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https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1872 | 800,081,875 | GoQuorum privacy private receipts | - fix nonce problem - remove not needed method on GoQuorumPrivateStorage - make receipts work as they work in GoQuorum Signed-off-by: Stefan Pingel <[email protected]> | GoQuorum privacy private receipts - fix nonce problem - remove not needed method on GoQuorumPrivateStorage - make receipts work as they work in GoQuorum Signed-off-by: Stefan Pingel <[email protected]> | No | General feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/ivpn/ios-app/issues/76 | 798,527,896 | Add NSLocalNetworkUsageDescription text in Info.plist | ## PR type What kind of change does this PR introduce? - [ ] Bugfix - [x] Feature - [ ] Code style update - [ ] Refactoring (no functional changes, no api changes) - [ ] Build related changes - [ ] Documentation content changes ## What is the current behavior? iOS presents the default text in the "#app name# would like to find and connect to devices on your local network." iOS 14 privacy alert. ## What is the new behavior? Added `NSLocalNetworkUsageDescription` text in Info.plist: "We need to use your Local Network to obtain IVPN servers latency." ## Does this PR introduce a breaking change? - [ ] Yes - [x] No | Add NSLocalNetworkUsageDescription text in Info.plist ## PR type What kind of change does this PR introduce? - [ ] Bugfix - [x] Feature - [ ] Code style update - [ ] Refactoring (no functional changes, no api changes) - [ ] Build related changes - [ ] Documentation content changes ## What is the current behavior? iOS presents the default text in the "#app name# would like to find and connect to devices on your local network." iOS 14 privacy alert. ## What is the new behavior? Added `NSLocalNetworkUsageDescription` text in Info.plist: "We need to use your Local Network to obtain IVPN servers latency." ## Does this PR introduce a breaking change? - [ ] Yes - [x] No | No | General feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/ivpn/ios-app/issues/73 | 798,243,664 | Implement a message that tells the user why the app is requesting access to the local network | ## Description The current implementation of the ping Ping Service requires access to the local network because it is implemented using [`CFSocket`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/corefoundation/cfsocket-rg7) (a low level communications channel implemented with a BSD socket) and this is one of the operations which will trigger this access request. Until we can implement the Ping Service in a way that does not require access to the local network, we want to describe to users why the app requires this. This is done by adding [`NSLocalNetworkUsageDescription`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/information_property_list/nslocalnetworkusagedescription) in the Info.plist. This issue is relevant only for **iOS 14+** devices. ## QA notes Instead iOS default alert message, now the alert contains a custom message describing why IVPN app requires access to user's local network - to obtain servers latency. To get this alert presented by iOS consistently, follow these steps: 0. Make sure to be connected to WiFi/local network 1. Delete IVPN app (if installed) 2. Reboot the device 3. Install the IVPN app 4. Launch the app - in most cases at this point the alert should appear 5. Go to servers screen and refresh servers latency times every 15 seconds, after a couple of times the alert should appear if it didn't at the app launch | Implement a message that tells the user why the app is requesting access to the local network ## Description The current implementation of the ping Ping Service requires access to the local network because it is implemented using [`CFSocket`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/corefoundation/cfsocket-rg7) (a low level communications channel implemented with a BSD socket) and this is one of the operations which will trigger this access request. Until we can implement the Ping Service in a way that does not require access to the local network, we want to describe to users why the app requires this. This is done by adding [`NSLocalNetworkUsageDescription`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/bundleresources/information_property_list/nslocalnetworkusagedescription) in the Info.plist. This issue is relevant only for **iOS 14+** devices. ## QA notes Instead iOS default alert message, now the alert contains a custom message describing why IVPN app requires access to user's local network - to obtain servers latency. To get this alert presented by iOS consistently, follow these steps: 0. Make sure to be connected to WiFi/local network 1. Delete IVPN app (if installed) 2. Reboot the device 3. Install the IVPN app 4. Launch the app - in most cases at this point the alert should appear 5. Go to servers screen and refresh servers latency times every 15 seconds, after a couple of times the alert should appear if it didn't at the app launch | No | General feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/ivpn/ios-app/issues/72 | 795,848,108 | Rewrite Ping Service to not require access to the local network | The current implementation of the ping Ping Service requires access to the local network because it is implemented using [`CFSocket`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/corefoundation/cfsocket-rg7) (a low level communications channel implemented with a BSD socket) and this is one of the operations which will trigger this access request. Ideally, we want to implement the Ping Service in a way that does not perform operations that require access to the local network. **Local Network Privacy FAQ:** https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/663858 **What operations require local network access?:** https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/663874 | Rewrite Ping Service to not require access to the local network The current implementation of the ping Ping Service requires access to the local network because it is implemented using [`CFSocket`](https://developer.apple.com/documentation/corefoundation/cfsocket-rg7) (a low level communications channel implemented with a BSD socket) and this is one of the operations which will trigger this access request. Ideally, we want to implement the Ping Service in a way that does not perform operations that require access to the local network. **Local Network Privacy FAQ:** https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/663858 **What operations require local network access?:** https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/663874 | No | General feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1849 | 795,671,596 | [Spike] Investigate atomic commit for public and quorum private data | Find out how we might resolve this. | [Spike] Investigate atomic commit for public and quorum private data Find out how we might resolve this. | No | Cannot relate to privacy |
https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1848 | 795,670,384 | GoQuorumPrivateStorage: remove storage of data not needed | Storing of the transaction receipt in the GoQuorumPrivateStorage is not needed, as it is stored in place of the PMT receipt. | GoQuorumPrivateStorage: remove storage of data not needed Storing of the transaction receipt in the GoQuorumPrivateStorage is not needed, as it is stored in place of the PMT receipt. | Yes | Privacy feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1847 | 795,664,403 | Add blooms for quorum style private transactions | In GoQuorum, the blooms for private transactions are stored separately stored from the public blooms. For operations that use blooms the public and the private bloom are always ored to get a combined bloom. see eth/bloombits.go line 123 | Add blooms for quorum style private transactions In GoQuorum, the blooms for private transactions are stored separately stored from the public blooms. For operations that use blooms the public and the private bloom are always ored to get a combined bloom. see eth/bloombits.go line 123 | No | Cannot relate to privacy |
