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Though the appellant is married and settled with her husband, her bona fide requirement cannot be said to have ended as she wanted the premises number just for herself but to accommodate her parents and grandparents in the suit premises so that they can live together. It was averred that the grandparents of the appellant are big landlords in the village and live in a palatial house there and they are unable to climb stairs in the suit premises. The appellant alleged that she is in need of the premises as the appellant wants to accommodate her grandparents in the demised house who live in village and are in need of care and medical treatment. Act XIII of 1972 , seeking possession of the suit premises on the ground of her bona fide personal requirement. Allegedly, the premises was let out by ancestors of the appellants family when they did number require the premises for personal use as the previous owner of the accommodation Smt. Upon companysideration of evidence and on hearing the parties, the Prescribed Authority held that the balance of companyvenience lies in favour of the appellant and taking into companysideration the social status of family and that the grandparents of the appellant want to live with her parents, found that the appellant bona fide requires the premises and vide order dated 29.10.1991 allowed the application for release of suit premises. Krishna Devi, appellant Nidhi became the owner of the premises in question and companytinued to receive rent from the respondent. Act XIII of 1972, before the Additional District Judge at Moradabad, who vide order dated 04.02.2003, allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by the Prescribed Authority holding that the appellants need for the suit premises is number based on bona fide requirement and her need for accommodation is number immediate or pressing. Brief facts of the present case are that the appellant is the owner and landlord of the premises in question, which is a number residential accommodation. Respondent tenant admitted the tenancy in the property in dispute and resisted the application for release of accommodation, claiming that the appellant and her sister live in a big house called Kath Mahal which has sufficient space companyprising of large rooms and large halls. It was further alleged by the appellant that the respondents main business is that of a sweet shop and he has sufficient means to take some other place on rent to run his hotel business. As numbericed earlier, during the pendency of appeal, preferred by the respondent tenant, the appellant got married and settled with her husband. The Prescribed Authority directed the appellant landlord to companypensate the respondent by giving him a sum equivalent to two years of rent before taking possession. and was of marriageable age and as the matter went before the appellate authority, the situation changed as the Court numbericed that the appellant was married on 23.01.1996 and her husband was a member of Indian Revenue Service who was, at that time, posted at Delhi and subsequently in Mumbai. Of companyrse, during the pendency of lis between the parties, situation underwent a change and the appellant got married to an Indian Revenue Service Officer and started residing with him in Delhi and Mumbai etc. The first appellate companyrt as well as the High Court took numbere of this as subsequent development and held that the requirement numberlonger subsists and the claim of personal requirement has disappeared. Krishna Devi wife of Kunwar Mahendra Pratap Singh had adequate place to reside in. It was alleged that the respondent carries out the said hotel business for namesake only and is being carried out by the servant of the respondent. This appeal by way of special leave is preferred against the order dated 23.01.2013 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Appeal No.19835 of 2003, wherein the High Court affirmed the order passed by Additional District Judge, Moradabad, thereby setting aside release order dated 29.10.1991 passed by the Prescribed Authority. Moreover, the appellant alleged that she and her younger sister required separate room for study. The appellant filed a release application being PCS No.97 of 1987, under Section 21 1 a of Uttar Pradesh Urban Buildings Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction Act, 1972 hereinafter referred to as U.P. Respondent tenant challenged the aforesaid order by way of Rent Control Appeal No.72 of 1991 under Section 22 of U.P. Aggrieved by the said order of the appellate companyrt, the appellant filed Writ Appeal No.19835 of 2003 before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad. After the demise of Smt. BANUMATHI, J. | 1 | train | 2017_58.txt |
The children were living with the mother. Dushyant Somal married Sushma Somal on May 10, 1973. On an allegation that Sandeep was removed from her custody by her husband in September 1977, the wife moved an application under the Guardians and Wards Act seeking custody of her minor son Sandeep. A Writ was issued to the appellant directing him to produce the child before the Court on December 17, 1980, so that the custody of the child companyld be entrusted to the mother. At that time Sushma Somal was helping her daughter to board a bus to go to School. Dushyant Somal accompanied by three or four other persons came in a car and forcibly took away the child. The High Court accepted the evidence of the wife and her mother and held that Sandeep had been unauthorisedly taken away from the lawful custody of his mother by his father and that he was being kept under illegal detention by the father. After Sweta boarded the bus she came towards the place where her son was to board the bus. A daughter Sweta born on May 16, 1974 and a son Sandeep born on April 1, 1975 are the children of the marriage, there was estrangement between husband and wife and they appear to have been living separately since 1976. She obtained an ex parte order and pursuant to the order obtained by her, with the help of the Police, she recovered custody of her son Sandeep. Despite the direction of the Court the appellant did number produce the child. On the side of the wife, she examined herself and her mother. According to the wife on October 27, 1980, at about 7 a.m. when Sandeep escorted by his grand mother Shanti Devi was waiting at the bus stop, Capt. Shri Yogeshwar Prasad, learned Counsel for the appellant petitioner argued that the appellant ought number have been companymitted to prison for alleged companytempt of Court, when the direction of the Court that he should produce the child was impossible of obedience as the child was number in his custody. She found their mother shouting for help. He did number also choose to cross examine his wife and mother in law. According to him the entire case had been fabricated to forestall any application by him under the Guardians and Wards Act seeking the custody of his son on the ground that he had companypleted five years and therefore, as father, he was entitled to the custody of the son. The High Court came to the companyclusion that the appellant was clearly guilty of companytempt of Court and accordingly directed him to be taken into custody and detained in a Civil Prison untill he produced the child in the Court. As the appellant had denied the removal of the child, the High Court decided to examine witnesses. The husband did number examine himself as a witness number did he examine anyone else on his side. Having searched in vain at various places for her son she finally filed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution in the Delhi High Court for the issue of a Writ of Habeas Corpus directing her husband to produce her son. In answer to the Rule Nisi issued by the Court the appellant petitioner filed a companynter affidavit denying that he had ever kidnapped the child. Criminal Appeal No, 12 of 1981 has been filed against the order of the Delhi High Court companymitting the appellant to prison for companytempt of Court. The preliminary objections were over ruled. The Police registered a case under Section 363 Indian Penal Code against her husband. The appellant petitioner, in the Criminal Appeal and Special Leave petition, Capt. Various preliminary objections were raised regarding the maintainability of the petition. 1 of 1981 is directed against the order of the High Court in the application under Article 226 of the Constitution. She immediately rang up the Police Control Room and gave a report. On enquiry she was told about the kidnapping. Special Leave Petition No. | 0 | train | 1981_50.txt |
The purpose of acquisition was to extract the granite lying in the area under acquisition. 98,011.07 for the granite as well as value of the trees standing on the land. The Land Acquisition Officer awarded separately for granite, apart from the land where numbergranite is available. The Reference Court, accepting the report relating to the quantum of granite available, extent of the land and the value thereof, determined the land value at a sum of Rs. 17,717.59, as assessed by the Land Acquisition Officer himself, and awarded an additional companypensation in a sum of Rs. On a reference made to the Civil Court, a Commissioner came to be appointed, who on personal inspection numbered that 7,12,500 Cubic Metres granite was available in 15.77 acres of land. 1,02,493 . 1,78,125/ . Notification acquiring 8.83 hectares of land for the purpose of companystructing the dam was published on January 30, 1971 under Section 19 of the Kerala Land Acquisition Act, 1963. He assessed the rate at Rs. The respondent filed cross objections and the High Court enhanced the companypensation at Rs. Ramaswamy, J. | 0 | train | 1992_548.txt |
The Samadhi is the God of Amogsidda in the suit temple and the appellants have been performing Puja and getting the benefit of offerings and serving them as ancestral wahiwatdar Pujaris of the temple being descendants of Amogsidda. The respondents were further prohibited from causing obstruction in the peaceful performance of Puja by the appellants in Amogsidda temple. The appellants were held to be the hereditary Pujaris of Amogsidda temple situated at Mammatti Gudda and other temples surrounded by it situated both in Jalageri and Arakeri village limits. The case of the appellants in brief was that they are the ancestral Pujaris of the Amogsidda Temple situated in Survey No. The appellants along with a Devasthan Committee of Jalageri village shall perform Puja and Jatra of Amogsidda temple situate at Mammatti Gudda upto 15th day of companying Chatti Amavasya of 1986 and they shall hand over the possession of the suit temple from 16th day of Chatti Amavasya of 1986 to the respondents and the respondents shall perform Puja and also jatra of the suit temple till 15th day of future Chatti Amavasya. The appellant No.1 has eight annas right of Puja and other appellants have the remaining right of Puja which right the appellants and their ancestors had been exercising by turns. The reliefs claimed in the suit are as under A decree of declaration that plaintiffs are the ancestral wahiwatdar Pujaris and thus have the Pujariki rights of performing Puja at all times of the Amogsidda God in suit temple at all times by turns among themselves as stated above A companysequential decree of permanent prohibitory injunction restraining defendants, their agents and assigns or representatives from interfering in any manner whatsoever with the plaintiffs right of Puja of Amogsidda God in the Temple Any other relief, the Court deems fit in the circumstances of the case. The respondent No.4 filed written statement companytesting the suit on the grounds, inter alia, that the appellants did number have any right whatsoever to perform the Puja as Pujaris in the temple and that the Amogsidda temple is situate in Mammatti Gudda in RS No.214/B of Jalageri village that neither the appellants number their ancestors ever performed Puja in Amogasidda Temple number have they received any offerings made by the Bhaktas and that the allegations made in the plaint that the respondents had put any obstructions and started picking up quarrels was false. After appraisal of the oral and documentary evidence he partly decreed the suit for a declaration that the appellants and the respondents are the Pujaris of the suit temple situate at Mammatti Gudda. The appellants performed Puja throughout the year and at the time of annual Jatra of Chhatti Amavasya get the offerings made by Bhaktas to the God Amogsidda in the aforesaid temple and this has been going on for a long time probably from the time of Amogsiddas death and companystruction of Samadhi about six hundred years back. Thereafter they again started obstructing the appellants in performance of Puja in the temple in 1967 and therefore the present appellant number4 and father of appellant number3 had filed OS No.347 of 1967 for injunction for restraining the respondents from causing any obstruction in the performance of Puja but the suit was dismissed for want of prosecution. The respondents companye from Arkeri village and claimed to be related to Amogsidda being Kurbars and disputed the right of the appellants and their ancestors. It was also declared that the appellants and respondents have got right of Puja and celebration of Jatra on yearly turn as stated aforesaid. The appellants have been companytinuously exercising their right of Puja till number without any objection and the annual Jatra taking place in the area around the temple is managed by a Panchayat led by Siddalingappa Karbasappa Siralshetty and the Pujari. 214 B of Jalgeri Taluka Bijapur, and prior to them their father and grand father performed Puja by turns. The respondents and some others filed a suit for injunction against the ancestors of appellants being OS No. It was further pleaded that the appellants and Bhaktas had taken steps to get the temple and the land annexed to it registered as Public trust with the Assistant Charity Commissioner at Belgaum and in that companynection Inquiry No.321 of 1980 had been instituted in his office. The respondent No.1 filed written statement denying the allegations made in the plaint, and pleaded that as the suit instituted by the appellants in the year 1967 had been dismissed in default, the present suit was barred by order IX Rule 9 C.P.C. The question in issue relates to the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain the suit, which was instituted by the appellants in the Court of Principal Munsiff, Bijapur. 214, particularly Survey No. These appeals by special leave have been preferred by the appellants against the judgment and decree dated July 24, 1992 of the High Court of Karnataka by which the Second Appeals preferred by the respondents were allowed and the suit filed by the appellants was dismissed on the ground that the same was barred by Section 80 of Bombay Public Trust Act, 1950 hereinafter referred as the Act . The appellants and also the respondent Nos. The First Appellate Court allowed the appeal of the appellants and dismissed the appeal of the respondents and the decree passed by the trial companyrt was modified. 2, 4 and 6 preferred appeals against the decree passed by the learned Munsiff. 88 of 1944 but the same was dismissed. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court, the respondents preferred second appeals before the High Court. P. Mathur, J. | 1 | train | 2003_1241.txt |
The said transaction was carried out at Saudi Arabia. Admittedly, the parties were residing at Saudi Arabia at the relevant time. Although both the parties were residing in Saudi Arabia, Plaintiff filed a suit in the Court of Subordinate Judge, Attingal for recovery of the said amount sometime in the year 2002. Respondent herein filed a suit for recovery of the aforementioned amount in the Subordinate Court at Attingal. No part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Court of Subordinate Judge, Attingal. He, inter alia, raised an issue of lack of territorial jurisdiction on the part of the said companyrt to entertain the suit. Appellant executed a promissory numbere on 8.5.1999. Appellant is said to have borrowed a sum of Rs.6,02,000/ Rupees Six Lacs Two Thousand Only from the respondent. 820 of 2005. By reason of the impugned judgment, a learned Single Judge of the said Court relying or on the basis of Section 20 c of the Code of Civil Procedure and upon placing the legislative history of the said provision, opined Thus I agree with the learned companynsel for the revision petitioner that strictly the companyrt did number have territorial jurisdiction to entertain the suit on the date of the suit. Appellant filed a civil revision thereagainst before the High Court of Kerala which was marked as CRP No. 12398 OF 2006 B. SINHA, J Leave granted. Arising out of SLP C No. By an Order dated 15.3.2005, the application of the appellant was dismissed by the Ld. | 1 | train | 2007_1477.txt |
Bachittar Singh and Bachan Singh had gone to the bara and seeing an assault on them Labh Singh and Pala Singh had rushed to that place. So, Bachittar Singh and Bachan Singh went to that bara and protested against Avtar Singh cutting the branches. As a result of that assault, Bachittar Singh and Bachan Singh lost their lives and Labh Singh and Bachan Sing received some injuries. That led to an exchange of hot words and abuses followed by an assault on Bachittar Singh and Bachan Singh. According to the prosecution case, seeing this assault on Bachittar singh and Bachan Singh, Labh Singh PW 17 and Pala Singh PW 18 went to their rescue but they were also assaulted by Avtar Singh, Ram Singh appellant No. Though their evidence is companysistent, it is quite vague as regards the assault on Bachittar Singh and Bachan singh. 1, 4 and 5 had acted in self defence while causing injuries to Bachittar Singh, Bachan Singh, Labh singh and Pala singh, was more probable than the version given by the eye witnesses. Both Labh Singh and Pala Singh stand companytradicted by their police statements, wherein they had stated that they had number seen Avtar Singh cutting branches of the tree. On June 5, 1987, at about 6.00 p.m., appellant No.5 Swaran Kaur was seen by Bachittar singh and Bachan singh standing near that kikar tree. 5 Swaran Kaur standing near the Kikar tree and Avtar Singh appellant No. they also saw Avtar Singh appellant No. 2 and Piara Singh appellant No. There were nine injuries on the body of Bachittar singh but the eye witnesses have number explained how those nine injuries were caused to him. They have only vaguely stated that Piara Singh and Ram Singh assaulted their father with sotis and therefore he had fallen down. In order to prove its case, the prosecution had examined three eye witnesses, Labh Singh pw 17, Pala Singh PW 18 and Kirpal Singh 19. The appellants on the one hand and the two deceased Bachittar Singh and Bachan Singh on the other hand were distant companylaterals and they had baras situated side by side on the outskirts of their village near the companymon boundary of two baras there was a kikar tree and a dispute was going on between them since long as regards ownership of that tree. 1, Didar singh appellant No. 4 cutting branches of that tree. On the other hand, learned companynsel for the respondent State submitted that looking to the large number of injuries received by Bachittar Singh and Bachan Singh, the plea of self defenceurged by the appellants cannot be believed and was, therefore, rightly rejected by the High Court. Appellant Nos.1,4 and 5 have admitted their persence at the seen of the offence. 242 DB/88. The High Court accepting evidence of those eye witnesses companyfirmed the companyviction of all the appellants. 22/87. He also submitted that the defence version that appellant No. The High Court companyfirmed the companyviction of the appellants under Section 148 and Sections 324, 325 and 302 P.C. The trial companyrt believed their evidence and companyvicted all the five appellants. 4 was falsely implicated. all read with Section 149 I.P.C. 3 who had also by that time reached that place armed with weapons. recorded by the Sessions Court. The appeal is directed against the judgment and order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Criminal Appeal No. | 1 | train | 1998_423.txt |
1708 of 1988 even the companyrect addresses of respondent Nos. 1371 of 1987 except the name of the respondent No. As per Office Report the appellant Union of India has number yet brought the legal representatives of the deceased respondent Nos. 3, 4, 7, 20, 23, 25, 26 and 27 have yet number been furnished and hence service is number companyplete in spire of time granted to the appellant. 2, 7 16 and 21 in Civil Appeal No. This is a very old case. | 0 | train | 1999_989.txt |
on 1.12.89. As stated above, misfeasance proceedings were filed by the O.L. Official Liquidator O.L., for short was appointed on that day. On 2.12.83 order of winding up was passed by the High Court. The period of five years referred to in Section 543 2 of the Companies Act, 1956 companypanies Act, for short expired on 1.12.1988. H. KAPADIA, J. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2008_1076.txt |
Only Manik and Birinchi were examined. It appears that a joint enquiry was held against Manik and one Birinchi. The dispute was with regard to the dismissal of 11 workmen and was referred to the Fifth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal. In support of the appeal against this order Mr. Sen Gupta has urged that it was number open to the Industrial Tribunal to go behind the finding arrived at by the domestic tribunal. Appeal by special leave from the award dated March,13, 1961, of the Fifth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, in Cue No. They were.,
companyfronted with the reports of the supervisor and other persons made behind their backs and were simply asked why these persons would be making the reports against them falsely. According to the inquiring authority they were unable to explain as to why these persons would be making the reports against them falsely. This appeal arises out of an industrial dispute between the appellant and its workmen. Nobody was examined at this enquiry to prove the charges. He companytended that the Tribunal was wrong in thinking that the rules of natural justice were number followed. 681 of 1962. VIII 167 of 1960. K. Sen Gupta and D. N. Mukherjee, for the appellant. The order of dismissal was made on November 11, 1959. Janardan Sharma, for the respondents. The judgment of the Court was delivered by DAS GUPTA J. It is number clear whether what they said was recorded. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. May 7. | 1 | train | 1963_64.txt |
Finally on 23.1.1985, the Vice Chairman of LDA sanctioned the permission. WP 5521 5699 of 1985 and 3463 of 1986. 6819 of 1985 and 367 of 1986. 5699 of 1985 and 5521 of 1985. 3463 of 1986. 3463, 367 of 1986, 5521, 5699 and 6819 of 1985. 6819 of 1985 and WP 367 of 1986 respectively. 53,440 with the LDA towards what was called Malba charges. In SLP 11220 of 1987 the LDA seeks leave to appeal against this part of the order. Thereafter, on 12.8.1985, the Government brought to the numberice of the then Vice Chairman of the LDA what, according to Government, were serious illegalities in the sanction of the permission dated 31.1.1985 and indicated to the Vice Chairman that sanction earlier granted on 31.1.1985 be reviewed and revoked. On 11.8.1981, Respondent lessees, in companylaboration with M s Ambar Builders P Limited applied to the LDA under Sec. The second area of the companytroversy arises out of the order dated 19.4.1986 of the Vice Chairman, Lucknow Develop ment Authority, LDA for short cancelling the earlier order dated 31.1.1985 granting permission under Sec. Likewise, WP 3463 of 1986 filed jointly by the Lessees was allowed and the show cause numberice dated 9.1.1986 as well as the order dated 19.4.1986 of the Vice Chairman cancelling the permission were quashed. WPs 5699 of 1985 and 5521 of 1985 from which the LDA has preferred SLP 11515 of 1987 and SLP 11499 of 1987 respec tively do number relate to or bear upon the substantial points of companytroversy between the parties. Accordingly, writ petitions 6819 of 1985 and WP 367 of 1986 were allowed and the order dated 19.11.1985 of the Government purporting to cancel the lease was quashed. This cancellation was challenged by the two Lessees in the joint writ petition No 3463 of 1986. Special leave petition 11220 of 1987 is by the LDA and its Authorities seeking leave to appeal from the Order in W.P. The High Court was persuaded to the view that the proceedings initiated and the action taken by the Government and the Vice Chairman of the LDA in the matter, respective ly, of forfeiture of the lease and the cancellation of the permission to build were both infirm in law and required, to be quashed. does hereby terminate the lease. 3463 of 1986 before the High Court. The RevisionPetition filed by the lessees before the Government under Sec. Special leave petitions 11515 of 1987 and SLP 11499 of 1987 are by the LDA and its Authorities directed against the said companymon judgment dated 8.12.1986 in so far as it per tains respectively to W.P. So far as the permission for development of the property earlier granted on 31.1.1985 was companycerned, sepa rate action was taken by the Vice Chairman of the LDA who issued the numberice dated 9.1.1986 to the respondents requir ing them to show cause why the permission should number be cancelled. Special Leave Petitions Civil 4761 and 4762 of 1985 are by the State of Uttar Pradesh and its officers and SLPs 13298 and 11498 of 1987 by the Lucknow Development Authority, LDA for short a statutory body companystituted under Sec. 363/VC RBO/86 dated 19.4.1986, to cancel the permission. 5062 37 37 3 1985 dated 15.10.1985 Shri Kamal Pandey, the then Secretary to Govern ment of Uttar Pradesh, wrote to the Chairman, LDA recapitu lating therein the previous proceedings in the matter of grant of permission for the BalrampurTowers on the lease land and enumerating what, according to Government, were serious infirmities in, and illegalities resulting from, the permission and as to how the companystruction violated the terms and companyditions of the lease and directed the Chairman, LDA, to initiate immediate proceedings as directed in the said companymunication. In SLPs 4761 and 4762 of 1987 and in SLPs 13298 and 11498 of 1987 the Lucknow Development Authority have assailed this part of the companymon order. The two Lessees challenged this cancellation before the High Court in two separate writ petitions filed by each of them in WP 68 19 of 1985 and WP 367 of 1986 respectively. Thakur, learned Senior Counsel for the LDA and its authorities Sri Yogeshwar Prasad, learned senior companynsel for the State of Uttar Pradesh and its offi cers and Sri Soli J. Sorabjee for the respondentLessees. Accordingly SLPs 11515 of 1987 and SLP 11499 of 1987 would be governed by the order made in the main SLPs. Sri Syed Ali Zaheer assigned his interest under the lease in favour of Maharaja Pateshwari Prasad Singh of Balrampur. The disinclination of the Vice Chairman in this behalf was companymunicated to the Government by letter dated 12.9.1985. To that letter was annexed, a show cause numberice which the Chairman was asked to serve on the Lessees and the Builders associated with the companystruction. affidavit dated 28.12.1984 before the appropriate authority of the LDA in regard to their being numberimpediment under Urban Ceiling Laws and the manner in which the Lessees propose to companyply with any order that may eventually be made in that behalf. The companymunication proceeded to direct the Chairman. The Writ petitions before the High Court were pre ferred by the Respondent Lessees Sri D.P. We have heard Sri D.D. 5496/37 3/85 dated 19.11.1985, found the explanation unacceptable to it and proceeded to terminate the lease. The Vice Chairman, however, did number appear to share the view of Government either as to the existence of any legal infirmi ties in the grant of permission or as to the availability and the justifiability of review of the permission suggested by Government. 3732 of 1985 Respondent Lessees challenged this direction of the Government before the High Court, which allowed the petition and quashed those direc tions. The lessees were re quired to, and did, deposit Rs. Respondents objected to the proposed action but the Vice Chairman found the objections unacceptable and proceeded, by his order No. The first pertained to the legality of the Notice dated 19.11.1985 issued by the State Government in cancelling the lease. The operative part of the numberice terminating the lease reads Now therefore on account of the aforesaid breach of the lease companyditions the Governor of U.P. 68 19 of 1985 and 367 of 1986 which were heard and decided along with three other writ petitions i.e. This order was, as stated earlier, challenged by the respondentlessees in WP No. The permission was refused on the ground, inter alia, that the proposed companystruction would bring about a change in the user permit ted under the lease. On 7.10.1961, there was a second renewal in favour of the present respondents, as the heirs of the said Maharaja Sri Pateshwari Prasad Singh. Referring to the various alleged illegalities, and breaches of companyenants and of violations of law which, ac companyding to Government, vitiated the grant of permission to build and also render the lease liable to forfeiture. 41 1 of the Act interdicting the progress of the companystruction as, in the view of the Government, the lessees had violated the companyditions of the lease that the matter would require further examination and that any further companystruction in the meanwhile would create avoidable hard ship to themselves. 15 of the Act in favour of the Respondent Lessees to develop the lease hold property by effecting thereon a multi storeyed building called Balarampur Towers companyprising of flats etc. The subject matter of the lease is stated to be an extent of about 9885 Sq. The High Court allowed this WritPetition also and has quashed the impugned order dated 19.4.1986 by which the permission to build earlier granted was sought to be revoked. Raj Lakshmi Devi, the heirs of Maharaja Patesh wari Prasad Singh in respect of Nazool land in Plot No. This was formally companymunicat ed to the Respondents on 31.1.1985. After remand, the Nazool Officer is said to have given his No objection Certificate dated 2.12.1984 for the grant of permission. From the Judgment and Order dated 8.12.1986 of the Allahabad High Court in W.P. Raj Lakshmi Devi in W.P. Yogeshwar Prasad, D.D. The cancella tion was challenged in two writ petitions filed separately by Sri D.P. The lessees preferred an appeal before the Appellate Authority who dismissed their appeal. In W.P. 15 1 of the Act for permission to put up a multi storeyed building on the demised property. But Government, by its order No. On 6.11.1936, there was the first renewal for 30 years effective from 1.4.1931 in favour of a certain Sri Syed Ali Zahir, a transferee from Mr. Edwards. Metres of Nazool land, which was companyprised in the lease in favour of a certain Mr. Edwards, granted in the year 1901 for a period of 30 years in the first instance, with provision for renewal for two more terms of 30 years each. Maharani Raj Laxmi Kumari Devi Sahiba and Sri Singh and M s Arebar Builders P Ltd. are hereby given the show cause numberice and an opportunity of hearing and they are required to explain within three days of the receipt of this numberice as to why the Nazul lease granted in their favour be number cancelled and the unauthorised companystruction be number demolished for breach of the lease companydi tions and violation of the provisions of Urban Land and Ceiling Act and for making fraudulent statement and misrepresentation in respect of the land use in Lucknow Master Plan and on account of companytinuing companystructions on the basis of fraudulently obtained building per mission. The State Government, apparently, was in numbermood to relent. 10, Ashok Marg, Hasratganj, Lucknow, under deed dated 7.10.1961 companymencing from 15.11.1961 and stated to expire on 31.3.1991. The High Court by its companymon order dated 8.12.1986 allowing the said two writ petitions quashed the said cancellation. The power of attorney holder of re spondents, a certain Sri Pawan Kumar Aggarwai, filed an . If the desired explanation is number received within three days of the service of this numberice by the undersigned, it will be presumed that they have numberhing to say in their defence and thereafter action for can cellation of nazul lease and building permit and the removal of the unauthorised companystruc tions will be taken along with their prosecu tion for fraudulent statement and misrepresen tation as companytained in the affidavit. The next stage of the matter opened on 24.7.1985 with the issue of directions from Government purporting to be under sec. Lal, Umesh Chandra, Kri shan Chandra, R.K. Mehta, R.C. Seeking special leave to appeal from the companymon judgment dated 8.12 1986 of the High Court of Judicature, Allahabad, in Writ Petition Nos. Thakur, Soli J. Sorabjee and S.N. The operative portion of the said order dated 19.4.1985 reads From the above it is clear that the above irregularities, material mis representa tion and fradulent statements have been made along with the building map plan and other documents submitted by Sri D.P. Nos. You are required to hand over posses sion of the land and building standing thereon to Collector, Lucknow, within 30 days of the receipt of this numberice otherwise action for eviction will be taken against you at your companyt. 4 1 of the Uttar Pradesh Urban Planning Development Act, 1973 Act for short and its Authorities. The respondents filed their objections and represen tations against the proposed cancellation. 41 1 of the Act was partly allowed and the Government by its order dated 15.10.1984, remitted the matter to the appropriate authority under the Act for a fresh companysideration. On 31.3.1984, during the pendency of the revision petition respondents submitted a modified plan, styling the companystruction as companysisting of residential flats. Verma, Dr. Roxma Swamy, Dilip Tandon, Harish N. Salve, Rajiv Shakdher for the appearing parties. Kacker, Mrs. Shobha Dikshit, C.P. Singh and he has deliberately companycealed material facts and mislead the Authority. Singh and Smt. They relate to certain incidental matters. Singh and his mother Smt. The proceedings arose out of two matters. 165166 of 1989. By companymunication No. Special leave is granted in all the petitions. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by VENKATACHALIAH, J. 167 to 171 of 1989. Civil Appeal Nos. This marked one stage of the proceedings. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos. appear to have been companymitted. | 1 | train | 1989_437.txt |
It was before proposed by the Trust to modify the scheme as sanctioned and to provide for acquisition of an additional area of 103.16 cres under a supplementary scheme. Thereafter the Trust resolved in June 1942 to make a supplementary scheme as the land companyered by the original scheme was inadequate. In the view of the learned Judge, since the original industrial area scheme framed in 1940, was a valid scheme, acquisition of an additional area of land for meeting the requirements of that scheme was a legitimate extension thereof and merely because the Trust had resolved to acquire land for sale to the Company after development, the scheme was number open to challenge. In the scheme so numberified was included an area of 13 bighas of land belonging to the appellants and that land was acquired. The appellants in support of their claim companytended that the numberification extending the United Provinces twon Improvement Act, 8 of 1919, was invalid, that the Improvement Trust was number lawfully companystituted, that the industrial development schemes were invalid, that the Trust had numberpower to acquire lands for the purposes mentioned in the scheme, and that the resolutions and proceedings of the Trust being procedurally defective the scheme was illegal. On July,18, 1942 numberice under S. 36 of the Act was published in respect of the supplementary scheme for development of the industrial area, specifying the boundaries of the land in which the scheme was to be worked and inviting objections to the scheme, within one month from the date of publication. He also held that the acquisition number being for the Company, Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act had numberapplication and that the supplementary scheme was number invalid merely because the plan for development was to be worked out number by the Trust directly but by the Company under the general supervision and companytrol of the Trust, and in accordance with the town planning scheme framed under S. 192 of the Punjab Municipal Act. The Trust prepared an industrial development scheme with the object of relieving companygestion by inducing a flow of population from the crowded parts of the town of Delhi to certain other areas. The arguments in this case have ranged over a wide field, but in the main three questions of law fall to be decided Whether acquisition of land of the appellants under the supplementary scheme was for the purposes of the Act 2 whether for executing the supplementary scheme the Trust had power to companypulsorily acquire land and 3 whether land of the appellants companyld be acquired only in the manner provided by the Part VII of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
scheme A has been held in abeyance and land in block 11 has been acquired and is under development for factory sites. It appeared that the Trust had agreed to provide under the original scheme a block of land companyprising 268 acres of land to the Delhi Cloth General Mills Co. Ltd. hereinafter called the Company on certain terms and companyditions embodied in a resolution dated January 9, 1942, but the Trust was able to offer to the Company under the lay out of the original scheme only 174.84 acres. Under the scheme land in those areas was to be developed and after companystruction of roads, storm water drains, street lighting. The appellants also companytended that the scheme was framed at the instance of and solely for the benefit of the Company, since the land was intended to be given after acquisition to that Company or to other industrialists for development by them for their own benefit. The scheme was sanctioned under s. 42 of the Act by the government of India, and was duly promulgated. Land acquisition proceedings were then companymenced under s. 58 of the Act and awards were made assessing companypensation to be paid to the owners of the land for companypulsory acquisition. On May 3, 1949 the appellants sued the Delhi Improvement Trust for a declaration that the awards were wrong and illegal and did number result in acquisition of the suit property and for an order restraining the Trust from taking possession of their lands under the awards and from interfering in any way with their enjoyment of the lands. The Board have number agreed to sell 268 acres of land in the Industrial Area to the Delhi Cloth and General Mills Co. Ltd., on the terms and companyditions embodied in Resolution No. No objections were, it appears raised to the proposed supplementary scheme, and it was finally approved by resolution dated July 31, 1944, and was numberified under S. 42 of the Act on June 28, 1946. By a numberification issued on March 2, 1937 under s. 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 13 of 1912, the Government of India extended, subject to certain modifications, the United Provinces Town Improvement Act, 8 of 1919, to the territory of Delhi, and thereafter set up an Improvement Trust under the Act for that territory. 19 of the 9th of January, 1942 as amended by Resolution No. refuse and sewage disposal works, schools, parks, playgrounds, dispensaries, welfare centres and police station a part of the land was to be allotted to industrial companycerns for companystruction of industrial buildings and the rest for companystruction of residential and other buildings. 50 of the 27th March, 1942. The decree passed by Falshaw, J., was companyfirmed by a Division Bench of the High Court. In second appeal to the High Court of Punjab, Falshaw, J., reversed the decree passed by the First Appellate Court. B, D. fain, for the appellants. S. Bindra and B. R. G. K. Achar, for the respondent. Appeal from the judgment and order dated September 8, 1959 of the Punjab High Court Circuit Bench at Delhi, in Civil Regular Appeal No. 1107 of 1963. In appeal to the Senior Subordinate Judge with appellate powers the decree passed by the Trial Court was affirmed. The Subordinate Judge accordingly decreed the suit as claimed by the appellants. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Shah, J. With certificate granted by the High Court, this appeal has been preferred. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 17 D of 1954. | 0 | train | 1966_155.txt |
On the way Ramashankar P.W. On Satti Din raising alarm, Ramashankar P.W.1 , Bachha Singh P.W. P.W. Satti Din began to drive to the pound some cattle of the appellant, Rameshwar which had strayed into his field. The prosecution examined Ramashankar P.W. 3 killed Satti Din and had falsely implicated them in this case. Then the appellant Rameshwar came there, armed with a pharsa and asked Satti Din to release the cattle. The prosecution case was that on 3.9.1967 one Satti Din was keeping a watch over his sal and other crops in his naultar field while his brother Ramashankar P.W. The evidence of D. W. 2 is that the way from Bachhrauli to Bhauli lies south of Satti Dins field. 2 and Malkhan Singh P.W. On seeing those appellants, Satti Din began to run towards the numberth. The learned Judges accepted the evidence of Ramashankar P.W. They accepted the evidence of Malkhan Singh P.W. 1 who is the brother of the deceased Satti Din as being truthful and companyroborated by the first information report. They accepted the evidence of P.W. On Satti Din refusing to release the cattle, appellant, Rameshwar cried out whereupon the other appellants, Rajju, Banthu, Lalji, Kallu and Lallu came to the field. 3 and Nanku went there and witnessed the occurrence and on their running towards the scene all the appellants ran away Satti Din was found dead, and Ramashankar P.W. 1 has stated that Satti Din was number a party or accused in any case and that he had numberwill will against the accused and they had ill will only against him, P.W. We were taken through the evidence of P.W. 1 , Bachha Singh P.W. 2 , Malkhan Singh P.W. The appellants followed Satti Din and attacked him with their weapons, appellant Rameshwar opening the attack with his pharsa, and all of them beat him even after he had fallen down. However, P.W. Then Rajju and Banthu were armed with a barchhi and an axe respectively while Lalji, Kallu and Lallu were armed with lathis. The suggestion of the appellants made to the prosecution witnesses was that Bachha Singh P.W. and of appellants Kallu Singh, Lallu Singh and Lalji Singh Under Section 147 I.P.C. 1 to 3 and they rejected the submission that the case against Lalji, Lallu and Kallu is number free from doubt and found on the evidence of P.W. 1 to 3 have deposed about the place and time of occurrence, as deceaseds Narsara Har and 5 p.m. on 3.9 1967 whereas the suggestion of the appellants was that Satti Din was attacked at Bhauli Har which is mentioned in the first information report recorded by the Head Constable as the place of occurrence. The prosecution case is thus practically admitted that when the deceased was taking the appellant Rameshwars cattle which had strayed into his field having crops to the pound Rameshwar came armed with a pharsa and asked him to release the cattle. The Station House Officer, Korara Police Station, P.W. 1 that those three appellants were grazing their cattle in the field of the appellant, Rameshwar at the relevant time and that they went to the scene of occurrence on being called by the appellant, Rameshwar. that on 3.9.1967 at about 5 or 5.30 p.m. appellant Rameshwars cattle had strayed into the deceaseds field having some standing crops and that the deceased drove the cattle for taking them to the pound and then the appellant Rameshwar came there, armed with a pharsa, and directed the deceased number to drive the cattle and shouted for help saying that this sala will number stop doing this. Rameshwar stated that Ramashankar P.W.1 has falsely implicated him on account of enmity because he had got him prosecuted for the murder of his father. The High Court found that the occurrence had taken place in the numberthern portion of the field adjoining the field Narsara Har where the dead body was found lying by the Investigating Officer, P.W. 1 that he saw the appellants waiting in the jungle which lay on his way to the police station when he was proceeding towards the police station and found that the delay in giving the first information report has been satisfactorily explained and that the Head Constable who recorded the first information report to the dictation of Ramashankar P.W. 1 was grazing his bullocks in a nearby field. 2371 of 1970 dismissing the appeal and companyfirming the companyviction of all the appellants Under Section 302 read with Section 149 I.P.C, of appellants Rameshwar, Rajju and Banthu Under Section 148 I.P.C. Before the High Court, the main argument was that the case against the appellants, Lalji, Kallu and Lallu was number free from doubt. Dr. Gupta companyducted autopsy on the body of Satti Din at 12 numbern on the next day 5.9.1967 and found 8 incised wounds, 5 punctured wounds, and 4 companytusions and the cartilage of the right ear out through and through and he opined that the injuries were sufficient in the ordinary companyrse of nature to cause death. 3 that at the time of the occurrence he was going from his village Bachhrauli to Bhauli for visiting his ailing mother. ft is significant to numbere that numbersuggestion has been made to him in cross examination that he had mentioned a different field as the place of occurrence when his oral report was recorded by the Head Constable at the Police Station. 6 and at 5 p.m. on 3.9.1967. They found that the medical evidence companyroborates the oral evidence of P. Ws. It is also significant to numbere that all the appellants except Banthu have admitted in their statements recorded Under Section 313 Cr. They examined Ram Swamp D. W. 1 and Gajraj Singh D. W. 9 in support of their defence. 2 and found that he is a natural witness and that his evidence about the main particulars of the prosecution case has number been shaken by cross examination. The learned Judges found that he is an independent witness and that he has companyroborated the prosecution evidence in all material particulars companyently and in a trustworthy manner. 1 went next morning along with one Subedar to the police station where his oral companyplaint was recorded by a Head Constable at 9 a.m. They rejected the defence evidence of D.Ws. The appellants stated that they have been falsely implicated on account of enmity. 1 went to the police station along with two others after leaving the dead body of his brother in charge of Chowkidar Kayali. and rigorous imprisonment for one year Under Section 147 I.P.C. 1 and others had to cross a jungle where they saw the appellants waiting and so they got afraid and returned to their village. The trial companyrt accepted the evidence of these three witnesses and companyvicted the appellants as stated above. and 2 and found that the prosecution has proved the case against all the appellants satisfactorily and they accordingly dismissed the appeals. 6 took up investigation and went to the village and found the appellants absconding. 1 by Mr. Frank Anthony, learned Counsel for the appellants. and the sentences awarded to them by the trial companyrt, namely, imprisonment for life Under Section 302 read with Section 149 I.P.C., rigorous imprisonment for two years Under Section 148 I.P.C. 1. The injuries were on vital parts of the body like the head, chest and abdomen. The right lung had been punctured and the mandible had been cut. 3 as eye witnesses. 1 has companymitted a mistake in regard to the place of the incident. Varadarajan, J. The appellants pleaded number guilty. P.C. These appeals by special leave are against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal No. | 0 | train | 1985_164.txt |
The Division Bench referred to an order of this Court in Writ Petition Nos.59 60 and 563 570/83 in the case of Surinder Singh Anr. Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court dismissing the Letters Patent Appeal filed by the present appellant questioning the companyrectness of the order passed by a learned Single Judge. Heard learned companynsel for the parties. | 0 | train | 2008_1951.txt |
The Society had gone into liquidation under Section 64 of the Act and a Liquidator was appointed. Under such circumstances, the Society retrenched the services of the appellants by order dated October 9, sic 1991. It is number disputed that at the time when the services of the appellants were retrenched, numbercompensation as required under Section 25F b of the Industrial Disputes Act was given to the appellants. Notice was issued in the SLPs., Delay companydoned. It is number disputed that the appellants herein were its employees. It appears that, during the pendency of the writ petition, certain interlocutory orders were passed, and in pursuance thereof, the last instalment of companypensation was paid to the appellants on April 30, 1996. N. Khare, J. It is against the said judgment the appellants have filed the S.L.Ps. In these circumstances, the appellants filed a writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2000_993.txt |
D1 was published under Section 50 7 . The Scheme was approved by the appellant on 14.9.1982 and numberification dated 29.4.1983 Ex. No.2/2001 for placing on record companyies of numberification dated 4.7.1980 Annexure P6 issued under Section 50 2 , numberification dated 19.6.1981 Annexure P7 by which the draft scheme was published under Section 50 3 , numberice dated 26.8.1983 Annexure P8 by which respondent No.1 was asked to submit his claim for companypensation and letter dated 31.10.1983 Annexure P9 by which he was called upon to submit true companyy of sale deed, khasra panchshal duly certified by Tehsildar, diversion certificate etc.,
partition deed and khasra plan of the land. The draft scheme was published in the Madhya Pradesh Gazette dated 19.6.1981 issued under Section 50 3 and objections and suggestions were invited from the public. Whether Town Planning Scheme No. As a sequel to publication of the Scheme, the appellant issued numberice dated 26.8.1983 to respondent No.1 and called upon him to submit claim for companypensation in lieu of acquisition of khasra No.164/2. After grant of leave, the respondents filed application dated 12.6.2009 for placing on record companyies of minutes of the meeting of the appellant held on 10.11.1993 Annexure R7 , letter dated 16.5.2005 Annexure R8 sent by Joint Director, Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh, Jabalpur to the Chief Executive Officer of the appellant, letter dated 16.12.2005 Annexure R9 sent by the Land Acquisition Officer to Shri Brij Bihari Nagaria, general power of attorney holder for Shri Najuk Jain, Shri Jambo Jain and Shri Jagat Jain, letter dated 26.12.1994 sent by the State Government to Commissioner, Jabalpur Division and Chairman of the appellant and details of the Scheme framed under the Act Annexure R9 . The appeal preferred by the appellant was dismissed by the lower appellate Court which expressed its agreement with the trial Court that the Scheme had number been published as per the mandate of Section 50 and, in any case, the same will be deemed to have lapsed because the land was number acquired within three years of the publication of numberification under Section 50 7 . The trial Court vide its judgment dated 17.11.1997 decreed the suit primarily on the ground that the defendant appellant herein has failed to prove that the draft scheme was published under Section 50 3 and was approved under Section 50 4 . An additional companynter affidavit dated 21.9.2002 was filed by respondent No.1 to which supplementary affidavit dated 27.10.2002 was filed on behalf of the appellant. After almost 9 years of the publication of numberification under Section 50 7 of the Act, the respondents filed suit for declaration and permanent injunction by alleging that the predecessor of the defendant appellant herein , namely, Town Improvement Trust, Jabalpur had made an attempt to acquire their land in 1977 by issuing numberification under Section 48 of the Madhya Pradesh Town Improvement Trust Act, 1960 but after filing of objections, numberfurther action was taken that the Scheme has number been framed published in accordance with the provisions of the Act that there was numberlegal basis or justification to acquire their land and the same will be deemed to have lapsed because the land was number acquired within three years from the date of publication of numberification Ex. The respondents then filed application dated 15.1.2003 for placing on record additional documents to which companynter affidavit was filed by the appellant on 14.2.2003. 11/2009 was filed on behalf of the appellant for filing additional affidavit of Shri G.N. Another letter dated 31.10.1983 was sent to respondent No.1 and he was asked to submit some documents necessary for determination of the amount of companypensation. Singh, Land Acquisition Collector along with letter dated 25.7.2007 sent by the State Government to the Chief Executive Officer of the appellant. Since the respondents did number reply to either of the companymunications sent by the appellant, the State Government was requested to acquire the land under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The appellant filed rejoinder affidavit dated 10.4.2002 along with companyy of the written statement. It also filed an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC for placing on record documents marked A to H to show that the Scheme has already been implemented. 14 hereinafter described as the Scheme framed by appellant Jabalpur Development Authority companyld number be implemented in respect of the land of the respondents due to the alleged number compliance of Sections 50 and 56 of the Madhya Pradesh Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973 for short, the Act is the question which arises for companysideration in this appeal filed against order dated 17.8.2001 by which learned Single Judge of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissed in limine the second appeal preferred by the appellant against judgment and decree dated 21.4.1999 passed by IX Additional District Judge, Jabalpur hereinafter referred to as, the lower appellate Court in Civil Appeal No. Similar numberices were issued to other land owners, majority of whom agreed to accept the amount of companypensation offered by the appellant. In response to the numberice of the special leave petition issued on 7.12.2001, the respondents filed detailed companynter affidavit dated 17.3.2002 along with companyy of the plaint and statement of DW 1 Kedar Prasad Sharma, who was then working as Section In Charge in the establishment of the appellant. Lastly, I.A. It is number in dispute that after acquiring the major portion of the land by agreement several multistoried buildings have been companystructed and a housing companyony has also been developed. 36 A of 1998 whereby the decree passed by 15th Civil Judge Grade II, Jabalpur hereinafter referred to as, the trial Court in a suit for declaration and injunction was upheld. The appellant challenged the judgment of the lower appellate Court by filing an appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure CPC . Along with the special leave petition out of which the present appeal arises, the appellant filed I.A. We have heard learned companynsel for the parties and perused the record. S. Singhvi, J. No. | 0 | train | 2010_779.txt |
In addition separate numberices were issued to the owners of holdings as and when the area in which a particular holding was situated was numberified. For the purpose of calculation of annual rental value of holdings, the method was simplified so that it was companyputable only on the measurement of the carpet area. In addition the percentage at which holding tax, water tax and latrine tax is to be levied, has also been specified. After the publication of the Rules, the Corporation issued two numberifications pursuant to Rules 3 2 and 5 1 . Each of the three numberices referred to separate areas of Patna and were dated 26 December 1993, 1st October 1995 and 30th December 1995 respectively. Three numberices were published under section 149 1 , number by way of beat of drum number by posting placards at companyspicuous places, but by publication in the newspapers. The Rules and the numberifications were struck down by the High Court as being unconstitutional. By the first numberification, the Corporation classified the several roads in Patna city into three categories. It is number necessary for us to go into details of this numberification or the second numberification which was issued soon thereafter by the Corporation which specified the rates of rental value per sq ft depending upon the situation, use and nature of companystruction of the holdings. The High Court also accepted the explanation given by the Corporation that they had given different publications for different areas since they did number have sufficient working hands and because of other administrative difficulties. The appellants also received numberices under section 149 2 . The Act, which came into force on 15th August 1952, was passed to companysolidate and amend the law relating to the municipal affairs of the town and suburbs of Patna. These Rules and the two numberifications were the subject matter of challenge under Article 226 before the High Court. In 1995, they filed objections under Section The objections have number yet been disposed of by the Chief Executive Officer. A brief survey of the relevant provisions of the Act is necessary before companysidering the facts of the case since the appellants grievances are that the provisions of the Act have number been followed in assessing the appellants properties to tax. | 0 | train | 2003_387.txt |
The answer which the paper setter supplies to the University as the companyrect answer is called the key answer. The snag lies in determining which out of the four suggested answers is the companyrect answer. These appeals raise a some what awkward question If a paper setter companymits an error while indicating the companyrect answer to a question set by him, can the students who answer that question companyrectly be failed for the reason that though their answer is companyrect, it does number accord with the answer supplied by the paper setter to the University as the companyrect answer ? That duty is naturally assigned to the paper setter, who is required to supply to the University the companyrect answer to each question, called the key answer. The candidates are required to tick the companyrect answer from out of those four. The difficulty arose because the key answers furnished by the paper setters turned out to be wrong. The students got to know the key answers out of the generosity of the University. The key answers are fed into a companyputer and the marking companyputerised. If he ticks the companyrect answer, he secures 3 marks and if a candidate ticks an incorrect answer, he loses I mark. The keys supplied by the paper setters in these cases raised more questions than they solved. 4092 of 1983. Hundred questions are set in each paper and four alternative answers are indicated against each question. 4068 4091 of 1983. No one can accuse the teacher of number knowing the companyrect answer to the question set by him But it seems that, occasionally, number enough care is taken by the teachers to set questions which are free from ambiguity and to supply key answers which are companyrect beyond reasonable companytroversy. Respondents, whose names did number figure in the list of successful candidates, filed writ petitions in the High Court of Allahabad, companytending that the answers ticked by them were companyrect and the key answers wrong. 4096 of 1983. 4773,4827, 5024, 5216, 5314,5716,5717,5724,5816,5817, 5818, 5819, 5829, 6067, 6069, 6102, 6103, 6389 of 1982 and 9, 146,230, 277 of 1983. 4773 74/82, 4827, 5024, 5216, 5314, 5716 5717, 5724,5816, 5817,5818, 5819, 5821, 6029, 6067, 6069, 6102,6103,6389, of 1982 9, 146,230, 277 of 1983. The difficulty involved in evaluating a very large number of answer books is solved by the State Government, quite successfully, by companyputerising the result. Aggarwala, Robin Mitra, K.K. The University produced the opinion of Shri H. S. Vishnoi of the Department of Zoology, University of Delhi. 4092 4115 of 1983 N. Kacker, Mrs. Shobha Dixit and Kulsherstha for the Appellants. Robin Mitra, Anil Kumar Gupta, and Brij Bhushan, for Respondents in CA. State Universities Act, 1973. In the year 1982, the Kanpur University, the appellant herein, was entrusted with the task of holding the Test. The Government numberinates one of the Universities in the State for holding the Test every year. 4068 91 of 1983 Mrs. Shoba Dixit and Kapil Sibal for the Appellants. Physics, Chemistry, Zoology and Botany are the four subjects which are prescribed for the Test. Two Indian authors, Dr. Ramesh Gupta and Virbala Rastogi, have expressed the same view in their respective books Aadhunik Jantu Vigyan and Madhyamik Jantu Vigyan. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos.4092 4115 of 1983. Gupta, M.B. Lal, Anil Kumar Gupta and Brij Bhushan for the Respondents. Each paper is of a duration of 3 hours. M. Kshatriya, E.C. One paper is set for each subject and the pattern of the examination is what is called the Multiple choice of objective type test. Gupta for Respondents. The High Court has accepted their companytention and that is how the Kanpur University has companye to file these appeals. K. Garg, R.K. Jain, M. Nitin Mohan Popli, Santosh Sethi and Ms. Sangeeta Agarwal for Respondents in CA. The difficulty which arose in these cases is number due to the failure of the companyputer, which is quite encouraging. C. Aggarwala Mahavir Singh and K.K. By any standard, it is a stupendous task because 20,000 applications are received every year for admission to a total number of 779 seats in the 7 Medical Colleges, out of which 50 are reserved seats and the remaining 50 are open. M. Kshatriya for Respondent No. The respondents in these Appeals applied for admission to the Medical Colleges in the State of Uttar Pradesh. For persons belonging to yester generations, this is a newfangled companycept. There are 7 Medical Colleges in the State of U.P., to which admission is granted on the basis of the result of a Combined Pre Medical Test which is held in pursuance of the orders passed by the State Government under section 8 of the U.P. Appeals by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 24th February, 1983 of the Allahabad High Court Lucknow Bench in Civil Mis Writ Petition Nos. Appeals by Special leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 24th February, 1983 of the Allahabad High Court Lucknow Bench in Writ Petition Nos. C. Agarwala, Vijay K. Pandita and R. Satish for Respondents. Mohan Pandey for Respondent. The habit of man is to blame the machine. AND Civil Appeal Nos. In Civil Appeal Nos. The Judgment of the Court was delivered CHANDRACHUD, C.J. In Civil Appeal No. So far so good. | 0 | train | 1983_208.txt |
Aggrieved by the order of the State Commission, the respondents approached the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission by filing revision petition. The appellant took up the matters in appeal before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission. The order of the State Commission was set aside restoring the order passed by the District Forum. The District Forum, in the light of the pleadings of the parties, raised the following points for determination Whether the companyplainants are companysumers and whether there is any companysumer disputes within the meaning of the Consumer Protection Act and whether this Forum has numberjurisdiction to entertain the companyplaints of this nature and decide the issue? Whether the companyplainants in all the companyplaints are entitled to the reliefs prayed for? The appellant companytested the claims of the respondents before the District Forum raising a preliminary objection that Consumer Forum had numberjurisdiction to decide the dispute between members and companyperative society in view of Section 90 of the Tamil Nadu Cooperative Societies Act, 1983 for short the Act . The respondents, being the members of the appellant society, had pledged paddy bags for obtaining loan. Hence, the State Commission did number deal with the other companytentions. The respondents filed petitions in the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Thiruchirapally seeking direction to the appellant to release the paddy bags pledged on receipt of the loan amount or in the alternative to direct the appellant to pay the market value of the baddy bags with interest thereon from the date of pledging till the date of release and also to pass an order for companypensation for mental agony and suffering. The State Commission held that companyplaints filed by the respondents were themselves number maintainable having regard to Section 90 of the Act. The National Commission, after hearing the learned companynsel for the parties and dealing with the companytentions advanced by them, found fault with the order of the State Commission. Whether there is any deficiency in service and negligence on the part of the opposite party in all the companyplaints? In brief the facts of the case are that a person was traveling in an omni bus, the driver of the bus tried to overtake a bullock cart due to which the bullocks got panicky whereupon the driver swerved the bus to the left and applied brakes. The District Forum answered the points 1 and 2 in favour of the respondents and granted relief. The appellant society issued numberices to the respondents demanding payment of loan amount with interest thereon. The State Commission, by the companymon order, allowed the appeals filed by the appellant and dismissed the appeals filed by the respondents. The legal representatives of the deceased victim did number file claim petition before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal companystituted under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. A deeper look at the facts of that case and question companysidered therein make it clear that it governs the fact of that case having regard to the specific provisions companytained in the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. In this situation the person, who was sitting in the rear seat, was thrown in the front and hit against the iron bar sustaining a serious head injury and subsequently succumbed to the injury. The respondents also filed appeal to the extent they were aggrieved in regard to payment of interest from 14.9.1992. Shivaraj V. Patil J. Consequently, the revision petition was allowed. Hence, this appeal. | 0 | train | 2003_837.txt |
For the purpose of accommodating its employees, TISCO has companystructed several residential bungalows flats quarters accommodations in the township of Jamshedpur and around its plants. They were allotted to its employees as also to other agencies including employees of the Central Government and State Government who were either transferred or posted in Jamshedpur. 3270 of 2003 may be stated The appellants were employed as officers executives by Tata Iron Steel Co. Ltd. TISCO for short . WITH TRANSFERRED CASES C Nos. Aggrieved by the above action, the appellants herein filed Writ Petition No. | 1 | train | 2006_986.txt |
A companyplaint was filed in the Court of Munsif and Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bilara, against the respondents under various sections of the Penal Code. The Magistrate, after perusal of the companyplaint, directed an investigation to be made as companytemplated by Section 156 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 the Code . The report came to be accepted by the Magistrate on 23 9 1981. 233 of 1988 was registered thereafter by police and a final report was submitted on 18 7 1981 stating that companyplaint was false. The gravamen of the allegation was that the respondents had, in pursuance of a companyspiracy, transferred some land on the strength of a special power of attorney bearing forged signature. Crl. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by L. HANSARIA, J. A case From the Judgment and Order dated 17 12 1990 of the Rajasthan High Court in S.B. P. No. Special leave granted. | 1 | train | 1994_1170.txt |
1101 to 1144 of 1979.
it appears that the government of karnataka decided to adopt a policy to encourage rapid industrialisation. on 12th january 1977 the government of karnataka issued anumberher order which recited that the reasons for making the said order of 12th january 1977 were that the scheme of companycessions adopted by the government earlier had given room for many types of misuse and the earlier orders had number prescribed any ceiling limits or restrictions on the quantum of refund of sales tax or concessions to be granted. an order number ci 58 fmi 69 dated 30th june 1969 was issued which recited that the government namely the government of karnataka was committed to a policy of rapid industrialisation and that in pursuance thereof the government had on 30th numberember 1966 issued directions indicating the incentives that would be given to entrepreneurs starting new industries in the mysore state. the material part of the said order for our purpose runs thus consequently the governumber of mysore is pleased to sanction the following incentives and concessions to the entrepreneurs for starting new industries in mysore state sales tax a cash refund will be allowed on all sales tax paid by a new industry on raw materials purchased by it for the first 5 five years from the date the industry goes into production eligibility to the companycessions being determined on the basis of a certificate to be issued by the department of industries and companymerce by an order dated 11th august 1975 the procedure was prescribed for obtaining the companycessions given under the orders referred to earlier. an appeal preferred by the assistant companymissioner of commercial taxes dharwar deputy companymissioner of companymercial taxes and the government of karnataka before a division bench of the karnataka high companyrt was dismissed by the companyrt which agreed with the reasoning of the learned trial judge. the said order dated 12th january 1977 inter alia provided as under the companycession of refund of sales tax on raw materials used by new enterprises should be limited to 10 per cent of the companyt of fixed assets per year thus number exceeding the total of 50 per cent over a period of five years for which the concession is available. where the annual sales tax paid on raw materials is less than 10 per cent of the companyt of the fixed assets according to the original value the companycession will be limited to the actual sales tax paid several persons claimed that they had started new industrial units in the state on the assurances extended or because of the companycessions granted to them inter alia under the said order dated 30th june 1969.
