the new tessera based implementation focus on this perfomance, cache topic? Kind regards Genesis File { "config": { "chainId": 2021, "muirglacierblock": 0, "ibft2": { "blockperiodseconds": 1, "epochlength": 30000, "requesttimeoutseconds": 2 }, "contractSizeLimit": 2147483647, "evmStackSize": 4096 }, "nonce": "0x0", "gasLimit": "0x1fffffffffffff", "difficulty": "0x1", "timestamp": "0x58ee40ba", "extraData": ---

Besu + Private transaction manager Performance problems HI At @iobuilders we are working with several clients, including Allfunds (on their custom transaction manager). On out latest smart contract set, we are using structs as params, return value, arrays etc. with the new abiencoderv2 We use pragma solidity ^0.7.5; pragma experimental ABIEncoderV2; We use a standard hyperledger besu network, with maxContractSize to 48k, because our main contract are around 38kb. (4gb 2vcpus, 4 validators, 2 regular nodes) Deploying smart contracts at the public state works perfectly fine. Once we deploy de same smart contract, and do the same transactions on the privacy group, and private state level, performance bottlenecks appears, increasing the heap consumption for one single rpc call ( not tx ) to 3GB. Added to rocks db thread blocked traces Having similar issues in the past with public state, and having reported rocks db performance issues in the past(https://pegasys1.atlassian.net/browse/PAN-3245?atlOrigin=eyJpIjoiYTUxYTI2MDQ3MTZkNDY2NGIwZTNjZTU4MjcxNmFlMWEiLCJwIjoiaiJ9), having known that private state has no log bloom cache, our guess and feeling, is that: - Private state performance for complex SC and transactions needs to be tuned - Root cause could be state read at rocks db level, and no cache existence Can you help us, give support on this? Does the new tessera based implementation focus on this perfomance, cache topic? Kind regards Genesis File { "config": { "chainId": 2021, "muirglacierblock": 0, "ibft2": { "blockperiodseconds": 1, "epochlength": 30000, "requesttimeoutseconds": 2 }, "contractSizeLimit": 2147483647, "evmStackSize": 4096 }, "nonce": "0x0", "gasLimit": "0x1fffffffffffff", "difficulty": "0x1", "timestamp": "0x58ee40ba", "extraData": ---

Yes

Privacy bug fix

https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2385

[Discussion] Private Genesis State

### Description As a user of unrestricted privacy, I want to be able to specify the initial genesis state for private transactions. There are a couple of options on how to implement this: 1. separate private genesis config e.g `private-genesis.json` 2. add an option into genesis.config e.g ```json "alloc": { "0x0ffd23af8eebc60b3cfdeed6f814988757237314": { "private": true, "code": "0x6080...", } } ```

[Discussion] Private Genesis State ### Description As a user of unrestricted privacy, I want to be able to specify the initial genesis state for private transactions. There are a couple of options on how to implement this: 1. separate private genesis config e.g `private-genesis.json` 2. add an option into genesis.config e.g ```json "alloc": { "0x0ffd23af8eebc60b3cfdeed6f814988757237314": { "private": true, "code": "0x6080...", } } ```

Yes

Privacy bug fix

https://api.github.com/repos/pymedphys/pymedphys/issues/1534

Unexpose pseudonymise

Hopefully just a temporary measure to address https://github.com/pymedphys/pymedphys/issues/1455

Unexpose pseudonymise Hopefully just a temporary measure to address https://github.com/pymedphys/pymedphys/issues/1455

Yes

Privacy feature

https://api.github.com/repos/nextcloud/server/issues/27192

Block Federated Learning of Cohorts (FLoC)

A new technology is currently being rolled out to browsers to replace third party tracking cookies. This technology is named Federated Learning of Cohorts (FLoC) and you can read more about it [here](https://github.com/WICG/floc) and [here](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/03/googles-floc-terrible-idea).

Block Federated Learning of Cohorts (FLoC) A new technology is currently being rolled out to browsers to replace third party tracking cookies. This technology is named Federated Learning of Cohorts (FLoC) and you can read more about it [here](https://github.com/WICG/floc) and [here](https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2021/03/googles-floc-terrible-idea).

Yes

Privacy feature

https://api.github.com/repos/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/issues/646

Policy Requirements

This pull request is written to fulfill the needs of the discussions started in Issue #608 around agencies expressing data sharing requirements more clearly. ## Explain pull request This would add a new endpoint Requirements under the Policy API that allows agencies to digitally express only the data they need for their jurisdiction and operating permit. ## Is this a breaking change * No, not breaking ## Impacted Spec Which spec(s) will this pull request impact? * `policy` ## Additional context The initial PR is a draft that will require feedback and edits from the MDS community before becoming part of the release, including external guidance documents and a new OMF repo to host requirement files for some agencies.

Policy Requirements This pull request is written to fulfill the needs of the discussions started in Issue #608 around agencies expressing data sharing requirements more clearly. ## Explain pull request This would add a new endpoint Requirements under the Policy API that allows agencies to digitally express only the data they need for their jurisdiction and operating permit. ## Is this a breaking change * No, not breaking ## Impacted Spec Which spec(s) will this pull request impact? * `policy` ## Additional context The initial PR is a draft that will require feedback and edits from the MDS community before becoming part of the release, including external guidance documents and a new OMF repo to host requirement files for some agencies.

Yes

Privacy feature

https://api.github.com/repos/infoderm/patients/issues/276

Warn when multiple tabs edit the same patient or consultation

Should be generic enough that it can be extended to anything. A robust idea would be to have a editing collection that keeps track of `{userId, itemCollection, itemId}`. This would allow anybody to see what others are editing. Should evaluate whether this is OK as long as itemCollection and itemId do not leak any information other than an editing histogram. This would also allow to display a list of items currently open for edition. An extension of this idea would be to enforce `{itemCollection, itemId, owner}` constraints when querying this new collection. Maybe it would be better to implement a proper permissions system. A scalable solution is again a similar idea as above where we store either `{userId, permission, itemCollection, itemId}` or `{userId, read, write, itemCollection, itemId}` if the only permissions are `read` and `write`. These solutions seems nice since we will mostly run permission testing code on the server. The only occasions where we might need testing on the client is for UX considerations (like hiding an edit button). With the first solution we would query `find({userId: this.userId, permission: 'write'})` and the second solution `find({userId: this.userId, write: 'true'})` with appropriate indices for uniqueness and search performance. NOTE: should write imply read?