https://api.github.com/repos/ivpn/ios-app/issues/62 | 790,818,286 | Investigate iOS 14 privacy alert - "IVPN would like to find and connect to devices on your local network." | ## Description A new iOS 14 privacy alert is presented when new installed apps require access/try to interact with the local network. First we need to investigate which part of the app/app's logic triggers this alert, and then resolve the issue in 2 possible ways: 1. Remove the logic that triggers the privacy alert, if possible 2. Add a custom description in Info.plist that describes exactly why IVPN app requires access to local network (instead iOS presenting a default alert text) More info: ג€¨https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/663858 | Investigate iOS 14 privacy alert - "IVPN would like to find and connect to devices on your local network." ## Description A new iOS 14 privacy alert is presented when new installed apps require access/try to interact with the local network. First we need to investigate which part of the app/app's logic triggers this alert, and then resolve the issue in 2 possible ways: 1. Remove the logic that triggers the privacy alert, if possible 2. Add a custom description in Info.plist that describes exactly why IVPN app requires access to local network (instead iOS presenting a default alert text) More info: ג€¨https://developer.apple.com/forums/thread/663858 | No | General feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/brave/brave-site-specific-scripts/issues/41 | 788,429,646 | Defer Publisher Lookups Until User Opts-in to Brave Rewards | When you visit a Twitter profile, Brave attempts to lookup publisher info for the author. These calls happen even if the Brave profile is brand new, and its user hasn't fully opted-in to Brave Rewards. We should not make these calls unless that user has opted-in. ![image](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/815158/104944872-7bef5a80-597d-11eb-93c7-175351ba0a4c.png) _Originally posted by @jonathansampson in https://github.com/brave/brave-site-specific-scripts/issues/40#issuecomment-762374529_ | Defer Publisher Lookups Until User Opts-in to Brave Rewards When you visit a Twitter profile, Brave attempts to lookup publisher info for the author. These calls happen even if the Brave profile is brand new, and its user hasn't fully opted-in to Brave Rewards. We should not make these calls unless that user has opted-in. ![image](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/815158/104944872-7bef5a80-597d-11eb-93c7-175351ba0a4c.png) _Originally posted by @jonathansampson in https://github.com/brave/brave-site-specific-scripts/issues/40#issuecomment-762374529_ | Yes | Privacy feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/16167 | 787,241,959 | Separate discovery from recovery contact information | **Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.** I would like to be discoverable via my phone number and work email but I don't want to use them as recovery options. Right now, I need to first add contact information for recovery before I can use them for discovery. **Describe the solution you'd like** I want to set an email or phone number for discovery without using it for recovery. **Describe alternatives you've considered** None | Separate discovery from recovery contact information **Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe.** I would like to be discoverable via my phone number and work email but I don't want to use them as recovery options. Right now, I need to first add contact information for recovery before I can use them for discovery. **Describe the solution you'd like** I want to set an email or phone number for discovery without using it for recovery. **Describe alternatives you've considered** None | No | General feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/issues/613 | 786,181,522 | [Provider API] - Include crash data as part of the `/status_changes` endpoint, `event_type` = `accident` | ### Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe. Several cities are inquiring about crash data. We have been supporting them in linking this data with street usage and existing infrastructure. Crash data are today issued from manual reporting at hospitals. It provides timestamp, location and type of vehicles. This data however is not of high quality, and it is difficult to make meaningful statistics out of it and hence support decision-making on infrastructure or policies. ### Describe the solution you'd like I believe it could be valuable to add this to the `/status_changes` endpoint. For example, I would see a transition from `on_trip` to `unavailable` with `event_type` = `accident/crash`. I don't know to which extent providers can obtain this information "live". Clearly a survey just after a crash is difficult. Some providers have reporting process through the website. I wonder whether the (next generation) vehicles are (will be) able to detect crash with accelerometer & speed data. A good question to operators. Ideally this would be part of the `/status_changes` endpoint. However we could also imagine a separate reporting but it may add complexity. Today, this would be very useful as historical data to get analytics on crash for shared micro-mobility and link it to street segment. However, tomorrow, in a broader context, I believe this is a great step for connected vehicles to report 'live' crash to roadway authorities and emergency services. ### Is this a breaking change I don't believe this is breaking. ### Impacted Spec Provider ### Describe alternatives you've considered An alternative could again be separate monthly reporting in csv by providers where we would see the number of crashes. However this would be left to goodwill reporting by users & providers. | [Provider API] - Include crash data as part of the `/status_changes` endpoint, `event_type` = `accident` ### Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe. Several cities are inquiring about crash data. We have been supporting them in linking this data with street usage and existing infrastructure. Crash data are today issued from manual reporting at hospitals. It provides timestamp, location and type of vehicles. This data however is not of high quality, and it is difficult to make meaningful statistics out of it and hence support decision-making on infrastructure or policies. ### Describe the solution you'd like I believe it could be valuable to add this to the `/status_changes` endpoint. For example, I would see a transition from `on_trip` to `unavailable` with `event_type` = `accident/crash`. I don't know to which extent providers can obtain this information "live". Clearly a survey just after a crash is difficult. Some providers have reporting process through the website. I wonder whether the (next generation) vehicles are (will be) able to detect crash with accelerometer & speed data. A good question to operators. Ideally this would be part of the `/status_changes` endpoint. However we could also imagine a separate reporting but it may add complexity. Today, this would be very useful as historical data to get analytics on crash for shared micro-mobility and link it to street segment. However, tomorrow, in a broader context, I believe this is a great step for connected vehicles to report 'live' crash to roadway authorities and emergency services. ### Is this a breaking change I don't believe this is breaking. ### Impacted Spec Provider ### Describe alternatives you've considered An alternative could again be separate monthly reporting in csv by providers where we would see the number of crashes. However this would be left to goodwill reporting by users & providers. | No | General feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1793 | 785,253,456 | Make PrivacyReorgTest Not Depend on Hardcoded State Roots | The `PrivacyReorgTest` is brittle with respect to anything that changes where in `BlockDataGenerator`'s random stream it gets its values from. ### Acceptance Criteria * It determines what should be the correct state roots at test time or otherwise tests the properties so that the changes to the random stream don't affect it. | Make PrivacyReorgTest Not Depend on Hardcoded State Roots The `PrivacyReorgTest` is brittle with respect to anything that changes where in `BlockDataGenerator`'s random stream it gets its values from. ### Acceptance Criteria * It determines what should be the correct state roots at test time or otherwise tests the properties so that the changes to the random stream don't affect it. | No | Bug fix |