they filed writ petitions before the high companyrt of karnataka claiming that the industrial undertakings started between 30th june 1969 when the order dated 12th june 1969 came into effect and before the order dated 12th january 1977 was issued companyld number be deprived of the companycessions given to them by the former order as the said grant of companycessions companystituted a promissory estoppel against the government on the basis of which they had acted by starting new industries requiring investment of companysiderable funds and the government was number entitled to go back or that promise as it had sought to do by the order dated 12th january 1977.
a learned single judge of the karnataka high companyrt before whom these writ petitions were filed upheld the aforesaid companytention of the petitioners urged before him relying mainly on the rulings of this companyrt in union of india v. m s. indo afghan agencies limited 1968 2 s.c.r. 2204 47 of 1980.
from the judgment and order dated 15.10.1979 of the high companyrt of karnataka in w.a. number 1101 to 1144 of 1979.
r. ramasesh for the appellants. 366 century spinning and manufacturing companypany limited anr. v. the ulhasnagar municipal companyncil anr. 854 and the ruling in m s. motilal padampat sugar mills companypany pvt. kania j. these appeals arise from the decision of a division bench of the high companyrt of karnataka in writ appeals number. limited v. state of uttar pradesh ors. 1970 3 s.c.r. s. krishnamurthy vineet kumar and h. raghavendra rao for the respondents. 1979 s.c.
the learned trial judge allowed the writ petitions and granted relief on the basis set out earlier. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by. a.i.r. civil appellate jurisdiction civil apeal number. it is from this decision that the present appeals arise. | 0 | dev | 1988_171.txt |
The Company Petition No. 113 of 1995 before the learned Company Judge to dismiss the Company Petition No. Vadilal Lallubhai Mehta was the Chairman and Managing Director of the Company. The appellants had filed the Company Petition No. 1 and 2, viz.,
Bipin Vadilal Mehta and Priyam Bipinbhai Mehta moved Company Application No. Thereafter, Bipinbhai purchased 8,600 shares of the Company M s. Sayaji Industries Ltd. and became its Managing Director on 18.11.1982. 35 of 1988 for rectification of the register of the companypany M s. Sayaji Industries Ltd. hereinafter referred as to the Company as provided by Section 155 of the Companies Act. The case set up by the petitioners in the Company Petition is that they had absolutely numberknowledge of the alleged utilization of the funds of the Company for purchase of shares by Bipinbhai and they came to know about it by or about in the month of May, 1987 when a criminal companyplaint was filed by some office bearers of the union of the Company and thereafter petitioner No. It is important to point out that apart from Ramesh B. Desai there are 8 other shareholders who had filed the Company Petition. He had two sons, viz.,
Bipin Vadilal Mehta and Suhas Vadilal Mehta for short Bipinbhai and Suhasbhai and four daughters, who are all married. The learned Company Judge and the Division Bench in appeal have referred to these facts and have recorded a finding that the petitioners had knowledge of the entire transaction and the Company Petition was barred by limitation. 35 of 1988 was filed by Ramesh B. Desai and 8 others, who are shareholders of the Company, which is a public limited companypany. As mentioned earlier two cheques of Rs.10 lacs and 5 lacs were given on 13.11.1982 and another cheque of Rs.5 lacs was given on 25.11.1982 by M s. Sayaji Industries Ltd. to M s. Santosh Starch Products and on the same day M s. Santosh Starch Products gave Rs.20 lacs through cheques to Bipinbhai and his family members. The Company Petition had been filed in September, 1987 on which numberice had been issued and respondent Nos. 1 in the Company Petition filed reply on the grounds, inter alia, that the application was number maintainable as the same had been filed when the Company Petition had already been numberified for final hearing and was on the final hearing board. This appeal, by special leave, has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 10.3.2000 of a Division Bench of High Court of Gujarat by which the appeal preferred against the order dated 12.3.1996 of the learned Company Judge, was dismissed and the order of the learned Company Judge dismissing the Company Petition No. 2 and 3 in the Company Petition filed their detailed affidavit and reply on 22.3.1988 and the companypany also filed reply on the said date. 1 Ramesh B. Desai petitioner No. The said preliminary objection was raised at the time of hearing and after companysidering the objections the learned Company Judge companysidered it appropriate to admit the main petition as far back as on 24.6.1988. Petition No. 35 of 1988, was affirmed. 1 gave numberice dated 14.6.1987. Though we should number be understood as recording any finding on this point, but in the natural companyrse of events or at least it looks quite probable that the petitioners in the companypany petition, who are small shareholders of the Company, may number have companye to know about the aforesaid transactions. The petitioners further say that though the share transfers were effected in the year 1982, the petitioners companyld number have detected the fraud earlier, but they came to know about the fraud in detail when the specific criminal companyplaint was filed by some interested persons, the office bearers of the Union of the Company before the Criminal Court at Narol and they came to know by or about in the month of May, 1987. 35 of 1988, without going into the merits of the petition, on the ground that the same is barred by limitation. This application was allowed by the learned Company Judge by the judgment and order dated 12.3.1996 and the said order was affirmed in appeal by a Division Bench of the High Court by the judgment and order dated 10.3.2000, which are subject matter of challenge in the present appeal. In their reply the companytesting respondents raised a preliminary objection regarding limitation and companytended that on the preliminary issue the main petition should be dismissed in limine. The allegations made in the companypany petition are as follows. However, respondents 2 to 11 wasted too much time in companyrespondence and thereafter this petition is filed immediately. Hereto annexed and marked Annexure I is the companyy of the said companyplaint. Thereafter they enquired into the matter and companylected whatever additional material available. The family owned several properties. P. Mathur, J. The respondent Nos. | 1 | train | 2006_931.txt |
6 lakhs which has already been paid under the order of the High Court in order to ensure security for the entire demurrage. 39 and odd lakhs as demurrage in respect of the goods which were released on the basis of the order of the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court dated October 22, 1990 and he insisted us to order that Bank guarantee should be furnished for the value of the goods, of companyrse, taking into account the sum of Rs. | 0 | train | 1991_121.txt |
Kutumbamma replied denying the allegation. Suryanarayana died on 1896 leaving behind his widow Kutumbamma. Subsequently, Nageswarudu put Kutumbamma in possession of the suit schedule properties in lieu of her maintenance, in 1897. The second respondent also supported the first respondent and companytended that the will executed by Kutumbamma was number true and that the maintenance deed gave only a life interest and that Kutumbamma companyld number assert any absolute title to the property. Nageswarudus son Venkata Sabrahmanya Sastry issued a registered numberice dated November 12, 1958 asserting that Kutumbamma was number entitled to the suit property absolutely. On September 29, 1956 Kutumbamma registered a will in favour of the appellant, bequeathing him the suit lands and died in 1959. The respondents companytested the suit companytending that Kutumbamma was given only a life interest in the suit property and the allegation of execution of settlement deed without her knowledge was denied. After the death of Kutum bamma, Venkata Sabrahamny Sastry issued a numberice to the appellant. Venkata Subrahmanya Sastry transferred the suit property it in favour of his two sons on December 30, 1959 and they sold it to the first respondent. One Dhara Suryanarayana and Nageswarudu were brothers and were members of a joint Hindu family. The second respondent is the tenant who expressed his preparedness to pay the rent and the possession to the true owner. He filed the suit No. 3 of 1963 against the respondents for recovery of possession of the plaint schedule properties, with past and future mense profits. The appellant replied on December 12, 1959. The first respondent in companylusion with the tenant, the second respondent, obtained a decree against the latter restraining him from interfering with first respondents possession. The only companytention raised by the respondents was that the maintenance deed fell within the ambit of Section 14 2 and number under Section 14 1 of the Hindu Succession Act and therefore Kutumbammas estate was number enlarged. The joint family owned 80 acres of wet land, at the time of his death. The appellant preferred a claim before the Tenancy Tribunal for eviction of the tenant. The respondent took up the matter in appeal to the High Court of Andhra Pradesh. This appeal arises by special leave granted by this Court against the judgment and decree dated December 29, 1971 by the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in L P.A. 9 of 1971. O.S. S. Kailasam, J. The appellant took up the matter on Letter Patent Appeal and the Division Bench companyfirmed the judgment of the Single Judge and dismissed the appeal. The petition for the grant of a certificate was rejected by the High Court and thereupon the appellant preferred a petition for special leave to this Court which was granted. The appellant in this Court is the plaintiff. No. | 1 | train | 1977_344.txt |
But strangely the girls husband Madhusudhan Reddy did number take any action in the matter. She has also companytended that her forced marriage with Madhusudhan Reddy was number valid as she was then a minor. The police filed affidavits from time to time in regard to the steps taken and reported that the girl companyld number be traced. The High Court disposed of the writ petition by order dated 3.2.2006 with a direction to companytinue the investigation and produce the girl as and when traced. An Habeas Corpus petition was filed by the first respondent mother of a married minor girl alleging that her daughter had been missing from 4.8.2004 and that her enquiries revealed that the second respondent herein had forced her daughter to accompany him. The Division Bench of the High Court took companynizance of the matter and issued a series of directions to the police to trace the girl. In the said order dated 3.2.2006, the Division Bench made an observation about the functioning of police, that police companycerned have number taken steps which should have been taken and even after giving a long room to them, they have number done anything in the matter. NO.2946 OF 2006 Leave granted. We are informed that the detenu has herself filed an affidavit before the High Court on 20.4.2006 after the impugned order stating that she has married the second respondent herein and would like to stay with him. The High Court also directed the Director General of Police to initiate an inquiry against the officials who were responsible for investigation of the case. O R D E R CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.258 OF 2008 SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION CRL. Aggrieved thereby, the State filed this appeal by special leave. Heard. | 0 | train | 2008_389.txt |
It also directed the Government to send the requisition to the PSC to fill up the posts of 30 vacancies from the list of the selected candidates prepared by the PSC. 17422/93 dismissed the batch of writ petitions filed by the petitioners allowed one writ petitions filed by the selectees and directed the Government to appoint the candidates selected through the PSC. In the meanwhile, the Public Service Commission PSC had selected the candidates who were number being appointed. The petitioners were appointed as Field Workers in the Filaria Department of the State Government between 1981 and 1985. Therefore, the selectees approached the High Court and filed the writ petition. The petitioners also filed the writ petition in the High Court seeking for regularisation. No.250/92 and the High Court directed the Government to companysider their representation and dispose it of by judgment dated January 18, 1993. Subsequently, since the Government had number taken any steps, the petitioners fixed another writ petition. When they came to this Court, this Court directed the Government to companysider their cases in the Right of the law laid down by this Court in State of Haryana Vs.
Piara Singh 1932 4 SCC 118. In the first instance, they had fixed W.P. The High Court in the impugned order dated June 24, 1996 in O.P. Thus this special leave petition. No. | 0 | train | 1996_1117.txt |
As ASI Tadvi entered the room, he was grabbed by the appellant. The companyplainant ASI Tadvi was posted on guard duty at the said prisoners cell in the Civil Hospital. As already described hereinabove, ASI Tadvi PW 2 , so also nurse Suman PW 3 and Police Constable Bhagwat PW 4 , are the persons, who reached the location in response to call by guard on duty, Police Constable Gokul. The prosecution case unfolded through depositions of ASI Ukhadu Tadvi PW 2 , hospital nurse Smt. Suman Bhave PW 3 and guard Bhagwat Sutar PW 4 , also companyplaint Exhibit 18 that was filed by ASI Tadvi, on behalf of the State. Gokul alone was in the guardroom, by the side of the prisoners ward. Dr. Surwade PW 5 , was the CMO, who had reached the location upon call by nurse Suman. The prisoner, who was caught by the guard and who had escaped from the handcuff, was the appellant. At about 3.30 a.m. on 19.7.2002, companystable Gokul was on duty. ASI and 4 plicemen were the party on guard, posted at the said ward. At about 4.00 a.m. Police Constable Gokul, on duty, shouted, Dada run, there is a numberse of violence in the prisoners room. Nurse Suman PW 3 had arrived there, who summoned Resident Medical Officer in short RMO . There were other four policemen also, along with him, namely, Police Constables Ibrahim, Bhagwat, Gokul and Police Naik Sattar. The RMO and other doctors then carried the victim Dilip on a stretcher to the room of Casualty Medical Officer CMO Dr. Survade, who, after sometime, informed that the victim had expired. Rajendra PW 1 , is the panch witness to inquest panchnama Exh.16 , spot panchnama Exh. Both, the victim and the appellant, were lodged in Ward No.14 in a companymon room. Victim Dilip was admitted for treatment since 14.7.2002. Dr. Bhalchandra PW 8 had performed autopsy. To be precise, it took place at about 4.00 a.m. of 19.7.2002, at Ward No.14 of Civil Hospital, Jalgaon, where the appellant and the victim Dilip Sitaram Chaudhary hereinafter referred to as deceased were lodged. It was also numbericed that Dilip, the deceased who was hanging by the side of the company, had suffered head injury. Dr. Satish Patil PW 9 and Dr. Subhash Badgujar PW 10 are the two psychiatrists, then attached to civil hospital and the appellant was under their observation, at the material time. Since it was raining, policemen occupied a location at the ground floor of the hospital. It was numbericed that the companyprisoner was number on the bed, but was hanging from the company, his leg still was locked to the bed with the fetter. It was numbericed at that time that, the appellant had freed himself from the handcuff. However, all policemen managed to companytrol the appellant and again put him on the bed, where he was asked to sleep on the night with handcuff. Iron stand, used for hanging a saline bottle, was lying by his side. A detailed companyplaint, narrating these events, was lodged by ASI Tadvi to the said Police Station, which was registered as First Information Report at 08.30 hours and after investigation and companymittal of the case, trial, which culminated into impugned judgment before the High Court, was held. Consequently, entire guard party rushed to the Wardroom and it was opened. Third panch witness Vilas PW 7 was present when arrest of the accused was effected, vide Exhibit 30 and also when clothes of the deceased were seized under Exhibit 29. On the fateful night, there was numberelectricity supply. On 18.7.2002, the appellant was admitted for treatment with the companyplaint that he was murmuring to himself, like a lunatic. In the meanwhile, electricity supply was resumed by the hospital generator. Blood stained pant of the accused was also seized under panchnama Exh. 26 was drawn in presence of panch witness Prabhakar. The trial Court, as numbered above, discarded the defence of mental illness as raised by the accused and found him guilty. Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. He has recorded an opinion that, the death was result of head injury sustained with multiple rib fracture, injuries suffered were sufficient in the ordinary companyrse of nature to result into death and the saline stand companyld be the possible weapon for inflicting the injuries. The prosecution and the trial Court have laid heavy emphasis on their evidence, in order to companynter the defence of mental illness, raised by the accused. Intimation to that effect was sent to Zilla Peth Police Station. 27 , in his presence. The incident in question took place on the night between 18th and 19th July, 2002. Other set of important witnesses is of four doctors. Challenge in this appeal is to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, Aurangabad Bench, dismissing the appeal filed by the appellant who was found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in short IPC by the Additional Sessions Judge, Jalgaon, in Sessions Case No.140 of 2002 and was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine with default stipulation. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2008_1492.txt |
Originally, the grandmother of the deceased Michaelraj executed a settlement deed in favor of Michaelraj which was subsequently cancelled. There was a land dispute between Michaelraj and the accused persons on account of which there was enmity between them. On 14.12.1997, Michaelraj died at the hospital and thereafter the inspector of police PW 12 altered the case into one under Section 302 of the IPC. This occurrence was witnessed by John Paul PW 1 and Anthoni Raj PW 3 . On 10.12.1997 at around 730 p.m., when Michaelraj along with his friend John Paul was returning from the house of his father in law, the appellant and other accused persons attacked him with deadly weapons. The appellant further claimed that even though interim orders were passed in the suit, Michaelraj and his relatives did number allow the appellant to enjoy his possession of the property. In the meantime, PW 1 went to the Police Station and filed an FIR to PW 11. Thereafter, PW 14 took up the matter from PW 12 and investigated the case further and filed a charge sheet for offence under Section 302 of the IPC. PW 12 filed an application seeking police custody from the Court. Despite the settlement deed, the appellant claimed that his possession of property was disturbed by the deceased and his relatives. The matter came up before the Trial Court, which after going through the evidence provided by the sole eyewitness PW 3, companycluded that the case of prosecution is proved beyond doubt and thereby companyvicted the accused under Sections 148, 149, 302 341 of IPC. Thereafter, a portion of the property was executed in favor of the appellant. Therefore, the appellant filed a suit against the deceased and his relatives. Subsequently, a case was registered under Sections 147, 148, 341, 324 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code IPC . On police custody, he obtained companyfession from the appellant, which led to the recovery of weapons, which were sent for chemical examination. The deceased sustained injuries and was taken to the hospital in a serious companydition. These appeals have been filed by accused persons against the judgment and order dated 16.3.2006 passed by the Madras High Court in Criminal Appeal No.1540 of 2002 by which the High Court has dismissed the appeal filed by the appellants. The High Court vide its judgment and order dated 16.3.2006, partly allowed the appeal filed by the accused persons, companyvicted them under Section 304 Part II of IPC and sentenced them to rigorous imprisonment for five years, stating that the doctor who treated the deceased was number examined and the documents regarding the nature of treatment were number produced. Pinaki Chandra Ghose, J. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Trial Court, the accused preferred an appeal before the Madras High Court. Aggrieved by the said judgment and order passed by the High Court, the sole appellant is before us. | 0 | train | 2015_809.txt |
The first respondent aggrieved by the dismissal of the writ petition preferred F.M.A.T. The first respondent challenged the issuance of second show cause numberice itself by filling a writ petition. Thereafter the disciplinary authority accepting the enguiry report issued a further show cause numberice dated 13.8.1981 why the punishment of dismissal should bot be imposed upon him in the light of the enquiry report and findings thereon which were accepted by him. On receipt of reply to the show cause numberice a regular departmental enquiry was held and the Enquiry officer submitted a report. The first respondent again challenged the order of dismissal by filing a writ petition and the learned Single Judge found that full opportunities were given to the first respondent to offer any explanation he wanted to offer and he was satisfied with the reasonable opportunity given to the first respondent in the light of the observarions of the Division Bench referred to above. The appellants number satisfied with the crder of the learned Single Judge preferred an appeal to the Division Bench in F.M.A.T. A charge sheet was issued on 11.5.1981 against him calling upon the first respondent to show cause against the charges brought against him. The Division Bench by judgment and order dated 29.1.1987 modified the order of the learned Single Judge by upholding the disciplinary proceedings putto the state of issuance of second show cause numberice. 1834/1986. This appeal is preferred against the judgment and order dated 3.9.1993 passed in F.M.A.T. The first respondent then challenged the order of dismissal by moving the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. On the other hand, the firs respondent treated the show cause numberices as number in companyformity with the direction given by the Division Bench of the High Court while disposing of M.A.T. It must be numbered that alongwith this numberice, the companyy of the enquiry report was also enclosed. After duly companysidering the representations, authority imposed a penalty of dismissal by order dated 7.3.1989. A learned Single Judge of the High Court by order dated 12.6.1986 set aside the enquiry proceedings and companysequently allowed the writ petition with liberty to proceed against the first respondent afresh according to law. 1834 of 1986. The first respondent was in the service of the appellant Bank. Venkataswami. However, He withdrew the same as before the writ petition companyld be taken up for hearing, the final order dismissing the first respondent was passed by the Management. 1182 on the file of the High Court of Calcutta. Heard Counsel on both sides. Leave granted. J. No. | 1 | train | 1995_729.txt |
The Commissioner of Commercial Taxes has suggested that New Indus tries companyered by the above scheme might be permitted to adjust the refunds to which they would be eligible against the sales tax pay able by them. 3436 of 1980. For the assessment year 1976 77, the appellant made such an application to Deputy Commissioner of Sales tax Administration on 10th November, 1976 for adjustment of the refunds against sales tax due. The new industries intending to take advantage of the system of adjustment shall apply to the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes Administration of the Division companycerned through the assessing authority. He said prior permission to adjust had number been company sidered by the Deputy Commissioner of Managlore Division, Mangalore, and, therefore, the Commercial Tax Officer was obliged to proceed to recover the taxes. While the matter stood thus, on 9th January, 1980, the Commercial Tax Officer of the companycerned jurisdiction issued three demand numberices demanding payment of the sales tax. The numberification companytains a package of reliefs and incentives including one companycerning relief from payment of sales tax with which this appeal is companycerned. Sales tax A cash refund will be allowed on all sales tax paid by a new industry on raw materials purchased by it for the first five 5 years from the date of the industry goes into production, eligibility to the companyces sions being determined on the basis of a certificate to be issued by the Department of Industries and Commerce. Order In partial modification of the Gov ernment order cited 2 above, Government are pleased to prescribe the following procedure for claiming refund of sales tax by new indus tries. N. Narasimhamurthy, K.H. Harish Salve, K.P. The relevant portions of the Preamble and the body of the numberification say Preamble . On 27th March 1979, the Deputy Commissioner of Commercial Taxes wrote to the appellant to say that the orders on appellants application for permis sion would be passed only on receipt of the clarification from the Government on these matters. 8A of the Act providing certain incentives to enterpreneurs starting new industries in the State, pursuant to States policy for rapid industrialisation. This was followed by a further numberification dated 11th August, 1975 envisaging certain modified procedures for effectuating the reliefs companytemplated by the earlier exemp tion numberification of 30th June, 1969. On 30th June, 1969, State Government issued a numberi fication in exercise of powers referable to sec. FD 428 CSL 70 dated 1.2. The following Order of the Court was delivered By this petition, Messrs Mangalore Chemicals Fertilis ers Limited, a registered dealer under the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957, Act seeks special leave to appeal to this companyrt from the judgment and order dated 14th August, 1990 of the High Court of Karnataka in W.P. Narasimhamurthy, learned Senior Counsel for the respondent Revenue. Thereafter, in Febru ary, 1980, the appellant moved the High Court for issue of writ of mandamus to quash the demand numberices and the pro ceedings initiated for recovery of penalty under sec. We have heard Shri Harish Salve, learned companynsel for the petitioner and Shri R.N. Some particulars as to the application made by the appellant for grant of permission might, perhaps, be neces sary here. Steps for recovery of the penalities were also initiated. 3235 of 1991. Ram and Ms. Amrita Mitra for the Appellant. Kumar, Ravinder Narain, P.K. The clause in the said numberification of 1969 relevant for the present purpose reads 1 . Nobin Singh and M. Veerappa for the Respondents. From the Judgment and Order dated 14.8.1990 of the Karnataka High Court in Writ Petition No. 1971 should be furnished. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. Special leave granted. No. | 1 | train | 1991_513.txt |
L. Dattu,J. Accordingly, the High Court answered the question of law framed in affirmative and in favour of the appellant and against the revenue. The revenue thereafter applied to this Court for special leave under Article 136, and the same was granted, and hence this appeal. These six appeals have been heard together. Leave granted in all the special leave petitions. | 0 | train | 2010_117.txt |
On or about 6.01.2006, a numberification under Section 4 read with Section 17 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for short the Act was issued for acquisition of the land in question for an alleged public purpose, viz.,
for the development and utilization of land for residential companymercial purpose. On 14.11.2006, the government issued a numberification under Section 4 read with Section 17 4 of the Act and on 15.11.2006 as also a declaration under Section 6 of the Act, for acquiring the land for public purpose, viz.,
for the development and utilization of land for outer ring road, green belt on both side, Pataudi Road to Jhajjar Road in the area of village Gokalgarh, District Rewari. Appellants land was being used for residential purposes and which also has the Samadhis of the ancestors of the appellants and a Shiva temple. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act was issued on 9.08.2006. 7008 of 2007. On 14.03.2007, numberices were issued to the appellants under Section 9 of the Act. The revenue records companyfirm the existence of these pucca companystructions. Appellants filed objections thereto on 29.03.2007. Appellants are, thus, before us. A writ petition was filed by the appellants, which was dismissed in limine by reason of the impugned judgment. This appeal is directed against a judgment and order dated 10.05.2007 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Writ Petition No. B. SINHA, J Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2009_776.txt |
8200 of 1983. 2140 of 1983. 8201 04 of 1983. 1876, 1908, 1909 and 1976 of 1983. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal Nos, 6407 6408 of 1983. L. Sahu for the Intervener Madanlal. 1232 and 1604 of 1982. Shiv Dayal, G. L. Sanghi, Mukul Mudgal and J. P. Sanghi for the Appellants. K. Sanghi, S. R. Agawala and V. K Chitre for the Respondents. Appeal by Special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 6th September, 1983 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. Appeals by Special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 17th March, 1983 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc Petition Nos. Appeals by Special leave from the Judgment and order dated the 22nd August, 1983 of the Madhya Pradesh High Court in Misc. WITH Civil Appeal Nos. Petitions Nos. AND Civil Appeal No. Petition No. | 0 | train | 1984_56.txt |
I 154/2008. He also saw Sanjay Chela Bharwad, Dhiru Matam Bharwad, Sura Raiji Bharwad of Dhedhal intercepting people going on the road and Karshan Chako Bharwad, Moman Natha Bharwad, Kalu Sedhu Bharwad, Kalu Hari Bharwad, Chinu Bhikhu Bharwad assaulting Vadibhai Pakhabhai and Amubhai as well as the chhakda rickshaw wala saying that the road was number for them and thus, they should number pass through it. Babubhai Popatbhai Koli Patel, companyplainant reached Dhedhal Chokdi and met Budhabhai Laljibhai Koli Patel of his village and his brother Jayantibhai Laljibhai and enquired about the incident. They companyplained about browbeating and threatening by the Bharwads as the Bharwads wanted that numberone else should bring jeeps and chhakdas to Dhedhal Chokdi. I 154/2008 and C.R. When the mob beat up Manubhai, at that time, other Bharwads from Dhedhal village had also arrived. The Bharwad companymunity had been preventing the Koli Patels from running their rickshaws in the said area. He saw Ganesh Jaksi of the Bharwad companymunity of Dhedhal village having tamancha like weapon in his hand and instigating the other persons to indulge in violence. I 155/2008 registered with Bavla Police Station. As per this FIR, an incident occurred on 7.7.2008 in the evening at about 6.30 p.m. His companysin Jayantibhai Gordhanbhai told him that when Budhabhai of their village and two rickshaw walas were taking passengers at Dhedhal Chokdi, the Bharwads of Dhedhal village who were also plying rickshaws, chhakdas etc. The Bharwads made calls on mobile phones to call other Bharwads. When they reached near Dhedhal village pond, the rickshaw and tractor were halted, his car was also stopped and he got down from the car and saw that 10 to 12 persons belonging to the Bharwad companymunity were assaulting his companysin Vadibhai Pakhabhai and Amubhai Pakhabhai with sticks. At that time, Jayantibhai Laljibhai Patel of their village and Matambhai Vadibhai Patel came on a motor cycle. On the date of the incident, when the informant was companying towards Dhedhal village from Vasna, his companysin Vadibhai Pakhabhais tractor and one chhakda rickshaw were passing through the road. In the first incident as per the said FIR the place of occurrence had been village Dhedhal near the pond. They were also assaulting the chhakda rickshaw walas. The Bharwads assaulted and killed Manubhai Koli Patel and Ajitbhai Prahladbhai Koli Patel by assaulting them with deadly weapons like revolver, dhariyas and sticks and also caused serious injuries to Babubhai Popatbhai Koli Patel, informant companyplainant on his head and hand. The companyplainant and Manubhai went to rescue Vadibhai. told the Koli Patels number to take passengers from there and they took away the keys of the jeep, beat up the Koli Patel boys, abused and threatened them and told them number to bring jeeps and rickshaws to Dhedhal Chokdi. The informant companyplainant stated that Kantibhai Ratanbhai Bharwad and other persons standing nearby told them to stop and threats were made by the Bharwads. I 154/2008 to the extent it was feasible. Thereafter, he received information that a clash was going on between the said two companymunities in Dhedhal village. He saw that Surabhai Raijibhai Bharwad had inflicted stick blows on Manubhai due to which he was injured and became unconscious. In the incident, more than 20 persons were injured and three houses of members of the Bharwad companymunity were set on fire. I 154/2008 registered with Bavla Police Station by an independent agency like the CBI, Special Criminal Application No. Pandya, Sub Inspector of Police, Bavla Police Station has stated that while he was patrolling in Bavla Town, he received a message from H.C. Kanaiyalal, Police Station Officer, at 10.00 a.m. that some altercation incident had taken place between the two companymunities at Dhedhal Cross Roads. I 154/2008 and the accused who stood arrested in companynection with C.R.No. The Bharwads started beating passersby on vehicles, who had worn clothes like Koli Patels and causing injuries to them. Statements of injured witnesses, who were admitted in Long Life Hospital, namely Dashratbhai Popatbhai Patel PW.26 , Hemubhai Babubhai Patel PW.12 , Jayantibhai Laljibhai PW.14 , Vadibhai Pakhabhai PW.27 were recorded on 10.07.2008. I 154/2008 as it stood earlier prior to the deletion of Section 302 IPC with a further clarification that quashing of the FIR registered by Bavla Police Station i.e. Statements of injured witness Matambhai Vadibhai PW.18 were recorded on 10.7.2008 and 21.7.2008. Several police personnel were also injured. C.R.No. In the pond, the damaged tractor, motor cycle and chhakda were found. The police resorted to teargas shells as well as to lathi charges to disperse the crowd. I 155/2008 and clubbed the investigation of the FIR along with the investigation of the other FIR bearing CR No. The case of the prosecution is that when the police reached the place of occurrence of the first incident, the mob had already dispersed, companyld number be companyrect for the reason that some of the witnesses have stated that the clash was going on when the police arrived and police resorted to force to disperse the mob. I 154/2008, was registered at 1730 hours in the Bavla Police Station under Sections 147, 148, 149, 302, 307, 332, 333, 436 and 427 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 hereinafter called as IPC read with Section 135 of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 for short BP Act and Sections 3, 7 of Prevention of Damages of Public Property Act, 1984 for short 1984 Act for an incident which occurred at Village Dhedhal, wherein Mr. M.N. The companyrt transferred the investigation to the State CID Crime Branch and directed the new Investigating Officer to investigate the Bavla Police Station R.No. No person was named in the said FIR. In fact, it was the police who summoned the ambulances which took the injured persons to hospitals. Mr. N. Pandya called the extra police force and went inside the village. One person, namely Ajitbhai Prahladbhai, also died. Several rounds of firing were resorted to in order to disperse the mob. 1679/2008 for quashing of C.R. Immediately, he companytacted the Control Room, as well as the Deputy Superintendent of Police of Dholka, for further police support and rushed to the spot where he found about 2000 3000 persons from both the companymunities, all with sticks, dhariyas, swords etc.,
attacking each other. They were also stopped and all the persons jumped on them and started assaulting and abusing them. On receiving the said information, he along with other police personnel, rushed to the place of incident, however, by that time the crowd had already dispersed. Ahmedabad, Gujarat. Twenty two persons were arrested. They also caused minor and major injuries to other persons. I 155 of 2008 would stand arrested in companynection with case C.R. By judgment and final order dated 22.12.2009, the High Court quashed the FIR registered as CR No. 1675/2008 praying for investigation of CR No. Some persons had been locked inside their houses and they had also put their houses at fire. I 155 of 2008 companyld number mean that accused in respect of the said FIR has been discharged of the offences as they would face the charges in C.R. on 8.7.2008, case No. On companypletion of investigation, the charge sheet was filed on 10.10.2008 against 12 accused persons and the case was companymitted to Sessions Court. The report of the autopsy revealed a large number of injuries inflicted on the deceased persons. The accused in both the cases filed Special Criminal Application No. These appeals and other companynected appeals have been preferred against the judgment and order dated 22.12.2009 of the High Court of Gujarat at Ahmedabad, passed in Special Criminal Application Nos. Hence, these appeals. Three applications being Criminal Misc. On 9.7.2008, the inquest panchnama was carried out and three dead bodies were sent for post mortem. On the next day, i.e. Application Nos. No. | 0 | train | 2010_1102.txt |
It was also held that the decree holder had already obtained possession of the area measuring 135 Kanals to which he was entitled under the decree and he was number entitled to retain the possession of the excessive area of 62 Kanals, 13 marlas of which only symbolical possession was given to him. In the present case in execution of the decree for pre emption on 13.6.1963, the delivery of symbolical possession on an area measuring 62 Kanals, 13 marlas was wrongly recorded. According to the facts found established on record, Grubachan Singh respondent was delivered actual possession of 135 Kanals of land and symbolical possession of 62 kanals, 13 marlas on June 13,1963 in execution of decree for pre emption obtained by him. It was thus, held that the possession of the land measuring 62 Kanals, 13 marlas of which symbolical possession was obtained was to be restored in favour of the objector judgment debtor. Gurbachan Singh has number filed a suit for partition in the year 1973 claiming number only 135 kanals on which he had obtained actual physical possession, but also 62 Kanals and 13 marlas on which he had been granted symbolical possession in the execution proceedings in 1963. The said suit was decreed in favour of Ladha Singh and the said declaratory decree was affirmed in appeal by the Additional District on actual possession of the portion over which symbolical possession was recorded in execution proceedings. Ladha Singh, father of the appellants companytinued to remain in possession over the aforesaid land and he also filed declaratory suit challenging the recording of the delivery of symbolical possession in favour of the decree holder. Apart from the other objections, one the ground raised was that the objection petition was barred by limitation as the same was number filed within three years of the order dated 13.6.1963 under which the symbolical possession was given to the decree holder. According to the decree, Gurbachan Singh was only entitle to actual possession was companycerned, it was beyond the terms of the decree. The decree holder number in 1973 filed suit for partition claiming land on the basis of order dated 13.6.1963. The appellants as such submitted an objection petition under Sections appellants as such submitted an objection petition under Sections 47/152/151 of the Code of Civil Procedure in the Executing Court on 22.71973 for rectifying the mistake and for restitution of the land for which symbolical possession was wrongly recorded. The respondent decree holder companytested the above application. Learned Single Judge allowed the revision on the ground that the limitation in case of such applications is three years and as the symbolical possession had been delivered on June 13,1963, the present application filed on July 22,1973 was barred by time. The Said declaratory suit was decreed in favour of Ladha Singh by the trial companyrt and was affirmed by the Additional District Judge by order dated 12.5.1969. After the filing of the suit for partition, the appellants filed an objection petition under Sections 47/152/151 of the companye of Civil Procedure Praying that necessary companyrection may be made in revenue record by restitution of excessive area wrongly delivered to the decree holder. Aggrieved against the aforesaid order, the decree holder filed a revision before the High Court. Ladha Singh, father of the appellants having companye to know about the said mistake, filed a suit for declaration and for permanent injunction in the year 1965. on taking the proceedings for partition in the 1973. In the aforesaid admitted facts, we are of the view that the period of limitation under Article 137 would companymence when actual threat of dispossession companymenced i.e. The short companytroversy raised in the present case is regarding the date from which the period of limitation shall companymence under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It remains undisputed that the aforesaid judgment given by the Additional District Judge, Karnal dated 12.5.1969 became final. Bishambar Lal Khanna and Ms. Geetanjali Mohan for the Respondents. from the Judgment and Order dated 28.9.1978 of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in Civil Revision No. 480 of 1977. The question when such right to apply accrues will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KASLIWAL, J. C. Agrawala for the Appellants. This appeal by grant of special leave is directed against the judgment of Punjab Haryana High Court dated September 28,1978. 3 We have heard Learned Counsel for the parties and have gone through the record. | 1 | train | 1992_480.txt |
This order of the Committee of Management was approved by the Vice Chancellor of the University on 7 12 1986. A Writ Petition was filed against this order of the Vice Chancellor by Dr. Gaur but this was dismissed by the High Court on the short ground that he had an alternative remedy before the Chancellor under Section 68 of the U.P. Later on, however, on a representation made by the Teachers Association and also by Dr. Gaur, the Vice Chancellor purported to review his earlier order and passed an order dated 29 6 87 by which he rescinded the approval granted to the termination of the services of Dr. Gaur on 7 12 1986. The facts briefly were that the Committee of Management had terminated the probation of one Dr. Gaur who had joined as Principal on 1 11 1984 and whose probation has been extended till 31 10 86. This was stated to be in pursuance of resolutions passed by the Committee on 11 10 1986 and, again, 20 10 86 and after numberice to Dr. Gaur. During the pendency of this SLP, this Court passed an interim order by which they permitted the Vice Chancellor to proceed with the enquiry directed by the order of the High Court dated 30 9 88 subject to the companydition that any decision taken by the Vice Chancellor should number be enforced and implemented until further orders of this Court. 12682/87 reported in 1988 All WC 1493 . It is against this order of the High Court that this Special Leave Petition has been preferred by the Committee of Management. This is a Special Leave Petition preferred by the Committee of Management of the Atarra Post Graduate College from an order of the High Court of Allahabad dated 30 9 88 in Civil Misc. State University Act. Ranganathan, J. Writ Petition No. | 0 | train | 1990_702.txt |
3 M s. S. Pottivelu Sons, S.P. PFA2 130714/89/DHS dated 22.1.1990 issued by the Director, Health Services and a cash memo dated 20th December, 1989 issued by M s. S. Pottivelu Sons A 3 , evidencing sale of misbranded biscuits. 55/ 90 in the Court of the learned Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate alleging that the companyplainant had purchased two packets of Cadburys Butter Glucose Biscuits from Accused No. Road, Trivandrum on 20.12.1989 and those packets were found number labelled in accordance with the requirements of Rule 32 b of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 hereinafter referred to as the Rules . It was alleged that there was misbranding of an article of food within the meaning of Section 2 ix k and as a companysequence there has been companytravention of the provisions of Section 7 2 punishable under Section 16 1 a i of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act hereinafter referred to as the Act . Along with the companyplaint, the companyplainant filed Sanction Order No. Central Stores, M.G. The appellant, Consumer Action Group, filed a companyplaint, being ST No. Dr. A.S. Anand, C.J. The learned trial companyrt took companynizance of the matter and issued process against A 1 to A 3. The appeal came to be listed for hearing before a Division Bench of this Court but since there was difference of opinion between the two learned Judges, companystituting the Bench, on an interpretation of Section 20 of the Act, the matter was referred to a three Judge Bench. in the High Court on 13th November, 1991, seeking quashing of the companyplaint and proceedings taken by the trial companyrt thereon which was allowed. Aggrieved thereby, the companyplainant has filed this appeal by special leave. The respondent herein A 1 filed a petition under Section 482 Cr. P.C. That is how, the appeal is before us. | 0 | train | 2000_88.txt |
Superintendent Central Jail, Jammu 8/1 In view of this endorsement the order of detention we do number companysider that it was necessary that the Deputy Superintendent, Central Jail, should have filed an affidavit to the effect that he had served the order of detention on the detenu Fazal Hussain. The State has annexed to the affidavit a companyy of the Government Detention Order and below the detention order the following endorsement exists The numberice of this order has been served upon Shri Fazal Hussain s o Ayub Khan detenu by reading over the same to him. The learned companynsel for the petitioner companytends that the Deputy Superintendent Central Jail, who is alleged to have served the order of detention on the petitioner, should have filed the affidavit. No grounds of detention were served on the detenu, but an order dated October 25, 1967, issued by the Secretary to the Government, Home Department, was served on him informing him that it would be against the public interest to disclose the facts or the grounds of detention to him. The petitioner, Arshad Ahmad, was detained in pursuance of Detention Order dated September 19, 1967, passed under s. 3 1 a i of the Jammu Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, 1964. The companyy of the order on the record shows that the order was served on the detenu by Jaswant Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police CID , Jammu on September 27, 1967. By order dated January 11, 1968, the petitioner was informed that it was against public interest to disclose facts or to companymunicate to him the grounds on which the detention order was passed. 32 of the Constitution of India for a writ in the nature of habeas companypus. The affidavit stating these facts is sworn to by the Additional Secretary to the Government, Jammu and Kashmir, Home Department, and it is stated in the verification that these facts were stated on the basis of information derived from the record of the case which he believed to be true. 32 of the Constitution praying for the issue of a writ of habeas companypus or other appropriate writ, direction or order directing that the petitioners be released. K. Garg and Anil Kumar Gupta for the petitioners. Gopalakrishnan and R.N. This is a joint petition by two detenues under art. Petition under Art. Sd Dy. Sachthey, for the respondent. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Writ Petition No. The Judgment of the companyrt was delivered by Sikri, J. | 0 | train | 1969_72.txt |
In spite of repeated reminders to the tenant appellant to vacate the tenanted premises, the tenant appellant having failed to vacate the same, the original landlord was companystrained to file the eviction proceeding against the tenant appellant. The case of bonafide requirement as pleaded by the original landlord was that the original landlord and his two sons were carrying on the same business as that of the appellant and as the original landlord had decided to settle his elder son Ved Prakash in the tenanted premises in the business of Commission Agent and the younger son Arun Kumar in another shop occupied by another tenant, he was companystrained to file the eviction petition on the ground of bonafide requirement and a separate eviction proceeding was also filed against the other tenant by the original landlord. The Rent Controller, Gurgaon, by his order dated 31.05.2004, had allowed the application for eviction inter alia holding that the original landlord had successfully proved his bonafide requirement of the tenanted premises. Feeling aggrieved by this order of the Rent Controller, an appeal was taken by the tenant appellant before the Appellate authority which affirmed the findings of the Rent Controller, Gurgaon and dismissed the appeal of the tenant appellant. In his written objection, the tenant appellant had categorically denied that the respondent had any bonafide requirement for use and occupation of his son for starting a business of Commission Agent in the tenanted premises. Accordingly, the tenant appellant sought for dismissal of the eviction petition. The tenant appellant entered appearance and companytested the eviction proceeding denying the material allegations made in the application for eviction. The case made out by the original landlord Mr. Om Prakash since deceased in his eviction petition can be narrated as follows The tenanted premises was let out to the tenant appellant in the year 1982 in which the appellant was carrying on the business of Commission Agent. This appeal has been filed by the tenant appellant from the judgment and final order dated 5th of March, 2007 passed by the High Court of Punjab Haryana at Chandigarh in Civil Revision Case No.3943 of 2005 whereby the High Court had dismissed the civil revision case and affirmed the order of the appellate authority as well as of the Rent Controller thereby directing eviction of the tenant appellant from a shop companystructed on the ground floor at Plot No.12, bearing Municipal No.179 a , Ward No.3, New Anaj Mandi, Sohna, District Gurgaon Haryana hereinafter referred to as the tenanted premises . Again feeling aggrieved by the order of the appellate authority, a revision petition was filed by the appellant before the High Court of Punjab and Haryana which was dismissed by the impugned order affirming the findings of the Appellate Authority as well as of the Rent Controller, Gurgaon. TARUN CHATTERJEE, J. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2009_1447.txt |
Reserve Bank of India, supra . v. Reserve Bank of India, supra . The Reserve Bank has its offices at nearly 15 centres throughout India. On 13th May, 1972, the Bank introduced the Administrative Circular No. On the same day the Bank introduced simultaneously the Administrative Circular No. The result of the referendum by secret ballot was filed by the Bank by an Affidavit. The Constitutional valdity of this scheme was upheld by this Court in Reserve Bank of India v. N.C. Paliwal supra . 8 dated 13th May, 1972 on Scheme for Promotions Staff Officers Grade II which is binding on all employees of the Bank. On or about 7th May, 1972, the Bank formulated a Scheme for Promotions Staff Officer Grade II after giving full opportunity to the Association to make its suggestions. 9 on Scheme for Combined Seniority List and switchover from number clerical to clerical cadre with effect from 7th May, 1972 which is binding on all employees of the Bank. This Court further directed on 29th July, 1982 that in the interest of justice All India Reserve Bank Employees Class III Workmen Associations and All India Reserve Bank Workers Organisation be added as the party respondents, and the appeal was heard for some time. The service companyditions were governed by the Reserve Bank of India Staff Regulations, 1948 hereinafter called Regulations . The Bank thereafter filed a Rajoinder setting out principles governing recruitment and promotion of Staff Officers Grade A on 22nd February, 1983 including the modification of the existing scheme mutually agreed between the Bank and the Association. On 7th May, 1972, the Bank and the Association further agreed by exchange of companyrespondence that the ratio of direct recruits to the total strength of Staff Officers Grade II should be at 17.5 82.5. On 7th May, 1972, the Bank took several steps towards equalising promotional opportunities of employees by introducing the Optee Scheme of 1965, the Optee Scheme of 1966 and finally by entering into Memorandum of Settlement dated 7th May, 1972 with the Association accepting the principle of maintenance of a companybined seniority list at a centre. Then this appeal after hearing was adjourned and this Court directed the Reserve Bank to frame a new scheme for promotion by order dated 20th October, 1982. The High Court numbered that the point arose at the instance of three petitioners who were Grade II working at Nagpur branch of Reserve Bank ever since their employment which companymenced somewhere between 1960 to 1965. This Court granted special leave against the said judgment on 4th December, 1981.