Warn when multiple tabs edit the same patient or consultation Should be generic enough that it can be extended to anything. A robust idea would be to have a editing collection that keeps track of `{userId, itemCollection, itemId}`. This would allow anybody to see what others are editing. Should evaluate whether this is OK as long as itemCollection and itemId do not leak any information other than an editing histogram. This would also allow to display a list of items currently open for edition. An extension of this idea would be to enforce `{itemCollection, itemId, owner}` constraints when querying this new collection. Maybe it would be better to implement a proper permissions system. A scalable solution is again a similar idea as above where we store either `{userId, permission, itemCollection, itemId}` or `{userId, read, write, itemCollection, itemId}` if the only permissions are `read` and `write`. These solutions seems nice since we will mostly run permission testing code on the server. The only occasions where we might need testing on the client is for UX considerations (like hiding an edit button). With the first solution we would query `find({userId: this.userId, permission: 'write'})` and the second solution `find({userId: this.userId, write: 'true'})` with appropriate indices for uniqueness and search performance. NOTE: should write imply read?

No

General feature

https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/17405

element-web runs offsite javascript from vector.im and riot.im

app = element-web version = 1.7.28 When using a selfhosted element talking to a sellfhosted server, enabling the Spaces feature establishes connections to `vector.im`, and when trying to view a jitsi video call inline fails with a "JavaScript is disabled. For this site to work you have to enable JavaScript." error when JS is permitted on the selfhosting domain but denied on others (and it shows it's trying to exec remote javascript from `riot.im` and `vector.im` domains). What's the point of having both a server app and a client app that can be selfhosted if it has to phone home to the developers to download remote executable code from an untrusted server to work right?

element-web runs offsite javascript from vector.im and riot.im app = element-web version = 1.7.28 When using a selfhosted element talking to a sellfhosted server, enabling the Spaces feature establishes connections to `vector.im`, and when trying to view a jitsi video call inline fails with a "JavaScript is disabled. For this site to work you have to enable JavaScript." error when JS is permitted on the selfhosting domain but denied on others (and it shows it's trying to exec remote javascript from `riot.im` and `vector.im` domains). What's the point of having both a server app and a client app that can be selfhosted if it has to phone home to the developers to download remote executable code from an untrusted server to work right?

No

Bug fix

https://api.github.com/repos/ivpn/ios-app/issues/146

As a user, I want to toggle Kill Switch

### Description: Implement rule that forces system to send all network traffic over the tunnel.

As a user, I want to toggle Kill Switch ### Description: Implement rule that forces system to send all network traffic over the tunnel.

Yes

Sending network traffic over a tunnel in order to hide it

https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2268

PrivateTransactionReceipt.toString() prints misleading info

PrivateTransactionReceipt.toString() is missing info eg https://app.circleci.com/pipelines/github/hyperledger/besu/8743/workflows/acf097ba-2e00-4288-9c38-5c26aedbc9f1/jobs/44907 ``` Expecting: <TransactionReceipt{transactionHash='null', transactionIndex='0x0', blockHash='0x52b77d062ce62d477869ae4431cf5cbbcbc52e3dfde1b624182a0c91c94aad99', blockNumber='0x10', cumulativeGasUsed='null', gasUsed='null', contractAddress='null', root='null', status='null', from='null', to='null', logs=null, logsBloom='0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000', revertReason='null'}> to be equal to: <TransactionReceipt{transactionHash='null', transactionIndex='null', blockHash='null', blockNumber='null', cumulativeGasUsed='null', gasUsed='null', contractAddress='null', root='null', status='null', from='null', to='null', logs=null, logsBloom='null', revertReason='null'}> when recursively comparing field by field, but found the following difference: ``` eg field from - toString() is implemented on superclass TransactionReceipt but PrivateTransactionReceipt also has a private final String from;

PrivateTransactionReceipt.toString() prints misleading info PrivateTransactionReceipt.toString() is missing info eg https://app.circleci.com/pipelines/github/hyperledger/besu/8743/workflows/acf097ba-2e00-4288-9c38-5c26aedbc9f1/jobs/44907 ``` Expecting: <TransactionReceipt{transactionHash='null', transactionIndex='0x0', blockHash='0x52b77d062ce62d477869ae4431cf5cbbcbc52e3dfde1b624182a0c91c94aad99', blockNumber='0x10', cumulativeGasUsed='null', gasUsed='null', contractAddress='null', root='null', status='null', from='null', to='null', logs=null, logsBloom='0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000', revertReason='null'}> to be equal to: <TransactionReceipt{transactionHash='null', transactionIndex='null', blockHash='null', blockNumber='null', cumulativeGasUsed='null', gasUsed='null', contractAddress='null', root='null', status='null', from='null', to='null', logs=null, logsBloom='null', revertReason='null'}> when recursively comparing field by field, but found the following difference: ``` eg field from - toString() is implemented on superclass TransactionReceipt but PrivateTransactionReceipt also has a private final String from;

No

Cannot relate to privacy

https://api.github.com/repos/sgibson91/open-practices-toolkit/issues/15

Informed consent

### Summary Collate together a document such that participants can provide informed consent to the interview

Informed consent ### Summary Collate together a document such that participants can provide informed consent to the interview

Yes

Privacy feature

https://api.github.com/repos/sgibson91/open-practices-toolkit/issues/11

Recording (Zoom) interviews

### Summary Interviews will be conducted over Zoom and will be recorded. These will be saved locally, **not** to the cloud. Once the recordings have been combined with the automated transcription #10 and anonymised, the recordings will be deleted.

Recording (Zoom) interviews ### Summary Interviews will be conducted over Zoom and will be recorded. These will be saved locally, **not** to the cloud. Once the recordings have been combined with the automated transcription #10 and anonymised, the recordings will be deleted.

Yes

Interview recordings not to be saved to the cloud

https://api.github.com/repos/sgibson91/open-practices-toolkit/issues/10

Automated transcription

### Summary Draft transcriptions will be generated using an automated tool such as otter.ai. These will be saved locally and not live-streamed anywhere. Once the automated transcription has been corrected/updated (with the help of the zoom recordings #11 ) and anonymised, the automatically generated transcriptions will be deleted.