https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1782 | 783,127,779 | Go quorum interop | ## PR description Make Besu interop with Quorum privacy | Go quorum interop ## PR description Make Besu interop with Quorum privacy | No | Cannot relate to privacy |
https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/9696 | 772,668,083 | Use correct request parameter type for poke privacy | Fixes #9306 Blocked by #9694 for test fix | Use correct request parameter type for poke privacy Fixes #9306 Blocked by #9694 for test fix | No | Bug fix |
https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/9690 | 771,852,952 | Append author's contact id to allowed contacts to prevent empty ACL for private items | Fixes #9672 | Append author's contact id to allowed contacts to prevent empty ACL for private items Fixes #9672 | Yes | Privacy bug fix |
https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/9672 | 770,406,590 | Private Messages are sent to the public | ### Bug Description Sending a private posting to an empty list plus some CC e-mails results in a message sent to all my followers (at least). This has been discussed also here: https://nerdica.net/display/a85d7459-365f-d92d-643a-321844968468 ### Steps to Reproduce <img width="320" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/813670/102548412-e7ae8100-40ba-11eb-9629-488701ee9251.png"> #### Actual Result: The above results in a posting to followers. #### Expected Result: The posting should be sent by e-mail to the addresses in the CC list **only**. ### Platform Info Friendica Version: Diese Friendica-Instanz verwendet die Version 2020.12-dev, sie ist unter der folgenden Adresse im Web zu finden https://nerdica.net. Die Datenbankversion ist 1382/1382 und die Post-Update-Version 1349/1350. | Private Messages are sent to the public ### Bug Description Sending a private posting to an empty list plus some CC e-mails results in a message sent to all my followers (at least). This has been discussed also here: https://nerdica.net/display/a85d7459-365f-d92d-643a-321844968468 ### Steps to Reproduce <img width="320" alt="image" src="https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/813670/102548412-e7ae8100-40ba-11eb-9629-488701ee9251.png"> #### Actual Result: The above results in a posting to followers. #### Expected Result: The posting should be sent by e-mail to the addresses in the CC list **only**. ### Platform Info Friendica Version: Diese Friendica-Instanz verwendet die Version 2020.12-dev, sie ist unter der folgenden Adresse im Web zu finden https://nerdica.net. Die Datenbankversion ist 1382/1382 und die Post-Update-Version 1349/1350. | Yes | Privacy bug fix |
https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1718 | 768,452,511 | Go quorum configuration | When using the GoQuorum compatibility mode in besu make the configuration available. | Go quorum configuration When using the GoQuorum compatibility mode in besu make the configuration available. | No | Cannot relate to privacy |
https://api.github.com/repos/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/issues/608 | 768,376,981 | [Requirements] Ability to express data sharing requirements in Policy | ### Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe. It has come up in a number of contexts that it would be useful to allow agencies to express data sharing requirements in MDS. I'm probably forgetting a few use cases, but here are some I have heard: - In #607, allow agencies to state which geographies they would like aggregate metrics or reports for - In #507, allow certain fields or endpoints to become "optional" in the sense of not being required by the spec, but still allow them to be "required" in the sense of the city explicitly requiring them of providers - In #503, allow agencies to explicitly opt int to new optional or beta endpoints - In #585, allow agencies to invite transparency and public accountability around the data they collect and why - Improve data security by allowing operators to allocate access properly so that a city that does not request a given field/endpoint does not in fact have access to it - Improve system efficiency by allowing operators to know in advance which fields/endpoints need to be stored and/or computed in advance ### Describe the solution you'd like I think of MDS Policy as the digital representation of a City's mobility program policies ג€“ֲ we are digitalizing their program PDF, in a sense. Data sharing requirements, including the requirement to provide MDS, are common in nearly any such policy. Hence, I think this belongs in MDS and in Policy specifically. One possibility that might meet some of the uses cases above would be adding a new rule type or set of rule types within the Policy endpoint that describe a city data sharing need. ### Is this a breaking change I think this could probably be done in a non-breaking way. ### Impacted Spec Policy. ### Describe alternatives you've considered There has also been discussion of this living in a new endpoint. I'm open to that, but I like the simplicity of having a single (public!) endpoint return everything about a city's policy. In addition, there are often direct relationships between rules and data sharing needs (cities need data to assess compliance with a rule). I think these relationships might be made more clear and explicit through a carefully considered augmentation of MDS Policy. | [Requirements] Ability to express data sharing requirements in Policy ### Is your feature request related to a problem? Please describe. It has come up in a number of contexts that it would be useful to allow agencies to express data sharing requirements in MDS. I'm probably forgetting a few use cases, but here are some I have heard: - In #607, allow agencies to state which geographies they would like aggregate metrics or reports for - In #507, allow certain fields or endpoints to become "optional" in the sense of not being required by the spec, but still allow them to be "required" in the sense of the city explicitly requiring them of providers - In #503, allow agencies to explicitly opt int to new optional or beta endpoints - In #585, allow agencies to invite transparency and public accountability around the data they collect and why - Improve data security by allowing operators to allocate access properly so that a city that does not request a given field/endpoint does not in fact have access to it - Improve system efficiency by allowing operators to know in advance which fields/endpoints need to be stored and/or computed in advance ### Describe the solution you'd like I think of MDS Policy as the digital representation of a City's mobility program policies ג€“ֲ we are digitalizing their program PDF, in a sense. Data sharing requirements, including the requirement to provide MDS, are common in nearly any such policy. Hence, I think this belongs in MDS and in Policy specifically. One possibility that might meet some of the uses cases above would be adding a new rule type or set of rule types within the Policy endpoint that describe a city data sharing need. ### Is this a breaking change I think this could probably be done in a non-breaking way. ### Impacted Spec Policy. ### Describe alternatives you've considered There has also been discussion of this living in a new endpoint. I'm open to that, but I like the simplicity of having a single (public!) endpoint return everything about a city's policy. In addition, there are