v. Reserve Bank of India, supra . Khanzode Ors. On 22nd May, 1974, the Bank took a decision, based on the recommendations of the Cadre Review Committee under the Chairmanship of Mr. Justice J.L. On or about 7th January, 1978, the Bank took further decision, based on the recommendations of two Committees, one headed by Mr. Justice Nain and another headed by Mr. Thareja, and issued Administrative Circular No. Nain and issued the Administrative Circular No. 1st September to 31st August will be declared by the Bank in advance and the number of candidates in that office to be called for the test in order to fill those vacancies in that office will number exceed twice the number of such vacancies subject to sub clause It may be mentioned that the decision was rendered in respect of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution by three petitioners who were Grade II clerks working at Nagpur Reserve Bank ever since their employment which companymenced somewhere between 1960 to 1965. 8 dated 13th May, 1972. Reference in this companynection may be made to Annexure II III to the further Affidavit for the bank filed on 27th August, 1982 and which are in the appeal Paper Book at p. 134 onwards. On 2nd May, 1984, this Court directed that the settlement between the Bank and the Association be referred to Class III employees and opinion of the majority shall be taken on the basis of referendum by secret ballot and the result of the referendum should be companymunicated to this Court on 16th July, 1984 and the appeal to be heard thereafter. 3234 of 1981. 15 dated 22nd May, 1974 to prepare a companymon seniority list and to provide for inter group mobility at the lowest level of officers in Grade A with effect from 1st January, 1970. In this companynection, reference may also be made to V.T. It may be mentioned that as a result numberexamination companyld be held for panel years 1980 81, 1981 82, and 1982 83 The said clause was as follows II. See V.T. Number of candidates for the qualifying test a i As estimate of the vacancies anticipated to occur in each office during a panel year i.e. Goel, Ajit Pudissery, M.S. It may be mentioned that this judgment of the High Court was delivered on 19th March, 1981. Anantha Raman, R. Basu Devan, A.K. 2334 of 1980. 14834 of 1985 application for intervention and Civil Misc. N. Sahasranaman in person, S.P. Sharma in person, T.A. Civil Misc. From the Judgment and Order dated 19th March, 1981 of the Bombay High Court in Writ Petition No. B. Pai and R.H. Parihar for the Appellant. Gupta and V.J. Petition No. The appeal is allowed and the order of the Bombay High Court substituted by the order mentioned hereinbefore. Francis for the Respondents. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. This was submitted for acceptance on behalf of the appellants before us. | 1 | train | 1986_81.txt |
3136 admeasuring 0.20 acre in DLF Qutab Enclave, Gurgaon. Originally site No. M s DLF Universal Limited and other group of companypanies created DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust wherefor a large number of sites were earmarked for companystruction of schools companymunity buildings in the companyplex. 2,96,204/ which tantamount to unfair trade practice since the companyplainant informant was number informed that the previous site No. 3136 measuring 0.20 acre was allotted to the companyplainant informant on companysideration of Rs. The Commission finally directed the appellants to modify the draft lease deed as indicated in Para 7 a to d above and furnish the final lease deed to the companyplainant second respondent within two weeks and hand over the possession of the plot for the purpose it was leased out to him within two weeks of the execution of the draft lease deed by the companyplainant second respondent. Later on, on a review application filed by the companyplainant second respondent, it was submitted before the Commission on 4.7.2003 that the appellants were number willing to hand over the possession of the site plot to the companyplainant second respondent subject to execution of the fresh lease deed without modification and deviation of the standard lease deed to be executed by all such lessors. In response to the advertisement issued by the appellants in November, 1991 Raj Kamal, companyplainant second respondent applied for and was allotted Nursery School site No. During the preliminary investigation, it came to light that at the time of advertisement by the appellants in November, 1991, the title of the sites including the site plot allotted to the companyplainant second respondent was already transferred by the first appellant to the second appellant on 27.11.1990. On 04.07.2003, the companyplainant second respondent stated before the Commission that the possession of the site plot to which he was entitled to in terms of the agreement executed between the parties has still number been handed over to him. It purchased free hold lands at Gurgaon in the State of Haryana for setting up a companyony known as DLF Qutab Enclave Complex. Later on, this site was substituted by another site plot number 3101 admeasuring 0.35 acre after charging of extra amount for additional land allotted to him. 2 had leased out the sites to the fourth parties after 7.8.1991 as per statement furnished during investigation by the second appellant to the DG. The transfer deed entered into by the first appellant with the second appellant did number make obligatory on the part of the second appellant to utilize the amount companylected as such for the purpose of providing better amenities to the residents of DLF Qutab Enclave. The appellants later on issued a letter dated 19.5.1994 making allotment of 0.35 acres of alternate land bearing site plot number 3103 in place of plot No. Later on, an application was filed by the companyplainant second respondent seeking to review the order of the Commission. In the PIR, the following unfair restrictive trade practices on the part of the appellants have been alleged in this transaction based on the investigation The appellants respondents before the Commission despite number having the title of the impugned sites issued advertisement in November, 1991 inviting applications for allotment which is a deceptive and unfair trade practice within the meaning of Section 36A of the MRTP Act. Subsequently, however, the appellants offered to the companyplainant informant an alternate site measuring 0.35 acre after receiving an additional payment of Rs. 350 of 1997 whereby and whereunder the Commission has directed the appellants to execute fresh lease deed in favour of Raj Kamal, companyplainant second respondent herein with amendments suggested by the companyplainant second respondent and to incorporate Clause 11 a and b in the agreement to lease dated 1.12.1992 instead of Clause 4 in the draft lease deed which provided for the refund in the event of termination of the lease deed. 25 different sites having a total area of 29,358 acres were earmarked for the purposes of providing educational facilities which were transferred to the second appellant trust for a sum of Rs. The appellants in their companynter reply to the companyplaint of the companyplainant second respondent inter alia denied the allegations stated in the companyplaint and maintained that the numberice of inquiry and the PIR do number set out the specific and precise allegations of unfair restrictive trade practices against them. The companyplainant second respondent filed a companyplaint on 20.6.1997 before the Commission which was referred to the Director General of Investigation and Registration for short the DG first respondent herein. Lokeshwar Singh Panta, J. M s DLF Universal Limited first appellant herein and DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Education Charitable Trust second appellant herein have filed this appeal under Section 55 of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 hereinafter referred to as the MRTP Act read with Order XX A of the Supreme Court Rules, 1966 against the judgment and final order dated 3rd July, 2006 recorded by the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission, New Delhi for short the Commission in M.A. Second Appellant was having a surplus of Rs. A Preliminary Investigation Report PIR was submitted by DG first respondent on 27th March, 1998 in which it was reported that the appellants have indulged in restrictive and unfair trade practices within the meaning of Section 2 o i and Section 36A of the MRTP Act. Taking companynizance of the PIR on 4.6.1998, the Commission issued numberice of enquiry to the appellants. The appellants raised maintenance bills for the nursery school plot No. The allegations made in the companyplaint by the Complainant second respondent were that the appellants had number handed over the possession of the alternate plot to him on the plea that the Government of Haryana was number recognizing the fourth party rights. This No Objection Certificate was issued on 1.12.92 with regard to plot No. 4 lakhs and also a lease agreement dated 1.12.92 was entered into for companystructing and providing educational facilities by the lessee. It is also alleged that the second appellant was number allowed to create fourth party right at the time of issuance of impugned advertisement in November, 1991. 1,05,000/ It was also provided that in case the appellants were unable to companystruct the said site within the stipulated period, the same would automatically be reverted to the State Government. 3136 was subject to the revision of lay out plan. Briefly stated the facts giving rise to the filing of the present appeal are as follows M s DLF Universal Limited is a public limited companypany registered and incorporated under the Indian Companies Act, 1956. The first appellant was required to companystruct at its own companyt or get companystructed by any other institution or individual at its companyt, schools companymunity buildings etc. Hence, the appellants by way of this statutory appeal have challenged the companyrectness and validity of the impugned order of the Commission. The Trust i.e. It was also submitted that the appellants had filed writ petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana inter alia challenging the letter dated 9.2.1994 issued by the DTCP, whereby the appellants have been restrained from creating and recognising any fourth party rights and the said letter was given retrospective effect from 7.8.1991. appellant No. 5,489,223.86p. 5,729,723.49p. on the land transferred to them by the Government of Haryana under Section 3 a iv of the State Act. The appellants were also directed to file the affidavit of companypliance within eight weeks. 14 of 2004 Review in UTPE No. respectively at the end of 31st March, 1996 and 31st March, 1997 respectively. It applied for and was granted licence in terms of the provisions of the Haryana Development and Regulation of Urban Areas Act, 1975 for short the State Act. and Rs. 7245/1997 on 07.03.2001 and against the said judgment, special leave petition had been filed in this Court. 4908/2002 along with Civil Appeal Nos. No. | 0 | train | 2008_927.txt |
khandsari. Sugar and khandsari are distinct and different from each other. On an inspection of the samples of khandsari sugar and plantation white sugar produced in the Court during the arguments in these writ petitions it was numbericed that both khandsari sugar and plantation white sugar are white in companyour and crystalline in form though the plantation white sugar is a little more lustrous than khandsari sugar. The sugar produced in vacuum pan process is standardized as per India Sugar Standards and graded into A30, B30, C30, D30, E30, A29, B29 C29, D29 and E29 whereas khandsari sugar produced by the open pan process is called khandsari, khandsari sugar, rab and sugar in the market. That numberification included among other things gur, rab, shakkar and khandsari. The challenge was made on several grounds but numberdistinction was sought to be made between Khandsari produced indigenously on the one hand and Khandsari produced in the factories like the petitioners factories on the other hands by calling the latter as Khandsari Sugar. What the petitioners produce in their modern mills by the open pan process is khandsari sugar, an industrial produce, and number an agricultural produce which is produced by agriculturists. 8 of 1970 was promulgated including gur, rab, shakkar, khandsari and jaggery in s. 2 a of the Adhiniyam. In my view, these may be good reasons for number subjecting khandsari sugar to the levy of market fee and subjecting plantation white sugar to the levy. The case of the petitioners firms which manufacture Khandsari sugar by the open pan process in the State of Uttar Pradesh and sell the same in that State is this. Writ Petitions 1347 to 1360 of 1981 and Writ Petition 174 of 1982 are by manufacturers of Khandsari sugar in the open pan process and sellers thereof in Uttar Pradesh. 1969 A was passed, where under, the definition of agricultural produce embodied in section 2 a of the Act was amended by including gur, rab, shakkar, khandsari and jaggery. The prefatory numbere and the preamble can be looked into only in the present case as there is dispute between the parties on the question whether khandsari sugar produced by the petitioners, which is number included in the schedule or definition of agricultural produce in the Adhiniyam, while khandsari is mentioned in the definition of agricultural produce in s. 2 a thereof can be the subject matter of levy of market fee under the Adhiniyam. It is number possible to accept the submission of Dr Chitale that what the petitioners produce is an agricultural produce, be it more or less refined than khandsari. Thus, Khandsari stood companyered by the definition of section 2 a of the Act SO amended. But, as stated earlier Khandsari is one of the items introduced into the definition of agricultural produce in s. 2 a of the Adhiniyam by the Amendment Act 10 of 1970. In the aforesaid companynter affidavit of Shri Ram Sharan it is stated that khandsari produced by number sulphur units and khandsari produced by number sulphur units is similar in process, raw materials and sucros companytents. The appellants in that case were companymission agents carrying on business in the sale and purchase of gur, shakkar and khandsari in the New Mandi, Muzaffarnagar. After the issue of that numberification the Mandi Samiti authorities required the writ petitioners in that case to obtain licences for carrying on their business in gur, rab, shakkar and khandsari. The additional companytentions raised by that Board which also opposes the petitions are these The original definition of agricultural produce in s. 2 a of the Adhiniyam did number companytain the words and further includes gur, rab, shakkar, khandsari and jaggery. 1978 after companysidering all the objections raised, specifically mentioning Khandsari along with gur, rab, shakkar and jaggery in the list of 115 companymodities liable for the levy of market fees. In Annexure VIII to the companynter affidavit filed in P. 1347 1360 of 1981 it is stated that the improved process of khandsari manufacture as evolved by the Gur and Khandsari Research Scheme of the National Sugar Institute, Kanpur is a simplified form of the single sulphitation process as employed in the vacuum pan factories and that as a result of the improvements it is number possible to get a recovery of 7.5 to 8.0 per cent of sugar on cane of average quality and the first sugar produced is quite companyparable to ordinary grade crystal sugar produced by the vacuum pan process. Market fees were being companylected in respect of Khandsari produced by the factories like the Petitioners factories under the Act ever since 1969 70. 4835 of 1969 in the High Court of Allahabad, challenging the validity of the inclusion of Khandsari in the definition of agricultural produce companytained in section 2 a . In the process of manufacture of Khandsari sugar there is number only a physical change of the sugarcane used but also a chemical change and the white crystalline sugar of 90 per cent sucros purity is obtained after drying, grading and vagging by eliminating all the ingredients of sugarcane except sucros. The sale of khandsari is free without any Government companytrol and it is effected in the market areas by companymission agents by mutual negotiation or open auction while a large part of the sugar produced by the vacuum pan process is companytrolled by the Central Government. In the companynter affidavit of Shri Zorawar Singh, Secretary, Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti, Moradabad filed in P.1359 of 1981 it is admitted that the juice of sugarcane boiled in the open pan by the producers and the khandsari sugar manufactured by them companytains more than 90 per cent sucros. It is admitted by Dr. Chitale that the petitioners factories are working under licences and that it is number obligatory on agricultural producers producing khandsari in the indigenous method to obtain licences for producing the same. But in the case of desi khandsari, gur, jaggery, rab and shakkar which are all manufactured from raw sugarcane juice, pectins, live saps, motals, minerals, nitrogenous companypounds, wages and salts are number removed and there is numberchemical change in the manufacturing process. And this provided the starting point of resistance in the form of a Writ Petition on the part of a few Commission Agents carrying on the business of sale and purchase of Khandsari. That process which has been set out in that Annexure though brief is quite elaborate and number far different from the one adopted in the manufacture of plantation white sugar by the vacuum pan process. 1347 to 1360 of 1981 under Article 32 of the Constitution are for declaring the provisions of the U. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Adhiniyam, 1964 as ultra vires the Constitution and for restraining the respondents from realising market fee and licence fee from the petitioners under the provisions of that Adhiniyam hereinafter referred to as the Adhiniyam . 1347 1360 of 1981 that The technique of sugar manufactured through the indigenous process without the use of companyplicated machinery has been known in this companyntry from time immemorial. 175 of 1973 were 1 The State Legislature was number companypetent to enlarge the definition of agricultural produce so as to include gur, rab, shakkar, khandsari and jaggery within the term agricultural produce 2 The State Legislature had numberlegislative companypetence to enact the U P. Amendment Act 10 of 1970 as that Act was with reference to subject of industries the companytrol of which lay with the Union Government as declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest within the meaning of entry 52 of List I to the Seventh Schedule 3 The provisions of the Amendment Act 10 of 1970 are repugnant to the Industries Development and Regulation Act, 1951 4 The provisions of the Amendment Act 10 of 1970 are discriminatory as vacuum pan sugar is number included in the definition of agricultural produce in s. 2 a and 5 The provisions of the Amendment Act 10 of 1970 infringe the fundamental right guaranteed by Art. Writ Petitions 21 to 23 of 1982, Writ Petitions 3178 to 3195 of 1982, Writ k. Petitions 3178 to 3195 of 1982, Writ Petitions 4527 to 4532 of 1982 and Writ Petition 3890 of 1983 are by traders in that product in U. The petitioners firms which are producers of sugar are number liable to pay market fee under the Adhiniyam, s. 17 iii b whereof provides that the market companymittee shall have power to levy and companylect market fee which shall be payable on transactions of sale of specified agricultural produce in the market area at seh rates being number less than one per cent and number more than one and a half per cent of the price of the agricultural produce so sold as the State Government may specify by numberification. Of 1981. These words were added in the definition by the U. P. Amendment Act 10 of 1970 in order to remove anomalies in the words processed agricultural produce. The State Government issued a numberification dated 8.11.1968 under s. 5 1 of the Adhiniyam declaring their intention to regulate the sale and purchase of specified agricultural produce in the areas including the New Mandi, Muzaffarnagar. The said Ordinance was subsequently companyverted into P. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Amendment and Validation Act of 1970. The schedule to the Adhiniyam companysists of 175 items including paddy, honey, silk, eggs and ghee which were in the schedule from the inception. 1347 60/81, 132 143, 3405 16, 342Q 22, 3423 25 of 1980, 806 18 of 1981,4251,9500 05, 9511 13 9514 of 1981, 21 23,37 43, 45 56, 63, 91 1 l l, 166 67, 174, 181 192 of 1980, 407 11 of 1979, 412 415, 416 18 of 1979, 193 220, 237 48, 825 36, 7 1 722 of 1982, 723 39, 3 19 30,969 78, 2171 73 of 1982 and 3864 69 of 1980,1227 33 of 1981,5520 22 of 1980, 1001 07 of 1981, 1109 30 1384,1453 62, 1469 of 1981, 805 24,866, 972, 1453 62, 1498, 4667 68, 975 83, 854, 984, 1469 78, 787, 1319 24, 1400 02, 1504 05, 1608 11, 1621 25, 1934 63, 2172 77, 2228 31, 2251 53, 2374 75, 2327 61 2556 65, 2612 13, 2625 27, 2624, 3070 88, 3178 95, 985, 4158 65 4527 32, 5113 19, 9196 98 of 1982, 5727, 8397, 9583, 9719 22 of 1982, 8262 67 of 1981, 10039, 10223 of 1982, 2682 84 of 1983, 3885 86 of 1983, 66 67, 68 69, 1139 2759 of 1983, 2379 of 1982, 2703, 1119 of 1983, 7993 of 1982, 1172 of 1983, 6498 of 1982 Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India FOR THE APPEARING PARTIES Shanti Bhushan, R. K Garg P. R. Mridul R. K. Jain, Pradeep Kumar Jain, B. R. Kapoor, S. R. Srivastava. The Rajya Krishi Utpadan Mandi Parishad hereinafter referred to as the Parishad , impleaded as respondent in the petitions has filed separate companynter affidavit raising similar companytentions as the market companymittees. Writ Petition No. They instituted a Writ Petition, being Misc. Thereupon, a writ petition, out of which Special Appeal No. 1347 to 1360 of 1981 were referred to by the learned companynsel for the parties when companymon arguments were advanced in all the writ petitions. 49 of 1969 arose, was filed by one Nanak Chand, challenging the enforcement of the Adhiniyam against him. Miss Shobha Dikshit, Pradeep Mishra, S. K. Kulshrestha, and A. M. Singhvi, Advocates Ravindra Bana, Sarva Mittra, Rajiv Datta, B. Tawakley, R. B. Mebrotra, Pramod Swarup, R. N. Poddar N. N. Sharma. P. H. Parekh, Miss Nisha Srivastava, Hemant Sharma, Miss Indu Sharma. The producer is also denied a large part of his produce by manipulation and defective use of weights and scales in the market The Government of India and the various companymittees and companymissions appointed to study the companydition of agricultural markets in the companyntry have also been inviting the attention of the State Government from time to lime towards improving the companyditions of these markets. It is Annexure II to the companynter affidavit of the Parishad in P. 1350 etc. P. Rana, D. D. Thakur, E. C. Agarawala, Raju Ramachandran, R. Sathish, V. K Pandita and R. Rana Dr. L. M. Singhvi, L. N Sinha, Y. S. Chitale, and G. Dikshit. It is seen from Annexure VIII to the companynter affidavit of the respondent Parishad filed in W. Ps. Ordinance 8 of 1979 which was replaced by the Amendment Act 10 of 1970 and a writ of mandamus directing the respondents State of Uttar Pradesh and others number to enforce the Ordinance against the petitioners therein. K R Mohan, and Geetanjali Moham. 175 of 1973 on September 7, 1977. Therefore, the pleadings in those writ petitions alone are referred to in this judgment. The reliefs claimed in that Writ Petition were a writ of certioraris quashing the U.P. A learned single judge, by his judgment and order dated February 18, 1972, repelled the challenge and dismissed the Writ Petition. There may be slight difference in companyour and crystalline nature of the substance which is attributable to the better clarification method and better equipment adopted by sulphur units which are all improvements and which create numberdifference in the nature of the product, i.e. 4636 of 1969. The Planning Commission stressed long ago that legislation in respect c f regulation of markets should be enacted and enforced by 1955 56. The matter appears to have rested there till 1981. Reference is made at page 3 in the judgment of my learned A brother Thakkar, J. in these Writ Petitions, to the judgment of a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court in Special Appeal No. 175 of 1973 filed against the decision of a Single Judge of that companyrt in W P. No. they are liable to pay it only if they also hold licences as companymission agents or wholesale dealers and sell the product. The pleadings in W. Ps. These W. Ps. The following Judgments were delivered VARADARAJAN, J. 584/X11 8 10 176 dated 11. after its inception . The Government issued the said numberification No. The proposal to enact a marketing legislation was first taken up in 1938 but it companyld number go through as the then Ministry went out of office soon. A Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court companyfirmed the decision in Special Appeal No. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WP Nos. The points raised in the aforesaid Special Appeal No. | 0 | train | 1985_46.txt |
P.W. 1 and P.W. Mohan P.W. 4 and P.W. The deceased and his companyaccused P.W. In the opinion of the Doctor P.W. 1 son of Shivlal P.W. 1 and Poona P.W. 2, Shivlal P.W. 3, P.W. The reason given by P.W. 3 , Nanda P.W. 1 to 5 and also P.W. On hearing the alarm raised by P.W. Dr. K. C. Jain P.W. In village Tolkyakhedi, there are two warring factions, one led by Shivlal P.W. Purshottam, Badrilal appeallants and their companyaccused Bansilal gave blows to Kanahiya on the head, while the remaining accused were shouting kill him kill him. 1973 at about 4 p. m., deceased Kanahiva accompanied by Shri Krishan P.W. 8 stated that the deceased after his removal to his house and administration of water made a dying declaration that the three accused Badrilal, Purshottam and Bansilal had caused him the injuries. On September 6, 1972, about 9 or 10 months before the murder in question, Radhye Shyam son of Badrilal appellant was murdered, and Kanahiya deceased, Shri Krishan P.W. Thereupon the deceased made a dying declaration before the witnesses that Purshottam, Badrilal and Bansi had beaten him with Pharsis, while the rest armed with lathis had surrounded him The deceased died on his way to Nalkheda Hospital. 3 and the other by Purshottam appellant. In their earlier statements recorded under Sections 161/164, Criminal Procedure Code, P.W. It may well have said that in view of the companyent, clear and companyvincing evidence of the Doctor P.W. The appellants and Bansilal and three other accused were armed with Pharsis, Ramkaran was carrying a gun. 10 further explained that revival of companysciousness by the deceased after receiving this injury was number possible because the injury must have caused companycussion followed by companypression of brain. They removed Kanahiya to his house, and administered him water. Purshottam and Badrilal who are brothers, are number the appellants before us by special leave under Article 136 of the Constitution. while the rest were armed with lathis. The dimensions of the wound were 51/2X1/2X11/2 extending from frontal suture to the occipital suture, l left lateral and parallel to midline. were close relations and partisans of the deceased. As numbericed by the companyrts below, these witnesses had the temerity to implicate all the able bodied relations and members of the family of Purshottam and Badri appellants. The flow of blood from sinuses over the brain matter must have paralysed the whole brain system. 10 , the companyclusion was inescapable that the story of this dying declaration had been falsely fabricated by the P. Ws. 10 for this opinion, was that he found only one external cut wound and there were numberlacerations or indents. When he reached near the habitation of the village, the 16 accused persons variously armed companyfronted them. 101 who performed the autopsy found only one external cut wound on left parietal area of the deceased. 10 further testified that in his opinion, after receipt of this fatal injury on the head, the victim must have immediately lost companysciousness and companyld number have regained companysciousness or spoken anything till his death. All these five P. Ws. 10 .
this injury which had been caused with a sharp weapon, companyld number be caused by two simultaneous strokes blows. At the trial, however, they took up the position that they had reached the scene of occurrence just after the incident, when all the accused were still present on the spot, variously armed. All the five witnesses, namely, P. Ws. There has been criminal litigation between these factions. 4 and Rameshwar also reached the spot. 5 claimed to be full fledged eye witnesses of the occurrence. 2 however, companysistently claimed to have witnessed the entire occurrence. 8 and others also went to the spot. 3 along with others were being prosecuted for that murder. The culprits then fled away. 1 had been released on bail. 1 to 5. The prosecution story as narrated at the trial was that on June 27. 2 was returning from the fields. The police had also initiated security proceeding against the two parties. | 1 | train | 1980_356.txt |
Appellant then took the prosecutrix to a dilapidated house situated there and removed the clothes of the prosecutrix. The prosecutrix PW 4 was sent for medical examination. The vaginal swab of the prosecutrix was prepared and the panty of the prosecutrix was taken by the doctor and the same was sealed and handed over to the police for chemical examination. When the prosecutrix cried, the appellant slapped her and forcibly companymitted rape on her. Then, these witnesses took the prosecutrix and the appellant to the police station Vijaypur where the prosecutrix PW 4 lodged the first information report Ex. P 1 the age of the prosecutrix was found above 17 years and below 19 years. On 5.2.2004 the appellant took the prosecutrix PW 4 aged around 13 years on his cycle to Raghogarh to purchase clothes for her. Sans unnecessary details the background facts are as follows The prosecutrix is the daughter of the appellant. At the time of incident, the prosecutrix was residing with her father alongwith her three brothers. At that time, three persons witnesses Kamarjeet, Promod and Suresh who were passing by, heard the shrieks of the prosecutrix, went inside the room and separated the appellant from the prosecutrix. For companyfirmation of the age of the prosecutrix, her x ray was taken and as per the x ray report Ex. Thus, according to the prosecution, the appellant companymitted rape on the prosecutrix PW 4 , who is his own daughter. The mother of the prosecutrix had died about 3 years back prior to the date of incident i.e. At around 3 p.m., the prosecutrix was companying back with him on his cycle when on the way, the appellant stopped his cycle near Bawdi Kheda Ashram. 5.2.2004. Dr. Chhaya Shrama PW 2 examined the .prosecutrix and found that her sexual character had started developing, pubic hairs were scanty and on internal examination, found old hymen ruptured at 11 oclock position including the redness over its posterior side. There can never be more shocking, depraved and heinous crime than when the father is charged of having raped his own daughter. P 3 , the appellant was found companypetent to perform sexual intercourse. P 4 against the appellant. On the basis of this examination, the doctor opined that possibility of rape companyld number be denied. The appellant was arrested and he was also sent for medical examination. Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. In support of the appeal, the stands taken before the trial Court and the High Court were re iterated. He was companyvicted and sentenced as aforestated. After companymittal of the case, charge under Section 376 1 of I.P.C. The accused took the plea of false implication which was number accepted by the trial Court. was framed against the appellant. The High Court affirmed the companyviction and the sentence. After investigation, charge sheet was filed. It is also stated that the High Court without analyzing the evidence dismissed the appeal. He preferred an appeal before the High Court. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2008_2784.txt |
The appellant is before this Court aggrieved by the order dated 27.10.2016 passed by the High Court, wherein the High Court declined to quash the proceedings instituted against the appellant under Section 420 I.P.C., pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class at Saundatti. KURIAN, J. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2017_337.txt |
The assessee purchased sugarcane from the registered ryots according to the provisions of the Sugarcane Control Order and also from number registered ryots. The sugarcane purchased by the assessee was much more than the sugarcane produced by it for the assessment years 1962 63, 1966 67 and 1967 68. The quantity of sugarcane purchased from the number registered ryots was negligible companypared to the quantity of sugarcane purchased from the registered ryots except during the periods relevant for assessment years 1962 63, 1963 64 and 1966 67. 6636/83, 6637/83, 6638/83M 6639/83, 6640/83, 175 77/85 are 1962 63 to 1967 68. 6636/83, 6637/83, 6638/83M 6639/83, 6640/83, SLP No. Sugarcane, as a matter of fact, was sold in the market in raw state, even before the Sugarcane Control Order came into force. The Tribunal was of the view that sugarcane companyld number be treated as agricultural produce ordinarily sold in the market during the relevant previous years. 2399/89, 175 77/85 3674/89 J U D G M E N T Sen, J. 2611/88, C.A. Since the profits made by the assessee from the sale of sugar arises out of agricultural activities as well as the manufacturing activities, the income earned by the assessee has to be divided into two parts. The assessment years in this group of appeals C.A. W I T H A. No. | 0 | train | 1997_1430.txt |
on companyton yarn produced by it and cleared, out of the factory in hanks. P. 2 and P. 3 which exempt from payment of excise duty companyton yarn of 17 companynts or more but less than 35 companynts, if cleared out of factory in hanks. As the exemption of duty on yam applies only to standard hanks of 840 yards in length, the double hanks produced by you will number be eligible for exemption. P 2 under which single companyton yarn between 17 to 35 companynts whether grey or bleached and grey multiple, fold yarn cleared out of the factory in hanks were totally exempt from the payment of duty w.e.f. It has been manufacturing companyton yarn of varying companynts ranging from 20 to 32. The appellant is a companypany engaged in the manufacture and sale of companyton yarn. Under the provisions of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944, companyton yarn is liable to excise duty at the rate prescribed in the Sch. He wrote to the appellant on November 14, 1962 as follows On a verification at your mill premises it was numbericed that the single yarn produced are double the length of a standard hank of 840 yards. In view of this numberification, the appellant did number pay any excise duty on the yarn produced by it and cleared out of the factory in companyls during the period from 17 8 1962 to 14 11 1962. The only question for decision in this appeal by Special Leave is whether the companyls of companyton yarn cleared out of the appellants factory during the period from 17 8 1962 to 14 11 1962 are exempt from excise duty in view of Exts. In support of their companyclusion that the word hank has acquired a precise technical meaning in companymercial circles, the learned judges of the High Court referred to the definition given to the word hank in Murrays New English Dictionary, Mercury Dictionary of Textile Terms, American Cotton Hank Book and to some of the Government publications. By s. 13 1 of the Finance Act, 1961 Act XIV of 1961 all companyton yarns less than 35 companynts were subject to excise duty at the rate of 10 Np. a circular loop or companyl of companyton yarn 850 yards in length Hence the appellant was number entitled to the exemption granted under those numberifications. This provision took effect from 1 3 1961 but the Government by its numberification dated 24 4 1962 under rule 8 of the Central Excise Rules 1944 granted exemption to the companyton yarn falling under item 18A of the 1st Sch. Superintendent of Central Excise Cannanore sometime in November, 1962. It may be taken that the word hank has acquired a techni cal meaning in companymercial circles and in the absence of any evidence to show companytrary intention on the part of the authorities who issued Exts. Both the single judge as well as the appellate bench of that High Court rejected the prayer of the appellant, accepting the companytention of the department that the word hank in Exh. The appellants factory was inspected by the Dy. Thereafter the appellant unsuccessfully appealed to the Collector of Central Excise. July 24, 1962. 46,647.85 np. In view of this numberification, the appellant became liable to pay duty at the rate of 3.5 per paise per Kg. On 13 6 1962 yet another numberification was issued by the Government under rule 8 1 Exh. to the Act from so much of the duty leviable thereon as was in excess of the duty specified in the companyresponding entry in companyumn 3 thereof. Collector on April 14, 1963. As per its numberification dated September 28, 1963 a further amendment was made to the numberification issued on September 21, 1963. per Kg. C. Chagla, Sardar Bahadur, Yougindra Khushalani and Vishnu B. Saharya, for the appellant. A further companymunication was sent to the appellant by the same Dy. P 2 and P 3 has been used to companyvey a special meaning, i.e. In reply to that letters, the appellant informed the Dy. Superintendent in respect of the same demand on January 2, 1963. A. Seyid Muhammad, B. Dutta and S. P. Nayar, for the respondents. The appellant objected to the demand but the appellants objections were rejected by the Asstt. 158 of 1965. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No, 2346 of 1966, Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated November 22, 1965 of the Kerala High Court in Writ Appeal No. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by Hegde. Thereupon the appellant brought this appeal. to the said Act. J. | 1 | train | 1969_403.txt |
The Insurance Company was aggrieved as the liability was imposed on them. The Insurance Company put forward a companytention that the deceased Dupinder Kaur was a gratuitous passenger in the truck and hence numberliability can be fastened with the insurer, but that companytention was repelled. The accident occurred while she was travelling in the truck on 11.3.1990. Her name was Dupinder Kaur. The claimants as well as the Insurance Company challenged the said award. Hence this appeal by special leave at the instance of the Insurance Company. The owner of the truck was found liable to pay the companypensation amount. A Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the Insurance Company but allowed the other appeal by doubling the companypensation amount. A 10 year old girl met with her death in a truck accident. M s. New India Assurance Company, the insurer had been directed to make the amount good with interest, as the vehicle was then companyered by an insurance policy issued by that companypany. After hearing learned companynsel for the appellant we felt that it is number necessary to send numberice to the respondents to companytest the appeal as there is numberscope for absolving the Insurance Company from liability. The farmer was dissatisfied with the quantum of companypensation awarded. The Motor Accident Claims Tribunal before which the claim was made passed an award in a sum of Rs.25,000/ to the claimants. Her father, brother and sister made a joint claim for companypensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 for short the new Act . She died on the spot. THOMAS, J. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 1999_845.txt |
1486 OF 2004 REPORTABLE by some of the accused in Cr. 3 companyperative bank. In this case, an application for bail was made CRL.A. And Administrator of the bank shall personally remain present at 215 P.M. before this Court. 121/2002 of Naranpura Police Station in respect of an offence alleged to have been companymitted by respondent No. 10,000/ should have their deposits released as and when funds were received by the respondent No. The appellant is aggrieved by the order dated 20th of December, 2002 whereby a direction has been issued by the learned Single Judge in an application for bail under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure made by an accused that depositors who had made deposits of less than Rs. Bail was granted by the Magistrate vide order dated 22nd February, 2002. This order was challenged by the depositors before the High Court. On the next date of hearing, all the accused as well as I.O. 3, the Ex Chairman of the Bank, respondent No. NO. | 1 | train | 2010_587.txt |
It was with reference to the meeting which the Chief Justice of Delhi had with the Chief Justice of India that the Chief Justice of Delhi adverted to the three points in his letter to the Chief Justice of India. Transferred Case No. No. But the Law Minister was number informed as to what was discussed between the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India and what were the details and companycrete facts disclosed by him to the Chief Justice of India. The Chief Justice of Delhi thereupon met the Chief Justice of India and had discussion with him on March 26, 1981. Now it is clear from this letter addressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi to the Law Minister that the Chief Justice of India asked the Chief Justice of Delhi to furnish him details and companycrete facts in regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar and in response to this request, the Chief Justice of Delhi met the Chief Justice of India on March 26, 1981 and discussed the entire matter in detail with the Chief Justice of India. If the Chief Justice of Delhi refused to disclose these facts to the Chief Justice of India, we have numberdoubt that the Chief Justice of India would have remonstrated with the Chief Justice of Delhi for such refusal and expressed his displeasure about it to the Law Minister. The Chief Justice of India was camping at Simla then. These two points must have been discussed between the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India, for otherwise there is numberreason why the Chief Justice of India, and the Chief Justice of Delhi should have referred to them in his letter to the Chief Justice of India and if these two points were discussed, it is difficult to believe that the Chief Justice of Delhi should number have disclosed all the facts bearing upon these two points to the Chief Justice of India. A companyy of this letter was sent to Chief Justice of India. There is also inherent evidence in the letter dated March 28, 1981 addressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi to the Chief Justice of India that the entire matter relating to the integrity of S. N. Kumar was discussed between the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India. March 26, 1981 The Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India had a discussion over Shri Kumars case. The letter refers to the meeting of March 26, 1981 between the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court. March 28, 1981 the Delhi Chief Justice wrote to the Law Minister enclosing a companyy of the letter written by him to the Chief Justice of India. This has reference to the letter of Chief Justice of India dated March 14, 1981, to Chief Justice of Delhi High Court. It is seen from the letter dated March 28, 1981 written by the Delhi Chief Justice to the Chief Justice of India that the Chief Justice of India had also written a letter dated March 14, 1981 which is number placed before us to the Delhi Chief Justice about the same subject and that the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court had met the Chief Justice of India on March 26, 1981 this date is mentioned in the letter of the Chief Justice of India dated May 22, 1981 which will be referred to later on . The Chief Justice of Delhi stated at the companymencement of this letter that he had had an opportunity to discuss this delicate matter with the Chief Justice of India. in his letter dated May 7, 1981 and this inference was obvious from the letters addressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi to the Law Minister and the Chief Justice of India. After that meeting the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court wrote to the Chief Justice of India the letter dated March 28, 1981 referred to above. The numbere of the Law Minister dated May 19, 1981 and the letter of May 29, 1981 written by the Law Minister to the Delhi Chief Justice which refer to the request of the Delhi Chief Justice clearly establish that the letter of May 7, 1981 was number sent to the Chief Justice of India number as part of any companyspiracy or pact between the Law Minister and the Delhi Chief Justice but at the request of the Delhi Chief Justice. Apart from these petitions which have been transferred to this Court other petitions were also filed against the order of the President transferring Justice Ismail, Chief Justice of the Madras High Court to be the Chief Justice of Kerala High Court and Justice K. B. N. Singh, Chief Justice of the Patna High Court to be the Chief Justice of Madras High Court. By my request the Chief Justice promised to send a statement showing the disposals of Justice Kumar. It is admitted that the letter of May 7, 1981 written by the Delhi Chief Justice to the Law Minister was number sent to the Chief Justice of India along with the letter of May 21, 1981. March 19, 1981 The law Minister in his letter to the Chief Justice of the High Court referred to the observations of the Chief Justice of India that the charges against Shri Kumar appeared to be too vague and asked for further companyments from the Chief Justice of the High Court on the question of companytinuance or otherwise of Shri Justice S. N. Kumar. It is strange as to how the petitioner companyld claim knowledge of the recommendations of the Chief Justice of India and Chief Justice of Delhi High Court. On the same day the Chief Justice of the High Court wrote to the Law Minister enclosing a companyy of his letter to the Chief Justice of India and he informed the Law Minister that he had had an opportunity to discuss the entire matter in detail with the Chief Justice of India . Pursuant to this request made by the Chief Justice of Delhi, the Law Minister did number place the letter dated May 7, 1981 before the Chief Justice of India. March 28, 1981 The Chief Justice of the High Court wrote to the Law Minister saying that he had had an opportunity to discuss the entire matter in detail with the Chief Justice of India and that after the discussion he had also addressed a letter to the Chief Justice of India. So also, all the material in the possession of the President must be placed before the Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of the High Court. This writ petition has challenged the transfer of Mr. Justice M. M. Ismail, Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras as the Chief Justice of Kerala High Court. On May 21, 1981 the Law Minister had written a letter to the Chief Justice of India when was in Simla. Obviously all the details and companycrete facts in regard to the allegations against S. N. Kumar which were required by the Chief Justice of India must have been discussed in detail between the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India at this meeting held on March 26, 1981. Thus on March 28, 1981, the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court wrote two letters, one to the Law Minister and another to Chief Justice of India and a companyy of the letter to Chief Justice of India was annexed to the letter addressed to the law Minister. It is true the Chief Justice of the High Court in his two letters dated March 28, 1981 written respectively to the Law Minister and the Chief Justice of India had said that the entire matter companycerning Justice Kumars integrity had been discussed between him and the Chief Justice of India but it would be wrong to assume, though the Chief Justice of the High Court spoke of the entire matter, that the particulars of the suits and the allegations against Justice Kumar companycerning them were placed before the Chief Justice of India. The Chief Justice of Delhi expressed the hope that what he had stated in his letter to the Chief Justice of India would be companysidered sufficient companyments on his part in regard to the observations of the Chief Justice of India quoted in the letter of the Law Minister dated March 19, 1981. She has sought for a declaration that the transfer of Mr. Justice M. M. Ismail, Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras as the Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court is unconstitutional. In this letter the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court informed the Law Minister that he had since received a letter from the Chief Justice of India asking him to furnish him with details and companycrete facts in regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar . It appears that subsequent to this meeting held on March 26, 1981, the Chief Justice of Delhi addressed a letter dated March 28, 1981 to the Chief Justice of India recording that since receipt of the letter of the Chief Justice of India dated March 14, 1981, the Chief Justice of Delhi had had an opportunity to discuss this delicate matter with the Chief Justice of India and observing, to quote the exact words used by Chief Justice of Delhi There were three points mentioned in my D. O. Since the Chief Justice of India had observed that the letter dated February 19, 1981 addressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi was too vague to form the basis of an opinion that S. N. Kumar was lacking in integrity, the Law Minister naturally asked the Chief Justice of Delhi to offer his further companyments in answer to this remark of the Chief Justice of India. This presumption is raised on the basis of the letters from the Chief Justice, Delhi. The Chief Justice of Delhi also addressed a letter dated March 28, 1981 to the Law Minister pointing out that since receipt of the letter of the Chief Justice of India, he had had an opportunity to discuss the entire matter in detail with the Chief Justice of India and that after this discussion he had addressed a letter dated March 28, 1981 to the Chief Justice of India, a companyy of which was being enclosed by him. The Chief Justice of Delhi emphatically reiterated in the last paragraph of his letter to the Chief Justice of India that the matter in regard to the companyplaints against the integrity of N. Kumar had already been discussed between them. 2 of 1981. In that letter he had also mentioned the disposals of Justice Kumar. But the letter of May 21, 1981 companytained a reference to the meeting which had taken place between the Delhi Chief Justice the Chief Justice of India in para 3 thereof. A further declaration was sought that the transfer of Chief Justice M. M. Ismail and Chief Justice K. B. N. Singh as Chief Justice of Kerala and Madras respectively being number in public interest and also because Article 222 does number companyfer any power to transfer a Chief Justice, is unconstitutional. The criticism of the Chief Justice of India voiced in that letter was that what was stated by the Chief Justice of Delhi in his letter dated February 19, 1981 was vague and the Chief Justice of Delhi therefore pointed out to the Law Minister that he had discussed the entire matter in detail with the Chief Justice of India and met his objection and hence there was numberquestion of any vagueness and he therefore hoped that his reply would be sufficient answer to the observations of the Chief Justice of India. The letter of May 29 discloses that the Chief Justice of the High Court mentioned three reasons for number disclosing the letter to the Chief Justice of India. Reverting to the letter dated March 28, 1981, written by the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court to the Chief Justice of India, it may be numbered that in this letter the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court in terms says that since receiving the letter dated March 14, 1981, with regard to Mr. Justice Kumar, he had also had an opportunity to discuss this delicate matter with the Chief Justice of India. To companytinue with the chronology, by the letter dated March 19, 1981, the Law Minister companyveyed to the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court the reaction of the Chief Justice of India to the observations made by the Chief Justice for number recommending extension of Shri Kumar especially the charge of vagueness and requested the Chief Justice to offer his companyments on the question of companytinuance or otherwise of Shri Kumar in the light of the view expressed by the Chief Justice of India. It appears from a subsequent letter addressed by the Law Minister to the Chief Justice of the High Court on May 29, 1981 that a few days after the letter of May 7 was written, the Chief Justice of the High Court had requested the Law Minister to keep that letter a secret from the Chief Justice of India. After a telephone talk with the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of India wrote on December 20, 1980 proposing the transfer of Shri M. Ismail, Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras, as Chief Justice of the High Court of Kerala and the transfer of Shri K. B. N. Singh as Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras. This was followed by a letter dated April 15, 1981 addressed by the Law Minister to the Chief Justice of Delhi. There was companysiderable companytroversy between the parties as to what were precisely the facts which were discussed between the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India at this meeting, but the subsequent companyrespondence exchanged between the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India throws companysiderable light on this companytroversy and we must therefore proceed to examine it. There is numberreference here to the letter of May 7 from the Chief Justice of the High Court. Honble the Chief Justice of India had made certain observations with regard to my recommendation about Mr. Justice S. N. Kumar and the same were companymunicated to me by you for my companyments in your D.O. The Chief Justice of India requested him to companye to Delhi to discuss the question of his transfer. After the discussion I have addressed a letter to the Chief Justice, a companyy of which is enclosed. 20 of 1981. April 15, 1981 My dear Chief Justice, I am to hand your D.O. There is numberreason to believer that any facts which were in the possession of the Chief Justice of Delhi in regard to the companyplaints and doubts against S. N. Kumar were number disclosed and discussed by him with the Chief Justice of India. Chief Justice of India filed his companynter affidavit dated September 29, 1981. You felt that the Chief Justice of India had already started wrongfully denigrating you for your letter of February 19, 1981. CMJC 2224 of 1981 in the Patna High Court against the Union of India, the Chief Justice of India, Mr. Justice K. B. N. Singh, Chief Justice of the Patna High Court and the Registrar, Patna High Court. I am also sending a companyy of this letter to the Chief Justice of your High Court. That letter runs as under Secret Chief Justice High Court of Delhi New Delhi O. He has impleaded Shri K. B. N. Singh, Union of India and the Chief Justice of India as respondents. It reads Secret Chief Justice High Court of Delhi New Delhi O. Undoubtedly, this letter has number been brought to the numberice of the Chief Justice of India. This letter addressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi to the Chief Justice of India clearly shows that there was full discussion between the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India in regard to companyplaints and doubts against the integrity of S. N. Kumar but at the end of the discussion the Chief Justice of Delhi stuck to his opinion and that is why in the letter addressed by him to the Law Minister, he did number go back upon his refusal to recommend S. N. Kumar for further appointment and maintained his original recommendation number to companytinue S. N. Kumar for a further term. That there was full and frank discussion between the Chief Justice of India and the Delhi Chief Justice with reference to the very particulars referred to in the letter of May 7, 1981 is clear by the following facts i The statement With regard to the companyplaints about Justice Kumars integrity and general companyduct, the matter has already been discussed between us which is found in the letter of March 28, 1981 written by the Delhi Chief Justice to the Chief Justice of India, ii the reference to the meeting in the letter of the same date addressed by the Delhi Chief Justice to the Law Minister enclosing a companyy of the above said letter dated March 28, 1981, iii the reference to the meeting in the letter of the Law Minister to the Chief Justice of India dated May 21, 1981 and iv the reference to the meeting in the letter of the Chief Justice of India dated May 22, 1981 written from Simla. The effect and substance of what the Chief Justice of Delhi stated in his letter to the Law Minister was that he had cleared the charge of vagueness by discussing all the facts in regard to the allegations against S. N. Kumar with the Chief Justice of India. The Chief Justice had also written to me a letter dated March 14, 1981 asking for details and companycrete facts in regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar . The Chief Justice had also written to me a letter dated March 14, 1981 asking for details and companycrete facts in regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar. 292 HCJ PPS March 28, 1981 My dear Chief Justice, I am in receipt of your letter dated March 14, 1981 with regard to Mr. Justice S. N. Kumar. After Shri S. N. Kumar was reappointed as an Additional Judge with effect from March 7, 1981, the Law Minister wrote on March 19, 1981 to the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court bringing to his numberice the numbere of the Chief Justice of India made on March 3, 1981 that the letter of the Delhi Chief Justice dated February 19, 1981 seemed to him too vague to accept that Shri Kumar lacked integrity and added In the light of these observations of the Chief Justice of India, I shall be grateful for your further companyments on the question of companytinuance or otherwise of Shri Justice S. N. Kumar. The Law Minister stated in the numbere that he presumed that when the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India met, the former must have informed the latter about the details that he had mentioned. 22 of 1981. Then it is further averred that Chief Justice of India had visited Patna as mentioned by Shri K. B. N. Singh himself. 19 of 1981. 24 of 1981. The only reply with the Law Minister got from the Chief Justice of Delhi was that the Chief Justice of Delhi had met and discussed the entire matter in detail with the Chief Justice of India and removed the objection based on vagueness by giving him details and companycrete facts in regard to the allegations against S. N. Kumar. Thereafter, the Chief Justice of High Court wrote a letter D.O. The Chief Justice of Delhi by his letter supplied to the Law Minister the material on which his opinion against the companytinuance of N. Kumar was based. The letter of the Delhi Chief Justice dated February 19, 1981 seems to me too vague to accept that Shri Kumar lacks integrity . The Chief Justice of India replied to this letter next day, May 22, 1981 from Simla. The Chief Justice had also written to me a letter dated March 14, 1981, asking for details and companycrete facts in regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar . The Chief Justice had also written to me a letter dated March 14, 1981, asking for details and companycrete facts in regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar. The letters of the Delhi Chief Justice dated February 19, 1981 seem to be too vague to accept that Shri Kumar lacks integrity. What is disputed is that for the proposed transfer Government policy was number the only reason given by Chief Justice of India and the Chief Justice of India in his companynter affidavit has stated that over and above referring to Government policy, Shri Singh was informed that it was proposed to transfer Chief Justice M. M. Ismail from Madras and it was necessary to appoint an experienced and senior Chief Justice in his place. About Justice Kumar number being very helpful in disposing of cases, I enclose a statement of disposal by Justice Kumar in 1980. The meeting between Chief Justice of India and Shri Singh took place in the evening on January 8, 1981. 13425 of 1981 requesting this Court to direct that Mr. Justice O. N. Vohra and Mr. Justice S. N. Kumar be impleaded as respondents. Shri Singh enquired why he was being transferred to Madras and the Chief Justice of India said that it was Government policy. The companynter affidavit of the Chief Justice of India prompted two affidavits in rejoinder, one by Chief Justice K. B. N. Singh and the other by petitioner 1 and 2. On March 19, 1981, the Law Minister wrote to the Chief Justice of the High Court drawing his attention to the observations of the Chief Justice of India that the letter dated February 19, 1981 sent by the Chief Justice of the High Court appeared to suffer from vagueness and it was therefore difficult to accept that Shri Kumar lacked integrity. March 3, 1981 A companyy of this letter was sent to the Chief Justice of India and on March 3, 1981 the Chief Justice of India recorded this numbere on the relevant file I would like to look carefully into the charges against Shri S. N. Kumar. On March 28, 1981, the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court replied to the letter dated March 19, 1981, of the Law Minister. It appears that the Chief Justice of India also addressed a letter dated March 14, 1981 to the Chief Justice of Delhi asking him, with reference to the observations made by him in his letter dated February 19, 1981, to furnish details and companycrete facts in regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar . The Chief Justice had recommended in that letter that Justice Kumars appointment should number be extended further for three reasons 1 that serious companyplaints were received against Justice Kumar orally as well as in writing 2 that Justice Kumar was number very helpful in disposing of cases and 3 that some responsible members of the Bar and Bench had expressed doubts about Justice Kumars integrity. The Chief Justice ended the letter by saying Perhaps you will companysider this to be sufficient companyments on my part as desired by you in your letter under reply letter dated March 19, 1981 about the observations of the Chief Justice of India which you have quoted in your letter . May 21, 1981 My In his letter dated February 19, 1981 the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court companyy enclosed had recommended that Justice Kumar may number be given any extension. Thereafter, he was appointed acting Chief Justice of the Patna High Court for a short while and as permanent Chief Justice on July 6, 1976. The averments made by Chief Justice K. B. N. Singh in this affidavit were disputed by the Union of India in an affidavit sworn by K. C. Kankan, Deputy secretary, Department of Justice, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs and the Chief Justice of India also filed a companynter affidavit in reply to the affidavit of Chief Justice K. B. N. Singh. May 7, 1981 In answer to the Law Ministers letter of April 15, 1981 the Chief Justice of the High Court wrote back saying that in regard to the allegations against Shri Kumar, he had discussed the matter with the Chief Justice of India and had also written to him. April 15, 1981 The Law Minister wrote to the Chief Justice of the High Court in reply to the letter dated March 28, 1981. The Chief Justice of Delhi then proceeded to add in this letter addressed to the Law Minister Perhaps you will companysider this to be sufficient Comments on my part as desired by you in your letter under reply about the observations of the Chief Justice of India which you have quoted in your letter. By my letter dated March 14, 1981 to the Delhi Chief Justice I requested him to furnish further details and companycrete facts in regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar since the result of the enquiries made by me was quite at variance with what the Chief Justice had stated in his letter of March 19. The petitioners statement that both the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court and the Chief Justice of India had recommended the appointment of these three Judges for a further period of two years is untrue and incorrect. It was argued on behalf of the Union of India and the Law Minister that it must be presumed that all the details were placed before the Chief Justice of India because the Chief Justice of the High Court in his letter dated March 28, 1981 addressed to the Law Minister had stated that he had an opportunity to discuss the entire matter in detail with the Chief Justice of India and that in another letter written on the same day to the Chief Justice of India he had said With regard to the companyplaints about Justice Kumars integrity and general companyduct, the matter has already been discussed between us. Again on January 8, 1981 Shri K. B. N. Singh met the Chief Justice of India at New Delhi and the question of transfer was again discussed. This writ petition was originally filed in the High Court of Madras under Article 226 of the Constitution and in this writ petition the petitioner challenged the companystitutional validity of the orders of transfer passed by the President on January 19, 1981 transferring Mr. Justice M. M. Ismail, Chief Justice of Madras High Court as the Chief Justice of Kerala High Court and Mr. Justice K. B. N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Court as the Chief justice of Madras High Court. I have received a letter from the Chief Justice of India with regard to my observations and recommendations made in my D.O. Whether the reasons for number disclosing the letter of May 7 to the Chief Justice of India were valid or number, it is clear that the Chief Justice of India was number apprised of the particulars companytained in the letter of May 7 companycerning Justice Kumars integrity. This was a companyrteous and respectful way of expressing disagreement with the Chief Justice of India. No affidavit in reply was filed by the Chief Justice of India who was respondent 2 to the petition. Shri K. B. N. Singh filed on October 16, 1981, an affidavit in reply to the affidavit of the Chief Justice of India. The first point to companysider here is whether the information companytained in the letter dated May 7, 1981 of the Chief Justice of the High Court was ever made known to the Chief Justice of India. This again is met by the statement of the Chief Justice of India in his companynter affidavit that there was full and effective companysultation between me and the President of India on the question of Shri B. N. Singhs transfer from Patna to Madras as the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court. The Law Minister obviously companyld number accept the opinion of the Chief Justice of Delhi blindly and unquestioningly because that would have amounted to abdication of his companystitutional obligation and he therefore asked the Chief Justice of Delhi to furnish him the material on which the opinion of the Chief Justice of Delhi was based. This made the Chief Justice to companyclude that reputation for integrity of Shri Kumar was number what should be for a Judge of the High Court. During this discussion according to Shri Singh the Chief Justice of India was number committal in the matter of Shri Singhs transfer. On January 5, 1981, the Chief Justice of India telephoned Shri K. B. N. Singh and informed him of the likelihood of his transfer to Madras. There is numberdoubt in our mind that the Chief Justice of Delhi must have disclosed all the facts relating to the companyplaints and doubts expressed against the integrity of S. N. Kumar to the Chief Justice of India but, as is evident from a subsequent letter dated May 22, 1981 addressed by the Chief Justice of India to the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of India had already, prior to the date of the meeting, made his own inquiries in the matter and as a result of such inquiries he was number inclined to agree with the opinion given by the Chief Justice of Delhi and it is obvious therefore that he must have told the Chief Justice of Delhi that in the companyrse of the inquiries made by him he had been told by persons that there was numberhing against the integrity of S. N. Kumar and he was companysequently unable to agree with the view expressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi. What was discussed between the two would appear very clearly for the letter addressed by the Chief Justice of India to the Law Minister on May 22, 1981. Now, as stated in the letter of the Chief Justice of Delhi dated February 19, 1981, companyplaint against the integrity of S. N. Kumar were received by the Chief Justice of Delhi direct as also through the Law Minister and doubts against the integrity of S. N. Kumar had been expressed by responsible members of the Bar as also by some of the Judges of the Delhi High Court and therefore the inference is irresistible that when the matter in regard to the companyplaints against the integrity of S. N. Kumar was discussed, these facts must have been disclosed by the Chief Justice of Delhi to the Chief Justice of India. 21 of 1981. 6 of 1981. The Chief Justice of India recommended extension of Shri Kumars term of office by six months. On March 3, 1981, the Chief Justice of India expressed a desire to look carefully into the charges against Shri S. N. Kumar and pointed out that the letter of the Chief Justice of the High Court appeared to be too vague to persuade one that Shri Kumar lacked integrity. 274 of 1981. I have since had an opportunity to discuss the entire matter in detail with the Chief Justice of India. This was a letter dated May 7, 1981 addressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi to the Law Minister in response to the request companytained in the letter of the Law Minister dated April 15, 1981. That paragraph refers to the meeting which had taken place between the Chief Justice of India and himself on March 26, 1981 on all relevant points relating to the proposal of reappointment of Shri S. N. Kumar and the fact that he had written the letter of March 28, 1981 to the Law Minister as desired by the Chief Justice of India. 1509 of 1981. Chief Justice K. B. N. Singh thereafter filed an affidavit setting out in extenso what transpired between him and the Chief Justice of India in regard to the proposal for his transfer and detailing the various grounds on which he companytended that the order transferring him as Chief Justice of the Madras High Court was unconstitutional and void. It is stated that Shri K. B. N. Singh had an effective opportunity to represent his case before the Chief Justice of India. The Chief Justice of India also requested Shri Singh during this companyversation to companye over to Delhi to discuss the question of his transfer. Probably the reference is to the following lines of May 7 letter written by the Chief Justice of the High Court Honble the Chief Justice of India had made certain observations with regard to my recommendation about Mr. Justice S. N. Kumar and the same were companymunicated to me by you for my companyments in your D.O. in October 1981. Shri Singh then proceeds to state that on January 5, 1981, for the first time he received a telephonic message from the Chief Justice of India that as Shri M. M. Ismail, the then Chief Justice of Madras was proposed to be transferred to Kerala, in the companysequential vacancy in the office of Chief Justice, Madras, Shri Singh was proposed to be transferred. 293 HCJ PPS dated March 28, 1981 and a companyy of your letter to the Chief Justice of India bearing the same date, regarding Shri Justice S. N. Kumar, Additional Judge, Delhi High Court. She challenges the transfer of Shri M. M. Ismail, Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court. It was the first order of transfer of Mr. Justice M. M. Ismail as Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court that was challenged by the petitioner in this writ petition. On January 8, 1981 at 7.30 p.m. Shri K. B. N. Singh met the Chief Justice of India at his residence in Delhi and was with him for some time. The letter of May 7, 1981 written by the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court to the Law Minister was marked SECRET For Personal Attention Only . Thereafter on May 21, 1981, the Law Minister wrote to the Chief Justice of India requesting him to give his opinion on the companytinuance of Shri S. N. Kumar. In regard to companyplaints regarding Justice Kumars integrity and general companyduct, the Chief Justice of the High Court discussed the matter with you as mentioned in his D.O. This letter is followed by the letter of May 29, 1981 by the Chief Justice of India to the Law Minister which runs as under Chief Justice of India Supreme Court of India New Delhi Confidential May 29, 1981 My dear Shiv Shankar, While in Simla, I received your letter dated May 21, 1981 in companynection with the extension of the term of Justice S. N. Kumar and Justice S. B. Wad whose term as Additional Judges of the Delhi High Court is due to expire on June 6, 1981. After careful companysideration of the material available with it and after taking into account the views expressed by the Chief Justice of India and Chief Justice of Delhi High Court and after giving full companysideration to the views of both, Government decided number to give appointments for a further term to Shri Justice O. N. Vohra and Shri Justice S. N. Kumar on the expiry of their term on June 6, 1981. A companytinuous process of companysultation between all three authorities is mandated, resulting ultimately in advice tendered to the President by the Chief Justice of the High Court and the Chief Justice of India. The Chief Justice of Delhi High Court by his letter dated February 19, 1981, addressed to the Law Minister, did number recommend an extension for Shri Kumar. The Law Minister sought advice from his Secretariat whether the companymunication of the letter to the Chief Justice of India was unavoidable. On January 19, 1981 the President issued a numberification, after companysultation with the Chief Justice of India, transferring Shri K. B. N. Singh as Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras with effect from the day he assumed charge of that office. He requested the Chief Justice of India to forward the advice in regard to the companytinuance or otherwise of Shri Kumar and Shri S. B. Wad. The Chief Justice of Delhi High Court proceeds further to state that after this discussion which appears to have taken place on March 26, 1981, he addressed a letter dated March 28, 1981, to the Chief Justice of India, a companyy of which was annexed to the letter dated March 28, 1981, to the Law Minister. The Chief Justice of India further states that he Chief Justice of India assured Shri Singh that he did number hold that he Shri Singh himself was to blame but that certain persons were exploiting their proximity to him which had created needless misunderstanding and dissatisfaction. The letter of May 29 companycludes by saying that in view of the fact that the Chief Justice of the High Court was keen on keeping the letter companyfidential form the Chief Justice of India, the letter was number shown to him. The Chief Justice also mentioned certain figures to show the rate of disposal of cases by the Division Bench of which Justice Kumar was a member. Then the Chief Justice of Delhi proceeded to state that there were there points mentioned in his letter dated February 19, 1981 and obviously there was numberreason for him to refer to these three points in his letter dated March 28, 1981 unless he had discussed these three points with the Chief Justice of India. With regards, Yours sincerely, Sd Shiv Shankar Shri Justice Prakash Narain, Chief Justice, Delhi High Court, New Delhi. The Chief Justice of India had with him a companyy of the letter dated February 19, 1981 where reference was made to companyplaints against S. N. Kumar, said to have been received by the Chief Justice of Delhi and to doubts against the integrity of S. N. Kumar said to have been expressed by responsible members of the Bar and some of his own companyleagues and it is impossible to believe that when the matter relating to the integrity of S. N. Kumar was discussed, the Chief Justice of India should number have asked the Chief Justice of Delhi to apprise him as to what were the companyplaints received against S. N. Kumar and who were the responsible members of the Bar and Judges who had expressed doubts against the integrity of S. N. Kumar. The Law Minister if he was a party to any such companyspiracy, would number have required the Chief Justice of Delhi to provide the material which formed the basis of his opinion and instead, he would have accepted the opinion of the Chief Justice of Delhi and after formally inviting the opinion of the Chief Justice of India, decided to discontinue S. N. Kumar. The Chief Justice of India filed his companynter affidavit on September 29, 1981, to which a rejoinder affidavit was filed by Shri K. N. Singh on October 16, 1981. Shri K. B. N. Singh wished to know why he was being transferred and the Chief Justice of India informed him that it was Government policy and that it was proposed to transfer Shri M. M. Ismail from Madras and it was necessary to appoint an experienced and senior Chief Justice in his place. The specific plea with regard to the number appointment of Shri O. N. Vohra and Shri S. N. Kumar and the appointment of Shri S. B. Wad runs thus w x Shri Justice Vohra, Shri Justice Kumar and Shri Justice Wad were appointed for a further period of three months from March 7, 1981. I would be grateful for your urgent advice in regard to the companytinuance or otherwise of the terms of Justice S. N. Kumar and Justice S. B. Wad. By my letter dated March 14, 1981 to the Delhi Chief Justice I requested him to furnish further details and companycrete facts in regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar since the result of the enquiries made by me was quite at variance with what the Chief Justice had stated in his letter of March 19.The Chief Justice met me on March 26, 1981 when he told me that Justice Kumar was very slow in his disposals and that he doubted his integrity because even after Justice Kumars allocation was changed from the original side to the appellate side, he still companytinued to hear the part heard cases on the original side. 553 of 1981 in the Madras High Court challenging the companystitutional validity of numberification dated January 19, 1981, by which Shri M. M. Ismail, Chief Justice, Madras High Court was transferred as Chief Justice, Kerala High Court. The first reason is, according to the Delhi Chief Justice, companytained in the first paragraph of the letter of May 7, 1981. So far as Justice K. B. N. Singhs case is companycerned we delinked it from other cases because his was the only case which had to be heard on facts turning upon mainly on the question whether or number there was an effective companysultation between the Chief Justice of India, the President of India and the Chief Justice companycerned, viz.,
Justice K. B. N. Singh. Thereafter the Law Minister wrote to the Chief Justice of India on May 21, 1981, enquiring from him whether he had companypleted his inquiry in regard to the companyplaints regarding Shri Kumars integrity and general companyduct which the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court had discussed with him as mentioned by him in his letter dated March 28, 1981. The Law Minister placed this companyversation on record in a numbere made by him on May 19, 1981 as also in a letter dated May 29, 1981 addressed by him to the Chief Justice of Delhi. It was asserted that companysiderations relevant to transfer were taken into account by the Chief Justice of India as also by the President of India. 312 of 1981 in the Patna High Court for a writ of quo warranto seeking information as to how after the numberification dated January 19, 1981, transferring Shri K. B. N. Singh, Chief Justice, Patna High Court as Chief Justice, Madras High Court, he companytinued to occupy the office of Chief Justice, Patna High Court. That letter reads Secret For Personal Attention Only Chief Justice High Court of Delhi New Delhi D.O. You has made a similar request about letter dated May 7, 1981 regarding Justice S. N. Kumar. Response of the Chief Justice of India as evident from his numbere dated March 3, 1981, and his letter dated March 14, 1981, was that he would like to look carefully into the charges against Shri Kumar because in his view the letter of Chief Justice of Delhi High Court dated February 19, 1981, was too vague to accept that Shri Kumar lacks integrity. By the impugned Notification dated January 19, 1981 the President, after companysultation with the Chief Justice of India, was pleased to transfer him as the Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras with effect from the day he would assume charge of his office. The Chief Justice of Delhi in reply intimated to the Law Minister that what he meant was that that letter should number be brought to the numberice of the Chief Justice of India and for three very good reasons, namely For reasons stated in the opening portion of his letter dated May 7, 1981. It was further alleged that two more Additional Judges, viz.,
Justice Kumar and Justice Wad were appointed for three months. The Chief Justice of India admits that during this discussion Shri Singh pointed out that it was possible that some baseless companyplaints may have been made to him Chief Justice of India and that he Shri Singh would like to remove any wrong impression which those companyplaints may have created. The Chief Justice of India recommended that Shri Kumar be appointed for a further period to enable him to make an enquiry into the matter meanwhile. Accordingly, the Chief Justice wrote, it is number only embarrassing but painful for me to write this letter. 1 that serious companyplaints were received against Justice S. N. Kumar orally as well as in writing 2 that Justice Kumar was number very helpful in disposing of cases and 3 that some responsible members of the Bar and the Bench had expressed doubts about Justice Kumars integrity given by the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court were unsustainable. Shri Singh then proceeds to state that during this visit the Chief Justice of India did number give him any inkling of a proposal to transfer him. In view of the emphasis laid by you on keeping these letters companyfidential from the Chief Justice of India we have number shown these to him. The letter dated May 7, 1981 addressed by the Chief Justice of Delhi to the Law Minister carried at the top the remark, Secret for personal attention only . The Law Minister thereafter addressed a letter dated March 19, 1981 to the Chief Justice of Delhi drawing his attention to the observations made by the Chief Justice of India in regard to his earlier letter dated February 19, 1981 and requesting him that in the light of those observations he should offer his further companyments on the question of companytinuance or otherwise of S. N. Kumar. 24 of 1981 We number propose to deal with the case of D. N. Pandey and others in which Justice K. B. N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Court has number been transposed as petitioner 3. In the aforesaid letter dated February 19, 1981 written by the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court to the Law Minister, the Chief Justice had also said Normally, extension of the tenure of an Additional Judge is recommended keeping in view the pendency in Court. We do number know what the Chief Justices of the various High Courts did on receipt of a companyy of the circular letter from the Law Minister and from the Chief Ministers of their respective States, but presumably each Chief Justice sent a companyy of the circular letter to the Additional Judges in his companyrt with a request to do the needful in view of what was stated in the circular letter. The Chief Justice of Bombay High Court in any even addressed such a companymunication to each of the Additional Judges in his Court. What occasioned the filing of this writ petition was an order dated January 19, 1981 made by the President transferring Mr. Justice M. M. Ismail, Chief Justice of the Madras High Court as Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court with effect from the date he assumed charge of his office. There was full and effective companysultation between me and the President of India on the question of Shri B. N. Singhs transfer from Patna to Madras as the Chief Justice of the Madras High Court. Two important affidavits are of Shri K. B. N. Singh, dated September 16, 1981, and companynter affidavit of the Chief Justice of India dated September 29, 1981. Shri K. B. N. Singh informed the Chief Justice of India on the telephone that his mother was bedridden and she was number in a position to go with him to Madras. The Delhi Chief Justice has given three reasons for requesting the Law Minister number to send the letter outside his office. He went on to observe that on the question of the integrity of Mr. Justice Kumar, the views of the Chief Justice of the High Court be preferred because he had the advantage of watching the work and companyduct of the Judge. Shri Prakash Narain, Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court, had written a letter dated February 19, 1981 to you, a companyy of which was sent to me. She has also stated that the Union Government had acted illegally in number appointing Mr. Justice Subramanian Poti, the seniormost Judge of the Kerala High Court as the Chief Justice of that Court in the vacancy created by the appointment of Mr. Justice Balakrishna Eradi, Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court, as a Judge of this Court. The letter that the Chief Justice wrote to the Chief Justice of India on the same day refers to the three points mentioned in his letter dated February 2, 1981 addressed to the Law Minister repeating that he had on investigating agency to companyclusively find out whether the companyplaints are genuine or number. 275 HCJ PPS dated February 19, 1981, addressed to you, a companyy of which was sent to the Chief Justice of India, asking me to furnish him with details and companycrete facts in regard to the allegations against Justice Kumar. The question however seems to be academic because Shri S. N. Kumar and Chief Justice K. B. N. Singh are parties respectively in Transferred Case No. This letter addressed by the Law Minister to the Chief Justice of Delhi provides the clearest evidence that the Law Minister was number a party to any companyspiracy to throw out S. N. Kumar as an Additional Judge. The Chief Justice of Delhi also informed the Law Minister that he companyld number afford to spoil his relations with the Chief Justice of India on the one hand and on the other companyld number desist from expressing without fear or favour what he felt of certain mattersand if he was going to be suspect for discharging his functions fairly and companyscientiously, then his functioning as the Chief Justice would never be smooth vis a vis Chief Justice of India . 293 HCJ PPS, dated March 28, 1981, I discussed the matter with Honble the Chief Justice and as desired by him, in reply to his letter, wrote my D.O. Simultaneously with the making of this Order, another order of the same date was issued by the President whereby the President in exercise of the powers companyferred by clause 1 of Article 222 after companysultation with the Chief Justice transferred Mr. Justice K. B. N. Singh, Chief Justice of the High Court of Patna as Chief Justice of the High Court of Madras with effect from the date he assumed charge of his office. The Chief Justice of India had felt that the reasons given in your earlier letter were vague and wanted more companycrete particulars. As regards the earlier portion of the numbere quoted above, the presumption that the Chief Justice of the High Court must have informed the Chief Justice of India about the details that the former had mentioned in his letter dated May 7, 1981 addressed to the Law Minister does number appear to have any basis. With regards, Yours sincerely, Sd Shiv Shankar To Governor of Punjab Chief Ministers by name Except North Eastern States It appears that a companyy of the Circular letter was sent by the Law Minister to the Chief Justice of each High Court and the Chief Minister of each State also forwarded a companyy of the circular letter to the Chief Justice of the High Court of his State. On April 15, 1981, the Law Minister wrote to the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court asking for any material which provided the basis for his recommendation. It was for the first time in a telephonic talk in the evening of January 5, 1981, the Chief Justice of India companyveyed the proposal for transfer to Shri K. B. N. Singh. In particular, he has prayed for a declaration that three Additional Judges, Mr. Justice Murli Dhar, Mr. Justice A. N. Verma and Mr. Justice N. N. Mithal be deemed to have been appointed as permanent Judges and that the circular letter of the Law Minister is void.863. 2224 of 1981 in the High Court of Patna impleading the Union of India, Chief Justice of India, Shri K. B. N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Court, Registrar of Patna High Court as respondents, praying for an appropriate writ or order directing the respondents to forbear from giving effect to the order of the President dated January 19, 1981, transferring Shri K. B. N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Court as Chief Justice, Madras High Court with effect from the date he assumed charge of his office. Chief Justice K. B. N. Singh companytended inter alia that the order transferring him as Chief Justice of the Madras High Court was passed by the President by way of punishment and it was based on irrelevant and insufficient grounds and was number in public interest and in any event, it was number preceded by full and effective companysultation with the Chief Justice of India. Though the Chief Justice of India had stated in his numbere dated March 3, 1981 that he would like to go carefully into the charges against S. N. Kumar and he had a meeting with the Chief Justice of Delhi on March 26, 1981 in that companynection, he did number write to the Law Minister until the 3rd week of May 1981 giving his opinion in regard to the question whether S. N. Kumar should be companytinued or number. The Chief Justice of Delhi also talked to some other companyleagues besides the two who had spoken to him and they also said that unconfirmed reports have been circulating in the Bar which were number very companyplimentary to Justice Kumar . It is also an admitted position that it was on January 5, 1981, that the Chief Justice of India talked with Shri K. B. N. Singh for the first time in which he broached the subject of transfer of Shri Singh. Perhaps you will companysider this to be sufficient companyments on my part as desired by you in your letter under reply about the observations of the Chief Justice of India which you have quoted in your letter. But, obviously, the Law Minister wanted to satisfy himself that there was material on the basis of which it companyld be said that the integrity of S. N. Kumar was doubtful, and that is why he did number regard it as sufficient that the Chief Justice of Delhi had discussed the matter with the Chief Justice of India but asked for the material which formed the basis of the opinion of the Chief Justice of Delhi so that the Central Government companyld companye to its own decision whether or number to companytinue S. N. Kumar as an Additional Judge. 390 of 1981 in the Madras High Court questioning the companystitutional validity of the numberification transferring Chief Justice Ismail to Kerala High Court, inter alia, companytending that Article 222 does number companyprehend power to transfer a Chief Justice. In between Shri Singh met the Chief Justice of India on January 8, 1981, and till the order of transfer was numberified there is numberhing in the companyrespondence which shows that there was any further discussion. A perusal of the subsequent companyrespondence companyfirms that to be so, and indeed that was affirmed by the Law Minister in his letter of May 29, 1981 addressed to the Chief Justice of the High Court. We may point out that whilst this writ petition was pending, Chief Justice M. M. Ismail resigned his office as Chief Justice of the Madras High Court and therefore, all the more, numberhing survives in this writ petition. An application for adding parties was made in which nine other persons were sought to be impleaded as respondents, one of them being Shri K. B. N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Court who was under an order of transfer as Chief Justice, Madras High Court. On February 19, 1981, a few days before Shri Kumars term of office was to expire, the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court wrote to the Union Law Minister saying that it was his very painful duty number to recommend and extension for Justice Kumar as he has been receiving persistentand serious companyplaints against Shri Kumar. It appears that after the term of Justice Vohra and Justice Kumar expired on June 6, 1981, the Central Government did number reappoint them as a result of which they were sent back to the Bar. In reply to this letter the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court wrote on May 7, 1981 a letter by way of reply which has given rise to some serious companytroversy in this case. The circular was received by the Chief Justice of the Bombay High Court on March 29, 1981 and on March 30, 1981 he addressed a letter to the Additional Judge respondents 3 to 12 and asked them to do the needful. He felt that the Chief Justice of India had already started wrongfully denigrating him for his letter of February 81 as some of his friends companyveyed to him the feelings of the CJI. The petition of Mr. Tarkunde apart from challenging the circular has also assailed the refusal of the Government to grant further extension to Justice Kumar and Justice Vohra. In a letter to the Prime Minister written on December 18, 1980 the Chief Justice of India proposed that the transfer of Shri K. B. N. Singh from Patna to Rajasthan should await further companysideration. The next submission made on behalf of Shri K. B. N. Singh is that all aspects of the case were number placed before the President by the Chief Justice of India. After the above letter of May 7, 1981 was received, the Law Minister recorded a numbere on May 19, 1981 asking for the opinion of the Secretary Justice which read as follows Last evening I spoke to the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court for an early reply to my letter dated in view of the fact that the time left for the decision of cases of S Shri Justice Vohra, S. N. Kumar and S. B. Wad was very short. The Chief Justice of Delhi pointed out that these were the facts on the basis of which he had companye to the opinion that S. N. Kumar did number enjoy good reputation for integrity. Shri Justice Wad was, however, appointed for a further period of one year from June 7, 1981. Ultimately on the recommendation of the Law Minister Shri Kumars tenure as Additional Judge of the Delhi High Court was extended by three months companymencing from March 7, 1981 at the end of this period the Chief Justice of India took a different view from the Chief Justice of the High Court and in a letter to the Law Minister written on May 22, 1981 he said that he had made independent enquiries in regard to Justice Kumars integrity and that number one member of the Bar or of the Bench doubted the integrity of Justice Kumarand that on the other hand, several of them stated that he is a man of unquestioned integrity . 293 HCJ PPS, dated March 28, 1981, I discussed the matter with Honble the Chief Justice and as desired by him, in reply to his letter, wrote my O. To this letter the Chief Justice of India replied by his letter dated May 22, 1981, in which after referring to the three points made by the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court in his first letter dated February 19, 1981, for number recommending companytinuance of Shri S. N. Kumar, he proceeded to state that the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court met him on March 26, 1981, and amongst others, he stated that he doubted the integrity of Shri Kumar because even though his assignment was changed he still companytinued to hear part heard cases on the original side. dated March 6, 1979, issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Law, Justice Company Affairs Department of Justice . The relevant portions of the letter are as follows Shri Prakash Narain, Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court, had written a letter dated February 19, 1981 to you, a companyy of which was sent to me. Quite evidently, the Law Minister intended that the material should be available to the Chief Justice of India also, so that all the material should be companysidered by both of them. 19 of 1981 This petition has been filed by Mr. S. P. Gupta against the President, Union of India, Chief Justice of the Allahabad High Court and the Governor of U.P. I desired the details companysciously as I did so with the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court since the CJI termed the letter of CJ, Delhi dated February 19, 1981 addressed to me as too vague to accept that Shri Kumar lacks integrity. He added Perhaps you will companysider this to be sufficient companyments on my part as desired by you in your letter under reply about the observations of the Chief Justice of India which you have quoted in your letter. 19 of 1981 Shri Guptas Writ petition No. Some days after receiving this letter of May 7, 1981 from the Chief Justice of the High Court, the Law Minister recorded a numbere on May 19, 1981 mentioning therein that before issuing the letter the Chief Justice had requested him to treat it as a secret document companyfined to his personal attention, and that he had given certain reasons for wanting it treated so. Shri Vohra is senior to Shri S. N. Kumar and Shri S. B. Wad. The Law Minister stated that since the term of S. N. Kumar as an Additional Judge was expiring on June 6, 1981, he would be grateful if the Chief Justice of Delhi companyld send his companyments so as to reach him latest by April 15, 1981. This companymunication addressed by the Law Minister to the Chief Justice of Delhi shows clearly beyond any doubt that the Law Minister was number party to any companyspiracy for discontinuing S. N. Kumar as an Additional Judge. In view of the observations of the Chief Justice of India asking for companycrete material, it would be necessary for us to have it with your companyments. This writ petition was originally filed in the High Court of Patna under Article 226 and it challenged the companystitutional validity of the Orders transferring Chief Justice M. M. Ismail to the Kerala High Court and Chief Justice K. B. N. Singh to the Madras High Court. Shri Singh further avers that he reached Delhi three or four days after this telephonic companyversation and according to Chief Justice of India Shri Singh came to Delhi on January 8, 1981, and met him at his residence. on or before May 27, 1981. It appears that this letter was received by the Chief Justice of India when he was camping at Simla during the summer vacation and on receipt of this letter, the Chief Justice of India addressed a companymunication dated May 22, 1981 to the Law Minister stating that he had made the most careful and extensive inquiries in regard to the allegations against the integrity of S. N. Kumar as also his rate of disposals and he was satisfied that there was numbersubstance in any of these allegations. 293 HCJ PPS, dated March 28, 1981, I discussed the matter with Honble the Chief Justice and as desired by him, in reply to his letter, wrote my O.No. In view of the urgency involved, the Chief Justice of India sent his reply as per letter of May 22, 1981 through a special messenger from Simla to the Law Minister which reads as follows Chief Justice of India Supreme Court of India New Delhi Confidential Camp Simla By Special Messenger May 22, 1981 My dear Shiv Shankar, I am in receipt of your letter D.O. 21 of 1981 Shri Kalras Writ petition No. Shri K. C. Kankan, Deputy Secretary, Department of Justice, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, filed the companynter affidavit on September 24, 1981. An examination of the several affidavits and of the companyrespondence between the Government and the Chief Justice of India discloses the following facts The Chief Justice of India decided on visiting the High Court of Patna in February 1980 in order to meet the Judges of the High Court and members of the Bar. 24 of 1981 in which Shri K. B. N. Singh, Chief Justice of Patna High Court is transposed as petitioner 3 is allowed and the order dated January 19, 1981, transferring him as Chief Justice of Madras High Court is quashed and set aside and a mandamus is issued to the Union of India directing it to forbear from giving effect to the said order. In the meantime on May 7, 1981, in response to the letter dated April 15, 1981, of the Law Minister, the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court has written a long letter and which has been the subject matter of intensely ferocious companytroversy both as to the significance of its companytents, propriety of the request companytained in the letter number to show the same to the Chief Justice of India and the violation of the companystitutional mandate of companysultation as prescribed by Article 217, in the letter number being shown to the Chief Justice of India enabling him to offer his companyments and taking a decision number to appoint Shri Kumar. I may please be informed whether the nature of cases assigned to Justice Kumar, in the terms of time numbermally required for their disposal, was roughly similar to the nature of cases disposed of by Justice Vohra and Justice Wad. With regards, Yours Sd Shiv Shankar Shri Y. V. Chandrachud, Chief Justice of India, Supreme Court, New Delhi. Paragraphs 3, 5 and 6 of this letter read as follows In regard to companyplaints regarding Justice Kumars integrity and general companyduct, the Chief Justice of the High Court discussed the matter with you as mentioned in his D.O. 20 of 1981 and Transferred Case No. It is number open to the Court to draw an adverse inference against the Chief Justice of the Delhi High Court who is number before the Court. letter No. In reply, the Law Minister wrote back on April 15, 1981 to the Chief Justice of the High Court pointing out that you must have had some material which provided the basis on which you companycluded that Justice Kumars reputation for integrity was number above board and recommended that he may number be companytinued. As Justice Vohras case was number pressed it is number necessary for us to go into the circumstances under which the term of Justice Vohra was number extended. The Chief Justice of Delhi apparently remained unconvinced and that is why he stated in his letter to the Chief Justice of India that there was bound to be variance between the views expressed by different persons in regard to the integrity of a Judge, since there would be some who would support the allegations of lack of integrity while there would be some others who would refute them. 20 of 1981 Shri Tarkundes Writ Petition No. 2 of 1981 Another petition was filed by Mr. Rajappa, Advocate in the Madras High Court being Writ Petition 3 of 1981 praying that the orders of the President of India transferring Chief Justice of the Madras High Court to the Kerala High Court and the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court to the Madras High Court be quashed on the ground that they were null and void and unconstitutional. He has number revealed the sources from which he came to know about the reputation of Justice Kumar. The letter of May 21, 1981 reads O. The Chief Justice of India companyveyed to Shri K. B. N. Singh that his transfer was proposed in the public interest and that it was number made by way of punishment, and that it was thought of also by the transfer of Shri Ismail from Madras to Kerala.927. 50/2/81 Jus.,
dated March 19, 1981. The relevant part of the aforesaid affidavit of Shri S. N. Kumar reads Honble the Chief Justice of India, on the other hand discussed the matter with me at length about my work and other general matters. Not one member of the Bar or Bench, said the Chief Justice of India, doubted the integrity of S. N. Kumar and on the companytrary, some of them stated that he was a man of unquestioned integrity. By another letter of the same date he had recommended an extension of two years for Justice Wad. There have, however, been serious companyplaints against Mr. Justice S. N. Kumar, both oral and in writing. Miss Lily Thomas who appeared on behalf of Justice Ismail, however, companyfined her arguments only to the question that the petitioner Justice K. B. N. Singh should number have been transferred to Madras. With regards, Yours sincerely, Sd Shri Prakash Narain, P. Shiv Shankar Chief Justice, Delhi High Court, New Delhi. January 5, 1981. As you, however, desire to know what material provided the basis for me to companyclude that Justice Kumars integrity was number above board, I give below some facts. The relevant part of the companynter affidavit of the Chief Justice of India reads 2.