Automated transcription ### Summary Draft transcriptions will be generated using an automated tool such as otter.ai. These will be saved locally and not live-streamed anywhere. Once the automated transcription has been corrected/updated (with the help of the zoom recordings #11 ) and anonymised, the automatically generated transcriptions will be deleted.

Yes

Transciptions to be saved only locally

https://api.github.com/repos/sgibson91/open-practices-toolkit/issues/9

Storage of ephemeral results

### Summary - Local downloads preferred over cloud recording.

Storage of ephemeral results ### Summary - Local downloads preferred over cloud recording.

Yes

Local saving instead of cloud

https://api.github.com/repos/sgibson91/open-practices-toolkit/issues/8

Collating transcriptions

### Summary - Full transcripts should be generated by combining outputs of the automatically generated transcriptions #10 and interview recordings #11 - These transcripts should then be anonymised - Remove/redact any specific mention of names, programmes and teams - Modify/reword quotes to anonymise further

Collating transcriptions ### Summary - Full transcripts should be generated by combining outputs of the automatically generated transcriptions #10 and interview recordings #11 - These transcripts should then be anonymised - Remove/redact any specific mention of names, programmes and teams - Modify/reword quotes to anonymise further

Yes

Transciptions to be anonimized

https://api.github.com/repos/sgibson91/open-practices-toolkit/issues/6

Long-term storage/sharing of transcriptions

### Summary Long(er)-term storage of the aggregated transcripts #8 should be hosted on the Turing's Sharepoint. This has been vetted for security by the Turing's IT department and has configurable access control (for new researchers joining the project etc.)

Long-term storage/sharing of transcriptions ### Summary Long(er)-term storage of the aggregated transcripts #8 should be hosted on the Turing's Sharepoint. This has been vetted for security by the Turing's IT department and has configurable access control (for new researchers joining the project etc.)

Yes

Transcriptions storage

https://api.github.com/repos/sgibson91/open-practices-toolkit/issues/2

Write a Data Management Plan

### Summary Write a data management plan which will outline the safe storage, access, and reusability of the interview transcripts https://dmponline.dcc.ac.uk/public_plans <-- Check for public DMPs from Yo

Write a Data Management Plan ### Summary Write a data management plan which will outline the safe storage, access, and reusability of the interview transcripts https://dmponline.dcc.ac.uk/public_plans <-- Check for public DMPs from Yo

Yes

Data retention policies

https://api.github.com/repos/sgibson91/open-practices-toolkit/issues/1

Write a Data Management Plan

### Summary Write a data management plan which will outline the safe storage, access, and reusability of the interview transcripts https://dmponline.dcc.ac.uk/public_plans <-- Check for public DMPs from Yo

Write a Data Management Plan ### Summary Write a data management plan which will outline the safe storage, access, and reusability of the interview transcripts https://dmponline.dcc.ac.uk/public_plans <-- Check for public DMPs from Yo

Yes

Data retention policies

https://api.github.com/repos/DataDog/browser-sdk/issues/823

Automatic metadata scrubbing

There's currently no automatic/manual way to instruct the SDK to scrub potentially sensitive properties. ```javascript import { datadogLogs } from '@datadog/browser-logs' datadogLogs.logger.info('Button clicked', { name: 'buttonName', id: 123, password: 'myPlainTextPassword' }) ``` Would it be possible to add a configuration or do it even automatically similar to e.g. Rollbar? https://docs.rollbar.com/docs/rollbarjs-configuration-reference ``` Default scrubbed fields for servers: ["pw", "pass", "passwd", "password", "password_confirmation", "passwordConfirmation", "confirm_password", "confirmPassword", "secret", "secret_token", "secretToken", "secret_key", "secretKey", "api_key", "access_token", "accessToken", "authenticity_token", "oauth_token", "token", "user_session_secret", "request.session.csrf", "request.session._csrf", "request.params._csrf", "request.cookie", "request.cookies"] Default scrubbed fields for browsers: ["pw", "pass", "passwd", "password", "secret", "confirm_password", "confirmPassword", "password_confirmation", "passwordConfirmation", "access_token", "accessToken", "secret_key", "secretKey", "secretToken", "cc-number", "card number", "cardnumber", "cardnum", "ccnum", "ccnumber", "cc num", "creditcardnumber", "credit card number", "newcreditcardnumber", "new credit card", "creditcardno", "credit card no", "card#", "card #", "cc-csc", "cvc2", "cvv2", "ccv2", "security code", "card verification", "name on credit card", "name on card", "nameoncard", "cardholder", "card holder", "name des karteninhabers", "card type", "cardtype", "cc type", "cctype", "payment type", "expiration date", "expirationdate", "expdate", "cc-exp"] ``` This could be extended to the existing scrubbable properties as well: https://docs.datadoghq.com/real_user_monitoring/browser/advanced_configuration/?tab=npm#scrub-sensitive-data-from-your-rum-data so that emails, passwords, tokens will be automatically scrubbed from `urls`, error stacks, etc.

Automatic metadata scrubbing There's currently no automatic/manual way to instruct the SDK to scrub potentially sensitive properties. ```javascript import { datadogLogs } from '@datadog/browser-logs' datadogLogs.logger.info('Button clicked', { name: 'buttonName', id: 123, password: 'myPlainTextPassword' }) ``` Would it be possible to add a configuration or do it even automatically similar to e.g. Rollbar? https://docs.rollbar.com/docs/rollbarjs-configuration-reference ``` Default scrubbed fields for servers: ["pw", "pass", "passwd", "password", "password_confirmation", "passwordConfirmation", "confirm_password", "confirmPassword", "secret", "secret_token", "secretToken", "secret_key", "secretKey", "api_key", "access_token", "accessToken", "authenticity_token", "oauth_token", "token", "user_session_secret", "request.session.csrf", "request.session._csrf", "request.params._csrf", "request.cookie", "request.cookies"] Default scrubbed fields for browsers: ["pw", "pass", "passwd", "password", "secret", "confirm_password", "confirmPassword", "password_confirmation", "passwordConfirmation", "access_token", "accessToken", "secret_key", "secretKey", "secretToken", "cc-number", "card number", "cardnumber", "cardnum", "ccnum", "ccnumber", "cc num", "creditcardnumber", "credit card number", "newcreditcardnumber", "new credit card", "creditcardno", "credit card no", "card#", "card #", "cc-csc", "cvc2", "cvv2", "ccv2", "security code", "card verification", "name on credit card", "name on card", "nameoncard", "cardholder", "card holder", "name des karteninhabers", "card type", "cardtype", "cc type", "cctype", "payment type", "expiration date", "expirationdate", "expdate", "cc-exp"] ``` This could be extended to the existing scrubbable properties as well: https://docs.datadoghq.com/real_user_monitoring/browser/advanced_configuration/?tab=npm#scrub-sensitive-data-from-your-rum-data so that emails, passwords, tokens will be automatically scrubbed from `urls`, error stacks, etc.