often direct relationships between rules and data sharing needs (cities need data to assess compliance with a rule). I think these relationships might be made more clear and explicit through a carefully considered augmentation of MDS Policy. | Yes | Privacy feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/issues/607 | 762,983,530 | Provider Reports - Static | ## Explain pull request This is a beta implementation of the #569 special groups aggregate metrics issue. It adds a /reports endpoint within the Provider API that handles returning monthly trip counts of special groups, in this case just low income groups. The response served up is a pre-generated CSV file of all data. ## Is this a breaking change * No, not breaking (new feature) ## Impacted Spec Which spec(s) will this pull request impact? * `provider` ## Additional context See PR #606 for a version that is dynamic and not static like this one. | Provider Reports - Static ## Explain pull request This is a beta implementation of the #569 special groups aggregate metrics issue. It adds a /reports endpoint within the Provider API that handles returning monthly trip counts of special groups, in this case just low income groups. The response served up is a pre-generated CSV file of all data. ## Is this a breaking change * No, not breaking (new feature) ## Impacted Spec Which spec(s) will this pull request impact? * `provider` ## Additional context See PR #606 for a version that is dynamic and not static like this one. | No | General feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/Jasmine-liang/gitblog/issues/2 | 762,508,880 | ו› ה½¿ח”¨ה¸€ה¸×ו·¥ו…·ו₪±ט´¥ט€ז¢ח´¢וˆ°ח„ו…³ה÷יח§ה¿ז₪ח„י—®י¢˜ | ## ה½¿ח”¨[WechatMomentScreenshot](https://github.com/TransparentLC/WechatMomentScreenshot) ט¿™ז˜¯ה¸€ה¸×ו¼€ז÷ח„ז‹ו‹וˆט½¬ו‘זˆ×ו›¾ח”זˆו™¨ן¼י€‚ח”¨ה÷ו½“ה½ ט¢«ט¿«ט½¬ו‘ז–‡ז¡ˆי›†טµז‰טƒ½ה½¿ח”¨זח§ה÷§ו“ח„זƒ…ז™¯ד€‚זˆ‘ו¨Chromeו’Firefoxיƒ½ח®€ו•ז‰‹ו¨זµ‹ט¯•ה÷†ה¸€ה¸‹וטƒ½ד€‚ו‘ח°ו¨Chromeה¸ח”זˆה¸ה÷†ו›¾ח‰‡ד€‚זˆ‘ו°±ו»י¡¹ח›®ח„issueי€›ה÷†ה¸€ה¸‹ח‹וˆ°ז‰ה÷÷ז˜¯ו› ה¸÷ה½¿ח”¨ו¹¿ו‘ז‹¦זˆ×ז’ה»¶ט€ח‹ה¸וˆ°ח”זˆח„ו›¾ח‰‡ד€‚זˆ‘זז³¨ז„ח‚¹ט½¬ו‘ה÷†Chromeה¸ו®‰ט£…ח„ז’ה»¶נ₪” ## ז‰¾וˆ°ה½ ה÷†ן¼ CanvasFingerprintBlockז’ה»¶ יו¸¸ח²—ז´ו°זז¯ה¸×ז’ה»¶יƒ½ט¯•ה÷†ה¸€ין¼ז€וו‘ח°ז˜¯ט¿™ה¸×ז’ה»¶ו¨טµ·ה½ח”¨ד€‚ו»Chrome web storeח‹ט¿™ה¸×ז’ה»¶ח„ה»‹ח»ן¼ו†ח»“וˆי¡¹ח›®main.jsי‡ו¯¹toDataURL() ח„ה½¿ח”¨ן¼ו÷ז¬ה¸ט¿™ה¸×ז’ה»¶ז˜¯ו¨י˜²ז¢ח”זˆח„canvasו‘ח½‘ח«™ו‘י€ח”¨זˆ·ח„ה¸×ה÷÷ז•°ז®ד€‚ > Such websites do this by painting an image on a hidden HTML <canvas> element and then taking a snapshot of it and posting the snapshot back to themselves. Because the exact pixel values in the drawn canvas can differ subtly from one set of hardware to another, these websites can use those differences to distinguish between visitors as well as to recognize specific visitors from one visit to the next. זˆ‘ו°±ו¾ˆו¥½ו¥‡ז˜¯ז€ה¹ˆה»ח”זˆח„canvasה¸ח„ט¿™ה÷›pixel valuesז¥ט¾¨וˆ«ח”¨זˆ·ח„ד€‚ה÷ז˜¯ן¼זˆ‘ז‰¾וˆ°ה÷†ה¸€ה÷›ט§£י‡ד€‚ ## Canvas fingerprintingח„ו÷ז¬וח† > Canvas fingerprinting works by exploiting the HTML5 canvas element: when a user visits a website their browser is instructed to ג€drawג€ a hidden line of text or 3D graphic that is then rendered into a single digital token, a potentially unique identifier to track users without any actual identifier persistence on the machine. Variations on installed GPU model, operating system and overall system performances cause the variations in the rendered digital token. ו‚ט€ƒן¼ - https://blokt.com/guides/browser-fingerprinting - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint זˆ‘ט¿˜ה» https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/ ט¿™ה¸×ח½‘ו€ה¸זµ‹ט¯•ו‡÷זˆ‘ח„Timezone, BrowserPlugin detailsן¼ˆו˜ו¨ז’ה»¶ז¼ז´ט¢«וˆ©ח”¨י£י™©ן¼‰, Device memoryח‰ו¾ˆו₪ה¸×ה÷÷ה¿¡ז¯ו‘¢:( ## ו¯ה»¥וח‚¹ו°ו°זµז— י™₪ה÷† [Coveryyourtracks](https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/learn) ט¿™ח¯‡ז–‡ח« זוˆ°ח„ז×ז–½ו₪–ן¼ה¾ז®ה¸וח„י€ז±‚וˆ†ו¼€ה½¿ח”¨זµט§ˆו™¨ה¹ז˜¯ה¸×וז³•ד€‚ | ו› ה½¿ח”¨ה¸€ה¸×ו·¥ו…·ו₪±ט´¥ט€ז¢ח´¢וˆ°ח„ו…³ה÷יח§ה¿ז₪ח„י—®י¢˜ ## ה½¿ח”¨[WechatMomentScreenshot](https://github.com/TransparentLC/WechatMomentScreenshot) ט¿™ז˜¯ה¸€ה¸×ו¼€ז÷ח„ז‹ו‹וˆט½¬ו‘זˆ×ו›¾ח”זˆו™¨ן¼י€‚ח”¨ה÷ו½“ה½ ט¢«ט¿«ט½¬ו‘ז–‡ז¡ˆי›†טµז‰טƒ½ה½¿ח”¨זח§ה÷§ו“ח„זƒ…ז™¯ד€‚זˆ‘ו¨Chromeו’Firefoxיƒ½ח®€ו•ז‰‹ו¨זµ‹ט¯•ה÷†ה¸€ה¸‹וטƒ½ד€‚ו‘ח°ו¨Chromeה¸ח”זˆה¸ה÷†ו›¾ח‰‡ד€‚זˆ‘ו°±ו»י¡¹ח›®ח„issueי€›ה÷†ה¸€ה¸‹ח‹וˆ°ז‰ה÷÷ז˜¯ו› ה¸÷ה½¿ח”¨ו¹¿ו‘ז‹¦זˆ×ז’ה»¶ט€ח‹ה¸וˆ°ח”זˆח„ו›¾ח‰‡ד€‚זˆ‘זז³¨ז„ח‚¹ט½¬ו‘ה÷†Chromeה¸ו®‰ט£…ח„ז’ה»¶נ₪” ## ז‰¾וˆ°ה½ ה÷†ן¼ CanvasFingerprintBlockז’ה»¶ יו¸¸ח²—ז´ו°זז¯ה¸×ז’ה»¶יƒ½ט¯•ה÷†ה¸€ין¼ז€וו‘ח°ז˜¯ט¿™ה¸×ז’ה»¶ו¨טµ·ה½ח”¨ד€‚ו»Chrome web storeח‹ט¿™ה¸×ז’ה»¶ח„ה»‹ח»ן¼ו†ח»“וˆי¡¹ח›®main.jsי‡ו¯¹toDataURL() ח„ה½¿ח”¨ן¼ו÷ז¬ה¸ט¿™ה¸×ז’ה»¶ז˜¯ו¨י˜²ז¢ח”זˆח„canvasו‘ח½‘ח«™ו‘י€ח”¨זˆ·ח„ה¸×ה÷÷ז•°ז®ד€‚ > Such websites do this by painting an image on a hidden HTML <canvas> element and then taking a snapshot of it and posting the snapshot back to themselves. Because the exact pixel values in the drawn canvas can differ subtly from one set of hardware to another, these websites can use those differences to distinguish between visitors as well as to recognize specific visitors from one visit to the next. זˆ‘ו°±ו¾ˆו¥½ו¥‡ז˜¯ז€ה¹ˆה»ח”זˆח„canvasה¸ח„ט¿™ה÷›pixel valuesז¥ט¾¨וˆ«ח”¨זˆ·ח„ד€‚ה÷ז˜¯ן¼זˆ‘ז‰¾וˆ°ה÷†ה¸€ה÷›ט§£י‡ד€‚ ## Canvas fingerprintingח„ו÷ז¬וח† > Canvas fingerprinting works by exploiting the HTML5 canvas element: when a user visits a website their browser is instructed to ג€drawג€ a hidden line of text or 3D graphic that is then rendered into a single digital token, a potentially unique identifier to track users without any actual identifier persistence on the machine. Variations on installed GPU model, operating system and overall system performances cause the variations in the rendered digital token. ו‚ט€ƒן¼ - https://blokt.com/guides/browser-fingerprinting - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Device_fingerprint זˆ‘ט¿˜ה» https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/ ט¿™ה¸×ח½‘ו€ה¸זµ‹ט¯•ו‡÷זˆ‘ח„Timezone, BrowserPlugin detailsן¼ˆו˜ו¨ז’ה»¶ז¼ז´ט¢«וˆ©ח”¨י£י™©ן¼‰, Device memoryח‰ו¾ˆו₪ה¸×ה÷÷ה¿¡ז¯ו‘¢:( ## ו¯ה»¥וח‚¹ו°ו°זµז— י™₪ה÷† [Coveryyourtracks](https://coveryourtracks.eff.org/learn) ט¿™ח¯‡ז–‡ח« זוˆ°ח„ז×ז–½ו₪–ן¼ה¾ז®ה¸וח„י€ז±‚וˆ†ו¼€ה½¿ח”¨זµט§ˆו™¨ה¹ז˜¯ה¸×וז³•ד€‚ | No | Cannot relate to privacy |
https://api.github.com/repos/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/issues/606 | 760,836,672 | Provider Reports - API | ## Explain pull request This is a simplified, beta implementation of the #569 special groups aggregate metrics issue. It adds a /reports endpoint within the Provider API that handles returning monthly trip counts of special groups, in this case just low income groups. The structure is similar to the Metrics API, but reduced in scope (no duration specifications, no measures besides counts of trips). ## Is this a breaking change * No, not breaking (new feature) ## Impacted Spec Which spec(s) will this pull request impact? * `provider` ## Additional context Measures and durations could be added back into the PR. See PR #607 for a static version of this solution. | Provider Reports - API ## Explain pull request This is a simplified, beta implementation of the #569 special groups aggregate metrics issue. It adds a /reports endpoint within the Provider API that handles returning monthly trip counts of special groups, in this case just low income groups. The structure is similar to the Metrics API, but reduced in scope (no duration specifications, no measures besides counts of trips). ## Is this a breaking change * No, not breaking (new feature) ## Impacted Spec Which spec(s) will this pull request impact? * `provider` ## Additional context Measures and durations could be added back into the PR. See PR #607 for a static version of this solution. | No | General feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/9641 | 760,409,415 | Misattributed Diaspora reply becomes top-level post | Original thread: https://friendica.mrpetovan.com/display/735a2029-745f-d0d9-92b8-25a575390980 Diaspora reply: https://nerdpol.ch/posts/735a2029-745f-d0d9-92b8-25a575390980#1a5b49401c58013960bc52540039b762 Misattributed