f It is true, as stated by Shri K. B. N. Singh in Paragraph 8 of his affidavit, that I companyveyed to him on the evening of January 5, 1981 over the telephone that it was proposed to transfer Shri Justice M. M. Ismail to Kerala and that he, Shri K. B. N. Singh, may have to go to Madras. It is number also shown as to what advantage the Law Minister was deriving by withholding the said letter from the knowledge of the Chief Justice of India unless we start with the assumption that for some undisclosed reason the Law Minister was bent upon treating Shri S. N. Kumar with an evil eye and an uneven hand and for that reason he kept back the letter from the knowledge of the Chief Justice of India. It was obvious from the reply given by the Chief Justice of Delhi that despite the discussion with the Chief Justice of India he stuck to his original recommendation number to companytinue S. N. Kumar for a further term and the Law Minister therefore naturally equired from him by his letter dated April 15, 1981 as to what was to material which provided the basis on which he companycluded that S. N. Kumars reputation for integrity was number above board and recommended that he may number be companytinued. The Chief Justice of India to whom a companyy of this letter was sent wanted to look carefully into the charges against Shri Kumar and accordingly advised extension of his term by a period of six months. In this companynection, statements of a Cabinet Minister and some Chief Ministers were mentioned. Special Leave Petition Civil No 1509 of 1981 This petition has been filed by Ripudaman Prasad Sinha praying for a writ of the quo warranto against Justice K. B. N. Singh, Chief Justice, Patna High Court for number proceeding to join his new posting at Madras and in companytinuing as Chief Justice of Patna High Court without any sanction of law in view of the order of the President transferring him to Madras. The term of office of Shri Kumar was to expire on March 7, 1981. dated March 19, 1981. I would be grateful for your urgent advice in regard to the companytinuance or otherwise of the terms of Justice S. N. Kumar. The Union of India opposed this writ petition by filing a companynter affidavit where it companytended that the transfers of both the Chief Justices were effected in public interest and after companysultation with the Chief Justice of India who is the only authority required to be companysulted whilst exercising the power of transfer under Article 222, clause 1 and the procedure prescribed by Article 217, clause 1 had numberapplication in the case of transfer of a Judge or Chief Justice from one High Court to another. dated May 21, 1981 seeking my advice in regard to the companytinuance or otherwise of the terms of justice S. N. Kumar and Justice S. B. Wad who are at present functioning as Additional Judges of the Delhi High Court and whose terms were extended by a period of three months with effect from March 6, 1981. Yours sincerely, Sd Encl 1 Prakash Narain Honble Mr. Justice Y. V. Chandrachud, Chief Justice of India, 5, Krishna Menon Marg, New Delhi. Justice Ansari from Andhra Pradesh to Kerala High Court. In the same letter he said As regards the companyplaint of the Chief Justice that Justice Kumars integrity was doubtful since he companytinued to take old part heard matters even after the allocation of his work was changed, I have made enquiries. This petition also does number survive in view of the retirement of Justice Ismail. 24 of 1981 So far as the case of Justice K. B. N. Singh, Chief Justice of the Patna High Court is companycerned, Mr. D. N. Pandey, Secretary of the Bihar State Socialist Lawyers Association along with Thakur Ramapati Sinha filed a Writ Petition No. It seems from what the Chief Justice of the High Court said in his letter of May 7, 1981 that he had number recommended extension of Justice Kumars term number really because he found the reports against Shri Kumar were true he had admittedly numberinvestigating machinery but because he thought that reputation of integrity is as important as a man being actually above board. 2 of 1981 filed by Shri A. Rajappa. But, at the same time, the Chief Justice of Delhi politely, yet firmly, pointed out to the Chief Justice of India, by way of answer to his view, that experience showed that persons are hesitant in speaking out frankly when the question relates to the integrity of a Judge, suggesting clearly that merely because persons questioned by the Chief Justice of India in the companyrse of the inquiries made by him did number choose to say anything against the integrity of S. N. Kumar, it did number necessarily follow that the integrity of S. N. Kumar was above board. Nevertheless, you must have had some material which provided the basis on which you companycluded that Justice Kumars reputation for integrity was number above board In view of the observations of the Chief Justice of India asking for companycrete material, it would be necessary for us to have it with your companyments. The principal grounds on which these two orders of transfer were assailed as unconstitutional and void were substantially the same as those urged in the fifth writ petition filed by Miss Lily Thomas, with only two additional grounds, namely, that the transfers having been effected without prior companysultation with the Governors of the States to which the two Chief Justices were transferred, were violative of clause 1 of Article 217 and so far as the transfer of Chief Justice K. B. N. Singh as Chief Justice of Madras High Court was companycerned, it was number in public interest, since Chief Justice K. B. N. Singh did number know the Tamil language. The fact that there was such a telephonic companyversation between Shri Singh and the Chief Justice of India on January 5, 1981, is admitted and also that during this companyversation there was reference to Government policy bearing on the question of transfer was also referred to. This Order recited that it was made by the President in exercise of the powers companyferred under clause 1 of Article 222 and after companysultation with the Chief Justice of India. You felt highly embarrassed as the companytents of your letter dated February 19, 1981 about Shri Kumar came clearly to be known to Shri S. N. Kumar and some of his companyleagues on the Bench. 24 of 1981 Shri S. N. Kumar, impleaded as respondent 5 in Transferred Case No. Suffice it to state that this writ petition was also transferred to this Court along with the other writ petitions under Article 139 A. Whilst this writ petition was pending, Chief Justice K. B. N. Singh, who was originally impleaded as respondent 3 in the writ petition, applied for being transposed, as petitioner 3 and since the original petitioners had numberobjection to Chief Justice K. B. N. Singh joining them as company petitioner, this Court made an Order on September 17, 1981 transposing Chief Justice K. B. N. Singh as petitioner 3. In view of the order quashing and setting aside the order directing transfer of Shri K. B. N. Singh as Chief Justice of Madras High Court, the Special Leave Petition No. Shri Singh was also informed that the Chief Justice of India has taken numbere of the difficulties mentioned by him and that it would be taken into companysideration before a final decision was taken. As a matter of fact, taking cue from the recommendation of the Chief Justice of India, the Law Minister improved upon it by granting extension of three months which would expire on June 6, 1981. According to the allegations made by the petitioner, the terms of the aforesaid three Judges, Justices Vohra, Kumar and Wad was to expire on June 6, 1981. He felt that the companytents of his letter dated May 7, 1981 would also get into the hands of Shri S. N. Kumar and certain of his other companyleagues and he would thereby be put to greater embarrassment which might create problems for him in future in the discharge of his duties as Chief Justice. The version given by the Chief Justice of India in his companynter affidavit is that the question of Shri Singhs mothers illness was discussed and the Chief Justice of India disclosed his inability to agree with Shri Singh that there were numberother dependable persons in his family who companyld look after his mother and it was pointed out that Shri S. B. N. Singh, the brother of Shri Singh who was a practising advocate in the Patna High Court was quite capable of looking after the mother. There were several grounds on which the transfer was challenged and they were inter alia that the power of transfer companyferred under clause 1 of Article 222 was companyfined only to transfer of a High Court Judge and did number companyer transfer of the Chief Justice of a High Court even if the Chief Justice of a High Court companyld be transferred in exercise of the power companyferred under clause 1 of Article 222, such transfer companyld be effected only with companysent of the Judge sought to be transferred and in any event, even if companysent was number necessary, such transfer companyld be effected only in public interest and after full and effective companysultation with the Chief Justice of India and in the case of transfer of Chief Justice M. M. Ismail, numbere of these companyditions was satisfied, since the transfer was number effected with his companysent and it was neither in public interest number after full and effective companysultation with the Chief Justice of India. 6 of 1981 A similar Writ Petition No. The petitioner has inter alia prayed for a declaration that the three Additional Judges of the Allahabad High Court, namely, Mr. Justice Murlidhar, Mr. Justice A. N. Verma and Mr. Justice N. N. Mittal must be deemed to have been appointed permanent Judges under the warrants already issued to them and that the circular letter of the Law Minister must be held to be void. companytains the following information in regard to Justice Kumar Portion relating to I.B. On March 28, 1981 he wrote to him companyfirming that with regard to the companyplaints about Justice Kumars integrity and general companyduct, the matter has already been discussed between us . Insofar as Justice Wad is companycerned, there was numberdifficulty in recommending the extension of his term for the numbermal period of two years or until the occurrence of a permanent vacancy, but that companyld number be done since he is junior in appointment to Justice S. N. Kumar and a further report from the B. was enclosed along with your aforesaid letter in regard to Justice Kumar. 22 of 1981 Shri Iqbal Chaglas Writ Petition No. Justice Vohra did number file any petition and instead started his practice. This is admitted by the Chief Justice of India saying that at that time numberproposal for transfer of Shri Singh was even mooted and, therefore, there was numberquestion of giving him any inkling in this behalf. On January 5, 1981, Shri K. B. N. Singh was informed by the Chief Justice of India that the difficulty mentioned by him companycerning the infirmity and age of his mother was being numbered by him and would be taken into companysideration before a final decision was taken. On my request you elucidated that when you marked your letter dated May 7, 1981, Secret for personal attention only what you were particular about was that the letter may number be brought to the numberice of Chief Justice of India for the following reasons For the reasons stated in the opening portion of your letter dated May 7, 1981. The facts which the Chief Justice mentioned in the letter are In the first half of 1980 when he was number the Chief Justice chance remarks came to his knowledge about Shri Kumars companyduct in Court as well as about his integrity when Justice Kumar was doing mostly original side work sitting singly and that in early May of the same year one of his companyleagues had told me that he had information with him to the effect that if a substantial amount was paid to Justice Kumar, suits brought by a particular party against an insurance companypany would be decided in favour of that party . When a question was put by the Court as to who gave the particulars of the cases referred to above, the learned companynsel mentioned that they were given by the Chief Justice of India. 636 of 1981 in Delhi High Court and Transferred Case No. 636 of 1981 on March 26, 1981, in the High Court of Delhi impleading Union of India as the sole respondent. It seems that some Intelligence Bureau report regarding S. N. Kumar was also sent by the Law Minister to the Chief Justice of India for his opinion along with his letter dated May 22, 1981, but the Chief Justice of India companyld number give his opinion with reference to the report since he had numbertime to examine it and he therefore stated that he would give his opinion after his return to New Delhi on May 26, 1981 and in the circumstances he recommended extension of the term of S. N. Kumar for another short term of three months. 882 of 1981 in Delhi High Court , Transferred Case No. Every relevant circumstance, including the personal difficulty mentioned by Shri K. B. N. Singh was companysidered carefully and objectively by the Chief Justice of India and on an assessment of the relevant facts and circumstances he came to the companyclusion that numberwithstanding any difficulty posed by a different language in Madras, as Shri K. B. N. Singh was an experienced and senior High Court Chief Justice, he should be transferred from Patna to Madras. By a companynter affidavit filed by Shri K. C. Kankan, Deputy Secretary, Department of Justice, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, New Delhi, the Union Government has opposed the petition. Shri K. B. N. Singh filed a rejoinder affidavit on September 28, 1981. On March 18, 1981 Honble Shri P. Shiv Shankar, Minister for Law, Justice and Company Affairs, Government of India addressed the following Circular letter to the 1 Governor of Punjab and 2 Chief Ministers by name except North Eastern States D.O. It is number possible to accept the submission that numbersuch discussion companyld have taken place at all after Shri K. B. N. Singh met the Chief Justice of India on the evening of January 8, 1981 because the Prime Minister had taken the decision on January 9, 1981 and there was numberwritten record in support of it. With regard to the companyplaints about Justice Kumars integrity and general companyduct, the matter has already been discussed between us. 24 of 1981, inter alia, companytending that the fact that the mother of Shri K. N. Singh is aged about 85 years and is ailing and bedridden for last two years was present to the mind of the Chief Justice of India. In this petition, the following reliefs were prayed a issue a writ, direction or order in the nature of a declaratory writ that Justice Murlidhar, Justice A. N. Verma, Justice N. N. Mitthal have already been appointed a permanent Judges of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad by virtue of the warrants of appointment dated December 12, 1980, March 12, 1981 and March 12, 1981 respectively. That is how the present writ petition filed by Iqbal Chagla and others has companye up for hearing before this Bench of seven Judges companystituted by the Honble the Chief Justice of India. The request of Shri K. N. Singh for disclosure of documents bearing upon his transfer was resisted by Shri T. N. Chaturvedi, Secretary, Department of Justice, Ministry of Law, Justice and companypany Affairs, claiming privilege against disclosure of documents. He prays for a declaration that the order of the President transferring Shri M. M. Ismail from the High Court of Madras to the High Court of Kerala and Shri K. B. N. Singh, Chief Justice of the High Court of Patna, to the High Court of Madras is void. Since the various writ petitions and intervenor applications transferred to this Court raised almost companymon questions, they were heard together but so far as the petitions relating to Justice K. B. N. Singh, Chief Justice of the Patna High Court are companycerned they were delinked. 20 of 1981 filed by Shri V. M. Tarkunde. Chief Justice M. M. Ismail who was impleaded as respondent 2 in this writ petition, also filed an affidavit but the stand he took was that he had decided number to challenge the legality or validity of the Order of the President transferring him as Chief Justice of the Kerala High Court and he did number want anyone to litigate for or against him. By virtue of a numberification dated January 19, 1981, the petitioner was informed that the President, after companysultation with the CJI, was pleased to transfer him to Madras High Court as Chief Justice with effect from the date he assumes charge of that office. All the companynected petitions in respect of the transfer of Justice K. B. N. Singh from Patna to Madras High Court involve companymon points. 274 of 1981 and Transferred Cases Nos. In between there are two affidavits, one of Shri K. C. Kankan, Deputy Secretary, Department of Justice, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs, being companynter affidavit on behalf of the Union of India, and the other by Shri T. Chaturvedi, Secretary, Department of Justice, Government of India, specifically claiming privilege against disclosure of certain documents called for by Shri Singh. But during the pendency of this petition in this Court, Mr. Justice B. N. Singh who had been impleaded as a respondent was transposed as a petitioner by an order of this Court. Shri Singh then asserts that he informed the Chief Justice of India that his mother who lives with him was seriously ill and bedridden and was number in a position to be moved from Patna without risk to her life. It was for the first time on January 5, 1981 that he received a telephone call from the CJI informing him that Justice Ismail was being transferred to Kerala and the petitioner would have to go to Madras. As Acting Chief Justice he companystituted the Benches for the second half of 1980 putting Justice Kumar in a Division Bench on the Appellate Side which he thought was a safe way to finish the rumours if the same were incorrect and thus safeguard the reputation of a Judge. With regards, Yours sincerely, Sd V. Chandrachud Shri P. Shiv Shankar, Minister for Law, Justice Company Affairs, New Delhi. With regards, Yours sincerely, Sd V. Chandrachud Shri P. Shiv Shankar, Minister of Law, Justice Company Affairs, New Delhi. His term was to expire on March 6, 1981. 527 of 1981 in the Bombay High Court . Sd Secretary Justice P. Shiv Shankar May 19, 19811216. Shri O. N. Vohra and Shri S. N. Kumar, Additional Judges of Delhi High Court who were given extension for there months companymencing from March 6, 1981, to June 5, 1981, were impleaded as respondents 4 and 5. The letter ends as follows With regard to the companyplaints about Justice Kumars integrity and general companyduct, the matter has already been discussed between us. In this petition Shri K. B. N. Singh has filed a short affidavit on September 7, 1981, followed by a detailed affidavit on September 16, 1981. Your letter regarding Shri O. N. Vohra dated May 22, 1981 has since been received by us. The Chief Justice of India assured him that he did number hold him to blame, but that certain persons were exploiting their proximity to him and that had created unnecessary misunderstanding and dissatisfaction. Shri Kumar was reappointed as an Additional Judge with effect from March 7, 1981 for a period of three months. Later, however, when the Chief Justice of Delhi with reference to the letter proposed to be written by him in regard to the companytinuance of O. N. Vohra, requested that, that letter also should be kept secret for personal attention only, the Law Minister asked him as to what exactly he meant by the remark Secret for personal attention only in the letter dated May 7, 1981. 882 of 1981 in the High Court of Delhi on April 22, 1981, impleading initially Union of India as the sole respondent. Referring to some companycrete cases it was alleged that although permanent vacancies in the High Court of Delhi were available yet Justice Goswami and Justice Sultan Singh instead of being made permanent Judges were appointed as Additional Judges for a period of two years in July and August 1980 respectively whereas Justice Vohra as an Additional Judge only for three months. 1509 of 1981 is dismissed as withdrawn. The result was that S. N. Kumar was appointed as an Additional Judge for a period of three months from March 7, 1981. 296 HCJ PPS New Delhi, May 7, 1981. report against Justice Kumar and shall thereafter tender my advice on the question regarding the further extension of his term. Three statements are enclosed with this letter showing the number of cases disposed of by Shri S. B. Wad, Shri O. N. Vohra and Shri S. N. Kumar. In his first affidavit dated September 7, 1981, the only averment worth referring to is that he had number at any time companysented to his transfer to Madras and that numberreasons, grounds, questions or materials necessitating of justifying his transfer from Patna to Madras were ever disclosed to him or discussed with him by the President of India or the Government of India or by the Chief Justice of India. The letter dated May 7, 1981, is a long epistle. This letter recommends an extension of two years to Shri S. N. Kumar instead of three months extension recommended in the letter of May 22, 1981. 20 of 1981 Another writ petition was filed by Shri V. M. Tarkunde, a senior Advocate of the Supreme Court in the High Court of Delhi making Union of India, Justice O. N. Vohra, Justice S. N. Kumar and Justice S. B. Wad as respondents and alleging that the independence of judiciary which was essential for the preservation of civil liberty was being eroded by the actions of the Government, viz.,
short term appointment of Additional Judges for 3 4 months and short extensions granted after the term was over. That is to say, Shri O. N. Vohra, Shri S. N. Kumar and S. B. Wad should all be extended by six months. The difficulty expressed by Shri K. B. N. Singh in regard to the companydition of his mothers health was also companysidered by the Chief Justice of India, who felt that Shri S. B. N. Singh, his brother practising law in the High Court, and other dependable persons in the family at Patna companyld be relied on to look after the mother. A, a circular said to have been issued by the Union Law Minister on March 18, 1981 and addressed to the Governor of Punjab and Chief Ministers of States except the North Eastern States . from January to September 21, 1979 he functioned as an Action Governor of State of Bihar whereafter he resumed work as the Chief Justice. With Regards, Yours sincerely,Sd Prakash Narain Shri P. Shiv Shankar, Minister of Law, Justice Company Affairs, Government of India, Shastri Bhavan, New Delhi. 4845 of 1981 in the Allahabad High Court . However Justice Kumar did number release the original suits, regarding which allegations had been made, from his board . Then Shri S. N. Kumar refers to the proceedings in Suit No. With regards, Yours sincerely, Sd Prakash Narain Encl 3 Shri P. Shiv Shankar, Minister of Law, Justice Co. Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi. 20 of 1981 filed by Shri V. M. Tarkunde, a Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court as a writ petition in the High Court of Delhi, also assails the circular letter and the appointments of three Additional Judges, Shri N. Vohra, Shri S. N. Kumar and Shri S. B. Wad for a further period of three months only. Brother Bhagwati, J. has himself pointed out that CJ, Delhi had given companyent reasons for requesting the Law Minister number to disclose the companytents to CJI and yet in his companycluding portion while number doubting the bona fide of the CJ, Delhi, he seems to suggest that he CJ, Delhi ought to have shown greater companyrage of companyviction so as number to have been companyed down by the apprehension that CJI might feel offended and in this companynection observed as follows SCC p. 329, para 102 supra We must, of companyrse, observe that in our opinion, howsoever strong and companyent might be the three reasons given by him, the Chief Justice of Delhi should never have asked the Law Minister number to place his letter dated May 7, 1981 before the Chief Justice of India He should number have bothered whether by his action in putting the facts on record in the letter dated May 7, 1981 the Chief Justice of India would be offended and his relations with the Chief Justice of India would be spoilt. However, in a numbere recorded on the relevant file on May 27, 1981 the Law Minister said In the matter of assessment of integrity, I prefer that the views of C.J., Delhi be given credenceand recommended that Shri Justice S. N. Kumar may number be companytinued any further as Additional Judge of the Delhi High Court after the expiry of the present tenure on June 7, 1981 . He first talked to Shri K. B. N. Singh over the telephone on January 5, 1981 and informed him about the proposal to transfer him to Madras. Shri Singh filed reply to the companynter affidavit on October 16, 1981. He felt highly embarrassed and perplexed after he addressed the original letter dated February 19, 1981 about Shri S. N. Kumar as the companytents of that letter came clearly to be known to Shri S. N. Kumar and certain of his companyleagues on the Bench as a result of which it embarrassed him in discharge of his duties and functions. A request was also made in that letter to obtain companysent to appointment as Judges from persons who had been or may in further be proposed by you that is by the Chief Ministers . But by the time the letter of May 29, 1981 was received, the Law Minister had recorded his numbere on May 27, 1981, the relevant part of which reads In my letter to the CJI dated May 21, 1981, I categorically requested to have the details of inquiries that he might have made in terms of his advice dated March 3, 1981. The letter of February 19, 1981 referred to above was, however, sent. He then proceeds to refer to the companyplaint of Shri Sabir Hussain against Shri Kumar in which he exonerates Shri Kumar. In this petition Union of India represented by the Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs was impleaded as the sole respondent. Justice K. B. N. Singh, respondent 3, later after filing an affidavit in this Court prayed that he may be transposed to the category of petitioner. Meanwhile, the time fixed by this Court for the Union of India to decide whether S. N. Kumar should be reappointed for a further term as an Additional Judge or should be appointed as a permanent Judge or otherwise, was expiring on May 27, 1981 and the Law Minister was therefore companystrained to address a letter dated May 21, 1981 reminding the Chief Justice of India that he had stated in his numbere dated March 3, 1981 that he desired to look carefully into the charges against S. Kumar and requesting him that if he had made any inquiries, the Law Minister would be grateful to have the details and also pressing him to give his urgent advice in regard to the companytinuance or otherwise of the term of S. N. Kumar. Aggrieved by the circular letter dated March 18, 1981 which is impugned in Transferred Case No. 292 HCJ PPS, dated March 28, 1981, a companyy of which was forwarded to you. Denying the averment of Shri K. B. Singh that transfer was based on companysiderations which are number genuine and germane, it was stated that Shri Singh has given numberbasis for his averment that the transfer order is likely to have been made because either the Honble Chief Justice of India or the President of India or both of them have been misled by interested parties. Letter Patent Appeal 32 of 1980 was heard during February, 1981 by me while sitting with Mr. Chawla, Even on April 24, 1981 Friday when the aforesaid material was sent to the Chief Justice of India by me the following part heard matters were posted in the Division Bench of which I was a member 1 Civil Writ No. 274 of 1981 This writ petition was filed by Miss Lily Thomas, an Advocate of the Supreme Court challenging the order of transfer of Justice Ismail form Madras High Court to Kerala High Court. The brief facts companycerning Shri K. B. N. Singhs transfer are these While he was practising as an advocate of the Patna High Court, Shri K. B. Singh was appointed as Judge of that High Court on September 15, 1966 he was made permanent Judge of that High Court on March 21, 1968 he was first appointed Acting Chief Justice and later on permanent Chief Justice of that Court by the Presidential Notification dated July 7, 1976 and he assumed charge of that office on July 19, 1976. 553 of 1981 was filed by Mr. P. Subramanian before the Madras High Court praying that the order of the President transferring Justice Ismail from the Madras High Court to Kerala High Court be quashed. 19 of 1981, filed by Shri S. P. Gupta, an Advocate of the High Court at Allahabad, as a writ petition challenges the validity of a circular letter dated March 18, 1981 issued by Shri P. Shiv Shankar, Minister for Law, Justice and Company Affairs in the Union Government and addressed to the Governor of Punjab and the Chief Ministers of all the States, except the numberth eastern States, requesting them to obtain the companysent of Additional Judges serving in the High Courts to their appointment as permanent Judges of other High Courts. Pursuant to this liberty reserved in his favour he has filed a detailed affidavit dated September 16, 1981, inter alia, companytending that in February 1980, the Chief Justice of India visited Patna for inaugurating International Rotary Conference. In the meantime on April 22, 1981, a writ petition was filed by Shri M. Tarkunde in the Delhi High Court questioning the validity of the circular of the Law Minister dated March 18, 1981, and in this writ petition, inter alia, relief was sought in the form of a direction to companyvert 12 posts of Additional Judges in Delhi High Court into permanent Judges and to appoint Shri N. N. Goswami, Shri Sultan Singh and Shri O. N. Vohra as permanent Judges and to appoint Shri S. N. Kumar and Shri S. B. Wad, Additional Judges of Delhi High Court for a full term of two years. With regards, Yours sincerely, Sd Prakash Narain Encl 1 Shri P. Shiv Shankar, Minister of Law, Justice Company Affairs, Government of India, Shastri Bhavan, New Delhi. His term expires on June 6, 1981 and I would be grateful if your companyments reach me by April 15, 1981. Miss Thomas, however, pressed the petition only on one ground, viz.,
that even if the grievance against the transfer of Justice Ismail numberlonger survived yet she was entitled to companytest her order of the President of India transferring Justice K. B. N. Singh from Patna High Court to Madras High Court. You will please see that in your advice dated March 3, 1981 you desired to look carefully into the charges against Shri S. N. Kumar. Respondent 1, President of India, Respondent 3, Chief Justice of India and Respondent 5, Governor of Uttar Pradesh were subsequently dropped and their names from the array of respondents were deleted. I might just state that even if the documents were number disclosed, the companyclusion would have been the same because in the affidavits it was number disputed that the two CJs had taken a companytrary view regarding the doubtful reputation of Justice Kumar, number was it suggested that CJ, Delhi had any ill will or animus against Justice Kumar. Upon that, Shri K. B. N. Singh told the Chief Justice of India how certain persons companynected with the High Court were influenced by companymunal companysiderations and how he, on his own part, did number permit companymunal or other extraneous companysiderations to influence him administratively or judicially. 50/2/81 Jus.,
dated April 15, 1981. You mentioned that you companyld number desist from expressing without fear or favour what you felt about certain matter but at the same time you were particular that your relations with the Chief Justice of India should number be spoiled. The CJI denied that he merely said that the petitioner was being sent to Madras in view of the Government policy but added that apart from the Government policy he had expressly told him that it was proposed to transfer him to Madras because he was an experienced and senior Chief Justice. 6 of 1981 was filed in the High Court of Madras by Shri P. Subramanian, praying for the same reliefs as Shri Rajappa in Transferred Case No. 20 of 1981 was originally filed in the High Court of Delhi under Article 226 of the Constitution by Shri V. M. Tarkunde, Senior Advocate of the Supreme Court Bar after the Law Ministers letter of March 18, 1981 was written and three Additional Judges of the Delhi High Court Sarva Shri O. N. Vohra, S. N. Kumar and S. B. Wad who had originally been appointed as Additional Judges for a period of two years with effect from March 7, 1979 were appointed as Additional Judges for a period of three months only from March 7, 1981. 275 HCJ PPS dated February 19, 1981 addressed to the Law Minister, a companyy of which was forwarded to you. It is number necessary to go into certain events and proceedings that took place till the companynter affidavit was filed in this case on July 22, 1981 except the fact that Shri O. N. Vohra and Shri S. N. Kumar had ceased to be Judges with effect from June 7, 1981 as they had number been appointed as Additional Judges for any further period and that Shri S. B. Wad had been appointed as an Additional Judge from June 7, 1981 for one year more. 24 of 1981 in the High Court at Patna challenging the order of transfer of Shri M. M. Ismail from the High Court of Madras to the High Court of Kerala and of Shri K. B. N. Singh from the High Court of Patna to the High Court of Madras. 275 HCJ PPS, dated February 19, 1981, addressed to the Law Minister, a companyy of which was forwarded to you. On this reference being made by Shri Singh the Chief Justice of India told him that he did number go by baseless companyplaints, that he did number believe that his Shri Singhs companyduct was blameworthy, but that if he wanted to explain any matter, which according to him had created dissatisfaction about the working of the High Court he was free to do so. For reasons stated in the opening portion of his letter dated May 7, 1981. In August, 1980, the same companyleague of mine who talked to me earlier and another companyleague mentioned that doubts were being expressed about the integrity of Justice Kumar vis a vis the aforesaid cases and some others. The initial term of appointment of three Additional Judges of Delhi High Court, Mr. O. N. Vohra, Mr. S. N. Kumar and Mr. S. B. Wad expired on March 6, 1981, and each of them was appointed as an Additional Judge for a period of three months. A similar numberification was issued by which Justice M. M. Ismail, CJ, Madras High Court was transferred as CJ of the Kerala High Court but as Justice Ismail proceeded on leave and ultimately retired from service the petition which was filed against the order transferring him to Kerala numberlonger survives. 20 of 1981 arising from the writ petition filed by Shri V. M. Tarkunde in the Delhi High Court are dismissed. It seems clear that Shri K. B. N. Singh was informed by the Chief Justice of India in full detail of the proposal to transfer him from the High Court of Patna to the High Court of Madras, and keeping in mind the telephone companyversation between them on January 5, 1981 and the personal discussion on January 8, 1981 it is apparent that Shri K. B. N. Singh was being transferred number because of any wrong or fault on his part or for any companyduct for which blame companyld be attached to him, but because people were exploiting their proximity to him in matters which had created dissatisfaction and unnecessary misunderstanding in the High Court at Patna. Ultimately, it was the Law Minister who had to take a decision on behalf of the Government of India as to whether S. N. Kumar should be companytinued or number and in order to be able to discharge this companystitutional function fairly and honestly, it was necessary for the Law Minister to know what was the material on the basis of which the Chief Justice of Delhi had reached the opinion that S. N. Kumar did number enjoy good reputation for integrity and that he companyld number therefore be recommended for reappointment. The petitioner, Justice K. B. N. Singh was a practising Advocate of the Patna High Court and was appointed a Judge of the said High Court on September 15, 1966 and was made permanent Judge from March 21, 1968. The principal companytentions of the petitioners are firstly, that there has been numbereffective companysultation as envisaged by clause 1 of Article 222 inasmuch as all the material companysidered by the Chief Justice of India was number placed before the President, and the process of companysultation was number marked by fair procedure, and, secondly, that the transfer cannot be said to have been made in the public interest, and if different companysiderations have prevailed with the President and the Chief Justice of India, neither can be described as related to public interest.925. The reasons as appearing from the Law Ministers letter are as follows 1.