Yes

Scrubbing sensitive data

https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2198

private state bug: invalid block

297 and 309 (ATs using single contracts) succeed 298/307/308 (ATs using multiple contracts) end up with invalid block (state mismatch) ``` 2021-04-28 14:51:29.884+10:00 | vert.x-worker-thread-2 | DEBUG | JsonRpcHttpService | JSON-RPC request -> eth_getTransactionReceipt 2021-04-28 14:51:30.011+10:00 | pool-8-thread-1 | DEBUG | IbftRound | Received a proposal message. round=ConsensusRoundIdentifier{Sequence=214, Round=0} 2021-04-28 14:51:30.029+10:00 | pool-8-thread-1 | WARN | MainnetBlockBodyValidator | Invalid block: state root mismatch (expected=0x36059c0c152ecd69a19d92c9d8986c1306a63307e4befa9ceb32fcef38224271, actual=0xd6bf6eb0fa4ef33b07a691396dd60533eeadc714b4030ec0970a9497b3855b37 ) 2021-04-28 14:51:30.030+10:00 | pool-8-thread-1 | WARN | MainnetBlockBodyValidator | Invalid block RLP : 0xf90320f90277a07b79a5f4d6cb42658ecb843f1b90a2f159e67afe7f63cec697fdd1bb454f8e25a01dcc4de8dec75d7aab85b567b6ccd41ad312451b948a7413f0a142fd40d4934794545bbfad3764a1ca38 e095fbc76bcbfb02bb70e3a036059c0c152ecd69a19d92c9d8986c1306a63307e4befa9ceb32fcef38224271a0c6e4bfbeed9c706f34239d63a939ba5af20c2a962f53c7e88fa140bd37724ae0a0b64408da6b8fe39ab764af88ece1e8cca1c35fd988db57806e99138c629365a0b901000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000181d684ffffff0080846088e9d2b880f87ea00000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000f85494068b5905cc03cba91efb5289fced160d98e75108940f8b0ab1c6e605d3e4558bca571e3b3f4e7e5ae794545bbfad3764a1ca38e095fbc76bcbfb02bb70e394e5f20844e7071ca28198a48de5375583e07e3d33808400000000c0a063746963616c2062797a616e74696e65206661756c7420746f6c6572616e 6365880000000000000000f8a3f8a10a808347b7609480bd481146703bb1ddb67a8184c34c84ee91f9df80b840c71fc33f39d19cf50c85f08246808c7b08a580313fb48567066fc6541855e3147401a4a618a6aa25835e62c30eb93ab6fd8cd7343b1207c4374c784b6f6f4b1725a0b5474018126a3705e24023ca494f9f505fe96dca743bb524a1 849d61741b1893a00606c50afc6a8570416c207afde4e778c898d5f49566e1e0cf641b21c7fa9bc4c0 2021-04-28 14:51:30.034+10:00 | pool-8-thread-1 | WARN | MainnetBlockBodyValidator | Transaction receipt found in the invalid block TransactionReceipt{stateRoot=null, cumulativeGasUsed=0, logs=[], bloomFilter=0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000, status=1, transactionReceiptType=STATUS} 2021-04-28 14:51:30.034+10:00 | pool-8-thread-1 | INFO | MessageValidator | Invalid Proposal message, block did not pass validation. ```

private state bug: invalid block 297 and 309 (ATs using single contracts) succeed 298/307/308 (ATs using multiple contracts) end up with invalid block (state mismatch) ``` 2021-04-28 14:51:29.884+10:00 | vert.x-worker-thread-2 | DEBUG | JsonRpcHttpService | JSON-RPC request -> eth_getTransactionReceipt 2021-04-28 14:51:30.011+10:00 | pool-8-thread-1 | DEBUG | IbftRound | Received a proposal message. round=ConsensusRoundIdentifier{Sequence=214, Round=0} 2021-04-28 14:51:30.029+10:00 | pool-8-thread-1 | WARN | MainnetBlockBodyValidator | Invalid block: state root mismatch (expected=0x36059c0c152ecd69a19d92c9d8986c1306a63307e4befa9ceb32fcef38224271, actual=0xd6bf6eb0fa4ef33b07a691396dd60533eeadc714b4030ec0970a9497b3855b37 ) 2021-04-28 14:51:30.030+10:00 | pool-8-thread-1 | WARN | MainnetBlockBodyValidator | Invalid block RLP : 0xf90320f90277a07b79a5f4d6cb42658ecb843f1b90a2f159e67afe7f63cec697fdd1bb454f8e25a01dcc4de8dec75d7aab85b567b6ccd41ad312451b948a7413f0a142fd40d4934794545bbfad3764a1ca38 e095fbc76bcbfb02bb70e3a036059c0c152ecd69a19d92c9d8986c1306a63307e4befa9ceb32fcef38224271a0c6e4bfbeed9c706f34239d63a939ba5af20c2a962f53c7e88fa140bd37724ae0a0b64408da6b8fe39ab764af88ece1e8cca1c35fd988db57806e99138c629365a0b901000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000181d684ffffff0080846088e9d2b880f87ea00000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000f85494068b5905cc03cba91efb5289fced160d98e75108940f8b0ab1c6e605d3e4558bca571e3b3f4e7e5ae794545bbfad3764a1ca38e095fbc76bcbfb02bb70e394e5f20844e7071ca28198a48de5375583e07e3d33808400000000c0a063746963616c2062797a616e74696e65206661756c7420746f6c6572616e 6365880000000000000000f8a3f8a10a808347b7609480bd481146703bb1ddb67a8184c34c84ee91f9df80b840c71fc33f39d19cf50c85f08246808c7b08a580313fb48567066fc6541855e3147401a4a618a6aa25835e62c30eb93ab6fd8cd7343b1207c4374c784b6f6f4b1725a0b5474018126a3705e24023ca494f9f505fe96dca743bb524a1 849d61741b1893a00606c50afc6a8570416c207afde4e778c898d5f49566e1e0cf641b21c7fa9bc4c0 2021-04-28 14:51:30.034+10:00 | pool-8-thread-1 | WARN | MainnetBlockBodyValidator | Transaction receipt found in the invalid block TransactionReceipt{stateRoot=null, cumulativeGasUsed=0, logs=[], bloomFilter=0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000, status=1, transactionReceiptType=STATUS} 2021-04-28 14:51:30.034+10:00 | pool-8-thread-1 | INFO | MessageValidator | Invalid Proposal message, block did not pass validation. ```