comment as a top-level post: https://social.yl.ms/display/e18176ef-945f-d0e1-b4c1-589737649409 This is a really weird occurence I've never seen before. A comment from one of my remote contact (A) on one of my top-level posts became a top-level post by me on another contact's (B) node. Apparently these two contacts cannot communicate with each other as A's posts don't appear on B's server and B's posts don't appear on A's server. But it still doesn't justify the comment misattribution. I believe the reply by A was delivered to B because I liked it. Then something really wrong happened and it got transformed into a top-level post attributed to me. | Misattributed Diaspora reply becomes top-level post Original thread: https://friendica.mrpetovan.com/display/735a2029-745f-d0d9-92b8-25a575390980 Diaspora reply: https://nerdpol.ch/posts/735a2029-745f-d0d9-92b8-25a575390980#1a5b49401c58013960bc52540039b762 Misattributed comment as a top-level post: https://social.yl.ms/display/e18176ef-945f-d0e1-b4c1-589737649409 This is a really weird occurence I've never seen before. A comment from one of my remote contact (A) on one of my top-level posts became a top-level post by me on another contact's (B) node. Apparently these two contacts cannot communicate with each other as A's posts don't appear on B's server and B's posts don't appear on A's server. But it still doesn't justify the comment misattribution. I believe the reply by A was delivered to B because I liked it. Then something really wrong happened and it got transformed into a top-level post attributed to me. | No | Bug fix |
https://api.github.com/repos/eclipse/vorto/issues/2729 | 758,290,680 | Consider whether feasible to automatically set a user's e-mail with the information from the OAuth provider login at first signup | This would help in situations where Vorto is integrated with other services, e.g. when a Vorto user creates a namespace and integrates with the Bosch IoT suite to give access to a technical user. In that case, it would help that the original user has their e-mail address set up automatically upon first signup - otherwise they will have to go do that manually once they start using the access request form if they assumed it would work automatically. That may require some addendum to our privacy policy. | Consider whether feasible to automatically set a user's e-mail with the information from the OAuth provider login at first signup This would help in situations where Vorto is integrated with other services, e.g. when a Vorto user creates a namespace and integrates with the Bosch IoT suite to give access to a technical user. In that case, it would help that the original user has their e-mail address set up automatically upon first signup - otherwise they will have to go do that manually once they start using the access request form if they assumed it would work automatically. That may require some addendum to our privacy policy. | Yes | Privacy feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1642 | 754,036,687 | add sendSignedTransaction method to QuorumEnclave | Signed-off-by: Stefan Pingel <[email protected]> This method is needed to use the to be implemented eth_sendRawPrivateTransaction. | add sendSignedTransaction method to QuorumEnclave Signed-off-by: Stefan Pingel <[email protected]> This method is needed to use the to be implemented eth_sendRawPrivateTransaction. | No | General feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1600 | 748,526,684 | GoQuorumEnclave | ### Description Enclave that supports /send, /receive, and /upcheck. This is needed to support the GoQuorum compatible privacy mode. ### Acceptance Criteria - [ ] GoQuorumEnclave can be used to send, receive and upcheck private transactions from Tessera. - [ ] Send/Receive methods covered by unit/integration (?) tests - [ ] PR merged - [ ] See it working (demo Besu being able to talk to Tessera - even if not actually processing/sending a private tx) | GoQuorumEnclave ### Description Enclave that supports /send, /receive, and /upcheck. This is needed to support the GoQuorum compatible privacy mode. ### Acceptance Criteria - [ ] GoQuorumEnclave can be used to send, receive and upcheck private transactions from Tessera. - [ ] Send/Receive methods covered by unit/integration (?) tests - [ ] PR merged - [ ] See it working (demo Besu being able to talk to Tessera - even if not actually processing/sending a private tx) | Yes | Privacy feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1599 | 748,473,159 | Go quorum enclave | Add an enclave that uses Tessera to send and receive private transactions. This implementation supports the functionality necessary for the Besu privacy mode that is compatible with GoQuorum standard privacy. | Go quorum enclave Add an enclave that uses Tessera to send and receive private transactions. This implementation supports the functionality necessary for the Besu privacy mode that is compatible with GoQuorum standard privacy. | Yes | Privacy feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/simonsdave/cloudfeaster/issues/45 | 743,379,954 | eliminate warning message in CircleCI logs | The following message appears in CircleCI logs. ``` WARNING! Your password will be stored unencrypted in /root/.docker/config.json. Configure a credential helper to remove this warning. See https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/login/#credentials-store ``` Some references that might be useful * [8 Jun '20 - Encrypted Credentials for Docker Login](https://leimao.github.io/blog/Docker-Login-Encrypted-Credentials/) * [15 Sep '20 - Docker pass Credential Helper on Ubuntu](https://geoffhudik.com/tech/2020/09/15/docker-pass-credential-helper-on-ubuntu/) * [```pass``` = the standard unix password manager](https://www.passwordstore.org/) * [Docker login command](https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/login/) * [Docker Credentials Store](https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/login/#credentials-store) | eliminate warning message in CircleCI logs The following message appears in CircleCI logs. ``` WARNING! Your password will be stored unencrypted in /root/.docker/config.json. Configure a credential helper to remove this warning. See https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/login/#credentials-store ``` Some references that might be useful * [8 Jun '20 - Encrypted Credentials for Docker Login](https://leimao.github.io/blog/Docker-Login-Encrypted-Credentials/) * [15 Sep '20 - Docker pass Credential Helper on Ubuntu](https://geoffhudik.com/tech/2020/09/15/docker-pass-credential-helper-on-ubuntu/) * [```pass``` = the standard unix password manager](https://www.passwordstore.org/) * [Docker login command](https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/login/) * [Docker Credentials Store](https://docs.docker.com/engine/reference/commandline/login/#credentials-store) | Yes | Privacy feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/15703 | 740,658,695 | Jitsi widget doesn't release camera after removing the widget | Jitsi widget doesn't release camera after removing the widget | No | Cannot relate to privacy |
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https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/9522 | 740,552,079 | Prevent ActivityPub message transmission to blocked followers | That's, huh, an oversight. Related to #9464 Discovered while working on #9515 | Prevent ActivityPub message transmission to blocked followers That's, huh, an oversight. Related to #9464 Discovered while working on #9515 | No | Bug fix |