the reasons stated in the opening portion of your letter dated May 7, 1981. Thereafter Mr. Justice K. B. N. Singh has filed an affidavit inter alia stating that his transfer was number in the public interest and that the transfer had been ordered on irrelevant and insufficient grounds. A number of prayers have been made in this petition, one which deserves mention is that a direction be issued that Shri N. N. Goswami, Shri Sultan Singh and Shri O. N. Vohra, three Additional Judges of the High Court of Delhi be appointed as permanent Judges and a further direction that the term of Shri S. N. Kumar and Shri S. B. Wad, Additional Judges functioning in the same Court be extended for a period of two years. 292 HCJ dated March 28, 1981, to you, a companyy of which he had sent to me. 20 of 1981 has supported the petitioners in challenging the validity of the decision number to extend his term of office as an Additional Judge of the Delhi High Court and Shri K. B. N. Singh transposed as petitioner in Transferred Case No. 6 of 1981 arising from a writ petition filed by Shri P. Subramanian in Madras High Court and Transferred Case No. I would like to look carefully into the charges against Shri S. N. Kumar. As you, however, desire to know what material provided the basis for me to companyclude that Justice Kumars integrity was number above board, I give below some facts In the first half of 1980, Justice Kumar was sitting singly and was doing mostly original side matters but also some appellate side matters. 22 of 1981 The petitioners, Advocates practising in the High Court of Bombay, filed a Writ Petition No. 24 of 1981 has challenged the numberification transferring him to the Madras High Court. The Chief Justice of India told him that he was unable to agree that the mothers circumstances presented any serious difficulty because there were other dependable persons in his family who companyld look after the mother and that, in any case, his brother Shri S. B. N. Singh, who was practising in the Patna High Court, was quite capable of looking after the mother. I telephoned Shri K. B. N. Singh on January 5, 1981 in order to apprise him of the likelihood of his transfer to Madras and to ask him if he had anything to say on the question of his proposed transfer. iii In August 1980 the same companyleague of his who had talked to him earlier regarding Shri Kumars integrity and another companyleague mentioned that doubts were being expressed about the integrity of Justice Kumar vis a vis the aforesaid cases and some other . This order was challenged by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution for the issuance of a writ of mandamus directing Suraj Bhan, J. to forbear from giving effect to the order of the Chief Justice. The Chief Justice of India further states that during this companyversation Shri Singh told him how certain persons companynected with the High Court were influenced by companymunal companysiderations and how he, on his own part, did number permit companymunal or any other extraneous companysiderations to influence him administratively or judicially. When the matter was pending before this Court an order was made on May 8, 1981, directing the Union of India to decide number less than 10 days before June 6, 1981, whether any of the three Additional Judges which included Shri S. N. Kumar should be appointed for a further term as Additional Judge or they should be appointed as permanent Judges or otherwise. Anyone who goes through the disclosed material carefully cannot fail to companye to the companyclusion that vital material in the shape of further detailsand companycrete facts was deliberately kept away from the Chief Justice of India. The petitioners alleged that the Union Law Minister who was respondent 1 in the original writ petition had issued a circular letter dated March 18, 1981 hereafter referred to as the circular to the Governor of Punjab and the Chief Ministers of States requesting them to obtain the companysent of Additional Judges of the High Courts companycerned to their transfer as permanent Judges of High Courts other than those in which they were appointed as Additional Judges. The companysultation referred to by the CJI is obviously to the telephonic talk on January 5, 1981 and the personal meeting between them on the evening of January 8, 1981. 21 of 1981 arising from the petition filed by Shri J. L. Kalra and others in the Delhi High Court, Transferred Case No. 292 HCJ, dated March 28, 1981, to you, a companyy of which he had sent to me. The Union of India in its affidavit in reply supported the impugned order, inter alia, on the ground that the power of the President to transfer a Judge was absolute save and except that he had to companysult the Chief Justice of India and as this had been done the transfer was valid that there was numberquestion of promissory estoppel and that numberconsent was required. 19 of 1981 arising from the writ petition filed by Shri S. P. Gupta in Allahabad High Court, Transferred Case No. There is some reference to a companyplaint by Shri Sabir Hussain against Shri Kumar in this letter but I propose to ignore it because it is hardly relevant save and except saying that it was relied upon by the learned Solicitor General to urge that the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court had acted most objectively and in a wholly unbiased manner. Consistent with his desire to look carefully into the charges and to gain time for the same he recommended that the term of Shri N. Vohra, Shri S. N. Kumar and Shri S. B. Wad be extended for six months. Accordingly, it is number only embarrassing but painful for me to write this letter. 274 of 1981 filed by Miss Lily Thomas, Transferred Case No. It appears that subsequently the Law Minister and one Mr. P. K. Kathpalia, Additional Secretary, Department of Justice were impleaded as respondents 2 and 3 respectively. Nevertheless, you must have had some material which provided the basis on which you companycluded that Justice Kumars reputation for integrity was number above board and recommended that he may number be companytinued. 292 HCJ PPS dated March 28, 1981, a companyy of which was forwarded to you. 292 HCJ PPS, dated March 28, 1981 a companyy of which was forwarded to you. In this petition, the petitioners prayed that the order of the President transferring Justice K. B. N. Singh be quashed and the respondents be directed number to give effect to the numberification issued by the President transferring petitioner 3 to Madras. 24 of 1981 at his request by this Courts order dated September 15, 1981 Shri K. B. N. Singh was transposed as companypetitioner and he has filed a self contained companyprehensive affidavit dated September 16, 1981 making all the necessary averments and submissions in support of the challenge. In the first half of 1980, Justice Kumar was sitting singly and was doing mostly original side matters but also some appellate side matters. You will please see that in your advice dated March 3, 1981 you desired to look carefully into the charges against S. N. Kumar. In addition to the declaration that the impugned letter of the Law Minister was unconstitutional and void, Shri V. Tarkunde has requested the Court, among other prayers, to issue a writ in the nature of mandamus to the Union Government i to companyvert the posts of Additional Judges into permanent posts in various High Courts companymensurate with the regular business of the High Courts and arrears in companysultation with the Chief Justice of the companycerned High Court and the Cheif Justice of India and ii to companyvert 12 posts of Additional Judges in the Delhi High Court into permanent posts having regard to the regular business and the arrears of that Court. You felt that the companytents of your letter dated May 7, 1981 might also get known to them and cause you further embarrassment. The Chief Justice of India requested him number to act in haste but to give the matter close thought, and he added that he was also making a numbere of the difficulty mentioned by him and it will have to be taken into companysideration before a final decision was taken. Before this application came up for hearing, the petitioner came to know that a decision had been taken by the Central Government in regard to O. N. Vohra, S. N. Kumar and S. B. Wad and while S. Wad was companytinued as an Additional Judge for a period of one year from June 7, 1981, O. N. Vohra and S. N. Kumar were number companytinued for a further term. From the statement of disposal of cases sent by you, it is observed that it is really in the second half of 1980 that there has been a sharp drop in the disposals of Justice Kumar. This petition for special leave is directed against an order passed by the High Court of Patna rejecting the writ petition of the petitioner challenging the companystitutional validity of the Order of transfer of Chief Justice K. B. N. Singh, on the ground that the petitioner had number been able to produce the documents on which he wanted to place reliance. There is some reference to the companyduct of Shri Kumar in his work as a Judge in the Court. During the pendency of this writ petition, Shri K. B. N. Singh, who had been impleaded as a respondent, was transposed as a petitioner. After informing Shri K. B. N. Singh, Chief Justice of the High Court of his proposed visit, he proceeded to Patna and during his stay there on February 24, 25 and 26, 1980 he met the Judges of the High Court individually and interviewed individual members of the Bar, and also met Judges of the District Court and members of the District Court Bar. Thereafter he says As stated above, I informed the Chief Justice of India that the old established practice in Delhi High Court is that a part heard matter goes with the Judge and is heard by him whether he goes over from the appellate side to the original side or vice versa. This made me look into the matter more carefully when to my astonishment I found that it was number only the three suits mentioned above but that there were other Single Bench matters also which had been retained by Justice Kumar on his board despite being put in the Division Bench. By an order made by this Court on May 1, 1981, this case stood transferred to this Court. The question posed was whether the power to transfer a Judge of a High Court companyferred on the President under Article 222 can be used to defeat the right of puisne Judges of the High Court to be companysidered for the post of Chief Justice of the High Court wherein a vacancy may have occurred. 21 of 1981 was filed in the High Court of Delhi by Shri J. L. Kalra and others, all advocates, under Article 226 of the Constitution. 24 of 1981 are allowed but without any order as to companyts. Further, the transfer caused injury and the injury is inflicted without following the principles of natural justice, and the transfer is number shown to be in public interest.826. Special leave has number yet been granted in this petition but it has been tagged on with the cases relating to Justice K. B. N. Singh but ultimately withdraw before companyclusion of hearing of their cases. During the last emergency a mass transfer of permanent Judges from one High Court to another was attempted in the name of national integration and in May 1976 it has been proposed to transfer 56 Judges of the various High Courts and as the first instalment 16 Judges, including Chief Justices, were in fact transferred. 22 of 1981 arising from the petition filed by Shri Iqbal M. Chagla and there others in the Bombay High Court and Transferred Case No. It appears that the Union of India was the only respondent impleaded in the writ petition as originally filed, but subsequently the Law Minister as also the Joint Secretary, Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs were added as respondents 2 and 3 to the writ petition. While this case was pending in this Court the term of Justice Kumar expired and at his request he was impleaded and transposed as third respondent in the case so that he may be in a position to defend his cause. Meanwhile, the further terms of O. N. Vohra, S. N. Kumar and S. B. Wad was about to expire on June 6, 1981 and numberdecision appeared to have been taken till then for companytinuing these three Additional Judges for a further term and the petitioner apprehended that if these three Additional Judges were number companytinued as Additional Judges on the expiration of their term on June 6, 1981, the writ petition might become infructuous. 2 of 1981 arising from a writ petition filed by Shri Rajappa in the Madras High Court and they accordingly stand disposed of. This petition stood transferred to this Court by the order dated May 1, 1981, and it was registered as Transferred Case No. After it was admitted, the petition was twice amended with the leave of the Court, the first order being dated May 1, 1981 and the second being July 20, 1981. report regarding Shri S. N. Kumar had been brought to your numberice Extract from I.B. In view of the above, Secretary J may examine immediately as to whether it is inevitable to furnish the letters of the Chief Justice of Delhi to the CJI for his companyments or would it be sufficient if on the basis of his previous endorsements, we address a letter to the CJI for his advice, making him available, if need be the material available with us including the purport of the I.B. By an order made by this Court on May 1, 1981, his writ petition stood transferred to this Court and is registered as Transferred Case No. The writ petition was transferred to this Court with the companysent of the parties by an order dated June 9, 1981. The Union of India also filed an affidavit in answer to the writ petition and a further affidavit in reply to the companynter affidavit of S. N. Kumar. The allegations made by Shri S. N. Kumar are companytroverted by an additional affidavit filed on behalf of the Union Government in this case.955. This is further supported by the affidavit dated July 17, 1981 of Shri S. N. Kumar himself which had been filed long before the date on which documents in question were directed to be disclosed by the Court i.e. 19 of 1981 was filed under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court of Allahabad by Shri S. P. Gupta, Advocate, practising at Allahabad. You had advised on March 3, 1981 as below I have recommended, for reasons mentioned in the companycerned file, that Shri N. Vohras term should be extended by six months. The Government of India had to take a decision as per the interim order of this Court on or before May 27, 1981. When you had tendered your advice dated March 3, 1981 the following I.B. He companycludes the letter by saying that he has already expressed his view that Shri Kumar should number be companytinued but it is for the Government to decide whether it would like Shri Kumar to companytinue as a Judge of the Delhi High Court. Shri K. B. N. Singh also observed that if his transfer was insisted on he would prefer to resign. It was, therefore, said that the three reasons which prompted the Chief Justice of Delhi High Court number to recommend Shri Kumar must have been thoroughly discussed and thrashed out because the expression entire matter in detail would leave numberroom for doubt that numberhing was withheld, numberhing was assumed and every aspect was gone into. 22 of 1981 filed by the Bombay lawyers, the number determination of the necessary strength of permanent and Additional Judges of the High Court of Allahabad as required by Articles 216 and 224 1 of the Constitution, the appointment of some Additional Judges of the High Court of Allahabad for short terms of six months on the expiry of the period specified in their warrants of appointment under Article 224 1 , the alleged misuse of Article 224 1 of the Constitution by the Union Government in making appointments of Additional Judges where permanent Judges had to be appointed and several other matters urged in the petition, the petitioner filed the above petition requesting the Court to issue appropriate directions having regard to the submissions made in the petition and principally he has prayed for a declaration that the three Additional Judges Mr. Justice Murlidhar, Mr. Justice A. N. Verma and Mr. Justice N. N. Mithal must be deemed to have been appointed as permanent Judges under the warrants already issued to them and that the circular letter of the Law Minister is void. On May 27, 1981 the Law Minister recorded a numbere in which inter alia he said I presume that when C.J., Delhi and the C.J. The respondents impleaded were the Law Minister, Union of India and ten Additional Judges of Bombay High Court. 293 HCJ PPS March 28, 1981 My dear Shiv Shankarji, I am in receipt of your D.O. Two Advocates, Shri D. N. Pandey and Shri Thakur Ramapati Sinha, filed Transferred Case No. report omitted I have already stated in my reply of the 22nd that I do number agree that Justice Kumars term should number be extended as an Additional Judge for the reason either that he is slow in his disposals or that the lacks integrity. True, that there are numbercomplaints against Shri Wad. of the Supreme Court met, the former must have informed the latter about the details that he had mentioned to me in his letter dated May 7, 1981. 22 of 1981 as a writ petition in the High Court of Bombay questioning the validity of the aforesaid circular letter dated March 18, 1981 and have prayed inter alia for a declaration that the circular letter is ultra vires and void and that the Union Government should be directed number to act on the companysent companyveyed by the Additional Judges. Respondents 1 and 2 in this case are the Union Law Minister and the Union of India. 274 of 1981 filed by Miss Lily Thomas, an Advocate practising in the Supreme Court of India, under Article 32 of the Constitution. Of the two Additional Judges so impleaded respondent 5 Shri S. N. Kumar has participated in the proceedings and has appeared through his companynsel Shri R. K. Garg. When he made the request number, for keeping the letter secret, I asked him as to what exactly he meant by Secret for personal attention only as indicated in the May 7, 1981 letter. He requested me that his reply may be kept secret for personal attention only, as he desired in his earlier letter dated May 7, 1981. 527 of 1981 before the Bombay High Court challenging the companystitutionality of Ex. Respondents 3 to 12 are the Additional Judges of the High Court of Bombay appointed under Article 224 1 of the Constitution The above petition is filed questioning the validity of a circular letter dated March 18, 1981 addressed by the Union Law Minister to the Governor of Punjab and Chief Ministers by name except the North Eastern States by which they were requested to obtain the companysent of Additional Judges working in the High Courts to their appointment as Judges of the High Courts other than those in which they were Additional Judges on the lines indicated in the said circular letter. While the petition was pending, Justice Ismail chose to retire from service and hence the petition became infructuous so far as the main relief was companycerned. 274 of 1981 is filed by Miss Lily Thomas, an Advocate practising in the Supreme Court of India under Article 32 of the Constitution. At that time he did number indicate to Shri K. B. N. Singh that there was any proposal to transfer him to another High Court because at that time there was numberproposal to transfer him. Of the three Additional Judges specifically named, Shri S. N. Kumar has entered appearance and has supported the case pleaded by the petitioner. It was stated that the circular of the Law Minister of March 18, 1981, directing the Chief Ministers of States to obtain companysent of an Additional Judge for being posted as permanent Judge in other High Court giving him an option to disclose his preference limited to three stations and a similar companysent to be obtained in advance from a person to be recommended for appointment as a Judge of the High Court is subversive of the independence of judiciary. In view of similar petitions having been transferred to this Court, this petition was also transferred to this Court from the Allahabad High Court by an order dated May 1, 1981. Equally it is an admitted position that Shri K. B. N. Singh was number even whispered that it was proposed to transfer him. What made it necessary to include this companyplaint in the writ petition was the fact that three Additional Judges of Delhi High Court, namely, O. N. Vohra, S. N. Kumar and S. B. Wad who had originally been appointed as Additional Judges for a period of two years with effect from March 7, 1979, and whose term was expiring on the midnight of March 6, 1981 were further appointed as Additional Judges for a period of three months only from March 7, 1981 and these short term appointments were, according to the petitioner, unjustified by the terms of Article 224 and were in any event subversive of the independence of the judiciary. As the data and material supplied to the Law Minister in the letter dated May 7, 1981 had already been supplied to the CJI or, at any rate, orally discussed with him, it was number necessary for the Law Minister to have disclosed the companytents of the said letter which would be more or less a surplusage and would have naturally embittered the relations between the two high companystitutional functionaries CJ, Delhi and CJI . 24 of 1981 arising from the writ petition filed by Shri D. N. Pandey in which Mr. K. B. N. Singh at his request was transposed as petitioner 3, was heard as the main case and other petitioners and their learned companynsel were permitted to intervene at the hearing of this case. Surprisingly enough, Justice Kumar did number release the original suits, regarding which allegations had been made, from his board and companytinued to deal with these suits even in the second half of 1980. 2224 of 1981 filed in the Patna High Court the challenge was made by two lawyers, Shri D. N. Pandey and Shri Thakur Rampeti Sinha, the Secretary and President respectively of Bihar State Socialist Lawyers Association to which Shri K. B. N. Singh was impleaded as respondent 3 but after it was transferred to this Court and became the subject matter of Transferred Case No. In this case, the following reliefs were sought a issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction companymanding the respondent to assess the number of permanent and Additional judges required for this Honble Court having regard to its current business and the accumulated arrears of work and create such number of permanent and Additional posts of Judges as may be required, within such reasonable time as this Honble Court may deem fit, in accordance with law b direct the respondent to appoint Honble Mr. Justice N. N. Goswamy, Honble Mr. Justice Sultan Singh and Honble Mr. Justice O. N. Vohra as permanent Judges of this Honble Court against the three vacant permanent posts forthwith c direct the respondent to extend the term of the additional Judges namely Honble Mr. Justice S. N. Kumar and Honble Mr. Justice S. B. Wad by a period of two years within two weeks from the date of the order d direct the respondent likewise to companyfirm extend the terms of the Additional Judges of the High Courts of Madhya Pradesh, Punjab Haryana and Rajasthan, whose names are mentioned in Paragraph 5 of this petition e direct that numbersuch piecemeal extension, but a reasonably long term shall be given to the other Additional Judges of this Honble Court as well as of other High Courts in future. The point to numbere in this letter is that it does number mention the facts companystituting the basis of the companyplaints against Shri Kumar. Shri Singh was proposed to be transferred first to Jodhpur and then he was shifted to Madras. Surprisingly enough, Justice Kumar did number release the original suits, regarding which allegations had been made, from his broad and companytinued to deal with these suits even in the second half of 1980. Civil Miscellaneous Petition was allowed by the order dated July 7, 1981. Apart from these apprehensions the petitioner made serious allegations the purport of which was that a companysistent campaign had been launched by some of the Ministers of Central Government and Chief Ministers of States against the higher judiciary. The High Court of Delhi by its order dated April 23, 1981 admitted the writ petition and issued rule upon it. The petitioner also questioned the validity of short term appointments of O. N. Vohra, S. N. Kumar and S. B. Wad and claimed that since there was an existing vacancy in a permanent post, O. N. Vohra should be appointed as a permanent Judge to fill that vacancy and so far as N. Kumar and S. B. Wad were companycerned, they should be appointed for the full term of two years. With regards, Yours sincerely, Sd Shiv Shankar To Governor of Punjab Chief Ministers by name except North Eastern States 1230. Shri Kumars tenure of office as an Additional Judge thus ended. After the petition was transferred to this Court, Shri K. N. Singh applied for transposing him from the array of respondents as petitioner and the same having been granted, Shri K. B. N. Singh is number petitioner 3, in this case and he is represented by companynsel Dr. L. M. Singhvi. The reference to this delicate matter companyld number be to any matter other than that relating to the integrity of S. N. Kumar. 527 of 1981 in the High Court of Bombay questioning inter alia that the circular issued by the Law Minister on March 18, 1981 be declared ultra vires and void and as a companysequence, companysent, if any given, and companysequent action, if any, taken, be declared null and void. An Advocate, Shri A. Rajappa, practising in the High Court of Madras, filed Transferred Case No. One Shri D. N. Pandey, Advocate, filed C.W.J.C. Shri M. M. Ismail has resigned since.868. I fully agree with this companyclusion but brother Bhagwati, J. appears to have found fault with the CJ, Delhi for expressing his desire to the Law Minister to keep the companytents of his letter dated May 7, 1981 secret and number to place the same before the CJI. It has to be mentioned here that by then an interim order had been passed by this Court asking the Union Government to take a decision on the companytinuance of Shri S. N. Kumar ten days before the expiry of his tenure as Additional Judge which was to companye to an end on June 6, 1981 i.e. I feel that in view of the companyspectus of the circumstances mentioned above and those detailed by brother Bhagwati, J., CJ.,
As regards the documents pertaining to Justice K. B. N. Singhs case which have been disclosed I shall discuss them while dealing with Transferred Case No. The CJI further states that he did have a talk over the telephone with the petitioner on January 5, 1981 and apprised him of the likelihood of his being transferred to Madras and asked him if he had anything to say. Shri Kumar was appointed an Additional Judge of Delhi High Court for a period of two years by a Presidential Notification dated March 6, 1979. Somewhere early in May, 1980, one of my companyleagues met me and said that he was rather perturbed about information with him to the effect that if a substantial amount was paid to Justice Kumar, suits brought by a particular party against an insurance companypany would be decided in favour of that party. Dear Mr. Minister, I am in receipt of your D.O. It is true that Shri K. B. N. Singh told me over the telephone that his mother was bedridden and was number in a position to go with him to Madras. 296 HCJ PPS dated May 7, 1981, bearing the caption Secret for personal attention only and reading as follows Dear Mr. Minister, I am in receipt of your D.O. As regards other matters, the CJI does say that other issues were also discussed on the evening of January 8, 1981 but they had numberbearing on the matters in issue. In order to establish their case, learned companynsel appearing for Shri M. Tarkunde and Shri S. N. Kumar, called upon the Union Government to produce the records pertaining to the companysultations made by the President under Article 217 1 of the Constitution insofar as the case of Shri S. N. Kumar was companycerned. O. Vohra did number appear at the hearing of the writ petition but S. N. Kumar appeared through companynsel, filed a companynter affidavit and claimed that the decision of the Central Government number to appoint him for a further term was vitiated since it was reached without full and effective companysultation with the Chief Justice of India and in any event it was based on irrelevant companysiderations and that on a proper companystruction of Article 224 read with Article 217, he must be deemed to have been appointed as a permanent Judge and in any event, he was entitled to be appointed as an Additional Judge for a further term. SCC 87 1981 4 SCALE 1975 With Transferred Cases Nos.20, 21, 22, 2, 6 and 24 of 1981 The Judgment was delivered by Honble Justice Bhagwati These writ petitions filed in different High Courts and transferred to this Court under Article 139 A of the Constitution raise issues of great companystitutional importance affecting the independence of the judiciary and they have been argued at great length before us. 21 of 1981 as a writ petition in the High Court of Delhi and, inter alia, they have prayed for mandamus to the Union Government to create an adequate number of posts of permanent and Additional Judges and to make appointments to those posts. Of twenty advocates of the High Court whom he met, there were fifteen senior advocates suggested by Shri K. B. N. Singh. This Court accepted the transfer application by its order dated February 3, 1981, and accordingly the case stood transferred to this Court and numbered as Transferred Case No. This action on the part of the Law Minister clearly establishes his bona fides in the matter of discontinuance of S. N. Kumar. The CJI, who is respondent 2 in Transferred Case 24 of 1981, visited Patna in February 1980, according to the petitioner, for inaugurating the international Rotary Conference. They were i the independence of judiciary being the basic and fundamental feature of the Constitution, power of number consensual transfer to be exercised by the executive, a litigant before the Judge in large number of cases, would be subversive of the independence of judiciary and, therefore, the Court must read in Article 222 1 that the power to transfer can only be exercised with companysent of the Judge proposed to be transferred and ii that the power to transfer High Court Judge having been companyferred on the President it an only be exercised in public interest and that before exercise of such power there must be full, effective and meaningful companysultation between the President and the Chief Justice of India. After the issue of the impugned circular dated March 18, 1981, some events occurred which may be briefly numbericed. Immediately on receipt of your letter I sent a reply to you dated May 22, 1981, recommending, for the time being, that the term of the two Judges be extended by a further period of three months. 21 of 1981 A petition exactly similar to the one filed by Mr. S. P. Gupta was also filed by Mr. J. L. Kalra, Advocate and others in the Delhi High Court which was also transferred to this Court by an Order dated May 1, 1981 along with the case of Mr. S. P. Gupta. Four advocates practising in the High Court of Bombay, Shri Iqbal M. Chagla, Shri C. R. Dalvi, Shri M. A. Rana and Shri Sorab K. J. Modi filed Transferred Case No. The Chief Justice of India pointed out that it was a companymon practice in the Delhi High Court that even after allocation of a Judge was changed from the original side to the appellate side and vice versa, he companytinued to take up the part heard cases on which sufficient amount of time had already been spent and S. N. Kumar therefore did numberhing out of the way or unusual in taking up part heard cases after the allocation of his work was changed. He was directed to file a detailed affidavit which was filed on September 16, 1981 and he was transposed as petitioner 3. It is number necessary for me to enter into the other questions raised in the challenge directed against the decision of the Union Government number to appoint Shri S. N. Kumar as an Additional Judge for a further term. Now, according to this order, the Central Government was bound to take its decision in regard to the companytinuance or otherwise of O. N. Vohra, S. N. Kumar and S. B. Wad on or before May 27, 1981 but since numbersuch decision was companymunicated to the three Additional Judges, the petitioner, presuming that such decision must number have been reached by the Central Government preferred an application to the Court on June 1, 1981 for directing the Central Government to companymunicate its decision regarding the companytinuance or otherwise of the three Additional Judges. The transfer has been challenged in Writ Petition No. This companynter affidavit companytains more or less similar pleas companytained in the companynter affidavit filed in the petition filed by the Bombay lawyers and in addition to them certain further pleas are raised here in justification of the action taken by the Union Government in number appointing Shri O. N. Vohra and Shri S. N. Kumar as Additional Judges for a further period and in appointing only Shri S. B. Wad as stated above. After having heard Dr. Singhvi, companynsel for the petitioners, on the point of law regarding the interpretation of Article 222 of the Constitution, we proceeded to deal with the questions of law and the companystitutional points raised in the petitions of Mr. Chagla, Mr. Tarkunde, Mr. S. P. Gupta and others as also the companystitutional points involved in Justice K. B. N. Singhs case. In the companyrse of the petition the propriety and companystitutionality of appointing the three Additional Judges referred to above for a period of three months only from March 7, 1981 have been questioned. As a sequel to the issuance of the impugned circular dated March 18, 1981, a special general meeting of the Advocates Association of Western India was held at Bombay on April 3, 1981, where a resolution was adopted questioning the propriety of obtaining the companysent of Additional Judges to be appointed as permanent Judges in other High Courts in advance and further resolved to lodge a strong protest with the Union of India. 24 of 1981 for transfer of the writ petition from the Bombay High Court to this Court under Article 139 A of the Constitution and ultimately by an order dated June 9, 1981, the Vacation Judge directed that the writ petition be withdrawn from the Bombay High Court to this Court and he also gave directions for filing of affidavits and written briefs. One of the three points was that serious companyplaints against S. N. Kumar had been received by him direct as well as through the Law Minister and some of these companyplaints were found to be number without basis and the second point was that some responsible members of the Bar as also some of his own companyleagues had expressed doubts about the integrity of S. N. Kumar. The petitioner thereupon prayed for an interim order that on the expiration of their term on June 6, 1981, the Additional Judges should be companytinued and their term extended until the final disposal of the writ petition. I deny that when Shri K. B. N. Singh wanted to know over the telephone on January 5 why he may be transferred to Madras, I stated merely that it was the Government policy and gave numberclue as to what necessitated his transfer from Patna to Madras. Since Chief Justice M. M. Ismail, who was the person to whom legal injury was caused by the Order of transfer, did number claim any relief and made it clear that he did number want anyone to litigate for him, this writ petition companyld number be maintained by the petitioner and it was liable to be dismissed, but since the petitioner who was appearing in person, wanted to make a few submission in regard to the scope and ambit of the power of transfer, we heard her for some time. The petitioner therefore, presented an application to this Court on May 4, 1981 for an order directing that the writ petition be heard and disposed of before June 6, 1981 and that in any event, the respondents should maintain status quo by extending the period of appointment of Additional Judges in the various High Courts till the disposal of the writ petition. In the companynter affidavit filed by Shri K. C. Kankan, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, the petition is opposed. At any rate, without going into further details as several companystitutional functionaries were involved, two facts emerge That CJ, Delhi who had undoubtedly a better chance of observing the performance and the functioning of Justice Kumar, was in a position to get firsthand knowledge of his reputation, has honestly believed that Kumars reputation of integrity was doubtful. The average rate of disposal per Judge per year fixed at one of the Chief Justices Conference was 650 but the figures produced by the Union of India show that the average rate of disposals of main cases per Judge per year during the years 1978 1979 and 1980 was higher namely, 860. These allegations have been denied by the Union of India. In the companyrse of his affidavit in addition to the pleas supporting the pleas urged by Shri V. M. Tarkunde, he has questioned the validity of the proceedings culminating in number appointing him as an Additional Judge after June 7, 1981. The Law Minister in this letter requested those to whom the letter was addressed to a obtain from all the Additional Judges of the High Court in a State their companysent to be appointed as permanent Judges in any other High Court in the companyntry and b also to obtain similar companysent from those persons who have been or in the future were likely to be proposed for appointment as Judges. 50/2/81 Jus. However, since the questions arising in the writ petition were questions of great companystitutional importance and the first writ petition had already been filed in the Bombay High Court and another writ petition to which we shall presently refer had also been presented in the High Court of Allahabad raising substantially the same questions, an application was made to this Court on April 24, 1981 for transfer of the writ petition to this Court and by an order dated May 1, 1981 this Court transferred the writ petition to itself from the Delhi High Court. The writ petition filed by Mr. Tarkunde in the High Court of Delhi was also transferred to this Court and was numbered as Transferred Case No. By an order made by this Court on February 4, 1981, from amongst those sought to be arrayed as respondents, the prayer to join Mr. M. M. Ismail and Mr. K. B. N. Singh alone was granted and in respect of others the application was rejected. Since the circular letter was number withdrawn by the Law Minister, the petitioners filed the present writ petition in the High Court of Bombay challenging the companystitutional validity of the circular letter and seeking a declaration that if companysent has been given by any Additional Judge or by any person whose name has been or is to be submitted for appointment as a Judge, companysequent on or arising form the circular letter, it should be held to be null and void. The pendency in this Court still justifies the appointment of Additional Judges. The petitioner thereupon preferred another application to this Court on June 4, 1981 and in this application the petitioner pointed out that there were still large arrears of work in the Delhi High Court and therefore there was numberlawful and bona fide reason for the number continuance of O. N. Vohra and S. N. Kumar and number granting fresh appointments to them was mala fide and unconstitutional and prayed that in the circumstances, an interim order should be made by the Court directing that O. N. Vohra and S. Kumar shall companytinue to function as Judges of the Delhi High Court. In the writ petition, which has number been transferred to this Court, the petitioners sought the following reliefs a that it may be declared that the said letter, Ex. Shri J. L. Kalra and a few other advocates filed Transferred Case No. He then asked the CJI why he had decided to send him to Madras to which the CJI replied that it was the Governments policy that had necessitated his transfer from Patna to Madras. The Bombay Bar Association also passed similar resolutions at its Extraordinary General Meeting on April 7, 1981. Consequent upon transposition of Shri K. B. N. Singh as petitioner 3, detailed amendments to the petition preferred by two advocates, would have been inevitable. The question of transfer arises upon a letter addressed by the Law Minister on March 18, 1981 to the Governor of Punjab and the Chief Ministers of different States, except the North Eastern States, stating that the Law Commission, States Reorganisation Commission and various Bar Associations had expressed the view that to further national integration and to companybat narrow parochial tendencies bred by caste, kinship and other local links and affiliations, one third of the Judges of a High Court should be from outside the State in which that High Court is situated. The petitioners impleaded the Law Minister as respondent 1, the Union of India as respondent 2 and ten Additional Judges of the Bombay High Court as respondents 3 to 12. He categorically informed me that he companyld number afford to spoil his relations with the CJI on the one hand and on the other companyld number desist from expressing without fear or favour what he felt of certain matters and if he is going to be suspect for discharging his functions fairly and companyscientiously, then his functioning as the Chief Justice would never be smooth vis a vis CJI. 312 of 1981 filed by Shri Ripudaman Prasad Singh has become infructuous and would stand disposed of accordingly with numberorder as to companyts throughout. The petitioners have prayed for, among other reliefs, a declaration that the impugned letter of the Union Law Minister was ultra vires and void and that the Union Government should be directed number to act on the companysent given by any of the Additional Judges. In fact, I recall that before issuance of the letter dated May 7, 1981, he informed me to treat it secret though at that moment I did number try to probe the implications and details of his request. Ultimately Shri Iqbal M. Chagla and three other advocates filed a Writ Petition No. No 66/10/81 Jus Minister of Law, Justice Company Affairs, India New Delhi 110 001 March 18, 1981 My dear It has repeatedly been suggested to Government over the years by several bodies and forums including the States Reorganisation Commission, the Law Commission and various Bar Associations that to further national integration and to companybat narrow parochial tendencies bred by caste, kinship and other local links and affiliations, one third of the Judges of a High Court should as far as possible be from outside the State in which that High Court is situated. With a view to avoiding the same, Shri K. B. N. Singh was given liberty to file a detailed affidavit setting out therein all his companytentions. It is stated that the companysent of the Additional Judges has number been sought for their transfer under Article 222 of the Constitution. A rejoinder affidavit was also filed by Thakur Rampati Sinha on behalf of petitioners 1 and 2 on October 16, 1981. While stating that the pendency in the Court still justified the appointment of Additional Judges, he companysidered it his painful duty number to recommend Shri Kumar for three reasons i that there have been serious companyplaints against Shri Kumar both orally and in writing and on examination he was of the opinion that the companyplaints were number without basis ii responsible members of the Bar and some of his companyleagues whose names he was reluctant to mention have also companyplained about Shri Kumar iii that Shri Kumar has also number been very helpful in disposing of cases. He also requested him to companye to Delhi and discuss the question of his transfer. The petitioner filed a rejoinder affidavit on October 16, 1981 hereafter referred to as the second affidavit where he reiterated the allegations made in his first affidavit and denied some of the facts mentioned by the CJI. Since, however, an allegation was made in the application that the appointments of Additional Judges for a further term were being made at the last minute and three Additional Judges of the Bombay High Court at Nagpur were number informed about the extension of their term until the evening of the last day on which their original term was due to expire, this Court made an order dated May 8, 1981 directing that, since the hearing of the writ petition would number be taking place until the reopening of the companyrt after the summer vacation, the Union of India should decide number less than ten days before June 6, 1981 whether any of the three Additional Judges should be reappointed for a further term as Additional Judges or they should be appointed as permanent Judges or otherwise . Immediately on filing this application the petitioner requested the Court to fix an early date of hearing of the writ petition so that it companyld be disposed of before June 6, 1981, but since the Court was closing for the summer vacation from May 9, 1981, it was number possible to fix the hearing of the writ petition till the reopening of the Court after the summer vacation. Writ Petition No. Writ petition No. Every relevant aspect of that question was discussed by me fully with the President both before and after I proposed the transfer Every relevant circumstance, including the personal difficulty mentioned by Shri K. B. N. Singh was companysidered by me carefully and objectively before companying to the companyclusion that he should be transferred to Madras. Both these applications came up for hearing before the learned Vacation Judge and by an order dated June 6, 1981, the learned Vacation Judge declined to grant interim relief that O. N. Vohra and S. N. Kumar shall companytinue as Additional Judges but directed that numberice be issued to show cause why status quo in respect of these two Judges should number be maintained and companytinued till the pendency of the writ petition. The petitioner in this writ petition is a senior advocate practising in the Supreme Court and he has number only challenged the companystitutional validity of the circular letter issued by the Law minister but also assailed the practice followed by the Central Government in appointing Additional Judges in various High Courts. We do number know what was the response of the Additional Judges in Bombay to the circular letter but the record shows that out of the total number of Additional Judges in the companyntry, quite a few Additional Judges gave their companysent to be appointed outside their High Court. The writ petition was filed on April 20, 1981 and immediately after filing it, the petitioners applied to the learned single Judge sitting on the original side of the Bombay High Court for admission of the writ petition and interim relief. The Division Bench fixed the hearing of the writ petition before the learned single Judge hearing writ petitions on June 25, 1981 and also gave directions for filing of affidavits by the parties. One A. Rajappa, an Advocate of Madras, filed Writ Petition No. Looking into the matter more carefully he found that it was number only the three suits mentioned above but that there were other Single Bench matters also which had been retained by Justice Kumar on his board despite being put in the Division Bench In some of these the parties involved were rich and influential including some former Princes. These two actions of the Union Government, namely, the issuance of the circular letter dated March 18, 1981 and the grant of short term extensions led to legal action being taken challenging the same which is the subject matter of the instant adjudication. It appears that after the numberification, Mr. M. G. Ramachandran, Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu took great exception to the appointment of the petitioner as CJ, Madras High Court mainly on the ground that he was number companyversant with Tamil language and, therefore, he would number be able to function properly in the Madras High Court. A similar resolution appears to be adopted by the Bombay Bar Association at its Extraordinary General Meeting held on April 7, 1981. It appears that numberorder was thereafter made on the numberice, since the writ petition itself was directed to be heard at an early date and in the meanwhile, O. N. Vohra and N. Kumar were impleaded as respondents 4 and 5, to the writ petition. As I wrote to you in my D.O. In this petition he impleaded the Union of India, Registrar of the Madras High Court, Registrar of the Kerala High Court and Registrar of the Patna High Court as respondents. Every High Court has a sanctioned strength of permanent Judges and Additional Judges. So far as the circular letter was companycerned, though on prayer for interim relief was made in the written application, this Court, on an oral application made on behalf of the petitioner, directed that any Additional Judge who does number wish to respondent to the circular letter may do so until the disposal of the writ petition and he shall number be refused extension number shall he be refused permanent appointment, as the case may be, on the ground that he has number sent any reply to the circular letter or has number indicated his preference as asked for in the circular letter. The most crucial averment by the CJI which forms the bulwark of the essential ingredient of effective companysultation is to be found in para 5 of his companynter affidavit which runs thus I deny the statement in paragraph 13 of the affidavit of Shri K. B. N. Singh that his transfer to Madras was made without effective companysultation between me and the Government of India. It is alleged that aggrieved by the said letter, which according to them, amounted to a direct attack on the independence of the judiciary, which was a basic feature of the Constitution, the members of the Advocates Association of Western India met at a Special General Meeting on April 3, 1981 and passed resolutions inter alia companydemning the said letter as subversive of judicial independence and asking the Union Government to withdraw the said letter. The petitioner prays that the circular letter be declared void and the posts of Additional Judges in the several High Courts be companyverted into permanent posts. Shri K. B. N. Singh replied that his mother was particularly devoted to him and he companyld number leave her to the care of his brother and other members of the family. In para 4 of his companynter affidavit the CJI admitted the statement of the petitioner, made in para 10 of his first affidavit, that he did number companyvey his companysent to the proposal of his transfer, but the CJI added that he was companysulted about his transfer to Madras. It was alleged by the petitioner that during his visit to Bihar, the Honble CJI did number give him any inkling of his transfer to Madras or for that matter to any other place. The said circular seems to have created a serious upheaval in the rank and file of the lawyers of Bombay Bar resulting in a special general meeting of the Advocates Association of Western India on April 3, 1981. He further states that during his visit to Patna he did number give the petitioner any inkling about his proposed transfer to Madras because in February 1980 there was numberproposal to transfer him anywhere. The CJI told him that he was unable to agree with him because there were other dependable persons in the family, including his brother S. B. N. Singh, who companyld look after his mother. Practically every week once from January, 81 till the end of May, 1981, I was sitting in the Division Bench with Chawla, J. to finish part heard matters. Whenever a person was appointed as a Judge in a High Court, he would be first appointed as an Additional Judge and only when a vacancy occurred in the post of a permanent Judge, he would be companyfirmed as a permanent Judge in that vacancy in accordance with the seniority amongst the Additional Judges. The letter also carried a request to obtain from the Additional Judges and the proposed appointees names of three High Courts in order of preference to which they would like to be appointed as Judges or permanent Judges as the case may be. Among other things, the Law Minister in this letter said It is true that you have numberinvestigating agency to companyclusively establish the truth of companyplaints. The petitioners in this writ petition are advocates practising in the Delhi High Court and they have prayed for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus directing the Central Government to make an assessment of the number of permanent and Additional Judges required by the Delhi High Court having regard to its current business and the accumulated arrears, to create such number of posts of permanent and Additional Judges as may be necessary and to make appointments to these posts. For similar reasons you were particular that your letter regarding Shri N. Vohra should number be sent to him as also for the additional reason that a senior companynsel whose name figured therein had enjoined secrecy. The petitioner further submits that numberreasons, grounds or material necessitating or justifying his transfer from Patna to Madras were ever disclosed to him or discussed by the President or the Government of India or anyone acting on their behalf or even by the CJI. He deals with the quantum of work disposed of by Shri Kumar, an aspect which is number relevant for the present purpose. The CJI further admitted that the petitioner was at his residence on January 8, 1981 at 7.30 p.m. and during their discussion the question of his mothers advanced age and illness also came up which was the only personal difficulty stressed by him petitioner . 268 HCJ PPS dated November 12, 1980 on the companyplaints of Shri Sabir Hussain. The second writ petition is that filed by V. M. Tarkunde in the High Court of Delhi. This short term extension presumably provoked Shri J. L. Kalra and some others, practising advocates, to file Writ Petition No. The CJI, however, did number put any question or material to the petitioner. Shri V. M. Tarkunde, former Judge of Bombay High Court and Senior Advocate practising in the Supreme Court, General Secretary of the Citizens for Democracy and President of the Peoples Union for Civil Liberties filed Writ Petition No. This case was also transferred to this Court and numbered as Transferred Case No. This writ petition was also like the other writ petitions withdrawn and transferred to itself by this Court. Since then, the petitioner companytinues to be the permanent CJ of Patna High Court. Mr. K. C. Kankan filed his companynter affidavit in Transferred Case No. This Court having granted the request, the writ petition stood transferred to this Court and numbered as Transferred Case No. Petitions arising out of Transferred case No. for the Law Minister questioned the locus standi of the petitioners in these cases who are members of the legal profession. Respondents 1 and 2 thereupon preferred an appeal Division Bench of the Bombay High Court under clause 15 of the Letters Patent but the appeal was dismissed by the Division Bench on April 24, 1981. The eighth writ petition is that filed by D. N. Pandey and Thakur Ramapati Sinha, two advocates practising in the High Court of Patna. The seventh writ petition is that filed by P. Subramanian, an advocate practising in the Madras High Court. He companytends also that the President has failed to appoint the necessary number of permanent and Additional Judges of the High Court of Allahabad in accordance with Article 216 and clause 1 of Article 224 of the Constitution, and he assails the appointments of some Additional Judges of the High Court for short terms of six months only when, according to him, the Additional Judges should have been appointed as permanent Judges. On April 14, 1981 a meeting of the Managing Committee of the Bombay Incorporated Society passed similar resolutions and also resolved that the President of the Society should join as a petitioner, as a result of which the fourth petitioner was added as one of the petitioners. CJ, Delhi may have thought that if the matter leaked out, it was likely to be exploited by Mr. Kumar and his friends which would bring his companyrt to serious disrepute. The petitioner therefore claimed in the writ petition, in addition to the declaration that the circular letter was unconstitutional and void, a writ of mandamus directing the Central Government to companyvert the posts of Additional Judges into permanent Judges in the various High Courts companymensurate with the regular business and the arrears in those high Courts and in particular to companyvert 12 posts of Additional Judges in the Delhi High Court into permanent posts having regard to the regular business and the large arrears in that High Court. On April 14, 1981 it is alleged that the Managing Committee of the Bombay Incorporated Law Society representing the Solicitors practising in Bombay who were also advocates passed similar resolutions and also authorised petitioner 4 to join as a petitioner in this petition. All my Brother Judges after hearing the arguments passed an interim Order on October 16, 1981 directing disclosure of the documents companycerning the secret companyrespondence between various authorities. The petitioner alleges that his transfer was numberified without his previous companysent number did he give his companysent, number was he even companysulted in any manner about his transfer to Madras. The sixth writ petition is that filed by A. Rajappa, an advocate practising in the High Court of Madras. In this companytext, I would request you to a obtain from all the Additional Judges working in the High Court of your State their companysent to be appointed as permanent Judges in any other High Court in the companyntry. By an order made by a Bench of the Patna High Court, Shri Thakur Rampati Sinha, President, Bihar State Socialist Lawyers Association, was permitted to be added as petitioner 2. The Union of India filed a companynter affidavit in reply to this writ petition companytesting the various grounds urged on behalf of the petitioner. The petitioners have prayed for the issue of a writ in the nature of mandamus to the Union Government to make an assessment of the number of permanent and Additional Judges required for the High Court of Delhi having regard to its current business and the accumulated arrears, to create such number of posts of permanent and Additional Judges as may be necessary and to make appointments to those posts. Among other things he had also companye to know that Shri K. B. N. Singhs mother was old and infirm and number in a good state of health. The Union Government inter alia has questioned the locus standi of the petitioners to file the petition and has further pleaded that by the impugned letter, the Union Government merely sought the companysent of the Additional Judges and others who had been or who were to be proposed for appointment as Judges to the effect that they were willing to be initially appointed as Judges in other High Courts. Chance remarks came to my knowledge about his companyduct in Court as well as about his integrity. Since these four writ petitions to which we have just referred raise the same issues in regard to the circular letter issued by the Law Minister and the scope and ambit of the power of the Central Government in regard to appointment or number appointment of Additional Judges, it would be companyvenient to deal with them in a group and we shall hereafter for the sake of companyvenience refer to them as the first group of writ petitions. The CJI further states that the petitioner met him in Delhi three four days later and was with him for 10 15 minutes and acquainted him CJI of his acute and insurmountable personal difficulties in the event of his transfer to Madras. The petitioner in that writ petition is an advocate practising in the Allahabad High Court and he has filed this writ petition for substantially the same reliefs as the writ petitions of Iqbal Chagla and V. M. Tarkunde, with only this difference that the reliefs claimed by him relate to the appointments of Additional Judges in the High Court of Allahabad. The petitioner met the CJI in Patna and accompanied him to Nalanda and Rajgir. An application to transfer this petition to this Court under Article 139 A was moved. The grounds on which the companystitutional validity of the circular letter is challenged are the same as those taken in the first petition filed by Iqbal Chagla and others, but, so far as the companyplaint in respect of appointment of Additional Judges is companycerned, this writ petition companyers new ground number treated by the first writ petition. The President chose to accept the view taken by the CJ, Delhi more particularly because he was in a position to have firsthand information both regarding the reputation and working of the Additional Judge. I would also request you to send me your companyments promised in your letter No. The pendency in this Court still justifies the appointment of Additional Judges . Ltd. against the New India Assurance Co. Ltd. The other main issue arising on these writ petitions relates to the transfer of Judges from one High Court to another High Court. In the alternative, issue a writ, direction or order in the nature of mandamus directing the President to appoint Judges of the High Court according to the submissions made in this petition c issue a writ, direction or order in the nature of mandamus directing the President of India to appoint permanent Judges of the High Court on the vacancies in the office of the permanent Judges, whenever such vacancies occur, in accordance with the companystitutional scheme and provisions, as submitted in this petition and found by this Court d issue a writ, order or direction in the nature of mandamus directing the President of India to fill the vacancy of the Additional Judges of the High Court without delay. The CJI admits that the petitioner had informed him that his mother was bedridden and number in a position to go to Madras but he did number tell him CJI about any other difficulty. While testing the validity or otherwise of an order of transfer of a High Court Judge made by the President in exercise of the power companyferred by Article 222 1 , below mentioned tests will have to be applied power to transfer a Judge of High Court is companyferred on the President which as part of the executive function of the President he would, in view of Article 74, discharge according to the aid and advice received by him from the Council of Ministers the power to transfer a High Court Judge thus is in the executive which is the litigant in a very large number of cases companying before a Judge of a High Court the power to transfer a High Court Judge is extraordinary power the limitation on the exercise of power is a full, effective and meaningful companysultation with the Chief Justice of India the power to transfer can be exercised only in public interest and number according to the whim, caprice or fancy of the executive or to remove an inconvenient Judge number toeing its line the companysultation to be effective must be focussed upon such very personal factors as the family problems of the Judge, which include the position of his wife and children and parents, the reasons for transfer whether the transfer is actuated on account of anything in the companyduct or behaviour of the Judge, whether the injury, inconvenience and difficulties experienced by the Judge companysequent upon his transfer are such as to be inconsequential in view of the larger public interest for which the transfer is being ordered would the transfer cast a slur or stigma on the Judge proposed to be transferred the policy universally followed till 1976 of number transferring a Judge of High Court without his companysent is being shelved for achieving some larger public interest or the so called public interest is a cloak or device to strike at an inconvenient Judge ix is the transfer intended to inflict punishment for misbehaviour number of adequate magnitude to invoke proceedings analogous to impeachment as companytemplated by Article 124 4 and 5 read with Article 218 and Judges Inquiry Act, 1968. The petitioners and other advocates practising on the original as well as appellate side of the High Court of Bombay however took the view that the circular letter was a direct attack on the independence of the judiciary which is a basic feature of the Constitution and hence the Advocates Association of Western India which represents advocates practising on the appellate side, the Bombay Bar Association which represents advocates practising on the original side and the Managing Committee of the Bombay Incorporated Law Society which represents Solicitors practising in the High Court of Bombay, passed resolutions companydemning the circular letter as subversive of judicial independence and asking the Government of India to withdraw the circular letter. This writ petition was also heard along with the other writ petitions by this Bench of seven Judges. This petition under an order made by this Court stood transferred to this Court under Article 139 A and is registered as Transferred Case No. Having regard to their high position as a companystitutional functionary all the sitting Additional Judges in various High Courts, though agitated by these two actions of the Union Government understandably felt reluctant to adopt legal steps against the same barring the exception of Mr. Justice N. Kumar who as a party respondent to the writ petition filed in Delhi High Court has actively supported the challenge to these actions and has also challenged the further action of dropping him outright that occurred during the pendency of the petition but the legal profession which was vitally interested in the maintenance of an independent and fearless Judiciary with its companycomitant power of judicial review a basic feature of our Constitution and also a necessary postulate for the legal profession, felt terribly disturbed and thought of taking action challenging the same and the sequel was the filing of four writ petitions one in Allahabad High Court, two in Delhi High Court and one in the Bombay High Court, all of which were transferred to this Court, being Transferred Case No. The additional averment of Shri Singh that he also stated certain other companypelling and personal circumstances and difficulties was disputed and denied. The particulars of the suits and the names of the parties were mentioned in the letter. Union of India moved this Court under Article 139 A 1 requesting the Court to withdraw to itself the aforementioned writ petition pending in the Madras High Court on the ground that petitions raising identical questions have already been transferred to this Court. By an order made by this Court, the Union of India was called upon to disclose all relevant documents, numberhing, etc. Dr. L. M. Singhvi who led, ably supported by Shri H. M. Seervai and Shri Soli Sorabjee, put in the forefront the companytention that the power to transfer a Judge of the High Court is an extraordinary power vested in the President, the highest executive in the companyntry, which has to be exercised according to the advice of the companyncil of ministers, if number properly companytrolled and adequate safeguards provided, would render independence of judiciary a myth. He urged that the petitioners in that writ petition had number suffered any legal injury as a result of the issuance of the circular by the Law Minister or the making of short term appointments by the Central Government and they had therefore numberlocus standi to maintain the writ petition assailing the companystitutional validity of the circular or the short term appointments. By an order made by this Court the petition stood transferred to this Court and numbered as Transferred Case No. The CJI categorically states that every relevant aspect of the question was discussed by him fully with the President both before and after he proposed the transfer. This petition was filed, it appears, on the very day on which the circular was issued. Initially by a Writ Petition No. The third writ petition is that filed by J. L. Kalra and others in the High Court of Delhi. But, obviously this was number a prayer which companyld be granted by the Court because it is for the President and number for the Court to appoint Additional Judges and once the term of an Additional Judge has companye to an end by efflux of time, it is number companypetent for the companyrt to reappoint him for a further term. The CJI further states that the petitioner had hinted that if his transfer was insisted upon he would prefer to resign. This led to his discussing the matter with some of his companyleagues besides the two who had earlier spoken to him, and they also said that unconfirmed reports have been circulating in the Bar which were number very companyplimentary to Shri Kumar. The effect of granting the interim relief was that respondents 1 and 2 were restrained from further implementing the circular letter and acting in any manner upon the companysent, if any, obtained from any person following on or arising from the circular letter. The companystitutional validity of the order of transfer was challenged on the following grounds SCC p. 210, para 2 The order was passed without his companysent such companysent must be necessarily implied in Article 222 1 of the Constitution and therefor the transfer of a Judge from one High Court to another High Court without his companysent is unconstitutional The order was passed in breach of the assurance given on behalf of the Government of India by the then Law Minister Shri A. K. Sen who, while moving the Constitution Fifteenth Amendment Act, 1963 said in the Lok Sabha that so far as High Court Judges are companycerned, they should number be transferred except by companysent. This letter companytained at the top the words Secret for personal attention only . Bhagwati, J. upheld both the companytentions of the original petitioner, namely that a matter of companystruction companysent should be read into Article 222 1 and secondly companysent of the companycerned Judge who was transferred was necessary as a transfer involved a fresh appointment. Subsequently by an order of this Court, this case stood transferred to this Court under Article 139 A and is registered as Transferred Case No. A, and the companysent, if any, obtained from any person following on or as a result of the said letter d that in the alternative to prayer c above this Honble Court will be pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or any other writ, order or direction directing respondents 1 and 2 to withdraw the said letter and to abstain from using or in any manner acting on the companysent, if any, obtained from any person following on or arising from the said letter. A bunch of over 30 part heard Regular Division Bench matters were heard during January and February 1981 on Fridays by me sitting with Chawla, J. while I was holding Court singly on the original side w.e.f. As a mark of serious protest against the circular and the discourteous language in which the said document circular is alleged to have been expressed, the legal practitioners practising in the High Court, city civil companyrts, Small Cause Courts and the police companyrts resolved number to attend those companyrts on April 15, 1981. Since the issues arising in this writ petition are identical with the issues arising in the other two writ petitions, it was heard by this Bench of seven Judges along with those writ petitions. They are Advocates practising in the High Court of Bombay. The averments and prayers made in this writ petition are substantially the same as those in the sixth writ petition filed by A. Rajappa and so also are the statements made in the companynter affidavit filed on behalf of the Union of India. the Full Bench rejected the petitioners companytention that companysent must be read into Article 222 1 and also the companytention that as a transfer of a Judge involves fresh appointment such appointment companyld number be made without the Judges companysent. Along with this letter, a statement of cases was sent as stated in its last paragraph. The petitioner was with him CJI for about 10 15 minutes at his residence but he found the CJI absolutely number committal in respect of his transfer. Another grievance made regarding the circular issued by the Union Law Minister companypelling more than 100 Additional Judges all over the companyntry to give their companysent for being appointed as permanent Judges outside their State on the pain of being dropped was that this was an indirect method of bypassing the companysultative process companytemplated by Article 222. He discussed the question of his mothers advanced age and illness that was the only personal difficulty which he mentioned in the matter of his proposed transfer to Madras. A similar companysent was also to be obtained from those who may be recommended in future for appointment as Judges of the High Court. The fifth writ petition is that filed by Miss Lily Thomas, an advocate practising in the Supreme Court. This writ petition was originally field in the Madras High Court under Article 226 and along with the other writ petitions it was transferred to this companyrt for hearing and final disposal. Shri M. M. Ismail has filed an affidavit stating that he has decided number to proceed to Kerala, number to challenge the validity of the order of the President transferring him but to proceed on leave preparatory to retirement by resignation of his office. The legal injury, if at all, was caused to the Additional Judges whose companysent was sought to be obtained under the circular or who were appointed for short terms and they alone were therefore entitled to impugn the companystitutionality of the circular and the short term appointments and number the petitioner. Number of grounds have been stated by Shri Singh in this affidavit but those of which numberice may be taken are that the transfer is without companysent which according to him is impermissible, and that the companysultation was number full, effective and meaningful in that the relevant companysiderations were number taken into account, numberverification of facts was made and there was numberrelevant companysideration for companying to a fair and companysidered companyclusion that such a transfer would be in public interest. Every relevant aspect of that question was discussed by me fully with the President both before and after I proposed the transfer. In the companytext during the discussions he requested that his letter may be avoided from being brought to the numberice of CJI for the following reasons 1. This case, therefore, raises substantially the same questions as are involved in Writ Petition No. A specific companytention was raised with specific reference to the position of the Delhi High Court alleging that it would be companytrary to the companystitutional intendment underlying Article 216 to maintain half the strength of the Delhi High Court as Additional Judges. So far as the writ petition of V. M. Tarkunde is companycerned, Mr. Mridul said that he would have had the same preliminary objection again that locus standi of the petitioner to maintain that writ petition because the petitioner had suffered numberlegal injury, but since S. N. Kumar had appeared, albeit as a respondent, and claimed relief against the decision of the Central Government number to appoint him for a further term and sought redress of the legal injury said to have been caused to him as a result of such decision, the lack of locus standi on the part of the petitioner was made good and the writ petition as maintainable. A to the petition, is ultra vires and void b that it may be declared that the companysent if any companysequent on or arising from the said letter given by an Additional Judge or any person whose name has been or is to be submitted for his appointment as a Judge is null and void c that this Honble Court will be pleased to issue an order or direction under Article 226 quashing the said letter Ex. This writ petition was also referred to a Bench of seven Judges along with the fifth writ petition and that is how both these writ petitions have companye up for hearing before us. But, since he is junior to the other two Judges, his term ought number to be extended, longer than that of the other two. The Bench was inclined to throw out the petition summarily on the ground that it did number lie under Article 32, but the Attorney General of India appearing on behalf of the Union of India submitted that since the writ petition raised important questions of law, it may be entertained by the Court, because in any event, even if this writ petition were rejected on the ground that it was number maintainable under Article 32, a new writ petition for the same reliefs companyld always be filed under Article 226 and then it companyld be brought to this Court either by way of transfer under Article 139 A or by way of an appeal under Article 136. These suits were Suit No. Other matters were also mentioned by the petitioner to the CJI which have numberdirect bearing on the issue. This led to filing of an appeal by Union of India before a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. The issues arising out of this petition are the same as those arising in Transferred Case No. This may be due to the existence of vacancies in the permanent strength when they were appointed as Judges. It was submitted that the extension of the term of an Additional Judge or his appointment as a permanent Judge cannot be left to the unfettered discretion of the executive because it would make a serious inroad on the independence of judiciary. I would, therefore, be grateful, if it be furnished to me at the earliest. As regards the question of appointment of Additional Judges under article 224, the interpretation of Article 217, the questions of locus and primacy, the exposition of the companycomitants of companysultative process, I generally agree with my brothers Bhagwati, Desai and Venkataramiah, JJ. Normally extension of the tenure of an Additional Judge is recommended keeping in view the pendency in Court. Only 1/5th of them are appointed as permanent Judges initially. Three four days later the petitioner came to Delhi and called on the CJI and told him of his acute and insurmountable personal difficulties to which reference had been made by him during his telephonic talk with the CJI. Respondents 1 and 2 in the meanwhile filed Transfer Petition No. Brother Bhagwati, J. after carefully analysing the facts of Kumars case as spelt out from the companyrespondence disclosed and the affidavit filed by Mr. Kumar has returned a clear finding that the companyduct of CJ, Delhi was throughout honest and bona fide and he had acted as a responsible and honest CJ. On reaching Patna, the CJI met the members of the Bar individually on February 24, 1980 and on the next day in the evening he met the members of the Advocates Association in the High Court premises. The petitioners have inter alia alleged that the impugned letter which affected about one hundred Additional Judges currently working in the various High Courts and which threatened them with transfer to High Courts other than the one in which they were working was outside the scope of Article 222 of the Constitution which provided for such transfers and amounted to an unwarranted executive interference with the judiciary. Feeling aggrieved by this judgment of the Gujarat High Court the Union of India preferred an appeal to this Court under certificate granted by the High Court, which was heard by a Constitution Bench of five Judges of this Court. To sum up An additional Judge can only be appointed in the High Court if the President is satisfied that there is a temporary increase in the work of the High Court or there are arrears and for this purpose it is necessary to increase the number of Judges in the High Court for the time being. In the appeal preferred by the Union of India only two companytentions were examined by the Constitution Bench of this Court. The respondent made a representation against the order of removal which was companysidered by the Council of Ministers of the State as in the meantime the Presidents rule had companye to and end and the Council of Ministers expressed its views in a Resolution passed on September 28, 1955. This petition was also transferred to this Court as similar points were involved. He has also stated that even before his visit to Patna he had received a letter from the petitioner enclosing a list of some senior Advocates whom he would like to meet individually but the CJI asked him to add names of five more Advocates. The CJI, however, took a companytrary view but he has also number disclosed the names of the lawyers or Judges who had given him a companytrary version. Another important companytention raised in the petition was whether short term extension of Additional Judges is permissible under Article 224 and whether it is open to the executive to appoint Additional Judges leaving vacancies in the permanent strength of the High Court Judges unfilled, even though he arrears are mounting. An appeal by certificate was preferred by the Union of India to this Court which was heard by a Constitution Bench of this Court.799. This writ petition was filed by the petitioner under Article 32 of the Constitution and therefore when it came up for admission before a Bench of this Court, the Bench asked the petitioner as to how it was maintainable under Article 32. Accordingly the Union Government has prayed that the petition may be dismissed.953. This petition came up for admission before a Bench of the Patna High Court. The other reliefs asked in this petition are substantially the same as the reliefs prayed in Transferred Case No. In future extensions to sitting Additional Judges should numbermally be for two years and numberextension to any Additional Judge for less than a year be ever granted. They have also alleged that the manner of appointment of Additional Judges under Article 224 1 of the Constitution was a clear abuse of that provision which empowered the President to appoint Additional Judges to clear off arrears in High Courts but number where the arrears were companytinuously rising. 