No

Cannot relate to privacy

https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2191

Flaky test: PrivDebugGetStateRootOnchainGroupAcceptanceTest

April 16 failure: `org.hyperledger.besu.tests.acceptance.privacy.PrivDebugGetStateRootOnchainGroupAcceptanceTest > blockParamShouldBeApplied FAILED` and `org.hyperledger.besu.tests.acceptance.privacy.PrivDebugGetStateRootOnchainGroupAcceptanceTest > nodesInGroupShouldHaveSameStateRoot FAILED` Have just failed on a Circle CI build https://app.circleci.com/pipelines/github/hyperledger/besu/8277/workflows/81e00426-bd7d-418d-b158-cf9f0ff1d809/jobs/41843 Failed again yesterday: https://app.circleci.com/pipelines/github/hyperledger/besu/8453/workflows/44ac2e16-9568-4c80-8edf-d301eeee1b14/jobs/43042 The failure is because the tx receipt is not populated ``` Expecting: <TransactionReceipt{transactionHash='null', transactionIndex='0x0', blockHash='0x3cf5c7abf7c052974f3479e1831a4731a1ac47c4af5fa49457aae37b9e9fc3e2', blockNumber='0x29', cumulativeGasUsed='null', gasUsed='null', contractAddress='null', root='null', status='null', from='null', to='null', logs=null, logsBloom='0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000', revertReason='null'}> to be equal to: <TransactionReceipt{transactionHash='null', transactionIndex='null', blockHash='null', blockNumber='null', cumulativeGasUsed='null', gasUsed='null', contractAddress='null', root='null', status='null', from='null', to='null', logs=null, logsBloom='null', revertReason='null'}> when recursively comparing field by field, but found the following difference: field/property 'from' differ: - actual value : "0xfe3b557e8fb62b89f4916b721be55ceb828dbd73" - expected value : "0x91240f5b6994c7ed80f9f94b1aa847880ad3b150" ```

Flaky test: PrivDebugGetStateRootOnchainGroupAcceptanceTest April 16 failure: `org.hyperledger.besu.tests.acceptance.privacy.PrivDebugGetStateRootOnchainGroupAcceptanceTest > blockParamShouldBeApplied FAILED` and `org.hyperledger.besu.tests.acceptance.privacy.PrivDebugGetStateRootOnchainGroupAcceptanceTest > nodesInGroupShouldHaveSameStateRoot FAILED` Have just failed on a Circle CI build https://app.circleci.com/pipelines/github/hyperledger/besu/8277/workflows/81e00426-bd7d-418d-b158-cf9f0ff1d809/jobs/41843 Failed again yesterday: https://app.circleci.com/pipelines/github/hyperledger/besu/8453/workflows/44ac2e16-9568-4c80-8edf-d301eeee1b14/jobs/43042 The failure is because the tx receipt is not populated ``` Expecting: <TransactionReceipt{transactionHash='null', transactionIndex='0x0', blockHash='0x3cf5c7abf7c052974f3479e1831a4731a1ac47c4af5fa49457aae37b9e9fc3e2', blockNumber='0x29', cumulativeGasUsed='null', gasUsed='null', contractAddress='null', root='null', status='null', from='null', to='null', logs=null, logsBloom='0x00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000', revertReason='null'}> to be equal to: <TransactionReceipt{transactionHash='null', transactionIndex='null', blockHash='null', blockNumber='null', cumulativeGasUsed='null', gasUsed='null', contractAddress='null', root='null', status='null', from='null', to='null', logs=null, logsBloom='null', revertReason='null'}> when recursively comparing field by field, but found the following difference: field/property 'from' differ: - actual value : "0xfe3b557e8fb62b89f4916b721be55ceb828dbd73" - expected value : "0x91240f5b6994c7ed80f9f94b1aa847880ad3b150" ```

No

Bug fix

https://api.github.com/repos/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/issues/640

Carshare Support

### Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe. Background: Ride Report is working with a variety of carshare operators on MDS and is looking to develop the spec to support carshare specific use cases we have identified. **Use Cases:** - **Flexible Rates:** Carshare rentals allow users to rent vehicles by the minute, hour, or by days. Currently, MDS Provider shows vehicle rental per minute and API consumers are unable to differentiate between users who selected per minute pricing vs. per day vs. per hour. - **Fleet Info:** Carshare providers utilize a variety of makes and models of cars. From sedans to SUVs, from ICE vehicles to electric or hybrid powertrains. All the vehicles have different cargo and passenger capacities. It would be helpful to get a snapshot of a providers fleet mix breakdown, to evaluate the type of vehicles people are utilizing. - **Service Area Exit:** The carshare mode inherently offers shared mobility users flexibility to take different length (distance, duration) trips. It would be helpful to get some sort of data about a trip when it exits the service area in privacy preserving manner. Are cars going far away? Are cars going out of the larger metro area? Are cars going out-of-state? - **Vehicle Idle Time:** Cars sit idle and take up a substantial amount of space. Cities would like to know how long cars sit idle on the PROW for a variety of reasons: to understand utilization, pricing, loss parking revenue, etc. With MDS Provider we can measure how long a vehicle is sitting based on the `unavailable` vehicle state, however with carshare a user can rent a vehicle for up to a week at a time and there is no state representing a reserved vehicle that is parked. - **Other Vehicle Data:** Odometer data to aid in accuracy of trip metrics and routing. - **Policy:** new Policy capabilities that are specific to car share, like parking parking Policy that refers to specific signage (i.e. 2hr zones) instead of just geofences. ### Describe the solution you'd like TBD, We are working on a more formal technical proposal. ### Is this a breaking change * I'm not sure, but this will become more clear as we determine the technical solution. ### Impacted Spec For which spec is this feature being requested? * `provider` * `policy`