https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/9515 | 739,163,548 | Reject replies when author is blocked by thread owner | Closes #9464 This change will only apply to future messages. I was able to test that a public reply from a blocked Mastodon contact was rejected twice: - Once as "Author is blocked by user" for the private copy of the item that should have appeared in my network feed (existing behavior) - Once as "Author is blocked by parent user" for the public copy of the item that should have appeared in the community pages for example. (new behavior) | Reject replies when author is blocked by thread owner Closes #9464 This change will only apply to future messages. I was able to test that a public reply from a blocked Mastodon contact was rejected twice: - Once as "Author is blocked by user" for the private copy of the item that should have appeared in my network feed (existing behavior) - Once as "Author is blocked by parent user" for the public copy of the item that should have appeared in the community pages for example. (new behavior) | Yes | Privacy feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/9500 | 738,410,551 | [dbstructure 1373] Replace contact.blocked with user.blocked in owner-view | Fixes #9326 - It was falsely reporting blocked users as unblocked since we don't block the public self contact Fortunately, the `owner-view` view isn't used much through the modules yet so the privacy impact has been low. | [dbstructure 1373] Replace contact.blocked with user.blocked in owner-view Fixes #9326 - It was falsely reporting blocked users as unblocked since we don't block the public self contact Fortunately, the `owner-view` view isn't used much through the modules yet so the privacy impact has been low. | Yes | Privacy feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1530 | 735,745,577 | Presentation Orion -> Tessera | ### Description Create a presentation that gives an overview of what needs to be done to enable us to replace Orion with Tessera. | Presentation Orion -> Tessera ### Description Create a presentation that gives an overview of what needs to be done to enable us to replace Orion with Tessera. | No | General feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/eclipse/vorto/issues/2681 | 734,575,567 | Allow comment moderation | Spin off of #2675 . In cases when the user cannot delete a comment (not the author / formerly the author but comment anonymized / not namespace administrator), it would be good to have an additional button to report a comment to the namespace administrator, for moderation. An e-mail would then be sent to the administrator with the given recommendations from the user, pointing at the "offending" comment. Given the very sporadic usage of the feature at large, this is very low priority at the time of writing. | Allow comment moderation Spin off of #2675 . In cases when the user cannot delete a comment (not the author / formerly the author but comment anonymized / not namespace administrator), it would be good to have an additional button to report a comment to the namespace administrator, for moderation. An e-mail would then be sent to the administrator with the given recommendations from the user, pointing at the "offending" comment. Given the very sporadic usage of the feature at large, this is very low priority at the time of writing. | Yes | Privacy feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/eclipse/vorto/issues/2675 | 733,051,122 | Allow users to delete their own comments / Allow namespace administrators to moderate (delete) comments in their NS | As the title implies, there doesn't seem to be any functionality implemented to delete comments (the closer thing is comment anonymization when a user deletes their account). It would be a good improvement to allow users to delete their own comments, and namespace admins to do the same for all users in their namespace. Aside from the self-moderation capability, that would also make it easier to fix privacy issues, e.g. if private data has been put in a model comment by mistake. | Allow users to delete their own comments / Allow namespace administrators to moderate (delete) comments in their NS As the title implies, there doesn't seem to be any functionality implemented to delete comments (the closer thing is comment anonymization when a user deletes their account). It would be a good improvement to allow users to delete their own comments, and namespace admins to do the same for all users in their namespace. Aside from the self-moderation capability, that would also make it easier to fix privacy issues, e.g. if private data has been put in a model comment by mistake. | Yes | Privacy feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/issues/594 | 732,012,957 | Add geography and authentication to Metrics feature branch | --- name: Default about: Suggest changes to MDS title: Add geography and authentication to Metrics feature branch --- # MDS Pull Request Thank you for your contribution! Please review our OMF [contributing page](https://github.com/openmobilityfoundation/governance/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md) to understand guidelines and policies for participation, and our [Code of Conduct page](https://github.com/openmobilityfoundation/governance/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md). To avoid complications and help make the Review process as smooth as possible, make sure to: 1. Target [**`dev`**](https://github.com/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/tree/dev) branch. Please ensure you are targeting **`dev`**, not **`main`**. 1. Keep the *"Allow edits from maintainers"* button checked to help us resolve some issues for you. 1. Be ready to resolve any merge conflicts before we approve your Pull Request. 1. Have an up to date profile, per our Github [community profile](https://github.com/openmobilityfoundation/governance/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#community-profile) guildance. ## Explain pull request Updates requested by @schnuerle for features-metrics. Add geography and authentication to Metrics feature branch. ## Is this a breaking change A breaking change would require consumers or implementors of the API to modify their code for it to continue to function (ex: renaming of a required field or the change in data type of an existing field). A non-breaking change would allow existing code to continue to function (ex: addition of an optional field or the creation of a new optional endpoint). * Yes, breaking * No, not breaking * I'm not sure ## Impacted Spec Which spec(s) will this pull request impact? * `metrics` ## Additional context Add any other context or screenshots about the feature request here. | Add geography and authentication to Metrics feature branch --- name: Default about: Suggest changes to MDS title: Add geography and authentication to Metrics feature branch --- # MDS Pull Request Thank you for your contribution! Please review our OMF [contributing page](https://github.com/openmobilityfoundation/governance/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md) to understand guidelines and policies for participation, and our [Code of Conduct page](https://github.com/openmobilityfoundation/governance/blob/main/CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md). To avoid complications and help make the Review process as smooth as possible, make sure to: 1. Target [**`dev`**](https://github.com/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/tree/dev) branch. Please ensure you are targeting **`dev`**, not **`main`**. 1. Keep the *"Allow edits from maintainers"* button checked to help us resolve some issues for you. 1. Be ready to resolve any merge conflicts before we approve your Pull Request. 