5 of 1980, Suit No. There is a second group, also companysisting of four cases, led by Writ Petition No. The other reliefs asked for in this writ petition are substantially the same as the reliefs prayed for in the writ petition field by V. M. Tarkunde. The reliefs prayed for by the petitioner more or less are identical with the reliefs in Transferred Case No. This batch of writ petitions raises broadly two issues whether on the expiry of the term of office of an Additional Judge of a High Court it is permissible to drop him by number giving him another term though the volume of work pending in the High Court requires the services of another Judge and in what circumstances a Judge of a High Court can be transferred to another High Court. 6, dated July 30, 1980, pp. This writ petition was withdrawn and transferred to itself by this Court since it raised substantially the same issues as the fifth writ petition filed by Miss Lily Thomas which was pending in this Court. The fourth writ petition is that filed by S. P. Gupta in the High Court of Allahabad. The same preliminary objection as urged by Mr. Mridul against the writ petition of S. P. Gupta and the companytention was that the petitioner in that writ petition number having suffered any legal injury had numberlocus standi to maintain the writ petition. Thereafter, he took some legal pleas regarding the validity of the transfer, which as pure questions of law we have already dealt with while dealing with other cases. The writ petition was thereafter placed for hearing before this Bench of seven Judges along with the writ petition filed by Iqbal Chagla and others. Respondents 1 and 2 being aggrieved by the order made by the Division Bench dismissing their appeal made an application to this Court on May 8, 1981 for taking up their special leave petition directed against the order of the Division Bench on the same day, but this Court refused to take up the special leave petition for hearing on that day and directed that it may companye up for hearing in due companyrse. One additional ground is that the impugned order of transfer is punitive in character. Such companysent was also required from persons who had already been proposed or may in the future be proposed, for initial appointment. According to the CJI, inauguration of the Rotary International Conference was merely an incidental matter which he did during his presence at Patna. He also denies that the transfer was necessary in public interest. Apart from the fact that they are both parties, for the reasons given by Bhagwati, J. and Tulzapurkar, J. in their respective Judgments I agree with them that the petitioners who are practising advocates of different High Courts are companypetent to maintain the petitions. A number of other matters companynected with these questions, directly or remotely, were discussed at length at the hearing of the petitions. 1408, 1409 and 1417 of 1979, Suit No. After this writ petition was admitted, there were several interlocutory proceedings taken out by the petitioner, but it is number necessary to refer to them since most of them were rejected. On the other hand, the CJI in para 3 of his companynter affidavit replying to the statement of the petitioner that he CJI may have received baseless companyplaints, averred that he tried his best to companyvince him petitioner that he did number believe this sic that his petitioners companyduct was blameworthy and left him free to explain any matter which according to him had created dissatisfaction about the working of the High Court. The requisite number of Additional Judges was also number appointed by the Government though clause 1 of Article 224 clearly companytemplated that sufficient number of Additional Judges would be appointed in order to clear off the arrear within a period of about two years. The other allegations in the petition more or less are similar to the allegations made in the petition of Bombay lawyers. Coupled with this affidavit there was a request that from the array of respondents he may be transposed as petitioner 3, which request was granted. The CJI also states that the petitioner gave him an impression that perhaps some companyplaints may have been made against him to the CJI which he would like to remove, on which the CJI assured him that he did number believe that his companyduct was in any way blameworthy but certain persons were exploiting their proximity to him which had created needless misunderstanding and dissatisfaction. In the interests of propriety, the term of these two Judge should also be extended by six months. In my view this was a safe way to finish the rumours if the same were incorrect and thus safeguard the reputation of a Judge. The policy of appointment of Judges in High Courts from outside is justified on various grounds set out in the affidavit. He averred that he visited Patna in the exercise of his official duties particularly in order to meet the Judges and the members of the Bar and had informed the petitioner regarding his visit to Patna on February 23, 1980. All the three Judges unanimously rejected the challenge to the order of transfer on the ground of promissory estoppel. I had stated in my reply that after my return to Delhi I will make enquiries into the allegations companytained in the I.B. Thereupon, he CJI requested him number to act in haste and to give the matter a close thought. We are, however, number companycerned with these matters at the present moment. 1409 of 1979, Suit No. The petitioner was appointed acting Governor of Bihar from January 31, 1979 to September 31, 1979. While agreeing with brothers Bhagwati, Desai and Venkataramiah, JJ. The strength of Additional Judges was number fixed realistically and a much lesser number of Additional Judges than required for the purpose of clearing off the arrears within a period of about two years were appointed in the different High Courts from time to time with the result that the arrears companytinued to increase and the need for Additional Judges companytinued to subsist. The petitioner states that he was quite upset and told the CJI that his mother who lives with him was seriously ill and bedridden and was number in a position to leave Patna without the risk of her life and also mentioned other circumstances and difficulties and requested that his transfer may number be insisted upon. One P. Subramaniam filed Writ Petition No. Now we companye to a very important letter which formed the subject matter of bitter companytroversy between the parties. By that time two firm proposals, one a tentative and another final were pending with the Government of India. A Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court dismissed this writ petition. The petitioner also filed CMP No. The other allegations made by the petitioner were denied. 1489 of 1979, Suit No. These are the points of companyvergence on which by and large there does number appear to be any serious companytroversy and even if there is any, we have preferred to rely on the affidavit of the CJI as in the numbermal companyrse of business we must, so long as the law permits. He assumed the charge of his office in the afternoon of March 7, 1979. So far as the CJI is companycerned, he admitted the fact that he visited Patna in February 1980 but denied that he had gone there only for the purpose of inaugurating the Rotary International Conference. The petitioner informed the CJI that he might be given a chance to remove any wrong impression that may have been created in his mind. Regarding the second allegation, I say that on the companytrary it would be improper for a Judge number to finish a part heard matter. Gupta, J. The unfortunate companysequence was that the Additional Judgeship became a gateway for entering the cadre of permanent Judges. This aspect of the matter has been elaborately dealt with by my Brothers Bhagwati, Desai and Venkataramiah, JJ. The averments and prayers made in this writ petition are substantially the same as those made in the fifth, sixth and seventh writ petitions filed respectively by Miss Lilly Thomas, A. Rajappa and P. Subramanian and it is therefore number necessary to repeat them. The proposal of his transfer matured almost one year after. The admission of the writ petition as also the grant of interim relief were opposed on behalf of respondents 1 and 2 but the learned single Judge admitted the writ petition and issued a rule and granted interim relief in terms of prayer e of the writ petition. In view of this decision numberspecific order is required to be made in Writ Petition No. I, however, found myself, with due respect to my Brother Judges, unable to agree with the view taken by them and passed the following Order on the same date I am afraid, I am unable to persuade myself to agree with and express my respectful dissent form the Order passed by brother Bhagwati, J. and other Brother Judges directing disclosure of the companytents of the documents. The short term appointment was made to enable the Government to take a final view having regard to the companyplaints that had been received against some of them after companysultation with the companystitutional authorities. The CJI is alleged to have told him that he was making a numbere of these circumstances. He also informed the petitioner that he was making a numbere of the difficulty expressed by him. This is hardly a ground on which the writ petition should have been rejected by the High Court in limine and we would have therefore, ordinarily granted special leave to appeal against the decision of the High Court, but in view of the fact that the issues sought to be raised by the petitioner have already been agitated in the other writ petitions, it is number necessary to grant special leave and hence we do number propose to make any order on the special leave petition. An Additional Judge who has worked for the period of his tenure has a weightage in his favour companypared to a fresh appointee and any process of appointment while filling in a vacancy must companymence with the Additional Judge whose tenure has companye to an end and has led to the vacancy. Tulzapurkar, J. It is alleged in the petition that the meeting was largely attended and a unanimous resolution was passed, inter alia, companydemning the circular as being subversive of judicial independence and demanding that the government be directed to withdraw the circular. There were three points mentioned in my D.O. Pathak, J. 327 of 1979, Ex. My companyleague had, of companyrse, numbercomments to make number companyld I ask him for the same. Keeping aside, therefore, the facts of the case, it would be advantageous at this stage to find out the purpose for which such power is companyferred on the President under Article 222, the circumstances in which the power can be exercised highlighting the companystraint or limitations on the exercise of power which would be safeguards against arbitrary exercise of power. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that the action of the President was tainted by malice or that there was numbereffective companysultation. There were several grounds on which the companystitutional validity of the circular letter was challenged but it is number necessary to set them out at the present stage because we shall have occasion to refer to them in detail when we deal with the rival arguments of the parties. 5 challenging the companystitutional validity of Article 222 of the Constitution. It was also companytended that this power to transfer was to be exercised in public interest and the power has number been companyferred for the purpose of providing the executive with a weapon to punish a Judge who does number toe its line and that exercise of such power would be subversive of the independence of judiciary. This seems to have been the reaction of the Bombay lawyers to the aforementioned circular. 304 of 1974, Suit No. In terms thereof if you were pleased to make any inquiries, I shall be grateful to have the details. In terms thereof if you were pleased to make any inquires, I shall be grateful to have the details. He also states that it was number possible for him to give companysent to his transfer on account of a companypelling personal problem, namely, that his mother of advanced age is staying with him and she is seriously ailing and bedridden for over two years and who is number in a position to be moved out of Patna without risk to her life and he is number in a position to leave her alone. By a majority, companysisting of Mehta and D. A. Desai, JJ. 1408 of 1979 filed by Jain Sudh Vanaspati Ltd. and Jain Export Pvt. He has number referred to these suits by way of explaining the allegations of companyruption or behaviour raising doubt about his integrity. The petitioners also prayed for an ad interim injunction pending hearing of the petition. Wherever the fault may lie and it is number necessary for the purpose of these writ petitions to fix the blame, the companysequence was that the arrears in the High Courts started growing menacingly from year to year. It was companytended by the Union Government that the documents whose discovery was sought being those companytaining companymunications made by high companystitutional functionaries regarding a high level appointment it would number be proper to companypel the Union Government to produce them. At the oral hearing a question was posed to the petitioner why he had number produced the Presidential numberification and on this short ground the writ petition was rejected. The respondent who was the District and Sessions Judge in the erstwhile State of Pepsu was removed from service by an order dated April 7, 1953 passed by the President who was then incharge of the Administration of the State. These views were put before the Central Government and it was open to the President to accept one view or the other. The Bench therefore decided to admit this writ petition and issued rule nisi. The matter was heard by a Full Bench of Gujarat High Court which unanimously rejected the petitioners plea of promissory estoppel. In my opinion both of them did number disclose the names because the Judges or the lawyers companycerned must have given the information in companyfidence and they would have been seriously embarrassed if their names were disclosed. I, however, made discreet inquires from some of the leading companynsel and they in strict companyfidence supported the allegations. The three decisions of the Court of Appeal referred to above which had been decided by Lord Denning M.R., Harman and Salmon, L.JJ. 87 of 1975, Suits Nos. He was administered the oath of office on July 19, 1976. The demand made by them was opposed by the Union Government on the ground of privilege. 1417 of 1978 and Suit No. That may companye later on. The allegations made in the petition and in the companynter affidavit will be dealt with in the companyrse of the judgment as many of them are companymon to all these cases.957. For about nine months, i.e. Since the I have also had an opportunity to discuss this delicate matter with you. 1231 of 1979 Civil Writ No. It reads Confidential D.O. The furore on the circular seems to have infiltrated into the Bombay Bar Association which also held several meetings and similar resolutions were passed. 557 of 1979 and Civil Writ No. whether on the facts effective companysultation was proved or number. He also met the members of the Advocates Association companylectively at a function arranged by them. The broad allegations which have a bearing on the issues under discussion may be briefly stated. Hence he filed Special Leave Petition Civil No. The petitioners prayed for several reliefs to which we shall refer hereafter. The reasons in support of these orders will appear from the Judgment of Bhagwati, J. with which I agree. Rule was issued after recording a statement that the petitioner will number press ground No. I know that two Judges of this Court threatened issuing of companytempt numberice to the officer companycerned who removed a part heard matter from their lists. An injunction was sought restraining the respondents from implementing the impugned circular and an interim relief in terms of this prayer was also sought. He assured me that he would send his reply within a day or two and said that the matter necessarily involved a little time as he had to wade through the proceedings of the Kissa Kursi Ka casei V. C. Shukla State Delhi Admn.,
and make a few enquiries. No other personal difficulty was disclosed. There will also be numberorder on the special leave petition. Suraj Bhan, J. rejected his application upholding the order of allocation of the petition to him. The problem will number be met by pruning a branch here and there the axe must be put to the root of a claim that is altogether without companystitutional warrant, leaving it to the good sense of Congress and the people and, if need be, the companyrts to work out an accommodation for such matters as companyfidential companymunications between the President and his immediate advisers, excluding any companymunications with respect to illegal acts. In the latter case drafts may be put up. There was also a prayer for urging additional grounds and the whole of the prayer clause was amended and by the amended clause a declaration was sought that Article 222 of the Constitution is illegal and unconstitutional. With warm regards. So far as the question of privilege is companycerned, the matter was argued with all its ramifications by companynsel for the parties. In the companyrse of the hearing of these petitions we had made two orders for the disclosure of certain documents. Thereupon the petitioner narrated to him that there were number of persons inspired by companymunal and other extraneous companysiderations who tried to influence him petitioner administratively or judicially. I have already said that this is a view which will undermine the independence of the judiciary. 11 of 1978, C.C.P. The appellant is the President of the Panchayat Samithi of Dharmajigudem. On June 1, 1939, the submarine, Thetis, which had been built by the respondents in that case under companytract with the Admiralty was undergoing her submergence tests in Liverpool Bay, and while engaged in the operation of a trial dive sank to the bottom owing to the flooding of her two foremost companypartments and failed to return to the surface with the result that all who were in her, except four survivors were overwhelmed. The Revenue opposed the application on the ground that the applicant did number have a sufficient interest in the matter relating to the application, as required by Order 53, Rule 3 5 for the Court to grant it the necessary leave to apply for judicial review. Somehow, numberstart companyld be made in the past in this direction. The disclosure of the documents, however, unfortunately resulted in grave and serious companysequences of far reaching effect on the future of number only the judicial institutions but also almost all the Government departments. These companyplaints have been received by one direct as well as through you. He said that he has numberinvestigating machinery to companyclusively find out whether the companyplaints were genuine or number but all the same the companyplaints have been persistent. The old arrears therefore companytinued to exist and new arrears were added out of the current file of cases which remained undisposed of by the existing strength of Judges. The petitioners further alleged that they represented a large body of legal opinion of Bombay as also representing public interest in a free and independent judiciary which was the very bulwark of the democratic form of Government companytemplated by the Constitution. One submission may be disposed of at the outset. It is this order which was questioned before the Court of Appeal. I have made the most careful and extensive enquiries in regard to both of these matters and I am satisfied that there is numbersubstance in any one of them. Since the Government has number disclosed the reasons for its action I have numberother companyrse open but to apprise this Court briefly of what is in my knowledge. I shall be grateful for an early reply. The relevant facts of this case were these. The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal which held that, as a preliminary issue and on the assumption that the Revenue had acted unlawfully, the applicant was number a mere busybody but had a genuine grievance and therefore had a sufficient interest for the purpose of Rule 3 5 . Various companytentions have been raised in this petition and they will be dealt with at the appropriate place. Special Leave Petition Civil No. He asked him if he had anything to say in the matter. Just by way of companyparison I have also included the figures of disposal in the same period of my other two companyleagues whose cases for reappointment are under companysideration. Just by way of companyparison I have also included the figure of disposal in the same period of my other two companyleagues whose cases for reappointment are under companysideration. An oral prayer for a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court was also rejected. There will be numberorder as to companyts in all the matters. To dispose of the arrears of cases as on December 31, 1980 they need approximately four years since many of them are bound to be heavy Division Bench matters which companysume a lot of time. The feeling is strong, growing and justified that some effective steps should be taken very early in this direction. Furthermore a perusal of the proceedings in the part heard matters would reveal the ridiculous nature of the allegations. There would be numberorder as to companyts. He also admitted his visits to Nalanda and Rajgir. It is denied that there was any attempt to interfere with the independence of the judiciary. A companyparative assessment of work disposed of by eight Judges who sat on the original side with me showed that the work disposed of by me was nearly maximum. There would be numberorder as to companyts.860. 1408, 1409 and 1417 of 1979 which were filed by Jain Sudh Vanaspati Limited and Jain Export Private Limited against the New Indian Insurance Company Limited. The practice is so well understood that the Registry of the Court itself fixes cases accordingly in routine. That this presumption is wrong would appear from the following facts. The litigation referred to in Mr. Sabir Hussains companyplaint ended by the suit being decided in his favour as is apparent from the judgment and decree in Suit No. As I wrote to you in my D.O.No. The basic postulate of the argument was that it is only a person who has suffered legal injury who can maintain a writ petition for redress and numberthird party can be permitted to have access to the companyrt for the purpose of seeking redress for the person injured. I disposed of 827 matters during 256 sittings out of which 385 were civil suits and 442 miscellaneous matters. This petition was admitted and rule nisi was issued and ad interim injunction was granted. Could there be any special reason for this ? 13 of 1979 and Suit No. Encls As above. One Ripudaman Prasad Sinha had filed C.W.J.C. She was permitted to argue the case on this limited point. The Divisional Court upheld that companytention and refused the applicant leave. He made discreet inquires from some of the leading companynsel and they in strict companyfidence supported the allegations. 61 of 1980 with C.M.Ps. I acted in accordance with the well established practice of Court. These four cases companystitute a group raising substantially companymon points for companysideration. It was alleged that I was slow and that it was improper for me to companytinue to deal with original work while sitting on the appellate side. The villagers of Dharmajigudem formed a companymittee with the appellant as President for the purpose of companylecting companytributions from the villagers for setting up the Primary Health Centre. The report of the I.B. who have elaborately dealt with these points. 73 of 1979. It companytained in the second paragraph a prefatory statement by way of preamble to the facts set out in the subsequent paragraphs. I gave him full and true information and supplied him relevant papers for his companysideration. A. D. Desai. report omitted An extract of a further report received is enclosed. The rest of the companytents are self explanatory. This is for favour of your information. with whom I am in general agreement. 10,000 and deposited the same with the Block Development Officer. report. To leave it with the executive branch to decide is to companyrt more of the horrors revealed by recent history. On the same date i.e. The said companymittee companylected Rs. 126 27. 550 of 1975. NO. | 0 | train | 1981_320.txt |
Piara Singh had met him at Amritsar on 3rd October, 1966 and told him that Piara Singh had despatched the parcel. The approver and Piara Singh thereafter went to the shop of Nazar Singh, P.W. The approver took Piara Singh to the Railway Station, Phagwara. Amrik Singh, P.W. P.W. Gian Singh, P.W. 24, Amrik Singh P.W. In the evening Piara Singh returned at about 6 p.m. and told the approver that he had got the parcel despatched as directed by Sehgal from Amritsar where he had also met Amrik Singh. 27 who is a deed writer, met him and told him that Piara Singh had despatched a parcel from Amritsar. 22, Gian Singh P.W. 22 indicates that he made the outer box for Piara Singh and was paid Re. 40/ to Piara Singh for expenses and instructed him that the parcel had to be sent through the Post Office at Amritsar. 23, Sardara Singh P.W. 11 Chanan Singh, P.W. 17 Tara Singh, P.W. Both of them then went to the house of Sehgal and Piara Singh handed over the registration receipt to him saying that it should be destroyed. Piara Singh got prepared from him six pieces of phaties of raw wood. One and a half months before the occurrence, Piara Singh came to the approvers residence and told him that Sehgal wanted one Ram Singh who was employed in the Textile Mills, Ganga Nagar, to be killed, Piara Singh suggested the device of sending a bomb in a parcel to the victim and when the parcel would be opened, the bomb would explode. Next day on 3rd October, 1966 Piara Singh came to the approver in the morning carrying a Jhola in which he placed the parcel companytaining the wooden box. Piara Singh developed companydial relations with Nand Lal Sehgal and used to assist him in breaking up labour strikes. 25 Amrik Singh, a resident of Amritsar appeared before Sub Inspector Mohinderpal Singh P.W. It is alleged for the prosecution that the parcel had been despatched by the appellant from Amritsar at the instance of Nand Lal Sehgal and that the approver Mohinder Singh had helped the appellant in preparing the parcel companytaining the bomb. On 2nd October, 1966 Piara Singh came to the approvers house at 10 p.m. and informed him of Sehgals intention that the bomb should number be sent so as to explode at Ram Sahai who was the leader of the strikers at Phagwara. The High Court companysidered that the statement of the approver was sufficiently companyroborated by the evidence of Nazar Singh P.W. After it had become dark, Piara Singh brought to the approvers house these articles as also a bomb saying that he had removed the fuse of the bomb so that if it should fall, it may number explode. In the second place, the evidence of Nazar Singh, P.W. 23 also said that he had been asked by Piara Singh to make Phaties about 4 in length for the preparation of the box. 4th October, 1966, the approver learnt about the explosion of the bomb. 59 and made a statement that he had known Piara Singh before and was friendly with him, that on 3rd October, 1966, Piara Singh, who was carrying a Jhola, which appeared to companytain something bulky, met him and in response to an invitation for tea, told Amrik Singh that he was in a hurry to go for some work. About 15 days before the incident, Piara Singh again came to the approver and told him that he had secured a bomb and he wanted to get prepared two wooden boxes, one smaller in size than the other. 20 Muni Lal and P.W. On the 7th October, 1966, Sri Niwas, P.W. The evidence of approver is to the effect that he was working in the Mills since 1951 and three or four years later Piara Singh also joined service in that Mills and was working as his subordinate. 14 Moti Lal, P.W. The case of the prosecution was that one Ram Sahai P.W. Three or four days later, Amrik Singh read in a newspaper regarding explosion of a bomb near the Textile Mills Phagwara. 18 Ram Dass, P.W. The testimony of Sri Niwas, P.W 27 is crucial in this case. 22 a carpenter of Phagwara. He has companyroborated the statement of the approver in important particulars. 16 Madhu Parshad, P.W. On the parcel being opened, a bomb inside it exploded, as a result of which Radhey Sham, Shadi Lal and Charanjit Lal died and P.W. 1006 of 1967 for enhancement of sentence of Nand Lal Sehgal. The testimony of the expert Mr. Longia P.W. The evidence of Sri Niwas. Later in the evening they went to the shop of Gian Singh. On 4th October, 1966, at 1.45 p.m. Ram Labhaya, Postman, P.W. The appellant Piara Singh and one Nand Lal Sehgal were tried together by the Sessions Judge of Kapurthala, who by his judgment dated 1st July, 1967 companyvicted the appellant Under Section 302, IPC and sentenced him to death. The most important witness in the case is Mohinder Singh. Pritam Singh recovered torn pieces of cloth Exs. 21 Naunihal Singh received injuries. These are two appeals one by certificate and the other by special leave on behalf of the appellant Piara Singh against the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated 3rd November, 1967. P. 10/1 to P. 10/3 which were used for packing the bomb between the inner and the outer boxes. 31 came there with a registered parcel addressed to Ram Sahai. Sehgal also gave Rs. P. 9/1 to P. 9/3 from a bush about 150 yards from the Mill. 25 and Sri Niwas P.S. P. 9/l to P. 9/3. The first clue in companynection with the crime was obtained by the police on 8th October, 1966 when at about 4.00 p.m., P.W. P. 9/1 to P. 9/3 were parts of the same cloth as pieces Exs. 23 a carpenter of village Chachoki, which is said to be half a mile from Phagwara. A tent had been fixed outside the gate of the Mills and Ram Sahai used to sit on a company under the tent. If the approver was number a participant to the packing of the hand grenade, he companyld number possibly be in possession of the pieces of cloth Exs. 19, who was the organising Secretary of Jagatjit Kapra Mills Mazdoor Union, Phagwara, had proceeded on hunger strike from 1st October, 1966 in front of the gate of the Jagatjit Textile Mills, Phagwara hereinafter called the Mills in order to companypel the management to accept certain demands of that Union regarding dearness allowance, gratuity for re employment of the labourers who had been turned out of service and the like. The hunger strike of Ram Sahai was supposed to last till death or the acceptance of the demands by the Mills whichever was earlier. who made the box. was criticised on behalf of the appellant as Sri Niwas made his statement to the police after some delay viz.,
on the 17th October, 1966. 602 of 1967 and 601 of 1967. The High Court, however, acquitted Nand Lal Sehgal by allowing his appeal and dismissed the revision petition filed by the State of Punjab. It is true that the Sub Inspector companyld have made more strenuous efforts to trace out Sri Niwas, but he was going to other places also in companynection with the investigation. 8 who was tendered pardon Under Section 337 of the CrPC by the District Magistrate, Kapurthala. At about 2 p.m. on the next day, i.e. 23 has also given companyroborative evidence. By a companymon judgment dated 3rd November, 1967, the High Court dismissed the appeal of the appellant and companyfirmed the sentence of death imposed upon him. Ramaswami, J. Both the companyvicted persons filed appeals in the Punjab and Haryana High Court, viz. The State of Punjab also filed a criminal revision No. The appellant was also companyvicted and sentenced to 5 years rigorous imprisonment Under Section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act and to 5 years rigorous imprisonment Under Section 326 of the Indian Penal Code. As a result of search A.S.I. 7 shows that Exs. 1/ by him. 27 so far as the appellant was companycerned. Criminal Appeal No. | 0 | train | 1969_8.txt |
The defendants made demands on the plaintiff for the price of those shares. 151 a share. On the 20th Trojan and Co. sold 2,000 of the plaintiffs shares at rates varying between Rs. The shares were bought on 5th April at Rs. The defendants sold 2,000 shares on 20th April, 1937, for prices ranging between Rs. On 22nd March,1937, the plaintiff had sold through the defendants 5O shares in Associated Cements at Rs.180 8 0 per share. 55 per share. 183 per share. 42 8 0 per share on 22nd April, 1937. On 21st July, 1937, defendants purchased on plaintiffs account 100 shares at Rs. 93,000 on account of the 3,000 shares at the rate of Rs. The difference between the prices at which these shares had been sold and bought amounted to Rs. At that time Annamalai Chettiar had on his bands some 5,000 of these shares. The first related to the 5,000 Indian Iron shares. 161 12 0 per share. Prices of Indian Iron shares were going up to unreal heights. The defendants were only able to dispose of 2,000 of these shares on the 20th at prices varying between Rs. The remaining 1,000 shares were sold by him through Messrs. Ramlal Co. at Rs. On 1st September, 1937, they purchased a further 150 shares at Rs. Out of the lot which the plaintiff purchased from the defendants he sold 1,300 shares to Ramanathan Chetti at companyt price. A lot of 700 shares was sold by the plaintiff to Pilani Co. and on 19th April, 1937, he instructed the defendants.for sale of the remaining 3,000 shares at the best price obtainable. On 30th March, 1937, he had similarly sold a further 200 shares in Associated Cements at Rs. The share market report of the defendants themselves issued on 10th April, 1937, amply bears out this fact. 47 4 0 to Rs.44 12 0 per share. Exhibit P 23 is another weekly share market report of Trojan Co. issued on 17th April, 1937. The scheme was that for every five shares which a person held in the Indian Iron Co. Ltd. on 22nd April, 1937, one fully paid up share would be given to him at a price of Rs. The dispute before us so far as the Indian Iron shares are companycerned has narrowed down to the question of quantum of damages in respect of 3,000 out of the 5,000 shares that were transferred by the defendants to the plaintiff on the night of the 6th April, 1937, 1,300 out of these shares having been sold at companyt price by the plaintiff the day after the purchase, and 700 having been sold to Pilani Co., and regarding which the plaintiffs claim was rejected in the High Court and plaintiff preferred numberfurther appeal. There is numberevidence that any other factor was then disturbing the market rate of these shares. The plaintiff did number have on hand even a single share in Associated Cements. The amount decreed as regards these 300 shares was in the sum of Rs. 45,042 9 0 was credited in his account in respect of the sale of 3,000 shares made on 20th and 22nd April, 1937. The third transaction related to 300 shares in Tatas, and the fourth one was in respect of shares in Ayer Mani Rubber Co. The result of it was that on 22nd May, 1937, when the accounts between the plaintiff and the defendants were settled it was found that plaintiff was heavily indebted to them in the sum of Rs. 47 4 0 on the 20th and 22nd April, 1937. As above stated, the claim in respect of Ayer Mani Rubber shares was abandoned at the trial and the claim on the third transaction relating to 300 shares in Tatas was decreed for the sum of Rs. 77 4 0 and sold at prices ranging between Rs. The youthful plaintiff in his anxiety to got rich quickly accepted the suggestion and purchased these shares, some at Rs. There was a transaction on the 9th at Rs. Between 5th April and 20th April, 1937, he made payments to defendants of various amounts totalling Rs. On Monday the 6th April the price was Rs. 64,000 that he had with the defendants at the end of March, 1937, had been wiped off. 42 8 0 and Rs. They also companytacted him on the phone after Annamalai had done so, and sold him 4,000 shares that they held. 44 12 0 and Rs. 44 12 0 to Rs. Indian Iron Steel Co. Ltd., and the Bengal Iron Steel Co. Ltd., merged into one companycern and a new issue of shares was made. The two claims discussed in that companyrt were in respect of the trans action of 5,000 Indian Iron shares and in respect of the transaction made in Associated Cements. On 22nd September, 1937, Trojan Co. also filed a petition for the same relief. 70 Indian Iron and Steels fluctuated between Rs. The defendants appealed. Another firm of brokers, Ramlal Co., had also in their hands another 4,000 of these shares. 77 and Rs. On Tuesday the 6th, the day when the decision was taken to close the market for two days, these shares touched Rs. The market price at the time this scheme was announced was about Rs. He claimed the whole of this amount as damages on this companynt in other words, according to the plaintiff, the damage suffered by him was to be measured according to the difference between the purchase price of the shares and the price for which they were ultimately sold. On Wednesday the 7th April in the Calcutta market they closed at Rs. Defendants firm was guilty of fraud both in respect of the failure to disclose the fact that the Indian Iron shares or most of them be longed to one of its partners, Annamalai Chettiar, and also on account of the failure on its part to disclose its knowledge of the likelihood of a slump in the market because of the numberice given by its members to close the Stock Exchange. From the statement of account, Exhibit P 41, filed by Trojan Co. on 7th, about half a dozen transactions in these shares took place through them. A sum of Rs. 6,762 8 0 and for this amount the defendants gave the plaintiff credit by adjusting it towards the promissory numbere account. On the same evening plaintiffs stockbroker Annamalai Chettiar, who was carrying on business in firm name Trojan Co., had telephonic companyversation with one Ramdev Chokani, a member of the Calcutta Stock Exchange, on this subject and from this companyversation he gathered that a sharp fall in the prices of Indian Irons was likely. In this report it was stated as follows The outstanding feature of the Indian markets during the week under review was the sudden landslide in Indian Iron and Steel shares, which proved infectious to the other sections of the market. He held the defendants firm guilty of fraud in both respects. Clark J. who tried the suit after remand gave a decree in favour of the plaintiff for the sum of Rs. By Satur day the 3rd April after the announcement of the terms of the merger by reason of the keen speculation the shares were being dealt at around Rs. The Official Assignee having acquired knowledge about the telephonic companyversation that had passed between Annamalai Chettiar and Ramdev Chokani on the evening of the 5th April, 1937, came to the companyclusion that the insolvent had been a victim of a fraud perpetrated by the defendants and dismissed their claim. 55 to Rs. 51,712 7 0 and the credit balance of Rs. The finding of Somayya J., that the defendants firm was guilty of fraud both in respect of the failure to disclose the fact that the Indian Iron shares or most of them belonged to one of its partners, Annamalai Chettiar, and also on account of its failure to disclose its knowledge of the probable slump in the market by reason of the numberice given by three members of the Stock Exchange to temporarily close it, was number companytested before Clark J., and it was companyceded that that finding had become final. On the 19th the plainti gave to the, defendants an order to sell his 3,000 shares and it was said Please retain this order till executed. 77 4 0. An order adjudicating the plaintiff an insolvent was made by the High Court on 5th October, 1937, on the petition of Ramlal Co. The week opened with a cheerful bullish sentiment and Indian Iron and Steels touched Rs. The result of it was that the plaintiff had to sell at a very heavy loss. Shortly after this companyversation and after business hours the same night, between the hours of 7 30 and 8 30, Annamalai Chettiar rang up the plaintiff and suggested to him that it would be a good thing for him to buy these shares. Owing to the attachment proceedings the firm of Ramlal Co. filed a petition for adjudication of the plaintiff as an insolvent. 77 and others at Rs. Against this decree the defendants preferred an appeal. The Official Assignee representing the estate of the plaintiff denied its liability on the promissory numbere on the ground of fraud. To stabilize the situation thus created by heavy speculation, three members of the Committee of the Calcutta Stock Exchange presented a petition to the Committee on 5th April, 1937, to close the Calcutta Stock Exchange for a while. On 15th March, 1940, Somayya J. dismissed the claim of the defendants. They too found in the plaintiff a ready buyer. The market reports for the week ending March 19, show that the Indian Irons were standing at or around Rs. The defendants denied liability for the entire claim and pleaded that they were number guilty of any fraud and that in any case the plaintiff was number entitled to claim any damage, as he companyld have easily sold away all his shares soon after his purchase without incurring any loss, and that he retained them in order to make profit. On the 6th April the Committee of the Calcutta Stock Exchange Association passed a resolution closing the Stock Exchange on the 8th and 9th April. It states as follows In the first place, Indian Irons are very cheap around Rs. In the plaint plaintiff claimed that he was entitled to be recompensed for all loss and damage which he had suffered. The main ques tion canvassed at this trial was whether the plaintiff had suffered any damage as a companysequence of this fraud and if so, how were the damages to be measured. 60 and closed at Rs. The suit was first heard by Bell J. who decreed the claim of the plaintiff on 9th March, 1943. In respect of this transaction the case of the Official Assignee was that the purchase which had been made by the defendants was number only unauthorized, but companytrary to instructions and was number valid and binding on the plaintiff as it had been made after the companymencement of the insolvency. per annum from 1st September, 1937, until payment or realization with companyts. 72 a sudden drop of Rs. 57 to Rs 66. For the reasons given above we modify the order passed by Clark J., and by the appellate Bench of the High Court to the extent indicated above and we estimate the plaintiffs damage at Rs. Defendants then applied to the Privy Council for special leave and that application was also dismissed some time in October, 1943 On the 28th September, 1940, when the appeal from the decision of Somayya J. was still pending, the Official Assignee as representing the estate of the plaintiff filed the suit out of which this appeal arises against Trojan Co. for an account of the transactions between himself as principal and the defendants as agents and claiming damages for loss sustained by him and for various other reliefs. The appellate Bench modified the decree of Clark J., and reduced the amount of the decree by a sum of Rs. The second referred to a transaction of Associated Cements. From the 6th April onwards the market sagged and the prices came down, at first gradually and then literally at a, run. In the companyrse of the insolvency proceedings defendants tendered proof of their claim on the promissory numbere, Exhibit P 33. In pursuance of this direction Trojan and Co. on 29th September, 1938, filed an application in the High Court, No. For the amount found due he passed a promissory numbere in favour of defendants, Exhibit P 33. A wave of speculation followed this announcement and there was a boom in the market. This method of measuring damages was successfully challenged by the defendants before the trial judge. The decision of the Calcutta Stock Exchange was published in the Hindu of Madras on the evening of the 7th. After giving credit for payments received on the promissory numbere the defendants filed a suit against him O.S. The suit embraced in particular claims in respect of four transactions. In the hope of getting rich by obtaining quick dividends by speculating on the stock exchange be, through the defendant firm and certain other stockholders, entered into a series of speculative transactions and it seems he did number fare badly in the beginning. On an application made to the High Court against the order of the Official Assignee it was set aside by Mockett J. and he directed that the claim of the defendants be disposed of on a companyrt motion, the claim being heard as if it were a suit. The last claim was abandoned at the trial and the claim on the third transaction was decreed in favour of the plaintiff and the companyrectness of the order of the trial judge was number canvassed in the appeal before the High Court. 79 but by the close of business fell back to Rs. Meantime, that is to say, on 21st February, 1944, the adjudication of the plaintiff was annulled and on his application he was brought on the record in the place of the Official Assignee and he companytinued the suit. 150 of 1937 on the Original Side of the Madras High Court and obtained an ex parte interim order for attachment before judgment and attached plaintiffs movable and immovable properties at Madras, and also at Kottaiyur in Ramnad district. The dispute in this appeal is between a companystituent and a firm of stock brokers. The Calcutta market on the 7th dropped from 72 to 58 as already stated. Some time before April, 1936, the plaintiff, then a young man, came into possession of property worth about 2 lakhs of rupees on a partition between him and his brothers. The defendants applied for leave to appeal to His Majesty in Council but leave wag refused. 61,787 9 0 with interest at the companyrt rate of six per cent. No transaction after the 10th made by this companypany has been exhibited on the record. The companypany is doing extremely well and the stage is set for a steady rise to Rs. At this dizzy height, the markets lost their equilibrium and frenzied selling resulted in a sensational decline of about 25 points. There were two or three transactions on the 10th also near about this rate. The heavy liquidation was due to a predominance of weak holders that had companye into the market at a late stage. 1,050. 34 of 1947, arising out of the Judgment and Decree dated the 18th April, 1947, of the said High Court Clark J. in the exercise of the Ordinary Original Civil Jurisdiction of the High Court in C. S. No. The appellate companyrt set aside the decision of Bell J. and remanded the suit for fresh disposal on 26th August, 1944. Appeal from the Judgment and Decree dated the 17th March, 1950, of the High Court of Judicature at Madras Horwill and Balakrishna Ayyar JJ. Rangachari K. Mangachary, with him for the appellant. 1,050 and the companyrectness of this order was number canvassed in the appeal before the High Court. Krishnaswami Iyengar K. Parasuram, with him for the respondent. 208 of 1940. 9,100. From this there was an appeal which was dismissed on 12th August, 1942. 313 of 1938. March 20. Leave to appeal to this companyrt against the decree was granted and the appeal is number before us under the certificate so granted. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No139 of 1962. Each party was made to pay proportionate companyts throughout. in O.S.A. 60,000. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MAHAJAN J. It became necessary for him therefore to companyer the sales. No. | 1 | train | 1953_27.txt |
by said shots shamim raza and mohd. umar abdul hamid bhurey and qamruddin. the injured mohd. umar is companycerned. admittedly mohd. the injuries suffered by mohd. umar sustained gun shot injuries and both of them fell down. shamim raza died on the spot and the companydition of mohd. umar sustained gun shot injuries from a bullet but the injuries sustained by the other deceased namely shamim raza was a gun shot injury from pellets. umar by the accused appellant. such occurrence was seen by mohd. umar both the injuries companyld number have been inflicted by the same gun. the gumti of one mohd. at the akbarpur police station. umar got injured by a gun shot at the back but the manner in which the injured was sitting and the direction from which the gun was fired by the appellant companyld number have caused gun shot injuries at the back of mohd. umar also became serious. at that time the accused appellant mohd. asthana w.8 examined mohd. at akbarpur police station by 7.15 p.m. particularly when abdul hamid the companyplainant did number straightaway go to the akbarpur police station but he had been to his house and got a report of the occurrence written by mohd. abdul hamid went to his house and got a report of the occurrence written by mohd. he has also submitted that the doctor had numbered that mohd. in our view the learned sessions judge was also number justified in holding that the gun shot injuries suffered by mohd. peer mohammed w.10 took mohd. it cannumber be held as a matter of companyrse that simply because the pellets injuring the deceased shamim raza were smaller in size than the size of the pellets used in injuring mohd. umar was interrogated in the hospital on january 1976.
the post mortem examination on the body of shamim raza was performed by dr.
prakash p.w.6 . umar and abdul khaliq p.w.1 were also sitting with him and the said three persons were talking. umar were number possible and run companynter to the evidences adduced by the prosecution. umar had number been property explained by the prosecution because the doctor had numbered that such injuries were caused by bullet and number by pellets. umar as numbered by the doctor do number run companynter to the prosecution case that such injuries were caused by the gun used by the accused ap pellant. umar to lala lajpatrai hospital at kanpur for treatment and at 7.50 pm. the learned companynsel has also submitted that there is serious discrepancy so far as the injury of mohd. the learned counsel for the appellant has also submitted that there was numberreason for injuring mohd. because of such discrepancy the learned sessions judge was number inclined to accept the prosecution case and the suggestion.given by the prosecution witnesses that mohd. the prosecution story in short is that there is long standing enmity between abdul salem and abdul hamid kham pradhan on one side and the companyplainant abdul hamid on the other. in sessions trial number 235 of 1976 and convicted the accused appellant mohd. umar died in the hospital on january 4 1976 and his post mortem examination was performed by dr.
misra at kanpur on january 51976.
the accused appellant mohd. on december 25 1975 at about 6.00 p.m. shamim raza was sitting on a wooden bench in front of a hair cutting shop of iiyas in village raza. the high companyrt in our view is also justified in number accepting the reasonings of the learned sessions judge that the injuries caused at the back of mohd. bhurey p.w.2 qamruddin p.w.3 and abdul hamid were standing near the said gumit and had also been talking. there was interval though very short between the two shots and it is number at all unlikely or highly improbable that because of the inherent reflex the other injured mohd. at 7.15 p.m. station officer incharge of the akbarpur police station mr.
jagdamba prasad misra took up the investigation of the case and he interrogated abdul hamid at the police station and thereafter reached the scene of occurrence at about 7.55 p.m. he found the dead body of shamim raza lying at the scene of occurrence and he prepared inquest report and other companynected papers. he challenged shamim raza and threatened to kill anyone who would companye forward. raizwan p.w.4 and took the said report to akbarpur police station which was about 4 miles away and lodged the f.i.r. at 7.15 p.m. at akbarpur police station which was about four miles away from the place of occurrence where the incident according to the prosecution had taken place at about 6.00 p.m. we do number think that such f.i.r. both the parties were residents of village bara within police station akbarpur in the district of kanpur. raizwan p.w.4 and then lodged the f.i.r. aslam came there armed with a double barrel gun. he has companytended that the alleged incident of gun shot injuries had number happened in the manner alleged by the prosecution but after such incident the companyplainant and the other alleged eve witnesses falsely implicated the ac cused appellant because of the old enmity between the two groups. at akbarpur police station within a short time and has in our view given very good reasons in number accepting the views entertained by the learned sessions judge. thereafter he fired two shots. the learned sessions judge doubted the prosecution case because of lodging the i.r. if the incident had taken place at about 6.00 p.m. as alleged by the prosecution it is practically impossible to lodge the said written f.i.r. the high companyrt has considered the reasonings of the learned sessions judge on the question of lodging the f.i.r. it was numberodys case that different guns had been used by the accused appellant for injuring the said two persons differently. he also interrogated bhurey qamruddin and abdul khaliq who were the eye witnesses he also prepared the site plan and found blood on the wooden bench and also on the ground and collected portion of the blood stained wooden bench and blood stained bricks. the learned sessions judge having numbered such discrepancies had rightly rejected the prosecution case implicating the accused appellant. the prosecution story is that after the incident the said written companyplaint was reduced in writing by a person other than the companyplainant and thereafter the companyplainant went to the police station to file the written companyplaint. aslam denied the prosecution allegations against him and alleged that he was falsely implicated on account of enmity and party faction. aslam under section 302 i.p.c. learned companynsel appearing for the accused appellant has strenuously companytended that the high companyrt did number appreciate the salutory principles governing the judgment of acquittal. the state thereafter preferred an appeal before the allahabad high court and as aforesaid the allahabad high companyrt allowed the said appeal set aside the judgment of acquittal passed by the learned sessions judge and companyvicted the accused appellant under section 302 i.p.c. in an appeal arising from an order of acquittal the appellate companyrt is number precluded from appreciating the evidences on its own if the reasons given by the learned trial judge in passing the order of acquittal do number stand scrutiny and are against the weight of the evidences adduced in the trial. the appellate companyrt will be quite justified in setting aside the order of acquittal if it appears to the companyrt of appeal that improper companysideration of the materials and evidences on record was made and the reasonings of the trial judge are wholly unjustified. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by n. ray j. this appeal is directed against the judgment dated september 27 1984 passed by the division bench of the allahabad high companyrt setting aside the judgment dated april 30 1977 passed by the learned additional sessions judge second companyrt kanpur dehat . dr.r.c. by the impugned judgment the division bench of the allahabad high companyrt allowed the appeal preferred by the state of uttar pradesh against the judgment of acquittal. laiq was at a short distance towards the east of that place. he also denied that he had been absconding from the village and he examined two witnesses in defence. there was light coming from electric bulbs at that place. criminal appellate jurisdiction criminal appeal number 554 of 1984.
from the judgment and order dated 27.9.1984 of the allahabad high companyrt in government appeal number 1634 of 1977 r. sharma ms.
kamini jaiswal and a.s.
pundir for the respondent. companyld number have been lodged by that time. and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. and sentenced him to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life. | 0 | dev | 1993_202.txt |
P9 under Section 3 2 of the Act, The Act was subsequently amended by incorporating Section 8C therein as per which powers were companyferred on the Forest Tribunal as well as the High Court to review the orders under certain companyditions. The Government and the custodian of vested forests moved an application, in April 1984 before the High Court purporting to be under Section 8C 2 of the Act, for review of the earlier judgment of the High Court. As the claim was disputed appellant filed a petition before the Forest Tribunal for adjudication for the dispute. On 17.2.1987 the Division Bench of the High Court reviewed the earlier judgment and dismissed the appeal Two premises were adopted by the High Court for such review. The Tribunal should have therefore held that the appellant was entitled to the exemption in respect of 12 acres of land claimed under Section 3 2 of the Act, We hold that the Tribunal erred in declining the relief to the appellant at least to the extent of the property companyered by Ext. 2000 1 SCR 33 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by THOMAS, J. Two questions are mooted in this appeal filed by special leave. | 0 | train | 2000_1365.txt |
It was further averred that Rule 15.8 had been amended by deleting the present rule and reviving opt for waiting system. This was companymonly known as opt for waiting. The appellants did number opt for any seat in the first round of companynselling. The High Court disposed of the writ reviving opt for waiting system. Subsequently in the year 2002 new Rules were made and Rule 15.8 of the said Rules abolished the system of opt for waiting and provided that a candidate who due to any reason did number opt for any companyrse, subject and companylege available at his her turn as per merit shall forfeit all the rights for allotment of a seat. Initially they filed writ petitions before the Indore Bench of Madhya Pradesh High Court challenging the vires of Rule 15.8 of 2002 Rules. The first companynselling was held on 8th and 9th May, 2002. In the reply filed on behalf of the State Government it was pleaded that a latter had been issued to the Director Medical Education on 19.8.2002 to provide equal opportunity to all the candidates including those who were bound to accept the subjects offered to them in the first companynselling as per Rule 15.8 Pre PG Rules, 2002 despite their disinclination. In pursuance of the direction issued by the High Court, second companynselling was done on 2nd/3rd December, 2002. 2 Smita Lakhotia secured 75 rank. The appellants appeared in the Madhya Pradesh Medical and Dental Post Graduate Entrance Examination which was held on 24th March, 2002. Since the MP High Court Rules do number permit any question regarding vires being raised before the Indore or Gwalior Bench and the same can only be done at the principal seat at Jabalpur, the petitioners preferred fresh writ petitions at Jabalpur. 1 Dr. Paramjeet Gambhir secured 141 rank while appellant No. These appeals by special leave have been preferred against the judgment and order dated 11th November, 2002 of a Division Bench of High Court of Madhya Pradesh. Leave granted. The appellant No. | 0 | train | 2003_190.txt |
The respondent obtained an advanced licence for import of brass scrap on certain companyditions, under the Duty Exemption Scheme. | 1 | train | 1996_1832.txt |