Carshare Support ### Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe. Background: Ride Report is working with a variety of carshare operators on MDS and is looking to develop the spec to support carshare specific use cases we have identified. **Use Cases:** - **Flexible Rates:** Carshare rentals allow users to rent vehicles by the minute, hour, or by days. Currently, MDS Provider shows vehicle rental per minute and API consumers are unable to differentiate between users who selected per minute pricing vs. per day vs. per hour. - **Fleet Info:** Carshare providers utilize a variety of makes and models of cars. From sedans to SUVs, from ICE vehicles to electric or hybrid powertrains. All the vehicles have different cargo and passenger capacities. It would be helpful to get a snapshot of a providers fleet mix breakdown, to evaluate the type of vehicles people are utilizing. - **Service Area Exit:** The carshare mode inherently offers shared mobility users flexibility to take different length (distance, duration) trips. It would be helpful to get some sort of data about a trip when it exits the service area in privacy preserving manner. Are cars going far away? Are cars going out of the larger metro area? Are cars going out-of-state? - **Vehicle Idle Time:** Cars sit idle and take up a substantial amount of space. Cities would like to know how long cars sit idle on the PROW for a variety of reasons: to understand utilization, pricing, loss parking revenue, etc. With MDS Provider we can measure how long a vehicle is sitting based on the `unavailable` vehicle state, however with carshare a user can rent a vehicle for up to a week at a time and there is no state representing a reserved vehicle that is parked. - **Other Vehicle Data:** Odometer data to aid in accuracy of trip metrics and routing. - **Policy:** new Policy capabilities that are specific to car share, like parking parking Policy that refers to specific signage (i.e. 2hr zones) instead of just geofences. ### Describe the solution you'd like TBD, We are working on a more formal technical proposal. ### Is this a breaking change * I'm not sure, but this will become more clear as we determine the technical solution. ### Impacted Spec For which spec is this feature being requested? * `provider` * `policy`

No

General feature

https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/10151

Disable Googles FLoC

Please disable Googles Federated Learning of Cohorts (FLoC) by adding `Permissions-Policy: interest-cohort=()` to the header files. See e.g. https://cleanuptheweb.org/ for some more information.

Disable Googles FLoC Please disable Googles Federated Learning of Cohorts (FLoC) by adding `Permissions-Policy: interest-cohort=()` to the header files. See e.g. https://cleanuptheweb.org/ for some more information.

Yes

Permisions

https://api.github.com/repos/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/1080

Provide a default privacy statement and end-user agreement

**Describe the bug** We added components for a privacy statement and end-user agreement in #862. However, currently they contain filler, lorem ipsum text. Before 7.0 we should preferably replace that filler text with a good default for both documents, or if we can't do that, disable the components by default. **To Reproduce** Click the privacy policy or end-user agreement links in the footer. **Expected behavior** Out of the box, DSpace should not show any filler text that has to be replaced in order to be usable. **Related work** https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/pull/862 https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/736 https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/issues/2808

Provide a default privacy statement and end-user agreement **Describe the bug** We added components for a privacy statement and end-user agreement in #862. However, currently they contain filler, lorem ipsum text. Before 7.0 we should preferably replace that filler text with a good default for both documents, or if we can't do that, disable the components by default. **To Reproduce** Click the privacy policy or end-user agreement links in the footer. **Expected behavior** Out of the box, DSpace should not show any filler text that has to be replaced in order to be usable. **Related work** https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/pull/862 https://github.com/DSpace/dspace-angular/issues/736 https://github.com/DSpace/DSpace/issues/2808

Yes

Privacy policy

https://api.github.com/repos/vladimiry/ElectronMail/issues/387

Improve unread messages notification format

It would be great to have the unread messages notification that pops up whenever there's a new mail to: - actually show the subject line and either the sender or a preview of that mail (instead of "x unread messages") - automatically open/expand the mail when clicked (instead of just displaying the inbox) That way one won't have to neccessarily click the notification to know what the mail is about.

Improve unread messages notification format It would be great to have the unread messages notification that pops up whenever there's a new mail to: - actually show the subject line and either the sender or a preview of that mail (instead of "x unread messages") - automatically open/expand the mail when clicked (instead of just displaying the inbox) That way one won't have to neccessarily click the notification to know what the mail is about.

No

General feature

https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2081

legacy privacy groups are created with duplicate members

This might be an issue with Besu, or with Orion, Running the web3js-eea/concurrentPrivateTransactions - a privacy group is created with "one" member but they are in there twice - privateFrom = privateFor ``` // options used to create a privacy group with only one member const privacyOptions = { privateFrom: orion.node1.publicKey, privateFor: [orion.node1.publicKey], privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey }; ``` as in, if I run it with Besu/Orion, and then do ``` { "jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "priv_findPrivacyGroup", "params": [ [ "GGilEkXLaQ9yhhtbpBT03Me9iYa7U/mWXxrJhnbl1XY=" ] ], "id": 1 } ``` the result is a privacy group with the same member in there twice ``` { "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "result": [ { "privacyGroupId": "MC4aHjApHsGb0j5glU2iAj5KcR5LId52S0BU9mtdeuY=", "name": "legacy", "description": "Privacy groups to support the creation of groups by privateFor and privateFrom", "type": "LEGACY", "members": [ "GGilEkXLaQ9yhhtbpBT03Me9iYa7U/mWXxrJhnbl1XY=", "GGilEkXLaQ9yhhtbpBT03Me9iYa7U/mWXxrJhnbl1XY=" ] } ] } ```

legacy privacy groups are created with duplicate members This might be an issue with Besu, or with Orion, Running the web3js-eea/concurrentPrivateTransactions - a privacy group is created with "one" member but they are in there twice - privateFrom = privateFor ``` // options used to create a privacy group with only one member const privacyOptions = { privateFrom: orion.node1.publicKey, privateFor: [orion.node1.publicKey], privateKey: besu.node1.privateKey }; ``` as in, if I run it with Besu/Orion, and then do ``` { "jsonrpc": "2.0", "method": "priv_findPrivacyGroup", "params": [ [ "GGilEkXLaQ9yhhtbpBT03Me9iYa7U/mWXxrJhnbl1XY=" ] ], "id": 1 } ``` the result is a privacy group with the same member in there twice ``` { "jsonrpc": "2.0", "id": 1, "result": [ { "privacyGroupId": "MC4aHjApHsGb0j5glU2iAj5KcR5LId52S0BU9mtdeuY=", "name": "legacy", "description": "Privacy groups to support the creation of groups by privateFor and privateFrom", "type": "LEGACY", "members": [ "GGilEkXLaQ9yhhtbpBT03Me9iYa7U/mWXxrJhnbl1XY=", "GGilEkXLaQ9yhhtbpBT03Me9iYa7U/mWXxrJhnbl1XY=" ] } ] } ```