1. Have an up to date profile, per our Github [community profile](https://github.com/openmobilityfoundation/governance/blob/main/CONTRIBUTING.md#community-profile) guildance. ## Explain pull request Updates requested by @schnuerle for features-metrics. Add geography and authentication to Metrics feature branch. ## Is this a breaking change A breaking change would require consumers or implementors of the API to modify their code for it to continue to function (ex: renaming of a required field or the change in data type of an existing field). A non-breaking change would allow existing code to continue to function (ex: addition of an optional field or the creation of a new optional endpoint). * Yes, breaking * No, not breaking * I'm not sure ## Impacted Spec Which spec(s) will this pull request impact? * `metrics` ## Additional context Add any other context or screenshots about the feature request here. | Yes | Privacy feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/brave/brave-ios/issues/2972 | 724,310,881 | Implement Global Privacy Control | More details here: https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/issues/11917 | Implement Global Privacy Control More details here: https://github.com/brave/brave-browser/issues/11917 | Yes | Privacy feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/issues/587 | 723,480,111 | Metrics - Feature Branch | ## Explain pull request This PR is to see what changes between the Metrics feature branch and the dev branch, and prepare it for merger once it's ready. ## Is this a breaking change * No, not breaking ## Impacted Spec * `agency` * `policy` * `provider` ## Additional context PRs #486 and #487 were merged to a 'feature branch' in the MDS repo so we can see how it fits into the larger spec, allow the community and staff to do PRs against it, merge other related PRs into it, and see how it will fit into dev when it's ready with this PR. | Metrics - Feature Branch ## Explain pull request This PR is to see what changes between the Metrics feature branch and the dev branch, and prepare it for merger once it's ready. ## Is this a breaking change * No, not breaking ## Impacted Spec * `agency` * `policy` * `provider` ## Additional context PRs #486 and #487 were merged to a 'feature branch' in the MDS repo so we can see how it fits into the larger spec, allow the community and staff to do PRs against it, merge other related PRs into it, and see how it will fit into dev when it's ready with this PR. | No | General feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/15461 | 721,427,545 | We should have a setting to disable P2P for Jitsi | It's not helpful that we have a 'Allow Peer-to-Peer for 1:1 calls' setting to allow users to disable P2P and thus shield their IP when doing 1:1 calls - but no equivalent for Jitsi. Jitsi's P2P mode is disableable, and we should provide Element users with a way to do so if they don't want to leak their IP to the other party when there are only 2 people on the call | We should have a setting to disable P2P for Jitsi It's not helpful that we have a 'Allow Peer-to-Peer for 1:1 calls' setting to allow users to disable P2P and thus shield their IP when doing 1:1 calls - but no equivalent for Jitsi. Jitsi's P2P mode is disableable, and we should provide Element users with a way to do so if they don't want to leak their IP to the other party when there are only 2 people on the call | Yes | Privacy feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/vector-im/element-web/issues/15460 | 721,426,140 | 'Allow Peer-to-Peer for 1:1 calls' setting does not make it clear that P2P shares your IP | ...and that the reason for disabling P2P is to avoid sharing your IP with the other party | 'Allow Peer-to-Peer for 1:1 calls' setting does not make it clear that P2P shares your IP ...and that the reason for disabling P2P is to avoid sharing your IP with the other party | Yes | Privacy feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/openmobilityfoundation/mobility-data-specification/issues/585 | 718,437,299 | Make Policy/Geography API Endpoints Optionally Public | ## Explain pull request The value of having Policy API endpoints be public has come up in several different contexts. In particular, in the development of #503, it has been pointed out that a hypothetical "bad actor" at a city could create arbitrarily small or specific Policy regions that undermine the stated goal of protecting rider privacy. For example, this bad actor could create policy regions around a political protest and the home of a specific individual and receive events that reveal the trips of this individual to/from a protest. In this hypothetical example, the value of a public Policy API endpoint is clear: anyone could see what is happening and ask the bad actor to account for creating such targeted policy regions. In less specific and hypothetical cases, there is public benefit from making Policy data "open data". For example, residents could monitor the vehicle caps over time and enterprising developers could add speed limits and no parking zones to their apps. This change may raise concerns that vehicle caps and other such data are proprietary data. There may be competitive concerns here, but I don't think they should overrule the public benefit of publishing this data. There are no individual privacy concerns or trade secrets in this data, and it is unlikely that cities could shield this data from a records request. ## Is this a breaking change No. ## Impacted Spec Policy. | Make Policy/Geography API Endpoints Optionally Public ## Explain pull request The value of having Policy API endpoints be public has come up in several different contexts. In particular, in the development of #503, it has been pointed out that a hypothetical "bad actor" at a city could create arbitrarily small or specific Policy regions that undermine the stated goal of protecting rider privacy. For example, this bad actor could create policy regions around a political protest and the home of a specific individual and receive events that reveal the trips of this individual to/from a protest. In this hypothetical example, the value of a public Policy API endpoint is clear: anyone could see what is happening and ask the bad actor to account for creating such targeted policy regions. In less specific and hypothetical cases, there is public benefit from making Policy data "open data". For example, residents could monitor the vehicle caps over time and enterprising developers could add speed limits and no parking zones to their apps. This change may raise concerns that vehicle caps and other such data are proprietary data. There may be competitive concerns here, but I don't think they should overrule the public benefit of publishing this data. There are no individual privacy concerns or trade secrets in this data, and it is unlikely that cities could shield this data from a records request. ## Is this a breaking change No. ## Impacted Spec Policy. | Yes | Location privacy |
https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1424 | 716,599,557 | [1404] Fixed NPE when executing eth_estimateGas with privacy enabled. | Signed-off-by: Mark Terry <[email protected]> <!-- Thanks for sending a pull request! Please check out our contribution guidelines: --> <!-- https://github.com/hyperledger/besu/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md --> ## PR description Addresses a bug where an NPE could be encountered when `eth_estimateGas` is executed when privacy is enabled. ## Fixed Issue(s) <!-- Please link to fixed issue(s) here using format: fixes #<issue number> --> <!-- Example: "fixes #2" --> Fixes #1404 ## Changelog - [x] I thought about the changelog and included a [changelog update if required](https://wiki.hyperledger.org/display/BESU/Changelog). | [1404] Fixed NPE when executing eth_estimateGas with privacy enabled. Signed-off-by: Mark Terry <[email protected]> <!-- Thanks for sending a pull request! Please check out our contribution guidelines: --> <!-- https://github.com/hyperledger/besu/blob/master/CONTRIBUTING.md --> ## PR description Addresses a bug where an NPE could be encountered when `eth_estimateGas` is executed when privacy is enabled. ## Fixed Issue(s) <!-- Please link to fixed issue(s) here using format: fixes #<issue number> --> <!-- Example: "fixes #2" --> Fixes #1404 ## Changelog - [x] I thought about the changelog and included a [changelog update if required](https://wiki.hyperledger.org/display/BESU/Changelog). | No | Bug fix |