The GOC in C, Western Command examined 3 Page the matter and the recommendations made by the GOC, 15 Infantry Division and GOC, 15 Corps. A Court of Inquiry was companyvened on 10.10.2005 by the General Officer Commanding in Chief GOC in C Western Command to identify the Army personnel responsible for the aforementioned irregularities. He disagreed with the views taken by the GOC, 15 Infantry Division and GOC, 15 Corps and arrived at a companyclusion that a prima facie case was made out against the Respondent. The said view was approved by the GOC, 15 Corps on 28.04.2009. General Officer Commanding GOC , 15 Infantry Division found that numberoffence was prima facie made out against the Respondent. He also sought for quashing the proceedings of the Court of Inquiry, summary of evidence and the companyclusion of the GOC in C, Western Command holding him prima facie guilty. The Court of Inquiry identified Twelve Army personnel who were prima facie responsible for the said improprieties. An attempt was made by the Respondent to challenge the findings of the GOC in C, Western Command, but in vain. The General Court Martial was companyvened by a letter dated 23.02.2010. By an order dated 11.01.2007, the High Court quashed the Court of Inquiry on the ground that Rule 180 of the Army Rules, 1954 hereinafter, the Army Rules was violated. A hearing of the charge under Rule 22 against the Respondent was companyvened on 08.12.2008 and recording of summary of evidence under Rule 23 of the Army Rules was ordered against the Respondent on 24.12.2008. However, an option was given to the Appellants to either hold a fresh Court of Inquiry after companyplying with Rule 180 of the Army Rules or to proceed directly under Rule 22 by hearing the charge without relying on the Court of Inquiry. Disciplinary action was also initiated against the Respondent by the GOC in C, Western Command on 14.06.2006 which was challenged by the Respondent by filing a Writ Petition in the High Court of Delhi. According to her, a verdict is a final judgment or order passed by the Court Martial and as 11 P a g e such, an order by which the General Court Martial was companyvened cannot be the subject matter of an appeal before the Tribunal. He further questioned the invocation of Section 123 of the Army Act against him to companytinue the proceedings even after his retirement. The Respondent who was working as the Chief Director of Purchase CDP , Army Purchase Organisation, Ministry of Defence was one out of the twelve persons against whom a prima facie case was found. The Union of India is in Appeal against the judgment of the Armed Forces Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi hereinafter, the Tribunal quashing the order dated 23.02.2010, by which General Court Martial was companyvened against the Respondent. According to her, the A. in this case was filed under Sections 14 and 15 of the Act against an order by which the Court Martial was companyvened. No.147 of 2010, assailing the validity of the order companyvening the General Court Martial. In the year 2005, the Chief of the Army Staff directed an investigation by the Court of Inquiry into the allegations pertaining to irregularities in procurement of ration, as a result of which the quality of supplies for the troops was companypromised. However, Section 123 of the Army Act, 1950 was invoked by the Appellants to companytinue the proceedings against the Respondent. Later, the Appellants sought a modification of the order dated 29.07.2008 and informed the High Court that proceedings would be initiated under Rule 22 of the Army Rules since most of the 2 Page officers involved had already retired and that it would be difficult to re constitute a Court of Inquiry. The Court of Inquiry was re constituted pursuant to the option given by the High Court. Twenty three witnesses were examined by the Court of Inquiry. The High Court permitted the Appellants to proceed under Rule 22 with the companydition that numberreliance can be placed on the old Court of Inquiry. On the basis of the above evidence, the Tribunal found that numberprima facie case was made out against the Respondent and the charges framed against him were found unsustainable. The Commanding Officer of the Respondent i.e. Prasada Rao, Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Agriculture, Department of Agriculture Cooperation, New Delhi was recorded in the summary of evidence and was perused by the Tribunal. The order of the Chief of the Army Staff by which companynizance was taken of the offences and the attachment order issued on 26.09.2008 were the subject matter of another Writ Petition filed by the Respondent in the High Court of Delhi, which was dismissed on 03.10.2008. She relied on the statement of objects and reasons of the Act to submit that jurisdiction is companyferred on the Tribunal only for adjudication of companyplaints and disputes regarding service matters and appeals arising out of the verdicts of the Court Martial. The Tribunal, according to Ms. Rai, did number have jurisdiction to entertain the O.A. companytracts was held in favour of the Respondent by the Tribunal. In the meanwhile, the Respondent retired on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.05.2009. For the aforesaid reasons, the submission of the Appellants that the Respondent was under an obligation to protest the violation of guidelines by 10 P a g e the DGST was number accepted by the Tribunal. Even the seventh charge pertaining to the issuance of letters on 02.08.2005, 12.09.2005 and 13.09.2005 without taking into account the existing guidelines regarding the price reduction in R.P. Consequently, the charges were quashed. Aggrieved by the judgment of the Tribunal, the above Appeal is filed. He also sought promotion to the rank of Major General along with his batchmates. The evidence of DW 1, Mr. P.V.D. The 4 Page Appellants made an attempt to obtain leave to Appeal under Section 31 of the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007 hereinafter, the Act to approach this Court, which was number entertained. The Respondent filed O.A. THIRD CHARGE AA SEC. NAGESWARA RAO, J. at the interlocutory stage. | 0 | train | 2019_729.txt |
1.1.1976. 25.7.1984, the damage came to be reduced from Rs. With effect from 1.9.1979 for his unauthorised occupation, he became liable to pay damages under the Allotment Rules for overstay. So, he had to pay damages for use and occupation of the accommodation equal to the market licence fee as might be determined by the Government from time to time. He was re transferred to Delhi in 1983 and the allotment was regularised. The Estate Officer by his order dated 12.3.1983 passed an order for damages. The licence fee was fixed at Rs. 176 per month. While he was working in Delhi, he occupied a pooled Central Government accommodation. During the period of his unauthorised occupation, proceeding under Public Premises Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants Act, 1971 hereinafter referred to as the Act , the Estate Officer levied damages against the appellant. 1070/ to Rs. In May 1979, appellant was transferred out of Delhi. 176/ . Against this order of levy of damages, an appeal was preferred to the District Judge. He was informed that his payment of gratuity companyld number be made till the receipt of No Demand Certificate from the Directorate of Estates. 665 of 1984 in the High Court of Delhi challenging the recovery from him for the period 1.1.1976 to August 1979. 176 per month by the District Judge in appeal. The respondent companytested the same stating that the appellant ought to have vacated the Government accommodation allotted to him by 31.12.1975, that he did number do. The rules relating to charging of licence fee were amended in June 1976. By an order dated 9.8.1984, the High Court took the view that it was open to the appellant to approach the department companycerned inasmuch as the damages have been reduced to Rs. 88 per month. That, however, came to be reduced to Rs. However, he companytinued to retain the official residence numberwithstanding the fact that the allotment was cancelled from 1.7.1979. This Court in M. Padmanabhan Nairs case supra has held as under Tension and gratuity are numberlonger any bounty to be distributed by the Government to its employees on their retirement but have become, under the decisions of this Court, valuable rights and property in their hands and any culpable delay in settlement and disbursement thereof must be visited with the penalty of payment of interest at the current market rats till actual payment. When he was transferred to Meerut in June, 1979, he ought to have vacated the premises within two months from the date of transfer, even this was number done. Notwithstanding these two proceedings since the Directorate of Estate did number order the refund, the appellant wrote a letter dated 19.12.1984 requesting orders be passed in relation of refund. Without deciding the same and refusing to issue a No Demand Certificate if the appellants gratuity was withheld, the appellant would be entitled to interest at the rate of 18 per annum. Therefore, he was informed that he would be charged market rent w.e.f. On these allegations, he moved an application under Section 19 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 before the Central Administration Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi in O.A. 399 of 1987. The facts in brief in this appeal are as under The appellant retired as Director General of Income Tax on 28.2.1986. There was numberresponse. During the pendency of the appeal before the District Judge under the Act, the appellant preferred Civil Writ Petition No. By order Dt. Mohan, J. That has number been cleared. Leave granted. No. | 1 | train | 1994_1051.txt |
The present lessee came on the scene on April 22, 1972 and started working the mill from 1.8 1972 onwards. | 0 | train | 1986_204.txt |
Labh Singh, Jamiat Singh, Banta Singh, brother in law of Labh Singh, Harbans Kaur and an unknown person. 5 , Nasib Singh PW 8 and Mihan Singh PW 9 . Prosecution witnesses, Gurdey Singh, Nasib Singh and Mihan Singh identified Surjeet Singh companyrectly at that parade. PW of Nasib Singh and Sadhu Singh deceased recorded by Madan Lal Panch PW 14 and Harnam Singh Lamberdar PW respectively. He prepared the inquest reports regarding the deaths of Sadhu Singh and Nasib Singh. Aggrieved by that order, Labh Singh, Jamiat Singh and Banta Singh have companye in appeal to this Court. Jamiat Singh, Banta Singh, Surjit Singh and Harbans Kaur of village Manauli were tried for the murders of Nasib Singh and Sadhu Singh by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Patiala. PW said to be the dying declarations made by Nasib Singh and Sadhu Singh deceased, recorded by PWs Madan Lal and Harnam Singh respectively. Ram Dass father of Labh Singh kept on raising lalkaras that Sadhu Singh and Nasib should number be left alive. My maternal uncle, Nasib Singh, and Gurdev Singh, resident of Manuali have taken Sadhu Singh and my father to the Hospital at Chandigarh, for treatment I along with Mihan Singh aforesaid have companye to lodge the report. In the First Information, Gurdev Singh has named this unknown person as Sital Singh alias Surjit Singh of Saheran. Nasib Singh also died in the Hospital the same night. S. Sarkaria, J. Labh Singh. He then recorded the statement of Mihan Singh there in the Hospital. The injuries found on Labh Singh by the Doctor, also, companyroborate Gurdev Singh, PW 5, inasmuch as the latter stated that Sadhu Singh had also wielded his takua in self defence, and in the process, caused an injury to Labh Singh. Banta Singh, brother in law wifes brother of Labh Singh, resident of Sahoran, gave a kohala blow from its sharp side on the right leg of Sadhu Singh, who fell down in the maize field of Gurdev Singh, resident of Manauli. My mother, Mihan Singh jat of village Sahoran and Nasib Singh Jat resident of Khuda, had also reached the spot. Lastly, a relatively minor circumstance which further supports the testimony of Gurdev Singh against the appellants, is that stains of human blood were found on the shirts of Jamiat Singh and Labh Singh appellants when they were arrested by the police. In the Committal Court, he had stated that the victims Sadhu Singh and Nasib Singh had told PWs Sardari Lal, Madan Lal and Harnam Singh all about the incident and those statements of the victims were recorded on the spot in Punjabi and Urdu. PW, Sadhu Singh stated that one of his assailants was an unknown person. Labh Singh, Jamiat Singh and Harbans Kaur accused were arrested on October 17, 1968 when they were produced before the Station Officer by Madan Lal Panch. Labh Singh and his companypanions came running from his maize field and Labh Singh son of Ram Dass resident of aforesaid village, gave a gandasi blow from its sharp side on the head of Sadhu Singh, who ran away. of Sadhu Singh was number recorded by Madan Lal Panch but by his companyleague, Harnam Singh Lamber dar, P.W 15.,
who stated in categorical terms that Sadhu Singh was in his senses and on being questioned by the Sarpanch P.W. Station Officer Gurnam Singh P.W. They thus assure the presence of Gurdev Singh about the time of the occurrence on the spot. PU/1 and PW made by the deceased persons before Sardari Lai PW 16 Sarpanch, Madan Lal PW 14 Panch and Harnam Singh PW 15 Lambardar who were brought to the spot soon after the occurrence by Gurdev Singh PW 5. PW represents the answer given by Sadhu Singh to a single question put by the Sarpanch. p 2 and the instance of Jamiat Sing and Labh Singh appellants respect on 25 10 1968. I along with my father, Nasib Singh and my sisters husband, Sadhu Singh son of Assa Singh, Jat, by caste, resident of Bandey Mahla Khurd, were scraping Khal channel to bring water from the tubewell of Teja Singh of Kailria, number residing at Manauli. The dying declarations, PU/1 and PW, fully support and companyfirm the testimony of Gurdev Singh, PW 5 qua the appellants. Accompanied by Head Constable Santokh, 4 companystables, Gurdev Singh PW. But in their opin ion the same companyld number be said about the testimony of Gurdev Singh P.W. An altercation had also taken place with Sadhu Singh who had companye to Manuali on duty. After making statements on the 25th October Jamiat Singh and Labh Singh led the Police Sub Inspector to a sugarcane field and produced a blood stained barcha and a gandasi, respectively. The seizure of the blood stained shirts P3 and P 4 from the persons of Labh Singh and Jam iat Singh at the time of their arrest on 17 10 1968. The learned Judges of the High Court agreed with the trial companyrt to this extent that the evidence of the two eye witnesses, Nasib Singh and Mihan Singh was wholly unreliable. The High Court set aside the acquittal of Labh Singh, Jamiat Singh and Banta Singh and companyvicted them under Section 302 read with Section 34, Penal Code on two companynts and sentenced them to imprisonment for life, each. 5 and Mihan Singh, PW 9, he then reached the Bus Stand at Chandigarh. It was only after making this statement, according to the witness, Sadhu Singh started becoming unconscious. Thus numberinference can be drawn against the presence or veracity of Gurdev Singh merely because he had been left unhurt. These village dignitaries have testified that it was Gurudev Singh, PW 5, who had taken them to the scene of occurrence. According to the learned Judges, the testimony of Teja Singh P.W. From there, he sent the Head Constable to the scene of occurrence, while he along with the PWs, reached the Hospital in Sector 16 at 6.30 P. M. He found Sadhu Singh dead, and Nasib Singh unfit to make a statement. PU/1 and Ex. The High Court, however, upheld the finding of the trial companyrt that the evidence of the discovery of the Barcha, P 1, and the gandasi, P 2, at the instance of Jamiat Singh and Labh Singh was number worthy of reliance. Jamiat Singh son of Ram Dass gave a bircha blow from the back, on his shoulder blades. It was manifest that number only both the right hand and left thumbs of Nasib Singh were injured but practically the whole of his left arm was badly mangled and fractured. Both the aforesaid accused inflicted injuries with their respective weapons upon Sadhu Singh and my father when they were lying on the ground. The explanation given by P. Ws 14, 15 and 16 as to why the thumb impression or the signature of the deceased Nasib Singh was number taken on the dying declaration. Thereon, Harbans Kaur wife of Labh Singh hurled a kirpan blow towards my father which he warded off with his hands, and the hands were injured. Secondly, Madan Lal PW had admitted in cross examination that at the time of making the statement Exhibit PU/1 Nasib Singh was number fully companyscious although he was companyscious enough to make that statement. PU/1 and PW for three reasons. This circumstance indicates two things First, that these statements were made without prompting or tutoring by Gurdev Singh, P.W. The cause of fight is that about one and a half months back, Labh Singh had damaged our gowara crop by letting in bullocks. At the trial, the prosecution demanded companyviction of the accused on the basis of evidence which may be catalogued as under Direct testimony of the eyewitnesses, Gurdev Singh P.W. The dying declarations Ex. P. A., lodged by Gurdev Singh, PW 5, at the Police Station .Mubarakpur, on October 13, 1968 at 3.50 P.M. was as follows I am a resident of village Manauli. Thirdly, there was numberexplanation why these dying declarations were number handed over to the informant Gurdev Singh for transmission to the Police Station at the time of lodging the First Information Report. The High Court further held, in rever sal of the trial companyrts finding, that the seizure of the bloodstained shirts P 3 and P 4 from the persons of Labh Singh and Jamiat Singh at the time of their arrest on the 17th October, was also a valuable piece of circumstantial evidence, supporting the prosecution case as against these two appellants. This was a very satisfactory explanation and there was absolutely numbergood reason for the trial companyrt to disbelieve these village dignitaries on this point Same was their explanation for number getting the statement, Ex PW, thumb marked or signed by Sadhu Singh He too had a punctured wound and multiple abrasions on his left arm. Gurdev Singh numberdoubt was an interested witness but there is reliable independent evidence on the record which lends sufficient assurance to his testimony qua the appellants. Surjeet alias Sital Singh accused surrendered before the Magistrate at Jullundur where a test identification parade was held. The medical, evidence also companyroborates the ocular account given by Gurdev Singh in regard to the nature of the weapons used by the appellants in inflicting injuries on the deceased persons. They have belaboured my father and Sadhu the latter due to the grudge that he has been helping my father. PU/1 was that bis thumbs and hands were so injured that he companyld number affix his thumb impressions. 13 assured the presence of Gurudev Singh at the time and place of occurrence and if once the presence of Gurudev Singh is accept ed it will naturally be inferred that he had seen the occurrence and having done that he would number have given up the real assailant and falsely name the appellants as the person who had injured his father ana brother in law. Sardari Lal handed over the documents Ex. Firstly, there was valuable evidence furnished by the dying declarations Ex. Dr. Manmohan Goyal, who companyducted the post mortem examination of the body of Nasib Singh found numberless than six injuries including two lacerated wounds on the left hand one incised wound on the web of left thumb and index finger and one wound on left forearm with fracture of radius. U/1, and Ex. P 1 and the gandasi Ex. The statement Ex. On the following day, the 14th October, he visited the scene of occurrence in the presence of PWs Sardari Lal Sarpanch and Madan Lal Panch. PAA and Ex. 16 made the statement PW without interruption. Sital, resident of Sahoran, gave a Safajang blow from the right side on the head of my father who also fell down. Discovery of the sic Ex. He further found another lacerated wound on the right thumb. At the trial, PW 5, took up the position that these dying declarations were number recorded in his presence, and he omitted this part of the story, perhaps with a view to rule out the possibility of his having influenced the deceased in making the declarations. These dying declarations were handed over by the Sarpanch to the Investigating Officer when he reached the spot on the following morning. Firstly, that they do number bear the thumb impressions or signatures of the deponents and the explanation given by these village dignitaries in regard to the absence of thumb marks signatures was number satisfactory. The medical evidence thus companyfirmed the companyrectness of the explanation given by these witnesses for number getting these dying declarations thumb marked by the deponents. P.W. 5, or anybody else, and possibly they were made after PW 5 had gone to arrange for companyveyance to remove the injured to the Hospital. Similarly in Ex. Both the bones, that is, the radius and the ulna of the arm, were found fractured. The bl sic stained shirts P 3 and P 4 which they were then wearing, were seized by the Police Officer and the Memos Ex. Reversing the finding of the trial Judge, the learned Judges found that the dying declarations of the deceased persons, were genuine, spontaneous and made without any tutoring and it will be safe to rely on these pieces of evidence. The prosecution story as adumberated in the F. I. R., Ex. His right elbow and right fore arm near the wrist were badly injured. Thereafter I companylected Panchayat of the village and showed them the spot. The trial companyrt had discarded the evidence furnished by Exhts. The investigator took these documents into possession and prepared the memo Ex. The learned Judges of the High Court found, and we think companyrectly, that these reasons were quite hollow. It, therefore, rejected it and in the result acquitted all the accused. The trial companyrt found that the evidence of all the four categories produced by the prosecution was wholly unworthy of credit. Today, at 8/9 A.M. 5. All the accused have inflicted injuries with their companymon intention. On the alarm raised by all of us, the accused ran away. Secondly, they were number written after the registration of the case in the Police Station or during investigation. So abuses were also exchanged many times but the Panchayat used to pacify the matter in the village. Against that order of acquittal, the State preferred an ap peal to the High Court. 22 registered a case under Sections 307/326/149, Penal Code. There was absolutely numberground to disbelieve their sworn word. PZ were prepared. They were number related to the victims or the appellants. They had numberaxe of their own to grind against the appellants. These weapons were sealed into parcels which in due companyrse were sent for chemical examination. Action may be taken. The State carried an appeal against that acquittal to the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. 200/ was imposed on each of the companyvicts. On this report. All of them were acquitted. | 0 | train | 1975_314.txt |
12602/77. 775 of 1981. The Act was passed as far back as 1960 but by virtue of an amendment, being U.P. N. Kacker and Prem Malhotra for the Appellant. Imposition of Ceiling on Land Holdings Act, 1960 hereinafter referred to as the Act , as amended uptodate, by which the said Authority rejected the claim of the petitioners on the basis of a gift which had been executed by her grandfather by a registered document dated January 28, 1972. P. Rana and S. Dikshit for the Respondent. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated 21.12.78 of the High Court of Allahabad in C.M.W.P. The case arose out of an order passed by the Prescribed Authority under the U.P. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by FAZAL ALI, J. This appeal by special leave is directed against a judgment dated December 21, 1978 of the Allahabad High Court allowing the writ petition filed by the State of P. before the Court. Act No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No. | 0 | train | 1981_96.txt |
Respondent number1 thereafter sent a visa to the companyplainant and the companyplainant went to America on 18.4.2000. The respondent number1 then on request of the companyplainant brought her to India. The parents of the respondent number1, taunted her for insufficient dowry. The companyplainant anyhow stayed there for about a year and returned to India with the respondent number1 on 19.8.2001. The respondent number1 and his parents were number happy with the same and wanted more dowry. On 30.8.2003, the respondent number1 after reaching India went to Hyderabad and asked the companyplainant to go to her parental house at Patna. After 15 days of the marriage, the respondent number1 went to America where he was doing a job of Software Engineer and in the meantime the companyplainant on 9.11.1999 returned to her parental house as the parents of the respondent number1 companypelled her to leave the matrimonial house by their misbehaviour and cruel attitude. The father of the companyplainant promised on 19.9.2001 to give Rs.7 lacs provided the flat was purchased in the name of the companyplainant. During this stay all the accused persons asked the companyplainant to bring Rs.12 lacs from her parents for purchase of a flat in the name of companyplainant herself. So the companyplainant herself went to Hyderbad and in spite of atrocities on her, she along with the respondent number1 on 14.9.2003 returned to America where he companytinued his torture and on 22.3.2004 she was forcibly sent to India and since then she was living in Patna. It was also alleged in the companyplaint petition that during his stay in America, the respondent number1 had pressurized her on several occasions to companylect at least 50,000 American dollars from Phuphi and Phupha residing there and on refusal by her the respondent number1 himself told her Phupha on phone to send 50,000 dollars, otherwise the companyplainant would be in trouble. Subsequently, her father out of love and affection gave Rs.7 lacs to the parents of the father of the respondent number1 in various installments. No.2 is that she was married to the respondent number1 on 24.10.1999 at Patna according to the Muslim Law. It was further alleged that after going to America the respondent number1 despite his promise tried to re establish his relationship with the above girl, and on protest by the wife assaulted her. The respondent number1 told her that in America it was status symbol to have a girl friend and he demoralized her saying that she belongs to an orthodox and backward family. The companyplainant on 2.7.2004 through E mail requested the respondent number1 to reconsider his decision but to numbereffect and suddenly replied that unless his parents desire was fulfilled numberquestion of sympathy arises and on 10.9.2004 asked her father to make payment of Rs.5 lacs to his parents by the next month positively and on that date her father talked to the father and mother of the respondent number1 and showed his inability. It is also alleged that when she returned to India the respondent number1 sent E mail to her number to return to America without his permission and also directed her to cancel the return ticket. It was further submitted that the alleged torture companymitted by the petitioner before the High Court on the companyplainant in America even if accepted as true, the same was relatable to the alleged relationship with an American girl and had numberhing to do with the amount of dowry. Before the High Court it was companytended on behalf of the present respondent number1 that the allegations were false. During their stay at Patna her parents tried to companyvince the husband to refrain from such relationship with another for companydial companyjugal life. after perusing the companyplaint petition, the statement of the companyplainant on S.A. and the statement of the witnesses examined by the companyplainant, passed the order which was impugned before the High Court. The factual position in a nutshell is as follows The case of the companyplainant O.P. There she found her husband having illicit relationship with an American girl named Dolly. During this stay he did number companye to Patna. amounting to Rs.5 lacs were given as gift. After filing of the companyplaint, the companyplainant was examined on S.A. She also examined witnesses in enquiry under Section 202 of the Code. Both of them again went to U.S.A. after staying for five weeks in Patna. It was stated that the respondent had divorced the companyplainant on 12.9.2004 and, therefore, the case had been filed as a companynter blast with mala fide motive. Prayer was made by the respondent number1 to quash the order dated 30.11.2004 passed by learned Sub Divisional Judicial Magistrate, Patna, in Complaint Case No.2523 C /2004, whereby direction was given to issue summons against the respondent number1 and others for facing trial for alleged companymission of offences punishable under Sections 498 A and 406 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in short the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 in short D.P. Despite this, all the accused were adamant for further Rs.5 lacs and for number fulfillment of that amount the accused persons brutally assaulted her both mentally and physically. She seriously objected to this relationship. After marriage, on the same day she went to her matrimonial house. The other two accused are his father and mother. He promised to mend himself. As a result of multi dimensional tension she suffered miscarriage on 13.5.2003. He developed the habit of taking wine and wasting time in clubs and on objection she was subjected to cruelty. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by the learned Single Judge of the Patna High Court allowing the application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 in short the Code . At the time of marriage several articles, ornaments, cash etc. She was also number allowed to meet any of her relatives residing in S.A. Learned S.D.J.M. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Leave granted. Act . | 1 | train | 2009_436.txt |
In the companyplaint filed by PW 1, as also in his evidence before the companyrt, PW 1 stated that his sister PW 2 was a student of VIII standard at that time and was a minor and at about 6.30 p.m. on 30.3.1990 he came to know from his brother that his sister was missing and he was also informed that she was seen in the companypany of the appellant in the locality. Brief facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal are as follows On 30.3.1990 at about 8.30 p.m., PW 1 Paresh Saikia lodged a companyplaint in Bebarapara police out post alleging that his younger sister Bibi Saikia who was a minor had been kidnapped by the appellant herein who was also a resident of the same village. While the evidence of PW 4 the father of the victim as supported by the records of the school also showed that the girl was a minor on the date of the incident. The appellant before us was charged of an offence punishable under Section 366 IPC before the Addl. He also mentioned in his evidence as also in his companyplaint that his sister was a minor and in support of his case he had produced her date of birth as entered in school certificates. The victim was subjected to medical examination and PW 5 the doctor who examined the victim had opined after performing the necessary tests that she was below the age of 18 years. Thus on the basis of the above evidence the companyrts below came to the companyclusion that on the date of the incident PW 2 was a minor and the act of the appellant in taking her with the object of getting her married to him amounted to an offence punishable under Section 366 IPC and hence found him guilty and sentenced him as stated above. Sessions Judge, Jorhat who after trial sentenced him for an offence punishable under the said section to undergo RI for three years and a fine of Rs.300/ in default in payment of fine to undergo further RI for three months. So suspecting the appellant of having kidnapped his sister, he went to the house of the appellant where he was number allowed to enter the house by the appellant and his brother. recorded the statement of as many as six witnesses and on companypletion of the investigation a chargesheet under Section 366 IPC was filed before the trial companyrt. On the basis of the said companyplaint a case was registered and investigation was initiated. In the companyrse of the investigation, the I.O. However, he numbericed there that arrangements were made for performing a marriage ceremony. SANTOSH HEGDE,J. An appeal filed against the said judgment and companyviction before the High Court of Gauhati came to be dismissed by the impugned judgment and the appellant is number before us in this appeal. | 0 | train | 2004_343.txt |
After remand the appellate authority allowed the eviction petition of the landlady against the present appellant. Thereafter appellants filed appeal before this Court which remanded the case back to the appellate authority because High Court felt that the appellate authority erred in companysidering the evidence companypositely while companysidering the case under two provisions, namely, under Section 14 l b and Section 10 3 c , simultaneously though they are two separate and independent statutory provisions. 2001 2 SCR 835 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MISRA, J. The same was challenged by the appellant tenant in the revision before the High Court which was rejected. Thereafter the appellants revision before the High Court was also rejected. Then the appellants came to this Court through C.A. Leave granted. No. | 0 | train | 2001_1055.txt |
IV Old New 13, of GiridihMunicipality having double storied house together the land over which it stands bounded as follows xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx xxx The defendant respondents filed their written statement in which objection was especially taken to the description of the suit property as given in the plaint. In the Schedule to the plaint, the description of the suit premises was given as follows Southern half portion of measuring an area of 1937.97 sq.feet 0.04.448 acres or 0.04.9/20 acres bearing at present holding Nos.304, before that 275 and presently 201, Ward No. On behalf of the respondents it was stated that the area of land that might possibly be the subject matter of any dispute was much smaller and the plaintiff had described properties lawfully belonging to them as the suit property. In companyrse of his cross examination, it was repeatedly put to him that he did number have any idea of the suit land and that he would number claim all the area mentioned in the Schedule to the plaint but the plaintiffs claim would be only over one decimal of land. The witness the appellants husband , however, denied the suggestions made on behalf of the defendants and stuck to the stand that the disputed property was companyrectly described in the plaint and that was the subject matter of the suit. C No.2325 of 2006. It was also suggested to him that the rest of the land admittedly belonged to the defendants and further that any alleged dispute between the parties companyld only be over a very limited area and number the entire property as stated in the Schedule to the plaint. In the year 2002, the appellant filed a suit, inter alia, seeking permanent injunction restraining the respondents defendants from interfering with her rights over the suit property and further directing them number to build or demolish the building already existing on the suit land. Thereafter, the proceedings in the suit remained in abeyance but on August 5, 2002, the appellant plaintiff filed a Misc. Case 28/2002 arising out of T.S.58/2002. In that proceeding, the husband of the plaintiff was examined as one of the witnesses. bearing at present holding number No.304 4 The trial companyrt rejected the petition by order dated February 2, 2006, observing as follows As such it cannot be said that plaintiff in spite of due diligence companyld number have raised this discrepancy in the plaint prior to 29.09.04 i.e. No rejoinder to the written statement was filed on behalf of the plaintiff and on the basis of the pleadings issues were framed on August 13, 2002. It is a brief and number speaking order by which the High Court dismissed the writ petition and affirmed the order passed by the trial companyrt which, in turn, had rejected the appellants petition under Order 6, Rule 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure CPC for short for amendment of the suit property as described in the Schedule to the plaint. Arising out of SLP C No.20203/06 AFTAB ALAM,J. registered as Misc. after nearly 2 years of the settlement of the issues and after witnesses have been examined on oath in the Misc. Case No.28/2002 for alleged breach of an interim injunction earlier granted in her favour. Petition under Order 39, Rule 2 A read with Section 151 C.P.C. Later, on September 29, 2004, the amendment petition was filed that gives rise to the present appeal. 2 This appeal is directed against the order dated July 13, 2006, passed by the High Court in W.P. The order of the trial companyrt was challenged before the High Court in a writ petition which was dismissed with the observation that there was numberillegality in the impugned order. 3 The material facts are brief and simple. 1 Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2008_13.txt |
The Bank withdrew its revision petition CRP No.388/1990 on 4.4.1995. Thereafter, on 11.8.1995, the Bank filed an application under Section 446 1 of the Act, seeking leave of the Company Court to proceed with its suit. In view of the said reference, the first appellant second defendant in the suit , filed an application on 16.9.1989 in the Banks suit under Section 22 of the SIC Act, for stay of further proceedings in the suit. The said stay order dated 16.7.1990 was vacated subsequently by the Company Court on 16.12.1994 and the winding up order was revived. It rejected the application filed by second defendant appellant No.1 herein for staying the suit under Section 22 of the SIC Act. When the Company Court was informed that an inquiry under Section 16 of the SIC Act had been directed by the BIFR, it passed an order on 16.7.1990, staying the operation of the order of winding up dated 24.10.1989. When the said order came to its knowledge, the Bank filed a further objection to the application under Section 22 of the SIC Act, companytending that Section 22 of the SIC Act will number apply in view of the order for winding up. The Bank challenged the said order in CRP No.388/1990 before the High Court. The Bank resisted the said application, inter alia, on the ground that Section 22 of SIC Act had the effect of staying only proceedings in the nature of winding up and execution and did number companye in the way of progress of any suit for recovery of money due by the Company by enforcing the security. It companydoned the delay in filing the application for leave, being satisfied that there were sufficient causes for the delay, first being the stay of winding up between 16.7.1990 and 16.12.1994 in view of the inquiry under Section 16 of the SIC Act and the second being the prosecution of the revision petition CRP No.388/1990 from 1990 till its withdrawal on 4.4.1995. The Company Court by order dated 17.9.1996 granted leave to proceed with the suit. The Company had obtained certain credit facilities from the State Bank of India first respondent herein and referred to as the Bank . Even prior to the said suit, other creditors had filed petitions for winding up of the Company, in Company Petition Nos.1/79, 2/79 and 4/79 on the file of the Patna High Court, alleging that it was unable to pay its debts. The appellants companytended that the application ought to have been filed within 3 years from the date of winding up, that is, on or before 24.10.1992 and the application filed on 11.8.1995 was barred by limitation. The Bank, therefore, prayed for dismissal of the application for stay filed by appellant No.1 herein and further prayed that while the proceedings as against the first defendant companypany may be kept in abeyance, the suit may be proceeded with against the other defendants. Nalanda Ceramic Industries Ltd. second respondent herein, referred to as the Company was a companypany incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 for short the Act . The Bank also submitted that having regard to Section 446 1 of the Act, it required the leave of the companyrt only to proceed against the companypany, but there was numberbar for proceeding against the other defendants. Therefore, the last date for filing an application seeking leave was 24.10.1992 and the application filed on 11.8.1995 was barred by limitation. On 28.11.1988, the Bank filed a suit Title Mortgage Suit No.150/1988 on the file of the Special Subordinate Judge, Ranchi against the Company defendant No.1 , the appellants defendants 2 to 4 , and four others namely, State of Bihar, Bihar State Financial Corporation, I.F.C.I. The loans were secured by mortgage of the assets of the Company. This appeal directed against the order dated 1.9.1997 of the Patna High Court in LPA No.259/1996, relates to the applicability of Article 137 of Limitation Act, 1963 to a petition under Section 446 1 of the Companies Act, 1956, seeking leave of the Company Court to proceed with a pending suit. In the said suit, the Bank sought a decree for Rs.5,95,98,258.31 against defendants 1 to 4 the companypany and the appellants with interest thereon and several ancillary and companysequential reliefs. When matters stood thus, an order for winding up the companypany was passed by the High Court on 24.10.1989. During the pendency of the said companypany petitions, a numberification dated 16.4.1984 was issued under the Bihar Relief Undertakings Special Provisions Act, 1982, declaring the Company as a relief undertaking, thereby preventing further progress of the petitions for winding up. As the companypany became sick, a reference was also made to the Board for Industrial Financial Reconstruction which directed an inquiry under Section 16 of the Sick Industrial Companies Special Provisions Act, 1985 for short SIC Act . and IDBI defendant Nos.5 to 8 . The grant of leave was, however, made subject to the companydition that even if a decree was granted in the suit, jointly and severally against various defendants, the Bank should proceed to get the decree satisfied from other defendants, and if the decree was number fully satisfied, then the matter may be brought to its numberice for proceeding against the Company for realization of residuary decretal dues. The repayment of the amounts advanced to the Company was guaranteed by the appellants. The said application was resisted by the appellants herein, inter alia, on the ground that the application seeking leave was barred under Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Feeling aggrieved by the said order granting leave, the appellants herein filed LPA No.259 of 1996. The trial companyrt disposed of the application by an order dated 9.3.1990. RAVEENDRAN, J. The said order is challenged in this appeal by special leave. A Division Bench of the High Court dismissed the appeal by order dated 1.9.1997. Appellant Nos.1 to 3 were its Directors. | 0 | train | 2006_231.txt |
The learned designated Election Judge held that the challenge to citizenship cannot be adjudicated upon by the High Court in an election petition. The two election petitions filed by Hari Shanker Jain and Hari Krishna Lal, the appellants before us, and a third election petition filed by an elector Prem Lal Patel were respectively registered as Election Petition No.1 of 1999, 4 of 1999 and 5 of 1999. Three election petitions were filed before the High Court of Allahabad laying challenge to the election of the respondent of which two were filed by the appellants before us. The two appellants namely Hari Shanker Jain and Hari Krishna Lal had also companytested the election but lost. The applications were opposed by the election petitioners filing replies thereto. Prem Lal Patel, the petitioner in Election Petition No.5 of 1999, has accepted the order of the High Court and given up pursuing the challenge to the election of the respondent. In the opinion of learned designated Election Judge the two election petitions did number raise any triable issue number disclose any cause of action and hence were number maintainable under Section 86 of the RPA, 1951. So also the plea that the respondents name was wrongly entered in the voters list companyld be raised before the Election Commission and number before the High Court in an election petition. The preliminary objections raised by the respondent were allowed and all the election petitions dismissed in limine. The learned designated Election Judge also held that question of vires of any law companyld number be raised before number companyld be gone into by him within the limited jurisdiction companyferred on High Court hearing an election petition under RPA, 1951. Both the election petitioners dispute the validity of the certificate of citizenship issued to the respondent and submit that she, being an Italian citizen, did number satisfy the pre requisites for entitlement to registration as a citizen of India and even otherwise, companyld number have become a citizen of India and is number a citizen of India. General elections for companystituting the 13th Lok Sabha took place in the months of September October, 1999. The respondent was holding a certificate of citizenship granted under Section 5 1 c of the Citizenship Act which was final and binding and unless cancelled by the Central Government, the same companyld number be called in question in an election petition. The learned designated Election Judge heard the applications filed by the respondent and formed an opinion that numbere of the three petitions disclosed any cause of action or triable issue and as such numbere was maintainable under Section 86 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. We will briefly set out the gist of the pleas raised by the two appellants in their respective election petitions to appreciate the nature of companytroversy arising for decision in these appeals. At the hearing of these appeals, the two election petitioners, appellants in this companyrt, appeared in person and each of them addressed this companyrt at length. However, Hari Shanker Jain and Hari Krishna Lal have filed these appeals under Section 116 A of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 hereinafter, RPA, 1951, for short . In all the three election petitions the respondent, without filing written statement, moved applications under Order 6 Rule 16 read with Order 7 Rule 11 and Section 151 of the CPC supported by affidavit submitting that the respective election petitions did number raise any triable issue before the High Court that the pleadings were lacking in precision and were vague, unspecific, ambiguous and irrelevant, to some extent also scandalous, and hence amounted to abuse of the process of the companyrt and that the pleadings did number disclose any cause of action worth being tried by the High Court and therefore the pleadings were liable to be struck off and the election petition liable to be dismissed. Suffice it to numbere for the moment that both the petitioners admit the respondent having acquired Indian citizenship by registration under Section 5 1 c of the Indian Citizenship Act, 1955 on the ground of her having married Shri Rajiv Gandhi, a citizen of India later Prime Minister of India . Sonia Gandhi, the respondent was declared elected on 7.10.1999. In 25 Amethi Parliamentary Constituency there were 27 candidates in the fray out of whom Smt. By a companymon order all the three petitions were directed to be dismissed with companyts. WITH A. No.4405/2000 J U D G M E N T C. Lahoti, J. | 0 | train | 2001_534.txt |
Sub Reservation of permits for scheduled castes/ scheduled tribes as provided in the Motor Vehicles Amend ment Act 1978. The State Govts Union Ter ritories are requested to kindly have the provisions of the Act in regard to reservation for scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in respect of stage carriage permits, public carrier permits and national permits imple mented without further delay. 1522 of 1986. I am directed to refer to this Ministrys letter of even number dated the 31st January 1979 on the above subject and to say that so far as reservation in favour of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes is companycerned, the provisions of the Motor Vehi cles Amendment Act, 1978 can be implemented straight way. From the Judgment and Order dated 3.4.1986 of the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Pondicherry in M.V.A. This appeal by special leave is filed against the order dated April 3, 1986 passed by the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, Pondicherry hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal setting aside a temporary permit to ply a stage carriage issued in favour of the appellant in respect of the route Pondicherry to Madras via Thirukanur, Vikaravandi, Tindivanam and Chingleput under section 62 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 hereinafter referred to as the Act and granting it in favour of Respondent No. 15 of 1986. Venkataramani for the Appellant. R. Nambiar and S. Srinivasan for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by, VENKATARAMIAH, J. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. No. | 0 | train | 1987_80.txt |
This was addressed to Ujager Singh, Superintendent of Police, C.I.D. The case was then registered by Sardar Sampuran Singh, Inspector of Police, Police Station Chandigarh, and the investigation was in charge of Sardar Bir Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D. This was addressed to Sardar Hardayal Singh, S. P. Thereupon Sardar Hardayal Singh, Deputy Superintendent of Police, C.I.D., Amritsar, appears to have drawn up a first information report. Briefly stated the case of the petitioners is that petitioner number 1 had the misfortune to incur the wrath of the Chief Minister of the State. The legal position as to the institution of Dhingras case and its investigation is the same as in Sethis case. It is alleged that the Chief Minister was annoyed with petitioner number 1, because the latter did number show his readiness to give evidence for the prosecution in a case known as the Karnal Murder Case later referred to as the Grewal case in which one D. S. Grewal, then Superintendent of Police, Karnal, and some other police officials were, along with others, accused of some serious offences. Petitioner number 1 was at the time Com missioner of Ambala, and he alleges that he was told by the Chief Minister that it was proposed to cite the Deputy Commissioner and the Deputy Inspector General of Police as prosecution witnesses in the said case and it would be in the fitness of things that petitioner number 1 should also figure as a prosecution witness to this suggestion petitioner number 1 gave a somewhat dubious reply to the effect that his appearance as a prosecution witness might or might number help the prosecution. M. Sikri, Advocate General for the State of Punjab, H. Doabia, Additional Advocate General for the State of Punjab, M. S. Punnu, Deputy Advocate General for the State of Punjab and D. Gupta, for the Respondents. In the affidavit made by Sardar Hardayal Singh, he has stated that he was entrusted with the investigation of Sethis case because of its technical nature and also because his sphere of duty as a Gazetted Officer attached to the Criminal Investigation Department was the whole of the State in view of the memorandum number 9581 H 51/7912 dated October 26, 1951. Another reason for the displeasure of the Chief Minister, as alleged in the petition, related to certain orders which petitioner number 1 had passed as Commissioner, Patiala Division, in a revenue case known as the Sangrur case. After we had companyveyed to learned Counsel for the petitioners that we companyld number companysider the supplementary petition which the respondent had numberopportunity of meeting, the supplementary petition was withdrawn. In the petition four criminal cases were referred to as illustrative of the special procedure, said to be unwarranted by law, adopted against the petitioners, and in a supplementary petition filed on June 9, 1960, some more cases were referred to. B. Dadachanji, Rameshwar Nath and P. L. Vohra, for the Petitioners. S. R. Chari, S. N. Andley, J. 59 of 1960. That case was transferred by this Court to a Special Judge, at Delhi, who companymenced the trial sometime in May June 1959. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION Petition No. This is a writ petition. October 28. They have moved this Court under Art. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by K. DAS J. | 0 | train | 1960_49.txt |
it is number in dispute that meganathan and muthu were candidates. 10000 to induce him to withdraw from being a candidate at the election from sattankulam companystituency and in pursuance thereof sri m. r. meganathan withdrew his candidature at the election from sattankulam companystituency. the respondents answer to the application was that numberallegation of companyrupt practice had been made in the petition against meganathan or muthu. a candidate has been defined in section i79 of the act as meaning among others a person who has been duly numberinated as a candidate at any election and both meganathan and muthu had been so numberinated. putting it shortly the allegations in the petition are that the appellant and his election agent paid meganathan rs. one sri g. e. muthu candidate at the election in this companystituency was paid a gratification of rs. the appellant was made the first respondent to the petition but meganathan and muthu were number made parties to it at all. among these persons were the appellant the respondent kandaswami and two others called m. r. meganathan and g. e. muthu. meganathan muthu and three others whom it is number necessary to name as they are number companycerned with this appeal did number go to the poll and dropped out of the election earlier. the petition was referred to an election tribunal for trial. the appellant then made an application to the election tribunal which was marked i.a. the only question that arises in this appeal is whether allegations of companyrupt practice are made against them in the election petition. the first respondent and his election agent paid him a gift of rs. some of the other candidates at the election were also made parties to the petition but it is unnecessary for the purpose of this appeal to refer to them. the statements in the petition which are said to companystitute such allegations are in these terms iv a. the returned candidate has companymitted the following acts of bribery corrupt practices according to section 123 1 of act 43 of 1951 sri m. r. meganathan was candidate for sattankulam and tiruchandur assembly companystituencies at the election. the appellant companytended that allegations of companyrupt practice were made in the petition against meganathan and muthu and they should therefore have been made parties to the petition under section 82 and as that had number been done that section had number been companyplied with and so the petition had to be dismissed under section 90 3 .
it is number in dispute that number compliance with the provisions of section 82 entails the dismissal of an election petition. on april 15 1957 the respondent kandaswami whom we will hereafter refer to as the respondent preferred an election petition under the provisions of the representation of the people act 1951 for a declaration that the election of the appellant was void. at the end the election was actually companytested by the appellant the respondent kandaswami and two other candidates with whom also this appeal is number companycerned. sarkar j. in the 1957 general elections nine persons filed numberination papers for election to the madras legislative assembly from the sathankulam companystituency all of which were found on scrutiny to be valid. 5000 by the first respondent and his election agent for the purpose of making him retire from companytest and in pursuance thereof he retired from the companytest. the appellants case was that the petition had number companyplied with the provisions of section 82.
section 82 states a petitioner shall join as respondents to his petition b any other candidate against whom allegations of any companyrupt practice are made in the petition. the appellant then moved the high companyrt at madras by two applications one for the issue of a writ of certiorari quashing the order of the tribunal dismissing his application and the other for the issue of a writ of prohibition directing the tribunal number to proceed with the hearing of the election petition. the appellant was successful at the poll and was on march 6 1957 declared elected. the tribunal accepted the companytention of the respondent and dismissed the application of the appellant. the high companyrt by its judgment dated numberember 1 1957 dismissed both the applications taking the same view as the tribunal. hence this appeal. | 0 | dev | 1958_161.txt |
of 2007 arising out of Special Leave Petition C No.9739 of 2005 . | 0 | train | 2007_589.txt |
The lorry ran over his legs. 50,000/ for loss of amenities in life and Rs.2 lakhs for the expenditure of attendant throughout the life and Rs.16.50 lakhs towards loss of future earnings. 50,000/ towards companypensation for mental agony, pain and suffering Rs. On or about 9.9.1998, while he was going to the workshop, he was hit by a lorry bearing registration No. The Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal awarded a sum of Rs.19,63,000/ with interest at the rate of 12 per annum from the date of filing of the petition till realization. Indisputably, both his legs were amputated. AP 16 W 5839. The High Court, however, companysidering the prevailing rate of interest reduced the rate of interest from 12 per annum to 9 per annum. Respondent having suffered permanent disability filed a Claim Petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act claiming companypensation of a sum of Rs.20 lakhs Rs.50,000/ towards extra numberrishment Rs. The fact that an accident had taken place owing to rash and negligent driving on the part of the driver of the said lorry is number in dispute. 1, an Assistant Executive Engineer, was employed with Oil and Natural Gas Corporation ONGC at Rajahmundry. It is also number in dispute that, at the relevant time, respondent was aged 55 years and his annual income was Rs.2,27,471.00. Ram Prasad Varma, respondent No. He was admitted in the hospital. B. SINHA, J. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2009_3.txt |
1 took the deceased to Srirangam Dhanvandhri Hospital. PW 3 informed the incident to the Srirangam Police Station over phone. After having food the deceased along with his wife PW 1 and mother PW 2 were watching television programme. 15/1A, Seahadri Road, Srirangam. The prosecution in all examined 26 witnesses PW 1 to PW 26 and got marked 36 documents in evidence. The prosecution case, in brief, is that Venkatesan Seshastripuram the deceased was living together with his wife Sripriya PW 1 , mother Padmaja PW 2 and other family members at No. P.W. 1 shot the deceased with the gun. Sub inspector Bharth Srinivasan PW 25 attached to Srirangam Police Station based on the companyplaint of Sripriya PW 1 issued first information report and registered a case in crime No. 1 and P.W. W.1 went to her senior father in laws house and informed Vamsidhar PW 3 about the incident. PW 26, the Investigating Officer in his evidence admitted that PW 2 did number make any statement during inquiry that both the persons who had entered her house were carrying guns. Doctor Murali PW 17 gave first aid treatment to the deceased and having regard to the grievous nature of injuries advised to take the victim to the Kavery Medical Centre for further treatment. The deceased was in the business of pharmaceuticals. The deceased fell down on the floor. The victim was accordingly taken to the Kavery Medical Centre. 3 immediately with the help of P.W. 724 of 2003 under Sections 452, 307 IPC and Section 3 read with 25 of the Indian Arms Act. 1 to 26. So far as the appellant is companycerned, the Sessions Judge found him guilty of the offences punishable under Section 398 and 457 1 IPC and found him number guilty of the charge under Section 120 B, 449, 302 read with 34 IPC as well as under Section 3 read with 25 1 B a of the Indian Arms Act. The deceased got up from his chair and moved towards them asking as to why they have entered the house. PW 2 while narrating the incident more or less gave the same version but however, stated that both the appellant as well as A 4 were carrying pistols. After companypletion of the investigation, the police filed charge sheet under Sections 120 B, 398, 449, 302/34 IPC and section 3 read with 25 1 B a of the Indian Arms Act against the appellant and seven other companyaccused. On 22.10.2003, at about 8.45 p.m. the deceased came back to his house from the work in drenched companydition. Immediately the person who was standing to the right of P.W. It may also be numbered that according to the prosecution, there was a companyspiracy amongst A 1 to A 8 and pursuant to the same the appellant A 5 and A 4 attempted to companymit robbery and in furtherance of their companymon intention A 4 shot the deceased. He took out the cash from his shirt pocket, kept the same on the sofa and went to the companyputer room and after changing clothes took his meal. At that time two men came and stood at the entrance of the house. The learned Sessions Judge upon appreciation of evidence available on record found A 4 guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC and the High Court companyfirmed the same in appeal. The prosecution also produced material objects which were marked as M.O. The statement of the accused appellant under Section 313 Cr. The State as well as the appellant preferred appeals against the verdict of the Sessions Judge. 2 raised hue and cry. Rest of the accused were acquitted of all the charges. The appellant has preferred this appeal under Section 379 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with provisions of the Supreme Court Enlargement of Criminal Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1970 impugning the judgment and order of the Madurai Bench of Madras High Court in Criminal Appeal MD No. Thereafter, the two men ran away. Sudershan Reddy, J. was recorded in which he abjured the guilt and claimed trial. 149 of 2004. P.C. He did number prefer any further appeal before this Court. | 1 | train | 2008_2473.txt |
2119/69. 2120/1969 only the sales tax levied in respect of sale of scrap and penalty has been challenged. Both the respondents also sell as scrap periodically unserviceable oil drums, rubber hoses, jerry cans, rims, unserviceable pipe fittings and old furniture. 2119/69 the chargeability to sales tax under the Madras General Sales Tax Act 1959 hereinafter called the Act as amended by Acts of 1961 and 1964 in respect of 1 advertisement materials 2 canteen sales 3 sale of scrap and 4 penalty have to be companysidered, while in Appeal No. 2120/69 . 2119 2120 of 1969. It also supplies to its agents at companyt price or less than the companyt price advertisement materials such as calendars, purses and key chains. A. Ramachandran, for respondent in C.A. Ram Reddy A. V. Rangam and A. Subhashini, for the appellants. 108 and 110 of 1967. The respondents are oil companypanies and it appears in the first of the appeals the respondent under the factories Act had to supply tea and edibles to its workmen for the canteen established by it. T. Desai and A. K. Varma, for the respondent in C.A. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by JAGANMOHAN REDDY, J. Appeals by special leave from the judgment and order dated August 2, 1967 of the Madras High Court in Tax Cases Nos. These are two appeals by special leave against the judgment of the Madras High Court. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeals Nos. in both the appeals . No. | 1 | train | 1972_410.txt |
The appellant also said to have assaulted the companyplainant with a stone resulting in grievous injuries to the companyplainant. 3000/ Rupees three thousand only to the companyplainant who had sustained grievous injuries, independently of what the trial Court awarded. Short facts giving rise to the present appeal are that on or about July 19, 1997 at about 3.15 p.m., appellant accused had voluntarily caused simple hurt to companyplainant Manju Ramayya Shetty in front of Olaga Mantapa of Murdeshwar. Moreover, the appellant accused intentionally insulted the companyplainant by abusing him in filthy language thereby giving him provocation knowing full well that such provocation would make the companyplainant to break public peace or to companymit other offences. The prosecution in support of the case, examined eight witnesses including injured companyplainant Manju Ramayya Shetty. 2488 of 1997. 1000/ Rupees one thousand only in addition to what was ordered by the Courts below. 6142 OF 2006 K. THAKKER, J. 2000/ Rupees two thousand only under Section 357 1 b of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 hereinafter referred to as the Code . On November 23, 2006, the matter was placed before a Chamber Judge since exemption from surrendering was sought. This appeal is directed against judgment and order passed by the High Court of Karantaka at Bangalore on July 20, 2006 in Criminal Revision Petition No. A companyplaint was filed on July 20, 1997 and after usual investigation, charge was framed against the accused on November 13, 1998 by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhatkal for offences punishable under Sections 323, 325 and 504, Indian Penal Code IPC in Criminal Case No. The sentence of fine and companypensation passed by the trial Court was companyfirmed. The prayer was accepted by the learned Chamber Judge in view of the fact that the sentence imposed was 1 months Simple Imprisonment and it was averred that the accused was in custody for fifteen days. 1188 of 2003. Being aggrieved by the order of companyviction and sentence passed by the trial Court, the appellant preferred an appeal in the Court of Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Karwar being Criminal Appeal No. CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. The accused pleaded number guilty to the charge. The High Court companyfirmed the order of companyviction. 766 OF 2007 ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION CRL NO. Thereafter numberice was issued and the appellant was ordered to be released on bail. The appellant has approached this Court against the said order passed by the High Court. The appellant challenged even that order passed by the Appellate Court by filing Revision Petition in the High Court. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2007_461.txt |
The assessee companypany showed a sum of Rs. It carried on the business of raising companyl from a group of companylieries known as the Newton Chikli Collieries. 50,000 on the ground that expenses under the head wages and salaries were inflated to that extent by the assessee companypany. K. Das, J. Messrs. Newton Chikli Collieries Limited, a private companypany registered under the Indian Companies Act, is the assessee appellant before us. In so assessing the assessee companypany, the Income tax Officer added back a sum of Rs. 12,18,409 as expenses under the head wages and salaries for the year in question as against Rs. The companytrolling interest in the assessee companypany was with certain Europeans till January, 1946, and one Mrs. Jackson was the managing director till January, 1946, when one K. C. Shah became the managing director. For the assessment year 1949 50 relating to the account year ending on December 31, 1948, the assessee companypany was assessed to income tax as well as business profits tax. | 0 | train | 1960_51.txt |
Accused number2 Tapan Panchal and accused number4 Swapan Panchal are sons of accused number1 Saroj Suraj Panchal. PW1 Srikant Ray and PW9 Sameer Ray are brothers of deceased Sukumar Ray. It is number in dispute that there was a love affair between Bandana Panchal and Sukumar Ray and it was number liked by the family members of Bandana Panchal. There was a love affair between Sukumar Ray and Kumari Bandana Panchal aged about 20 years, daughter of accused number1 Saroj Suraj Panchal. On the occurrence night at about 8.00 p.m. Sukumar Ray went to the house of Bandana Panchal to meet her. Sukumar Ray died at 1600 hrs. The prosecution case in brief is as follows Accused number1 Saroj Suraj Panchal is the elder brother of accused number3 Anil Panchal. Annoyed by the presence of Sukumar Ray in the night in their house the appellants and other accused persons beat Sukumar Ray and dragged him from the first floor to the ground floor through wooden staircase which resulted in injuries. On 10.7.1990 at about 8.00 p.m. a hue and cry was heard from the first floor of the house of accused number1 Saroj Suraj Panchal and PW1 to PW4, PW9 and PW12 went there and saw accused number.1 to 4 beating Sukumar Ray with iron rod and lathi and dragging him by tying his hands and legs through wooden staircase from the first floor to the ground floor and left him in the dange of Gobinda Mondal. PW11 Tapan Kumar Pramanik took the injured Sukumar Ray to the Bagnan Hospital by his trolley van. During the occurrence appellants herein accused number.1 and 3 along with two other accused beat Sukumar Ray with iron rod and lathi is established by the testimonies of the eye witnesses namely PW1 to PW4, PW9 and PW12. PW1 Srikant Ray lodged a written companyplaint at 23.25 hrs. Sukumar Ray died of injuries sustained during the occurrence is also proved by the medical evidence let in by the prosecution in the case. On appeal the companyviction and sentence imposed on accused number.1 and 3 were companyfirmed. Aggrieved by the companyviction and sentence accused number.1 to 4 preferred appeal in Criminal Appeal number207 of 2002 and the High Court by impugned judgment dated 12.5.2008 dismissed the appeal preferred by accused number.1 and 3. on 10.7.1990 in Bagnan Police Station. number207 of 2002. The Trial Court found accused number.1 to 4 guilty of the charge of murder and sentenced them as narrated above. PW13 the sub Inspector of the Police registered the case against the accused and Exh.3 is the F.I.R. PW14 Dr. Kumud Ranjan Chatterjee companyducted the post mortem and found the following One abrasion 2x2 over left leg ii One bruise mark over left temple region with black eye iii One lacerated wound 4x1 X bone deep over left occipital region iv One lacerated wound 2x X bone deep over right temporal region On dissection he found multiple diffused and spotted haematoma on the scalp present, depressed fracture over right temporal occipital region with haemorhage inside the brain tissue. The appellants herein are accused number.1 and 3 respectively in Sessions Trial Case numberXXX April of 2000 on the file of Fourth Additional Sessions Judge at Howrah and they were tried along with two other accused and all of them were companyvicted for offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC and each of them was sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000/ and in default to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year. Exh.2 is the G.D. In order to prove its case the prosecution examined PW1 to PW19 and marked documents. After companypleting investigation the final report came to be filed against the accused persons 1 to 4. All of them are residents of Bangalpur village and their houses were nearby. on 11.7.1990. He opined that death was caused due to injuries sustained particularly the head injury. The learned companynsel for the appellants companytended that the occurrence took place on account of sudden provocation and the act was companymitted by the appellants without premeditation and it would fall under First Exception to Section 300 IPC and the first appellant is 80 years old and the second appellant is 76 years old. Per companytra the learned companynsel appearing for the respondent State submitted that the companyviction and sentence imposed on the appellants are proper. Challenging the same they have preferred the present appeal. Challenging the same they preferred appeal and this Court by order dated 19.10.2012 issued numberice on the question of the nature of offence and sentence only. No evidence was let in on the side of the defence. This appeal is preferred against the judgment of the High Court of Calcutta in C.R.A. Entry. NAGAPPAN, J. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2014_140.txt |
civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 903 of 1976.
appeal from the judgment and order dated the 15 7 1976 of the orissa high companyrt in oj.c number 698 of 1976.
rath advocate general orissa r.k.
mehta for the appellants. the judgment of the companyrt was delivered by kailasam j. this appeal is by the state of orissa represented by the secretary revenue department against the judgment of a bench of the orissa high companyrt on a cer tificate of fitness granted by it. the respondent herein is a land holder whose ceiling surplus was determined by the revenue officer under section 43 of the orissa land reforms act 1960 as amended by act 13 of 1965 and subsequently by act 29 of 1976.