Yes

Privacy feature

https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/2046

Possible race condition in flexible privacy

When sending a private transaction using flexible privacy the information about the members of the groups and the version of the privacy group is done with two seperate calls to the on-chain management contract. The two calls are both made against the chain head, but if the head changes in between the two calls and the group membership has changed the result would be inconsistent. To fix that we could: - make sure the two calls are happening against the same block (less changes) - return the version of the group and the members from the management contract in one call (more changes incl. management contracts, but makes sure that there cannot be a race condition)

Possible race condition in flexible privacy When sending a private transaction using flexible privacy the information about the members of the groups and the version of the privacy group is done with two seperate calls to the on-chain management contract. The two calls are both made against the chain head, but if the head changes in between the two calls and the group membership has changed the result would be inconsistent. To fix that we could: - make sure the two calls are happening against the same block (less changes) - return the version of the group and the members from the management contract in one call (more changes incl. management contracts, but makes sure that there cannot be a race condition)

Yes

Privacy bug fix

https://api.github.com/repos/Ride-The-Lightning/RTL/issues/631

Plausible Deniability

**Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.** We need a way to protect our node history, like a plausible deniability feature. Like Bluewallet is having, a fake wallet **Describe the solution you'd like** We need a SHTF backup plan. Use cases are many: robbery at gun point, police raid, stealing node from home etc. I also want to hide my LN transactions, I know is not possible to delete them from history, but in some way to not be visible. That wallet history in wrong hands could be dangerous. We need ways to protect that. A simple alternative login, that show up an empty or limited account with no history. Can be even fake data, dummy txs, from testnet.

Plausible Deniability **Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.** We need a way to protect our node history, like a plausible deniability feature. Like Bluewallet is having, a fake wallet **Describe the solution you'd like** We need a SHTF backup plan. Use cases are many: robbery at gun point, police raid, stealing node from home etc. I also want to hide my LN transactions, I know is not possible to delete them from history, but in some way to not be visible. That wallet history in wrong hands could be dangerous. We need ways to protect that. A simple alternative login, that show up an empty or limited account with no history. Can be even fake data, dummy txs, from testnet.

Yes

Privacy feature

https://api.github.com/repos/pymedphys/pymedphys/issues/1455

DICOM Pseudonymisation appears to be reversible in some cases

Not sure if the DICOM Pseudonymisation streamlit function was meant to leave date of birth and gender unchanged, just thought I would mention it as I thought they needed to be replaced also.

DICOM Pseudonymisation appears to be reversible in some cases Not sure if the DICOM Pseudonymisation streamlit function was meant to leave date of birth and gender unchanged, just thought I would mention it as I thought they needed to be replaced also.

Yes

Privacy bug fix

https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/10049

Blocked contacts still able to receive public posts and comment on their node

This is less a bug report than an unpleasant experience report. I've been able to find on their node a comment on one of my public posts from a contact I blocked. After the unpleasant surprise, I realized that, as a public post, it is impossible to limit who can have access to it, but the fact that I was surprised feels like we probably aren't explaining the negative interaction between blocking a contact and public posts correctly. I don't know where to put this particular bit of information, maybe in the permission screen in the "Public" box?

Blocked contacts still able to receive public posts and comment on their node This is less a bug report than an unpleasant experience report. I've been able to find on their node a comment on one of my public posts from a contact I blocked. After the unpleasant surprise, I realized that, as a public post, it is impossible to limit who can have access to it, but the fact that I was surprised feels like we probably aren't explaining the negative interaction between blocking a contact and public posts correctly. I don't know where to put this particular bit of information, maybe in the permission screen in the "Public" box?

Yes

Privacy bug fix

https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/16609

We should have a way to display the list of all the messages we sent since the beginning of times

**Is your suggestion related to a problem? Please describe.** Several countries make it a legal obligation for service providers to let users find out exactly what data is stored from them. Matrix already offers APIs for that (i.e. /sync with filters) but there's no UX for this purpose. Consequently, the only way for end-users to get this information is currently to get in touch with their homeserver admin. I believe that we should add a UX for this. **Describe the solution you'd like** One possibility: somewhere in our "Privacy" tab, we should have an entry, e.g. "See all my messages" that opens a pseudo-room to see all the messages we have sent since the beginning of time (loaded lazily), with the ability to edit/remove them as usual.

We should have a way to display the list of all the messages we sent since the beginning of times **Is your suggestion related to a problem? Please describe.** Several countries make it a legal obligation for service providers to let users find out exactly what data is stored from them. Matrix already offers APIs for that (i.e. /sync with filters) but there's no UX for this purpose. Consequently, the only way for end-users to get this information is currently to get in touch with their homeserver admin. I believe that we should add a UX for this. **Describe the solution you'd like** One possibility: somewhere in our "Privacy" tab, we should have an entry, e.g. "See all my messages" that opens a pseudo-room to see all the messages we have sent since the beginning of time (loaded lazily), with the ability to edit/remove them as usual.