https://api.github.com/repos/hyperledger/besu/issues/1422 | 716,210,277 | Add ATs for on chain privacy with multi tenancy | ## PR description Adding acceptance test for on-chain privacy with multi-tenancy ## Changelog - [x] I thought about the changelog and included a [changelog update if required](https://wiki.hyperledger.org/display/BESU/Changelog). | Add ATs for on chain privacy with multi tenancy ## PR description Adding acceptance test for on-chain privacy with multi-tenancy ## Changelog - [x] I thought about the changelog and included a [changelog update if required](https://wiki.hyperledger.org/display/BESU/Changelog). | Yes | Privacy in the cloud |
https://api.github.com/repos/commons-app/apps-android-commons/issues/3946 | 712,588,446 | Use a different setting for Mapbox telemetry opt-out | **Summary:** I believe "Telemetry Opt Out" is kind of a contradictory name for the option as it contradicts the option description by conveying that enabling the setting means the user has **opted out** of telemetry while that is not the case. To my understanding, enabling the setting means telemetry would be sent to Mapbox. So, we should use a better name for the setting too. My suggestion would be "Mapbox Telemetry". **Device and Android version:** Samsung SM-J111F running Android 5.1.1. **Commons app version:** 2.13.1.793~66f6e2e *Note*: First reported in #3943 | Use a different setting for Mapbox telemetry opt-out **Summary:** I believe "Telemetry Opt Out" is kind of a contradictory name for the option as it contradicts the option description by conveying that enabling the setting means the user has **opted out** of telemetry while that is not the case. To my understanding, enabling the setting means telemetry would be sent to Mapbox. So, we should use a better name for the setting too. My suggestion would be "Mapbox Telemetry". **Device and Android version:** Samsung SM-J111F running Android 5.1.1. **Commons app version:** 2.13.1.793~66f6e2e *Note*: First reported in #3943 | No | Bug fix |
https://api.github.com/repos/jonathanvdc/res-publica/issues/13 | 711,154,185 | Move HTTP request arguments to request body | Some of the HTTP request arguments we send to the server are sensitive and should be ephemeral. They should be placed somewhere where they will not end up in the log. The HTTP request body, for example. | Move HTTP request arguments to request body Some of the HTTP request arguments we send to the server are sensitive and should be ephemeral. They should be placed somewhere where they will not end up in the log. The HTTP request body, for example. | No | General feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/brave/brave-ios/issues/2909 | 710,496,918 | [hackerone] #992204 - IndexedDB | https://hackerone.com/bugs?subject=brave&report_id=992204 | [hackerone] #992204 - IndexedDB https://hackerone.com/bugs?subject=brave&report_id=992204 | No | Cannot relate to privacy |
https://api.github.com/repos/brave/brave-ios/issues/2907 | 710,190,530 | Clearing Browsing history should clear tab history as well | <!-- Have you searched for similar issues on the repository? Before submitting this issue, please visit our wiki for common ones: https://github.com/brave/browser-ios/wiki For more, check out our community site: https://community.brave.com/ --> ### Description: Clearing Browsing history should clear tab history as well ### Steps to Reproduce 1. Visit sites in tabs 2. Open settings and clear data 3. Tab history is not cleared **Actual result:** <!-- Add screenshots if needed --> Clearing Browsing history should clear tab history as well **Expected result:** Tab history should be cleared **Reproduces how often:** [Easily reproduced, Intermittent Issue] Easy **Brave Version:** <!-- Provide full details Eg: v1.4.2(17.09.08.16) --> 1.20/1.21 **Device details:** <!-- Model type and iOS version Eg: iPhone 6s+ (iOS 10.3.3)--> All **Website problems only:** - did you check with Brave Shields down? NA - did you check in Safari/Firefox (WkWebView-based browsers)? NA ### Additional Information | Clearing Browsing history should clear tab history as well <!-- Have you searched for similar issues on the repository? Before submitting this issue, please visit our wiki for common ones: https://github.com/brave/browser-ios/wiki For more, check out our community site: https://community.brave.com/ --> ### Description: Clearing Browsing history should clear tab history as well ### Steps to Reproduce 1. Visit sites in tabs 2. Open settings and clear data 3. Tab history is not cleared **Actual result:** <!-- Add screenshots if needed --> Clearing Browsing history should clear tab history as well **Expected result:** Tab history should be cleared **Reproduces how often:** [Easily reproduced, Intermittent Issue] Easy **Brave Version:** <!-- Provide full details Eg: v1.4.2(17.09.08.16) --> 1.20/1.21 **Device details:** <!-- Model type and iOS version Eg: iPhone 6s+ (iOS 10.3.3)--> All **Website problems only:** - did you check with Brave Shields down? NA - did you check in Safari/Firefox (WkWebView-based browsers)? NA ### Additional Information | Yes | Privacy feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/9306 | 709,966,277 | Poking ACL selection for private pokes is wrong | ### Bug Description When poking some contact privately, the poke should be delivered only to that account. Instead it is delivered to the ACL _default_ group of contacts. Also the poked person is not mentioned it seems. Here is the source of the poke. ``` [url=https://social.diekershoff.de/profile/tobias]Tobias[/url] stupste [url=]Michael Vogel[/url] ``` ### Steps to Reproduce 0. Define a default contact group for your postings in the settings, maybe... I have one 1. Start to poke somebody 2. Limit the audience to private 3. Do the poking Actual Result: The poke is posted to the default ACL group. Expected Result: Having the poke only distributed to the poked contact. ### Screenshots ![friendica-poke](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/433490/94396169-aa90bd80-0161-11eb-9c9e-4f80783d9bf5.png) ### Platform Info Friendica 2020.12-devf | Poking ACL selection for private pokes is wrong ### Bug Description When poking some contact privately, the poke should be delivered only to that account. Instead it is delivered to the ACL _default_ group of contacts. Also the poked person is not mentioned it seems. Here is the source of the poke. ``` [url=https://social.diekershoff.de/profile/tobias]Tobias[/url] stupste [url=]Michael Vogel[/url] ``` ### Steps to Reproduce 0. Define a default contact group for your postings in the settings, maybe... I have one 1. Start to poke somebody 2. Limit the audience to private 3. Do the poking Actual Result: The poke is posted to the default ACL group. Expected Result: Having the poke only distributed to the poked contact. ### Screenshots ![friendica-poke](https://user-images.githubusercontent.com/433490/94396169-aa90bd80-0161-11eb-9c9e-4f80783d9bf5.png) ### Platform Info Friendica 2020.12-devf | Yes | Privacy bug fix |
https://api.github.com/repos/returntocorp/semgrep-action/issues/66 | 708,486,059 | Remove privacy-sensitive findings fields from backend post | We should omit fields that are both: - sensitive - not necessary for backend operation Specifically, the `syntactic_context` field falls in this category. | Remove privacy-sensitive findings fields from backend post We should omit fields that are both: - sensitive - not necessary for backend operation Specifically, the `syntactic_context` field falls in this category. | Yes | Privacy bug fix |
https://api.github.com/repos/tianhaoz95/check-group/issues/26 | 706,594,137 | Privacy Policy | https://tianhaoz.com/check-group/#/privacy Description | Privacy Policy https://tianhaoz.com/check-group/#/privacy Description | Yes | Privacy feature |
https://api.github.com/repos/friendica/friendica/issues/9230 | 704,467,741 | Remove tracking pixels when importing feeds | I discovered that one of the feeds that I'm mirroring on one of my systems does contain some tracking pixel. So now pixels width the width and height of eine pixel will be removed. | Remove tracking pixels when importing feeds I discovered that one of the feeds that I'm mirroring on one of my systems does contain some tracking pixel. So now pixels width the width and height of eine pixel will be removed. | No | Bug fix |