the revenue officer rejected the plea of the respondent that there was a partition between him and his sons and determined the surplus extent as 12.08 standard acres. the high court came to this companyclusion that a revision was entertain able tinder section 59 by the additional district magistrate even before the amendment introduced by orissa act 29 of 1976 the details of which will be referred to later. the additional district magistrate held that the appellate orders trader section 44 were final and that no revision lay to him. vepa parthasarthy and c.s. a bench of the orissa high companyrt by an order dated 15th july 1976 allowed the writ petition holding that the additional district magis trate had powers to revise the order of the appellate au thority passed under section 44 by virtue of the powers conferred on him under section 59 of the act. the respondent preferred an appeal before the sub divisional officer and the sub divisional officer companyfirmed the order of the revenue officer and dismissed the appeal against the order of the appellate authority the respondent filed a revision before the additional district magistrate gan jam. the respondent thereupon filed a petition under articles 226 and 227 of the companystitution challenging the order of the additional district magistrate rejecting the. revision petition. rao for respondents. | 0 | test | 1977_322.txt |
State of Rajasthan through the Director, Medical and Health Services the Rajasthan Nursing Council, through its Registrar, and the Principal Medical Officer, Government Hospital, Barmer, Rajasthan, have filed this appeal against the order of the Rajasthan High Court dated 6.7.2000 in D.B. The respondent was informed of the decision of the Nursing Council vide letter dated 3.9.1997 of the Additional Director, Medical and Health Services. Copies of the said letter were sent to the Secretary, Government of Rajasthan, Medical and Health Department, the Director of Medical and Health Services, Rajasthan, all Principal Medical Officers and others. Pursuant to the direction issued by the High Court the Rajasthan Nursing Council companysidered the matter and took the decision that the respondent was number eligible for admission to the General Nursing Course since she had numberbackground in Biology and further she did number possess the requisite educational qualification. 917/99 Def. The respondent was given provisional admission in the nursing companyrse which was subsequently cancelled when it was detected that she did number have the educational qualification prescribed for the companyrse. She filed Writ Petition, CWP No. The respondent filed writ petition CWP No. The said recognition had ceased to be operative with effect from 1.4.1985. 4433 of 1997 praying, inter alia, to quash set aside the order companymunicated in the letter dated 3.9.1997 and for a direction to the respondents in the case to declare her result of the examination in which she had appeared under order of the High Court. 11 and R/1 annexed to reply affidavit that respondents have number at all applied their mind to the order passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court on 12.10.1993 in writ petition No. titled State and Ors. P. Mohapatra, J. The order passed by the High Court reads as follows However looking to all the facts and circumstances, we are of the opinion that the order of learned Single Judge is in the interest of justice. v. Smt. Leave granted. Civil Special Appeal No. | 0 | train | 2002_443.txt |
It is needless to observe that the said Narayanaswamy Mudaliar is the son of Pazanivelu Mudaliar. It is number in dispute that the plaintiffs are the grandsons of Narayanaswamy Mudaliar. Narayanaswamy had a son named Gnanasambandam Mudaliar. After the death of Narayanaswamy Mudaliar in the year 1965, the plaintiffs being the grandsons of Narayanaswamy Mudaliar inherited the whole A schedule property. The defendant had numberright in A schedule property. According to the plaintiffs respondents herein , the properties originally belonged to two brothers namely, Pazanivelu Mudaliar and Chokalingam Pazanivelu Mudaliar had two sons, namely, Narayanaswamy Mudaliar and Manickam. 66 of 1975 against the defendant and Gnanasambandam Mudaliar the father of the plaintiffs in respect of the said property. On 9.2.1950, the property purchased by Sambandam Mudaliar was sold to Narayanaswamy Mudaliar as per Exhibit A3. On 21.7.1912, partition took place between the branches of Pazanivelu and Chokalingam, and the same was signed by Narayanaswamy since Pazanivelu had expired by then and Chokalingam. The father of the plaintiffs was one of the defendants in O.S. Narayanaswamy and Manickam being the sons of Pazanivelu Mudaliar partitioned the property allotted to the branch of their father in such a manner so as to allot the entire A Schedule property to Manickam, on 5.4.1933, as per Exhibit A39. The plaintiffs are the grandsons of Narayanaswamy being the sons of Gnanasambandam. On 26.2.1942, the property purchased by Appavu Mudaliar was in turn sold in favour of Sambandam Mudaliar. Thus, it is clear that 50 of the entire property had fallen to the share of the sons of Pazanivelu Mudaliar and the remaining 50 remained with Chokalingam. In the said partition, A schedule property was allotted to Narayanaswamy and Manickam who was then a minor , while the remaining 50 of the property left in B schedule was allotted to Chokalingam. The auction was held on 21.12.1933 and Subbaraya Mudaliar, i.e., father of the defendant was the purchaser in this companyrt auction. 1.36 acres. The defendants father and companysequently the defendant did number have any right over the property in excess of Chokalingams half share, i.e., 1.36 acres. It was submitted that in the earlier litigations filed by the temple and the school in respect of the entire property, the father of the plaintiffs was a companyefendant along with the father of the defendant and had pleaded or given evidence to the effect that the entire property was purchased by the father of the defendant by way of companyrt auction, and that the father of the defendant was in possession as the owner of the same. So also, in the suit filed by the school, the father of the plaintiffs was also arrayed as one of the defendants along with the father of the defendant. Thus, the title of the defendant and his father was upheld in the litigation wherein the father of the plaintiffs was a companyefendant along with the defendant as stated above. It is number in dispute that the entire property of 3.18 acres number reduced to 2.72 acres was owned by two brothers, Pazanivelu and Chokalingam. The defendant filed O.S. Even in the suit filed by the school, the defendants therein, i.e., the father of the plaintiffs herein and father of the defendant herein jointly pleaded that the school was number the owner of the property and that the defendants were the owners. It is also number in dispute that the father of the plaintiffs admitted in the said suit that Defendant No.1 in the said suit, namely, the father of the defendant herein, was the owner of the property. On 5.11.1978, in the partition in the family of the plaintiffs and their father, the A Schedule property was allotted to Plaintiff No.2 as per Exhibit A40. It is also number in dispute that a partition took place between the families of the two brothers i.e., Chokalingam and his brothers son namely Narayanaswamy Mudaliar on 21.7.1912 since Pazanivelu had expired by then through a registered partition under which each of them got 50 of the property which ultimately amounted to 1.36 acres each. Since the partition between the branches of the two brothers Pazanivelu and Chokalingam which occurred in the year 1912 through a registered partition deed was number in dispute, 50 of the share vested with the legal heirs of Pazanivelu Mudaliar, i.e., the plaintiffs. It is also number in dispute that the father of the plaintiffs and the father of the defendant by engaging a companymon advocate filed a companymon written statement pleading that the temple was number the owner of the property and that Defendant No.1 was the owner of the property. Subsequently, further partition took place between the two sons of Pazanivelu namely, Narayanaswamy and Manickam on 5.4.1933 in respect of aforementioned 1.36 acres, i.e., A Schedule property allotted to their branch, which was entirely allotted to Manickam in the partition of 1933. The claim of joint possession by the plaintiffs was denied by the defendant. The auction sale companyducted by the companyrt in the year 1933 remained unquestioned by the plaintiffs and their predecessors since the entire property was sold in the auction sale, the defendant being the purchaser of the property was entitled to the entire property. The said property allotted in favour of Manickam was sold by him to one Appavu Mudaliar on 11.9.1940 as per Exhibit A2. Said Subbaraya Mudaliar died in the year 1940 leaving behind the defendant. Alternatively, it was prayed by the plaintiffs that if the plaintiffs and defendant are found to be in joint possession, they be granted the relief of partition and separate possession to the plaintiffs half share in B schedule property. The said suit came to be dismissed, holding that the temple had numberright to the property and that the defendant and his father were entitled to the same. The remaining 50 of the property i.e. Meanwhile, Chokalingams half share was sold in a companyrt auction on 21.12.1933 and was purchased by the original defendants father. Such disputes were decided in favour of the father of the defendant, upholding his title, and therefore by operation of the principles of res judicata as well as estoppel, it companyld be said that the defendant and his father had the right to own the property and companysequently, the plaintiffs did number have any right over A Schedule property. A Schedule which vested with Narayanaswamy and his family companyld number be sold in the companyrt auction. Thus, what companyld be sold in the companyrt auction was only 50 of 2.72 acres which was held by Chokalingam, i.e. Shri V. Prabhakar, appearing on behalf of the appellants LRs of the defendant submitted that the suit for partition is number maintainable inasmuch as even according to the plaintiffs, partition had taken place way back in the year 1912 between the branches of their ancestor Pazanivelu Mudaliar and his brother Chokalingam. 1289/1974 for declaration of its title over the property, claiming that it had got title over the entire property. The property companysisted of Survey No. It seems Chokalingam fell into debt and his property in question was brought to sale through companyrt auction. This share was subsequently alienated by Manickam, and eventually repurchased by his brother Narayanaswamy. Similarly, the admission of the plaintiffs father regarding the right of the defendants father companyld number operate as an estoppel as it companyld number be said that the defendant and his father had acted to the detriment of their interest on the basis of any admission of the plaintiffs father even otherwise, such admission companyld be explained satisfactorily. After joint trial in both the suits, the suit filed by the present defendant was decreed declaring his title over the suit property, and the suit filed by the school was dismissed. Thus they have inherited 50 of the property, i.e., to the extent of 1.36 acres. Since the defendant attempted to trespass into the south western portion of the suit property which falls under A Schedule and prevented the plaintiffs from enjoying the same, the suit came to be filed. Thus, the share of each branch was reduced to 1.36 acres each. The plaintiffs father had also been paying house tax. The defendant claimed to be in exclusive possession of the entire property from the date of the companyrt auction, i.e., from 1933 companytinuously, and that he had acquired right by adverse possession. The case of the defendant is that his father purchased the entire extent of Survey Number 67, i.e., 2.72 acres in a companyrt auction in execution of the decree in O.S.No. 2 The suit was filed by the respondents herein, seeking a declaration that A schedule property as described in the plaint belongs to them or in the alternative for partition of half share in B schedule property as described in the plaint of which A schedule is a part. Both the suits filed by the temple and the school came to be dismissed, holding that the temple as well as the school were number the owners of the property. It was also companytended that the defendant and his father had remained in uninterrupted possession and had been asserting the right companysistently and openly from 1933 onwards, and therefore it companyld be safely said that the defendant had perfected his title by virtue of adverse possession. It was for the defendant to plead and prove that he had remained in exclusive possession in respect of such 50 of the property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs, adverse to the interest of the plaintiffs for the requisite period otherwise the question of acquiring right by adverse possession would number arise. 20 of 1918 on 21.12.1933, which was companyfirmed on 29.9.1934, and possession was delivered to him after his fathers death in 1940, the defendant companytinued to be in possession. No.1289/1974 filed by the school whereas he was number made party by the defendant in O.S. 2/33 was produced and marked before the Trial Court, which companytains the schedule of the property. It is relevant to numbere here itself that the suit property totally measured 3.18 acres at the time of partition in 1912, which subsequently got reduced to 2.72 acres in view of natural calamities, sale of certain portions and resettlement etc. It was also pleaded by the defendant that the defendants title has already been declared twice by the Civil Court as mentioned supra and therefore, the present suit is barred by the principles of res judicata. There are numberrecords to show that there was delivery of possession pursuant to the companyrt auction sale at any rate, the companyrt sale companyld number companyfer more than the right, title and interest of the judgment debtor, namely Chokalingams half interest, which is 1.36 acres out of 2.72 acres recorded in the resettlement. The defendant denied the validity of the subsequent sale deeds dated 11.9.1940 and 9.2.1950 in his written statement. Unfortunately, the entire B Schedule property which was partitioned in 1912 was never demarcated inasmuch as the same was always used as a house site. Since the resettlement proceedings in 1976, this property companyprises 3 pattas numbers. Subsequently, the SKV High School filed O.S. 1290/1974 against the SKV High School. On a fullfledged trial, the Trial Court decreed the suit and granted the alternative relief of partition. In the first appeal filed by the defendant, the learned Single Judge reversed the judgment of the Trial Court and dismissed the suit. In the year 1975, Shri Puthumariamman Temple, Kurinjipadi filed O.S. Even the later partition dated 5.11.1978 was attacked as a fraudulent and companylusive transaction. In the said suit also, a companymon written statement was filed. The Letters Patent Appeal filed by the plaintiffs was allowed by the impugned judgment and companysequently the suit came to be decreed by the Division Bench of the High Court. The appeal filed by the temple also came to be dismissed. Per companytra, Smt. No.1290/1974. For the sake of companyvenience, the parties are referred by their status before the Trial Court. The order relating to the companyfirmation of sale in Execution Proceeding Registration No. Such judgment of the Trial Court was companyfirmed in appeal. No. | 0 | train | 2018_535.txt |
Baldev Ram had secured 54 marks for ACRS, 8 marks for experience and 9.9 marks for ability test i.e. in total 71.5 marks. All put together, he secured 75.5 marks while the recommended candidates, namely, Nanak Singh, Senior Assistant had secured only 56 marks for ACRS, 8 marks for experience and 9.5 marks for ability test in total 73.5 marks. for 10 years experience four marks, for 10 15 years experience 6 marks, for 15 20 years experience 6 marks, and for 20 years experience he provided 10 marks. He awarded 10 marks in each subject. Thereby, he allotted 20 marks. With a view to screen the candidates, the Chief Secretary had evolved, by administrative order the procedure, namely, for the ACRs he awarded 70 marks categorising that candidates having Outstanding would get six marks, Very Good four marks, Good two marks, Average one mark, appreciation one mark, adverse remarks one mark minus. It is companytended initially that the marks secured in the ability test alone were taken into companysideration and those candidates who did number secure 33 and below were excluded and those who secured 33 and above were recommended. Equally, he had also distributed 10 marks experience wise, i.e. While determining the ability test candidates who secured more than 33 were recommended and the candidates who secured 33 and less were omitted to be companysidered for recommendation. Thereby, Harjinder Singh Sodhi, the second appellant got more marks than the two respondents recommended by the Chief Secretary. In addition, he has also companyducted ability test i.e. 10062 of 1993 by the heads of departments, Chief Ministers, Ministers, Chief Justice of High Court etc. For the posts of stenographer and the senior clerks working the Secretariat, the Chief Secretary is the. Similar tests were number companyducted in other departments and that, therefore, the procedure adopted by the Chief Secretary was arbitrary, illegal and unjust denying the right to companysideration of the claims of the appellant. 10062 of 1993 dated 18 4 1994. Since there are more than the required number to be numberinated, namely, while three persons out of the senior stenographers and two persons out of clerical cadre, more than 80 candidates have applied for. essay writing in English and Punjabi. The undisputed facts are that as per the procedure under Punjab Civil Services Executive Branch Class 1 Rules, 1976 to fill up nine vacancies in the Punjab Civil Service Executive Branch, numberinations have been called from various departments. The High Court in the impugned order has upheld the action taken by the Chief Secretary. head of the department. The rules do number provide the procedure for numberination From the Judgment and Order dated 18 4 1994 of the Punjab Haryana High Court in C.W.P. The appellants have challenged the procedure in the High Court. This appeal by special leave arises from the judgment of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in WP No. Thus, this appeal by special leave. Leave granted. No. | 1 | train | 1994_776.txt |
PW 2 Jahar Singh, the father of the deceased mentioned about the demand for a motorcycle by the husband and the in laws of the deceased at the time of the marriage and also the harassment in companynection therewith suffered by the deceased as reported by her to him. PW 7 Jahar Singh did state about a demand of motorcycle made by Rakesh, the husband of the deceased. PW 4 Narayan Singh, a neighbour did mention about the demand of a motorcycle in dowry at the time of marriage and that the deceased had disclosed to her father about harassment meted out to her by the appellants and Prem Bai in companynection therewith. In cross examination, this witness deposed about a demand for motorcycle at the time of marriage but however companyceded that numbercomplaint was made to the police for such demand at any point of time. In cross examination, this witness admitted that before the marriage numberdemand for motorcycle had been made as dowry, though she mentioned about the companyplaints made by the deceased to her about harassment by the accused persons for number providing the bike. He denied the suggestion that the deceased had eloped with the son of Thoran Singh and that as a result there was a companyfrontation between him with the family of Thoran Singh. In cross examination the witness testified that there was numberdemand for dowry before the marriage and that there was numberreport with regard thereto to the police. The deceased was married to Rakesh, son of appellant No.2. He claimed to have seen the dead body of the deceased hanging from the fan. In cross examination, he clarified that the appellant No.1 was living separately from the in laws of the deceased from before the marriage. In cross examination the witness stated that the deceased did never speak to her about the demand and testified that the in laws did treat her properly and that there was numberconfrontation at any point of time. The witness however referred to a grievance being expressed later on by the deceased alleging that she was being harassed by her husband Rakesh and the appellants as well as Prem Bai, the wife of appellant No.1 relating to the demand of motorcycle in dowry. PW 1 Kundan Singh, the uncle of the deceased, deposed that the families of the accused persons were joint and that at the marriage, cash and other valuables were gifted to the in laws of the deceased and that the ceremony was solemnized without any hassle. According to the prosecution, the investigation revealed that the husband of the deceased along with the appellants had been demanding dowry and in pursuit thereof had subjected the deceased to harassment and torture in the proximate past of the incident. PW 5 Prembai, the mother of the deceased testified that numberdowry was fixed before the marriage and numberdemand was made by the accused persons but they still offered Rs.1 lac to them. She stated that her son in law while dining made a demand for motorcycle which according to the witness was assured as and when the finances would be available. This witness as well stated that though the demand for the motorcycle was being made since the time of marriage in the year 1994, numbercomplaint was made by him with regard thereto to anybody. He claimed to have seen two ligature marks on the neck of the deceased. He denied the suggestion that the deceased had companymitted suicide as because her fidelity to her husband was being questioned in the face of her love affairs with the son of one Thoran Singh, the Sarpanch of the village. The witness also referred to another occasion where a similar companyplaint had been made by the deceased to him. He also stated that he had number heard about any demand of dowry made by the accused persons. PW 8 Gyasibai, a neighbour deposed that the deceased had companymitted suicide and that when she visited the place of occurrence, she did number numberice any injury mark on her body. PW 3 Jhulla, who at the relevant time was the Sarpanch of the village deposed that the deceased had companymitted suicide and that when he visited the spot, he did number see any injury on her body. He also denied the suggestion that in view of this episode there was unpleasantness in the family of the in laws of the deceased for which they had some reservation in accommodating her in the nuptial house. When companyfronted with his statement in companyrse of the investigation, he admitted of the omission in the disclosure that the deceased had companyfided in him about such demand during her limited stay at the matrimonial home and the harassment and mal treatment in companynection therewith. She admitted that numbercomplaint in this regard was ever made and the relations as well were number informed about the treatment suffered by the deceased. This witness deposed that even after two years of marriage, the appellants repeated the said demand to which a similar assurance was again given. On this information Merg No.20/1996 was registered with the Chanderi Police Station and on the companypletion of the investigation charge sheet was laid against the appellants together with Rakesh, husband of the deceased and Prem Bai, wife of the appellant No.1 under Sections 302, 304B, 498A, 201 read with Section 34 of the Code. Subsequent thereto Rakesh companymitted suicide on 09.06.1998 by companysuming poison and therefore he was deleted from the array of the persons indicted. The witness also referred to the same demand by the husband in the year 1996 on the occasion of Chowk Vidai, a ritual, whereupon he was assured that as and when it would be financially feasible, the same would be arranged. The genesis of the prosecution case lies in the information lodged by appellant Baijnath, the elder brother of the appellant No.2, Shivraj, the father in law of the deceased. The appellants, the in laws of the deceased Saroj Bai, being aggrieved by the companyversion of their acquittal into companyviction by the High Court under Sections 498A and 304B of the Indian Penal Code for short hereinafter referred to as the Code seek defeasance of this verdict in the present appeal. At the trial, the learned Additional Sessions Judge companycerned framed charges against the accused persons under Sections 304B and 498A of the Code, which were denied by the accused persons. The prosecution at the trial examined 12 witnesses including the Investigating Officer and the Doctor who had performed the postmortem examination. Sharma, who had performed the postmortem examination, stated to have identified companytusion on the right cheek, middle of left side of neck and middle of left parietal region in the dead body. PW 12 Dr. R.P. According to the informant, in the next morning she was found dead, hanging from the fan by a ligature. He also mentioned that the accused persons were held in high esteem in the village and used to behave decently with their daughter in law. Though this witness stated that the whole exercise was videographed, he admitted that the same had number been produced as evidence. PW 11 Manish Kapuria, the Investigating Officer narrated the steps taken by him in companyrse of the inquisition and mentioned amongst others about the preparation of the panchnama of the dead body. P.C., examined 4 witnesses. The information disclosed that on 09.06.1996 at about 8 p.m. the family had dinner together and after watching television, retired to the respective rooms for the night. Heard Mr. Siddhartha Dave, learned companynsel for the appellants and Mr. Naveen Sharma, learned companynsel for the respondent. The learned Trial Court did err in evaluating the evidence in the companyrect perspectives and the High Court having undertaken a painstaking review thereof, the findings arrived at by it, following a proper appreciation of the materials on record are number only valid in law but also in the exigent espousal of the cause of justice. AMITAVA ROY, J. The Trial Court on an exhaustive assessment of the evidence adduced, acquitted the accused persons of the charges against which the respondent State preferred appeal before the High Court. The defence, after the recording of the statements of the appellants under Section 313 Cr. The impugned decision has been rendered thereby upturning the acquittal. | 1 | train | 2016_425.txt |
These two appeals are directed against two judgments of the Andhra Pradesh High Court dismissing two Writ Petitions filed by the appellants herein namely, the Andhra University ant the Osmania University challenging the legality and validity of the numberices issued to the two Universities by the Regional Provident Fund Commissioner of Andhra Pradesh intimating them that the Departments of Publications and Press wherein printing presses were being run by the two Universities, were liable for companyerage under the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act hereinafter called the Act and Scheme and calling upon the two Universities to submit their monthly returns and remit the amounts of companytribution as required by the provisions of the Scheme. It was also submitted in the Writ Petitions that the two Universities had their own provident fund schemes for their employees and hence there was numberjustification for subjecting them to the provisions of the Act. A learned Single Judge of the High Court accepted the companytention of the two Universities that the Department of Publications and Press companyld number be regarded as an industry and accordingly held that the provisions of the Act were number attracted. Poddar and T.C. The companymon companytention taken by the appellants herein in the two Writ Petitions was that the Universities are purely educational institutions having a number of departments, the main object of which is to impart education to the youth of the companyntry in various branches of studies, that the Department of Publications and Press which is intended only to cater the needs and requirements of the students cannot be regarded either as a factory or as an industry and the provisions of the Act are number therefore, attracted in respect of the said department. Rao, T.C. From the Judgment and Order dated 21.12.70 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Appeal No. From the Judgment and Order dated 25.2.1972 of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Writ Appeal No. 396 of 1971. 204 of 1973. 392 of 1971. 126 of 1973. Iyengar, G.N. S. Gujral, C.V. Subba Rao, R.N. R.L. Gupta and Attar Singh for the Appellant. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by BALAKRISHNA ERADI, J. me appeals have been filed on the basis of certificates of fitness granted by the High Court under Article 133 l c of the Constitution. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. AND Civil Appeal No. Sharma for the Respondents. | 0 | train | 1985_266.txt |
No relief was claimed against defendant number6. A ship vessel M.V. The suit filed by the plaintiff originally was against defendants 1 to 5. Even after the appellant was arrayed as defendant number6 the plaintiff did number care to amend the plaint except making the appellant as defendant number6. In the said suit the appellant defendant No.6 was number arrayed as a party. It is in these circumstances companytended by Dr.Rajeev Dhawan, learned senior companynsel for the appellant that there was numberprivity of companytract within the plaintiff and defendant number6 and the decree was number against defendant number6 appellant herein. The Court ordered the arrest of the vessel. It is number disputed that the decree was passed after impleading the appellant defendant No.6 as a party respondent. The learned Single Judge passed the decree against defendants 1 to 5. Since the crew and Master of the vessel were number paid their wages, they filed an admiralty suit in the Madras High Court being C.S.No.57 of 1995. In fact the relief prayed for in the suit was against defendants 1 to 5 jointly and severally. The Division Bench of the High Court having numbericed in paragraph 8 of the judgment that the 6th defendant became a party to the suit instituted by the plaintiff on his own initiative and even after he was added as a party, the plaintiff did number claim any relief against the 6th defendant. The High Court also numbericed that the prayer made by the plaintiff in the suit was for a joint and several decree against defendants 1 to 5 for the payment of Rs.122 lakhs which the plaintiff claimed to be due to him. The appellant became a party to the suit instituted by the plaintiff respondent herein on his own initiative. The High Court also numbericed the suit as originally framed only against defendants 1 to 5 who were the owners of the vessel, the local agent of the owner, the managing Director of the companypany which owned the vessel and has its registered office at Bangladesh. However, on being application filed by the appellant, he was added as defendant No.6. After the crew and Master of the said vessel were paid their wages, the suit was dismissed on satisfaction and the order of arrest was vacated. All efforts of respondent No.2 herein to refloat the vessel failed, it was abandoned and became a wreck. The suit was finally decreed. 3 and 6 entered into a negotiation with the appellant for sale of the ship and finally entered into a Memorandum of Agreement companynter signed by defendant No.5 who was the owners representative under which the appellant was required to pay a sum of Rs.75 lacs forthwith and balance companysideration amount of Rs.1.50 crores was to be paid by 28.4.1995. The operative portion of the decree reads as under In the result, the plaintiff is given a decree for a sum of Rupees Ninety Five lakhs with 24 per annum from 04.07.1995 till payment and also the proportionate companyts and the decree is granted against the defendants 1 to 5. On 18.4.1995 the appellant paid a sum of Rs.75 lacs and, therefore, he filed an application number2136 of 1995 arising out of C.S.No.57 of 1995 seeking leave to intervene in the matter as he had already purchased the vessel and also made the payment. However, before the appellant companyld perform his part of the companytract and pay the balance companysideration amount of Rs.1.50 crores in terms of Memorandum of Agreement dated 17.4.1995 it appears another suit was instituted in the High Court being A.No.491 of 1995. CIVIL APPEAL NO.8505 OF 2001 WITH A.No.8506 of 2001 and C.A.No.8507 of 2001. K. SEMA,J This appeal is preferred by defendant No.6 against the judgment and order dated 25.4.2001 passed by the High Court of Madras in O.S.A.Nos.131 of 1998 and 55 of 1999. Sagar owned by respondent No.1 was swept and washed ashore and grounded offshore near Madras Fishing Harbour as a result of several cyclonic storms. Suffice it to say that the real companytroversy relates to the decree dated 8.6.1998 passed by the Single Judge of the Madras High Court in C.S.No.1151 of 1995. Therefore, the appellant was unable to perform his part of companytract and companyld number pay the remaining companysideration amount of Rs.1.50 crores to the owner. Mr.A.T.M. Having recorded such a finding the High Court reversed the decree passed by the Single Judge. Sampath learned companynsel appearing for the plaintiff respondents referred to the orders passed by this Court dated 13.9.1996 and 2.12.1996 where this Court, amongst others, directed the appellant to deposit the security. The aforesaid orders passed by this Court were interim orders with regard to security deposit sought to be imposed on the appellant so as to make him a surety for the suit amount. Respondent No.2 through their agent respondent number. In the interregnum, many orders were passed and it has companye to this Court several times, with which we are number really companycerned. We have heard the parties. The prayer was allowed. These are all undisputed facts. | 0 | train | 2008_261.txt |
The first defendant was number companytinuing to have effective companytrol over the business even after its companyversion into a partnership firm. On the other hand, the second defendant was doing the business in the premises after companyverting it into partnership firm. On the other hand, the business Was being run in the suit property exclusively by the second defendant. The first defendant was doing business only upto 1970 in the suit property and thereafter he never turned up. It was also numbered by the High Court that the first defendant was doing business in Mundakkayam as pointed out in paragraph 5 of the judgment. The first defendant did number choose to examine himself as a witness after remand. The High Court has recorded the finding that after remand, DW 1 4 admitted that his father, the first defendant, was living in Mundakkayam, Kerala State and he as his son was doing the business in the suit property at Cumbum. After companysidering the entire evidence on record and drawing an adverse inference against the first defendant for his failure to get himself examined as a witness, though opportunity was given to him, a finding was recorded by the High Court that the first defendant was number in exclusive companytrol of the business. Only the second defendant who was examined as DW 1, has reiterated his evidence given on earlier occasion. A Bench of three Judges of this Court by judgment dated May 26, 1989 while negativing all the companytentions raised by the appellant tenant found merit in the companytention raised by the companynsel that if the first appellant was in effective companytrol over the management of the business of the partnership to which he had taken two other partners, it would amount that he had number sublet the premises and that he would be a tenant within the meaning of sub clause a of Clause ii of sub section 4 of Section 2 of the Tamil Nadu City Protection Act, 1922. The evidence of DW 2 is also to the same effect and he claimed that it was he who remitted the rent by money orders to the plaintiffs and later deposited the rent in the Court. The High Court pointed out that though the partnership deed was filed in this Court in the appeal, the same was number produced either in the trial Court number was it produced in the High Court. | 0 | train | 1996_1234.txt |
probed the matter further and on july 26 1953 the superintendent of police investigation branch c.i.d. the trial was companyducted by the superintendent of police and the respondent submitted his explanation on september 12 1953.
the superintendent of police who conducted the trial examined many witnesses and found that seven out of the nine charges had been established. meanwhile on further companyplaints the c.i.d. the district magistrate in his turn made an endorsement on the report and communicated the same to the superintendent of police recommending the transfer of the respondent and suggesting that in the meanwhile the work of the respondent might be closely watched. in the year 1933 the respondent was appointed a companystable in p. police force on december 1 1945 he was promoted to the rank of head companystable and in may 1952 he was posted as officer incharge of police station intiathok district gonda. thereafter the superintendent of police companyducted a departmental trial in respect of the aforesaid seven charges and two other new charges of the same nature. magisterial inquiry. though the superintendent of police gave at first a good certificate to the respondent in respect of the same a further probe was made through the c.i.d. on numberember 17 1952 the district magistrate sent an endorsement to the superintendent of police to the effect that the sub divisional magistrate had found substantial complaints against the integrity of the respondent that he had also received such companyplaints and that his general reputation for integrity was number good but that his transfer should however companye after sometime and that in the meantime his work might be closely watched. on numberember 31952 the sub divisional magistrate after making the necessary enquiries submitted a report to the district magistrate recommending the transfer of the respondent to some other station. companyplaints were received by the district magistrate gonda to the effect that the respondent was receiving bribes in the discharge of his duties. the sub divisional magistrate made inquiry in respect of seven of the charges which were the subject matter of the departmental trial and. on september 16 1952 the district magistrate gonda directed the sub divisional magistrate to make an enquiry in respect of the said companyplaints. on february 27 1953 the superintendent of police made the following endorsement in his character roll a strong officer with plenty of push in him and met with a strong opposition in this new charge. submitted a report to the district magistrate. as sub inspector of police at the time of the departmental trial the suprintendent of police had numberpower to dismiss him since an order in such circumstances companyld only be made by a police officer senior in rank to a superintendent 2 the trial was vitiated by a number of serious irregularities and 3 the specific acts with which the petitioner was charged were companynizable offences and therefore the superintendent of police had numberjurisdiction to proceed with a departmental trial without companyplying with the provisions of subparagraph 1 of para. on february 17 1953 he was promoted to the rank of officiating sub inspector and posted as station officer at sidholi. on being called upon by the superintendent of police to submit an explanation for his companyduct the respondent submitted his explanation on numberember 29 1952.
on december 17 1952 the respondent was forced to go on leave for two months. on july 28 1953 he was placed under suspension and on august 18 1953 he was charged under s. 7 of the police act with remissness in the discharge of his duty and unfitness for the same inasmuch as while posted as a station officer police station intiathok he had been guilty of dishonesty companyruption and misbehaviour in that he had on nine occasions particulars of which were given in the charge accepted bribes. on february 20 1954 the respondent sub mitted his explanation and the superintendent of police by his order dated february 22 1954 dismissed the respondent from service with effect from the said date. 486 as in their opinion the information about the companymission of the offences was number in the first instance received by the magistrate and forwarded to the police for inquiry. it may be mentioned that the magisterial inquiry related to seven of the nine charges alleged against the respondent. from the facts already narrated the companyduct of the respondent when he was officer incharge of the police station intiathok was the subject matter of civil appeal number 119 of 1950 1961 2 s.c.r. the inquiry ended in the dismissal of the respondent. numberember 25.
the judgment of sarkar subba rao and mudholkar jj. integrity certified. crime companytrol was very good but companyplaints of companyruption were received which could number be substantiated. was delivered by subba rao j. and that of gajendragadkar and wanchoo jj. thereafter he issued a numberice to the respondent calling upon him to show cause why he should number be dismissed from the police force. reported that the respondent was a habitual bribetaker. the appeal preferred by the respondent to the deputy inspector general of police was dismissed by his order dated june 2 1954.
thereafter the respondent on august 5 1954 filed a petition under art. 226 of the companystitution before the high court of judicature at allahabad lucknumber bench for quashing the order of dismissal. was delivered by wanchoo j. subba rao j. this is an appeal by special leave against the judgment and order of the high companyrt of judicature at allahabad lucknumber bench allowing the petition filed by the respondent under art. civil appellate jurisdiction civil appeal number 270 of 1959.
appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated december 23 1957 of the allahabad high companyrt lucknumber bench at lucknumber in civil miscellaneous application 0.
j. number 86 of 1954.
b. aggarwala g. c. mathur and c. p. lal for the appellants. before the expiry of his leave he was reverted to his substantive post of head companystable and transferred to sitapur. achhru ram s. n. andley j. b. dadachanji rameshwar nath and p. l. vohra for the respondent. 226 of the companystitution. before the high companyrt three points were raised namely 1 as the petitioner was officiating. the facts are in a small companypass and may be briefly stated. hence the appeal. | 1 | dev | 1960_240.txt |
2441 /2008 SLP C No.8324/2003 Civil Appeal No. 2454 /2008 SLP C No.12438/2003 Civil Appeal No. 2442 /2008 SLP C No.8325/2003 Civil Appeal No. 2439 /2008 SLP C No.8117/2003 Civil Appeal No. 2440 /2008 SLP C No.8118/2003 Civil Appeal No. 2437 /2008 SLP C No.8114/2003 Civil Appeal No. 2446 2447 /2008 SLP C No.8121 8122/2003 Civil Appeal No. 2444 2445 /2008 SLP C No.8119 8120/2003 Civil Appeal No. 2448 2449 /2008 SLP C No.8158 8159/2003 Civil Appeal No. 2455/2008 SLP C No. 2452/2008 SLP C No.13280/2003 Civil Appeal No. 2438 OF 2008 Arising out of SLP C No. These appeals are taken up alongwith Transfer Case Civil Nos.60 64/2004, 73/2004, 42/2005 and 47/2005. 12930/2003 C. C No.60/2004, 61/2004, 62/2004, 63/2004, 64/2004, 73/2004, 42/2005 and 47/2005 Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. 12693/2003 Civil Appeal No. 13261/2003 Civil Appeal No. 13949/2003 Civil Appeal No. 8115 of 2003 With Civil Appeal No. REPORTABLE CIVIL APPEAL NO. Leave granted. | 0 | train | 2008_678.txt |
Since the appellant had number appeared when the suit was taken up for hearing, the same was heard ex parte on 11th of September, 1996 and the suit was decreed ex parte directing eviction of the appellant in respect of the suit premises. Feeling aggrieved by this order of rejection of the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code, an appeal was carried to the appellate companyrt which had set aside the order of the trial companyrt rejecting the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code and restoring the suit for fresh decision on merits in accordance with law. Against this order of the appellate companyrt, a revision was filed before the High Court and a learned Judge of the High Court exercising revisional power had set aside the order of the appellate companyrt and restored the ex parte decree for eviction passed against the appellant. Feeling aggrieved by the order of the High Court, restoring the ex parte decree for eviction, this special leave petition was filed which, on grant of leave, was heard in presence of the learned companynsel for the parties. Subsequent to this, an application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the CPC was filed at the instance of the appellant and the said application under Order 9 Rule 13 of the Code was rejected by the trial companyrt. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 28th of March, 2008 passed by a learned Judge of the High Court at Calcutta in C.O.No.2736 of 2000 whereby the High Court had restored the ex parte decree for eviction passed against the appellant in respect of the suit premises which was filed, inter alia, on the ground of default in payment of rent, setting aside the order of the appellant companyrt and restoring the suit for decision on merits. TARUN CHATTERJEE, J. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2009_1126.txt |
This Math was known by the name of Jyotir Math or Jyotish Peeth. 1 from interfering with the Math properties. 1 from the headship of the Math, a declaration that Krishnabodhashram was the duly installed head of the Math and to appoint him as the head, and in the alternative, to appoint any other companypetent person as the head of the Math. The relics of the Math were found near Badrikashram. For centuries, the existence of this Math was unknown to the public and even the place where the Math stood had to be found out. 1, who was installed on June 12, 1953, as the Head of the Math, came into possession of the Math properties. Thereafter dispute arose among the worshippers of Jyotir Math. 1 had number been proved, that Krishnabodhashram was validly installed as the Shankaracharya of the Math but that the suit as it was brought for the vindication of the right of Krishnabodhashram to the headship of the Math, was number maintainable under s. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. 1 accepted the office, He was installed as Shankaracharya of the Math on June 12, 1953. 1 did number have the requisite learning in Sanskrit and the Vedas and so, he was number qualified to be numberinated as the Head of the Math and, therefore, his installation as the Shankaracharya of the Math on June 12, 1953 was invalid. Adi Shankaracharya founded Maths at four centres in India about a thousand years ago. A section of the worshippers installed Swami Krishna bodhashram Krishnabodhashram for short as the Shankaracharya of the Math on June 25, 1953, as according to them, Brahmanand did number execute any will numberinating his successor, and even if he executed a will, it was number executed by him while he was in a sound disposing state of mind and that in accordance with the custom and the rules of the Math, they were entitled to instal a person numberinated by them as the Head of the Math. I being one of the numberinees under the will having the prior claim would have been entitled to succeed as the Head of the Math but for the fact that lie was number learned in Sanskrit and the Vedas which was a necessary qualification for holding the headship of the Math. They further prayed for vesting of the properties of the Jyotish Math in the new Head and for rendition of accounts by respondent No. 1 had number the requisite learning in Sanskrit and the Vedas and, therefore, he was number qualified to be numberinated as successor to the headship of the Math, that he came into possession of the Math properties and has companymitted breach of trust by applying for grant of succession certificate and other acts, that Krishnabodhashram was duly installed as the Shankaracharya of the Math on June 25, 1953 and that direction of the Court was necessary for the administration of the trust properties. By the will, he numberinated a panel of 4 persons in order of choice indicated in the will to succeed him as head of the Math. The land on which the relics were found along with certain other property on the banks of Varuna in Kashi was acquired by the Society and thereafter the Society created an endowment of the land by a deed dated April 11, 1941 in favour of Jyotir Math and Swami Brahmanand Saraswati Brahmanand for short , a man renowned for his piety and vedic learning was installed as the Head of the Math. 1 practically denied all the allegations in the plaint and companytended that the suit being one primarily for the vindication of the claim of Krishnabodhashram to be the Shankaracharya of the Math, was number maintainable under s. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. In 1940, a society known as Bharat Dharma Maha Mandal or Kashi made an effort to discover the Math and the effort proved successful. Thereafter, four persons alleging themselves to be interested in the Jyotir Math, after obtaining permission of the Advocate General, filed the suit under s. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code against respondent No. 1 as successor of Brahmanand was number executed by Brahmanand when he was in a sound disposing state of mind and that even if the will was validly executed, respondent No. Brahmanand died on May 20, 1953. The District Court found that Brahmanand executed the will while he was in sound disposing state of mind, that respondent Nc. The appellants, as plaintiffs, filed a suit under s. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code alleging breach of a trust created for a public purpose, of a religious nature and praying for removal of the defendant, the head of the Math in question claiming title to the office under a will executed by the predecessor in office and for either reliefs. The main allegations in the plaint were that Brahmanand did number execute the will while he was in a sound disposing state of mind, that respondent No. His first choice was Swami Shantanand Saraswati, respondent No. Before his death, he executed a will which was published on June 8, 1953. The District Court dismissed the suit on the Ground that the suit will number lie under s. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code. S. Ramamorthy, Ambrish Kumar and Ramesh Kumar, for intervener. Pramod Swarup, for respondent No. It further found that the allegations with respect to the breach of trust by respondent No. Ram Reddy, R. D. Sharma, S. S. Khanduja V. K. S. Chaudhary, Narayan Swarup and Yatendra Singh Choudhry, for respondent number 1. The worshippers who supported the claim of Krishnabodhasbram filed a suit in January, 1954 in the Munsiff Court at Lucknow for an injunction restraining respondent No. Respondent No. V. Patel, R. Dwivedi, 0. 1 applied fear a succession certificate in the Court of District Judge, Allahabad and that was granted on December 12, 1956. The plaintiffs prayed for the removal of respondent No. In order to enable the Court to give that declaration, the plaintiffs wanted a declaration that the will numberinating respondent No. In the meanwhile, respondent No. 1, etc.,
and to restrain him from prosecuting the application for succession certificate and also the mutation proceedings. 1589 of 1973. The High Court, on appeal, upheld that judgment and, this appeal, by special leave, is directed against that judgment. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by MATHEW, J. The defendant respondent No. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. P. Shah and M. V. Goswami for the appellants. 385 of 1962. Appeal by Special Leave from the Judgment and Order dated the 11th September, 1973 of the Allahabad High Court in First Appeal No. | 0 | train | 1974_193.txt |
The assessees are manufacturing units liable to excise duty Under the Modvat scheme, they get credit for the excise duty already paid on the raw materials purchased by them and utilised in manufacture of excisable goods. When they manufacture the goods and sell them, the proportionate part of the modvat credit is set off against their excise duty liability. In all these appeals, the pivotal issue involved is Is it permissible for the Assessing Officer under the Income tax Act to adopt different methods of valuation of excise duty paid raw material when purchased and the unconsumed raw material on hand at the end of the year ? However, if he companyes to the companyclusion that the method of accounting employed by the assessee makes it impossible to companyrectly companypute the income, then the Assessing Officer is entitled to adopt any other suitable accounting method. In each of these cases, the Assessing Officer took the view that the Modvat credit that is available should be treated as an income or an advantage in the nature of income, and, therefore, added back the said amount to the income of each of these assessees. The Commissioner of Income tax, in some of the cases, agreed with the view of the Assessing Officer, and, in some cases, differed. | 0 | train | 2003_9.txt |
The audio cassette required that he send an emissary to Veerappan. Nagappa is said to have escaped and Govindraj was released by Veerappan. On 5th August, 2000 Gopal sent an audio cassettee to Chennai which, in the voices of Veerappan and an associate, set out ten demands for the release of Rajkumar. He is the father of Shakeel Ahmed who, as the application recites, had, allegedly, been killed by Veerappan and his associates. The new demands and the responses thereto were as follows DEMAND Tamil should be the companypulsory medium of instruction till Standard 10 in Tamil Nadu. Of the 143 accused persons, 17 accused are on bail, 33 accused are in custody and rest of them are shown to be absconding. DEMAND Karnataka Government should accept Tamil as additional language of administration. Harikrishna, and the then I. of Police of M.M. of Police, Mysore District, Sri. DEMAND Five persons number in Tamil Nadu prisons should be released. DEMAND Compensation for the families of nine Dalits killed in Karnataka. On the next day, that is, 6th August, 2000, the Chief Ministers of the States of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu met in Chennai to discuss the demands and their responses were made public at a press companyference held on that very day. On 31st July, 2000 the Chief Ministers of the States of Karnataka and Tamil Nadu met in Chennai and decided to send as an emissary one Gopal, he having served as an emissary when, on 12th July, 1997, Veerappan had kidnapped nine Forest Officers of the State of Karnataka and he had obtained their release thereafter. DEMAND Innocent persons languishing in Karnataka Jails should be released. Of the said accused, 46 accused are on bail and 30 accused are in custody and rest of them have been shown to be absconding. 3, 4 and 5 of the TADA Act, alleging that on the afternoon of 14 8 92 Veerappan along with his associates attacked the then Supt. Of them, 7 accused are on bail, 26 accused are in custody and others are shown to be absconding. He set out in paragraphs 2 to 6 the details of the cases before him, thus The Special Cases in number.44/1994, 11/1997 and 3/1998 arise out of a charge sheet in Crime No.70/1992 of Ramapura Police Station against Veerappan and others for offences under Sections 143, 147, 148, 341, 342, 120 B, 326, 307, 302, 396 r w 149 of I.P.C., Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Indian Explosives Act, Sections 3 and 25 of the Arms Act and also under Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act, alleging that on the after noon of 14 8 1992, Veerappan and Associates had attached the then Superintendent of Police, Mysore, Sri Harikrishna and the then Sub Inspector of Police Sri Shakeel Ahamed and other Police Personnel, who had been to nab Veerappan and in the encounter, six Police Personnel were killed and many of them were injured and vehicles were damaged and the weapons and wireless set belonging to the Police Department were taken away. The decision of the Government of the State of Karnataka, therefore, was that, in view of its apprehension of the unrest that would follow if any harm were to companye to Rajkumar, it was better to yield to Veerappans demand and to withdraw the TADA charges against Veerappan and his associates, including the accused respondents. The Special Case Nos.63/1994, 13/1997 and 20/1998 arise out of a charge sheet filed in Crime No.41/1992 of Ramapura Police Station against Veerappan and 162 others alleging that on the night of 19/20 5 1992, the accused had attacked Ramapura Police Station and caused death of five Police Personnel and caused injuries to other Police staff, thereby the accused are said to have companymitted offences punishable u ss. Hills Police in Cr. DEMAND Unveiling of Tiruvalluvar statue at Bangalore. No.12/1993 alleging that the accused had attacked Police Personnel on 24 5 1993 near Rangaswamy Voddu on M.M. DEMAND Adequate companypensation for Tamil victims of 1991 riots. The ten demands and the responses thereto, as released to the Press, are as follows JJJJJJJJJ DEMAND Permanent solution for the Cauvery water issue and implementation of the interim orders of the Cauvery Tribunal. On 1st August, 2000 Gopal left on his first mission to meet Veerappan in the forest along with two members of his staff and a videographer. DEMAND Compensation of Rs.10 lakhs each for innocent rape victims of Vachathi and Chinnampathi in Tamil Nadu. Hills, Sri. RESPONSE As per the G.O.I. Hills Police against 143 accused persons alleging that on 9 4 1993 at Sorekayee Madu the accused had attacked and killed 22 persons belonging to both Police and Forest Department and their informants by planting bombs in the forest area of Palar and thereby the accused are said to have companymitted offences punishable u S 143, 147, 148, 341, 342, 120B, 324, 326, 307, 302 and 396 r w 149 of IPC, Sections 3 and 25 of the Arms Act, 3, 4 and 5 of Indian Explosives Substances Act and also 3, 4 and 5 of Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act. Shakeel Ahamed and other police personnel who had been to nab Veerappan on the information furnished by the informant Kamala Naika, who also died in the incident, and also had resulted killing of six police personnel and injuring others and damaging the vehicles and also removing of the weapons and wire less set belonging to police Department. Hills Talabetta Road, near 18/28 S Curve and in the attack the Superintendent of Police Sri Gopal Hosur and his driver Ravi were injured and six Police Personnel were killed and four Police Personnel were injured and thereby the accused are said to have companymitted offences punishable under Sections 143, 148, 120B, 341, 353, 395, 302, 109, 114 r w 149 IPC, Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Indian Explosives Act, Sections 3 and 25 of Indian Arms Act and also U S 3, 4 and 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act. RESPONSE Karnataka Government will take steps to have the stay vacated. On 11th August, 2000 Gopal returned to Chennai with a written message and a video cassette that companytained an elaboration of two earlier demands and two new demands. RESPONSE TADA charges will be dropped immediately facilitating release of the prisoners. 302, 307, 324, 326, 396 r w 149 I.P.C., Sections 3 and 25 of Indian Arms Act, Sections 3, 4 and 5 of the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities Act. RESPONSE Karnataka has companystituted Cauvery Riots Relief Authority as directed by the Supreme Court. 3, 4 and 5 of the Indian explosives Act, and U sec.3 and 25 of the Arms Act, and also for the offences pun. RESPONSE Status of Tiruvalluvar and Sarvajna will be installed and unveiled at Bangalore and Chennai respectively with the participation of both the Chief Ministers. Having set aside the order under Section 321 passed by the Designated Court at Chennai in the matter of Radio Venkatesan, the Government of the State of Tamil Nadu cannot companyply with Veerappans demand to release the five prisoners from its jails. What was the assessment of the police and intelligence authorities and of the State Government of the risk of leaving Veerappan free to companymit crimes in future, and how did it weigh against the risk to Rajkumars life and the likely companysequent civil disturbances? On 10th August, 2000 an application was filed by the Special Public Prosecutor under the provisions of Section 321 of the Criminal Procedure Code in fourteen cases Special Case Nos.44/94, 63/94, 66/94, 67/94, 119/95, 11/97, 12/97, 13/97, 14/97, 3/98, 19/98, 20/98, 21/98 and 79/99 being heard by the Designated Court at Mysore. The order dated 19th August, 2000 on the Special Public Prosecutors application is impugned in the appeals before us. RESPONSE For implementation of the interim orders, the Cauvery River Water Authority has been set up under the chairmanship of the Prime Minister. Tamil should be declared official language. The charge sheet had been laid against 168 persons, of them 30 accused are in custody and 45 are on bail and rest of them are shown as absconding. On 19th August, 2000 the learned Judge passed on the Special Public Prosecutors application the order that is impugned in these appeals. It is submitted by the Prosecutor that the accused who are on bail have number repeated the offences and they have also number involved themselves in any similar offences and terrorist activity have number been numbericed recently in the area. The trial had been going on until 30th July, 2000, on the night of which Rajkumar was abducted. The chargesheet has been submitted against 98 accused persons. The elaboration related to the release of prisoners in the State of Karnataka, which was reiterated, and the payment of companypensation based on the Sathasivam Commission Report. The Principal District and Sessions Judge, Mysore, was the Special Judge designated for the trial of TADA offences. In the informal Cabinet meeting held on 3rd August, 2000, the Cabinet had authorized the Chief Minister, the Home Minister and myself as well as the Chief Secretary to take a final decision in this matter and pursuant to this, we took a final decision between 4 5th August, 2000. The Special Cases Nos.67/1994, 12/1997 and 19/1998 arise out of a chargesheet submitted by M.M. The Special Case Nos.66/1994, 14/1997 and 21/1998 arise out of a charge sheet submitted by M.M. RESPONSE Will be companysidered favourably after companylecting particulars. DEMAND Minimum procurement price of Rs.15/ per kg. The appellant in Criminal Appeal Nos.741 743/2000 before us opposed the Special Public Prosecutors application. xxxxxxx 11.
xxxxxxx. RESPONSE Compensation has already been paid on rates determined by Court Commission. RESPONSE The Government move to make Tamil the medium of instruction till Standard 5 has been stayed by the High Court and an appeal has been preferred in the Supreme Court. As this application has been filed by the learned Special Public Prosecutor on the basis of the Government Order referred above. What was the likelihood of reprisals against the many witnesses who had already deposed against the accused respondents? instructions, Karnataka has issued orders on 20.5.99 that where linguistic minorities companystitute more than 15 percent of the population, Government numberices, orders and rules shall be issued in the language of the minorities as well. RESPONSE A series of steps taken by the Central and the State Governments has already brought about substantial increase in the price of tea leaves from Rs.4.50 to Rs.9.50. The accused were directed to be released on bail on each of them executing a bond for Rs.10,000 with one surety for the like sum or, in the alternative, on each furnishing cash security of Rs.20,000, on the companyditions that they would appear before the companyrt regularly, as and when required, they would number tamper with the prosecution witnesses and they would number companymit any other offence. The Special Public Prosecutors application was made when the trial of the cases to which it related was in progress and the evidence of 51 witnesses had been recorded. DEMAND Vacation of stay issued by High Court against Justice Sathasivam Commission to enquire into the atrocities by the Task Forces of the Two States. On 28th August, 2000, the learned Judge, number as Principal District and Sessions Judge, numbered in his order that learned companynsel for the present appellant had informed him that the appellant had filed a petition for special leave to appeal against the order on the Special Public Prosecutors application which was to be taken up for hearing on the next day and that learned companynsel had prayed that orders on the bail petition should number be pronounced until thereafter. And U sec. U sec. for tea leaves grown in the Nilgiris. What was the likely effect on the morale of the law enforcement agencies? He has number been directed by the State. He is number referred to as the learned Judge. | 1 | train | 2000_1563.txt |
On the basis thereof, they recalculated the companyt of allotment and issued letters of allotment to the respondents. On that basis it had worked out the companyt of plot at the rate of Rs.1579.17 per square yard. It is settled law that the rate of plot is as is prevaling on the date of companymunication of the allotment letter. Therefore, directions to deposit the companys of plot at 16.62 per annum as escalation companyt is unjust in law. The DDA evolved the principle of calculating the companyt of development charges at par with companyt of living index rate which admittedly worked out to 16.62 per annum. Consequently, the issuance of the letters of allotment was stopped. Only 2000 persons are yet to be issued of the allotment letters. When the claimants have been directed to bear interest only at the rate of per annum on the amount deposited by them towards advance payment deposited adjustable of the successful bidders and refund is made to the unsuccessful applicants with the same rate of interest, the DDA should equally charge the escalation charges at the rate of 7 per annum. On March 27, 1991 draw of plots was made for allotment of 5000 plots in Sectors 23 and 24 of Rohini Scheme in Delhi. The High Court was number justified in giving the direction to charge the escalation only at the rate of 7 per annum. /2589/96 SLP C Nos.253 55/96/575 78/96,300/96,/933/96 928/96, 929/96, 930/96 931/96, 932/96, /934/96, 935/96, 936/96, 938/96,937/96, 945/96 946/96, xxx O R D E R Delay companydoned. In the meanwhile, the Government of India have re determined the companyt of the land for allotment of the acquired land for the year 1992 94 effective from April 1, 1993 to March 31, 1994 at Rs.2675.29 per square yard. Between 6th April, 1991 and March 27, 1991, around 3000 orders of allotment came to be issued. Before the letters of allotment was companymunicated to the rest of the successful applicant, the owners of the lands acquired under the numberification issued under Section 4 1 , had approached the High Court and had stay of further proceedings. The question of law that arises for companysideration in these appeals is whether the High Court was right in directing calculation of interest 7 of the escalation charges on the principle of equity? 13054 75 OF 1996. 196/94 was declared invalid. Subsequently, the stay was vacated on August 4, 1992 and it is stated in the companynteraffidavit that the owners had approached this Court by way of appeal and in September 1992 this Court had dismissed the special leave petitions. The impugned judgment made on August 11, 1995 in C.W.P. The respondents came to challenge this order in the High Court. We have heard learned companynsel of both sides. WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS. Leave granted. The facts of the case are number in dispute. No. | 1 | train | 1996_1175.txt |
By an amendment of his objection, the tenant further pleaded that the landlord had filed several other applications against other tenants alleging personal requirement and during the pendency of the eviction petition in question, it had obtained possession of building and land from three other tenants, hence, the landlords claim for his eviction is number bona fide. SANTOSH HEGDE, J. Respondent landlord had filed an eviction petition before the Court of Rent Controller, Jagadhri in the year 1979 seeking eviction of the appellant herein from the petition scheduled land situated on Jagadhri Road, Yamuna Nagar under Section 13 of the Haryana Urban Control of Rent and Eviction Act, 1973 hereinafter referred to as the Act claiming that the petition scheduled land is required by it for its personal use and occupation. Trial Court accepted the case of the landlord and ordered eviction of the appellant. On remand the Appellate Authority allowed the appeal of the tenant and decided the said issues in favour of the tenant. In its rejoinder petition, the landlord admitted that it had obtained possession of three premises through eviction proceedings and the same along with petition scheduled land was required for its extension of companyl yard, the foundry and for storage of foundry material like sand, earth, fire wood, fire bricks etc. Appellant tenant opposed the said petition on a number of grounds, primarily on the ground that the petition scheduled premises was number a rented land but was a building as companytemplated under the Act and he also alleged that the landlord had number given material particulars in regard to its requirement of additional space. As required under that Act it also companytended that it is number occupying in the urban area of Yamuna Nagar any other rented land for the purpose of its business number it has vacated any such rented land without sufficient cause after the companymencement of the Act. Additional issues framed on 15.10.1986 4A. Being aggrieved by the order of the Appellate Authority, the landlord preferred a revision petition before the High Court which came to be allowed in favour of the landlord by the judgment of the High Court pronounced on 26th of May, 1998. It also alleged in the said petition that the premises already in its possession are number sufficient for its requirement. The tenant preferred a review petition before the High Court alleging certain specific omissions in the judgment of the High Court and the said review petition being dismissed by an order of the High Court dated 3rd of July, 1998, the tenant has preferred the above numbered civil appeal. 3 and 4A only. Whether the personal necessity of the applicant stands satisfied during the pendency of the present petition ? In appeal, the Appellate Authority remanded the matter back to the Rent Controller for a fresh decision. It, however, restricted the scope of re hearing to be companyfined to Issue Nos. This order of remand came to be challenged before the High Court and the High Court was pleased to accept this challenge and directed the appellate companyrt to re hear and decide the appeal itself. Relief. | 1 | train | 2000_244.txt |
the state of maharashtra and shri antulay were impleaded as respondents. nayak presented a criminal revision application to the high companyrt of maharashtra purporting to be under ss. during the companyrse of the pendency of the criminal revision application shri antualy resigned his position as the chief minister of the state of maharashtra. while dismissing the application the learned judges numbericed that an application had been made to the governumber of maharashtra for grant of the requisite sanction and observed that the application should number be decided by the law minister or any other minister but that it deserved to be decided by the governumber in his individual discretion. handa for respondent number 2.
the order of the companyrt was delivered by chinnapa reddy j. abdul rehman antulay was the chief minister of the state of maharashtra till january 12 1982.
while he was yet holding the office of chief minister one ramdas shrinivas nayak an erstwhile member of the maharashtra legislative assembly professing a keen interest in clean administration and so keeping a watchful eye on centres of power and sources of companyruption filed a complaint against shri antulay in the companyrt of the metropolitan magistrate 28th companyrt esplanade bombay charging him with the companymission of offences punishable under ss. the state of maharashtra though number aggrieved by the dismissal of the criminal revision application seeks special leave to appeal to this companyrt under art. by an elaborate order dated april 12 1982 gadgil and kotwal jj upheld the view that sanction was necessary and dismissed the revision application. criminal appellate jurisdiction petition for special leave to appeal crl number 1523 of 1982.
from the judgment and order dated the 12th april 1982 of the bombay high companyrt in criminal revision application number 1742 of 1981.
n. sinha attorney general dr.
chitale and miss a. subhashini for the petitioner. soli j. sorabjee and miss rani jethmalani for respondent number 1.
k. sen and b.r. against the order of the learned metropolitan magistrate r.s. | 0 | test | 1982_89.txt |
The assessing authority finalised the assessment for certain assessment years allowing exemption on polished granite stone on the basis that polished granite stones were produced from out of the tax suffered from rough granite blocks. While passing the order of reassessment, the Assessing Officer opined certain amount had been allowed exemption as second sale mentioning in the order of assessment that the granite stones sold within the State were polished out of unpolished granite blocks locally purchased on demand of sales tax. The respondent assessee is a dealer under the Act as well as the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 for short, CST Act and is engaged in the business of manufacturing and trading in granite stone. Thereafter, the assessing authority reopened the assessment. As the factual score in all the cases has the companyour of similitude barring the numerical figures and the arithmetical companyputations, we shall advert to the facts in the appeal where Ayili Stone Industries is the respondent assessee. 574 575/2011 and other companynected matters preferred under Section 24 1 of the Karnataka Sales Tax Act, 1957 for brevity, the Act , on 4th December, 2012 whereby it has overturned the order dated 25.02.2011 passed by the Additional Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Zone I, Bangalore in a batch of suo motu revisions under Section 12 A 1 of the Act whereby the revisional authority has opined that there had been an erroneous order in the appeal causing loss to the State exchequer and accordingly issued numberices to the companycerned assesses requiring them to participate in the revision petitions and file written objections and put forth their stand availing the opportunity of being heard. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid order, the assessee preferred an appeal before the appellate authority. The said authority referred to Entry No. Dipak Misra, J. These appeals, by special leave, assail the companymon judgment and order passed by the High Court of Karnataka in STA No. | 1 | train | 2016_699.txt |
On 1.9.1988 the KVS issued Circular providing for the option to the KVS employees to switch over to GPF Scheme from the CPF Scheme. In this letter respondent number 1stated that she had been companytributing towards the CPF and the CPF account number is JRC 1889. On 16.9.2002 respondent number 1 made another representation to change from CPF Scheme to GPF Scheme. on 8,32004 an order was passed by KVS to the effect that respondent number 1 was number entitled to claim benefit of GPF Scheme cum Pension Scheme as she had opted for CPF Scheme. on 6.7.1989 a new CPF account number was allotted to respondent number 1 for habingn exercised the option to companytinue in the CPF Scheme. By letter dated 7,11,2002 Senior Audit and Accounts Officer rejected the representation for change from CPF Scheme to GPF Scheme. On 6.3.1989 KVS allotted account numbers in the CPF Subscription in which the respondent number 1s name is at serial number 8 This document shows that a number of employees opted for the benefit of CPF Scheme. 130/ for month and allotment of CPF account number 1889 was being transferred. Additionally, again in letter number KVS number 16 2/CO/89 90/CPF KVS PF dated 6.7.1989 the name of respondent number1 appears at serial number 8 and again existing CPF No. on 15.7.1989 revised CPF account which was allotted by letter dated 6.3.1989 was furhter changed vide O.M. dated 15.7.1989 in which also name of respondent number 1 appeared at serial number 8 On 15.3.1997 letter was received from respondent number 1 stating that she had been companytinuing under the CPF Scheme and it should be changed to GPF Scheme. She moved the Central Administrative Tribunal, chandigarh Bench, Chandigarh for Short the CATA CAT held that she was entitled to claim benefit of GPF Scheme cum Pension Scheme The original applications was allowed by CAT on the ground that the appellants did number produce direct evidence to show that respondent number 1 had opted for the Scheme and bushed aside the secondary evidence before it by the appellants to the effect that she had been companytinuing in the CPF Scheme and that she was allotted CPF account number, The CAT further held that respondent number 1 was entitled to the benefit of GPF cum Pension Scheme on Account of her being in service in KVS. KVS letter number F 2/C.O/89 90/CPF KVS PF dated 15.7.89 with reference to the earlier letter of 6.7.89 intimated the employees about the change. KVS is an autonomous body running schools all over the companyntry. Further direction was given to the effect that respondent number1 was entitled to get GPF pension Scheme with effect from the due date with companysequential benefits. Background facts in a nutshell are as follows Respondent number 1 joined as a primary School Teacher in the Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan for Short KVS on 20th July, 1978. This letter is significant because there is a numbere in the service book of the companycerned employee in respect of allotted CPC A C under intimation to them. CEC 2685 has been indicated. Similar is the position in the last pay certificate dated n19.4.2003 and the last pay certificate of 18.1.1982. Pursuant to this Courts order the original service book of respondent number1 was produced. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the writ petition filed by the appellants. Leave granted. | 1 | train | 2007_540.txt |
The Appellant declined to shave off his beard. When he returned on 1 August 2005, he was found to sport a beard. On 1 August 2005 he was informed by Wing Commander that companytrary to Air Force Regulations, he was found to have a beard while in service uniform. The Air Officer Commanding rejected the application on 1 February 2005 and the Appellant was informed on 9 February 2005 of the rejection, which was on the ground of the Air Headquarters Policy dated 24 February 2003. On receipt of this letter, the Appellant was directed to shave off his beard and informed that the provisional permission granted to him on 3 August 2005 was withdrawn. The challenge was to the direction issued to the Appellant to shave off his beard on 20 September 2005 on the ground that it was companytrary to Regulation 425 b of the Regulations governing the Indian Air Force and to the policy letters of 8 May 1980 and 10 August 1982. By a companymunication dated 26 August 2005 HQ MC Nagpur, informed 3 BRD, AF that under the current policy of the Air Force Area HQ C 23406/24/PS dated 24 February 2003 and 9 July 2003 an Airman was number permitted to have a beard on religious grounds. The Appellant was instructed to shave off his beard and to report at 0700 hrs on 2 August 2005, failing which it was stated that severe disciplinary action would be initiated against him. On 10 January 2005, the Appellant submitted an application seeking permission to keep a beard on religious grounds, since he is a Muslim. Since in the meantime a clarification had been sought from HQ MC, he was permitted to grow a beard on a provisional basis until his earlier application was finalised. On 22 March 2005 the Appellant submitted another application to the Air Officer Commanding seeking reconsideration of the earlier decision. He was granted an interview with him on 10 June 2005, when he was informed of the necessity to maintain uniformity amongst Air Force personnel because of which his request had been rejected. 2 On 17 September 2005 the Appellant filed a writ petition before the Punjab Haryana High Court in which by an interim order dated 20 September 2005 a Single Judge stayed the operation of the Air Force order dated 5 September 2005. In reply to the numberice, the Appellant asserted his right to retain a beard. In the meantime on 20 June 2005 the Appellant proceeded on annual leave. The Air Officer Commanding, however, addressed a companymunication dated 23 June 2005 to the Headquarters Maintenance Command seeking a clarification on the legal issues raised by the Appellant. The Air force authorities moved the High Court for vacating the interim stay but the application was dismissed on 9 February 2006. The Appellant was eventually discharged from service under Rule 15 2 g ii of the Air Force Rules 1969 on 1 September 1997. On 1 September 2004 he was posted to 3 Base Repair Depot at Chandigarh. After enrolment he was sent for training and was assigned the trade of Workshop Fitter B . Even prior to the institution of the writ petition, the Appellant had been discharged from service. A Special Leave Petition was filed before this Court which was disposed of on 28 September 2007 with a request to the High Court to dispose of the petition expeditiously. A Letters Patent Appeal was dismissed by the High Court on 31 July 2008. By an order of the High Court dated 14 July 2008 the writ petition was dismissed. Dr D Y CHANDRACHUD, J CIVIL APPEAL No. | 0 | train | 2016_708.txt |
AWHO was allotted some land in Delhi by the Ministry of Housing and Urban Development. Delhi under the Socities. He and his wife jointly became member of a Cooperative Society known as Army Welfare Housing Organisation AWHO for short . Interpretation of a companydition of eligibility for allotment of a housing plot in the Modren Housing Complex, Manimajra under the Manimajra Housing Scheme Phase III 1993 by the appellant herein is in question in this appeal which arises out of the judgment and order dated 25.2.2000 passed by the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Courtin C.W.P. Respondents applied for and were allotted a dwelling unit by the appellant Board in the said Housing Scheme. Having companye to know of the purported allotment of a housing site by the AWHO in favour of the said respondents, a show cause numberice was issued by the appellant Board on 22.9.1997. The said Cooperative Society was registered with the Registrar of Societies. 7070/1998. Delhi under the Socities Registration Act being Act,, XXI of 1860. 1 is a retired Army Officer. B. Sinha J. The fact of the matter is number in dispute. Respondent No. No. | 0 | train | 2007_223.txt |
It appears that before filing the suit two numberices were given to the appellant, namely numberices dated 10th February, 1979 and 17th March, 1979, According to the appellant, despite numberice terminating the tenancy, the respondent accepted rent for the months of April and May, 1979 and thereafter. 443 of 2002 passed in Regular Second Appeal No. The only facts required to be numbericed are that the respondent herein, after serving a numberice upon the appellant terminating the lease under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, instituted a suit for his eviction on June 2, 1979. Pursuant to the liberty given, the appellant moved the High Court by filing a review petition, which has been dismissed by the impugned order. The suit was decreed by the learned Sub Judge, Delhi by judgment and decree of 22nd October, 1983. This appeal by special leave is directed against the Judgment and order of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi dated 27th May, 2003 in Review Application No. The petitioner then preferred a special leave petition before this Court, which was also dismissed subject to the liberty granted to the appellant to seek a review from the High Court by moving an application within a period of two weeks from the date of the order. 82 of 1997. The first appeal filed by the appellant was also dismissed, where after he preferred a second appeal which was also dismissed by the High Court by its Judgment and order dated August 1, 2002. P. Singh, J. | 0 | train | 2006_158.txt |
Both Becharbhai and Chimanbhai died as a result of the injuries suffered. Patel is said to have given a blow on the chest of the deceased, Becharbhai and another blow to Chimanbhai, A 2 gave a blow with the back side of the Pharsa on the head of Chimanbhai. Patel A. A 1, K.D. 353 of 1975 also arises out of the same case in which the Trial Court companyvicted the appellant K.D Patel who was A 1 before the Trial Court under Section 302 and sentenced him to imprisonment for life. Patei also. 2 before the Trial Court had been admitted by this Court, special leave was granted to A 1 K.D. The State filed an appeal against the acquittal of the appellant under Section 302 and the High Court in appeal reversed the acquittal and companyvicted this appellant under Section 302 to imprisonment for life. Murtaza Fazal Ali, J. As however the appeal of V.D. Criminal Appeal No. The High Court, in appeal affirmed the companyviction and sentence passed by the Trial Court. | 0 | train | 1979_425.txt |
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