Yes

Privacy feature

https://api.github.com/repos/microsoftgraph/microsoft-graph-explorer-v4/issues/868

Enable Graph Explorer to support sovereign/national clouds

**Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.** A clear and concise description of what the problem is. Ex. I'm always frustrated when [...] **Describe the solution you'd like** A clear and concise description of what you want to happen. **Describe alternatives you've considered** A clear and concise description of any alternative solutions or features you've considered. **Additional context** Add any other context or screenshots about the feature request here. [AB#8314](https://microsoftgraph.visualstudio.com/0985d294-5762-4bc2-a565-161ef349ca3e/_workitems/edit/8314)

Enable Graph Explorer to support sovereign/national clouds **Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.** A clear and concise description of what the problem is. Ex. I'm always frustrated when [...] **Describe the solution you'd like** A clear and concise description of what you want to happen. **Describe alternatives you've considered** A clear and concise description of any alternative solutions or features you've considered. **Additional context** Add any other context or screenshots about the feature request here. [AB#8314](https://microsoftgraph.visualstudio.com/0985d294-5762-4bc2-a565-161ef349ca3e/_workitems/edit/8314)

No

General feature

https://api.github.com/repos/blockonomics/woocommerce-plugin/issues/237

Order id should be encrypted like WHMCS plugin

It may be possible to view other order information by changing order id in order info URLs. We should either encrypt order information or use a separate column in table with a unique id

Order id should be encrypted like WHMCS plugin It may be possible to view other order information by changing order id in order info URLs. We should either encrypt order information or use a separate column in table with a unique id

Yes

Privacy bug fix

https://api.github.com/repos/vladimiry/ElectronMail/issues/375

cannot attach file: file manager Nemo issue in Cinnamon desktop environment

When trying to add attachment and opening the default file manager nemo 4.8.4 in Cinnamon DE 4.8.6, then only Downloads folder is visible and no other folder in $HOME. So, cannot attach file. Only drag-and-drop is the way, how currently we can attach file, using Cinnamon DE and Nemo in Linux Mint 20.1. Actually Desktop choice on navigation bar is visible, but desktop will NOT be opened and actually that Desktop choice on navigation bar cannot be activated. When trying manually via CTRL+L enter location, the window will be closed and no location will be opened. EDIT: looks like even drag-and-drop to attach file doesn't work :( Only via that Downloads folder is currently still possible to attach file.

cannot attach file: file manager Nemo issue in Cinnamon desktop environment When trying to add attachment and opening the default file manager nemo 4.8.4 in Cinnamon DE 4.8.6, then only Downloads folder is visible and no other folder in $HOME. So, cannot attach file. Only drag-and-drop is the way, how currently we can attach file, using Cinnamon DE and Nemo in Linux Mint 20.1. Actually Desktop choice on navigation bar is visible, but desktop will NOT be opened and actually that Desktop choice on navigation bar cannot be activated. When trying manually via CTRL+L enter location, the window will be closed and no location will be opened. EDIT: looks like even drag-and-drop to attach file doesn't work :( Only via that Downloads folder is currently still possible to attach file.

No

Bug fix

https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1942

Nonce of private transaction not incrementing when private transaction reverts

[Raised in RocketChat](https://chat.hyperledger.org/channel/besu?msg=3gsQR3svKFEp5gq4i): Hi community, We have noticed that if a private tx reverts (e.g, when a require condition fails), then the private nonce is not incremented. On the other hand, the public nonce, that of the privacy marker tx, do increment. So my question is: ֲ¿is there any way to change this behaviour, allowing the private nonce to increment? We have found this situation problematic when leading with concurrent private tx, because if tx n fails, then n+1, n+2, etc will also fail. Thank you very much in advance community! - [x] Confirm behaviour is inconsistent with public transaction behaviour - [ ] Document current behaviour as a known issue - [ ] (longer term) If yes, fix. Fix will require a CLI option or preferably something better (something in the database possibly) to not break backwards compatibility. -> this might be support for forks in privacy - and this is also a way to deprecate privacy methods in future

Nonce of private transaction not incrementing when private transaction reverts [Raised in RocketChat](https://chat.hyperledger.org/channel/besu?msg=3gsQR3svKFEp5gq4i): Hi community, We have noticed that if a private tx reverts (e.g, when a require condition fails), then the private nonce is not incremented. On the other hand, the public nonce, that of the privacy marker tx, do increment. So my question is: ֲ¿is there any way to change this behaviour, allowing the private nonce to increment? We have found this situation problematic when leading with concurrent private tx, because if tx n fails, then n+1, n+2, etc will also fail. Thank you very much in advance community! - [x] Confirm behaviour is inconsistent with public transaction behaviour - [ ] Document current behaviour as a known issue - [ ] (longer term) If yes, fix. Fix will require a CLI option or preferably something better (something in the database possibly) to not break backwards compatibility. -> this might be support for forks in privacy - and this is also a way to deprecate privacy methods in future

No

Bug fix

https://api.github.com/repos/NeonGeckoCom/NeonCore/issues/61

feat/libretranslate_detect

- adds libretranslate for language detection - adds support for api_key (optional) in libretranslate translator - makes libretranslate the default engine, its free, can be self hosted, its accurate, supports most common languages and has no additional dependencies I did not realize earlier that there was a language detection option Neon will probably want to distribute keys for the paid options under the system level mycroft.conf , libretranslate should be considered a demo/fallback

feat/libretranslate_detect - adds libretranslate for language detection - adds support for api_key (optional) in libretranslate translator - makes libretranslate the default engine, its free, can be self hosted, its accurate, supports most common languages and has no additional dependencies I did not realize earlier that there was a language detection option Neon will probably want to distribute keys for the paid options under the system level mycroft.conf , libretranslate should be considered a demo/fallback

No

General feature

https://api.github.com/repos/brave/brave-ios/issues/3331

add CI script to check for rewards requests before rewards opt-in

see https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/issues/14278 for details. this issue is to do the equivalent CI testing on iOS.

add CI script to check for rewards requests before rewards opt-in see https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/issues/14278 for details. this issue is to do the equivalent CI testing on iOS.

No

General feature

https://api.github.com/repos/NeonGeckoCom/NeonCore/issues/56

feat/apertium translate

adds the option to use https://www.apertium.org which can be self hosted https://github.com/apertium/apertium

feat/apertium translate adds the option to use https://www.apertium.org which can be self hosted https://github.com/apertium/apertium

No

General feature

https://api.github.com/repos/NeonGeckoCom/NeonCore/issues/55

feat/libretranslate_engine

adds a text translation option for libretranslate, can be self hosted

feat/libretranslate_engine adds a text translation option for libretranslate, can be self hosted

No

General feature

https://api.github.com/repos/infoderm/patients/issues/185

Implement HIPAA-like access/update log

Existing implementation: - https://github.com/awatson1978/deprecated-clinical-hipaa-audit-log

Implement HIPAA-like access/update log Existing implementation: - https://github.com/awatson1978/deprecated-clinical-hipaa-audit-log

Yes

Privacy feature